Baca PDF (OCR): Indonesia free : a political biography of Mohammad Hatta / Mavis Rose

abundant riches.... The economic basis in the future will avoid individualism as much as possible and come as close as possible to collectivism, that is of maintaining an equal level of prosperity.34 Hatta knew that the Indonesian trader and farmer was vulnerable to international consortiums and world marketing systems. Although opposing individualism, he never suggested that an individual should not have rights to trade or hold private property, which would anyway be against Islamic teaching. The emphasis in economic policies formulated by Hatta was the protection of the weaker members of society involved 1n the economic process. On July 16, 1945, the BPKI completed Its deliberations accepting the Draft Constitution. On the same day, news was received from Tokyo that Japan would recognize the independence of the East Indies as soon as possible, with an acknowledgement that the three war zones must now liaise more closely on the independence issue. It was decided to establish an arch1pelago-w1de Pan1t1a Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia [Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence—PPKI] which would allow regional representatives to pool their viewpoints on independence Issues, such as the Draft Constitution formulated in Java. This decision was warmly received by Hatta, who had been conscious of an underrepresentation of the Outer Island viewpoint in the sessions of the BPKI. Hatta had been permitted to fly to Banjarmasin in Kalimantan [Borneo] the previous month, where at a meeting of local dignitaries in the Town Hall he had faced a barrage of questions on how independent Indonesia would be governed and what would be its territorial limits. Hatta assured his listeners that the boundaries of the new nation would correspond to the former Netherlands East Indies. Hatta’s speeches seemed to have an impact 1n the Outer Islands, winning considerable support from the local elite. The journey was not uneventful. Noor, an engineer from Kalimantan who accompanied Hatta, recalling that their airplane had to skirt a force of Allied bombers, remarked on Hatta1s cool Indifference to the dangers around him. He reportedly showed more interest in the areas of tall along-(Liang grass through which their vehicle passed on the journey from the airport to the town, querying whether the area could be drained and developed for rice production.33 Hatta's first meeting with the local people had to be carried out 1n blackout conditions in the courtyard of the house where he was lodging because of air-raid warnings. His address was significant 1n that, for the first time, he spoke out openly about Japan’s impossible military situation and the likelihood of Its Imminent defeat, comments usually expressed privately but never aired in public.3^ The extent of devastation on Hiroshima resulting from the drop of an atomic bomb on August 6 highlighted the proximity and strength of the Allied forces. On August 9, Sukarno, Hatta, and Dr. Rajlman Wed1on1ngrat were unexpectedly summoned to Saigon to hold discussions with Marshal Terauchi, the Japanese commander-in-chief for the Southern Territories. Japan wanted an assurance of Indonesian support in return for Independence. Their airplane never reached Saigon, crash-landing in a field several miles from the city.37 Following an overnight stop in Saigon, the party was driven to a villa at Dalat where Marshal Terauchi was convalescing following an illness. 115

Hatta recalled that the Marshal confirmed the granting of Independence to Indonesia, allowing the new PPKI to set the date for a proclamation to be made. "I was unusually happy because, being August 12, It was my birthday,” commented Hatta, continuing: ”In my innermost heart I considered Indonesian independence to be my special gift for those long years of struggle for the freedom of Indonesia.”38 On the return journey, Sukarno and Hatta learned the strategic news that Russia had entered the war and was advancing on Manchuria. They now realized that the battlefront might never reach Java, that Japan would be forced to surrender, handing Indonesia back to the Allied forces, including the Dutch, before independence was declared. This meant that members of the new preparatory committee must act fast to proclaim independence. Fortunately the Japanese had announced the committee’s membership and arrangements were under way to bring the Outer Island delegates to Jakarta for an inaugural meeting on August 18. On the section of the return flight between Singapore and Jakarta, Hatta and Sukarno had an opportunity to confer with the three Sumatran delegates to the PPKI who were sharing their plane. Hatta urged the three Sumatrans to accept the Draft Constitution in its present form to prevent any hold-up.30 He believed the most contentious issue for Sumatrans might be the decision to designate the whole of Sumatra as one Indonesian province rather than three. There was no suggestion in Hatta’s account, at this stage, that the Sumatrans might be dissatisfied with the Panca SZla. A crowd of people was awaiting the return of Sukarno and Hatta, pressing for information as the two leaders disembarked at Jakarta. As the Japanese officers were anxious to whisk them away for briefing, Sukarno made an unusually short speech. His words had special meaning for the Javanese, referring back to the Joyoboyo legend. ”If I used to say that Indonesia would be free when the corn ripens,” he stated, ”1 can now say that Indonesia will be free before it blossoms.”40 The crowd understood. Hatta recalled that Sukarno’s words were greeted with enthusiastic applause and cries of "IndLonzAla Mzxddta!"*! During their briefing session, Hatta noticed that no mention was made of Japan’s impending defeat, but that discussion centered on preparations for independence. On returning home in the early afternoon, Hatta was greeted by an impatient Sjahrir, who had just picked up the news on h1s radio that Japan had requested peace terms of the Allies. Sjahrir urged Hatta to contact Sukarno immediately to try to persuade him to proclaim Independence over the air 1n the name of the Indonesian people. He was convinced that such a spontaneous declaration would carry more weight with the Allied forces than a declaration made under Japanese auspices.42 Hatta, according to his memoirs, agreed that independence must be proclaimed quickly but ’’doubted whether it could be done by Sukarno alone as the people’s leader in the name of the people" rather than as chairman of the PPKI. As far as the Allies were concerned, Sukarno would still be viewed as a collaborator whatever way he proclaimed independence.43 The situation was reminiscent of 1942 when Hatta contemplated his chances of survival under the advancing forces because of his anti-Japanese sentiments. Now he was a p&uana nan QKaZa. in the eyes of the Allied forces for having collaborated. Hatta realized that a spontaneous declaration of independence would not only violate Indonesia’s agreement with Tokyo but would rob the Outer Islanders of a voice in the independence preparations at a time when they 116

were already suspicious of Java domination. Hatta pointed out to Sjahrlr that If Sukarno acted on h1s Initiative* lfhe would be considered to be expropriating and usurping the rights of the Panltla Perslapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia*"44 in other words* acting undemocratlcally* an Issue about which Sjahrlr was usually very sensitive. The events surrounding the proclamation of Independence and Hatta1s writings on the period reveal his exasperation with Sjahrlr and the pzmuda for their lack of sensitivity to the dangers Inherent 1n rash action and the need to rein In revolutlonary ardor until the Dutch return. His tone Is that of someone who Is convinced that he has moved a rung higher on the ladder towards mature statesmanship, that he considered the stance taken by Sjahrlr and the pzmuda leaders to be unrealistic. As Hatta summed up the situation in h1s later writings: In our opinion* the Proclamation of Independence had to be confirmed by the PPKI because its membership consisted of several Indonesian experts and it was considered to represent the whole of Indonesia. Although the delegates from Java* Sumatra* Kalimantan, Sulawesi, the Lesser Sundas and the Moluccas were appointed by the Japanese, the opinions which they expressed... were the opinions and alms of the people.

• # • Thus the principal difference of opinion was between the Sukarno/Hatta group, which followed a legal course* and the API [Angkatan Pemuda Indoneslal-Students-Sjahrir group which considers Its course to be the revolutionary way. It 1s difficult to reconcile a standpoint which 1s based on the logic emanating from a warm heart and a cool head with a point of view which 1s rebellious and hot-headed.4 5 After three years of collaboration* Hatta was much more finely tuned than Sjahrir to the ebb and flow of compromise between the Japanese and Indonesian leaders. In this delicate period, while hovering on the brink of nationhood, a false step could spell disaster. According to Sastra* an active member of the New PNI during Hatta’s and Sjahrlr’s exile* Sjahrlr was prepared to consider Tan Malaka as a possible alternative proclaimant.4® Sastra further commented: "Remembering that Sukarno and Hatta* although certainly well known to the people* were tainted 1n the people1 s eyes and 1n the International world because of their collaboration with the Japanese* we decided to contact Tan Malaka* the PKI leader who append thz 1926 Communist InAvwuuitlonA and later established and led a clandestine organization, PARI... who had slipped back into Indonesia and was hiding 1n Bayah Banten under the alias Ibrahim." When contacted* Tan Malaka bluntly declared that he was not prepared to proclaim Independence so* concluded Sastra* "for us there were no other alternatives but Bung Karno and Bung Hatta."47 Sjahrlr believed that the period between the Japanese request for peace terms and their acceptance by the Allied forces was the "psychological moment" for independence to be proclaimed* because Japan was then powerless. The proclamation would therefore signify seizing Independence from Japan* not from the Allies.4® It was a convincing argument which* according to Sjahrir’s account* both Sukarno and Hatta were willing to explore* although both preferred to act under the auspices of the PPKI. They learned from Rear-Admiral Maeda the following day, August 15, that the Japanese Emperor had broadcast his country’s Intention to surrender. Maeda also made it clear that no Instructions had been received from 117

Tokyo as to what action the authorities on Java should take. According to Hattafs account, he suggested that the PPKI meeting be held the next morning instead of on August 18, since all the delegates were assembled 1n Jakarta.49 The rumors of Japan’s surrender increased tension among the pmuda. That evening, while frantically preparing papers for the PPKI meeting, Hatta was interrupted by the arrival of two pmuda, who pleaded with him to ensure that the proclamation of independence was not made under the auspices of the PPKI, thus branding it forever as "Japanese made." Hatta, according to his memoirs, tried to convince the young men that he and Sukarno were adopting a sensible, rational stance. He recalled that he was accused of being "no longer a revolutionary."50 Hatta retorted that he wanted to stage a revolution but wanted first of all to organize it properly. He pointed out that the action proposed by the pmuda was not a revolution but more like Hitler’s "putsch" in Munich 1n 1923 which had failed. Pmuda pressure switched to Sukarno, perhaps viewing him as more malleable than the steely Hatta. Wikana, a young prot§g6 of Sukarno who worked with Subardjo in Maeda’s office, was the spokesman for the pmuda delegation, many of whom were from Sjahrir’s group and also from the Menteng 31 oAKama.^ 1 Wikana brought the confrontation to crisis point by accusing Sukarno of failing as a leader, threatening that if he did not make the proclamation, "tomorrow there will be murder and bloodshed." Sukarno’s patience snapped under the pressure and heatedly he shouted at the startled young men: "Here 1s my throat! Don’t wait until tomorrow."52 Hatta, summoned by Subardjo to come to Sukarno’s aid, arrived shortly after this emotional outburst. He took it upon himself to inform the pmuda that neither he nor Sukarno would be forced into taking actions which were unwise. "If you are prepared to proclaim independence yourself, go ahead," he challenged.55 Hatta, when angry, could be awesome and cold. The severity of his tone cut short any further argument but h1s riposte, provoked in anger, bit deeper than he had intended. Hatta admitted that the pmuda delegation "had been shamed" and they took the humiliation as a challenge.54 Their rejoinder to him as they left Sukarno’s house was: "We the pmuda cannot allow the postponement of the proclamation for another day. We will take action and prove our ability as Bung suggested."55 Yet the pmuda realized that they did not have the prestige to make a declaration of independence. They devised a plan to kidnap Sukarno and Hatta, taking them to a Peta barracks at Rengasdenglok, a small town northeast of Jakarta. It was planned that the pmuda would either stage a rally in Ikada Square, 1n an effort to seize control from the Japanese, or would at least threaten to do so, 1n the hope that Sukarno and Hatta would accede to their request.56 According to Des Alwi, there was also a plan to broadcast a text prepared by Sjahrir on the evening of August 15, if Sukarno and Hatta were prepared to sign 1t, which they refused to do.57 The blame for the kidnapping of Sukarno and Hatta early on the morning of August 16 may be attributed in some degree to Hatta’s angry challenge to the pmuda. It should be remembered, however, how physically exhausted he was at the time, after traveling to Saigon under hazardous conditions the previous week and surviving a near-fatal air crash. It was also Ramadan, the month of fasting, always a tiring time. 118

The kidnappers used no force apart from a pointed gun when they bundled Hatta, Sukarno, and h1s wife, Fatmawatl, and baby son, Guntur, Into a car to take them to Rengasdenglok barracks. Hatta’s heart sank as he visualized the PPKI members arriving for the fateful meeting at which Independence was to have been proclaimed, only to find that both he and Sukarno were absent. He recalled; "In my eyes I pictured the destruction of our alms to Implement Free Indonesia."58 ,f0om Hatta was furious about the kidnapping," Des Alw1 admitted.59 Hattafs anger and frustration were understandable; he had been within hours of achieving his life’s goal only to see 1t snatched away by action for which he himself must accept a degree of responsibility. The kidnapping did not weaken the two leaders’ resolve, nor change their viewpoint. The two men merely spent an anxious day speculating on the events taking place In Jakarta. Hatta’s main concern was whether the PPKI meeting would go ahead and what would be the outcome of the panada putsch. If this were not sufficient trial, Hatta suffered the further physical discomfort of having h1s only available pair of trousers wet through while taking a turn at nursing baby Gunturl^O Sj'ahrlr did not support the kidnapping, although he backed the panada plans to proclaim Independence In Ikada Square. Subardjo and Rear-Admiral Maeda at first suspected that the Japanese Army had arrested Sukarno and Hatta, but the Gunselkan denied responsibility. The Kempeltal was ordered to search for them. Through Wlkana, Subardjo managed to ferret out details of what had happened, finally persuading the young man to take him to Rengasdenglok. Hatta was relieved to hear that no youthful uprising had 1n fact taken place. The PPKI members had decided to postpone their meeting. Hatta resolved to make up for lost time, and on h1s return to Jakarta that evening tried to arrange an Immediate meeting of the PPKI. He gladly accepted Maedafs offer of his house as a venue, knowing 1t was free of Kempeltal and Japanese Army Interference. But a new obstacle had arisen. Sukarno and Hatta were Informed that, under the surrender terms, Japan was ordered to maintain the status quo 1n all occupied territories from the date of acceptance of the Allied ultimatum. They were also warned not to try to convene the PPKI meeting In Admiral Maeda’s house. Maeda did, however, manage to extract from the Army a reluctant assurance that, as long as Independence was proclaimed quietly and the panada remained calm and under control, the military authorities would remain passive.6* Word was quickly passed to the panada to send representatives to Maeda’s house so that not only the PPKI members but the panada as well could join 1n drawing up the proclamation of independence. Sjahrlr, anti-Japanese to the end, refused to enter Maeda’s house, but his panada group took along the text which he had helped them to prepare. Sukarno and Hatta rejected Sjahrlr’s text, sensing that Its tone was too provocative. They decided Instead to use a sentence from the Preamble to the Draft Constitution: "We the Indonesian people declare herewith Indonesia’s independence," merely adding a short sentence: "Matters concerning the transfer of power and other matters will be executed 1n an orderly manner and 1n the shortest possible time."62 The pzmada leaders protested that the proclamation was too "tame" but the PPKI delegates supported 1t wholeheartedly. It was suggested that all present sign the proclamation. The panada refused to sign 1n conjunction with the PPKI members but agreed that six of their members would sign under Sukarno and 119

Hatta’s signature. This was unacceptable to the PPKI delegates. Finally, it was agreed that only Sukarno’s and Hatta’s names should appear on the proclamation. Hatta expressed exasperation and disappointment: f,I hoped that they would join in signing such an historical document which would carry their names to the pride of their future descendants.”63 Sukarno and Hatta rejected any suggestion that the proclamation be made in Ikada Square, knowing that a mass gathering would alarm the Japanese Army. Instead it was decided that independence be proclaimed in the courtyard of Sukarno’s house at ten o’clock that morning, five hours hence. Dawn was already beginning to break. The proclamation of Indonesian independence was not made amid great fanfare. Sukarno, with Hatta at his side, read the brief proclamation while a home-made red and white flag was raised and the anthem Indcwula Raya sung. Hatta obviously felt a great sense of release and happiness, relating how he embraced his family and friends amid tears of joy.6* He knew it was not the final seal of independence, only the beginning of the bitterest conflict of all. But at least now they had a foundation of nationhood on which to build, much more than a seemingly impossible dream. In later years, when the Vwl Tunggal no longer existed as a political unity, Sukarno in his autobiography made a particularly spiteful attack regarding Hatta’s presence at the proclamation ceremony: No one shrieked ”We want Bung Hatta.” I did not need him. Just as also I did not need Sjahrir who refused to show himself at the time of the reading of the Proclamation. Indeed, I could do it myself and indeed I did it alone. In those nerve-wracking days, the role of Hatta in history did not exist. He had no individual role in the time of our struggle. It was just Sukarno who continually pushed him to the fore. I needed this person who was called ”a leader” because of one consideration. I needed him because I am a Javanese and he is a Sumatran and in those days I needed a person from Sumatra. ... At this grave historical moment, Sukarno and the native land of Indonesia awaited the coming of Hatta.65 Not surprisingly, Hatta was forced into print to list his movements on the morning of August 17. His response was quiet and restrained: ’’People knew that I am always punctual. Sukarno need not have worried because he knew my habits.”66 Nevertheless, it was an occasion when Hatta might have relieved tension if he had arrived before schedule. Those organizing the ceremony were growing nervous about Japanese reprisals as the morning progressed. As Sudiro later remarked: ”Up to 0950 Bung Hatta had not put in an appearance but Bung Karno was not prepared to read the Proclamation unless Bung Hatta was present.”67 Sudlro’s reminiscences seem to refute Sukarno’s willingness to act alone. Indeed the historical record would seem to indicate that at the moment of the declaration of Indonesia’s independence, Sukarno and Hatta were working together as a very close-knit team. With Maeda’s cooperation, the Naval Office press was used to Issue copies of the proclamation for distribution in the capital and the news was telephoned and telegraphed across Java. At 7 p.m. that evening, broadcasts of the independence proclamation were made, Des Alwi relating how he had helped to smuggle the text past the Kempeitai guards into the 120

radio building.68 Hatta had also prepared a personal message for trans- mission to his nationalist friends. Sjahrir, although remaining aloof from the declaration because of its association with the Japanese, nevertheless acknowledged that it had the desired impact on the Indonesian people: The effect of the proclamation was tremendous. It was as though our people had been electrified. A majority of the Indonesian civil servants, administrators, police and military groups immediately declared their support for the Republic. National strength and unity reached greater heights than anything we had known before.69

1.Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesian Aims and Ideals,” in Portrait o^ a Patriot, p. 503. Speech, August 23, 1945.
2.See Anderson, Java In a Tabriz o£ Revolution, p. 66.
3.Subadio Sastrosatomo, "Bung Karno dengan Keyakinan dan Tak- dirnya,” p. 87.
4.See Adams, Sukarno, pp. 192-93.
5.Kanahele, "Japanese Occupation of Indonesia,” p. 189, n. 9.
6.Ibid.
7.See B. R. O’G. Anderson, Some Aspects a^ Indonesian Politics unde* tkz Japanese Occupation, 7 944—45 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1961).
8.Y. B. Mangunwijaya, "’Archetype1 Sutan Sjahrir," in Mengenang Sjakrtn,
p. 220.
9.Interview with Subadio Sastrosatomo, February 22, 1982.
10.As reported in Kompas, March 15, 1980.
11.Cited in Abu Han if ah, Tales o£ a Revolution, p. 163.
13.Alfian, "Islamic Modernism in Indonesi an Pol itics, theMuhammadijah Movement during the Dutch Colonial Period (1912-1942)" (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin,
1969), p. 177.
14.Interview Mohamad Roem, February
1982. See also Ny. Maria Ullfah Soebadio, "Bung Hatta dan Saya,” in Bung Hatta: Prtbadlnya dalam Kznangan, p. 262. Ny. Soebadio recalls her first meeting with Hatta in the Netherlands when he came with Haji Agus Salim to visit her father. She comments: "Bung Hatta hardly spoke at all, quite different from Oom Salim who told many stories. In this my first meeting with Bung Hatta, I judged him to be a shy and unassuming person.”
15.Sutan Sjahrir, Ouk StmggJUz, translated with an introduction by
B. O’G. Anderson (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1968).
16.Adams, Sukarno, p. 210.
17.Hatta, Bung Hatta Mzn/atvab, p.
89.
18.Hatta, Memoir, p. 2.
19.Ibid., p. 435.
20.Saifuddin Anshari, Tkz Jakarta Ckartz* o£ June 1945; Tkz StmggJUz hox. an Islamic Constitution In
12.Ibid.

Indonztla (Kuala Lumpur: Muslim Youth Movement of Malaysia, 1979),

p. 17, n. 1.
21.Ibid., p. 14. Sukarno admitted that the Dutch Marxist, Baars, had influenced his thinking. Hatta has defended Sukarno as the originator of the Panca Slla and, according to his secretary I. Wangsa Widjaja, was critical of Yarnin’s documentation of the preparatory committee. (Interview, I. Wangsa Widjaja, February 1982.) Frans Seda claims that Sukarno was already working on the Panca Slla concept while in exile on Flores. See Frans Seda, "Bung Karno, Mikul Duwur, Mendem Jero," in Bung Katna dalam Kznangan, ed. Solichin Salam, p. 74.
22.Mohammad Hatta, Mznuju Uzgatia Hukum. An address delivered on receiving the degree of Doctor Honort* CauAa from the University of Indonesia on 30 August 1975 on the Thirtieth Anniversary of Indonesian Independence (Jakarta: Yayasan Idayu, 1975), pp. 9-10.
23.See Anshari, Jakarta CkartZK,
p. 19.
24.Mohammad Hatta, Sziudak 15 Takun, a Speech delivered on the Ninth Anniversary of Sjiah Kuala Darussalam University in Banda Atjeh on 2 September 1970 (Jakarta: Djambatan, 1970), p. 15.
25.Ibid.
26.A. K. Pringgodigdo, Tkz O^lcz Psiztldznt In IndonxAla a* Vz^lnzd In tkz Tiikzz Constitutions In Tkzoxy and Pnactlcz, trans. A. Brotherton (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957), p. 30.
27.Hatta, MzmolK, p. 461.
28.Pringgodigdo, Ccz a& PkzsI- dznt, p. 6.
29.Ibid.
30.Hatta, Szsudak 15 Takun, pp. 15-16.
31.B. M. Diah, "Manusia Hatta,” in Bung Hatta: Prthadlnya dalam Kznangan, p. 570.
32.According to Hatta in his booklet Pzndldlkan Haslonal Indo- nzsla, p. 29, "the aims of decen- tralisation and autonomy which were supported by the Pzndldlkan Haslonal Indonesia lived on in Article 18 of the Constitution concerning regional government.” According to Professor Kuntjoro Purbopranoto, "Bung Hatta dan Demokrasi Kita," in Bung Hatta Mzngahdl pada Tjlta-T/lta, p. 349, Hatta rejected the creation of a Macktstaat, where the state had excessive powers.
33.Cited in M. Hatta, "Message to

viewpoint but stressed that it would need Sukarno’s cooperation.

43.Hatta, Mzmat*, p. 442, and Anderson, Somz Atpzct* a£ IndanzAtan Palittu, p. 66.
44.Hatta, Manat*, p. 442.
45.Mohammad Hatta, Szktta* Pa- klamatt 17 Aguttut 1945 (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1969), pp. 10-11.
46.Sastra, ,fMakna Sjahrir untuk Sastra dan Sastra untuk Sjahrir," in Mzngznang Sjaht*, p. 90.
47.Ibid., p. 90. Sastra’s italics. Hatta was aware of Tan Malaka’s return to Indonesia and had, he claimed, actually seen him at Bayah Banten where Tan Malaka had deliberately tried to avoid him. See Hatta, Bung Hatta Mznjawab., p. 16. Tan Malaka was said to consider "Sukarno and Hatta to be symbols of the old group who collaborated with the Japanese authorities," deeming them, and especially Sukarno, to be "opportunists." See Alfian, "Tan Malaka: Pejuang Revolusioner yang Kesepian," in Pt4ma, August 8, 1977, p. 90.
48.Sastra, "Makna Sjahrir untuk Sastra dan Sastra untuk Sjahrir,"
p. 91.
49.Hatta, Manat, p. 443.
50.Ibid., pp. 443-44.
51.A. Subardjo Djoyoadisuryo, Laktnya Rzpubltk Indanztta (J aka rta: Kinta, 1977), p. 85.
52.As cited in Anderson, Samz Atpzct a£ IndanzAtan Paltttc*, p.
69.
53.Subardjo Djoyoadi suryo, Laktnya Rzpuhltk Indanztta, p. 85. According to Adam Malik, Rtwajat dan Pz~ djuangan Szktta* Paklamcut Kzmz- dzkaan Indanz^ta 17 Agu&tut 1945 (Jakarta: Widjaja, 1950), p. 35, Sukarno and Hatta would not have proclaimed independence without Japanese permission whatever the ci rcumstances.
54.Anderson, Java tn a Ttmz a& Rzvaluttan, pp. 73-74.
55.As cited in Subardjo Djoyoadi suryo, Laktnya Pzpuhltk IndanzAta, p. 85.
56.Anderson, Java tn a Ttmz a£ Rzvaluttan, p. 75.
57.Des Alwi, "Oom Kacamata yang Mendidik Say a," in Bung Hatta Pttadtnya dalam Kznangan, p. 326.
58.Hatta, Manat*, p. 448.
59.Interview with Des Alwi, February 6, 1982.
60.Hatta, Manat*, p. 448.
61.Anderson, Java tn a Ttmz a£ Rzvaluttan, p. 79.
62.Ibid., p. 82, and Hatta, Manat*,

CHAPTER NINE INDEPENDENCE DEFENDED Every revolution Invariably gives rise to an atmosphere Influenced by a mass psychology, which Is Itself strongly affected by romanticism and heroism. The primary problem In a revolution Is how to channel the burning but anarchic energies of the masses, and to mould them Into a body, strong at heart, capable of enduring sneering and undergoing trials In facing reactions that may arise, until the final victory Is achieved.1 ”How to channel the burning and anarchic energies of the masses” and maintain national strength and unity were major problems facing the Vwl Tunggal in the newly proclaimed Republic of Indonesia. In the preceding two years Hatta had stressed to the youth that the fate of the nation rested on them, that they were ”heroes in his heart.” For the next four years, he would find himself tossed about amid a current of youthful tumult, far more aggressive and impetuous than the ferment he had experienced in his own period of youthful nationalism. The pemuda basically needed to relate to and work under mature national leaders; they were prepared to accept the Vwl Tunggal's direction but, as if to punish them for prospering under the Japanese regime, were reluctant to accord them traditional respect. Both Sukarno and Hatta would be stretched to the limits of their leadership capabilities to maneuver within this youthful whirlpool. Many times they would find themselves fighting both internal and external foes for survival. The pemuda groups were invited to send representatives to the final sessions of the PPKI, but their delegates insisted that the PPKI first convert itself into the Komit6 Nasional Indonesia. Hatta tried to defuse the issue by explaining that the nationalist leaders were still responsible to the Japanese authorities and that the PPKI would in due course re- constitute itself as a national body. ”For this reason we tell the Japanese that this is a meeting of the PPKI,” Hatta contended, ”while we guarantee to the people that this is the first meeting of the Komit6 Nasional Indonesia [Indonesian National Committee],”2 a remark which the pemuda leader, Adam Malik, dismissed as "Hatta’s hermaphroditic statement. ”3 Hatta was also concerned that territories outside Java and Sumatra, especially ethnic groups 1n the past favored by the Dutch, such as the Menadonese and Ambonese, might opt for a continuing Netherlands association. Only a few hours after the proclamation, a Japanese naval officer warned Hatta that Christian groups in the eastern islands were concerned by the clause 1n the Ponca Slla referring to Islamic obligations. Aware from his period of exile in Banda Neira of the strength of Ambonese loyalty to the Dutch, Hatta immediately sought out influential Muslims in the PPKI to obtain their support. Teuku Hasan, the Acehnese delegate and an influential Muslim representative, recalled that Hatta requested his 124

assistance In persuading the Javanese Muhammadiyah leader, Ki Bagus Hadlkusumo, to agree to the omission of the phrase ’’with an obligation to carry out the AkasU'ak for its adherents.1,4 Hatta commented in his memoirs that the attitude of the Islamic delegation was ”a sign that the leaders at that time really were concerned about the future and unity of the nation,”5 perhaps a subtle suggestion that national and religious leaders should be more accommodating about constitutional matters in future crises. Sukarno and Hatta were unanimously elected President and Vice-President* amid thunderous applause, a spontaneous rendering of the anthem Indonesia Raya, and with a firm proposal that the offices constitute a special Vwl TunggaL. There was a challenge inherent in the term. It signified that the two leaders must maintain a united front, and be prepared to settle their differences behind the scenes. They were expected to pool their talents in order to produce a rounded, stable leadership, a leadership made up of elements with which the various streams in Indonesian society could identify. With Sukarno as the orator and magnetic force, Hatta would provide planning and attend to administrative detail. Sukarno would reflect the ’’ahangan” Muslim, Hatta the more orthodox. Sukarno would project the brilliance and sensuality of the Javanese ruler while Hatta would offset 1t with his puritanism and Incorruptibility. Sukarno would represent autocratic centralist Javanese rule while Hatta would reflect kzdaaLatan siakyat modeled on the dJunokJiaAJL a&ll of the Agam plateau. Together they would provide a symbol of national unity, in particular a microcosm of the macrocosm of Java and the Outer Islands, so vital a concept at this particular time of crisis. While the pzmuda accepted the Vwl TunggaL, they reacted angrily to the PPKI’s decision to disband Peta and Heiho, the most widespread militia forces on Java. Rzmuda spokesman Wikana urged that a national army be established Incorporating all Peta and Heiho units.® The compromise offered by the PPKI was to establish a Badan Keamanan Rakyat [People’s Security Body] or BKR, which, although posing as a police force to allay Japanese fears, was regarded as the nucleus of an Indonesian army. This response was still too passive for the prnuda, who independently regrouped into their former Peta and Heiho units, loyal to local officers rather than to any central administration. On August 29, 1945, Hatta broadcast an appeal for coordination. ”The youth must not act alone,” he warned, ’’failing to bind themselves to the people and outside the main movement of the people.”7 Hatta did not underestimate the need for defense forces, and his memoirs suggest that he played an important role in the establishment of the national army. On October 4 he was introduced to Urip Sumohardjo, a former officer in the Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger [Royal Netherlands Indies Army known as KNILl, who expressed his willingness to participate in establishing the Republic’s army.® Hatta recorded that he appointed Urip chief of staff, ’’empowering him to appoint his own auxiliary staff, as much as possible consisting of former Peta and KNIL officers.”* Hatta’s wife, when reminiscing on her husband’s insistence on attending an anniversary of the founding of the armed forces on October 5, 1974, recalled that Hatta expressed a sense of duty to be present, in spite of 111-health and advanced age. ’’Wasn’t it I who first built up our national army,” he maintained, adding: ’’Who cares if people forget about me, for me that 1s not important. It 1s sufficient that I personally know that 1t was I who established the armed forces of the Republic of Indonesia."10 125

Both Sukarno and Hatta played major roles in the appointment of the first presidential cabinet, which incurred Sjahrir’s strong disapproval. In response, Hatta explained that by selecting ,fthose men who were already placed at the top of the departmental hierarchies... the downward channels of command could be controlled and the Japanese easily set aside.”!! Hatta admitted that they could have built up "a national governmental administrative arm alongside” the Japanese administration, a course which in many respects would have resembled his past formula of a ”state within a state.” ”This way might seem to be revolutionary,” Hatta conceded, ”but it would not be rational. And what is not rational in a revolution is not revolutionary.” Hatta believed that, if the administrative structure had not been infiltrated by nationalists, it would simply have been handed on from the Japanese to the Allies, ”and from the Allies it would have been transferred to the control of Holland.”!2 The cabinet was made up of many of Hatta’s former companions in the Perhimpunan Indonesia, including Subardjo as foreign affairs minister and Iwa Kusuma Sumantri as minister of social affairs. To prevent its being labeled a cabinet of collaborators, Amir Sjarifuddin was appointed minister of information, although Ali Sastroamidjojo deputized for him while Amir recovered his health after the ordeal of Kempeitai imprisonment. Both Tan Mai aka and Sjahrir refused seats in the cabinet, Sjahrir stating bluntly in his political manifesto, Oust SttaiggJLz, that it was composed of ”men without real character,” most of them ”too accustomed to kowtow or run errands for the Dutch and Japanese.” Sjahrir further charged: "Psychologically they are irresolute and have proved quite incapable of acting decisively and assuming responsibility.”!3 For practical reasons, Hatta needed the skills of his peer group. He had experienced 'ue.alpolttlk for three years and had learned to temper idealism with realism. Although he still advocated kzdaulatan Kakyat, Hatta had to admit that the present situation of people’s sovereignty ’’differed from its intentions,”!4 as the masses increasingly acted independently of the newly appointed government. Yet, while Hatta deplored the growth of disorder in Indonesian society, fearing it would create an adverse impression internationally, Tan Malaka applauded the radical revolutionary mood of the masses, and began to move more openly among the pmuda. He was supported by nationalists who had tried to keep alive his Partai Republik Indonesia in the thirties. According to Abu Hanifah, it was known that the Dutch had plans to capture Sukarno and Hatta as collaborators.!^ Supported by Subardjo and the pzmuda group led by Sukarni, Chaerul Saleh, and Adam Malik, Tan Malaka pressed Sukarno to seek refuge in the interior. Depressed and insecure, Sukarno impetuously agreed that, if he and Hatta were taken prisoner by the Allied forces, Tan Malaka could hold the fort as President in his pi ace.!6 According to Hatta in one of the final interviews of h1s life, Sukarno regretted his agreement with Tan Malaka and sought a compromise. Hatta claimed to have suggested to Sukarno that the presidential mandate be transferred to a quadrumvlrate, including Tan Malaka, Sutan Sjahrir, Iwa Kusuma Sumatri, and Wongsonegoro.17 Hatta’s suggestion mirrored the concept of the Empat Sz^ang/uU, a joint leadership representative of mainstreams in Indonesian society during the Japanese Occupation. According to Adam Malik, Tan Malaka viewed this new arrangement as a breach of promise!8 and certainly the VufZ Tunggal's decision failed to scotch rumors that Tan Malaka was Sukarno’s sole successor. 126

With the Labour Party under Clement Attlee in power in Britain and the Dutch Labor Party dominating a coalition government in the Netherlands, Hatta grasped the opportunity to gain support from overseas socialists, especially those with whom he had worked in Europe. On August 30, he launched a radio appeal 1n the hope of winning an acknowledgment of Indonesia’s independence, reminding his listeners: In the past, when we were comrades in the common fight for the realization of the principles of humanity and justice, you threw your whole heart and soul into the struggle for Indonesian independence. Today you sit 1n high positions wielding much power. Now, then, it is the time for you to give us the assistance we seek.19 The response from Britain was cautious, but not entirely unsympathetic. Attlee, like Hatta, was a social democrat; but the British prime minister was in a dilemma. Like Hatta, he tended to conform to the rules, and the established principle in Europe was that one did not Interfere in the colonial affairs of an ally. General MacArthur’s relegation of Indonesia to Lord Louis Mountbatten’s South East Asia Command (SEAC) had been a last-minute decision, throwing both Mountbatten and the Dutch government into confusion. Van Mook, the Acting Governor-General and head of the newly formed Netherlands Indies Civil Affairs Administration (NICA), had been liaising directly with MacArthur in Australia and now had to brief Mountbatten, reiterating that the proclamation of independence was merely a Japanese stratagem. Mountbatten was hesitant, having observed the strength of nationalism in Burma at first hand, and he delayed inaugurating the repossession of Indonesia until he had established a new base in Singapore. When on September 15, 1945, Mountbatten’s representative, Rear-Admiral Patterson, landed at Tanjung Priok, almost a month had elapsed since the proclamation. Patterson accepted General Yamamoto’s advice not to treat Sukarno and Hatta as war criminals, assessing that, with its present extended commitments, SEAC would be unable to engage in large-scale combat. He suggested to Mountbatten that the Allied forces concentrate in the key coastal cities, using them to evacuate Japanese forces and Internees and acting in cooperation with the Indonesian government. Further penetration would be the responsibility of the Dutch.20 Mountbatten accepted Patterson’s recommendations and instructed General Chrlstlson, the newly appointed Allied commander for the area, to instruct the Republic of Indonesia to continue its administration of all areas 1n Java and Sumatra except the coastal bases. Chrlstlson relayed this information by radio from Singapore, at the same time confirming that the Republic’s leaders would not be removed as collaborators; 1n fact he would ”ask the present Party leaders to treat him and h1s troops as guests.”21 For Sukarno and Hatta, Christison’s statement was tantamount to a reprieve, although they recognized that the Dutch might not concur 1n 1t. Patterson's recommendations had not only been based on Japanese advice. During h1s short stay in Jakarta he himself had witnessed the Vvul Tunggal's leadership abilities. The pmada and several of the older nationalists, under the sponsorship of Tan Mai aka and against Sukarno’s and Hatta’s wishes, had held a mass meeting 1n Ikada Square while Patterson was conferring with the Japanese administration. The pemuda were 1n a highly volatile mood, but Sukarno again proved that he held the trump 127

card. His speech before the massed audience was short, soothing, an appeal for their confidence. It was an appeal that immediately evoked an enthusiastic avowal of loyalty. Quietly Sukarno ordered: f,Let us all go home now, calmly and serenely, but maintain our vigilance.”22 This incident confirmed for Sjahrir that, although he disliked the present government, Sukarno himself was an essential ingredient in rallying anti-Dutch resistance in Java and must be protected, although preferably detached from his tainted colleagues. When approached by Tan Mai aka in early October with a suggestion that he join forces with him to overthrow Sukarno, Sjahrir rejected the proposal, perceiving this to be disastrous for national unity.23 Likewise, when the pmuda leader Sukarni, on October 31, proposed to Hatta that he support a move to dislodge Sukarno from the presidency, replacing him with Tan Malaka, Hatta’s response was cold and disapproving.24 However, these approaches did warn Hatta that a power struggle could be imminent, exacerbated by Dutch threats to Sukarno. The Dutch embassy in London on September 30 had issued a statement denouncing Mountbatten’s concessions to the Indonesian government and reiterating that it was ”a Japanese puppet government of a totalitarian character dependent on the Japanese military organisation.”25 yet Van Mook, now in the Indies, had to admit that dramatic changes had occurred in Indonesian society during the Japanese Occupation. Observing the widespread resistance to the Dutch return, he could now understand Christi- sonfs desire to maintain the Vuil Tung gal's goodwill. Van Mook compromised, informing the media on October 14 that he was prepared to meet representatives of Indonesian groups, Including Sukarno.26 Unfortunately, his statement was immediately repudiated by The Hague, which forbade any dealings with Sukarno, although conceding that the Dutch government was prepared to grant dominion status to Indonesia. On October 18 Hatta held a press conference in which he emphatically rejected the Dutch government’s proposals for "dominion status” within a Netherlands Union, querying: ”And why must Indonesia willy-nilly be made partner of a commonwealth in which the Dutch tail will wag the Indonesian dog,” adding: ”The Dutch are graciously permitting us entry into the basement while we have climbed all the way to the top floor and up to the att1c!”27 This was Hatta back in prewar form, doing what he enjoyed most, needling the Dutch, attacking their colonial kautzusi. There never had been the same degree of satisfaction in Hatta1s cuts at the Japanese, apart from the danger of reprisal. Van Mook and his deputy, Van der Plas, undoubtedly caught the confident determination of Hatta’s statement. In spite of their home government’s hard-line attitudes, they agreed to Christison’s call for negotiations. Hatta recalled that he, Sukarno, Subardjo, and Haji Agus Salim met with Christison and the two Dutch representatives on October 23. The Republicans stressed that any links formed between the Netherlands and Indonesia must be on the basis of two independent nations, with a preliminary requirement that the Dutch propose Indonesia’s admittance to the United Nations. ’’Van Mook, as Lieutenant-Governor of the Netherlands Indies, could not make a reply,” commented Hatta, ”so our discussions had to be discontinued.”28 Van Mook has been described by P. J. Idenburg, a former colonial associate, as ’’belonging to a group of Dutchmen whose being and existence were so linked to the Indies... that the Netherlands-Indies portion of the Netherlands had 1n fact become their father!and.”29 jn January 1930, as an ardent associationist, Van Mook had been among a group in the 128

