Baca PDF (OCR): The dynamics of the Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) problem

THE DYNAMICS OF THE WESTERN NEW GUINEA (IRIAN BARAT) PROBLEM ROBERT C. BONE, JR. Assistant Professor of Political Science Tulane University INTERIM REPORTS SERIES Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program Department of Far Eastern Studies Cornell University Ithaca, New York

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I *(IRIAN BARAT) PROBLEM THE DYNAMICS OF THE WESTERN NEW GUINEA Robert C. Bone, Jr. Assistant Professor of Political Science Tulane University * MONOGRAPH SERIES Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program Department of Far Eastern Studies Cornell University Ithaca, New York 1958

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A * © 1958 by Robert C. Bone, Jr

Ill PREFACE Considering its importance the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands over Western New Guinea (Irian Barat) has received little scholarly attention. Highly tendentious treatment has characterized most writing concerning the issue, and those who would seek a full and unvarnished account have been little instructed. In so far as the press has been concerned with the problem, its attention has been largely focused on U.N. debates and on current statements by the spokesmen of the countries involved. Slight effort has been made either by journalists or by those who have professed a more scholarly approach to dig into the relevant historical background or to give any full account of the contemporary factors which shape this problem. In what is the first major study of the dispute, Dr. Robert C. Bone has to a remarkable degree offset these deficiencies. His report is by far the most substantial and thorough yet to appear, and it is the precursor to a considerably more comprehensive monograph on this subject to be printed in 1960. Having a substantial knowledge of the modern history and contemporary politics of Indonesia and the Netherlands, with at least two years of residence in each of these countries and a command of both their languages, and having devoted two years of sustained research to the problem of Western New Guinea, he is perhaps uniquely qualified to write this study. Prior to embarking on an academic career Mr. Bone served as Political Officer in the American Embassy in The Hague from 1947 to 1949 and as Senior Political Officer in the American Embassy in Djakarta from 1951 to 1953. In 1954 he resigned from the Foreign Service and entered Cornell University as a fellow in its Southeast Asia Program. From January through September 1956 he carried out research in the Netherlands under a fellowship from the Ford Foundation. He received his Ph.D. degree from Cornell University in 1957, and has since then been Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Tulane University. Ithaca, New York September 15, 1958 George McT. Kahin Director

V ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Above all the writer would like to express his appreciation to Dr. George McT. Kahin of Cornell University, who served as director of the original dissertation on which this monograph is based and without whose constant thought- fulness and encouragement this would never have been written. It is a pleasure, also to make public acknowledgment of the deep debt owed the Foreign Areas Training Program of the Ford Foundation and the Modern Indonesia Project of Cornell University. The writer had the privilege of holding a Ford Fellowship for a year and a half as a result of which he was enabled to spend nine months in the Netherlands and the remainder of the time at Cornell in the course of doing research on the Irian problem,, The Cornell Modern Indonesia Project was gracious enough to provide financial support during the Summer of 1957. I am much indebted to various Dutch and Indonesian informants who were gracious enough to assist me both with ideas and materials. In particular, while in the Netherlands, invaluable assistance was given me by the staff of the Library of the Ministry of Overseas Territories, above all by Miss Jeanette Bikart and Miss E. Bonniset. Also I am indebted to Dr. A. Beeukes of the Information Section of the Indonesian Representation in The Hague, to Mr. A. Kamil, presently Public Affairs and Information Officer of the Indonesian Delegation to the United Nations, to Mr, J, Rookmaaker, Chief of the Indonesian Section of the Netherlands Foreign Office, Mr, J. A. vanBeuge, Chief of the New Guinea Section of the Ministry of Overseas Territories, Dr. J. A. Pieters, special advisor to the same ministry, Professors

J. H. A. Logemann, F M., Baron van Asbeck, both of the University of Leiden and to Professor W. F. Wertheim of the University of Amsterdam. Further thanks are owed to Mr. Theodore Droogh of Elsevier’s Weekly, Mr. A. Stempels, parliamentary correspondent of the Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, Mr. Dres Ecker of Het Parool and to”Miss Nei Slis, Associated Press correspondent in The Hague. A particular debt of gratitude is due Dr. Alistair M. Taylor of Ottawa, Canada and to His Excellency, Lambertus N. Palar, Ambassador of Indonesia to Canada, for their invaluable assistance in connection with the section on the Round Table Conference. Special thanks finally are due Mr. A, van Marie

VI for his assistance in keeping me abreast of current political developments in the Netherlands over the last two years, to Mr. Idrus N. Djajadiningrat for his stimulating criticism in the course of my writing of the original dissertation and finally to Mr. Herbert Feith for his thoughtful comments on the draft of the present monograph. It only remains to be said that all opinions and value judgments expressed in this monograph are the sole responsibility of the writer and should not be attributed to any of the individuals mentioned above, to the Ford Foundation or to the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. The writer is also responsible for the translation of the various passages and references taken from Dutch and Indonesian sources. Tulane University,Robert C. Bone, Jr. New Orleans, Louisiana August 27, 1958

Vll TABLE OF CONTENTS CHAPTERPage

I.BACKGROUND FACTS................................... 1
Physical and Ethnic............................ 1
Economy and Resources. ......................... 6
II.THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE DUTCH CLAIMS TO
WESTERN NEW GUINEA................................. 9
III.THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRIAN
ISSUE, 1946 - 1949......................... 24
From the Independence Proclamation through the Den Pasar Conference, August, 1945 -
December, 1946. ...................... 24
From Den Pasar to the Transfer of Sovereignty, January, 1947 - December,

1949...................................... 41 The Dynamics of the Round Table Conference,
August-November, 1949.................... 47
West Irian in the Round Table Conference,
August-November, 1949.................... 56
IV.THE IRIAN ISSUE IN DUTCH-INDONESIAN
RELATIONS, 1950 - 1953....................... 73
Through the Failure of the December,
1950,Conference...................... 73
The Irian Question as an Indonesian and Dutch Domestic Political Issue, January -
March, 1951..................................... 97
The Netherlands............................... 100
The Widening Rift,· 1951 -1953................. 109

viii CHAPTER

V. THE IRIAN ISSUE IN THE WORLD FORUM,
1953 - 1958........................
Through the Ninth and Tenth UN Assemblies,
1953 - 1956...............................
Embittered Stalemate, 1956 - 1958.........
Page 120 120 144

ix INTRODUCTION On the agenda of the last four UN General Assemblies has appeared an item entitled, "The Question of West Irian (West New Guinea)." Ostensibly the point at issue is whether the Dutch or the Indonesian flag should fly over the western half of that vast and primitive island—Australian rule of the eastern section being disputed by no one. (1) Seemingly here is but another one of those endless territorial disputes which so burden the pages of history. But even the most cursory examination of the problem's inner dynamics reveals otherwise. For West Irian, like Goa, is one of those areas in the world which has acquired symbolic value far in excess of intrinsic worth. The Irian issue em- bodies many aspects of that colonial-anti-colonial dichotomy which so divides the new Afro-Asian nations and the present and former colonial powers of the West, To Indonesia and its Afro-Asian supporters the issue is basically a very simple one; End colonialism now.' For Indonesia, so long as the Dutch flag flies over West Irian the national revolution is not fulfilled, brother Indonesians yet remain under colonial rule and the former colonial rulers still hold a base for possible subversive activities at the nation’s very doorstep. Further, as the legal heir to the former Netherlands Indies, the Indonesian Republic considers that its territory should extend ffom the island of Sabang, off the northern tip of Sumatra, to Merauke on the border of Australian New Guinea, The Netherlands has based its case for retention of the area on its supposed exclusion from the terms of the Hague Round Table Conference of 1949 at which the Dutch finally

(1) This point has been repeatedly emphasized by responsible Indonesian spokesmen from 1950 to the present. Most recently in the course of the Irian discussions in the sessions of the First Committee of the Twelfth General Assembly of the UN, Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Permanent Indonesian Delegate to the UN, stated on November 26, 1957, "As far as Indonesia is concerned, we have no claims on any territories which are not part of the former Nether East Indies, today called Indonesia. Let no one suggest otherwise or advance dangerous theories in this respect."

X accepted the fact of Indonesian independence, the backwardness of the native peoples and a newly-discovered moral mission to prepare them for self-government at some unspecified future date. Nor have the dynamics of internal politics failed to play a role. For a large and politically influential section of Dutch opinion, the concept of a "moral mission" is a valid one which, come what may, the Netherlands is under obligation to God and the world at large to implement. Yet another group feels that this last fragment of a once-great colonial empire must be retained at all cost, as a symbol of national greatness and for its alleged value as a defensive bastion in the Pacific. Nor is this latter view held by Dutch sources alone. Australia, grimly remembering the Pacific War and fearful of future aggressions, feels itself menaced unless the whole of New Guinea remains in western hands. For others in the western group of powers, most notably France, Portugal and Belgium, support of the Netherlands is a necessity for the preservation of their own colonial possessions. And for the United States the Irian question poses yet again one of the most harrassing of post-World War II problems. It is equally dangerous to affront the public opinion of needed European allies or to appear to block the aspirations for political and economic equality of the new Afro-Asian nations representing that uncommitted one-third of mankind. The first course means the disruption of an essential barrier against Soviet expansion in Europe. The second is to present the communist propaganda apparatus with certified proof of its constantly reiterated charges of covert American sympathy for the colonial cause. The very complexity of the various currents of international and domestic politics which influence the dynamics of the West Irian problem make it impossible to examine the question solely in terras of its contemporary setting. As a basis for understanding, some attention must first be paid to developments long before the Netherlands and Indonesia went their separate ways in December, 1949. It is to a brief examination of this background that we turn first.

CHAPTER I THE BACKGROUND FACTS Physical and Ethnic (1) New Guinea, largest of the world's islands after Green- land, lies in the southwest Pacific, directly north of Australia and at the eastern extremity of the Indonesian archipelago. Its north coast is south of the Equator by less than one degree (19') and its fifteen-hundred mile length stretches between approximately the 130th and 150th parallels. Netherlands New Guinea, occupying the western half of the island, lies between the 130th and 141st parallels while its 151,000 square miles comprises approximately 47% of the entire island's 312,329 square mile total. In terms of its position between Asia and Australasia, New Guinea, "together with the main Indonesian islands," forms part of "a discontinuous bridge" between them. (2) In common with the islands included within the political boundaries of the Indonesian Republic, it forms part of an area of gradual change from Asian to Australasian flora and fauna types. (3) In this connection it is not without interest that New Guinea, the entire Philippine archipelago and all of the Indonesian islands to the east of Borneo and Bali share the distinction of being to the east of the limit for typically Asian zoological types as defined in the boundary drawn in the latter half of the nineteenth century by the famous naturalist, A. R. Wallace, founder of the modern science of zoogeography.

(1)Probably the most authoritative reference source on this topic for the non-Dutch reader is R. W. van Bemmelen's The Geology of Indpnesia, in particular volume IA (The Hague";
1949). Among the extensive range of Dutch language sources, probably the most accessible and compact, yet authoritative, are various chapters in the encyclopedic (three volumes) Nieuw Guinea, de ontwikkeling op economisch, sociaal en cultureel gebied in Nederlands en Australisch Nieuw-Guinea, under the chief editorship of W. C~. Klein ('s-Gravenhage, 1953-1954).
(2)W. Gordon East and 0. Η. K. Spate, The Changing Map of Asia (London, New York, 2nd ed., rev., 1953), p. 184.

Of the role played by Wallace's line in delimiting the boundary between Asian and Australian fauna, a recent geographical study comments, "By far the richest zoological group is that spreading from Asia. For a long time Wallace's line was held to demarcate these zoological types; Wallace himself drew the boundary just west of Lombok and Celebes but Huxley later extended it to include the Philippines in the 'Australian'
zone.... Wallace's line is thus now best thought of as the
eastward limit of the typically Asiatic zoological types;... (4) And it might be noted that, in the same sense, the equally well-known line of Weber, just to the west of the Indonesian islands of Halmahera and Buru, is considered as indicating the median point between the eastern extension of Asian fauna and the western extension of Australian. (5) As a reference to the map will indicate, there is thus a considerable extent of territory in the eastern part of Indonesia, comprising the Celebes and all of the islands east of Bali, in which there is an equi-balance between the Asian and Australian faunal types with the transition towards the domi- nance of either so gradual as to exclude precise delimitation. There is, perhaps, no more graphic illustration of the role played by the Indonesian archipelago as a connecting link between the Asian and Australasian spheres. In topographic terms, New Guinea is characterized by extremes ranging from the sweltering, swampy lowlands of the coast to snow-capped mountain peaks soaring up to 16,000 feet. And, as with its topography, New Guinea's flora presents striking contrasts. Again the transitional nature of New Guinea and the islands in the eastern half of the Indonesian archipelago is apparent. For, while most of New Guinea's flora is more closely related to the types found in Australia rather than in Asia, it does possess various types of flora found as far west in the Indonesian archipelago as the island of Celebes. (6) Of its fauna, it has, in common with Australia, a wide range of both marsupials and horny anteaters. And, of all its fauna, its "extraordinary" bird life, comprising some 650 native species, is most outstanding. (7) It is from this

(3)E. ΪΓ GT Dobby, Southeast Asia (London, 3rd ed., 1953),
p. 72.~
(4)Dobby, op. cit., pp. 71-72„
(5)van Bemmelen, op. cit., IA, 4.
(6)Atlas van Tropisch Nederland ('s-Gravenhage, 1938), Plantengeographie (map), p7 7.

category that has come its animal product of major economic value, the plumes of the birds of paradise, the trade in which is now prohibited. But it is not only in terms of geographic position, flora and fauna that New Guinea and the islands of the eastern provinces of Indonesia represent a transitional area. For this same characteristic is true of the ethnic and linguistic situations. Illustrative of this transitional aspect is an article written in 1956 by a Dutch anthropologist, P. J. Kleiwig de Zwaan, on the topic of "The Papuans of Dutch New Guinea, A Physico-Anthropological Survey." Summarizing the results of various Dutch anthropological surveys in the area of eastern Indonesia, including New Guinea, he writes: (8) ... I think that one may definitely assume that there is a Papuan element in these regions, given the fact that the Papuan element gradually decreases from New Guinea to the more westerly-lying islands in the Indonesian archipelago... Lamars concludes that a blood type occurs in the eastern part of the Indonesian Archipelago which forms, as it were, a link between the Australian and Malayan types. The term "Papuan" was first apparently applied to the indigenous inhabitants (9) by the Malay peoples of the Moluccas

78) Antiquity and Survival, An International Review of Traditional Art and Culture, New Guinea Number, published in collaboration with the Royal Association "Oost & West" (The Hague, 1956), p. 322. There is much material, both in Dutch and English, on the ethnic and linguistic aspects of New Guinea. The best general guide is to be found in the Bibliographie van Nederlands-Nieuw-Guinea, compiled by DrT r IC Galis (Netherlands Ministry of Overseas Territories, 1955). An American edition was issued in 1956 by the Southeast Asia Studies Program of Yale University. The April, 1957, issue of the quarterly Nieuw Guinea Studien (Jaargang 1, Nr. 2) contains (pp'. “91-105) an article in English by the well-known Utrecht University anthropologist, H. Th. Fischer, on the topic of "Recent Ethnographical Studies on Netherlands New Guinea" listing some 72 studies in Dutch and English published since World War II, the majority since 1949.
(9) It is generally assumed that the Papuans entered the island at a very early date, forming a second wave of migration after the Negrito peoples. See M. W. Sterling, The Native Peoples of New Guinea, Smithsonian Institute War-Background Studies No. Nine (Washington, 1943), p. 17.

to describe the woolly hair which seemed to them to be most characteristic of the coastal peoples they met on mainland New Guinea. (10) It is in the western coastal areas of New Guinea, particularly along the shores of the Bogelkop and the Bomberai Peninsula (see map), that an admixture of Indonesian elements has taken place within historic times. For, from at least the fifteenth century, and probably much earlier, merchant-pirates from the Moluccas and farther west established petty, and usually ephemeral, states in the seacoast areas, generally based on a convenient harbor and existing by virtue of trade, piracy and slave-raiding. Such as they were, they represented New Guinea's most advanced type of political organization. (11) It has been only in the coastal areas occupied by these petty states that Islam has ever been able to gain a foothold on mainland New Guinea. (12) Of the character of the indigenous peoples, a Dutch economist as of 1952 could observe: (13) (10)The term is presumed to come from the Malay pua-pua, meaning crinkly or woolen hair. This explanation is accepted both by Stirling and the writer of the article on "Papoea's" which appears in Encyclopaedic van Nederlandsch Oost-Indie ('s-Gravenhage, Leiden, 1917), III, 298-338. This article contains an excellent biographical listing. (11)For a description of such states still existing in the second half of the nineteenth century, see the report entitled Nieuw Guinea, Ethnographisch en Natuurkundig, 0nderzocht beschreven in 1858 door een Nederlandsch-Indische Commissie (short name; Etna Report) in the Bijdragen totde Taal-, Land en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie (referred to hereafter as BKI) (Den Haag, 1862), Π7 196-200. (12)Christian missionary activity seems to have made slow progress. The Protestant missions, which began operating in 1855, listed only 129,240 converts in their annual report for 1951 and the Catholics, who were not permitted to establish mission posts until 1905 are much weaker. See the articles on Missie (Protestant) and Zending (Catholic) in Nieuw Guinea, op. cit., I, 82-159 and 160- 229 respectively. of Western New Guinea's presently estimated 700,000 population, the vast majority are pagan. (13)R. J. Stratenus, Een voorlopig onderzoek naar de economische vooruitzichten in Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea (Amsterdam, 1952), p7 2 and p. 10.

The Papuan people of New Guinea belong to the most primitive in the world. Their development stands in some respects, for example by their complete lack of ceramic art, even still behind the culture of the Neolithic period, the new stone age, which in Europe must be dated at about 2000 years before the beginning of our era. For centuries New Guinea remained isolated from all contact with the outside world...Western influence only began to make itself felt along the coast several decades ago; the majority of the Papuans still live in their old state of virtually complete isolation... It is difficult to characterize the Papuan economy because New Guinea is inhabited by a greater number of peoples and races than Europe, differing from each other in stature, language, religion, intellectual development and ways of life. The Papuan lives in a greater or smaller, usually even a very small social unit, which is not only economically self-sufficient, but also, in all other respects, is enclosed within itself... Sometimes, separated by not more than several kilometers from each other, there are groups with languages as little related as Dutch and Russian. A specific example of the amazing diversity of languages which exists among the indigenous population was afforded by an investigation made into the languages to be found in a single administrative sub-district of Hollandia, in the vicinity of the international boundary with Australia. In this limited area alone there were no less than seventeen Papuan-based and four Austronesian-based languages. (14) And in the field of linguistics, as in other areas of reference, Western New Guinea manifests its transitional character For, while various of its dialects have Austronesian affini-, ties, others are related to various dialects spoken on the islands of the Moluccas. (15) Under the circumstances it is not surprising that in common with the rest of Indonesia, Malay has long been the lingua franca for Netherlands New Guinea. Of this the director of protestant missionary activity in the area has observed: (16) (14)ΪΕ K. J. Cowan, "De Austronesisch-Papoea'se tallgrens in de onderafdeeling Hollandia (Nieuw-Guinea)," Tijdschrift Nieuw-Guinea, Aflevering 4 (November ,1952) pp. 133-143; Aflevering 5 (Januari 1953) pp. 166-177; Aflevering 6 (Maart 1953), pp. 201-206. (15)J. Boelaars, "Talen," Nieuw Guinea, op. cit., I, 78 (language distribution map).

Malay is currently so acclimatized on New Guinea that in the development program thousands of guilders annually are expended for Malay reading material, tens of thousands of Malay bibles are in circulation as well as song books, Christian reading material and books from the Indonesian book markets. In its report to the United Nations for 1954, the Dutch administration estimated Western New Guinea's indigenous population at approximately 700,000.(17) This was divided approximately equally between those tribal groups brought under administration (376,532) and an additional estimated 300,000 still in a completely primitive state and not administered by Dutch authority. Additionally there were 14,000 Europeans and 16,000 Asians. Economy and Resources (18) Western New Guinea’s commercial contact with the rest of the world, in one item of merchandise at least, is apparently of long-standing. For as early as the eighth century, Papuan slaves seem to have been present in the great South-Sumatran-based empire of Srivijaya. (19) And indeed until late in the nineteenth century, New Guinea's chief items of export (16)I. S. Kijne, "Onderwijs en Volksopvoeding," Nieuw Guinea, III, 323.------------- (17)Report on Netherlands New Guinea for the year 1954 (Ministry of Overseas Territories, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hague), Appendix IV (f). (18)There is much material in Dutch on this topic but comparatively little in English. Perhaps the best English-language source is the annual report on "Netherlands New Guinea" submitted by the Dutch Government to the United Nations under the provisions of Article 73 (e) of the Charter. (19)See J. N. Krom, Hindoe-Javaansche Gescheidenis ('s- Gravenhage, 1931j^ pp. 122-123 and 309. For information on this in ancient Chinese sources, see W. P. Groenveldt, "Notes on the Malay Archipelago and Malacca, compiled from Chinese sources," in Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunst en Wetenschappen (Batavia en 's-Hgge, 1880).

were slaves and birds of paradise feathers. Very shortly after it first established contact, the Netherlands East India Company reached the realistic conclusion that New Guinea's chief value was as a barrier to intrusions by other European powers into the jealously-guarded monopoly of the Spice Islands in the Moluccas. And as late as 1826, a Dutch naval officer, in the course of an exploring visit to the south coast, listed as the chief items of commerce, "massoy- bark, nutmegs, trepang, tortoise-shell, pearls, edible birds- nests, birds of paradise,...’’ (20) Nor, since the initial seventeenth century disappoint- ments of the East India Company over the meagreness and poor quality of New Guinea's coal deposits, have decades of hopeful expectation and constant search revealed much that is en- couraging concerning New Guinea's mineral resources. (21) Indeed to list the minerals and mineral products which geologists have concluded New Guinea does not possess, is to name most of the commercially important items in this category. To give only a partial listing, no evidence has been found to date to indicate that Western New Guinea possesses any resources of tin, bauxite, lead, zinc, manganese, platinum, diamonds, tungsten, iron, chromite, sulfer, iodine mercury ores or phosphates. (22) And the results achieved to date in the efforts to ex- ploit the one mineral resource, crude oil, which New Guinea appears to possess in any quantity at all, have been uniformly disappointing. Since 1936 the Netherlands New Guinea Petro- leum Company has invested, through December, 1955, more than $100,000,000 with a return for the same period of approximately $25,000,000 while future prospects continue dubious. Although in 1956, raw oil constituted New Guinea's chief item of export to the value of approximately $5,000,000, appromi- mately 80% of all exports, (23) its negligible importance in (20)D. H. Kolf, Voyages of the Dutch Brig of War, Dourga, etc., translated from the Dutch by George Windsor Earle (London, 1840), p. 342. (21)For current (and unencouraging) reports on this topic, see Report on Netherlands New Guinea for the Year 1954 presented by the Netherlands Government to the Secretary-General of the United Nations, pp. 3 and~4"and Report... 1956, pp. 2 and 3.’ (22)van Bemmelen, op. cit., II, 88-241, passim. (23)Report on Netherlands New Guinea for the year 1956, op. cit., Appendix XXIV.——————

δ terms of world production is obvious when compared with Kuwait's approximately 400,000 barrels (New Guinea - 2600) or even Indonesia's production of 94,000 barrels. (24) Nor do New Guinea's soil resources offer any more hope for agricultural than for mineral riches. In contrast, for example, to the rich volcanic soil of Java, New Guinea's contains large deposits of limestone and coral while, over the centuries, pounding tropical rains and blazing suns have combined to wash and bake out much of the organic matter needed for successful crop cultivation. Added to this are the difficulties of cultivation in the extensive areas of hilly or mountainous terrain. All in all, it is not surprising that in terms of the administration of the area, heavy annual subsidies from the Netherlands Government, averaging between $10,000,000 and $15,000,000 have been necessary in the past with but slight prospects of their cessation in the foreseeable future. (25) Certainly the paucity of productive soil, the poverty of the natural resources, the primitiveness of the people and the difficulties of communication give little reason to question the official conclusion that, "From the economic viewpoint, Netherlands New Guinea is still one of the least developed areas of the world." (26) Nor, can there be much question, as a recent study has observed, "...that the loss of New Guinea, from the economic viewpoint, can only signify a gain for the Netherlands." (27) But, undoubtedly correct as this analysis is, now as in the past, it continues to be the curious destiny of this deficit economy area to have its possession disputed for strategic, psychological and emotional reasons far removed from any concern with its basic intrinsic value. It is to the dynamics of that struggle that the remainder of this monograph is devoted. (24)The World Almanac and Book of Facts for 1958, Harry Hansen, editor (New York, 1958), p. 698. (25)Actually the government subsidies for 1955 and 1956 amounted to approximately $21,000,000 and $16,000,000 respectively. See Report...1956, p. 52. (26)Report...1955, op. cit., p. 13. (27)J. W. H. Leslie-Miller, Het economisch aspect van het Nieuw-Guinea vraagstuk ('s-Gravenhage, n.d., but probably T935)“, p? 73.---------

CHAPTER II THE LEGAL BASIS OF THE DUTCH CLAIMS TO WESTERN NEW GUINEA In 1545 New Guinea first came within European ken when Ortiz de Retes landed on the north coast and took possession of the entire island, which he dubbed "Nueva Guinea," in the name of the King of Spain. Myth and legend aside, (1) our historical knowledge of New Guinea dates from this event when the early European traders in the Moluccan Archipelago became vaguely aware of its existence. But even by then its role as a passive pawn of history seems to have been well-established and to a small degree it had already figured in the history of the Moluccan Archipelago. For various of the petty rulers in the area alleged claims both to certain of its off-shore islands and scattered areas along the western and southern coasts based on the sporadic slave-raiding and trading contacts of past centuries. (2)

(1)In addition to the references cites in Note 19 above, see H. Kern’s "De invloed der Indische Beschaving op Java en omliggende eilanden" in his Verspreide Geschriften ('s-Gravenhage, 1928), XV, 182-183, for comment on a possible reference to New Guinea’s now-capped mountain peaks in the famous Sanskrit epic, the Ramayana. See the same source, volumes VII and VIII, for the Dutch trans lation of the famous medieval Javanese epic, the Nagara- kertagama, which would seem to indicate some connections between Western New Guinea and the empire of Madjapahit. For critical comment on this, see Kern, VII, 241, Krom, op. cit., pp. 416-418 and C. C. Berg, "Javanese Histori- ography—- A synopsis of its evolution," Historical Writing on the Peoples of Asia-South East Asia'Semlnar, Univer-~ sit'y of London Conference (mimeographed), n. p., n. d., p: 6 and "Oe Sadeng-Oorlog,'' Indonesie, V (1951), 413.
(2)See such sources as A. Haga's Nederlandsch Nieuw Guinea en de Papoesche Eilanden Historische Bijdrage, 1500-1883 (Batavia, 's-Hage, 1884), ΐξ J~. iCdeJonge, De opkomst van het Nederlandsch gezag in Oost-Indie (1595-Γ610) (’s- Gravenhage, Amsterdam, 1865), III; Robide van der AA, Reizen naar Nederlandsch Nieuw-Guinea (Bilage A, "Over de rechten van Batjan, Tidor en Gebe opNieuw-Guinea en de Papoesche eilanden) ('s-Gravenhage, 1879).

But except for these vague and perfunctory assertions of sovereignty, New Guinea attracted even less attention in the seventeenth century than previously. For within the Moluccan Archipelago itself two important developments were occurring. The first of these was the mounting struggle during the century's first half between the island kingdoms of Ternate and Tidore for naval and commercial hegemony. The second was the explosive appearance on the scene of the first European voyagers to reach the Spice Islands, towards the fabled riches of which they had been groping their way ever since the end of the Middle Ages. Initiated by the spectacular surge of Portuguese expansion into the East which had entered on its brief but hectic zenith when daGama turned the Cape, the first half of the seventeenth century saw the Portuguese, Dutch, Spanish, English and French, in decreasing order of potency, vying with each other for control of the golcondan riches of the Moluccan spice islands. (3) In a complex and shifting series of alliances, comparable to the diplomatic maneuvers of Renaissance Italy, native po- tentates and foreign.intruders plotted and fought with, for, among and against each other. By 1660 the eclipse of Portugal, the progressive decline of Spain and the expulsion of the English and French East India Companies from the Moluccas left the Dutch as the dominant European power. Nor is it any misnomer to term such a commercial enterprise as the Dutch East India Company (Vereenigde Oostindische Compagnie) a "power." Like its English counterpart in India, the next hundred and thirty years were to see it functioning as the major political influence in the whole of the Indonesian archipelago with its own fleets and armies and complex series of diplomatic alliances with its vassal states. (4) For a full historical account of this conflict, see P. A. Tiele's "De Europeers in den Maleischen archipel, 1509- 1619" published in eight parts between 1877 and 1886 in the annual issue of the Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie; F. W. Stapel, editor, Geschiedenis van Nederlandsch Indie (Amsterdan, 1943), III; D. CL EL Hall, A History of South-East Asia (London,

1955), pp. 224-265.---------------------------
(4) Volumes III and IV of Stapels' Geschiedenis, op. cit., are devoted to the Company. For a good but brief account in English, see J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India, A Study of Plural Economy (New York’, 1944), pp. 20-53. For a comprehensive compilation of the diplomatic treaties concluded by the Company, see the Corpus-Diplomaticum Nederlando-Indicum referred to in the following footnote.

In the Moluccas the foremost of these vassal states was the Sultanate of Tidore which for the first half of the seventeenth century had been the ally of the Portuguese and then the Spanish in their losing struggle against the Dutch. But a palace revolution of 1657 placed Tidore firmly and permanently in the Dutch camp. Unchallenged in its hegemony by 1660 the Dutch East India Company undertook to regulate the territorial claims of its Moluccan vassal states, including the conflicting and vague sovereignty claims to islands and areas of New Guinea. The result was the Company-dictated treaty of December, 1660, which sought to define the domains of the Sultans of Tidore, Ternate and Batjan. (5) As a Dutch report of the eighteenth century described the text of the treaty: (6) The lands, which would belong to each of the
three kings, were specifically distributed....
Under the King of Tidor (various areas on the nearby island of Halamahera). „., so also with the Papuans, or all of their islands;... By this contract the Papuan islands in general were placed under the King of Tidor without being specifically enumerated but on this question it is noted by the Government in a letter of January 14, 1671, that the Papuans begin with the corner of Onin westward along the land, further that the chief islands consist of Waigamo, Salawatti, Batanta, Masowal or Misool, Wigeoe or Poele Wardjoe. And commenting on the treaty from a perspective of two hundred years, Colonel Haga, whose two volume study (see footnote no. 2) was based on a thorough combing of the old Batavia archives, observes: (7)

(5)Heeres, E., compiler volumes II-V, and Stapel, F. W., compiler volume VI, Corpus Diplomaticum Nederlando-Indicum, verzameling van politieke contracten en verdere verdragen door de Nederlanders in het Oosten gesloten in the Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde van Neder-Tandsch-Indie, ('s-Gravenhage, 1931), II, 338-344 (referred to hereafter as Corpus-Diplomaticum, vol. no., BKI (year).
(6)deKlerck, R., van Mijlendonk, J. E. and Alting, W. A., Rapport over 's-Compagnies Regt op de Groote-Oost (1761) in Verhandelingen van het Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen (Batavia, 1868), XXXIII, 9. (Referred to hereafter as Rapport over 's-Compagnies Regt.)
(7)Haga, op. cit., I, 76-77.

We know, however, that the Netherlander at that time from their own observations knew nothing-or almost nothing,...of the Papuan islands. Actually, therefore, they did not know what territory it was that they placed under Tidore, nor on what grounds Tidore's right stood;... The assignment of "the Papuan islands in general" to Tidore rather than to Ternate or Batjan, which at this time certainly had equally as valid claims, (8) seems to have been an acci- dental result of the balance of power policy the Company was following at this time for the purpose of trying "to keep the activities of these eastern princes always in balance." (9) But by the time, a few years later, the need again arose to define the sovereignty claims over New Guinea, or any part of it, the situation had changed radically. For, in 1663, the Spanish, completely isolated by the Tidorese shift in alliance six years previously, withdrew their last garrison from the Moluccas and left the Dutch East India Company as the only European power in the area. And with this action came to an end, for all practical purposes, the sovereignty claims of the Spanish Crown over New Guinea which had been asserted in the previous century. (10) And, except in theory, it was to remain an unwanted and largely un- claimed land for the next two centuries. Neither the poverty of its natural resources, the fierceness of its barbaric peoples nor the unhealthfulness of the coastal areas offered any inducements in this connection. For the East India Company New Guinea’s sole function was that of serving as a barrier against unwanted intrusions into the jealously-guarded Dutch preserve of the Moluccan

(8)On the Batjanese claims, see Robide van der AA, op. cit., Bilage A, and pp. 353-57.
(9)Corpus Diplomaticum, op. cit., II (1650-1675), BKI, 87 ΤΓ93Ί), 337.------- --------- — (10)For a comprehensive survey of boudary problems pertaining to the Netherlands East Indies, see J. E. Sturler's Het grondgebied van Nederlandsch Oost-Indie in verband detractstern met Spanje, Engeland en Portugal (Leiden, 1881). Commenting’ on the application of the treaty of Utrecht, Haga (I,
196) notes that Spain "tacitly abandoned all rights on New Guinea” while that "the rights of the Company on that island stood only on the Tidorese claims which were still not yet recognized, is clearly evident."

Spice Islands. And within the sea area of Western New Guinea and the Moluccas the Company was equally concerned with the maintenance of peace and order for the profitable transaction of its business affairs. Yet, like all commercial concerns with stockholders anxiously awaiting their annual dividends, (11) it was confronted with the problem of achieving the maximum results at the minimum cost. Both in connection with the utilization of New Guinea as a barrier against intrusion by other European powers into the Indies and the curbing of piracy in the Moluccas, the Company found a useful instrument in the new vassal state of Tidore. And the second of these efforts to make use of Tidorese services, seems to have flowed logically from the first. For the chief bases of the pirates which infested the archipelago were precisely those same "Papuan islands in general" which had been assigned to Tidore under the treaty of 1660. Indeed, clause seven of that same treaty stipulated that, "...the King of Tidor pledges, in (the interest of) doing good, that his dependent Papuans in every respect will definitely be restrained in their raids on the lands and peoples of Ternate or of the dependencies of the Honorable Company." (12) Consistently refusing to learn from disillusioning experience, first the Company and then the Netherlands Indies Government for almost two centuries incorporated variants of this clause in treaty after treaty with Tidore. And this particular series of treaties with Tidore over a period of almost three hundred years furnished but one thread in the weaving of that curiously complex feudal pattern by which Dutch authority ruled over the Indonesian Archipelago. For from beginning to end of Dutch rule there was never any uniform administrative system as such. Rather there was a patchwork of feudal obligations by virtue of which on the maps of the world the’ Archipelago was designated as the Dutch East Indies. But for Western New Guinea, as for so many other areas, this was possible only because the local rulers were vassals of the Sultans of Tidore who, in turn, were essentially feudal vassals of the Batavia regime. (13) (II) And handsome dividends indeed since "The Company managed to pay dividends at an average rate of 18 per cent a year over the whole period of its rule from 1602 to

1800." J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India: A Study of Plural Economy (New York," Cambridge, 1944), p. 49. (12) Corpus Diplomaticum, Tweede Deel (1650-1675), BKI, 87 ΤΪ33Ί), 343.------------------------------------—----

And the legal fictions by which this state of affairs was created were long in the making. And, as we shall see, their making was not alone a question of time but was shaped by the exigencies of international politics. Initially, once the need to keep the native states from siding with another European group had been removed, Dutch authorities were reluctant to accept at face value the Tidorese claims of hegemony over the various little island and mainland coastal kingdoms of Western New Guinea. The 1667 (second) contract with Tidore, for example, assigned the Papuan islands to Tidore "insofar as they belong under the sovereignty of Tidore." (14) And this same vagueness appears in a contract of 1689.(15) Quite beyond our scope is any discussion of the various documents, letters, treaties and personal accounts which seem to shed light on either the extent of Tidorese sovereignty, actual or alleged, or its acceptance by the Dutch authorities .(16) But since the theory of Tidorese sovereignty over not merely the Papuan islands but also areas of mainland New Guinea fitted in so well with Company policy, it was included in the various contracts of the eighteenth century and indeed acquired a certain sanctity, as so often happens, merely by virtue of repeated statement. (17) And while Company officials, (13)It is curious that no study has ever been made of Dutch administration from this viewpoint. Actually the Dutch East Indies, as of December, 1941, was a curiously anach- ronistic (and flourishing) example of the functioning of a feudal political system. (14)Corpus Diplomaticum, op. cit., 352. (15)Ibid., Vierde Peel (1676-1691), BKI, 91 (1934), pp. 499-506 (16)See Haga, op. cit., I; P. A. Leupe, De reizen der Nederlanders naar Nieuw-Guinea en de papoesche eilanden in de I7e en 18e eeuw in the Bijdragen tot de taal-, land-, en volkenkunde van Neder1andsch-Indie, 22 (1875), 's-Gravenhage: ML Nijhoff; and the Rapportover ’s-Compagnies Regt., op. cit. (17)See the text of the contracts of May 21, 1705, January 2, 1709, June 21, 1728, June 23, 1733, and February 7, 1757, Corpus Diplomaticum, Vierde Deel (1691-1725), BKI, 93 (1935), pp. 236-238, 310-314; Vifde Deel (1726^T752), BKI 96 (1938), pp. 25-32, 153-157; ~Zesde' Deel (1753-1799), collected and compiled by F, W. Stapel, 's-Gravenhage, 1955, pp. 123-128.

exhibiting a high capacity for Orwellian "double-think,” were frank in indicating their scepticism as to the validity of Tidorese claims they were equally ready to accept them at face value, and sometimes more, when it served the purpose of hindering other European penetration into the Moluccas. (18) And this remained true to the very end of the eighteenth century when Company rule was terminated and authority was assumed by the Dutch Government as such. (19) Most significant of the eighteenth century contracts had been that of 1779 which had declared, "that the state of Tidore is no more in alliance, but now is a vassal in relation to the Netherlands Company,..." (20) But if the eighteenth century had seen Tidorese sovereignty claims on New Guinea treated with sceptical reserve, the nineteenth saw their validity officially proclaimed as a matter of solemn state policy. Indeed, at the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars, New Guinea, for the greater part, was in as much of a masterless status as it had been a hundred years earlier after the disappearance of the old Spanish claims. Further, the only state which had actual international recognition of any rights on mainland New Guinea was neither Great Britain nor the newly-formed Kingdom of the Netherlands but rather the Sultanate of Tidore. Writing in the early 1870's a Dutch scholar summarized the basis for the inclusion of Western New Guinea in the Netherlands Indies as follows:(21) A claim was made by the Sultan of Tidore on the western section of New Guinea as his dependency, and, as this Ruler was a vassal of the Netherlands Government, that section of this island was also considered as belonging to Netherlands India. Nor during the course of the nineteenth century did this anom- alous relationship of New Guinea to the rest of the, then, (18)In both the 18th and 19th century, England was the greatest source of uneasiness in this connection. (19)Actually as of 1799, the United Netherlands was a French vassal state. The Netherlands Indies were seized by Great Britain in 1810 and restored at Vienna (1815). (20)Corpus Diplomaticum, Zesde Deel (1753-1799), VI, pp. 440-441. (21)J. J. Mainsma, Geschiedenis van de Nederlandsche OostIndische bezittingen, (Delft, 1872), II, 248.

