Baca PDF (OCR): A Dictatorship Self-Destructs Sucession Crisis in Indonesia

Issue No. 63

SUCCESON CRISIS IN INDONESIA A DICTATORSHIP SELF-DESTRUCTS

SUCCESSION CRISIS IN INDONESIA

Issue No. 63 July-August 1978 Indochina Resource Center, is a major non-governmental in local outlets, and they include government studies, source of information on cursen t develnpmen ts in the counforeign publications and unpublished academic r-carch, tries of Southeast Asia, and on the U.S. involvement there, as well as many out-ot-print works on the Indochina war. ties d Vietnam, Laos and Kampuchea (Cambodia), and and high school students, and also poetry and prosc by also covers Thailand, the Philippines and Indonesia. We Thais, Vietnamese and Vietnam-era veterans. A free catacontinue in the tradition of the Indochina Resource Center, lo~ue is available on request. I source Center maintains a mail-order service specializing in surface-mail: $15 foreign airmail : 520 sustaining. AI! conbooks, articles and audio-visual materials rrn Scltrthcast tributions to the Center are tax-exempt. curate information for the anti-war movement's successful Glenn Hirsch . loel Rocarnora, and Mart ha Winnacker effort ta cut U.S. aid to theThieu regime. The Chronicle is published six times a year. Subscriptions

About This Issue ........................................... 1 Last Days of Indonesia's Suharto? ............................. 2 Popular Culture Goes Political .............................. 18 1978 Student White Book ................................... 20 , Why Fre tilin Keeps On Fighting in E. Timor .................. -24 Riches of the East: US Interests In Indonesia .................. -26

Specill Prr>ductinn Arqistnncr fmm: Typtsct ant1 Atrlietypc (Typc+crrinp) and Inkwtrrk% Il'r~nrin~)

hks to Rafic Wi Center for thdt help in photo research.

hd thanks also to fmlm photographer R'utdy ty-t for donating his photm

Cover Photo: Stuhnt demomtratots face polim In Djakarta in early January 1078. t Tenrpn magazine)

The Southeast Asia Resource Center, formerly the Asia. Many of these materials are not normally available The Center follows and interprets events in the new socic- The Center offers a unique collection of hooks tor children

which played a crucial role as one of the key sources of ac- The SRC Collective is: Candace Falk, hwell Finl~y, As a service to our readership, the Southeast Asia Reare: 88 regular; % low-income: 92 institutions; 510 foreign

PO BOX WD CALIFORNIA 94704 1415) 545-2546

About This Issue n this issue of the Snrrtl~m.;t ..l<in

rllrnrlicfr we evarnine recenr dcvelrlpmentz in Ir~doncsin, the fifrh lar ,rst cr~untc In ~hc ~vorlcl and a major U.S. ally in Snuthcast Asla. AS qerlou? opposition to Pres~ilcnr Suharrtr has surfaccd dirnng the part yrnr. many casust ohsrrvcrs of Indoncsin have wondered not why there ic dissrnt. hut why it has taltcn ro long ro rlwelop. In his artidc. Hen Anderson, a Cornchll LTniiocrsity lndunccta specialist and nnc of the U.S.' lend~ny aurtinritlcs an that country, an:llyres the nnture of the coalition which has wpportcd the Suhartn government. tlr also explains the aticnation of kt? rlemrnrs of rhat coalitton nvcr the past tlrcadc. In 3 pattcrn charnctert~tic nf dfctntr~rship~ in orhcr rtllrntrie< .~q well, .-2ndcrsan hclirvcs the contraditrions spawncrl by his own politic\ will force

Suhattn out of office heforc the end of hit: crlrrenl fivc-year rum. Yet rvirhol~t 3 well-orgnn~rcd democratic ar lcfr moucmenr, it ts I~kcly !hat Suharto's .;ucccsfclr wilt Ilr another rni11mry stmnpan.

Suliarto's weaknew artscs from tiis gn\*crnrncnr*s inab111ry ro dclivcr on irs promises $5 wefl 3s from a dcvclopmr.nt stratcgs which is creating increasing poiucrry among I~rgt scctnrs of Inrlones~n's popula rwn. f4nwevrr, IF d~fficultics havc bccn increa~ed IEV the cont~nlring wu.;lr in Ga~t Timur, where Indnnflian rroops are hoged down In a no-win ';ituation. Now In ~ts third year. the war is cnu~ing prolnund dirconrrnt among thc peaqan ts ~vhosc snns. llrothcrs anti t~urband~ arc dyrnp gn an %pparCnrlv FuriIe attempt ro conquer hall an island at nne end uC the Iridoneqian archipel:~gi.rl. In this issue, wc Zonk at some of rlw rcasons

the Essr Timorcse have heen aide tn carry on tt)rir fight for so long against an overwhelrn~nglv supcrlor militan* force.

F~nallv, I,rnny Siegcl, dircrtor or rhe l':~cifrc Shldicq Center, provides I h~stow of IJ.S. rnrcrcsts in Indonesia during thc twenricch ccntun. Sic~el clcscrihcs economlc and rnilicart. cnns~dcmtians and the caving approaches ,\mcrican policy makers have cmplnytd to enrurr. U.S. access rtl Indonr-~ia. Staff frnni the Pacific Srudies Centcr, :I crtnlnlunity rcscarch anti ~nfumarion cenrcr born out ot thc anti-war nrovcnlunt, have dcrrorccl mucfl of the P~ST rhrcc yean TO research on Inrlonesia and U.S. invnlvcrnrnts there. In atldition, Sicgel Iim wrlrtcn frcgucnrl!~ nn U.S. m~litar? and rconnrnic cnnccrns In thc Pacific. PSC: wrtrkerl cic~seIy with thc Sr~uthcalit Asia Reqnurcc Center in preparing rhiq issuc of rhc (7lrrotlirlr 10

Issue No. 63 I

Today's opponents of the political status quo are the same social groups which supported the New Order at its inception.

of rhis y .enr, the I srrokr ci Ir~sed. do prcss i~ 1 Jn karta <?*,l " II ,.I the nation's most p u~inlpusm were put under direct partly professional, partly academic, and partly artistic.

pointees. Beyond the government's concern for the smoothness of the efeetion-which toolc place as scheduled in March-wits a deepseated alarm at the strength and character of the opposition. For rhe movement indicated that the coatition wh~ch has kept Suhnrto in power since 1966 is breaking up.

Today's nppnnenrs of the political status quo are not descendenrs of S~tharto's foes in 1965-66. They are instead the same sociat groups which supported the New Order at its

CRSON Cummumist Party (PKT), which had been rapidly rrowing in influence under the protection of the then Prcs~tlenc Sul~amo. The most important clernenn in it were the f~llowin~, each with O"( ndanesian government in irs own reasons for anti-communist animus : (1) The bllfk of the wn two-thirds of the senior offices of the Indonesian army; (2) The dpvout Xsfamic tncl , arrested hundreds of community, both urban and rural; (3) Protestanr and CsthoIic 51 udr n t lc,,, .,,, ,la,ri suspenl,,, ,,,= elected Student Councils minorities; (4) A small indigenous entrcpreneurial, profesriond througlio~~t the crlu ;cl,ru:iy and hlarch, a number of and bureaucratic middk clnss; (5) -A Westernized inrelligennia,

military occupation : placrs, sn~dents were assa~~lted Of these elements, far the mwt important was the lcadeship with bayonets, and in others,universfty buildings were attacked of the Indonesian army. As age and ill health made it clear rhat with panzers. During the same period, somc nf Indonesia's most Sukarno's days were numbered, Indonesians came to expect a prornlnent intellectuals werc placed in detention. strn~lc that would pit the army generals against the The immediate occa5ion for the series of repressions-the comrnunists in a battle for control of the state. Although the most severe in a decade-was an eccalating movement of army had originated aq an extrcrnety heterogeneous guerrilla opposition to the scheduled reelection of Preqidena. Suharto to force during thc national revolution against ~btch colonialism another five-year term. The ~I~CFO~ body, the People's (194549), by the mid-1960%. ix had become a coherent and Consultative Assernbfy, includes 60 percent government appowcrfu'ul opponent af President Sukarno and his left-wing supporters. -The proceqs of development from decentralizei guerrilla units to unified military-political force had included purps of left-wlng, devoutly Islamic and Outer-Island elerncnts as well as the centralizing and homogenizing impact of training, equipment and organizaticln by the United Stateq. '

The army leadership hated the PKI for three fundnmcntal reasons. First, there was sheer instlcutional rivalry: the generzls intended to he mashers of indonesin once the chariqrnatic inception. Through 12 years of military rule, they have Sukasno passed from the scene, and only the PKI was gradually los~ faith in the goilernment as irs policies have created sufficiently organ~zed, diqchplined, and popular to pose a real new versions of thr problems thar alienated them from the "old threat to that goal. Second, the army I?ad become deeply order." IIencc, in order to undewtand what is happening today, dependenr on the United Srates in almost even, aspect of its and ro puge the future, it is imporrant to consider the nature of existence; in 1965 it could not even manufacture ia o\vn rifles. the co:alition that 1,rought Suharto to power in 1965-66 and the The PKl's stronglv anti-American poficv threatened to cut the - - kind of legitimacy the New Order originally claimed. annv's organizational, technoiogical and ideological life-line. 'She coalition rhat united behind General Suharto, then Third. the generals had heen rhe main beneficiaries of the Commander of the Army's Strategic Re5erve, after he 1957-58 natnonalizatlon of the vast array of Dutch corporate suppressed chc so-called 'Youp" of October 1, 1955, war, highly holdings in Indonain, for as state enterprises, the corporations diverse, united only in irs fear and hatred of the Indonerian had heen placed under the control of senior armyofficers,

2 SOUTHEAST ASlA CHRONICLE

Indonesia is a nation of over 13,000 islands. Toclap, only 12OJo of the land is cultivated. Fifty-eight per cent of the country's 135.2 million people are under 21 years old. There are five doctors per a 100,000 people, and # I i .= .- - - - - the average iife expectancy is 38 ppars. 62% of Indonesia's people work in agriculture, 11% in cammcrce, and 8% in mining & manufacturing. Indonesia to the 1 exports no manufactured gods, and under 1 Suhartolr regime, has herome the wrorld's No.1 rice importer United stat@ I NDONE I w, 2

SOC"TI-lErZCT ASIA CfIHONICI.1.: 3 and print :ate% in Ja P f~cr rhn r rhe pre-m colonial sl va, 2nd rhc crllln at J~enrrtI .-t:i~ic ~ris Durcl? rocracy tl cnloi~~alrs 1~11 "stnt .rc d<tmin iqtical" atcd 1)): s . " :n~ent of cncc in I Indor~cs~; rndcpand 949 ~ppcnrcd to s for Islan prcmisc I 1. Ihii il~r trhrd tirst by the sr were (la y and f politic~l wpulnrit> ,irno, a clas~ic or SuL "sr:itlst~cal" Muslii e rapid ricr of rhe PKl, s p:trt>. riot onl? ): ~phy of matrrialism, hat rlr,in~tlg 11s popul vlrnlngly from '%rarist~cal Mils1 ims " ~'1ll.n ~0111c ,1Iu'r11111 1~'ddCrs wcre drawn into rhe "regional IC I~tc 185M, Snkarno, with PKI SLI pport. lo hn one of the major Muslim p~rtics "3 f mutl~ of its political freedom of l>l~IlL~il\'Cl ~lthoupli out Xluclim community rccogr~i/~ IC army IL .c predornina ntly "statistito feel that the overthrow cnl Musli hail goo nt Sukar,,., .,..-. ,.lc dcstruc.r~c)n of the I'KI would at last make CII i~al tlol ini.al ~11d 11101:11 force in Indoneqian ~ociery.

ou5 icic:~lisn~ was h! ncr n~cnrrs the onlv f;ictor attaching ~d cspccizll!. Islan~~c 1c:ldcr~-to Suharto's coal~tlon. -I'i-:iditk<>r nic Icadcr shrp has i ~ome from two prominent social gr Ivng-:-sr:u1 d111g urh: an, indigenous (it, nondnd n~ral retigious scholars (:hin~.sr) rJr rncrcI1.1 tnr clas5.. ,, , -r~r~rl tmn (I~I~(IH~~) 2nd pilgrims rctilr ..-- . . ,,.,i Mecca (hi+), many of c si~nblc. ! whom .~r Innti-amncrs. {Only thr well-off can afford the r trip ro rxpcnsn t hlcccn an~f hach.) The policies of Sukarno's )cnr<,cr;~c! I;u~tlr.tl T , ( 1053-65) srriously thrcatencd the pofitions ~rist orie ntation and its - of "cllc~ 'R who depended ltslnessrne ~c;~ll~ -dc.r~and so forth) SII bsidies, squewcd thc ~nt~cpcnricr~t Mtrrl~rn entrepreneur4 to thc marsin. At the fame tlmc, the rcgirnc's policicr on land reform and rent rqualizarinn tl~rcatrncti the rirral arccndancy of ~dIn?~a and baji It WRS eaqy to tusc reli~rot~s and economic grievances and to cnt pnlici~ read into r~, strnngly hacked by the PKI, not anothrr soclal re1 savage attack on Idam. Suharto's 1 to prorr ascendan1 lise not only the ~nd of land rrform, -, but also a new chance for inciigeno~~s snpit a I' rsm.

Indonesia's Christian rnin{rrit~cs, nn rhc other hand, opposed Sukarno and the Ipft more fur sr>c~al and economic than religious re;! sons. Long favoretl Iy rllc Dutch cotonla4 rcglme, they found thtlmsclves protccrcd hy Sukarnu, as hc used argument., for religous tolerance rr) ward off claims by devout Mt14irnq. Thanks to the rnoncy and enerpy of a variety of missionary groups, Chrivians had exceptional opportuntties to pursue advanced education. As a reqult, thcy were reprcrcnted in key social positinnc; q~rite out of proportion to their numhers, particularly in the armed forccs and the professional middle claqs. They feared PKI ascendancy would threatcn their continued enjoyment of these social rofes. In additron, key clement5 of the Catholic community violently oppclced communism on religiou~ grotinds. Thus these rninoririe~ looked m Suharro. backcd hy an zrmv officer corp5 tn which they were well-represented. to puaranrre thcir intererts and che~tfaith.

The remaining scgrncntr of Suharto's coalition can bc treated -- together. (To snme extent their mcmbcrrhips overlap rhosc: of the rellp~ous comrnunitie~ discuscrd so hr.) f elr they reprr5cntcd various elements of IniInnrsia's small midrlle class. Yet while as middle class people they all had economic reawns for their anri-communism, thelr adhcrrnce to Suharto's coalition had sipnuficantly different additional gsou r~clx. Thew

had a.r much to do with hc of the aritity to the style and aims Sukarno re~ime as anything )!ex to clsc. 17nl r rcnsons roo corn1 rl~scus.; here, thc regime of I; :rtking uidcd Dei . .. . nocrxcy, 7 while arlvt . . .. ., itself ac "rrvoli~r~onary," "?elf-rel~nnt. ' "narlnnalirt," and "liberating," was any of rhe~e only to a very l~rnired extent. Sukarno's personal style W~S decidedly "feudal," and the atmosphere in the presidential palace was more reminiscent of pre-colonial royal courts than anything else. Sultarni>'s cabinet5 wrrc full of people with aristocratic background? and manners. While Sukarno attacked "colonial-minded," "lcglistic" thinking in the name of "revolurionary law," in practice rh~r amountecl largely to bureaucratic arbitrariness, adrninistrat~ve confusion, and corruption-and great day-to-day uncertainty alwut the latest whims of the repme.

'%atiunal selPrrliance" w2s also perceived by many as a self-serving fraud, because it perrn~ttcd opportunist bureaucratic cxactioas on independent businessmen and led to catastrophic inflation (600 percent in the last year of S~ikxrno's rule). While Sukarno rcpratrdly rrumpcred the slogan of national economic independence, American Interets continued to dominate indoneqia's crucial forcign cxchang-earning oil indr~stry. I<y I 965 thc government had accumulated over twa billion dollars in extcrnal debts, mainly to the Soviet Union. If Sukarno continuousiy heaped scorn on lawyers and economists for "bourgeois" atritudcs, these profcr~iond elements were profoundly repelled by what thcy saw as his trampling on legal dcccncies and economic ratirrnalip. Finally, Sukamok attempts to impose a shallow, would-hc "revolutionary" cultural policy (by censonhip, in timidation, and selective suhsidic~), in part to compensate for lack of wrious progrrse, in other fields, offended and frightened a s~gnificant proportion of Indonmia's arriqtl;, journalisrs, ncademics, and other cfcmcnts of the intelligentsia.

In joining Subarto's coalirion, all these groups, in cltfferent wavs and with different emphases, expected that the New Order would bring about a rcstoraticw of the rule of law, OF economic rationality, of intellectual an tl artistic freedom, and an end to corruption and the mortgs~ing of thc cc>untry's future by the irresponsihle acct~mufatroii of extcmnl del~ts.

One t~nal "prornisc" of 1969 need< to be mentioned, because it appealed to almoqt at1 the group5 that have been discusqed so far. There was a widespread feeling that Sukarnr~'~ foreign policy, in particular hi.; attempts to break up the Malaysian Tederarion hy military, cconomic and diplomatic means, had been cliqx<trous. Nut only had it discrediteri Indonesia In the eyes of many members of the "Afro-Asian" btoc, but it had been both uncuccrssf~~l and extrerneiy costly. Many believed in fact that Sukxrno had focused so much on foreign affairs preciselv to divert atren tion from sevcre internal prohlerns and rapidly deteriorating soclal and economic conditions at home. It was thus expected hy many that under S~harto there would be an end to unsucccsrftd and irresponsible adventures outside Jndoncsia's border$.

CONSO1,IDATING THE NEW ORDER

In the earlv vcars of the Yew Order, until about 1970, many, if not rnoct, of the coalition's cxpectationr gppearl-d rr, be on rhcir way to fulfillment. Suharco's own prcstiyc, not only as rhe "hero of the hour" on Ortoher 1, 1965, seemrtl irna~sa~lal~lu. Thc mhcsive purge of suspected pro-communists from the state administration (and of course many orher institutions) In 1966-67 allowed Suharto to keep at least in part, three different

4 SOUTI FEAST ASIA CHROYICLE

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n -1 ITI.~SSII'C' ~-jlort t<~ IIIIJI~~IIC IT\ rt irt~lrli~\ rnav Ilr JCFC rhln l)npp\ hum.in rl~htf Itr1.1gc. thc Intl~)nccl.rn I',~rn III~F S~~lleluviw: P~IFIITIC'~C to I111nt 1i.ltt COIC~HIIIC~II~ ~n~~trttn~hctl r!~c rclc tqc ttlrlnil I c~ntlit~nnq ~nur h morc tl~lt~cult ~II 1 t~,tlttO 11(~li11( ,11 I>~IS{)IIC~ r11 DcL-~.ITI~~~ than thct hntl lrcrn lrtl trl ccprt.r, ant1 1077 :tt>(l plt-tl~*rd it1 rthl~-;h\r t3(l rtvn~ of rhosr who h.1~ appllcd rtl rct~irn thc~r

t!ic 2 I -4h l 11 (-1 II~II< 111 III~C~ ~C~-~ITII>C~ f~rmcr hnmcr hate brcn torl~ic!rlcn ro I Q79. 'I'hin (: jrtpr :I~III tr~i<~i-.! tion i1~.15 Ir:tvr thc i~lanct. !

~l~ii~k 141 r;*<pon~l ii~rli ~~OIIW fttr rlw IT rc,l ,dcl,.+rr dl,nLlt nunlhcrr, The 1077 rclc3cc5 lcft h.llf (>I' Indtp Intlonrxtnn .Ictlrrn, ;~ntl \'ict. Prrvdrnt . . . ... h h.ille~ t IIC t'lrt. r,F 54) rn;~ti!~ ILVCS, '''I~'' nffrrial'!. nc'knr'wlrll~c-d P~)I~~~~~~ \I'~licr .flon~l.tlc rt.i~cr:~rcil rht. Lt 5. goytI1~4c polnr~ SII~~L*~~ th.um:1ny ~31' the pT''OnCr ~'l""'~"'~ On r'lrh "la nri crnrnrnt'< plvacr~rr tl~lrlt~~ n Xlav 1978 of'f~c~.~ll\ rc.lc*trc(l pri<clnrn arc nnt vcr nhlu" hn' L'crrl i'cvc'n~clr I' .k i1i11 tr, f~1,1rt?. trcr, (-r,nfitjrntB.ll rr.pnrr9 fn,m ,nrlllnexia tran~rn~qr~ciim ccnrcr slncc priwnerr u7rrr C.lr)rer u)l';rrv~rq ttr.~n M~inrl rckc.ivr.rl 1,) '1 :lF1 (kl.S./Rritlsh C.lmp,~~gn fir't srnt thcrc In 1''69= Fnrrrrt r" twcbn Icss plr.~cc.cl. ;\rnnnr thC 1 for rhc Rclc.~rc nf Ind(~nt-~i:ln I'ol~n~.at LI'vclo~ iun~lr lanrf 11 tic? nc>tctl IIV journ:lli.;r'; mi 1111. I'rl<r>nt.rr) ~nthcate rhar thr\r.r. rt Ir :I ;'llI lit "' "'rr""t ' "' 1" C I)cccn~l>cr. grit,-, rlvl, !,, . ,,' ,,,),. r! tf 11 listb f-rt-~rt 41 6 $*I ~lh~~ Llnl a *' IInsr of tfic 1,500 pri\t>ictc 11.- ~>TL! 01 lptl I,t !(.(, r:rq 11rt31, ,11~hr~tl~:t1 tj~! IL (l~b~ri*~! if, I I( :.! Icnsrtf from rhu notonotrq ~rl II,L~ ~II I:u~ir 11 II\!.C: L.lp ,r, mlwt I!< ~~I~ILI~IL rq T(V I IIL- lrl,!~t.~~5 itlv? wcrc nlrl m thrtrnr~-,~llv 111; I~I'ITI( I I,ccn rcrlrllrtctl xrc thchr yu hrtl\ I(? ~omc r~r~ttiatcq. rhr * * I\ Carrp ~rnpor~t~n 171 r,, ~rrrll 11 rl r rt~c~r hr>rnr~. hltjsr ot ~hcsc. R'lru dctcrrr'r'n ccnrcrr the rclc:~srd 111 (17 l~cr :TTC;LS w3crc rchy Pri,(,rlcr, ,vCrC rclcnScll fmm prisnr,r QICCL-'S~~U~ t>i tr~dlnnrsin'q tr:lnvvrptlnn ~:IYL. cl~t,qc-n to rc-m.jln nc,tr thc~r 111 I or rrrurntrl ro J-II~ frrlm fiurl,.lng tllc ~l~~t~~m~nt ~t ruth dt.tciit~on in spcc~:kll\ prey.u crl rth<t r t lc ~nd~;, rnc1llding 1311 nl. Ahlc-holl lccl "u~"~'' 1r'matc5 as "ran'rwdva rrl~nt CC~TCP;, ,,crc rr.~c.aqcrf pt lrnnrilv In K~l~,nl,lntall Anm~ Tocr rhat " I'hl~ phcc ?llo\lld I)c '* Conrlitlnnc for nllowinc lnd sum:ttra. ,\ trcrP nlany l,crr tr3nq- Ixmm~iI rlnivn."\.\ccr~rtlcnplv, cotlrccq pnsnncrl LO returrr ro rhCtr hnrr I urruii frnln drtcn hr,n rc.nrc.rq tl, ru5cttlc- !\ ho h:~vr rnnnirnrccl thc <~tuar~nn 01 t L s n as I 2 i I -I t nlcnr .krras. Accorrllng pvcrnment ~'~l'~~~'~ I'riqnner5 In lni'nnc'ln cl''\c15 <trin~rr>t, The! ~ncludrhd cvirlt rlk-r. rii.rr 5nurcc~. t. i-prikqvnerc mrn,ing rn rcscrrlc- "h" ff'.:'"kt~lt Runl mnl\ l*c tlc'r?n.llctl :4 thc pr,w,nrr h:lrl conductrrl 11:715<.1' 1r1 ~rjcrit srca.; havc rlonr QO vtrl~~ntanly, lltlr tr"lsmigrarinn r'rnrcr r:l h~ln .IJrrvnyrtwn In accordlncc with tllr )V3\'1'Yrlrllc a~nil:~l)l~ crjjctlcr ~klgpt~ lrl.,i fhcblr ti"" CCnTcr \.rrlrh Ilrflc rI~ang{~ ~n the acrwn! rncnr's "l'nncnsila" iiJcoloprr. rr clll,icc lnav have llrcn cnnrinucL~ st3t~1s 01 11s rrqirlrnrs. l.iren !I' rhcy wrrr by Imrh f3rnrhcs and nri~hl~rlrs frtl rwT rlctcnt ion allrrwcr! to vis~t thc~r Iirlmcr, rnmy ~n