Indies to form the movement "Stew.” This movement aimed at making the Indies an independent commonwealth in which the Indonesian would have a part ffin proportion to his political and social significance,” a suggestion of a situation similar to South Africa, where the Afrikaner minority is considered to be of greater political and social significance than the African majority. In a radio broadcast Hatta summed up his views on Van Mook: The inability to keep pace with the forward march of the subject peoples is an occupational disease to which all bureaucrats fall victim, but it was in Indonesia that that disease manifested itself in its most virulent form. And the worst sufferer was undoubtedly Doctor van Mook. He fell victim to the delusion that, because he was born in Java, he was possessed of clairvoyantic powers which enabled him to see what was missed by other Dutchmen. The truth of the matter is that Doctor van Mook, like the old China hand, is Zn the country but notit.30 Although relations with the British remained relatively cordial, incidences of confrontation increased as Dutch forces entered in greater numbers. Hatta described the uneasy atmosphere in the capital: "Dutch troops, the majority of them Ambonese, cruised around Jakarta in jeeps or trucks, shooting at random, in particular at the cars of Indonesian dignitaries which they identified by the red and white flag flying at the front."31 In view of the Dutch government's continued rejection of the Republic of Indonesia on the grounds that it was a totalitarian state* the national leaders felt they had to present a more democratic image. Sjahrir, who had been critical of the extra transitional powers allowed the presidency, suggested that the Central National Committee, KNIP, should assume temporarily the role of the proposed legislative bodies, the MPR and DPR.32 Sukarno accepted Sjahrir's proposals, sensing how precarious was his own position and the need to present a more liberal Image to the Allied powers. Yet he was reluctant to associate himself fully with legislation which not only diminished his power but was thrust upon him by external pressures, especially the need to placate the Dutch. Sukarno therefore assigned to Hatta the duty of issuing a decree to give KNIP legislative powers, and at the same time removed himself from the capital. Hatta was willing to perform the task; he had always perceived wider power sharing as closest to his ideal of democracy. "Hatta appreciated the logic behind Sjahrir's strategy," confirmed Subadio.33 Not only would the Republic be less totalitarian but the decree would institute the system envisaged 1n the Draft Constitution where the presidential cabinet was balanced by a popular assembly. Under the unusual appellation of MaklumaZ x [Decree x], on October 16 Hatta decreed the conversion of the KNIP into a legislative assembly. The decree was not unchallenged, and there was a sharp division between the supportive pemuda and older nationalists such as Sartono. A Badan Pekerja or Working Body led by Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddln was instituted to deal with day-to-day affairs of KNIP. Sjahrir took h1s democratization efforts one step further, calling for the establishment of political parties, 1n an effort to ensure that any plans to establish a one-party system were blocked. Although in principle supportive of political parties, Hatta omitted from his memoirs any mention of the decree of 129

November 3# 1945# which permitted political parties to operate. This may have been a result of the future implications of his action# or his own subsequent disillusionment with the implementation of the multiparty system. Two days previously, on November 1, Hatta had also issued a "political manifesto#" which criticized Dutch attitudes to the new Republic. Denying that the Dutch had any moral right to "take the virtuous stand that we cooperated with the Japanese#” Hatta claimed that the nationalists who collaborated never "forsook the nationalistic ideals which for years had been their guide.”34 He warned that failure to accept Indonesia’s independence "will be nothing but a deliberate violation of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter" and "it will result in endless bloodshed and sacrifice of life# for only by force and force alone can the Dutch try to pull down the government which we have set up.”35 Hatta assured the Dutch that Indonesians entertained no personal hatred for them and that Indonesian sovereignty would not "affect Dutch capital or Dutch lives”; in other words# Dutch business interests would be safeguarded. "All property of foreigners will be handed over to them,” Hatta promised# with a stipulation that "we reserve the right to acquire at fair prices such property as shall be deemed necessary for the welfare of the country." He concluded: "All debts incurred by the Dutch East Indies government previous to the Japanese surrender and fairly chargeable to us we will unhesitatingly take over,"36 an issue which was to provide difficulties for him in the years ahead. Tan Mai aka challenged Hatta’s concessions to the Dutch and advocated instead seizure by the masses of foreign properties without compensation# no doubt remembering the extent of exploitation he had witnessed 1n the plantations of East Sumatra.37 Tan Mai aka also challenged Sjahrir to oust the Vu).i Tungg&L since he had been so contemptuous of them and of the presidential cabinet in Oust StJiuggLt,3& Sjahrir’s response was to recommend to Sukarno and Hatta that the presidential cabinet be disbanded# that Sukarno and Hatta become heads of state# and thus inviolate, while KNIP be permitted to appoint Its own cabinet# with the leader of the KNIP becoming prime minister. This strategy would both thwart Tan Malaka’s attacks on the Vwl TunggaL and provide a national leader acceptable to the Dutch, for Sjahrir’s standing was high with the Allies in view of his anti-Japanese activities. The fact that Sukarno was prepared to transfer his powers to Sjahrir, a man he disliked# indicated how far his confidence had been undermined. But Sukarno was also aware that Sjahrir’s position depended on Sukarno and Hatta remaining as heads of state and that he therefore did not pose such a personal threat as Tan Malaka. Sukarno agreed to the Implementation of a system he had always disliked as being too individualistic and Western: parliamentary democracy. Again Hatta was assigned the task of Issuing on November 14 a decree which in effect ended presidential government and converted the Republic of Indonesia into a parliamentary democracy. Sjahrir, at the age of thirty-six became Indonesia’s first prime minister. This final decree was to remain a source of disquiet for Hatta# one of the Issues in his political career on which he was most ambivalent. Undoubtedly# he concurred with Sjahrir that parliamentary democracy had always been his goal for Indonesia. But Hatta had also contended that this goal had to be preceded by a period of education in political responsibility# because it was not a system with which the Javanese masses were familiar. There was another more pressing consideration. The difficulty 130

1n controlling the pmuda groups alone was an indication that the wartime situation demanded strong central control. The British commander in Surabaya, Brigadier-General Mallaby, voiced concern at the militant spirit of the pzmuda in his area, appealing to Sukarno and Hatta to intervene personally to try to prevent further bloodshed. On arrival in Surabaya, both men sensed the frenzied atmosphere prevailing in the city. Des Alwi, who was among the pzmuda fighting there, recalled Hattafs anger when his vehicle was halted by two armed pzmuda who demanded that their British driver be handed over as a prisoner. ”0n hearing this, Oom Hatta was furious,” Des recalled, "admonishing the two young Indonesians, inquiring: fHey, is killing all you want to do? That won’t achieve our struggle!’”39 Sukarno and Hatta tried to mediate between the Allies and the pzmuda leaders in Surabaya, but they only achieved a fragile settlement. No sooner had their airplane flown out than Mallaby was caught by a bullet in cross-fire and killed.40 British sympathy for the Indonesian cause declined, Christison issuing an immediate warning that he would "bring the whole weight of his sea, land and air forces against the Republic forces unless the culprits surrendered.”41 when on November 10, the British insisted on a surrender of all weapons in Surabaya, the pent-up emotion of the pmuda erupted in a fury which astounded not only the British but the nationalists. It has been estimated that thousands of Indonesians died 1n what was regarded as one of the most heroic battles of the struggle for independence. In the midst of this frenzied maelstrom of internal and external threat and political Intrigue, Hatta at last ended h1s self-imposed celibacy. His bride was Rahmi Rachim, the elder daughter of Anni Nurdin, the girlfriend he had rejected for the nationalist cause. Sukarno, a man with a discerning eye for feminine charm, approved of Hatta’s choice, describing his bride as "the most beautiful girl in Bandung.”42 whether Hatta saw in Rahmi Rachim the qualities he had previously admired in her mother, he does not mention. In fact, in Hatta1s memoirs the wedding is marked only by a photograph of the bridal couple. Anni Rachim admitted that she was surprised when Sukarno, acting as a marriage broker on Hatta’s behalf, asked for her daughter’s hand in marriage. She recalled: ”1 considered that the age difference between Yuke and Bung Hatta was too great, but I merely replied: ’Mas Karno, about this proposal, I must ask my daughter first. She’s nineteen years old and adult enough to decide her own future.’” Rahmi’s younger sister, Titi, was more candid than her mother: "Don’t accept, Yu,” she advised, "He’s too old!”43 Titi was later to revise her opinion of Hatta’s senescence when she discovered that, when climbing mountains, she could not keep up with him. "He walked so quickly, like a Westerner,” she acknowledged.44 Sukarno assured Rahmi of Hatta’s suitability as a prospective husband: "The main thing is that Hatta is a fine person, he 1s a good leader and he’s my own very close friend,” adding: "You won’t be disappointed. Hatta 1s a perfect gentleman with the highest principles.”45 Rahmi married Hatta on November 18, 1945, a union which endured until Hatta’s death. "Every opportunity we had of being together felt beautiful and valuable,” Hatta’s wife recalled, "like a string of precious jewels.”46 Many Indonesians claimed that, as a good Muslim, Hatta had four wives: the first was Indonesia, the second the Indonesian people, the third h1s work, and fourth—Nyonya Hatta!47 131

In view of the war-time situation, Hatta requested that the wedding ceremony be simple, attended only by close family friends. It was at h1s small villa 1n the hills at Megamendung that he ceased to be Indonesia’s most eligible bachelor. Hatta’s wedding gift to h1s bride, h1s recently completed book ALam PlklJian VunarU ["The Greek Thought-World"] did not meet with his mother’s approval, although Rahml accepted the gift In the spirit In which It was offered, knowing that books were Hatta’s most treasured possessions and that Greek views on democracy accorded In many respects with his own. The first years of their married life were difficult and dangerous, affording Hatta scant time to devote to h1s wife. On December 26, Sjahrlr narrowly escaped death, when a pistol fired at him by a KNIL soldier miraculously jammed.48 Two days later an assassination attempt was made on Amir Sjarifuddin. By January 1946# the situation in the capital was so tense that Sjahrir evacuated his government, accepting the offer from the Sultan of Yogyakarta of h1s royal domain as an alternative capital. It was a move which restored leadership significance to the Vu)l Tunggal because, while Sjahrir remained in Jakarta for negotiations, Sukarno and Hatta acted as de facto heads of government in Yogyakarta. Sukarno’s confidence recovered in this center of Javanese culture. For Hatta, too, the transfer was satisfying as it allowed him an opportunity to concentrate on consolidation, especially in the economic sector. One of Hatta’s priorities was to commission a printing press to produce Republican currency to replace the Japanese money still in circulation and to prevent Dutch NICA notes being used. Republic of Indonesia money lOzang RzpuhLlk lndanz4ta~0RIl had been printed in Jakarta, but because of the abundance of Japanese notes in circulation, it was decided to delay their issue until February 1, 1946.49 However, when the Allies occupied the state printing works in Jakarta in January 1946, they confiscated the Republican currency, necessitating the production of new notes. Dening, the SEAC adviser, warned that the economy of the country would be ruined if the Republic issued its own currency, although Hatta had already made clear that Republican money would be backed by goods rather than gold.50 Hatta managed to find an alternative printer for the new currency at the Kolff printing works at Malang in East Java, although the quality was inferior to that of the state printing works in Jakarta. When the new currency was finally issued on October 31, 1946, Hatta made a radio broadcast to the nation, urging that Indonesians regard 1t as a symbol of independence and economic development, rejecting the NICA money. Hatta explained that the power of the rupiah would be roughly equivalent to the prewar Netherlands Indies guilder.51 Hatta had also, on the first anniversary of the proclamation of Independence, opened the Bank Nzgana Indonztla, the Indonesian State Bank. From now on the Dutch and Republic of Indonesia were strongly competing for control of the nation’s financial affairs. Hatta was also active in the field of education, supporting the establishment of a new national university in Yogyakarta, named 1n honor of the famed Majapahit leader, Gajah Mada. An American observer has commented that the man who in those first years was responsible for the day-to-day functioning of the Republic was "neither Sukarno the spell- binder nor Sjahrir the thinker, but Hatta the administrator."52 132

During 1946# the Sjahrir government came under fire for dampening revolutionary ardor by its efforts to restrain the anarchical spirit prevalent in the archipelago. The Tan Malaka group accused Sjahrirfs government of pursuing policies which were too conciliatory to the Dutch# thus contrary to its ideological commitment to social revolution. In a pamphlet# MozAllkat ["Strategy”], the Tan Malaka group argued that "armed struggle" rather than "diplomacy" should be adopted by the Sjahrir government. The group formed a Persatuan Perjuangan [PP or Struggle Union]# stressing the goal of "100% Me^defca" to be attained through a struggle which included the confiscation of enemy property. Tan Maiaka’s program received wide support. Its fiery, revolutionary ring appealed to the pzmuda at a time when the Republican government seemed to be losing ground in its negotiations with the Dutch. When on February 10# 1946# Sjahrir announced to the KNIP that Van Mook insisted on the formation of a United States of Indonesia under the Dutch Crown in which the Republic of Indonesia would merely represent Java# the reception he received was so hostile that he submitted his resignation to Sukarno.53 When the Persatuan Perjuangan group pressed Sukarno and Hatta for a mandate to form a coalition cabinet# Hatta made clear to its spokesman# the pmuda leader, Chaerul Saleh, that "neither Sukarno nor I can accept as cabinet policy the Persatuan Perjuangan program."54 The PP discovered that# although 1t had succeeded in ousting Sjahrir from office# it could not gain support for a cabinet which did not have the Vwl Tunggal's approval. On March 2# Hatta announced that Sjahrir would form a new coalition cabinet based on a Five-Point program# incorporating the PP’s emotive theme "100% M^tdefea." Hatta stressed that the second cabinet would be more widely representative and less accommodating to the Dutch. The Tan Malaka group did not accept its rejection passively# arranging a congress to be held on March 17 to coincide with Sjahrlr’s negotiations with Van Mook. Sjahrir relayed a secret request to Yogyakarta that the Vu)'C Tungg&L and Amir Sjarifuddin detain the PP leadership temporarily# as their antigovernment sentiments were making 1t difficult for him to achieve a satisfactory settlement.55 On the charge that inflammatory# ant 1 government sentiments had been expressed at the PP congress# Tan Malaka# Yamin, Sukarni# Chaerul Saleh, and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, the Muslim leader, were arrested. Aware of having adopted tactics which were 1n sharp conflict with democratic principles# Sjahrlr’s government Issued an explanation on April 1, which read; "The purpose and aim of these arrests# based exclusively on the government’s full responsibility# was to avoid the possibility of still graver dangers to the security and well being of the state."56 Press response was critical, comparing Sjahrlr’s actions with those of the PID and Kempeltal. Sukarno defended Sjahrir, stressing that "the object was to maintain maximum unity while solutions to political difficulties were being sought."57 Increasingly, it became the task of the VujI Tunggal to ward off attacks on Sjahrlr’s government and to present the unpleasant realities of the negotiations to the public. On June 27, Hatta announced on Sjahrlr’s behalf that the Republic of Indonesia could at most claim sovereignty over the Islands of Java and Sumatra# that the Dutch had reestablished colonial rule 1n the remaining territories. The resentment aroused by Hatta’s announcement was sufficiently heated for the PP to attempt a 133

coup, kidnapping Sjahrlr and h1s party while they were traveling In Central Java.58 On June 28, Sukarno proclaimed a state of emergency and resumed his presidential powers. Members of the pro-Tan Mai aka group who had now been released from jail presented Sukarno and Hatta with four decrees to sign Instituting a new "Supreme Political Council” headed by Tan Mai aka, with demands that Sukarno’s military powers be delegated to the army commander, Sudlrman. Sudlrman was persuaded to remain loyal to the government and he agreed to arrest Subardjo, Iwa Kusuma Sumantrl, Yamin, and Sukarnl. Hatta was faced with authorizing the arrest of two former PI colleagues with whom he had enjoyed particularly close associations in the past—Subardjo and Iwa. He was many times to learn that politics play havoc with personal friendships. The removal of the PP leadership did make It easier for negotiations with the Dutch to continue. On October 2, the Vuil Tunggal handed back their legislative powers to Sjahrlr, allowing him to form a third cabinet, this time a body representative of a wide spectrum of parties and nationalist groups. On November 15, 1946, under the chairmanship of the British mediator, Lord Killearn, Sjahrlr Initialed a treaty with the Dutch, the Linggajatl Agreement, in which the Dutch representatives finally recognized the Republic of Indonesia as the de facto authority on Java and Sumatra* agreeing that the Republic and the Netherlands would cooperate to establish a United States of Indonesia, consisting of three entities, the Republic of Indonesia, Borneo, and the Great Eastern State, all part of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union.59 There was widespread hostility to the Linggajati Agreement, which now had to go before KNIP for ratification, in spite of the fact that Sjahrir had obtained recognition of Sumatra as Republican territory. Feelings became polarized into two opposing fronts, the Benteng Republik [The Republican Fortress], which included members of the two most influential parties, Masjuml and the PNI and which opposed the agreement, and the Sayap Kiri [The Left Wing], consisting of Sjahrir’s Partai Sosialis, the renascent PKI, the Labor Party, and Pesindo, the Indonesian Socialist Youth [Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia], which supported it. Seeing that the Sayap Kiri would be outnumbered in the vote for the Linggajati Agreement, on December 30, 1946 Sukarno took back power in order to issue a presidential decree Increasing the membership of KNIP from 200 to 513, thus allowing the Sayap Kiri a sufficient majority to ensure the agreement’s ratification. Masjuml and the PNI were furious, condemning Sukarno’s action as a violation of Hatta’s decree of October 16, 1945. Sukarno defended his action by declaring that he was not a President of the French or American type but a "President h la Indonesian revolution," whose responsibility was to guide and lead the people.60 But resentment ran too deeply for the KNIP to accept Sukarno’s explanation and heated debate continued for two days. On the third day Hatta intervened, making an -ex tempasiz speech before the KNIP assembly. It was, as a member of his audience recalled, "very strong and fiery, quickening the heart beats of those who heard h1m."6l Gone was the phlegmatic Hatta, to be replaced by an emotionally charged revolutionary, whose "voice trembled” and whose face "grew red.”62 Hatta drew the KNIP’s attention to the seriousness of the crisis facing the new nation, and declared that if KNIP were "not satisfied with the leadership of the President and Vice-President, let us look for another President 134

and Vice-President.”63 Hatta’s outburst had the desired effect. No further objections were raised. The audience broke into wild clapping, Hatta recalled in his memoirs, people "coming over to where I was sitting, congratulating me and expressing thanks."64 According to Abu Hanifah, "Hatta’s speech was a psychological masterpiece because the big majority did not fancy the idea of a Republic without Sukarno and Hatta."65 In the brief lull which followed the initialing of the Linggajati Agreement, as both governments mulled over its implications, Hatta’s first daughter, Meutia, was born. The birth took place in the large house in Yogyakarta, which had been allocated as the vice-presidential residence. But Hatta found that he had little time to spend with his wife and baby. It was clear that the implementation of the Linggajati Agreement presented problems. On May 27, 1947, the Dutch issued a further challenge to Sjahrir, demanding Indonesian recognition of Netherlands de /o/te sovereignty and the immediate establishment of an interim government to administer the whole archipelago until the United States of Indonesia was formally inaugurated on January 1, 1949. In this interim government, the representative of the Dutch Crown would have ultimate power, in Republican ears an echo of past colonial governorsf "exorbitant rights."66 At the same time, Dutch troops continued to press into the Javanese interior, raising speculation in Republican circles that the struggle might even- tually have to be fought out in the mountains and forests of Sumatra. Hatta had been concerned for some time about the situation in Sumatra. Two social revolutions had already taken place, one in Aceh and the other 1n East Sumatra, both directed against the local rulers. The Acehnese revolt, which was Islamic rather than Marxist, was less worrying for Hatta than the uprising in East Sumatra, which had direct links with Tan Malaka’s Persatuan Perjuangan. Tan Malakafs standing was high in Sumatra, including in the Minangkabau region, and his strategy of "armed struggle" accorded more with the spirit of militancy among the Sumatran nationalists than Sjahrirfs and Amir Sjarifuddin’s advocacy of "negotiation." A minor uprising 1n West Sumatra directed against the Republic administrators, several of whom were former members of the New PNI,67 alerted Hatta to a potentially dangerous mood of dissatisfaction prevailing in his home region. On May 20, he accepted an invitation to tour Sumatra in an attempt to strengthen local support for the central government. Teuku Hasan, whose influence outside Aceh was limited, was facing immense difficulties in carrying out his task as governor of Sumatra. Hatta could see that his plea to the PPKI to divide the island Into three provinces had been justified. In a subsequent report he pointed out that "the Governor of Sumatra was only the Governor of Pematang Slantar because of the lack of communication with the Residents."68 Teuku Hasan had moved his capital to Pematang Slantar because of the build-up of Dutch forces in Medan. Hatta commenced his tour in South Sumatra, traveling up through Jambi and across to Bukit Tinggi. His itinerary was interrupted when he received a request from Sukarno to fly to India to negotiate for arms with his old friend Nehru. At the time the Republicans were in desperate need of defense equipment. On May 7, 1947, Dutch ministers Bee! and Jonkman had held talks in Jakarta which foreshadowed a military offensive as a means of solving the Republican deadlock. Economic factors were involved, as the Dutch were anxious to resume plantation operations 1n a more secure atmosphere. Sukarno’s message was relayed to Hatta by Biju Patnaik, an 135

Indian nationalist, the pilot of an Indian plane which had landed at Bukit T1ngg1 on Its return flight, having delivered aid supplies to the Republican government on Java. Sukarno suggested that Hatta accompany Patnalk disguised as his co-pilot. The two ’’Indias,” the British and the Dutch, had already established a supportive relationship. The former was now self-governing and on the brink of full independence, so more free than Indonesia of colonial interference. In June 1946, Sjahrir’s government had consigned 7,000 tons of rice to relieve famine in India. Hatta admitted that, although the amount was not large, ,fas a contribution from the Indonesian people to the people of India, 1t has great significance, clearly influencing International politics, because by offering rice to India, the eyes of the world are redirected to Indonesia.”69 The gesture established Indonesia as a nation engaging in foreign relations independently of the Dutch. Haji Agus Salim, as deputy foreign minister, also signed treaties of friendship with Egypt and Syria. India’s prime minister had given what support he could, organizing an Inter-Asiatic Conference in New Delhi in March 1947 to coincide with the signing of the Linggajati Agreement. He established a rapport with Sjahrir, who arrived at the conference just in time to address the closing session.70 Now it was Hatta’s turn to use his Influence with an old friend to gain arms for Indonesia. As he knew the Dutch would be watching his movements carefully, Hatta had to maintain h1s disguise even when 1n India. In New Delhi, he had to decine Nehru’s offer of hospitality for the sake of secrecy. Patnalk recalled that even when Nehru introduced Hatta to Gandhi his real identity was not revealed, ’’for which Pandit Nehru was later reprimanded by Mahatma Gandhi.”*71 Hatta remembered that Gandhi was confident that Indonesia would attain Its independence, commenting that ’’however aggressive the Dutch, Indonesia will be victorious.”72 The British army was still 1n control of military supplies, Its presence required to prevent Hindu/Muslim rioting on the eve of India’s independence and partition. Because of this Hatta did not succeed in obtaining arms, although the Indian leaders did offer moral support. Hatta returned to East Sumatra to find Governor Hasan’s capital at Pematang Siantar was about to fall to Dutch military forces. Hatta and Hasan had little alternative but to find a new capital, their choice being Bukit Tinggi. The whole Republic was in a state of crisis. While Hatta was overseas, Sjahrir had again handed back his mandate to govern, disillusioned by the Dutch failure to honor their agreements and worried by the extreme left wing group within the Partai Sosialis. The tense situation was heightened by the receipt on June 28 of an

for its neglect of Sumatra and a general distaste for the Linggajati Agreement. A difficulty experienced by Sumatran administrators was an inadequate supply of Republican currency, forcing them to print their own. Although special Republic of Indonesia, Sumatra Province, currency was printed in Pematang Slantar and issued in April 1947, the supply was still insufficient.74 Hatta's nationalist colleague, Hazairin, who held the position of Resident in Bengkulu, recalled that he challenged Hatta to provide him with legal currency when reprimanded for printing his own notes. "Pak Hatta was silent,” he recorded.75 Hatta tried to regularize Sumatra’s important external trade with Singapore and the Malay peninsula, establishing in July 1947 the Central Trading Corporation. He also tried to coordinate the activities of the various nationalist groups in West Sumatra. Hamka, a local Masjumi leader, recalled how on June 30 Hatta invited all "those holding responsible positions in parties, local groups, the military, religious teachers and civil servants” to meet with him for a "briefing” in which Hatta reiterated the importance of unity of command, "because, even if the spirit were bubbling over, if mature decisions were not made under a unified command, it would be very difficult to achieve their goals.”76 But the concept of a paramount chief was not one which was easy to accept in this part of the Minangkabau. Audrey Kahin, in her study of West Sumatra during this period, has observed that "Hatta was the principal agent ensuring the subordination of local to national issues. As a Minangkabau and one of the two highest leaders of the Republic, he exerted great influence over the situation in West Sumatra,”77 sentiments echoed by Hamka, who declared: "He could hold the hearts of the Minangkabau people in his hands."78 Yet, despite the psychological strength which the people derived from Hatta’s presence in their midst, Audrey Kahin felt that some of the policies which he pursued were incompatible with the most effective marshalling of the Republic on Sumatra to confront the Dutch.79 in trying to impose centralized control on his people, Hatta was running contrary to traditional patterns of working in independent local groups. One of Hatta’s first initiatives had been to merge the numerous Sumatran parties and organizations into a National Defense Front and to incorporate the disparate combat units into the regular army, a move which was to prove unworkable. Yet, in other ways, Hatta tried to correct Javanese centralist influences, aiming to restore local autonomy by abolishing the residencies. The problem was that the Residents had become effective regional administrators. It was while Hatta was in Sumatra that the Indonesian struggle assumed a much more international character. On August 14, 1947 at Lake Success in New York, Sjahrir became the first Indonesian to address a United Nations assembly, appealing to the Security Council to back Indonesia’s bid for independence. In response, the Security Council appointed a Good Offices Committee from among Its members, allowing the Dutch and Indonesians to choose one delegate each. The Dutch chose a Belgian representative and the Indonesians an Australian, sensing that Labor Prime Minister Chiffley was sympathetic to their cause. The third member was a representative of the United States of America.80 Hamka recalled the determination of the Minangkabau people to impress the Good Offices Committee members when they made a tour of inspection of Sumatra, rallying the people by "using old-fashioned but tried methods of beating the mosque drums.” He remembered Hatta’s look of surprise when 137

seeing mass formations streaming up to his Vice-President1s mansion, the majority carrying bamboo spears and shouting ’’Long live Bung Hatta!lf81 Hamka delivered the speech of welcome to the Good Offices Committee. He appealed: Sirs, have you ever seen a place as beautiful as this? Its mountains, its ricefields, its green forests and villages? For three hundred and fifty years this land which we love has been taken from our hands, although it is we who own it. We lived in it but we did not control it. We were considered to be slaves in our own country.... Sirs, you see our bamboo spears! Even if these are the only weapons we have to defend ourselves, we will never allow our native land to be plundered again.82 Glancing at Hatta, Hamka noticed to his astonishment that the Vice-President’s eyes were moist and red, that the self-contained Hatta was actually weeping.83 it was one of the few occasions when Hatta allowed his emotions pub!ic display. For Hatta, his own close personal relationships with members of the Good Offices Committee, especially the Australian and American representatives, would play an important part in the final attainment of Indonesian independence. Hatta had always supported the concept of an international forum and judiciary to protect the interests of the weaker nations. As 1947 drew uneasily to a close, Hatta appealed to his people to maintain the fight: Struggle demands sacrifice, suffering, patience and a conviction that our goals will be achieved. We must be prepared to fight on for a very long time and we must safeguard that the base of our effort is pure because it is the purity of our goals which is our strength. This last year has shown us that our freedom depends on two things: firstly, our own personal strength, and secondly, the sympathy of the international world towards us.84

1.Mohammad Hatta, ”Isi Proklamasi in Fakta dan Vokumen-Vokumen untuk men/usun buku * Indonesia memosukl Gelanggang International*, Supplemen
1.Vol. II (Kemlu R.I. Direktorat V, Seksi Penjelidikan Dokumentasi dan Perpustakaan [ed. Emzita], 1958),
p. 1, as cited in Anderson, Some Aspects o£ Indonesian Politics undesi the Japanese Occupation, pp. 99-100.
2.See Anderson, Java In a Time o& Revolution, p. 86.
3.Malik, Rlwajat dan Perdjuangan,
p. 6.
4.Teuku Mohammad Hasan, ’’Bung Hatta di Sumatera,” in Bung Hatta Mengabdl pada Tjlta-Tjlta, pp. 182-
83. Hatta did not obtain Hasan’s support for the division of Sumatra into three provinces. Hasan was later appointed governor of Sumatra.
5.Hatta, Memolsi, p. 460.
6.See Anderson, Java In a Time o£ Revolution, p. 102.
7.Mohammad Hatta, ’’Bulat Bersatu Menghadapi Masa yang Genting,” Radio Speech, August 29, 1945, in Kumpulan Pldato: Vasil Tahun 1942
S.d. 1949, pp. 69-70.

8.Hatta, MemolA, p. 470. According to Hatta, it was Amir Sjarifuddin who made the introduction.
9.Ibid., p. 471. The name was changed to Tentara Keamanan Rakyat [People’s Security Army] from October 5, 1945 and finally designated Tentara Nasional Indonesia [Indonesian National Army]. As Sukarno was out of the capital, Hatta as Acting President commis- sioned the establishment of the national army.
10.As cited in Ny. Rahmi Hatta, ’’Prinsip-Prinsip Bung Hatta tak Pernah Luntur,” in Bung Hatta: Pnlbadlnya dalam Kenangan, p. 44. According to two future chiefs of staff, Generals Nasution and Simatupang, the armed forces did not view Hatta as their founder. Simatupang believed Amir Sjarifuddin took more initiative than Hatta. Both agreed that Hatta was effective as a minister of defense. Interviews: General A. H. Nasution, February 22, 1982, and General T.
B. Simatupang, February 4, 1982.
11.Hatta, ”Isi Proklamasi,fl p. 2, as cited in Anderson, Java In a Time o£ RevGlutton, p. 112.
12.Ibid., pp. 2, 4.
13.Sjahrir, Oua Struggle, p. 20.
14.Mohammad Hatta, ’’Kedaulatan Rakyat,” a speech given to a meeting of civil servants at Solo, February 7, 1946, in Bung Hatta BeApldato, Bung Hatta Menulls, p. 25.
15. Abu Han if ah, Tales o£ a Revolution, p. 191.
16.Interview with Sajuti Melik, September 24, 1962, in Anderson, Java In a Time o£ Revolution, p. 278.
17.Hatta saw Tan Mai aka as representative of the radical group, Sjahrir of the semi-radical, Sukiman of the Muslims, and Wongsonegoro of the conservatives. As Sukiman was in Yogyakarta, it was agreed that Iwa Kusuma Sumantri represent the Islamic body. See Hatta, Bung Hatta's Answers, p. 15.
18.Adam Malik, In the Service o£ the Republic (Singapore: Gunung Agung, 1980), p. 204.
19.Mohammad Hatta, ”A Personal Message to My Old Comrades Wherever They May Be,” in PoKtnalt a£ a PatAlot, p. 505.
20.See Anderson, Some Aspect* o£ Indonesian Politics, pp. 120-21.
21.See Anderson, Java In a Time o£ Revolution, p. 135. According to Anderson, no official transcript of this broadcast was released and SEAC tried to play it down. Ander-

Study a£ HI* Rate, In Dutch-Indonesian Relation*, 1945-48 (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1982), p. 8.

30.See ibid., p. 73.
31.Hatta, Memoir, p. 467.
32.To back his proposal, Sjahrir obtained the signatures of fifty members of KNIP, which he presented to Sukarno and Hatta on October 7.
33.Interview with Subadio Sastrosatomo, February 22, 1982.
34."Political Manifesto of November 1945" as cited in Feith and Castles, eds., Indonesian Political Thinking 1945-1965, p. 52.
35.Ibid., p. 53.
36.Ibid., pp. 54-55.
37.See Rudolph Mrazek, "Tan Mai aka: A Political Personality’s Structure of Experience,” in Indonesia 14 (October 1972): 9.
38.According to Mohamad Roem, Hatta had been included in Sjahrir’s criticisms of the national leadership. Interview, February 2, 1982.
39.Des Alwi, "Oom Kacamata yang Mendidik Saya,” p. 328. Hatta himself relates the story of Indonesian soldiers who originated from Aceh who drank the blood of Gurkha soldiers before the corpses were thrown in the nearby river. See Memoir, p. 477.
40.See J. G. A. Parrott, "Who Killed Brigadier Mallaby?" in Indonesia 20 (October 1975): 87- 111, in which the writer presents evidence that Mallaby’s death was more likely to have been caused by a blunder on the part of his own troops than by an Indonesian bullet.
41.See Wehl, Blxth o£ Indonesia,
p. 62.
42.See Nyonya H. S. S. A. Rachim, "Pribadinya Bung Hatta yang Saya Kenal," in Bung Hatta: Pribadinya dalam Kenangan, pp. 25-26.
43.Ibid., p. 26. "Yuke” was Rahmi’s pet name.
44.Raharty Subijakto, "Sebuah Kenangan,” in Bung Hatta: Pribadinya dalam Kenangan, p. 38.
45.Rachim, "Pribadinya Bung Hatta yang Saya Kenal,” p. 27.
46.Rahmi Hatta, "Prinsip-Prinsip Bung Hatta Tak Pernah Luntur," p. 41.
47.See Coast, Recruit to Revolution,
p. 153.
48.Interview, Nyonya Siti Wahjunah Sjahrir, February 5, 1982.
49.According to Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, later to become finance minister, he had pressed Hatta to print Republican money from the time of the proclamation. See Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, "Bung

tune o^ tlie Indonesian Republic (New York: John Day, 1948), p. 95.

53.Anderson, Java ln a Time a& Revolution, p. 306.
54.Hatta, Memoir, p. 484.
55.See Anderson, Java in a Time o£ Revolution, p. 323. Anderson in footnote 35 states that Subadio, in an interview on June 4,1967, admitted that he was one of the couriers of the message from Sjahrir, which was delivered orally.
56.Ibid., pp. 327-28.
57.Nendeka, March 29, 1946.
58.See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p# 189, n.
64. Kahin quotes Sjahrir as stating that his kidnapping came as no surprise since the Dutch army radio had already announced it the evening prior to the event.
59.For details and text of Linggajati Agreement, see C. Smit, Het Akkoond {/an LinggadLfati: Uit Vagboek van Pno£. Vn. In. W. Sckenmenkonn (Amsterdam: Elsevier, 1959).
60. See Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 97.
61.See Rahendra Koesnan, "Membantu Perdana Menteri Bung Hatta,11 in Bang Hatta Mengabdi pada Tjita-Tjita, p. 222.
62.Ibid.
63. See Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 98.
64.Hatta, AiemoiK, p. 494.
65.Hanifah, Tales o£ a Revolution,
p. 207.
66.See Wehl, Bintk o£ Indonesia,
p. 156.
67.Among them were Chatib Suleiman, Leon Salim, and Darwis Thaib as was also Mohammad Sjafei, a personal friend of Hatta’s.
68."Outline of Vice-Presidents Statement on the Situation in Sumatra," January 17,1948, as cited in A. Kahin, "Struggle for Independence,” pp. 246-47, n. 7.
69.Hatta, "Beras Kita ke India,” in Kumpulan Pidato, p. 81.
70.Biju Patnaik, "Mengenang Dr. Mohammad Hatta, Bekas Wakil Presiden Republik Indonesia,” in Bang Hatta: Pnibadinya dalam Kenangan, p. 358.
71.Ibid., p. 361.
72.Hatta, Nemoin, p. 504.
73.According to R. E. El son, "American Policy and the Indonesian Dispute, 1945-1949” (B.A. Honours Thesis, Monash University), p. 28, the US State Department failed to comprehend the nature of the gulf separating the Dutch and Indonesians.
74.See Cribb, "Political Dimensions of the Currency Question," p. 132,

Revolusl dari Buklt Tinggi,” pp. 83. Ibid., p. 171. 168-69.

84. Hatta, "Pidato Pada Perpisahan
85. Ibid., pp. 170-71.Tahun 1947-1948,” in Kumpulan Predate, p. 135. 142

Proclamation of Independence Unggajatl Discussions (L to R: Sukarno* Prof. Dr. Schermerhorn, Lord Klllearn, Hatta, H. J. Van Mook)

Sjahrlr, Sukarno, Hatta being taken prisoner by Capt. Vosveld of Dutch Military Intelligence, Yogyakarta, December 19, 1948 Family members and staff at Presidential Palace as Sukarno, Hatta, and Sjahrir are driven away, December 19, 1948. Mrs. Hatta is second woman from R.

Hatta on Bangka, April 1949 (L to R: Abdul Gafar Pringgodlgdo, Sudarpo, Hatta, Assaat) Transfer of Sovereignty (Hatta 1s on Queen Juliana’s right)

Hatta with his wife and daughters At Sjahrlr's graveside, 1966

With his family, following conferral of honorary doctorate at University of Indonesia, 1975 At Panca S1la commemoration conference, June 1977. At R 1s his daughter Halida, who completed h1s speech for him.