Netherlands Indies change to any important extent. For much the same reasons as had motivated the Company in the eighteenth century, the Indies government also was reluctant to assume direct responsibility for a territory which seemed to offer such meagre possibilities. Hence, as in the previous century, the convenient fiction of Tidorese sovereignty was utilized as offering the most expedient and cheapest means of fore- stalling any annexionist ambitions by other European powers, above all England. (22) And it was precisely such fears which led to the most significant action taken in connection with the defining of sovereignty over New Guinea by Dutch authorities during the course of the nineteenth century. This was a secret proclamation by the Netherlands Indies Government in July, 1848, the effect of which was to lay claim to the whole of Western New Guinea from the 141st parallel in the name of the Sultan of Tidore and thus, in the customary indirect fashion, to include it within the boudaries of the Netherlands Indies. (23) And the reasons, as frankly summarized by a Dutch com- mentator within a year after the 1848 proclamation, were that; (24) The prosperity which Netherlands India enjoys, makes it imperative for the Government to neglect nothing to assure for itself a natural limit, precisely circumscribed in the extreme east...it was of the greatest importance for the masters of the archipelago that the protecting flag wave equally in the extreme east of their colonial domain. It was to this end that they were to take possession in 1828 of a very extended section of the western coast of New Guinea. This was the only way of pre-serving the Moluccas and the eastern archipelagoes {22) Nor did the fumbling effort of 1828 to establish a military post on New Guinea with its vague annexation proclamation make any real change in this general approach. See Haga, II, 86-87; also, Coutts Trotter, "New Guinea: A Summary of our Present Knowledge with regard to the Island," Proceedings of the Royal Geographic Society, V (1884),-------------------------------------- (23)Haga, II, 76-79. (24)J. Temminck, Coup-d’Oeil General sur les Possessions Neerlandaises dan 1'lnde Archipelagique (Leiden, 1849),

from all hostile blows, as well as all attempts at annexation on the part of the European powers,... This contemporary judgment would seem to offer a basis for the conclusion of a twentieth century Dutch civil servant to the effect that: (25) Tidorese sovereignty was defined, .by the Netherlands in the 19th century (above all for opportun- istic reasons and certainly with an eye on foreign powers). In 1824 there was adopted the indication given in the contract of 1814 that Tidore was considered as master of the Papuan islands to the west of the Vogelkop and of the four Noemfoorse districts, alias the Noemfoorse colonies, on the New Guinea coast. Certainly in neither the contemporary official or unofficial accounts of the proclamation of 1848 is there the slightest or even the most indirect of implications that any concern for the welfare of the native populations involved had any bearing on the actions taken. Commenting on the implications of the 1848 proclamation some ten years later (1859) a Government Commission observed: (26) In this connection, attention is drawn to article 3 of the still active agreement concluded on May 27th, 1824, with the Sultans of Ternate and Tidore, by which "supremacy and sovereignty of the Netherlands government over the states of Ternate and Tidore," is recognized (by these rulers) and to which complete submission, loyalty and obedience is pledged; together with the stipulation in article 5 of the agreement that the states of Ternate and Tidore will extend themselves over all these islands which were then in the possession of either of these crowns;"...one comes to the conclusion that the Netherlands Indies Government stands in no other (25)K. W. Galis, (Chief, Office of Population Affairs, Hollandia), "Geschiedenis," Nieuw Guinea, op. cit., I, 23-24. (26)Nieuw Guinea, ethnographisch en natuurkundig, onderzocht en beschreven in 1858 door een Nederlandsch-Indische Commissie (Etna Report), in Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde van Nederlandsch-Indie, 9 (Amsterdam, 1862), pp. 193-196, passim.

relationship to the above-described Netherlands territory on New Guinea than in the capacity of Overlord and Sovereign over the state of Tidore... it follows therefore that the political relationship, forbids, without further agreement with Tidore, by the nature of all supreme authority, any direct interference by the Sovereign in the immediate administration of these lands without the interme- diary of the ruling Vassal... Discussing the whole question of the New Guinea frontier almost a generation later (1883), the same English geographer quoted previously observed: (27) At all events it is clear that no valid act of annexation was performed by van Rochussen in 1848 nor probably was any such act intended... It seems probable that the slight show of possession hitherto kept up by Holland may, except perhaps as regards the western peninsula, be read as signi- fying no definite annexation, but merely a provisional claim...or it may simply represent the survival of a state .of matters now past or passing away,--a caution to all unlicensed traders to the New Guinea coast, and a barrier against intrusion from the east into her Moluccan preserves. But fiction though it was, the myth of Tidorese rule over the western half of the island furnished the basis for the boundary agreements of 1885 and 1910 with Great Britain and Germany which finally brought New Guinea into the power system of the modern world. (28) Typical of the "contracts" (treaties) concluded with Tidore during this period was that of 1872.(29) As previously, (27)Coutts Trotter, op. cit., pp. 214-215. (28)Galis, "Geschiedenis," Nieuw Guinea, I, 26-27. Great Britain staked its claim on Eastern New Guinea with a notable lack of enthusiasm for the project, but London's hand was forced by Australian fears (not unjustified) over Germany's intentions. Even at this early period, Australia—even before it had ceased to be geographical expression and become a nation--was acutely sensitive as to what power was in possession of New Guinea—or any portion thereof.

the Sultan and his officials continued to recognize (Article

1) that ’’the state of Tidore and its dependencies continued to constitute a part of the Netherlands Indies" and that the state existed only asa"f ief" of the Netherlands Indies with the Sultan and his officials acknowledging (Article 9) "the unquestioned right of the Netherlands-Indies Government, should it find such a measure desirable, to take into its own hands the administration of the whole state, or any section thereof." (30) Pinched by shortages of men and money neither the Dutch Colonial Ministry in the Hague nor the Indies Government at Batavia was eager to assume the financial and administrative burden represented by Western New Guinea. But the need to control the Tugeri headhunters of the south coast in the boundary area near British Papua forced the Government to include in the Indies budget for 1898 an item designated as, "For the establishment of administration on the Netherlands section of New Guinea, f. 115,000." (31) The only opposition offered in the Dutch Parliament came from the then miniscule group (3 members) of the newly-formed (1894) Social Democratic Party, the dynamic spokesman of which, van Koi, (32) advanced arguments very similar to those which the descendants of his political opponents of 1897 would put forward as a reason for New Guinea's retention by the Netherlands. Their modern adaptation of van Koi’s arguments represent an ironic volte- face. For as a case against the extension of the authority of the central government on Java over Western New Guinea, van Koi argued the often-stressed mid-twentieth century argument of the ethnic differences between Javanese and Papuan (29)For the full text, see Haga, op. cit., II, 439-454. It was virtually a word for wordrepetition of the contract of April, 1861. (30)Given the power relationship between the respective parties, Tidore obviously had little choice in the matter. (31)Verslag der Handelingen van de Tweede Kamer der Staten-Generaal gedurende het zittingsjaar 1897-1898 (n.p., n?d.), (14de Vergadering - 19 November 1897, Vaststelling der begroting van Nederlandsch-Indie voor het dienstjaar
1898), ρξ 170 (hereafter referred to as Handelingen, Tweede Kamer). (32)Henri Hubertus van Koi (1852-1925) was the first European Social Democratic parliamentarian with any practical knowledge of colonial affairs. In youth a civil servant on Java, he was one of the founders and first parliamen-

only to have his case summarily repulsed by Government spokesmen and the official thesis that "New Guinea without administration can never come to development" carried by a substantial majority. (33) The result was the first permanent establishment of any Dutch military posts in New Guinea including one at Merauke on the south coast where the right to do so was purchased from Tidore at an annual rental of 6000 guilders. And this fiction of Tidorese rule over Western New Guinea continued to provide the shaky basis for the area's inclusion within the Dutch East Indies until July, 1949, on the very eve of the Round Table Conference which acknowledged Indonesia's independence. A contract of 1894, for example, renewing the "alliance" between the Sultans of Tidore and the Indies Government, enumerated as being among the territories of the Sultan's realm "the entire area of Western New Guinea." (34) In 1906 the Tidorese throne became vacant and for several years the Indies Government considered the possibility of implementing its right to take the whole of the Tidorese domain under direct administration--a right which had been implicit since the signing of the contract of 1779 and concretely explicit since the contract of 1861.(35) Finally, however, the Government contented itself, apparently deterred by the increased budget costs involved, with installing a new sultan who was required to sign a special version of the standard tary representatives of the Dutch Social Democratic Party. In Parliament he regarded himself as the representative of "the brown brothers, the millions of Insulinde who could send no representatives to the Binnehof." Despite the numerical weakness of the Social Democrats, van Koi's own forceful personality, tireless zeal and parliamentary skill made him a force to be reckoned with. In the course of his long life he also helped found the Belgian Socialist Party and found time to write some 24 books and "brochures," many dealing with colonial problems, plus air endless stream of maga- zine and newspaper articles. (33)See the Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1897^-1898, op. cit .~ppT 170-181.------------------------------- (34)Bilagen, Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1900-1901, op. cit., 169, No. 28. (35)For the provisions of the contract of 1779, see Haga,op. cit., I, 291; For the actual text, see the Corpus DipTo- maticum, Zesde Deel (1753-1799), VI, 433-453~; for the text of the contract of 1861, see Handelingen,. Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1861-1862, Bijlagen, pp. 781-784“

"short declaration" (korte verklaring) which was used to regulate the relations' between the~Government and its native vassal states. In addition to the usual declaration to the effect "that the sultanate of Tidore forms a part of the Netherlands Indies," this particular Tidorese version concluded with a recognition on the part of the Sultanate of "the right of the Netherlands-Indies Government to incorporate the sultanate of Tidore at any time as directly-governed territory." (36) But however much it fitted into official policy to maintain the polite fiction of Tidorese sovereignty over Western New Guinea, succeeding generations of Dutch officials cherished no illusions as to the realities of the situation. Within the space of less than thirty years, during the final period of Dutch rule in Indonesia, we find Tidorese rule over Western New Guinea characterized as being of "purely theoretical character" (1907) and, almost a generation later, as "purely fictitious" (1935).(37) Economically, as well as politically, there continued to be but little incentive to make any changes in New Guinea’s dubious administrative status quo. Investigation into its economic potentialit.ies—was accelerated in the twentieth century but with results as disappointing as had been those of the past. As a survey of 1911 noted, "In the economic sense, New Guinea at the moment has no great value for /Netherlands/ India." And in the late 1930's just prior to the Japanese invasion, the Department of Economic Affairs, headed by the indefatigable Hubertus van Mook, Lieutenant Governor-General in the postwar period, conducted perhaps the most extensive of any survey into New Guinea’s economic po- (36)For the text of the contract of 1909, see Handelingen, Tweede Earner, Zitting 1909-1910, Bilage 312 (Overeen- komsten met inlandsche voorsten in den Oost-I-ndische Archipel) / 21, p. 16.------------------------------— (37)The first quotation is taken from one of the best known reports of the pre World War I period--that by Captain

H. Colijn (Nota betreffende de ten aanzien van Nieuw’ Guinea te volgen gedragslijn, Batavia, 1907, p. 13), usually referred to for short as the Colijn Report (Nota Colijn). The second quotation is taken from a letter on New Guinea's future written by the Resident (Haga) of the Moluccas on January 31, 1935, to the Governor-General, as quoted in the official and unpublished "Verslag van de studiecommissie Nieuw Guinea, ingesteld bij gouverne- mentsbesluit van 15 Maart 1948, No: 3," pp. 15-16.

tentialities with the, by then, traditionally negative results. (38) The result was that throughout the colonial period New Guinea continued as the stepchild of the Indies, a neglected backwater useful only as a barrier against foreign intrusion, a place for tours of punishment duty by delinquent civil servants and, finally, of exile for nationalist leaders. This last function of Western New Guinea came into being when the Netherlands Indies authorities utilized the opportunity afforded by the suppression of the sporadic communist revolts of 1926-1927 to conduct a general roundup of the leadership of the nationalist movement. As one Dutch scholar put it: (39) The government reacted to these disturbances by exiling over a thousand Indonesians to Boven Digul, a dreaded detention area in Western New-Guinea. For the first time the Netherlands had a use for its colonial power over half of that huge island. Nor was any change brought about in New Guinea's ignomin- ious status by the persistent propagandizing of a small group of New Guineaphiles within the Indies civil service or by the vague but burgeoning aspirations on the part of certain Eurasian groups in the period between the world wars to make New Guinea into a "tropical Holland" which, as a "Christian land," would at long last provide a real homeland for these tragically rootless and marginal people of divided hertage and confused cultural allegiance. But alike the pleas of civil servants in search of new empires to build and of the proselytes for a tropical Holland fell on the deaf ears of an apathetic and cost-conscious bureaucracy instinctively hostile to radi- cal experiment. Indeed there was to be but little change until the out-lines of a new Indonesia and a new Asia began to emerge from the turbulent and bloody independence struggles of the postwar period. New Guinea played no important role in these events. T38) The 1911 quotation is from H. A. Lorentz, "Nieuw Guinea" in Nederlands Indie, Land en Volk, Geschiedenis en Bestuur, Bedrijf en Samenleving, onder leiding van H. Colijn, Minister van Oorlog (Amsterdan, 1911), I, 295. The source for the second (1930’s) statement is Dr. van Mook himself as recalled by him in an interview with the writer on April 3, 1957.. (39) W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition, A Study of Social Change^ (The Hague/Bandung, 1956), p7 71.

But for the first time it was truly involved in history. In the period between the proclamation of Indonesian Independence in August, 1945, and its official acceptance by the Dutch in December, 1949, New Guinea was swept into the rushing political currents of the twentieth century. How it came about that Western New Guinea during this four year period emerged from its long settled status as the stepchild of the Indies to become an object of bitter dispute between the Netherlands and its erstwhile colony and, as the Irian issue, an eventual issue of East-West conflict is the burden of the following chapters.

CHAPTER III THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE IRIAN ISSUE, 1946-1949 From the Independence Proclamation through the Den Pasar Conference, August, 1945 - December, 1946 The dramatic events, centered mostly on Java, which con- vulsed the Indonesian archipelago between 1945 and 1949 are, for the most part, extraneous to this study. Of necessity, reference to the major developments of the Indonesian independence struggle must be sketchy at best. Also a general familiarity on the part of the reader must be assumed. In both English and Dutch, there are a number of studies to which reference may be had for an account of overall developments. (1) It was thus as one aspect of a highly complex and dynamic political situation that the events discussed in this chapter occurred. With the proclamation of independence by Sukarno and Hatta, destined almost immediately to become president and XT) The most exhaustive English-language study of the development of the nationalist revolution is that by George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca,

1952). For the early period (1945-1947), see also Charles Wolf's The Indonesian Story (New York, 1948) and David Wehl's The Birth of Indonesia (London, 1948). Other than partisan pamphleteering, there are surprisingly few full-length Dutch studies and none to match the thoroughness of Kahin's book. An extreme right-wing and minority viewpoint on Indonesian developments is given by former Prime Minister Gerbrandy in his Indonesia (London, 1950). Re- grettably former Lieutenant Governor-General Hubertus J. van Mook in his Stakes of Democracy in Southeast Asia (London, 1950) deals with Indonesian developments only incidentally--apparently deliberately so. Of interest, although both are written from a Labor Party (Partij van de Arbeid) viewpoint are C. Smit's De Indonesische Quaestie (Leiden, 1952) and J. deKadt's De Indonesische Tragedie (Amsterdan, 1949). More specialized, focusing as it does on parliamentary developments, is A. Stempel's De Parlemen- taire Geschiedenis van het Indonesische VraagstuE (Amsterdam, T950).------------------------------------------------

vice-president respectively of the first unitary republic, on August 17, 1945, the national, as distinct from the colonial, history of Indonesia begins. From the very first every action taken by the leaders of the nationalist movement indicates their conviction that they were acting on behalf of all the varied peoples included within the administrative boundaries of the former Netherlands East Indies. The implementing sentence of the independence proclamation itself reads, "We the people of Indonesia herewith proclaim the independence of Indonesia” (Kami Bangsa Indonesia dengan ini menjatakan Kemerdekaan Indonesia).(2) And when two days after the independence proclamation the administrative structure of the new nation was organized, provision was made to divide the area comprised within the former Netherlands Indies into eight provinces, including one for the Moluccas. (3) In almost every respect, including the province of the Moluccas for the easternmost territories, these territorial divisions followed long-existing Dutch patterns of administration. (4) Yet in a curiously clumsy attempt to be disingenuous about the matter, the Dutch representative in the course of the 1956 UN discussions on the Irian question, after reading this list of the eight provinces, was to proclaim with a triumphant flourish, "New Guinea was not mentioned. I repeat in this enumeration of the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, New Guinea was not mentioned." (5) As the Indonesian representative was quick to reply, in connection with the Dutch reference to the territorial administration outlined by the Republic in 1945: (5) J2) Muhammad Yarnin, Kedaulatan Indonesia atas Irian Barat (Dj akar t a, 1956)”, p. 42.

(3)Kahin, op. cit., p. 140.
(4)Compare the listing of the Indonesian provinces given by Kahin as noted above and the enumeration of the Dutch territorial divisions, taken from the Statistich Jaaroverzicht, 1932, given by J. S. Furnivall in his Netherlands India, A Study of plural Economy (Cambridge, New York, 1944), p. xv. See also A. D. A. deKat Angelino's Colonial Policy, abridged translation from the Dutch by
G. J. Renier.
(5)Both the landschappen and the gourvenementen were part of that baffling administrative melange with which the Netherlands Indies Government experimented so enthusiastically, if not always sucessfully, in the period between the wars. A landschap was an administrative sub-division which, as

As far as the territory of the Republic of Indonesia is concerned,... naturally we need not elaborate every time on the components of Indonesia, as we
have in fact about 3,000 islands, great and small....
But it was and has always been clear to everybody, including the Dutch Government, that Indonesia was and is the former Netherlands East Indies... I may mention to him (i.e., the Dutch representative) that West Irian in that (the 1945) division was included in the province of the Moluccas, that is, province 7; as a matter of fact, it was only in conformity with the Dutch administration division itself. I can prove this by reading to you from the Statistical Pocketbook on Indonesia for 1941. I quoted this Pocketbook this morning and on page 2, dealing with the areas and provinces of Indonesia in 1941—and even in this Pocketbook the name Netherlands East Indies was already altered to Indonesia, so it had already become official--it says that Indonesia was divided into many provinces and then continues:'One of the provinces is (the) Moluccas (including New Guinea). So, when we divided, in 1945, Indonesian territory into eight provinces, West Irian was included in the province of the Moluccas in conformity with the Dutch administrative division itself. And it can be further noted in this connection that from the very beginning such control as the East India Company and then the Indies Government exercised over Western New Guinea was administered from various points in the Moluccas such as Banda or Ternate. Between the two world wars, for example, Western New Guinea experienced a brief period of independent administration between 1919 and 1923 and then, in more traditional fashion, was first incorporated into the Ambon Residency until 1928 and then in the "Region" (landschap) of Tidore under the "Government” (gouvernement) of the Moluccas, itself one of the case of Tidore, might be "self-governing" (zelf- bestuurende) or "directly-governed" (rechts-bestuur). A gouvernement was an administrative area, superior to the landschappen, with a certain degree of autonomy and, presumably, in due course was destined to attain provincial status. See deKat Angelino, op. cit., II, 1-29 and Amry Vandenbosch, The Dutch East Indies ("Los Angeles and Berkeley, 1944), pp7 126-146.

the administrative units of the Province of the Great East which had been organized in 1938 for the government of all the territories east of Borneo and Java-Madura. (5) In July, 1946, as part of the general postwar reorganization, New Guinea again was made a residency. (6) With various modifi- cations, to be noted later, this has provided the administrative framework ever since then. During the course of the year 1946 a series of conferences was sponsored by the Netherlands Indies Government with the object of formulating proposals for the reorganization of the Dutch empire on a new commonwealth basis. Again, the details need not concern us. The vague concepts of this new approach had long been discussed, indeed overly so. In essence it was ah attempt to create a British type of commonwealth association by administrative fiat (7) rather than by evolutionary development. At only the first (Malino) of these conferences did Western New Guinea have even token representation. But its future was a topic for discussion in all three—most importantly at Den Pasar in December, 1946, which brought into existence the state of East Indonesia, comprising with the significant exception of New Guinea itself, the area previously included in the Province of the Great East. The first of this series of conferences was held at Malino, a hill town of the South Celebes, in July of 1946.(8) The conference’s purpose, its presiding officer, Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook, told the delegates, was "the formation as T6) Staatsblad~~van Nederlandsch-Indie, No. 69, July 15, 1946.

(7) One of the tragedies of Dutch rule in Indonesia was the consistently unimaginative timing of undoubtedly well-intentioned policies. Throughout the latter period it was always a case of too little, too late, coupled with a complete inability to sense the probable evolution of events. Precisely the qualities which made the Dutch the world's best colonial administrators were those which served them worst in the period between 1945 and 1949. One has only to contrast the difference between the British and Dutch approach to the liquidation of empire for an illustration of this.
(8) For accounts of the Malino Conference, see Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1946-1947, Bilage 341 ("Overzicht van de voornaamste feiten uit de voorgeschiedenis van het begeuren tijdens de conferentie van Malino, 16-24 Juli 1946") and W. A. Goudoever's Malino Maakt Historie (Regeerings Voorlichtings Dienst, Batavia-C, 1946).

quickly as possible and with all necessary administrative services of a self-governing Indonesia which can choose its own place in the society of nations and, with the assumption of the responsibilities which every land in the world must assume, can select its path for the future." (9) The delegates, drawn from the Indonesian areas east of Java and Madura, discussed the organization of a United States of Indonesia which should have the Great East as one of its principal components. Nor is there any indication in the records of the conference that when the Great East entered the proposed federation it was anticipated that its boundaries would differ from those which it had always possessed, i.e., all Indonesian territories east of Java and Borneo, including the Government of the Moluccas, the territory of which since 1926 had comprised the Moluccas themselves, Halmahera and New Guinea. (10) But it was at the second of the 1946 conferences, that of Pangkalpinang, held in early October, that a new factor which was to exert increasing influence on New Guinea's future was introduced into the equation. Officially the conference was not concerned with problems of political or administrative organization. Rather it was dedicated to the collection of a representative sampling of the opinions held by Indonesia's chief minority groups such as the Chinese, Arabs and Eurasians as to their present and future status. (11) It was at this time that the propaganda for New Guinea as a Eurasian homeland mounted to a degree of hitherto unequalled stridency and vehemence. The desperate urgency which prompted these chimerical visions is understandable. For, if in the years before the war, the Eurasian community had experienced an uneasy sense of anomie, it could, at least, take comfort in the fact that it was regarded by the Indies Government, even if somewhat patronizingly, as a highly useful instrument in the administration of an apparently permanently enduring colonial society. But after 1945, it found itself fighting for sheer survival in an increasingly hostile environment. It was in this atmosphere of mounting panic that the mystique of New Guinea as the Eurasian fatherland was propagandized by its sma,ll group of fanatical converts. In the Netherlands itself the ideas of

(9)Goudoever, Malino Maakt Historie, p. 9. (10)Vandenbosch, op. cit,, p. 138. (11)For an official account of the conference, see D. J. van Wijnen, Pangkalpinang, Werkelijkheden der Minderheden (Regeerings Voorlichtings Bienst, Batavia-C, 1946).

this group were able to exert an influence out of all proportion to its actual strength in the Eurasian community of Indonesia. The results were to have long-lasting and unhappy effects on the whole course of Netherlands-Indonesian relations For among certain influential political-religious circles in the Netherlands the concept of a moral obligation to provide for the Eurasian's future soon became a compelling one. (12) It also offered a basis for resistance to the aspirations of the Indonesian nationalist movement on the grounds of adherence to the loftiest of religious and ethical principles. Unquestionably many who based themselves on this viewpoint did so from the sincerest and most idealistic of motives. In its closing session the Pangkalpinang conference adopted two policy statements on New Guinea’s future. The first of these was embodied in a lengthy resolution (No. II) dealing with the whole question of the future relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands. (13) Indorsing the the right of Indonesia to self-determination and independence, the resolution noted in its final section (par. 6) that: A number of representatives consider it necessary to create and keep open the possibility of an association with the Netherlands of the territories of Indonesia eligible therefore and also of a special status for those territories within the Kingdom. While New Guinea in this particular expression of opinion was not mentioned by name, it was clearly the area most directly concerned. The conference's second policy statement which referred specifically to New Guinea was embodied in the third motion accepted by the concluding session. (14) Noting that both in the Netherlands and in Indonesia there were certain groups which saw in emigration to New Guinea a possible solution (12)Tt is not without interest to note, however, that at this time that concern for the welfare of the Papuans themselves which was so to dominate the arguments presented by the Netherlands in the UN discussions of the 1950's was, as yet, completely lacking. This second category of "moral duty" did not emerge until much later in the period under discussion when the chimerical quality of the Eurasian homeland concept was becoming increasingly painfully obvious. (13)van Wijnen, op. cit., p. 103.

for their problems, the delegates urged that "in connection with the above, a separate political status within the Kingdom should be awarded to New Guinea, separated from Indonesia." Commenting on this last expression of opinion, the conference's chairman noted that, while the Government recognized the difficult position of the groups concerned and was prepared to explore the possibilities for solution, "It is, however, not yet possible at present to make a statement over the future status of this land (i.e., New Guinea).” (15) With this statement may, perhaps, be dated the official beginning of that endless uncertainty about New Guinea’s political future which has so influenced the course of events ever since. The last of the series of conferences during 1946 in which New Guinea figured was held at Den Pasar, on the island of Bali, in Decenber. Its line of descent was from that resolution of the Malino Conference which had requested the convening of another assembly to work out the proposals for the political organization of Borneo and the Great East. (16) But in the months since Malino, efforts to find a solution to the Dutch-Indonesian conflict had culminated, under British auspices, in the signing of the so-called Linggadjati Agreement in mid-November by representatives of the Netherlands Government, and the Indonesian Republic. (17) Most of the detailed clauses of the Agreement are not pertinent to this study. Suffice it to say that in broad outline provision was made for the establishment, not later than January 1, 1949, of a democratic, federally-organized United States of Indonesia T14) Ibid., ρΊ 109. The conclusions of the conference were embodied in a series of resolutions (resolutie) and motions (motie), the latter being signed by three or more delegates as sponsors. The difference is not very clear but apparently the resolutions were to be considered as policy statements by the whole conference while the motions represented group proposals. (15)Nota inzake Nieuw-Guinea, Departement van Sociale Zaken,

n.p., n.d. (mimeographed), p. 22. (16)van Goudoever, Malino Maakt Historie, p. 49. (17)The name was taken from the small hill town of Linggadjati in Central Java where the meetings took place. The Indonesian Republic, since its capital was at Djogjakarta (Djogja) in Central Java is often referred to as the Djogja Republic.

which was to possess sovereignty over "the whole territory of the Netherlands Indies" (het geheele grondgebied van Nederlandsch-Indie).(18) Through the medium of a Netherlands-Indonesian Union, to be headed by the Dutch sovereign, close cooperation was to be established between Indonesia, the Netherlands and Dutch territories in the western hemisphere. The Agreement contained, however, two articles in connection with New Guinea's future to which reference has so often been made that it seems appropriate to quote them in full. They read as follows; (19) Article 3 The United States of Indonesia shall comprise the entire territory of Netherlands India with the understanding that, if the population of any area, after consultation with the remaining areas, give an indication by means of a democratic process that it is not, or not yet, willing to join the United States of Indonesia, a special relationship for that territory to these States and to the Kingdom of the Netherlands can be brought into being. Article 4

(1) The constituting states of the United States of Indonesia shall be the Republic, Borneo and the Great East without curtailing the right of the people of any territory to indicate by means of a democratic procedure that it wishes to see its place in the United States of Indonesia regulated on another footing. (18) Both Wolf and Wehl give extensive coverage to Linggadjati. See Wolf, pp. 43-47, 105-127 and 175-180; Wehl, pp. 144-
178. For the Dutch parliamentary history of the Agreement, see Stempels, pp. 60-88; for the Indonesian, Kahin, pp. 196-206. For comment by one of principal partici- pants, see van Mook, pp. 221-225. Full English language texts are provided by Wehl (pp. 146-148) and Wolf (pp. 175-178). An extensive compilation of various texts, radio speeches, official declarations, etc. pertaining to the Linggadjati negotiations is given in W. H. van Helsdingen in his Op Weg naar een Nederlandsch-Indonesische Unie ('s-Gravenhage^ 1947), pp. 358-562. (19) van Helsdingen, pp. 412-413 (Dutch text).

As much as has ever any passage in Holy Writ, it was the sad fate of the Linggadjati Agreement to produce a plethora of clashing attempts at its exegesis. The detailed story of these is a volume in itself. For our purposes it must suffice to note them rather briefly as they applied specifically to New Guinea. In this connection it is certainly not without a certain irony, in view of the oft-cited future appeals made to the Linggadjati Agreement in connection with the settlement of the Irian issue, that actually as of 1946 there were few areas in the Netherlands Indies to which an application of the principles in Articles 3 and 4 were less appropriate. At the most only 50% of the Papuan population was even in contact with any administrative officials. And even this 50%, except for an infinitesimal handful, was divided into small tribal groups, possessing an upper Stone Age culture, in a state of perpetual warfare among themselves and automatically with any and all outsiders. It was clear that even the thought of the population of such an area determining anything "by means of a democratic process" and "after consultation with the other areas" was so absurd as to merit no consideration. And indeed no such proposal was ever made from either Indonesian or Dutch sources. As the "Explanation" (Toelichting) of the Dutch Commission-General which had negotiated Linggadjati noted: (20) ...the Commission-General does not conceal from itself the difficulties which can result for such an area as New Guinea from the logical application of articles 3 and 4 of the draft agreement. These difficulties may appear to be of such a nature that the result is to force the holding of further discussions on the possibility of offering New Guinea a special status on another basis than that envisaged in articles 3 and 4. As part of the Kingdom, and as such included in the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, this territory would then be able to be brought into a special relationship. And along the same lines the Explanation of the Agreement offered by theDutch Government to the Second Chamber (lower house) of Parliament, observed; (21) (20)Linggadjati, De Toelichting der Commissie-General (Rijksuitgevij, 's-Gravenhage, 1946), p. 21. (21)Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1946-1947, (25ste Vergadering - 10 December 1946), p. 707.

...the Government declares that it desires, in the spirit of articles 3 and 4, that New Guinea must be able to obtain its own status with respect to the Kingdom (new style) and the United States of Indonesia, as it would perhaps still be difficult for the autochthonous people to be able to express themselves; in particular it is appropriate that the possibility should be kept open there for larger settlements of Netherlanders, in the first instance of Indo-Netherlanders /note: Eurasians/, who want to live under their own management. — In the midst of the Den Pasar conference, the Second Chamber signified its acceptance of Government policy in connection with Linggadjati by the passage on December 20 of a Catholic-Labor (Romme-van der goes van Naters) motion of approval. With specific reference to New Guinea's future, the acceptance of this motion was considered as indicating: (22) (underlining in original) that the wish is that New Guinea must be able to receive its own status vis-a-vis the Kingdom (new style) and the United States of Indonesia; further, in particular to keep open the possibility for greater settlements of Netherlanders, primarily the Indo-Netherlanders who want to live under their own administration. Now all three of these statements on New Guinea share this in common: they have nothing to do with the stipulations agreed to in articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement. Consistent among themselves they are; but this consistency is achieved quite outside the Linggadjati framework. The Commission-General's statement frankly recognized this with its candid reference (underlining added) to the fact "that the result is to force the holding of further discussions on the possibility of offering New Guinea a special status on another basis than that envisaged in articles 3 and 4.” Since the Government Explanation of December 10th insomewhat contradictory vein had commented that "it would still perhaps be difficult for the autochthonous people to be able to express themselves," precisely to whom or to what group in Western New Guinea did the Commission-General envisage making this offer of "a special status"? (22) Nota inzake Nieuw-Guinea, op. cit., p. 25. For a summary of the parliamentary discussions about the ratification of the Linggadjati Agreement, see Stempel, op. cit., pp. 64-82.

There is the further interesting fact that Dutch official statements justifying the Netherlands role in the area have constantly emphasized the present and, except in terms of decades, future inability of the peoples concerned to make any determination of their own future. This was particularly the case during the course of the several UN discussions on the Irian issue in the mid-fifties. Yet a decade earlier a high-ranking and authoritative Dutch official body based its policy proposals for New Guinea's future on the supposition that there were persons or groups then existing (as of 1946) to whom it would be possible and logical to offer the possibility of New Guinea having "a special status on another basis." The pessimism of 1957 in this connection would seem far more conditioned by ensuing changes in the international scene than by developments in New Guinea itself. There is one final point to be noted in connection with all three of these attempts at providing an exegesis of the Linggadjati Agreement. And that is that none of them sought to modify the straightforward language of the Agreement other than by implication or the most oblique of interpretations. The Commission-General speculates on the "possibility" of offering "a special status" while the Government Explanation, quite begging the question of consistency, confines itself to stating that "it desires" to see a different course than that envisaged by the actual Agreement text itself. And finally the Second Chamber resolution limits itself to the modest expression of a "wish." It hardly seems that any of the various attempts at an exegesis, given both the tentative character of the verbs employed and their departure from the Linggadjati formula, should be considered as constituting nearly so much of an authoritative and forthright statement on New Guinea’s future as that made in direct and unequivocal terms by the highest-ranking Dutch official in the Netherlands Indies, Lieutenant Governor-General van Mook, at the conclusion of the Den Pasar cpnference. This conference which convened at Den Pasar from December 7th through 24th, 1946, met for the purpose of transforming the province of the Great East into one of those three or four largely self-governing states which both the Malino Conference and the Linggadjati Agreement had visualized as forming the component parts of the forthcoming United States of Indonesia. (23) With the significant exception of New Guinea, the conference delegates were drawn from the whole of the vast T23) An official account of the conference is given in W. A. van Goudoever’s Den Pasar bouwt een huis (Regeerings Voorlichtings Dienst, Batavia-C, Februari, 1947).

expanse of the Great East, ranging from Bali to the Southeast Islands, just off the New Guinea coast. During the course of the conference, van Mook threw his personal influence against the inclusion of Western New Guinea in the new state. His actions seem to have been motivated by economic rather than political considerations based on his personal knowledge of the tremendous task still to be done in New Guinea and the possibly crushing burden this would represent for the weak economic and personnel resources of the new state. (24) It also seems probable that pressure was brought to bear from and by Eurasian sources interested in the "homeland" concept. Whatever the precise reasons, the result was the formation of the new state, under the name of East Indonesia, comprising the same boundaries as had the former province "except that it shall be decided later concerning the inclusion of the territory of the present residency of New Guinea and its relation to the State of East Indonesia and to the future United States of Indonesia." (25) But this exclusion of New Guinea, achieved only by virtue of the weight of van Mook's personal prestige, obviously rankled with the delegates—as careful as the Dutch authorities had been in selecting them. (26) Various times (24)Personal statement by Dr. van Mook to the writer on April 5, 1957. (25)Chapter I, Article 1(2) of the Definitive Text of the East Indonesian Constitution, Den Pasar bouwt een huis,

p. 88. It has been aptly observed of this clause, "The vagueness of this statement made it possible for the East Indonesians to continue in the belief that West New Guinea would, in one way or another, remain part of their territory, while the Dutch Government proceeded on the assumption that a separate administration would be established there." Chdrles A. Fisher, "West New Guinea," The Year Book of World Affairs 1952, published under the auspices of the London Institute of World Affairs (London,
1952), p. 197. (26)The question of the manner in which the delegates to these var ious Dutch-sponsored conferences were selected has always been an interesting and controversial one. Not surprisingly the Indonesian Republic regarded all of these conferences as completely stooge affairs convened "under compulsion at bayonet’s point" (Hatta on Malino). The official Dutch position was that, "These representatives were chosen in accordance with the fulfillment of democratic norms as

during the course of the conference the question of the historical territorial integrity of the former Netherlands Indies was raised with one speaker, quite correctly it would seem, pointing out the inconsistency between the Government policy declaration on New Guinea of December 10th and the discussions at the Malino Conference. (27) And noting what the exclusion of New Guinea from East Indonesia would mean in terms of area, one Balinese representative observed that, "The Great East without New Guinea must properly be considered the Small East.'" (28) The result of these unsuccessful efforts was the presen- tation of various motions at the conference's conclusion, when New Guinea's exclusion was already a fait-accompli, with the evident intent of leaving no doubt in the minds of the Dutch Government as to exactly where the delegates stood on the issue. It was just prior to the voting on the most important of these (the Nadjamoedin motion) that Dr. van Mook made what would seem to represent an unequivocal and binding statement of official intent which, unlike the other three statements of the month of December, had the virtue of being fully consistent with the Linggadjati Agreement. The official minutes of the conference summarize it as follows: (29) The Lieutenant Governor-General declared that it absolutely was not the Government's intention to shut New Guinea out of Indonesia but rather to examine carefully in what fashion it should be included within the extent of Indonesia. Admittedly there permitted by the circumstances." (Malino Maakt Historie,

p. 4). Within limits delegates did” at times, exhibit a marked unwillingness, as at Den Pasar, to accept Government policy at face value. It seems logical, however, that their selection was carefully screened. (27)Ide Anak Gde Agoeng Gde Agoeng,subsequently a leading figure in the Federalist movement and cabinet minister under the 1949 and 1950 constitutions. See the official summary as given in De Conferentie te Den Pasar, 7-24 December 1946, Peel I; Handelingen (uitgave van het Algemeen Regeeringscommissariaat voor Borneo en de Groote Oost) (Batavia, n.d.), pp. 35-36. Hereafter referred to as De Conferentie Den Pasar. (28)Ibid., p. 58. (29)Ibid., pp. 81-82.

are other areas where still much must be done for opening up and development but New Guinea indeed occupies a very special place in that category. Above all, it is a territory that is totally undeveloped and at the same time is of strategic interest, not only for one of the constituting states but for all. From the Government-proposed addition (to Article One), it is apparent that the intention is to keep the area within the compass of the United States of Indonesia Against what is required in the motion, His Excellency has no objection but He does not concur fully with the considerations as formulated.* (* the second and third underlinings have been added by the present writer. The so seldom-mentioned Nadjamoedin Motion to which Dr. van Mook referred is worthy of more than passing note for at least two reasons. It represents the earliest comprehensive statement of Indonesian opinion on the Irian issue and it indicates that even as of December, 1946, even the carefully-screened delegates to a Dutch-sponsored conference felt strongly on the matter and already regarded the issue as an important point of controversy between the Netherlands and an, as yet, unformed united Indonesia. Approved by 68 out of 70 votes, the motion's main points were these: (30)

1.Netherlands New Guinea had formed a political unit with the territory included in the present Government of the Great East;
2.Although racially "Polynesian" (sic.'), "the population of New Guinea nevertheless considers itself, through traditional ties, as a part of Indonesia";
3.Since New Guinea constituted the greatest part of East Indonesia (31) and, as proved by events of the Second World War, was of strategic interest for all Indonesia, "the joining of this area with the state of East Indonesia is not only desirable but, at the same time, necessary"; (30)As summarized from the text of the motion as given in De Conferentie Den Pasar, Peel II: Bijlagen (U), p. 42. (31)The functioning of this commission is an excellent case study in the reasons why Dutch policy failed so disastrous ly in the postwar period. The commission was finally appointed, more than fourteen months after the conclusion

4.As a result of the construction of various strategic strong points by the American armed forces, New Guinea "constitutes an indispensable outpost for the defense of Indonesia in general and of East Indonesia in particular";
5.Intensive exploration and exploitation of the existing soil resources of New Guinea, along with the other territories of East Indonesia offered "great possibilities for a favorable development of the financial position of East Indonesia which would add greatly to the international solvency of Indonesia." Given these five considerations, the Den Pasar conference urged the Government to investigate promptly the possibility of including New Guinea in the East Indonesia state and, to facilitate this, to appoint a commission, including three to five representatives from East Indonesia, which would investigate the present status and future prospects of New Guinea. (31) In the writer's opinion it was precisely at this time, on December 23, 1946, with the virtually unanimous passage of the Nadjamoedin Motion that at Den Pasar rather than at the Hague Round Table Conference some three years later that the Irian problem came into being. True, after the Round Table Conference it became increasingly the acute problem in Dutch-Indonesian relations. But after the Den Pasar conference adjourned on December 24, 1946, there was a full-fledged Irian problem as such. Even if the Dutch had been able to implement to the letter their plans for the future organization of Indonesia, even if the Djogja Republic had been obliterated from the face of the map, it seems highly probable that Dutch-Indonesian relations would nevertheless have been vexed by conflict over whether the western half of the island of New Guinea was to become an Indonesian Irian Barat or remain as Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea. Further, had President Sukarno never been born, the Irian issue would yet have come of Den Pasar by Govt. Decree No. 3Ί March 15, 1948. Γη April, 1949, it produced a comprehensive 185 page report (Verslag van de Studiecommissie Nieuw-Guinea) which, after a detailed ethnic, economic, financial, medical and political survey, reached the conclusion that there was much to be done. The report was then apparently duly filed. It has never been published although the writer was fortunately able to obtain a copy.

into being. (32) Indeed most of the political history of Western New Guinea between the period of Den Pasar and the convening of the Round Table Conference (RTC) is concerned with the vain efforts by East Indonesia to gain control over the area which it felt had been unjustly and arbitrarily separated from its historic administrative connection and the endless maneuvers by the Netherlands Indies Government in Batavia to prevent this from happening. The story of the failure of the Linggadjati Agreement which was eventually formally signed in March of 1947 is again beyond our scope. The chief factor in its failure lay in the completely different concepts of exactly what comprised the Agreement. The Indonesian Republic announced that its delegates would be authorized to sign Linggadjati ’’based on the articles initialled in November, with the inclusion of the notes, the explanations and the official correspondence with the Netherlands delegation and not being bound by any other discussion outside the official contact of both delegations." (33) On the other hand the Netherlands Government made it clear that as far as it was concerned the Agreement was not to be considered in terms of its simple text as the Indonesians wished but in terms of what the various "Explanations" of the Commission-General and the Government had initiatively read into it. As an objective Dutch source commented some years later; (34) These historical facts must lead to the conclusion that, with respect to the content and meaning of the Linggadjati Agreement, there existed between the two parties involved irreconcilable differences of opinion, one of these differences—although this was never said in so many words--related to New Guinea. (32)An opinion, I am well aware, not shared by certain distinguished editorial voices of the American press. (33)van Helsdingen, op. cit., p. 454. (34)Nieuw-Guinea als probleem van het Nederlandse volk, rapport van de Commissie voor Internationale Zakenvan de Oecumenische Raad van Kerken in Nederland (Amsterdan, T956) (pamphlet), p. 57 ("New Guinea as a Prob1em of the Dutch People, Report of the Commission for International Affairs of the Ecumenical Council of Churches in the Netherlands").

