
IN THE SHADOW OF MOUNT RAMELAU

THE IMPACT OF THE OCCUPATION OF EAST TIMOR



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George J. Aditjondro

Indoc

This book offers a comprehensive survey of the various impacts of the Indonesian invasion and occupation of East Timor. It not only focusses on the cultural, economic and political alterations brought about by the enforced integration, but it also elaborates the extent to which the Indonesian occupational policy has a detrimental effect on the environment of East Timor. This aspect of ecocide is a comparatively new point of view raised by Dr.George Aditjondro.
The Indonesian Documentation and Information Centre (INDOC), Leiden, The Netherlands, took the initiative to publish this updated compilation of three articles written by this eminent Indonesian scholar. His texts were edited with a historical survey by Dr.Rudie Trines.

The Indonesian Documentation and Information Centre (INDOC) aims to provide information on current social, political and environmental developments in Indonesia, especially those involving human rights issues. To this end it has an extensive collection of printed material at its disposal, consisting of newspaper clippings, periodicals, books, reports and unpublished documents collected over the last fifteen years.



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He has followed developments in East Timor personally since 1974, both while working as a journalist for *Tempo* and subsequently as a university lecturer. He used information obtained during his visits to East Timor, complemented by literature he has collected in Indonesia, in East Timor, in the U.S. during his periods of study there and in Lisbon, Portugal.

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In the Shadow of Mount Ramelau

The Impact of the Occupation of East Timor

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Foreword

This publication is the result of a co-operation of Indonesian, English, Dutch scholars and NGO's. Each contribution was indispensable to the task formulated by the editor, to present an updated picture of the predicament of East Timor generated by an opinion on the inside.

To the European point of view the history of Timor is to a large extent supposed to be the shaping of its people into the Portuguese and Dutch colonial mould. Contrary to this European perspective, however, the Timorese have not solely existed in their encounter with colonialism. Timorese anthropology and ethnography unearths a rich cultural and political tradition both during East Timor's precolonial and colonial period. Drawing on these sources provides us with more adequate information to understand twentieth century developments.

This publication is unique in terms of describing the cultural changes in East Timor within the four corners of the Indonesian occupation: not only a genocidal assault on the eastern half of the island, a process slowly leading to the ethnic, cultural and religious extinction of the people of East Timor, but an ecocidal onslaught as well. Particularly the aspect of ecocide is comparatively novel in the discussion which until now has been more or less entirely political. This view, it should be emphasized from the beginning, stems from fieldwork by an Indonesian scholar, Dr. George Aditjondro, and makes up the main part of this book. We want to express our gratitude to him for making available the texts for translation and editing.


The historical survey preceding the main text is intended to provide a frame of reference within which the three articles by George Aditjondro can be appreciated. It elaborates in particular on the events leading to the Indonesian invasion in December 1975 and the subsequent years of military occupation. It also revives our memory as to the massacres that have occurred over the years, the latest being in November 1991 in the Santa Cruz cemetery, Dili.

The conclusion amounts to a clear political viewpoint, taking into account the facts presented. Attention is called to the actual state of affairs since 1975, conflicting with international treaties and UN-resolutions. The Indonesian Government seems to be persevering in its arrogance of power instead of observing a policy favouring the people's sovereignty.

The Indonesian Documentation and Information Centre (INDOC), Leiden, The Netherlands took the initiative to this publication because it is convinced of the necessity to provide more, and more factual information relating to one of the most forgotten wars of the last two decades.

The editor should like to thank all contributors, translators and others who gave their time and expertise, while at the same time emphasizing that INDOC remains responsible for editing and translating the articles of George Aditjondro as well as for the contents of the historical survey.

Leiden, June 1994


EAST TIMOR
DISTRICTS
I LAUTEM
II BAUCAU
III VIQUEQUE
IV MANATUTO
V DILI
VI AILEU
VII SAME
VIII AINARO
IX COVA LIMA
X BOBONARO
XI ERMERA
XII LIQUICA
XIII OECUSSE
ATAÚRO ISLAND
WETAR STRAIT
OMBAI STRAIT
DILI
Manatuto
Baucau
Lospalos
Liquica
Ermera
Aileu
Ainaro
Same
Viqueque
Maliana
Suai
Suai Loro
Tilomar
Atambua
Oecusse
Pante Macassar
Nitibe
Oe Silo
Pisseube
WEST TIMOR
TIMOR SEA
Mt MATABIA
Mt MUNDO PERDIDO
Mt MAUBISSE
Mt DIALILO
Mt SABORIA
Mt TATAMAILAU
Mt TAFOI
Mt TAIROMAN
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INDONESIA
East Timor
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1. Historical Survey

Attracted by the abundance of sandalwood on the remote island of Timor, the first European colonizers were the Portuguese in the 16th century.[1] Soon, in 1656, a substantial Dutch military force landed in the west of the island. Timor was divided in two and the Portuguese had to be content with the Eastern half. In addition to collecting and exporting sandalwood and exploiting coffee plantations on a modest scale, they imported Catholicism and used the island as a place of exile for political and criminal convicts.

After centuries of rather formal rule, the Portuguese at the end of the nineteenth century endeavoured to establish a more effective control over their colony. Their objective was to create a basis for a methodical economic exploitation. Portugal's only contribution to the infrastructure of the island consisted of a restricted programme of road construction, largely to settle the transport inconveniences of the colonial community itself. Neither did they invest a great deal in healthcare or education of the East Timorese people. In 1899 the SAPT introduced coffee plantations into East Timor and between 1911 and 1917 copra, an additional crop, was introduced. Particularly the use of forced labour involved in these and similar policies provoked widespread resentment amongst the Timorese. This indignation culminated in an uprising from 1910-12, the crushing of which took the lives of about 3000 Timorese. The effective establishment of Portuguese colonial rule was merely deceptive. The traditional East Timorese political hierarchies continued to be enacted.[2]

After a military coup in 1926 in Portugal, Antonio Salazar drew up a new Colonial Act in 1930, centralizing the political control over the colonies under direct rule from Lisbon. The Portuguese stated a 'civilizing mission', incorporating the Catholic Church, entrusted with the education in their colonies. This socializing encounter in Catholic missions effected the emergence of Timorese political élites in the 1950s and 60s.

During the Pacific War East Timor had to pay a large toll for harbouring allied troupes who used Timor as a forward base for the defense of Australia. Towns, villages and hamlets were destroyed by both Allied and Japanese bombing raids. By the time of the Japanese capitulation some 60.000 Timorese, i.e. 13% of the population, had died as a result of the war[3]. After the Japanese left, the Portuguese reasserted their traditional pattern of colonial rule in a ruthless fashion.[4] However, the indigenous self-regulating political system, with which the Timorese had resisted earlier colonial influence, the Japanese and the subsequent re-establishment of Portuguese colonial rule, was to be the framework they could use in the coming struggle for independence.

When on 25 April 1974 the Portuguese Movement of the Armed Forces (MFA) during the Lisbon revolution overthrew the Caetano regime, the Portuguese established a government committed to modernization and decolonization. Portugal ratified the right of colonized peoples to self-determination and acknowledged that East Timor was not by nature Portuguese. Soon it created the

opportunity for the East Timorese to prepare for the departure of the former colonizer.

Apart from three comparatively unimportant parties[5], three major political parties were formed:

(1) UDT (Timorese Democratic Union), founded on 11 May 1974, calling for "self-determination for the Timorese people oriented towards a federation with Portugal with an intermediate stage for the attainment of independence".[6] Its president was Mario Carrascalão, a coffee-plantation owner and former representative of the Caetanoist *Accão Nacional Popular* party.

(2) ASDT (Timorese Social Democratic Association), founded on 12 May 1974, initially calling for gradual independence, preceded by administrative, economic, social and political reforms.[7] Its future president was Xavier do Amaral. Most of its members, amongst whom several members of *liurai* families, were employed in government service. In September 1974 ASDT changed its name into Fretilin and altered its objective. Whereas ASDT was founded to defend the idea of the right to independence, Fretilin was formed to fight for it. In 1988 Fretilin was reorganised into the multi-party CNRM-coalition and the Falintil, the former Fretilin army turned into a national army.

(3) Apodeti (Popular Democratic Association of Timor), founded on 27 May 1974, calling for "an autonomous integration into the Republic of Indonesia in accordance with international law".[8] Its most important leader was the pro-Indonesian Guilherme Maria Goncalves, a *liurai* from the border area. Apodeti never had more than 300 members in 1974, whilst UDT and ASDT membership grew rapidly into the thousands.

General elections were held in summer 1975 and the Fretilin started with a majority vote to form a transitional government.[9] However, hostilities broke out between the Fretilin and UDT-Apodeti, the latter parties, forming an "anti-Communist" coalition which invited Indonesia's intervention, receiving support from Indonesian so-called volunteers. *Operasi Komodo,* a secret intelligence operation aimed at destroying the thriving independence movement, was launched in October 1974. *Komodo* operatives implanted rumours of a intended Fretilin coup and Fretilin was accused of being a communist movement. On 9 and 10 August 1975 UDT members demonstrated, calling for the banishment of communist from the country. A small civil war broke out and ended in favour of Fretilin. An Indonesian invasion now seemed imminent. In order to enhance their 24 November appeal to the UN Security Council for the withdrawal of Indonesian troops from Atabae, Fretilin administration proclaimed independence unilaterally. On 28 November 1975 it proclaimed the Democratic Republic of East Timor. Only a few days after the Dili declaration of independence, UDT-Apodeti, directed by BAKIN, signed a declaration of integration. On 7 December 1975, a few hours after an official visit by President Ford and Minister Kissinger to Jakarta was concluded,[10] the Indonesian army officially invaded East Timor.

During the attack on Dili, called *Operasi Seroja,* led by General Murdani and Colonel Dading, the *Brawijaya* and *Siliwangi* divisions from East and West Java acted in the most savage fashion.[11] The inhabitants of Dili were subjected to systematic killing, unprovoked violence and uncivilised pillaging. Some 80% of the male population of the capital had been killed by mid-January 1976.[12]
The Falantil, the army of Fretilin, had to retreat into the mountainous central region and embarked on a guerrilla war. Human rights violations like extra-judicial executions, disappearances, rape, political imprisonment were the vehicles of the Indonesian power to stifle the cry for freedom. According to Amnesty International more than 200.000 people have died on a total population of 700.000 between 1976 and 1986, as a result of war, hunger, forced migration, crop failure, and illnesses. Several foreign journalists were assassinated.[13]

The island was cut off from the rest of the world. The International Committee of the Red Cross and human rights organizations were not allowed to enter. Journalists had no access. News was confined to what the army chose to say, and the press was forced to print just that. Foreign press was seriously censured. Indonesians themselves were screened and denied permits arbitrarily. All East Timorese had to have a *surat jalan,* a travel-permit, if they wanted to visit their kin. Postal and telephone services were under tight control.

In 1989 East Timor was announced open to tourism and trade, but this in fact did not prove to be an improvement. Journalists had to travel under "guidance" of the army, human rights organizations did not get a permit. Demonstrations or other expressions of anti-Indonesian feelings (e.g. when the pope visited Dili in 1989) were dealt with as violently as before, and resulted in disappearances, executions, and imprisonment.

Integration of the Timorese into Indonesian society is, if desired, very difficult. Indonesian education is sparse, and from an economical and social point of view there are many aspects of discrimination. Those East Timorese who refused to accept the Indonesian nationality have lost all rights to their own land, because by the Agrarian Law of 1 June 1991 foreigners are not permitted to possess land on East Timor. The trade is concentrated in the hands of Indonesian officers and their dummies. Transmigration of Indonesian farmers and traders is highly advocated by the authorities.

The Resistance

The resistance has increased due to the cruelty of the Indonesian occupying forces. Since 1975 the feeling of "We are Maubere" has braced the Fretilin and Falintil both in numbers and in commitment. The word *Maubere* was originally used by one of the most impoverished hill-peoples, the Mambai, to denote friend. The Portuguese used the word to vilify the Timorese peasantry. Fretilin, however, turned the word into a symbol of what the movement stood for. The expression *mau bere* became a all-pervading refrain, a call for Timorese unity, for to be a *mau bere* was to be a son of Timor.[14]

The Catholic church has played an increasingly important role in contesting the cruelties inflicted on the people of East Timor by the Indonesian occupying forces. In the years following the invasion many priests retreated into Fretilin controlled areas and began denouncing Indonesian brutalities. The Timorese Martinho da Costa Lopes, installed in May 1977 as apostolic administrator, and other priests became increasingly influential. In 1982 the Indonesian Bishop's Conference began taking up the issue of East Timor. Under pressure of the Pro Nuncio in Jakarta, Costa Lopes retired in May 1983, and was replaced by Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo. Belo, however, almost immediately picked up the thread and gave a detailed criticism of the military oppression during *Operasi Persatuan*. This account was one of the reasons why a papal tour to Indonesia was revoked. The pope expressed the hope that the ethnic, political and cultural identity of the East Timorese would be respected. The Council of Priests in Dili subsequently produced a penetrating critique of the Indonesian occupation on New Year's Day 1985.[15]
In April 1986 the Vatican arranged a meeting between Belo and Xanana Gusmão, and the Pope repeated his hope for deference for the East Timorese ethnic, religious and cultural character in 1987.
In February 1989 Belo wrote a letter to the UN secretary-general Perez de Cuellar and the Portuguese president, describing the continuing human rights abuses and calling for a referendum. The Vatican responded by announcing that the Pope would visit Indonesia, including East Timor. On 12 October 1989 the Pope sanctified the cathedral in Dili and celebrated mass to some 100.000 people at Taci-Tolu, many others being prevented to attend by the military. He acknowledged the brutality of Indonesian's occupation, saying: "For many years you have experienced destruction and death... You have known what it means to be victims of hatred and struggle." Dozens of people started shouting independence slogans and calling out "Long live the pope." A hundred others carried banners saying "Fretilin greets the pope". The military intervened and the site of the mass was transformed into a battlefield, demonstrators being beaten and journalist being their cameras wrenched away.

The antagonism of the Catholic Church to the forcible Indonesian annexation can be viewed as part of a process of growing institutional disapproval. There was an increasingly larger number of social groups and political élites that delineated themselves primarily through their estrangement from the military project. This meant that there are fewer and fewer social institutions on which the military could count on to achieve annexation. One could hold the view that the military was compelled to a comprehensive resocialization of the East Timorese in order to construct a new social and economic framework for its military rule. This full-scale remodelling of the social structure tends to annihilate all traces of indigenous society and cultures.

The opposition has expanded to Timorese students and those who followed courses at universities on Java and Bali, disseminating information to Indonesian students. Hundreds of them signed a request for a referendum that Belo mentioned above. In the same year the first copies of the "Newspaper of National Resistance of the Students of East Timor" were sold illegally.

Early 1990 the ambassador of the United States had to witness a demonstration of hundreds of people outside his hotel. They carried slogans like "Independence or Death", "Integration: No and Never!" and "Indonesians out of our Country!" The ambassador allowed for a meeting with a delegation of the demonstrators, and spoke with them for some time, but as soon as he had left, the army intervened. An eye-witness: "When the ambassador's car was fifty meters away, riot police and soldiers charged into the demonstrators, beating them with batons and rifle buts. (...) (They) were clubbed and beaten into a human pile against the hotel's iron fence. Many were streaked with blood and obviously in shock." (Asia Watch, 1990:70) A number of persons arrested and wounded has never been made public.

Preamble to the Massacre

In the late seventies and early eighties frequent operations to extinguish the Falintil resistance were launched by the army. Chief-staff of the army General Benny Murdani repeatedly stated that the policy was to clean up the area from all Fretilin members. These encirclement and annihilation campaigns were called "Operation Clean-up" (1979), *Operasi Keamanan,* "Operation Security" (1981), *Operasi Kikis,* "Operation Clean-Sweep" (1983). One means to force the guerrillas to surrender was the *pagar betis,* a fence of legs, during *Operasi Keamanan,* forcing some 80.000 - at the most conservative estimate - East Timorese between 8 and 50 years old to act as a human shield between the Falintil and the Indonesian army. Hundreds of them were killed and innumerable others died of starvation. This remorseless attitude still is vigorous among the military.

After the operations, which had no significant results, the Indonesian military initiated negotiations for a ceasefire. On 23 March 1983 a ceasefire agreement was signed and a proposed Australian fact-finding delegation, led by Bill Morrison, was agreed to. This apparently beneficent gesture on the part of the military was occasioned by the Australian Labour Government anti-annexation policy. The Indonesian military severely limited the delegation's scope for investigation, with the result that Morrison concluded that Indonesian development "is for the people of East Timor"[16]. The delegation departed and on 17 August 1983 the ceasefire was broken and *Operasi Persatuan,* which was to continue till 1985, was launched upon.

During the late 1980s people were constantly being arrested and re-arrested. These arrests particularly occurred before, during and after President Soeharto's visit to Dili in November 1988 and the Pope's visit in 1989.

In an atmosphere of political rapprochement requested for by international fora such as the United Nations General Assembly, Indonesia admitted two Portuguese journalists to the area, and a visit of a group of parliamentarians was planned for November 1991. One of the journalists in the party's train was refused entrance and the Indonesian government deferred the whole visit. Disappointment was great among the East Timorese when eventually the Portuguese gave up their intention for the visit.

Unrest increased during October 1991. Potential demonstrators were arrested preventively, others sought refuge in consecrated churches and church yards. In the Motael Church In Dili some 20 Fretilin supporters were hiding during the night of 27-28 October 1991. The Indonesian army entered the church, thus breaching the consecration. During the confrontation that followed two Timorese youths were shot, Sebastio Gomes Rangel, and Alfonso Henriques. The others were taken into custody. In the days that followed many others were taken from their homes and hidings.

The Massacre of Santa Cruz

On 12 November 1991 a mass was celebrated to the commemoration of Sebastio Gomes and in closing the participants started a peaceful march to the cemetery of Santa Cruz. The demonstration grew to an estimated number of several thousands as they walked on, and people were carrying images of Xanana Gusmão, the leader of Fretilin, and cried nationalist slogans. They reached the cemetery after having marched through the city for about one kilometer without real violence. Two soldiers had become injured by accident. The army had been brought to the cemetery by armoured cars, and the soldiers attacked in an orderly disciplined way. According to eye-witnesses there was no warning prior to shooting at the people themselves. The demonstrators were enclosed by the cemetery walls and could not get away. The shooting lasted for one hour. The scene was one of absolute horror. Youngsters were attacked by fixed bayonets as well as by bullets. There was no attempt to disperse the demonstration or to arrest evident Fretilin supporters. The masses of young people were killed intentionally.

