Baca PDF (OCR): A Dictatorship Self-Destructs Sucession Crisis in Indonesia

SUCCESON CRISIS IN INDONESIA A DICTATORSHIP SELF-DESTRUCTS

SUCCESSION CRISIS IN INDONESIA

Issue No. 63 July-August 1978

About This Issue ........................................... 1 Last Days of Indonesia's Suharto? ............................. 2

Popular Culture Goes Political .............................. 18 1978 Student White Book ................................... 20

, Why Fre tilin Keeps On Fighting in E. Timor ..................-24

Riches of the East: US Interests In Indonesia ..................-26

Specill Prr>ductinn Arqistnncr fmm: Typtsct ant1 Atrlietypc (Typc+crrinp) and Inkwtrrk% Il'r~nrin~)

Ihks to Rafic Wi Center for thdt help in photo research.

hd thanks also to fmlm photographer R'utdy ty-t for donating his photm

Cover Photo: Stuhnt demomtratots face polim In Djakarta in early January 1078. t Tenrpn magazine)

Resource Center, formerly the Asia. Many of these materials are not normally available

Indochina Resource Center, is a major non-governmental in local outlets, and they include government studies,

source of information on cursen t develnpmen ts in the coun-foreign publications and unpublished academic r-carch, tries of Southeast Asia, and on the U.S. involvement there, as well as many out-ot-print works on the Indochina war. The Center follows and interprets events in the new socic-The Center offers a unique collection of hooks tor children ties d Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia), and and high school students, and also poetry and prosc by also covers Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. We Thais, Vietnamese and Vietnam-era veterans. A free cata- continue in the tradition of the Indochina Resource Center, lo~ue is available on request. which played a crucial role as one of the key sources of ac-The SRC Collective is: Candace Falk, hwell Finl~y, curate information for the anti-war movement's successful Glenn Hirsch. loel Rocarnora, and Mart ha Winnacker effort ta cut U.S. aid to theThieu regime. The Chronicle is published six times a year. Subscriptions As a service to our readership, the Southeast Asia Re-are: 88 regular; % low-income: 92 institutions; 510 foreign source Center maintains a mail-order service specializing in surface-mail: $15 foreign airmail : 520 sustaining. AI! con- books, articles and audio-visual materials rrn Scltrthcast tributions to the Center are tax-exempt.

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This Issue

n this issue of the *Snrrtl~m.;t ..lSuhattn out of office heforc the end of the Essr Timorcse have heen aide tn carry rllrnrlicfr we evarnine recenr dcvel-hit: crlrrenl fivc-year rum. **Yet rvirhol~t 3 on tt)rir** fight for so long against an rlpmentz in Ir~doncsin, the fifrh well-orgnn~rcd democratic ar lcfr **mouc-overwhelrn~nglv supcrlor militanforce. lar ,rst cr~untc In ~hc ~vorlcl and a major menr, it ts I~kcly !hat Suharto's .;ucccsfclr F~nallv, I,rnny Siegcl, dircrtor or rhe

U.S. ally in Snuthcast Asla. AS qerlou? wilt Ilr another rni11mry stmnpan. l':~cifrc Shldicq Center, provides I h~stow opposition to Pres~ilcnr Suharrtr has Suliarto's weaknew artscs from tiis of IJ.S. rnrcrcsts in Indonesia during thc surfaccd dirnng the part yrnr. many gn*crnrncnr*s inab111ry ro dclivcr on irs twenricch ccntun. Sic~el clcscrihcs eco- casust ohsrrvcrs of Indoncsin have **won-**promises $5 wefl 3s from a dcvclopmr.nt nomlc and rnilicart. cnns~dcmtians and dered not why there ic dissrnt. hut why it stratcgs which is creating increasing the caving approaches ,\mcrican policy has taltcn ro long ro rlwelop. In his poiucrry among I~rgt scctnrs of Inrlo-makers have cmplnytd to enrurr. U.S. artidc. Hen Anderson, a Cornchll LTniiocr-nes~n's popula rwn. f4nwevrr, IF d~ffi-access rtl Indonr-~ia. Staff frnni the Pacific sity lndunccta specialist and nnc of the cultics havc bccn increa~ed IEV the Srudies Centcr, :I crtnlnlunity rcscarch
U.S.' lend~ny aurtinritlcs an that country, cont~nlring wu.;lr in Ga~t Timur, where anti ~nfumarion cenrcr born out ot thc an:llyres the nnture of the coalition which Indnnflian rroops are hoged down In a anti-war nrovcnlunt, have dcrrorccl mucfl has wpportcd the Suhartn government. no-win ';ituation. Now In ~ts third year. of the P~ST rhrcc yean TO research on tlr also explains the aticnation of kt? the war is cnu~ing prolnund dirconrrnt Inrlonesia and U.S. invnlvcrnrnts there. In rlemrnrs of rhat coalitton nvcr the past among thc peaqan ts ~vhosc snns. llrothcrs atldition, Sicgel Iim wrlrtcn frcgucnrl!~ nn tlrcadc. In 3 pattcrn charnctert~tic nf anti t~urband~ arc dyrnp gn an %pparCnrlv U.S. m~litar? and rconnrnic cnnccrns In dfctntr~rship~ in orhcr rtllrntrie< .~q well, FuriIe attempt ro conquer hall an island at thc Pacific. PSC: wrtrkerl cic~seIy with thc
.-2ndcrsan hclirvcs the contraditrions nne end uC the Iridoneqian archipel:~gi.rl. In Sr~uthcalit Asia Reqnurcc Center in pre- spawncrl by his own politic\ will force this issue, wc Zonk at some of rlw rcasons paring rhiq issuc of rhc (7lrrotlirlr 10

Issue No. 63 I

opponents of the political status quo are the same social groups which supported the New Order

at its inception.

Cummumist Party (PKT), which had been rapidly rrowing in

CRSONinfluence under the protection of the then Prcs~tlenc Sul~amo.

The most important clernenn in it were the f~llowin~, each with of rhis y .enr, the I ndanesian government in irs own reasons for anti-communist animus : (1) The bllfk of the O"( srrokr ci Ir~sed. do wn two-thirds of the senior offices of the Indonesian army; (2) The dpvout Xsfamic tncl prcss i~ 1 Jn karta, arrested hundreds of community, both urban and rural; (3) Protestanr and CsthoIic 51 udr n t lc,,, .,,, ,la,ri suspenl,,, " ,,,=II ,.Ielected Student Councils minorities; (4) A small indigenous entrcpreneurial, profesriond througlio~~t the crlu ;cl,ru:iy and hlarch, a number of and bureaucratic middk clnss; (5)-A Westernized inrelligennia, the nation's most p u~inlpusm were put under direct partly professional, partly academic, and partly artistic. military occupation : placrs, sn~dents were assa~~lted Of these elements, far the mwt important was the lcadeship with bayonets, and in others,universfty buildings were attacked of the Indonesian army. As age and ill health made it clear rhat with panzers. During the same period, somc nf Indonesia's most Sukarno's days were numbered, Indonesians came to expect a prornlnent intellectuals werc placed in detention. strn~lc that would pit the army generals against the The immediate occa5ion for the series of repressions-the comrnunists in a battle for control of the state. Although the most severe in a decade-was an eccalating movement of army had originated aq an extrcrnety heterogeneous guerrilla opposition to the scheduled reelection of Preqidena. Suharto to force during thc national revolution against ~btch colonialism another five-year term. The ~I~CFO~ body, the People's (194549), by the mid-1960%. ix had become a coherent and Consultative Assernbfy, includes 60 percent government **ap-**powcrfu'ul opponent af President Sukarno and his left-wing pointees. Beyond the government's concern for the smoothness supporters. -The proceqs of development from decentralizei of the efeetion-which toolc place as scheduled in March-wits a guerrilla units to unified military-political force had included deepseated alarm at the strength and character of the purps of left-wlng, devoutly Islamic and Outer-Island elerncnts opposition. For rhe movement indicated that the coatition as well as the centralizing and homogenizing impact of training, wh~ch has kept Suhnrto in power since 1966 is breaking up. equipment and organizaticln by the United Stateq. ' Today's nppnnenrs of the political status quo are not The army leadership hated the PKI for three fundnmcntal descendenrs of S~tharto's foes in 1965-66. They are instead the reasons. First, there was sheer instlcutional rivalry: the generzls same sociat groups which supported the New Order at its intended to he mashers of indonesin once the chariqrnatic inception. Through 12 years of military rule, they have Sukasno passed from the scene, and only the PKI was gradually los~ faith in the goilernment as irs policies have created sufficiently organ~zed, diqchplined, and popular to pose a real new versions of thr problems thar alienated them from the "old threat to that goal. Second, the army I?ad become deeply order." IIencc, in order to undewtand what is happening today, dependenr on the United Srates in almost even, aspect of its and ro puge the future, it is imporrant to consider the nature of existence; in 1965 it could not even manufacture ia o\vn rifles. the co:alition that 1,rought Suharto to power in 1965-66 and the The PKl's stronglv--anti-American poficv threatened to cut the kind of legitimacy the New Order originally claimed. annv's organizational, technoiogical and ideological life-line. 'She coalition rhat united behind General Suharto, then Third. the generals had heen rhe main beneficiaries of the Commander of the Army's Strategic Re5erve, after he 1957-58 natnonalizatlon of the vast array of Dutch corporate suppressed chc so-called 'Youp" of October 1, 1955, war, highly holdings in Indonain, for as state enterprises, the corporations diverse, united only in irs fear and hatred of the Indonerian had heen placed under the control of senior **army-**officers,

SOUTHEAST ASlA CHRONICLE

Toclap, only

12OJo of the land is cultivated.

Fifty-eight per

cent of the coun-

try's 135.2 million

people are under 21

years old. There are

five doctors per

a

100,000 people, and

I the average iife expectancy

i .= .-- - - -

is 38 ppars. 62% of Indonesia's people

work in agriculture, 11% in cammcrce, and

to the 1

8% in mining & manufacturing. Indonesia

exports no manufactured gods, and under

1 Suhartolr regime, has herome the wrorld's No.1 rice importer United stat@ I

NDONE I w, 2

SOC"TI-lErZCT ASIA CfIHONICI.1.:

and print P f~cr rhn r rhe pre-m colonial sl :ate% in Ja va, 2nd had a.r much to do with hc aritity to the style and aims of the rhc crllln .-t:i~ic ~ris rocracy tl at J~enrrtI Durcl? Sukarno re~ime as anything clsc. 17nl r rcnsons roo corn1 )!ex to cnloi~~alrs .rc d1)): s 1~11 "stnt iqtical" rl~scus.; here, thc regime of I; uidcd Dei nocrxcy, 7 while arlvt :rtking. ". ... .. .,.. itself ac "rrvoli~r~onary," "?elf-rel~nnt. ' "narlnnalirt," and Indor~cs~; :n~ent of rndcpand cncc in I 949 ~ppcnrcd to "liberating," was any of rhe~e only to a very l~rnired extent. prcmisc I s for Islan 1. Ihii il~r sr were (la trhrd tirst by the Sukarno's personal style W~S decidedly "feudal," and the politic~l y and f wpulnrit> or SuL ,irno, a clas~ic atmosphere in the presidential palace was more reminiscent of "sr:itlst~cal" Muslii e rapid ricr of rhe PKl, s pre-colonial royal courts than anything else. Sultarni>'s cabinet5 p:trt>. riot onl? ): ~phy of matrrialism, hat wrrc full of people with aristocratic background? and manners. rlr,in~tlg 11s popul vlrnlngly from '%rarist~cal While Sukarno attacked "colonial-minded," "lcglistic" thinking Mils1 ims " ~'1ll.n ~0111c ,1Iu'r11111 1~'ddCrs wcre drawn into rhe in the name of "revolurionary law," in practice rh~r amountecl "regional IC I~tc 185M, Snkarno, with PKI largely to bureaucratic arbitrariness, adrninistrat~ve confusion, SLI pport. lo hn one of the major Muslim and corruption-and great day-to-day uncertainty alwut the p~rtics "3 f mutl~ of its political freedom of latest whims of the repme. ~lthoupli out Xluclim community '%atiunal selPrrliance" w2s also perceived by many as a rccogr~i/~ IC army IL .c predornina ntly "statisti-self-serving fraud, because it perrn~ttcd opportunist bureaucratic cnl Musli hail goo to feel that the overthrow cxactioas on independent businessmen and led to catastrophic nt Sukar,,., .,..-. ,.lc dcstruc.r~c)n of the I'KI would at last make inflation (600 percent in the last year of S~ikxrno's rule). While CII i~al tlol ini.al ~11d 11101:11 force in Indoneqian ~ociery. Sukarno rcpratrdly rrumpcred the slogan of national economic ou5 icic:~lisn~ was h! ncr n~cnrrs the onlv f;ictor attaching independence, American Interets continued to dominate ~d cspccizll!. Islan~~c 1c:ldcr~-to Suharto's coal~tlon. indoneqia's crucial forcign cxchang-earning oil indr~stry. I -I'i-:iditk<>r nic Icadcr shrp has i ~ome from two prominent I 965 thc government had accumulated over twa billion dollars social gr Ivng-:-sr:u1 d111g urh: an, indigenous (it, non-in extcrnal debts, mainly to the Soviet Union. If Sukarno (:hin~.sr) rJr rncrcI1.1 tnr clas5.. dnd n~ral retigious scholars continuousiy heaped scorn on lawyers and economists for ,,, -r~r~rl tmn (I~I~(IH~~) 2nd pilgrims rctilr ..--.. ,,.,i Mecca (hi+), many of "bourgeois" atritudcs, these profcr~iond elements were pro-whom .~r c si~nblc. ! Innti-amncrs. {Only thr well-off can afford the foundly repelled by what thcy saw as his trampling on legal rxpcnsn t r trip ro hlcccn an~f hach.) The policies of Sukarno's dcccncies and economic ratirrnalip. Finally, Sukamok attempts I;u~tlr.tl T )cnr<,cr;~c!, ( 1053-65) srriously thrcatencd the pofitions to impose a shallow, would-hc "revolutionary" cultural policy ~rist orie ntation and its (by censonhip, in timidation, and selective suhsidic~), in part to

-of "cllc~ ltslnessrne 'R who depended compensate for lack of wrious progrrse, in other fields, offended ~c;~ll~-dc.r~ SII bsidies, and so forth) and frightened a s~gnificant proportion of Indonmia's arriqtl;,
squewcd thc ~nt~cpcnricr~t Mtrrl~rn entrepreneur4 to thc marsin. journalisrs, ncademics, and other cfcmcnts of the intelligentsia. At the fame tlmc, the rcgirnc's policicr on land reform and rent In joining Subarto's coalirion, all these groups, in cltfferent rqualizarinn tl~rcatrncti the rirral arccndancy of ~dIn?~a and baji wavs and with different emphases, expected that the New Order It WRS eaqy to tusc reli~rot~s and economic grievances and to would bring about a rcstoraticw of the rule of law, OF economic read into cnt pnlici~ r~, strnngly hacked by the PKI, not rationality, of intellectual an tl artistic freedom, and an end to soclal re1 anothrr savage attack on Idam. Suharto's corruption and the mortgs~ing of thc cc>untry's future by the ascendan1 1 to prorr lise not only the ~nd of land rrform, irresponsihle acct~mufatroii of extcmnl del~ts. -, but also a new chance for inciigeno~~s snpit a I' rsm. One t~nal "prornisc" of 1969 need< to be mentioned, because Indonesia's Christian rnin{rrit~cs, nn rhc other hand, opposed it appealed to almoqt at1 the group5 that have been discusqed so Sukarno and the Ipft more fur sr>c~al and economic than far. There was a widespread feeling that Sukarnr~'~ foreign religious re;! sons. Long favoretl Iy rllc Dutch cotonla4 rcglme, policy, in particular hi.; attempts to break up the Malaysian they found thtlmsclves protccrcd hy Sukarnu, as hc used Tederarion hy military, cconomic and diplomatic means, had argument., for religous tolerance rr) ward off claims by devout been cliqxthe rnoncy and enerpy of a variety of eyes of many members of the "Afro-Asian" btoc, but it had missionary groups, Chrivians had exceptional opportuntties to been both uncuccrssf~~l and extrerneiy costly. Many believed in pursue advanced education. As a reqult, thcy were reprcrcnted fact that Sukxrno had focused so much on foreign affairs in key social positinnc; q~rite out of proportion to their numhers, preciselv to divert atren tion from sevcre internal prohlerns and particularly in the armed forccs and the professional middle rapidly deteriorating soclal and economic conditions at home. It claqs. They feared PKI ascendancy would threatcn their was thus expected hy many that under S~harto there would be continued enjoyment of these social rofes. In additron, key an end to unsucccsrftd and irresponsible adventures outside clement5 of the Catholic community violently oppclced Jndoncsia's border$. communism on religiou~ grotinds. Thus these rninoririe~ looked m Suharro. backcd hy an zrmv officer corp5 tn which they were well-represented. to puaranrre thcir intererts and **che~t-**faith. CONSO1,IDATING THE NEW ORDER

The remaining scgrncntr of Suharto's coalition can bc treated In the earlv vcars of the Yew Order, until about 1970, many, --together. (To snme extent their mcmbcrrhips overlap rhosc: of if not rnoct, of the coalition's cxpectationr gppearl-d rr, be on the rellp~ous comrnunitie~ discuscrd so hr.) f elr they rhcir way to fulfillment. Suharco's own prcstiyc, not only as rhe reprr5cntcd various elements of IniInnrsia's small midrlle class. "hero of the hour" on Ortoher 1, 1965, seemrtl irna~sa~lal~lu. Yet while as middle class people they all had economic reawns Thc mhcsive purge of suspected pro-communists from the state for their anri-communism, thelr adhcrrnce to Suharto's administration (and of course many orher institutions) In coalition had sipnuficantly different additional gsou r~clx. Thew 1966-67 allowed Suharto to keep at least in part, three different

SOUTI FEAST ASIA CHROYICLE

n-1 ITI.~SSII'C' ~-jlort t<~ IIIIJI~~IIC **IT** rt irt~lrli~\ rnav Ilr JCFC rhln l)npp\ hum.in rl~htf I tr1.1gc. thc Intl~)nccl.rn I',~rn III~F S~~lleluviw: P~IFIITIC'~C to I111nt 1i.ltt COIC~HIIIC~II~ ~n~~trttn~hctl r!~c rclc tqc ttlrlnil I c~ntlit~nnq ~nur h morc tl~lt~cult ~II 1 t~,tlttO 11(~li11( ,11 I>~IS{)IIC~ r11 DcL-~.ITI~~~ than thct hntl lrcrn lrtl trl ccprt.r, ant1 1077 :tt>(l plt-tl~rd it1 rthl~-;h\r t3(l rtvn~ of rhosr who h.1~ appllcd rtl rct~irn thc~r t!ic 2 I-4h l 11 (-1 II~II< 111 III~C~ ~C~-~ITII>C~f~rmcr hnmcr hate brcn torl~ic!rlcn ro I Q79. 'I'hin (: jrtpr :I~III tr~i<~i-.! tion i1~.15 Ir:tvr thc i~lanct. ~l~ii~k 141 r;IT rc,l ,, dcl,.+rr dl,nLlt nunlhcrr, The 1077 rclc3cc5 lcft h.llf (>I' Indtp Intlonrxtnn .Ictlrrn, ;~ntl \'ict. Prrvdrnt... ... h h.ille~ t IIC t'lrt. r,F 54) rn;~ti!~ ILVCS,'''I~'' nffrrial'!. nc'knr'wlrll~c-d P~)I~~~~~~ \I'~licr .flon~l.tlc rt.i~cr:~rcil rht. Lt 5. goy-tI1~4c polnr~ SII~~L~~ th.u m:1ny ~31' the pT''OnCr ~'l""'~"'~ On r'lrh "la nri crnrnrnt'< plvacr~rr tl~lrlt~~ n Xlav 1978 of'f~c~.~ll\ rc.lctrc(l privcr nhlu" hn' L'crrl i'cvc'n~clr I' .k i1i11 tr, f~1,1rt?. trcr, (-r,nfitjrntB.ll rr.pnrr9 fn,m ,nrlllnexiatran~rn~qr~ciim ccnrcr slncc priwnerr u7rrr

C.lr)rer u)l';rrv~rq ttr.~n M~inrl I<: !1.:t,t. rckc.ivr.rl 1,) '1 :lF1 (kl.S./Rritlsh C.lmp,~~gn fir't srnt thcrc In 1''69= Fnrrrrt r"
twcbn Icss plr.~cc.cl. ;\rnnnr thC 1 ,Rclc.~rc nf Ind(~nt-~i:ln I'ol~n~.at LI'vclo~ iun~lr lanrf 11 tic? nc>tctl IIV journ:lli.;r'; mi 1111. 5t't.IIt' ll) I'rlnt.rr) ~nthcate rhar thr\r.r. rt Ir :I ;'llI lit "' "'rr""t ' "' 1" C

I)cccn~l>cr. grit,-, rlvl, !,,. ,,' ,,,),. r! tf
11 listb f-rt-~rt 41 6 $*I ~lh~~ Llnl a ' IInsr of tfic 1,500 pri\t>ictc 11.-~>TL! 01 lptl I,t !(.(, r:rq 11rt31, ,11~hr~tl~:t1 tj~! IL (l~b~ri~! if, I I( :.! ! Icnsrtf from rhu notonotrq ~rl II,L~ ~II I:u~ir 11 II!.C: L.llp ,r, mlwt I!< ~~I~ILI~IL rq T(V I IIL- lrl,!~t.~~5 itlv?

wcrc nlrl m thrtrnr~-,~llv 111; I~I'ITI( I I,ccn rcrlrllrtctl xrc thchr yu hrtl\ I(? ~omc r~r~ttiatcq. rhr