At the time that it approved the Linggadjati Agreement the provisional parliament (Central National Committee) of the Indonesian Republic, although helpless to do more, placed itself firmly on record as being of the opinion ’’that in these revolutionary times it must become an important task of the Republican government to struggle for the freedom of Borneo, Celebes, the Little Sunda Islands, the Moluccas and New Guinea,..·." (35) But even at this early date there would seem to be evidence to indicate that, however sincere van Mook may have been in his categoric assurance at Den Pasar that the historic relationship of New Guinea to the rest of the archipelago was not to be changed, there were official sources in The Hague which were methodically moving to do so. In this connection there is the usually overlooked but highly significant circumstance that within a few weeks (February 6, 1947) after the conclusion of the Den Pasar conference, the Netherlands Government joined with Australia, France, New Zealand, the United Kingdom and the United States in organizing the South Pacific Commission, the sphere of activity of which was defined as comprising, "The non-self-governing territories lying generally south of the Equator, from and including Netherlands New Guinea in the west..." (36) If there was any intent on the part of the Netherlands Government to include Western New Guinea in a presumably imminent United States of Indonesia this was indeed a curious step to take. Were there, even at this early date, officials in The Hague, actuated both by hostility to the Indonesian independence movement and a prescient sense of political reality who thought it desirable to attempt to foster a non-Indonesian cultural and economic orientation for New Guinea in order to thwart the spread of the independence movement? For as conflicting as are the several versions of political developments on New Guinea itself during this period, the fact does emerge that there was political ferment, that it did have a Republican orientation, that it was forcibly suppressed by the Dutch authorities and that the almost complete lack of political activity in Western New Guinea after 1947 was due less to apathy or any other such causes than to the strong control exercised by Dutch authorities. As the "Political Section" of the Resident's official report for 1947 noted with obvious relief in connection with the inde- T35) van Helsdingen, p. 522. (36) Article I, Clause 2 - see the article, "Report on the South Seas Conference" by Emil J. Sady, Department of State Bulletin, March 16, 1947, p. 2.

pendence movement on New Guinea: (37) ...it was fortunate that the leaders, in this case Javanese for the most part, did not limit themselves to underground burrowing and agitation but all too quickly tried to pass over to violent revolt which made possible their detection and arrest. For these attempts, the leaders of the movement are behind bars. The same Dutch official source refers rather obliquely to "a political unrest, beginning at the end of 1945,” which apparently was suppressed so effectively that by 1950, an official Indonesian source estimated that initially ”1000 Irianese” had been imprisoned, "part of which is still in the prisons of Hollandia and in other places,..." (38) Certainly it does not seem without significance that, with the sole exception of Malino, the Batavia regime never permitted New Guinea to send a representative to any of the various conferences over Indonesia’s future which were held between 1946 and 1950. This willingness to treat the peoples of Western New Guinea merely as voiceless pawns contrasts oddly with the so constantly reiterated declarations in recent years by Netherlands officials, in and out of the UN, of their government’s deep concern to safeguard the right of the peoples of New Guinea to self-determination at some un- stipulated time in a vague and indefinite future. From Den Pasar to the Transfer of Sovereignty, January, 1947 - December, l94ff In the period following the adjournment of the Den Pasar conference and the signing of Linggadjati until the convening of the Round Table Conference there were few (37)Verslag ~Residentie Nieuw-Guinea, 1947, mimeographed (for official use only) n.p., n. d., p. 79. (38)Report of the Committee New Guinea (Irian) 1950, Part III-Text and Appendices of the Indonesian Main Constituent (published by the Secretariat of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, n.p., 1950), p. 83. Dutch sources say this figure of 1000 is greatly exaggerated. They place the figure of those imprisoned at a few score. While this may be too low, it does seem probable that the Indo nesian estimate is entirely too high.

developments of significance which directly affected the fate of New Guinea. Following the breakdown of the Linggadjati Agreement and the failure in the Summer of 1947 of an all-out military attack (the so-called "First Police Action") a second attempt at peaceful settlement between the Indonesian Republic and the Netherlands culminated in the Renville Agreement, negotiated this time under auspices of the recently-established United Nations Committee of Good Offices which subsequently (January, 1949) became the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI). (39) Signed in January, 1948, the Renville Agreement neither added any new factors in terms of New Guinea nor even clari- fied the ambiguous situation of conflicting interpretation created by Linggadjati. Indeed its "Six Additional Principles for the negotiations Towards a Political Settlement," proposed by the GOC and accepted by both parties, merely perpetuated the original conflicts and uncertainties of Linggadjati. The first of these provided in part that, "Sovereignty throughout the Netherlands Indies is and shall remain with the Kingdom of the Netherlands until after a stated interval, the Kingdom of the Netherlands transfers its sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia." (40) The sixth and final political principle read: (41) Should any state decide not to ratify the constitution (i.e. of the proposed United States of Indonesia) and desire, in accordance with the principles of articles 3 and 4 of the Linggadjati Agreement, to negotiate a special relationship with the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands, neither party will object. Thus neither was anything added nor any of the misty uncertainty dispelled. Yet again the way was left open for an area to resolve its political future "by means of a democratic (39)For a brief but comprehensive account of the role of the GOC and its successor, UNCI, see William Henderson, Pacific Settlement of Disputes, The Indonesian Question, T946-1949, Woodrow Wilson Foundation (New York, 1954), pamphlet, 89 pp. Appendix D comprises a well-balanced "Selected Bibliography." For an account of the Renville Negotiations, see Kahin, op. cit., pp. 213-255. (40)Henderson, p. 73. (41)Ibid., p. 74.

process" and yet again Western New Guinea was patently outside the whole process. The essence of the Dutch official position then and subsequently was to insist that the determination of New Guinea's future must be decided by the application of articles 3 and 4 of Linggadjati, as continued by the sixth additional Renville Principle, to use this argument as the technical reason for the special treatment given New Guinea and yet never to make any effort to implement the principles concerned on the plea of the backward cultural circumstances of the peoples concerned. History certainly affords few better illustrations of the advantages to be gained not only from being both judge and jury but also the drafter of the legal code involved.' However, the basic reasons for this approach, as we shall discuss later, would seem to have been conditioned far more by the exigencies of Dutch internal politics than by any other factors. But unless interpreted in terms of this process of involved and procrustean logic noted above, the Netherlands official statements to the world on Indonesia's future seemed to indicate every intent to implement van Mook's pledge at Den Pasar as to New Guinea's inclusion within the future United States of Indonesia. At the opening session of the Third General Assembly of the United Nations at Paris in September, 1948, Ambassador van Royen informed his fellow delegates: (42) ...the issue between the Netherlands and the Republic is not whether the people of Indonesia will become an independent nation. That issue has been decided and the creation of the United States of Indonesia, embracing the whole Archipelago (underlining addecT) is only temporarily delayed,.. Far more often quoted, however, is a subsequent but not nearly so precise statement also made by Dr. van Royen in an Assembly speech of December, 1948. True he stated, "All parties agree that what used to be the Netherlands East Indies shall become an independent State as soon as possible." (43) (42)Quoted from the English text as given in Verslag over de Derde Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigcfe Naties, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken No. 20,('s-Gravenhage, September 1949), p. 292. (43)Indonesia in de Veiligneidsraad van de Verenigde Naties (November 1949-—Januari 1949), Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken No. Γ9 ('s-Gravenhage, September, 1949), p. 520.

But it should not be overlooked that he then went onjto declare, "...we shall stand by the political principles we accepted in the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements and shall carry them into effect." (44) The very special sense in which the Dutch conceived these principles must be kept in mind. And during this same period an excellent illustration of this was being afforded by the course of Dutch internal politics. During August and September, 1948, the Dutch parliament (States General), meeting in special session after emergency general elections, (45) had approved various amendments to the Dutch Constitution designed to fit the proposed commonwealth association into the legal framework of the Netherlands Kingdom. But included in one of these new sections of the constitution (208(7)) was the proviso that: (46) In so far as any part of Indonesia shall not form part of the United States of Indonesia, the relations of that territory with said States and with the Kingdom referred to in the fifth paragraph of the present Article shall be regulated separately as far as possible in accordance with the principles of this Chapter. That by the term "any part of Indonesia" was meant preeminently New Guinea is obvious. It is equally clear that in terms of domestic politics it was already considered highly inadvisable even to pay lip service to the idea of New Guinea's inclusion within the United States of Indonesia. For just as by the end of 1946 the Irian issue had come into being as far as Indonesian opinion was concerned, almost simultaneously for a highly influential section of Dutch opinion the concept of a unique moral mission was in process T44J ibid., p. 537. (45)The next regular four year election was not due until 1950, but, in view of the crucial problems involved, it was felt desirable to have a new expression of public opinion before taking any decisive measures in connection with Indonesian affairs. The election results weakened the Labor Party and strengthened tbe parliamentary right wing. For an'account of the election and the special parliamentary session, see Stempels, pp. 147-

155. (46)Indonesie in de Veiligheidsraad, op. cit., p. 196; for the full English text, see pp. 19B-197.

of development. Its sources were varied and not in all cases altruistic in their inspiration. For the Eurasian groups it was the hope that under the status of a Crown Colony New Guinea would furnish a place of refuge. For various political groups in The Netherlands itself, the motives became increasingly complex. On the part of the Calvinist parties in particular, drawing on the background of their unique politico-religious culture, the continuance of Dutch rule in New Guinea became increasingly involved with the doing of God's will and the execution of a moral mission for the pro- tection initially of the interests of the Eurasians and then increasingly, by a curious process of transference, on behalf of the indigenous inhabitants themselves. This last concern, however, was very late in emerging. Even at the time of the Round Table Conference in August, 1949, and thereafter, this moral obligation to the primitive peoples of New Guinea was mentioned but little. (47) Intertwined also with this moral mission concept, in its several variations, there was certainly a strongly motivating desire to salvage something from the wreckage of empire, to keep the Dutch tricolor flying in the Pacific where it had been for so many centuries. As one spokesman for this viewpoint expressed it, "I have said that I hope that the Netherlands Government will preserve carefully this last emerald from the girdle of emeralds; that it will leave this as a last relic to the Netherlands Crown." (48) Increasingly after 1949 as the Cold War waxed in intensity, this argument was to be bolstered by a variant of the moral mission contention. It was to be argued by extreme right-wing political groups that the Netherlands had an obligation to the western world to retain New Guinea as an anti-communist bastion in the Pacific. (49) The; political dynamics of the Dutch viewpoint are so important that it seems desirable to (47)This statement is based on a careful scrutiny by the writer of the parliamentary debates as compiled in the official records (Handelingen) for the period between 1946 and 1950. Rather curiously at no time did the fate of the somewhat less primitive Dayak peoples of Borneo inspire anyone to a similar crusade on their behalf. (48)Mr. Welter in the Second Chamber on August 16, 1949 - Handelingen - 1948-1949, 73ste Vergadering, p. 1828. (49)See, for example, De Vrije Pers, issues of October 13 and 19, 1950, the information bulletin of the semi-fascist Nationaal Reveil (National Awakening) group which pictures the whole of the Indonesian revolution as part of a gigantic communist plot for control of the Pacific and eventual world domination.

make some investigation into their sources. This, however, can perhaps best be reserved for a later section. Dutch political activity in Indonesia during the period between Den Pasar and the Round Table Conference was characterized by a determined effort to construct a so-called federal system to be composed of a group of client states which could serve as a counterweight to the Indonesian Republic in the forthcoming federation. (50) Again the details of this are beyond our consideration. Suffice it to say that particularly on the part of East Indonesia, it was < nude clear repeatedly that on the Irian issue representatives ox the Federalists, as the client states came to be called, were as strongly dedicated to the preservation of the complete territorial integrity of the former Netherlands East Indies as was the Indonesian Republic itself. On several occasions the parliament of East Indonesia placed itself emphatically on record as favoring the continuation of West Irian’s historic ties with the rest of the Moluccas. (51) And delegates from the Federal states at Bandung in July, 1948, even though meeting under Dutch auspices and, for the most part, domination, nevertheless set forth a basic program, the first point of which read: (52) (underlining added) The free and sovereign United States of Indonesia shall comprise the entire territory of the Netherlands Indies, undiminished by the stipulation in Article 3 of the Linggadjati Agreement. And repeatedly throughout this period various other attempts were made by the Federalists to get some clarification on (50)For a highly legalistic and completely uncritical account of this development, see A. Arthur Schiller, The Formation of Federal Indonesia, 1945-1949 (The Hague/Bandung,

1955); for a realistic political evaluation, see Kahin (Ch. XII - "The Strategy and Tactics of Indirect Rule"), pp. 351-390. (51)it should not be forgotten that, except for New Guinea, the rest of the Sultanate of Tidore was now a component part of East Indonesia. (52)indonesie in de Veiligshdeidraad (Maart-October 1948), Buitenlandse Zakan No. 14,(’s-Gravenhage, December
1948), p. 282.

Irian’s future. The major effort in this connection was made at the so-called "Hague Discussions" convened in, the Fall of 1948 by the Dutch Government for the purpose of discussing future political organization. (53) But here again; the Federalists found themselves put off by vague references to the need for further consideration of the problem. It does not seem unreasonable to assume that here again the political exigencies of Dutch politics rather than technical factors were the chief influences at work. Thus it was that when the Round Table Conference for the acknowledgment of Indonesian independence met, under United Nations auspices, in August, 1949, the stage was set for Irian to become the issue in Netherlands-Indonesian relations and, yet further, to evolve into an issue of even wider international concern. Present at The Hague conference which met from August 23rd to November 2nd were four different parties; the United Nations Commission for Indonesia (UNCI), the Indonesian Republican delegation, the Indonesian Federalist delegation and that of the Netherlands Crown. The Dynamics of the Round Table Conference, August-November, 1949 (54) For UNCI the success of the RTC was vital not only for the Commission itself but for the UN's own prestige. Its T53) The summary minutes of the conference (Het "Haags Overleg" (September-October 1948) Deel I-Inleiding en Stukken), which were never published, may be consulted in mimeographed form in the holdings of the Wason Collection of the Cornell University Library, The statement referred to was made by a Mr. Afloes in the meeting of Saturday, October 9, 1948, held in the Treves-zaal. See p. 8 of the minutes. (54) For accounts of the RTC, see Kahin, pp. 433-445; John Coast, Recruit to Revolution (London, 1952), pp. 260-271;

C. Smit~ De Indonesische Quaestie (Leiden, 1952), pp. 224- 253; for basic documentation, see the Report and appendices of the UNCI to the President of the Security Council as repreduced in Indonesie in de Veiligsheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties (Februari-December 1949) Ministerie van Buifenlandse Zakan No. 21, op. cit., pp. 202-389. A comprehensive and informed account of these developments is given by Dr. Alistair M. Taylor, Press Officer of UNCI at the time, in his (as yet) unpublished dissertation (Oxford, 1955) on "The United Nations and the Indonesian Question:An analysis of the role of international mediation," pp. 339-375.

sucess was equally important for the national and, in one case at least, personal interests of the three members of the Commission. As had been the case with its predecessor, the Good Offices Committee which UNCI had replaced in January, 1949, the Australian representative, T. K. Critchley, served as the spokesman for the Indonesian Republic, the Belgian,

R. Herremans, for the Netherlands and the Commission’s American representative, H. Merle Cochran, as the disinterested, balace-of-power third party. Particularly for the United States as a nation and for Mr. Cochran as an individual, the success of the Conference was imperative. For the United States there was the very real threat that if the Hague discussions failed the ensuing chaos in Indonesia might well open the way for new communist gains, already swollen by the, then, almost completed triumph of the Chinese communists. For Mr Cochran, an astute veteran career diplomat of strong personality, the successful culmi- nation of a forty year career was at stake. Aided by the tremendous power of the United States and his own diplomatic adroitness coupled with the great prestige he had acquired with all parties concerned, he was, to say the least, primus inter pares among the members of the Committee and a highly Trifluential factor in the developments of the Conference. For all of the other three delegations at the Conference their attitudes towards its development was influenced sub- stantially by the dynamics of their domestic political situations. Since this was particularly true in connection with Irian, it seems advisable to examine briefly the various pressures under which they functioned. In the order of an increasing degree of intensity and complexity, mention should first be made of the Indonesian Republican delegation and lastly of the Dutch. Basic to the concept of the Republican delegation was the fact that the whole struggle of the nationalist movement in the prewar period had been based on a unitary concept of indivisibility. This had been formalized at the great Indonesian People’s Congress held in December, 1939, under the sponsorship of the Federation of Indonesian Political Parties (Gapi). (55) Attended by representatives of some ninety different nationalistic, political, social and economic organizations, the Congress represented the broadest cross- section of Indonesian opinion ever to be brought together (55) J. M. Pluvier, Overzicht van de ontwikkeling der nationalistische beweging in Indonesie in de jaren 1930 tot 1942 (’s-Gravenhage, Bandung, 1953), p. 142; see also Kahin, pp. 97-98.

during the colonial period. As concrete manifestation of its adherence to the concept of a unitary and indivisible Indonesia, it passed resolutions "concerning one flag, one language and one national anthem." (56) It was on this philosophy that the Indonesian Republic had based itself from the beginning so that even during the darkest hours of its fight for survival it regarded itself as the representative for all of Indonesia and as waging the independence struggle as much on behalf of the people of Irian as those of Atjeh. Aside from possessing a viewpoint of such clarity and directness as this, the Republican delegation enjoyed an advantage denied both the Dutch and the Federalist delegations This was in the fact that its chief was Dr. Mohammed Hatta, Vice President and Prime Minister, who enjoyed a prestige in the nationalist movement second only to that of President Sukarno. Neither his control of his own delegation nor the unlimited backing he could count on from the legislative branch of the Republican Government was open to question. He was thus in a uniquely independent position to deal with Irian, or any other of the problems of the RTC, as he judged best. While sharing the same philosophy about the inviolability of Irian as an integral part of Indonesia, the Federalist delegation suffered from a far weaker leadership and an uneasy feeling of moral inferiority vis-a-vis the Republicans. (57) As has beep noted, as early as the Den Pasar conference when East Indonesia was created, there had been strong feeling in the Federalist camp on the subject of Irian. Nor had events between Den Pasar and the RTC contributed to any mitigation of these feelings. Indeed, as it became increasingly obvious that the Dutch were playing a losing game in Indonesian affairs generally and following an increasingly fabian policy on Irian, the feelings of bitterness and resentment mounted. The result was that at the RTC the Federalists were to show themselves far more adamant on the Irian issue than the Republicans to such an extent that it could be observed that "the Federalists were plus royaliste que le roi..." (58) Nor is this at all surprising. Added to the long- smouldering resentment over Dutch stalling in connection with clarifying Irian’s future was the fact that the RTC offered V>6) Pluvier, p. 142. (57)For a comment on this, see Coast, op. cit., p. 260. (58)Taylor, op. cit., p. 307.

the last, best chance to incorporate Irian into East Indonesia In very practical and urgent political terms, there was the further point that such a political victory would greatly strengthen East Indonesia's position within the forthcoming federal union. For an East Indonesia regime and a Federalist delegation which had forced the Dutch to back down on the Irian issue and had been successful in realizing the long-existing dream of an independent Indonesia, coterminous with the full boundaries of the former Netherlands Indies, would have demonstrated beyond cavil that patriotic devotion to the service of Indonesia was no monopoly of the Republicans, and that, whatever their past collaboration with the Dutch might have been, the Federalists too were dedicated nationalists. Patriotic emotions aside, this very real need to improve their own position may go far to explain both the urgency and the vehemence with which the Federalists pushed the Irian issue at the RTC. The Dutch delegation to the RTC headed by Minister of Overseas Territories, J. H. van Maarseveen, was faced with a difficult and complex equation in domestic politics. Super- ficially this seemed to stem from the exigencies of the Netherlands system of constitutional amendment. Basically the reasons lay in certain unique factors strongly dominant in Dutch political culture. The superficial problem was this. Under the provisions of Article 2-3 (Chapter XIII) of the Netherlands Constitution, constitutional amendments required a two-thirds majority in both houses of the parliament. Since the new relationship with Indonesia had to be dealt with according to this procedure, it meant that the necessary amendments must receive at least 67 of the total 100 votes in the lower house (Second Chamber) and 34 of the total 50 votes in the upper house (First Chamber). (59) Like other European parliamentary democracies operating under proportional representation, Dutch political life expresses itself in a multi-party system. After the 1948 elections, for example, there were eight parties represented in the Second Chamber among which even the two largest (Catholic and Labor) could muster only 32 and 27 votes respectively while the third .in size (the Anti-Revolutionaries who comprised the major force of the opposition) could muster only

13. The result was that the necessary two-thirds majority (59) The amendments designed to bring about the new changes were grouped in a new chapter of the Constitution (No. XIV) comprising Articles 208-211. For a discussion of the parliamentary debates, see Stempel, pp. 121-155.

could be obtained only by the formation of a multi-party governing coalition. But this was complicated by the intensity and rigidity of the basic ideological divergencies between the different parties. For the Netherlands is unique in possessing two separate but co-existent party systems—based respectively on religious and secular principles. Interestingly this is reflected in the seating arrangements in the rectangular chambers of the parliament where parties are seated to the right and left of the presiding officers not on the basis of being Government or Opposition but rather according to their adherence to a religious or secular ideology. The largest of the religious parties is the Catholic Peoples which from the very beginning of the modern party system in the Netherlands has been the vehicle of that large proportion of the Dutch population which adheres to the Catholic Church. (60) In 1949, at the time of the Round Table Conference, the Catholic Party was united, as had been the case since 1945, with the mildly leftist Labor Party to form the backbone of the governing coalition which also comprised two smaller parties, the secularly-oriented Freedom and Democracy Party, heir of the political traditions of nineteenth century Liberalism, and the Christian-Historical Union, the smaller and less tradition-bound of the two major Calvinist parties. Because of the necessary two-thirds majority, the eight and nine votes respectively possessed by these two small parties in (60) From the end of the 19th century when a modern party system first evolved in the Netherlands, the Catholic Party has commanded virtually the complete support of the Catholic population. However, in the period between 1948 and 1952 there existed a rightwing independent group headed by former Colonial Minister Welter which disap- proved of Labor Party collaboration and regarded the willingness of the official party to compromise with the Indonesian nationalist movement as dangerous folly. And as the representative of that section of the population which had long been an oppressed religious minority, the Catholic Party has felt concerned to prove that it is as zealous in defending the interests of the nation as any Calvinist political group could be. In 1949 large sections of the party were dubious about the advisability of compromise with the Indonesian Republic and but little was needed to tip the balance within the party in favor of disrupting the coalition with the Labor Party and joining with the Anti-Revolutionaries to form a cabinet committed to a strong-arm bitter-end policy on Indonesia.

the Second Chamber were important. Within both these parties there was an influential element dubious about the advisability of accepting what they regarded as the defeat of the Dutch cause envisaged by the Round Table Conference. For the Freedom and Democracy Party, spokesman for the business and financial community, the motives were largely the fears of economic loss and a patriotic reluctance to see the liquidation of the vast Dutch empire in the Pacific. With the Christian-Historicals, on the other hand, the second factor probably carried some weight but their most important concern was a moral rather than an economic one. For in common with the more fundamentalist and perennially oppositional Anti-Revolutionary Party, (61) the Christian-Historical Union felt a deep moral obligation to provide refuge for the unfortunate Eurasians. Almost insensibly, as the chimerical nature of the hopes for Eurasian settlement in Western New Guinea became increasingly obvious, this moral concern on the part of both Calvinist parties was shifted to the primitive Papuan peoples who, it was alleged, required an extensive period of guidance and tutelage for their own good. And this new-found discovery of an obligation to the Papuans fitted in well with that traditional sense of moral mission and paternalistic perfectionism which had characterized Dutch colonial administration for decades before World War II and so excited the admiration of foreign observers. (52) (61)The Anti-Revolutionary Party emerged in the 1870's as the political arm of that Dutch neo-Calvinist revival which was part of the general European conservative reaction against the secular liberalism stemming from the French Revolution. Its upper class element seceded around 1900 to form the Christian Historical Union. The Anti-Revolutionaries were dedicated to the political implementation of Calvinist principles which in terms of colonial problems worked out to the necessity for obedience to duly-constituted authority and the conscientious discharge of a virtually eternal moral mission to the subject peoples--even when they, like willful children, did not appreciate the need. (62)The ultimate failure of Dutch colonialism lay in precisely that same unimaginative passion for perfection and legal precision which so excited foreign admiration. As colonial administrators, the Dutch were very good indeed but unlike the British they could never envisage thenselves in any other role„

Basic to this had been a sense of mission which was never to end except in a distant future so remote as to be meaningless. And' unlike the other great colonial empires such as the British or French, the Dutch had had nearly all their eggs in one great basket. Little in the experience of a century and more in the enclosed Hague-Batavia centric world of the past had prepared Dutch opinion to face the explosive realities of the post-World War II period. The resulting experience was dearly bought indeed and left its psychological scars. (63) As of 1949 even among those members of the Catholic, Freedom and Democracy and Christian Historical Union parties who realized the necessity of coming to terms with the Indonesian nationalist movement there existed, for various motives, the desire to retain at least a symbol of former imperial greatness. By virtue of its geographic position on the very edge of the Indonesian archipelago, Western New Guinea, if for no other reason, was an obvious choice. This then was the domestic political situation confronting the Dutch delegation as the Round Table Conference opened in late August, 1949. Adamantly opposed to Government policy were the Anti-Revolutionaries and several rightwing splinter parties. (64) Equally certain to be cast against any Government proposals were the eight votes of the Communist representation in the Second Chamber. (65) The Catholic (63)For an excellent example of the almost traumatic sense of shock experienced by the Dutch in the post-World War II period and the desperate effort made to see the whole Nationalist movement as a wicked plot by a few evil men, see the previously-cited Indonesia by wartime Prime Minister Gerbrandy. (64)The rightwing splinter parties concerned were the fos- silized ultra-conservative Calvinist States Reformed Party with two votes and Mr. Welter (Catholic National Party—though then the rightwing Catholic secession was still known as the "Group Welter"). (65)The Communists, although already launched on that process of decline which has reduced their strength from the ten seats won in the election of 1946 to the meager four as of 1958, were as of 1948 still one of the largest minor parties. Because of the effectiveness with which the Indonesian Republic had suppressed the Communist revolt at Madiun in the Fall of 1948, the official party line in 1949 was still to regard the Republic as a stooge of the imperialists and basically hostile to the best interests of the Indonesian masses, etc. The result, for

Peoples' Party, although with dragging feet, would support the compromise policy which its representatives in the cabinet had assisted in working out. But it was clear that a large section of the party membership, even if it had not supported the rightwing bolt of former Colonial Minister Welter, felt as strongly that Western New Guinea must be retained as did the two minor partners of the Government coalition, the Christian Historical Union and the Freedom and Democracy. For the Labor Party, the one political group disposed to liquidate the whole of the old colonial venture, the political implications of the situation were obvious. For the Labor Party the whole Indonesian situation from 1945 had been an agonizing experience. As such, the party had only come into existence in the post-war period when an attempt had been made to form a broadly-based, mildly leftist party which would be able to stage a "breakthrough" (doorbrak) in the shell of the old party system and attract socially-minded individuals whether of religious persuasion or secularly-oriented. The core of the new party had been furnished by the prewar Social Democrats. For a large section of Labor Party membership, the memories of the old anti-colonialist, socialist tradition, as exemplified by van Koi, (66) died hard. But, on the other hand, the fruits of office were sweet; nor was the prospect of returning to the barren desert of the prewar opposition status an attractive one. The result was that, although unwillingly and with grim forebodings on the part of representative sections, (67) the neither the first nor last time in the Netherlands and many other countries, at one time or another, was in effect to align the Communist Party on the same side of the issue as the extreme rightwing. (66)See Note 32 on p. 19. (67)Various Labor Party spokesmen expressed pessimistic and, as events proved, all too accurate forebodings over what Dutch intransigence on the Irian issue would mean for future relations. In a remarkably prophetic speech in the Second Chamber on August 17, 1949, just before the opening of the RTC, former (1945-1946) Prime Minister Schermerhorn vainly warned his colleagues "that the interest of the Netherlands lies in cooperation with the United States of Indonesia. If we should sacrifice this for the maintenance of New Guinea, it probably--no one can see into the future--will be very dearly paid for." (Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1948-1949, p. 1848). Another, and more influenctial section of the party,

Labor Party accepted the fact that to accomplish anything at all at the Round Table Conference, the Dutch delegation would have to stand firm for the retention of Western New Guinea. (68) Otherwise it was clear that the necessary two-thirds majority could never be obtained. (69) Shortly before the Conference convened, a little-noted, seemingly routine, administrative decree provided the formal legal basis for Dutch retention of Western New Guinea, For on July 9, 1949, the High Commissioner of the Crown in Indonesia issued that year's decree no. 180 which at long last implemented the authority which the Sultanate of Tidore had been forced to concede some forty years earlier under the unique fourth clause of the Short Declaration (Korte Verklaring) of 1909 (see p. 21 above). This, it will be recalled, gave the Netherlands Indies Government the right to annex arbitrarily Tidore, or any of its territories, and place them directly under the rule of the Batavia administration. More than once in the intervening decades various sources, in the interests of administrative reform, had urged the implementation of this authority, but until July, 1949, these suggestions had always been ignored. Even when Dutch authority was re- established in 1945 and the need for administrative reform was headed by Prime Minister Drees was, then and now, quite ready to cooperate with the Catholics or any other group favoring the retention of Western New Guinea or in support of a generally stiff policy on Indonesian relations generally. (68)Among the members of the Dutch delegation, reputedly including its head, Overseas Territories Minister van Maarseveen, there does not seem to have been any very strong feelings on the matter. Left to itself, in the opinion of various observers, the delegation would probably have been willing to cede Western New Guinea along with the rest of the former Netherlands Indies. Bu, as noted, the exigencies of the domestic political situation were quite otherwise. (69)At that, it was a very tight squeeze. When the final votes on the Indonesian constitutional amendments came, the results were 71 to 29 in the Second Chamber and 34 to 15 (1 member absent) in the First Chamber. In the Second Chamber, five of the nine Christian-Historical members voted against the transfer of sovereignty while in the First Chamber all five Christian-Historical representatives were in opposition.

imperative, the old fiction of Tidorese rule over Western New Guinea was revived. Not until July 9, 1945, a little over a month before the RTC convened, was it decreed "that the self-governing territory of Tidore which belongs administratively to the Residency of New Guinea will be brought directly under the Government of Indonesia..." It does not seem improbable to read a significant timing into this action—a timing of considerable political importance. Administratively and legally it was indeed routine-- blazing no new paths or establishing precedents. But coming at long, long last, as it did, just before the opening of the Round Table Conference, the declared purpose of which was the liquidation of the Dutch colonial empire, it seems doubtful if it can be dismissed as a routine administrative measure. Rather it would seem to have been a phase in a stubborn holding action intended to lay the basis for retention of at least a fragment of empire. In spirit and intent there is much akin to the equally curious timing of theinclusion of Western New Guinea in the South Pacific Commission as of February, 1947 (see p. 40 above). The legal and administrative effect was to separate any section of Western New Guinea from the Sultanate of Tidore, a constituent element of the state of East Indonesia which itself was obviously destined for inclusion in the impending "free and sovereign United States of Indonesia." Thus the July decree opened the way for drawing an international boundary without undue complication at the easternmost extent of the territory then under the jurisdiction of the State of East Indonesia. The meticulous, legalistic precision of this act was, furthermore, well calculated to fit into the whole careful mosaic of stipulations, reservations and special exceptions in connection with Western New Guinea's future which, from the time of the parliamentary discussions on Linggadjati in December, 1946, had been so carefully constructed to meet the exigencies of the Dutch political situation. West Irian in the Round Table Conference, August ~ November, 1949 The agenda of the Round Table Conference afforded tacit evidence of Irian's status as a controversial issue. For listed as the very last of any topic to be considered by the Conference was the item of "New Guinea." This was no accident. Rather it was clear indication of the important and delicate question of the area's future. New Guinea, at UNCI's suggestion, was made the last item on the agenda with the expectation that, if by the time this final point was reached, the

conference had been successful in reaching agreement on all other issues, then none of the parties to the dispute would be willing to bear the onus of wrecking the conference solely over the question of New Guinea's political future. (70) And, after the Conference began, its Steering Committee agreed to postpone all discussion on the New Guinea item "until after sufficient progress had been made on other issues." (71) For this reason no discussions were initiated at all until September 30th, more than a month after the Conference convened, when a sub-committee of the Political and Constitutional Committee took jurisdiction. It soon became apparent that the respective viewpoints were quite irreconcilable. As Taylor summarizes the positions taken: (72) According to the Netherlands, New Guinea must receive a special status because: it had no ethnological, sociological or religious ties with the rest of Indonesia; it was undeveloped; and it had no essential economic relationship with the rest of the archipelago. New Guinea should therefore remain outside the future USI and have special political and administrative ties with the Kingdom. It would be administered in accordance with the United Nations Charter, and advanced aggressively to autonomous status through education of its population and development of its economy. The Indonesian delegation insisted that New Guinea must be integrated, as part of East Indonesia, in the USI for the following reasons: ethnological, economic and religious links already established with the rest of Indonesia; Linggadjati and Renville stipulated that sovereignty was to be transferred over the whole territory of the former Netherlands Indies; and the USI through its participating state of East Indonesia, aimed at fulfilling the objectives of the United Nations Charter by gradually preparing the territory for autonomy. T70) My sources for this assertion are; 1. a member of the Dutch delegation, and; 2. a member of the UNCI secretariat. Both sources asked not to be cited by name. These cal- culations, however, that no delegation would want to accept the onus of wrecking the conference over the Irian issue were not quite correct. The Federalist delegation at one point was quite willing to do so and was prevented on ly by its own impotence rather than any pangs of conscience. (71) Taylor, op. cit., p. 305. (72) Ibid., pp. 305-306.

