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Nationalism and Rer olution in Indenesia

Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia

GEORGE McTURNAN KAHIN Azsutent Prefessor of Government and Execuive Director, Southeast Avs Pregrem, Cornell Unuvernty

PUBLIMHED UNDER THE AUIPICES OF THR INTERNATIOVAL SZORETARIAT oF THE INSTITUTE oF PACirIC RELattoNS AND THE SOUTHZAST ASIA PROGRAM, CORNELL UNTVERIITY

Cornell University Press

ITHACA, NEW YORK

Copynght 1952 by Coenell Univervity CORNELL UNIVERSITY PRESS

Fust publohol 1932 Fourth proting 1920

PRINTAD IN THE ANITLD STATES OF AVIERICA

To Maggu

Preface

THIS book has grown out of a year's study of political developments in Indonesia undertaken there by the author from mid-1g18 to midsg19. The study was made possible by a fellowship from the Social Science Research Council. The author withes to thank the Council for this much appreciated amistance as well as to indicate appreciation to the Inatitute of Pacific Relatioms and the Cornell Univeruty Southeast Asia Program for support enabling him to devote three subsequent summers to research and writing related to this book.

The author particularly wishes to express his gratstude to three men who throughout the writing of this book have given him their warm encouragement and helpful criticium-Professer Rupert Emersity; William L. Holland, Secretary General of the Institute of Pacifie Page School of International Relations at the Johns Hopkins University. The author wishes to make clear that he personally is responsible for all statements appearing in the book and for all its inadequacies.

In preparing the book the author is also indebted to a policy pioneered by Professor Owen Lattimore of the Johns Hopkins University and supported by its late President, Isaiah Bowman, and his successor, Detlev Bronk, Under this plan the graduate student who has completed all work toward his doctorate except the dissertation goes out into the field to do research with the understanding that upon his return he will have a year's academic appointment during which his only duty

PREPACE

will be to give a semunar relating to the general subject of which the topic of his dusertation is a major comtstuent Thereby, in prepating tor the seminar, he contributes sndirectly to hus dusertation, the re maining major part of his time he is free to devote to the organization and wrating of the material he has gathered in the field while it is still fresh As the grateful recspuent of such an appountment, the author was able to devote most of the academic year following his return from Indonesca to twork on thas book

To a major extent the book as based upon the zuthor's personal observations in Indonesun and upon extenuve cunversatsons wyth people there, political Jeaders as well as members of the rank and ile A lut of persom boch in Indonesa and the Unted States to whom the suthor s particularly indebted for help in gathenng anformation will be found in the Acknowledgments Much of this information would not have been obtained by the wrster had it not been for the candor of many of these people and other leaders and efficials wth whom he spoke. A great deal of what they told him had, and still retauns. mportant signuficance with respect to Indoneua's domeste politucs or relationship with other countraes Became of thos fact, many of them requested that their names not be mentioned should the author uue thos informatoom in his writing Thus, frequently where unformaton suppled hum by theve persons is incorporated nto this book, the author has had to refraon from citing the sources.

A Note on the Spelling of Indonenen Pisces and Names

Early in the course of the revolution it was offcafly decided that all place names whoch had used the lettees "oe" to expres the sound o (as in flute) should subatute the letter "u" for "oe " (Thus Soerakarta became Surakarta) Ths spelling has been adopted throughout this book.

It was optronal whether or not this change in spelling was carroed over to the names of people Some adopted the change, some dad not, some adopted st and then later changed back to the previous method, whale steme ineorporated thus change for one of their names and mot for the other Frequently neses dupatches and persodical articles give the "u" spelling rather than the "oe" even though the indivodual in question has kept the old way of spelling and so wones han name The wrter has endeavored to spell mames according to the manner which, to the best of bis knowledge, the indvidual in question now prefers

For a tume during the course of the revolution there was a tendency

PREFACE

with both place names and personal names to alandon "dj" un favor of "" and ")" in favor of ")." wung these fetters as in Enginh rather than according to the previously adopted Datch system In general this change was alrindoned after a year or two. However, since an English Iunguage newspipers she present capetal of Indonesia and its former revolotonary capital are generally spelled wsth a ")" rather than a "dj." un this book, for the convensence of she reader, they both appear wath a sımilar spelling 1e Jakarta and Jogjkarta.

Indoneuan Names and Titles

Many Indontams have only one name, and in such cases st usually hat no relation to that of their father In particular dhun a frequent among Javanese Thus the only name of the Presdent of Indoneua is "Soekarno" (It was an enterptiing American nenspuperman who wanted lus dspuches to look more complete and first tacked on "Achmed" as a fitst name )

Wah the revolunon the mazorats of Indoneuans wah arstocratae hand, academme tales are still much prued These conform wrth those in use in the Netherlands Most frequent is the tetle "Mr " (Merater in Reckten, Master of Laws), which nditates that the person las a law degree, usually imolsing three to four years of tuniversity study in the Netherlands or fine in Indonesa Second in frequeney in the tatle "Ir." (Ingemewr, Engineer), wluch andicates that the indivodual bas a degree in engineering, usnally insols ing five to tex years of woek at the university tevel Much les frequent in the totle "Drs" (Doctorendus) This indicates that the indvudoal has completed all work towand his doetorate with the exreption of the divertation Finally there is the title "De." (Doctor), indicating as ehewhere that the indivudual s esther a Doctor of Medcine or the holder of a Ph D. Recently the otuation has become confused with the tendency of many holders of the Meester un Rechten to use the title "Dr " mstead of "Mr."

Cornell Unversety

Grorer McT. KAmv

July, 195a

Contents

Preface vii I The Social Environment of Indonesian Nationalum I II Genesis of the Indonesian Nationalst Movement 57 III History ef the Nationalist Movement until sg1* 61 IV The Japanese Occupation 101 V Outbreak of the Revolution 154 VI The Internal Politics of the Revolution until the First Dutch Military Action 147 VII War and United Nations Intervention 213 VIII Aftermath of the Rensille Agreement *30 IX The Internal Struggle for Power from Renville through the Communist Rebellion 25G X Ideological Orientations and the Development of Internal Politics, October-December 10. 1918 301 XI The Secand Datch Military Acrion and the United Nations" Reaction 33* XII The Strategy and Tactics of Indirect Rule 351 XIII The Final Struggle and the Republic's Victory 391 XIV The Unitarian Movement 44G XV Achievements and Prospects 470 Acknowledgments 481 Index 484

Maps

Map , The Netherlands East Indies 5 Vap : Java Shotung the Renville Truce Lane *35 Vap 3 Federal Indoneua 455 Vap 4 Unitary Indonesia 45

Nationalism and Revelution in Indonesia

The Social Environment of Indonesian Nationalism

THE ENVIRONMENT which has conditsoned the growth of Indonesian nationalum will undoubtedly appear somewhat unique to those whose understanding of the dynamics of nationalism is based primarily upon its hstory in the West. Thus quality of uniquenes remains even when comparisons are made with such colonial-conditioned nationalisms as have emerged in India and the Philippines. Indeed, even rough congruence in the pattern of condtioning background is found only when comparison is made with Berma and Indochina.

In order to understand the nature of Indonesian nationalam and the revolutionary movement into which it developed it is particularly neceuary, therefore, to have some knowledge of the most important features of the social milieu in which it was generated. The twentiethcentury colonial environment which conditioned the modern, articulate, and discernuble phase of Indoneuan nationalism is one demanding fullest analysis. This cannot, however, be undertaken satisfactoily without some prior understanding of the previous historical conditioning of the more salient features of that environment. For, though the thickest roots of contemporary Indonesian nationalism are nourished principally by the soil of the twentieth century, some of their most critical tentacles reach down further into much older strata of history.

It has been a frequently made observation that during their more than three centuries of colonial rule in the Indies the policy of the Dutch was to maintain the existing structure of native soclety, and that darng ths peried dhe basie charactenae a that sociey, exept for a grafung upon it of European and Chinese economic enterprise remaned virtually unchanged

Though considerable popular wriing has concemed iself with the question of whether the mauntenance of the old native society was good or bad for the Indoneuans, very litle attentson has been paid as to whether the bauc postulate itself is correct Wath respect to Java— whuch long before and throughout the peraod of Dutch rule was the polotocal and cultural cenoer of Indonesia and the supporter of most of its population —modern scholarshup has inereasungly demonstrated the meorrestness of this postulate In fact, the impact of Dutch rule substantaally altered the basic structure of Jananese socral erganization * Apparently to an apprecable extent it also altered the political and economse attitudes of moch of the population of Java.

During three centurses of colonial rule a Javanese socsety whose political articulation had been for the most part only moderately authoestanan became generally strongly authoritarian in character. A Java nese peasantry whuch in most areas had been able to force the andigenous nobdity to respect sts rights became weakened in its relatiomship with thos nobility, which vas then able to secure greatly ancreased power and righes over it In additson, the peasantry, which on the whole had pomtued xubstantral economic strength and among whom generally there had been only a relatively moderate degrre of communalstie economue organiration, became economically as well as politically weak, much more communalistic in economue orgamication, and so dulled in its economic sense as to brung some Dutch scholart to descube its twentoeth century mentalty as still "precapetalatue." * To

1Dqarunent van Ecusomache Zeken (Dept of Lconeme Affaet). Ielsteling ( Cerus) zyyo (Batavia aggt) Vi 7 The fint offcul esterate of peptlaten far the whole of todonesa wan in siyo It techened the pepulation of the tren cutade Jasa and Madors (s mmall zland adarcens to the norihesiem const of Jeva and uncladed wth ia for admmntrane purposs) as appoosomately se ooo on at agorot a popalston af ay foy pit for Java and Madara The last eemsus that ol sgjo. couted (he pepulaton et Jara asd Madora as qopaag at aganat 9 e g4 for all the sest of ledonens

à The stractume of socal ergamitatãn sn seme sren ounde Jana-a an nome of the mont umpottant, spoin prodncng vanda o4 the Medoms (rg, Danda and Antbeena) and mrath ater an dhe East Coat mmudeney of Somatra—wan also grratly sd de a Da , tgh a a t m

C Nodan Du Papm Oompronleláhed en Emmuch Apet us e Durp op Jom en Medoena (Leslem. igsi) pp vg-s8i In some areat the aundeney tovanda ancreased commenalate oegimmuion in the village had been sguie even befase the amsel of the Durch as a resction to the possure ef the limited extent that pre Dutch ledonesuan socoety could be described as having had a muddle class, that class uas almost completely elumunated dunng the course of Dutch tule, the once flourishing Javanese mer chant class all but drappearing

The impact of the Dutch on the Indoneuan soctal structure commenced shortly afier the founding of ther Last India Company in thoz The objertive of the Conpuns was to muke maximum profits in trade, and to realuze thus aum it sas felt necevarv to monopolure ex ports and impoets The Compons s attention whuch smitially had been absoebed bs the spore of the Moluccus' way soon attrasted to the well establohed and exteouve tradle centerang un Java Here it obtasned trading persdeges, at first of a relatvels lumsted character, from the native wielders of poliucal power

The olpertse uf the Company besng tradin, pruleges, it had no inclination to sunk ats limoted resources anto developong political con teat over Javaneve territors, except invofar s this was necesary to secure and mauntain such prossleges But it woun besame lear that unless these could be exerved as monopolies vis à in competing traders from other countries they were of tatle value In order to elmsnate competation from Jwanese, \rab, Chunese, and nun Dutch European traders and to ensure an implementation of agreementy made wuth local rolers most susted to its own antereses, the Compuny gradually found it necessary to antervene politically more and more decisively over wader and wnder areas of Java

Fortunately for the Dutch, Java an the seventeenth and esghteenth centuries was politically unmtegrated Moreover, Mataram, the largest of the Javanese states, was durang much of this peraed seriously weakened by ciil wars Initally, only by playing off the Sultanate of Bantam agaunst Mataram were the Dotch able to maintain their trading post at Batavia It vas to an unportant extent because of the drvisuon and mutual enmity of the choef Javanese states that they were thereafter, by playing one state aganst the odber, eventually able to dominate the aland coemplecely

Between s7 and 77. the Company extended its poltical and economic control over two-thurds of Java,' while ot dominated, for the most part, the economic life of the remander of the nland, the truncated and nomunally independent state of Mataram Mataram was totally excluded from commercal relations with the outer world Its commerce was vigorousty supprested, "., merthants, and shipbuilders lost their occupation, and the fishenes and forests were no longer proftable The Javanese became a people of cultivators and the economic comtent of their social life was stunted "

Commanding very lomoted resoures and expected to show a high annual proit on sts small caputal, the Detch East India Company wat not in a postion to pay the ligh conts that a system of direct adminis tration would have entailed Sufficient to secure the polstical control necessary for attaunment of its economic objectrves was the inexpensive system of andirect rule that it came to follow. The essence of this sys rent comnrted in the utoloration of the indigenous power structure for its own unterests More precnely this meant the mainsenance and reinforcement of the poutson and power of the amenable elements of the Javanese anstocracy Their power had to be enlarged, for the Compuny's nterests called for new and additional burdens being placed en the peasantry' The pover of this arnstocracy was atrengthened by Dutch mifutary foce, which stood ready to back it against the populace to tong as it controlled the econome activites of the later in accordance with the anterests of the Company

Thereby Javanese ancety was thrown sersously out of balance. The formerly strong peasanery could no longer curb the arbitrary actions

Map t. The Netherlands Fast Indes

of the anstocratic elite, the balance that premously had given ats interess proteo could no be manamed, fo te anstoca, bace as they were by the Dutch, could now muster oserwhelming force against an The cemter of grasaty of power moved to the porty whoch recelved the support frtem the foreign power, so that the postion of the native ruler an his own jurndiction became stronger, but on the contrary in has relations with the foreign military pover, the ruler became lens and less andependent " * As a result, an all the Javanese states the adminntration of the local rulers tended to develop in a despotuc direeion * As a consequence the pattem of social relationships among the populatient of Java untdernent important changes, and the structure of Javanese socsety became strongly distorted

To carry out ats program of economic explostation, the Company shaped the formerly loosety antegrated and relatvely halamced indigenous power apparatus ineo an sntegrated, hoerarchoc system, strongly autheritarian an character t* At the apex of the hoerarchy stood the Company The second echelon in the huerarchy was compened largely of those members of the matave anstocracy who were appointed by the Compan), xome of these top appountments, hovever, during the later penod of Company rule were given to Chunese. Except in a fer places the deselopment of politocal relationshops between this tevel and the village was entirely in the hands of these appontees and was rarely interfered with by the Company,

In those areas taken over by the Company which sull retained much of the adminatratrie apparatus of no longer sovereign mative states even an psrudoundependent Maturam, the exutang smali seale develop ment of apanage was greatly expanded by thear Company buttressed rulers Under this system the native lord granted authorsty mer a certasm area to the apanage holder, usually a relative, court servant, or offcial of his The holder then frequenily leased his rights over the area to another Indoneuan or to a Chintse " Otheruse, in the Company-contrelled princely states and generally in mure directly ad minstered areas such an Prangan the practice was for the Company's anstocratic employee, useslly Anown an "regent," a to appount ether

Indonesian or Chonese subordinates who administcred subdisisions in his and ther own behalf. Fmilly. at the bottom was the village headman who exercned comtrol over the sillage in behatf of his supermon.

The functionng of amenvble elements of the natne aristoeracy as effective vaval agents in the Compamy's system of economic exploita tion necevitased that it en iow them wth wade poners over the peasant in the economoe sphere that thes pres sousty had not ponesed "Nearly all the threads of economse life therefore came together sn the lords, who deraved ftom thus enormous power

The over all system operated to exploit as much from the vallages as was posble Thesr populatsons were compelled to mike forced de Iveries of a large portion of their crops and to perform non igricultural forced tabor on an extenuse scale Iheoreticalls these deliverses in kind were pand for, but acttally shey amounted to sustarned tribute lesues on an ummense scale, the sillage generally being allowed to kerp just enough of ats produce to sustasn sts snhabetants as a labor force

It must be emphosuzed that not only the Company but the native arstocracy upon whoch the functioning of the system was dependent likewuse benefised. The qusd pro quo for ats servung as the anitrument of the Company's poliey was not only polstical, the virengthening and expranuon of its poners vis à sis the native population made posuble by the Company's bicking; in addition, it shared wuth the Company the direct economot benefits of the system. Over and above the amount they were charged wath delverang to the Conpany in return for ans backing, these atistocrats were generally free to add to these demands as much more as could be sqoeezed out of the villages in the areas under their control Thus "the demand for these products by the Company in the interior frequently was made heasier by the Indonesian lords to their oun advantage." is

The key posstion occupued by the native aristocracy in the Com pany's system of economic explostation soon came to be equaled by that of the Chunese, who likewse tame to be indispentalle to its successful functiomong. Neither the system developed by the Company and continued along roughly similar lines after its demise under the

1Ibd

i Burger, op eot, p As an example of the woking of thon sytem, in sge the native crltnator wan allawel oo keep jut t4 Ite of every wpo-ago ie of coffer that he kat chargnd wuh delneteng to the Camipany Neatly roo lhn was alaneted hy the admunutratve hurarchy betwern the village ant she Companys wareheunes klole the Compuny's undmpasd officalt wuneted anocher s1 lla out ol the otal (Fumnall, ep at, p eo)

name of "the Cultn-ation System" nor the social legacy of Dutch rule at a whole can be clearly understood without some account of the building up of the econome role of the Chinme in Indonesia.

Pror to the arrival of the Dutch, Chinese merchants were active in the Indies and had establuhed several trading settlements on the north coast of Java " Honever, the lotal prinees severely limited the areas of their sesilement," and their principal actrvity was as intermediaries in the exchange of Indies and Chinese goodh, largely on a wholesale basis at

Wath the establahment of the Company's power over Java, however, the sope of the actvity of the Chmese greatly expanded. This expansion was made pouble by the Company, which initrally looked upon the Chomest as sts spetial protégês and strove to protect and favor them became of ats convaction that its own explostation of the Indies could be most efficsently achoeved with their belp " The Dutch East India Company's policy is well expressed by ats first governor, J. P. Coen, who stated "There is no people an the woeld which serves us better than the Chonese, too many of them cannot be brought to Batava " " Coem held that the Company should Iamit its trade to that of a "mighey wholesale dealer," with the Dutch active as muddlemen. Retail trade was to be left to the Chinese, "retailers who in this connecton, and even as merchanes, fat exceed ours in ability." a" The sole of the Chinese in Java thus changed from that of sntermediaries between the big Chuna bated merchants and the populatson of Java to that of antermedarses beteen the Company and the latter.n

At first the actrmities of the Chinese in Company controlled teritory were largely confined to the retailing of imports, and this sector of the economy they soon caste to dominate Increaungly, however, despoie the Company's inital wnwillongness to have them emer the field, they came to partucipate in the gathering of native produce for export by the Company." In evence this meant that they were alsorbed into the system of pelitical relationships developed by the Company. There they came to occupy an extremely umportant poution, holding to an increasing extent postions at first reserved only for members of

Suth Chinese actually stood on a contractual lasis wsth the Cempany or the Indonesuan londs from wlhom, for a stipulated payment in gold or produce, they leased polhtical and economic authorsty over one or more villages or whole diatricts for a certain number of yeats Hon ever, the relationshup of these Chunese with the nhalutants of the areas they leased was not contractual but semifeudal an the same degree as obtained between the Company and the native nobility and the areas under their control a "In nearly all these cases." states Cator, "the lessee acted as the nes feudal lord. who kept an unwlling populataon in check, if need be by foree of arms The result of thos system was that the lessees, like bloodsuckers, took as much as they could get t* The power of these Chinese was very wudely concened Not only dud the sus tem allow them to squeere as much as they eould sn the way of agri cultural produce and forced labor from the population, in addition. "they found in it at the same tome the opportumity for the practice of usury, because in the villages they had the village authorsty in their honds and thus could be assured of repayment."

The Company tok the instiative in the leasing of valliges to Chinese, but its example was soon followed by the regents (the top aristocratie leaders in the areas durectly controlled by the Company).* and in varying degrees by the native rulers of Java, including Mataram." By the end of the eighteenth century en the Conpany's lands on the north coast of Java alone 1,131 illagts (out of a total of about 16,noo for all Java) were leased to the Chunese. Not enly vallages, but thtee en tire distriets had been leased by it to the Chunese, who thereby held about the same poution as the regents did ehenhere."

In adation to these ares teases the Company farmed out to the Cese vao moopol, uc as te rt to colle roa toll, ey bazsar fees, sell salt, and even the night to collect the ostoms duty. Through these parucelarly their control of the bozaars and their st-ong hold on the race trade arrung out of thest conerol of the ecuno mars of their lessed villages, the Chonene came to govern almost com pletely the mternal commerce of Java,** the andigenous merchant clas being nearty elomunated

Widespread corruption in sts admunustration in the Indies and a reck less financial policy which paid stockhulders an average rate of 18 per cent per yesr betneen 16or and s8oo led to the collapse of the Dutch Eant India Company in v798 n1 The area controlled by it was then placed under the direct authorty of the Dutch Government. Houever, as Vandenbosch states, "there was no sharp break with the Company system, ndeed, nearly all the old anstitutions, such as forced labor, de Ineraes in kund, feudalnm, and monopolses in certain crops were retained " = With the brnef interlude of Bntnh rule (1811–s8r6) under Sir Stamfond Rafles, an mpreuse program of reforms was started, but most of them were only partually realtzed, and much of what was ac complihed was abandoned by the Dutch after ther return *"

Betr een 1816 and 183o the poliey of the Dutch government was

Vandeetauh ep ot, p 54 indecisive and wavtred between openng up the Indies to andsudurl enterprise and revertinç to a ssstem of government monopols clovely parallel to that followed Iis the Comprimy Ultmatels, fmanttal con suderations arnung out of the large scale rebellion in Java between 182s and 18gn." and the unoccevdul war woth telgium anduced the government to embark on the lauer course The new ssstem kown as the Cultsatson System ( Cultuur Stedel )." lasted as a whole untal 18p, after which it uas progressels restrated unul in ugas it was completely aboluded The soucess of the new wstem tiom the stand pount of the Dotch can be measured bs the fact that io top7 it had paid off the East India Compums's debts of 35 oooo gilders and in add: toon brought into the Netherlands home treavury a tribute totaling 661.500,n00 guilders **

Esventally the Cultavation Svstem had much an common wath the wstem of the Compums Though it stalsred a comudetahle numbet of European employees, the basuc elements of the pirtalls destroved ss tem of political relttioms developed Ins the Gompans were resusutated in order to make in operative Indeed, these eleoents ptouded the warp and woof of its pattern of explostation Iromberg feels that the new system could not have sueceeded without the support of the top elemem in the Javanese arntocratic loerardhy, the regents" and it as generally conceded that under et their poners actually anereased In order to secore the effective support of the regents, the goverument gave them grants of land and made thesr office hereditary. In addatson it gase them, as well as leser natave officrals and the neu Éuropean of ficials, a direct financal interest in the sistem's operation, a percentage of the crops collected from the peasantry." "Over agamt hus subordnate cvil servants and the population," states Fromberg. "the regent was elevated to become a feudil prince, who in turn, hoever, had to carry out the will of the resident [the top termtonal Dutch eßcal] From the population servile submisson was demanded and even the village leadership, by nature identical with the interests of the people, was made a tool in the hands of the regents and their suberdinate district heads

In theory the Cultvation System called for only one fith of the peasant's ne fields being planted with a commercial crop designated by the government He was to spend no more tame cultivating this crop than he would have spent if the ground upon which it grew had been plamsed in race. Upon delivery of the desgnated crop to the government he was to be exempted from payong a tax.a

In practice, the peasant was mot only forced to continue payment of the land tax, but the rentraetion callong for the linitation of the govenment's crop area to ene fifth of the peasant's rice land was rarely observed According to Van der Kelf, "One-tlurd, one half, and even the whole of these srtigated fields were used for that purpose." aa The demanda on the peasant's labor for the cultivation of dry as well as arrigated land far exceeded the limet that the government had announced "Intead of 66 days per year, which onginally was the normal persod, the interests of certasn government cultores necessitated those lable to service workang zdo days and even more."*" In short, the peaant paid hs former land tax plus whatever amount of crops the various financially anterested elements in the hierarchy operating the system could squeere out of hum He had no chouce as to the cropt he grew; and the amount of coffee, sugar, indigo, ete. left to him from twhat he produced was frequently not enough for him to purchase sufficient food foe his family, so that sn some areas serious famines re solted As a result of a succeuoon of famines berween 184ß and 1848 the population o one regency f om to o and ha of atother from 8g,500 to g,000 a

Though terratonal leares appear to have been ducontinued under the Cultrvation System, functional monopaly leases were connderably expanded, so that the economue poustion of the Chinese who controlled these lesses became further consolidated By about 1Bso the principal leased monopolies ncluded levyeng of the poll tax, brdge tolls. slaughtering tax, and gaming tax, the sale of fish, opum, and alcoholic hquors, the operation of pawmihops, and the levying of tax fees on all goods brought to public market." A few of these monopoliet, the

41 frombeng op nt, p sih lad, po 1ng-113 "Fumasail, ap ar, p y

+n Van der Kelf, op ar, p soß a5d, p 110 aoe, op ot , p sh market tax monopoly being the most important, were abolished before the ending of the Coltivation System in 1877, but other important ones such as the epium," pannshop, and slaughtering monopolies ran umil the turn of the century or stightly after.

These monopolies frequently brought indirect as well as direct benefits and powers to the Chunese Tor instance, a French obnerver writing in i8gg noted the Javamese was forced to pay a slaughteting tax of three guildets en each animal, the Chinese keeping spies an each village to repert slaughterings Generally, howeser, the natse did not have the three guslders, so the Chunese took the hude of the animal intead, the natve not knowang vis valoe was more than thsee guilders. This practice among the Chunese was so generat that they had con tracts with the principol tanners m whuch they guaranteed delivery of a fixtd mumber of hudes "

The system of economic explotation followed under the Cultiva tion System was, therefore. in its bane elements roughly the same as that pursued earher by the Cempany It thus tended to solidily the pattern of Jasa's social structure and emphasire among the indigenous inhabitants the socio psychological penchants that had begun to develop tunder the rule of the Company The funetioning of these systems necesutated that the authoritarian content of native society be not only maintained but considerably increased. The village headman came more and more to owe his pesition to the Dutch and the Dutchbacked aristocratic hierarchy above him, the interests of which he came increasingly to represent rather than those of the villagers The relatiomthip between the village and the political structute above it assumed a substantially more authoritarian character than had obtained in most parts of Jasa prier to the arrival of the Dutch.

A cominuation of the development of nasive society along communal lines had been increased under the Company and was an outstanding feature of the Cultivation System. "So great were the demands on landholders." states Furnivall, "that landholding was no longer a privilege but a burden which oceuputs tried so share with ethers." *

iaj. Challep-Tet. Jave el aes Aabtmts (Parh, sges)- p 1 a Furmivall, ap or, p. ua

Mortover, from the standpoent of government supervision of crop growing and the most effcsent use of angation facilhtier, Van der Kolf notes, "It twas much easser to deal tath compact blocs of land" and to regulate such matters "wth a potwerfut village council rather than with the andivodual landowners " a" In additron, "In many parts of Java the hability of service on publie works was confimed by cmtom io landholders and as the officuals wished to ncrease the mumber of hands avallable for puble works, and the people themselves wnhed to dutribute and reduce the burden of service on such works, it was to the anterest of both officals and landholders that the occupation of land sheuld be vaidely shared Thes encouraged communal posesson and obliterated hereditary socral distunctions"

Again patallel wuth development under Company rule was the no lation of the Javanese population from contact with a market economy. The economoc function of the populatian was restricted to that of agriculturat laboeer on the service of the gmvernment, and at was unable to acquire trading expersence tt As was the case during the Company's rule, the monopoly policy of the Cultvatson Syatem "csused a gap between the producer and the market whereby there was no know! edge of the market, no outlet for enterprse, and no posubelity of developing a natne trading class **s Moreover, the system appatently sended to develop an enduring economic psychology among the Java nese population In the words of Van der Kolff

The lonz degrsdaten of the tam [pearant] to an underpasd labourer in com pulsory serice on the large estate which the goveroment of the Netherlands Indses an st were, esploted im Java, coopled wuth the umeertanty el besng atle to dapose of his own ground and energy, killed all ha creative qualtses and ttotratve as a farmer Tha socal peychologcal factor did not ammediately dis appear on the ahelruon of the forced laboor systen and with ths there were strang anfuences costining whch dsd much towands retarding development of the natuve along agraran lines

It must be emphasured that the effects of the political and economic etganuation of the Company and Culuvation systems were not transitory They were strongly m evidence untl the end of Dutch rule in early sg* and are still very much felt The contours of the mold in whoch they cast Indonesian society were eroded only partially by changes in Dutch policy vubsequent to their abolishment Likewise,

an Van der Kalf of ent, p sst n Van der Kolf, of a, po ia 3bd, p u1

" Tummall op ct, p tqt urd, p 116 much of the social pychology anduced by that rule appeats to have lingered on. As a mouer of fact sts survival in some respects tended to be preserved by the character of certain of the farets of subnequent Dutch rule.

In the frst phce, the ending of the government's export monopols in 1877 and the throwung open of the Inhes to esplostation by prate capital ded not mean the ummedaute end of furced cultvaton in be half of the government. Thos was only gradually abolihed, the forced ctltration of coffee (the most amportant of the crops) did not com pletely disappear until vqsb-sgig" Meseover, tor a consuderable perod the power of the village headman, still tucked by the govern ment, was used to orginize forcabls the supply of natave labor needed bs Dutch private capital Not untal sbgo did the government begin to oppose this practice wath vagor *

For a tonuderable tume after this the government's needs for foreed labor for roads and other public works necesutated its marntenance of authontaran rule in the village through as agent, the sillage head man. In Java soch compulsory labor hy the sallage population was not completely ended until sgt6, and outsude Java at was never abolnhed, though in i91n a law was psed making it posuble to avoud labiity for such labor by the payment of a tax *

However, thöugh the foreed labor for the government for whuch the Indonesan was lable was ended an Jasa and much reduced elsewhere, he remaned obligated to perform forced libor for his village. Under the authonty of an artatrary headman tlus couhld often be a severe burden. The autocratie power of the government lacked village beadman only began to be reduced after sgo6, when a new and more enlightened colonial policy appreciated the necesuty of building up the sallage's lapied democratic ansututions, if the government's policy of increasing native welfare twas to be achoeved

Although the powers of the illige headman were sharply himited in some directions (for antance, his authoraty to exact forced labor from the villagers), the needs of the government demanded that they be expanded ote (lletion of e land en, police onction, operation with the civil service in carrying out new meatures designed to benefit the village, etc.). By virtue of these functians and the fact that his respommbility was primanly to the Nethertands Indies evil oervce herarchy rather than to the people of his village, the authoritaran rature of his relationshup wth the village remained dominant. As late as 1941, st was observed in the report of a governatent commis non that the viloge headman n Java was "almost exclsively an instrument of the government .. his conceen for the incerests of the village itself remauming complenely in the background " *

Moreover, quete apart from the authotstaran role which he played as agent of the government, the vilage headman frequently abused hus government backed autfhoraty by independent activaty. This developed partly in reipotme to the needs generated among the peasantry by the penetration of money economy, but partly it was for his personal bene- It Sometames this resulted an the leasing of vallage rice lands to Eoropean plantations and often in the drvision of the communal holdings among indivoduals exercsing prvate rights of ownershup Writing in sgzg Schreke stated:

Genealogeal headmentdhe tradtional admetutraters of the undinded famidy posesions—assume the doponution over them Supported by the admttintraton of whch they ate the iutrument, they begin to eshuhat feudal tendencies intefar in the presence of an autocrate admonutrauon allows Morgagng of the ground a an the mcrease for porposes whuch the old customiry lasw never recognund Even the sale of ground—whuch was foebodden by eustomary law— a becomung more and more usual The dmmon of famly lands, of whoch the meobens of the family rective individal shares to look after, assumes a more

Increasungly, and parteularly afer about igto, the European personnel in the cvil service sought to protect the Indonesian peasant from the village hradman, the Chonese, and Dutch capital However, despite this and the protection given him by the new agranan laws introduced in 187g.*" at was didfcult for the peatant to better his status in the new

e1 These forbec e the sale ef natve agrncultural land to noe vatves economic emironment which began to develop around him. The nted for money to pay taxes and to bay commodiues no longer produced in the village, often combined with the personal enterests of the hesdman. brought many Javanese villages in the richest rice areas of the istand to lease their land to European entrepreneurs an return for advances paid by the latter. The mapor crop gronn on such land was sugar cane, and the puttern of agracultural relations involved in its growth tended to maintain and reinforce communal land ownerhup and blocked the poubelity of developung a strong peasantry In sgrg it was estimated that from so to ss per cent of the total race field area of Java was thus affected, with no prospect existing "for the development of a strong and proiperous peasantry “n

In the areas of Java not affected by Western estates the discontinuance of forced cultisation and the influence of such facters as indrs idual Iability for taxation and the ancreasing presare of the population on the available arable land gradually broke down the communal land ownership that the Company and Cultisatson systems had fostered Ry sogz, of all natne agncultural land, 83 per cent was penately owned. The diminshung of the village's right to dnpose of land n brought out by the figures in Table a, showing agrieultural holdings for Java

Table r. Lavo notzeses rv Java (in thousands of hectares) *

* Figures quoted by Boeper fom J W, Stoppelate, "De Aard van het Intandeh Betstretht ep Java en Maduns," Aolonaf TipdicAnft, (pgz), p sy Much ef thus change in proportion of indivadually ewned land arose thesegh the cleaelng of new land whuch tendel to temain ostnde the ambat ef commonat control (Batger, op (st, p zio)

NATIONALISU AND REVOLUTION

The over all result of the increasingly indnodualistie besis of land ownerslup vas the concomstant development of social differentiation in a sociesy that preuomly, under the leveling mmpact of enforced communalism, had been marked by a signal absence of differensiation

The pattern of Indoneyan, partucularly Javanese, society of the igao's and apso's was still remarkably balanced and free of the dntortion of socio economie extremes charactenstic of most other Auan agraian societies, but it was less so than the Indonessan pattern that had ebtamed during the prevoous few decades Though the percentage of agncultural families on Jasa and Madura that owned land was est mated at over 49 per cent in sg2s, an snerease of about 4 per cent over 19o5." this must not ubncure the fact that the absolute number of fandless peasants must have been snerezsung during dhus period Moreover, because of the rapidly dimunshing margin of noncultovated reserves of arable land and the growing dnparity betw een the agnoultural bose of the village and the popelation dependent on it, the number of landless peasants undoubtedly ancreosed greatly during the iggo's Very likely this resulted an a substantial sncrease in the peoportion of tand less peasants to peasant owners

The wudespread supplanting of communal by indissdual land ouner shup did not, however, entail a commensurate diuntegration of the communal pattern of socal relationhips Thu remauned sepriungly strong almost everybhere in Java and throughout much of the rest of Indonesa as well Though the chuef objective characterstic of agrarian communalum-common ownership and/or disposition of land—had for the most part disappeared, the tommunalstic psy. chology nduced by sts previous long persod of operation remaned Such activstues as house buldang znd harvesung were still wadely carrond out on a co operative lass The village as a whole continued to sapport not only all its orphans, aged, and suck, but its unemployed as well

The number of landlem agncultmal workers was mereaung rapidly during the last decades of Dutch rule, but the great "revolutionary agrarian proletatat" that some Indonesian Communist leaders had been counting on did not emerge Though the economse ansecurity of thos "proletariat" was great enough to develop wathun it a comoderable degree of poltical comiciousnes, the mummum social secutnty still provded m most cates by the village restraned most of thus group from manifetting any senioos poltical restivenes In both the deptesson of the early sgzo's *" and that of the sggo's, mont of the econoically deststute were sutcored by the sullage

Boeke, regarding tus contmuing communalum as a strong tarmer to the development of caputalism, has in whit are pouubly somewhat exaggerated terms thus deseribed the sstem

Every persen on need—from whatever cauve-can crunt on help, wuch n the nsture of the communal life But the advantage of this n effuet by a doad vantage in which turks the weaknes of thos cornmunal wolidarts every tule wandfall must be dntributed without delav The sellage commumsty tolerates no economse dfference but acts as a leselßer in thn respect, regarding the in do dual as part of the community

In some areas, at least, it could undoubtedly be argued that thos contimuing communal relatiomhup was more a convequence than a cause of the weak economoc posstion of the peasant At any rate this phenomenon uas certanly not the only amportant factor working aganst the development of an agraran tased Indonean capstalum.

In the first place, the posubslities of accomplnhing thus were not porticularly lright in an area such as Java where the per capeta income of the to per cent of the population dependent upon agriculture for a Iving * was in sggg estimated to be enly $5.gr, including the value of ctops consumed as food, only $1 15 beng attual cash imtome. (Outtole Jasa the respective figures averaged about 63 per cent greater.) ** In the relatively prosperous year of sgrs, of the Indonesuan families on Java and Madura dependent on agroeulture for a lsung and duelling outude municipalities, about 2 per cent were clamihied (aecordng to a rough government survey based on a sampling technique) as "rch pesans" and had an average money income equivalens to 54y5 The next highest category of landowners, "ordinary landownens," consturuted s9 8 per cent of this population and averaged $:zo yearly per famdy, while the remaining landowning group, "poor landowners," constitating s7: per cent, averaged 5$59 per family." Accordang to thas survey the remainder of the population of Java and Madura dwelling outsde municipaloties was classified as shows in Table :

Teble = I~covz os vaous socias caoum 14 19s

Secondly, though the general pattern of Indonesan landownership during the last decades of Dutch rule appeared to be relatively balanced and free from extremes* wath relatvely little concentration of land nto large holdings and almost half the families on Java and Madura dependent on agriculture owning all or part of the land whoch they worked, this pattern of legal ownershup gives very little

i Meper Ranes It and Hundet, e or . p it Though ther numbery mapadly in ereased betwem iges and igas there were few large landheldem only sgy Indo nuan beldeg begal otle lo mone thkn sy hectzmen as Java and Madura in spts. and dumag dia penod the peroentage of pénts owning land increset from aboet 41%1000% inmigha mto the actual econonic pes't or ef the peasaniry In fact. though impartant to the peasant in a social sense, legal ownership often bad tatle relevance to economic status, for it did not ensure eco nomic control ef the land onned Frequentls and sers povubls in the majority of cases, the Javanest peasans did not evereue econense con trol over the land to whoch he held legal title

Though the government's agrarian legslation aßorded the peasant protection that his counterpart in other colorial countries dad not enjos, it gave him ons a tumited pro'ection The penetration of a mones economs, in partacular the habilits for varicus tases pavable in mones." unaccompanied bs ans spread of reasonable credit facl tes, forced the peasant to bocrow from the local moneslender uemalls a Chinese and an most eases his onls source of credit " Often because of mabilits to repas these loans, the peasant was forced to gros crops designated bs has creditor sellirg them to him at a prace set bs the later Therebs he became a tenant on his own land. with the prefts of his labor going to hs credator *

Not untl after the anstation of sts Ethical Poliey in sgoo did the government take steps to make credit factlities available to the peasant, and its efforts wete entrely madequate to meet this situation" Par

et Tomobly ef equal umpertante was the netewts ef paving emenes foe cesutes goods which farme tad beem manufaetured be vdlage handerat s-daen m of huh was elmunaned dang the tt quaner of the tweweth ermiurs a the marhet waa Booded ts cheap factery prodaend arteles frem the Wes and from

Le vallage monnlencm, almoa all ed wtom were Chasee, averaged no on a lan of aze meeth duraten.

ta Moermin, ep ed, pp a-as Wwth repect to thas eruation wee an partscutar Karl ) Pelaen, Pinee Setenient en te daate Tropes (Sew Yoth sgts pp 15p vpe Tetzer notes that gemeralle roch teraney cettracta were urrepurered a-d were not knowa to the aucencas unless specal suves were Pade le cos ere suth varvey made in vesn an the regenev et Toeloengigoerg an Last Jana where i was dadoed tat "ent of a total of a peo landownurg prasanus ;s ts had been larend to lease mosze of these land in erder to ebtan es and m ears as g g"s Fad bee fored to lease all of thesr land"

ts The dief sourer el govemment crebst (on sego. v tee oro eut et a soual ef ippo gulldens estended threeg all povemmnt-cosatol'el crelit ststtsto was the Sate Pawnatop miem etabhahed in sgoa. Tor all Irdortua Ioweer, shee were esublabed enls soo govemmens pawnshops Becane of the dscavee imelied. mant peauza were unable to male use ef ese sheps, Eut even mtre ampatam thee rates were oftes mot suoraile lover than thove of te Chnre to indace te prasana to eumply wuth the undemlar red tape whach the,r loars em aded Thos the govemmme's epersien of tha credit souree was at fine based euduugh en te dmry to belp the petunt, at socn became cenerrted to at anportal extent wath mapag tevemae ams the sane tressury Dunng ene penod the aterenc chaged

VATIONALISM AND REVOLUTION

tacularly dunng the sgyo's, when they profited by the money scarcity of the depression years, the Chanese came to control more and more natve crop land As in petvious years they did not obtaim legal tile to st, but th.y did obtasn functional control over it In the words of Boeke, "Their aim was mot to approprate land, but to have at their duposal uie marketable products derived from the land—the rice from the sawahsas well as export crops Taking advantage of the peasant s crincal need of money, they supplhed him with "buyers" credit agaonst an undertaking to repay by handing over produce after harvesting and they manage to acquire ever mcreasng rights by imposung onerous condmom when woung the losn"

Finally, it must be noted that the mereasing volume of export crops grown by the Indonesian population " during the last decades of Dutch rule did not meam a proportuonate increase in the welfare of the Indoneuan peasant A substantal part of the salue of these exports went to Chinese—and to a lesser extent to Arab-entrepreneurs, who absorbed a major share of the peices earned by these commodities Because of their credit relatomhip with the sndebied Indonesian grower, they could purchase his products at conuderably under the local market prices

Moreover, though many government officials strove hard to rase the economic status of the Indonesian population, at must be moted that their efforts were considerably handicapped because of the ap parently greater feelang of obligation for the welfare of Dutch capital daplayed in crstical persods by the government This became es pecially clear during the great depression of the sggo's and was manifnted in the government's penalting the fon,ooo Indonesian producers of rubber (by far the most important export crop groun by the native populatson) for the benefit of the Western owned rubber estates

Though the annual rate of production by Indonesian growers had been goo,ooo tons as against soooo by the Western-owned estates. the government in 1931 (in meeting the quota atugned it under the international rubber control regulatson to whuch at was a party) restricted the native producers to a quota of 1 15.ooo tons whule allon ing the estates to produce zos,ooo tons t* Between June, s951. and De cember, zgy6, natise rubber exports wert kept in check shrough "a special export tax deugned to depees local prices sufficiently to keep native exports wathun the permiuble tevet " t" In order to Leep this production by Indoneuans down the government umpoied a progres aively stifler tax, so that in sgg6 over 95 per cent of the export value of the rubber produced by them was absorbed by the tax.** Estate rubber was subjected to a much smaller tax The monumum duparsty an thes taxation allowed the estate owner to realize thurty cents on each kilo produced and the Indonesan twensy cents, while the maximam reached was sixty two cents for the estate owner and five cents for the Indoneuan producer " The consequences for the Indoneuan population were so severe that in some areas famine and hunger rots resulied.*

Of the zo,s79.6pz Indonesuan workers indicated by the sggo census. 1.55s,131 were lnted as workang for non Indonesian agrieultural enterprises (5og.759 of this nomber being women and 519,157 being male and female workers emplozed by sugar plantatiom) *" and z,tos.tzg

a P. T. Rauer, The Rubher Indurtry, A Study in Comprtition and Manopely (Cambridge, Mau, api§), p ses Ourput for the in months ending May, sgpt. had bern sspme tons for Indonenan peodures and stopmo tona for etatet, in she latter months of the period, however, the dusparity inctrased sharply in faver of the native prodaees.

"rhd, p

a Baven CCt N san Suchaeten, "Parallellen." Aelens! Tydetedt (Sept, st). P s78 Oormubly the extra tex eollected from the Indonrian popdures was to be used on gmenment projects drugned to premone their welfase Duing the two and a balt ean of its operation this tat setted t,ozen goilders from the Indoseuan rubber prodocer, However, "these lange aum proved too smong a temptation for the N Y. asthorities, and pat ol the Ionds were diserted to grneral espenditure." whillt in vygs an Seast Szentee al the gunden detned tron the spedlat tus en the Indoneuan pooduter were toed by the govemmest to poy the emate producen lor their rubber (Baurr, ep. dt, p0 tgt, 1s. 18) Aa o sg, gopz of the tetal no cnlleciet was repoited to be stil in the Nethastands Indes Tteasury (Van Suchtelem, op est, p 535).

s Van Suchirlem, ap. et, po 5do. g9t

an Though in the latter quanter of the nineteenah erntury almost all plancation workes ouasde of Java wete Chinese, dosing the last decade of Dosch rule Javsneve lator had eome to erplate the Chinese alment estirely At the end of appo on all plantatons oumde of Jina thene mere enly n.tos Chsesz as against goßßio Javaneue plantation labotern (teduch Fevslag, zet, p zza)

were listed as industnal workerns, Gr8,a7a of this number being womer A large part of Indonesian labe working outside of the village, much nonvillage tased plantation labor as well as probably the majority of urban labor, masntained clove contact with the village through former domocile and/or blood relationship with its members and in tome of economoc crus was able to rely to an smportant extent on the social recutity that the village provided. The fact that these groups could look to the agrculturally based village for minimum food and shelher in tates of prolonged industrial and plantation unemployment is essenal in undertanding the poltical erentation and activity of Indo nesian tabor The vull strongly communabstucally inclined village must be consdered as having provaded for a major portion of induntria and plantation labor a cuthoon of sociat security which tended to obvate the vaolent political reactions that might otherwise have been generated during the connderable persods of usemployment experienced by thn group an tames of economic depression Thus though dicontent with wage levels and working conditrons certainly developed the polstical consciousness of urban and plantation labor, because e the socal security offered by the village most members of these group fell far short of developing the revolutionary mentality that some Communnt leaders were counting on.

Some ndicatsoen of rural wage levels is provided by the statistic concernung daily wages given an Table

There does not appear to be sulcent relable data to warrant co cluuam a to the progress or retrogresuon of the ecomomic welfare o the natve population of Indonesa during the whote of the last four decades of Dutch rule ** However, enough is avaulable concerning the

wall has caßected dats suggating that the etonomic welta tion sround the tom of the cemisty de 187g-1884 (furmiralL, ap est, pp zsq-xus)

Teble , Wacts or vaxiois crours or woakzes

• The above data ia from Indurh Teroleg, (gyr, II at-tg)

† Vargitua Thompron, Lator Problems in Southres Aua (Sew Hven gt) pp

period from sgis until the great economie deprestoon of the iggo's to suggest why during the course of that period Indonesians came to develop a degree of political consciousness not previtusly manifest The evidence indicates that even prier to the depresuon the general level of economic welfare of the native population was declining, while at the same tume it was being obhged to shoulder a heavier burden of taxes.

After a shert period of diminishing economic welfare during the first years of thes century there was a general increase in the real intome of the native population of Java up unil World War I, during and after which it declined untal sgzt-** Total real ancome of this population during the critical period igro-sgsy was estimated as ranging from 5 to 10 per cent less than in 1g1s and in sgz4 only slightly exceeding that of sgis*" despite the fact that the population had increased by at least so per cent during this period.*" Meijer Ranneft and Huender, on che basis of their government spomored investigation ef agss, concluded that "everyuhere in recent years there has been an untustakable decline in the welfare of the native population" Analyss of the ancome data collected by them, twhen viewed in conjunction with the popolation increase, allows no concluson but that between sgis and igas there was a very consuderable and apparently rasher steady decline in the real per capria income of the population of Java and that even in sgzę st was still well under what it had been 1n 1913

Statstics for the years sgz6-agga sndieate that during that penod the natve population of Indoneia as a whole expernenced a further decline in economic welfare Between these years the average income per person declined steadady from 47 6 guilders to zo 3 guillers in Java and Madura and from g2 5 to s8 8 gulders im the rest of Indonesia Over the course of these years the relatuve decrease m the over all cosu of laving foe Indoneuams lagged slightly behand such income decreane* During the same perod the percentage of taxes in relation to income pasd by the whole ratve population ancreased from 7 61 per cent to 10 95 per cent *0

The head of a government sponsored investigation of the econorue postion of the Indonetian population of Java and Madura ptade in p2o-tg1, concluded that this population had *been taxed to the lurthest limits of its abilty" and read "with a shudder" plans to increase the natise land and head taxes** Despite his warning, during the next seven years the amount of land tax paid by the peasant was steply ancreased." and, though in sgas the caputation tax was ended,

an Minper Ranneft and Homder op ct, p 1

Thus cociumos, detved lom amome Égures, a lent ssbsraraton by Égurer wereming impans of laue ratrie cmrimem a grod-comon cloth, thrend, and turings These show a ditlant decreise in per ciputs lmporta hetsem igig and igey (id, p gt) An sndependem govemmment saey moted shat wages in syt were mach lower san an san and that agad showed è esetmued smereine la loing tonis over sesl wagen ( I1 Goveroment, Fenilag ven dr Écaseesscles Tostond der Jelasdele Bevoog [elteveden sget] L, ago-an, za)

L Gétn Vobuskomes en Belasting" Kolomale Trudue (Oct asgl. 7 479 en Ieduch Feylag syo), It alo This cancluven is bised on the pmumption that food wat the cdal and gostmng lem in the nansea cast of Imng The perse mdes a dd b te ae popal droppd

n Goum op eat, p 425

W Hsender, Ourocht pen den Erenemuchen Toestand der Inhremcie Bevelkng son Jasa en Madoere (The Hagse, sytt), p z45 Hunder eoncladed that the ludoneunn was pasing on kn average sy a% of has zmmma un gaore (bed, p aet)

** A D A de Kat Angelane, Calomal Paley, oe frum the Dunch by G J Renet (Chicugo, sgy), I, tge Dunung tho pened vhe land ax pasd by the Indoverion pop latin rome foom ei,po oee to gi,po aoe guldern the proportion of taxes to income paid by the native population continued to increase.

In tggz, though taxes collected from the native population were but 6s per cent of tgzf, its income was only 45 per cent as large as in the earler zear. Thus its tax burden ancreated by 41-1 per cent between sgz6 and sggz." During the depresuon years of the mid iggo's, the over all Netherlands Indies tax burden increased by so per cent over 1gaß and by s91o had reached s3o per cent of the sg:3 6g ure *" Undoubtedly, these gemeral increases entailed a conuderable additional growth in the tax burden borne by the Indonesian population

The tiny remnant of the Javaneve commercial class wlach still survved at the end of the Cultvation Svstem mas have receved some instial benefit from the ending of that system and the untroduction of a laster fatre economs But there was little or no increase in its numbers. The conditioning of the Compumy and Cultnation systems had blunted the people's sensitasats to the urges of caputalat economics, In Jasa, at least, there was no significant response among the Indonesian population toward taking advantage of the entrepreneurnal opportunities whuch the ne system opened up Into the resulting vacuum crowded the aggresise, already established, reudent Chunese merchant class supplemented by thousands of smmigrants from south east China," armed with the sndustroousnes and commercial knotuhow they had acqured in the fiercely competiuve socoety of theer own country, to exploit eppertunsties which the ratve population was no longer equipped to dispute wath them and whch did not tempt most Netherlanders.

At first, Chinese credit buyers, retaslers, meeeylenders, and indus tral entrepreneurs were restricted by governmemt regulations to coastal areas oe if they were allowed to operate in the inserior, they had to obtain posses from the Dutch authorsties, whose aim it was to protect the Indonesans from their explostation Between sgo1 and tgie, how ever, the government, under growing pressure from a riung and organzed Chinese nationalist movement among Indomesia domiciled Chinese, acreded to its demands and lifted most travel and residence restictuom pertaining to Chunese ** The comiderable amount of Chonese caputal set free by the government's cancellation, shortly before, of the Chinese held opoum and pawnshop monopolies was able to operate in the interior wothout lundrance Remauning Indonesian merchants and indmtnalnty of the intersor, who had been relatively unmolested peesoously were thereby subjected to the full brunt of aggrettave Chonese competition

As a reaction, and in order to resinst this competition, Javanese batck merchants in Surakarta in igas formed a co-operative association. Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamoc Tradong Society) This soon changed its primary orentation from commerce to politits and was for a long tme the moit mportant Indonesan mationalnt ceganization t* But as a means of stoppung Chinese penetration mto the last preserves of the Javanese meschant and anduitral class its suceess was limited. Increaungly the Chinese penetrated the ttwo choef remaining native industres, bank (a highly specalized indigenous process for affixing color deugm to cloch) and kretek (Indonesan cigarettes). Often, though an Indonesian remained nominally the owner of such enterpowes, a Chinese came to control them, and the former was merely "a vage slave in the servace of a Chinese creditor." im

Not only did the remmant Indoneuam entrepreneurial groups suffer from the now unimpeded competstion of the Chinese Equally daas trous to their survval was the drnappearance during the fist quarter of thun century of much of the andigenous village industry that had provided a large part of the economic opportunities which mourished these groups Much of vach sndustry and the trade arsing from it was destroyed by the heavy import of cheap, mass produced articles from the West and Japan **

Bearing in mind the fact that many mominally Indonesian otned industries were actually controlled by non Indonesians, purticularly Chinese, seme additional comprehenuon of the weak positson of the Indonesian entreprentursal group s given by the figures of a government survey showung ownershup of industries in Indonesua employing more than sex persons in tgzs Of all soch enterpries, z.816 were owned by Europeans, 1.16 bw Chonese, and only 86s by Indonesiam, Araln, and all other non Europeams and non Chunese com bined.

If one can speak of an Indonesian middle class, its entrepteneurial element had been almost elaminated by the circumstances attending three centurses of Dusch rule If the terem "muddle clas" can be used as pertaining to those nonarustocratic members of Indonesian society whose economic poution was well above the average. at can then be sand that the Indoneuan moddle class that exnted during the last two decadet of Dutch rule was peedomsnantly noncapetalistic It the term can be employed in an equally loose but more restricted sense as meaning all vuch elements whote income was not directly derved from agrs culture, it can be said that this middle claw was not only predominantly noncapitalntic, but that for the most part at consuted of salatied employees, most of whoen were cival servants

The last three decades of Dutch rule resulted in a rapid change in the ever all character of the tuny native middle class, its capitalnt element becoming smaller in proportion to a mew and soon much larger group made up ef government clerks, administrative officials (mostly of a jumior grade). and teachers, bating their positions on the newly available Western edocation, and in porticular on their command of the Dutch language. It is of importance to note that Western education revulted in almost no increase in the natse capetalst element. The educated elements of that group continued to be preponderantly educated in Islamic schools.

A goveroment survey in sgt8-sgag of usban sress showed that less than * per cent of Western educated Indonesians were self employed: over B3 per cent werked for wages (only 2.1 per cent of their employers beng Indoneuans), while the temander was unemployedThese figures, the survey noted, did not indicate that Western educatron was augmenting the economie development of matve society To the ex tent that at led to employment for Indoneuans st was to jobs with the Netherlands Indhes government and Western busness enterprise,s The opportunities opened up by the latter were, hovever, extremely lamated Of the Western educated (able to use the Dutch language) Indonesians employed n the olices of Western firms, only B16 Indonesiams received soo guulders ($4o) or more per month, and of these only ss6 were receving more than soo guilders (58e) per month. This compased woth 83 foregn crentals' (moutly Chanese) and 3.goo Europeans rectaang soo guilders or more per month, of whom z1s and t,841 respectively were rectiving more than soo guilders per month **

Most Wesuern educated Indonemans able to find employment found st in the government service Of the s3,a44 employment seekang Indo nesuans who had receved at least a primary education along Western lines, 45 per cent were an sgaß employed as civil servanes iu Sance only 75 per cent of all such graduates manoged to obtain jobs where the use of the Dutch language was requared,is thas meant that of those Indonetaans able to find employment where thesr educatson was umed about 6o per cent found it with the colonial government A somewhat clearer picture of the character of the Indonesan middle class is gauned by an inspection of income tax statstes for agas These indi cate that almost 55 per cent of the 4,or6 Indonesians assessed as having ncomes between 3,000 gualders ($1,200) and s0,000 gulders ($8,o00) vere cvil servants

us Holanduh Dalardch Osderwin Cammuse (Datch Natse Edecatse Coma un) Puthustian la Dr Werkgelegnhnd ve Nederiandrh Isde soor Nedmlendach Ép Öpa p a N d S of Dacd) (eleeden 1st) p 4

180 Ilsd

um Computed fron Egures appeining in shad, pp s8-tù

un Zbud, y vt Thene vas a loal of gé say ladenesan guadates frors uchool peas and 7224 forego enntale (abad, p 1s)

199 2hul , p 75

a Compused (roen Égares appeanitg in Mededertagrn ven Aet Castreal Lantoar voor de Siatonra, dg. Emge Buandsheden Brtegende ket Aantel Aangriagee in de lehomotbelutug en han Belttaar Juhomen aver het Joer Ity (Bolleton of the Crotal Borern of Statanas Gg Some Pamculars Cuncermong the Namber of Fenon Ammed in the Income Tas and Ther Aneuatle Inomes for the Yeay igas) (heltevreden agug)- p es (Thne figues exilade perees shone source of uncome foum ratire agucaliae The ancome tax was ast awesed on noeses demng fros tho smurce a laed tax an collected)

The development of this noncapitalistic sector of the Indonesian middle class got well under bay enly during the last two decades of Dutch rule and was made pousble through the antroduenon of Westers education, particularly secondary education and beyond "• The slow initial growth of such educational facilities is shown in Table 4.

Taßle Nt ustns or INDotsNs OBtare WEsTERs raccAov, 190-1gt? *

• Jloandh Ialandwh Onderwi Cromone, no n, Rrumt (Batasa, ost). pp.1-t3.

a Western primary education, 8,s55 in Mulo schools (Western education. grades 7-g). and 1.756 in all high schools. From these three types of schools respectively 7790, 1,s5o, and rão Indonesian ssudents graduated in aggo. It is important to note, as Indonesian nationalists certainly did, that in sgto high s.hoel education (that is, secondary education above the Mulo level) wa* sull largely reserved fer the European population, s.653 of the students in such schools being Europeans as against 1,786 Indonesians." Graduates of high school in Indonesia are listed in Table 5.

The establishiment in Indonesia of a technical college in sgig. a law college in agr4. and a medical college in sg:6, all open to Indonesians, created additional, though exceedingly tiny, channels for the develop

Tor Govermment seoodary education as given enlv in the Dutch language tn Thene fguem are mmputed trem zratntes appesing in Zuduch Ienizg, zy?, It. pp. tos, to. (Thos stacstscal abatract was put out pearfy be the Central Seataucal Burers ef the Department ef Emnomse Ataus ef the Netherlands Istes Gevernmmt)

Teble 3 RaczaL ORtzonn oF RItl scHooL CRADtATes*

•* Brogaana and Sonana, "Enkele Gegevens van Socaten Aand," of of, y dt

ment of an Indonesan muddle clas By sggo there were 63y Indonesians atteading the varous colleger, with s7 beong graduated in chat year,

At first Western educatson was available only to a few chuldren of the Indonesian snstocracy who were beung trasned for the top ranks of the native beanch of the cril service Thus as late as the school year agi#-igig, in one of the chref secondary schools, the Iaw school, all of the forty Indonesian students were sons of the mative anstoo racy a Dunng the First World War and thereafter secondary education became open to talent as well as to birth For Indonesian society thas appeoximated a small scale socal revolution By academic training and ability a man could rse in the civil serice to a rank close to that of regent (a group who conttnued to be recrunted exclusively from the top anstocracy). The social poution of these newcomers in Indonenart society tended to approximate thear heightened economic position Even in the Javanese peincipalities the princely nobility cortimenced to grant high socal posntuom to ntellectuals me It must be emphasized, however, that the socal mobility anduced by this new situation was Intated, owing to the fact that schooling for Indonesrans was not free and only the relatvely wealthy could affoed to educate their children in secondary schools or even in Western prmary schools to* Moreover, children of the aristocracy continued to be strongly fwored over others. The inselligent son of an aristocrat could usually gain admittance, while the equally inselligent son of a nonarntocrat, even though able to provide tustion, very frequently could not.

Expansion of thos new sector of the Indonetan muddle class was sharply limeted by the paucaty of secondary and higher educational opportunites open to at The government's announced furing polcy was that function must he dependent upon education, and few Indonesons were in a postion to apps for cval sersvice poutions higher than the rank of cterk So timited were the opportunites for an Indonesian to acquure a secondary education, much les a college educa ton, that fen were able to equp themielves to compete with the Netherlands trained and Indies irained Dutch and Eurastans "* Moreover, Indonesums who had the requred education for the jobs they sought found thu they were wbject to datcrsmination in favor of Dutch and Eurauan applicants Private enterprse ducrimimated against Enrasians as well as Indonesanms an favor of Dutch applicantt,"" whale in a number of departments the government's luring polies fas ored both the Eurauan and the Hollander over the Indonessan as the competition for its poutions became keener."

An extensive survey made by a government commission an the still prospetous years of 1grß-1gr9 ** showed thrt s5 per cent of all Indonesians who had graduated from Western schools were unable to find jobs where their education could be utilured Members of thus group found tbeir diplomas "devalued" and were enly able to get "jobs that were more on the periphery of economic life" with salaries well below those earned m jobs callang foe a knowledge of Dutch In private en terprise the increaud supply of Indonesians edocated along Western Iines forced down the wage scale of those Indoneuans employed by such concerns The commusion stated, "about twice as many pupés graduate woth a Western educataon as Jobs can be found for." It en visaged the stuation growong much worse and anticipated that even in prosperous temes over all government employment could not in crease more than a per cent yearly, whule instruction of the Indonesian popolation sn Western education was uncreasing at a yearly rate of 67 per cent Thus, it concloded that the "tempo of expanuon exeeeds the scope of socual developement"

The degree of economic devaluation of Western education and the dispanity betveen Western trained Iodonesians and jobs avadlable kept rapidly mcreaung Thus between sgzß and sgs the mumber of Indoneuans graduating from primary schools giving a Westeen educa tion was a,gßo and from secondary schools s98, whale the number of Indoneuats employed an the Class B civsi sesvsee category rose only from 4,8yz to 6,o54 and in Class C, che highest of the three categories, from go tozDee aan g thee wa some erease the number and peoportion of Indoneuans holding middle rank pon tions in the government service However, despite the decrease in attendant upon the government's retrenchment of expendituse during the deprestoon years, the disparity between government pobs open to Indoneuans and the Indontssans qualified to 6ll them contnoed to grow As late as October, sgo, out of the g,og higher rank crvil service positions only re1 were held by Indonesians 1at Indonesiams in 1g40 held soz out of the tg.1yz upper maddle cvil service positioms and 8.8go out of t4,r1a lower middle rank poutions These figures cannot be compared wath categurues B and C above, sunce sgz8 new categories were an use However, both stts of categories embrace the large majority of postion requunng a Western education A beeakdown of statat tcs relatng to government employment as of October sgg8 showed a dstrhution of the four civil sernice casegorzes as given in Table 6

Table d Crviu senuos rurtoveest (ay Pracevtace) *

• Brugmans ant Soenarsé op ei p €

†"Vnmlated Indonesan" rrars penom aumilatel to Ferepean legal eatus an

Except as teachers an ptisate schools there were almost no openings tathin Indontsan societs stself for Indonesuans with a Western eda cation The tremendous grawth in the number of highty nationalistic prnate Indonean "wild schools" during the last twents zears of Dusch rute is certainly related to ths tatuanon

Sote impretoon of the relatave strength of the nonagrculural Indonesian middle class as compared to sumslar groups among the Euto pean and Chinese poprulation as well as of the oser all pattern of the plural society that exnted in colontat Indonesia can be gained by an imspection of income tax statusics for tggg." as shoun in Table 7.

These statisties cleatly reffect the manutenes of the Indoneuan nonagricultural middle and upper classes in proportuon to the whole Indomesian population and their small suze in compurson with European and Chinese middle and upper-clats sectoes of the colonial society. Likewise, they suggest how few were the Indonesans, other than the remumang Dutch backed arstocratic elements and the handful of lange landholders, who on material grounds might be deemed to have an anterest in the mamtenance of the colonia) status quo. Fimally, they help explain the Indoneuan's growing conviction that economic postuom un coloncal rocety was determined along ethnic lines.

Teble , Iscauz rax mixmnnes. 9

• Icduseliag zpje, Viit, -ge Of tdhe Earopean pepulatson es8 nig wete Necher lander (of whan mere than halt wene Eurauana), é ssy wete Germit, 7 is wert Inpusese (he mimon ol Eusepean beng legl statat), * 4i4 ese Brnach Ot the The last cosplatad censes was that of sgga

+ The wige zoome (d those reteming total anomet of less (han gos gildes kan rot ratpect to (he mense tax Tha valae ot tre goddet (er fiona) was US 4o centa oe Bbtnh 17 If

Genesis of the Indonesian

Nationalist Movement

IT HAS often been noted that political frentsers tend to establsh national conciouineu, and it in certain that the atbotrary frontier delineating the area of Dutch polstural control in the East Indies wat decisive in determining the boundaties of the Indoneua whuch absorbed the attention of Indoneuan nationvlists Dutch admunistration welded together peoples ol sarious tongues and cultures into one political unit and in so doing tended to develop in them a "conscioutness of kind." Therely the Dutch helped pin the archupelago's many local piriotiums together snto ene all embracing patrotum Thereby they helped open up one great chinnel unto whuch the many Iocalbased antagonnms and grevances resulung from contact wrth the alien ruler could flou-a channel snto whoch the countless tatle currents of local disnatislaction could merge and maintain themmelves in collectivity, rather than doupote themelves sungly un the sands ol their own isolated parochialiem

However, the geographical lemits of the territney of Indonesian nationalism were not exclusively determined by the boundaries of Dutch political control. Prior to the coming of the Dutch, Indonesia was no mere geegraphical expression. To an important, though subsidiary, extent these limits wese desermined by the fact that the area administered by the Dutch was roughly congruent with the two great Indonesian empires of the ninth and fourteemth centuries, Shrivijaya and Majapahat * Moreover, the tradition of thos mighty past was important also in the development of the communaty pride that is bane to the development of mationalam In thus respect, the awareness of former political mght as exemplified by the area controlled by Indo mesian states of the post and such ancidents as the defeat of Kublas Khan's anvading army by the Javanese, along with remembeances of past cultural głory ruch as Shrivijaya's havang been an anternational center of Buddhust studies, were all umportant

One of the most mportant factoes contributing to the growth of an integrated nationalam was the high degree of religious homogenesty that prevailed en Indonesia, over go per cent of the population being Mohammedan As the nationalnt movement spread out from its origi nal and principal base on Java to the other islands of the Dutch controlled portion of the archupelago. the parochral tendencies that mught oeherwise have become strong among thear communities tended to be counteracted because of the solidarnty unduced by a common religion

The Mohammedan religaon was not pust a cotmon bond, it was, indeed, a stet, of im group symbol as against an alien incruder and oppressor of a different religion Thus Wertherm states: "One can, stdeed, sustain the poradox that the extension of Islam in the Indonesan archupelago was due to the Westerners" The arrsval of Portuguete power in the area, he says, "induced a large number of Indonesian princes to embrace the Islamoc fasth as a political move to counter Christuan penetration " * The subiequent smpengement of Dutch power undoubtedly sustained, if it dad mot actually accelerate, the latter stages of this process

1 Shrtipyé at uts heught eueted varyeg degrees of crtrel over most of (he Indas, the Sosth China Ses, part of Inda and waged socermful wams aganst Cam hoda Ses Vakke, ep ed, pp yo-ga Maapalat, basel os East and Central Jass Ehoagh not emetrolling West Jave contralled alnost all the zest of the Indim (m cladeng Noth Beneo) and Malays as well The hand headed French colonnl ad monutnr and observer of Dusch paley Boospuet, espretted hn agrersest voth Soouck Hargaaje that ledoneus is mame dan à gregraphical expremon and gons os 4o rermink There is hstencal relaton bevees sa difermt part It a ant mendy an acodent that che Nethertands Indres ao we know them mnclode almost extdy the terniory of the Hindu kyngdany of Madppabet ot the tme of is most estensene prutt in the 1qth cemtory (G 11 Boaagut, 4 French Fate of ühe Nether avd Isdet, tr frem the Fresdh by Pnlip E Litantbut [New York and London, 1H01, 19 30-31)

Another important integrative factor was the development of the Iingus franra of the Indies, baraar Malay, snto a national language, racending the bazaar and sersing wth Mohammedanism to break an parochral penchants in Indonesian natsonalism. To an imporit extent thus happened becasuse the Dutch frequently used Malay an ninistration, some of them snsisting that Dutch prestige and the lonesian's feeling of mfertority could best be maintained by refus- ; to allow hum to use Dutch in addresung a Netherlander In sgg8, unquet observed "The real truth is that the Dutch deured and still ure to establish thesr superiority on a basus of matis e sgnorence The : of Dutch dimimuhes the gap between snferior and supersor-and s must be asosded at all cots' • He concluded

opposung him [the Indoneuan] wth a language ntended in mark the dnke which sets hom apart from the European the Dutch have sttwen and stll ne, though vainly, to deprove thest ward of contact wath the outude wntld Sinte the Dunch did not allow the use of theur language to spread befote borth of natonalhsm, natomalnts now employ Malay as a weapon against tch influenteThey believed themmelves to be foegung a chain foe their jecta, tut they are mow shat they have given hom a »eapon, shat termbile chological weapon, a common national language wath whuch to expeen ur cormmon natuonal aspurations *

In addition, the integratson of Indoneuan natsonalsm is generally tognized to be to some extent indebted to the exstence of the lksraad (People's Council), the top representatve council for all donesia. In beinging together Indoneuans from varaous parts of the :hipelago and making them more aware of their common probnm and common relationshep with the Dutch, this body tended to velop in them a more conscious unoty whuch integrated their nationism roore closely.* The degree of the Volkaraad's mportance in the velopment of organized natsonalism is somewhat harder to deterine* Established in tgs, with purely advisory powers, the Volksraad vas in iga7 granted co legualatave powers weth the Netherlands appomted Governor General. Prncipally because of the latter's ight of veto, however, this power was not of great consequence." Actually, the Volksraad was chiefly a soundung board, useful to the government in determining the viewes of the Netherlands Indies communsty, It provoded linuted merns for thme Indoneian nationalists who were mem bers of it to educate the Inerate publie in the more moderate aima of the nationalist movement and to keep a number of nationalist grev ances before its eye However, during most of the period of the Volksraad's exustence, the majuryty of the amportant nationalist leaders re fused to wock through it Its membershup usually represented the varws of a minonty of the natuonalist movement, and many of its Indomenan members aimed openly no hogher than limited self government to be reached by an evolutionary process on the bases of co-operation with the government

In any case, the Volksraad was not an anstitution designed to pro vide contact between the natsonalist Jeaders and the masses. The me chanics of the indirect electorat process leading to its membershup effectively prectuded thos powibihty Whether or not, as some Indo neuans allege, antmodation by Dutch cvil and police officers played a part in the latter stages of the undurect electoral process whereby the to per cent of the Indonesan population allowed to vote chose ats 957 electors, it as certain that these electors dad not have full freedom of selection Foe the selections were mot made by them alone, bet in conjunction wish si5 Indonesan electors appounted by the government This method of election may partually explain why eleven of the nineteen elected Indoneuan members of the suxty man Volkoraad were active or retred and penuoned government officials*

Finally, the growth and spread of mationalum was contiderably abested by the means of idea dissemunition previded by the de velopment of a vernacular peess and the radio, as well as by the great increase in the geographucal mobility of people and sdeas whuch was a conequence of the twenueth century pittern of economae orginiza tion in Indoneua and the transportation facilities wlch it entasted

The beginnings of Indoneuan nitsonalsm cannot be prerively or even roughly dated Its clearls artculate and organzed phse begin enly in the second decade of the twenneth centurs, but many of ats most essental constituent elements go bwk much further, some probahly to the perod when the smpet uf Dutch vule was first fels It might be argued that Istent nationalisms of an embryonoc character have extted within the chiel Indonesuan socoeties sunee then and that thear actne manfestation was kept so long in abesance primarihs because of lzck of leadership, their traditonil arstocracoes refusung to be udenufied with them since their personal umerests were best served by supporting the Dutch On most of the few occauons when the Indoneuan ars tocraey did asert stielf agtunst Dutch rule, at found a reads and strong support from the Indoneuan peasantry

However, the structure of colonsal society was such that the peasantts. without the guidance of an indigenous elite, was generally unable to understand the relatsonshup between its deversorated poution and Dutch power. Interposed between it and that power stood the traditional Indonesian arinocracy by wluch it remasned governed, albest more thoroughly and harshly than before The politucal buffer between the Dutch and the Indonesuan masses provaded by thus aristoctacy was matched by the baffer an economse relationshops provuded by the ars tocracy and the Chonese jointly and subnequently ty the Chunese alone. By virtue of their indirect politscal rule and unditect econousc esploitation, the Dutch for three centuries were able to avond collsion wsth the teaction and opposstion of the gentral Indoneuan population to the conditions for whuch an an ultimite sense the Dutch were responsble. Indonesian opposition was almost entsrely absorbed by or vented upon the indigenous aristocracy, the usible rulers, and upon the Chinete, the visible economic exploiters Wath the abandonment of the Cultivation Syseem these huffers were gradually broken down. However. they never entirely dnappeared, despute the postical education of the masses atirmpted by the new Indonesian leadership that began to emerge pust before the Frst World War

With the replacement of the indirectly adminstered system of econome explostaton of the Cultivation System by the direcily admitistered system of free enterpeise which succreded it, considerable sectors of the agrocultural populatuon began to come anto ammedate contact with Dutch persons and Dutch economie power At first on the sugar plantatsons in Java and later on the plantationa of Sumatre, when Javanese labor replaced Chunese contract coolhes, large numbers of Indomeuan peasants came to develop some comprehension of these sub ordinate and dependens econorme position vas à vis the Dutch In perods of econemie crim and unemployment thua discernment tended to become sharper A clearer understanding of colonal economics, or at least a more acute awareness of the disparity in economic welfare between the Dutch and the Iodonessan populaton, was developed among the osù field workers, railway men, and the urban laborers whose mumbers began to expand rapodly durang and after the Fiest World War

In general, the mcreaung eroion of rottmunalnte relatiomhipi and the concomitant emergenee ef indivadealstic social crientations developed a receptuvity among the peasantry to nationabistie adens that would not have exnted had their horrons contneed to be Iimoted to the intrmeruve communal village This peceptivity was, of course. greatest among workers on plantations and amng those landlem, securty provided to such elements by the village an the post World War I depresuon and the tonger depresson of the sggo's greatly miti gated the economie datress they would ochervise have encoumered and chereby tended to counteract the growth of a mure mulitant type of natonalnm among them On the other hand, they came back to the haven of the village as proselytzers of the nattonalistoc adeas that their experrence outside had already developed an them, adeas stall somewhat smehoate but much stronger and more precise than the embryotuc of even latent mationalistic concepts of the villagers

With the abandonment of much of the structure of andirect govern ment an Java and parts of Sumatra that followed the ending of the Cul tivation System and the large ncrease of Dutch personmel in the (ivel service, the Indonesian's awareness of political control by the Dusch was heightened To an ncreasing extent he became conscious of the relatuonshop between Dutch pover and the eronomue and politt cal conditions which he was expeuencing Particulatly was thus true after sgoe, when Dutch eavil servants—frequently altristar and realous tor the welfare of the Indoneuan, but otten overls paternalatic came into deect contact with the villige and sought to introduce re forms Is methods of "genile pressare' depending ultomatels on eco nomic sanctions or actual foree I qualls umpottant in developung the peasont's awarenen of bn subordmation to Duteh potser and arousing his antipathy to st was the meseaveng burden of momey taxes demanded of hum ty the government

The peasamiy s frequent nrgatse veattion to thos change in the pat tern of poltiral control over at tas often strong and at first spontaneout sothout peompting bs the emerging nationalist teadershup Its acts of protest, both soolent and nonvsolent were not un a strnt sense manifes tations of nationslum But thes ded represent a polstirs of protest agzinst the Dutch Indies gmernment whch nationaltt leadens soon undertook to esplost, attempting to direct these energies anto more clearly nationalstic channels

One of the best examples of soch spontaneous peavant protest os fur nnhed ly the Saminist movement, which began about s89o in the Blora area of northeast Moddle Jasa By tgo7 when the government arrested and exiled Samun and eight other peasant leaders the movement entolled gooo famly hetds Thereafter it continued to spread, and, though in general relving on pawive resstanre to governmental autbority, led to serious disturbances in 1o1; un the Pats area 1hese the guvemment had to put down with armed force, and the leader of the reustance, Pak Karuph, was exuled in October, 1g17."

The esvential character of the Saminst movement was the desire of de peasants to be left free to lead their oun lves unmolested by gonernment interference and to seturn to a communalistsc social organi ration boted upon the economic equality of indnuduals and upon possesion of the land and sts products in common As it progressed the movement developed snereasingly anarchastie tendencies, many mem bers refused to pry taxes or to perform corve or the multitude of new legally teqaired village servites, and all members songht to avond ons contart with the government's employees According to the govern ment imvestigston of ig17, the chiel grievances of the Saminists were the obligation to pay a head tax, the introduction of new land ta regu-

1 I Sctoeke, Dr tedlandache Poltek (Amuendam sgag) p? (t-15 Irela Farde iae Nederlenduch Indir (md et, The Hague and Ledem, sgg) art "Sam aome," 111, 685-681 latons and later increaie in that tax, slaughtering taxes, and the host of new and enforced dutues—desugned to benefit them but not so apprecated by them—whoch the government's Ethical Pohey after sçoo progresuvely demanded. (These new duties included taxes to support the establishment of village banks, schools, night watchmen, bull studs, and arrigation regulations, as well as serrender of land for the support of the village schoolteather, and foeestry regulatons making procurement of tradstional wood requarements mese difficult.)

The govermment's anvestigation of the cruses of the movement is nstructive in dhat the condutions it found responsible for the attitudes of the pemant followers of Samon were also responsible for roughly umular, though les artuculate and more pasuve, atutudes on the part of much of the Indonestan peasantry at the time It is also enlightening to note the mamy basnc sumlaritves between the conditions provoking the Saminist movement and thore whuch later government unvestgavons found to have wnderlam peasamt ruppot ed the Communut led rebellions of 1g26-sgz7 an Java and the West Coast Reudeney of Sumatra

Tramlation of the peasantry's gnevances and snereased pohtical consciousness anto an articulate nationslrsm awaited only the emergence of a nationalist Indonesian elite to lead at This elite the Dutch themselves were largely—though uncontciomly—responuble for producing The preoccupaton of the Dutch wath the dangers of Pan Isfam caused them to underestimate the dangers to thesr regime inherent in the Islamic Modernist movement," while the weapon woth which they chore to fight Pan Ihfam—Wesserm education—soon developed a sec end edge whoch cut the other way It as the supreme rony of Dutch rule that the means chosen to defend the colonial regime from the everrated threat of Pan Islam developed unto one of the most posent of the forces undermuning that regame.

In retrespect it seems surprising to find Snouck Hurgronje, the outstanding Dutch authoraty on the Mohammedan religion and ats prac tace in the Indres,a regreing an ages that the apparently munaoory

17 Ar Chat tome be vas Counadlar for Nanse Affaet to the Nethertands Meatry of Colonus

Pan Iilamic movement " was "not counterbalanced by a powerful national sentiment among the natives ..."" For, given the advantage ef hindight, it seems clear that the Mohammedan religion in Indoresia, and the Pan Islamie movement in particular, had absorbed and become energized by the very national sentiment which Snouck Hurgronje sought."

The Mohammedan religion did not pasuvely abnoeb ampuhes of a nationalast character. It came to prenade the earloest channel of de velopment of modern, mature Indonesian nationalism, a channel hich is still of great smportance The unique character of the Mo hammedan religion profevved by most of the go per cent of the Indonesian populataon of that fasth helped make thes posuble Probably in no other Monlem country does one find the hugh degrre of religsous talerance, lack ef bigotry, and openness to new sdeas that one finds in most of Indonesia In Java, at least, thet is pirtly due to the fact that Islam has wsually been only a relativels thun frostung on top of thick cakes of Hindu-Duddhum and the older indigenous Javanese mytichim But there and throughout most of the rest of Mohammedan Indontsia this also arises from the fact that-unlke the sutuation in the Near East-the Moslem religion his not been tied in with either the poltical er the secio-economic order or interpreted so as to maintain their stetus quo.

Thus the Modernist Islamic teachungs as they developed during the finst decades of this century in Cairo found a responie in Indonesia out of all proportion to that whoch they elicsted in other Ilamoc countries Danger to Dutch ascendancy in the Indies came not so much from the Pan Islamme ideas that Indomesias students at Mecca brought back with them, of vbich Snouck Hurgronje and the Netherlands In des Government were so much afraud, as from the Modernnt Islamue ideas being taught in Cairo, in particular those stemming from the teaching of Mohammed Abduh *

The Abduh movement emterged to promunence about the turn of the century and has contamued as a potent force ever since. Islam, is followens " beheved, could be defended only by sheir understanding Western knowledge and methods and the reasons for the progress of the West, whule punfying the Mohammedan religion of ats accumulated corrupe and superstutious influences and practices Moslem hugher education was to be reformed by incluuon of study of the modern sciences, European hustory, and Chratianity, Pohitical and socal justice vere emphouzed This emphasus quate naturally renforced the already asakened nationalnt feelings harbored by vts adherents

It was the tmportant Al Manar branch" of the movement, with ats attempt "to restate the principles of Islamic ethics in terms of socal values" a and its particular conoern for social and political justice, whoch exercosed the chuef attractson for Indoneuans At least, they so interpreted its emphaus As Manarist ideas filtered down to Indonesia, at first pronespally through members of the communalstically orsented Menangkabou society of west centeal Sumatra, therr natsonalstst content took on strongly ant imperalst overtones, and in general they were so snterpreted as to render them more easily reconcilable wich socialst economue principles than appears to have been the case in any other Islamit country

Though gradually the government became alerted to the danger of the Modernist movement in general and hanned much of sts Iiterature, its initiat and domumant concern twas with the threat to the politt eal status quo that it believed Pan Ilam constituted. Snouck Hurgronje's astesment of the problem and his advice at to ats solu. tion wete particularly influential in determining the government's polcy, and at is therefore worth whole to note them in some detail Spezking in sgss, he observed that Indoneuans then studying in the international Mohammedan mulieu of Mecca were absorhunz Pan Islamic adeas "whuch can maåe their dispoution tomards the European admanntration of thesr fatherland unfasorable " Happuls, he continued

These gerrs of fanatixsm becorse completelv developed among onls a minor sty of the Indoneuans wbo studs on Arabss No one has so far found the means of stopping tus fow The only procedure whuh can be recommended is slow and endirect It consests in anfuenong the chatarter of the natves in anost er drection All that deselops the educaton of the people can serve it Each step of the natne along the path of our culture leads hom awar frors the deure for the polgtumage

By giving the Indonean population, at least sts elite, a Western edu cation, it would be turned away from the path of Islam toward cultural anociation wah the Duteh, and thus would "remove all political and wxal significance fron the difference of religion " If thes association were not made, he held, "the nevatable umpulhe of the covaltatson of the Indonesians," would be. "to move further and further away from us, for then others than we will control the direction of their antellectuat evolution." " Whale providing the Indonesians with a Western education, the government was to control Mohammedan education, watching againt all Pan Islamic propaganda, and be "completely antramugent" against admivuon of all political elements of Mohammedan doctrine and law."

Snouck Hurgronje partscularly emphauzed that these Indoneuans who acquired a Western education should be guaranteed posstzons an the service of the state worthy of their educatson "In multaplying the epportunities for natives of supersor development," he held, "the gos-

"hd,p 1 ément mt ree te d o fuc s a to ree a large part to the natives of modern culture " If his suggestiom were fully carrled out, Snouck Hurgronje antscspated that:

The Pan Ilamse ades, whuch his not yet taken a great hod on the native xtnteeracy of Jasa and the other nlandh, will love all chance of exntence wrthun thas milieu, when those who compose it have became the free auociates of our cv ration f it then happens that a part of the mdions of natve Indonesans. whose daly labor as amall peasants does not permt thesr spints to ne above the level of theer fields of nice, find themelven attsched by the epidemae of Pan Islamsm thesr compatron, who hase become our amocaaten and equals, woll themelves have the greatest inserest to wand off thas menacing danger In order to emancapate the other clames from the Islamic creed, it is only a question of tame, vethout applcaton of force, of we knos how to enlarge hberally our polrtical and national frontuers(We add that at will ala furnish, in other rexpects the solution of the problem of futere relations berween the popelaton of the Indontsun archupelago and the mother country) Frots the point of vare of general polituca, it in to our vutal interest not to wint until unexpected curcumstances corepel us to gise that whach we can grant to the Indoneuanm solentanly and in the form which seems to us the best.a

Cogen Snouck Hurgrone's des were, they were enly patally carroed out, and the results he antscspated were only partally achueved The speead of Pan Islamoc sfeas was largely checked, but the government was not successful in keeping out all politocal elements of Moham medan teachang Modernist poltucal and social ideas entered the country and exerted a tremendous infuence, finally mamofesting themselves in the fiest powerful Indoneuan natonalut movement, the Sarekat Islam It was the nationalstie, anti mpenaint, and socalotcally in chaned program of this movement, rather than the ideas of Pan Islam, which was the "epodemic" that attacked so consoderable a part of the Indonesian population

However, undouboedly the most important reason for the nonfulfilment of Snouck Hurgronje's expectations was the government's faslure to carry out hn recommendation that Indonesuans to whom it provaded a Western education be gearanteed an important place an the service of the state Many of those who were given such posts upheld his theus and did tend to adentify themselves with the coloneal political order.

Pottuqur Musalmane de lo Hollamde, po 150-1z:

But the targe majarity of Western edurated Indonessams were esther given posts which they felt to be snfersor to thesr educatonal training or were unable to get governmental er any other employment where their training was utilsred It twas thus group whoch was to emerge as the chief force behund the Indonesan natuonatst movement and whuth soon prodoced leaders much mo-e numerons than tho-e coming from the slightly older Modernst Islamie root of dhe nationalist movement

In conjunetion with, but to a much greater extent than, the Modern ist movement in Islam, Western edocatson was responuble for the development of a nes Indonesan elite. the mterests of whtch were at variance with colomal rule (In addition, the tendenes was for Indomeuans of strong Vohammedan cons artiets who recened Westem edu cation to be attraeted to the Modernist movement ) Thus new elite was a dissatisfied elite, and at was endowed wath Western and Modernist Islamie social and polstical sdeas whoch could not be harmonired with colonial social and pelitical relationmhups With sts emergence the Indonesian mases were provoded with what thes had so long lacked, and what the traditional Indoneuan aristocratic elte had not given them— political teadership.

Under the impetus of the counsel of Snouck Hurgronje and his numerous following among liberal circles in the Netherhndt, and because of the demand for cheap clerical help by the government and private enterprite in the Indies, Wetern education was increasingly made available to Indoneuans during the first four decades of this century, though the number allowed accen to st. particularly at the secondary level and above, remasned extremely small Even the student who limited his reading to the currcutum could not help noting that the dominant strain in the Dutch national udeology was independence from outside control and found it hard not to see a parallel between an upholder of Duteh power in the Indres, such as Van Heutr, and the Duke of Alba. Likew ise he found st diffcult, vn vew of Dutch nawonal history, to understand why the history books on Indonesia which he was given painsed Duponegoro and other leaders of resistence to the Dutch as worthless traitors and selfish opportunists A targe number utilued their command of the Dutch language to explore extracurricular subjects, especially of a political nature, many of those receising a secondary or higher education being strongly attracted to the writings of Rousieau, Locke, Mazzini, Sorel, and the Utopian and Marxist socialists Their dominantly Western channel of approach to poltical and social problems is emphaured by the fact that the attention given to Sun Yat sen, Gandho, and Tagore, though amportant, was mech less

In general, the social and political sdeas of the West justified, garbed with authorsty, and greatly ntenufied the broadly socal impulse of Indonesuans to resut pohtical and economic subjection and explorta ton by the Dutch In a uemlar manner these sdeas reacted upon their more vubgective and andvidual desires for dignity and aviertion of equahty agaimt the numb feeling of infersonity that subjection to alhen domutation had developed in them

The long unculkated idea that the Indonesian was infersor to the Netherlander and needed his guidance and protection was rapidly eroded not only by Western political ideas, but lékewse by the peli tical events in Asra that roughly paralleled the introduction of Western education and whuch aho aflected large numbers of people not exposed to it The struggle of the Filipinos agamat Spaun and the early American ocrupaton, the succenes of Kemal Ataturk against Western milt tary power, the actrities of the Congress party an Indra, the rsing tide of ant: Western Chinese nationalism especially as repeesented by Sun victory over Russa—all combined to make the Indonesians doubt that they were snfersor to the Dutch or unable to govern themselves without Dutch help **

The few Indonesean students able to study in the Necherlands were strongly infloenced by the political conditiom as well as the polstical adras which they encoontered there The eoil libertues and democratic government which they found in Holland contrasted so sharply with conditions in Indoneua that they were bound to make a strong impresson on these stodents Lakewse, they could mot fasl to be ampresed by the fart that up uneel sgag the only polstical party whach advocated complete andependence for Indoneua was the Communut Party Later, equally tmpressive for them was the fact that gradually thereafter the Dutch socralists (Social Democratie Party) came out for andependence rather than limted self-government as they had pres:ousdy advocated, while in sgg5 the Communnt Party, as part of ss over all Unted Front poliey, took a stand aganst independence and supported the Dutch

The former head of the Netherlands Indies govemmene s Departasent of Patde Irnmnacmas wrote et sgt It an abese all saace the wer between Japan and Rama. tat the aden that an Artnt pepefaton can govere melf wothout the semsiy ef one Eatepa hn penetrud" J IH Abendinon, La Indias neerlandear (Vladud. 1501) p à government. The Communest Party undertook to justify ats volteface by what seemed to many Indonesian ntellectuals to be a specious and hypocritical ratonaliration, namely, that an ndependent Indonesa would be too weak to wilstand the adsance of "Japanese Im pervalost Tascism"

The appeal of Lenmist Markasm was especally strong. for to many it alone seemed to pout a satslactory solution to the antitheus pre sented by Western polstical concepts of liberts and equality and West ern colonralhsm Of partcular unfluence were the writings of Bukhun and Lenum concerning imperalnm, and to them the handful of Indo neuan students able to studs an contimental I urope was especally at tracted Had thes been able to stody an Fngland thev might rather have looked primarily to Hlobson, for their attras toon to Marxism was pre domnanty because of its ant umpernals coment Indeed, as events vere to prove, the maporits appenrched at un an extremely eclertit manner * The hugh degree of religaous and politsco-ufeologscal toler ance possessed by many Indonestans allowed many sincere Moham medans to develop a working syntheus of smportant conststuent elements of Marxun and their religion The noncapatalnt bockground of the overwbelmong majonty of Indonesuan secondary and college stu dents meant that on perional, material grounds they were not alienated by the socialist economues of Marxnm Very few had any sested snterest in capitalam The only smportant development of caputalum in Indonesia was an the colonial ecomomic sphere, the benefits of whoch, they were consinced, completely by pased them and their famlies

Capitalum and mperialien were to them equated, and hostility to imperalum qute naturally entailed hostility to caputalum.

In addition, the convicoron was common among educated Indoneuans that any future poltocal andependence would mean little unless accompanued by economuc andependence In a socrety where almost all capital was possessed by nonindigenous elements it was essential, they felt, that the government of an undependent Indomeua control economuc life and operate crstical sectoes of the economy. Even among those who dod not comuder themselves to be socialists, most agreed that, unce there were virtually no Indonestan capitalist class and no Indoneuan caputal accumulation, it would necessarily devolve upon any future gosernment of thear own to fill much of the economie void that the Indonesian's lack of trainang and caputal left. Moreover, as we have seen, of those obtaining a Western education who were able to find employment utilizing st, three fourths worked as government employees, a type of employment unlkely to engender hostility to socralnt ideas Also the ever ancreaung number of Western educated Indonesians unable to find employment that utilaed their educatiom could not eauly avosd begetting nationalistuc reactions huving a strongly socialntic con tent

But apart from the adeological onentation which at induced, the mest important consequence of Western education was un doubtedly its development of an indigenous elite whach colonial society could zot absorb—an acutely dmatisfied, cramped, and frustrated elte For enly a small pruportion of thoie Indontstans equopped with Western education were able to get jobs commenurate wath their trastong and ability. A majority expersenced sharp discontent because the poutions they obtained were in ferior to what they were convenced their qualdfications enutled them. The conviction that diuserminatory employment polces were responsible for grving the better positions to Netherlanders and Eurastans increased the betternes A substantal minority were un employed or forced to accept infernor positions requring no Western training, and that group esperenced even greater dncontent Finally, * group of consoderable sue, embittered because unsuccessful un finding employment wth ether the government or Western busmess enterprise, led a precarious economee exostence as poorly paid teachers in the numerous strongly mationalnt Indonesian private schools which burgroned largely becouse of this group's econome plight Thereby was developed a propagater of Indoneuan nationalum, and eften of socialitt deas as well, the potency of whuch has generally been unnoticed or underettimated

Aside from this widespread and basue dosatisfaction there were a number of other grievances important in nouzvshung Indonetian na tionalism. These were not confined to the Western educated myonty of the new Indoneuan znteligentsia and the maniscule Indoneuin moddle cla, but were held by these groups as a whole, as well as hy most whate collar workers and the more politically concsous anel bet ter edocated sectors of the rapodly growing skalled labor element Of mubntantal zmportance was the social decrimonation whoch many Netherlanders and kurauons peartwed toward Indonevans and the blatans attstode of saperiorsy whuh some of them mandested taward the latter even theugh the tormer s educatiomal lrieigrounds, manners, and ablities were, as Colign temarked, edten quite mferior " Despoe some mitigation, this daerimination and attutode of superiorsty contimped to be unportant in generating nationtlstse feelings as late a5 1919

A contenual source of grievance was that pudicral admunstration and penal legislation dncriminated sharply agaanst Inloneuam Ihe courts to whuch they had aceess were of much poorer qualaty than those pro vided for the European populatson, and, because of the purucipation of extcutve officers in them, ofßered much ltss protection. Whereas legally trained judges sat in the cours for Eusopeans, Indontsusns were forced to rely on courts hall of whose members combuned both exeeutive and legat funetuons, tho of the members beong actove or retired (and penuoned) members of the Indoneuan atdmenistratve cisil sersice. Indonesians, as opposed to Europeams, could be held an jail under "preventive detention," even though no judicral authorization had been made.

Discrimimation in the economoe sphere was of greater and more widespread importance. The new Western educated elte in particular. but also educated Indonesians in general, felt strongly that the paucity of jobs and the few good posntions open to thens in the casal service and pravate enterpriuse wete a result of employment practices which diy criminated agaanst Indonesuans Almost every Indonesian nationalnt expetienced the bitterness and frustration born of thas realstation. Typocal of this was the expenence related to the wnter by an Indomeuan successful in pawing the examination for entrance to a government school leading to muddle-rank cvil service poutons. In s939 there were poo Indonesians and soo Dutch (including Eurauara) who took the examnation for entrance to the school Twentyahree Dutch and 3 Indonesans were accepted He later dneovered that 15 of the Dutch applicants knes before the exammatson that they had been accepted and that a quota of 3 had been set for Indonesrans His dis covery of this, he felt, was one of the events in hs life most important in turning him into a nauonaliet

Indonesian asporants for profesional posstuons bere keenly aware of the efforts of Netherlanders to monopolze these poutions and the government's cumphance wath the oppoution of Dutch profesuonal men trying to avoid Indontuan competition The lawyers were able to resne the projected opening of a law school in sgog and the Medical Assocation the opening of a ssedical school in igis, soch schools being establshed only in sgz and sgad, respectvely However, the lawyers contanued to male Indoneuan competation difficult To get a degpee from Bataua Law School it nat necemary to study five years as against three ot four in Holland, and the school was comidered by Indonesians to be more difficult than Dunch law schooh

Acute dusatisfactuon developed becruse of the Joner rate of pay of Indoneuan government employees in comparson wsth Dutch and Eurasuans doung sumalar work For unstanee, in the Indonesian branch of the covil service those who had passed the clerkship examination (kleme ambtenser) started at s5 guilders per month, while Europeama (mostly Eurasians) possung the same ecamination started at 6o guilders in the European branch Sumulaaly an the army, Indonesian prisates recaned esther 15 or z5 guilders per month (the latter sum af they came from the Chratsan areas of Ambon, Menado, and Timer), while prnvates who were Netherlanders or Eurassans receised 6o guilders

Probably the most tadespread graevance was that resultang from the very limated educatioral facilities pronded Indonesans and the fact that ao large a proportion of such facditues was reserved for European children" Parturular bittermess was felt ever the fact that while almost all Indonesians (except for a meager handful able to ob tain scholarships) had to pay substantsal turtson fees, Dutch and Furasian chuldren were tustion frre unles the yearly sncome of their pirents was more than t,roo gtulders " Nationalst sensitivaties were forther zroused by the unofical but widely known gmernment attitule thit began to develop during the rogons thit too much education was politically dangerous and that Western edo ation, especally secondary education, should be curtatled at least to the pont where the colomil economy could absorb all those indis udual who recenved at Ihus Coltyn in 1gzß saw n the qus& growth of Western education foe Indo neuans "a danger for the peaseful developmeut of the course of af farrs in Indonesia Such education bud been too much expinded, he felt, and should be latoted to the poont where the andigenous economy itself (as opposed to employment with the government and Wesern enterprise), could absorb at *

Fimally, note must be taken of the fact that during the 1st twenty fise years of Dutch rule an uncreaung comvietion develeped among poltically conscious Indonesians that theer country was besng milked by the Dutch Some, particularly those under the nfluence of Com munist indoctrination, conceived of this as a sumple syphoning off of Indonesian wealth to Dutch coffers Others admitted that Dutch capital developed the over-all economy in a manner whoch provsded some incidental benefits to Indoneuans but mauntained that their benefit was miniscule compared to that of the Dutch Moeeover, they main tained that ths capetal had been for the most part originally created by the tribute levies on Indoneua mherent in the Company and Cultivation systems. Regardless of the estent of their understandang of the colonial economic system that operated in Indonesia, most were cognrane of certaan avaslable economme facts wluch gasned an everwidening currency and uhuch sended uncreasingly to be given a polti cal interpretation Promunent among these was the wade margin of exports over amports The value of Indonesa's imports and experts in priwate trade (merchandine) in guilders ($-4=) is shown an Table 8.

Table & Valce of neports ato exroats *

• Irdoch Fentog, eays, Il, p siz Thee figures mdade mendhandse esperta rs posate erede ontr They do not tichude coued and enmsed gold and sher shipmeus ao prrrase trade er for gremmest aooust, and they do vot sudode mer chandus dupmemts fer govemiest aowees. Such emparts and mmpone were negh ghle en cotiperim wih prwate trade expora and umperts un merchandue ind dmeoge the over all poedtale sery lattle

Also zmportant were the prace diffemential betseen the goverument rubber monepoly's prce to European and Indonesian growers,a" the hezvy tax burden borne by the Indonesan populatson and its greater relatise uncrease as compared to that borme by European ressdents of Indonesia.»" and the hogh percentage (zo per cent accondang to gevermment estutanes) of Indoneua's wealth that went to non Indonesiana"

Opposed to the grneth of Indoneuam mationatisto—and to the po Iiteal and social rnolutaon for whuch it came to stand-were a num ber of factors whch in thert eombnatuon were eflectise un limiting its growth and paev enting the foece it was able to muster danng the pernod of Dutch rule from rraching its objectives. One of the most ampertant of these factors was the general system of underect rule which, through a multipioity of patterms, the Dotch applied to the difieremt areas of Indonesa and whoch. Rupert Emersen observed in sg57, served "as a highty efficient desace fer breaking up and segregatng potentzal na tienalist movements and at somethung of a moral justification for demying the clasms to poner of the more advanced elements of native socoety.""

Even in the areas formalls dengnated as "directly ruled" (93 per cent of Jasa and somewhat less than half of the rest of Indonetia), the formula of indrect rule, though less thorough than presoutly, continued through the last decades of Dutch rule to be of great smportance In these areas the upper ranks of the Indometuan arstoeratit luerarchy (in Java the regents and to a lesser estent their princspal subordinates. the Wedonos and Assntant Wedonos) during this period had lout many of their poners and much of thesr effectiveness as instruments of andirect rule. However, the lowest strata, comprued of the sullage hezdmen, had been reinforced in its power and, uwhere it did not too much abuse st, was effective in ser ing as a buffer between the Dutch civil servuce and a substantzal, though diminshing, sector of the agrarian population

Taken as a whole, this aristocratse hoerarchy continued to play an important part in the over all pattern of Dutch political control, so much so that as late as sgs8 Colijn. though recognizing its decreased capacity, referred to it as "the backbone" of Dutch authority ** Its effectiveness, particularly that of sts upper strata, progressively declined after that date. But up until the end of Dutch rule, it still commanded a considerable support from a mapor part of the Indonessan masses and continued to comstitute one of the moit smportant pillars supporting the Dutch regime.

To an impertant extent this decline in the effectveness of the upper ranks of the aratocratic Indonesian admunistratuve element was a re sult of Western education. A strong and widespread tendency was for the Western-educated sons of ats members to refuse to fill the positions of their fathers. More and more of these, because of thear awakened nationalism, sought to disatociate themmelves from the old arstocracy which they torretly saw as supporter ol the colonial regime. Sometotnes all the sons of an aristocrat would refuse to fill the admunistrative posts of thear fathers, seeking to equip themselves for ether jobs, the tendency often being to seek poutions whach would give them as much economic independence as possible from the colonial regime. (Thus the surprising number of Indontsian natuonalist leaders who have been and are doctors and wio often entered dhat ptolestoon as much from a deure to ohtain the economic independence necessary for effective partcipation in the nationalist movement as from a deure to practace medicime) Increasngly the ablent sons of Indonesian aristocratic of ficals sought such positiont, leavang the least educated and generally least competens sons to fill the posts of their fathers The result was not only to lower the caliber of the anatocratic elements that continued to serve the Dutch, but also the government was oblged to draft nonanstocrats Indontsuans to fill these posstions Because of thus as well as because of sustauned attack by the nataonalst leadens, the prestige of the undrect ruler in the eyes of the Indonesuart population was greatly lovered, and as a consequence his effectiveness as an aatrument of andirect rule dimonshed Colajn nooed that whule in agog 7* s per cent of the students in the guvernment's school for Indonesuan admutistrators were the sons of Aatant Wedonos (admitistrators of sub dstricta) or higher, by ags6 thn was true for only 44 7 per cent and that only two of the fourteen admtted to the school in 1gey were sons of wch asstocratic admumstrators*

In those areas officially designated as "indirectly ruled," that is, in the zfg nasve states = marmtained by the Dutch, the character of their rufe contanund to be a good deal less direct in most cases than in the nontunally "dtrectly ruled’ areas, but the effectrreness of Netherlanda control was no less In those areas the contact between the population population that it was being governed by its own traditional rulng elements greater than in the relatively directly ruled areas The mantenance of these statm by the Dutch as a bulwark agasnst natsonalom was strongly sensed in 1g37 by Emersom, who wrote

Ther preent mantenance by the Datchn to be explauned less in terms of a cancen for the sprstosl and muteral ease of their people than an serms

a Jhnd pp 40-41

These sutes embraced more thun half the area of lndovesia osttale fave and 7 per cree of chat slind where Ferakana and Joggatata, the rao largest natie stzin sere locatnd They reged in pepofaton brom go ta s gspooo and ttsled i sgtoe inhototants an aganx 3 assse heng in the nemmalty domcily naled anas (gyo orous tmenen, ap cit, p 6)

41 Emenoa nets That thete in nothing macroans alout the naove State as uch de Dutch tave smply drsanmeé by the cavaler faboen un whach Chay bait up Status hete and kifed then eft there wah to bener engument than expedimey or hotorral acrdene to pusefy thn chose, and those chat have sorvosed to the preees day have done se only at the cost ef tramfemeng large wgreente af ches powere dencdy oo tbe Duch' ()thd , p 4)

of Dutch dread of Indoneam conmtunom and eationalen Orznalls en coutaged for the sake el umpernl convenmence an conirolling tast trroeres and betetogeneres penples the States have nos anereavinghs come to be reganded as euental butvars agant the pread of domenunn and as parmatle saated buck waters in whch the old lovalties in wrll subsrdurd rulers are espbuted in the imittests of the nen manters."

It is likely that the much earher and mote protent development ol the nationalst movement in Java and «edher relatvels darertls adminos tered parts of the Indies as compared to the natave states " was to some extent due to the relatvels greater directnes of rule in thone ateas and the consequentls moee protonanced ants Dutrh reactoon that st provoked It does not seem altogether unpusnfied to suggest that realization of thn fact mas have plved some purt on the poliss of admomistrative decentrataration and augmentation of the povers ed de native states which the Dutsh emburked upon in tozt in Boriro, Celtles, the Lever Sundas and the Moluccas"

The plural nasute of colonual ssiess in Indonesia, in pasticular the correspondence of ethnic and socio-economic groupn, constituted a mapor limitaton in the growth of Indoneuan nationalism Its Loropean ruting clas felt its welfare tied up wrth the polstical and economic stefur guo and wath fen exceptions opposed the natsonalist movement. The muddle claw of that socoets was predominanils non Indoneuan, being largels Chonese and Eurauan, and was lhewse wedded to the political and economse status quo and strongly hovtale to the natsonalist movement From the presious chapter the stake of the Chunese sn the maintenance of the colonnal regime should be obtous. As for the Eurastans, Wertheim observes. Together wath the feutlal chiefs and the Ambounese and Menandonese Christians [mostly in the army] they be came pillars of Dutch authorirs in the Indies Thes soon constituted the core of the army, the police, the cis il servants and the judicans " More over, a tumber vere in the apes of the government structure " In thest access to these poutions the Lurasuans had un general been strongly favored by the Dutdh over the Indonesians, and by the muddle igeo's it was apparent that the overwhelming majorsty of them was not ond effectvely detached from the natsonalist movement, but as strongly if not more strongly opposed to it than wese the Dutch. "More Dotch than the Dutch," many nauonalots thracteroed them. Wuth respect to the Eurassam, Wertheam concludes

Ia the pellans of Durch rule, they believed thest penaleges depended on that wuthonty Henre their main poltral aurciation=the IEV (Inde Esropeeath I erboed)—ss ctmspcovesly conseratne in charartr, xholehesnted) lozal to Datch nor at umught to prenerve the nemerous prodeges ennerned wah the Europeon statos of in members *"

As Furnnall hzs remarked, "Natonalism withon a plural society is vielf a diruptive foce, tending to shotter and not to comsolidate its soril etder a The gulf between Indoneurmt and non Indoneuams cununurd to inrreave through the Ist years of Dutch rule." Indo nesrin mvuonalises eould not, as their European counterparts have done, count upes the middle clas as their printipal baus of rupport, enly a tuny fraction of thot class being Indonesian This meant that the enly posuhle bous for a sucressful Indontuan ratronalst movement, that n, une powerinl enough to aclueve sts politiral objectives, lay in the etabluhment of effectoe lanon betheen the natoealut leadenhip, drawn particularly from the amtellectual elements ef the tiny Indoneun secter of the moddle class, and the Indoneuvn masves

Opposed to the achoevement of this end was the near monopely of obstruct almost complesely the efforts of the nvtionalist lesders and the frartonal Indoneuam moddle class as a whole to establah effecuve political contact uuth the Indonesian agrarian population An army and a polce fneee almost wholly officered by Dutch and Eurasiams with a major proportunn of ther rank and file drawn from these elements and frmm Chrstan Indoneuans fron the Mmahassa (Menado arra).

Ambon, and Timor *" were the cluef instruments of the Dutclh repressive power. This police and mitary power was vapplemented by and untermeshed with governmem regulatioms whuch narrowly circumeribed and often almos complesely cut off legal organization and prosecu uon of the nationalist movemens The strength of the army and the polce force and ther nonsympathetuc attutude totu ard the nationalistit movement in conpunction wuth the general abelhty of the P'ID (Polsteke Inhchtangen Dienst, Poltical Inselligente Servire) the government's secret servace, made at extremely difficult to develop the mos ement ef fectvely on the extralegal plane

One of the government's etrungest legal weapons against the na tionalist movement-tt was not alvays averve to applying extralegal force against the movement-was the power of the governer-general to exile a person to any particular part of Indoneua whenever he deemed thas necesary "in the nserests of peace and ordet" " Tlus power was invoked frequently and on a wode scale and was largely respanuble fer the raped tumover in leadershup of the nationalat movetent This impermanence of leadership greatly weakened the movement, for in a society such as the Indonesian, where political organsration from the top doún was dhe tradational norm, an almost sustained disruption of that leadership was drsastrous Also frequently invoked and bearing similar consequences was the government's pouer to arrest without prevsous authorization by a court any Indonean suspected of an offenme and to keep hum under "provimonal arrest." a Thus was used parucularly agaunst second and thurd-echelon nataonalst leaders. The kidespread fear of being observed by the omnspresent agents of the PID and being subjected to an sndefinite perod of prospuonat arrest twas sufficient to suppress even unfoemal proselytstng efforts by the less courageous nattonalasts

Attempts at organirational proselytuzing by leaders courageous enough to dueegard these prospeeis were rendered extremely difficult

12

NATIONALISV ASD REVOT UTION

because the righes of association and awembly were tightly controlled and thesr exereise narrowly restrocted by the government.** Ome of the severest handcaps encountered by the mationalists was Article 155 of the Penal Code whoch provaded a maximum imprnonment of four years See anyone who "pubhtly [eeally or in writing) mamfests hov thty, dnlike or contempt for one or more of the populatoon groups of the Indies The gonernor general's power to suspend the publicatoon of alt peraodicals whose content was deemed by hum to be contrary to the amierests of prublt secunity -* was an additional Imaitation on the vaiue of the press as a means of furthering the nationalut move ment The effectveness of the press was, of course, already resurcted because only 6 4 per cent of the Indonesian population were laterate a

Until sgsy, despite severe legal restrictions, the teade utoon movement constituted an umportant means for prosecuting the nationalnt struggle Theresiter, and partacularly sites vag, the government's pobey and legslatson were so hostile toward it that st was no longer of great effectvemess i* Labot legslation of sgss ineorporated limitations on the right to strike into the Penal Code Respectang thes Virginia Thompson observes

Any labor agatuon that sonded to duturb putie erder or contravene a laber contract was hatle to penalation Theoreocally thas legulation amed to peevent polucal agranors froe vtating economut nroes, but se prictice oes serms could be applel to prohibetung any erganuraton of sttikes

à The govereer goneral sas empovered to declart any amocation illegal whosh he dremed an evetrasenen ol puttle secunny Open ast peblit preetasgs ware poshuloted usles prevous permusuon had teen secared frore the head of the locat Jina aed Vadus and hours in adanse elseebere To sch metongs ' and to all meesingy whch are open to the pulfic aflion aad enployees of the pace were to have frendoes of adrenion Tor the shrne regelatom on wvagutias aod avently vee Stestallad vee Naderiandirh Indie, tgig no 1 in ámended s0d, 95, m 1 Loneserung wuh the Stase of wag and Sarge aettuset in oggg all prerate metongs smndy and pemaon eosld be deted hy the miltary muthonae (StontiHad, aggs

Staniiad 91. me 4 (Ondeance ef Sept ? ag() Between sged and gs drerdom of theę prem was smewhan greater

t" An of the hit crnmun thas of rgge

Vugas Thaepn Labar Prabieu as Ssurieat dae (Ser tasen 10t7). tãe She nases chas elfoal statoies tndicate the eflememen of thes leplation Ite wal mumber of suniars in the whale of Indonesn dutng ipza km only a15. a namter greater dhan that of any of the pesaoun a yeans

tn fid p ão Indaneuas labee leaders informed the wezer dat tath the poocle

Because of the overwhelming power poveved be the Dutch and the extremely restricted channeh of developnemt which thest power al lowed the nationalnt leaders and ther organuratsons, these leaders were never during the course of Dutch rule able to ceme anto suffeient contact wsth the peasantes to otganture it eflextavels unto the nationalist movement. Extensve adeolegual and consoferable organirational con taet was corsummated with urban labor particularl ats skalled ele ments. but it, in conjunctaon wth Indonetan white collar workers and the tuns Indoneuan ruddle clan. constatuted almest the entire organzed socual werght behind the natuonaliet mover-tnt \ liruted adeo'egical contact was made with the peauntrs a conuderable por non of whach, because of ets changieq sonal environrment, had been developung an incipient nationalist orventation of its own Fstful and neomplete ergamzational contact ws establihed wth soe margi nal elerrents of peasant societs such as plantation workers and soe ef those caseal laborers most loosels ted to the allage But attempts at organizational contact wth the mass of the peaantrs were almost completely frustrated Without the oganuzed backing of this masn, the Indonesian nationalist movement stood lottle chance ef success against the represuve power which the Dutch regume was able to rarshat against it.

