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  1. Digital Freedoms in International Law
  2. About this Report
  3. Disclaimer
  4. About GNI
  5. Table of contents
  6. Executive summary
  7. International law requirements
  8. Export controls and licensing
  9. Recommendations
  10. Companies
  11. Governments
  12. Inter-Governmental Organisations
  13. Non-Governmental Organisations
  14. Investors
  15. 1 Introduction
  16. 1.1 Technologies of political activism and control
  17. 1.2 Protecting human rights and public safety online
  18. 2 International law standards
  19. 2.1 Standards that apply in ordinary times
  20. 2.2 Standards that in times of national apply war or emergency
  21. Principle 7: Protected Expression
  22. 2.4.1 The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights
  23. 2.4.2 The GNI Principles and Implementation Guidelines
  24. 2.5 Difficulties in applying the existing and emerging international standards in the environment digital
  25. Google’s transparency report
  26. 3.1 States’ to Protect Responsibility
  27. Technology Exports to the Middle East
  28. 3.2 Dual use controls and the Wassenaar Arrangement
  29. 3.4 Transparency and non-Wassenaar producers
  30. 3.5 Technical standards
  31. 3.6 Civil liability and private rights of action
  32. 4 Recommendations
  33. 4.1 Companies
  34. 4.2 Governments
  35. 4.3 Inter-Governmental Organisations
  36. 4.4 Non-Governmental Organisations
  37. 4.5 Investors
  38. 5 Endnotes

Digital Freedoms in International Law

Practical Steps to Protect Human Rights Online

A report by Ian Brown & Douwe Korff

About this Report

This report was commissioned by the Global Network Initiative (GNI) and was made possible by a grant from the Open Society Foundations. It is an academic work designed to pose and bring others into dialogue. It to tackle of the most difficult questions a attempts some questions around protecting rights to freedom of expression and privacy in the Information and Communications sector. We view this the rather Technology (ICT) report as beginning, than the end of and welcome feedback. a conversation, we

The written and Korff and is based extensive interviews report was by Ian Brown Douwe on with government, civil society and corporate actors involved in these matters, and draws on their practical experiences. We held three workshops, in London, Washington DC and New Delhi, with key stakeholders from all of these groups. Thanks to Eric King of Privacy International for providing the content for the Technology Exports to the Middle East map.

Please direct comments to [email protected]. or questions

Dr. Ian Brown is Associate Director of Oxford Centre. He has led University's Cyber Security EU and UK-‐funded research and information numerous projects on privacy security, for the Commission the revision of the including a comparative study European on current Protection and co-‐authored with Korff 2011 "Social Data Directive, Douwe a report on Media and Human Rights" for the Council of Europe Commissioner for Human Rights. Dr Brown has consulted for the US Department of Homeland Security, JP Morgan, Credit Suisse, Allianz, McAfee, BT, the BBC, the Cabinet Office, Ofcom and the National Audit Office. He is a member of the UK Information Commissioner's Technology Reference Panel.

Professor Douwe Korff is a Dutch comparative and international lawyer. He is both a general human rights lawyer and a specialist in data protection. Following academic research at the Institute and at the Max Planck Institutes for European University and international criminal-‐ and he at the of comparative public law, taught University Maastricht in the Netherlands and the of Essex in the UK. He is at University currently Professor of International Law London and at Metropolitan University visiting professor at the Universities of and in Croatia. has carried extensive work data Zagreb Rijeka He out on protection for the European Commission, the UK Information Commissioner, and industry, often with Ian Brown.

Disclaimer

The views expressed in this publication are those of its authors.

About GNI

GNI is multi-‐stakeholder of civil human a group companies, society organizations (including rights and press freedom groups), investors and academics, who have created a collaborative approach to protect and advance freedom of expression and privacy in the ICT sector. GNI provides resources for ICT companies to help them address difficult issues related to freedom of expression and privacy that they face anywhere in the world. GNI may has created a framework of principles and a confidential, collaborative approach to working through challenges of responsibility in the ICT sector. Learn more at: corporate http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org

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Table of contents

About this Report..............................................................................................................2 Executive summary............................................................................................................4 1 Introduction ................................................................................................................8 of control ............................................................ 9 1.1 Technologies political activism and human and online..................................................... 11 1.2 Protecting rights public safety 2 International law standards....................................................................................... 14 2.1 Standards that apply in ordinary times..................................................................... 15 2.2 Standards that apply in times of war or national emergency ................................... 15 2.3 Standards that in relation to terrorism and other serious breaches of apply public order, short of internal armed conflict, other national falling war, or emergencies ......... 18 standards the actions of 2.4 Emerging on companies .................................................... 22 2.4.1 The UN Business and Human Guiding Principles on Rights................................ 22 2.4.2 The and Guidelines........................................... 26 GNI Principles Implementation 2.5 Difficulties the and international standards the in applying existing emerging in digital environment............................................................................................................ 30 3 Export controls and licensing ..................................................................................... 33 3.1 States’ Responsibility to Protect ............................................................................... 33 3.2 Dual controls and the Wassenaar use Arrangement................................................. 36 tools for activists...................................................................................... 38 3.3 Protecting and non-‐Wassenaar 3.4 Transparency producers........................................................... 39 3.5 Technical standards................................................................................................... 40 3.6 Civil and of liability private rights action ................................................................... 40 4 Recommendations..................................................................................................... 41 4.1 Companies................................................................................................................. 41 4.2 Governments............................................................................................................. 43 4.3 Inter-‐Governmental Organisations ........................................................................... 44 4.4 Non-‐Governmental Organisations ............................................................................ 45 4.5 Investors.................................................................................................................... 45 5 Endnotes ................................................................................................................... 46

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Executive summary

With around 2.3 billion the Internet has become part of the daily lives of a significant users, percentage of the global population, including for political debate and activism. While states for human online under international law, are responsible protecting rights companies responsible for Internet infrastructure, products and services can play an important role. have and social to supporting Companies also a legal corporate responsibility support law enforcement actions reduce online criminal such fraud, legitimate agency to activity as child and terrorism. sometimes face ethical and moral dilemmas when exploitation They such actions facilitate violations of human may rights.

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In this report we suggest practical measures that governments, corporations and other stakeholders can take to protect freedom of expression, privacy, and related rights in globally networked digital technologies. These are built on a detailed analysis of international law, three workshops in London, Washington DC and Delhi, and extensive interviews with government, civil society and corporate actors.

International law requirements

The International Civil Political related Covenant on and Rights and regional treaties protect online freedom of and these for expression privacy. States must ensure protections anyone within their effective power and control. In many instances they must also protect individuals against violations of their rights by other individuals or companies.

Restrictions on rights must be based on published, clear, specific legal rules; serve a legitimate aim in a democratic society; be “necessary” and “proportionate” to that aim; not involve discrimination; not confer excessive discretion the relevant authorities; and be on to effective and remedies. subject safeguards

In “time of other the life of the war or public emergency threatening nation”, states can “to the the of the impose restrictions extent strictly required by exigencies situation”, discriminate racial should although not solely on or gender grounds. Emergency legislation be passed in ordinary times when it can be fully debated and understood.

The UN Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism has recommended that anti-‐terrorism measures are overseen by the judiciary “so that they remain lawful, proportionate and effective, in order to ensure that the government is ultimately held responsible and accountable.” This should be used with other breaches of order that fall approach public short of armed conflict.

Government for data agencies are increasingly asking Internet companies directly customer held outside their When law enforcement national in jurisdiction. or security agencies one country want to obtain access to evidence in another country, they generally have to go through “Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties” (MLATs) that protect the rights of all affected persons. MLATs are complex and can be cumbersome in practice. However, bypassing established MLAT constitutes an infringement of sovereignty. processes standards Emerging company

The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights provide a comprehensive framework in which companies can address their responsibility to respect human rights. Companies faced with state demands that violate human rights have a duty to minimise the extent of such cooperation. They must assess in advance the human rights risks in any countries where take measures to minimise these and the victims they operate, risks, help of enforced any cooperation.

The also the need for be in the GNI Principles stress companies to pro-‐active minimizing of restrictions the freedom of and of impact government on rights to expression privacy their users; the need to build the principles into companies’ basic policies, procedures and processes; and the need for due diligence and risk assessments.

Export controls and licensing

US and EU sanctions such Iran and already include against repressive regimes as Syria bans the of and services that could aid in human specific on export technologies rights violations. these will and tools However, not prevent monitoring censorship being acquired and built the infrastructure of that reach this into repressive regimes are yet to stage.

Many of these tools are “dual use”, with legitimate network management and security purposes. Some are required for law enforcement purposes by democratic states. There are extensive international controls on the export of other “dual use” technologies with civil and military applications. However, many of the technologies we discuss can already be used to enable widespread repression, without that use being “military”.

Technology have legitimate concerns that controls limit access to companies export and bureaucratic constraints sales that potentially significant markets, impose on legitimate be ineffective bad A further is that controls block the may against actors. danger provision of tools to activists. This broad controls such those democracy can happen through as the US Iran and But when the of the applied by against Syria. even relaxed, complexity controls and the harsh penalties for making a mistake still discourage many companies from allowing the use of their products by in these countries. anyone

Some software and telecommunications products require frequent updating by the vendor, or can be remotely disabled. Where such restrictions can be shown to be effective, the need for export controls on that equipment as a preventative measure is reduced, since usage controls can be in at time. put place any

Recommendations

the basis of and the and On our analyses building on UN Guiding Principles GNI Principles and Implementation Guidelines, we propose the following possible steps that can be taken to prevent or mitigate human rights violations perpetrated or facilitated by the use of globally networked digital technologies.

Companies

Companies should exchange information on legal systems and experiences in specific jurisdictions with other companies, governments and non-‐governmental organisations (NGOs). Before market, should whether the domestic entering a companies assess legal

Law 5 and conform international human rights and rule of law systems practices to requirements. If authorities in the involved in human and if the country are rights abuses, technologies a is there could contribute such it should company considering selling to repression, carefully how make available form that the risk of abuse. plan it can its technology in a minimises

Companies should ensure they have a clear understanding of lawful procedures under which subscriber data can be requested, material blocked, and connections terminated. Where possible they should on specific points of contact for government requests, agree and mechanisms to check the authorisation of requests. Companies should share and collectively publish statistics about the use of these procedures, and challenge aggregate ambiguous demands in the higher courts.

should to reduce the and Companies use “Privacy by Design” principles processing storage of data for business which could later be personal no longer required a legitimate purpose, to disclosure. In countries with deficient this include subject compelled laws, may storing data outside the control of that and conditions personal jurisdiction. Companies’ terms should specify that user data will only be provided to government agencies upon receipt of a legally binding request. Companies should insist that Mutual Legal Assistance (MLA) arrangements are the only appropriate means of cross-‐border data access.

If host authorities demand ad hoc access to data in circumstances that a country suggest potential violation of international human rights law, the should challenge the company demand before the courts of the host and resist at access full country, attempts pending judicial review of the demand. If the host demands direct country access to company data, the insertion of “black box” the through opaque interception or access devices, company should consider its of the the such fundamentally provision product to country: effectively unlimited and uncontrollable basic of the rule access is fundamentally contrary to principles of unless control and law, accompanied by a very strong oversight regime.

Governments

States should be in resolution resolve conflicts willing to engage dispute measures to over human rights compliance in the use of products sold and supported by companies from their country.

States should insist that demands for access to data held on their territory should be made only through the applicable Mutual Legal Assistance arrangements, and that extraterritorial demands for access to data on a server in their jurisdiction would otherwise constitute a violation of sovereignty. They should consider backing such action in domestic law, and up in and treaties. should also consider civil inter-‐governmental arrangements They applying that fail due checks or to take legal liability to companies to perform diligence measures to end abuse of for the of serious prevent, mitigate or products perpetration large-‐scale or human violations. rights

States should consider including tools that have primary or significant potential uses for human rights violations in “dual use” export control regimes, requiring suppliers to undertake extensive due diligence on end-‐users before export to or support, maintenance or training for specific repressive regimes. The maintenance of a list of controlled items and targeted states would require frequent multi-‐stakeholder discussion between states, technology and human rights and academics with in the of companies, groups expertise use these tools for human rights violations.

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Tools useful for political activism should be clearly excluded from controls and more export sanctions. At broad the of software and a minimum, general licences, allowing export well easier understand and with than support as as information, are to comply a for individual Information tool controls could be requirement licensing procedures. security immediately scrapped.

Meaningful statistics and information should be published to allow the public to see how, how often, and in what kind of circumstances blocking technologies are used, and how personal data and communications of private citizens are being shared between Internet intermediaries and governments.

Inter-Governmental Organisations

Global and regional inter-‐governmental organisations (IGOs) should review MLA to address the currently unresolved complex legal issues that arise under arrangements, them. Such review should also address the need to introduce speedy to personal a access data under to Further research is needed into MLAs, subject appropriate safeguards. that increase the of MLA while human measures can responsiveness requests protecting and and into conflict of laws issues that rights public policy objectives, are currently arising.

IGOs should make clear that states may provide incentives to companies that act in accordance with these and disincentives that recommendations, may impose on companies act blatantly contrary to those recommendations. US and European calls for restrictions on Internet freedom of expression to be classified as barriers to trade should be given speedy consideration by the World Trade Organisation.

Non-Governmental Organisations

Human rights NGOs can play an important role in educating companies about relevant international standards, in training staff on dealing with human rights concerns in company countries in which and in the conduct of human assessments. they operate, rights impact

NGOs should efforts to create international law frameworks for the support stronger of human in relation to the sale and of human sensitive protection rights support rights should and for human law products by companies. They develop campaign stronger rights standards how demand removal and of on governments content /blocking sharing user that actions often have data, given specific governmental global implications.

NGOs should do more to raise public awareness about the roles and responsibilities of ICT companies in protecting people against human rights abuses, and how to make informed decisions as consumers and users when choosing between ICT products and services. They can also do more to educate people about how to themselves against human rights protect abuses when using ICTs in their daily lives as well as during political crises.

Investors

Socially responsible investors should expect companies to commit to appropriate human rights standards that meet three essential tests. Standards should have operational utility, addressing issues in concrete, practical They should be developed and implemented a way. in multi-‐stakeholder with academic and other stakeholders. And a process NGOs, experts should if certain details held they require accountability through public reporting, even are back in sensitive situations. some extremely

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1 Introduction

With around 2.3 billion the Internet has become part of the daily lives of a significant users, of the global population. In countries this includes its use as an important percentage many platform for political debate and activism. Frank La Rue, the UN Special Rapporteur on freedom of noted it is “one of the most instruments of expression, recently that powerful the 21st for in the conduct of the century increasing transparency powerful, access to and for active citizen in democratic societies. information, facilitating participation building the of demonstrations in countries the Middle and North Indeed, recent wave across East African region has shown the key role that the Internet can play in mobilizing the population 1 to call for justice, equality, accountability and better respect for human rights.”

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International law gives states the principal responsibility for protecting human rights. However, the broad ecosystem of companies responsible for Internet infrastructure, products and services play role. can an important supporting

have and social to law Companies also a legal corporate responsibility support legitimate enforcement actions reduce online criminal such child agency to activity as fraud, and terrorism. sometimes face ethical and moral dilemmas when such exploitation They actions facilitate violations of their users’ and other individuals’ human may rights.