There are quite a few foreign eye-witnesses of the massacre. A journalist was able to make recordings on video. The Special Rapporteur on Torture of the United Nations Human Rights Commission (Dr. Pieter Kooijmans) was in Dili at the time but was not allowed to leave his hotel. Others gave horrendous reports.
Sources mentioned numbers of persons killed in hundreds rather than tens. Bodies have been taken away and never been seen again. The families have had no opportunity for identification or proper burial. Rumours have it that bodies have been thrown in the sea.

In 1994 evidence was shown in a video report that victims of the massacre who had been wounded, were transported to the Wira Husada Military Hospital and have been murdered by desinfectant pills and sheer violence. Journalist Max Stahl noted two eye-witness reports of East Timorese who were involved in this aftermath. Soldiers forced the hospital personnel to show the storing place of the poisonous pills, and administered those to the wounded. Other soldiers crushed skulls and limbs of the wounded in the mortuary with stones and rifles. One witness Stahl interviewed was himself a victim in the mortuary and managed to get away saying he was a police spy. An estimated 60 - 100 people would thus have died in the hospital. Other witnesses reported a second massacre occurring in the following week mainly of people having been arrested on 12 November. On 15 November 60 - 80 detainees would allegedly have been taken from their cells,

brought out of the city, executed and buried collectively. Two mass graves have been mentioned, but there has been no investigation into this incident.

The Indonesian Government repudiates both these allegations. International human rights organisations like Amnesty International and Asia Watch have been refused any access, so that rumours cannot be investigated independently. Organisations of Timorese exile-groups in Portugal speak of a total number of people killed 271, still missing 250 and wounded 382. The number of 271 stems from Timorese research rigorously cross-checked by the Lisbon-based human rights organisation Peace is possible in East Timor. The research lists the names and addresses of each one of the victims.
The army was quick in cleaning up any traces. Relatives have not been informed. Graves have not been indicated. Representatives of the International Committee of the Red Cross had no access to the hospital for a fortnight, because of the military clean up.
Accounts of eye-witnesses went around the world in English, Australian and US press-reports, journalists being there disguised as tourists in anticipation of the Portuguese parliamentarian visit. The video-reports caused a shock to the outside world and wide protests from abroad.

The Indonesian Response

General Try Sutrisno, at the time chief-staff of ABRI (now vice-president), said in a initial reaction to the foreign protests: "This scum must be eliminated (...) come what may, they cannot ignore ABRI (...) ABRI is determinated to eliminate anyone who creates disturbances." General Theo Syafei, commander of the army in East Timor said that it was right to shoot "those" people. The attitude of the army in the eighties with its complete negligence of human rights or even of human behaviour has not changed.

The foreign protests to the massacre made President Soeharto to establish a National Investigation Commission (KPN), consisting of 7 military and civil servants, led by General Prosecutor Djaelani. Particularly international outcry compelled Soeharto to do so, several donor countries having declared that the continuation of aid depended on a satisfactorily intensive investigation.

An initial report by the KPN stated that 19 people had died, but many - among them the Timorese governor Carrascalão - who had seen a truck full of dead bodies claimed that this was impossible. Carrascalão was the only official expressing his indignation, and he also announced his definite retirement when his term would come to a close (september 1992).
The second report of the KPN (26 December 1991) stated there had been 50 people killed, more than 91 wounded and only 18 unidentified graves. The report expressed criticism on the Indonesian troops ("A spontaneous reaction grew among the soldiers to defend themselves without an order to do so"). Asia Watch criticized the report saying that the criticism had not led to indepth and thorough

investigation. The inconsistencies in the investigation as such were only too evident.
On 13 April 1992 the ultimate report of the KPN was published, consisting of 45 pages, 60 video-tapes, photographs and audio-tapes with interviews. The report had no reassessment of numbers. The conditions that led to the massacre were caused by overreaction of the soldiers, not by unjust orders of the officers, nor by the policy of the central government, the regional administration of the military command.

A second investigation was perpetrated by the Military Honorary Council *(Dewan Kehormatan Nasional),* from January 2 till February 20 1992. This Council was chaired by the new chief-staff of the armed forces, General Edy Sudradjat. It concluded that 6 high military officers had to be transferred, three others were discharged but their names (Brig. Gen. R.S. Warouw, Gatot Purwanto and Binsor Arwan) have never been published officially. General Warouw was commander of the regional military command of the lesser Sunda islands, and he was replaced by General Theo Syafei. A tenth officer, Major General Sintong Panjaitan was temporarily discharged and replaced by General Herman Mantiri.
The impact of the Council report is not very clear. Minister of Interior, retired general Rudini said it aimed at an opportunity for the officers involved to explain their position before being charged.

A trial was held from 30 May until 5 June 1992 in which ten lower ranking soldiers were tried and convicted to imprisonment of up to 18 months for not obeying a command. The command was to report, not to shoot. Eleven officers have been punished disciplinarily with different punishments like transfer, discharge and dismissal. There have been no trials or charges which mention murder, execution or excessive violence. A follow-up report by ABRI (28 June 1992) stated that from those missing, initially 115, about 50 persons have been traced, but 66 remain missing.

Consequences of the Massacre in East Timor

Anxiety lingered on. The presence of the Indonesian military was not a new phenomenon, but now more menacing. The army entered the villages launching a new policy officially aimed at social development and housing facilities. This Territorial Operation (Opster) was supposed to render the East Timorese more Indonesian-minded and more supportive of the Indonesian attitudes. Youngsters were to become more susceptible to the Indonesian national colours Red-White. The objective was to drive those siding with Fretilin into the bushes, to prevent them from receiving any help from the outside world. The army present in the villages would be able to intercept food, munition and other support from villagers to either Fretilin or Falantil. This policy of a political rather than a military approach was effective. Fear for the omnipresent army caused a compliant attitude among the population. Several people who had fled into the bushes after the massacre were tracked down by the Opster-operation in the mountain villages. Although their actual fate remains unknown, they are supposed to be in detention.

In the second half of 1992 military commander General Theo Syafei declared that those willing to surrender would not be punished. He on the contrary promised protection and new housing. Many did actually surrender and several illegal organizations *(Ojectil, Fitur, Frente Clandestine, i.e.* one of the fronts of CNRM) were discontinued. The statement of Syafei only served as a window-dressing for foreign observers. Those who surrendered were brought to trial and punished.

East Timorese students who had presented petitions at the United Nations Office and the Japanese and Australian embassies in Jakarta on 19 December 1991 have been arrested and brought to trial. The scholarships of students in any other way connected with the massacre were abolished. The whole system of scholarships was modified to the effect that the student's views could not be disseminated to other Indonesian student movements.

During 1992 a lot of publicity was awarded to disbanding the operational troops in East Timor. Many official statements underscored the grip Indonesian administration had established on the area, no army being necessary any more to support it. However, it should be noted that no individual soldiers were transferred from East Timor back to Indonesia on account of their task being fullfilled: they just continued to be where they were but now in the context of the Opster-operation.

Governor Carrascalão retired in September 1992. He wrote a kind of self-critic titled *Daftar Dosa,* a List of Sins, for his successor, Abilio Soares. According to his opinion the economic policy has been a failure. It has caused social unrest and ultimately engendered the feelings leading to the massacre. He did not agree either with the measures against General Warouw and Panjaitan.
Still he proves an official holding conflicting opinions. Shortly before his resignation he appealed to Fretilin supporters to surrender, and on leaving he was awarded the Mahaputra-star, a decoration awarded especially to regional leaders succeeding in developing their province.

Soares is, like Carrascalão, a civil servant, but with close connections to the Indonesian military. He is a close friend of Col. Prabowo, who served for a long period of time in East Timor, and is a son-in-law of President Soeharto. He will continue stressing a political approach in keeping with policies as Opster. Development of the area and education are supposed to remove frustrations among the population.
At the same time transmigration of non-East Timorese to East Timor is stimulated by the central government, although this has proven another source for regionalistic feelings, like eg. in Irian Jaya, where many Papuans have become jobless. It may be a blessing in disguise that Javanese and other Indonesian transmigrants are not willing to migrate to the "unsafe" area of East Timor.

One year after the massacre commemorations were planned, but many were arrested preventively before November 12 and maltreated by the Indonesian military. As several Special Rapporteurs of the UN have stated, maltreatment in pre-trial and preventive detention is structural in Indonesia and East Timor. The

commemoration on the cemetery consisted of sprinkling flowers and was completely peaceful. An overview of the present situation was provided for by Mgr Belo. Integration seems not to be an issue anymore. "More freedom, not free from Indonesia, but free as citizens of this unified country." But also: "Continue to give attention to East Timor. If possible give it a wider or a special autonomy. This is because we are different in culture." Not all East Timorese will agree with him, but his statement, not receiving any response, attests civil courage.

Foreign Interest

The Portuguese involvement in the East Timor issue is self-evident, but other countries, such as e.g. Australia and the U.S., show a more than customary interest in East Timor as well. Since the early 1970's Australia has been conducting negotiations with Portugal about the large oil deposits in Timor sea, but proved unable to attain its goal. According to Australia negotiations concerning the exploitation of this area could be conducted with much more profit with Indonesia than with either Portugal or an independent Portuguese Timor. On account of this, Australia tends to support the integration. In December 1989 Australia and Indonesia reached an agreement as to the exploitation of oil and gas in the socalled Timor Gap. This agreement prevented the East Timorese from controlling their own natural resources, like gold, marble, manganese and oil. Furthermore, the deep channels of the Ombar Wetai straits situated north of Timor are of strategic importance to the U.S.

Australian and U.S. economic and strategic interests prevailed in delineating their attitude and certainly contributed to the lack of political willpower of the U.N. In December 1975 the U.S. provided guarantees as to their supply of arms. In addition to the U.S., Britain, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Malaysia either publicly or secretly provided Indonesia with both arms and political and financial aid. Using these weapons Indonesia was able to devastate hundreds of villages and thwart independence. By employing Fretilin to convince the world of the dangers of a communist government in East Timor, Indonesia acquired Western support for its pro-annexation policy. Only Portugal and its five former colonies in Africa brought out their vote in favour of an independent East Timor each year at the General Assembly's Resolution.

The East Timor issue did not provoke much reactions in Indonesia itself, due to rigorous censorship. On 19 December 1991, just after the Dili massacre, Australia and Indonesia signed a final agreement about the Timor Gap and 11 foreign oil companies - 6 Australian, 1 British-Dutch, 1 Japanese, 2 U.S. and 1 British - became parties to this treaty. Only four weeks later four companies were able to start their exploitation.

It is no surprise Australia, Japan and the U.S., nothwithstanding contradictions in the KPN report, showed themselves prepared to continue their development aid. A connection between oil and development aid seems obvious. Economic and

strategic interests seem to prevail above international law, righteousness and peace for the governments of these countries.[17]

Responses from Foreign Countries to the Dili Massacre

The activities of foreign journalist resulted in a world-wide protest against the Dili massacre. Departing from December 1991 a black list of foreign journalists has been drawn up and foreign journalist are being expelled under the cloak of espionage. Despite critical reactions, the negotiations of British Aerospace about 48 Hawk Jets and 39 German war-ships continued. Japan, the largest investor of capital, did not alter its policy at all.

The Netherlands initially abandoned their development aid programme, but in January 1992 the government eventually decided to spend 147 million guilders, because they felt Indonesia had reacted in an adequate way to the massacre.
Soeharto retorted that Indonesia did not appreciate foreign economic aid if this aid was bound up with domestic political issues and human rights abuses. This point of view was hammered out repeatedly by Alatas, the Indonesian minister of foreign affairs, when visiting the Netherlands in February 1992. Alatas has travelled all over the world explaining that the massacre was not wished for by the Indonesian government, and that the Indonesian commander of the armed forces, Try Sutrisno, had been charged with investigating the whereabouts of the missing persons. He also emphasized that both military (8) and civilian demonstrators (56) were tried. The relations between the Netherlands and Indonesia seemed to be restored, until Indonesia rejected Dutch development aid on 25 March 1992 and abolished the IGGI, headed by the Netherlands. Although Indonesia rejected the sum of 170 million guilders, amounting to 2% of their total aid, it nevertheless received a record number of aid funds.

Initially Australia condemned the Dili massacre. Indonesia reacted by stating that it could cope with a protest via the press, but that it felt the boycot of Garuda and navigation and pelting the Indonesian embassy with stones went too far. An Australian institute provided money for the Jakarta demonstration of 19 December. The Australian trade union organized boycots in harbors and airports and supported the foundation of a symbolic East Timorese embassy.
Australia seemed to support East Timor, but in reality the country opted in favor of integration due to economic interests. On 21 April 1992 Minister President Paul Keating provided a sum of 13 million dollars to restore normal relations. East Timor continued being a knotty affair for the relation between Indonesia and Australia. The rejection of an Australian governmental delegation to East Timor did not contribute to mutual understanding as well.

In 1992 Portugal tried to urge the E.E.C. to adopt a similar attitude as did the Netherlands in connecting political issues with foreign aid. So far only the Danes have followed this example, while the E.E.C. dismissed the issue as an Indonesian-Netherlands affair. The Portuguese request for a U.N. referendum was not met with. Departing from September 1992 Alatas and the Portuguese minister of

Foreign Affairs, Joao D. Pinheiro, are frequently negotiating. The talks directed under the guidance of Boutros-Ghali are meant to enhance the communication more than to actually surmount the difficulties. Portuguese journalists are still being refused to enter the country, due to fear concerning disturbance of peace.

The Indonesian fear was clearly on display when a Portuguese ship, carrying 60 students and 60 journalist from 25 countries, appeared to be on its way to Dili to show their distress by sprinkling flowers around the church yard Santa Cruz. Indonesia looked upon this event as a provocation with a political aim, as a mental terror. When the ship arrived in the waters of East Timor, it was stopped by a blockade of 6 war-ships and a fighter flying at low altitude. The vessel was forced to return to Darwin.

American senators were satisfied with regard to the attitude of the Indonesian government at the beginning of 1992. But in April two American senators were prevented entering East Timor, their visit supposed to be detrimental to peace and order. At the request of the House of Representatives - Tony Hall drew attention to the fact that the financial aid would go to the military which had killed unarmed civilians - president Bush in June suspended 2.3 million dollars of aid, meant for training and education of the Indonesian military. Ron Machtley and Tony Hall started preparing a proposal to the effect of withdrawing all aid and trade concessions to Indonesia, and they felt that the U.S. had to offer resistance against new loans from the World Bank (the new chairman of the former IGGI, now the CGI). Despite these efforts the CGI promised Indonesia 4.94 billion US dollars for 1992-1993, without even mentioning human rights abuses.

The first reactions of the U.N. regarding the massacre consisted of the announcement of sending a representative, Amos Wako. Indonesia would permit a representative, but would not admit "a special human rights reporter". Wako was accompanied by two representatives of human right organizations from Geneva and by two KPN-members. He met Mgr. Belo and Theo Syafei, visited the hospital Wira Husada and made the journey from the Motael church to the Santa Cruz cemetery. On Bali he had a meeting with Mantiri and in Jakarta with the KPN and the Attorney General, dealing with the lawsuits. Allegedly Wako's conclusion is that everything is in order on East Timor, but his report has not been made public. He travelled according to a set scheme, devised by the government, without leaving his bus.

Naturally quite a large number of statements have been made about the massacre, but the words of the British Lord Avebury, chairman of the Parliamentarians for East Timor (PET), in a letter to Boutros Ghali, is worthwhile quoting here:

> The evidence of eyewitness statements indicated that the massacre was a premeditated and well planned exercise, and that it must have been approved in the highest quarters.

By assigning a representative to East Timor Boutros Ghali confirmed the likeliness of Lord Avebury's statement. In September 1992 at the Jakarta Convention Soeharto agreed to put East Timor on the agenda of the U.N.

Trials - The First Wave after the Massacre

During the first half of 1992 publicity regarding East Timor trials abounded in the Indonesian press. These articles relate to various aspects of the East Timor issue. To give some examples, in early 1992 there was a dissemination of "secret" documents. Three persons were on trial on the accusation of giving "secret" documents to Mgr. Belo who forwarded them to foreign press. The documents related to an already public interview of governor Carrascalão, the Portuguese visit in november 1991, and the visit of an Australian football team. Sentences ranged from three to five years imprisonment. Mgr. Belo was not involved in the trial. In March 1992 the trials concerning the demonstrations protesting against the massacre. Arrests were made in Dili (37 Timorese students), Jakarta (22), Den Pasar, Bali (3) and Bandung (9). The students in Bandung have been released soon after arrest, but about those in Den Pasar no further information has been received. In Dili 13 students were on trial, four on subversion allegation, 9 because of the hate-speech articles. Twenty four others were publicly released in March 1992, but outside Dili forced to accept a "mental training" to become "perfect Indonesians". In Jakarta the twenty odd students were publicly released on 28 February 1992, but transported to Eastern Jakarta and rearrested. They still have to report regularly. Five of them were on trial for subversion and hate-speech. The sentences in the Dili trials were very harsh: six years to life-long imprisonment, those in Jakarta ranging from six months to ten years. Human rights organisations were denied access to the prisoners, and legal aid was insufficient. The inconsistent reports by the Indonesian government increased doubts as to the compliance to international standards of the trials.

The military trials stood in stark contrast with these civilian procedures: soldiers having neglected military orders were tried and sentenced to a maximum of 1 1/2 years imprisonment. The differences with sentences above mentioned being self-evident provoked much protest abroad. Over one hundred political trials were conducted in 1989 and 1990. It appeared justice remained up for sale. Security forces were able to engage in abusive practices that go virtually unpunished.[18]

Note on George Junus Aditjondro

George Junus Aditjondro is a lecturer in Environmental Impact Assessment and Social Movements at the Post-Graduate Programme in Development Studies, Satya Wacana Christian University (SWCU), Salatiga, Central Java.
He has followed developments in East Timor personally since 1974, both while working as a journalist for *Tempo* and subsequently as a university lecturer. He used information obtained during visits to East Timor, complemented by literature

about the island he has collected in Indonesia, in East Timor, in the U.S. during his periods of study there (1981-82, 1987-1989, 1991-1992) and in Lisbon, Portugal.

The text presented here is a compilation of the following articles written with a June 1994 update by Aditjondro:

1. *Prospects for Development in East Timor after the Capture of Xanana Gusmão.* A translation of a revised version of a paper presented by the author at a seminar on human rights and development in East Timor at Satya Wacana Christian University, Salatiga, Central Java, in November 1992. It has been censored by the university's scientific journal, *Kritis,* due to its critical stance. Eventually it was first published in a magazine of literature students of the Diponegoro University in Semarang, *Hayamwuruk,* no.1/vol.VIII, 1993. It was also published in a magazine of the economics students of Satya Wacana Christian University in Salatiga, *Dian Ekonomi,* first semester 1993/1994.