History of the Nationalist

Movement until 1942

BEFORE igiz the emphasn of Indonesian nationalism except for sts Pan Islamic and sncipuent Modernist Islamic currents was cultural rather than polucal, though politacal overtones were often present. Education was the chief vehucle for this phase of the nationalist move ment. The moit mportant early effort along these lines was launched by Reden Adjeng Kartins, the young daughter of a Javanene regent. She felt that the conditon of her people could be rased through education which was Western as well as Indonesian in contens In sgos by founding a school fer the daughters of Indoneuan ofßcralh, she gave the atotial ampetus to mndern female education and eas impeetant sn stumulating the culoural nationalnt movement an a whole Her actuvity marked the first manufestation of the umportant role which vomen came to play in the Indonesian nationalist movement. (The Mohamtedan religoon had been unable to make an apprecable inroad upon the strong soçial poution of Indonesuan women, partieularly among the Javanese and Menangkabau)

The first cegantred cultural nationalist movement bas launched between igoß and vgeß thoough the efforts of a retred favanese physlcan, Mas Wahidn Soediso Hotsndo, who sought to elevate the Javanese people through study of Western knowledge as well as thear own cultural heritage He traed wth alroost no success to collect funds to be uted for such edocaton ftom the arutocratic Indonessans in the government's admonatrative service Finally he met woth success among the sons of these aristocrats attending the medical school at Batavia. Particulariy through the efforts of two of these students, Raden Soetomo and Raden Coenawan Mangoenkoesoemo, who were later to emerge as important nationatat leaders, there was founded in October, 1go8, an organization called Boed: Oetomo (Pure Endeavor) Its initial pregram was essentally nonpolitical and called for the development of traditional and Western edutation among the peoples of Java and Madura, the advancement ol agriculture, undustry and commerce among them, and finally "everything that will guarantee them the life of a dignified people ": Despste the cireumstances of sts launching. elder and relatively conservatve men emerged as its first teaders, all coming from the top echelon of the Javanese arstocracy The organiratoon's early policy was that "The youth should remain 'the motor which drnves forward", the elders should be "the steerimen, who with dextrous hand know how to asood dangerous rocks in order to bring the boat to safe harbor * " * By the end of 1geg. Boeds Oetomo numbered almost ro,ooo members, made up largely of Indonesian evil servants as well as nearly all the students above the suxth grade in Java and Madura. Its numenical strength was short lived, however, for as poltically eriented nataonalst organirations began to arne, almost all its members except the polstically conservatve aristocratic elements, mostly civil servants, drifted away. Thus loss of membershop to political nationalist organizations was so great that after sgty the organization went anto a period of stagnation and an over-all decline from which st never fully recovered despite sts establnhment of a polsticat program in sga7 * and sts even laser attempt to develop a mass following

The first politically based Indoneuan nationalist organization- Sarekat Islam-burst upon the beretofore tranquil colonsal scene with a suddennets and a force which quite astonished not only the Dutch but many Indonestans as well Withun lour years of its lounding in sg12 it bad developed a membeslup of sio oos and was emlassked upon a

However, the outstanding aumedate cause fur tdhe energente of an Indonesian political nationalst leadershop revulted from the suddealy imereased impengement of aegresvely competitivse Chusese entrepre. neuts upen dhe interests ef the vestigiat Javanese merchint class tht atended the gradual lifung of travel reurictions on the Chunese on the interior of Jasa between 19o1 and 1911 1he political nationalist organization, Sarekat Ilam, stemmed from an Indonesian trading so ciety, Sarekat Dagang Islam (Islamic Irading Assciation) formed in tgog by Raden Mas I artogdioeryo. an arntoerate Javanese merchant and manager of a trading compans then in procen ol laqusdanon Shurp Chinese trading peactices brought hum and oehes Jasanese merthants to form a co-operatve tralang organsraton fut protestion aganst Chanese dealets, whom thes were prepured to bon cott if necewars In 1g1, support was oltarmed from a great fasanese merchant and batik mamu facurer of Surakarta, Hadye Samanhoed: who was aho a Moslem re ligious leader of comuderalée stature Ihe senture was rearganred on a co-operatve baus and geared to launch bovcotts agaunst the Chunese in defenie of the interests of che large number of Javanese merchants it had attracted.

The nes organuatsen was seen by Indonestans un general, regand. fes of their economic fonction. as a smbol of religious—and thereby of Indonesian—unity aganst forengners, at first especially Chunese. Its lasis of motual asntance and adsancement of the anterests of all Mohammedaes kas cauly anterpreted in teros of strong nationalum, and its religious and nationalist character soon overshadowed its originat economie emphaus Not only did et attract an avalanche of members,* but its program also served to star and embolden outuders. Thete resulted widesprrad boycotts aganst the Chunese as well as a number of physical atacks upont them culmitating early un sgiz in anti Chunese riots in Sutakarta and Surabaja. I hough ats leadershup was not sn itself responuble for this volence. the organzation was for a fet momths lanned by the governmeet." In September, sgoe. the Sarekat Dagang Islam re-emerged as Sarekst Islam (Islamic Assotuation) under the leadership of non merchant antellectuals and religyous leaders as well as meschants and was chaurmaned by Oemar Sasd Tjokroamunoto, em ployee of a commercial firm in Suralaya, and a mam possessed of eon siderable Western education At the assocation's first congress in Januan, 1g15 Tiokroamamoto emphasued that st was not a polstical party and that it sould marntain absolute loyalty to the government. Iis an nounced program was * (a) promotuing coemere among Indoneuans, (b) motual support of members who encounter economot deficalties, (c) promotion of the intellectual development and materal mterests of the Indoneuans and (d) eppoutson to wrong religious concepts con cerning the Mohammedan religaon, and promotion of religrous lhfe among Indonesuans

The non polstical appearance of thus program as rather deeeptve. It was necessary becrose of Government Regulatson 11 whach Supreme Court Jutce Fromberg. wnting in sg:4. noted. "absolutely feebids organirations and meetings of a politacal character "*

Certainly the rapodly expanding organization had anterests wider tlan its announced prograst, as speeches made at sts early meetings restify Thos, the pressdent of the umportant Semarang branch of Sarekat Islam stated an March, sgtę, before a large meeting there The Sarekat Islam already esusted an the hearts of the natises be Iore it s as establnhed Thos ss not only a movement of an economic and moral nature, bat means also that the nouves seek yestice, which they have never yet found * " He then ponted out that the Indonesians did not understand why they were poce, and that to understand the cause of ther poverty, it was necessary for them to be unuted."

The antutheus between che traditsonal Indoneuan anstocracy and the interests of the people was emphasized by the movement's leaders and generally felt by its mrunting membershop Thas feeling vas in enmtfied by the strong opponstion to Sarekat Islam shown by arutocratue Indoneuan admunutrative officers of the Dutch regime They felt that it attarked thear prvaleges and opposed it as a matter of self preservaton to Early in tga4, Fromberg observed

One charactenstic el the Sarekat Idam mmvemem is that it tilames the native government off cals for a hege part of the muery of the people, in thes and the emaneipatron of the penple eppung elements are sren The non native is seen makang off wth che ponits ol the cmuntry and theve sasve o" cuals are found to be no protecors peuple feel themmelves represed and obetructed by the eppreuse customare laty evere attempt to rave themsehves n frutrased and the nstise of cals are ween as the star mauntarners of thete lass"

In this sein Tpokroaminoto referred to the people as "the servants of the vegent" " and un Match, tg. Raden Achmad, another of the Sarekat Isdhm leaders stased

The people have puned Srekat Ilars en mame berause shew seek it eor rights They have sought them in vain from thest legal chiefs lthe Indonevan arisoox raey]It is the people tlat sees ats tghts contatruallw dhreatened that n why there n the great cry for theen to utite themmelhes in onder to defend and reut wth more power those who tob them of their rights

Increasingly the outwardls religious emphaus of the organization yielded place to a polstical one, some leaders frankly acknowledging religion to be princspally a meams to the political ends soughu by the movement. Thus at the Semarang meeting of sgtp. Tjokreamimoto openly stated. "Sarekat Islam uses religion as a bond, as a means of cohesion, and the progress whach it wants is not gong to be hampered by thin religion.""

The wide lasus of support that Sarekat Islam's leaders were bent on developing was alrezdy emerging at the beginning of tgt p. when Froemberg noted that it was made up of the most heterogeneous elements, "educated young Javanese, religious leaders, merchants, peatants, and Iaborers." i* The tremendous growth of the movement and its already apparent abilaty to attract wade mass support alarmed the government. It does not seem unreasomable to assume, as has Sotorus, that the gosernment's leaders reasoned chat a frontal attempt to crush Sarekat Islam mught beget a reaction among Indonesians that would be dangerous." Whether or not that was thesr reasoning. ther policy was not one of frontal asault but rather an andirect one based on weakening the movement and attempting to control it through refutal to countenance sts organsrational untegration, It is highly protoble that government Teaders understood what Fromberg in tgtt credited the leaders of

" fbad2 /bod, p 513 12 /i2, p 545 175nrus, ep nt , pp 15=15

Sarekat Islam with realinng, that the power of the movemene lay "not in dieconmected groups, but an united mast, that local organizations which are thrown on their own resources wuth nothing behand them have every chance of coming under the influence of the comervative Natuse Admmstration and thereby beng rendered powerless..."

The govement's poby found expresan in an act of Marc, . wherein it conferred Segal status on the varnous brenches of Sarekat Islam only, refusing such statum foe the organization as a corporate whole *" Thereby its central headquarters was cut off from the local branches Effective central direction of policy and co ordination of actuvity were rendered extremely difficult, whole control over the activites of any partscular beanch was made almost mpossible That the immeduate effect of thes polocy was to weaken Sarekat Islam and to decrease whatever threat st may have comtstuted to the colonlal regime there as no doubt The trony is that ats long term result—one that began to emerge withan less than three years—was the development of the movement in a much more radical direction By undermuning the authority of the relatuvely moderate exponents of Modernconttstuent beanches of Sarekat Islam, the Dutch made it a great deal eauer for much more radieal elements, boncally Communent rather than Élamic in character, to nltrate and ally cpture contel of a major mumber of thoe branches

A shoet lved attempe to found a politcal partey advocaung racial equality, socio-economie justice, and ultumate independence, and based upon Eurasian Indonesan co operation was launched in December, 1uz, as the Natonale Induche Partij (National Indies party) Its motto was "The Indies for thote who make thesr home there," and in addotion to some 1,goo Indonesans it soon attracted about 6,ooo Eur asant, particularly those who resensed the growing competution of an increased influx of Netherlanders who generally retared to Holland upon ending ther careers in the Indies Withun a year's tome the party was suppressed, and ats lenders—Douwes Dekker, a Eurasian, and De. Tjipto Mangoenkoesoemo and Soewardi Soeryatongrat (afterwards knewn as Kr Hadjar Dewantoro), boch Indaneuans were exaled, but permetted to go to Holland o Therewoth the first and last threat of

Indonesian-Eurasian combunation agaanst Dutch rule came to an end. Most of the Eurasian following of Douwes Dekker then jouned Insulinde, a purely Eurasian party, with a relatively moderate program Hovever, the minority of the Nationale Indnche Partij's membershup whoch had already developed an anterest in Marxst sdeas wat attracted, along wuth a small tbut growing group of sumslarly sncdined people, mostly Lurauans and Netherlanders, to the new and forceful leadershup provoded by Hendrsk Sneeslhet He was a former member of the Social Democratic I abor Patts in the Netherlands who m 1914- shortly after hus arroval in the Indses, founded the Indies Socral Deino cratte Anociation wth the help of the Dutch socalists, H W Dekßer," Bergima, and Brandsteder Despote defertoon of some of its more mod erate members, Sneesliet s eaginizatt n grew rapodls in numbers and in the radicalam of its Marxium However, it soon became apparent that its European leadershup would be able to acqusre little Indoneuan and, therefore, little mass support Wsthout surh support, Sneeslhet real ized, a succesful revolution aimung at poltscal mdependence and socialist economic organsration could never succeed Acqustution of this backing neeesutated winning Indomesian support for the baue tenets of his revolutionary Marxnm Contact was made wth socialis tically inclined Indoneuan leaders from the Semarang branch of Sarekat Islam who, wlule remasning active in that organization, joined the Social Democratte Asnociation and became energetic proielytizers in its behalf throughout the ranks of Sarekat Islam By tgs7 a revolutionary current was susible un Sarekat Islam, wath Semaoen and Darsono, leaders of ts Semarang branch and the ablest of these proselytizers, as sts spokesmen"

There was nothing casuaf in the infiltration of the Sarekat Isfam branches by Sneeshet's organration, whuch, it should be noted, became ancreasengly nBuenced by events in Ruvia Sneeshet recegnured that the rapudly growang mass based Sarekat Islam was the ideal medrum for lus group to work through in order to establsh contact wath and capture support of the Incdonesian masses. The government's legislation forcing Sarekat Islam's organizational disintegration made the conditions for anfiltration ideal. So succesful was the infiltration by Seevliet's organiration that in sp2s, a little over three years after In expralsion from Indoneua, Soeevluet (Maring) as the Comintern's fost delegate to China, pramanily on the baus of his espenence with Sarekat Islam, propoied to the Chinese Commumast Central Commoitee that "the Commutiuts poin the Koomuntang and utilire ts becad loose organuation structure as a means for developing their propoganda and contacts omong the masses* Acrording to Sneevlet, Harold Iaacs states, "the majority of the Chutese Central Commutte accepted these voens=

Under mounting preware from the grow ing number of sncreaungly Marxat oruenoed local bramches of Sarekat Islam, the organization's centrall leadershup, possessed of no effectise means of disciplining such daudent elemens, was progressively forced to compeomose its onigmal Modernst Islamic tenets in the direction of revolutonary Marxism The effect of this pressure was moticeable as early as October, sg17. in the program drawn up by sts second natuonal congress This called for independence, as contrasted to the self government pressously demanded and indirated that if monviolens efferts to obtasn ths goal were frurtlem, another approach might be necesary, Actually mesther this noe the extensne sotal referms thich the program called for were incompatible with the Modernist Islamoe ideas whoch had gisen impetus to the orgamazaton's geneus and which had at fest everted a pre ponderating mluence upon its leadershup Bot tihe expiient con demnation of "unful capitalism," though by no means diametically an opposition to these adean, was undoubtedly prompted by pressure from Communst dominated bronches, It a understandable that the Indoneuan merchants who backed the movement and were partcularly amportant because of the fnancal support whoch they give it mught well have taken strong exception to this pount It as probabte that Tyokroaminoto's public elucidation of the term a short tume later was occastoned by their resentment The explanation whach he gave shows

Harold R bencs Thr Traged, of the Ctanear Enalaton (Landee apgl), p to Tha nfonranas o tasd on haacs eeevemotee wth Somlet n sg Sorcileis Ceennten rarse sas Vaning Ol the three faetoes upen slosh Sote het bosed socendy on he sinvlege mnd tactaral eechtusoes of the Serond Congreun of the Conusiem and chodly on the fact that cornetieen hnd already bem etatinled be the koumos tn ergrtitaton of the kvemmntang and Santkat Ilan sese of esune,

For an areount of the poaguns drawa up by the coegrem set Blamberger un Esryr Aadelandeh Inde, pp dg and Suare op nt, pp -t dearly how he was being forced to staddle basuc social issoes in order to maintain the support of hos ornginal followers, wlule meeting the munimum demands of the fast growing Marxast anfluence in many of the most impottant local tranches Temporarily T pokroaminoto resolved this antitheus by describong "sunfal capotalim" as forergn capotalum and mferring that Indonesian capitalism w2s acceptable.

Not onhy because of the necesity to control its Marxnt enented branches, but also because it was conscious of the vmpathetue response that Martst slogans were eliciting from urban taborers and the poorer peasants, the central leadershup of Sarekat Islam felt smpelled to move Iurther touards an espousil of a revobotionars polutacal program and Marxnt ideas. Moreover, the wudespread revolutootary movements in Europe in sgi7-1g:8, whuh in the latter sear for a moment seemed to threaten even Holland, entboldened the orginzation's leadershup by suggestung to at that tradstsonal polatsal relationshops all over the world were being or were about to be overturned

Thus in the third natsonal congrew of Sarekat Islam on Ortober, sg18, where a membership of p3o,ooo was represented, sts potentally revolutionary character and ancreased socialistic emphaus were clearly ap parent. Despte this and Tjokroamanoto's statement that if the gos ernment dud not speedily undertake wade socral reforms Strekat Islam would do so by itself, the powerful Marxist faction Jed by Semanen was far Irom satisfied In the first sessons of the newly established Volksraad (People's Coancil) an May, s918, the Sarekat Islam representation voiced strong criticism of the government At its second meeting in December, 1g18, Cramer, a Dutch socralist, orginized the "Radical Concentration," whach included hus ou n moderate socialst organization, Sarekat Islam, the Indies Social Democratic Assocation, Insulinde, and even Boedi Oetomo This coalition displayed a strongly crigical attitude tovard the government," culminating in a revolu tionary speech by a Eurauan of the Insulinde party A few days later the Governor-General learned by cable of the heightened revolutionory dnturbances in Europe and thear threatened speead to the Netherlands Thoroughly alarmed, he appeared before the Volkaraad and made farreaching peomises tor rapid and extensve reforms in the structure of the Netherlands Indies government The apporent weakness and will ingoess to appease displayed by the government at this time of crisis srongly umpreved Indoneuan leaders and emboldened them to em lark, upen more estreme nationalstic programs

Sneeshet was arresoed by the go ernment and forced to lease Indo neua in December. sgs8, but thus did not retand the peocess of infiltra ton of Indonesion members of the Socal Democratic Asociation inoo positions of leadershup an local branches of Sarekat Istam Despote the grow ing strength of these elements, they were unable to get control of the Fourth Comgress of Sasekat Islam, held in sqig. by which time the organizatson s total membership hnd reached almost tmo and a half mulhon Following the central leadership of Sarekat Islam's refusal at this congress to accept the extreme propoals ef Semaoen's fartion, he and the ocher leaders of the Socral Demoeratie Avocration undertonk to convert thear ceganiration anto the Communist Party of the Indies (Perserikaten Kommunist di India), er PhI, as it tas generally knotn In this nen party launched at the Semarang ofice of Sarekat Blam en May s. sgso, Semanen was elected as preudent, Darsono as virepreudent, Bergima as secretary, and H W Dekker as treasurer

The nes party developed a clove relationshap with the Comintern. jouning that organizaton at the end of tero Sneeslet, who had un dertaken en hs own to represent Indonesor at the Second Congress of the Comintern (summer of tggo), later established contart wath the Indoneuvn party ua Shanghan," and in sçat Darsono went to Mosreu to represent Indonesia at the Thund Congress** Tan Malvka, one of the purty s top leaders, represented Indonestv at the Fourth Congrews in the subuequent year and took an acuve port in framinz its policies * In Auguse, sçes, Semaoen was arrested and forced to leave the country or face eile to Timoe, and by the end of the year all Dutch leade of the pany hid alio been feeed to leave Aereding to Semtoen, the departure of the Donch leaders from the piety "raved the prestuge of the party in the eyes of the mases' becvove of exrtmz prejudice agasnst the Duteh, whatever thenr attstude tmards colonualen *" Cer tainly thereafter during the 1geo's there vwas little rappeet wrth the Communut Party n the Netherlands Indonesn Commenits looked

2n noras op et p où to the Comintern for guidance but not to the Netherlands Communust Party, Indeed at the Fifth Congres of the Comuntern an tgs1. Semaoen bluntly andicated that the Netherlands Communist party was more of a lability than an aset to the Indomesuan Communists "

In the meantime the central leaderslup of Sarekat Islam undertook an increasingly active poliry and for a time kept the unitiative in its struggle with the Semaoen faction Its leaders, Aldoel Moen in parteular, made solent attacks agtunst the government whuch stirred up the population and at one place, Iols Iols an the Celebes, in the mod dle of igag led to a short ansurrectoon Shortly thereafter a local Sarekat Islam leader in Tumreme, West Java, actng on dus own authorsty, led a umall smsarrection against the government in protest agaonst its collection of rice *a

Conuderable soccess had been encuuntered in organizing labor unsons, and at the end of Decemmber, 1g19. the Sarekat Islam's central leadership managed to unite twenty two Indoneuin trade unions. totaling 77,ooo members, under one of ats leaders, R V Soerpopranoto Semaoen's group ammediately attempted to get control of thos organization, the Trade Unon Central (Pergeraken Kaoem Hoeroch) a" At its first congress in August, igzo, Semaoen was elected chairman, Soerjopranoto, vice chairman, and Hadji Agoes "Salom, a young and able leader of Tjokroamanot's group, secretary " It twas particularly due to the efforts of Silum that Semaoen and hus faction were unable to wrest control of the organization from Sirekat Islam's central leadership " Defeated in thas effort, in June of the next year Semaoen was successful in setting up a rival association of trade unions, the "Resolutonary Trade Union Central," and an the peocess was able to detach considerable strength from the older organization "

The increasingly butter struggle betueen the central leadership of Sarekat Islam and the Communsts for control of the organization's branches and the growing Indonesuan trade union movement, in conjunction wish their differences over questions such as class warfare and religion, made a formal rupture betveen them intsitable. At the Soth National Congress of Sarekat Islam in October, sgas, the strug. gle came to a he Hee te oee w tae by Had Age Salim, u.ho introduced a moton hacked by Abdoel Moes calling for party dscsphne and requuing that no member of Sarekat Islam could at the zame tume hold membershep an any other party, A botter debote followed wherein Semaoen and Tan Malaka, Jeading the opposition to the motion, sought to ndicule the central leadership's refusal to rec ognue the class struggle and accused it of being capitalut and ants tocalut After a spirited ansver by Hadjı Salım, in which he maintasnel that Mohammed had preached socalut ecomomies twelve centuries before Marx was born, a vote was taken wth a large majonty of defegates favorsng party ditciplme Thereupon the Communists peesent reugned, and wath that the Communist controlled branches of Semarang and sts vicmity seceded

The antense struggle that followed for control of the local branches of Sarekat Islam vas dnastrous for the natronalist movement, destroy. ing most of its ptasant based organization The Communnsts within four years managed to get control of a probable majonty of the branches, but in the coume of the struggle most of the targe peatant membership of these branches melted away Thus probably was due principally to to reasons (s) the govetnment's increasingly effectnve barnng of concact between the leaders (both non Communist and Com munst) and the peasantry, and (s) the fact that religion became a pranopal ue in the strugge. wt the Commumits alienating peasant members by violating their religiout sensitivities, or at least those of their influentual religsous lesders By sgré she Communists had ap parently realized the senousness of thas mustake and changed their tacties, but the damage had been done and they were unable to Iive down the charge of beang ants religrous

In order to wan control of the Sarrkat Ilam branches the Com munsts, who had already heaily anfiltrated many of them, at theur congres of December ag. sgzs at Semarang decided to set up a Red Sarekat Ilam headquarters to compete with the onginal central lead enshup of Tjokroamtinoto, Salhm, and Abdoel Moeas *" At the beginnung of sger, during Semaoen's and Darsono's absence in Moscow, Tan Malaka took the mituative in attempung to develop a stnke of government pawmshop employees anto a general strike embracing all Indonetuan laber The Revolutionary Trade Union Central called upon

t Btemberger, De Netsonalatucke Brvegng on Arderiawduch Indu, p 35 all workers to go on a sympithy strle but was not succeuful, and Tan Malaka, arrested by the government and gven the choice of exile er leaving Indonesa, left for Ruwia Doring the attempted general strike Semaoen had been in Mocos attending a Far Fstern tabor conlerence. He returned after a srut of seven months on May r2, sgz, and devoted his attention to centralizing the leadershup of all Indoneuan labor organorataons nto the hands of hs group On September z. vysz, at a general meeting of Indonestan Labot oegonuzatons at Madium he was steresful in pulling the member unsons of the T rade Union Cen tral away from the control of its leaders into a nes all-embrating tunson knewn as Peratoean Vakbonden Hindha (l naon of Indan Labor Unons) in whoch the Communst purts leaders were domenant "

Thus coup and the contanued growth of Communist anfluence in the local beanches of Surekat IsLam brought sts leaders in Iebruats, sgzy, to attempt to essend porty dou splime to all the conststuent parts of the eeganuration In retaliation the Communeits at their March congress decided to establish sections of the Red Srekat Islam wherever there was a branch of Sarekat Islam, recruting their members from these branches The name for these nns Communist contralled unnts was changed to Sarekat Rakjat (People's Assocsation) and they were concened of as "the foundation of the Communst Party in the mastes." "

The Fith Congres el the Comintern (June-July, sga1) emphaszed that the top priority of Communist parties was to gasn control of the trade umon movement wuthout which, it held, revolutson could not be succersful. This thess was underseored by the Pan Pacific Labor Conference held under Contontern auspices at Camton in June, t9z1. and attended by two umportant Indonesan Commonist leaders. Ahmin and Beedisoetpitro The response of the Indonetan Communist Party to this durective was so complete and so extreme as to very nearly demolish its base of peasant support Despute the faet that at ats previous meeting, the peasaniry had been recognized as the party's undispemuable mass base, Alarcham, its secretary, at its meeting of December, 1p24. introduced a resolution callang for the dissobution of the Srekat Rakjats and their replacement by trade unions as the party's maw base. The Sarekat Rakjats, he argued, contamed too many bourgeois mationalists who could not be counted upon in times of violent action. Aliarcham's propoution was strongly attacked and finally a compromise solution emerged. The dimolution of the Sarekat Rakjats was accepoed in principle, bot the process ef dasolution was to be carrsed out gradually so as to asoid enfeebling the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) While neglectang the Sarekat Rakjits, the Communists were to concentrate their forees on the trade union movement In addition it was agreed that the cadres of the PKI hnd to be disciplined and their quality improved so that they would be able to undertsle efectise reso lutionary action *" Finally the program drasn up demanded the es tabhshment of a Sovset Republic of Indonesua

Dunng the counse of agas the actrvity of the PKI ameng the trade uniona ancreased greatly both an seope and aggresuveness Control was gamed over a greater mumber of umons, and frequent stnkes were called " Though Sarekat Islvm levders had tied to bring about natonalst sohdarsty early in vorę at a joint meetinq wath the PKI and Toed: Oetomo,*" the Communists appeared not to wish repprockeeffected by the PKI with Commonsts among the Chinese laboring community." but in general the socal bave of the Communist movement shrank greatly during 1gas It forfested a lrge proportion of its peasant associate membershup by turnang sts back on he Sarekat Rakjats and it lost all mapport wuth the "beurgeos mational revolutionmts" of Sarekat Islam, Boed: Oetomo, ete

The leadenhop of the Comunoern, particularly the leaders of Soviet Russua, had taken a particolar interest in Indonesia " and were dis turbed at the falure of Indoneman Communsts to follow the othodox interpretation of the sprę Comintern directives Stalin, speaking at the end of May. igss. accused the Indoneuan Communists of Leftist deviation conusting in

overratung the revolationary potentahoes of the liberation movement and im underating the mpertance of an allance berween the working class and the

e Saonn op oe, p so, Bhmherger in Ferye Medtindarh Inda, p p en Bumbergre in Enrye Nedeslandeck Inde, p 9is

e Se Semaom, "Iasemational Imperialien and the Commutnt Faty la Inda nena Comeusut Inirmatenel (engan of the Earcuuse Commiee of the Commiem) (Lninguad and Londee), ne 17 (agrff), p fo revolotonary bourgeote agaumt impenalem The Corimunnts in Java, who recently erroneously put forwand the slogan of a Soviet government for thesr country, sufßer, st aeem frem ths devsation That is a devation to the Left, huch threatens to volate the Communnt Parts from the maues and to trans form at anto a sest \ determined streggle against thas devatien at an evental condstuen for the trastung of really revolouomary cadres fot the colonues and dependent countres of the Eant"

The Executive Commsttee of the Comintern in its plenary sesuon of March, sg. specsficalls called upon the Communosts in Indoneua to form a united ants umpersalst front wth the non Communnt Indoneuan nationalnt organsrations and to utihize the Sarekat Rakjats as an undependent national revolutsonars urganization linked up with the wide masses * \ spokesman for the (omontern noted some tux monthn later that despite growing prewure from the rank and file of non Communast nationalist erganizations for a unted front agaunst the Dutch and the efforts of Tjokroaminoto in the summer of 19z5 to start negotations with the PkI leaders fur such a bloc, the negotsattons had led to no results He went on to sas

Our Java eomrades have not aufßcientle reacted to thn peocen The Con munot preu devotes too lattle atention to the adea of a unted front and to a platform en whach all the natsonal revolutzonary elements could be umsted. Methods of approach to tose mases soll under d e unfluence of the refoemost leaders have not yet been worked outThe Indoneuan Communnt Pariv despte all ins acuvaty hos not yet got properis down to wotking artong the peasantry and drawing the latter unto the matvonatut riovervent. The errors of the Indoneuan comrades with respect to the national organizations are repeated oth regard to the peasantry The resolutaons of the tase Plenum of the [CCI [Exeestne Commitee of the Communnt International]have not yet been put into force f the Party does net sdopt a coerect polies towands the peauntry an tume, the poltucal movement of the latter will pas bs the Party, as is to be elnerved to à cestaun estems in respect to the vadieal nationalut elements. Only a complete and unconditional enforcement of she resolutuon ef the Marth Piemum of the ECCl can put an end to the volated poston ef the Party and make it an sndomitable maunitar around whach all the actise anti imperalut forces ef the Indonesan people will rally "

Probably this advice from Moscow was receved too late for the Indonesian Communists to reverse the line of action that they embarked on Had these directives arrned in time, it as likely that they would have followed them, because thear leaders were split over what course of at tuon they should take

During the course of agzs the more extreme elements withon the Indonesian Communist Party came under the control of Dahlam and Soekra, leaders who refused to take orders from the regular party lead ershup They contunually agitated for revolution and resorted to ter ronstic methods an order to domomate the party In their eforts they were backed by two of the mportant establthed purty Jeaders, Altan and Muso This group was able to domnate a decuve meeting of the Executive Committee of the party and the leaders of the prinespal Commumnt-contrulled trade unoons held at the temple of Prambanan (between Jegjakarta and Surakarta) in mid October, sp2s *" As a re sult revolution was decrded upon A strike by the raslroad workers was to be the signal for a general strike which was in turn to develop smo the revolotion in which Dutch power was to be overthrown and replaced it was fels mecesmary to have the support of Moscow t1 and of the proms nent Indoneuan Communnt leaders forced to remain outnde of Indonesia Of these the support of Tan Malaka—the Comontern's agent for Southeast Asia and Auntrnlia a—was felt to be particularly esential To ask for Moscots's support without hs backing would be ankward, at win sralued In order to have ume to mobelue thn suppont and to make the necessary preparations in Indonena, the date Ioe the resolution was set for June s8, 1ga6 "

The actisities of the Communists during the antenm period, hon-

" Thas undormation in bsed pernandy upon coeseoupees of the author duning 1yg8-g ith averat prerenent comereporary Indenevan natoralut

à It iè inimesting to nose tar acerding to the gremment a repon Alana had paggend appresomatrly ths ume panema of revoletsen at a secres merting of the PhI held at Jogakarta on June a7 sgas (éseuare de Darusestahre Celormie Comperee 1ga7 p sge)

It is unclear whestar the sappert sought was fnineal as well at moral Mam Teger and the gvemmest repott cued in he abose memuoned denanre asuert das

Accorting to Tan Valvis shs poretson wis gren lorn at the qth Cangress of the Comasten in iges, to ale efett a agay (Taa Valaka Thene an Ideresun (Jakarta 97] pp s9-s sg-6e) Alanua un his baner arack on Tan Malaka dos net d=pae thes clarm and by mplrestion cdeariy santantates it He does hoever, mantar that Tan Malaha did eet pomess a power of veto ever decresen tsken by the Phl (Alimn, dasbr, in [ndansuas (Jogahana, (91)] PP 3 s+7 8)

See Tan Malaka, o nc, p s, ue alia Mazanar, Rapors 4s gpth Seuan (ah Congros el the Conasies, Moso, At, 7, tga,' Feporcar, , zo pu (Oct 1, rgat) agos Vaunsar goes she dase a. Jep. igol ever, did not develop as had been planned On November =s, sgrz. the govetnment-posibly as a teaction to the mounting number of small strkes and uncreaung solence cattied out by small armed bands and posubly because of knowledge of long range Commumost plans, er both-swipended the right of swembls throughout nears all of Indo nesa for the Commonist Parts, the Sarekt Rakpat. and most of the Comatunist-contrelled labor organrations As ws undoubtedh in tended, thus actson served to umpede effective contact betw een the Com munists and the tabot unions As a resuls, the strategic sequence of strkes that the Communnts had planned at Pramhanan did not go of! as scheduled The mazor strikes of workers in metsllurgical concetns and dock workers beoke out in Surabava in the muddle of December. 19, sux menths ahead of schedute In the supprewon of these strikes the government craked doun hand arresting most ed the umportant labor leadery concerned an additon to three of the few remasnumg top Communant leaders still in Indoneua, Darvono, AMarcham and Mardjoha *"

The evenes that followed should be obverved in some detail, for they help to esplaan not onts the failure of the Communist revolu tionary effort but aho the development of the great schnm in the ranks of Indoneuan Communosts that has existed ever sunce Tan Malaka had been opposed to the drift of events in Indoneus beginning with the decision taken at the Pkl Congress of December, tgrt. call ing Ior the dissolution of the Sarekat Rakjat " Referring to the Prambanan decruon, he stated

I beant of thas decsuon on Vanila towands the end of March (oorá) I wat on vened to come to Singapere, but not dor she purpove of doeuing & Petber er wot the PAI sds ready to lrad the revelution agastnt the Dinch er Fe to tead that revolution 1 tas unvted to come to Suncapoee in ender to peoceed to Moscow with Musso Thete we were to aik tor approval and motal avstance. sunce the decision mide at Prambanam was agant she regulations ef the Cemittern"

Tan Malaka was strongls opposed to the Prambanan decson and refosed to come to Singapore, peoballs because he knes that the peo-

n See dneuere de Doumemtatios Co'ona'r Compare sot: ? non Manar ep, nt, p aga) The Commenuts emadent Surahana to te the kes unduntul area for att lndooessa

" Blssterget, Le Cornusme aue Indes Nerrianaun p 6 Dareno men theresfter allowed to lesve Indrneta Ahumin had escapet to Sireapore before the others were atmested

u Tan Valala. ep est, p €7

d. p s (abe ate Tan Malalas)

ple assembled there would outsote hum and his supporters and that according to the formula of "democratic centrabsm" he would be called upon to abude by their decnion *"* Alimun was then sent by the Communsts auembled at Sgapore to see hm an Manl. Tan Maa relused to sanetion the plans for revolution and maintained that any uay the deeision bad to be made in Mascow in conultation wth the Comntern Fimilly he gave Alimin a document stating lus reasoms againt the Prambinin decosion to be communmcated to the group in Singipore and the PKI leaderslup on Jasi and Sumatea, Alimin did not deliver this document to the group at Sengiprre and appirently led them to heheve that Tan Mzlaka felt as he and Musso dad, The group then voted tn support the Prambanam decasuon, and Alimin and Musso were delegated to proceed to Moseots to ask its clearance and support for the revolution **

Shortly after thesr departure Tan Malaka arrived in Singapore, where he pervoaded at teast tho ef the Communnt Seaders there, Subakat and Damatudin Tamin, that conditions were not favorable for a revolution Tamin was grv-en a copy of the memorandem pressounhy given to Alimun and immediately teft for Indonessa Wrth thes he traveled throegh Java and Somatra contieting most of dhe local PkI lenders, many of whom he was able to duwuade from backang the projected revolution Tamun's finil efforts must hase been comidetably aded by the circulaton of the booklet tratten by Tan Malaka in the maddle of sga6, and pronted in Sungipore a few menths before the revolutian broke out in Java Thes booklet, Messe detie, incorporated the pounes made in his memorandom In it he argued that a wcceuful revolution demanded miss support A Patarh by lerden disorced from the mue would never mced, he waned. it indeed the Communut leaders possessed the mecessry mis support, they had alredy let pus the prychological and practierl moment for revalt, he sand That thould have eccurred, be muntauned, ummedhately upon the Duteh arrests of PK1 and labor lenders and the suspension of the right of assemhly at the end of sgrs ** He concluded by questioning whether the PKI hid suflicoent mans backing and "whether Marout efoeastom hod been correctly and seffitsently gvem so that eur workers have Marxist stability and Lenonist elasticety." If thos were not the case, as the preceding piget of his booklet had andscated, he foresaw.

, chaot in the whole revolutuonary movement in Indonetua Nen workers will take the helm and lrad the party to a Putich or to anarchum, and ulls mately it wall be completely dratrazed Thn danger becomes greaser and greater as the great revolutvonary lerders who hase influence over the mases are exiled from Indonesua one after the other

Alimin and Musio arrived in Malaya in the middle of December. 1gr6, hasung returned from Moscon via Canton On December 18th they were arrested by the Brstnh at Johore, nesther returned to Indonessa * Whatever the reactron of Moscon to thesr propoals. they have never made it publie Not only does the published adsice of Ruwian and Comintern leaders to Indontsuan Communists in the months preceding Alimon and Mutso's arrival in Moscos suggest that the reaction was negatve, but Alumin's sulence as to their attitude when he n defending himself and attacking Tan Malaka aho tends to support such a conclusion **

The Communist Party was forced to operate more and more underground while deptived of its ablest leaders Its activaties became less and less co-ordinated, with the extremist leaders who had dominated the Prambanan conference managing to maintain thesr ascendancy in much of Java despite the ants revolutsonary protelytunng of Tamin During the first ten momhs of sga6 more and more of the Communist leaders were arrested. Intra-organirational contact was progrestively disrupted as was attested by unco-ordinated sporadic outbreaks of violence at wudely solated places throughout Java The acceating disintegration of the Communust Party organization was accompanied by a rapod loss of contact with former peasant supporters. many of whom were an any case being alienated by the policies if the inferior Communast leadershup in Indonetua. The Communists postponed the date of the revolution, and not until the night of November 17, i26, dod it break out The disorganzation then exusting within the party as demonstrated by the fact that though plans for the revolu tion called for its breaking out first sn Padang on Sumatra's West Coust, actually it broke out first in Batavia, with the uprising in the Padang area coming a full two months later and after the unsurrection in Java had been complesely crushed

At the end of December, 1ga4, there were z6 sections of the PKI woth a,s4o members and s4o sections of Sarekat Rakjat totaling g1,1*4 members The following year PKI membership was increased to 3,ooo based on 65 sections n Given the policy of gradual disolution of che Sarekat Rakjats, it is reasonable to asume that ther membership had not increaned above the sgtę igure Therefore, probably the most that the Communsts could count on in their revolutian were some gooo party members, and a mass base of no more than 31,00o pratants and a somewhat smaller pumber of urbun laborers As a resalt of the progressive weakening of the party and Communistcontrolled organization denng the course of sgeß, it might be expected that the actual numbers participating in the rebellbon was much less, and that was crrtainly the case It is unlikely that moee than 5.ooo persons were actively anvolved in esther the Java uprising or the later one on the West Coast of Sumatra Only in Bantam (West Java) and in the West Coust Readency of Sumatra were the Communists able to rely on a messure of support from the local pessntry, There the fighting lasted for a few weeks, but elhesehere the undermanned Communist bad for power was suppressed withan a day er two As Semaoen himself admitted, "The masses of the workers in the cites, at nell as on the plantationn, adopted an attitude of ndifference towards the rebel movement"

To what extent the failure of the Communist rebellion is to be atenbuted to the efforts of Tan Malaka and Tamin, st as difficult to gauge It stems hikely that but for their work the Commømist effort on Java moght have been more widespread and somewhat more powerful and that on Sumatra st would not.hase.been restncted to the West Coast district alone, but would have embraced a number of other areas on that island including the plantation dstriet of the Last Coast, a center of consuderable Communent strength Though ther work undoubtedly dud substantially weaken the revolatsonary effort, it is probable that the above-mentioned government action against the Communists was at least of equal smportance an undermuning thear strength, and on Java, at amy rate, of contelerably greater importance Even had the whole of the Comsonst orgamzation lacked the rebellion the government would probabls have had latle trouble an suppressing it.

But it is Tan Malaka and hos assotates that the Cemmunses who backed che rebellion blame as the choef czuse of ats laslure, and at as he who has become their principal seapegoat The charge by Muyo, Alman, and other members of the present day På1 leadersltup that Tan Malaka is a Trotskyøst has generally been represented by them to be based upon his refusal to atcept the Prambanan decision. his ef forts to stop the rebellion, and the fact that shortly after the end of the rebellion he estabhshed a new party, whech they maantazn was com pletely outside the Commonist fold ** Probably, however, theer attitade was also moulded by another event, one which they appear never to have made public. This was Tan Malaka's stand at the sixth meetang of the Comintern in August, sgs8. In a speech there be made a vigorous attack against Bukharın and the program whuch the latter was attempt ing to plot through He maineanned that thes program agnoeed the experience of the Communist Party in Chuna and that st called for an alliance between the native bourgeoisne and the Communists in the colonies which would result an the same victory of the bourgeonse and destraction of the Communists as had just happened in China. In the course of what appeared to be a rather sneffective reply to Tan Malaka's attack, Bukhanın called hum a "Trotskyst." "

Tan Malaka's new organization, Pan (Partas Repoebhik Indoneua —Indonesian Republie Party), was establnhed by him and his two lieutenants, Tamin and Subakat, an Bangkok an age7 Par's ammedsate objective was the training of Indoneican underground workers in Bangkok who were to return to Indoneua and there train additsonal members and build up underground cadres. Its long term objective was the building up of a co-ordinated proletarian movement in "Aslia"

(Sootheast Asta and Australa). Ten Malaka envisaged an eventual fusion of eight regional Communist federations: Astin, West Europe, Rusua, India Iran, Afraca, Chana, North Amenca, and South America. Poobly the fact that Tan Malaka had been apponed Comunterm ag for Southest Au and Austrada had somethin to do with this udea There is no evadence to indicane that anythung concrese was ever done towards the attainment of thos objectine Tamin, however, did make some prugress towards buldang up an underground am Indoneua Though the membership of this underground was never large. us leaderihup in Java, eventually headed by Adam Malik and Sukarus. was a capable one and, while attasmong mnfluential poutions in legal youth crgamuations, usually managed to keep clear of Dutch suspicion.

With the faslore of the sga6–ige7 rebellions, the Communists' cegan zation was crushed, and the large majorsty of Communist leaders still in the Indies were arrested and deported to the concentration camp of Tanah Merah in New Gusnea Altogether some 1z,ooo people kere arrested. Of these, 43o0 were gwen prrion sentences and s,go8 were interned, Bay being sent to Tanah Merah The remaunder of the 13,oon vere soon released " Amongst those interned, the gomernment a al leged to have included a number of nauonalst polncal and labor leaders who were not Communsts and who had nothung to do with the rebellhon"1 After these arrests the power of the Communsts was broken for the remasnder of the penod of Dutch rute.

In igaß a relatnely weak comeback wat developed by a group of Surabaya Communuts who had lasn los during the rebelhon In July, sg28, under the leadership of Soenarpo and Mansoeki, a close aoquaint ance of Muso, thev establnhed a small labor union federation, Sarekat Kanem Boeroeh Indonesia Its plan of operation was to mfiltrate the varom umons wsth sts own cells which would eventmally come to control there After reaching a select and duriplined membershup of some seven hondred and after a year's exustence, the organtzation was dusohed by the government and its leaders arrested ta In Apnl, 1955. Vusso managed to re-enter Indoneua, remaning nearly a year an the

Surabaya area before leavinz agun for Ruvua. fere he bult up whvt was to become the cduef Stalitast-orsented Communist underground, the so-called "Ellegal Indonesron Commonst Party " Aspsrant ptobatonary members were ceganized anto a closely associated organiza tson, the Partat Korunes Moeda (Younz Communist Party) It s peobable that the unpaled membership of the Sarekat Kaoem Boeroch Indonewa provuded much of the nucleus of Muws's organration" Both Mutuo's and Tan Malakas undergrounds were. however, relatvely weak, and the center of the stage in she natsonalist struggle dueing the remaander of the period of Dutch rule was held by non Communist leaders and thesr crganizations

The bitter struggle between Sarekat blam and the Communats and later the sharp reaetion ts the government to the Comavunest rebel fbon convunced manv strongly Moslem nationalists formerly assocoated with Sarekat Iilam that work towards their socioreligious and mational odeals could be better carried on through nonpolitscal channels Thus a targe poetion of the membernhup of Sarekat Islam that did not follow the Communsts streamed nto the Mohammadipah.* an organization founded in igia at Jogakarta bv Ka Hapi Ahmad Dahlan. a believer in Modernist Istamuc sdeas. Oniginally devoted largely to education, the organaration broodened its actavsties to include a wade range of social services free clinocs, poor relef, crphanages, publahung of the Koran in Javanese and Malay, libraries, etc, as well as Molem schonlt It concesved suelf esentially as a propagator of Moslem culture and the nonpolitical ideas of the Modernist movement The organiration, itself, undertook no political actvity, leaving such actavity to its members on an indn idual basus t" As Bousquet observed. "It would be very wrong, hovever, to suppove from this ats members entertain no political biat. Indeed, it would not be wholly ineorrect to say that they are quite as ants Dutch as other mationalists, Moslem or otherwise."" Actually the progresuse Moslem social concepes whoch it sought to advance could not be divested of polstical overtones. The Mahammadijah could not help but develop the political conicsousnes of ats members and of the pupils taught in its reany schools It was a still, but deep, tributary of the stream of political nationalism and quetly but sustainedly nourahed and strengthened that stream.

Performing a roughly smolar function win the Tamon Siswa move ment establshed in igas at Jogjakarta by R M Soewardi Soeryaningrat (Ka Hadpar Dewantoro) shartly after he returned from the exile consequent upon hus earlier natsonalut activities His alm vas to develop an edocational system based upon a realistic synthesis of Indoneian and Western culture whuch would train Indonenan youth in sellreliance and deselop in them a competence to meet the practical problems whch they faced Though the teaching of polstics was expresly forbudden, teachers an the more thon zoo Taman Siswa schools being forbudden to hold membershap in a political party." there is no doubt that these schools were estremely umportant in developung a national ist mentality among the youth It s no accident that so large a proportion of thesr graduates became actne particopants and leaders in the varaoun politcal natiomalut organurations

Of greatest amportante in deterrmaning the character of the Indonesiun notionalnt movement an the years folloving the Communist rebellion was the Perhumpoenn Indonesa (Indonesian Union) Tha esventially political organization of Indoneuan students studyang in Holland was formed there in sges from the ranks of a peevaeus but lea pohtical organuation Its adeas and policies came to play a doms ront role in the development of nationalsm in Indonesia, and the actinve in ths organoration in Holland By sgay its program stood for unequsocal ndependence for Indoneua to be attmined by the unifed efforts of all Indoneuam groups and classes on the bosus of nonco operation with the Dutch s The Marxist orlentation of most of its memhers was strong but the large majeority dad not become doetrinaire Marxats Support from and associstion wath all anticolonial groups and organizations was vought, whether they wese Commumist or not

Only a small proportion of the membership of the Perhompoenan Indonesta finally emerged as members of the Communist Party Among these were Setadpt. Abdulmadjd, Suripno, and Maroto Darosman none ol whom returned to Indoneua until 1g46 After Hata's departure for Indonesia late in tggz, the organization came increasiagty under the control of Setiadpst and Abdulmdjud Though they never acknowledged thesr Communost affiliation untal sg18, they succerded after sggß in changing the polity of the Perhumpoenan Indoneua, in line with Cominterm pohey. to one of co operation with the Dutch Symbolie of the dropping of the demand for full andependence was their change of the name of the organsration's official pobtication, Indonens Meideka (Free Indentua) to Indoness Under Setadt and Abdulmadjd the organuration strongls attacked the policies in Indoneua of Hatta and Sjahrer as well as those of Soekarno

Semaoen and Tan Malaka established contact wuh the Perhumpornan Indonesa and, though undoubtedly influencing some of its members, by no means domnated it On December 5. 1926, Mohammad Hatta, leader of the Perhumpoenan Indoneua, tugned a united front comvention ith Semaoen, as repretentative of the Indoneuan Communast Patty. According to this the Perhompoenan Indoneua was to aswume top leadership and full responsibility for tdhe natsonalist movement in Indonesia and the PKI and ats subordinate organzations would refrain from any opposition to the Pethampoenan Indomesta's leadership so long as it consistently continued to follow the policy of independence for Indonesia A sear later, however, en December 19. 1ga7. Semaoen felt obliged to repadiate the agreement and formally recant, saying that when he signed it he had not been in contact with esther the Indonesian Communist Party or the Comantern He had made a mistake, he stated, and after careful study of the agreement "in the light of Communist principles on the one hand and of events in Indonesia on the other" it wan clear to hum that to carry on with it would mean "the liquidation of the independence and leading role of the Communist Party."* Ths broke the bond between the socralstically inelined revolutionary nationalats of the Perhumpoenan Indonesia and the Communits. The bond between the organzation and the League Against Imperialism (Laga) was dnsolved in the summer of sgag. when the Perhimpoenan Indonesia delegates followed other socialists an resigning from that increaungly Comintern-dominated body."

The ideas of the PI (Perhsmpoenan Indoneua) affected the course of the Indonesian nationalist movement via the return of its members to Indonens and through ats publications In addatitm st maintained close contact wath and exerted a strung influence on the thinking of the larger number of Indonesian students studyng at Cairo and Mecca Almost all members of the PI upon fitahing thear studies in Holland returned to Indoneua to embark upon political careers Between 1g23 and tgay these memhers helped establish a number of "study clubs" in some of the cheel Indoneuan cittes and an them PI Ideas were dis semunated In sgs6 the PI an Holland decoded that its resurnees in Indoneua were atrong enough to establish a political party, Because of the exnung strength of the PKI, however, this plan had to be deferred *

On June 4. sgs7. such an organration, the Paria: Nauonal Indonesia*" (Indonesian Nationalat Party), or PN1 as it was usually referred to, was establabed by the members of the Bandung Study Club under the chasnmanshup of = young engineer, Soekarno, one of the few umportant ptembers of the organization not a member of the PI. Soekarno had been a protégé of Tjokroominoto and had erned his engineering degvee and the title Ir. (Ingenmeur) as the Bandung Technical College Possessed of a conuderable Mostem as well as Western elucation, he had the unique gifs of being able to syntheuze Western and Islamue concepts wrth those of the strongly survwing Hindu- Buddhust tempered Javanese mysticiim and translating ths synthess in terms which the peasant could understand, Other leading members of the new party were Me." Iskaq Tjokrahaduoerjo, as seceretary, and Dr Typto Mangoenkoesoemo, Ir. Anwars, Mr. Boedarto, Mr. Sartono, Mr Al Sastroamidjojo, Dr. Sams: Sastrowsdagdo, and Mr. Sonarjo The party's am was complete independence for Indonena, economic as well as polrtical, with a government elected by and respomuble to he whole Indonen people. Such independence could be reached, it held, only on a baus of nanco-operation with the Dutch and would come enly as the result of the united efforts of the Indo neuans themielves Unity among and self rellance by Indonesans were held to be of primary amportance Soekarno frequendy stressed that the party could not have an Islamic basit, for independence was as much the objectise of Indonesan Christians as of Mohammedans It was useless. he stated in hut speeches, to wait for help from "an airplane from Moscow er a caliph from Istanbul " Unity was also necessary, Seekarno warned, even in tgzg, to defend Indonesia in the appronching Pacific war among the Great Powers. In ats smmediate program the party was attve in building up the laber unions, un developing co-operatnes and in supporting national education, especsally the Taman Siva schools

The PNt's program and able leadershup. in particular Soekarno's cratortal skill, brought it rapud and large scale gronth Within two years it had over 1o,ooo meribers U'ndoultedly some of this number was drawn from the former membership of the Sarekat Rakpats and formerly Communne-dominated trade unoons This rapid growth was also to no small estent made povible because of the relatively liberal policy towards the right of assoctatzon allowed bv De Graeff, the Durch Governor General whose five vear term commenced just after the out break of the Communst rebellion He was far more tolerant of the nationalst movement than ans of the Governor Generals who pre ceded or followed hem.

The PNI became the most powerlul nationalnt organztãon in In donesia, and, supported by the teaders of Sarekat Islam, it was able to establish a loose federation of all the umportant exnting nationalit organizations. Thus federation, the PPPKI." gave the nationalist movement a unity that it had never prevsously pevtessed. A result of this was to push the constituent co-operative nationalst erganizations more in the nonco-operative direction of PNI and Sarekat Islam.*

The rapudly gathering strength of the PN1 and sts outspoken antsgovernment tone combined with anticapitalnt (though clearly non- Commumnt) overtones thoroughãy alarmed the Dutch community in the Indses It soon brought pressure to bear en the already uneasy government, and on December z4. sgzg. Soekarno and seven other leaders of the organsration were arrested. After more than seven months of detention, four of them—Soekarmo, Gatot Mangoepradja. Maskoen, and Soepradinata-tere beought to tral and on September

3. 1p3o, sentenced to from approximately one to three years impeisonment, Soekarno getting the maximum term. They were charged with having partscapated at an organsration whch had as its aim the committing of crmes as well at ... deliberately expressing themsehes an words wheresn the disturbance of public order and the overthron of the estihlished Netherlands Indits Authotity were recommended"

These arrests and the subsequent outlawong of the PNI served for some time to moderate the character of nationalest organizations and made thesr teaders more cautious The PNI membership was absorbed by three new ceganuations, two of which adopted much more cautiout polcues and more moderate programs than had the PNI. The first of ihese, the Partas Rakjst Indoneia (Indoneuan People's Party) was organued by Muhammad Tabram, an outstamding Indonesuan jowrnalnt, on Septenber 14. 1ggo Its program was based on co-operation self government by parltamentary means, it attracted few members.** The majonty of the PNI membershap followed the lead of Sartono, who in conjunction with the remainder of the party's central beard ordered its membershup to cease activaty Sartono then established a new party, Partai Indonesia (usually referred to as Partindo) at the end of Aprl. tggt This aimed at complete independence on a basis of nonco operation but was conuderably more moderate in the methods it ads ocated than the PNI had been"

There was an amportant munorsty of the old party, however, which olently oppoied its disiolution and accused Sartono and his colleagues of lick of courage and character fer their actiant Furthermore they maed tha he an te reman pary leadeip hd aced cratcally by forcing domolutuon wthout fest determinng the wishes of the party memberthup This group, the Golongan Merdeka (Independent Group) maintaened subetantally the same program as had te PNI I vas fotonate obai tw ecetonaly ale leader Soetan Sjahrar, a twenty three year old law smodent at Leiden and promonent P1 member who returned from Holland to head the or-

llambenger in ep est, po gii-goe

Sat, ep est, p éo Blambenger in ap est, p sis ganization in early sgpa, and Drs Vohamtad Hata, the expersenced leader of the PI who came back to Indoneva later on the year Shortly after Spahtu's armval the name of the Gotorgan Merdeka was changed to Club Pendadikan Nasoonil Indoreua (Indonesun National Educa toon Club) Hatta upon returning repliced Sjuahrir as churman, with the younger leader becomunz hux cluet leutenant

It is of lonz term segnafrance diat Hatta ant Spahror preferred not to mork wcth Partundo, the man palitu al ragantuaton, but unitead de lberatels chose to awrcate themseses sth the relatvels small, and highly polsteally consesuus group of natomulista un the Golorgan Merdeka Both were consinced that such russ purues and she chars matte leadershup upon wtuch they depended were unvasted to the ef feetrve furtherance of the natoonulst movement Ihe alulity of the Dutch to jaul at will anv leader whone appeal to the muses became dan gerous to theur unterests made reiianre on sish iradervhip uselew, thev fel. A matsonal movement dependent upon a fe-s kes men at the top was doomed to failure sunce the Dutch could be resed upon to re move such leaders from the political cene Such a muvement, thev be lotved, would have enduring strength only ef a ugnd cant nunber of the Indonesan penple were educated to politcal maturity and a thoeough understanding of natsonalnt principles This process of edocation they conceived of as a long term, unspectacular operation The turlding up of cadres of firstand second echelon leaders was the necessary firtt step These an turn could educate woder crcles Small cadres of sell reliant. strongly conscious mationalists would an the long run, they were con vinced, achieve the undependence that mass support of short-careered charsmatic leaders could not.

The Dutch were not slos in understanding the threat to their as cendancy that the sdeas of Hatta and Spahnr posed In February, 1931- boch were arrested and without tat exaled to the Tanah Merah con centration camp at Boven Digul, New Gurnes There and afterwards on the tuny sland of Banda they were confined until released just be fore the Japanese invatson in early sgpz. The soundness of their ideas is attested to by the fact that after their exule four vuccewse executive boards of their organtzation were arrested and yet it continued to carry on until thear return to Java.*

Following hit releate from jail an December 3t, s93s (after a short-

Suarun, ep et, pp 4-51 emong of lhas prson term), Soekarno worked hard to jorn the Partindo and the Penddákan Nauonal Indonesia into one party, but without success Finally, in July, rgsz, he decided to join Partindo, of whach he was made chaurman by unanomous acclaim Under his leadership that peaty ummedaiely adopted a irmer natsonalst lume, and ets growth accelerated enormously By mud sg3s it had so branches and zo,ooo membens as compared to about 1,ooo members im the Pendidikan Nassonal Indonesia *ª With zo ooo regntered members, the party undoubtedly had a mass following many tames that great, Soekarno's excepional abulasy to command the respect and loyalty of smany inselleo tuals while establishong wude rapport woth the masses was a dangerous combonation, and woh hattle heutation the government antervened, summanly arresting ham in August, 19g3, and without trial exiled him to the usland of Flores Later he was transferred to Benculin, where he was confined unul released by the Japanese sn vpe

With the arrest and exile of Soekarno, Hatta, Sajahrır, and other dy. namuc nationalist Jeaders, and with the continuance of a strongly repressive pobey under Governor General de Jonge, the Indonesian nationalnt movement was forced in to much shallower polstical chan nels than it prevoously had reached Those who had the courage to fol low n the steps of the euled leaders were promptly arrested, while the ancreased efficiency of the secret poloce made underground activisy more difficult than ever Thought some of the most smportant portues sefused to send representatives to the Volkseaad and for the most part man tauned a polaey of nonco-operwtion, there was a general shift in the center of gravity of the movement towards fimited co operation, it be ing felt that such was the only practical way of winning politscal con cruons

This feeling provoked a schusm teathen the Sargkat Islam, whoch un igag had changed its name to Partan Sarekat Islam Indonesia ** Its refural to co-operate and its ancreaung emphaus on relgion at the expeme of social and economic questsons were held by many to have been promanly responuble for sts having teathered to some sr,ono members The splat was firally preciputated in sg34 over the role of the knaps (the local refigrous teacher and leaders) Dr Sukuman and Abtkusno Tjokrosujoso, tho of the party's top leaders, wished to utlize these

e See Banbenger, Dr Comessutuche Brueging in Nederlasdech Ind a, p 1s3 Indonaun Iilamuc Amaçatsn Past) The teperstn of the wond 'Indo nouas ato dhe orgreuntion'à mame reflecied pa alundosment of à ras lslanut outhck, an agtlaok wloch followong the sphttang off of the pro Convanat elemeare frem the ergamation tad tessme quse srong consersative local leaders to bnld up a moneo-operative mam party based primatily on religion Oppmed to this was the the group led by Hadji Agoes Salint who thought such a courte would neressitase abandonment of the soetat and economic relurm snherent in Modernist teachong. and furthermnre that uvetul concessions from the govern ment might be won through a polics of limited co-operatson entaling porticipation un the Vofksrand Salam s group became known as the Pemjedar Barisan PslI 1Movement to Make the Partas Sarekat Islam Indonesia Comcaous) **

Symbolie of the general trend ron ards evulutiomars political organuratons was the roe of the relativels moderote Parandra (Partat Indoneua Rapa, Greater Indonestan Parts) Ihis beame the chuef Indontuan political organization and u s o-uperative or notco-opetative as st felt the occaron demanded It nas formed in sgss out of a fuson of the federatuon of moderate studs clubs known as the Persaroean Bangsa Indonena, the Bord: Oetomo, and a number of umaller non Javanese nationalat organuations L nder the leadershup of Dr Raden Soetomo,*" Mohammad Hoesni Thamrin. Mr Susanto Tirtopeodjo. Sockardjo Wirjopranoto, and Woeraningrat, this becante the most influential Indonesun group in the Volksraad Though at was able to accompluh lttle in that hodv er in the political sphere in general, it dad do conviderable valuable work for Indonesian society in other felda It estabblahed retail and pezsant co-operatves, a bank granting reasonable credit terms to Indonesuans, a hostel for ampoverished laborers, a program to combat sllsteraty, and a number of other socally valuable undertokings "

The hopes for an evolutsonary development toward sell government entertained by members of Parndrs and other moderate nationalist groups soon espetsenced a rude shock. This resulted from the rejection by the Netheriands government of the Soetardjo Petstion. a proposal passed by a majority (r6-zo) of the Volksraad in mid 19g6 Thas asked that a conference be convened to discuss plans for she evolutionary development of Indonesa over a ten year period toward self government within the timits of the exsting Dutch Constipation." The rejectson of thas very moderate proposal was a sobering dash of cold water in the faces of those Indonessans who had believed that a policy of moderation and co operatson with the Dutch twoald be a sure, though perhape slow, rood ton ard self government

Partly as a tewalt of the general reaction to the government's negatwe atutude tovards the Soetardjo Petstion and partly because of a growing consciouness among Indontuan antellectuals of the over all world threat of Fasenm, there was established at the end of Apeil, 1957. a ntn patty, the Gerindo (Gerakan Rakjat Indonesia, Indonesuan People's Movement) Enrolled in it were the members of the desolved Parundo as well as numerous indis aduals who had become dissatisfied with the more comeratve partes Under the leadenship of Mr Sartono, Mr Amır Sjarduddın, Dr A K. Gani, Sanus Pane, Wikana and Mr. Mohammad Yamun, this party grew rapudly and soon became the powerful left uung of the natsonalist movement. What maght have emerged as a strongly mulitant nationalnt force was sempered by the developing world stuation and the keen senutneness of the nationalists encolled in the Gerndo to the threat of Fasosm From the very beginning, the strongly socialenticafly mclmed membershup of this party diusplayed an internatanal orxentatuon The struggle for national independence was seem as dependent upon the outcome of worid wide stroggle between the forees of Faseam and ants Fascum Most of its members felt that the danger of world conquest by the Fascst powers was a problem which took immediate precedence oner their struggle for national andependene They vere consed tha the lon run aainmen of Indontuan ndependence called for their short run solidarity with the Dutch to delend Indoneua aganst the mounting threat of Japanese conquest Thos the Gerndo, despite the zmherently militant nationainm oi sts members, operated on a generally co-operative banis, supporting the government and partsespating an the Volksraad But at the sime ume it exerted strong and constant pressure for the grantung of self government to Indonesia. and st made it clear that effective cooperation beteen Holland and Indoneua agaant the spread ef Fas csm called for co operation an the hasis of equality "

In May, so39 prateapafly through the efforis of Mohammad Horni Thamrin of the Parindra, the prncipal Indonesian nationalst cegatizations were drawn tegether into one large federation," the Gapi (Gaboengan Poltiek Indonetia-Federation of Indonesian Political Parties). This united eight of the most amportant natsonalist organizations and was chairmaned by a trumvirate consisting of Amir Sjarifuddin, representung Gerindo, Abikusno, representing the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia. and Thamrin, repeesenting Parindra. The principal points in the common program uniting the conststuent groups of Gapi called for (1) the right of self-determinatson for Indoneua, (s) national unity founded upon "politscal, economie and social democcracy," (s) a democratscally elected Indonesian parliament respomuble to the people of Indonesia and (t) solidarity between Indoneuan political groups and the Netherlands in order to maintain a strong anti Fascut front.

This program was gsen more definite form at the Indoneuan People's Congress (Kongres Rakjat Indonesa) spomored by the Gapi in December, agg9. and attended by repeesentatves of ninety different mationalntic political, socral, and economsc organizations Streung the need for unity among the natzonalist organizations, the Congres offically adopted the Indonesuan language (Bahasa Indoneua) as the national language, the red and white flag as the natsonal flag. and the song Indonesia Reja ("Greater Indonesia") as the national anthem

*The PPPKI had meantime become inacthe following Gevemment attion againnt the non moperatise partas that had chiety energand at lis qth Congreu, acheduled to meet in Surakarta in sggy had to be cancrlled because the govermmens refoved its permimion

a It incdaded the Gerindo, Parindea, Pasoendan, Penatoran Munatasa, Partal Kachalak Indeoma, Patal Sarekat Idam Indooesia, Partai Islem Indonea and Partai Arab Indonena (ee koch, op enf, pp sgo-sgi) Because of the govemnent's ban en is holding of metngs the Pemdidáan Nasonal Indonetia ded not jon (Satrus, ep, nt, p 55)

tet Actally these natonalat symbels were alrrady widely accepted The oath to support one country and one language, the Dahasa Indonesa. ent tack to the sgaß eoederence of Pemuda Indonesua (Young Indeneua), the all Indonesca youth erganiraton The following year this eath had been taken over by the chief pohtcal partirt and religrtun mocial organiaations After thas all ofcul nationalit publications were in the Bahasa Indenema (The bane element in the Tahasa Indonesia wis the "tazaar Malay" which had apread thmugh most of the market plates of Indoneua as a lngua franca froes its souree in centeal and south Sumatra, frorn whence it alte sprend to Malaya However, thas base was boch refined and muth expanded by reference back to the language an it had developed in Sumatra Lhewae a large zumber el Wetem sords, Datch in parneslar, wete added to at along wth a lever number of previoudy unabserbed Arabic espremora)

Indasena Rajs was etmposed by W. R. Soepratman for a zouth congrew held n sgay Is was uken over by Sodkarmo't PNI and soon became the pesopal fationalut wong

The vague speech of Queen Welhelmina from London on May to, *g1t, in which she promised that efter the wer there would be an indefinite reorganiration of the relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia, hardly offset the ditulluson that snternatsionally oriented Indonesians had experienced because of the government's attstude toward the Wiwoho Resolution and the Atlannc Charter Thas drullu sion resulted in a rapud erouon of the Indoneuan Dutch soldarity whoch the threat of expanuonist Fascnm had anduced There occurted a wide seale disaflection of Indonestans from the once consuderable ranks of those who because of that threat had gren first prioraty to Indoneuan Dotch solidarity A decreasing handful ef sntellectuals still managed to see thungs in the same petipectase How ever, the majority of educated Indontuans who for à time had subordinated their na uonalism to an internauonal ouslook now drifted back to the numerous ranks of those who had not done so The gulf between the Dutch and the educated Indonesians gres wider, and the attitude of the latter and that ofl the Indonesian masses grtw clover Spabest observes that for she average Indoneuan

The fall of Holland evoked aectet atafaction, and at was espected that there would be stull more radscal happenungsThe conscousness of foreign domination coupled wath an intense deure foe (reedom and independence became increasingly srong As the war [in Eutope] developed sn those first years, the people deswed a vicarous satuslaction froen the musfortunes of theur rulens And this provaded a stunulus for further escrangement from the Dutch and for the growth ol a national welf-consciousness.

For the average Indoneuan, the war was not really a world conflet between two great world feces. It was aumply a struggle an whuch the Dutch colomal rulers fnally would be punahed by Provydence for the esl, the arrogante, and the oppremon they had trought to Indonesua Among the maues. ants Dutch feeling grew stronger and strenger Thas wan naturally reflected in the nation alut mosement and an ats leadershup. part of whch espresed sympathy for the Axis openly 193

The small number of infuential teaders of the nationalist movement who remained conseneed that resstance to the threat of the Fascist powers to the freedom of the world as whole took precedence over the struggle for Indonesian independence were meither able to infuence the masses un this direction nor to motigate their mounting consiction that Japan's defeat of the Dutch would mean liberaton For as Spahrir explains: "Essentially, the pepularty of Japan ancteased as one

1* Sotan Sjahair, Oul of Enle, tr by Charles Welf, Jr (New York, sgig), pp *18aspect of the groving ants Dutch animus and as a projection of fresuared deure foe freedom." u* The mythocal prophecy of Djojabojo, a Javanese king of the fourteenth century, reappeared and gained the aidest currency According to in the Indonesians after a long period el sibjection (accordang to sote versions of the propheey, three centuries) by a whate race would be freed after a yelloue race from the north had drum out the whates The zellow race would stay in Indonesis an long as the span covered by the gronth of corn betweem planting and harvest Long before thetr attack the Japanese were looked upon as the vellon hberators of the prophecy, so that as their aggressne demigns became cleaser those who believed tn the prophecy felt their tiberation that much nearer at hand

When finally the Japanese atack came, the overwhetming majority of the Indoneuan people, sncluding a large majoraty of educated matonalsts, esther welcomed it because of their antucapaton that conds trons under the Japanese would be better or remained apathetic be-

Whule donang the last tao years of Dutch rule the inciplent ad hoe solidanty betseen the Indonesan ntellectuals and the Dutch was disintegrating. the solidaraty among Indomeian pationalats was increasing A second Iodonesian People's Congres was held September 13-14, a91a, at Jogjakarta wth a representation even vrder than the first. It decided to estabish out of itself a permanent erganiration, the Madjelis Rakjat Indontua (Indonesian People's Countil), wath an execuve board made up of representatives of Gapi, the MLAI (a federa tron of nonpohtical Moslen organuzataons), and PVPN (a federation of trode uroons of govermment employets) The Madjelis was regarded as a permanent representatve body of the entire Indonmian national imovement Itn chaei cbjectve vas a representatve parliament for Indonetia to which the Indies government would be respensible. It had yost embarked upon a vagorous and widespread peogram dedicated to that aum when the Japanese reached Indonesia.

ut Sre shad, pp z-

CHAPTER IV

The Japanese Occupation

THE WEAK, half hearted defense put up by most Dusch land forees against the invading Japanete made a tremendout ampresuon on the Indoneuans * On February 11, sg1z, the Japanese attacked and quickly overran South Sumatra. Early on March ist they landed on Java and within eight days the Dutch Commander in Cluef of Allied forces on Java, Lt. Gen. Ter Poorten, surrendered in the name of all Allied forces in Java. Though some 8,ooo Britush and American troops on Java led by the Britsh Major General Sitwell wnhed to continue Eighting the Japanese and their intention wzs known to the Dutch, Ter Poorten surrendered on theer behald wthout conmultung their commanden.a This fart became generally knonn and served to ingrease the conviction among Indonesians that the Dutch lacked courage.

To many educated Indoneuans this eagermess of the Dotch to surrender and not to provoke Japanese hostlty by the contimuance of warfare was positive proof of the strong rumoes that they wshed to make a deal woth the Japanese such as the Vachy French had done in Indo Chana, whereby they would continue to admanister the counery, but under Japanese supervuon * Moreover most of the population re ceved the impresmon that the Japanese troops were more poorly equipped than the Dutch and, up untal the Dutch capitulated, seemed to be smaller in numbers They had, of course, no means of knowing that dhe pungle warfare and infiltration tactics of the attackers called for small tututs and that actually the Japanese had a conuderable supemonty un numbers, nor that the tevel of Japanese tranang was far supernor to that of most troops under Dutch command.

Regardless of one's analyus of the corcumstances of the Dutch defeat, it entailed two clear consequentes Farst, Dutch peestige in the eyes of the Indonenans suffered a devastating blow Second, many Indonesans were commined that, if given arms, they could have done as well as the Japanese

When the Japanese arrved, they were generally enthusiastically recerved The popuflar feeling that they came as liberators was renforced nenan national flag and the singing of Indonerra Reys, the national anthem, boch of which bad been forbidden by the Dutch

Of great importance in winning the instial acceptance by the ma jorsty of educated Indoneuans of the Japanese occupation was the tremendous upward rse in socio-economoc status of such people which expedrency alone foeced the new rulers to bring about This was made necesmary because withun six monthy of thesr amval the Japanese in termed in concentratson camps practscally the whole Dutch popula tion plus a sulntantial proportion of the Eurauans, as well as a number of Chestan Indoneuanm whom they suspected of harborang pro Dutch sympathoes The Japanese had extremely few military government per sonnel and perforce had to rely on Indonenans to fill most of the middle and upper beacket admunistratve and techical postions vacated by the Dutch and Eurasuans.* Thus almost all such Indonesian personnel found themselses advaneed at least one and frequently two or three ranks in the hierarchy in whuch hey had been employed Thereby the Japanese anstally ether won the support ee neutralzed the anupathy ef a very large poruson of educated Indonesuans

For thas reason, and becaume of the welcome thes receved from the popalation, the Japunese do not srem to have antaripated any real epposition from the nationalist leaders Ihes appeared to feel that they could esploit the resources of Indonesua for the benefit of their war effort wthout having to make concevoons to Indonesuan natuonal ism On the bates of this com action thes launched the Triple & Move ment (Pergeraken Tiga A) on April 29 1912 The thrre Vs stood for the slogans introduced and much propagandued be the Japanese Japan the Leader of Aua. Japan the Prutector of Aua, and Japan the Light of Ata" The aljectiue of the movement was to mubilize Indonesuan support for Japan's war eflort and the Greater East Vua Co prosperts Sphere The earls belef ol the Japanese that thes did not need to work through Indonesan natsonalism in order to attain their objectives is further borne out bs the fact that the Indonesuan whom they apponted to lead ths movement, Mr Raden Samsoedon, w2s clearly not a nationalnt leader of the first rank •

Speedily the Japanese were drabned of thus idea The Triple A Movement despote its hogh powered propaganda was a complete fizzle Aan soludarity against the West under the hegemony of Japan was an udea wluch in any case would have elicsted small respome from Indometcans. It was certainly not of sufficient attractiveness to outwengh the economic exploctaton upon wluch the Japanese embarked Very soon st twas apparent that the country s eronomic welfare tu2s being subardnated to the benefit of Japan with no quid pro quo for Indonesia

The archupelago vwas beang draned of foodstuffs, oil, and quinine, while badly needed rommumer goods, voth a cloth, and machine pasts were not comang an The hvesh and heas, handed control by the Japanese over school curricalwm as well as thesr mital mstenee that the Japonete linguage replace Dutch in the secandary and higher schoola and as the langunge of governmental admamitration resulted in sharp nega Ive reactions

More umportant, and peradang almot the entre Indonestan populanon, was the strong antaganum ereated by the overbeanng rudeness and faequent beutalty on the part of many Japanese in their deal anga uith Indoneiuats Withun a few months the Japanese began to realure that they no longer enjoyed the support of either the masses or the large smajorsty of educnted Indonesiins A growing antupvthy toward them smong the population began to become motiorible and was punctuated by epen smalt seale unsurrections against them even belore the end of 1g1ª The Japanese were concerned about the obvous hostilty and occasional defiance displayed by some of the col lege and secondary school students, and they were partcularly alarmed oner the dscovery that underground ceganizations enrolling some of these students as well as more seatoned poltscal leaders were heing established They began to comprehend that the Indonesuan natsemalnt movement was a real and powerfut force with whuch same sort of modus an endr would have to be reached if even the minmum aums of their occupation were to be attained Realzation of this broughs the Japonese to embark on radically differene policies First of all they turned thear attention to those nationalist leaders who they felt sure commanded real popular sopport.

Shortly after thear arrnal, the Japonese released Soekarno from his place of detention in Benculen and alloned him to procted to Jasa Here he quickly contacted Hatta and Sahrir, both of whom hod already bee bouch wth the underground beng orgauzed by Sprtudh and Danmavan Mangoenkoesoemo It was mutuolly decided that the natoonalst struggle could best be peosecuted as two levels-legally above ground and underground Soekarno and Harta were to wark above ground through the Japanese, and Sjahnr, whale maintaming contact wath them, vas to erganure an undergroond resistance

For several years at was repeatedly claumed by Dutch spokesmen thit Soekamo vas an unpnncipled, pro Japinese collaborator, In earty 19p9 subitantally the same charge was mrde by Sosset spokesmen, it being applied by them to Hatta as well ' Gradually the Dutch have dropped their chatge, Van Mook himielf stating at the end ef 1918: "From documents later discovered it is very elear that an all his objectiomable activties he (Sockarno) was always govermed by the objective of an independent Indonena "• It in werthwhule noting what Sjahrir, one of the buterest opponents of those who collaborated th the Japanese for their own penanal ends, has to say ol thas early meeting with Sorkarno and Hatta Soekarno, Sjahrar says, regrded the Japonese "as pure fascists, and fels that be must use the most vabtle counsermethods to get arouned them, such as mrking, an appear ance of collabcration " Boch Soekarno and Hata, he contunues, agreed to do "everything legally possible to give the nationalist struggle a broader legal scope, and at the same time secretly support the revolu thonary resutance " It was expected, he sass. that the Japanese would attempt to capitalue on Soekarnos populrity for propoganda pur poset, and the three "agreed that politscal concessions from the Japa nese must be presed for in return•

With regard to Hatta, the Datch shemmelves were aware that, while he was still in exile on the island of Banda, and only a few weeks be fore the Japanese landed, he had the courage to w rite an article, wudel circulated in the press throughout Indonesia, in which he declared his strong oppoution to the Axis and hs support for the Allies Sjahrir states that Hatta "never made common cause with those Indoneuam who went to work for the Japanese because of ether maternal deugns or potical sympotlues " Hatta acrepted his postion under the Japa nese at the behest of Sahrt's underground group By them he was given the tasks of securing fonds and facilitaung the travel of its meesbers. According to Spahrar, he "acqustted humself of these tasks capably and fasthfully, He alto receved our reports and warned us when lhe heard something was beewing on the Japanese side I heard from him everything that took place among the Japanese and among the coltaborating Induneuans" a" Through to exceptuonally skillful underground workert, at first Djohan Sparoezah and later Dr. Abdul Halım, Hatta was able throughout the Japanese occupation to keep in contact with the ptincipal Indonesuan underground organsrationa

in order to enlist she support of Soekarno, Hatta, and some of the coher imluental natsonalist leaders for their war effort, the Japantse promned that sell-government would be granted in the near future and allowed the establishement on March g. 191g, of am all inclusive nationalust orgamzation, the Poesat Tenaga Rakjat (Cemter of People's Power) or Poetern as it came to be known This included all of the fornter Indonesian polstucal and nonpoliucal nationalut associationt domiciled in Java and Madura The nes organzation was limited to these is lands t" and was envsaged as a beidge to sels-governmenm. Thos idea was encouraged by Premaer Tojo it a beoadcast in June. s94s. and in hs vait to Indonena in the following month, when he announced that Indonetwam should take part an their own government A beard of four membens twith Soekarno as charman, Hatta as vice-chairman; and ncluding Ks Hadjer Dewantoro and a prominent Mohammedan Jeader, Ksaps H M Mansoer, were appointed by the Japanese to head the Poetera t" The general conviction that Poetera was a genuinely natronalist organszaton beaded toward self government beought it widespread backing, even from many of the students who had been in contact with the underground organizations

This belief was soon Jent support in early Sepoember 1943. when ancillary to the Poetera, a Central Advnory Board, an apponted representative councd for Indoneua, was estahlished ath Soekarno as preudent This and sumilar local boards which were then set up were supposed to be consulted by the Japanese authorties befare drawing up any smportant measure. On November 1o, spgy, Soekarno and a leading rmember of the Central Adssory Bourd, Ki Bagoes

"thd, p

Hadikoesoema, went to Tokzo in order to espees the thanks of the people of Java for the step toward self government conudeted im plicit in the granting of this repreientatise council.

There was an amutung twist to thas Hatta, because of het relation shap with the underground, had come to be conudered too dingerous by the Japanese authorsties in Java It was their plan that for safety's ike he be anterned upon arrsving an Japom and nnt allowed to return Thesr untention was apparently muunderetood an Tokyo Ior there he was awumed to be a member of the Commosion of Tlunks and along with Sorkarno and Ks Bigoes sas prestnted wath a decoration making hum immune from arrest hy the kempesta: " and then returned to Java with the others, much to the surprise of the authorsties there

For the Japanete the Poettra was primarily a means for rallying Indoneuan support behund their war efßort, wherein certain conces sons to the nationalut leaders had to be made an order to keep them in line To these nationalst leaders it wat primarily a means for spread ang and ansenulying nationalnt adeas among the manes and forcing concewons from the Japinese leading towatd sell government See ondaraly and subordinately, they conceved of it as an neganization dedicated to helpung the Japanese war eflort, but only to the munumum extent necesury in ender to allow the furtherance of thesr oun long term nationalist aima Active in the Poetera were a conuderable num ber of purely self seeking opportunnts and a few Japonese symputluzers, but the majority of sts leaders and active members conceived of it primarily as a means for supporting the long term struggle for unde pendence. For thus end it was an umperfect and imprecise instrument Certainly it did arouse Indoneuan natronalum and advance the cause of Indonesuan independence But in the proces st begot dangerout comtequences Not only dod st strengthen the Japanese war eflort, but also it helped estallish ceganuzations, pirticularly among the youth, among many of whose members the Japunese mculcated authoritarian mentalities with a poutive respect for force and an emotional ants- Westernism Particularly was thas true among the youthful and shightly educated members of the milatary and para mulatary organarations which it sponsneed. In the end the mapornty of their members emerged anti-Japonese and pro-Allied However, the legaey of unerstral te aponte to authortarcan command from above and the dnpoution to rely on violence and brutality with whuch the Japonese hael sn sntensely indoctrinated them remained strong among miny.

" The Kempeltal was amemewbue similar an the German Gecape or the Sosrt StD

NATIOVAIISM AND REVOLUTION

Yet theie is no doulke that the most smportant long term result of the actuvities of the Poetera was the tremendous increase in political consciousness of the Indonesuan masses, and in particular their will to independence For the Poetera not enly allowed but even encouraged the contact between nationalst leaders and the masses which the represuve apparatm of the Dutch regime had so severely limited. The objective of thas contact from the standpoint of the Japanese was to indoctrinate the masses to support them and to hate, and if necessary fight, the Allhes, to recrust labor battalions and rear-area troops for the Japanese army, and to mobilize raw material resources. In a limived measure this was accomplished But in much greater measure it resulted in the awakening of the vatonal velf consciousners and desire for inlependence of the Indonesian peatant. In this respect the radio, and in partacular Sockarno's spreches, were most important. The Japanese conssderably built up the archipelago's radio network, making sure that many of the villages and every city square had receivong sets. Large pablic address systemm linked to the tadio network, "unging towera," were set up at important points throughout the cities At prescnbed hours the populatson was required to laten to thear oficial brosdcasts, including the frequent speeches of Soekarno. In these, ao cording to his anstructions from the Japanese, he attacked the Allies, extolled the Japanese and called spon the population to support their twar eflort An examunation of these speeches, however, will support Soekarno's contention that "75 per cent of their content was pure ma tonvlam " Moreover, they were full of ubtleties and double talk which generally passed over the heads of Japanese monitors but were meanngful to the population, especially thme ef Javarese culture. Such talk made it easy for the peaant to equste "anti imperialim" with "ann Japanese."

Under the aegis of the Poetera a number of organizations dedicated to prosecution of the Japanese war effort were set up, The fist of these, the Hes Ho, consuted ef conscrnpted Indonesuan laborers, romushss, who were incorporated into the Japanese army as labor battalions and sent as far as Burma to wark on roads, fortificatons, etc. The casualty rate of these romushet was exceeduogly bigh, and of the many thoutands vio lelt Java only a small proportion returned. Large mumbers did not leave Java and were used by the Japanese to work plantations on on roads in the district from which they were draftedis

"la onder to mitlgue the handihips asfered by the fimilses of the romurtar, Poteca estaltluhed a social servike esginizatias beaded by Ono tshander Dinsto help them

In September, 1913. was establshed the most important of the Poetra sponsored organirations, the Soelarela Tentara Pembela Tanah Air (Volunteer Army of Defenders of the Fatherland) or Peta as it was commonly Anown Its members were often referred to as Sorkarelas (voluntcers)

Ths was a Japanese trasned, but Indonesan officered. milhtary orgaturation formed to help the Japanese defend Indoneya against Al Ited unvason At sts peak strength in the muddle of s91s it numbered about sso,ooo armed men It was the Peta which was to become the backbone of the Indontsian Republx s army The contunuous objec tve of Soekarno, Hatta, and other Poetera leadets was to andoctrinate the Peta's members wth a pro-Indomeian point of vew and only outwardl a pro-Japanese and ant: Allied orientatson Thesr success was not complete, but in conjunction woth the efforts of severat of the underground groups it was conuderable Bs s911 the average Peta mem ber was comerousds strongly natsonalist, ant Japinese, ants Dutch, but for the most pirt favorably disposed towards the other Vilhes, par ticularly the Unsed States Soekarno and Gatot Mangkoepradja, the Indonesian head of P'esa, becanse of their influence on the Japanese officers makang the selectiont, were able to muure the relability according to nationalist cons:derations of most umportant Peta officers. They argued to the Japanese. and eiectively, that in an army dedicated to the defense of the fatherland it was necessary to have strengly nationalst efficers In addition Sockarno cominced the Japanese that the Peta could be a good defensive organiration only if sts rank and file as twell as ies ofßcers had an aroused national consciousness. Thus, they allowed hum and others to speak to the various Peta units, inflaming them not against the Alhes alone, but against amperralism in general. Many Peta members had no dificalty in equating Japan's aetisities with amperalism by themselves To most of the less astute, this connection was soon made clear either by the educational work of the underground organizations or by the veiled unnuendos dropped by Soekarno and Hatta an theer speeches

The Japanese were particularly conscious of the favorable political results that might be realized through organizing the uneducated Indo nesan youth. These. haung liule knowledge of the West, could be most easily and effectively indoctrmated to hate and to fight the Allies The training of these youth groups was not in the hands of the Poetera but was managed by the Japonese propaganda service, the Sendenbo, whuch escablished several youth organizatons. These were given political imdoctrination plus some military training The first of them, the Srinendan, was established at the end of sggr an a naus youth organuation baied particularly on the village. Its members were rained in sumple muhtary exercues, mass dnll, and ants Albed ideas by a memher of thear village who had attended a Japanese school for instructors In s943 was organized the Gakutotat, an organration of studemts from the seventh grade through high school (and thus found unly in the cmes) Its members were aso given unteriave indoctryna taon agasnst the Allies (though with much less sucrem) and pome milt tery trasnong Famally was estabbshed the Barrian Pelopor (Piuneer Column), the most heamly indoctrstated of all zoush corps. The atti Western orientation of the members of thn tunarmed, but meltartly tramed, mass youth organzation was conisederably stronger than that of any of the othen

By the end of sgsß it was clear to the Japanese that the Poetera was accomphshing conuderabty moee for the Indonesan nationalist move ment than it was for the Japanese war effort In addition at was apparene that many of sts supporters, in particutar the educated youth, clearly evadenced atutudes that were more ant Japanese than ants Alled Accordimgly the Japanese military command dissolved she Peetera In its place, en March t, rgs4. they set up a new crganiza ion which they felt they could control more effectively, the Perhanpoenan Kebaktien Rakjat (People's Loyalty Oegatration), more generally known by sts Japanese name, Dawa Hokokas To help that at repeesent the Chonese, Arab, and Eurasuan communaty as well as the Indotesuan and forced it to submit to a much closer supervason and control than ltad been the case woth the Poetera Though nominally charmaned by Soekarno,i" the new ceganuration stood directly under the control of the Gunserkan, the Japanese emmmander in chief The hughly developed organization of the Hokokas, with a branch in every village, was mantained compofsoeily It did not win popolar backingBy many Indoneuans Soekarno and ats other leadery were felt to be prsoners of the Japanese, and an fact they retaaned very letle latstude for maneuvering the advancement of dhe nationalst move ment.

Concuerently with their efforts to wom Indonmuan support through the Hokokas, the Japanese on Java and Madura attempted to win support on another basis as well, that of religion Specril attention was paid to the kiajer, the local Islamic leaders-largely teachers and experts in Iwlamse law. They were goven local poutions of honor and amportance The attempt was made to enroll thesr support in a propagandh campaign aamed at arousing reustance to the Allies on the baus of defense of Islam agaimst infidels bent upon again enslavang the Mslem population of Indoneua To facilitate the organuraton of thus effort the Japanese established tou ards dhe end of 1913 one large. all inclusive Islamic orgamization vulvuming all existing ones of a nonpoliical mature (includang Mohammadipah, the more consersa tve Nabdatul Ulama, and also the MII (known as the Madjelis Sjuro Muslimm Indoneua [Councol of Indoneuan Moslen Associa tions] or Maspumi) Udhough through thos organizatton the Japanese do appear to have ancreaved the sporit of nationalism among the manes. they do not appear to have had much vutces in buubding ants Allied, as dutingushed from anti Japanese, sentsment Nearly all ol the ksojis relused to lend themselves as instruments of Japinese aims In fact the majoity of them had already been outraged by the clumy handling of the Mohammedan religion by the Japanese The people being forred to bow towards Tokio rather than Mecca snd the exaltation of the Imperor on a religious plane were particularly umportant an this re spect Thus antagonnum towards the Japanese brought them to empha wuze Indonessan andependence above all elhe, and this was more frequently accompanied by ant: Japanese than ants Allied overtones. In enlisting Indonenan support the Japanese were no mere successfel with the Masjumm than they had been wath the Hokokas.

Sockarno, Hatta, and a few other promment leaders were able to an smportant, though much diminished, extent to utilare the organza tuon and radio facilities of the Hokokas pust as they had used those of the Poetera to maintain contact wath and develop the natenal conscrousness and will for ndependence among the Indonesian peatantry and other grougn in Jasa and Madura Other natsonalsts, the educated youth in pirticuhr, not being alle to do thus through the Hokokas, worked through underground channehs to accomplah thus end.

Initually the largest of all the ants Japonese underground oegatara tons was that headed by Amir Sparfuddn Thus tas established un port under N.E1 government auspices a few weeks before the Japa nese landed. The government supplied as,poo gurlders for this purpose, it being gnven to Sjarfuddin by Dr Charles van der Plas Thus enrolled varsous people of strong ants Fascut feelangs, the most numer our among whom were the members of the underground Communist Party (the Ilegal PKI ), contact wath them having been establshed by Spanfoddhn But because of the early mdncretaon of some of its rmembers thus group got off to an unfortumate start During the fist month of the Japanese eccupation several of them were caught and under torture gave the names of many others in the organuzation. This conuderably curtapled the ability of many of the remainder to operate Early in a91y Spanfuddin and several other lezders were arrested, and on February a9, 1944, he and more recemly apprebended leoders were aentenred to death Soekarno's anterventon was responsible for comsmuting Sjarsfuddin's sentence to life xmprsonment, bot four of the ocher arrested leaders were execated * Whether correctly or not, it was tus predomunantly Communust led wnderground ir of whuch the Japanese were most afrand and whuch they made the greatest effort to root out

The underground whuch eventually developed the most strength was that headed by Soetan Saher It developed branches in Jakarta (Batava), Cheribon, Garut, Semarang, and Surabaya, drawing its pran cipal support from the educated youth of those citaes In the vacmity of Chenbon, under the leadership of Dr Sudarsono, it establahed a vide network of efficiently funetioning peasunt co operatuves (sane toned by the Japenne) and behund thas façade gradually organazed a lonuely imtegrated, but extensive, revotutionary orented pessant bese

The third group, the Persatoean Mahauswa (Student Unoon) was made up of unveruty students in Jakarta, prineipally those from the medical faculty Thus group an the middle of sgga e= protest agautat the order that all wudents crop theer hur organuzed a wude protest atrike among alf uneversity students Though twenty of its members were roughly handled by the Japanese and jailed for a month, they were noc intamadated Their contanued defiant atntude and epen and public critucrens of the Japanese dhd much to spread ant Japanese revolationary senument This group had some laison with the Sendenbu groep of Sekarns but maintalned a particularly close re latonshup with Spahrar

THE JAPANLSE OCCUPATION

A fourth and smaller nucleus of undergroutd strength was headed by Sukarmi and included among its leaders Adam Malik, Pandu Wiguna, Chairul Saleh, and Maruto Natmihardjo Through Maruto, it maintasned fatly constant lanvon with Sjahtat's group However, since its leaders had intrenched themtelves withun the Japanese propaganda service, Sendenbu, at twas not entirely trusted by the other organi zations even though the core of the group toon gave up most ol its ties with the Sendenbu.

There were also mumerous small groups of young intellectuals and students who formed study clubs. such as that headed by Mohammad Natsir and Spafruddin Prawsranegata, wluch operated partly under ground and partly abose and were important in dnsemimating ants Japanese nationalist ideas and in collectang anformation whach they pasted on to the moch larger eeganatations

In addituion mention should be made of an amaring indiidual. Djohan Sjaroerah, a well-educated VMenangkabau of about thurty, who in igps-igis whale serving as Hatta's secretary mauntazned contact with all four of the princopal undergrounds and was for a tame their chuef meams of hason He had partscularly close relatonshaps wth the underground of Sjahrir and, according to Adam Matak, was for a time co-chairman with Sukarni of the latter's group * Later in 1915 he went to East Java and wuth other leaders of the Sjahrir group organized an underground among the youth in Surabaya Shortly thereafter he actomplahed the same among the oil workers of Tjepa.

Infiltration of the Peta and the Japanese sponsored youth organizations was the chief objective of all four undergrounds The objectise of this infiltration tas two-fold- (t) to establish as much control as posible within the unsts ef these organsrations through relhable men holding key poutions and (z) to unfluence their membership in an anti Japanese and pro-Allied direction. specsfically to prepare them to rue zgainst the Japantse whenever the expected Allhed ansason should come. Most of the underground leaders agreed wsth Sjahrar that Indonesia's bargaining poution wsth the Allies for her independence would be stsongest if there were a powerful Indonessan uprising against the Japanese councident wsth the Allied landings. Having taken an important part in the defeat of the Japinese, the Indonesans would be in a much stronger positson to demand independence. All of the greups seet tuth considerable vorcess in their efforts to infiltrase and ndoetrmote the unita of Peta In this Sukarmi's group was es pecrally wnrcenfal with units stationed in the general vicinity of karta," whole Sjmfuddin's group was most suecesdul in east Central Js In seme cases antJapineve indoctrination was not aeetempomoed by suficient infiluratuon to control a. wnit's revolotionary impolses and everal of then en their own snitiative res alted peematurely vnd unuerevdolly agunst the Japinese The most umpartint of these uprisingt was the Pest revolt in Bitar in sg1tpepbably a result ef vetsiry by Srfuddn's groap Infiltration and indoetrination of the (rkutoru and Semendn was undertsken by all groups, with Sjahrit's kint the met stuve port, pornrularly un the Grkotorsi where very grest seees us aclueved

To enntrel the anerevungly hostile edueated zouth and especially to Leep them from efertve portripataen an underground artn ity," the Iopinese hnd recoure to an sngenious deure In mid spit, they es riblohed the Angkwn Modh (Yeuth Orgmavuon), an organirtion of educned younq men from about thenty to thurty bhoch they clonely roncrolled Mmy of those tho were knonn er sopected by the Japanese to be active in the underground were foreed to avume responsible prutsons ef levdershap in at They were thus kept eut in the epen u here the lapinese conld mree easily wich and eentrel them To help zeecompleh the, the Japinese hyd their oun Indonesian spies withun the orgnuzation It wis hoped thvt the amti-Japnese activity of these underground werkers ennld be stopped and that ln vartue of their lerding poution in the Angkaein Mnds they would appear to ts rank-and file membership to be vinctiening its ami Allied, pro- Japinese program Thus Soksni and Chairul Ssleh were ferred to take leidng potions in the Jüasta brunch of the Angkatan Muda, and Roeslin Vhdnlgam, the leader of Spher's group in Suribrya, was foreed to become chtorman of the Angkrin Muda branch there. Made to serve on its Suralyy bound of twenty were a mumber of other influentzal yowth leaders, most of whorm hvd alo oceupied leading reles in undeeground actisity, including Sutomo (later "Baenq Tomo"). Kilm, and Krvubme The last two byd bren aetive in the PKI un-

Mayeda contacted many of the principal non Communist nationnlst tenders, requesting that they give lectures to the studenes on natonvlum, economoes, polrties, sociology, and Marsism. The ebject, he told them, ws to train the studeuts as able nationalist teaders, fully conscrous of the fact that the Indonesan sndependente to which they were to lead their people mount have a social content meaningful to all of them, to those of ihe villages as well as of the towns Among thove ratunmlist leaders other thron Wikana and Subundjo who leetured at the achoolh were Hatta, Sjhene, Soedro, and Iua Kmuma Sumantn.

Sphrar and Hatta saw thos as an opportunity to infuence the stodents on accordince wuth their oun ides and for a while were able to esert consuderable infloence on them They were given complete freedom to say whasever they wabed, making open propaganda for Indonesian ndependenee and, seconding to Spaheur, even atacking the army controllel Japmese admonstration

Mayeda and the maval untelligence efficers taho helped him run the schools soon eame to gise prineipal emphasis to the study of communusm They stressed the necessuty for natonaluation of production, but the chuef emphrsus of their terchung was negative, ants tmperialism and anticapotalism being the domunant themes The communsm which they taught was strongly internotonal The stodents were taught to see Indoneua's fight for undependence in terms of an international struggle against csputabst smpenalum, Social justice for the world as a whole, not pont Indoneua, was to be the objective. Thit intermational emphons had lattle in common tuith the then current Soviet lime. The sebordhmation of anticolonalum to ant: Fascum and the temporit vng policy tau ards the colonvl powers and the Unnted Sates demanded in the Dumutros Uroted Front policy found no place in these teachings The enemy were the colomal powers and America, not the Axis.

Unted the end of July, sgis. these schools ran two month courses and turned out several lundred graduates Beginnng in May, 1915- thoe who had gradumed here appeached by Subandjo and aed to poin an ostensibly underground anei Japanese movement wluch he hended Though subsduing this organzation, the Japanese did not smeriere with it and let Indonesians believe ths they knew of ves esstence only as an illegal vinderground movement Beudes a majorsty of the Communist onensed graduates of these schools, a conuderable member of other Indonesians were enrolled, including a number of thove weeking in the rentral admmstration under the Japanese.

Soekarno and Haua, it should be noted, hod nothing to do wath this movement. It is interesting to note that a great many of these nonstudent adherents were regarded as "Fascnt" an ostlook by Sjshrar and some other non Comsmwnist left wing leaders According to several top Indonesian leaders, the principal common denaminator of Subandjo's heserogeneous group, other than opposition to colonsal rale and capitaliim, was an outlook congenmal to authorntanan pohucal erganitation.

Subardjo's organization assumed increasungls smpresive proportions It carrsed over into the Republacan period, and for a short time was a power to be reckoned with sersousls Hovever. the strong oppoution to at from most of those who had been conneeted wath the chief ant Japanese undergtounds, Sjahrir in parucular, in conjunction wth lack of support from Soekarno and Hatta caused at so fall apart less than three momihs after the revolution was launched

Thereafter most of the orgamzatson s members uho had entered it through one of the Japanest sponsored schoohs pouned one of three groups A consderable number attached themseves to Tan Malaka. whale a probably someuhat smaller number joned the PKI It was Mohimmad Juuf, one of the older, nontudent members uho had been active un Subardjo's Japanese sponmored political organirauon, who in late October, ig15. re-established the PKI Though he had been a member of nether the prewar purty nor ats wartime ant- Japanese underground, he mantaned hummell as ats head untal March i. igęß, when his fruntless terrorist actrusties were condemned by a party conference Not until early May, 1gp6, was it clear that the orthodov, preuar leadershup of the party had reawerted ats contrel. However, probably the greatest number of the graduates of these Japanesesponsored schools jouned the Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Youth), a large, armed organization in whach some became thard and even secondechelon leaders. Though Wihana was from she outset one of ats top leaders, the Pesindo did not come under effective control of the PK1 until mid-1948.

Why did the Japonese establish these schools and sponsor Subardjo's erganiration? That question is still asked in Indonesua todvy, anI there is no unanimity among those who believe they know the answer. Some are convinced, as is Sjahrir, that the primary purpose of the Japantse was to penetrate and eventually control the PKI underground through the youths trained in these schoolh. After having eflectively infiltrated ths underground, they would brung it mnto Subardjo's organiza an, where at could be controlled and vurmed agant Britan and Amenca, the powers most Iikely to insade Indonessa

A leader of tdhe Surabaya branch of Sjahrur's underground, also asked by Mayeda to Jecture at the school, thinks differently. He agrees that the Japanese tactucs called for penetratson of the PKI underground by the school's graduates However, he belheses that their object was lunted to splittung the PKI and detaching part of at He believes that the Japanese felt that the strongly internatsonal emphasts of the communism they were teaching would be more attractise to the numesous marginal elements of the PK1 underground than the Iine of its more orthodox Stalmst leadershup with their greater emphas upon the prioraty of Rusuan mterests Such a spht tould, of cmurse, undermune the strength whach the PKJ undeeground could being to the support of an Allied landing in Java

Bot these explanatsens made it dilficult to understand the use ef soch a bona fide leader of the PKI underground as Wikana by the Japanese Moreover, he used the position an whoch they placed ham to gather mformation about thesr activities and particularly about the ergan ratian they and Subardjo were bualding up, mdormation whuch he promptly pasted on to the PKI underground and the underground led by Sjahrar.

On the other hand, a number of ntelligent nationzlnt leader, n cluding such a well balanced person as Hatta, are convunced that Mayeda and many of the nasal oficers under hum were genumely son cere in their denee for Indonesian independence and that they ap peooched demestic as well as world wide social problems in an esemely progreve manner Several Indonesian intellectuals de veloped close aoquantance with them and were aurprised at the depth of their knowledge of Marxum Some of them were convenced that these oficers were Communists with a strong international bias

Some Indonesians speculase as to the posubulity of a tae up between these Japanese officers and Tan Malaka They point to Tan Malaka's consstent attraction to the sdea of anti Western, pan Assam solodarvty, the fact that severat years of hos exile were spent sn Japan, the further lact that tho of his books deahng with cremmunum were published there, knd fipally to the fact that somehow he managed to get back to Java early an 1944 In s914 and s9g5 he was working in a coal stine in West Java A respected Indonesan newspaper editor rwears that he saw ham late in i94 in the vicinoty of thus mine in the company of high ranking Japanese naval officers. Also there are subitantiat grounds for believing that Subardjo, who soon after the declaration of Indonesian independence emerged at Tan Malaka's strong supporter, was in contact with hum fairly early in v915"

It is pethaps arguable that the Japinese may have been wulling to work with Tan Malaka to splst the P'kI underground and wan more Indonesians to thesr sude to fight an Allied an atoon They undoubtedly knew of the post vg2ß schism among Indonessan Communists and they must have known of Tan Malaka's oppostion to the line of the Stalindominated sgz8 conference of the Comintern Given the fact that the PKI underground was followang the Rusman line and was therefore dis posed to fight beude an American insading force agasnst the Japinese, st might be logieal for the Japanese to back a Communist group not wedded to the Rusuan line in the belief it would joun them in fighting the Americans if st could be assured that the Japanese would grant real independence to Indonesa

Most relatvely obpective Indonesian leaders, even those butterly op posed to Tan Malaka, are comsnced that he would never have lent himself to a role where Indonema's natsonal anterests would have been subordinated to thone of any other nation, incloding Japan or Rusia. To gain his co-operation they believe, Mayeda and his stafl would have had to convince Tan Malaka absolutely of the genuineness of their interest in Indonesian independence. It is is thas that leads a number of Indonesian leaders to speculate as to the posubility ef an ideological affinity between him and these Japanese naval oficers.

But there are addstional facts which throw a somewhat different light on these puzzling Japanese actassties. In their conversations with Indonesiam, partucularly with those whom they knew well, many Japanese officers, from the army as well as the mavy, during late tg11

With pespect to she selationuhup of Subaedjo and Tan Malaka and the quention of their relatandhip to the Japanese it may be of signifcance that daring sgss-g6 Solundjo was in Tokyo as eotmipendent for the Indonesian newtpuper Matehan (The Son') It is widely believed that Tan Mataka wat alo In Tokjo dunieg thit period

Atcording to Adam Matk, he and Sukami-the peinciple leadern of Tan Malaka's porwar Pan underground-ded not kaow of Tan Malaka's retum to Iodonesla until after the declaration of Indonesian independence on Aug 1, 191s Adam Malk atates that ther fnt contact with him was on the night of Ang 14, ag4s. when an elderly man gring the nime of "Eluus" introdated himelf to Sukami as "a tepretentative of the youth of moutherm Bastam," bus that it was not reslted then that " Huun" was Tan Malaka, On Aug , he states, "Houn" vnted Satandjo who serognized him as Tan Malaka He aftiras that this wis the first tame the two had aeren each other wnie sgn in tellnd (Adam Malik, ep eit, pp si, st)

and through s9gs at Ieast up until the Potsdam Agreement, appeared confident that Rusia would evenrually join with Japan against the Unted States. It is not clear whether they envinaged this Russo Japanese alliance as arung before or after the end of World War II. How eser, officers of the political and psychological warfare detachment of the Japanese army in Java seemed cons inced that a third world twar woald break out shortly after the end of the second and that in it Japan and Rusua would be alled According to Indonesiam, it was in a cordance wsth this comuction that they organized several suicide battalions of Indoneuans, the Djibaku Their musion was to maintain a conitant and intensive guerraila warfare against any Allied administraton which sought to estabhah stself in Java They were to keep Jaa in a state of chaos pending the curbreak of World War III and thereby make it imposuble for the United States and/or Britain to coraolidate hemelses there and easer for Japan to dislodge them. Finally, Indo nesuans who had close personal acquauntance with Japanese naval and army offoems were ampressed at the apparent sinceraty and conviction wath whoch mam of them, upen leasang, asserted that they would soon be back agaun.

It n pouble that the puzhng attstudes and activities of these Japanese officers was a phenomenon not limited to Indonesia. Perhaps when more complete studies of Japanese occupation policies in other areas become available, it v.ill be found that eflorts at Communist in doctrnation of their populations durang the last year of Japanese control were not confined to Indonesia."

For what to him seems to be one of the most plausible explanations of the above-demcribed Japenese attstudes and activities in 1914-1945. the writer a indebted to Dr. Nobutaka Ike " Dr. Ike notes that accord ng to the United States Strategie Bombing Suney, the Japanese navy was prepared to fight a two-year war, and no more. By mid-sgfé. navy officers, partucularly intelligence efficers, stationed in Indonesia must hase realzrd that Japan could not win the war. There appears to have been a rather widespread belief among both Japanese army and nary oficers that, if Japan was defeated, it was probable that a Com munut revolution would break out in Japan. Conceivably, Dr. Ike concludes, they reasoned that in case of such a revolution Rusna would throw her support to Japan. Dr. Ike's conclusions help explan the apparent certainty of Japanese ofßcers un Java that Japin and Ruysia would be allied Anticipating the rise of a Commumist regime in Japan and the posubilsty of an alignment of Japan and Russ:a against the United States, it might not seem illogical for them to endeavor to equip potental Indoneuan leoders wsth pro Communist leanings

As Allied power drew near to Indonesia and ant Japanese feeling mounted, the Japanese miltary authorsties on Java began to take new steps tonards the establuhment of an undependent Indonesian gon. ernment In late s911. three Indoneuans-Soetardjo. Soeiro, and Suroso—uere appointed as residents (polstical head of a reudency). and in the remaining residencies of Jasa and Madura, Indonesian subresudents were appointed These Indonesian sub residents rather than thear Japanese supersors, who were only nomsnally resudents, sctually ran their respective administrations (Outude Java and Madura, the Japanese admcnistrations did not allon Indonesans to occupy cnvl service posts higher than that of district head) On March s, s915. the Investigating Commitee for the Preparation of Independence (Badan Penjelsdik Usaha Persiapan Kemerdeksan) was set up * As chairman the Japanese apponted Dr Radpman Wediodmingrat A Japanese, Ichibangase Yeshio, and an Indonenan, Suroso, were appoonted sice chairmen. The Committee's fifty nine remaining members included representatves of all of the pruneipal socta! and ethnie groups of Java and Madura, including Soekarno, Hatta, and otber smportant nationalist leaders, plus seven additional Japanese " In st were two co-secretaries, Abdul Gafar Pringgodigdo and a Japonese who did not know the Indonesian language, the language an whuch sts delsberations were carrsed on. The committee had two plenary meeungs, May aS-June 1. and July 10-17, and reached basic agreement concerning constatutional and economie questions. A committee endowed wsth a roughly similar function, but much more clostly supervned, was established by the Japanese milhtary administration on Sumatra on July 5, 1015, with Mohammad Sjafei, head ef the pres rously established Sumatran Cen tral Advisory Council, as chairman and Adinegoro as secretary."

The Japanese naval command at Makassar set up no sach organization for Celebes, Borneo, the Moluccas or Lesser Sundas An almost

Innctionles "Natonal Party" was allowed by at to be estblnhed ua June, 1915, with the Sultan of Bone (Arumpone) a4 chairman and D Raa Lage a vie cdu, but abu sx wes it wa op preud.

Despute the eoncenons mide by the Japrnese adminitration to Indoneu ons on Jwa and Madurs, ther demand Ior ncreased sell government und on axceleratd granting of independence mounted. hnouledge of Allud voctonet and the approveh of Americam forces to Iniomess mode them mere sell confident, wlule the contunung he ut slity dnpl iyed by m iny Japncse croops strengthened antagonism rowords ehe Japonese The Perr resolt an Bltar was followed by an uprinong agunst the Japinese at Indramnju in the muddle of ig11 tbevesfter there occwned a whote senes of lewer but more frequent amurrectionay fare ups, Irgely of peavint engn Ant Japrnese attoty hy students became more darng In June, ig15. at Suralry the Jepnese spnnoored a mis meeting of more tham 4ooe students orgunazed atound dhe theme (ht Indoneuan undependence wat tn be ing wn luoileast hy rado tn all of Java One of fhe Indanetutm aperkers, a momher of the Angkatzn Mod of Suralaya, agreed that Indo nesans would have to fight for thesr ndependenee, but very pountedly Jod fomly reyesed the Japruese comenuon thst she fighung was to be gant the Altes These rem orks were greeted by thunderous apylause, wloch way lendk ust over the radho along with the speech. The meeting hin turnced nto duonder, and the Japinese were able to treak it up nly by turning on the aur rand urens

Is was ag wst tlun loskgruond of twong and ntreasingly articulvie nts [arnese feeling tlrvt Sockarno on June s, 1915 delivered a speech lefore the Investigting Comotottee for the Preptratson of Independ eme In it he optinesd the five houe proncoples, the Pantys Sela, that he felt should guude and serve as the pluloiophacal fomndtion of an sulhpendent Indoneu: Thoe speech cleasly beedered on the revolu ton ay and, though it angend Japanese semy authorntes, dhey ev dintly dad not feel it wse to take action agunt him The udeas exproaed lay Soekarun in ths epeech are impettant in thas they sepse sented the m stured pocrl plubosophy of the mont influentrd of Indo newan natsonalst leaders and of the min who wos to become the most import mt pohtical leader of the Repobbse of Indonesiv They are of grevt umportance too lecauve of their inffuence upon the social thunking of Iodonevant during the revnlotinntry struggle thot soon begve an influence which is still today of great importance. Much of this influence is because Soekarno formalated wath clarity the ideas whuch were dominant but incboate in the mends of many educated Indonesans and because he dod so en a languzge and a symbolum moch of wluch was and remains meaningful to the uneducated rank and file Probt bly in no other exposution of principle can one find a better example of the syntheus of Western democratae, Medernist Islanuc, Marxist, and indigenousvillage demeeratic and communalstic udeas whuch forms the general haus of the socsal thought of so large a part of the post nar Indonesian poltucal elte Thus, a rather extensuve examenation of the principal points of Soekarno's speech wl be useful

The first prnciple wluch must underlhe the phulmophucal basis of a free Indoneua, stated Soekarno, is matronafum He emphasized that he did not mean a nationalum in a narrou sense The definstion of Renan that the requrement of a nation is "le déur d'étre ensemble" and that of Otto Bauer that it a "ene aus Schucksalgemenschaft erwachsene Charaktergemenschaft" were not adequate. be said, be cause they dad pot take unto consuderation the addtional requnute of "uniry between men and place." "According to geopolitics," he con tunued, "Indoneua is our country. Indoneua in its entorety In this ven he sient on so say

Briely speaking, the people of Indoneua, the Indonesian Natson is not osly a group of ndviduah who, havang "le déure d'étre ensemble." Iive in a small area hke Menangkabau or Madura, or Joga, or Parundan, or Makauar, but the Indoneuan people are all the human bengs who, acceeding to gropoltics ondarned by God Almighty Iive througlrout the enture archupelago of Indontua from the northern tup of Sumatra oo Papua! Only twse hase ue exper: enced a natronal state, that was in the tume of Srowipapa and in the time of Madjopaht.

However, Soekarno emphasized, "Undoubtedly there is a danger in this principle of nationalism The danger a that men will reduce nationalism to chauvinism. . . . Gentlemen. do not let tas say that the Indonesiam nation as the noblest and most perfect, whtle belittling other peoples We should aim at the unoty and brotherhood of the whole tworld." With this thought he continued to expound his second principle, internationalism or Aumanitananium:

Sockarso'rs sprech wat net wnten out beforehand and bas tecordnt siemo graphrally at the meeting The fallowing quotatsons are from the Englah tmansía ton made by the Minatry of Informaton of the R. U.S 1 under the ide of The Bhrth of Pastjanle (Jakarta, agge) Italhes are an gven in the tranlation

We shoufd not only estabbsh the state of Free Indoneua, but we should also arm at malang ome famaly of all nations ... Thn is the second prineiple of pholosophy I propoue to yoe, gentlemen, to thuch I gve the neme of inter entonalum But úhen I say internsnonziuet, I do not mean comopoltanism, whch does not recogmze nationalrim, which says there is no Indoneua, no Japan no Burrea, no England, no Ametta, and so on Internatonalum can not fover if it n not rooted in the sod of nationalam Natonalam cannot fover if it does not grow withon the garden of snsernatonalism Thon these tso, grardersen, principle one and principle two, vhoch I have fint propned to you are dosrraaled together

As has thurd principle Soekarno postulated that of reprerentatoe governnent or of consent "I am convenced," he said, "that the chief condstion for the strength of the Indonesian state as conferring. is rep resentative government." Quite clearly answering the arguments of those who desured an andependent Indonesia so be organired as an Islamac state, he went on to say,

Thou n the best condstoon for the Slamoe relipen to prosper .. By meam of agreemees we shall mnprove all motiers, we shall peomote the smnerests of reliponThe Home of Reprementatves-thn is the place for in to hning forward the demands of IslamIf we reatly are an Istamse people, let us work hard so that most of the seats in the people's representatne body we will create are eccupied by Islatisc delegatesWe aay that nonety per cent ef tn are Islam(ie] in rehgion, but Iook around you in ths gathenng and are what perrentage gise thear sones to Ilam³ A thousind paedons that I should ques ton that mattent To me it n pooof that Ilam does not yet flourih among the masses Therefore. I ask you gentlemem, both thone that are tot Moslem, and in partculie those who are, to areept thus prunciple nomber three, that is the penople of confernng, of representatise govemneesWahan the peo ple's reporagntatise body, Moslems and Chnstians should vork as af mpured If for mutance Chentians wah every Jener ithon the regulauona of the state of Indonena to accotd woth the Boble then let them work together to uve body may be Cheatuans That as just—(nr playt There is no stase that can be cilled s kmng sate if thave n no marmal stroggle

Hs fourth prmesple, stased Soekarmo, was that of soeisl prosperity or apecrel justice. In explaining thus he stated.