In 2011, GNI commissioned a report that mapped the factors that can cause freedom of expression and privacy problems against the various sectors making the global IT up 2 industry, such as service providers and hardware vendors. The report concluded:

What is needed is a concerted effort, undertaken by the industry as a whole and its various stakeholders (including human rights governments, investors, and groups, to how the human and academics) explore rights of freedom of expression privacy be effectively in the of legitimate law enforcement and can most protected context national activities. security

This is further towards that concerted effort. It builds the of the report a step on findings 2011 report, international human rights law, as well as on the broader work by other experts on business and human rights, to suggest practical measures that governments, corporations and NGOs can take to protect freedom of expression, privacy, and related rights in globally networked digital technologies.

We conducted extensive interviews with government, civil society and corporate actors involved in these matters, and draw on their We held three practical experiences. workshops, in London, Washington DC and New Delhi, with key stakeholders from all of these We have included number of their in the text. groups. a examples

Our focuses that have the freedom of analysis on technologies greatest impact on and look that be used block information expression privacy. We at systems can to access to the nation-‐state in of Internet websites. at level, particular through blocking Secondly, we examine technologies that can be used by states for mass surveillance of Internet activity and mobile phone use. In combination with data mining and “profiling” tools, these technologies can be used to identify and target minority groups and possible political which in repressive states them to harassment, arrest, detention, opponents – exposes 3 torture and even death.

The is structured follows: report as

• In the rest of this introduction summarise the role that networked we digital communications in and the of technologies now play political activism, response repressive regimes – as well as legitimate Internet-‐related state actions to protect public safety.

• In section 2 we outline the relevant international law standards, in relation to relatively normal times and times of national emergencies, as well as in relation to measures aimed at countering terrorism and major disturbances. We focus on the and difficulties of these standards in the legal practical applying new, global, public-‐ as faced by and how to overcome these difficulties. private environment, companies,

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• In section discuss control/export licence in 3, we arms regimes, including particular the Wassenaar with serious for Arrangement, to see whether technologies potential could be within these be repression brought regimes, or equivalent measures applied mutatis mutandis.

• In section 4 summarise recommendations for civil we our governments, companies, and investors. society groups,

1.1 Technologies of political activism and control

Over the last three the political ferment in Iran and Arab countries has years, many the role that networked communications in highlighted digital technologies play political activism and well the determined this has provoked from organisation, as as attempts to and monitor activists and block repressive regimes censor political change.

In Yemen and coordinated and Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, campaigners publicised mass protests online and of which using blogs, tweets, Facebook, videos, SMS messages – many were the media and around the world. These picked up by global published protests ultimately led to regime change, although the extent to which the Internet contributed to this is fiercely contested. But the governments of Syria, Bahrain and Iran have so far resisted change through a ferocious counter-‐response, including monitoring online communications to identify activists for arrest, torture and murder.

becoming increasingly adept at the online environment to Repressive regimes are turning their The Iranian for asked the for in own advantage. government, example, public help individuals in of in online media. Officials have identifying photos protests, published news checked the Facebook accounts of Iranians at visiting passport control, noting any and and suspicious-‐looking friends, sent threatening messages warnings to overseas that their relatives home be hurt if have Iranians at may they support protests. Iranian ISPs slowed and blocked the and data access to sites criticising regime. Voice communications have been widely monitored at centres originally installed by companies including Nokia Siemens Networks – using equipment built to meet demands from democratic governments 4 for “lawful access” capabilities in their own communications networks.

Iran is hardly alone in these activities. In a 2011 study, Freedom House identified fifteen countries that in “substantial blocking” of online political content. Twelve were engaging countries had total bans Twitter services. imposed on YouTube, Facebook, or equivalent

Technical attacks used disrupt activist networks, eavesdrop were to on communications, 5 and websites in further twelve nations. cripple a

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6 These and their have been technologies repressive uses comprehensively documented. Here, we would like to note a few matters in particular.

The first is that the scope and criteria for the use of surveillance and blocking technologies are not hard-‐wired into those technologies. It is difficult enough, even in democratic states with meaningful human rights protections, to ensure surveillance and blocking tools are used in an accountable and transparent way. Deep Packet Inspection hardware, for is used for network network of example, management, security, building advertising profiles as well as for the of communications. Real-‐time surveillance of high-‐ users, monitoring bandwidth links within and between ISPs but this is less can require expensive equipment, of issue for those small countries that interested in their low an are mainly relatively volumes of international traffic. It is in technical to between even difficult, terms, distinguish surveillance of communications data who is and the use (such as talking to whom) contents 7 of communications.

Secondly, surveillance and blocking systems are highly portable, especially software components, and it is extremely difficult for states to control their export. However, the producers of these technologies frequently need to supply software updates. They are also often able to see if their technologies have been resold or exported, typically because of the use of new IP addresses in the communications between the and the user. producer

national-‐level and the time Finally, filtering “blocking” systems are at same relatively easy to and tend to be excessive in their to by-‐pass, seriously application, by blocking access many sites in addition the few that the 8 This legitimate to were intended targets. may not worry oppressive regimes, which may anyway be more interested in gathering data on individuals circumventing restrictions, but it makes the use of such technologies highly dubious in terms of international human rights law. The system configuration is again crucial.

The Internet and the Egyptian revolution

The Internet was one of the tools used in 2010-‐11 by Egyptians to organise protests against the regime of President Hosni Mubarak, and to electoral fraud and other expose criminality. In turn Mubarak’s monitored online and imprisoned, government regime activity attacked and murdered and old Khaled Mohammed journalists activists, including 28-‐year who had online video about A Said, posted an police corruption. cybercafé owner reported that Said arrested and beaten death A Facebook was to by two plainclothes policemen. called “We All Khaled Said” members. The group Are quickly gained nearly 100,000 regime tried to slow and block online access to critical material and then the entire Internet as it was overwhelmed by protest in January 2011.

Local telecommunications companies, including Vodafone Egypt, were forced to comply with government orders to cut off phone and Internet connectivity for several days, and later to send SMS to customers. These orders under pro-‐regime messages were given Egypt’s laws, with a state of having been continuously in place since emergency emergency 1981.

have few when such but their actions Companies options given orders, were heavily criticised. and activist Alaa Abd in the Silicon Egyptian blogger El-‐Fatah, a speech to Valley Human Rights conference, said that he did not expect companies to become revolutionaries – but he did want them to delay, protest, and demand court orders before complying.

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The shutdown did not cut off Internet France Data Network completely Egyptians’ access. and the Swedish activist Telecomix both offered international while group dial-‐up accounts, and callers leave audio Google Twitter set up a phone gateway allowing voice to recordings that tweeted Callers could also listen recorded were at @speak2tweet. to previously messages. Activists were able to provide continuing coverage of protests to outside media organisations such as the BBC World Service, which beamed them back into the country and all around the world.

1.2 Protecting human rights and public safety online

What can governments, technology companies and campaign groups do to reduce the recurrence of some of the shocking human rights violations recently seen in repressive regimes, whilst at the same time facilitating legitimate state action to protect public safety – especially in democracies under the rule of law? Much work has already been done to 9 document and address the roles of state and government practices corporate actors.

States have “positive” duties to the right to life and other crucial rights of protect such criminal and terrorist threats. 10 have duties in individuals, as against They special relation to the of the child.11 As further discussed in section states have the rights 2, right, and in the restrict in order others. In some cases duty, to some rights to protect some limitations. special circumstances, they may impose further-‐reaching

The that concerned with this – freedom of and rights we are most in report expression information, privacy, and related rights such as freedom of communication and association are all rights that can be limited in ordinary times, and even further limited in times of – although always within certain legal parameters. The publication of certain emergency, types of information has been criminalised in almost state. Images of child abuse are every almost banned. Most nations have criminalised the online distribution universally European of “racist and material, threats and insults, and the denial of xenophobic” or justification crimes 12 Countries with of communal violence “genocide or against humanity”. a history often ban material that could exacerbate such tensions.

can shut down telecommunications networks. In emergencies, most governments or restrict For example, after the 7 July 2005 London bombings, London police restricted mobile phone calls to pre-‐authorised emergency personnel for nearly five hours within a kilometre of a 13 bombed train station. These shutdowns can also obstruct attempts by individuals and companies to respond to an potentially leading to panic. emergency,

Providers of communications services required by in almost are government agencies every to enable the lawful interception of communications and supply communications country “meta-‐data” such subscriber the sender and of and the as records, recipient messages, location of These communications and data role in users. play an important counter-‐ terrorism and criminal with the UK’s Serious Crime investigations, Organised Agency that “in lawful and communications data contributed the reporting 2006-‐7, interception to recovery of £29m of criminal assets and stolen cash; 151 firearms being taken off the UK streets with the arrest of a number of gang members; some 830 arrests and the seizure of 3.5 tonnes of Class A drugs; and the rendering of assistance in 35 threat to life situations, 14 As leading to the prevention of a number of murders.” a Nokia Siemens Networks representative told a European Parliament hearing after criticism of sales of mobile phone 15 monitoring equipment to Iran:

Today, in almost all nations to deploy Lawful governments require operators condition their license to As LI is in Interception as a of operate. a result, present almost telecommunications network in the world, those that every including are used in this to being by probably everyone room today. And, for good reason: support law in like child and enforcement combating things pornography, drug trafficking terrorism.

Law 12 all of these responsibilities difficult balancing For Meeting can require a act. corporate GNI has issued Freedom of and and set of actors, Principles on Expression Privacy, a Guidelines these It has also established Implementation on principles. a Governance, Framework and other stakeholders the Accountability & Learning to help companies in information and communications industries and technology (ICT) to respect protect freedom of expression and privacy globally through individual and collective actions. Regular independent assessments are carried out of companies’ compliance with the principles and implementation guidelines.

Service providers play an important role in democracies in checking that warrants for interception and communications data are appropriately authorised, and in providing only the data that has been One told us that work with the lawfully requested. provider they senior politicians advocate that “publicly traceable, accountable and most to warrants are defined in law” clear that due has been that – making process followed, requests are there is of and that named individuals proportionate, an appropriate degree transparency, Another told that the otherwise of are clearly responsible. provider us legitimacy or requests for data is often clear given the user information available through their own systems, and suggested that providers need a “behind the scenes” mechanism to challenge the validity of requests when there are requirements attached. secrecy

Some governments have demanded that surveillance tools are directly inserted into communication in the form of ”black boxes” through which the authorities can systems, directly data flowing through the This sometimes the access any system. requires of the communications cooperation providers concerned, although major intelligence from undersea fibre satellite agencies are adept at intercepting signals optic cables, radio and microwave and other communications media. 16 A downlinks, signals European telecommunications told reluctant allow such provider us they were extremely to opaquely functioning equipment to be attached to their network, although it may be a condition of market entry in some countries.

One of our interviewees pointed out that law enforcement officials will often have their actions questioned and judged in court, but that the same does not apply to the activities of national Judicial is, in democratic states with independent courts, security agents. scrutiny an important safeguard although such scrutiny is still often limited when it comes to – criminal activities, and limited to specific mechanisms in national intelligence very oversight matters. In the for it is precisely because the police and intelligence security UK, instance, do not want to their surveillance that the results of agencies expose techniques communications admissible in intercepts are not court.

telecommunication tied and often Historically, systems were to a particular country, originally state-‐owned and run. Most of the data processed in such systems still tends to be kept on servers of those companies, situated in the country in question. However, companies increasingly store and process customer data in remote data centres (“the cloud”). For the moment at least, these companies and data centres are mainly based in democracies that the rule of law. This has implications in relation to demands for respect access to the data, made by agencies in the where companies and data government country centres based and used. India and Saudi Arabia have both demanded that are companies hold data from their residents local where be accessed own on servers, they can more easily law enforcement and national by security agencies.

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2 International law standards

The use of the technologies we described in section 1 affect a of fundamental rights: range freedom of communication, freedom of association, freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authorities, regardless of frontiers and freedom of and freedom from surveillance and intrusion through any medium, information, into one’s life and social and activities. also the private political They can impact on social and cultural of individuals and economic, rights groups, especially cultural, religious, ethnic national and or minorities, women.

All these rights are recognised in the main international human rights instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the International Covenants on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (which together constitute the UN Bill of Rights), and in regional instruments including the European Convention Human Rights (ECHR) and the Council of Europe’s Social Charter, the on American Convention on Human Rights, and to a somewhat lesser extent in the African Charter Human and on peoples’ Rights.

will focus the freedom of and with Below, we on rights to expression privacy. However, even this the of these standards is limitation, application not simple.

Current international human rights law essentially applies to states, and actions and omissions of public bodies only. Different standards apply in normal times, and in times of war or national emergency. The exceptions that can be invoked in times of serious political upheaval falling short of such emergencies, and in relation to anti-‐terrorist is measures, decided in light of the circumstances.

there are in law and human law in Secondly, special problems applying generally, rights particular, the global, digital environment. Laws still mainly drawn for to new are up an environment with defined territorial And much of the control the clearly jurisdictions. over Internet in the hands of whereas traditional human law rests private companies, rights almost focussed This of both and entirely on states. raises problems “prescriptive” “enforcement” and of law jurisdiction, “privatised” (or semi-‐privatised) enforcement, without adequate remedies.

Third, there is the fact that in law and in practice some countries are worse than others. Some countries have laws that are generally compatible with international human rights standards and generally good practices, independent courts and fair and effective remedies. Others either have serious deficiencies in their laws as far as global human rights standards are concerned, or fail to comply with them in practice, or have courts and remedial systems that free and The show all of these failings. are not independent. worst

the “horizontal” of these standards to acts and Finally, application already complex omissions of is indirect and standards companies only limited, although new are emerging that deal with them. These include the and more directly Guiding Principles on Business drafted the of the the Human Rights, by Special Representative UN Secretary-‐General on issue of human rights and transnational corporations and other business enterprises, John Ruggie (the “Ruggie Principles”) and, of course, the GNI Principles on which we build.

In this section, we set out the accepted international human rights standards that should be adhered to all and the more tentative standards to be with by states, complied by

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Of fail live their duties, and companies. course, many governments to up to many do not subscribe to and human rules. But it companies yet good governance rights-‐friendly is the of this in line with these and purpose report to help bring practice more norms, we recommendations will contribute that. hope our to

2.1 Standards that apply in ordinary times

In normal times, restrictions on the rights to freedom of and information, any expression privacy and other rights such as the rights to freedom of communication and association must meet certain standards. Under the International Covenant Civil and Political on Rights 17 and human these restrictions must: regional rights treaties,

1. Be based “law” – on clear and the of on published, specific legal rules, application which is reasonably foreseeable;

democratic This of includes law 2. Serve a legitimate aim in a society. course enforcement and the protection of national security. However, limitations imposed for such reasons should not be abused for other ends, such as to protect a from embarrassment or of wrongdoing, or to conceal government exposure information about the functioning of its public institutions, or to entrench a to industrial unrest particular ideology, or suppress (Johannesburg Principles 2b); Principle

3. Be and that and the of the “necessary” “proportionate” to aim, not impair essence right;

involve discrimination based 4. Not on race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, nationality, property, birth or other status;

5. Not confer excessive discretion on the relevant authorities; and

18 6. Be subject to effective (judicial) safeguards and remedies.

States must the above limits restrictions of not in of their ensure on rights just respect own but also for else who is within their citizens, anyone territory or jurisdiction, or even, as 19 extra-‐territorial within their effective and control. regards acts, power

States must, moreover, in many of the instances relevant to our report, protect individuals against violations of their rights not just by their own public authorities, but also, where relevant and appropriate, against actions by other individuals, or other private entities such as companies, that result in undue restrictions or interferences with their rights (so-‐called 20 “indirect” or “horizontal” effect of human rights provisions).