Again beyond our scope is any detailed account of the development of the Irian issue during those last few weeks of the Conference when, as one observer comments, "It seemed incredible that a last-minute crisis could be caused by that inhospitable, expensive sub-continent, but so it was." (73) During this period of deadlock, various sources proposed some type of international trusteeship as a way out—proposals which were to be revived again a few years hence. (74) After struggling vainly with the problem until October 30th, with the Conference scheduled for adjournment on November 2nd, the Steering Committee asked the United Nations Commission to make a proposal aimed at settlement. (75) Actually Australian representative Critchley had suggested several weeks before that the whole dispute simply be held in abeyance "to avoid long and fruitless dispute" the justification being that: (76) With such a compromise, the Statute of the transfer of sovereignty could specifically exclude New Guinea with the proviso that its status would be a subject (73j Coast, p. 269. (74)The Algemeen Handelsblad, August 10, 1949, suggested that the forthcoming Netherlands-Indonesian Union act for the UN, under the provisions of Article 77c of the Charter, as a trustee for New Guinea until its people could exercise their rights of self-determination. And, without knowledge of the Algemeen Handelsblad article, Dr. Taylor, on October 10“ 1949, proposed to Mr. Critchley in an informal draft memorandum entitled "New Guinea, Considerations in favor of Trusteeship," that "a ’face-saving’ solution ostensibly could be found in the proposal that the area be placed under the International Trusteeship System." And Critchley himself suggested some sort of trusteeship solution in a meeting with his other two colleagues on October 13th; although he apparently did not consider this the most feasible approach. Taylor notes (p. 307), "Undoubtedly he had already discussed the matter informally with the Indonesian delegates and learned of their distaste for the idea." (75)Taylor, p. 308. (76)Ibid., quoted from "Draft Proposals to assist in an Early Settlement of the Main Issues in the RTC," submitted by the Australian representative, 13 October 1949, S/AC.10/TH/SR.3, Appendix A (New Guinea), p. 1.

for further negotiations to be conducted within a specified time. This proposal would have the advantage that discussions over the status of New Guinea would eventually be held in an atmosphere in which political problems might not be so important and in which the real problems of administration and development could be given special consideration. Already, on the evening of the 29th, the day before it was asked to furnish a solution, UNCI had circulated among the three delegations the text of a compromise "along the general lines advocated by Critchley." (77) It provided for the maintenance of the status quo of the Residency with the proviso that within a year after the official transfer of sovereignty, the territory’s future status would be determined by negotiations between the Republic of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. On behalf of both Indonesian delegations, (78) this proposal was rejected by the Republicans "for the reason that according to UNCI's proposal the territory of New Guinea would not be included in the transfer of sovereignty." But, for precisely this same reason, Dr. van Royen announced the willingness of the Dutch delegation to accept the proposal. Rather surprisingly, it was the Federalists who, at the meeting on the afternoon of October 31, produced the formula which made agreement possible. As an UNCI report summarized the role played by the Federalist delegation: (79) (underlining added) Their comprehension of the position of the Netherlands delegation enabled them to suggest the solution which after discussion and some amendments was accepted by all. in preparing the draft agreement which they submitted, they followed the lines which had been originally suggested by the Commission... Sovereignty over New Guinea would not be transferred (777 Ibid.----- (78)Since the Inter-Indonesian conferences of the previous July, there had been an increasing degree of cooperation between the Republican and Federalist delegations. See Kahin, pp. 430-431. (79)Quoted from a copy of the report dated November 2, 1949. The initials, F.C. A., -are the English abbreviation for Federal Consultative Assembly, the official name for the Federalists. I

to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and within a year, negotiations between the Netherlands and the Republic of the United States of Indonesia would be undertaken to solve the problem. However, the F.C.A. Delegation insisted that it be specifically mentioned in the text of the agreement that a "dispute" existed between the Netherlands and Indonesia on the matter. The Netherlands Delegation attempted without success to have this wol?d deleted from the text. On the other hand the Netherlands insisted that it be stated in the text that the status quo of the Residency of New Guinea shall be maintained under the Government of the Netherlands; this the Indonesians refused to accept. Finally, a compromise was found: it was agreed that no mention of the position of the Government of the Netherlands in New Guinea would be included in the text, but that an exchange of letters would take place specifying the point. Thus article 2 of the Draft Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty was definitely worded and the question of New Guinea found a solution, if only a temporary one. As a result of this last minute compromise, the final text of the "Draft Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty" read as follows: (80) Article 1

1. The Kingdom of the Netherlands unconditionally and irrevocably transfers complete sovereignty over Indonesia to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and thereby recognizes said Republic as an independent and sovereign State. (80) Hound Table Conference-results as accepted in the Second Plenary Meeting held on 2 November 1949 in fhe "Ridderzaal" at The Hague (published by the Secretariaat-General of the Round Table Conference, The Hague, n.d.),
   p. 9. Referred to hereafter as RTC Results. Simultaneously, Dutch (Resultaten van Ronde Tafel Conferentie) and Indonesian (Hasil-Hasil Konperensi Medja Bundar) versions were published but it is worthy of note the Covering Resolution of the Conference provided that, "The official English text will prevail in case of divergent interpretation of the Netherlands and Indonesian texts." (RTC Results, p. 7)

2.The Republic of the United States of Indonesia accepts said sovereignty on the basis of the provisions of its Constitution...
3.... Article 2 With regard to the residency of New Guinea it is decided;
a. in view of the fact that it has not yet been possible to reconcile the views of the parties on New Guinea, which remain, therefore, in dispute,... (81) that the status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be maintained with the stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia the question of the political status of New Guinea be determined through negotiations between the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. On November 2nd, the day of the Conference's conclusion, the exchange of letters agreed upon in the meeting of October 31 took place. Overseas Minister van Maarseveen in his capacity as Chairman of the Dutch Delegation addressed identical letters to the chairmen of the two Indonesian delegations which read; (82) Sirs, I have the honor to ijnform you that the Netherlands Delegation to the Round Table Conference states that the following has been agreed upon by the Delegation to the Conference. The clause in article 2 of the Draft Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty reading: "the status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be maintained" means:"through continuing under the Government of the Netherlands." I shall appreciate learning if you can agree to the foregoing. I have the honor to be, .„..

In a joint letter of reply the two Indonesian delegations expressed concurrence with van Maarseveen's letter, repeating also as their second paragraph the second paragraph of his letter. The complex question of what the two articles of the Transfer of Sovereignty and paragraph 2 of theletters of November 2nd actually meant was to become a matter of bitter dispute. Nor, considering the wording of the text, is this surprising. As a Dutch scholar has recently commented: (83) In order to get out of the impasse and to reach a solution acceptable to all, an ambiguous text was drafted by UNCI which gave each party the opportunity of thinking about it in its own way and which thus by the parties could be interpreted at their pleasure. This is the same procedure which was followed in the Linggadjati Agreement and led there to such disastrous consequences. Illustrative of the differing interpretations is the exchange which took place between the Indonesian and Netherlands spokesmen when the initial consideration of the "West Irian Question (West New Guinea) was taking place in the United Nations. Describing the settlement of the Irian issue at the Round Table Conference, the Indonesian representative (Mr, Sudjarwo) told the Ninth Assembly's First (Political) Committee: (84) "(Bl) Sections b through f simply list other reasons for the implementing paragraph such as the need for the Conference to conclude on time, the importance of the problem and the need for further research, the dedication of the parties concerned to peaceful solutions, etc. (82)RTC Results, p. 79. (83)Prof. Mr. B. V. A. Roling, Nieuw-Guinea wereldprobleem.’ (Assen, 1958), p. 33. (84)"Speech of Mr. Sudjarwo in Committee 1 on 23 November, 1954," Nederlands Nieuw Guinea in de Negende Algemene Vergadering van de Verenigde Naties, September-December 1954, Ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken 37 ('s-Gravenhage

1955), p. 102. Short title hereafter; NNG in de Negende Algemene Vergadering,

Mr. Chairman, in order to avoid possible mis- derstandings, the parties to the Charter of the Transfer of Sovereignty exchanged a letter of 2 November 1949 in which it was agreed, according to the English text, that the phrase in article 2 of the Charter, reading "the status quo of the residency of New Guinea shall be maintained" means "through continuing under the Government of the Netherlands." However, it must be stressed that the phrase: "through continuing under the Government of the Netherlands," taken from the English text, is not a complete translation of either the Dutch or Indonesian texts thereof. For example, the Dutch text of this phrase reads as follows: "met voortzetting van het gezag van de Regering van het Konindrijk der Nederlanden over de residentie Nieuw Guinea." And the complete translation of this phrase is as follows; "through continuing the authority of the Government of the Kingdom of the Netherlands over the residency of New Guinea." (85) In other words, and this is important, the official English text, for some unaccountable and unfortunate reason, omits the words "the authority of," as well as the phrase "over the residency of New Guinea," which are to be found in both Dutch and Indonesian texts. (85) The same phrase in the Indonesian text of the RTC Resulrs (Hasil-Hasil Konperensi Medja Bundar, p. 79) reads, "dengan melandjutkan kekuasaan Pemerintah Keradjaan Nederland atas keresidenan Irian (Nieuw-Guinea)." Its English translation is exactly the same as Mr. Sudjarwo gave for the Dutch version. The writer has checked through various Indonesian-English, Dutch-English, Dutch-Indonesian, etc., dictionaries in an effort to pin down the precise relationship between kekuasaan, gezag and authority as well as discussing the matter with Indonesian and Dutch informants. The consensus is that insofar as precise translation can be made from one language to another these three words are about as close in meaning as it is possible to find.

However, it must also be stressed that, in the exchanged letters, the word "sovereignty" was not used in the English, or Dutch ("souvereiniteit") or the Indonesian ("kedaulatan") texts. It is clear that what the Netherlands was allowed to retain over West Iiian is something that the parties, in their exchange of letters, purposely refrained from terming "sovereignty," in the English, Dutch and Indonesian texts. In short, Mr. Chairman, it is amply clear from the language of the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty and the accompanying letters, that, while the Dutch were allowed to retain temporary administration and control over West Irian, the Netherlands claim to sovereignty was not recognized or supported or furthered by the Charter. But, in his speech at the same (November 23, 1953) meeting of the First Committee, the Dutch representative (Mr. van Balluseck) contended: (86) In the minutes of the Round Table Conference it was stated that the Federal Consultative Assembly (which, as I explained before, was one of the two Indonesian parties to the agreements) declared that the stipulation that New Guinea was to continue in the status quo meant that it would remain "under Netherlands sovereignty." What the illusive "minutes of the Round Table Conference" (87) do, or do not, record the Federalist delegation (86)NNG in de~Negende Algemene Vergadering, op. cit., p. 155. (87)The so-called "minutes of the Round Table Conference" are shrouded in mystery. During his stay in the Netherlands in 1956, the writer was variously told by equally responsible Dutch officials that: a. there were no "minutes" and; b. there were "minutes" but that for policy reasons (?) they were still regarded as "top secret" and kept under lock and key by the Foreign Office Those who acknowledged (believed in? knew of?) the existence of these "minutes" all contended that their contents greatly strengthened the Dutch case for the retention of Irian. If such be the case, it is difficult for the observer to understand the air of mystery which surrounds the question of their very existence and why so little use has ever been made of them. For a further reference to this Federalist declaration, see Minister

as having declared, does not seem too important. What is important, and obvious in the discussions over the Irian issue at the RTC, is the scrupulous care taken by everyonte to insure that the administrative and political status of West Irian would be so shrouded in thick clouds of vague verbiage that the definite status of the area was left open for whatever interpretation anyone wished to draw. (88) And of October, 1949, this was indeed the only realistic course which any of the delegations could follow in terms of the dynamics of their respective domestic political situations. In particular was this a prime consideration for the Dutch delegation. As mentioned previously (Note 69) the results of the RTC received the vital two-thirds approval in the First and Second Chambers of the Netherlands Parliament only by the narrowest of margins. Indeed the parliamentary debates prior to ratification made it very clear that the Government had followed the only course in connection with the Irian problem which offered any prospects of obtaining the two-thirds majority or, for that matter, of the continued existence of the Drees cabinet itself. (89) Not only from the ranks of the right opposition but from van Maarseveen's speech in the Second Chamber on December 8, 1949 (Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1949-1950,

p. 891.) In any case, the Federalists were the less important of the two Indonesian groups involved and the one most amenable to Dutch pressure. (88)I am well aware of the seeming contradiction to this interpretation provided by that famous "Note" appended to the "Draft Agreement Concerning the Assignment of Citizens" (RTC Results, p. 49) which exempts the inhabitants of New Guinea from the provisions of the Draft Agreement "in case the sovereignty over this territory is not transferred to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia." However, in this connection, I find myself in agreement with Roling when he writes (p. 34), "It seems to me that in the interpretation of the principal compact, where the word sovereignty is so carefully avoided, an international jurist should not attach decisive significance to this 'Note'." It seems more logical to attribute the wording of the note to the lack of time for careful editing rather than to any other reason. (89)For the full transcript of the debates, see Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1949-1950, pp. 799-931·:

the government coalition as well, voices were raised prophe- sying a stormy future in connection with future negotiations over West Irian. Said the parliamentary leader of the Labor Party, van der Goes van Naters, commenting on the Government explanation, "It is fully stated that sovereignty is not to be transferred. I fear that we shall have a difficult year over this." (90) The whole course of the debates left no doubt that more than a few members of the government parties cast affirmative ballots with reluctance. In the writer's opinion, in neither chamber would it have been possible for the government to have won its two-thirds majority if it had not been for the position taken on West Irian by the Dutch delegation, many of whose members were apparently personally either indifferent to its retention or willing to accept the correctness of the Indonesian viewpoint. But this undoubtedly would have meant parliamentary rejection of the whole RTC Agreement with incalculable consequences. It was not at the RTC in the Fall of 1949 that the Dutch Government erred. (91) Here indeed it showed a highly sophisticated appreciation of the need to balance domestic and international factors in order to achieve any solution at all. To this the developments of 1950 were to provide unhappy contrast. On the Indonesian side the reactions to the postponement of any settlement of the Irian issue ranged from appreciation of the realism of the action to the frustrated outrage of the Federalists. Illustrative of the former viewpoint, was Premier Hatta's statement to the legislative body (Central National Committee) of the Djogja Republic when he "declared that the question would be settled through negotiation between two sovereign states. There is no fear that the island would not be returned to Indonesia." (92) And just after the conclusion of the RTC, an important Indonesian-Chinese daily, for example, quoted "a leader of the left groups in Jogja" who praised Hatta as "a qualified statesman" who had realized that the risk of a deadlock over Irian could not be taken and as a result of which "Indonesia has shown not only the Netherlands TGO) ibid., p. 831. (91) Initially it was at the time of Den Pasar (December,

1946) when the simple endorsement of van Mook's statement on Irian's future would have prevented the Irian issue from ever emerging. But, given its own self-created difficulties, the Netherlands Government, for virtually the first and last time, exhibited at the RTC a grasp of political realities. (92) Aneta News Bulletin (Batavia edition), December 14, 1949.

but the foreign world that it is capable of wise and flexible responsibility." (93) On the side of the Federalists, however, there was only outrage. Even as the struggle over West Irian had been mounting to its peak in late October, the East Indonesian parliament had been debating, or rather discussing for there was no opposition, an interpellation calling the Government's attention to that decree, mentioned earlier, of the High Representative of the Crown in July which had separated New Guinea from the Sultanate of Tidore. Terming the future of New Guinea an "unconditional problem" ever since the Den Pasar conference, the interpellation's sponsor (Manoppo) drew attention to the fact that after "almost half a century" the Dutch authorities had suddenly seen fit to take advantage of the special clause in the contract of 1909 with Tidore. This, he declared was a "step which smells of a past era— the colonial era. A colonial decision par excellence, anno 1949, just before the transfer of sovereignty." (94) After the briefest of discussions, a unaminous motion was adopted asking the East Indonesian government "to exert itself to the full limit of its powers" to obtain nullification of the July decree. And echoing the pessimistic forebodings of former Prime Minister Schermerhorn (nee Note 68), a prominent Republican press organ obsecrved: (95) It will not surprise us if the agreement about New Guinea which the RTC has reached was received by the people and the parties in this country with angry reactions, although they should try to restrain their feelings to permit the Government to seek to settle this question within the stipulated period of a year. We are not surprised that the Dutch attitude in connection with Irian (New Guinea) is an endeavor to build a new bulwark, considering that the Netherlands is forced to quit the old T93) Keng Po, November 5, 1949. (94)Rundingan Badan Perwakilan Sementara Negara Indonesia Timur, Sidang Kedua 1949 (n.p., n.d.), p. 88. For the Tull text of the East Indonesian parliamentary discussions on the "Usul-Manoppo untuk mengadakan interpelasi mengenai Soal Nieuw-Guinea," see the Rundingan, pp. 84- 85, 87-90 and 98-102.--------- (95)The Djakarta (Batavia) daily Merdeka, November 15, 1949.

fortress. It is also understandable that as a result of this, suspicions can again be awakened which will be capable of killing all possibilities for cooperation between the Netherlands and Indonesia. In 1949 as in 1958 the solidarity of Indonesian opinion on the Irian issue contrasts sharply with the confusion and divergencies of various Dutch viewpoints. As striking as this contrast was even in 1949, it is significant that, while Indonesian opinion has continued united on the achievement of the national claim to Irian, scarcely a year has elapsed since then without new voices being raised in the Netherlands in opposition to official government policy. And, as we shall see a little later, increasingly important sections of the Dutch intellectual and religious communities have participated in this. In mid-December when the first cabinet of the United States of Indonesia was formed with Dr. Hatta as Premier, another indication was given of the importance attached by all political groups to the Irian issue. For among the cabinet's seven point program, listing the most urgent problems confronting the new nation, point six read, "To settle the Irian (West New Guinea) issue within a year." (96) Thus, on December 27th, 1949, when theformal transfer of sovereignty occurred, there began what had so prophetically been designated as "a difficult year" of fruitless negotiations based on the provisions of article 2 of the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty. In the UN General Assembly that same month came the first intimations of the emergence of the Irian issue on the International stage. In the course of UN discussions on the results of the RTC, the Indonesian representative, Mr. Palar observed; (97) (96)For a full summary of the program of the Hatta Cabinet, see 17 Agustus (sic), 1945-1951, Nomer Peringatan, pub- 1ished by the Information Section, The Consulate-Genera1 of the Republic of Indonesia (Singapore), pp. 46-47. This paper-bound pamphlet lists the members and programs of all cabinets from the initial Sukarno presidential of August, 1945, through the Sukiman Cabinet formed in April, 1951. (97)"Rede van de Heer L. N. Palar op 12 December 1949," Indonesie in de Veiligheidsraad van de Verenigde Naties TFebruari—December 1949), pp. 457-458.

The New Guinea issue could be considered a territorial restriction of our sovereignty. But, as you are well aware, this question must be settled within one year...The stands taken by the two parties on this issue, however, are at this moment extremely far apart. It will be a very difficult task to bring these divergent viewpoints together... It is for this reason that, in my opinion, the United Nations Commission for Indonesia should assist in the solution of the New Guinea issue... The difficult negotiations which will have to be undertaken on the issue of New Guinea will cast a shadow on the cooperation between the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands. You cannot cooperate with your right hand and carry on a dispute with your left... In a speech the following day, Dr. van Royen of the Netherlands commented: (98) The representative of the Republic of Indonesia said yesterday,...that the difficult negotiations which will have to be undertaken on the issue of New Guinea would cast a shadow on the cooperation... On the point of New Guinea, I feel sure that Mr. PALAR will prove to be wrong, not that I do not admit that our points of view on this issue are still far apart—even, if you will, diametrically opposed—but, as I also stated yesterday, I am certain that with the goodwill and the good faith which exists on both sides, it will be possible within a year to reach a satisfactory solution of this problem... But even as Dr. van Royen was speaking these conciliatory words in the UN Assembly, the Netherlands Government was engaged yet again, as it had at the time of Den Pasar and Linggadjati, in demonstrating the difference between the voice of Jacob and the hand of Esau. On December 29th there waspromulgated a decree for the future administration of Western New Guinea which quite belied Dr. van Royen’s optimistic expectations that the next twelve months would bring "a satisfactory solution" of the Irian problem. (99) I98T'Ibid. 7^p~460. (99) For the full text of the "Besluit Bewindsregeling Nieuw-Guinea," see W. A. Engelebrecht, compiler, Kitab-Kitab Undang-Undang, Undang-Undang dan Peraturan-Peraturan Serta Undang-Undang Dasar Sementara Republik Indonesia TLeiden, 1954), pp. 3090-3116.-------------------------

Its purpose clearly was to establish not merely a provisional administration which would serve for the next twelve months while the area’s future was being determined; rather, the definitiveness and detail of the royal decree in question left no doubt that the Netherlands Government, with characteristic bureaucratic thoroughness, was organizing a permanent administration intended to endure virtually in perpetuity. (100) Again, as in the case of the July decree separating New Guinea from Tidore, here was a clear advance indication of how futile subsequent diplomatic discussions would be. The administrative machinery provided by the decree is a somewhat wistful replica of the governmental structure of the erstwhile Netherlands Indies. Appointed by the Queen is a Governor, responsible only to the Crown. In his duties he is assisted by the Council of Heads of Departments--apparently modeled on the old Council of State (Raad van Staat) of the Indies. While the Governor may consult the Council, and apparently usually does, and the Council, for its part, "is entitled to advise the Governor of its own volition in cases where it judges this to be advisable in the interests of the Kingdom or of New Guinea," all actual executive powers rest with the Governor. In its all-Dutch membership, even as of 1958, the Council actually represents a retrogressive step from the status of the Council of the Indies in 1930 when two Indonesians were included. (101) In view of the emphatic and repeated claims by Dutch spokesmen, particularly in the UN, that the sole purpose of continued Netherlands rule is to further the interests of the peoples of West Irian and that vast sums have been spent on this, it seems strange that a decade of such activity has not been able to produce even one "native" worthy in Dutch eyes of participating in the administration. (102) And this archaically colonial aspect of the administrative organization is completed by the absence of even the most nominal sort of any type of representative assembly. <100) And, with minor changes, it continues to serve as the basis for Dutch administration. (101)For an account of the organization and powers of the Raad van Staat, see Vandenbosch, op. cit., pp. 103-106. (102)For a self-drawn picture of the Dutch "mission," see the pamphlet, From the Stone Age to the 20th Century, issued by the Netherlands Embassy in Washington in either 1954 or 1955. No date is given.

True the original decree of 1949 provides for the establishment of a New Guinea Council which, again obviously modeled on the powerless semi-representative "Peoples’ Council" (Volksraad) of the old Indies, was to include among its 21 members, "10 representatives of the indigenous population." (103) But, as of 1958, the Council has yet to be brought into existence. The official reason for this delay, as given in the most recent (1956) report rendered by the Netherlands Government to the United Nations on its administration of New Guinea in a sentence identical to that which appeared in the 1955 report, is tersely summarized as being due to the fact that, "As yet the setting up of such a body has encountered great practical difficulties." (104) Whatever may be the difficulties, the effect is to leave the Dutch administration in a phase of autocratic colonialism, which in the Netherlands Indies was concluded in 1918 with the establishment of the Volksraad. The promulgation of the "Decree for the Administrative Regulation of New Guinea" (Besluit Bewindsregeling Nieuw-Guinea), with its obvious purpose of solidifying Dutch rule on a virtually permanent basis, clearly violated the intent which lay behind the inclusion of Article 2 in the Charter of Transfer. The purpose of this article had been two-fold:

a. to record officially that "the views of the parties on New Guinea" remained "in dispute," and; b. to place the "political status" of the area in a state of suspended ani- mation for a period of one year while the problem was being settled through negotiations. Yet on December 29, 1949, the mere act of promulgation of the New Guinea decree made it emphatically clear that for the Netherlands Government the question of New Guinea’s future was already decided. As with the unilateral, December, 1946, interpretation of Linggadjati, the action of December, 1949, signified a tacit but conclusive repudiation of the intent of the agreement in question while lip-service was given to the letter. Actually the decree of December, 1949, would seem to represent another step in a long-maturing Dutch determination to retain control of Western New Guinea regardless of (103)See Engelbrecht, op. cit., ("Zesde Hoofdstuk-De Nieuw-Guinea Raad"), pp. 3101-3103. When and if ever established, its powers will still be nominal. (104)Report on Netherlands New Guinea for the year 1956, presented by the Netherlands Government to the Seere tary-General of the United Nations pursuant to Article 73(e) of the Charter, p. 7.

what happened elsewhere in Indonesia. On the part of certain official groups this possibly was an accepted policy as early as February, 1947 (see p. 40). Certainly this determination to keep New Guinea Dutch under any circumstances had been long evolved by July, 1949, when the official separation from Tidore was brought about with seemingly no more pressing reasons to do so than those which already had been present for forty years. If the Dutch Government had genuinely accepted the intent of Article 2 with its obvious implication that very possibly, indeed probably, within twelve months after December 27, 1949, the date of the so-called transfer of sovereignty, (105) the Dutch flag would cease to fly over any area of Indonesia, then the December, 1949, decree never would have been issued. Rather, preparations for an orderly transfer of authority, perhaps through the medium of the UN, would have been undertaken. (106) In December, 1949, however, Irian was still as it had been since Den Pasar--merely one among a number of problems (105)I use the adjective "so-called" because the Indonesian people no more consider that their sovereignty as an independent nation dates from December 27, 1949, when the Dutch formally acknowledged its existence, than do the American people that the United States only came into being as an independent and sovereign nation with the signing of the Treaty of Paris on September 3, 1783. In both cases the independence days are celebrated not on the dates when the erstwhile colonial rulers finally accepted the inevitable, but rather on the anniversaries of the original declarations of independence, i.e., August 17, 1945, and July 4, 1776. (106)This statement is,admittedly, pure conjecture on my part. But, based on some, knowledge of the Dutch way of doing things, I cannot imagine any official action, once the basic decision had been taken, being carried out other than with extensive, carefully planned and well-docu- mented preparations, initiated well in advance of the final implementation of the measure in question and with scrupulous attention given at every stage to the precise legal niceties involved, The mere fact that over so long a period of time precisely this course of action was followed in the interest of keeping New Guinea Dutch, and only in this interest, is indicative of the fact that at a much earlier date the final decision had been taken.

in Dutch-Indonesian relations. The events of the next year were to catapult it into the dubious status of being the problem in relations between the two countries. And unTil 1953 Irian remained primarily a problem in Dutch-Indonesian relations. But as the new nations of Asia and Africa began to make their voices heard, the Irian issue became one of the foci of East-West tensions in the mounting struggle between the old colonial powers and the new nations, determined to eliminate the last humiliating vestiges of Western colonialism. It is with the first of these phases, when Irian was still primarily an issue between Indonesia and the Netherlands, that the next chapter is concerned. Since the developments of this first phase occurred within the framework of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, it is to a brief examination of this product of the Round Table Conference that we turn first.

PART II THE INTERNATIONAL PHASE OF THE IRIAN PROBLEM, 1950-1958 CHAPTER IV THE IRIAN ISSUE IN DUTCH-INDONESIAN RELATIONS, 1950-1953 Through the Failure of the, December, 1950, Conference The Netherlands-Indonesian Union, within the framework of which the initial Irian discussions were conducted, was a curious institution. (1) Vague plans for reform of the Dutch Empire along the' lines of an attenuated British commonwealth organization had been current for several decades prior to World War II. (2) And in the postwar period, shortly after

(1)For the full texts of the Union Statute and the various financial and economic agreements, see RTC Results. For an analysis of the significance of the financial agreement concluded between the Netherlands and Indonesia at the RTC, see Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 438-444. The Indonesians have always considered that both the financial and economic agreements of the RTC were strongly slanted in favor of the Dutch and still left Indonesia’s financial and economic life very much under Dutch control.
(2)Schiller, op. cit., briefly mentions these proposals, pp. 14-18. For full elucidation of some of these, see Verslag van de Commissie tot bestudeering van Staats- rechtijke Hervormingen ("Report of the Commission for the Study’of Political Reforms"—usually referred to, after its chairman, as the "Visman Report"), II, Indie's Wenschen ("India's Wishes"), Tweede Druk (New York"; 1944), Verslag van de Commissie van Onderzoek naar de opvattingen in Nederland omtrent de plaats van de overzeesche gebiedsdeelen in het koninkrijk ("Report of the Commissiοn of Inquiry into Opinions in the Netherlands on the position of the Overseas Territories in the Kingdom"), I, II (Bijlagen) ('s-Gravenhage, 1946); W. H. van Helsdingen (Chairman of the just noted Inquiry Commission), De plaats van Nederlandsch-Indie in het koninkrijk ("The Place of Netherlands India in the Kingdom”), tweede deel (Leiden,
1946).

the return of the Netherlands Indies administration to Batavia (Djakarta), a statement was issued on November 6, 1945 announcing the intention of inducting "Indonesia" into "a full partnership in the Kingdom" which was to be composed of the various parts of the existing empire. (3) And on February 10, 1946, simultaneously in The Hague and Batavia, a further policy statement on Indonesia's future voiced the same intent. (4) This concept of saving the empire by its enforced transmutation into a Dutch organized and controlled commonwealth became one of the cardinal points in Netherlands policy in the postwar period and at the Round Table Conference found at least nominal fulfillment in the creation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. For the Union which emerged from the Conference was a far cry from the super-state envisioned in earlier Dutch thinking. As Kahin characterizes it: (5) In fact the Union was largely a paper institution without any real substance and powers. Primarily it was an agreement for mutual consultation on matters of common interest. Technically the Dutch monarch was at its head but without powers and charged only with the duty of effectuating "the spirit of voluntary and lasting cooperation between the partners." Relations between the Union partners, based on "free will, equality and complete independence," were to be regulated by biannual meetings between the respective councils of ministers and a Court of Arbitration. (6) Administra-

(3)For the full text, see Indonesie's Toekomst (Indonesia di Kemoedian Hari) ("Indonesia's Future") which gives the Dutch and Indonesian texts of various official documents of the period. Regeering's Voorlichtings Dienst (Batavia, July, 1946), pp. 7-12.
(4)Ibid., pp. 13-14.
(5)Nationalism and Revolution, p. 434.
(6)The Union Court of Arbitration held one session in the Fall of 1951 to discuss a minor problem dealing with compensation to former Netherlands-Indies civil servants by the Indonesian Government and after a brief session adjourned, unknowingly/ sine die, with its six members deadlocked in a 3-3 split which mirrored all too well the state of Indonesian-Dutch relations by that time. The only notable exception to the fiasco of the various

tive services were to be provided by the only actually functioning organ of the Union, a permanent Secretariat with offices in both The Hague and Djakarta headed by equally-ranking Secretary-Generals. Envisaged further, but never implemented, was the creation of "good contact and regular cooperation between the parliaments of the partners." Diplomatic relations were to be based on an exchange of "High Commissioners." In theory the Union existed from the conclusion of the RTC until its unilateral abrogation by the Indonesian Parliament in late April, 1956. Actually such meaningful existence as it had was encompassed in the brief twelve months between December 27, 1949, and the same date in 1950 when it became clear that no solution for the Irian problem was to be found within its framework. If the Union relationship had possessed any real viability, it might have survived the Irian and other problems which plagued it from birth. But from the very beginning, there was a Potemkin-like air of unreality about the Union. In essence it represented an effort to create a model British-type of commonwealth association by administrative fiat rather than by the normal process of evolutionary development over a longer period of years. Indeed, the Statute, like all the other elaborate plans of the postwar period with its lack of political reality, failures in psychological insight, (7) and over-meticulous attention to every minute detail of the projected relationship, was an example of the basically well-intentioned but unimaginative, too-little, too-late policy which had characterized Dutch actions in Indonesia for the previous half century. What, at the end of World War I, might have been a brilliant stroke of creative statesmanship was, even by 1947 when the Linggadjati Agreement was signed, already a generation too late, let alone a psychological and political impossibility at the time of the RTC, less than a year after supplemental Union agreements was the effective cooperation between the Dutch Military Mission and the Indonesian Armed Forces which continued until the end of the Mission’s activity in 1953.

(7) A conspicuous example of this failure in psychological insight was the provision that the Dutch rulers would always be the permanent heads of the Union. For an association based theoretically on "equality in status," a rotating chairmanship would have seemed more appropriate. The measure was one calculated to arouse Indonesian resentment from the very start.

the so-called "Second Police Action." (8) The Indonesian delegations, particularly that of the Republic, accepted the concept of the Union without enthusiasm as part of the price to be paid for the success of the Round Table Conference Nevertheless it was at the first Union conference of ministers, meeting in Djakarta in late March, 1950, that the initial steps were taken to find a solution for the Irian problem within the framework of the Union. The Conference discussed a variety of problems in connection with the future relations of the two countries. The final communique summarized the discussions about Irian as follows; (9) With regard to the Irian problem (New Guinea) both parties were agreed that a final solution still could not be found during the course of this first conference. In preparation for further and defini-

(8)Two so-called "Police Actions," July, 1947, and December, 1949, were undertaken by Dutch military forces against the Republic of Indonesia„ Actually both "Actions" represented full-scale military offensives with the objective the second time that of destroying the Republic. Under the circumstances, it was rather surprising that the Dutch as of November, 1949, assumed that the same people they had been dropping bombs on eleven months previously would not welcome such a close association as that envisaged by the Union. Judging by the very modest and always rejected demands of the Indonesian Nationalist Movement in the period of the 1930's, even at that late date a Union would have had a good chance of succeeding. But 1949 was just about a decade too late. For accounts of the modest reforms in the administration of the Netherlands Indies requested by the Nationalists, such as the Sutardjo Petition of 1936 asking for a ten year evolution of Indonesia towards the status of self-government within the Dutch Empire or the Wiwoho Resolution of 1940 asking that the Indies administration, in habitual parliamentary fashion be accountable to the Peoples' Council (Volksraad), see Kahin, pp. 95-98, and J. M. Pluvier, Overzicht van de ontwikkeling der nationalistische beweging in Indonesie Tn de jaren 1930 tot 1942 ('s-Gravenhage, Bandung, 1953), pp. 118-129 and pp. 171-183.
(9)Resultaten der eerste ministersconferentie van de Nederlands-Indonesische Unie, gehouden te Djakarta 25 Maart-1 April 1950 (Djakarta, 1950), pamphlet, ρΊ 89„

tive treatment of this question at a second and special Ministers’ Conference to be convened for that purpose, it was decided to appoint a mixed commission to which each of the partners will appoint three members... Although also discussed at this conference, nothing resulted from an Indonesian request to send a parliamentary commission to Irian nor from a Dutch suggestion that Indonesia send a "commissioner" to represent it there. As this first Ministers' Conference was meeting, the keen interest of Australia in Dutch retention of Western New Guinea was made unmistakably clear. The earliest support given to the Indonesian independence struggle by any non-Asian nation had come from Australia. And it will be recalled that the Australian representative on both the Good Offices Committee and the United Nations Commission had functioned as the representative of Indonesian interests. This was the Australian role to the very end of the Round Table Conference in early November, 1949. In December of that year the long-dominant Labor Party was defeated in the Australian elections and the government thereafter composed of a coalition of the conservatively oriented Liberal-Country parties. It was during this same period that the drawing tensions of the Cold War continued to mount. And in October, 1949, the Peoples Republic of China had been proclaimed, signalizing both the most significant communist victory since November, 1917, and the emergence of a militant and potentially powerful new Asian state. To weigh the influence of any one of these, or other, factors in bringing about the change in the Australian official attitude towards Indonesian affairs which was made so obvious in early 1950 is impossible. Suffice it to say that while prior to Indonesian independence, the Australian Government had exhibited an at least friendly attitude towards the Indonesian nationalist movement, (10) in the period beginning shortly after the Round Table Conference, Australia adopted and has maintained a position on the Irian question even more intransigent than that of the Netherlands itself. Officially Australia has never given the slightest indication of any desire to compromise on the issue. During a visit to the Netherlands in August, 1950, for example, Minister of (10) While not subject to proof or disproof, the degree of Australian official sympathy and support may well often have been exaggerated by Indonesian sources either in- tentionally or in terms of wishful thinking.