Do we wans a toee Indonesa shere caputalus bear sway, or where the enoure peaple prosper, where every men hn enough to eat, enough to wear, Ives in prospenty, feels chetnhed by the hometsnd drt gnes lom soficent keep? Do not imagine, gemlemen, that an ven as the People's Repersintatse body. comes inso being, we shall autnmatically achieve thus prosperaty We hase seen that in the states of Europe there are reprtsentative bodoes, there n prolaamentary democracy But an ot not in Europe that the capstalnta are an control?

In Amerca there n a people's repeesentatise body, and are not the capitalnts throughout the Western Continent in control» There is no other rezvon but the fact that the people's representanve bodaes estahlshed there have merely fol lowed the recipe of the French Revolution What n called democracy there is merely a pohtical democracy, there as no aocual justice and no economic demoerscy at all

In explaitong that polutical democrary does not insure economst de mocracy, Soekarno significantly quoted the Revasuonist Socialnt, Jean Jaurhs rather than a doctritasre Martust He chen went on to say

Gendemen, if we are setkung democracy the need is not for the democracy of the West, but forpobtico-economic deroocracy able to bring socal prospenty! The people of Indoneua have long spoken of this matter What in meant by 'Ratu Add' the God of Justice? It is aocual pustire The people wish for prospersy. The people, who recently have fels themselves what it n not to have enough to eat mor enough to wear. wuh to create a new world in which stand, remember, and love the people of Indoneua, let us accept this prnciple of aocal pustice which is not only polhtscal equality. gentlemen In the field of economy, too, we must create equality, and the best common prospenty

Gentlemen, the people's conference which we will establish should not be a body for the ducuuon of polstical democracy onh, but a body whuch, together with the community, wall be able to shape two pruncaples polstral pustice and pocual juster.

Soekarno's fifth principle was that the organization of Free Indonesia should be in the light of a belhef an one God In elucidaing this he stated:

Not only should the people of Indonessa hase belef in God, but every Indonesan should beliese in hu ewn partocular God The Churstian should wonhup God according to the teachings of Jeus Christ, Moslems according to the seachings of the Prophet Mohammad, Buddhusts should dncharge their religrous rites according to their own books

But let us all have belief an God The Indonesian state shall be a state where every peron can vanhup God in freedoms.. wathout religious egoum' And the State of Indonesia should be a State ancorporating the belsef in God.

Let ua oborve, let us prarice religion, whether Idam er Clmotanity, in a civilued way . .. the way of mutual sespect.

In conclusion Soekarno went an to emphauze the mutual compatbility of these Sive principles and the amularity of their totality with the spirst of indigenous Indonesian society, The fest two peinciples, natonalism and internatonalum or humanstarzanism could, he sand, be reduced to a single principle-that of avero-natsonaliam Likewhe, he continued, the next two principles, thove of democracy (or consent) and socal justice could be reduced to one principle, that of socso democracy Thus three principles remained socso nationalium, souo-democracy, and a belsef in God However, he sand, that these three could be reduced to a songle prinesple a prinesple for which there is 4 genume Indaneuan term, the term 'gotong rojong (mutual cooperation) The State of Indonesia whoch we are to estallnh should be a state of mutual co operation. How fine that is! A Gofong Ropong state In explanation of ths term Soekarmo continued:

Mutual co-operation n a dyname convicton, meee dynantc than tether boood, gendlemen Brotherhood is a atatie consiction, but Getang Reyong, mutval cooperation, portrays one endeavor, one chonty, ose tatk Go tong Rojeng means toding hard together, swesting lund together, a struggle of help me to help you together The poety of all for the anterests of allt That is Gorong Rojong'

The principle of Gotong Rojong berween the Ech and the poor, between the Modem and the Chontian hetween those not cengmating from Indonesa attd their chaldren who beoome Itdoneuann Ths, gentleme, t what I propete to you

Finally Soekarno stated that he thanked God that the Indonesian state that they would establish would be set up "in the midst of war's thunder" and that comequently at would emerge "a free Indentsa tempered in the fury of war a strong Indonena state, not an Indonesian state whuch would turn soft after some tme." Attainmens of a free Indonesia based upon the five principles be had set forth could only be realuzed, he emphasized, through struggle, struggle which would continue, though in different form even after the attainment of independence He concluded hus address an a malitant tone, stating

And partcudarly m thua ume of war lave fasth, culusate in your hearts the convastion tdus lirr Indonema canaos come il the people of Jadapena do noe dare take a risk do not dare dive for pearis anoo the depibs of the ocran f the prople of Indonnua are not unoed and not determoned to lire or die for freedom, the freedom of Indoneua woll never be the ponenon of the Indoneaan people, never untd the end of tomel Freedom can only be achoeved and owned by a people whove soul is aflame with the determunation of Merdeka [freedom]—freedom or death*

On August 7. s915. permission was granted by Lt. General Terauchi's headquarters at Saigon *" for the establishment of an all- Indonesian commitiee, the announced function of whuch was to make preparations for tramfer of govermmental authorsty from the Jzpa neie armed forces to it Knotwn as the Indonesian Independence Preparatory Commattee (Panitia Persiapan Kermedekaan Indonesia), this enrolled an appounted membershup of tuents-one drawn from all parts of Indonesia on a baus of representation roughly proportional to populaton, All of thone Indoneuant appointed were outitanding national nts. Its members were Ir Soekarno, charrman, Drs Mohammad Hatta, vice-chaurman. A R T Radpuman Wediodiningrat, R. Otto Iskander Drnata, Ki Abdoel W'aschd Hasyım, As Bagoes Hadikoetoema, B K P A Soerpohamodjopo. B P Poerbojo, M Soetardpo Kartahadikoesomo, R P Saroso, Prof R Soepomo, and R. Ab doel Kader for Java, Dr Mohammad Amır for Sumatra. Mr Tenku Mohammad Hastan for Sumatra, Mr Abdoel Abas for Sumatra, Dr G. S. S. J. Ratu Langie for Celebes. Anda Pangeran for Celebes, A. A. Hamidhan for Borneo, Mr 1 Goesti Ketoet Poedja for the Lesser Sunda Islands; Mr J Latuharhary for the Moluccas; and Drs. Yap Tjuan Bing representing the Chinese community

On August 8, 1915. Soekarno, Harta, and Radjiman were called by General Terauchs to Dalat in Indochuna. There on August is he promised them that independence would be granted to Indonesia on August z4 A constitutional assembly was to be called on August 19. and during the intervening week, this was to round out and ratily the constitution whoch the pressously establuhed commuttees for the preparation of independence had been working on. The three returned en August 11 to find the Indonesan undergrounds op posed to any Indonenan independence that was a gift of the Japanese and absolotely desermaned to wrest uncondstional andependence from them by force. These underground movements in Jasa, and apparently those in Sumatra, were pledged to and orgamized for an upriung agasnst the Japanese which was to coincide with the espected Allied attack against Jasa and Sumatra. Moreover, a fesw days after thesr return they found the Japanese maltary adminis-

as Under which weme the Japanese cormmands in ledonena and clewbete in Southest Atua tration obliged, because of Japan's capotulation to the Allies to main tain the political stetus quo. This was the situation whuch precipitated the Indonesian revolution.

But to understand mare clearty the revolutionary phase of the Indomesuan natiomalist movement and the character of that revolotion we should pause and assess the mipact of the Japanese occupation upon Indonesian society, The outetanding development during the Japa nese occupation was the tremendous ancrease in mational conicious ness and the will to political andependence which it fostered The harsh and arbitrary rule of the Japanese aßected almost the encire population In comparnon Dutch rule had been moderate and was much less felt by most Indonesmans. Japanese rule aromed a comciousness of common suffering and humilhation and a common resentment aganst the Japanese that enormounly strengthened the already exist ng mational coniciouinem of Indoneuans

The indirectness that had characteruned the relationship of the Dutch admunistration wuth the peasantry was rucceeded by a drect and jarring antrumon by the Jaçanese milhtary admanntration whach was only slightly cushiomed by partally operating through the Poetera and Djasa Hokokai. As Sjaheır has oboerved

Dorng the theee snd = half peany ef Japanese accupation, the foundatiom of rural sueety vere shaken and undemned by forced regulaoom, kidnapping from homes for conscripcoon as laboerers abroad or as aalfiers, compubory surrender of harvested crops, coespslsory plasteng of desgmated crops—ell umposef vuch unlumuted stbtrannean

In many areas vallage socseties were severely wrenched and forced to readgn ther strucures because of the beavy demands on ther labor supply made by the Japanese The conmeription of hundreds of thousands of ther most able workers into the Hei Ho, Peta, etc meant that tradotional patterms of work and land apportionment had to be altred The cruelty of the Japanese, their exorbotant demands for labor and crops, and their repayment in a weethless cutremey whuach would buy almost none of the traditoonal meeds, such as cloth, agntcultural implements, etc aroused in most peasants an intense bicternes aganst them It as true that, because of the tremendous mometary inflation that developed durng the last two years of the Japonese oc capation," the widespread monetary andebtednens of the prasantry

m Sostan Spbee, Orur Ttryd (Amsaadare 19g). p 1 n See Mohammad Sasban. Dua Tahun Uang Reputta," fap, Manch g. (9e)

was reduced in proportion to the salue of its land But this meidental result of Japonese rule could not long be capotalued upon by most peasants because the severity of Japanese exactuons left them no recourne hut to neur new debts from their traditonal source of credit, the itinerant Chunese moneylenders By s911 these moneylenders had generally stopped advancing credht in kand (seed, cloth, and agricul. tural implements) for repavment in the increatungly inflated currency Instead ihey agreed to make such adsances only for a stspulated percentage of the peatant's crop Thereby much of the benefit from the inflation by passed the peasant

As a reaction to and in order to reust the heavs demands of the Japanese, the peasantry became much more polstscally conscious than it had ever presiously been Thos and ats feeling against the Japanese is attested to by the wodespread and freqoent local peasant revolis that occurred, particularly during the last pear of the Japinese orcupation. Indoctrination by the undergrounds plus the skill of the nationalist Ieaders in the Poetera and Hokokat. particularly Soekarmo and Hatta, who by radio and personal appearance were gven an almost un- Iimited contact with the peasantry by the Japanese, tramlated this political awakening and the groevances belhund it snto a natsonal consciousness and will for national independence such as the peasantry had never pres cously possessed In particular this was due to the speeches of Soekarno, broadcast as they were to almost every large village of Java and Madura. HMs ability to communicate with the peasantry in terms and concepts understandable to them allowed him to establish such rapport with them that when the resolution broke it was prsmarily to hum that they looked for leadershup

The conitant Japanese propaganda aimed at developing popular support for their war effert and castigating the Allies undoubtedly increaned the polstscal awakenng that the material spect of the Japanese occupation was prosoking Though Japanese propaganda and acvitem" were eective in increasing the population's leeling against the Dutch, the Japanese eßort to make the people hostile toward the other Allies, particularly the United States, met with comparatively Iitde succems. The Japanese failed almost completely in their eflorts to bring the Indonesians to identify their national interests with those ef Japan. The efforts of the anti-Japanese Indonesian undergrounds to connter thete Japnese asms was made eatier and encuuraged by American victoraes over the Japanese and the antieolonial attutude uhich America seemed to the Indonesians to have espoumed. Reparts of these vactones and this attstude were received by the radios of the underground organizations and disstminated by them to the papulation, un partucolar to the Peta units and the youth ceganizations. The insistent proclamition of America's attachment to the terms of the Atlantac Chirter and the Charter of the Umted Natsons in overseat beosdeuts from the Unoted States pucked up in Indonesoa in conjunetuon wah the defimte Amenean pirdge of postuat independence for the Pluappones conineed many Indomeuans that America was in gen eral oppmed to colonalim and that thus appostion extended to Indomesit

Prolribly the deepest smprint of the Japinese occupauon was left on the Indonesan youth, in particular those between fdteen and thenty five years of age Especally among those who had recewed ht tle previous education, and that was the large majorsty, the sustauned and intense Japonese peopiginds left its mark. It narroned and insenufied their nationalist sentuments Few developed a pro-Japanese orentation, but many developed an extremely mditant motonalhsm wath a strong, emotional ants-Western buas wloch frequently verged on sheer hritred and often extended stself to antspathy against Eurasians and Inhes Chunese ** The number of those whose natamlism wat so narrote should not be evaggerated Though their number wat lage. they here poolally not an the majorsty, Whatever the case, most of them proved willing to follow the counsel and example of the educated youth and older natonal leaders, whose mationvlsen was much less narrow There did remain, however, a signsficant munoraty whoch carly m the resalution s.2s attracted to the suppert of less enlightened leaders

Becuse of the domntnt role they were to play an the fest and most enaucal phises of the Indonesan revolution, at is porticularly impor tnt to understrnd the eflect of the Japnese occupation on the rehtwely edocated zouth, especially the secondary school and college stodemts The Japanese pobey of forcing thesr language an Indonesian stulents (most emphasued dunng the Sest sear of the oceupation) coupled wyth their harsh and autocratic admunistratson of the schools sery quickly antagonoed the students Many of the more spirsted of them were either foreed to leave school because of their open reustance

"Ct Soeun Sphan, op ef, pp o-zg to the Japanese school authorities or resigned in protest. A number remained in school enly to hide better the anti-Japanete underground activities that abiorbed most of thear time

A large portion of the student body came from homes outside the few large coties where the secondary schools and colleges were located. They were seporated from thesr homes in most caves, and if they did not accept scholarshup asd from the Japanest school admimistration, which soon became anathema to most, were forced to shuft fer them selves. Having to support themselves was a cosmpletely new experience for most of them Because of the shortage of relativelv educated gonermment and commercial workers resulting from the incarceraton of the European populatoon, thas was fasrls eass The abilsty to support themselves gave mans of them a degree of self-confidence which they had not possessed before Lackung st mans ase consinced, they would bave been moch tew able to plas the tevaluvanars roles which they were soon to assume

Moreover, those who left school and had homes to go to had to make the best of thesr tree tume The same problem to a lesser extent was encountered by those who had got jobs and therefore did not have to devote thest evenings to stodvung subjects of the school curriculum. From the beginneng the extraondinary political events they had been witnessing and their hostility to the Japanese unduced them to study the social sczences, subzects largely denied them by boch the narpow cutriculums of the Japanese and the Dutch-controlled school administrations Many Indoneuan students first encountered the writings of Western political wruters during this enforeed idleness, and many of thase who had savored them before found theur first opportunity to read them wsth any thoroughness With the abolitzon of the Poetera at the end of sgis, most of the secondary and college students who had supported it established contact with one or more of the undergrounds, id they had not aleeady done so In these-n particular under the tutelage of Spahrar and members of hs group such as Dpohan Sjaroerah, Roeslan Abdulgan, Subadio, Dr. Subandrio and Dr. Sudarsono-their political education was furthered while at the same time they engaged in the work of the undergrounds. Fimally we must note the deep ant imperalist, pro-Communist imprant left upon those students attending the Asrama schools.

Among literate Indonestans (between 6 and 8 per cent of the population) the development and spread of the Indonesian language during the Japanese occupation meant the strengthening of their national conscioustess and the ofectung of parochial tendencies that mught otherwne have been enhanced because of the division of Indonesa into three admmstratise splheres Initsatly the fong run objective of the Japanese was to aubstitute their own language for Durch as the admunistratuve language and as the meduum of instruction an the schools Short rum expediency, however, forced them to rely on the only language other than Dutch whuch could be undenstood by sigrificane numbers of Indonesuans throughout the archipelago This was the Matay language,a or Belaro Indonesas (Indonesian language), as the dralect generally spoken throughout Indomena hod become known Under the Japanese st became the official language for administration and for all educatson above the third grade Indonesians wbo had held the top posttions open to natives under the Dutch admunistration and who spake flawless Dutch but little Indoneuan were compelled to learn the latter in short order. The sate was true of school teachers whose vehucle of instructson had been Dutch or perbaps Javanete, Sundanese, or Madurese Takdur Alisjabana observes.

Because the Japanme were determuned to emlat the energins of the entee Indoneuan popalation an the war effort, they penetested mto the villages in the resotest bockwaters of the nlands, ming the Indonesan language as they went

Thres the langunge foutshed and mhund the people wih a ferling new to most of shem As pmore and more of them Jearned to speak it freely, they be came avare of a common bond The Indoneuan language became a sysbol of natonal unity in oppoution to the eforts ef the Japanese ultimately to (m plant thezr ten language and cultare By the tme, therefore, of the Japanese tutrenden, dhe poution of the Indoneuan language had impeoved enarmounly both an strength and in prestige vin à vis not only Dutch but aso the varaous regional langunges of the archopelago, whuch had no oppartunty to develop dansng the occupation **

Another consequence of the Japanese occupation, extremely important in developing nationalnt sentiments amongt Indonenans and in partacular their will to poltical andependence, resulted from the tremendous increase mational self confidence of Indonesians gemer ally and un the individual self confidence of most educated Indonesians. This arose, as we have seen, from the necessity for the Japanese to en ploy Indonenans in most of thone administrative and techmical pose trons Irom whach they had removed Europeans. The raslroad systen

1 See shove, foosaote ssa cn page 57

" Takér Alepahuna, "The Indonmos Langrage-By Prodat of Nanamlan" Pac/lc Aßat, Dc v3is. 7 30a.

under the management of Indonesians may not have sun as efficiently as it had under the Dutch, but it dud run It was sudfenly apparent that the so thought esoteric skills of the "superior Dutchman" not only could be but un mamy cases already had been mistered by Indonesians This made a tremendous umpeewion on the average man By the undevidual Indonetan who performed these tasks, and with respect to a number of activities by the obsersing Indonesan public av a whole. it was noticed that frequently when a Japanese took over one of these admonntrative or technical jobs fus level of performance was sulntanmally below that attasned by Indonesuans "Well," reasoned many Indonesiam, "the Japinese eauly thrashed the Dutch, and we can petlorm these jobe better than the Japanese We certainly therefore, are not an infersor people Why should we be governed bs anyone but ournelses?"

But quste aport from engendenng this powerful self confdence, the employment of Indonesians in poutions formerls filled by Furopeans strengthened the Indonesian will to independence in another ampor tant way. For the miny Indoneuans who had benefited from thus revolutionary upward socio-economie movement had a strong sested interest in maintaining these changes For them that meant reusting a return of Dutch rule They were sure that ats return would mean demotion to their old posiuons On the other hand, independence was ensisaged at promising even hugher positions than they had atready obtained. Attainment of thear new poutrons dad not satisfy them, but the enhanced self confidence springing trom their alulity to handle these jobs merely whetted thear appetite for the better positions retained by the Japanese or for the full occupancy of thesr new positions without the incubus of a Japanese "advser" as their overseer.

The social revolution whuch expediency forced the Japanese to ereate benefited even many of those Indonesians who as members of the old indigenous arstocracy had been favored by the Dutch and had netupied relatisely lugh admunastratve poutions under them In most caies these positioes had been high enough to give them a strong interest in assisting in the maintenance of the Dutch colonial status quo. However, under the Japanese many such persons were pushed upward to positions which they had no hope of attarning under the old regime. In them, too, twas born the conviction that they could handle posstions higher than those they had been allowed by the Doteh, that they were entitled to such positions, and that in an independent Indonevia they would be assured of them Thus were spoited some of the most effective and reliable instruments of Dusch rule.

Outbreak of the Revolution

RUMORS that Japan had or was about to capitulate to the Allhes spurred into action the several underground orgaruzations that had beem powed to rue agaunst the Japantse when the Allhes should land As early as August 1o, sg4s, Sjahrir, who had received radio reports of Japanese peate feelers, urged Hatta that he and Soekarno should um imediately proclaam Indontesian mdependence and assured him that he could count on the support of the undergrounds and many of the Peta unmts When Soekamo and Hatta returned from Daħat on August 14. he informed them that the Japanese had requesied an armstice and agaon urged their prompt procdamation of ndependence Soekarno and Hatta were not yet convinced that Japan would surrender, felt that overthrow the Japanne, and feased a meless blood bath might result

Sjahrar, however, belheving that Soekarno would soon proclaim an dependence in the strongly worded ants Japanese terms of the declara tion which Sahnr and his co workera had peepared, began at once to oeganze the undergrounds and the Jakarta students for mass demon strations and military eventualities Copoes of their ants Japanese ande pendence declaration had been sent to all parts of Java to be publuhed atmediately upon the expected announcement of the fifteenth by Soekarno and Hasta would not make the proclamaton on the fifteenth Sjahrir was utable to contact all leaders of hs organzation in tme to telt them of this. An isolated revolutuon whach the Japanese suppressed was started in Cheribon on the lteenth undes Dr. Sudarsono.

Sorkarno and Hatta still hoped to avoud bloodshed, while the underground groups joned Spahner in lus demand for an ummediate declaraton of andependence couched in teruns so stronghy ants Japanese that the whole Indonesian populatuon would rally belund it in one com mon surge to overthrou the Jap mese Meanwhile the underground led by Sukarns and supporied by a consderuble mumber of the Student Unoon group lost patsence und at 1 a a on the sixteenth, kudnapped Sockarno and Hata to the Pett g irrnon at Rengasdengklok Here thes conneed Soekarno and Hatta that the Japunese had really surrendered They then tried to presal upon them to make an smmedeate declaration ef andependence Sukarni marntasned that there were 15.o00 armed youths on the outskirts of Jakarta ready to match agasnst the csty as soon as the proclamation was made Soekarno and Hatta were sure that he exaggerated the armed strength he clasmed and that the Japanese uould easily sappress such an attempt Apparently they felt it was posuble that an understanding could be arrived at wrth the Japanese whereby they would not oppose the declaration with malstary force In the interests of avouding unnecesary bloodshed they wnhed at least to ascertain the attitude of the Japanese malstary authorities before calling upon the people to rue Moreover, they both felt that any declaration most emphasize its all Indonesian soutce and that therefore it should be done through the Independence Preparatory Commuttee wrth its all Indoneuan representation Thereby, they felt, the whole of Indonesia would rise together to assert andependence. and the chances of successiul molulsration of the population against the Japanese would be greater A meeting of the Commsttee was schedaled for vo a s on the seventeenih, and st was then that they proposed to declare independence

In the meantme the Japanese had learoed of the Aadaapping, and Subordjo, uho was a close acquasntance of the Sukarni group, went to Rengasdengklok, cerianly nith the knowledge of Admural Mayeda. if not also of Japanese army officers, to persuade Sukarmm and the student leaders to return wath Soekarno and Hatta to Jakarta Thos confirmed the suspicion of Sockarno and Hasta that the Japanese knew of the genetal phans for declaration of andependence and reinforced their belief in the inadequacy of the armed Indoneuans on the outskirts of

Subardpe, it will be rcalled, was chief of the commulung ofßre of the Japanese navy's Java It Q she capital, sonce now they could no longer ottack wwh the advantage of surpruse

Upon returuing to Jakarta late on the night of the sisteenth, Hatta xtmedisely got in touch with the nght hand sman of the commander sh choef of the Japinese army on Java. Thus officer informed him that by the surrender terms the Japanese were "merely agents of the A1- les" and thit they could by no means countenvnce a dechratlon of undependence by the Indonesins It was thus clear to Hatta and Soekarno that a bloodless revolotion was ampossble and tht the course advocated by Sjshne, Sukarns, Wikan, and the other wnderground levders was the only posuble means of atrvuning independence. andependence, hovever, he was unable to secvre from hun a commutment that it wonld be done in the strongly anti Japanese terms that he and his group advocvted

The Japanese were now on the alert, and the movements of all Indonewan leaders were being closely watched A place of meeung free from the Kempeitat was vital At about mudmoght Hatta contacted Vice Admural Mayeda, who agreed to turn over hs house to a meeting of the nationalats Mayeda abnented humself and at * a st en the seventeenth, Sorkarno and Hatta met wath the members of the Preparanory Commattee and Subndjo, Wikana, and Sukarni to draw up a declrasnon of independenct * After much dicusuon the text was decded upon, and on the morning of August 17, sp1s, Sockorno read the declaration to a smoIl group outside of hus own residence Soon afterwands the declaration along wuth Hatts's personal messige to his old natuunalst frends was broadcast over the enture Domel Indonewan radio and telegraph network by Indoneuan emplopees hehind the locked doors of its Jakvrta (Ivtavn) " effice

The Indonesrn revalution hod been launched, and the popular in Jrkarta, was remendous The Japnese reaction was prompt Upon oeder of the commander an chief of the Japinese army n Java, Mayeda and hus entire staft were qunckly ptuled, and independence announcemenes being posted around the city were torn down by the Kempeitas

The following day the Japanese ordered the dnbandonment of the P'eta, Hei Ho, and all other armed Indonesian organtratsons

Apparently, however, the Japanese authoratues were at firut not certain what actoon they should take towards Soekarno and Hatta On the muneteenth these two leaders, urged on by the undetground groupt, undertook to address a mass meetin, of enthtuastic Indonesuans as sembled at the great central park of Jakarta This meeting was pocketed by Japanese sanks and aswored cats, and the otignat untention of the Japanese was to arrest Sorkarno and Hatta However, the suelling en thusasm of the buge and ancreasung crond esudently caused them to change thear mends Soekarnto spoke to the crowd briefty in moderate serms. but stucking to the claem of andependence He then called upon the tens of thousands of Indonesuns who latened to lewe the pork qusetly and return peacefully to thear homes They did The Japanese could not but be umpressed w ith thos demontration of controlled power

Where they were not too far outnumbered, Peta units throughout wude areas of Java retsted the Japanese orders to disirm, kept their arms, clashed wth the Japanese, and in some places themselves dis armed Japanese wnits. The Japanese gartsons maintasned mulhtary contrel an the larger estaes and tonns. but control over consoderable areas began to pass to Indoneuan armed groups. Peta, or unsts of youth orgamzatons whith had taken their arms from small Japanese formations either by force or in many smstances because their commanders were demoralued and surrendered them, sometimes doung so willingly. The Indonesian flag was forbodden by the Japanese. But Soekarno, recogniring its revolutsonaty symbolsm, ordered that it be flown from all public buildings Indonesian youths began to rak their lives to put it up, ineutably provoking clashes wsth the Japanese, who smmediately attempted to tear it down. Wathan six neeks the fag, the tangible symbol of independence, was flying from nearly every public bulding in Java. The students became the vanguard of the revolution, ditecting the demobilhzed youth from the Japanese sponsored zouth organarations and wsth thesm seinng arms from the Japanese, dragging Japanese offiters from thesr cars, eusting Japanese functionaries frem government buildings and in gentral provuding the cluef pushing force behind the new Republic that Soeåarno was leading.

The Japanese military command was in a quandary. The orders ut had received from the Alled Southeast Asia Command clearly called for its maintenance of the political stotus quo unul Allied troops took over. Yet it vas cons inced, and Soekarmo argued eloquenmly to increase its comoction, that any atempt to suppress the newly proclaimed Republic and the andependence movement which backed it would result in a tremendoum bloody struggle. The Japanese might posibly have emerged vactonous in such a fight, but only at the cost of very beavy casualoes Their pohey until the arrwal of Allbed troops at the end of September was uncertarm, wavering, and compromising, and sought to asnd a head-on collmon with the Iodonesian revolution. In general, they wete afrand to contest squarely the establshment of an Indonesian government, but wath more vigor undertook to stop the growth of Indoneuan melatary power

The establahment of a government for the newly proclaimed Re public proceeded rapudly At its first meeting on August 18, 1945, the Independence Preparatory Committee added six people to its member shup, Subardjo, Kasman Songodumedjo (the commander of the Jakarta Peta garnson), Sukarnt, Wrkana, and Charrul Saleh. Tbe expanded commuttee elected Soekarno and Hatta respectively President and Vice- Preudent of the Repoblic of Indones It apponted a commmsion of seven-Soekarno, Hatta, Profemor Soepomo, Subardjo, Otto Iskander Dunata, Mr Mohammad Yamon, and Mr Wongononegoro—to make the necessary and final changes en the national Comtstutson, already largely Within a week the final draft of the Indonesuan Contitution was completed and, though comudered definitely provisronal, was smmediately promulgated Providing latitude for wade scale socsal and economue as well as polsmcal change, it soon became a revolutionary symbol of great power, a harhinger of the good lofe that would follow the overthrow of alien enntrol

A more videipread rmolutionary symbol, symbolie of the revalution's egalitanian as well as fraternal eomtent, wis the mode of address mtroduced by Soekarno and soon in use throughout the Republsc of Iodoneua Thus word Bung (pronounced báng) was best tratalated as "bether" and in a rough sense w.as comparable to the "cituen" of the French Revolution oe the "comrade" of the Russean It derived from the local Jakarta varsant of the Indoneuan word abang, elder brother (Thn variant was aho common to East Java) However, the modifying "elder" was no part of the expresion The closest approximation of the idea it conveyed would probably be a syntheus of "brother revolutonary," "beother Indoneuan nationalnt," and

*It acrepued that part of the Consituten cut vas alrudy oropleed at ths mering on the o8th

"trother Republican." Young and old, poor and rich, President and peasant could and usually did address each other wsth this word. A diner in a restaurant addressed the waster as "Bung", a cabunet minister or the humblest Indoneuan peasant addressed Presdent Sockarno as "Bung Karno."

The Indoneuan department heads under the Japanese admunistra ton speedily declared for the new government Along with several new appointees of Soekarno and Hatta—both men who had worked wuth the Japanese (such as Suburdjo) and who had not (such as Amur Spanfuddin and Ir Sorrachman)—they conststuted the first cabinet of the new Repullic, a cabinet which under the Constitution was re sponsible to the Presudent, Soekarno The following was the member shup of the first calunet of the Repoblic of Indonesia ( \ugust 3t, 1915— November 11. 1915)

After September 1, s915. the Indoneuan department heads who had served the Japanese, as well as the new men appounted by Soekarno and Hatta to head other departments, gave orders as minsters of the Republic. Soelarno decreed that all Indoneuan evil servants were to ignore orders from the Japonese and follow those of the Republican government alone. The departments headed by hus ministers at once received the backing of almost all Indonesian government personnel. Without that personnel, the Japanese administration could not function. Millitary control of the chief urban centers was for a time maintained by the Japanese, but they were powerless to check the rash of cvilian functsomaries to the service of the Republic.

On August a9, the Independence Preporatory Committee was des solved by Soekarno and in its place was establshed the Komité Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Central Indonesian National Committee).

or KNIP as it came to be known Thus was to serve solely as an sdvisory body to the President and his cabinet, undertaking no legutative funo tions of ats own * To ths mew body Seekarno, assised in his selections by Hatta, appointed 135 members (including those of the Independence Preparatory Commottee), whom they deemed to be the cutstanding Indonesisan nationalists and the most mportant leaders of the chief ethnoc, religious, social, and economic groups in Indonena. They d:d not merely select amenable polatical stooges, but chose met and vomen nearly all of whom commanded wade popular support as outtanding leaders of Indoneuan socoety

By a decrte of dhe Preparatary Commettee an August 19, Indonesia had been divided unto eight provanees West Java, Middle Java, East Java, Sumatra, Kalimantan (Borneo), Sulawen (Celebes), Maluku (the Molucca), and Sanda Ketpil (the Lemer Sundas), Soekarno appointed a governor for each province from among sts own populatoon, and the KNIP gave mandates to one of its own members from each of these areas to form provineial KNI s (Indoneuan National Committees) to assst these governors an thesr admuniatrationa." Speedily there developed a spontaneous erupton of Jocal KNI's an the district and municipal level as well For a considerable period these local revolutionary committees executed the real admunistratuve power an thear areas Inotally they were self constuooted by the recognized Jocal Jeaders, but later, beginning in late November, according to a unsfoem pattern establohed by Government regulation. This was formaluzed in Java and Madura by a Governmental Act of November #g. *915, which called for the estahlshment of such councils in all rendencies, regencies, municipalities and such ether terrotories as the Ma of Interor mgt desgmate (On Otber , 1945 the Sulan of Jogjakarta had decreed the establahment of such a councal an hs ow temtory) By g, where conditions alowed. many o these KNI's were created on the bans of local elections

An August sg. the new government began to organize an army Upon the tose of armed and drarmed Peta units and from the ranks of the several youth organizations was establohed the BKR (hadan Keamanan Rakjt, People's Peare Preservation Corps), woth headquarters in Jakarta This lootely erginzed army was composed of highly autonomous and surtually sndependent constituent unus hav ing a temtorial tasn and subject to varying degrees of control by the KNI's of their respecuive ateas, wlueh were charged with their mauntenance and supply Begannang on October s spp). the name of the national atmy was changed from BkR to [KR or Ientara Keamanan Rakpat (People's Peace Prevervation Arms), sts constutuent units dur ung the course of the nest fet moeths being brought under greater. but frequently neffectve, degrees of central control The BKR unsts were quickly brought into the revolutronary struggle They helped seize government busldings from the Japanese and arreted those who refused to leave them

Fatful fighting betueen the Japanese and Indonestans contunued with mountung Ireequency and scale throoghout September Indonesan attempts to secure Japanese weapons and Japinese contestaton of Indonesan eval authorsty brought more and more clashes The first Brituh troops began to land at Jakaria on Sepoember 29. just as Indonesan attempts to wrest arms and cisl authority from the Japanese entered their most siolent phase During the first two weeks of October there was heavy fighting between Indonesian and Japanese troops for control of the cities of Bandung, Garut, Surakarta, Jogjakarta, Semarang, and Surabaya In Bandung. Garut, and Surabaya the Indoneslans won temporary control and retained control of Jogjzkarta untd December i9. tg8 Semarang uas entered by the Brstsh on October 19 after the Indoneuan forces had already suytained some a,ooo casualties fighting the hard presed Japanese garruon.

The task of the incoming British forees was formidable The instructions of the Allied choefs of staff as anterpreted by Lord Mountbatten, Allied commander in chief for Southeast Asia, called for accepting the surrender of Japanese armed forces, releate of Allied war prisoners and evshan internees, and dsarmament and concentration of the Japanese in readiness for tramsport back to Japan. In addition they called for the establishment and marntenance of law and order an Indontsin untd the Netherlands adminstration in the Indies was able to functions by stuell This last inuruction, of course, amtedated Allied knowledge of events withon Indonena British officers in Java and Sumatra and Australhan officers an pores of Celebes and the Lesser Sundas bere bound by instructions bised on premises that were no longet salud as to condituons in the Indies Beutsh and Australuan forces landing in Indonesia in October, s91s, encountered a situation for wluch they were totally unprepared* Throughout most of the area. in Jasa and Sumatra in particular, civid administration was operating an a level of effiesency that quste amnaed she Allied forces

Soekarno and Hatta nsued a general order aganst interfering wuh Broush troops, and groups of the stodents went out into the field to explain the utuatson to the Djibaku unies and to see that they dud not undertake rresporuble acuom However. not only the Dpibako, but al) Indenesans soon came to have migrvings about Brstish antentions As early as Septemher ag. Rear Admural Patterson, commander of the Bretah Fifth Cruter Squadron, proclaumed that Alled troops had arrwed to peotect the people and "to maintaam law and order until the time that the lawful government of the Netherlands East Indies is once again functsoning." Netherlands late twould be applied and en forced, be saud, by Nethertands admunntratise efficers an Java subject enly to whatever commands Admeal Mounthatten might ssue. The zame day Lt Gen Sir Phiip Christison, Athed commander in choef foe the Netherlands Indies, announced that Japanese forces in Java would be used temporanly so maintain law and order." These an nouncements were soon followed by the landing, under Bratush cover, of small contungents of Dutch troops Repeatedly Soekarno and other Republican Jeaders warned the Britnh to atap these Brstish protected landings They were convonced that the Iodonesan population, al ready suspocious and antagontzed by Patterson's and Chrstnon's announcements, coufd not faidl to interpret che influx of Dutch troops as positive indication of an antent to overthrow the Republhe and return

Indonesia to colonial status. The Indonesuan leaders feared that the popular reaction to this realization would lead to violence against the thousands of Dutch unternees stll quartered an the Japanese concentration camps

Any remaining doubts on the part of the Indonesan population as to Dutch intentions were rapudly dispelled by the activities of Netherlands and Netherlands colonal troops • The United States military observer attached to the staff of General Chrntison, Major F E Crockett noted

Concurtent with General van Oven's arroal there began to appear in the streess [of fakarta] roung patrols of tmgger happs Duth and Ambonese [of the kNtL—the Royal Netherlands todies Nrms] soldiers They shot at an thing that looked suspocious and when hunting was poor thev were not abese forcing an Indoneuan houne and dragging off without charges or warrants some or all of the sthabitants The smcalents' sncrrased The Natonalnts were smatrected that amy outbreaks on their part would be severely dealt wth by the occupyung authorsties In otder to prevent trouble, Soekarno ondered all Indoneuans off the streets of Bataua at dark By eight o'clock the streets were empty eeept for the roving Dutch putrols It was an umprevuve demomtration of Soekatmo s contrel ever his people "

Such activity effectively undermined the posubility of carrying out the policy of non intervention in Republican Dutch political relations that Lt Gen Christison after his apprasal of local conditions had hoped to follow Major Crockett's analyss of the sutuation and the apprehensoons it raused wathan hum were also felt by the Republic's leaders According to Crockett

It seemed clear to me from what I had seer that the Dutch in ve of Beitan's politucal mon mterference pronounoement, would try and were trying to an volve the Bronh snetttrably by provokung unsest among the native popula ton I could see no other reasonable explanatuon for she leutal conduct of the Dutch patrohh What they would gon by such tactes was obuous they would keep the Brtnh too busy to daarm the Japonese (whoch was thesr ptimaty reasan for beong there) and they would face the Brush to oommt more and more troops to the area. which would hesstably mean more and mote in solvement1

1• Both mesly landed soldiers and es solders who hid pust been releived from proen camp and foreed back anso unfoem under ordem of Lt Gen san Oyee, the

in Fredend E Crodiett, Hos the Troutle Began in Java" Harper't, March. 1915. p r91

17 thsd, p z5z

Such actity by Dutch troops, their continued landing under British protecuion, and the equivocal announcements of the British combined to demomtrate to mout Indonetans that their assertion of independence was besng challenged and seved to prosoke thear sharp response. No longer could the Dibaku be restrained. Its units subdivided into small combat groups and were soont follomed by the various armed youth uns in vaolent attacks agaunst Dutch and British patroh In several canes the objects of such attacks, usually where the Bartan Pelopor was involved, were not confined to foreign troops but extended to unarmed cvilian Dutch anternees, ancluding women and chaldren Concurrently, all Indonesan armed units antemifed their efforts to trest arms and control from the Japanese

The Allied command now placed dhe resteraton of law and order under Brsush control in the chief citses and ports of Java and Sumatra as the top prionty, with the disarmament of the Japanese to come later It ordered Japanese commanders to attack and recapture Indonestan beld coties such as Bandung The Allied use of Japanese troops aganst the Republic fwrther aroused the Indonesuans against both the Beatah and Dutch and reinforced their convsction thot st was intented that Indonesia revert to colonsal status During November and December wade seale and intense fighting raged throughout most of Java and much of Sumatra and Bah The heaviest fighting occurred during the first half of November un Surabaya, where several of the Jarge armed Indoneuan youth organzations that had been loosely co ordunated under the BKR ressted a drvsom and a half of Beitah and Indian troops for ten days, suffenng extremely heavy casualties.

Though the British, bocked by planes and the guns of their warships an the harbor, eventually after a long and botter fight managed to gain control of the caty, the battle was and still is looked upon by the Indonesans as a trumph Fer the Battle of Surabaya was a turning pount un thevr stroggle for sndependemee. It demonstrated to the British the fightang strength and the wallingness to sacrsfice life iwelf that were behind the popular movement they confronted It awoke them to the fact that the Republhe vas backed by the Indonesan masies, not apathetacally bot positively and enthusiastucally. The Battle of Surabaya shocked the Brntush unto the realizatlon that, unless they were willing to bring to Indoneua and expend a greatly amcreased strength of soldoers and equupment, they would have to alter their pohiczes and find some measure of common ground with the leaders of the Repub lie As this became clear, the Brsush commenced to stiffen against the refusal of the Dusch to deal with the Republic and put strong presure on them to negotiate to the end that peaceful compromse might be effected. Thus the Battle ol Surabaya, along wth other examples of strong Indonesian resistance, made posuble the diplomatie negotuations durang 1916 and early s917 between the Dutch and the Indonesians.

Fighting was by no means suspended during thus later period, but ats generality and intemuty was consoderably less than during the last ten weeks of sg15 In Java and Sumatra the Brytah and later the Dutch for the most part restricted thear operations to theer enclaves around Jakarta, Bogor (Bustenzoeg), Bandung. Semarang, Surabaya, Padang. Medan, and Palembang In Borneo, Celeles, the Moluccas, and Lesser Sundas the Dutch eneounsered linle difficulty in mon areas and soon brought in enough troops to take over from the Australrans, who hed already disarmed the Japanese occupyng forces

Bali, the Monahasa area of north Celebes, and southuest Celebes were, however, mportant exceptions Fighing between Dutch and Re publican forces continued on Bals until mod ig1 Republican resutance in heavily populared southwest Celebes was so inteme that the Dutch were obliged to resort to the most brutal tacties to gain con rol. Here in early 19p6 they employed the notorvous Captain Westerluag to "pacily" the country, large numbers of Indomessams, cisslsans as well as guerrillas, being limed up and methodically executed by hus firing squads, Repubhtan authortits masntain that nearly zn,ooo Indonesians were killed in this manner and in the course of fighting. Unofficial Dutch army sausces affirm that only 4.ooo were killed. The Netherlands government appounted a commasson to investigate bruratity on the part of Dutch forces, but no report was ever published. Most resistance leaders who were not Lilled were jailed. Over onefourth of the Indoneuan aristocratic rulers of southmest Celebes (including the most ;mportant of them) were removed by the Dutch and replaced by more amenable ndivuduals. The remaunder were thus consinced that retention of thear poutions depended upon their stup portung Dutch policy.

In Minahassa in February, rg16 Indonesian soldiets of the KNIL. (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) rebelled aganst the Duteh, proclaimed lor the Republie, and with the assistance of local cvilians maintained authority for a month.

Except for a few pernods of troce, all but one of which were extremely short, the first four years of the Republic's exustence were dominated by warfare against powerful adversaries-a warfare the outcome of which uts leaders conceived as determinang its very surnal Both the Repubhic's long negotiatons wath the Dutch and the unternal politics of the Indoneuin revolution as well must be seen agust the bockground of that fact if they are to be understood.

There ws a shoet peniod of relative peace during the last few months prior to the withdrawal of Brotish occupation forces at the end of November, sg16 and for a mondh or two followng the Limegadjats Agreement of March n5. s917 The only consoderable persod of troce was that follow ing the Remille Agreement of January i7. v02 From then wntul the Duoch ateack of December i9. r918, fighting berween Dutch and Repoblican troops was limited to clashes between patrols However, even most of thn penod was rendered tense because of the contnuing expectation of full seale Dutch attach, parocularly after June, 1o1ß In general, vetual or threatened mulitary pressure from the outude by a pouerful foe was a constant condstion ing factor of the Repoblic's anternal as well as external political re- Intems from its borth unil late in 1919

The Internal Politics of the Revolution until the First Dutch

Military Action

SJAIHRIR and hut group had refused to sponsor the declaration of independence of August 17 and had stayed away from the meeting held the prestous ight at Mayeda's house The declaration of Soekarno and Hatta was too weak, they feared, to aroose the populatton to the revolutsonary pitch aganst the Japanese that was necessary. Moreover, they more låely if its leaders had gone on recoed as being more strongly and openty ant: Japanese Thus, unstally Sjahrir and most of the powerful group that backed hum stood aude and refused to support Sockarno of an important cabonet post. Accompanied by several youth leaderns, Spahrir undertook a twoweek trip through Java to ascertaon the attitude ol the popuhation He tound that he nenly proclaimed Republat had a tremendoun and enthuuastuc backong by the people everywhere. The whole population was fighting Ior its andependence, and in that fight they looked for leadershap peuncipally to Soekarno Seeing this, Sjahrir felt that he could not repudiate the revolution led by Sockarno and upon returning to Jakarta accepted the request by Soekarno and Hatta that he joun in its leadership From that moment on Sjahrit, though frequently oppoung their program, supported Sockarno and Hatta as leaders of the Repallsc. However, two other pow erful leaders, 147

Subordjo and Tan Malaka were ambitious to assome the top positions an the Republe and at first separately and later Joincly worked skill fully to attan them.

On August rπ, sgis, at the some time that it hod set up the KNIP (Komite Nasional Indoneica Pusat—Central Indonesan National Comimattee), the Preparatory Commitee had established the Indomesian Na uonal Party (Partas Nasuonal Indonesia) Nme days later, however, on September 1, this momolithie national parry was dissolved because it was felt to be redundant and competutive with the KNIP and dherefore likely to finter disanaty.

Thereby, however, the party whuch Subardjo had been burlding up sence dhe last months of the Japanese admunistration was left as the only large, well developed politscal etganmmtion in the Republhe Among its leaders were several colleagues of his in the cabinet and a connderable number of local government oficials outude of Jakarta who had gven actrve support to the Japanese adminstration After the dnsolution of the government sponsored Indonesian National Party Subardp's organizatiom commenced to expand rapidly. To many Indonesuans, particularly Sjalrur's group, this created a dangerous situauon It appeared to them that the politucal vaewum thereby created was being filled by polrtically ambituous indrviduafs distrusted by many becaune of their close collaboration woth the Japanese and believed to have zuthontatan palhtical atttudes (according to Sjahrir's group "Fascstic") Whatever the accuracy of these allegations, Soekarno and Hatta as well as a nuniber of other top leaders felt it advisable by the end of October to endorse Sjahrar's proposal for the mtroduction of a mults party sysem Deswous as they sll were for umaty in the face of the struggle for ndependence, this was seen as the enly way to undermine Suhardjo's power and what many sasw as an ominously authori taruan prompect inherent in the growth of his party. This mantuver resulted in the straft datolution of Subardjo's organiration. But it anly partially undermned he political prospects of Subardjo For, while building his parey, he had at the same time been active in peomoting Tan Malaka's bod for pover, apparently on the basis that if Tan Malaka were sueceuful he, Subardjo, would also benefit

Notng Sjahrir's mtial refusal to back Soekarno, Tan Malake contacted Sjahnr smmedately after hn trip through the interior of Java. He proposed to hom that the two of them joun forces to overtheow

Sockarno Tan Malaka would then become President, and Spihrsr would emerge as cabuntt head and holder of the portfolatn of Defense, Etonomic Aflasrs, the Intersor, and Foreogn Affaurs, whule Subardjo would share some of the cabinet pover By this tame Tan Malaka apparently bebeved he could rely on the support of the underground of Sukarnt' and peobably many of the armed units st non controlled or influenced. Presumably Tan Malaka reasoned that of Sjahtir and the poverful groupt supporting hum thres in their weight wth the Sukarns group against Sockarmo they would be sttong enough so overthtow hut.

Sjahtar bluntly refused to take any part on Tan Malaka's plan and suggested to hum that if he had any slluuons concerning his own popa larity as contrasted wath Soekarno's, he should take a trip thtmugh the interior such as he had just made Ian Malaka seon teft Blogor (Bustenzorg) on vuch a trip and came back con unced chat Sorkarno enjoyed immemely more popular lacking than he * Thereby he saw the neces mity for changing his own strategy, for it was obssous that his own slender backing was mußicient to risk his head on oppoution to Soekamo.

To understand the strategy of Tan Malaka's second plan, which he catrsed out with the help of Subordjo, we must recall the condtion of Jakarta in September, s915. Sotkarmo and Hatta knew that the Britah were under great presure from the Dutch to attest them. They felt there was a streng chance that of they were not arrested by the Britah force occupying Jakarta, the Dutch would have them assassinated. Indeed, they were cettain that the Dutch were alseady attemptng this. Soekarno's car hod been fired on (when he was not an st) and his chauffeur wounded. Dutch colonmal troops had fired on the cars of both Spahtu and Sparnfoddin.

Tan Malaka came to Sockarno * and emphassted to lum the danger to hom and Hatta in Jakarta and the dnaster for the Repahlse of st should be deprved of abte leadershup at such a critical time. He proposed that there should be a standing arrangement for hum to succeed them as head of the Republic should they be killed or jailed and sugpotion of wuch an eventuality Soekarno, whule agreeing to the necessity of providing for cont;nuity of leadershup, had no wish to make Tan Malaka the sole poltical heir. Tan Malaka then got in touch with Subar.ho wa pay to plam, and e ate nied Skame, Hatta and Tan Malaka to hus house Here en October 1 he argued to them the necetuty for a political testament Soekarno and Hatta agreed to draw up yuch a testament, but they pointed out that Tan Malaks repersensed enly a manority of the backers of the revolution Therefore they decaded to make their heir a quadrumvrate conusting of leaders of w hat they concenved to be the four peincipal groups backing the revolution These were (1) Tan Malaka, representing the extreme Marxist Left, (2) Sjaheer, representing the moderate Socialises, (3) Iwa Kusuma Sumantr,* represeneung the Moslem organuations, and (4) Wongsonegoro, repeesenting the anstocratic, old line civil servants Sutardjo was requested to inform the three deugnees of the testament not present of the decuon taken A cabinet meeting was then beld at whoch Soekarno announced he was leaving a lesser andicating whom the cabinet was to follow should be and Hatta be killed or captured Subardjo did not carry out hos mauon of promptly anformang Sjahnr, Iva Kusuma Suman Ei, and Wongsonegoro of thear augnments under the politcal testa ment Indeed he never anformed Sjahrer and dad not tell Wongsonegoro untal early February, 1916

Tan Malaka then wrote out a document in whach Soekarno and Hatta transferred all power to hm alone an case of their inabelity to function as leaders and forged thear signatures to at Armed with this he departed for the snterior where it was known, as it was throughout most of the Republie, that Sorkarno and Hatta had made some sort of a polrtucal testament During most of October and November he traveled through Java, shonang hit version of the testament to in Sual people and tel them that Sokao and Ha ee pr ers of the Bratush in Jakarta and unable to leave the city Sonce they were prisoners, he asgued, it was his duty to assume the powers they

+ Actually Dr Sukoman was fest dengnated far tha plane, but unte be was out of rerch semastere in Creral fiua fan name kar wachdrzwn in fner of Satavda canddate. Iwa Komuma Somanin, who at a cabenet member was immeduely avail atle The lasser had been a strong Mavost, lad (thoagh net à Coramsest Party den an à Iawyer lad been acresed by the Doith of beveg a Communest en ecled to Banda, whese be becarme à Mohammedan and apperred to Hatta pher, and Tppco Mangankuaame, who were an euile these far many yeu had asked him to take over in cave they were incapacitated. There is no way of estimating how many influental people he was convincing and how moch support he was actually buslding up Has success was apparently sufficient to snduce Soekarno early un December to make a "whistle stop" trip through much of the intersor of Java in order to demomtrate to the population that he was a free agent Tan Mataka's agitatson also contributed to the decnion a few months later for Soekarno and Hatta's permanent removal from Britsh-occupted Jakarta to the inland city of Jogakarta and the transfer there soon afterward of all ministries except that of Foreign Affairs Spahrir, in particular, strongly urged Soekarno and Hatta to go to Jogjakarta not only be cause of the danger of arrest by the Bevtsh or assasunation by the Dutch troops but aho because he felt there was a danger of thesr besng assasunated by Tan Malaka's group Soekarno and Hatta left an great secrecy. their departure not being known in Jakarta until announced the fol lowing day in Jogjakarta

Concurrent wath Tan Malaka's and Subardjo's maneuvering for power, there occurred another political development of moch greater long term consequence. Thas tuas generated by the growing ducontent of the most dynamic of the revolutionary groups, the students, with the authoritarian pattern of the emergeney government headed by Soekarno and particularly with the compoution of his cabenet. Wath enly a lew exceptions that cabinet was made up of men who had held high offce under the Japanese and except for Sjarifudden contained none of the underground leaders. Most of these men, they felt, had collaborased with the Japanese largely on an opportunustie bass for their oun selfish benefit, more than for Indoneian andependence. They felt that the presidential system, parucularly under che emergency provsions gov. erning its operation during the anterim period before the anticipated elections, was far too authoritarian, particularly when it operated through such a cabinet. Their concern over the autocratic and totalitarian drult of goverwment was consderably besghtened by the grosing success of Subardjo in creating a sungle authoritarian political party, organized from the top down. Their concern was shared by Sjahrir, Sjarnfuddın, Supeno, Sukarni, Subadio, Mangunsarkoro and his wife, Ir. Sakarman, and a number of other leaders.

At the beginning of October, Supeno, Sukarni, Subadio, Ir. Sakirman, and the two Mangunsarkoros, all members of the KNIP, embarked apon a plan amed at changing the form of government so that the presidential system would be replaced by a parliamentary system of government, with real legislative power an the hnds of the KNIr, to whuch the cabinet would be directly responsible. Upon achieving this they plinned to peovoke a vote of no confidence sn the exnting cabenes whoch would catne it to fall They would then support Sjahrir as Pume Mutuster and formetenr of a new cabinet.

Their first step twas to consert the KNIP from a purely advisery body to one uath real legalatve power. To thas end they secured the signatures nf go of ts sgo members to a petstion lemanding such a change and on Oetober y handed this petstion to Sorkarno Neither Spekarno not Hatta oppoed this chonge and both ef them worked to expedite sin consummvtion On October 16, after a discustion and appemal of the propovil an the KNIP, Hatty on behalf of Soekarno and himself wued a decree whereby the KNIP was vessed woth full legslative poner poondy with the Presodent * Thes mernt that all legislatron htd to be appeuved lby the KNIP as well as by the Presodent o In the Preudential Decree, it was suprulased, as had been requested by the KNIP, that it would delegvie its powers to a small perornently sritaog repreventative body Anown as the Working Committee (Tidvn Pekerdja) whuch would be composed of members of the infrequently consoked parent body (the KNIr') and would remain responuible to it. The Working Com mettee was requored to mret at lest every ten dýs and the KN1P at least ence a year *

The NIP thereupon eleced Sahr and Spnfudd repeela Clharman and Vice Churtan of the Working Committee wrih the right jountly to select thirteen additional members of thre body." All the imembers whom they chose were their strong sepperters, and most of them hud been actve un the ant-Japonese underground. The fifteen members of the Working Committee were Soetan Sjahror, Mr. Amır Sjarifuddin, Mr. Souandi, Mr. Safruddin Prawiranegara, Krapi Wachid Hasjim, Mr. R. Hendromartono, Dr R. M. Sunano Kolopaking. Dr. A Halim, Subadio Sastrosatomo. Mr. Tan Lug Due, Supeno, S Mangunsarkoro, Adam Malk, Tadaludin, and Dr Sudarsono.

At the same time the kNiP called upon the Preudent to enlarge its membershup from 15o to 188 members, so that a number of influenval leaders not yet uncluded could be added Soekarno smmediately comphed, severat of the thirty eight neu members being appoumted by sartue of the fact that Sjahrar desired them to serve wath lum as members of the Working Commattee

In order to avoid misunderstandings as to ats status and funetions, the Working Committee on October zo set forth a "Clarnfication" of vts pontion It interpreted the Presidential Decree of October 17 as gising it the dates and powers to

a) Take part un shapang the outimes of the polies of the State Thos implies that the Working Conmittee, wath the Presdent, sets out the broed cuthoses of State polky The Worhing Commuvee does net have the power to interfete in the detads unvalved un the puryast of this policy Tha n the aole right of the Preudens

b) Estobish together wth the Preodent, the laws affeeting all felds of ad munutraton These laws are to be evecuned by the Covernmem, te, the Pres dent, atunted by the mutusters and their suboedanate ocers

During the first forty days of its existence, whule led by Sjahrir, the Working Committee became the dynamic beart of the government and wrought great changes not only in the system of government but also in the balance of polutal power Indeed the major consideration behind the changes in governmental structure and practace championed by Sjahrar and his Iollow ers was their desire to rescue the Republic from what they saw as an ominous drift towards authoritarian, totalitarian politucal forms and organiration. Specifically they sought to desuroy the formidable political machune being built up by Subardjo and some of his associates both in and outside of the cabinet. Principally these gosernmental changes were a means to that poltical end. An umportant, though datinetly secondary, consideration behind this policy was the desire to remove as much as possible of the collaborationist taint from the goscoonent in the belhef that that would give it a stronger position metnatsonally from which to megotiate wath the Dunch.

The fiest move of the Workin Committee was to insure adequate supervsson of the central government ever the local KNI's and the harmonsation of sts actusstses wath therts By vts proposed legoslation of October zo. 1945.31 passed after presudentral coneurrence on November #3. the regsonal KN1 s came under the chaurmamahip of Iocal leaders apponted bs the central government These bodies were to hase ther own Working Commuttees coniating of a maximum of fne members elected from the local kNI's and ther chaurmen were men who had been apponted by the central government as charrmen of the KNI as a whole i: Thereby the pouubelity of daudent elements utilizing the local kN1 & as bates for buildang up their oten antigovernment potser was much reduced The procedure for election of their representatves was left to the discretion of theur respectve communitres and continued to vary wadely In some areas, particularly where fighting was frequent, conditions did not allow such local elections But probably in about half of the KNΓ's in Java, Madura, and Sumatra, the repeesentatives KNI's remauned the same They could consuder as their legiumate preserves the whole area of legislation not yet covered by the central gonernment, vubnequent legislanon by it would always take precedence over any legulation passed by the local KNI's. Similarly, legslatson by à provincial ANI took precedence ever that ef a dutriet or municipal ANI

The second smportant action of the Working Committee was by a subseqoent legslatve propoial on the sarme day, October zo, s945 This called for the abandonment of the one party system and its replacement by a mult party system un which alt smportant politoctal currents would have representation. Preudential concurrence swas speedily forthoom ing with the appended requnst that these partues be formed before the elections for the Council of People's Representatives (whoch was to re place the temporary. non-elected KNIP) scheduled for January, sgg6 Dunng November and December there was a rapod formation of po-

Iitical parties, with the result that Subardjo's party soon withered and died, many of its members joming the standard of Tan Malaka.

Of the many political partues launched, smitially the most powerful was the Partai Nanonal Indonesia (Indonesan National Party), or PNI as it was generally knoun Thus new PNI was backed by a large per centage of the Repubhc's profewmonal prople and a protable majorsty of the eval servants who had worked in the prewar colonsal admunistra uon A large number of sts ntellectwals had been actve in the ptewar nationalist movement For the most put it was an older generation party, the majority of ts leaders averaging well above those of any other in age

The mital mass follouing of the PNI was attracted to a large extent because it bore the name of Sockarno's prewar mass party as well as that of the offical government sponsored party launched on Augunt 2. 1915 wrth the backng of both Soekarno and Harta Thus a conuder able amount of its original mass backing rested on the fiction that the PN1 was "the party of Soekarno and Ilatta " It took many Indonesans a year or more to become disabused of thos fiction, and some foreign correspondents never were

However, the PNI had an important long term means of atracting mass support This arose Irom the fact that it enrolled the backing of a probable majority of Republican local administrative officers, for the most part the same men who had made up the old aristocratsc Indo nesian ciwil service whuch had served the prewar Dutch admunistration. Lakewise, it attraesed considerable support from their nonanstocratic sabordinates in the cvil servuce, a large number of whom had aho worked in the preuous Dutch admunistration Though the revolution was making a powerfut smpiet upon the long ungrained, authoritarian habets of Indoneuan society, there stll remauned a strong tendeney for the peasantry to look for polutseal gusdance and directves from its tra ditional governoes, the expernenced Indonesian administrative class " Thus fact was the tong term polatuca! forte of the PNI

It was wadely believed that the peasantry's traditional and habitual responte to authority gave the PNI a strong competstive advantage in the projected electons, an adhantage surpassed only by that held by the Masjumi wth its religrous toe with the peasantry In addition the PNI had the support of most of those members of the tiny Indonesian commercial and anduunal muddle class who were not attracted to the Masjumi It was becaune of this and the fact that it incorporated a prob able majonty of the largest sector of the Indonessan moddle clas, the old regeme Indoneuan bureaucracy, that the PNI veas often referred to as "the middle clais party" of Indonesia. Finally, the PNI developed a left wing. a amall munoesty at first, but of increaungly subitantial proportions It was based principally upon the support of some non Communist Marxnt ntellectuals, some small labor groups led princpally by Wilopo and Mangunsarkoro (after hos defection from Sjahrir). and a group of progressively inclaned students

However, it was neither the old line arntocratie civil servant leaders of the party's right wang nor these anereaungly infizenual leaders of its small left wing that domanated the party's leadership. That function was held by a small but powerful group of men who had dntunguished themselves an the pre war Indaneuan nationalnt movement, for the most part an the Partaa Nanonal Indoneua of the late sgao's and its succesor the Partindo Amang the most mportant of these were Mr. Sartono, Mr. Als Sastroamidjojo, Sadik Djojosukarto, Manai Sophiam, Mr Sujono Hadinoto, Mr Susanto Tirtoprodjo, and Suwirjo. The socioeconomie udeology of most of thn group was comiderably closer to that of the left wing of the party than to that of its right wing.

The heterogeneity of its constiruent elements made the PNI an unwieldy poltocal organiration Is basic tenet that national independence had to precede any baue social reform kept ita constituent groupt together and allowed the party to maintain a relatively consistent policy wath respect to relatsons wath the Dotch. However, the daparity in outlook of these groups in regard to domestic questions made it diß- cult for the party to follow a connstent and clear policy in that sphere

On November 7. 1915, was founded the Masjumi (Madjelia Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia-Council of Indonesian Moslem Association) which withen a year was to surpusis the PNI in size and become by far the largest political party in the Republic. Though it bore the name of the pramaraly social asociation established during the Japanese oc cupation, it was a new and dutinct crganiration." It enrolled all the

uhi was oaly by a namew tanpn, sa-se, that the compess of Modem leades hach lasnched che pazy decaded to eati it Mapemi sather tan Partal Raizat hlam (Party of the Irlamic Peeple) Thene is na douhe but thig it wm shle to get somethong of a hend stant by stiluing some of the existng ergamtsion of the old nenpolitical Islamic organirations subsumed under the Masjumi of the Japamese period, including the Mohammadijah and Nahdatul Ulama as well as such prevar Islamie poltical organzations as the Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia

Because of support by the large, nonpolitical Moslem social organiza trons and partsculatly because of its support by sullage religious leaders. the Masjums was able to busld up a huge, if unintegrated and unorganized, mass backing Almost all Moslem religious leaders of Java, Madura and Sumatra supported the Masjums, which also astracted most of the vestigial Indonesuan commercial and industrial muddle class throughout that area Likewse it attracted the majority of the larger Indonesian landowners "

As was the case with all Republican polstucal partses. national independence was the Masjums s chief asm Next to that, it was dedocated to the organzation of the state according to Islamic principles Only with a small minorvty of members dod thos dedication verge on religrous intolerance and andeed the large mazorats of the party's leaders wel comed the adea of non Meslema holding some cabunet and Working Committee posts It was over the interpretation of uhat Islamie soczal principles were and how they should he appled in Indonesa that the two chief groupe within the party—the "Religious Socalnts" and the conservauve, older-generation religious leaders—were generally at oddi. The Religoous Socialnts drew much of their imspiration from the teachings of Mohammad Abduh However, the views of this young and dynamic group were in large measure their own and new. They represented the impact of the Indonesian revolution upon sintere young Mohammedans postessed of enlightened minds and a strong sense of thear duty to serve society Thear prancipal leaders—Mohammad Natsir, Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Mr. Mohammad Roem, Mr Jusuf Wibisono, and Dr. Abu Hansfah—found considerable common ground with the moderate socialsts who follow ed Spahtar and with such progressive leaders of the smal but effective Christian Party as Dr. Leimena and Mr. Tambunan." The differences between this left wing of the Masjumi and its right twing, hased on the Nahdatut Ulama and the more conservatrve elements of the Mohammadhjah, was generally bridged, though frequently not effectively, by the more progresise members of the Mohammodijah, by the party's chasrman, Dr. Sukiman, and tater by another of its leaders, Prawoto Mangkusasmito

Also among the "big three" pohtical parties that domonated the fiest two years of the Repoblic's existence was the Socralnt Party (Partas Sosuales) Ths was establuhed in early December, s915. as a merger of the shortly previously establnhed Partas Sosalis Indonesia of Amir Sjanfuddin and the Partas Rakjat Sosialis (Socialist People's Party) of Soetan Sjahmr (Sjarifuddin's party had been established un early November and Sjahnr's on November so, 1915) The new, combined Socalst Party was headed by Spahrr and commanded great strength among the younger sntellectuals and a large proportion of the secondary and college students, including most of the members of Spahrir's ant- Japanese underground and a large pereage o those from that of Sjarifuddin It dod not have the same large, loose and unorganized mass Iollowung as the PNI and the Masjumi But the popular support it did have was more politically conicious, and mare solidly and effectively organzed behund it than the rank and file whose polstical alleglance was clamed by the other two maje partses Also it had the backing of most of the small group of nctuvely pro-Republican Indonesian Chinese For the first eighteen mnnths of ats existence no important splsts occurred wathon the Socalist Party Its membership was unsformly in fasoe of a relatively large measure of social reform but placed this, at ded all the partses, after the struggle for independence and the national unity prerequmite thereto However, Iike the Masyumi, it did not bebeve that all socal reform had to wait upon full independence for all Indoneua

Dunng the lat montha of 194 there aho occurred a rapid burgeon ing of small parties In addition to the Chriustan Party there emerged a small but aruculate Catholic Party (Partas Katholik Republik Indo neua) under Kasimo a" On October #1, 1915. re emerged the Indaneuan Commennt Party (Partar Komuns Indoneua—PK1) under the leadership of Mr Mnhammad Jusuf. (The party actually emerged snto the open on November γ, but Jusuf claumed at had been re established on

it There were undee go oee Irelomemun Catholics on Jasa and Sumatra, bet thet zverage level of edueston and soeal penison wn hagh Vost of the Índenean Cathele pepulation wis in arcas carly seoerupued by the Dunch, sach ts Flores Temer, and Aotben Far a good wotount of the Catholac Paty see Grons*ho Prsion De P K Rt —Parts Rsthabk Repoeblak tedenesn." Indonriva. July n7. sgg6

October r1.) He and a number of his followers had been amociated with the Japanese sponsored "Communest Movement" which Subardjo had helped orgamre. He had no connection with the actual PKI underground or esther the "Illegal PK1" established by Vuso an sgss or the earher PKI which launched the rebellion of sg:6-z7 His group was responuble for antigovernmental actisities an Pekalongen at the end of October and in Cheriben in mid February 1916 In the latter sts armed adherents attacked a Republacan police barracks, killing several police before being dnarmed, after which Jusuf was arrested The party developed lattle following or prestige untal May, vg16, after the arrval from Australia of the old tume Communist leader Sardjono," who replaced Jusuf as chairman On Vugust 12. s916, Alimin returned to Indonessa alter twenty years abroad, the last vear or more of whach had been spent in Yenan Though with Sardjono, who remained chastman, he added prestige and able leadership to the parts it never until 1918 attained a stature approachang that of the PN1, Masjumi, or So cralist Party

It is of importance to note that a large number of the Indonesian Stalinists, including some of the most important of them, did not enter the PKt. Instead they entered one or the other of the three chief non communist Marvist parties, the Socalist Party, Laber Party, and Pesindo. Probably as many members of the "Illegal PKL," the group ong. inally orgamized by Musso in t9ss and ahuch later became one of the two chief ant: Japanese undergrounds, entered these groups as entered the post-Jusuf PKI. They may well have initually been deterred from entering Jusuf's organization because of the low caliber of his leadership as well as because of ats obvious deviation from the Moscow line. There are also grounds to believe that some stayed out of the PKI after Sardjono and Alimin had captured its leadership because of differences in outlook with these leaders." It may well be that because of this initial character of the PKI. that some of the Indonessan Communist leaders epon returning to Indoneua from the Netherlands in late 1945 and early spgß, felt their pohtical prospets would be better if they were asocated with the much more powerful Socialist Party. Certasnly their unterprecation of the Damotrov Doctrame did not bar such a course. Their Communist aflilsations were not then known to the leaders of the Socalist Party and thesr record during the war in the Soczalist led underground in the Netherlands made them highly acceptable as members and subordunate leaders

The Communnts who jouned the Socialist Party, the Labor Party, and the Penndo ultimately emerged in control of these organirations and im August s9p8, undertook to fure them with the PK1 This has Ied some Indonesians to conclude that there was a long term conscious deugn on the part of these Communists to infiltrate and wrest comtrol Though thos in fact did happem, the proof is Iacking to demomtrate conclussely that that was their conscious long term plan. It does seem clear that when they first atrived in Indonesia late in 1945 and early in ig46, they twere adhenng closely to Mostow's lime, at least as it was interpreted by the Netherlands Communist Party Their mitial orienta ton was, parallelang that of the Netherlands Communst Party, anti- Republie They conceived of the Republic as Japanese-made and Fas cistic and their objective was to reunite the NetherIanda and Indonesia Thus the Netherlands government was happy to fly them out free of charge to Indonesa At first they sought to being the Republican lead ers to accept the proporals of the Netherlands government. In thus they met no success, but in attempting to do so they saw the Republic from the inside They soon cumcloded that it was mesther a Japanese product nor a Fascist dictatorshup It twas clear to them that the Republic had the enthussastic support of the population and that the future of the natsonalst movement in Indonesia lay with it Wshing to be realstic about their own polstical future they made an adjustment which constituted a sort of synthesis between their own matunalist vorws, personal political ambetions and the Communist line. The Lt Governoe- General of the Netberlands East Indies, Dr. Hubertus J. van Mook,

hevever, that Mumo was bot fally an mrach to blame boe the fahume of the tuas-ay revoleton at vas Almus Posbly conmderstin shosld be grven to the fact tat Alaten and Sardjpeo sese goneraty connudeved (n mad sgp) to have mere coment of natoraleme in their Comrmornm than Muno It aho may he ngssdoant that Aleun spent soese ome past before the end of the war woth Mao Te ang un Yenan gave them permission to enter the Republic, where they suoriated themselses with shote political foeces withun it thit were willing to try megotiating with the fiutch for independence befote revosting to foece. They appirently felt able to ratioailue thon conduct in terms of the sull prevailing Dimittow Doctrne or at least in terns of loow their oun wahful thunking prompted them to interpeet ot Ihus, though of thas group Maruto Darusman pouned the Srdpmo and Alman led PKI, Abdulmadpd pouned the Soralist Party and Setadjt the Lahor Parry

On November 9. t91s. the leaders of the rerently estalduded and short Ived General Indoneuan Irade Umson (Barian Buruh Indos neua) formed the Indoneuan Lahoe Patty (Partas Buruh Indonrsia) For aeveral monthn thn party way latpely unter the controd ed In doneuans who had worked in the Labor Deportment of the Japanre occupation admanistration and helped at tecruit faeced labor " How ever, in early agg6 with the artival of Senadjn " from Holland control of the party was wrested from thos collabeeatootust group, he emerget as in chairman, and it became moee repreventatise of the unterests ed labor. For the next eigiteen monthn of sts exstenre the purty clovely followed the lead of the much larger Socaliet Party and consistrntly supported it.

Some of thone who looked to Tan Malaka for Iradershup formed in November, 191s, the Partai Rakjat Delata (Comsson Peopdr's Party) headed by Soetan Dewanit The majurity, lowever, waited lor more than six months before estaldudung polatral purtues Hovever, as e will see, they were energetically engaged in peolitirs, particutarly in Luilding Tan Malaka's national front sdganizaton, deugnrd to uub sume all pelitical patrtes and tring lis to poltiral asrenlanay.

During the first zear od the Republt's existenre, Lst to a rapidly dimindshing extent thereafter, an smpoetance in the internsl poltirs ed the revolution almott equal to pat ol the lormal polstiral purtiet was held by the peineipal factaons within the TRI (the nataonal army) and the several poverful semu autonomous* arregular military organi zations

Poliucally the most potent and in a military sense probably the strongest of these arregular armed organ:zations was the Pesindo (Pe muda Sonals Indoneua—Indoneuan Socalist Youth) Thas was es tablnhed from the amalgamatron of seven jouth orgamurations*s at a cunierence held on November 10, s945, at Jogjakarta The objective of the conference had been to merge all twenty tho Repubhean yruth organstations Merger anto one antegrated body was agreed upon only by the seven organizatsons that fused to become Pesundo The remaining fifteen organuations in conjunction with Pesndo did form a loose of the Organzaton of Youth of the Republc of Indonesia) Differences in vwews of its conststuent groups handicapped the effectiseness of thos federation, however, and on only a few occasions was opinmon within it soficiendly unform to allow it to take concerted action

The Peundo, on the ocher hand, because of the relatvely homoge neous outlook of its members and the ability of many of its leaders, became by far the mont dynamue and powerful of all youth organza nons in the Republhe. A contuderable mamber of the young men makang ep sts membershap were organaaed anto well armed, discsplined fight ng unts of bastalion strength The total armed strength of the Peatdo

n Unal Jan as iggs, the manonal army was kaoka as the TKR—Testare kea e Repebhe ef Indonnu) On Juve , aget, ata zame kas agan changed and caae kna s the TNI (Tentara Nanmal Indoneti=Indoneun Nat

" Ther matonomy frore the hagh ceearund of the ThR was very goeat dunang the nn teonths of sndepemdmer, tux cheneafter more and mone of these ergemion ane abeerbed eco the Ttt and the larser's anthority ever thone sill separate nnderatly ancreased Complete sntegrason of all aétary orgaeuatorn anno th ntorul army wnder a aungle comeand was zoe effected unol the end of Oct, sg1t

Theste kere () Pemuds Repabtiß Iedoness (PRi—Youth of the Indonmas eputhcß lasgest of the armed yesth orgasccatarn, and the one whoch bat pn rablahed a Intlant socand an the Surataya Sghtng and was sepoosessed in th IP. (r) Anglaten Femuds Indonena (ledenesun Young Gemeratian), alo la ad well arrmad, but le well ogaused and deepheed shan the FRt, (g) Anglatas foda Repatlk Indaneua (Voung Gemeranan of the Repebh: of Indomeea). (1 onea). () Aeghatan Voda Kerein Aps (Yonng Ralread Aerdtent, (5) Anglat

INTTRVAL POLITICS OF REVOLUTION

during the finst year of the Republic probably totaled about 25.000 It won great prestige because of the effectise part it played in fighting the Britsh troops. Both ats general membership and ats armed unsts sdentified their anterests with those of the Socralat Party and by contstently backing it contributed greatly to its political strength

Milstary strength backing the Masjumi was provuded by the Hubul lah, an armed organization of strongly Meslem voung men besween erghteen and twenty five years-old " Organared into battalion units, it probably mustered between 20,ooo and 25.000 armed men during mot of the first year of the Republie It was organzed under the leadership of the Masjumi and was contodered as its armed auxsliary In pracuce, bowever, liason between Masjums leaders and many of the Harbullah commanders was frequentlv vers loose Largely on paper there alho eusted the Sabilhlah, a sort of terrtorally tased home guand in which all Masjums members were hable for servuce In some areas, however, its units were armed and of importance

The Japanese-sponsored Barsan Pelopor (Pioneer Legson) continued its exstence alter August a7, and in mad December, 1915. changed ats name anto Barisan Banteng (Butfato Legion) Next to the Peundo it was the strongest of the armed youth organizations. In number of armed adherents st may have mutially surpased the Peundo, but is was much less well dnciplined, had fewer able officers, and the educational level of its rank and file was belowe that of the Peundo. As a resalt, its fighting power and politocal strength were considerably less. Occasonally during sg45 and early sg16 it gave support to the PNI (particularly in Surakarta, chuef headquarters of the Barsan Banteng) as twell as to Tan Malaka. Later it became mote esclusively attached to Tan Malaka.

An regular armed organstaton of consderable sate durng the first six months of the Republic's exstence, but of dumunahung strength both abnolutely and relatve to other irregular armed organizations, thereafter, was the Barisan Pemberontakan Rakjat Indonesua (Revolu tionary Legion oI the Indontsian People) headed by Sutomo (Bung Tomo). This was a Ioosely organzed youth organiratson which took an important part in the Surabaya fighting. It had no formal political afßliations but, possessed of several radin stations, managed to evert some political influence. It consestently and strongly opposed any negotiations with the British or Dutch and attempted to rally the

21 The Hubullah had actually ben net up as a youth orgosation of the Jopanesesponsored Masjume at apts It had been gven some msilstary trunng but no ama population to an all-out resistance of the most militant character. Smallest of the more important irregutar armed organizations was the Kebaktian Rakjat Indonesia Sulawesi (Loyalty of the Indonesian People from Sulawesi) or KRIs as it was uiwally known. This was made up of men from Celebes, mostly Christians from the Minahasss resdent in Java at the end of sg1s Initially it was formed for mutual protection of its members against those Indonesians who assumed that Chrntans were pro-Dutch, as well as for the parpose of fighiing the Duich. Its combat record agunst the Dutch was so good that it soon won the high regard of all Republicans Probably no other group did so much to convince Mohammedan Indonesians that Christians could be just as relhable Republocans as they. Though having only about amed soldu, the hig average level o education amon them gave rts battalions a higher discipline and more able leaders than were postued by most of the other irregular armed organizationt.

The largest of the urregular armed organizations was the Laskar Rakjat (People's Army). This was made up of foosely Inoegrated, frequently almost avtonomous, terntonally based and raised unit—a sort of home guard. Set up in October and September, v9ss. largely on the inituative of the Sultan of Jogjakarta, it was considered as the auxilary of the regular army (the TKR, later TRI) and sts umts were in varying degrees amenable to army leadenhip" Progretsively the control of the TRI over ins units gres—but it was not until mid-1917 that this process was largely complete. For the most part the Laskar Rakjats remained ouside of politaes, but occasionally Iocal units assoclated themselves with and supported one or another poltical group "

At the end of October, Sjahrir published a small bocklet, Perdpuee gan Kite ("Our Struggle"), which during the frst days of November was widely circulated. Its impact upen political thinking in Indonesia

INTERNAL POLITICS OF RFVOLUTION

was tremendous, particularly among the former underground workers and the educated zouth. In thus he called upon the youth to act with a responsibdity commensurate wuth their revolutioniry importance: specifically to refrain from antsforesgn and ants Eurasian volence, and to bend their energies towards formvtson of a democratie, nonfasent, nondeudalistic gmernment He warned that Indonesia must adjust to the reality that she lay in the American Blestah power sphere and that she would have to Iive wnder the unfluence of American and Britth caputalism and ampernalum Isen upon attainment of full polataçal independence from the Dutch, he asserted, the limots of the polstical and economc independence attaunable by Indoneua and the scope for internal socral change would be circumicribed by that condition. Indonestans mant dntingush between the outward aspects of thesr reso Iution-nationaliam—and its internal social atpect There was great danger, he sand, that in concentrating on the nationalntie aspect of the revolution, the democratically based, nternal social aspect would be neglected. Given the strongly survving feudalntne herstage in the counery, this absorption with the nationalatic aipect to the exclusion of the internal democratue anpect would lead to fascism; for the requisite ingredoents of fascism are "feudalism and supernationalism " Democracy and not nationaliem, he emphasized, should be the primary objective of the Indonesian revolation.

Finally, Sjaltir called on the Indonesian people to rejett the leadershop of all thone who bad actvely collaberated with the Japanese or the Dutch and to entrust Ieadershup in the revolution only to those untainted by such a relatiomdup and whose goal was democracy. He stated:

Our revoletion must be led by revolutionury, demoeratic groupt and mot by natonalnt groupt, which have let themmelves be twed an servants ef the Fascists. whether Dosh colowsl Fawuis, o Japonese moloary Fastina

The revolutionarydemocratie struggle must begin by putifying iaelf ef all Japinese faucnt stain and oppoing all thome whose spint is still under the influence of Japanese propiganda and edocation Thoie who have sold themsehes and their honer to Japaneve fascism, must be theown out of the leadership of our revolution-that it thoe who have ever woeked for the Japanese propagands organirations, the secret palice, in general, everyone who has worked for the Japanese fifth colomn All these persons must be contidered as trastors to our struggle and be datinguished from the common laborers. who have had to work for the enemy in onder to suppeet themuelves Thus all the abone mentsoned collaborators must be conudered as our own fascius, as accomplices t" and tools of Japanese Fascism, who bear a heasy guilt and hive committed treason to our struggle and our people's revolation *

It has often been asserted by foreagn versters that Spahrr's demand for this porge was due to has convuction that the Alles would be more disposed to negotate with and ultemately to recognure an Indonesian government untanted by collaboration vwich the Japanese than one which was Though thn bas from Sjahrir's standpoint an important consideration, at vas dncinctly secondary to his fear of the fascist potential of the evsting government Sjahrar opposed ats dominantly collaborataonist cabimet " for the same reason that he opposed the oneparty system *" and urged replatement of the monohthsc presidential system of government by a porliamentary presidential syitem where power would be wadely diffused He feared the development of a totilitarian government in Indoneua because of the legacy of feudalstic authoritaransm whuch bad been kept alne and reinforced by the long persod of colonsal government. The members of Subardjo's clitqut withun the cabinet and sprinkled widely throughout the Republican adminstration were, be felt, collaborationsts wath fasest outlooks close to the Japanese whom they had served In the positiom of power which they controlled, he felt, they might be able to lead the nation towards a fascist form of government.

Whatever the justification of Spahnr's fears concerning the polstical crientation of those who worked with the Japanese admanutration,

n In hos ongual Indasesan edrton Spahne used dhe serm "tunnong degs" (aedpeg kskr tengo) mather than "arrompleen* of Japanrse Fascion To be relerved to as who hid werked fer the Japanese adterstraien san made even grester by hs une of tha epttet In later edroors., the wond "aoreeplese" was setrosuted for 'running dog."

in Soetan Spahnr, Osce Sinpd (Doith trmand of Perdjunngas Arta) (Aasterdam, 91月.p 3

An He dil not emnuder all sach membem of the cabonet to be fascst on memoality. nor all to tave been willeng urrvant of the Japaner

the penod of smeggle At the end of Octater, hovever, an appeared to tom that Sultandjo and has groap were emerpeg at the hrad af the one mapor ruoseeal porty and that hecsuse ef ther dommant postson in ats lendenhup the party woold be asthenstarin and fnent Brcause of itos fesr be took a lesdng rofe an poomotang a auala paety system calatated to hin over che petestal mam mappert of Scbardjo's fallowing

INTERNAL POLITICS OF RIVOLUTION 167 they were immediately echoed by many members of the underground and a large portion of the students, most of whom were soon to become members of the Socialist Party They rallied behund Sjahrir in lus campoign to oust these people from the government.

Though Spahrır had not meant to suggest that Sockarno and Hatts were collaboratonsts to be ousted frum the government, for a time there was confusion among muny as to his stand on thes In anv case the pontionts of Soekarno and Hatta had been weakened by Tan Malaka's conunuing propaganda that they were under the control of Braush and Dutch octupation forces in Jaharta

The first mose of Tan Malaka's group was an attempt to detach Hatta from Soekarno Apparently on October zi. Sukarni approsched Hatta. suggestng that Tan Malaka replace Soekarno as Presdent, urging that he was better fit to lead the revoluuon Ihes proposal was abruptly turned down by Hatta

Within a few days thereafter the effects of Spahnr's antscollaborationist brochure began to be noticeable It was undoubtedly the heavy ralliing of much of the most dynamie revolutionary element-the youth—to Sjalrr's standard that consunced Tan Malaka of the desirabulty of uniting his own conoderable backing from the same element wth Sahevr's He personally contacted Syaleer and tobl him of the Poltical Testament of Soekarno and Hatta. The evodence is considerable that Tan Malaka then suggested that means be found for remoung Soekarno and Hatta from their posutions so that the Political Testament might "legally" take effect. Many people feel that Tan Malaka had in mand nothung less than assawination, In the new government enviaged by Tan Malaka, Spalrir and he would be dominant, Sjahair vould be President and Tan Malaka asked only the key minstries of Interior and Labor, with one other munistry going to Subordjo Sjahrir refused to have anythung to do with Tan Malaka's propotal

A splht between the two had already begun because of theur diflerences over the course which the revolution should take. Among other thingt, Tan Malaka advocated immediate seizure by the masses of all foreign properties wathout compensation, feeling that stronger mas support for the revolutionary struggle would thereby be gained. Sjahrir oppoved this, arguing that if this occurred America and Britain would certainly rally to the support of the Dutch and crush the Republie.

Sahn's categorcal rejection of Tan Malzka's propoal deciavely wsdened the split between them.

Almost immediately Tan Malaka shafted to a nese tactic, hoping to proft by the strong appoution of Sjahtar's group to the gmernment. Capitalinng on the strong antigovernment sentiment aroused among the vanguard elements of the revolutson, Tan Malaka, Subardjo, and the other leaders of their group on or about November . 1915. petwed Sorkarmo and Hatta to reugn The situation was extremely critical. As between Tan Malaka's group and Soekarto and Hattz, the group led by Spah clearly held the halante of power. But the lattude of maneuver of Spahrer and the leaders around hum was, as Tan Malaka mus have realzed, extremely lumited. Sjahrir humielf had led the anteollabocationoat crusade, and hs supporters expected hum to carry it cut Adiherence to the political status quo vas imposukble. Change was demanded, and if Sjahrir oppoted it, he would probahly lose much of his followeng, which might then swing over to follow the leadership of Tan Malaka. The weake of Sahn's pouon was th n launc ing his antscollaborationat movement he had mot sufficently dat tinguished between Soekarno and Hatta and other leaders who had collaborated choefly to advance the cause of Indonesan independence as agaunst those Indonesam who collaborated principally out of sellanterest Because of this Tan Malaka was in a posstion to uthze the movement to oust both groups, including Soekarno and Hatta Prob ably feelng that Spahrir would be forced to follow Tan Malaka's Jead, Subardjo appeoathed him and asked him n his capacty as Chairman of the Weeking Commattee to back Tan Malaka's demand that Sorkarno and Hatta resign,

The problem of Spahrir and the leaders around him was a difficult one. How were they to maintain their support of Soekarno and Hatta whale meeting the demands of the swelling anticollaborationist movement suffeciently to keep Tan Malaka out of power? The formula de vsed to accomplish this was announced by the Werking Contmittee on November 11 and was in fact completely in harmony with the pre voously launched objectives of the Supeno-Subadio Mangunsarkoro- Sukarns group of the previous month It called for a baue change in the system of the Repulblic's gaveroment, mamely, the uatroduction of cabinet responstbthty to parhamens (the KNIP) Betueen meetangs of the KNIP, the Working Commottee would serve as ats deputy, wath the cabumet accountable to at Should a dafference arise between the Press dent or cabunet and the Werkang Commattee, it was anticipated that the mater would be referved to a meeung of the KNIP for settlement." Thus a modas evends was reached whuch sufficiently satisfied the anticollaborationist backing of Sjahrar and kept it from drifung from him to Tan Malaka. For now the collaboratuonists in the cabinet were respomuble to the KNIP and therefore, it was felt, under its control.

Soekarno quckly grasped the realities of the polucat stuatuon. He promptly approved the Working Committee's proposal for cabitet respontubilety to the kN1P, contacted Spahror, who it was clear backed hum rather than Tan Malaka, and asked him to become Prime Minis ter. Sjahror accepted the post on the condition he be given complete freedom to select the members of his cabinet. Soekarno agreed and abruptly dumossed his own cabonet, thereby taking from Tan Malaka practically all of hes political caputal

For about two months the bitterness of most of the dumused cabunet members agarnst Sockarno was intense. Thereafter they directed their anumosty against Spahrur—feeling hus anticollaborationist attack was the real basus of their fall from office and that their reputatioms had been unjustly sullied by that attack. In Sjahrir's estumation the enmity which he and his followers aroused through their bitter anticollabo rationist campaign among most members of the custed cabinet and among other politically prominent persons who had worked for the Japanese was the basic factor in internal Republican politics until his replacement as Prime Minister in June, 1917. Since a mumber of those against whom his attack was launched were prominent within the PNI and the Maspumt, particularly the former, there wat a tendenty for these persons to urge their parties to oppose Sjahrar and the policies of his cabinets, Alio of extreme smportance was the fact that this antagonnm to Sjahris generated by his attack against collaborationists *pread to a major portion of the armed forces. Since their training had largely been received under the Japanese, there was a tendency for them, their officers in partucular, to teel that they, too, were the bat. of Sjahrir's attack.

On November 14. Sahrir, as Prime Minister, announced the membership of his first cabinet. It was compoted of either his own followers or competent nonpolitical administrators, all el whom had a record of nonto optration with the Japanese. Only two members from Soekarno's cabomet were retained—Amur Sparifuddin, who held the posts of Mannter of Defense and Miniter of Information, and Ir. R. P. Soerachman, who wis placed in charge of the Mimustry of Fanance. Spahrar, homaelf, assumed responsubility for the Ministries of Foreign Affaurs and Internal Affairs

Immedately Sjahnr's cabinet was bitterly attacked by boeh the ousted cabunet members and the Tan Malaka group. Both the cabnet and the Weeking Committee, they clarmed, were unrepresentative and should become coulition bodies embracing all polutucal currents and composed only of representatives of parties To some extent these demands were generated by deure for natuonal solvdanty, bot certanly they were also actreated by personal ambition for political position and the wish to oust Spahnir and hs group The oppoution to has cabinet became so great that Sjahror could not ignore it, and on November 1g. Sjanfuddin announced that the cabinet had deckded to call a meeting of the Central Natonal Commotter (KNIP) "in view of internal enticasn of our cabunet " The cabinet would ask for a vote of confidence from the Commuttee, he stated, and "if the Committee endorses our policy, we vill contanur our nork Otherwse, I expect that the cabinet wall have to resgn From November a to zy the KNIP met in Jakarta It overhhelmurgly endonsed the uttroduction of cabenet responubulity to the KNIP and tes agent, the Working Commottee (whach pdea the latter had already approved) Then by a vote of eighey four to eight with Efteen abstentions at voted confidence an Szahrar and his cabenet

Since Sjahnr. Sjarsfuddin, and several oihers of those forming the new cabmet had been members of the Werking Commottee, the rump of that hody reugned so chat a full new Commottee could be elected by the KNIP That body deraded that the Workng Commuttee should be enlarged from fifteen to thenty five members so that the sanious politacal currents wothin the KNIP could be more completely represented by ets smaller agent body Seventeen of the members were to represent

INTFRNAL POLITICS OF RFVOL UTION

the chief social groups and were to be directly elected by the KN1P, and they in turn were to elect eight other members-one from each province—on the basis of nomunees submatted by the governors and representative bodies (hNI's) of those prossnces and/or thesr reu dencoes There was a general demand wathin the ANIP that the "fighting youth, peasants, and urban workers" be gnen a wude repre sentation in the Worknz Commattee. and tis idea carmed As a tesult of the soting Spahrer and Sjarsfuddin were able to count on at least seven of the seventeen members elected by the KN1P as being thesr cannistent backers, five of these besng memsters of thesr osn party " At least two others could be counted on to lack them in most cases" Ihe P\l's strong poution in local government administration *" wa reflected bs the (ast that the majorits of nortunations sulbmatted by provuncial representatives were fur sndisiduals from ats membershep Thus six out of the eight prosuncal representatives elected by the seventeen members of the Working Committer already chosen by the λNIP were from the PNI

The political affiliatuon of the twenty five members of the Working Commistee folloting the election of the prosoncial namumees was as follous " PN1, ten members, Socialnst Party." fise; Masjumi, four, Chrastian Party, one, PP1 (otung Women's Party), one, nonpurty, four Two of those designated as nonparty, Adam Mahk and Sukarni, were strong supporters of Tan Malaka *" Supeno of the Socialist Party was tlecied by the KNip as ats and the Working Committee's chartman

With the cabunet dominaoed by Spahrer's group, and the majority of the Working Committee and the KNIP iwelf along with Sockatno and Hatta backing it, the position of Tan Malaka and the disidemt ex cabinet members who joined his opposition was difficult. The interam, pre elecuon, government was firmly in the hands of the Sjahrir group, Soekarno, and Hatta. It was probable that the holding of nauonal electuons, scheduled for the end of January, s94f, would confirm their clarm to power and almost cestain that it would demonstrate the overwhelming mass support commanded by Soekarno Thos Tan Malaka and his group were forced to work rapidly in order to seuze power before the strength of the politucal sneumbents could be consolidated, whether through elecuons or other means.

To build up hs oppontion ceganizaton Tan Malaka relied upon three sources of support.

(i) his own prestige and the attraction of the polatical and social program he advocated, this bringing him the hard core of his organiration, a number of milutant youth led by young leaders such as Sukarni, Adam Malik, Chairol Saleh, Pandu Wiguna, and Maruto Notimihardjo,

(z) the strong anti Sjahrir feeling among the many anfluential po latical and mulitary Jeaders who had worked with or under the Japanese admunistration, including (a) cabinet members who had been ousted by Soekarno and who felt that by joining the most powerful nucleus of oppoatinn, that of Tan Malaka, they stood the best chance of regaining power, (b) many others twho had worked under the Japanese-malitary (ex Peta) leaders and holders of high adminitrative postt—who felt insecure in thear poutions in the light of Sjahrir's antcollaborationist campaign, particularly after the dismissal of Sockarno's cabinet, and were anxoous for the overthrow of Spahrr's group so that thesr posutions would be more secure:

(g)the surging tode of nationalum which made it difficult for many people to countenance any negotiatsons whatsoever with the Dotch so long as thest troops were on Indonenan soil, and in particular when the number of their troops kept steadily increasing,

Drawing upon these strengtha and potential strengihs, Tan Malaka and his lieutenants undertook to build a mighey political organization which would compete with and ultimately supplant the existang gov ernment as the leader of the Indonesian revoletion. In the form of a mass movement-the Pertatuan Perdjuangan (the Fighting Front). supporedly oriented towards mobilaration of the widest pouble nstsonal support behond the government rather than oppored to it, they launched

INTERSAL POLITICS OF REVOLUTION

their bid for power. In the interests of national solidarits a meeting of zoo delegates from most of the political and militars organirations of the Republie was called at Purvokerto en Januany à and s. t916. Here Tan Mataka made an address which set the course for the Peratuan Perdjuangan established ten davs later at Surakarta by an even larger number of delegates He called for monolithic political sobdarts during the struggle fer freedon the abolshment of the recenths established polatical parues, and an end to all polrtieal dvsion In addition, be demanded repudiation ef the negotiauons recenths begun with the Dutch and the confiscation of all foreign propertes Tan Malaka stated

The seed *bch can speead eruuble sb can cause doseruors un our case. must be avosdnd be not trnngieg forwand propouls whach can lrad to d. agrreents ard fet tho porpose e run mae a muramem peoetan, tée most eencoe prveram which can be aecepted by all partues. and seleir an eun nection with our strueg'e

Whée we are facorg the eneme we mue watch that ro trouhle arues amorg us as a reult of de bpirg forward ef varrous "nms" ch in reslrv sho not be beought unts ducum.on at tis tie before we ebtun eur freedom cemplenelr The evnterce ef teeub'e aerz ourelves ill caese weakres in our strugete, as it will tend to weaken the zral of the e vure popolaten.

Twente chre vrars ago we alo espenenend a confat between ce PKI (Indotesan Conmunnt Parts) ard the Sarrlat Ilar, We becare weaà, That was our weaknes our plight whoch was abo keown br the eneme...

We are poe willng to eegonae woth ane ere elhe before we obtain eur too per cent freedom and before eur eremv has left eur shores and our sess an good ender We are rot wilhre to regotate with a thief in eur bene. Let us not tave the sdea that the pubit does zot urdemtard d plomaes. We are eot willing to negetate as lorg an the eremr u still in our coustry.

It we are willing to fold regotatons, we are doung it aarst de will of the general pabtie

Thetefore, as long as ene sogle ememe remarts in ºr courav, as lorg as there is an enemr shup on our séere, we must entimut to Eat. ...

We woh the govereornt to act an armndarce wth de desres ef dhe poblk. in agrtement wuh the vleolegy of the publc.

I we base our fate on diplomsey alone, we will errtainds be ertargted in poor díplomacy. . . .

At sha emoment, ehe speedy formation of a Figtieg Front (Tersatesn Perdpuangan) is badlr needed, along wch the entralustion ef all fghting forres. to demand a mitemem precram

To pegouate upen the bass ef seo per ent recogrstion after foreign troopa lave left the shores and tht veas of lodonesis.

Soekarno Realizing thus, Sjahene saddenly, and to the surprise of the PP leaders, on Febeuary s8, 1915 handed in his resignation to Soekarno.

For a tume it appeared as if Tan Malaka and the ocher PP leaders had tromphed and had succeeded in overthrowing and supplanting the Spahrar group Soekarno gave them the mandate to form a new cabenet Immedately the weakness of the disudent coalition manilested stelf Its leaders were divided as to the allocation of the positions of power which lay within their grasp. Their diserse social interests— those of anti Marxust Moslems, contervatise bureaucrats, and nationalist Communasts—and an partucular their competing personal ambitions was not matched by that of buildung a workable governung coalition *" Many in ihe PP coalitson, sncluding General Sudirman and several other army leaders, while destrous for Sjahrit's overthrow, did not want a cabtnet domunated by Tan Malaka and his group They feared, with some justafication, that once having reached that rung in the ladder of power, Tan Malaka, would attempt to supplant Soekarno The rmajonity of the PP coalstion wanted Soekarno to remasn as president. Most of the mulitary and political figures of this group were primarily interested in weakeming the poution of Sjahrir while maintaining that of Soeharno They had no wsh to strengthen Tan Malaka They were walling to go along with his group only as far as its first objective.

After having offered the PP leadees a mandate for forming a cabinet whuch they had been wtable to carry cut, Soekarmo wat free to ask Spahrir to form a new cabonet. The KNIP, stll sn sesuan, Immedintely approved this action by a strong sote of confidence in Sjahrir, but at the same tume voted that his cabunes be beoadened so as to be more wudely representative of the chief political currents in the nation Thin was agreeable to Spahrer so long as the choiee of members would be pencipally his. After a werk of consaltation with Soekarno and Hatta, Sjahrur announced the membershep of his new cabnet. The selection of uts new meshers had been principally Sjahrir's and only

e Atoondag to Tan Malaka, las group did not carry mut the mandate Sor foem ing a cabeset betense st cveld mot get the neorury bachirg (pertemally from Sorkama and Hatta and/ee the KNity for the pregranm a wohed to catry oul Marmovem, he aaten "We aever knew the esacr extee of pewer of the Pretedest m velatsen tn that of the Frane Manutet, with the fonmet in Droga [kana] and the aoer in Donch-ooupuet Besnu" (Tan Vaths. Thess Jeharta, apts p zs)

secondarily that of Soekarmo and Hatta, there being, however, mutual agreement among the three on the choices made. Ten of the eleven munnters of Sjahnt's first cabinet stayed on in his second. One, Dr. Mulia, gave up his post of Manister of Education to a newcomer. Mohammad Sjafes of the PNI, but remained in the cabnet as Vice- Manister of Education Two additional munasterial posts were added. ene-Agnculture—vent to a PNI member, Mr. Rasat, and the other— without portfolho-went to Wikana of the Pesundo. Of the eleven relatively powerless vice Ministers added to the new cabinet, three were nonparty, three were from the Masyume, two from the PNI, two from the Christian Party, and one was from the Soczaltt Party, None of the new cabinet members, munisters or sice-unasters had been leaders of the Peratuan Perdjuangan.

Thus the new cabinet, despite the strong agitauon of the PP, twas clearly domonated by Sahrir's group Moreover, the powers of the cabunet were increased and clarified They now derved from the KNIP as well as from the President. A clear mandate of legislative pover had been delegased to the cabinet by the KN1P in its session of February zS-March z. Thereby the KNIP was by-pasing the Workang Commsttee and was in effect givang the cabinet roughly equal stature with it as a legulative body. All cabinet measures still had to secure concurrence of the Working Committee, but certainly much legislative initiatve had been thus transferred from the Working Commitsee to the cabinet.

The mandate included (s) conduct of dncussion with the Netherlands authoraties based on recognition of the Indonesian Republic; (s) preparatson of the defense of the Indoneuan Republic; (s) etab lishment of a democratic baus for central and provincial governments; (4) prosimion for maximum production and fair dutribution of goods; (s) the runming of essential estates and industries under government supervision.

The dsappointment of the Persatuan Perdyuangan leaders and their opposition to Sjahrir's new cabonet were strong. Almost immediately they called a large meeting of their organization at Madiun, where they smade plain the unacceptability of the new cabinet and its program and their intention to ake matters into their own hands. The government met this challenge immediately; its troops in Madsun on March 17 arrested and jasled Tan Malaka and six oiber important leaders of the Periatuan Perdjuangan-Abikusno Tjokrosujeso, Chairul Saleh,

Sukarni, Suprapeo, Mohammad Yamin, and Wondoamiseno ** Thereby the PP sustaened an important sethack in Java In Sumatra, hov ever, it contnued to grow.

To understand the rapod burgeoning of the Persatuan Perdjuangan in Sumatra it is first necessary to know something of the situation there follow ing the outbreak of the revolution News of Soekarno and Hatta's declaration of Indonetern independence was received in Sumatra on August 17, jost as it was elsewhere in Indoneua There soon developed in Sumatra the same raung agaanst Japanese authoraty as there dd in Java There, too, some Japamese officers offered no reustance. The situaon was less difficuls for the revolutionnts in Sumatra thn in Jana because of the very limted operatiom of the Beitnh on the larger island Sumatra never became the major battlefield between the Indonesians and Brtash that Java did, the Bestnh being content to Iimit their occupason there to three tany enclaves—the port cities of Palembang and Pading and half the port caty of Medan.

The revolutsonary leaders on Sumatra acknosledged the Republie vo their government and Soekarno, Hatta, and Spahror as its top leaders Houever, in practice unul the spring of ig16 the revolouonary movement in most areas of thus great island wat largely autonomous There vere Republican goverument efficers in Sumatra apponted by the central government in Jasa Bot thesr authonty was limited Only in Imted areas such as Atjeh (of whuch he was natve) and in Medan, hos caputal (where he had the able assistance of the Repoblican mayor, Mohummad Jmuf), was the Republic's govermor of Sumaira, Tergka Hasan, ale to everese even a snall amount of authenty, Actually untl the beginning of Apnl. 1916, the only contact between the Repeblicam government in Java and Sumatra was by radio

There hod grown up in Sumatra political orgamrations vith the sime momes an those on Java Honever, they were quite autonomon, many of them even ater t di not come de te ducphe e the Jva beadqoarters of their porty.

The Last Cost Ressdency of Sumatra (before the war by far the most important center in Indonesia of plantatson based export agtcolture) was an area which the Dotch had ruled andarectly through ocal aristocrats. The strength of ths nobulity vs à vis the local peasantry had been much strengthened because of the bicking given them by the Dutch. Most of them had badly abused thesr augmensed surength to the senious detriment of the local peasantry Wath little regard for the rights of the peasantry, they had leased wide tracts of land, the disposal rights over wluch frequenthy had laan tradstsonally wath the illage. to foreign componoes needing land for plantations devoted to export agriculture Generalls a dsproportuonate amount of the rental paid by the Western enterprses went directly unto the hands of these arntocratic rulers, many of whom became very wealthy, and generally benefised the peasantry lattle or not at all

Not only did few of the aristocratic rulers govern in the interests of the local populaton, but alto most of them took pauns 1o emphaare thear Malay peninsula ancestry and cultural orrentation, rather than adentifying themselves with the local population. Moreover, they served the Japanese as well as they had the Dutch.

Thus, when after the launchung of the Republican revolution most of these rulers held back from joining the movement," the long. smoldering popular hatred of them markedly increased When in late February reports circulated that these rulers were contacung the Dutch in the hope of reinstaing themselves in their old positions, a spontaneous movement to oust them quckly developed

This movement, later known as the "Sumatra Socal Revolution," * soon gathered momentum and became wantonly brutal. The local amrices pooeed soo litde poeer to rmtraio it. rmpras, eppoturirst polilal Iadnd whra two Pi Co or at, Larr- Marah Sotan an? Luat Soregar, were tbe o» stant-appartcdy uw de evesent as a msam to poiéal poven a c-des to reach dear end dhey cumutased it through the wildest wn ! aztatre. Aa a reralt de eostn and armed garzs dhey exborte lted sd éle loal armtooraue leaders and dbeir fariles. In ad o é loooad atzt any ropounglookinz bome, vometime d’ez es occspanes watout becheneg vo fnd ost wbo dey wern dosever, da was est alvays septy indscrimimase activs against d eattha Oftem in was a recat «d he toeg done df ants Wetern propa recda de Jepsese Lad fed Inézeesaes duneg ther ocupatáon e was a treguent enésy fo memese these ms e te up éestermeduated Indocenan prefesuoul people, penicutely ho srz rn a osespauzn'y Wetem maener. Tru, a resler ef pro tepolhan nateratas er meclers of érir families " were killed sarte ore as were de peo- Datch arioooas and ceir fa-ites.

In thzuld te nsed dat ite rajn reoh of the "Sxial Resduti the East Const Rendency was de killeg of aristocratze relers wbr chonte, bowever, vas afready Carezarded. Their palaces vere loos et goerally dtere was Lnde smerest shown in sveizieg éeir priat ed An shat ume, an a reuls of daponese pite, there was an actua ent et amal’e land imn tée Redency. The Japanse, teirz able to esp ev Late, a mply temed eer most of the plantatooens (ecates) in e to ée lale toe el wre soon which had fomly wo em and to aone ee wh wabed to gre his on food ont me was prasy of land zadatle beiore the "Social Rench

The sooat ferment gemeraced by tée "Socul Rerolation"

pan rim aard so as eseode tanb aend etotam nmerset soe e lest fée den s d da eszrua arasonn tad at cm Iwon, er mposn dl des wre esp de toat elare é

Man dndeet toe er Rapatlx, a pae Danet de eav el ér "hoal Ralzze La

Coast Residerey spilled ever into parts ef Tapanul and the Menang kabau area en the went coast ef Sumatra. However, partlv becsuse secial deavapes were reéatively sight in these areas a mandestaos there was much mere moderase. The proapal reyalt in these aress was the replacemert of a number of village beids.

Taang note ef what was going on in Java the tame leders ho had ndden to postions of pover en the creie ef the "Sonal Revolaton"— Luat Suegar, Kaa Marah Sutan, and Sarwono (ef the Sumara Pesdo and several echerorpanued theseves and e armed grop apocated wch them eno the etdes ef an East Sumatras branch el the Peratuan Perdjuargan. seekung to attract as atde a pol.ocal folowuig as pomble. So conatirated, ches cans esed to dety the local Repuhtan authermes. esong ther ewn erders over thesr beads Apparentdy oking esample trom ths zcton as well as free evens cn jara, a large custer ef peltcal leaden ca the Wess Ceast Resdeney ef Sumara set up their ewn brarch of the PP a few davy Later. It was repertel, that a meetang there en Marth sy. ssts, ef represenatves free thete feer peltica! and eilhary ergiaintens. indlading the TkI. had set up a new trarch. the ansounced purpose of whach was to "defend the entegttv ef the counry aganst cerrupt stratepems from wthin and without." " t'rdoubted'v in Sumutra as in Jra the PP was receving the support not mtrelv ef pel-ca! lesder who tought to gun politocat advanage tut aho ef those who were critical ef Suhrr's willagoess to megotuate th the Bntah and the Dutch and feared that Indanemn dependence mght te eompto mised in the procts.

Clearlr the erucaleess ef eéhe tsmapon in Sematta reqused prompe action by the cenral govermment in Java. Late ia March a man.ee was Gapatched by it to Samama beded by the Mimater of Defense. Amer Spanfuddm, and nddy the Menister et lafarmrte, Mahamad Nanir; Me. Abdlmadjicd, and Mr. Lmael Tapeb, alt but Abdutmajal being Sunataes, Fint the mismen went to Melan, eapital of the East Ceast Resideney and beadquarters of the Republiean govereer ef Somata. Tengku Hasan. With the prmoge ef the RepubCan gosernment and is leaders behind it and by dat ef in ewn atte efarts in winning the support ef many local mitary and pelitcal erpanintions, the minion rueeded in reestabüshung the authenry ef the Repobliean Governmemt in chís area, eot in aoy absolute vense, bes

" Ati aa epeet be Are. Mch , d Aara ws he ce psten neve agacy Is win prvagdy evnet ant maaapaí.

making it at least somewhat stronger than it had been before the "Soeal Revolution" and the tse of the local PP branch The leaders of the latter found it expedient to ackmowledge their submitian to the authority of the central government.

Nest the misson went to Bukit Tinggi (formerly Fort De Kock). capotal of the West Coast Residency. tere the Persatuan Perdjuangan's autonomous branch was stronger than the one in the East Coast Resudency hod been and even more defant of the Republican Governments authorsty Not only had at begun ssuing its own orders over the head of the later, it had announced that the hundred rupiah bills of the Republic's paper currency were no tonger vald and had begun calling them in, paying seven ten rupiah beils in return In a speech before a mass meeting in Bukit Tinggi Mohammad Natsir made clear that sunce the Republican government had iisued the money, it alone could declare it anvalid and left the datanet impresion with the audsenre that the local PP leaders had nothing leis in mind than using the hundred rupuah bells they had acquired ao cheaply for purchases in some other area where they expected to get the full value of these notes

In order to strengthen the Republic's authority in the West Coast Resilency as well as throughout Sumatra as a whole, Sparifuddin's motson organized a Sumatra KNI (Indonesuan National Committee) The first meeting of thun twas held under the mision's auspices at Bukit Tinggi on April 15. where over 10o delegates from all parts of Sumatra were represented. At this meeting Sjarifudden nsued directives for the establushment of a network of Sumatran KNI's such as had been estab- Iished on Java The top KNI for the Republic remained the Central KNI (the KNI Pumat—KNIP), meeting on Java and in which at representatives from Sumatra. However, interposed between it and the local Sumatron KNI's was the all Sumatra KNI establiahed en Apeil 15 In theory the same general drvisson of competeneies between the national, regional, and local KNI's exusted en Sumatra as on Java. the subordinate bodses being competent to legslate on whatever subject hod not alrendy been fixed by legislation of the higher body, with legislation of the latter takng precedence in case of conflict, In practice the regonal KNI's in Sumatra and the regional adminutratons there in general were much more autonomous than those in Java.

As a result of Sjanfuddin's mision, Sumatra, though still highly autonomout, was more effectively ineorporated anto the Republican admonntration than previously. Withun Sumatra the local administra ton under Tengku Hasan was strengthened, but ats control over mot local districts in Sumatra was still anfinutely weaker than that of the Republican government in Java over mont distriets there In general, bowever, the power of the Persatuan Perdjuangan in Sumatra htd been seriously weakened When in mid May it attempted to stage a comebock in the East Coast Resilenry, again delying government authornty, the local ANI twas succewful an havong its leaders arrested.

Meanwlule on Java, the PP, though deprved of its top leaders, remamed strong The demands for Dusch acknawledgement of Indonesion independence prior to negotiations," and to a leser extent for national unuty as expreied by a coalition cabunet, and for nataonalization of amportant undustrtal and plantation enterprues, though champroned by Tan Malaka and other teaders of the PP, were by no means restricted to them They were poprular and wudespread If not met by the government, at least partually, they would contunue to provule important polatical caputal for any group seekang sts overthrots More over, unce even a partual meeting of these deininds necessitated considerable tume, at was felt esvental that in the unterum perod they be given a channel of flow alternative to that already peosuded by the PP. Such a new channel, it was hoped, would dvert a major portion of the PP's source of strength, leaving with it only those political elements whuch, though undoubtedly genusnety com nced of the value of these demands for Indonesia's welfare, were aho anterested in utllizing them as a means of overtheowing and replacing the exsting government.

Thus the government encouraged the formation of a new political coalition, the Konmentran Nauonal (National Concentration), wlach provided just such an alternatave channel. Contiderahle succen attended this effort. Many groups swatched their allegiance from the PP to the new organization becauve they were uneomfortable at what they believed to be the ultsmase aim of many of the PP leaders, overthrow of the exsting government. Thus proces was undoubtedly expedited when the government let it be Anown that it was contemplating the formation of a widely-losed coalstion cabinet, the compostion of which would be determined by consaltation among Soekarno and Sjahrir and the Konsentrasu Nauenal. When it was launched on May

11, 1916, the Konsentrasi Nasional included mot only the Soclalist Party and the Pesindo, but also a major part of the backing of the PP as well, including the Masjumi, the Labor Party, the PKL, and the prncipat peasant and labor organuations, i e , the Barisan Tanm Indonesia (Indonesan Peasant Frone) and the Barisan Buruh Indonesia (Indonesan Labor Front) Conspicuously absent, however, were two powerful polotical groups, that of Tan Malaka and the PN1.