* * I* Carrp ~rnpor~t~n 171 r,, ~rrrll 11 rl r rt~c~r hr>rnr~. hltjsr ot ~hcsc. R'lru dctcrrr'r'n ccnrcrr the
rclc:~srd 111 (17 l~cr :TTC;LS w3crc rchy Pri,(,rlcr, ,vCrC rclcnScll fmm prisnr,r QICCL-'S~~U~ t>i tr~dlnnrsin'q tr:lnvvrptlnn ~:IYL. cl~t,qc-n to rc-m.jln nc,tr thc~r 111 I or rrrurntrl ro J-II~ frrlm fiurl,.lng tllc ~l~~t~~m~nt ~t ruth dt.tciit~on in spcc~:kll\ prey.u crl rth r t lc ~nd~;, rnc1llding 1311 nl. Ahlc-holl lccl"u~"~'' 1r'matc5 as "ran'rwdva rrl~nt CC~TCP;, ,,crc rr.~c.aqcrf pt lrnnrilv In K~l~,nl,lntall Anm~ Tocr rhat " I'hl~ phcc ?llo\lld I)c ' Conrlitlnnc for nllowinc lnd sum:ttra. ,\ trcrP nlany l,crr tr3nq-Ixmm~iI rlnivn.".\ccr~rtlcnplv, cotlrccq pnsnncrl LO returrr ro rhCtr hnrr I urruii frnln drtcn hr,n rc.nrc.rq tl, ru5cttlc-!** ho h:~vr rnnnirnrccl thc <~tuar~nn 01 t L s n as I 2 i I-I t nlcnr .krras. Accorrllng pvcrnment ~'~l'~~~'~ I'riqnner5 In lni'nnc'ln cl''\c15 t, The! ~ncludrhd cvirlt rlk-r. rii.rr 5nurcc~. t. i-prikqvnerc mrn,ing rn rcscrrlc-"h" ff'.:'"kt~lt Runl mnl\ *lc tlc'r?n.llctl :4 thc pr,w,nrr h:lrl conductrrl 11:715<.1' 1r1 ~rjcrit srca.; havc rlonr QO vtrl~~ntanly, lltlrtr"lsmigrarinn r'rnrcr r:l h~ln .I Jrrvn- yrtwn In accordlncc with tllr )V3\'1'Yrl-rllc a~nil:~l)l~ crjjctlcr ~klgpt~ lrl.,i fhcblr ti"" CCnTcr .rrlrh Ilrflc rI~ang{~ ~n the acrwn! rncnr's "l'nncnsila" iiJcoloprr. rr clll,icc lnav have llrcn **cnnrinucL~**st3t~1s 01 11s rrqirlrnrs. l.iren !I' rhcy wrrr by Imrh f3rnrhcs and nri~hl~rlrs frtl rwT rlctcnt ion allrrwcr! to vis~t thc~r Iirlmcr, rnmy ~n I+\, t.-lvikfi~rt-r r~tnrn, and a ~II 1 111 3 c,l3tcr:lcnt ~tl~ **/c.s. sf,1tc-**I1va-the 1 "0 nlilcs KPsrarlnfi tturu .I ~th, I)~~~~~~~~ irl ,977, ~~d~,~~~~~~ Irorn Java zv~~irlil I)r n forni lrl.thle crh~taclc ** Fu-pr~sr~ncrq whr 1 r r! F:rnh~~s\ in W3qhlngtun norc.d to rwc m~c.mrnt. ~muld nor hc nllow I I 'l'licrr .IIY. twn mutl\nd< of rctu:~sr; Now* rcwtrlrnltrlr seas fnr ;I yt..kr INow* rcwtrlrnltrlr seas fnr ;I yt..kr I namvly ~l~rcct rrlcast-to socictv and 11,, ,,,,,,, ,,,,,,, f,, rhlr nrrlcle ,< Ll,, rcrurnin~ hnmc \v(11iIt1 mni.ll ~l~rnu~li rcscrrlcmcn t. "' ;I Jlnr r~l Stlrlnrno flrrrlwr.. ~n.cII-tIrr~~ui~cnt~tI rcpclrt prcp3rt t! 11). hnusc arrest for siu n~<~ntlbc. told J:lkartn'% frndlnF ne\r.spnper rh.11 the'V~%l't~l-. I3ri~istl ( ~rnp~~p f<~r ttlc RV~L 114

'' No cnrnpletu ll~t ill tllnir. gn,,crnmmt hat] ,pCnl

3,0 mtll,nn ln~lrx~rc~m I'~)!ILIL:I~ I'r~roncn In t etrrunrr

1WU. 'Vlw rcpt>rl 1% ~ilirtt" Tr,vt~?~t~~~t has 1)c.c-11 lnatie .~v:lilnLbI~ ?(I tlic pi t IJ-S. %762.0[1fll 10 ~~t~l)~ish 16 lrs~lls- <,,,,lrTr,,w ,#n/811,",1]* ,b *m,r,,,,.v,, ,,,.,, ,,, ** Mtrv ser~r~~~~lv, thc It, ~niparicrn c~mpq elpccial!! for rch!r,i~ctl #md rrnrlrrrrr .,nil I, .rvnil.1l4r lrtln~ yo1 L 1 II~~IL-IJT t~l.11111~ thc t 077 ~rl( prlrr,nenhd iI'hlle rhc Iiidnncsl.ln *~r~ic-rn-r \PO! I 0 nu, hrlo,** M~rl~tcl.~lr. N.1 17 142 IS r I I I *Incntl~.~~p~~ql~~~{tIlcp~rltcl.r,l~r~n-;mlgr.l-M.l~e".ll~4n~llnc~~Inlh~I'7~olreport1'** rlctcnt~rrn~ anrl II h nr I,l~tlrrcrl t rinn ftlr nvrr .I tlrc.ltfc. ar n mein\ conf~r~~~rd tjy \toric~ tilthtl tly. ST, ~t\urnnllrt\ whn ~r.~tnc-sc+l wmc. 111 most of thr rcrn;~lnrn~ rf~ I jlllrr F crllsl til~u~in~ rh~ uvcrrro~\ tic11 pr~pula-,, ,I ,,,, cnrl of 1979. Ilr~wcvrr. ~\rnnc< llrln c,f J~:I, thc crtai)lr.;hn~cnr of cprclal 1 Irl prcw ~rltrwlc\r tin N 7 n,ir~on;rl bclicvc\ rhc ~IC 1111 c.~mfr for fOmlcr l,rrlrtlc,il ~rrls~n~fi .;rbliFrc 1077. i!tInl ~II, It?nl*~ hb rcp~jrtc~l 1 tlctaincc9 is near 100,000 11 r' cL,n rl13t Tl,,,k ,,,lli rc,T lJin iqo, ,ltct 1 fr(,ln J.~kfrt~ pcrccnr ant1 ~li1111c% 10 pcrtcllt t1.1~~ of \11ai tht

11) rt L[ n1 ' llliln:, !TLI\~* 0 PI 1~111h
caw, thc gor'crtimcn~'s pl.~nr I-.) soclcty. In thc~r f~rw ! c.lr ,1t FUC~ c LI'IP'F. +,rc .~llchAraT~- --,il,,,l,,,~ ,v ,,%< ,lBkr ,IS nmn! .IF 70.000 ~)coplc rn pt,,,,, ,,,, ,, torrner prisani-rs will nor 1~ :I llowccl ttr ~~~~~,~p,,,, f~~,~~~~! ,,., ;I ,!lla ,I, '1 \~~~hrii.~ I rlctrntiun, rhu~r cuinr~.tl 11) Ic.~vc thc cthllrc IT.-I+IIC.T~,~~IC.T, VEV~C 1x1 :I> L~JIIIIV 111 ' ,! II<* ~L~C.IWL! otl ~cial c~rul~.;. 5tatc~i1cnrs In .ltlt~~tl .it rhvlr h~,rnr< will I~c pcrn~itrcd t+nIy 31 the ''lCJ I' '"p I 0 ? ( ltctt Stlrlomcl, lic:~cl r~l Kophnlntll). I)cc~rln~nrr tliwrctirm ol luc.ll :~~~thor~t~cr. WIl~lc ,\i,n,,l i3rr 10, 1077 I'lrci! III in hluvcn~bcr 1977, th3t Inr~r 1111 I:brnllics will hc cncournqcd I~I )ern fnrnivr ,I pr~cttncrk .1ru "~l~thnrcl~" anrl n~., tfc.~~~ntr.~ in t hc tr,lnqnlgr.ltlcln camp, I,I 117&i"' \C LA:~V,,~, J.ITILI irtbccl Icncl crctlc~~cc tn tlit~ ft.~! ' thc c\twncnrc Kuru C~I~;~FIC fh.tt \tiL h**-11**

"pmmiser." All vest igial PKI : influence life cs ~tastrophic inflation of Suka mo's Iast years. In add~tion, thev was wiped out. Th c govcrnl tllC'111 E<>11 ation-in sr~tuted new replatinn? for fore ign inves trnmt, which ali7ing" the hugr, ~inrvicli Iy, and crncy h~ ~o~~ght a host of muftinatinl nal carpol ration? inl 'n the country inherited from rlie L1llRlllllVC1.I-.,rmn 1 ?CUL.7..I.., rrilll,I,A ,,JlllCC rllCIC v.CICf1111110,ms=r I,..,~rr the nert decade. of emergency, rnili~nry mcn could I,c placed In key po5it1ons Morc than mything eke, ?he SUCC~CF of St~harrn's policieq in throughout the society it lthour ~irtlustng much oppost~ion or ending the inflation pave his coalition a sense of confidrnce in fears of militarism. By thrsc lncdlls Suharto consolidatud his its leader. Not l~rng symbolized more rhe new reg~me's snhrjetv, support within thc : withou t scriousl ~lidity, and cnmpct~nce. Norl~ing crt wed rnol 2nd any elements in his r :epl!; a relieved sense of wcryc lay norir lifc. The purge wwas n, ~d to civiI ians, howl uslnessmen, civil servants, pensionerr., and dep I felt if not thousands, nt military mcn wcrc also purged-forclbly rheir positions and frltnres at last secure,.A 1-,,",l,4;,,,, Sood

-thc Y governmen-.. ;akened its own support by its aoying the organized left...
rctirL'cI or ~nrpr~sonea--on grounds or t>erng secretly pro-of cheap {and many not so cheap) imports now permitted corn~nunist, pro-Sukarno. ~nd so forth. 7'11c "mutiny panic" and appeared like manna to middle clnsec, starved of such oCtcrl parano~;~c anri-cornmu nisin in thc upper officer corps commodiries under the protectioni~rn and hankniptc?) of the a Ilowcd SI ~harlo to .;ltc. his p he army to an last Sukarl no yeas. Ir seemr :d pnsqiblc to "liv main '* e xtcnt th; kt no pn donrsian military man had ever Meanwhile, the hu Ige loans and rnaqsive inw wcre a chirved. " L'he purge ack kcy v ,acancies j n the initially in as signs of the rich Wmt's s,,,,J,,,,,ce in -... " .... rn~iltary h~crarchy with closc tricnds xrld tollowers, espccialIy Indonesia's nctv lcadershlp and its future. frnm his c >wn Dipo ntgoro Division (the territorial Uiv~sion of The second area of policy chanp can be called the Central jar la). Accus cd of Ocing "Sukarnoist," the armyts srrvice polirico-cultural. If rigid 'bans werr imposed on all expreniom r~rals, the navy (an d especially ~ts Mnrinc Corps), and the Air of leftwing thought and anything remotely resembling left-wing fa rc virtual and plat :cd direct ly under army organizations, this w 'as not sor nerliing that trouhlcd any dement c I 1969, a on of the, entire defense of Suharto's cnalitior I. For thc firgt time since the middle 1950s, c rry power and sreepened thev were, almost all of t hem, given freedom ro exprem and strcarnllncd rn~l .,..., ,,.,, archies under Deputy Minisrer of themselves, and the)-, I.P%-P..,,, ,P".,,courxged to think that freedom of Uefensr rncral hia radenn l'angga bcan. General Panggabcan was expression would qu~tc soon be followetl by freedom of not onIy penonall! i loyal to Suharro. As a I'rotcstant and organization. Doaens of ncm newspapers, magazines, and mcmbcr of ' the natn k ethnlc minorrty, he could not herome an journalr appeared. TTundreds of poemc, -short storics, pbys and indcpendcr ~r ccIItcr In this role, General Pan=tl;ean songs which had been 1,anned or remained unpubliched under uqs in cfft rct itcting ministcr r~ntil 1973, when he was Guided Democracy, emerged into the light of day. It would 'he a formalf!* p ,rornorc.d. the defensc podolio tlntil early great mistake to underertimatr the polutical and psychological

Impact of this aspect of earl^ Vew Order life. it wac. crucial to In tandem with the purgm, the Suhx rto goverr lrnent launched maintaining the support of the professional, academic, and two other policies which d~d much in the short term co satisfy artistic intelligentsia, and its pro~rmsive disappearance after its various constituencies. Mc >st impor tanrly, A ~harro reversed 1970 is directly related to their n~l,program of rcs tr~cring toreign access TO the Einalfy, Xuharto rnm~rd quickly to liquidate the "Confrunta- lndonc~ian econorn? r and sell iing primardy on state enterprises tion" with Malaysia, ending (tcrnpor~r~ly) Indonesian inter- ar the vehicles of celuprnen t. Suhartc~ caIled on the services of ventions ovet~eaq.~ hlthougfr aclations with the Chinese People's ~ndones~sn tcclrnac rat<-., .. inrl ..uding a group referred to wen Repu hFic were frozen, and Indonesia became increasingly today as t la," man!, of whom hold Ph.D.s dependent on the West and Japan, diplomatic relations wcre from the 'ornia-Rcr keley. Their jr~b was to maintamed with the Sovirt Union, the Easrrrn European stares, create a c .rnnomlc policy anenred toward Cuba, and the Democratic Rep11,lic of Vietnam. ?'his pattern "rational~rp" 2nd "dcvclopmcnr." These men were **all com-**created the impresr;ion that Indonesia's Traditional 'Yndependcnt rnirtcd to the nmerlcan economic orthodoxies of the 195Os, foreign policy" had not been compromised and that the inter- anti rhey tirere srrongly backrd t)y the ISIF, the Wortd Bank, and national community understood and respected Indonesia's in- ult~matcly the inrernarional cnnqnrtiurn of lend~ng counttie4 tention of soberly putting its own house in order. {the I!.S., Wcstern anrl Japa n) known as the IGGl (Inter-Govr :rnmctl ral
ia). They proceeded very rapidlv ro stnljili~~ rnonetarv,system.and SEEDS OF DISINTEGRATION

reestablish an al~nc rsr vanish ed confidence in the Indonesian In retiospecr, it s ecmq like Iy that th e vear 1971 marked the currencv. &y a s cries of inter-related policies, including apope of the New ( 3rdt-r's cc rherrnce a nd of Su harto's personal budgetary cuts, virtt 131 nholiti on nf rxpnrt-import controk, and a~~rlioritv and prcst ige. r~n ti 12t same vear, however, the first liqurdation of bankrupr st~tt. enterprises, and with the crucial clear signs of the diqlntegratlon or P me 0 anti-communist ctjalition inflow of hundred? nf rn~lllnnr ot dollars of loans md grant5 became visihte. In ,a uer! ctrnple map, the government we~lrened from JEGI rnernhen, thry succeeded in overcoming the its own support t~v its colnpfere succesq in decrmyin~ the

SOUTITEAST ASIA CHRONICLE

organized left in 1965-66, killing hun e government's **a** ~ge, "successing" the
imprisoning further hundreds of thousa..,.,, ...., ririvlng r,,, **bLctBull-**lllcnnt arranging an OUPCC~~TIC which would ensure
rrrnatnder into hiding or terrified si!, Bp 1871, t he cnmplcre control over rhe legislature they produced. But there I< communist menace" had begun to rece, de into n lernory, a nd were real difficulties. While Suharto himsclf remained reason- pvcrnment legitimacy derivrd solelv fi mrn this source v r3S ably popular with the coalition, rhe military as such, never becoming. tenuous, while the cn~de use of "anti-corn h liked bv the population, had grown in unpopl~lnricy along justify policies and actions that had nothing wcalth and power since 1965. Moreover, the army had wpprcaing the PKI undermined that residual ys claimed to he above politics, so its direct participation in fnrthrr. With the decline of the vividness and *. p~aus~h~llt!,. ot the thr elections in competition with the sfirviving parries wo11Id "cainmunist threat," the prime cement of thc 1965 coalttion have been cmbarrassrn~. The solution to thw difficu'fty was nect~sarilv grew brittle. The government itself began ro fcel the found hy formally excluding the armed senrice4 from the need for some more contemporary confirmatton of its elrctions and awarding them 100 appointive scars in thc new legitimacy. pnrl i arncnt. Ry this expedicnr, Suharto avoided the potential for The elections of 1971 were exrmplarv nf organiz ed split! j within the milirary due to electoral competition and ratifications by military rcgimm. At the same rime, t he pro!, ided hirnqelf wirh a means of rewarding his supporten in government's very st~cccw in using the poll3 to srwebLctBull-lllcnnt arranging an OUPCC~~TIC which would ensure
rrrnatnder into hiding or terrified si!, Bp 1871, t he cnmplcre control over rhe legislature they produced. But there I< communist menace" had begun to rece, de into n lernory, a nd were real difficulties. While Suharto himsclf remained reason- pvcrnment legitimacy derivrd solelv fi mrn this source v r3S ably popular with the coalition, rhe military as such, never becoming. tenuous, while the cn~de use of "anti-corn h liked bv the population, had grown in unpopl~lnricy along justify policies and actions that had nothing wcalth and power since 1965. Moreover, the army had wpprcaing the PKI undermined that residual ys claimed to he above politics, so its direct participation in fnrthrr. With the decline of the vividness and . p~aus~h~llt!,. ot the thr elections in competition with the sfirviving parries wo11Id "cainmunist threat," the prime cement of thc 1965 coalttion have been cmbarrassrn~. The solution to thw difficu'fty was nect~sarilv grew brittle. The government itself began ro fcel the found hy formally excluding the armed senrice4 from the need for some more contemporary confirmatton of its elrctions and awarding them 100 appointive scars in thc new legitimacy. pnrl i arncnt. Ry this expedicnr, Suharto avoided the potential for The elections of 1971 were exrmplarv nf organiz ed split! j within the milirary due to electoral competition and ratifications by military rcgimm. At the same rime, t he pro!, ided hirnqelf wirh a means of rewarding his supporten in government's very st~cccw in using the poll3 to srwe its purpo~,.PP* *IlC,a,,.,niiitav hy appointing them to the legirlature. Ac the same created the first serious divisions in the 1965 coaliti~n,~ 2% xve1I time, he assured turnself of the support of a solid 22 percent of as foreclosine the poqsihility rhalt parliamentary instirurionc the new 460-rnemkr assernbty. would become a mean< of broadening the coaIition Ity \I'ith the military provided for, the government srill needed a integrating new elements into it. For bv 1971, Suharto's policies party of its own. Otherwise, rhere W~F a real powibili ty that the hepinning to create grievances as ~vell as satisfaction, bur traditionaf parties, with deep roots in Indonesian society, would the engineering of the clectionq--which were intended to tvin enough votes to place rhem in a porltlon of relative demonqtrate srlpport for the Suharto resimr-lvas such that independence from Suhartn-even if they conrin~ied to support grievances wou!d find neither expression nor resolution in tIie him. The solt~ tion to this delicate politicai predicament was bodies rhey crcared. something called Gol kar (an acronym from the Indonesian

Issue No. 63

woras Tot' runctlonal c,roups), a h: r!e rtoral

machine amply funded by the govc nd' const] :ucted uneqr~ally from three very dispara ncs. Firs1 t and Fort.most wcrc thc parallel vertical h~e~~~~~~,~~ .f fh~ ulk ,.,,.r~strrrs*%A;-* of Defcns e and Int .crier, each keadcd by general? in Srtharto's inner circ le. These hierarchies reached down from the c.tpital virtually KO tne 0 vulapc .,, Icvel. Oqtcnsiklly the neutral organi7crs larders of an open process, i n fact the: y used 1 ginablc r ntans fox ensuring I the SUC cess of I 'iolkar ( ;. Not l Fur noth, ing did Intcrior Minister Amir.. ... .. .-
!.,,C.....UY earn the n~cknarne "bulldozer .. .. +r(lnCi .,-+-.. WAS a s~zcabl~
Imdy of promincn ~t "indepl ~ndcnt" I notat~ilitie s, intellectuals, academics publicis ts, and tl cchnocrat s, il core clcrncnt in the New Ordr fr coalitit In, peopll c who ha d traditio ~nally disdained 1 mrry puli tics. 'FheiI was to F ~1 and 1 .dcologica 1 uphi~lfta che skclei td hy I the minis tries of ( id rhe in J here there IS room perhaps tor some surprise-was tne rraa~cicrnal I ?opular cl ~nstiruent :y of the old Ieft, the kind of people who rn thc last p revious e! lcctlons (1955) had supported the PKI and chc left r wing of t he Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). Nor 1 only were those vut ers with01 ~t their traditional parties; 1965-66 wits recrr tt enougk i for the m to he eas~ly it~timidatec I into I "proving" their goo d behavio r t~y vutlng for Golkar. Hilt-.1 11 this was not rnought sufficient ... for a thr lrou~h"Lt. General Widoda, leader of a powerful army faction op- "s~ccessir lg" of tk re elrctirt ns. Thc i ylvcrnmer ;h the posed to ! iuharto. agency ol : General Ali Murc opo's Spt .cia1 Opcr atians pu lirical- -

intcliigcnc :e appara' tus, P'OC' :cded tu. directly in the ..,, .. a Finally, the very t.. ,f the elec tcd 3 parlia~ TI rnent, kr partics to tnsl ire that tkotr leadersh~p tell TO so carrtulfv engineered t~p tnc pc)vernmc.nr, closeu rne one ~t and ol 'ten vcna 1 second- raters. While this policy possi hle national channel for voicing rhe :~ccurnulating griev- I d thc pli: ability of party 1, Ic aders. it undcrmincd the nnces wh~ch the government's own poiic~es rrtere by now cntnuslasm or party rvorners ana ~owcred .... rhc. oarfies' electoral creating. It is to these rhat rve now mtlst turn. sppcal. ?' he most : significanl ation, fro m thc pc view of our anal ysis, was lent inrc~-vention, in the internal, affairs ol the M usi. lt w rill he.. ren~crnbered that in 1960 Sukarno had hxnned the largest Much of the early credrn~!it)r of the New Order had come ex~sling Muslim parry, ~Masjurn~. Aflcr 1965, Suharto had come from a belief that it was mpidly setting the Indonesian economy undcr strong pressure from rhe Mtlslirn component of his to righrs after abuses undcr St~karno which had led to coalrrion to rwokc the ban and pcrrnit Masjurni's revival. He had corruption, speculation, inefficiency and the mortgaging of the attempred to satis fy this ct mstrnrcnc ,p, aiid at the same time country's future. This belief had gained strength from the keep it firmly unde r his runt] rol, by ref using to t? evoke Sukarnok rapidity with which New Order financial policies had brought ban, hut permittin g the par ty'~ parti al rcsurrc ction under the inflation under control, hut by 1471 it was becoming clear that new name Parmus~. Btrr hlasjuml'r popu lsr older leaders, the promise nf that early achievement had been overstated. For including nvo former Prime Mrnisters, were tjarred from the belirf rhac the New Order would lead to national prosperity leadersh~p positions in ir. As a rusult, while Masjumi had won rested on one basic illr~sion: that the economic problems of the

20.9 percent of the votes in 195 5 Parmusi secured a mere 5.4 Sukarno years had been primarily the product of Snkamo's percenf in 11971. (n tions help ed to reduce rhe personal cxnavagance agd willful Ignoring of eiernentary PNI's vote from 22 economic realities. While rhcse poi
, icics - and .. the targeted 63 The truth of the matter, however, was very different. The percent majclnt? tor C;nikat on elecrlon day, they helped tn real locus of the crisis lay in rhe eventi of 1957, when the vast alienace permanently stgnlficant sectors of the Muslim commu-Dutch holding in Indonaia, ahove all in its non-oil export nity, who saw rhumsclves once again deprived of their legitimate sectors, were nerninalty nationalized but actually fell under rights and nlace in Indanes~an sociury. In addition, the one control. of the military. These state corporations-operated as party whi $Ed to ho ,Id its ow n aginst the government the private fiefdoms of the generals in charge of them-quickly hulIdozer,, the cor ~scrvative ru~al-uln mo dominated Nahdarul fell into ruin and in the process dragged the economy down.. uarna, alarmed tl-IC govern ment 1)). its tenacious]>old on its with them. The norable exception, for a time, was the state oil

. .. ..

enterprise, Pertamina. They rteclined for three inter-related rural: following, stirnuratlng nitnerto fairly well-concealed mspicion and hosriliry rnwards all devout Muslims In the reacons. Almost all the new military managers had absolute1 y no president's stmnglp "statistical Muslim" inner circle.' At the serious experience in managing cornplev corporate empires. The same time the governmen t's open ru thleqsness produced a small great majority of them plundered the entcrprrses' assets for their but significant protest from the younger liberal intelligentsia, own private profit. And the army lexdenhip, desperately which mounted G campaign to get vorers to abstain from vodng concerned to maintain discipline ant1 morale In the ranks, and

SOUTHEAST ASIA CHRONICLE

no less despt find rnr nance a hr -oad as t ,ft drinks, and so forth. where earlier they had bt

anti-cnminur crnaric;lll! ablt .lop some rhc ccono

ml UL

rces

TO c

gen~~,,,~..-..*I.. UC'I' I. I TO prlvliegra

t bro iiphr und lreamr (a:

e starc cr Iter-: strength. Key scctors c~f prisec whlec. Iy rcr~uir,,,~ ,,,,L;l:*nl.lIIIRllds~~~ II,> .>.. ...- -. J to can IL LU r,pcr~tiril..-,.->-.under whdr ir eunhemist~callv cnl tmr n over sec :retly llarp ions if th c cntcrpri "jo rn t-ccntur cs." Thc oretically partners vccn fore rhe army. The owl rrhrtlw of Suk:arno, thc supp the and I do~ilcsti capital, in fact thcy repr exchnngc left and the insritu rir ,n of the Nctr Ort icr did r~c the for, :lgn won 1 technolt ngical rcs r palitica re*- I~~II~ thc buaru luurllb. ' iic CnSeS, conccsstons, ann arcm Whar thc cr did in rnic arcna was tr} in: stall ma1 rkcts. In effect, tb nic palici m of rhe : Nrw Or dcr "nmkelc and thci es in the governrnr nt's led) weal th to tht ,se with the

-. politic g of the banking-t sysl led

ickly to embezzlerrrent on a sfialo never st: - -fore -

fin ancial rn and planning agencies and to srv~tch political power to dlocate these lie1 mses, cn and m ,phns~s frt >m state to privatc cnterprisc. Acting in lrne with concesstons: namely,, the fi merats a ,nd their late.. thr~r own rralnlng nnd thc wishes of the IMF and the I(iG1, the cntouragcs.' ect ,rhnocl-ar( cd national economic policy to In additio tion and the aminc )us spread I OF ct11 on and privatc domertic and foreign "joint ventu-amrer of the RCO nnmy of the ~~VL~L~TIL~IL. They did IIUL-JIIU thcv could not curb thc ability 1970s workcu ru urlucrl~ll~rc th~ PoVtr .----.." ~I~IIC~IL 3 IIIIUUIC-C.~~SS -:,121-

fur t was thc I

t rum went rnto nus~ness tor 2nd were cornperled ,

of tt~r gene1 vert nalrn rccs fur ty or sup;t was thc : qujre fl agrmt ppo nipulatior I of f0l their orv lent. As t ~pt stare e lost ban essential for the gr owth of r JI indigen nus th rir key 1 in the I :conolrly, tary bus banks ape rated und y supervis ion oftlcers wno nsu managed then1 ~nto to otter huge credrts and unreallstleali?f low

.. ,.+. .. ... .>

tIlemseIvcs, drawing financial and inn :rcsi rate!: to senior officers rg working them). business sup porr. Vel -y uftcn tIiese cheap credif ~t used for ptoductive .----.*-.-.-.-.-A... In this ct>rr{c.rr unc: olrrrr rmrnr 1h WV~LII UC~IIIIY 1r1 II rstnlcnt, but for real-e~tatc ~~crllration. land graljhing, IVF iile the at nly Ieade~ rship had installed generals n 'IS as Iu x ury hous ing, and so forth. Second was the survival o fa thl : top rn. anagers c ~f the st are enrcr .prist.s (c for nur nbcr of ii Important statc rno nopolies, which in effect leg: dly PQ Iitical rea sons),.. it t~ad tried,, in its (13 ,vi~ way.