External Affairs Spender, in a lengthy statement dealing with the Irian dispute, told the press: (11) The Australian Government does not consider that Indonesia has any valid claim to Dutch New Guinea, the future of which is of vital importance to the Australian people... Australia has a deep attachment to the people of Australian New Guinea... If the claim of Indonesia to Dutch New Guinea were conceded to any degree at all, it would be a matter of time, no matter how genuine may be assurances to the contrary, when the claim will be pushed further so as to include the trust territory of Australian New Guinea and its people. Experience has shown to the Australians how strategically vital to Australian defense is the mainland of New Guinea. I have pointed out before that we cannot alter our geography which for all times makes this area of supreme consequence to Australia. Quite apart from its military and strategic significance, one cannot disregard the ever-increasing Communist pressure in Asia. Communism has not got any foothold yet in Australian New Guinea. Australia is determined in so far as it can to ensure that it will not. And four years later the same gentleman, then his nation's Permanent Representative at the UN, was telling the Political Committee of the Ninth Assembly, "Events in any part of the world are viewed with interest in Australia. But when the island of New Guinea is mentioned in an international context, then that interest becomes of an intense nature... New Guinea has been shown to represent the very key to Australia's defense... We feel that the destiny of Australia is closely bound up with this island which stands so close to us...(12) (11)The text is taken from the version quoted by L. Metzemaekers in "The Western New Guinea Problem," Pacific Affairs, XXIV, 2 (June, 1951), pp. 139-140. (12)UN General Assembly, Ninth Session, First Committee, A/C.l/SR 727 (26 November 1954), pp. 48-50, passim. It seems probable that even had the Labor Party won the Australian elections in 1949, there would still have been a change in Indonesian policy. Foreign policy in the period between 1945 and 1949 seems to have been largely the personal affair of Minister of External Affairs Evatt who found himself in the position of being

As groundless as it would seem to be, there is no denying a very genuine fear on the part of Australia that, West Irian once gained, Indonesia would then lay claim to Eastern New Guinea. It is true that more than once the Irian issue had been used, in an ancient tradition, to distract popular attention from the failures of Indonesian domestic politics. Often the acquisition of West Irian has been pictured, particularly by the nationalistically-oriented political parties, as a task far more important than any problems of domestic development. And on the shoulders of the Dutch has conveniently been placed the blame for events over which they had no control and only the remotest connection. But even assuming Indonesian acquisition of West Irian, it seems highly unlikely that Australian New Guinea would then become the next object for the relief of domestic political pressures. For leaving aside completely for the moment the constant assurances given by ranking Indonesian officials, of every political belief, from 1950 to the present of their desire to include within the present boundaries of Indonesia only that territory comprised in the former Netherlands Indies there is another factor involved. And that is that aside from the diplomatic assurances in this connection, precisely the same point has been driven home over and over again in terms of domestic propaganda. To organize an irredentist campaign for Australian New Guinea would not merely require beginning from a dead halt but rather a completely reversed ~~~ the Tmoulder of the first essay in an independent ' Australian foreign policy as such at a time when most of his countrymen were still immersed in domestic affairs. Both External Affairs Minister Evatt and his appointee to the UNCI, Mr. Thomas Critchley, apparently possessed a liberal basically anti-colonial viewpoint. By 1950 the rise of Communist China and the fears that Indonesia would shortly also become Communist had apparently crystallized public opinion to the ppint where, even had it desired to do so, no Government could have pursued the 1945-50 policy further. Among all parties, from 1950 on, strategic considerations seem to have been influential in theii· consideration of the Irian problem. In the opinion of a qualified observer of Australian affairs, it was not until about 1953 that there was general public awareness of and support for the pro-Dutch position of the Government. It was from this time on, rather than as of 1950, that the Australian attitude became actively opposed to the Indonesian claim rather than merely passively in opposition.

domestic propaganda approach which would mean nothing less than the repudiation of repeated statement made by every ranking Indonesian public official from President Sukarno on down over a period of years. West Irian once gained, any government in need of an outlet for public discontent over domestic affairs is far more likely to turn on that traditional scapegoat, the Chinese. 0**, if the desire exists to find a specifically anti-colonial outlet, Portuguese Timor seems a far more likely, and militarily much safer, prospect than Australian New Guinea. But even this latter possibility would require a very sharp and rather unlikely policy re- versal. (13) Whether Australian fears in this connection can even be laid to rest remains to be seen. Possibly an Indonesian offer of a treaty of friendship and non-aggression with full acceptance of the 141st parallel by both parties as an irrevocable boundary might be acceptable at some future date although it obviously would not be so now. (14) But in spite of the fervor with which Australian spokesmen stress the strategic importance of the island of New Guinea in their country’s defense, the proposition seems open to doubt. For New Guinea's chief value for Australia in the Second World War and in any future conflict was not and would not be that of an outer bastion but rather as a final rampart. When hostilities have come so close to Australia that it needs New Guinea in either capacity, the situation is grave indeed. Assuming such a catastrophic development, one wonders exactly what value can be attached to the meager military resources available from the Dutch forces in the western half of the island. Either the friendly neutrality or armed assistance of a multi-millioned Asian nation, rich in strategic resources, would seem to offer Australia a far better alternative. And if that contant Australian bogey of a Communist Indonesia should ever become reality, again Dutch (13)Indonesian spokesmen have been prompt to deny any annex- ationist ambitions whatsoever in connection with British or Portuguese territory in the area. In October, 1956, for example, after an anti-colonial group in Indonesia had demanded the "liberation" of Portuguese Timor, a Foreign Office spokesman pointed out that Indonesia had never made any claims to either Portuguese Timor or British Borneo but wanted only its proper boundaries—

i.e., the area of the former Netherlands East Indies (Antara News Bulletin, October 19, 1956). (14)Former Minister of External Affairs Evatt proposed such a pact just after the conclusion of the Bandung Conference in the Spring of 1955. His concept, however, was a tripartite one with the Netherlands included.

military power would seem to offer but the thinnest of barri- ers. Finally it seems dubious if in the age of the jet plane and the guided missile New Guinea possesses any value either as outer bastion or final rampart. Indonesia has repeatedly sought to dispel Australian fears as to what it would mean to have it as a neighbor. At the conclusion of the discussions on the Irian issue in the Twelfth General Assembly, for example, Foreign Minister Subandrio commented: (15) Towards our closest neighbor, Australia, I should like to say this. Our security in many fields are interlocked with each other. In this context the Indonesian people do not understand why the Australian Government harbors aspirations towards West Irian. (16) Once Australia realizes that Indonesia as a whole is more important than a Netherlands colonial enclave in West Irian, then I think we will have achieved our aim in laying the basic foundations of peace and security in that region. The joint commission called for by the Ministers’ Conference of April, 1950, began functioning in May. After an orientation trip to West Irian in June, it attempted to reach an agreement on formulating a report. But so far apart were the viewpoints of the Indonesian and Dutch members that eventually, some weeks after the original July 1 deadline, two separate reports had to be submitted. These known respective ly as the Netherlands Main Constituent (Part II of the whole report) and the Indonesian Main Constituent (Part III) shed no new light on the issued (17) Actually, drawing on the (15)Statement "made before the General Assembly on November 29, 1957—quotes taken from text supplied by Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the UN. (16)This apparently is a reference to various proposals and suggestions from Australian sources that Australia should either attempt to buy West Irian from the Netherlands or let it be known that Australian armed forces would occupy it in the event that cession to Indonesia was ever contemplated. (17)The Report of the Committee New Guinea (Irian) comprised four sections. Other than those mentioned, fliese were Preface (Part I) and Appendixes (sic) (Part IV). The Report was ’’published BynETie^ecrefariat of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union,” (n.p., n.d.).

same basic materials, each side had produced a lawyer’s brief drafted for its maximum propaganda value. The arguments used at the RTC which Taylor summarizes so ably (pp. 61-62) were again repeated. However, the Dutch report is of interest as virtually the first official indication of a refocusing in the "moral mission" concept. From Linggadjati through the Round Table, the calvinist parties in particular had stressed again and again the need to retain New Guinea as a future homeland for the Eurasian population of Indonesia and as an area to which native Dutch immigration could be directed for the creation of the long-visioned Tropical Holland in the Pacific. Before the RTC, Dutch papers were talking in terms of an Eurasian immigration which alone would comprise 100,000 to 150,000 persons. (18) The fantastic nature of these expectations were clear enough by mid-1950 for the Netherlands Main Constituent (see Note 17 above) to observe (p~ ...presently there may possibly be room for a few thousands of colonists, who, if they comply with certain demands, could find a reasonable existence... From the preceding is also to be deducted that from the Netherlands also New Guinea is not to be viewed as the country towards which the pressure of the population of the fatherland is to be un- burdened by definitively transplanting an important part of our younger generation. And, as would be the case henceforth in other Dutch policy statements, the report made little mention of the previously predominant moral duty to the Eurasians but rather, without venturing to suggest a date, dwelt on the need to preserve "the right of self-determination of the autochthonous population.,," Thus was the Netherlands concept of the moral

718) Rotterdams' Nieuwsblad, September 5, 1949. By the end of 1950 the "European” population of New Guinea had increased from about 500 in September, 1949, to 8,500. The 1956 Report to the UN (Appendix IV (f)) places this figure at 14,409. The Eurasian tragedy has been two-fold: a. they have been displaced from the privileged position they held in the colonial period by the very fact of their fanatic loyalty to the old regime, and; b. they have not, by and large, been able, or, in some cases, wanted, to adjust to the new order. Above all, as a bureaucratic lower middle Class, they were singularly ill-equipped to play the roles of pioneers in New Guinea. For a brief summary of the Eurasian problem, see Virginia Thompson and Richard Adloff, Minority Problems in Southeast Asia (Stanford, 1955), pp~ 138-143.

mission, refocused. Again, well in advance, this calculated revamping of propaganda themes made it clear that the Netherlands official position in the December, 1950, conference would not be changed from that of the BTC While the "Committee New Guinea (Irian)” was engaged in its fruitless compilation of data, contemporary Indonesian political developments in connection with the Irian issue had continued apace Most striking had been the increasing absorption of President Sukarno in the issue. The President is a man of dynamic personality, possessed of a strong will and determined to overcome all obstacles. His great strength, possessed by no other public fugure, has Iain always in his remarkable oratorical ability which given him a charisma for the masses, whose voice he feels himself to be. To him, after a lifetime of unstinting dedication to the idea of the freedom and sovereignty of all Indonesia, "from Sabang to Merauke," continued Dutch occupation of West Irian is little less than personal affront. As long as the situation continues he feels the national revolution not only incomplete but endangered by the continued maintenance of a military base of the former colonial power on Indonesia’s back doorstep „ Supporting the President in his increasingly vehement Irian campaign was that strong current of Indonesian political thought which bases itself on the concept of a national and secular state. (19) Most prominent among the political parties in this group was the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia), with the prewar predecessor of which the President had been closely associated The Nationalist Party and other such groups in part supported the President’s urgent campaign on Irian from ideological con- 0-9) For information on the Indonesian party system, see George Kahin’s "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism" in Asian Nationalism and the West, edited by William L, Holland (New York, 1953), pp’, 67-196; Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Interim Report Series, Cornell Modern Indonesia ProjecT, Ithaca, 1957); RoesIan Abdulgani, The Political Party System of Indonesia on the Eve of Elections, a Dutch-language vetsion of which appears in the Indohesisehe Bulletin, published monthly by the Indonesian Representat ion in The' Hague (VI, No, 10, October, 1955, pp 21-34); Soedjatmoko, "The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia" in Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia, edited by Philip W. Thayer (Baltimore.

1956), pp 128-140.

viction. But also in part it was because of the fact that it offered a convenient weapon against their chief political rivals. Foremost among the parties competing with the Nationalists for political hegemony in Indonesia's polyparty system was the Masjumi, which bases its political philosophy on a social welfare concept of Islam in the modern wona much as the Christian Democratic parties of Europe base their philosophy on a similar interpretation of Catholicism. Closely allied with Masjumi's leftwing of religious socialists was the, then, influential Socialist Party. This political group- ing looked to Vice-President Hatta rather than President Sukarno for its political leadership Though manifesting less emotion, their commitment to Irian becoming Indonesian was as dedicated as that of the Nationalists and the President (However, they were less fully committed in terms of domestic politics,) The difference lay in priorities. The Hatta-Masjumi-Socialist group felt that first had to come an attack upon Indonesia's problems of internal security and economic prosperity, These solved, they believed that West Irian would become Indonesian by almost irresistabie attrac- tion. This dichtomy of tactical viewpoints was to prove an important political dynamic in the years to come, The major Indonesian policy statement on Irian was, appropriately enough, given by President Sukarno in the course of an address on August 17, 1950, the fifth anniversary of the Independence Proclamation. Aside from the fact that Indonesia was celebrating the day for the first time as a fully-accepted, member of the world community, it was notable for another reason. Only two days previously there had been promulgated the "Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia," marking the transition from the Dutch-sponsored federal system of the short-lived (December 27, 1949 - August 15, 1950) United States of Indonesia to the original unitary pattern of the Djogja Republic. (20) The Official Elucidation to the Constitution, issued by the Ministry of Justice, had, significantly enough, defined a reference to the area comprised by the Republic of Indonesia (Article 2) as meaning, ",,.the territory of the former Netherlands Indies..." (21) Concomi- T20) The "Dutch imposed character" (Schiller, p, 9) of the federal structure doomed it from the start. As Kahin says, "More than anything else the change from the federal Republic of the United States of Indonesia to the new Unitarian Republic represented the desire of the population to shake off the legacy of Dutch colonial rule." (Nationalism and Revolution, p. 463). For a detailed account of "The Unitari"an~Movement," see the same source, pp. 446-469.

tant with the proclamation of the second unitary republic, the cabinet, headed by Dr. Hatta, resigned. (22) It was against this background that the President delivered his Independence Day anniversary address, In connection with Irian, he said; (23) This is not a trifling question; this is a major issue. I fear that the Netherlands does not yet understand that the Irian question is a major issue to us... The Irian question is a question of colonialism or non-colonialism, a question of colonialism or independence. Part of our country is still colonized by the Dutch. This is a reality and we do not accept this... We still observe the provisions of the R.T.C. agreements that the question of Irian shall be peaceably settled within this year. After this year neither party will be bound by the R.T.C. provisions. We are now in the middle of August and there are no indications as yet that the Dutch will change their attitude. Only four and a half months separate us from seeing the sun rise in 1951. People of Indonesia...--let us clearly understand what this really means. In our present Constitution it is expressly laid down that the territory of our State comprises the entire former Netherlands Indies, that is from Sabang to Merauke. Thus, (21)Quoted from the version of the English language text given in Indonesian Review, I, 2 (February-March, 1951),

p. 154.— (22)On August 22, 1950, President Sukarno instructed Mohammed Natsir, Chairman of Masjumi, then the largest party in the legislative branch, to form a government. On September 6, Natsir announced the formation of a cabinet dominated by the Masjumi'and Socialists but excluding the Nationalists since no agreement could be reached over the division of cabinet portfolios. During the Natsir Cabinet’s short life (September, 1950-March, 1951) the Nationalists, supported on occasion by the Communists, constituted the chief parliamentary opposition. The failure of the December, 1950, Irian conference was a defiriite prestige loss for the cabinet, and the Masjumi. (23)English language text quoted from version given by Kahin in Indonesian Politics and Nationalism, pp. 165-166.

according to our Constitution, Irian is also Indonesian territory, territory of the Republic οΐ Indonesia—not tomorrow, not the day after tomorrow, but now, at this v®ry moment. The Dutch de facto authority over Irian is recognized for this year only. (24) If a settlement by negotiation cannot be arrived at within this year a major conflict will arise over the issue of who will be in power in that island from then onward. For once again I declare:we will not stop fighting, we will continue fighting, we will keep on fighting whatever may come, until Irian has been returned to our fold. And I have great hope, I know that Irian will return to our fold. For our weapon is the unsurpassed weapon of the National Revival which the Dutch have fought repeatedly and which—at long last they must admit-^they could not crush,... At present we are at peace and on a footing of friendship with the Dutch, but "peace without justice is not peace," a wise saying goes. Let us, therefore, pray that the eyes of the Dutch people may be opened and that they may realize the justice of our demand, so that friendship between our people and the Dutch people may flourish. Although the anti-Indonesian bloc in the Dutch Parliament (25) was to show itself impervious to this and other (24)As far as the writer is aware, this is the first public statement of the Indonesian assertion that sovereignty de jure was transferred at the time of the RTC and that Article 2 related only to the continuance of sovereignty de facto during the stipulated twelve month period (i.e., until December 27, 1950). (25)It was a curiously assorted group including the calvinist parties, the Freedom and Democracy Party, a probably predominant section of the Catholics and, paradoxically the Communists whose party line on the Irian issue descended to a new nadir in semantic confusion. For, according to a manifesto issued by the party in October, 1950 (Kronik Dokumentasi, p. 126), the Irian question was simply a bone of contention between "Dutch Colonialism," supported by Australia, on the one hand and "Sukarno and Associates, supported by Imperialist America," on the other. The result, as the Indonesian Socialist organ, Pedoman, editorialized on October 20, 1950, was, in terms of practical politics to seat the Dutch communists "in the same row with Gerbrandy, Welter and all the other reactionaries."

appeals for amicable settlement, the President’s August 17 speech and other indications of the urgency with which the Irian problem was regarded by Indonesia aroused concern among the still dominant Dutch business community„ In the Fall of 1950, the Dutch-owned news agency, Aneta, interviewed "a number of prominent figures in Netherlands~Eusiness and commercial life in Indonesia as to their opinions about the New Guinea question (26) The consensus ran as follows; 1 As business men there is little desire to mingle in political matters, but; 2, it is thought that most Indonesians now find it difficult to accept the fact that the Netherlands, which is so far away, should still continue as a colonial power in the eastern neighborhood of Indonesia. 3. Those interests at home which favor the continuance of Dutch sovereignty over New Guinea only constitute a hindrance to the development of proper relations; the business interests in Indonesia ask themselves this question, "Can the maintenance of Dutch sovereignty over New Guinea really have any significance?”; 4, they believe New Guinea has only potential value, and that only if the Dutch Government’s plans for developing the land and the people can be brought to fruition, but where is the capital coming from? The Netherlands cannot supply it alone, (27) 5, Since this is so, if an open door policy is followed in connection with the development of New Guinea, political sovereignty is unimportant and, under such conditions, what groups should stand a better chance than Dutch business and commercial interests with their extensive experience in tropical areas? (28)6, The Netherlands would do well to (26)As summarized in Keesings' Historisch Archief 1010 (22 tot 28 Oktober) 9042l, This is the Dutch equivalent of the American Facts on File publication, (27)This, or course, is precisely the argument used by van Mook against including Irian in East Indonesia and which subsequently has been used by the Dutch arguing against Indonesian acquisition. In all three cases, the argument seems valid. It is beyond the resources of either Indonesia, alone or the Netherlands alone to develop West, Irian, On the other hand, once the Irian problem,Jias been settled; as inevitably it must be, by a restoration of the area to its traditional political, cultural and economic ties, the possibilities for international assistance in development would be greatly enhanced, (28)As we shall see in discussing the December, 1950, conference, Indonesia made a sweeping offer in this connection which was summarily rejected by the Dutch Government,

review its position in connection with New Guinea and Dutch business interests should try to win a good reputation with the Indonesian people in order to maintain their positions/

7. The present official Dutch position constitutes an obsti- nate block in this connection; 8. but there is also need for understanding from the Indonesian side. In November, 1950, the principal organization of Dutch small business men in Indonesia (General Commercial Association) sent a letter to Prime Minister Drees and the Dutch High Commissioner in Djakarta, (29) expressing the "uneasiness of the foreign community in Indonesia in connection with the Irian question. It predicted that, if there was not a settlement of the Irian issue satisfactory to the Indonesian side, sentiment would seek an outlet which would express itself to the detriment of Dutch business and commercial interests in the country. For this reason, the Dutch Government was urged, "to do everything possible to settle the Irian question to the maximum satisfaction both of the Republic of Indonesia and, the Kingdom of the Netherlands." At the time the letter was written, there seemed to be justification for the Association’s fears of becoming a scapegoat for the policies of the Dutch Government. For early in November the leader of one of the smaller left-wing nationalist parties (30) in a press interview had urged the imposi- tion of a general economic and commercial boycott of all Dutch enterprises should the Irian issue fail of satisfactory solution by the end of 1950, Although much discussed, and a source of anxious concern to Dutch business interests, the project had little practical result. For not only did Vice-President Hatta and the Executive Council of the powerful Masjumi place themselves publically in opposition to the idea, but even the Chairman of the Nationalist Party expressed acceptance only "in principle," and then proceeded to qualify even this lukewarm approval to such a degree as to make his indorsement meaningless. (31) "(29) The Indonesian text of the letter is quoted in Kroqik Dokumentasi, op, cit., p, 146, (30) This was "Bung Tomo" (Sutomo) who had been the leader of the Indonesian defense of Surabaya against British occupation in November, 1945, and one of the most extreme of nationalist agitators in the pre-sovereignty period. His party, the Indonesian People’s Party (Partai Rakjat Indonesia), previously unrepresented, won two seats in The 1955 parliamentary elections.

The program of the first cabinet of the restored unitary state, headed by Masjumi leader Natsir, included among its principal objectives, "to continue the struggle for the settlement of the Irian issue within this year." (32) And in his initial parliamentary address, Prime Minister Natsir said: (33) The Government has decided it will send a delegation to a Special Conference in the Netherlands in connection with the Irian question The composition of this delegation will be complete within a few days and will be announced... The Government will try to settle the Irian question as quickly as possible in connection with our national objectives and this effort will be carried out, with all our strength. We hope that the Dutch will comprehend that the prompt settlement of this problem will only improve relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands, while, on the other side, the postponement of this settlement will only worsen these relations. The Government is convinced that in these efforts it will get full support from Parliament and the whole Indonesian people. Although originally scheduled for mid-October, it was not until the 4th of December, 1950, a little over three weeks from the fateful deadline, that the Special Conference on Irian finally convened in The Hague. Serving as Chairman of the Netherlands Delegation, as had been the case at the RTC, was Minister of Union Affairs and Overseas Territories van Maarseveen, aided by Foreign Minister Stikker. The Indonesian delegation was headed by Foreign Minister Mohammed Roem, a prominent member of the Masjumi. (34) While both (31)The texts, in Indonesian, of all these statements are available in Kronik Dokumentasi, Hatta, p. 156; Masjumi,

p. 159; Nationalist, p. 155. (32)17 Agustus, 1945-1951, op. cit., p. 49, (33)Risalah Perundingan 1950/1951, Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat Republik Indonesia, Djilid II (Rapat. Ke-XI S/D Ke-XVIII) (Djakarta, 1951), p. 371. Referred to hereafter as Risalah Perundingan with vol. no. in Roman numerals. (34)The complete list of the delegations and the texts of the various notes and statements are available in Handelingen, Tweede Earner, Zitting 1950-1951, Bijlagen 2051” 2, 3

delegations showed themselves keenly aware of the fact that, in the words used by Prime Minister Natsir when bidding his delegation farewell, "There is infinitely more at stake here than a piece of land called West Irian," (35) it was equally clear that the gulf between the respective viewpoints was both wide and deep, An official news source summarized the Indonesian viewpoint on the conference as follows: (36) The "Irian Issue" from the Indonesian standpoint boils down to this; (a) West New Guinea is politically and economically (and culturally) a part of Indonesia, just as it used to be a part of the Dutch East Indies. (b) Dutch Colonialism in Southeast Asia must be liquidated as soon as possible.

(c) The Irian people have demonstrated time and again their desire to join the Republic. The Dutch argument that West New Guinea "is not yet ready" to be included in the Indonesian Republic strikes the people of Indonesia as threadbare and discredited... the same old defense employed by Colonials everywhere. A similar point that Indonesia "is not yet ready" and "lacks the resources" to improve the standard of living... seems equally unconvincing... Finally it should be remembered that the Indonesians have reason to fear the continuing "influence" of irresponsible Dutch Colonial elements in the archipelago. They have after all, clear proof that Dutch army officers were involved in the Westerling, Makassar and Ambon uprisings,and suspect "colonial influences” behind recent disturbances in Java. (37) (35)Report on Indonesia, Information Office, Republic of Indonesia, New York, II, 14 (December 11, 1950), p, 5, (36)Ibid. (37)The Westerling revolt was an attempt, in which certain Federalist leaders were involved, to murder the cabinet and overthrow the government in January, 1950. Its leader, former Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) Captain Westerling, a man of dubious reputation, escaped from Indonesia on board a Dutch military plane. For details on this and other subversive activity in this period, see Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, pp. 454-460.

In the course of 1950 various subversive disturbances had occurred in different areas of Indonesia, most importantly in the South Moluccas and in particular on the island of Ambon. With pome of these activities, reactionary groups in the Netherlands were belligerent in proclaiming their enthu- siastic complicity. The effect was to worsen Dutch-Indonesian relations in general and give the Indonesians yet another cause of concern in connection with continued Dutch retention of West Irian. Ambon and the other areas of the South Moluccas where the subversive disturbances were and would continue, are within easy communication distance of Dutch military bases on West Irian by sailing prauw--let alone fast motor boat, In the years that followed the initial subversive disturbances, it would be alleged by Indonesian officials that the groups involved were able to continue only by virtue of the assistance received from sources in Netherlands New Guinea. (38) Repeatedly, Indonesian sources have pointed out that the civil administration of Netherlands New Guinea is staffed largely with former members of the old Netherlands Indies Civil Service. Within the prewar Indies civil service there had been a liberal element. (39) But those former members of the civil service occupying posts in the Dutch administration of New Guinea were, by and large, precisely those individuals most dedicated to the maintenance of the old colonial status quo. (40) That any support ever came from these sources for subversive activity in Indonesia has, of course, always been vehemently denied by the Netherlands Government. Whatever may be the actual facts, Indonesia

138) It; seems not improbable that more than once such charges were made without any basis in fact simply to save face over governmental blunders which had aroused legitimate local resentments and resistance, (39) I refer to the so-called "Stuw-group," the leadership of which was largely composed of the liberal element in the Indies civil service. The group’s objective was to promote a closer (and more equal) cooperation between Dutch and Indonesians and to bring about an independent Indonesian Commonwealth which, presumably, would have associated with the Netherlands on much the same basis as existed in the British Commonwealth of Nations. The period of the "Stuw-group" (1930-1933) was an unfortunate one for liberal or progressive ideas and its propaganda fell at that time on barren ground; it bore bitter fruit in post World War II days when History had converted the idealistic appeals of the early '30’s into the meaningless constitutional blueprints of the late '40’s. See Pluvier, pp. 38-40.

has continued to feel uneasy over the possibility of infil- trations and covert assistance to subversive groups from the colonial-minded administration of Netherlands New Guinea. And as long as the Dutch flag continues to fly within a few miles of Indonesia's sprawling and unguarded eastern sea frontier, the fear of official or unofficial assistance to subversive groups will continue to affect the Indonesian attitude towards all things Dutch. Although these fears were already present when the December conference opened, the Indonesian delegation made a determined effort to offer scrupulous safeguards for Dutch interests in West Irian—very much along the lines mentioned by those Netherlands business sources quoted in the Aneta survey earlier in the year (see p. 87). On December ll, Foreign Minister Roem offered the following concessions to the Dutch Government as the basis for regulating West Irian's future: (41)

1.Recognition of existing Dutch economic and financial rights and concessions plus special consideration in connection with new investments and concessions and in the development and exploitation of soil and forest resources; prefer- ential treatment for Dutch interests in such areas as trade, shipping and industry;
2.Dutchmen to be eligible for administrative employment;
3.Pensions for Dutch officials to be guaranteed by the Indonesian Government, as in the case of the Round Table Conference Agreements;
4.Immigration of Dutch nationals to Irian to be permitted and due attention paid to supplying the manpower needs of West Irian; (40)And from personal observation, as of 1956 the same was true of those former Netherlands Indies civil servants who virtually monopolized the policy-making posts concerned with Indonesian and New Guinea affairs in the Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Overseas Territories. (41)This summary of the Indonesian 7-point proposal is based upon the English text given by Kahin in his "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism," p. 166. The full original text (in Dutch) is given in Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1950-1951, Bijlagen 2051, 2, p. 4.

5.Incorporation of West Irian into the Indonesian communications system but with "due attention to the concessions granted earlier to Dutch or mixed enterprises";
6.Guarantees for freedom of religion and assistance to "the humanitarian work of religious missions" by the Indonesian Government;
7.Efforts to be made to operate "a fully democratic government in West Irian" with a representative body to be established as soon as possible with the population possessing "full autonomy and a voice in the government"; To these proposals the Dutch replied with a firm negative which emphasized, as would often happen again, the determination of the Netherlands Government to "exercise sovereignty., until the right of self-determination is utilized by the population of New Guinea." (42) It proposed that a meaningless T42) Some seven years later, the Dutch delegate to the United Nations (Mr. Schurmann) told the Political Committee of the UN, "If it were possible at this time to let the Papuans choose for themselves under what regime they would like to live, my Government would not hesitate for one moment to do so...the Netherlands Government is using every means within its power to hasten the education of the population of Netherlands New Guinea and to bring nearer the day when they shall be able to decide for themselves on their own destiny.” Mr. Schurmann concluded by quoting the 1950 "Speech from the Throne" of Queen Juliana in which it was announced (underlining added), "In particular it is intended to adopt a development plan for this territory as soon as possible. Through these measures the foundation should be laid for the possibility that in due course the population will be enabled to decide on its own future." The speech, which as Mr. Schurmann observed, had been "made long before" the 1957 meeting of the UN, was quoted by him as the most authoritative reference available of the current state of Dutch good intentions towards West Irian as of a period half a decade later. (Eleventh Session, First Committee, UN General Assembly, A/C.1/PV.857, 23 February Τ9“57; pp. 83-84.----------------------------------------- It is interesting to contrast this Dutch policy of what has, for so long, been "intended" for the creation of the mere "possibility" that "in due course" some sort of political option might be permitted the Papuan population with what has been done for the only slightly less primitive Dayak people of Borneo (Kalimantan) by that

"New Guinea Council," with equal Dutch-Indonesian representation, be created for the sole purpose of receiving an annual report from the Dutch administration on its activities. Or, it was suggested, in what was evidently intended as a concession, if the idea of the "Council" did not appeal, then the annual report could be rendered to the Council of Ministers of the Union. Other than this rendering of an annual report to one council or another, the administration of Netherlands New Guinea was to have no obligation towards the joint body concerned nor was the latter to possess any inherent powers or supervisory functions. Following Indonesian rejection of the council proposal, the Conference recessed while Foreign Minister Roem returned to Djakarta for consultations. Although it resumed delibera- tions for yet another four days on the 23rd, it was clear that this was merely for the sake of the record. On the 27th the Conference ended in what Foreign Minister Roem aptly described as "complete deadlock." Indeed, as one account summarized it, "...the Conference consisted of a series of disagreements, from beginning to end. At the final session, as the two delegations to the Conference could not agree on a Joint-Statement, each decided to issue its own." (43) Indonesian Government, the incompetence and inability of which for carrying out such a "moral mission" as is involved in West Irian, the Dutch never cease emphasizing. Yet, the Dayaks of Borneo, the source of the legends about the "wild man of Borneo," have since the end of the colonial period in 1949 been brought far along the path to the 20th century by the Indonesian Government. As an English journalist who visited Borneo describes the post-colonial progress of the Dayaks, "They have their own representatives in Parliament. They have their own organization, the National Council of Dayaks, with a membership of 120,000. Their aim, one of their M.P.’s told me is to develop a communal rather than a tribal consciousness as a step towards the larger self-consciousness as Indonesians... Thus, in the few years of the Republic’s existence, the people of Central Kalimantan, and especially the younger generation of Dayaks, have a wider horizon; they are no longer content to be anthropological. specimens,,.." (Dorothy Woodman, The Republic of Indonesia (New York, 1955), pp. 70-71), (43) "Irian—Crisis in Indonesian-Dutch Relations,” Indonesian Review, I, 1 (January, 1951), p. 41.

The Dutch statement, after reviewing the various proposals which had been made by its delegation, suggested in terms of a "last effort" to reconcile the conflicting viewpoints either that sovereignty over West Irian be transferred to the Union with the Netherlands continuing to exercise de facto control, or that negotiations be continued under the-auspices of the still extant United Nations Commission for Indonesia "or any other organ, that would be able to render good offices to the parties." (44) It concluded with the declaration that since the future of the area had not been decided by negotiation within the year’s period stipulated in Article 2 of the Transfer of Sovereignty, "Netherlands sovereignty and the status quo are maintained,” (45) The Indonesian statement, after reviewing the various proposals made by its delegation, went on to explain the reasons for the rejection of the final Dutch proposals as having been because; (46) "(44) Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1950-1951, Bijlagen 2051 & 2 T"Nota betreffende de onderhandelingen van 4 t7m""27 Dec, .1950 gevoerd tussen het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden en de Republiek Indonesie"), p. 8. The basis for the prompt Indonesian rejection of this proposed UNCI mediation was the fact that by this time it was clear that two of its members, "Belgium and Australia, would be certain to back Holland's claims." (Report on Indonesia, Information Office, New York, II, 16 (January 2, 1951),

p. 1). Nor, by the end of 1950, was Indonesia any too sure of what could be expected from American policy which since the outbreak of the Korean war the previous July was increasingly committed to an exclusively communist-anti-communist evaluation of all world problems. (45) Article 2 of the Charter of Transfer of Sovereignty, had been scrupulously drafted to avoid any mention of "sovereignty" in any connection whatsoever. Nor did any of its various clauses afford justification for the continuation of Dutch rule in West Irian after December 27, 1950. Here again, in the Linggadjati tradition, was a purely unilateral interpretation on the basis of a notre convenance. (46) Standpoint and Views of the Indonesian Delegation at the Close of the Irian Conference, A.E./592, Kement'erian pgnerangan (Information Ministry), Djakarta, December 1950, mimeographed, single sheet.

Firstly, the proposal was made to transfer sovereignty over West Irian to the Union, while the administration should remain in the hands of the Netherlands. The Indonesian Delegation categorically rejected this proposal, since this possibility was considered as early as 1949 and the Indonesian standpoint in this respect was also determined in that year; ...this standpoint was based upon the consideration that, ...we cannot indentify (sic) ourselves with or put ourselves on the same leveT as the Netherlands in a colonial relationship with regard to West Irian. Further, we cannot accept a continued Netherlands administration in West Irian as we cannot recognize the continuance of a foreign administration in a territory which, in our conviction, forms an inherent part of our country. The statement concluded with declarations to the effect that:

1.The Republik Indonesia maintains its claim to West Irian as part of Indonesia’s territory.
2.The status quo over West Irian which, under the
R.T.C. should be continued with Indonesia’s approval, is continued without the approval of the Republik Indonesiaas from this date. Among the proposals and counter-proposals of the 1950 conference, the Dutch suggestion that sovereignty over West Irian be transferred to the Netherlands-Indonesian Union is of particular interest, For the Union to which such sovereignty could be transferred was simply not in existence. What had emerged from the Hague Conference of 1949 was but the feeblest of incarnations of that theoretical "Leviathan" about which Dutch empire builders had been speculating and writing even before World War I. The super-state which most of them envisaged would indeed have been capable of exercising sovereignty over West Irian. But it was nothing less than an excursion into a political dream-world, however sincerely undertaken, to envisage this being done by the so-called Union of the RTC, lacking as it did, aside from its small secretarial staff, any administrative life of its own, and having had its sole basis for existence the purpose of providing a means of "agreement for mutual consultation" by the partners. But very quickly it was demonstrated that even this meaningless concession on the part of the Dutch delegation had been too much for the chronic suspicions held by a large section of Parliament towards any and all dealings with Indonesia. The result was that Dutch interest in the Irian

question, following the fiasco of the December, 1950, conference, shifted from the international to the domestic level, and the month of January, 1951, found the Government engaged in a full-dress parliamentary defense of its conduct of affairs at the Conference, Nor was the Natsir Cabinet in any happier circumstances. For, on the same basis, it too came under attack by the opposition, particularly the Indonesian Nationalist Party. The Irian Question as an Indonesian and Dutch Domestic Political Issue, January-March, 1951 In Indonesia The failure of the December conference brought sharp and immediate reaction in Indonesia. On January 3, Prime Minister Natsir made an official statement to the House of Representatives, Indonesia’s unicameral legislative branch, on the matter. In the course of reviewing the developments at the conference, he observed of the Dutch insistence on the need for self-determination by the people of Irian, "These words are familiar to us, because this theory was used by the Dutch when they attempted the ’balkanization’ of Indonesia into several States...The astonishing thing about the Dutch claim on the Irian question is that the Dutch government now maintains the right of self-determination for the population of New Guinea, while they had denied this very right during the Netherlands Indies period to the Indonesian people...(47) Of the final Dutch proposal to transfer sovereignty to the Union, the Prime Minister commented: ...this proposal was not meant to find a solution but was only calculated for effect abroad, This was also stated by two important Dutch papers, Under the R.T.C. Agreements, the Union does not constitute a State or a Super-State... Transfer of Sovereignty to the Union would mean giving a character to the Union which had no foundation in the Union Statute.., (48) (47)This quotation and the two following are taken from the previously cited article, "Irian—Crisis in Indonesian Dutch Relations,” Indonesian Review, pp. 46-48. (48)The similar conclusions of the writer on this point, as stated on p. 96, were reached prior to coming across this statement by Mr. Natsir.

Indonesia's future plans were summarized as follows: In connection with the failure of the Irian Conference, the Government of the Republic of Indonesia holds the following views:

1.The Government maintains, and will continue to fight for the national claim on Irian in a proper way; any negotiations in the future can only be held on the basis of the transfer of sovereignty over Irian to Indonesia. (Underlining added.) It is the Government's opinion that a conference which is not based on this transfer of sovereignty will miscarry, even when it is attended by a Third Party„
2.The Government is of the opinion that any negotiation which does not result in sovereignty over Irian being transferred to Indonesia will result in the Indonesian-Dutch relations becoming more strained and tense. The failure of this conference has given rise to a new situation. Indonesian-Dutch relations must be therefore revised in the light of this new situation. The Irian problem is a legacy from the Indonesian-Dutch dispute, the settlement of which was postponed at the R.T.C. Thus Irian attains a provisional status which differs from that of the other Indonesian areas. This is felt as a burden by our nation, just as several matters pertaining to Indonesian-Dutch relationship of likewise (sic) nature. In connection herewith the Government is of the opinion that the Indonesian-Dutch Agreements, including the Union Statute, needs reconsideration and revision on a new basis. In making his speech, the Prime Minister was fortunate in having a clear indication of parliamentary thinking in connection with the failure of the Irian conference. For several days previously, a meeting attended by representatives of all the major political parties, had adopted a resolution which, referring to the Dutch refusal to transfer Irian, declared: (49) J4l·)) The meeting was held on December 31, 1950. The text quoted is taken from Report on Indonesia, II, 17 (January 16, 1951), p. 3.

...considering that this Dutch step is a violation of the principle of transfer of sovereignty to Indonesia... that this Dutch action means the continuation of colonialism in a part of Indonesia... and...makes cooperation between Indonesia and the Netherlands no longer possible or at least more difficult; and believing that the Indonesian Government must do everything possible to fight the continuation of colonialism, (the Parliament) has decided to urge the Government : First, To annul the Netherlands-Indonesian Union, and Second, To study other agreements which are the result of the Round Table Conference in order to see whether they can still be observed as a result of the Dutch action. Very early in the course of the discussions it became apparent that the government was not likely to fall on this issue as such, in spite of the strength of the parliamentary opposition and the difficult situation faced by Mr. Natsir within his own Masjumi Party. (50) There were two motions presented; one, sponsored by the Indonesian Nationalist Party, called for the continuance of efforts for the speedy inclusion of Irian within Indonesia, the abrogation of the Union and a review within a period of three months of all other agreements resulting from the Round Table Conference with a view to their abrogation also; the other, termed the "five fraction motion" owing to its sponsorship by a coalition of various non-leftist parliamentary groups, differed only in asking in more moderate terms for the same results. (50) The Masjumi, as it existed in the period between its formation in 1945 and the secession of its right wing in mid-1952, has always seemed to this writer to bear a surprising resemblance to the Democratic Party of the United States in terms of the incompatible elements which for some seven years called themselves by the same party designation·The modern-minded, religious socialist wing of the party, headed by Mr. Natsir, drew its chief support from the Mohammadiyah group within the party. This group, dedicated to a contemporary interpretation of Islamic doctrine, was opposed by the Nahdatul Ulama, the membership of which was largely composed of village religious teachers (the kiayis) dedicated to the preservation of traditionalism. Dr. Sukiman, next to Mr. Natsir, the leading figure in the Masjumi, although also

After the Government agreed to appoint a commission to study the question of revising the RTC agreements, this motion was withdrawn by its sponsors and never came to vote. The Nationalist motion, however, received the support of sixty-three members, mostly from the Nationalist and Communist parties, as compared with the sixty-six votes the Government was able to muster against it. The result was a technical victory for the go-slow policy favored by the Natsir Cabinet. But while the Cabinet survived for almost another two months after the vote of January 10, and was finally brought down over an issue not even remotely connected with its handling of the Irian conference, (52) nevertheless its failure in this connection was probably a contributing factor in its enforced resignation in March, 1951. Like its predecessors the new cabinet of Dr. Sukiman, which took office in April, had among its chief objectives: (53) To expedite inclusion of Irian (Western New Guinea) in the Republic of Indonesia. The Netherlands Even before the Dutch Parliament reconvened from its Christmas recess in mid-January, 1951, clear indication had been given of the strength of anti-Indonesian feeling among the political parties. The Communists aside, only in the Labor Party was there any disposition towards a reconciliation, and events in early January proved how weak a current this was. During the Christmas recess, the Second Chamber leader of the Labor Party, Jonkheer van der Goes van Naters, while vacationing outside the Netherlands, gave a press interview member of the Mohamiuadiyah, was generally regarded as leader of the conservative wing, Significantly after the Natsir Cabinet fell, Dr. Sukiman consented to form a cabinet without consulting his party and included in the new government, based on a partnership with the Nationalists, no representatives of either the Natsir group or of the Indonesian Socialist Party. In July, 1952, the Nahdatul Ulama seceeded from the Masjumi to constitute its own political party. As a political party it scored surprising gains in the 1955 elections, winning 45 seats and 18% of the vote. (52)It was concerned with the organization of regional councils. See Kahin, "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism," pp. 142-147. (53)17 Agustus 1945-1951, p. 50.

in which he voiced the feelings of those members of the Labor Party whose political orientation was towards its old socialist tradition rather than towards its official non-Marxist and mildly reformist program. In his interview, Mr. van der Goes said that when the Second Chamber reconvened the party would utilize the opportunity to raise the Irian question yet again. "In principle the Labor Party is not averse," he said, "to renewed discussions on the basis of the transfer of sovereignty over New Guinea to Indonesia,” The Labor Party, he continued, regarded a solution of the problem of prime importance—cooperation with Indonesia was more important than retention of sovereignty over New Guinea. The party thought that the Dutch Government suggestion for third party mediation held possibilities and was worthy of exploration. If Indonesia remained adamant in its opposition to this method, then discussions should be carried on directly between two parties with parliamentary representation in the respective delegations. (54) The effect of the interview on Dutch intra- and inter-party tensions was explosive. In particular was this true of the Labor Party. Within ten days of the van der Goes interview, the following events occurred: 1. the initial report that van der Goes spoke for the Labor Party stirred speculation of an imminent split between Labor and Catholics and the consequent fall of the Cabinet; 2. the executive council of the Labor Party issued a statement expressing its belief that the final Dutch proposals at the December conference offered "a basis which can be accepted for holding further discussions between the Netherlands and Indonesia"; (55) 3. Mr, van der (54)The interview was given to the General Netherlands Press Bureau (A.N.P.) on January 4, 1951. This summary is based on the version given in Keesing's Historisch Archief, No, 1020 (1 tot 6 January 1951) 9160C. Mr. van der Goes’ emphasis on the importance of cooperation with Indonesia was, of course, in the direct line of Mr. Schermerhorn's comments in the Second Chamber the previous year (Note 08,Chap ter III), it is interesting that the socialist-oriented wing of the Labor Party and Dutch business and commercial interests, although for very differing reasons, both early reached the conclusion that the maintenance of good relations with Indonesia was of paramount importance. For its inability to convince its Government of this fact, the business community was to be forced to pay a high price in subsequent years. (55)For the text of this statement (in Indonesian), see Kronik Dokumentasi, p. 214.