I+\, t.\-lvikfi~rt-r r~tnrn, and a ~II 1 111 3 c,l3tcr:lcnt ~tl~ /c.s. sf,1tc- I1vathe 1 "0 nlilcs KPsrarlnfi tturu ** Fu-pr~sr~ncrq whr 1 r r! F:rnh~~s\ in W3qhlngtun norc.d to rwc m~c.mrnt. ~muld nor hc nllow I I '*l'licrr .IIY. twn mutl\nd< of rctu:~sr; Now\ rcwtrlrnltrlr seas fnr ;I yt..kr I namvly ~l~rcct rrlcastto socictv and 11,, ,,,,,,, ,,,,,,, f,, rhlr nrrlcle ,< Ll,, rcrurnin~ hnmc \v(11iIt1 mni.ll ~l~rnu~li rcscrrlcmcn t. "' ;I Jlnr r~l Stlrlnrno flrrrlwr.. ~*n.cII-tIrr~~ui~cnt~tI rcpclrt prcp3rt t! 11). hnusc arrest for siu n~<~ntlbc. told J:lkartn'% frndlnF ne\r.spnper rh.11 the 'V~%l't~l-. I3ri~istl ( ~rnp~~p f<~r ttlc RV~L 114 '' No cnrnpletu ll~t ill tllnir. gn,,crnmmt hat] ,pCnl 3,0 mtll,nn ln~lrx~rc~m I'~)!ILIL:I~ I'r~roncn In t etrrunrr 1WU. 'Vlw rcpt>rl 1% ~ilirtt" Tr,vt~?~t~~~t has 1)c.c-11 lnatie .~v:lilnLbI~ ?(I tlic pi t IJ-S. %762.0[1fll 10 ~~t~l)~ish 16 lrs~lls- <,,,,lrTr,,w ,#n/811,",1] ,b m,r,,,,.v, , ,,,., , ,, , ** Mtrv ser~r~~~~lv, thc It, ~niparicrn c~mpq elpccial!! for rch!r,i~ctl #md rrnrlrrrrr<r,1rrr,rl .,nil I, .rvnil.1l4r lrtln~ yo1 L 1 II~~IL-IJT t~l.11111~ thc t 077 ~rl( prlrr,nenhd iI'hlle rhc Iiidnncsl.ln ~r~ic-rnr \PO! I* 0 nu, hrlo, M~rl~tcl.~lr. N.1 17 142 IS r I I I Incntl~.~~p~~ql~~~{tIlcp~rltcl.r,l~r~n-;mlgr.l- M.l~e".ll~4*n~llnc~~Inlh~I'7~olreport1' rlctcnt~rrn~ anrl II h nr I,l~tlrrcrl t conf~r~~~rd tjy \toric~ tilthtl tly . ST, rinn ftlr nvrr .I tlrc.ltfc. ar n mein\ ~t\urnnllrt\ whn ~r.~tnc-sc+l wmc. 111 most of thr rcrn;~lnrn~ rf~ I jlllrr F crllsl til~u~in~ rh~ uvcrrro~\ tic11 pr~pula- ,, ,I ,, cnrl of 1979. Ilr~wcvrr. ~\rnnc< llrln c,f J~:I, thc crtai)lr.;hn~cnr of cprclal 1 Irl prcw ~rltrwlc\r tin N 7 n,ir~on;rl bclicvc\ rhc ~IC 1111 c.~mfr for fOmlcr l,rrlrtlc,il ~rrls~n~fi .;rbliFrc 1077. i!tInl ~II, It?nl*~ hb rcp~jrtc~l 1 tlctaincc9 is near 100,000 11 r' cL,n rl13t Tl,k ,,,lli rc,T lJin iqo, ,ltct 1 fr(,ln J.~kfrt~ pcrccnr ant1 ~li1111c%0 pcrtcllt of tht rt n1 llliln:, 1~111h t1.1~~ \11ai 11) L[ ' !TLI\~* 0 PI caw, thc gor'crtimcn~'s pl.~nr I-.) soclcty. In thc~r f~rw ! c.lr ,1t FUC~ c LI'IP'F. +,rc .~llchAraT~ - -- ,il,,,l,,,~ ,v ,,%< ,lBkr ,IS nmn! .IF 70.000 ~)coplc rn pt , , , , , ,,, , ,, torrner prisani-rs will nor 1~ :I llowccl ttr ~~~~~,~p,,,, f~~,~~~~! ,,., ;I ,!lla ,I, '1 \~~~hrii.~ I rlctrntiun, rhu~r cui<tcnc.c tlt nr~.tl 11) Ic.~vc thc cthllrc IT. -I+IIC.T~,~~IC.T, VEV~C 1x1 :I> L~JIIIIV 111 ' ,<ml~,k .It>! II<* ~L~C.IWL! otl ~cial c~rul~.;. 5tatc~i1cnrs In .ltlt~~tl .it rhvlr h~,rnr< will I~c pcrn~itrcd t+nIy 31 the ''lCJ I' '"p I 0 ? ( ltctt Stlrlomcl, lic:~cl r~l Kophnlntll). I)cc~rln~nrr tliwrctirm ol luc.ll :~~~thor~t~cr. WIl~lc ,\i,n,,l i3rr 10, 1077 I'lrci! III in hluvcn~bcr 1977, th3t Inr~r 1111 I:brnllics will hc cncournqcd I~I )ern fnrnivr ,I pr~cttncrk .1ru "~l~thnrcl~" anrl n~., tfc.~~~ntr.~ in t hc tr,ln*qnlgr.ltlcln camp, I,I 117&i*"' \C LA:~V,,~, J.ITILI irtbccl Icncl crctlc~~cc tn tlit~ ft.~! ' thc c\twncnrc Kuru C~I~;~FIC fh.tt \tiL h -11

.I ~th, I)~~~~~~~~ irl ,977, ~~d~,~~~~~~ Irorn Java zv~~irlil I)r n forni lrl.thle crh~taclc

"pmmiser." All vest igial PKI : influence al life cs ationin was wiped out. Th c govcrnl tllC'111 E<>11 ali7ing" the hugr, ~inrvicli Iy, and .I.., rr A ,, crncy h~ f ,ms=r I,. C1.I-.,rmn 1 inherited from rlie L1llRlllllV ?CUL.7. illl,I, JlllCC rllCIC v.CIC 1111110 of emergency, rnili~nry mcn could I,c placed In key po5it1ons throughout the society it lthour ~irtlustng much oppost~ion or fears of militarism. By thrsc lncdlls Suharto consolidatud his support within thc : withou t scriousl any elements in his r

The purge wwas n, ~d to civiI ians, howl if not thousands, nt military mcn wcrc also purged-forclbly

~tastrophic inflation of Suka add~tion, thev mo's Iast years. In sr~tuted new replatinn? trnmt, which for fore ign inves ~o~~ght a host of muftinatinl 'n the country nal carpol ration? inl .,~rr the nert decade.

Morc than mything eke, ?he SUCC~CF of St~harrn's policieq in ending the inflation pave his coalition a sense of confidrnce in its leader. Not l~rng symbolized more rhe new reg~me's snhrjetv, ~lidity, and cnmpct~nce. Norl~ing crt 2nd wed rnol :epl!; a relieved sense of wcryc lifc. lay norir uslnessmen, civil servants, pensionerr. I felt , and dep A 1- ",l,4; rheir positions and frltnres at last secure,. ,, ,,,, Sood

- thc Y governmen- . . ;akened its own support by its aoying the organized left . . . grounds

rctirL'cI or ~nrpr~sonea--on or t>erng secretly procorn~nunist, pro-Sukarno. ~nd 7'11c "mutiny panic" and so forth. oCtcrl parano~;~c anri-cornmu thc upper officer corps nisin in ~harlo to a to an Ilowcd SI .;ltc. his p he army xtcnt th; donrsian military man had kt no pn e ever L'he purge a n the ,acancies j chirved. " -.. ack kcy v . " .. rn~iltary h~crarchy with closc tricnds xrld tollowers, espccialIy >wn Dipo frnm his c ntgoro Division (the territorial Uiv~sion of la). Accus Central jar cd of Ocing "Sukarnoist," the armyts srrvice r~rals, the d especially ~ts Mnrinc Corps), and the Air navy (an rc virtual fa ly under army and plat :cd direct I 1969, a c , entire defense on of the c and sreepened rry power and strcarnllncd rn~l .,..., ,,.,, archies under Deputy Minisrer of rncral hia Uefensr radenn l'angga bcan. General Panggabcan was penonall! not onIy i loyal to Suharro. As a I'rotcstant and ' the natn mcmbcr of k ethnlc minorrty, he could not herome an ~r ccIItcr indcpendcr In this role, General Pan=tl;ean rct itcting uqs in cfft ministcr r~ntil 1973, when he was ,rornorc.d. formalf!* p the defensc podolio tlntil early 1978.

the Suhx In tandem with the purgm, lrnent launched rto goverr much in the short two other policies which d~d term co satisfy its various constituencies. Mc ~harro reversed >st impor tanrly, A of rcs Su kamo's program tr~cring toreign access TO the r and sell lndonc~ian econorn? iing primardy on state enterprises ar the vehicles of <it. t. Suhartc~ caIled on the services of celuprnen rat< inrl ~ndones~sn tcclrnac -. , .. ..uding a group referred to wen today as t , of whom hold Ph.D.s la," man! from the keley. Their jr~b was to 'ornia-Rcr create a c policy anenred toward .rnnomlc "rational~rp" 2nd "dcvclopmcnr." These men were all comrnirtcd to the nmerlcan economic orthodoxies of the 195Os, anti rhey tirere srrongly backrd t)y the ISIF, the Wortd Bank, and ult~matcly the inrernarional cnnqnrtiurn of lend~ng counttie4 Wcstern {the I!.S., n) known as the IGGl anrl Japa (Inter-Govr :rnmctl ral ia). They proceeded very rapidlv ro stnljili~~ reestablish an al~nc cries of 131 nholiti

of cheap {and many not so cheap) imports now permitted appeared like manna to middle clnsec, starved of such commodiries under the protectioni~rn and hankniptc?) of the Ir seemr no yeas. last Sukarl :d pnsqiblc to "liv main '* , the hu Ige loans Meanwhile and rnaqsive inw wcre initially in of the rich Wmt's s,,,,J,,,,,ce in as signs . . Indonesia's nctv lcadershlp and its future.

The second area of policy chanp can be called the polirico-cultural. If rigid 'bans werr imposed on all expreniom of leftwing thought and anything remotely resembling left-wing 'as not sor organizations, this w nerliing that trouhlcd any dement I. For thc of Suharto's cnalitior firgt time since the middle 1950s, all of t thev were, almost hem, given freedom ro exprem , I.P%-P P". themselves, and the)- .., , , , ,,courxged to think that freedom of expression would qu~tc soon be followetl by freedom of organization. Doaens of ncm newspapers, magazines, and journalr appeared. TTundreds of poemc, -short storics, pbys and songs which had been 1,anned or remained unpubliched under Guided Democracy, emerged into the light of day. It would 'he a great mistake to underertimatr the polutical and psychological Impact of this aspect of earl^ Vew Order life. it wac. crucial to maintaining the support of the professional, academic, and artistic intelligentsia, and its pro~rmsive disappearance after 1970 is directly related to their n~l,<cqucnl: aliennrion.

Einalfy, Xuharto rnm~rd quickly to liquidate the "Confruntation" with Malaysia, ending (tcrnpor~r~ly) Indonesian interventions ovet~eaq.~ hlthougfr aclations with the Chinese People's Repu hFic were frozen, and Indonesia became increasingly dependent on the West and Japan, diplomatic relations wcre maintamed with the Sovirt Union, the Easrrrn European stares, Cuba, and the Democratic Rep11,lic of Vietnam. ?'his pattern created the impresr;ion that Indonesia's Traditional 'Yndependcnt foreign policy" had not been compromised and that the international community understood and respected Indonesia's intention of soberly putting its own house in order.

rnonetarv system and SEEDS OF DISINTEGRATION , . rsr vanish ed confidence in the Indonesian In retiospecr, it s e vear 1971 marked the currencv. &y a s inter-related policies, including apope of the New ( nd of Su harto's personal budgetary cuts, virtt on nf rxpnrt-import controk, and a~~rlioritv and prcst vear, however, the first liqurdation of bankrupr st~tt. enterprises, and with the crucial clear signs of the diqlntegratlon or me anti-communist ctjalition from JEGI rnernhen, thry succeeded in overcoming the its own support t~v its colnpfere succesq in decrmyin~ the 6 SOUTITEAST ASIA CHRONICLE

ecmq like Iy that th 3rdt-r's cc rherrnce a ige. r~n ti 12t same P 0 inflow of hundred? nf rn~lllnnr ot dollars of loans md grant5 became visihte. In ,a uer! ctrnple map, the government we~lrened organized left in 1965-66, killing hun imprisoning further hundreds of thousa..,.,, ...., ririvlng r,,, mce. Bp 1871, t he rrrnatnder into hiding or terrified si!, I< communist menace" had begun to rece, nd de into n lernory, a mrn this pvcrnment legitimacy derivrd solelv fi r3S source v "anti-corn becoming. tenuous, while the cn~de use of justify policies and actions that had nothing wpprcaing the PKI undermined that residual *. . fnrthrr. With the decline of the vividness and p~aus~h~llt!, ot the "cainmunist threat," the prime cement of thc 1965 coalttion nect~sarilv grew brittle. The government itself began ro fcel the need for some more contemporary confirmatton of its legitimacy.

The elections of 1971 were exrmplarv nf organiz ratifications by military rcgimm. At the same rime, t government's very st~cccw in using the poll3 to srwe its purpo~, created the first serious divisions in the 1965 coaliti~n,~ 2% xve1I as foreclosine the poqsihility rhalt parliamentary instirurionc would become a mean< of broadening the coaIition Ity integrating new elements into it. For bv 1971, Suharto's policies hepinning to create grievances as ~vell as satisfaction, bur the engineering of the clectionq--which were intended to demonqtrate srlpport for the Suharto resimr-lvas such that grievances wou!d find neither expression nor resolution in tIie bodies rhey crcared.

e government's a\ ~ge, "successing" the bLctBulllllcnnt arranging an OUPCC~~TIC which would ensure cnmplcre control over rhe legislature they produced. But there were real difficulties. While Suharto himsclf remained reasonably popular with the coalition, rhe military as such, never h liked bv the population, had grown in unpopl~lnricy along wcalth and power since 1965. Moreover, the army had ys claimed to he above politics, so its direct participation in thr elections in competition with the sfirviving parries wo11Id have been cmbarrassrn~. The solution to thw difficu'fty was found hy formally excluding the armed senrice4 from the elrctions and awarding them 100 appointive scars in thc new pnrl i arncnt. Ry this expedicnr, Suharto avoided the potential for ed split! j within the milirary due to electoral competition and ided hirnqelf wirh a means of rewarding his supporten in he pro!, .PP *IlC . ,a,, ,niiitav hy appointing them to the legirlature. Ac the same time, he assured turnself of the support of a solid 22 percent of the new 460-rnemkr assernbty.

\I'ith the military provided for, the government srill needed a party of its own. Otherwise, rhere W~F a real powibili ty that the traditionaf parties, with deep roots in Indonesian society, would tvin enough votes to place rhem in a porltlon of relative independence from Suhartn-even if they conrin~ied to support him. The solt~ tion to this delicate politicai predicament was something called Gol kar (an acronym from the Indonesian mhlrd r!e woras Tot' runctlonal c,roups), a h: rtoral :ucted machine amply funded by the govc nd' const] uneqr~ally from three very dispara t and ncs. Firs1 .f fh~ %A;- Fort.most wcrc thc parallel vertical h~e~~~~~~,~~ ulk ,.,,.r~strrrs e and Int of Defcns .crier, each keadcd by general? in Srtharto's le. These inner circ hierarchies reached down from the c.tpital 0 .,, virtually KO tne vulapc Icvel. Oqtcnsiklly the neutral organi7crs process, i n fact the: an open larders of y used ntans fox 1 ginablc r 'iolkar ensuring I the SUC cess of I Minister ( ;. Not l Amir Intcrior ing did ... .. . Fur noth, . . .. .,-+-.. .. - !.,,C.....UY earn the n~cknarne "bulldozer +r(lnCi WAS a s~zcabl~ promincn ~t "indepl Imdy of ~ndcnt" I s, intellectuals, notat~ilitie publicis ts, and tl academics cchnocrat clcrncnt in the s, il core fr coalitit In, peopll New Ordr c who ha ~nally disdained d traditio I was to F mrry puli 1 tics. 'Fhei ~1 and che skclei .dcologica 1 1 uphi~lfta td hy the minis I tries of ( J here id rhe in there IS room perhaps tor some surprise-was tne rraa~cicrnal ?opular cl ~nstiruent I :y of the old Ieft, the kind of people who rn revious e! thc last p lcctlons (1955) had supported the PKI and chc left r wing of t he Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI). Nor only were ers with01 1 those vut ~t their traditional parties; 1965-66 I into I wits recrr i for the tt enougk m to he eas~ly it~timidatec d behavio "proving" their goo r t~y vutlng for Golkar.

Hilt 11 -.1 this was not rnought sufficient for a thr " re elrctirt ns. Thc i posed to ! iuharto. "s~ccessir ;h the lg" of tk agency ol : General Ali Murc opo's Spt .cia1 Opcr atians pu liricalin the a , .. :e appara' tus, P'OC' :cded tu directly to tnsl ire that ~t and ol 'ten vcna 1 secondparty Ic 1, d thc pli: ability of cntnuslasm or party rvorners ana ~owcred rhc oarfies' electoral creating. It is to these rhat rve now mtlst turn. ... . . he most : significanl sppcal. ?' ation, fro m thc pc in the view of our anal ysis, was lent inrc~ -vention , affairs ol rill he internal , the M usi. lt w . . ren~crnbered that in 1960 Sukarno had hxnned the largest ex~sling Muslim parry, ~Masjurn~. Aflcr 1965, Suharto had come undcr strong pressure from rhe Mtlslirn component of his coalrrion to rwokc the ban and pcrrnit Masjurni's revival. He had fy this ct attempred to satis the same time mstrnrcnc ,p, aiid at r his runt] keep it firmly unde evoke Sukarnok rol, by ref using to t? g the par ban, hut permittin ction under the ty'~ parti al rcsurrc new name Parmus~. Btrr hlasjuml'r popu lsr older leaders, including nvo former Prime Mrnisters, were tjarred from leadersh~p positions in ir. As a rusult, while Masjumi had won 20.9 percent of the votes in 195 5 Parmusi secured a mere 5.4 11971. (n tions help percenf in ed to reduce rhe PNI's vote from 22

rhcse poi icics and , - .. While the targeted 63 percent majclnt? tor C;nikat on elecrlon day, they helped tn alienace permanently stgnlficant sectors of the Muslim community, who saw rhumsclves once again deprived of their legitimate rights and nlace in Indanes~an sociury. In addition, the one $Ed to ho party whi n aginst the government ,Id its ow ~scrvative hulIdozer, mo dominated Nahdarul ru~al-uln , the cor . . uarna, alarmed tlits tenacious ]>old on its IC govern ment 1)). ..# . .. rural: following, stirnuratlng nitnerto fairly well-concealed mspicion and hosriliry rnwards all devout Muslims In the president's stmnglp "statistical Muslim" inner circle.' At the same time the governmen t's open ru thleqsness produced a small but significant protest from the younger liberal intelligentsia, which mounted G campaign to get vorers to abstain from vodng

8 SOUTHEAST ASIA CHRONICLE

.. . lrou~h Lt. General Widoda, leader of a powerful army faction opylvcrnmer -

. .. , Finally, the very t . . intcliigcnc rnent, ,f the elec tcd parlia~ 3 TI kr partics tkotr leadersh~p tell TO so carrtulfv engineered t~p tnc pc)vernmc.nr, closeu rne one raters. While this policy possi hle national channel for voicing rhe :~ccurnulating grievI aders. it undcrmincd the nnces wh~ch the government's own poiic~es rrtere by now

Much of the early credrn~!it)r of the New Order had come from a belief that it was mpidly setting the Indonesian economy to righrs after abuses undcr St~karno which had led to corruption, speculation, inefficiency and the mortgaging of the country's future. This belief had gained strength from the rapidity with which New Order financial policies had brought inflation under control, hut by 1471 it was becoming clear that the promise nf that early achievement had been overstated. For the belirf rhac the New Order would lead to national prosperity rested on one basic illr~sion: that the economic problems of the Sukarno years had been primarily the product of Snkamo's personal cxnavagance agd willful Ignoring of eiernentary economic realities.