. T ..

I that exc ,luded in digcnous

.-. .-

entrepre ncurs frc tnl *. certal In econo mic some cxpcrrencen mislnesqrnen assumctl sullordlrlntc pr>sltivns fields. tJarfrcuiarly notorlous lnstznces or these were, and 3tc, so that the gcese would continue ta Iay same goldcn cggsIs, The ~hr stare oil company Pmtamina, and Rulog, the National at>vious choice of such hl~sinewnen lay between indigenous aird Supply Board, which controls the import, marketing, and Ctrinew. In tIie great majanty of cases the decisiotl was ~nadt. dr>mcstic wurchase of basic staples. Not sur~risinrly, the~e for the Chinese, Irtving the hasis For the partncrd kip of gr3n crals li~c rnopolies were and are the or ~rnporwnt and rlcknng (Chinese tycoons) which has bccr me a cei !nrral mil mrters of Suharto. cl~aracteristic of late New Order 1nc lonesia. t *or the :rear ' acpcnces of all of the above F he almmt the advantage of the Chinese, from the perspccr~ve or tnc rnllitary " 3 ., mart opposrte of the economic expectation9 or s~reablc parts of elite, is rhey are a pariah poulp, wlm, even if many of the111 are rhc 1965 coalition. Far from frnding their situation and Indonesian citizens, are still viewed with hostiliry by many opportunities improved, many indigrnous buqines~men (perhaps indigenot~s Indonesians ar aliens. In effect exc1udc.d from thc cisptcially devourly Islamic busines5men) found it even harder to political arena-there bnq never been a gencr: 11 of Chi nese sur vivc rhan under Su kamo. Far from the New Order economy ancatry, and, under the New* Order, there has irb~ting tl le virtues of economic rationality, predictability, cahinet minister of Chinese origins- -the Chir icsty and autortolr y, it showed every sign of symrnecricaHy polltical thrcat to the army leaderrhip, ana I I nave Deen at]ear1 opposite fnil~ng. superficially content with the narrowIy economic hich M'c have secn how access te bank credit WM and is not in the rhey have heen confined. slighresr determined by provrn entrepreneurial ability, financial During the decade 1968-78, the Indoneslazt ~~~~~nrny-.probiry, or the social benefits to be derived from its utifimtion. assumed a verv specific character, one which in certain 1 lasic RUI t in addirion, political plundering of the banking system led respects steadily erntied the regime's political st bpport. N nmi-~li ckIy to embezzlement and corruption on a scale Indonesia nally a largely "free-enterprise economy," it came quickly t o l~e hat 1 never secn hefore. Some indication of this scale is suggested dorninared by giant multinationa! corporation<. Lonccnrrarca n _If tl! rhe recent criminal conviction of a middie-lweI provincial heavily in the envrrons or the capital city, in remu iclal of the National Supply Raard fox the emhezzlemtnr of (minerals, fuels, and lumber), and in fight cnnsr~ 3 million.9 In COntTaSF, the conventional figure for per capita these corporatiom quickly drove the RaSCcrr~ IIIUI~L IIIIU? ,Illllual income in indon~sia is $150. The "joint venture" waq tndoneqian husiness class to tI-le waH. Far from recciviag the another natural breeding ground for corruption, and many expected opportunity to expand their opcrarionq, strch hfNCs were willing to pay huge bribes for licenses and contracts. businrwnen found thcrnselves even squeezed 011 t of fields, such In a recent casr, Seymour Hersh of the New York Times

Issue No. 63

a liberal Catholic newspaper, is nne of Djakartav< thrce major dailier. Thc government clorett it down fur three wcckq. alhving it to rcsumc pulllication only aFter prol~ihiting all rncrltion of thc ~tutlrnr rnnvemcnt.

Fnrlsidtfrn ro criticize cithcr prvernrncnt pulicics or poccrnmenr within university watls. Kvcn rhcrc, studcnts and tcnchem were p'""""r1. u+i~rned that cr1tici9111 must l~c "constn~ct~vc." 't'll I? pnlicy, Iiowa~cr. had thc onintt,ntlrd cffect of niaking the univc~~tlrr appr:ir more :In[] morc as s;~ncruarics of rclattvc frretlrlm III a NEW STUDENT MOVEMENT prtlitic;~l sysrcrn of dccpcninp authoritarianism. !r aErcj hcight- ,\, significant turning point was the explosion of mid-Januar!. cncd srlliclarity ;inlong univcrs~ty studcnts across thc rounm..

1974. whcn siors broke our in Jnknrrn durinc thc vis;~t of then ,Mranwhilc, nnuthrr pnvcrnnient pol icy wa< prodt~c~ng Japnncsc Prlrnc Minister Knkuci Tanakn. 'fhc riots follnwrd itnintrnded conscqilcnccs: the politicai 1rnp:tct of research. wvcral months of incrc;rsiri~ly chnrp critlcisrn OF the poucrnmenr Suhnrtr)'~ top tcchriclcr;~ts wcrr acat!rnrics, primarily ccclno- l~y ~nldcnr luarlcrs 2nd younger intcllcttrlnls, cat~t~nusll-backcd rnists. Tht-sc mcn, rvl~nsc altthcwity dcpcridctl rxt.ltrsir~cly an by RI Irnst nnr nlilltary f;~ct ion. Regmning nc pcaccful, nrd'rly thcir scicnrific kno\rlc.dge :~nd thrir capacity to fomulatc prutcqts. osrcnsilrI!, apin~t rurhlcss 1 apancsc ctjrparfitc. t:~piral-succcssirr na rional flvc-year plans. cncouragrd thc pntfc.rnmcnt ism. but transparentlv 8150 :pinst Indoncslan povcmrncnt rn spend large sums elf rnoncy nn policy-or~cntctl rc~~+arch. Such complicity wirh rt, tlic dcrnon.;ltrntions rnrlcd in wrdcrprcatl rosrnruh was conccnt rn tctf in what wcre rcgartlcd as poliric:~lly Ijuming of Jaynncsc :rutnmnhiles and other propcrry by innoclluus fic1d.r lfkr ;\gricultur:~T rctlnnmirs, rirrnogr:~phy. ant! i~nemployed urban yon tf~s ant! same gmUcrnmen t agcnrs nutririon. In this cffort, tile tcchnocrnrq hat! thc rnrhusinstic provticntcisrs. Thc gnvcrnnienr tnok tl11~ ~~~tt~l~fjt 3s R prctcst, support of ~nstltutinns like the \Vr)rlrl Rank and USAID, on nnt unlv for arrcs~ing sttc:~ble numtwrs of its ttitirs, but for wllr~rr Inr~ssr rhc gilvcrnrncnt \tn?s hravity depcndcnt. Tlicrc IS insisriny thar st~tdciirs shr>uld nnt gr1 invrr!r*etI in politics. Tl~c!~ no tIrlirt~t alqo thnt many of I!I~ m~lirary IcatIrfi aroclnd S~tharto WPIII~ have tn cnnfine thcn~sc-lvcs ro rhcir carnpuscs. Acadcrnic saw rhc rapid rsp:tnsion of ihiq rc as a uscful deflecrion of Crectlr~rn wt,uItE hc rcrpcctctl, but nnly sa long as ir was confincd the energics of thc youn~c-r intdlipcntsi;i. \'rlhnt happcncd, Issue No. 63

was tha I ~hc cup policy rrfenrch, While GNP was riring rapidly, real apricultrrral wages were young m iin tcl. ame to a painful declining. In the same area wlrer~ claily wnEe rates for ". agricultural labor were in the neighhorhoad of Sd, the price of awarunea ot what war happcn~ng In a world with which they would o have ha, Indonesia'r, and irrigated wet-rice land was betneen $4,000 and $5,000 per espvciall) illagcs. hectare-prices driven fantaqtically high by rich urhan absentee land speculators. In Java and Rali, 55 percent of farmers were unable to live VILLAGES from the yield$ of their fields. Villagers' share in the Gross What lents disc little by little, were the Domestic Product steadily dr~lrnpd during the New Order vears. reafities concealed bq *optim~stic ult~cidl dacfopmenr statistics,** The rechnolopical revoltttion in agriculture, hailed by the w~ch as I -king Gh' realities f undarnent ally eroded their technocrats as rhe soIution ro **Indaneno t urnply 1 rd will of thr gown ~ment, bur in the problems, was depriving millinns of villagers of ernploymenr and good sen se and EC : of thc tc rc hnocmt: F themselves. l4 It income. Japanese rice-hullers, American tractors, Geman may he usc~ul .--a+ .l ro hurrchc LrlC

-1.:.. K~IIU~ -1.. ~II. r illt~~ll~dtion :-c----
this research rotary-weeders made hngc numbers of agricultural lahoren was tur r ling up, this also hy the youthful incren5indy redundant, wrrhout at the same time significantly idealism and sacia 1 conscier ger generation of increasing producrinn. Dmrnatic illustrations of thew trends ... crime at the end of 1777: 'Ihr government wax forced to admit students were so detplq sr~rxcd. "'-1'ht.y learncd chat one-fifth of all Indonesian babies do nor lice to the agc of five. Contrary to that Indonesia had become the urorldk No. 1 rice-~rnportcr, rhe myth of t.he too-fertile pour, scvcrc malnutrrtion means that purchasing more than 2.5 million tons ahroad in that year-a the tr~rly poor hxve fctvcr childrcn rhan the more twl!-to-do. figure higher than ever before in Indoneqia's history. At the

SOUTIIEAST AStA CHRONICLE

e time, famine hrnkt out in the drstnct ot Krawang, only a IY7X war a five- or six-year-old chitd in 1965. Hear she had no few mileq fr~ tn. and traditiot~ally one of Jam's mosr concrcte experlcnce of cnrnmunism, or even real memory of it, fcrt ile rice hn qrl succc.ssful had the extirpation of the communist party been. t tcsearch ;LIW m;tclc vcrv CIC~ how that char~ucs nrtd +'--'---c 1971 the government had 40 prodigally uqed accusatio-- dist ribution ' of politic 31 pOWeY under th c New 01 rdcr affw " heing expIoited hy undergrnu the systcnr r ,f rural s .ocial stra .tification. The "G rn threat en or sile nce critics of wery conct.lval

tech nolc llture was ~e~nvm~ ons or emproymen~.. Indonesia was

19W ,,,, world's No. 1 rice-im~urter a..

tion '"ha be nefitred r ;c. dites. giual innc **wa-**strip e that its initial ci .edibility as the cot~ntry'r "rarior" frc

.. ....... .,

IPCC rnln

.., ... +;-s llnri allawc.rl these c.11rc.s to attlid crrlployng their Innd>,,,, nunism ism had hy E 978 worn very thin indeed, especial.,, fcllr nv-vi l1agc1 rs for ha, rvesting a nd the li kc. Govc rilmcnt rl 11 ng. 111 was la rgrly mo~ lopoli,cd by the s ,amc clitc s, steepen thc gap bcl wecn vil' lag" rich and prl, or. Cc~ncs entration A NEW COALITION ip mas st catlirv in creasing, in the h: ~nds both tlf 3TOrb all( i of villa ~gc notab lcs such as headn~ en. 7 'hr elcctir Ins of 1977 illtlqtrate very well what had become ' tht u,xkc of the Jr: ;tmctiun I 3f the PKI I, thc lnoc lest of S uhnrm's t :oafition by that year. As in 1971, the government I-reform and crop-sharing ICgisratlon .+, or P, rnc buttarno * yc 'mrc-.-. .-''ci~r-ct.sseu < ., rhrsc elections largely according to plan. Golkar had bccorrle. a dcad lct tcr. Much of tile la1 ~d re-distr ibutcd in the won almost e xacrIy the same prcenrage of rhe vote that it had car1 y 1960s had rcvu rtcd to I ts carlicr owners 1 I)? rhr e; ~rly in 1 871. Yet there were important difference from 1971 aq 197 0s. Altho ugh thc 1; provid ed for 50 b50 share s in the u rnp well. In.. the first placr, the victory was achieved almost

.,-*.. many ars ras 111~' ac ri~al ratio ran CXCI uslvrlv by strong-arm hulldozer tactics, with the ministries

vucr,, J ill I I w~tn tne was lcad ing roles The array of distinguished independents who had (>rv

vucr,,+<..+,> LLC~~*~IT and landlard, ill I righ as 70-30 nr evrn 80-2C in the I; indlords' favor. It of c lcfensc and ehe interior, as well as Kopkarntih, playing the roo easy ro brand any ntrc mpts to e nforcu tht : land-ref< ,rnl ... ., share-crnpping srarutes as "cornmrinrst. 0, ..,, 0 rnm---,her1----1 pers~raded to stand as Grhknr candidates in 1971 had of the rnaqsacres of 1965-66-which roo k place 1: ~rgely in the 1arg1 :ly disappeared. jMany of the more honest and self- villages-srill only too vivid, few poor fa .rmers da red to rry to rcsp ~ctiny! of them had found their soles in a pcrwerteqs ognni7e to defend their legal righm. par1 iarnent meanindess and had withdrawn. Secondly, Golkar t:ina!ly, smdcnts sent to LI~-esearch i, n rural xr Cd3 **1,rnc-**actually outpolled, nor only in the traditionallv strong1 y

became aware, in terns of re31 ce, of thr ? meaning of Muslim province of Aceh, but in the capital city of Jakarta the government's own statistics arion: (1: I Only ab~ au t itself. Its successfi~l rival was a pnrcv called the United one qllarrer of primary-sc-hod-age ch~ldren were ~ctuaHy In ... n~vcloprnent Party, a fusion of all pre-existing Muslim parties school; (2) Less than 2 percent nf coilcge-age yot~th wcrc in forc ed by the government itself, All the other parties, including institutions of higher learning.16 In other words, stude nts ~IC NationaIist Pnrzy, the Pmteqtant Party, the Carholic Pnrty lwcame conwions of their eutranrdinarilv privileged sirr~ntion hyand so forth had been forcibly rnergrd into a political Freak comparison with the vast hulk hful lndo neslans. Jot kno wn as the Indonesian Democracy Party. surprisindv, in some this consci f pr~vllegc in thc ml dst f iefore tur ning to the meaning of this surprising victorv, it is of deepening rural misery produced a real radical1 zation, wl lllc nect :ssary fir st to undcnrand hath the purpose and the.. ..

11.7~ ,.An, ,L.ruL,,,,.
in otl~crs it gen~rated at least a rtrong sense of middle-c of these impoqed fusions. The government's reformist concern. poli tical strategists, most notably General Ali Murtopo, had Under the circumstances, it is not suq tt aq the h few calc ulnted that the forced fusion of partie traditionally in Ordcr regime celebrated its tenth anniversary, r he canlpt rses riva: Ir). nit11 one another and ~4th welf-established pnputar became the focal: poinr of opposition tc I it. ITnr T lses idcr ti ties ~vould fatally weaken them, both internaIIy and werc the meering point of two diffrrent streams c on-extc .rnalIy. It was expected that the rivalries would continue and ment and dissatisfaction. As youthful rn emlwrq o dle eve1 r rntenslfy as the different parties' leademhips srntggted for class which had backed Snharto in 1965, thc stildeilts sha~~~1""my,>-YLLeminence in the new entities, thereby paralyz~ng their that class's r~rhan frustrations: government cornlprron, offi, cia1 elec toral energies and sapping their morale and organizational lawlessness, restrictions on freedom of exprrssion, nrarginal **iza-**cohl erence. It was also cxpected that the artachmcnt of, say, rion of independent entrepreneurship, huge foreign del)ts,. ~nd blur Jim voters to a ftlsion of idamiu parries, in whase imposed squandering of the national patrimony. But tht :y were : ~lso nnt* re (United Development Party) no trace of Islam was, much more aware of and concerned by the i ~ccumulat 'ing d~tt =ctal>le, would he decisively reduced. Would a traditional problems of non-middle-class Indonesians, most pa rticularly the sup] 3orter of the Nahdanrl Ulama he enthusiastic ahnut a new vast armie of the m-ural poor. We should also nott.,,,,nnn h.~+ hrmr.,,,ynertin which leadership positions had to be shared by aspect of the political experience of the srudenr population, a Nalldstul tllarna with it< longstanding competitors. for M~tslim direct prodrict of its youth. The 18-vear-old college fre5hman of loyalties? In fact, the government's strateqy worked perfectly in

Issue No. 63

thc C:I\C r .lc ~l~rrrb~~r \l.r~t Rcmrx~r:!i~ I'nrt~. M'prhour a ~'rlh~.rr-~~t Inin11r4 ibr jvr(yr:rrii :~nrl rc=tlt I)!, ~ntcrnal ir~icll~ipatil~il- I T 1 I I I. 8. rc to Fn thc <:*W u! I!W ['TIf'. h,~!t-~ imr-!.. W.L< in ~?ri>~f:~ I .:.nt 'i yrd nlrt.n:!rion tti if< 1oh.F $11 rr! l,!rt>i!ttir i'its!(~n vnlv

I.. !II1CI ,.!, I..1 Lt1 11. !{ti1 111~ **1 Ill!' vtlrt- (ir ttb~>r? 29 ~~~'r-ri ~?~I'.!?.IY:\ I. .~l~:~r.r !I' in [.![;xrf:~. 1v.15 \I~<>II~ r11dc.ni.r~ r11.1r r aqr tElr. flr~~ titnt. 1!1 nl~lilcrn Inilor~rhirtort 5i7 '~:l.:l~~:b,.?l "-1 id rw!! ['rr>tc~tant~ ;an8 qr rh1r 1~ :rvrgr nl' :I \ltt~llm partv, CYl r:v\v t!>:11 .-1~rlI~-rrtY!ll>?r ilbC~I\ ,if

..-.. I...

11 IVY t~:~~iitit~t~;~Il-I! ~rorlvl! inf!uc.ncrrl 1119 rc.lit.iortr

t>rlt.~~t.?~i,>n. + IV~T:V~!,~I-IC< !ii$~ly

nntl 1r.l.11 ~t

13 c>\~cr! r II rr n~ .tl>ic :r+ rlrl1r.r. 1rcn1:71 IICI lllln Suk:~rntv, thc

"Yt-~v r,,*livr in !!I(+ ~.kk:t. t~f

rr-!l<rrr rll~. rft.;rrr. tlr~sat l~i:lct rl>n IV~I~F rtl~ I?ilii.ilp?:1!* ofc tilt

1.1-1 ~mlriiinit In cl'lccr, vlt, nrn- cr-lalition
f"~.,,,,,~.. .................................It. .... 1ll.l.V. .~g:~iri < >ir!~r" rh:!rr t<,~t**!~~!ix.n. ~I~II;II-!Y~ rhr c-lctrtrt~nq, tlrcrr ncrt-%rr;*np ;ntfic.~tja,t~< u,i ncrv F~!I~Vir. stl~ulcn~t, ar.cr!.!Jrnrf tr.~tllr:r\n:~l rcliptqr~r ant! other Aivi\i(ms, Xt IF 'II-C'C!' fl! ?~%?~~~~??~IIIFII~TI srr~rlt~nr Icndcrr. .. I.,

:~nd zhvct, .I'<'TC incr c:)qin~l\ nt~~nslhiri~! ntm-hludtm-----+ .- "r.t ,? '?~::l\,~<*< beitii rht-ir t?~~r~ki~t!!.