2. *From Memo to Tutuala, A Kaleidoscope of Environmental Problems in East Timor.* An introductory working paper given at a conference on the environment held by LPM - SWCU on SWCU campus 6th August 1993.

3. *In The Shadow of Mount Ramelau, Some Sketches of East Timorese Cultures.* A revised edition of a background paper for an Ethnology class on Irian Jaya and East Timorese cultures at the 24-th PIBBI at the Satya Wacana Christian University in Salatiga, 3-5 January 1994, specially updated for the first CIP at SWCU, January 9 - February 6, 1994.



A young East Timorese man carrying a pillar for his house
Jakarta Post, 22 November 1991

2. Introduction

There is a story about a rape trial. An old but still strong man was accused of raping a beautiful, gentle and much younger woman. The judge and the prosecutor were both men. In his defence, the accused denied that he had raped the woman. "She didn't protest at all, in fact she moved with me. She was enjoying it. And if she enjoyed it, it can't have been rape, can it?", argued this Arjuna. The judge declared the man innocent on the grounds that the woman had enjoyed having sex too. It had been no rape, but an act of mutual consent.

Luckily that was not the end of the story. The woman, convinced that she had indeed been the victim of a rape rather than a consenting partner, appealed to a higher court. This time she was defended by a lawyer from the LBH, and the presiding judge was a woman, who naturally had more understanding for the female point of view. During the retrial, which attracted crowds of mainly female spectators, it emerged that the woman had been gagged and her hands tied to the bed. Small wonder, then, that she had not been able to utter any protest. It was also discovered that the victim had struggled and writhed with pain, not pleasure, during the forced sex. In the end the rapist was jailed for five years, and the victim's honour was restored.

This story about the rape that was denied reminds us of the official Indonesian view on East Timor[19]. A small country, forced into union with its larger and older neighbour, is portrayed for years on end as having requested the unification itself. The union took place at gunpoint, so that UDT, the party which had struggled at first for the independence of the country, was eventually obliged to "request" unification. On the other hand Fretilin, the party which remained consistent in its support for rapid independence, was silenced by being dismissed as a "gang of security disruptors" and declared an illegal party.

The third leader of this party, the recently captured Jose Alexandre Gusmão, alias "Xanana", was subjected to character assassination by the Indonesian media calling him a "rat", a "common criminal", a chaser of Portuguese girls, and suchlike. His confession in front of Indonesian officials was broadcasted over and over again to all parts of the country on Indonesian state television news programmes, always to be reproduced by the printed media the following day. Meanwhile the trial which was supposed to establish Xanana's guilt - or innocence - was postponed for months after his capture.

Of course, the silencing of dissidence by means of press condemnation - in fact a sort of "trial by the press", or more precisely "trial by the authorities through the press" - is not new in Indonesia. When on 6 February 1989 Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo, the senior church leader in the former Portuguese colony, wrote to the UN secretary general requesting that the UN organise a referendum in the territory, he was instantly attacked from all quarters by the Indonesian mass media (see *Tempo,* 27 May 1989:14; *Panji Masyarakat,* 1-10 June 1989:16 and 11-20 September 1989:19). Even the semi-official magazine of the Roman Catholic church in

Indonesia, *Hidup,* joined in the attack on this priest's views *(Hidup,* 18 June 1989: 24-26).

Yet in reality, Bishop Belo's proposal was anything but new in the history of decolonisation in East Timor. Nor has it always been condemned by the politicians of the region itself, including those who (later) became pro-Indonesian. At one time a referendum to ascertain the will of the majority of the East Timorese population was demanded by all of the major political parties there, namely UDT, Fretilin, and Apodeti *(Topik,* 17 April 1975:16 and July 1975:11). Even when the UDT leaders fled to West Timor (in the Indonesian province of East Nusa Tenggara), their 17-point petition to President Soeharto still specified a referendum in East Timor within three years of integration as one of their preconditions for unification with Indonesia. In fact even at the time when the town of Dili was seized from Fretilin, a referendum continued to be discussed as an instrument for establishing the wishes of the population *(Tempo,* 13 December 1975:5).



A traditional house in Iralafai, Lautem
Merdeka, 5 December 1991

3. Various Settings of East Timorese Cultures

The objective of this chapter is to disseminate some knowledge I have gained about East Timorese cultures. Since I am myself not an expert but only a novice in this field, this chapter can only present some sketches of the incredible wealth of East Timorese cultures.

a. East Timorese and Indonesian Cultures: Distinct or Similar?

There seem to be two misconceptions I have often discovered in the way East Timorese cultures have been presented by other authors. Two radically opposite misconceptions color the literature about East Timor. The authors symphatizing with the independence of the East Timorese cultures, tend to underline the *uniqueness* of the East Timorese cultures. These cultures are claimed to be completely different from the Indonesian cultures, amongst which they take the Javanese culture to be the most representative symbol. E.g. in his defence plea before the Indonesian court in Dili, the most prominent leader of the Maubere resistance, Jose Alexandre Gusmão (Kay Rala Xanana), stated that only during the stone ages there were similarities between the cultures of the East Timorese people with some of the peoples of East Nusa Tenggara (NTT) province of Indonesia.

On the other hand, among pro-integration anthropologists and other social scientist who have studied East Timorese cultures, I have noticed some underestimation of the cultural resilience or the adaptiveness of the East Timorese cultures towards the various waves of domination with which they have had to cope. This underestimation is focused, a.o. at the role of Tetun (also: Tetum), the *lingua franca* of East Timor, and the role of the Catholic Church in this stillborn nation. This underestimation of the vitality of East Timorese cultures has been combined with a historical portrayal that in the former times the entire island was united by one powerful kingdom, namely the kingdom of Belu, with its seat in West Timor, from where it spread the Tetun language all over the island (see, e.g., Lapian and Abdurachman, 1980:12-114; and Neonbasu, 1992:20).

Budhisantoso, for instance, one of Indonesia's most prominent anthropologists, claims that Tetun is not an effective vehicle for spreading the Christian religion in East Timor (1980:7, footnote No.8). Certainly a groundless claim, because during the Portuguese era Tetun had not been used as the major language for Catholic religious purposes, although a Tetun catechism had already been produced by the church and the main prayers could already be recited by some of the Catholics in the rural interior in Tetun. After the Indonesian occupation, however, when Portuguese was forbidden and when the East Timorese Catholic church was not keen to adopt the Indonesian language as the major liturgical language, Tetun was adopted instead.[20]
And currently one can certainly observe the results of that policy: the total number of members of the Catholic church in East Timor has drastically increased from only 27.8% of the population in 1973 to 81.4% in 1989 (Neonbasu, 1992:76).

Both the misconception that the East Timorese cultures are completely distinct from Indonesian cultures as well as the misconception that the East Timorese cultures are just subcultures of Indonesia-based cultures seem to be ignorant of various lessons which history may teach us. Not all German-speaking peoples are happily united in one nation. Instead, they are spread over various nation-states, namely Germany, Austria and Switzerland. Similarly, not all the Malay-speaking people live in Malaysia. Instead, they are spread over Malaysia, Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Singapore as well as Thailand. And if we expand the Malay-speaking peoples with all the peoples in the world who speak several of the Malay-Polynesian - or Austronesian - languages, this cultural realm will cover even many more independent as well as stillborn nation-states.


Therefore, we should not omit the fact that there are various strong cultural similarities between the East and the West Timorese, some of whom speak the same Tetun language, originate from the same Belu or Tetun ethno-linguistic group and profess in the same Catholic faith. I certainly do not consider this a condition for them to merge into one nation-state, if the peoples of those parts of the Timor island do not wish to do so.

b. Ecological Diversity

The fallacy of overemphasizing the "distinctiveness" of East Timorese cultures as well as overly stressing the "similarity" of East Timorese cultures with other Indonesian cultures seems to leave us with no room to comprehend the East Timorese cultures in a more positive way. Yet, I do believe that there are certain keys to analyze the East Timorese cultures, and to relate them to the struggle still going on in the territory. Two of those so-called keys are the *ecological* and the *historical* settings of East Timor. The ecological setting has an influence over the *synchronic* changes, while the historical setting has affected the *diachronic* changes of the East Timorese cultures.

According to the Portuguese architect, Ruy Cinatti, East Timor - including the enclave of Oecussi - can be distinguished in three major ecosystems or biotopes, namely: first, *the mountains;* second, *the hills and plateaux;* and third, *the plains* (Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987:56-57). Obviously, those three different biotopes are not evenly distributed all over the island. The western and central part of East Timor is much more mountaineous than the eastern part, which is covered more by hills, plateaux and plains. Plains also are more abundant in the southern than the northern coast of the territory, which is covered more by tidal swamps abundant with mangrove forests. This ecological division has a hold on the population distribution of the island, which in turn effected the concentration of the indigenous population (see Map 1), and consequently, Portuguese colonization and land-use patterns.

Map 1. Population distribution in East Timor in 1950



Source: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987:28.

The western and central part of the territory, where the Ramelau mountain range was located and had the highest population density in the territory (up to 40 persons/km2 in 1950), became a place ideally suited for introducing coffee. The introduction of coffee brought along with it the two major large plantations systems into East Timor. The firstsystem consisted of large plantations controlled directly by state-owned companies, such as the 9.000 hectares coffee plantation in Fatubessi, Ermera, owned directly by SAPT (now having been taken over by the Indonesian company PT Salazar Coffee Plantations).

The second large plantation system are the *fazendas* owned by individual families, through whom the Portuguese colonial administration ruled East Timor. They consisted of families of the *liurai,* or chieftains, who were supportive of the colonial power, and families of the Portuguese radicals who were deported to East Timor. By awarding them those land favors, the Portuguese colonial administration "bribed" those *deportados* into supporting Portuguese rule in the territory. The *mesticos* who were the offsprings of those *deportados* became the second layer in the Portuguese colonial administration, together with the families of the faithful *liurai* and officials from the African territories[21] who were posted in East Timor[22]. They also enjoyed more educational opportunities in the ter-

ritory, in other Portuguese colonies, such as Macão, as well as in Portugal or other European countries.[23]

The eastern part of the territory, with its abundant hills, plateaux, plains and a much lower population density (up to 10 persons/km2 in 1950, with the exception of Bacau, which already had up to 40 persons/km2), became less attractive for the Portuguese rulers. With the exception of Viqueque, the population of the eastern part of the territory had also not been under the influence of the Tetun-speaking Belu kingdom (which contradicts the myth that the Belu kingdom ever united the whole island of Timor), and were also more rebellious to the Portuguese rulers and their Catholic faith. The people of Tutuala, for instance, the eastern-most settlement in East Timor, were christianized by the Salesian missionaries as recent as January 31, 1948 (Vasconcelos, 1922). In contrast, the first baptism of the Bunaq people - whose homelands covers the western part of East Timor and West Timor - already took place more than a century earlier, on July 19, 1875 (Bele, 1992:36).

c. East-West Division

The "east-west" differences among the Maubere people have given rise to popular names - and stereotypes that go with those names - for the two groups, namely *Firaco* for the Easterners and *Caladi*[24] for the Westerners of East Timor. The *Caladis* were stereotyped as being more "civilized" and hence more diplomatical than the *Firacos*, who were considered to be more "barbarian" and prefer to fight instead of to negotiate.

This stereotype still lasts until today, taking into account the fact that the former leaders of the independence movement who were *Caladis* - such as Francisco Xavier do Amaral - were too eager to surrender to and negotiate with the Indonesian forces, while *Firacos* - such as Kay Rala Xanana - have shown a much stronger fighting spirit. And even among the pro-integration leaders, such as the present governor, Jose Abilio Osorio-Soares, who can be categorized as a *Firaco* since he hails from Manatuto, which is also Xanana's home-district, also showed a tough fighting spirit in insisting that all future district heads *(bupati)* in East Timor should be native, civilian East Timorese. For months he has consistently resisted the wish of the Udayana army regional commander, Brig. Gen. Theo Syafei, to put military men from outside East Timor in some of the strategic *bupati* posts in the territory, such as Viqueque.[25]

As with any stereotype, the *Firaco-Caladi* characterization of the East Timorese, however, is also full of exceptions. Guilherme Goncalves, a *Caladi* native from Ermera, also showed a rebelious spirit of not always being eager to negotiate, when, as the second pro-Indonesian governor of East Timor, he openly criticized the coffee monopoly supported by the Indonesian army officers. He had also publicly criticized those officers in the 1980/1981 Old and New Year's party in the governor's residence for the atrocities committed against the Timorese people in the previous year. Consequently, in 1981 he was fired from the official governor's

residence after only two years in power, and in the following year his tenure was reduced from five to four years, under the pretext that he spoke Indonesian s badly. After withdrawing from East Timor as well as from politics to busines even his microbus company in Jakarta has been hindered by the Jakarta special territory government *(Fakta,* 1 June 1993:78-79).[26]

On the other hand, *Firaco* fighters such as Kay Rala Xanana have also shown sophisticated diplomatic skills. In 1988 he managed to reorganize the scattered resistance units into an umbrella organization, CNRM. The more conservative pro-independence party, UDT, was included in the CNRM coalition, together with FALINTIL, the former Fretilin army which had been transformed into a national army, after Xanana had returned his own Fretilin member card.

After making all those organizational changes, based on the resolutions of the first and second national conferences of Fretilin in the interior in 1981 and 1984, and endorsed by the formation of the UDT-Fretilin National Convergence in Portugal in 1986, Xanana showed further negotiation skills in dealing with so-called outsiders. First he negotiated with the Apostolic Administrator of Dili, Mgr. Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo,[27] to obtain the support of the curch for the independence struggle, and even negotiated for a cease fire with the Indonesian army commander of East Timor, Col. Purwanto. Unfortunately, that cease fire was pretty soon annulled by the Indonesian chief of the armed forces at the time, General Benny Murdani. Mgr. Belo himself, a native from Baucau, is another *Firaco* who has shown very sophisticated diplomatic skills and has continuously maintained a relatively independent stance for his diocese, though confronting Indonesian government and church authorities continuously urging him to publicly declare his support for integration.


Anyhow, this *Firaco-Caladi* characterization of the resistance's leadership is only a partial explanation for the resilience of the guerrilla war in the eastern tip, or *ponta leste.* Other factors, such as the terrain with its savannahs and hills, culminating in the Matebian mountain from where "mouse trails" allow the *guerrilleros* to slip into the three bordering districts - Lautem, Baucau, and Viqueque - plus the tacit support of *collegios* which silently took care of the wives, widows, children and orphans of the *guerrilleros* were also decisive in prolonging the independence war.

d. Variety of Architectural Styles

The ecological diversity of the territory, discussed above, has brought about seven major styles of vernacular architecture, namely (1) the Bobonaro style; (2) the Maubisse style; (3) the Baucau style; (4) the Lautem style; (5) the Viqueque style; (6) the Suai style and (7) the Oecussi style (see Map 2 and Table 1). These seven styles represent three quite distinct ecosystems or topographies. The first two, Bobonaro and Maubisse represent settlements in the mountainous regions. The next two, Baucau and Lautem, represent settlements in the upper plateaux, while the last three, Viqueque, Suai and Oecussi, represent settlements in the lowlands.


According to my opinion, those architectural styles are much more varied than in most of the Eastern Indonesian provinces. The Lautem, or more known as the "Lospalos style" reminds one of the *tongkonan*, the tall and beautifully decorated houses of the Toraja in the highlands of South Sulawesi. The Bobonaro and Maubisse styles are reminiscent of the *silimo* and other Central Range architectures in the New Guinea highlands (see Aditjondro, 1989:12). The Viqueque, Suai and Oecussi architectural styles of the East Timorese plains call to mind the houses of the Atoni in West Timor and other people of the plains in Eastern Indonesia. In other words, the architectural diversity of East Timor can be seen as a "micro-cosmos" of nearly the entire eastern part of the Indonesian archipelago, with glimpses of the Melanesian and Polynesian archipelagoes as well.

Map 2. Distribution of the seven major architectural styles in East Timor



Source: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987:56.

Table 1. The seven major architectural styles in East Timor



Source: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987:57.


The similarities of certain East Timorese architectural styles to those from other parts of the Indonesian archipelago, as well as to the Melanesian and Polynesian archipelagoes, relates to the unique historical setting of East Timor. Apart from the ecological ones other factors must have had a hold on shaping all those

different architectural styles. Among these other factors the historical ones seem to be the most influential.

e. Indigenous Population and Linguistic Diversity

What I mean by historical factors is the unique geographical setting of East Timor located at the crossroads of all the major Asia-Pacific migrations during pre-historical times as well as at the crossroads of all the major Western superpowers during modern times. As observed by Mendes Correia, the pre-historical migrations have imprinted the genes of four races among the indigenous population of East Timor, being (1) the Melanesoid race; (2) the Vedo-Australoid race; (3) the Proto-Malay race and (4) the youngest race in this region, the Deutero-Malay race (Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987:26).

Map 3. Racial distribution in East Timor, prior to the Indonesian occupation




Source: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987:26.

Before the Indonesian invasion, the distribution of those racial genes were as follows: 7.5% Melanesoids; 13% Vedo-Australoids; 19.3% Deutero-Malays and 60% Proto-Malays (see Map 3). This explains why one can see such a large diversity of types among the East Timorese peoples, ranging from the shorter, darker skinned and more Papuan looking highlanders from the western interior, to the taller, fairer skinned and more Polynesian looking lowlanders from the eastern part of the territory. This also explains the similarity between the Lospalos


architectural style with the Torajanese as well as Batak architectural styles, since the people who built those beautifully decorated houses in Lospalos were predominantly of the Proto-Malay stock, just like their Torajanese and Batak brothers and sisters.

Map 4. The legendary migration of the ancestors of the East Timorese



Source: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987:14.

Symbolic motives of crocodiles on the panel of a house




Source: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987:13.

Some of the migration routes of the East Timorese ancestors have been documented in the popular legends of the East Timorese, which traces their origin to Malacca, Macassar (now, Ujung Pandang) in South Sulawesi, as well as the island of Ceram in the Moluccas (see Map 4). One of the most popular myths ties up the origin of the island with a crocodile, who was actually a wanderer from Macassar, South Sulawesi. This myth, which has inspired many decorative patterns in East Timor (see the additional drawing after Map 4), is common to the East Timorese and the Atoni of West Timor (Cinatti, 1987:154-155; Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987:13).