The truth of the matter, however, was very different. The real locus of the crisis lay in rhe eventi of 1957, when the vast Dutch holding in Indonaia, ahove all in its non-oil export sectors, were nerninalty nationalized but actually fell under control. of the military. These state corporations-operated as the private fiefdoms of the generals in charge of them-quickly fell into ruin and in the process dragged the economy down with them. The norable exception, for a time, was the state oil enterprise, Pertamina. They rteclined for three inter-related reacons. Almost all the new military managers had absolute1 y no serious experience in managing cornplev corporate empires. The great majority of them plundered the entcrprrses' assets for their own private profit. And the army lexdenhip, desperately concerned to maintain discipline ant1 morale In the ranks, and no less despt -o find rnr nance a hr anti-cnminur crnaric;lll! e starc cr ,> .>.. ...- *-. prisec whlec. Iy rcr~uir,,,~ ,,,, IIIRllds~~~ II L;l:*nl.l ml n over sec ions if th tmr :retly llarp c cntcrpri rhe army. TO The owl thc supp rrhrtlw of Suk:arno, left insritu rir icr did r~c ,n of the Nctr Ort and the .-..*I.. re*- gen~~,,,~. I~~II~ thc buaru luurllb.

stall ma1 nt's bro -oad as t Iterablt J to can rces "jo - !nrral mil lasic RUI o l~e hat _If y or sup lost ban :rear ' nese sur Issue No. 63 9

Whar thc cr did in t rnic arcna was tr} in: "nmkelc and thci es in the governrnr

,ft drinks, and so forth. where earlier they had bt : strength. Key scctors c~f rhc ccono .lop some ..-,.- >*-. IL LU UL r,pcr~tiril under whdr ir eunhemist~callv cnl rn t-ccntur cs." Thc oretically partners vccn fore the and I do~ilcsti c capital, in fact thcy repr exchnngc the for, :lgn won 1 technolt ngical rcs r palitica I. ' I UC'I' iic CnSeS, conccsstons, ann arcm TO prlvliegra rkcts. In effect, tb m of rhe nic palici dcr : Nrw Or iiphr und lreamr (a: ,se with th to tht led) weal the -

. politic g of the banking - t sysl led ickly to embezzlerrrent on a sfialo never st: - - fore

ancial rn fin and planning agencies and to srv~tch ,phns~s frt m to privatc cnterprisc. Acting in lrne with >m state . . thr~r own rralnlng nnd thc wishes of the IMF and the I(iG1, the ect ,rhnocl-ar( cd national economic policy to ct11 on and privatc domertic and foreign nnmy of -:,121* - ~~VL~L~TIL~IL. They did IIUL-JIIU thcv could not curb thc ability of tt~r gene1 vert nalrn rccs fur t f0l their orv lent. As t ~pt stare e th t in the I rir key 1 tary bus :conolrly, . . oftlcers wno nsu managed then1 ~nto rum went rnto nus~ness tor tIlemseIvcs, drawing financial business sup porr.

.----.* -. -.-.-.-A. . . In this ct>rr{c.rr unc: olrrrr rmrnr 1h WV~LII UC~IIIIY 1r1 II rstnlcnt, IVF iile the at nly Ieade~ rship had installed generals n 'IS as thl ~f the st .prist.s (c for : top rn. anagers c are enrcr Iitical rea sons), it t~ad tried, , in its (13 that PQ ,vi~ way. I . T .. . . some cxpcrrencen mislnesqrnen assumctl sullordlrlntc pr>sltivns so that the gcese would continue ta Iay same goldcn cggsIs, The at>vious choice of such hl~sinewnen lay between indigenous aird Ctrinew. In tIie great majanty of cases the decisiotl was ~nadt. for the Chinese, Irtving the hasis For the partncrd kip of gr3n and rlcknng (Chinese tycoons) which has bccr me a cei cl~aracteristic of late New Order 1nc lonesia. t *or the " 3 ., advantage of the Chinese, from the perspccr~ve or tnc rnllitary elite, is rhey are a pariah poulp, wlm, even if many of the111 are Indonesian citizens, are still viewed with hostiliry by many indigenot~s Indonesians ar aliens. In effect exc1udc.d from thc political arena-there bnq never been a gencr: there has ancatry, and, under the New* Order, -the Chir I I cahinet minister of Chinese originspolltical thrcat to the army leaderrhip, ana nave Deen at ]ear1 superficially content with the narrowIy economic hich rhey have heen confined.

During the decade 1968-78, the Indoneslazt ~~~~~nrny assumed a verv specific character, one which in certain 1 respects steadily erntied the regime's political st bpport. N nally a largely "free-enterprise economy," it came quickly t n dorninared by giant multinationa! corporation<. Lonccnrrarca heavily in the envrrons or the capital city, in remu (minerals, fuels, and lumber), and in fight cnnsr~ these corporatiom quickly drove the RaSCcrr~ IIIUI~L IIIIU? tndoneqian husiness class to tI-le waH. Far from recciviag the expected opportunity to expand their opcrarionq, strch businrwnen found thcrnselves even squeezed 011 t of fields, such

dlocate political power to and these lie1 mses, cn , the fi concesstons: namely, late merats a ,nd their cntouragcs.'

In additio tion and I OF the aminc )us spread "joint ventu -amrer of the the RCO .----..*" 1970s workcu ru urlucrl~ll~rc th~ PoVtr ~I~IIC~IL 3 IIIIUUIC-C.~~SS ;t was thc : qujre fl agrmt ppo nipulatior I of essential for the gr owth of r JI indigen nus rated und ion banks ape ,.+ . y supervis .. . .> , .. 2nd were cornperled to otter huge credrts and unreallstleali?f low and inn :rcsi rate!: to senior officers rg working them). Vel -y uftcn tIiese cheap credif ~t used for ptoductive but for real-e~tatc ~~crllration. land graljhing, Second survival o ury hous ing, and so forth. Iu x fa was the nbcr of ii Important nopolies, which in effect leg: statc rno nur dly digcnous exc mic ncurs frc tnl certal In econo ,luded in . -. entrepre . - *. fields. tJarfrcuiarly notorlous lnstznces or these were, and 3tc, ~hr stare oil company Pmtamina, and Rulog, the National Supply Board, which controls the import, marketing, and dr>mcstic wurchase of basic staples. Not sur~risinrly , the~e crals li~c rnopolies were and are the or ~rnporwnt mrters of Suharto.

acpcnces of all of the above F he almmt the mart opposrte of the economic expectation9 or s~reablc parts of rhc 1965 coalition. Far from frnding their situation and opportunities improved, many indigrnous buqines~men (perhaps cisptcially devourly Islamic busines5men) found it even harder to 11 of Chi under Su vivc rhan kamo. Far from the New Order economy le virtues irb~ting tl of economic rationality, predictability, autortolr icsty and y, it showed every sign of symrnecricaHy opposite fnil~ng.

M'c have secn how access te bank credit WM and is not in the slighresr determined by provrn entrepreneurial ability, financial probiry, or the social benefits to be derived from its utifimtion. -. t in addirion, political plundering of the banking system led nmi- ~li ckIy to embezzlement and corruption on a scale Indonesia 1 never secn hefore. Some indication of this scale is suggested tl! rhe recent criminal conviction of a middie-lweI provincial iclal of the National Supply Raard fox the emhezzlemtnr of 3 million.9 In COntTaSF, the conventional figure for per capita ,Illllual income in indon~sia is $150. The "joint venture" waq another natural breeding ground for corruption, and many hfNCs were willing to pay huge bribes for licenses and contracts. In a recent casr, Seymour Hersh of the New York Times reported that General Suhardjono, Director-General of Posts and Telecommunications, demanded $30 million in bribes from General Telephone and Electronics for the contract to build Indonesia's domestic satellite system.10 Meanwhile, the presidential palace is far from offering an example of austerity and sobriety in a country where daily wage rates for agricultural labor are sometimes eight cents. Suharto, his wife, his oldest son, and many relatives have used their political power to accumulate fabulous riches.

Cynical or history-conscious supporters of the New Order sometimes argue that such corruption is perhaps a necessary price to pay for rapid development. After all, was not America's own industrialization presided over by "robber barons"? Even such supporters assumed, however, that what was being bought so expensively was efficient and patriotic management. Until late 1974, it was common for them to point with a certain ambivalent pride to General Ibnu Sutowo, longtime President- Director of the state oil company, Pertamina, as a worthy successor to the American robber barons. Sutowo was immensely corrupt, they admitted, but they believed he was also ruthlessly efficient, able to deal on equal terms with the global oil giants, and he was strongly committed to his country's interests. As is now widely known, early in 1975 Pertamina went bankrupt. Indonesia was in the humiliating position of being the only member of OPEC to have an insolvent state oil corporation. More devastating still, Pertamina's outstanding debts were of the magnitude of $10.5 billion, almost five times the size of the entire national debt accumulated by the economically irrational Sukarno.

In the wake of the Pertamina disaster, it also became clear that the "rest" of the Indonesian government had run up debts to the tune of over $8 billion, creating a total debt of close to $19 billion. So huge had the debts in fact become that economists estimate that in the late 1970s and early 1980s, Indonesia will have to spend about one-fifth of all export earnings just to service them.11

The dimensions of this crisis not only mortally wounded the New Order's claims to economic competence, prudence, and honesty. They also called into question its nationalist credentials. Particularly among younger Indonesians, who would be living with the consequences of New Order policy long after its architects were in their graves, increasing numbers of people began to feel that the country was literally being sold out by its rulers. To ruinous debts were added the extraction of clearly finite natural resources (oil, tin, copper, bauxite) for almost exclusively foreign consumption. The specter loomed that by the time Indonesia was economically advanced enough to make full use of its mineral resources, they would long have been depleted, and Indonesia would have to purchase what it had lost on the world market.

LOST HOPE FOR CIVIL LIBERTIES

became increasingly threadbare. Although the left had been virtually destroyed in 1965-66, the all-powerful Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (Kopkamtib), showed no signs of being dissolved. (Indeed, it continues to flourish today, twelve years after the "coup" it was organized to repress.) Kopkamtib had already used its virtually absolute powers of interrogation and detention in the 1971 elections to harass the rivals of Golkar. After 1971, it increasingly began to arrest, interrogate and detain strong former supporters of the New Order Coalition. Some of its most prominent detainees were precisely committed, honest, middle-class lawyers such as Adnan Buyung Nasution, who in 1966 had been in the front rank of New Order militants. In typical fashion, Nasution was detained for two years without trial and then released without explanation or apology.

But it was not only in the economic sphere that the Suharto government's policies and attitudes eroded its political base, especially among civilian middle class groups. Two other spheres were also significant: law and freedom of expression. In the early New Order days, Suharto had made much of his claim to be restoring the rule of law; he had appeared to encourage lawyers and judges to reassert themselves, and had promised that his government would be a faithful respecter of its own legal codes. From the time of the 1971 elections on, such claims

If the government was increasingly using the instrumentalities of law (if Kopkamtib can be so regarded) against its critics, it was also increasingly seen as obstructing judicial processes to protect the charmed circle of its core supporters. Examples of this are multifold: it should suffice to point only to the most notorious case of all, that of General Ibnu Sutowo, "genius" of Pertamina. While many ordinary Indonesians believe that for the harm he has done to the country and its future he should be executed as a traitor, Sutowo has never been put on trial for anything. Nor is there the faintest likelihood that he will be. He has simply lost his job. As a consequence of such inequities and the general sense of arbitrariness in the processes of justice, Suharto's initial claim to be a just, impartial upholder of the law has almost completely disappeared.

The same processes have been at work with regard to freedom of expression, something especially important to the middle-class intelligentsia which enthusiastically backed Suharto in 1965. One rough but significant indicator of trends is the number of newspapers published. In 1969, at the height of Suharto's popularity, there were something like 64 newspapers. With every following year, the number has decreased. By 1976 it was down to about 31, less than half of the earlier figure.12 These figures are particularly revealing, because huge sums of money were flowing into the country at the time, and government economists were proudly brandishing statistics showing large annual increases in GNP. In fact, the newspaper decline did not reflect economic scarcity, but outright closures by the government (through bans, threats, forced mergers, or the withdrawal of state advertising),13 as well as the reading public's own boredom with an increasingly tame press. Of all the closures, none was more symbolically significant than that of Harian KAMI in 1974, for this paper was expressly the organ of the student federation KAMI which had played a spectacular and central role in the overthrow of Sukarno in 1966. Similarly, two of the main newspapers banned on January 20, 1978, and reopened later under severe restrictions, were Kompas, organ of the Catholic community, and Sinar Harapan, mouthpiece of Protestant opinion. Never before had the government turned so directly on these old allies of 1965-66.

Controls over the press have been only part of a generally growing intolerance of even verbal challenge. Small private radio stations which flourished in the late 1960s have been suppressed or "disciplined." Public panel discussions have been arbitrarily banned or broken up. For two years, Indonesia's best-known playwright, W. S. Rendra, was forbidden to put on any of his plays in his home town of Jogjakarta. One of the ground rules for the 1977 parliamentary elections was that candidates were

Kornpns, a liberal Catholic newspaper, is nne of Djakartav< thrce major dailier. Thc government clorett it down fur three wcckq. alhving it to rcsumc pulllication only aFter prol~ihiting all rncrltion of thc ~tutlrnr rnnvemcnt.

Fnrlsidtfrn ro criticize cithcr prvernrncnt pulicics or poccrnmenr p'""""r1.

NEW STUDENT MOVEMENT

,\, significant turning point was the explosion of mid-Januar!. 1974. whcn siors broke our in Jnknrrn durinc thc vis;~t of then Japnncsc Prlrnc Minister Knkuci Tanakn. 'fhc riots follnwrd wvcral months of incrc;rsiri~ly chnrp critlcisrn OF the poucrnmenr l~y ~nldcnr luarlcrs 2nd younger intcllcttrlnls, cat~t~nusllbackcd by RI Irnst nnr nlilltary f;~ct ion. Regmning nc pcaccful, nrd'rly prutcqts. osrcnsilrI!, apin~t rurhlcss 1 apancsc ctjrparfitc. t:~piralism. but transparentlv 8150 :pinst Indoncslan povcmrncnt complicity wirh rt, tlic dcrnon.;ltrntions rnrlcd in wrdcrprcatl Ijuming of Jaynncsc :rutnmnhiles and other propcrry by i~nemployed urban yon tf~s ant! same gmUcrnmen t agcnrs provticntcisrs. Thc gnvcrnnienr tnok tl11~ ~~~tt~l~fjt 3s R prctcst, nnt unlv for arrcs~ing sttc:~ble numtwrs of its ttitirs, but for insisriny thar st~tdciirs shr>uld nnt gr1 invrr!r*etI in politics. Tl~c!~ WPIII~ have tn cnnfine thcn~sc-lvcs ro rhcir carnpuscs. Acadcrnic Crectlr~rn wt,uItE hc rcrpcctctl, but nnly sa long as ir was confincd

within university watls. Kvcn rhcrc, studcnts and tcnchem were u\+i~rned that cr1tici9111 must l~c "constn~ct~vc." 't'll I? pnlicy, Iiowa~cr. had thc onintt,ntlrd cffect of niaking the univc~~tlrr appr:ir more :In[] morc as s;~ncruarics of rclattvc frretlrlm III a prtlitic;~l sysrcrn of dccpcninp authoritarianism. !r aErcj hcightcncd srlliclarity ;inlong univcrs~ty studcnts across thc rounm..

,Mranwhilc, nnuthrr pnvcrnnient pol icy wa< prodt~c~ng itnintrnded conscqilcnccs: the politicai 1rnp:tct of research. Suhnrtr)'~ top tcchriclcr;~ts wcrr acat!rnrics, primarily ccclnornists. Tht-sc mcn, rvl~nsc altthcwity dcpcridctl rxt.ltrsir~cly an thcir scicnrific kno\rlc.dge :~nd thrir capacity to fomulatc succcssirr na rional flvc-year plans. cncouragrd thc pntfc.rnmcnt rn spend large sums elf rnoncy nn policy-or~cntctl rc~~+arch. Such rosrnruh was conccnt rn tctf in what wcre rcgartlcd as poliric:~lly innoclluus fic1d.r lfkr ;\gricultur:~T rctlnnmirs, rirrnogr:~phy. ant! nutririon. In this cffort, tile tcchnocrnrq hat! thc rnrhusinstic support of ~nstltutinns like the \Vr)rlrl Rank and USAID, on wllr~rr Inr~ssrhc gilvcrnrncnt \tn?s hravity depcndcnt. Tlicrc IS no tIrlirt~t alqo thnt many of I!I~ m~lirary IcatIrfi aroclnd S~tharto saw rhc rapid rsp:tnsion of ihiq rc<c:trch as a uscful deflecrion of the energics of thc youn~c-r intdlipcntsi;i. \'rlhnt happcncd, ho\vmer, was tha I ~hc cup policy rrfenrch, young m i<Id\r-clas! ". ;~ntl in tcl . . ame to a painful awarunea ot what war happcn~ng In a world with which they would o have ha, Indonesia'r, and espvciall) illagcs.

VILLAGES

What lents disc little by little, were the reafities concealed bq optim~stic ult~cidl da*cfopmenr statistics, -king Gh' w~ch as I ally eroded their realities f undarnent t urnply 1 faith, no ~ment, bur in the rd will of thr gown se and EC : of thc tc rc hnocmt: good sen F themselves. l4 It .--a+ .l - 1.:.. -1.. . r :-c---- may he usc~ul ro hurrchc LrlC K~IIU~ ~II illt~~ll~dtion this research ling up, was tur r hy the youthful this also idealism ger generation of and sacia 1 conscier ... students were so detplq sr~rxcd. "'-1'ht.y learncd chat one-fifth of all Indonesian babies do nor lice to the agc of five. Contrary to rhe myth of t.he too-fertile pour, scvcrc malnutrrtion means that the tr~rly poor hxve fctvcr childrcn rhan the more twl!-to-do.

2 2 SOUTIIEAST AStA CHRONICLE

While GNP was riring rapidly, real apricultrrral wages were declining. In the same area wlrer~ claily wnEe rates for agricultural labor were in the neighhorhoad of Sd, the price of irrigated wet-rice land was betneen $4,000 and $5,000 per hectare-prices driven fantaqtically high by rich urhan absentee land speculators.

In Java and Rali, 55 percent of farmers were unable to live from the yield$ of their fields. Villagers' share in the Gross Domestic Product steadily dr~lrnpd during the New Order vears. The rechnolopical revoltttion in agriculture, hailed by the technocrats as rhe soIution ro Indane<ia's long-sfanding agrarian problems, was depriving millinns of villagers of ernploymenr and income. Japanese rice-hullers, American tractors, Geman rotary-weeders made hngc numbers of agricultural lahoren incren5indy redundant, wrrhout at the same time significantly increasing producrinn. Dmrnatic illustrations of thew trends crime at the end of 1777: 'Ihr government wax forced to admit that Indonesia had become the urorldk No. 1 rice-~rnportcr, purchasing more than 2.5 million tons ahroad in that year-a figure higher than ever before in Indoneqia's history. At the siim few fcrt

t dist ribution ' 31 pOWeY under th c New 01 of politic the ,f rural s .tification . The "G .ocial stra rn threat systcnr r

e time, famine hrnkt out in the drstnct ot Krawang, only a IY7X war a fiveor six-year-old chitd in 1965. Hear she had no mileq fr~ tn. and traditiot~ally one of Jam's mosr concrcte experlcnce of cnrnmunism, or even real memory of it, ile rice hn qrl succc.ssful had the extirpation of the communist party been. tcsearch ;LIW m;tclc vcrv CIC~ how that char~ucs nrtd +'- - '---c 1971 the government had 40 prodigally uqed accusatio-- rdcr affw " heing expIoited hy undergrnu en or sile nce critics of wery conct.lval

tech nolc llture was ~e~nvm~ ons or emproymen~ . . Indonesia was

19W ,,,, world's No. 1 rice-im~urter a . . ;c. dites. e that its . . tion .edibility as the cot~ntry'r "rarior" frc +;-s llnri allawc.rl these c.11rc.s to attlid crrlployng their Innd>,,,, nunism ism had hy E 978 worn very thin indeed, especial.,, Issue No. 63 13

'"ha be . . .. nefitred r . . giual innc . . . ., initial ci , .. . fcllr rs for ha, nd the li nv-vi l1agc1 rvesting a 11 ng. kc. Govc rilmcnt rl 111 was la lopoli,cd rgrly mo~ by the s ,amc clitc s, steepen wecn vil' entration thc gap bcl lag" rich and prl, or. Cc~ncs catlirv in in the h: ~nds both tlf ip mas st creasing, ~gc notab lcs such as headn~ 3TOrb all( < ., i of villa tht u,xkc of the Jr: ;tmctiun I I, thc lnoc 3f the PKI P, * .+ , I-reform and crop-sharing ICgisratlon or rnc buttarno yc -.-. .- had bccorrle . tcr. Much a dcad lct of tile la1 ~d re-distr ibutcd in car1 y 1960s had rcvu ts carlicr rtcd to I owners 1 I)? rhr e; 197 ugh thc 1; ed for 50 provid b50 share s in the u 0s. Altho .,-*.. +<..+,> vucr,, LLC~~*~IT and landlard, ill I many ars ras 111~' ac ri~al ratio indlords' favor. It righ as 70-30 nr evrn 80-2C I in the I; : land-ref< J roo easy ro brand any ntrc mpts to e nforcu tht 0, ..,, 0 ... .,share-crnpping srarutes as "cornmrinrst. w~tn tne rnm of the rnaqsacres of 1965-66-which roo ~rgely in villages-srill only too vivid, few poor fa .rmers da red to rry 1,rnck place 1: ognni7e to defend their legal righm.

t:ina!ly, smdcnts sent to LI~ Cd3 -esearch i, n rural xr became aware, in terns of re31 of ce, of thr ? meaning arion: (1: I Only ab~ the government's own statistics au t one qllarrer of primary-sc-hod-age ch~ldren were ~ctuaHy In ... school; (2) Less than 2 percent nf coilcge-age yot~th wcrc institutions of higher learning.16 In other words, stude lwcame conwions of their eutranrdinarilv privileged sirr~ntion neslans. comparison with the vast hulk hful lndo surprisindv, in some this consci f pr~vllegc in thc ml of deepening rural misery produced a real radical1 zation, wl . . .. in otl~crs it gen~rated at least a rtrong sense of middle-c reformist concern.

Under the circumstances, it is not suq tt aq the h Ordcr regime celebrated its tenth anniversary, r he canlpt became the focal: poinr of opposition tc I it. ITnr T werc the meering point of two diffrrent streams c ment and dissatisfaction. As youthful rn emlwrq o class which had backed Snharto in 1965, thc stildeilts sha that class's r~rhan frustrations: government cornlprron, offi, lawlessness, restrictions on freedom of exprrssion, nrarginal rion of independent entrepreneurship, huge foreign del)ts, . squandering of the national patrimony. But tht :y were : much more aware of and concerned by the i ~ccumulat problems of non-middle-class Indonesians, most pa rticularly . nnn h.~+ vast armie of the m-ural poor. We should also nott ,, aspect of the political experience of the srudenr population, a direct prodrict of its youth. The 18-vear-old college fre5hman of

wastrip IPCC rnln

A NEW COALITION

en. 7 'hr elcctir Ins of 1977 illtlqtrate very well what had become ' lest of S uhnrm's t :oafition by that year. As in 1971, the government 'mrc ''ci~r -ct.sseu rhrsc elections largely according to plan. Golkar the won almost e xacrIy the same prcenrage of rhe vote that it had ~rly in 1 871. Yet there were important difference from 1971 aq rnp well first placr, the victory was achieved almost . In the . . ran CXCI uslvrlv by strong-arm hulldozer tactics, with the ministries was of c lcfensc and ehe interior, as well as Kopkarntih, playing the ,rnl lcad ing roles The array of distinguished independents who had 1 pers~raded to stand as Grhknr candidates in 1971 had (>rv her1 ---, ---- the 1arg1 :ly disappeared. jMany of the more honest and selfto rcsp ~ctiny! of them had found their soles in a pcrwerteqs par1 iarnent meanindess and had withdrawn. Secondly, Golkar actually outpolled, nor only in the traditionallv strong1 y Muslim province of Aceh, but in the capital city of Jakarta itself. Its successfi~l rival was a pnrcv called the United n~vcloprnent Party, a fusion of all pre-existing Muslim parties in forc ed by the government itself, All the other parties, including nts ~IC NationaIist Pnrzy, the Pmteqtant Party, the Carholic Pnrty hy and so forth had been forcibly rnergrd into a political Freak wn as the Jot kno Indonesian Democracy Party.

dst f iefore tur ning to the meaning of this surprising victorv, it is :ssary fir st to undcnrand hath the purpose and the lllc nect 11.7~ ,.An, ,L.ruL,,,,. of these impoqed fusions. The government's poli tical strategists, most notably General Ali Murtopo, had few calc ulnted that the forced fusion of partie traditionally in rses riva: Ir). nit11 one another and ~4th welf-established pnputar lses idcr ti ties ~vould fatally weaken them, both internaIIy and onextc .rnalIy. It was expected that the rivalries would continue and r rntenslfy as the different parties' leademhips srntggted for dle eve1 ~~~1 my,>- "" YLL eminence in the new entities, thereby paralyz~ng their cia1 elec toral energies and sapping their morale and organizational izacohl erence. It was also cxpected that the artachmcnt of, say, ~nd blur Jim voters to a ftlsion of idamiu parries, in whase imposed ~lso nnt* re (United Development Party) no trace of Islam was, 'ing d~tt =ctal>le, would he decisively reduced. Would a traditional 3orter of the Nahdanrl Ulama he enthusiastic ahnut a new the sup] hrmr nert .,,,y in which leadership positions had to be shared by Nalldstul tllarna with it< longstanding competitors. for M~tslim loyalties? In fact, the government's strateqy worked perfectly in thc C:I\C r .lc ~l~rrrb~~r \l.r~t Rcmrx~r:!i~ I'nrt~. M'prhour a ~'rlh~.rr-~~t Inin11r4 ibr jvr(yr:rrii :~nrl rc=tlt I)!, ~ntcrnal ir~icll~ipatil~ilI T 1 I I I. 8. rc to Fn thc <:*W u! I!W ['TIf'. h,~!t-~ imr-!.. <IVITL-~ W.L< in ~?ri>~<r t~i,mplcrc f:~ I .:.nt 'i yrd nlrt.n:!rion tti if< 1oh.F $11 rr! l,!rt>i!<! 11:~. :tn<l (:c~~n~*~~~~<~ilv. prc lc tt114im , whi[*li ttir i'its!(~n vnlv I.. !<I! II1CI ,.!, I..1 Lt1 11.