2.2 Standards that in times of national apply war or emergency

In certain extreme states restrictions of the and circumstances, can impose on many rights freedoms in the international human that the guaranteed rights treaties, go beyond “normal” restrictions described above: they can “derogate” (partially deviate) from their of these These include all the obligations in respect rights. “derogable” rights ones most relevant to our study: freedom of expression, freedom of communication, freedom of 21 association, freedom of information and privacy.

Law 15 of this kind allowed only “In time of other public Derogations are war or emergency the life of the nation”. 22 However, the in the human threatening derogation provisions treaties do blanche the rights not give states carte to disregard “derogable” rights as they far from please -‐ it.

Thus, first of all, states may only adopt measures derogating from their normal obligations “to the extent strictly required by the exigencies of the situation” (Art. 4(1) ICCPR, Art. 15(1) ECHR).

Secondly, the ICCPR stipulates that the measures “not involve discrimination solely on may the of colour, social (Art. 4(1)). Other UN ground race, sex, language, religion or origin” documents make clear that this applies in particular to the use of “profiles” in the fight but it is clear -‐ and also follows from the status of the of against terrorism, principle non-‐ discrimination rule of that serious rule in as a jus cogens, is, as a most binding (peremptory) 23 international law -‐ that this also in the life of the nation. applies emergencies threatening

And third, the ICCPR in particular adds the important procedural safeguard that the existence of any such emergency must be “officially proclaimed” (Art. 4(1)). Moreover, states that do proclaim such an and derogate from provisions in the ICCPR must emergency immediately inform the other state parties to the Covenant of the provisions from which it has derogated and of the reasons for the derogations (Art. 4(3)).

The Human Rights Committee (which is the body implementation of supervisory overseeing the ICCPR and which issues its and has addressed guidance on interpretation application) the of in 1981 and in “General Comments”. 24 The UN question derogations twice, 2001, two standards also summarised in UN Fact Sheet No. to which are usefully a document, 32, we 25 will in detail below. return more

The international human rights standards applicable in times of emergency have also been addressed in the so-‐called Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights Norms in a State of Emergency and the Johannesburg Principles on National Information.26 Security, Freedom of Expression and Access to

Here, it must suffice to the main of relevance to briefly highlight requirements companies faced with demands made them under laws that the upon emergency may impact on fundamental and freedoms of their customers to rights individuals, including (and embassies that should discussed in section support them, as 4.2).

their book than States must put emergency legislation on statute in ordinary times (rather rush through special laws once an emergency has arisen), so that everyone who might be affected by such legislation including companies can know what might happen in special -‐ -‐ circumstances.

These laws must meet the normal “quality requirements” of “law”, i.e., they must be published well clear, specific and foreseeable in their application; and they must not as as excessive discretion to the authorities implementing the provisions. They grant emergency must the of the courts to review the of both the of preserve powers compatibility provisions these laws with the relevant constitutional and international law and the requirements, in which those Courts should defer the manner provisions are applied. not to assessments of political bodies (like the government, or certain ministers) as to whether there is an emergency, and as to what is necessary to meet the emergency.

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Such laws only be brought into force in serious that actual may emergencies pose an or imminent threat to the of the the manifestly physical integrity population, political the territorial of the the existence basic of independence or integrity state or or functioning and the the institutions indispensable to ensure protect rights recognized in Covenant (and the of whether this is the should be question case fully justiciable).

Any emergency in which such laws are brought into force must be officially proclaimed. That proclamation, or information published immediately after it (to the general public, domestic and international), must clearly specify:

• The of the international human instruments and the Constitution provisions rights from which the state has derogated;

• A of the of the with the constitutional copy proclamation emergency, together decrees the of allow provisions, legislation, or governing state emergency (so as to for of the and constitutional and international law of an assessment scope validity the derogation);

• The effective date of the imposition of the state of emergency and the period for which it has been proclaimed;

• An explanation of the reasons which actuated the government's decision to declare and to from its normal of an emergency derogate obligations, including a description the factual circumstances leading to the proclamation of the state of up emergency; and

of the effect of the the • A description anticipated derogation measures on rights relevant international human and the recognized by rights instruments constitution, including copies of decrees derogating from these rights issued prior to the notification.

If a particular threat to public order or national security can be met by the normal laws, under the normal limitation clauses relating to the relevant human rights, then that is how that threat should be met. In such to laws beyond the cases, recourse emergency going ordinary limitations are not justified and to international law. contrary

When restrictions fundamental that exceed the normal are placed on rights restrictions, those restrictions should still be and to those not necessary proportionate circumstances, in in the but also in relation individual The just general or abstract, specifically to cases. of question whether they meet that standard, in each case, should remain fully justiciable.

If any emergency measures are applied in a way that either specifically targets, or has specific negative effects in relation to, certain individuals or groups because of their race, colour, ethnicity, language, gender, religion or social origin -‐ then irrespective of whether this is intended, it constitutes a form of discrimination that violates international law and remains illegal under international law even in times of emergency.

The references above the able such the to courts being to adjudicate on matters as existence of the need for from the normal rules the an emergency, or derogations (including normal limitations fundamental in shall be read the on rights, ordinary times), as including for individuals and others affected the laws rules refer both possibility by emergency or to the and the of the rules in their the general questions, application special specific cases, to courts for free and impartial adjudication. All individuals and groups -‐ and companies -‐

Law 17 affected by laws and rules and have effective remedy emergency practices must an to such rules and in and the courts must be under to challenge laws, practices court, a duty deal with such ad whether the relevant challenges fundum, i.e., not merely by assessing formalities have been with. complied

We believe that the above provides for a basis for effective actions by companies and democratic governments supporting companies, as further discussed in section 4.

2.3 Standards that apply in relation to terrorism and other serious breaches of public order, falling short of internal armed war, other national conflict, or emergencies

Terrorism is abhorrent and a threat to society. As the UN Fact Sheet No. 32 puts it:

“Terrorism clearly has a real and direct impact on human rights, with very devastating for the enjoyment of the right to life, liberty and physical consequences integrity of victims. In addition to these individual costs, terrorism can destabilize Governments, undermine civil society, jeopardize and security, and threaten peace social and economic All these also have real the development. of a impact on of human rights. enjoyment

the individual is basic human and the individuals Security of a right protection of is, Government. States have accordingly, a fundamental obligation of therefore an obligation to ensure the human rights of their nationals and others by taking positive measures to protect them against the threat of terrorist acts and bringing the perpetrators of such acts to justice.” (p. 1)

However, the adoption of undue measures to counter terrorism can also a serious pose threat to democracy, human rights and the rule of law. The UN and regional such the Council of and the intergovernmental or supranational organisations as Europe Union have with these difficult issues and the dilemmas European long engaged they pose, albeit without resolved them. 27 Here, it must suffice to note the main thrust of having fully the international in this with reference the “Ten of best approaches respect, mainly to areas identified the latest annual of the practices in countering terrorism”, in report UN Special the and of human and fundamental freedoms Rapporteur on promotion protection rights 28 while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin, the UN Factsheet on Human Rights, Counter-‐Terrorism,29 Terrorism and the Council of Europe Guidelines on Human Rights and 31 the fight against terrorism,30 and the Johannesburg Principles.

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These documents firstly state that effective counter-‐terrorism measures and the protection of human rights are not conflicting goals, but complementary and mutually reinforcing ones. on to stress that while sometimes acts of or a terrorist They go terrorism, campaign, may bring about “emergency threatening the life of the nation”, (usually an or may amount to a armed there is serious risk in this too and to non-‐international) conflict, a assuming readily, that the normal human standards resort too quickly to measures contravene rights discussed invoke the This the fact that above, i.e. to unduly derogations. is aggravated by anti-‐terrorist have become or counter-‐insurgency measures a tendency to semi-‐permanent. They also often include transferring powers to military authorities.

Another danger is that in domestic law the of “terrorism”, and thus the of concept scope anti-‐terrorist is stretched to include minor acts and measures, relatively offences, especially 32 when related social trade union activities. to political, or

33 In these respects, the Special Rapporteur recommends as his third “best practice”:

To the broadest possible extent, measures against terrorism shall be taken by the civilian authorities entrusted with the functions related to the combating of crime, and in the exercise of their ordinary powers.

Unless a state of has been officially declared because terrorism genuinely emergency threatens the the nation and the that cannot be life of requires adoption of measures undertaken through restrictions already permitted under international human rights terrorism does not law, trigger emergency powers.

Where the law includes particular provisions that, for a compelling reason, are considered and authorities with necessary in combating terrorism entrust certain specific powers for that reason, the use of such powers for any purpose other than the combating of terrorism, as properly defined pursuant to practice 7, is prohibited.

In line with this, the Special definition which limits the of Rapporteur proposes a concept terrorism -‐ and thus the legitimate of anti-‐terrorist laws and measures to hostage-‐ scope -‐ serious violence undertaken for the of state taking, killings or physical purpose provoking a of terror of compelling international to do abstain from or a government or organization or 34 Note that this excludes to for such doing something. doing “damage property” a purpose, which is included in the contentious definition of terrorism in the Draft UN Comprehensive 35 and which much be Convention on International Terrorism, can too easily applied to large-‐ scale demonstrations, blocking of ports or highways, etc., in the context of political or trade-‐ 37 36 As union protests. the UN Fact Sheet puts it:

clear safeguards must exist to ensure that [derogations and limitations in human rights treaties] are not used to curb the rights of political opposition parties, trade unions human rights defenders. or

The Special also (on the basis of Article 5 of the COE Convention on Rapporteur proposes the Prevention of Terrorism), that acts should be (and be only regarded as only prosecutable 38 “incitement to if fall within the of that crime: as) terrorism”, they following description

It is and distribute otherwise make available an offence to intentionally unlawfully or a message to the public with the intent to incite the commission of a terrorist where such whether offence, conduct, or not expressly advocating terrorist offences, causes a danger that one or more such offences may be committed.

(Practice 8. Model offence of incitement to terrorism)

The Johannesburg Principles also expressly limit legitimate restrictions on freedom of of national to situations in which expression on grounds security a government can demonstrate that: the is intended incite imminent violence; it is (a) expression to (b) likely to incite such and there is direct and immediate connection between the violence; (c) a and the likelihood of such violence expression or occurrence (Principle 6). They usefully the kinds of that should be threat national expand on expressions never regarded as a to be within the of anti-‐terrorist wider security (or, we may add, brought scope or emergency legislation):

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Principle 7: Protected Expression

and release (a) Subject to Principles 15 16 [concerning of official information], the peaceful exercise of the right to freedom of expression shall not be considered a threat to national security or subjected to any restrictions or penalties. Expression which shall not constitute a threat to national security includes, but is not limited to, expression that:

(i) Advocates non-‐violent change of policy the government or government itself;

criticism insult the the its the (ii) Constitutes of, or to, nation, state or symbols, government, its agencies, or public officials, or a foreign nation, state or its symbols, government, agencies or public officials;

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(iii) Constitutes objection, or advocacy of objection, on grounds of religion, conscience or belief, to military conscription or service, a particular conflict, or the threat or use of force to settle international disputes;

(iv) Is directed information about alleged violations of at communicating international human standards international humanitarian law. rights or

(b) No one may be punished for criticizing or insulting the nation, the state or its symbols, the government, its agencies, or public officials, or a foreign nation, state or its symbols, government, or public official unless the criticism or agency insult was intended and likely to incite imminent violence.

The UN Special adds that individuals and entities (organisations) should only be Rapporteur listed “terrorists” “terrorist when there “reasonable to as or organisations” are grounds believe that the individual has carried in or entity knowingly out, participated or facilitated a 39 terrorist act (as properly defined pursuant to practice 7 above)”.

would add that individuals should be treated terrorists the basis of We not as merely on some links with, or some expressions of support for, organisations that have been involved in (some) acts of violence, or some of whose members have been involved in such acts. may We know from experience that it is precisely this “bringing forward” of the criminal law, and especially of anti-‐terrorist laws, that a threat to human rights and freedom of poses grave 40 expression.

And finally, in terms of substantive law, we should note that the principle of non-‐ discrimination also anti-‐terrorist Indeed, it has applies to measures. some special in this in in relation to of to importance context, particular “profiling” as a means trying actual terrorists. A of human bodies and identify or potential range high-‐level rights experts has about the risk of discrimination that expressed grave concerns serious profiling poses in 41 this and has controls and context, urged tight judicial supervision.

In addition, there is the always-‐crucial matter of the need for appropriate remedies. We have already noted that even in times of emergencies threatening the life of a nation, crucial issues must remain fully justiciable. The same applies a fortiori to anti-‐terrorist

As it in by independent UN Robert K. Goldman, with measures. was put a report expert 42 reference to the debates and studies from the 1970s onwards:

these studies that human risk Many of found rights were often at heightened of abuse, even in democracies, where emergency powers were increasingly concentrated in the executive branch. In order to prevent such abuses, these reports stressed the need for states to guarantee the independence and supervisory powers of the civilian judiciary during all situations. emergency

This admonition is no less relevant in today’s struggle against terrorism than it was 20 ago... (paras. 13 14) some years –

Consequently, it “a theme in this that civilian courts must have was recurring report ... to review the and the all counter-‐terrorist jurisdiction provisions supervise application of without the other branches measures any pressure or interference, particularly from of government.” (para. 15, emphasis added)

The above is re-‐affirmed in UN Fact Sheet No. 32 with specific reference to freedom of 43 association, and in the COE Guidelines on Human Rights and the Fight against Terrorism in relation to measures that interfere with privacy:44

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Measures used in the fight against terrorism that interfere with privacy (in particular searches, house searches, surveillance body bugging, telephone tapping, of correspondence and of undercover agents) must be provided for by law. It must use be to the these court. possible challenge lawfulness of measures before a

the affirmed the More important yet, principle is more generally and forcefully by UN and his Special Rapporteur on Human Rights Terrorism, Martin Scheinin, in 2006 report to 45 the UN. Quoting the Goldman paragraph highlighted above, he writes:

This principle is fundamental in the context of counter-‐terrorism, where governments can hide behind the banner of classified information to limit the rights of freedom of assembly or peaceful association based on confidential information which can neither be verified contested. The Special stresses that decisions nor Rapporteur any which limit human rights must be overseen by the judiciary, so that they remain and in order to that the is lawful, proportionate effective, ensure government held and ultimately responsible accountable. (para. 29)

other breaches of short of internal armed Essentially, public order, falling war, conflict, or other national emergencies, should be dealt with in the same way. It should not be too assumed that such other from the normal human readily emergencies warrant derogations rights standards -‐ in principle, they should be dealt with under the normal rules on limitations of rights. The measures adopted in this regard should be strictly limited in scope (including geographical scope) and time, and fully subject to judicial review, both in terms of whether the relevant formal and procedural requirements are and as to whether the met, actual taken meet the international standards of “law”, “legitimate purpose”, measures “necessity” and “proportionality”.

Between the detailed substantive and of international them, procedural requirements human sound basis for rights law, set out above, provide a companies trying to implement the GNI make the relevant whether demands from Principles to assessments as to governments made to them, under either ordinary law or emergency-‐ or anti-‐terrorist law, the relevant international Obviously, however, the actual meets requirements. assessments in individual circumstances will not be We therefore them cases or specific country easy. use the bases for in section 4. as our recommendations, set out

Before proceeding to those, however, we must first address one further crucial issue: the question of whether, and if so when and how, these standards apply to the actions of companies. We also need to note the special problems that arise in applying the standards in the special contexts we are discussing. We will deal with those questions next, in sections 2.4 and 2.5.

standards the actions of 2.4 Emerging on companies

International human law and actions rights essentially applies only to states, to (or of it be what is somewhat omissions) public authorities. Sometimes, can given mistakenly referred “horizontal that relation to as effect”, in it is applied, indirectly, in to actions (or omissions) of private actors. But even then, the relevant obligations still rest on the state. The state is, in such cases, held responsible for the fact that it did not control the actions of the relevant private actors that impinged on human rights of individuals. Individual victims 46 cannot invoke international law rules against private parties.