Later on, due to the inclusion of East Timor in the Portuguese imperium, its status was raised during the last stage of Portuguese colonialism into an "overseas province". It has a similar status as the African colonies, among which a circulation of civil servants and military personnel was applied. As East Timorese began serving in Africa and Africans in East Timor, African blood began to circulate among the East Timorese people. Prior to that, European blood had begun to circulate in the East Timorese veins, due to the voluntary as well as compulsory settlement of Portuguese in the territory. In the meantime, Arab migrants from what is currently Yemen as well as Chinese migrants had also settled down in the territory in the past, attracted by the lucrative sandalwood trade.

Map 5. Linguistic Map of Timor



Source: Fundacão Oriente, 1989:167.

The Portuguese language, however, was only spoken among the assimilated élites in the townships of Dili and Baucau. The majority of the indigenous East Timorese people still spoke their vernacular languages about a decade ago. Besides leaving its physical imprints in the genes of the population, the various waves of migration also interacted with the geographical isolation of the various ecosystems in East Timor to create more than thirty vernacular languages, some of which can still be divided into several dialects (see Map 5 and Table 2).

Table 2. List of East Timorese vernacular languages

Name of language	Number of speakers, prior to 1975	Austronesian or Non-Austronesian language	Name of dialects
Tetun	220.000	Austronesian	Tetun Dili or Tetun Praca; Tetun Terik; Tetun Suai; Tetun Viqueque
Mambae	80.000	Austronesian	Mambae Ermera; Membae Letefoho; Mambae Maubisse; Mambae Hatu Builico
Makasai	60.000	Non-Austronesian	
Ema (Kemak)	59.000	Non-Austronesian	
Bunaq (=Marai)	50.000	Non-Austronesian	
Tukudede	45.000	Austronesian	
Galole	30.000	Austronesian	
Dagada (=Fataluku)	30.000	Non-Austronesian	
Baiqueno (=Atoni)	14.000	Austronesian	
Idate	?	Non-Austronesian	
Isui	?	?	
Lacalei	?	?	
Lolei	?	?	
Lovaia	?	?	Epulo, Macae, Lovaia
Habo	?	?	
Cairui	?	Austronesian	
Midiki	?	Non-Austronesian	
Naueti	?	Non-Austronesian	
Nai-damo	?	?	
Na Ine	?	?	

Name of language	Number of speakers, prior to 1975	Austronesian or Non-Austronesian language	Name of dialects
Na Nahee	?	?	
Osso-Moco	?	?	
Maku'a	?	?	
Maklere (=Maculere)	?	?	
Sahani	?	?	
Socolori	?	?	
Uai-Moa (=Waima'a)	?	?	
Ressuk (=Uho-Manguili?)	?	Austronesian	
Ranklung'u	?	Austronesian	
Rahessuk	?	Austronesian	


Sources: Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes, 1987:27; Vasconcelos, 1992; Fundacão Oriente, 1989:167; Duarte, 1984:11-20; Masinambouw, 1980:70-74; Suparlan, 1971:203-204.

As we can see from the map and the list above, the nine largest vernacular languages, in terms of numbers of speakers, are Tetun, Mambai, Makasai, Kemak (=Ema), Bunak, Tokodede, Galoli, Dagada (Fataluku), and Vaiqueno. Combined with all the smaller vernaculars, East Timor can be characterized by a much greater linguistic diversity than West Timor (see Map 6), where the main languages are Atoni (similar to Vaiqueno), Belu (similar to Tetun), Marae and Kemak (similar to the Bunak and Kemak languages in Bobonaro, East Timor), Helon (only on the island of Semau), and Rote (the language of Rote migrants on West Timor) (see Suparlan, 1971:204). So, out of those six major West Timorese languages,[28] four overlap with the thirty languages of the East Timorese.

East Timor's greater linguistic diversity also occurs in smaller parts of the territory, for instance on the island of Atauro, north of the Dili Bay. This island, treated as a "prison island" by the Portuguese as well as Indonesian rulers, shows a quite high linguistic diversity. The indigenous inhabitants of that island, amounting to only 5.180 people in 1915, speak three different languages. The Makili and Makdadi peoples inhabiting the southern part of the island, speak the Ressuk and Raklang'u languages, while the Beloi and Bikeli peoples speak the Rahessuk languages. It is still unclear whether those three languages should be treated as independent languages, or as creoles, since most of their vocabulary was derived from - or similar to - Malay, Tetun, Mambai, Galole and Cairui words (Duarte, 1984;11,15,19-20; Vasconcelos, 1992). Another area in East Timor with a high

linguistic diversity is Laga, in Baucau district, where people speak Nai-damo, Na Ine, Sahani, and Waima's (Vasconcelos, 1992; *Funcacão Oriente,* 1989:167).

Map 6. Linguistic map of West Timor



Source: Suparlan, 1971:204.

Finally, a note on the literacy rate and the popularization of the Tetun language in East Timor is called for. It cannot be claimed that the current literacy rate of 46 percent of the population is solely the result of education enjoyed in the period since "integration". Before the Indonesian education service became active in East Timor under the leadership of Jose Antonio da Costa, a priest who had also been involved in the foundation of Apodeti, Fretilin had already launched a literacy campaign in the villages of the East Timorese interior using methods invented by the Brazilian educationalist Paulo Freire.

Equipped with a simple reader entitled *Rai Timur rai ita niang* ("Timor, our country"), Antonio Cavarinho (now deceased) and his colleagues taught the Roman alphabet to the upland population using 50 of the most common words in the Tetun language (Taylor, 1991:35). So unless all those who benefited from the Fretilin literacy programme have now been killed, this presently banned political party must also have played a part in raising the literacy rate from the 2-7 percent

of the Portuguese colonial period to its present level *(Tempo,* 3 September 1988:22; Taylor, 1991:35).

The popularization of the Tetun language in the post-Portuguese time was initiated by Fretilin in 1974, and continued in the bushes until the 1976-1979 aerial bombing put an end to the widespread guerilla movement. Then, in the early 1980's, Tetun received a boost due to its adoption as the main liturgical language. And eventually, in 1990, to win the hearts and souls of the East Timorese, even the Indonesian government adopted a policy to teach Tetun officially in all the elementary schools in East Timor (Suprihanto, 1992:11). Thereby, Tetun may become not only a real *lingua franca,* but an official second language next to Bahasa Indonesia in East Timor, similar to the function of Javanese as an unofficial first language among the Javanese-speaking Indonesians. It is not clear what will happen to the linguistic diversity of East Timor. The popularization of Tetun, which is also the language of a part of the West Timorese people, might be a cultural strategy to make the integration of East Timor into Indonesia less painful, so that we can say that this linguistic strategy functions as a kind of "shock absorber".

In the meantime, while many vernacular languages were on the brink of extinction due to the popularization of Tetun, the Portuguese language was rising from the grave in which the Indonesian authorities had intended to bury it. Portuguese, in former times the language of oppression, has been transformed into the language of resistance. In spite of its abolition from the public and private schools, Portuguese is currently widely used in the clandestine communication networks between the resistance leaders and militants in East Timor and abroad.

4. Environmental Impacts of the Indonesian Invasion and Occupation

In the large amount of mass media articles praising the development achievements in East Timor, which are indeed far superior to those booked by the Portuguese over hundreds of years, we often find a serious lack of balance. The physical development achieved since "integration" is strongly emphasized, but the economic and non-economic losses caused by the war are not taken into consideration. The truth is that the impact of the war in East Timor has been very serious indeed.

In my opinion, there are five main environmental problems "plaguing" the land of Loro Sae. First, the environmental impact of the war that has been waged for the past 18 years to crush the liberation struggle there. Second, the impact of large tracts of land owned by old and new absentee owners/controllers of land. Third, the impact of the official transmigration programme and the flood of spontaneous migration from Indonesia following the era of the open war. Fourth, the impact of the programme of guided villages and the construction of houses by territorial battalions in East Timor. Fifth, the potential impact of the planned exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas in the Timor Gap. I will examine briefly these five environmental problems.

a. Human Casualties and Population Decline

One of the direct impacts of the war is the number of human casualties, on the Indonesian side, and to a far greater extent, on the side of the East Timorese people. From December 1975 to August 1976, 500 Indonesian soldiers were killed and 2.000 were seriously injured (Liddle, 1992:22). How many more Indonesian soldiers have died since then on the battlefields of East Timor is unclear. Xanana Gusmão, for instance, has estimated that between 25.000 and 30.000 Indonesian troops have died in East Timor *(Inside Indonesia,* December 1990:8).
We cannot know how accurate this estimate is. But regular reports in the media on the subject of war widows, and on orphanages for the children of those who died in *Operation Seroja* (see, for example, *Tempo,* 4 February 1978:8; *Sinar Harapan,* 16 Juni 1985), justify the conclusion that the number of young Indonesian men who have died in the war in East Timor is not small. The seriousness of the losses is acknowledged by high ranking ABRI officers themselves *(Tempo,* 2 February 1980:9; Jenkins 1987:24).

The number of casualties on the East Timor side is far in excess of this. According to U.S. political scientist J. William Liddle, sixty thousand men, women and children, or about ten per cent of the population of East Timor, were killed during the first two months of this terrible war either in the fighting or as a result of war-related deprivations (Liddle, 1992:22).

The death toll among the East Timorese quickly escalated during the succeeding years. M. Hadi Soesastro, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and Internatio-

nal Studies (CSIS) in Jakarta, has presented some rather less grim population statistics for East Timor (Table 3). According to Soesastro, an assumed population growth rate of 0.9 percent per year (as in 1970-1973) should have resulted in a total population of 667.100 for East Timor in 1980. In fact, the census of that year only recorded a population of 555.350 - a discrepancy of 112.000 people.

Table 3. Population change in East Timor, 1927-1986

Year	Population	Annual population growth (%)	Period
1927	451.604		
1936	436.996		
1948	420.430	- 0.3	(1927-1948)
1960	517.079	1.7	(1948-1960)
1970	609.477	1.7	(1960-1970)
1973	626.546	0.9	(1970-1973)
1980	555.350		
1986	640.820	2.4	(1980-1986)

Source: Soesastro, 1991:210.

Despite this, Hadi Soesastro believes it a mistake to interpret the figure of 112.000 as the total number of casualties of the war in East Timor. The accuracy of the Portuguese colonial census must be questioned, for instance, especially for those parts of East Timor often afflicted by hunger and disease. Additionally Soesastro estimates that "tens of thousands" of East Timorese fled as refugees after the collapse of Portuguese authority on the island.

This notion of "tens of thousands of East Timorese refugees", however, is itself questionable. According to an estimate made by the East Timorese refugee organisation *Comissão dos Refugiados de Timor Oriental* (CRT), in 1979 there were between 3.000 and 3.500 East Timorese refugees in Australia and about 2.200 more, half of them of Chinese descent, in Portugal (Aditjondro, 1981:6). Even according to an interview conducted by one of the newspapers which strongly supports the Indonesian government on the East Timor issue, the total number of East Timorese refugees in Portugal up to 1993 is about 4.000 *(Jawa Pos,* 9 March 1993).

However, apart from the difficulties of conducting censuses either in the Portuguese or the Indonesian periods, as well as apart from the question of the number of East Timorese abroad, several micro-studies have confirmed that the number of lives lost in the villages of the East Timorese interior was indeed extraordinarily high. The population of the unassimilated peoples - the so-called *gentios,* or "pagans" - has been drastically reduced. Or at least, considering the difficulties of carrying out a proper census in the midst of a war zone, it is safe to say that the livelihood of the unassimilated East Timorese, living mostly in the valleys of the

Ramelau mountain range in the interior of the Western part of the territory, has been most drastically effected. According to Alex Dirdja, an Indonesian Jesuit priest who was in East Timor in the month of March 1979, the Maubisse village in the district of Ainaro which had a population of 9.607 in 1976, had lost 5.021 inhabitants. The priest sometimes had to bury four people in a single day (Dirdja, 1979:23). He also reported that in the first three years of the war the population of the former Portuguese colony fell from 688.771 (in 1974) to 329.271 in October 1978 (Table 4).

Table 4. Population of Portuguese Timor in 1974 according to the diocese of Dili and in 1978 according to the military command of East Timor

Population Group based on religion	Total population 1974	Total population 1978
Catholics	220.314	225.417
Protestants	2.550	4.354
Confucians	5.660	no data available
Moslems	135	661
Gentios (Pagans)	460.112	68.839
Total	668.771	329.271

Source: Dirdja, 1979:22-23.

The death toll among the East Timorese quickly escalated during the succeeding years. During the first three years of the war, the population in the territory fell from 688.771 in 1974 to 329.271 in October 1978. What happened to the shortfall of 359.500 people? According to information obtained by this priest, about 4.000 people either went into exile in Portugal and Australia in 1975-1976. A large number of people were forced to flee or went voluntarily into the forests or went up into the mountains with Fretilin, as a result of which they could not be included in the army's census (Dirdja, 1979:23). Let us say for argument's sake that the number who followed Fretilin was about 50.000. That would mean that *at the beginning* of 1979 there were 300.000 "missing" Timorese.

The high death toll was not only paid by the non-Christianized highlanders in the western part of the island, but also by thousands of the indigenous peoples in the eastern point *(ponta leste)*, who fled with the guerillas to the Matebian mountain. Faithful to its name, "the abode of the death", Matebian became the silent witness when Indonesian counter-insurgence airplanes raided the mountain slopes with its fatal bombs, forcing the surviving guerilla fighters and villagers down to the lowlands of Baucau, into the resettlement camps in Laga. After the aerial bombing of Matebian, many more of the survivors died in the camps, if they were not executed by plunging them from the notorious Celicai river banks, the "second hell" *(segundo inferno)*, as the local people came to call that place.

Various ways of executing the survivors of aerial bombings were developed in the western part of the territory. One of them was plunging those suspected of

supporting the freedom movement over the cliffs of the Sarei river at Builico in the district of Ainaro.[29] Other ways consisted of plunging the suspects into the sea of Dili Bay, or overcrowding prisoners in barracks on the Atauro island with 40 to 80 inmates, covered with black canvas.[30]

The disastrous famine of 1979 was said to have rivalled its Cambodian and Biafran counterparts in severity. According to the Catholic Relief Service (CRS), a US humanitarian organisation, the total death rate in 150 settlements rose again at that time to 1.400 per month *(Famine Relief,* 1979:31). The large number of deaths among the refugees coming down from the mountains, which became the subject of a heated debate in the American Congress in 1981, forced the Indonesian government to open East Timor to humanitarian organisations like CRS and the International Red Cross.

b. Costs of Maintaining the Indonesian Army in East Timor

As we all know, the official version which has been - and had to be - disseminated by the Indonesian mass media since October 1975 is that only civilian Indonesian volunteers were asked to help anti-communist groups in East Timor to liberate the Portuguese colony from domination by Fretilin which was portrayed as an extreme communist group supported by elements in the Portuguese colonial army. The true facts have fortunately now begun to emerge for the Indonesian public in the Indonesian language. The weekly journal *Tempo* in its edition of 5 December 1992 published a documentary photograph on page 28 with the following caption: "ABRI troops landing in East Timor (1975)".[31]

The January 1993 issue of *Angkasa* published a report illustrated with colour photographs on pages 39 - 42 describing how Indonesia purchased 16 OV-10 Bronco counter-insurgency aircraft from the U.S. to destroy the Fretilin liberation movement (1976 to 1979). According to the journal, these aircraft are capable of carrying a variety of weapons, including napalm, which suggests that reports by foreign observers that have appeared the media about the use of napalm bombs in East Timor (see Taylor, 1991:204) are likely to be true.

Eleven months later *Angkasa* published an article of four pages (pp.39-42) on the Indonesian army's helicopter corps. Under the command of the former Colonel Sahala Radjagukguk, now Indonesian ambassador in India, this *Penerbad* corps was successful in burning out the "rats in their holes" in East Timor, using Bell 205 A-1 helicopters purchased from the U.S. in 1977, later complemented with Bolkow NBO-105 from the German company Messerschmidt-Bolkow-Blom, assembled in Bandung, Indonesia.

While *Angkasa* is mainly read by aircraft fans, information about the role of the Indonesian armed forces in the forced "integration" process also appeared in more widely read media and other Indonesian language literature.

Writing in *Travel Club,* an Indonesian language tourism magazine which one can find in Garuda and Merpati airplanes, a writer on tourism describes how Indonesian landing boats used during the "integration" period are left to rust on the Dili beach in front of the governor's office, as a "silent witness" of East Timor's history as well as a "reminder" for the East Timorese people (Maluw, 1994:22).

Nevertheless, the most candid and widely read information about the role of the Indonesian armed forces to enforce East Timor's "integration" into the Indonesian republic has been provided by the - now retired - General Benny Moerdani in his widely read biography (Pour, 1993:377-409). He describes the "liberation" of Dili and Baucau from 7 to 10 December 1975, involving paratroops from the 17th and 18th brigades of the special army troops, *Kostrad,* strengthened by the Indonesian navy *Marinir* brigades. Supported by Dading Kalbuadi, Moerdani himself landed in Dili on the second day of the operation. In this chapter, Moerdani also implicitly admits the fierceness of Falintil troops in defending their homeland, by stating that the *Kostrad* troops suffered the highest death toll among the Indonesian troops, losing 247 of their men during the five years of the *Seroja* operation, including 35 men during the first day of the operation.

Two sources I interviewed in East Timor, told me, without my even asking them, about a type of bomb that generated enough heat to melt the windows and glassware in the convent and that burnt human flesh. It is also likely that herbicides used as defoliants, such as *Agent Orange* used in Vietnam (Weisberg 1970; Galstone, 1971; Wilcox, 1989), were also used in East Timor, as foreign commentators have surmised (Human Rights, 1977: 63; Taylor, 1991:85). This was also confirmed by a participant at the Symposium recently held by Oporto University in Estoril.

During my recent visit to East Timor, I encountered a "silent witness" of the ferocity of the war in December 1975, the former complex of "Our Lady Fatima Seminary" *(Nossa Senhora de Fatima)* which was almost totally destroyed by bombardment from sea and land on 13 December 1975. The destruction of that seminary was reported in 1979 by Fr. Alex Dirdja S.J., an Indonesian Jesuit, in *Inter-Nos*, the in-house journal of the Indonesian Jesuits.

The cost of maintaining between 10.000 and 35.000 troops in East Timor at any one time is certainly not small either (Liddle, 1992:22). According to a report by minister of defence General Jusuf to a committee of the Indonesian parliament on 9 June 1978, routine armed forces expenditure in East Timor for the budgetary year 1977/1978 amounted to 30 billion rupiah, or about 2.25 million US dollars. In East Timorese terms this is a large sum. Economist M. Hadi Soesastro estimates that armed forces salaries and related military expenditure account for some 5-6 percent of the provincial GDP, or 25 percent of the government sector. Yet the military budget makes only a very small contribution to the East Timorese economy, because soldiers save part of their wages in term deposit accounts at government banks, to be withdrawn only when their service in East Timor is completed (Soesastro, 1991:214).