Hatta as Prime Minister

CHAPTER TEN PRIME MINISTER However emphatically the Dutch government produces legal argument* that the sovereignty over Indonesia lies In the hands o£ the kingdom o£ the Netherlands, the Indonesian people o£ the republic Is o£ the opinion and J^eel* that Its state Is sovereign. It has Its own government which Is not subject to any other government. It has Its own army and Its own police J^orce to maintain law and order, It has Its own monetary system and last but not JUeast It has Its own foreign policy and representation abroad A 1948 was one of the most critical and challenging years of Hatta*s life. In January he returned to Java where a political crisis had developed following Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddinfs acceptance of the Renville Agreement.2 Under the new treaty with the Dutch, the Republic was reduced to a "sub-state"5 among many, its territory comprising merely Central Java and less resource-rich areas of Sumatra, although including the indomitable Aceh. The "Van Mook line,” an arbitrary boundary joining up Dutch military spearheads, ceded to the Dutch Republican territory in which some of its most efficient fighting units were well established. In the face of bitter resentment and accusations of being pro-Dutch, Amir Sjarifuddin tendered his resignation. For six days the government hung in the balance, no party prepared to face the repugnant task of implementing the Renville Agreement, especially persuading Indonesian military units to withdraw to the Republics reduced territory. "Renville was a low point in the struggle," Mohamad Roem recalled, "Everyone felt the need for a strong cabinet and Hatta seemed to be the strongest leader."4 Hatta was initially reluctant to accept the prime ministership, not surprising since assuming the office was tantamount to committing political suicide. There was an anomaly 1n the person who had decreed parliamentary government heading a presidential cabinet, although Hatta did consult the Working Body of KNIP on most major decisions.5 Hatta returned briefly to Buklt Tinggl to seek support for his government, pleading that the unfavorable terms of the Renville Agreement be regarded as "just a link in our long struggle."5 He pointed out to his mass audience: People say that we are defeated, but let me remind you that a defeated nation 1s one which admits it has lost. Our struggle still continues, despite the risks. The United Nations has accepted that we are entitled to defend our freedom. Indonesia will never again be wiped off the map of the world.7 The Renville Agreement marked a turning point in the close relationship of both Hatta and Sjahrir with Amir Sjarifuddin. Sjahrir 1n February 1948 led his own socialist faction out of the Partai Sosialis, forming a 143

new party, the Partal Sosialis Indonesia or PSI, a party considered to be a continuation of the policies of the New PNI of the early 1930s. The Sayap Kiri now consisted of Amir Sjarifuddin’s Partai Sosialis group, the PKI, the Labor Party, and Pesindo. Formerly dependent on strong support from the Vwl Tunggal, the Sayap Kiri was now bitterly critical of Hatta heading a presidential rather than a parliamentary cabinet. Several of Hattafs former antagonists now had strong leadership positions in the Sayap Kiri, such as Abdul Madjid, Tan Ling Djie, and Setiadjit, men who had supported Rustam Effendi and the Communist Party of Holland in their attacks on Hatta. Rustam Effendi was back in Indonesia but had switched his allegiance from the Stalinists to Tan Mai aka, thus as a national Communist perhaps qualifying for the label "Trotskyist." Hatta’s gibes that he was’’Stalin’sslave"may have borne fruit.A disquieting factor for Hatta was that,duringhis absence in Sumatra,the Communist group had been wooing Sukarno. As Abu Hanifah commented: "At that time it was very difficult to approach Sukarno. If one wanted to talk to him, one had to ask for an appointment through Setiadjit,"® possibly an exaggeration. Hatta offered the foreign affairs portfolio to Sjahrir, highly regarded internationally since his defense of the Republic of Indonesia before the United Nations Security Council. Sjahrir refused, preferring to remain a special adviser, dislikingthe return to apresidential rather than a parliamentary cabinet and,since theRenville Agreement, opposingthe policy of continuing negotiation.9 As Haji Agus Salim had been liaising closely with Sjahrir in building up a diplomatic corps overseas, Hatta offered him the foreign affairs portfolio instead. His former PI colleagues, Sukiman, Maramis, and Ali Sastroamidjojo, now representing Masjumi and PNI, he appointed ministers of the interior, finance, and education respectively. Hatta’s cabinet program had four main goals: implementation of the Renville Agreement with continued negotiation through the Good Offices Committee, acceleration of the formation of a sovereign, democratic United States of Indonesia, rationalization of the Republic’s army and civil service in view of the nation’s limited resources, and an attempt at national reconstruction. In defending his government’s policies, Hatta pointed out that "like 1t or not, the Republic of Indonesia 1s bound to implement the Renville Agreement."1® He recalled in his memoirs: "What was amusing was that, in the following debates, it was the Amir Sjarifuddin group in the Working Body which opposed my Government’s policies. They, who had produced the Agreement, wanted it to be rejected. "H The Sayap Kiri, following the pattern set by Tan Malaka’s Persatuan Perjuangan, on February 26 transformed itself Into an anti government group calling itself the Front Demokrasi Rakyat [People’s Democratic Front], abbreviated to FDR. Its program mirrored that of Tan Malaka, advocating mass struggle, nationalization of foreign properties and a cessation of negotiations with the Dutch while they remained on Indonesian soil.12 "Diplomacy" was now a very unpopular concept to the humiliated Indonesians. When on May 26, the Soviet Union announced that it had ratified an agreement for the exchange of consuls between their nation and the Republic of Indonesia, Hatta was considerably embarrassed. He took shelter behind the Renville Agreement, claiming that the Dutch and Americans might misinterpret an agreement between Indonesia and the Soviet Union as the treaty did stipulate Dutch control of Indonesia’s foreign relations, a 144

concession made by Amir Sjarifuddin.!8 yet Hatta had ignored this clause in appointing Haji Agus Salim to the foreign affairs ministry and in continuing Indonesia’s diplomatic offensive overseas. His government assured the American representative on the Good Offices Committee, Du Bois, that, as long as Hatta was prime minister, there would be no exchange of consuls with the Soviet Union.!4 Undoubtedly the most contentious issue in Hatta’s program, both in Java and Sumatra, was "rational ization” of the civil service and armed forces. In defending the program before the KNIP’s Working Body on February 16, 1948, Hatta stated: That the revenues of the state do not cover expenditures should be no reason for wonder. But the difference can be narrowed by judicious rationalization, by transferring labor from unproductive work to productive fields of activity. This transfer of labor will not at once show a decrease in the state’s expenditures; the contrary may even be the case in the beginning, because the creation of productive enterprises requires previous preparation and investment to work on. But once the preparations are completed, the productive labor will begin to yield its profits and the income of the State will increase.!5 This was Hatta the economist speaking, applying business management principles to his government. The problem was that a chaotic revolutionary situation was not an ideal basis for sound planning. Due to the large numbers of refugees flooding into the now pocket- sized Republic, Hatta’s government had a massive unemployment problem on its hands. The refugees had to be fed and offered sustenance, but the main government employment opportunities, apart from the already cumbersome defense forces and civil service, were in the oilfields at Cepu and the railway workshops at Madiun, both overstaffed. Hatta instituted a Ministry of Youth and Reconstruction to try to retrain and rehabilitate excess labor. The problem was that, in the atmosphere of war, the prestigious course open for young men was to take up arms. Hatta’s attempts to establish agricultural cooperatives also received a weak response. The Japanese had discredited such enterprises by using them as a means for extorting produce from the Indonesian people. Hatta was uneasy about the nationalization of the armed forces already begun under Amir Sjarifuddin’s government, which included the demotion of General Sudlrman and the sacking of Ur1p, both of whom Hatta reinstated. In h1s memoirs Hatta cited the existence of a marine corps, part of the left-wing Fourth Division, which was ’’led by nine admirals, all friends of Amir Sjarifuddin.”16 The admirals Hatta dismissed, Informing them that, as the Republic’s armada was Insignificant, 1t ’’had no need of nine admirals.” Hatta also recorded the case of a militia unit ’’which was considered to be the FDR’s army," explaining that "I began by removing this People’s Army, which was financed by the ministry of defense."!' The detailed reports from Colonel A. H. Nasution do not confirm Hatta’s figures, but do state that "the top leadership of the ALRI was eliminated."!8 Nasution also pointed to persistent conflict between his own Smwanai Division and the Marine Corps, the Tentara Laut RepubHk Indonesia, !” and stated that the Sayap K1r1 controlled more than 80 percent of the People’s Army and almost all of the Marine Corps.20 145

In his rationalization efforts Hatta was strongly supported by Nasution, the young but highly regarded Sumatran officer who was chief of the Siliwangi Division, and with whom Hatta was to work very closely both as minister of defense and prime minister. T. B. Simatupang, another senior Siliwangi officer close to Sjahrir, agreed that the forces needed tidying up.21 Generals Sudirman and Urip, however, aware of a crisis situation within the armed forces, were of the opinion that such drastic pruning should be postponed in spite of the high cost of maintaining irregular units. Dissatisfaction among the military was particularly evident in the Surakarta region where a number of officers refused to relinquish their commands, and many were resentful of the Siliwangi Division’s favored status. For the rest of his life, Hatta was to be the target of recriminations that he was the direct cause of the internal revolt which broke out in the latter half of 1948. Both Nasution and Simatupang defended Hatta, claiming that, apart from defusing anti government elements in the forces, Hatta’s motives were defensible on economic grounds.22 Undoubtedly the Dutch blockade was impoverishing the Republic, cutting it off from sources of income, from arms purchases and medical supplies. The Republic was forced to exploit a stockpile of opium left over from the Dutch and Japanese regimes. Morally it was not a situation which Hatta enjoyed, but he felt that the opium’s exchange value and its neatness as a smuggling commodity were too advantageous to be Ignored. John Coast, an English socialist working for the Republic, recalled that one of his assignments was to report to Hatta on the Republic’s opium-running operations centered on Singapore, which had become the subject of Dutch criticism. Hatta’s delicate way of delegating this task amused Coast. ”As an afterthought and smiling like a benign sphinx, he commented: ’And at the same time, John, please see if you can clear up this opium business for me!’”23 Coast sensed Hatta’s discomfiture. ”To Hatta, I knew the Republic’s reputation in this vital commercial centre was all that mattered. To settle ’this opium business’ which was boomeranging round the world with the full power of the Netherlands foreign minister’s information service behind 1t, was hardly likely to be a sinecure.”24 Like many of Hatta’s fellow Indonesians, Coast saw that the Vwl Tunggal was an effective leadership combination, commenting: Hatta 1s too good and too quiet to be popular in the Sukarno sense, but between the two of them, with the parallel characteristics of showmanship and solid administrative ability, of artistry and applied economics, of brilliant demagogic appeal and a reputation for utter integrity, they were as President and Vice-President a most happy combination for Indonesia.25 Coast also noted the physical contrast between the two men. ’’Sukarno is tall and unusually handsome, with brooding, thoughtful eyes. There is about him a mixture of missionary, orator and actor.” Hatta he described as ’’small, slightly chubby, bespectacled,” sitting on his chair like an Indonesian Buddha, ’’calm, imperturbable and steady-eyed. In his lobks there was nothing of the fanatic and no indication of his revolutionary past. A solid sincerity sat about him.”26 Critchley, the Australian representative on the Good Offices Committee, also considered that ’’Sukarno and Hatta had a unique and complementary partnership during the independence struggle,” at the same time remarking: 146

But it was Sukarno with his charismatic oratory who captured the imagination and allegiance of the Indonesian people. I remember travelling from Yogyakarta to Wonosobo with Sukarno in 1948. Hatta followed in a car behind. Villagers along the way flocked to Sukarno’s car to cheer him and they filled our car with fruit and vegetables. Sukarno went out of his way to tell them that Bung Hatta was following and that they should give some of their attention to him, but their interest was primarily in Sukarno.27 Sukarno’s strong support for Hatta at this time undoubtedly made his task easier as the Dutch relentlessly pressed the Republic to the limits. Hatta sounded out Van Mook’s sincerity regarding the Republic’s eventual inclusion in the United States of Indonesia by offering to participate in planning of the interim federal government. As he had suspected, this was the last thing Van Mook wanted, and Van Mook’s reply made it clear that the Republic would not be welcome in any planning until a final political settlement had been achieved, which would depend on the Republic’s full acknowledgement of Dutch authority.28 On March 9 Van Mook had already announced that he was to be President of the interim government, with key secretariats headed by Dutch colonial officers. Hatta made clear that in any transfer of sovereignty, Sukarno would replace Van Mook as President.29 The American and Australian delegates to the Good Offices Committee, Du Bois and Critchley, offered compromise proposals, suggesting that elections be held for the federal government's Constituent Assembly, and that this body be allowed to delineate the constituent states and elect the President, with a proviso that the Netherlands high commissioner retain certain rights of veto.30 Hatta supported the Du Bois-Critchley proposals, which were rejected by the Dutch government. The 1948 elections in the Netherlands had consolidated the power of the conservative Catholic Party, which considered Van Mook too conciliatory, replacing him in October 1948 with the more hardline former prime minister, Beel. Beel was given the new title ’’High Representative of the Crown,” an indication of how important it was to the Dutch not to let the Indies slip from their grip. As had been the experience of Sjahrir and Amir, Hatta was not only faced with Dutch intransigence and intensification of Dutch forces around the Republican perimeter, but he was also under increasing attack on the home front. In May 1948, the Front Demokrasi Rakyat launched a strong offensive against Hatta’s government, demanding key ministries, and proposing a new ’’National Program” with a new ’’National Government” in which they would be represented. Labor unrest accompanied their demands, the most serious incident being a strike at Delanggu, a cotton-growing area providing raw materials for much needed textiles. Yet Hatta refused to use force to bring about a return to work. On July 27, as a gesture of reconciliation, he announced that he would accept the FDR's National Program, as it differed little from his own. However, he was not prepared to offer the ministries which the FDR demanded, in particular his own defense ministry.31 Hatta was on the alert for more serious confrontation when the veteran PKI leader, Musso, returned from Russia on August 3. Musso immediately advocated a Jalan Boa a, a New Way, insisting that the PKI become a single party of the working class, taking over from the FDR the task o^ wresting control of the government from the ’’national bourgeoisie.”32 when 147

reminiscing on Musso’s return, Hatta expressed the opinion that lfMusso?s original plan was to proclaim an Indonesian Soviet State,”33 Hatta had grounds for making this assumption in that Musso openly declared that his strategy was based on the ”Gottwald Plan,” by which power in Czechoslovakia had passed relatively blood!essly to the Communist party. The FDR responded to Musso’s call, its member parties, including Amir Sjarifuddin’s Partai Sosialis, agreeing to merge into the PKI. For Indonesians in general, a surprising aspect of the merger was Amir’s public announcement that he had been a member of the Communist party for many years. Most people, including Hatta, found it difficult to accept this statement.34 Hatta was aware that Amir commanded considerable popular support and that therefore the PKI threat must be taken seriously. On the third anniversary of the proclamation of independence, August 17, 1948, Sukarno announced an amnesty for the jailed leaders of the Persatuan Perjuangan, releasing Tan Mai aka, Subardjo, Iwa Kusuma Sumantri, Sukarni, and Abikusno. The Tan Mai aka group, now calling itself the Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat [People’s Revolutionary Movement] or GRR, was strongly hostile to Musso, who had consistently accused Tan Mai aka of thwarting the PKI revolts of 1926-27. What better strategy than to set two of the government’s most ardent opponents at each other’s throats? In his major address to the Working Body of KNIP on September 2, 1948, Hatta was determined both to defend his government’s policies and at the same time to alert the Republic to the Communist threat: If our struggle were to be regarded merely from the Communist point of view, then indeed there would be much to say for identifying ourselves with Soviet Russian policy. To the Communist, Russia represents the foundation on which to work for the realization of his ideals; for the Communist, struggle rises or falls with the Soviet Union... and therefore the interests of the Soviet Union take precedence over all other matters in international political controversies.33 Hatta pointed out that a nationalist, ’’even though he may have a socialist outlook,” must give precedence to his country’s independence and therefore ’’the methods he follows in his struggle differ widely from the methods to which the Communist resorts.” Hatta directed attention to the bipolar power structure which had emerged internationally in the wake of the Second World War, contending: No matter how weak we appear to be as a nation that has only recently won Its independence when compared to the two giants in the conflict—the United States and the Soviet Union—it is the view of the government that we must continue to base our struggle on the principle that we must have confidence in ourselves and that we must struggle on our own strength and abilities.3^ Here Hatta was reiterating Sjahrir’s call for an independent policy free of great power domination. Hatta also pointed out that it was premature to stage a social revolution, using Marxist theory to back his statement. ’’Even those, who formerly quoted Marx’s and Mao Tse-tung’s maxims to remind us of the fact that we have not yet passed the stage of national revolution and that therefore the time has not yet arrived for a social revolution, have 148

forgotten their own theories and are ardently advocating a social revolution.” Hatta defended his government’s record, claiming it had achieved results in spite of the emergency situation, including the cultivation of an extra 75,000 hectares of land, the organization of agricultural cooperatives, price control, and attacks on hoarding.3*7 As a response, Musso wrote directly to the leaders of the two major parties, the PNI and Masjumi, seeking support for a united front against the Dutch and American imperialists. Musso realized that the Republic’s tense situation was making the policy of continuing negotiation increasingly unattractive. Both parties remained loyal to Hatta, Masjumi further accusing the Communists of ’’insulting the Hatta government and organizing anti-tax campaigns.”38 Musso now turned to the Javanese peasantry for support. On September 4 he addressed a congress of the radical Barisan Tani Indonesia [Indonesian Farmers’ Brigade] or BTI, groups reminiscent of the former Sarekat Rakyat, insisting that ’’agrarian revolution, the division of land to the peasants, must be carried out in this time of revolution.”39 Musso was playing on a very emotive issue, as the influx of refugees had increased demand for available land, exacerbating the latent religious animosity between the more affluent landed AantsU and the poorer ahangan Muslims in the villages. Musso also had strong support from discontented combatants who had been demobilized under Hatta’s drastic pruning operation, who were now eager to rally behind a leader out to attack the man they considered was most to blame for their unhappy ci rcumstances. The Americans were watching closely the confrontation between Hatta and the PKI. Hatta had also clearly put out feelers to see how the Americans, in their present sensitivity to the Communist threat in China and Asia generally, were reacting. Consul General Livengood in Jakarta informed Secretary of State Marshall that Hatta was ’’prepared to take strong action against intransigent elements” and wished to know ’’the official US stand, particularly regarding assistance to the Republic against Communists.”40Replying on September 9, Marshall instructed Livengood to inform Hatta that ”US Govt will in every practical way assist democratic non-Commun1st govt of Indonesia,” but he also made clear that extension of financial help would only be forthcoming when a ’’just and practical settlement [of the] Dutch-Republican dispute” had been reached. On the same day he requested the Dutch government to support Hatta, ’’stressing the great Importance which US attaches to bolstering Hatta Govt [at] this juncture.”41 Hatta had not long to wait before Musso’s revolutionary rhetoric sparked Into revolt the underlying unrest and general dissatisfaction in Central Java. The mysterious disappearance of five left-wing army officers had heightened resentment against the government and there were accusations that the S1liwang1 Division was the culprit. This event coincided with the commencement of a tour of the Republic by Musso, Amir Sjarifuddln, and Setiadjit. In Madiun, Musso delivered a challenging speech, admonishing Indonesian Communists for allowing the revolution to be led by the bourgeoisie and stating that ’’elements which opposed the course of the revolution must be purged.”42 On September 18, left-wing disgruntled army groups responded to Musso’s challenge and took over the administration of Madiun, capturing or killing the government’s administrative officers. Musso’s immediate response was one of dismay, a realization that again a PKI revolt was being staged before the circumstances were right. He offered to settle 149

the uprising peacefully if Hatta would include the PKI in his government.43 In an interview after his arrest, Amir Sjarifuddin denied that he had started a rebellion in September 1948, asserting that f,even if it is assumed that there were preparations made for a coup, the time for such action was still premature, because it would not be possible to start the action with any chance of success if there were as yet no political unity, and our policy was to bring about this political unity first."44 In Critchley's opinion, "the revolt was largely the work of people like Musso, and I am convinced that it took some of its supporters, such as Amir Sjarifuddin, by surprise."43 The uprising constituted a crisis for Hatta. Again Sukarno came to the fore, using his magnetism to draw the Javanese people to his side. On September 19 he appealed to them to choose between Musso and the Vwl Tunggal. Less than two hours later, Musso broadcast his reply, calling on the people to overthrow Sukarno and Hatta, contending that the revolution had been led by the national bourgeoisie, "uncertain and vague in its stand in facing the Imperialists in general and America in particular." He continued: "It is clear that in the past three years Soekarno-Hatta, the ex-RamuAka dealers, the sworn Quislings, have executed a capitulation policy to the Dutch and the British, and at this very moment they are going to sell out Indonesia to the American imperialists."43 There was no mention of Amir Sjarifuddin1s acceptance of the Renville Agreement. Hatta wasted no time. On September 19, PKI leaders in Yogyakarta and other urban centers were taken into custody, including Tan Ling Djie and Abdul Madjid, several not even aware that a revolt had taken place. Hatta called an emergency session of KNIPfs Working Body, and requested permission for "absolute authority" to be vested in the presidency and the proclamation of martial law. As defense minister, Hatta assigned to his most loyal unit, the Siliwangi Division, the task of quelling the PKI revolt. In this, he was not fully supported by General Sudirman, who preferred negotiation with the rebel forces.47 The original PKI plan was thought to be geared to an anticipated second military action by the Dutch, in which Sukarno and the Hatta government would be eliminated, allowing the PKI an opportunity to lead the final guerrilla struggle against the Dutch.48 Hatta recalled in his memoirs that "about the end of September, I received a letter from Van Mook offering me assistance."49 This Hatta rejected, determined not to present Van Mook with a coaAl blanckz to enter Republican territory. Through Cochran, the new American representative on the Good Offices Committee, Hatta appealed for weapons and ammunition to fight the Communists,38 but this was not agreed to. Support for the PKI declined once people realized that this demanded a full commitment against Sukarno and Hatta. Yet the conflict was too heated for immediate settlement. Already savage killings and atrocities had been committed by both sides. The Republican forces quickly gained the upper hand. On October 31, 1948, Musso was killed in a skirmish, and at the end of November, while leading the PKIfs main force, Amir Sjarifuddin was captured near the Van Mook line in the Purwodadi area. According to Hatta, Gatot Subroto, the military governor of Surakarta, sought instructions on the treatment of captured leaders. "I said to detain all of them and bring them before the Court," Hatta recalled. Amir was held prisoner until the Dutch began their second military offensive and 150

then executed by firing squad. Hatta explained 1n an Interview many years later: "Gatot Subroto said that# Instead of taking the risk of their crossing over to the Dutch# * 1t 1s better to finish them off."51 Hatta may have been trying to clear h1s own name# for Gatot had claimed that he carried out the execution on Hattafs orders.52 In Cr1tchleyfs opinion, ,fAm1r Sjar1fudd1n became somewhat of a scape- goat.”55 Hatta acknowledged that Amir was an enigma. "He was an Intellectual who believed 1n communism (atheist) and at the same time he was a Christian (thelst). In confronting the Bible, he was a Christian# facing society and politics he was a communist." Hatta admitted: "I do not know how to analyze such a person; that 1s a job for a psychologist!"5 Yet many of Hatta’s fellow Mlnangkabau were both Communists and practicing Muslims. Hatta himself had# as a young nationalist# described the simi- larities between Marx and Islam# claiming both creeds were striving for social justice# but then Hatta did not regard communism as pure Marxism. Overall, the Madlun revolt enhanced the status of Hatta1s government. Coast noticed that "the general feeling 1n Yogya at the time was that the Communists were twice traitors: traitors to Hatta and h1s government: traitors to the nationalist struggle."55 According to Roem# "Only Hatta could have coped with Madlun.1,58 One positive result for the Republic was that the army on Java was much more Integrated after the revolt. Also# Internationally# Hatta*s government was now seen by the Americans as responsible and moderate and, even more commendable 1n their view# ant1-Commun1st. Although the United States did not Immediately switch Its support to the Republic# Washington was becoming convinced that the Hatta government could provide a bulwark against communism in Indonesia.57 The Dutch countered this American change of attitude by accusing Hatta of being Marxist. They drew attention to Hatta’s release of Tan Malaka# which had permitted him to establish a new national Communist party# the Partal Murba# on October 3, 1948.58 There was Httle respite for Hatta. No sooner had the Madlun crisis been resolved than he was forced to return to Sumatra to settle a dispute between rival military commanders 1n Tapanull. Situated so close to Dutch lines# such a clash could provide an excuse for the Dutch army to take over further Sumatran territory under the guise of restoring peace and order. Hatta had expected a parallel Communist upsurge 1n Sumatra# especially as Musso had spent several days 1n the Mlnangkabau on his way to Java# but the Mlnangkabau Communists remained loyal to Hattafs government.59 While in West Sumatra# Hatta began to make preparations for a transfer of Republican government to Buklt T1ngg1 1n the event of a further Dutch offensive on Java, Instructing his minister of economic affairs# Sjafruddln Prawlranegara# to remain 1n Buklt Tinggi. Hatta had already made arrangements with Nehru, through the Indian consul, for Sukarno and Sjahrlr to be flown to India to plead the Republics cause abroad and to protect Sukarno from the Dutch. He himself hoped to continue his prime ministership from Buklt Tinggi if Yogyakarta were seized. "Ifm not sure how serious Hatta was about leading an emergency government 1n Sumatra#" Crltchley commented many years later# "but 1t would have been a realistic assessment of where such a revolutionary government would have had to be based."88 Hatta was summoned back to Java to resume negotiations with yet another delegation from the Netherlands government. H1s talks with Stlkker# the Dutch foreign minister, were far from reassuring. "The 151

general atmosphere was worse than in July 1947,” Hatta acknowledged, ”even the Good Offices Committee was concerned that the Dutch were bent on war.”61 Hatta still believed that it was to the Republic's advantage to continue to negotiate. As long as the Dutch were seen to be the aggressors, the Republic of Indonesia retained the goodwill of the Security Council, such sympathy being a powerful "psychological power factor.” On November 10, Hatta sent Stikker an aide-memoire in which he agreed that, during the interim period before the establishment of the United States of Indonesia, ”if the federal Indonesian government agreed that a state of insecurity existed, then the High Representative of the Crown might be permitted to use Netherlands troops to settle it.”6^ Hatta conceded that the armed forces of the Republic would be partly incorporated into a federal army in the interim period, but with separate identity and answerable only to the interim federal government. Only in an emergency would the federal government ask for aid from Dutch troops and only in such an emergency would the High Representative of the Crown be in charge of all forces.63 on returning to the Netherlands, Stikker ignored the subtleties of Hatta's note, indicating erroneously that Hatta was willing to allow Dutch troops entry anywhere in Indonesia.64 The Republic was appalled. Mohamad Roem, representing Masjumi, wrote to Cochran, saying Hatta had gone too far, and asking him ”to do whatever is possible to lead procedure back to its proper course under auspices of GOC [Good Offices Committee].”66 On November 26, the Dutch government had announced the appointment of a top-level delegation to Indonesia, in the hopes that direct talks "will yield results and will shortly lead to conclusion [of a] political agreement... .”66 In discussions with its chairman, Dutch Minister for Overseas Territories Sassen, on December 2, Hatta made it clear that his aide-memoire had been misinterpreted. Unfortunately it had not only been misunderstood by the Dutch, but within the Republic a new left-wing protest front was being formed.67 On December 4, Hatta conferred with Stikker and the delegation and, while saying he would adhere to his aide-memoire ”in principle,” asked for a "gentlemen's agreement... which would actually restrain high representative of Crown from using troops in RepubCHcan] territory without concurrence [of the] interim government.” Stikker recalled that Hatta was "quite tense” during the meeting, not surprising since he was treading a political tightrope.66 According to Hatta, Sassen Insisted that the Indonesian army immediately be "converted into a 'gendarmerie,' so our discussions reached deadlock.”69 Hatta challenged Sassen, demanding to know 1f the Dutch Intended to establish a federation of Indonesian states without Including the Republic of Indonesia. Hatta recorded that Sassen assured him that the "Dutch government has no such Intention."70 Yet, on December 13, Sassen persuaded the Dutch cabinet to authorize a full-scale military assault to destroy the Republic, which was to commence at midnight on December 18, the date Sukarno and his party were scheduled to fly to India.71 On December 7, the American government sent an aide-memoire, to the Netherlands, threatening to cut off Marshall Aid if a military offensive was launched against Indonesia. Following Dutch protests, the note was reworded on December 9 and the threat of aid curtailment withdrawn. For the Dutch, this represented the green light for an attack on the Republic.72 Hatta had previously warned Cochran that his own position with the Indonesian military and political parties was perilous, expressing 152

the belief that 1t was reasonable for the Netherlands to make considerable concessions.Crltchley admitted# "There were times when I was unhappy about U.S. attitudes, but major power support was needed to bring about a settlement and we were fortunate that that power was the United States," adding: "Much of Australia’s diplomatic effort, particularly in Indonesia, was directed to getting U.S. understanding and support."74 On Cochran’s advice, Hatta made an attempt on December 13 to reopen negotiations. He sent a note to the Dutch which he knew would alienate him from practically every Republican, but which he needed as a trump card in h1s battle of wits with the Dutch. It read: We are fully prepared to recognize [that] the High Representative has the right of veto over acts of the various organs of the Federal Interim Government. ... We are prepared further to concede that the High Representative be given emergency powers to act in a state of war, a state of siege or a state of insecurity. As part of an over-all agreement, we should be ready to stipulate that the High Representative himself be the ultimate judge of the necessity for the exercise of extraordinary powers under these circumstances.7$ Hatta had now gone as far as he could possibly go. As far as h1s own political career was concerned, he had laid h1s neck on the block. Yet Hatta could read the mood of the Dutch because so many of their characteristics had rubbed off on him. He knew how difficult it would be for them to veer from their set course, seeing the weak and beleaguered Republic as the only obstacle 1n the path of repossession of the Indies. They were unable to accept that sympathy for the Republic of Indonesia, both externally and Internally, could escalate Into a force stronger than military might. The reply Hatta had expected arrived on December 17, an Insistence that the Republic accept all Dutch demands by 10 a.m., Jakarta time, on December 18.This time even Cochran was enraged, protesting: You will agree, I am sure, that 1n such circumstances, I cannot 1n justice press Dr. Hatta for an immediate reply to a letter which calls not for a mere expression of willingness to resume negotiations but rather for surrender to the position of your Government on every material point.77 Hatta may have recalled h1s own words to the Netherlands court 1n February 1928: "Thus the Netherlands has 1t entirely within Its own power to determine 1n what way Indonesia will become free, by violent means or by the path of peace."7® Hatta resignedly and heavy-heartedly Instructed Commander-In-Chief Sudlrman to prepare h1s troops to meet an Imminent Dutch assault. He returned to Yogyakarta, spiritually drained, accepting h1s doctor’s advice that he rest 1n the hills at Kallurang, knowing that he would be 1n close touch with the Good Offices Committee, who were resident there. Coast remarked: "We were all quite sure that nothing on earth would ever stop Hatta’s brain, but he had developed serious Internal troubles, and by h1s consistent overwork was running down the whole mechanism of h1s body."*79 The cool air helped to revive him, and Crltchley later remarked that he "did not seem seriously 111" and "as far as I was aware he was 1n Kallurang primarily because the G.O.C. was there."90 153

Critchley had established a rapport with Hatta, a person he described as "friendly and pleasant, small in stature but big in intellect." According to Critchley, "Hatta was deeply religious, but this did not in any way alienate him from Australians," affirming: "Neither I nor the other Australians I knew at that time would have considered him a ’wowser.’"81 He continued: I felt that Hatta accepted me as a close friend and I was not conscious of a cultural gap. I felt very comfortable in Hatta’s presence. He had a sense of humour and we occasionally exchanged jokes. Although I do not remember actually discussing the opposite sex with him, I would not have felt inhibited about doing so.82 At midnight on December 18, Cochran, then in Jakarta, was handed a note stating that the Netherlands was terminating the Renville Agreement. Cochran tried to wire the message to his colleagues at Kaliurang, but the Dutch denied him access to telegraphic facilities. Nehru’s plane, sent to collect Sukarno and Sjahrir, was refused landing rights, so it was forced to remain 1n Singapore. For the Republic, the first direct Intimations that the second military offensive had begun were the explosions from bombs dropped on Maguwo, Yogyakarta’s airport, followed by rocket attacks on the city and parachute troop landings. Critchley came almost immediately to Hatta’s bungalow to consult with him and took breakfast with him. Hatta later recorded that he Informed Critchley that he would "discuss with the Cabinet what should be done and it would depend on Its decision whether the government would join the guerrillas or stay 1n Yogya."83 On h1s drive to the capital from Kaliurang, Hatta was met by the Sultan of Yogyakarta, who had offered to fetch him despite the bombs and strafing. A11 Sastroamidjojo remarked that Hatta’s arrival at the presidential palace had a calming effect; it enabled an emergency cabinet meeting to be held and decisions taken.84 General Sudlrman had already asked Sukarno to implement a previous promise that he would fight 1n the mountains with the people, although Simatupang believed that neither Sukarno nor Hatta were made of the stuff needed for guerrilla warfare.88 Both Hatta and Sukarno were to suffer accusations of cowardice for deciding to remain in their offices in Yogyakarta. But Critchley has contended: "Their capture by the Dutch provided a focus for the G.O.C. and the Security Council to demand their release and their return to Yogyakarta. It was more in keeping with their status as national leaders to have been taken 1n their national capital than to have appeared as rebels fleeing Into the jungle."88 According to Hatta, there were two good reasons why he and Sukarno could not escape into the hills at the conclusion of the emergency cabinet meeting. First, there were insufficient troops left in the city to cover their escape and, second, it was more advantageous from the point of view of the Good Offices Committee’s report to the United Nations for them to be seen as victims of Dutch aggression.87 Before his arrest, Hatta managed to dictate a short speech for circulation throughout the Republic, which conferred full powers on Sjafruddln Prawiranegara, the economic affairs minister 1n Buklt Tinggl, to lead an emergency government and, should that government fall, authorizing his finance minister, Maramis, then in the United States, to establish a government in exile.88 154

On the morning of December 20, 1948, the Dutch commander on Java, Major General Meyer, requested Sukarno to declare a ceasefire. Sukarno refused. On December 28, Sukarno, Haj1 Agus Salim, and Sjahrlr were flown via Brastagl to Prapat, a lakeside holiday resort 1n northeast Sumatra. Hatta, the Working Body chairman, Assaat, Gafar Prlnggodlgdo, A1r Commodore Suryadarma, and, subsequently, Mohamad Roem and All Sastroamldjojo were detained 1n a small villa on the Island of Bangka off the east coast of Central Sumatra. It was Hattafs third term of Imprisonment at the hands of the Dutch. The year 1948 ended uncomfortably for Hatta, sharing with h1s associates two rooms of the villa, encaged with barbed wire. Dutch methods had not changed from prewar days. Hatta and his colleagues were offered freedom of movement within the Island of Bangka 1n return for a signed statement agreeing to refrain from political activity. Hatta was determined that this time the Dutch must recognize that their captives were government leaders not native dissidents. He urged his fellow prisoners to observe a dignified stance. A11 Sastroamidjojo, in captivity with Hatta for the second time, humorously recounted Hatta's directives: He emphasized that even though we were 1n exile, we had to continue to regard ourselves as officials of the Republic of Indonesia. ... He hoped that we would be neatly dressed whenever we left the bedroom; we should not wear pyjamas or a sarong. Apart from that, he emphasized that in our place of exile we must continue to hold fast to the principles of democracy. "For example,” he said, "If we bathe, we must not use as much water as we please. I have measured the volume of the water for bathing and it turns out that there will be enough water if you use only ten dippers each time you bathe.89 A11 admitted that "Hatta's 'water regulation' made us laugh, but we obeyed it because he explained 1t so seriously."90 Mohamad Roem recalled receiving a reprimand for leaving the bedroom not fully dressed. He defended himself by pointing out that Hatta had suggested that they maintain a homely atmosphere: "At home I wear pyjamas outside my bedroom," Roem protested. Hatta retorted teaslngly: "At home does not mean as in Roem's house!" Roem did admit that Hatta's dominant personality and discipline 1n their situation of close confinement prevented the atmopshere from deteriorating Into acrimony, as happened at Prapat.91 Sukarno and Sjahrlr, under any circumstances uneasy partners, became so hostile to one another that a rift developed which was never healed.92 Hatta's living conditions appalled Critchley on his first visit to the Internees as a member of the Good Offices Committee. "He was startled seeing us 1n a cage," Hatta recalled, "this being contrary to the explanation given by the Dutch representative 1n the United Nations who said that we were all free to move around Bangka."93 This was the Dutch again playing Into Hatta's hands; their deception merely added fuel to the International hostility created by their aggression. Rahml Hatta remembered that the letters she received from her husband in this period, "written neatly 1n pencil," expressed hope rather than despair. "He was very much convinced that the road of history was leading towards the aims of the Indonesian nation, that Indonesia would obtain Its sovereignty." Hatta's letters were not just political, they showed his deep concern for h1s family: 155

I felt relieved receiving your letter, having all along been convinced that you would be patient and withstand the trials. Trust 1n God Almighty, for He Is our strength. Hopefully Meutla will calm down again. Environment has a big Influence on a small child, so do try to surround her with rays of happiness to brighten up her spirits.9* After the removal of the government leadership, Tan Mai aka on December 21 called for total war, declaring: "I shall lead the fight against the Dutch to the bitter end.”95 Using the Kedlrl area as a base, Tan Malaka began an Intensive campaign of political Indoctrination, assisted by Partal Murba leaders, Including Rustam Effendl and h1s brother, pointing out the "mistakes and short-comings of the Sukarno-Hatta government."9* Tan Malaka had the backing of an army battalion, but In a skirmish with the local military commander he and the other leaders were captured. H1s execution 1s believed to have taken place between February and May 1949, although mystery still surrounds the circumstances.9? The vacuum left by the capture of the Republ1cfs top civilian leadership was filled on Java by the military commanders In liaison with the Sultan of Yogyakarta. From Buklt T1ngg1, Sjafruddln Prawlranegara headed the Pemerlntah Darurat Republ1k Indonesia [Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia], although h1s leadership activities were, through circumstances, mainly confined to Sumatra. The Dutch, the United Nations, and the BFO states persisted 1n treating the leaders 1n detention as the legitimate government. In h1s memoirs, Hatta was anxious to establish that he did not deliberately Ignore the Buklt T1ngg1 government. He claimed that, when asked to confer with Dutch Prime Minister Drees at the end of January, he refused, telling Crltchley that "Sukarno and I were no longer 1n control because from December 19, 1948 we handed over to Mr. Sjafruddln Prawlranegara 1n West Sumatra.”98 The military leaders on Java and Sumatra, supported by the local people, undoubtedly played a major role 1n preventing the Dutch from gaining advantage from the removal of the Republican government. The ability of the regional commanders to continue guerrilla warfare against the Dutch forces on Java 1n particular was an essential component 1n convincing the Dutch that they could not win back the Indies by force. The Dutch came under fire Internationally after launching their second military offensive. On January 20, 1949, Nehru opened a special conference to discuss the Indonesian dilemma, held 1n New Delhi, which recommended to the Security Council that a firmer stand be taken against the Dutch. American disapproval was more punishing; on December 21, President Truman suspended Marshall Aid to the Netherlands. The United States also proposed that the Good Offices Committee become the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI), with powers to advise on what areas should be returned to the Republic.99 The Security Council resolved on January 28, 1949 that the Republican leaders be restored to their government 1n Yogyakarta and that the United Nations, through Its commission, supervise the formation of the proposed United States of Indonesia, with transfer of full sovereignty by July 1, 1950. This was a much stronger action than the Dutch had anticipated. Hatta commented with a hint of satisfaction: "It 1s not I who needs to talk to Prime Minister Drees but probably he who needs me.”!" Sukarno and Haj1 Agus Salim were transferred to Bangka at the beginning of February 1949. When Hatta, backed by Sukarno, refused to negotiate while 1n captivity, the Dutch transferred Sjahrir to Jakarta, hoping to 156

use him as an intermediary between the Dutch and Hatta. Sjahrir Insisted that the political leaders must first be released and the Security Council’s resolutions observed, assuring Hatta that he would make no commitment to the Dutch without cabinet's agreement.101 Sjahrir was permitted to travel to Bangka to confer with Hatta, who suggested that Sjahrir go once more to the United Nations Security Council at Lake Success as a spokesman for the Republic. Again Sjahrir refused. He was still basically opposed to Hatta's policy of continued negotiation and reliance on the United States of America, disliking Its tactics of forcing the Dutch to their knees by withdrawing aid. On February 26, yielding to mounting pressures, the Dutch proposed that a Round Table Conference be held at The Hague on March 12, to which all Indonesian states, Including the Republic, be invited to "discuss the conditions for and the ways along which the earliest possible transfer of sovereignty" could be effected.102 The UNCI was still dissatisfied, reporting on March 1 that 1t considered that the Dutch statement was merely a "counterproposal" to the Security Council's resolution of January 28, nor did 1t sanction the return of the Republican leaders to Yogyakarta.105 A disquieting factor for the Dutch was the realization that their action had not only lost them International support but had turned the BFO states against them, Inspiring an archipelago-wide spirit of Indonesian nationalism. Anak Agung Gde Agung, the Balinese prime minister of the Great Eastern Indonesia state, obtained permission to visit Bangka to confer with the political detainees. Anak Agung was Impressed by Hatta; a strong and lasting friendship developed between the two men. In the face of American pressure and with the realization that the majority of Indonesians were turning against them, the Dutch agreed to restore the Republican government to Yogyakarta on condition that Informal discussions be held to draw up a basis for establishing the United States of Indonesia. Hatta admitted to Cochran that he had to be cautious "not to lose confidence of supporters through what might be considered weakness" 1n agreeing to negotiations with the Dutch. He feared that "Tan Malaka and others would attack him bitterly thereon."104 This time Hatta rejected suggestions that Sjahrir act as an Intermediary. "For a long time, since Renville, Sjahrir had not wanted to be Included 1n delegations negotiating with the Dutch," he later explained.105 Hatta Instead appointed Mohamad Roem to be leader of the Indonesian delegation, assslsted by Ali Sastroamldjojo, but asked Sjahrir 1f he would assist Roem as an adviser. Although consenting to act 1n this capacity, Sjahrir consistently avoided the delegation's Invitations to attend official discussions.106 In Critchley's opinion, "Hatta related better to and was more comfortable with Roem than he would have been with Sjahrir, but Sjahrir would also have been a valuable adviser and negotiator." Crltchley defended Roem, asserting that his "qualities should not be underestimated; he was Intelligent, honest, trustworthy, with considerable human understanding and sympathy."10? Sukarno was further Irritated by Sjahrir's refusal to work with Roem. "Sukarno felt it to be a humiliation directed at him personally," recorded Hatta.100 Sjafruddln Prawlranegara was also offended at being Ignored when h1s government was officially the legal government of the Republic of Indonesia. Hatta tried to smooth Sjafruddln's hurt feelings by obtaining permission to fly to Aceh to confer with him. According to Hatta, he chose to go there as he believed 1t to be the only area of Sumatra outside 157

Dutch control./\s Sjafruddin had decided to remain in West Sumatra, Hatta met only with Colonel Hidayat. One of the most sensitive Issues to be raised in the forthcoming discussions was that guerrilla warfare should cease, both in Sumatra and Java. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara later exonerated Hatta from blame for by-passing his government, explaining that he "gained the conviction that he acted in all things according to a plan and purpose, which was honest and sincere."HO On June 14, Sjafruddin announced that the Emergency Government would support the agreement concluded between Roem and the Dutch representative, Van Royen. The main opposition to this agreement emanated from Sjahrir’s PSI and the Partai Murba. It was also generally disliked 1n army circles, with army leaders disappointed that they had not been consulted. "Hatta could have communicated more with the people by radio while on Bangka," Nasution contended, "and also included the military leaders in consulta- tions with the Dutch and UNCI."!1* On July 6, the political prisoners were finally released, although they had been free to roam the island of Bangka since the end of January. Yogyakarta welcomed back Sukarno and Hatta with an air of warmth and festivity, special acclaim also going to General Sudirman, now so ill with tuberculosis that he had to be carried on a stretcher. Amid the welcome ceremonies, Sukarno and Hatta could sense the chill of army hostility. While they had lived in comparative safety and comfort in exile, many of those remaining on Java had died, including Urip, the former army chief. Sudirman was so antagonistic to the ceasefire order scheduled for August 1 that he wrote a letter of resignation, only retracting it when Sukarno countered by threatening to resign himself. A week following the VwZ Tungg&C1s release, Sjafruddin returned to Yogyakarta, formally returning his mandate to Hatta, thus allowing him to form a new cabinet. A strategic move taken by the Republic was to invite the BFO states to an Inter-Indonesian Conference held in mid-July before the scheduled opening of the main Round Table Conference in the Netherlands in August. There was not complete unanimity among the BFO leaders about an absolute transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia. Anak Agung led a group which strongly supported the Vu/Z TunggcU. and complete independence, while Sultan Hamid of West Borneo headed a group which preferred stronger ties with the Dutch. Most of the BFO states admired the Republic’s refusal to accept defeat after the second Dutch military action, although there also still lingered resentment that the Republic had accepted the terms of the Linggajati Agreement which allowed the Dutch to continue in control of many of the Outer Islands. One of the main topics discussed at the Inter-Indonesian Conference was the form of the Constitution for the proposed United States of Indonesia. This time there was no doubt that the voice of the Outer Islands was strong, showing preference for a federal state and knowing that the Dutch would insist on a federal parliamentary system. Hatta, in his opening address to the conference, stressed the need for unity, asserting somewhat inaccurately that the archipelago had been united both under the Majapahit empire and the Dutch colonial regime. He called to mind the oath taken by the youth at their historic conference in October 1928: "We are one nation, we have only one native land, we have one uniting language."H2 Hatta once more asked Sjahrir to assist as an adviser at the all-important Round Table Conference commencing 1n The Hague on August 23,