Goes, thus repudiated by his own party, hastened to issue a "correction” to his interview to the effect that he had spoken for himself alone—however, before Parliament reconvened, as further penance he was forced to resign his post as Labor party leader in the Second Chamber; 4, a member of the socialist wing in the Labor Party revealed in a newspaper article that the day after the failure of the Irian conference, the Labor group in the Second Chamber had sent a letter to its leading representative in the Cabinet, Prime Minister Drees, urging the cession of New Guinea as necessary for future cooperation :(56) the letter apparently was coldly received and the writer in protest resigned his seat on the Party's governing bureau; 5„ on the right wing of the party, another prominent member, then serving as mayor of Amsterdam, withdrew entirely from the Labor Party in protest against the action of the Second Chamber group; 6. former Prime Minister Schermerhorn in a New York interview on January 12 stated much the same views on Irian as had Mr. van der Goes with the result that his party executive felt it necessary to issue another statement posthaste stressing the personal nature of this comment also. But aside from the attacks launched on Mr. van der Goes and, until the distinction was made clear, the Labor Party, by spokesmen of other political groups, the failure of the Irian conference revealed schisms within another party. This was the Freedom and Democracy (Liberal) Party, represented in the government since 1948 by Foreign Minister Stikker. Early in January the party’s weekly, Vrijheid en Democratie, carried an article by parliamentary leader, P. J. Oud, which was highly critical of the government’s handling of the just-concluded Hague conference. While this criticism, by blanket indict- ment, of his own party representative in the cabinet was unusual enough, Mr, Oud a week later publically criticized Mr, Stikker individually for his role in the conference.

756) Mr, ΪΓ Vos in an article for Het Vrije Volk, official organ of the Labor Party, on January 20, 19)51. Prime Minister Drees, for reasons which are not at ail clear— or else highly personal—for some time even before the RTC was rumored to be one of the strongest opponents of any concessions to Indonesia, An interesting test of the currents of opinion within the Labor party was furnished on February 9, 1951, at the party's annual congress, A resolution, offered by Vos, criticizing the party leadership for supporting the government policy on Irian, received support from only 30% of the delegates «.

The reasons for this did not originate entirely from the events which had occurred between December 4 through 27,

1950. Mr, Oud, a long-time political figure in the prewar liberal movement, represented the thinking of the professional politicians in the party. Mr. Stikker, a successful business man, had had no experience with political affairs until he became the party’s representative in the cabinet in 1948. As has happened in other countries, Mr. Stikker apparently continued to operate in the world of politics much as he had been accustomed to do in the business world, Mr. Oud and the other professionals of the party did not find palatable this lack of concern for, indeed, even awareness of, the protocol of politics. (57) In connection with the December conference, they were apparently particularly annoyed that Mr. Stikker had conducted himself as an independent business man anxious to work out a deal with the individuals on the other side of the table, rather than as the spokesman for the Freedom and Democracy Party duty-bound to consult constantly with the party leadership, particularly the parliamentary The result of this intra-party tension, which the Irian conference had brought to a head, was the fall of the first Drees cabinet, The day after it reconvened from its Christmas recess on January 17, the Second Chamber initiated debate over the Government’s "Note in connection with the discussions of December 4 through 27, 1950, held between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Indonesian Republic on the question of the political status of New Guinea." (58) The debates, which were spread over most of the parliametary sessions until January 25, contained no surprises. Indeed they only served to underline the bitterness felt over the loss of the colonial empire. (57)While in The Hague in 1956, the writer was told on several occasions that during the time Mr. Stikker was Foreign Minister (1948-1951), for months at a time there were no contacts between him and Mr. Oud and the other seven members of the party’s Second Chamber representation, and then only when the parliamentary group took the initiative. Reportedly, even on the occasions when they did so, it was still necessary to make an appointment to see the Foreign Minister some weeks in advance. This state of affairs was not conducive to cordial relations. (58)For the full text, see Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1950-1951, Bijlagen 2051. The verbatim report s of the debates are to be found on pages 461-689, this same 1950-1951 series.

As in the debates of 1949, the spokesmen for the right wing stressed the need for the continuance of a moral duty to "the simple inhabitants of New Guinea," the need for the Netherlands to bear witness on behalf of "justice and morality and to attest before the world its unshakeable adherence to ethical principles. (59) On a somewhat less idealistic plane, the other points in the argument for Irian's retention were marshalled by ex-Colonial Minister Welter, the parliamentary spokesman of the rightwing Catholic National Party. Mr. Welter viewed the Government’s intentions with deep sus- picion. It was, as he saw it, engaged yet again in virtual betrayal of the Fatherland with the surrender of the last fragment of empire as its chief policy objective. It was dead to all appeals to national honor, to the glories of the past or the possibilities of the future. In scathing words, Mr. Welter charged; (60) If I should say that the Netherlands flag over New Guinea would signify the maintenance of a Netherlands center in the Pacific Ocean where for so long we have held a predominant and very important position, this would indeed probably be answered on their part with a pitying shrug of the shoulders. If I should point out the necessity for our rapidly increasing people to preserve an opportunity for their young men and women, insofar as they belong to the better educated classes, to offer a way out for the unfolding of their knowledge and talents, then I am certain that this argument means nothing at all for this Government. If I should point out that New Guinea within ten years under Netherlands leadership, given the capa- bilities of this people, would become a model state, a model state in Southeast Asia which would loom up like a lighthouse above the deteriorating territory round about, then I fear that this also would say nothing to this Government, this Government which has repudiated a far greater and mightier (59)For the speech of Mr. Schouten, parliamentary leader of the Anti-Revolutionaries, see pp. 461-477. (60)Ibid., p. 489. Subsequent developments between 1951 and 1958 were to prove both Mr. Welter’s fears and hopes equally chimerical. If the Netherlands Government by the end of the 1950's had accomplished in West Irian even a small fraction of the original expectations, it would have been able to point to a record of some worth.

task in the Netherlands Indies as though it was veritably a painful burden. Also I don’t think it will make much impression on it that thousands of Indian Netherlanders (note:

i.e., Eurasians) would be able to find a new existence there, nor also that the mountain regions in New Guinea offer possibilities of colonization for many Netherlanders because their height, just as has been proven in the1Cordilleras in South America, nullifies the influence of the tropics. For the Government would be able to say, "We are making provision so that our people can go to Australia or Canada, or even Brazil. That in the first place it is necessary for Netherlanders to remain under the Dutch flag is, in line with my apprehensions, again an argument that, however I urged or proposed it. would not stir this Government. If I should indicate the enormous strategic significance of New Guinea for the maintenance of the status quo in the Southeast Pacific and for combatting the onward drive of Communism, then they would undoubtedly marshall as counter arguments that we have no mopey to pay for all this or something of a similar nature. Perhaps the most sober and realistic of any of the speeches delivered in the course of the six day debate was that of Labor Party member de Kadt. (61) The real reason why New Guinea had not been included in the sovereignty transfer of December, 1949, he said, was quite different from the "unconvincing" and "inconclusive" arguments which had been put forward either by the Government or by the political parties. It was simply that the transfer of sovereignty, minus New Guinea, at that time was very clearly the maximum which could be accomplished and yet maintain the coalition of parties necessary for the two-thirds majority. (62) "And we stood, therefore," continued Mr. deKadt, "before this (61)For the text of deKadt’s speech, see Tweede Kamer, 1950-1951, pp. 497-511. As mentioned earlier (Note 1,chapter IIJ)jir. deKadt is the author of De Indonesische Trageaie. (62)For the writer’s own views on this, see p. 71 it was an excellent demonstration of a realistic comprehension of politics as the art of the possible. The following quotation can be found on page 497 of the Handelingen.

choice; either to let any agreement tail or to achieve an incomplete agreement which in its imperfection would define the greatest and most important part of the new relationship with Indonesia. And in such a situation, the choice for supporters of a constructive policy is not difficult," The result was postponement of the settlement for a year’s time. Personally, Mr. deKadt noted, he regretted that it had not been possible to find a solution en bloc as of 1949. The Netherlands should accept the fact that it had failed to restore the prewar situation and that "whoever will wage war, must accept the consequences." The Netherlands must realize that it lost the war. The consequences of defeat must; either be accepted or the war continued as the rightwing desires. "It seems to me impossible to have a policy of peace and cooperation in one part of the area and continuing conflict in another part: i.e., New Guinea." (63) It was necessary, he stressed, to reach a realistic understanding with Indonesia in connection with New Guinea. For what point was there in taking a position which permitted existing conflicts to continue and new ones to develop. And as for the moral mission, Mr. deKadt asked: (64) But I indeed ask myself; Can we protect the Papuans by remaining? Or should we not be forced to leave them to their fate if we ourselves are forced out, as we have had to do with so many others in Indonesia? And will not their fate then be a much worse one? I am convinced that defeat will be our end in this conflict. And I would spare both Netherlanders and Papuans that end... Turning to the colonization and economic potential of New Guinea, Mr, deKadt pointed out the impossibility, all other factors aside, of the exploitation of the area by the Netherlands in the face of a hostile Indonesia. For from where else but Indonesia, he asked, could a working force come? And financially, even under the best instead of the all-too-probable worst of circumstances, there would be too heavy a burden imposed in terms of what the Netherlands needed for itself and for the fulfillment of its world obligations And, the speaker pointed out with grim prescience, as long as the conflict with Indonesia continued, Dutch business enterprise in Indonesia with its multi-millioned Tg3T~HandeIingen, Tweede Kamer, 1950-1951, p. 498. (64) Ibid., p 500.

investment, was condemned to work ’’under conditions of great difficulty and danger.” Also lost in the shuffle, due to the attention riveted on New Guinea, was the Netherlands moral and cultural task in Indonesia itself. "If people could consequently view New Guinea exclusively from the viewpoint of the direct Netherlands interest, and with strong emphasis on the material aspect of this interest, then there would be but one solution: the direct transfer to Indonesia of all of Netherlands New Guinea de jure and de facto." However, the speaker cautioned, therc^as the ~fear“that the Indonesians might refuse the offer on the basis that, "We are no collectors of malaria, morrasses and swamps. It is your duty, Netherlanders, to keep and develop New Guinea." (65) The parliamentary representation of the Labor Party was of the opinion that the best solution for this difficult problem would be for the Netherlands Government and people to realize that New Guinea will require a prohibitive outlay of funds and creates a psychological situation which makes it impossible for the Netherlands to remain and still discharge its international obligations, its obligations towards Indonesia or to its own people, Every effort must be made for agreement with Indonesia and to realize that in the course of realistic discussions the Netherlands must be prepared to accept the transfer. Both the Government and the (Second) Chamber should realize that only the transfer of sovereignty over New Guinea represents a realistic solution. The Government, not for the first time, has committed the error of having a static policy in a dynamic situation. (66) In conclusion, Mr. deKadt noted that there were many important problems facing the Government at that time—problems of greater magnitude than New Guinea. Their solution, he said, requires a peaceable settlement of the differences with Indonesia. National, international and popular arguments push the Government towards new discussions. Labor will support such a move in the direction of a policy "which for the Netherlands, for Indonesia, for New Guinea and for the internatbnal community can give a truly satisfactory result."(67) I have quoted the speech of Mr. deKadt at some length since it represents one of the earliest realistic evaluations of the implications of the Irian problem. But the voices of (65)Handelingen, T K., 1950-51, p. 502. (66)Handelingen, 50-51, p, 509. Here in a sentence is the story of Dutch Indonesian and Irian policy from 1945 to the present.’ (67)Ibid., p. 511

Mr. deKadt and his other Labor party colleagues, who so prophetically foresaw the perils of the dangerous path along which the Dutch Government was so doggedly plodding, were of little avail. Always, it seems, it is the fate of the Cassandras to startle, offend and be ignored. The Government was able to defeat with ease motions of criticism from both the left and right. But in spite of its top-heavy victory margins, (68) the result of the Irian debates was to bring it down. Mr. Stikker, stung by criticism from his own Freedom and Democracy Party, resigned. Immediately following this the rest of the Cabinet followed suit, taking the viewpoint that the coalition basis on which it had been constituted in 1948 no longer existed. It was not until mid-March that a new cabinet was formed. Again it comprised the same four-party coalition of Labor, Catholics, Christian-Historical, and Freedom and Democracy with Mr. Drees again prime minister. (69) In an address to the First (upper) Chamber of Parliament, .just after his new (68) The motion of criticism offered by the Freedom and Democracy Party was defeated by a vote of 66 to 26; the motion offered by Mr. Tilanus of the Christian-Historical Union lost by a vote of 59 to 33 and the Communist motion was obliterated by a negative vote of 86 out of the total 92 members present. The Communist motion afforded virtually the only comic relief in the otherwise solemn discussions. Impaled on the horns of the peculiar party line on the Irian issue, the Communist fraction in the Second Chamber was in no position to take any real stand on the issue. The result was a motion which, by a process of Alice-in-Wonderland dialectics, asked for the with- drawal of Dutch troops from Indonesia as a means of freeing the Indonesian people from any colonial domination inasmuch as this, it was stated, was "directly connected" with "the fate of New Guinea." For additional information on the influence exerted by Mr, Stikker's attitude at the Irian conference on his conflict with the Freedom and Democracy parliamentary group, see an Algemeen Handelsblad report of May 24, 1955, on a speech delivered by Mr. Stikker to the Netherlands Club of New York City. See also a reference made to the resignation of 1952 by Prime Minister Drees in the course of a speech to the Second Chamber on May 17, 1955 (Handelingen, Tweede Earner, Zitting 1954-1955,
pjQQ^y-........................................—

cabinet had been inducted, Mr. Drees made it clear that there would be no change in government policy on New Guinea. Nothing further could be done about this, he said, so long as the Indonesian Government declined to withdraw its demands for the transfer of sovereignty. The Prime Minister’s only new contribution towards a solution was the statement that the Netherlands would have no objection if Indonesia wished the question of the juridical difference over New Guinea’s future settled by the Court of Arbitration of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. (70) Both the parliamentary discussions and the virtually simultaneous announcements of the new cabinet programs in both countries made it clear how complete was the deadlock over Irian, It was apparent that, barring sensationally unexpected changes in viewpoint, any Dutch cabinet henceforth would be as firmly committed to the retention of New Guinea as its Indonesian counterpart to the acquisition of Irian. The rift could only grow wider. And this was precisely what occurred in Dutch-Indonesian relations in the time between the failure of the Irian Conference of 1950 and the emergence of the problem as a focus of East-West conflict on the world stage. The Widening Rift, 1951-1953 During the latter part of the intrinsically Dutch-Indonesian phase of the Irian problem, its international implications became increasingly apparent. As we have seen, Australia as early as 1950 had already made itself an active party to the dispute. And that same year, in the course of a state visit to Indonesia, Prime Minister Nehru of India told the press, "...if considered from the viewpoint of history and geographical position, West Irian has to be returned to (έ>9) As of 1958, Mr. Drees has been continuously in office longer than any other European prime minister. He assumed office initially in 1948, while Chancellor Adenauer, for example, did not come into power until

1949. Barring the unexpected, Mr. Drees will continue to head the Dutch Government at least until 1960, (70) This summary of the remarks is based on the account printed in Het Vrije Volk, official Labor Party organ, on April 11~ 1951. Inasmuch as the Court of Arbitration was divided three to three, a deadlock was inevitable, No Indonesian source ever showed any interest in the proposal,

Indonesia...." (71) Great Britain and the United States were
officially committed to a policy of neutrality. Both these countries at the time of the December, 1950 conference had taken the opportunity openly to avow their strict neutrality on the issue--the British Government in an aide memoire while the conference was in session, and the American Government in identical notes to the two parties after the conference had concluded, The American note expressed regret over the failure and urged the resumption of bilateral discussions. (72) The logic of its position as one of the world's leading colonial powers was to align the British Government on the Dutch side on the three occasions that the Irian issue has come up for discussion in the United Nations. Caught on the horns of the dilemma of its European commitments and Asian Cold War aspirations, the United States has cautiously refrained from taking sides in the UN discussions. Given the world position of the United States, it was not surprising this effort was made to carry water on both shoulders. Nor, on the other hand, is it surprising that the result has been to spill water from both buckets. For each side saw American neutrality as actually favoring the other. The Netherlands felt that the United States should give positive support to a NATO ally Indonesia saw the mere fact of American in- activity as tacit support of the Dutch since permitting the status quo to continue left the Netherlands undisturbed in its position as occupying power in West Irian. Nor has the cautious American avoidance of commitment on the issue been of assistance in the propaganda battles of the Cold War, The Afro-Asian nations see the United States as seemingly tacitly allied with the colonial powers while at the same time the Soviet Union misses no opportunity to proclaim its support of the anti-colonialist crusade. Here again, as on so many other occasions during the present Dulles period in American foreign policy, the failure to exercise constructive leadership has alienated the Asian powers and presented the Soviet Union with a propaganda (71)Kronik Dokumentasi, pp. 53-54, (72)Keesing's Historisch Archief No. 1021 (7 tot 13 Januari

1951), 9l7A. For the statement of~tEe British position in the Irian discussions of 1954 and 1957 respectively, see Summary Record of the Seven Hundred and Twenty-Eighth MeetTng, First Committee, Ninth Session, General Assembly, A/C.l/SR 728, pp, 2-4, and Verbatim Record of the Eight Hundred and Sixtieth Meeting, First Committee Eleventh Session, General Assembly, A/C.l/PV. 860, pp. 27-32.

in opening it has not been slow to utilize. Indeed as early as December, 1950, Soviet sources were charging that the United States was playing Indonesia against the Netherlands in a ddep-layed plot to gain possession of New Guinea for its own imperialist designs in the Pacific. The Sovief naval journal, Red Fleet, wrote on December 15th, for example, "The conflict over New Guinea has been stimulated from the beginning by American diplomats who work busily behind the scenes„" Ironically enough the most unquestioning acceptance of the Soviet viewpoint on the strategic importance of New Guinea has come from the extreme rightwing of Dutch politics from among those who envisaged a strategic role for the island as part of a gigantic world-wide ring around the Communist world. The most vocal exponent of this viewpoint has been retired Dutch Admiral Helfrich who once commanded the naval forces of the Netherlands Indies. (73) But in contrast to the frankly expressed Australian belief in New Guinea’s strategic value, there is no available evidence of any American military or diplomatic interest let alone any such Machiavellian designs as the Communists alleged. Rather, as in so many other instances, the fault has been that of a totally unimaginative lack of policy which, let alone not preparing for eventualities, tries to ignore their very existence. A new phase in Netherlands-Indonesian relations was initiated in January, 1951, when the disintegrating Natsir Cabinet appointed a state commission, headed by the well-known jurist, Professor Supomo, to review all the provisions of the Round. Table Conference with a view to their revision. And President Sukarno in the same month began to make it unquestionably clear that the struggle for Irian for him had ceased to be merely a matter of state policy and instead become a personal political commitment. Speaking on January 15 to the Indonesian Journalists’ Association, the President expressed his regret at the turn of events and, while stressing his desire for cooperation with the Dutch, called for reconsideration of the whole field of Dutch-Indonesian relations. He concluded by calling on "(73) For an exposition of this viewpoint, see an interview with Admiral Helfrich which appeared in the February 15, 1952, issue of U.S. News and World Report, pp. 42-45. See also a printed account of a speech delivered by the Admiral entitled New-Guinea, Political-Strategic, (printed by the Stichting Rijsbehoud, 's-Gravenhage,

1955).

the Indonesian people for "a mustering of force” so that the struggle could be continued on the basis of "demand backed by pressure" and expressed his belief that, "if the Indonesian people are really united, I am convinced that West Irian will return to our fold before the dawn of January I, 1952." (74) And again in his Independence Day speech in August, the President asserted that the Indonesian people could never really be free while the Dutch were in Irian. It was not, he said, merely a matter of a national claim but a question of national security. As for himself, he was honored to be termed an "agitator" on the issue. (75) In November the President called on the people of Indonesia to make their own plans for the acquisition of Irian and rely no longer on negotiations with the Dutch. (76) But even as the President spoke this last time the Indonesian Government was making still another attempt to settle the problem through the bilateral conference method. This had been initiated as early as June when, in the course of a policy statement on the program of the new cabinet, Prime Minister Sukiman had declared that "the Netherlands-Indonesian Union does not live in the hearts of the Indonesian people and our nation does not want or need it." (77) Almost simultaneously, Overseas Territories Minister Pieters told the Second Chamber that if Indonesia attached no value to the Union, there was no reason to leave cooperation on that basis. As to the New Guinea problem, the Netherlands Government, he said, still held the same view as that expressed by Dr. Drees when the present cabinet had taken office in March. (78) But in spite of the adamant stand taken by the Dutch Government on the Irian issue, the Indonesian Government in August, 1951, appointed Professor Supomo as special ambassador (74)Report on~Indonesia, II, 18 (January 29, 1951), p. 2, (75)Antara News Agency (Djakarta), Daily Bulletin, August 18, Τ9ΈΙ7-------------- · ------------------------- (76)Heroes' Day Address-Aneta News Bulletin (Djakarta), November 11, 1951. (77)Antara News Bulletin (Djakarta), June 12, 1951. The Sukiman Cabinet, based on Masjumi-Nationalist collaboration, was formed on April 26, 1951, and lasted until February 23, 1952.

for the purpose of conducting informal discussions on the transformation of Netherlands-Indonesian relations from the Union basis to that "customary between two fully independent sovereign states.” These informal discussions dragged on in The Hague until December when formal talks were begun on the abrogation of the Union, the RTC agreements and Irian. The inclusion of this last item on the agenda was significant in view of the fact that Dr. Drees in March had stated that discussions were fruitless so long as the Indonesian Government insisted they were based on the assumption of de jure Indonesian sovereignty ever since December 27, 1950" For its part Indonesia had contended that discussions could only be concerned with the ways and means of transfer. No official explanation was ever offered by either government as to why it had tacitly ceded its respective sine qua non. It can only be speculated that moderate elements on both sides saw in the conference the last hope of working out peaceably a constructive solution. The failure of the conference and the subsequent course of events was to demonstrate that this, indeed, had been the last chance for any sort of cooperation between the two nations. But, at best, it had not been too promising, and a series of unfortunate events just prior to the convening of the December, 1951, conference made failure virtually inevitable. The first of these developments was the submission to the Second (lower) Chamber of the Dutch parliament of a proposal by a state constitutional commission for various revisions of the Netherlands Constitution, most notably Article One which defined the territories of the Kingdom, Since 1943 this article had read: (79) The Kingdom of the Netherlands comprises the territory of the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and the Netherlands Antilles. Since the reference to Indonesia was now incorrect, it was proposed to strike it from the enumeration and instead sub- stitute, "Netherlands New Guinea.” The Memorandum of Explanation accompanying the suggested changes justified the new wording of Article One as being intended merely for the purpose T^9 ) For full texts of the constitutional proposals, see the Handelingen, Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1951-1952, Bijlagen 2341. The text of Article One as quoted above is taken from Grondwet voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden (Tekst 1953) (Groningen/Djakarta,’ 1954), p. 37“

of geographical accuracy and as lacking in political implications. "Article 1," it was stated, "aims only at giving a geographical description." Yet it is not without interest that subsequent suggestions by Labor Party members that the less controversial designation of "West New Guinea" be used were rejected by the Government. It would seem that the official protestations that nothing was changed by this action with its purely "geographical" implications were somewhat disingenuous. For the territory comprising the Kingdom of the Netherlands could obviously only be those areas of the world where the sovereign power of the Dutch kingdom was exercised. To enumerate these territories in the first article of so basic a political document as a constitution had rather wider implications than the mere transcribing of a copy-book exercise in elementary geography. And so the Indonesians thought. Both press and official reactions were violent and vociferous, On November 10, the Indonesian Government despatched a note to the Netherlands High Commissioner terming the action an "unfriendly act" and "unilateral" in character. To this the Netherlands Government replied, expressing its "astonishment" at the reaction of the Indonesian Government and again asserting the purely technical and innocuous character of the proposed constitutional changes. (80) In December the Indonesian, for their part, added fuel to the fire. Two Dutch ships, the Blitar and the Talisse, while in the harbor of Djakarta enroute to West Irian, were searched by Indonesian police and small quantities of arms, destined for the Dutch armed forces, were impounded. The Incidents caused press attacks by rightwing elements in the Netherlands and a note of protest from the Dutch Government. While officially the Indonesian action was justified as pre- venting military equipment from reaching Dutch forces regarded as being in illegal occupation of Indonesian territory, the desire for a retaliatory gesture was probably also a factor. The Indonesian delegations headed by Prof. Supomo, held discussions on the questions of the abrogation of the Union and the Irian question with Dutch authorities in The Hague from mid-December until, the end of February, 1952, although the first plenary meeting was not held until mid-January On Union abrogation, progress was made; on the settlement of the Irian problem, there was none, Indeed, how little hope there was of any solution was indicated by no less a figure than

180) For summaries of the note exchange, see Keesings Historisch Archief No. 9709 (18 tot 24 November 1951).

Prime Minister Drees himself. Queried in the course of an American visit in January, 1951, as to "the New Guinea situation," the Prime Minister replied bluntly: (81) Talks are going on now between the Netherlands and Indonesia, but I don't see that as far as West New Guinea is concerned a solution will be found. West New Guinea remains for the present under our control until the population has developed to the point where they will decide the issue for themselves. But the question of New Guinea is undoubtedly the principle difficulty at the present moment between Indonesia and the Netherlands. In the Hague discussions, the Indonesian delegation took the position that only the issue of de facto sovereignty had been involved since December 2Τξ 1950. This, of course, was not accepted by the Dutch. Apparently the Dutch cabinet considered turning the whole problem over to the UN but retreated when confronted with parliamentary hostility. (82) A Dutch suggestion to submit the Irian problem for settlement by the International Court of Justice was rejected by the Indonesian delegation on the grounds that the problem was not juridical but political in character. Just prior to the adjournment of the talks on February 29, (83) a final compromise proposal was offered by Professor Supomo. This suggested that, while the basic problem of sovereignty would continue to be discussed, a joint Indonesian Dutch "responsibility" could be established for the administration of the area. To this proposal no reply was ever made. Reviewing the failure of the conference, Antara, the semi-official Indonesian news agency, on March 12 quoted sources close to the Indonesian delegation as saying that (81)Interview in U.S. News and World Report, 32 (February 15, 1952), p.~3S; (82)The guess may be ventured that ultimately the Netherlands will turn to this as a way out. Direct transfer to Indonesia would be difficult for the political parties to swallow—transfer to the UN for an interim period might work, (83)The permanent recess was caused by the resignation of the Sukiman Cabinet on February 23rd. In theory the talks were to be resumed when a new Indonesian Cabinet was formed.

the delegation had been quite willing to make concessions in connection with the retention of the RTC financial and economic agreements, as one-sided as they were felt to be, in return for adjustments on Irian. In an article discussing the conference, published shortly after the February "recess,” Professor Supomo himself put his finger on one of the in- hibiting factors as far as the Dutch negotiators had been concerned. He wrote: (84) The Irian question was indeed difficult for the Netherlands regime since a large section of the Netherlands parliament supported the "ice-box theory." Also the Government parties did not want to run the risk of future losses before the elections by conceding the Indonesian claims. The results of the Dutch parliamentary elections, held in June, to which Prof. Supomo had referred, served as one indication of the hardening of attitude characteristic of both sides. For while the Labor Party, gaining three seats, had equal representation with the Catholics in the Second Chamber (thirty each), the inclusion in the new Drees cabinet of the intensely conservative Anti-Revolutionaries made it clear that there would be no change in Dutch policy. Likewise unchanged was the position taken by the new Indonesian cabinet of Prime Minister Wilopo which had assumed office in mid-April. In his policy declaration to the House of Representatives, Prime Minister Wilopo declared, "Since West Irian politically constitutes a national claim and strategically it is most vital for the safety of the Republic, the Government will incessantly, and with all the means at its disposal, continue the attempts to include West Irian in the territory of Indonesia at the earliest possible moment." (85) Actually, quite aside from the domestic troubles with which it was beset during its crisis-torn fourteen month existence, (86) the (84)"Sekitar Perundingan Indonesia-Belanda di den Haag," Mimbar Indonesia, VI, 12-13 (26 Maret 1952), p. 30. The essence of the "ice-box theory" was simply to sit tight, do nothing and hope that eventually the sheer passage of time would help solve the problem. (85)Report on Indonesia, III, 22 (May 22, 1952), p. 1. (86)For the story οϊ the Wilopo Cabinet, see Herbert Feith's The Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953: Turning point in ^Post-Revolutionary, Indonesia, Monograph Series, Cornell Modern Indonesia Project (Ithaca, 1958).

Wilopo Cabinet tended to play down not only the Irian but all foreign policy matters in an effort to solve the serious domestic problems with which it found itself faced. (87) About its only action in connection with Irian was the acceptance by the Cabinet of the text of a parliamentary election law which included West Irian as one of the electoral districts and provided for three representatives from the area. Publically at least, by 1953 both sides were committed to irrevocable positions which involved not alone national honor but the personal prestige of the top leadership. Nevertheless, on a confidential and unofficial basis various efforts were made to find a splution. While in The Hague in 1956, the writer was told of one such effort to find a way out of the impasse by one of the principals concerned. (88) The individual in question, partly on his own initiative and partly on behalf of various Dutch business interests, spent some time in Djakarta during the course of 1952 discussing the whole range of Dutch-Indonesian relations with a wide range of individuals prominent in Indonesian political and official circles. He found, he said, at the very highest level, a willingness to compromise. Interest was expressed, for example, in the idea of Dutch administration continuing for the next, twenty to twenty-five years under the supervision of an international commission composed of the United States, Indonesia, the Netherlands, Australia and India. At the end of this period, a plebiscite would be taken with the expectation that the probable choice would be that of adhesion to Indonesia. On returning to the Netherlands, the gentleman in question informed appropriately placed individuals of the results of his Djakarta conversations. With the significant exception of Prime Minister Drees, other cabinet ministers, regardless of party, favored the idea. But there was strong opposition on the part of the entrenched political leadership of the government parties since they feared the impact on their political fortunes. The result was that the project (87) In part this may have been motivated by the fate of the preceding Sukiman Cabinet which had been brought down over a foreign affairs issue (acceptance of the Mutual Security Act aid assistance under provisions which seemed to weaken Indonesia's independent foreign policy). There was also the fact that various members of the Wilopo Cabinet were essentially apolitical specialists well aware of the urgent nature of the financial and economic problems demanding solution.

aborning, as no doubt did other approaches of like nature. In mid-1953 as the Wilopo Cabinet was leaving office, the announcement of new plans for closer Dutch-Australian cooperation in New Guinea indicated again that the Netherlands Government regarded its ’’mission" as one which would be long-enduring. In the period since December 27, 1949, the failure to j find a solution for the Irian issue had markedly damaged Dutch-Indonesian relations. Increasingly from mid-1953 this unfortunate process was not only to continue but to reach new intensities of bitterness. And in global perspective the Irian problem both contributed to and, probably more importantly, reflected the rising tensions between the new nations of Asia and Africa and the Western Powers. In terms of American and Soviet jockeying for influence among the uncommitted nations of Asia and Africa, the respective positions of the two super-powers on the Irian issue was an important element in the period between 1953 and 1958 in determining the Indonesian official attitude towards the two nations. As President Sukarno recently summarized it in a public address; (89) ...in the case of West Irian, the American attitude in this matter is always connected with what attitude she has to take towards the Netherlands. America is always balancing. I told them openly and bluntly; You are like a tightrope dancer, between the East and the West, between NATO and Asia, between NATO and Indonesia. This is wrong, I said. Because if it goes on like this, the Indonesian people will not be able to see the anti-colonial attitude which they could see earlier with the Americans. It is becoming more and more blurred. "What is the matter with you now, America?" As a result of this, the Indonesian people start to look in another direction. Their /American/ anti-colonialism is not so clear, but their-~ /Russian/ anti-colonialism is very clear. That is why the-Indonesians start to look in another direction; to put it frankly: Indonesia starts to look /88) While the writer is pledged to keep the source confidential, the status of the individual concerned gives every reason to accept the account at face value. (89) Lecture by President Sukarno before Students jqI Padjadjaran University in Bandung on May 2, 1958 (Translation-Embassy of Indonesia, Washington), pp. 11-12.

with sympathy at Moscow. Actually, you will dis- cover that it is in Moscow that they justify Indonesia's claim on West Irian. It is there that the Asian-African Conference was accorded full support. It is there that our independent policy has been justified. Were we to make request for a financial loan; well, in a few minutes the money is there. Although I as President say that everybody is good, the fact remains that one shows a wavering attitude while the other discloses clarity in vision.

CHAPTER V THE IRIAN ISSUE IN THE WORLD FORUM, 1953-1958 Through the Ninth and Tenth UN Assemblies, 1953-1956 The Wilopo Cabinet in Indonesia was succeeded by that of Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo in August, 1953. The words with which the new Prime Minister summarized the new government's position on the Irian issue differed but little from those used by his predecessors. In the course of a policy statement to the House of Representatives, he said, in part, of the West Irian issue, listed significantly enough as the second major point in the new cabinet's program: (1) The national claim with regard to Irian is based on the ground that historically, legally, and politically, this area actually forms a whole with the territory of the Indonesian nation. What is meant by the area of the Republic of Indonesia since the Proclamation of Indonesia's Independence, is the former area of the late Netherlands Indies... The political position of West Irian was to be settled by way of negotiations within the period ending 27th December, 1950. However, the dispute over the de facto authority was not settled within that period, and the Indonesian Government made the statement to the Netherlands Government that, as from 27th December 1950, the occupation of West Irian by the Netherlands did not carry the consent of the Government of the Republic of Indonesia... Further more, no sentence whatever in any agreement concluded between Indonesia and the Netherlands says or intends that the de facto authority may permanently be exercised by the Netherlands Government over West Irian when the negotiations on the authority over that area should meet with failure... The National Government of Indonesia firmly holds to the West Irian area, and is in duty bound to peacefully reunite it with the Indonesian territory whose sovereignty, forming a whole entity in itself, may not be divided so that the de facto authority over that area must, also be in the hands of the Indonesian Government.

But while the words differed but little, the methods used by the new Prime Minister differed radically from those of his predecessors. Dr. Ali Sastroamidjojo assumed the premiership after a lengthy tenure as his country's ambassador in Washington. Whether attributable to this fact or not, he exhibited far more interest in foreign affairs than had his predecessor and demonstrated an acute appreciation of their impact on national problems. Of no problem was this more true than the new approach made to the settlement of the Irian issue. For during the period of the first Sastroamidjojo Cabinet (2) the third and present phase of the Irian problem was initiated. From 1946 to 1950 it had been a problem in Dutch imperial politics. From 1950 until 1953 it existed within the essentially parochial framework of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union. But from this time on the Irian problem increasingly assumed an international character as one of the prime examples of East-West conflict over the colonial issue. Credit is due the first Sastroamidjojo Cabinet for this imaginatively-planned campaign to mobilize world public opinion, in particular Afro-Asian, behind the Indonesian efforts to gain control of West Irian by making it into a well-known symbol of the already forceful anti-colonial campaign being waged by the new nations of Asia and Africa, aided by the not always welcome support of the Soviet Union and its satellites. The effect was to raise the issue far above the level, of a mere territorial dispute, to insure for Indonesia the support of a substantial majority of the nations of the world (3) and, most importantly, to gain new sources of strength for the struggle from the dynamic force of the mounting anti-colonial tide in the world. But the first action of the new cabinet in connection with Irian was not taken in the international sphere. Instead the first effort to coordinate and execute a consistent campaign on the Irian issue was undertaken by the official (1> Indonesian Affairs, published by the Ministry of Information, Djakarta, (August, 1953), III, 8, pp. 57-58,

(2)The first Sastroamidjojo Cabinet was in office from August 3 until July 24, 1955 and the second from March 26, 1956 until March 13, 1957. For convenience, the Cabinets are usually referred to as Ali Cabinet I and Ali Cabinet II
(3)In 1954 Indonesia received support from 33 of the 60 member nations with 4 absentions; in 1956 it was 40 of the 78 total with 13 abstentions and in 1957 the respective figures were 41 of 81 with 11 abstentions.

establishment in December, 1953, of the "Irian Bureau" directly under the Prime Minister. (4) This Bureau was the first of a series of organizations which would be established during the next few years as the Irian campaign was increasingly accentuated. One of the first international steps taken by the All Cabinet which was related to the Irian question was the resumption in mid-1954 of the discussions for the dissolution of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union talks which had been suspended in February of 1952 when the Sukiman Cabinet fell. In spite of determined Indonesian efforts to include Irian on the agenda, the Dutch held to their position, adopted in October, 1952, that there was no virtue in resuming discussions on the issue. (5) The result was that while the 14 j PresidentTal Decree No. 201, December 14, 1953.