This is in the context of the issues and in relation problematic we address, more specifically to the of the Internet and mobile The relevant use technology. technologies are mainly and the human violations to address managed by private-‐sector entities, rights we are trying have their in demands that those entities origin by governments private-‐sector cooperate with them law national least in enforcement, security or anti-‐terrorist measures (or at claimed be for those measures to purposes).

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It is therefore important to note that new international standards are emerging, intended to be applied by companies. The most important are the UN Guiding Principles on Business and 47 The Human Rights (the “Ruggie Principles”). GNI Principles and Implementation Guidelines, elaborated by GNI several earlier, fit into and significantly extend the years Ruggie framework. The European Commission has also recently begun a dialogue regarding the of the in the Information and Communication implementation Guiding Principles 48 Technology sector.

2.4.1 The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights

The UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights provide a comprehensive framework in which companies can address their responsibility to respect human rights. The 49 Special Representative summarised this framework in an earlier report as:

[A] conceptual and policy framework to anchor the business and human rights debate, and to all relevant actors. The three core help guide framework comprises principles: the state duty to human rights abuses by third protect against parties, the to human and the need including business; corporate responsibility respect rights; remedies. The three for more effective access to principles form a complementary whole that each the others sustainable in supports in achieving progress.

As noted below, the Ruggie Principles are useful in many respects, and we draw on them to develop our own recommendations. However, they tend to focus on possible human rights violations by companies and the duty of “host” states to take measures against such violations. 50 They do deal in detail with the in which that not converse situation, states serious human violations make demands of if acceded perpetrate rights companies that, to, would lead violations of international human and involve those in to rights law, companies them.

51 However, the Special Rapporteur does stipulate that:

The responsibility to respect human rights is a global standard of expected conduct for all business enterprises wherever they operate. It exists independently of states’ abilities and/or willingness to fulfil their own human rights obligations, and does not diminish those And it exists and above with national obligations. over compliance laws and regulations human rights. protecting

In other in faced with state demands and laws that violate words, principle, companies human have refuse do where and minimise the of rights a duty to to so they can, extent any such the least the cooperation to possible in circumstances.

52 This brings in a second point made by the Special Representative:

Addressing adverse human rights impacts requires taking adequate measures for their and, where remediation. prevention, mitigation appropriate,

That is to say: companies should think in advance of possible risks arising from undue state demands made them, and should take technical upon they measures – including measures – to and make it for them to at least minimise their try possible deny or cooperation. They afterwards the victims of their enforced with such undue must help cooperation allegedly alleviate the harm much latter should and illegal state actions, to done as as possible. The in least include those of unlawful taken the our opinion at informing victims actions by state, and of any enforced cooperation they had to provide.

Indeed, in the two paragraphs in which Ruggie does specifically deal with the danger of complicity of companies in human rights violations by state entities, he stresses that there 53 be serious legal for this: may consequences

Some environments, such conflict-‐affected increase the risks operating as areas, may in human abuses committed other of enterprises being complicit gross rights by Business should this risk actors (security forces, for example). enterprises treat as a the web legal compliance issue, given expanding of potential corporate legal liability extraterritorial civil and the the arising from claims, from incorporation of provisions of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in jurisdictions that provide criminal and for corporate responsibility. In addition, corporate directors, officers employees may be subject to individual liability for acts that amount to gross human rights abuses.

In complex contexts such as these, business enterprises should ensure that they do not exacerbate the situation. In assessing how best to respond, they will often be well advised to draw not only and cross-‐functional consultation within the on expertise but also to consult with enterprise, externally credible, independent experts, including civil national human institutions and relevant from governments, society, rights multi-‐stakeholder initiatives.

As the GNI reflect and Principles operationalise, companies’ responsibilities go beyond merely trying to avoid exacerbating the situation, and extend to a duty to take preventive

Law 23 action and avoid such complicity, action it where to try contemporaneous to mitigate and remedial action where it occurred. In this fits in with the unavoidable, our opinion, other discussed below. Special Representative’s proposals,

Thus, crucially, the Ruggie Principles provide for a corporate framework of “operational 54 principles” that include a requirement that companies adopt a company human rights policy, adopted and supported at the highest level, and embedded in all the company’s overall operational policies; and crucially, for human rights due diligence. The latter is 55 described as follows:

In order to and account how address their adverse identify, prevent, mitigate for they human rights business should out human rights due impacts, enterprises carry The should include actual and human diligence. process assessing potential rights and the and impacts, integrating acting upon findings, tracking responses, how addressed. Human due communicating impacts are rights diligence:

(a) Should cover adverse human rights impacts that the business enterprise may cause or contribute to through its own activities, or which be directly linked to its operations, products or services by may its business relationships;

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(b) Will in with the size the business the risk vary complexity of enterprise, of severe human rights and the nature and context of its impacts, operations;

be that the human risks (c) Should ongoing, recognizing rights may the business and change over time as enterprise’s operations operating context evolve.

Ruggie usefully stresses that human rights due diligence must “beyond simply identifying go and managing material risks to the itself, to include risks to rights-‐holders” (i.e., to company individuals whose human rights be at risk); and that it “should be initiated as early as may 56 possible in the development of [business] relationship”. a new activity or

again, Ruggie’s human rights due diligence principle does not seem to cover However, adverse human that the business contribute to (or rights impacts enterprise may cause or become if it accedes to state demands that violate international human complicit in), rights standards. Even the GNI that human due the so, Principles emphasise rights diligence on of part companies should also cover such possible situations.

The therefore the here the same applies to requirement repeated by Special Representative 57 (with reference also to Principle 22), that:

Human rights risks are understood to be the business enterprise’s potential adverse human rights impacts. Potential impacts should be addressed through prevention or mitigation, while actual impacts those that have already occurred should be a – – subject for remediation.

More the in several to the of specifically, Special Representative refers, instances, possibility in human violations other entities – but those a company becoming complicit rights by be with in which those “other entities” other principles appear to dealing only situations are and in other with which the has business companies, particular companies company relationships. A core premise of GNI is that these principles can and should be applied mutatis mutandis situations in which be implicated in human rights to companies may 58 violations states. by Ruggie suggests the following:

Where business contributes contribute adverse human a enterprise or may to an rights impact, it should take the necessary steps to cease or prevent its contribution and use its leverage to mitigate any remaining impact to the greatest extent possible. Leverage is considered to exist where the enterprise has the ability to effect change in the wrongful practices of an entity that causes a harm...

There are situations in which the enterprise lacks the leverage to prevent or mitigate adverse and is unable to increase its Here, the should impacts leverage. enterprise consider ending the relationship, taking into account credible assessments of adverse human potential rights impacts of doing so.

Where the is “crucial” the it raises relationship to enterprise, ending further could be deemed crucial challenges. A relationship as if it provides a product or service that is essential to the enterprise’s business, and for which no reasonable alternative source exists. Here the severity of the adverse human rights impact must also be considered: the more severe the abuse, the more quickly the enterprise will need to see change before it takes a decision on whether it should end the relationship. In for as long as the abuse continues and the enterprise any case, remains in the relationship, it should be able to demonstrate its own ongoing efforts to the and be to mitigate impact prepared accept any consequences – reputational, financial legal of the connection. or – continuing

GNI that this should not to business with other suggests apply just a company’s relationships but its with the host often lack companies, equally to relationships state. Companies may leverage over that state -‐ but if state abuses are serious and continue in spite of protests and other action aimed at mitigating them (at least to the extent that the company is implicated in them), the company must be prepared to accept the consequences in terms of reputation, financial costs and legal challenges, or end the relationship, i.e. cease its operations in the country.

Moreover, the GNI states that the referred to here should not be limited to a leverage simple assessment of whether the could force the state to end its human rights company violations those that it is forced to be (or even merely complicit in). Rather, companies can also work with their home the human governments to exert pressure on states violating should and initiate such with their rights; and they try cooperation own governments or embassies wherever of democratic states should their possible. And governments use influence unlawful demands from if needs be to support companies facing repressive states, the of in the to extent directly interfering companies’ businesses, e.g., through export control arrangements. We will return to these matters in our recommendations.

Equally important is the question of recording the companies’ actions, and reporting on 59 them. As Ruggie puts it:

In order to account how address their human business for they rights impacts, should be to communicate this when enterprises prepared externally, particularly raised stakeholders. Business concerns are by or on behalf of affected enterprises whose risks human operations or operating contexts pose of severe rights impacts

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and that human (a) Be of a form frequency reflect an enterprise’s rights impacts and that are accessible to its intended audiences;

(b) Provide information that is sufficient to evaluate the adequacy of an enterprise’s response to the particular human rights impact involved;

(c) In turn not risks to affected stakeholders, personnel to pose or legitimate requirements of commercial confidentiality.

the above take various forms, adds, Although can Ruggie “[f]ormal reporting by enterprises is where risks human whether this is due to the expected of severe rights impacts exist, the business contexts.” 60 nature of operations or operating

the of remedial if has become involved Finally, Ruggie addresses question action a company human either business in rights violations, directly, or through its partners. His recommendations in this respect again focus on how host states and their institutions should be able to provide for remedies for victims to seek redress against the company. These of little relevance in circumstances in which it is the host state itself that is the are of the violations, and that compelled the to become complicit in perpetrator company those. GNI is to and mechanism working actively develop an engagement grievance broadly in line with that suggested by Ruggie.

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noted that in circumstances However, as we earlier, Ruggie points out some companies can become liable for human violations that legally rights by states they helped to perpetrate. In this include international criminal the kinds of that extreme cases, can liability. In cases we are talking about, it is more likely to consist of civil liability for the companies’ actions, in particular in their home state if that is one in which human rights are given strong protection.

In our opinion, practice consistent with the Ruggie principles we have outlined, including those applied mutatis mutandis to situations in which forced to become we companies are complicit in violations of human rights by host can and should have a significant states, the of acted in accordance with the and impact on question liability. If a company principles, thus took all to avoid enrolled in state’s possible measures being a repressive actions, minimised unavoidable and revealed its involvement-‐under-‐duress and any involvement, helped possible victims -‐ then the company could reduce its liability, and certainly avoid punitive damages.

By contrast, if a company negligently failed to perform human rights due diligence -‐ if it took no measures to avoid being used, or to minimise its involvement, or if it kept its involvement secret and failed to help the victims -‐ then that should impact on civil any liability it have in its home state (or indeed elsewhere). may

Indeed, states that want to provide for human rights could strong support protection to such and include this in recommendations. legislate impose liability, we our

2.4.2 The GNI Principles and Implementation Guidelines

The GNI was established, four years before the Ruggie Principles were published, specifically to address the fact that ICT companies, including Internet Service Providers, telecommunications companies and other service providers such as social networking sites, increasingly face by in that the fundamental pressure governments to act ways may impact human of and freedom of of their users. GNI framework rights privacy expression provides a of GNI and principles (“the Principles”) supporting guidance (“Implementation Guidelines”) such well and Framework”. to companies, as as a “Governance, Accountability Learning that in the Initiative and the that Companies participate sign up to Principles accept they 61 have specific duties to respect and protect these rights.

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Here, it will suffice to note that the Principles, Guidelines and Framework fit in well with the Ruggie Principles – and fill many of the gaps discussed in the previous section. Like the Ruggie Principles, the GNI Principles stress the need for companies to be pro-‐active in trying to avoid or minimize the impact of government restrictions on the rights to freedom of and of 62 the need to build the into expression privacy their users; principles companies’ basic policies, and and the need for due diligence and risk procedures processes; in with other stakeholders. 63 The latter should include assessments, cooperation “consideration of relevant local laws in each market and whether the domestic legal conform rule of law Unlike the systems [and we may add, practices] to requirements”. Ruggie Principles, which do little to address a key problem faced by Internet intermediaries that governments can be the driver of human rights violations, the GNI focuses specifically on that problem.

Importantly, the Implementation Guidelines spell out certain standards that companies should adopt when faced with demands that impact on the rights to freedom government of and/or of their users. 64 Companies faced with demands from expression privacy if acceded violate their users’ consumers’ human governments which, to, might or rights, should:

that follow established domestic when - Require governments legal processes they restrict freedom of are seeking to expression/are seeking access to personal information;

- Interpret government restrictions and demands so as to minimize the negative effect on freedom of expression/narrowly interpret the governmental authority’s jurisdiction to access personal information, such as limiting compliance to users within that country.

the to minimize the - Interpret governmental authority’s jurisdiction so as negative effect freedom of and on expression/narrowly Interpret implement government demands that compromise privacy;

- Seek clarification modification from authorized officials when or government restrictions [or demands] appear overbroad, [unlawful], not required by domestic/applicable law or inconsistent with international human rights laws and standards on freedom of expression/privacy.

clear written communications/[clear communications, preferably in - Request writing] from the government that explain the legal basis for government restrictions to freedom of expression/demands for information, personal including the of the and the title and of name requesting government entity name, signature the authorized official.

- Challenge the government in domestic courts or seek the assistance of relevant [government] authorities, international human rights bodies or non-‐governmental when faced with restriction/demand that organizations a government appears inconsistent with domestic law international human laws or procedures or rights and standards freedom of on expression;

- Adopt policies and procedures to address how the company will respond in instances when governments fail to provide a written directive/when government demands do not include a written directive, or fail to adhere to domestic/established legal procedure. These policies and procedures shall include a consideration of when to challenge such government demands.

The GNI number of comments these (referred to provides a on guidelines as “Application Guidance”). These stress that when possible, should seek written demands companies rather than verbal and that “Policies and accept orders; stipulate procedures adopted by will address situations where make demands participating companies governments may and other third to evade domestic through proxies parties legal procedures.”

Further “Application Guidance” adds that “It is recognized that it is neither practical nor desirable for participating companies to challenge in all cases. Rather, participating companies select cases based on a of criteria such as the potential beneficial may range impact on freedom of expression/privacy, the likelihood of success, the severity of the case, cost, the representativeness of the case and whether the case is of a larger trend.” In part our view, when a case is serious (“severe”), and representative of a number of and cases, a trend towards undue restrictions or should indeed showing demands, companies challenge them.

the Guidelines in another Guidance comment Finally, Implementation recognize Application that “the the internet is that will be nature of jurisdiction on a highly complex question subject to shifting legal definitions and interpretations over time.” In our recommendations, we try to deal with some aspects of this problem, in particular in relation to demands from law enforcement agencies to companies, ordering them to provide data from their servers, 65 when the latter are situated in other countries.

The GNI Implementation Guidelines also stress (again in line with Ruggie) the need for on the of as concerns demands made of them to restrict transparency part companies, freedom of or access to information, or to disclose personal information. We expression, build this in recommendations in relation to on own transparency.

In the GNI and Guidelines the need for addition, Principles Implementation stress with and international the companies to engage governments organisations in promotion and enforcement of the principles.

Finally, we should mention that GNI provides for a serious system of cooperation between participating companies and other stakeholders, aimed at giving real effect to, and expanding the principles and guidelines. These include mechanisms for independent on, assessment of members’ efforts to implement and uphold the GNI Principles.

The GNI instruments provide helpful assistance, and we build on them in our own very recommendations. Before to those, however, it is to note the in coming necessary problems this regard.