!{ti1 111~ <I~I~!IL- rtid~l i~\trrr<fin!! ~hin;: X~IIUI? thr 1 Ill!' vtlrt- (ir ttb~>r? 29 ~~~'r-ri ~?~I'.!?.IY:\ I. .~l~:~r.r !I' in [.![;xrf:~. 1v.15 \I~<>II~ r11dc.ni.r~ r11.1r r aqr tElr. flr~~ titnt. 1!1 nl~lilcrn Inilor~r<i;~ri hirtort '~:l.:l~~:b,.?l 5i7 " -1 id rw!! ['rr>tc~tant~ qr rh1r 1~ ;an8 :rvrgr nl' :I \ltt~llm partv, r:v\v t!>:11 CYl .- 1~rlI~- rrtY!ll>?r ilbC~I\ ,if ..-.. I.. . 11 IVY t~:~~iitit~t~;~Il\- I! ~rorlvl! inf!uc.ncrrl 1119 rc.lit.iortr t>rlt.~~t.?~i,>n. <II<-~I + L- IV~T:V~!,~I-IC< !ii$~ly <I~III~IC.I~T+ nntl 1r.l.11 rr-!l<*rrr rll~. rft.;rrr. ~t tlr~sat l~i:lct rl>n IV~I~F rtl~ \, ilii.il II 13 I? n~ .tl>ic :r+ p?:1! ofc tilt ~mlriiinit rr 1.1-1 rlrl1r.r. In cl'lccr, thc c>\~cr! r vlt, 1rcn1:71 nrncr-lalition It. .... 1ll.l.V f"~.,,,,,~.. ................................. IICI . lllln Suk:~rntv, .~g:~iri<r rllr "Yt-~v < >ir!~r" r,,*livr rh:!rr t<,~t**!~~!ix.n. ~I~II;II-!Y~ in !!I(+ ~.kk:t. t~f rhr c-lctrtrt~nq, tlrcrr ncrt- %rr;*np ;ntfic.~tja,t~< u,i ncrv F~!I<!:BT~T~c~ nrntmr ~Vir. stl~ulcn~t, ar\.cr!.!Jrnrf tr.~tllr:r\n:~l rcliptqr~r ant! other IF 'II-C'C!' fl! Aivi\i(ms, Xt ?~%?~~~~??~IIIFII~TI srr~rlt~nr Icndcrr. .I'<'TC incr :~nd zhvct, c:)qin~l\ nt~~nslhiri~! ntm-hludtm "r.t<lic:~I" co beitii rht-ir t?~~r~ki~t!!. ,? '?~::l\,~<*<

It c7r1 tnr I~I~~I~IIr::t!c.rl tt~ tt Suh~rro'~ c'nalit~r>n h3~ h~'r !TIC, 11 cutrrlnrlr ~n~~~rtrt:ln€, rlrrnv~it. thc mi! TI IT[ ti) cllic!uOc t4i~ ,tn.ll\ rtt rhcrcfnrtH1I r \vr.l) 1t ha< Ii:i~~pt-nccl tn thc rnilrtnr? \lntlrr !~IC YL.W, 0r1k-r .111tl (5 h31 it< ~~t~ii~rlr-~ it< I~tn~~tcrni lrailcr cur v IvL-.

qr-~ntf thy p)litlr< utf thr In<lnncci:kn nrrrty. nnc has ti7 t'~.rt it had II~ i1rtr;nc 111 !ltr j.ip.~nt-fc Occiipnrir*n rbii:il ri~~rl ~ntl thc ir,tti trr~irlr~ nf I 045-40. ?'i~r. l~~lk rlf it< scnic~r 1' .ITC' trtt L~I ~I~LT< foth 'T1I1F rvi 1 tt'rct* crcnrc,! In rhc J?p tnrce t(+ I rhr IF\. Ilclp rlrlriid ~ntls of !.I~:I ;tntl 511tnarr;t ay:lln~t :tn .... anr~clpqtcii i\~f~cd Incrslcln. Thcv wrrc rrilnctl In lrrrgulnr w~rlnrc ~nd scn.t.d in rllc~r humr Iocallr~re. \cr ccnitr:~l sr.tft W:LF crr ~rl.rl. 5inct I hc f :rl~:tncrc. scrrc~l tbar t rlnctlon. The tcnticnc~ ro\v.~rtl.: "hcar!!c~snrr<." I1r~;lTi7al1rrn, and dcccnrr.ili,at~on n.lr .~crrnrual~+al In the rc.rnlr~~icln,hcn hitndrcrk of tllillt~:tnrl~ cif prrrlr!t -tr+~lnr~l.lnr~rl\ -arint.il, Irut mllltnnr < nuthr jrllnctl horh thr otf'it.) tl ,~rn~v of' 11ic III!,ITI~ rcp~ldic .~n~l :I v\rvrt\ nf ~rrep~l~\r fc~rccx. 111 sciilr~t~n, Iri .In Irmv crcatt.(l .ilrnnsr tlvrrn~gt\r, rhc arnl\. l~lrrnrchv. rrtrrn gc.ncr:~l ctnivn trl prwatc, wnq lrllcd Ilv pr~~v'tc nlrnrxr thr sdmc ncr- Thr rcr,oluriunnry rnn~mnntlcr-11,- ch IL-f , 511 ~lirrn:~ 11. ~~:i.; nr!rri 50 tvlirn Itc ,~r<umctl th;kt po5trlon, Ar thc rnd <I! the, rcr.nlr:tion, thr. gr~rrrtlmcnt ~ntl r'lt. rnil/t:trl Icadr.~l-ril, wcrc- Facrrl ~v~th .t<-lttc tiroldrn~s al' Jcmol~~Zl,at\rm, .IS rvr.11 nc rbf rnctplrn? cr1nfllr.1 I>cr{rcrn h~ndr~rk of wlilnr: rrnlor c~firctfi wl~o 11.1rl nt, 1t1c-t ot rt.~irity, Ct}r a Itmg ti ti^-, and h:r~itlrctl< r-r! ! rlunp lur IT whc~ 11x1 II~J ~tfc:~ *I!' rc!i~.iininq jun~wr nlrra-em nndct 1'h~~ trncion~ CTC;~TCII ~~rt'rcdisr.i~rlitinr\ yrtllllcm.; ,ln~rihutrrl tn rhc dntcr~c IF^' n?iit1n1c5 I~J rrllr-ll~rms t11:tt pl.rritr.il Inrilrnrr~a lw-tween \?-kc' nn~l I~02.

Thr Im~ic ~trlurion ttt rhc prnhlr1-n (nrltlt. fill111 ihc. Ixtrpc m:~dc P~~CFLI>IC ~vhcn rnurrnlcs r+r rctlcll~r*n< were <ucccwf ulltprrt dn\r,n) wr twts-trlltl. Frr.ir, for :I dccarlc nt) nu\\ (rff~tr.fi wrrv rc'r~~lre~~. ,% 117i!i~:?r\ +?c.~<Tt*rtiy wa? nnt wt 111) ~i!! thr I.I!c 14)sfk 3nd tlul nur <tart j!r.\t\i\~t\np c.tdcrs k1nt11 t hc cnrlv I9ht)s. Sr-contl. lucr.111r.c. .131rl prt-xflgirlriF IoI>< tvrrr Fn11 ncl ntttxidc I llc n?\f~tary qrhcrc m ,Iwunqc .r!lc ,%rnf>i~~,lnt kc\- 0l'irt.n. n~trltl~ C;~~!tlcrl I)crnocra~!~, rhc. t,.~rirm:~lirctl Irrrnrcr Di~tch cntcrprlsc.; pro\ rdrd tfir high-lrvcl !r>l,g. qttcr 1065, n 11h ~hc nmli ln frjlt

... Suharto's coalition was reduced to a single element: the military

coilrrok or thr smtc. .I!\ Imnchcr of ptlvrrnt~~cnt rinpln~rrI armv cifl'lcers. 'rllrtc r< nr, ilc~ul>t ihxr rhr rrrr.~r~r~linaw crppr\rrllnrrlrb< ftlr dirprncinc patrlln.tyrwfl~irll rhr nnsrr nF rhr Nctv Or11c.r ptcwn~tvl to !%~h.irt~-n,~ lrcc 1h3n tlic :inti-trv~nmur~irt 3~111 :rnti-"Suk:rrnt~i<r" 1)llrgcr crsn\lr~ctetl trirttln tlic ni~I~r:~rr. - h:~r.r hrr.11 ?hc kc! rmc;<ln\ ~vhv hib hw srl f.lr i,rcrl;E 11,s vcrl <CrltttlF ihxtlcnpr from rvirh~n thc :trrn!. In ntt~lrt~dln, Srtli.~rtn .~ntI hlr; afc-11 ct>hnrrs arc I)!. nOH' hcavr. rnidtltt-;~gc.tI mrn In ttrrrr cnrfv .~nd rn~rl-f;k. wit11 I:~rgc hmrnrlrr. nirh .I srromg 5ral.c In tilc ~I:I~EIS 1!11(1. an'! in nt, nirlwl tcl icapnrrli/r thinly I>!. poliricnl

turers sup ,f its equi

advcr donc well hp the army, 2nd that his successor, who ought tn 1 ,,.-.. w:.,nlIrures. ,mny reel rtiar wnalcvcr nls mlStaKc5, sunaxto n ;petted army officer, should tnke ovrr In an ordcri a re! "lrel1.l rimed and institutiona1izt.d fas1jior1-l,v consensus ~ainot *TL11- 1 the g enerals themselver. After all. , rhcy anr arc all mt nf th e "1945 Generation," the g pcrntion ght for ar won - independence for their count q'.

Yl ns within the arm! ; which a rt there art certainly tensio likel) r to play an increasingly imp ortnnt sol e. Most ir nportant I these is the \vide gap, in ter rnq of 'iencc, ar LC nnrl rl ge, exper .- AC ron *w* ca I;+*-, mr l,,,7,Lssionalism, lwtween the rni,,,,,~ , ,, ,,,, ., cadets of the early 1960s. WIlile thc yoanger men, now irr thc late 30s and early 40s, I~ave none of the "rt.volurionar> prestige of their elders, they are much more highly tra~ricd, ar l~elieve themselves to he Far mt we prr~fc: ssiorldly They ?hare no particular sense ( 7f cornr~ icshiy wi. Indeed, there are a number of go ,od rensor IS why his rn.atr,r;evl 111 ;- their eyes may he quite low. Ptrst, the .,.,,,,..., equrpnlcr anc 1 irainrng of the army have been allowed to nln scrious do1 vnhill since the 1960s. It is likely that some ynunper offlce kli leve that if the New Order has rakcn goorl tart of tl erals, it has neglrcted the army. Secondly, it is an opc ret, even in Intloncsia, that the invasion of t ,Ire for~nt nrpuese colony of East Timor in Decemher T 975 was .." *...,. -" itary disaster. The army's inahili ty in the s~cceedi,,~ , avu *v.arr L'Lll ah alf years to crush the Eretilin independence fighters, or evc car' ture any of their leaders, let alone win over the populntio~ has compounded the younger officers\c*)ncerns. There a1 reaqons for supposing that they have attributed this rn~lirary tjumiriation to the bungling and incompetence of their elders,

roo ur~sv nollntelnv and ma kin^ money to ju~r~rv rne C C 8 colnr nand ticlns. Tht lming Lyni ted Katio ns conden natio mssinn in ' Timot ant 1 refusal t ,n of thc fPn".l"P I Ncw Ord InAnnmrimi *,. I.nlra coun CCIlllllCC IIIVIILJIU I laHlld CV 1. "~ntcgrat~ d" ir hat . .. : ir diffic~ 111 for Sul lartcr to give rhe fighr~ng mtlch publlclr). omc. Po r a Inng time, the namr ot the Indnnrsian nandcr 01 id was kept secrct from the rndonc5ian 1 the ~slal LL. ---- . . . . . ,.. . c. as ~t.c~c 111c rrarrles and numbprs of casualties. Suharttl's t war has lifficult fr >r him to maintain I mornIe en who rng nn the ~g thc I;( . . are acru: 11Iy carry .. .. rng. No patrrrjric ceremonzes, such as rncdaT-g~vlng or puhlic -31s for b:: ~ttlt. trernt rune1 T have ht :ally possi :en politic blc: ind o vholc mct 1 who iac the v e tllr pro Ienth in 11 qpect of ( attle like t ud both 4 beli~ rry is pro -d them a ur that tl .>... ,I..:-- ic~r cotlnl ll',. -L-. nrl nf wh: ,--* * tht~ dlr U~JIIIK. wrc \~rurlId not bt xu( trrlwd then if stlr~tlnrrrc . -. - - . - - . go hctter grow g !-(,~ngcr officers thar '9rhing.r u~~~ld if "w i charge.

. . Thlrtl~y~ thcrc 1s the matter of the army's honor, sornethlr r, less cy nicaI officers in almost any army raE than dn their elders. The youngtr men do nt rnrnent'q policies hut they arr expecte arta gove *..r I-rl tu cdrr? rlrclll (Jul. ,lllLl mnny of them are u~ll aware of ho unpopular the ~nt Iins become. To the extent that rfi unpopular~ry 1 to attach tn the army, it is prohahly matter of conrern to them. More particularly, thc penon ... disrc am11 y has I,rough t nn ~LIW wliic h hi3 amt ~itiolis ant 1 grecdy f President is a sou trce of d thc arrnssment to these aily emb off~cl sizes rhc need for crs, w11t1: -:.", ,. * ,4 ., qe rnilitn ,.*a:.+. ,$A : ry trxinir - -:I:&-& ig empll: . - - - - - - ...*, >. 111% LWU ICCLILIIUC 111 I~IIIIL,+~~ C~JI~I~II~IT~C~S. '' TO the extent Irlirg that thc indil r~dual Sul mrta comes to he viewed acr bringing o1)lor {"lr' 011 th c lnstirut Ion of the army, he is in serio~is political ,Ic. ? ,. .

as In to rhe gr JUC~KIC)~ meration gap, two other linrs of fission ,e divid y. Its thrs I. the ;~rm et. geat territorial divisions (Siliwangi in y, West mncgorn jnvn, DI] in CentraI Java, and Brawijaya in E:as~ " ln,-\ arc cons LX~IJL I lrar3. There are alio strong tensions between mainstream militav estahli3hment in the Minisrry of nsc and the politics! generals of Suharto's personal clique, dominate the palace, the cabinet and the Stare Entelligence cg. Suha~ re ngen rro oncr commanded the Diponegor *1, 7f and I IIOS~ mem 11wrs of his inner circle are also from th 7. rd Athc 3. l%*llnn LC VNLall ,ugh he I .,... ~P+.IIP. has attempted to keep some sort of ye , ,.,m the divisions, members ef the other r wLl utr aldt ,ir alwa! is acknowledge ~he~e efforts. It is not surprising that those "' gcncr ,315 who in rccent years have been more or less publically ~d critic al of Suharto-and have been punished for it-hnve come Rrawija ya (Gen. St~mitro), and Siliwangi (Generals tion, Dli: srsono, and Kemal Idris). Their crlricisms have :-d and el . .. . ncouragd student criticism of the government. ,I, 3 111 S~li wang~ Divi5ion is especially important because it l y contr -01s the province of Wet Java where the capital city is rr; locat ed. (The actual metropolitan area is under another IC comr nand.) If rhc rumors art me that it is primarily Siliwangi ,n and Brawijaya troops that are heing sent off to fight in Timor taking heavy casualties there), one can ma pine rhat :r (and rcscn trnent of presidential favoritism far Diponegorn is being :rl,ared.

~nflicr between the Defense Ministry and the "political As" is l~a~ically a matter of institutional rivalry. Career ars, primarily concerned with the military's own internal rvcH-t~cing and development, are concentrated in the ministry. On the tvhoPe, they shun the spotlight and emphxqize "the

ue Yo. 63 I5

CIITPF" :111(l ~)~IXI'RIIC~:ICII- ~C'XIYI-I'I~OTK. I ~ICY nrt ~nctit~rd to II'~IO~P th:?r rntlli incrmcnl <!icllilrl drpcntl on pr~!~wlnnnl r ~~rnjlr-rcrr~ -h:tr, prr-.oti.~l rrrilnrrFlon<. Suh~rrtl. tiow t~rr. h~rltl- LVIC Il<r~~ttc.ll ~i1'1,-v 11i pr~sdrnr 1~ \v1-11 1% hciry ;I sca~rlnrd \*rrvnn of tvrcrr1,tl .~rm\ 1 ro c~vt 11 in~self c 3 pi~~on:ll ptnrrvr. :1n4 ,rvcr~ct Iwctlmin~ ICT rlf ?Irc :~vnly thr prrq<,r c<r:~iili<+n,rnt.. he h.15 r*~rbrrctE .tra)ilnt cr\~>i~al mi of I hrm :I p ,. 8 . crnrr.~ls. ir ho hnvc ~pt*t~nli/rd nett ~n TII.I*I op~r:!tion~, I~it in wch nrcaq ,is ~rrtrtllyr.ncr, w~ppl\. f~nqn~.~, nnrl in~lttar\ pu1ic.c.. 7 htw. ~tc nor Jcp+irt.r~r~t< th,tt mn:nrtrr-nrn .lrmy mrli I:oltF In TllpJ~ c.<tcbrm, and rhv~r. ~cr~crnI< Ctrlrnv rl~ar rheir ptlwc-r :111d prtxrI2y rcst \sfiolI\~ rtrl t?~c. Prc.r~dcnt's rtl!:rical .;un rr..il. 'l'hr rr~!ttl l.nr~tv thcv will urt .I hvnrl. whrrrvcr 111lld~ th~ prcsit2cnr.\. Whrn 111rtcr r~t.;rlric.; anlong thr gcner.11~ h,~uc <rirf-+crd I+t.firrr :hr putll~c. riotzl~lr rrt 1073-74 ant1 14)78, they ~:IVI. i livnll~~11 TI~O~C\IIIPTI for rhc ''e~r~h! i~hm~n!'* (f.;c.ncral Sunl~rru in I(";.?-74, Cicneral Siirilnr~ in 1Q:R) .lp,lmrr thr- ~ulacr pdiri~~t>s 1 bl~nvi. :11!. l;iv)rr~! 11; llt~rtt,~~, on IHHII o~.cxion<\.

Yc~rtc rrf rlicsr irrrcrri2l tli\irtcrrrr wirhin rlrc ,trrricil forcrc, ir fat:~l, ln~t iic~rlirr nrc rlrcv rcrnrlraldc. As Srih:~rtrr IS vcrlv much nwrnrr, \\ ~th tl7c ~?lrllr rrgr,ttir$n of t!iv rrqt of !I~F cjnr-:lmc coalition. it rnxy I>c tcrnptlng for romr mitiray officer trl try [IF put toyctcthrr a r~cw ~cl:ll~;t~rln, coup. .issacsln:lti<m. or rlrfrcr me.xn\. If war rhi\ fr.~l+, nlorc ~11311 an\ rhlny c?rr. ~vhich !a\. lwhint! nhr cr.irLlnrrn uf J.~riilnr!. 20, 1078. 'fhat this fear r.cm.<lnr unx<.~i~xpd is, indicsrv~l tn cvrnr.; aftrr S~r!lnrto'< rucc.r.r<f~~l cnr:irlc'cnnF of ~LF tlrvn rc-t!rct~o~i 35 prccirlcni in M:~rcll. Ir tr rt~th .I ~Iinrc :tr thrw t-uttnr.; flint tvc m;ty I~tr~ngly rim~=ltrdr. For CIS-h cv~~n~ \!IO~T q~i~tc clc~rlv 1h.11 511hr~t3 15 drrcrlninrrl trl cu~l~inuc wirh. or sccs n0 :~lter~latlvr tu, ihr rnurrc hc ha5 pursrrcd over t3nc p:wr fctv !r:ifi

'Tfie rcpinw rc.rrivrd ,ITI ilnp!c~s.lnt jolt zvhci~ S~~ltan I tarncnek~~ Rt~rvonr~ nf Jtlf:jnknrta, itmg<tnnd\n~ \'ice-l'rm~ilcnt undcr S~thnn~~, nnnrn~nc~tl In \?nrr!l that he zvrn:lrl nor rtnntf fnr r~~lcctton. '1'11~ .irtriL*ttncrnlcnr. IVIIIIC ~ldcli~~~nc "rr.~s~rn~ (it' hcalrh." niadc it c(i11tc p!:izrt tEinr ~thr \\1t1<[1 rc\p~ctrtl S~~ltan find lrecornc dir:~lfcctr.tl From thr govrrniilcnt, and urae no fr~ngrr willing ro shoulrirr rrrpnn<iti~l~tv for ptrlicirs hr cvpposcd. In chtjocmg .{ ilcrv vicr-!~rc~r~lrrrt, Suhnrrrk h.lrl mrprc or Ir\r thc I'nllnwing chnircs- ,I wrll-knrwn Ficurt. trtrm nnc of thr. pnlitical pm-rlt*<. IIIc~II\ fro ti^ [Itc 5t11din1 !-'Ill'; vrv wnv*r gvmrral with 3 rrl~t~vclv pard rrpur,~tion, crr :in "intlrlwnrlcn~" rv~tliout :Iny qrrong pnl~tic.:~f Support of his rrtvn. 'I hc !IK~ I-hoice wtlultE 11;lt~ rr.twr\cntc.ri nn nrrcmpr ra woo h~r crlrics. rhu sccimrf wr>r~ltl h:ivr mrazit that lie 1~x5 (.3rrii1llr, smnnrhin~ thc psth for a nlccrwor. Thc rhirtl-rvh~ch v..~ rhc choice artt~ally ma~lr tn rhc ~wrsoti of rlir g~rnt!an~s cu-f:~lrcign 3lin1ster hd:~rn 13:ilikr~~.vr:llrd fh~.t Sulr:~rrv rnisrcd no unc wrrh rcnl pnl~ttcal wcighr In st1 rrrltepc B f1091~11m. an11 xva? ~lctrrmincd 11) nrle rrrr rhc irldcfinitc future.