1949. Again Sjahrir refused, worried by the dominating position of the United States representative, Cochran, and by statements made by Sukarno 158

that "the solution of the Indonesian problem now rests solely with the United States," implying that, without American support, he and Hatta were finished and "chaos and Communism would be the inevitable result in Indonesia."113 Coast was disappointed that Sjahrir was not accompanying Hatta, recalling that "I rashly risked rebukes by trying to find out what really kept apart these two men, whom I so greatly liked and respected."H* Sjahrir admitted that he had "little faith in the return of the Republican government to Yogya at the insistence of the United Nations," believing that "the Dutch were still not ready for serious negotiations." He preferred the "idea of the restoration of the Republican Government in unconquerable Achinese territory in North Sumatra."115 As prime minister, Hatta led the Republic of Indonesia’s delegation to the Round Table Conference in The Hague, appointing Roem his deputy. Sukarno remained in Indonesia. Hatta called briefly to see Nehru on his way to the conference, receiving advice and, in return, expressing Indonesia’s gratitude for India’s solid support for the Republic. Then it was on to Europe. Hatta did not record his personal feelings on being back on Dutch soil after a lapse of seventeen years. He had left in July 1932, a recently graduated young nationalist. He returned a prime minister and head of government. Hatta began his stay on a hospitable note, holding a reception on August 17 to celebrate the fourth anniversary of the proclamation of Indonesian independence. His guests, he later recorded, included "Dutch Cabinet Ministers, members of the First and Second Chambers, party leaders and old acquaintances of mine from the time I was a student in Holland and a member of the PI• "117 Hatta, who only two months previously had been a reluctant "guest" of the Dutch government, obviously relished his role as host. Coast noticed how deferentially the BFO representatives looked to Hatta: "If a Federalist could sit down for a meal with Hatta, he was a conspicuously proud man for the rest of the day."11® The official opening of the Round Table Conference took place in the Knights’ Hall in The tfague, at which Dutch Prime Minister Drees presided. In his speech to the assembly, Hatta pointed out that the Dutch had failed to appreciate how much the Indonesian people had changed under Japanese rule, strengthening the "will for freedom."119 He averred: "The Indonesian Dutch conflict is mainly a psychological matter," without revealing that it was now his turn to practice psychological stratagems on the Dutch. Hatta assured the Dutch that "Netherlands capital and economic interest in Indonesia" would not be endangered, a promise which would be difficult to keep. In conclusion, Hatta called for a new understanding between his people and the Dutch: For four long years our two peoples have lived in mutual enmity and with feelings of resentment in their hearts. For four long years we have been fighting and killing each other, with vain sacrifice of property and blood. Let us now commence a new era, founded on peace and collaboration.120 The deliberations of the Round Table Conference continued until November 2, getting off to a slow start. Coast summed up the atmosphere: "The Dutch in their fear of becoming only a tiny West European state did all they could to bind Indonesia to them in what they termed a ’tight’ union, while the Indonesians, who had accepted the principle of entering a Dutch-Indonesian Union symbolically headed by Queen Juliana and consisting 159

of two equal and sovereign Independent states, only wanted a 'loose* Union, with the flimsiest possible ties.”121 Three basic agreements were formulated: the transfer of sovereignty, the Institution of the Union, and the Transitional Measures setting down the practical details Involved 1n the transfer. The three United Nations Commission members were present during the whole proceedings, Cochran and Crltchley playing the major roles. Coast observed that the BFO delegates "were on the whole a dull and timid lot, showing an obvious Inferiority complex 1n the presence of the Republic.11 The exception was Anak Agung, whom Coast described as the "second Indonesian power 1n the Conference," remarking that "perhaps Anak Agung did more than any one else to bring the Republicans and Federalists together. "122 Coast noticed that Hatta was again suffering physical exhaustion, commenting that he was "losing weight visibly and looking terribly tired."123 Roem was 0f the opinion that "Hatta did a fantastic job at the Round Table Conference,"124 a vjew backed by Nasutlon, who acknowledged that "Hatta was clever at the Round Table Conference, he did not give too much away."125 One of the most contentious Issues discussed was financial. The Dutch Insisted that Indonesia accept an external debt of f 3,167 million and an Internal debt of f 2,956 million, a large proportion of which covered the costs Incurred by the Dutch army 1n fighting the Republic. Hatta was outraged, flatly refusing to accept any debts Incurred after the Japanese Occupation. He called on the chairman of h1s Economic and Financial Subcommittee, Dr. Sumltro Djojohadlkusumo, like himself a graduate of the Rotterdam Handelshogeschool, to present alternative figures. Hatta also wired Nehru, asking him to try to convince the Americans that the Dutch were asking too much.126Hatta himself took advantage of American "Cold War" nerves, reporting the "financial and monetary situation so bad" that, unless the Netherlands reduced their their demand he "might as well suggest sovereignty be transferred directly to Communists rather than first to his group."127 Again 1n this statement was contained an uncanny foresight of future trends 1n Indonesia. The Dutch were adamant that acceptance of their debt figure was a requirement for transfer of sovereignty. Cochran urged Hatta to accede to a reduction of f 2,000 million on the original Dutch figure, warning him that loss of sovereignty would not only entail renewed hostilities but would mean the loss of American sympathy.128 Sumltro claimed that a serious difference of opinion arose between himself and Hatta when the latter finally accepted a figure of f 4,300 million on October 24.129 Roem supported Hatta, reprimanding Sumltro for "taking such a hardline attitude."!30 At the same time, he praised Hatta's leadership, stating that achieving agreement between the BFO and the Republic at the conference was "In large part due to their trust 1n the Chairman of the Republic1 s delegation, Dr. Mohammad Hatta."131 Sumltro conceded 1n retrospect that, although he still held fast to h1s own opinion, "I understood better how difficult was Bung Hatta’s position and role while leading the Round Table Conference discussion."132 Crltchley admitted that "I was unhappy about the debt figure but 1t would have been hard to justify a break-down of the Conference on this alone."!33 Another Issue which almost deadlocked the conference was Dutch refusal to relinquish West New Guinea. Crltchley knew that "Sukarno had Instructed Hatta not to return without West New Guinea," observing that the attainment 160

of the territory had become an emotive Issue, backed by Anak Agung. Crltchley also noticed that "Hatta was the one Indonesian whom I met at that time who did not seem emotionally concerned about the Issue. He agreed with me that postponement was better than a breakdown of the Conference and that 1t was an Issue that could be more readily and realis- tically solved after the Dutch had taken the major step of transferring sovereignty.11134 The New Guinea Issue was finally resolved at 5 a.m. on the morning of November 1, the deadline for discussions, with a compromise that the transfer of West New Guinea’s sovereignty be settled within a year of the conference. Nasutlon expressed his satisfaction: "Hatta had to yield on West New Guinea but at least he got Surabaya Naval Base, which the Dutch hated giving up.”135 Hatta understood Dutch reluctance to part with West New Guinea: "For many Dutch people, who had grown grey 1n the colonial service, 1t was very hard to accept the loss of Indonesia.” He explained: "Involved was a loss both of prestige and of what had long been called ’the cork supporting the welfare of the Netherlands.’" He added: "Memories of former ’colonial glory’ could be kept alive only by retaining some part of the former Netherlands Indies under Dutch control. Hence the notion of excluding West Irian from the transfer of sovereignty."136 At the closing session on November 2, the formal records were signed. Coast noted that "on all sides there was a sort of guarded enthusiasm. No one could deny that Hatta, an Aslan statesman, had shown to the world that, with the consistent, calm aid of the United Nations, 1t was possible, even 1n the year 1949 and after two military attacks, for a country to settle Its urgent and all-pervading political problems with goodwill and patient, reasonable negotiation."137 In h1s address at the conclusion of the conference, Hatta admitted that "our job 1s somewhat tempered by the fact that not all problems at this Round Table Conference were able to be solved."138 He also tried to make 1t clear that the new union differed from past association policies, that Indonesians were no longer younger brothers, as 1n the past, but that 1t was "on the basis of free will, equality and equal rights" that they continued their association with the Dutch.139 Hatta flew back to Indonesia immediately, aware that the terms he had accepted would evoke criticism, In particular the onerous debt and the failure to finalize the West New Guinea transfer. He defended his delegation’s efforts, contending that "historically and Internationally what we have achieved 1s the best that could be achieved at this time."140 Certainly 1t was difficult to believe that only one year previously the Republic of Indonesia had faced annihilation. Even more satisfying, victory had been achieved without the cost in human lives of a long-drawn-out war. Even Sjahrlr admitted to Coast that "Hatta had achieved more than he had believed possible," qualifying h1s statement with the comment that, on the other hand, "1t would now be Impossible to carry out a socialist economic policy or a really free foreign policy."141 Hatta presented the Round Table Conference Agreement to the full session of KNIP on December 15. It was passed by 226 votes to 62.142 For Hatta, perhaps the most hurtful aspect was that among those who voted against the Agreement were members of the PSI, the group which more than any other Identified Itself with the New PNI. Hatta could not prevent h1s resentment creeping Into h1s memoirs, remarking with unusual pique: "What was manifest was that almost all the factions of the Partal Soslalls 161

Indonesia rejected the results of the negotiations. Many believed that they did this because it was not Sjahrir who successfully achieved the Round Table Conference Agreement.” 1*3This -time Des Alwi supported Hatta, believing his view to be more sensible than that of Sjahrir, who was ”too idealistic and inflexible."144 Abu Hanifah confirmed that the majority of people appreciated Hattafs achievements and were grateful to him. "Finally the period of fighting was over; the enthusiasm of the masses was overwhelming, refreshing and exciting.”143 But he noticed that Hatta’s response was much less euphoric, carrying a note of warning: ”Yes, we must hope that we will do better in the future in building up our nation. It is not enough to win the war, you must take care not to lose the peace.”146 Hatta was predicting that the social revolution which should follow national revolution might prove more difficult to achieve. On December 16, 1949 in Yogyakarta, the BFO and Republican representatives met together to elect a President, the unopposed choice being Sukarno. The office of Vice-President had been discarded in the Draft Constitution of 1949. Hatta was unanimously elected prime minister, but this time leading a parliamentary rather than a presidential cabinet. The Vwl Tunggal now consisted of a constitutional head of state and a head of government responsible to parliament. On December 23, Hatta and Sultan Hamid flew to the Netherlands to attend the official ceremonies for the transfer of sovereignty. Coast noticed that Hatta was "still terribly tired. ... He looked drawn and pale, while even his hair seemed to be thinning."14? The summer warmth which had greeted Hatta's return to Europe in August had become the chill of midwinter, as if the naked branches symbolized for the Dutch the stripping from them of their beloved Indies. On December 27, in an impressive ceremony in the Royal Palace in Amsterdam, Hatta accepted the freedom of his country. He and the Dutch Prime Minister signed the Protocol transferring sovereignty, while Queen Juliana read the Deed of Confirmation, stating: No longer do we stand partially opposed to one another. We have now taken our stations side by side, however much we may be bruised and torn, carrying the scars of rancour and regret.148 Having accepted the Charter of Sovereignty, Hatta made a brief speech in which he expressed his hopes for the future of Indonesia. Queen Juliana then shook his hand, while a carillon of palace bells rang out the WlikeJjnuAp the Dutch anthem, followed by Indonesia Raya. As Hatta stood quietly to attention, pale and drawn, exhausted after a year of imprisonment, negotiations, and bitter haggling, the words of the anthem may have formed in his mind: Indonesia is my country, It is the land of my birth, There I stand, guarding my motherland. The dream of his boyhood had been accomplished; politically Indonesia was free and he had led the final negotiations which had achieved that freedom. It was undoubtedly for Hatta the crowning moment of his life, as confirmed by many of his friends and colleagues, and the pinnacle of his political career. 162

Hatta concluded his memoirs at this point, as if the years which followed faded into insignificance or were too painful to record. The struggle to achieve social revolution would never be quite as stimulating or satisfying as the struggle to oust the Dutch, nor would it meet with the same success. The Dutch had been physically removed but the system around which they had structured their colonial administration remained— the traditional Javanese pattern of rule.

1.Mohammad Hatta, "On the Road to Transfer of Sovereignty," in ?atalt (x& a Patriot, p. 508. Speech delivered at the Opening Session of the Round Table Conference on August 23, 1949.
2.The agreement was signed aboard the American battleship, the USS Rznalllz anchored off Jakarta, a venue suggested by Sukarno.
3.This is how Subadio Sastrosatomo described the Republics reduced status. Interview, February 22,
1982.
4.Interview with Mohamad Roem, February 5, 1982.
5.John Coast, a young English socialist who was working for the Republ ican cause, recorded widespread approval of Hatta1s apointment as prime minister, and Critchley, the Australian representative on the Good Off ices Committee, has remarked: "Hatta was a man who commanded respect, a man of unusual quality. He may not have sought to arouse the emotions of the people, but he always remained a man of the people." Personal communication from T. K. Critchley, May 1, 1983.
6.Hatta, Hemal*, p. 522.
7.Ibid., and T. Mohammad Hasan, "Bung Hatta di Sumatera," in Bang Hatta: MzngatxU pada yita-TjUta,
p. 186.
8.Hanifah, Tat&& oj. a Zevalutlan,
p. 272.
9.Interview with Subadio Sastrosatomo, February 22, 1982.
10.Hatta, Hemal*, p. 525.
11.Ibid.
12.Kahin, Natlanalltm and Rzvalutlan In Indantlla, p. 260.
13.See Reid, Indanjeilan Natlanal Pzvalutlan, p. 131.
14.Oey Hong Lee, U/an and Diplomacy In Indonesia 1945-1950 (Townsville, Qd.: James Cook University, 1981),
p. 177.
15.As cited in Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 262.
16.Hatta, Hemal*, p. 527.
17.Ibid.
18.A. H. Nasution, Stklta* Peang KjemecLekaan Indonesia, vol. 7: Ren- vllle Period (Bandung: Angkasa,
1978), p. 135.
19.Ibid., pp. 213-14.
20.Nasution, Sekltan Penang Keme*- dbekaan Indonesia, vol. 8, p. 75.
21.Interview with T. B. Simatupang, February 4, 1982.
22.Both Nasution and Simatupang confirmed this point 1n Interviews in February 1982.
23.Coast, Rec*ulX ta Revolution,
p. 163.

24.Ibid., p. 164.
25.Ibid., pp. 153-54.
26.Ibid., p. 100.
27.Personal communication from T.
K. Critchley.
28.United Press Dispatch, February 14, 1948, as cited in Kahin, nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,
p. 245.
29.Oey Hong Lee, Wax and Diplomacy in Indonesia, p. 171. According to Harmani, Hatta1 s envoy to discussions on the provisional federal government, Hatta requested the position of second man for himself. De Villeneuve, one of Van Mookfs assistants, interpreted this as meaning Hatta "wants to be the boss.”
30.For the Du Bois-Critchley Plan, see Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 248.
31.Ibid., p. 267. 3 2. Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 137.
33.Hatta, Bung Hatta9s Answexs, p.
16.
34.Hanifah, Tales o£ a Revolution,
p. 278.
35.As cited in Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 281.
36.Ibid.,p.282.
37.Ibid.,p.282,n. 46.
38.Ibid.,p.285.
39.Buxuk,Yogyakarta, September 4, 1948, as cited 1n Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 138, n. 19.
40."Consul General at Batavia (Livengood) to Secretary of State (Marshall)," September 7, 1948 in Foxeign Relations o£ the United States, 1948 [hereafter FRUS], vol. 6 (Washington, D.C.: Department of State, 1974), p. 325.
41."Secretary of State to Consulate General at Batavia,” September 9, 1948, in ibid., p. 327; and "Secretary of State to Embassy in the Netherlands," September 9, 1948, in ibid., p. 328.
42.Api Rak/at, Madiun, September 9, 1948, as cited in Reid, Indonesian National Revolution, p. 142, n. 28.
43.Oey Hong Lee, Wax and Diplomacy in Indonesia, p. 190.
44.Tjekampa, "Interview dengan Bung Amir," in Hidup [Roman Catholic newspaper printed in Yogyakarta], December 18, 1948, in Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia,
p. 285, n. 53.
45.Personal communication from T.
K. Critchley.
46.Fxont National, September 20, 1948, as cited in Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 293.

the Madlun Affair suggests that Gatot Subroto carried out the execution on Hatta’s orders as it was feared the Communist leaders might escape and rise to power after the second Dutch attack. See

D. C. Anderson, "The Military Aspects of the Madiun Affair," in Indonesia 21 (April 1976): 48, n.
123.
53.Personal communication from T.
K. Critchley.
54.Hatta, Bung Hatta Menjawah, p.
23.
55.Coast, Recnult to Revolution,
p. 195.
56.Interview with M. Roem, February 2, 1982.
57.El ink Schuurman, a Dutch delegate 1n Jakarta, Informed Foreign Minister Stikker on October 18 that "I receive lately the growlngly strong impression from my contacts with British and American representatives and with the American delegation that these circles are planning to support the Hatta regime at any price," as cited in Oey Hong Lee, Wan and Diplomacy In Indonesia, p.
195.
58.Stikker suggested to Schuurman that he use the tactic of pointing out to the world that communism in Indonesia was not dead after the "Madiun Affair." See ibid.
59.While 1n West Sumatra Musso had spent a night at Nazir Pamontjak’s house. After the Madiun revolt, several PKI leaders were detained in the Minangkabau but released on swearing loyalty to the Dwl Tunggal. Nazir Pamontjak himself was not arrested, and in October was sent abroad. In view of h1s close PI association with Hatta, Nazir Pamontjak may have been a restraining influence on PKI elements in West Sumatra. See A. Kahin, "Struggle for Independence," pp. 269-70.
60.Personal communication from T.
K. Critchley.
61.As cited in Coast, Recnult to Revolution, p. 209.
62.See Oey Hong Lee, Wan and Diplomacy In Indonesia, p. 196, and Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution In Indonesia, pp. 323-24.
63.Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution In Indonesia, p. 324, n. 20.
64.Stikker interpreted the document as Indicating Hatta’s willingness to surrender key powers to the Dutch during the interim period. See ibid., p. 323.
65."Consul General at Batavia (Llvengood) to Secretary of State,"

of their desire to keep Sukarno from reaching India. See Kahln, Nationalism and Revolution In Indonesia, p. 337, n. 13.

72.Oey Hong Lee, Wan and Diplomacy In Indonesia, pp. 200-201.
73.Ibid., p. 199.
74.Personal communication from
T. K. Crltchley.
75.United Nations, S/1129, December 19, 1948, p. 3, as cited 1n Kahln, Nationalism and Revolution In Indonesia, pp. 334-35.
76.Oey Hong Lee, Wan and Diplomacy In Indonesia, p. 203.
77.See Woodman, Republic o£ Indonesia, p. 248.
78.Hatta, “Indonesia Free,” 1n Pontnalt o£ a Patnlot, p. 291.
79.Coast, Recruit to Revolution,
p. 215.
80.Personal communication from
T. K. Crltchley.
81.Personal communication from
T. K. Crltchley. A “wowser” Is defined as “fanatical puritan, spoil sport, kllljoy, teetotal 1er.” See The Austnallan Pocket Oxford Dictionary, p. 958.
82.Personal communication from
T. K. Crltchley.
83.Hatta, Memoir, p. 540.
84.Sastroamldjojo, Milestone* on My Journey, p. 169.
85.Interview with T. B. Slmatupang, February 4, 1982. According to Des Alw1, “Oom Hatta was no coward but would have made a hopeless guerrilla as he had no stomach for bloodshed.” Interview, Des Alw1, February 1982.
86.Personal communication from
T. K. Crltchley.
87.Hatta, Memoir, p. 541.
88.Nalenan, Arnold Mononutu, p. 191, and M. Rasjld, Rasjld—70, Panltla Perlngatan Ulang Tahun Mr. Rashid Ke-70, Jakarta, p. 85.
89.Sastroamldjojo, Milestone* on My Journey, p. 173.
90.Ibid.
91.M. Roem, “Bung Kecll yang Berbuat Besar,” In Mengenang S/aknlr, pp. 141-42.
92.Haj1 Agus Salim, the third member at Prapat and Sjahrlr’s uncle, agreed that Sjahrlr was undoubtedly rude to Sukarno, blaming him for talking too openly about the trip to India, criticizing him for begging favors of the guards at their bungalow, yelling peevishly at Sukarno to “Shut Your Mouth!” when Sukarno was singing 1n the bathroom.
93.Hatta, Memoir, p. 545.
94.Ny. Rahml Hatta, ”Pr1ns1p- Prlnslp Bung Hatta Tak Pernah

100.Hatta, Bung Hatta Mznjawab, p.
57.
101.Roem, "Bung Kecll yang Berbuat Besar," pp. 152-53.
102.See Kahln, Hatlonall4m and Revolution In Indonesia, p. 406.
103.According to Beel, Sukarno and Hatta would later be granted the same rights and duties as any other citizen but under the State of War and Siege which existed 1n Indonesia, they could not engage 1n political activity or return to Republican territory. See Ibid., p. 407, n. 34.
104."Consul General at Batavia (Llvengood) to Secretary of State," March 28, 1949, 1n FRUS 1949, vol. 7, pt. 1, p. 352.
105.Hatta, Bung Hatta4 An4wen4,
p. 35.
106.Roem, "Bung Kecll yang Berbuat Besar," p. 155. According to Hatta, when receiving h1s letter of appointment as adviser, Sjahrlr queried Sukarno’s signature on 1t, saying "What 1s he? Why should he appoint me? The one who should appoint me 1s Syafruddln (the head of the RI Emergency Government In Sumatra)." See Hatta, Bung Hatta'4 An4we4, p. 36.
107.Personal communication from
T. K. Crltchley.
108.Hatta, Bung Hatta'4 An4we/t4,
p. 36.
109.Interview with Hatta, October 6, 1976, 1n A. Kahln, "Struggle for Independence," p. 351, n. 10.
110.Sjafruddln Prawlranegara, "Bung Hatta Demokrat Sedjatl dan Pem1mp1n jang Saja Hormatl," p. 326.
111.Interview with A. H. Nasutlon, February 22, 1982.
112.Hatta, "Pldato Pembukaan Konperensl Inter-Indonesia d1 Yogyakarta," In Kumpulan Pldato, p.
291.
113.As cited 1n Oey Hong Lee, Wan and Diplomacy In Indonesia, p, 235.
114.Coast, Recnult to Revolution,
p. 292.
115.Ibid. Crltchley was not Impressed by this viewpoint, commenting: "To continue from Sumatra or elsewhere would have Involved at best a long drawn-out struggle with all the suffering and uncertainties that this Involved." Personal communication.
116.The Indonesian delegation was housed 1n the Palace Hotel 1n the seaside resort of Schevenlngen.
117.Hatta, Memoln, p. 558.
118.Coast, Recnult to Revolution,
p. 261.
119.Hatta, "On the Road to Transfer

In Indonesia, pp. 243-44. In Subadio’s opinion, Hatta was too naive in trusting Cochran at the Round Table Conference, allowing himself to be used. Interview, Subadio Sastrosatomo, February 22, 1982.

129.Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, "Bung Hatta Sebagai Manusla:Sekedar Kenangan Pribadi," in Bung Hatta: Pnlhadlnya dalam Kenangan, pp. 424-
25.
130.Ibid., and Roem, ,fMohammad Hatta, Ketua Delegasi Republik," in Bung Hatta Mengabdl pada Tjlta-Tjlta, p. 386.
131.Roem, "Mohammad Hatta, Ketua Delegasi,” p. 388.
132.Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, "Bung Hatta Sebagai Manusia,” p. 425.
133.Personal communication from
T. K. Critchley.
134.Personal communication from
T. K. Critchley.
135.Interview with Nasution, February 22, 1982.
136.Hatta, "Colonialism and the Danger of War," in Pontnalt a Patriot, p. 573. First published in ktlan Sunvey 1, 9 (November
1961).
137.Coast, Recnult to Revolution,
p. 271.
138.M. Hatta, "Pidato Ketua Delegasi Republ 1k Indonesia Pada Sidang Penutup Konperensi Meja Bundar," in Kumputan Pidato, p. 318.
139.Ibid.
140.As cited in Woodman, Republic o£ Indonesia, p. 260.
141.Coast, Recnult to Revolution,
p. 293.
142.Hatta, Memoln, p. 559.
143.Ibid.
144.Interview with Des Alwi, February 6, 1982.
145.Hanifah, Tale* o£ a Revolution,
p. 329.
146.Ibid.
147.Coast, Recnult to Revolution,
p. 279.
148.As cited 1n Woodman, Repuhllc o£ Indonesia, p. 260. 168

CHAPTER ELEVEN FROM DWITUNGGAL TO DWITANGGAL Wke.it we abandoned the. 1945 Constitution and replaced IX with, the. 1950 Constitution, the. meaning and position of the. Vwltunggal began to change and decline. The PK1 took advantage of this situation In Its strategy and political struggle, speeding up the process of decline In the binding capacity and usefulness of the Vwltunggal. Mis understandings between the two of us wene often cheated, especially when the political parties began to fight among themselves, trying to oven.thn.ow one anothen... * The PK1 succeeded In tnansfonmlng the "Vwltunggal" [two-1n-one] Into "VwlXanggal" [doubly divided].1 Hatta, speaking 1n old age and once more playing with words, was describing h1s perception of the major factors which had shattered the Vwl Tunggal.H1s partnership with Sukarno had been consolidated 1n a period of struggle against foreign domination. Once the goal of Independence was achieved, the latent conflict on how Indonesia should be governed once more assumed major proportions. Undoubtedly the schism between the two men was widened by the parties1 exploitation of the Vwl Tunggal for their own Interests. As 1n the closing months of 1949, Hattafs most consistent support came from the major Islamic party, Masjuml, a party ardently anti-Communist. His opposition came not just from the PKI but also from the left wing of the PNI and the Tan Malaka-1nsp1red Partal Murba. Although the PSI was the party representative of kedaulatan nakyat, It looked to Sjahrlr for direction, at times hindering rather than supporting Hatta. The Masjuml, 1n spite of Its loyalty to him, did not meet Hatta’s requirement of a party dedicated to achieving social change. An unsigned article written 1n October 1954 pinpointed Hatta's dilemma, contending that while Sukarno and the PNI were compatible, "For Hatta there 1s not yet a party which really suits him.”2 The writer assessed that "the party which suits Hatta 1s an Islamic party with socialist alms because for Hatta socialism 1s a duty assigned to him by God.”3 Hattafs task from now on was to Imbue the elitist urban Masjuml with greater concern for the underprivileged masses, both rural and urban. Hattafs outlook was changing. He no longer Insisted that political parties be religiously neutral, the stance he had taken 1n h1s polemics with Perml 1n the 1930s. From now on, he would stress that socialism was a basic tenet of Islam, maintaining that ”1t 1s the task of every Muslim to bring Into being a society which will ensure to each of Its members security and the good things of life.”4 "We have achieved an Indonesia which 1s Independent and sovereign, but we must still achieve an Indonesia which 1s just and prosperous,” he maintained.5 Hatta was to discover that Instituting a system of parliamentary democracy did not guarantee the Implementation of kedaulatan nakyat. The power of the ballot box was an alien concept, especially on Java. The 169

implementation of local autonomy or village democracy was also very difficult to achieve. As Hatta pointed out: "A perfect system of democracy is to govern from below. The people must be able to feel that they govern themselves."6 Hatta again refuted any suggestion that the masses were too stupid to participate in politics. "They must make more use of their intellect and take more initiative," he insisted.7 The 1949 Constitution, in theory, provided Hatta, as prime minister, with a stronger leadership position than Sukarno. In practice, Sukarno's prestige and magnetism assured him of the loyalty of the majority of Javanese, thus allowing him much greater power than a constitutional head of state usually enjoyed under a parliamentary system. Sukarno, his confidence restored, was advocating a return to unitary government. Federalism, in his opinion, encouraged regionalism. This became the focus of Sukarno's speeches during 1950 as he toured the archipelago, introducing himself to the Outer Islanders, who greeted him ecstatically in a wave of nationalistic euphoria. Thus Sukarno was, in essence, actively campaigning for the demise of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, RUSI, Hatta's government. It was not surprising that the RUSI should crumble. The puppet states, formulated according to the whim of Dutch strategists such as Van Mook, and based on the ability of the Dutch forces to reclaim territory, had become a symbol of intrigue and deliberate violation of the Linggajati Agreement. Hatta had actually surmised even before he left the Netherlands that the federal structure would disintegrate.8 Yet, when reviewing his premiership in 1953, Hatta indicated that a unitary system per se did not necessarily prevent separatism, observing that "a federal system is in fact suitable for such a far-flung archipelago and might be expected to strengthen the feeling of unity.The more decentralized the system of government, the more the people could control their own affairs rather than being at the mercy of a self-interested ruling elite. Hatta returned to Indonesia on January 3, 1950. He realized that his government faced a daunting and chaotic internal situation which would tax his leadership and administrative skills to the full. He had chosen his cabinet mainly on the basis of expertise, a business-like cabinet. Hatta drew up a program based on seven main goals, among them repair of the shattered economy, creation of new defense forces, ensuring the protection of human rights, and setting in motion preparations for a general election to provide a parliament representative of the people and to elect a Constituent Assembly to frame a permanent Constitution. Education was also a priority in Hatta's program. Although he assigned the defense ministry to the Sultan of Yogyakarta, Hatta decided to take the foreign affairs portfolio himself.10 He advocated non-alignment through an active and independent foreign policy. Two major international hurdles to be overcome were how to steer a middle course between the United States of America and the Soviet Union and how to persuade the Dutch to relinquish West New Guinea. Hatta refused to be drawn into the Korean dispute. On June 30, 1950 his government issued a statement that "the so-called civil war in Korea is first and foremost a matter concerning the two major powers in the 'Cold War.'"11 Hatta opposed the American policy of excluding the People's Republic of China from the United Nations,12 and established diplomatic relations with the Mao Tse-tung regime. He delayed applying for Indonesia's admittance into the United Nations for fear that Chiang Kai-shek would retaliate by applying his power of veto. Hatta also rejected a 170

proposal by the Philippines government for an antl-Communlst Pacific Pact, and was also reluctant to recognize the French-backed Bao Dai regime in Vietnam. In response to criticisms that he had failed to establish relations with the Soviet Union, Hatta reiterated that, In h1s opinion, the Soviet Union wanted to dominate rather than work on a basis of "mutual esteem."13 He stressed that "we are neither following in the wake of Russia nor of the United States."14 Hatta defended the legality of the trend away from federalism; fobbing off Dutch protests by pointing out that "the transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia Imposes no conditions, therefore the Indonesian people have the right to decide for themselves what constitutional form their state will take."15 when 1n March 1950, a Dutch ministerial delegation arrived in Jakarta to participate in a Conference of Ministers of the Union Partners, Hatta noticed that the Dutch reaction to the unitary state was to adopt an even more hard-line attitude to the release of West New Guinea.!6 With the election of the Liberal-Country Party in Australia in 1949, Australian sympathy for Indonesia was waning, an attitude Hatta criticized in an article written eight years later, averring: "For Australia, which supports the Dutch stand, the problem of West Irian is a tragedy also because Its policy strengthens the very thing 1t so strongly opposes— Communism in Indonesia."!' The PKI, backed by Sukarno, was to use the West Irian question as a revolutionary theme, while the campaign to acquire the territory provided the army with added prestige and power. Yet 1t was in domestic rather than foreign affairs that Hatta faced h1s greatest challenges. As he described the situation 1n 1950: "When the Kingdom of the Netherlands transferred sovereignty on December 27, 1949, the new regime inherited a devastated land."!8 Armed dissidents who refused to accept the new state under the transfer terms or who preferred to live as bandits rather than face civilian life, presented the most serious impediment to an orderly return to peacetime government. West Java was a particularly volatile region. A pro-Dutch terrorist group, the Angkatan Perang Ratu Ad 11 [Forces of the Just Prince], led by ex-KNIL officer Captain "Turk" Wester!1ng, launched a challenge to Hatta's government on January 23, 1950. The timing was reminiscent of the second Dutch offensive, for Sukarno was about to depart for India. Hatta later discovered that Westerling was supported by Sultan Hamid of West Borneo, the leader of the BFO delegation to the Round Table Conference, whom Hatta had felt obliged to Include 1n h1s cabinet. Both Sultan Hamid and Anak Agung Gde Agung were wary of the trend towards a unitary state, sensing that it ran contrary to the wishes of many of the Outer Islanders.I9 Westerllng's first assault was on Bandung. Since Dutch troops were Involved, Hatta requested the Dutch High Commissioner to Intervene. Although the Dutch garrison in Bandung persuaded Westerling to leave the city, he was allowed to move on towards Jakarta. Later Investigations revealed that his intent was to kidnap Hatta's cabinet while in session, and to kill the defense minister, the Sultan of Yogyakarta, and the acting chief of armed forces, Colonel Simatupang, who had taken over from the terminally ill Sudirman.20 Hatta, forewarned of the coup, adjourned h1s cabinet meeting early, while the Siliwangi Division, now on Its home territory, acted to counter Westerllng's threat. The attempted coup merely accelerated demands for a unitary state free of Dutch association, while Sultan Hamid's Involvement, when revealed in April 1950, brought the BFO states Into further disrepute. The States of East Indonesia and East Sumatra were among the most reluctant to change 171

from a federal system, and a resistance force led by an ex-KNIL officer, Captain Andl Aziz, mounted a challenge to the proposed unitary state 1n Makassar 1n Sulawesi. On April 10, Hatta broadcast a speech to the people of Sulawesi, appealing to them to dissociate themselves from Az1zfs action. Nevertheless, Hatta made 1t clear that there was a difference between Wester!1ngfs defiance and Captain Az1zfs action: "Do not let us forget that the opponent Is not an enemy but our own brother, our fellow national and fellow countryman. Therefore It 1s not right that the political struggle be accompanied by granite-f1sted toughness or such-like action.”?! Hatta pointed out that political opposition through correct channels was permissible but must not endanger security. "Democracy Is not anarchy where anyone can take up arms as he pleases,” he warned.22 Aziz yielded. He was placed 1n military detention and later sentenced to a term of Imprisonment. Dutch Influence was still strong In East Indonesia. Hatta's government faced a further challenge, this time from the East Indonesian minister of justice, Dr. SoumokH, who proclaimed a separatist State of the South Moluccas 1n Ambon. When negotiation failed, Hatta appealed to the people of the region: ”If you truly love Bung Karno and me as your leaders, don't drag our names down by Irregular action of an anarchical nature.”23 The South Moluccan region had a special place 1n Hatta's heart since h1s exile to Banda Nelra; he understood the cultural dilemma 1n which the people were placed because they were different from the people of Java and Sumatra. While prime minister, he continued to use non-v1olent methods to settle the dispute, Including a naval blockade, although the conflict was finally settled by military action. Hatta realized that strategically 1t was Important to prevent the area from coming under Dutch control, as it was so close to West New Guinea. In spite of the Insurrection facing the government, Hatta still supported a thorough overhaul of the armed forces. Under the terms of the Round Table Conference Agreement, Indonesia had to accept ex-KNIL Indonesians Into the army, a most difficult task 1n view of the animosities which had built up between Republican and KNIL troops during the Independence struggle. Republican personnel expected to be accorded greater recognition, but there was also the practical consideration that KNIL personnel were better trained for modern warfare. Thus, as 1n the past, "rationalization” of the armed forces became a very emotive Issue, 1n spite of Hatta's attempts to defuse tension by Initiating rehabilitation prog rams. 24 In regard to the civil service, Hatta faced problems of Integrating the Republican and NICA administrations. Again, it was a task requiring sensitivity. Under the Round Table Conference agreement, the Republic had to retain 15,700 Dutch civil servants for at least two years.25 The allocation of senior administrative posts to nationalists 1n preference to long-serving pangsuk pKaja. created tensions. Hatta again appealed to the old civil service corps to discard colonial attitudes, reminding them that they must show leadership but not play a political role: "What we desire are people who have sovereignty, not a state which has sovereignty.^ jt was a warning to change past patterns of considering the civil service bureaucracy as a ruling elite. To help formulate fiscal and economic policies, Hatta established an economic and finance council, made up of members of h1s ministry and chaired by himself. Certainly Hatta Inherited a daunting economic situation. Three years later he described h1s cabinet's dilemma: "It found 172

itself with an empty treasury; the budget for 1950 envisaged a deficit of f 1.5 billion, approximately 17% of the total—a huge sum for a poor nation that had no facilities for raising capital within the country."27 Inflation was rampant; much of the export trade was still being conducted through smuggling operations, which had become almost institutionalized. Estates were run down and independence had sparked off a wave of labor unrest, in which Hatta saw the renascent PKI’s influence, contending: "In North Sumatra, the PKI incited the plantation workers to go on strike just at the time when the seedlings and young plants had to be trans- planted. "28 yet Hatta refused to bear down on the unions; the right to strike was a principle which he had always respected. Faced with a sizeable deficit and an enormous debt to the Netherlands government, on March 13 Hattafs government introduced an exchange certifi- cate system which altered the 1:1 ratio of Dutch to Indonesian guilders to one of 1:3 as far as export, Import, and other transactions were concerned.29 Hattafs government also introduced another draconian measure. On March 19, currency notes of f 2.50 and above were cut in half and exchanged for new currency notes and government bonds. All bank deposits 1n excess of f 400 had to be halved, one half going to the government as a compulsory loan. This prevented the Dutch from converting Indonesian money into Dutch currency at a fictitious rate and encouraged export production. Fortunately the war in Korea had stimulated the demand for Indonesian products, with consequent above-average prices on the world market.30 By the time Hatta*s cabinet retired in August 1950, the economic crisis was greatly relieved and the position of foreign reserves improved, leaving an impression of strong, stable, if somewhat austere government. The rapid demise of the federal states and the persistent demands for a unitary state from radical nationalist political groups, supported enthusiastically by Sukarno, forced Hatta to accelerate the dissolution of h1s government. His main concern was to make sure that the basic principles of kzdaulatan Jiakyat be protected 1n the changeover and Incorporated into the new Constitution. Hatta and Halim, the acting prime minister of the Republic of Indonesia, on May 19 signed a charter of agreement setting in motion a return to a unitary state, a new Republic of Indonesia. A joint committee of RUSI and RI representatives was established to finalize the details, including once again a Draft Constitution to legalize the new state. The charter of agreement set down guidelines, suggesting that there be a "revision of the RUSI Provisional Constitution in such a manner that it shall contain the essentials of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia, including (a) Article 27; (b) Article 29; and (c) Article

33.These were three articles 1n the 1945 Constitution which had been very close to Hattas heart; the protection of the rights of the ordinary citizen, freedom to profess ones beliefs, and Hatta’s own special economic clause safeguarding the economy from an overly liberal 1st approach. The agreement emphasized that "the unitary constitution will be provisional only."32 As Hatta explained to the press, "it will be the Constituent Assembly which will decide the permanent Constitution."33 As the years passed by, Hattas hopes for Implementing kjtdauLatan tiakyat would rest Increasingly on the deliberations of the Constituent Assembly. In the discussions which followed, it became apparent that Hattas position as prime minister was not a foregone conclusion as in December
1949. There were demands for the restoration of the Vwl Tunggal, with the inclusion of a Vice-Presidency in the new Constitution. The parties 173

were also vying for power, promoting their own leaders as prime minister, such as Mohammad Natsir of Masjumi and Sjahrir of the PS 1.34 Hatta had irritated the PNI by resisting the traditional patronage role of the ruler, refusing to accede to solicitations for bureaucratic and diplomatic posts and to requests for a share in the bounty of ex-Dutch colonial property which had been transferred to the new state. Yet a commentary in the local newspaper Me^defea, whose editor, B. M. Diah, was not particularly close to Hatta, recognized that public opinion did not favor Hattafs immediate retirement from the premiership, claiming that ,fit is only someone like Hatta who can overcome party inf1ght1ng."35 Hatta recalled that in the joint RUSI/RI discussions, two viewpoints emerged: One line of thought, espoused by Masjumi supported the continuation of a Presidential Cabinet with me as Prime Minister while concurrently Vice-President, which clearly had been successful in safeguarding the nation in times of crisis. The alternative view, put forward by the PNI and supported by the PSI and others, was that I should choose to be Prime Minister or Vice-President in a unitary state.36 The dialogue on Hatta’s future role was long and contentious. Hatta withdrew from it, agreeing that "whatever decision was reached, I would accept it."37 The RUSI representation regarded Hattafs relegation to the Vice-Presidency as tantamount to being "kicked upstairs" and would only agree to it on condition that there was a legal way for him to be appointed prime minister in times of crisis. This legal loophole was termed an "escape clause."38 jhe suggested "escape clause" was rejected by the PNI and several other parties, including the PSI.39 The PSPs vote against the "escape clause" was a bitter wound for Hatta since the party held the balance in the decision. The PSI claimed to be ardent advocates of parliamentary democracy but yet had insufficient foresight to understand that, if the system fell into disrepute through party deadlocks, as it had in Europe in the twenties and in the thirties, and as had happened closer to home during the struggle against the Dutch, the considerable forces preferring a return to more authoritarian government or to totalitarian one-party systems would gain credence. When Hatta 1n 1960 criticized the "ultra democracy" of the parties,46 ft was probable that he was Including Sjahrir and the PSI, to him a group of intellectually brilliant people but yet immature and blind to the realities of Indonesia’s domestic situation. Hatta did not confine his criticisms to the parties. He indicated 1n an interview in his latter years that he believed Sukarno had misled those deliberating on the new unitary state when he remarked: "Bung Hatta will become a Vice President in a Parliamentary Cabinet. But when difficulties arise later on, I know wkat I 4kall da."41 Hatta recalled: "This was Interpreted by all those present, that it would be the same as 1n Yogya before, namely, that when difficulties arose, Bung Hatta would be Vice President and concurrently Prime Minister."42 By the time Hatta’s name was suggested again as an emergency prime minister, Sukarno was too hostile to Hatta’s promoters and too allied to their opposition groups to reinstate Hatta as head of government. The new Republic of Indonesia came into being on August, 17, 1950, the fifth anniversary of the proclamation of Independence. Sukarno appointed Mohammad Natsir, the leader of Masjumi, formateur of a cabinet, 174

a leader who was to become a thorn 1n Sukarnofs flesh and almost as great a txltz nolnz to him as was Sjahrir.43 On October 14, 1950, the new parliament voted to recommend that Hatta be appointed Vice-President.44 The PKI had tried to block Hattafs automatic selection but the move was stalled by a majority decision to appoint a committee to draw up a list of names for submission to Sukarno, as stipulated by Article 45(4) of the new Constitution. Sukarno was left with little choice as only Hatta’s name was submitted. The daily MzsuUka expressed approval: "With the election of Hatta as Vice-President, our nation will be strengthened, both internally and externally. In the view of the people, Sukarno-Hatta are one."45 How misled the people were. From 1951 to 1956, his five-year term as Vice-President, Hatta tried to moderate his political comment, much as 1t went against the grain to do so. He could sympathize with Sukarno’s frustration when the Natsir government requested the President to refrain from making political statements, although Hatta made efforts to support Natsir whose cabinet policies were almost identical with h1s own. The theme of "nation building" did not call for the same dramatic talent as hurling Invective at the Dutch, nor were there clearly discernible feuding forces which were so much a part of past revolutionary rhetoric. Yet both Hatta and Sukarno were called upon to play advisory roles, unable to avoid Involvement 1n the Incessant wrangling between political, religious, military, and regional groups during this period. Inter-party rivalry at the expense of stable government particularly Irked Hatta. "Political parties are Intended to be an orderly means of representing public opinion," he pointed out 1n 1951, "but 1n the development of our parties, the party 1s the goal and the State becomes Its tool."43 Nevertheless, Hatta never suggested that the party system be abandoned, merely trimmed and reformed. "Democracy cannot proceed without political parties," he insisted.4^ A significant amount of Hattafs time over the next few years was spent touring the archipelago. He went out of h1s way to speak to young people wherever he traveled, seeing them 1n terms of Indonesia’s future leadership, following the pattern of "caderization" set by the New PNI. He stressed: "It 1s no longer the time to play at being romantic heroes, we must get down to work."43 He made clear to the Illegal guerrilla bands still marauding the countryside that they should cease fighting: "Rebellion is no longer revolution, but counter-revolution, which must be wiped out. There must be no ’state within a state.’"49 The "state within a state" was clearly an oblique reference to the groups fighting for an Islamic state. Hatta still enjoyed close relationships with the army, especially with its current leaders Simatupang and Nasutlon, the S1l1wang1 Division officers who had played a decisive role 1n the Madiun Affair. He lectured to the Sekolah Staf Komando Angkatan Darat [Army Staff Command School] or SSKAD, trying to influence the middle-ranking officers who attended courses there to accept a professional military role rather than a political one. Hatta, although sympathetic to the army’s frustration with the ineffectiveness of civilian government and the low caliber of many of the politicians, continued to emphasize that the country’s armed forces should be depolitlcized, that "the Army is a national instrument."50 Regional dissatisfaction with the central government was provoked by inattention to the needs of the Outer Islands. A debacle over Government Regulation 39 of 1950 concerning regional elections finally toppled 175