Though greatly weakened, the PP still remained dangerously strong because of the continued backung of most of the PNI, Tan Malaka's following, and a consderable number of leaders of the TRI, as well as of several of the irregular armed organirations Its strength relative to that of the government was consuderably enhaned because of the equivocal attutude taken by General Sudırman and several other high TRJ officers Wath Spahrir as Prame Maniter these officers felt their poutsons insecure and were dnposed to back the PP's campaign to overthrow hum Continuously leaders of the PP whispered into Sudirman's ear that Sjahrar was maneuvering to replace him as commander in choef of the army. The same technique was applhed, often with success, to other hugh officers who, having received their military training under the Japamese, had been antagonared by Sjahrir's denouncements an ha pamphlet, Perdjuengen Ktta. As a result, the P?, despite its extenive loss of civilan support to the Konaentrasi Nanonal, was able to maintan most of its mihtary backang If it should openly chalmilitary leaders and the helpfel neutrality of an even larger number

There was undoubtedly some bass to the whispering campaign which alleged that Spahnr sought to replace the top Japanese-trained officers. Certanly both he and Sjanfuddin felt that some of the officers, bodh in the TRI and in the irregular armies, mught prove unrelable in face of a coup d'etst directed against their government. To combat this threat they embarked on a two fold program Farst they made sure of the loyalty of a number of the megular armies by ineorporating them anto the regular army and grwing their leaders high rank within it. Secondly, they undertook to build up a new and elite army drenion out of some of these erregular armies, including a number of Hizbullah units and other TRI troops, under officers who had not been trained by the Japanese, but rather by the Dutch before the war. This, the Sdiwangi Divman, was composed of Indonesians most of whom had some education and a Large proporuon of w hom were literate " Under Colorel Dudi Kartasasmita, Colonel Hadayat, Colenel Nasution, and Colonel Sumatuparg, it came to be the strongest divison in the Re publican amy To the same end and wth sunmlarlv trasned ofcen. Sjuhrar built up the Mobtle Police Brgade The educatonat level of the men un at was generally even higher than those in the Siliwang: Divition and it was to prove stself one of the most eßective and de pendable fighting unats in the Republie The control of General Suder tan over both of these units was larzelv nomonal thev looked chueflv to the Minuster of Defense and the Minater of Interior for thesr orders

In eertain areas »Pere the PP or ats comitutuent organaations re maured streng. it contanued to operate in defiance of government directves, rotably in Surakarta, Salatuga and the Krawang area Suta karta was the great streeghold of the PP Here were the headquarters of Tan. Malaka s organuation as well an that of the Barisan Banteng" Here the PNI was part;cularly stroeg and here aho were centered most of those Masjums teaders &ho were opposed to Spaheer

The caty of Surakarta was also capetal of the largest and the thard largest of the four remainang principalities of Java, Surakarta and Margkunegaran. The Sunen, prince of Suraksrta, was a weak ruler posesed of Ittle poutuve popular backang" Ey the sprng of s916 there was certaunly conuderable popular feeling in Surakarta for sttippeng the Sunan of his goveremental powers and all of his wealth outnde of has palace. Certain PNI and Barisan Banteng leaders and Rono Marsono, a powerful but corrupt local labor unmon leader," had worked hard to sncrease this sentiment. Sjahrir and hat cabinet did not oppose this trend, but insisted that desermination of the popu lar will as to the Sunan's and Mangkunegore's (ruler of Manglune garan) futures be decuded by lallot, Elections were scheduled, but both relers began to campaign ao vagtrousdy and effectively that their prospects as against the political parties opposing them began to appear better and better To Rono Marsono and some of the ether local leaders this was an unwelrome prospect, particularhs since they were probably at least as internsted in obeauming control of the well stocked ware houses of the Suman as they were un the socal ies molsed. They put pressure on those leaders prumanh inserested in these social iuues o act ummediarerly

On April t8. the PNI in Surakarta demanded the aboltion of the Sunn rule and he mpora e b prunce in te Republe on the same admunntrative level as its drectly admanistered territory." On the twenty seventh the Werking Committee of the KNI of the Sragen Dutrict of the Suvan's provnee broke off relations with him. On the twents ninth, the paralel body un the Klaten Dntrict, in concert with local mdtary organuzationas and eival servants called for the abolnhment of the roval goverument and ats replacement by a popular, demo crate adminstration On April zo, the Sunan, in rmiponie to these demands, announced that he would tratuler his zuthurity to the gosernment of the Republe of tuch was andeed the wih of his people.

\ fes das later the troops of the Barisan Banteng undertook to back the PNI teaders un thesr demand en the Sune Its troops sur rounded the Aepstsban (admunistrative ofhue) and the warehouse of the Surer, forced out a number of his oficals, and replaced them with its on n men The Sunen was shorn of his pow ers and lefs only bis kreton (large palace) A detachment of Barsan Banseng was conewrrently sent to the palace of the Mengkuxegare to parallel thos performanre. Hotever, the resstance of his troops turned them hack.

Upon recen ung onders from Jogjakarta from Dr. Sudamono, Minster of Interur, the state poloce intervened and deterred the Barsan Ban teng from further actnity. Spahrer and Sodanono soon arraved and ordered the arrest of the twelve top lraders of the outbeeak, including Dr Muward, head of the Barsan Banteng, and his chief heutenants,

in Smet September, rogs the Repabht had sepenaed the fuen't néle thoough a érectornte ef s men *ppeuered te the K1? Sopewtat laoer the Preudret tad apposztnd a coemswaomer to Seralarta, Stroo, who shared poser with the di orate Betseen thean, these had developel emaderatle fnetien. Atng to smplare Surso be Surjo, Covrraar of Eat Java, whe w wan Sorese would thm take the laees plare a Last Jas

Rono Marsono, several other trade unoon leaders, and a number of important local leaders of the PNI Shortly after the middle of May. the police had rounded up and pailed all twelve of the leaders

The Barisan Banteng then held large prosest demomtratons and appealed to General Sudirman to release those arrested Sudorman responded promptly and onfered a unst of TRI tronps stationed in Surakarta to effect their releave immediately * On May 31, the twelve leaders were released from jail and never recommutted Suderman was summoned to and appeared before a plenary cabunet sessuon to explasn bas actioms He stated that wath strong Dutch forces based on Semarang and poised to strike at Surakarta he felt it ewental to restore order and unity there and that this conssderataon had prompted his action Though has esplanation was hardly sausfactory from the standpoint of the cabinet, the general sutuation was esodently too precarious for it to attempt his chastisement Thus the posstion of two of the strongest constituent elements of the PP, the PNI and the Barnan Banteng. w24 not only mauntauned but even enhanced The coup they had engineered in Surakarta remained a fest arcomplh and was not undone

In the meantime, however, the majorsty opposition to the PP was becomung better erganzed and more effectnely manhaled in support of Sjahrir and hus group. On May 28 and 2g meetungs were held an Jogakarta among Soekarno, Spahrir, and leaders of the consttuent organszations of the Konientrau Nauonal with a voew toward estab luhing agreement upon the compoution of the expected coalition cabinet. Many competing claums had to be resolved before a workable balance could be achieved among these leaders and the groups they represented But duting early June, as this work progrewed and the new cabinet's emergence became more and more amminent, the pros pects of those who hoped to otherthrow Sjahrir through political maneuvers steadily decreased. For the smaller group, which had hoped to overthrow Soekarno as well, and which had Jooked particularly to Tan Malaka Ior leadershup, the prospects for suecess through such methods were even les Increasingly it must have become apparent to these PP leaders that to gaan power they would have to resort to force. and increaungly the government came to semse this prospect.

In anticipation of such a move, Soekarno and the cabinet with the approsal of the Working Committee on June 6 proclaimed a state of nege for the prnepalts of Surakara, and the nest day estended tis to the whole of Jaa and Madura The following da, June S, these three ergans of the government jointly establehed a Nationat Defense Counral responsble to the cabinet and through it to the Werking Commattee. but able to take ammedate decisions when the situation demanded subject only to laser reveral by the cabinet er the Working Commsttee The law prouding for this emerpeney organ of government stipulated that its membershup consist of the Prume Minister; the Minosters of Defense. Intenor, Fanance, Eronomie Affzin, and Ceem municutions the Commander in Chief of the Arms, and repeesenta tives from three popular organsrations to be chosen by the President. As Commander in Chief of the TRI, General Sudirman zuumed merberhop. The three presudental appontees were Masjur, repreenung the Sabelhlah. Sumarsono, representing Peundo; and Sardjona, representang the PkI

The Defense Councit was, of coune, no stronger than the suppert which ans mrembers and member organizations were willing to give it In the fare of the continung equnoral poution of General Sudirman. is effectvenets was seronl weakened. Though a votal member of the coun he manaed h eppotn to Sr, the eouncils air man, and has hase of power was sufiesent so that nether Sjahair nor Soekarno could dictate to hom On the other hand, he apparently had mo desore to see real power in the hands of Tan Malaka

On June e7. a government spokesman stated that it was espected that the longawaited cabnet reorganaration would be announeed the following day This was apporentls the sign for the revolutionaries to stike Most high government officials were aware by the twenty seventh that the espected coup was immunent, but none was ture how extemive the backing of the revolutionaras twoald be. Indeed, there in considera ble esodence that a number ef vers important political leoders had tentatrvels thrust one foot into the eamp of the revolutionarses, while maintaining ane in that of the government, in erder to be certain of being on the wanning nde.

It wat probably dunng the das of June z7 that Tan Malaka and the other piled Pp leaders were released from the Surakarta jail by the woops under the eommind of Major General Sudarsono, commander

" tet Na. 16, reg Bmia Report I=doena, 1I, nm., e1 (S, 10g

"Terteran Peenaa" (Gevemmt Regulstee") rn 6 n Bmit Re a Indona, Aurat s and as top Thin fsal drat las et atest in chief of the TRI Third Drs sion That evening Spahrur, as had been expected, arrived in Surakarta on his way back from a trip to East Java. With him in Surakarta were Darmawan Mangukusumo, the Minister of Commerce and Industry, and Major General Sudibjo, in charge of evacuation of Allied POW"s captured by the Japanese *" Late that noght these three and several lesser figures were kidnapped ** and taken to the mountain town of Paras by a small unst of the TR1 soldiers of Gentral Sudartono's command These soldiers had no adea who the men were, hasing been unformed by the officer un charge only that they were Dutch agents

Immeduately after having heard the news of the kodnapping,*a the remaining members of the cabenet under the leadershup of Amir Sjarifuddin, Minater of Defense, met together and proposed that for the duration of the emergency all powers be tranferred to President Soekarno, with the cabinet becoming responuble to hum. The Working Committee quickly approved this decison and likewne made explicit that ministeral responsibilaty to it and the KNIP was to be re-established as soon as condstions had returned to normal Thas decision was then announted by radio to the nation by Soekarno at midnight on the twentyeighth shortly after he had proclaumed a state of war and siege throughout Indoneua.

Though a number of the PP's leaders and much of its backing were concerned largely woth the overthrow of Sjahrir's cabinet, the plans of those who seized the nitiatse and launched the coup went much further. The conspiratorial Jeaders-Tan Malaka, Subardjo, Yamin, Sukarni, Pandu Wiguna, Iña Koesoema Soemantri, Sajuti, Sumantoro, Dr. Buntaran, and several high army officers, ancluding General Sudarsono—sought the overthrow of the entire government, including Soekarno and Hatta. However, since for ihe successful achievement of their plans they felt it necessary to secure the neutrality, if not the support, of General Sudirman, the unfolding of their plans called for two phases. Fint Sjahnx and his cabines wese to be semoved from pover and supplanted by a "Supeeme Poltical Council" of ten men headed by Tan Malaka and ancludıng Subardjo, Sukarnı, and Yamin. Soekarno would be forced to transfer his military powers to General Sudirman, but would for a time, until the revolutionary government was comolidated, remain as nominal head of the government. The second phase called for Tan Malaka's replacement of Soekarno as president, and posubly— though this is not clear-has asumption of the presidential military powers taken over by General Sudirman as well ar It is difficult to ascertain whether or not the leaders of the Bansan Banteng were a party to the second phase of the plans as well as to the first It is equally ddfficult to estabinh how far General Sudirman was actually backing General Sudariono, in particular whether be wnhed to take over powers from Soekarno

On July 2 General Sudarsono, accompanued by Mohammad Yamin, called on Preudent Soekarno Actang as the spokesman for Tan Malaka and the ocher recendly freed comspuratorval leaders, he allegedly " stated to Soekao that he had receved ructo from Generl Sudman to request that he sign four decrees These provaded for dubanding the Spahrir cabunet and sts teplacement by a "Supreme Political Council" headed by Tan Malaka as well as the tramfer of Soekarno's mihtary powers to General Sudirman Sockarno bluntly refused and ordered his bodyguard to arrest General Sudarsono and Yamon

On July a whule Sudarsono and Yamun were seeing Soekarno in Jogjakarta, the Republican capital, events elsewhere were moving rapidly and confusedly A loyal army unst released Sjadmar and those who had been kadnapped wath him, in Surakarta Bansan Banteng troops attempted to kodnap the Minister of Defense, Amir Sjarfuddin, but though killing his two hodyguards, were unsuccessfut.

In the meantome General Sudirman remained noncommittal and out of contact with the government He and many of the other top army leaders appeared to be remasning neutral and on the fence. Sudirman and they took no action aganst the rebellsous Third Diwzuon and the Baraan Banteng However, mmedately upon bearing of Sjahrir's kadnapping, strong unts of heavaly armed Pesundo troops struck west ward from their base near Surabaya, announcing by radio that if Sjahrsr were not freed they would occupy Surakarta, the Peesatuan Perd

INTERNAL POLITICS OF REVOLUTION

juangan's stronghold. Within a few days they had occupied both Madrun and most of Surakarta. In the meantime the pro Sjahrir Seliwangi Division stationed in West Java began to march eastward, threatening to occupy Jogjakarta It despatched its Special Troops Battalion, completely moterized and equupped woth tanks ahead of the main force, and this arrved in the ensirons of Jogjakarta the followong day, June rg Here st and additional Siliwangi units which arraved later remaned poned until the trouble subsuded

The actions of the Peundo and the Silowangs Div ision made it clear that any further attempt to carry out the coup d'etat would be con tested wth vigor and could only lead to a servous civid war It appeared that the population in general and most of the army was aganst such a development, if for no other reason than that the Reprublic would be dangerously weakened in the face of mounting Dutch military strength Probably Sudirman was mmprened by this prompect, along wath other thus far "neutral" malitary leaders, he abandoned hus peevuously ambiguous attitude and finally made it clear that he would not back the coup That ended the prospects of the reselutsonaries Even with the benevolent neutralety of Sudirman and other lugh military leaders, they could not alone, supported only by the Barsan Banteng and the Third TRI Dnssson have stood up to both the Peundo and Silliwangi. Moreover, it is unlikely that most officers and troops of the Third Dw sion ould have folloned General Sudarsono in actual Eighting against their own countrymen.

The PP leaders had counted on a sudden, soceessful coup which would then be accepted by Sudirman and other army commanders. There are indscations that Sudirman and some of these officers may have expected such an eventualty and been prepared to support them (on certain terms) once the coup hid been successfully carried off. But none of these military leaders was willing to weaken the Republic against their common enemy, the Duteh, in order to back the PP leaders. Furthermore the probability is that had a cvil war actually broken out a majority of military units would have fought alongside the Slocangi and Pesindo in vapport of Spahrir. Moreover, once it had become evident that the Persatuan Perdjuangan leaders were seeking to force concessions of power frem Soekarno, the opposition to them would have been even greater.

Suditman was finally prevailed upon by Soekarno to back. Sjahrir, and agreed to support the arrest of the PP leaders who had planned for the second phase of the rebellion-Tan Malaka. Subardjo, Sukarni,

Iwa Komoema Soemantzi, Mohammad Yamin. But sn return for his support he amusted upon and obtained terms calculated to maintain intact his own powerlul pontion. None of the PP leaders concerned only with the first phase of the rebellion were to be arrested, and, except for General Sudarsono and a few officers under him, no ether TRI or Bansan Banteng leaders were to be either demoted or arrested. And Snally, the Pesindo twas obliged to evacuate Surakarts, with the military stetur quo ante to prevail there.

Thus, though the attempted coup was frustrated, and the prospects of future coups much dimunshed, though the PP was dasolved, and though many of its amportant leaders were jailed, the balanee of power wthin the Republie was only partially altered The oeganization of the anti Spahrr forces was disintegrated, but many of the elements that had made up the PP were about as strong as they had been previously The mporiant exoeption was the amorphous Tan Malaka group. whoch, deprived of ats top leaders, lost its effecuveness for a consderable tume to come and never regaoned the power and following which it pomemed during the fest months of 1g46

Though the atempted coup of the Peratuan Perdpuangan only partally altered the actual patterm and balance of power within the Re public, it made clear as never before theur outlime and character. It became apparent as it had not been peeviously that the division and dispersson of forces within the country was so considerable that no faction or probable combinatson of factsons was likely to muter overwhelming power, except as the consequence of a lntterly contested civil war. The actons of the Pesindo and Siliwangs Drision demonstrated that attempts at coup dfetat would not be met by apathy, but would certamly entail strong resistance. Given the powerful nationalut spurie gripping almost all Indonenans, it was clear that the protpects of fsture coups d'etat was much diminnhed So long as civil war was likely to result therefrom, few patrsotic Republicans would be hkely to countenance them, for the internal diviuon and the weakness comequent Dutch attack. Thas strong desure for national solidarity in conjunetaon with the realzation that exsting power was diffused and unlikely to be connoladated shoet of civil war combuned not only to increase internal stabelity but alho militated toward the peactace of mutual compromise and adjustment of competing interests that is essenual to the develop ment of democratic goverument.

Followinz the suppresion of the coup d'étot, Sockarno undertook to make the government more widely representative. He proposed that the pattern of representation of the KNIP be relormed so that, pending the holding of general electuone, that body would an the meantime be as representative as posuble Hs proposal of July so *" called for a ressston of the compoution of its membershup of too'" that would teave much of the snitrative of choce for 1so of the members to regional election committees and for uxty of the other members to the polatical parties Only thurty members would be directly choven by the Preudent. (All roo members of the exusting KNIP, with the exception of thove sull remauming from the twenty one man Independence Prepuratory Committee, had been appointed directly by Soekarno after comulta tion with Hatta and other smportant political leaders)

Implementation of the law, however, required agreement among the partues as to the compoution of regional election committees (The term of the las provoded that regional representatises could be members of political parties) Since they could neither agree on this nor upon the apportuonment of the suxty seats among the partues, the law lapsed Thus untd February, 1917, the compoution of the KN1P remauned the same. Out of sts membership of zoo there were s2g who were members of political partes. Of these, forty five were from the PNI, thirty five from the Maspumt, thorty five frem the Socialist Party. six from the Labor Party, four from the Chrustuan Party, two from the Catholhe Party and two from the Communist Pariy (PKI) Of the remaining seventy-one nonparty members, five represented the Chinese community; two, the Arab communety, and one, the Dutch

By mud August, sg16, the KN1P at ats sesuon in Joggakarta was able to announce that the extraordinary internal situation had ended and that the reinstatement of a parliamentary cabinet responsuble to it was now fully justfied It called for the "reschon of the composition and the strengthening of the government through the establisliment of a coalition cabinet," " To effect the compromnes necestary for the building of much a coalition took more than six weeks of negotiatson bettween

Sjahrir, whom Sorkarno wath concurrence of the kN1P had designated as Prume Mumoter and cabinet formsteur, and Soekarno and Hatta and the leaders of the powerful PN1 and Masjums

Sjahrir no langer had the freedom of chouce in selecting his cabinet colleagues that he had enjoyed an forming has first two calunets Hu pouton an hrs thusd cabonet bas moch weaker He felt, however, that he had to accept the post of Prume Manster if a settlement with the Dutch teas to be reached When finally announced on October s, it was apparent that the new eabtnet was the most widely representative that the Republhe had yet known Members of every amportant political porty and the Chinese and Arab communittes as well were represented in at *3 One miniscry was headed by a woman, Mana Ulfah Santoso, and anocher cabinet post was held by the Seltan of Jogjakarta * The coalstton nature and wide basus of the new cabunet can best be grasped by listing its members with their party affiliations

Tlurd Sjaknr Catues (Osuter e 1g5-June e. 1947) 1

n The Maporet in a party van not pepemested an the cahenet Those Mepums mesiaos who paroopated in it dd as zi mdvadualt, mot as repreentatier of the Vaijamu party, and sere not repoahle to it Appivently the same has ue on the coe of the phI measbert af che caloaset This eoly n haged serae could the cabmet be degrated as a ccainen calaset"

* As he eutvei of the revolotion, the Sultan of Jogakarts hod seppeted the Repobhe and the socal chinge it reponented On hen ewn msatrve he antrudosed zmportint and far ugtred peltacal and economie relarms an ha ueraory-belory they had ben adopted in the Repalaie as a vhale Ha umaary came ta comatue inrroduent duquentdy vere later sstrodosed snto eiber atess of the Repubhe Ie wan the presciple founder of the Ladkar Rakut and a calonel in the TkI

n The order of ponts an lated us not neonmanly an ender of amportance, lut cun fomes to ttat in the offoal cahnet lut as tappbel the wrsier hy Raomoho, the

1o Hadp Agoen Satm las aftm been relmed no as belongung escher to Maizum oe (alter July tgz) to the Pattim Sarekat Ihlam Indonma He vae actally a mem bar of nauther, though he sas an infureoal anofical advace of the tayurus progponre wing

Though Sjahir's party occuped only a few of the posts, st should be noted that most of the numerous Masjume monisters were from the progressive wing of the party and fairly close to Sjalirur with respect to most basic questions of policy. The same can be said of the majority of the nonparty representatives and of those from partaes other than the PNI. The PNI and the centerand right wing of the Masjum: remained adamant in their opposition to negotsation wth the Dutch until after their troops had left Indonesuan sosl. Furthermore most PNI Jeaders felt strongly that their party was entitled to more cabinet posutions than it had been given, including the post of Prime Minister,

" Formerly knawn as Douwes Dekker.

THE LINGGADJATI AGREEMENT

The Brituh were extremely anuaous to leave Indoneua and the uncomfortable role they had asumed there They served notice to the Dutch that they would commence wothdrawing their troops by the end of November, ig46, and put great pressure on them to come to an agreement with the Republic This pressure combined with the willing ness of progresuve Dutch elements to make realistic concessions to the Republican point of view enabled the Dutch Commussion General in Indonesa, headed by Wellem Schermerhorn, leader of the Netherlands Labor Party, to instual on November 15 what was envnaged as a final settlement between the Netherlands and the Republie Known as the of agreement, according to which the specific emplementing detaifs were to be gradually worked out

Charles Wolt, Jr has ably and sucometly summarzed the prinespal provatons of the Lunggadjati Agreement stating that st called for

(t) That the Netherlands Government recogtize the Republie as the de fecte authornty in Jasa and Sumatea,

(r) That the Netherlands and Repuhlcan Goverrments co-operase toward the setting up of a aoveregn democratie fedemal state, the United States of Indoneua, to conust of doee states, the Repablie of Indonesia, em bracng Jasa and Sumatrs, the state of Boeneo, and the Great Easteen State [all the rest of Indonesa—e the areas of the foemer Netherlands East Indies lyng to the east of Java and to the east and south-east of Bor no].

(3) Thas the Netherlands and Repubhican Govermments co-operate toward the forranon of the Netherlands Indoneuam Unon. to tomot of the Kng dom of the Netherlands—anclding the Netherlands, Surnam aod Curacto —and the U S 1 [United States of Indonetra], which Unson would lave in rts head the Queen of the Netherlands,

(4) That the NethertandsIndoneuan Uman and the U SI be formed no later than Jamuary s, sgg9 and that the Umon set up its ewn agences for the regulaton of matorrs of coanon interest to the member states specifi cally, the matters of foreign afaes, defeme and certam financual and economuc pahcon,

() Faly te Agrenene proded f a m md o se and a gradual evacuacion of Darch troopa from the Repuhliçan arras as quockly as poable conuatene wth the maintmanee of law and onder, and for the recogniton by the Repablac of all claurra by foreign nataonals for the restitution and mantenanre of thear tights and peopertres wuhon the areas controlled by the Republic **

Wolf notes that "according to the Agreement the U.S I would be a sovereign democratie state and an equel farrner of the Arngdom, rather than a partner of the Netherlands wathun the kingdom as the Dusch had proposed." ta "From a purels political point of ven," Wolf ol» serves, "the Netherlands seemed to have made the greater conces stons " " However, the Agreement protected the great Netherlands economuc investments in the Indies and incorporated several political provissom which seemed umpertant to the Dutch eg, mantarming Indonesa ssmbolealls at least under the Dotch Crown (onts as an equal partner in the Netherlands Indonesian t mon did it come under the Crown), and organsration of Indoneua on a federal baus, wrth the Republie one of at least three conststuent states, with ans terrstory hasung the right it it so wished to ' decide bs democratic process to establnh "a special relatsonthop with the Netherlands rather than porning the Unnted States of Indonesta"

As Wolf concluded, the Agreement had two vital weaknesses. It called lor "cooperation between the Netherlands and the Republic toward the comtructhon of the United States of Indonesia and the Netherlands Indonesian Union. cooperation in the reduction of mslitary forces and in the regulation of economue matters." " Its Levstone was co-operation between the two parties, and if that did not develop, most of the claunes in the Agreement could not be umplemented Unfortunately, as Wolf notes. "there were still mans streng elements on both sudes wluch were not yet ready for such cooperation. largels because they lacked the conviction that the other party was suncere and trustworthy." " In the second place, as Wolt obierves, the Agreement stipulated "a fedevel United States of Indonesta to consist of three semi autonomous states. the Great East and Borneo as well as the Republic. It implied a paper equality of areas which are not, cannot and will not be equal-economically. politically, or culturalls " The area of the Repubhe (Java and Sumatra), Wolf noted, contained "about 3 of the tota! Indomesian population ... and before the war... accounted for be-

n Clarles Wolf, Jr. The Indrersar Sterr (New Yoek va1. pp 45-1 tn evrel Lnt ataln el the Linegadpt Igreraent and of the events leading ep to st n foend in tha book.

" Lurggadjati Aereement etts un and in

st helt, of ot. p 45.

tween four fifths and nine-tendhs of the total export and import trade of the whole Indonesuan archipelago""

Though it soon became apparent that the clausts contained in the Agreement were open to conflicting mterpretations, it was felt by many that they might be resolved peacefullly because of ats arbitration claute. This stipulated that the two governments would "settle by arbotration any dispute which moght anse from thes agreemens" which could not be solsed between themuelves. In such a case it was provided that "a chasrman of another natsonality with a deciding vote shall be appointed by agreement between the delegations or, if such agreement cannot be reached, by the Presndent of the International Court of Justice"

It is important to mote that thas extremely important clause as well as the first article of the Agreement, in which the Netherlands govern mens recognized the de facto authonty of the government of the Re publse of Indoneua over Java, Madura, and Sumatra, were agreed to by the Netherlands Commission General in the absence of its fourth member—Dr. Hubertut van Mook, Lt. Governor General of the Nech erlands East Indses Whecher or not the report is true that he refused to subtcribe to these clauses when he learned of them, his policy as head of the Dutch admonastration in Indonesa certainly does not ap pear to have been based upon thesr acceptance

Though the establishment of a federal system was called for in the Langgadjati Agreement, it was expeessly staprulated that this was to be the product of Dutch and Repubhican co-operation " Van Mook unilaterally undertook to create a federal system along the lines he saw fit. The system which be began to establnh was seen by Republicans as a superfically dugused polsey of divade and rule calculated to establish eventual Dutch hegemony over all Indonesia. Shortly after the agreement was smitiated, be called a conference for December 18, 1g16 at Den Pasar in Bals to begin the establshment of his federat system by formation of a major constituent state, East Indonesia The Republic had agreed to the estahlishment of such a state in the Linggadjatt Agreement, but only on the basis of co-operative effort betueen at and the NetherIands The utulateral character of Van Mook's action wat emphauzed by the constatutian which the Den Pasar Conference pro duced By its terms the new "state" of East Indoneua was effectively controlled from Batavia by the government of Van Mook, and people in the Republic were largely justified in ther feeling that at was has puppet.

Many Indonesians, potticularly supporters of the Masjumi, PNL, and Tan Malaka, had been crrtucal of a number of articles in the Linggadjati Agreement, especally articles su=san and xts, provuding for a Netherlands Indoneua Unson under the Qoren of the Netherlands and the restoration to all non Indonesians of their pressous rights and goods Van Mook's actions confirmed their doubts as to Dutch toncerity in implementing the Agreement and increased their already consuderable oppotetion to it His action also brought other leser, but important, groups such as the ARIS (the armed organizaton of Celebes men lvung in Jasa) to joun thenm in opposing ratsfication of the Agreement. This opposition to Linggadjats formed elf into a powerful political coalition, the Benteng Republik (Republican Fortress)

It ias amposuble to disentangle and to assess the relative weight of the two chuef rauons d'dtre of this oppoution, (s) genusne oppoution to the Republican government's Langgadjats polics, and (z) the desire to achieve hgher political poutions at the espense of Spahrsr and In group. Many indvidualh of all conststuent groups of the Benteng Republik, and undoubtediy the KRIS as a whole, jouned it and ets antegovernment stand exclutvely out of genuine oppoution to Linggadjats. But certainly there were some political leaders whose opposition to that agreement derved at least in part from thesr contction that this might be a means of mobilizing a popular sapport sufficient to induce the KNiP to refuse to back Sjahror, Thereupon, they anticspated, hus cabinet would fall and they mught supplant hum.

Lined up in oppositron to the Benteng Repubhk and behund the Government's Linggadjatt policy, was the Sajap Kis (Left Wing). a coaltion of the Socralist Party, Pesindo, Labor Party, and the PKL Supporting it were several smalt polstical groups, sncluding the Christan and Catholic partues, By mud December it had become a matter of some conjecture as to whether or not the Sajap Kars and these smaller parties would be able to command sufficient support in the KNIP to insure its ratsfication of the Langgadjati Agreement,

Thus Soekarno's Presidential Decree of December zg, 1916, to increase the membership of the KNIP by aso per cent was snterpeesed by the leaders of the Benteng Republik as a means of guaranteeing ratification of Linggadjati, Whatever the truth of their allegation, which was sigorously denied by Soekarno, it is true that be had long been attemptang to present a plan for reformation of the kNIP atceptable to the Workang Commstee. The latter body had deluted and worked at amendments to his pre oous proposals of July to, but had never arrived at a final conclusion It was wadely felt that there had emerged in the country a puttern of politucal fores which found little congruence with the pottern of representation in the KNIP, nearly all whovt members had been appomed over a year pres sously at the very outset of the revolutuon Certainly this general sentiment was shred by Soekarmo and constotuted a major reason for hos plan of espansion of the membershop of the kIP The desire to asture adequate support for the Linggpadpot Agreement may well have been an estremely umportant consuderation, but at was by no means the sole umportant reason for the espansion

Soekarno s decree of December r9. 1946 called for sncreasing KNIP membernshup from 2oo to s14 Of the s14 new members, ninety three were to represent poltucal parues. forty were to represent the peasantry: fom, labor. seventy eght. the regons outude of Java and Madura. and fne, ethme mimontoes. the remaining as members were to be appounted on the baus of geoeral socal prominence or as representatves of minor partaes and arregular armed organizations Whereas in the old KN1P, the PNI held forty five seats out of roo, or ##5 per cent, in the new &NIP propected in Soekarno's decree at was to have the same number of seats, forty five out of s14, or onl) 8 8 per cent. The leaders of the PNI were understamdably duatasfied wath thas Ditatafaction was also felt by Maapum: leaders. Although thear party's representa tion was to be increased from thurty five to sity seata, there as no doubt that they were correet an thear clasm that Masjumi's strength in relation to the other parues entitded it to a consoderably greater increase Furthermore thoagh the Bemeng Repoblik held eighty out of sng parvy sets in the old A,NIP, as agunst the forty three of the Sapap Kirt, it 925 to hohd only 1oz nut of un the nes. KNIP as againit sos for the Sajap Kiri

Table g conauns a breakdown of membershup in the eld KNIP and the one propmed by Sockarmo

On Jay , g, a the fint meeting of the Worng Commttee followang announcement of Soekarto's decree of December ag strong objections of PNI and Masjumi members were rased against the decree The cabinet on January s7 announced its belief that smuance of such a decree was the prerogatne of the Preudent Hovever, the feeling was

INTERNAL POLITICS OI RFVOLUTION Table , Covtestisos or rus xtrtastNrsmos•

• Figuret dennel frem Preudencal Reputaton No é. rop6 (Dec eo 4015), app † No regonal erpreentation was gwen Jana and Madura, lecaute at was fele thot they were adequately repoesemed through the fact that the polteal partirs were post mrongly developed shere and thut a mazonts ol thesr representatnes were lrora Jina and Madura as eornpuord to thas of the litter was, under Soxkarnos propeul. greater thas thear pepulataon warranted

the President might assume initative in issuing such a decree, it could not come into force, any more than could ordinary legnlation, until approved by the Workinz Committee

On the seventeenth, following the cabinet's statement of position, the Working Committee held another meeting attended by only eleven

212

of its twenty three members " Ten of those present, including eight out of the ten PNI and twe out of the four Masjumi representatives voted to draft a bell repealing the Preudent's decree. Of the eleven present, only Mr Assaat, the chairman, opposed the measure Apparently there were enough other members on the Committee to have grven the sponsors of the bill a majority if the whole active membership of twenty three had been present ** Presumably, though agreeing woth the ten sponsors, some of those members who stayed away did not wish to place themselves publicly in open conflict with the Preudent. Ap parently they were not opposed to his unilateral exercise of the pre rogative of appontment to the KN1P per se, but opposed the decree primanly because of what they enmsisanged as its certain consequence, ratificatson of the Langgadjat Agreement

The Working Committee's decmon raned the critucal question of whether or not the Pretadent retaned any power at all of which the exercise was not subject to approval by the ad imseram House of Representatses, the KNIP, and sts agent, the Workng Conmittee. The only body competent to ansher thn question was the KNIP self. Between February 25 and March s, tp17, at Malang, thus body beld sts first sesson sence that heid an Surakarta a year prevaously ** In hus speech opening the session, Soekarno made clear bn belief that anlutuon of the problem lay with the KNIP, but went on to state Iis personl postion, saying

In my oputoon uncd we are able to leave the compoution of the repeesentatne bodues to the electorate, it is the task of the Preudent homself to nomunate and appoumt members becouse of the fact that the Preudest hunself s regarded as the representative of the whole people

A vigorous debate withun the KNIP emued between the members of the exusting soo member body, it being unammously agreed that the new appoentees were not competent to pass judgment on a question concerning their own status After two days of debate, its memberslup was about evenly divided as to whether or not it should support or reject the decrion of the Working Committee**

At this juncture Vace-Pressdent Hatta an an impasoned speech pointed out that if the KNIP backed sts Workang Commttee's decnion

an Two memben Suama and Adam Malik had becn puled in Juse, thirged sith plotting the everthoow of the government in connection with Tan Malakas a

Mr Auair, ZHukan Tote Negora, p γ to reject the Predent's decree, then Soekarno and he would be forced to resign. The only alternative would be, he said, for the KNIP to dissolve The response of the KNIP to Hata's speech left no doubt but that ats overwhelmung majerity was ready to back lum and Soekarno. Taced wath this sitaation, the Workong Committee withdrew the bill st had sponsored opposing Soekarno's decree Tacit approval had thus been gven by the KNIP to Soekarno's decree, and tlhas brought the Werking Commattee to wsthdrau its oppoution Thereby this specific decree of Soekarno was conudered to have the force of lau

However, there had been no formal and poutve resolution by the KNIP of the principle at swue " To the extent that the sue was resolved and precedent established, this was accomplished by ntta's speech Mr Assaat, Chasrman of the KNIP has stated to the water that Hatta's threat of resugnation tended to fis the principle that if on a matter of preregatise ** the President was opposed by the kNIP, he and the Vace President would have to reugn A new President and Vice- Presudent would then be elected by the kN1P Assoat states, however, that the general consensus was that unless the pount of difference betheen the Pressdent and the KNIP was satal to the Republic and the Presudent arrevocably committed to hus action (e g , hos sogming of a treaty with the Dutch whoch the ANIP rezected) the President would merely yteld to the KNIP and remain in ofice.

However, as Mr. Assaat makes clear, urth respect to matters of ordsnary legnlaton (outside the sphere of preudenual prerogauve) af "a sernous confhet arses between the cabunet and the KNIP where the President is convanced that the KNIP no longer repeesents the people." he may dissolve the KNIP and provode for the establishment of a KNIP which is "more representative" Therealter should the conflact between the cabinet and the new kNIP continue, "the President may not distolve the KNIP again. In thus case the President is obliged to dis solve the cabinet.""

On March r, s917 Soekarno's new appointees were sworn in as members of the greatly espanded KNIP. The old Workang Commottee was damised, and the nest day, March y. elections for a new one were begun by the new KN1P. The object again was to make the smaller agent body merror as precsely as possible the basic political pattern represented in the Iarger parent body The new Working Committee had forty seven members el whom forty were elected from the KN1P on the basus of each getting the votes of at least twelve of that body's membershop Seven of the seats were reserved seats, the occupanes be mng elected by a maponty of the KN1P, and beang filled by representa tves from Borneo, Celebes, the Moluccas, the Leiser Sundas, and the Chinese, Arab, and Indaes born Dutch communuties The pattern that emerged wothin the nesr Workang Commottee was one that lated until the Communist rebelhon of late September, ig18 A member might reugn because of the necessity to assume other daties (partacularly cabunet office), but his successor had to be from the same party or area or community

Teble to Coupoutiov ef THe Wonins Couvttee zLzeten BY THE ANIP A7 MaLavo (Manct , 1917)

It should be noced that a number of the nonparty repretentatves wert actually closely assocrated woth partes. Thus numbers 6, 57. 4o, 44 and 46 almost always supported the Socalut Party Number 4* supported the PNI; number §6, the PhI. Several representatises of the stmaller parties were generally to be counted on as supporting the Socialnt Party up untà the splut between the Sjahrar and Sarfuddan factions of that party in January 19g8. These included numbers 7. 8, and 9 Nomber to was a supporter of Masjumi. Numbers z6 and s7 looked to Tan Malaka and Sukasns as thest leaders The Socialist Party, Labor Party, PKI, Labor representatives, Barsan Tani and the Pesindo, Christian Party, and PP1 representatives were able to agree on most

policies untdl the beginning of sgg&. Thus the Sajap Kiri coalition (all of these last named groups except the Cheistian Pariy), heid a strong edge in the Working Commattee over the Benteng Republik coalution (Masjum, PN1, and Partai Rakjat)

The last act of the Malang sestuon of the KNIP before its adjourn ment on March 5. 1917 was to adopt a vote of confidence in Sjahrr's catonet, in portucular vis handling of negotatsons wih the Dusch. Despite the opposition to the motion and abitention from voting by the Masjumi and PNI members, the moton was carmed by a subitas tual majorsty of the KNIP's membership Thereby it ratified the Ling gadyats Agreement, whuch was formally sgned by the governmens of the Netherlands and the Republc of Indoneua on March as. This ushered in a bref period of relatuve unter party soidarity with the Benceng Republk, the Masjumi an particular evincing willingness to bock the Sahrir cabunet until sts fears regardong the Dutch unterpretatuon of che Agreement were borne out

These fears were soon substantsated As Wolf notes, even at the ugning of the Agreement on March s5, 1917 both purties "bound themelves to different interpeetations of the key terms 'cooperation' and "Tederal*" On the one hand. "The Netherlands Government as sumed that cooperation with the Republic neverthetess implied a contimuation of Dutch leadershup and sole responubilsty pending the formation of the U S1 [United States of Indonena]" On the other hand, "The Republic interpreted the term to mean joint responsibility and mutual conultation in the setting up of the progected federation." Alto, Wolf olnerves, "The Dutch interpeeted the term 'federal" to mean equal states with equal voices tuned an key wath that of the Netherlands, while the Republre anterpreted at to mean that a Iederal U 5 I did not deny ether the Republic's ewn primacy among the component pars by urtue of its greater political and economuc wealth and maturity, mor sts equal postion as co-sponsor of the U.S 1 along woth the Netherlands Government""

This area of dreagreement between the Dutch and Indoneuans not only remiuned but rapudly grew. Charges and countercharges of vaola tion of the Agreement increased.*" On May 57, 1917, the agent of the Netherfands governmemt in Indonesa, the Commoson General, peesented an ultmatum to Spahrer which was snterpreted by the Republican government as poting the alternatves of capetulation to the

Wolt, op cs, p 4

n Fer a balaneed semont ef thne changes ses Wolt, ep ot, pp sol-ut

Netherlands or all out war. This called for de pure Netherlands sosereignty over Indonesia untul January 1, 1919 Pending that date. Indonena was to be governed by an anterum government in which the representative of the Dutch crown twas to have final power of decsuon. Thes Dutch domanated interim government was to set up the general political structure and constituent government organs of the ensisaged sovereign United States of Indonesia whoch was to come into poter en January 1. s919 It w2s to control all matters relatung to exports, amports, and forergn exchange for all Indonesa untnl that date In addstion, during the period of anterim governement a joint Indonesuan Dutch gendarmers was to be established It would be com poved of an equal number of Indonestan and Dutch troops with the duty of maintaining law and order throughout Indonesa, incloding the territory governed by the Republst " The Dutch categorically re fused to abede by the arhitrauon clause uf the Lnggadjats Vgreement, and Van Mook made st clear that noncompliance with the ultimatum would mean war.

Realing that the Dutch were prepared to go to war, Sjahrur undertook to go as far as he could in meeting their demands In a serses of counterproposals to the Dutch, he accepted on June 8 the principle of an interim govetnment and on June so agreed to the de jure "special potution" of the Dutch Crown's representatives in such a government and to what amounted to Netherlands control of Indonessa's forergn relations duning the period of the interim government

The magnitude of Spahrir's concessions sersously undermuned his polstcal support in the Republic Before making his counterproposals of June so, 1917. be had secured the concurrence of those members of his cabinet then in Jakarta, namely Gans, Natsir, and Abdulmadjid. The following day Sjarfuddin arrived an Jakarta and likewse sapported the concessons.

In the meantime Abdulmadjd had been sent to Jogakarta to explain to the rest of the cabinet why the concesuons had been made. However, upon arryving there, both before the cabnnet and before a meeting of the Sajap Kari, he strongly opposed the concestions and attacked Sjahrir for having made them When Sjarsfuddin arrived the next day, he found that several of the top leaders of the Sajap

Kirt, including Tan Ling Djie and Wikana, had Jined up with Abdutmadjd and finally agreed to follow them in condemnation of Sjahnu's contcésions

All of the major parties except the Masjumi now began to abandon suppoet of Sjahrur * The five Masjumi members of his cabinet continued to support hum and successfully urged thear party to do likewise In an attempt to reconsoldate hus crumbling support, Sjahrir journeyed to Jogjakarta, where on June z6 he addresed a meeting of the leaders of the Sajap Ktn, except for Setadjit, head of the Labor Party, who was then slroad There he was strongly astacked by Tan Ling Dje, Abdulmadjod, and by Sparifudden for the concesionm he had made. Here was the first symptom of the impending schum in the Socialist Party that was only fully to emerge ax months later. The Sajap Kiri repeesentatves voted their dnapproval of hot concessuons and thereby jomed the already considerable opposstion led by the PNI. Wath Sjaheir's ot'n party opposng him, the Masjumm felt at had no recourse but to join the oppoutson On June s7 Sjahnr handed hs reugnation to Soekarno

The gravty of the atuataon which Sjahrir had sensed in Jakarta was soon felt by the Sajap Kirs leaders in Jogjakarta. Within nineteen hours of Spahnr's resignaton they reversed thear position, agreed to his concessons, and expeessed their wnh that he resume hs post as Prime Minister Soekarno likewne urged hum to do so However, Spahrir refused to accept the post Undoubeedly he was convinced that with the Dutch atotude of "either, or" further negotsations would be zmpuble.

Upon Sjahrr's reugnation, Soekarno, im view of the dangerous sutuation, announced the exstence of a state of emergency and, as he had done the year previously during Tan Malaka's attempted coup d'etst, asumed full powers of government On the following day, Jume s8, the Working Commuttee raified his decree and it became law.* He requested the members of Sjahrsr's cabunet to remarm in office untel a new calunet was formed and undertook humuelf the task of negotiations with the Dutch. Pressure from the United States probably removed any doubts he may have entertained as to whether or mot Spahrir's concesuons should be mantained.

A Unuted States arde mémorre of June *8 called upon the Republie n The Maspum as a pirty van mot in Sahnrs cabenet These Manjum membem wha parispaud ua hs cabnet ded so as sndmdals and were net respomtle to the Mapuna Party

" Ancta, june 87. zt, n9. 3947 to "co-operate wathout delay" with the Dusch in the iommedate formation of an interim federal govermment for the whole of Indonesia, a demand that hid just been accepted by Sjahrar. However, the note wens on to state, "The Linggidjati Agreetent specifies an snterim period from nots until January t, 1919, durang which the Netherlands is to retain sov ereugnty and ultumase authoraty an Indonesia " is Since actually thus concept appears nouhere in the Lnggadjats Agreement, and since this constatuted one of the chief demands in the Dutch ultumatum, the Republican leaders could enly conclude that the Unuted States, whule anxious to avoud the outbreak of full scale war in Indo nessa, was backing the Dutch as aganst the Republie Thus, they felt the strength of thesr polstical positson sus à vis the Dutch weakened because of thas oln pous Amertean backing of some of the most amportant of the Dutch demands **

On June so, Soekarno called upon the leaders of the four largest portes—the Masjum, PN1, Socialest, and Labor—to form a coalition cabinet The Masjum demanded the post of Prume Minster and the smunistries of Delense, Foreign Affarrs and Internal Affaurs The other parties refosed to enter a coalition cabenet so dominated by Mayumt Eventually, on July 3. Sarfuddan was able to form a cabinet based on support by the three other large partses and a small, newly emerged party Whoch had spht off from the Mayumt. the Partat Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSII)

The leaders of thas new party had been leaders in the prewar party of the same name." Intally they commanded hittle popular following but hoped to be able to attract the many ex members of the pretwar party that had become members of the Masjums." For the most part they were older generation mationalises who felt that the posituans they held w thon the Masjumi weve not as high as they merited on the basus of the poutions they hod held in the preswar Islamme nation alist minement They resented the captunng of party leadership by Dr Sukman and the Religsous Socialists of the party's youngergeneration left wng (Abu Hanifah, Mohammad Natsir, Mohammad Roem. Safroddin Praworanegara, and Jusuf Wibisono) Since many of them had been the butt of Sjahrir's antscollaboratlonist drise, they bitterly opposed hum Because of thos they were all the more antago nistic tow ards the Jeft wing of the Masjuma, whoch in general had been Sjahnr's strong supporter Some of them undouboedly entered the new party largely to gain a poution im Amur Sjanfuddin's calunet, an action which he strongly encouraged

The feeling among Masjume and other politscal ercles was overwhelming that political opportunism was the choef impulhe toward formation of the new PsII Indeed, Abtkusno Tjokroujoso, who later became chasrman ef the party,i states that is was re-euablnhed in Jul), 1917. agaant hus express wishes, by Wondoamiseno and Arudje Kartaw nata as a result of a deal between them and Sparafuddın, who needed Islamic poltical backing for the cabunet he was attempting to form, the Masjumi having refused to support him. As quid pro quo for re-establuhment of a PSII pledged to support him, these two men were given respectvely the posts of Mimster of Imerior and Vace Minister of Delense an his cabonet.* Six others of the new party were offered calnet posts, all of whom except S. M. Kartosuwirjo and Surowjono ** accepted

The imtal membershup of Sjariluddm's cabinet was as follows.

e Abáume, kho was later to replace Wondeamueme as chermean, was st the tame sill under arrmest en the ctarge ef emphity un the attepted coap d eist of Jone. 9315

soe Kartusaw apo was efleret the post of ed V se Vutoster of Defenue and Surossyono

Although the concessions to Dusch demands advanced by Sjarifudthe Dutch were not satisfied.*** They continued to demand joint control over and joint manning of an Indonewan gendarmery operating

so Badan Aongres Pemuda Republ& Indeneua as Zarian Tank Inosena

s The masimee Repabliean concemons to the Dutch demando were contained in a note from Setiafpt of July 8, which atated (t) The Repable acoepts the de jure authonty of the Netherlands crown represestative un the unterm governmet danng the tention penod and agrees to an intenm goverrment componed of represemathes of the crown and repoesentstnes of the future statrs of Indonrua (t) The Republic withdraws ts resuen for separste Republican reporentataon s foregn eapitals dunng the inmrrim petod (s) Rghts of foregners to estates [plan atom will te veogrord by the Repohlean Govermement () The Repoblsc atepta Netheclands proposals fer federal eogans soch as estem and economit agendes (N r. Tins, Jsly g. 1947- p 1g)

NATIOSALISY AND REVOLUTION

refusal to yield on this and a few les important points, the Dutch Prime Mimnter, Beel, on July zo upon the recommendation of Van Mook,is ordered the Dutch army to launch an all-out attack deugned to crush the Republic. The next morning Dutch armered columns with powerful aur support fanned out inland from their seaport bases in Jasa and Sumatra

Generally the Dutch rationalaed their decsion to resort to military force by mauntauning that the Republican government did not exercise sufficient control over disudent extremist elements wathin its territory to implement agreements which it entered into. Though it is true that ts control over all areas and over all sts armed elements was not complete, this control had been steadily increasing. At the time the Dutch launched theer attack the Republic's control over its territory was greater both as to extent and effectiveness than it had ever been before, likewse its control over and the dncipline and integration of ita armed unots were greater than they had even been. It was ironic that in order to meet the Dutch attack most effectively it was neomsary to decencralure the Republican malstary organization and give back to unit commanders the autonomy which the Indonesian leaders had been engaged in dimunishang during the previous eighteen months.

sus Woll, op et, p zns

CHAPTER VII

War and United Nations

Intervention

TANK-TIPPED Dutch mechanized columns aided by strong'aernal support soon cut deep into Republican terrstory. Within two weeks the Dutch had secured control of most of the chuef cities and major towns of West and East Java, had obtasned a partial control (though none too securely) over the major communication links between them, and had occupied all remaining Republican deep-water ports in Java. In Sumatra Dutch forces spread out from Medan to occupy key points cupied the chief west Sumatran coast ports. Finally, they had secured a bridgehead on the western end of Madura.

Though in this short time the Dutch were able to reach many of objective, destruction of the major body of the Republic's armed forces. Except at a few points, the Republic's lightly armed forces refused to engage in frontaf combat with the heavily armed Dutch forces. Instead. and accerding to plan, they withdrew from the flat tank country and the principal communication arteries to the mountains and hills that flanked them, Within these pocket areas, some of which held large populations and towns, they setled down for a protracted hit-and run guerrilla warfare.

In the undefendable plains of Java, as much as posuble of the accumulated export crops, transportation equipment and machinery was moved by the Republicans abead of the advanting Dutch columns in towards the heartland of the Republic—the Magelang. Jogjakartz, Madun, and Kedirs areas. Plans called for a scorched-earth policy't being apploed to such of these asiets as could not be moved. The rapidity of the Dutch advance and the dasorganization of Republican efforts were such, however, that only a small amount of produce and equip ment was evaczated. The scorched-earth tactses, though widespread, often emphasized buildings and equipment rather than stocks of ex port produce As a result the Dutch were able to attain one of then chief secondary aums, capeure of large quantaties of the export products which thesr blockade of Java had kept boetled up there since shortly after the Japanese capitulation

Boch che Unted States and Great Brtan were undoubedly op posed to the Dutch attempt to settle their dupute with the Indontuars by force and made efforts to restrasn them. What was most noticed in Indonesa and throughout most of Assa as well, however, was the fact that though both the United States and Great Bratain had recognuzed the Republic of Indonesa de facto and had boch been vocferous an their denuncation of the Dutch aggresmon, neither showed willengnet to take effectise measures to stop it. The British almost smmedately made a relatively poutive move by offering to mediate the dispute but vere rebuffed by the Dotch. The Unted States govemment made a keaker effort, offering not mediation but only its "good effces" * to bth parties Morover, tha limted Amemcan offer of July came the day efter India and Australha had lasd the Indonruan conflict be fore the Secunty Council The Dutch, already having attained most of their geograplucal objectries and undoubtedly in the hopes of removing the dispute from the UN. arena, agreed on August & to acrept the Amerscan proposal. The Republic, however, rejected at, belteving ita anterests would be better protected by the Unsted Nationm. This rejection of Amemcan god offices * was symptomatic of the fact that even at this early date the formerly overwhelming pro-American sentiment among Republicans had become strongly overlaid with the suspicion that tovertly the Unsted States was partual to the Dutch and that, if it had strongly deured to, it could have stopped them from resorting to force.

India's response to the Dutch aggression was prompt Prime Minotter Nehru on July *1 stated "What has become of the Unsted Nations Charter? The spenst of new Ana will not tolerate such things. No European country, whateser it mas be, has any business to set ats army in Aua against the peoples of Asia When it does so, Aua will not tolerate it." • On July a8, Nehru announced that India would refer the Indonesian situation to the United Nations * Two days later beth Indaa and Austraha brought the dipute before that body, the Australian request for U N untervention takung precedence over that of India nasmuch as it was based upon the contention that there had been a breach of the peace (Article gg of the United Nations Charter), while that of Indio was bosed upon the contention that maintemance of insernational peace and securpty was endangered (Article s4). In anvoking Article s9 of the Charter, Australia proposed a resolution calling upon the Dusch and Indonesians to cease hostilstses immediately and submit their dupute to arbitration by a third party as provsded in the Ling. gadjati Agreement.

The debates that then ensued were closely followed and tong re membered in Indonesia and were anfluential in deseloping the attitudes of many Indonesians towards Russia and the United Seates. Whether or not American action proceded from a desire to avoid a Council deadlock or a French veto, the refusal of the Unsted States to bick the Australian propesal except in a drastically amended form was profoundly disilimioning to Indonesuans. In breaking the deadlock produced by the differences of opinion concerming the Australian propesal, the United States dod not appear to Indonesians to throw its weight againt the coloniat powers on the Councl: Brtain, France and Belgium. The compromise solution which it spontored appeared to them to be much closer to the stand of the colonial powers than to the Russian-backed Australian proposal. It was a compromise which in Indonesian ejes drew the teeth of the Australian proposal. The American compromise proposal accepted on August s by a vote of eight to three (with Britain, France, and Belgium abstaining) called upon the Netherlands and the Republhc: "(a) to cease hostilities forthwith, and

4 N Y, Times, July *5, 1947-9.5

* thas, July s1, p 1.

(b) to setle their daputes by arbitration er ether peaceful meant, and to keep the Councal informed about the progres of the sestlement."

Russia and Poland, on the other hand, consitendly called for the withdrawal of Dutch troops to the points from which they had launched thear attack. Gromyho amisted that "any negotiation, whether by arbtratuon or some other method, conducted while the troops of one party are on the termtory of another cannot conduce to creating equality for both partses"• A Rusuan proposal calling upon both sudes to withdraw to the positions held prior to the Dutch attacks was decisively defeated, all other council members except Poland abttaining*

On August 3 the Netherlands government instructed Van Mook to cary out the cease fire order at midnight on August 4-s. and the Republican govermment nsued like instructions to its forces. As Ememson observes "The tocation of opposong forces when the cease fire orders were ssued was no more stable and no more suited to become the basts of esen a temporary settlement than that which existed after the fiest few days of the Nan anvasson of Poland in 1959" i" The Dutch halted their dnve on the Republican capotal of Jogjakarta, but they did not cease foeward operatlons Their spearheads advanced laterally to enciecle targe islands of by-passed Repubtican forces and then conserge anwards on them to obliterate them, an activity euphemntically referred to by the Dutch as "mopping up operations" In addition, in a number of entical areas Dunch forces continued to advance further forward into what remained of Republican-controlled territory

Thus &hen Soetan Sjahrir, appointed by che Republic to represent it at Lake Succes, was finally allowed to appear before the Council on August 14, he emphaszed that the only way to end the fighting was fer the Council to dispatch a commumon to supervise obedoence to its cease fire order. In addition he called upon the Council to hold to the otiginal Australan proposal and iself arbitrate the dnpute and inssted upan the wothdrawal of Dutch troops to the positions they had held before their attack. Strong support was given this ponstion only by Ruaua and Poland. A Russian propotal for the setting up of a commissoon of the Council to supersntend the crase fire erder then recenved the bachang of the Unsted States, Australia, Branl, Colombia.

Poland and Syria, a sufficient mumber for its adoption. France, bonever, vetoed the proposal." The maximum that France would allow was a consular commision made up of representatives of those governments having career consuls at Batavsa to report back to the Security Councal as to the observance of the cease fire order " Thus rather than establishing ats own agency to superentend the cease fire, the Council on August ss agreed to rely upon a commission to report to it on how the cease fire was being observed, a commosion over whuch it had only indirect control and which had a more pro-Dutch compositson " than the Secursty Council

An impasse was also reached an the attempt to pros ide for an effective procedure fer attaning a political settlement between the parties A Polah proposal provuding for arbitration of the dispute by a commisuon made up of representatives from the eleven nations sutting on the Security Council receved the support of only Russia and Syria. An Australian propotal calling for arbetration by a commottee composed of three members of the Council, each party to the dispute selecting one member and they selecting the third, received the support of only Colombea and Syna.

This impasse was later on August as beoken by an American proposal which was supported by all members but Russia, Poland and Syrna, who abstained." The plan provided that the Securty Couneal "tender its good offces to the two parties in order to assst in the pacific settlement of their dispute in accordance with" the second part of its resolution of Auguit t. This expressed the Council's readiness, "of the parties so reguest, to asust in the sestlement through a commottee of the Council comsisting of three members of the Council, each party selecting one, and the thord to be designated by the two so selected." " By September 18, the Netherlands had selected Belgium, the Republic had chosen Australia, and the two so chosen had selected the United States as the third representative on the committee. However, the committee, generally known as the "Commitee of Good Ofßces," did not hold sts first offical meeang untal October 20, s917, and dad not arrave in Indonesia until a week later.

In the meantime the Dusch were having things very much their own way in Indoneua On August sg they unilaterally proclaimed the "Van Mook line," supposedly defining the positsons they held at the time of the cease fire In general, thus Iine connected up the isolated Dutch spearheads thrust far into Republican territory and enclosed extensive tracts of territory between theur spearheads that were stull under the effecuve control of the Republic's troops and eavd administration Thes, long after the cease fire order Duich troops captured such important by possed towens as Garut and Taukmalaja Moreover, as Van Mook homself admotted, an a number of cntical areas the demarcation line was drawn to anclude tracts of Republican terrstory into which the Dutch armored columns had not even penetrated i" According to his leme, the Republic was lamoted to a little over one third the area of Java—the east central area (minus all deep tater seaports) and the extreme western tip of the nland, half of Madura, and the largest but poorest part of Sumatra (See Map a, p *ss)

Such actions and the refusal of the Security Council to contest them demomtrated to Indonesans how little in awe of the Securnty Council the Netherlands stood This eehng was mereased by Van Mook's publie advocacy on August go, the eve of hus departure to the Netherlands for comultation, that the Dutch put an end to the authonty of the Republae

The Council's cease-fire order was not observed Continuing Dutch advances forward and their wide scale efforts to eradicate Republican military and civil control in the extensive areas criginally by passed by their spearheads provoked resistance and bitter Sghtang Such actions continued to be justafied by the Dutch as "mopping up operatiom" and were held to be quite consutent wath their interpretation of the cease fire The saewpoont of the Republicans was not unnaturally dif- Serent and was thus deicribed in a telegram of Dr. A. K. Gani, the Vace Prome Minister, to the Council dated September zg. 1947:

Dutch atmy accupued big towns and masn communkation Iines between thone tovns Aress surrounding beg towas and adjacent to mint commenication lines sull fally under Repatlican conorol In those areas complese unuts of Repub bcan army aull an coounuous contact woth general beadquartem and Republe

Is Sistement ot Van Mack befare a preu cafemence, Baava Ot es 1947 a repaned by UF

Foe à topos o ho satement te N Y Tomet, Ag to atp can eivil adminintration still is functionung at urual As soon as Dutch lave succeeded in occupyang fes towns and main rmads they start cdasmung that entire area eovered by maginary demarçation lates they dra» on map be comes terre nederlandue Subsequently follow inesstable mopping up opera trens. Not astonishung at all chat un wuch a way fierce ightung continurs un atated Penetratuon a not octupation Nor dors a conder right to penetrators to regued areas betseen converging bones of penecration as occupued terrstory or even patel the sume"

The Republt's contnuing demand that Dusch troops retire to the poutions from whoch thes launched their attack, though still rece eng support from the Russian bloc and Australa, as well as from Indua outsude the Council, nas contstends opposed is the United States Throughout October, this ssue domonated the Council debates on Indoneua. On October g. the Unuted States delegate to the Council, Mr. Austen, jusufied American support of the Dutch refusal to wuth drate their troops on the grounds that this would contravene the U.N. Charter by posibly prepudicing the rights of the partes to the dispute.» A Sovset resolution of October g1. calling for wathdrawal to postions held before the Dutch astack, receved the support of Auttralia, Colombia. and Poland, but was opposed by the Unuted States. Britain, France, and Delguum, with the other Council members ab staining"

Reports of the Consular Commission of October t4 and 2* " stating that the cease-fire order was not being carried out made it clear that further action was demanded of the Council if its intervention tcas not to prove a complete fiasco Attempts an the Council to meet this situa tion effectively were unable to secure majority backing, and finally a weak United States compeomise was accepted on November 1 " Thas resolution called upon the two parties "forthw ath to consult wath each other, either directly or through the Committee of Good Offices, as to the means to be employed to gve effect to the cease-fire resolution." Aho it advised the partues that its resolution of August 1 was to be interpreted as meaning "that the use of the armed forces of either party by hostile action to extend its control over territory not occupied by it en August 4. 1917, is inconsistent wath the Council resolution of August 1.n

Set A1 Tin, Ot 0, 19G.P n Secunav Couten, Ofinal Rereeds, rd. yr, no ses, agem U 5/g5 za Poland veting againt and Rtna, Colraba and Svra antaming (Setunty Couscl O7 oet Rreenda, ad v ro roz z7)

SATIOVALISN AND REVOLUTION

The Counril's feeble caveat appears to have made latle impeession on te Dut They dd o wdra from e tere tey d see after August 4, und just ten days after the resolution was made, these troops crosed theur onn Van Nook line and overran the remaining half of Madura"

The refumal of the mapanty of the Security Council to order the Dutch to wathdrau. from the territory they had seized or to compel them to submit to peaceful arlutration, or even to abide by the weak resolutions it had been willing to agree on, made a powerful impression on Indonesians In general, theur auesment of ihe attutudes of the Securnty Council members was baned exclusvely upon their knowledge of the debates and the vores taken there. A few gotsed that Secretary of Stase Marshall had made it clear to Van Mook when he visited Washingron in early September that the United States was firmly against hs plan for waping out what remarned of the Republae But even they believed that the Unsted States was conscioumly follotving a policy wbich in most respects backed the Dutch. Their following of events un the Security Council conv unced them of this and in addition that Russia was the Council member who most strongly supported the Republie Moreover, the feeling was wudespread among Indonesians that the Dunch maltary campaugn against the Republic could mot have been undertaken wsthout Amencan and Brstish military equipment." Among educated elements it was widely bebeved that Dutch de pendency upon Amencan credit for reconstruction ef the Netherlands home economy put the United States in a positaon where it could force the Dutch to suspend military operations in Indonesia any time it wahed These sentiments were shared by representatives from both the extreme left and estreme right of the poltical spectrum.

An ofßcial statement of the peineipal Republican trade union federatuon, the SOBS1 (not then under Communist domination), broadcast mer the Jogjalarta radho on October 17, r947, decdared that Dutch defiance of the Security Council's cease fire order wat explasned by the fact that "certain Western powers" were "secretly prosoding the Dutch with war materals to carry out their colonsal war in Indonena " It went on to say: "Our hopes for a peaceful settlement in Indoneua have been smashed to atoms because three months after Unated Natsons intervention there is still no solution to end the bloodihed on Indonewan sod lt has become unmntakabily clear that the socalled evdized Western nations justsfy Dutch aggresion and have no untention of ending the bad conditions in Indonessa caused by the presence of Dusch troope" In conclusion the statement accused the Unted States of granting credits to the Netherlands whuch were uied by st "to suppress the national upsurge in Indonena*

On November 12, in a speech before the Republican Parliament, Mr. Katemo, Vice Minaster of Economoc Affairs and chairman of the Indonestan Catholie Party spoke of the "obnsous partiality of the Unsted States" in fasor of the Dutch and stated that the Indoneuan people were unable to understand uhy 'certain poverful natsoms so cbsiously side wth the Dutch" and "refuse to acknowledge the same rights of freedom and self-determination for Indonetans that they subicribe to an the Atlanue and U N. Charters "

Meanwhile time was workang against the Republic and in lavor of the Netherlands. The Van Mook Iine cut the Repablhe off from the richest agricultural areas of both Java and Sumatra But particularly in Java the situation was serious. The area remainong under the Republic's control was a deficot food area with a per-capita rice production calculated by its government as being only 6a 6 quantals as compared with a production of 85 g in the area cut off by the Dutch *" In addition this area left to the Republie in Java had its normal population of about sg,oon,ooo svelled by an influx of more shan 7oo,ooo refugees from the areas overrun by the Dusch This figure was later conuderably increased.

The blockade which the Dutch threw around the area left the Republic cut off not only from outude sources of arms, but from sources of food and clothing as well. The Republie's need for swift action by the Unuted Nations toward effecuve implementation of the crase fire and armval at a politieal sestlement is shown in Prime Mimister Sjari fuddin's memorandum to the Securiry Council of November s6, s917:

Any delay in rtachung an everall pohtcal settlement, and the implemensanon of the cease fre, wall enatle the Netheelands Goveznment to conuolidate ats econotuc gum, and mast therefere inestably weaken the poution of the Repuhtc We feel that the econone blockade which the Netherlands is now imposng will not only crease dire datres wuthun the areas under the conteal of the Republic but woill also petjudite a proper oppeeciation of the polrual utuatan in the adands and ernoody hamper a proper impastal judgement of the stustion

Even before July sust, the Netherlands Government was seeking by naval blockade to impose an econosic strangleheld on the Republac. The Republie was cut off from supphes by sea and enable to repair and maintain euental transpont whch had seraoundy detersarated dering the Japanese occupaton and whuch was needed for anternal dutzibution In occupying tome areat the Dotch bave conmenoently been able to duerbute supplres to alleviate shortages for whuch they themeives were reiponuhle This they hase sought to doak agptuon in the guse ot liberation, to apprar to the people and the world an benelactoms antead of aggressors

The Committee of Good Offices set up by the Security Council was fared wath an stmpossible task. It had been delegated a problem of the greste dculy but had not bee gven the power with which to solve the problem It had become a symbol of the great aspiration of the Unted Nations, the resolving of conflict by peaceful means Yet it was possessed nerther of power of sts own nor of backing by the Security Council suficiens to Ine up to this expectation. Intially there was a belet that the Secursty Councal would not let its agent down and could be relied upon when the time came to give it the minimum suppor mey fo at eect should the two par to the dapue prove antransigent, but this was not the case The Committee of Good Offices soon found stself in the poutson of an unwanted child, for the most part spurned by ts parent, the Secursty Counol. Despite uts entreaties to that body, it was umable to get the support necesary for carrying out its task

What was suprang was that dhe Commoe was able to aceve e tranuent success That achievement bas in a very large measure due to the determunation of the Commuttee's Amencan member, De. Frank Graham Thns fleetung success was made possible by the concessions the

Republic was willing to make on the basis of its trust in him and its belief that his proposals would, as he honestly expected, be backed up by the American government, The transitory nature of thes succest was principally a result of the subsequent refosal of the State Department to back him and the bebef of the Dutch that at would not. More specifically it was because of the oppositnon to Graham's ssews by certain personnel of the State Depattment snterposed in sts chain of command between him and Secretary of State Marshall. In the words of Dr. Graham

The Commostee at all tumes ka up agaimt uch realmes as (i) not only the lack of power to act an arbtraturs but aho the lark of power even to medate the dupute, and thereforr. (z) the larå ed power to make publie sts suggstionm to the partues. (s) the necesuty for the commetee to be unanimous in ceder for its confifential suggestions to the partes to have some moral power, (6) the power of esther one of the parties to contimue to veso any sog. gestion of the commostre even when unanimous. (s) the posibdty of the polncal overthrow of estber cabunet or the resligniment of the political parties en the ban of the negotantrons in the Indontuin daprate, (6) the poubolity eil by ene veto er a combination ef negitne votes or abitentions from voting, () the lack of anstant public conseleration by the Assembly.. "

In addition the Committee was contumually handicapped by the deepseated suspicion between the two parties regarding each other's desire or abelity to live up to any agreement that might be mode. Moreover, as Graham observes:

A strong obstructing Datch factor was the underbyang and not always submerged determination of seme powerful econome and political inserests in the Netherlands not really to use the Commttee of Good Ofices and to elimi nate the Republic from any real pirt an the peepatation for an organization of the promned United States of Indonesa an

There was a feeling among impertant Dutch evil and army leaders in Indonesia that time was on thesr side The political and economic pressures they could apply agaanst the rump Republiean area would be sufficient, they believed, either to ansure such a further deterioration of the Republic's economy as to ease its government to collapse or at least thereby to ereate political condstuons of so dnorderly and unstable a natore as to allow a Duteh sponsored and controlled Indonesian federal government to request the assistance of Dutch armed forees in eliminating the Republic. Such action could be undertaken in selfprotecuon agaunst Republican "aggression" or to clean out a source of "Communist anfection."

If, however, the Republic (reduced in size as st now was) were to become a member of such a Dutch sponsored federal Indonesian government, particularly if it entered it under some sort of U.N guarantee whereby it had fair representatiom an the new government, it would be very much more difficult, af not imposuble, for the Dutch to carry out such plans Thus the major effort of Graham and his Australian counterpart on the Commsttee was to keep the Republhc in the projected independent United States of Indonesia

On December 8, 1947, the Good Offices Commuttee finally opened its first formal sesson with the Republican and Dutch delegatsons in the neutral termtory provaded aboard the U.SS. "Renville" anchored an Batava harbor. Its first proposals were accepted in full by the Republican delegation but only in purt by that of the Netherlands Its second plan was likewise agreeable to the Republic but acceptable only as a working paper by the Netheslands **

In the face of thus Dutch antransigence, the Committee on December z6 submutted its "Chrisemas Message," an over-all proposal much closer to the Dutch postion This called for a truce, with the "Van Mook line" to be accepeed as the military boundary between the two disputants but providing among other things that wothin a penod of not Jess than three months the Netherlands would withdraw its troops to the poutsons held proor to their attack ot July es, s947, and that the Republican crvil administration would return to the arras so evacuated. The proposals were accepted by the Republic.

The Netherlands agreed to accept the Commotte's proposals only an part, countering them wath sts aen set of tweive polrtical principles in which those parts of the propotals acceptable to st were incorporated* These Dutch counterproposals did provide that within "not less than ux months and not more than one year after the sugning of the agreement during which time uncoerced and free dncuisson and conuderation of vital issues will proceed" free elections would be held fr e detematon by the peple of te polcal relatomup to the Uneted States of Indonesia, and further that ezch party would

"guarantee the freedom of awembly, speech and publication at all times, provided that this guarantee is not construed so as to include the advocaty of violence or reprisals " *s However, they elimunated any mention of the withdrawal of Dutch troops or the restoration of the Republic's cul adminstration in the terrstory they had eccupied. There was no provsion for representation of the Republie in the anteram government pending the transfer of sovereignty, and indeed there uas no menton of the Republic by name and in any of the twelve principles More alarmmg from the Republic's pont of view was the lack of amy guarantee of snternational obnervation between the signing of the agreement and the tramfer of sovereagnty " In submitting this proposal the Netherlands andscated that "id not accepted unconditionally by the Republic, it would not be bound by the 1a principles and liberty of action would be resumed""

The Netherlands poution was made yet clearer on December 2g when Van Mook announced the unslateral establishment of the "state" of East Sumatra, the rschest of the areas sesred by the Dunch from the Republic *" Thus, without reference esther to the Republie er the Commsttee, the Dutch were proceding andependently to set up a federal Indonesua of their own desugn in territory anneved from the Repablie.

On January 4 the Dutch convoked a conference of representasives from ten areas in Indonesa, three of whom came from areas detached from the Repullic (West Java, Madura, and East Sumatra). The Dutch selecoed delegates from these ten areas attended the meeting as representatives of future components of a federal Indonesia. This conference meeting wuth the Dutch Prime Minnter, Dr. Beel, resolsed that an internm federal government preparatory to the establohment of a sovereign Unated States of Indonesia be formed immedlately.*" The Republic was insited to enter this government, but only as a minority partner, wuth the several Dutch sponsored states to have at least twice its voice therein *"

With respect to negotratrons with the Republic, Dr. Beel stated- "Holland reserves the right to resume her freedom if satisfactory re sults are not soon achuesed." " On January g this warning was made by the Netherlands delegation directly to the Committee in a letter stating that unless st receved an unqualhfied acceptance by the Re publie of ats counserproposals withon three days, it would ask its government for further anstruction, "indicating that there was reason to beleve that ats Government would decide to resume their freedom of action " "

Knowang that the Republican government could not accept this ultmatum, the Commottee attempted to resolse the impasve by itself suggesting six addituonal peinciples, supplementing the twelve proposed by the Netherlands Implementation of these promused to insure that the people of Indonesia themselves would determine the fate of their own country It was envisaged, according to Dr. Graham, that these six addmonal principles "would tramfer the struggle from a prosmonal military demareation lne, which would disappear, to a democratte polstical line whuch would endure.""

These principles prossded foe Netherlands sovereignty over Indenesia untal "afier a stated interval" sovereignty was to be transferred to an andependent United States of Indonesia, of which the Republic wos to be a conitituent state. In any prosuonal federal government created praor thereso each conststuent state would be offered "fair representation " Either party was to have the ight of requesting the assntance of the Committee of Good Offices "in adyosting differences between the parties whoch relare to the politscal agreement and which may arae during the antenm pernod " "Withun a period of not less than 6 montht and not more than one year from the signing of the agreemens" a plebisoste was to be held "to determine whether the populations of the varaous terrstorses of Java, Madura, and Sumatra wish their territory to form part of the Republic of Indoneua or of another state wsthin the United States of Indonesia," with the Commottee of Good Offices observing it if so requested by either party. Follouung thus delimeation of states a constitutional convention con vened "through democratic peocedures" would draft the constitution federal Ututed States of Indoneia and negotiate "a special relationship" with esther it or the Netherlands"

The Netherlands sndocated at would actept the six proposals of the

Committee if the Republic would accept them and the twelve proposed by the Netherlands within the time set in its ultimatum of January 9 This limit was later extended forty eight hours

The thelse principles propoted by the Dutch were vague and ambiguous, and the Republic asked for their clarsfication. Wath the time limst set by the Dutch approachong an end, there was not time for regular negotiatsons. Members of the Commottee therefore flew to Jogjakarta and on January 13 at the nearby hill statson of Kalurang undertook to answer the questions of the Republican leaders concerning them In part they accomplished this through a draft statement of their own stews, not binding on either party, whuch contasned most of the commensus of the Committee's three members

This anterpretation of the Committee, though unacceptable to the Dutch, was important in anducing the Republic to agree to the milatary truce and the twelse Dutch counterproposals, "for they tended to quiet the Republic's concern over certasn matters such as the link between the Truce Agreement and the politucal principles, and the future status of the parties, particularly in relationship to the Securaty Councal." Dr. Graham in partscular calmed the fears of the Republican leaders over possoble dimunshment of the Republic's internal powers during the transitional period pending the transfer of Netherlands sovereignty to a federated Indonesia. "You are what you are," he assured them, and left them with the impression that the Committee would countenance no such diminishment until the Republic had secured "fair representation" in the independent all-Indonesian federal government that was to be formed.

Nonacceptance of the truce and the twelve Dutch counterproposals would, the Commuttee emphauzed, lring its functuoning to an end and return the dispute to the Securaty Couneil. There, it pointed out, a Trench veto could be relied upon to holt any attempt to impose arbitraton of the disprote. De. Graham made it clear thnt unleis the terms demvnded by the Dusch were accepted by the Republic, the American government would probsbly not be inclined to eppose further Dutch attempts to smpose a setlement by force He convinced the Repoblic's leailers that if they dad accept these terms they would be able to count upon the Amerscan government's exerting its influence to assure that the Dutch carned out their part of the birgun, in parteular the promned U N upervned pleluictes It was this assurance that finally brought the reluctint leaders of the Republican government to agree to a truce based upon the Van Mook lme and the vague and unpalatable demands contasned in the Dutch counterpeopotals They felt sure thit these pleboscites could only result m overuhelmung pro Republican majoraties With the battle tramferred "from bullets to ballot," at by the Dutch army would come bock to the Republican fold Thereby they felt certasn that the Republae, and mot the Dutch, vwould dominate the envuaged federal Indoneuan government

It twas only by a very narrow margin and wath the greatest reluctance that the Republican government finally decuded to gaeld to the Commuttee's—and porticularly Dr. Graham's—urgings ** and sign the agreement demanded by the Dutch in their ultimatum To the very end Sjahrir, the leaders of the Masjum, and most of the leaders of the PNI opposed such a couse At fost, Preme Minnter Sjarifuddin, President Soearno, and Vace President Hatta opposed it as well However, reports from some of the most important Republhcan army commanders to Soekarno of thesr cntucal shortage of ammuntion, the certain convsetion that the Dutch would launch another all out campaign if the Repullhc refused to accept their demands, and the Commitee's blunt warmng that nothing eletive could be expected from the Secunty Councal sn that case combined to convince them how desperate the utuatson was The Repuhlie, they realred, could reluse to accept the Dutch ultimatum and fight alone. Alter several years of grueling guerrilla warfare it might force out the Dunch, but the casurlties among

Indonesians and the suffering of the whole population would be tremendous. Could they be responmille for such a decision? No, they de- For them soch hope did exst in their belief that the Amerscan government could be reled upon to smnst thut faur, U N supervned pleboscites be cartied out un the areas overrun by the Dutch army

Thus en January 17 and 19. 1918. the Republican government joined the Netherlands an sugning the Renvalle Agreement incorporating a military truce based on the Van Mook line, the twelve political principles of the Dutch, and the six additsonal princsples proposed by the Committee of Good Offices

CHAPTER VIII

Aftermath of the Renville Agreement

SIGNING of the Renville Agreement provoked a cabinet crnis in the Repoblic Antucipating its signature, the Masjums, the largest of the politocal partues, on January 16 withdrew from the cabinet.* Though opposed to the agreement, it agreed to abode by at, sunce it had been signed by the Republic's government a Following the signature of the agreement both the Masjumi and the pow-erfut Indonesian Natonalnt Party (PNI) made clear that they would no Ionger support Sjarfuddon as Prame Mimster and that their support of any future government would be condstional on ther domunant posution therein* Their atttude was that they could not be expected to support the implementation of an agreement to whach they had been oppomed + unless they, rather

1 Antata, Jan t6. tu? On Nov 1z. sge7 the Mapam hał ageed to sapport and yun Sanfuddns cabenet Theseupen Samsathn of the Majumi repland A K and Setudpt (Laber Parry) benemng fourth Vze Preme Minoier Wosdeewssens Dy Mohasamad Roes of the Mapues and became secend Vaee Prume Mnater Hadμ Mastorr of the Mayama becarae Mnsrer of Reigpon, replating Ktis Athmad Arjars of the PSII, and Kauman Singodimmpo of the Manpam became Vire Merrier of Jussse than the group primanly respontuble of the agreement, were in power.

In the face of their wthdrawal, Amr Sparifuddin, now supported only by the Sajap Kina, on Jamuary a3, sg18, resigned as Prıme Minister." Because of the need for strong leadershsp to begin prompt implementaton of the Renvalle Agreement and because of the delicateness of the sotuataen both with respect to the Dutch and elements wthin the Republican army (many of which were bitterly critical of the terms of the agrtement), it was imperative to form a new cabinet smmediately However, nesther the Masjum nor the PN1 appeared anxsous to asvame primary responsubelity for carrying out the distasteful serms of the agreement. In addstzon, thev could not quickly agree upon a mutually acceptable division of the major cabinet posts, and the urgency of the sutuation did not allow suficient ume to work out these differences.

Formation of a presodenual cabenet * with a national, all party character seemed to be the only means of creating quackly the strong leadership needed Accordangly, smmediately following Sjariluddin's resig nation, Presulent Soekarno appointed Drs Mohammad Hatta, who as Vice-Preudent stood above party, to form a preudental cabinet. Hatta sought to feem a "National Government," enrolling all the chief parties He was, however, unable to reconcile the conflicung demands of the Masyum: and the PN1 as against the Sajap Kir. The latter demanded a mutumusn of four calunet posts, with Sjarifeddin as Minister of Defense. (In the previous cabinet he had been concurrently Prime Mannter and Mototer of Defense) In particular, the Mapumts twas epposed to Sparifuddin's appontment to the defense post, believarg, wth justufication as events were to show, that in controlling this matostry en the prevsous cabinet be had been using ets funds to build up a pernonal following among milstary crcles In the cabinet finally formed on January zg. 1g18,° the Masjumi and PNI were domman: Also included were members from the Catholie and Chrittian parties and, sgnoficantly, from Syahrir's wing of the Socialst Party.

Though anually conceived as a temporary expeduent pending the formation of a new parliamentary cabinet respontuble directly to the KNIP and ats Workang Commuttee, Hatta's cabinet was to last untal the transfer of Dutch sovereagnty on December z7, 19g9 Though as a presidentual cabinet at was officially responuble only to the President, in pracuce it held stoelf accountable to the Working Committee of the KNIP as well Its membershop was the follow ing:

*Ofßcally aseeuncad pwo days later See Antama, Jin po, 15e9

* On Tab as. sgg, Sopeno left the Socalot Piriy and psened the neul formed Indomexan Socalal Pety beaded by Sahnr In entetang the Hatts catenet he had acted as a pevase sndadsal and not an a member of rhe Socuhet Pietr

*Uaid Apni is, ipgt, thas pout wat held by Ir Duinda along ah that of Caes manxoces.

Afep a Disson of Jasa under the Renville Agreement (Janry 19. 1919). Whate (unohaded) areas remined under

be under Netherlatds occupation Heavy they approxomate the pervious Van Mook lime as lant prolumed by the Dutch

The four point program announced by Hatta for his cabinet included (1) umplementation of the Renville truce agreement and political pronciples and contunoation of negouations wyth the Dutch through the Securnsy Council's Commottee of Good Offices; (a) acceleration of the formation of a sovereagn, democratic United States of Indonesia; (3) rationalhuation of the Republac's army and economy, (4) reconstructnn of damage caused by the war and the Japanese occupation.

Almost immedrately Hatta's cabnet began to carry out the most disagrecable terms of the Remille Agreement, recognntion of the Van Vook. line This neceutated wathdrawal of some of the Republic's best troops from the consuderable pockets that they occupled bebind the Dusch ude of the Van Mook line and thesr removal into the trumcated area that was left to the Republic. By February z6, sgg8, all regulor Republcan army units (TNI)—3s,ooo in number—had withdrawn from dheir pockets and crossed over the Vat Mook line into Repubhcan held terrstory It was not easy for the Republican government to persuade them to abandon the easity defended guerilla bases from whoch they wsthdrew Only its aasurance that U.N.-observed plebscates would soon be held in these areas induced them to leave. There remained onty about 4.ooo srregular troops who refused to be eracuated, for the most part troops of the Hizbullah (Originally malitia of the Maspum, the Hirbullah had been incorporated into the TNI Most Hizbullah unots did withdraw)

In the meantime U N -sponsored politicat discussons between the Dutch and the Republc had not begun and did not begin until the moddle of March, largely because of the Netherlands' delay in appointang representatives" Thus apparently calculated delay, the unilateral Dutch sponsoeshup of nete statts in the areas stred from the Republc, the suppresuon of freedom of speech and assembly in these areas, and the inauguratron of a Dutch sponsored Inserim Federal Government all combined to make Indonesians progressively more convinced of the unsallmgness of the Dutch to abide by the Renville Agrrement The fact that these developments elicited no protest from the Security Counol made them increanngly skeptical of its intention to see that the Dutch henor the agreement.

The Netherlands claumed that no vsolation of the Renville Agree ment wta insolsed in the establalment of these states and the Interim

"C7 J Torter Collra "The Utated Stana and ladenea," Ietereatanal Aecee nistoe. Varch, szyn pp 1st-tyg

Federal Government since they were merely "provaoonal." Regardless of the merits of this potition, which the American and Australhan members of the committee vaewed pravately as pure sophustry," these states were not, as the Dutch maintained, the spontaneous creations of their Indonesian poprulauons In the formation of every one of them the actual initsatuve came from the Dutch Moreover, in none of these areas did the Dutch allow the "treedom of atwembly, speech, and publication" and the "uncoerced and free descustion and conuderation of vital sues" that they had agreed to ansure under the Renvlle Agreement

MADURA

Less than a week after signing the Renville Agreement the Dutch unilaterally conducted a plebiscate on the sland of Madura whuch determaned its status between the Republic and the newly-created Intervm Federal Government sponsored by the Duteh Thos plebescite was contrary to the prosisuons of the Agreement in that it was not "conducted under observatson by the Committee of Good Offices" and was not carmed out at least six months after the sugnong of the Agree ment nor under condstuoms which had allowed "uscoerced and ftee dscussion and connderation of vatal assues," and "treedom of assembl), speech, and publication." The Commottee witnesied nesther the plebiscite nor the subsequent elections for a popular assembly of Madura In its report to the Securty Couneil concerning them the Committee merely forvarded to it the conflicung vermons concernung them supplied it by the Netherlands and the Republe*

During the Dutch occupatson of half of Madura in early August, 1947, its Republican Resident,a Tjakranangrat, dsd not evacuate to the western half of the wland along with the other offcers of the Republacan civil administration. He remauned behind in the area then overrun by the Dutch and, giving sickness as his resson, resigned his post as Republican Resudent." During the first week of September, a month betose the Dunch overran the remanmong halt of the nland, Tjakraningrat entered into an agreement with the Dutch " In return for being anstalled as duef of the administration of Madura with no other administration competing wath his, he agreed to co operate wuth the Dutch, recognuzing their Recomba (Government Commissioner for Adminstratne Affatrs) as co-ordinator and repeesentatise of the central authoraty.""

In an interuew wth seven foreign correspondents in mid-November, 1947. Takranıngrat stased:

As soon as I was cut of from the Repubhe wben the Dutch landed in Madura an early Augunt, I was foreed to act on my osn putatave for the zake and welfare of the people of Stadura I requested the Duich Governor of East Java, Mr ven der Plas, to help the distress of the people by supplying food and cdothung 1 was cut eff from the Republie and recereed no oedems er dareeuom from the Repebican authonties in Jogjakarra I am stll a natonalit. but I am no longer in sympahy woth the Republie because of rts actrons. The Republir never obuerves the rules of demeerary It hat alvaya been the wuh of the peaple of Madura to be governed hy themselves. and therefore this step whach I bave taken is an conformity with the wahes of the people. We toll form a specul area fot this country and co-operate wth the other states of Jana whuch ultumately will be anduded n the United Srates of Indonesa under the serms of the Linggadjats Agreesens. I was nolated from the Relanded on Maduta, Augut †

In hus capacity as Dusch-appointed Resident, Tjakraningrat helped the Dutch Reronbs of East Java, Charles van der Plas, ceganue a plebtscite, the purpose of whoch was to make Madura a separate "state" in the envsaged federal government. This plebucite was announced on Jamtuary 16, 1g18 and was conducted just seven days later under a "state of war and sege." wherern the exercise of basic ervil liberties was not permitted. Public gathenings were not allowed; private smeetings of more than four persons required permission from the Dutch authontes five days in advance and the polior had the right to attend " All radio sets were collected by the Dutch." chus ruling out any contact with the Republic and any presentation of the Republican government's views to the population. The population had no mea.is of knowing that Tjakraningrat was no longer recognsred by the Republic as its representative on the asland.

To the Committee of Good Offices and vra it to the Secunity Council the Netherlands represented the question asked at the plebiscite as having six points, the first of which was "to declare the relations between Madura and the Republit of Indonesa severed."" The wruter in sisiting Madura a little over a year later found no Indonesian among those whom he questooned who recalled the plebiscite questson hav:ng been posed in this manner Both Dr Suparmo, one of the most widely respected of pro-Republican leaders on the sland, and Roeslan, secretary of Tjakraningrat, stated that the plebotcste choote was limsted to the double question (s) in these dificult times is it not deurable that we create a state of our own whoth can look after the snterests of all of us² and (2) do you wish Takraningrat as Wali Negara (Chief of State) of this state?

Much of the population had no inkting of Tjakraningrat's defection from the Republic, and, therefore, the lanking ol his name to a state of Madura meant Ior them a retention of an associaton with the Republic. For those who had some sdea of the real situation there was no opportunity to express their view on the plebiscite by private ballot. The plebucite was public. In each village all in favor ef the double question were asked to stand on one side and those opposed on the other." It was not altogether surprung under these circumstances and in view of the fact that the iland was under garrison of Dutch troops that less than 5 per cent of those participating voted in the negative on the question.*" On January 21 Van Mook recogmized the "State of Madura" and Tjakraningrat as its president (Wals Negara).

A better measure of the real sentuments of the population of MMadura was expressed in the ensuing election for a Madura parhament held by ballot between March 15 and Apnl 15. 1918. Even though this, too,

NATIONALISY AND REVOLUTION

was held under the condition of "war and siege" with its attendant lach, of cvil hibertes, though a number of the Republican leaders were an jail, and though the election was highly indrect, it returned a pro-Republican majonity of thirty-one out of the forty members elected *" However, this victory at the potls did little to strengthen the Republican position on Madura This parliament had no povers, but many of its members did at first dare to expren their political views As a result woihin a month of thesr elections twenty of the forty members of parliament were arrested and jasled by the Dutch melstary intelligence

WEST JAVA

The fears of the Republican leaders rassed by the Netherlands' actions in Madura were soon increased by activaties in that part of western Java (the major part) twhich Dutch troops had overrun. The Netherlands' actons here in particular convanced them that the Dutch would not honor the Remville Agreement and that the Security Council could not be relied tupon to enfoece thesr adherence to it.

Pres ous to the signing of the Renville Agreement the Dutch had made a number ef moves vluch had appeared calculated to establah a non Republican regime in the ares The instial attempt, the *Pasundan Movement," launched early in March, s917, had been, as Wolf states, "a mosguded plan engineered by overzealous units ef the (Dutch) Army and the Cavil Administration," ar wuthon the small enclaves of West Jaa then under Dutch control The Indonesian who had been "Preudens" of thus movement, Kartelagawa, stated to the writer that the iden for st was that of Colonel Santoso, political ad Dutch army intelligence (NEFIs) He sasd he knew nothing of the movement hamself until two days after it had been started ** Ap parently the movement was a sort of trial balloon launched in order to determime the prospects for weaning the dominantly Sundanese population of West Java away from the Republie by holdang out to them the prospect of forming their oun separate state. As Wolf observes, "the whole 'movement" wat a farce from start to finish~ ** For the Sundanese it was an object of derision and dad not weaken their support of the Republic.

Following their multary occupation of most of West Jasa, the Dutch had embarked upon a new course of action also onterpreted by Republicans as calculated to establish a Sundanese regime amenable to Netherlands control Berween October 15 and 19, a917 the First West Java Conference was convened by the Dutch Recombs (Government Commasoner for Adminstrative Aflasrs) of West Java at Bandung It was attended by forty five Indonesans, all of whom had been appointed by the Dutch authorities The Recomba called upon them to discuss an agenda containing, among others. the following pointt "the quickest way for the population of West Jasa to partscipate in government" and "the way in which West Java could participate notw in the central adminostration and in the estabfishment of the United States of Indoneta." " The conference obliged by resolving to "establnh a contact commusion to request che authorities to call a Second West Java Con ference of representatnes of groups of the populatson and all parts of West Java in onder to bring about the establishment of a prossional goserning ceganmration of West Java on a democratic bass"

A Second West Java Conference was called by the Recomba to implement thas resolution and met from December 15 to 20, t917. The Dutch appointed all of the 151 delegates (11s Indeneuans, 18 Chinese, 16 Netherlanders, 8 Arabs) ** One of the bolder delegates appointed by the Dutch voiced during the meeting the feelings of many of his Indonesian colleagues, stating that the conference "did not represent the mapority of the people," that it was "not democratie." and that the majonty of representatves were "government oficzals" of the Netherlands Indies admanistratson *" However, the mazoraty of the apponares obliged the Duteh by possung a resolution calling lor the convocation of a Thurd Wesu Java Conferenee which was to establish a provissonal government and repeesentatve asembly for a state of West Java "

Though Republican leaders had atwamed that the terms of the Renville Agreement prechuded the calling of such a conference, it soon cation on February z4. sg48 In vain, the Republican government peorested to the Dutch and the Good Offices Commsttee that wach action was a voolation of those terms of the Agreement concerning the promised U N supervsed plebscite " The minumum of ux months of "uncoerced and free discusmon" and "freedom of assembly, speech. and puhlication" was, as they pointed out, hardly compatible with a one-month period under Dutch martual law wherein such conditions were not allowed

The refusal of the Dutch to live up to these terms of the agreement was highlighted by their prompt suppresuon of the Repuhlicanspomored Plebseite Movement. Thas movement had been organzed by Repablicans on February t. sgçß, to express the Republican point of voew an accordance wuh the above mentioned terms of the Renville Agreement in the areas the Dutch had overrun, The Comatitution of the Plebueite Movement was as follons

Artede =A Working Contmittee has been forned called the Plebtscte Mosemens of the Repuhlae of Indoneua and hasing its seat and head ofite at Jakarta

Artcle n-Tha movement bas as es objectise (a) To mmpress upen the populauon of the occupeed arele the sigtafcance and purpote of the plebisote, (b) To impress upon the prople the importance af chomung and defending the Republit of Indoneua in x plehacioe Tha objectire shalt be resched by all legal mezra

Artule m-The arganuation of this movemem in as foltows (a) Bourd of Mamapemere, (b) members

Artle a—The Boand of Management of this Movement comata of (a) The Bound (b) Councl of Repesentatoves of the Board, (c) Cadre of the Board.

. Arnele o—Membenbip of this movement a open to all adelt rmoen and omen

toont, (b) Donatons and fends abtuned legally

Arnde sn—Tha movement shall be dasolved ummedrately upen the cootpletion of the plebscite

NUN, 5/20 p 5

CL U.P dupach trom Bauma Te 14. 19

On Febeuary 15. Mr. Ah Budhardjo, Chairman of the Plebiteite Movement was summoned by the Attorney General for the Dutch Indies administratioe, Dr. Felderhof, and told that the movement was "premature" Felderhol's reatoning was in terms of what had now become the Dutth interpretation of the Rensille Agreement, an in terpretation drametrucally opposed to that held by the Republic when it ugned the Agreement and lkesise opposed to that held by the Good Oßces Commottee and communocated by at to the Republican leaders n the Kalurang converatsons that immediately preceded their segnature This Dutch interpretatson was that the emvsaged plebiscite was to be held not sex months to a year after the Remille Agreement, but sx months after a final political agreement between the Dutch and the Republie, reached according to the terms of the Renvalle Agreement Before thos hypothetical future date, Felderhof insisted, nesther the Dutch nor the Republicans were empowered to take any steps toward preparing for a plebuncite The Republican government protested this interpretation and the suppression of the Plebuscite Mosement to both the Dutch and the Committee," but without eflect.

Dutch oficals and the Dutch controlled press and radio, however, waged a powerful and unrestricted campaign to bring the population of West Java to support the Thord West Java Conference and form a separate state of West Jasa The conference was to convene on February r5, 1918 and consist of 1oo delegates Forty seven of this number were appointed by the Dutch-twenty-tho Indonesians, tuelve Dutch. tone Chinese and four Arats" Fifty three were to be elected, all of whom were to be Indonesians, in elections starting on January s5. In reporting on these elections at the request of the Committee of Good Offices, the Dutch stated that announcements of the elections were made between Janmary 1o and 15 However, the Republican delegation claimed to have heard about them only two days before, on Jaruary s3 " Moreover, the amportance of these elections was not made clear; there was no indication that these one hundred delegates would serve as the prov isional government of a state of West Java.

uct Ur, dupatch from Batasia Feb n9 1918

U N, 5/pts. "Repent en Politcal Deselopments in Westerm Jasa", pp 5-6 t Ia signlat that the leadng Arab soial engimuationt framed a penm tesolution which they sent to the West Jina Conferenet in whach they refused to teeghue these Arala as thele pepresestaties Ot the ia Durch apposnted, nene wm a member of the Progresmse Concentration, a group entcal of Netherlands pehey in Infonesia an jbid, pp 5.7.

Not only were these elections rushed through with short potice but also they were held under conditions which ruled out the basic civl libertoes generally asuociated wich democratic electoral processes. Freedom of the pres did not exust, and most publications and all radio facilities in the area were in Dutch hands. The state of war and siege ("staat van oorlog en beleg") still amposed by the Netherlands adminis traton prohaboied pubhe meetungs and allowed prvate poltical meetangs only after five days' notice of such a meeting had been given Appeoval for such prrease meetings had then to be given by the Dutch Assstant Reudent, and the police had the right, which they frequenely exercised, to attend Not only were meetings of the Republican Plebiscte Movement forbidden, but meetings of Republican poltical parties were also forbidden "

The fifty three elected representatives to the conference were to repeesent she fifteen regenczes of West Jasa over which the Dutch claimed control, each regeney hasing three or five delegates depending upon its population ** The Netherlands Delegation stated to the Committe of Good Offices that no attempt had been made to carry out elections in Jakarta, a regency which was allotted five delegates ei Alho they informed the Committere that they were unable to obtain election statisties from four other regencses " This plus the fact that the Netherlands Delegation presented to the Commuttee letters from the heads of several regencies statang that "owing to the disruptrons of administration and commucation, a had proved mpoble to hold eleos in many areas," " gives support to the Republican assertion that the delegates of these four other regencses were actually appointed and not elected Thus at least fise and sery postubly Irom seventeen to thenty one of those delegates officially deugnated as "elected" were actually appounted Moreover, two of the delegates elected "were ex cluded from takung part in the conference by the Netherlands authorithes " " This would mean that possibly as few as thorty of the ninetyeight delegates to the conference had any claim to an "elected* status

How ever, even an those areas where an attempt acveally was made to carry out the electoral procem, its character freqoently took on authers tarian overtones Elections were held in three stages Firnt an oral voce in the village selected a delegate to the second stage, that ot the

Ses UV, 5/10g, pp 6.1 "Ihd, p a "Jht, p §

te Jd p s One had bean impruused dor esbetemest (a dpualdaton under dhe clecoan rulen) and the oiher wa excudid tecaoe of suspiion that he had memtind modemeanon Hovever, chargem agast hom were later dusibeed dutrict. In each diurict the delegates from the villages were to choose three of their numbers to go on to the third stage of the election, that of the regency. There the district delegates chose by secret ballot from three to five of their members to represent the regeney in the West Java Conference " Houever, as the Committee of Good Ofices noted "For a variety of reasons, including the abience from their homes of numbers of the populatson who had removed to the mountains at the time of the action by Netherlands forces six months before, st was necestary in a number of cases for the elector to be . , elected by a reduced electorate or appointed by the Lurah (sallage chief) "

The Thard West Java Conference met in Bandung from February z3 to March 5. 1g18, without representatnes or obiervers from esther the Repablic or the Good Offices Commsttee Mr Ali Budiardjo, chaurman of the Pleboscite Mosement, attempted to attend but was forced by the Dutch police to leave Bandung Giving as ats reason "lack of staff," the Committee sent no observer to the conference," and its respome to the Security Council's request of February s8 for a report on political developments in western Java conusted of merely transmitting to the Secursty Council a report based only on secondhand information submitted to it by the tho interested parties, the Republic and the Netherlandt. The lactor of ume, it stated, made it imposible to address questions to the West Java Conference itself."

Despite the semi-controlled manner of the elections and the policeridden atmosphere of Bandung. most of that minority of the delegates who had won their places through the electoral procets set up by the Dutch, as well as several of those Indonesian delegates who had been appointed directly, made clear from the outset their pro-Republican feelings. Twenty seven of them did so unequivocally, and thirty-five had courage enough to oppose the formatson of a West Jasa state. How ever, the steam roller methods by which the Dutch ran the conference gave them little chance to be heard. Soejoso, leader of the pro-Republican factuon, introduced a motion that the conference, and not the chaurman (Dutch appeinted), alone had the righs to determine its agenda. The motion was pamed, but twhen on the next day (February sd) Soejoso moved to change the agenda so that the pros and cons of establishing a stase of West Java could be dseussed, the chaurman adjourned the conference, and an informal meeting was held between hum and several other appointed members and the leaders of the pro Republican faeton As a result a compromse was eßeeted whereby it was agreed that the conference would vote an a resolution calling upon the Netheslands Indies government to transfort the conierence into a "Pro vosonal Repeesentatire Body" of a ' Provuonal Government" but that "the status of West Java" was "to be determined by a plebncite as re ferred to in the Renville Agreement "

However, the following day, the chairman read to the conference a letter from the Netherlands Indies governmental agent in West Jasa (the Recombs) stating that the State of West Java was already in the process of being created. He went on to say that West Java had already been recognazed as a state by the Netherlands Indies government and in consequence withdrew his agreement to the compeonmise motion he had sugned the peevsous day. Soejoso promptly sought to prooest the chaurman's ruheng, but was grven no epportunity. He then urged that the conference undertake a general discussion of che future status of West Java and aho urged adopcron of the previously agreed compromie proponal The chasrman allowed neither general discusuon nor consderation of the compromse proposal."

Finally on the same day, wath a vote of sixty two in favor and tharey five agasnst, a resolutson was pased expresung the delegates desare that the conference be transiormed snto "a provnional representative auemhly of West Java" and that aa such they draw up a constitution Ior such a state and in accordance wth it "establah a provisional government of West Java " * The final phrase of the oraginally agreed compromse solutson that "the status of West Java as to be determined by a plebiscite as referred to an the Renville Agreement" was conspicuoualy mumung. Promptly on the following day, Februsry s6, the Netherlands Indies government approved the resolution," Thus was boan the Sane of Wet Java, ot "Parandan" ta at tame to be calied.

Increasing indications that the Dutch were undertakng unilaterally and withont reference to the Good Offices Commsttee to create a central federal government for the envisaged Unsted States of Indonesia added to the alarm thst Republicans felt over the rapod establishment of Dotch sponsored states in areas whuch prevons to the milstary actaen had been adminestered by the Republe ** Such a move was seen as the logical corollary to the formation of Dutch controlled member states of the federation The comlsned maneuver spelled for Republicans a thunly disgused, centralzed Duteh control belund a façade of decentralured papuer miche puppet regomes

In lis fiest pobry statement before the Working Commattee of the Republican parlsoment on February 1. Hatta mide t clear that the Republe not only was peepured to jon an unterom federal government of the projected Unted Srates of Indontsr, bat also thot at was prepared to relitqush a number of ats potets to such a government However, the Republic's proposal was smmedately torned down by the Dutch. A letter from Van Mook to Hatta stated tht the Republie could not be adosstted anro any such government until after a final peliteal agreement had been negotrated between it and the Netherlands"

The Dutch then proceeded uath their plans to organire such a government unilaterally and without the Republhe as a constituent element. On March g Van Mook announced the establishment ol such an interim federal government wluch was to funetion uentel the establishment of a Unted States of Indonesia ** Thus new government represtnted no real change in the poner structure ol Dutch controlled Indonena It was merely the old Netherlands Indies regime in new dress and was run by the personnel of the colonial regime wth a few anti-Republocan Indontuans included to present a better façade.a" Certainly there uas lstle laus for claiming that at was a step towards Indonessan self government.

Though formally the Repullic was inssted to join in this government, the Dutch sull attached the same pror conditsion, negotlation of a final polstcal agreement between the Duich and the Republic. The Republican leaders smmediately challenged this cart beforethehorse procedure and lodged a formal protest tath the Good Offices Commitoee, charging the Dutch woth acting "contrary to the letter and spent of the Remville Agreement," and pounting out that according to the Agreement, "The two governments undertook to cooperate in the political settlement sncloding the formation of a pros uonal federal government "**

Equally duquieting to the many Republicans who had plaerd thest latth in the Renville Agreement was the federal conference called by the Dutch at Bindung for May r7 and lasting nearly two months Several members of the Good Offices Commuttee as well as the Repub- Iscans found it dficult to reconcile the Dutch contention that ths conference was merely "consultative" wth Vam Mook's opening address to is Dutch selected delegates at Bandung "But it did not seem pos uble to contunue wasting for the moment when the Republhe would join us the peoblems we have to deal with are too urgent and of too great xmportance to all of us to postpone this conference any longer." For Republicans this seemed to underine and gve top-level sanction to the statement made ten days peeviously by the chairman of the Netherlands Delegution

The further expamuon of the federation goes on Even if the Repahlc entendh shat a federation wathout is portuopation in an tmpoublty, the federal ats are of exactdy the opposste opotion They cotasder a federaton withoet the Repable an no vay an imponublaty **

The Repub!hcan government protested the holdeng of this canference and called upon the Good Ofices Committee to submit a report on it to the Seconty Couneil. This was done, but agan the report had as its basa nothing more than the formal documenes relating to the

non Report to the Secuty Counail on the Federal Canlerenet Opened in Bandang on ay May rg." pp m-sy J Foner Collins noret that mach sasenenas haghtmel the impremuen thas "The Netherlands was proceedng tnlatmally wth the ten- Xorawage (Dusch lamgusge Brtass nesspaper), May a8, g8, quased in U 8/5p p 11 conference and the conflicting interpretations of the two delegations. The report elicited no responte from the Securnty Council.

BREAKDOWN OF NEGOTIATIONS

At the same time that the Dutch were unslaterally attempting to shape the fuure of Indonesua along their own lones, and while they were maintarning the umpossibility of allowng the Republit to partake in tht proces unul after a final agreement between it and the Netherlands had been reached, they appeared to the American and Australian members of the Good Offices Committee as well as to the Republicans to be cemmoted to a policy of making any such agreement smposuble unless based on their own teruns

The Dutch, within the limits of thesr oun approach and their own imterpretation of the Rentelle Agreement, had dhesr grievances also The Republic's continued expanson of att foreign relations was, they insisted, in vaolation of the serms agreed (The Republic's interpretation of them, as buttressed by Dr Graham s "you are what you are" clarification of the Renville prnciples at Kalurang, was that there was nothing in the agreement contrary to such action.) More generally the Dutch snsted chat politocal negottations could not be held unless the Renville truce was stractly observed. Both the Dutch and the Republic continually accused each other of responsubility for the Irequent Jotalzed, small scale clashes that occurred along the Van Mook line, or atatus quo line as it came generally to be called. Responntbality for these ineidents lay wth both parties: it is difficult to say who was to blame for most of them. However, there is no doubt that Republican officers were responuble for a comsiderable number of them, particularly in the area to the west of Surakarta.

The negotatons between the two parties under the auspices of the Good Offices Committee soon bogged down with conflicting actusations as to respontibilaty for truce vuolations and particularly with conflicting interpretations of the Renville Agreement whoch made the prospect for reaching any setlement hopefess In general the American and Australan members of the committee were umpressed wth the co-operative spirst and willingness to compromose evadenced by the Republican Delegation, as contrasted with what seemed to them to be a nonco-operative and uncomptomising attitude on the part of the Dutch. Likewise they felt that the Republscan interpretation of the Renville principles was much more closely congruent to both their 1 UN, 8/84t letter and sptrit than that given by the Dutch. Repeated cables by the Commuttee to the Security Council emphasizing that the impase could only te resolhed by the Council's intervention trought no response.

In oeder to tresk the deadlock the American and Ausralian mem bers of the Commuttee themsehes then took the anotuative and drafted a careful and realistic set of compromuse propotals for the sestlement of the depute These principles, known as the Dußoit-Critchley Plan were vobmuted prsately to both she Dutch and Indonesian Delegatrots on June so, sgg%. Graham gnes a good summary of the plan:

One or rore electos an propomon to the populaton were to te eleced fromt all d + saDest adrunutratne enrts througout Iedyneua. Thev dhovn eleciors would then prt topetbes on tdhe mext higbrst admunatratse level and el ds ao te Cnt A wa wesd te bo e pro varnal tzrlause avetéy and te constitutrenal comvemton.

T7 is pronzirstal parluraent (i) would, on the baus of grography, ethtopre phs, hatsry, tradton, and anumem of peoples, d-lieease the suates of dhe new Uned sars of fodmesa, (t) would elect t- Preudent wbo would ap pomt the Pre- Viniter who would, un tum, form a Cabuoet repomb to thproevomal parlum-ne, (g) and would have full powers of elfgmen mont indudinz d - corr-and of all Infoneuan armed foeces The Nethe Lands High Coromronsr would retain certast seto nghts and have powt ts dedaran erergence in a smuatom bevond thcmrol ol t peoniton rvemrent, on wtoch cae be would hane the power to cosrand dhe ame oeces

The Comu Ad, as te prnnrnal patamm, wod wuh de Net -rlandt, fram a statute of dhe NetherlandIndoneuan Unon which would saf-gurd I-ptrate conomer, eulturat, and rultary snterets of ead coustry m the obet and proade the frammeark tot onperaten of the tes rrertrvats in all fids of coamon amerest. As the cosstrutronal corsen trom, de Consttuent Asently woud wete the Conuestron of the Unaed States of Indoneua. Wben che consocution and the statates of the unson be raufed, dhe Neth-rlands would trander gneresgmy to the Unntel Sutes o ndmrua.*a

Although the Repullic agreed to accept the princsples of the plan fot negotuations, the Dutch flatdy rejected it refuing even to diseuss it and charging the Ameican and Australuan members of the commsttee with versteppinz thesr puthorsty.“" However, the reasonableness of the propoals was of such a nature tat dumissal of them on thear ments one would lane been extremely awkward for the Dutch. Presumably to escape the accusatson of lavang done so, the Datch resorted to a remarkable expedrent. On June 16, wath self righteous undignation they heoke aff the U.N.sponsored negotiatsons with the Republie becaute of leakage of the confidential contents of the Dullos Critehley plan to Daniel Schorr, correspondent of Ttme magatne The Dutch in Ratavea unofically antimated that Coert Dullors, chuef American delegate of the Commattee of Good Offites, had deliberately leaked the contents DuBons categorically demed that either he or any member of the American delegatson had done so, and the body of foreign correspondents un Batatua stood ready to back hum up n thus assertron Time did not print Schorr's story covering the contents of the plan The fact that it had not yet printed Schor's story when the Dutch broke off negotiations "in ssew of the publiratun of the strsctly con fidential document "e" aroused the suspicsons of many However, most pesons dumosed thes ancongruny, an dud Tame, as meaning only that Dutch authorsties were "snooping unto corvespondents outgoing cablegrams " *r Though it was kept secret for a long tame, the actual fact of the matter as known to the top foreign correspondents in leaked this story to Schorr themmelves.

On June az the Dutch agreed to revume negotations. However. when at the first meeting of the partaes on the following day the Republican Delegation called for ducusion of the Dullots Critchley proposals, the Dutch categorically refused and returned all thesr copues of the plan to the Good Offices Commattee ** An impase agton resulted. Because of tus and because of a series of callegrams dispatched by the Committee to the Securaty Council emphaunng clearly its impotence to halt the deserioration of the situation, it was the expectation of both the Amerscan and Australian members of the Commottee and of the Republican Delegation that the Secursty Council would take the posutve action meotstary to resolve the umpasse. Thos expectation was disappointed On July t the Securaty Council agan delased the Indonesian question, and a Chunese motton was made that the Council study the Dulois Crtchley proposals. However, the Unrted States refused to support this motion and it was defeated.'s The departure home of Dußos the following day was interpresed by Indoneslans as meaming his recall and seen as further proof of the United Stares repudiation of the DuBos Critchley proposalt. To the Republican leaders this all spelled the definite withdrawal of the United States from any posuuve amocation with the Renville Agreement. They were now completely disillusoned wath the expectation that had prompted them to sign the Agreement, namely, that fulfillment of its bestt provisions would be underwntten by the United States.

THE DUTCH BLOCKADE

In the words of one member of the Good Offices Committee. "This faslure of the Securaty Council to act at a decisive moment gave the Nethertands speciat opportuntues They maintauned their preswure on the Republic and made every effort to sow seeds of dusenuon and create difficultres for at " a The politucal pressure applied by the Dutch agaunst the Republhe was matched by thear economic pressure. As atother member of the Committee, De. Graham, noted:

Teme worked beavly agunu the weaker govesmment. In the summary tecord of regotatons woth the Republie, or lack of negotations .. a revraled a Doch polsey pauern of delay and snnoon The Netheslands Government esed the polity of delay to carry on what the Republie conadered a prograra of econorut strangolauon snstead of the opening of trade as provided for it the agreement1

The "export umport controls" establabed by the Dutch were a mere euphemism for what in effect was a blockade of the Republican ares whoch almost completely closed off trade with areas ouuside. As the Commsnee of Good Offices noted, the several agreements "in principle" entered into by the Dutch to open up this trade were in general never amplemented **

n UN. Secerity Cruncl, Ogeet Breand, gt yr, na p: (Jtty 1, sal, pp 14 Se Thone in favor (ncladel Cinida, China, Colombn, Syeia, Ukstone, and U'SSR Thone abraztiag vere Ageeona, Belgrim. Frare. Ussted Kongéom, and the Unted Stanm

Accaally PeBed was not recalted, brut rerermed heme becaure of crtacat sllses It sheutd be nated that he immedace taemer, Chaelion Ogbsen, had bem hot depety and wan s strong praponent of (he Dalos Crituhley propotals

it Sused in è convenation wuh the wrage

Graham, ap of, p ygal

Te The Coummee ntared in its callegram of Jame at, igi, to the Semmy Coun ol. "Alébeegh impottant agreemeenta fer she stmumptuon ef nooral tuade and coen meste bevem wensones sndet the cnstrel of the Repablic and thone ouin

To undestand the significance of this Dutch blockade it must be realized that the truncated area of Java left to the Republic under the terms of the Renvalle Agreement was a deficit food area which in normal tumes imported connderable food from the surplus rice and maize areas now shut off by the Dutch. Into it had streamed nearly a milloon refugees from the areas overrun by the Dutch army. Whereas per capota production of rice for the whole of Jasa and Madura in 1gpo had been 81 kalograms and that of maize 11 kilos, the corresponding figures for the area of Java controlled by the Republie in 1918 were estimated at 6o and g5 kilos respectuvely

The supply of textules became even more critically short. Upon artval in the Republican area in \ugust, s918, the writer wat struck by the large proportion of both the rural and urban population laterally drested an rags or in gunny sacks '* The average yearly consumption of textules for the area of Java controlled by the Republie was com puted as being about gyn,ooo,ooe mesers in the years just previous to the Japanese invason, of which over 3yo,ooo,ooo had been amported From the end of July until the end of December, s917, the total of such imports was computed as being only slightly over 15,oo0,000 meters."