St~nrrly after his rt-rtrcrirm. Suh.trttl annr>uncrd 3 new r~htnrt. Far from rrprrwnrzng an atrenipt to u-idm h~s rhrunltc.11 potitic:il hasc, it t~orc all rhr char:irtcrixrirs rjf a rtf!inlr rlndrr sicp-. Ir cnntair~rii f.~r mnrr grner.~ls rtl.in its prrtlecr\snr, and thcct. ~el~rml~ W~TC :tII rncn~kwfi of rhc nld palscc cliqu~'. tVhnt ncw iacr~ I-mcr~rd wvrc nia~nly c.rcnarurc< rrF I;cnt-ml :\I1 hlurtttpo'c ~ntclligrncc app?r>tltc. In a s!pnil~cxnt c)nlcn t'rrr rtrr lun~rc of rllc Indoncs~nn prcss. ~hlitrtnpo himsclf hccamc minlrter of intr)rmatxe~n. 1.07 t31c Irrv rime tn Indoner~:~'~ h~rton rhr ininir~ry OC rclyinn (an c-Ill Slu\lrrn I>niliwiclc\ rvnc ritrn to J

cstitlid.trr for thc prt.~i~lrt~ti.!t rltvt.rrcrrm. ncpnn \tm>ctl I rlrt c-u Conimandrr-in-C:f~~cf Sur~mo was \vt~r<kctE rlut of tllv 1111llt.irv hicmrch! lntlr n pre<tfC!tlit< ant1 pntvcrlrrr pcwt ~uprn-~~in:;'ct~c.t~~t nrlf I~V pol~t~c~. ltv\? 11.1rniin~: (4 ,111 T~C ~<I<ITI~I~< l>f I !cn~t! ,~f thc Sr.~tc I11rcll1ycnt.t- ;1~cnr~ :inJ Cllicf of Srnff (r.c., ac.rlr.tl cr~nrrcjllc-r) trt Kr-pl.,,~mrllv Irnvr- Il:-rn pni In :flc I~~rrd< (11 IHHC prfinn. rhr, fr-:~rcrl Lcrlcml 'rrr~~:;i k~rrrrrno (.\II !\tiirrlc:l n an.~lop wr~irld Ilc nrnlring rhc snnic. rnzn \~r~tuliqnett!~<ty t~rlitt c,f rhc. 1:1:1 ant1 tbc. CIA.)

Mc.lnwhlFc, nrhirmr\* nrrcqts of rtutfr.nr5 ~nrl rrcpc-ctcd tIt~s~dcrir tior~l~~litic"i ~ZVC cont~nucd trn~llatrrf rincr t5r prc~tdrnr'~ r-~Ic'~tit~ri. Thcrc- Irc ntl ricnq of :I \of~rnirlg on rt~ic. tronr. 1 Ilc trrcnrl is ~n rhc nppo<trc dart-t rlcrtl.

llt3~!<.rn ili<?t)r> I< flll~ oi' r~2mplr< <>! ,81%l<lL~r3t<a \VII(I IJIYt orll\. :~ltcn:trctl t hcir lvcol)lt.s, t~ut .tiso thll 1-\1crvt hlng thrv cnliltl rn rn:~kr. -Ipeat-rt'ul i.lrangc of tulcfi .:ant1 pr>lickr rrnpos<jhlc. Xg1 Dinh I)icm, !.on Nnl :incl S\ ngrn:ln I?)ict. nrc- 1mlt8 stllnc ru.bmplt.%. It i'.; I~kclv rl>:~r Sttharral I\ rnn\lnK rnrtr jwr wrh n pl~it~on llr i13n nt+t cot>~rrt11rr4*n~l11 l*c scv!.:cCd fllr nnntl~cr tk t c*\rq, j~f 1% tJrrt ~\nr~l,civ thar hii nt!c tvill IIV :~l)lc to WFISI IIICTCIII~T fnr cI11n~:c r? 11 Icln~. 1,~ Scnr, TIT? thc r~rrr ~imr undrr rbc h'cw Orrlet, thr p11vtrnlltcnl .innj~~~nrt.d tllnr :In ass.tss~n:~t~on plot h,~rl hccn tI~ccnr.crc~l avrlilng Ilu<l~rn <t~r,lr~nr R'V rh.rr~rcl wrrh plnnnin~ tcl htvnh f!~c prrcit!t.rrr. hrc ~v~fc. ~rld nvcrnl h~b~rsc~ of prrr\t~tur~ori.l!) \Yl~rtlicr :in?. ~rh plnr :~c*tlrnll\ cslrrc(l 1s a m:itrcr c&F c+r~rTjtrrrlrc, 1)11r thr nrlntluncr-~ncrlt .;h<lirz what rhc p.llacv Icsn.

Shnultl Suh.trtn bc .t~~:~q.;inatrtl or cllr In r3ihc.r. it Ir rnrtcr iinf~kelv rli:rt rl~c liyljr-tvcietii Adnw hlalrk., .ll<r~ n dcc;#rlc crltltr rli:in rile E'rcsi~lcnt, tvnrilri I)v nllorrrrrl to r~1rcr.c.d h~rn. The way \vrlrhtl hr oprn for n hirtcr and prwqbhl~ hlrwlcfr' ~rn.\:lylc f,lr po\r.cr nrncmc t.rrnrrr~di~ry rnilit:~rr ~T(HIP~. Anrl tvr s!lrlutil not nc~lcct [hi* powib~litv .t WLI 1) lc'[ It! rot1 ngrr i>t'flct-fi, who rn~~r't~r atrtmp rcr 1>1111c1 '1 nrw ptdiltt 11 ct~:iT!tion on I~C I~RTI~ of tl~r-~r rlai~~i~ to rcvirr hrrncrrv in gowrnmcnr, rcrclir rhr nnrlrln from pccdv fnrcipcrs. .!rid, for .I \vh~lc zr Icnr;t. rcstort. popular lihc.~ir~~, :at leaxt rr, lnd~wlts~,l'c troublcd rniddlv clnsws. ~t nnl to hr-r huge, Itmpsuffcr~ng a!!mrlln ~lcrpulntion.

North Relincse ttmplc rclief ~howing Drrrch cnlonilcrs drinking her (ca. 1910). Holland ruler! Indonesia far over 300 years.

NOTES

1. On thc tnnsf~~rmaticrn of the rcvnlutianary xmy, ker the mnfistcrl:kl ,~nirlek nf Kuth 'I'. MrVqv. "l'he Pmr-Revnlutionow Tr:irlrform:trion or rhc 1rl.rlont.sinn Amp," l'~rr$ I 2nd El, in I)>rf~>n*.rrn. I I (April lt'?l 1, pp. 131-76. :\ntl I3 (April 1 Q7?), pp. 147-HZ.

2. Fnr trlnrlsrinns nF thr "cnwp Croup'c" drcrccc, ~PP "Srlwted Docttmenrs Rclar~ng ro rhc Srptcml)cr 311th Movcmcnr IIKI 11s Fpllopc," I>ltIo?~c*ia I (April 1 Ofifij, pp. I 3 1-204.

5. I'nr ilctnilq nl the rcnrgnnirarinn, :tnd a discuwion of its ~rnpl~catinn~. %cc "Currcnt Slat3 on t llt: Inclhnr\rnn Army l-'l~tc nftcr rhc Kcurp:tn~!:~tlnn of 19b~-1970." Indr~rrr~rrr, 10 (Orrrrtwr 1?7F1), rl pp. lug-208.

4. Scc I'ranklin 11. Weinqrtin. Itrdont~in /Ihnwfnn~ Con/rorrr~~rrov (Ithac:~: C:umrll Mrbdcrn In~lc~ncr~r l'irjcct lntcrirn Rcport, 1969).

5. Thc Ilrrt crutlic., of rt~c 1971 rlectlnn.. nre Mm:~rh~ Nish~harn, (:olRar atld thr Ir~dowt~n~r~r I-lvrtic~nf u/ 1971 (I tt!a~.a. (:crrnrll Moclcrn lndoncria Project hlonttgr~rrpll SC~I~F. I671 ) : rntl Kcr~ W.brrl, Tbtn 1071 I lrctron rn I~rdunt,rra ~rn hirrt ,l,rw I.,~rr 5rrrdv (Cl.~yrnn. I'lc1ori3- l\4nnx4i I'apm on Sourhca~r A~i:i. No. 2, lg73). %Inst of rtic olwrv.~rionq 11cl~~w nrc Ibnwtl 11n ~IIc~.

6. Src Ufsr(l, 7%~ l p71 Flr.crion, ch3prt.r 9.

7. The Nahdnrul lllnrns'c vote actualtv rose from 18.4 ro 18.7%.

8. For :I ucrful an:lly%~c of thc "'jtr~nr \.rnturr," :zml 01 tIie ktrucrurc r>f cxpitfliwn in Iatc New Ortlcr tlrtloncGn in pnvr:~l, rcc K~clr:~r~l Rot+r\cln, 'Tl'r,ward a I:ln<\ Analyw c~t the Indnncsmn M~l~tary nnrc.:luur~r~c Statc." I~rdont.rrrr, ?S (April lt)7H1. pp. 17-41).

9. For morr ticr.~lls, rcc tllr If l-lw Ilcrrlk IJ/ rlv 197R StrrBnrtts" Stnr~Ir. in Indorir~m. 25 (April l'r7HI. pp. I 71-HZ, eqp. at p. 1 55. Rf rhc

\1Jrit~ Htmk puinrc nirr, wl~ilc t11c government uurl thc cmr ra \how i~ ws SCC~OUF allnut supprmin~ corruptinn, no nar~n~laf-lcwl IIulo~ oiLrid ho* cver hccn prn<ccutctl, though trRulog'< corruptiori I< lcpcn+lar_r..

10. Vm J or[- I~rmcr. I.~nu.~v 25, 1977.

1 I. For dctails. wc In$ro>rpr;r I c-n?mmir r'rncperts nnd ~hr Slarrrf nf tlrrrrr,ln R;~l.>f~ (W:tuhinpft~n, F).C:.: Ccntcr for Intvrnatirmal Pul!ry. lnternntionnl Policy Heprlrr. Decemher 1 976).

12. Vig-ura ~lrnwn irom tlrc tc~rimony of IIencdict R. O'C:. 11ndcrcnn in tirrnmrr Iilphrr nl I?II~R~I~~TIII mtd tt't. I'hiirppirit.r. tlcnrin-p Itrforc rhc Strhcclmmittcc on lnternntionnl Organtnat~nlir of rllc (:rbmmrrtcc rln 1nternstiun:tl Relntions. I Inuse of Iicprr-entaz tvcr (Dcceml~rr I H. 1 975. ;wtl May 3, 1976), W:rshingtori. D.C.: (;nv~+r~irncnl Printinp Office, 19761, p. 72.

13. Sec R. Wjlliarn I.idrtfc, "lnrlonfiis 1977: Thr Ncw Orrlrr's Swnnd P.irliamcnrnn7 Elrctivn," Asir~tt Srrrvr,v. 18.2 (Frltrunry IPi'R), pp. 175-85. 3t p. 181.

11. Thrs hitrcr ~li~illusionrncnt with the tcchnocrars is vlvirllv aprrs.;cd thmu~hour the I1 1*r!t~ IEnnk.

15. Thv l:~r rr l~sred 1)rlow~ :[re Fnlrly rnndnrnty ~rlecrcd. Thcv arc drsw inter 31i:i from An\l~.f~on'~ i.~ngrvwi~naI icrrirnnny c~rcd al5ovc; ~lic nrticlw trv William I:olllcr, "l'oo1'1 I'r~~lrlcm~. Vnrrnploymcnt nnd rlrv Cirecn Hcvnlutinn In Rural Jnvn," ant1 Ily Jno E. Rt~hcfc, Trrcnct. I!, tlull. ant1 Lukos Ilcndrato, "Who Dlcs nC Wlrxt ant1 i\rhv." rn I'n~lrrir IJakart:r). Q (Mar& 1')7H), pp. 3H-52 anti 2657, wh1c.11 wrnrnari~c c.~rl~cr rcscnrch findlnp; ant! rlrher wurcfi.

t h. Scc Andctson'< ~ongrcqsional tcctimt~nv. p. 71.

17. Sce Lidrilc. "lndnnrrin 1377," p. 17'1.

IX. For ~llurninntinp ilrraits on thc prcfitlrnrinl farn~lyk tinmcial hi~li-rolli~~p. qcv Rot~i<ot~, "Tu\r'arJ~ 3 Class Analvkts," pp. 30-32.

I4 homn Iralna. tlrc "kilt{

hc dirwna rtmr nns rnckvn Ind~rncwan pnl~rrcal c~rclcc; in ~hc lnrr yiqr ir fintllny vul>trwldm in manv fxt is of rn<lr,nc~iaii lilr, r:inmnp fr(31n hil*h cult~rrc ro srrcrr-cc~rncr Folk murn-. RC[I~OEIS ICRI~CR a5 swll nr arricr~ nrc rabinq t~p tllr rrfrfin of' c~pporlt~trn trr l>rr.~t~lrnt Suhnrro. In thc v:lr~ctl farms In wt~~ch rhc rnc<saF IF F{IIIC~L'~~, ~t r~rikrt drrp rcsrxnanctarnnng Irz ntldicncrs. wltr, II~F ijn won!^, strnp :~nd rvcrrts whtch rhc youernmcnr cIac5 rlor nllmt. to hc p1111l1cval. rvh~lr t t~e rnrllrny rrlcs ftttilclt. to srnp it.

I hxvc rr-rirren rhrc pnmphtrt t,ccnurr rhc inr;titu~iort< of ptll>li~ ripiriion :ire ccngcrctl nr~tli ~.ol>wt-ls.

Pcoplc 5pcnk In n4lrllrr. l'n sprak yoitr mind hcconlc< .I t-rmfvqs~r~n.

t f rntlcrcm ir allarwerl only ihrouyh clff1ci3F chnnnclr, lifc will Iyr likc catinf: vcprtnltlcs w~ttiour s3lt,

I Iimr wrrrrcn t?~s: pamplhrt hcr.lusc pamphlets arrnot tall~>tl for ~OC~C.

I Ion~ I'or csrricr pipcons. izlv h:iricls, lrch tt* usc slgnnl flap. 1 yc:rrti Firr thc rmokr 5ign3Es usrtl Iw thc Indianc.

1 src no rrasrrn tn rcinain silent. 1~1th foldctl handr . . .

Itf S. !Icndr:i, 13ne I nd(~t~m~:~'s ITIOST pnyular prtrrs :~ntf ~ll.tywr~ghrr, rccrntly rc~.brcd thlq ant! otbcn nt !I:< pocrns to :in rnthorinxr~~. audirnct. rbf 2,F;DI) in Jak.~n:l. 'fhrcr ~lnv\ Intr-r, nn hlny 1, 1?17R, hr was a~r<trcl hy the rnr11t.try. 1%~ rrul~lic~~. nr&lcr, thv In(Iont~~.tt~ nicrle.~ msv nor mrnrinn 111c nnrrw. frr tliat of ci.vrr7l rlthcr npprflltltln fig~lr~r. It~nc a crirlc 1)1 rflc gu\t"~~nient. Itendn nnt hten prrmiriel! tt? per!orni hic play< in hit nnrivr j~l~t~lil~t:l for yeam. Wrth vlmrriutj\ di*;\,~tlrFn~.r~r~n nowrstrnrl~nl! much furt5rr rl1:tn dcmon~fratlnq ~rl~ilrnrq ar~d tli~;!*f~vr~.~l grncral<, it< artistic csprrr~ioti prt~\brlkcr f'lcrrr povcrnlnrnt rcprcwion.

:\lril Suiletmr>, com~nanrlcr (II Indnnt.rrl0< ftnrcd sccurlrv forte. Fiarnkarntib, jtt~t~ficrl Rrntlr:i's :IrrrLt 1110 wIftnF thnr t~iq ~vorb lr "frlll rlf ~rruirthmcnr5." 'I'Jlc j:ik.lrta +I~Cimry C:rrmn~anri espan~lcd on rbt~ "<uch .;tt~fC can lracl ru unrtrr nnrl social conflfcr~. It givrq ~wnplc thc wm11,p picrtlre of thc rrrulrr oi dcvclopmrnt." Ic:irhcr ~han silrnce thc prntert inp rnic~%. howcvrr, thc prrvcrnm~nt'~ action sccms ro create nrw nncs. Cln j .~nu:irj, 24, 14 \earlinp inrt.l!rttunlc and :~rrisr< rlgncd n y~rhlic qrarrrncnr r~l>lrcting to rhr cl(r5urc ot rnnlrrr RI'~I~Fpnpm :lnrl :~rr~-ts of hz~ntlrcils cd s~riJrnrs, I'op~har mllslclnns hsvt. ~wvtittrn sonp to prorcst govcrnrncnt rcnstl~liip ol' critical films nnd nrt rxhihitq.

In rhc p.m >car, Prcs~ctcnt S~shartn xnrt his fnrn~ly havc hccn rhe ruh~cct nf tllrrrt crlticrcm fnr rhr fifit timr sinrc Suli:lr80 charnr fr, pntvrr in 19Clh. Il~l Tlrn, Sulr:arttr's IVI~C, 11as gainrtl partlcu!.ir nt>turicr\, hccauw of I~cr curr~icivr ant1 shady hurincsr dcalin~. L)uhl>rtl M:tdninc 'I'cn I'erct-nr in rhe carlv 1t370<, slir !\:IS rccrntly hren rrn:~rnrd Il~u 5Q-50. .A pop- ;\unric Sun, nh ..211nrle Sun. an dcriv uldr rrrck gnup, Tr~o Rimtln, wrorc a :~llntlr., sane at>l~ut It~u Ticri wll~ch !la< circ~~ latcd St) ;lcrrzrc. in qrr nlanv diifcr~nt wirlcl\r arnrlnp studcntr dmp~tr a envctnn~cctin~ and club<, nwnr bnn nn ~ts pctiunn.lncr or publ*lt>rn~ng, noim, and nlght, IIC:II LOTI. (Ih ,Iirr~tic Sun. ;I rnr3drl a1tnritL.

Al~nric Sun, Oh ,111nttc Stin, .I weer aunttc, l-'vt.r?.dav ir r'nen)~vd 113 FP(IT~C. C;[~r.r uulfinq tjnt14 norrn, 7 11t.n ~rr.11gh1 to I ht' Irra~~t)-' parlor for :I mil\< l>:~th.

I'n~cr:~ld,inrncrr~il and c-rt~\hrd ~t~l:~c. C;r+l~l, arid (tm<trllr.tion ($1 Iron Ir.~r.:

:trth ltcr lwinc*<q. . . I rcclcmq, dirccr~~r~., anti hrnkcn .2rr rlo\rn on i hvrr Lri~c-f <~rClni~ttbn~l ttl Auntit. Si~ii

,luntltn Sun. 011 .\unr~r. .sa1n. a ~tvI15lr .rtrntle.

Yrvrr I cci~ un7i.ill r\~rr\*l>tltlv,

T;rp~i\a~ty r11c t,ld an(l rt~rvrrrlntr. nh ,\urir:c Sl~n. 011 .l~rnt~r. .Iunrlr 5ttn

h$c:~ntvl.~~le, rlic nlrm 1wy1 I:irforn~ trF rnu<iC in bn~l(mc~~ I, !\ntvun ,I% ''~i,rt7i;,{71r'' I>r~aurr- ~IC 115 ~li;ir.l~t~r:~l~~ h~a1.1. ,it>nn1,c.at. II:I< nl~n I,ct.c)mc :I tnctliun~ r~l disscnt, rcachln!! rjut to hupc .~udicnci.~ In mnrkt-tpf~cc-5. <trCCTt-Orn{ hctnlc5 Ithnrn~ Imnia, rhr i!c7t~qyifnt, " rc<ptui~ L-I~ t4b 1 c,cns~mhip ol :r frlri~ tlcpictinl: I flc I~lr. (11 ;I TtTC'Ct ptqn.cln w'h .i runt-. rsf prrlrltrtl r~hng<. lnclt~clcd jn :I rcccnr t.l<SCEtc rc II,rl.' /Istl\l (F Eur~iqn Ryhrq):

I loti{~r human TEP~LS ?~c~-,lti<c 1L t<tt1r <!lltV uvf l>lll \vi. arc all frcc ro C[IOI)S' rhc H'~V of II~C H'T IC-~FII !- 1.t-n (.nJ ~Iw\n'r r(~rnpci $15 scnTnr7 In thrrr nctlrbnk.

"Tycoons, directors, and brokers, Are down on their knees to -Auntie Sun."

Apply r hc P:rnr..rsrln rlcnir~cr3cy .IF I ht. f'r,t~ntl.tr~lrn rif cwr r.otlntry. Doil't Iiccp 'tprnt: rnv:?vrnt:) tlir frcrtlr*rn tr! (lrtjrnr I)CC':IIIFC it 17 111 ~onflicl wit11 hum:~n (1it:nity.

Iturnan rij~hi 1

Thc l'rccdnm ol' qpccuh (rhlr.5 3 Itt1n1:1n r~el~r)

Wc:trv nll frctc Irk iIn anr tlrin~

1;rct.c.i'fotn re work (rhar's a human I ryh t 1

\t"r-: :trc Crrc tfr d~l anl.thtng :I< long 2% il tlocr;tr't cnnn~~ r ~~th th~ I'ancns~l~.

I,.~sr Dcrcml?cr (1"77), rhir Font WIF torll~rlrlcn rn Iyr FIT(I;ILIC~~ t111 trkvi~ir>n, I~rt thc rrnsr,rrliip 113~ nnF!' nladc Ir more pc'pll t.11..