Nats1rfs governmental leaving the statefs affairs in limbo while parties wrangled and bargained with one another to try to form a new coalition cabinet. Sukarno ignored press comments that "community hopes are being expressed that... Hatta will be given the mandate to form a Cabinet,”52 and instead appointed Sukiman, now a Masjumi leader but not in the Natsir faction, as cabinet leader. Sukiman was on amicable terms with the PNI through PI peer group ties and was liked by both Sukarno and Hatta. Certainly the Vuit Tungg&L relationship improved during Sukimanfs regime, Sukarno moderating his speeches, playing down the West Irian question and dwelling on nation building. In return for Sukarno's support, Sukiman instituted a new interpretation of the roles of President and Vice-President, obtaining parliamentary consent for their wider involvement in state affairs, for which the cabinet was prepared to accept responsibility. As Karim Pringgodigdo analyzed the situation; "Considered politically, the government statement affirms that the Head of State remains unconditionally in office, whilst the activities of the President and Vice-President could possibly bring about the resignation of a Cabinet."53 Sukiman Implemented an ardent anti-Communist program, supported by Sukarno, who advised the PKI not to "sell your national soul for a dish of international lentils.”54 when accused of harassing the PKI, Sukiman alleged that he was acting on rumors of Communist plans to murder both Sukarno and Hatta while they were en route to their weekend villas in the West Java mountains.55 Sukiman's leaning towards the United States of America was criticized by the PSI. Having spent the major part of 1951 overseas,56 sjahrir sought out Hatta on his return to Indonesia. "Sjahrir felt rebuffed by Hatta,” recalled Subadio, "because he showed more Interest 1n National Sports Week than in listening to what Sjahrir had to tell him.”57 This may have been Hatta1 s way of reminding Sjahrir that 1t was the PSI that had assisted 1n relegating him to the role of an impotent Vice-President, whose main function was to officiate at occasions such as National Sports Week. On the other hand, Hatta may also have been responding to an editorial in AieAdtka which suggested that the English Labour Party was using Sjahrir and Nehru to form a "third power” 1n Southeast Asia.58 Since the Round Table Conference, Hatta had not only instituted but had tried to advocate an Independent foreign policy. When writing on Indonesia's foreign policy a year later, he deplored the "bloc” mentality in international relations, declaring that Indonesia was "not prepared to participate in any third bloc designed to act as a counterpoise to the two giant blocs.”59 in rejecting the "third bloc” as a foreign policy strategy, Hatta was not just alienating himself from Sjahrir but also from Nehru. This viewpoint would also separate him from Sukarno, who 1n 1955 would see the potential of a third bloc for projecting himself as a Third World leader. Hatta pointed out that the "bloc” system violated the spirit of the United Nations.80 It was its deference to America which toppled the Sukiman cabinet, especially after Subardjo, as foreign minister, accepted mutual security aid which virtually committed Indonesia to sharing in the defense of American interests 1n Asia. While Indonesia wrestled with the problem of finding a new cabinet, Hatta prepared for what 1s the high point in a Muslim's life, his kaj to Mecca. 176

Hatta combined state visits to Egypt and the Middle East with his religious pilgrimage, on which he was accompanied by h1s wife and her parents, Rusli and Ann1 Rachim. Hatta may have chosen to go to Mecca at this time for political reasons, as the religious affairs minister had been under attack for h1s mismanagement of transport arrangements for pilgrims 1n 1951.61 Hatta has made scant reference to his kaf, nor did he ever show the degree of affection for the Middle East which he expressed for Europe. His daughter Meutia recorded that he was Irritated by the disorder which prevailed 1n Mecca, especially around the shrines, suggesting remedies to the Saudi Arabian government to correct weaknesses in the organization of pilgrims.62 Wilopo, a PNI leader and a keen socialist, had succeeded Sukiman as prime minister on Hatta’s return to Indonesia. Hatta approved of Wilopo, who had served as labor minister in h1s own RUSI cabinet. However, Wilopo fell from favor with Sukarno for including in h1s cabinet people whom Sukarno disliked, men 1n the Natslr-Sjahrir groups such as Mohamad Roem, the Sultan of Yogyakarta, and the economist Sumltro. Perhaps even more worrying for Hatta was the realization that the PKI leader, D. N. A1dit, had begun to woo Sukarno and that the latter was responding. The PKI made a particularly vehement attack on Hatta and Sjafruddin Prawlranegara, accusing them of having accepted funds from the United States of America to liquidate Communists 1n the aftermath of the Madiun Affair.63 Although taken to court for insulting the Vice-President, Aidit did not receive any significant sentence and the case dragged on over several years. From 1953 onwards, Masjumi and the PSI were to be the objects of constant abuse 1n the PKI press, Natsir, Sjahrir, and, after 1956, Hatta becoming prime targets for attack. Army unrest escalated in 1952. The end of the Korean War in 1951 had broken the economic boom which had helped to ease the new Republics first two years of independence. For the defense ministry, the need for tighter budget control provided a further rationale for the minister and his defense chiefs to Implement policies which would rid the forces, the army in particular, of personnel who were inadequate 1n terms of educational standard and physical fitness. The army leaders had also tried to impose tighter control on regional commanders by transferring them away from their power bases, thus making them less Independent and more subject to budgetary control. These policies disadvantaged the ex-Peta groups the most, many of which had political ties with the left wing of the PNI. While Hatta was on close terms with the more professional group of army officers, Sukarno was building up a support group among those army officers disadvantaged by modernization programs, becoming the champion of the factions, mainly ex-Peta officers, most opposed to Nasutlon and Simatupang. Parliamentary supporters of the pro-Sukarno factions mounted criticism of Wilopo’s defense policies, forcing the defense minister, the Sultan of Yogyakarta to resign. Nasutlon, disgruntled by government Interference 1n military affairs, organized a demonstration which clamored for general elections to elect a new government. This minor coup, staged on October 17, 1952, included visits to the residences of Hatta and Sukarno. As Sukarno spoke to the crowd gathered outside h1s Palace, two tanks appeared, their guns trained on him. Sukarno agreed to receive a delegation of top-ranking officers, requesting that Hatta and Wilopo be present. Since 1949, the army leadership had become Increasingly disenchanted with civilian government, impatient with the left-wing elements in the 177

parliament and their attitudes to defense policies. Military defiance was therefore not unexpected. Nasution had previously proposed that the parliamentary system be replaced, by means of a coup, with an oligarchy, a TsiltunggaL consisting of Sukarno, Hatta, and the Sultan of Yogyakarta. Hatta, although sympathetic, stressed that reform must take place through a properly elected government and Constituent Assembly. Nasution paid the price for h1s strong-arm tactics, being dismissed as chief of army staff. H1s successor was an ex-Peta officer, Colonel Sugeng, a friend of the President. H1s appointment was a temporary one. Military defiance and economic decline combined to unseat the Wilopo government. The Masjuml called for a return to a Hatta cabinet, Natsir warning: "The State 1s in danger at this time, although this may not be evident on the surface."64 This time the PSI strongly supported Hatta, aware that Sjahrir was Increasingly withdrawing from direct participation in politics.65 Again Sukarno acted quickly to deflect any proposals for Hatta's return to the prime ministership, declaring that he "still upheld the basis of our Constitution and parliamentary traditions," and adding: "So far there is unanimity between Vice-President Hatta and myself."66 Sukarno's remark was significant in that it was an acknowledgment that the public was aware of strains in the Vui£ TunggaC. The cabinet crisis was finally resolved by recalling Ali Sastroamidjojo from h1s post as ambassador in Washington to become prime minister. As he could not reach agreement with Masjuml, A11 excluded the major Islamic party, although he included representatives from Nahdatul Ulama which had broken away to form a separate party.67 His cabinet was predominantly Javanese, and according to Mohamad Roem, it was dominated by Sukarno. In his view, AH, in spite of his Immense presence, was "a creature of Sukarno." As Roem portrayed the situation: "All's top priority was not to differ from Sukarno's wishes, thus Sukarno was behind the scenes manipulating A11."66 The exclusion of the Masjumi from government incurred the wrath of strongly orthodox Muslim groups, especially those seeking an Islamic state. Regional unrest became particularly heated in Aceh.69 Hatta, renowned as the Sumatran trouble-shooter, flew to this fanatically Muslim outpost to try to defuse the situation, directing attention to the need for stability and nation building.70 His bid was unsuccessful as armed conflict erupted a few months later. A dilemma for Hatta was that, as far as the Institution of an Islamic state was concerned, he was just as opposed to it as were Sukarno and the PKI and thus out of step with his most ardent Islamic supporters. Patterns of traditional Javanese power relationships and elitist attitudes became more apparent during the A11 cabinet. By 1954, as if sensing that his goal of kzdauULatm siakyat was losing ground, Hatta began to speak out more forcefully in defense of democracy. "There can only be justice 1n a state 1f the basic principles of the government have come from the people themselves," he stressed,71 contending that an autocracy was "too dependent on the personality of one Individual." Among the examples of dictators, he cited the name of Gadjah Mada, a strong man of Javanese imperialism. Hatta seemed to be warning the people that Sukarno and those who advocated more authoritarian rule were bent on destroying the present system of government. Hatta appealed to the parties to restore credibility to parliamentary democracy, suggesting that they play an educative role as teachers of sound government. 178

The weakness of the successive cabinets directed public attention back to the Vwl Tungg&L. The Bandung daily, Plkitian Pakjat, commented on the leadership abilities of both Sukarno and Hatta: "They have both high standing and are considered to have power by the people, but our Constitution fetters their actions and energies; they are not able to act according to their own concepts but are merely symbols." The article further commented: As far as we can see and hear, Hatta is able to control himself and remains within the constitutional boundaries; in other words, he does not interfere in executive affairs. But as far as we can gather, it is torture for Sukarno to remain within constitutional limits and not interfere in the executive and, because of his impulsiveness, he violates the limits of the Constitution.73 The writer had failed to discern that Hatta, too, was a tortured soul, but then Hattafs emotions were not easy to read because he had long ago trained himself to hide them. His pain at being excluded from power and of being unable to further his social goals was just as agonizing as Sukarnofs, perhaps even more so since it could not find relief in open defiance. "Hatta 1s too full of creativity to become a symbol without responsibility," asserted PZIU^an Pakjat. The conclusion reached by the paper was significant 1n that 1t was one on which Hatta would act. It read: "It would be better 1f Sukarno and Hatta do not make themselves available to be reelected as President and Vice-President. It is better that they return to the people, putting forward their conceptions via party poll- tics."74 Hatta, like every other Indonesian, began to pin his hopes for clean and efficient government on the results of the general election, finally scheduled for late 1955. He was particularly concerned about the A11 government's fiscal policies. Hatta pointed out that, while the government enriched the elite, "there 1s considerable victimization of the people, especially by means of taxes" and that the people's economy had not been improved by giving priority to Indonesian businessmen because "many people who obtain licenses sell them to foreign enterprises."75 Regional unrest was escalating because the government's economic policies worked to the advantage of importers on Java and against Outer Island exporters. AH's cabinet gained most renown 1n foreign affairs. It staged the first Conference of As1an-Afr1can nations 1n Bandung in April 1955, which was supported by Nehru and attended by the Chinese premier, Chou En-la1. The conference was enthusiastically espoused by Sukarno; Hatta played a much more low-key role, although the conference did allow him an opportunity to hold discussions with Nehru and to meet Chou En-la1. In spite of his criticism of the "third bloc" concept, Hatta admitted that "the Bandung Conference brought to birth a spirit of peace which we must try to fertilize."76 The prestige gained from staging the Bandung Conference did not save All's cabinet from mounting domestic disapproval of its policies. The greatest challenge came from the army, which had begun to patch up its own Internal rifts 1n order to present an Image of strength vis-3-vis civilian government. There was widespread disapproval of Iwa Kusuma Sumantri's performance as defense minister. 179

Ali returned his mandate to govern to Hatta on July 24, 1955, while Sukarno was overseas on his ka/ to Mecca. Since the general elections were scheduled to start in September, it was clear that the next cabinet must be of short duration. Both Masjumi and the PSI again proposed that the new cabinet be led by Hatta. In this they were supported by the daily PZkVian Pakjat, which reported: f,Hatta is the only capable and honest leader with sufficient authority to surmount the present emergency situation.”77 Hatta recalled that Subadio, then chairman of the PSI, urged him to take on the premiership. Resentfully Hatta retorted: ’’Why? It was you people who wanted a parliamentary cabinet so much! According to the 1950 Constitution, I cannot possibly hold office as Prime Minister again!” Subadio answered: ”We never guessed that it would turn out like this!"78 Hatta insisted that the only legal way for him to accept the premiership would be for parliament to pass a resolution declaring him non-active as Vice-President while prime minister, in other words introducing an ”escape clause.” This the PNI would not accept, demanding that Hatta first resign as Vice-President. This proposal alarmed Masjumi, who suspected that the PNI and PKI wanted Hatta removed from the Vice-Presidency to suit Sukarno’s purposes. Hatta pursued the matter no further, and Instead persuaded Burhanuddin Harahap, the parliamentary leader of Masjumi, to head the new government. As a relative of the acting chief of army staff, Colonel Zulkifli Lubis, a North Sumatran, he was a prime minister acceptable to the army leadership. Although Nahdatul Ulama agreed to join his cabinet, Burhanuddin could not persuade the PNI to work with him. This was not surprising since his main goals were to clean up the corruption and reverse the undesirable trends in government attributed to the previous PNI leadership. On his return from overseas, Sukarno made it clear that the new cabinet did not meet with his approval. Even Hatta was disappointed with its performance, in particular its decision to ape PNI tactics of placing its own party members 1n senior civil service posts, a ploy redolent of the power politics it was supposed to rectify. Hatta realized that the Burhanuddin cabinet was too weak to restore faith 1n parliamentary democracy. The final blow for Hatta was the general election result. No clear winner emerged. Masjumi and the PNI were tied with 57 seats each, although the PNI recorded more votes. Next came the Nahdatul Ulama with 45 seats, followed closely by the PKI with 39 seats, having previously held only

17. The PSI polled extremely badly, gaining only 5 seats.79 One aspect of the electoral system which later drew criticism from Hatta was that the people voted for a party but the party chose the representatives. Thus, Hatta pointed out, the representative was not necessarily a person who had any direct association with the area where h1s party polled the votes.®9 Hatta also blamed the election system for the proliferation of minor parties, pointing to the example of the system in Britain, ’’where every area directly elects its representatives to Parliament” and the small parties are automatically eliminated.®! Hatta slipped away from Indonesia’s post-election disillusionment to accept Nehru’s long-standing invitation to revisit India. He returned to Indonesia in the New Year of 1956 to face what was to be a period of major decision 1n h1s life. The split 1n the Vwl Tunggal became a reality when Sukarno, for the first time 1n their partnership, refused to endorse 180

a decree Issued by Hatta while Sukarno was 1n Mecca.82 Another development which must have chilled Hatta and made him realize that the balance of power was now in the hands of those advocating more authoritarian government was that there was a rapprochement between Sukarno and the recently reinstated army chief, Nasution.88 It was apparent that Sukarno and Nasution were united in a common goal: to dismantle parliamentary democracy and restore presidential rule. It was the army's bid to gain political power by becoming the "powerhouse” behind Sukarno.8^ The PNI, because of its larger vote in the general election, had the right to form a government, and it again called on Ali Sastroamidjojo to become prime minister. This time A11 sensed that presidential support was nominal; in fact Sukarno had begun to drop hints that he was formu- lating a new conception of government for Indonesia. Sukarno was also reluctant to endorse All's choice of cabinet because 1t included Masjuml members whom Sukarno disliked, such as Mohamad Roem as deputy prime minister, a man close to Hatta. Hatta was aware that Sukarno was on the attack and had acquired a formidable power base—the Javanese people, the PNI, the PKI, Nahdatul Ulama, the Partai Murba, and now the powerful army chief, Nasution. Under the Constitution, Hatta was required to assist Sukarno 1n his duties. But Sukarno now considered it to be h1s "duty” to destroy the only type of democracy which accorded with Hatta's perception of "Indonesia Free.” Hatta felt that, 1n order to defend his social revolution, he must place himself 1n a position of "opposition." Hatta warned Natsir of his intention to resign, explaining: "I can't continue with Sukarno!”88 Natsir and Halim appealed to him to reconsider his decision. He finally agreed to work with Sukarno for another six months.88 Circumstances in the months from July to December 1956 tended to reinforce rather than weaken Hatta’s resolve. Sukarno returned from overseas trips to the United States, the Soviet Union, and China more than ever determined to change the present system of government. In a speech on October 28, he suggested, "Let us now bury all parties,"8^ Indicating that he had a new concept of democracy, which he termed "demo-IvlcuZ tznpimp&i'' [democracy with leadership].88 The Outer Islands, especially Sumatra and Sulawesi, reacted angrily to the trend away from parliamentary government. Power struggles were also taking place within the army, sparked to some extent by Nasutlon's alliance with Sukarno.Natsir recalled that Hatta came to see him, affirming: "This is it—I can't go on!" Hatta was reluctant to denounce Sukarno openly, Natsir recalled, fearing that such a declaration might endanger Indonesia’s unity.89 Hatta’s speech to the University of Gadjah Mada In Yogyakarta on November 27, 1956, where an honorary doctorate was conferred upon him, revealed that the decision to leave the Vwl Tunggal had hurt. He began: Confronting realities—particularly very bitter ones—people often conceive of ideals as a cure for their wounded spirit, ideals that give them hope for the future.98 He reminded his audience that the nationalist struggle had not just been against the Dutch but also dedicated to freeing the Indonesian people from oppression and social injustice, an attempt to implement the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. He advocated that Indonesia's Ideal should be social democracy, Inspired by Western socialist thought, Islam, and Indonesian village democracy. 181

Defending the Panca Slla as a state philosophy, Hatta noted that It Incorporated the elements of social justice and religion, and he believed that, 1n spite of Its shortcomings, the 1950 Constitution contained all the Ideals of the Independence movement. In view of the fact that his resignation took effect as the newly elected Constituent Assembly was about to begin Its deliberations, Hatta1s speech was clearly Intended to draw attention to the values which should be preserved In the permanent Constitution. Hatta condemned the Irresponsibility of the political parties and the "scramble for profits” which had caused so much dissatisfaction In the public generally.91 He criticized the denial of autonomy to the regions. Hatta gave h1s opinion that since 1950 the type of government practiced had been "parliamentary democracy without democracy and without a parliament,” resulting 1n political anarchy. "The authority of the government has further declined because party politics Introduced and maintained the peculiar custom that power Is 1n fact not vested with the responsible government, but with the party councils which are not responsible."9^ Thus, claimed Hatta, there had been a distorted form of parliamentary democracy, a rule by the powers behind the throne. In h1s official letter of resignation Hatta was restrained, giving little Indication of h1s realization that without Sukarno^ backing, he was facing an uphill task 1n achieving his goals. His comments were succinct but low-key: "After participating 1n the task of nation and community building from above for eleven years, I wish to contribute my strength from below as an ordinary person, free of any position.”93 Hatta wrote Sukarno a personal letter which was much more condemnatory than his letter of resignation. Halim strongly advised him to publish the letter. "Do you want to risk the outbreak of civil war?" queried Hatta.94 He was already anxious about the reaction to his resignation In the Outer Islands. "My letter 1s sufficiently rational and sufficiently pointed, even here and there accusing Sukarno of behaving like a dictator,” he exclaimed, adding, as If to express a feeling of an unpleasant duty faithfully discharged. "By this letter, I have fulfilled my responsibility to history.”9* Unless Sukarno were prepared to support him, Hatta knew that h1s position 1n the Vwl Tunggal was practically that of an Impotent figurehead. Even more galling, he could be regarded as part of Sukarnofs effort to dismantle parliamentary democracy, an essential component of kedaulatan KakyaZ. If he remained as Vice-President, he would be condoning the reIntroduction of authoritarian, centralized government, where the voice of the people could be overruled by the ultimate authority. The Vwl Tunggal would resemble the governor-generals of old, of whom Hatta had once been so scornful. For Hatta, the roots of democracy had to be nurtured, not torn out before they could stabilize and grow to maturity. The civilian leaders and the people needed more time to gain experience about how a democratic system should operate. Hatta agreed that the system needed modification 1n the transitional period, but not elimination. If Sukarno was determined to destroy democracy, he believed he had no alternative but to resign. As an ordinary citizen, he could voice his opposition, explaining how kzdaulalan Kakyat was endangered and putting forward suggestions to prevent Its destruction. 182

For Hatta, It was back to square one* From now on to the end of his life, he would revert to the role of fighter for social justice, non-cooperator, and political critic, as if he were again proclaiming to the Dutch court: "Cooperation merely means that the stronger party bullies the weaker, using the latter as an instrument to support his own interests."^ The j)W£ junggaL had become dUultanggal.

1.Hatta, Bung Hatta Menjawah, p.
157.
2.Plklan Rakjat, October 9, 1954.
3.Ibid.
4.Mohammad Hatta, "Islam, Knowledge and Society," in Potalt o£ a Patriot, p. 599. Speech delivered at A1 igarh University, India, October 29, 1955.
5.Speech by Hatta in Solo, Central Java, reported in Plklan Rakjat, July 24, 1957.
6.Mohammad Hatta, "Demokrasi dan Otonomi," in PUeOian Rakjat, April 27 and 29, 1957.
7.Ibid.
8.Interview with Nyonya Maria Ullfah Subadio, February 22, 1928; and Maria Ullfah Subadio, "Bung Hatta dan Saya," in Bung Hatta: Plbadlnya datam Kenangan, p. 264.
9.Hatta and Sukiman had been the more ardent advocates of a federal Indonesia many years before when the Perhimpunan Indonesia began to discuss the form of the independent state.
10.Coast, Recult to Revolution,
p. 289. According to Coast, who had worked in the foreign ministry, Hatta's decision was partly influenced by the fact that Sjahrir had refused to be foreign minister and partly because Hatta wanted to avoid embarrassing disputes between the nominees of the parties.
11.See J. M. van der Kroef, "Indonesia and the West," Fa* Eatten Survey, 20, 4 (February 21, 1952),
p. 40.
12.See Michael Leifer, Indonesia' Foreign Policy (Sydney, Allen and Unwin, 1983), p. 27.
13.Medeka, July 20, 1950.
14.See van der Kroef, "Indonesia and the West," p. 40.
15.Medeka, June 5, 1950.
16.The New Vonk Timet, March 6, 1950, commented on this conference: "The Dutch have not been acting like people who expect to be out of New Guinea by the end of the year."
17.Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia between the Power Blocks," in Potalt o£ a Patriot, p. 567. First published in Foreign Attaint, April 1958.
18.Mohammad Hatta, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," in Potalt o£ a Patriot, p. 554. First published

21.Mendeka, April 11, 1950.
22.Ibid.
23.Ibid., May 9, 1950.
24.Hatta Instituted training and education facilities, concentrating on craft skills. He also set up special transmigration schemes offering land In the Outer Islands to soldier settlers. See Herbert Felth, The Decline Constitutional Democnacy in Indonesia (Ithaca,
N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1964), p. 81.
25.See Ibid., p. 82.
26.Mendeka, October 27, 1950.
27.Hatta, ”Indones1as Foreign Policy,” p. 554.
28.Hatta, Bung Hatta Menjauuati, p.
24.
29.Felth, Decline o£ Constitutional Democnacy, p. 85. In September 1949, when the pound sterling was devalued, Indonesian currency had been adjusted to the dollar but not to Dutch currency. This move partly corrected this Imbalance.
30.Ibid., p. 86. Hattas wife remonstrated with him for not warning her of this move. Hatta*s defense was: ”Yuke, 1 f I had told you 1n advance, you would have told your mother, and you both would have protected yourselves and possibly told other close friends.” See Nyonya R. Hatta, ”Pr1ns1p- prlnslp Bung Hatta,” p. 43.
31.See Kahln, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 461.
32.Mendeka, June 5, 1950.
33.Ibid.
34.In regard to Sjahrlr, there were doubts expressed about h1s support. Mendeka commented: ”As far as the PNI 1s concerned, It Is certain that Sjahrlr would not have backing, while 1n Masjuml this too 1s uncertain, taking Into account opposition 1n certain Masjuml quarters to Sjahrlr personally.” See Mendeka, May 25, 1950. Sjahrlr was regarded as an opponent also by the PKI and Partal Murba.
35.Mendeka, May 25, 1950.
36.Hatta, Bung Hatta Men/arntx, p.
26.
37.Ibid., p. 27.
38.See Mendeka, July 4, 1950.
39.Felth maintains that the PSI hoped that Sjahrlr could return to the prime ministership. See Felth, Decline o£ Constitutional Democnacy,
p. 96, n. 83.
40.Mohammad Hatta, Oua Democnacy, trans. R. Cook (Brisbane: Griffith University School of Modern Aslan Stu dies, Teach 1 ng Tran si at 1 on Ser 1 es,

47.Ibid., October 4, 1958.
48.Afe^defca, February 14, 1951.
49.Ibid., September 20, 1951.
50.PlfUA.an Pakjat, July 26, 1955.
51.When acting as Prime Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, Halim had on August 15, 1950 issued Regulation 39 of 1950 concerning regional and municipal elections, which the Nats 1r government endorsed. Opposition to the regulation stemmed from a suspicion that it would favor the Islamic party, as the election system was based on established local organizations. See Feith, VzcJLinz Constitutional Vzmocnacy, pp. 165-69.
52.See Mendzka, March 24, 1951.
53.Pringgodigdo, O^icz o£ PAZSidznt in Indonesia, p. 49.
54.Feith, VzcJLine a£ Constitutional Democracy, p. 216.
55.See ibid., p. 191.
56.While on this overseas trip, Sjahrir married in Cairo his former personal assistant, Sit 1 Wahjunah, known as Poppy. Having looked at various socialist systems, including those of Poland and Yugoslavia, he came to the conclusion: "For all Its shortcomings, democratic government 1s better than all other government systems.” See Mendbeka, September 13, 1951.
57.Interview with Subadio Sastrosatomo, February 22, 1982.
58.Editorial, Mendzka, October 3,
1951. Entitled ”Quo Vadis, Sjahrir?” the editorial read: '’Perfidious Albion, expert in diplomacy over the centuries ... it wants to defend Its position as a 'balancing power' 1n the East and West. The position in the West is achieved but in Asia It needs an Asian bloc with a basis of English socialism.” British Influence at this time was already on the wane.
59.Hatta, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," p. 549.
60.Ibid., p. 550.
61.See Feith, Decline. o£ Constitutional Vemooiacy, p. 235.
62.According to Hatta, if the shops and hawkers in the vicinity of the Haram Mosque were removed and median strips provided on roads, there would be a more orderly flow of pilgrims, preventing people from colliding with one another. See M. F. Swasono, "Ayahanda: Pribadinya dalam Kenanganku," p. 56.
63.See Hanlon Rakjat, February 5, 1955, where Aidit's statement on the Madiun Affair, first published in Hanian Rakjat on September 14,

of Its cabinet# the NU might break away from Masjuml. Masjuml did not Include Wachld Hasjim’s name on the list of persons recommended for the portfolio. On April 6, 1952, NU broke away from Masjuml. See also Felth, Vzctlnz

68.Interview M. Roem, February 5,
1982. As Roem served as A11fs deputy 1n h1s second cabinet, h1s viewpoint carries some weight.
69.The military governor, Daud Beureueh, had close links with the outlawed Darul Islam movement 1n Java and with another extremist Islamic group In South Sulawesi.
70.Ttmz* IndanztZa, July 31, 1953, commented that Hatta was well received 1n Aceh. There were no posters setting out specific demands as was the case during Sukarno’s visit a few months previously. Hatta’s visit to Aceh was criticized by the PKI, which accused him of Interference 1n government problems. See Pzdaman, November 2, 1953, and Hasiian Rakjat, November 7, 1953.
71.Ttmz* IndanzAta, July 5, 1954.
72.An editorial 1n PlklKan Rakjat of October 25, 1954 followed up Hatta’s remarks about the parties as educators, commenting:”Ah Hatta, we feel your suggestions will float 1n the air for a long time before finding fertile brains and hearts. Perhaps we should wait five more years! Aren’t Easterners patient people? But 1f after five years the parties 1n our country are just as now, selling humbug and demagogy, grabbing seats and rank, riding on Ignorant people made more befuddled by the parties, perhaps we should have a dictator! Would 1t be better to kill ’democracy’ so that DEMOCRACY can live? Would 1t be better to follow Mustapha’s example, whose actions you once praised?” Mustapha clearly refers to Kemal Pasha of Turkey.
73.Ptkt^an Rakjat, October 9, 1954.
74.Ibid.
75.Ibid., November 26, 1954.
76.Ibid.
77.Ibid., July 26, 1955.
78.Hatta, Bang Hatta Mznjawab, p.
53.
79.For more comprehensive details of election results, see Feith, Vzcttnz a£ CayMtttuttanal Vzmocsiacy, pp. 435-36.
80.Ptktnan Rakjat, July 24, 1957.
81.Ibid., September 2, 1957.
82.The decree 1n question had been Issued by Hatta on the advice of

February 6, 1983. Hatta was particularly disgusted by Sukarnofs granting a partial reprieve to the justice minister, Djody Gondokusumo, although he had been convicted of corruption in January 1956.

87.See Feith, Vzcltnz o£ CanAtttuttonaL Dmooiacy, p. 517.
88.Ibid., p. 515.
89.M. Natsir in interview, February 6, 1983.
90.Mohammad Hatta, Pcut and Putunz, an address delivered upon receiving the degree of doctan konana catua from Gadjah Mada University at Yogyakarta on November 27, 1956 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project,
1960), p. l#
91.Ibid., p. 12.
92.Ibid., p. 16.
93.Letter of resignation, in Anak Agung Gde Agung, Tuuznty Yzasu, pp. 622-24.
94.A. Halim, f,Gores-Gores tentang Bung Hatta,” in Bung Hatta: Pntha- dUnya datam Kznangan, p. 692.
95.Ibid.
96.M. Hatta, "Indonesia Free,” p.
246. 187

CHAPTER TWELVE NON-COOPERATOR If we truly love a Tree Indonesia, which Is united, Indivis- ible, sovereign, just and prosperous, let us reflect for a white on how to return to those former Ideals which were so pure, and bring back honest leadership combined with a spirit which Is prepared to make sacrifices. .. Our people are stUil poor, even poorer than formerly, In the midst of abundant natural riches. It Is best we contemplate the present situation of our people, who truly are entitled to a better fate, one which accords with our original alms A Hattafs resignation undoubtedly led to an escalation in regional defiance. In the outcry there was an element of Sumatran loyalty to Hatta personally which must have mollified his hurt feelings, while also alerting him to the need to exercise a tight rein on his political behavior for the sake of Indonesian unity. Hatta knew from his extensive tours of the regions that central government economic policies had disadvantaged the Outer Islands. The seeds of revolt were there ready to be fertilized. Already there was speculation that the political situation must be critical if Hatta retired from the apex of government. This was to some extent true. Hatta did want to alert his people to the threat to legal government and parliamentary democracy. From November 20 to 24 there had been a reunion of the Banteng Division, the main fighting unit in the Minangkabau during the Revolution, which had subsequently been disbanded by Nasution. Before the reunion ended, a decision was made to establish a Banteng Council which would press for reforms, especially for improved state and army leadership.2 Following Hatta1s retirement from the Vice-Presidency, the regional army commander, Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Husein, acting as chairman of the Banteng Council, formally took temporary charge of government in Central Sumatra, the incumbent Javanese governor quietly surrendering his powers in face of Minangkabau militancy. Two days later, in North Sumatra, the army commander, Simbolon, declared a State of Siege and War in his area and assumed local leadership as military commander. Simbolon stressed that he did not favor separatism but wanted "to improve the situation of the nation and of the Indonesian people by handing over the reins of government to those national leaders, who with honesty and integrity can develop the nation, free from lust for power and self seeking.”3 Simbolon called for a restoration of the Vwl Tunggal, declaring: "It is our conviction... that the Vwltunggal may no longer serve merely as a symbol but must function as a moving force, with a careful division of duties."4 The last phrase was significant, for 1t suggested that Hatta be accorded an office commensurate with Sukarnos new powers in order to restore reality to the concept of the Vwl Tunggal. The South Sumatrans followed the example of the other two provinces, army commander Barlian establishing 188

the Garuda Council, forcing the Javanese governor to agree to regional self-government. Defiance was not confined to Sumatra. On March 2, the commander of the South Sulawesi region, Sumual, proclaimed the Plagam Pcxjuangan S&n&sta [Charter of Common Struggle] or Permesta, a declaration of support for regional autonomy and an expression of disapproval of the Jakarta government. The Permesta declaration made clear that, if the proposed National Council and Gvtang-siayong cabinet were to gain support, they must be led jointly by Sukarno and Hatta. To absorb regional dissidence into national affairs, on March 14 Nasution declared a "state of siege and war,” urging Sukarno to persuade Hatta to return to government, although not necessarily as prime minister. No direct government action was taken against the rebel regimes, although Nasution acted quietly to undermine the power of the regional commanders.5 The PKI had seized upon a Masjumi representative’s press comment that Hatta would consider the prime ministership if the parliament offered it to him and was prepared to back his program until the next general election. The PKIfs reaction was to brand Hatta a "dictator” and an "American djago [champion],”® also pointing out that the other leading Islamic party, Nahdatul Ulama, considered Hatta to be "tetuitLangan ajasian politW' or politically insolent.7 On February 21, enthusiastically supported by the PKI, Sukarno announced the formation of the Gotovug-wyang cabinet, in which all parties, including the PKI, would be represented. "All members of a family should eat at a single table and work at a single workbench," he declared.® Hatta would have concurred with this conception in 1926 when he believed the PKI to be essentially a nationalist group. In 1957, however, he contended that "as the PKI is basically part of an international movement,” Sukarno’s blend of national, religious, and foreign-oriented parties into one cabinet was "like trying to mix oil and water.”9 Sukarno’s koruzpAl also included the establishment of a National Council which he himself would lead. The National Council was reminiscent of two advisory bodies of the past, the Dutch Volksraad and the Japanese Central Advisory Council. The disturbing factor was that the National Council would take precedence over the popularly elected parliament. Sukarno did not seek a replacement for Hatta as Vice-President. There was really no place for an institutionalized duumvirate in Sukarno’s conception of "democracy with leadership,” although in practice he relied heavily on having advisers and administrators by h1s side. Sukarno’s konAzpAl drew its main support from the PKI and the Partai Murba. Chaerul Saleh, now returned from studies in Europe, had become one of Sukarno’s leading supporters, just as he had admired the more authoritarian form of government advocated by Tan Mai aka. Indeed, according to Hatta, Sukarno had not coined the term ndmak^(uZ texptmpin.'' "As far as I know,” said Hatta, "those who brought the concept to Indonesia were ex-Major Ahmad and Chaerul Saleh as a consensus of Indonesian students studying in Western Europe," adding: "This Idea was born as a reaction to the crisis of democracy which has taken place in Indonesia."H Hatta pointed out that even the overseas students were vague about the meaning of guided democracy. "What is clear 1s that they do not want a dictatorship but feel the party way of implementing democracy is Incorrect."12 Hatta accused Sukarno of failing to analyze his concept of "democracy with leadership”; that as a result, Sukarno "has only arrived at the 189

bridge to be crossed... but what 1s its form and content has not yet been Illustrated.*1 Apart from Its lack of constitutional basis, Hatta pointed out that the National Council membership "is not representative and has no authority at all." He added scathingly: "It is not surprising that this body is more like—according to a term 1n Constitutional Law—a mznagzKlz du Kol rather than a body which can uphold its own authority."13 Hatta defended the parliamentary democracy of the 1950 Constitution from Sukarno’s accusations that it was "free fight democracy." He conceded that the proper implementation of such a system depended on "responsible leadership"; thus to correct its faults, "we should revive the feeling of moral responsibility 1n our leadership, and in political party leadership circles." In Hatta’s view, Sukarno’s chairmanship of the National Council was Inappropriate 1n that "he is constitutionally not responsible," but "the leadership of a democracy—even a guided democracy—should be responsible. "14 Hatta was pointing out that under the Constitution 1n force Sukarno did not have to accept responsibility for h1s actions, this was the duty of the cabinet and parliament. Sukarno ignored the Masjumi’s requests that it be given the mandate to form any new cabinet, aware that it would probably offer the prime ministership to Hatta. Instead Sukarno appointed himself "citizen Sukarno" 1n order to become the formateur of an "emergency extra-parl1amentary- business cabinet" which would act "properly and firmly" and would establish the National Council.15 Sukarno appointed Djuanda, a non-party man and a fellow graduate of the Bandung Institute of Technology, as prime minister. Hatta’s reaction was swift. He pointed out the sections of the Constitution which Sukarno was violating by his actions and warned that they "will have major consequences for our country and for interpreting the rules of our Constitution."^ Hatta spent much of 1957 touring Sumatra, where he received an enthusiastic welcome as if he were a returning hero responding to his people’s call. He emphasized that his intent was not to incite rebellion but to prevent it. The Sumatrans assured him that they wanted to remain part of Indonesia but were not prepared to accept the type of government being practiced in Jakarta. Anti-Java feeling was running high. In his press statements, Hatta denied that the regional rebellion was a Miningkabau affair. "In my estimation the movement which emerged on December 20, 1956 was not an ztknlc but a regional movement, which demands improvement and development in areas which so far have been neglected."!7 Hatta described the regional revolts as "explosions of dissatisfaction" and "a psychological conflict between the center and the regions," analyz- ing the attitudes of the regional leaders: "The dialectic which they frequently put forward is that they deliberately violate the law to negate the central government’s present basis of illegality." Hatta cautiously commended the Minangkabau refusal to condone undemocratic central government, declaring that "providing the Banteng Council truly acted In the interests of the people, I am prepared to recognize 1t provisionally as a ^oJX accompli."1° Again Hatta was using the criteria of "people’s welfare" and "social justice" as h1s measuring rod. The PKI’s response was to lampoon Hatta in cartoons, criticizing his advice to the Garuda Council in South Sumatra that 1t seek overseas loans for regional development and suggesting that such action would "not result in improvement but anarchy."19 There was an unmistakable tone of ethnic pride as Hatta wrote about the achievements of the Banteng Council and the Minangkabau people. 190