It c7r1 tnr I~I~~I~II ~r::t!c.rl tt~ tt Suh~rro'~ c'nalit~r>n h3~ h~'r !TIC, 11 cutrrlnrlr ~n~~~rtrt:ln€, rlrrnv~it. thc Thr Im~ic ~trlurion ttt rhc prnhlr1-n (nrltlt. fill111 ihc. Ixtrpc mi! TI IT[ ti) cllic!uOc t4i~ ,tn.ll\ rtt rhcrcfnrt-m:~dc P~~CFLI>IC ~vhcn rnurrnlcs r+r rctlcll~r*n< were ullt- prrt H1I r \vr.l) 1t ha< Ii:i~~pt-nccl tn thc rnilrtnr? \lntlrr dn\r,n) wr twts-trlltl. Frr.ir, for :I dccarlc nt) nu\ (rff~tr.fi wrrv !~IC YL.W, 0r1k-r .111tl (5 h31 it< ~~t~ii~rlr-~ it< I~tn~~tcrni lrailcr rc'r~~lre~~. ,% 117i!i~:?r\ +?c.~ wa? nnt wt 111) ~i!! thr I.I!c 14)sfk cur v IvL-. 3nd tlul nur c.tdcrs k1nt11 t hc cnrlv I9ht)s. qr-~ntf thy p)litlr< utf thr In nrrrty. nnc hasSr-contl. lucr.111r.c. .131rl prt-xflgirlriF IoI>< tvrrr Fn11 ncl ntttxidc I llc ti7 t'~.rt it had II~ i1rtr;nc 111 !ltr j.ip.~nt-fc Occiipnrirn n?\f~tary qrhcrc m ,Iwunqc .r!lc ,%rnf>i~~,lnt kc- 0l'irt.n. n~trltl~ ~ntl thc ir,tti rbii:il ri~~rl trr~irlr~ nf I 045-40. ?'i~r. l~~lk rlf it< scnic~r C;~~!tlcrl I)crnocra~!~, rhc. t,.~rirm:~lirctl Irrrnrcr Di~tch cntcrprlsc.; L~I ~I~LT< foth 1' .ITC' trtt 'T1I1F rvi 1 tt'rct crcnrc,! In rhc J?p tnrce t(+pro\ rdrd tfir high-lrvcl !r>l,g. qttcr 1065, n 11h ~hc nmli ln frjlt Ilclp rlrlriid I rhr IF. ~ntls of !.I~:I ;tntl 511tnarr;t ay:lln~t :tn anr~clpqtcii i\~f~cd
....
Incrslcln. Thcv wrrc rrilnctl In lrrrgulnr w~rlnrc ~nd scn.t.d in rllc~r humr Iocallr~re. \cr ccnitr:~l sr.tft W:LF crr ~rl.rl. 5inct I hc f :rl~:tncrc. scrrc~l tbar t rlnctlon. The tcnticnc~ ... Suharto's coalition ro\v.~rtl.: "hcar!!c~snrr<." I1r~;lTi7al1rrn, and dcccnrr.ili,at~on n.lr .~crrnrual~+al In the rc.rnlr~~icln, nhcn hitndrcrk of tllillt~:tnrl~ cif

was reduced to a single

prrrlr!t -tr+~lnr~l. ~lnr~rl-arint.il, Irut mllltnnr < nuthr jrllnctl horh thr otf'it.) tl ,~rn~v of' 11ic III!,ITI~ rcp~ldic .~n~l :I v\rvrt\ nf ~rrep~l~\r fc~rccx. 111 sciilr~t~n, Iri .In Irmv crcatt.(l .ilrnnsr tlvrrn~gt\r, rhcelement: the military arnl. l~lrrnrchv. rrtrrn gc.ncr:~l ctnivn trl prwatc, wnq lrllcd Ilv pr~~v'tc nlrnrxr thr sdmc ***ncr-***Thr rcr,oluriunnry rnn~mnntlcr-11,- ch IL-f, 511 ~lirrn:~ 11. ~~:i.; nr!rri 50 tvlirn Itc ,~rth;kt po5trlon, Ar coilrrok or thr smtc. .I!\ Imnchcr of ptlvrrnt~~cnt rinpln~rrI armv thc rnd the, rcr.nlr:tion, thr. gr~rrrtlmcnt ~ntl r'lt. rnil/t:trl cifl'lcers. 'rllrtc r< nr, ilc~ul>t ihxr rhr rrrr.~r~r~linaw crppr\rrllnrrlrb< Icadr.~l-ril, wcrc-Facrrl ~v~th .t<-lttc tiroldrn~s al' Jcmol~~Zl,at\rm, .ISftlr dirprncinc patrlln.tyr- wfl~irll rhr nnsrr nF rhr Nctv Or11c.r rvr.11 nc rbf rnctplrn? cr1nfllr.1 I>cr{rcrn h~ndr~rk of wlilnr: rrnlor ptcwn~tvl to !%~h.irt~-n,~ lrcc 1h3n tlic :inti-trv~nmur~irt 3~111 c~firctfi wl~o 11.1rl nt, 1t1c-t ot rt.~irity, Ct}r a Itmg ti ti^-, and :rnti-"Suk:rrnt~icrsn\lr~ctetl trirttln tlic ni~I~r:~rr.-h:~r.r h:r~itlrctl< r-r! ! rlunp lur IT whc~ 11x1 II~J ~tfc:~ *I!' rc!i~.iininq hrr.11 ?hc kc! rmc;hib hw srl f.lr i,rcrl;E 11,s vcrl nlrra-em nndct 1'h~~ trncion~ CTC;~TCII ~~rt'rc-ihxtlcnpr from rvirh~n thc :trrn!. In ntt~lrt~dln, Srtli.~rtn .~ntI hlr; disr.i~rlitinr\ yrtllllcm.; ,ln~rihutrrl tn rhc dntcr~c IF^' afc-11 ct>hnrrs arc I)!. nOH' hcavr. rnidtltt-;~gc.tI mrn In ttrrrr cnrfv n?iit1n1c5 I~J rrllr-ll~rms t11:tt pl.rritr.il Inrilrnrr~a lw-tween \?-kc' .~nd rn~rl-f;k. wit11 I:~rgc hmrnrlrr. nirh .I srromg 5ral.c In tilc nn~l I~02. ~I:I~EIS 1!11(1. an'! in nt, nirlwl tcl icapnrrli/r thinly I>!. poliricnl

ur~sv nollntelnvCand ma kin^Cmoney to ju~r~rv rne 8 colnr nand ticlns. Tht lming Lyni ted Katio ns conden natio ,n of thc Ncw Ord mssinn in ' Timot ant 1 refusal t counfPn".l"PCCIlllllCCI InAnnmrimiIIIVIILJIU I laHlld*,.CV I.nlra1. "~ntcgrat~ d" ir hat

. .. : ir diffic~ 111 for Sul lartcr to give rhe fighr~ng mtlch publlclr).

omc. Po r a Inng time, the namr ot the Indnnrsian nandcr 01 1 the ~slal id was kept secrct from the rndonc5ian

c.. as... ~t.c~c. ,... LL. 111c rrarrles
---- and numbprs of casualties. Suharttl's t war has lifficult fr >r him to maintain I mornIe ~g thc I;( en who are acru: 11Iy carry rng nn the.. .. .. rng. No patrrrjric ceremonzes, such as rncdaT-g~vlng or puhlic rune1 -31s for b:: ~ttlt. trernt T have ht :en politic :ally possi blc: ind o the v vholc mct 1 who iac e tllr pro qpect of ( Ienth in 11 attle like t beli~ ur that tl ic~r cotlnl rry is pro ud both 4-d them a nrl nf wh: tht~ dlr
.>....
U~JIIIK. ,I..:--ll',. wrc \~rurlId -L-. not bt. xu(

-. .-

trrlwd

-. - -. then if stlr~tlnrrrc
,--* *

grow g !-(,~ngcr officers thar '9rhing.r u~~~ld go hctter if "w i charge... Thlrtl~y~ thcrc 1s the matter of the army's honor, sornethlr r, less cy nicaI officers in almost any army raE than dn their elders. The youngtr men do nt arta gove rnrnent'q policies hut they arr expecte tu cdrr? rlrclll (Jul. ..r ,lllLl I-rl mnny of them are u~ll aware of ho unpopular the ~nt Iins become. To the extent that rfi unpopular~ry 1 to attach tn the army, it is prohahly matter of conrern to them. More particularly, thc penon ... disrc ~LIW wliic h hi3 amt ~itiolis ant 1 grecdy f am11 y has I,rough t nn thc President is a sou trce of d aily emb arrnssment to these off~cl crs, w11t1: qe rnilitn ry trxinir ig empll: sizes rhc need for ..., Irlirg>..-:.",111% LWU,. * ,4 .,ICCLILIIUC ,.*a:.+. ,$A :111--:I:&-& I~IIIIL,+~~.C~JI~I~II~IT~C~S.- -- ---'' TO the extent turers sup ,f its equi that thc indil r~dual Sul mrta comes to he viewed acr bringing o1)lor {"lr' 011 th c lnstirut Ion of the army, he is in serio~is political ,Ic. advcr Irures. ,mny reel rtiar wnalcvcr nls mlStaKc5, sunaxto n as In JUC~KIC)~ ? ,.. to rhe gr meration gap, two other linrs of fission donc well hp the army, 2nd that his successor, who ought tn 1 ,e divid I. the ;~rm y. Its thrs et. geat territorial divisions (Siliwangi in a re! ;petted army officer, should tnke ovrr In an ordcri y, West jnvn, DI] mncgorn in CentraI Java, and Brawijaya in E:as~ "lrel1.l *TL11-1 rimed and institutiona1izt.d fas1jior1-l,v consensus ~ainot" *ln,-*arc cons LX~IJL,,.-.. I w:.,nl-lrar3. There are alio strong tensions between the g enerals themselver. After all., rhcy anr arc all mt mainstream militav estahli3hment in the Minisrry of ght for ar

nf th e "1945 Generation," the g pcrntion nsc and the politics! generals of Suharto's personal clique,

I 7f *1, 7.

ca rnq I;+*-, mr ron nnrl rl l%*llnn

won-independence for their count q'. dominate the palace, the cabinet and the Stare Entelligence Yl rt there art certainly tensio ns within the arm!; which a re ngen cg. Suha~ rro oncr commanded the Diponegor likel) r to play an increasingly imp ortnnt sol e. Most ir nportant and I IIOS~ mem 11wrs of his inner circle are also from th these is the \vide gap, in ter of ge, exper 'iencc, ar rd Athc ,ugh he I has attempted to keep some sort of ye w l,,,7,Lssionalism, lwtween the rni,,,,,~ .-,,AC,,,,,LC,,,, .,3.LC VNLall.,... ~P+.IIP.,,, ,.,m the divisions, members ef the other r wLl utr aldt cadets of the early 1960s. WIlile thc yoanger men, now irr thc ,ir alwa! is acknowledge ~he~e efforts. It is not surprising that those late 30s and early 40s, I~ave none of the "rt.volurionar> "' gcncr ,315 who in rccent years have been more or less publically prestige of their elders, they are much more highly tra~ricd, ar ~d critic al of Suharto-and have been punished for it-hnve come l~elieve themselves to he Far mt we prr~fc: ssiorldly Rrawija ya (Gen. St~mitro), and Siliwangi (Generals They ?hare no particular sense ( 7f cornr~ icshiy wi. tion, Dli: srsono, and Kemal Idris). Their crlricisms have Indeed, there are a number of go ,od rensor IS why his :-d. ... and el ncouragd student criticism of the government. ;-111 their eyes may he quite low. Ptrst, the .,.,,,,...,rn.atr,r;evlequrpnlcr ,I, 3 111 S~li wang~ Divi5ion is especially important because it anc 1 irainrng of the army have been allowed to nln scrious l y contr -01s the province of Wet Java where the capital city is do1 vnhill since the 1960s. It is likely that some ynunper offlce rr; locat ed. (The actual metropolitan area is under another kli leve that if the New Order has rakcn goorl tart of tl IC comr nand.) If rhc rumors art me that it is primarily Siliwangi erals, it has neglrcted the army. Secondly, it is an opc ,n and Brawijaya troops that are heing sent off to fight in Timor ret, even in Intloncsia, that the invasion of t ,Ire for~nt :r (and taking heavy casualties there), one can ma pine rhat nrpuese colony of East Timor in Decemher T 975 was rcscn trnent of presidential favoritism far Diponegorn is being L'Lll itary disaster. The army's inahili ty in the s~cceedi,,~.." *...,., avu-" v.arr:rl,ared. ah alf years to crush the Eretilin independence fighters, or evc ~nflicr between the Defense Ministry and the "political car' ture anyof their leaders, let alone win over the populntio~ As" is l~a~ically a matter of institutional rivalry. Career has compounded the younger officers\c)ncerns. There a1 ars, primarily concerned with the military's own internal reaqons for supposing that they have attributed this rn~lirary rvcH-t~cing and development, are concentrated in the ministry. tjumiriation to the bungling and incompetence of their elders, On the tvhoPe, they shun the spotlight and emphxqize "the

ue Yo. 63 I5

CIITPF" :111(l ~)~IXI'RIIC~:ICII-~C'XIYI-I'I~OTK. I ~ICY nrt ~nctit~rd to II'~IO~P th:?r rntlli incrmcnl for thc prt.~i~lrt~ti.!t rltvt.rrcrrm. ncpnn \tm>ctl I rlrt c-u r ~~rnjlr-rcrr~-h:tr, prr-.oti.~l rrrilnrrFlon<. Suh~rrtl. tiow Conimandrr-in-C:f~~cf Sur~mo was \vt~r rlut of tllv 1111llt.irv t~rr. h~rltl-LVIC Il~i1'1,-v 11i pr~sdrnr 1~ \v1-11 1% hciry ;I hicmrch! lntlr n prepntvcrlrrr pcwt ~uprn-~~in:;'ct~c.t~~t sca~rlnrd *rrvnn of tvrcrr1,tl .~rm\ 1 3 ro c~vt 11 in~self nrlf I~V pol~t~c~. ltv\? 11.1rniin~: (4 ,111 T~C ~f I !cn~t! ,~f pi~~on:ll ptnrrvr. :1n4 ,rvcr~ct Iwctlmin~ thr prrq<,r ICT rlf ?Irc :~vnly thc Sr.~tc I11rcll1ycnt.t- ;1~cnr~ :inJ Cllicf of Srnff (r.c., ac.rlr.tl cr*~rbrrctE .tra)ilnt I hrm :I p cr\~>i~al mi of cr~nrrcjllc-r) trt Kr-pl.,,~mrllv **Irnvr-**Il:-rn pni In :flc I~~rrd< (11 IHHC crnrr.~ls. ir ho hnvc ~ptt~nli/rd nett ~n TII.II ,. 8. op~r:!tion~, I~it in prfinn. rhr, fr-:~rcrl Lcrlcml 'rrr~~:;i k~rrrrrno (.\II !\tiirrlc:l n wch nrcaq ,is ~rrtrtllyr.ncr, w~ppl. f~nqn~.~, nnrl in~lttar\ pu1ic.c.. an.~lop wr~irld Ilc nrnlring rhc snnic. rnzn \~r~tuliqnett!~htw. ~tc nor Jcp+irt.r~r~t< th,tt mn:nrtrr-nrn .lrmy mrli I:oltF In rhc. 1:1:1 ant1 tbc. CIA.) TllpJ~ c.~cr~crnI< Ctrlrnv rl~ar rheir ptlwc-r :111d Mc.lnwhlFc, nrhirmr* nrrcqts of rtutfr.nr5 ~nrl rrcpc-ctcd prtxrI2y rcst \sfiolI\~ rtrl t?~c. Prc.r~dcnt's rtl!:rical .;un rr..il. 'l'hr tIt~s~dcrir tior~l~~litic"i ~ZVC cont~nucd trn~llatrrf rincr t5r rr~!ttl l.nr~tv thcv will urt .I hvnrl. whrrrvcr 111lld~ th~ prc~tdrnr'~ r~-~Ic'~tit~ri. Thcrc-Irc ntl ricnq of :I \of~rnirlg on rt~ic. prcsit2cnr.. Whrn 111rtcr r~t.;rlric.; anlong thr gcner.11~ h,~uc tronr. 1 Ilc trrcnrl is ~n rhc nppo dart-t rlcrtl. I+t.firrr :hr putll~c. riotzl~lr rrt 1073-74 ant1 14)78, they llt3~!<.rn ili I< flll~ oi' r~2mplr< <>! **,81%lorll. :~ltcn:trctl t hcir lvcol)lt.s, t~ut .tiso thll 1-\1crvt hlng thrv cnliltl Sunl~rru in I(";.?-74, Cicneral Siirilnr~ in 1Q:R) .lp,lmrr thr-~ulacr rn rn:~kr.-I peat-rt'ul i.lrangc of tulcfi .:ant1 pr>lickr rrnposXg1 pdiri~~t>s 1 bl~nvi. :11!. l;iv)rr~! 11; llt~rtt,~~, on IHHII o~.cxion<. Dinh I)icm, !.on Nnl *:incl S* ngrn:ln I?)ict. **nrc-**1mlt8 stllnc ru.bmplt.%. It i'.; I~kclv rl>:~r Sttharral I\ rnn\lnK rnrtr jwr wrh n pl~it~on llr i13n nt+t cot>~rrt11rr4n~l11 lc scv!.:cCd fllr nnntl~cr

Yc~rtc rrf rlicsr irrrcrri2l tli\irtcrrrr wirhin rlrc ,trrricil forcrc, ir tk t c*\rq, j~f 1% tJrrt ~\nr~l,civ thar hii nt!c tvill IIV :~l)lc to

fat:~l, ln~t iic~rlirr nrc rlrcv rcrnrlraldc. As Srih:~rtrr IS vcrlv much WFISI IIICTCIII~T fnr cI11n~:c r? 11 Icln~. 1,~ Scnr, TIT? thc r~rrr ~imr

nwrnrr, \ ~th tl7c ~?lrllr rrgr,ttir$n of t!iv rrqt of !I~F cjnr-:lmc undrr rbc h'cw Orrlet, thr p11vtrnlltcnl .innj~~~nrt.d tllnr :In

coalition. it rnxy I>c tcrnptlng for romr mitiray officer trl try ass.tss~n:~t~on plot h,~rl hccn tI~ccnr.crc~l a vrlilng Ilu
[IF put toyctcthrr a r~cw ~cl:ll~;t~rln, coup. .issacsln:ltiR'V rh.rr~rcl wrrh plnnnin~ tcl htvnh f!~c prrcit!t.rrr. hrc ~v~fc. ~rld

me.xn. If war rhi\ fr.~l+, nlorc ~11311 an* rhlny c?rr. ~vhich !a. nvcrnl h~b~rsc~ of prrr\t~tur~ori.l!) \Yl~rtlicr :in?. ~rh plnr :~ctlrnll\ cslrrc(l 1s a m:itrcr c&F c+r~rTjtrrrlrc, 1)11r thr nrlntluncr-~ncrlt .;hlwhint! nhr cr.irLlnrrn uf J.~riilnr!. 20, 1078. 'fhat this fear what rhc p.llacv Icsn.

r.cm.indicsrv~l tn cvrnr.; aftrr S~r!lnrto'<
Shnultl Suh.trtn bc .t~~:~q.;inatrtl or cllr In r3ihc.r. it Ir rnrtcr rucc.r.rcnr:irlc'cnnF of ~LF tlrvn rc-t!rct~o~i 35 prccirlcni in iinf~kelv rli:rt rl~c liyljr-tvcietii Adnw hlalrk., .lln dcc;#rlc crltltr M:~rcll. Ir tr rt~th .I ~Iinrc :tr thrw t-uttnr.; flint tvc m;ty I~tr~ngly rli:in rile E'rcsi~lcnt, tvnrilri I)v nllorrrrrl to r~1rcr.c.d h~rn. The way rim~=ltrdr. For CIS-h cv~~n~ !IO~T q~i~tc clc~rlv 1h.11 511hr~t3 15 \vrlrhtl hr oprn for n hirtcr and prwqbhl~ hlrwlcfr' ~rn.\:lylc f,lr drrcrlninrrl trl cu~l~inuc wirh. or sccs n0 :~lter~latlvr tu, ihr po\r.cr nrncmc t.rrnrrr~di~ry rnilit:~rr ~T(HIP~. Anrl tvr s!lrlutil not rnurrc hc ha5 pursrrcd over t3nc p:wr fctv !r:ifi 'Tfie rcpinw rc.rrivrd ,ITI ilnp!c~s.lnt jolt zvhci~ S~~ltan nc~lcct [hi* powib~litv .t WLI 1) lc'[ It! rot1 ngrr i>t'flct-fi, who rn~~r't~r atrtmp rcr 1>1111c1 '1 nrw ptdiltt 11 ct~:iT!tion on I~C I~RTI~ of I tarncnek~~ Rt~rvonr~ nf Jtlf:jnknrta, itmgIn \?nrr!l that he zvrn:lrl nor rtnntf fnr tl~r-~r rlai~~i~ to rcvirr hrrncrrv in gowrnmcnr, rcrclir rhr nnrlrln

r~~lcctton. '1'11~ .irtriL*ttncrnlcnr. IVIIIIC ~ldcli~~~nc "rr.~s~rn~ (it' from pccdv fnrcipcrs. .!rid, for .I \vh~lc zr Icnr;t. rcstort. popular

hcalrh." niadc it c(i11tc p!:izrt tEinr ~thr \1t1<[1 rc\p~ctrtl S~~ltan lihc.~ir~~, :at leaxt rr, lnd~wlts~,l'c troublcd rniddlv clnsws. ~t nnl to

find lrecornc dir:~lfcctr.tl From thr govrrniilcnt, and urae no hr-r huge, Itmpsuffcr~ng a!!mrlln ~lcrpulntion.

fr~ngrr willing ro shoulrirr rrrpnnfor ptrlicirs hr cvpposcd. In chtjocmg .{ ilcrv vicr-!~rc~r~lrrrt, Suhnrrrk h.lrl mrprc or Ir\r thc I'nllnwing chnircs- ,I wrll-knrwn Ficurt. trtrm nnc of thr. pnlitical pm-rlt*<. IIIc~II\ fro ti^ [Itc 5t11din1 !-'Ill'; vrv wnv*r gvmrral with 3 rrl~t~vclv pard rrpur,~tion, crr :in "intlrlwnrlcn~" rv~tliout :Iny qrrong pnl~tic.:~f Support of his rrtvn. 'I hc !IK~ I-hoice wtlultE 11;lt~ rr.twr\cntc.ri nn nrrcmpr ra woo h~r crlrics. rhu sccimrf wr>r~ltl h:ivr mrazit that lie 1~x5 (.3rrii1llr, smnnrhin~ thc psth for a nlccrwor. Thc rhirtl-rvh~ch v..~ rhc choice artt~ally ma~lr tn rhc ~wrsoti of rlir g~rnt!an~s cu-f:~lrcign 3lin1ster hd:~rn 13:ilik- r~~.vr:llrd fh~.t Sulr:~rrv rnisrcd no unc wrrh rcnl pnl~ttcal wcighr In st1 rrrltepc B f1091~11m. an11 xva? ~lctrrmincd 11) nrle rrrr rhc irldcfinitc future. St~nrrly after his rt-rtrcrirm. Suh.trttl annr>uncrd 3 new r~htnrt. Far from rrprrwnrzng an atrenipt to u-idm h~s rhrunltc.11 potitic:il hasc, it t~orc all rhr char:irtcrixrirs rjf a rtf!inlr rlndrr sicp-. Ir cnntair~rii f.~r mnrr grner.~ls rtl.in its prrtlecr\snr, and thcct. ~el~rml~ W~TC :tII rncn~kwfi of rhc nld palscc cliqu~'. tVhnt ncw iacr~ I-mcr~rd wvrc nia~nly c.rcnarurc< rrF I;cnt-ml :\I1 hlurtttpo'c ~ntclligrncc app?r>tltc. In a s!pnil~cxnt c)nlcn t'rrr rtrr lun~rc of rllc Indoncs~nn prcss. ~hlitrtnpo himsclf hccamc minlrter of intr)rmatxe~n. 1.07 t31c Irrv rime tn Indoner~:~'~ h~rton rhr ininir~ry OC rclyinn (an c-Ill Slu\lrrn I>niliwiclc\ rvnc ritrn to J

Relincse ttmplc rclief ~howing Drrrch cnlonilcrs drinking her (ca. 1910). Holland ruler! Indonesia far over 300 years.