Apart from the high routine costs of maintaining military units in East Timor, the continuous modernisation of the military equipment has also led to considerable overseas debt. Since the beginning of the intensive involvement in East Timor at the end of 1975, the debt - often misleadingly called "aid" - on armaments has risen from year to year (Table 5).

Table 5. US "military aid" to the government of Indonesia, 1974-1976

Fiscal year	Type of programme: Military Assistance Programme (MAP) Grants (US$ 1000)	Type of programme: Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Credits (US$ 1000)
1974	9.765	148
1975	15.854	8.009
1976	14.448	4.120
Total	40.067	12.227

Source: *Human Rights,* 1977:64-75.

Apart from MAP and FMS there are also three other categories of "military aid" from the USA to Indonesia: EDA, IMET, and ESF. EDA, the Excess Defense Articles programme, involves the supply of "surplus" US weapons. IMET, the International Military Education and Training programme, provides officer training. ESF, the Economic Support Fund, supplies a special subsidy given to pro-American governments, including that of Indonesia (Klare and Anson, 1981:112). Table 6 provides a comparison in size between these three categories and the two categories of "military aid" to Indonesia hotly debated in the US Congress in March 1977, MAP and FMS.

Table 6. US "military aid" to the Indonesian government, 1950-1979

Category	Amount (US$ 1.000.000)
MAP Grants	194.7
FMS Credits	126.7
EDA	33.9
IMET	28.0
ESF	63.0
Total	446.3

Source: Klare and Anson, 1981:115.

The table to the left only shows "military aid" from the US that was actually realised up to the 1979 fiscal year. The total sum of FMS credit approved for the Indonesian government from 1955 to 1979 was even greater - US$ 212.463.000. Outside the FMS framework, the purely commercial purchase of US weapons from 1971 to 1979 exceeded 34 million dollars (Klare and Anson, 1981:120).

Table 7. "Military aid" and commercial weapons sales from the US to the Indonesian government, 1974-1983

Category	Amount (US$ 1.000.000)
MAP	78.288
FMS (approved)	340.279
IMET	21.778
Commercial sales programme	66.081
Total	506.426

Source: Tapol, 1983:104.

According to another source, the commercial purchase of US weapons in 1983 exceeded 66 million dollars (Table 7).This represents the debt and foreign currency expenditure for military purposes only in the US, in the beginning of the process of "integration" of East Timor.

Table 8. Australian "military aid" to the Indonesian government, 1972-1981

Fiscal year	Amount A$ (1.000)
1972-73	3.763
1973-74	5.108
1974-75	5.565
1975-76	6.259
1976-77	6.596
1977-78	7.209
1979-80	9.589
1980-81	11.935
Total	54.014

Source: Tapol, 1983:105.

Australia, a neighbour whose population is often thought to be sympathetic to Fretilin, has actually been another very consistent supplier of weapons to the Indonesian government (Table 8).

Even Israel, a country having no officially diplomatic relations with Indonesia because of Indonesian solidarity with the Palestinian national struggle, provided the Indonesian military with weapons. These include A-4 Skyhawk warplanes made in the USA and modified in Israel (Jenkins, 1987:28), and also Uzi machine guns wholly manufactured in Israel. Recently, the Indonesian Chief of the Armed Forces, General Feisal Tanjung, denied that Indonesia ever bought UZI guns or other wapons from Israel *(Jawa Pos,* 20 October 1993). However, a recent book about the OPM by an Irianese author shows that the West Papuan artist Arnold C. Ap. fled from the Jayapura prison with an Irianese policeman armed with an UZI (see Djopari, 1993:129).

All the debts Indonesia accumulated through military expenditure will have to be repaid by its grandchildren. If, that is, they are not killed first by American M-16 bullets, French rockets, and the like. Furthermore, all the foreign currency Indonesia used to buy weapons automatically implies a reduction of the amount to spend on humanitarian projects, such as, for instance, reducing infant mortality in West Nusa Tenggara, which is one of the highest in all of Indonesia. The present

priorities for the use of foreign loans and currency are higly questionable from a moral point of view.

c. Fall in Rice Production, Coffee Export and Live-stock

Another direct consequence of the war was the fall in rice production, in the number of cattle, in coffee output and other natural resources. The overall output of agricultural crops fell from 42.100 tons in 1973 to 12.600 tons in 1976. Rice production, in particular, fell during this period from 25.200 tonnes to 8.000 tonnes (Soesastro, 1991:210).

Table 9. Coffee exports from East Timor, 1973-1992

Year	Quantity exported (tonnes)
1973	5.584
1978	1.329
1979	2.510
1980	5.597
1981	3.547
1982	2.968
1983	4.600
1984	2.995
1985	3.195
1988	6.000
1989	10.000
1992	4.523
Total	52.848

Source: Soesastro, 1991:224; *Tempo,* 19 July 1988:34; *Kompas,* 27 December 1989; *Media Indonesia,* 5 January 1993.

At the same time the production and export of coffee, East Timor's main commercial crop, declined drastically (Table 9). According to Hadi Soesastro there were five reasons for this decline in coffee production. Firstly, many of the coffee plantations and other facilities were destroyed by the war. Secondly, plantation labour became increasingly scarce. Thirdly, restrictions were imposed on the mobility of the coffee harvesters, who had formerly been free to move from area to area according to the coffee harvest cycle. Fourthly, coffee price controls were introduced. And fifthly, for some time the International Coffee Organisation, which determines coffee export quotas for its member countries, did not recognise East Timor as part of Indonesia and consequently did not grant it an export quota (Soesastro, 1991:-210-212,223-227).

For the people of East Timor itself the restrictions on the movement of coffee harvesters, in addition to a coffee trading monopoly seriously depressing the price of this commodity, had very serious effects. Of these two factors the coffee purchase monopoly granted to the Village Unit Cooperatives (KUD), and the monopoly on inter-island coffee trade and export held by the company PT Denok Hernandez Indonesia, have drawn the most persistent complaints from the East Timorese population since 1977. The same complaints have also been voiced by a number of foreign journalists, by members of the Indonesian parliament, by pro-Indonesian East Timorese politicians, and by an East Timorese student at Satya Wacana Christian University, Paulo H. Ximenes *(The Age,* 15 March 1977; *Sinar Harapan,* 27-28 August 1979; *Tempo,* 3 November 1979:36, 3 September 1988:23; *Kompas,* 27 December 1989; *Suara Pembaruan,* 9 January 1990).

So while the Indonesian government claimed that it has pumped nine billions of *rupiah* into the physical development of East Timor, coffee farmers there have been losing billions of *rupiah* because of the discrepancy between coffee prices in East Timor and those in West Timor (part of the province of East Nusa Tenggara), where market prices for coffee have been up to three times higher than those determined by the KUD in the east. Shortly before East Timor was declared open at the end of 1988, the KUD in East Timor, for instance, paid Rp 1.200 per kilogram of Robusta coffee and Rp 1.500 per kilogram for the Arabica variety. The market price in Atambua, West Timor, by contrast, was Rp 4.000 per kilogram (*Tempo,* 3 September 1988:23). So, based on the balance of Rp 2.500 per kilogram not received by the East Timorese coffee farmers, they at least "subsidized" the occupation forces with Rp 132 billion. This total loss of income to East Timorese coffee growers as a result of this is seldom taken into consideration when the costs and benefits of development in East Timor since "integration" are being assessed.

Table 10. Livestock populations in number of animals in East Timor, 1976-1987.

Livestock type	1976	1980	1985	1987
Cattle	70.200	30.700	49.800	53.593
Buffalos	90.600	24.600	35.200	36.548
Horses	95.400	15.500	23.300	23.890
Goats	188.200	26.400	73.900	79.053
Sheep	27.700	11.200	27.500	28.309
Pigs	121.900	64.000	190.400	204.062
Poultry	724.500	218.800	417.900	453.204
Ducks	31.500	18.100	29.400	30.408

Source: Soesastro, 1991:212; *Hidup,* 27 November 1988:9.

After three years of open warfare only 5-10 percent of East Timor's prewar livestock was left (*Tempo,* 3 November 1979:35). Livestock can be plundered by troops who are able to take advantage of the unsupervised transport network run by the civilian administration. The extremely severe livestock crisis felt during the first few years after "integration" had a number of negative effects. In the first place, bearing in mind the fact that livestock, especially bullocks and cows, are used to till the land according to the *halai natar* system also found in West Timor, the yield from ricefields also fell. There are only a few places where it is possible for peasants to start tilling their land again; these are places where they are able to hire a tractor cheaply from a local non-governmental organisation such as the Etadep Foundation in the Loes River Valley on the boundary between the districts of Liquica, Ermera and Bobonaro and the Fatumaca College in the district of Baucau.

On the other hand, security disturbances in the Loes Valley have forced the peasants to change their past practice of letting their livestock graze freely in the

valley bed. Now they have to keep what livestock they still have in cowsheds near their village on the mountain slopes. This meant having to cut down a part of the forest to clear grazing plots for each family's livestock. This new method has led to serious erosion in the hills around the Loes Valley (Metzner and Rumawas, 1991:16-17).

For a general picture of how the numbers of different types of livestock in East Timor fell after "integration", see Table 10.

d. Socio-psychological Consequences

There have been many indirect consequences of the war in East Timor. One of the most important is the fostering of a culture of violence in the territory. This culture of violence reaching its zenith with the massacre of 271 young people at the Santa Cruz cemetery, Dili, on 12 November 1991, also fostered the "intel culture" in East Timor. This is the emergence of an appalling habit among East Timorese of spying on their compatriots, trying to solve the conflicts between them by making - often false - reports about the activities of their rivals to the Indonesian security forces in East Timor (Neonbasu, 1992:36,38).[32]

This culture of violence, or perhaps more correct, this culture of intimidation, has given birth to a new vocabulary in East Timor. Native East Timorese informants are nicknamed *bufo* (from the days of PIDE, the Portuguese secret police) or Mau'hu (a new term that has come into being during Indonesian rule). As a way of intimidating people opposing the government, a number of new expressions have been created which are strongly associated with the methods of execution and torture employed during the first five years of war in East Timor. These include expressions as *mandi laut* (bathing in the sea) in Dili, *(jalan-jalan) ke Jakarta Baru* (taking a trip to New Jakarta), *piknik ke Builico* (going on a picnic to Builico) in Ainaro, *menghinap di Hotel Flamboyan* (staying the night in Hotel Flamboyan) in Baucau, and others.

Besides the linguistic dimension, there is also a gender dimension to the culture of violence which unfortunately has not been taken up by activists defending the rights of women in Indonesia. As with armies of occupation everywhere, sexual harassment of native women by thousands of Indonesian soldiers has been unavoidable. In the course of my observations, I have noted two kinds of reactions from the local population to the sexual pressures from soldiers who are stationed there. Some simply succumb to the sexual desires of the incomers and resign themselves to becoming the "kept women" of the armed men who are bivouacked in their kampungs. Without intending to insinuate, I call this the "Viqueque model", named after the place where this kind of response has been reported.

However, in some places, the local women are rigorously protected by their traditional community. Any soldier who is attracted to a woman must first go through a traditional ceremony (for instance, paying a dowry that is fixed by the prospective in-law family) and go through the marriage ceremony in church before

being allowed to live with the woman of his choice. Any soldier who refuses to undergo these customs and the church ceremony is reported to his superior officer in Dili, some of whom have been willing to discipline their subordinates who played around with women. This happens particularly in the eastern sector (district of Lautem) and the central-eastern sector (Manatuto and Baucau) where the Falintil guerrilla forces[33] are still a force to be reckoned with by ABRI. This response, which I call the "Lospalos model" because I heard about it on my way from Lospalos to Tutuala, has occasionally been able to prevent the soldiers there from using local women for their sexual satisfaction.[34]

If one can really classify the sexual harassments in East Timor in these two models, and some of my informants have expressed their doubts, probably the Viqueque model is much more predominant. Let us take a recent case happening earlier this year. Adriana dos Reis, a young woman living in the village of Abafala in the subdistrict of Quelicai, Baucau, was kept for a while as the mistress of as commander of the Baucau army command *(Kodim)*. Eventually, she got pregnant and gave birth to a son. After this, the wife of the military officer came to join her husband in Baucau. Adriana and her baby had to return to the village.

However, harassment did not stop there. She was continuously threatened by the officer's men not to show her face and tell the officer's wife that she had been her husband's (forced) mistress. Eventually, to prevent the young woman from reporting the officer's misbehavior to his superiors in Dili, earlier this year Adriana was forced to sign a letter addressed to Governor Abilio, wherein she stated that she apologized for besmirching the officer's name, and admitted that she had "tempted" the officer into having sex with her. Fortunately, the letter was intercepted by Mgr. Belo, before it was sent to the governor. The bishop then went himself to the governor, to explain the background of the letter.

It is very important to underline the culture of violence in East Timor. I say this because some Indonesian intellectuals - among them, members of the academic staff at UKSW - actually believe that it will be easy to resolve conflicts over the exploitation of natural resources in East Timor simply by applying the provisions of the Law on Administration, the Law on the Environment and other Indonesian civic and military rules and regulations.

e. Miscellaneous Consequences

Another indirect consequence occurring in countries that have lost large numbers of their menfolk due to war is the increasing of the burdens born by the women. This is because they have had to take over as the head of the household and make a livelihood to cater for the family's basic needs, as well as taking on additional jobs, along with their children, for productive purposes outside the home (Nysliweg, 1988:10-12,52-53).

In the case of East Timor, school-children who have lost either one or both parents or their older brothers and sisters due to the war, often carry out various

jobs normally performed by adults in Indonesia. E.g. tarmacking road seems to be prevalent in the districts of Dili, Aileu, Lautem and Ambeno. Others go from house to house in Dili to sweep the gardens in return for money plus organic waste to feed their pigs at home. Some children work as housekeepers, *pembantu rumah tangga,* to be able to earn a place to live while going to school and studying at night under candle-light. While in Baucau, East Timor's second largest town, children often sell chicken and *kangkung* in the town's market, brought all the way from the villages outside Baucau, to enable them to pay for their own education and help to support their families as well. Although these children prefer to do all types of manual work instead of begging, many Indonesian civil servants distrust the war orphans, suspecting them of stealing clothes or other properties from the newcomers, when one allows them to work in their gardens and houses (Seran, 1989; Laksono and Fernandez, 1992-1993:24-25,30-35).

In recent years new forms of work have been introduced to the East Timorese teenagers. Initiated by *Yayasan Tiara Indonesia,* a foundation set-up by the first daughter of President Soeharto, Mrs. Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana *(Mbak Tutut),* East Timorese youths began to be send to work at industries in Java and Kalimantan in early 1991. Actually, these young recruits were offered to be send to the industrial development site of Batam Island, near Singapore, to work for salaries ranging from Rp 250.000 to Rp 300.000 per month, with additional attractions of being sent to various training facilities in Java before being sent to Batam. Hence, on 27 March 1991, the first wave of 132 East Timorese potential workers left Dili, followed by several more waves. Until October 1991, about 800 young East Timorese had already signed up to be employed through *Yayasan Tiara.*

However, Tiara's promises were rather empty. After arriving in Jakarta, many of them were first exposed to military training at the *Kopassus* training center in Cijantung, south of Jakarta, and then sent to work as ordinary manual labourers at various factories in Java, Bali and Kalimantan. The salaries they received were also very low, ranging from about Rp 10.000 monthly salaries at a plywood factory in South Kalimantan to Rp 40.000 monthly salaries at a textile factory in central Java, with reductions for lodging, accomodation and transport. In addition, they were also harassed, physically as well as psychologically, by Indonesian fellow workers, who accused them of "ingratitude" on account of their complaining.

At the Kanindotex factory in Bawen, south of Semarang, a fight with Indonesian workers lead the 75 East Timorese workers to protest to the Indonesian authorities, the Indonesian parliament, and Mgr. Belo, for the failure of *Yayasan Tiara Indonesia* to live up to its promises. However, after realizing that their protests were futile, only 42 East Timorese workers are still working at Kanindotex. Three of them are young East Timorese women who followed in their husbands' steps to join the factory's working force, while sixteen of the young Timorese men married local, Javanese women. In the meantime twenty former Kanindotex employees went home to East Timor, 18 moved to Jakarta, and one has moved to Yogyakarta to continue his studies.

Instead of taking the complaints of the East Timorese young workers seriously, the government continued to send more and more of their compatriots to work in Java. And ironically, after dropping out from their schools in East Timor, many of them also dropped out from the factories which employed them in Java. E.g., from the seventy East Timorese girls who had initially been recruited by the Sritex textile factory in Sukoharjo, north of the city of Solo, Central Java, only thirty have remained there. More than half of them have returned home on their own account. While those who remain earn a monthly salary of Rp 44.950.

Let us describe Sritex, since this is the first Indonesian industry to benefit from the Indonesia-Portugal "reconciliation" moves of Mbak Tutut and her industrialist colleagues in Portugal. On 14 February 1994, the first shipment of fifteen tons of cotton yarn from Sritex were cleared by the customs at the Port of Leixoes in Portugal. It was ordered by Manuel Joaquim Rodrigues Macedo, a Portuguese businessman who heads the Indonesia-Portuguese Friendship Association. The raw material was to be turned into cloth for making, among other things, shirts and sheets in Macedo's textile factory in Ermesindo *(Diario de Noticias,* 16 February 1994; *Pos Kupang,* 21 February 1994).

This shipment of Indonesian cotton-yarn immediately attracted the media's attention in Portugal. The shipment appeared to be a denial of the Portuguese government's appeal to Portuguese business people and comsumers to boycott Indonesian-made products. However, it is not only the Portuguese people and government who have something to say about Macedo's Indonesian business partner. In Indonesia this factory has also attracted the media's attention for other negative aspects. First, this factory was suspected by a critical parliamentarian, Sri Bintang Pamungkas, of having misused a large number of government bank credit *(Bernas* and *Jawa Pos,* 3 March 1994).

Then, after being inspected by members of the Indonesian parliament, it was found out that only one third of the 12.000 labourers were covered by the government's workers insurance *Astek.* Apart from this, there were still workers who received daily wages of Rp 1.600, far below Central Java's required minimum daily wage of Rp 2.600 *(Bernas* and *Surya,* 6 April 1994). And finally, Central Java governor Soewardi criticized Sritex for its poor waste control system and its lack of participation in alleviating the poverty of the surrounding communities *(Bernas* and *Kedaulatan Rakyat,* 17 May 1994).