"Many kilometers of roads have been Improved, roads which eight months ago were Impassable," he reported. What Impressed him even more was that this construction was carried out by gotong-wyong, not gotang-wyong which 1s forced but gotong-wyong arising from a desire to Improve the general welfare." This was a subtle dig at Sukarnofs kantzpAt. Hatta reveled 1n the spirit of dynamism 1n h1s home region, "as 1f the people have taken on new life,"20 justifying what he had written about autoactivity and traditional democracy, Hatta, at the same time, had to face up to the threat of separatism In any regional act of defiance. Underlying the positive and constructive regional actions were elements of personal revenge. The Sumatran army commanders, especially Lubls and Slmbolon, were resentful of both Sukarno and Nasutlon, as were Masjuml and PSI leaders. Hatta knew that both Natslr and Sumltro were also 1n Sumatra seeking support. Hatta warned the Banteng Council to exercise restraint, knowing that the presence of the disgruntled Masjuml and PSI leaders might unbalance the region. "The spirit which 1s rampant at present must be nurtured and channeled Into continuous nation-building," he stressed.21 The PKI press was pointing out that Nazaruddln, the head of the security section of the Banteng Council, was 1n Singapore arranging the procurement of arms from the headquarters of the South East Asia Treaty Organization CSEATO].22 Hatta must have realized that h1s own presence 1n Sumatra was as unsettling an Influence as those of other outraged politicians, heightening rather than calming the spirit of rebellion. He tried to avoid being treated like a conquering hero, even to the point of offending local dignitaries by refusing to be carried aloft In a special "Chair of Honor."23 He was being pressured Into becoming a leader of regional revolt, a position he would only accept 1n terms of social reform rather than armed uprising. Hatta emphasized that he was not 1n Sumatra as the leader of a breakaway movement. In South Sumatra he declared heatedly: "If 1t 1s the case that the movements 1n South Sumatra Intend to separate themselves from the unitary state, then I will never again return to South Sumatra."24 Hatta directed h1s pen to the question of regional autonomy. He criticized civil servants who "feel suspicious about autonomy at the village or de^a level" because "In their opinion the village 1s too lowly, too narrow-minded, politically and socially."25 Hatta returned to h1s basic view that the various ethnic village structures contained the essence of Indonesian democracy, "units of society which were clearly democratic with meeting halls for sessions and deliberations on joint projects through gotong-wyang." Although damaged by the colonial Impact, Hatta believed that the roots of democracy were "still there and alive."26 While Hatta was touring Sumatra, Sukarno was expressing h1s dissatisfaction that the major parties had not been more supportive of h1s fec, especially that they had rejected the PKI’s Inclusion 1n the new cabinet.He again attacked the party system. He pointed out that "1t wasn*t I who ordered the existence of parties," that "Thank God, 1t wasnft Sukarno who signed that decree!"2' Of course, the signatory 1n November 1945 of the decree Instituting the party system had been Hatta. It was noticeable that Sukarno did not attack Maklumat x, the decree by which Hatta had converted the National Committee Into a parliament. Sukarno had already undone much of Maklumat x by forcing the elected parliament to take second place to a National Council, which had not been elected. Yet as the army encroached on h1s power domain 1n the years 191

ahead# Sukarno would turn to the parties for support# becoming extraordinarily adept at the old ploy of dLvLdz zt Lmpz^z, playing one force off against the other. Hatta retaliated against Sukarno’s assaults in a speech delivered to the alumni of the University of Indonesia# which he entitled the "Moral Responsibility of the Intelligentsia." In the Minangkabau# the intelligentsia traditionally acted as a watchdog on the councils of pzngkuLu.28 Hatta dwelt on the subject of dictatorship# warning that historical example demonstrated that dictators were only effective if they were men of high moral standards, with courage to act and accept responsibility and with extraordinary ability to organize and administer.29 Hatta was making it patently obvious that Sukarno did not possess the abilities and character of a responsible dictator. On the other hand, it was Interesting to note that the attributes which Hatta ascribed to such a benevolent despot were those qualities for which he himself was most admired. Hatta followed up the theme of this speech in his public addresses# pointing to the example of his archenemy# Stalin. "Stalin taught people to submit only to the leadership in the party hierarchy# teaching them to become machines with a soul which shows no mercy for their fellow men."30 He drew attention to the fate of Stalin’s former comrades# that "his opponents were cruelly removed without consideration for their past services.” He was justifying his own determination to take no part in Sukarno’s kzpL. "Dictators have no place for dualism in leadership#” he contended.31 in other words# if Sukarno had ambitions for unquestioned authority# then it was unlikely he would encourage a restoration of the Vu)L TunggaL as a leadership partnership. Nevertheless, the disintegration of the VwL TunggaL was increasingly a matter of public concern, not only in the Outer Islands. "Hatta was popular in Java as well as Sumatra right up to the time of his death#’’ reminisced Natsir.32 j0 try to defuse the VwL TunggaL issue# in April 1957 Sukarno empowered Djuanda to offer Hatta the chairmanship of a national planning board. Hatta declined the offer# accusing Sukarno of supporting the Western economic system# pointing out that "the policy of ’free exchange’ in Indonesia’s present economic climate bites deeper than the free exchange in the time of nineteenth-century 1 Iberal 1sm.”33 it was a damning accusation. Hatta was Implying that not only was Sukarno taking on the "exorbitant rights" of Dutch colonial rulers but condoning at the same time economic policies which were even more exploitive than those of the colonists. The success of the PKI 1n the regional elections in 1957 heightened tensions both in Java and the regions# drawing together the three main non-Communist parties. On Prime Minister Djuanda’s initiative# a Musyawarah Nasional [National Consultative Conference] was held 1n September 1957 1n a further attempt to reunite Sukarno and Hatta presumably 1n the hope that Hatta would draw Sukarno away from the PKI. Civilian and military representatives from every region were invited, including the Sumatran and Sulawesi rebels. Prior to the conference# the dissidents gathered in South Sumatra to prepare their case, drawing up a document which they entitled the "Palembang Charter." It called for the restoration of the VuiL TunggaL# changes 1n the central army leadership# regional autonomy# and the conversion of the new National Council Into a senate.34 Hatta agreed to attend the National Conference but made it clear that# unless Sukarno allowed him a position of real power within the Constitution, the VwL TunggaL would remain a mere facade, unable to 192

fulfill its function. In such circumstances, Hatta reiterated, he would rather f,let Sukarno run things his own way.”35 At most, Hatta was prepared to sign a joint statement with Sukarno supporting nation building and the Panca Slla. Although there was widespread disappointment that the Vuil Tunggal was not restored, no one in government took action to meet Hatta1s requirement or to try to countermand Sukarno’s unconstitutional behavior. Nasutlon did not respond to the dissident commanders’ demands for changes in the central army leadership. Surrounded by mounting pressure to accommodate himself to the new regime, Hatta was glad of an opportunity to, escape from Indonesia, accepting Premier Chou En-Lai’s invitation to visit the People’s Republic of China. Hatta was impressed with China’s postrevolutionary achievements, so much so that the PSI’s newspaper, Pzdman, expressed some concern at the warmth of his public statements.36 Hatta’s retort was that ’’any sane and objective person must admit that China has carried out massive nation building.”37 He praised the role played by the People’s Liberation Army under the direction of the civilian leaders, and expressed the opinion that such cooperation between people and army need not be confined to a Communist regime: ”A democracy which is responsible and has moral discipline could do as much,” he insisted. Hatta was pointing out to the regions that an army could work constructively alongside responsible civilian leaders; it did not need to take over command. He believed that China’s success lay in ”1ts tidy organization and strong discipline” and the ’’realistic outlook” of Its people.38 Rather pointedly he remarked: ’’Anyone who follows Mao Tse-tung’s analyses carefully will find them to be practical and nzallAtic," adding: ’’the people understand Mao Tse-tung’s kan^zp^c.”39 On his return from China, Hatta found that not only were the regions smoldering, but Indonesia’s failure to obtain a two-th1rds United Nations’ endorsement of the return of West Irian had stirred up anti-Dutch feeling. The issues of his return to the Vwl Tunggal confronted him the moment he stepped off his plane, when he saw placards reading ’’Long live the Vwltunggal Sukarno-Hatta” being prominently displayed. Hatta was evasive about his future role in politics, his only concession being to participate with Sukarno in a special study of the economic situation.40 Hatta alone opened the economic study group commencing on November 26, 1957, because Sukarno had been shaken by an attempt on h1s life while he was attending a function at his children’s school in Cik1n1. It was suspected that this act of terrorism was the outcome of Colonel Lubls’s anti-Communist exhortations to extremist Muslim youth. Hatta condemned the assassination attempt, which took the lives of innocent bystanders. ”In a country based on Belief 1n God and Humanity,” he rebuked, the religious reference clearly directed to h1s fellow Muslims, ”1 regret that a despicable act like this can take pi ace.”41 The failed assassination attempt sparked off rumors in the Dutch press that Sukarno had been overthrown, which 1n turn provoked PNI and PKI union retaliation. Supported by Sukarno, although condemned by Hatta and Djuanda, employees in Dutch enterprises took control, ousting their employers. The army acted quickly, Nasutlon ordering his forces to take over from the unionists. The army never relinquished the Dutch properties it acquired. With the excuse that 1t was controlling radical unionism, the army became an economic force in Indonesian society while the Dutch sustained a major loss. 193

The general unrest 1n the wake of the takeover of Dutch enterprises* dissatisfaction with Nasution’s army leadership* the assassination attempt on Sukarno1s life, the failure of the National Conference to satisfy the demands set out 1n the Palembang Charter* and the disruption of inter-island shipping brought regional dissidence to a head.42 While Sukarno was away on an overseas tour* the Sumatran rebel commanders* together with Sumual from Sulawesi, met between January 9 and 13* 1958 with the political leaders Natsir* Sjafruddin Prawiranegara* Burhanuddin Harahap, and Sumltro at Sungai Dareh* a small town near the West Sumatra-Jambi border.48 They drew up plans to establish an alternative Indonesian government with headquarters at Bukit Tinggi. As 1n 1949 Sjafruddin would again act as prime minister as if he were determined to come once more to Indonesia’s rescue as it faced a foreign threat* a danger which he this time perceived as international communism. Rumors of the impending rebellion reached Jakarta. Both the Masjumi and PSI sent delegations to Sumatra to try to persuade the rebels to discard any plans to form an alternative government. Hatta too was appalled when he heard of the proposed challenge to the central government. He recalled that he sent an urgent message via the chief of police in Padang to cancel the plans, warning Husein* the Minangkabau commander, that rebellion would destroy his region.44 The Javanese regional army commanders had been reluctant to take action against their brother officers in Sumatra and Sulawesi* but the establishment of a rebel government raised the level of dispute to an issue of treason and national security. Hatta1 s call for abandonment of the plan went unheeded, about which he later spoke with distinct annoyance* alleging that he ’’told Ahmad Husein not to rebel.” ”1 told him three times,” Hatta recalled, ”but he still did it.”45 On February 10* 1958* the Sumatran rebels delivered an ultimatum to Jakarta demanding that PM Djuanda’s cabinet resign, that Hatta and the Sultan of Yogyakarta be appointed formateurs of a new cabinet* that parliament allow these formateurs to form a national business cabinet to operate until the next general elections, and that Sukarno resume a ’’constitutional” position. When the ultimatum expired on February 15 without any of the demands being met* the Pemerintah Revolusloner Republik Indonesia [Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia] or PRRI was formed. Sukarno returned hurriedly from his overseas trip the next day. In spite of Hatta’s rejection of the rebel government’s action, the English reporter* James Mossman, 1n Interviews with rebel leaders* found that they hoped that Hatta would join them once the government was estab-Ushed. According to Simbolon in North Sumatra: ”If we waited for Hatta to act against Sukarno, we would wait a hundred years* but if we take the Initiative ourselves, Hatta will follow.”48 Natsir was more skeptical about Hatta’s participation* although he was of the opinion that Hatta would ”be on the shelf for a long time* perhaps for the rest of his life,”47 if he did not join the rebels. In an interview twenty-five years after the event* Natsir stressed that Hatta did aspire to return to power* but through Sukarno’s self-destruction rather than by illicit action.48 Hatta had the patience to sit tight and wait; the rebels did not. Apart from Hatta’s repugnance for civil war, there was another disturbing element 1n the regional revolt: the rebels were seeking support from the Americans and British.49 Although John Foster Dulles in March 1958 194

testified to Congress that the United States was not "intervening in the internal affairs" of Indonesia, there is evidence that many in the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department saw merit in supporting the rebels, fearing Sukarno would fall under Communist domination.5° The PKI press in March 1958 pointed to a statement made by the Council of SEATO ministers held in Manila on March 13 which read: "It is hoped in top circles here that the rebels will be able to... force a compromise which can place the former Vice-President Mohammad Hatta in power. This 1s the hope of the ' anti-communist’ world!"51 It is unlikely that Hatta wanted to return to power on the back of the CIA and SEATO, which would place him in the category of an American "puppet." He knew from the history of the archipelago that its unity had been shattered in the past by foreign exploitation of internecine war. Mossman also mentioned 1n his account that there were rumors that Sumatra might establish links to Malaya.52 Hatta personally never supported such links, because of the problem of Chinese economic domination, a point he was to stress in the future when Indonesia and the new state of Malaysia were in confrontation. 53 It was not easy for Hatta to ignore the call of h1s own people. As a distinguished fellow Minangkabau, Dr. Z. Zain, commented: "It would have been sufficient for Hatta to cross the Sunda Straits for the Republic of Indonesia to exist no more."54 Mossman reported an unnamed rebel's disappointment that Hatta had not supported the rebel government, saying: "He never let us down exactly, but he never lived up to our expectations either. He hasn't the imagination it takes to act unconstitutionally." Yet Hatta did have the imagination to foresee the effects of a secessionist movement sponsored by the United States and Britain. The rebel spokesman continued: "I used to tell him sometimes that he had been in Rotterdam too long and picked up the habits of mind of a Dutch grocer." He concluded: "Sukarno may have too much fantasy in his make-up, but Hatta has too little. At heart he's a bureaucrat not a leader."55 How short was the rebel's memory of Hatta's leadership of the struggle for sovereignty when in 1948 no party leader was prepared to take on the task. Hatta was then prepared to use foreign aid to obtain Independence, but he would not use it to split the unity of Indonesia. He had been criticizing for years the unwieldly bureaucratic centralized government in Jakarta, stressing the need for the people to have a greater role in managing their own affairs. Bureaucracy and ktdaulatan nakyat did not go hand in hand. Yet how much were Hatta's criticisms to blame for regional insurrection? His detailed analyses of how extensively the regions were being disadvantaged had exacerbated latent feelings of grievance and anger. Hatta's warnings on what to expect from dictators like Stalin had alerted many Indonesians to the need to restrain Sukarno and had heightened fears about communism, especially after the results of the regional elections were announced. Indeed, the force of Hatta's political comment in 1957, curbed for five agonizing years while Vice-President, might have brought rebellion to boiling point, even 1f this had not been Hatta's deliberate intention. Hatta had been hurt and demoralized by Sukarno undermining his authority. He may have underestimated the accumulative effect of his outspoken protests, and not have realized how sensitive his own Sumatran people were to h1s personal slight. The American historian, Louis Fischer, recorded an Interview with Hatta at this time when he suggested to him that he did have the authority to 195

end the civil war, Hatta was scornful. "I canft do 1t by running a Planning Board,”56 he retorted, the position offered to him by Djuanda in

1957. He pointed out that the rebels were demanding "a Cabinet with Hatta as prime minister and the Sultan as deputy prime minister.” Hatta made it clear that it was up to Sukarno to end the debacle by forming ”a responsible government.” When Fischer hinted that Hatta was being overly "constitutional and legal," Hatta1s anger erupted. "My way is political, not legalistic,” he responded, "All sides must return to the Constitution. The Sumatran government must be scrapped and a Presidential Cabinet established in Jakarta."57 Hatta’s words sounded contradictory, an indication of his own distress and confusion. Hatta admitted to Fischer that it would be pointless for him to join the Sukarno government in order to undermine it by "boring from within" because "the parties wonft let me," meaning most of all the PKI. "The PNI wants me back," he conceded, "to use my prestige," but he refused to be part of unconstitutional action, stressing that he "must not pave the way to totalitarianism."56 Caught off guard, Hatta let slip the depth of his distaste for Sukarno’s dominance and his hypnotic power over people. "I don’t wish to be the prisoner of other men’s policies," Hatta declared hotly, averring: "I have known Sukarno for decades. He won’t change."56 Sukarno returned prematurely from his overseas trip, visibly shaken that a revolutionary government had been established. He sought out Hatta, and prevailed on him to negotiate with the rebels on behalf of the central government. Hatta agreed to Sukarno’s request, although refusing to join him in a public address on the emergency situation, merely urging him to "speak calmly."66 Hatta suggested that Sukarno bargain with the dissidents: a return to the Constitution in return for a restitution of the pre-February 1 status quo, with a conversion of the National Council into a "pro-Senate," if approval for this were given by pari lament.6* Hatta declared his willingness to be prime minister of a temporary presidential cabinet if Sukarno reverted to being a constitutional President. Sukarno was reluctant to accede to what amounted to a reversal of his leadership ambitions. He knew he had the support of the air force chief, Suryadarma, and Nasution had also issued a warning that there would be no compromise with the rebels.6^ According to Mossman, Nasution and Suryadarma both ordered the first military actions against the revolutionary government.65 Nasution made use of the defection of the rebel commander in South Sumatra, which enabled h1s troops to enter from the southern flank. The unexpected use of force before he had been given an opportunity to negotiate infuriated Hatta. Mohamad Roem recalled that this time Hatta vowed that "he would never work with Sukarno again."64 Hatta was also strongly critical of the Islamic party, Nahdatul Ulama, for supporting Sukarno against their anti-Communist brothers in Sumatra, declaring: "From the very beginning of this tense situation, the NU considered me as being on the side of the rebels. They were 1n favor of attacking the rebels."65 Hatta also lashed out at American interference in other nations’ affairs to suit its own interests and denied American insinuations that "Indonesia has entered the Communist trap."66 Hatta himself had been criticized in the pro-American MarULa Tam.* for h1s complimentary remarks about China, the paper suggesting that Hatta’s thinking was turning left, which meant that he "no longer had an Influence which could stabilize Indonesian politics."67 At home he had acquired the reputation of having 196

an American bias, the PKI seizing on the statement of a Masjuml member that ,f1t seems that Bung Karno leans more towards Russia while Bung Hatta on the other hand, leans towards America."68 "Everything Is measured by American axioms, the American view of life," he commented 1n exasperation.69 The failure of the regional challenge strengthened the position of Sukarno and the PKI and also added to the prestige of the national armed forces under Nasution. The regional failure meant further loss of support for Hatta 1n h1s efforts to salvage parliamentary democracy. He was forced to move further towards the position he had occupied In the colonial period, a man building up opposition to the government 1n the shadows. As 1n the 1930s, his task was made difficult by the secret agents assigned to surveillance of h1s activities. In 1959 Hatta Intensified h1s role as political educator, concentrating especially on university students and army officers undergoing training. He did not Incite them to violence against Sukarno, Insisting that "there 1s no aim to replace Bung Karno because he Is a chosen person."70 Instead Hatta attacked the prevailing standards of political behavior, and appealed to his audiences not to act as "goats," following the example set by their parents, but rather to "choose to be ’herdsmen’... putting aside ambitions for self-enrichment."7^- The Constituent Assembly, on which Hatta 1n December 1956 had pinned hopes of achieving constitutional reform, remained deadlocked over the contentious Issue of whether to give more recognition to Islam or to retain the Panca SZla 1n Its present form. The assembly was now expected to Incorporate Sukarno’s "guided democracy" Into Its formulations. When Hatta recalled this period 1n a speech he made 1n 1975, he was sharply critical of the "Islamic State group, whose voice was only 48%," therefore below the required two-th1rds majority,7^ for slowing up the deliberations, giving a more valid reason for the assembly’s dissolution. He commented: How much better 1t would have been 1f 1t had been more tolerant. Having earnestly struggled and been outvoted, it should not have continued but democratically accepted Its defeat and reached a consensus on the Panca S^Cia, which was the original basis of the State.73 Nasutlon was again urging a return to the 1945 Constitution. Sukarno, while agreeing that his konAzpAl could be accommodated within this Constitution, was now wary of Nasutlon, who had adopted threatening attitudes to civilian politicians while Sukarno was abroad. Nasutlon was undoubtedly ant1-Commun1st and the trend towards military takeovers 1n postcolonial nations was too well-defined to be Ignored. The dissolution of the elected Constituent Assembly and the reversion to the 1945 Constitution not only brought protests from the Masjuml but also demands for Hatta’s recall to the V1ce-Pres1dency, which 1t pointed out was an intrinsic part of that Constitution. Sukarno Ignored these; nor did Hatta have any Intention of again working directly with Sukarno. Hatta’s response to the dissolution of the Constituent Assembly was, nevertheless, surprisingly mild, although admittedly he was overseas at the time. He knew that he had included the principles of kedaoLatan Jiakyat 1n the 1945 Constitution. He was also no doubt relieved that the state philosophy remained the Panca StLa, which for Hatta was the basis of religious socialism and, 1n contrast with communism, was avowedly "the1st1c." 197

Hatta again castigated the Islamic leaders for their lack of social concern, accusing them of allowing the Communists to gain Influence among the people. As he pointed out: As far as a just and prosperous society 1s concerned, Islam does not differ from Marx. But Islam is unable to provide a defense against the magnetism of Marxism, which is in opposition to Islam, because at present Islamic education stresses dogma and religious duty rather than the community. Social work is limited to formal almsgiving.74 As the Communists regained confidence under Sukarno’s umbrella, Hatta increasingly became the target for abuse, directed through the media and in demonstrations. Now that he had to take Into consideration the safety of a wife and three children, he had to be ever more cautious. Halida, his youngest daughter, recalled that the first time that she realized that her father was an important political figure was when, as a small child, she observed him being mobbed by jeering Communist youths at the airport, his Buick repeatedly blocked on the journey home.73 On Proclamation Day 1959, Sukarno issued his regime’s political manifesto, like the Panca $>ILol based on five principles, which he referred to as Manipol-Usdek.7® In spite of protests, 1n particular from academics, allegiance to its principles became compulsory.77 Another matter of concern to Hatta was the announcement of a monetary purge, which vaguely resembled action taken in his own second prime ministership, except that Hatta’s measures had been aimed at the Dutch while the new initiatives hit the Indonesians. Hatta was contemptuous and dismissed the policy as ’’nonsense,” claiming that it would not overcome the huge budget deficit.7® Prime Minister Djuanda was nettled. He accused Hatta of being ’’very shallow and insolent,”7® claiming that his government’s measures were not as stupid as Hatta had intimated. Hatta’s response was terse: "Tuizedz n

pointing to his flagrant disregard for the Constitution and condemning h1s dissolution of the elected Constituent Assembly and parliament. Hatta gave as h1s opinion that democracy had been replaced by a dictatorship. He reminded h1s readers that dictatorships tended to be short-11ved, that when Sukarno disappeared from politics ”h1s system will collapse by itself like a house of cards” because of the low caliber of those in authority around him.84 Hatta compared Sukarno with Mephistopheles 1n Goethe’s FauAt, 1n that ’’Mephistopheles said that he was part of those powers that always want what is evil and yet always produce what is good.” According to Hatta, ’’Sukarno 1s the opposite of this. His objectives are always good but the steps that he takes often lead him away from those objectives.”88 But Hatta laid equal blame on the unprincipled and self-interested political elite who had been 1n government since independence. He pointed out that ’’Indonesian history over the last ten years seems to reflect the picture painted by Schiller,” quoting the German poet’s lines: The century has given birth to a momentous epoch, But the momentous epoch is met by little people.88 Sukarno’s reaction to the article was angry. From now on, Hatta would find 1t very difficult to publish within Indonesia. Even Plktsian Rakjdt, the newspaper consistently loyal to Hatta, was forced to stop publication of his articles in order to remain in circulation.87 The editor of the Muslim journal Pandji Mcuyasiakat, Hatta’s Minangkabau friend Hamka, who first published ”0ur Democracy,” was arrested and his journal banned. 1960 saw the forced closure of many newspapers, Including the PSI's Pzdoman. In August 1960, both Masjuml and the PSI, which had refused to participate 1n the Gctcng-Jiayong parliament, were banned on charges of being Involved in the PRRI/Permesta rebellion. For Hatta personally, this denial of a free press limited his scope for political criticism. He was forced to use personal correspondence as a means of protest and correction, from 1960 to 1965 criticizing Sukarno’s policies through private letters, including letters to h1s former partner.88 Hatta’s secluded villa at Megamendung from now on became a base from which to organize opposition to governments which violated the principles of kzdaulatan Kakyat. According to journalist Roslhan Anwar, a leading PSI member, Hatta suggested the formation of a Partai Daulat Rakyat which he hoped would be able to function 1n the open once Sukarno’s regime had collapsed. He envisaged that the new party would Include Islamic groups but have as an Ideological basis the Ponca S'CLa, with a stress on democracy.89 Hatta proposed that the party be built up by the formation of cells of four or five people, the methodology of the New PNI, aiming 1n particular at Muslim youth.98 Hatta was clearly trying to woo Muslims away from their preoccupation with doctrinal issues, 1n particular with the concept of an Islamic state, using the common ground of k&daoLatan nakyat and theism with an emphasis on social justice as the bonding material for struggle against autocratic government and atheistic communism. The year 1962 opened 1n an atmosphere of war tension, as on December 19, 1961 Sukarno had ordered mass mobilization for an Invasion of West Irian. On January 4, while seeking support for the struggle 1n Sulawesi, Sukarno was the target of another assassination attempt as a hand grenade was hurled at h1s car, but he escaped uninjured.91 Following this Incident, Sukarno suffered the humiliation of learning that two Indonesian 199

naval boats had been sunk by a Dutch frigate off Aru Island. His response was to arrest the strongest opponents of h1s policies. On January 16, 1962, Sjahrir and his close associate, Subadio, were detained on the orders of the Supreme War Command, of which Sukarno was head,92 although the order was signed by Nasution and the minister of foreign affairs, Subandrio, a politician now working very closely with Sukarno.^ Sjahrir and Subadio were joined in detention by Mohamad Roem, Anak Agung Gde Agung, and Sultan Hamid, along with several other prominent non-cooperators.94 Hatta was not detained, but an even closer surveillance was maintained on his movements, including strict measures to prevent him from having direct communication with the detainees. Hatta was an old hand at circumventing prison regulations. Anak Agung’s wife, Vera, became his messenger, concealing Hatta’s communications in the hem of her skirt.95 Hatta was shocked and sickened by the arrest of his friends, and in particular of Sjahrir. As Des Alw1 had maintained: "No matter what their differences, there remained a very special bond between Hatta and Sjahrir which was never broken; they were closer than many people realized."96 Des Alwi had participated in the Permesta resistance in Sulawesi and was thus more involved in rebellion than his foster father. In a letter to Sukarno, Hatta pleaded for Sjahrirfs release, trying to restrain his comments to prevent further antagonism: I think that a sane person would condemn an act of terrorism such as took place in Makassar, and I am convinced that Sjahrir and other principled people would oppose any kind of terrorism in politics because it is contrary to socialism and humanity.... They would not hesitate to carry out determined opposition 1n politics, as they did in the time of the nationalist movement, but it would never enter their heads to participate 1n acts of terrorism.97 Sukarno ignored Hatta’s letter. When h1s associates suggested that he speak directly with Sukarno, Hatta was of the opinion that "it was not yet the right moment."98 He also warned that Nasution1s Influence over Sukarno was waning, as evidenced by Sukarno’s deliberate attempts to bring Javanese generals to the fore, that "the President was emerging as the one with the most power, as an all-out dictator."99 Sjahrir had always been more adversely affected by isolation than Hatta. This time the consequences were grave. In November 1962, he suffered a stroke, necessitating his removal from Madiun jail to Jakarta’s main hospital. Through the cooperation of friends among the medical staff, Hatta managed to be included 1n a routine visit to Sjahrir’s room, but his surreptitious visit did not go undetected. On December 11, an order was issued that Sjahrir be transferred to a military hospital. Thestrain was also taking its toll onHatta; hesuffered a stroke himselfsix months later.This time Sjahrir tried tovisit his friend. "I am really loath to ask the government for any concessions," he admitted to his wife Poppy, "but because Hatta is acutely ill and we do not know what will happen tomorrow, I want to ask permission to see him a while. Poppy begged the attorney-general to convey Sjahrir’s request to Sukarno, stressing that "this 1s not a matter of politics but of humanity; Sjahrir and Hatta have been fellow strugglers since colonial times." When Hatta was outof danger and stillno permission tovisit himhad been received, Sjahrirsuggested that hiswife cancel therequest."I was not asking 200

for a social call,” he remarked bitterly, "but when Hatta’s condition was acute and causing concern, then I wanted very much to see him again.”101 They were never to have a reunion. Instead Sukarno himself visited Hatta 1n hospital, Insisting that he be sent to Sweden for treatment at state expense, accompanied by h1s personal doctor, Professor Mahar Mardjono. Hatta1s secretary noticed the look of compassion on Sukarno’s face when Hatta climbed weakly from his car to visit Sukarno at the Palace before h1s departure. Sukarno’s parting words were: ’’Wangsa, look after Bung Hatta well!”102 Before Hatta’s departure for Sweden, Sukarno relaxed the ban on h1s speeches, allowing him to make a radio address on August 25 to celebrate the eighteenth anniversary of the proclamation of Independence. Hatta’s speech called for a proper Implementation of the Panca Slla, the Indonesian HenaLd commenting that, 1n spite of their differences, ”Dr. Hatta has always stood by President Sukarno as a staunch exponent and defender of Pan£/asHa."10* But Hatta was not just supporting Sukarno, he was recalling the colonial period and the Japanese Occupation when ’’many freedom fighters languished In jail.” Without drawing direct parallels with the present time, he also pointed to the ’’determination of the youth and people to struggle to defend Free Indonesia with the motto ’once Free, always Free.”,l04 He begged the youth not to use the Panca Slla ’’for Up service only,” continuing: "Belief In God" does not just mean respecting each person’s religion but 1s a basis which leads towards truth, justice, goodness, honesty, and brotherhood. According to this basis... the nation’s government must not deviate from the straight path towards the people’s well-being and the security of the community, peace and national brotherhood.... Hopefully these alms will come alive In the spirit of young people today and 1n the future so that they can truly carry out their historical duties to the archipelago and the nation.100 Dr. Mardjono observed that Hatta’s health Improved amazingly 1n Europe once Indonesia’s tense and stressful atmosphere was left behind.106 From Sweden, they moved on to West Germany and the Netherlands.In Holland Hatta’s reception was unusually warm. He was no longer viewed as a traitor but as someone who had had the courage to stand up to Sukarno. It was a strange situation for Hatta, but Dr. Mardjono noticed that he gained Immense personal satisfaction from being hailed as a defender of democracy.10? Hatta nevertheless was careful not to condemn Sukarno publicly when abroad. When studying at the University of California’s Berkeley campus, economics student Emil Salim, later a government minister, recorded how Hatta responded to a question concerning Sukarno when he was addressing a meeting 1n 1960: In many matters I disagree with Bung Karno but he 1s the President of the Republic of Indonesia, the country for whose Independence I struggled for years.... Right or wrong, he 1s my President.100 On any of h1s trips abroad, Hatta went out of h1s way to maintain contacts with Indonesian students. They were the people he must fire with h1s Ideals while they were living 1n a free society, just as the Perhlmpunan Indonesia had awakened under the Influence of veteran nationalists like Dr. Tjlpto Mangunkusumo and Douwes Dekker. The University of 201

California’s Berkeley campus had become the new training ground for many of Indonesia’s future economists# replacing Rotterdam. Having helped to defuse the West Irian question# the Americans were pressing Sukarno to concentrate on Indonesia’s economic problems. Sukarno’s national planning council# chaired by Muhammad Yamln# had produced an Eight Year Overall Plan with a strong nationalist orientation.l®9 The plan, in theory# Incorporated many of Hatta’s Ideas and suggestions, while Sukarno’s supportive slogan of "Bz'uU.kasU" IB&wUsU ata4 Kakl SzndiKi— Stand on your own feet] was a reiteration of Hatta’s theme of autoactivity. Hatta had set out details of how a village unit could be self-supporting# and his ideas seemed to have been enlarged to national proportions 1n Yamin’s plan.HO At the national level# the problem was how to finance development projects when most of the nation’s resources# including foreign aid, were being used to purchase military equipment or to erect ostentatious national buildings and monuments. In 1964# the economic situation was so critical 1n Indonesia that Sukarno sought Hatta’s help. This immediately raised speculation that Hatta might at least be appointed a deputy prime minister#!!!, which brought angry rebuttals from both the PKI and the Partai Murba# especially the latter’s leaders, Chaerul Saleh and Adam Malik. Hatta scotched the rumors, making it clear that he would act as an adviser only. ”Our State is not a legal state# so it is very difficult for me to occupy an official office, although I will be an unofficial adviser.”!!2 Perhaps because of Sukarno’s softened attitude to him# Hatta was permitted to return to Sumatra in 1964# the first time since the eruption of the PRRI revolt in 1958. Hatta deplored the deterioration in services and infrastructure in Sumatra. ’’Transportation by land, sea and air at that time was terrible,” he recalled many years later, ’’the state budget was spent on politics and glory.”!!3 In spite of his age and Indifferent health# Hatta was determined to travel by jeep from Medan to Bukit Tinggi, noting that the road was ’’indeed appalling,” one twenty-four kilometer stretch taking five hours to traverse. In interviews with h1s own people# Hatta recorded that there were complaints that ’’although many new mosques had been built in West Sumatra, nevertheless the whole situation in the Minangkabau was dominated by the PKI.”114 Even the red and white flags brought out to greet Hatta had been confiscated. In spite of his refusal to join the rebels# Hatta was still popular. His parting words to his people were to be patient and to prepare themselves for whatever possibili- ties the future had to offer.115 The year 1965 opened 1n an atmosphere of gathering crisis# related not merely to Sukarno’s new campaign to ’’Crush Malaysia.” Just as in early 1945# Indonesian society was in turmoil, seeking an outlet for pent-up emotions and Inner hostilities. Sukarno leaned even more heavily to the side of the PKI# as 1f aware that the military were closing in on him. The PKI had succeeded in gaining entry to a new ’’Nasakom” cabinet which Sukarno had established in spite of Army protests.116 Since 1963# Aidit had been trying to give his party a more nationalist image# claiming that the PKI rejected ’’the baton of any other Communist party#”!!7 as responding to Hatta’s accusations that the party was dominated by the Soviet Union. At Megamendung, discussions continued on Indonesia’s political future. Hatta considered that three main parties would be sufficients an Islam-Panca S^Cia group# a Nationalist party# and the Communists.!!® Although Hatta disliked the Communists, he still believed that they played an 202

important role as an opposition group. Hattafs colleagues noticed that Hatta did not include a military party, an indication that he was still holding to his principle of the army serving the state rather than governing it. When asked his opinion about "the military groups who now play a major role in our national life,11 Hatta answered that it would be best to return to the original idea of a militia-type army. "But can that be done remembering the number of vested interests in the armed forces?" queried his colleagues. Hatta was optimistic, mentioning the names of several officers whom he considered to be still uncorrupted. Not only had Sukarno weakened Nasution’s power by his appointment as chief of armed services, but he was promoting another Javanese general, Suharto, by appointing him head of a new Army Strategic Reserve Command [Komando Cadangan Strategls Angkatan Darat—Kostrad], an appointment which was to have great significance both for Indonesia and for Sukarno himself, in that he had unwittingly promoted his own successor. Sukarno also began to bestow on his top civilian advisers, such as Subandrio, military ranks, giving a military look to government which was to continue into the future. In April 1965, Sukarno organized a Bandung Conference Reunion, the main guest being Chou En-lai. Aidit, now turning to China for guidance rather than to the Soviet Union, sought the Chinese premier’s advice. In spite of the PKI’s considerable following in Indonesia, the Communists lacked fire-power. The party’s infiltration into the armed forces was insufficient to ensure victory in a showdown with Generals Nasution and Yani. In discussion with Sukarno, Chou En-lai suggested the formation of a "Fifth Force," a people’s army of peasants and workers, offering to supply arms.120 Hatta tried to obtain an interview with Chou En-lai but was not permitted access to him.121 "Fortunately the Fifth Force was never formed," Hatta commented in later years, "But Aidit’s efforts to seize power were accelerated from the beginning of 1965.”122 Rumors had been rife since February that there was a top army leadership plan to oust Sukarno. The atmosphere grew more heated when Sukarno publicly revealed the contents of a telegram allegedly sent by the British ambassador in Jakarta hinting that an army plot was afoot. Yet Hatta was of the opinion that, in the event of a showdown between the army and the PKI, "if the PKI had really won, Sukarno would have been eliminated."12^ On May 26, Sukarno convened a conference of military leaders, including Nasution and Yani, and informed them that the military forces must adopt Nasakom and be prepared to have political commissars to "nasakomize" their servicemen. Sukarno’s directive was received coolly, the army leaders being particularly hostile when on May 31 Sukarno requested the four armed services to assist 1n the establishment of a militia, a "fifth force." Only Air Marshal Omar Dhani offered to conduct citizen training. Hatta recalled that he advised Yani to pay close attention to what was happening, commenting: "I saw that the army was the only force capable of facing up to the PKI."I24 Hatta seemed to have made a choice. If totalitarianism were unavoidable, he preferred the Indonesian army to be at the helm. He had a long-standing special relationship with prominent officers, especially those from the Sillwangl Division in West Java, and many "cadres" among the army command from h1s association with the Staff College at Bandung. Life was particularly insecure for Hatta in 1965 as the PKI sought out targets for condemnation and attack. Sukarno did not fully support PKI assaults on Hatta, and reacted strongly when the party cited Sukarno 203

as the sole proclamator of independence. Guntur recalled his father’s anger. ”1 myself am sometimes fed up with Hatta’s policies,” Sukarno admitted# ’’Hatta and I sometimes bug each other! But omitting Hatta from the Proclamation Text... that is the action of a coward|«125 jh© bonds of comradeship may have been frayed but were not completely severed. In July 1965# Sukarno gave permission for Sjahrir to be flown to Zurich for medical treatment as he had suffered a second stroke in January which had robbed him of his speech. No sooner had Sjahrir left than Sukarno himself became seriously ill, a team of Chinese doctors warning that his condition was grave. This medical bulletin seemed to bring to a head PKI-army confrontation. Sukarno recovered sufficiently to deliver his proclamation day speech on August 17# warning against military leaders who regard themselves as ’’directors of the Republ ic."126 with an obvious dig at Nasution, he declared: !,Even though a man was a brave general in 1945# if he now starts to destroy revolutionary national unity# to stir up trouble in the Nasakom front# and to oppose the principles of the revolution, he is nothing but a champion of reaction.’’i27 On the night of September 30# 1965# the PKI-army showdown took place, an event referred to 1n later years as Gestapu [Gzsiakan SzptmbZK T<,ga P&Luk—the September 30 Movement]. The coup aimed to annihilate those army leaders who had most resisted Sukarno’s ’’nasakomlzation” program# especially the council of generals suspected of plotting to overthrow Sukarno# including Nasution and Yani. Hatta was in Ball at the time of Gestapu# having been advised to holiday there for health reasons#^2® perhaps an indication that those who suspected that a coup was imminent were concerned for his safety. He recalled that ”1 heard the first news about the kidnapping and murder of the leadership of the Army from Slmatupang on the morning of October 1st 1965,” adding: ’’Further reports revealed that Nasution, after having left his hiding-place# went straight to Kostrad. He found that Suharto had already taken action.’’l2^ The coup was to bring the Javanese General Suharto to the fore, forcing Nasution into second place. How deeply Sukarno was Involved in Gestapu has never been fully explained. Certainly Hatta considered that Sukarno was culpable, stating: "I presumed that the happening was at least carried out with the knowledge of Bung Karno# that very probably he was even backing it.” Hatta added firmly: ’’Without Bung Karno’s consent# I do not think all this would have possibly happened.ffl30 It was a strong judgment# for the aftermath of the Gestapu coup produced one of the most horrific and murderous episodes in Indonesia’s history. Anti-PKI action became the release valve for years of bottled- up resentment and incitement to revolutionary action. In 1945 the targets had been the foreigners: the Japanese# the British# and the Dutch. In 1965# 1t was brother against brother. By the end of 1965# the rivers of Indonesia were literally running with blood. Hatta admitted in retrospect# although cautiously# that ’’from the Moslems# the reaction was very strong, especially from those who at that time felt the worst pressure#” that Nahdatul Ulama leaders were prepared to ’’take revenge by killing at least ten PKI people for every Moslem scholar they had killed.”131 Hatta could not conceal his repugnance for this kind of Islamic justice, especially from an Islamic group which had 204

been prepared to work alongside the Communists for the sake of retaining Sukarno’s patronage.132 From the PKI point of view, Hatta assessed that "the actions of the people who were under pressure and who afterwards took revenge showed that A1d1t had miscalculated.” He considered that Aidlt’s campaign was "based on the mobilization of masses of people, accompanied by agitation and mental terror, so that people went along for their own safety.” In Hatta’s opinion, A1d1t had not paid enough attention to "factors of education.” Hatta could not refrain from correcting Aidlt’s methodology as If presenting a lesson for all socialists to learn. "Cadres who truly understood and who were really convinced should have been built up first, until they had reached an adequate number to give support to the mobilized masses.”133 The PKI had used methods espoused by Sukarno and the Japanese Propaganda Department, methods which Hatta had denounced nearly forty years earlier. When 1n March 1967, Sukarno was finally replaced by Suharto, Hatta was free to attack the man who had perhaps done most to destroy h1s democratic Ideal and his career. Hatta had already censured Sukarno at Sjahrir’s funeral 1n April 1966, following h1s death 1n Zurich at the age of 57 years. Hatta’s graveside address included a bitter condemnation of the persecutors of h1s former associate: Sutan Sjahrir, who carried 1n h1s heart great alms, led a life of continual struggle, suffering and sacrifice for them. He died without achieving them. He struggled for a free Indonesia, endured exile for a free Indonesia, participated 1n building a free Indonesia, but he became 111 and died 1n detention 1n the free Republic of Indonesia. Isn’t that a tragedy? Sutan Sjahrlr suffered more within the Republic of Indonesia Itself, which is based on the Panca SZla, than 1n the colonial Dutch Indies, which he opposed. Sjahrir is now burled 1n a state ceremony. Is this not a sign that the Government acknowledges the mistake 1t made 1n the past 1n regard to Sjahrir? If this 1s true, then all those who were arrested at the same time as Sjahrir should be released, those others who were arrested on a mere rumor. Hopefully justice will prevail.13* Hatta concluded on a note of personal farewell: My brother Sutan Sjahrir, up till now we have accompanied you on your last journey.... Rest in peace.133

1.Mohammad Hatta, "Fifty Years of the National Movement,” PZkZ^an Rak/at, May 19, 1958.
2.See Felth, VzcJU.ru. cr& CanAtctu- tlonal Vmacsiacy, p. 523.
3.See 1b1d., p. 527.
4.Ibid.
5.Nasutlon’s strategy was to undermine Slmbolon’s position 1n North Sumatra by appointing to h1s command officers of different ethnic and religious persuasion. In the case of Huseln, because of the homogeneity of the Mlnangkabau 205

region and the high level of support for the Dewan Banteng, Nasutlon could only employ persuasion and negotiation.