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search and other for share Companies providing engines, blogging platforms, ways users to information have been under from states to block content. Some increasing pressure illegal of this material conflicts with Terms of Service. The Content for already companies’ Policy Google’s blogging platform, Blogger, for example, bans “hate speech”, “crude content”, material that “exploits children”, threats of violence, copyright infringement, personal and confidential information, and illegal activities. But many countries have criminalised other types of expression that would be protected under US law (such as genocide denial in European nations, and criticism of the monarchy in Thailand). Google, Microsoft, Twitter and Facebook have all therefore developed to block access to specific search systems results, blogs, tweets, videos, and other media on a country-‐by-‐country basis.

While this is less than ideal from freedom of country-‐specific blocking a expression it is material that is criminal in perspective, preferable to having any one country completely removed from the Internet. Without these face blocked in mechanisms, companies being well criminal local staff. specific jurisdictions, as as proceedings against

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Transparency is the main mechanism companies have used to protect against over-‐blocking. Google, Microsoft and Twitter have developed measures to inform users when material has been blocked, such as notifications on search result and greyed-‐out warnings that pages “This tweet from @username has been withheld in: Country”. User location is determined based on their IP address, although Twitter allows users to select a different location, or to choose “worldwide”, blocks. and Twitter also send removal thereby avoiding Google for publication and analysis at the Chilling Effects website run by the Electronic requests Frontier Foundation and several US universities.

After for four with Chinese demands filter wide of complying years government to a range from search decided instead redirect political content results, Google in 2010 to customers from mainland China to their unfiltered site in Hong Kong. Searches for politically sensitive keywords are now blocked by China’s national firewall. Google has just started notifying 66 users in mainland China when they search for terms that are known to cause blocking.

It remains to be seen whether governments and courts will be satisfied with country-‐ reactive If made that content has been blocked, there specific, blocking. users are aware are a number of they can around those restrictions. ways get

Twitter it will refuse to block tweets for says proactively (based example on keyword but Brazilian have for block filtering), prosecutors already applied an injunction to tweets the location of traffic and British reporting on speed traps checkpoints. courts frequently issue broad privacy injunctions forbidding the publication of certain private facts, and a UK parliamentary committee recently called for Internet intermediaries to play a bigger role in enforcement. In both a purely reactive approach is unlikely to stop information from cases, spreading quickly. But the effectiveness of more proactive filtering is also unclear, and would be likely to impose significant constraints on freedom of expression. very

2.5 Difficulties in applying the existing and emerging international standards in the environment digital

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There be made the of how are six main points to on question new communication be in order them used technologies can regulated or managed to prevent being by states to perpetrate human rights violations (or to stop them from being so used once repression has begun). These six matters have a bearing on a variety of issues discussed later, including our recommendations on practical measures and arrangements that companies and can take or make, and on the question of whether, and if so how, the existing governments arms export control regimes can be used to control those technologies. We have added brief comments to each of these issues, with reference to our discussions elsewhere, and to recommendations. our

The devices for and data their nature we discuss, interception, blocking, mining, by very can be used for wide of behavioural a variety purposes. They can support marketing or human but advertising; rights sensitive not necessarily incompatible purposes (such as surveillance the of criminal national police in context a investigation, or more problematic, security intelligence or anti-‐terrorist operations); or serious breaches of human rights, such as suspicionless mass surveillance to find, arrest, torture or kill political opponents, or the blocking of political speech, communication and activity.

The distinction between IT products and services is blurring: surveillance and blocking hardware often frequent software updates. This allow the vendor to requires may gain an into how the is used. Sometimes devices be insight product can remotely disabled, if with that It be build certain especially explicitly designed functionality. may possible to functionalities the concerned unusual limit into products to flag uses, or even to uses to what is reasonable in We build of normal, legal, targeted interception. some our recommendations on this.

Interception and blocking technologies are used for repression and to perpetrate serious violations of human rights in situations that have not (yet) deteriorated to the extent of constituting a non-‐international armed conflict in the sense of Additional Protocol II to the Geneva Conventions, or a clear threat to regional or international and security in the peace sense of the UN Charter. This is relevant to the question of whether arms control/export control be used to limit the spread of the technologies this is arrangements can report concerned with.

The is the Wassenaar established in 1996 most applicable agreement Arrangement, to and transfers of conventional and promote “transparency greater responsibility in arms dual-‐use and thus 67 goods technologies, preventing destabilising accumulations”. As discussed below, these arrangements are generally focused on, or even explicitly limited to, the spread of “arms”, “military capabilities”, and exports that could threaten regional or international peace and security. Our recommendations therefore also moot the possibility of applying the principles in such arrangements mutatis mutandis in cases in which the formal arrangements could not cover the technologies discussed in this report.

These are traded and This too is relevant to the technologies globally relatively freely. application of and controls. The Wassenaar criteria that if potentially arms export suggest a “dual use” available the from that item is relatively easily on open market, states are not of the if the of the item be part Wassenaar Arrangement, or export cannot easily controlled, if it be easily specified in sufficiently clear and objective then the item or cannot terms, should not be the restricted list at all. recommendations put on Again, therefore, our are that in such the relevant and should be mutandis cases principles processes applied mutatis where possible.

Service providers often process and store data outside their customers’ jurisdiction (albeit that telecommunications services more often function around domestic servers and infrastructure). In the “offline world”, when law enforcement or national security agencies in one country want to obtain access to evidence in another country, they have to go through “Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties” or MLATs. This typically involves a court in the first country requesting a court in the second country to issue an order for the seizure, and over of the materials. It involves to ensure production handing usually legal proceedings that the substantive and procedural rights of all affected and entities persons are protected. MLATs and be cumbersome 68 established are complex can in practice. However, by-‐passing MLAT constitutes of the of the second and processes an infringement sovereignty state, a of the of interested under the laws of that if negation legal rights parties state, especially those parties are headquartered or established in that state.

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Collecting evidence relating to a suspected offence, or for intelligence purposes, is a form of so-‐called “enforcement jurisdiction” (as distinct from “prescriptive jurisdiction”, which covers the issuing of substantive rules relating to acts). In relevant international law there is a basic principle: “enforcement jurisdiction not be exercised in the territory of may any 69 other state without the consent of that state.”

States of other states the to exercise enforcement can course grant right jurisdiction on their via in of form of territory treaty. Long-‐term acquiescence respect some specific enforcement would be law”. jurisdiction by many states come to recognised as “customary that be said about data from therefore However, cannot yet extracting remote servers. We later make proposals that reaffirm the need to abide by established MLAT procedures, yet also recognise that those procedures need to be streamlined and dramatically speeded up, especially in cases such as an immediate risk to life.

Google’s transparency report

Like other Internet Google receives from and courts companies, requests governments around the world for data and to block content. It has role in user played a leading the of these its improving transparency requests through Transparency Report service, which shows the number of in six-‐month with details of each requests by country intervals, unless the concerned full and the request government prohibited disclosure, percentage of requests complied with fully or in part. Google also publishes details of traffic patterns to specific services by region, which allows users to see where access may be blocked, and has recently added information on requests made by copyright owners.

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There are some limitations to the statistics. Google excludes to takedown child requests abuse images, which are against the company’s own Terms of Service. Individual figures not made available for countries that have made fewer than 10 content removal are since limited information. countries that have made fewer requests, they provide Similarly, than 30 data at risk. user requests are excluded, as they might place investigations Government made via the web forms requests company’s public reporting may not Other of identify a government source. requests arrive in a range formats, making it difficult for statistical to categorise automatically purposes.

The back is in the level and data, going to July 2009, already revealing interesting patterns trends of well how with them. US removal requests, as as frequently Google complies stable this time with around requests were relatively over period, compliance at 80%, first half of although with a drop to 63% in the 2011. Pakistan submitted a very small number of of which with. Brazil of the requests, none were complied was one largest submitter of requests, with around 70% complied with. Data for China is largely unavailable, as YouTube was blocked and “Chinese officials consider censorship demands to be state secrets, so we cannot disclose information about [search] content removal any for the two reporting periods from July 2009 to June 2010.” Google has recently requests begun notifying Chinese users when their search queries cause connection issues. may controls and 3 Export licensing

There has been widespread criticism of companies in democratic states that have exported products and services to repressive regimes for mass Internet surveillance and censorship. Iran, Syria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Uzbekistan, China, Bahrain, and recently overthrown regimes in Libya, Tunisia and Egypt, have all blocked critical websites and/or spied on 70 movements protest using such systems.

of these tools “dual with network and Many are use”, legitimate management security such “Denial of Service” traffic and malware ISP networks purposes as filtering on or Web and closer speeding up browsing reducing congestion by caching pages to users. They include systems for ISP blocking of customer access to illegal content such as child exploitation, copyright infringing sites or gambling sites, which are mandated or imposed through unofficial government pressure on ISPs in countries including the UK and the 71 Scandinavian nations.

Many democratic nations require that ISPs install surveillance equipment to facilitate the “lawful of communications and law enforcement for interception” by intelligence agencies, the US Communications Assistance Law Enforcement Act of 1994. The example through to democracies’ further tools to monitor the location of security agencies use investigative mobile devices and webcams and and personal computers, access microphones, scan and calls for known messages voice keywords or speakers.

A particular problem from a human rights perspective is that once built, these tools frequently end up in the hands of repressive regimes. A Bloomberg investigation found that by 2007, Nokia Siemens Intelligence Solutions had over 90 monitoring systems installed in 60 countries, while Nokia Siemens Networks spinout Trovicor had surveillance equipment in 72 at least 12 Middle Eastern and North African countries, including Bahrain and Yemen.

Non-‐democratic countries frequently ISPs to block customer access to a wide require range of material critical of the other of websites, especially government, or types political China’s shield” from such Cisco expression. “golden project uses equipment companies as to block material related the Falun and the in to Gong organisation 4 June 1989 protests Tiananmen Cisco Vice-‐President Mark Chandler has “We Square, even though, as blogged, have never customized our equipment to help the Chinese government – or any government – censor content, track Internet use by individuals or intercept Internet 73 communications”. A leaked internal Cisco presentation from 2002 showed that the had noted the Chinese government’s wish to use the “golden shield” to “combat company hostiles”.74 ‘Falun Gong’ evil religion and other

3.1 States’ to Protect Responsibility

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It is in international within the UN that increasingly recognised law, especially system, states have their citizens. serious failure fulfil a “responsibility to protect” own Any by a state to this of concern. The international has the duty is a matter legitimate community right to take steps against states that seriously fail in this respect, in particular by violently repressing political opposition and indiscriminately attacking civilians and civilian targets, even if there is as such not threat to regional or international security. yet any

Technology Exports to the Middle East

Under President Ben Ali, the Tunisian government took control of virtually the entire nation’s communications. Two deep-packet inspection systems were used in Tunisia: one for blocking websites and the other for intercepting e-mails. Mobile phone voice calls and other data were intercepted, and state agencies had the tools to reconstruct a target’s browsing history and logs of his or her e-mail correspondence.

Other systems could alter the content of emails in transit, allowing the government to seed distrust amongst human rights defenders.

In Gaddafi’s Libya, a monitoring centre was created to intercept and monitor all communications and to spy on human rights defenders and opposition activists. This massive, passive, strategic nationwide interception system allows state agencies to trawl through emails and other internet content in real time using keyword searches.

A system was also provided that allowed the monitoring of GSM and 3G mobile networks, fixed line networks, satellite communications, international telecommunications gateways and high density fibre-optic cables. This system can intercpet 100,000 simultaneous voice channels, allowing the state to capture up to one billion intercepts per day and storing in excess of 5,000 terabytes of information. The system captured roughly 30 to 40 million minutes of mobile and landline conversations a month and archived them for years

This system was not only used to tap all the international phone calls going in and out of the country, but also to log them for later anaysis.

In Syria, a planned system that would have intercepted and stored every email flowing through the country - capturing both domestic and international traffic - was aborted in 2011 after the company involved pulled out, leaving an old system that can only intercept a portion of the country’s traffic. The system, which was to use deeppacket inspection probes to monitor email, was to be integrated with the state-owned Syrian Telecommunication Establishment, the nation’s main fixed-line operator.

Although this system was abandoned, there are still systems in place to filter and censor the Internet and to record browsing histories.

In Iran, state agencies are able to monitor the locations of mobile phones, tracking a target’s movements every fifteen seconds and mapping their movements, on at least one major commercial network. Another system can analyze all messages in English, Persian or Arabic for keywords or phrases, store them and flag those caught by filters for review.

Communications monitoring centres have also been used to track and arrest activists.

Yemen monitors the locations of mobile phones, allowing state agencies to track a target’s movements and plot the locations on a map.

There is a monitoring centre in Bahrain used to monitor phone calls, e-mails, text messages and Voice Over Internet Protocol calls. Some products used by the local security services can also secretly activate laptop webcams or microphones on mobile devices using trojans.

The monitoring centre has the capabilities to change the contents of emails as they pass through the network, use speaker recognition technology to scan phone networks (detecting people who are attempting to stay under the radar by using “burner” phones) and pinpoint people’s locations through their mobile phones. The centre can scan traffic in real time for keywords in written and verbal communications for additional analysis.

Egypt acquired trojans and remote infection proxies to infect laptops and mobile phone devices before the fall of the Mubarak regime. This allowed state agencies remote access to the filesystems and webcams of the devices they infected. The tools even allowed them to remotely turn on microphones to surreptitiously record the conversations of prodemocracy defenders.

Mubarak’s government also used Deep Packet Inspection technology to monitor web traffic; it is not known whether this equipment is still in use.

US and EU sanctions such Iran and already include against repressive regimes as Syria bans the of and services that could aid in human specific on export technologies rights violations. In 2012 the US added additional controls that enable those April on companies those that “create used and violations, particularly or operate systems to monitor, track, 75 citizens for other target killing, torture, or grave abuses”.

Clearly such sanctions should be imposed against other regimes that in torture and engage mass killings, as the European Parliament noted in a non-‐binding resolution passed on 18 April 2012. However, these alone will not prevent monitoring and censorship tools being acquired and built into the infrastructure of repressive regimes that have not yet reached this One official told us that sanctions are extremely time-‐consuming to (not stage. agree least due to political sensitivities significant national exporters), often to over easy and difficult to extend small number of circumvent, beyond a targets.

3.2 Dual use controls and the Wassenaar Arrangement

There are extensive international controls on the export of “dual use” technologies with civil and military applications. The main example is the 41-‐state Wassenaar Arrangement, whose members to monitor and control of “major or key elements for the agree exports indigenous development, production, enhancement of military capabilities,” and to use or share information on and refusals of to non-‐participating states. exports exports

The Wassenaar control list includes that be used mobile already equipment can to intercept calls the GSM this does not to network phone using standard, although apply providers. Human such San Frontières have called for such controls be rights groups as Reporters to for extended to surveillance and censorship products and services destined authoritarian states:

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The leaders of international companies operating in the new technology domain, especially telecommunications surveillance... should think about their responsibility. Their tools, their equipment and their know-‐how are being used for criminal Like the EU regulations on trade in products that could be used for purposes... “capital punishment, torture other cruel treatment,” there is need to or now a introduce international the that threaten regulations on provision of technology control the certain cyber-‐citizens, to export of technologies, to create a monitoring 76 that and have dissuasive body is independent of governments to sanctions ready.

Other of the IT have been faced with that their could be parts industry concerns products used to impose censorship or surveillance in repressive states. For example, the Chinese government proposed in 2009 that “Green Dam Youth Escort” filtering software should be pre-‐installed on or supplied with all new personal computers. This requirement was made optional after criticism from the public and from PC suppliers. But other states such as 77 Indonesia and Vietnam have raised the possibility of similar mandates.