This is the company-profile of Indonesia's first cotton-yarn exporter to Portugal and one of Indonesia's 100 largest conglomerates with 0.5 trillion worth of assets *(Economic & Business Review Indonesia,* 23 April 1994:11), which employs 30 young East Timorese women. Maybe other Indonesian firms will follow this company's example in trading with Portuguese firms.

In the meantime, the social environment in Java has not been so good for some of the victims of Mbak Tutut's recruitment scheme. So far, five of them have died in Java, as we can see in table 11. The causes of their death varies; two persons were killed by speeding vehicles, two others died from diseases which they may have

contracted in their workplaces, and one of them died mysteriously. With the exception of Alfredo da Costa, whose body was flown back to Dili on 2 September 1991, they were all buried in the nearest cemetery in Java. Their remains were not flown back to be buried in East Timor, in most of the cases based on the orders of the government.

Table 11. List of young East Timorese workers who have died in Java during the last four years

No.	Name	Age	Place of origin	Cause of death and other details
1.	Alfredo da Costa	25	Lospalos	Died after being hit by a vehicle on 31 August 1991 at 4:30 am, while jogging with two friends near the training center of the *Kopassus* paracommando unit in Cijantung, south of Jakarta
2.	Marcos Soares Fatima	21	Rei-laco, Ermera	Died from sickness on 17 September 1993. After being expelled from PT Warna Primadana, a lumber and furniture factory at the Nusantara industrial estate in North Jakarta, he was jobless for six months, until he was recruited by PT Ina Tai, another wood-based industry. He left an Indonesian wife, Lopian Gultom and their one month old baby, Rika
3.	Joao Castro	22	---	Died after being hit by a racing vehicle in Tegal, Central Java, on 25 September 1993. He was following a training course at the local Fishery High School
4.	Petrus Tomae	32	East Nusa Tenggara (Indonesia)	On 29 January 1994 his body was found on the banks of the Citeureup river in the district of Bogor, West Java, about 1 km from the Indocement factory where he had worked since 1991, and also about 1 km from his rented house. He had left the house mysteriously on the previous morning, after holding an informal meeting with three other East Timorese workers (Gabriel, Luis and Domingos) the night before. According to an autopsy by an Indonesian doctor, the dead man was found to have brain damage, a cracked skull and a broken bone in the nape of his neck. He left an Indonesian wife and their child
5.	Filomeno Gabriel dos Reis Amaral Lino	21	Viqueque	Died on 27 february 1994 from lung disease. It is unclear when and where he contracted that disease initially, because he has had a very varied working history after arriving in Jakarta in June 1991. First, he had to follow a 40-days disciplinary training at the *Kopassus* complex in Cijantung. Then his first job was work at a sand paper factory in Grogol, West Jakarta, which only lasted for four months. After being suspended from that factory, he got a new job as a security guard at Grand Hotel Menteng on Matraman Raya Avenue in East Jakarta, from where he was also expelled in August 1993. After that he was jobless for six months, until the Department of Labour placed hum at PT Gunung Indah in Grogol, West Jakarta

Sources: *Suara Timor Timur,* 11 March 1994; *Hidup,* 24-31 October 1993:15, 10 April 1994:12; *Tapol,* October 1991:20; other unpublished documents; interviews.

Petrus Tomae's case did attract some public attention. Petrus actually hails from East Nusa Tenggara, but since he had already lived for a long time in East Timor and had also joined the workforce employment scheme of *Yayasan Tiara* in Dili

and because he was also associated very closely with the East Timorese community in the region, his case was immediately picked up by the East Timorese Families' Association (IKTT - *Ikatan Keluarga Timor Timur).* The organization's leaders sent a letter to the company and the police asking them to investigate the circumstances of Tomae's death. Yet, on 24 February, as a result of the IKTT formal complaint, the 33 East Timorese workers at the factory were summoned by the company's director of personal affairs, Soepardjo, who told them to withdraw their complaint within 24 hours, or they themselves would be dismissed. Soepardjo also told the media that for the time being no East Timorese would be recruited by the factory but that local people would be recruited instead (See *East Timor - The Inside Story,* May-June 1994, quoting *Tapol; Suara Timor Timur,* 11 march 1994; interviews).

Another case of irregularity occurred in early 1994, when four young East Timorese men and one West Timorese man were detained by President Soeharto's palace guard for the death of one of the guard's commanders. A fifth East Timorese youth, who acknowledged his involvement in what turned out to be an accidental killing of an off-duty presidential guard officer, was in hiding. The incident had happened outside a gambling place in Tanah Abang, West Jakarta, where the six young men had been forced to work as bodyguards after going to Jakarta a year earlier on the unfulfilled promise of jobs of Mbak Tutut's *Tiara* foundation.

Until the time of writing this book, the five youths were still in detention and Luis was still a wanted person. According to one source, the detainees were held by the police, in co-operation with the Department of Labour. But according to another source they were detained by the special military unit for political affairs, *Bakostranasda,* in their interrogation centre on Jalan Kramat VII, Central Jakarta. The names of the detainees are Hercules of Ainaro, Duarte Freitas of Lospalos, Domingos of Ermera, Sales Maliana, and Lobo[35], who hails from East Nusa Tenggara (Indonesia). The East Timorese fugitive is Luis M. Lopes *(AFP,* 16 May 1994; interviews).

Many more conseqences of the war and occupation of East Timor have to be borne by the Indonesian people. On the national level, the budget needed by the armed forces to cover the costs of the war in East Timor has drastically reduced the state budget allocated to education and health (see Kuntjoro-Yakti and Simatupang, 1990). On the community level, communities living in the vicinity of army barracks must share in bearing the stress suffered by the troops that have just returned from East Timor. Besides, communities living near areas which are periodically used as training grounds and waters of the armed forces, also have to bear the burden of soil, air, and water pollution, or of being evicted from those areas. Also, to protect the reputation of General Dading Kalbuadi as commander of the Udayana division, which includes East Timor, a homocide carried out by his son, Gandhi Kalbuadi, was initially taken to court *(Detektip & Romantika,* 5 July 1982:12-13), but eventually solved out of court.

The Indonesian society must also subsidize the war and occupation by bearing the costs of the orphanages that care for the children of soldiers killed in East Timor (see, e.g., *Tempo,* 4 February 1978:8; *Sinar Harapan,* 16 June 1985; *Jawa Pos,* 4 November 1993), as well as the orphanages for children of the East Timorese killed in the war. Back in 1980, the Indonesian government already admitted that the war in East Timor had already resulted in thousands of widows and thousands of orphans, attributing these sad facts, however, to "Fretilin's indiscriminate killings". In Dili the Indonesian government set up a *Seroja* orphanage which accomodated 86 East Timorese orphans. Many other East Timorese orphans were sent to Java. E.g. at the *Kinderdorf* orphanage at Lembang, West Java, 25 East Timorese orphans were accomodated, at the Cibabad orphanage, also in West Java, six orphans were accomodated while nine others were expected at the Bandung orphanage, and at the Ungaran orphanage in Central Java, twenty more East Timorese orphans were accomodated (Information Division, Embassy of Indonesia, 1980:7). We do not yet know how many more East Timorese orphans have been created by the war and the Indonesian occupation of East Timor.

In addition, the Indonesian society must also subsidize the rehabilitation centres in Java accomodating some of the East Timorese war casualties. Back in 1980, 15 disabled East Timorese had been sent to rehabilitation centres in Ujungpandang, South Sulawesi, and Solo, Central Java. After treatment, training by using artificial limbs, and receiving vocational training, those disabled East Timorese were supposed to find their ouw sources of income and employment (Indormation Division, Embassy of Indonesia, 1980:7). However, until early last year, three of those East Timorese disabled persons, Nokurau, Duarte and Sinaldi were still stuck in a paraphlegia clinic in Solo, without any chance to return to their homeland *(Minggu Pagi,* third week of February 1993).

Finally, widows and children of the Indonesian soldiers who died in the war also subsidized the East Timor war and the Indonesian occupation by surviving without support from their husbands and parents. If the estimate is true that about twenty thousand Indonesian soldiers have died in the war, one can imagine the burden put on the twenty thousand Indonesian widows and about fourty thousand Indonesians orphans.

The families of the fallen soldiers receive a certain amount of money as compensation for their husbands' and fathers' service to their country. Every widow was entitled to receive Rp 3 million *uang duka* ("grieve money") plus the Rp 3.000 daily lumpsum called *uang lauk-pauk* ("money to buy extra food") earned by the husband during his period of service in East Timor. The children can receive a reduction of their school tuition, if they can get written statements from the village authorities that their fathers' sacrifices made them fall under the category of poor families. Occasionally, some of them receive some educational tools - such as computers and typewriters - from local military divisions during Armed Forces Day (5 October) or Heroes Day (10 November), as experienced by Timtim Yunita, a high school student living in an orphanage in Surabaya, whose father died in the *Seroja* operation in 1977 *(Jawa Pos,* 4 November 1993). And if they excell in

academic achievements, as "veteran's children" they are entitled to fellowships to study at the state universities.


The financial problems caused by the loss of their dear ones were still easy to cope with by the families, since the larger public - without their consent being asked - helped to subsidize those financial costs. However, some of the more psychological problems are difficult, if not impossible, to compensate. An important Javanese tradition which was difficult for the families of most of the fallen soldiers to carry out is the rite of visiting, cleaning and praying at the graves of their husbands and fathers during the Javanese month of *Ruwah* (the month of the spirits). Most of the "hero cemeteries" where the soldiers were buried are located in East Timor, which are too far and too expensive for those families to visit. So, in this sense the families of the fallen Indonesian soldiers experienced a similar fate as the families of the East Timorese buried in Santa Cruz. Although those families live very close to their deceased relatives, plain-clothed Indonesian soldiers hinder them to fulfill their need to pray at their relatives' graves.

Besides those who were instantly killed in the war, there have also been Indonesian soldiers who suffered mental stress[36] with fatal consequences.


Recently, the war in East Timor has not only demanded the sacrifice of professional Indonesian soldiers. Members of the student regiments have also died in East Timor. For instance, the commander of the student regiment of a private academy in Karanganyar, Central Java, was shot dead by local snipers together with another student and two professional military near Lospalos on 17 March 1993. This young man became the victim of too feverish Muslim proselytation in this predominantly Catholic country. To commemorate him, his campus has recently been renamed as the "Joko Witoyo campus" *(Kedaulatan Rakyat,* 18 August 1993).

Another indirect consequence, one that is most conspicuous in East Timor, is the discrimination as regards the construction of the infrastructure, particularly roads, bridges and harbours, in regions where armed conflict is still taking place, for instance in the eastern sectors of Baucau and Lautem. In the relatively more "peaceful" regions such as Ermera and Maliana and from the Maliana border region to Suai, the condition of the roads is deplorable and there are hardly any bridges for crossing the rivers.

These are, in brief, the primary, secondary and tertiary consequences of the war that has raged for the past 18 years in East Timor, at first in the form of open warfare, and more recently in what has become known as "low intensity conflict". At a time when environmental scientists have begun to pay special attention to the ecological consequences of war or *ecocide* in South East Asia and the Middle East, time is pressing for Indonesian academics to investigate the ecocide that is happening in Indonesia's own backyard, East Timor.



Children tow fish net along the coast of Dili
Jakarta Post, 22 November 1991



A farmer, and his horses stamping new harvested paddy
Jakarta Post, 22 November 1991

5. Political and Economic Impacts of the Indonesian Occupation

a. Impact of the Monopolization of Strategic Commodities

The next set of problems consists of the ownership of large tracts of land by just a handful of people. As so often happens in agrarian societies, a very lopsided pattern of land ownership gives rise to to a situation where the majority works as agricultural labourers or becomes small-scale peasants. This "forces" the majority of poor peasants to scratch out a living on mountain slopes to which no one claims ownership. This in turn results in erosion. How has this condition, inherited from the days of Portuguese colonialism, fared during the era of the Indonesian occupation?

First we need to understand the structure of land ownership in East Timor during the Portuguese colonial era, when vast tracts of land were in the hands of four main groups. First, there was the *mestico* group (from the mixed marriages between Portuguese and local inhabitants), the descendants of political activists who were exiled to Portugal's most easterly colony. One example is the 360 Ha *fazenda* (large plantation) owned by the Carrascalão family in the border region between Liquica and Ermera (see *Editor,* 28 September 1991:110). By giving them large tracts of land, Portuguese colonial government intended to dilute the radicalism of the *deportados* to prevent them from instigating local rebellions against Portugal.

The second group of large land-owners consisted of a number of kings or *liurai* who had served the Portuguese well. One example is the King of Atabe, Guilherme Maria Goncalves, one of the first chairmen of the pro-integration political party Apodeti. Besides these private land-owners there were state companies such as SAPT controlling thousands of hectares of land in East Timor (Guterres, 1991:56). Most of the land controlled by the Portuguese state companies were coffee plantations in the western sector (Liquica and Ermera)[37] and some coconut plantations in the east (Baucau and Lautem).

But the largest land-owning institution in East Timor was probably the Catholic Church. The lands on which the parish churches and the monasteries were situated, some with their own boarding-schools (*collegios*), were surrounded by large tracts of ricefields and plantations feeding the communities in the parishes and the *collegios*. During the Portuguese era, the ricefields owned by the *collegio* in Maliana were tilled by the students as part of their training and discipline.


The pattern of land ownership at the end of the Portuguese era was lopsided to such an extent that it is not surprising that the leaders of the UDT - most of whom were the offspring of *deportados*, plus six *liurai* - and the Apodeti were anti-Fretilin. Fretilin was victorious in the elections of village heads being held in the interior of the country in the second half of 1974. The party had campaigned on a political platform stressing the need for land reform (see Taylor, 1991:33). They

meant to redistribute the large land holdings in private hands as well as those in the hands of the Portuguese state companies. Fretilin even intended to distribute surplus land owned by the Catholic Church to landless peasants. This is why the leadership of the Catholic Church in Dili was initially anti-Fretilin.

It should be explained that this lopsided pattern of land ownership existed primarily in the western part of East Timor inhabited by clans of the *Caladi* tribe. They were the first to be pacified by the colonial troops, the priests and then by the political exiles from Portugal. The lower slopes of Mount Ramelau were also very suitable for the coffee plantations owned by the *mesticos*, the *liurai* and SAPT. The population farther to the east was mainly from the *Firaco* tribe where Portuguese influence was considerably weaker. The land here is nowhere near as fertile as in the west and was for the largest part owned by clans having far fewer *fazenda* than those in the west.

Now that the "open" war has ended and turned into a long-lasting guerrilla war, many highlanders and other villagers who had to live in the settlement camps in the lowlands have been allowed to return to their villages on the mountains, hills, and plains. Back home, however, life has not returned to normal.


Map 7. Sandalwood forests throughout East Timor



Source: BPN province East Timor.

After "integration" the large plantations hardly changed at all. The large pro-Indonesian land-owners who had not fled abroad were able to keep hold of their *fazendas*. Those *fazendas* that had been abandoned by their owners fell into the hands of a small group of East Timorese and Indonesians working for new rulers in Dili. Coffee, the main cash crop of the highlanders, has been monopolized by an army-backed company, PT Denok Hernandes Indonesia, since the beginning of the occupation. This monopoly has drastically reduced the income of the coffee farmers (see Lolly, 1993:57), with the exception of the old and new *fazenda* owners. The plantations in Liquica and Ermera formerly owned by SAPT were taken over by PT Salazar Coffee Plantations, a private company run by a group of businessmen enjoying the backing of the new rulers in Dili. In addition, a new group of landowners not in the coffee business, such as for instance the army-backed sandalwood oil-refining company, PT Scent Indonesia, has been granted concessions in all the sandalwood forests throughout East Timor (see Map 7). PT Marmer Timor Timur (East Timor Marble Co.) was granted the monopoly over all marble quarrying in East Timor (see Map 8).

Map 8. Mining sites throughout East Timor



Source: BPN province East Timor.

Some land re-distribution did occur in villages previously owned by one or two *mestico* families. This was carried out by the UKSW project in Vatuvou village, sub-district Maubara, district of Liquica, with the help of the National Land Agency (BPN) office in East Timor. But on the whole, absentee landownership by large-scale companies, in violation of the provisions and the spirit of the Land Reform Acts No. 5/1960 and No. 56/1962, has grown enormously under the Indonesian government. We can anticipate that conflicts regarding land questions will grow in number along with civil and criminal cases arising from these conflicts.

Moreover, PT Salazar Coffee Plantations monopolising coffee business, PT Scent Indonesia monopolising sandalwood-oil business and PT Marmer Timor Timur monopolising marble quarrying, are all subsidiaries of the PT Batara Indra Group. This holding company monopolising almost the entire economy of East Timor grew out of PT Denok Hernandes International which was set up by the three officers who commanded *Operation Seroja* - Benny Murdani, Dading Kalbuadi and Sahala Rajagukguk. They were helped by a two brothers of Chinese origin, Robby and Hendro Sumampouw,[38] to finance military operations in East Timor by monopolising the purchase and export of coffee from East Timor (Taylor, 1991:125-127) (See Table 12).



Market traders in western Dili
Jakarta Post, 22 November 1991

Table 12. List of PT Batara Indra Group (BIG)'s member companies

No.	Name of company	Line of business and other information
01	PT Denok Hernandes Indonesia	coffee trade; oldest BIG member, since this company arrived with the Indonesian troops in 1975
02	PT Salazar Coffee Plantations	took over SAPT coffee plantations in Ermera
03	PT Pelayaran Nedíak	sea-freight company
04	PT Batara Indra	initially established to manage the tourist and recreation activities of this group, it turned into BIG's holding company, which also imported various kinds of consumer goods to East Timor, from Indonesian cooking oil, sugar, wheat, and cement to Portuguese wines. The shipment of its merchandise to/from East Timor was handled mainly by PT Nedíak
05	Toko Marina	Dili's main department store, located in Colmera
06	PT Scent Indonesia	produces sandalwood oil, a basic material for perfumes, in its factory in Dili. It exports this commodity by air from Jakarta for US$ 150 per kg in 50 kg drums. This factory, the only one in East Timor, has invested Rp. 1.395.671.000 (the largest industrial investment in East Timor so far), employs 42 workers, produces 465 tons of sandalwood oil and waste sold for Rp. 497.088.000 (1990)
07	PT Marmer Alam Timor Timur	produces marble in Manatuto. In 1993 it was officially still a "project" and not yet declared to be a commercial operation since the marble produced was not yet profitable (its quality was considered to be lower than Tulungagung marble in East Java, and the transportation cost to Java was obviously much higher compared to marble from Java and Lampung, Southern Sumatra). So far, the East Timorse marble produced by this company has been exported to two sister corhpanies of BIG in Surabaya, shipped by Nedíak
08	PT Kerta Timurindo	set up in 1991 as a side project of BIG's sandalwood and marble production units and deals in marble and handicrafts and sandalwood statues, produced by 30 craftspersons in its factory near Comoro airport. Most of the craftspersons were recruited from Java. According to the Indonesian statistics, the two marble handicraft industries in Manatuto and Dili employed only 12 workers in 1990, producing 2.340 pieces of handicraft worth Rp 58.5 million with a total investment of Rp 9.3 million
09	Hotel Mahkota	largest, 92-rooms, 3-stories and most modern hotel in East Timor, located in the centre of Dili, adjacent to the old SAPT-building
10	New Resende Inn	22-rooms hotel in Dili
11	Bioskop Seroja	the only cinema in Dili, located at the former Sporting stadium, where the "integration" farce took place on 31 May 1976
12	PT Watu Besi Raya	contracted most of the civil engineering projects in East Timor, incl. roads, bridges, and the unfinished harbor of Com in Lautem
13	PT Gunung Kijang	contracted most of the minor civil engineering projects in East Timor
14	PT Konindo Timur	engineering consultancy

Source table 12: Taylor, 1991:125-127; *Timor Timur dalam Angka 1990;* Muller, 1991; *Tiara,* 12 September 1993; *Kompas,* 5 September 1993; *Jawa Pos,* 9 September 1993; *Suara Pembaruan,* 17 May 1993; interviews.