6.See Hanlon Rak/at, January 5*
1957.
7.See 1bId., December 3, 1956.
8.Veuuan National (Jakarta, 1957),
p. 25.
9.Mohammad Hatta, "Assessing Bung Karnofs Konteptl," Indonesia Raya, March 5, 1957.
10.The National Council was to be a purely advisory body made up of representatives of the various streams and functional groups 1n Indonesia. The chiefs of the armed forces together with ministers would also be Included. It was expected that membership would be nominated.
11.Mohammad Hatta, "Demokrasl Terplmpln atau Menyehatkan Demokrasl," Plklnan Rakjat, September 2, 1957.
12.Ibid.
13.Ibid.
14.Ibid.
15.See Jhaver1, Pnetldency In Indonesia, p. 246.
16.Mohammad Hatta, "Pembentukan Kablnet dan Konst1tus1," Plklnan Rakjat, April 17, 1957.
17.Mohammad Hatta, "Menlndjau Sumatera-Tengah," Plklnan Rakjat, June 3, 1957.
18.Ibid.
19.See Hanlon Rakjat, July 1, 1957.
20.Hatta, "Menlndjau Sumatera-Tengah."
21.As cited 1n Plklnan Rakjat, June 27, 1957.
22.See Hanlon Rokjat, May 29, 1957.
23.See Plklnan Rakjat, June 27,
1957.
24.See 1bId.
25.Mohammad Hatta, "Demokrasl dan Otonoml," Plklnan Rakjat, April 29,
1957.
26.Ibid.
27.Cited In Daniel S. Lev, The Tnantltlon to Guided Vemocnacy: IndonzAlan Politic4 1957-1959 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966), p. 55.
28.According to Tauflk Abdullah, "Modernization 1n the Mlnangkabau World," p. 197, within the naganl, the village coffee house was nick- named the halal nzndak [lower council] as It was a meeting place for airing criticism of the ruling pzngkulu and did exert Influence on decision making.
29.Mohammad Hatta, "Tanggung Jawab Morll Kaum Intel 1gens1a," In Bung

36.See Pedoman, October 4, 1957.
37.Plklran Rakjat, October 19#
1957. Hatta may have been trying to Indicate that he was not an American ”d/aga” but a neutral In bipolar pol1t1cs.
38.Mohammad Hatta, "Pembangunan RRT,” Plklran Rakjat, November 20 and 21, 1957.
39.Mohammad Hatta, f?Masalah Pembangunan dal am RepubHk Rakjat T1ong- kok," Plklran Rakjat, December 23 and 24, 1957.
40.The economic study group evolved from the National Conference.
41.As cited In Plklran Rakjat, December 5, 1957. Colonel Lubls was believed to be 1n hiding 1n the Jakarta area. He had been evading detention since h1s attempted coup against Nasutlon 1n October 1956.
42.The captains of KPM ships on the seas were Instructed to take their vessels to non-Indonesian ports. Interlsland shipping lost 78 percent of Its tonnage. See Feith, Decline o& Constitutional Democracy, pp. 584-85.
43.Harvey, PermeAta: Hal£ a Rebellion, p. 86.
44.See "Rlwayat Slngkat Bung Hatta,” In Membangun Kooperasl dan Kooperasl Membangun, A Collection of Essays by Dr. Mohammad Hatta (Jakarta: Pusat Kooperasl Pegawal Negerl, 1971), p. xxxxv11.
45.Hatta, Bung Hatta* 4 Answers, p.
40.
46.James Mossman, Rebel4 In Paradise (London: Cape, 1961), p. 65.
47.Ibid.
48.Interview with M. Natslr, February 6, 1983.
49.According to Mossman: ”It Is no secret that Britain and the United States keep 1n touch with the rebels. The British do so through agencies 1n Singapore and Malaya and the Americans through Formosa and Manila.” See Mossman, Rebel* In Paradise, p. 230.
50.See David Wise and T. B. Ross, The Invisible Government, 3rd ed. (New York: Random House, 1964), pp. 139-43.
51.Harlan Rakjat, March 14, 1958.
52.Mossman states that ”the argument used 1s that If Java should ever become Communist, 1t might be necessary to encourage the secession of Sumatra and the other main Islands.” See Rebels In Paradise,
p. 230. This was Secretary of State Dullest policy. Mossman also cited the opinion of the old-guard Sultan of Dell, who claimed

60.Hatta, Bung Hatta4 An4ujz^u, p.
40.
61.See PZk&ian Rakjat, March 4 and 5, 1958.
62.Nasutlon was of the opinion that the type of government which Hatta was defending was suitable for a homogeneous society like Great Britain but not for Indonesia. Interview with A. H. Nasutlon, February 22, 1982.
63.See Mossman, Rzbzl In PaAadl4z,
p. 102. The first government attack was a drop of 700 paratroopers over the Caltex oil depot at Pekan Baru 1n Central Sumatra, a strategic drop as 1t was also the site of a rebel arsenal.
64.Interview with M. Roem, February 5, 1983.
65.Hatta, Bung Hatta4 An4wtA4, p.
42.
66.Hatta, "Indonesia between the Power Blocs,” In PoKtiatt a£ a Patriot, p. 563.
67.PltUKanRakj'at, November 1, 1957.
68.As cited 1n Hanlan Rakjat, September 29, 1958. The remark was attributed to Drs. A. S1g1t.
69.Hatta, "Indonesia between the Power Blocs,” p. 564.
70.PtklKanRakjat, February 7, 1959.
71.Ibid.
72.Mohammad Hatta, Mznuju Nzgana Hukum (Jakarta: Yayasan Idayu, 1975),
p. 15.
73.Ibid.
74.PlktAan Rakjat, May 14, 1959.
75.See Halida Nurlah Hatta, "Mengenang Ayahanda," in Bung Hatta: Psuhadcnya dalam Ktnangan,
p. 84.
76.U-ilndang-undang VaAan. 1945, S = Sa4tatt4im Indawula, D = Vmo- fwaAl Tj&iptmptn, E = Ekanomt Te- ptmpln, K = Ktp>uhadlan Indonesia.
77.Many academics, Including Hatta, opposed Sukarno’s Manlpol-Usdek, and 1n 1963 tried to promul- gate their own cultural manifesto. Those who refused to accept Sukarno’s manifesto were denied teaching positions.
78.Rp. 500 and Rp. 1,000 notes were reduced to 10 percent of their face value and bank deposits over Rp. 25,000 were frozen.
79.See P£JU*an Rakfat, October 9,
1959.
80.See R1nto Alwi, "Bung Hatta, Pemimpin yang Berkarakter,” p. 392.
81.Ikatan Pendukung Kemerdekaan Indonesia [League of Upholders of Indonesian Independence].
82.See PtktMan Rak/at, June7, 1960.
83.Ibid., May 2, 1960.

90.Ibid., p. 160.
91.It was suspected that the culprits were followers of the fanatical Darul Islam supporter, Kahar Muzakar.
92.The charge was that they were involved 1n the assassination attempt on Sukarno’s life in South Sulawesi.
93.In Subadio’s opinion, Sukarno and Nasution were most to blame for the trumped-up charge against himself and Sjahrir. (Interview, Subadio Sastrosatomo, February 22,
1982.) Sol Tas believed that Subandrio had had a grudge against Sjahrir because of the latter’s off-hand treatment of him. (See Tas, ’’Souvenirs of Sjahrir,” p.
151.) Nasution claimed that he had no alternative but to sign the detention order as there was a signed document Implicating Sjahrir in the attempt on Sukarno’s life, although this accusation was later proved to be false. (Interview, A.
H. Nasution, February 22, 1982.) Nyonya Sjahrir states with absolute conviction that Sjahrir was not involved in any assassination attempt on Sukarno’s life. (Interview, February 1982.)
94.Anak Agung had been holding the traditional Bal inese funeral ceremony for his father, to which he had invited close friends such as Mohamad Roem, Hatta, and the recently released Sultan Hamid. Sukarno may have suspected that the funeral ceremony was used as a trystlng place for those plotting his overthrow.
95.See Anak Agung Gde Agung, ’’Bung Hatta jang Saja Kenal,” 1n Bung Hatta M&ngatKU pada Tjlta-Tjlta, pp. 72-73.
96.Interview Des Alw1, February 6,
1982.
97.As cited in Ny. Siti Wahjunah Sjahrir, ’’Bung Hatta: Beberapa Catatan,” in Bung Hatta: Pnlbadlnya dalam Kznangan, p. 480.
98.Rosihan Anwar, Sehelum psiakana,
p. 159.
99.Ibid., p. 160. Nasution had been relieved of his post of chief of army staff and made chief of armed services. His place was taken by General Yani, a Central Javanese.
100.Ny. Siti Wahjunah Sjahrir, ’’Bung Hatta: Beberapa Catatan,” p.
481.
101.Ibid.
102.I. Wangsa Widjaja, ’’Mengenang Bung Karno,” in Bung Kamo dalam Kenangan, ed. Sol ichim Salam, p. 115.
103.See Indonesian Hz^ald, August

date with 17 volumes, 8 parts and 1945 clauses. See Herbert Feith, "Dynamics of Guided Democracy,” in Indonesia, ed. Ruth T. McVey (New Haven, Yale University, 1963), p.

384.
110.For further details of Hatta’s plans, see M. Hatta, "Autonomi dan Auto-Aktivitet,” Pikiean Rak/at, May 14, 1957.
111.See Rosihan Anwar, Sebelum PsiakaA.a, p. 449. Djuanda, who had died in office, had been replaced as first minister by a triumvirate of Subandrio, Chaerul Saleh, and Dr. Leimena.
112.Ibid., p. 416.
113.Hatta, Bung Hatta'4 Answers,
p. 39.
114.Ibid.
115.See Deliar Noer, "Bung Hatta yang Taqwa,” in Bung Hatta: Ptiiba- dinya dalam Kenangan, p. 620.
116."Nasakom" represented Nationalism, Religion (Agama), and Communism. Hatta later wrote that "Sukarno had meant well in creating Nasakom, its purpose being to eliminate the system of ’free fight democracy’ and replace it with mutual cooperation between the four most influential groups in the community: the nationalists, religious groups, communists and functional groups." See M. Hatta, "Panca Sila Jalan Lurus,” in Bung Hatta Be*- pidato, Bung Hatta Menulie, p. 102.
117.See Arnold C. Brackman, Inda- nesia: The Gestapu Ai^alK (New York: Amerlcan-Asian Education Exchange,
1969), p. 13. In January 1965, Sukarno yielded to PKI demands and banned the Partai Murba, although not insisting on its disbandment until September. The Partai Murba had tried to woo Sukarno away from the PKI in August 1964 by founding a Body for the Promotion of Sukar- noism.
118.Rosihan Anwar, Sebelum PtiahcJia,
p. 415.
119.Ibid. According to Nasution, "Our Constitution, our State philosophy, the Panca Sila, and the direction of Manlpol-Usdek give sufficient guarantee that we are not heading towards militarism." See Vuta Masjatiakat, September 29,
1962.
120.See Harold Crouch, The Amy and Politics in Indonesia (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press,
1978), pp. 89-90; B. Dahm, Histoey ob Indonesia in the Twentieth Centuny (London: Pall Mall Press,
1971), p. 224; and A. C. A. Dake,

132,According to Minister of Religion Wahlb Wahab, '’cooperation between the three groups—Islamic, Nationalist, and Communist—had been going on since the beginning and did not pose any problem.” Hanlon Rakjat, August 19, 1960.

133.Hatta, Bung Hatla’* AnMuznt,
p. 50.
134.As cited 1n Leon Salim, Bung Sjaknln: Pahlawan National (Medan: Masadepan, 1966), pp. 62-63.
135.Ibid., p. 63. 211

CHAPTER THIRTEEN THE UNACHIEVED FREEDOM Hopefully the spirit o& the Panca Slla which Is aJUve again and seethes In the, hearts o£ the Indonesian people, can restore the political movement o& the Indonesian nation to a straight course towards Implementation o& the alms o£ the Indonesian Revolution, which were Ignored by the Proclamation o^ August 17, 1945. Young Indonesians, both now and In the future, must be aware o£ their obligations to understand In as great depth as possible the basis o& the nation so that they can truly ^ul^UUL their historical task to their homeland A As one of the few civilian leaders with sufficient prestige to challenge the military’s assumption of power, Hatta 1n 1966 expressed h1s willingness to stand as President for a limited period.2 H1s offer was Ignored, proof that the downfall of Sukarno symbolized the passing of the 1928 Generation and that the political ambitions of the military, which had been present since the Revolution, had been fulfilled. Yet the offer did Indicate that Hatta never Intended to retire permanently from government. For Hatta, a return to the apex of power would not only have presented him with an opportunity to try to restore creditability to civilian government but, Indirectly, would have enabled him to prove himself as a leader 1n h1s own right without Sukarno. Hatta had lived with recriminations that he had failed Indonesia by refusing to accept a position in Sukarno’s regime, being categorized as an academic who preferred to formulate and criticize policies rather than exert Influence within government. Although his forebodings on the dire consequences of unlawful government had been vindicated, he still had to face up to murmurlngs that h1s country had been sacrificed for h1s moral purity.3 Hatta reiterated that he could not have restrained Sukarno: ”In the ’guided democracy’ system, everything was decided by President Sukarno himself. He was the dictator above the name ’guided democracy’; dissent was not all owed.”4 A second option open to Hatta was to return to government as a party leader. The civilian forces clamoring most forcefully for a genuine democracy were Modernist Muslim students and academics. Hatta was close enough to the ex-Masjum1 leaders to harness this Modernist dynamism. While he had admitted the need to make use of the ardor of Muslim youth at the clandestine gatherings at h1s villa 1n Megamendung 1n 1962, Hatta had not specifically advocated forming an Islamic party. The overriding consideration for Hatta now was the Institution of a party prepared to continue the struggle for social democracy. 1966 was a year when socialism was in disrepute. Although several former PSI members were accepted Into positions of influence 1n the New Order because of their*expertise, such as the economist Sumitro, neither the PSI nor Masjuml, the two main exponents of parliamentary democracy, was permitted to re-form. For the Modernists, who had been so supportive of the military action against 212

Sukarno and the PKI# this rejection came as a blow. As a sop# the Suharto government conceded that an alternative Islamic party could be established. Hatta must have realized that# 1f the PSI were debarred from politics, a party with similar roots and overtly advocating parliamentary democracy and social reform such as the proposed Partai Daulat Rakyat would never gain acceptance. The New Order# following Sukarno1s example# preferred to appoint the majority of representatives to the MPR and would also screen future election candidates for the DPR. A party drawing attention to kzdLaulatan rakyat would have appeared hopelessly utopian, almost verging on the anarchical# 1n the prevailing political climate. Hatta now hoped to blend Modernists and displaced socialists, presumably including former Communists# into a Partai Demokrasl Islam Indonesia. When Introducing his new party, he claimed that it would correct inadequacies in past Islamic parties, stating: In the past# people often used Islam as a "name'1 only. The Indonesian Islamic Democratic Movement seeks to practice what it preaches about the welfare of society. The basis of "Belief 1n God" will be Implemented# along with religious duties, within the framework of the Panca Stia... .5 Hatta*s task from now on would be to convince his supporters that the Panca StLa was the most appropriate ideology for Indonesia# particularly as, not only was it associated with Sukarno and the PKI# but it had been adopted as the principal maxim of the New Order. Hatta discovered that h1s new party was causing Muslim disquiet. "Some people say that the newly created Partai Demokrasl Islam Indonesia is not an Islamic party but a Panca Stia party," Hatta admitted. He queried with barely concealed irritation: "Can the basis of fBelief in God,1 which permeates the whole Panca Stia, not be put into practice according to Islamic concepts?" He accused his fellow Muslims of Inflexi- bility# questioning: "If Protestant and Catholic churches can accept the Panca Slla according to their religious tenets, why canft Muslims?" Hatta defended the new party from accusations that sufficient Islamic parties were already in existence. He stressed that the party would be different from other Islamic parties because it would be based on "socialism which is sanctioned by God," a party for "Islamic youth of the 1966 Generation. Certainly the party platform gave as much weight to socialism as to Islam. The first aim of the Partai Demokrasl Islam Indonesia was to implement "Indonesian Socialism#"7 an Indication that Sukarno’s "Socialism A la Indonesia" was perfectly acceptable 1f practiced correctly. The role of Islam in character training was acknowledged but coupled with Hatta’s usual stress on political education. Hatta still Intended to use the cell system# and urged party branches to establish Islamic Political Education Clubs "to teach prospective members the aims of the party and to educate party cadres."8 In launching a new party so similar 1n aims and format to the New PNI# Hatta was treading a tightrope. He was using a strategy which had split asunder Sarikat Islam in the past# although to Hatta his brand of socialism was eminently compatible with Islam because 1t was not atheistic. Hatta recognized that Indonesia needed a socialist party in order to keep in focus the dire needs of the masses. Certainly the events of 1966 were hardly conducive to attracting ex-PKI members to an Islamic party. 213

Members of Ansor, the youth wing of Nahdatul Ulama, had played a very active part In purging suspected Communists and settling old scores. Hatta contended that Marx "never clarified socialism positively," that 1t was ”h1s disciples who gave it positive form by converting Marx’s theories Into an 1sm, creating an atheistic Marxism."9 He reiterated the statement he had made 1n 1938: "Marx stressed that he was not a Marxist." To satisfy the Muslims, Hatta was attacking Marxism; to appeal to the left-wing, Hatta was exonerating Marx. "Marxism 1s socialism which 1s Anti-God,” he affirmed.10 Yet in mentioning Marx even so delicately, Hatta was in danger of creating doubts in the minds of h1s Islamic following. Marx and Islam were uneasy bedfellows and Hatta and the New PNI were often perceived 1n the past to have had a Marxist slant. In 1962, Hatta had accorded the PKI the democratic right to remain 1n existence as a party drawing attention to misgovernment and corruption. In 1966, without fully supporting the Inhumane assault on the PKI, Hatta alleged that the party had sealed its own doom. "By its brutal action in trying to seize power, which was by the grace of God foiled by the Army, the PKI revived Its fierce opponents."11 Hatta did not, 1n 1966, speak out hotly against the arbitrary slaughter of thousands of Indonesians who had followed the PKI, a party openly advocating social revolution. As 1n Madiun, Hatta viewed the PKI coup as endangering Indonesia’s independence from foreign domination. As he commented 1n his introduction to the new Islamic Democratic party, there were fears whether "Indonesia would become a colony of Peking.nl2 Hatta always perceived communism as a type of social revolution which opposed futdcmuLatan siakyat. Certainly so ardent was the anti-Communist sentiment in 1966 that it would have been tantamount to political suicide for Hatta to defend the PKI’s democratic right to a continuing voice in politics. From late 1965 onwards, Indonesia entered an era of institutionalized anticommunism which far exceeded that of McCarthy’s era in the United States. Nor had Hatta any personal reason to defend the PKI. The New Order had dawned in an orgy of revenge. Hatta had suffered indignities, abuse, and harassment at Communist hands since the Second Congress of the League against Colonialism in 1928. He knew from the past, that whenever he took any initiative to promote his brand of socialism, the Communists did their best to undermine his esteem. Hatta carried too many PKI scars to endanger the delicate balance in his new party by defending the PKI’s right to exist. The New Order had an important redeeming feature for Hatta. Suharto had promised to make a determined assault on the economic chaos which he had inherited and had also adopted pmb.angunan as the watch cry for the future. Any dedication to economic betterment and nation building sounded sweet in Hatta’s ears. He had in the past commented that increased prosperity not only relieved poverty but engendered the conditions for a return to more liberal government. Suharto was not a charismatic leader like Sukarno, nor was his oratory more than mediocre. He appeared basically quiet and unassuming, presenting an image of affability in spite of the toughness of his regime. On the surface, he was more like Hatta than Sukarno, calm and self-contained. Suharto had distinct advantages which Hatta did not. He was Javanese and a generation younger; and supporting him was a formidable military machine. Hatta was aware that his age would prevent him from remaining a party leader for long. When writing about the Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia, he commented: "The prime task of a democratic leader is to look for his 214

replacement, and the quicker he is replaced the better.11*3 Although the statement applied to himself, it could also have been directed to Sukarno, a hint to him to step down gracefully. Hatta admitted that the new party would have a marathon task ahead of it, that "returning to a correct path will require moral courage."*4 Now that he was identifying openly with an Islamic party, Hatta used the concept of the "correct path" more frequently, as if returning to the thought world of the tcvukat, the Sufist way. In leading an Islamic party, Hatta seemed to be looking back to Batu Hampar, to the social inspiration he claimed to have attained from Syech Arsyad, stressing that social concern was an essential part of the Muslim’s religion. In view of the party’s social democratic flavor and its methodology, 1t was not really surprising that Suharto refused to sanction it. Islamic socialism combined with Leninist practices constituted a volatile mixture, presenting much too dangerous an opposition. Instead Suharto appointed a conservative Muhammadiyah leader to form a Partai Muslimin Indonesia. To ensure that the new Islamic party was relatively acquiescent, former Masjuml leaders were excluded from its leadership. Hatta bowed to J^okcul majZUAJt with his customary stoicism, concealing his disappointment and frustration from the public eye, admitting: "For me, there was nothing else but to accept the decision, and so the Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia never material 1zed.’’*5 Hatta later defended the proposed party, claiming that "it would have been a fresh and refreshing antidote to the extremely confused situation of the period.’’6 To him, a swing to the far right had always had associations with fascism, which he rejected on both humanitarian and socioeconomic grounds. But it was not just the Suharto regime with which he was disappointed, but also his fellow Muslims. In one of h1s last Interviews he commented: "One of the things to be taught to the Islamic communities is that they should apply the science of salt, which 1s felt but not seen, rather than the science of lipstick, which is seen but not felt."? Now that his brief courtship with a new-look Islamic party had ended, he would have to fight for hzdaulatan zakyat from the shadows rather than in the open. It was a situation with which he was all too familiar. On March 27, 1968, Suharto was sworn in as President for a five-year term, the office of Vice-President remaining vacant. In the same month, Hatta published a booklet entitled simply PzwUdUkan NcuUonal Indonesia, in which he recounted the history of the New PNI from Its inception to the present time, stressing that the party must continue to operate in some form until Its aims were achieved and contending that the "Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia had never been dissolved nor dissolved itself,"*8 in other words the groups which had espoused the New PNI’s aims had never ceased to struggle for them. Hatta admitted that he must surrender the struggle to present and future generations of socially concerned youth, optimistically predicting that "our children and grandchildren will fight for Free Indonesia with an organization and spirit which we have set alight."*9 He still urged the use of non-cooperation as a useful weapon, because 1t "encourages a responsible feeling 1n the breasts of young Indonesians, awakznZng tkz manhood In their bodies and showing them the way back to their own people." Hatta warned the younger generations that they must be "prepared to make sacrifices and not live 1n ease, trying seriously and with all their strength to create a new situation rather than cooperate like robots as 215

in the old system.If20 This was again an echo of his defense speech, his call to sons of the elite not to ape their parents* comfortable but subservient lifestyle. In spite of his assertion that he did not want to !lrehash the quarrels and conflicts of the past," Hatta was on the attack again, determined to warn future generations to be cautious of leaders like Sukarno: As a skilled speaker who became more spirited on hearing the claps and tumultuous responses of the people, he believed he was an actor who played a role on the podium, with the masses his audience. He did not teach them to be fellow strugglers, only to be followers. According to his ideals, only ant parity should pioneer the independence struggle, all others should trail behind. That one party should be his party; it would be he who would mobilize it, he who would lead it and he who would steer it.21 Hatta was back in spirit in the New PNI polemics of the thirties. Although he acknowledged that flSukarno, besides his faults, gave great service in developing a spirit of Indonesian freedom,” he refuted the claims of overseas writers that Sukarno engendered unity. According to Hatta, Indonesian unity was first nurtured by the Perhimpunan Indonesia in the Netherlands. This was a subtle way of claiming that he personally had done more for Indonesia's unity than Sukarno, and he wished Western writers could overcome their fascination for Sukarno and recognize the real situation. "Sukarno merely strengthened the existing aims with his sonorous voice," Hatta contended. In other words, Sukarno was the ptmbza Cparroter] of ideas already formulated by Hatta and others, rather than an original thinker. Hatta went even further, claiming that Sukarno actually endangered unity. "It was Sukarno who broke the aims of Indonesian unity when he deviated from the basis of the state with his policy of Nasakom." This, according to Hatta, had sparked off the PRRI and Permesta rebellions. "The civil war which ensued considerably damaged Indonesian unity and the aims of a just and prosperous Indonesia." Hatta allowed the resentment welling up inside him to erupt on the surface, accusing the former President: "Having participated in nation building, Sukarno destroyed it!"22 Hatta's indignation contained an element of pique, as if adding: he also destroyed my political career and my plans for Indonesia. Hatta lashed out at Sukarno's egomania, his desire to be the "center of everything." He denounced Sukarno's regime as being more dastardly than any of its predecessors, a very strong condemnation. "For a long time, Indonesia lived in the shade of feudalism, but Sukarno's neo-feudalism was more evil and more vicious," he contended. Hatta pointed out that most feudal rulers "understood their responsibilities as well as their rights," even though "those rights were almost unlimited." Hatta scornfully gibed: "the neo-feudal big shot, who has no tradition, only knows his rights, not his responsibil ites." He concluded hotly: "We do not want either feudalism or neo-feudal 1sm, we want Kzdaulatan Rakyat as created and propagated in the past by the Pendidlkan Naslonal Indonesia, which is now rooted in our Constitution. This we must defend!"2^ Recalling informal discussions with Hatta in 1968, Professor Kahin of Cornell University commented that "certainly he was disappointed because his hopes had not been realized." Kahin remarked that Hatta never lost his conviction that "Islam could play a progressive socio-economic role, which would present Indonesia with a superior social justice."24 Kahin 216

noticed Hattafs hurt. "I could sympathize with his disappointment and dejection at that time and in future discussions,” he said, "because the government had rejected his desire to establish and lead a political party to achieve these aims." Kahin personally deplored the situation, remarking: "The reality that one of the two people who had established a nation was not allowed an opportunity like that certainly constituted a tragedy in the history of that nation."25 Hatta managed to escape from the frustrations of Indonesia for six months in 1968 when he accepted an invitation from the University of Hawaii to be a Special Visitor to its East-West Center to allow him an opportunity to record his struggle for independence. His eldest daughter, Meutia, accompanied him, enrolling as a student in an anthropology degree course. On his return from Honolulu, Hatta received a firm offer of leadership of a party which was permitted to operate, the Partai Nasional Indonesia. The news first broke in the press on June 23, 1969. The response from Hatta’s secretary, Wangsa Widjaja, was that "Bung Hatta knows nothing about his nomination as chairman of the Partai Nasional Indonesia [PNI]" and that he was engaged in writing his memoirs. A press report alleged that "almost all the leaders of the PNI, old and new, support Hatta as chairman of PNI."26 Hatta did not accept the offer, whether on ideological grounds, for fear of endangering the party’s existence, or because of his past relationships with the party is unclear. The PNI had always been closer to Sukarno than Hatta. Nevertheless, for Hatta existence in the New Order was not as uncomfortable as for his fellow Proclamator. Sukarno, now condemned for Involvement in the Gestapu coup and stripped of h1s "Presidency for life," was confined within his Jakarta home, the only companionship permitted him being occasional family visitors. Like Sjahrir, Sukarno suffered greatly if cut off from social intercourse. H1s Isolation further aggravated his already serious health problems. Sukarno’s son, Guntur, recalled h1s own dilemma in 1970 when h1s father was not granted permission to attend h1s wedding in Bandung. To Guntur’s surprise, Sukarno suggested that he ask Hatta to deputize for him. Guntur was reluctant to approach Hatta, querying his father: "Are you sure that Pak Hatta will want to?"27 Sukarno knew Hatta. Hatta might attack and revile him for his policies and political behavior, but 1n their private lives, the bonds of comradeship forged in the independence struggle bound them like blood brothers. When Guntur’s mother telephoned Sukarno’s request to Hatta, the answer was spontaneous and in the affirma- tive. In June that year, Sukarno’s health deteriorated, and he had to be admitted to the military hospital. When 1t was evident that he was near death, Hatta applied for permission to visit him. Their last meeting took place on Friday, June 19. Hatta’s secretary, Wangsa Widjaja, who accompanied Hatta and h1s family to the hospital, recalled that Sukarno was comatose, Indeed Hatta wondered if he would regain consciousness. The once handsome face was swollen and moonshaped, disfigured by disease. Suddenly Sukarno’s eyes opened and he exclaimed in surprise: "Hatta, you’re here!"28 Meutia remembered that her father greeted Sukarno by the special affectionate shortening of his name: "Ah, how are you, No?" The reply came weakly 1n Dutch: "f/oe gaat hzt nutt /oa?"29 Hatta sat quietly holding Sukarno’s hand while the tears streamed down the dying man’s cheeks, his hand groping for his spectacles so that he could see Hatta 217

more clearly. Speech was too great an effort for Sukarno, so Hatta remained silent. Meutia recalled: "Although there was no further conversation 1t seemed as 1f they were speaking to each other with their hearts, as If the two of them were remembering their ups and downs 1n the struggle together 1n past years, 1n the period when they worked with one another, possibly asking each other for forgiveness."30 Hatta had difficulty In disengaging h1s hand when finally 1t was time to leave. Sukarno died two days later. Although forced to accept the constraints Imposed by the new regime, Hatta continued to propagate h1s Ideals, traveling widely around the archipelago. He had to be circumspect to avoid house detention, yet It was basically against Hatta's carping nature for him to observe undemocratic government and economic mismanagement without voicing critical comment. It was part of h1s role as a political educator and social reformer. From time to time, he would throw discretion to the winds, allowing h1s thoughts free expression. The technique of the "hidden message" wrapped up 1n protective layers of verbiage was brought to perfection by many Indonesian academics and journalists In the New Order. If dissidents became too skilled or too daring In their word games, they simply lost their jobs or were restrained 1n some way. Hatta was fortunate; h1s prestige acted as a safeguard. Hatta sought out opportunities to address students, taking advantage of appointments he held as an emeritus professor up until 1971. In a speech at Sylah Kuala Darussalam University 1n Banda Aceh on September 2, 1970, Hatta pointed out that poverty had not been eliminated within the first quarter century after Independence, as he had planned as prime minister, but had "even worsened," although there were "many Indonesian millionaires" with domestic and overseas business Interests.By 1970, the extent to which army generals and their families, Including Suharto's, had enriched themselves was gaining public attention and was being highlighted In the more daring newspapers such as Mochtar Lubis's Indonesia Raya. In 1969, Hatta had agreed to act as an adviser to a special commission set up by the government to Investigate corruption, chaired by former Prime Minister Wllopo. Mochtar Lubls recalled showing Hatta documents he had acquired Indicating large-scale manipulation of funds In Pertamlna, the government oil company. "At first Bung Hatta just shook h1s head as 1f he could not believe what he was reading," Lubls recalled.32 Hatta also criticized the dual function or theories espoused by the New Order to rationalize the civilian role played by the military. Hatta observed that, unless "there 1s an Insufficiency of civil servants," a military civil service was undesirable.33 It was a remark loaded with sarcasm for Indonesia had suffered from an oversupply of civil servants for years. Hatta was also concerned about the military reg1mefs strategies to ensure that no viable opposition could emerge 1n the already limited section of government scheduled for election 1n 1971. The Golongan Karya [Functional Groups] or Golkar, formed 1n 1964 under army initiative to counter the PKI's proliferation of organizations, had by 1969 become an Instrument for vitiating the existing political parties. Hatta appealed to h1s audience to choose responsible leaders, using the past "as a lesson to pioneer a new way."34 Hatta again suggested that electors look to Great Britain as a model of democratic government. In May and June 1971, Immediately prior to the general elections, an Indonesian Committee to Uphold Democracy was established by a group of 218

university students, who appealed to Hatta for support. Hatta praised their spirit, advising them not to be "afraid to take risks." He reminded them that "I myself took risks and was even betrayed by friends,"35 no doubt a reference to his expulsion from the Perhlmpunan Indonesia. Although he encouraged the student protest, Hatta was not prepared to join the young people on the streets. H1s days of student activism were over. Hatta’s association with young dissidents did not go unnoticed, and he received a summons to the President’s palace, together with h1s wife. Mrs. Suharto, a figure of power and wealth behind the President, announced that It would be best If Hatta leave for Europe for medical treatment, which journalist Brian May Interpreted as a presidential command to Hatta to absent himself from Indonesia during the elections.36 It was not a harsh exile for Hatta. He had many sympathizers among the overseas embassy staffs and valued contacts with Indonesians studying abroad. It was now common practice to dispatch prestigious "thorns-in- the-flesh" to countries far removed from Indonesia. Hatta traveled via the United States of America, spending most of h1s time 1n Austria and Rome. His old friend, Anak Agung Gde Agung, was now the Indonesian ambassador In Vienna. Anak Agung noticed that Hatta "was physically very tired, that h1s health was genuinely troubling him."37 Golkar’s decisive win In the 1971 elections gave the government added confidence. To Hatta, the poll was a meaningless exercise because of the factor of Intimidation,36 and he lent his support to a group of abstention- 1sts, known as the Golongan Putlh [Blank Group]. He sympathized with their refusal to cooperate 1n elections to a body which was not fully democratic. 1971 was a year of disillusionment and cynicism. The corruption commission’s report did result 1n an anticorruption bill being passed 1n parliament but this was neutralized by the government’s refusal to bring the worst offenders to trial.39 Hatta was certainly free of the taint of profiteering; Indeed, there were times when he found 1t difficult to meet h1s household expenses.40 Although h1s Income, acquired from h1s writings, a government pension, and family property, was above that of the average Indonesian, it was below that of the governing elite. Ironically 1n the last two years of h1s life, Hatta’s pecuniary predicament was drastically remedied. The Sultan of Yogyakarta had accepted the MPR’s offer of the V1ce-Pres1dency 1n 1973 but, on leaving office 1n 1978, he received a much higher pension than Hatta’s. As a result, Hatta’s pension had to be raised 1n line with the Sultan’s. For Hatta personally, one of h1s official visits around the archipelago had special significance. In April 1973, he was Invited back to Banda Nelra, accompanied by h1s wife and two younger daughters and also by Sjahrir’s widow and Des Alw1. Poppy Sjahrlr noticed that aboard the naval ship which carried them from Ambon to Banda Nelra, Hatta seemed "unusually relaxed and happy."41 On approaching the harbor, their ship was welcomed by gaily decorated boats from the kampungs, while on the shore schoolchildren greeted them in song. The names of Hatta and Sjahrlr were now a part of the islands, a mosque being named after them as well as two offshore Islands. In spite of the warm welcome which he received, Hatta seemed disappointed as he observed the neglect and deterioration of the island.42 The fine old colonial buildings were decaying, and the standard of living 219

generally had declined. Poppy Sjahrlr too noticed Hatta’s concern at the "rundown plantations and dilapidated houses, the poverty of the Inhabitants and the number of children who did not go to school because they had no money.”45 was Hatta experiencing a pang of guilt for having assured the prosperous Moluccan Islanders that Independence would be to their advantage? Protests escalated 1n January 1974 against the New Order’s neglect of the Indonesian small businessman while encouraging foreign enterprise. Certainly Hatta had seen evidence of Indigenous decline 1n Banda Nelra. A student demonstration coinciding with the visit of the Japanese Prime Minister Tanaka deteriorated Into a mass riot, known afterwards by the acronym Malarl, signifying the January 15 Disaster. There were claims that the Malarl violence was deliberately provoked by the government to allow Suharto an excuse to dismiss h1s security chief, whom he suspected of plotting against him. Yet 1n some ways Hatta, too, had provided fuel for the Malarl outburst. A month previously, 1n an article entitled "Foreign Capital" written for the student paper MakculAwa IndanzA'Ca [Indonesian student], Hatta had pointed out that Article 33 of the Constitution concerning a cooperatively organized economy, based on the situation 1n Scandinavian countries, had been disregarded.44 He argued that the government’s American-trained economists had "turned around the economic policy of Indonesia from a guided economy along the lines of the 1945 Constitution Into one which goes 1n the direction of economic liberalism.” He alleged that "what 1s being emphasized 1s private enterprise” but that Indonesia’s entrepreneurs were not yet ready "to confront a period of economic liberalism.” Hatta pointed to the damage being caused by foreign exploitation, especially Japanese, and by the Inability of the Indonesian businessman to compete with the Chinese, claiming that "new citizens of Chinese origin” had profited most from foreign loans. Again Hatta could not conceal h1s Innate dislike of the Chinese businessman, refraining from mentioning that there were many Indonesians, too, especially 1n the top levels of government, who were receiving benefits from foreign business enterprises. Hatta gave his opinion that the "consequences of this new economic policy Is that the gap between the social classes has Increased tremendously and the difference between the rich and poor has become glaringly evident.”45 Despite expressions of derision emanating from the New Order’s economic experts, Hatta refused to alter h1s emphasis on cooperatives being best for the welfare of the weakest economic groups. But not only Hatta and the students were protesting. Islamic opposition to the military regime was becoming more fanatical and fundamentalist. The Acehnese rebel, Daud Beureueh, echoing Hatta, was also advising Suharto "to return to the real and correct path,”45 dubbing Golkar the Golkur [Golongan Kuralsh], the aristocrats 1n Mecca against whom the Prophet Mohammad had waged h1s Jlkad. Daud Beureueh supported the formation of a new Islamic State movement, the Komando Jihad, reminiscent of Darul Islam. Hatta moved to offset the "Islamic State” trend in opposition to the government and agreed to chair a Committee of Five set up to reinterpret the Panca SZla. In supporting the state Ideology, he needed to make public that h1s opposition to the New Order was as strong as ever. This point Hatta clarified in August 1975 when, on the thirtieth anniversary of Indonesia’s proclamation of Independence, he was awarded h1s third honorary doctorate, this time 1n Constitutional Law by the University of 220

Indonesia. He entitled h1s address "Towards a State based on the Rule of Law,” an Indication that he did not consider that the present regime behaved as a government conforming to the Constitution should.His speech resembled a new manifesto# running hand 1n hand with "Towards Free Indonesia,” the political statement Hatta drafted for the New PNI 1n