(5) Memorie van Antwoord, Rijksbegroting, 1953, Tweede Kamer, Zitting, 1952-53^. In 1953 on the same occasion, the statement was made, "The Government bases itself unalterably on the viewpoint that sovereignty over New Guinea, de jure and de facto, belongs with the Kingdom of the Netherlands." And during 1954 two official reports were issued which indicated the long-range view taken by the Netherlands Government of its self-imposed "mission" in West Irian. The first of these, published in January, was the report of a parliamentary mission which had visited the area in 1953 and was mostly concerned with the existing situation— in particular note was taken of bad housing and health conditions and the bad relations existing between the people and the governmental apparatus as a result of the highly autocratic colonial atmosphere prevailing. For the full text of this report, see Bilage 3 3 64; Tweede Kamer, Zitting 1953-54.~ In June, 1954, there was made public the so-called Inter-Departmental Report on the Future Development of New Guinea, often known, after its chairman, as the Pieters' Report ("Toekomstige Ontwikkeling van Nieuw-Guinea, Rapport van de Interdepartmental Commissie"). Its general conclusions were that the political, cultural, economic and social development were at a very low stage and that long and laborious development was necessary before the Netherlands mission could be considered accomplished. In July, 1953, the Dutch Government had summarily rebuffed an Indonesian suggestion for consultations on such matters prior to the discussion of them by the Dutch with Australia.

conference, held during mid-Summer of 1954, made progress on steps to dissolve the moribund Netherlands-Indonesian Union, there was no discussion of the Irian problem„ It was a significant indication that the bilateral phase of the problem was over and that its solution would have to be found in a broader sphere. Official indication of this was given in President Sukarno's annual Independence Day address on August 17, 1954. In the course of the address, the President said: (6) We call on the countries that are members of the United Nations to witness that Holland has unilaterally rejected an agreement solemnly signed by Dutch representatives stipulating that the political status of West Irian must be settled by negotiation. .. Consequently we are raising this issue on (sic) an international forum, and it is our sincere hope that those countries which uphold the ideals of justice and right will give full support to the Indonesian claim. ... It cannot be overemphasized that the question of West Irian is a serious obstacle to good relations between Holland and Indonesia, and in repeating again our desire for friendship with Holland, I must stress the obstruction created by the unre- solved problem of West Irian. On the same date, Mr. Sudjarwo, Acting Permanent Representative of Indonesia to the UN, requested the Secretary-General "that the following item: 'The question of West Irian (West New Guinea)’ should be placed on the agenda of the ninth regular session of the General Assembly for its consideration and to make appropriate recommendations." (7) Offered as justification for this action was what the accompanying "Explanatory Memorandum" termed the "reluctance, if not unwillingness" of the Dutch Government "to negotiate the final political status of this area, while at the same time constantly seeking to strengthen its colonial hold on West Irian." It was the Indonesian contention that "as long as this probelm—representing the remnant of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia--remains unsolved, it will continue to be a latent threat to the peace

(6)Antara News Bulletin (Djakarta), August 18, 1954.
(7)UN General Assembly, Ninth Session, A/2694, 18 August, 1954.

and security of that part of the world,, This situation should be of vital concern not only to the two countries concerned, but to the world as a whole and certainly to the United Nations." Commented a pro-Indonesian Dutch language paper a few days thereafter: (8) More than ever we are convinced that the Dutch policy regarding Irian is a great and tragic mistake More than ever before we are convincedthat the Netherlands has placed itself in a position which will make it increasingly difficult to arrive at a solution acceptable to both parties... the reasoning followed in The Hague may be watertight formally but in actuality'it is false through and through. The reasoning is that Indonesia in 1949 agreed to a postponement of the decision on Irian and has since then taken the viewpoint that Irian by rights belongs to Indonesia—and that is not be be considered. Ergo: Indonesia is the cause of all the trouble. But such views as this and the several conciliatory voices raised in the Dutch Labor Party (9) were conspicuous by their isolation. Far more typical of the Netherlands position was a statement on September 27th by the Dutch Ambassador to the United States, van Roijen, to the effect that the Netherlands would ignore any recommendations which might be made by the UN to settle the problem. Dr. van Roijen's statement came just after the General Committee of the General Assembly had voted on September 24th to place the Indonesian request for UN assistance on the agenda of the forthcoming ninth session of the General Assembly. (10)

(8)Nieuwsgier~XDjakarta), August 23, 1954.
(9)See, for example, the statement by Labor MP Jacques deKadt on September 15th urging a more conciliatory attitude on the part of the Dutch Government. (10)The vote in the plenary meeting of the General Committee on September 24, 1954, which placed "The Question of West Irian (West New Guinea)" on the agenda of the Ninth General Assembly as Item 61 was 39 to 11 with 10 abstentions. Support came from the Asian, African and Latin American members of the Committee. Outside of the "Western European Bloc" in which I include South Africa, only Turkey voted against inclusion. The Latin American nations not voting for inclusioji abstained (Venezuela, Colombia, Dominican Republic, Peru) along with the United States, Canada, China, Ethiopia, Iceland and New Zealand.

For both Indonesia and the Netherlands this transfer of the issue to a world forum meant involvement with a whole new series of factors of largely unknown potentiality, In terms of the nations on which it could count for virtually automatic support, neither Indonesia nor the Netherlands could count in advance on being able to muster sufficient backing for its particular case, But, yet again enjoying one of the virtually inevitable advantages of defending the status quo, the Netherlands from the start was in a better strategic position than Indonesia. Under the procedural rules of the General Assembly a two-thirds vote is necessary for the adoption of any resolution. Thus to prevent a pro-Indonesian resolution passing the General Assembly it was only necessary for the Netherlands to convince twenty other of the sixty members as of 1954 to vote against it. For these, coupled with the Netherlands own vote, would make it mathematically impossible to obtain the necessary two-thirds. Even before beginning any canvas for support, the Netherlands was virtually sure that it could count on some thirteen to fourteen votes from among its Western European neighbors and such European extensions as Australia, New Zealand, Canada and South Africa. The ties with these nations were based either on traditional friendship or the fact that they too had colonial possessions to defend. The result was that from among the remaining forty-odd member states of the UN, the Netherlands needed only to secure the support of another seven or eight votes to be able to block any pro-Indonesian resolution. The Indonesian problem was a much more difficult one. To secure the Assembly's blessing Indonesia needed the support of a minimum forty votes. True, like the Netherlands, Indonesia could count on a certain bedrock support. This comprised the fourteen or fifteen votes available from African and Asian member nations. It was also probable that, in pursuit of its own objectives, the Soviet Union would cast its vote and those of its satellites on the Indonesian side. But since in 1954 these totalled only five,(11) it meant that approximately another twenty votes had to be won. For most of these votes there was clearly only one major bloc from which support might be won. This was from among the twenty votes represented by the Latin American nations. As a veteran UN observer noted shortly after the conclusion of the Ninth Assembly: (12) Ill) In 1954 the Soviet bloc comprised, aside from the U.S.S.R. Byelorussia, Czechoslovakia, Poland and the Ukraine, (12) Mario Rossi, "UN Blocs and Colonialism," Foreign Policy Bulletin (February 1, 1955), XXXIV, 10, p7~7T.

Obviously the Asian-African bloc cannot hope to succeed unless it wins new allies. They have found there is no use turning to the West, The Western bloc, including most British Commonwealth countries, being largely colonialist in sentiment, provides opponents rather than allies. There remains the Latin American bloc, with which the Asian-Africans have cooperated on other issues. These two groups, representing most of the world's underdeveloped countries, have often joined in opposing the socio- economic policies of the industrial nations. Since the industrial group also includes the colonial powers, past or present, the Asian-Africans had hoped that cooperation with Latin America could extend to the colonial question as well. After all, they argued, were not the Latin American countries also colonies once? If the United States had backed the Indonesian cause, the support of most of the Latin American bloc would probably have been available. As it was, given the official American position of neutrality, the Latin American nations were to show themselves in all three sessions of the Assembly (the Ninth, Eleventh and Twelfth) in which the Irian issue came to a vote the least bloc-like of any of the various geographical and ideological groupings in terms of their voting. (13) For several, cultural ties with Europe were apparently the dominant factor; for others, under authoritarian rule, ideological factors seem to have been important. And for most, financial and economic ties with Western Europe were an influential consideration. An indication of Indonesian expectations of support was (13) In the Ninth General Assembly, the Latin American nations split as follows; For the Indonesian resolution - 10; opposed - 7; abstaining - 3; in the Eleventh (1956) and Twelfth (1957) Assemblies the respective divisions were: 6-6-7 and 5-9-6, representing a steady gain for the Dutch and consequent loss of support for Indonesia. Bolivia, El Salvador and Costa Rica have always voted consistently in favor of Indonesia just as Brazil, the Dominican Republic, Nicaragua and Peru have done in opposition. Only Mexico has consistently abstained. Whatever conclusions, if any, may be drawn from this, the writer would prefer to leave to the Latin American specialists since his own ignorance of Latin American affairs forbids even hazarding a guess.

given in mid-October by the semi-official Antara News Agency which estimated correctly enough the bed-rock support for each side but erred badly with its expectation that some sixteen nations would abstain from taking sides. The article noted realistically enough that, "The distribution of votes depends of course, finally on behind the scenes manoeuvres of power politics as much as anything else, and it is also not to be forgotten that Holland is making every effort to secure the greatest possible support." In conclusion the hope was expressed that: (14) However, since Indonesia is intending to put forward a restrained resolution, proposing only that the United Nations recommend further negotiations between Holland Indonesia on the question of West Irian there is a very reasonable possibility of acceptance of this resolution. It would be difficult for the United Nations to reject a resolution designed to bring about a peaceful settlement of a dispute between two member /nations/. A refusal would be entirely at variance wTth the sjpiriX^and purpose of the Unifed Nations Charter. There was little, if any, expectation of American support. Indeed somewhat earlier a leading Indonesian daily had speculated on the possibility of actual American opposition when it wrote; (15) ...speculation in diplomatic circles indicates that if forced to make a decision, possibly America will support Holland. This is in connection with the impression that American authorities have indicated their doubts about the ability of the Djakarta Government to execute an effective administration in the area concerned at this time. (14)Antara News Bulletin, October 18, 1954, In the article it was estimated that the following sixteen nations would abstain from voting: U.S., Canada, Iceland, New Zealand, Colombia, Brazil, Costa Rica, Haiti, Honduras, Panama, El Salvador, Guatemala, Chile, Venzuela, China, "perhaps Ethiopia," Actually on the final vote only the U.S., Guatemala, Haiti and Mexico abstained while the votes of the others were divided with a majority in opposition. (For a complete breakdown of the voting by blocs in the 9th, 11th and 12th sessions, see the analytical chart at the end of this study.) (15)Merdeka, August 20, 1954.

The discussions on "The question of West Irian (West New Guinea)" were held in the First (Political) Committee of the Assembly from November 25th through December 3rd, 1954, with the discussion in the General Assembly taking place on December 10th.(16) In neither the arguments presented by the respective sides nor in the composition of their membership were there any startling developments. In essence the arguments presented at the Ninth Assembly furnished the pattern for the other full-dress debates on the Irian issue in the Eleventh and Twelfth Assemblies. In outline form the points made by Mr. Sudjarwo Tjondro- negoro, the Acting Permanent Representative for Indonesia at the UN, in his initial speech to the First Committee on November 23 rd, 1954, were these: (17)1, West Irian had always been an integral part of Indonesia; 2. Indonesia, as Dr Roijen bad pointed out to the Security Council in 1948, was composed of at least seventeen major ethnic and linguistic groups with a common nationalism and language (Bahasa Indonesia) as the unifying factor; therefore, the racial differences between the people of West Irian and other areas of Indonesia were irrelevant; 3. the independence movement in West Irian had been violently suppressed; 4. now, as in the past, Dutch rule in Irian was doing little for economic and social advancement; 5. Dr. van Mook at Den Pasar had declared it was not the intent to exclude Western New Guinea from Indonesia /see p.36 above/; 6. the Linggadjati and Renville agreements had accepted the basic idea that the Netherlands East Indies in toto should be transformed into the independent state oT Indonesia; 7. the Round Table Agreement had been a temporary compromise intended to suspend the question of sovereignty; 8. in 1950, 1951 and 1952, Indonesia had en- deavored to discuss the issue but had been rebuffed on each occasion as well as most recently in the 1954 conference on the dissolution of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union; 9. "Indonesia sought the road to a peaceful solution and did not ask the United Nations for a solution immediately. It sought only further negotiations with the encouragement and guidance ofthe United Nations. (16) The sessions of the First Committee concerned were the 726th through the 735th and of the General Assembly the 509th, An extensive (but not verbatim) report of the meetings is to be found for those of the First Committee in United Nations General Assembly-Ninth Session-First CommTTtee, A/C.l/SR 726-735. (Short reference used here- aTTer, UN-Ninth-First Com. /SR., date. For the General~Assembly, UN-Ninth-GA No~ date). (17) UN-Ninth, First Committee /SR 726, November 23, 1954, pp. 2-16.

The Netherlands position, as outlined by its permanent representative, Mr. van Balluseck, was as follows: (18) 1. the Netherlands chief concern was for the welfare of the primitive population involved which meant that a long period of tutelage was necessary before there could be any thought of self-determination on their part; 2. the Netherlands did not agree with the Indonesian interpretation of the Charter of Sovereignty at the RTC; 3. the various conferences since 1949 had failed because of Indonesian unwillingness to compromise; 4 the Netherlands felt a deep obligation to ad- minister Western New Guinea under the provisions of Article 73e of the Charter of the UN; (19) 5 "In the case of West New Guinea, the Netherlands Government had of its own accord repeatedly declared that it would, at the appropriate time, give to the inhabitants of Netherlands New Guinea the opportunity to determine their own future.” Essentially the division between the numerous other speakers who participated in the debates was that of colonialism versus anti-colonialism. The supporters of the Indonesian side saw the Irian dispute essentially as yet another manifestation of the struggle against Western Colonialism. (20)

118) UN-Ninth, First Committee /SR 726, November 23, 1954, pp.”16-26;--------------------------------------------- (19)In 1950 the Netherlands began submitting annual reports on its administration of ’’Netherlands New Guinea" to the Secretary-General under the provisions of Article 73e of the Charter, From 1952 on Indonesia has regularly protested the submission of these reports as illegal. Article 73e reads as follows: Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government, recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost,..,, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and to this end: ...
(e) To transmit regularly to the secretary general for information purposes,..., statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible... (20)Speeches in favor of the Indonesian case were made by the representatives of India, the Ukraine, Greece, the Soviet Union, Poland, Burma, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Liberia, Ecuador, Byelorussia, Thailand, Syria, Yugoslavia, Bolivia, Egypt, Argentina, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Philippines, El Salvador and Iraq.

This was strongly denied by those supporting the Dutch position. It was their contention that rather the issue of protecting the eventual right of self-determination of the Papuan peoples required thecontinuance of Dutch rule. (21) And in the several speeches made by the Australian delegate, Sir Percy Spender, stress was laid on the strategic value of the whole island of New Guinea for Australian defense. (22) The discussions in the First Committee were concluded on November 30th by the adoption (23) of a draft resolution for submission to the General Assembly which in its operative sections read as follows: The General Assembly, Having considered item 61 of the agenda of the ninth session” "The question of West Irian (West New Guinea)”, „..

1.Expresses the hope that the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands will pursue their endeavors in respect of the dispute that now exists between them to find a solution in conformity with the principles of the Charter of the United Nations; 2,Requests the parties to report progress to the General Assembly at its tenth session. When the vote on the draft resolution took place in the General Assembly on December 10, 1954, the division on the first operative section was 34 in favor, 23 against and 3 abstentions while on the second clause the only difference was a shift by Mexico from a vote favoring Indonesia to a position of abstention (see chart in Appendix 1 for analysis of the vote). In this as in subsequent sessions of the UN, Indonesia was to experience the frustration of seeing its cause supported by the representatives of nations which comprised the overwhelming majority of the world's population and yet finding itself consistently defeated. (21)Speeches supporting the Dutch position were made by the representatives of Australia, Belgium, the United Kingdom, Brazil, Peru, Canada, France, China, the Dominican Republic, Union of South Africa. (22)UN-Ninth, First Committee /SR 727, pp. 2-10, /SR 733, pp. 17-22. (23)The vote on adoption was 34 to 14 with 10 abstentions. The only non-European countries to vote in opposition were Colombia and Turkey.

Among Asian and African nations, only the vote of Nationalist China had been cast against Indonesia and in the Western group only that of Greece had been cast in favor, presumably because of Cyprus. The Ninth Assembly, however, was to represent the highwater mark of non-Asian and African support for Indonesia, Excluding the five votes of the Soviet bloc, twelve nations outside the Asian-African sphere supported Indonesia as compared with eight and seven in the Eleventh and Twelfth Assemblies respectively Although substantial support had been received from the Latin American bloc (ten votes), it was far from the united support for which Indonesia had hoped, based on a common colonial heritage and the fact that most Latin American nations were also in the "underdeveloped" category. A possible explanation as to why a number of the Latin American nations voted as they did was suggested shortly after the close of the Ninth Session by a journalistic observer at the UN when he wrote in connection with colonialism: (24) But on this issue the two groups have parted company. The Asian-Africans are either neutralist or, from the West’s point of view, not firmly enough committed in the cold war, while the Latin Americans are strongly on the Western side, and many of them consider any weakening of the West, even in its colonial possessions, a weakening of the cause of democracy.,.. During the 1954 UN Assembly session the Latin Americans were even less inclined to antagonize the industrial colonial countries because of the disarmament resolution. Disarmament means far more to them than the vision of a world at peace. It represents the hope that, before long, promised and needed economic aid may flow to them from the United States, Hitherto Washington has answered Latin American pleas for aid with the argument that only savings realized through disarmament would make large-scale economic and financial assistance possible. Press comment in the Netherlands, Australia and the United States was almost uniformly favorable to the defeat of the Irian negotiations proposal. In Indonesia, in spite of the "moral victory" which had been won in terms of world support, disappointment was bitter. For months past various branches of the "West Irian Liberation Committee" had been (24) Mario Rossi, "UN Blocs and Colonialism," op. cit., pp, 73-74.~

formed in various towns and cities and just prior to the UN vote, the Committee had held a large mass meeting in Djakarta, sponsored by some thirty-five political and other organizations. (25) The meeting had passed resolutions urging the Government to take unilateral action for the inclusion of West Irian into Indonesia and denouncing continued Dutch occupation. And in mid-December, President Sukarno in a public address called for the formation of an All-Indonesian Irian Front, comprising representatives of all shades of political opinion. (26) On the whole, however, Indonesian reaction was comparatively mild. When "The question of West Irian (West New Guinea)" next came before the UN Assembly in December, 1955, Indonesian prospects seemed much, improved. The combination of international and domestic factors among various nations which seemed to augur this was in itself a significant indication of the complexifies which now surrounded any solution of the Irian problem. The possibility of settlement merely between the Netherlands and Indonesia was not a thing of the past. For by 1955, general developments in world affairs as well as the currents in the domestic politics of various nations had all become pertinent factors. Internationally two important events had taken place— both in the Spring of 1955. The first of these, the Geneva Conference, had served to lessen the tensions of the Cold War to an extent which led Indonesia to hope that strategic considerations and the anti-communist crusade of the United States would both be down-graded sufficiently to permit the Western Powers to view the Irian issue on its merits rather than in terms of this or that treaty organization or commitment. The second major international event was the holding of the Asian-African Conference at Bandung, Indonesia, during the month of April. Of the Bandung Conference, it has been observed: (27) The Conference held in April 1955 by twenty-nine Asian and African countries at Bandung, Indonesia, was a unique and significant event. Its scope of membership was unusual; nearly all of Asia was (25)Antara News Bulletin, December 6, 1954. (26)Ibid., December 20, 1954, (27)George McT. Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, Bandung, Indonesia, April 1955 (Ithaca, N. Y771955), ppT 1-4,~ passim.

represented --... and most of independent and nearly independent Africa—.., The initiative for holding an Asian-African Conference was Indonesia’s, the idea originating primarily with its Prime Minis ter, All Sastroamidjojo. At first his proposal was to invite only the Afro-Asian group within the United Nations, and it was with this in mind that he introduced the idea to the prime ministers of Burma, Ceylon, India and Pakistan at their meeting in Colombo at the end
of April 1954... at the end of December,... the
five Colombo states met briefly at Bogor in Indonesia to lay definite plans... In their Bogor communique the five prime ministers also made clear their own stand on several of the issues which they expected the Conference to discuss. "In the context of their well-known attitude towards colonialism," they "took note of the case of West Irian" (Western New Guinea), "supported the position of Indonesia in this matter," and "expressed the earnest hope that the Netherlands Government would reopen negotiations to implement their obligations under the solemn agreements concluded by them with Indonesia." In its final communique on April 24, 1955, the Bandung Conference placed the representatives of the twenty-nine Asian and African nations represented there as being on record to the effect that; (28) The Asian-African Conference, in the context of its expressed attitude on the abolition of colonialism, supported the position of Indonesia in the case of West Irian based on the relevant agreements between Indonesia and the Netherlands. There were, of course, no immediate direct results to be anticipated from this but it served notice on the world that the Indonesian struggle for West Irian now officially had behind it the support of virtually all the independent and semi-independent nations of Asia--including Communist China-- and Africa, the populations of which comprised the vast majority of mankind. And inter-related to a certain degree with these international events, (29) were developments in both the Netherlands and Indonesia which seemed to offer the most (28) Kahin, The Asian-African Conference, p. 83.

hopeful prospects yet for reapproachment between the two nations. In Indonesia the long-lived cabinet of Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo finally came to an end in July to be replaced in August by one headed by Masjumi Leader, Burhanuddin Harahap, and based on moderate-minded political groups which had been largely excluded from the Ali Cabinet. While as unswerving as any previous regime in its intent to "regain West Irian," the Harahap Cabinet was dedicated to achieving this by different methods than those of its predecessor. As the parliamentary correspondent of a Dutch Labor Party-oriented weekly summarized it: (30) The new problem for the Netherlands lies at present in the importantly modified claims of the present Indonesian government. Premier Burhanuddin Harahap, according to the words of his diplomatic representative at the UN, Abu Hanifah, aims at bettering importantly Indonesia’s relations with
the Western World.... there are indications also
that Indonesia is thinking in terms of a longer time period in connection with the claims for the transfer of New Guinea. The Netherlands, the article continued, was now faced with the problem of dealing with a government no longer flirting with Communism, which was winning the sympathy of the Western Powers and which was "exposing the Netherlands to an offensive of reasonableness." Further, the article queried, how was the Netherlands to find the vast sums necessary to develop New Guinea? An example of this new "offensive of reasonableness" on the part of Indonesia was given by Dr. Abu Hanifah, diplomatic spokesman for Premier Harahap in an interview in New York just after the opening of the Tenth Assembly, Asked what were Indonesian expectations of support from Latin American countries, he replied: (31) We are now trying hard to get the Latin American countries which supported Indonesia in last year's debate on West Irian in the General Assembly to support Indonesia again in this year's discussions. We hope that the other Latin American countries will change their voting, or at least show better understanding of the West Irian problem.

130) "New Guinea and Reality," Vrij Nederland, September 10
1954.-------------- (31) Interview with Antara News Agency (Daily Bulletin (New York), September 13, 1955).

We also hope that those who could not favor General Assembly discussions of the West Irian question last year because they feared an increase in world tensions, will now realize that, with the lessening of that tension, the West Irian quest ion can be discussed again in the General Assembly in a business-like way and without emotion, Indonesia, and the Netherlands are now seeking for ways to settle their still pending problems and in an atmosphere fruitful for negotiations. And in 1955, developments in the Netherlands itself seemed to indicate the beginnings of a thaw on the Irian issue, Primarily there was the realization on the part of many that the Harahap Cabinet represented the best and possibly last chance to work out. a modus vivendi with Indonesia, Nor was this feeling confined to liberaT-minded intellectual circles. By 1955 it had spread to those hard-headed men of business who had been taking a long, cold look since 1949 at the investments at stake in Indonesia and the hazardous risks involved in retaining an area of such dubious economic worth as Western New Guinea. One well-placed business figure told the writer in 1956 that in his estimation while in 1951 perhaps 75% of Dutch business circles, aside from those with direct involvement in Indonesia, (32) favored retention of Western New Guinea, by 1955, 75% probably favored disposing of it in some way either by direct transfer to Indonesia or through an international solution. (33) Increasing uneasiness both over various indications that Indonesia might take economic action against Dutch enterprises and the rising threat of the dynamic and economic competition of colonially-untainted West Germany played their part in this change. Not surprisingly it was within the Labor Party that by 1955 the sharpest divergencies had arisen over New Guinea policy. The dominant group in the party, under the leadership of Prime Minister Drees and several now bitterly disil- lusioned former Indonesia-philes,(34) continued adamant on any concessions to Indonesia. But, according to several T32) As early as 1950, Dutch business interests in Indonesia had gone on record as favoring transfer of Western New G-uinea, (33) Neither this statement nor the material in the following paragraphs is subject to absolute proof. It represents a consensus of the opinions voiced to the writer by various business, journalistic, political, intellectual and other sources during his stay in the Netherlands in

1956.

qualified observers, representing more accurately the viewpoint of the rank and file, was a group headed by former Prime Minister Schermerhorn which favored transfer of Western New Guinea to a UN trusteeship as a way out. Smaller in numbers was yet a third group which saw direct transfer to Indonesia as the only solution. In terms of practical politics, neither of the dissident Labor groups was able to bring about any change in their party's policy on New Guinea nor were business circles on the position taken by their political representative the Freedom and Democracy Party. (35) The chief public results were to appear in 1956 when the sentiment for a revision in Dutch Indonesian policy led to the publication within a short period of various pamphlets and appeals urging a new start in Indonesian policy and in particular a revision of the official position on the Irian question. The most controversial and widely-publicized of these various publications was a pamphlet, issued by the Commission for International Affairs of the Ecuemenical Council of Churches in the Netherlands in June, 1956, entitled, "New Guinea as a Problem of the Netherlands People." (36) This (34) One of the most bitter and vociferous of these former ardent supporters of Indonesian nationalism is Mr. Frans Goedhart who, once on the far left of the Labor Party, is now a leader of its rightwing. The reasons for his change of opinion, according to various sources, were not necessarily ideological in character. For an indication of his outlook on Indonesia, after "disillusionment," see his Een Revolutie op drift (Amsterdam, 1953) and in particular his chapter entitled, "Persconferentie," pp. 187-193. (•35) The seeming helplessness of the clientele of Dutch (and other European) parties to exert any real control Over-their party bureaucracy seems to offer striking confirmation of Michels' "iron lay of bureaucracy" concept. (36) Nieuw-Ouinea als probleem van het Nederlandse volk (Amsterdam, 1956), pamphlet, 24 pages. Also published at about the same period were two other pamphlets which attracted attention. Although one was written by a liberal Catholic journalist (Theodore C. Droogh, De deurknop in de hand, 's-Gravenhage, 1956) and the--other by a liberal Protestant university professor at Leiden (A. Teeuw, Het conflict met Indonesie als spiegel voor Nederland ("The Indonesian Conflict as a Mirror for the Netherlands") 's-Gravenhage/Bandung, 1956) and the burden

soberly-worded and objective study of the arguments of the two sides sought to set forth the facts necessary "to get out of the blind ally of the sterile Netherlands-Indonesian sovereignty debate and its mutual lack of trust." After reviewing "The History of the Netherlands-Indonesian Dispute in connection with New Guinea," the writers of the pamphlet, mostly either liberal churchmen or Christian Socialists, ended by saying: (37) On the basis of the preceeding, we reach the following conclusion.

1.The existing situation has very great objections:
a. because it has the tendency to poison Netherlands relations with Indonesia to an unnecessary degree, b because it drives the Netherlands into an increasingly more difficult position in the society of states of the United Nations. 2,Search must be made for a way out which;
a.does away with the objections enumerated under 1, wholly or to an important extent;
b.will bring West New Guinea, under international supervision, into a quieter sphere; the points mentioned self-evidently provided with substantial guarantees for an unweakened concern for the interest of the people. A substantial book could be filled with samples of the violence of the reaction to this very modest "appeal to common- ~ of both was the same. Their message was that the hour” was late in Netherlands-Indonesian relations, that the colonial era was dead and that it was both morally necessary and commonsense to mend fences and bend every effort to reach an understanding. Appeals from the Quakers of the Netherlands, from a long list of Netherlands intellectual figures in December, 1956, addressed to the political parties and in January, 1957, from the Dutch community in Indonesia, asking for a modification of policy on West Irian, alike all. fell on deaf ears. They were denounced by a substantial section of Dutch public opinion committed, on either religious or nation alistic grounds, to a bitter-end policy on New Guinea and ignored by the Government. (37) Nieuw-Guinea als probleem, etc., p. 21.

sense." (38) Suffice it to say that orthodox Protestant and, for the most part, Catholic journals, along with such' a prominent organ of conservative secular opinion as the well-known Elsevier's Weekly (Elsevier's Weekblad) outdid themselves in their scathing denunciations of the well-meant efforts of the appeal of the Ecumencial Council. The leading organ of the Catholic party termed it, "An Unfortunate Appeal," while Elsevier's could only sigh, "How good it would be if these preafchers would confine themselves to their churches. Their dwindling congregations are not increased by such appeals." And the daily voice of the rightwing Calvinist Anti-Revolutionary Party noted with stern disapproval: (39) What is in this appeal in the light of God's Word which the Synod should seek? We have not per- ceived any of it there. Let New Guinea alone.' The Synod has produced a political piece here which is not derived from any awareness of Biblical convictions on this problem but is a typical example of what one, on the contrary, terms "practical politics." And yet another among the predominantly hostile press comments saw the church appeal as sinister evidence of the degree to which Labor and Socialist elements had infiltrated religious activities. (40) Allegedly spontaneous declarations: of affection and un- dying allegiance from Papuan groups in Western New Guinea which had been cabled to the Government were given prominent space in the concerted press campaign against the appeal. Of these declarations, a left-wing Labor Party journal wryly observed, under the editorial heading of "New Guinea and Stupid Propaganda": (41) We once rather pretended to be a level-headed people who first saw which way the cat jumpbd and were not willing to be the victims of misstatements (38)The writer has in his files several bulging envelopes filled with merely a representative (and far from comprehensive) sampling. (39)Volkskrant, June 23, 1956, (Elsevier's) June 30, Trouw, June 22. (40)De Telegraaf, June 29, 1956. (41)Vrij Nederland, July 21, 1956.

and fallacies; but, all these qualities seem to be hhrd-pressed as soon as New Guinea is involved. The gathering of outstanding Papuan leaders about which the N. R. Ct. /Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant/ writes has declared-ggainst the appeal for commonsense of the General Synod of the Netherlands Reformed Church (42) and wishes to know no other rule than that of the Netherlands ’’with which the Papuan people have strong and historic ties." And this nonsense which these outstanding leaders of the Papuan people have put out is thoughtlessly taken over by the Netherlands press. The Netherlands left the Papuan people in peace in inaccessible New Guinea up to the moment that a political point was made of New Guinea at the Round Table Conference with Indonesia when suddenly the sense of responsibility for the Papuan people began to itch. Before this time efforts were made in the coastal areas by Catholic and Protestant mission- aries who quickly died of malaria but that was about it. After discussing the fact that, for the Netherlands, Western New Guinea no longer held any strategic importance, the editorial continued: There remains the responsibility for the Papuan people. One can talk about this; one can believe in this responsibility or one can consider that this hanging on to the responsibility is inter- mingled with a number of other considerations. In T42) The Netherlands Reformed Church (Hervormde Kerk) is to be distinguished from the Reformed Church (Gerefomeerde Kerk), The former is the original vehicle of the Dutch Reformation and numbers among its present day membership most of the aristocracy and, by constitutional requirement the Royal Family. The political vehicle of its somewhat relaxed and relatively sophisticated Calvinism is the Christian-Historical Onion. The Reformed Church became a separate body in the late 19th century, standing in relation to the Netherlands Reformed Church much as does Methodism to Episcopalianism since it too arose out of an initial effort to stage a revival within the ranks of the established church. Its political arm is the Anti-Revolutionary Party which bases its political program directly on Biblical precepts as interpreted through orthodox Calvinist eyes.

either event, one cannot make propaganda, via the Papuan people, with "the strong and historic ties" which these people, who for a good part live in the stone age, would maintain. That is boring, propagandistic nonsense. For with the greatest part of the Papuan people there do not exist any "strong and historic" ties whatsoever because they still have never seen a Netherlander... and with that portion which has occasionally seen a Netherlander, these ties are still but a few years old. (43) They are thus neither strong nor historic. In any case they are not so strong and historic as the ties with the Javanese, Sundanese or Madurese who gleefully cut these ties when we no longer had the power to exercise our authority, But even before these developments took place in the Dutch election year of 1956 the Netherlands Government had somewhat unnecessarily provided yet again convincing proof that it had no intent of abandoning its long-fixed policy on (43) Interesting confirmation of this is given by a Dutch map compiled in 1938. The purpose of the map was to show the development of Netherlands authority in Indonesia in terms of "Official dependency" and "Actual authority." On mainland Western New Guinea the earliest exercise of actual authority is placed in 1901 at Merauke in Southwest New Guinea near the Australian border. In all the rest of New Guinea the remainder of the dates are in the 1920’s and 1930’s which, as Vrij Nederland observed, gave very little time for the development of "strong and historic ties," Ironically, actual Dutch authority on the eastern tip of neighboring Ceram, the possession of which the Dutch never attempted to dispute with Indonesia was established as early as 1661. For Ceram a legitimate case could have been made for the "strong and historic ties" argument while to Western New Guinea it was ab- surdly inapplicable. For the dates of occupation of New Guinea, see the map in the rear. The dates given are taken from Map 10 a, included in the Atlas van Tropisch Nederland, uitgev.en door het Koninklijk Neder-Tandsch Aardrijkskundig Gehoiotschap in samenwerking met den Topografisch Dienst in Nederlandsch-Indie ("Atlas of the Tropical Netherlands," published by the Royal Netherlands Geographical Association in collaboration with the Topographical Service of Netherlands India") (’s-Gravenhage, 1938).

West New Guinea. In October, 1955, for example, before returning from the convening of the Tenth Assembly of the UN to The Hague, Foreign Minister Luns had invidiously contrasted for a group of interviewing correspondents the difference between, what he implied was the essentially negative spirit of Bandung and the constructive spirit of Geneva. (44) And in December, 1955, Overseas Territories Minister Kernkamp, to the delight of the conservative press, told the Second Chamber of the Parliament: (45) The Netherlands is conscious of the responsibil itv it bears for the development of Netherlands New Guinea. However as completely unnecessary as it is, I am glad to offer an explicit declaration that the Government holds firmly to the standpoint that it exercises de jure and de facto sovereignty and will continue to exercise it until the people of New Guinea themselves are in a position to decide about their own future. This firm reassurance to the Chamber on the Government’s intentions had been prompted by the uneasiness of certain parliamentarians over the possible results of a new venture in Dutch-Indonesian discussions which began at The Hague on December 10, 1955. The talks, which had been long in preparation, represented the climax of the Harahap Cabinet's efforts to make a new approach to the difficult problems of Dutch-Indonesian relations. Although the Irian question was not directly involved, it was the hope of the Harahap Cabinet that success on other matters might pave the way for further discussions on this issue of major controversy. On the Irian issue it had been agreed that "with respect to the sovereignty each party maintains his own position. (46) Because of the pending talks, the Irian issue although inscribed on the agenda of the Tenth Assembly, (47) was not discussed by that body. Instead the General Assembly unani- mously adopted a draft resolution expressing the hope that (44)Nieuwe Rofterdamse Courant, October 19, 1955, (45)De Telegraaf, December 9, 1955. (46)New York Times, December 11, 1955. (47)As a result of a letter (General Assembly, Tenth Session, Document A/2932) requesting this which had been forwarded in mid-August under the signatures of the representatives of some fifteen Asian-African nations.

"the problem will be peacefully resolved," and expressing the hope that the forthcoming negotiations would be "fruitful," (48) A fruitful outcome for the Harahap Cabinet and especially the political forces it represented was a political necessity. President Sukarno had viewed its formation with hostility and in the strong parliamentary opposition against which it had to contend were both the Nationalist Party, favored by the President, and the bitterly hostile Communists. It had been the hope of the Harahap Cabinet and its dominant Masjumi Party that Indonesia’s first general elections, held in November, 1955, would see the Masjumi emerge in such a strong position that it would dominate the political scene thereafter. (49) Instead the Masjumi found itself winning merely the same fifty-seven seats as had the Nationalists while the latter actually led in the number of popular votes. To com- pound the difficulties, the conservative Nahdatul Ulama which had seceded from Masjumi in 1952 and, although holding two portfolios in the Harahap Cabinet had refused to be represented on the delegation to the Hague conference because of what it considered to be Harahap's much too moderate approach to the Irian problem, emerged.as a strong third party. The final one of the new big four of Indonesian political parties were the Communists who had polled approximately 6,000,000 votes and won thirty-nine seats. Equally embarrassing was the fact that all the other parties in the Harahap Cabinet had met disaster at the polls and now represented political liabili- ties, (50) However the Harahap Cabinet attempted'to use its very weakness as a bargaining point in the discussions with the Dutch delegation. Of this an American correspondent, Walter H, Waggoner, covering the "Hague" discussions, wrote: (51) (48)See General Assembly, Tenth Session, Document A/3093,, Report of the First Committee (14 December 1955) and Resolution 915 (X) (Document A/RES/384) adopted at the 559th plenary meeting on December, 1955. (49)Masjumi’s expectations were on the highest level. The writer was told, for example, just before the election by a prominent Masjumi leader that estimates among the party leadership ranged from 55% to 75% of the total vote. (50)For a detailed analysis of the elections, see Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Modern Indonesia Project Interim Report Series, CornellUniversity, Ithaca, N.Y., 1957).