The acute shortage of these basic necessties generated an inflationary problem of the most serious proportions which the government. handicapped even by shortage ef the proper facilsties for printing money, found imposible to keep within manageable proportions

The potential ampact of this inffation upon political astitudes within the Republic can be judged froen Table s, showing market prices of the key Indonestan foods

Tadle 1) Avinact pWics Is RLotats PeA KILo tn canes MARKET CESTERS OF REPUOLICAY CONTRaLLED JAVA *

Figures for the montha et Ang ngg? and Ang vgp8, were supplied the wser by katlan A Tahur and hn saff at she Monotry of Eeonosece Affaos. Jogakmi. Nov sggs The fgores fer Apol and Juse ag1º are computel fren Egunm ppeat raz in Sente Prrekssemee (ecal pubocatan of the Virastry ef Foeeomtc Aflim) June og18, p 01 and Ang 9p p 158

These figures take on added sugrificance when it is realred that the average dasly wage of a nonagranan laborer in the Republie an August, 1918, was from 15 to a5 ruprahs per day Though beginning in March. 928, ervil servants and army personnel were given rice allotments of so kilos each plus s for each dependent, whuch they could purchase from the government at sotnewhat belote the market level, they fre quently sußered moee than nonagrarzan labor The government fixed monthly salazy for loser class caevl servanes ranged unly from to to 16o ruptahs per month, for muddle rank cul servane; the range tras from g to g8o rupuahs, and for the upper rank bracket from v75 to 70o rupsahs

Civil servants who no longer had posesuom whuch they could sell to supplement these ncomes very frequently had to accept the fact that ther families would remaan undernourished A large propartion of them, partucularly in the capota! of Jogjukarta, were tn thus category Thousands, particularly those from West Java, had fled ahead of ad vancing Dutch troops with only those possessons they could catry wih them Their lot was particularty band and the suffenng they

Tigures here ered were also mapplaed by the Depamment of Eronortsc Afturs With supert to nue alloteeea ste aho Sasbin, 'Dua Tahun Oeang Republr, V," Sthup, Apol ns sges endured often heroie. Very quickly they had sold all but the barest necessities in order to buy food supplementing that purchatable with their salaries Though the Preudent of the Supeeme Court, Koesoemah Atmadja, earmed the top evil ser-ice salary of poo rupuahs per month. ene of has chuldren began to go blind because of the dietary deficiency arsing from the father s smalolity to buy enough proper food for his famals He was one of those many unfortunate Sundanese from West Jasa who had been forced to flee precopitounly leasing almost all his posestom behind

The Dutch blockade umpunged sharpls on other sensitve poonts It was almost empouuble to get medicane and surgical equrpment through to hosprtals and clinucs in the Republican area Many idlnesses could not be treated," and even such bauc thungs as landages were uttually unobtartable " The blockade extended even to udeas Mail service wth the outside was cut off There was no regular means for brunging in books or petsoditals and as a result the strongls subuduzed Com munnt news organs an such citses as Jogjakarta and Madoun were able to propagate their sdeas wsthout the necessty of overcoming the antidote of more objective material from outtude Indonesuz The serousness of this blockade of adeas is expressed in the following excerpt from a letter from Bsfhop Soegiopranoto, leader of the Catholae communaty in the Republie, to the editors of Commonu esl magaane. Though wretten shortly after the suppression of the Communist rebellhon, it desertbes sery well the sumilar condatsons that preceded it.

The appeal of Communnt sdeas remains strong so Iong as she Dutch blockade uas chey snsenuvely now do—lettang no food, no cloth no mail, no books, no magannes, no adeas an to us frem the outsude Your miganne has begun to let adeas an to us—not jost about whut is really happening outside. Iike nes More stmportantly it goes us to know that it is not just the Communists

As of Oct q. sgt there were on hand far the z,poo,pos people of Reputhian enstrolled centzal and eau Java exactly fo sollathanne got s fatsrole, go codein. and ig nosocain adreselin tatlets (figures from the Indoneuan Red Cron at Jog păarta, Des. . se. throngh ss headquarters were depesed all medcal supples to all hosptala and army mndical unstsy De Yap Jaas limous Chunese eye spe malat, had hs eye chese anoss the street from where the wnter Ined in Joggakarta The wniter tecalls veadly trameroun converatons wyt thn veeratle mas whenec be pathetealy bemouned the fact that for the lack of a few ountes of à tertash vitamn catcemtrate whach he eosld net impéet because of the Duich llockade seures of has patenta were neelleuly goung lánd

The weiter can testify penonally to the sreffectvenes of the seelond banana leas whac the Republican medcal authostes attempted to use as aubstituies fot cotton bardages who like social gentce It gises us to know that Amencans also want this and that thay want protectnn of the sndnadual and to allow for his development too We hope, too, to find that shey want these thongs and freedom for coloncal people too Please cottmue to send us The Commontwesl so we are not closed off from the ousude*

Thus throughout the spring and summer of 1g18 the charater of Indonesian nationalum was subjected to a powerful political and eco nomic conditioning The violation of the Rensille Agreement by the Dutch, the refusal of the Secursty Council even to note these violations. and in porticular the faslure of the American government (shich most Indonesians saw as dominatung Secunty Council decuom) to honor what Indoneuans consdered to be its promose to oversee the implementation of the Renville principles, were extremely dulfluuoning and embottering to Indoneuans To what end had they agreed to Dutch occupation of the nchest areas of the Republic, to the arbitrary Van Mook fine, and the withdrawal of their own troops from behund Dutch lines' The great qood pro quo which they had counsed on for having made these concessions-freedon of expresuon and polstical associa tron in the terrstories overrun by the Dusch, followed by U.N. supervned plebiscites—had failed to matersalire Instead they saw the Dutch cavaheriy proceeding wath the unslateral erection of their own puppet states in these conoested areas, quite obviously with the antentaon of creating a federal Indoneuan structure amenable to their own control

The refusal of the Unoted States, the power which had anduced the Indonesins to ugn the Renville Agreement and which they had counted upon so insure sts implementation, to contest these actions of the Dutch generated a mounting disillutsonment with America among Indoneuans, who increasingly tended to view the Unsted States as the covert ally of the Dutch America, they felt, was aho gring direct asd to the Dutch through sts powerful backung of the Netherlands* economy The S3o6,ooo,ooo in Marshall Plan aid granted the Dutch in the spring of 1918, wth the provusion that $84,ooo,ooo of ths amount could be used by the Netherlanda adminutration in Indonesia, was for many Indoneuans added proof of ther conviction that the United States stood aligned wath the Dutch and agaunst the Republhe of In doneua

an Prated aa Casunasweal, Dee gi, s p yos The woer fount meats far bavong ths maganre and hruted soerten of athar Amencan and Butah putica teans went shroogh the blockade

These conditions were not alone in aggravating the frustration of Indonesian hopes for national indtpendence. It was Ikewise increased by the progressively harsh material conditsons experienced by the urban elements, the principal leaders and organizers of the revolutionary effort. Indeed, for many of them there was a tendency to link their sufferingt in the material sphere and the pychological sphere with what they conceved to be the pro Dutch policies of the United States and the Western Furopean members of the United Nations.

Thus it is perhaps understandable why some of the officals of the Netherlands Indies admunistration confidently expected that these factors would soon bring about the collapse of the Republie without the necessity for any further Dutch military effort It is also understandable how many Indomesan Communist leaders, esaluating the same factors, concluded that condstrons were becoming increasungly propitious for an attempt to overthrow the Republican government and seze power an sts place They could not help but develop hopes for popular backing in a situstion where the Republican government appeared to many to have sacrificed the interests of the nation by an apparently unwarranted and dnastrous faith in the Unsted States, and in which Sovet Rustia consistently appeared to champion the cause of the Republbe against the Dutch.

The Internal Struggle for Power from Renville through the Communist Rebellion

THROUGHOUT ig17 the Jraders of the PKI (Indoneuan Communst Party) and those umproclamed Conmunsts who had joned the Socialnt and Laber partaes and the Pesundo appeared to follote polaces determared choef, by what best aenved theer ewn political advancement rather than what a conscientious Stalinnt mught hane conmidered would have best served the Kremhen Beginning only at the end of *917 dad their atutodes commence to show any significant increast towards conformity wuth Moscow policy, and not untol early March. 1g18, did this ancrease become substantial No approximation of real congrunty was reached until August, 1g48

There were tho principal reasons fee thes ancreasingly orthodox Stalunst orentation. In the first place, the actuons of the Unuted Statem in the Netherlands Indoneslan dupute were more and more anterpreted by Indonesans to be defintely partnan and in favor, of the Dutch Remalle Agrrement of January 17. 1918 This mounting conviction beought many Indoneians, non Communsts as well as Communists, to the conclusion that the force of Indoneuan nationalism alone was not sufficiently strong to wun independence for theur country Belheving that ene of the tno great powen was backang the Dutch, many felt they had no alternative but to tie themselves more closely to the other great power. Though not uyually joining it, more and more Indoneuans began to look to the PKI for leadership. The tendency grete, both among the memberslup of the PKI* and among ats larger and rapodly growng fringe element, to take seriousty the kremlin's clarm that genuine independence for colonial areas could never be won untd the United States and its Western allies were domunated by Russia Increasingly the follotwers of the PKI and the monority of Commtanists wathan the Socialist and Labor parties and the Pesundo were ready to believe that the "narron course of natiunalism" had to be abandoned in favor of a long term struggle between the Communist and non Communist worlds, a struggle in whuch the role of the Indo neuan Communst Party was to conform to the dictates of Moscon's world twude policy rather thun to what mught be deemed the immedaate unterests of Indonesian nationalnts.

The second principal reason for this change in orientation dovetailed snugly wth the fiest Withun the PkI stself st may well have been the more potent of the two This was the revolt of the second echelon of the party leadershup agaanst the policses formulated by and being pursued by their top leaders For actually the policies of the PKI during the last quarter of 1g17 and the frst two months of t918 desrated very far from the erthodox Stalinast line then being laid down an Moscon and by the Comunform. It is umpossible to tell whether the top PKI leadershup knew the content of the Zhdanos report to the first meeting of the Cominform. But certainly at was many months before the PKI showed any signs of reacting to and changang its policzes in conlormity with the new anternational line for Communists whuch was laid down at the end of September, s917.* Despite the general strkes launched on November 12 an Italy and November 18 an France—the clearest indication of a major change in anternational Communist policy— there was no indication during the next three months of any change in PKI policy.

In February, 1928, however, the young, second-echelon Indoneuan

Areardng to Mohammad Hata, Prome Monoier and Vace Pressdent of the Republe, actal membenhop of the PkI in md tgu did not exored aooo (tatement to the witet, Jogalarta, Ort. p. spt) Areording to Sunpno, a member of the Pulabureau el the Pkl, sta membenhup amounted to enly agoo in Java and yoo in Sumatrh He stated it wat a matter of pelity to restnet actual membership to an elte ef cunsenced and relable Stalimsts (estement to the wnter, Joguzharia, Sept. 3.191]

*The new program emphanted the dumon of the world isto two bloet—the "aggresine capitalot" bloe led by the Us and the "demooraic" bloc led by Rumsh -and called upen all Communant Parmes to wredk the Marshall Plan.

Communust leaders attending the Calcutta conferences met delegates from the Sovet Asian republies* They learned the new Communist Lane with its davided world basa and its anti-Marshall Plan emphasit, a line which their leaders an Indonesia had not been following. They returned to Indonesia as bearers of the true gospel and as ideologotal experts, and they demanded conformity with the new line. Their demand was reinforced by Indonesian delegases returning to Indonessa early in the summer from the Conference of the World Federaton of Trade Unmons and the International Youth Conference at Prague The older top leadership of the party had no alternative but to adopt the policues commumicated to ins subcedinates at Calcutta. Refural would undoubtedly have led to a serious challenge to ats poution of ascendancy wothin the party Even so, many of its members lost prestige and influence to the younger, second echelon leaders

During the latter half of ag47, theve had been developing a growing splet wathin the Socialst Party between the faction led by Sjarafudden and the smaller group led by Spalnr. Spahenr's group was becoming uncreasingly antagonmzed by the grotong emphases of the larger group upon class warfare and aligemens with Rusua In December, r947. Sjahrir wrote that Sjarfuddan would have to decide whether he was fiest a nationalist or first a Communise Sjahrir and most of his group felt then es they do now that applicatson of the Marxut doctrine of class warfare was absurd in the Indonesan communaty aunce there was practscally no Indonesian bourgeoise, that class in Indonesia being almost excluuvely made up of Dutch and Chinese. Secondly, they were strongly opposed to a policy of alignment with enther Russia or the United States. As between the great world powers and in the context of the cold war in particular, Indoneua must, they were and remain convinced, maantaun a "posctive neutrality." This meant no advance commotment to esther ande by Indonesta and the following of an andependent course best suited to her interests as governed by the internatiomal stuatuon at any given moment In addrtion "postive neutrality" was seen as the course whereby Indonena could offer its maximum contribution to the cause of woeld peace.

The splst between the two groups became dangerously wide in January, ag48, when Sjaheır's group epposed the Renville Agreement sponsored and approved by Sjarafuddin as Prume Minister, most of his cabinet, and the majority section of the Socalist Party. as well as by the Labor Party and Indonesian Communst Party. The splht became decisive soon after the establshment of Haua's presidential cabonet. Sjanfuddin's group withun the Socualist Party along with the other Sajap Kiri parues (PKI, Labor Parts, and Pesndo) demanded as a price of their support of Hatta at Prime Minaster four of the key mitstres wth the exprew stipalatson that Spufuddin continue on as Menater of Defense * The Masjumi and PN1 refused to particapate in the cabinet if this happened and ultomatels Hatta formed has cabunet without the Sajap kirt*

Thereupon the Sajap Kits went into oppostion aganst the Hatta government This actton was stronghs opposed bs the Spahrar faction, which, because of this and its other diflerences with the group led by Sjanfuddin, split off from the Socialit Parts (Partas Soualas) and the Sajap Kit coalition on Februar 15. s91, and formed ets own party, the Indonesian Socalst Parts (Partai Sotcals Indonesua) This new party * ammedrately pledged its support to Hatta's government. Thereupon control of the rump Socrilst Party passed to Sjarifuddin and hus amoclates, Tan Lang Djie and Abdulmadjid.'

Initally the only basis of the Sajap kurs oppostson was its demand that Hatta's peeudenual cabenet be replaced by one whose character was parliamentary. In such a cabinet it hoped to acquire a strong position. In its conference of February t, Spatfuddan's Socralist Party, still the central party of the Sajap Kirt, maintasned this position, making explieit that it contnued to approve the Renville principles and urged their implementation

At a masn meetung at Surakarta on Februasy ±6 the Sapap Kiri underwent a reorganaration and emerged as the Front Demokrasi Rakjat (People's Democratic Front) or "FDR" as it was popularly known The program then announced by Satsfuddan, chaieman of the new coa- Ittion, put more emphass upon the anterests of labor and the peasantry, but echerwse vas almost dentacal with the Sajap Kan program of Febroary 21 " Durang the course of the next two weeks, hovever, the program of the FDR wnderwent a basse change No longer could the members of its conststuent groupo—the Socalist Party. Labor Party, PkI, Pesindo—and the closely associated Indoneuan Federation of Trade Unions (SOBSI) be reckoned amongst the poltucal moderates. Their andiadual program and that of the FDR as a whote now called for repudiation of the Renville Agreement, cessation of all negotia uons wth the Dutch unul they wthdrew from Indonena, natsonaliza ton of Dutch and other foreign properties without compensation, and in general a program almost identical to that supported from the inception of the resolutson by the more stuongly nationalist group of Commonsts Ied by Tan Malaka and Sukarnm Yer the breach between the two groups remained, and there was no co-operation between them

The relatuons berween the FDR and the Hatta cabinet became pro gresuvely less frendly A second attempt by Hasta to snclede it in hs cabonet failed, the FDR leaders insnting as they had just presoously as members of the Sapap kars that they be given the domnant poutions wuthun it, choefly at the expense of the Masjumi

During the next us. months a struggle of mounting sntensity developed between the ΓDR, and the Hatta government The long term arm of the FDR vas domanatson of gomernmental poner If pouble at hoped to attan this through forcing the loquudation of Hatta's peesi dental cabinet and substituting a calinet of parbamentary character (reponsible directly to the KNIP and its agent the Working Com me) wheren it vould conrol the key mnatey of Defense and if possible that of Intemor as well However, during the course of thas struggle there developed a grtwing disposution upon the part of Sjanfuddin and other top leaders of the FDR to be prepared for all ee and eed be to pre te saln re ary lines

The FDR had ts.o ptintipal bases of strength. v.1thn the anmy, and among the ranks of labor In his capacity of Minister of Defense from July 3. 1917 to Janeary a8. 1918. Sjantuddin had managed to boild up a strong peruomal position wothun the army Hs power over appoint ments and the dsposition of funds hod secured ham the loyalty of a substamtal number of offcers an the regular army, the TNI He and a

* Anesrs, Feb st, 1g8 handful of his more tuunted followers were often the only ones who knew the location of the numerous arms and munitions caches being set up in mountarnous areas in antieipatson of further Dutch malitary action.

Even more smportant was the strong poution Sjarifuddin had bult himielf wuthin the army's prineopal auxuliary organaration, the TNI Masjarakat (People's TN) Ihos lud been estabinhed in early August, s917. shortly alter the begoning of the Dutch military action, for the purpose of orgimong popular defeme en a locat basus to sup plement the regular arms lt aluoebed the old Baro Perdjotangan (Struggle Bureau) wluch h=d been dedicated to ntegrating the many semm autonomous molitus nto the regular army The proces of ante gration was stopped and actually reversed un order to meet the needs of dupesed guerrilly tirtits necevary to fight the Datch eflectvely Top appontments to miny of the reconststuted Ladpars (semi autonomous milstsas) and all of thove an the rapodly burgeoning TNI Masjarakat were made by Sarzfuddin, and were largely men of lus choice and upon whon be had reason to believe he could depend The inany small muclet sent out from the headquarters of the TNI Masjarakat undertook to organize and train militarily the etenmunities to which they were asugned In addition they attempted to inculcate poltical ideas, adeas partscularly hostile to the Masjumm and wloch duting the first months of s918 became closer and cloier to the increasingly Communist line emerging in the FDR.

In addition, the FDR held a clearly dommant position within SOnsI," by far the largest labor organization in the Republie. Thit was baved upon both urlan and plantation laber within the Republic, and its membershup probably stood between goo,ooo and go,ooo" Houever, a comuderable proportion of thus membershup was relatively pasive wth respect to the oppoution of the FDR to the government, and some of ins conststuent unions were far from enthusiastic about this course.

A large mumber of the nearly s,ooo,ooo refugees who fled mto the Lamally Sonety's TNI

H Sentral Ogarvasi Bersh Scturu Indoneua—Ceszal Organuatitn of all In dasesun Laler The second lagest grtup of trade uns (much smalier la men Lentop than Sost), looked to Tan Malaka and hit zvoclates for lradedhép and operstnd pohtraly though the Partal Indonema Burah Merdeka headed by Samu lara Ddaya It claimed ty ono durt payng membery pa md tgpt See Sukrsne, Crnakan Revolani Rakpnt," Somet, Sepe S. rpA, for an atront af ths party shrunken area Jeft to the Republic from the areas overrun by the Dutch conssted of skilled and sems skilled labor which from the standpoint of the Republic's economy was redundant to the labor supply already exsting withun sts shrunken borders. Thus in the Republic's oil field and refinery at Tjepu there were avaslable more than twice as many qualified workers as there were jobs At the Republic's principal railroad shops in Madrun the proportion of skilled workers to jobs was even hogher No matter how snefficient the rato of workers to Jobs, all these workers had to be fed In addition there were at least soo,ooo excess troops in the Republic, men for whom the supply of arms and ammunituons was inadequate

To meet the crtical problems—economic, military, and polatical— arsung from this situation Hatta and hus cabunet ammedately embarked upon a ' Rationalization Program." With respect to thus Hatta stated in his address to the Working Committee of Parliament on February 16, 1918

That the revenues of the state do not cover expendstures ahould be no reason for wonder But the diferener can be narrowed by judscous ratonaliration, by teatafertang laber from unproductive work to productne fields of actovity The transler of labor wil not at once show a decrease an the sate's expenditures, the contrary may even be the eme un the beginnung, because the crea tion of produttre enterprues requrms peevuous preparation and nvestment to work on But once the preparations are completed, the peoductve labar will began to yaeld us profis and the income of the Sate will sncrease .. Expecrally in regard to our armed forces the rstionalratsont propect must be camed out along a determmed and clear cut ine, for an the armed forces there in an unssnranted use of manpower which cannot be peoductre an the feture If we do not begn racsonaligation soon the country will find stself an the grop of an enflation of such calamitous peoportsons as to be paralying

For every worker who has to be dummed as surplus personnel a new occuparion has to be provded that amures hum of a fair liong

Reorgazaton of te army cad for an micial demoblaon te ing sáo,ooo men Eventually it was hoped that this could be reduced to a final fgure of s7,ooo regular troops Ths well armed and welltrasned regular army, it was planned, would le prepared to operate at bantalion strength un a mobne, hard botong guerrilla war against the Dutch, should they again attack. The old "static defese" would be changed into a "mobile offemive system" of shifting pockets that could not be mopped up * Sapplementing this force of highly trained regulars would be a wude network of terratorial mulitias made up of the local peasintry, who would be called upon to devote purt of thesr time to military traning

Demobiliued soldiers were to be employed in creative actinaties In the initial stage of mobilization about soo ooo of those demobulized were to return to rural communities to practice agriculture The rest were to receive trasming un new jobs or rehabilitation to old skills under a program run by the newly anststuted Manostry of Youth and Recon struction " headed by the former youth leader, Supeno, a member of Spahrtr's new pirty In addition, thus Minastry was to transder surplus industtal workers from the jobs where they were not needed to jobs where theer skills would be productive and if necenary to new and different kinds of work

Finally the rationalization program was to extend to the sphere of governmental admunistration Surplus personnel uza to be drepped, and there was to be a general organsuatronal utegratson This was particularly necesssry in Sumatra, where the decentralized units of the Republican administration were almost completely autonomous Hatta's program called for organizing the residencies in Sumatra unto three provinces Each provunce was to have a lugh degree of autonomy from the central Republican government at Jogpkarta and real authority over its constituent reudencies. This program was carried out with partial sutress in the summer of s918*

For the FDR the Rationalzation Program had two prancipal consequences Once its pmplementation had got under way in early March, *918, it revulted un a gradual eronon of the base of the FDR's strength within the army. Though thus was slight doring the first few month, it became considerable once the program had begun to gan momentum As the peasant based terrntornal defense was orgamzed, the TNI

Masjarakat was liqusdated Also, as the regular army was reorganized. there was no certainey that key posstions would go to the offieers who had foemevly been sponsored by Sjarsfaddn

On the other hand, the discontent of many of the troops being demobilized was most frequently projected against the government, and often their tendeney was to took for lerdershup to the I'DR, whuch announced its vagorous opposstion to any demobilization of the army. Smilerly, in the frequent cases where sueplus laborers could not find jobs employıng their partueular skills and where the government was tandy, as at frequently was, an finding new jobs for them or where it found them jobs wuth less poy or presge vatue than they had held belore, the TDR often benefited Such persons, too, tended to hold the government responsible for thear plight and naturally gravitated towards its pomeapol eeganzed opposition Because of the wadespread desatisfaction amongst labor with the government's rationalsrtion program, the told of the FDR on SOtist became stroeger

Implementatuon of the government's rationalration program wothen the army not unnaeurally mes with resstance. For many efficers thus spelled a toss of prestige and power to which they coold ill adjest. Some uncerely belseved thar, quute apart from their personal interests. the program was a mustaken one and that, no matter how underequupped, multary unts should not be dabanded Lkeuise it wat drlßcult to pervuade soldiers of one umt that they were less well trauned tham thme of another, and that consequently they should dishand and yseld their atms to them. Morttver, many soldiers as well as ofieers sleted for demobluation were uneonvnced that the government would provede them wsth alternate occupatuons of a desirable chvracter

Certaunly the FDR could sot clarm that the early stages of the rationalization program discrmonoted against it Extept for the over all Iong range program of tramforming the TN1 Maspsrakat mto a locally- Iysed pesant munuteman mahta, the prancopal lases of FDR power wudon the army were not touched The first regular army dission slated for denolulizaton, the Fifth, was one in wluch the ΓDR's unfuence was weakest By mod sammer tor enture duvision to had been auccessfully demobilued tnsd reasomalle progrem achueved in rehabelatating sts personnel for evilan occupations In oddtion, the fost of the large lestparr (semi autonomous milutias) ordered to demobilre, the Pem

t Sreegre ed a fut Regebleam drion befere tre ratmsaliesten pregram wn berontakn * Republi Indoneua. Ied Ly Bung Tomo,* was strongly anti FDR.

The Pemberontakan refused to comply with the government's demobalization ender and sat behond its guns in ats barracks an Sura karta. If it made its refusal stark, other Iukpers slated for eventual demobalization would take example and the goveroment's whole program would collapee Into tdus hoeuch teaped one of the elite organrs toms of the arms the highls diswiplined Tentara Peladpar (Seudents Armvy Componed almost entirels of voung men who had been attending maddle and secondars whools just prour to the Japanese invaion, it was one ef the most effective of the arms's units and could always be reled upon to buck the governmemt in tumes of criss Wearing whate clochs over theer clothes as wmbols of purity thes solunteered to force the Pemberontakan to torn in its arms On March 27, sup ported by the local detachment of state polce (Polisu Negara) they marthed agaunst the danodents barracks Miter two days of fighung the Pemberontakan had had enough and agreed to disarm Under peessure of the Tentara Peladjar several smaller armed groupe an the city quickly followed sust. During the course of the next month another powerful laskjer baved in Surakarta, that headed ty Mardjuks, was forced to daband by troops of the regular arms, and after short fights Iasèjers based near Magelang and Wonosobo were likewne disasmed. Simslar succeves were being encountered by the government's regular troops in Sumatra, and by eatty May st seemed prolable that no further dis obedience twould be encountered among the Iaskjars.

Thereupon the government turned its chaef attention to rationalizatoon of the regular army Again the unruly Surakarta area commanded it chief attention Here the rump Fourth, or Senopats Do roon, only some g.oon strong. was slated for demobilaration Half its number being Republican marines (ALRI)," st was partscularly approprate that this organization have a lugh prporsty in the ratoonalization program. Honever, within the Fourth Dissson the anfluence of the FDR was partscularly strong, many of its troops being srmed formations of the Peundo Although the larger Fifth Dissuon had alrtady begun carryung out the government's demobilration orderr, the Fourth Drvision's commander temporssed and refused to begen the mobilration process wathan han own command As will be seen, this was to have extremely emportant conmequences

In the meantime the FDR did not abandon its effores to force she peognation of Hatta's cabinet, with the ebjective of having it sup planted by a pathamentary cabinet wherein at would control key poutona Beganming im May st launched a two-lold peogram ** to attain this end Farstly, thes sought to weaken and drcredit the government through wudespread strikes among urban and agricultural labor, It succreded in launching one serious strike involting some zo,ooo agticultural workers in the extremely important Delanggu cotton growing area whuch lasted from the muddle of May untal the middle of June. This strike was of critical amportance because these cotten fields were the chief source of rase material fer the Republic's lumited textile industry Under conditaorts of the Dutch blockade domestic peoduction of textiles tas, of courne, particularly important. (A government arbitration bourd set up by the Workng Conmttee of Parlament inseuigated and settled the strnke There was no doubt but that the agricultoral laborers involved had some legrtimate grievanes)

In grneraI, however, the FDR's soccess was Iamited. With the Repub be standng wth sts back to the wall and blockaded by she Dutch, it was dificult to convince most laborers that thus was the peoper time to rarry out stikes Sorkarmo in several radoo addresses was effective in demonstrating the unpatriotac mature of stnkes at such a time. pointing oot that strike teganirens could serve tresr country best by eperating in Datch occupied territory

The pro-Tan Malaka Independent Labor Party (Partal Indonesia Buruh Merdeka) strongly opposed strikes at such a tme of mational emergeney In addition, it, in eonjunction with other Tan Malaka orsented groups, in early June formed a strong political federation, the Gerakan Revolus Rakjat (People's Re-oltionary Movement), or GRR " whuch, though close an ats program to that of the FDR and

n Dratied at a mrong of in ladenhip in Dodonaporo in mid Apol " The wther groaps whch pomed the Gkn were the Fartn Rakpet (Feop't Paris), the Pastia Ratzat Dpelata (Poor Peeples Patty). the Anglatin Kom tada (oung Gemeration of Cammunan), the Panas Ihasta Raájat (People Party)- he Permtsin Invelden Indonea (Unon ef Doatlad Mes the Latkjar Rakjae Daharta Raja (Pesple's Vdtia of Grester Dp oppoted to many aspects of Hatta's peogram, made clear sis support of Hata's government."

The second aspect of the FDR program centered about the idea of promoting national unsty, an adea thoroughly acceptable to all political parties. The first step in this strategy was to be achueved by dralting a "National Program" whoch was to be the highest common denomunstor of agreement between all the major politicat parues ancluding the FDR. Upon achuesing ths, the I DR leaders felt that they would be in a strong position to demand an all party 'National Governmens" to implement such a National Program They not smplauubly felt at would be diffcult for anyone to advocase thesr excluson Irom such a government, sunce such advocaty could be eauly attacked as being agaonit the anterests of national solidarsty

This strategy of the FDR was, however, very soon perctived by the other printipal parties They all co-operated an working out a mutually agreeable general program, accomplnhed by mid June, and then sat doun to work out sts details Thus served a useful purpose an delineating in fairly precne language the opinsoms of the parties wuth respect to all aspects of governmental policy, thereby serving as a guode to the government. Though at contained a sague clause to the effect that "the government should be democratised," the most the major parties outside of the FDR were prepared to do by way of a change was to reshuffe the cabunet under the leadershap of Hatta"

and the Banuan Banteng (Boffale Legion) The list of thete was tased vm Surskanta. had aome gooo armed mm and had been uncorporated into the regular amy as a aema zutasemous unit The Laskjar Rakpn Dakaita Raja was in verevory sa Vest Ja nomnally under Dotch costrel and was wagng a guernilla warfane agtunst Dutth troopt pameslarly in the krawang aoea where it had strong tacking fron the local popelation Ot the actual pelitical paries maling up the federation, the Partas Rakgar, led by Manuto Nuimahandyo, was the largrvi It was the only ene with repremtaton en the forklng Comnutee of the A\IP (howevet. it ranel in sute well after the larger Reputlican partses) For an aceomt of the GRR se Sohrano, "Gerakan Reialasl Rakjet." Sasel, Sept s. sg

" Like the FDR, the CtR called for cuung of segotatitem wth the Duch wevn, a leded upen a peley ol neutahty in the Celd War at least until alter Indonmian independence had been attaned It unged the Govemrera sa "tale strong athon agaust dntrueuse elements," le, the FDR and "esclude the heroes of Long gadjan and Ressille [the pates making vp the FDR were comudered coefly re spanule for boh agrementl from the leadenhop of partae, mevolatonary erganrateen, the govemiment, ammy. pobte, and laber, peasant, aed josth erganirationt" Decuon of the Cmral Commitre of the GRR, Jogakarta. Sepe a. tgg, as repecind by Surte (eficlal newspaper ot he GRR) Sept 6. 19g9

+ On July & 1918, both the Majum and PN1 made it clrag that though they maght conant to à sight veshrufle ef the cabunet, it would have to remain under the lendshap of Itama, Ser Antara, July g. 3948

NATIOVALISM AND REVOL UTION

On July s7, sg18, Hatta announced chat hus cabunet offcially ac cepted the National Program, which sn most respects actually differed very little from the program he was already commisted to," and thereby pulled the rug out from under the FDR's strategy and dimmed its hopes of ousting him. The major parties other than the FDR then concluded that it was not esen necessary to reshuffle Hatta's cabinet.

Despute the fadure of these tacucs, the FDR continued to attack Hatta s government and call for sts replacement by a new parhamentary cabunet It dersed new ammunition for this attack because of the government's refunal to ratify a consular treary with Sosset Rusua which that country had sself ratified Supto, who st later developed was a Stalinist Communst, had been sent by the Republican govern ment as ats ensoy to Eastern Europe shortly before the Dutch Launched thesr attack of July, t917 Has musson was to lite up whateser dip Jomatic support in the area he could for the Republic. In January, s918, Surpno had approached the Sovret Ambasador to Prague, who appeared veceptive to the sdea of negotatang a consular treaty wish the Republic An agreement was antraled later an January and Suripto asked the Reputdican government for anstructions However, Sjan fuddin was then in the midst of negotatung the Rensille Agreement and dud not wish the treaty with Russa consummated The succeeding Hatta government liew ise refuned to take any more action wth respect to the treasy ** However, the Souet government melf finally tock the insttative, and on May a», ats ambasador to Prague anformed Suripno that the Ruman government had ratufied the consular treaty

Whether or not this Rusuan move conststuted formal recognstion of the Republic, it was so interpreted by the FDR.* In fact, the Rus san ambastador refosed to make any commitment to Surapno as to whether Runua would send any material asd to the Republic once consuls had been exchanged " However, the FDR made the most extras agant claims as to the materal and Russia had pledged to send to the Republic once the establrshment of a Sovaet comsulate on the Republie had opened up the channels of trade Some an propoganduzung thas adea went so far as to pusnt a pucture of Rusuan planes and shups running the Dutch naval lioxkade in order to brng arms and munisions to the Republie

For mans Indonesians the fact that the Republican government made no move to mich Ruvua s ratuficauon of the treats, but mnstead called Suripno Fome for consaltations lent comoderable weight to the FDR's assertuon that Hatta s government was trockling to the United States Agaenst the background of mounung feelang that the United States backed the Dutch, this allegatson was a ponerful weapon for the FDR.

Inctezueghs the government became suspicious of the atms of the FDR These suspocsuns appear to have been well justified. Apparently by earis Juls purvtuddn and the other leaders of the FDR had come to entertain little hope of wnneng governmental poner by purels political means Though by no means abandonemz that approach, they began to tlunk more and more an terms of attaining thear objective through palitary force should political means fail. The outlook and plans that were developing among them are demonstrated in a report drafted by them in mid July "" comboning an analysis of the situation and longterm plans of strategy (The document here cited did not come into the govetnment's hands until after the outbreak of the rebellion two and a half months later )

In its snitial amalysos of the contemporary sstuation this report noted that attempts of pro-FDR olfcers in the army to anfluence the courie of the rationalization program in favor of the FDR hod not been suecessful Only two out of twenty key poutions in the central leadership of the army were in their hands, the Deputy Commandership of the Java Termtorial Command and the post of Head of Puhlie Relations. The report noted that the TNI Masparakat had been dis ided into six small unuts under the control of the staff of the Territorual Army. The Political Information Dosuon of the TNI Masparakat, which had been controlled by FDR officers, had in the process been entrely dissolved.

However, the report went on to make clear that despite this the military poution of the FDR was still strong. "The government's efforts to divide our unts have been for the greatest part prevented, so that practically spraking our real strength is still intaet and sill under the command of our men or those anfluenced by us " It estimated that about thorty five per cent of the armed forees were under FDR control. Consderable peroentages of certaon other army units were conudered to be under FDR influence, and at was bebeved that if the cands were played correctly some of these might well support the FDR when the time came, or that at least they could be counted upon to adopt a neutral postion

The strategy outlined in the document was dended anto two phasts. the fest calling for the use of "parliamentary means" and the second. to be nvoked if the first failed, calling for the adopcion of "nonporiiamentary means" It was apparent that the PDR, despote its instual sethacks, had not yet given up hope for attaunment of power through sts National Program strategy. The first or "parliamentary phase" of this program of mad July was stall dedicated to this strategy and was formulated in the following term.

(a) To nflunce the Workong Commtee [of the parlamene-kNIr] for pasing a motion an whach it is stated that the Natronal Pregram be made the program of the govenment and therefore the prtaent governmemt should be dmolsed and a new responuble [re, parlomentary] cabmes be formed, (b) to acrelerate the formaton of the Nauonal Front (organimtion]. especially regonal Natonal Fronts, (c) the Natonal Front will stage a large scale cam poign for disolving the prment cahinet, (d) if the abone menooned plan fash large arale demonstrations wull be staged by those workers, peansnis, army mem, and other groups which can be persoaded to joon ts . , Largestale demonuratons must be deectly followed by a general stnke and if neoesury by forcible mesures

(s) in tlus mam acton the werien, prvants and seldem partiopane who wil exreute our discsphine foully, (e) Army cadres which lead the mats attion must be those whach have had poltocal and sdeologaeal eduta ton in accondance wath the respoouboity we give them, (s) Thus man acton should only be staged in areas where we have suficient mltary strength to belance the sizeegth of the enemy

If the government then continued to refuse Iiquidation and the formation of a new nasional cabinet wberein the FDR would hold key posti, a mitch would be made to the second phase of the strategy.

n Lated in tho canegory weme the Fmndo unm, the Laskpar Rakpt, Lakjat Bensh. Lakar Merah, ALKI (tannet), PTL (Naval Pohee), and that pert of the TNI where the drafters of the program stated: "We will cut off all relations with the government and continue our struggle under our own leadership either as rebellion or as separate gov ernment." Preparatson for this called for the following.

(i) Wahdrawal of a part of oor troops frem the frent lines [ie, she "status quo hne" disading Reprubluzan and Dutch-occupred tertones]

(a) The brigades of Maroono and Jadau will be ordered to strengthen our internal operations

(b) If we are forced to send troops to the front lames, then troops whach we do not yet complevely trust wall be sent there

(t) Removal of our troops to areas whuch we conuder as besng stratege and abandonment of thote areas whunh can no longer be defended

(a) The Madiun area wil be made the strongest guerrella stronghold for the long termn atruggle

(b) We must station at least five battalions an Madiun, which should already be there tha month or in August

(c) We will make Solo [Surakarta] a ' Wald West * an onder to attract at tentuon there, but we must have the atrongest troops in Solo, ao that the de facio authorsty in always an our handh

(d) hedu, Jogakarta, Pati, Semarang, Bodjonegoro. Surabaya, and Kedn fressdencies—that is those portions of then under Republican enntrell will be made neutral teritones. which means that as crcum stantes permut we will fortdy these areas or ahandon chem The forces In each of these areat must not exceed two battalions

(e) We can completely evacuate Malang RBanjumat, and Pekalongan terntones [These were the ressdencies most peripheral to the central core of Republican-conmolled terrnory, whoch was the Madron area ]

(s) Alongside the offical armed forces we must now begm to establish a People's Army in the widest sense of the term In a general sense we will form these forces dlegally.

(a) In every subdistnct whuch we conuder strategically sutuated and in whch our influence n amplanted, a group of sexty armed soldiers led by a commander will be stationed

(b) Thest vsty petsons wil be dorótd ito vnaller grrups oi vs oo ten and sent to the villages

() The general leadershop in a subdistrict is in the hands of a com mattre repreuenting the wotken, peasant, and the commander of the sussy armed soldien.

(4) Our program for the second phase ean be determined further accoding to the csrcumstances We cam state in advance that we must realure the Nacional Programn, especally in regand to agrarian reform, people's defeme, and the struggle of the workers...

Thse were the long term plans of the FDR. The government never tearned of them pn this detasl until after the Madoun rebellion had been launched However, it ded learn of their general nature in mad- July, about the tame that these detasled plans were beng drafted Accordingly it then began to take steps to remove FDR officers from ther commands or shoft them to lens strategie commands at the rate and to the extent ponible short of provoking the FDR to revolt, Given the fact that concentrations of heavaly armed Dutch troops were dratn up along the borders of the Republie that was a difficult and delicate operataon and had to be carmed out slovdy and with extreme caution

The plans of Sjanfuddin and the other leaders of the FDR ran into am umespected development. On August . v918, these armed at Bakat Tingps. the Republaean capital on Sutatra, an arplate bearing Suripno and an older Indoneuan who he stated was hus secretary and who had accompaned hem from Prague The older man sent a note to a frnend whach was antercepted by Republcan governmental zuthorntaes and whoch stated that he hoped to form a cabomet soon On August 1s, Serapno and hts "secretary" flew on to Jogjakarta. Here a few days laser as a meetang of the PKI leadershap Suripno dramatocally revealed the real sdentaty of hs compauon, uneroducing him as Musio Hese was resurmed after an absence of more than twelve years a revolutionary leader who had been a member of the Polsfbureau oI the PKI in the early twenues, a leading figure in the sge6 rebellion, founder in s955 of the underground organuation, the "Illegal PKI," and in addition fresh from Moscow, Moso's receptron smong the PKI members was enchwuastic, and by acclamatson they voted hum sn as secretasy of the party mt place of Sardpono

From the stamdpount of the PKI, Musso's returm could not have been better timed His artnal coneided wuth the full tude of general Indo nessan dullu-ionnment with the Umuted States whem the belef tdat it backed the Dutch was strongest His returm to 2ndonesia afer moore than a decade of resdence in the U.5.5 R. could nst but be interpret: d zs tangible evadence of Moscow's ummediare interest in Indonetza Among members of the FDR thos accelerated the tendency, already increased by Runsta's willangnen to extablish consular relations, to Jook to Moscow for fulfillment of thesr Iong frostrated deuse for full na tronal independence.

On August z9. 1g48. Sjarduddım pubhcly announed that he had been a Comtunnt aince sggs when, he clamed, he had pouted Monso's

"Illegal Corusmist Parts" in Surabasa " On the same das Setiadpt. chaeran ef the Lalve Pars, and soen afterwands Adalradpd and Lan Ling Due ef the bsualist Parts announoed that thes teo had lobeen Communsts There s latle doult that the clauns ot the tast thare were correst Beçutnine in soes in Heltand Seudpt and Wdalmadad agpeated to follow the Gommumet lane and the tolßomre vear thes wem to Mossos to studs at the Lenn Insutute Tan Lanz ipe spent fise sears un Moscos ad was later afilated woth the underground "Illegal Comrumis Parn

Honever the legtuetes ot Satitudden s slates has been t e subject of wade dapote aewng Indonesan leaders taliet leaders laked has laun, wbale the bollovers et 1an Malaka astred hum of bein; a secret agent et dhe Dunh oruttwred to then to dorupt and weaken the Repabla usaton wh thes leve leveled at etuudpt and Nbduleoadpal As related bs them to ihe writer however, it e eponer ar, tat tod hd not pre wul een a member et the Pkt thowgh be dut have sownestens wth the Ullecat Pkt' uderground legening an saya.

In royo Sparifoddim was arrested bs the Dutsh becaue of hs actvt tnes as a natenalst leadet and was goven the choce ef weekang with thers et beonz eiled He chave the forrer and was given an amportant pos an the Depurnrent of Tonemis Nars. Shorths belere the arrwat ef the Japarese. Dr Chattes van det Plas, one et the top ofal in the Dutch reeume. gave anluddn rs oso gudders to te disbursed ba hum to the "lleçal Pêt un'erereund fe eperatens aganst the Japanese. He pouned therr wnderground wath the knosledze and approval ef the Datch Ihis undoubtedds as the eal real bais of the charge by Tan Mataka s group that be was a Dutch agent. T he pont us, ef coune, that at ths tome Sealmst Cetumanosts an all colontal countries wete espected to sabondinate ummedste natonalet auns to belping the coleaal power an ats struegle aganst Fascum In Indonesia this

"tee Knles'ses Ratet ume ot te two sthet moepartt papets tn gslarta, Aet gs vt In a pah elooson vt tn staiment en ept e andoV. vtane? "a a crerunnt I mevgue rn mecale, and I poetve met to mate emes aztt" to te Jipavew esepaten fer the popose ef urmirg en unéergns rd putait e. te stred "However, I aooeponl the effet beave the Coeuntetm tat propomed to ut tn co-operste wa the celemal powens un à punt fone agarst Fasren " te went no to uar that row that Verta Wat t had eel. tormenots tave dopeet w? rua peley et eetlarstaon" (Aatara. Spt t. rott subeedination was also followed by a number of non-Communist anti- Fancists as well, and a considerable portion of those joining the "IMlegal PKI" undezground to fight the Japanese were actually not Com monorts

Evem if Sparfuddin actually did become a nominal member of the "Illegal PKI," the coniensus among non Communut Indonesian leaders is that he was certainly never an cethodox Stalinist Communist and to the end was more of a nationalnt than a Communnt. They attnbute hus final public espoutal of a Stalunnt peutson to two principle factors. disillunonment vith the United Stases and pohtical opportunism.

Many of those who were close to Sjarifuddin feel that his disillusion ment woth the Unsted States was of central importance in his development of a more Stalinast onentation. His feelings were particularly bister, they say, because he felt himelf more responsible than any other person for the Republic's signing of the Renville Agreement; for un ugrung thus he beheved that the Unuted States would inure (ts smplementatson His belef that the Uited States backed the Dutch must be seen against the background of his conviction that war between the United States and Rusua would betak out during the course of 919

Even so it took Sparifuddin some time to make up hus mind. As late as August s7, one influential non Communist leader felt that his decinon was still sn the talance and urged the wrater to see him on that day in the United States and the sdeas of Franklin Rooseselt towards colomial peoples were now too weak to influence American policy. In the course of a long talk wath the wnter, Sjarnfuddin expressed keen interest in the poobable cutcome of the impending American presidential elections and was in particular anooous for an estimate as to when progresuve forces of the character of Roosevelt's New Deal could be expected to regain power. In response to the wnter's estimate that probably thas would not develop within less than four years, he indicated that thus was alrrady his conviction, too, and stated: "That will be too long"

Instability of character and polstical ambition were certaanly of great importance in Sjarifuddin's decsion to cast his lot with the Stalinnts Those who knew him well testify to the instability of his philosophical and religrous mootings * None of his convictiens seemed very solidly bsed to them, and they remark that when depressed he was especially amenable to the persuasion of others Though there is general agreement among top noncommunest leaders who knew Sjariluddin well that he was too religious to become a Cemmunnt at heart, they alt agree that his character dod not stand in the way of has working with Stalinnts to attain hs own poltucal ends Few Indontsrams who knew him are prepared to say that Amur Sparsfuddın was not an extremely ambitious man, and the belef in widespread that Musso's dramatie attinal must bave somewhat pancked Sparnfuddin. They believe that he felt it necessary to co operate wuth Musso or ehe become politically nolated and lose control over nsany of the TDR elements On the other hand, he probably believed that Musso's arrval strengthened the publhe appeal of the &DR. Undoubtedly both Musso and Sjarfuddin felt that they could use each other to wrest governmental power from the incumbent regime Had they succeeded in doing so, it would stem almost snevstable that a struggle for power betheen the two of them would have ennued

Musio arrived with plams of his oun, but in most respects they were very close to those already land out by the leaders of the FDR. He referred to his plan as has "Gottwald Plan." making it clear that he hoped to doplicate an Indonesia what Gottnald had just accompluhed in Crechoslovakia. If possible power was to be acquired without a major resort to force. only if this proved smpostuble, was there to be rehance upon actual smurrection Fresh impetus was to be gisen to the FDR's demand for the formation of a new and parliamentary cabinet within which key poutions would go to its men Efforts in this direction were, however, coldly recesved by Sorkarno, Hatta, and other Republican leaders outside the FDR.

Apparently at was becoming clear to the FDR leaders that their orgamration was too loosely knst to foree the government to make concessions Lakewse, because of the strong popular conviction that the FDR was chiely responsible for the Linggadjati and Renville "debacles," it was not capetalizing effectively on the growing anti- Amerncan, peo-Russuan sentiment developing outude as well as within the FDR. This prompted the FDR leadershup, now strongly under Musso's influence," to embark upon a two-fold campaign designed to remedy these deficrencies First, the FDR was to be reorganized and so integrated as to be more effective in exertang politucal presiure both Jegalls and allegally, and second, a mew pychological foundation was to be laid to attract more people to ats leadership

During the last ten days of August the leaders of the FDR took the nitral steps tomards integrating and strengthening their organzation. Muso nsaited that all its consutuent organizations merge wiuh the PhI, so that there would be onty ene integrated organaration, this en larged PKI The Politbureau of the PKI was reported to have approved dhas palies on August es, and its recommendation was approved by an extractdinary conference of the party beld between August eß and 27 and attended by sts sectron commsttees and resideney commitiees as well as members of the Politbureau " On August ey, the Labe Party leaders decoded to fuse thesr party with the PKI,a" and two days later a similar decsion was taken by the Socalut Party Councel, with the understanding dat its deesion was subject to confirmation in a party congress scheduled for October

A fiest step in the fusion was the establishment of a new Politbureau for the expanded PKI which would include most of the coef feaders of the FDR. As announced on September s, its cotepositon was as follows

Generel Sreretonat " Muuo, Maruto Daruman, Tan Ling Dpe, Ngadinan,

Lebor Sreretzrut 4. Tykronegoro, Asdo, Sutmeno.

Leurk Seewtznar Wilana, Sarpoo

Woses's Sevetanat (Tetaperarilt fataged by Gemeral Secretarat).

Defear S-evetarat Amur Spandaddan,

Propezz-dz Apztion Sreetarat Lukman, Aleton, Sardjono,

Orgesizatien Seretanst Seduman d.

Ocrupud Temoeones Servelanat Managtd by the General Seorearut,

Secvetanst of Foreige Aßems Sumpmo,

Repett Stat Sa [a mmer o the Work Commtee)

Gadre Seeretorat Managod by the General Sectetarust,

Fesznnzl Sreretanat Rudak.

epon br de prental group ef PßI and Socatat and Lator Fany membem who bad betn cmtem of che "Itirpal PKr" (founded be Meme in rpss) es ter rpecul

in Saava ftu Eate (Vonce of de Capual." ocal penespaper of dhe Pit), Sepes a.

thd, top gn, 191? to day work wil be esicuted by che Geeral Secreurat"

In the contemplated fusion of the contituent elements of the 1DR inso one integrated, ducaplened party, the new PKI, it was planned to incorporate only the "select part" of thesr membershup To the 3,o00 members of the original PKI there would be added only go,ooo out of the approumately Go,ooo members of the Socalist Party ** and a toughdy sumitar proportion of the much smiller Labor Party Thus apparent selection of members may well hove been un large part a ratonalzation of the fact than consoderable portioms of the membershup of both the Socialst and Laber partses in Jasa were opposed to such a fusion wth the Pk1 In Sumaura and Bantam, as it developed. the Socalist Party opposed the fusion Ihere seems Inttle doubt but that the pernod enusaged for working out this fusion was calculated at no less than six weeks, and very lkely was expeeted to last somewhat longer

Roughly concurrent with the early stage of this process of fason there developed a well publicred campaugn of self cnueum of the mustakes made by the FDR partues in the past, in partscular their promunent part an upporung the Langgadjats and Remille negotsauons and their fanlure to stress the socialist as well at the natonalnt aspect of the Republican revolution Charactenstuac of the sort of self-criticism and correctton embarked upon by all the constituent elements ef the FDR (Socalst Party, PKI, Labor Party, Pesindo, and SOnsI) was the fol- Iowing resolution adopted on August r2, 1g18, by the Presidum of the sonsi.

Cetudening that on acrount of the exaggeratson of the ampenalst power and the munimzation of the ants mperalnt power, the sOnst has made bauc erroes by puruing a compromse policy wuh the amperialuns, whuch has had an st retults that (z) the matioal resolution os mot led by a conustent ants amperulnt and revolutonary Labar Class an alhance sath the peasants and in cooperation with all progreuse people, (b) the colonial government ap paratus han not been chvoged and the remauns of feudalum are not elimamated. (t) no real efforts have been made for umpeoving the lisong condtiom of the workers and the peaants, (d) no consstent ants umpersalnt National Front hat exsted, (e) agreemenes, colonualutsc an nature, have been approved,

Whereas the SOnst deem at neceuary to take poutise actaom un ceder to carrect the abose mentoned peincople errors, it therefore decides

(t) to acknowIedge the mustakes of paruung a compromise policy with the impealnt powers and afterwands to follow a cpnsntent ants amperalast policy.

(a) to call upon the government

Statement to the wnter by Sunpns memler of the Tolathrureau of the PhI (Uogaharta, Sepe, a, aggs)

(a) to thraw the Pultral Mamfeto ef November a, 19.

(b) tn repodiate both the Linggadjati and the Renvdle Agreements,

() to reet the Ameran Astain [Duon Cchle compromhe proposals,

(d) to ntgatiate en the bran of the reengnioon of the full savereignty of the Repalile of Indoneus,

(e) to reslue ommedhately the exchange of consuls with the Sosiet Union and to endeavout to obtain the recognition of the People's Democeatie Sa h as Cecoaa, Pold, Hay. Jugd, Aban, Ro mvnsa, and Balgwa,

(f) to naponalue the properies of all those who are bettile to the maturual revolution, without guing any compenauon,

(g) to stop all megosators with the Dasch as pronest agust the fascut Dutch shonting ef chddren and boy scoutt who wete celetraung the thund annverary of the Repoblic of Indoneua in Jakarta, megotatanm can only be reumed on the felfillment of clause e d.

(h) to clese the compoution ot the entire Stase's apparatus of the remans ef colonalun and to appone ecu wu à conat a emperalist spunt.

(s) to speme and be preparel to mplement the National Program;

(s) to peoneer the establnbment of a democraue Natonal Frons, the mem bershup of whoch body enners as indwadualt.

(s) to sege the Head of the Sone to dimohe the poesent Calonet and change ino a reiponuble Natonal Front Cabinet on the condtons

a that it be based on the National Program.

b tha the Minmes are penos sho agree w the etablament of and are members of the National Front,

(s) to pretiopite in formong the National Front Cabinet,

()t ie the pran the sd e p n e peple defense by arming the whole people.

(8) to upport the clam of the pemens for ownenthp of the lands they cultvate,

(s) to Eght actnely for the realastion of thut resslution and make prepara tons for all comequences "

Elaborate ratsonales of the past mistakes of the FDR parties and laders were ten developed and pucd On Agus , e Scalnt Party in sts officral netvspaper, Buruh, stated:

en Uodagbtedly thia hen pentinlat refmmce to the cdase in that docunmt guatuntzcing the setina of foorigs losestmenis and the boneting of all peesar dehos ef the Dench East ladas governmeat once the independenet of the Repablle had

"Buna (La" cief mepaper of the Selalt Ta), A

Adminon of mistaker made on the past by the Socualut Party

I. In the field of erganzation"

(1) In October, 191s. the Illegal Communuts establuhed the Indonesian Socialnt Party (Paru) This was a matake becaune Communits should not establish a Socralist Party, but should have establuhed a Communist Party

(a) Alter the Indonetan Soczalnt Party (Pans) funed wth the Socialist People's Party (Paras) Paras wan the rnight wang of the Socalat Party and was led by Soetan Spahror This was a mstake because a party based upon Marxnt Leninum should not fuse with reformnts

(3) The leadership of this fused Socualet Party was searrd by the right wing Socalsts.

Self-cterection in the field of cegatzation began to succred when the Sphra cabumes was rtpedaied an June, sp17, followed by she expulsson of the right wang Socialnta from the party un February. s918

II In che poliucal Beld

(s) It was a mutake to co-operate with umperalnt nations on the assumpuon that this could be done because they and ants Imperalat natrons were fghting a common enemy [i e the Axas Powers] Becase of thus atertude in Europe, the Communats here agreed to fuse with the reformnt Socalota.

mistakes took on cfearer form in articles appearing during the next few days in its several leading newspapers." Characteristic of this was an article entitled "Politik SOBSI" submitted by the Central Bureau of SOBSI in the September 3 isue of Buruh:

The werld is drvsded anto two frents, the Anti Imperialist Front and the Imperaint Yront. Who rally behund the Imperalut Front? All countries with colonats. , Imperalst Amersca is the leader of the Imperalist Frent. We cannot semain ntutral, we must choose one of the two fronts The talk about a Third Force' is noniense, Nehru who says he in going to form a third force is purvaing a pro-Iemperalst policy The Communnt Party which wan al- Jowed to function an Intah India can now functuon only allegally; the same it true with Burma,

The Republie of Indoneua faces not enly a Dutch impersalism, it faces an international imperialum...We must find our frends among the New Democratse Seates of Easterm Europe and the Balkans, and we must inmeduately exchange cansuls with Soviet Russa. We must not only make friends with Rusta, but we must hase a strong relatonship wuth Russia.

Why did we pursue a compromse policy with the enemy?

" Burah (Socalut Party), Suora Tiu Kata (PKI), and Rrvolavener (Pendo)

(i) The labor mement wis infected wath the dsease of reformoun After the Sternd World War the Communst Partes an Trince. Great Besrin. ed the Nenhrrhnds caloul ted dist nest to the umalvable etntroverues letheen the Sosyet Umm and the United States there were also controvemues between the stmill srepenalnt countren and the Unsted Strees The amill im petulet counanes sere eppmung impervtist Amenes Coniequennly the Com ntinot Pity in Irance muggrated to Ilo Chu Mimh thit he orecept a pret of umpon woth Frnce And the Communet l'any an the Netherlvnds suggeted a part of uunn between the Netherlveds tnd Indonews And the Commuost Pursy in Greas Testun suggrated a Crmentnwerlih for Indi Thn reformnt tel compromine poñiey in wrong as cheve os now no conizmeray between the areill and lug ampenvlnts

() We rsaggratnd the atrength of the anperalats ao thit he were afrand to uppote there Becaune of these two mut ikes we punuel a compromme pohey though we hwe the sorength to oppose the imperrvlets

Hmonsully speakoig enly the labee cds cun lead a nitonril revolution, n eudenm in he Somuet Umon A mtomi revoleaan led by the bouegeosue idi ful ef Inds under Neteo and also Barmy and Cloni Becaune of us wevknew thn groop n uncertum a tn slhit to do beth exterwelly and anterotlly We ane cherefore cononced that anly the lhor cdhw wepparted lay the pewants ved the peagrevose group cin finsh the resolanon "

A few leaders of the fringe elements of the pen Tan Malaky Gerakan Revoleat Rakpt (GRR) at first attempted to dotingush between Munn and the lenlets of the IDR and an a fets enstances mbcated a leure to pon wsth Muno However, the oserwhelming mpnrity of the orgtmzation demonstrated the sume streng hostulity towardh Mumo that they hud already been showing towards the FDR leaders Thes may kell have had somethung to do wth the goveenment's deemon to release the still yoled teaders of the Persatuan Perdpuangan, who had been the chuef enstigtors of dhe attempted coup d étar of June-July, v)26 On Angust t7, Soekanto an a speech commemorating the thued anniversvry of the Republic's declaration of andependenre, the keynote of whuch wat natsonal unsty, annoonced that all thove teho lul been juled an connection uith thos ncewrrence were being relened from jail Almost smmedrtely Mr Subrdjo, Mr Iwa Koesoem Soemntn, Panda Wigun, and Dr. Buntaran were released On September 16, Tan M ilk, Sukarm, and Abukusno were freed

As a result of the counterpenpoganda of tdhe GRR as well as of the goverument and the pratses associated wath it, the effectwenes of the

" These thm Iotonl a recapoisl virn of the prineple pent ia the aliove queel 500t réleties of Aug propoganda of the resamped FDR, or PKI-Musso as it came to be known, was somewhat diminvhed It was unable to take full advantage of the atmosphere of natsonalut frustration and drulluuonment wath the West that had developed Except for the plan& an ats program calling for alignment with Ruvua, the peogram of the PKI Moso was in its essentrals no different from the program which the groups wathin the GRR had been ads ocaing ever since the first days of the resolution The publicatuons of the GRR lout no opportunity in pointing this out. and lkewse emplasized their contenton that those partaes most respomuble for the 'Rensille debacle' could not excuve themselves from haung so seriously prejudiced the nation's welfare by mere admisuon that they had been wrong

Mohammad Hatta, the Prime Monister, though no Communast, was pouesed of a Marxint traaning and an arquaintance with Soviet in terpretations of Marxist principles fully as great as the most Anowledgeable of the PKI leaders In his address to the Workng Committee on September s, s918, where lhe answered the blistering criticums of its PKI Musso members. he employed thus skill wsth great effectvenest Tlus meeteng was attended by the writer Some excerpts from Hatta's speech will serve to demonstrate the proneipol basos of the gov ernment's "nationalium versus communism" argument

It our struggle were to be regaeded merely from the Comtnunst pont of iew, then andeed there would be muth to say for sdenufying ounelves with Sovet Ruwan pobcy To the Comnomist. Rosut represents the foundation on whch to work for the realuatuon of hn sdeals, for the Communst, stroggle tors or falls with the Souet Unonand therefore the interests of the Sovet Union tike peecedenee oser aill other matters an anternataonal poltical controserues If necessary in the nterest of strengthening Sosuet Ruua's position aty ather smoerests excepe those of the Sovet Unson will be sacniced. including the anterests of the subjogvted countrues, as happened in tg55 and in the subnequent years For an the Communst hnr of thunking goes once Sosiet Rutua has won the sictory over smperalum, freedom woll automatically tome

Not ao, however, the standpount of the nationalst, even though he may have a socalist outtook From the nitonalnt pount of voes, andependence of the country takes all out precedence, so that all efforts are concentraond on the struggle for the attastment of that independence He is permardy occupied wath the tquestson ol how the independence of the people can be achoeved in the shartest pouble time And for thn reason the methods be follows in hs struggle differ wadely from the methods to whuch the Comtmunast resorts

et ANarba (penopal newapaper of the GRR), Aug t, sp13

Nataual und pendence stids as the tou ptare, the tastacs of the struggle are alperd to the enturotuices And therefore the nvtponalnt does not bliedly choose the uade of euher of the twe conuting slesleges Howevet grert miy be his sympsty towanls thst one el the two cerrents which atoracts bum mos, he tkes hn osn stept in dralng with the problems of se dependente

No moiter hots we sk we appete to he an a matinn that hn only recently won an imdependence then compired to the tso grvoes in the conllet=the Unod Se ites ansd the Soum Unuon-it in the siew of the govemment that we mont conoue to bise our souggle on the penciple dem we must hove canfidente in ontsehes and that we most utoggle on oue onn steengts ant allaves

Mr féevmau The dificulnes whuch contront us waihn the enuniry ate suidl ferther magodisd on accoure of a certun srend wJuch hra been a cunatant festure of our stroggle I refer oo the trend tut faih to see the disonction be iscen a mtomal evolution and a soeril revalotaon The fart hta eften been meriooked vhas in she poruem visge of mur yiruggle we are mngoged vn out nstatal srvolstion Our natonal revobation is certain to bresk down modway if we allow elemtnes of soccil resolation to creep snto it Esen thme sbo Sormetly qunted Mars's and Mvo Tae Tung's mvarn to remund en of the fact that we hane not yet paant the srge of matosal resolanon and that theretore the tme had not yet eome for a socul trevolouon, these people have fergolten thear ewn theones and are ardently advocatetg a anciil tevolution

Hatta then went on to show that the government hod done the best it could vowands benering soeial conditions, gven the sev ere limitationt unposed by the Dotch blockade and the overpopslatson of the Reprublican controlled area **

However, the effectveness of the government, the parties astocated with st, snd the GRR in replying to the nrw PKI's propagandh wat only partual The keen dullusonment wath the course of pohtral events in Duteh occupoed terrtones follon ing the Reusalle Agreement, the Dutch blockade, increasingly harsh economse canditions wathun the Repablar, and the unrest of soldiers and laborers shready rationalted or slited for rationalization soon combened to lay a seal and substanurl lasd fee the tadespeead popular darontent wpon wbach the PKI Mmso sought to eaputalae.

It was natural that this discontent would fotw anto whatever channel td protet lay at hand The PKt-Musso was the largest and best or

etln partiretar he cind the farts thas during the pervioes sis meede gond bectares ol nesly esltvatnl land, derhed frem foreos plantatian and formdy frrrign orcepind wnall hollings were noe plinvied with rire or otter food erep that bifh had bren prepand for the engaairation ef eo openasives (peincipal ganized of the existing channel. The GRR had long criticized the government in almost the same terms thas the PKt Musso and its predecesser the FDR had so recently adopted However, sts organiration was smaller and less effectuvely integrated. In addstson, many of those persons whose nationalst frustration was keenest, and who had de veloped the most embittered disullusonment woth America and Western Lurope during the course of the pre oous year, could not find satafaction on the policy of self relhance and alignment with nether the Unsted Seates nor Russia pending attainmens of full Indoneuan andependence,* advocated by most of the nataonalist Communast leaders in the GRR Ior such people the consiction that Ameraca supported the Dutch seemed to dictate the necessuty of Indonesia's reliance on and alignment with the opposte international pole, Souet Ru1sia.

Undoubtedly aware of thas feeling, Musso and other leaders of the netw PK1 put great emphasts on the theme that, within a world divided between the two great blocs, Indogesia could not powibly stay neutral, but had to choose between the Unmted States and Russia." Wah respect to tht propoution Musso stated in his address of Sep tember 5 to the Indonesan Student Federation. "Obviously a nation such as Indonets, which is fighteng umperzalrtm, cannot sde with an imperalntic power, it must align siself with the forces fightung against imperialism, and that means Russia " "

Particular attention was paid by the PKI Musso leaders to winning increased vapport among demobslued soldiers and among the peasantry. They persisted in the unrealistsc demind that the government maintain the whole sll-equapped army Their propaganda asmed at soldiers who had been demobclized or were desugnated for demobslzztion- "You've done your duty, you've protected the government, and now thes ve through wsth you"—found a ympathetae response arnong a con toderable mumber Despite the portucular efforts of Muiso and other top lesders of the P, the prneopal peasants erganaration, the Barsan Tams Indonessa, though comuderabh influeneed by them refused to follot their Jead. * The program adopted by ats corgres be tween September 4 and 6. demonstrated that an some important respects its program difered from that of the PåI " In the reodency of Madiun the PhI sponsored and controlled a peasant orgamurstuon knuwn as the Sarekat Rakjat (People's Association), but in comparson wrth the Darnan Tans and the somewhat Jesser Mapumu peasant or ganazzton Sarakat Tans Iblam Indonesua (Indonenan Islamic Peasant

In general bs mod September, s91B, the Jeaders of the new PKI had onl begun to reorganuze and strengthen thesr organzatson. They drd not espect to be able to art with anvthing approaching their full effectveness for at least another six weeks. They sul bad not gven up the idea of wanning poner droug"s legal or quasi legal potitical pres sere There is no doubt that concurrent wuth these plans for winming power short of force they were also makung preparatsons to seare powe on vaolence if that should prove necessary

10 Fror to the Tes rot spht withan the Soculist Parte thaa orpaamure locke umanl to ahnr and hn group wtun the pare for tmdentap Therenfter t DR erpured xmcreaung inffomce 5arapoo eated so she wmier ce Srpt s. roz? The Ph1 hin grest snfuenee zn the Eanuan Tana tut shat tepttntataen still ha acusuoms before deoding en pobes end retaums frendom of actro even thoug a aongie a uesoed ln the Pl" (ogakarta. Sept a rog)

In Ig. The ctorn shoald te gres a herelsary aghi to penate eearntup The Pk, theugh ageeatle to the adea of amdi adual pessast ownenhap sould tard e grne sloeg with so teoad a staiemenn ef aogal ponople. And "Capzal mry b cospoed as foregn meimet frees Troprmune Demodrater Saten end for rhe ne deang aée fres etler roustnes it tbe ivesimest an not mxoopebotst in eatere th the prevanen that che tater soeroe of caprtel nn as small as pesalde" Ialar ire the wreer s, thn qualifeanon wat, of coune, pet paraled to the Pk3 lase

"There vere mditataos (hat the PK Jaden would lane wiloomed a Dutth urack on the Repaláe and bad lud plarn fer tha erentuaity, belamang that an onsnqame of the ressling chas and goemila wurfere they weold in the loeg un beneft cmemprg at the head of the goemilla resstanee- Theugh there is seassa to doste the certamrty of thnr beang ahle to aoaplas thus cheve as no doult hat ie sacb a seeaeten seme smpertant adracrages would hve been cn the de In the int plate sevent of the tremtituent elememts ef the new PhI wen moong the mont bighls organued polstacal groups sn the courtry In the seon lare most el the mumtooes dumpe and arma caches preparnd in anaopation c ontle Dutch attack were esablnhed donng the long penod than Sanfuddn tenter of Defemue, anf ite whereabees of mem

However, the avaitable esulence peunts toward the conddason that the top leadershup of the new PKt did not intend to resort to revolutionars tacties uetd et had esade further eforts for capturing pover through nonrevolutionars means, and certainh not before it had completed reorganaring the constituent FDR eeganizations into ente untegrated and well disiplined poltcal organration such as at envosaged the propected " Ph1 Musso" to be " Whatever the case, it is the consentsus amorg rant non & o emunist Republican leadets that the top IDR teaders and Musso were not prepared to resort to revebationan methods betore earls Nuveuber uap Suve a f them do not betieve that the Commutists would have been reads to resort to res olutionary methods before Jamuars : 1019

On September o the Central Cemmittee of the new PkI gave sts fiest fermal unvnation to the Masyums and PI parts sountils for a jont cunference for the purpose of buildanz national unity " " The leaders of these purties unterpreted this bod as undicating that the new parts was adopting the taatu of uts predevevor the FDR, of establishung a national political frunt calculsted to foret the bass of a nen "national cabunet The Masjum leaders formalls dectined the umataten" the followung day, and om September 13, the PNI leaders followed smit.» Concurrent with this maneuver, the top PKI leaders appear to have planned a senes of speaking engagements designed to step up their attacks on the government and to secure backing for their continued demand that the Hatta cabunet step down and allow the formation of a mew parhamentary cabunet wheresn the PKI-Musso would contrel key poutsons Beginning on September 7, the party's top publicspeakers. Mumo, Sparluddn, Wikana, and Harjono, embarked upon what was undoubtedly planned as a junket lasting well over two weeks. The evenong of September 7 they spoke in Surakarta, on the erghth in Madiun, on the tenth and eleventh an Kedra, where they were joined by Setadpt, on the thirteenth an Djombang: on the fourteenth in Bodjonegoro, on the sixteenth in Tjepu, and on the seventeenth in Purwodad: Plans called for vissting many other towns. Wonmobo, near the oppoute extrematy of Republican held terrstory wàs, for instance, to have been the locus of a mass meeting addressed by Mumo on September a4

But Purwodads was the last town that Musso and Sjanfuddın visted in accoedance with the plan of their itmerary. There they learned that the tutatve had been takem from thear hands and that the decusson as to what tactics would be followed had been assumed by the subordunate leaders of their organsration's perapheral elementa, the Pesundo and the pro PKI Fourth TNI Dirison. Purwodad: on the morming of September 18 was a mais of red flags, and Musso and his party left for Madrun, escorted by a heavily armed truck." They arrved at Redjoagung, near Madrun, on the night of the eighteenth to find that the local PKI organaration, led by the Peundo, had already launched a coup and seized control of the caty and the surrounding reudency They were peesented with a fast accomph. The Communist revolutson had begun

Whale Moiso, Sjarsfuddın, Seuadjit, Wikana, and Harjono were on their speaking tour, and while other top leaders such as Tan Ling Djie. Abdulmadjid, and Suripno were in Jogjakarta. developments began to take place in Surakarta and Madrun * very much out of line with the strategy and tactics whuch they had planned Initiative was taken from their hands by pro-PKI milstary groups. partcularly the leaders of those groups, who felt that their own personal interests dictated immediate action These groups were able to stampede most of the PKI erganuation on Java into an ill co-ordinated and poorly executed revolt agaunst the Republican government For the most part their action appears to have been dictated by thesr realization that the govenment had come to learn of the long term plans of the FDR and sts successer, the PKI-Musso, in particular their preparations for ultimate revolutionary action should that prove necessary to wun power.

During early September the government had been stepping up considerably its removal of pro-PK1 oficers in the regular army from key poutions esther through tranmßer or outright retirement. At a result the military support which the PKI might count on within the TNI was beng inereasngly diminished Of more smportance was the fact that the government was not beginning to put real pressure on boch the Peundo and the ALRI (Republocan Mannes) to vubmit to its demobilization erders in connectuon wath the general army rationaliration program. Particular pressure was being applied by the government on the Fourth ("Senopah") TNI Dission, stationed in Surakarta. Its commander, Lt. Col Suadi, had for well over a month defied the government's order that his unit be demobiluzed. His undermanned division of some 5.ooo men was Ior the most part made up of ALRI and Pesindo troops and probably contained about one-third and one quarter respectively of the armed men of these two organirations The Fourth Division was the principal military force in Surakarta and PKI (FDR) plans called for its maintaining PKI military ascendancy there if and when the revolutionary phase of ats strategy was entered upon.

The situation an Surakarta was rendered comphcated and tense because the other chief military force in the city (probably between s,ooo and z,soo armed men) was composed of partmans of Tan Malaka, most of these troops being members of the Barsan Banteng. The only other important malitary force ensode the caty was one bottalion of the highly discsplined and relable Stdrwang: Drminon, under Lt, Col Sad kin At least one other Siliwangi unet stationed a short distance outsade Surakarta was also under lus command

Early in August, L4 Col Sutarto, Suadi's predecessor as commander of the Fourth Drison, hke ham a member of the PKI and unwilling to carry out the government's demobslizatson order, had been murdered It was not certasn who was respomuble, but members of the PKI suspecied the Barisan Banteng On September 7. five army oficers whe were members of the PKI disappeared in Surakarta Two days later, two other hugh pro PKI oficers disappeared ° It is posuble that actually these men had been arresied by government order and removed to Jogjakarta The PKI press did claim that two members of the Penndo, one of the PKI, and one of the Socalist Party were arrested by the government in Blitar on September 1g ** In addemion the news agency Antara reported that State Polace and army troops had been carrying out "deanup operations against armed elements" beginning on September 12 in Bürtar and on September 13 in the Njandjuk area, another PKI stronghoId *a

It is possible that these solated evenes may have been sympimmatic of a general and wadespread government drave aimed at cutting down the military strength of the PKI Cavem the fact that the government was now acquarnsed with the long term plams of the PKI, such action would seem very plauuble However, it is also posssble that some of these actions, in Surakarta at least, may actually have been undertaken by the butterly anti PKI, pro Tan Malaka, nationalst ouented Communnts wothin the GRR Whatever the case, the reaction of the PKI was not unly to accuse Sadhkin's Siliwangt batalion, but also the GRR. particalarly ats conitatuent organization, the Barisan Banteng, of responsbelty for the duappearance of PKI members and pro-PKI of ficers in Surakarta and for a nught raid on the local Pesundo office

On September 11, Lt Cot Suadi accused the Silneangi buttalion of Sadiken of responubdty for kidnapping the mussing PKI officers and demanded that at returm them by s rvr on the thareenth When that tame arrived and the men had not returned, Suads crdered the men of ha ALRI unit to storm the bartacks of the Shwangs The latter fought back and repued the attack On the same day a unit of the Pesndo kadnapped Dr Muwardh, head of the Barsan Banteng and chairman of the GRR, along with three other members of the GRR. On the fourteenth a Siliwangi unit which had been stationed a short distance outside of Surakarta arved in the city to reanforce the battalhon already stationed there. Together they attacked the barracks of the ALRI and foreed that unst to fiee the city

On September 15. Soekarno proclaimed a state of martial law for Surakarta and the surrounding resudency wath Col Gatot Sulroto as Military Governor On the same day General Sudirman, Commander in Chief of the TN1, sent 3,ooo reinforcements from the Silawangt Disusion to Surakarta These took up postions on the outskarts of the city, it apparently being expected that pro-PKI reinforcements might armwe from the northern front, 1e, from their positions along the Van Mook line fating the Dutch

In the meantame the Barisan Banteng had demanded that the Pesndo surrender Dr Mun ardi and the three othert captured t ith hum by the suiteenth " When this tme had expured and the ultamatum not been met, the Barisan Banteng together with the two small Sili wangt unats wathun the coty launched an attack agaunst Peundo head quarters and sucteeded in drasang the Peundo troops to the south of the city

On September 1g, a powerlul ALRI unet statoned lacang the Dutch along the Van Mook line to the north of Surakarta had left the lines and marched off to Surakarta hopung to arrive in time to help the ALRI stationed there, not realizing that they had already been ejected to the south of the city On the outskirts of the city it ran snto the Stliwangt troops recently dispatched from Jogjakarta by General Sudirman Sharp fighung ennued and on the night of the sixteenth the ALRI were fimally driven off Thus they were unable to form a juncture wath the troops under Suadi's command to the south of the city.

The following morning. September 17, Lt. Col Suadt, hasing regrouped the ALRI and Petando troops under Ius command, launched an all out attack to capture Surakarta Appurently he did so without knowledge of the potential source of reanforcement of the strong ALRI force to the north of the city and wathout know ing that reinforcements of Pesindo troops were on their way from Madun to help him His fores pushed through the Barisan Banteng forces defending the southern edge of the city and penetrated to its center. Here heavy fighung enmued; the Stlrwangs, including at least part of thone sent by Sudmman, and the Barsan Banteng forced Suadi's troops out of the

" It laore developed that they had been killed ty, thu tme for good. Thereby the PKI lost a baule of critical im portance

Events in Surakarta were undoubtedly making the Pesindo leaderns at that crgamsration's central headquarters in Madrun incressingly uneasy Wath the Pesando and ALRI units in Surakarta Eghting troept of the regular army there in open violation of the government's erdens, they must have felt their own poution and that of the mew PKI in gemeral becoming increasingly compromoted Certainly they must have reatoned it would be natural for the government to asume their de fection too Government arrests of Peundo members in Blitar on the tharteenth probably removed any doubes they may have had on this score Also it is extremely likely that the government's "cleanup operataons againit armed units" an the near by Nandjuk area referred to Pesindo unsts For the top Pesindo leader, who had already defied the government's demobilzation orders, it mast have appeared that the die had been cast and that they now had only two alternatives, (i) to submot to the government's demobulizatson order and thereby give up thear own personal postions of power as well as a major source of the revolutionary mulitary potentzal of the new PKI, or (t) to take the inotiatise themselses and emburk upon the revolutionary phase of the PKI's strategy, hoping thereby to preserve their own mmedrate posutions and the prospects of the PKI revolution, the outcome of whoch they must have belheved held the key to their long. term futures.

It was the laster courve which Sumarsono and the other top Pesindo leadens in the Madrun area chose. The local peo-PKI offiers of the regular TNI units stamoned in the eastern part of the Republican controlled area apparently decided likewise and such efficers as Colonel Djokosujono, Lt. Col. Dahlan, and Lt. Col Surtantr jorned with the Peundo leaders On their own, without the consent or knowledge of the top leadership of the PKI, they formally faundhed a revolution agaimt the government of the Republic. One mught say that the revolution had already been informally begun by the Fourth Division in Surakarta It is posuble that its Ieaders reasoned that their resort to fgng would foe the her miltay umi of the PKI as well as is top polstical leadershup anto the revolutsonary phase of strategy. Whether or not they del so caleulate, it seems almost certain that the Pewndo and other PKI military Ieaders in the Madrun area must have believed that ther acthons would hase such a result.

Beginning on Sepoember 13. just after the Fourth Division had been ejected from Surakarta, the Pesindo units in East Java and the Twenty winth Bragade** from the eastern feont embarked upon the malitary phase of the TDR plan drawn up in June They and some smaller detachments of the pro-PKI troops converged on the Madosn area, where sone l'esindo troopa wete alreads stationed Of this force, one battalion was stationed in the tety of Madrun, one each in the adjorning regencies of Magetan and Ponorego. and two in Ngawi regenes During the first four days these troops left the admonistrations of the caties and towns n this area alone and concentrated thear effurts an the sillages, where without having to fight thes secured control \ delaved report from a Murda cortespondent in Madiun (probabls dispatched late en the thirteenth) who witnesed the first phase of this take-over stated.

In an actuve and aggresuve was the IDR rover-ens to setze power has been sarted especrally an the villagesThas rwserent is protected by four temtorial and one molule battalian whash are taken from nearh the enure fotce in Eart Java These bantals ins hase been daaded up among the vatous villagesThe sval a trunotrators fel uneass whate the polce cannot take ans actaon betause of belpeonis Thes azitate that the Soekarno Hatta gmernment has atdieated and that 1an Malaka and hs eolleagues and the Mayums and ets colleagues are trastees."

AMter comolidating its control over the illages, the Peundo and other PKI troops seazed control of the totans and the cats of Madien, thereby lringing to a head the ancipoent clash wth the local Republi can admumistration. Thas militant phase begvn at 3 a on Sepeember 18 in Madaun wath Sumarsono and Dpokosupono leading the operation. Armed men quickly sesred the local government offices, telephone eschange, and army headquarters There were almost no loval troops on the spot, and the fighting was brsef, two loval offeers being killed and Iour wounded. "From Madiun victors begins." announced Sumarsono over the local radio, reportedly exhorting the PKI as a whole to follow the example set in Madrun**

At about midnight of the eighteenth, some twenty hours after the coup in Madun and the surrounding resudency had been launched, Muuo, Sjarifuddin, Setadjit, and Wikana arrived at the house of Sumartono in the town of Redjoagung, near the outskirts of Madiun.

Here they talked to Sumarsono and Djokosujono and learned how far events had gone They were presented with a fast arcomph Whether they kked it or not, they found themselves catapulted from the Gottwald Plan phase of ther campaign into the revolutionary phase that the Fourth Dia mon and the Madiun Pesindo headquarters had premaverely stampeded It is posuble that unce they had learned the full facts con cerning the developments in Surakarta, they wauld have themseles made the same decision as Sumarsono and Djokosujono and switthed P.I strategy over to the revolutsonary phase. Very possibly they would have felt that they could not afford to repuduate soch a major souree of armed suength as the now committed Fourth Dission. Even had they decuded to remarm passve and accept such a loss, however, it must have seemed probable to them that the government, now understandably alarmed over general PKI intenssons, would have begun to remove all pro-PKI officers from their commands and would attempt to disarm peo PKI military unats In any ese once the Madiun coup had taken place, Musio, Sjanifuddn, Setadpt, and Wikana undoubtedly reasoned that they had no chouce but to associate themselses with thas meh revolutionary phase and male the best of it,

Any reservatsons they may have had were eluminated by Soekarno's radio address at ten o'clock on the night of September ig He brooght the ussee clearly to a head, calling upon the population to make a choce berseen "Musso and his Communist Party" and hinself and Hatta In the core of his speech Soelarno stated.

Yestenday mooming the Cammurast Parry of Muso suaged a coup in Madiun and formed a Sout governoent there under the leadeship of Muuo They conuder thu seuure of poser by fete an a prelamunary step in the sezure of the eptare governetent of ühe Republae of Indoneua Prom thas fact at in obnoous that che Selo [Surakarta] and Madzun aneadents are not nolated events bot are consttuent parta of an over all panern of action deugoed 1o overhroe the govermment of the Republe of Indoseua To achueve ths end, the rebeh have tred unata of the Tweny Nunth Brngade, the foemer streguler fovee coramanded by La Cal Dahlan By so doing Dahlan hin betrayed the eousary and Im vaolated the oath of the temy Therefote I hereby dumas Dahlan from the army

Brothers, consder crefully dhe meiting of tha Muns't Commuont Party n attempting to sesze our beloved Republie of Indoneua

My beloved people. in the nime of the stroggle for andependent Indoneua I call on you at ths extremely tnteal moment shen you and I are expement ing the greatest test to make a chosce betsetn followang Mue and hn Cren manst Pariy, who will obstruct the attammtnt of an andependent Indonreu

INTFRNAL STRUGGLE FOR POWER

or following Soekarno Hatta, who, wath the Almighty's help, will lead our Republie ef Indonesia to beeome an independent Indonesia which is not melijected to ans oher country whomorvet.

Support the government, evert yourteves to the utmost in suppoetng the otgins of government in combating the anurgents. and restree the lawful ilmunestratien in the regun senorsned Madron must be veturmed to our bands as seon as pesuble

An hour and a half later, at 1 to r a. Moso replied Calling on the population to overthron Sockarno and Hatta and seize the power of the state in at otan hands, he stated

On September s8. vo1*, the cnuens of Madran seued the authornts ol state in thesf own hands Wub that the ctuens of Madren have done their date in our mattonal prvolotios whsh as a mater of fact munt be led by the people and not by ans other clan'

Our revelution has ceotmued fot three sears under the lradershup of the national brurgron sdm, whah has alsays been untertam and vague in its stand in facing the Imperulnts in grneral and Amerka in porucular Thn ia one of the reasom wtos economn and polmcal condions wthan the Republie are continaally gritine worve That a whv the peeple in general and the wrekers in purtacular have not been able to fnd ans ddference between peesent conditionm and thome eoting under Dutch and Japanee regmes. Actually those un the Gesernment hase used our revolution for enrthine themvehes Dunng the Japanese eceupation these persons acted as Qunhings Remmnha [lorend labour]dealers and Heho [Week Ceeps] propagandests More than two mdhon women became wafows, because thrir husbands were Romedas And tes, the uame periom ate going to aell Indonema and her penple once more, to the Amthean Imperulnts

Soclarms, uung fabe accusations and peoofs, accused the People's Demoeranic kroes (Fbk) and Musos Cemmunet Party (Pkl) as obitruetensts Has Soekarno forgetten that un Selo [Surakanta] he mude use of Trotskyite trators to terrenee and krdnap all Commomots? Has Soekums forgotten thit he prommed and sunctrsied the enmes of the Sliwangi Danion and these terreents? What an the obgectve of Soekarne, the es Roemmnhvdealer, in releasng Tan Malska, a eranunal who endeaveeed to overthros hs Presülency? It in tlear that donng the past three yems Sorkarmo-Itatta, the es Rreoshadralens, the woen Qustings, have esecuted a capottlation peicy to the Dutch and the Bestnh, and at thut very moment they are goung to tell out Indonria and ber people to the Amercan Impetalats. Can penple of thos kond elaim that they have the just neht to goveen our Repubbe? The people of Indonesit are not blundt They undentand that these Romosha dealers are not fit to rule the cownsty The ctueos ef Madun and tome oiber plaers are breaking off eonnections with these amperalnt stelltes....

It was nesther Sorkarno nor Hasta who have opposed the Dutch, the Best ub, and now the Amercam, but rather the Indoneuan prople themthes Thetefore the happenngs im Madun and elsewhere are a ugnal to the vhole people to wrest the povers of the state snto ther own hands Thes is the only gusrantee thet the Repeblc will be truly sovereign, and capahle of fatng all attacks froen waibin and of lberasng ssell from these smpersalst satellnes

The people of Indonrua were asked by Sockarno to chose Soekarno or Musse!

The people should anmwer back "Sockarno Hatta the slaves of the Japanese

We are certasn that the people wall say "Munon aluays servex the prople of Indoneu! "

Acrordang to cete report, a few hours later the Moscow radio geared in wth Mumo's ammouneement, and backed the Madoun regime, stating

There has been a People's Goverrment set up in Madrun and Peaple's Com mattees are being estoblnhed in other leading towns Ths was a popolar up ruung agmnst the Govemment of the Fascut Japanese Quulinga, Soekarne and Hatta "

The government of the Republic moved swiftly. Early on Septem ber sg its poice had begun rounding up PKI Jeaders in Jogjakarta and other cities The unscheduled nature of the Madrun coup and the general unpreparedness of the top PKI feaders for the change over to revolutsonary tactics was attested by the fact that several of the most umportant of them knew mothang of what had happened n Madrun when, much surprned, they were arrested in Jogpakaria on the morning

is Mesctw Home Setvice Rado toondcsting in Rasun, Sapt ig ra, si reporind by a woeevber of the Secretimat of the U N Comzuttee of Good Offons The wnier os usanare shether ueslay beoadonts vete beamed to Indoneus en Indonesian or any other linguags Élasevm, the repeet of thas brondoust was almnt smemedusely made knonn to the top Repuhlacan Irades Nosther thes hyoadcast noe these knowledgs of st vas ever given pablstrty in Todaneua Possbly, of they gave cmedence to thas repert at they moned to they dsd mot wsh to antagorue what they evadently still con sudered to te a posenri murte of dplsmsant sappoet n the difinult omes they sew Iyng ahend Prolatly ence it beame kaavia in Moseoe, as it seen most hase been, that the rebetuen win not rhaly tn sucrred, conudeyatont of pohstal eupedancy charatter Bet faur soonchs later Sevei ness ergam were sgun dnenfaig the Madren rebellrin and Sociamo and Hata in sdhese teoes of the nineteenth. Among them were such top men as Tan Ling Djie. Abdulmadjid, Djokoudjono,* and Ir Sakirman

The following day before an emergency session of the Working Commettee, Prime Minister Hatta declared that proclamation of a national emergency was not sufficient and asked that "absolute authornty" be vested in the Preudent for a period of three months so that the emergency could be dealt wth adequutely The Workong Commottee quickly conmented to thes request,"* and mattial law was then proclaamed by Soekarno for the whole area of the Republic

Though less than s5,ooo troops fought on the sude of the Com munists, the government was severely handicapped in dealing with them because the bulk of its loyal troops were unmobilzed along the Van Mook lime facing the Dutch It had no asturance that the Dutch would not attark whele it was engaged in puttung donn the Communests, and it was mortally afraid they would attempt to intervene, ostensbly to help put dotun the murrectson Such action would have played drectly anto the hands of the Communists, lending support to their constantly repeated asiertion that the government had capotulated to the Dutch and that sts troops were operating under Dutch command against the Madiun regime. Likewise, the Republican leaders were certain that once the Dutch had antervened they would not leave. At this juneture the United States government wsely put strong pressure on the Dutch not to inter ene, and they were restrained from doing so. Nevertheless, throughout the course of the Communist rebellion the Republican government was never certain enough of Dutch intentions to risk pulling more than a small part of vts troops back. from the Van Mook line to fight the rebels It relied almost exclusively on its crack Silivangi Disnsion, its Police Mobtle Brigade, and a part of the Sungkono Division, stationed on the eastern border, to put down the rebels Altogether this fore was only slightly larger than that avaslable to the Communists. Honever, st wzs better tramed, better armed, and better offcered.

Net o be confosed wth Dokonopone, one of the pesncipal lradena at (he Madon coup Dokotudjono had been actne in the Pl at the tme of the sge6 rebellion and was contudered a close frund of Masso

to The PI (fDt) members of the commritre wete of trome, not poruent

nn The lew embodying the requen read "Fer thre manchs begatoang on is September. spp, the Pretdent at empowerd with full authont) (plee pouno) to take meemurs aod to wdapt vegulations whch may devate froet al eating Lava and Regulatans in eeder to preserve the welfare of the State in the mounting state of emergeney

Durang the fist few days following Mumo's procdamation of revoloton the Communsts expanded their controt over most of the residency of Madun and some towns and snall areas perspheral to st, the most umportant of these being Purwodadt. There were a few small and iso- Isted upraungs in relatsely unimportant areas in the north and west of Republican central Java (such as at Parakan), but they qusckly eol- Iapsed Therealter, the core of the revolutuonary regume, the resadency of Madiun, progressas-ely shrank under pressure from the simultaneous advance of the Silewangi Drvision and Police Mobile Bngade from the west and elements of the Sungkono Distion from the east In those unstances (uch as at Wonogin, Blora, and Tjepu) where a new town outside of this area passed under Communist control, st was primanly because of the arrival of Commutust armed forces which had been ejected by loyal troops from some other area

The program promulgated by the res olutionary regume, or "National Front Government" as it called asself was announced on September to It read

Oving to the seste of zffaurs at Madiun, we, the people of Indontina, most now undertake to eazcute the dutars of our Natenal Revolution, not enly in Madiun but also in the whole of IndoneuaOnly when the people have the lradentap of the revolutson and consequendy of the Governmeor. v the Republst pay wttentron to the whole need of the people, and at wall then eertimly be stretger and better able to rmrarme furtber struggles agaanst the Duch laperal A ather daus he prd ape rd leadertup an thas ann Impenalut struggle

To ae all ts te peophe i tag a gen p t landts, most also execate the followung

I The old Goverument apparsten which for the mast part constsa of heutating clements and khch created a feudal bourgros Government, mast wlach from the lowest to the haghest is chosen by the people Those clements whoch are conscous of the meeds of the people must be elecoed to the contral goveromens apparatus as welt as ento the govermments of regrots and vdlages.

II The melitary pover mrost be thoroughly to the hands of the people, so that st eat be trily a weapon an the defense ef the country and tbe prople agaurnt our eneranes agerits inerrtally The struttute and ceder of the Peoples Army frora the tnwet to the haghnt munt be radatally tehufed so thon at can peonve real democratr tendencin The army mnt havr clomer auocuton wth the prasants and workery Our army most be hmed upon prolegarsanesm

III Alee the people hate takem power, all deparunems, fatones batks.

and other thingy must be handed to the State. and the workers granted wafe democrauc tights by placeng them in poutions of leaderthup in production and dutmbuion

IV. Accoedang to the laws of a National Revolution thos revolution must be led by the workers united with the peatants A revolution can gain vcoory enly when supported by the peasants. especually the por peasants Therefore these poor peasants must be goen lands Our motto is ' Lands for those who sork them" All lands that can be dinuded munt be given to the peaants

V In the econome feld, the Prople s Government must aeize all factorats, plantaciont, banks, tramport and all means of communcations and osher things which were owned by our enems, the Dutch In che towns and soflages all foodsruffs must be contzulled oo that prxes can be fixed so as to simplify dutnbuton when necevary

VI The whole people workers. peasants men and women, must be re teganued so that they effeetvely stand behind the new Government All ef forts of the People's Gosernmens must be done wth dhe people and for the people Only with this can the people be a mighty revolutionary tactor which can easly defeat the attacks of the enemy wsthin or without.

curty Depariment must be extatlnhed, made up of all soçally conscious elements .. . Ths aort of Securaty Department wall be able to arreu the agents and spies of the enemy The same Security Depattment can work more effectively, if in all public enterpenes, factones. and in the ofices, there are action commuttees formed, havong as their duties the guarding of the safety of the enterprses from all antunataonal elements

Ferther, for the stzengthening of antermal secursty, the workers and farmers are given arms Tha will net only umpiidy the means of guaranseing on ternal aecuraty, but will alvo lighten che burden of the State on defenie as a whole

That in the only way to dncharge our natonal revolution for the needs of the working prople and for the strengthening and defending of our Proletarsom Republc.

Freedoml Vartoey!

Long Lave eur Proletarian Reputlicd The National Front Commuee, Indonesia"

By the evening of September zo, at must have been clear to the PKI leaders in Madiun that the wadespread popular uprisings that they had counted upon were not taking place elsewhere in the Republie. Perhaps they felt that this lack of popular support resulted in part from the extreme and uncompromiing tomes ef their mitial pronouncements and that they had altenated potental supporters by going too

" Ponied in Frase Navonal, Sept as, agg far Whatever the case, beginning on the evening of the twentieth, the tence of their pronouncemems alsered sharply and became moch milder

In the revolutionary government's efficial news organ of September *1, Musmo n the lead article (undoubtedly written the day before) took paims to pornt out that the Madun coup was not directed toward the establishment of a Sovart government. The National Front government that the PKI had establshed was, he explained, dedicated to the natronal revolution Only at a later date, after completion of the national revolution and the commencement of a socalist revolution, would a Sovset gmernment be established Sockarmo and Hatta and the 'nationalat bourgeon groups" in Indonesia, hbe stated, had sided wrth the " Imperalists" and betrayed the Indoneuan revolution. There were houever, "prugrevuve" bourgrois elements such as those backing the Madoum regume, be sud, and they were still needed an the nationalut or "democratc bourgeoa" phase of the revolution "

On the evenung ef September ro, Col Djokosujono, Miitary Commandant in Madiun, broadeast over the local radio

Many peaple, meluding the Preudent, think that we wanted to overtheew the Repablix and esablah anodher Repobist with vs own armed forces Thu. bowever is not tree The Madran affaur in not a coup it n not an atterpe to overthrow the Repuhlit The Madiun zffaur a enly a cormection ef the policy of chose elements whuch washed to lead the revolution in anocher daret ton It n therelore, cdear that the Madsun affair is not an attempt to overtrow the Republir, but n merely an attempt to elimmate colotul and feudal elements

An equally mild speech was brnadcast by Suripno the same night. On the neght of September 2s. Amir Sjarsfuddin in the last recorded broad cast by a member of the top PKI leadershup stated in his opening paragraph

The struggle *e ane now carrying an heme a no more and no les than a move ment to corrett the evolution of our molotion Therefore the boses remates the sume and never changing The revolutron according to out conudera tooto temama one sbush ian natsomal in charattet, whoch eim be called a veola tron of bourgeoa democrata Our conutntution remarm the szme one, our fiag in the sume red and whte, whle our manonal anthem m none other than the Indonesa Raja

INTERNAL STRLGGLE FOR PONER

On the folloning day when Silwangs troops were gettang uncom fortabls clo-e to Madiun, Sumarsono, the originat leader of the Madrun coup, humelf came out wath a prenouncement, the mldnest of which contrasted shurplhs wath his etigunal revolutionars staterents. In an oScal announcement segned bs humself as Military Governor of Madrun he stated

We berewsth ofcaalls announce that eut gusern-ens has rever hurbered anv unention ol sreain a Sovuct s e a Gpurut govermens as has eften been stated bv our Enees Tre guvern-ent in AMadiun a a reg oral popular ad eunttration and n estabioled an à part sf te drmarax Repubi of Iedores

The accuuton tat se obpectve of vur enve ent begur un Maducn n to aboluh ed e Repullx in rerebs redered fa'se 1 roverrt s only an en desvor to ruke a proper corretion ed e ptaì a et the Hatta gverm rient aed ef eser lendet sto rrrded ta tes e Duch

The whole people of tntoreus and ée wold ens eust support shs move ment of thew really da not wut to be thr slaves od the cmperulots agaon."

However, the new tone of the PhI leaders brought no ducernuble increase in their popular support. Government troeps drove theur armed forces from the kes toswnts of Magetan and Ngawi, and finally on September go Lt. Col. Sadikan s brigade of the Sdiwangt Dnsion entered and secured contrel ever Madiun atsell

Therrafter the strategy of the Pkt leaders was to avoid battle with the guvermment forees and retire to mountaumous areas sustable fur long term guermlla warfare. Thes hope? to ruauntain themselves and most ef their remauning troops untact umtal the Dutch laurched an attack agairst the Republic. Thes were confdent that such an attack would develop by the finst of Januarv. sgz9. Thes appurenthy believed that once it was launched, the presure seanst them would be eased and they would be able to rehabsltate thesr political position en the basis of an appeat for mational soldarits aganst the Datch.

In their vetreat frum Madrun the destunation of the PK1 leaders. now significantly under the command of Sparfudin rather than Musso, was the guertella base of Kandangan This was a welt prepared and eauly defended area where large supplies of munitions and arms had been built up in anticipation of an eventual Dutch attack. Honever, befare Sjarifuddn could get there, the place was ecupied by the battalion ef the Sungkona Divinon led by Major Sabarodin. De

19 Phal, sope. es, 1245.

prived of tus lose, Sjarafuddin was forced to move to weaker, less defendable boses in the Mount Willis area.

There followed a month of shufting, hat and run warfare with the government's troops closing in tuaghter and tighter around the principal Communst units As Commutist forces became harder pressed, many of them, particularly some of the smaller unasts, became increasingly beutal Several hundred cvil sersants and school teachers were executed by them, fifty one out of fifty tix polacemen un Magetan alone In partucular, members of the Matyum appeared to be sungled out for cruel treatment, sometimes thas beang limited to robbery, but frequently extending to torture and execution At Pemorogo on October 4. the armed peasant auxilsary of the PKI, the Sarekat Rakjat, in attempting to recapture the toun from a Silmangs unst forced about s,ooo casilians to march an front of at to screem sts advance As a result almost so0 ciwilhans were kalled

On October t8, the last large rebel malstary unat, numbering about 1.geo men, was captured, and the back of the rebelloon was consudered defnnely broken '" Three days later Musso wat shot and killed in a skirmish On November sg. Dyokosujono and Maruto Darusman were captured, and two days later the same fase befell Sjarsfuddin and Suripno In the meantime all the other top PKI leaders " except Seuadjst, Sumarsono, and Wilana had been captured These last three never were On December 7. 3918, TNI headquarters announted the final "extermunation" of the rebellon and stated that approximately $5.000 persons, mostly troops (partacalarly of the srregular malrtary ceganiratom), had been arrested " On December 15. the mandate of emerpenty pouers granted to SoeLarno to meet the situation came to an end and was not renewed

A majer reason for the failure of the PKI rebellhon was undoubtedly the fact that ats leadery had heen prematurely stampeded into action for whoch they were not yet prepared The process of fuuon of the constituent FDR partes anto ene monolathic PKI had only pust begun when the rebellion staried The mew sutcessor political organaration could hardly have been an a more amorphous and dsorganized stace. Large poruons of the memberhapa o the Socalat Paty, the Labor Party, the SOBSt, and the Peundo were actually strongly opposed to the foson They were es en more strongly opposed to the sdea of revo

Jutionary action against the gmernment The FDR parties in Sumagra and Bantam oppased the udea of fuuon All of them, including the Sumatra beanch of the PKI, almost smmedaately following the Madiun coup announced their loyalty to the government of Soekatno and Hatta Even in Republican central Java, several local beanehes of the FDR prutes, sncludng the Bodjonegoro branch of the PKI," refused to brek the rebellion and promptly announced their support of Soekarno and Hatta

Had the Communsts had tome to organue thesr revolumonary effort effectivels, and had it been co-ordinated, it would undoubtedly hve been a far mote serious aflair The psychological and economse conditions descrbed in the peeceding chapter would then hase undoubtedly been much more effectvels explosted However, even had the organuation and co-ordnatoon of the Communost effort been op timum, st is probible that they still would not have succeeded There were other lasic farters whch prohabls would have miluased decsively against their succew

In the first phee, the Communnts were attacking leaders who had become the very symbol of the Repubbsc and of Indonesan independenre. Sorkarne, in particulr, had for an undouberd majerity of the Indonesin rank and file come to symbolize the Republic. For them an attatk on Soekarno was an attack on their Republie.

Also of great impertance was the fact that the majernty of the peasantry withun the Republic was reasonably well off. Though they suffered from an acute shortage of texules, moit of them had more to eat than they hud had during the persod of Dutch colonial rule, and all or a large port of their undeltednew had been uiped out, For the most part thns arose from the faet that they were required to pay the same monttary fand tax that they ltad been obliged to pay during the petiod of Dotch rule. Wth the tremendous snflation that had oc curred since then, ths meant that they were required to pay well under one tenth of the land tax un tenms ef crop percentage that they had formerly paid, The fractional amount of land tax wluch they now paid meant that more of theur crop could be kept to themselves, thereby giving them a surplus whuch they could either eat or sell at the high prevaing market prices to poy off thear standing debts Thus the appeal of Communists to peasants who owned the land they worked was negligible

In addition, the appeal of the Communists to landless peasants was limited except xn a few places, notably where there were foreign es tates It was reatized by most of those who worked the land that except for these forergn-owned plantations there was little land available for dstnbution The incidence of indigenous landlordism in Indoneua was vers shigtt, parucularly in central and east Java, where very few land on ners had more than enough land to work themselves. In addition. the forced labor programs of the Japanese had resulted in the death of many farm laborers, and a great many more were servang in the Republican armed forces These two factors had decreased the number of farm laborers suffioently to relieve sigtoficantly, though eertainly only temporanly, the excess of landless peasants in relation to the land available " Also most of the land which the Communists slated for dissuon amongut landless peasants was village etenmunal land, used for puvng the cost of the village sdministration. It was generally reahzed that loss of this land to the village would mean that the local peasants would have to provade cash funds to pay for the serices of the village officers, amigation, schools, etc. This was, of course, par ocularly opposed by the landowning elements snce et would mean vers considerable taves for them

Actually one can an general say that the bourgros group that the Communats so vehemenily maligned had suffered on the average a good deal more than the peasantry Certarnly most of sts memben, strugghing as they dad on the meager pay of cavil servants, ane less than the average peasant. Though they Ived in buldings of masonry and brack, they probably averaged leas floor space per family than the typocal pearant hoose In vmting villages the vrater was strotk by the fact that often the homes of wealty peasants were much betier furnished with such stems as chuna tableware than those of many middlerank, eval sercantt. Upon inquiry he found that generally such stems had been arqurred at the market from eval servants who had come to trade their possesions for rre an onder to supplement what was purchasable with their inadequate salarses

Aho the Commumsts overestimaned the support dhey could get from organized labor. In certain areas, such as Madsun and Tjepu, where labor discontent twas pirticularly great, they did get consuderable backing In general, however, except where their troops led the way. organired labor was apathett to theor exhortatsons for militant action and a general strike

on wrthan the armed forces Here as well as among the ranks of laber tion program Here, too, there was dissatnlaction because of economic conditions and thuarted nationalist hopes. for which the government was in varying degrees held to blame Frequenth this dossatisfaction was strong enough to snduce elements of these groups to back the Communnts in thesr demands on the govermment for rectification of these conditions, purticularls tence thes were the prinespil organaued chainel of protest However, un most such cases thes were not willing to back them in an atempt to overthrow the government, a government whoch, despote its limstations, for most of them as well as for the peas antry had come to symbolize their own nationalism

Ideological Orientations and

the Development of Internal Politics,

October-December 19, 1948

ONLY a small number of the members of most Republican political partues were fully acquaunted with the sdeology and platform advocased by the leaders of their party However, it is of importance to reahze that zome Anowledge of their party's prugram and sdeology (beyond the mere fact that at was anteolonal and pro-ndependence) was possessed by a probable majoraty of the adhermts of all parties This did not mean that the majority of backers of most porties were not wually supporters of them ptimartly because of their suppeet of thear partacular leaders as andrviduals Nor did it mean that most of the supporters of the Islamoc partoes dad not back them prsmatily because they were sdentafied wth Islam But wath probably a majorsty of the backers of every party there was some ugmficant degree of undemtanding of part of its program and ideology and a dspoution to suppoet it partly because of that

There was an actne and dynamoc minorsty in almost every party's membershup whoch did attach great smportance to ats adeology and plat form Because of ther own actine poletical leadenhop or simply because as undividuals they were held in respect in ther community, members of these monorities generally influenced large numbers of more apathetsc and untutored menbers of their porty, translating for them in sumplafied terms and famlar symbols sts program and relatively more esoteric ideology. They served as a sort of trdge between the top leaders of the party, its ideology, and plasform and a large part of sts mass following

Thus, the relatsonship between the party s udeology and platform and its mass backing, though in general tess substantial in res olution ary Indoneua thin an most countries of the West, was of real smportance

An snterestung aspect of the Communast upruang was the fact that except in a few places the Chinese population fared extremely well This was a matter of surpesse to many Indoneuans because un most pressous instances where fightang occurred the Chonese population generally suffered the most Ihere w2s a tendency for most Indonesiant to look upon the Chinese as collaborators of the Dutch or at least as desirous of maintainang Dutch ascendiney Certainls it was true that the majorrty of wealthy and moddle clas (hinese were unsympathetuę to the natsonalst hopes of Indonesuans and would have preferred the contnuanee of Dutch hegemony

Thus when fighting troke out there had frequently been a tendency for Indoneuans to loot Chunese shops and ecrasuonally to kill Chinese However, no Clunese were reported killed during the course of the PKI rebellion, while a great many noncombatant Indoneuan civdians were Except in marginal areas where the central Jeadershup of the revolutionists was weakest, the Chunese sustasned almost no property lowes The tendency of many Indonesans was to unfer that this unusual development was a consequence of comcious, strongly enforced policy on the part of the PKI leadership and to ascribe thus policy to the desire of these leaders to develop the bases for friendly relations with the new Commumist regume in Chuna Thiese Indonesians note that in cases where armed adherents of Tan Malaka's varsant of communism have been :nvolved the utustion has been quste the reverse, and the Chinese population has suffered more, rather than less, than usual.

MASJUM1

It was the members of the Masjumi Party who were the special victims of the revolutionists' violence This cannot be satisfactorily explained by the fact that a majority of the larger Indoneuan landowners were from the Maajums and that the ancidence of members of that party among Indonesian moneylenders was high Probably a majority of the incidents of violence where Masjums members were victims befell civil servants and teachers who had nothung to do with agriculture or moneylending Whether this appotently general anti Maspumi policy arose prutespally im a spontaneous way from the rank and file of the resolutiomats, parthy as a consequence of an undoubted anti Masjumi indoctrnation gn en them by leaders of the FDR,' or whether it actually arore largely as a result of consesous direction on the part of some of those leaders, the tendency among most Masyumm members was to beleve the latter

As a resul, the antos-Communst orsentation ef many Masjumi mem bers became even stronger than st had presiousdy been Fer a great many the reinforcement of this attitude covered not only the Stalinist Communists who led the PKI, bot extended to the mationalst Communists of the pro-Tan Malaka camp who had furnoshed some of the most mulitant oppoution to the rebels A lesser but impertant mumber for a short time progected this attatude to cover noncommunist socialists as well, such as Sjahar's ants PKI Indonman Socalat Party

For a time, too, as a result of tus general ants leftat sentiment the infuence of the Relagious Socialists within the Masjumi suffered a setback. However, they soon recovered the strong position which they had been steadly buldn up du the oue o he prious tee vears and continued to strengthet it. Just before the outtreak of the Vadsun rebellion the nurober of Religious Socalists on the Masyums Party Council had grown to six out of a total of seventeen (Tweve of the seventeen members were pervons of Western education, one of the tvehe being a woman) With several other members of the council. including sts chaurman, Dr Sukman, holding vuews reasonably close to thers, the Relgaous Socalurs had by Decmmber, 1, come to extteuse more influrnce over Masjumm policy than the remainder of the Council's members combined. Thear grouung anfuence was re ffected by a gradual stuft sn the eutlook of most of the other leaders of the party to poutions clmer to their own

The character of the Masjums that had been developing since its formation m November, 1915. cannot be understood by mere reference to the conststutson under which it was then established Only a little more than sux months later the broad and cautsous phrasing of that document was ecipsed by the more vigorous and socially dynamic Ianguage of the party's "Urgeney Program," of which the Religious Socialsts and those closest to them were the principal architects. Among other thangs thus called foe- (t) Realuztion of the Islamic deology tn matters eoncerning the state in order to be able to establinh

1 Cedeeátefly sn seor reral arem eononx grevanes apnt Indlnés an onecieuders were a state Iosed on popular sovereignty and justice in harmony sith teachings of Islam, (2) Enactment of faws whuch guarantee to workers monimum wages, maxumom working hours, arcadent and old age allowances, protection at to security, health, and housung, and (s) Enaetment of laws uluch guarantee for the peasant pevate ownershup of land sal- Écsent to support hum and fis famals, protection in the sale of hut products, and the general enhincement of hos status

Finally with regard to the general organiration of the economy, the program stated (t) The pruncipol duty of the stase must be to open the posubulity to work and to have a pob to all citzens, (*) The economy should be hased upon collectvum in whucdh undissdual anituatwe may not be detrimental to the general interest and should be directed towards the general prosperity, (3) The right of prnate ownership is recognared, limsted ly the prosnuons lasd down in religion (taxes, charzty, ete ), and (t) Caputalsm which obssously consosts of andiudual interest alone must be oppoved (s e , secrally harmful caputalum is to be opposed]

Not only dud the pirty press the government to adopt thas program, but it aho undertook to amplement much of st direetly Via the Islamic sýstem of sakat,* a form of charnty ancwmbent upon all who can afford payment, it financed the measures whuch at introduced In Western prlance sotat would be recognuzed as akon to the tithe that formerly twas prad to the Chureh, In Islam, honever, there is no crganuzed church to undertake tithe collecton, and if st is to be taxation datinct from that of the state, the community atself must organire it. Without such community organization, the indissdual as not apt to pay. Masjumi Jeaders maintasn that the Koran stresses that zokat does not mean merely grving the funds collected to beggars, at must be an organized system to expand the economie wealth of the community as a whole and must not be sterile investment.

Late in s9j6, in the resndency of Kedirs, the Masjumi underrook the collection of zatat in order to apply st to the social reforms to which it was committed. For this purpose it established the Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesla (Indonesian Assocration of Islamic Peasants) The governing board of each local branch of the Sarekat Tani was elected by all the landowners of a village or village complex. Each board assessed the zokat that the landowners of the area should pay. Those assessed then ha o e me e t h ST for the support of schools or mosques. Whereas prevously the relatively small amount of sakst collected by local religious leaders had gone almost excluuvely to the support of Islamic schools and mosques, a major portion of the much larger amount now collected went to the Sarekat Tani

Under the gurdance of Masjumi leaders the Sarekat Tani utilized in zaket funds for helping poor and landless peasants In each community wastang Inta of the most diligent landless peasants were drawn up by the local boards, and land was bought each year for those whose diligence put them at the top of the list, no repayment being demanded of them. In addstion consumer and prodecer co-operatives were organ raed among the peasantry to free them from dependency on the itmerant Chinese moneylender, previously their prenopal source of credit. These co-operatives marketed the crop and bought at wholeule tools and fertilizers for the peasant, while advancing him sufficsent credit to tude hom over untel the crop was harvested and sold Loans were at the extremely low rate (for Indoneua) of to per cent per annum, did not re qure the usual extensrve collateral, and could be repard either in money or in kind So successful were these co-operatives sponsored by the local Sarekat Tanos that wathin two years the large majonty of the peasants in the areas served by them had turned to them and away Érom the Chinese moneylendens Many of these Chnese were forced to emograte to Dutch-ocrupied areas (in partscular the reudeney of Pekalongan) in order to make a livang By midsggß, there were over zo,ooo members of the Sarekat Tanı in Kediri and Madiun reudencies and more than 10,ooo in the Magelang Wonosobo area. Branches were being set up throughout most of Republican controlled Java in what was envsaged as a tremendous program of expansion (Masjumi leaders stated to the wnter that it bad not been deemed necessary, as yet at least, to introduce the program into Sumatra unce the communal ceganiratuon of agriculture generally remains stronger there and there is aho plenty of land)

In early s9s7, the Sarekat Dagang Islam Indonena (Indonesan Is Iamic Commerce Assotation). am organiration of merchants roughly parallelng the Sarekat Tans Islam Indonesa, was establohed under the auspices of the Masjums. Thas undertook to erganaze the merchants for the collectoon of the askst along the same Iines as the collection from landowners. Zekat funds collected by the Jocal Sarekat Dagang Islam branches were utiltzed to establah a Bank Pembanguman Umat (Bank for the Reconstruction of Society). Its function was to advance credit at low rates with minimum security requirements to small merchants and to worthy poor persons needing capital to start businesses By mid- 1g18, the succeis of dhe Sarekat Dagang Islam had been establnhed, and its number of branches was beginning a rapod expanuon.