1932. Both discourses set down the goals which must be achieved before Indonesia could be considered "free." The first manifesto charted the reader through the dangers of a colonial regime, the second through the equally hazardous waters of autocratic Indonesian military rule. Having Issued a plea to his Islamic associates to accept the Panca Slla, Hatta went on to Indicate the ways 1n which the Suharto regime was not living up to Its state Ideology. He hit out at the governments handling of public monies. One of the difficulties which the corruption commission had faced was the lack of detailed accounting 1n state agencies. He expressed h1s disapproval of such methods, stating: "There still exists a custom which does not accord with the 1945 Constitution, which 1s called Son-budgetary1 expenditure,” adding peremptorily: "Hopefully this custom will be abandoned."47 Hatta next turned to the human rights clauses 1n the 1945 Constitution, h1s criticism of the military regime sharpening as he accused 1t of "having done very little up to now" for the poverty-stricken and their children. He alleged that the social welfare proposed during the struggle for Independence thirty years ago was "still mainly drifting along."4° Hattas old fire began to engulf the Initial veil of caution. "The democracy of the Panca Slla can only come Into being when Indonesia becomes a state based on the rule of law,” he declared bluntly, "and so far a state based on the rule of law has not yet been achieved." As 1f h1s audience were h1s cadres In training, he exhorted: "Therefore every one of us must try to accelerate the Implementation of this state based on the rule of law," continuing: Since establishing the Republic of Indonesia, 1t Is this kind of legal state which we aimed for and Immediately set the course towards achieving. But because of misconceptions about the Panca Slla and Impatience among our freedom fighters at that time, people forgot to differentiate between Ideal and reality. The reality was that the 1945 Constitution was right at that time.49 This time Hattafs criticism was aimed at Sjahrlr for h1s denigration of the 1945 Constitution 1n h1s booklet Oua Struggle, and h1s Inability to understand that Hatta had managed to Include the major alms of the New PNI 1n the 1945 Constitution. It had been a more suitable document for Indonesia than Sjahrlr had surmised once the transitional clauses were discarded. Hatta reminded h1s audience of the Dutch and Outer Island Influences 1n the 1950 Constitution, with Its parliamentary cabinet and Its relegation of the Vuil TunggaL to the sidelines. Certainly Hatta would have benefited from the 1950 Constitution If he had remained prime minister. He did not mention this fact, but rather maintained that "because of that change of governmental system, the Vuiltunggal became a dwl tang gal and presented opportunities for disruptive groups."50 jn regard to the Constituent Assembly, he reiterated that the lack of an "attitude of tolerance" on the part of those supporting an Islamic State had allowed Sukarno to 221

dissolve the assembly. Because of Sukarno’s Illegal action, the 1945 Constitution, which was basically sound, was thrown into disrepute. Hatta had been unusually quiet about Indonesia’s takeover of East Timor at this time, as if undecided which side to support. He was suspicious of the Communist element in Fretlin, alleging that there were foreign influences, ’’people calling themselves representatives of East Timor, who were in fact among persons from Africa and other countries (who nata bznt had been said to represent other countries).” Hatta suggested that ’’the economic situation and the people’s livelihood should be restored immediately... through proper planning.”51 As an economist, Hatta believed that East Timor would benefit more from integration with Indonesia. As a nationalist, he found it difficult to condemn his country’s action. By the mid-seventies, Hatta was becoming noticeably more frail. He was now too infirm for the bicycling, mountain climbing, and golf which had kept him fit in middle age. Following the example of many of his contemporaries, Hatta turned to a new fitness program, a type of Yoga known as the OlakAaga Hldup Basiu [Sports for a New Life] or Orhiba, to offset the immobility of aging. Orhiba combined gentle exercise with a state of tranquility. Orhiba also provided an admirable screen for intrigue. The organizer of the Orhiba Movement was Said Sukanto, who had been chief of police in Hatta’s government in 1950. Sukanto was a devotee of Javanese mysticism, IteJiat^Cnan, as was also President Suharto. Through Sukanto, Hatta in 1972 first met Sawito Kartowibowo, a former civil servant.52 a distant relative of Sukarno, Sawito had established a reputation as a mystic and there had been speculation that he was a Rata Adti sent to unseat the Suharto regime which had lost its moral right to rule because of the extent of corruption and social injustice it had perpetrated. It was remarked that Sawito and Hatta fraternized easily,53 and Sawito became a member of the group which met regularly at Hatta’s villa at Megamendung. Perhaps Hatta saw Sawito as a potential mouthpiece for the group. There was clearly a political element in Sawito’s writings on Javanese mysticism, which were frequently published 1n the journal Mawat VtsU [Introspection] established by Dra. Trimurti, the left-wing nationalist who had worked in Hatta’s office during the Japanese Occupation. What Sawito was writing had strong echoes of what Hatta himself was saying to the orthodox Muslims: ”It is clear that the Panca&tta is not a creation of man, but a way of life created and offered by our Creator for the needs of mankind.”54 Sawito called for the ’’leaders of religious and mystical groups to come forward and set an example for the rest of the community,”55 an appeal Hatta had made to Muslims when trying to establish the Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia. The New Order regime had divided the two opposition parties roughly along religious lines, Islam versus ahangan and Christian. Hatta’s tactics were reminiscent of the nationalists in the 1920s, when they resisted Dutch ’’divide and rule” policies by uniting the ethnic groups. Like the Theosophists, Hatta and Sawito were proposing the elimination of religious barriers, creating Lt dt^tn d'jtViz in the fight against unjust and dishonest government. At Hatta’s seventy-second birthday party in August 1974, the suggestion that Hatta replace Suharto for a transitional period was first openly discussed among the group. General Ishak Juarsa, a former military commander in both Aceh and South Sumatra, had urged Hatta in 1970 to 222

accept the Presidency as an Interim measure.55 Hatta, at h1s birthday party, signified his willingness to act as President, provided the transfer of power was effected constitutionally and without violence. It was a role which Hatta had played most successfully in the past, taking over the reins of government in times of crisis. He pragmatically pointed out that he would also require the backing of a leading military figure.57 This was to be Domo Pranoto, a former police chief in Central Java and once a close friend of Suharto. Domo Pranoto held the Important position of vice chairman of the MPR/DPR, representing the armed forces faction in the consultative assembly.55 The group continued to make careful preparations to stage a bloodless coup against Suharto, challenging his rule on the basis of morality, an Important factor in the Javanese concept of power since the ruler is expected to reflect a godlike image. Three of the early nationalists, Iskaq Tjrokrohadlsurjo, the joint founder of the original PNI, and two other former Perhimpunan Indnesia members of Hatta's generation, Slnggih and Sudjono, were now participating 1n the deliberations. To add credence to the religious and moral theme of the challenge to Suharto, Domo Pranoto suggested that the backing of four prominent religious figures be sought.5^ This was not an easy task as many such men were 1n their positions of leadership because of their loyalty to the Suharto government. However, four prestigious religious leaders were prepared to support the challenge. These were Cardinal Darmoyuwono, the highest ranking prelate 1n the Indonesian Catholic church; former armed forces chief, Simatupang, representing the Indonesian Council of Churches; Hatta’s Minangkabau friend Hamka, representing the Council of Islamic Scholars; and Said Sukanto, who held the post of head of the Secretariat for Cooperation among Mystical Sects. As Singglh had received an invitation from Suharto to visit him 1n the Presidential Palace in September, he was assigned the task of handing over the documents which the group had prepared. Singgih visited Hatta at Megamendung on September 7 to make sure he understood the likely repercussions.50 Politically 1t was an opportune time to act, as most Indonesians were appalled at the news of Pertamina’s collapse and at the huge debt and misappropriation of public money involved. Before Singglh had time to present h1s documents to the President at the palace, he was arrested. On September 22, 1976, Suharto summoned the leaders of the MPR, DPR, Supreme Advisory Council, several Supreme Court judges, the attorney-general, and the head of the intelligence body, Bakin. Following discussions, the government made a public announcement that "there had been an illegal attempt to replace President Suharto by unconstitutional means."61 it was further reported that leading religious and political figures had been deceived Into signing a document entitled "Menuju Keselamatan" or "Towards Salvation," dated July 17, 1976. It was later disclosed that the signatories were Hatta, Cardinal Darmoyuwono, Simatupang, Hamka, Sukanto, and Sawlto Kartowibowo.^2 The term "Menu/u" was in Itself suggestive of Hattafs influence, one he had used in previous manifestoes which mapped out the path towards kzdauLatan >iakyat. The document "Towards Salvation" had strong overtones of people’s sovereignty running through it. It stressed that the "leadership of the Indonesian people is not restricted to those who run the State or who take an active role in the government leadership."55 The document further made the accusation that "1f the current progress in national development is evaluated in the context of the way it has really benefitted the 223

Indonesian people as a whole, 1t is clear that ... it has brought about an obvious deterioration in the standard of human dignity.”64 Sawito denied at his trial that he had masterminded the coup. He also denied that he had drafted '‘Towards Salvation,” testifying that "Bung Hatta was the source of this affair."6^ Sawito explained that "Towards Salvation" was based on Parliamentary Decision No. X/MPR/1973, which enabled the President to transfer responsibility to someone else when "the unity of the nation and the success of national development were threatened."66 It was hoped that Suharto would transfer his powers to Hatta, who would then request the MPR to elect a new President. A "savior team" would assist Hatta in the interim period. "Towards Salvation" was not the only document which the government seized. There were supposed to be eleven in all, although only five were specifically mentioned.67 The final, and perhaps the most intriguing of them, was a "Statement Forgiving Bung Karno" signed by Hatta and Sawito, in which Sukarno's part in propagating the Panca Slla and in proclaiming independence was recalled. The paper ended with the words, "we the
undersigned ... do officially PARDON ... all the mistakes and short-
comings of the late DR. Ir. Haji SOEKARNO/Bung Kamo."68 Whether Hatta was prepared to regard Sukarno in a warmer light for the sake of unity and to gain Sawito1s cooperation is difficult to judge. At his trial Sawito was adamant that this was the only document for which he was completely responsible, an indication that he was anxious to clear Sukarno's name. Certainly Hatta was still criticizing Sukarno two years later in interviews, but by then the Sawito case was over and lost. Hatta tended to be most ambivalent when Sukarno was involved, torn by the events and frustrations of the past. What was totally out of character for Hatta was that, together with all the other signatories, he signed a statement to the effect that the documents had been read hurriedly and he had not known the use to which they would be put.6^ The government obtained Hatta's repudiation before making their seizure of the documents public. There is evidence that considerable pressure was exerted on Hatta before he complied with the government's request, and that the statement the government published was the third he wrote for them, dated September 20, 1976. The most he had been willing to concede in his first statement dated September 16, following a visit by two leading government figures, Adam Malik and Emil Salim, was that he had signed the documents "because they defended the Panca- 4£ta."70 Many of those Involved in the coup signed statements under duress which they later rescinded during the trial proceedings. The problem for Hatta was that he was never called as a witness. Sawito's trial opened on October 6, 1977, the charge being subversion and intent to overthrow the President. It was assumed that all the signatories would be called as witnesses, including Hatta. One of the judges, John Loedoe, later removed from his position on corruption charges, informed the press that "if the accused summons Bung Hatta as a witness 'a de charge' and the judges considered 1t important that his testimony be heard in the interests of the inquiry, then he may indeed be called to testify."71 Yet Hatta was never called to give evidence. As Sawito himself informed the court, "It is very clear that the judges and prose- cutors are afraid of hearing Bung Hatta's testimony."72 It was no doubt a disappointment to Hatta, remembering how his heated appeal on behalf of the Indonesian people had undermined the prosecution's case 1n the Netherlands. 224

The trial dragged on until May 1978, Its most Important contribution being the opportunity 1t afforded Sawlto for revealing actual Instances of political opportunism, corruption, and Illegal practices which had greatly enriched the President’s family and the governing elite. The prosecution accused Sawlto of manipulating mysticism for h1s own ends and of deceiving Important people such as Hatta. Sawlto was found guilty and sentenced to eight years’ Imprisonment plus the costs of the trial. Hatta had been too prestigious a person to arrest but the government employed subtle methods to damage h1s standing and reduce the Impact of h1s revolt. He was cited as being a senile old man, the victim of manipulation, while h1s failure to support Sawlto as a witness left an Impression that he had not supported h1s fellow conspirators as loyally as he might. Hatta’s family and associates strongly denied that his mind was Impaired at the time of the coup, a statement supported by h1s closest medical advisers. Certainly Hatta had been 1n poor health In 1976, having suffered a slight stroke 1n the aftermath of two major operations 1n March of that year. '3 But by August, he was 1n command again, leaving not only his signature but h1s stamp on the Incriminating documents. In August 1976 Hatta had also been sufficiently fit to make a tour of West Sumatra, Invited by the governor to celebrate the thirty-first anniversary of the proclamation of Independence 1n Buklt Tlnggl. As usual, Hatta Included the Batu Hampar 6un.au. 1n h1s Itinerary, his particular concern being the health of h1s eldest stepsister Hallmah, a child of his father’s first marriage and now ninety-two years of age. He confidently promised Hallmah that he would return 1n 1980 to celebrate h1s seventy-eighth birthday with her. It was a promise he could not keep; Hallmah outlived him. Hatta was never to set foot 1n the ALam Mlnangkahau again. In spite of h1s frailty and diminishing eyesight, Hatta continued to attend meetings of the Committee of Five set up to promote the Panca S'CLa. On June 1, 1977, the thirty-second anniversary of the acceptance of Sukarno’s Panca S^Cia, a special remembrance ceremony was arranged 1n Jakarta at which Hatta Insisted on delivering the major speech. He was realistic enough to recognize that he might not have the strength to complete the address, deputizing his youngest daughter, Halidah, to take over from him when h1s strength ran out. Having dwelt again on the origins of the state Ideology, complaining that 1t was now only given ”Hp service,1’ Hatta concluded on a note of concern for the general lack of humanity 1n Indonesian society: ’’Look how easily people kill each other!” he exclaimed.7 Hatta deplored the widespread Indifference to human suffering and the lack of justice, giving the example of detainees who had starved to death because the prison officers neglected to feed them. Such cold Indifference, Hatta pointed out, was ’’completely contrary to the basis of the nation, to the basis of humanity and social justice.” He concluded: ’’Note carefully, the Republic of Indonesia 1s not yet based on the Panca S£La.”75 By 1979, Hatta was forced by 111-health to curb h1s activities and restrict h1s travel. He was suffering frequent blackouts and his heart was weakening. H1s mobility was hampered by swollen legs, which entailed rest with h1s feet raised. 1979 became a year of loneliness and accen- tuated frustration, and even worse, a consciousness of approaching senility and loss of h1s mental powers. Hatta began to turn h1s attention to the Islamic scriptures, as 1f preparing himself for the last stage of h1s tatukatj^ He was particularly Irate when advised to stop attending the 225

mosque, snapping peevishly: ’’Why can’t I attend the Friday prayers, I can still walk?”?? As he had already fallen and wounded his head through sudden loss of consciousness, 1t was risky for him to venture out 1n pub!1c. Because of h1s condition, 1t was not expected that he would attend the 1979 Congress of the Association of Indonesian Economics Graduates to be held 1n Bogor In June. But as 1f realizing that this would be h1s last chance to meet with Indonesian economists, on whom he depended so much for the Improvement of the people’s welfare, Hatta not only Insisted on attending, but declared that he would make a speech. He had difficulty reading 1n the poor light but struggled on until h1s strength failed, when he handed over the script to h1s son-in-law, Ed1 Swasono, also an economist, to continue on h1s behalf. Not unexpectedly h1s speech once more pressed home the Importance of cooperatives for the advancement of the underprivileged. The audience, many of them Hattafs former students but also graduates of the University of California, greeted h1s comments with a round of applause, 1n spite of h1s rebuke that they, the techno- crats, had "deviated” from the 1945 Constitution.78 Seeing Hatta’s physical condition they probably realized that 1t was h1s economic swan song. Hatta’s last political act 1n 1980 was to lend h1s patronage to a Committee of Fifty led by Nasutlon, who intended to present a petition to the DPR pointing out the New Order’s disregard for the Panca SZla and the 1945 Constitution. It was to be h1s final participation 1n a challenge to the Suharto government. He did not live to savor the repercussions which followed 1n the wake of the Committee of Fifty’s presentation of the petition on May 13, 1980. On March 3, Hatta left home for the last time, entering a private hospital for medical treatment. When h1s condition worsened on March 13, he was transferred to the intensive care unit of Jakarta’s main hospital. H1s family and friends maintained a v1g11 by h1s bedside, hoping that, as 1n the past crises, he would rally and pull through. This time there were no reserves of strength to call on. On March 14, 1980, Hatta died. The state funeral accorded him drew a huge following. As one press report read: ”In their thousands ordinary folk flocked to Jakarta’s Tanah Kuslr public cemetery for the funeral of former Vice-President Mohammad Hatta.1,70 Hatta’s final Instructions were that he wanted to be burled 1n an ordinary cemetery among the people. An elderly mourner commented to a reporter: ”It was Bung Hatta’s honesty that made me come.” A student leader remarked: ”He was Integrity personified, everything that a modern Muslim should be,” adding: ”He set a superb example.” Perhaps the most enigmatic remark came from President Suharto: ”For those of us left behind, the greatest tribute we can pay 1s to struggle to realize Mohammad Hatta’s dreams.”80 Although Hatta had many critics while alive, 1n death the voices of condemnation were hushed. ’’The Guardian of the Nation’s Conscience” was one of the epithets given to him as a tribute.From Indira Gandhi came a letter portraying him as ”one of the pioneering giants, who along with my father took a leading role 1n their countries’ fight for independence.” On a more personal level, she added: ”To us who had the privilege of knowing him, Dr. Hatta was a warm human being, deeply concerned with the problems which your country and ours have 1n common. 226

According to a Rotterdam newspaper: "Many people are of the opinion that Hatta was not a leader but an idealistic theoretician, he can perhaps be called fnaive.f"88 it was a strange remark to make about a man who more than any other Indonesian had finalized the transfer of sovereignty. Perhaps Hatta was idealistic, but he also desperately wanted to be a leader as well as a theoretician. The problem of being an advocate of the type of democracy practiced in Western Europe and in Minangkabau traditional society is that one cannot grasp power, one must be placed in power, if one is to play by the rules. The Minangkabau scholar, Taufik Abdullah wrote: "One thing is sure, expressed by others also, I feel a sense of very great loss now that he 1s gone."84 The mourning of the nation and his family was expressed in a poem by Ann1 Rachlm, written in the Dutch language in which she and Hatta had received their schooling: A miracle has taken place! After the grave is filled Ah! See! a gentle rain falls! Naturefs farewell to a great man! Afterwards... A dark cloud Spreads over the ground below Like an umbrellafs shade Giving shelter to those who need it. Gone five ofclock The sky has shed its tears In a heavy shower.85

1.Hatta, "Panca Sila Jalan Lurus," 1n Bung Hatta B&ipldatc, Bung Hatta MznullA, pp. 163-64.
2.See Mznddta, June 2, 1966.
3.This view came through in my Interview with Subadio Sastrosatomo, February 22, 1982. The opinion that Hatta had failed as a leader by h1s withdrawal from direct involvement in politics during the Guided Democracy period was particularly evident in my interview with T. B. Simatupang on February
4.1982.
4. Mohammad Hatta, "Pengantar, Rencana Dasar, Program dan Struktur Partai Demokrasl Islam Indonesia," March 17, 1967, in H. Oemar Bakry, Bung Hatta Szlamat Jalan, Clta-Cltamu Kami Tznuikan (Jakarta: Mutiara, 1980), p. 168.
5.Hatta, "Pengantar, Rencana Dasar," p. 165.
6.Ibid., pp. 168-69.
7.Ibid., p. 172.
8.Ibid., p. 179. According to M. Natslr, 1n the PDII Hatta hoped "to work through private Islamic educational Institutions. Hatta was very Interested in supporting wide political education." Interview M. Natslr, February 6, 1983.
9.See MzsuUka, June 3, 1966. An address by Hatta to the Angkatan Muda Islam [Islamic Youth Force] in Bandung.
10.Ibid.
11.Hatta, "Panca Sila Jalan Lurus,"
p. 163.

12.Hatta, "Pengantar, Rencana 30. Ibid. Dasar," p. 165.
31.Mohammad Hatta, SzAudak 25 Tahun,
13.Ibid., p. 169.pp. 7-8.
14.Ibid.,p. 166.
15. 161.Hatta,Bung Hatta’ ■&AMWZKA, p.
16.Ibid.,p. 159.
17.Ibid.,p. 161.
18.Mohammad Hatta,Pzndldlkan National Indonesia (Bogor: Mel at i,
1968), pp. 5 and 8.
19.Ibid., p. 6.
20.Ibid., p. 12.
32.Mochtar Lubis, "Bung Hatta, Manusia Berdisipl in," in Bung Hatta: PtUhadlnya dalam Kznangan, p. 581.
33.Hatta, Sziudak 25 Tahun, p. 18.
34.Ibid., p. 20.
35.Brian May, Tkz IndanzAlan Tnagzdy (London: Rout!edge and Kegan Paul,
1978), p. 265.
36.Ibid.
37.Anak Agung Gde Agung, "Bung Hatta jang Saja Kenal," p. 74.
21.Ibid., pp. 13-14.
22.Ibid., pp. 31-32.
23.Ibid., pp. 32-33.
24.George McT. Kahin, "Mohammad Hatta Sebagai Pemikir Bebas, in Bung Hatta: Pnlhadlnya dalam Kznangan,
p. 459. According to Natsir, Hatta saw Islam chiefly at the individual and community level, therefore Hatta was not emphatic that everything had to follow Islam. Although Hatta’s motivation was religious, Natsir thought that Hatta did not consciously use Islamic ideas in terms of state and nation in the way Masjumi did. Interview, M. Natsir, February 6, 1983.
25.Kahin, "Mohammad Hatta Sebagai Pemikir Bebas," p. 459.
38.See May, Indonesian Ttiagzdy, p.
265.
39.In cases involving members of the armed forces, all criminal charges were referred to military courts, and thus remained an internal army affair.
40.Ny. H. S. $. A. Rachim, "Pribadi Bung Hatta yang Saya Kenal," p. 32, in which it is suggested that even providing refreshments for Hatta’s frequent visitors was a strain. When Hatta was made a Special Citizen of the Greater Jakarta Region in 1972, the governor, A1 i Sadikin, helped by absorbing Hatta’s electricity and water charges.
41.Ny. Siti Wahjunah Sjahrir, "Bung Hatta: Beberapa Catatan," p.
484.
26.See Hanlan Ahadl, June 25, 1969.
27.Guntur Soekarnoputra, "Orang Besar, Jiwa Besar," p. 626.

45.Ibid.
46.See ibid., p. 231. Beureueh's letter to Suharto was reproduced in Impact International [London], May 9-22, 1975.
47.Hatta, Menu/u Negara Hukum, p.
12.
48.Ibid.,p.13.
49.Ibid.,p.14.
50.Ibid.,p.15.
51.Hatta, Bung Hatta'* Anwer, pp. 140-41.
52.DavidBourchier, Dynamic* a& Dl**ent In lndonela: Sawito and the Phantom Coup (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1984), p.
51.
53.Ibid.
54.See G. J. O'Rourke, "Between Dreams and Reality: The Sawito Affair” (MA Thesis, University of Melbourne, February 21, 1980).
55.Mawa Vlrl, October 1975, p. 13.
56.Bourchier, Dynamic* o£ Dlent,
p. 74.
57.See O'Rourke, "Between Dreams and Reality," p. 26.
58.Bourchier, Dynamic* o£ Dlent,
p. 84.
59.Ibid.
60.Ibid., p. 73.
61.Kompa*, September 23, 1976.
62.Bourchier, Dynamic* o£ Dl*ent,
p. 22.
63.Ibid., p. 23.
64.Ibid.
65.Ibid., p. 86.
66.Ibid., p. 79.
67.For a listing and analysis of these, see ibid., pp. 22-31.
68.Ibid., p. 29.
69.Titania, Sawito: Slapa, Mengapa dan Bagalmana? (Solo:Sasongko,
1978), p. 58.
70.Bourchier, Dynamic a£ Dl*ent,
p. 91.
71.Titania, Sawito, p. 35.
72.Bourchier, Dynamic o£ Dl*ent,
p. 86.
73.According to Dr. Mahar Mardjono, there were fears that this stroke, in the aftermath of operations for a prostate gland and hemorrhoids and complicated by diabetes, might impair Hattafs faculties. When Hatta regained consciousness, the medical team anxiously tested his responses, Dr. Mardjono enquiring: "Who am I?” Hattas testy reply, "What game are you playing now, Mahar?” assured the team that Hatta was still mentally alert. Interview Prof. Dr. Mahar Mardjono, January 1982.
74.Mohammad Hatta, Pengertlan Panca Slia (Jakarta: Yayasan Idayu,
1981), pp. 20-21.

79.A4ta \tizek, March 28, 1980.
80.See Bung Hatta Ktta, pp. 138-39.
81.See Kompui, March 15, 1980.
82.Letter from Prime Minister Indira Gandhi to Mrs. Mohammad Hatta, March 17, 1980, as cited 1n Bung Hatta K-Cta, p. 94.
83.Hlzuwe. RotteJidamiChe. Counant, March 15, 1980. Crltchley did not support this view, stating: "I never considered Hatta to be •naive.1" Personal communication from T. K. Crltchley.
84.Tauflk Abdullah, "Ataukah Dialog Antara Gambaran dan Kesan?" 1n Bung Hatta: Pnthadtnya daiam (Ctnangan, p. 543.
85.Ny. H. S. S. A. Rachim, "Pribadl Bung Hatta yang Saya Kenal," p. 34. 230

INDEX Abdullah Ahmad, Haj1, 10 AbdulMadjid Djojoadlningrat,25; 36; :38; 41; 44, n. 18; 56; 144; 150 Abutarl, 25 Aceh#124; 135; 143; 157; 159;178; 186,n. 70; 220 Aidlt,D. N., 177; 185, n. 63;202; 205 Alw1,Des, 82-83; 88; 97; 118;120; 131;162; 166, n. 85; 200; 219 AnakAgung Gde Agung, 157;158; 160--61; 171; 183, n. 19;200; 209,n. 94; 219 Aok1,99-100 Ar1f1ni, Syekh, 66 Army,125; 134; 137; 143; 145-46; 149;151; 152-54; 156; 158; 171-72; 175;: 177-78; 179; 181; 186, n. 84;188; 192-93; 194; 197; 202-4; 206,n. 10; 212; 214; 218;221; 228,n. 39 Arsyad, Syekh, 7-8; 13; 21; 66; 215 Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia (Menteng 31), 104; 118 Assaat, 155 Attlee, C., 127 Az1z> And1, 172 Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR), 125 Badan Penyel1d1k Kemerdekaan Indonesia (BPKI), 109; 111; 112; 114; 115 Bahder Djohan, 9-10; 12 Banda Nelra, 37; 68; 81-82; 85; 87-88; 97; 124; 172; 219-20 Bandung Conference, 179; 203 Bandung Study Club, 30-32; 34-35; 37; 40; 46; 48 Bangka, 155-58 Banteng Council, 188; 190-91; 205-6,

n. 5 Barlsan Tan1 Indonesia (BTI), 149 Batu Hampar, 5; 7-8; 66; 215; 225 Beel, L. J. M., 135; 147; 167, n. 103 Belief 1n God (Ketuhanan), 112 Benteng RepubHk, 134 Beureueh, Daud, 186, n. 69; 220 BF0 (Federal Consultative Assembly), 158-60; 162; 171-72 Bod 1-Can1 ago, 3; 24; 41 Boeke, J. H., 24; 29, n. 42; 37 Bondan, 76-77; 78-80 Bose, Rash Baharl, 69 Boven Dlgul, 33; 46; 70; 76-81; 83; 88; 100 Bud1 Utomo, 30; 40; 48; 51; 52; 59; Burhanuddln, 64; 76; 79-80 cell system/caderlzatlon, 20; 49; 55; 65-67; 68; 76; 104; 175; 199; 205; 213; 215; 221 Central Advisory Council, 100-101; 109; 189 Central Intelligence Agency, 195 Central Trading Corporation, 137 Chlang Kai-shek, 170

Corruption Commission, 218; 219 Crltchley, T., 146-47; 150-51; 153; 154; 155-56; 157; 160; 167, n. 115; 230 cultuurstelsel, 4 Darmoyuwono, Cardinal, 223 Darsono, 23; 25-26; 31; 36; 39; 49; 70 Darul Islam, 186, n. 69; 209, n. 91; 220 Vaulat Ra'/at, 54; 56; 61; 62-63; 65-66; 70; 71; 76-77 Decree of Nov. 3, 1945, 129-30 De Graeff, A. C. D., Gov. Gen., 41; 44, n. 51; 49; 51; 60 De Kadt, Jacques, 63 De Jonge, B. C., Gov. Gen., 60; 72 Dewan Perwakllan Rakyat (DPR), 113; 213; 223; 226 Dhanl, A1r Marshal Omar, 203 D1ah, B. M., 102; 114; 174 Djamil, Haj1 (Hatta's father), 5-6 Djuanda, 190; 192; 194; 196; 198; 210, n. Ill Domo Pranoto, 223 Douwes Dekker, E., 32; 201 Drees, Willem, 156; 159; 162 Du Bo1s, Coert, 145; 147 Dutch-Indoneslan Union, 160; 161 Dutch Socialist Workers' Party, 38; 51; 55; 63; 80; 92 Duys, Dr. J. E. W., 38; 41-42; 46 dwi^ungil, 218 Dw1 Tunggal, 96; 113-14; 120; 124-25; 126-28; 130; 132; 133; 144; 146; 150; 158; 162; 165, n. 59; 169; 173; 176; 178-79; 180-83; 186, n. 84; 188; 192-93; 221 East Indonesia, 171-72 East Sumatra, 130; 135; 136; 171-72 East Timor, 222 Empat Serangkal, 101; 126 escape clause, 174; 180 Ethical Policy, 5; 41 exorbitant rights, 34; 89; 135; 192 fascism, 84; 86-88 federalism, 170-72; 183, n. 9 fifth force, 203 Firnmen, Edo, 55; 60; 63 Fischer, L., 195-96 Front Demokras 1 Rakyat (FDR), 144-45; 147-48 Gabungan Pol1t1k Indonesia (GapD, 86; 88-89 Gandhi, 25; 52; 69; 136 Gan1, A. «., 85 Garuda Council, 189; 190 Gatot Mangkupradja, 34; 51 Gatot Subroto, 150-51 Gatot Tarumlhardja, 35; 38 general election, 179-80; 218-19 Gerakan Rakyat Indonesia (Gerlndo), 85; 88 Gerakan Revolusl Rakyat (GRR), 148 Gerakan September T1ga Puluh (Gestapu), 204; 217

Hatta, Mohammad (continued) cooperation with Sukarno/Dwl Tunggal, 93-183 passim kidnapping of, 118-19 Proclamation of Independence, 120-21 marriage, 131-32 Vice-President 1n Buklt Unggl, 136-38 Prime Minister, 143-74 passim detention 1n Bangka, 155-58 at Round Table Conference, 158-62 haj, 176-77 and Sawlto Affair, 222-25 declining years and death, 225-27 Armed Forces, relations with, 125; 145-46; 150-51; 153; 158; 172; 175; 177-78; 180-81; 197; 203; 212; 218 chairmanship of Perhlmpunan Indonesia, 25-27; 30-43; 46-51 and cooperatives, 27; 34; 114-15; 220 criticisms of Sukarno, 53; 62; 65; 68; 71; 96; 110; 174-75; 181-82; 189-90; 192; 196; 198-99; 201; 205; 212; 216; 224 economic viewpoint of, 11; 19; 24; 26; 34; 84-85; 114-15; 192; 202; 214; 220; 226 on fascism, 84; 86-88 foreign policy of, 170-71; 176 formation of first party, 31-35; 40-41; 46-47; 48-49; 52 and Indonesian democracy, 23; 34; 54-55; 56; 61; 66; 83; 112-14; 169-70; 174-75; 178; 181-82; 190-91; 193; 197; 199 Influence of Marx on, 18-19; 26; 36; 54; 60; 62; 65; 84-85; 148-49; 151; 198; 214 Islamic State, views on, 111-12; 175; 178; 197; 199; 220-21 Kempetal plot against, 101 Modernist Islam, Interaction with, 12; 31; 48-49; 63; 65-67; 79-80; 124-25; 169; 178; 180; 212-13; 215 and non-cooperation, 21; 27; 34; 68; 77; 81; 94; 215 on Panca Sila, 112; 182; 197-98; 213; 220-21; 225-26 on pang/ieA psiaja, 99; 172 and people's sovereignty (feedaota- tan fiakyat), 54; 60; 99; 126; 169; 173; 182; 190; 197; 199; 214; 216; 223 Perhimpunan Indonesia and, 18; 20-56 personality, 1-2; 6-7; 9; 13; 15,

n. 24; 21-23; 32; 35-36; 38; 47; 51; 55; 64-65; 67; 76; 79-80; 81-83; 97; 99; 110-11; 115; 118; 125; 131-32; 134-35; 137; 146-47; 153-55; 174; 179; 189; 192; 194-95; 212; 214;

Islamic State, 8; 111-12; 175; 178; 197; 199; 220; 228, n. 24 Iwa Kusuma Sumantrl, 25; 50; 77; 82; 83; 86; 126; 134; 148; 179 Iwata Tateo, 69; 74, n. 58 Jakarta Charter, 112 Jambek, Syekh M. Jamil, 7; 19, n. 27 Japanese, 69-70; 74, n. 58; 84; 86-89; 92-104 passim; 108-9; 115-21 Jawa Hokokal, 103 Jong Sumatranen Bond, 10-12; 17; 18; 20; 21; 66 Joyoboyo, 86; 116 Juliana, Queen, 159; 162 Kahln, Audrey, 137 Kahln, G. McT., 165-66, n. 71; 216-17 Kamang uprising, 8-9; 12; 15, n. 34; 42; 88 kebatlnan, 222 ke.daulaXan. nakyat, ize. people's sovereignty Kempetal, 93; 95; 99-101; 103; 104; 109; 119; 120; 126; 133 Ki Bagus Hadlkusumo, 102; 125 K1 Hadjar Dewantoro, 98; 101; 184,

n. 44 Kill earn, Lord, 134 Kolso Declaration, 104; 109 Komlte Naslonal Indonesia Pusat (KNIP), 124; 129-30; 133-35; 145; 161 KonlnkHjk Nederlands Indlsch Leger (KNIL), 125; 132; 172 kon&zpii, 189; 191-92; 197 Korea, 170; 173; 177 Labor Party, 134; 144 Last, Jef, 63 League against Imperialism, Colonial Oppression and for National Independence, 35-36; 38; 50; 55-56; 66; 69; 77; 214 Leeuwen, Ir. van, 17; 23; 25; 28-29,
n. 36 Le Febvre, 20; 23; 33 Lenin, 19-20; 36; 49 Lily, 82; 88 L1mburg-St1rum, Gov. Gen. J. P. van, 11; 41 L1nggajat1 Agreement, 134-35; 136; 158; 170 Llvengood, 149 Lubls, Col. Z., 180; 191; 193; 207,
n. 41 Lubls, Mochtar, 218 MacArthur, Gen., 127 Madlun, 145; 149-51; 175; 177; 185; Maeda, Rear-Admiral, 99-100; 104; 117-20 Majapahit, 19; 21; 132; 158 Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat (MPR), 113; 129; 213; 219; 223-24 Maklumat x, 129; 191 Mai aka, Tan, 23; 26-27; 31; 33; 43, nn. 8, 15; 61; 63; 117; 123, n. 47; 126-28; 130; 133-35; 144; 148;

Muis, A., 10-11; 12 Munzenberg, Willi, 35; 50 Murad, 76-77 Murase, 101 Murwoto, 76 Musso, 147-51; 165, n. 59 Mustapha Kemal Pasha, 19; 23-24; 70; 186, n. 72 Musyawarah Nasional (Nat. Conference), 192-94 Nahdatul Ulama, 178; 180-81; 185-86,

n. 67; 189; 196; 198; 204; 214 Nasakom, 202; 204; 210, n. 116; 216 Nasution, Gen. A. H., 139, n. 10; 145-46; 160-61; 175; 177-78; 181; 186, nn. 83, 84; 188-89; 191; 193-94; 196-97; 200; 203-4; 205-6,
n. 5; 208, n. 62; 209, nn. 93, 99 National Council, 189-90; 192; 196; 206, n. 10 Natsir, M., 174-76; 177-78; 181; 184, n. 43; 185, n. 65; 191-92; 194 Nazir Pamontjak, 10;18;35;00 m 41; 165, n. 59 Nehru, Jawarhalal, 35'-36;55;87; 136; 151; 154; 156;159-60:176; 179; 180 Netherlands Indies Civil Administration (NICA), 127; 132; 172 Ning, Haj1 Mas Agus, 6; 9 non-cooperation, 21; 24; 27; 34; 36; 48; 53; 62-63; 67-68; 71; 77-79; 80-81; 83; 85-86; 183; 215 Noor, P., 115 November Promise, 11; 86; 100 October 17 Affair, 177 Oeang Republlk Indonesia (0RI), 132; 137 Olahraga H1dup Baru (Orhlba), 222 Onafhankel 1jke Sosial istische Partlj (OSP), 63; 67-68 one-party system, 23; 174 Orde der Dlenaren van Indie, 17; 25 Padri, 4; 6; 22; 111 Palembang Charter, 192; 194 Panca S1la, 112; 116; 124; 182; 193; 197-99; 201; 202; 205; 210,
n. 119; 212-13; 221-22; 224-26 pangwh. pfiaja., 65; 99; 109; 172 Panitia Perslapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia (PPKI), 115-20; 124-25; 135 Pannlkar, K. M., 32 Pari, 63; 117; 126 Parliamentary democracy, 23; 34; 112-13; 130; 169; 174; 178; 181-82; 188; 190; 197; 212-13 Partal Daulat Rakyat, 199; 213 Partal Demokrasl Islam Indonesia (PDII), 213-15; 222; 227, n. 8 Partal Indonesia (Partlndo), 53-56; 61-62; 64-65; 66-68; 70-72; 85 Partal Murba, 151; 156; 158; 165,
n. 67; 169; 189; 202; 210, n. 117 Partal Sosial1s, 134; 136; 148 Partal Sosial 1s Indonesia (PSI), 144; 158; 161-62; 169; 174; 176-78; 180; 191; 194; 198-99; 212-13

Plakat Pandjang, 4; 8; 14* n. 13 PI as,C. vander,49;128 PNI,46-49;51-54; 56o VO-61;65; 72;77; 134; 144;149;165,n. 67;169;174;176-77;180-•81; 184, n. 34; 193;196; 217; 223 Pol Itleke Ini Ichtlngen Dlenst (PID) * 70; 99; 133 Pringgodigdo, Gafar, 155 Pr1nggod1gdo, Karim, 113; 176 Proclamation of Independence, 120; 127; 132; 159; 174; 198; 201; 204; 212 Pusat Tenaga Rakyat (Putera), 98-99; 101-3; 109 Rachlm, Anni (n&e Nurdln), 12; 16,

n. 50; 131; 177; 227 Rachlm, Rahmi (Ny. Hatta), 131-32; 155; 177; 184, n. 30; 219 Rachlm, Rusll, 12; 16, n. 52; 177 Rafl'ah (Hatta’s sister), 6; 80 Rais, Ayub, 12-13; 69; 74, n. 57; 79 Rais, Great-Uncle, 9; 12; 42; 67 rationalization, 145-47; 172 Rengasdenglok, 118-19 Renville Agreement, 143-44; 150; 154 Rival, Dr., 55; 64; 79 Roem, M., 143; 151; 152; 155; 157-58; 159-60; 177-78; 181; 186, n. 68; 196; 200; 209, n. 94 romusha, 103; 109; 150 Roslhan Anwar, 199 Rotterdam Handel shogeschool, 13; 18; 20; 25; 160 Round Table Conference, 157; 158-62; 171-72; 176 Rustam Effendl, 55; 84; 144; 156 Said Sukanto, 222-23 Saleh,Chaerul, 126; 133; 189;202; 210,n. Ill Sal 1m,Emil, 201;224 Sal 1m,Haj1 Agus,12;23;31;48; 70;85; 110-11;128;136;144-45; 155-56 Sangnler, Marc, 32 Sarekat Rakyat, 23; 31-32; 35; 51; 69; 149 Sarekat Rakyat Naslonal Indonesia, 32; 43, n. 9 Sarekat Usaha, 10; 66 Sarlkat Islam, 10; 12; 23; 26; 30-32; 48-49; 51; 53; 57, n. 8; 60; 63; 65; 70; 79; 85; 93; 103; 165, n. 67; 213 Sassen, E. M. J. A., 152 Sastra, 86, 117 Sartono, 46; 52-54; 56; 64; 68; 72; 85; 88; 129 Sastroamldjojo, All, 22; 36-38; 41-42; 46; 50; 53; 68; 126; 144; 154-55; 157; 178-81 Sawlto Kartowibowo, 222; 224-25 Sayap K1r1, 134; 144-45 SEAT0, 191; 195 Second Military Action, 150; 151; 152-55; 158

Starkenborgh Stachouwer, Gov.-Gen. Tjarda van, 87; 88-89 state-wlthin-a-state, 27; 30; 34; 40; 92; 98; 126; 175 Stlkker, D1rk, 151-52 Subadlo Sastrosatomo, 109; 129; 141, n. 55; 176; 180; 200 Subagio, 86 Subandrlo,200;203;209, n. 93 Subardjo,20-21; 22; 23;25;35 36; 38-39; 97; 99; 104;118-19 126; 128J 134;148; 176 Sudjadl, 31; 34;46;54; 56 Sudlrman,Gen.,134; 145-46;150 153-54;158; 171 Sufism# 4;5-6;7-8;14-15,n.19 Suharto, 164, n. 47; 203-5; 213-15; 218-19; 221-24; 226 Sujitno, 88; 95; 105, n. 12 Sukabumi Police School, 88; 93 Sukarela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air, ■itz Peta Sukarnl, 126; 128; 133-34; 148 Sukarno, 32; 40-41; 46-47; 48-50; 51-55; 60-65; 68; 70-72; 75, n. 70; 77; 81; 94; 95-99; 101; 102-4; 108-17; 118-20; 125-26; 127-31; 132-36;146-47; 150; 154-59; 169-70; 173-82; 189-205; 212-14; 216-18; 222; 224 Suka Sumitro, 76 Suklman, 49; 53; 139, n. 17; 144; 176-77; 183, n. 9; 185-86, n. 67 Sumadl, 36 Sumitro Djojohadlkusumo, 160; 177; 191; 194; 212 Sumual, 189; 194 Surabaya, 131, 161 Surabaya Study Club, 30; 48; 49; 52 Suryadarma, A1r Commodore, 155; 196 Sutomo, Dr., 30; 48-49; 52; 54; 62 swadeshl, 63 Taher Marah Sutan, 10; 66 Tamln, Djamaluddin, 63-64 Tan Ling Dj1e, 84; 144; 150 Tas, S., 55; 61; 63; 81; 209, n. 93 Tengku Nurdln, 12; 16, n. 51 Terauchl, Marshal, 115 Thamrln, Husnl, 62 Third bloc, 176; 179 T1ga A, 95-96; 98 Tjokroamlnoto, Anwar, 103 Tjokroaminoto, H. 0. S., 10; 32; 40; 110 Tjokrosujoso, Ablkusno, 93; 133; 148 Tojo, 99-101, 102 transfer of sovereignty, 171 transitional clauses, 113-14; 129 Trimurtl, Dra., 222 Tweede Kamer, 63; 67; 71; 80; 84 unitary state, 170-74 United Nations, 128; 130; 137-38; 144; 154; 155-57; 159; 161; 170;

United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI), 156-58; 160