NOTES

\1Jrit~ Htmk puinrc nirr, wl~ilc t11c government uurl thc cmr ra \how i~ ws SCC~OUF allnut supprmin~ corruptinn, no nar~n~laf-lcwl IIulo~ oiLrid

On thc tnnsf~~rmaticrn of the rcvnlutianary xmy, ker the ho* cver hccn prn though trRulog'< corruptiori I< lcpcn+lar_r..
mnfistcrl:kl ,~nirlek nf Kuth 'I'. MrVqv. "l'he Pmr-Revnlutionow **10. Vm10. Vm10. Vm10. *Vm* J or[- I~rmcr. I.~nu.~v 25, 1977. Tr:irlrform:trion or rhc 1rl.rlont.sinn Amp," l'~rr$ I 2nd El, *in I)>rf~>n.rrn. I I 1 I. For dctails. wc In$ro>rpr;r I c-n?mmir r'rncperts nnd ~hr Slarrrf nf (April lt'?l 1, pp. 131-76. :\ntl I3 (April 1 Q7?), pp. 147-HZ. tlrrrrr,ln R;~l.>f~ (W:tuhinpft~n, F).C:.: Ccntcr for Intvrnatirmal Pul!ry.

2. Fnr trlnrlsrinns nF thr "cnwp Croup'c" drcrccc, ~PP "Srlwted lnternntionnl Policy Heprlrr. Decemher 1 976).
Docttmenrs Rclar~ng ro rhc Srptcml)cr 311th Movcmcnr IIKI 11s Fpllopc," 12. Vig-ura ~lrnwn irom tlrc tc~rimony of IIencdict R. O'C:. 11ndcrcnn **I>ltIo?~cia* I** (April 1 **Ofifij, pp. I** 3 1-204. in **tirrnmrr Iilphrr nl I?II~R~I~~TIII mtd tt't. I'hiirppirit.r.** tlcnrin-p Itrforc rhc

5. I'nr ilctnilq nl the rcnrgnnirarinn, :tnd a discuwion of its Strhcclmmittcc on lnternntionnl Organtnat~nlir of rllc (:rbmmrrtcc rln
~rnpl~catinn~. %cc "Currcnt Slat3 on t llt: Inclhnr\rnn Army l-'l~tc nftcr rhc 1nternstiun:tl Relntions. I Inuse of Iicprr-entaz tvcr (Dcceml~rr I H. 1 975. Kcurp:tn~!:~tlnn of 19b~-1970." Indr~rrr~rrr, 10 (Orrrrtwr 1?7F1), ;wtl May 3, 1976), W:rshingtori. D.C.: (;nv~+r~irncnl Printinp Office, 19761, rl pp. lug-208.

p. 72.
4. Scc I'ranklin 11. Weinqrtin. Itrdont~in /Ihnwfnn~ Con/rorrr~~rrov 13. Sec R. Wjlliarn I.idrtfc, "lnrlonfiis 1977: Thr Ncw Orrlrr's
(Ithac:~: C:umrll Mrbdcrn In~lc~ncr~r l'rirjcct lntcrirn Rcport, 1969). Swnnd P.irliamcnrnn7 Elrctivn," Asir~tt Srrrvr,v. 18.2 (Frltrunry IPi'R),

Thc Ilrrt crutlic., of rt~c 1971 rlectlnn.. nre Mm:~rh~ Nish~harn, pp. 175-85. 3t p. 181.
(:olRar atld thr Ir~dowt~n~r~r I-lvrtic~nf u/ 1971 (I tt!a~.a. (:crrnrll Moclcrn 11. Thrs hitrcr ~li~illusionrncnt with the tcchnocrars is vlvirllv lndoncria Project hlonttgr~rrpll SC~I~F. I671 ) : rntl Kcr~ W.brrl, Tbtn 1071 aprrs.;cd thmu~hour *the I1 1r!t~ IEnnk.** I lrctron rn I~rdunt,rra ~rn hirrt ,l,rw I.,~rr 5rrrdv (Cl.~yrnn. I'lc1ori3-15. Thv l:~r rr l~sred 1)rlow~ :[re Fnlrly rnndnrnty ~rlecrcd. Thcv arc l\4nnx4i I'apm on Sourhca~r A~i:i. No. 2, lg73). %Inst of rtic olwrv.~rionq drsw inter 31i:i from An\l~.f~on'~ i.~ngrvwi~naI icrrirnnny c~rcd al5ovc; 11cl~~w nrc Ibnwtl 11n ~IIc~. ~lic nrticlw trv William I:olllcr, "l'oo1'1 I'r~~lrlcm~. Vnrrnploymcnt nnd rlrv

6. Src Ufsr(l, 7%~ l p71 Flr.crion, ch3prt.r 9. Cirecn Hcvnlutinn In Rural Jnvn," ant1 Ily Jno E. Rt~hcfc, Trrcnct. I!, tlull.
7. The Nahdnrul lllnrns'c vote actualtv rose from 18.4 ro 18.7%. ant1 Lukos Ilcndrato, "Who Dlcs nC Wlrxt ant1 i\rhv." rn I'n~lrrir IJakart:r).
8. For :I ucrful an:lly%~c of thc "'jtr~nr .rnturr," :zml 01 tIie ktrucrurc Q (Mar& 1')7H), pp. 3H-52 anti 2657, wh1c.11 wrnrnari~c c.~rl~cr rcscnrch
r>f cxpitfliwn in Iatc New Ortlcr tlrtloncGn in pnvr:~l, rcc K~clr:~r~l findlnp; ant! rlrher wurcfi. Rot+r\cln, 'Tl'r,ward a **I:ln<** Analyw c~t the Indnncsmn M~l~tary t h. Scc Andctson'< ~ongrcqsional tcctimt~nv. p. 71. nnrc.:luur~r~c Statc." I~rdont.rrrr, ?S (April lt)7H1. pp. 17-41). 17. Sce Lidrilc. "lndnnrrin 1377," p. 17'1.

9. For morr ticr.~lls, rcc tllr If l-lw Ilcrrlk IJ/ rlv 197R StrrBnrtts" IX. For ~llurninntinp ilrraits on thc prcfitlrnrinl farn~lyk tinmcial
Stnr~Ir. in Indorir~m. 25 (April l'r7HI. pp. I 71-HZ, eqp. at p. 1 55. Rf rhc hi~li-rolli~~p. qcv Rot~i "Tu\r'arJ~ 3 Class Analvkts," pp. 30-32.

Issue No. 63

homn Iralna. tlrc "kilt{

hc dirwna rtmr nns rnckvn Ind~r- ncwan pnl~rrcal c~rclcc; in ~hc lnrr yiqr ir fintllny vul>trwldm in manv fxt is of rnro srrcrr-cc~rncr Folk murn-. RC[I~OEIS ICRI~CR a5 swll nr arricr~ nrc rabinq t~p tllr rrfrfin of' c~pporlt~trn trr l>rr.~t~lrnt Suhnrro. In thc v:lr~ctl farms In wt~~ch rhc rnc IF F{IIIC~L'~~, ~t r~rikrt drrp rcsrxnanct-arnnng Irz ntldicncrs. wltr, II~F ijn won!^, strnp :~nd rvcrrts whtch rhc youernmcnr cIac5 rlor nllmt. to hc p1111l1cval. rvh~lr t t~e rnrllrny rrlcs ftttilclt. to srnp it.

I hxvc rr-rirren rhrc pnmphtrt t,ccnurr

rhc inr;titu~iort< of ptll>li~ ripiriion :ire ccngcrctl nr~tli ~.ol>wt-ls. Pcoplc 5pcnk In n4lrllrr. l'n sprak yoitr mind hcconlc< .I t-rmfvqs~r~n. t f rntlcrcm ir allarwerl only ihrouyh clff1ci3F chnnnclr, lifc will Iyr likc catinf: vcprtnltlcs w~ttiour s3lt, I Iimr wrrrrcn t?~s: pamplhrt hcr.lusc pamphlets **arr-**not tall~>tl for ~OC~C.

I Ion~ I'or csrricr pipcons. izlv h:iricls,

lrch tt* usc slgnnl flap. 1 yc:rrti Firr thc rmokr 5ign3Es usrtl Iw thc Indianc.

foldctl handr...

Itf S. !Icndr:i, 13ne I nd(~t~m~:~'s ITIOST

pnyular prtrrs :~ntf ~ll.tywr~ghrr, rccrntly rc~.brcd thlq ant! otbcn nt !I:< pocrns to :in rnthorinxr~~. audirnct. rbf 2,F;DI) in Jak.~n:l. 'fhrcr ~lnv\ Intr-r, nn hlny 1, 1?17R, hr was a~r hy the rnr11t.try. 1%~ rrul~lic~~. nr&lcr, thv In(Iont~~.tt~ nicrle.~ msv nor mrnrinn 111c nnrrw. frr tliat of ci.vrr7l rlthcr npprflltltln fig~lr~r. I.t~nc a crirlc 1)1 rflc gu\t"~~nient. Itendn nnt hten prr- miriel! tt? per!orni hic play< in hit nnrivr j~l~t~lil~t:l for yeam. Wrth vlmrriutj\ di*;\,~tlrFn~.r~r~n now rstrnrl~nl! much fur- t5rr rl1:tn dcmon~fratlnq ~rl~ilrnrq ar~d tli~;!*f~vr~.~l grncral<, it< artistic csprrr~ioti prt~\brlkcr f'lcrrr povcrnlnrnt rcprcwion. :\lril Suiletmr>, com~nanrlcr (II Indnnt.rrl0< ftnrcd sccurlrv forte. Fiarnkarntib, jtt~t~ficrl Rrntlr:i's :IrrrLt 1110 wIftnF thnr t~iq ~vorb lr "frlll rlf ~rruirth- mcnr5." 'I'Jlc j:ik.lrta +I~Cimry C:rrmn~anri espan~lcd on rbt~ " .;tt~fC can lracl ru unrtrr nnrl social conflfcr~. It givrq ~wnplc thc wm11,p picrtlre of thc rrrulrr oi dcvclopmrnt." Ic:irhcr ~han silrnce thc prntert inp rnic~%. howcvrr, thc prrvcrn- m~nt'~ action sccms ro create nrw nncs. Cln j .~nu:irj, 24, 14 \earlinp inrt.l!rttunlc and :~rrisr< rlgncd n y~rhlic qrarrrncnr r~l>lrcting to rhr cl(r5urc ot rnnlrrr RI'~I~F- pnpm :lnrl :~rr~-ts of hz~ntlrcils cd s~ri- Jrnrs, I'op~har mllslclnns hsvt. ~wvtittrn sonp to prorcst govcrnrncnt rcnstl~liip ol' critical films nnd nrt rxhihitq. In rhc p.m >car, Prcs~ctcnt S~shartn xnrt his fnrn~ly havc hccn rhe ruh~cct nf tllrrrt crlticrcm fnr rhr fifit timr sinrc Al~nric Sun, Oh ,111nttc Stin, .I weer

Suli:lr80 charnr fr, pntvrr in 19Clh. Il~l aunttc,

Tlrn, Sulr:arttr's IVI~C, 11as gainrtl partlcu!.ir l-'vt.r?.dav ir r'nen)~vd 113 FP(IT~C.

nt>turicr\, hccauw of I~cr curr~icivr ant1 C;[~r.r uulfinq tjnt14 norrn,

shady hurincsr dcalin~. L)uhl>rtl M:tdninc 7 11t.n ~rr.11gh1 to I ht' Irra~~t)-' parlor

'I'cn I'erct-nr in rhe carlv 1t370<, slir !\:IS for :I mil< l>:~th.

rccrntly hren rrn:~rnrd Il~u 5Q-50. .A pop-;\unric Sun, nh ..211nrle Sun. an dcriv uldr rrrck gnup, Tr~o Rimtln, wrorc a :~llntlr., sane at>l~ut It~u Ticri wll~ch !la< circ~~ latcd St) ;lcrrzrc. in qrr nlanv diifcr~nt wirlcl\r arnrlnp studcntr dmp~tr **a envctn-**n~cctin~ and club<,

IIC:II LOTI. (Ih ,Iirr~tic Sun. ;I rnr3drl a1tnritL.

-

1 src no rrasrrn tn rcinain silent. 1~1th nwnr bnn nn ~ts pctiunn.lncr or **pub-**l*lt>rn~ng, noim, and nlght,

dinrncrr~il and c-rt~\hrd ~t~l:~c.

C;r+l~l, arid (tm
:trth ltcr lwinc*I. rcclcmq, dirccr~~r~., anti hrnkcn "Tycoons, directors, and brokers,

.2rr rlo\rn on i hvrr Lri~c-f <~rClni~ttbn~l ttl Auntit. Si~ii

Are down on their knees

,luntltn Sun. 011 .\unr~r. .sa1n. a ~tvI15lr .rtrntle. Yrvrr I cci~ un7i.ill r\~rr*l>tltlv, T;rp~i\a~ty r11c t,ld an(l rt~r-vrrrlntr. nh ,\urir:c Sl~n. 011 .l~rnt~r. .Iunrlr 5ttnto -Auntie Sun."

h$c:~ntvl.~~le, rlic nlrm 1wy1 I:irforn~ trF rnu in bn~l(mc~~ I, !\ntvun ,I% ''~i,rt7i;,{71r'' I>r~aurr-~IC 115 ~li;ir.l~t~r:~l~~ h~a1.1. ,it>nn- rlrr.sr %t,nrr in,! ptrcrnq Tmth C'I-TI.FS ,L~ICE rlirn~ntprrpr~lnr Lnrtercst In thr CIW 1,c.at. II:I< nl~n I,ct.c)mc :I tnctliun~ r~l lnqulr**-111** CX~VI~I~III~: II~~LI~I of-pi~sit~on 'I (I rn:lny J.1r~nr-;c, thr "5:tw~ro Afl.iir" 1s disscnt, rcachln!! rjut to hupc .~udicnci.~ In rncrlr In t 41r rrmntrwidc. 11rlwr.vc.r. proof lrhnr rhc z+alvjr, Iprrwcr) oiF rhc mnrkt-tpf~cc-5. ~rmolrrh tc \r.cm1~hr (1' : ht. pvrrnlnvnt Sulinrro rcclrrw hac .;lip!>rtl rltlr rlf Its hctnlc5 Ithnrn~ Imnia, rhr I ?ll-!i XL kc(? 11~ drr~vvt from i!c7t~qyifnt, " rct4b 1 ~r~.ventc~l .111\, (lirr-t t t'Yprc'FT1OR oh rlic rtimh1~13rinn of S:~ruitn'r hziic :I$ +a c,cns~mhip ol :r frlri~ tlcpictinl: I flc I~lr. (11 ;I L!~w;~r YIT~ I. hrvutri.r, fatnr rnvqtic nnrl tr:~tlitinn,tl Jlv-tnc~r ctmcr!- TtTC'Ct ptqn.cln w'h .i runt-. rsf prrlrltrtl xhytr crf d~rs~r~ ~rt.~k rb~n~i~l~ 1hc tirvns of ptwcr. Thc grrvcmnrcrir'~ rrac- r~hng<. lnclt~clcd jn :I rcccnr t.l rc II,rl.' cn'ort <+ti ~L>IcI< ~ioil ~nJicntc-s that it, irw, nkeq J.tvnnr /Istl\l (F Eur~iqn Ryhrq): ' 1r1i idc.a~ scricsurl!'. Sawltr, Irrr~ird l i~ I loti{~r human TEP~LSI%<+ r~kcn cIr~rn.tt~c rortti in nor n r1ircr.r pr~liricnE rlirvnr, for lir h:~r no ?~c~-,ltilllIf! 11r." < ILY~?~. T mt~ltlTc- pr.rrnnal fo!l~w~n~. Ilc \rras nor rvm \vi. arc all frcc ropnl~ ricnl idc.a~ scricsurl!'. Sawltr, Irrr~ird l i~ I loti{~r human TEP~LSI%<+ r~kcn cIr~rn.tt~c rortti in nor n r1ircr.r pr~liricnE rlirvnr, for lir h:~r no ?~c~-,ltilllIf! 11r." < ILY~?~. T mt~ltlTc- pr.rrnnal fo!l~w~n~. Ilc \rras nor rvm \vi. arc all **frcc ro** C[IOI)S' ~yt (8 ~,IS.~IICV t~tii \~-n.iri? ~lth a pol7111:1r rr~tlrlt known 11ntEl rhc povt-rnmtnr rhc H'~V of II~C H'T IC-~FII :~iuvn :I\, I% cuwrnfl* on tlccutlcrl to prmrCutc firm. !-1.t-n (.nJ ~Iw\n'r r(~rnpci fiir "iuln crlrnr pr~nr~lr.~h!c *T?IT pr~)wCver, $15 scnTnr7 In thrrr nctlrbnk. r7:h. t t15 1 !TI L~IC s~tlm~~~t~t! Ir prcwtnp mthn n~ow ~l.in~a~~nrr t!~:~n h~s n lcrrcr to Suharrn ur!ilny hlln to rtbqn. rctlucqt t113r St~hnrtci rcsiFn. 1'rl:tl rcrclrlns Apply r hc P:rnr..rsrln rlcnir~cr3cy Of ~rkc.TI, tlm zcc tluc-~ not .ippc:ir arr rl.~~ly pnckcri rwth rri)\rrl< nE rnlhu- .IF I ht. f'r,t~ntl.tr~lrn rif cwr r.otlntry.

p.~rt~oi~+rl\ <~tllt~.fin c or t-\chn ln7rrt4>ttng. r~artic ~t!ppnrrcfi R htr chr-t-r P.IC~ ~CT rbf
Doil't Iiccp 'tprnt: rnv:?vrnt:) Itlir 5.t~ itor tn,~n.t~~ctl t,) pcmuadr < ~tlcl\ pcrl irtcll Iwnv l~ln In. rlrc un rcpcnranr tlir frcrtlr*rn tr! (lrtjrnr ~CFII~ crvrP fnn nrr VICC 11rt+51rlcnt 1 Jat 13 S:iw~~u. R!' t~rinF;ng hini tc~ tr~.~l, thc
I)CC':IIIFC it 17 111 ~onflicl wit11 hum:~n
anrl A<-> IC.l(+<-fi (TI' Inil~mc~~.~'\ ,Alti!):IS crcattarl n nctv (1it:nity. rtl,* ~?n .I* te3~Jlr rc 'rri~l tt~t I'rott-t ITI~ !nil pr)lrriczt flgiirc, urhnsc ~rcrn~nqlv Irrlrbrm- C!tllr~e+c, crlt~tcht\, to rrvn Iris duc~~~ncnt 31 .In(! qr!r\ritlc sttar hq on : hc vcvrcrn-Iturnan rij~hi 1 Alr/imigh *t!itmrnt srrllt~ ~+~ilt~~t.~lly dc-cp and rcwn:int Thc l'rccdnm ol' qpccuh (rhlr.5 3 rliat \ rrvitu h ttl ~riikctl rlrcm inso ugnmg rh(rrt1r tn thr. t nilone.i~:~n public. 0 Itt1n1:1n r~el~r) rhc Icttcr, rh-ir ~~FCISI~C~ haw nor Wc:trv nll frctc Irk iIn anr tlrin~

1;rct.c.i'fotn re work (rhar's a human I ryh t 1 \t"r-: :trc Crrc tfr d~l anl.thtng :I< long 2% il tlocr;tr't cnnn~~ r ~~th th~ I'ancns~l~.

I,.~sr Dcrcml?cr (1"77), rhir Font WIF torll~rlrlcn rn Iyr FIT(I;ILIC~~ t111 trkvi~ir>n, I~rt thc rrnsr,rrliip 113~ nnF!' nladc Ir more pc'pll t.11.. SII~) 4-x prrx-iitir~< of i!\w-r~t bt, ~scst- rrnii-cri In~cll~ct~r.rl% :inl) t~rhn :Irrhrrr hnvc lrlatlc ~n~p~~rrant ~lrirt< in tflc lcciri~i~a~-v 111v Strh3rtlt rt.pitnr. Ttrr Irr "~ntr 1% 1 ~.rt~ci~I C'!~.ITIC~~ in thr- rcptnc'~ wlf-im:icc. At tlrr 1;3nlc II~IIC,

Note

TI1,. 8uku I'utih (Il'l-i!e Souk) ir tllr ~itr~Tr~ ~vosr importrrnf danfr~~i.tir to cortzr r~rt n f IESP politicilI disr rrrl7r;zrcer rr~ Intiow~sfn **rndy in danfr~~i.tir to cortzr r~rt n f IESP politicilI disr rrrl7r;zrcer rr~ Intiow~sfn ***rndy in* S 978 /I ltl~o~rgl ir is f(rrrr;ully ,a .vtr~trmr~lt or11,y (I/' tl~c The cover 1971 6&S tutZcnt Hlhi te Irr,r, h,.. publ irheri nj' rlrtn Rrtndrrr~~,

.S'~rrdrnt f nrr~icfl In.clrrrttr nf 7'echnnnlfl tIn17').

it rlrp

ir trlqrl i~mpottt7nt RS of

**CounciI of fiantSung I nstittr tc nf Tcc~,no~~,v rt.prr3~rnts rEv w~~ritnrtltr 01 srittl~nt ?no?~r7~t.ntCounciI of fiantSung I nstittr tc nf Tcc~,no~~,v *rt.prr3~rnts rEv w~~ritnrtltr 01 srittl~nt ?no?~r7~t.nt* 0s R

wlrolr. It ~n i~lrl;r-ntio?t thr rbnngrs in th~ sfridrnt mnnmtrrrttr drtrina tlw p~rsr st3mtr y~'rlrs. HJ/?rtf it fim~

I>ugi~n tn stir in 1970, tlrr rr~tdenr Jrtovettrmf wzr cnnc~rnrd

1. Suhccrto

pnmnnrily with pnvrntm~rrr comrprron. ir~ tune ulnc mornfi~tic

and nrrnn~t apoIittc,rl** Ry 1974, **stridrnr ikrui~s Jnrl1iriipr.1I ~rannnrir nnrrnnaljsnl. n111-y I?, 1978 drd s;rtrrzrtn 11inlsrIf The students of the RIT dcclarr rhat they do nut tn~t beco~nr tbr. tarpt of i~ttli~k. Mort-sipi]icrmrl,y, the rzlwrnr and du not want Suharto to he Prcsidcnt rsC rlic Ttcpuhlic of rirrt?~n1 ~t~nvmmcnt !WF sr,!)jrrrrrl riat. r')ttin3 strrrctrtr( of* Indancsia again. Zl'r~trrw-inspitrrl n?rd FV't,:rtcnr-ori~r~ted t+conatnir pnlicy to N Thr stvlc of a national leadcsslr ~p rhat 11s conucnmatcd all syst~r~cntir crirtqtte, rlw jjnf itr t2 ytvn of rttrilirntjr ntlr. prrwcr ln its own hnndr haq cr~pplcil the offiri:il c.c~nrrifl~tiona[ Huku Putih is nrtdi?cinrt~ find nt tlw snTniq irm~ seller rrnd polirical forces.. tliiq ccntrali~ation of pol~rical pr~wcr ss clcme SY~~OI~S. 1 8f.n us it^ critic-01 a?~,rlytis uf povrrnment policy is simply to safc~sard itf own continttation. contprtrnt. soplisticnirJ 17nd closely ~~r,iprd, itq asc of In addition, tl~r life swlc of die Family of** ilr. Prcridcnt Fntfonesirr n snlloqrli,rli~t~r T r?trrf?v il pnprrlari~f ~rrrssible docu-Suhnrra has had a great sociocuItural Impact on the major1 tv of rnrnt. 11s i~ttilrk otn .\ rtlv~rro ~tld I~F t~~cl~nocru~s is dr~~nt~itin~, our people. 1 Its \Sit harrrl'sl nepotism tarvards his chiltlren and hrrrrrts~ ir rrddrcrs~r.5 tl~inr irt Jlfir~iliar, rr!~nmt rwprrritrrnt. irnJtt, younger ~iMing hat hum rop~cd tty many Fovcrnmrnt nffrcisls 7b mpficrr Irotl~ rlsppcrs nf rl-r dol-~mvwr in n I~rnired cpacp, wt, of all ranh, such as c ;avrrnors, Bupari. vrllnp hcndmcn. and so Ilrrw rfrosr~r to rrmng orir rxrrrptr trot in t/rr> nrdrr tlrr-y Irtrth. The f~t that thc family of f'rc5~dcnt 5uhnrto has becarnc nppctrx bt~r nrcnrrling tn !l)r mni~r ti-rrnr~r o,! tilt. documrnr ns ?UP vast\v wealth! ~incc he bcczrne llenrl of St~tc some yeilrr a~o st^ slrrrt. ?'Ire- r~oYEtirs whirl) lrrr 1l1e s!~ttjrct of R~rktl I'urih nrr (see. e.g.. l'apos, hlnnpdcp) h:~s $\,en rhr imprcssinn to lower t,.rplnln~d in tl>r artick i71 rlli~ irsrrc of the Souttimst Asla officials that chcv tor, h:tvc thr ryht trr acr Iilic rhcir l'residcnt. Chron~clc Irv ISr,rrdict InrJd.rron, 7Yrc tn~irr, dncnntmr Pnny ht, In this war, thr wcnlth of .\ti-. I1rcsidcnt Suhntro has exestcd** rt,td an tljt. .\prii, 1978 rrsirr 01' tndonmia, rnljnw frirnslnrion up gent influcnct. on thc drvclnpmunr of :i srrStrrrr nfCnwrrprit~n in lr rr 11.~1'ug.-.I. H. Indnncsra!