The feeling of Masjums leaders in mid 1919 was that with the attainment of andependence the government should co-ordinate the actasaties of the local unts of the Sarekat Tans Islam and the Sarekat Dagang Islam, but should not interfere in thear local administration. For they felt that the population must not lean on the government, but must be made comcious of ats own responubility and ability to tale action on its own imitiative.

During the years following the Masyumi's Urgeney Program of early 1946, the sdeology of the Religious Socialists took on outlines that became more and more distunct, and they became increaungly artucalate in expressing it. One of the clearest expoutions of their ideas is to be found in the pamphlet, Poltek dan Revolun Kita ("Polstics and Our Resolution*), published in the middle of tg18 by one of their most influential leaders, Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara The following excerpts from it may help to illustrate the siewpoint of that increasingly influentual left wing ef the Masjumi:

What is the asm of our natonal revolution? The arm is the unity of the Indontuan people and the realiratian of socual justce and prospenty for our people Therefere the abolaton of the colomual sytem alone at not enough. We need an economic and polstical structure which can guarantee the realuration of socal justice, and thns could not be realheed in the Dutch time which was colonualstic and capitalistic in nature

Our constitution is also inftuenced by socalom, as is proved by article s3 However socaluto in the comtitutson has no spestual connection with Marxian Socialun, beckuse article ag, clause one, stapulates that our state is hased on Relsgion. The followers of the constisution who are now following Marxian Socialam unconscously puesue a wrong path

Collectivium wichout indevadualnm is like a flock of sheep which can be dapemed easily. It is Fascism if a eertain sdeology will impose collectreuim upon the prople by torcibly elmunating a clasn of people

Islam forbids the forcible smpostion of a certaan adeology. Indidualism ia peoperly respected by Idam, each individual is vesponarble for humself to God. Ilam calls for the reaching of agreement by means of discussion among the people In our revolution many Molema are foegetung the peinciples of Ilam: they support Marxian Secialiem and participate an actions which merely create troubles and hamper the revolution.

Our matzonal revolution needs an sdeology whuch can guarantee the realuatron of socal juntuce However, I beheve that Marsism can not fulill the need, in addition, Marxism in contrary to the Constitation The adeology whach a urtable to our society is Religrous Socalism, an sdeology which is in hanmony with the Conttution Relagrous Socralnm dees not abolnh indh vidualum, ndondual smtative, and ndinduat emponsubday Thus, not only the frendom ot the whole naton is gurranteed bet also the freedom of the indvsdoad, wothout cloung the door for pouble nationaluration or socals ration of certain votal encerprues This è the ideal of ouy natsonal revolution

Therefore at as not cormect to state that it is not yet the tme to begin socalut resolution On the contrary, our natuonal revolution obvioudy andicaten ele ments of socialnm, whuch are smlar to Marxsan Socalsm If the elements of sogatum do not exat, the natsonal sevolution meann nothuing to us, as it does not gise new hope However, the baus of secialnm in our revolution an not the hstancal materahsm of Mars, but ats bass is the duty of man towards man and the duty of man towards God.

Therefore the means of reahzng secralum must be different from the means used by Marsoan Socalem with ats class struggle According to Re Iigous Socalum, socialiation s only a means to realure sooall justice and the people's prorpersty Therefoee to acheve socalration st n not neceuary to elmnate a certaan cdasa or groupa, and rt n also not necuary to ntroduce an over all sonaluaton, it is enough if soculutation n antroduced when neces sury

Compention arang out of prisate innustre as such n not bad, but the contrary, because competition incremes production and mproves the qualey of goods We must not Ioeget that the progres of prodoction and economy en Europe and Amenca vas ponhle becuuse of competton. Only at a eettaim stage does thos liberal economy not meresse production and s there a tendency to lunst peodoction At that stige the govemment mest intervene by netionalieng eertain prvase enterprues or establuhung enterpnses stself

Generally speskung the 1mutataon of compeuuon and/or socaluation should not be introduced merely because of a deure to realue a certan theary, the tume and cirçumutances mest also be taken mto consderataon If the govem ment organt are not yet well enough orgimzed to cary out and supervue the regulanons made by the state becmuse of the lack of capahle personnel, and if bone producoon s not yet suffcsent to supply the needs of the people. we most thnk twice before we ntrodece socaluation or lunst competstion Oere merly t e of reaan a cn ey, w e own people to de *

The sucess of the Religrous Socraluts in bringing the Masjumi as a whole towards their pount of view is attested by the extent of agree ment reached by a sulntantial majority of the seventeen members of the Masjumi Party Countil by the end of tg18 The following is a poraphrase of the proncoples espeuned by the coumcil's mapoeity at that tume, principles wluch as far as the wrater knows are still held

(1) Complete independence of Indoneua

(x) Following of and emphaus upen the penciples of sectal pustie and democracy found an ddam

() The state muu be gomerned seceoding to the will of the majenity, with is prncipal offeers beng (hosen through electiom

(q) Oppmtion to capotalum in prnnciple but arknowledgment of the merewity of sis continmsance for some tome an certain spheres

(s) A mxed economy shoald be followed-cooperatise. tocalstsc. and aportene

(6) Emphaus shoudd be on the en-operative sector, with the state advane ing creda to develop thn

() As the govertment acquires suficent captal and admanstratve per aonnel, it should gradoally nationalue trampeetation, conmuica tom, monong, od peoduction, large plantacions and any largescale in dustry so long as such matronalatation an to the country's best anterevts Natonalzation should be accompaned by payment of reasonable compensstion to those whose property is exproprated

(8) Small scale ecenomic enterptse on an indoiduat bast, so long as it is not uncontrelled, an sncially bealthy, un particulir because it developt indoudual unitative and responublty

(o) Small scale econome enoerpene should remain an the hands of the indosdual. Duu only where it cannot be integrated into eo-operatives should at reman on a purely capitalntie bases.

(te) Foreign captal in welcomed so long as in is non polsteil and so controlled that the Indoneuan worker it protected and escessive profits are not taken oot of the country.

(ss) Wages must be equvalent to the social value of the work performed

(s) In non nationalued economoc emerposes the government should en sure that ownen of the capatal do not take excesuve prefits and thit the workers share in the profits

(ss) Abuolute neutrality in the Cold War, abgnment wnh nesther U S5 R. nor U.S A *

PARTAI SAREKAT ISLAM INDONESIA (PSH)

Wthin the Partas Sarekat Islam Indonesia (PSt1) a shake-op of leadershup and a change in onentation followed the suppression of the Madrun rebellaon On July s. sg4ß, a eonferenee of the party at Kedurl had called for Wondoamseno's replacement as chairman by Abikusno. Hovever, Abikuino tras then under house arrest * and could not effecovely ight to enfore the decruon, while at the same time Wondoamisen's postion ras strong because his political sponsce, Sjarifuddin, was still in a postion of power Following the rebellion, however, Wondoamseno found hamself wuthout a powerful sponser and confronted by Abokusno, who was now no longer an jil. On October 15, he comented to zeld place as chaurman to Abikusto

Though after Abokusmo's asiumption of leadershup the orientation of the PSII became more defeute, ita program with respect to domestic polcy, at lrast, temauted far from clear. Its leaders, unlike those of the Maspam and hke thome of the PNI, stressed that domestic social reform would have to awast the attainment of full independence. It was probably an part became of thos that their socso-economie platform remamed vague. Accordng to Abkusno, the PSII opposed socalism and considered Indonesuan socialsts to be no different from Communasts "We respect indis idual rights and pewate property," he stated in November, sg8, to the writer Defending economae indsidualam. he contamued "The actrities of the indasadual are more antensive than those of the gosernment, and the andrudual can be better relied upon" But he qualified his defense of ecenome indsidualism. "As long as prwate enterpese is able to meet the needs of the people, it is all right." be sasd "Otherwose the government must regulate economic enterprise." Should it be found to be in the country's interests, his party kould, he stated, countenanee the nationalization of transport and largescale industnes. "The peescriptions of Islam are not narrow," he eancluded, "and to a large extent can be interpeeted to meet the needs of the utuation."

which it feared would never end in real independence for Indonesia. In working to keep the government from entering into further negotiations it was willing even to co-operate closely in ths sphere wuth the Murba Party.

With respect to foreign polaty the stand of the PSII was approximately the same as that of the Masjuma-strict neutrality between the United States and Rustua and refusal to be drawn anto esther the Cold War or a fighting war.

PARTAI MURBA

The demate of the FDR parties in Jasa (except in Bantam, where they had not backed the rebellion) left a sacuum in political teadership which several of the other parties, partucularly the GRR, the PNI, and Sjahrir's Indonessan Socalnt Party sought to explost. Obviously any party which could attract a conssderable proportion of that majority of the memberships of the Socialist and Labor parties and SOBSI which did not tack the rebellion would find sis strength substantsally enhanced.

To capitalize en this opportunity the principal loosely federated parties which made up the pro-Tan Malaka GRR decsded to join together in one solid, monolithic party. Therefore on October g. the Partai Rakjat (People's Party), the Partai Rakjat Djelata (Poor People's Party), and the Partai Indonesia Buruh Merdeka (Independent Indonesian Labor Pasty) announced their merger into a single political party, the Partai Murba (Proletarnan Party), to take effect on November 7, the anniversary of the Russan Revolution. Meanwhale the GRR continued to exist as a federation of political organizations, and its three principal constituent parties which had merged into the Murba collectively maintained their membershup in the federation

Neutral estimates credited the new party with having about Bo,ooo members* Its leadershup was drawn from the ablest supporters of Tan Malaka, for the most part young men possessed of a milstant idealism. They intluded Sukarni aa chaurman; Maruto Nitimdhardjo, vicechairman; Sutan Dewanis, second vice-chairman: Sjamu Harja Udaja, secretary general, and Pandu Karta Wiguna, secretary. Actually the party's behind the scenes mastermind was Tan Malaka humself. In an article in the October so issue of the party's newspaper he laid down the official definition of the word "Musba." He stated:

• See Rokpet, Nov, e. igs Pekpet wa a PNI newspapet statted shonty atter the Medrun rebellion.

By the word 'Murba" we mean the group of people she have nothung escept bearn and body The vond a appruxmately covered by the oerm "peo letanat" Hewever, the hustorscal development and the characienuties of the Indonesan Merba are diferent from the Western peoletarsat The Indonesan Murba is not yet completely separated from the famaly, as in the West More over the strugple and the enemy of the Indonesan Murba are different fram the struggle and the enemy of the Westerm proletariat, especally sn matters concerning derad

Among the varsous working groups conitatuting the Murbe, Tan Malaka ncluded the Murba Intellek (insellectual Murha) He went on to say

The Murba a the reualt of the exploutaton of the capetahist mperalnt Dutth and other foreignens who have socceeded an redacung the peatants the artrans, and even the Indonesan landowoers and modffe clans chat exnted at the tme the Dutch landed in Indoneua The Indonean Meebe reiults from the transfoematon of the Indonetan 'have” mno the Indoneson "have not' dur ang the coome of the past gso years

The Indonesus Murbu clas his saffered most under the yoke of foreign esplortaton and, therefore, ar*ardng to the theory of Duilectacal Matetilam, the Murba clas mast have the truest deure for freedom and che atrongest desure for freedom

In dhe sroggle foe undependence and agarmt fincum, mpetalom, and captalum, it n natural that the Murba clan form the moving forte, aunce the Murba class is the largest and has auffeed mout

By formang an Indonesan Merta organuaton wch seel dscipline. and by execoung è tactac and roategy wloch ase bese fieted to the Indoneean Murba, the Indonesan Murba will play the Htorse Role which n enposed upon it, namely

To AGAzE AND AOeLI ALL RÉVOARy POE oF THE (NDSIAN FEOPE WITH THE PURPOIE oF DEITROING THE ACCRESSION oF THE CAPHTALSTS AND IMPERIALISTS AND LAVING SONN THE FOTNOATION or A SOCIALNT SOCIETY IN INSONTHA *

The comtstution of the Murba as announced on November ss, 1918, contaned among its provauons the following cenual poines (t) The besus of the party is antifascurm, ant umperalism, and ancocapitalism, and it bases ats struggle on the orderly action of the proletariat, (e) to negotate with the Dutch on the bases of full recognotion after foeeig= noops have left Indonenis, (s) confiscation and explostation of enemy properties, (c) nationalization and collectiization of vitat economic

a Capataluason a Tan Malikan enterprises (including plantatsons, mening, indonery, and transpert); (s) nationaliration of binking and of exports and imports, (G) to strive for Indontua's becoming a member of the Unated Nations and other internationnt organirations on the losis of equal status and democracy, and wth the purpose of estiblshung a proletaran world government, and (7) erganitation of the Murb: Parts ascording to the principe of “Democratue Centralum "•

The concepts and phraseology of the consttution en general ap peared calculated to attract not enls ex FDR members who had become drellusioned w,th ats ar tous," but a much brozder group as well The mas party that was ens saged was to be somewhat in the niture of the old Persatoan Perdjuang in of earls 19p6, and certainly ats program closely approumated it" In endeavoring to atract a large mass fol lowing portarular puns were taken not to alrmate peospective members on religious grounds or berzuse of doctrinaire sdeological attitudes. Thuy at the first public meeting of the Murbo Parts on November 7. 1918, sts secretary general. Spamsu Harpa Udaja, stated that the party as "lased upon religion, nationalnsm, and socralsm, wsth the purpose of strengthening the undependence of the Repubhe " and that "prior to the attainment of full Indoneian independence the party would not lay too much stress on adeology " i"

In attracung nes adlerents the Murha Party already powested the very real advantage of having folloved a consistently nationalst policy, a quality whach, in the minds of many, sts cluef Communist competitor, the PKI, had not possesed Thongh pro-Soviet, sts leaders were reservedly so. They had conustently adhered to the position that Indoneua's immediate interests took precedence over those of Runia. Emphasis upon thes was one of the most utal elements in the particular variant of Communem espoused by its leaders, and this factor put the porty in a strong pounon to attract many ex FDR members The imernatiomal orventation for Indonena advocated by Tan Malaka was well adapted to attracting those Indonesians who, though qualifiedly pro Communist and disillusoned with American policy towards Indoneua, had had some of thesr sllusiont about Soviet Russma strained by their belsef that at had backed the Madoun rebellion"

However, in attracting the former political backong of the FDR partes st was not the policy of the Murba Party to play up Soviet Russua's moral support of the rebellion Despute theur actual deviation from the Kremlan's lite, the Murba Party leaders stoll professed themselves to be the true exponents of orthodox Sovet communum. They felt convinced that the wave of the future was communism and that Soviet Rusua would ultumately become ascendant over the United States and Western Europe II they attempted to advertise and exploit Soviet Rusma's moral backing of the Madium rebellion, they would probably have lost the support of a large number of the many Indoneuanm (both thote already in the Murba and those ex-FDR supporters whom they hoped to attract, who identified communum wth Soviet Russia Thus they would have cut off much of thesr immediate existing and potentral source of strength, while at the same time sersoualy un dennining the long run prospects for communnm an general in Indoneua

Therefore, an order to explost the siruatson fully and astract support both on the baus of natsonalum and communum the Murba Party waged a propoganda campaign to convince the Indoneman public that the Madrun rebellion had no connection wath Sovaet communsm, that at had never been endorsed by Sovet Russia, and that Musso and the FDR leaders were actually secret agents of the Dutch. This propa ganda encoumnered a fasr measure of success because of the fact that such top Stalinst leaders of the FDR as Setiadjt, Abdulmadd and Maruto Darusman during the early perod of the revolution actually had opposed the Republic and had worked as agents of the Dutch. (See Chapter VI)

Some Murba teaders even smusted that the whole "Illegal PKI" es tablnhed in 1955 by Muto was a Dutch sponmored operation They intimated that the United States backed the Dutch an promoting the Madren rebellion and that an American army officer hod been involved Finally, they suggested that the Communist parties an Holland and the Unated States followed an imperalst line, anasmuch as they

" Though few ladonetans kaew of the repent of the Mosonw radso brsudeast of Sept. i, bockang the Madiom rebellian, the tendency was far some to laseepret Mund arnvel from Mostow at andsewtng Soret spensonhop of hn actiorn In Indoner had voiced thear support of the rebellion. Meanwhile, they alleged, no indication of support had come from Russa The length to which they went is illustrated by the lead article in the Murba Party's official newspaper for October 15, sg18 It was enutled "Sudjad:, alias Musso, a product of the Dutch" and read

Who a Muno Alter the acepeance of the Langgadjau Agreement fallowing the Jelv g afßatr [the coup d'etat ted by Tan 3talaka and ochet elements of the Persruan Perdjuangan in July sgyé) Alitan came tn the (ote Peuple who know tell us that Aliman came to Indoneua in a Dutch submanne and landed at Tegal Ha name ar thar time was Hauan Together with hum came a well bals man [Mumo was well tbrolt) by the name of Suleuman The tard ean of the company fed, while Hassan and Sulennan were arrested by the Reputlxan Army. When Musso arrved in Jogakarta. no one was pertotted to see bum. However, the aostade of cas Musso was different from the Musso whom we koew before There an nothing new in has theary He copies most of the theonnta of the Pertatuan Perdjuangan When thea Mutso began to actune Tan Malaka as being a Trotakyut, people began to doubt but identity

If this Mosso is the ame Musso who estabtabed the Young Communist Party [x branch of the "Illegsl PKI"] of vgss-56. then ths Mosso, aconding to the followers of the Young Communtust Party, was a produtt of the Dusch. and the Young Communist Party was the party of Van der Plas [one of the top oßcals of the Dunch colonual regme and conudered by Indonevunt to have been in charge of its dissuon of political intelligence] And the actual name ef tha Dutch Muso was Sadads. Is not ths Muuo the ume peron who came to Indoneta together with Hasuan, or Alimon, on opgG?

Now another important fact. On the night of August go at es go hours a plame arnved at Maguwo aurfield [ouside ef Jogjakarta] and left the aurfield at s go hours According to the repoet we reoewed, the plane beought the American ufßcer, Colonel Frank, who at that tume talked oth Muso alone.

After the outbreak of the Madiun uprising no comment came from Rusia. But the Communut Party an Amerira vouced ets approval.

When the Madrun rebels were suppreued by the gosemment, it was the Dutch who actively curculated false news The Dutch reported that Musso and Amir (Sjarifuddan) had fed to Bangkek. Thus falte news aumed at eug gesting to prople that they dad not need to pugsue Mumo and Asur because they had gone away,

When Madiun twas recaptured, Amir sent a mesuage to the Dutch for help. and a Dutch vesel was wasting on the south coast of Java.

Condtsion: The Madaun eoup was mot staged by Communiats acconding to itatructions from Moscow, but the coup was sponsored by the Dutch, Amar himself has acknowledged that be himself establuhed the Van der Plas PKI;

nd when Van der Plas Eed to Australia deting the Japanese insasion, Amir eorised money fron Van der Plas. Anur humaelf acknowleozed thtn fact. Whet re Japanese atormrogaind Amar, he openly dedared that Indonesa could o e fere whout the support of the Datch

The ofßical wntheun of the Murba Party's nationalut and pro- Sovset pontions was presented in a seralued article by Tan Malaka prented in the newest of the party's the oal newspapers, Mame Vasses) betwern November g and 19, s935 " Into a serses of relatively orthodos Stalonur atatements, ntcludang a long attack on the Marshall Plan, he wove the followang dominant theme

Thetemaoonal conrovers a a sregge between two mtems, caprtalum and aocalum.The core of the controsemy lhes in the fact that the capa alane suarm a prevenmed from lavng a frre hand an the aoculat countres in the capetalatox couothes dhemselves, ard an the colonues and anor-colonan.

To vtate that the resuft of the struggle will be so or that the course of che struggle will be so wothout knowang the faets a not Marxnt. We need ume in order to cake a drinne atutade, alhough we knom thas vactory will be oury and he proleanat ll en This is as certain as that if we sail from est to east we will onne to the Amerstan contunent.

When will the wor come? Who wall wm? We cannet gne the amiwet oo tme qummons because an uncalculated anoher will have consequemom for àr p people bese

We cannot vet sane shoch powern will un che war Becatse it might be dat the present ally of che Soum Unon woudd latre become ats enemy, and he ume in true wth the Uated Scanes.

The ald capualam wil still survove for a certasn penod bectuse of the isretaons an reenves- Hovever, in the long run because of too many injectons hn old apatalon will die.

De part of the globe in whach our country lies cannot be exduded fren he world controvene Howeer, tha does nst necessrly mean that we zrot partiérpate tn de dopuse, ue, poun one of the parties in arder to attack the her The prrary canditons for an alliance are (s) to smorese one's own rength and weakem that of the eorov and (t) to take care that you are no sen up be vour ally

Ggrapha and umepally speakang o n not yet tme to cone ene e parues. Land, atr, and sea dstances are mot yet favorable for anerens io power d we make an alliance wth the Fedcratson of the Socudur Cou

Tan Malaka's eseges belped make deser the partys orimation sually, howeer, his satenents and suc documens as she Mu

Peetargn Iimetal (lurauonul

Party's constitution described only the haue points of agreement shared by the majoeity of the party's more artise membershup Among most party members there existed eonsuterable confuuon and dnruon of opinson over the attitode to be taken tomards Sovset Rusia, Yugoslasia," the Cold War, and some of Lan Malaka's geopolhtical pdeay woth respect to the regronal crganzation of Southeast Aua It ws perhaps because the Morba Party dud not estallish rigodls dogmatsc at titudes towands these questsons thit it was alle to attrart a fairly large fringe of sympathurers Such persons were olten not enrolled as pirty members, but they give it a strong potentril should events move un certain drections It was the ports s appsrently succevful synthess nf nationatsm and communom that brought st mone of thus support For even a consuderable monorits of the ports s hogh leaders were cratical of Souet Ruwia's international poicies and some others were at leant susputious of them It was undouhtedly ths feeling that trought some of the party's members to conoder themvelves as sorialnts and not communists, statang that 'communnts base their struggle on world revolution, whule socalats lase theirs on national revolution

PARTAI SOSIALIS INDONESIA

Though some members of the Indonesrin Socalist Party were anoout to compete with the Morha Party for the sopport of that majotvty of ex FDR members who had not bicked the Madiun rebellion, most of its leadershep felt otherwse At a meeting of the party's leaders on November z1, sg18, Spahrur argued that the party should contunue with its emphass upon developing cadres of consineed socralnts, who understood the meaning of socialism and its applscation to Indonesia, rather than seek to busld up an amorphous mass party of nomsnal socialests who would blindly follow the orders of their leaders He felt that elimination of the PKI only partually elimimated the threat of totaltananium and that the best antidote to thus threat was to trasn politically selfsufficient andividuals who could diserumunate and act poltscalty on the basis of their oen trasning and yodgment wthout hasang to rely on the directives of a few leaders at the top Some of the more enlightened antitotalitarian FDR members who had not sapported the Madiun rebellion were welcomed into the fold of the Indonesian Socialist Party, but the process was a hughly selective one.

4 When the wuter alkel to a resdemey head of the Murta Party in eaely Decetm het, app, be fuund that the Ttn Seahn split was already è catne ol eoemudealle amuny to thus perstn and that he was relactantdy peepared to admut tlat he thought Tito wat right

It was and still is ancorrect to say, as some opponents of the party do, that "Spahrir is the Indonesian Soclalist Party." Actually the party has always enrolled a particularly high percentage of independent tunkers some of whom-Hamid Algadrie, Subadio Sastroatomo. Dyohan Sjaroezah, and Setorus, for instante—have exercised comidenable infloence on social thought outode as well as amude the party. But there at no doubt that the ideas of Spahrir have been and continue to be of paramount importance in the development of the ideology and program of the Indonesuan Socialist Party The adeas of some of the party's leaders have in certain respects varied somewhat frem his. In general, however, and certainly since late sgg8, it can be said that the warp and woof of ther social sdeologses and their political platiorma have been generally congruent wrth his. Thus knowledge of his ideas provades a general understanding of the baue orientation of the party as a whole Liketuise it helps one gain a better appreciation of the ideas of many nonparty untellecruals as well as those of some other politacal groups in Indoneua, ancluding the Religious Socialists within the Masjumi, the Chratan Party (Parkando), and even a section of the left wing ef she generally strongly anti-Spahrar PNI. For Sjahrir's infloence has not been restrieted to his own party

Though several leaders ef the party maintain that their socialum stems directly from Marx, Sjahnr and most other leaders have been definitely "res muenist" o and coniciously eclectic in their appeench to Marsoim It as not merely forturtous that their party is called the Indonesn Socalst Party. Ther socalum adapted to Indonesian conditiom, and bears a dstancsly Indoneuan character. As was mentaomed before, they have, for snstance, felt that the Marxian doctrine of claus war is inapplicable to the pattern of social condations existing in Indontsua

Sjahrir is a young man, enly forty three, but he does not feel that a socialnt socety can be establuhed in Indonesia wothin his lifetime. The society that be advocates and does en sage as posuble of develop ment durang the next two or three decades is based upon a mixed economy with a substantual sector of economme life left to private enterprse. For a long tome u ill be phystally ampemible, he feels, for the state to direct more than = himuted share of economie Iile, Ste there at not suficient administratve personnel available to carry out any wadespread management of economuc life by the state There is no

le the sense that the term an asroossoed wuth Eduand Ben capitalistic Indonesian middle class from which such persennel with the requisite managerial skills can be recruited, and it will be impossible foe a comuderable period to trasn more than a small fraction of those necessory. Sjahnr believes at unlikely that Indonesian capstalism will develop very greatly and lhas Itule fear of any signußcant dangers arueng from st. Indeed he would welcome a contuderable measure of capotalist development, because this would demonstrate that Indonesuans had rod themselves of much of the encumbrance of thear "feudal" herutage and would show that they had developed sntrative and andivadualest lan Moreover, to the extent that capetalist enserprse does develop, he feels that it will have two considerable advantages (s) at will help fill in thoue gaps un the economue life ef Indoneua that a socalstically anclined government will not have the necessary adminstrative persomnel to manage tself. at least not effeaenth nor well enough to serve the natsonal amerests, and (s) it will develop people endowed with suficient admunistrative espersence to provide the government with the personnel neceuary to operate the groning government managed sectors of the economs

It will be much better for Indonesua, Spahrar believes, if the socalism that is introduced is decentralued and ademanstered locally as much as powuble. He feels very strongly on thus pont. for his greatest fears are totalitatianuim and zuthoratarianum Gven the strongly survuving hentage of a "feudalnue," authoritarian mentality among many Indonessans, he belheves that his grounds for these fears are very real. The Communuts. he states, were able to explost thes hertage by building a poverful porty organued along authoritarian lines. The Communist leaders themaehes, he says, exemplifs the effect of thus heritage; most of them come from the old atistocratic famdies, and sngrained in them is a patermalistic authortaranum.

Becauve of this danger and because of a strong belsef in the democratic potental of the Indonesian people, Spahrir and the other leaders of the Indonesian Socialst Party amust that the eflorts of their parts be devoted ta polstical education of the people in order to make them politically mature, crucal, and endowed with the capacity for andependent analysis and judgment of political uues. Thesr endeavor has not been to build up a mass party of blind, uncritical followers. Rather they have sought to build up cadres of consaneed and enlightened Indonesian socialnts accustemed to act, not merely on the baus of orders from above or in termss of dogmstic doctrine, but in atcurdante with what they as mdividuals conceive to be best suited to their own country under the particular cscumstaneces obtaining there at any given time.

With respect to Indonesia's foetign polbey Spahrar and the other party leaders have vigorously oppoved their coumtry's alignment with esther Russa or the United States. Between the two great power bloes, Indonesta must, they have held, remain neutral But thus neutrality must not be pasuve It must be a "positive neutrality' and contribute to a "thurd factor" in international relations Maintaining and developing thins factor as of crucial amportance, they fel, if the dangerous threat of a growang and increasungly brottle polarzation of the world between the Rusuan and Amencan blocs is to be mitigated They do not en visage thus "thurd factor" as a closely organued, monolithic, commonly onented group of states constututing a "thard force" of roughly the same power-character as the two great exsting power blocs But they do see the posubility for states such as Indoneua and India to masntaun that minimum of poluucal and economoc andependence from the two Great Powers that can assure chem a fasr measore of treedom of acton Through exercise of that freedom, Indonessa can, these men believe. best protect sts own interests and at the same time make sts maximert contribution towards assuaging international friction, partcularly an Ata The fact that most Indaneuans are deologacally protagonasts of nesther communum nor caputalom is held by many members of the party to be a factor both callutg for and making more poitable a foreign pohey of "potutive neutralsty" whereby Indoneua's weight is added to that of those few ocher states capable of generating "third factor" influence on the course of internatsoetal affairs

PARTAI NASIONAL INDONESIA (PNI)

During the course of 1g4ß there appeared to be developing an ancreas ing unity of araentation and action between the center and left wing of the Indonesian Nataomalist Party (Partat Nauonal Indoneua) This and the cenmer left coaltion whuch was reducing the tight wing to a poution of mereasung saposence in the formulation of parry paley. The party prneaples expounded at this third annual congress on June z4, 1g18, by Sujono Hadinoto, sts chaurman, undoubtedly put more emphaan tupon a post andependence soczalst goal than a number of the more conservative members of the right wing liked Some of the more relevant parsages of Sujono Hadinoto's address were:

The weil revolutrin which is to esta'dhà the pew yerty toe arr sraing for mut be carmed out throuzh the natonal reveluton Our gonl, the eutabluhrent of a seculistut socety wll never be achoeved as hng as natrotal frredom ard à sovereign natonal State have not been attautedFmm the begintarz the PNI has declared that natonaluem (wor»natonalen, lot not jognntic natuonalum) an she mad to a natannal Srate the latter wall pro vate the tndge whoch will tring us to the realization of a wealatie tworty Sxionatonaliem n a kand of nataonalurn whuh is baurd on betdd pran oples and dr*ens enurelv frors narros munded or prgartit tationalue. te cruse vxionatonatium an uns relatumhup to the smernatiotal oeld reon nurs the duty of the nutums to corstatute a corsrututv of nations. fre frur dorautation and oppervuon rnt onle in a politiol lut sn an econoric and culteral senme as ellNatrnal freeóue is the gatewa» to proepetity The totul structure and the was ed life we seek can onts te realu-d afier the achuever-ent of srv’ependence *

The PSI efforts to tod for the support of sorte of the ex members of the FDR, partucularly sts corng etiton wath the Murta Party and the Indoneuan Socrlst Party for unfluence withun the labor unions, ape peared to push the orientation ed the parts somewhat further to the left This was prolabily a factor in the spit wathun the PNI that developed dunng Novemter, sg1, wherein elements of sts right wing became degruntled and split off to help form a new party Though thus may have been a fartor of umprortance, another developtment was the choef caute of the sphie. Thet arose from a sernes of meetings betveen Prime Minieter Hatta and the Dutch Forergn Vanster, Dirk Stikker, at Kaluranz Letween Nosemler 4 and 9

These informul and tentatve negotrations were beld without the intermerfuary ef the Gosst Ofres Commsttee and concerned the pon tubnlity of a mutually agrerafle tous for the entabluhment pending the trander of vortrognty of an interim federal government for all Indoneur in whurh the Pepublie would partscipote It appeared to some tresters of the PNt thst it wat poible to nterpret an erde m/moure written by fitts on November so as a sillingness to surrender key prosers to the Dutch during tuch an unterem perood " Though when

Sukker returned to Jogpakarta on December s, Hatta made it dear that his asde mémoore was not to be so interpreted,*" the belief remained with many of the PNI leaders that he was disposed to make concesions to the Dutch thas might result in their virtual domination of the envnaged federal interim government

Because of this, the PNI made clear ats oppontion to Hatta's policy of negotration and began to crganae a polutical front together with the other partues most vaolently opposed, namely the Murba Parsy and the Partai Sarekat Islam Indoneia This polstical federation, knowin as the Indonesian People's Congrest, had as its prancipal objective opposition to Hatta's policy of negotuation. With the object of widening ats mem bershup, the leaders of its constutuent parties scheduted a national congress in Surakarta for December 24=16 to whuch all major Republican partues were anvited

PERSATUAN INDONESIA RAJA (PIR)

Some leaders and members of the PNI's nght wing, however, were strongly opposed to thos decison and wshed to support Hatua's policy. It was thus natural that they should be attracted to the new party being organzed by a number of prominent nonparty andividuals who felt that support of Hatta's policy of negotuation was essential On December vo. sg18, these dsnudent PN1 members followed the lead of a larger mumber of promunent persons who previously had belonged to no polatical party and gomed with them in launching the Persatuan Iodonesia Raja (Greater Indonesuan Umon) or P1R as it came to be generally known For the most part the party's founders were oldergeneration cavil servants having arstocratie hackgrounds. Though the instal membershup of the PIR was enly a fraction of that of the PNL. it was grnerally consodered to have a substantial political potential. Fot most of vts memben, those prevsously uneonnected with any party as well an those from the PNI, were administrative civil servants whose positions would give them an excellent opportunity to crganize the prarant vote The principal officers of the new purty were: chaurman. Mr Wongsonegoro (Governor of Madle Java), vice-charman. Mr. Tadjoddin Noor, secretary. Kadarman Reksonotoprodjo," and treasurer, Pangeran Purbojo. Other prominent members of the party were Dr. Sunario Kolpaking, Sewaka Suwardt, Professor Johannes, Mr. Latuharhary, T. Pello, and Mr. Wahab

The point of view of the majority of the PIR's founders in De cember, 1918 can be paraphrased as follons

The PIR a to be a mas-backed party wathout the religrous onentation of Masjemm and without being bosed upon the Western poltucal concepts of the PNI. It is to be based upon traditional Indonesian pobtical and socioeconemuc concepts partially modified and adapied to those of the West. The present in seen as a transtional penod between the old authoritaran socrety and the more Western-oiented Indonesan society that n yet to come The ballot cannot alone serve to tnure chat the nterests of the common people widl be looked after Not only will many of the common people not vote. but when they do they may well sote un a way that does not serve their interests They are not indsidualusc enough to look adter thear own snterests directly and are accustomed to and expect authaniry from abose

The great danger a that the peatant sote wdl go to arresponuble demagogues who do not undentand the people and ate not in a pouution to repeeuent their anterests The people need and expect gundance from abose, thin has been ingrasned in them for centunes The people themselves are not accus tomed to pushing thesr own anterests in a poloucally aruculate manner and cannot ever night be expected to become polically respensble indnudualuts of the chatacter of people Inang in the Weuern democracors.

Some means muit be found for grming real representation to the agrarian population Such tepresentatvon was goen them in the past by the cvd servants because of the fact thst they went out to and among the people and learned what their anterests and desnes were. Somehow this varrue must be incorporated atto the structure of Indonesian government. The leaders of the government must be able to know the interests of the people and must to a sery large extent depend upon themselves, rather than upen the people, to ascertain what their anoerests are The character of the Indonesian governrment that is to be developed must allow for "fatherly authoety" from above to look aftes the netda of the peatantry.

It is significant that these ideas frightened away the important younger sector of the nonpasty group led by Mr. Ali Bodiardjo, which had been prepared to support the PIR on the basis of its backing of Hatta. Within this sector were two large organizations of older students, one of which was the Tentara Peladjar (Student Army). These withdrew their initial support from the PIR when it became clear to them that the older generation cul servants and their ideas would dominate the party. They were uneasy at what they termed an "overpaternalntse" astrude evinced by the PIR teaders toward the peasantry, fearing it maght eventuate an an authorrtarian political pattern with "fascat" characternties They foresaw a party led by aristocrate oldergeneration civil servants, endowed with what they felt were reactionary socto economoc sdeas and mondemocratie political pleas, in control of a large and uncritscal man followang steeped in the adeas of authon tarian rale and uilling to respond wathout question to directnes from above They felt that implantation of the sdeas of the PIR leaders would lead to a hardenung of the authorstariam politucal mentality of the prasantry instead of weakening zt On the odher hand, they felt that the revolution had already consoderably undermined the charaeterstie of docile acteptance of paternalutse authority, and they felt that the PIR leaders greatly exaggerated it The reneved vegor of peatant democracy at the village level, they insnted, augured well foe peasant partscipation in polaties on higher levels in a manner conuntent with the real interests of the peasantry

DARUL ISLAM

Finally in West Java, outtude the area left to the Republae under the Renville Agreement, was a newly formed but poweriul polstucal organization also dedicated to Indonessan independence but independent of the Repoblsc It did not recognaze the Renville Agreement and had become Jocked in combat with the Dunch Known as Darul Islam (the pdeolagical formulatiom of the character and qualities wluch the Islamue state should powess Darul Ilam n West Java purported to be the actual phyucal xmplementation of that concept It vas a polotical organaration haveng an independent government, controlling ta own army and ternoory and seeking to expand ats area of control. It con struted an aggresuve, growing poltical force with what appered to be a poverful potental

The Dared Ilam movement arove in an arra of central and eastcentral West Java (doefly in the Preanger arenn of Taukmalaja, Garut, and Tjamis and around Madjalenka and Kunongan). where the influenee of Modernst Islamic thought had never become strong and where that of more old fashuoned Mohrmmedan leaders, strongly op posed to Western lesrmtg and ideas, had long been extremely pouerful In this area there had occurred darng the prevoous two years a rapud alteration in the pattern of landholdng, with a large mumber of peasants who hod owmed small plots of land loung all or part of their land to landowners most of whom had only moderate holdingt of land prior to the revolution. It is the wrster's belhef that thas arose chuefly through dslocation of the traditsonal system of agrarian credit donng the Japanese occupation and the subsequent revolution.

Before and dusng the Japanese occupatson the choef source of credit for the peasant was the stanerant Chunese monezlender. During the course of the Japanese occupation of Indonessa there occurred a tremendous monetary inflation whoch ofien resnlted an the easy laqusdation of long standing peasant debts to these Chunese Havung leen dealt a severe econonae blow thereby and correctly antncspating further inflation, the Chunese moneylender during the last year of Japanese occupation refused to advance credit for a monetary return, but de manded instead a specific percentage of the crop in return for the credit—now usually in the form of cloth, agrocultural smplements, etc.—whch lhe advanced to the peatant. Stall desperately needing credit, most peasants acqusesced an this arrangement, but hasing al ready tasted the benefits brought so the deltor by unlation, accepted the usually severe terms of the Chunese moneylender wuth a good deal more resentment than an the past. Apparently because of this resentment and their aeakened feelings of andovadual dignoty and strength, as well as because of increased amumosity toward those assocated wath the old colonial regime—as the Chunese were—stumulated among much of the peasantry by the declaration of ndependence and the stirring events of the revolution that followed, there was a tendency among many of them to repudiate the debts whuch they oned to the Chinese.

This was in stself a revolutionary phenomenon. In the Preanger and some adjacent areas of West Java the degree of land concentration, though neghgible in relation to most areas of the Far East, was greater than on amy other part of Jasa These concentrations of land hod given to their onners, frequently absentee landlords living in nearby towns and cites, a small—but in Javanese terms large—amount of lquid captal. Some of these West-Java Indonesian landlords had presiously engaged in momeylending acts stres to poorer peatants. But their operatrons had been restreted because of Chunese competition wluch few were competent to meet Now suddenly Chinese competition was removed, and although the revolution might sanction repudiation of debts to the Chinese, st did not do so to the Indonesian creditor. Thus there was opened up to the Indonesian landlord moneylender a virtually uncontested monopoly in the lucrative field of agrarian credit. But the Indomeuan landloed creditor did more than merely replace the Chinese. For the Netherlands East Indies agrarían laws, which the Republic inherited, had prohibited the sale of agrcultural land to any non-Indoneuan Thus the Chinese creditor, no matter how much he was oved, could not obtaon legal tatle to has debtor's land (Often the Chunese creditor did manage to obtain a faurly complete functional control, but at least the prestige and social perqumses of landow nership remained with the legal owner.) But there was no such impediment barrang the Indonesian landlord creditor He could and did suume legal title to the land of his debtor. Thus had occurted on an unpeecedented stale durng the prevous few years, and at zt the wrster's helief that the wadespread discontent araung from this atmong the peasantry throughout much of West Java was utilared by the leaders of Darul Islam, provading them with a major portion of their polutical capstal.

The vdea of euablulung a Durul Islam, a puvely Ilamit state gov erned excluvely by Mohammedan law, had been held by a number of West Java Ilami leaders fo some tme. But no untl he Unted Nations sponsored Renvlle Agreement of January. 19g8, did circumstances lend themielves to the practical implementation of their idea. That agreement called for the wathdrawal of the numerous units of the army of the Indonesan Republhe from the extenuve pockets over which they contimued to maintain contrel an West Java following the attack of Netherlands foeces Though wathan two poontht some 35,ooo Republican troops were withdeawn into the shrunken area left to the Republic, about 4,ooo irregular troops—Ior the most part Habullah battalions of the Masjumi=remained behind. There was a tendency for the troops left behind and for much of the population of West Java in general to feel that they had been abandongd by the Republc. Partucularly dud this feeling grow when the Dutch refused to allow preparationm for the plebucite which the Renvile Agreement cafled for in the territarses they had overrun The regular Republican troops upon retiring had made it clear to the population that the only reason tey we la w e t ge t s ee a se UN baced plebnce Therefore the frustrated maponala aspiraton of the strongly Moslem peoples of the central mountasnous areas of West Java froem which the TNI troops had withdrawn, the recent and ncreasing agarsan discontent widesprend among much of the peatantry of the area, and the fortuitious circunstance that most of the arregulat Republican troops left behind were the strongly Mohammedan Hirbu lah units of the Masjums combined to create especually fasorable conditions for those local Mohammedan leaders who had tong been advocates of the theocratic state, Darul Islam

A conference was convened in an area of Preanger Residency controlled by Huzbullah troops an March, 1918, by Kartouwuryo and a number of other promunent Islamsc leaders of West Java Kartosuwirjo had been an ardent, suncere, and somewhat mystical religious leader of great unfluence in south Preanger Before the war he had been a prominent leader in the old Sarekat Islam and had set up his own Islamoe school at Tjiamis After the revolution he had jooned the Masjuna and headed one of sts local branches an West Java Among leaders of the Masjumi hus relatonshop and outlook had been closest to the group which broke away and re establnhed the Partat Sarekat Islam Indoneua This must partly at least account for his havang been effered in July, t917. the post of second Vace Minister of Delense sn the cabunet of Sparnfuddin, a post he did not accept The nutial March conference an Preanger was not called to establsh a separate state, but merely to organire the population of the area in co-ordinatuon wth the Hubullah for defense against the Dutch This delense organization took the name of Darul Islam and was consudered as an organtration loyal to the Republic and, as specsfically stated by Kartosuwarjo, with no connection with the Masjumi.

At a second conference, probably around the end of March, s918, it was decided to convert the defense organization of Darul Islam into an autonomous state, the Negara Darul Islam (State of Darul Islam). This new organsration, with Kartosuw irjo as preudent, undertook to govern, as well as to defend, the popalation of West Java over which sts military power extended For some tume it still did not oppose the Republic, and the Jeadershup stipulated that st would later join the Republic, so long as its own internal autonomy was respected.

The new Negara Darul Islam was organized along theocratic lines Not only were its chief civsl officers kzajs, Moslem religious teachers, but also its laws were exclusively those of Islam In addition to advoeating complete conformance with the prescripts of Islam, its emphasis was on "anticolonialism" and "anticapitalsm " Its army, the Tentara Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Army), successfully campaigned against the Dutch and wrested territory from them. Its crval service collected taxes and ran schools For a time, apparently, a sincere attempt was really made to run the Negara Darul Islam in rough conformance with the lofty principles of the Islamic concept of what Darul Islam should be But this state of affaurs did net Ist Iong. The presure of contmual waafare agaunst the Dotch created cireommtanes that made it difficult for the actual operation of the government to conform to the theors to thich at was dedicased Even more important was the mabelty of Drul Islam's onginsd leadershup to maintain effective control over the organuration.

As Darol Islam became the chuef core of resstance to the Duch in West Java," to its standard flocked most of the religaous leaders of Preanger and adjacent areas as well as the peasantry that looked to them for guidance In addition. many ambitious political and guerrilla leadess whose concern with Islam was very much secondasy to their conçern for their own fortunes jouned the movement Lakewse many of the old tame profestonal bandit gangs of the area felt their fortunes mught mpeove d they were connected twath the military power and fruendly peasant hase of Darul Iilam Kartotuharjo and other regious leadets wete gradually pockejed opt of theur poutions of dominance by the more poterful of the unscrupulous, and sometimes fanatical, religious and nonrehigious adherents attracied to the erganiration Withan a year of the Preanger confetence of March, sg1ß. kartmunitjo and others of the origimal leadenshup had lost much of theer poher. Though still maintaitung most of the top postions in the central leader shap, they frequencly and mcreaungly were umable to control the actisstes of many of their mihtary and cnal subordinates Whether or not Kartosuwsrjo and the oraginal top leadershup coneurred, by late December, 1918. Daral Islam had become epenly ant: Republean

As the organization of the Negara Darul Islam duummegtated, sts Iocal mulitary and ovil leaders became more and more andependent. The dutaes whach were umposed upon the peasantry increasingly took the form of forced exactaons Noncomplhance wsth their regulations and demands for food and servoees frequently met wich sangunry bru tality Co operation of the peauantry with Darul Ihvm was increas angly on the basas of terrorzation rather than of freely given support denwing from feelngs of natronolisen or religson Even ao, the popoh tion had Iittle inchination to turn to the Dutch, and those that had the socdmation were too learful ol vetiootion by Barol lam volduer to do so When a Dutch patrel entered a Darul Ilam area, st uas rarely

n Exerpt for Iantam (the estreme wes() whoch, in atvondavre wth the temrs of the Rensile Agroment, remaned a Repubban temiory and the krawang Deits atga lagely ceetrolled by the peo Tan Nataka Laiue Rajat Dusa Bazs (les lea Armmy of West Jasa) foenerly celled Lankzer Raipst Dakaeca Raa (Feep Amy et Grenter Jakartaj able to encounter the population of the vllagt, The ullagers were afraid to remain, If they dud, upon the wathdraval of the pattol Darul Islam troops would return and aceuse them of collabeeation wth the Dutch and might kill some of the village leaders as an esmple "

The Dutch were unible to suppdew or even contaan the growth of Darul Islam In faet in late io1s and esrls inpe almost as much of theer West Jasa puppet state of Pasundan was controtled In Darul Islam as by their oun troops Paundan ouuals, umluding the II ah Negare (chuef ef state), Wtranata hoesoema were cons tnerd that enls Repab lican troops would be able to suppress the Darul Islam

« Tha was ahe anaurious ep msen ef Wetanita Aoesema asd e'e cumerous etter Pamedan eficals cntervirwed bs the sn er in leb iopo

CHAPTER XI

The Second Dutch Military Action and the United Nations' Reaction

FOLLOWING the breakdown in negotations betw een the Netherlands and the Republhe a new attempt was made early in September, sg4ß, by the Committee of Good Offices to have them resumed under is auspoces The Commuttee's new Ameracan representatise, Merle Cochran, a former foregn service inspector, put forward a draft agreement for over-all polstical settlement in the form of a confidentual oral note vubmutted sumultaneously to both parties * Hns proposal, which became known as the Cochran Plan, was simalar an sts general outlines to the Du Bon Crachley Proposals of three months before. However, it was consderably more favorable to the Netherlands, making, as Foster Collins notes, "several amportant concesuons to the Netherlands' point of sew " * Despite these concesuons, neither the Netherlands nor the Republie would commit themielhes to accepting the subitance of his proposals and both insisted upon such preliminary conditions as to make the resumptoon of negotiations under the Commitee's auspices impouble*

U Secanty Counol Commate of Good Oftes on the Indonuan Queston. Fourth Intemm Repori of the Commattre to the Seeunty Counnl (S/ioßg. Non 1). =g43 p ia

Following Cochran's failure and the arrival in Indonesia on November t, 1918, of the Netherlands Foregn Minister, Dr. D. U. Stikker, direct talks (by-pasting the Committee) were begun between the Netherlands and the Republic. It was belheved an Republiean circles that Stukker represented a more liberal pount of ssew than most members of the Duich cabinet, and for a time there was hope that poutive results moght result from the talks between hum and Hatta. The eidemémoire of Hatta given Stikker just before hus departure for the Netherlands on November 1: (as was noted in the prevsous chapter) did not clearly represent the Republican pont of siew However. despite the informal nature of thos document, st gave Stukker grounds for beleving that the Republicans, at least ssofar as Hatta spake for them, had come significantly closer to the Dutch point of ssew But when Stukker returned to Jogjakarta on December e. Hatta made at clear that the anterpretation Sukker had goven hus arde-mémoure was not correct. On the other hand, the briefing given Stukker in the interım at the Hague appeared to have changed hus position to one much less easily reconciled with that of the Republie Moreover, the cabinet mnister who accompanoed lum en his return visit, Dr Sassen, the Minister of Overseas Territorses, appeared to take a more irreconcalable position shan Stikler and to anuse on Stkker's zuelding ground in his direction.*

These direct talks between the Netherlands and the Republic soon broke down over the sstal question of the powers of the Netherlands High Representative of the Crown during the envistged period of an interum federal government preceding the transfer of Dutch sovereignty. The Dutch demanded that theer High Representatve have the right to dispatch Netherlands troops on bis own authosty anto areas where he himself found a case of internal disturbance to exist. The Repablicans, who had gone far in acceding to the other Dutch demands.* remained adamant in their refusal to subemit to this. Their poution was that internat disturbances should be dealt with by the Indonesian forces of the intenm federal government, and that only an case that government requested assistance from the Netherlands High Repre sentatuse of the Crown should Netherlands troops assust Indonesian troops in such matters It seemed to the Republicans that submussion to the Dunch on this point would mean abdication of the poner they had built at so much sacnfice durang the course of the revolution, bith the result that the independence that they had achueved in the territory controlled by the Republic would be subgect to the mercy of the Netherlands government The record of their dealings with the Dutch did not, they were convenced, warrant their taking this chance. Moreover, in the event thos Dutch formula was accepted by the Repubbcan government, st as not at all certain that the latter could have induced the Indonesuan army to carry out its terms

On December 11, 1918, the Netherlands authortses informed the Commitoee of Good Offices that it had been aboolutely impotuble to reach agrrement wuth the Republican leaders and that "negotiations under the auspoces of the Commttee at thin stage are fotile " * They stased that they planned to go ahead and establuh an tnterm federal government tithout the Republhe, though a place would be left open for its possible later inclosion Two days Taoer Prame Minister Hasta asked Mr Cochran to astist in reopening negotations, sending him a note for transmittal to the Dutch Delegation In thas he stated that "the Republae" recognured Netherlands sov ereignty dunng the interm perood, but that it asked that the Netherlands "impose upon itself certaon limitations on the exercune of ita pover " He then went a long distance towards meeting the principal and most smutent Dutch demands stating.

We are folly prepared to recegnur [that] the High Repeesentatve has the reghe of veto over acts of the vanous organs of the Federal Inernm Govern ment We ask only thst deinite standards be set forth oe perhaps defitite es l p pr f e Re sn the exertse of hus power of veto

We are prepared farther to concede thst the High Representatse be gnen emergency povers to act in a state of war a atate of sege or a state of insecunty, As part of an over alt agreement we should be rendy to stpulate that the High

UN. 5/11T P 4

Representative hinvelf be the ultumate judge of the necrusty foe the exerose of estrsondunary pomets under thete cincumstances Agin we ask only that definite standandy be lasd down to govern the High Repeesentatse's dewon

Four days after receiving Hatta's note, the Netherlands Delegation made its teply. Ths was in effect an ultumatom demanding tdat the Republse agree to complete complhance wath the Netherlands pount of siew wutlun enghieen hours It stased that Hatta's letter was not in itself soficient to anduse the Netherlands government to resse the conclumons set forth an its note of December 1 It made clear thit the Netherlands would countenance no change in ats stand concernong the powers of ts High Repeesentative of the Crown and that the Republie could be sncorporated into the propected federal oeganuzation only "on the same footing as the other federal sreas"* Ihus the Repullie with do per cent of the Indoneuan population still wothan ats admuntstrative boundaries was to enter the federation on the same footing as the fifteen Dutch sponsored, Dutch-controlled states Ihat st would be swallowed thereby and that Indonesia as a whole would take on the characteritsties of the fifteen tndividual puppet states set up by the Dutch seemed certain to most members of the Good Offices Committee as well as to the leaders of the Republit.

Though this message was dispatched to Jogjakarta as soon as powible, there was olvioualy not time enough belore the expuration of the eighteen hour deadline to allow the Republican government to assemble and expren Iormal asent to the caputulataon demanded even had its members been dispoed to do so • Although the Committee had in the meantume in a cable of December i2 informed the Security Council of the minatory sotuatson developing," the Councal, then meeting in Paris, had made arrangements to end its meetings on December 16, and not to reconvene before the end of Chratmas recess.

7UTN, 5/ting (et g, 2gt)- p 5 * ed, pp 5-4

Very tkely this fact played a past an determining the Dutch timing At as so houts on December 18, Cochean, who was thert in Batavia, was handed a letter addremed to the "Chairman of the Security Coun cif's Good Offices Committee at Kalurang" (All bot the Amercan member of the Committet twere then assembled at Kalrurang in Republican ternnory near Jograkarta) " The note stated thas the Netherlands was terminating the Renvile Truce Agreement. However, when Cochran attempted to tratmit the pote by telegraph to the Committee's chairman at Kalrurang the Dutch refused to allow him to do so At 23 45, the secretarygeneral of the Republican delegation in Batavia was gven a simlar note but likewue not allowed the telegraphic facilsties to communcate at to his government An hour later he was zummarnly arrested Four days later, four days after the Dutch had launched their all-cut attack against the Republic, the chairman of the Committee of Good Offices finally recerved the message that Cochran had attempted to tranamet on the nught of December

Though the Republican government had realued that relatons with the Dutch were serously deterorating, it had not expected the attack. Parucularly wth the Committee of Good Ofßices entconced at Kalturang in Republican terrstory and only fifteen msles from Jogjakarta it was felt that the Dusch would not dare attack. (The Committee had arrved at Kalnarang only a few days before the attack, planning to stay there two or three weks before retuming to Baravia) Moreover, Cochran's statements to Indonesian leaders indicating his conviction that the Netherlands would not resort to force-in conjunction with their belhef that be spoke for the Ameracan State Department—tended to be interpreted by them as meanang that the Unated Seates would not countenance such a move by the Dutch Republican leaders beleved that the Dutch would dare attack only after they had established the projected federal interam government made up of the Indonenan states whuch they had set up and whach they controlled. It was antacspated that such a puppet federstion would ebligngly call upon the Dutch for armed mmustance to help at aganst alleged Republican frontvet velatioms of instigation of uprinings withum one or more of the puppet states adjarent to the Republic. Only by masking their action as assistance at the behest of one Indonesian party agzinst another did Republican leaders believe that the Dutch would dare fly in the face of the United Natioms and repudiate the Renselile Troce Thus on the morning of December sg, President Soekarno was antitipating the arrival of the private plane of the Indian Prime Minister, Pandit Nehru, whuch was to take lum to India on a good will trip intended to establish closer relations between Indra and the Republic of Indoneta " The Republican army was scheduled to begin manuevers that morneng, and Prime Minoter Hatta was an Kalurang

The fint news of the Netherland's abrogation of the Renville Truce was receved in Jogjakarta at 5 so Asr in the form of an astack of Dutch bombers (American Mitchels) on the nearby asrport. After the small Indonesian force defending the airport had been el;minated by an hour of beavy bombing and rocket fire, some goo Dutch parachutists were dropped. They quickly secured the area, and soon a steady stream of Dutch tramports began funneling troops and supplies from the Dutch aurbsse at Semarang, some eighty meles away. Thereupon, Dutch bombers and rocket firng P-s1's and Spotfires began softening up Jogjakarta for an assault by the Dutch: Marine Brigade," whose strength was being built up at the airport. Bombs and rockets were loosed at various objectives, mostly of military value, withan the cty, and planes strafed the streets both lengthwane and crostwise ** According to plan, the Indonesian army units stationed in the capital, commenced to evacuate the city to rendezvous points outsede in preparation for the guerrilla tactics which they had planmed to embark upon in such an eventuality. By mid afternoon, after having vurrounded the eity, the Dutch Marine Brigade, augmented by a large number of Ambonese troops of the Dutch Colonial Army (KNIL), had fought its way to the center of the city to the Presidential Palace. The President's small bodyguard resisted, but was soon ordered by Soekarmo to lay down its arms in face of the overwhelming odds. By virtue of their unannounced abtogation of the truce and their blete tactics, the Dutch had captured

Sorkarno, Hatta, Sjahrer, and half of the Republhe's eabinet, sncluding the Foreign Minster, Hadp Agoes Satim.

Of great ampetance to the Dutch was the fact that they vere able to knock out the Jogjakarta radio staton befere Soekarmo, Hatta, and Natur were able to delaver the speeches of exbortauon and gusdance to the population thst they had begum to peepare shortly after the cabinet merting held at Soekarno's Palace at 10 At on December 19 The content of these speeches was not known to Indoneuams outside the vaonoty of the Jogjakarta area nor to the Good Ofices Commattee untul almost mid Januaty, 1919, after an American secured copies of them from the Republican underground zn Dutch occupued Jegjakarta through the belp of tho courageous Indonesian girls, Jo Abdurachman and Jo Kurianingrat

On the morning of the tentueth, the Dutch commander in Centrat Java, Majer General Meyer, requested Soekarno to order the Repub lucan army to cease resstance Soekarno firmly dechoed and on Dectmber zz, he, Hotta, Sjahrte, Me Aaaat (chairman of the Workng Commuttee and Parhament), Mr Abdul Gafar Pringgodego (chief secretary to the Presdent), Hadp Agoes Selam, Mr Ala Sastroamudjajo (Minister of Education), and Arr Commodore Suriadarma were fiown by the Dutch to the sland of Bangka (off the east coast of central Sumatra) There Soekarno. Sjahrir, and Salim were separated from the othens and flown to Brastagi and fater to Prapas on Lake Toba, both in north central Sumatra "*

Durng che next week, Dutch armored columns woth heavy air sup port had reached and sezed control of the principal remaining Republican held cties in both Java and Sumatra To the world outsude, the Dutch were report that only sigt Republean restance was being encoemtered and that the population was weicomang thesr troopa as liberators o To itsure the success of this policy they enforeed a strict censorship on news going out of Indonesis so that the true facts would not be known." This wat mot lifted untul January v, igp9. In additaem, the Datch refused to allow the Comittee of Good Offices to use its plane for obiervatton purposes and ondered all of its mulitary observers in from the field to Hatavia where they were detained untal January 7. It seemed thyt the Dutch wwhed to present the world with a fart arromple and that they believed that if the sordid details anvolved in their accompluhung thus could be suppreied until after their eflort had been convammated, the world would he more likely to countenance it." However, to some extent, suppeesson of news from Indonesa was compemsated for by the exceptuonally able and trelen work in the Republhe's belilf perforned by ets reprrventatnes abroad, in particular its brillant obversation mivion to the I neted Nations headed by L. N Palar and hs deputy, Soedjumoko Mangoendiningrat, and two portsrularly dynuic andsuduals who eserted thesr efforts cduefly an Washungton and New York, Dr Somitro Djojohadkunumo (Monister Plentpotentary for Economic Aflars) and Soedarpo Sastrositomo (Press Officer vuth the U N Obnerver Mivion)

Despite the meagerness of details avalable to it, much of the world outsode was outraged at the very fact ef Dutch aggrevuon, partacularly since it was in violation of a United Natsons sponsored truce. On December to, the American representatve on the Securaty Council, Dr. Pholip Jessap, requested an emergency meeting of the Securty Council The Couneal met on the twenty second, and a draft resolution was presented jountiy by the United States, Colombia, and Syra. Thus called upon the parties "to cease hostilatues fortlwyth, and ummedately to asthdraw their armed forees to thesr respective sdes of the demilttarred zones established under the Truce Agreement of January 17. tg18 ~ " However, enough support could not be mustered in the Council to pass thus Belgum, France, the Ukrasne, and Soviet Russia abntained thronghout the voting on ats provvuons, and with respect to

" Thun she ener in telephenong to the Us añee tn enaceation fern Jogakarta following the Duieh retupation wan net even allowed to mesuon that the esty had teen bented

a In late December darang the petod of ernsonhip a high official of the Infor matan Servue of the Netherlands Indies admanotratien whe was publant at the couse beng taken by hn gmeramene sated to the writer an pustdcapon for the exsong cersonhup on outgong ress Yon Amemrans are a sentumertal people, jon don't lhe shat we'te doung nos So it's hest you dlos't hear more about it In x week ar twe youll have coeled off and have foegoem all sbeot ths thing" (1s p t ta t ka se le at) " UN, S/gt tdhat part concernung withdrawal of troops they were jolned by Argentina and Canada Wath only the United States, the Uninted Kingdom. Cluna, Cotomhua and Syria in favor of the resotution, only five of the necevary seven votes were received. France and Belgum abstained on the grounds that the Couneil wat not competent to intervene in the dupute, while Soviet Russa and the Ukraune stated that they were abstaining because the resolution did not go far enough and because it did not label the Nethetlands as the aggremor.

Two days later the U S 5 R introduced ats own draft resolution. This condemned the aggresuon of the Netherlands governmem and listed the following points:

(s) Reques the memedune cenation of mdetary operatont,

(z) Requres, an the first step towards the sestement of the conflict, the with drawat of the Netherlands troops to the pontsom they occupoed before the resewal of mdtary operatioon.

(5) Rerpesres dhat the Netherlnds Governmenm shall wet free knmtdatrly the Pressdent of the Indosenan Repuldec and other Republcan poltucal leaders arreted by the Netherlands sutbmtiet,

(4) Renlves to set up a commumon of the Secuity Counol composed of reprerenatves of all states members of the Secerity Counol,

(s) lostructs the Corertosuon to super ue the fulfillment of the resolution on the cevatron of miltary aperatoonn and the wathdrawal of troops, and to swst in sesting the confict an a whiole berween the Neherlands and the Indoneun Repatdcn

Though China, Colombua, and Syia were prepared to support parts of the U S 5 R retolution, only the Ukrane gave full support. Both the United States and the Unted Kingdom abstaoned

Finally on the same day a compromue resolutian was introduced jountly bry the Unuted Scates, Colombia, and Syrra. Because of yts omimon of any demand for the troops of the dnputants to withdraw to their prevoous poutions thas resolution obtained the support of Argentina and Canada, and hence the requred majonty, the United Kingdom and Chna likewne supporting it The four abstaming powers were France, Beigrum, the U/ S S R , and the Ukrame. The resalution adopted stated

The Secanty Counal, notng wu concera the semption of hones in Indnnesa and, havang taken mote ef the reporta ef the Committe of Good mediately to release the President and ether political prisoners arrested unce 18 December. Instructs the Cemmattee of Good Orfices to report to the Security Couneal fully and urgently by telegraph on the events which have trampired in Indoneua sunce is December ig18, and to observe and report to the Security Council en the complance with subparagrapha (a) and (b) above "

When the Security Council reconvened three days later the Netherlands had done nothung to carry out thus resolution and was contanuing its forward mulitary action at full puce In addressing the Council on December 27, the Netherlands representative stated that hus government had "ammediately given the resolution of the Security Council its serious attention" and had "communacated wth the Government of Indonesia [ie., its own admunistration there] in order to obtain additional unformauon and advuce to enable it to determine sts poution with regard to the resolution.The operational phase of the action in Java has now pracucally reached ins end except for povuble clashes with arregular armed bands"" Quite obsaously the Netherlands gosenment was not carryang out the Council's resolution This unsatisfattory reply, in conjunctaon uith a report receved the same day from the Good Offices Commattee in Batavia indicating the continued wade scope of Dutch army advance unto Republican territory, made clear that unless the Council was willing to accept this Dutch rebuff, it would have to take further action.

Resolutions then introduced by the Ukraine calling for the with drawal of Netherlands troops "smmediasely to the positions which they occupied before military operations against the Indonesian Republic were renewed" ** and by the U.S.S R. ordering "military operations to cease within twenty four hours" " were both defeated. The Ukrainan resolution was supported by China, Colombia, Syria, and the U.S.S R., vith Argentina, Belgium, Canada, France, the United Kingdom, and the United States abstasning. That of the Soviet received the support of only Colombia, Syria, and the Ukraine, with all the ocher members abstaining."

Finally on December a8 * compromise resolution introduced by China waa accepted by the required majority of the Council, receiving the support of Argentina, Canada, Colombia, Syria, the Ukraine, the 1 UN, 5/1150

United States and the U.S S R. Abstarning were Belglum, France, and the Unoted Kingdom " The Chimese resolution nosed "that the Netherlands government has not so far released the Preudent of the Republie of Indonesa and other politucal peisoners as required by the resolution of December *4, 1948," and called upon the Netherlands "to set free those politscal prsoners forthnsth and to report to the Security Councal thin e hours of the adoption of the present resolution."

To many Indoneuans the origomal "cease hostilities" resolution, unaccompanind as st remaamed by a demand that the Dutch retare to the pontrons chey had held before attacking, spelled a tacit confirmation of the latest Dutch conquests It seemed to indicate to them that the Dutch were beng alloued to retasn their conquests while tdhe stillintact Indoneuam army was called upon not to counterattack in order to oust the anvader It, and the subsequent Chinese resolution, seemed to them to skirt the realites of the situation The pertinent observatrons made by the Commuttee of Good Offices in sis report of December a6 to the Council appeared to them to have been sgnored. Among other thungs this report noted

Negouatuons presappose two partues, each uncoerced by the armed force of the other and each prepared to move sowaed the reasonatle soewpont of the other

Polticaly, the people of one party [se, the Republic] wachout whose soup port any agreement, even sf achurved, may well be unenfonreahle, will be reluctant to accepe as bona fide any negonations an which agton they start woth an anea under their control dimimshed an a result of the remoet to araed force by the other "

The Netherlands' rebuff to the Secunty Councl follow ing sts second resolution, alng woth the diamclination of the Council to take measures to councer et, was a chilling cold shower for those Indoneuans who had staked thesr hope on the Couneil's and In anper to the Council's two resolutiont, the Netherlands U N represenratve, Dr. J. H. van Royen, stated on behall of his government, not that at had terminated hostulitues, but that Netherlands fores an Java would cease hostilines by January s, and om Sumatra "tho or three days later." He then broadly qualified even thas by stating "It wall of course remain mecensary to act against disturbung elements who, either indivadually or collectvely, endanger public security or interlere wath or prevent the supply of food and other eswenual commodities to the needy popula-

WUN, 5/irta tion "" Obviously, this qualification could be so interpreted as to give blanket authoruation for undertaking military action against all Reprubhcan forees wluch did not submut to Dutch authority.

In response, Col. William R. Hodgson and Fars el Khouri, the representatives respectivels of Australia and Svria on the Council, charged that the Dutch were delaysng thesr complhance with the ceasefire order so as to have time to elimonate all effective Indonesian resistance. Gromsko, the Soviet delegate, aecused the "Anglo-American majonts" of havang eneouraged the Dutch to reject the Councal's authonts and asked whether the Umted Seates and Britasn intended. like Pontus Pilate, to wash thesr hands of the question * Though the Amencan delegate, Dr Philip Jessup, had termed the Dutch reply "unsatisfactors.' both he and the Britsh delegate opposed further action bs the Council untul after it bad reconvened at Lake Success eight days later " In fact, no further action was taken bs the Council for a full month.

In the meantume, the Dutch continued to flout the U N's resolution. They maintained their aggressive malitarv actions, and they refused to free the top Republican leaders. In fact. on January so, 1949. the imprisoned Repablican leaders on Bangka " were offcally informed by the Netherlands suthorities that the Dutch government no longer recog nized the Republie as a polatical organization with a territory of its own and therefere no longer recognized the internees as having any governmental position. They were informed that the Dutch government would agree to set them frre withen the loruts of the sland of Bangka and permit their famlies to join them there prorided they were prepared to gve a wntten statement that they would refroim from all poltical artivity "

Thus it was that Indonesan Republicans entered the new year with a feeling of lonelv abandonment. As far as they could dncern, the United Nations, despite its verbal admonishment of the Dutch, was doing absolutely nothing effective to restrain the Netherlands. They telt that they were now on their own and that thes could count on their own efßorts alone to save their independence. Mans began to give serious thought to the last minute radio benadcast of Tan Malaka from Kediri on December s1. The purport of his speech was that the Indonesian people should repudiate the policy of fruitlesa negotiations with the West and repudate the Indonesiart leaders who had followed this policy in the belief that just treatment could be expected from the West Indoneuans could only achorve thesr andependence through their own efforts, he inusted They should countenance no more negotiations untul after full independence had been won. They must fight until the Dutch were ejerted from Indonessa and root out all Dutch puppet states As spas opened, much of Tan Malaka's speech began to ring with a more convineing tone for many Indoneians.

Indonesian representatives abroad near the nerve centers of the West were equally dnheartened as to the prespects of efective Western aetoon aganst Dutch aggresson In general, they felt that Indonesia's future was besng sacrrficed to what Amercan and Sovaet leaders beleved to be their own interents in the worid stauggle shat divided them The Sostes s action appeared to some of them to be more dicrated by the deure to embarrat the Unoted States and Great Brntain and to acquire a vtrong propaganda base against them than to help Indonesla win its independence Hotvever, practically all of them zaw the United States as so obseued with the desure not to antagonaze ats continental Westerm European ailes (France and Belgrum as well as Holland), with thear strong colomal anteresta, as to pay no more than lip service to the principle of colomsal self-determination. Though these Indonesians could not thermelves see thot these countres, certanly Holland, had any alterratve but to follow America's lead, they encountered the argustent that too much peetwure by the United Nations on the Nether lands meght dangeroosly weaken the relationdhup between the Netberlands and the Unoted States and thereby the whole system of Western secursty The mood which they frund in Washington was veflected by am artucle of Arthur Krock m the News York Tamer Krock staned a

The f remam that the Duc ae te y krytone of the may d econecne aeceraty syemes (n Western Eutope that a vytal to the United Scares And is was shokn by the debates atd voin m the Secunty Counral of the Unoted Natons on the Arerscan proposh for a atatus quo ente in Indoneua, our mont ampertant Earopean wibes wil not go along with a drastic program agarmst the Netherlands on the buss of ats actaon in Java

The dehcate fahrc of Wenen seounty agumt Rusasn commounum woem wigh sech dffrulty and stalt far froen comapdete, could readdy be shatend by an Atcrcan attempt to nolate Hollind utles at compleuly yecdes froe

a1 N Y Taut, Dac +s. 15g8 p E 3 its pretent pesstron. Of this the Govemment of the United Sunes a uneauly aware, as it is aso aware of the stubbornness of the Duich character, the provocations of Indoneuan conduct and the imsention of Soviet Rusia to male all the capital it can out ef the epesode Thus our Government an caught in amother dilemma of foreign policy whuch at hopes can soon be resolved but does not yet know how

The lack of hope for Amerstan support derived by Indonesians encountering this point of sew was reinlorced by an expernence they had in Washington a few days before the Dutch launched theur attack. At that time, Indonesan representatives expressed to the State Department officual primarily concerned with Southeast Asian affaurs their apprehension that the Dutch would soon launch an attack. They asked hum whether in thas case the United States would recognize new territorsal gans made by the Dutch at the expense of the Republic. Accerding to these Indonesuans, the State Department officsal answered, "It depends on dhe sutuation." Hes anner and the context of general conversation wrthon which he gave it consinced them that the United States would give real support to the Indonesuan posutson onty if and when Indoneuan arms had demonstrated thear abolity to prevent the Dutch from achievang therr objectives This ancident, at is ampertant to note, was later widely reported among Republican leaders in Indonésia.

There were enlightened and liberal elements in the Netherlands. principally wathin the Labor Party, and a amall tircle of Netherlanders in the Indies as well who genuinely desired a real untrammeled transfer of Dutch soveresgnty to Indonessans. Many of them belseved that Indonesians, partscularly the dominant Republican group, were capable of doing a reasonably good job of governing themselves. All were convinced that the only way peace would return to Indonesia was for Indonesians to be governed by people of thest own selection unimpeded by any strings of outude political control However, this group of Netherlanders was smaller and less anfluentral. at least untal mid 1919- than those representing other currents of opinion.

Of these other groups, the largest, but the least organized and coheuve, was that whose chief characteristic was one of strong paternalsim. 'The character of the paternalism of its vartous constituent elements had a broad range. On the one hand was the considerable number of those sincerely devoted to what they belseved was an the best interests of the Indonesian people and who definutely subordinated Dutch ma terial anterests to those of the Indonesians Thas group genuinely deured to transfer the basst attributes of soverengnty to the Indonesuan people, tot it wshed them to exerose that sovereignty an the manner it thought best for them Comequently it wshed "independence" to be granted to Indonesia in such a way as to insure thus, and it wished it to be tramfersed to "reasonable ' Indonesians who would undenstand the necestuty of continuang dependency upon Dutch administratne afßcuals for at least a decade to come The majoruty ol Republican efficialt, at realred, would not enser anto such a relatsonshup The "extremuts" and "demagogues who controlled Republican policy were, therefore, to be forced out of ther poutons of pow er and replaced by "moderates" willing to rely on the Dutch for guodance To ansure chat amenable Indenesian elements remamed in power following the transfer of Dutch soveresgnty, a decentralized, federal system of government was to be establabed uheresn ulumate authonty would be indirectly, but eßeetively, under Netherlandt control for some time to come.

In general, members of ths group fels that liquidation of the Re public was necessary before a federal system could be establnhed, Some believed at might be possible to include it and secure ats umpotence through a federal system, the political mechanics of whoch would smother it among a congerses of Dotch dependent states However, the prelerable course was deemed to be its destruction and replacement by several new political unts—headed by "reasonable" Indonesians— whoch would pon the fidteen to twenty member Indoneuan federation separately It was realized that at least andirect Dunch foree would be necrisary to mantasn thus syatem for some time, ancluding the lodgment of military and police poners an Dotch hands However, it uas belbeved that "reasenable" Indoneuams would see the neeesity of this and welcome it for the general welfare of Indoneuan socsety, or at least in ceder to guarantee the secursty of their own enhanced positions

Among the mentbers of this pelatvely progressive wing of the large group of paternalists were such men as the recently dumissed Lt Gov ernor General van Mook and hus chuef laeutenant, Dr. P J Koets Such men vere soso-economic progresiuves, anxsous to protect the Indoneuan people from explostation by Western and Chunese economic enterprne They knew a great deal about Indonesia But one vital thing tbey did not understand, the dynamics of colonial nationalum Most of em hd apparenly led too lon an the datoted, arcial colonial social envronment Whatever the reason, they did not seem to compeehend that celonal brand of paternalsm could not miv. In addition, perhaps because of their oun wushful thunking, they underestumated the extent of popular backing wluch the leaders of the Republae enpoyed.

However, among the paternalnts there was another powerful wing. larger than the fiest and made up of thove whose paternalism was in varying degrees much less colored by the quality of altrusm To a large estent, thesr priternalom twas a rationalization of thezr economie interests or, more accurately, what they belheved were the conditions for maintasning and promoting Dotch economat interests in Indonesua Γor some, the desire for Indoneuan dependence upon the Netherlands was a matter, net only of Dutch prestige and the deure to compensate for the umallness of Holland on a world of grants, but derved from ether less-eatuly descrnbed characterntics of Dutch nationalum as well The outlook of many of them was strongly conditioned by feelings of racial superiority touard Indonesians This conservative wang of the paternalists envnaged a much Jonger period of Dutch supervision of Indonesian affairs and a much more direct system of control than dud the progressive wung. In general, they had much less confidence in the ability of Indoneuans to govern themselves and were more certain that Dutch economic snterests would sufßer in proportion. They were willing to accept some internal Indonesian self government but insisted that it be sufßciently contained by ultimate Dutch power to safeguard and promote their economie interests. Thus they were willing to grant no more than a nominal independence to Indonessa

Finally there was another smportant group, not so large as the thern, but better organized and lughly potent. There were two chief elements in this group. The fiest was represented by a probable majority of those Dutch interests having large investments in Indonesa and an undoubted majorsty of their manageral representatives in Indonesia They felt that any substantial relaxing of Dutch control would seriously threaten both their esusting investmenes and the possslulity of any future investments' garnering equally high returns on capital The second element in this group was made up of army ofiers, from the KNIL (Netherlands Colonial Army) ** and of probably a majority of those Dutch and Eurasian middleand upper rank esil servants whose em ployment began before World War Il (It should be noted that most ovil servants from the Netherlands who joned the service for the first

"It is of probable spnißicante thst a latgr peetom of the efiters of the NIL had before the war bern arden membent ef the Msn, the Dutch countepart of the Nan prsty ume aer the ua wee mch moe pregree te rc t the question of Indoneua's polrtical future)

Here was, un shot, the group haing the pepal vested nteret in the posutioms provaded by the colonal mlitary and administratve apparatus Mantenance of is poution was cletarly meompatible bath any substantial amount of Indonesian independence. Thus Indonesiandomitiled element, both ats Dutch and Eurauan components, was generally strong in its feeling of racal supersonty tovand Indonesans It opposed any sugnificant amount of internal aelf government, even af contaned by ultimate Dutch power and was adamantly opposed to granting any real independence Weth regard to all these questions it found stself un close agrerment wrth most manageraal agents of Dutch economie interests in Indoneua, uath respect to the ausue of independence st was in close agreement woth most of the Netherlands domiciled persons controlling or holding responsible posutsons wath the contervatvely oriented majonty of these concerns

With the Dutch electons of the summer of 1918, there had been a slight shaft to the nght, with the Labor Party as well as the small Communnt Party losing strength to the Protestant parties of the right, to the Catholic Party, and to the newly formed Party for Freedom and Democracy There also appears to have been a shoft to the right wsthin the Catholic Party, the largest an Parhament, holding thurty two out of ome hundred seats *" Polcy towards Indonesua had been a major issue in these elections, and the results of the soting appeared to indicate a slight ncrease in the relative strength of those advocatang a less pro gressive Indonenan policy The kind of limited independence anned at by the de fecto Govermor Genera! ** in the Indies, Dr Hubertus van Mook, appeared to be conudered by the majonty of Dutch voters at going too far in the direction of real independence It was probably because of this that follou ing the formation of a new catunet *" headed by Dr. Willam Drees of the Labor Party, Van Mook was relheved of the position he had held since s915 (Because of the outtreak of the Madsun Rebellion, Van Mook was requested to stay on unul after it was aver and did not actually leave his office until November, a9g8) The man replacing hum and holding the new title of High Commis sioner of the Crown was Dr L JM Beel, the outgoong Prime Minster and one of the top leaders of the Catholic Party Beel was generally be. lheved to be more conservative in hn approach to the Indoneuan ques tion than Van Mook Ihe general result appeared to be a weakening of the posution of the progresuve paternulists relative to that of the other princspal groups

The Netherlands policy touards Indonesua that began to pell during the last months of 19g8, and which with slight modificatsons was to contunue until mid 1919, was a rough synthesis of the four bosst poents of vaew described above It was not a completely smooth synthesis, nor was it very clearly defined, and it did not result in fully consistent actions ** In its basit charactersties it approximated a posution roughly midway between that of the progresuse paternalists and that held by the majority of comervative paternalists.

Implementation of thus policy involved a three fold strategy First, it called for the application of sufficient military force to destroy the Republic and administer a decisve defeat to ats armed forces Second, it called for an over-all pregram of dis ide and rule, maintasned through a skillfully operated form of sndirect rule of the fifteen to twenty states into which Indonesia was to be dvided and which together were to be known as the United States of Indoneua. Third, at called for obtaining international sanction of this program through the granting of sovereignty to this indirectly Dutch-controlled federal Indonessa

Daring the first half of 19t9. the Dutch endeavored to bring to consummation the first two phases of thus strategy and made formal plans for the thurd. Though the milstary phase was beginning to encounser more renstance than had been expected, there teas wydeapread optimism among Dutch officals in Indoneua at the beginming of January, 1919. that the succesful completion of thos phase could be expected within a month at most The aspect of Dutch policy which was most complicated and confuung and whose analysis and interpeetation have occa noned most controversy is the second phase An understanding of it is vstally necessary for an understandong of the projected thurd phase and also for an understanding of the history of Indonesta folloning the tranafer of soveregnty that finally did take place

CHAPTER XII

The Strategy and Tactics of Indirect Rule

TIHE FEDERAL political system begun by Van Mook and continued by his saccessors was eventually Dutch created and Dutch maintained. Its constitaent states, the most important of which were set up in territory wtested from Republican control by force, were of the same general character and were ly no means the spontaneous creations of Indonesians. Undoubtedly genunely altrustic Dutch paternalism was one important farter behund ths policy. But it was not the only important factor. Whatever one accepts as the mean of the dnvergent ultmate objectves of the diversely orsented groups of Netherlanders who sponsored the federal system, thter immediate objectve was control. Certainly that was clearly the objective of Dutch government policy as it operated in Indonesia from mid s918 to mid 1919

The claracteristies that clueffy distingushed thes federal system from prevar colonial Indonesa were (t) a mete and elaborate formula of indirect rule wherein ulumate Dutch control was much more skillfully camouflaged than peeviously, (a) mere Indonesans holding middle and upper governmental administrative posts and having in a few of the constitment states a small measure of governmental smutiative subject to supervition and control from Bataviz; (s) more Dutch military and police pover standing in back of thus structure, and (t) more Indonesian nationalnts in jail. The small minerity of Indontsians whose positive support the Dutch were able to enlist in the fifteen "states" (negtrar)

and "autonomous areas" (dorrah utmewas) * which they establisbed consisted largely of elements of the local arstocracies who feared loss of their political and economc positions under Republican rule, and polstical opportuniests dusatnfied with their positions under the Republic

The oly sporat ecepon to this geeral pate was in the sae of East Sumatra There, in addition to these two elements, there was a third made up of certarn peofesuonal and ens il service elements posess ing undoubted imtegrity uho were clearly not political opportunists. This curcumstance arose as a consequence of the so-called "social revolutron" whoch took place in the resisdency of East Sumatra in January, 1916 prior to the establahment of firm Republican authorsty there. In the Communut-led disturbances that beoke out, the familses and houses of a number of pro-Republican middle-class elements, including those of urveral leaders of the local Republican admunustratson, suffered from the same brutal volence as dod most of the much hated, pro-Dutch local nobdaty

Bse of te beeme at t, and becase of the fat tat iwas several months before Republican authoraty was well establnhed in the area, a number of these persots cast thesr lot wrth the Netherlands authonues then emconced behund Brstish beyonets in the sector of the reudency capotal and port of Medan then occupied by the British. Though after the re-establishment of Republican authority in the area some of them came to regret thesr decision, they had already attached to themselhes the recced ef collaboration wath the Dutch and had thereby forferted the potstions ef leadership in East Sumatran society which they bad formerly held.

Once these Dutch backed states and autonomous areas had been set up, other Indonesian elements came to pittscipote in them In vome cases uncere Republicas freely partieipated in their prrluaments out of the conviction that E doeng so thev could to some extent offset the ant: Repuldacan attitudes of the arstoerats and sellaecekinz epportunsts who were generally the domenint element in chesr "govern ments" However, a more wudespread reavon for what patuve Indonetan support thete regimes were able to command was economie. "Co-nperate, or no job was the forzrula emplosed ty the Dutch Most members of the tiny Indonetan moddle, whute coller and shilled laber cdaves held out as lonz as thev rould be selling the family sulver and furnsture, their toods, and most of their clothes for food But after three and a balf vears of Japinese ncruptuon and a sear or tso of fighting the Dutch most of them had little of such 'resuscance capital " left. Moreover, nonco-operation was sometumes unterpreted by the Dutch as resistance and in such cases resulted in a person a heing sent to jail for an indefinite period A min with a famly dependent upon lum uiually thought twice hefore emlarking upon tuch artion The large majority of the tiny Indonesan middle-claw and white-collar element had been eivil servants With the Dutch controlled regimes in the federal areas monopoluing such poln, the bargaining poution of the Indonesian mationalist was practically nd If be was a merchant oe sought to enter trade, he found that the licentes or foreign exchange neceswiry for such actruty were closely cnntrolled by the Dutch. Nonco-operators were generally unable to oltain them.

In most of the federat states and autonomous arean which they estab lished, the Dutch, after pilarg many of the most alle and actse pro- Repubdicans who had not afready left for Repubdican-controlled areas, carried out electiont and set up local Indonesian "governments." The controlled chvracter of there elections was such that the Dutch »ere able to inure that the majority of those elected were men of theer otn choire. The amenableness of these governments was further increased hy the fact that a subatantual minority of the members of their parluaments were apponted by the Dutch. Even ms, woth surprung frequency appointed as well as elected members who had been thought by the Dutch to be "reliable" and "reasonable" in thesr nationalsm turned out to be ardent Republicans and a source of great embarrassment, In fact the majority of members of these federalit governments with whom the writer spoke, and all of them who did not have a special stake in the artsficial regimes, were frank in stating that what Iamited degree of self-government they enjoyed was a result of the Republic's fight against the Dutch "Had shere been no Repolát," they stated, "the Doch vould not hase felt compelled to gwe it to us "

Actually each of these federal states and autonomous areas rested on Dutch bayonets, in particular troops of the KNII (Royal Netherlands Indes Army) and large Dutch oficered police foros In aeveral of them, KNIL soldiers were being formed into "state Security Battalions" so that the supporting bayonets would Jook fess Dutch, but Dutch melutary and police control remaned unquestuoned They were polace states

To appotciate clearly the nacure of these states and the over all Dutch strategy of whuch they were such a vital part, it wilf be helpfut to ex plore im some detal the poitical organszation and relationshupa that existed in the most amportant of therm Of the fifteen federal unit created by the Dutch, six were states (negares), while nine had the status of autonomous termratornes (dorrah utamewas) Those in the seeond category were urually much smaller in popalation than thase in the first or else had been more pecently created The theory upon whach than datunctron was based was that the less populous of these tesritories (and usually the most backuard wath respect to cultural level and economae deselopment) wese St to recesse a leses degree el sellgovernment than the Iarger, and were to be more dependent upon the central government of the federation Unul the actual uansier of sovereignty at the end of sgag. the ceotrat government remaned the Dutch-controlled regame at Batavia, subject as at was to directoves from The Hague. The six states wath the approxumate populatons they claumed to administer (consoderable areas olten being an fact under Repubhran control) * were East Indeneua (compraing Celebes, the Moluccas and Lesser Sundas), 11,oo,oso, Pasundan (West Java), re,ooo, 000, East Javz, 8,o0o,oop, Madura, 1,8oo,000, East Sumatra, 1,700,000, and South Sumatra, 1,goe,ooo Except for Central Java, woth a population of 7,soo,poo, she autonomous areas ranged in population from about 100,00o (Roouw) to about 1,noo,oo (West Borneo), tbe other six autonomous areas beang Bandjar (in south Dorneo), Great Dayak (central and south Borneo), Southeast Borneo, East Borneo, Bangka, and Bilhiton (Bangka and Belliton are the two largest sfands between

Borneo and Sumatra, Riou as the nvme of the atchupelago of small islands to the north and northwest of Bangka See Map 3)

EAST INDONISIA

Estallished December z1. rgp6, the State of Last Indoneua was the largest and by far the oldest of the federal units establshed by the Dutch Accotding to them it posessed conuderably more self government than any other of the unsts* and wat frequently held up as a model to whuh it was hoped the mewer federal units would eventsally contorm Because of thus it is of particular value to make a somewhat extenuve analysis of the politual pittern developed there by the Dutch An understanding of it, in conjunction with the knon1 edge shat more self government had been granned I ast Indonesia than any other Dutch sponsored state. gves a subtuntial unsught into the plans for developing the ether conststuent units as well as into the over all nature of Dutch polutscal strategy in Indonesia

The nationilist monement in Est Indameur lud for several yeans been opesatung wnder comdatroms monh dißerem from thome obtasning in Java and Sumatra In the first place, during the three and a half yeats of Japanese ocrupation, Last Indonesia was adimunistered ly the Japanese navy, whuch sought to suppress the nationalist movement rather than to allew at to develop tathon lamited bounds, as was the policy of the Japanese army an Java and to a lesser evtent in Sumatra. Thus the Japanese collapse and the proclamataon of the Republie in the middle of August, 1913, found the nataontlist movement in Celebes and other parts of East Indonesia poorly organsred. Its leaders ammediately declared for the Republie and establuhed contact wrth the Republican leaders in Java Bot lacking adequate arms and organization, they were in a weak posution to reast the force thit the Dutch, supported by Australian troops, were able to bring aganst them. The Republican adminstration on Celebes endured until April 5. 1916, when the Dutch arrested and jailed the Republican Governor, Dr. Ratu Langie, and hus staff Since almost all the rajahs and other atistocratic Ieaders of Celebes had also supported the Republic,* the Dutch at the sime time arrested theer most prominent members, either jaaling them or sending them into exile. However, despite the removal ohee lede, the Duc, aping to teestabhsh sheir conrol encouptered an extremely tenacious resatance, partucularly in populous southwestern Celebes, led by those remaining intelleevuals and aristo cratte leaders tho had not been intimidated

Not unt the begnning of 17 were the Dutch able to muster the overshelming force necessary to crush this reustance, and in the pacicaton campaign" which they conducted from mid December, 1916, ontl March, t947. they were foreed to employ estremely brutal methods in ceder to sucreed In the areas where Indanesian resistance was most stubborn, authorsty was given to the savage Captain "Turk" Westerling to do what was necessary to break it. His most eßeetive method was to hase his troops round up village populations in the areas of pruncipal resstance and arbetraridy pull men out of the crowd and shoot them, contanung this process untit he was satsfied that the asvembled villagers hod uelded suffciem informotion concerning which of their members had been active in the resustance and the whereabouts of renstance foros Probably between goo and s,ooo Indonesians were killed in this manmer, while probably at least so,ooo oihers were killed in the course of the whole campaign' Most of thost amocated with the reustance who tere not kalled wete jailed and for the most part remauned in jaal untal after the transfer of Dutch sovereignty at the end of 1919 By mod 1947. the Dutch had replaced more than 25 per emt of the rajabs, Laraengs, village heads, and other Indonesian rulers in South Celebes wath more amenable persons. Among those replaced were the most smportant of the anstocratst leaders Thest included the Rajahs of Bone and Luwu and the Karaengs of Gantarang. Bonthan and Panghadjene. The remaumong aristocratic leaders, after vitneung that, were easily cons anced that the secunty of their pasitions was dependenmt upon thenr tacking Dunth poliey.

By cootrast, in Java and Sumatra, the Dutch were not able to dis pose of force so overwhelming as to enable them to deal in a similar fashiom bath the matonalist movement there (though the attack of December 19. sgg8, vas undertaßen with the comvactron that they did have sach force at thesr command). The fact that East Indonesia was e ony one of the maor federa poheal un here the Duchha enough force available to control nearly the whole area is one which munt not be lost sight of in understanding and evaluating political developments chere. (The only amportant area of Republacan guerralla strength remaiming in East Indonesia at the beginning of 1gt9 was in the hills and mountains of south Celebes)

The extent of this force and the scope of ats application were ob served by the writer during has vaut to East Indonesia from March 15 to April 8, 1919 At that time the following condstsons obtained. Dutch army unots still occupied East Indonena and were scattered around the islands in unots of battalion strength Datch army oficers were making cavilian arreses All the top oflicers and well over go per cent of the minor officers of the police force were Dutch The Prosecutor General made arrests on orders of Batasia Dutch Residents overruled Indonesian officers of the Department of Justice. The jails were crowded wath political presoners liung under conditions so bad that the Dutch prison doctor at Rappang, one of the principal prisons, stated that he could no longer be responuble for thear health Most of these political prisoners had been in jail for more than two years and had not yet been brought to tral. Nearly all of them had been amprisoned by order of Dutch malitary of eivil efficers. The arresting of people on political grounds was stull continuing On December 16, i918, over one hundred members of the Badan Pimpinin Pemuda, East Indonesia's largest youth organization, were jailed and had not been released. Members of the East Indonessan Parlament had asked information as to the number and names of politucal prisoners but had been given no amswer. The Minister of Justace, Mr. Soumokil, stased to the writer that he had no idea how many politucal prisoners were in jail.*

Makassar, the capital, along with several other areas of South Celebes and the entire island of Bali were stall under a state of "war and siege" (steat ven oorlog en beleg) This directly or indirectly ruled out the basic civil liberties in those areas. Private political meetings, Soumokil confirmed, could not be held without fise days' notice and permission from the police; and when permission was granted, a police oficer was required to be present at the meeting; public meetings could be held only if permimion were given by the Dutch Resident, Indonesians were not alowed to travel from Makassar to any other town without a pons * People were reluctant to speak frankly if they feared they were being overheard There was no freedom of the pres Editors who were teo outspoken were jasled and their papers closed doun Over po per cent of the newspapers were being put out by the Govermment Informa ion Servoce, headed by and largely staffed by Dutch civil servants.

In those areas where the state of war and emergency had officially been termanated, conditons were Ittle better In the Minahassa area of morthern Celebes, for instance, soldiers of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army (KNIL) had through antamodation kept the largest peo- Republbcan party there, the Barisan Nasuonal Indonesia (Indonesian Natonal Legion), trom holding pubic meetings t" In addition, the Dutch Reudent allowed Dutch soldrers from both the KNIL and the Royal Neiherlands Army (KL) vatsoned in the Minahawa to vote in the local elections there, held on March 6, 1918 " The leaders of every major polstical party in the Minahassa except that made up pramarily of ÀNIL atd ex KNII, soldiers and tbeir famdies, the Songa Minahasta (Lron of Minahasia), expeesed to the writer the hope that the United Natons Commaston for Indonesia would mpervse the coming electrons (July, sggg) for the East Indonesian Parliament, they feared that otherwise they would not be conducted fairly.

The economic control of the Netherlands Indies government over East Indoneua was as eflective as ats military and police control and helped maintaim them Export and amport licenses and foreigoexchange allocatuoms were urord exchomevely by the Netheslands Indies government an Batava and constiteted amportant arstruments of political control over the commercial elements of the popolation Dutch control of credit sources was equally mportant Moreover, since the government of East Indoneut was sharply Imuond in sts means of securing revenue, ," it ancurred a large budgetary deficat whuch at could meet only with funids peosuded hy Batavsa Estamated intome of the government of 1 ast Iindonesia in v919 was sg,oon,ooo guslders as agaiest an antcipated expenditure of 9g,poo,ooo and an addatsonal caputal outlay of : 1.son,ooo, the deficot was to be met by BHatasa The secretarygeneral of the Deprurtment of I nance un Makasar told the wrster that, although he believed that Iast Indoneua would lhve to repay the 11 son,onn guallers for caputal expendture, hos depsrument dut not know whether or not it would be sequred to refund the remaiming zf,ooo,ooo suppbed by the Netherlands Indies government * Indonesan offcal aerted thut it was generally conudered mpoltic in thear departments to exhbut attatodes different from thove of Batasia when they were dependent on the Latter foe so much of their operating funds

Firm in the possesion of these means of control, the Dutch relen qunhed governenental fanctions to Indoneuans more tudely in East Indonesa than an any other foderal area Whule the transder of powers looked smpressve on piper (though not sensitionilly so), the daipirity between wht appeared there and whst an fact obtaned was on the whole very great The pow ers trasferred to the state of East Indonesta by Laeutenant Governor General van Mook on December 3i, spt6, were almost identical wath those awugned to the Indoneuan arstocratic rulers in thit area and in Berneo by the Governor General in 1ggS." Indeed, the only unportant difference was that the powers transferred to Last Inlonesua were to he enforced wth respect to non Imtonesians well as Indonesians Moreover, whereas the ipg8 regulations applied only to those areas under ndirect Dutch rule—about to per cent of the area of East Indonewn and a someuhat larger percentage of its population-the new regalstiont gonerned hoth these arens and those formerly ruled directly by Dutch cisil servants

At the end of t917. the powers tramterred on paper by the Netherlands Indies government to the state of East Indonesia sncluded responsiladity for finance, justice, general economie affaurs, police, education, information, health socul affars, indutry, shippung, forestry, and irrigvtion, in sg18, agraran affairs was added * The East Indomenan government actually ded exercise a limited anitlative in the felds of educatuon, socal aflaurs, health, strigation and, to a mech lesser extent, industry. Houever, the exercise of most of the powers theorestcally tramferred to it wan vitiated by the numerous general and parucular povers specifically reserved to the Netherlands Indhes government at Batavia

Even where it appeared that no reserved powers anterfered with the exercue of a delegated pouer, the East Indoneuan government was m some amtanes vartually powerless For example, the paper transfer of authorsty over thuppang meant very little as long as the Dutch protected the inter-sland monopoly of the Konanklike Paketvaart Maat chappty. a large Dutch steamshap company The East Indonesan government's ostensuble power over economie affairs was limited, not only by Batavia's cantral ever exports and imports, but also by the fact that the purchase and sate of the area's major crop, copea (on which almost halt the population was esther prumanly or to a ngnißcant exsent dependent for a lavelihood), was a strict monopaly of the Dutch adminstration at Batavia The latter's agency, the Copra Fund, fixed the prace at which the Indonesian producer could sell his copra to the Fund, the only legal purchaser The proce averaged far less than the price obtarnable at the nearest worid market outlet in the Phalippines "

Though the ostenuble reason for the Copra Fund's exntence was to stabilize the prace of copea for the benefit of the Indonesian producer by buolding up an sniurance fund from the margin between purchase price and sale price, thus rationale appeared to have hitle in common with the actual operatson of the Fund Even despete the low level being paid Indonesian producers the price of copea had not been stabilized but had been in the long term signsficanily reduced " Several of the more candid Dutch officals of the Ministry of Intersor wath twhom the writer spoke in Makassar in confidence gwe credence to the wudespread and batter allegatuon of Indonesan officrals of the East Indonesian government that the Copra Fund was selling copra to Dutch proeenors " at far below the wurld market proce and that most of the sull subtantal margin between this prore and that paud the Indoneuan producer was not used to stibdue the price of copea but rather went directlhy rnto the coffers of the Netherlands Indies government. This amount, Indoneuan offirals in Makassar alleged, uas consuderably greater than the deficst in the East Indonesin budget for whuch thesr government was dependent upon annual subventions from Batasia. The East Indonesian government was powerless to remedy thus sutuation, and it and ats Parliament were unable to learn from the Copra Fund what the latter's income was or what price it was selling the copra for"

Apurt from all tho, honever, the lack of Indoneuan personnel avaalfunctions allowed it and facilatated control by Batasia Since so many of its own people were esther in the service of the Republic or in jail, East Indoneswa relied heavily on Dutch personnel to evecute even the limited duties avugned to it Although all cabinet posts except that of Finance (a entically umportant one) were filled by Indonesians," the majority of the remaming high government poutions were filled by Dutch evil servants pot "at the dsposal" of the government of East Indonesta by the Netherlands Indies government at Batav:a, Certainly some of shese Dutch officials, partocularly those without prewar e perience in Indoneua, did try to serve primarily East Indonesta rather than Blatava, but they qute naturally tended to regard themselves as Netherlanders first ol all, and their actiens vaere olten lkely to be influenced by what they deemed to be on the best interests of Holland as well as ef East Indoneua Although Batavra on eccasion supported the Preme Minister of East Indonessa agaunst high Dutch offcials in the employ of his government." most Indonesians in the government appeared to be convmred that Dutch oficials of East Indonesia eem monhs acted as agents of Batasia and that, in the unlikely event of ther decosons' being coesested by Indonesians, the Dutch could gen erally count on backang from Batav ta

In admonistratve afßaums a more complete transfer of authority was in tram Dutch coil servants were being replaced by local councils adminsterang the regulatsons stemming from boch the powers reserved to Batassa and those delegated to the gevernment of East Indonessa These local councihs were, an additron, recersang certain subordinate legslatve powers At the level of the dorrah (terrstory), of which there were thirteen un East Indonesa," the authorsts transferred to the counols was, an theory, to rorrespond to that Iemetly exereised by a Dutch Reudent, at the next Iower level, that of a dnstriet, it was to corrempond to that of an Assistant Rendent. On the darrah level (except an Minabassa and South Moluccas, where elected people's councals exusted) soch powers were entrusted to councils of anstocratie rulers posessing both everute and legulatve powers In theory, this lega latve pover was shared wath undirectly elected people's councils, but in fact at least as late as Apml, 19i9 the latter remained merel advscey bodies At the distriet level, all legulatne authonry was reseed o c o atce lede e le o e peoples e there was, even an theory, wholly consultatve. Despite the v.udespread establabment of yuch eouncils. Dutch and Indonesian members of the East Indonetan government told the witer that, with the eveeption of Balt, and to à lesser extent, the Minahassa and South Moluccas. Dutch Reudents, Asustant Residenta, and Controleurs vho remained as adhnets to these councils continued to exest deçave anfuence on local affaors

The lamited experience of the teriter lent substance to this asertion For mtance, when he unseroeued the Arumpone (Rajah of Bone). chaman of the Hofot Tingg (High Cooncd) of the Daersh of Sowth Celebes, the Dutch secretary of the Rajah, an Assutant Reudent, in structed him as to how to anywer the wrster, haus anstructions being gisen in Indoneuan In anwer to one of the wrater's questions the Rajah's initual repdy was that the Unoted Nations should intervene on the dipute hetween the Netherlands and the Republic Upon being poltely admonished by the Avustant Resudent, he gve the anwer which the ltter suggested as being most approprnate, namely that he w2s in complete agreement with the poutien taken by the Batasia government on thas question

At a meetung of the Drstrict Counel of Pangkadjene in southwest Celebes (established tn May, a917) attended by the wrter, he was told beforehand by the loxal Asustant Reudent that the latter was there merely as a guest However, the Asistant Reudent domanated the meetung, he offered most of the propoals, and all those made by lum were adopted

In Balt, where the few remasning Dutch officals actually had come os Iimst themelves to adssory functions, the Rajah Council had exhabuted authorstarian tendencies In Aprid. 1917- prior to the trans Ier of admutueratuve authorsty by the Dutch to tdhus bod), at had been able to control elections to the Bals People's Council to stch an extent that fete nonamenable elemenes were elected to in (Well over half of that body's thurty four members were civil employeet of the Bali govetnment whose poln were dependent upon maintaining good rela- During the course of these electsons in two rajalbdoms, a tireable numher of pro Repulilicans were elected to the P'eople's Council, whereupon the Rajah Councol annulled the results of the elections in these areas and ordered new ones held Thus second time the rajals were more succewful (It should be noted that the Dutch army still occupied the islaned and a state of war and ssege still prevasled there, conditions wluch continued to exist when the writer vouted Bali an April, s919)

In the spring of 1919. most Indonesian intellectuals in East Indoneva felt that the Dutch were smpoung a political system whoch would dam or force nto Dutch controlled channels chear nationalíntie impulses They helieved that thus system resersed positions of political power to those Indontuans most ready to compromise Indonesian um favor of Dutch interests, and that it developed for such men a vested interest in maintaining East Indonesia in a state of pseudo independence in which their retention of political power was contingent upon Dutch support. They feared that they were beung saddled with a political system which would be controlled hy and operated for the benefit of the Dutch and a small reactonary manority of indigenous aristocrats and political opportunists, and that under at the social change which they idennfied woth nationalism woald be unobtainable. They believed that at was not through mere physocal force that the Dutch were es tabloshing contrul oves East Indonesa, In varyang degrees they percerved them to be coupling this application of force wsth a pattern of shrew d political ztaneuvers and a subdle sýstem of politacal stechanics which dovetauled woth ther basie policy of force, malang it both more effective in function and more respectable in appearance.

The process of vapplemenung phyucal and ecomomie fatce with polstical means started wath the Den Pasar Conderence, which set up the state of East Indonesa It vas called by Lt Govemor General van Mook and beld December 18-24, 1g46. According to efficial Dutch publicatioms fifty fise of the seventy delegates to the conference were elected and fifoeen apponted It aa perhaps hard to understand why at leat fotty of those elected were esther employees of the Netherlands East Indes government or arstoerate rulers and members of their stas" unles oe nooes that those members relerred to as "elected" were chosen by counchs appounted by, or largely appointed by, the Dutch Reudents These seventy delegates together elected a Balimese nobleman. Tokorde Gde Rake Sukawati, as Preudent ef East Indo meua These sesenty plus a later addition of sesen appointees of the President ** became the Provasonal Parlament of East Indonessa.

When the Parliament began to meet, st soon became apparnt that a conuderable number of these Iodonetans employed by the Netherlands Indies government were talking in terms of sndiluted Indonesian nattonalum and enabzshed support of the Republic ratber than in terms of a natuodalsm tempered to sust the minimum objectuses of the Dutch, a line whch might have seemed to be more compatible with their ammedaate economt secunity and penion, to come.

For their parf, mout of the aristocratie element t" became alarmed over the tendency toward social reform displayed by many of these same members With only twenty representatives in the Parliament, and even a few of these inclined to advocate progressive social legislation, most aristocrats felt their poutions and their prerogataves insecure. Moreover their Dutch advners and other Dutch eivil servants had implanted in the mands of most of them the firm conviction that the Republic stood for the ummediate abolishment of their powers and wealth. Most of them, partucularly those who had replaced the actively pro-Republican rajahs and karaengs an sg16, felt that the security of thesr positions demanded the retention of ultimate Dutch authority in East Indonesia Thus they were easily convinced of the mecessity of building up a state as completely disorced from the Republican areas of Indonesta as possible and ponesed of a constitutional structure that would ansure them an unassailably domunant pontion therein.

The chief political weapon of the Dutch in bending thus utuation to their purpose was theer relatsonshup with the aristocratic Indonesian rulers. These rulers were in most cases dependent upon the military and police power wth whoch the Dutch buttressed them In addstion, they all were legally bound to the Dutch by a politscal contract known as the Short Declaration (Korte l'erklaring) Under these contracts each ruler recognzed the sovereignty of the Netherlands, swore loyalty (on the Koran if he was a Mohammedan) to the Queen and the Governor General, and agreed to obey all regulations applicable to his area made by the appropriate Dutch authoritses. The importance of this relationship can be apprectated when it is recalled that approximately 7o per cent of the area and 75 per cent of the population of East Indonesia were governed through these aristocratic rulers. A major objective of nationalist elements in the East Indonesian Parliament was to remove this manifestation of colonial status. In their desire to have the government of East Indonesta replace that of the Netherlands as the chief partner in the contract with the arassocratic leaders, many strong nationalests overlooked the possibality that in the process they might lose much of what power they already had within the government of East Indonesia. During the late spring and early summer of vgig they did in fact suffer just such a loss.

In order to maintain their posution, the aristocratic elements followed a courve enabling the Netherlands to secure a more effective political control over East Indonesia unembarrassed by outward signs of such control. The Short Declaration contracts were renegotlated, with the state of East Indonesiz replacing the Netherlands as sovereign.

However, in retorn for atcepung thus change, these aristocratic rulers obtained a poution in the government of East Indonesia, their new uvereign, which astured thenm not only of being able to defend the poutons and prileges which they enjoyed under the old Dutch regime, but also substantally incresased their power relative to that of the pro Republican element in that government In aecoedance with their demands, a Senate was establshed on May s8, 1g49 * Thus body had thirteen members, ome from each drerek government. Since the arstocratic elements controlled ten of these," they were amnsured of alvolute control of the Senate, and. in fact ten members of the new Senate were from their group. The nevr and final constitution that was heng prepared for East Indonesa jontly by the Dutch and the existing Provisional Parliament could not be sntroduoed until ratified by thas Senate t" This being the case, at was generally expected that che comtstuvon finally ratsbed would protect the mterests of the sristocratkc rulers and guarantre them a strong postion in the new government This was exactly whst did happen Its provumons specifically protected "uncurtailed" the rights of their prnate domauns as eutlined in the political contracts imherted from the Dutch: * In addition, all such contracts had to be appeoved by the Senase*" Moreaser the method of election of the Preudent, whose effice comatanded very conuderable powers (encdedreg drsoluton of Parlument and calling of new electsons as well as appointment of the Prime Meuster) wa such is to make it virtually certain that no one other than a representa tive of the arstocrate rufers could be elected to that office " Sukawati,

e The últamate provmon for a senate fud been adømbrated in the Den Past segulatans, but the esaet powen it would enmnan spon its establahmeeg had nst been ood ( Rageing ost Vomteng vam den Sast Got Indamena' c . wt 4 Stustahled, sgg6 eo 14y)

w All lst Mirahama Souh Molanas and Lombek These thret arest had formerty bem doectly goverted by the Dutch rather than sidoectly through a loal nolbdty In the ether so dorrake Rapah Ceuncils chose thesr nenatans

to Thene Mecnoen of dhe Conwituón relating to the etattalumenr of the Smate and ce maneatce of the pouten of the anstrennt relen wese dralied prè vusonally at a prest cenference of mepeesgatues of the Poovsinsl Perlumen, (e anstoenstec lenden, and the Detth Crows at Maias an Mat, s98 The charadter ef the decsass amored at in the cedrme shdretel vhan the wraaevns vuls aa the Datch damonsted the prooredingt

n Conetitetion of the State of East Indaneme (Advance Bosth langrage ebtont mageo Malamat, segs, art gs ()

Fud art gs (r)

1n fhd, ant i5 {) ant 2e (1) and ()

the Balinese nobleman, rentauned as Presadent, and at seenued certain that under the nes censtitation any vuccesser of lus would be from the same class.

In addition to a full right of veto with respect to legulation concernong the areas adminostered by the indigetous nobulits, the Senate was provaded by the Constituton wth considerable powers over the whole range of legolation Ans legslation wuth whoch at disagreed it could hold up for as long as a veat unlens at vas overrudden ls a twotherds majarits of the House of Representauves " Thus it held a vartual power of veto with respect to budgetars matters Moreover. since approsumateh one thord of the members of the lower house had outlooks sumilar to or easils harmonzable with those of the majority of the Senate. the possibelits of overrading ats vear long deferment of a bill was slight I hough thete uas some danger of such a majorits being mustered by the old Pros isional Parliament, thus danger was removed by the sntroduction of a new election lau so designed as to make almost certain that more than one thurd of the membershup of Parlhament would have points of viet in general similar to those of the Senate majority " By the electsom held under thus las in the summer of vgug. the representation of the arstocratic rulers in Parliament in creased substantally and was well over one third.

In gentral, the changes in the system and composition of the East Indonessa goverriment between December, rg& (whben its cabinet resgned in protest against the Dutch attack on the Republic), and July. 194g. were such as to make at significantly less pro-Republican in character and more amenable to the interests of ant Republican aratocratuc elements and thesr Dusch sponsors

PASUNDAN

The second largest of the states establshed by the Dutch, Pasundan, was much younger dhan East Indonesia, dating only frorm the spring of 1g18 Lake the later, it had been formed on the initiative of the Dutch and was brought into exutence only through very considerable pressure on their part "" In Pasandan, there were no autonomous Indonenan anstocratic rulers, persons who felt that the petention of their povers and lands was dependent upon Dutch rule, as an East Indonena. Thus Paundan was tathout the arutocratc underpinnings that characteraed such federal unmts as Eant Indonesia, Est Sumatra, West Bormeo and East Borneo. In Pasandan, the only positise Indo nesan support upon whuch the Dutch could rely was from politacal opportunats, partaculartly persons who had felt that their poitions under the Republie had been unadequate, and a few Sundanese " who felt that the Republic's cause was doomed and woshed to ansure that Sun danese intevests (or at least what they concesved them to be) would be protected by a sem wutomomous Sundanese state (Pasundan) within the projected Dutch sponsored federal oeder.

From the beginning the outspokenne of pro-Repubbean sentiment

1n Spe Ch V1f for an aertunt of its engetn

oo The principul local languge of West Java is fendanese Theogh the baux ed tore of the ares as the sime as thst of cenural Java and est Java there are nome dder high as that in central Java Dunang mest of the pre Dutch penod the Saedasese area ss roted by tocally tooted sranscraces aodependent of pol trtal corenol by the tatt of cestral Java Daring the later pean of ibear rule tdhe Doth doaded Jinva grumt weh the wlmstutratne suas cdanned loe Parundan mnd sornewhst esase roughly wech the amea where the Bundzseme language was damseane Certandy the lerge mperity of the sreas populatias was more censccus of berg Indenesin than Sendarese di sheeld be notnd cat a ulstunmal mnonty of the papelation of the mren drograind a Pasecder. purticularly in its noesheastere setter, speke Jasa nee in is léeat lenguage among the Indonesians forming the Parliament and cabinets of Pasundan was greater than among the Indoneuans heading any other federal regime with the posseble exception of Madura Because of this and basically because of the lack of enough amenable Indonesian elements the Dutch were obliged to apply much more direct and undiguised force against those Indomesians heading the Pavundan regime than against those heading that of East Indoneua Undoubtedly this was also a reason for dhear granung less autonoms to Payundan than to East Indonesia

From its unception en April =1, t915 ** Pavandan never measured to the boundarses claimed for it by the Dunch At the outset aproximately ene quarter of its area was controlled bs such ant Dutch Indonesian organzations as Darul Islam and the Laskpar Rakjat Djawa Barat.** Dutch troops were in general more on the defensive than the offensive against thete ceganirations, particularhs bs the fall of 1g18 With the Dutch attack against the Republc of December s9. sg1$, the laster's crack Silwang: Dnusion fought sts wav to West Java and soon thereafter no more thon ene thurd of the area claimed is the Dutch to constitute the state of Pasundan was under effectre Dutch control

Withun the area of west Java whach the Dutch actually did control, the Dutch army played a very smportant polstacal role, much more direct and ev ulent than was the case in East Indonesta. In all esential masters Pasundan was governed by at and the central Netherlands Indies administration at Batavaz A state of war and siege euited throughout Pasundan whereby, as in East Indonesia, the basic civil Iiberties could not be exererised Political partes could not be formed without ther being approved by the Dutch authornties, and the limitations on publie and private meetings were quite as severe as in East Indonesia. In general the Dutch held a considerably tighter control ever political actiities in Pasundan than in East Indenesia. At least as late as May, sga9 (when the writer was last in Indonesia), the radio, newspapers, and even the local (regeney) anformation ofßces in Pasundan were all directly managed by the N.E.L. Government Information Senvice in Batavia or controlled by Netherlands citizent.