SII~) 4-x prrx-iitir~< of i!\w-r~t bt, ~scstrrnii-cri In~cll~ct~r.rl% :inl) t~rhn :Irrhrrr hnvc lrlatlc ~n~p~~rrant ~lrirt< in tflc lcciri~i~a~-v <if 111v Strh3rtlt rt.pitnr. Ttrr Irr "~ntr<tr.~t~t~~" 1% 1 ~.rt~ci~I C'!~.ITIC~~ in thrrcptnc'~ wlf-im:icc. At tlrr 1;3nlc II~IIC,

rlrr.sr %t,nrr in,! ptrcrnq Tmth C'I-TI.FS ,L~ICE lnqulr -111 CX~VI~I~III~: II~~LI~I of-pi~sit~on rncrlr In t 41r rrmntrwidc. 11rlwr.vc.r. ~rmolrrh tc \r.cm1~hr (1' : ht. pvrrnlnvnt I ?ll\-!i XL kc(? 11~ <!rrTl FrFrC'<$lOtl- ~r~.ventc~l .111\, (lirr-t t t'Yprc'FT1OR oh L!~w;~r YIT~ I. hrvutri.r, fatnr xhytr crf d~rs~r~ ~rt.~k rb~n~i~l~ 1hc cn'ort <+ti ~L>IcI<

' 1r1i <tFrrlnp In ~r.itl~tin11al IndoncI%<+ r~kcn cIr~rn.tt~c rortti in If! 11r." < ILY~?~. T mt~ltlTc- ~yt (8 ~,IS.~IICV t~tii \~-n.iri? ~lth a pol7111:1r :~iuvn :I\ , I% cuwrnfl\* on fiir "iuln crlrnr pr~nr~lr.~h!c r7:h. t t15 1 !TI L~IC s~tlm~~~t~t! n lcrrcr to Suharrn ur!ilny hlln to rtbqn. Of ~rkc.TI, tlm zcc tluc-~ not .ippc:ir p.~rt~oi~+rl\ <~tllt~.fin c or t-\chn ln7rrt4>ttng. Itlir 5.t~ itor tn,~n.t~~ctl t,) pcmuadr \< ~tlcl\ crvrP fnn ~CFII~ nrr VICC 11rt+51rlcnt 1 Jat 13 A<-> IC.l(+< anrl -fi (TI' Inil~mc~~.~'\ ,Alti<l~m rtl, ~?n rc 'rri~l tt~t I'rott-t ITI~ !nil .I\ te3~Jlr , , C!tllr~e+c crlt~tcht\ to rrvn Iris duc~~~ncnt

Alr/imigh t!it*<c fip~rc\ l.itcr t-I"t~rncd rliat \ rrvitu h ttl ~riikctl rlrcm inso ugnmg rhc Icttcr, rh-ir ~~FCISI~C~ haw nor

rlirn~nt<licd prrpr~lnr Lnrtercst In thr CIW 'I (I rn:lny J.1r~nr-;c, thr "5:tw~ro Afl.iir" 1s proof lrhnr rhc z+alvjr, Iprrwcr) oiF rhc Sulinrro rcclrrw hac .;lip!>rtl rltlr rlf Its Vi.in~l~. ?'firs ~t~ttrprrtsti~)n drr~vvt from rlic rtimh1~13rinn of S:~ruitn'r hziic :I$ +a rnvqtic nnrl tr:~tlitinn,tl Jlv-tnc~r ctmcr! - tirvns of ptwcr. Thc grrvcmnrcrir'~ rrac- ~ioil ~nJicntc-s that it, irw, nkeq J.tvnnr<r pnl~ ricnl idc.a~ scricsurl!'. Sawltr, Irrr~ird li~ nor n r1ircr.r pr~liricnE rlirvnr, for lir h:~r no pr.rrnnal fo!l~w~n~. Ilc \rras nor rvm rr~tlrlt known 11ntEl rhc povt-rnmtnr tlccutlcrl to prmrCutc firm.

T?IT pr~)<w.~urion 01 SS!V~T(T. !!i*wCver, Ir prcwtnp mthn n~ow ~l.in~a~~nrr t!~:~n h~s rctlucqt t113r St~hnrtci rcsiFn. 1'rl:tl rcrclrlns arr rl.~~ly pnckcri rwth rri)\rrl< nE rnlhur~artic ~t!ppnrrcfi R htr chr-t-r P.IC~ ~CT rbf pcrl irtcll Iwnv l~ln In. rlrc un rcpcnranr S:iw~~u. R!' t~rinF;ng hini tc~ tr~.~l, thc Sr~h:~rtn pwvrtlnlcril !):IS crcattarl n nctv pr)lrriczt flgiirc, urhnsc ~rcrn~nqlv Irrlrbrm31 .In(! qr!r\ritlc sttar hq on : hc vcvrcrnmrnt srrllt~ ~+~ilt~~t.~lly dc-cp and rcwn:int rh(rrt1r tn thr. t nilone.i~:~n public. 0

Editor's Note

TI1,. 8uku I'utih (Il'l-i!e Souk) ir tllr ~itr~Tr~ ~vosr importrrnf danfr~~i.tir to cortzr r~rt n fIESP politicilI disr rrrl7r;zrcer rr~ Intiow~sfn rndy in S 978 /I ltl~o~rgl* ir is f(rrrr;ully ,a .vtr~tr*mr~lt or11,y (I/' tl~c The cover 1971 6&S tutZcnt Hlhi te Irr,r, h,. . publ irheri it rt.prr3~rnts rEv w~~ritnrtltr 01 rlrp srittl~nt ?no?~r7~t.nt 0s R wlrolr. It ir trlqrl i~mpottt7nt RS ~n i~lrl;r-ntio?t of thr rbnngrs in th~ sfridrnt mnnmtrrrttr drtrina tlw p~rsr st3mtr y~'rlrs. HJ/?rtf it fim~ I>ugi~n tn stir in 1970, tlrr rr~tdenr Jrtovettrmf wzr cnnc~rnrd pnmnnrily with pnvrntm~rrr comrprron. ir~ tune ulnc mornfi~tic 1. Suhccrto and nrrnn~t apoIittc,rl Ry 1974, stridrnr ikrui~s Jnrl1iriipr.1I rirrt?~n1 ~t~nvmmcnt !WF sr,!)jrrrrrl riat. r')ttin3 strrrctrtr(* of Indancsia again.

SY~~OI~S. 1 8f.n us it^ critic-01 a?~,rlytis uf povrrnment policy is simply to safc~sard itf own continttation. lr rr 11.~1'ug. -.I. H. Indnncsra!

.S'~rrdrnt f nrr~icfl nj' rlrtn Rrtndrrr~~, In.clrrrttr nf 7'echnnnlfl tIn17'). CounciI of fiantSung I nstittr tc nf Tcc~,no~~,v

~rannnrir nnrrnnaljsnl. n111-y I?, 1978 drd s;rtrrzrtn 11inlsrIf The students of the RIT dcclarr rhat they do nut tn~t beco~nr tbr. tarpt of i~ttli~k. Mortsipi]icrmrl,y, the rzlwrnr and du not want Suharto to he Prcsidcnt rsC rlic Ttcpuhlic of

Zl'r~trrw-inspitrrl n?rd FV't,:rtcnr-ori~r~ted t+conatnir pnlicy to N Thr stvlc of a national leadcsslr ~p rhat 11s conucnmatcd all syst~r~cntir cirtqtte, rlw jjnf itr t2 ytvn of rttrilirntjr ntlr. prrwcr ln its own hnndr haq cr~pplcil the offiri:il c.c~nrrifl~tiona[ Huku Putih is nrtdi?cinrt~ find nt tlw snTniq irm~ seller rrnd polirical forces . . tliiq ccntrali~ation of pol~rical pr~wcr ss clcme

contprtrnt. sopl*isticnirJ 17nd closely ~~r,iprd, itq asc of In addition, tl~r life swlc of die Family of ilr. Prcridcnt Fntfonesirr n snlloqrli,rli~t~r T r?trrf?v il pnprrlari~f ~rrrssible docu- Suhnrra has had a great sociocuItural Impact on the major1 tv of rnrnt. 11s i~ttilrk otn .\ rtlv~rro ~tld I~F t~~cl~nocru~s is dr~~nt~itin~, our people. 1 Its \Sit harrrl'sl nepotism tarvards his chiltlren and hrrrrrts~ ir rrddrcrs~r.5 tl~i*nr irt Jlfir~iliar, rr!~nmt rwprrritrr*nt. irnJtt, younger ~iMing hat hum rop~cd tty many Fovcrnmrnt nffrcisls 7b mpficrr Irotl~ rlsppcrs nf rl-r dol-~mvwr in n I~rnired cpacp, wt, of all ranh, such as c ;avrrnors, Bupari. vrllnp hcndmcn. and so Ilrrw rfrosr~r to rrmng orir rxrrrptr trot in t/rr> nrdrr tlrr-y Irtrth. The f~t that thc family of f'rc5~dcnt 5uhnrto has becarnc nppctrx bt~r nrcnrrling tn !l)r mni~r ti-rrnr~r o,! tilt. documrnr ns ?UP vast\v wealth! ~incc he bcczrne llenrl of St~tc some yeilrr a~o st^ sl*rrrt. ?'Irer~oYEtirs whirl) lrrr 1l1e s!~ttjrct of R~rktl I'urih nrr (see. e.g.. l'apos, hlnnpdcp) h:~s $\,en rhr imprcssinn to lower t,.rplnln~d in tl>r artick i71 rlli~ irsrrc of the Souttimst Asla officials that chcv tor, h:tvc thr ryht trr acr Iilic rhcir l'residcnt. Chron~clc Irv ISr,rrdict InrJd.rron, 7Yrc t*n~irr, dncnntmr Pnny ht, In this war, thr wcnlth of .\ti-. I1rcsidcnt Suhntro has exestcd rt*,td an tljt. .\prii, 1978 rrsirr 01' tndonmia, rnljnw frirnslnrion up gent influcnct. on thc drvclnpmunr of :i srrStrrrr nfCnwrrprit~n in

2. Technocrats

.ns and :ir r. ha.... . From a scrim of dizcus<io ~:ilyscs c;~rricd nut I>\. thc authors of rhir papcr, u-c ,c:lchcd n very srartIirig conclusiofi: Namdv, rhc rles~gnrrs of crur precent dcvvlopmc.nt, Bappcnas and thr. I)cp:itfments of the government, arc In fact awnrr and (in vrnlrzte rhat thcrc. arc dclects anrl crrnrs In thc prescnr development srrntcrrv. Rut why do rhcv remain silent' C. iin mutr Why do they rem: althnu~h their policy errors have made millions of ~ffrr' l'crhap~ they rcnlun silent hccausc they are ,,,,,,,LLLdal prortitutrs tr~lio (In nor havc scientific integrity? Or rlo hey I~rlnng ro tht group who rnjoy thc "fruits 01 develnpncnt" precisely hecatlsc nf rhc~r pnlicy ci-~ors??

3. Wives of Officials

(3nr srt-finn o j Ru krl Purih tnq~i~~r ib~r 7rtiz~t-s of r~lfiriltis, known (IF "1t>11," OF R .~o;~rrr nvrf L-nnnx ol'nffirinl ~(~rrrtpfir~tt.

Duar Ihu . . . it) tslking ahout thc rcllc of women in dcvclapmcnr rvc often also ~alk about womcn's cmanciparion. Ern;~nriparion, howevcr, doer: not mean that tlic wife nrlrst tdkc PW'I in Ibc~r lv~sbarid's arJicir~1 firm-tinns or ri~~~r sbt* n~rrsr t+splnrr Ibr-r hltshnr7d:c position. It dnc5 not mean chat rhc wife Inmt hkc part In dctcmiining hcr hushantI's policy in matrcrs conctlrning his officc or that shc stinuld prtnfic w<r7 of II~ jircilities nnd perqziisiirs fa wl~ir'll lwr IrllsIm~d is r~~titi~ii. ~VC fccl. too, rhar [here arc many orhcr rnatrcrs rclarcd tt~ characrcr and I>charl~cir that can have n nrgative cffcct on tlic acttvitic-s of her husblnd,

Wu sav this bcrausc in fact we havc the irnprewinn and we olwwe that there are many of you, Illt~, who linvc gnntrlrtri~y irr pliying yrljir soli~, many who hnve rnisundcrstood ttlc rnranin~ of womcn's cmanciparion.

I 4. Development Policy

lowed r -+...- . In establishing "dtvcluprnrnt policy" we hwe smnl hook, linc. and slnker thc data and ,znalyses made by for~i~r~rt~. cven though they obviously haw inturcsts ul rhcir own. To tlrrerminc rhc number of ptclplc who arc IIEIOW the povrrry I~nc, we use the dnta and analyses of the World Rank. To rncasurc rhc success r~f dcvcIclprnent, we employ foreign mcasurcs nf grnwrh, such s GNP, CDP, per capita incomr. and

so forth. . . .4 great campaign to stupidif? the people is taking place today. TIic ~~coplr arc bcing swamprd rvlth vapc terrnino!ogy or tcrminolngy made vapc on purposc. Z\'licn pcoplc arc

stanmlnp, they arc s~id "not to have enough to eat" or "possibtv ma!. not have cnnu2h tcl cat,'' etc. Cr~ricisrn is answ,ercd hy bring tcrmed "a d:lngrr to stahil~ty" or "rvidenrl>, trine ruplnircd," and so fnrth. . .

In measuring rbc qrtcrrqs u f t,.~tt~!di~rlwf poltrirs, T11an Wijrrvu and his fr~cndq usc scrcral s~ati~tics, nich as Inrrtnasr in (;.z'I'. r,'DI'. per cnpita rrrrnmr., tbr rirtp n/' injlaliun, etc. Using thcsc figures, the 1301~cy-lllakers claim that . . . /only! 3 nlrt of lo Etr tlo~rr~in)rs lirc Ilrlow tlw pnaer?y lin(7. Thi5 is am wing prtpress. Thcrc is also the critcnon which drterm~nrp that 3 per u:iplra income of nvcr $[IS 75.00 per ;Innurn is :thrrvr rhr Iwvcrty lint.

Takc the c~sc of a pavcrty-srricken, uncrnploycrl v;lpran t. I lr picks up ciprcctc burrs: he scrounFcs for his dailv food in the garbage-c~ns of rrstauctnts: he sleeps under a Lridgc or under the carre< elf shops; he wears whntever he cnn find. 1 Ir maka Up. 300 a day. En a rnonrh, that amounts to Rp. 9.000. and in a year to Rp. 108,000 nr SL!S 250. This is \vcll ahovr the povcrrv linc.

Ir tlli~ thc itray to mcasttrc thc success of a polluy? In tli~r cast, the more vagrants wc havc, the mote prnspcrnlrs our country. I-un~ live 1':kk \%?joyo!?!!?

5. Credit

fr~ critiui=i~~,y nihrr ,rvpt3rrs of thr govnvrmrnnlr'~ econo~trir polic+y, Dukku Purih fnrrrst,s or1 illr in~bd~lrinrr it] hrrit,firr fm~n this pn!ir~#. T~~rorq~~o~lt [be riorv~rrr7ti tlw chrlrp ir rrprtltr-d rlr~rt ,f'r~rt,~,~~rs otr7 ~r~trfifr~g t?rortz nrad v~orr* rnnnry wllilr, Irrrlonrsinns RTr' hrc~rnit?~q purrrt'r clnd poorrr.

Most guvernmcnt credit fall5 into the hands of non-nativcr. hIr)st of rhosc who crnbe~rle there crcdits art: al3o non-natrues. Of the Rp. 20Q,OOO,OOU1000 Rank Rumi Dxya crcdits rhat d~sappenred, most again W;IS taken hv non-nat~vcs. But if is thc pcoplr rvho h:wr tn suffrr the I~rsrtlcn of it all. The proplt bear rhc conspquenccq, hut thc nnn-nztlvcs cnjoy rhc fntirs. In fact, it ir ~hcir pcr capita inrnmc drat has increased many ttnlts owr. Not the people's.

Ten ycars ago thc hstn group, the Panin psup, rhc Central Aria Rank. f.icm Soci I-ioag and orhtr ~rrkon,~' wcrc noch~ng o what they are now. Rut the proplc of Krawang still starvr. rhe government proudly aggregates the incomes of rhme .rik<~rr~ with tht incnrncs of thc penplc of Krawang, Royoldi. 2 r ~nd Ciunung ~idu~' and then avenge< thcrn. Next rhr govmrncnt loudly prrlclaims that "pcr capita incornc ha5 skyocketcd." Is rhir not manipul*rion?? Thc pcoplc of Krawan~, who have been reduced tc* cat1 ng water-t~yac~n ths, have I>c.comr the victims of a manipularinn of the nutnbers that thc govcrnmien? alwayq wonhips, Thc pcoplc of Krawang have becornc thc v~ctims of sratistics. It i~, said that in 1967 pcr capltn incornc rvs %US RR, whilr by 1977 it had incrcascd tn %I& 130. But rfle fact rcn~ains rhnt Krawang, which always uscd to be a rich rice panary rvhcrc pcoplc ncver suffered hunger, ha tod;~? dcclinecl into a famine area, where people are reduced tco racing warcr-hyacinrlls! no you know. fricnds, what wl~trr-hyacinths arc? Water-h!.acinthq are feed for p~gs.

1 si~rlildr L~nri-/i)~~,j4qn rnrrt7 pd,t-sriti~~ llukii I'ii I ih's di'irt-lr~sios r!f i~p'rr~ltrrrd pntirv. ip,zrr Jro?n rrrsfipnriri~ rl)r nqolrr-rtiment Jirr ~t~~~vd~>vrng !tl?ii/ rtj0m7, Ihikn ht~i h dc!~o pui~~tq tu tlv ,L~t/ttri, of tbr RO?~I'WJ!~"~~ 'F ricr [~(I~/?~TISP)~ pmagrirtn. ?'/T~F yrnr, Iudrsnesi,r will import 2.4 million rnr!.r r~j ?ic,r', rrrnn* rlli~n nq! r)tl)r-r cortpltrjv r~? thin wnrtd.

. . . thc prlcc r7T thc in~pa~rtcti ricc. ir Kp. 100 per kiluysm mort cxpcns~~~c than dornrs~ic rhcc. This means that the Indor~csi.~ri gcrlcrnrncnr is frrdr?z,y ((s~~F~ridi/ingl fnrmers from Soutti Korco. J:ipnn, .Iu<tr:rli:~, urc. .I[ .I ntc 21f tip. TOO per kiln. Wcll, ~vrll, Zlr. *I'hoyih Il;~ttil\~rjay:r, ~Zlr. Hustanul ~lrif~n,~ .tnd you gcnrfr-incn in Ihppcnns, livw conw !*ou acru:~ll?' hclp rrr tncrc:lsc agriurrlrur;tl productrt,n In crtllcr ctrnntrics?T kn'i thcrc snrnctliing funny hue?) 131d you yct !,our palms grcasccl, nx-iybc?? It" not onl!~ rh31 yrlu arc hnnl~lc to incrcasc dr)mcstic lirocll~ction. Inir . . . ht-v! yon'rc actually Ilclping rtl incruasc roniconc C'IFC'S :~gric~~lturxI ~~r,rducricm. Yo11'12 p3y far it some c3nv. fr~cnd<l! l!

7. Employment and the Industrial Sector

Ovcr tlic p:w rieht !~BTS, thc inditqtrial ssctor has only Ixen ablc ro ,~hsorb 1.2 million pcoplc. Thir is an alxorprion raw of only 1 2.5 pcscrnt oT .nrail.lF)lc rnnnpolver. Thiq prow4 that rhc thc Cicld prrsrn~ policy In 1 of industry will trr-vrr hr trblp to .~I,~t>rh thr i~lcrrlcr Islmr Lircr. The picture hecom~ kc into ai ... WIITW ~f H'P ~l~n ta count the lnrs of jrh c~pportun~tir~ in narionnl cr)mpanIcs rhat have h;~d to cltlsr down hccauw of the Influs of' fitrcil!n cap~tsl. ?'he only local raw material l~scd Ilv thc Indo ,ttiIk c:nrnpnny, for inqtancc, i~ watcr. The milk crlncentrarc. irwli' i< imprlrrcd from itustmlin. ICfhilc the jnh s nnt cxll rnsrkur ha ,andctl, rhc sidc effrcrs are wrccl.;inr the life of rht. natl Ion.

wcrnrncni The C;r -IF I~CIUFCTIAI pol~cy s11011ld ha\^ hccn gcarcd . .. cowarrls thc dcvctr~pmmt of ~rrtlusfrv rlnigncd to suppclrt a~riculturc. P>ccau.;c xyriculturc i~ the [main] witrcc of incornc for 60 pcrccnr of chc. flnclonrqinn pcnpk. Yct what wr now scc i~. xhc rapid ~crwrh of consunrrr-oricnred ~ndusrrics, suclr as rhc motnrcyult and c:lr indurtrics, not of a~ic~llture-sirpporring industries.

t 3. Popular Participation I Popular Control

Il'i.r!ltrps tltc sinfilt' tttosf in~pnrtilrrt tl~rnrr in rllis ilnt,umrrlr is iff RJI~I.~ tn pnpril~on.

Thc dcfccrs that wc scc todlv are caused b\+ rhc kLrtiontll Lrrtdrrs!rip and by the "Systcn~ of C;ovtarnmcnr" th:~t Ir hn~ crestcd, Improper nicchanisrns for nhr mmapment nl the StAte, which in turn have ~ivcn birth trr crroncouq and uncontroflcd pol trim and prosrams, havc hrcd rcsrlcssncs< In soctcr y.

The inn~rt~ro\t aotrt* 01' tlw littL, JJPO~IP. ~rllo livr under rhr opllrr~srott and ri*pn*ssina of thc "elitc" forcer, never rcaclrcc tlic cars of the povcrnmcint. tn nsrn, rhr Irovcrnmunt lias nc\.cr opcnrd its ticart to the pure :~nd Fiontljt "~rrricr. 01 !!rr c nntnrnn pi~i)pI~'s Irctrrr. " Thus a system in rvh ich rhc 1-irj1 pr,nplr~ cuploit the tliIl,rgt7rr, the rrr/j npprtss thc pour. prrvcrtrq rllrr rltrow r it11 I)rrsi,s c~ir into rl~c sl.c~w I:rnes. r\~-;ilthy I~IO~C k~ck acirlc prrnk bvi,q/11 p~npIt*, ~I~H-TJLI~~V~. t~tlsincsslnen kill off Jznrrar I~urjncsqmcn, crc , gocs on and on, and rhc npprc.ssed havc nu wnl of stopl~ing it. '['here arcn't even an! r-n?npbri~r/c nhnut rt it) Parl iamcnt .\nv morc.

'I'llr prevailing sicu:~tic>n is such rhnt "thc rtlp pcnplc" solely direct their cycs ancl cam furrhcr up. They ;ill str:~mlllc to cnlnIb thr Iit.rrmii.s rhac arc i ndccd Irt-tuly "~F-OZ?ILEI*IJ " t IF thc liI>(~~~l ccrrnnmic sytcm pr~icfi~-t"i by rhc ~OVC~II~~II t ! ! 'rl~r~r C~TIOTS could decclop to such a disxrroi~s poinr bccansc cotrtrol functinns have nrtc r~pcrarerl as rhc! shnr~ld. St:irc In.;r~t~rt~nns havr in Facr bcrn "trucd" so ss nor to intcrfurc wirh thr 1)uild-up of "cxcrluri~~c i~t~wr," Firr thc sake of srat~~lity in ccnnomic dcvtllopmcnt, tl~e wliolr systcm and :dl the ;actlVitics of the Ilighcsr Statc Inaitutinns have Iwcn "harnroni/e~l" with thc tasrcs of thc cxccutivc..

9. The Parliament

11p till nmv, P:~rliamcnt is nnt an insritution cap;~lblc of channtrIlrne thc azpir3tinns nf the pcnplc, nor is it an c-ffcctivc instirucion for con~rcrl. I'arlinmrnt is stmplv a spectator to all thr irrcplnritics rh:~t :trr rakine plncc within rhc cucci~nvtr! 'fhcrc hnvu hccn many incicirnts, rh~rncful rn cntr nation nntl statc, which have dc~rt.~ndcd :~ctive inrcwcnricrn hy rhc pcoplc'r reprcscn tativcs, bit t the!. l~avc tlonc al,rolu tcly nothing.