The Wassenaar controls to items where the state able “to are only applied parties are control effectively the of the goods.” This could be difficult with highly portable export communications software. For in activist Telecomix tools, especially example, 2011, group obtained from Blue Coat web devices installed the logs ProxySG on Syrian Telecommunications Establishment backbone which used for network, were being and blocking of connections. 78 Blue Coat stated after these logs that monitoring reviewing a distributor in the United Arab Emirates had diverted the devices to That illegally Syria. distributor has been added the US of Commerce’s control list. now to Department export Blue added: “We other these Coat are not providing support, updates or services to If review of the facts about this diversion solutions that enable appliances... our presents us to better protect against future illegal and unwanted diversion of our products, we intend to 79 take steps to implement them”. A technologist told us that there is a thriving second-‐hand market in equipment that can be used for mass surveillance and blocking, often sold by ISPs in advanced economies as they upgrade their networks, which is perfectly adequate for the networks in use in less industrialised economies.

The Wassenaar of “dual use” does not fit with human The concept fully rights protection. instruments relating controls aimed primarily threats global to export are at preventing to and and at most non-‐international armed conflicts in the regional peace security, including of Additional Protocol II the Geneva Conventions. and sense to Many recent ongoing of and human violations do fall within this situations serious repression rights not 80 category. “Dual use items” or “goods” are defined as those that can be used for both civil and military purposes (EC Regulations), or as (civilian) goods and technologies that can “enhanc[e] military capabilities” (Wassenaar). Human rights issues are therefore at most matters to be taken into account in assessing whether export restrictions should be imposed, or even whether certain technologies should be classified as “dual use”.

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However, until and unless internal situation deteriorates to the extent that large-‐scale an force is used in at the time of of the military (as Syria writing), many technologies we are be used enable international discussing can already to widespread repression, contrary to human without that in the And if rights law, use being “military” export-‐control sense. even there is real of the under the control a “military” use technologies, current export systems the question of human rights compliance of an importer is at most only one aspect that may be taken into account.

Technology companies have legitimate concerns that export controls will limit access to potentially significant markets, and impose bureaucratic constraints on legitimate sales that be ineffective bad actors. The Wassenaar specifies that it “will not may against Arrangement impede bona fide civil transactions.” One civil society told us they “have to see a expert yet workable definition based the tools’ other attributes that won't solely on capabilities or either be too broad that they undermine the people we're to help.” narrow or so trying

controls should therefore be limited that has limited Any to monitoring technology very such surveillance that be used national scale legitimate uses -‐ as mass equipment can at a to monitor block numbers of simultaneous and or very large communications, “weaponised exploits” that exploit weaknesses in commonly-‐used software (such as Microsoft Windows 81 or Apple’s iOS) for the of undertaking stealthy monitoring. Campaign purposes group Privacy International, for example, suggests controls on items such as “IMSI, MSISDN, IMEI, TMSI interception and monitoring equipment” and “Tactical SMS, GSM, GPS, GPRS, UMTS, CDMA, PSTN and satellite phone and equipment”. The interception monitoring European Parliament called in 2011 for a ban on “the granting of general authorisations from the EU for to certain countries of telecommunications for in connection exports … technologies use with violation of human democratic freedom of defined a rights, principles or speech as by the Charter of Fundamental of the Rights European Union, by using interception and data transfer devices for mobile and technologies digital monitoring phones text and targeted surveillance of internet (e.g. via Centres and Lawful messages use Monitoring 82 Interception Gateways)”.

Some of suitable for categories very high performance monitoring equipment mass surveillance may be able to be specified precisely enough to be included. The US already restricts the export of technologies that are "primarily useful" for the "surreptitious 83 A interception of wire, oral or electronic communications". civil society expert told us that bespoke equipment is being made for repressive regimes, including technology such as location tracking, with teams of European engineers on the ground maintaining the technology.

Some software and telecommunications frequent updating by the equipment requires vendor for be disabled. Where such restrictions ongoing functionality, or can remotely can be shown be effective, the need for controls that to export on equipment as a preventative is since controls be in at time. These restrictions measure reduced, usage can put place any also reduce the circumvention of controls the resale of controlled can export by equipment, especially where the end-‐user needs to connect the equipment to the vendor from an IP address whose geographic location can be determined with reasonable although accuracy – such controls can in themselves be circumvented.

tools for activists 3.3 Protecting

One of sanctions and controls is that block the of useful tools danger export they provision activists. This broad controls such those to democracy can happen explicitly, through as the such and when those controls applied by US against countries as Iran Syria. But even are the of the controls and the harsh for mistake still relaxed, complexity penalties making a discourage many companies from allowing the use of their products by anyone in these countries. This has stopped Zimbabwean activists looking for web hosting, Iranians from downloading web browsers and using blogging and open source software sites, and Syrians from using LinkedIn even after the US Treasury granted general licenses for the of -‐-‐ export 84 communications tools to the latter two countries.

The Obama administration offered further in March 2012 to US guidance companies services but this does extend number of tools useful wanting to provide to Iranians, not to a for such antivirus Virtual Private domain and activists, software, Networking code, or names SSL certificates. The Parliament resolved in 2012 that EU in this European April policies area “should be in order be effective and hurt human defenders”. precise to not to rights Schaake MEP told that she is for the EU Marietje us campaigning to set up industry-‐specific “checkpoints” for companies to go through before setting up business deals in repressive states, which could provide human rights assessments and confidential advice to businesses that would then have certainty under EU law. She also proposes to explore ways in which the EU can businesses when they face to violate human rights in third support pressure countries. Controls equally should not get in the of other legitimate such as way purposes, security research and development.

The Electronic Frontier Foundation offered help the complexity of to companies navigate this offer has to be taken EFF has also for such export licenses, although yet up. campaigned be with the removal of all controls “piecemeal approaches” to replaced export on 85 tools and services. communications

Law 38 activists remain extremely critical of controls after the of the US Many export attempts to them to the of software government use stop spread privacy-‐protecting encryption the 1990s. The the Good during most high-‐profile target was Pretty Privacy (PGP) open software Phil who became the of three-‐ source initially developed by Zimmerman, subject a criminal the US Customs Service. This without year investigation by was dropped charges, and the software became widely available online. This case is a useful demonstration of the limited impact export controls are likely to have on software-‐only systems, especially where the underlying mathematical algorithms are widely published (and protected as free 86 speech). The authors of “circumvention tools” such as Tor, who have received funding for this from the US State Department, told us they are still having problems getting purpose licences to those tools to activists in repressive regimes. Another significant export very problem is software with developers around the world with clear “owner” open source no or “exporter”.

3.4 Transparency and non-Wassenaar producers

Countries outside the Wassenaar Arrangement play an important role in the availability of controlled items. Software giant India is bidding for membership of Wassenaar, with the of the US. But Chinese companies are developing increasingly sophisticated support and telecommunications with Reuters finding that computing systems, a investigation Shenzhen-‐based ZTE Corporation has supplied Iran’s main telecommunications company with surveillance that “locate their voice, text equipment can users, intercept messaging ... chat conversations web access." The also to be emails, or company appeared supplying US Iran. 87 export-‐controlled technology to

By contrast, in December 2011 Chinese company Huawei decided to scale back its activities and business with in Iran, “by no longer seeking new customers limiting its activities existing 88 customers". This was an illustration that transparency leading to a negative public reaction can be a powerful motivator of behaviour. A second example is technology company companies’ reaction to the government of Pakistan’s call for tenders on a national Internet blocking which required the capability to block 50m web addresses. After a system, by in Pakistan, with from GNI, Access and others, campaign groups support companies including Cisco, McAfee, Websense, Verizon and Sandvine all pledged not to bid for the 89 work.

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The Electronic Foundation has mechanisms this Frontier suggested to increase transparency, bodies and “hold issue including encouraging government legislatures to hearings, subpoenas for documents or testimony and even conduct full investigations.” Human rights could be and the annual reporting requirements required in government procurements, in 90 reports of companies of companies doing business with repressive regimes. Companies can out much stronger due diligence on customers in repressive regimes, as carry 91 recommended by the EFF for government sales and promoted by the proposed US Global Online Freedom Act (HR 3605). Even one manufacturer told us that after rejecting five so, sales in following internal human rights review, in and one quarter an competitors Europe China made those sales.

3.5 Technical standards

An area that has so far been less explored is the inclusion of human rights protections in technology standards related to targeted interception and web blocking (backed by up public procurement rules and legal mandates).

The main “lawful standards have been the intercept” developed by European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI), non-‐profit with 700 a organisation over members from 62 countries. of different communications They cover a range protocols, from mobile cable communications e-‐mail phones, TV/telephony, emergency systems, to and The of such standards mandated Internet access. use is in many countries.

The companies designing and operating communications equipment could standardise and implement functionality that could be used to limit the use of their equipment outside this legal, targeted interception framework. Explicit limits could be set on the proportion of communications that could be intercepted within a specific device. The production of unalterable audit logs could help with the oversight of the use of the capability (although not enforce its use). Stricter standards could be set for the verification of interception instructions, avoiding the problems encountered in Greece where investigators are still who used LI facilities the minister and other top officials. 92 One unsure to wiretap prime standards told that could be senders expert us intercepts targeted on specific or recipients of but broad searches While such communications, not on keyword or speaker recognition. would be there such of abuse requirements not typical in an ETSI standard, nor is a danger of other communications standards typical requirements.

Web blocking tools do not have equivalent standards to lawful intercept. However, producers of these tools could similarly explore whether standardisation of protections for freedom of expression would be feasible and useful, alongside concrete principles for sales -‐ such as rejecting customers that wish to use tools to impose filters going government the ICCPR their citizens, China’s “Green Dam Youth Escort” and Pakistan’s beyond on as proposed national firewall would both have done. GNI member Websense has taken such a 93 One that could position. technologist suggested to us high-‐performance blocking systems be that would their designed only accept blocking configurations digitally signed by manufacturer.

3.6 Civil liability and private rights of action

A further potential remedy is a private right of action for individuals whose human rights are violated using equipment or designed for this Two ongoing cases in the US systems purpose. to create such precedent: Du Cisco in the US District Court of Maryland, are attempting a v. and Doe Cisco in the US District Court for Northern California. The suits have been v. brought under the federal Alien Torts Statute Act and Torture Victim Protection well Act, as as state law. 94 Yahoo! Inc. settled similar in 2007.95 Cisco has that “The lawsuits a case responded inaccurate and without foundation”.96 French human and are entirely rights groups FIDH LDH have similarly filed a criminal complaint and an application to join civil proceedings with for violations of human against Amesys a Paris court, “being complicit in grave rights on 97 the basis of extraterritorial jurisdiction”.

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4 Recommendations

On the basis of our analyses and building on the Ruggie and GNI Principles and Implementation Guidelines, discussed above, we the measures set out below as propose possible practical that can be taken to or mitigate human rights violations steps prevent perpetrated or facilitated by the use globally networked digital technologies.

We have set out under five our proposals headings, addressing companies, governments, and should be clear from intergovernmental organisations, NGOs, investors. However, as the the of action taken in this will proposals, strength any respect depend on positive between them. Our forward basis for cooperation proposals are tentative: they are put as a further discussion, not as fully-‐fledged prescriptions. But we hope that they add some further flesh to the structures usefully created by the Ruggie and GNI principles.

4.1 Companies

should exchange information legal and in specific 1. Companies on systems experiences other and jurisdictions with companies, governments, intergovernmental organisations NGOs. Where such information is it be shared in trusted forums such sensitive, can as and make available information GNI. Companies should aggregate collectively public on their experiences in a format that will shield them from sanctions from authoritarian governments – if necessary, through an independently operating third party to avoid competition concerns. On the basis of such exchanges, GNI members will be able to review and develop the GNI Principles and Implementation Guidelines, and see how they can incorporate the present proposals into them. All of our interviewees were in favour of greater information sharing and transparency, while recognising that this is not on its own a panacea.

2. Before market, should whether the domestic entering a companies assess legal systems and conform to international human and rule of law practices rights requirements. In draw information this, they can on provided by intergovernmental organisations, democratic that of the human governments in countries publish assessments rights situation in various countries, and reputable NGOs. If these indicate that the authorities in the country are involved in human rights abuses, and if the technologies the company is considering selling there could contribute to such repression, it should carefully plan how (and whether) it can make its technology available in a form that minimises the risk of abuse. It should also plan how to respond to legal and extra-‐legal demands from that government that have human rights implications.

should have clear with about the 3. Companies ensure they a understanding governments lawful under which subscriber data be material blocked, and procedures can requested, connections terminated. Where should of contact for possible they agree specific points senior law national and and mechanisms enforcement, security regulatory officials, to check the authorisation of from these telecommunications requests contacts. One told that after such with in the Middle company us agreeing procedures a government East, data requests fell from 16,000 to 4,000 per month.

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4. Companies should disclose policies and procedures they have in place to human manage rights risks. They should share and collectively publish aggregate statistics about use of and subscriber data access unless from blocking procedures, expressly prohibited doing by the Where such clearly in compliance with so statute or courts. statutes are not international law should demands in the standards, companies challenge ambiguous in all detailed record of actions defend higher courts. They should cases keep a (if only to themselves Information about in possible subsequent legal actions). specific cases can be disclosed when “safe harbour" schemes. confidentially appropriate to recording

5. Companies should stipulate in the terms and conditions for the use of their products that they should not be used in violation of international human rights law. This should include speedy mechanisms for dispute resolution in such cases, involving the diplomatic services of the home of the company. Technical measures for enforcement can country include in-‐built mechanisms to disable, withdraw or stop offering the product or service if and when it is used in clear breach of international human and when the rights law, that these violations has that illegitimate after country perpetrates not stopped use at resolution. Before the of to attempts finalising supply a potentially repressive product non-‐democratic without human and the rule of a country meaningful rights protections should seek and make the law, companies assurances from, arrangements with, authorities of the state about the protection of human rights, especially during emergencies.

6. If a notices that a product has been exported to a repressive country without company its prior agreement, it should consider disabling the product. This applies a fortiori if the unauthorised is to a known to wide-‐scale or serious human export country perpetrate rights violations.

should to reduce the and 7. Companies use “Privacy by Design” principles processing of data for business which storage personal no longer required a legitimate purpose, could later be disclosure. In relation with deficient subject to compelled to countries this include much data located outside the laws, may storing as as possible on servers control of that jurisdiction. Companies’ terms and conditions should specify that user data only be provided to government agencies receipt of a legally binding request. upon Where the company holds data on servers outside the jurisdiction, the company should insist that the host country authorities use the appropriate Mutual Legal Assistance (bilateral or multilateral MLA treaties) as the only means of arrangements appropriate access.

8. If the law enforcement national authorities of the host demand ad or security country hoc to data held the in contravention of the host access by company country’s own the basis of that is invoked in (normal or emergency) laws, or on emergency of international human that that contravention rights law, or in circumstances suggest the of the data will violate international human the likely uses rights law, company should challenge the demand before the courts of the host country whenever this is practicable, and resist attempts at access pending full judicial review of the demand.

9. If the host country demands direct access to company data, through the insertion of “black box” interception or access devices, the should fundamentally opaque company consider its of the product to the such effectively unlimited and provision country: uncontrollable access is fundamentally to the basic principles of the rule of law, contrary unless control and 98 If such demands accompanied by a very strong oversight regime. made in circumstances in which the in is are state question perpetrating large-‐scale or serious human it be assumed that those demands such rights violations, must support

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4.2 Governments

10. Governments of democratic countries, and their diplomatic missions, should support in the implementation of the above proposals. They should assess the human companies rights situation in the countries with such missions, and share this information with about and services in those in companies thinking offering products countries, particular when there is evidence that serious human violations widespread or rights are or are to in the This assessment should include laws. likely take place country. any emergency Those and missions should be able draw within governments to on expert knowledge their this end. told included this own ministry to One government us they already type of information in risk maintained each countries and a register by embassy. Democratic their diplomatic missions should moreover engage with companies and NGOs in the exchanges of information referred to above.