Even the powers transferred to the "state" of Pasundan on paper were ments concerned with agranan affairs, industry, and economic affairs were particularly drappointing to Pasundan officials The wide powers reserved to the Batavia government in these fields made it impossible for the Paundan government to undertake any measures which could significantly alter the colonial economic pattern existing within its area Durectves conctrning "general agrarian policy" vere reserved to Batavia as were all regulatsons concerning the rights of foreigners or Netherlands subjects outade Indoneua over lands within Pasundan." An equally blanket reservation of contrel by Batavia over Dunch and other non Pasundan owned agrarian snterests eas stapulated in a clause providing for such reseruation twith respect to "subjects of an agrarian nature lyung withan the field of evil and commercial law" which were esther "of general commercial anterest" or of "particular signaficance for important elements of the population whuch as such dad not belong to a partucular state " Control over foreign owned indestry located in Pasundan was ruled out, an wat that over all indestrial enterprise whose regulatuon Batav:a might deem to be in the interests of all Indonena"

Pasundan was granted a reasonably unfettered power to regulate its econamic ide outnde the sphere of colomal economue relatianr, in pastoular with respect to the development of intra Pasundan trade and native agriculture and handicrafts However, effective prosecution of soch actvities requred fundh of a magnitude not possessed by the Pasandan government The Indoneuan oficials of Patundan felt that the long lat of centrally amportant powers in the economoe field reserved to the Netherlands Indies government was hardly balanced by the hst ot specific, unqualfied " poners in the economic field that were gransed to the government of Pasundan The lnt of these powers as conveyed in the instrument for transfer of economit affairs was the following "enal [intra Paundan] trade, sa and cost fhing: smulation of local pr sappo, pea, mote o pea, and spange e a, tion of turtle eggs "o

Even the limited powers tratmferred to Pasandan on paper were largely vatated by the anadequacy of the funds available to it and the f e

Batavia gosernment. This almost complete dependency upon Batavia, of course, increased Netherlands control over the Pasundan administration. As the chairman of the Pasundan Financsal Commattee stated in an interview on April zg. s919. Pasundan had actually had no budget during tg18 and "only disposed of funds supplied as an adsance by the centrat government." 4" With respect to the year s919, he estsmated expendatures at : 17.ooo,ooo guilders of which Pasundan had the meant for raung only s7,ooo,ooo Of the balance the Batasua government was espected to advance g7.ooo,ooo guilders, leaving a deficit of 33.ooo,o00 ** Actually the funds beng made avaslable for expenditure per month in a919 were approxumately 25 per cent less than had been avaslable per month during s948 **

Thus the scanty funds for the depurtments of the Pasundan government were sharply cut, and even less of ats meager pow ers could be carried out than petwously. In view of the fact that the budget of his depart ment (computed on a yearly bass) was beng cut from s6,ooo,ooo to 5,000,o0o guillders the Pasundan Minster of Social Affairs announced on April a7, i919 that hs department was being forced to abandon its emergency social program in a way which he could not justify He went on to say that, though Pasundan had requested an integral trans fer of social affairs to it from the Batas:a government, ths request had remained unanswered So far, he affirmed, his department was actually nothing more than an affiliate of the Department of Socal Affairs of the central government at Batavsa, with the latter determining the regolations and his department merely implementing them " All departments of the Pasundan government were being forced to curtail their activities in the face of the dominshment of the already inadequate funds made avaslable by Batavsa.

Netherlands control over Pasundan was. as in the case of all the federal units, further insured as a result of the fact that most upperrank cival service positions were filled by Nethetlanders. This condihon was rataonaloed by the Dutch through maintaining im force in Pasundan the prewar salary regulations of the Netherlands East Indies evil servace According to these, rank was determimed by education, woth many of the top poutions requiring the possesuon of a law degree. There were, houever, only five Indonessans in Pasundan with such a degree (out of slightly under goo among Indonesans in all Indonesia). Mortover, nearly go per cent of the civil servants an Pasundan were drectly employed and paid by the Netherlands East Indses admotutration Indonetan members of this group were generally crutious not to dependent for enptoyment and pensons (Indonesans ebgible for pensons wthun a few years felt partcularly constrained)

Followung the second Dutch miltary action against the Republie, launched December 19. 1948, the majority of the Pasundan Parhament evinoed a pro-Republican attutude which was distimetly embarraming counteract thas, Dutch anterference in what political life Pasundan was allosed became increaungly persustent and heavy handed, Shortly after the Dutch launched their second actson, the Pasundan cabinet, headed by Adil Poradredja, not only reugned, as did the cabinet of East Indoneua (headed by Anak Agung), but also openly condemned the Netherlanda aggresson

The Dutch Prime Mimister, Dr. Willam Drees, who fad come to Indoneta wath much world pubbcity for the announced purpose of consultung with the reptesentatres of the federal units on the establish ment of an interim Iodonesian federal government, teas ebvrouily in an embarratong poution The two principal federal states had no governments and thetefore could not send representatives to the federal conference he was to meet The Dutch had no great diffeulty in getiang a majoraty of the East Indoneuan Parlament to hack a new cabnet headed by Anak Agung However, Adil Puradredja and the majonity of the Pasundan Parhament refused to form a new govern ment for Pasundan Thereupon, both Lt. Gen. Simon Spoor, com mander in chuef of the Netherfands anmies in Indonesa, and Dr. R. W. van Dufelen, the Dutch Crown Commusuoner for Pasundan, vauted Wiranata Koewema, the Wsh Negere " of Pasundam and demanded

e' Lotemiiy. "Suta Guardan " Wriennta Koeoema had fomaely bees an am parnast aeaber of the Reputhcan goveremest, having been chourmun of the pres denial advoery hody kaoan an the Councl of State Be bad lefi the Rapallse t that he appoint a new cabinet formateur and see that a new government was promptly formed

Finally, Wiranata Koesoema was able to get Djumhana, a nonparty member of the Pasundan Parliament, to attempt formation of a new cabnet The program upon the bass of which he astsempted to form it called for. (s) rehabolitation of the Republic as of December 18, 1918, under Soekarno and Hatta, (2) ummediate formation of an interim government in whuch the Republic was ancluded, (3) continuance of negotatsons between the Republac and the Dutch under United Nations auspices, and (1) representation of each comstituent state of the prorected federal Indoneua (meluding a reconstututed Republic) in proportion to its population On thos bass, Djumhana was able to obtain majority parliamentary backing fer hat cabinet, ** but because of its defiantly anti Dutch nature he was able to enlst only six other persons in has cabinet

Promptly, Dyumlhana went to Batasia for the federal conference with Drees Here he was told by the Dutch that the program of his cabinet was abtolutely unacceptable He refused to yaeld to thear demand for change, but consented to proceed to Bangka along with four other representatves of the Dutch sponsored states to talk wath the interned Republiean leaders there. This raised strong protests from some of the members of the Pasundan Parliament who had backed hom on the basis of his pro-Republican pregram,** such an action being considered as geared to Dutch plans and at variance with that program. There quickly developed plans for antroducing a no confidence motion in Parlament Aware of this and angered by the announced basis of the program of Djumhana's cabnet, the Dutch acted wuh force and dipatch

Beel, the Dutch High Communsoner of the Crown for Indonesia, wrote to Waranata Koesoema that if the program of Djumhana's cobinet were npt promptly dropped the Pasundan government would be scrapped an favor of a straetly military government Major General Engels, territorial and troop commandant of West Java, speaking for the Dutch Commander on cluef, General Spoor, and Dr. van Diffelen, speaking for the N EI civil authoritses, called on the unhappy Wah Negara in person and bluncly sold hum that, unless the program of the cabinet were changed, a number of the leading members of the Pasundan government would be arrested Engels made the seriousness of this threat abundantly clear by presenting hum wath a black list of ptrsons who would be jailed if his demand were not fulfilled The names on this hst anchuded Male Wiranata Koesoema, eldest son of the Veh Negara and regent of Bandung, Adil Puradiredja, member of Parliament and former Prume Mmiter, Mr Hasan, member of Parlament and a leader of dhe pro-Republcan Fractse Indonesia, Mr. Kotanh, State Secretary of Pasundan, Makmun Sumadspradja, Secretary General of the Department of Internal Affars of Pasundan, and Wirasupena It was made clear that thn was a partal list and that "other promment people who sympathize with the Republhe" could alho expect to be jaited in case of non complsance **

Weranata Koesoema's reply was that if these persons were arrested he twould reugn Posubty at was because of this that, in the face of continued noncomplaance with their demands, the Dutch arrested five others instead On Jutuary 14. s9g, while Waranata Koesoema vas out of Bandung on an mspection trp and Djumhana was still on Bangka, Dutch army authorsties zn Bandung summanly arrested Soejoso, a member of Parliament and chairman of sts strongly pro Republicam Fractue Indoneua; Mohammad Enoch, another strongly pro-Republican member of Parlhament, Ating, High Commiuioner of Pasundan police, and tho other prominent pro-Republican Sundanese, Dr. Suratman Erwan and Gondokusumo. This action thoroughly untimudated most members of Djumhana's cabinet and many members of Parlament. It was generally believed that contanued noncompliance with the Dutch demand for a change an cabinet program would mean further arrest.

On the night of the fifteenth the four members of the cabinet then in Bandung held a meeting and resolved to resign as individuals. Wiranata Koesoema refused to accept their reugnations. The followung day Djumhana returned and was able to delay thear resignations for a week. However, his arguments against their resigning were demolnhed when Major General Engels again intruded lumself into the political stuation by way of a public announcement which most of the manisters felt was pointed directly at them The pertunent part of Engels' proclamation read.

Influences are actve again, especially during the last days. which have endangered the order, peace, and security an Pasondam to such an extent that I, as Ternoal and Troop Commandans of West Java changed wuh the maintary power have been obliged to my regret to order some arrests to be made.

To the population peace, order and accunty must be guaranteed and I well not hentote to take even smore atringent mearares agsunst whosoever obstrucis the execution of my task.st

Immedeately the four wavering members of his cabinet turned in their resignations. Left with only two ministers.*" Djumhana tried vainly for another week to reconstruct his cabinet and on January a8 resigned has post.

The Netherlands policy of antimidation had been successful The only way in which Djumhana could form a new cabinet was by dropping his former program and substituting an extremely mild one. The program of the new government which he formed at the beginning of February called for establnhment of a sovereign and free federal Indonesia as soon as possible and formation of an interim government in whach the Republhe would take part The Dutch were probably cognizant of the parallel sub rose program which the parties backing the cabanet had given Djumhana the durective of artarning namely, implementation of the program of the prevoous cabinet. However, they peobably felt that they could keep enough pressure on Djumhans and his cabanet to make such an endeavor relasively meffectual ≈ More important, they had elimnated most of the sheen from the example which Pasundan had begum to set for weaker or tamider pro-Republican elements an other federal units an well as the embarrasiment it was causing the Nesherlands wuh respect to the world outude. Such was the political autonomy of the "state" of Pasundan

EAST JAVA

East Java had been advertsed as a "state" to the outtode world and so represented it the Dutch spontored Federal Consultative Assembly a for more than four months pror to the wrser's votat to Surabaya, 1ts capotal, in Apeil, aga9 However, upon arrving there he found that no powers, even on paper, had yet been geaned thes "state " Members of its Indonesan "government" with whom he spoke somewhat apolo getscally explamed that no power transfer could take place yet becaune the comstitution of the state had been writtet in Dusch and had not yet been translated anto the Indonesman language However, they stated that this docoment, drawn up by some of them under the superetson of the Dutch Government Commassuoner (Recombe) foe East Java, was expected to be approved soon by Batavia It had been sent to Batava fot tranmlation into Indonesian, and as soon as this was completed st would be stubmitted to the East Java Representative Asrembly for ratafication Then the "government" of East Java would be able to function wothn the framewoek of whatever powers the Dutch had been willing to grant it

Dutch officals with whom the writer spoke talked enthusastically of the "reasonableness" of most of the mesnbers of the East Java government and appeared to have high hopes for their performance Dr. Charles van der Plan, the Government Commssoner for East Java (as soch he was aIso an charge of the N EI's admimstration of Madura, where be undertook to establah a separate megara), restersted this sentiment and assured the wtiter that the members of its Representative Assembly had been selected by democratic elections giving real representation to the people of East Java.

However, the whole range of Indonessan oponion encountered by the wnter contested this assertion. Because of thes and the qualities of Machsavellian political cunning, shrend intelligence, and keen understanding of Indonesian society attributed by so many Indonesuans to Dr. van der Plas *" the writer felt that st would be not only umportant but interesting to probe further anto the electoral process in East Java. The common denominator of the accounts from the varsous Indonestans of East Java whom the writer questioned coneerning thas is contasned in the following paragraph a

At the end of August, 1918, Dr van der Plas ordered electuons held for the regency councals of East Jasa Before the war these bodies had been vartually powerless and largely advsory in nature Consequently much of the populace was apathetie tonards these electsons, hasong no inkling that Van der Plas would soon be gning those elected a very important political role. Among Indonesian intellectuals there was concern over the seriousness with whoch the Netherlands officials seemed to view these elections, but they could not fathom their reasons. The Dutch went to very great lengths to insure that pro-Republican membership of these councils was kept at a minimum. Dutch civil servants told the population in several regencies prior to the elections that those who voted for Republican candidates would automatically be forced to leave thear homes and go to the Republican-controlled area of Java. There were widescale arrests of those pro-Republican leaders not already in jail, so that few pro-Republican candidates remained.

Elections were held, and the twelve regency councils constituted as they had been before the war. Thus the elected members of the couneils were outnumbered by these appoonted by the Dutch. (The compositson of each councel was made up of one elected and one appounted member from each dintract plus several other appontees—Dutch, Chinese, Arab-to represent these three minorites) Even so the results were apparently not entarely pleasing to the Dutch, a comuderahle number of pro Republicans being elected to the councils In Djember, one of the most mulstantly pro Republican of the twelve regencues, the Dutch Asostant Reudent refused to accept the results of the election (approximately three fourths of those elected being peo Republican) and ordered a second election held In the interval several of those elected the first time were juled, thereby convineing a number of others that in would be unwise to run for office agan Sux to eight weeks after the electuon had been completed throughout East Java between 5 and s0 per cent of the total membership of the regeney councils were juled Since nearly all those pailed were elected members of the councila, this meant that at least io per cent of the elecied membenhip of the councals was jailed For instance, sn the case of the fifty three member councol of Lumadjang Regency, twenty four members were elected and of these eight were jailed

Afoer having carmed out these actiont, the Netherlands authorities apparently felt that they could rely on the large majority of the mem bers of the regeney councals They anmounced that these members had requested that East Java be grven the atatus of negere Accordingly the Government Commitsioner, Dr van der Plas, obliged by calling a confprence of representatises of the regency councals at the town of Bondon aso in mad November, 1g8 It is to be olntrved that Van der Plas did not call a conference of all the members of the regescy councils, only three to twelve repeesentatrves from each being sent.r* Thereby the repeesentation of pro Republican elements was further minimined, for with so few represetaie ben sent, moy groups had le cn of be se, paly f e e t wee reece having anly three or four delegates

Dr van der Plas appeared to have little difficulty un steering the Bondowoso Conlerence in the direction he wished The conierence formally called for the establalment of a state of East Java and asked

T Ot the s delegetes to the cnsfemmae, fy were lsted ao beng cletted and to appemiet of the tutal srasber y7 wem Indonanam, the vesn teng Chanese, Neher landens ee Arabe (V E I Govemmet Intoemation Servor, Batamia, Noe , 1g that it (the conference) become the provuonal representatve body of this state. The Batavia government promptly complied with this request and one week later, November 26, 1918, formally approved the formation of the "conststutional unt of Djana Timur (East Java) with the status of negera and recognation of the Djvwa I mur Conference as the provisional representation of the people of that territory." The success of Van der Plas was complete when on December : the conference elected a man agreeatle to the Dutch authorsties, Achmad Kusumonegoro, Regent of Banjuwangt, as Weh Negera of the new state and agreed upon a pattern of government favored by them. The system agreed upon by the delegates was much more eauly controlled by the Dutch than the parlamentary systems of Pasundan and East Indonesia It was sumilar to that introduced in the negera of East Sumatra, the W'eh Negare havung a fae year term with the cabinet respontuble directly to hum rather thhan to the representative assembly, and be and his cabunet having co-legulatve power with the assembly.

During the next four and a half months, the "government" of the "state" of East Java had no powers to exercne, and insofar as it was able to keep occupied did so principally by drauung up sts constitution in conjunetion with Dr. van der Plas and his staff Seven of the members of sts Prosauonal Representative Assembly ** had courage enough to sign a petstuon on March 10, 1919, asking that the Dutch clarily the status of the conuderable, and recently much augmented, number of Indonesians in East Java jauled as political prsoners." However, the large majority of ris seventy five members continued to behave themsehes.

MADURA

Dr van der Plas' establishment of the state of Madura was described in Chapter VIII. When the writer visted sts capotal of Pamekasan an mid April, 19g9. more than fourteen months after Van Mook had recognued Madura as a "state" and Tjakraningrat as ats Wahs Negore, he found that no transfer of poners had yet been made. Tjakraningrat explained to the writer that Batasia had not yet granted has state a conatstution, and that because of thus no governmental departments had been set up He claumed that he, himself, was administering most of the authonty in behalf of the N.E L government, but admitted that finance and judicial affars were still under the durect control of the office ol Dr van der Plas am Surakaya, wath Dutch civil servants representing that office stataoned in Madura

Zanal Alim, top Indoneman polce oßcer for Madura, was frank un stating to the wrater the lemotations of his pontaon Accordang to hom there were stall over one hundred persons from Madura in jail under polutical arrest by the Dutch authorates, be and other Madura authorities had no power to ntervene in such matters "At present," he stated, "one can't speak of the popular will in Madura, for the people are not yet freq of fear" "If one makes a nattonalnt speech," he contanued, "he at conudered by the Dutch to be ant: Dutch, there fore, at is dificult to get the real opunion of a person." Most Madurese, he explained, were afraid of contravening the law of "disturbance of peace and order" whereby at was merely a matter of interpretation as to whether what a person sud constatuted an offense The state of war and sege stull exusted throughout Madura, and its application was strictly interpreted, he sand The Dutch did not allow the holding of public meetings, regardless of whether permusion was applied for in advance No political parties exsted un Madura, he stated, not be cause of any exprem regulation foebidding them, but umply because people feared arrest of they undertook to form them

Among Indonesam ut general with whom the writer spoke in Madura, the sngle ancadent that had done most to stifle polutical actrity weas the example set by the Dutch in the speing of the prevous year (1948), when they sommarily arrested twenty of the forty elected members of the Madura Parlhament Two of those arrested were atall in jail, the chief Netherlands army ntelligence officer on Madura in formed the wrater This officer declined to say on what grounds these two men had been arrested and told the writer that he would have to take up a request for this anformation wath Netherlands army authort tes in Surabaya, or wath Dr van der Plat He dad state that regular Netherlands army units on the aland had been largely replaced by the Madura Security Battalhon numberang some s,roo men, but that the oficers of thes arganization were from the KNIL Fatally this antella gence officer stased categoracally to the wrater "It s not possible to mantasn law and oder here wythout the Netherfands army amelligenct servace " r

"launnew of the wntre wath Lt Van der Kaj, daef of dhe Madara branch of

SOUTH SUMATRA

In early May, 1g19. the writer visited Palembang, capital of the "state" of South Sumatra. Though South Sumatra had enjoyed its status of "state" for some eight months already, the following conditions ob tained. The actual area of the state covered only the reudency of Palembang. approximately one-quarter the area of South Sumatra" The state of war and siege wath all ats lomitations on cival liberties and democratic political proctues was still in force No politieal pasties existed Beginning on Felruary 1. 1919. powers over some beanches of govenment had been translerred to the "government" of the stase of South Sumatra These included internal affairs (tranmferred Feb ruary 1), traffic, reconstruction and arrigation, health, social affars; information, and education In effect, this tramfer of powers meant enly that Dutch and Indonesian officrals formerly Iisted as working for the Netherlands Indies admanistration in the reudency of Palem bang were now Inoed as werking for the state of South Sumatra. How. ever, the latter could not dismiss wuch personmel and their salaries continued to be paid by Batasia. In the regional adminastration of the area those under the rank of IB'edene (District Officer) were pasd by the Recomba of South Sumatra.

Though the Interior Department was headed by an Indonesian, that individual, Al»i, spent most of his time in Batavia as a representative of South Sumatra to the BFO The department was actually run by a Netherlander, Mr. van der Griend. The head of the police department was Dutch, as were all the police inspectors (generally Eurasians). The head of the Land Servace Dis sion ("Agrariz") of the Department of Intermal Affairs, W. V. Doop, was a Eurasian. His office had the important function of leasing land to non Indonesians and was in charge of urban property righas. This person was also mayor of Palembang. The former head of the Department of Socal Affairs and the current acting head were both Dutch The head of the Department of Education was an Indonesian, but the Department was actually run by Mr. Bockhove, a Netherlander who was Director of Schoolt. Very likely the

Recartba for South Sumatra would have preferred to have moee Indonesans in these offices, houever, he was limited by the fact that the majonty of well educated Indonesuans from Palembang Residency esther refused to co operate, were m pal, or were servung in the civil admmostrations and army of the adpaoent Republicart controled areas of Sumatrz.

The means whereby the Dutch obtained politacal control over the state which they sponsored in South Sumatra were relatively simple and employed an general approximately the same formula which they used m other federal areas In early May, 1g18, they announoed the establahment of an "Advaory Council for South Sumatra" of thirty ux members, twenty two of whom they stated had been elected by the Indontuan population of that area in democratic elections. Of the fourteen apponted members, two were Dutch, two Chinese, one repre sentatave of the Indian and Arabian popoulation groups, and eight Indonesant, of whom five were to represent the city of Palembang.* the Dutch being reluctant to hold elections there

As usual, the prinoipol key to understanding why a majority of this reprmentative body was amenable to Dutch wshes is to be found in the nature of the electuons that were held Even if one dncounts the wide spread and imustent Iadonesuan clarms thas in several destriets these elections wese charactenzed by coereion and other arregularsties. it as sumple to understand how the Dutch obtamed their majornty control of the Advisory Council The gaoning of nune of these twenty tho elected stats could be accomplished without any coereaem sunce the electoes of these tame were mostly apponted by the Duteh authorties The ordinance providang for the electuons stipulated that mine of those elected were to be marge heads (choefs of village complexes) a The electoes for these nine representatives had to be mergs heads themselves

Thus the nine representatives on question were lmuted to adminis trative offcrah of the Netherlands Indies regume elected by their own colleagues Futhermore the majority of the electors had been appointed to ther poutions by the Nedherlands East Indaes government. They hod replaced the prevoously elected eargs heads of the Republican regime after it had been driven out of this area follosing the first Dutch malitary action against the Republhe in 1947. Thus most the electors were persons who from the Dutch pount of vsew were considered "reliable" and who were certain to lose their positions if a Republican regume were re establuhed, and probably would if subject to election by the populations of the marges.

In all, a total of twenty three, not merely fourteen, of the tharty sux members of the council were persons upon whom the Dutch had substantial reason to belseve they could rely As far as the amenabelity of the council as a whole was concerned, it was not of vital amportance what the poltical atttudes were of the remaining thurteen elected representatives (that group whose election was characterred according to a number of Indonesians as sometimes marked by undemocratie procedures) "

Assured of their control of the Advsory Councel, the Netherlands authorstses proceeded to establish (wsth the council as the foundation) the new state of South Sumatra On August 17. 19g8, the council petithoned the Netherlands Indses government to grant South Sumatra the status of "state" and asked that it (the Advsory Council) be recognized "as the prouusional parliament of the Dutch-controlled territory of South Sumatra." The Batavia government granted both these requests on August so and authorred the couneil to dranw up a constitution for the new state to be completed by the end of November. This was achieved, and a form of government simsliar to that being established in East Java was set up, with the cabinet responsible to a presudent and the latter sharing legislative power wath a representative assembly. The council transformed ittelf anto such an assembly and elected for a four- Jear term as Weh Negsra, Abdul Maltk, a man long regarded by Republicans as one of the most unprincipled of opportunists, ambitious for positson, and walling to serve the Dutch in order to achieve it

Such were the negaras or states which were to be the elate, most utonomtous, members of the federal political order the Dutch were ent upon establalung**

PLANS FOR AN INTERIM FEDERAL GOVERNMENT

Simultaneously with ats artack on the Republic, the Netherlands gov ernment announced sts plans for estallishing the central governmenta organuation that was to rubnume and ncoeporate these megeres and the other less mportant federal unots, and ultamately the Republi areas of Indoneua at well Thas was to lunction as the "Interim Feder Government" of Indonesa until the trenifer of sovereignty to at by the Dutch in conjunctron with the Dutch, it wat to create the final fedral Indoneua to recerve that sovereigney The blueprint of the strue are and polstical articulation of thes interon governmene and the ay in which the envaaged ultumate Indonesian state was to be ablshed were set forth in a decree of the Netherlands government December 14. 1918. gmerally teferred to as the "B1O Decree " This w drawn up by the Netherlands government after connultations in Hr and in September and October with the delegaton of the Feder Consultative Amembly (BFO), a committee sponcaed by the D ad made up of repretentatives of the varsous federal units they tablnhed, each unit regardles of ats tuze having one vote in B canons " Ouensibly the "BIo Decree" was a Jornt peoduct of

It will te pecalled chat ef the is federal unris entablabed by the Datch th the satus of negma, ay mase were datiegvuhed from the ls papuleua ly rore ecseotletly and caltaratly tackwand dresak anenrett, ar cemtones (srally specal ueraooes') by srtre of bneg granted dy at leas) mge ait govemment and grone aatueomy froon the cmirel ra wan reperted te le appoiormstily the same as (har in South Sn

Netherlands gosernment and the BFO Actually, however, the members of the latter body were chagrined to find that the decree bore little trace of their suggestions

The "BIO Decree" was clasified as "confidential," and as far as the writer knows its full text was for several months at lezst not made public *" The ofßcal public pronouncements made by the Netherlands government concerning the decree gave a gronly distorted pocture of its content Thus a statement of December :8 snd that the estabinh ment of the interim government provided by the decree was expected "to come as close as posible to the ultamase aim of a completely free and sovereign fedetation, unsted to thus country in a Netherlands Indonesian union," with the provision that "enture control of internal affairs is placed in the hands of Indomeuans trusted by their felloncountrymenalthough Nethertands soseregnty will remain in effecs in the interim period." *" Acrually the terms of the decree put the "entare control of internal affasts" solodly in Dutch hands Nothung could be done by the Indonesian governmental adminintration provided for by the decree with which the Netherlands government did not agree, and the latter or its agent, the High Representatise of the Crown, could undertake whatever poutive action in Indonesia they desired, whether the Indonesian authortses establuhed by the decree concurred or not."

the B&O, the groop wahin is most inclmed to work closely with the Duth Furthest to the lefs (mont imongly pro-Rapuhlaae) were Pasundan and Madera Tha pon taon of Madura reflecied the sentument of its functonten parliament and not of lu Weis Negte

mn The wnitet pomewes a copy of the test Pataphranes of it whuch wete oheosly earefully adad from the engnal were sem by the writer an the prem whule he was in Indonesa (wtich he left May st, spas), but he never saw in most pertinent phrases in hoeral fom made public whale he wat there

er N Y. Tomr, Dec. 1g. 1919, p 1

as The Bto Decree read "The Representative ef the Crown shall sospend the enfotement of a decree and the taking eflrct ar the further effect of a federal law er federal order [ve, of the federal Inorrim Indenesian gvermment], in the event that in ha epoñion tha dreree, fnderal law, or federal ender a at vanance wath the Netherlands Constitation, the presemt Detree, te Oat [re, the Netheriands Crown] directions ee drmens" (B1O Deree, set. 57, par a) In case the federal gvernment did not sgres wuh such a dennion of the lhigh Repoesentatme of the Crown, the Netherlanda govemment wat to decade the peue (ee 57- pur 4)

The pouove powens of the Repenentasve of the Crown were equatly wodely eon ceuved Thus the decme provided "The Represmtatime of the Crown may sulmit to the fedeval government proposala for the adoption of the follovung meavares.. (b) for the hutflimens of udeguardng of a legal oblgutiom of Indonma the requne ments of legal mecunty, the fonfamental human rights and freedons and sound admuslatraton. (t) for makong provman for interets whch have to be preteted in

Likewne the dectee gave the Nethertands government ar its repre sentative an Indonesia absolute and unrestricted power to do as they pleased in the establishment of the final constitutional order in Indonesa to uhich the Netherlands had pdedged to transfer sovereignty. The power was such that if it so desired the Netherfands could com pletely daregard the washes in thus matter of the interum federal Indo neuan government that it was establishing under the Bão Decree."

Thus, though the decree provided that power could be exercwed by the interm federal government with respect to its own operation and ats preporation of the conststutionol onder that veas to succeed it, srch pover was exercised on sufferance of the Netherlands government and its agent en Indonesta, the High Repeesentative of the Crown. stricily in accordance with their wishes Failure to do so was unlikely becatuse any action contrary to their desires could be summanly halted and negated by the Netherlands government or ats High Representative of the Crown, wuth the lawer able to take whatever posstive action in these two spheres they deemed approprate

At the same time, however, as the decree provided for these absolute powens of the Netherlands government and ats representatnve in Indo nena, at also provsded foe a means of undarect control Given the exissence of certain conditions, this would obstate the necessity of employing the above mentioned absolute power, allowing them to be kept in reserve and making the operation of the Indomesun interim federal government appear outh ardly to be genusnely autonomous and its role in constructing a nen and definitive Indonesian constitutional order genunely sndependent The two peerequutes necessary for effective emplovment of thus ndirect meams of contrel were (s) amenabihity to Dutch control of the constituemt umts of the projected federal stase and (2) possession by the Datch of the same preponderance of phyucal force throughout Indonesia as thes alreads commanded an the states and specal territories whuch they had established outsude the resudual Republican area The first of these conditsons, as we hove al ready seen, was being achieved Therr remained only the second Thas requured the destruction of the Republe of Indonesua and its mulitary forces, and to thes end the Dutch had committed themmelves at the same tume that they announced the BIO Decree

The key to the system of sndirect control pros sded by the BiO Decree was to be found in its pror sions for the estabishment of the organs of the federal interm government. The essence of the formota employed was to vest control over the most amportant of these organs in the collectisity of consttuent unsts of the federation uhose indiusdual amenability the Dutch had already secured In other words, it was a means for linkung together the undivsdual amenabulitues of the "states" and "autonomous territories" anto one tractable unsty

Thus the most powerful of the two tegslative bodses of this government was to be the Federal Council, composed of just one delegate from each constituent stase or antonomous territory (regardless ef its size) appointed by and responsuble to their "governments or administrations"* In addition, the minonty groups of Indonesia— Dutch, Chinese, and probably the Arab group as well-were to have representation on this council and a vote an it with respect to certain cases to be fived later and presumably concerning their own interests " Thereby adilitional support for Dutch anterests by the Federal Councol would be ansuted Practically all, if not all, acuon of amportance undertaken by the interim federal government required the approval of the Federat Councal " In addition, the Federal Couneil and the

500

"Federal Government" (the executive organ, the appountment and discharge of whose members requured the consent of the Representative of the Crown) were empowered to regulate "the composstion, the chair mmanshup, the teem of session, and the procedure to be followed by the Federal Representative Body" *" Fimally, the predominance of the Federal Council and the executave arm, the "Federal Government," over the Federal Representative Body (or one might say the predoms nance of the organs of the anterim federal government which were most susceptible of inderect control by the Netherlands over that organ whuch. potentally at least, was most representatrve of the Indo neuan people) was unequrvocally assured They could enact over its obpections whatever legislation they felt to be requred

The Dutch appeared confident that before the end of January, 1949. they would have attauned the only unrealzed prerequiute barring theur effective vndsrect control of Indonessa namely, clear preponderance of phytucal power throughout the whole of its area. If able to achoeve thos, there was substantal reason to belheve that they would he able to establah an Indoneuan tegame vufficiently under thesr control to make safe the tranifer to st of the foemal attrabutes of "sovereignty" and possessing a convincing enough façade of "autonomy" and "selfgovernment" to sutusfy at least a mayorsty of Secursty Council members

Between them and this objective stood the army and the citizens of the Republic of Indonena

msefer ns fating under the yansdacton of the federat legsletere' [the contrars of tdete eakers wth the Netherlands Cowa were beng taken over or wese to be taken eere by the consttoent states of the federaton therusulses not by the tederal goeernmmt). regulaung (he tranuton to tnd the corstaon of the ooe legal structare paretnt to Chapter Feumes of the Netherlinds Conattution, eurrpe aaotar as the regslation theresf comes under the jarsdictson of the particpating temtory

4 Ser 4 of the BiO Decre read 'The Tedent Governemest may m concur resce with the Poderal Counol esact en za own authonty and ssponitsdty a fed enal hell or tae, which n zabmmed io the Federst Repreenanee Body if () the Fedeml Reprmecatrre Body has falad to potfy sppreeal or repecton wuthm the term pracubed fas thas penpost, (b) no agroesens has bem resched with td.+ Foderal Reprsentatrve Body, and immedate provanon should be made to seet ur gent moquressenes

The Final Struggle and the Republic's Victory

THE DUTCII were not able to present the world with the fart arcomph they had counted en They had gone anto the month of January woth the confident expectation that well before the month was ended Republiean resustance would have collapsed and the way be left open for their creatng the kind of poltscal order for the whole of Indonesia that they wshed. Hovever, both Republican military resistance and cvilian nonco-operation developed a magnitude and intensity which was of stunneng surpeise to them. By late January the 115.000 Netherlands troops in Indoneua were actually more on the Republican csties and towns was soon strongly contested by powerful night attacks of large Repablican units By day Dutch armored colthey believed Republican forces to be concentrated. But at dus& they resurned to their lases, where sometumes they had to fight for sheer survval through much of the night. They held strong points between these towns and cities but exercised only a limuted control over the roads between them, being able to megottate many of them only by heavily armed convoys. The majer city of Madun was through much of January completely isolated and had to be supplhed by air. Plantatrons were being alandoned, the Dunch havang no troops to spate for their protection, even hasing to pull their garrisom from some of the smaller towns

NATIONALISV AND REVOLUTION

Outnde the towns and just back from the main roads Republitan ervil servants, though frequently on the move to escape Dutch patrols, mauntuned the Republican cvil admunisteation as best they could In central and east Java ths admuastrauon was hexded by five cabinet mansters who had etcaped the Duteh—Dr Sukaman, Susatto, Kasito, Masker, and Supeno—and Dr Murdjant, Republican governor of East Java In the cataes and towns that they had "liberated" from the Republican regime the Dutch encountered a sullen and hostle estizenry The co-operaton they could obtass frum it even durng the fiest ten days of thear attack, after Republican troops hod evacuated she tourns and befoee they had ndicated the pouer to undertake effecnve counterodensives, was practstally mil Wich the development of Re publcan counterattacks from their bases outude of the towns, the reustance morale of the urban duellers became even Iigher.

Certaonly the outlook of the Republe's leaders showed no spint of defgatum The attitudes whuch they esaneed an the fice of the Dutch attack andacated their conviction that a final and decuere phase of all out struggle had begun and their expectatson that the Indonesian people could be reled upon themselves to see t through to the butter end

A few weeka before the Dutch attack Sjafruddin Prawıranegara, Manuter of Fanance in the Republican government, hod gone to Bukat Tinggt, the Republicen capttal of Sumatra on a mihsion connected vuh the affairs of hos momstry Before his departure Prene Mamter Hatta, so as to be prepared foe all eventualities, gave hum a mandate to take over the leadershap of the govertment in case he and Sockarno might be captured by the Dutch whule he was away The fighting spirt of Sjafruddin's Emergency Government was mdiceted by the anstruethons whuch be broadcast from hus central Sumatea hesdquarters to the Indeean depaon to the Ued Nations on December a The text read

The Government of the Republst of Indoneua ns prepared to order a cese fire and enter mto megotations with the Netherlaods government on the bass of and which as independent and sovereign-by the Indonesuan nation stself and without Dutch unterference.

(s) the wathdrawal of the whole Durch army fron Indoneua as soon as pes aible after the formation of an all Indomeuin gmernment The economic anterests of the Netberlands wall be penperly ebserved*

In the Jogjakarta area typewstten copues of the speeches to the Indonestan people prepured by Soekarno, Hatta, and Natsir on the morning of December ig (but undelivered bs them because of the bombung of the Jogjkarta radio statson) were cateulated from hand to hand and their contents paved on by word of mouth These speeches were of importance in bolstering Indonesian morale and in making the unterned leaders of the Republit seem more alive to the people In spirit, at leat, they were still lerding the struggle for andependence In addstion, Natur's set forth the gonernment's specific imstructions to the population, showing the way to be followed in the stroggle by those who were indecune or confuned as to what the most eflective course was. Wathon two or three weeks of the Dutch attack copies of these speeches had circulated as far as Surakarta and Magelang. It was not until the evening of January so that copues of them finally found their way to Batavia and then unto the hands of the Good Ofices Commmittee and Republicans there Shortly thereafter, however, their contents were made knoun throughout Java and to the Republican Emergeney gonernment on Sumatra, everting an influence such as they had in central Java.

The closing words of Soekarno's address read:

We know that with their arms the Durch will pombly capture and occupy several impartant placrs, but they will not be able to smash our fighting spirst, to evase, or to decrease the undependence of the people of Indonesia, the independence whch we have learned so love and defend during these last three jears The ndependence which we proclaumed on Augunt 17. 1915 and which has satwrated out souls will never be crushed by force

Afy prople, let us stand together now in the defeme ef our country and our freedom with every atrength avaslable Conunue ove streggle and beleve that the ultumvie victory in ours

In the core of his speech Hatta stated:

Radogram through All Indis Radie. Srngapore and Bangkol, Dee t1. 1915 An appeosumstely smdar venuen was breadcast on the zpth over the Repohlean radis in Madran shortly before that cty fell to the Dinch The vermen gruen over the Madan rado suatef. "The ecanomac snterests of the Dutth will be properly tared for

The enemy deurey to capture the government, but the Republic of Indonesia dots not depend upon the fase of the persam who are at the head of the State or nho are inembers of the government

The people must fight and I am convneed that the enore poputation of Indoessa a perpared to take over the struggle from un

Mobammad Natsir, Minister of Infermation and one of the most induential leaders of the nation's largest polstical party, the Masjumi, included the specific instructoons of the government in his address, the most important part of which was the following

The fall of Jogjakarta, whch the Dutch assume will be the end of all ther trouhlem, in-enentually-the begimning of every tontvable strugle and troutle for the Datch the end of whuch hex far in the future

The fall of the capotal, Jogjakarts, under the Dutch attack does not mean the end of our sruggle, but from chere on well the Indonesan people begn in tensccous and ferce struggle, whereın quirter shall be senther athed noe gven

The Repu om thoug he lead e thee are captured by the enemy The emential princople is that the people shall cenneve is straggle The bog canes can be occupied by the Dutch forres, bet the rural countryude cannet be captured The Dutch lack the power to domsmate the whole Rtepublican termaory, and they lack the money to maintain thouuands of soldaens So the Repablican goversment must and vell conunue to furction outude the bog coties For ths purpose each memtory must or ganze its battle strategy without too much dependence upon the central admomtration The fest am of the struggle in Republican temtory n

(s) Continaous obecructron, leavung the Dutch no appeetunety to arganue a regelar admunutratoon We mest, ebstrurt and anbotage every effort to consolidase the Dusch government Thes meant that the covt servants mest be 1o0 per oent nonco operatuee It means thac nch men and secially monded men must establoh a rehet fand for the most umportant conl serrants to pre sent their fonced co operation with the Duich bectuse of a hungry stomach They mast undertake as soon as possible these socal effors, especally for the politucal victums and the unemployed crl servanty The women's oganiatons moust pave the way

(B) Eesnomse conuelidation ot the Dutch can be prevemed by aburucting the peodacuon of goods they zeed for foreign exchange The means thereet are known to our fighten, and the merchanta murt understand whst is to be done

(c) Polateal cenushidtion of the Dutch, namely, the conatitutaon of a peppet regime mafe up of men of their own thoice, must be prevenied Then in the duty of every polrtital leader from every polotieal party The way is dear beter to be jaded than to be a puppet and a traiter.

Our struggle against the Dutch in the territones outsale of the Republic and in foreign countrses shall be contunued The results of this fight depend largely upen our own struggle wthun the Republic.

From January 6 to 1o, 1919, the writer visited Jogjakarta and was able to watness how closely the situation there conformed to that which the Republican leaders had relsed upon the people to create, and how dafferent it was from what the Dutch were telling the world exusted in the areas whoch their troops had "Iiberated " * He found that it had be come for the most part a city of women, children, and old men A majonsty of the young men bad gone to the countryswde to fight the Dutch from there. Few people ventured out of their houses The caty was not under complete Dutch control Its central area and part of its suburbs were occupied by a Dutch garrson of about 1,ooo men possessung ten Stewart tanks and large numbers of armored cars and Been-carrners But much of the periphery of the city was esther no man's land or actually occupoed by Republican guerrilas The Dutch malitary authorities informed the writer that several areas of the city to which he wshed to go were "not safe." Both Dutch and Indonestan sources afirmed that in a major attack on December 2g Republican troops had penetrated to withun four blocks of the city's center. On the night of January 9. whale the writer was still in the caty, a heavy by a KRIS* company of the Republican army launched a four hour attack which penetrated to the very center of Jogjakarta, where they fought for two hours before Dutch tanks and armored cars finally ejected them.*

* After havong left Jogukarta en Dec sg, spgs, folowang ate bomtang and ansanon by the Dutch the wntre pevuted the eity an early January as a correspondent for Ovemeas Neas Ageney Osly by becoming a eormespendent was be atle to vmt the

* Made up of men from Sulawen (Celebet), a large sumber of whors here from the Mirahaua anea

• The objetive of the Republican attack was the Hotel Mendeia (Frerdom Hooel) It was ewther fatuousty remaraed Grand Hoted by the Datch after ther occepoten of the taty. The wnter was saying these at the teme of the attack Thoogh he wm iware of fightang withan the block in whuch the hotel wan atuated, he did not realire unrtl afterwands how mestly soccessful the Republican artack hid bern He later Iramed that a Repubbcan squad had pmetrated the back entrince of che hotel and was layung dyeamite charges theme when drses off by Dutch anlders One manth later in Dutch-orcupand BRandang the Repablhcan hratenant who had been in charge of the dynamate aquad was kind enough to exprem to the wooer hrs regoes that he had been placed in such an ushealthy predicament and assured bom thit there had been no deure to dynatute hom penomally.

The nonço operation of the Indanesian cvihan inhabitants of Jogpakarta was almost absolute. The head of the Dutch economic adminatration in Jogjakarta, Mr. B J. Muller, informed the writer that out of the esty's population of approximately coo,oon enly 6,coo peo ple were working for the Dutch. Out of about so,ooo civil servanes in the Jogjakrata area no more than so, he stated, were working for the Dutch administration With regard to even these he was frank to stase that it was hn belief that they were working only because expreuly ordered to by the Sultan of Jogjakarta so that the civilaan populataon twould not seffer unduly. These few civnl servants were from the city's water works, sanmtary department, power station, and hospotals This conditaon perinted, Mr. Muller stated, even though there was an acute food shortage sn the city, the supphes comeng in being at the most omly go per cent of what they had been before the Dutch attack. About half of the approximately forty tons of food coming into the city per day was being beought in by the Dutch va convoy from Semarang, but thus, he stased, went excluuvely to the Dutch occupatoon forces and those 6,ooo Indonesians willing to work for them. Noncollaborators (except for persons in the hospotal) were given none of thes food a

Thus at least pgo,ooo of the city's preattack population of some goo,ooo were dependent upon a daily incoming supply of food approximotely equal to one third that which was being supplied the coty before the atcack* Thos plus whatever meager store these people had been able to accumulate prevoously was thesr sourte of food. Fortunately for them the slom supplies of food which peasants from mearby areas were bringing in could be purchased for Repubbean eurrency and only Republican currency, the peasants refusing to accept the N E I currency broughe in by the Dutch.

One ugnofeant effect of this, a factor which helped buoy Republs can morale, was that the rate between the N E i guilder and the Republican rupeah prevatling among Chunese shopkeepers in Jogjakarta, whch had fallen from 1 go befoee the Dutch attack to 1-gno a few days thereafter, had climbed lack to : sgo Some Chintse shop keepers with whem the writer spoke in Jegjakarta at thus time stated a preference for Republican currency over N E.I currency, explaining that they had to have the former in order to buy rice Ten days after the writer left the ratio was back to i 11o and by the end of January st reached : go The faith of the Indoneuan peasans in the Republican regume and its dog eared puper notes bath the picture of Sockarno on them appeared to he exerting a greater power over the relative values of the currencies than Dutch military moght

Gradually the acuteness of the food stuation was somewhat reheved after more peasants from outlying areas lost some of theur fear of bringing food anto a Dutch occupted coty, wath the Dutch encouraging thesr coming and the hugh prices obtained for rice undoubtedly sers ing as an additional anducement Honever, at the time the writer was an Jogjakarta and for some weeks thereafter the situation remaned extremely crutucal Considerable credit for meeting thas situation must go to Indoneuan women such as Mrs Suriadarma, Dr. Sulianta Suleiman, Mns Budhardjo, and Miss Kuraningrat who set up clandestine "nee kitchens " Here Indoneuan cvl servants who did not wsh to collaborate wsth the Dutch, but who had no food in reserve, could obtain the mmmum to keep themselhes and their families alive.

The treatment of the enilan populatuon by the Dutch served to in crease its resolve not to co operate with them The majority of wounded civilhans in the hospital had sustained thear wounds after, rather than during, the Dutch attach on Jogjakarta Almost every night a few civilans were killed and wounded in the fighting between Republican putrols and the Dutch garrison, and the Dutch were held ultmasely responsuble for this Moreover, several well knoun Republican leaders had been summarily shot by Dutch troops, Among these were Dr Santoso, secretary general of the Department of Education, who on the day of the Dutch attack was Iined up wsth eight other ewilans and shot by a Dutch majee.' Three other promiment persons were shot in thear homes: Masdoellhak. Nasution, advser to Prime Minister Hatta, Mr. Hendromartono, a former cabonet minnter, and Sumarsono, a high Ministry of Interior official Two sons of Abikusno, chairman of the Sarekat Islam Indonesia party, were dragged from his home on

December zs by Dutch soldiers and found shot to death the next mornng.? the oficial Dutch explanotion beng that they were shot because they were out after curlew *

The Dutch authorties understood clearly that, even if they could mantan military sopremacy in the Jogokarta area, their situation was hopelem unless they could bring a substantial number of Indoneuama, partictularly cvil servants, to co operate with them. They knew how strong was the popular support in ceneral Java, particularly in the Jegjakarta area, for Hamengku Buw ono IX, the Sultan, and they hoped that he would provode them the key for solving this votal problem If they could secure hus support, they believed that a substantsal part of the population mught give up sts attstode of nonco-operation To do so they were prepared to make hum It'alh Negere of a state to be included in the federation they were sponsoring His state would include all ar most of the arra admunistered by the Republic in central and east Java pror to their attack However, the Sultan shut humself up in his krefox (nalled complex of the busldings of his court) and refused to treat wath the Dutch mihtary or en dan authonties. Fenally after General Spoor, the Netherlands commander in choef, threatened to enter the hroton doors in a tank, the Sultan agreed to grant him a ten munute intervaew However, the only subject the Sultan wnhed to dscums was the departure of Dutch troops from Jogjakarta, and at the end of the ten minutes andicated coldly that the interview was over and left the room

Approxumanely the same condstsons found by the twrier in Jogjakarta were encountered dutang the same week in Surakarta and Madiun by Quenton Pope, the able staff corvespondent for the Far East of the Cluengo Tribune Indeed, as later reports demonstrated. better armed renstance and stubborn evvilan nonco operation was being encountered by the Dutch throughout the Republican areat of Java and Sumatra However, the conditsons whuch actually exuted in

* Staned to the wree by Capt Vonveld chart at Dusch aemy aveligenct in Jog pakteta The peer qualty of Detch arety untelignce ut adiared by the lat that Loseld dád not reslre who Abskuseo was Appavently the wniter's snpasry cun omming ths shred han to telegraph Batavia nega dag the matter The feloning wonweg Gan ù the vmey vwas plaent ander bouse arnnr an he Merdeéa Moted by Varneld ee ondem from Batama, and shoedly theresfier Abkuuno was srrestel Oa Jon to the wytue has fon vith a milzary palice eeart bock to Batavsa khene he was relesed He wn nover gven a sstofatiory eeplamaten of thn acuon by the Duch asthonoes despte sequnns on hu pat and that of neveral ether foregs these areas were not being reported to the outsude world by the Dutch. Though they had ended censorshup of outgong news at the beginning of Januaty, most news floning out of Indonesia for the nest tuo weeks was based upon the Dutch veruon of events i* Most foreign cor respondents un Indonesia were agency men wathout assistants and forced to spend most of their time in Batasia To visit the fightng areas in volved three or four days away from the telegraph office in Batasa and whasever mportant news might break there Not until the second week in January did a second staff correspondent, Robert Trumbull of the Nee I ork Tomes arrne on the wene The Commattee of Good Offices and its milatary observers lad been confined to Batavua until January 7 and were unable to collect suffuient data to draw up a report even partally covering the sotuation until January 2p.

During the latter half of January reports from foreign correspondents in Indonesia made it mereaungly clear to the world outsede that the course of events there was hardly what the Dutch had been representing them to be. The report of the Committee of Good Offices cabled to the Security Council on January z1 sndicated in the most temperate tetms, but very clearly, the complete falure of the Dutch to Iive up to the Security Council's resolutions and thesr misrepresentation of conditions in Indoneua Noting that ats malitary observers were "able to obnerve only the localities taken by the Netherlands Army in its occupation of large towns and the main reads connecting them" and that beng attached to the Netherlands forces they could not employ Repobliean molitary seurees in thear reports, the Commitee even so was forced to conclude

As a result of the Netherlands Army occupatson and the consequent guernila hve, in general, not been establshed Untl now, in fvct, serous dnoeders have been erritedSince the Republican Government has been prevented from funetonung, there a no autheeity on the Repuldcan ude to implement the Secunty Council s resolution directing both parties to "cease hastilities" Despote the Netherlands order to its troops to "crase hostilites." such cessatmon has not been, and cinnot be, attained an the present utuation

* Thes Robert Trumbult cahled the N'3 Tomes on Janeary ao with respect to the wtster's aetount of the heavy Republaran attack on Jogakata 'Mr kahe siney in the fint cunuale account of the courent guernila warfare on the interior trce the Datch cease five" ender of Dee g: There hive been no Dotch communoqués on major actiom since the ceve fire" (71 Tomes, Jan. 11, sgg) p 3) Qunntan Pope retumed from the etenor tso days alter the wnter U N mdtary olaeruens dad not bepn ther mmertgstions an the fietd untd Jan

15 U N , 5/1223, pP-3

Clearly this report coupled with that of a bweek before stating that the Republic's leaders were still imprisoned" ealled for further action from the Security Council

The melnaton of the Counal to take ne action was undoubtedy increased by the decismons taken at the conference on Indonesia con- Voked by Pandit Nehru, the Indian Prome Minister, at New Delhi from Janoary so-ry Recommendations to the Secunty Countil were made jorntly by the partcipants—Afghanistan, Australsa, Burma. Ceyton, Egypt, Ethiopua, India, Iran, Iraq, Lebanon, Pakistan, Philippenes, Saudh Arabia. Syria, and Yemen " These resolutions went farther than most members of the Security Council were prepared to go and probably resulted an that body's taking a firmer stand than it was prepaning to " Even so the resolution finally adopted by the Security Council is u.as not strong Agam Soviet Rusua went on record as op poung a resolution whuch Indonesiams felt to be strongly favorable to the Netherlands Agaan Indonesians noted that the Soviet insistence that Dauch troops withdraw promptly to the positions from which they had launched thear attack was opposed by the United States and the

U S/AC. sa/aga (Jan vs, sgis) The Cotmtee wan rully gven perms w the Dusch to vut Bangka an Jan. as Regandng the ondnaon ef the 6 Repotheat endens setermed there at stated an ata repost "They base one doorlen bedvoom 6n En n whch are locotd 6 beds In addnon, they were engpnally allowed an ann of qn a sorm wared e foom a large teteption novm Since ix Janusry tha ware ha xen removnd and the entare rerpten room sgm x stem a epen to ther uue Th e pemaited Imated acren to the voof under gund All windows are enclosed e nettng at in the zrea around the door Guands ane en duty in sevtry bon unedately cusede They ime not allowed to lave the wired area"

ia Poot to the elerese todis Pakntan, Burma, Ceylon, and Saodh Aaba had thdrasn all trasst faclinas, both ses and ae, from the Netherlands

34 See U N, 5/1m, p9 3-5

Begng hit the dee ym dhe membemp ol the nospermunnt mmn o re Ceunct had patadly ehanged, with Cuba, Égype and Noreay replacing Syot, Delgern and Colontia From the standpont of the Netherlands seplarement elpun wan cousndered a dotanet loss

n A Seriet propoal calling for the wthdrawal of Doich ereope to arels ocrupued them befere the stack of Des sy seomed the auppom of only the Uhrane, Caba. nd Egpt (X Y Hemeld Trobune, Jan ts vgisì) It in io be noted that Cuha folowed the foottepa of is predeemor on the Ceunel, Colembes in sefuong the he umdy made Communst amertiom that the Luun Arversas amtes en the Used bena vosnd as pappes ef the Upsted States

Indonauna were aware of the fact shat st msd Jimoary che Unsted Statm b zn Ée sshatne n propoung thst the Untad Nanans Caemauon for Ind ertatlahed with pewitm to recammend to the Councl what aress of Jasa,

On January zS the Security Council finally paned a resolutaun submirted jointly by the Unuted Scates, Chuna, Cuba, and Norvay a week previously This noted that the Council's resolutions of December *4 and z8, 1g18 had not been carried out and (1) called upon "the Government of the Netherlands to insure she immedate discontunuance of all milstary operations" and upon " the Gevernment of the Republic simultaneously to order ats armed adherents to cease guerrnlli warfare." (2) called upon the Netherlands "to release ummedzately and unconditionally all political prrioners arrested by them since 17 December 1918 in the Republit of Indoneua, and to facslitate the am mediate return of officials of the Government of the Republic of In donesta to Jogjaåarta in order that thes mas discharge their responss bilitats under paragraph ; above, se, ordering cevation of guernlla warfare and in order to exercise their appropriate functions in full freedom, sncluding admonistration of the Jegpakarta area, whuch shall include the city of Jogjakarta and its immediate envaroms." (3) recommended that the Netherlands and the Republie again undertake negotiations on the basts of the Langgadjats and Renille Agreements and the proposals submitted by Cochran on September 1o, 1918, with these negotiations being based on the establshment by March 15, 1919 of an interim federal government "granted the povers of internal government in Indonesia," elections for an Indonesian Constirutent Assembly completed by October a, s919. and a "transfer of sovereignty over Indonesia by the government of the Netherlands" to a "United States of Indonesia" by July 1, iggo. In addition, the Council reconstatuted its Committee of Good Offices as the "United Nations Commission for Indonena," endowing it wath more competencies than it potsessed pres iounly and allowing it to make decisions on the basis of the agreement of two of its three members (sull the Umited States, Australia and Belgrum). It was gnen the poner to make recommendations to the Council and to the two parties to the dispute, asssting the latter in their negonations and in amplementing the resolutions of the Council."

Tho facts were in partcular noted by Indonesans (t) the Couneil did not call upon the Dutch to evacuate anything more than the Jogjakarta area, and (z) the Councal made no provision for the enforcement of its resolutions In the light of the refusal of the Netherlands to ine up to the previous resolutions of the Council this omis unn was cbvoousty extretely serious The lack of teeth in the Councal's resolution convinced Indonesans all the more that no effective help could be expected from the Unoted Nations The deflant response of the Netherlands government to the Council's resolution certainly did not encourage them to think otherwuse The Netherlands representatve in the Unsted Nations stated on January a3 in reference to the Council s resolution that his government would carry it out "to the extent to which it is compatible with the responubilaty of the Necherlands for the mauntenance of real freedom and order in Indoneua, a responsibility which at ths moment no one ehe can take from ut = "

In Indoneua the reaction of much of the Dutch population to the Council s resolution twas reflected in a cartoon coverang the front page of the Sunday supplement of one of the prineipal Dutch language newspapers This cartoon was entutled "The UNO Deures Free Elections for Indoneua" and depneted a long queue of individuals each bearing the name of one of the Soveet satellite countrses and dressed in prison garb standing before a booth marked "UNO," the fiest person in the queue snquonng "Is this where we get free electios, Excellency?" An obtous intent of the cartoon was to soggest the anomaly of expectung free elections in Indonesia when so much of the world was wothout them. But that was not the only adea which the cartoon got across Also de picted was a small dog dentified as "NICA" (Netherlands Indies Crvil Admunistration) with one hind leg raised and in the process of urinating on the booch marked ' UNO *n

Among educated Indonesians wath whom the writer spoke at ths time the position taken by the Unsted States towards the Indonesian- Netherlands dspute was not measured by the speeches of American representatives before the Security Councol In part the poution of the Unsted States was ndscated to them by its voting record an the United Nations However, their chuef undex of ats attutude was provided by its economse relationshup with the Netherlands. They were absolusely consinced that the Netherlands would never have been able to undertake ats milutary measures agaunst the Republic had at not been able to rely on very great economic help from the Unsted States under the ECA program The more knowledgeable of them did not unust that the Untted States was prov udang the Netherlands directly wath the finantial means for mounting this effort But they did insist most adamantly that the subudurng of the Netherlands home economy under the Marshall Plan allowed the Dutch to divert a major portion of the wealth of that economy to the recenquest of Indonena. Thus was a financial outlay, they ansisted, whch could not pesubly have been made had not Manshall fands replaced this drain on the heme economy. They noted that maintenance of the Netherlands armed forces in Indonesia during the single year 1918 was estumated to total well over $poo,ooo,oon " and that EGA aid allotted the Netherlands duing the year April, 1918. through March, 1919, was reported to total $1oz,Soo,ooe."

There had been an additonal £CA grant of $68,ooo,ooo to the Netherlands regime in Indonesia of which 551,ooo,ooo had been epended at the time of the Dutch December attack. On December et, i918, the Economic Co-operation Admmistration, with State Department concurrence, smpended allocation of the $1pooo,ooo balance pending "clanfication" of the sstuation growing out of the Netherlands attack " To Indonesians this stoppage was in general seen as nothing more than a publicity gesture of little real effect. If the United States had genuinely wished to restrain Dutch military aggression, they held, it could have done so by threatening to cut off Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands If it now really desired to make the Dutch abide by the Security Council's resolutions, it could do so, they insisted, of it threatened to stop further ECA allocations to the Netherland.

However, the American State Department appeared to remain commotted to a policy of absolute prionity to development of the military and economie strength of Western Europe Despite their strong disapproval of Dutch actions and genuine anger at the Netherlands refutal to abode by the Secunty Councol's recommendations there was a general reloctance among most top State Department personnel to apply sunetions against the Dutch that would weaken the Netherlands economy and thereby perhaps undermine the over all strength of the Western European economy whuch they were trying to build up

But, as the Dutch were aware, there was in the United States an increasingly powerful criticim of this policy of the State Department from outside the government, a criticum that soon came to be echoed by a growing number of Congressmen The CIO made known its views at early as December ay in a letter of ats President Philip Murray to Secretary of State Mashall Speaking in behalf of the 6,ooo,oon members of his labor federation, Murray stated:

We feel that imofar is Amercan asd is now avadable to the Nesherlands gov emment, ri a beng wtd for purpones meonustent woth the oniginal (otent and objectives of che European Recovery Program

I voce the hope, on behall of the members of the CIO, that the govern ment of the United States will eontinue to take every feasble step in the realm of diplomacy and econammes to help termunate the Dutch aggresuon in Indonesa, and to asture a speedy settlement recognuung the rightful interesta of the Todonetikn people in ther quest for democratic self rule You may rent aswured that the State Department will enjoy the full support of Amencan workers an whatever steps it may take in this direction"

Oppoutron to the State Department's subordination of the interests of a sound Indonesan policy to what it concerved to be thone of a strong Western Europe became increatengly manifest in nongovernmental circles Reftecting this was a column of Walter Lippmann published on January so in whuch he stated

Ou frand in Wes Erope shou ay to undean w w be mae, e dae gepun

Is a poms contesence en Tes s, tges. Lo Alan J Valentine, chaf of tha ICA Memen to the Nethertanda sated "Te eut eff ald to the Netheriands weald cet taunly lupair reoesery of alt Weumm Europe" (37 y Herald Trabane, Feb § teer) m y y Times, Duc. ay, sg8 (ales the wntert)

the independence movements in Ases Thes should tell their propopundists to stop smeaning these movements They should ns to realize ho duastrous it would be to them and to the cause of Westeen osilirataon if ever it could be stnd that the Western Unoon for the defense of freedom an tutope was in Asta a syndicate for the preservation of decadent empires *

This point of vsew also became increasungly strong in Congress" A number of Democratst Congresmen shared thes mounting sentsment but restrasned themselves from undertakang any overt action because of the posution taken by the State Departmens Many Repub lican members, honever, felt no such limutation and soon made clear their poution On February 7 a resolution was presented in the Senate by Owen Brewster and signed by nine other Republican Senators This called for the stopping of all EC\ and ans other financial and to the Netherlands unul it ceased bostilsues against the Indonesian Re publie, wathdrew its armed forces to sts side of the Renvalle truce Iane, released all Republican government leaders arrested since December 18, and opened *bonafide negotations with the Indonesaan Republic under the terms of the Rensalle Agreement.""

As Quentin Pope reported from Batava to the Chucago Trbne at the end of February thas move greatly dnturbed Hollanders in Indonesia and was very seriously vieved by them. Dutch representatives in Washington were undoubeedly aware that a conuderable number of Democratie Senators shared the sentuments of the ten Republicans who signed the Brewster Resoluton and would have been more outspoken except for their deure not to embarrass the Administration themselves with the Brewster Resolution It must have become obvious to the Dotch that thear initial stubborn stand against the Security Councal's resolution of January 28 was too extreme and too likely to beget a dangerously hostile reaction, not only in the United States, but in other countries as well.

During the first tro weeks of February a cabinet crisis developed

3. Herate Tnbuse, Jan a, 1919 in the Netherlands over what polcy was to be followed in Indomesia. The Catholkc Party strelf was torn by the dispute, the chief protagonists beng tho of us impoctant leaders—Samen, Minister of Overneas Terrntories and Beel, High Commissioner of the Crown in Indonesia Oficial Dutch sources in Batavia stated that, whereas theee months premously these two men had seen eye to eye wath respect to policy in Indoneta, they were now far apart *" Both men were committed to the "lederalist solution" of the Indonesian problem as outlaned in the BiO Decree However, it appeared that Sassen wat aboolutely intramugent towards the Security Council's resolutions while Beel felt that a formula exusted whereby a sufficient gesure could be made towards compliance with those resolutions whale adhering to the plans of the BIO Decree " On February 11 Dr Sassen resigned and Beel, his polacy accepted, soon departed for Indonesia.

Upon his return to Indonesia on February sf, Beel's plan was officially announced by the Netherlands government, a fuller explanatron being gwen by hum in a press conference in Batavia held on March 1 tn In introducing his explanation of the plan Beel stated that "there was full agrerment between the Netherlands government and the Security Council twith respect to the aums of boch partses." The only defference, he asserted, was with respect to "the steanr for reaching this goal" The Netherlands was willing not only to accept the Secunty Councl's tmetable for the transfer of sovereignty to Indomesua but planned to accelerate that tometable.

Though it would be unable to form am interim Indonesian federal government by March 15 as the Secunity Councl had requested, the Netherlands government planned to convoke a round table conderence at the Hague on March is to which all Indonenan element, ptcloding the Republacans, were invited and which it hoped would be attended by the U.N Indonenan Commission. The announted purpose of this conderence was "to dncum the conditions for and the ways along which the earliest possible transfer of sovereignty" could be effectuated.

ucr Up dapaich frun Baatsk Feb it 1pea

n A N'Y Times dapatch from the Hlague reperted Samm as having "uncumpre masngly appesed the Secanity Counal reoluten" It reported that be had been replaced by Dr J iI saa Massesten, "aho frorn the Cathohe Panty bet met aa sutrense as De Sanen" N Y Tumt, Feb 11. 1913 p 3

in Atirnded by the wier The text of the statement of the Retherlands govem ment en the Beel Plan relnased at the Hague en Feb sf was seported is the NY. Tomea, Feb et, igts p : The following aeroeet of the Duel Plan is haad upon the ongnst test released at the Hegue and Beel s aluedatson en March a

"The simultaneous establthment of the Netherlands Indonesian Union and the arrangement for the intermedrary period, including the creation of a federal interim government" were to be considered in relaton to such an accelerated transfer. The endeavor would be made to conclude the work of this conference by May i, 1gs9. to have an interim federal government establshed by that date, and to complete the transfer of sovereignty to it on July 1, sg1g-a full year ahead of the final date suggested by the Securaty Council. In addition, the Netherlands government anounced that at had "decided to lift the remaining restriction on the hberty of movement of the Republican lead ers and to consult with them concerning their wshes as to thesr future rendence and the arrangements which will have to be made in thus respect " However, "conditions," it was later explained, would not allow them to be returned to Jogjakarta, nor was the Secursty Council's request for a return of Jogjakarta to Republican suthorsty to be fulfilled." Beel made clear that if the Republican leaders refused to accept the invitation to attend the conference at the Hague, it would be held without them.

As the United Nations Commsuon on Indoneua noted in its report of March i, 1919. the Beel Plan ded not constitute a compliance with the Security Councal's resolution of January 28 In fact, the Commission regarded it as "comprising a counterpropotal, or substitute, for the provisions of the s8 January resolution " * The Dutch had not abandoned the essence of their original plans The only change in their posituon, other than agreeing to impose fener restrictions on the freedom of movement of the interned Republican leaders.** had been

""Thus was not made clear until after Beels pem conference of March : There he sefuned to anwer the quertuons of correspondenos on thas qumtson, saying only "It ia better not to go into the question of the return of the Republican leaders to Jogja [kanta]" However, ths hid been made clear to the Repabhican leadern en Bangka en Feb aß when they were vouted by Dr Koeta, chuef austant of Beel (ure UN, 5/zn70, add 1, p 4)

"At hs Manch : pees conference Beet explaned that the Repubhican leaders would "later" be granted the "ume rights and dutaes as any ardunary cstuzen in tha eventry" He stated that thesr nghis were to be govemed by the conditions of the state of war and wege thas exnted throughout Indoneua Mandestly thn meang that they could nst engage in ordrury pehtical actisity, rmuch les rerure to Republican eontrelled parts of Java or Sumatrs The estermed leaders elected to remain on Bengha rather than go to Batava or some sther Dutch controlled arra By Jate Jameary Sockamo and Hadji Agoes Salm had been brought to Bangka from Somtra to Joun the oher Repubban leaders there Shartly therrafter Sahoir, because he was not tecinically a member of the Republian govemment, was allowed to go to Batasss to set specrfic target dates for the formstion of an interim federal Indo neuan government and for the transßer of sovereignty to st.

Furthermore, that "transfer of sovereignty," lowever complete or incomplece it moght turn out to be, vas still to be to a federal govern ment wluch the Dutch had created and uluch was to be indirectly con trolled by them As Beel made clear an lis peem conderence, the Netherfands omy would be maintarned m Indoneus untel after tdus transfer of sosereignty, thereafter, but only 'on the request of the federal government, it vould stay on untal the Indonesian government had belt an army of its onn capable of maintaumong law and order. There was httle doubt but that sech a federal government uould make this re quest Should st not do so, st was obs sous thit Republiean troops would quickly take over

As had been espected by the Dotch, the anterned Republican tead ers refused to accept thesr insatation On February =S after the Dotch propoals had been brought to Bongka, Mr. Rorm, charman of the Indoneuan delegation, after consulting weth the Republicam leaders there, announced the refusal and stated that the Republicam government "vill never take part in any action evading smplementation of the Secunty Council's resolution " " Honever, the next day the BFO (Federal Canultative Assembly), follonung its comultations u ith Beel, formally and unanimously (i e, all the fifteen sestes and specral tem tones represented in t) accepted the smotation to attend the conference at the Hague and accepted it on the basis of the Netherlands government statement of Febeuary a6 Thus it was that at hn press conferenct on the night of March : Beel's obvious pleasure at the course of events wan generally remarked

However, Beel's pleasure did not last long Five days later the BFO announced that its posution had changed A majority of its smembers now demanded that the Netherlands carry out the Security Council's resolution that the Republican goveroment be restored to Jogjakarta This, they inusted, vould have to precede the peojected conference at the Hague There was no longer unanimity in the BFO, and the di Vauon ameng its comtstuent delegationt between pro Republican and an: Repablacan blocs became mereaungty sharp with those daring to be openty peo-Republocam, for the time at least, in the majority

Many Repablocan leaders were convinced that this delection ef so

T Tint, March 1, 190 P1 many "Federalists" was to a large extent a consequence of conditions in the anterior of Java and Sumatra. Republican resstance to the Dutch had through January and February significantly inereased, in some areas spectacularly so Moreover, this resstance had come to extend over an increaungly wider area Following the Dutch attack of December 1g the enture body of the Republie's crack Silmangs Divasion had spilled over the old Renvalle truce line and marched for West Java, the area where it had operated before evacuating under the terms of the Renville \greement Marching in units of one or two battalions and often with the wives and chuldren of the men in the rear the Siliwangt Divaoon fought its nav some soo miles through central and part of West Java, its various battalions finally halting, according to plan, in the vacinsties of Bandung. kuningan, Cheribon and Garut.

Their way was botterly contested not only by the Dutch but by the troops of Darul Islam as well, with as many casualtses being lost to the latter as to the former. (This was totally unexpected, many Siliwangi units being caught completely off guard, for at the time they set out they had beseved Darul Islam still backed the Republic.) Wherever the units of the Saliwangi bent, they were enthusiastscally received by the local inhabitants as deliverers not only from the Dutch, but from Darul Islam as well. Wiranata Koesoema and other top officials of the Dutch-sponsored West Java state of Pasundan unanimously agreed that the Dutch could not laquidate Darul Islam; enly the troops of the Indonesian Republic, they declared to the writer, would be able to do that.

Were it not for the fact that many of the Siliwangi units were tied down in combat with the troops of Darul Islam, the situation for the Dutch in West Java would hase been dangerously critical. As it was, their position there was very diffcult By the end of February anly about one-third of the area supposedly comprising their state of Pasundan was controlled by Dutch troops. Anether third was controlled by the Silwangi Divsmon and ether Republican troops, and the remainder by the ferces of Darul Islam. Roughly the same situation existed in East Java. There, following the Dutch attack, the entire Sungkono Divisuon crossed over the Renville truce line into areas from which Republican troops had withdrawn nearly a year previously. By the beginning of March less than half of East Java was under Dutch control.

Though the delegation from Pasundan to the BFO was well aware of the malstary situation in Java," it was known to be strongly pro- Republican, and apparently because of this its counsel was discounted by other repeesentatives of the BFO. The only other delegation to the BFO comung from an area where Republacan reustance was obvaous and wudespread was that from East Java, whose Indoneuan Govern ment, as we hase seen, was of a kand conmdered "reliable" by the Dutch ** Most Federalist representatives in the BFO, particularty that large majorsty of them coming from outade Java and Sumatra, had been grven little opportunity to learn the real facts concerning the Republican resistance in these areas For the most part they had been forced to rely upon the Dutch veruon of events in the interior of Java and Sumatra as relayed to them by the press and radio of the Dutch controlled snformation servaces of their state or autonomous temtory The wrter was suapeised in traveling through the Dutchsponsored federal states outude Java by how Iittle Indonesans there knew even as late as March and Apral, 1g19. about the real nature of mulstary developments in Java and Sumatra Likewise they generally had no knowledge of the extent and antensty of civilian noncooperation wath the Dutch in the mewly overrun terratorses Indeed, the news they recerved from the Dutch had gven them the impresoon that there had been wadeapread co-operation with the Netherlands authori thes on the part of Repubican elements

Even in Batavia news of the real suteation was not easily avalable to todonesam, neuspapers there being suspended if they publsbed too much mews of the strength and aggresuveness of Republican milt tary actrity. For the newspaper reader at was actually much eauer to learn what was going on in the internor of Java in New York tham it was in Batavia The Indoneuan press could not freely prant all dnpatches from Batavia by United Press and Associated Press corve spondents, even though sts papers subscribed to these agencies Moreover, Federalists were useally under the chaperonage of Dutch oficials when they were in Batavia and when alone belheved themselves to be

an The wter mteraeved both aa drlegates

The temory of Cestrat Jren (pompriung that part of Cestral Jasa oocupuel by the Dunch praor to hesr aack of Det voet) did nat have a vete in the Bo untd Aprd i4 saeg At dhat nme (when st was vinted by the wnitet) it had a fune sonles seponentatve cvencil eompoued of pesns eleced by * revitcied lnt of ndonetan, Chonese, Arab and Dotch organirataons appuoved by the Netherlasds rathornten The vee chaman of thas bedy. Me 7aml Ábodm antarned the wone that et lest 8o per cent of Its Indommas mesbers (pe out ef its 8t meebers bon Indoneuant) wese oel wervanss employed by the NEI Goserwsens "So for.

THE FINAL STRUGGLE

under close watch by inteligence agents of the Dutch. Thus they were generally reluctant to have contact with members of Indonesian underground organarations who were in a posstion to tell them facts they could not learn from Dutch officials or the newspaper or radio. In short, most delegates to the BFO and most Federalist leaders in general, partucularly those from outside Java and Sumatra, were aware that Repablican resntance was contmung. but thought it to be weak, futile, and doomed to suppresuon by what they believed was the atresistible weight of Dutch arms

On March 3. s919. two events councuded to shake these convictions of the BFO leaders On that day they had sent a delegation to Bangka which found the Republican leaders interned there more confident than ever of the ability of the Republic's forces to reust the Dutch suecestfully " and clearly determined not to consider proposals of the Dutch whoch were not an accord with the Security Council's resolu tion, particularly not unul they and Republican authorsty had been returned to Jogjakarta On their return to Batava these BFO delegates learned some startling news, news which probably gave a fresh perspective to the expernence they had just had on Bangka. What had been dismised as rumor the day before now turned out to be fact. The Republican army had very nearly captured Jogjakarta. The situatiom there was so serious that the Dutch authoritues had felt obliged to admit that there had been heavy fighting lasting two days and inmeleing some s,ooo Republican troops, and that thote troops had "gained temporary successes."

For many Indonesians such an admisuon meant that at least twice as many Indonesian troops had been involved and that, had the Dutch not been able to fly in heavy reinforcements from Semarang. Jogjakarta would have fallen to the Republican army. Of more importance, this report meant to them that the host of reports of guerrilla successes during January and February—which the Dutch had so consstently dismisied as Repablican propoganda-vere probably mostly true. Undoubtedly thus same reaction was shared by many Federalists. Presumably this and the attitude of the Republican leaders on Bangka stiffened the spines of many BFO leaders. Certainly it was a factor in the sudden disaffection of a majority of BFO delegates encountered by the enraged High Commisuoner of the Netherlands Crown, Dr. Beel, on March 5

Thua atuvude of the majotty of BrO leaders continued and indeed appeared to ncrease through most of March, More and more reports of powerful guerrilla attacks agaumat the Dutch and the increaungly defenave powure of the Dutch army an Java and Sumatra convinced most of them that the Dutch plan for a federal Indonesia could be realized only af the Republie were included Fighung would never tease, they belseved, unlem a reconsututed Republican government satting an Jogakarta and led by Soekarno and Hatta ordered Republscan solditrs to stop. Thn did not mean that mose of these Federalat represemtatves were not stall wedded to the creation of a federal ordet in which dhey, backed by Dutch power, would be dominant. But they felt that thus could not be achteved unless the Republst was included as a manor partner.

Moreover, the feelings of some of these Federalists were being turned against the Dutch because of the brutal tacties to which theer army was resorung, tacucs which were alenatung the Indonesian popolation as a whole even more widely from the Netherlands than before Almost every correspondent who traveled with Dutch army convoys in February related at leant one mtante of the mereaungly frequent machine gunnang and cannonading of villages near the roads to be sure no guernillas were lurking there, with no apparent regard for the killing of unarmed civilans. Tha was by no means general practte; it was the exceptron, but enough Dutch officers resorted to this tactic to create a popular mpreson that it was wsdespread Undoubtedly many of the ancreassng accouns of atrooties were exoggerated, bot many, it was clear, were not, for instance, the forthnight report of the East Java Mauon of the Dutch Reformed Church conctrning the brutal killing of Indonesan civdians in Peniwen ly Dutch troops os Febreary so

Letters smuggled out of such Dusch occupied cities as Jogjakarta and Surakarta and the corroborating reports ef foreign correspondents viuting those cities gradually made clear the absence of law and order that exnted there The stroggle of Republican enal servants and labor ers there to reust the prevures exerted upon them to co-operate wth the Dutch was an example whuch began to afford unspuratson to many an other areas "

Proof of the veracity of these reports and the general character of the Dusch regime in the newly occupued areas was lent by the publie letter of January z: of the Sultan of Jogjakarta whach was wadely circulated in Jasa and found sts way to Batavia by early March In this the Sultan stated that the report in the Dutch controlled press that he was e nerating with them was "a he " He sand that he had resigned hes o, as id of the Jogjakarta area and that hs reugnation ex- He had done so, he stated, because

(s) I cannot apprase of the Dutch action towards our Republic.

(e) I cannot werk to safeguand the peace and welfare of the people of Jogakarta, because of brutal actsons of the Dutch towand the people —male, female, fouth, and the people on general They hve been arrested wthout any due proces, houses and sallages have been burned down uneil nochong remains This was done not only agaonst the In doneslan people, but agaunst Chonese as well Thesr protets have been antwered wuh "Yes, we are at war The people have to wuffer "

Although we hive met with a great many diffrmltiet, we will fight on from here. I am prepared to face any action the Dutch will employ toward me, but at is for the Dutch to understand that my attitude is the result of thesr actions

However, an outsode event adminstered a rather sharp check to this growing defectson among the Federalists. In answer to the deteriorating situation the Security Council on March 2s passed a new reso- Iution, known as the "Camadian Proposal," by an eight vote majority

(including the Unted States).ª The Canadian Proposal was clearly a substantial concewion to the Netherlands" point of view. The New Yorê Times correspondent at Lake Success reported that "delegations of the Republic of Indonesia, India, and other Far Eastern countries looked upon this latest resolution as giving away to Dutch demands and a face saving gesture to make it appear that the council was not backing down on its earlier resolution." = Republicans in Indonesia were bitter and discouraged about the Council's actions. They believed that the resolution, despute its name, was American instigated, and they noted that the Sonet Unuon opposed at Republican sympathizets in the federal states were deeply disheartened," and the revolt of Federalist representatives wathin the BFO agaanst Dutch dictation was markedly curbed

The Council did not again direct the two parties to cease fighting. nor did it direct the Netherlands to restore the Republican leaders and their government to Jogjakarta It merely requested that its agent, the Unuted Nations Commnmoon for Indonesia, "in accordance with the Council's resolution of 28 Jamuary, 1949, and wathout prejudicing the rights, claims, and positsons of the partses" should assist them in reaching agreement as to implementation of the resolution of January #8, in partucular that part of it dealng with the cesation of hostalities and the restoration of the Republican government and of its leaders to Jogjakarta It also called upon the Commssion to asust the parties in reaching agreement as to "the tume and conditions for holding the proposed [by the Netherlands] conference at the Hagoe, to the end that negotiations contemplated by the resolution of s8 January may be held as soom as possible " If these agreements were reached, the Councal stated, the holding of such a conference and the partscipation tere of dhe U N's Commimon for Indonesia, "in accordance with its terms of reference," would be considered by the Council as "consatent with the purposes and objectives" of its Janoary a8 resalution 5

Responding to this ambiguous directive,** the U.N, Commission for

en All brat the Sonaet Cnon, Ukraine, and France

Repost by Gesrge Barrett to NY Tumu, Manh es. tpg p

Indonesia on March a6 called upon the Netherlands and the Republic to resume under its auspices thesr long suspended negotiations. Both parties agreed to this, and Dr. J. H. van Royen, leader of the Netherlands delegation arrived in Batavia on April 12. In the meantime the American Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, stressed to the Netherlands Foreign Minster, Dr Stukker, on the latter's vuut to Washington on March gt, the desire of the Unsted States for a prompt and amicable settlement of the dispute It s probable that in therr discussions Acheson emphasized to Stiller the necesuty for thus if the State Department were not to be under a pethaps srresstible pressure from Congress to suspend ECA help to the Netherlands.

In its reporting of Acheson's talks wsth Stukker the New York Timer dispatch from Washungton stated "The State Department has been opposing efforts on Capotol Hill to eliminate European Recovery Plan allocations to the Dutch pending a settlement of the Indoneuan questions. Thus far these eflorts have not succeeded." " However, there was increasing and soundly based fear in the State Department that the Senate's mounting and progressively articulate oppostion to Netherlands attions in Indonesia mighs delay pasage of the entire $s.s8o,- ooo,ooo European Recovery bill and that ultimate agreement to its passage might not be won until the Sgso,ooo,ooo earmarked for the Netherlands was stricken out of the bill"

At the same time Senate opposition to the refusal of the Netherlands to live up to the Security Council's January s8 resolution threatened to delay and posibly defeat the Administration's proposed miltary equipment program for Western Europe, or at least to restrict it from extending to the Netherlands. As the New York Tomer reported from

Washungion "These is strong oppoution to the arms program in general, so strong in fact, that the State Department is now seriously con cerned about at The oppostion contains more chan a few influential legalasoes sho argue that the Unted States should not gise arms to the Netherlands to replace or supplement malitary equipement being used in the Netherlands Indies."

Houever, passage of the ERP program was of the most smmedate and critacal concern to the State Deportment and the Adminutration in grneral There was before the Senate an amendment to the European Recovery Bill antroduced by Senator Owen Brewster which emjoyed the support of a large number of Republican Senators and the pomubelty of backang from enough Democratic Senators to make its adopton a very real possubdity This amendment was of a general character, but specafically aumed against the Netherlands. It read.

No fonds authotated for the purposes of this act shall be allocated to or ex ped ee f oly w te o requests of the Secarnty Counol of the Unued Nauant unul such tumes an the Adeunostator is advned, in wenng by the peeudent of the Seceenty Counal that soch complhance hin been effected **

This was the situation which the Netherlands Foreign Mamister, Dr. Stikker, found when he arrved in Washangton, and there is htle doubt that it was made clear to the Dutch at thus point that enly if they agreed to go at least a subitantial distance in carrying out the January #8 resolution of the Security Council would the State Department be able to convince the necessary number of senators not to cut off ECA allocations to the Netherlands

Because of sts importance in determining later Indonesian attstudes towards the Unoted States, it as relevant to note in some detail how Indonesan leaders have regarded these talks between the Netherlands Foreign Minister and Mr. Acheson They beleve that by this time the United States government was concerned about the damage being done to the prestige of the United Nations by the Netherlands defiance of its resolutions They feel that of even more importance from the standpount of the United States was the dangerous potentral that developments in Indonesia held for Indonetua stself It is their belief that the Stase Department was now fully aware of the sustained effectiveness of Indonesuan malitary resustance to the Dutch and the tenacious nonco-operation of Indonesian cvilians, and that it had finally become convinced that the Netherlands would never be able to marshal sufßcient force in Indonesia to maintain law and order, much less to enforce a viable political decsson. The State Department was now believed to fear that continued separation of the ants Communist leaders of the government of the Republic from the leadership of the irrepressible independence movement in Java and Sumatra might result in the repudiation of their leadership, with a majority of the population coming to acknowledge that of Communist leaders instead.

The leaders of the Republic's government were seen by many of the Indoneslan people as having rsked the prospects of independence by a willingness to negotuate wath the Dutch and make concessions to them (e g , the Renville Agreement) at the behest of the United States and because of a belief that by so doing they could rely on America to make the Dutch live up to their end of the agreement. This policy of reliance upon the United States with which the Republic's interned leaders were identified was now widely believed to have been unjustified and ruinous for the cause of Indonesian independence.

Aware of this situasion, the State Department, so Indonesians believe, felt that to keep Communist leadership from becoming ascendant in what appeared to be an unsuppressible Indonesian resustance movement, it was necessary to being the anterned leaders on Bangka back to Jogjakarta and to the actve command of the Republac's forces. Likewise the State Department is believed by them to have concluded that the projected federal Indonesian state to which the Dutch had promised to transfer sovereignty would not be viable in an environment of Communist pressure unless the Republic of Indonesia was included as a constusuent unvt.

With these conaiderations in mind, the State Department, Indonean leaders bebeve, put strong pressure on the Netherlands gov ernment, prncipally in the form of a threat of ECA ald suspension, to enter into an agreement whereby the Netherlands would live up to the Secunty Councal's resolution of January 28, 1949=or at least that part of it calling for the ceation of hostilitues, the unconditional re lease of the intemed Republican leaders, and the return of them and their government to Jogjakarta. Also they believe the Dutch were asked to guarantee a tramaier of soveseignty by the end of sggo to a federal Indonesian state in which the Republic was to be a constieuent unt

As qutd pro quo these Indonesians beleve that the State Depart ment agreed (s) to use its inffuence wath the Senate to keep ECA fonds flowing to Holland, (a) to use Amercan inffuence to insure that in any trenafer of soveregnty to Indonesia Dutch investments and Dutch trade wuth Indonena would be protected; (s) that the tramfer of soverergnty would be via a conference to be held at the Hague; and (4) that soverergnty would be transferred to a federal Indonenan stase whuch, though including the Republic as one of its constituent stater, would also be based on the fifteen-odd states and territcries al ready set up er in the process of beng set up by the Dutch, with the latter group having peeponderant representation in the government of the federal state

It is the belief of these Indonesisn Ieaders that the Dutch interpre tation of this agreement was that the Republie to be included in the propected federal Indonenan state could be a small and weak one and that in this federal state the Netherlands would be able to exerent paramount control along the general limes enviraged in its BtO Decree

It was on the buxis of such an agreement, these Indonessan leaders feel, that the State Department was able to brng most Senatets who had beem prepared to support the Brewster Amendment to the Earopeant Recovery Program Bell (mcluding Brewster himself) to hold off on any move cutuing off ECA assistance to the Netherlands until the Dutch had been grven a resaonable opportunity to carry out their end of the bargaon

On Apnl ± it was reported from Washington that a compromise amendment in the place of Breweter's had been peepared by Senator

Arthur Vandenberg which was sasd to have been worked out with State Department approval." The essence of this compromise was that ECA aid for the Netherlands would be halted only if the Security Council ordered sanctions to be taken agasnst the Dutch for thest refusa! to abide by its resolutions *" Manifestly the "if" involved was a purely hypothetical one. The compoution of the Securaty Council was such that even in the unlikely event of swostering the necestary majority of seven members in support of such action, some member of the Council would have been cestain to veto at France had already vetoed much milder action by the Secursty Council wsth respect to Indonesia and, given the situstion in Indo-China, could hardly be expected so concur in establishing such a precedent "

It is logical to assune that this sharp reversal in poution of the many Senators whose sympathoes lay wath the Brewster Amendment was enly made because of assurance from the State Department that the Netherlands had made commitments that it would go at least a substantial distance towards meeting the Security Councal's resolution. Such a warm friend of the cause of the Indonesian Republie as Senator Frank Graham would hardly have supporsed this move otherwise. He certainly spoke for other Democratse Senators as well as many of the Republicans who had supported the Brewster Ammendment when on April 5 he made it clear that, if the Dutch should continue to evade the Security Council's resolution and the Council iuself be unable to secure compliance, the Unted States should then cut off ECA aid to the Netherlands.*

The widely respected independent Republhcan, Senator Morse, refused to accepe the Vandenberg compromne and made the defense offered by its backers appear shabby indeed. The soundness of his arguments was admitted by many of thoie who supported the compromise, and it seems safe to astume that they would be remembered f Dutch intransigence continued. In the heart of his address to the Senate. Senator Morse said:

I do not see how we can escape the conclunon that to whatever exsent we have been belplul to the Dutth econtmy under the Marshall pian, we necessanly therely have been helpful to the Doch Goverement in carrying out an volations of what I conuder to be one of the most besise prmeiples of our pledges under the Uosted Natons Charter, the pledge that we would seek at least to protect the imtertits of people in the woeld who sought to make a fght fot freedom as we beleve in freedom .. We should not adopt the compoomuse amendment We aee deahng wnh great mocal wnd ethical mues, and I do not think at a night to sanction here ... approval for the expenditure of Amerncan dollaes im the Netherlands under ZCA, while the Netherlands stands in open defiance on the record of ius obligations under the United Natons Charter I say at has been found guilty of tramphng freedom in Indonesa I hold to the vew, Mr Presudent, that ao Iong as we permat the Duch to get by with the courte of defant actoon whutch has been thees snce the vaolation ol the Remville Agreerment, we are goung to be maundentood in Indoneua, we are goung to be musunderstood elseshere in the world shere weak people see looking to us to take a dominans role in protecting freedom n

It was therefore made clear to the Dutch that the American Senate was closely watchung thear actions an Indonesia and prepared to apply severe economie sanctions agaumt them if they did not abandon thesr defance of the Securnty Council's resolutiom" In addation, in the General Ausembly of the Unsted Natuons there had developed strong dissatafaction with the manner in which the Secumty Council was handling the Indoneuan question On Apral is by a vote of forty one to three ths body agreed that it would look tnto and debate the questaon " Wsth the large majority of its members supporting the Republie, it seemed certain what the tenor of these debates would be. They would mobilize world opution, uncluding that of the United Suates Congress, esen more powerfully behund the Republic's poution Thest debates were scheduled for early May, and ths fact twas certainly an added goad to the Netherlands to areive at some agreement with the Republie before then

n Congenonal Rrand, XCV, m0 58 (Agn1 6 10a2) 4977-18

* An example ef the comtumuing survedlance under whuch develepenevts ie ledo nesua were kept wat a leter to Fredens Truman drafted by Sesator Foewster and ugeed by as Reputlican Sematers regsesting the Preudene io pestract the Secetary of Sute and the Amencan delegunen to the U N to tike mnedately those sept necouary to asmule endorement of the U N pmolatiom A repert of thn, vu Arets. rathet Banva en Apel o

er The meson fot thas debuse was spetsored by Auemalia and India The ap pouten veses were from the Nefheriands Delgram and the Unon of South Afnce À meton to poupont thas detate was detesed, 4n to io wah 6 sirtemorn ncluding the Us Anong ihose arging postpanweent ere Tean Irance, ind the Sandna vun group (V T Ton, Apil rs, (ges)

THE FINAL STRUGGLE

On Apeal :; negotiatsons were finally resumed between the Netherlands and the Republse at Batasra under the auspices of the UN Commission for Indonesia. A week later the negottatsons reached an impasse with the mustence of J H. van Royen, chief of the Netherlands Delegation, that his government would restore the Republic to Jogjakarta only efter the Republican government ordered "its armed adherents to cease guerrilla warfare and co operate in the restoration of peace and the mantenance of law and onder' and agreed to attend the proposed Round Table Conference at the Hague " The poution of the Republican delegatson, led by Mohimmad Roem was that the oppoute sequence should ebtain and that it was unreasonable to expect such undertakangs to be pledged by a Repubican "government." when in fact the members of that government were wudely dupersed, out of contact wsth one another, and unable to meet in their capetal This umpisse contunoed until May 7. during whoch Indonesans afirm that the Republican delegation was under very strong presure from the American representative on the U N Comososion, H Merle Cochran, to give ground in the directuon of the Dutch pototson *

Because this epesode has had an smportant bearing upon subsequent Indonesian attitode towards the Unted States, it is of amportance to understand the Indonesian version of it. Among Indonesian leaders it is generally belheved that Mr. Cochran was attempting to bring about the implementation of agreements arrved at in the talks between Acheson and Stikker fve weeks before But they affirm that the concessions being asked of the Republic were much greater than those being requested of the Netherlands They believe that the respective positions of the two parties on April ±1 at the time of the deadlock as compared to those obtauning when they were prevailed upon to accept the terms of the Roem-Van Royen Agreement of May 7 clearly demostrates that the Repablhe yielded by far the most and that actually the Dutch were gong no further than Stikker had already agreed the previous month in Washington.

The tacties of Cochran were such as to aronse keen resentment among members of the Republic's delegation, particularly among those who later became convaneed that he had delberately msrepresented to them the temper of American Congressional sentiment** Members of the Republic's delegation state that he gave them the impression that he wa te age o the State Deparme, with ful power to make the Deparument's policy in Indonesia, and that the American Congrem had hatle interest in the Indonesian question. Soedarpo Sastrosatomo, an extremety well-anformed Indonesian representative in Washington, arrved in Batavia in late April and tried to convince the Republic's delegation that the American Congress was closely watching events in Indonessa and was sympathetic to the Republic's position, and tat the State Deparement's action concerning Indonesia was closely cin cumscribed by the attitede in Congrens. Accoeding to members of the delegation, Cochran belittled Soedarpo's report, indicating that it would be futle to rely on Congress for support. He emphasied to them, they declare, that what American support they could count on would be no more than what he, himelf, would be able to convince the State Department it should extend. Also, they state that he was imnstent thas they condlude an agreement wuth the Dutch befone the General Atembly beld sts debates cn the Indonesian question, deprecating the effectiveness of any support for the Republic that these debates might elicit and maintaining that discuasion of the dispute by the Generat Assembly would merely prolong it and let it get it out of control.

In presung the Republic to atcept the agreement with the Dutch which he advocated, Cochran, according to members of the Republic's delegation, gave his verbal guaranty that the United States would "stand beand a traner ol soveregty by the Neterlanda to Indonesia In addition, they state, he gave them the strong impretton that if they did so they could expect substantial American economic sup port following the transter of sovereignty, However, Cochran made clear to them, these Indoneslans affirm, that if they refused to accept the agreement which he sponsoeed-a solution which the Dutch had already indicated was atceptable to them—tt would no longer be at all certain that the United Stases would give effective support towards a Netherlands transfer of sovereignty to the Republic.

Though there was great relctance on the part of the delegation and the leaders of the Repoblican government whom they consehed oae esolion prope by Cra, he e a te that he spoke foe the Unied States and that unes they acceded to his propotals any real American support for the Repoblic might be lost. They did not doubt the Republhc's ability ultimately to win Indonesia's full independence from the Dunch without outside help. How ever, they felt that American support could result in this being attained much sooner, at the sas ing of many Indonesian lives, and without entailing the risk of plunging Indonesia into a political and economic chaos such as they feared might be the consequence of a lengthy struggle, a chaos which might continue long after the Dutch had been drven out of Indonesa. They felt that the concesssons to the Netherlands that Cochran was asking them to make were dangerous in that they might make possible an Indoneuan federal state to which the Netherlands could make a formal tramfer of sovereignty but over whach the Dutch would still be able to exert a critical degree of indirect control. However, most of them belseved that such a chance had to be taken in order to gain American support. Though a majority of the Republic's delegation finally agreed to accept Cochran's proposals and on May 6 won the concurrence of Soekarno and Hatta, one of its key members, Mohammad Natsur, who a little more than a year later was to emerge as Prime Minuter, resugned in protest.

On May 7 the agreement whoch Cochran had sponsored and which was to be known as the Roem Van Royen Agreement was formally accepted by the Republican and Netherlands delegatons. Under this agrrement the Republican government did not stielf pledge implementation of the three Dutch demands as a prerequisite to petmission for its return to Jogjakarta. But the next thing to this was agreed to. President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta gave "their personal assurances" that they favored in cenformity with the Security Council's Resolution of ±8 January s949 and its directive of a3 March:

(t) Iuuance of an eder to the Republican armed adherents to cease guerilla warfare;

(s) Co-operation in the restoration of peace and the maintenance of law and order; and

(3) Particpotion in a Reund Table Conference at the Hague with a view to accelerating the uncondstonal teanifer of real and complete sovereignty to the Unted States of Indonesia

President Soekarno and Vice Preudent Hatta undertake that they will urge the adoption of such a policy by the govemment of the Repuhlic of Indonesia as soen as possible afoer sts restoration to Jogjakarta.

For all practical purposes, then, Van Royen had won the concetsions he had demanded on Apeil a1 as prerequisites to the Republic's return to Jogjakarta—prerequisites, it is to be observed, that the Security Council had not called for. According to the Repablican view it had

UN,5/13%- P. 15 won the Dusch much more For though the stven point statemens of Van Royen was hesded by Netherlands agreement a to the return of the Republie to Joguakarta, there were included among the other ux points tems which were seen as smportant defeats for the Republe's pouton Though the Netherlandh agreed that the Republiean government should exercise control over the reudency of jogjakarta, is ded not undertake to return any other area to Republican control. The area it was returning was slightly smaller than the state of Rhode feland and was a small fraction of the tertstory which the Dutch had overrun

Republican officals were to contarue to function in those areas of Java and Sumatra where they were still doing so (i e, where the Dutch muls tary control did not extend), but except for Jogjakarta there was no mentuon of the Necherlanders' evacuatung their otn admonntrations from the sreas of the Republc which they had on errun Though both sides agreed to discontanue mainary eperatsons, thus undertakung in con junction woth the freenng of areas of admunstratve control (other than Jogjakarta Reudency) teemed to Republicans to confirm all the latest Dutch conquests other than the amall area around their capital, while depraving the Republic of the right to contanue its successful guerralla warfare avmed at drving the Dutch from these arem

The Nethertands undertook to "release ummediately and uncondoionallya0 political prisoners arresoed by them sunce 17 December 1918 an the Republic of Indonesia " The magorty of Republican polituical pruoners captured sunce that date were thereby released. Houever, this undoubted advantage to the Republic was reduced by a maneuver of the Netherfands mulitary commander in Indonesia, who on May so reelassied polencal prooners who had been captured after December st as "cramonals" and thus outude the category qualified for release.

One of Van Royen s points stated that the "Netherlands Government favors the exupence of the Republic as a state to take ats place in the United Sestes of Indomesia," and at was stupulated that the Netherlands would "refran from the establnhment or recognition of negeres [seates] or deernhs [ternitorses] on terrttary wndes Republican control prior to 1g December 1gg8 and from the expansion of xzegeres and derrahs affectang the raid tertitorzes" Honever, it was also stipulated—and this was a major defeat for the Repubhe—that, when a provsional repeewentative body for the whole of Indonesa was estabinhed, only onethird of the representation therton would go to the Repoblit.*" The se-

1 UN, 5/175-0 40 mainder would go to the congeries of Dutch spontsored states and special territories

Thus the long espected, U N supersned plebacites in the Republscan areas which the Dutch had overrun in thear first milstary action in the summer of 1917 were no longer even mentioned *" The regumes which the Dutch had unlaterally establnbed in these areas were un effect confirmed and were to represent shem in the federal state that was to receve the Netherlands transfer of son ereignty

Though the more reactionars elements in the Netherlands appeared to be outraged at the Roem \an Roven Aereement, and though Beel rengned his post as High Representatise of the Crown in protest against it, most Dutch opunion seemed to be well satsfied wath it Netherlands officials in Batavia generalls appeared pleased with the agreement and indicated a belhef that despete the promned return of the Republican government and leoders to Jogpakarta, the Indonesian federal state to which sovereignty would be tranferred would possess a government of which they approved Thus outiook appeared to be piralleled in the government's official statement to the Netherlands Parloament regarding the agreement made by the Minester of Overieas Territories on May 1s.** The BFO w2s reported as greeting the agreement wath "joyfu1 leelings" and expressed sts confidence that "on the basis of the peesent results there can be frutful negotsations, resulting in an early and adeequate settlement of the Indoneuan dispute

* It was alo panred out that though the populaten of the Repuldican controled areas pmer to Dee ny oggn sas at lent de à of thet ef all Indoneus, the Republie sas to get only ene thod of the representation in the poos moral repreentative as semtly (The population of Repatdcan contmotled areas proe to the Duch molitary atton of mid s917 was approtimanely to"s of that of the whole of Indonena)

The fact that the plan whah Mr Cochrin humelt had attempred to antroduce (umaeendally) in Sept, ag, an a tun for regouationm bevwcen the Repoblie and the Netherlands also called for the Repobies being restncied to one thund repre sertation tn the provismonal federal government which he eesuagel pretahly had Amencan and Delgun members of the Commmon formed a majeenty aligeed woth the Netherlands viewpount

es As to whether ee not the gmemment's new pohey saned froen that of Mr Beels anoented before Parlament on Feb s6, this satement rend "The govem mest han adhered to its cosse in the drectson of the sums then stated, butin the coume of the voyage towards that aim it has permatted uself some deviations whach have necher been annotend nar foresees If the govemment should be hlamed foe thu, I would remark, sull fallowing the meraphee, that the eaptaun at master of hos shup but of mesther the seas nor the sndh'(E1 Govemment In formatsan Servire, Batasia, A E . May , apes) Bed a mcosr, A H J Lon. attned in Dstnia on June s

Aeng Po, May 9 1üis (It vat unclear from ths commumque whether the apnon esporned was that of the whole BFO ee merely that of tx maponty)

However, among many of the Republican leaders responable for siguung the agreement there was grave concern and uneasiness that the actian they had taken might prove to be a fatal mistake. The general reaction among the educased Republican element in Indonesia was one of great depression and a belsef that an important defeat had overtaken the Republican catme Among many of them the feeling was that expressed by the pro-Republocan newspaper, Merdeka, that this was net only a defeat, but a defeat which could not be eradicated."

It was generally belueved among educated Repubticans that the Roem Van Royen Agreement had been engineered through strong Amencan pressure on the Republican leaders Among them there wat a strong tendency to entiere ther leaders for having accepted it. Some of them mantained thst the terms of the agreement called for a surrender of Indonesian interests which, when coupled with past con cessons made by the same leaders under U N. and particularly American pressore, sdded up to ruch a total capotulation to the Duich as to senously discredit these leaders This linking of these Republican leaders wath Ameraca in conjunetion with the fact that they trere known to be an Commuis tended to seer opposition to the agreemen ino snti American, pro-Commusst channels**

Had st not been for the fact that an altermate, non Communist chan pel of oppontson to the agreement was opened up by Sjahrir's Indoneuan Socalist party this drift would probably have been on a much larger scale than it was. Despite the safety valve for oppositson sentiment provaded by the Indoneuan Socialnt party's strong opposition to the agreement, the natronalat Communist Partai Murbe's backing increased sugusficantly as a result of the widespread dissatisfaction. Many believed that the increase in support for Daral Islam in some aress was also a consequence

Dissatsfactson wth the agreememt among Republican troops was wadespread, particularty among those who had evacuated thesr guerrilla stronghulda some fifteen months befeee under the terms of the Renville Agreement Why, indeed, might they ask, had they ever done so² On May 1g and sy Dutch authorities announeed successive increases yn the actwity of Repoblican goemilas ** There was considerable specolation in Batavia as to whether this mounting guerrilla pressore against the Dutch reffected hostility to the Reem Van Royen Agreement or whether it was merely a continuation of the increase that was already noticeable before the agreement

On June 11. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara finally made clear the position of the Republican Emergency Government in a broadcast from his Sumatran headquarters His government would support the Roem Van Royem Agreement, but only under the following conditions (t) the Republican army was to stay in the poutions it then occupoed, (z) the Dutch army was gradually to be withdrawn from the positions it occupied, (s) restoration of the Republican government to Jogjakarta was to take place unconditionally, and (t) Republican sovereignty over Java, Sumatra, Madura and surrounding (offshore) slands was to be recognured by the Netherlands in conformance with the Linggadjats Agreement " As if to make clear the support of the Republic's troops for this pronouncement, two days later a Dutch army communiqué reported a "serious increase in guerrilla activity " *a

The mounteng tide of Republican mlitary " pressure was noted with concern by Netherlands civil and military officers.* It made a strong impression on BFO delegates in Batavia Presumably it was also noted by the American State Department.

At the same time the continuing authority of the Republican government over its troops was impressively demonstrated On June 18, the Sultan of Jogjakarta, under orders from the Republican Emergency Government, issued a cease fire order to all Republican troops in the residency of Jogjakarta preparatory to the evzcuation of Netherlands troops in the area. The order was observed. On June go the last Dutch soldier withdrew from Jogjakarta Residency, and Republican army units took over without any major incident and without the "Communist disturbances" which so much of the Dutch press had been pre-

r* Aneta dupanch, Batavia Jane 15, 1p19

1 U P. dapatch frem Batavia, June 16, 1919

ra "Guemila premure" woeld be a mulearing term knce much ef the actimty of Republacan ameed groups was en a bottation acale, frequently Inveding more than a hattalion

vaThe writer notictd conuderatle difference in the outlook of Dutch army offees with whom he spoke in January an compared to thone he spoke sruth un Apnl and May Whereas most of those he tatked woth an Jamuazy appeared to have high morale and were certain ef a quick vctary, tha atutude was not encountered among most of thove wth whom he talked in the later penod. For the most part they could we no end ao nght, makang dear thesr belef that there wene not enough Netherlands croeps to do the pob shat was expected of them and frequmily ahowang a rather alarmed rmpect for the aggremse costage of the Republican troops dicting as a certanty The Communists vere novhere in evidence for the very good reason that thesr armed strength was too weak for them to even thank of ntruding

Sus days later Soekarno and the other long interned Republican Jeaders entered Jogakarta trumphantly to a thunderous popolat aoclaum On July 13 the Republican cabenet held its first meeting sunce the launchung of the Dutch attack seven months befere At the same time Sjafruddin Pratwiranegara handed back the mandate that Soekarno and Hasta had then go en hum as head of the Emergency Government The Working Commattee of the Republican Parliament was soon recomened, and after a week's debate at was clear that its majority would support the Roem Van Rozen Agreement, but it was tasistent that the terms lad down by Sjafruddin be met."

Incvezunglv during the spring of 1g19 the Federalut leaders, both the delegates to the BFO and the leaders of the seseral federal units, had become smpressed with the power of the Republic's armed forces and the dogged nonco operation of ats civilian populatson with the Dunch It became esident to them that the Dutch were able to secure control over only a part of the post Renville Republican area and that even an those parts which they controßled they were unalle to get Indoneuvts to partucipate in goveroments under Dutch sponsorship To almost all ol the Federalast leaders it had become clear that a fed eral Indonesan state whuch did not anclude the Republie could never be vable Yet at was obvious that the Republie would never enter such a federal state except on its orn mitemum terms

Moreover the pouer daplayed by the Republie against the Dutch had brought the majorsty of Federalnt leaders to beleve that masntenance of thesr own positions would be determaned quite as smuch by reachang agreemens wth this Republatan power as wth the pomer of the Netherlands If one came trom the stases of East Jasa, Pasundan, or Central Java, where Republican forors controlled as much of the frea as ded the Dutch, it was impomible to reason othernne The Republican conteol of lesser, bst substantual, areas of East Sumatra and South Sumatra probably beought even their strongly ants Repablacan leaders to realire that some sort of agreement tith the Republic had to be reached.

This mability of the Dutch to enforce their own polatical deciuon in Indoneta and the progressively defemuse posture of their armed forces there was, undoubtedly, the most amportant reason for the in creasng defectson by Federatst leaders from the Dutch camp during the late spring and early summer of 1919 However, alto of great smporiance was the groting dessatnfacion of many of them with the character of the "autonomy" and 'self governmens" that the Dutch had granted them Most had conmented to work with the Dutch in the expectation that thes would be somethung more than wandow dressing for what contmued to be a very complete furm ol Dutch control Some had thought that when they could demonstrate to the populatsons of their areas a real measure of autonomy from Dutch control, they might be able to expect some signeficant amount of popular backong However, the Indonestan leaders of even the "adhanced" state of East Indoneua, after nearly two and a half vears of "antonomy," lad potsfully little to shou. In none of these federal units had the Dutch sponsored Indonesan leaders won the support of a maporsty of the Indonesian mhalutants In every one it twas clear that the majority of the population stull looked to the officials of the Republic for leadershap

However opportunastic some Federalnt collaborators of the Datch might be, however great the amportance others attached to their anstocratic prerogatives, they were all nauonalists, they all resented Dutch domanation All were dusstisfied wth the failure of the Dutch to transier the powers they had been led to expect would be transferred to them. Many were acutely butter and resentful because of thus. Originally many of these Federalists had appeared to welcome the prospect of the maintenance of a camouflaged Dutch milstary pover in Indo nesia following the transfer of sovereognty But they had ensisaged the Dutch offcered "state securaty battalions" which anevered thas description as buttressing admanistrations headed by Indonesian Federalists who had been granted real power

Such power had not been relnquushed by the Dutch, and these Indonesians were increasingly skeptical that it would be By many the announcement of the Dutch on March so that the strength of these vecurity battalions would be ancreased by 18,ooo men was seen as a further indication that Dutch control would be masntauned after the trans- Ar of sovereignry, The drastic receganuration of the constgution of

Est Indea and e rduo o the me elecon la tere wee interpeeted by many Federalists as a Dutch maneuver to insure the more complete amenabilaty of East Indonesia to Netherlands contrel following the transfer of sovereagnty. The fact that by the elections held under thos new lasw in the early summer of ig49 a parliament was retarned whuch contaned fewer pro Republican reprerentatives than the previous one seemed to confirm these fears

To the many Federalsts who had become disillusioned and embettered by thear unfruitful relatsonshop wath the Dutch and who feared that the projected transter of sovereignty by the Duoch to a federal Indonean state would mean little real change in that relatiomhip the Roem Van Royen Agreement opened up a new possbility, This agreement appeared to many of them to lay the bans for a strategy whereby they could play off the Republhc and the Dutch against each other and secure their aums wichout comung under the domanating anfuence of esther In return for supporting the Republac's petution against the Dutch at the peojected "Round Table Conference" at the Hague they might be able to exact from the Republican leaders guaranties which would protect thear own interests and posutsons If they could secure such agreement, there would be less need to rely upon Dunch miltary and police pover to keep an check the large pro-Repubbcan majorutier among the populations of theer states and specal territorses. What was needed was Republican acquiescence to a governmental syitem for Indonesia that would guarantee the mauntenance of the alreadyestablnhed federal units, grant them real autonomy, and muse the Federalist representatives so strong a poution un the central government as to make certain their abeluty to defend the autonomy of these lederal unts It was apparently with tis stratey in mund that the majoesty of BFO delegates entered anto talks with the leaders of the Republican government an mad July.

Frosm July 2g to za mn Jogjakarea and from July so to August s in Batavia were held the anter Indonesian conferences between delegatsona reprmenting the Indonesan Republic and the BFO. As a resuls of these, a number of mportant concemmons were made by each party. The BFO Delegataon acknowledged that the envaaged federal Indo ntuan state would be receivang sts sovereigoty both from the Netherlands and the Republic of Indoneua. Also st was agreed to establsh a "National Preparatary Committee" componed of representatives of the Republst and the BFO in coder "to co ordinate all preparations and actmtwes which have to be undertaken during or after the Round-

Table Conference . . . a central organ in maintaining liaison between the Republic and the BFO" Though the undertaking was later not always adhered to, the BFO agreed that the constituent states of the federal government would not posness separate armed forces. In addı- ton, the BFO made clear its support of the Republic's demand for a real and unconditional transfer of sovereignty wsthout political or economic stringy

In return the Republican delegation agreed that the constitution for the new Indonesian stase to be drawn up at the Round Table Conference at the Hague, would provide for a governmental system gning the Federalists and thesr states what appeared to be a very strong potston Not only were the fifteen federal unsts which the Dutch had establuhed to have two-thirds of the representation in the House of Representatives in the new government. In addstion there would be a Senate composed of two representatves from each federal unot. Thus, thas body would have thirty members from the states established by the Dutch and two from the ene other federal unit of the projected United States of Indonesa, namely, the Republic. It was agreed that this Senate would have co-legislative powers with the House of Representatives in respect to all matters "concerning the relations between the central government of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the component states, or in matters concerning the relations between the states." Moreover, the Senate itself had the right to de termine whether or not legislation fell into these categories. Only by a two-thirds majority could the House override a decision of the Senate."

On August t, sg19. a cease fire was finally agreed between the Netherlands and the Republic, to be issued simultaneously by both parties on August . and going into effect on August 11 in Java and on August 15 in Sumatra. Thereupon the Republican and BFO delegations, headed respectively by Prime Minister Hatta and Sultan Hamid of West Borneo, departed for the Hague, where the Round-Table Conference concerning the tramfer of sovereignty was to commence on August a3.