stanmlnp, they arc s~id "not to have enough to eat" or "possibtv

Technocratsma!. not have cnnu2h tcl cat,'' etc. Cr~ricisrn is answ,ercd hy

bring tcrmed "a d:lngrr to stahil~ty" or "rvidenrl>, trine ruplnircd," and so fnrth... In measuring rbc qrtcrrqs u f t,.~tt~!di~rlwf poltrirs, T11an Wijrrvu and his fr~cndq usc scrcral s~ati~tics, nich as Inrrtnasr in (;.z'I'. r,'DI'. per cnpita rrrrnmr., tbr rirtp n/' injlaliun, etc. Using thcsc figures, the 1301~cy-lllakers claim that... /only! 3 nlrt of lo From a scrim of dizcus. thc Etr tlo~rr~in)rs lirc Ilrlowthc Etr tlo~rr~in)rs lirc Ilrlow tlw pnaer?y lin(7. Thi5 is am wing
authors of rhir papcr, u-cr. ha.... .,c:lchcd n very srartIirig prtpress. Thcrc is also the critcnon which drterm~nrp that 3 per
conclusiofi: Namdv, rhc rles~gnrrs of crur precent dcvvlopmc.nt, u:iplra income of nvcr $[IS 75.00 per ;Innurn is :thrrvr rhr Bappcnas and thr. I)cp:itfments of the government, arc In fact Iwvcrty lint. awnrr and (in vrnlrzte rhat thcrc. arc dclects anrl crrnrs In thc Takc the c~sc of a pavcrty-srricken, uncrnploycrl v;lpran t. I lr prescnr development **srrntcrrv.*C.***Rut why do rhcv remain silent' picks up ciprcctc burrs: he scrounFcs for his dailv food in the Why do they rem: iin mutr althnu~h their policy errors have garbage-c~ns of rrstauctnts: he sleeps under a Lridgc or under made millions of ~ffrr' l'crhap~ they rcnlun silent the carre< elf shops; he wears whntever he cnn find. 1 Ir maka Up. hccausc they are ,,,,,,,LLLdal prortitutrs tr~lio (In nor havc 300 a day. En a rnonrh, that amounts to Rp. 9.000. and in a year scientific integrity? Or rlo hey I~rlnng ro tht group who rnjoy to Rp. 108,000 nr SL!S 250. This is \vcll ahovr the povcrrv linc. thc "fruits 01 develnpncnt" precisely hecatlsc nf rhc~r pnlicy Ir tlli~ thc itray to mcasttrc thc success of a polluy? In tli~r ci-~ors?? cast, the more vagrants wc havc, the mote prnspcrnlrs our country. I-un~ live 1':kk \%?joyo!?!!?

3. Wives of Officials 5. Credit

(3nr srt-finn o j Ru krl Purih tnq~i~~r ib~r 7rtiz~t-s of r~lfiriltis, known (IF "1t>11," OF R .~o;~rrr nvrf L-nnnx ol'nffirinl ~(~rrrtpfir~tt. fr~ critiui=i~~,y nihrr ,rvpt3rrs of thr govnvrmrnnlr'~ econo~trir Duar Ihu... it) tslking ahout thc rcllc of women in polic+y, Dukku Purih **fnrrrst,s (IF "1t>11," OF R .~o;~rrr nvrf L-nnnx ol'nffirinl ~(~rrrtpfir~tt. fr~ critiui=i~~,y nihrr ,rvpt3rrs of thr govnvrmrnnlr'~ econo~trir Duar Ihu... it) tslking ahout thc rcllc of women in polic+y, Dukku Purih ***fnrrrst,s* or1 illr in~bd~lrinrr it] hrrit,firr fm~n dcvclapmcnr rvc often also ~alk about womcn's cmanciparion. *this pn!ir~#. T~~rorq~~o~lt [be riorv~rrr7ti tlwthis pn!ir~#. T~~rorq~~o~lt [be *riorv~rrr7ti tlw chrlrp ir rrprtltr-d Ern;~nriparion, howevcr, doer: not mean that tlic **wife nrlrst tdkc rlr~rt ,f'r~rt,~,~~rs otr7 ~r~trfifr~g t?rortz nrad Ern;~nriparion, howevcr, doer: not mean that tlic *wife nrlrst tdkc rlr~rt ,f'r~rt,~,~~rs otr7 ~r~trfifr~g t?rortz nrad v~orr rnnnry wllilr, Irrrlo- PW'I in Ibc~r lv~sbarid's arJicir~1 firm-tinns or ri~~~r sbt n~rrsr t+splnrr nrsinns RTr' hrc~rnit?~q purrrt'r clnd poorrr.** Ibr-r hltshnr7d:c position. It dnc5 not mean chat rhc wife Inmt hkc part In dctcmiining hcr hushantI's policy in matrcrs conctlrning his officc or that shc stinuld prtnfic w II~ Most guvernmcnt credit fall5 into the hands of non-nativcr. jircilities nnd perqziisiirs fa wl~ir'll lwr IrllsIm~d is r~~titi~ii. ~VC hIr)st of rhosc who crnbe~rle there crcdits art: al3o non-natrues. fccl. too, rhar [here arc many orhcr rnatrcrs rclarcd tt~ characrcr Of the Rp. 20Q,OOO,OOU1000 Rank Rumi Dxya crcdits rhat and I>charl~cir that can have n nrgative cffcct on tlic acttvitic-s of d~sappenred, most again W;IS taken hv non-nat~vcs. But if is thc her husblnd, pcoplr rvho h:wr tn suffrr the I~rsrtlcn of it all. The proplt bear Wu sav this bcrausc in fact we havc the irnprewinn and we rhc conspquenccq, hut thc nnn-nztlvcs cnjoy rhc fntirs. In fact, olwwe that there are many of you, Illt~, who linvc gnnt-rlrtri~y it ir ~hcir pcr capita inrnmc drat has increased many ttnlts owr. irr pliying yrljir soli~, many who hnve rnisundcrstood ttlc Not the people's. rnranin~ of womcn's cmanciparion. Ten ycars ago thc hstn group, the Panin psup, rhc Central Aria Rank. f.icm Soci I-ioag and orhtr ~rrkon,~' wcrc noch~ng o what they are now. Rut the proplc of Krawang still starvr. rhe government proudly aggregates the incomes of rhme .rik<~rr~ with tht incnrncs of thc penplc of Krawang, Royoldi. I 4. Development Policy 2 ~nd Ciunung ~idu~' and then avenge< thcrn. Next rhr gov- r mrncnt loudly prrlclaims that "pcr capita incornc ha5 sky- In establishing "dtvcluprnrnt policy" we hwe smnl lowed r ocketcd." Is rhir not manipulrion?? Thc pcoplc of Krawan~, hook, linc. and slnker thc data and ,znalyses made by for~i~r~rt~. -+...-. who have been reduced tc cat1 ng* water-t~yac~n ths, have I>c.comr cven though they obviously haw inturcsts ul rhcir own. To the victims of a manipularinn of the nutnbers that thc govcrn- tlrrerminc rhc number of ptclplc who arc IIEIOW the povrrry mien? alwayq wonhips, Thc pcoplc of Krawang have becornc thc I~nc, we use the dnta and analyses of the World Rank. To v~ctims of sratistics. It i~, said that in 1967 pcr capltn incornc rncasurc rhc success r~f dcvcIclprnent, we employ foreign rvs %US RR, whilr by 1977 it had incrcascd tn %I& 130. But mcasurcs nf grnwrh, such s GNP, CDP, per capita incomr. and rfle fact rcn~ains rhnt Krawang, which always uscd to be a rich so forth... rice panary rvhcrc pcoplc ncver suffered hunger, ha tod;~? dc-

.4 great campaign to stupidif? the people is taking place clinecl into a famine area, where people are reduced tco racing
today. TIic ~~coplr arc bcing swamprd rvlth vapc terrnino!ogy warcr-hyacinrlls! no you know. fricnds, what wl~trr-hyacinths or tcrminolngy made vapc on purposc. Z\'licn pcoplc arc arc? Water-h!.acinthq are feed for p~gs.

Issue No. 63

3. Popular Participation

I

Popular Control

***Il'i.r!ltrps tltc sinfilt' tttosf in~pnrtilrrt tl~rnrr** in *rllis ilnt,umrrlrIl'i.r!ltrps tltc sinfilt' tttosf in~pnrtilrrt tl~rnrr** in *rllis ilnt,umrrlr is *iff RJI~I.~ tn pnpril~on.

Thc dcfccrs that wc scc todlv are caused b+ rhc kLrtiontll Lrrtdrrs!rip and by the "Systcn~ of C;ovtarnmcnr" th:~t Ir hn~ crestcd, Improper nicchanisrns for nhr mmapment nl the StAte, which in turn have ~ivcn birth trr crroncouq and uncontroflcd 1 si~rlildr L~nri-/i)~~,j4qn rnrrt7 pd,t-sriti~~ llukii I'ii I ih's di'irt-lr~sios r!f pol trim and prosrams, havc hrcd rcsrlcssncs< In soctcr y. i~p'rr~ltrrrd pntirv. ip,zrr* Jro?n rrrsfipnriri~ rl)r nqolrr-rtiment Jirr* The inn~rt~ro\t aotrt 01' tlw* littL, JJPO~IP. ~rllo livr under rhr ~t~~~vd~>vrng !tl?ii/ rt-j0m7, Ihikn ht~i h dc!~o pui~~tq tu tlv ,L~t/ttri, of opllrr~srott and ripnssina of thc "elitc" forcer, never rcaclrcc tbr RO?~I'WJ!~"~~ 'F *ricr [~(I~/?~TISP)~ricr **[~(I~/?~TISP)~* pmagrirtn. ?'/T~F yrnr, Iudrsnesi,r tlic cars of the povcrnmcint. tn nsrn, rhr Irovcrnmunt lias nc.cr *will import Iudrsnesi,r tlic cars of the povcrnmcint. tn nsrn, rhr Irovcrnmunt lias nc.cr *will import 2.4 million rnr!.r r~j ?ic,r', rrrnn rlli~n nq!* r)tl)r-r opcnrd its ticart to the pure :~nd Fiontljt "~rrricr. 01 !!rr c nntnrnn cortpltrjv r~? thin wnrtd. pi~i)pI~'s Irctrrr. " Thus a system in rvh ich rhc 1-irj1 pr,nplr~ cuploit the tliIl,rgt7rr, the rrr/j npprtss thc pour. prrvcrtrq rllrrpour. prrvcrtrq rllrr rltrow r it11... thc prlcc r7T thc in~pa~rtcti ricc. ir Kp. 100 per kiluysm I)rrsi,s c~ir into rl~c sl.c~w I:rnes. r\~-;ilthy I~IO~C k~ck acirlc prrnk mort cxpcns~~~c than dornrs~ic rhcc. This means that the *bvi,q/11 p~npIt, ~I~H-TJLI~~V~. t~tlsincsslnen kill off Jznrrar I~urjncsq- Indor~csi.~ri gcrlcrnrncnr is frrdr?z,y ((s~~F~ridi/ingl fnrmers from mcn, crc, gocs on and on, and rhc npprc.ssed havc nu wnl of Soutti Korco. J:ipnn, .Iu.I[ .I ntc 21f tip. TOO per kiln. stopl~ing it. '['here arcn't even an! r-n?npbri~r/c nhnut rt it) Wcll, ~vrll, Zlr. *I'hoyih Il;~ttil\~rjay:r, ~Zlr. Hustanul ~lrif~n,~ .tnd Parl iamcnt .\nv morc. you gcnrfr-incn in Ihppcnns, livw conw !ou acru:~ll?' hclp rrr 'I'llr prevailing sicu:~tic>n is such rhnt "thc rtlp pcnplc" solely tncrc:lsc agriurrlrur;tl productrt,n In crtllcr ctrnntrics?T kn'i thcrc direct their cycs ancl cam furrhcr up. They ;ill str:~mlllc to cnlnIb snrnctliing thr Iit.rrmii.s rhac arc i ndccd Irt-tuly "~F-OZ?ILEIIJ " **tou acru:~ll?' hclp rrr 'I'llr prevailing sicu:~tic>n is such rhnt "thc rtlp pcnplc" solely tncrc:lsc agriurrlrur;tl productrt,n In crtllcr ctrnntrics?T kn'i thcrc direct their cycs ancl cam furrhcr up. They ;ill str:~mlllc to cnlnIb snrnctliing thr Iit.rrmii.s rhac arc i ndccd Irt-tuly "~F-OZ?ILEIIJ* " **t IF thc liI>(~~~l*

funny hue?) 131d you yct !,our palms grcasccl,

It" to ~OVC~II~~II C~TIOTS

Inir

l! bcrn "trucd" so ss i~t~wr," to

Statc

nx-iybc?? not onl!~ rh31 yrlu arc hnnl~lc incrcasc dr)mcstic ccrrnnmic sytcm pr~icfi~-t"i by rhc t ! ! 'rl~r~r lirocll~ction.... ht-v! yon'rc actually Ilclping rtl incruasc could decclop to such a disxrroi~s poinr bccansc cotrtrol roniconc C'IFC'S :~gric~~lturxI ~~r,rducricm. Yo11'12 p3y far it some functinns have nrtc r~pcrarerl as rhc! shnr~ld. St:irc In.;r~t~rt~nns c3nv. fr~cndhavr in Facr nor intcrfurc wirh thr

1)uild-up of "cxcrluri~~c Firr thc sake of srat~~lity in ccnnomic dcvtllopmcnt, tl~e wliolr systcm and :dl the ;actlVitics of the Ilighcsr Inaitutinns have Iwcn "harnroni/e~l" with thc tasrcs of thc cxccutivc..

7. Employment and the Industrial Sector 9. The Parliament

Ovcr tlic p:w rieht !~BTS, thc inditqtrial ssctor has only Ixen ablc ro ,~hsorb 1.2 million pcoplc. Thir is an alxorprion raw of 11p till nmv, P:~rliamcnt is nnt an insritution cap;~lblc of only 1 2.5 pcscrnt oT .nrail.lF)lc rnnnpolver. Thiq prow4 that rhc channtrIlrne thc azpir3tinns nf the pcnplc, nor is it an c-ffcctivc prrsrn~ policy In 1 thc Cicld of industry will trr-vrr hr trblp toinstirucion for con~rcrl. I'arlinmrnt is stmplv a spectator to all .~I,~t>rh thr i~lcrrlcr Islmr Lircr. The picture hecom~ thr irrcplnritics rh:~t :trr rakine plncc within rhc cucci~nvtr! WIITW ~f H'P ~l~n ta kc into ai count the lnrs of jrh c~pportun~tir~ 'fhcrc hnvu hccn many incicirnts, rh~rncful rn cntr nation nntl ... in narionnl cr)mpanIcs rhat have h;~d to cltlsr down hccauw of statc, which have dc~rt.~ndcd :~ctive inrcwcnricrn hy rhc pcoplc'r the Influs of' fitrcil!n cap~tsl. ?'he only local raw material l~scd reprcscn tativcs, bit t the!. l~avc tlonc al,rolu tcly nothing. Ilv thc Indo ,ttiIk c:nrnpnny, for inqtancc, i~ watcr. The milk I'hc reason, of counr., ic rhat I':~rli;lnirnt has been ''li~rtf" lay crlncentrarc. irwli' i< imprlrrcd from itustmlin. ICfhilc the jnh the nacional cxccurivc lcadersl~ip KO I>cct~rnc so pnn~l.ylrrrr!J Evcn rnsrkur ha s nnt cxll ,andctl, rhc sidc effrcrs are wrccl.;inr the life at the time when thc official /i~t of plrrli,rr?rrrttilry mjrdiitntr,~ of rht. natl Ion. fmm the Political Parties anrl from (Icrlk;ar wnq being drawn irp The C;r wcrnrncni**-IF** I~CIUFCTIAI pol~cy s11011ld ha\^ hccn gcarcd For rhc Gcncr:~l I;lcctirm, thc inrlivirlital~ listcd wcrc picl11y. .. cowarrls thc dcvctr~pmmt of ~rrtlusfrv rlnigncd to suppclrt thc t;r~vcrnrncnt. 13cr)pk rhoufihr rn h~ve roo nrrrrly rn~rr~~~~, a~riculturc. P>ccau.;c xyriculturc i~ the [main] witrcc of incornc iv1t7,prit.y~ ~~rrri pri?rcip/i, urcrtT .I-ansidt7rtpri rlL,rnpr-rnm-and wcrc for 60 pcrccnr of chc. flnclonrqinn pcnpk. Yct what wr now scc i~. scrarchcd nft' rhr list. l'liose wlio rcmninr~l on thc Iist of xhc rapid ~crwrh of consunrrr-oricnred ~ndusrrics, suclr as rhc candidates "hlc~scd" by ~hc govcrnmcnr consisrcd of pr.r~pIc motnrcyult and c:lr indurtrics, not of a~ic~llture-sirpporring who wcrc rithcr a.r17k or, :lr lwsr ntnt/~-r,rrrs, rc.:lrly to srrring ro industries. thc ri~ht or 113 the Icfr, Intr the ?tllrlr~ritjj, of count, wurc wvirk.

Could rl le little F the villq es, who i

Polli~~~a~ ~arxes

IG pcrs~cutru q dur~nf! v me e~ect~ons,

4. nslc .-.

Tor nclp trnm thc

'oplc's representatives in Parliament''=... "-he simple answer In reaIit tical forc~ es, name1. h'o! I'ari~arnent's Cornrnirtee 11, in charge nf Jeal~ng xv~th the Political Parrrw anu CIOIKRT, arc IIOL YCIIUIIIC ---- UIIIILICJI .I-* -..-I IUICT~
E ......
-oblcm of cucesses dur~ng the General Elections, could never me that d ley atc cl assificd 'r, :dt~ialistr~~i ifiicial p(~: litical m eet to di these incl .c was nc icr a groupings, 1,at real political pow" li es in the hands o f the 41 IOrUln, S11 dkar merr f... G'ovtmrnen rt. Thc PI? ~litical Par -tics and E iolkar hat ,c to follo w thc.. ...--... will: of this govcrnltlcnr, wt~cther they i~kc ~t or not. IT tht the pwsent s-yst~m !hp:oiq and its obstinate, the gov* ncdia1t.1). interfere ~ls yzritt (remove S~rrb~nrt~ piircr cwrcnt manipulate them ro o longer 1 Jose a thr~ **.-~rlnpvnp>, y), manipulate them ro o longer 1 Jose a thr~ ***.-~rlnpvnp>, y),* Ruku Putih lt ofir miy the government.. rernntiws. nror riors tbqt~ stzrdebent ~troo~~rztwr RF CT w17nIr. TIJF In add~i rim, the parties are not allowed to operate i doncsiun student n~owwmzt is wlariz villages, ye #e the vil lager are whcrc 80 pcrcunt of lndrlrl rrlly out oj rg smse oj selfprsewr?tioj inlu bitancs Tivr!! if thc parlies are not allowed to operate I itirizu tJ~r rentral mlc oj th m. L,L‘+brmX villages, thrs ineans that mtzly 20 purrcnt of the inhabitants ot thejt ddrsm'be so eloqnc~?tly. /'he mninstrt7am oJ ihe cc Indonesia \ heir aspir; rcsen tcd. PP? nlso rrmm'ns pxplidtly onti-comm-rr~list. ljnt it worrld hr 'y to pvcdict itt frltltlr~c dr.~rlopmcnt. As govemlncnt rc7presslon znt~nsifips, ns it did in the ~nrly months o]' 1978. ~br snoue~ntnt u7iII bovt. to d~wlop pew smtrres of poIitira1 strrngtk' ij it is to surunve. Its longterm choice wordid appear to lie

1 1. Electionsbt,twt,en finding poweftil spo~so~ witbin the mifita y

tablisbmc nt and developing s positfoe poIitiral propurn which

ill rrpprd I to *the pensants nwd workem ud~o wnke* 7tp the ~t,ruhelrn~ ;ng rnalori~ oftbe Iwdowesfun popztlntion. O

... Consider thc General Elections, tor Instance: rhe Plectiofl

Cammission was forrncd and appointed, not t~>* Parliamenr, bur by the (;orernmmt, rho~iglm in fact the (;wernrno-it, through Cinlkar, wn~ also a participant in the Geilrrd PIccr LlOlIb.----

Footnotes

Excesses, naturally, were unavoidable. tfcrce Amir Machm~td "joining in the gap **11rrL2h o Nitisastro 1s Indoneqix's top economic planner.** [village headmen] and camt [c;uhd~strrct oft~cersj, all tr rr the 2. ( **ukcing is a rerm for wcaltlly** ( Itinme businrrs pantnelv of key sake of recuring victory for Colkar. Rut little [~copic i, n the It donm mi an ~rnrmI~ snd pol~ticrms.

3. noyrt1:rli and Cunung Kidul, in Centrd Java, are among the poorest
village?; were pressured, and not just prcssul red, but even a, -eas 111 the country. persecuted, with threats of he in^ kidnapped-cspecjall [p in 4. Ilalliw~jaja i\ the Minister of hgiculturr. Atifin is the head of the crt~ciak areas such as West Java. Centra! lava, and I..BSL

r.-., lavd.

....

owrlul sratc tood di*rrihurron agcncy BUI.~?G.