11. Governments and diplomatic missions should make clear that serious breach of any human rights assurances given to companies will be taken at a high diplomatic level, up and will have serious diplomatic repercussions.

12. Governments should be to in resolution to and willing engage dispute measures try resolve conflicts human in the of sold and any over rights compliance use products from their should that feel supported by companies country. They support companies forced disable in the circumstances described to products above, or to challenge demands from the host country, or to withdraw their product.

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13. States should insist that demands for access to data held on their territory should be made only through the applicable Mutual Legal Assistance arrangements (bilateral or multilateral MLA treaties), and that extraterritorial demands for access to data on a 99 server in their jurisdiction would otherwise constitute a violation of sovereignty. Consideration should be to such action the domestic law of given explicitly backing up by the countries concerned, and in the and treaties inter-‐governmental arrangements referred to should also consider to below. They applying civil legal liability companies that fail due and fail take to perform diligence checks, to measures to prevent, mitigate end abuse of for the of human or products perpetration large-‐scale or serious rights violations.

14. States should consider including tools that have primary or significant potential uses for human rights violations (such as high-‐end mass surveillance equipment and weaponised exploits) in “dual use” export control regimes, requiring suppliers to undertake extensive due diligence on end-‐users before to or maintenance or training for export support, specific repressive regimes.

15. States should and extend the of international control formally explicitly purposes arms from international also the agreements essentially military security to cover protection of human at in the terms of the UN to include the aim of rights -‐ or least, system, from fulfil their their preventing or stopping states failing to “responsibility to protect” own citizens. The Wassenaar Arrangement is the broadest international agreement that could be used for this critical “race the bottom” purpose -‐ a requirement to prevent a to where their to countries that have not such suppliers simply move operations imposed controls. Until this is that of the Wassenaar rules should be achieved, we suggest many mutandis which fail fulfil their applied mutatis to situations in states to “duty to protect” the human of their in which this looks rights own citizens, or likely to happen imminently. The Wassenaar Arrangement requires “The ability to make a clear and objective specification of the item.” The maintenance of a list of controlled items and targeted states would require frequent multi-‐stakeholder discussion between the Wassenaar states, technology companies, and human rights and academics with groups expertise in the use of these tools for human rights violations.

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16. Tools useful for activism should be more excluded from controls political clearly export and sanctions. At broad general licences, allowing the of software a minimum, export and well easier to understand and with than support as as information, are comply a for individual The Information section of the requirement licensing procedures. Security dual-‐use list could be but Wassenaar immediately scrapped as it is now largely obsolete, still obstructing the distribution of activism tools such as Tor.

17. Transparency is crucial to ensuring that intrusive technologies are used correctly, in line with the standards we have adduced. States should establish oversight and reporting procedures in relation to the use of those technologies, and wide debate on encourage them, including in their legislatures. Meaningful statistics and information should be published to allow the general public to how, how often, and in what kind of see circumstances such used. Failure state to or cases technologies are by a seriously and the of such is clear indicator of supervise report on use technologies a likely abuse, and is thus factor that should take into in their "due risk a companies account diligence" assessments.

4.3 Inter-Governmental Organisations

18. Global and regional IGOs should review the international system relating to Mutual Legal Assistance (bilateral or multilateral MLA treaties), to address the currently arrangements unresolved complex legal issues that arise under them, 100 with view to the a support recommendation made for to confirm that law enforcement and we governments national in should demand from in security agencies one country not access a company that the and data in another but that such country to company’s servers country, rather, demands for such data held in the latter should be made access to country always through the relevant MLA treaty. At the same time, such a review should also address the need introduce such data under to speedy (and in some case, emergency) access to such MLAs, subject to appropriate safeguards. Further research is needed into measures that can increase the responsiveness of MLA requests while protecting human rights and public policy objectives, as well as understanding how to resolve conflict of laws issues that are currently arising – a key issue according to one official we interviewed.

19. Intergovernmental should make clear that countries and regional organisations like the EU incentives to that act in accordance organisations may provide companies with the recommendations made and disincentives above, conversely may impose on that those of companies act blatantly contrary to recommendations, e.g., in terms trade and without that preferential treatment in contracts, being regarded as an interference in free trade, World Trade principles. US and or contrary to Organisation calls for restrictions Internet freedom of to be classified European on expression as barriers to trade101 should be consideration the WTO. given speedy by

4.4 Non-Governmental Organisations

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20. Non-‐Governmental Organisations are frequently in possession of reliable information on the human rights situation, and on relevant laws and in countries in which practices, companies would like to sell human rights sensitive products. NGOs should with engage such if the latter keen to avoid in human companies are becoming complicit rights violations in those in that would not the countries, a way compromise independence and of the work of such NGOs. GNI forum for such impartiality can provide a engagement.

role about relevant international 21. NGOs can play an important in educating companies standards (which as we have shown are complex), and in training company staff in how to deal with human rights concerns in countries in which they operate, and in the carrying out of human rights impact assessments. NGOs can also help to educate activists about using online communications tools safely.

22. NGOs should and themselves efforts to create international support, engage in, stronger law frameworks for the of human in relation to the sale and of protection rights support human sensitive should and for rights products by companies. They develop campaign human law standards how demand removal stronger rights on governments content and of that often have /blocking sharing user data, given specific governmental actions global implications.

23. NGOs should do more to raise public awareness about the roles and responsibilities of ICT companies in protecting people against human rights abuses, and on how to make informed decisions as consumers and users when choosing between ICT products and services. They can also do more to educate people about how to themselves protect against human rights abuses when using ICTs in their daily lives as well as during political crises.

4.5 Investors

24. Socially responsible investors should expect companies to commit to appropriate human rights standards that meet three essential tests. Standards should have operational utility, addressing issues in a concrete, practical They should be developed and way. implemented in a multi-‐stakeholder with NGOs, academic experts and other process stakeholders. And they should accountability through public even if require reporting, certain details are held back in some extremely sensitive situations.

5 Endnotes

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2 Dunstan Allison Hope, Protecting Human Rights in the Digital Age: Understanding Evolving Freedom of Expression and Privacy Risks in the Information and Communications Technology Industry, BSR, February 2011. 3 Cf., Fredrik Laurin, Telco caught colluding with dictators, Index on Censorship, 1 May e.g., 2012: “Nordic Telecom giant TeliaSonera forced to act after evidence that its data has been abused to harass and activists and Belarus.” target, jail in Uzbekistan, Azerbaijan 4 The Net Delusion: How Not Liberate the World, Allen Evgeny Morozov, to Lane, 2011, pp.9-‐14. 5 Freedom House, Freedom on the Net -‐ A Global Assessment of Internet and Digital Media, 2011, at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/4dad59042.html. 7 Peter Sommer, Can “comms data” and “content” and what will it cost? we separate – for London School of at Scrambling Safety, Economics, April 2012, http://scramblingforsafety.org/2012/sf2012_sommer_commsdata_content.pdf. 8 Social See Ian Brown & Douwe Korff, Media and Human Rights, in Human Rights and a Media Council of December Changing Landscape, Europe Publishing, 2011, pp. 175 – 206. Note that although the systems may be relatively easy to by-‐pass, this will often flag up the individuals doing this, and them to repressive actions on the part of the authorities. expose 9 Most recently see Freedom on the Net, note 5; The Net Delusion, note 4; Richard Fontaine and Will Rogers, Internet Freedom: A Foreign Policy Imperative in the Digital Age, Centre for New American 2011; Without Borders, Enemies of the Internet, 2010, a Security, Reporters at C. M. E. De Marco http://en.rsf.org/IMG/pdf/Internet_enemies.pdf; Callanan, Gercke, and H. Internet in democratic Dries-‐Ziekenheiner, blocking: balancing cybercrime responses Aconite Internet and Rebecca Consent of the societies, Solutions, 2009; MacKinnon, Basic 2012. Networked, Books, 10 See Douwe Korff, The Right to Life: A guide to the implementation of Article 2 of the European Convention on Human Rights, Council of Europe Human Rights Handbook No. 8, 2006, in particular pp. 59 – 85. See also the quote from a UN Fact Sheet at the beginning of section 2.3. 11 Cf. the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1989 (in force since 1990).

1 Frank La of the Special the and of the Rue, Report Rapporteur on promotion protection to freedom of and Human Council seventeenth right opinion expression, Rights session, document 16 2011. A/HRC/17/27, May

6 See in particular the information provided by the OpenNet Initiative at http://opennet.net/: “ONI’s mission is to identify and document Internet filtering and surveillance, and to and inform wider public dialogues about such practices.” See promote publications Access Denied, Access Controlled, and Access Contested and profiles. country

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12 Council of Additional Protocol to the Convention the Europe, on Cybercrime, concerning criminalisation of of racist and committed acts a xenophobic nature through computer systems, 28 January 2003, CETS No. 189. 14 Home Office, Protecting the Public in a Changing Communications Environment, Cm 7586, The Stationary Office, April 2009, p.8. 15 Nokia Siemens Networks, Statement to the Public New Information Hearing on Technologies and Human Rights, 2 June at 2010, http://www.nokiasiemensnetworks.com/news-‐events/press-‐room/statement-‐to-‐the-‐public-‐ hearing-‐on-‐new-‐information-‐technologies-‐and-‐human-‐rights. 16 The Shadow The from the James Bamford, Factory: NSA 9/11 to Eavesdropping on America, 2008, Doubleday and The NSA Is Building the Country’s Biggest Spy Center (Watch What You Say), Wired, 15 March 2012; Emma Draper, Round-‐up: Scrambling for Safety 2012, Privacy International, at https://www.privacyinternational.org/blog/round-‐up-‐ scrambling-‐for-‐safety-‐2012. When we discussed this with officials from a major Western it was not denied that the of that have an interest country, security agencies country might in certain states exported “black boxes”. The could conduct surveillance using agencies the and/or vulnerabilities in the concerned. through company systems 17 The here all the main international human but tests set out are common to rights treaties, under the somewhat most developed European Convention on Human Rights. For a longer overview of the details of these tests, see: Douwe Korff, The Standard Approach Under Articles 8 – 11 ECHR and Article 2 ECHR, at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/news/events/conference_dp_2009/presentations_speeches/KO RFF_Douwe_a.pdf. Cf. also the Office of the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-‐Terrorism, HCHR Fact Sheet No. 32, 2008, 23 26. pp. – These basic standards are also reflected in Part I of the Siracusa Principles on the Limitation and Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political and in Derogation Rights, the Johannesburg Principles on National Freedom of and Access to Security, Expression Information. 18 Cf. the “The law should Johannesburg Principles, Principle 1.1(b): provide for adequate and the safeguards against abuse, including prompt, full effective judicial scrutiny of restriction tribunal.” validity of [any] by an independent court or (emphasis added)

19 Human Rights Committee, General Comment No. 31 on the Nature of the General Legal Obligation Imposed on States Parties to the [International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights], 29 March 2004 (2187th meeting), UN Doc CCPR/C/21/Rev.1/Add. 13 of 26 May 2004, 8. para.

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not violations of the to life: see Article the is in constituting right 15(2) ECHR; same implied the Under the freedom of conscience and is also ICCPR). ICCPR, thought, religion non-‐ be limited under the normal derogable (although it may rules). Finally note that, as discussed in the the of discrimination in the ICCPR is also made text, general prohibition non-‐derogable, in respect of the most important grounds for discrimination.

22 Article 15(1) ECHR. The ICCPR only has: “In time of public which threatens the emergency life of the nation” (Art. 4(1)), but this is read as clearly also including a time of war.

23 See the UN Fact Sheet No. 32, note 17, 37 38. pp. –

24 Human Rights General Comment No. 5 of Rights (Article 4), Committee, on Derogation 31/07/1981; Human General Comment No. 29 States Rights Committee, on of Emergency (Article 4), 31/08/2001.

25 The of the standards of be found Note 17. summary applicable in times emergency can on pp. 26 – 29 of the Fact Sheet.

26 The Siracusa Principles were contained in an Annex to a Note verbale from the Dutch to the UN Commission Human Rights, dated 24 1984, and government on August subsequently in UN Document E/CN.4/1985/4 of 28 September 1984. The Paris Minimum Standards at the 61st Conference of the International Law Association, held in were adopted Paris from 26 to September 1984. They published in October 1985. The August 1, were AJIL, 1 October 1995 of in Johannesburg Principles were adopted on by a group experts international national and human convened ARTICLE the law, security, rights by 19, International collaboration with the for Centre Against Censorship, in Centre Applied Legal Studies of the University of the Witwatersrand, in Johannesburg. Although none of these three documents are binding or constitute formal legal interpretations of the law, they chime with the approach taken by the Human Rights Committee and other international judicial and quasi-‐judicial human rights bodies. Moreover, the first two are explicitly referred to in General Comment No. 29 (See the last sentence of 10, and footnote 6 to para. which it refers.) while the third (the Johannesburg Principles) have been endorsed by Mr. Abid Hussain, the UN on Freedom of and in his Special Rapporteur Opinion Expression, to the and 2001 sessions of the United Nations Commission on reports 1996, 1998, 1999 Human and referred to the Commission in their annual resolutions freedom of Rights, by on since 1996. All three therefore be taken authoritative expression every year may as by to with the GNI companies trying comply Principles.

27 The main UN documents be found can at: http://ap.ohchr.org/documents/dpage_e.aspx?m=134. Information on the main activities of the Council of Europe in this respect can be found at http://www.coe.int/what-‐we-‐do/rule-‐ of-‐law/terrorism. See also the following pages with links to relevant conventions and other texts: http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/conventions_en.asp, http://www.coe.int/t/dlapil/codexter/otherTexts_en.asp. For the activities of the European Union, see the EU Council website: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/fight-‐against-‐ terrorism?lang=en. The main EU documents in this available at: area are http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/fight-‐against-‐terrorism/documents?lang=en. See also the website of the EU Counter-‐Terrorism Co-‐ordinator, at: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/policies/fight-‐against-‐terrorism/eu-‐counter-‐terrorism-‐co-‐ Cf. also section of the EU’s “Stockholm ordinator?lang=en. 4.5 Programme”, at:

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One of this http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/10/st05/st05731.en10.pdf. aspect is the the the of the and of programme pursuit by EU, through UN, drafting adoption a International Comprehensive Convention on Terrorism (Stockholm Programme, p. 87).

28 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Martin Scheinin -‐ Ten areas of best practices in countering terrorism, Human Rights Council, Sixteenth Session, UN Document A/HRC/16/51, 22 December 2010. The first report by Martin Scheinin’s successor as Special Rapporteur, Ben Emmerson, will be submitted to the HR Council’s twentieth session, later in 2012.

29 Fact Sheet No. note 17. 32,

30 Council of Human and the terrorism: The Council of Europe, rights fight against Europe Guidelines, 2005.

31 Note 26.

32 As the UN Special Rapporteur on human rights and terrorism put it: “The adoption of overly broad definitions of terrorism carries the potential for deliberate misuse of the term ... including as a to claims and social movements of indigenous peoples as well as – response – unintended human abuses. Failure to restrict counter-‐terrorism laws and rights implementing to the of conduct which is truly terrorist in nature also measures countering the risk where such laws and restrict the and pose that, measures enjoyment of rights will the and that the freedoms, they offend principles of necessity proportionality govern human of best permissibility of any restriction on rights.” (Ten areas practices in countering terrorism, note 28, para. 26). Indeed, we would go somewhat further than the Special Rapporteur, and feel that applying anti-‐terrorist measures to such acts -‐ i.e., to acts that are not “truly terrorist in nature” is prima facie disproportionate and and thus in -‐ unnecessary -‐ violation of international human rights law.