I'hc reason, of counr., ic rhat I':~rli;lnirnt has been ''li~rtf" lay the nacional cxccurivc lcadersl~ip KO I>cct~rnc so pnn~l.ylrrrr!J Evcn at the time when thc official /i~t of plrrli,rr?rrrttilry mjrdiitntr,~ fmm the Political Parties anrl from (Icrlk;ar wnq being drawn irp For rhc Gcncr:~l I;lcctirm, thc inrlivirlital~ listcd wcrc picl<cJ 11y thc t;r~vcrnrncnt. 13cr)pk rhoufihr rn h~ve roo nrrrrly rn~rr~~~~, iv1t7,prit.y~ ~~rrri pri?rcip/i, urcrtT .I-ansidt7rtpri rlL,rnpr-rnmand wcrc scrarchcd nft' rhr list. l'liose wlio rcmninr~l on thc Iist of candidates "hlc~scd" by ~hc govcrnmcnr consisrcd of pr.r~pIc who wcrc rithcr a.r17k or, :lr lwsr ntnt/~-r,rrrs, rc.:lrly to srrring ro thc ri~ht or 113 the Icfr, Intr the ?tllrlr~ritjj, of count, wurc wvirk.

10. The Polli~~~a~ ~arxes Could rl le little F q v

In reaIit tical forc~ -- - - .I-* es, name1 -..-I E ...... Political Parrrw anu CIOIKRT, arc IIOL YCIIUIIIC UIIIILICJI IUICT~ me that d :dt~ialistr~~i ifiicial p(~: litical m ley atc cl assificd 'r, groupings, 1,at real political pow" li es in the hands o f the 41 G'ovtmrnen rt. Thc PI? ~litical Par ,c to follo w thc -tics and E . . iolkar hat ... - -.. . will: of this govcrnltlcnr, wt~cther they i~kc ~t or not. IT tht ncdia1t.1). interfere obstinate, the gov* Jose a thr~ manipulate them ro o longer 1 the government . .

rim, the In add~i parties are not allowed to operate i #e the vil villages, ye lager are whcrc 80 pcrcunt of lndrlrl Tivr!! if inlu bitancs thc parlies are not allowed to operate I villages, thrs ineans that mtzly 20 purrcnt of the inhabitants ot Indonesia \ heir aspir; rcsen tcd.

1 1. Elections

. . . Consider thc General Elections, tor Instance: rhe Plectiofl Cammission was forrncd and appointed, not t~>* Parliamenr, bur by the (;orernmmt, rho~iglm in fact the (;wernrno-it, through Cinlkar, wn~ also a participant in the Geilrrd PIccr ---- Excesses, naturally, were unavoidable. tfcrce Amir Machm~td "joining in the gap 11rrL2h [village headmen] and camt [c;uhd~strrct oft~cersj , all tr rr the [~copic i, n the It sake of recuring victory for Colkar. Rut little red, but village?; were pressured, and not just prcssul even a, [p in persecuted, with threats of he in^ kidnapped -cspecjall r.-., .... crt~ciak areas such as West Java. Centra! lava, and I..BSL lavd.

the villq 4. es, who i .-. IG pcrs~cutru dur~nf! me e~ect~ons, nslc Tor nclp trnm thc 'oplc's representatives in Parliament''= . . . "-he simple answer . h'o! I'ari~arnent's Cornrnirtee 11, in charge nf Jeal~ng xv~th the -oblcm of cucesses dur~ng the General Elections, could never eet to di these incl icr a .c was nc IOrUln, S11 dkar merr f.. .

the pwsent s-yst~m !hp:oiq and its ~ls yzritt (remove S~rrb~nrt~ piircr cwrcnt .-~rlnpvnp>, y), Ruku Putih lt ofir miy rernntiws. nror riors tbqt~ stzrdebent ~troo~~rztwr RF CT w17nIr. TIJF doncsiun student n~owwmzt is wlariz rrlly out oj rg smse oj selfprsewr?tioj itirizu tJ~r rentral mlc oj th m . L,L‘+brmX cc thejt ddrsm'be so eloqnc~?tly. /'he mninstrt7am oJ ihe PP? nlso rrmm'ns pxplidtly onti-comm-rr~list. ljnt it worrld hr 'y to pvcdict itt frltltlr~c dr.~rlopmcnt. As govemlncnt rc7presslon znt~nsifips, ns it did in the ~nrly months o]' 1978. ~br snoue~ntnt u7iII bovt. to d~wlop pew smtrres of poIitira1 strrngtk' ij it is to surunve. Its longterm choice wordid appear to lie bt,twt,en finding poweftil spo~so~ witbin the mifita y tablisbmc nt and developing s positfoe poIitiral propurn which ill rrpprd I to the pensants nwd workem ud~o wnke 7tp the ~t,ruhelrn~ ;ng rnalori~ oftbe Iwdowesfun popztlntion. O

Footnotes LlOlIb.

o Nitisastro 1s Indoneqix's top economic planner.

2. ( ukcing is a rerm for wcaltlly ( Itinme businrrs pantnelv of key donm mi an ~rnrmI~ snd pol~ticrms.

3. noyrt1:rli and Cunung Kidul, in Centrd Java, are among the poorest -eas 111 the country.

4. Ilalliw~jaja i\ the Minister of hgiculturr. Atifin is the head of the owrlul sratc tood di*rrihurron agcncy BUI.~?G.

hc mill~c~n tnh:t7it rrrlq (7: r:n\ F trt 'rtnlclr have tIrtl.cn drrp w r.11pc.q rnra r thr 5rrh rrrn ronti?~on. I)c7; ~~ffict:~l Inllonrc~xn t.!q~nt* to 11.lr.r ~r:~n<f~wmrrl rhc ftprrncr Portuprsc coli,n!* Inrn :4 pr?rrfirl ~rrnr.inrc ~trc nrnirr crntic lirl,t~lll~c of I:.lrr 'I lmnr rr~ll crrcrs r~vu-:~nd-.t-b:~It full-~cale I ndnr~man I nl v hc~.~ n. I'rrlm rhr htel ~mrnt to ~lrc villn~rs o! Jl.lvn, ttic onqrrlng nxr pcnrrstcs ~IISF:I~IF~C~~OP 2nd Ince* Thc rwo ride< sccnictl so uncvcnty rnarchcil thar 11 wns ~1% <:IrvrlFr to IcR~~ rlixt 1lr~wrt-n IrO. I 100,000 F.nft 'rimt~rcsc -3 C) sf tlrr p+%l~ulatirjnhnvc t~ecn kiI wnr in wh~ch rhr 1nvdr.r rlW< :trrplanr<, f-i~hi~ anti n.1~1 trunil~ardmcnr in .rddit~nn trh rrm oi !hotl~:intl~ of wrlf-nrmctl ~nk~ntr~. tnnps acatnqr :I rlntlnn c,f pcacanrs. Intlonrsinn ttrrcc~ have nlsn ~:npr><cd :in -11 ~IIOFI unhrc:lknl~lr rn~h:~r~n ,In rhc ~sf:~nd, <IICC~~F~UIIV prcvcnttng c~i~rridc clh\cn.err from rrportiny what Ir happur~ing tlirrc, nlthnu~h the Indonrq~~n goccrnmrnr occasitln.~liv rakm erlltrps rrporrcrq nntl dl?n~t.~r~c< rtn c.ircfullr. ct>nrrt~Elrtl clrlrnr r\vwtfniri~irs.

Tltc Inilcrnrs~:in artack #In f-nst l'tmor wx mntns.ircrl t>y fcar of 1-r~tilin. thc tor tnc 1.rcril1n Rnroliitionary I-ronr ' ' Inrlrpenctcncr of I<R~T Tinior. IS cnnlmrrtrd ro 3 prc~grarn of intlcpcndencr, sot-1x1 nn~l rrcmolllr( ~t~t1.1lirr.. a112 na~icln:~l A. . ~ntrrnarionnl rlr,n-.~I1gnrr1i.nt. \tsth thc clccltnr nf Pon~~m~r-~ccolnni.11 power In

1974. Frertlin ernrryerl as thr ~rrtjnrc-t and mrtst ptjpitlsr of thc threc pr~l~r~c,\l POHPIR~F cnrnperln!! for control of rl~c ~nun-t(~-l>c ~nrlcpmtlcnr starc For rlir Inrlrmfilxn pmreinnlcnt. thr npccndenc\* crl I-rcrllin HW alarrnin~ on rwo counrr: (1 ) r.xr 'T~rnor govcrncd hv Frtlrl~n .~plm.rstl 52 3 pot~n?l:11 "<:lib3 nn rlur donrrrrp," :I prilgrrssivc ccnrcr within ihr mil !tan.-ruled Intlcrncsian nrcliipclay~~. I?) ti I'rcrilln wrrr surccssf~r~ In Icacl~r~p Flrr Tunlor rn indcpcn Jcncr, thc. cxnm plc rn~~frt rnrotirnpe rrr~olrq on rlrhcr ~<lnntl~ \v~:OFC pr~plc wcrr nnt tlappv ~VII~I n~tr from J:~kan:l. The Un~tcd Statrc povc-rnmcnt. w~rh .t gcncrzl rntrrcq: 111 Indonmian rtabit~nl ant1 a t~~~lttaty incrmr In pw~cnv\nq ~uhm3rit~c nccesC tn the clrcpwntrr Elnlbai-Wct:~r straits juqr nt~rrh of Timor, tacirly FU 1~11nrrcd Suhartcr'q pl.~n< to fnrcc Ilnrt 'I'imrlr to join Intlnnc<ia.

tndone!:!n StntCpt3tq r\pet.rcd to "11:acifv" E:wt Tiinor In a few dnyr. Vcr t~r rvcrks ~ftcr rht 1n1rinF rnvnqliln 11%. lfl,On0 troop?, tlicy wre forced tr, srntl anorhcr 15,non mcn. 'I'wo-rrnd-a-lrnlC yc:rrs I:~rcr. thc war continues. I:rc*r~lin IF hcl~~\.~rl to ci,ntrt~l twrt-rlidril< of r hc l:~ncI :1rtn:t of I~;Iv 'I'irn~~r :ITI~ upwani~ of HO percent of the pnp~~l:ar!r,n. Inklr~n~~i~n h~>rpit:~l.; and cenreterics arc rcptrrrrtl tn I,r crowdcrl with cdcl~altlr< lrtnm n war th:at is arldom acknnwlrdyed in put~lic hs n~orc and more peoplc Iccl Irs cftcccs nn~l RC it hrcon~c~ clrar rhnr direr rnil~tnry f~irce wilt nor dmtroy I;rct~lrn. thr co<~ rr, 5uharr1r of the rrfon ta F~~IHF:ITC F;Ic~

it ! I I! C;t~ttlc.nr~ dcrn~ln<rrat~ng :Icn:llcr h11.1 In Ilc'c-e~~~l~cr IV7 ;tcldccl ~t~ctr ,>hlrc1141n< to [TIC 7 jf1111r carnpllcn to thr~r ~TOII'CTC .II*~IIRTC F(I\'cTnnirnt c'tjmlllrrlon

To mfnr o~ir<~cIrr~. f+?\t 'rtrnt~~-.*nd Frer~ltn -appcnr nr trzplc vlr-trmt Yrr Ir ~c ImpOrtRTIl I<> c?i.lmiriti!le n.lsttnc l'rrtilin har lwcn ;111ltttr lirllti cult <rr Tonp, I:rt~rrng tf~c Indcrntb<i~n rn~l!r.irr 711 a .ct?!crn lrc . Jorc I<.trnilr-l lnn:~, t.rt*t ~ltn's .t~~i't~gss 1c1r)r to rhr I?n~trti K~rtr>n<. ~'Y~~.IIIIS tht phcnomencln in hoth phv~1~;11 .11<1 ~ir~fitlc.t! tcrms. IYointitig ot11 th:~~ mr)Lt of I ~<t I'lmor is r~i~~~iir.~~ns, Rsrnor-l l~~rta atltlq rhnt nhcrc are f'w p?rwfilr roa+i< -inJ rl:nt nluv crf tllc lwuplr. Iivr 111 rvrl.1 rctl. r~ll~~t-c Thr czprtal cltv of I>i!t at IIF pr:tk ronr2ined 30,1101F ~rlliab~r.tnt<, ant1 ihc "rlrtr~n cenrrrr," atilrh 1 rCrllin nrknt~w.lc(!!WF :ire cnnrrr~!~t(I trv rhr lnri~*nr%~:fns. COIIFtCt pf a h:tlf-dn:cn ho~t~x tvherr rhc I'onupiesc onrc mar nra lncd pol ~cc po<rs. Intiontri:tn trotrllc, ~htr d~t nor F~C:I~ thc Yln~~ipr of 'rirntw ant! arc not f:~ni~I~:~r WII~ 11% rcrrnin, tacc 1 hoqr~lc yr>p\ll:rtlnn. I:rrr~lin h i~ wrln rhc Irtv~lty 02' mnsr 1. IF^ Stmorrsc hy nn cncrctrlc carnpnicn ro I,rir~~ ctlucarrdvn, hcnlth cnrc :~nd ~ltipr<lvc(l ~ond prrrrlt~ct~on rr~ 2 pcnplc WI>IIW tornler r(>it~r~t.!l nl.hK<IT ti:irl lcfr Oii prrccnr uf them ~l[itcrarc. In Itsmt~r-Ffrlrt:~'r uordc, W"cn wr taIk hour srn~rrl srrugglr we 1nc7 i tatrl! Iinvr. tri 13lk ?t>~-t~rr <c.hoclEr. hellth crnten, an ford prorl~iution. bcr-;~~~~c rhcw thrngr ni I~nkrtl. 'rlrcrc c.innitl irr I r:rcrt.r~fr zn11ir.lry r:irnp;ilrn without :I p~rlllrl campaign tt~ Ilrcar.ac!.. pol 1t1c31 C~UC.II ~nn. htaith ancl fo~~tl prr~durttrrn." Clncr rhr Iyort~~p:r<c d~d nor rerii~rirlr. rcnrpni~c Il.lrr I'imr~r'q \uhs~rtcncr ccrmnrnv, rhcb w!f-rtb!ianrr foscrd by Inttonmln's Illnck- :~rle rlf rl~t 1sl:lntI i< ncnl~~ng new, ac.crrrtlrng tn R:imtx-;i lorr,t.

I-'rctrl~n Ic~riers, who hrtmrirasr dcspalrlng c-371s for help a< rhc IntJoncc~:~n< launchrd rt,r~r firqt w:nc cr! slsughtrr ag~n~t tllc rcrltlrnt5 r>F fhti, ntlw \llrak i.r+nl'lc!tntly 01 ultimntr victcjry. In :I spccch on May 20. 197FI, Nicolau I.nhato. presidrnt of I*rcril~il's Ccntr:ll Cnmrnittrc and prcsidenr r~f the I>rrnocrntic Repuldic nf E.~rt Trmtlr, exprrrrcd the nrtr mood. Lobato's spccch m:~rkcd tlrr fllnrth vrrslv rh lhc foitntiing rbf 1-rcrilin:

". . /Il~oat, ,711, rl7c.y were [urrr ynrs a[ pnliticid d<-zv-lt>p??rt-?rt, +/in17 .vt7un of SIYII~IC. :irtd in ti>i'st* fortr rJ*nrf jji'rrrs. th pc'oplt' 0)- J.'~IsI l'imnr /.rrrzlcv fcrfirrr rr p;,,t t strp 1;) ~xwrd, jivn? ,if] rtr (.i,~tt ~tti~q oj ~.o!ot?inl ilurrrinrrtion, to rr tloiri! ion. I.rrrrr yrors rrn(l !o~r crrr t?tn't~s.

"4 grrlrr rtt,p, in Inct. mnrf~ po~~ihlr !J)* Frrti1i11 !i>r$ir!g Tin~nrrw 1711i r~unsciortsnr+sc, jijr rlbr pvnlilt= trr inrr frnvr jhur r~t~t 7trivv tjj rdo~~i,i/ ~I~rrk,,~~~, - trj xl~t<pr tr st~~!~llon~, 1)~rotr ntttl ~jr~trr~ort~ nr~~tr*tl ~tr:i,&~, L~,p~ill~~ t!lt" ~!'rl??lt'ltil a,qpips~io?t oj tJ*e IIT~~O~ICS~~FH coIn~?i~ll ~+.~p~ufiSiorrisf~ and ~-r>rrr,wi,orrslv rrrdvnrrce * on rl7c rt

"That that rodd Ilnpprrz ir t-wor~gl~ to cllo~r. !/>C murld iarir TPSO~II~P wid' to fwrly Iitv our idr-ntii~j os t.;lsr Tinlnn*se, orir rrnl~~irttlfi~rhlt~ ndtinrra/ iot~s~.ina~snrss. *r iit,i,pt,ir rrprddrarfnr~ 01- tv~pbnidwt~ (1 t~ll /<)ntts oJ drtt~i~~i~tio~i tmd ,-.~p!oito+ r71 of~z11~1 I),v t~itn. . . . -0- , hurtt ~ri?ri, I?IOHI~*S sincr the

I'TI chcd its lirrt big rnr~rpoip of te?r ~ttld r7?~nilriintinn, n i.a??rf 17r,~rr wrlr r r. 7' ~lj'Tt'Spf'I't.

"!lo~ur?~r~r, tlvcp~ri, rlv. smprr~ssinr sizi, oj'tlli.~ c,i~np~ip~, j1rl1 of tlw noier r~f tl~r rnncliini,~ of ttl,rr, illis rntnpatp is irri.nrt,drnbly sinkrrrg ivi tl'.r,Jin17rt<,r rty$nns. pi, ~/t~f,,rr~zil~otrr)~~ Lz>~,f tt?iriotiz,,* of tl~ ~SSC'~ ill fl'i. tro fror~li~r Ceiht(Jrx r7rtJ 7.,+fimrir~,q s~t rt7~iuii7trc i/mt t!ftn /dootf~fil,r Irr~int~t~~inn gr r~rr~rE~ ! b . . . We !JrIid'2t' 117~ Ir1 ,tt-d ,lsrfi,lrr<l ~nrrnlr </><>141l# T1.C OP711Lt' lh~l' /?(7:'f /i?<t ~/IP

"7%~ crperirncr of ~tirer ~PUOIIItinnoty ~POII~PF, as w~ll ~1s our own rxpt-rii-nrr. ~I~ows 1/73! ~J'P mrmy will ttr7lrr 1~ ~ORZ~~IICI'~~ Ipy rt'rlqt~n ~lji~~ I;rilt-d c-iiv?pai=qn if wrii y nnorllrt (?rid so QII+ to it< cor~~p1t.t~ (/t,[t~,~t . . . ri~r tJntJmy rnrrst br ~ft*/t-,rrrd Irr];.lrr it ~iil hr canwincrd. . . .

"\lJr. HOW f@t with bnlf rictoty -on. ht~crrrrsr ~L'P ,we rryturn oj'nra m'ctory. For rll,ir rrtlson WF ~~7.y. 'I/ICIOT ir crrtu;?].' . . .

"I tllirlk rhat Scnhorrs Jrrkarrrl J~~'?IPTI~F slwrild r~ntirr~ti~~~~i tlwt Fo~f Timor is not u colotty of Indotr~sin, and will nmvt Irr n nrvrnlnny. I'int, PI-RIISC I?~ilnnt'r~~~ <!OPT no! Irnvt* tllr r-co~iontil: Crlprlt:lty to nrnrtlrar?i r11.a-r.vlotrrt,s. Spc-rind, iu-rnrts~ tll(~t i~ r~rtirinl~l trot wbrlr wr nri- Ji4qf~rr~t4t ./or. . .

''With all our srrt,t~gt/*. WF proclut~n lorrd nrrd rkxi~r ON? ~tndm/r I-ontinirrr crtrd victuqr trrtclin ' "

nrican pilota and milirav sdr~isrrs hnve jiinrtl rhc nrt:lcli 4)n Fast Timor, nccnrrlin~ ro T:rctilin stlurcc$. In n lunc 211 l,madcast, l;trtilin Infc~rni:iricrn Sccrct;~? Alarictr t-'ernanr!cs chargctl that "Arncrican pillit< arr fl).iny nronco O\,'-19

Klshor:rting on rhr ch:rrges, Fretilin's Aml)nux:ldar to the Unirrd Nntinria Jme R:~mos-llnrt:~ li:~i~l on July 12 thsr ttvn Arncrican rnili~ar!' advisrrs hwc 11cc.n srarionrll in Dili sincc I;~st Uccctnhur nrlrl th;~r worth h:td arrivcll duriny thc f~nt thrcc months of this year. hltIinuph tt~e st:lrc ncpnrtmcnt has AskThai!ancl abut it.

prevcnrs ovtsidc ol~sen~rrs from investipring the Gtti:~rinn

* 8 .. r 8, . ., . I,nr".,., I*.IU,~!I"Q,#1C,

therc, I-Inwrvcr, the tct that such chsrgcs 17avc not hcrn mnrl

In a icttcr ro U.S. r\ml,assndnr trl rhe Ilnired Smtes Antlrcw Ym~ng. Frctilin Ambassador K;~mos-ldorta rccallcd his countrl-'s initi:~l enur*uragemcnt at Jimmy C~rtrr's carnpai-p "cnrnrnitrncntr; tn human rights and promises to ccase U.S. support to

Issue Ntr. 63 2 5

Riches of the East . INTERESTS IN INDONESIA

J.S., INT: !+'OR LI)

nnrt.11 E:l.;t Inrllcc prrlr)ld~:tl rhc [I S. with rln, rlrf~hrr, nntl qurnlnr-, ,IT (rdl .a? IEW cth.llt-~~< r nrnnlr~rlitir.~ inr.!n~'l~rlp crrl'l'cr, rupar, anti coym Ijurch prcltrrc on rh~r tr:rtlr wl)s?rlirt.tl Nt.tlrerlantlr lIilpnrrs of ,\rnrrlc.ln ~ond< ll.t;. KuVq!>cr ~ntl (;nodvc:tr c<t:12llrrhrrl n~ld~rr rlxn~.~tiorl< in 1010 I~LI 1910. CInIrcx, .i jnrnr vcnrurr of Tcu:~cr~ .tnd Ci.~!idart! 011 of I:.~l!ftwn~a, .~cq~~~rcd 1 ~?etn'lcurn crlnctrston ti 1'4.35. Hv ! *!?. rhc 1 nqr Inrhcq qt~pplicd marc than 1t31:' thr I'.F crln<blnil?rlon r>f 21 lrnst I5 ~lirtincr cnrnniodlr~cc.

V<-:~rl\ rwtr !.can h~forr Prarl t tlrhor. I7.S. Sccrcr,~rv o! Statr Corrlcll 11~111 i7~rrionccl th:~ t rf J {pall ~~cc~lp~etl rhc h'cthcrlanti~ Indics, "'I lh cradr routrr of ~hc ITnnlr(l St.itrr rvnultl t>trrrrtrurly vripptrd, :an41 ~nrl~tstrv rn ilrnrr+c~n wrri~lcl hc most rrnpr,rrL~nrly .~ffrctcd. . ."' hnrir~p:~r~n~ :r Inpanr.';t' :lr\ault rln Indnnewt 4nJ !!~I.Iv tw rlw Rau~t~t-IT adnitntcrr:Iiion prr.pnrrrl 3 clarl.inc?ir rn Norrmbcr 1041 :isk~ne CrrngrCr~ trt rlr~.larranr. Scxcrt tnr!. r>f lt'nr Sr~mson prc:parrtl rho flmr rlr~ft.