Issue No. 63

-..

it ! I I! C;t~ttlc.nr~ dcrn~ln:Icn:llcr h11.1 In Ilc'c-e~~~l~cr IV7 ;tcldccl ~t~ctr ,>hlrc1141n< to [TIC 7 jf1111r carnpllcn to thr~r ~TOII'CTC .II*~IIRTC F(I\'cTn- nirnt c'tjmlllrrlon To mfnr o~ir<~cIrr~. f+?\t 'rtrnt~~-.*nd Frer~ltn**-appcnr nr** trzplc vlr-trmt Yrr Ir ~c ImpOrtRTIl I<> **c?i.lmirit-**i!le n.lsttnc l'rrtilin har lwcn ;111lt-ttr lirllti cult Tonp, I:rt~rrng tf~c Indcrntb711 a .ct?!crn lrc. Jorc I<.trnilr-l lnn:~, t.rt*t ~ltn's .t~~i't~gss 1c1r)r to rhr I?n~trti K~rtr>n<. ~'Y~~.IIIIS tht phcnomencln in hoth phv~1~;11 .111<1 ~ir~fitl- mill~c~n tnh:t7it rrrlq (7: r:n\ F trt 1974. Frertlin ernrryerl as thr ~rrtjnrc-t c.t! tcrms. IYointitig ot11 th:~~ mr)Lt of I ~'rtnlclr have tIrtl.cn drrp w r.11pc.q and mrtst ptjpitlsr of thc threc pr~l~r~c,\l I'lmor is r~i~~~iir.~~ns, Rsrnor-l l~~rta atltlq rnra r thr 5rrh rrrn ronti?~on. I)c-POHPIR~F cnrnperln!! for control of rl~c rhnt nhcrc are f'w p?rwfilr roa+i< -inJ rl:nt 7; ~~ffict:~l Inllonrc~xn t.!q~nt to 11.lr.r ~nun-t(~-l>c ~nrlcpmtlcnr starc For rlir nluv crf tllc lwuplr. Iivr 111 rvrl.1 rctl. ~r:~n rhc ftprrncr Portuprsc col-Inrlrmfilxn pmreinnlcnt. thr npccndenc* r~ll~~t-c Thr czprtal cltv of I>i!t at IIF pr:tk i,n! Inrn :4 pr?rrfirl ~rrnr.inrc ~trc nrnirr crl I-rcrllin HW alarrnin~ on rwo counrr: ronr2ined 30,1101F ~rlliab~r.tnt<, ant1 ihc crntic lirl,t~lll~c of I:.lrr 'I lmnr rr~ll crrcrs (1 ) r.xr 'T~rnor govcrncd hv Frtlrl~n "rlrtr~n cenrrrr," atilrh 1 rCrllin nrknt~w.l- r~vu-:~nd-.t-b:~It full-~cale .~plm.rstl 52 3 pot~n?l:11 "<:lib3 nn rlur c(!!WF :ire cnnrrr~!~t(I trv rhr lnri~nr%~:fns. I ndnr~man I nl v hc~.~ n. donrrrrp," :I prilgrrssivc ccnrcr within ihr COIIFtCt pf a h:tlf-dn:cn ho~t~x tvherr rhc I'rrlm rhr htel ~mrnt to mil !tan.-ruled Intlcrncsian nrcliipclay~~. I'onupiesc onrc mar nra lncd pol ~cc po ~lrc villn~rs o! Jl.lvn, ttic onqrrlng nxr I?) ti I'rcrilln wrrr surccssf~r~ In Icacl~r~p Intiontri:tn trotrllc, ~htr d~t nor F~C:I~ thc pcnrrstcs ~IISF:I~IF~C~~OP 2nd Ince Thc Flrr Tunlor rn indcpcn Jcncr, thc. cxnm plc Yln~~ipr of 'rirntw ant! arc not rwo ride< sccnictl so uncvcnty rnarchcil rn~~frt rnrotirnpe rrr~olrq on rlrhcr ~ f:~ni~I~:~r WII~ 11% rcrrnin, tacc 1 hoqr~lc thar 11 wns ~1% <:IrvrlFr to IcR~~ rlixt \v~:OFC pr~plc wcrr nnt tlappv ~VII~I n~tr yr>p\ll:rtlnn. I:rrr~lin h i~ wrln rhc Irtv~lty 1lr~wrt-n IrO. I 100,000 F.nft from J:~kan:l. The Un~tcd Statrc povc-rn-02' mnsr 1. IF^ Stmorrsc hy nn cncrctrlc 'rimt~rcsc-3 C) sf tlrr p+%l~ulatirjn-mcnt. w~rh .t gcncrzl rntrrcq: 111 Indo-carnpnicn ro I,rir~~ ctlucarrdvn, hcnlth cnrc hnvc t~ecn kiI wnr in wh~ch rhr nmian rtabit~nl ant1 a t~~~lttaty intcrmr In :~nd ~ltipr~ond prrrrlt~ct~on rr~ 2 1nvdr.r rlW< :trrplanr<, f-i~hi~ anti n.1~1 pw~cnv\nq ~uhm3rit~c nccesC tn the clrcp-pcnplc WI>IIW tornler r(>it~r~t.!l nl.hK ti:irl trunil~ardmcnr in .rddit~nn trh rrm oi wntrr Elnlbai-Wct:~r straits juqr nt~rrh of lcfr Oii prrccnr uf them ~l[itcrarc. In !hotl~:intl~ of wrlf-nrmctl ~nk~ntr~. trnnps Timor, tacirly FU 1~11nrrcd Suhartcr'q pl.~n< Itsmt~r-Ffrlrt:~'r uordc, W"cn wr taIk acatnqr :I rlntlnn c,f pcacanrs. Intlonrsinn to fnrcc Ilnrt 'I'imrlr to join Intlnncsrn~rrl srrugglr we 1nc7 i tatrl! Iinvr. ttrrcc~ have nlsn ~:npr>:in-11 ~IIOFI tndone!:!n StntCpt3tq r\pet.rcd to tri 13lk ?t>~-t~rr crnten, an unhrc:lknl~lr rn~h:~r~n ,In rhc ~sf:~nd, "11:acifv" E:wt Tiinor In a few dnyr. Vcr ford prorl~iution. bcr-;~~~~c rhcw thrngr ni c~i~rridc clh\cn.err t~r rvcrks ~ftcr rht 1n1rinF rnvnqliln 11%. I~nkrtl. 'rlrcrc c.innitl irr I r:rcrt.r~fr from rrportiny what Ir happur~ing tlirrc, lfl,On0 troop?, tlicy wre forced tr, srntl zn11ir.lry r:irnp;ilrn without :I p~rlllrl nlthnu~h the Indonrq~~n goccrnmrnr *oc-anorhcr 15,non mcn. 'I'wo-rrnd-a-lrnlC campaign tt~ Ilrcar.ac!.. pol 1t1c31 C~UC.II ~nn. casitln.~liv rakm erlltrps rrporrcrq nntl yc:rrs I:~rcr. thc war continues. I:rcr~lin IF htaith ancl fo~~tl prr~durttrrn." Clncr rhr dl?n~t.~r~c< rtn c.ircfullr. ct>nrrt~Elrtl clrlr- nr hcl~~.~rl to ci,ntrt~l twrt-rlidril< of r hc l:~ncI Iyort~~p:rnor rerii~rirlr. rcnrpni~c **r\vwtfni-**ri~irs. :1rtn:t of I~;Iv 'I'irn~~r :ITI~ upwani~ of HO Il.lrr I'imr~r'q \uhs~rtcncr ccrmnrnv, rhcb Tltc Inilcrnrs~:in artack #In f-nst l'tmor percent of the pnp~~l:ar!r,n. Inklr~n~~i~n w!f-rtb!ianrr foscrd by Inttonmln's Illnck- wx mntns.ircrl t>y fcar of 1-r~tilin. thc h~>rpit:~l.; and cenreterics arc rcptrrrrtl tn :~rle rlf rl~t 1sl:lntI i< ncnl~~ng new, Rnroliitionary I-ronr ' tor tnc ' Inrlrpen-I,r crowdcrl with cdcl~altlr< lrtnm n war ac.crrrtlrng tn R:imtx-;i lorr,t. ctcncr of I Tinior. 1.rcril1n **IS cnnl-**th:at is arldom acknnwlrdyed in put~lic hs I-'rctrl~n Ic~riers, who hrtmrirasr dc- mrrtrd ro 3 prc~grarn of na~icln:~l intlcpcn-n~orc and more peoplc Iccl Irs cftcccs nn~l spalrlng c-371s for help a< rhc IntJoncc~:~n< dencr, sot-1x1 nn~l rrcmolllr( ~t~t1.1lirr..

A.. a112 RC it hrcon~c~ clrar rhnr direr rnil~tnry launchrd rt,r~r firqt w:nc cr! slsughtrr
~ntrrnarionnl rlr,n-.~I1gnrr1i.nt. \tsth thc f~irce wilt nor dmtroy I;rct~lrn. thr co<~ rr, ag~n~t tllc rcrltlrnt5 r>F fhti, ntlw \llrak clccltnr nf Pon~~m~r-~c-colnni.11 power In 5uharr1r of the rrfon ta F~~IHF:ITC F;Ic~ i.r+nl'lc!tntly 01 ultimntr victcjry. In :I

on May 20. 197FI, Nicolau I.nhato. "That that rodd Ilnpprrz ir t-wor~gl~ to "7%~* crperirncr *of ~tirer ~PUOIII- presidrnt of I*rcril~il's Ccntr:ll Cnmrnittrc **cllo~r. !/>C murld iarir TPSO~II~P wid' to tinnoty ~POII~PF, as w~ll ~1srcril~il's Ccntr:ll Cnmrnittrc ***cllo~r. !/>C murld iarir TPSO~II~P wid' to* tinnoty ~POII~PF, as w~ll ~1srcril~il's Ccntr:ll Cnmrnittrc *cllo~r. !/>C murld iarir TPSO~II~P wid' to tinnoty ~POII~PF, as w~ll ~1srcril~il's Ccntr:ll Cnmrnittrc **cllo~r. !/>C murld iarir TPSO~II~P wid' to tinnoty ~POII~PF, as w~ll ~1s our own and prcsidenr r~f the I>rrnocrntic Repuldic fwrly Iitv our idr-ntii~j os t.;lsr Tinlnnse, rxpt-rii-nrr. ~I~ows 1/73! ~J'P mrmy will nf E.~rt Trmtlr, exprrrrcd the nrtr mood. orir rrnl~~irttlfi~rhlt~ ndtinrra/ iot~s~.ina~snrss. ttr7lrr 1~ ~ORZ~~IICI'~~ Ipy rt'rlqt~n ~lji~~ Lobato's **spccch m:~rkcd tlrr fllnrth *r iit,i,pt,ir rrprddrarfnr~ 01- tv~pbnidwt~ I;rilt-d c-iiv?pai=qn if wriispccch m:~rkcd tlrr fllnrth *r iit,i,pt,ir rrprddrarfnr~ 01- tv~pbnidwt~ I;rilt-d c-iiv?pai=qn if wrii y nnorllrt (?rid so *vrrslv rh lhc foitntiing rbfvrrslv rh lhc foitntiing rbf 1-rcrilin: *(1 t~ll /<)ntts oJ drtt~i~~i~tio~i tmd ,-.~p!oito+ QII+ to it< cor~~p1t.t~ (/t,[t~,~t... ri~r tJntJmy *r71... ri~r tJntJmy *r71 of~z11~1 I),v t~itn.... rnrrst br ~ft/t-,rrrd Irr];.lrr it ~iil hr* ".. /Il~oat, ,711, rl7c.y were [urrr ynrs -0-, hurtt ~ri?ri, I?IOHI~S sincr the canwincrd.*... a[ pnliticid d<-zv-lt>p??rt-?rt, +/in17 .vt7un of I'TI chcd its lirrt big rnr~rpoip of "\lJr. HOW f@t with bnlf rictoty-on. SIYII~IC. :irtd in ti>i'st fortr rJnrf jji'rrrs. te?r ~ttld r7?~nilriintinn, n i.a??r-ht~crrrrsr ~L'P ,we rryturn oj'nra m'ctory. For** th pc'oplt' 0)- J.'~IsI l'imnr /.rrrzlcv fcrfirrr rr f 17r,~rr wrlr r r. 7' ~lj'Tt'Spf'I't. rll,ir rrtlson WF ~~7.y. 'I/ICIOT ir p;,,t t strp 1;) ~xwrd, jivn? ,if] rtr (.i,~tt ~tti~q oj "!lo~ur?~r~r, tlvcp~ri, rlv. smprr~ssinr sizi, crrtu;?].'... ~.o!ot?inl ilurrrinrrtion, to rr tloiri! ion. I.rrrrr *oj'tlli.~ c,i~np~ip~, j1rl1 of tlw *noier r~f tl~r "I tllirlk rhatoj'tlli.~ c,i~np~ip~, j1rl1 of** tlw *noier r~f tl~r "I tllirlk rhat Scnhorrs Jrrkarrrl J~~'?IPTI~F* **yrors rrn(l !o~r crrr t?tn't~s. rnncliini,~ of ttl,rr, illis rntnpatp is ir-slwrild r~ntirr~ti~~~~i tlwt Fo~fyrors rrn(l !o~r crrr t?tn't~s. rnncliini,~ of ttl,rr, illis rntnpatp is ir-slwrild r~ntirr~ti~~~~i tlwt Fo~f Timor is not "4 **grrlrr rtt,p, in Inct. mnrf~ po~~ihlr ri.nrt,drnbly sinkrrrg ivi tl'.r,Jin17rt<,r *yrors rrn(l !o~r crrr t?tn't~s. rnncliini,~ of ttl,rr, illis rntnpatp is ir-slwrild r~ntirr~ti~~~~i tlwt Fo~fyrors rrn(l !o~r crrr t?tn't~s. rnncliini,~ of ttl,rr, illis rntnpatp is ir-slwrild r~ntirr~ti~~~~i tlwt Fo~f Timor is not "4 **grrlrr rtt,p, in Inct. mnrf~ po~~ihlr ri.nrt,drnbly sinkrrrg ivi tl'.r,Jin17rt<,r rty$nns. u colotty of Indotr~sin, and will nmvt Irr n *!J) Frrti1i11 !i>r$ir!g Tin~nrrw 1711i pi, ~/t~f,,rr~zil~otrr)~~ Lz>~,f tt?iriotiz,, of tl~ nrvrnlnny. I'int, PI-RIISC I?~ilnnt'r~~~ r~unsciortsnr+sc, jijr rlbr pvnlilt= trr inrr ~SSC'~ ill fl'i. tro fror~li~r Ceiht(Jrx r7rtJ no! Irnvt tllr r-co~iontil: Crlprlt:lty to frnvr jhur r~t~t 7trivv tjj rdo~~i,i/ ~I~rrk,,~~~, 7.,+fimrir~,q s~t rt7~iuii7trc i/mt t!ftn /dootf~f-nrnrtlrar?i r11.a-r.vlotrrt,s. Spc-rind, iu-rnrts~

trj xl~tr~rr~rE~ tll(~t i~ r~rtirinl~l trot wbrlr wr nri-Ji4qf~rr~t4t* nr~~trtl ~tr:i,&~, L~,p~ill~~* t!lt" ~!'rl??lt'ltil ! b... We !JrIid'2t' 117~ ./or... a,qpips~io?t oj tJe IIT~~O~ICS~~FH coIn~?i~llIr1 ,tt-d ,lsrfi,lrr our srrt,t~gt/. WF proclut~n** ~+.~p~ufiSiorrisf~ and ~-r>rrr,wi,orrslv rrrdvnrrce <>141l# T1.C OP711Lt' lh~l' /?(7:'f */i?~/IP lorrd nrrd rkxi~r ON?/i?~/IP lorrd nrrd rkxi~r ON? ~tndm/r I-ontinirrr crtrd * on rl7c rt victuqr trrtclin ' "

nrican pilota and milirav sdr~isrrs hnve jiinrtl rhc nrt:lcli

4)n Fast Timor, nccnrrlin~ ro T:rctilin stlurcc$. In n lunc 211 l,madcast, l;trtilin Infc~rni:iricrn Sccrct;~? Alarictr t-'ernanr!cs chargctl that "Arncrican pillit< arr fl).iny nronco O\,'-19 Klshor:rting on rhr ch:rrges, Fretilin's Aml)nux:ldar to the Unirrd Nntinria Jme R:~mos-llnrt:~ li:~i~l on July 12 thsr ttvn Arncrican rnili~ar!' advisrrs hwc 11cc.n srarionrll in Dili sincc I;~st Uccctnhur nrlrl th;~r worth h:td arrivcll duriny thc f~nt thrcc months of this year. hltIinuph tt~e st:lrc ncpnrtmcnt hasAskThai!ancl abut it.
* 8 .. r 8,. .,. I,nr".,., I.IU,~!I"Q,#1C,*
prevcnrs ovtsidc ol~sen~rrs from investipring the Gtti:~rinn therc, I-Inwrvcr, the tct that such chsrgcs 17avc not hcrn mnrl

In a icttcr ro U.S. r\ml,assndnr trl rhe Ilnired Smtes Antlrcw Ym~ng. Frctilin Ambassador K;~mos-ldorta rccallcd his countrl-'s initi:~l enur*uragemcnt at Jimmy C~rtrr's carnpai-p "cnrnrnitrncntr; tn human rights and promises to ccase U.S. support to

Issue Ntr. 63

of the East. INTERESTS IN INDONESIA

J.S., INT: !+'OR LI)

If ~hc lnp;?i~rrr-.trc pvrm~rtr.~~ rn L..lrrx ncui,l I~nt~lc ia~r rnxxqirr rlchtr tc* the

nnrt.11 E:l.;t Inrllcc prrlr)ld~:tl rhc [I S. with rrtsr rl~c.ir threat [ti nrrwk anti ronrpcr Vrt!irrlanrls. In thc c:~rly l'JjO<. rh~ tl S. rln, rlrf~hrr, nntl qurnlnr-, ,IT (rdl .a? IEW [rhc UcrhrrT:~ntl~ Fasr Ind~cs antT rhr ~nt ct~~rlornic rnlwl1ns t4~ In(!(>nc'to cth.llt-~~< r nrnnlr~rlitir.~ inr.!n~'l~rlp crrl'l'cr, LIl:tlavan** ~r-trlcmciirr], uur mporrq ~'qr3hlish Arnrr~cin nid prrlgr:lnls. rvh~lr rupar, anti coym Ijurch prcltrrc on rh~r !ram ~IICK CVURtIIl'S rrlll Ilt' Inter-*[wit ttc. t!.S.** r~rr.int,ntir)n~, irirti :tr tile tr:rtlr wl)s?rlirt.tl Nt.tlrerlantlr lIilpnrrs of ruptcd and dcstr~lvcd.... In rinw of ICrrrtl l;rruntlatic~n :rntl rht. h~:I.-CIC), FCT ,\rnrrlc.ln ~ond< **ll.t;. KuVq!>cr ~ntl (;nod-war, rvjrh the splrcr of c\ploirarinn and up 1-rnprms 11, I clrn Ir~tlnncq~nn ccon- vc:tr cin tlc5rrlrt-t~un (~r cnrnrncrrc wtiich cu lsrq r?nll\rp, c~al srlrnr~qtr. aruP Ial)or Icatlrrs. 1010 I~LI 1910. CInIrcx, .i jnrnr vcnrurr of trl rlic \vr,rld torl:~?, wrh an tnrrrrrlp-En ITJS1, ju~t f~j~~r VPJ~S nfrcr tr~dn-Tcu:~cr~ .tnd Ci.~!idart! 011 of I:.~l!ftwn~a, tirln of rrur ~radc wth thc Nerhcrlnnds nrmn intlrpcncfcnrr, I'rr~tdrmr 1;l~cn- .~cq~~~rcd 1 ~?etn'lcurn crlnctrston ti 1'4.35. I.?2nd thC \1~la~an XrJrrS tin\r,cr inullkerl r hc rrr hc5 nt 1nrlnnrrl.t ro Hv ! *!?. rhc 1 nqr Inrhcq qt~pplicd marc wrruld hc c~tastt-ophic " 'juvifr 1J.S. conrrihurion.; ro thr I rcr~ch than 1t31:' thr I'.F crlnr>f 21 lrnst**:I** I.~rer dr:ift warncrl ttir thrc.31 tts t1.S. war cFforr an Inrl(~ch~na I5 ~lirtincr cnrnniodlr~cc. ronr nicrcr "l)crwc.cn the I':tc~lic and thv V<-:~rl\ rwtr !.can h~forr Prarl t tlrhor. Inrlr~n Orcxn. " ' Thr surprlsr arrark on liar. wltcn rhr L1nlrc-d St.~tc'i zprltrq QSnfl

I7.S. Sccrcr,~rv o! Statr Corrlcll 11~111 PTNI !nrl>or ~>rccluded ~or~srvclt's mcs- rn~ll~r~n to hclp that wir. wt. arc not i7~rrionccl th:~ t rf J {pall ~~cc~lp~etl rhc say'. hut h~s por1tic)rl \I~X~ ~f.Ie:~r. Thr (!.S. vlrfrnr for :I ~IVU~\~.IV Vro7:lm. Wc nrc h'cthcrlanti~ Indics, "'I lh cradr routrr of w:I': prcp~rcd TIP f'lrht lapan tn prorcct vrrtbn;! for t11c chmyrclt ~v.ir. th:~~ rw ~hc ITnnlr(l St.itrr rvnultl t>t-rrrrtrurly .tlnt.r~c:ln ruppllcs (11 Snurlira~r t<~an ra\r cnn In prch.cnr tlrc occrlrrrncr nf

vripptrd, :an41 ~nrl~tstrv rn ilrnrr+c~n wrri~lcl rn;~~rrl~!s. s~~rncrhlng rhar \voulbl Ilc. of thc nim~

hc most rrnpr,rrL~nrly .~ffrctcd.. ."' ,2fter the war, rhc llnitcrl St,lts frrritdr-rr!nlificarirc fcbr tlrr Ilnitcd

hnrir~p:~r~n~ :r Inpanr.';t' :lr\ault ***rln* Indn-**pr.rsu:~dcrl rhc Nrrhrrlnnds ro kqanr Sratrr of ,\rnr.rlr..l-<)\ir rc~urirv. nur newt 4nJ !!~I.Iv tw rlw Rau~t~t-IT adnitnt-~nrlcpentfrncc to Inrlrlnc~~n, lqlcnin? thr pt~u~r .~nd ?hi!it\ rcr yrt ccrt,tin th1nL5

crr:Iiion prr.pnrrrl 3 clarl.inc?ir rn Norrm-(loor to ;try ~nt*rc.nsrrl Arncricnn rcorlarmlr wr. ncrrl trrm rhr r~chrs n! t?rc

bcr 1041 :isk~ne CrrngrCr~ trt rlr~.larr- anr. roSc rhcrc. At thc samr rlrnc, rhc C1.S. Inrionrslan tcrr~tr~n.. :tntl fl.,,rn S~l!tfh-

Scxcrt tnr!. r>f lt'nr Sr~mson prc:parrtl rho :~rr:~n~ed tcrniq ~~ar;~nrt*c-mg 11ir s:~rictity r:rsr

flmr rlr~ft. nt Dutch Inrfcrrnrntc :lntt I~olrl~n~ Intfo-A~I~IIIE~~ thi~ dt~rnino rhcrltl.. rhc nrltron

Indonesia I- -I--.-- iqrn if itr ne-Ec'Ic dlqcrcditcd, m; kerli~vcd V.S. inrrwenrron in i terl-l,iln h.1~1 Iwuyht timr f Indnneia.