Dutch Foreign Office Officials are being reminded that the regime of Premier Burhanuddin Harahap is "probably the best” they can expect in Indonesia for a long time... What the Dutch are being asked to do, in short, is to modify their position on issues of grave national concern because they are dealing with a "moderate" Government instead of an intransigent one. Success in the negotiations was not so much a policy matter for the cabinet as such as for the Masjumi which, particularly after its election check, wanted to achieve the best possible position for use in bargaining over portfolios in the formation of the first post-election cabinet. However the Dutch Government showed little disposition to reach any basis of understanding with the Indonesian delegation with the result that the Conference ended in deadlock on February 11, 1956(52) Although the Harahap Cabinet sought to extract something from the wreckage of the Conference by swiftly and dramatically moving for the unilateral abrogation of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the drastic modification of the other agreements of the Round Table Conference, (53) President Sukarno’s refusal to sign the enabling law until after the Harahap Cabinet had been forced from office (March 2, 1956) frustrated even this last attempt by the Masjumi to gain prestige,, The result was that the task of inaugurating yet another new phase in Dutch-Indonesian relations passed to the second cabinet of the Indonesian Nationalist Party's All Sastroamidjojo which assumed office on March 26, 1956. It can be argued in the light of subsequent events that T51) The New York Times, December 23, 1955, It should be noted that by this date the "Hague" discussions had become the Geneva discussions since the conference had moved to the traditionally neutral atmosphere of Switzer- land on December 17, 1955, (52)Apparently the Dutch delegation had accepted the final Indonesian proposals on the drastic modification of the financial/economic sections of the RTC only to be counter- manded by the Government, allegedly because of violent opposition to concessions on the part of the dominant Drees-Goedhart group within the Labor Party. (53)The results of the 1954 negotiations had never been ratified by the Indonesian House of Representatives

the relatively brief (August, 1955 - March, 1956) regime of the Harahap Cabinet offered perhaps the last prospects for a new turn in Dutch-Indonesian relations. While the hesitancy of the Dutch Government to enter into negotiations with a cabinet which, particularly after the elections, possessed so uncertain a future, is understandable it was unfortunate that so unyielding a course of no concessions and absolute adherence to legal technicalities was followed to the letter. Willingness to discuss and negotiate in an atmosphere of compromise and conciliation might have saved much tragedy of recent date. Sections of Dutch public opinion were giving highly vocal evidence at this time of desiring change and concessions to the Harahap regime on the part of the Dutch government would have won approval from this section of domestic public opinion. Further, in Indonesian terms, such concessions might at least have strengthened the position of the moderate groups in political life and given them a much stronger position in the bargaining for the new cabinet. The Harahap Cabinet as such had an admittedly limited life expectancy following the elections but it would seem to have been short-sighted of Dutch policy makers not to appreciate the results of their policies on the future political prospects of its components--in particular the Masjumi. Dutch intransigence at Geneva strengthened precisely those political elements within Indonesia basically the most hostile to Dutch, interests. Indirectly the actions taken by the Dutch Government in the early months of 1956 played their part in bring Ing about the developments of December, 1957, which were so tragic for thousands of Netherlanders then living in Indonesia, Embittered Stalemate, 1956-1958 Like all its predecessors the second Sastroamidjdjo Cabinet came into office pledged to continue the Irian struggle. But also included in its program was a pledge for the "Formation of a province of West Irian." (54) In mid-August 1956 the House of Representatives passed a bill providing for the establishment of an autonomous provincial government for West Irian. In September the ruling Sultan of Tidore, Zainal Abidin Sjah, was officially installed as the first governor of this province which comprises Tidore and various other areas in the North Moluccas. (55) The primary effect of this, as well as of President Sukarno's world tour in the Spring and Summer, was, of course, propa- T54J Kabinet Ali-Roem-Idham, Program dan Pelaksanaan, Kementerian Penerangan, R. I., (Djakarta, 1957), p. 30.

gandistic, prior to the third Indop-^ian effoix to obtain assistance from the United Nations. And designed for the stimulation of internal morale, an "All-Indonesia People's Congress” was held in August at which, aside from efforts once again publically to reassure Australia on Indonesia’s intentions, Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo outlined as his government’s three-point program in connection with Irian; (56) a„ to harnass the forces to be found in our own country;

b. to mobilize the anti-colonialist forces all over the world; Co to encourage our countrymen in West Irian to intensify our joint efforts, under a systematic plan of action In mid-October, 1956, on the basis of a request signed by the representatives of fifteen Asian-African powers, "The Question of West Irian (West New Guinea)" was inscribed on the agenda of the Eleventh Assembly of the UN. (57) Discussions, the verbatim record of which occupies some 550 pages, were held in the First (Political) Committee between February 23rd and 28 th, 1957. (58) The problem facing Indonesia in the Eleventh Assembly differed only in degree from that first met in the Ninth Assembly. Yet again it was confronted with the problem of the two-thirds majority which offered such a bastion of defense for the Dutch. The number of Afro-Asian states had, it was true, increased from seventeen to twenty-seven and eight instead of five votes were now represented by the (55)See the"Ministry of Information, Republic of Indonesia, pamphlets; West Irian is Indonesian Territory, The Autonomous Province of West Irian and Brief Hist ory in Chronological Order of the Dispute about West Irian "(Djakarta, 1956). (56)West Irian is Indonesian Territory, p, 20, (57)UN General Assembly-Eleventh Session-Document A/3200 October 195ΒΊ— (58)The sessions of the First Committee which discussed the Irian question were the 857th through the 863rd inclusive. For verbatim texts, see UN General Assembly-Eleventh Session-First Commi11ee-A/C-1/PV,857-863 inclusive, “(Short reference hereafter, GA-Eleventh-First-PV. etc., p.,

Soviet bloc,, But this offered the somewhat cold consolation of being able merely to make a better showing, not of meaningful success. (59) Except that on the Netherlands side, Mr. van Balluseck had been replaced by the former Deputy High Commissioner in Djakarta, Mr. Schurmann, the principal characters and the lines they spoke were much the same in the First Committee meetings of the Eleventh Assembly as those of the Ninth. The Indonesian representative, Mr. Sudjarwo, drew attention to the fact that the independence of the entire territory of the former Netherlands Indies had been proclaimed on August 17, 1945, while his Dutch opponent sought to prove that this had not been the case, (See above.) Mr. Sudjarwo's mention of the various pamphlets and petitions asking for a change in Dutch Irian policy were countered by Mr. Schurmann's undoubtedly correct assertion that his Government had no intention of changing its policy and that, furthermore, official policy commanded the backing of an overwhelming majority in Parliament As had been the case in 1954, Sir Percy Spender, the Australian Permanent Representative, presented as vehement defense of the Dutch position as did the Netherlands' own representative. The chief difference in the Australian position was a down-grading of the island of New Guinea’s importance as an Australian strategic bastion and a new emphasis on the mission of the Netherlands to remain for the purpose of carrying out its mission of preparing the Papuan peoples for the much-mentioned eventual right of self- determ i nat i on. Perhaps the most interesting and thoughtful observation on the constantly reiterated Dutch-Australian claim of a

159) But one wonders, assuming that it had been possible to secure the necessary two-thirds majority, just how "meaningful” would it have been actually? It will be recalled that Ambassador van Roijen had publically stated in September, 1954, that the Netherlands would ignore any UN recommendation (p. 124 above). And considering that since early 1956, the description of the territories of the Netherlands (Article 1) now includes "Netherlands New Guinea," it is difficult to visualize how the two-thirds majority necessary to modify the constitution could ever be achieved in the Dutch Parliament. It would require nothing less than a political revolution ip a country where the gain or loss of two or three seats in a general election causes banner headlines on the dramatic changes involved.

moral obligation to backward primitive peoples was made by U Pe Kin, the Burmese representative, when he commented: (60) I turn now to the Netherlands argument that it is under an obligation to continue its control over Irian because of the "backwardness" of the population of Irian. That is an argument which I should like to consider in greater detail in view of the fact that my country has had some experience with peoples at similar levels of development, and, I might add, with which I am familiar through personal participation, Many in this Committee may recall that in the days of British rule in Burma, special provision was made, not only for so-called "backward tracts," but also for other "excluded areas."... These "excluded areas" embraced the Shan states, the Karenni and the tribal hills, which therefore were governed and administered differently from
Burma Proper....
Even though these tracts were administered differently from the part of Burma which was subject to Minfcterial control,... the United Kingdom placed no obstacles in the way of incorporation of these peoples and their respective areas in the Union of Burma when the Union achieved its independence on 4 January 1948. The status of Irian under Netherlands rule was certainly no less than that of the hill tracts under British rule in Burma... There were certainly no greater grounds to justify the retention of a colonial status for the people of Irian than for the primitive peoples of Burma,,.. The British in Burma were wise enough to leave the question of the status of all the frontier areas, including the tribal peoples, to the Burmese peoples themselves, and not to single out the tribal peoples for separate political treatment...,my delegation would urge the emulation of the British attitude towards the status of the primitive peoples of the Naga Hills and the Wa states, as exemplified in the following extract from the Report of the Burma Frontier Areas Commission of Enquiry, 1947, pre-sided over by a member of the British Parliament: (60) GA-Eleventh-First-PV.859 (25 February, 1957), pp 6-8.

"We found it impracticable to procure witnesses from the Naga Hills and the Wa States, but we have no hesitation in recommending that representatives need not be sought from these areas for the Constituent Assembly on account of" — not "because of" but "on account of" "the primitive nature of their civiliza- tion and the impossibility of their finding persons who will be able to assist in the drawing up of Burma's future constitution. ” Allow me to refer to a further instance of this principle by the British, In India, the 1951 census indicates that there were then approximately 19 million persons living in tribal conditions, but when India achieved its independence all of these people were incorporated within the national domain, This is certainly not dumping millions of people like cattle, as my friend and colleague, Sir Percy Spender, said this morning. Nor is it colonialism by a non-European Power,.„, If in fact it is the desire of the Netherlands to assist in the progressive development of these people, it could best discharge this function by providing technical and economic assistance based on the knowledge of the territory which it has acquired during the many years in which it had assumed responsibility for the welfare of the inhabitants. What I have said is fully recognized by a growing number of enlightened elements in the Netherlands itself,,.. In a speech the following day, the Dutch representative, Mr, Schurmann, provided an unintentionally apt illustration of the contradictions in which Dutch propaganda about the people of West Irian had immersed itself. In the course of replying to the Burmese delegate's speech, Mr. Schurmann read a cablegram which he said had originated as a result of the fact that, "On 12 February--this month—nine chiefs of various tribes in different parts of Netherlands New Guinea met together and sent a telegrame to the Secretary-General of the United Nations,... (61) The text of the cable which, since it was not otherwise stated, had presumably originated in English was essentially (61) GA-Eleventh-First-PV. 860 (27 February 1957), p. 18.

in the pattern of those various protestations of devotion and loyalty based on "strong and historic ties" which had been inspired the previous year by the Reformed Church's statement on the West Irian issue. The cable was notable both for felicity of phrasing, its superior command of the English language and an apparent excellent grasp of world affairs. Rather interestingly, in view of the repeated Dutch assertions as to the past and present impossibility of gaining any knowledge whatsoever as to what; the Papuan people really wanted, it contained such statements as, "The Indonesian people themselves have witnessed that in 1949 when sovereignty was transferred to them, we have rejected that New Guinea would be made a part of that transfer. " and, "...it should also be made very clear to the United Nations that the presence of the Netherlands Government in New Guinea is in accordance to the wish of 98 per cent of the Papuan people, based on historical ties and on our trust in the Netherlands people." (62) Three days earlier, in his opening address, Mr. Schurmann had described the state of affairs in Western New Guinea as follows; (63) The territory of Netherlands New Guinea has a size of 308,000 square kilometres—that is roughly the same size as the United Kingdom (sic)—and an estimated population of about seven~or eight hundred thousand; that is to say, less than three persons per square kilometre. Only approximately half of this population has ever had any contact with someone outside their own tribe, The other half lives hidden away in the immense jungle and does not even know that there exist other people in the world beside them-
selves ....
Extensive and comprehensive plans have been drafted /underlining added/ in order to reach these people, To educate them, To cure and to prevent the recurrence of their endemic diseases and to give them some idea of what our modern world, in which they have to live, is like. (62) The reader is referred to Vrij Nederland's comments on the similar theme embodied in the loyalty statements of 1956 and also to the map appendix showing the dates of effective Dutch control in various areas of West Irian. (63) GA-Eleventh-First-PV. 857 (23 February 1957), pp. 82-83„

...If it were possible at this time to let the Papuans choose for themselves under what regime they would like to live, my Government would not hesitate for one moment to do so... The First Committee discussions were concluded on February 28, 1957, with the adoption, by a vote of 39 to 25 with 9 abstentions, of a draft resolution which had been sponsored by various Latin American, African and Asian nations, (64) Unlike that of 1954 which had merely expressed the hope for continued bilateral negotiations, the implementing sections of the 1957 resolution would have placed the General Assembly on record as requesting:

1..the President of the General Assembly to appoint a Good Offices Commission consisting of three members, with a view to assisting in negotiations between the Governments of Indonesia and the Netherlands in order that a just and peaceful solution of the question may be achieved, in conformity with the principles and purposes of the Charter.
2. the Good Offices Commission to report to the General Assembly at its next regular session. The final vote in that same day’s session of the General Assembly yet again indicated the virtually privileged sanctu- ary afforded by the two-thirds rule. To Indonesia was left only the meaningless satisfaction of knowing that it commanded strong majority support among the nations of the world (40 in favor, 25 against and 13 abstaining) and had another representative group at least willing to defer judgment. (65) The Latin American group aside, the lines of division among the regional blocs varied little from the results of the Ninth Assembly. Once more, Nationalist China was the only Asian-African nation to vote against Indonesia with Laos and Cambodia abstaining. And among the Western Nations, only Greece again cast a pro-Indonesian vote. The twenty Latin American nations, with Colombia apparently absent from the
164) For the full text of the resolution, see GA-Eleventh-Document A/C.1/L.173 22 February, 1957. The:sponsors were Bolivia, Burma, Ceylon, Costa Rica, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India, Iraq, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syria and Yugoslavia. (65) For the text of General Assembly discussions, see GA-Eleventh, No. A/PV.664, 28 February 1957.

voting, split almost evenly in the proportions of six each for and against the resolution and seven abstaining (For a detailed breakdown, see the analytical chart in the appendices.) Both the Dutch and Indonesian Governments had been attempting to win support from this vital Latin American balance-of-power bloc. In 1955, for example, Indonesia invited as state guests the delegates of Bolivia and El Salvador while the Netherlands sponsored a tour of Western New Guinea by the UN delegates of Cuba and Colombia Exactly how much influence these public relations activities exerted is open to question. The increasing shift of the Latin American bloc to the Dutch side seems far more attributable to a general desire to remain in the good graces of the larger nations of the Western Bloc, with the potential economic assistance they represented, than any sudden conversions to the Dutch viewpoint. (66) Nor does the increasing amount of internal administrative independence which the Netherlands was engaged in granting to its Carribean possessions during this period seem to have exerted any major influence in disposing Latin American opinion more favorably. Indonesian reactions to the disappointment of the results in the Eleventh Assembly session were largely ob- scured by the swift pace of the nation’s domestic political crisis which resulted in the resignation of the second Sastroamidjojo Cabinet just two weeks after the Assembly vote, It was replaced in early April, 1957, by the present regime of Mr, Djuanda Kartawidaja, a well-known independent political figure, heading what President Sukarno designated as "an emergency extra-parliamentary Cabinet of experts " Shortly after taking office the new government organized a "West Irian Liberation Committee" under the supervision of Information Minister Sudibjo to coordinate its efforts to mobilize domestic opinion. In a statement to the Indonesian House of Representatives in late May in connection with the program of his cabinet, Prime Minister Djuanda stressed the need for internal unity to achieve a successful solution of the problem and to continue efforts internationally both in- side and outside the United Nations, (67) And in early June, Dr. Mohammed Hatta, former Vice President along with President Sukarno--the most respected figures of the Indonesian nationalist (66)The reader is referred to the analysis given by Mr, Mario Rossi in his "Un Blocs and Coloniasm"--see Note 6, * (67)Indonesia Raya, May 29, 1957

movement-made it very clear that, whatever might be the differences of internal politics, the Irian issue was not among them, In an interview with a Dutch journalist, representing the Labor Party organ, Vrij Nederland, Dr. Hatta said; (68)“ For Indonesia the claim to West Irian has already become a question of honor, Abvoe all it would not be morally responsible for Indonesia to abandon West Irian to its fate and, aside from that, we have a juridical claim to this former area of the Netherlands East Indies, It was a serious mistake, Dr. Hatta said, for the Dutch to view the Irian problem "entirely from a juridical viewpoint." He warned; "In my opinion, this fact constitutes a major error. For a long time past I have urged that there be created a basis of mutual trust..." Earlier in the interview, he called attention to the fact that, "The Netherlands commercial world in Indonesia has to bear a heavy burden in view of the general suspicions concerning the Dutch, suspicions which for the most part are based on the continuation of colonial rule in West Irian," Increasingly during 1957, it became clear that a climax was approaching in Netherlands-Indonesian relations over the West Irian question, Indicative of the rising tensions were the reiterated demands from political parties, youth groups, veterans associations, labor unions and others that Indonesia be prepared to take drastic action should the efforts in the UN again fail, Between mid-August, 1957, when some twenty-one nations requested the inclusion of the Irian question on the agenda of the Twelfth Assembly (69) and its consideration in mid-November, nothing took place to ease the rising tensions-in Dutch-Indonesian relations; rather, much occurred to intensify them. On the Indonesian side, the West Irian Liberation Committee increased its efforts which had culminated in late October in a four day boycott against Dutch enterprises. From the statements of various leaders of public opinion, including members of the legislative and executive branches, it was clear that more drastic steps were likely to take place at any time.

168) As reported in Pedoman, June 4, 1957. (69) The relevant document is General Assembly, Twelfth Session, A/3757, 27 November 1957.

President Sukarno himself in the course of a speaking tour on the Irian issue in Eastern Indonesia on several occasions urged the severance of trade relations and the freezing of Dutch assets Speaking in Den Pasar, Capital of Bali on November 10, 1957, he told the crowd: (70) Although the struggle to regain West Irian is based on the forces at home, outside Indonesia, however, about 2,100 million people support the struggle of the people of Indonesia; the progressive peoples all over the world who are anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, anti-feudalism and anti-fascism total about 500 million spread-over the whole world and plus the 1,600 million people of the Asian-African countries. We should continue our struggle to include West Irian into the territory of the Republic of Indo- lnesia and one day honourably or dishonourably the Dutch will be thrown out from Indonesian soil. Shortly after the convening of the Twelfth General Assembly, Foreign Minister Subandrio told the assembled delegates on October 3rd, "...the only question is whether the United Nations is the pface where its /The Irian question/^ solution may be worked out, or whether we must embark upon another course, even at the risk of aggravating conditions in Southeast Asia and perhaps inviting cold war tensions to muddy further the waters of peace in that region of the world." (71) On November 12, the 520 members of Indonesia’s Constituent Assembly, representing every shade of political opinion, approved overwhelmingly as the first accepted article of the new constitution they are engaged in drafting one which defined the territories of the Indonesian state as follows: (72) The territory of the state of Indonesia as proclaimed on August 17, 1945, comprises the whole of the former Netherlands East Indies according to the status at the time of the outbreak of the Pacific War on December 7, 1941. (70)Quoted in West Irian Liberation Campaign, 4 (Ministry of InformaTion, Republic of Indonesia, n.d.), p. 3. (71)Antara News Bulletin (New York), November 12, 1957. (72)Antara News Bulletin (New York), November 12, 1957.

The pre-UN discussions phase of the Irian campaign in Indonesia culminated on November 18, 1957, in a gigantic mass rally in Djakarta, addressed by both President Sukarno and former Vice President Hatta. The President urged national unity as the key to victory while Dr. Hatta significantly stressed that, whatever other differences of opinion there might be on various issues, "there is, however, a consensus of opinion as regards one question, i.e., West Irian must return to the fold of the Republic of Indonesia." As one report summarized the gist of Hatta’s speech: (73) He quoted Article 3 of the Linggadjati Agreement which said that the United States of Indonesia which was then to be formed would comprise the entire territory of the Netherlands Indies, with the proviso that "should the inhabitants of a certain area express their wish by democratic means that they did not, or did not yet, wish to form part of the United States of Indonesia, special provisions should be made for that area concerning its relations with the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands.” Hatta argued that "because of the negligence on the part of the Dutch to educate them, up to now the inhabitants of West Irian are not yet able to determine their own fate. As they have not yet expressed their wish to leave the Indonesian fold, West Irian became part of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia under Article 3 of the Linggadjati Agreement." Western press comment preponderantly viewed the whole of this Irian Liberation campaign as a conveniently stage-managed affair intended to distract public attention from internal problems. Almost completely ignored were such sober evaluations of the real meaning of the Irian agitation as that given by a prominent Australian correspondent who, writing shortly after the November 18 mass meeting, observed: (74) It is generally assumed in.Australia that the Indonesian Government has turned on its Dutch New Guinea campaign like a tap to divert attention from its own appalling internal problems.

173) West Irian Liberation Campaign, 4, p. 29. (74) Denis Warner in the Melbourne Herald, November 26, 1957.

Of all, the current misundein 1. ngs about Dutch NvW Guinea, none is mori 'Misleading or dangerous. Its a nice plausible explanation but it just doesn't happen to be true. From the very first day of Indonesian independence in December, 1949, Indonesia has been shouting for Irian as Dutch
New Guinea is known there....
Maybe the issue has snowballed a little in size, but it was serious three years ago and it is serious
to-day--not just a political expedient....
We may bitterly disapprove of what Indonesia is doing. We may doubt the legality of her claim. But we’re kidding no one but ourselves if we persist in the argument that it's all merely a matter of crying wolf abroad to cover up the fact that the fox is eating the chickens at home. In what was obviously designed as a strategic move prior to the Irian discussions in the UN, the Netherlands and Australian Governments issued a joint policy statement on New Guinea on November 6, 1957. Its gist was this; (75) The territories of Netherlands New Guinea, the Australian trust territory of New Guinea, and Papua are geographically and ethnologically related and the future development of their respective populations must benefit from co-operation in policy and administrations. The Australian and Netherlands Governments are therefore pursuing, and will continue to pursue, policies directed towards the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the peoples in their territories in a manner which recognizes this ethnological and geographical affinity. At, the same time, the two Governments will continue, and strengthen, the co-operation at present existing between their respective administrations in the territories. While the statement was no more than an affirmation of the policy which the two governments had followed since 1953, it was evidently intended to leave no doubt that the Netherlands position on the Irian question would remain unchanged for the indefinite future. (75) Memorandum on Netherlands New Guinea, The Netherlands "information Service, Volume 2. November 1957.

Commenting on the Dutch-Australian statement, former Prime Minister Sastroamidjojo, now Indonesian delegate to the UN, observed: (76) The Indonesian delegation deeply regrets that such a statement has been issued, particularly since the question of West Irian has been placed on the agenda of this session of the assembly by 21 state members with the purpose of trying to achieve a peaceful solution in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. This move by the Governments of the Netherlands and Australia prior to the discussions of this question by the General Assembly must be regarded as an action tantamount to undermining these efforts by state members of the United Nations. In the writer's opinion, the statement by the Netherlands and Australian governments seems to indicate that their long-range plans envisage nothing less than the ersatz creation of a technically autonomous Papuan client state which, perhaps, as had been suggested several years earlier by a distinguished Dutch authority on colonial problems, (77) might be intended to form part of a future Melanesian Southwest Pacific Federation. (78) The obvious eagerness of the

176) West Irian Liberation Campaign, 4, p. 16. (77)See the article by Prof. F. M., Baron van Asbeck, entitled, "Waarheen Nieuw-Guinea?" in Wending, Maandblad voor Evangelie en Cultuur ("The Turning, monthly for Evangel- ism and Culture"), (Juli/Augustus 1956), Jaargang 11, Nummer 5/6, pp. 265-275. (78)Antara (N.Y. edition) reported on February 10, 1958, a speech by an Australian expert on Pacific affairs urging the inclusion of the whole of New Guinea in a future Federation of Melanesia within the British Commonwealth. Indonesian spokesmen have repeatedly pointed out over the years that the two halves of the island have nothing in common since West Irian’s orientation has always been towards the Indonesian archipelago while East New Guinea’s orientation, such a^ it has been, is Pacificward. On this, Dr. Hatta comments in a recent article, "The fear that Indonesia after obtaining West Irian would claim East New Guinea is totally unfounded. The Indonesian people do not feel any links of a common lot or history with the people of that area; hence their national claim, historical and juridical in nature, does not extend so far." Mohammed Hatta, "Indonesia Between the Power Blocs," Foreign Affairs (April, 1958), XXXVI, No. 3, p. 487.

Dutch to find a way for wrenching Western New Guinea from its traditional political and economic patterns was clear indication of the objectivity with which they viewed the much-publicized right of eventual allegedly free and un- trammeled self-determination. The results of the Twelfth Assembly’s consideration of "The question of West Irian (West New Guinea)" were a foregone conclusion, Yet again Indonesia secured substantial majority support from the delegations of forty nations, representing 1,130,000,000 people. But also yet again, the colonial powers and their supporters were able to prevent the achievement of the necessary two-thirds majority. (79) In his final statement, Indonesian Foreign Minister Subandrio told the delegates: (80) As I said in my earlier statement (700th meeting), the implications of this dispute are not merely the maintenance of the Netherlands rule in West Irian or the reunification of that territory under the Indonesian administration. Indeed that was the starting point of the dispute, which during the years has resulted in growing tension between Indonesia and the Netherlands in particular, and which has had its repercussions on the complex problem of present international relations in general. Nobody would deny that if we were to allow the present problem to remain unsolved, the implications might be very grave indeed. T79j Indonesia (as usual) had won the vote in the First Committee without difficulty, 42 to 28 with 11 abstentions only (as usual) to fail in achieving the 2/3 majority in the plenary session on November 29, 1957. However, supporting Indonesia, if Communist China be included, are the governments of 2/3 of the human race. For the official account of the discussions in the Twelfth Assembly, see for the First Committee discussions (November 20 thru 25) GA-Twelfth-First-A/C.l/SR 905-912 inclusive and for the plenary meeting of the General Assembly—GA-Twelfth-A/PV.724, Friday, 29 November 1957. The 1957 resolution (GA — Twelfth-A/3757) differed from that of 1.956 in-dropping the idea of a Good Offices Committee and instead asking the Secretary-General to assist in mediation. (80) GA-Twelfth-A/PV.724, p. 548.

Up to now we have done our utmost to conduct our policy in such a way as to discourage any action which might lead to disturbances in the territory under dispute, West Irian and its sur- roundings; but to maintain this policy would be an almost impossible task for any Indonesian Govern-
ment now....from the point of view of the outside
world, no international problem and certainly not such a grave dispute as that between Indonesia and the Netherlands can be isolated. In one way or another, this dispute is likely to become an issue in the overall struggle of international power politics. It is for this reason that Indonesia regards the West Irian problem as more acute than ever, and it is for this reason again that Indonesia is trying to solve the problem as soon as possible, or at least to reduce the tension between the Netherlands and Indonesia by a discussion of the West Irian problem and othermatters affecting both countries. We thought that this was a positive contribution towards the slackening of international tension. ...West Irian is a vital problem for Indonesia, which might affect the basic development of our national life and policies. In this affair our basic attitude has been and will never be affected, as is the case with the Netherlands, which has in fact no real interest in West Irian whether for economic or for security reasons. Shortly after leaving New York, Dr, Subandrio told the press that Indonesia, for its part, had brought the Irian issue to the UN for the last time. It was now, he said, up to the Dutch to initiate any further negotiations; although Indonesia was still prepared to seek a way of peaceful settlement, it could no longer take the initiative. (81) Both public and official reaction in Indonesia to this final UN rebuff was sharp and immediate. On December 2 a twenty-four hour general strike against all Dutch enterprises was launched and youth groups, labor unions and veterans' organizations, often egged on by the Communists, made unauthor- ized seizures of Dutch business firms. This phase was, however, quickly brought to an end by the Army, and the Government then proceeded to the implementation of long-held plans for the nationalization of Dutch enterprises. Other (81) Antara (New York), December 10, 1957.

measures taken included the banning of KI^M, the Dutch commercial airline, from Indonesia, the prbhibition of Dutch publications and news media and measures to facilitate the departure from Indonesia of the unemployed and superflous sections of the Dutch population» Although, under official Netherlands urging, this quickly became virtually a mass exodus such, as Prime Minister Djuanda pointed out in a mid-December press interview, had not at all been the Government's intention. (82) And in the course of making an official statement on Indonesian-Dutch relations before the House of Representatives on December 21, Foreign Minister Subandrio commented: (83) The Government has never issued any statement about the mass evacuation or mass-hostages of the 50,000 Dutch citizens living in Indonesia, as has been sensationally reported in the Dutch press and in other foreign papers. The Government has indeed been guided by its desire to facilitate the departure of all Dutch citizen who have no employment in Indonesia (and this category amounts to about 9000 persons) and those who wish to return to the Netherlands, plus those Dutch citizens who are not regarded as necessary any longer for the continuation of their jobs in Indonesia. However, what are the present facts? The Dutch Government itself is apparently advising all its citizens who are engaged in important jobs in Indonesia, be it in the technical, industrial or any other field, to leave Indonesia immediately. Perhaps the Netherlands Government hopes in this way that the Indonesian Government an experts....
Mr. Chairman, if now the Dutch are not able to continue their work in Indonesia, or if they feel their interests threatened, it is not at all because the Government or the people of Indonesia are playing with the fate of Dutch citizens living in Indonesia, nor are they playing with Dutch interests (82) Bagian Penerangan, Kementerian Luar Negeri, N. 3597 B., tg. 18 desember' (83) Normalization or Liquidation-Government Statement before the Parliament, December 21, 1957, on the Indonesian Dutch Relation, delivered by Foreign Minister Subandrio (Djakarta, n„d.), pp. 27-28.

in Indonesia. The present happenings in Indonesia are solely the result of the attitude of the Dutch Government alone, which since 1950, for seven years, has staked the interests of the Netherlands in Indonesia, and has gambled with the fate of 50,000 Dutch citizens in Indonesia/ (Underlining added) With very few exceptions the Western press showed little understanding of developments in Indonesia during the month of December, nor of the long chain of events which had led to them. Nor were their scare headlines implying the virtually imminent massacre of the entire 40,000-odd Dutch residents ever subsequently corrected by giving equal prominence to accounts pointing out that no violence had been done individual Dutch citizens in spite of the bitterness against the official policy of their government. As Prime Minister Djuanda commented to the House of Representatives in January, 1958" (84) The reactions from the whole Western press during the first and second weeks /of the anti-Dutch actions/ can be said on the whole To have been violenTly hostile to the steps taken by the Indonesian Government and in sensational fashion it was predicted that Indonesia will collapse after the Dutch, leave Indonesia, or at least that the K.P.M. /the Dutch inter-island shipping company/ and Dutch enterprises will not continue theTr activities any longer. Only just a few newspapers that understand Asian difficulties are able to approve of the steps which the Indonesian Government has taken, aimed at the consolidation of our national economy. In contrast to the Western attitude, news accounts in the Asian press were carried under such headlines as "Indonesia Hits Back" and "West’s Own Responsibility." (85) At the end of 1957 Indonesia’s attitude towards the United States was one of increasingly cool appraisal. (85) Disappointment there had been in the past over the fact that the United States with its anti-colonial heritage yet stood T84) Keterangan Pemerlntah tentang Perdjoangan Irian Barat, Kiuptjapkan oleh Perdana Menteri 27 Januari 1958, Kementerian Penerangan (Djakarta, 1958), p. 3. (85) The Hindu, December 4, 1957; The Hindusthan Standard, December 4, 1957.—

aloof on the Irian issue in the United Nations. But of more recent date had been the virtually unanimous hostility of the American press which gave what Indonesians felt was a highly distorted picture of events. In early December, 1957, for example, the New York Times featured a curiously blundering United States Information Service news release which sought to tie in the anti-Dutch campaign in Indonesia as of December, 1957, with a pamphlet written in 1955 by Indonesian Communist Party General Secretary Aidit. For this inept and pointless slur the State Department found itself obliged to make official apology early in 1958. Also in December, 1957, came an abortive and mishandled U.S. proposal for mediation between Indonesia and the Netherlands, Nor was the situation bettered during the last half of 1957 by an obviously deliber- ate American delay in answering Indonesian requests to purchase small arms. (87) In January, 1958, a personally popular American ambassador who had been in Djakarta slightly over a year was transferred. Both Indonesian and American observers saw this as indication of a growing estragement. Commented the Washington Post on January 22, 1958; (86) The English-language Times of Indonesia (Djakarta^. opined, for example, on February 17, 1958, ’!Our relations with’the United States are at an all-time low, largely because the American pseudo-neutrality policy towards West Irian tends in practice to favor the Dutch at our expense." (87) In April, 1958, Foreign Minister Subandrio was quoted (Antara, April 10) as denying that the arms purchase in any way, shape or form had any relation to the Irian dispute. He pointed out that the request had then been pending for almost a year-long before the Irian issue had become acute. A few days prior to Subandrio’s statement, Secretary Dulles had said that the U.S. was concerned lest the arms be used by Indonesia in an effort to gain by force what it had fhiled to get through the UN. Mr. Dulles was apparently quite unaware of the fact that, even at the height of Indonesian anger over the final UN failure, Foreign Minister Subandrio had told the House of Representatives (December 21, 1957), "I would like to reiterate, Mr. Chairman, that the Government has not closed the door upon negotiations with the Dutch in solving the West Irian question.” Normalization or Liquidation, p. 29.

We hope that the shift in Djakarta and the re- placement of Mr. Allison by Deputy Assistant Secretary Howard P. Jones does not mean what it appears to mean—that the United States has decided
that the situation in Indonesia is beyond repair....
Some time ago this newspaper advocated that the United States back the Netherlands in the New Guinea dispute. We have modified our stand on the basis of more information... It will do the free world little service if New Guinea is saved while Java
is engulfed by communism.... if the stiff-necked
opposition in The Hague could be overcome, it still would be worth trying a new initiative that would aim at renewing negotiations and at the same time safe-guard the defense interest in New Guinea. Although there had been no official change in American policy on the Irian issue, the granting of the long-deferred request for arms purchase in mid-August, 1958, apparently indicated that American officials had decided that Indonesia would survive its internal difficulties and that it was necessary for the United States, which had given not so covert moral support to the Sumatran rebels, apparently on the automatic reflex basis of their alleged anti-communism, to begin the mending of much-neglected fences. (88) Commenting on the effect of the Irian issue on Indonesian American relations and American incomprehension of its influence in strengthdning precisely those internal Indonesian forces which the United States most feared, Dr. Mohammed Hatta wrote in the April, 1958, issue of the influential American quarterly, Foreign Affairs: (89)

188) In particular Indonesian opinion had resented a press conference of Mr. Dulles' in February, 1,958, shortly after the outbreak of the Sumatran revolt. In the course of the conference, Mr. Dulles permitted himself to express a somewhat patronising concern over the ob- servance of constitutional and, democratic procedures in Indonesia’s internal affairs although, as Antara pointed out, he had never found it necessary to voice similar sentiments in connection with such seemingly far more likely objects for concern as Formosa, South Korea or the Dominican Republic. (89) "Indonesia Between the Power Blocs," op. cit., pp. 486-
487.--------

The United States stand of neutrality m the feud between Indonesia, and. the Netherlands over West Irian does, in fact, give support to the Dutch,, Because of it and its adoption by various other states, Indonesia’s suggestion in the General Assembly of the United Nations for the opening of discussions with, the Netherlands regarding West Irian was never able to muster the necessary two-thirds vote and failed to pass. It has been rejected three times with the result that relations between Indonesia and the Netherlands are extremely bad„ Indonesia cannot understand why the United States should assume such a half-hearted posture in this matter. The "nj.tpd. States has been the moving forrp ?n sp’t ;'-·<> up NATO and SEATO to-halt the spread of Communist influence and power in 'Europe and in Asia., yet to permit West Irian to continue indefinitely as a bone of contention between Indonesia and the Netherlands is to afford Communism an opportunity to spread in Indonesia,, The claim to West Irian is a national claim backed by every Indonesian party without exception; but the most demanding voice, apart from President Soekarno himself, is that of the Communist Party of Indonesia, By putting itself in the vanguard of those demanding realization of this national ideal... the Communist Party of Indonesia is able to capture the imagination of an ever-growing section of the population.,, The West Irian question, thus represents a tragedy. The United States, the Netherlands and Australia, all equally afraid of the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia, are carrying out a policy which, in fact, strengthens Communism. For, so long as West Irian is in Dutch hands, that longer will the Communist Party of Indonesia be able to carry on a violent agitation, using nationalism as an excuse to oppose colonialism, and thereby touch the soul of the newly-emancipated Indonesian people whose memories are still fresh with the struggle for freedom against colonialism. In the Irian problem generally the first eight months of 1958 have seen a continuation of embittered stalemate. Such news as there has been, has had a curiously repetitious air about it. In January, for example, the Netherlands-Indonesian Association ’’announced an appeal by leading Dutch citizens for talks with the Indonesian Government which will

go to the root of all current problems, including West Irian,..." (90) The end of that same month saw the New York Times correspondent in The Hague (Walter H. Waggoner) writing that there were now second thoughts in the Netherlands on the wisdom of"the Government’s policy on the Irian dispute, while the independent Labor daily, Het Parool, came out for transfer to Australia and Dr.~In’t-Veld, Labor Party Chairman in the First (Upper) Chamber of Parliament unsuccessfully urged exploration of the possibility of new talks about West Irian. But such developments as these were more than counter-balanced by official statements to the effect that the Government did not feel it "realistic" to set any date for the completion of its development task in New Guinea and the reassurance given the First Chamber of Parliament by Foreign Minister Luns that, "as the Government has already repeatedly stated," the members could rest assured that "any discussion with Indonesia about New Guinea is out of the question." (91) In July, 1958, a study commission of the Dutch Labor Party issued a report on the West Irian problem which declared that sovereignty could be transferred only "if constructive powers in Indonesia get the upper hand." The report accepted the Indonesian desire for political unity from Sabang (the small island off the tip of North Sumatra) to Merauke (bprder post of Southwest New Guinea) as a force which existed and constituted a significant factor which would have to be coped with. It was suggested, without specifying, that since the Irian problem had become a difficult one both in international and domestic politics for. the Netherlands, some way f^hould be found to make it an international rather than a purely Dutch problem. (92) And as the anniversary of Indonesia’s independence ap- proached in (mid-August, it was clear that, simultaneously with the overcoming of its internal difficulties, Indonesia would continue to push the struggle for West Irian. President Sukarno, in two speeches during the month of August, (93) stated that since seven years of negotiations had failed, (90)Information on Indonesia, Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, Bui. No 4, 21 January 1958. (91)Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant (weekly overseas edition), January 12, 1958; May 6, Γ958. (92)Information on Indonesia, Bulletin No. 54, 18 July 1958.

Indonesia was now "forced to find another firm course" and urged his countrymen to consolidate the "national strength" for the struggle of the coming years. In Djakarta, on August 19, the Foreign Ministry announced that Indonesia would not seek to place "The question of West Irian (West New Guinea)" on the agenda of the thirteenth General Assembly since it was clear, both because of the "Dutch attitude" and "UN administrative procedures," that the United Nations could not as yet solve colonial issues. (94) That another phase had come to an end in the long struggle for West Irian was thus officially confirmed. What would be the shape of future developments remained as yet unclear. It seemed not improbable that the Indonesian course for the immediate future would be to continue and intensify its campaign on the international level--but outside the United Nations. There was no question, however, that as of September, 1958, the West Irian problem remained in the very eye of the storm in a state of embittered stalemate. (93)Antara (New York), August 18, 1958. The speeches in question were delivered on August 15 on the occasion of the installation of new officials of the West Irian Liberation Front and on August 17, Indonesian Independence Day. (94)The New York Times, August 20, 1958.

ΤΗ* MOLUCCAN ARCHIPELAGO, showing the dates of the initiation of the actual exercise of Dutch authority in West Irian and on various other islands as given by the Atlas van Tropisch Nederland, 1938 (see Note No. ^3, Chapter V .) International boundaries are shown thus:- Note how far west in the archipelago the "watersheds" of geographical, floral and faunal division take place. Scale: 1:1,000,000 SUMBA 167

APPENDIX NO0 2 VOTING RESULTS BY BLOCS IN THE UN GENERAL ASSEMBLY ON "THE QUESTION OF WEST IRIAN (WEST NEW GUINEA)" (PRO indicates support of the Indonesian position) ω oo Bloc Afro-Asian Country Afghanistan Burma Cambodia Ceylon China Egypt Ethiopia Ghana India Indonesia Iran Iraq Japan Jordan Laos* Lebanon Liberia Libya Malaya Morocco Nepal Pakistan Philippines Saudi Arabia Sudan Syria Thailand Tunisia Yemen 9th Session-1954 Pro Anti Abstain x~~ x x x x x x x x x x x x x x 11th Session-1956 Pro Anti Abstain x~· x x x x x x x X X X X X 12th Session-1957 Pro Anti Abstain

9th Session-1954 11th Session-1956 12th Session-1957 BlocCountryProAnti AbstainPro AntiAbstainProAntiAbstainNotes

W. BuropeAustraliaXXX & ColonialAustriaXXAdmitted 1955 BelgiumXXX CanadaXXX DenmarkXXX Finland-XXAdmitted 1955 FranceXXX
G. BritainXXX GreeceXXX IcelandXXX Ireland—XXAdmitted 1955 Italy-XXAdmitted 1955 LuxembourgXXX NetherlandsXXX New ZealandXXX NorwayXXX Portugal-XXAdmitted 1955 South AfricaXXX 4pain—XXAdmitted 1955 SwedenXXX 1T31 1721T81 Soviet.AlbaniaXXAdmitted 1955 Bulgaria—XXAdmitted 1955 ByelorussiaXXX CzechoslovakiaXXX Hungary—-XAdmitted 1955 PolandXXX Romania—XXAdmitted 1955 UkraineXXX
U.S.S.R.XXX 8-g- 169

Bloc Latin American Country Argentina Bolivia Brazil Chile Colombia Costa Rica Cuba Dominican Rep El Salvador Ecuador Guatemala Haiti Honduras Mexico Panama Paraguay Peru Nicaragua Urugray Venezuela 9th Session-195411th Session-195612th Session-1957Notes Pro Anti AbstainPro Anti AbstainPro Anti Abstain XXX XXXXXX XXX X-(1)-X(1) No record XXXof vote. XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXX XXXXXX XXX XXXXXX XXX XXX XXX TCT*θ756 <1 o Others Israel Turkey

U.S.A. Yugoslavia RECAPITULATION BY BLOCS: Afro-Asian161—24122512
W. Europe & Colonial113—11721181 Soviet5——8——9—— Latin American1073667596 Others121112112 33“23"'4'4ϋ2513412911