Changes in the attitudes of both the Netberlands and American governments favored the Republican negotiators at this conference. These changes appeared to result primarily from the same factor that had been the chief reason for the change in attitude among the majority

* The powen which It was agred the Senate should pouwes represenned a compeo mise beteen the poutions ef the twe delegstons The Repulie was opponed to having any Senate at all, while the brO Initlally Insisted that the Senate be more pewerfal chan the House of Representatives of BFO members, namety, the unsuppeesuble Republican resistance. More and mme Netherlanders had become convunced thas the miltary effort whoch their country could mount in Indonesia was not powerful enough to enforce a political setlement Prolongation of the fighting meant not only a continuation of the destruction growing out of such fightung but also a contnoation of the conicious Republican scorchedearth poliey, che planned destruction of Dutch plantations, sugar fac tories, etc It was clear to many Dutch busnessmen that if indeed the Netherlands army ever was able to attasn full control over the country, by that time there would be litele Jeft of the billion and a quarter-dollar Netherlands investment there With many business Interests in the Netherlands now adding thear werght to that of liberel elements, par tacularly represented by the Laber Party, the domestsc pressure on the government to transfer sovereigney to Indonessa, though perhaps noe representatise of the majority of Netherlands public opinion, had consuderably increased

The tendency for the Netherlands government to move in thin directiom was ancremed by renewed peesrure from the American government Indoneian Ieaders believe that by the time of the Hague Conference the State Department was completely convinred that the Dutch could not enforce a polrtical decisson in Indonesra by military mrans They bebeve that it had also become conunced that if the Republie a delegation did not being back genuine independence from the Hague Conference popular confidence in the Republican leaders would be gravely undermined and the prospects of communism un Indonetua much stronger

During the two month peraod preceding the Hague Conference, the same Senators who had preously urged smpemeon of ECA asd to Holland continually prodded the Scate Department to make sure that real and unfettered andependence was transferred to Indoneua As late as mud June nether Senator Brewster nor Senator Graham had reahzed that tbere was widespread drsatsfaction among Indonesian Republicans with the Roem Van Royen Agreement and that a nom ber of its provissons were very unfavorable to the Republac. When they were apprised of thn however, they ndiented that they would utilaze this atdormation "

" Upen the weiers unformting Sernine Beosuer of these fats the Seasor on qunted hum to draw up a memorandum gpsong the Indonaan Repahlcan smachen to the Agroemeet and anslynng in as te the efedt of ra daunn Brevater stated be zntedet to utéur thas meesandum prrenptly and dhat st weeld be of great help to hom Copues of tus memoraedam wele goem to a zuber of other senatan utdoding Grahas and Vandenherg

By the time the Hague Conference convened, the American govern ment appeared to Indonesuans to have reached the point where st unequivocally insisted upon the granting of full and untrammeled n dependence to a federal Indonesia whereon the Republican element would be strongest, and appeared prepared to exert very conuderable pressure to attain that end Indonesian Republican delegates who attended this conference were of the opinion thas for the first tume in the history of the Indonesian independence movement as much or more Amerscan pressure was being applied upon the Dotch to bring them to make concestsons to the Republican point of vues as was being applied upon the Republic to make concessuoms to the Dusch

THE HAGUE (ROUND TABLE) CONFERENCE

From August r3 to November s. 1919. at The Hague, the delegations of the Netherlands, the Republsc of Indonesia, and the Federal Consultative Assembly (BFO) met together and, with smportant assestance from the United Nauons Commission for Indonesia, finally hammered out an agreement. Thas provaded for the uneonditional and complete tramfer of sovereignty by the Netherlands no later than December 3o, 1919. of the entire territory of the former Netherlands East Indies, except for Western New Guinea, to the Republic of the Unted States of Indonesia, a federal government formed of the Republic of Indomesia and the fifteen political units established by the Dutch The provisional character of this Indonesian government was established by a draft conatitution drawn up by the Republacan and Federalist delegates to the conference on the basis of the agreements reached between their representatives in the inter-Indonesian conferences held in Jogja- Larta and Batavia in late July and early August. (Wathin thes federation the territory of the Republic of Indonesia, by far the largest constiruent unit, was to posess post-Renvalle. pee December 191ß bound aries " The tramler of sovereignty to this Indonesian government wa to be immediate, with no period of Dutch chaperoned interim government such as had originally been envisaged.

The character of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union established by the Hague Agreement was undoubtedly a dsappointment for that majority of Netherlands opinion which favored a "tight" or

"heavy" umoon." In fact ths Unaon was largely a paper intitution wathout real substance and powers Primarily it was an agreement for mutual consultation on matters of common interest. Though the Queen of the Netherlands was desgnased as "the head of the Union," as such the Queen had absolutely no powers and was merely to effectuate "the spert of voluntary and lasting co operation between the partnees All of the lengthy provauons for co operataon between the two partners must be read in the lhght of the first arucle of the Unoon Statute which is the clearest, most succinct descrption of the Union's characser. This reads. "(:) The Netherlands Indonenan Unoon effectuates the or ganized co operatton between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of the Unated States of Indonesia on the basis of free will and equality an status woth equal rights. (a) The Umon does not prejedice the status of each of she two partners as an andependent and soveregn State"

The only really yubstantive provaions of the Unoon Statute were for a permanent Union secresariat, the holding of conferences of a group of calinet minuters from the two governments at least twice a year, and a Union Court of Arbutration These conferences were to work out those details of the settlement not covered by the Hague Agreement and to provode the peincipal channel for voluntary cooperation in peoblems of mutual interest All decmons of ruch minus tertal conferences were to be unanimous and to require endorsement tration was charged with the settlement of legal duputes araung out of the Umon Statute, other agreements between the two countres, and joint regulations (se, decisions taken by the Conference of Ministers and endorsed by the two parlaments), Both countrles agreed to comply wth and :mplement us decusons It was to be composed of three members apponced from each country for terms of ten years Its decnons were to be taken by majornty vote In cases where the voses were equally drided the coust was to request the President of the Intermatsonal Court of Justice, or another mutually agrecable international authcrity, to appomt a person of another nationality as a seventh member of the court to take part in a renewed consideration of the dipute and in the deesion thereon "

Map 3. Federal Indonesia. Boundanes shown are of the Republie of the United Stases of Indonesca on December z7, sp49 (Parendan is designated here

as West Jasa ) With the exception of Middle Java, whose boundanes date from extly March, s919. all approxomate the bounda ies of foutteen of more monita peessously

The mapor excepten is West Porneo. whose southwest corner had for a brsef perod heen detached to form the short- Ived autonomoos area of hota Waringen.

Exph reguaons, under the Hague Agrement, prosided for the udraal of Netheland trps (KL—Roal Neterlands Army) from Indoneua "withan the shortest posuble time" following the transfer of sovcrengnty Pendung thesr wothdrasw al these troops, along with those of the KIL. (the Dusch colonsal army), were to be restricted to deugnated mulitary aren, where responubelity for military law and disciphine among them was to rest wath their onn Dutch officers. These troops sere not to be used for mibtary operations unfess so requested by the government of the Republie of the United States of Indonesia The KNIH. and the federal secursty battalions were to be "reorganured," part of their personnel to be abiorbed anto the army of the Republic of the United Stases of Indoneua, part to enter the service of the Netherlands army (and thus be dspatched to Holland) and the remainder to be demobolued

Undr the tenus of the Hague Agrement the Republe of the United States of Indonesia (R U S I ) undertook to recogniue and restore "the righos, concessons and benses properly granted under the law of the Nethy riands Irdies (Indonesia) and still valid on the date of tram fer of sovertognty" and restore to "the nghtful claimanes" the "actual exercis" of their rights " * It in alto agreed to make available the possholsty Ir an extemion, a reneval, or the granting of rights, concescons and tceme" requred for the operation of "exusting and new enterprves and evtates" except uhere thus was deemed to be "in con travent.on of the puldic interest, includitg the general economic poliey of the Repobloc of the Unuted States of Indoneua "

Reglatem en the land forces in Indoneua under the Nethertands comeued clter the tunder of movenegiy egue Agrement, ch a, ara q-1s au, ga (It ma pefatnd shat resrganaugon of the KNI. and weoanty batalion wat to ul plate p thm a pennd of ut manihs foun the day of the patheaton of the cond lonn of entotment n the ammed land forues af the Repeobde of ladeeesua" (at

The R1 47 posmnnees hoates, resersed the nghe to condact an smestigana in respect ed emportaet nght onoemuona and licetes grarted after a Manch sget wh c't mas usflueese the exssemt polity of the Repatlst of the Enzed Scates by the Netherlands Indim regrme duniag the penod st7-g9 YWath respett to t renamen account mat lo le ulen ol the patte ammonst an chose cass a lantrtom hat leen tareed osee to the pepudatson by the Japanese authatzta che groong of food. a rather widopuad phenemmon, and also of centam cnurt shoct tad leen tempetardy sepuretssned for gonemment ser

The agreement stipulated that "expropruation, nationalaration, liqusdation, compulsory cesuon, or transfer of property rights" were to take place "exclusvely for the public benefit, in accordance wrth the procedure prescribed by law, and, in the absence of an agreement between the partes, agasnst presoously enjoyed or guaranteed indemnity to be fixed by judicial decuon at the real value of the olject involved, in accordance uith prousions to be preseribed by 1i

Regulatrons un the field of fabor relations, hooung, and ocher socal welfare measures concerning labor were to be applied equally agaunst Netherlands and Indonesiun business enterperves in Indonesia. In all such enterprises at the "earliest posble period eligible Indonesans" were to be beought into their "direction (and management) and staff " I raining courses were to be establshed ' wath the objectve that after a reasonable persod, the peedomunant purt of the leading staff personnel of the entespties will comust of Indontsian nationals ""

The R.U S I. agreed to grant "most favored nation" treatment to the Netherlands and recognared "that the special interests of Netherlands nationals and corporate bodhes withun Indoneua will be fully taken into account " However, any suggestion mplicit in thus sentence that the Netherlands would enjoy a more favored poution than other countries seemed to be mullified by the preceding sentenee whuch stated "Foreigners of all nations will have equal rights in the participation of trade with Indoneua and in the economie attavsty and andustral development of that country " Though the R U S I. undertook to subject the unserests of Netherlands natsonalt antd corporate bodies to "no dincrimination," at made clear that this commitment dad not prejudice "the night of the Republae of the Umted States of Indonesia to make such regulations at are necessary for the protection of national interests or economically weal. groups."

Wath respect to trade polity a relatively amportant conctsuon uas gained by the Dutch, the the R.U.S I undertaking to take over and implement the trade agreements to whoch the prectding Netherlands Indies regime had been commotted * Continuance of these favored the Netherlands as against Indonesia Honever, the Repuhlican and Federalist delegations to the Hague Conference felt that Indonesia could afford to make this concession sonce these agreements extended only to

rbad, art 1

October, igso It was agreed that the two parties would discuss possible alterations of the agreement during the first quarter of 1ggo to take elfect in October However, when the time came (at the first Minsterial Conference) the R U S 1 found iself in a very weak bargaining postion ance at was then in the process of negociating a bodly needed loan from the Netherlands Thus the R U S I was obliged to extend these agreements for another year, Indonessan resentment because of this was increased by the fact that after the Hague Agreement had been signed and just a week before the tranider of sovereignty the Dutch amended these trade agreements an a way even more favorable to the Netherlanda and less favceable to Indonesia

From the Indoneuan pount of vaew the two greatest concessions made to the Netherlands under the Hague Agreement concerned the debt amumed by the R U S I and the status of New Guinea The question of the debt became of central amportance socm after the conference was opened In the first meeting the Netherlands delegates made clear their contention that, as long as the Netherlands remained the biggest credotor of Indonesa (and grven the magnitude of the Netherlands claum st seemed probable that this condition would last for a long tume), the R U S1 government should not change the financial and economic lavs and regulations at was amberiting from the Netheslands Indhes regime without the agreement of the Netherlands.

From the outset the Republican delegation adamantly refused to zueld to ths claum and received backing an ats posution from the Unted Nations Commassum for Indonesia The Republican counterproposal (sopported by the BFO Delegation) was finally accepted This called for pror consultations wath the Dutch on all matters of monetary and financial polhey where the interests of the Netherlands were conorrned, so long as the Netherlands remaned the R.U S I's credator *" This did not commit the R U S 1 to accept Duteh adice in these matters, but at dad, in the view of the Indonenan negotiatoes at teest, mean an important adrantage for the Dunch mot possessed by any other counery. For thereby they would be informed of R U S I. financial and monetary policies before they were put imto force and could take steps in anticipe tion of them,

Soon after the cunference was under way, st was clear that uts sucomss er failure would, to an important extent, be determined by how the issue of the publhc debt of the Netherlands East Indies regime was resolved. The basic view of the Dutch was that all debts of that government as of the moment of transter of sovereignty should be taken over by the government of the Republhe of the Unssed States of Indonesia. Initially they demanded that it take over a total debt of 6,100,o00,000 guilders ($1,732,100,oo0), consisting of an extermal debt of g,100,000, o00 guilders and an internal debt of 3ooo,o00,o0o (the internal debt havang been created by the issuance of government paper money, bank notes, and government bonds)

The Dutch maintained that only the external debe could be a sub ject of discussuon and that the untermal debt was completely a mater for the future Indoneuan government to solve. From the external Netherlands East Indies debt (by far the larger part of whuch was oned to the Netherlands) the Dutch stated that they were prepared to deduct soo,ooo,ooo guilders. thereby leaving an external delt of s,Goo,. ooo,ooo guilders to be added to the internal debt of g,oo0,ooo,ooo or a total indebtedness of approxumately 5,fon,oon,ooo guilders.

IH the Indonesian delegations would accept thos, the Dutch stated that they would waive their claim for a say in the future economie and financial policy of Indonesia; they would then be satafied, they stated, with prior consultations, leaving the ultumate decision to the Indoguaranteed by: (s) reserving a percentage of the proceeds in foreign exchange of Indonesian exports each year touard repayment of the debt; and (z) placing the revenues of the annual Indonesian tin production in escrow with a Dutch bank to be used toward amertization and interest on this debt in case the amount from Indonesian exports was insufficient.

Oppored to this viewpoint was that of the Indonesian delegates (both Repubheans and Federalists) that while there was no objection to awuming all debts sncurred proor to the Netherlands' surrendet to the Japanese in March vg1, reservations were made with respect to all debes ineurred thereafter. Their posation was that, wath regard to debts incurred afterwards, only those debts should be taken over which pertained to expenditures which had been of beneßit to the Indonesian people. Consequently the Indonesian delegates made clear that they refused to bear the burden of either the direct or indirect cests incurred by the Netherlands mihtary actions against the Republhe ef Indonesia.

Proceeding on the basis of this reasoning. the Indo trom, follosing the lead of the brellhant chaurman of the Republican Delegation's Economoc and Futancial subcommittee, Dr. Sumitso Djojohadikusmo, cane to a conclauon which reportedly attonished and shook the Netherlands Delegation Thes was that the new Indonexuan state woold not be an debt to the Netherlands, bot rather that the Netherlands would owe st more than goo,ooo,ooo guilders.

The Indonesians reasoned as follows: The cost ef Dunch milhtary expenditures in Indonesa since a915 they calculated at approximately 35o0ooo,oo golders (not ncduding the manmtenance ef a noemal peacrtime army and the normal cost of govertment), Such expenditure on an effort to crush the Republic of Indoneux was, they maintained, something that the Indonesian people and the new Indonesian state could not be beld responsible for and had to be rejected. Subtraction of this sum of 3.5no,ooo,ooo guilders from the figure of 6,100,000,000 guilders (whuch the Netherlands claumed the new Indonesian government would owe) left a total of a,soo,ooo,pon gulder ewed by Indo nessa to the Netherlands

However, these Indoneuams mämtagned thzt at least z,s1o,o00,000 guilders of she Netherlands milstary expenses atcurred in the efforts to defeat the Republic had been raned in Indonesia, largely by inter nal money creation in Indonesia Thn sum, the Indonesians claimed, represented a clam of the future Indonesian gosernment against the Necherlands government Thut out of the total snternal debt of Indoneua amounung to z,ooo,moo,ooo gualders, the Indonesans held dat ther new govemment should be reponuble for only pe, guilders (:e, 5,o0o,o0,oo0 minus 2,ao coo,coo galden). Of the re mainder of the g,goo ooo ooo guilders expended by the Dutch in their military campaogns agwmt the Repoblie, the Indonniam calcelated that 1, ráo,poo,ooo was chasgeable to the external debt of Indonesiz, the preponderant part of whoch had been owed directly to the Nether lands Thes sndebondness for military expendsture they likewise re Ied tn poy and held that it should be suberacted from the total In donesan external debt of s,roo,ooo,ooo gmalders and boene by the Nethertands staelf Thereby they calculated the legitimate external debt of Indonesia to stand at 1,8 jo,ooo,oo guilders Of this sum, honever, 14o,noo,oo repeesented Indonesia's debt to thurd countries and only 1,goo ooo,noo guilders represented that part of this external debe due the Netherlands.

Thus, the Indenesian delegations wound up thesr calculations with the conclusion that the Netherlands owed Indonesia s,r4o,000,000 guilders (its share of the Indoneuan nternil delht), wlule the nen In donesian state wuld owe the Netherlands s.zoo ooo ooo gulders (the legitumate prrt of sts esternal debe, se. thut prt not asctibrible to Dutch beerowong fer milstan eflorts agant the Republn) Theren they concluded the Netherlands was an debt to Indonevra to the amount of z,r jroo,neo guslders mmus 1,7o,ooo o00 or 10,o00 ono gnlders

Wth the submusuon of these Indoneuan counterrroposils the negotiations on the debt poution were heoken off, none of the delegt tions or UNCI (United Natoons Commison for Indoneu s) seting a solution The poont of ues of the Indotesun delegations ns tht the transfer of sovereignty should not be held up over thos ssue and that the final decouon as to the datubution od the lululities of the Netherlands East Indies government between the Netherlands and Indontua should be worked out by a debt commosion, including the representative of a thurd prety, perhroips from the World Bnk or UNC1 They beld that the final delt settleuments between the Unuted Stites and the Plulippones and between Great Brorun and Inda had been worked out after the tramfers of soverergnty had been mvde, and save no reason why the same practoce should not obt un between the Netherlands and Indoneus However, the Dutch were not prepvred to agree to thit, and it was clear that the debt issue wonld have to be worked out first if the conference bas not to brenk domn

It was the deure of both Indonesan delegatsoms to resolve this impasse by calling in the UNCI as the thond pasty wth them and the Netherlands, and between the theee (the two Indoneuan delegvtions constitutung a sungle porty) to arrive at a compnomse on the question of the distribotion of the Netherlands Fast Indies debt. Honever, rather than the UNCI as a whole fitling the positson of arbutrating thind party on the emisaged debt commssion, Mr. Cochran, the Ameriean member of UNCI, areonding to Indonenan delegates to the conference, "forced his way" into this posotion humself as the sole repeesentative of UNCt. Accoedang to Indonesian delegates shus actuon was strongly resented ly both the Indontsian delegitions and by the Australian representative on UNCI, who along wth one of the key Republican delegates very nearly resigned in conmequence.

In general the Republican delegation aluays preferred to have the Australian delegate to UNCI, Mr. Thomas K. Cratchley. participate in negotlations, not enly because of Australia's sympithy for the Indontuan poution, but also because they believed be had a much greater knowledge of Indonesia than either the American or Belgian delegates on UNCI These qualities of Mr. Crtchley, the Indonesians felt, would more than balance the peesence on the full U.N. Commission of the Belgian member The weght of a powerful sector of world opinion —aith, if need be, debates on the General Assembly—would, they believed, srengthen the hand of the Australan member sn the Commuson's arbitration of the debt wwue They feared that the desire of the United States to strengthen the Dutch econamy would being Cochran to recommend a debe settlement much more fasorable to the Netherlands and correspondingly more unfav-orable to Indonesia than the full UNCI would be likely to countenance. Apparently this was the opineon of the Netherlands government, too, because, according to Indonesan delegates, Cochran had already secured the appooval of the Netherlands Delegation to serve as sole thurd party mediator before he approached the Indonenans with this suggestion.

Cochran, the Indonestan delegates state, murited that the debt commessuon of which he was to conisitute the third member have powers of arbutration This, they say, meant that he would himself have full power to establish whatever debt settlement corresponded with the maximom concesuon the Dutch were prepared to make; they be Iieve that this is precnely what happened. Moreover, though Cochran would be stung on the debt commotuon as "a representative of UNCI," this, the Indaneuan alleged, would be pure fiction since his status had been agreed upon by the Netherlands and Indonesuan delegations beforehand without any comultation with UNCI and at Mr. Cochran's own personal iniuatise They felt he could not be considered as any thng other than a representative of the American State Department in this capacity, and they were sure has function would be so inter preted in Indonesia As one Indoneuan delegate obierved at the time: "Any result coming from such a cummusion would be interpreted at exchesuvely an Amenican solution; this would create a breeding ground in Indonesa whereby the Communsts could make strong poltical captal."

However, Amercan support for the Indometian position at the Hague Conterence had thin far beem important, and the new Indo neuas state's dependence upon promised American economic assistance was ensnaged as being great. Thus the majority of the Indonesian dele gates were reluctant to contest Cechran's unofficial request fer this vital position If they did so, they feared American support at the confer ence might be less and that the prospects of American economie atsistance would become dim.

The Indoneuan delegations had realized that as the price of a transfer of sovereignty they would have to go a contuderable way toward meeting the Dutch pouton wath regard to the Netherlands East Indies debt. They had been prepared to agree to a figure of sgoo,ooo,- ooo gulders, but no more However, both Cochran and the Netherlands Delegation inssted upon a substantrally higher figure, and finally on October a1 the Indonesuan delegatsons agreed that the new Indo newan state would take over debts totaling approximately 4.goo,ooo,oo0 guilders (nearly $1.sgo,ooo,ooo) from the Necherlands East Indies government. Of this, 3,ooo,ooo,ooo guilders composed the entre anternal debt of the colonal government *" Of the external debt of t,sgi,ooo,ooo guslders assumed, 871,ooo,ooo made up the consolidated debt to the Netherlands and the remaining sum-1ao,ooo,ooo gulders—was owed to other countries.*" However, Indonesia was not obliged to pronde the Netherlands with any lien on its revenues as insurance that its debt to the Netherlands would be pand.

To many Indonesians the magnstude of thos debt seemed an unfair burden to be placed upon the shoulders of an Indonesia whuch had suffered such extensise desastation from three years of Japanese occupation and a subsequent four years of warfare against the Britsh and the Dutch. However it may have been regarded in Washangton, Cochran's part in the resolving of the debt impasie, in the opinion of Indonesian delegates, did a great deal to detract from the good will which the American postion, and hus capable representation of it, had won with respect to the other wues that had arisen at the conference. The conviction that they were being forced to pay for a major share of the Netherlands military operatsons against the Republic could not but dnappoint and embitter Indonesians The goo,ooo,ooo guilder disparity between the maximum debt that they had been prepared to shoulder and that which they were finally obliged to pay did mot appear to many of them to be appreciably compentated for by the $10o,oo0,o0o American loan which Cochran several months later, as America's fitst ambassador to Indonesia, informed them he had arranged. (Thit, it wzs noted, was less than a thord of the goo,ooo,ooo guilders, at t as a loan, and one t lich hod to be repaid with interest) Alter the dein seulement the final issue remaining in the path of successful completion of the conference wat that of New Guinea. The western halt of shus luge wland bad formed a part of the Netherlands Last Indies The Netherlands contended that ethnically and culturally this area was not part of Indoneua and that there was po reason why it should te transferred to the new Indonestan state The Indonesians, particularly the Federalist Delegation, were adamant in their contention that it was an antegral part of Indonesa and that sovereignty over it sbould be tramferred along wuth the rest of Indonesia.

The top Netherlands oficals un Indonesta and consuderable pruldic opanion in the Netherlands fav ored tramfer to Indonesia of this great undeveloped asea However, the Dutch cabunet, evidently with good reason, was consunced that if New Guunea Las not retained it might be imposuble to muster the necesary two thurds vote (requnite to change the Netherlands Consurution) an both houses of Parliament to get the Hague Agreement ratified Netherlands Nes Gusnea was poor and cost some ao,oon,ooo guulders a year to adminster. The profits to Netherlanders from ats oul fieldt nowhere approached this figure. Dutch bussneis and fieancal nterevts were generally not unterested in retaning New Gusnea The Dutch cabinet did not feel impelled to retan st on materalstst grounds Prychological reasons connected with the dinamies of Dutch nanonalnm counseled its reoention. These were dificult to define, but probably, as some Netherlanders remarked, New Guinea's retentsen seried as a symbol to undicate that the Netherfands had emerge fro the conerece an a poson o stregt, welas symbol undicating thas the Netherlands was yull an Astan power.

Finally thus last ampasse encouncered by the conference was resolved by a compromase formula of the UNCI. Thos called for the status quo (e, Neserlands control and admmistration) in wete New Guea heng mamaned "with the stipulaton that wathn a year from the date of tramfer of sneregnty to the Republie of the United States of Indoneua the question of the politacal status of New Guinea be Getermoned through negotsataons" beteeen the Netherlands and the R U.S I Wath the concurmence of the two parties with thus compromise, the sarous agreemenes renched during the conference were signed en November a by the Republican and Federaint Indoneuan delegattons and by that of the Netherlands

After a long and butter debate an which crticim was pramarily drected against the amount of debt awumed by Indonesia and against the disposituon of western Nes Gunes. the Prosuuonl Parlament of the Repubic of Indonesis (the KNIP) en December 11 ratified the agreements reached at the Hgue Conference, the other fifteen con neua lvung completed their rndn uduil ratifications shortly before On December 21 both houses of the Netherlands Parlaament ratified the agreement, but in the Tirt Chamber by a margin of only nne sote oser the two-durds mun:mum necewary (thurty four to fifteen) On December 27, sg1n. the Netherlands formally tramferred sovereignty over the whole of the former Netherlands Fast Indies manus wetern New Gunea to the new Republic of the Unsted Stytes of Indonesia On the same dry the caputal cuty whah had been riled Batavua took once agun its old Indonesian name Jakarty

Despute the Soviet Umon s vetoong two Security Council resolutions prassng the transfer and the UNCI's role in the negotatsons, and as sertions tby ats delegate and that of the Ukrauve that the tranvier merely trol," real sovereignty and its substantve attributes had been transferred. The new Indonesuan state was fully andependent

During the next few weeks most of the major world states accorded and Communest China had followed sutut, and shortly thereafter Indo nesa was admitted into the United Nations as that organization's suxtieth member.

*N.Y T1ne, Det 14 1919 P

CHAPTER XIV

The Unitarian Movement

WITH the transfer of sovereignty, the pramary objective of the Indo neuan revolution had been wan However, before the Indonesian people's focus of attention began to shift from the political to the socio economme, there was one final major development in the polautal sphere Thus was the "unutanan movement," a development which during the first seven months of sgso completely overshadowed all others. The movement was energued by the almost smmedate popular reaction agaunst the pramanly Dunch created federal politseal erder vith whoch the Hague Agreement had endowed the new Indonesian state. Until thus vestige of the repudated neo colonal order had been shaken off, many Indonesnans would not feel that thear mewly won poltical andependence was complete It was this reaction against and liquidation of the inhersted federal system and its replacement by a unitarian form of government that constitoted what the Indonesans referred to an the unitarian movement. Helpful to an understanding of thin deselopment is a knowledge of the federal Draft Corattution whuch from December s7, 1919. untel sts supercemion some seven months later by a unitaraan comtitution governed the new Republic of the United States of Indonesia (Republhk Indonesia Serikat) or R,U SI as it was generally called The Constiteton of the R U SI provided for a federation composed of sixteen comstiteent states. By far the largest ef these member states was the Repahlic of Indoneua with its populaton of more than gi,ooo,o00 and embeacing almost the same area it had under the terms of the

Rensille Agreement. The other fificen constituent states were the puppet or semipuppet states (megaras) and special territories (daerah istomewas) oraginally set up by the Dutch, ranging in populaton from about 100,000 10 11,000,000. (See Map 3)

Each of theve suxteen conatituent states of the R.U.S.I, regardless of its population, was represented by two senators. Every senator was appointed by the local government of the consutuent state whach he represented, beng selected from a list of three candidates proposed by the R.U.S1. Home of Representatves' On matters "referring particularly to one, several or all partucipant terrstories or parts thereof, or concerning the relation between the Republie of the Unused States of Indoneua" and the contutuent territories the R U SI Senate (made up of these thurty two Senators) held co-legslative authority with the House of Representatives The Senate could snitiate legalation concerning these matters, and ats agreement was requtred for all legislation in thas sphere unless at a meetung of at least tw o thurds of the members of the House of Representatives two thurds of that number should oppose the Senate decisuon.*

The R.U.S I. House of Repretentatives was made up of 1so members, &fty from the Republie of Indonesta and one hundred from the fifteen Dusch created states according to their respective populations. It was provided that of the total membershup at least tane, six, and three members respectvely represent the Chinese, European, and Arab minorities. Each of the suxteen polstscal unsts was free to decide on the manner of selecting ats representatives, whether by election or appointment. The Hone of Repeesentatves had the right to introduce legislation and the concurrence of at least half of its quorum (the quorum being 5o per cent of total memberslup) was required to pass any legislation.*

The "Government" (President plus one or more ministers) exertised co-legislative power with the Houte on all matters and with the Senate as well in thote matters coming wthin the compass of its authority. It could antroduce legslation, and its approval was required for all legislation. The Pressdent was the "Head of the State" and commander in chief of the army, and was elected by the House and Senate in joint sesion. With the concurrence of these two representatave bodies the Presdent appounted a commattee of three for the puspose of forming a cabinet In accordance wath the recom mendations of thes committee the Preudent appented the Prime Minnter (who had to be one of these three) and the other minnters.a

Accoeding to Artucle 139. one that assumed great smportance in the Ixguxdation of the consutuent states "The Government on ats own au thenty and responsibility has the night to enact emergeney lans for the regulation of such matters of federal governing pover as demand immediate provmons on account of uegent circumstances" Thereupon such regulations had to be presensed to the House of Repre sentatnves for its approval However, the right of initative with ve spect to these emergency laws lay excluuvely wath the Government, and in any case they were operative until dnapprosed by the House*

The power to amend the Constitutson was lodged with the House and Semate A quorum of twotherds of the membership of each was requmed when this master was under consideration To make any constitutaonal change a two-thurds majonty of both quorums or threefourths of that of the House alone were required *

On December 16 sg19. elevem days before the actual tramfer of soverengnty, a zount meeting of the House and Senate unanumously elected Sockarno as Preudent of the R U 51 Intead of three, he ap pornted Iour cabinet formsteurs, tho Republicam—XMohammad Hasta and the Sultan of Jograkarta—and two Tederalnts from the Dutchsponsored states—Anak Agung Gde Agung (Ifrem East Indonesia) and Sultan Hamid II (from West Borneo) The Cabunet that emerged was headed by Hatta as preme munuter and ancloded eleven Repubbcams and five Federalists The membershup of Hatta's cabunet, one whuch was to endure until September 6, 1gso, included

The federal system of government bequeathed by the Hague Agree ment remauned antact for unly a u ant sis weeks and thereafter began progressvely to disintegrate under the mounting pressure of a wide spread movement for sts replcement by a unituran form of govern ment Actualls, though this his not been too well understood by some people, the terms of the Hague \greement s Charter of the I ransfer of Sovereiguty" were not a legal bar to such a course I bey are sltort and worth quoting

Artcle :

(1) The katglom of the Netherlnds uneonditonvlly and serevocably transders crmplete severeignty over Indonevos to the Repubtie of the Unoted of Indonesia as an ndependent and sovereegn state

(a) The Republic of the United States of Indoneser accepes sasd sovereuqnty lrought to the knowledge of the Kinpfom of the Netherlands

(y) The transler of soveregnty shall take place at the latest on go December 1919*

The remaening article of the docwment (\rt. z) dealt exclusively wth New Guinea

It is important to mote that the transfer of sovereignty was comecrpreting the second paragraph as a condotion of the transfer of sovereignty. Obtously an uncondstionally soverergn state has the tegal right to change ats own constitution as it sees fis Certainly it has the right to chinge a draft conststution Thus the federal pattern wath which the Hague Agreement endowed the new Indonesan state was not by the terms of the agreement anvoolable and sacrosanct.

• Though he had been a member of the purlument of the atate of Tast Indonesa. Nononute had been beal of the peo Republiean factunn there and was comuderel to be moch mere of a Repuhlean than a Teleralat of the Sse calsnet members deogeated an Teleralets artually enly Anak Agueg and Hamed H strongly fatored a feferal form of goverament

• U N, Secunty Coumcil, "Appendices to the Specsal Report to the Secunty Council en the Round Tattę Confereooe," §/tpt7, add 1, p 66

However, to many ouside observers the unitarian movement ap peared to develop with unneceuary haste and duorder and with a rather cavalser disregard for legal amenites and the spirit, if not the actual content, of the Hague Agreement. But if one looks behind the juridical façade of the federal system of government imposed upon Indoneua by that Agreement, the unotanan movement must seem net only entirely natural, but also healthy. Indeed Indonesla would be politically and socrally sick sf thes deselopment had not taken place For, as has been seem in the prevaous chapters, the federal system begun by Van Mook and continued by has successors was essentially Dutch crested and Dutch maintauned By most Indonessans it had been seen an an instrument of Dutch contrel and an ebstacle to the attanment of their independence. To keep this system meant for them the setention of an unweleome legacy of their colonial past and the manntenance in power of many Indonenans who had worked woth the Dutch for ends which appeared selfish and epposed to the struggle of the Republac, people who in nearly every case enjoyed little backung from the populations of their areas

Within the federal R U.S L the old Republic of Indonesla remained virtoally autonomous Not only was its internal admunistration independent of the federal capital at Jakarta (formerly Batavia). but many civil servants in such states as Middle Java, East Java, and Pasundan looked to ats capital, Jogjakarta, rather than to Jakarta for their orders Frequendly thus resulted in a confuung "double adminis tration" woth two sets of civil servants attempting to administer the same terrstory The already great prestige of the old Republic as the successful champion of Indonesian independence tended to incresse becrose of the selatvely high level of law and order, adminntrative efficiency, and absence of corruptron maintained within its area as contranted wish the ocher constituent states of the federation t

The great majority of Indonesans were profoundly dusatisfied with the federal system wath which they had been saddled by the Hague Agreement In all the fifteen Dutch-created states this discontent soot began to manifest stself in spontaneous and uidely based popular de mands for a scrapping of what was concesved to be an alien imposed federalum and for the liquidation of these states and their merger

Map . Unitary Indonrua. Boundaries of the ten peovences of the Republic of Indonesia as established in late August. pggo Indoneuan names of the provinces are as follows

Noeth Sumatra Maddle Sumatra South Sumatra Beneo Celrbes

Sumatera Tengah Sumatera Selatan Kalimantan Sulawesi

West Java Maldie Java East Java Moluces Leser Sundas

Dpwa Barst Djawa Tengah Dawa Timur Maluku Sunda Ketpil

wth the ald Repable Open encouragement was gven these move ments by dhe government of the old Republic and by Soekarno and other leadang Repoblicans in the R U S1 goverwment. As Dutch puuls tary and police authonty were nathdrawn from these states, and as the several thousand strongly peo Republican political prsoners were released from thesr jails, the force of the umotarian movement became overwhelming and met wath real retatance enly where large numbers of Doch colonial troopa, the KNIL (Koninklagke Nedertandsche Indrsche Leger—Royal Netherlands Indies Anny), had not been de moblzed and opposed it

Not only that major part of the population which was unitarian in senument but also many sincere advocates of a federal polstical system tocked thus movement Though advocating a federal system, the latter group wuhed Indonesa to have sts own home fashuoned pottern of federalism, not an artafical legacy of thear eld colonial msster. In general they preferred to wast upon the deciston of an elected all Indonesan Constituent Assembly to determine whether or not Indoneua was to be federal and according to what pattern

Soch people recalled that wathin the Republhe there had been a steady trend tovard decentralzatson," and few were much impressed by the auduousl, fostered Dutch argumens that unifieation meant Java nese domination They were aware thot Soekarno was half Balimese, that every prume minster the Republue had had down through and including Hatts had been Sumatran, that only five out of the aexteen members of the R U SI cabunet were Javanese, and that in the old Republe's parhament representatron vas weghted strongly aqanst Java as compared to the areas outside

Moreover, the federalism which they advocated was a limited one and conditioned by the fact that Indomena possessed far fewer edu cated prople than necestary far the adequate staffing of even a modrst central government The tremendous reduplication of functions in herent in the federal system of outonomous, unhalanced units (eanging in papulaton from soo,pon to over soooo,ooo) bequeathed by the Hague Agreement was not, they tealaed, in harmony with the fact that Dutch colonual rule had provsded Indonewa wwih an educational system that as late as tgço made possible the yearly gaduatian from lugh school of only zto Indoneuan students from a total Indoneston population of 70,000,000

Ey the serms of the Hague Agreerent the kNit. (colonsat atms), force of 65 noo men, w2t to be dowolved by July zf, tgzn Actually the process was much slower thn had been antseipsted I sen as late as that date, s7.ooo of thus mumber h ud not been demobilued." and not untel fune j, v9gs, w2s it offeialls announced that the process bad been entireh completed * By July zf, s9ßn. some zfoono KNIL tronps had been incorporated unto the armed forces of the R U 51, :8,75o had heen demobulored an Indonesrt, and 3 azo had deprted for the Netherlvnds"

Though most of the offiers on the kNII were Dutch er Furauans, the majority of its troops were recrusted from the (hruuan Indonesitn areas of the eastern port of the archupelago, partucularly Ambouna, the Minahasns area of north Celebes, and I smor Soldiers from these areas were grnen a subitontrilly higher rate of pay than the relatvely small KNiL Many of theır Dotch and Lurasan offeers lad taken pains to convince them thut in an Indonesia cdominited by Republican elements they would not only love their higher rate of pay, but that they frequently drilled unto them by these offeers that in an Indonesea whete the Repoblic was dominant their own Chratun areas would he controlled by the Mohammedan Javanese

Thus many of these soldiers had sersous mngivings about the sort of future they could expect after demobclization, whether they were abtorhed into the armed forees of the R U SI or returned to cilan life- A number of them alrezdy felt or were easily persuaded that masntenance of a federal system of government was the coutse best calca lated to protect theer anterests A smill number of Dutch and Eurasian officets and Indonesian polstical leaders in some of the federal states helped convince them of thos. Thus in particular in East Indoneua (within the confines of whoch were Amboina, the Minahasta, and

Timee) still mobolized KNIL units as well as demobilized KNIL personnel twho often posssed arms were a force oppoung the unitarian movement.

Though this was the case in East Indonen and to a lesser extent on East Sumatra, a quickly suppressed, but extremely dangerous revolutiomary coup in Pasundan (West Java) by KNIL elements (both demobalued and active were unvolved) had the effect of accelerating the unstarian movement By discrediting the Pasundan government and demonstrating the weakness of she federal units in dealing with these powerfel anti R U S I as well as ant: Repubhcan forces, it gave the uni tarian movement an additional justification

Apparently at least by mid November, tgg. Captain Paul ("Turk") Westerling, recently demobelzed from the KNIL and the oficer chiefly responsuble for the calculated killing of large numbers of civilians in south Celebes in late 1g16, had begun ceganuing a force made up principally of demohilued KNIL troops A number of Netherlanders including two former police inspectors were included in his group He and his officers entered into contact with some of the KNIL and KL (Konınkhphe Leger, Royal Netherlands Army) troops still garrisoned in Bandung, chief city in Pasundan

Accoeding to the Indonesuan Ministry of Defense, Westerling's forre approached Bandung on the evening of January s2, tggo, and was augmented by regimental shock troops of the Royal Netherlands Army statroned in Bandung Thus total force of about Boo heavily armed men, of whom the ministry's communiqué estumased that about soo were soldiers of the Royal Netherlands Army, entered Bandung on the mornang of January sy Sharp fighting ensued during which sixty men of the smaller R US'I unt quartered there were killed.is Wester lin's foeces occupted most key points wthon the city for part of the day, but were finally prevaded upon by Major General Engeh, commander of the KL garraon of Bandung, to leave the csty.

On January a6, Westerhng's troops began to filter into Jakarta, apparently wsth the purpose of launchng a major coup d'étet Before they could reorganize, however, they were discovered and after some boef skunmshes were draven out Plans for this operation Iater found by the R. U.S1 government indicated that the objective of the in filtration into the capotal was a swift coup whereby it was planned to kill Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, the Minister of Defenie; Mr. Al: Buduardjo, Secretary General of the Minstry of Defense; and Col.

1s Commanipeé, B.u51 Mumstry of Dedese. Jen n. sggo

Simatupang, the acting Chuef of Staff, and to kidnap the remainder of the cabinet. According to R U.S I sources, it later developed that Sultan Hamod II of West Borneo, one of the leading Federalists and a member of the cabinet, had masterminded the whele affair, with Wesserling actang as his malitary arm. Upon the evodence of others imvolved in the coup, Hamid was arrested on April 5 and jailed Government sources reported that on April ig he conlessed to having attempted to overthrow the R U.S 1 government through Westerling's attempted coup of Januar r6 and through a later attempt en February i5 snvolvung a projected attack on Parliament (not cartied out because as a precaution a battalion of R U S I troops lad been quartered nearby). After mod February Westerling's dispersed forces appeared to melt away, and on February z6 he was arrested in Songapore after hasing been floten to Malaya in a Netherlands military plane.

The Westerling afßair did setious harm to Indonesan-Dutch relations. Indonesuans were outraged by the involvement of some Netherlands army efficers in the affair, and they felt that the Netherlands army high command was seriously delinquent in its ability to keep control over its own troops. The belief that certain officials of the Pasundan government had made "arrangements" with Westerling, and the fact that a number of Dutch members of its still partly Dutchofficered police force had deserted to hem, dsd great damage to the position of the Federalists Fellowing the later allegations against Hamid, one of their chief champions, thesr position became even more difficult.

Immediately there arose a widely based demand, which the R.U.S L government leaders encouraged, that the leaders of the Pasundan government be removed On February 8, the R.U S I. cabinet drafted an emergency law calling for the tramafer of the powers of the Pasundan government to a State Commissioner appoinsed by the central gov. emment. On the Iollowing day Wiranata Koesoema, IIal: Negara (State Head) of Pasundan, transferred his powers to Sewaka, the neuly appointed R.U.S L. Commistuoner for Pasundan

Once started, the movement for implemenung the unitarian idea spread rapidly. On February 1o, the Representatise Council of the state of South Sumatra voted to transfer the powers of the State to the R.U.S I. government, The movement quickly entered this phase in most of the constituent states. The general tendeney, however, was for dissolution of the states and their amalgamation into the old Republie rather than into the R.U.S.I. itelf.

Thia formula was not ressted by most of the R U SI leaders The tide of nationalist feeing was so strong that even the overwhelming majonty of the members of the R U S I Senate, including many who had been strong Federalists, appeared to beleve that esther objective wulom or the unterests of thear own poltocal futures coumeled that they go along with the R U S I House of Repeesentatives and government in passng an emergeney law, bosed on artocle 1sg of the Constatution, vhoch made legal the dssolution of those constotuent states whose governments so requested and their amalgamation anto the old Republic of Indonesia Such a law was passed on March 7, sgse, and two days later, followang votes of approval an the R U.S L. House, the requests of the governments of East Jasa, Central Java, and Madura for dusolution and merger into the Republic of Indonesia were approved The requests of Patundan and echer states followed in short order and wene quackly approved By the end of March, only four statesWest Borneo (headed by Sultan Hatad), East Sumatra, East Indontsia, and the now moch expanded Republie ol Indonessa remasned as conitstuent states withan the R U SL

In the state of West Borneo, especally after the discredeting of Hamod, there developed an mereasing demand of the population (culmunating in a general strke an its captal of Pontianak) for ats des solution and merger into the Repubic Upon the recommendation of a Government Commmuon sent to mvestigate conditions in West Borneo, the R U S I House of Representatves on April zo voted fifty to one to endorse thus demand

In East Indonesa shortly after large popular demonstrations urging its Ibquodation and merger with the Republic and a motion to thas elect by peo Republican elements in ats parliament, freedom of poltt cal asemhbly was agaim suspended and a number of strongly pro- Republian leaders wo were not members of parame ee paled by order of Soumokal, the state's Minister of Justice

Moss of the troops statoned in East Indonesa were KNIL. units Some of them, uncluding the principal armed force un the are of Makauar, capotal of Ease Indonesia, were ex KNiL unita which had recently bem absorbed into the R U SI army Among these unts there descloped an increasing umeauness over the rapud course of the unitaran movement When on Apnl 5. 1gso, they learned that some goo ex Republican troops sent by the R,U SI government from Jokarta were about to land at Makassar it must have seemed to many of thes that the old order un Fast Indonesia was about to collapse. The landing of these troops would shult the balance of military power in the atea in favor of the pro Republican unitarian elements There a some evodence that Soumokil and a few other leaders of the East Indonesian state helped consince them that this was their last opportunity to act Before the Republican troops could land, about two companies of ex kNIL troops under the command of Capt Ands Aziz captured tdhe fen ex Republican R U S I troops in Makassar and sesued control of the city I hey then drew up artallery and foreed the R U S I. troop trammports in the harbor to s ul away

Anz stated that he was actng to defend the state of kast Indonesia However, the East Indoneuan government, except for a few of its mem bers, refused to ndorse his artuons Nevertheless it was powerless to stop lum On April 13. Preudent Soekarno branded \u an snyargent, statung "Whether East Indontsia, East Sumatra, or the Jogjakarta Republie semasn autonomous ssates is no concern of the armed forees " He called on the R U.S I armed forces to restore onder in South Celebes. Sukatat, the preudent of Last Indonesta, affirmed that lus govern ment had had absolotely nothung to do wuth Aiz's revolt and had given it no awistance On the fourteenth Aziz agreed to go to Jakarta for talks uith the R U SI government. Here lhe was summarily arrested. On April 21, newly landed R U S I army unets entered Makassnr without encountering resustance

With the balance of miletary power thus changed, the East Indomessan cabnet of Prime Miniter Diapari found itself no longer able to muster a majority in parliament and was forred to resogn It was replared by a pro Repubthcan cabinet headed by Mr. Putuhena. In Makassor and the surrounding territory of South Celebes an Emergency Goveinment was set up responsible directly to Jakarta. Political prisoners were released from pail, and a state of martal lve was declared. Wath the sluft in the brlance of power. pro Republican guerrilla elements based an the hulls now felt strong enough to launch at tacks on towns where some of the local arstoeraue elements who had worked most closely twath the Dutch headed the local admunstrations. Thus often insolsed sharp fighting wsth KNIL units still stationed in these areas Though the Emergency Government decreed that "All officials of the princely states, local rapahdoms, and other local governments should continue theur duties as a matter of routine," it at the same time scemed to gre tacst encouragement to ther removal by a The administration of the princel state should be democra tred andthe pres adapt themselses to the e coue of eets in ine with the w ishes of the people."

Ocsonally the guilas is freeing poluical prisonens from the jails let erdinary criminals out as twell. Many of these, as well as some opportunistic guerrdla leades, exploted the stuation to enrich themselves or build up their own power. As a result, it twas several months before R U.S.I maltary authornties in co-operation with the more responsible guermlla leaders were able to establsh a reasonable degree of las and order an South Celebes. In late February, r9ss. agreement vas finally reached betw een the Indonesian government and the peineipal leader and spokesman for the 14,ooo guerrillas of South Celebet Kahar Musakar, for the ineorporation of a major part of them inte the army and the demobslization of the remainder. (Later, after pas tal demobelzation, this agreement was to fall through)

In the meantume Soumokal had fled further east in East Indonesla to e nland of Amboina. Accordng to R.USI. govement source b was transported there in a Netherlands army bomber. Under the lead enshup of Soumokal and several local polltucal and military leaders, the South Moluccas Council, which it should be moted had originally been constututed dunng the penod ef Dutch occupation, proclaimed the independence of the territory (daerah) of the South Moluccas." The council stated it had taken thus action because East Indonesia had be uable to maain it poson a a conete of the RUS1 and because the actions of the R.U.S I woth respect to East Indonesla were in conflict with the terms of the Hague Agreement.

Amboina, by far the most populous stand of the South Moluccas for over a century had been the chuef recrusting ground for the KNIL. A large percentage of the families en the island were supported by a father oe brother who was either acuse un the KN1L or drawing a penuon for past service Despite asurances of the R U.S I. govern ment to the contra, there was a odespread fear that qudation of the KNIL would result in a loss of employment or pension for the rediners of tese familes In addition, the precolonial culture of imboms had been more completely lost than that of almost any other rea an Indonetia and there was less consciousneis of kind besed on

Prodamatan of the Emergemcy Geremment ef Salaveu Selatan (South Celcle)

th Voluccas had bee ome of the dorar of the State of Eant Id cultural affinity wath the Javanese and Sumatran matroxes of the Indonestan independence movement than was true of such East Indonesian deeraAs as South Celebes, North Celebes (Gorontalo), Bals, or the North Moluccas.

Thus for reasons of economie and peestige ansecursty (because of uneasiness about the future of KNIL soldiers) and because of cultural differences, particularly religiuous (well oser half the population of Amboina being Chrstan), a large part of the populotion of Amboina vas undoubtedly dispoved to support the rebellion However, there a no way of telling whether this twas a majority of the populatson of Ambona or not. From the outset the Sowth Moluccas Republie was a military state governed prancipully by mulitary las wath a comudera ble degree of compuluon besng evercned by miltary elements in cluding a number of active KNIL oficers At the very beginning of the rebellion the specal correspondent of the Dutch owned Aneta News Serace learned from Netherlands military sources in Jakarta that "the Royal Netherlands Indies Army troops stationed at Amboina are larking the Moluccas proclamation of ndependence " Its dispasch of Apnl s6, 1ggo, went on to state. "Chuef of Staff General van Langen of the Netherlands Army in Indoneua wared Commander in Cloef General Buurman van Vreeden today that despote perustent efforts to keep the Indonesian members of the KNIL on Amboona under mihtary dncipline he was unable to do so" • Whether much of that part of the population of Ambona whuch appeared to support the rebellion did so freely or was dragooned into doing so, it is impossible to say. In most of the islands of the South Moluccas outsude of Ambouna it was, however, clear that the peeponderant majorvty of the populatson had no interest in the rebellion, and in a number of them there was no dusident movement whatsoever.

At firnt the R.U.S L. authorstes sought to negotate with the dissadent regime. However, the mission it dispasched headed by Dr. Johannes Lemena, a dntingunhed Republican Ambonese who was Mmiter of Health in the R U 51. cabenet, met with Iailure. The rebel leaders refused to enter into negotations unless recognized as representatives of an andependent state This being amadmissible from the R U.S 1. government's point of view, it was forced to undertake military measures The number of actave and demobilized KNIL troops on Amboina was considerable and they fought well Several montha of

1" RUSI arerces maintainet that Gemeral van Langen hinnelf atteded the fag Wertng tetemony for the ' Republic of the South Molurcan" held in Ambeunt butter fighting took place before the back of the rebellion was broken. Not untl mid November, i9so, was organiaed militasy resistance on Amboina finally overcome.

A forther detetoraton in Indonesian Dutch relations was a conse quence of the Amboina rebellion Since the Netherlands government was responsible for KNIL unsts until they were demobilured, it was felt in Indonessan circles that the Netherlands was to an important ex tent responsible for events in Amboina. Illustrative of this point of view was a Ministry of Defense communuqué made shortly after the ourbreak of the rebelliom whach stated- "Armed units falling under the responubeluty of the Netherlands government have forced some politicians to announce the proclamation of the so-called South Moluccas Repubhe and shey vobotquently made arrests and committed killings " Indonmams were dusatsfied wath the Nethertands military authorities apparent umwillingness to do more than dismiss the mutinous Ambonese KNIL units Irom the army. They pointed out that violation of military ordery uvually called for courts martial and punishment.

In the meantime the unitarian movement was proceeding at a rapid rate ehewhere. As early as Apnl 21, the President of East Indonesia, Sukawati, had announced that his stase was prepared to become part of a unotarian state if the Republic of Indonesia agreed to be ab sorbed along wuth East Indonesia in such a state The groups which wrihed to see East Indonena constituted as a republic separase from the R.U S I were, be said, small an sue and number, and it could be generally said that the Indoneuan people wished to remain one"

However, there soon began a movement among all the thirteen vmember territorses of East Indonesia excepe the South Moluccas to separate from the state of East Indonesia and incorporate themselves zmio the Republic of Indonesia On April zo, the Minahassa daersA council woth a vote of nuneteen to zero, with three abstentions, de caded to serede from East Indoneua and join the Republic of Indonesia As contrasted to Amboina, it was ugnificant at this time that in Minahassa, also a KNIL stronghold, all troops of the KNIL were confined to thesr barracks Later that day the doerah of North Celebes followed the example of the Minahassa and during the course of the next few weeks all the other dsersks of East Indanesia except the South Moluccas followed sust.

In a conference from May 3 to 5. Mohammad Hatta, Presidemt Sukavat, and Dr Mantur, head of the state of East Sumatra, reached

"nta repet from Malam, Ap m, ga agreement on the establshment of a umitarian state On Vay 13 the Provisional Coutcil of East Sumatra endorsed this decsuon but stipulated that it wshed to join the projected unitartan state ua the R U S 1. and not via the Republie of Indoneta Despite strong pressure from a large part of East Sumatra's population for amalgamation vua the Republic, Prime Minster Hatta staunehly supported the postion of the state's Provouonal Council He felt, with justification, that the sutuation within the stare was too delcate to admit of such a course Amalgamation with the Republic might well have provoked the for mer KNlL soldiers of the still euntent East Sumatra Security Battalhon to undertake an adventure such as had occurred in Amboina»

After several weeks of negotsations between the leaders of the R U S I government and those of the Republac of Indonesia agreement on the formation of a unstarian state was finally reached on May t9. 1ggo The introduction to the agreement read

The Government of the Republic of the Uoned Scates of Indoneua whuch un thin case aho acted with a full mandate on behalf of the Governmenes of the State of East Indonesma and the State of East Sumatra, on the one side. and the Government of the member stane, the Reputlic of Indonesia, on the other side . . . herehy declare. (t) that we agree to amplement an co-operaton the Iormation of a Unitanan State aa a matenalratson of the concept of the Republic ef Indonesea amed at in the Proclamation of the 17 Aogust s915. .

The agreement provided that the provisional conititution of the unitarian state "shall come into being through resision of the R.U.SI. Provisional Constitution in such a manner that at shall contain the essentials of the Constitution of the Republic of Indonetua, ncluding: (a) Article r7, (b) Article sg, and (c) Article 33, and additionally appropriate sections of the Provituonal Constitution of the R.U.S I." Since these three articles of the Republican Comstitution were so stressed it is important to note them. They read

Antuele x7

(t) All caturens have the same statis in law and in the government and shall, without exception, respect the law and the govemment

o Lkewsse the pention ef the Pkt was strong an East Sumatra It had been choefly responuble for a bloody uprang agaanit local aratocratie elemenis an early ss, and there was widesporad fear that if fghong breke out seme mmolat development might take place

Charter of Agorement Berween the Covernments of the Unsted Statm of Indonesa and the Republic of Indonetua.

(e) Every eitten shall have the right to work and to espect a remomable stundaed of laving

Artcin a9

(t) The State shall be based upon bebef an the God of all Mankand

(s) The Scate shalt gusrantee the freedom of the people to peofes and to eazrcue thetr own religion

Anle 3r

(s) Economy shall be crgaand cooperatively

(a) Branches of prodoction whuch are arnportant to the State and whoch affect the lafe of mast people, shall be controlled by the State

() Land and war and the naral es there sa be controlled by the State and shall be exploued for the greasest welfare of the people *

In attempting to describe the right of property ownershap more fully than had been done in esther of the constitutions, the Agreement stated that "the Provituonal Comtstution shall contaon an article laying down the bame pranerple that the night of peoperty is a socal funetaon * * ts In other words the property owner was expected to use has property an a way which was in harmony wuth the interests of socety."

Other major peovisons of the Agreement concerning the new wnu taman state were the following.

(a) The Senate was to be abolubed

(b) A prosimonal parltament for the nete stase was to be formed from the

n The R. U S1 Conmotuten mesely stated that " Every etsten wtrondeng to hn abd uy tan the rght to eumlable work (ut ay salaes the weoer s)

a The rndemng of thame thoee aades followa the oficat Englsh trantdatren of the Corststetum frptally puhtahed in the Fece of Iree Indaneua, Oct, 1945

4 The phoase is Mak misk na edeiah ruate famitz sasl, and a Iteral trasslaton would be "The nght of preperty eosts as a smeal fenction " In the unstanan con ststation than cmngad lasey sha phrase was added to the eustng artele eunzering into the new useanan censtrtation vs 'Eeryone has the nght to osn property andmdually aa well at in anocatson weth ohes No ere shutt be deperret arbstyanly of tes property" (art af of hach the R. U.S1 Constoston and che new untanun crestatation)

Par 1 am ey of teth coenttosots resds "Espeopraton of amy property or nght for the gemenl benee canaat take place esrept with undemndeston and as at ordance with regulattaons at entablahed by law*

o The edieal steprelatien of thn siatement tm gsen by the Virater of Justrit Prefener Soepemo, shestty ater posmuigation of the vmtanin cosototon was The soeal foncton of property is fundamezal and moss be smtespested mo as to mean that paopersy way not be ined to harm smcety ( Elacodaton to Act no 7 igyo on the rvnon of the Provatoral Coostteson of the Repetre of Indsaeua cuanevoeg ths mto the Prorosnnal Conurunon of the Upstary Rapuhle of Indo nms, Supplreuec to the R USI Gartte, to 37)

eumbined memberships of the R U S1 House ef Representatives and the Working Commttee * of the ANIP (pressuenal parliament of the Republic of Indoneua) woth such addrtional rmembers as might be appointed by the Pressdens "after conuleration by the two governments"

(c) A proswonal consutution for the new state was to be drawn up by an "Isembly for Changing the Consttution" made up of the House of Representianves of the R U S I and the Workung Committee of the KNIP

(d) A constituent auembly to be elected as aoon an pouble thereafter, "on the basn of one member for every goo ooo zmhabutants with dee contderation for a fair repaesentation ol mumotstues, whch would frame a final constitu on

(e) Sorkarno would be persudent of the new state

(t) The cabmet of the government of the new state would be reiponsible to ats parlament

(g) Pending the untroduction of nes legalvtion be the unitarian state exust ing acts and regulations were so remain in force "wath the undentanding that wherever powble, the laves of the member stase, the Republix of Indonena,

There followed a perzod of two months during which the representatives of the R U.SI House of Representatves and of the Republican KNIP met together to werk out a draft for the unitarian comtitution ly July zo, they bad completed thesr task and presented their draft to the R U.S L. House and Senate and the Working Committee of the KN1P for approval. It had been agreed that these bodies could not amend the draft, but could only approve or disapprove it. After more than three weeks of discusuon general agreement was finally reached. On August 14, the R U.S 1. Senate endorsed the draft by a unanimous vote, and the R U S.I House did so by a vote of ninety ment by a vote of thorty one to two wsth seven abstentions. The fotlowing day, August 1g. aggo, President Soekarno signed the draft bill and with the countersignature of Prof Soepomo, Minister of Justice of the R.U.SI, the bill was promulgated as the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of Indonessa

The very name of the new State—Republie of Indonesia-symbolized a return to the unitarian pattern of the old Republic of Indonesia and a triumph of the nationalism which it represented. More than anything ehe the change from the federal R.U.S L to the new unitarin Republie represented the deure of the population to shake off the legacy of Dutch colonial rule For despite the full sovereignty ento The 47 man ad Interim agent ef the KNIP.

joyed by the R U.S I, the preponderant majorty of the Indonesian population saw its federal structure as Dutch imposed and a relic of colontalum For them the Iiquidation of federalum meant the final tri umph of the Republic of Indonesia proclaimed in August, t915.

The constitution of the nete unstarian state is explhertly provisional and, undeed, is deugnated as the Provisional Constitution of the Republie of Indoneua How ever, the general expectation is that the final veruon which emerges following the deliberations of the projected consturuent assembly will be very close to it.

The present provissonal Unitaran Constitution is essentially a revasion of the R U S L. Conmuitution so as to harmonize more completely wath that of the old Republic of Indonesia, ineoeporating (with certain amendments) the Charter of Agreement of May sg between the government of the R U S I and that of the old Republic. The most impor tant of these amendments was the decion not to have the President appoint additional members to the new state's House of Representa tives, but rather to incorporate the membershup of the R.U.S I. Senate and the Republhcan High Advisoey Council into it along with the memberships of the R U SI House and the Working Committee of the Republican KNIP

Thus the membershup of the single-chambered legalature of the nes state, ts Houne of Representatves, was mode up of sy7 members, 147 from the House of Representatnes and g1 from the Senate of the R U S I, 46 from the Working Committee of the KNIP, and t3 from the High Advisory Counol of the Republie of Indoneua.* Thn first House of Representatves of the new unitarian state is comidered temporary and is laser to be replaced by one based upon country wide electoms ** A second amendment to the charter was that providing for the ratio of members to the projected Constatuent Assembly to be : to every s5o,o0o, rather than 1 to every go0,ooo inhabitants.*"

Except for its untarian erganizstion and the elimination of the Senate *" the general pastern of government established by the unitarian

i7 The Provataonal Constitation af the Repablse ef Indonema, at y7. ses alão Elandatsn to Act No y, tggs" loe est

" At the ume of thesr funen all these four comttuent bodes had mesbershipe sighdy smafler than tdeer mromun The RUS1 House of Raepementstes had a asthoraed membenhap of ao, the R USI Senane, go. Republeian Werking Com metter, 47, and the Etigh Adraney Couned. if As far as the wnter knows, undted postsona arung frone drath oe neugnason wese she resson for thon docrepancy 20 5ee art, y5 constitutuon is close to that of the R U SI It prosades that legislause authoraty be shared between the Government (Preudent plus cabinet) and the House of Repreientatves Both can introdure legislation, and presudential decrees (oncluding those concerning the Pres dent's authority over the armed forces) require the asient of both " The Government posvesses the right to enact emergeney lass on its onn authorsty However, shey must be approved by the House of Representatives at its nest sotting, otherwne they lapse " The cabunet as a whole at well as each minunter indis udually is responuble to the House of Representatnes Even during the perind that it is prosaronal (: e , before general elections are held) the House has the rnght to com pel the cabunet or munisters ndnodually to reugn"*

Thrus there are actually three lodgments of power the President, the cabinet, and the House of Representatves All ordinary legalation requires the smmediate approval ef all theee Emergency legislation requres the immedate approval of Preudent plus cabinet and ultsmate sanetion by the pirliament, though it is operative pending ob tainment of that sanction However, this nterim need not be long. for the House can assemble not only whenever requested by the Gossires " Moreover, since the cabinet is responuble to the House, it would be unlkely to approve such legslation unless reasonably sure of later securing the House's approval.

The President's** power is comuderable In addetion to sharing in

* Art gf-97 the legislative power he has the right to dissolve the House of Representatives and call for new elections t" Also the President "forms the ministerses" and "appoints one or more Cabinet formateurs" who in turn appoint the other cabinet ministers,." in conformity, of course, with the wshes of the majority of the House of Representatives Since the President À he so wishes has the option of appainting only one cabinet formateur, he can, therefore, appoint the Prime Minlhtersubpect, of course, to the approval of a majornty of parliament.

Though the provnional unitaran Constitution is not federal, the povernmental apparatos whoch it provides for is not monalithuc. It stapalates that the drvision of Indonesia's termtory into large and small autonomous terrtones and the organization of their administration shall be establshbed by law, observing and considering the principles of consultation and representation in the system of government of the state" and that "the terrutories shall be given the largest poste ble measure of autonomy, to manage their own local government."

Soon after promulgation of the mew Constitution the terratory of Indonesua " was sobdivided into ten provances. These are Sumatera Uara (No Sumara), Sumatera Tea (Mddle Sumara), Sumatera Selatan (South Sumatra), Djawa Barat (West Java), Djawa Tengah (Middle Java), Dyawa Trur (East Java, including Madura). Kalimantan (Bornto), Sulawen (Celebes), Maluku (The Moluccas). and Sunda Ketjil (The Leuer Sundas—Bali, Lombok, Sumbava, Sumba, Flores, Tumor, ete.). Though by mad-19g1 some admanistratave decentralizaton had developed along provincial lines, no great amount ol subtantve govermmental decentralration had yet occurred. Un doubtedly thit was partly a consequence of the monopoly of attention stoll beng absorbed by the pressing problems of the central government and its snability to release sufficient personnel to staff adequately the provincial admumatrations It twas, hovever, also to an important extent a conmequence of the fact that theie provincial administra tons had not yet been granted the power to rune sums of any conse quence through Iocal taxation

On August as, vgge, a week after the establahment of the new unstarian state, Presudent Soekarno unstructed Mohammad Nator, chairman of the Leadershup Council of the Masyum: to form a new cabinet. The cabunet announced by Natur on September 6, symbolared the hqundation of the old federalsm and the fulfillment of the unstarian movement. It contasned only one former Federalt *" and all of ats key posts were occupued by former Republicans It was based upon a coalition which derived sts principal strength from the Masyume, the Iargest party in partsoment (hav:ng so of its 257 seats).

Other parties partscipating in Natssr s cabinet were the Persstuan Indonesia Raja (PIR). eoghteen seats, the Parta Soualis Indoneua of Spahrir, sixteen seats, the Fraksi Demokrat (Democratic Faction), eleven seats, the Parindra (Partas Indonesia Raja—Greater Indoneuan Party). mine seats. the Partat Katolik (Catholie Party), eght seats, Partaa Nasional Indonesaa Merdeka (Independent Indonesian Natuonalst Party), six seats, the Parta: Sarekat Islam Indoneua (PSII), five seats, and the Parta: Kristen (Christran Party), four seats. In addstion more than half of the thenty four nonparty members of parlament supported Natsir's cabmet.

The principal party in oppoution to the new cabinet, the PNI, had refused to enter it because offered fener portfolios than it felt enttled to. It held forty-one seats in parliament, whele the other chuef opposition group, the block of PK1led, pro-Stalinist parties, controlled twenty-nine seats *" Not in the government, but relatnely neutral in position, were the Partai Buruh (Labor Party) headed by S M. Abidin, seven seats, and the Barnan Tam Indonena (Indonesian Peasants' Corps), five seats.

Except for the fact that it dad not have the support of the PNI, Natsir's cabinet was a strong one. Most of sts members were experienced and highly respected men, the majority of whom—particularly those in the most important posts—held political and social sens which were close to his. Natsir and hs Minster of Finance, Sjafruddin Prawaranegara, were the two principal leaders of the Religious Socialist group within the Masjumi, and Mohammad Roem, who had been recalled from his post of High Commssioner to the Netherlands to fill the post of Minister of Foreign Affairs, was also a leadeng member of this group.

1 M. A. Pellaupessy, Minmter of Ieformation

"Of these the PKi had &, the Front Buruh (Laber Front), y, (te Partas Borsh Indonesia (Iodooesan Labor Party led by Sukarman), 5. the Partin Kedealatan Ralpat (People s Sosereignty Party Ied by Luat Siregar). §. and the Partm Seualo (Socalnt Party), = The Partai Murta had ondv s represestatves in Parlarment, eoruadecably Im than ata strength in relatuon to the other partes

Two others holding important posta, Sumstro Djojohadikosumo (prevsoualy Economic Minster Plenipotentuazy to the United States). Mimster of Commerce and Industry, and Tandiono Manu, Minister of Agriculture, were members of Spahri's Indonesian Socalist Party and held socio-economic views fairly clove to the Religious Socialists Most of the other umportant posts were in the hands of nonparty men of proven abdity Among them was Hamengku Buwono IX, Sultan of Jogjakarta, who held the position of Deputy Prime Minister. Hn wark in increasing internal security as Minnter of Defense un Hatta's outgoing cabinet had enhanced his already great prestige. In Natsir's cabtnet he continued to desote honself peimanly to this task. The other functuons of the Mimstry of Defense were taken over by Dr. Halim, a monparty man close in his outlook to Spahrer and untit then Acting Prame Mitater of the old Republie of Indonesa The Menister of Intertor, Mr Astaat, had a closely sumular approach to socal problems and had wan much prestige as zcting Preudent of the old Re pubhe and before that as Chaarman of the KNIP and its Werking Commuttee

The membershup of Natur's cabinet (September 6, 105o to March 20, 1951) was at follows

Some of the parties participating in Natsit's cabinet, it will be noted, were mew and had not been in existence during the penod of

Hatta's R.U.S I. calunet. In fact they all emerged duang or immedately following the establishment of the expanded Parlament of the new unitarion state.

The largest of these nenly-established partues was the Fraksi Demokrat (Democratic Factuon) It twas a rather loose coalatson of representatnes from Celebes, the Moluccas and Lesver Sundas, most of whom had when members of the R U S1 House and Senate belonged to no politscal party It enrolled a large number of former ovil servants, including a number of admmistrative oficsals closels taed to the local aristocracits ern Celebes.

The second largest of the new parues, the Parndra (Parta: Indonesta Raja—Greater Indonesian Party) was based largely upon the prewar members of the party of the same name who had not already elected to join the PNI Thev were drawn primanly from Java, Celebes, and the Lesser Sundas, and were for the most pirt ciil servants presaously belonging to no political party and whose position with respect to politucal and social problems appeared to be approxumately madway between that of the PIR and the PNI.

The smallest of the new partues, the Partat Nasional Indonesia Merdeka (Independent Indoneuan Natonalist Party) was a right wing splinter that had detached stself from the main body of the PN1. According to its leaders, ats defection resulted in part because of the PNI's drift to the left and what they termed sts "indecisse policy." Thus was, however, probably more a result of the dssatisfaction of its leaders with their subordinate postions within the PNI and their attendant lack of success in attasning the governmental positions which they sought. In their own terms their action was "a revolt against the trust company of the old guard." Several months after the formation of the Natsir cabinet they changed the new party's name to that of Partas Rakjat Nasional (National People's Party).

CHAPTER XV

Achievements and Prospects

CONSUMMATION of the unitarsan movement marked the close of the Indoneian resolution, or at least of sts dommantly poletical phase. With the formation of the Natur Government a new emphass emerged which vas more socio-ecotomic than politatal A number of smportant political problema remained, in partiçufar those refating to Western New Gunea, magntenance of an independent foreign policy, internal secenity, orgamization of local government, and drawing up of election lavs Although these ded command much attentuon from the wee government, it was obliged to focus its attention even more on the urgent socio-economie prohlems which had been held in abeyance for so lang by the prority of the struggle for nataonal andependence

Before dmcwsung some of the prineipal secio economic problems confronting the postrevolutuonary governmem, it would be worthwhile to note some of the outatanding achorvements of the Indoneuan revolution. Its general prychological impact had been tremendous Whele bringing about a basite change in che political atats of Indonesia, the revolution brought with it ugnaficant and wadespread changes in the character of the Indontuan people During the ux year period, s945-sgso, their sense of personal and collective dignoty, self respect and self confidence had grown enormoualy Thux change was greatest among the educated urban dwellers and next among the laboring population in the towns and on the estates But to an important degree it had affected most of the peasant population as well Therehy an energy and crtanveness in tackling socio economic as well as political problems was released among the Indonesian population which was surpritung to many oldergeneration Indoneuams as well as to many Netherlanders

It was among the younger generation that thos change in character appeared most marked During the crucial years s915-1919 the most dynamic element in the revolutoon was the educated sector of Indo nesian youth Without its energization the Indoneuan revolution could not have succeeded In additoon, quite apart from us sanguard role in actisating the revolution, citcumstances dictated that it play an im portant role in staffing the revolutionory governmental admunistration and the revolutiomiry army Tlus stemmed promanly from the paucity of upperand muddle rank Indonesvan cavil servants trasned by the colonial regume and the aeromponying Iack of any suzable Indonesian professional or commercral muddle clas from whth men could have been receruited whoie expersence might have qualfied them to fill many of these posts To make up for the deficienry the revolutionary regime had no alternative but to turn to the only pouble remaining source of such personnet, the educated youth-n pirtucular, college and hogh school students. Therefore thus element staffed a major part of the mud dle and upper-middle echelons of the governmental offices and of the upper and upper muddle ranks of the army of the new Indonesian state.

As a result of the beavy responsubulties it shouldered and the instiative forced upon st, Indoneuan youth in general, but particularly its educated element, developed the qualstues of self confidence and enterprise to a degree which dastingushed it from sts counterpart of a decade before. This characteritie was most marked among the young men, but it extended to women as well Indeed, the revoluton brought a signeficant increase in the already-substantial socal status and activities of Indontsian women in general A number of lugh adminntrative posts in the government were filled by them, and the percentage of women in parliament was greater than in most Western European countroes and in the United States Congress

The political achievements of the revolution were not limited to the attainment of independence from the Netherlands and the ending of colonial status. In addition the revolution wrought profound changes in the internal political articulation of the country At the national level, a constitutional type of government was estaldshed which give promise of taking firm root. It is true that the parliamenes of both the revolutionary and postrevolutionary governments were made up of individuals

NATIONALISA AND REVOLUTION

who did not owe their office to free popalar elections. The parliaments were, hotever, roughly representative of public opinion and exercied real poner Moreover, the large majority of the indviduals composing them were tuncerely dedicated to the principles of representative demoe racy and most of them were eager to have the exsting parliament yield place to one bused upon natsonwide free elections

Less well known, but of great importanece, were the political achieve ments at the village level Here the example set by the enlightened and peogresne young Sultan of Jogakarta, Hamengku Buwono IX, was, with some vanations and adaptations to meet local conditions, being folloued increaungly throughout most of Java and to a lesser extent un other places Among the most important of the refoems introduced by the Sultan was thas provdng for electiom of all village efficials under a franchse covening all inhahitants over the age of eighteen * (Under the colonial regene enly the village headman was elected, he then appointed the other village ofßiciahs The franchise had been limited to landowners, and sometimes colonial officzals interfered in the elections, in some cases appointing the headman ) Under the Jogjakarta system the village coun ol, Madpeln Desa, was elected under a sumilar franchse and was made up of representatives from each group of four to five contiguous households Anpone over the age of eighteen, whether or not a landowner, was eligible for thus office In turn, the Madjelis Desa (averaging about four hundred membes) elected a People's Repeesentative Council (Dewan Perwakilan Rakat) averaging about thorty members The village legn lative and esecutive organs were separated Should a difference arise between the Represengative Council and the executive officers of the village, collectively known as the Executrve Councal (Pamong Desa), the dispote was referred to the Madjeln Desa for resolvement. Whether or not uch a dispute developed, the Madjels Desa was required to meet at least once every three months to revatw the actions of the Representative Council and Executne Council, both of which were responsible to it. In addition, a general admimustrative rationalization was achieved, with the smaller adjacent villages berng merged * This resulted im a pooling of resources so that their facslities for education, irrigation, credit, etc. could be more effectively utilized.

Finally, throughout wde areas o Indonema the revoluton had had a direct physical umpict upon the allige whuch stomuhted the politscal consciousness of ats snhabutants and shook up the social relationshups among them, Naturally thus was pirticul rly great an thove extenive arew where fighting had occurred. and it was probably greasest an Jasa. In many parts of the sland the prevoous depletson of the able bodsed male popalation nitsated under the Japinese occupution with the drafung of forced laber and the formation of a nutive militia was in creased by the extemuve recrustment for the Repullic's armed forces Thos tended to reheve the prewure on the land n many ullages temporarily. It eften resalted afio in additional responsibslity for women, there being more female thon male landowners in some communities Like wise, new responululstses hud to be asumted ly boys an their early teens

Those forred Iyborers who, after livang been uprooted for several years and suffering great hardshups, Ilived to return to thesr villages an 1915-1916 could not but come back twrth a stronger national conscious ness and with quickened politicat pulses As the armed forces were par tially demobilized under the ratsonalization programs of sg18 and sggo. there streamed back to the sallages many young men whose political consciousnes and self confidence were much greater, and whose pa rochialsm was much les, than befere they had left bome Probably it was to a large extent because of thus thhat the younger generation began to participate in the political life of the vallage so moch more actively than had previously been the case.

One important result of these developments and of the ampoct of the revolution as a wbole on the vallages was the very considerable turnover among efficials there. TIhose illage officrals who had served their com munities well durang the persods of Netherlands and Japonese rule generally continued to hold the confidence of these commumtues and were maintained in office. But probably a conuderably greater number were replaced by new officials Thus, the anternal political change attending the Indonesian revolution was mot merely one of an exchange of governing elites at the top, with an Indonesian nationalist elite replacing the old alien colonial elite. The change penetrated deeply into Indonesan society.

In the socio economie sphere, as well as in the political, conuderable change accompanied the revolution Some of this was a resalt of the conscious effort of the resolutsonary government, but much was not.

At the village level, a system of gotong-rojong (mutual belp) puoneesed by the Sultan of Jogjakarta among the vallages of the five regencies of the Daerah Istumewa of Jogjakarta had by late sg18 begun to be sponsored by lca uto sev r ree Repu conrod Java Under this sytem the funds from a so per cent tax levied on the ancomes of rich villages wathim the regency were uued to subsidize its poor villages Of the money rassed so per cent was used as a direct grant to help support the coss of admonstration in the poor villages The remaining 8o per cent was lent the latter at an interest rate of s per cent per annum. As these sums were repand to the rich villages, they were used by them to develop village ou ned undustries

During the course of the revolution some modest beginnings were made by the central government on projects peovding for reasonable agraruan credit and the establishment of peasant co-operatives However, very little was achoeved, primarily because of the malitary stuation and the government's desperate Siemancral strasts In general a sizable gap remarmed between announced government antentions and their implementation

Largely as a result of conscious governmental policy, the status and bargaining poutson of labor were conuderably strengthened during the revolutionary persed Initally in port a consequence of the govern ment's desire to counter a burgeoning anarcho syndicalism with a more socally respomuble tade umon crgamzation, thus pohiey reulted primarily from the lasting dedication of many of the government's top lead ens to the long submerged interests of Indonesian labor Thus, during the revolution a substantual Indoneuan trade union organization de veloped

In addition, dunng the course of the revolution important developments n the socio economic sphee took place que independenly of government action The programs of the Masjums an Kedıri and else where to peovide land to deserving landless peasants, to organre peasant co operatives, and to provade credit at low rates to poor merchants have already been described Probably the most amportant of these developments, one whuch has been very much overlooked, was the widespeead redistnbutsion of wealth whuch occurred In the agrarinn field this was olten almost revolutionary in seope Bascally it was a result of the tremendous anflaton, the complete lack of govemmental action adjusting the land tax to the anflation,* and the very limuted measures taken by the government to adjust peasant debts to ot. The sarme land tax was paid by the pearant in Republican territory in s947 and 1918 as in 1911. Yet

* Gesemmest legolation aubatnutang an income tax for the land tex had bees drafted and kan achedaled to go mio ellet at the begenng of tge bot the Dutch attack made thes empouutle he was receiv ing over fifteen tumes as much money per kilo of roct in 1917 as in 1g11 and more than sixty timts as much by mid :g18 In effect, then, the peasant in Republican terrstory had virtually no land tax to pay-

Some measures were attempted by the government to adjust standing debts to the inflation, but these efforts were extremely hmited and fell far short of theer mark As a result, a major share of peasant indeboedness was wiped out under the inflation In additson, the peasantry in many areas had a tendeney to vieu the Indonesian Chinese as aligned woth the Dutch Many of these peasants tended to identify the Chinese with the old colonial order and to see the revolution as directed against them as well as agaunst the Dutch Because of thus, the peasants were often reluctant to repay both thesr inflatson lightened monetary debts and their more substantal debts in kind to those who had been their chief sources of credst, the stinerant Chunese moneylenders (tpine sundering) In general Republican officials showed no dispostion to enforce the collection of these debes, and as a result an many places an outight repudration of debts to Chinese credators occurred Thus, during the course of the revolution there was a great decline in the andebtedness of probably a majority of the peasantry in Republican Java and Suma tra.

Also estate (plantation) laborers generally fared relatively well in most areas of Republican-controlled Jasa and Sumatra. Except an that minority of cases where the government undertook to operate the estates, such laborers were usually free to move onto the rich estate lands and farm them, growing food crops for their own benefit. Frequently peasants from adjacent areas who owned no land or an nadequate amount of land alio farmed land en these estates.

Whereas the course of the revolution saw a socio-economic adjustment which in general favored the peasantry of Republiean Java and Sumatra, cuncurrent wuch thas was an adjustment which was disonctly unfavorable to the majority of the middle-class and white collar groups within the Republic. Their level of Iiving sank to a point where most of their members suffered from grossly nadequate food and housing, a substantial number being dangerously undernourished * An undoubted majority of them, while better dressed, ate considerably less than the averege peasant, Urban labor often fared poorly too, but generally its level dan d no fal a mc as d at of these other ure groups

T he sooeoom sp te reolun h a leel ing effect upon an indigenous socrety whose diffventiation on ths sphere was already much less than that in most other Auan countries

Insofar as socio-economic extremes tend to create political unrest, this added leveling of Indoneuan society, partscularty as it occurred in the agranan sector, probably tended to ancrease sts polutical cohesion In addition, this process prebably reanforced the already substantual homogenesty of outlook among mout Repullican leaders woth regard to the socio economie aums and program of the net state. Indeed, this simolanty of outlook was one of the most umportant and unique attributes of pontrevolutsonary Indonesra, an advantage held by few of the newly emergent states of Asna, and by none of them, except perhaps Burma, to the same degpee

The beginning of the postresolutsonary period found the leaders of all smportant politucal groups, escept for the Commutists, dedicated to the achuevement of roughly the same sort of socio-economic system, namely, a mixed economy—co operative, socialist, and capitalist—wath prumasy emphasus on the co operative sector Secondary emphasis was ultumately to be placrd on the socualst portion Hovever, it wat gencrally agreed that the mpoetance of the caputalist sector of the economy would remain substantial for some time to come, both because of the desurability of temporarsly mantainang, if mot augmentung, foreign capt tal invesement and as a result of the anability of the state to move directly much farther ato the economic sphere because of the small number of Indonesans swufficuently traned for staffing socualntuc enterprises A somenhat greater diffesence of oponson exuted regarding longterm aums, especually as to how much emphaus was to be put on increas ing the socralist at the expense of thhe capotalnt sector of the economy. Hovever, the goals envaaged by the principal non Communst parties and the most anfluential nonparty undnuduals for at least the nest decade were remarkably close.

These outlooka resulted to a large extent from the fact that in Indoneua, an contrast eo most newly emergent Auan stases, almost none of the poltucal leaders held any vested interest in the exnting socio economoc stafus quo The concentration of landownershup in Indo nexuan hands was relauvely slight, and few Indoneuans wuth much political anfluence had an mportant stake in the evisting system of agrarsan relauonshops Moreover, Indoneua's leadershiip vas almost en tirely without capotalist roots, and only a very few polstieally anfluential Indonessans had a vested interest in the capitalist sector of the economy The faet that thus sector was almost excluuvely the domasn of Westerners and Chonese resnforced the socsalstic penehant of many Indonesans Even those fetw leaders who did not espouse some varant of socalist sdeology agreed that since the country had vartually no Indonessan capitalnts of prvate capital, the only feasuble way to protect sts people from explostatson by the strong and experienced non Indomesuan capetalist elements was for the government to intervene in economuc life ether through advancing credit for the organization of co-operatives or, where necevary, by direct participation entailing government owner ship

This homogenesty of outlook among Indonesia's postrevolutionary leadership extended atso to basic polstucal princoples. The preponderant majorsty of that leadershop, the prncipal exeeptuons being the Com munsts and some leaders of Darul Istam and the PIR, were dedicated to political principles and practuces whuch were roughly the same as those aspired to in the Western democracies Also reinforcing the prospects for democratic poltucal development were the widespread quality of a relatively high degree of sdeological and religuous tolerance among the Indonesian populatson and the vstality of their resurgent and expanding ullage democracy.

Although most of Indonesia's postrevolutionary leaders espoused roughly the same polatical princaples as dad most leaders in the Unuted States and the democracies of Western Europe, this did not entail a common international crientation. A consiction of paramount impertance among Indonesian leaders was that thesr country should pursue an independent foreign policy ted to nesther the American Western European nor the Sovset power bloc, but that Indoneua should follow whatever course between them seemed best sunted to her own interests and to what she conceived to be the interests of international peace This strong desire for an autonomous snternational role stemmed primarily from Indonessa's oun conditioning within the anternational communsty In the fitst place, the outlook of her leaders was a reaction to her long history of colontal subjection, as in ether recently freed ex-colonsal countries there was a great sensitveness to any kind of international relationship that tmight be interpreted as subservience to an outside power. Secondly, Indonesians had been keenly dnellusioned w:th both the United States and Soviet Russia during the course of their revolationary straggle: the policies of both of these powers toward Indonesia during the crntical yeans s916-1919 appeared to them to be much more actuated by calculations of narrow self interest than by the principle of self determmation for subject peoples.

The necessity of organizing a new and elfectne state administration coupled wusth an extensive program of socio-economic change required that the postresalutionary Indonesion government be a strong one. A basie questson was whether it would prove possible to develop such strengih while at the same time promoting a democratic system of gon emment Although the Republit's leaders were sncerely devoted to the attainment of both objectives, some of the most peescient among them feared that the temptation might become strong to resort to authoritarsan methods in arder to attain the requrtite governmental strength.

One of the grratest ampedements to the development of democratie political practices was the stall surviving authoratarian tradstion and the related habet of dependence upon orders from above Although among wide sectars of the population these qualities had become sigruficantly weakeped by the impart of the rev olution, most of the Indonessan population still espected their leadees to solse thetr problems for them.

Despite its ascalened national conscsousneis and the smuch increased vigor of sts politseal life at the village level, peasant socrety veas still not etectuvely linked wsth the natuonal government in a mutually activaeed and mutually responsne relationshup The exsting relationship was still predominantly a one way affair—trom the top down. Those ties between the village and the national governmoent whuch were substantial were sull primarily through the medium of personatities rather than political partues represented in the national parliament. So long as these partaes floated at vague shapes above the pearant masses with either few or no real lines of contact betwren them, a two eay relatiomhup betw een the village and the mational representative body could not be developed. Without such a refationshup, an authoritaran artculation of govermment could not be avooded, and a troe representatuve democracy would not be possible

No great progress an thus directron was líkely to be made uneil na tional clections were held, and the exsent of such progress would depend to an mportant extent upon the character of the syptem of elections introduted Though adequate preparation for soch elections would necessanly take tume, there was a danger that some polstical parties and mdonduals mght out of seli mieret emverdy delay them longer than was good foe the new state's polucal health

There were several ether conditions which would probabty inBuence significantly the extent to which Indonesizn society moved away from its authoritarian past and towards a genuinely democratae political system. Among these, and in partseular important for gis ing its people the necessary sense of actual participation an the political process, would be that of governmental decentralization There was some danger that the jusufied repudation of the artificial, alsen umpoted federal structure inherited from the Datch might create a groundless, long standing prejudice agaumt decentralization per se However, there was a real need for a considerable number of governmental functions of predomanantly local amportance becoming the responsibility of local representative bodies and tocally elected executive effieers Many governmental fune trona could not feasubls be so decentralized because of the prohubotive expense involved or because of the paucity of eval service perionnel. However, a number of them could wsthout serously raising these prob lems Among these was the polace sustem Once fulls elected local representatve bodies had ben establuhed, it would undoubredls be healthuer polstically to decentralize the police svstem. thereby making at more directly accountable to the citizenn Though the postrevolutionary gosernment appeared to be moving in the direction of decentralzation of some governmental funetions, there was danger that smplementation of this program might be seriously prejudiced by a faslure to provide sufficient local fiscal autonomy.

Another influentual condtion would be the ability of nontotalitarian political parties to attraet the support of crganized labor, the demobilized soldiers, and those important elements of educated Indonesian youth not zncluded wathun these groups. The extent to which the dynamic emergues of Indoneuan youth, particularly sts educated sector, were kept from flowing into totalitarsan channels twould be contungent to an important extent upon the eßectiveness of the government in provading it with opportunities for socially constructive work at least roughly commensurate wath the abilities it had demonstrated during the revolution.

The potentials of authorstarian and democratic forms of government in Indonesia would also be nfluenced by the character of the new state's program of socio-economic reconstruction. Its scope and cempo would be important in determuming whether or not the pressures generased by the devastation of the economy, the popular expectation ef a rapid postrevolutionary rise in the level of ln ung, and the wadespread demand for a mote socialized economy could be contained in nonauthoritarian political channels. If the scope of the program w huch the Republic's leaders undertook to carry out were too lumoted, or the pace too slow, they might forfest their popalar haekang, and tdhose more disposed to employ authorstariam techniques maght replace them at the helm of government. The speed and scope wath whuch ats leaders moved forward, however, would be to a crstical extent dependens upon the amount of capital avaslable to thitm so long as tworid condituons comtinued to create a heasy demand for Indoneua's choef exports, sufficient donestie capital peolably could be accumulated wathout the necesty of applying any great governtmental pressure on the population But should thot demand appeeciably domumsh and should it aso then prove smpomuble or unfeasible to make up for thus loss through borrowing abroad, a major problem would arne. In order then to accumulate sufficient domestic capotal for the full maut tenance of its program the government mught well be obliged to force the populatuon to cut its level of living severely This would requure very strung measures, and it would be doubtful whesher the government could put them through without sts own character becoming conuderably more authontanian in the process Houever, if the volume of foreign trade attauned by Indonena in sgso could be sustained over the next fne or oen zears, this problem moght not arise, at least not in so scute a form Tor n thas case the govertment's program for vocioeconome development might have by then so strengthened and balanced the economy that even should the market for ats leading exports serously contract it would be able to rasse sufficient domestic capital wiuhout forcing a pregram of austerity upon the population

Whatever the case, if in attempting to solve ther great postrevolumanary problems the Indoneuan people were able to demonstrate the same qualhtes thoch they had shown in therr struggle for poletical ande pendence, thest chances of success appeared strong

Acknowledgments

MUCH of the materal presented here could not have been gathered lhad st not been for the generous assstance of a great many of the people with w hom the author had the good fortune to become acquainted while he was in Indonesia Withun the Republic he was purticularly in debted to Presudent Soekarno, Mohammed Hatta, Vice President and hrir, Hadjs Agoes Salim, then Minaster of Foreign Aflasrs, Ali Sas troamadjojo, then Minister of Education, Mohammad Natur, then Minster of Information, and Mohammad Roem, then Chairman of the Indoneuan Delegation to the U N 's Committee of Good Ofices All of them gave generously of their tume to the author during a period when they were partscularly hard preved by their smportant dutes.

A similar debe is ow ed b the author to the following for their helpful auistance: Abrkusno Tjokrosuposo, Alt Budandjo, Hamnd Algadrse, Abdul Gafar Prnggodigdo, Abdul Karim Pringgodigdo, the late Ratu Langie, Roeslan Abdulgani, Maria Ulfah Santoso, Subadio Sastrosatomo, Mohammad Saubarn, and R P Selosoemardpan The author wshes to acknowledge aho the extensive help gven hum by members of the staffs of the Minstry of Informatson, in partucular Hanan and Hilman, and of the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Education, and Forengn Aflairs, especially Darmanto

Among the many additional people to whom the author s indebted for assistance receved in the Republic, he would an parncular Iike to express his thanks to the following Jo Abdurachman, Abu Hanifah,

Assaat Gelar Datuk Mudo, Basvedan, Didi Djajadıningrat, Professor Djokosutono, Ismojo, Koemoro, Jo Kuranıngrat, Johannes Leimena, Nuradi, Ratmoko, Sjøfruddın Prawiranegara, the late Amir Sjarafuddin, Momsignor Soegoopeamoto, Soemardt, Sutomo Tjokronegoro, Achmad Subardjo, Sudarsono, Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, Sukrano, Sunarjo, R. P. Soerachman, the late Sunpno, Suwito, Kaslan A Tahor, Wongsontgoro, and Mohamed Yunus

While in the Netherlands-controlled areas of Indonesia, the wroter recerved the appreciated auntance of Lt Governer General Hubertus J van Mook, his Chief of Cabonet, P J Koets, and Abdoelkadir Widjojoatnodjo, as well as of the Regeerangs Vocelochtings Dtenat and its staff—in purucular Messrs Bapetto, Hubrecht, Scheoen, Seret, and Wansink Lakewise he is grateful for the aaustanor given hom by the Leger Contacten office of the Royal Netherlands Army and the office of Nefis dealing wath the Japanese occupation.

Among the numerous other people to whom the writer is indebeed for help recesved in Nethertands controlled areas, he would like to mention the following

In Betavia—Zainal Abidin, Herman and Henme Buitenhuijis, Chen Tey Soe, Donald Davves, B M and Herawatu Diah, Erna Djajadiningrat, Willard Hanna, Hamengku Buwono IX, Injo Beng Goot, Johanne. Jusuf, Gratmah Kartalegawa, John Ketcham, Wim Latumeten, Harold Nelson, Karl Neys, Taufik Salom, Sanjoto, Soedjono, Richard Semart, Thio Thuam Tjong. and Wirjauan.

In Celebes—Arnold Monomutu, Anak Agung Gde Agung, Ands Burhanuddin, A I A Peuk, Mayor Polak, Soh Lran Tjpe, aho D A. Gerungan, Jacques W Levap, Abdul Madıd, C B J Mamsouw, Andi Masarapi, Jan Maveikese, Pantouw, Jakin Permata, W. Renitra, the Sulean of Tidore, Tjokorde Gde Rake Sukawati, Soumokl, Pastor Sondakh, Andi Sultan Daeng Radja, Tan Tek Heng, Teng Tjin Leng, and A. B H. Watvuruntu

In Bah—Hans Snelleman, Hans Harten, Manuaba, Theo Mejer, Made Mendera, Gusti Ketoet Ngnerah, Nanja Guita Bagus Oka, Ide Anak Agoeng Gde Oka. I G. Panetje, Ida Bagus Pxdada, and Poetoe Weya

In fart Jeoo—Djashadh Supeapeo, Djoewsto, Domind Hildering. In drakoesoma, Domoné Iskander, Murdjant, and Charles van der Plas

Is Modure—Mohamad Mahfoed, Oemar, Roeslan, Suparmo, Tjakranigrat, M Zainalalim, and leaders of Madura branches of Pandura Rakjat Indonesa and Gaboengan Peladjar Indonenia.

In W'est Javs—R. B. K. E. Djajadiningrat, R. Djumhana, Haan Natanegara, Kotatih, Adil Poeradireda, R. Soejoso, Soemarno, R. A. A. Soeriakartalegawa, Male Wiranata Koesoema, Muharam Wiranata Koesoema, and R. A. A M. Wiranata Koesoema

In Bengka, Semarang, and Polembang—M Jusuf, Mas Sjarif, J. C. Verkerke, Zainal Abodien, Sinaga, Slamet Tirtotoebroto, Ktajs Hadji Azhan, and R. Hanan.

The following indivsduals and groups also rendered important as sistance:

Republiean Indonestan representatues in the Urated States—in particular, L N. Palar, Soedarpo Sastrosatomo, Soedatmoko Mangoendiningrat, Sumstro Djojohadhkusumo, Ismail Thajeb, and Basoeks Djatiasmoro.

Many of the foreign correspondents in Batanta—n particular, Arnold Brackman of United Pres, Henk van Maunk of the Gelderlander Pers, Quentin Pope of the Chocego Tribune, and Chrs Schefter of the Nieuve Rotterdamse Courent

Members or former members of the Unted Nationt Commuttee of Good Offices on the Indonenan Question and sts secretariat—in particu Iar, T. K. Crtchley, Lieutenant Colonel Dewar, Frank P Graham, Myra Jordan, John Landsey, Colonel Walliam Mayer, E A Roberts, and Philip Trezise.

In addstiom, the author wishes to thank Charles Wolf, Jr. for his helpful comments on the first four chapters and the following for their Iikewise helplul remarks pertaining to one or more of these four chapters Willard Elsbree, Claire Holt, Nobutaka Ike, Harold Isaacs, Paul Kattenburg. Victor Purcell, Arthur A. Schuller, and the members of the Political Science Seminar at the Jolins Hopkins University.

Finally the author wwhes to thank the following for permission to quote extracts from their publications: The University of Chicago Press and H. A. R. Gabb, Modem Trends in Islam, Commonurel (December 3s, s919). a letter from Bshop Soegiopramoto; The John Day Company. and Soetan Sjahrir, Out of Exole, Herper's Magazine (March, 19r6) and F. E. Crockett, "How the Trouble Began in Java"; The Institute of Pacific Relations and Charles Wolf, Jr., The Indoneman Story; The New York Times (December z6, 1948) and Arthur Krock, "Capital in a Dilemma on Indonesian Policy"; Pecific Affairs (December 1919) and Takdir Alisjabana, "The Indonesian Language—By-Product of Nationalsm"; Preses Universitaires de France, Snouck Hurgronje's Pohtique Murulmene de Is Hollande; and Soetan Spahrir, Onze Stripd.

Index

INDEX

Gunet rmponulalt, 164, 170 ahne 153 101 19 81021. 951419 410 Calcatta conferencet, 138 Cathoie Parte, 154. egs. Casor, W J, 8, g s9 Grntral Adevory Beand, 106 Central Indenesan Nanonal Cemm PFANP Central Java, Daerah Isimewa of €36 Centné Orginaateon of an Indonnuan Laler are sonst Chaorol 5alkh 115 *1 13* v7* *77 Chneve in leloneua G so i3 19 22 67 st3 139 154 1710 195 095 305 50 31731939907 475 Chratan Partv a 17 195 45 Chnsnson La Ges Sar Phahp igs s45 Coil Servuer 1155 Coxhrnan. 11 Meile 550 555 551 336 421 423 419 41: 412 413 Coen. Jan P Colipn if 11n 53 57 s4 Corunform #57 Comniem sin :179 fam 3 Ag Cormunalon 15 14 17 14 09 *1 Commenoem, ore Coemunus Parts In tands, Creronfon Corunoeen Murtia Parts, Iliegal Indonevan Commenot

Commuat Party Infonrun (PkI) 74 83 pm, 117 119, 1 139 161 180 106,14 033. 002; 050 072, 173 *- r s paim. ym. yoi Pola tmeau mententup ag%

Cormmutst Party, Netherlandt. 505t. 53aGo Copra Fund, gog(s Critchley, Thonas λ, m4n. 1 Cultvation 5vstem, 11, 11 13. 14 15. 55

Dahlan. Bo Dahlan, kaji Hada Ahmad E7 Damasetawan, De. g Darenn, gin, qi. gb [6, Ba Dorenman, Maruto, 83, s61, a75, gao Debt vaue, 459 413 Delker. Douwtt, po. 71. 935 Dekker, IH W. pi Delangge sinke, s96 Demotritix Factian, anr Fraku Demokrat Dewanas, Sostan. 1, 111 Dewaton, Ki Hadpar. 0, 88, pot, 1y Diapan, 457

Diffeten. R W v2n, 371 3:6 Domstrov Doctnne, sin, ste, 1fs Danara, Otto Ikander, 127, 117, 199 Dipenegoro, un, 49 Dibako 120, 141 Ilpopolanys prophrry, 100 Dpokovolpne Dckoupono Cal, pyo sps ayz s, zo Djuanda 197 Djumhana R. 571- 577 579 Dores Wolem 571 Duflot (oert sjt zzs rjn tym DuBans Cractey Plan at ayo

Earet Inda Co Dutth ro parum, 55 tase Instonesa Negara of 355 50. 432. 46041 Pat Jaa Negara ef 374 5t 435 Eaa Nunatra Negara of a25 *g5s g5a. €\ avustanue to the Netherlands a54 4°3 4 4*5419 m 452 Eronms con fitions sthon Repubie Iduxation 5351 513% 13° Repulican Emeron Rupest 36 5°n 16 Fagels Major Gen 5tb 577 451 Fnoch Mohanmad 3;6 Fthucal pelicv as Faru 3 55 51531901516

Federal Convultatue Voembly, e trO Federalois 410 414 perur4 419 451 per Aom. 47 493 455. are alho BFO Fonced laber, 15 Fraksn Demokrat, 1S7 463 Fromberg, P H., 1, 45n, 6ze. 6;n, 68 6g Front Demoktan Rakut (FDk). 23 279 paum, a8 3, 301, 35, 5:3 Furmnall, J 5, 4. 13, 60

Galkatocia, 110, 114 Cant. Dr A k 1g. s. 18. Capi, 97 100 General Indonesan Trade Union, sse Gemakan Revelos Rakpst (GRR), t6l, e05s a6gn, 15a, a8s, z53 253n, a55, 2g 313 Grendo, 95 Gób, H A R. 41n. 4tn Gelongan Merdeka, go-95 Graeff, Govener General de, gt

INDEX

Cmham Yrink, s sy, s14, 15, y, zat, zyon, z18, syn. 65k

Hadμ 157n

Hadkoesoea, ks Bagoet, 10l 107, 147 Halim. Dr A. 155 n01 450 Hamd 1. Saltan, 451, 440, 455 Hamodlan A A. iep Tergu Mehammad, ny, v7 lasta Mobammad. 53. e 121 pasi, v5 117, 19%, 197, 951 sst paan, 147 155 pam, 167, 168 178-128 paum, 20z 205 2zß ag1, 851, *45 a5 26d a1, 49 105 34, 337. 35h, 3. 355 49 435 453.431-498458.4 Sleidman set Viige hesdman Hes 11o no8, 1s8 137 Hmdremanena, R, 155. 97 Hoesodo Mas Wahadin Soedire, 6 10okrka. Drsa, 138, 118, 115 Hurgeeße Sneurk, 44. 47 49

Hague (Round Tabie) Cemleremte. 43t,

Illegal Indonmas Commanest Party, 87.

Imperts g5

Incone and sage, 19 t0, a5 x, g5

Indanran

loárect rslk, 49 patom, 4t

mhip of, ag

Itan, are Western New Gaunea Ishaę Tzskretadaoerpo, go Ialam, are Mobammedanio Iaa kuuma Sumanin, sod, 150 120 18

Japanese occupatión, 9 19 Juat, Mshanmad, 127, 153, 153 Aahar Manakar, 4ts kanm Varah Satan, s Ramah, Pak, 43 Aártisismsta, Col Dd, kammi. Radea Adjng 61 Karougkito, 8 Md, zo1 010, 570 3 Rauzan Sngodmeda, 1gt hmpentan 10gn, a0, s96 kL. (honähjke Leget) 454 kNT) (Reganal), 14% 154. 11a hoomah Amada, 2 ho 71.516 i van der, 19, Karte Verklaning 1§5 kRIS 119 535 hroek. Arthur, 361 315 konamngrat, 3o, 353, 307

ANL (kenmlije Nederandhe la dache Leger) 145. 517- 354-58496

KNtP, 129 145, 150-152, 156. 168 182 p4r a50n 445.43

Puut, are

Labor organcataont 6a. 75- 7781, 10%

Laod ax, 54, 351, 414 415

Langen, General van, q19

*55, 495. euin,

INDEX

Lippmann, Water, 4 I uat Sergtr, s5t, ses Lnkman. s6

Madon Retellien, z9og, . 5 Mideln Rakjat Itlonesa, so Madera, Negara of n55 ay7, 3t1 gta, 456 Magpshet 54.5°n takmen Soreadpradp. 376 Valay language sre Indonevan language Malh Aire 6, 115 15. 171. 17 Masal Snpluan v16 Vaeperáoeemo Durmasan 1o1 s5y Man peno oevoemo Radrn Gorrawan, 6y Vargrenkoesoemo, Dr Typto po yo Mangoepradje Gatst gt, sng Vargumarknes 5 15i. 155t01 Maroer Aunp: II M, 10G Marwar De, 4fo Vana, Tandone qi Maramt A A. Vardjoha Ba Vanig, sre Soeeslirt. Bendnk Varoeki #5 VMaruro Ntmlundyo, 415 17z, 095, 515 Vasoen, g Minahama Retellion of Feb 191, 143 More, Sevator Vayne, 4tg szo SMountdutten, Lond Lount sgt. t Afutler. n J= 50G Marha Party, 519 g10-4t6 Mardani, De, Martay. Ptehp, 41

3Mapum, a3, 136 158. 163 171 12 181 18g, 105 196- 095, 109 z0z, 008, ang 5031,4

Markut, py

Mataram 34.6

Majda, Nize Admiral, 115, 116, 18. 19. 151.147

Voert. Abdeel. 25, 16

Nohammadijah, §2 88, 111, 157 128

Vohammedannm, 3, 41 19 87, 111, 157. are eno Matjun, Partal Sarekat Islam Indoseun. Sirekat Islare Dand Ilam, and Pan Ilan

Monopoly lenes 10, 15, 13

Mook, 1taherten J van, es. ve. t%. 201, *16 918. 127, 825. 237, *15 416. 515, 519, 319 333,361-459

Stulia, Dr, 17

Vase, Po87 paet, 15g, z7z, z75- z76,

Masandi, Dr, 186, a5, z5ß

Nabdatul Utama, 81. 157

Nasution. Cel, 185

Nautmon, Vadoelhak. pt

National Deleme Counéil, 189

Nanonale Indeche Parmp, po, γ1

Nationalat Party, ledoneuan, pierevolotionnry, gn. gi ga. postrevoñutionary, 155 130 171 173, 177, 185, 194, 192,

Natar Mohammad, 11z a55, 155, 192105907 525 351,46-470 NEF15, 14mn, a35 Netro Jaahanlal 33z, 4on Netherlandy Invlonesian Lrion 455 451 New Gunea are Weren New Gusnea Ngadamun 175 Npotn, 176

Palar L N999

Tan Idam 41 43

lăandu Wguna 1, vt. 18g 1, 315

Pam, F2

Panndra 55 467 4g

Partn Bonsh Indonma, are Laber Party, Indoneuan

Partn Barsh Indonesa Merdeka, sfon.

Partai Komunis Idenema (Pk), are Communnt Farty. Indenesan

Partat Komenn Monda are Young Com matiit Party

Partal Nauenal tedoneua (PNI), are Na tonalnt Party, Iadonesin

Partal Nauonal Indonraa Mendeka, 467.

Partal Repoehlá Indonniv, are Pari

Partai Raśpat, y1y

Partai Rahjat Delata, a5t. 515

Partan Rakjat lodonesa, er

Partai Rakjat Nanonal are Pastal Na-

Partai Sarekat Ilam Iadoneua (PSI).

Partal Soscahus are Soctabat Panty

Pamim Sosala Indonena, se Socalut Party, Indonetun

Partnão ça, 05 94. 125

Faundan, Negira of, 816 55 578, 455:

Patierson, Reae Admnal, 141

Pemada Indoneua, gyn

Penddrdikan Nasonal Indonetia, 95.

Peéjedar Paraan P511, 25 reoples Democrate Tront, are Freet Demoktis Raljat

Pertospoenan Indonesin (P1) 88g) Perenaen omaunut di Inda 4. are alio Comunest Party, Indonesun Peundo 117 ro. 1de 177. 188 190 sgh. Pr12 10., 19 114, 122 183 135 137 Pk1 ses Coeieusut Pasty, Indonnian Plas Chatles van der tst. ayă 825. g07- 518 519 573 573%, 550, 991, g9€ Plcbosse Meseratat, tue zęs PN1 mw Natorahat Paty, Indunean Pocda 1 Goesti Ratort, ie Poerbej B P 11, 197 Folaece Mable Brigde 183 95s sy0.993 Pohtcal Teturrent, 167 Pope quentin, g9 9ogn 405 Pomn Lt Gen ter tos Popataton as ay, 514 Prt (temada Patn tidooea). v7t PPOkI g1 Prswoto Mangusauesto 155, r Prevdene ofiee of 15z 199 ros jee, Pruogpdigão, Aldal Gatar, uas, 558 Pumdrodja Add, 14- 516 PAPS, 100

Propies Revolitienary Vovemm, are Gerakan Revolan Rakut

Pergeakes kanes Bonoch, are Trade Uron Central

Perotuan Indonmua Raja (P1K). 5t4 3r6

Radical Conreniratson 73 Radjuman edodeergrat 1, 127 Ralfles Sar Stamdond, in, ton Ranset Mepet ts s Rasjads, Hadps 175 Rel Sarelat Islam. Religeen Secufists 157 yo6 g10, 457 Ressslle Agreennent, zty nng pa, aga nma (RU51) s58, 45T- 45t Drut Comsittn. 416649 45t 445, Roece íábametad. s, upa 400, 42,

Roem-san Royen Agreement. 47145 Rotan Abdutgae 11. 131 Rouhar, 108 Rone Marano, 13 1M, r17 are Hagve Round Tatle Contrenor, Conference Rojen J 1I umm, 517, 413 4ts. 493. 496 Rubler growang [2 z Rastzm Dr, 205

Saharodun Major Sabeblah, sdy s8a Sadán Lt Cal. sts, eg Sajap kin agg zso toę tm. no, sa0 Sapzit, 18y Salum, Hadu Agoes 75. ;653891 33 Samasbondi, Hadp, 67 Saenom, 454 Samm Sastrowolegdo. 9m 159 Samvoedin, Raden, soy zoj Sunnoso, Mana Ultah, ng1 rgg Sardpona, s agn 1, zz azs Sarekat Dagieg Ila, s9, 6j ta Satekat Dugang Islas Indooessa, zod yog Sarekat 1ilam, 63 78 pamm, 87, 51 Sandkat Ielaes Paty er Patiai Sarekat Islaes ledotua Sareknt Rajut. 77 8o pasom, 81, 451 300 Sarekat Tam Isfam. gey yo Sarsona, s Suen, L M J A, 355 4od 359 Schermerberm, Welen agó Schtneke, B. 25 Seinendan 130 Semaon. 71, 73 77 pasom, 89 Seuabuddtu, aer Doues Dekker Sruadje, 55 5y v51, rin, 1gs. sy r8. Sevala Suhatd 575, 455 Shrzaya, 33, 5%, ga Silwangs Dnoonn, i. igt, 35t. aig ags agil tg0 g50 40g Sazatupang Cal, cs 455 Sga Vrabua 5 Sauell, Major Gen, 1tt Sμfruddin Prasiranegua, 236 309 310, 527, 47, 428, 46 ühair, Sorin, g q y p a, u 111 115 110 117, 444, 151, 151 155 19c 117 159 1onm, st1 171 fanis. 4z 10s I eon. syy os, nog, avt nog, Suneu Harjs 1daja. 5ig. 315 Gtifuldin, Amle, & 67, in 1, 112 5 1 25, 15 11 p, 1. 1z, 1 189 , pu, myt ny tyy yun Aarnesahs Dyhan is sgi son Selaliet Party as* 1to st7 1079 031 037 0704 Sonlirimoke Mangoradsogras Soeginprannto Dühep 8 *51 Secandps Wirppransto 0s 19) trkamo 4g 01 1o n faet 1. 1, 117 pomim, 15s, stz. sts vs sg8 fanum , a, by g, 1 51* Sejeatman, otn Sepoiatinara, 4 Scrathman, sg sz Serjepraton, 9s tetanls kamhafkorormo, M, 4 Setandjr lecitien, as 96 *retieno Raden, G 9) Vewandi Suryahingtat R. M, arr k.l Hadjar Deaantona voth Modoeran Rrleiben, 4s South 9omarta, Negra of, 5ºs3*s 455 yoor, 11 Gs amon. 371 516 Studrat noen ( envitoris Malariswa). toudi, Ir Cal, shp, n94 sty Suldo umtino 11, 1, 1 Sutalar, Rr. P, Sotnntrin, 19s

Sulunt,o Atbteid ns to famiv, 1*5 190 /om. 118 19) 159 166 11, 1 , sho tutrotn, Cal Grot, t Sulaturin 1tr, n 95 1 1, 19s Sodaon, Major Gen, 1, s sy, Sule po Ma} rn 1y olitmin dmetal s7 *ss 18). Sapo Hadmote vt a g q Sukami 1 155. 17 119 151 171 177 178 19 9 112 Sukarns ww Sekertn Slawano Tpánnde Cde Rale g G Sukiman Wirjrandpoo 41 spon, sy. Suluts Slrimun De Sulies od 1 gakarta u Étemraghu Pu Sultan ed Suà spyn Vomsia peilatsal drvelpments in e7 Sonan of Surskatt: s45 186 Sunarin Koloquking I: 10 a5y gas Songtres Itrlues mys nos eyn Sopeno g. 1 Soptapos vpt Sarzhapa Patte of 11 15 Sormmas Frain 977 Sotlsdarmes Ait CGommdber 3 Sotarto 1t tnl a/ Suwanli. ip 19s Suwlzy, 136

fateasi Modarmad oa Takdie Alisjshuna, rgs Ladpilofio e Eathm Nires 88 Iandenan A 157, an1 Tamin. Djomalatin. Pa. 81 Lan Eing Ijle, 151 a1, mn a7 a7 Ean Muisha 4tm 7577 prnim, Po8y potim , 117, 11, 119 1g. 140 15t. 955. 2to 177 pm, 1 19s pom,

410

INBEX

Tan Malaka (reet) 10. 000, x, s82. 50%, 513 314, 318. Ton Po Cvan, 195. ao5 Tzmsh Mersh 8695 Taxes, a6 at, sre alo Land tas Tedjwkmana 1, uog Testara Isian Indonrua, sug Tentma Peladar (Sradests Army) afs Tériahl, 1t Cen, 127 Tekraminoto, Harmono, 125 Tjekremneto, Oear Said, 68 6g. 7 291, gto ssc sla, siy aăy Tomo, Tung vi v0y aly Trade unonn ae Laboe erganation vun, vfy 151 vi8, vya Tople A VMsememt, sa Tri/oll, Robert, 399-4051

Umon Court of Artarnrtion 455 miuan on ladonetla, 40s, 409, 414 Ussted Nanses Serntay Counol Cem san Qorsien, z17 tn8, z15 m ziz Untel Natises Seronny Caencl, delates resolrilonm and voting on the Indenrsan questson 15 a, a18, 13 Unlied States of Indoneva are Repoálic of the Unsted States of ladenesia

Vardembeg 5-ruire Arlise, 410 45tm Vandenteuh, Amry, an, inn 2031 Village gmeenment, 471 171 Willige headman, 1s, 16 ilage leing 3 Vofhiraad 504o 53, 01 Waprs are Ineoeme and w1prt Maschid lam, k Abdoel . 15 Wenloge k Wenen W 1 y yy to Wesn Bamee Dueiah latauewa of esß test Jasa prelteal developmenes ia duneng 1017 1919, zyt =11 24, are eho Wenering Cype Past (Tark), v4s go5 Bikinn 11 18 pouon, syt, 198 177 Wirua kosma R A A if, 150 951.971 975 135%, 570, 490 455 Wivolo Resslstion, g Wondruns, vzê es, gia Wongonegoro, a38 15 501 Morkng Committee rgs. iss 1ss 1t8 177 fum, 188, 18 s 0 paun, so8, sgun, aggn, u00, ag1 4tg mem/aer Yamin, Mohammad, 135, 178, 159 100 Yoduo Irhdungse, im Young Indonesian Commmonist Parsy By,

ser e Wegal

Zemsl Alm, yit