33 Ten areas of best practices in countering terrorism, note 28, 21. para.

34 Idem, 28. para.

35 The definition in the Draft UN Convention International Terrorism Comprehensive on reads follows commits offence within the of as (emphasis added): “Any person an meaning this Convention if that and Death person, by any means, unlawfully intentionally, causes: or serious bodily injury to any person; or Serious damage to public or private property, of including a place public use, a state or government facility, a public transportation system, an infrastructure facility or the environment; or Damage to property, places, facilities, or systems referred to in paragraph1 (b) of this article, resulting or likely to result in major economic loss, when the of the conduct, by its nature or context, is to purpose intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing act." Note that it is precisely because no on this any agreement definition could be reached that the drafting is deadlocked. On some of the difficulties to the definition Innocent International Terrorism in relating see, e.g., Maja, Defining Light of Liberation at Movements, July 2008,

http://www.nyulawglobal.org/Globalex/International_terrorism&liberation_movements.ht m).

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36 See the comments in the UN Fact Sheet No. note that broad 32, 17, “Overly vague or definitions of terrorism be used may by states as a means to cover peaceful acts to protect alia labour human limit inter rights, minority rights or rights or, more generally, to any sort of and that “Too wide definition political opposition.” (p. 40); or vague a [of terrorism, terrorist acts and terrorist groups] may lead to the criminalization of groups whose aim is to peacefully protect, inter alia, labour, minority or human rights.” (p. 44). Cf. also 24 of the p. Fact Sheet, under the heading “(b) In the pursuance of a legitimate purpose”.

37 Idem., 43. See also the reference to the points made by the UN Special Representative p. of the Secretary-‐General in Human Rights Defenders in that respect, on 44. Cf. also p. of the Principle 2(b) Johannesburg Principles.

38 Idem, 32. The Council of the Prevention of Terrorism para. Europe Convention on 2005, CETS No. 196. See also the UN Fact Sheet No. note which stresses that 32, 17, “Prohibiting incitement terrorism be limited what is to must therefore to actually required to protect national security or public order”, and must always remain proportionate to those aims (p. 26).

40 Cf., from our own of the law regarding freedom of in the experience: Aspects expression Federal of later used Korff’s trial observation the Republic Germany (1983), (with report on in the International Prosecution for the case against Haag et al.) Amnesty publication exercise of the to freedom of in the Federal of AI right expression Republic Germany, Document EUR restrictions freedom of 23/02/85, London, 1985; Criminal-‐legal on expression in Israel and the Occupied Territories (1986), used in an AI Submission to the Israeli government that year. On the German situation in the 1970s and early 80s, see in particular also chapter 4, Criminal Law as a Weapon/Das Strafrecht als Kampfmittel, in Sebastian Cobler, Law, Order and Politics in West Germany, Penguin, 1978 (translation of Die Gefahr geht von den Menschen aus: der vorverlegte Staatsschutz, Rothbuch, 1976). These are just examples of the general tendency of anti-‐terrorist or laws over emergency time spreading out (or being brought forward) to cover all kinds of actions that are not “of a terrorist nature”. manifestly truly

41 UN Fact Sheet No. section 37 with references 32, note 17, E, pp. – 38, to statements by the UN Committee the Elimination of Racial the Inter-‐American on Discrimination, Commission Human the Commission Racism and on Rights, European against Intolerance, and the Network of Fundamental European Union Independent Experts on Rights.

42 Report of the independent expert on the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, Robert K. Goldman, submitted to the Commission on Human Rights by the High Commissioner for Human Rights, UN Document E/CN.4/2005/103 of 7 February 2005.

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without much to the rules adding general regarding lawfulness, legitimate aim, necessity and proportionality. 49 of the of the the issue of human Report Special Representative Secretary-‐General on rights and transnational and other business John corporations enterprises, Ruggie: Protect, and Framework Business and Human UN Human Respect Remedy: a for Rights, Rights Council Document 7 2008. In this the A/HRC/8/5, April report, Special Representative rightly that: “The well established international law and be stresses duty to protect is in must not confused with the concept of the “responsibility to protect” in the humanitarian intervention debate.” (par. 9, note 5, p. 4) 50 See the Ruggie Principles, Part I, The state duty to protect human rights (paras. 1 – 10 of the Principles). 51 Idem., Part II, The responsibility to human rights, 11 (commentary corporate respect para. on the first “foundational principle”), emphasis added. 52 Idem. 53 Idem., “Issues of added. para. 23 (commentary on context”), emphasis 54 Idem., Part II, section B, paras. 16 – 24. 55 Idem., 17, emphasis added. para. 56 Idem. 57 Idem., Part section 17 on the “human due II, B, para. (commentary rights diligence” principle), emphasis added. 58 Idem., Part section 18 and added. II, B, paras. 19, emphasis 59 Idem., Part II, section B, para. 21, emphasis added. 60 Idem. 61 See the principles quoted in the text, and also the more general stipulation in the Preamble to the GNI Principles that: “Information and Communications Technology (ICT)

45 Protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms while countering terrorism, UN Document A/61/267 of 16 August 2006.

46 See 2nd. Harris, O’Boyle & Warbrick, Law of the European Convention on Human Rights, ed. (2009), Chapter 1, section 5, Negative and Positive Obligations and Drittwirkung, in particular 19 21. pp. –

47 Report of the of the the issue of human Special Representative Secretary-‐General on rights and transnational and other business John Ruggie: Guiding corporations enterprises, Business and Human the United Nations Principles on Rights: Implementing “Protect, and UN Human Council Document 21 Respect Remedy” Framework, Rights A/HRC/17/31, March 2011.

48 Corporate Responsibility to Respect Human Rights Sector Guidance Project, ICT Sector Discussion Paper for Public Comment, Institute for Human Rights and Business and Shift, 24 May 2012, at http://www.ihrb.org/pdf/roundtable-‐discussion-‐papers/ICT-‐Sector-‐ Roundtable-‐Discussion-‐Paper-‐For-‐Public-‐Comment.pdf.

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have the to and the and companies responsibility respect protect freedom of expression their users” privacy rights of (emphasis added). 62 GNI Principles, Principles 2 and 3. 63 See Principle 4: Responsible Company Decision Making, Principle 5: Multi-‐stakeholder Collaboration. 64 For these matters spelled out somewhat differently, and in less some reason, are more or detail, in the different sections dealing with freedom of expression and privacy. In our shortened summaries have them (with or paraphrases, we brought together emphasis added), and have omitted comments in the Implementation Guidelines referred to as Guidance”. deal with those comments later in the text. “Application Rather, we separately 66 Google, Better search in mainland China, Inside Search, 31 2012, May at http://insidesearch.blogspot.co.uk/2012/05/better-‐search-‐in-‐mainland-‐china.html. 68 footnote below. See 92, 70 Paul Sonne and Aided Wall Street 30 Margaret Coker, Firms Libyan Spies, Journal, August Vernon Silver and Ben in Bahrain Becomes Routine With From 2011; Elgin, Torture Help Nokia 22 Vernon Siemens, Bloomberg, August 2011; Silver, H-‐P Computers Underpin Syria 18 Leila Coat: US Surveillance, Bloomberg, November 2011; Nachawati, Blue technology Global surveilling Syrian citizens online, Voices Advocacy, 10 October 2011; Cindy Cohn, Trevor Timm and Jillian Can Avoid York, Corporations Assisting Repressive Regimes, Electronic Frontier Foundation, 17 April 2012, at https://www.eff.org/sites/default/files/filenode/human-‐rights-‐technology-‐sales.pdf; The Local, TeliaSonera 'profits by helping dictators spy', 18 April 2012. 71 Internet blocking: balancing cybercrime in democratic societies, note 9. responses 72 Silver and Elgin, idem. 73 Mark Freedom of Internet and Human Chandler, Cisco Supports Expression, an Open Cisco 6 Rights, Blog, June 2011, at http://blogs.cisco.com/news/cisco-‐supports-‐freedom-‐of-‐ expression-‐an-‐open-‐internet-‐and-‐human-‐rights/. 74 Cisco Systems, Overview of the Public Security Sector, 2002, slide 57, at

65 In another have the of the of law context, we addressed question application domestic freedom of made websites other restrictions on expression to expressions on registered in countries: see Human Rights and a Changing Media Landscape, note 8. However, that is a separate question from the ones relating to companies’ duties and responsibilities.

67 Wassenaar Controls for Conventional Arms and Dual-‐Use Goods Arrangement on Export and Guidelines & the Initial amended and Technologies Procedures, including Elements (as in December 2003 and WA updated July 2004), Secretariat, Vienna, at http://www.wassenaar.org/2003Plenary/initial_elements2003.htm.

69 Vaughan Lowe, Chapter 10 Jurisdiction, Section III The Fundamental Principles -‐ – Governing Enforcement Jurisdiction, in: Malcolm Evans (Ed.), International Law, 1st ed., OUP, 2003, 351. p.

http://www.wired.com/images_blogs/threatlevel/files/cisco_presentation.pdf.

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75 The White Sheet: A and New Tools to Prevent and House, Fact Comprehensive Strategy 23 Respond to Atrocities, April 2012, at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-‐press-‐ office/2012/04/23/fact-‐sheet-‐comprehensive-‐strategy-‐and-‐new-‐tools-‐prevent-‐and-‐ respond-‐atro.

76 Reporters without Borders, Companies that cooperate with dictatorships must be sanctioned, 2 September 2011, at http://en.rsf.org/companies-‐that-‐cooperate-‐with-‐02-‐09-‐ 2011,40914.html.

77 note Hope 2 p.21.

78 Nachawati note 70.

79 Blue Blue Coat Devices in 15 Coat, Update on Syria, December 2011, at http://www.bluecoat.com/company/news/statement-‐syria.

80 Prosecutor Ramush The International Criminal Tribunal for the v. Haradinaj et al., Former Yugoslavia and the Threshold of Non-‐International Armed Conflict in International Humanitarian Law, ASIL Insights, Vol. 12, Issue 7, 23 April 2008, at http://www.asil.org/insights080423.cfm. Note however that the Council has Security over the last decades become more willing to recognise the existence of a threat to international and and indeed to authorise the of force in such contexts. As Christine peace security, use notes: “The Council has not [only] authorized force Gray Security against an aggressor state, but it has also authorized force in internal sometimes in to conflicts, response non-‐ with UN-‐brokered the of humanitarian aid in cooperation cease-‐fires; to secure delivery Somalia and safe havens and enforce in Yugoslavia; to protect no-‐fly zones in Bosnia-‐ Herzegovina; to restore democracy in Haiti; to protect a refugee camp in Rwanda …” (Christine Gray, The Use of Force in International Law, in: Malcolm Evans [Ed.], International 1st Law, ed., 2003, 609). Still, there are situations in which the SC did not act, or p. many recognised the existence of a threat to international peace and security. There have, for instance, been no Security Council Resolutions under Chapter VII of the Charter (which deals with international and security) in respect of Uzbekistan -‐ one of the most repressive peace in the world. regimes

81 For A Price List For Hackers’ Secret Andy Greenberg, Shopping Zero-‐Days: Software 9 2012. Exploits, Forbes, April

82 2008/0249(COD) -‐ 27/09/2011 Text adopted by European Parliament, 1st reading/single reading.

83 18 US Code § 2512, Export Control Classification Number 5D980 and 5E980.

84 Cindy Cohn and Jillian York, “Know Your Customer” Standards for Sales of Surveillance Equipment, Electronic Frontier Foundation, 24 October 2011, at https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/10/it’s-‐time-‐know-‐your-‐customer-‐standards-‐sales-‐ surveillance-‐equipment.

Law 54

88 Ibid. 95 Sui-‐Lee Wee, Insight: Cisco suits on China rights abuses to test legal reach, Reuters, 8 September 2011. 96 Chandler, note 73. 100 See Kate Westmoreland, Sharing Evidence across Borders: the Human Rights Challenge, 2012 (forthcoming).

89 Maija shun Pakistan Financial 14 March 2012. Palmer, Technology groups firewall, Times,

90 Corporations Can Avoid Assisting Repressive Regimes, note 70.

91 Cohn, Timm and York, note 70.

92 Vassilis Prevelakis and Diomidis Spinellis, The Athens Affair, IEEE Spectrum, July 2007.

93 Websense, Websense Policy Government-‐Imposed Censorship, 2011, at on http://www.websense.com/content/censorship-‐policy.aspx.

94 John Claims Cisco China Pursue Falun New York 22 Markoff, Suit Helped Gong, Times, May 2011, at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/23/technology/23cisco.html.

97 FIDH and LDH file a complaint concerning the responsibility of the AMESYS in company relation to acts of 19 October 2011, at http://www.fidh.org/FIDH-‐and-‐LDH-‐file-‐a-‐ torture, complaint.

98 COE Commissioner for Human Issue the in the Rights, Paper on Protecting right to privacy fight against terrorism, 2008, in particular the bullet-‐points in section 7, Conclusions, p. 14. Cf. also the discussions of the surveillance the and supervisory systems over in UK Germany, in the ECHR Cases of Weber and Saravia v. Germany (Admissibility Decision on Application no. 54934/00, 29 June 2006) and Liberty and Others v. the United Kingdom (Judgment of 1 July 2008).

99 Cf. the recent on US subpoenas on private companies holding EU citizens' data, in report the EDRi weekly of 27 April 2012: “Commissioner Reding indicated that the report Commission considered that when law in the US realises [European] a enforcement authority that is outside its the channel obtain the necessary information jurisdiction, appropriate to data should be the mechanisms that with Member transfer cooperation are in place EU States where that data located. Such instruments the bilateral are are, among others, Mutual Legal Assistance agreements and, more specifically, the EU-‐US Mutual Legal She added that outside the established when Assistance agreement. currently channels, replying directly to requests originating by US authorities, companies may be in breach of national rules implementing the Directive 95/46/EC.”

101 Cynthia Internet censorship trade barrier: look the WTO of the Liu, as a a at consistency in the wake the Journal of International great firewall of China-‐Google dispute, Georgetown Law June 2011. 42(4) pp. 1199-‐1240,

13 London Assembly, Report of the 7 July Review Committee, Greater London Authority, June 2006, s.3.12.

20 Ibid., 10. On the duties of companies themselves to and the rights of para. respect protect their section 2.4. customers, see

21 The freedom from and the life most important “non-‐derogable” rights are torture right to that that result in deaths but that in accordance with the Geneva (except acts are Conventions and its Additional Protocols [“lawful acts of war”] are ipso facto regarded as

39 Practice 9. Core elements of best practice in the listing of terrorist entities, point 1, in para. 35.

43 UN Fact Sheet No. 32, note 17, section I, 44. p.

44 COE note section Measures which with Guidelines, 30, VI, interfere privacy, point 1, on p. added. See also the of the case-‐law of the Court of Human 11, emphasis summary European Rights in this area, on pp.

21 – 22. The UN Fact Sheet No. 32, note 17, deals with the same issues of “Surveillance, data protection and the right to privacy” in section J, pp.

45 – 46, but

85 Idem.

86 Whitfield Diffie and Susan the Line: The Politics of and Landau, Privacy on Wiretapping Encryption, MIT Press, 1999.

87 Steve Stecklow, Chinese firm helps Iran spy on citizens, Reuters, 22 March 2012.