RACKSTAGE INFLUENC:

In rhr ltrrr-, the Indonrsisn go. not'lng left, ndopring na~rtul,l~rsr cuclnrjmrr ~(III- cirs, Anpretl 11 I!. thr r:o dzim to IV-t ? the Suknrnn rt"g lrnt qc-i~ct,. ttm and reptidt.9 trtl its dc1)t to the Werherlandr. \lrlitrugh Altrericnn Inrercsts fared hettrr, the clilnarc lor Invr.\tmcnt 2nd rradr \vat poor. i,nol;ing fnr inllrrr>vtA- menr, In 195% rhr I1.S.- plantarinns. Rel~rving that the right-atpin? Ford Foundntion'~ ernncc. I~L' t:t.dcr.it~otl tln~ted CounciF of Gen~rals, which workrd with Sumirra njojoh;tdfk~i~trrn1f>.i11, S,ir.l~r .lk ~ntl Singapore. the U.S., was ahat to serizr: power. to join a rrlwllir~n IN ~onserv3t11,t~ ant1 >lth.lr1io \J\L 11s ~.I.c;til<)n ,ts a ifircc~ thrcnt left-leaning officers staged a prc.rmprive ' tdarnic gro~~ps in Intlcmesia'.: ourcr1 l~e pursch on Srptrmhcr 30, 1965, IctTFing six islands. The ( IA also hnrked rhc rel)<.lc, 1 rn rnemhen 0nT the Cor~ncil of Gent.rals. and AmrrEcan pilor Allcn Pope spnrkcd ..- .. tnl~ LkK,tlt,. L,~~~~,, ,,,, tc,l,c,L,6nL,t his General Sr~harro, the cr~nsemarive corn- an inrrrnatinnal ~ncirlrnt wlicn II le war; Cjplrr such sanr tlon! :in manner of the stratrgic rewwe, rnnhtlised

n :~ntl rr tl~ttctl U. srrtn~th to quell rhe

chot down orw Sktlnrvc.;i ICclct>esl In t11c r

OIIC' n rrle .tnoi her. that coopewtion

n .i

~jr~t~ec! n+..,*l .z, WI~

chot down orw Sktlnrvc.;i ICclct>esl In t11c r S. riyttt-win? army same vear. c ,t>cd town ,rtl rcpl:ic At lei rim. Charpng thr PKI was

f)mpite the small of Amrncnn pnlnr.
-t c.t.1 ,., --r.c~tirr7mniatcri-**r-Iris responqihle for the Septcmhrr 30 coup, pcnnnlrlir acrnity in Indonecia i n rhe Ir pn'duc cd Sul~arm forcer, in with enrly I96fls, L1.S. prrlicy makes cnn-a stnrrlng Su kar no sn~tfentl; and labor proupc Iinked to the tn cove rhe cottntrv's ~.IIIZ~ 1 aIris responqihle for the Septcmhrr 30 coup, pcnnnlrlir acrnity in Indonecia i n rhe Ir pn'duc cd Sul~arm forcer, in with enrly I96fls, L1.S. prrlicy makes cnn-a stnrrlng Su kar no sn~tfentl; and labor proupc Iinked to the tn cove rhe cottntrv's ~.IIIZ~ 1 a rnilnc hl: ,. *...\,-";<.IUIII~-FIIJ?. L.I.S., unleashed a of terror againrr rclrources. Ruhlxr ruprwtr m thr V.S. hnti Mort- i~r~pr n \uch "dirrv rricks," quspecrrd PKI mernlwrs. At least hnlf a actuaHv decttned, as the nrkber com-fiovxcer, t jurtship of ri~ht-wing million were killetl. In March 1966, panie druelr>ped cheaper, htter syn-Indc)nc\~ar Ic2tIcn. Suhnrtn formally took power from rhetics, hut Indonminn oil continued to I,nllmv~np IIIC fn~lilrr of the CIA-Su knrna. Iw an imprtanr conccrn. tn 1963, whcn hackcd 01 rir Rcbeilron, Ameri-A. soon as Suhnrro took thr rsrnq, it apprnrctl that Irrdr~nerin might seix can lcatlc ssrd chcir approach Indonesia annotrncert itr renewed horpi-Cdceu and other American oil aqsrt5, thr tclwnrd Ii1dones1.1. Ptnddctl by Sti~tthcast tality toward foreqn invcstmrnt. Witli~n Kenn~dy admfniqtration riiqpatchrd a Asi,~ \pc~.i. list E;t#v tJau kcr nl .thr Rr\Nn days, the U.S. and it5 a1Ii-v~ offered cretlitr speci~l ernissnrv ro Japan to rnediste in Cnrpnr.1 r lr In, tfic U .S. gowrr lrncnlr devtl-to *upport the parchas? of rirc. Invtrtnrr betwren flw indoncsian gotr-nperI 11c.c to righr- wing gen crnls in the did not rurh in, howcvrr. blrqt unmc an

clmmsqlons

crnrnent .and the rrif companies. nrtc-rr r r

4111

1~ was perctiaded

Indnnnlan arm!.

-A .%, 1 r-

.~rrrrrress

. cnactrd 1171; team, which deriped a ntn- qrnhili-On a hroadcr scale, the U.S. attempted thr Rroornfirld cntlmcnt ~n 1963 to].ation p3ck:~~e supported hy lofins from ro influence Suksrno's ~conomtc pnl- rrstrirt cronnmic a tl d. nnrl. tlre shipment nF rhe 'U.S., the U"orld Rank, Japan, and cjr replace his pvemmrnr itti ti a tucapnnq 'to indonrwr. IT Et~royran nations. Indonesia's crediron rc~~rne more Cavorshlt to the U'rsr and to hy I'entagon cxpl-rr~ rn rerain train~ng formed the Inter-GovcrnrnentaI Croup on fnrelgn investment. The Ford Po~rnda- and civic action prnpmr rlmi_ped to Indoneria {KG!) to canrdinare ad poli-tion, working wirh the Universitv of maintain the h+rrncldrip ol armv Ir3drm. tier ant? moniror Indoneria's rcnnamy. (::tlifomin-Rrrkclry, Ilarvard, and other American ndvrserr cntourapd the armv Meanwhile, the U.S. graduaUv huilt up Its tt.S. tnsr~~~-tltions, continued ro teach to prepare to take power-if not imme-rnili~~,zr?. arqistance and salw propam, American development strsteyy TO lado-diatplv, then upon the death or retirement pmvidint;. tht-military governmrnt with nesian ecnnornists. In 1963 ttie U.S., in of rhe aging, nilrng St~karno. A team of the wcnponr to comhat domcrric insur- allies, and the Internatinnal Monctar), tl.S.-rraincd ~conarnis1 s sponqnred hv the rection. .l+urc than rupplvin~ hardware, T;trnd irnpowd a "stahilizntion pm~ram" Ford Foirndattnn tau$% colrmec at the howwer, military sqsirtancr, ecr,nr>mic nn Indonesia as a condition for foreign arm!? command scl~nrrl to promote nte~t- prograrnq, 2nd privarc training PrOJFCtS eachanee loans. Il lowrver, the program ern capirzli~r ~hougl?~ within the topreintorcvd hmrrican pnlitical influence. was never carried nut, becausr the U.S. ranks ot the militant. With fowign assistancr in hand, the and the IMF canceilett rhc Toam after Rv 1965. lndnneian pniirrcr polar-pnrralr instatled the Ford-rrainect ecnn-Sukarno ~ri;rcd Kritish propertv to pm-;led. tndnneqian zvnrkrts. rpurred hy the omicrq, known 3% fhu "Eierkrlev Mafia," tcsr rhe formation of the Malaysian lar~ and well-nrgant7ed **Indon~qian Corn-in key planning pfiitionq and rcturncd Frderation. Spcmsored hy Cirent {{ritain, rnuniqc hrty (1'Ki). wi7rd t the end of $he

Issue No. 65

reg~mt ase el Goodvcar, extraction sector, particularly in ail. The not oniy rl~tl tl c ~ts plnnrntlc)ns, rnlc of oit in rhc Indnncs~an rcnnomy is hut they cvcntl I thc cclnrpnnv t(i cscmplif~cd In thc expansion of ourpur Rtn tivn gilvcr~l~~r~ L,~-LII*~C~ lire pl:mts. from 500.000 pcr [lay ln 1467 to 1.4 ~IVIRF C;clnt!yc:~r :t nionopnly rrves Indu-million hsrrrls per day in 1973. Irs ncsian rirc prcrtlr~crirrn. 7'11~ Ikrkelcy connibuttnn to the Oalnncc crf paymcnn hlafin, nidctf 2):) tlicir :\mr.ric:~n mentors, has thercforc un~lctgonc a rtmarkahlc dcl-~cd new laws tn cncuurayc fclrrign changc. MrhcrC nct oil caming-s wcrc only ccnnr>mic nctir-i ty. 3 5 percent of non-ohl cupnrtq in 1956-66, by 1933-74-l~ciore thc risc In oil priccs

-thry wcw alrc;tdy 96 purcvnr nl lion-oil

THE AMRRICAN STAKE TODAY cxporrs.

Sharrly aftcr thc Suhxrtil rcgimc took Thc lndoncrian involvcmcnr of Arnerl- powrr. Richnrcl Nivon clcqcrihr~l his irlcn can llankc nrv-d? no qua1ificnarir,n. They of the Rrncricln intertqr in Indnnesi:~: carry rtt lcasr $2.2 bill~nn. and pow~hfy "Witti in 101) rnill~on pcoplr lnrrw f 35 more. of lndr,nt.sis'r ctapgcring 519 rn~ll~onl and its 3.OOOmilc arc of tflantlr hillinn cxtcmal ilcht. Whm Pcrtnrninn, cnn tn* inin5 *rhc rcgion'~ richest t), oard ofthe starc r~il company. wcnr Ijanltntpr in natur: 11 rcsniitr **:cs, Fndo~ nrsia** con stituts 1975. leading U.S. Ixtnks joincrl with rhc p rcintcst pr 17~ in [hi-Sou thcas t Asian Europc~an, C3nadi:jn and Japnnrw finan- ;tr~;b.',T I..,+,.l..rrlr dt-cnclc sinlE."..-L..hll.tt:ttlblL,," *I...**ll#=**ri:11 Inslln!tlnns to !,nil out rhc cnnlp3ny

U.S. stakc in Intlonmia hns incrcnscd un condition rhar Pcrtarnina bc pi-iced many times ovcr. Stratug1c3tly, rlie under thc conrrnl of Indonc-63's
i.\~ncrican defeat in Inclorl~ina knq forced Arnrric:~n-t mined tcchnocrars. Since thc 3 rc3 of rhc 17,s. dcfcnsivc. rcorpmizatinn of lErrtnrnina, (ndnnc~in's ~OFXII nt BTC3. T~F Prnragon's finaiicial position h.15 impmvcd, but pl:irln' think ir 1 terms of rlw rreditrir I~anks still have a large rtakc In "~slan,r. " ..,lr:r,, ,,,,h dclincs idand thc continued pcrwth of Indtrnesin cu-Southcast Asis ;~q part of n I~nr: of ilcfrnsc ports, ~i+tich arc thcit collatcr;tl. stretching from japan rrhougli archi-In rhc past dccndc. lndoncsia has prlnp~c Sor~thcnst Asin m thc Incli:~n indeed l,een tlic W.S.'?; "nche~t prt~c" in
IFollyw~)oct\ vicw of Indonesia: Occ.:tn. Sirtine on the rnajor sca lancs Sourhcasr Asin, The thruat frnm thc left which connect I5urope and thr. MirIdle Hall I-lopc in Rnndfo RaIi (1952). has hcen rcmovcd; a cc~opcrarivc militan. Fast m hqia ri:~ rhc lndinn and Pacific Icadcnhip is in polrrcr: and irs cconomic Occ:ans, lnrlnncsi:1 providc~ the linchpin shipped to Japan, alrhnuph thir propor-prlliricc. pidcd 11s L1.S.-traincd cxprrrs, for this srr.rtcby. Thc most hravily tion had drtvppcd to 48 percent in I977 have f:~cil~tated suhstanrial incrcascs 1n aavclud route is thr. Stnits af Malacca, as thc U.S. share of ~ntioncria's exports American loans, rrad~ and invustmcnr bcrwccn thr hidayan ptninsula and rosc to 3 7 percenr. in Indonesia. Rut thcse sanir policics have Swnarra. hut rhc Sombr~k, hlaknsrar and Apart from the oil companies, **Free-**inevi tntsly gcncraterl social prcqsnrcs Ornt~ai are 31~0 irnpnrranr for port IM~~~M!s has a lucrnrjve coppcr mine rvhich arc now finding cxprrrrion. dupitc milirary traffic. in lrian Jaya (West New Guinea); Wcyur-intenrificd povcrnrncnr rcprcssion. While Indoneia's peopphiu significance hacuser, Georpra Pacific and othcr U.S. rhc cast ro the U.S. nf chc hencfitr it lias nlco applies ro tht. cconnniic firld. As rhc lumr~er comp;~nics have large conccr~ions rcapcd from lndones~a in the p-t drcadc Pentagon told the U.S. Congrrss this in Kalimantan. Not all U.S. companies in 1135 lwcn rclativcly low, rhc next dccadc IS vear: " Uiiimpcilcrl passage thrclugk rhcsc Indone~ia arc ~nvolvcd in primnr!. produc-likely to rcquire more cnmmitment of watcrw:~)-s is cqwntial for tl~c prtroPcum tion, however. Such firms, sttch as Singer, American economic and mi1it:~r-y rlwis- and othcr nw m~rcriab ymports crf Jnpan. ITixrr and Union Carbide opcrzre rance to prop up an inerrasinply un- a major ally, as tvcll as iinpnrtnnt for thc "import suh~titurion'hanufacturing popular miIit3ry rcgirnc. llnitcd Sratcs and fricndl?. Asian facil~tit=s which pmducr goods for rhc n:~rinnq."' American concern for J:~pan's Ind(mt.qia market. Orhcr cornpanics pm-Notes cconornic wclfarc- 5tcrns frnm mtm than vidc scrvic~: IFi~phcs Aircmlt, for Instance, npcnrcs thc new I'nI~pa sarellirr

I. **Citcd in Fred hael. ti!., TfrrCitcd in Fred hael. ti!., *Tfrr* Wirr IJ~cny
altn~irrn. Much nt thc oil and nrher rnrv

r)f Iirt-rlrtnnrlgr I.ran~ (CJnivrm\tv rlf Ncl~r;~%k:~
marcrials pawing thmugh Inrl4lncsia arc communications system. A few carpnr;t-Prw%, 1 ohb), p. 81. wld to J:~pan by Amcncan rntllti-{inns. si~ch as National Sernicondllctor 2. F#rrr.t,pi ptrttb~rioirr o~-thr=Sernicondllctor 2. F#rrr.t,pi ptrttb~rioirr o~-thr= .Itrrtrd 'tairr natlonalq. 'rhc rnmrr multi-nntionnls and Faircl~ild Semiconducror. nwrrnl~lcJdpnrr. 1041. IV. pp. 677-78,**

U.5.-supplied components for rcLr.sporr.
3. Ih~cl., p. 67 H.
control thc cxtrnction of Indoneqinn nw

4. Remark% tr Gmcrnors' Cnnfercnce.
rnxtckals-nl~o fnr sale to Japan. Over 90 Althoirgh Arnc~ican invmtnlrrnt in**Auptri 4.Auptri *4.* 1453. Circtl in I'mt~~~on 18~pcrr, lpercent of rhc cnidc oil prtrditccd in **Indoncsil, ~vhich is.Indoncsil, ~vhich *is.* approx-irnatcly 5730 Gr:~vel Etlition. Vnl. 1, p. 592, Indonesia cnm-from arcas ~vorkcd bv million, is anlv 11 pcrccna of rota! *5. I.uw~,p~~ .Illbirr.,* ncrohr 1967 ("Aqis American oil crtm panics such as at tcx, foreign investmint :rnd "is only haEf thnr **Virtn:tm"*** pp. I 1 l-?5).

h.* I:r~~!qr~,r~nnn.rl I'n'rrnrutton *I)r>crr~$rc.trf~
1bcr1 and Union Orf. In 1973 ncnrly of Japan's. its impclrtance is cnlar-vd by ccrmr ,, **crrrm,rc,. I,IIIF nntcrrrm,rc,. I,IIIF nnt Firca, Yc:,r s70, three-quarters of Indonc~ia's rlil wxs its concentration in the kcy mineral ~-47.

Int'l Secretariat-TAPDL.'USA-Org; i. support for movpment. 134 Roundary St., tj/F, Kow. Orqaralzcs international adopthon of lndo potlt~c;tl r~r~soners I Isin. Pi~hlishes loonHong Kong. Inerian political prisoners, thr foc!tr af bi-rnnnthly newslelter rs-r JLI'USA. P.O. Itherr 1'177 campalqn. Has publrsh~d a Box 609, F.lon~cla~r, Nw Jcrr~y 17 t 42. The Indonesian Action Group-Organizes Imajor report on Indonesian prisonerr.10 around the human riqhts ~sstw and Soutlihanpton St. Lonrfon WCZE JMF f APO C lf 3ritish Campaign for the Release pressurm for cufs in Australran military

-.'
and economic support to the Indonesian England. on lndonesian Politteal Prisoners- lniriared the ~nfernat~onal support work rqlme. Publishes bl-rnonthty Indon~sian Church Committee on Human Rights in for indon~sinn political prisoners. Pub-Nrlws S~lecttons, based prirnar~l y on Asia-Works with church and community trshs hr-rnanfhlv n~wsletter TAPoL. 103 translations of the lndonesran press. P.0. groups to prewure for improved human Rand. ZVandworth Common, Box 137. Collingwood 3066, Ai~~tral~a. rights in Indon~sia, the 'Philipp~ner, and ;\VIR Enq land. South Korea. Recently f~l~d stnckholder Campaign for an independent East Timor resolutions with U.S. corporatkons call ~ng (CkET)-Network of int~rnational qroups for improved labor conditions in AsIan ' Eurapean support for improved human do~ng solrdarity work and providinq np~ratfonr. Publrshes thr Ash F~nhts rlqhn in Indonesia. Sponsored ronfrrence wrltten and aud~o.visual TPSOUrGfi on Advocate. 5700 S. Woodlnwn Avr?. i on "The Qthpr Indonesia," critiquing the Timor, U.S.A. Emr Tirnar Defense Corn. Chicago. IL 65637 phone (815) impact of for~ign aid. Pubtish~s rrq~llar rnittee: P.O. Box 251, Pld Chels~a 756-9335. 1 bulletin in Dutch. P.0. Rnx 4098, Statlan, MY, NY 10010. British Cam-Amsterdam, Holland. paign for an Independent East Timor: 40 Pacific Studies Center-Maintains a public Concanon Road, London SUT Enqland. rewarch crnter on U.S. foreign polrcy in Int'l Mo of Cathdic Sksdents, Australian Campaign for an Independent Asia, ~ncl~idinq Indones~a. P~~blish~s bi-Asian Ser Maintmns contact wi?h East Tirnor: 232 Castlereanh St 4th monthly Sacr!rc Rtrs~arrIi, a journal on Stutfmt: IJ, uu,l, indonrsia and coordi-Floor. Sydney 2000 Australia. New

U.S. and multinational corporatp activity natrr work with internatnonal student Zealand Campaign for an Independent In Asra. 867 !V. Dana Rm. 204, Mountain groups. Has publjshecl an annotated East Timor: P.O. Box 1157, M1hanqarel. View, CA 94041 phone (4 15) 969-1545. chronolnqy on the 1977-78 sttrrknt New Zeafand.
1

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! Organization

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S Single Copy $1 llIi Ten or more ,65/ea.

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m BERKELEY, CA 94704 Cl Imor more .SO/ea.r4 !a " (4153 548-2546 Issue No. 63 PLEASE SEND A FREE CATALOG w -

LA'

The indonesian anmy invaded East Tirnor in 1975. A bloody guerrilla war continue to this day

U.S. POSTAGE PAID

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PI IIPJIT NO 171 1

PRINTED MATTER

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SUCCESON CRISIS IN INDONESIA A DICTATORSHIP SELF-DESTRUCTS

SUCCESSION CRISIS IN INDONESIA

Issue No. 63 July-August 1978

, Why Fre tilin Keeps On Fighting in E. Timor ..................-24

Riches of the East: US Interests In Indonesia ..................-26

Resource Center, formerly the Asia. Many of these materials are not normally available

Indochina Resource Center, is a major non-governmental in local outlets, and they include government studies,

PO BOX WD CALIFORNIA 94704 1415) 545-2546

This Issue

Issue No. 63 I

CRSONinfluence under the protection of the then Prcs~tlenc Sul~amo.

SOUTHEAST ASlA CHRONICLE

Toclap, only

12OJo of the land is cultivated.

Fifty-eight per

cent of the coun-

try's 135.2 million

people are under 21

years old. There are

five doctors per

100,000 people, and

i .= .-- - - -

is 38 ppars. 62% of Indonesia's people

work in agriculture, 11% in cammcrce, and

to the 1

8% in mining & manufacturing. Indonesia

exports no manufactured gods, and under

1 Suhartolr regime, has herome the wrorld's No.1 rice importer United stat@ I

NDONE I w, 2

SOUTI FEAST ASIA CHROYICLE

'' No cnrnpletu ll~t ill tllnir. gn,,crnmmt hat] ,pCnl

3,0 mtll,nn ln~lrx~rc~m I'~)!ILIL:I~ I'r~roncn In t etrrunrr

SOUTITEAST ASIA CHRONICLE

Issue No. 63

woras Tot' runctlonal c,roups), a h: r!e rtoral

. .. ..

SOUTHEAST ASIA CHRONICLE

ickly to embezzlerrrent on a sfialo never st: - -fore -

.. ,.+. .. ... .>

. T ..

.-. .-

Issue No. 63

SOUTIIEAST AStA CHRONICLE

tech nolc llture was ~e~nvm~ ons or emproymen~.. Indonesia was

19W ,,,, world's No. 1 rice-im~urter a..

.. ....... .,

IPCC rnln

Issue No. 63

..-.. I...

was reduced to a single

. .. : ir diffic~ 111 for Sul lartcr to give rhe fighr~ng mtlch publlclr).

-. .-

ue Yo. 63 I5

NOTES

I hxvc rr-rirren rhrc pnmphtrt t,ccnurr

I Ion~ I'or csrricr pipcons. izlv h:iricls,

Itf S. !Icndr:i, 13ne I nd(~t~m~:~'s ITIOST

IIC:II LOTI. (Ih ,Iirr~tic Sun. ;I rnr3drl a1tnritL.

dinrncrr~il and c-rt~\hrd ~t~l:~c.

C;r+l~l, arid (tm :trth ltcr lwinc*I. rcclcmq, dirccr~~r~., anti hrnkcn "Tycoons, directors, and brokers, .2rr rlo\rn on i hvrr Lri~c-f <~rClni~ttbn~l ttl Auntit. Si~ii

Are down on their knees

Note

I>ugi~n tn stir in 1970, tlrr rr~tdenr Jrtovettrmf wzr cnnc~rnrd

1. Suhccrto

pnmnnrily with pnvrntm~rrr comrprron. ir~ tune ulnc mornfi~tic

Technocratsma!. not have cnnu2h tcl cat,'' etc. Cr~ricisrn is answ,ercd hy

3. Wives of Officials 5. Credit

Issue No. 63

3. Popular Participation

Popular Control

7. Employment and the Industrial Sector 9. The Parliament

Polli~~~a~ ~arxes

Tor nclp trnm thc

1 1. Electionsbt,twt,en finding poweftil spo~so~ witbin the mifita y

tablisbmc nt and developing s positfoe poIitiral propurn which

... Consider thc General Elections, tor Instance: rhe Plectiofl

Footnotes

....

Issue No. 63

Issue Ntr. 63

C;r+l~l, arid (tm
:trth ltcr lwinc*I. rcclcmq, dirccr~~r~., anti hrnkcn "Tycoons, directors, and brokers,

.2rr rlo\rn on i hvrr Lri~c-f <~rClni~ttbn~l ttl Auntit. Si~ii