As we can see from table 12, the production of three major commodities, coffee, sandalwood and marble, has essentially been monopolized by this conglomerate. There is a trend to produce handicrafts from marble and out of sandalwood from waste-products from sandalwood oil production. According to one of my sources, some of the marble ashtrays sold on the roadside in Manatuto were made by East Javanese migrants. This will, or can, severely limit the working-scope for small farmers and craftsmen. Sandalwood and marble are actually strategic commodities for the indigenous rural people, because no sophisticated technology is needed to carve miniature Lospalos houses or rosaries from sandalwood, or ash trays from marble. Unfortunately, there are indications that the supply of sandalwood has been reduced drastically (see Tables 13 and 14). Meanwhile, Batara Indra personnel in charge of the sandalwood and marble businesses could not tell me whether they will be able to maintain their level of production with the total estimated marble available in East Timor (see Table 15).

Table 13. Production trend of sandalwood and sandalwood products in East Timor, from 1986/1987 till 1990/1991. (Total production in kg)

Product	1986/ 1987	1987/ 1988	1988/ 1989	1989/ 1990	1990/ 1991
Sandalwood	328.392	309.717	149.966	17.603	57.066
Sandalwood oil	0.300	--	7.500	8.000	2.700
Sandalwood powder	64.700	--	--	--	330.000

Source: *Timor Timur dalam Angka 1990:* 165.

Table 14. Export[39] trend of sandalwood products from East Timor from 1986 till 1990, total amount (tons)

Product	1986	1987	1988	1989	1990
Sandalwood oil	2.3	5.6	6.3	1.8	3.8
Sandalwood powder	109.7	200.4	75.0	57.0	40.0

Source: *Timor Timur dalam Angka 1990:* 205.

Table 15. The potentials of marble deposits in East Timor (thousands of m^3)

District	Estimated	Hypothetical
Ermera		
Atabae		1.500
Bobonaro		
Mt. Aben		
doDatoc		42.023.250
Mt Cailaco		6.103.125
Balibo		66.062
		48.212.437
Ainaro		
Desa Mulo		76.192
Mt. Qablaque		19.333
		95.525
Aileu		
Hato-ermera	501	
Coulau	253	
Riafuso	2.066	
	2.920	
Manufahi		
Mt. Caicassa in same subdistrict		2.949.421
Manatuto		
Hatada Hun	226.778	
Mt. Lilu	49.415	
Maholigaren	1.634	
Mt. Muoceun	79.190	
Mt. Curi	12.238	
	369.255	

Source: *Penelitian dan Inventarisasi Bahan Galian Logam, Bahan Galian Bukan Logam dan Geohidrologi Propinsi Timor Timur,* Yogyakarta: UPN "Veteran", 1992:7-8.

A subsidiary of PT Batara Indra Group, PT Watu Besi Raya, has been able to take hold of the lion's share of civil engineering projects in East Timor. The same group of companies also planned to invest in a sugarcane plantation and sugar-mill in the district of Lautem, but the plan was not realized due to unclear reasons.


Besides violating various articles of the Indonesian Agrarian Laws, the subsidiaries of the PT Batara Indra Group also proved capable of ignoring the provisions of the Law on the Environment, in particular the Presidential Decree on Environmental Impact Assessment (AMDAL).[40] There are no known measures to protect the sustainability of the sandalwood forests, the products of which are monopolised by PT Scent Indonesia. In less than a year after its operation, which officially began on 5 October 1979 (Indonesia's Armed Forces Day), PT Scent Indonesia had already savoured 1000 tons of sandelwood to produce 2 tons of sandalwood oil (see *Tempo*, 23 August 1980:19). It seems impossible to minimise the effects of quarrying marble monopolised by PT Marmer Timor Timur, nor to anticipate the ecological consequences of the sugarcane plantations and the sugar mills which were planned to be built by those companies in Lautem. It seems equally not possible to anticipate the ecological consequences of the new bypass-road being built by a member of the Batara Indra Group in Manatuto.

b. Impact of Transmigration Programme

While large-scale land ownership has gathered speed in East Timor, small landholdings are shifting out of the hands of native peasants. Fortunately, this is happening in one or two districts only, because transmigration projects are still on a restricted scale in East Timor (see Map 9), centred in the districts of Maliana and Kovalima. There are also a few transmigration sites in the districts of Baucau and Viqueque, set up on the initiative of the Indonesian Council of Churches and the East Java Christian Church (Taylor, 1991:124). But for the moment, let us concentrate our attention on Maliana and Kovalima.

The transmigration sites in these two districts have several features that distinguish them from the transmigration projects in Irian Jaya which several years ago attracted considerable international reaction (see Aditjondro, 1986). Unlike the transmigration projects in Irian Jaya or in Kalimantan, the transmigration locations in Kovalima and Maliana have not been "carved" with a great deal of effort out of what was formerly primary forest, secondary forest, savannah or marshlands. On the contrary, the transmigration locations in Bobonaro and Kovalima were "pulled out of a hat" from ricefields that were formerly owned by local inhabitants. That land only needed some dikes and irrigation water. The government was very willing to provide for this. Because, in contrast to the transmigration areas carved out of the tropical rainforests or savannah forests in Kalimantan and Irian Jaya, paddy fields *(sawah)* had already been a well-established tradition in many parts of East Timor. What is unique of the East Timorese paddy fields is that the farmers rotate the irrigated rice with grass. In this way they can also "harvest" their Timorese cattle on those rice-fields during the dry season in addition to harvesting their rice. During the dry sesaon, the cattle and the buffalos were used to trample the mud in the rice fields, instead of the buffalo-drawn plows[41] in Java and Bali.

Map 9. Transmigration sites in East Timor



Source: BPN province East Timor.

Unfortunately, the pacification war of 1975-1980 had killed most of the East Timorese cattle and buffalos (see Table 10), leaving many rice-fields idle. Thousands of hectares of such so-called "underutilized" rice field were awarded by the Indonesian government to the Balinese and Javanese "transmigrants",[42] without any compensation to the original land-owners, under the pretext of teaching the East Timorese better farming techniques. Hence, only in East Timor were the "transmigrants" officially called "pioneer farmers" *(petani teladan)*, a title never given before to proper Indonesian transmigrants. In one location in Bobonaro which includes the village of Memo, the ricefields were "acquired" from the local owners without a single cent being paid in compensation, according to the local peasants whom I interviewed. With not the slightest effort, the Balinese transmigrants were very quickly able to reproduce their ricefields, drainage systems and temples, while at the same time widening the gap between their level of prosperity, culture and religion and those of the local inhabitants.

There is another aspect of transmigration in East Timor that distinguishes it from transmigration in Irian Jaya. The transmigration sites in Merauke and Jayapura have not attracted much of a flow of migrants from Papua New Guinea. The

transmigration projects in Bobonaro and Kovalima on the contrary, so quickly turned into economic growth areas, greatly attracts spontaneous migrants from West Timor, particularly from the district of Belu. Almost every hour on my journey from Maliana, the capital of the district of Bobonaro, to Suai, the capital of Kovalima, I came across busloads or truckloads of passengers from Atambua, capital of Belu district. Since they are able to speak Tetun, which is their mother tongue, and adhere to the same religion as the majority of the people of East Timor, the migrants from Belu will soon intensify the struggle for land in the border region of East Timor, part of which is already controlled by transmigrants from Bali and East Java.[43]

The problem is where the peasants of the Tetun, Kemak and Bunak clans, the original inhabitants of the border region of East Timor, are supposed to go to. There is less and less land available at the foot of Mount Ramelau because the upper slopes have been taken over by coffee plantations and business activities of Bugis-Makassar traders dominating the markets along a north-south axis running from Dili to Same.

As for the lowland peasants living along the coast of Kovalima, they face a new challenge from economic activities to support the exploration and exploitation of oil and natural gas in the Timor Gap - which I will discuss below. But first, there is another environment problem which needs our attention, namely the re-settlement of inhabitants in the guided villages and the style of housing built by the territorial battalions in East Timor.

c. Impact of Programme of Guided Villages


The style of traditional housing in Lospalos from Portuguese times up to the Indonesian era has been regarded as "representative" of the region as a whole is in fact one of seven types of traditional architecture in East Timor as described earlier.

These seven traditional architectural styles are the result of inter-action over hundreds of years between the native inhabitants and their environment. The materials used for construction, the configuration of the kampungs and the characteristics of the architecture of each building in the kampungs fitted into their system of beliefs, social structure, the ecosystem within which they tilled the soil, hunted or secured their livelihoods in different fashions, as Cinatti, de Almeida and Mendes described in detail in their study (1987). It is therefore no coincidence that a region that is "only" 18.898 square kilometres (including the enclave, Oecussi, Atauro Island and Jaco Island) should have produced such a stunning variety of traditional architecture.

Today East Timor's traditional architecture has been slowly ravaged by the resettlement of populations from the interior of the country to the guided villages that are spread across a number of areas (see Map 10). These guided villages are the "inheritance" of the resettlement programme for the inhabitants leaving the

mountains along with the resettlement of Fretilin and Falintil guerrillas who surrendered or were captured in the late 1970s. This flood of people leaving the mountains was caused by intensive bombardment by the AURI squadron of OV-10 Broncos from 1976 - 1979. The bombing campaign was very effective indeed because the planes were able to carry out raids flying as low as 100 - 200 metres, unloading their napalm bombs that so terrified the guerrillas *(Angkasa*, January 1993:41-42).

Map 10. Transfer of population to guided villages



Source: BPN province East Timor.

Not only do the guided villages fail to use the traditional local architecture, they also have no surrounding plots of land to provide for the needs of a population suddenly exploded in size. This is the reason for the extraordinarily high death toll in those guided villages that can bear comparison with the tragedy in Biafra (Taylor, 1991:92,99).

After resettling the people who had come down from the mountains, the "aid" provided for constructing houses for the population continued flowing. This was an integral part of the aid from the territorial battalions which was intensified

during the time Brigadier-General Rudolf Warouw was commander of *Kolakops*. The *Operasi Teritorial* battalions in East Timor, in one of the government programmes drastically reducing the cultural diversity of the Maubere people, everywhere built standard, nuclear family houses along the main roads. These house-building activities disregarded the various traditional architectural styles discussed above. This programme failed to heed the cultural requirements of the native inhabitants, a culture that blended a variety of ecosystems and topographies. Like the uniforms worn by the soldiers building the houses, all the houses they built for the East Timorese people were exactly alike. This had nothing whatsoever to do with encouraging independent initiatives by the people and everything with building as many houses as possible within the shortest time possible. This violation of the traditional architectural patterns also violated the economic independence of the Maubere people, since living in standard rows of houses along the main roads took them farther and farther away from their swidden farms, their hunting grounds, and their customary forests. Most important of all, all the houses were built along the main roads so as to make it easier for the security forces to keep an eye on the population. For they are obliged to report any long-distance trip away from the Opster-built houses to the local military post, before and after coming back froms their subsistence trips. This surveillance aspect was clearly far more important than ensuring easy accessability of gardens and forest to the inhabitants.[44] As a result, in many places, the only useful thing that the infantry battalions did in their programme of "territorial guidance" has been the provision of water facilities. Many of the houses built are now left standing vacant.

Certainly, there have been some attempts by the Indonesian government to maintain the traditional architectural styles of the East Timorese. Those attempts, however, are more of symbolic and touristic nature. The only architectural style being promoted so far was the Lospalos style. This promotion occurred in certain places at that: in Madame Soeharto's Miniature Beautiful Indonesia Park *(Taman Mini Indonesia Indah)*, in the province's coat-of-arms, and in the village of Rasa in Lautem, where forty-four families were on display to be admired by the passing-by tourists (see Muller, 1991:269-271). In that sense, the Indonesian occupation has not changed the village of Rasa very much, since during the Portuguese time Rasa was already a show piece of excellent Lospalos craftsmanship. The major difference is that during those times Rasa was not the only showpiece of Lautem architecture. When the Portuguese architect Ruy Cinatti made his famous study of traditional East Timorese architecture, eight other villages were awarded the same dignity, namely Vero, Tchailoro, Loro, Poros, Muapitine, Pehe-Fito, Ira-Ara, and Vailana (see Cinatti, de Almeida, and Mendes, 1987:120-155).

d. Potential Impact of Exploration of Oil and Gas Resources

Now we come to the last environmental problem which is as yet still a potential problem, the impact of the drilling and distribution of oil and natural gas from the Timor Gap. The first offshore drilling began last December by the U.S. company USX Marathon Oil, a company with capital from Australia, Indonesia, Britain, Brazil and Egypt. Ten other companies are ready to follow in Marathon's foot-

steps, Royal Dutch Shell (Dutch/British), Chevron (U.S.), BHP Petroleum (Australia), Woodside Petroleum (Australia) and its subsidiary, Santos Ltd, Nippon Oil (Japan), Philips Petroleum (U.S.), Sagas Co (Australia), Petroz NL (Australia), Enterprise Oil plc (Britain) and Western Mining Co. These eleven companies are ready to sink 45 exploration oil-wells in a seismic area that extends across 52.100 square kilometres (*Publico*, 12 December 1991; *Cahaya Siang*, 3 October 1992; *Kompas*, 6 November 1992).

Various groups have reacted each in their own way to the current "Timor Gap fever". Portugal, still recognised by the UN as the administering power in East Timor, has summoned Australia to the World Court in The Hague (Nairn, 1991). In Australia, José Ramos-Horta, on behalf of the National Council of Maubere Resistance (CNRM) has summoned the Australian government to the Australian High Court. Meanwhile business circles in Australia and Kupang (Indonesia) are fighting hard for their respective regions and companies to become the supply base for the drilling of oil and natural gas. In the evenings the flashing lights of the oil platforms docked in Tenau harbour are clearly visible from the town of Kupang. During daytime there is a mad scramble to buy up the land of people living in Bobok district, near Tenau harbour, because the provincial government of Nusa Tenggara Timur is actively promoting the bid for Bolok to become the supply base for oil-drilling in the Timor Gap, as well as to build an industrial complex covering 1.600 hectares (*Pos Kupang*, 3 June 1993).

Meanwhile, things are still quiet in Suai, the capital of the district of Kovalima in East Timor. But beneath these calm waters, government circles and the East Timorese anticipate an oil boom from the Timor Gap. Three new bridges over the dried-up rivers leading into Suai seem to be ready for a new influx of heavy equipment. One local priest I interviewed expressed the fear that offshore oil-drilling would include drilling along the south coast of East Timor, which also has rich oil reserves (see Map 8). "When people dig for water-wells, they often find oil," he said. He is very much afraid that the land owned by the local inhabitants, much of which has been gradually taken over by the transmigrants and the spontaneous migrants, will now be taken over again for oil-drilling.

Perhaps no drilling for oil will occur along the south coast of East Timor even though oil-wells dating from the Portuguese era are still visible in Suai Loro. But, as in West Timor, in these southern coastal districts various economic activities to back up oil and natural gas drilling can be expected to emerge. Some people have already suggested that Suai be given a share in exploration activities for the Timor Gap by taking advantage of Holbells airfield, large enough for Transall C-160 and Hercules C-130 planes to land, to be used as a stepping-stone to Darwin in Australia (Wibowo, 1993).

Measures should be taken to anticipate the impact of exploration of oil and natural gas in the Timor Gap on the coastal environment in south East Timor in order to prevent local inhabitants from rebelling. For as long as they continue to be regarded as Indonesian citizens, they should have a veto on all economic activities that could conceivably be harmful or disruptive to their interests, in

conformity with the provisions of Point XX of the Law on Disturbances, 1926 (Salindeho, 1989:43-47).

Oil and natural gas exploration off the south coast of East Timor may also have harmful consequences for fishermen and others involved in maritime activities. It so happens that, as in West Timor, the waters off the south coast of East Timor are known as "the man's sea" (*Mar de Homem*) because of the huge waves that lash the shore, as compared to the Ombai Strait in the north which is known as the "the woman's sea" (*Mar de Mulher*). This is why these waters have never been attractive for East Timorese fishermen. But even so, there is always the danger of tanker accidents occurring or oil spills from tankers that sail through the Timor Sea, events that are routine in the Malaka Strait. Environmental activists in East Timor as well as in West Timor should already be anticipating such possibilities.



Traditional East Timorese troops in Iralere village, Viqueque
Jakarta Post, 22 November 1991



6. The Indonesian State versus the Catholic Church

The number of those professing themselves Roman Catholics has increased tremendously since the Indonesian occupation, from only 27.8% in 1973 to 81.4% in 1989 (Neonbasu, 1992:76).

Six factors contributed to the drastic increase of Catholics in East Timor:

(1) the religious policy of the Indonesian government forcing every citizen to adopt one of the five officially recognized religions (Islam, Protestantism, Catholicism, Hindu and Buddhism). Catholicism seemed the most attractive choice, since the other recognized religions were mostly the religions of the newcomers and non-East Timorese;
(2) the progressive stance taken by the Catholic church in East Timor, especially under the leadership of Martinho Lopes and Carlos Felipe Ximenes Belo, defending the universal human rights of the East Timorese people, including their right for self-determination;
(3) participation in the numerous religious activities of the Catholic church as the only way of associating freely and publicly in large numbers. The Indonesian authorities could not easily forbid these activities, due to their Pancasila principles;
(4) the iconography of the Catholic church, such as the crucifixes, Virgin Mary statues and *grottos,* and *via dolorosa* structures, substitued many of the indigenous forms of ancestor worship. These became difficult to carry out in the territory, since they might be labeled as Fretilin gatherings;
(5) the influx of Catholics from the dominantly Catholic regions of East Nusa Tenggara, especially the Tetun speaking Belunese in West Timor, who could easily travel by land to East Timor;
(6) the adoption of Tetun as the liturgical language to replace Portuguese, which has been abolished from public use in East Timor by the Indonesian government.