If ~hc lnp;?i~rrr- .trc pvrm~rtr.~~ rn L..lrrx rrtsr rl~c.ir threat [ti nrrwk anti ronrpcr [rhc UcrhrrT:~ntl~ Fasr Ind~cs antT rhr LI*l:tlavan ~r-trlcmciirr] , uur mporrq !ram ~IICK CVURtIIl'S rrlll Ilt' Interruptcd and dcstr~lvcd. . . . In rinw of war, rvjrh the splrcr of c\ploirarinn and tlc5rrlrt-t~un (~r cnrnrncrrc wtiich cu lsrq trl rlic \vr,rld torl:~?, wrh an tnrrrrrlptirln of rrur ~radc wth thc Nerhcrlnnds I.?<t Intlic~ 2nd thC \1~la~an XrJrrS wrruld hc c~tastt-ophic " '

:I I.~rer dr:ift warncrl ttir thrc.31 tts t1.S. ronr nicrcr "l)crwc.cn the I':tc~lic and thv Inrlr~n Orcxn. " ' Thr surprlsr arrark on PTNI !nrl>or ~>rccluded ~or~srvclt's mcssay'. hut h~s por1tic)rl \I~X~ ~f.Ie:~r. Thr (!.S. w:I': prcp~rcd TIPf'lrht lapan tn prorcct .tlnt.r~c:ln ruppllcs (11 Snurlira~r t\<~an ra\r rn;~~rrl~!s.

nt Dutch Inrfcrrnrntc :lntt I~olrl~n~ Intfoliar. wltcn rhr L1nlrc-d St.~tc'i zprltrq QSnfl

,2fter the war, rhc llnitcrl St,lts pr.rsu:~dcrl rhc Nrrhrrlnnds ro kqanr ~nrlcpentfrncc to Inrlrlnc~~n, lqlcnin? thr (loor to ;try ~nt*rc.nsrrl Arncricnn rcorlarmlr roSc rhcrc. At thc samr rlrnc, rhc C1.S. :~rr:~n~ed tcrniq ~~ar;~nrt*c-mg 11ir s:~rictity

ncui,l I~nt~lc ia~r rnxxqirr rlchtr tc* the Vrt!irrlanrls. In thc c:~rly l'JjO<. rh~ tl S. ~nt c~~rlornic rnlwl1ns t4~ In(!(>nc'<la to ~'qr3hlish Arnrr~cin nid prrlgr:lnls. rvh~lr [wit ttc. t!.S. r~rr.int,ntir)n~, irirti :tr tile ICrrrtl l;rruntlatic~n :rntl rht. h~:I.-CIC), FCT up 1-rnprms 11, I clrn Ir~tlnncq~nn cconr?nll\rp, <r>c~al srlrnr~qtr. aruP Ial)or Icatlrrs.

En ITJS1, ju~t f~j~~r VPJ~S nfrcr tr~dnnrmn intlrpcncfcnrr, I'rr~tdrmr 1;l~cntin\r,cr inullkerl r hc rrr hc5 nt 1nrlnnrrl.t ro juvifr 1J.S. conrrihurion.; ro thr I rcr~ch war cFforr an Inrl(~ch~na

rn~ll~r~n to hclp that wir. wt. arc not vlrfrnr for :I ~IVU~\\~.IV Vro7:lm. Wc nrc vrrtbn;! for t11c chmyrclt ~v.ir. th:~~ rw cnn In prch\.cnr tlrc occrlrrrncr nf s~~rncrhlng rhar \voulbl Ilc. of thc nim~ frrritdrrr!nlificarirc fcbr tlrr Ilnitcd Sratrr of ,\rnr.rlr..l-<)\ir rc~urirv. nur pt~u~r .~nd ?hi!it\ rcr yrt ccrt,tin th1nL5 wr. ncrrl trrm rhr r~chrs n! t?rc Inrionrslan tcrr~tr~n.. :tntl fl.,,rn S~l!tfhr:rsr

A~I~IIIE~~ thi~ dt~rnino rhcrltl.. rhc nrltron iqrn if itr ne dlqcrcditcd, m; kerli~vcd V.S. inrrwenrron in i terl-l,iln h.1~1 Iwuyht timr f Indnneia.

RACKSTAGE INFLUENC:

In rhr ltrrr -, the Indonrsisn go\. not'lng left, ndopring na~rtul,l~rsr cuclnrjmrr ~(IIIcirs, Anpretl 11 I!. thr r:o dzim to IV-t ? <P\V (:U~II the Suknrnn rt"g lrnt qc-i~ct , . ttm and reptidt.9 trtl its dc1)t to the Werherlandr. \lrlitrugh Altrericnn Inrercsts fared hettrr, the clilnarc lor Invr.\tmcnt 2nd rradr \vat poor. i,nol;ing fnr inllrrr>vtAmenr, In 195% rhr I1.S.- Ford Foundntion'~ ernnc Sumirra njojoh;tdfk~i~trrn to join a rrlwllir~n IN ~onserv3t11,t~ ant1 tdarnic gro~~ps in Intlcmesia'.: ourcr islands. The ( IA also hnrked rhc rel)<.lc, and AmrrEcan pilor Allcn Pope spnrkcd .. - .. an inrrrnatinnal ~ncirlrnt wlicn II le war; C In t11c r chot down orw Sktlnrvc.;i ICclct>esl same vear.

f)mpite the small <calf of Amrncnn pcnnnlrlir acrnity in Indonecia i n rhe n enrly I96fls, L1.S. prrlicy makes cnna n+..,*l 1 ~jr~t~ec! tn cove rhe cottntrv's ~.IIIZ~ .z, rclrources. Ruhlxr ruprwtr m thr V.S. hnti actuaHv decttned, as the nrkber companie druelr>ped cheaper, htter synrhetics, hut Indonminn oil continued to Iw an imprtanr conccrn. tn 1963, whcn it apprnrctl that Irrdr~nerin might seix Cdceu and other American oil aqsrt5, thr Kenn~dy admfniqtration riiqpatchrd a speci~l ernissnrv ro Japan to rnediste in clmmsqlons betwren flw indoncsian gotrcrnrnent .and the rrif companies.

On a hroadcr scale, the U.S. attempted ro influence Suksrno's ~conomtc pnl1~ cjr replace his pvemmrnr itti ti a rc~~rne more Cavorshlt to the U'rsr and to fnrelgn investment. The Ford Po~rndation, working wirh the Universitv of (::tlifomin-Rrrkclry, Ilarvard, and other tt.S. tnsr~~~-tltions, continued ro teach American development strsteyy TO ladonesian ecnnornists. In 1963 ttie U.S., in allies, and the Internatinnal Monctar), T;trnd irnpowd a "stahilizntion pm~ram" nn Indonesia as a condition for foreign eachanee loans. Il lowrver, the program was never carried nut, becausr the U.S. and the IMF canceilett rhc Toam after Sukarno ~ri;rcd Kritish propertv to pmtcsr rhe formation of the Malaysian Frderation. Spcmsored hy Cirent {{ritain,

c\. I~L' t:t.dcr.it~otl tln~ted 1f>.i11, S,ir.l~r .lk ~ntl Singapore. >lth.lr1io \J\L 11s ~.I.c;til<)n ,ts a ifircc~ thrcnt 1 l~e 1 rn tnl~ LkK,tlt,. L,~~~~,, ,,,, tc,l,c,L,6nL,t his sanr tlon! jplrr such :in n :~ntl rr tl~ttctl U. S. c At ,rtl rcpl:ic ,t>cd town -t ,., OIIC' pnlnr. rrle c.t.1 r.c~tirr7mniatcri Iris -- - rIr pn'duc .tnoi her. cd n stnrrlng no .i Su kar . *...\,-";< a<wrh-.tllh< 1~1 LZ J fur , .IUIII~-FIIJ?. rnilnc hl: Morti~r~pr n \uch "dirrv rricks," fiovxcer, t jurtship of ri~ht-wing Indc)nc\~ar Ic2tIcn.

I,nllmv~np IIIC fn~lilrr of the CIAhackcd 01 rir Rcbeilron, American lcatlc ssrd chcir approach tclwnrd Ii1dones1.1. Ptnddctl by Sti~tthcast list E;t#v Asi,~ \pc~.i. .thr Rr\Nn tJau kcr nl In, tfic U .S. gowrr Cnrpnr.1 r lr lrncnlr devtlnperI 11c.c crnls in the to righr- -A .%, wing gen 1 r- . Indnnnlan arm!. nrtc-rr r .~rrrrrress cnactrd r thr Rroornfirld 4111 ~n 1963 to cntlmcnt rrstrirt cronnmic a tl shipment nF d nnrl tlre . . tucapnnq 'to indonrwr. IT was perctiaded hy I'entagon cxpl-rr~ rn rerain train~ng and civic action prnpmr rlmi_ped to maintain the h+rrncldrip ol armv Ir3drm. American ndvrserr cntourapd the armv to prepare to take power-if not immediatplv, then upon the death or retirement of rhe aging, nilrng St~karno. A team of tl.S.-rraincd ~conarnis1 s sponqnred hv the Ford Foirndattnn tau$% colrmec at the arm!? command scl~nrrl to promote nte~tern capirzli~r ~hougl?~ within the top ranks ot the militant.

Rv 1965. lndnneian pniirrcr polar- ;led. tndnneqian zvnrkrts. rpurred hy the lar~ and well-nrgant7ed Indon~qian Cornrnuniqc hrty (1'Ki). wi7rd t<S. rubber

plantarinns. Rel~rving that the right-atpin? CounciF of Gen~rals, which workrd with the U.S., was ahat to serizr: power. left-leaning officers staged a prc.rmprive ' pursch on Srptrmhcr 30, 1965, IctTFing six rnemhen 0nT the Cor~ncil of Gent.rals. General Sr~harro, the cr~nsemarive cornmanner of the stratrgic rewwe, rnnhtlised riyttt-win? army srrtn~th to quell rhe lei rim. Charpng that thr PKI was responqihle for the Septcmhrr 30 coup, Sul~arm forcer, in coopewtion with sn~tfentl; and labor proupc Iinked to the L.I.S., unleashed a WI~ of terror againrr quspecrrd PKI mernlwrs. At least hnlf a million were killetl. In March 1966, Suhnrtn formally took power from Su knrna.

A. soon as Suhnrro took thr rsrnq, Indonesia annotrncert itr renewed horpitality toward foreqn invcstmrnt. Witli~n days, the U.S. and it5 a1Ii-v~ offered cretlitr to *upport the parchas? of rirc. Invtrtnrr did not rurh in, howcvrr. blrqt unmc an 1171; team, which deriped a ntnqrnhili- ].ation p3ck:~~e supported hy lofins from rhe 'U.S., the U"orld Rank, Japan, and Et~royran nations. Indonesia's crediron formed the Inter-GovcrnrnentaI Croup on Indoneria {KG!) to canrdinare ad politier ant? moniror Indoneria's rcnnamy. Meanwhile, the U.S. graduaUv huilt up Its rnili~~,zr?. arqistance and salw propam, pmvidint;. thtmilitary governmrnt with the wcnponr to comhat domcrric insurrection. .l+urc than rupplvin~ hardware, howwer, military sqsirtancr, ecr,nr>mic prograrnq, 2nd privarc training PrOJFCtS reintorcvd hmrrican pnlitical influence.

With fowign assistancr in hand, the pnrralr instatled the Ford-rrainect ecnnomicrq, known 3% fhu "Eierkrlev Mafia," in key planning pfiitionq and rcturncd U.S. propertrt-s seizcd nexr the end of $he

Sukarno reg~mt ase el Goodvcar, not oniy rl~tl tl c ~ts plnnrntlc)ns, hut they cvcntl I thc cclnrpnnv t(i Rtn tivn gilvcr~l~~r~ L,~-LII*~C~ lire pl:mts. ~IVIRF C;clnt!yc:~r :t nionopnly rrves Induncsian rirc prcrtlr~crirrn. 7'11~ Ikrkelcy hlafin, nidctf 2):) tlicir :\mr.ric:~n mentors, dcl-~cd new laws tn cncuurayc fclrrign ccnnr>mic nctir-i ty.

THE AMRRICAN STAKE TODAY

Sharrly aftcr thc Suhxrtil rcgimc took powrr. Richnrcl Nivon clcqcrihr~l his irlcn of the Rrncricln intertqr in Indnnesi:~: "Witti in 101) rnill~on pcoplr lnrrw f 35 rn~ll~onl and its 3.OOOmilc arc of tflantlr inin5 rhc cnn tn rcgion'~ richest t), oard of 11 rcsniitr nrsia con stituts natur: :cs, Fndo~ rhc p 17~ in [hit Asian rcintcst pr Sou thcas .".. -L..* *: ,T I.. .l.. ," *I... ;tr~;b.' ,+, rrlr dt-cnclc sinlE hll.tt ttlblL, ll#= U.S. stakc in Intlonmia hns incrcnscd many times ovcr. Stratug1c3tly, rlie i.\~ncrican defeat in Inclorl~ina knq forced 3 rc3 17,s. dcfcnsivc. of rhc nt BTC3. ~OFXII T~F Prnragon's pl:irln' 1 terms of rlw think ir r. " ..,lr:r "~slan, ,, ,,,,h dclincs idand Southcast Asis ;~q part of n I~nr: of ilcfrnsc stretching from japan rrhougli archiprlnp~c Sor~thcnst Asin m thc Incli:~n Occ.:tn. Sirtine on the rnajor sca lancs which connect I5urope and thr. MirIdle Fast m hqia ri:~ rhc lndinn and Pacific Occ:ans, lnrlnncsi:1 providc~ the linchpin for this srr.rtcby. Thc most hravily aavclud route is thr. Stnits af Malacca, bcrwccn thr hidayan ptninsula and Swnarra. hut rhc Sombr~k, hlaknsrar and Ornt~ai <traits are 31~0 irnpnrranr for milirary traffic.

Indoneia's peopphiu significance nlco applies ro tht. cconnniic firld. As rhc Pentagon told the U.S. Congrrss this vear: " Uiiimpcilcrl passage thrclugk rhcsc watcrw:~)-s is cqwntial for tl~c prtroPcum and othcr nw m~rcriab ymports crf Jnpan. a major ally, as tvcll as iinpnrtnnt for thc llnitcd Sratcs and fricndl?. Asian n:~rinnq."' American concern for J:~pan's cconornic wclfarc- 5tcrns frnm mtm than altn~irrn. Much nt thc oil and nrher rnrv marcrials pawing thmugh Inrl4lncsia arc wld to J:~pan by Amcncan rntlltinatlonalq. 'rhc rnmrr multi-nntionnls control thc cxtrnction of Indoneqinn nw rnxtckals-nl~o fnr sale to Japan. Over 90 lpercent of rhc cnidc oil prtrditccd in Indonesia cnmfrom arcas ~vorkcd bv

IFollyw~)oct\ vicw of Indonesia: Hall I-lopc in Rnndfo RaIi (1952).

shipped to Japan, alrhnuph thir proportion had drtvppcd to 48 percent in I977 as thc U.S. share of ~ntioncria's exports rosc to 3 7 percenr.

Apart from the oil companies, Freeport IM~~~M!s has a lucrnrjve coppcr mine in lrian Jaya (West New Guinea); Wcyurhacuser, Georpra Pacific and othcr U.S. lumr~er comp;~nics have large conccr~ions in Kalimantan. Not all U.S. companies in Indone~ia arc ~nvolvcd in primnr!. production, however. Such firms, sttch as Singer, ITixrr and Union Carbide opcrzre "import suh~titurion'hanufacturing facil~tit=s which pmducr goods for rhc Ind(mt.qia market. Orhcr cornpanics pmvidc scrvic~: IFi~phcs Aircmlt, for Instance, npcnrcs thc new I'nI~pa sarellirr communications system. A few carpnr;t- {inns. si~ch as National Sernicondllctor and Faircl~ild Semiconducror. nwrrnl~lc U.5.-supplied components for rcLr.sporr.

Althoirgh Arnc~ican invmtnlrrnt in Indoncsil, ~vhich is. approx-irnatcly 5730 million, is anlv 11 pcrccna of rota! American oil crtm panics such as at tcx, foreign investmint :rnd "is only haEf thnr Virtn:tm*" pp. I 1 l-?5). h. I:r~~!qr~,r~nnn.rl I'n'rrnrutton I)r>crr~$rc.trf~ 1bcr1 and Union Orf. In 1973 ncnrly of Japan's. its impclrtance is cnlar-vd by ccrmr , crrrm,rc,. I,IIIF nnt Firca, Yc:,r s70, three-quarters of Indonc~ia's rlil wxs its concentration in the kcy mineral ~-47.

extraction sector, particularly in ail. The rnlc of oit in rhc Indnncs~an rcnnomy is cscmplif~cd In thc expansion of ourpur from 500.000 pcr [lay ln 1467 to 1.4 million hsrrrls per day in 1973. Irs connibuttnn to the Oalnncc crf paymcnn has thercforc un~lctgonc a rtmarkahlc changc. MrhcrC nct oil caming-s wcrc only 3 5 percent of non-ohl cupnrtq in 1956-66, by 1933-74 - l~ciore thc risc In oil priccs - thry wcw alrc;tdy 96 purcvnr nl lion-oil cxporrs.

Thc lndoncrian involvcmcnr of Arnerlcan llankc nrv-d? no qua1ificnarir,n. They carry rtt lcasr $2.2 bill~nn. and pow~hfy more. of lndr,nt.sis'r ctapgcring 519 hillinn cxtcmal ilcht. Whm Pcrtnrninn, the starc r~il company. wcnr Ijanltntpr in 1975. leading U.S. Ixtnks joincrl with Europc~an, C3nadi:jn and Japnnrw finanri:11 Inslln!tlnns to !,nil out rhc cnnlp3ny un condition rhar Pcrtarnina bc pi-iced under thc conrrnl of Indonc-63's Arnrric:~n-t mined tcchnocrars. Since thc rcorpmizatinn of lErrtnrnina, (ndnnc~in's finaiicial position h.15 impmvcd, but rreditrir I~anks still have a large rtakc In thc continued pcrwth of Indtrnesin cuports, ~i+tich arc thcit collatcr;tl.

In rhc past dccndc. lndoncsia has indeed l,een tlic W.S.'?; "nche~t prt~c" in Sourhcasr Asin, The thruat frnm thc left has hcen rcmovcd; a cc~opcrarivc militan. Icadcnhip is in polrrcr: and irs cconomic prlliricc. pidcd 11s L1.S.-traincd cxprrrs, have f:~cil~tated suhstanrial incrcascs 1n American loans, rrad~ and invustmcnr in Indonesia. Rut thcse sanir policics have inevi tntsly gcncraterl social prcqsnrcs rvhich arc now finding cxprrrrion. dupitc intenrificd povcrnrncnr rcprcssion. While rhc cast ro the U.S. nf chc hencfitr it lias rcapcd from lndones~a in the p-t drcadc 1135 lwcn rclativcly low, rhc next dccadc IS likely to rcquire more cnmmitment of American economic and mi1it:~r-y rlwisrance to prop up an inerrasinply unpopular miIit3ry rcgirnc.

Notes

I. Citcd in Fred hael. ti!., Tfrr Wirr IJ~cny r)f Iirt-rlrtnnrlgr I.ran~ (CJnivrm\tv rlf Ncl~r;~%k:~ Prw%, 1 ohb), p. 81. 2. F#rrr.t,pi ptrttb~rioirr o~- thr= .Itrrtrd 'tairr Jdpnrr. 1041. IV. pp. 677-78, 3. Ih~cl., p. 67 H. 4. Remark% tr Gmcrnors' Cnnfercnce. Auptri 4. 1453. Circtl in I'mt~~~on 18~pcrr, Gr:~vel Etlition. Vnl. 1, p. 592, 5. I.uw~,p~~ .Illbirr., ncrohr 1967 ("Aqis

Amnesty International. Int'l SecretariatOrqaralzcs international adopthon of lndo nerian political prisoners, thr foc!tr af therr 1'177 campalqn. Has publrsh~d a major report on Indonesian prisonerr. 10 Soutlihanpton St. Lonrfon WCZE JMF England.

Church Committee on Human Rights in Asia- Works with church and community groups to prewure for improved human rights in Indon~sia, the 'Philipp~ner, and South Korea. Recently f~l~d stnckholder resolutions with U.S. corporatkons call ~ng for improved labor conditions in AsIan np~ratfonr. Publrshes thr Ash F~nhts Advocate. 5700 S. Woodlnwn Avr?. Chicago. IL 65637 phone (815) 756-9335.

Pacific Studies Center-Maintains a public rewarch crnter on U.S. foreign polrcy in Asia, ~ncl~idinq Indones~a. P~~blish~s bimonthly Sacr!rc Rtrs~arrIi, a journal on U.S. and multinational corporatp activity In Asra. 867 !V. Dana Rm. 204, Mountain View, CA 94041 phone (4 15) 969- 1545.

1 A IH n II m m r IR II RENEWAL m SOUTnEAST ASIA RESOURCE CENTER S m Single Copy $1 llIi Ten or more ,65/ea. n : P.O. Box 4000-0 IR D D PLEASE ENTER MY SUBSCRIPTION 58 regular I I a A % low income NEW m ; Address II I@ la fl Reprints of this Issue A fI BERKELEY, CA 94704 Cl Imor more .SO/ea. m r4 !a " (4153 548-2546 Issue No. 63 PLEASE SEND A FREE CATALOG 81 I w -

TAPDL.'USA-Org; i. support for potlt~c;tl r~r~soners I sin. Pi~hlishes bi-rnnnthly newslelter rs-r JLI'USA. P.O. Box 609, F.lon~cla~r, Nw Jcrr~y 17 t 42.

3ritish Campaign for the Release f APO C lf - .' on lndonesian Politteal Prisonerslniriared the ~nfernat~onal support work for indon~sinn political prisoners. Pubtrshs hr-rnanfhlv n~wsletter TAPoL. 103 Rand. ZVandworth Common, ;\VIR Enq land.

' Eurapean support for improved human rlqhn in Indonesia. Sponsored ronfrrence i on "The Qthpr Indonesia," critiquing the impact of for~ign aid. Pubtish~s rrq~llar 1 bulletin in Dutch. P.0. Rnx 4098, Amsterdam, Holland.

Int'l Mo of Cathdic Sksdents, Asian Ser Maintmns contact wi?h Stutfmt: IJ, uu,l, indonrsia and coordinatrr work with internatnonal student groups. Has publjshecl an annotated chronolnqy on the 1977-78 sttrrknt

movpment. 134 Roundary St., tj/F, Kow. loon Hong Kong.

The Indonesian Action Group-Organizes around the human riqhts ~sstw and pressurm for cufs in Australran military and economic support to the Indonesian rqlme. Publishes bl-rnonthty Indon~sian Nrlws S~lecttons, based prirnar~l y on translations of the lndonesran press. P.0. Box 137. Collingwood 3066, Ai~~tral~a.

Campaign for an independent East Timor (CkET)-Network of int~rnational qroups do~ng solrdarity work and providinq wrltten and aud~o.visual TPSOUrGfi on Timor, U.S.A. Emr Tirnar Defense Corn. rnittee: P.O. Box 251, Pld Chels~a Statlan, MY, NY 10010. British Campaign for an Independent East Timor: 40 Concanon Road, London SUT Enqland. Australian Campaign for an Independent East Tirnor: 232 Castlereanh St 4th Floor. Sydney 2000 Australia. New Zealand Campaign for an Independent East Timor: P.O. Box 1157, M1hanqarel. New Zeafand.

Name 910 foreign

M $15 foreign airmail ! Organization R $12 libraries, institutions

The indonesian anmy invaded East Tirnor in 1975. A bloody guerrilla war continue to this day

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