In spite of its position a religious majority in the territory, the Catholic church has to face several problems at the same time. First, she has to bring together both East Timorese and Indonesian Catholics residing in East Timor supporting integration with Indonesia as well as East Timorese still striving for an independent Timor Leste Republic. Secondly, with the increasing number of Indonesian Catholic laymen as well as religious persons residing temporarily or permanently in East Timor, different traditions of Catholicism have confronted each other. Thirdly, the East Timorese Catholic church for the first time in its history[45] has to face a dynamic religious pluralism, with the number of non-Catholics continuously on the rise (see Table 16) due to the influx of outsiders as well as due to conversion from other religions. Fourthly, the Catholic church, as the largest non-political force of the Maubere people, often has to confront the Indonesian authorities, especially Indonesian security forces.

Table 16. Followers of Various Religious Groups in East Timor from 1974 to 1990

Religion	1974	1990
Catholics	220.314	676.402
Protestants	2.550	20.660
Confucians	5.660	-------
Moslems	135	27.334
Gentios (Pagans)	46.112	-------
Hindu	-------	3.961
Buddhism	-------	841
Others	-------	18.607
Total	668.771	747.557

Source: Dirdja, 1979:22-23; *Bappeda Tk. I*, 1992:128.

While the first two problems - the political and theological/liturgical diversity among the Catholics - were still easy to cope with, the last two problems were much more of a headache to the Catholic church in East Timor. Many East Timorese Catholics, laymen as well as religious persons, looked upon those two problems as the two faces of the same coin. The rapid growth of non-Catholic religions - some enjoyed a fantastic growth of 110 to 400% in 1992 (Neonbasu, 1992:44) - was regarded as an indicator of the Indonesian domination over their homeland.

Maintaining the emerging antipathy of Catholics against the non-Catholics, however, is an unhealthy attitude. Because even in an independent East Timor, religious freedom - including the freedom to convert from one religion to another - would be a universal human right to be respected by that independent East Timorese nation-state. I do believe, however, that the reluctance against religious pluralism[46] in East Timor actually hides a deeper feeling, namely a feeling of insecurity among the indigenous East Timorese in the wake of the continuous influx of outsiders. In that sense, Catholicism is mainly an expression of their collective cultural identity.

In that sense, too, many East Timorese also were dissatisfied with the influx of fellow Catholics from the neighboring Indonesian province of East Nusa Tenggara, because that those "fellow Catholics" had been instrumental to delivering them into the hands of the Indonesian generals in 1975.[47] Those fellow Catholics, especially the Tetun-speaking Belunese from West Timor, were arriving daily by buses from Atambua,[48] and were also buying the land of the East Timorese in the border districts of Bobonaro and Covalima, just like the successful Javanese and Balinese immigrants. Hence, in the case of a referendum, those Tetun-speaking West Timorese could tilt the balance in favor of continuing the forced integration with Indonesia, so some of my East Timorese sources feared.

In the meantime, immigrants from South Sulawesi and other parts of Indonesia were also arriving every week in Dili in the three new Indonesian passenger ships, KM Kelimutu, KM Tatamailau and KM Dobonsoro.[49] They have certainly become a very decisive economic force in East Timor, with Buginese shops already lining the main road from Dili to Same across the Mambai highlands, selling all kinds of daily needs, from food and textiles to gasoline.

The increasing religious plurality has already caused tensions between the various groups, anxieties partially instigated by the local Indonesian authorities. For instance, in Hatu Builico, Hatu Udo and Ainaro, local policemen forced some children to convert to Protestantism. If they refused, they would be accused of being *kepala dua* (litt.: "double headed", a code for Fretilin symphatizers). In Suai, a member of the *Hansip,* the paramilitary force, was intimidated not to convert from Islam to his original religion, Catholicism, by accusing him of being a Fretilin member. He had to "rehabilitate" his name by bribing the local authorities with gold.

While Catholics were intimidated by non-Catholics, attacks on non-Catholics have also taken place. On one night, some clandestine high-school student activists removed the loudspeaker from the large mosque, built by Indonesia, in Kampung Alor, Dili, and buried it near the mosque. In Lospalos, Lautem, two *Menwa* or student regiment members from Java, who had declared publicly that they wanted to spread the Islamic religion all over the territory, were shot dead together with two Muslim Indonesian soldiers on 17 March 1993, near a military post outside the town of Lospalos (Aditjondro, 1993:6).

This brings us to the continuous confrontation between the Catholic church and the Indonesian state, an area where the theological position - and endurance - of the church leaders is constantly being tested. Interestingly enough, in this field a symbolic battle between the church and Indonesian state leaders has been waged during the last decade.

To claim its stake over the entire territory, the church leaders have boosted the construction of as many physical Catholic symbols - crucifixes, Virgin Mary Statues and *grottos,* and *via dolorosas* - on as many hills and mountains as possible. For instance, an Italian marble statue of Jesus Christ was erected on the top of the Matebian in a religious procession led by the acting Bishop of Dili, Mgr. Belo, during the annual Virgin Mary celebration on 13 October 1993.

On the other hand, the Indonesian security forces have confronted the symbolic challenge of the church through overt and covert means. The overt means included the construction of *integrasi* monuments in as many towns and villages as possible. One of such monuments was being constructed in the capital of Ainaro district in July 1993. Meanwhile, the covert means consisted of the attack on the Motael church, the oldest church in Dili, as well as the destruction of Virgin Mary statues in Dili and Bobonaro (see Table 17). In many of the latter incidents (destruction of Virgin Mary statues), the security apparatus produced interrogation reports which stated that those vandalistic and sacrilegeous acts were done

by parish activists carrying out the orders of their parish priests. Stories that no sane person in East Timor believed, including the provincial prosecutor, a Muslim who had been educated at Catholic schools.

Table 17. Destruction and/or humiliation of Catholic religious symbols in East Timor since 1975

Date	Place and object	Description of incidents
7-13 December 1975	Nossa Senhora de Fatima seminary in Dare, Dili	70% of the seminary building was destroyed by heavy sea and land bombing during the invasion
late 1975/ early 1976	Maliana church in Bobonaro	A wall hit by canon bullet during the invasion
Unrecorded	Virgin Mary statue at Lecidere, Dili, in front of the Bishop's residence	Coiling a dead snake around the neck of the statue
January 1987	Virgin Mary *grotto* in Comoro, Dili	Destruction of the Virgin Mary statue
27 February 1987	Virgin Mary *grotto* in Lahane, Dili	Destruction of the Virgin Mary statue
15 September 1991	Virgin Mary *grotto* in Malilait, Bobonaro	Destruction of the Virgin Mary statue
23 October 1991	Chapel in Lolotoi, Bobonaro	destruction of the tabernacle
28 October 1991	Motael church, Dili	Throwing of stones and shooting at the church
12 November 1991	Santa Cruz cemetery in Dili	Chapel and graves brazen by gun shots aimed at the mourners. Since the massacre, the cemetery has been heavily guarded by plain-clothed military men, prohibiting the families of the deceased to pray at the graves.

Source: Cardoso Gomes, 1992:8; da Silva, 1994:115; *Jakarta-Jakarta,* 13-19 November 1993:79-80; interviews and field observations.

While the humiliation of the physical religious symbols were only occurring "incidentally", one of the most persistent and widely supported issues of conflict between the Catholic church and the Indonesian state in East Timor (see Table 18) was family planning. Based on the *Humanae Vitae* encyclical, the acting Bishop strongly opposed the Indonesian government's "family planning"[50] programme, prohibiting all artificial contraceptives while only allowing natural methods. In this field, Mgr. Belo received unanimous support even from pro-Indonesian East Timorese leaders, including former governer Mario Carrascalão, who criticized the application of contraceptives on secondary school girls (see de Magalhaes, 1990:58). And with the latest trend in Indonesia's family planning programme in East Timor, where injectables - which can prevent pregnancy for up to six

months - and implants - which can prevent pregnancy for years - (see Table 19) were still very widely applied, this area of conflict between the Indonesian state and the East Timorese Catholic church may still continue to intensify in the years to come.

Table 18. Several areas/issues of conflict between the Diocese of Dili and the Indonesian state, apart from the humiliation and/or destruction of religious objects

Area/Issue	Date
Education Fr. Jose Antonio da Costa (now Vic. Gen. of the Diocese), as the first head of the Indonesian Education Service in East Timor, suggested to Jakarta to continue the reforms proposed by the East Timor Educational Reform Committee (CRET), which had been formed by the Portuguese and in which Fr. da Costa had been actively involved. Those proposals included a two-years vocational training programme for elementary school graduates who could not continue their studies. This suggestion was turned down, and the East Timorse had to follow the centralized curriculum of the Indonesian Department of Education.	1976
After having been opposed for a long time by the Diocese, the only Portuguese-language high-school, *Externato,* which still combined its Portuguese curriculum with some sections of the compulsory Indonesian curriculum, was closed, after the Indonesian security apparatus suspected many students of this school to be involved in the 12 November 1991 demonstration.	March 1992
Famine Relief In spite of her extensive network and good relationship with the East Timorese people, the Catholic church was detained from distributing famine relief received through government channels, since the local Indonesian army commander found that only the Indonesian government had the monopoly over the distribution of that relief. Hence, many parish priests and Catholic school principals had to purchase food and medicine for their parishioners and students in kiosks where a large portion of the relief donations were sold.	1977-1978
Violation of universal human rights In a pastoral letter, Mgr. Belo strongly critized the Indonesian security apparatus for violating the civil and political rights of East Timorese involved in a messianistic movement, *Yayasan Santo Antonius.*	5 December 1988
In a letter to the UN Secretary General, Mgr. Belo appealed for respect to the right of the East Timorese people for self-determination through a UN-supervised referendum.	6 February 1989
In response to the attack on the Motael church on 28 October 1991, which caused the death of Sebastião Gomes, and consequently the Santa Cruz massacre on 12 November, Mgr. Belo issued three pastoral letters (dated 2, 14 and 22 November), strongly criticizing the very biased media coverage of the Indonesian state-controlled media. To emphasize his protest, Mgr. Belo also refused to attend the Indonesian bishops' annual conference, where he has an observer's status.	November 1991

Church's land By applying the Indonesian agrarian law, the status of the church's land was changed from private property to rights to merely use it, which at any time could be withdrawn by the Indonesian state. This radical change, compared with the church's land priviliges under the Portuguese law, also raised strong objections from East Timorese lay leaders, incl. an East Timorese parliamentarian, Salvador Ximenes J. Soares, and former governor Mario Carrascalão, who raised the church's concerns to an Indonesian parliamentary mission to East Timor in July 1991.	1991
Family Planning In a pastoral letter, Mgr. Belo criticized the Indonesian government's family planning programme, which had already been zealously introduced in East Timor since 1980. He categorically labeled all unnatural contraceptive methods as being "illicit and illegal" from the canonical point of view. This opposition against the Indonesian government's FP programme has been strongly endorsed by the lay leaders of the diocese, incl. former governor Mario Carrascalão and former head of the provincial Population & Environment Bureau, Tito Baptista.	May 1986 until today
Manipulation of cultural and religious ceremonies A series of "blood oath" ceremonies were engineered by the security apparatus in Soibada (Manatuto), Baucau, Aileu, and Ainaro, to show the outside world that Fretilin supporters had already dropped their quest for independence and had became good Indonesian citizens as well as "good Catholics". In Soibada, 47 persons had to join the fabricated ritual on December 11. A week later, 397 persons had to join a similar ritual in the capital of Ainaro district. These people were rounded up from the subdistrict of Ainaro (about 200 persons), Maubisse (about 126 persons), Hatu Builico (about 60 persons), and the rest were Hatu Udu. All those persons - or their parents - were suspected of being clandestine resistence activists. Small samples of their blood were taken and mixed with the blood of 8 cocks and 6 bottles of whiskey. They had to drink that mixture, and pledge loyalty to the Indonesian flag, and finally have a collective meal with the local parish priest in the church. The priest objected to this ritual, which was against the East Timorese tradition, in which both the conflicting parties had to drink each other's blood. It was also against the Catholic tradition, since with Christ's death on the cross, no more blood need to be shed by all human beings. So, the priest left the town, and a mere assistant was to "bless" the strange ritual. The young man resisted by opening and closing the Holy Father prayer without making the sign of the Catholic cross. However, in the Indonesian news media, the entire ritual was presented as if they were genuine. After Mgr. Belo received reports from the parish priests in all those places about their forced participation in those strange rituals, he filed a strong protest against the local Indonesian military commander, Theo Syafei. Hence, further "blood oaths" were stopped. Nevertheless, in Suai, another strange ritual had still been carried out. There an Indonesian flag was soaked in ordinary water, and that water was forced to be drunk by those who were suspected of being clandestine activists.	December 1992

Sources table 18: *Editor,* 30 November 1991:20; *Hidup,* 1 June 1986:35-36, 2 April 1989:32-33,45, 8 January 1989:24-26, 15 December 1991:20-22; *Jakarta Post,* 30 March 1992; *Jawa Pos,* 19 December 1992; *Kompas,* 14 December 1992; *Panji Masyarakat,* 1-10 June 1989:16; *Suara Pembaruan,* 1 August 1991, 22 December 1992; *Suara Merdeka,* 26-27 December 1992; *Tempo,* 27 May 1989:14; Dirdja, 1979:27; interviews.

Table 19. New Acceptors and the Contraceptive Techniques applied at "Family Planning" Clinics in East Timor in 1990/1991


Rank	new acceptors	Technique used	Percentage
01	5.105	Injectables	65.52
02	1.127	Pills	14.46
03	698	IUD	8.95
04	637	Implant	8.17
05	147	Condoms	1.88
06	77	Female and male sterilization	0.98
Total	7.791		100

Source: *Timor Timur dalam Angka 1990:* 108.

As in the case of resistance against religious pluralism the issue was not simply a blind fidelity to a Papal encyclical. Nor was it mainly a matter of protecting the right of the women of East Timor to make their own reproductive choices. According to my opinion, what was at stake was the East Timorese women living up to a "patriotic duty". They wanted to bear as many babies as possible to make up for the tremendous losses of lives during the Indonesian occupation, in order to make te survival of the East Timorese people feasible.

In other words, what was at stake was the survival of the East Timorese in their own homeland, especially in response to the challenge of the increasing influx of Indonesian immigrants. The massacre at Santa Cruz, where 271 young people died, 250 were missing, and 382 were wounded and hospitalized (Peace is Possible, 1992), made this question of survival even more urgent.

What has not been discussed in this matter, however, is how to distribute in a balanced way the burden of child-bearing and child-rearing more equally among the different genders. Because in addition to food-preparation and cloth-weaving in traditional East Timorese society, child-bearing and child-rearing activities are more of a concern to women more than to men, (see *Fundacão Oriental,* 1989). So, while agreeing that opposing a genocidal policy is certainly a political virtue, one still has to think about who has to bear the personal consequences of such a political strategy.



An afternoon Sunday mass at the Dili cathedral
Jakarta Post, 22 November 1991



Regular face to face communication in Iralafai, Los Palos
Jakarta Post, 22 November 1991

7. Comparison of East Timor's Social and Economic Conditions with six other former Portuguese Colonies

The comparisons made in the media between physical development in East Timor during the Indonesian and Portuguese periods are deceptive. This is because the condition of this former Portuguese colony now forced into union with Indonesia is not compared with that of other former Portuguese colonies which are now independent, so that the reader is not informed about the golden opportunity which was missed - or has yet to be seized.

If we compare the socio-economic condition of East Timor with that of former Portuguese colonies which are now independent states (Table 20), we see that the condition of those not bordering upon aggressive and expansionistic neighbours is far better than that of East Timor.

Table 20. Economic and social indicators for 6 former Portuguese colonies in 1989

State/ region	GNP per capita (US$)	Average literacy rate (%)	Life expectancy	Infant mortality (per 1000 births)	Number of inhabitants for every doctor
East Timor	80 (1988)	46 (1988)	55.3 (1990)	93 (1985)	5.217 (1990)
Formerly Portuguese island states off the coast of Africa (figures 1989):					
Cabo verde	310	38.6	65.6	42.0	5.283
Sao Tome e principe	410	67.0	65.8	44.9	1.988
Formerly Portuguese states on the African mainland (figures 1989):					
Mozambique	80	38	48.6	137.5	37.955
Angola	610	41.0	45	132.7	17.786
Guinea-Bissau	190	31.4	39.8	141.4	7.262

Sources: (1) *Pemerintah Daerah Tingkat I Timor Timur,* 1986:65; (2) *Tempo,* 3 September 1988:22; *idem,* 23 November 1991:31; (3) *Hidup,* 27 November 1988:9; (4) World Bank, 1991:8-9,54-55,128-129,144-145,212-213,268-269; (5) *Siregar,* 1991: 43; (6) *Bappeda Tingkat I Timor Timur,* 1992:95,303,305; (7) Dandoon, 1989; (8) Torp, Denny and Ray, 1989.

Note, for example, the socio-economic situation of Cabo Verde having a population of only 339.000, and Sao Tome e Principe with just 125.000 souls. These two island republics have higher per capita incomes than those of East Timor. Their

literacy rates are also higher than in East Timor and they have far more doctors in proportion to their populations as well.

These realities shake the myth, promoted since the beginning of the decolonisation process in East Timor, that one half of such a small island would not be capable of standing on its own as an independent state. This myth was used to legitimate the campaign integrating East Timor into the territory of the Indonesian Republic. Sixteen years later, the same myth is still being upheld by an observer of East Timor from CSIS, Hadi Soesastro. In the introduction to his text quoted repeatedly above, Soesastro writes:

"As with the 'micro states' of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, the major question is whether, and how, East Timor can achieve economic independence" (Soesastro, 1991:207).

At the end of the same article Soesastro again stresses that:

"It was a belief that an independent East Timor was not economically viable that provided one of the justifications for its incorporation into Indonesia" (Soesastro, 1991:221).

Yet other observers, like R. William Liddle, note that the 1991 World Bank annual report acknowledges the economic viability of many mini-states (Liddle, 1992).



A trader in Bekora kampung in Dili
Jakarta Post 4 December 1991

8. Call for a UN Supervised Referendum

I believe that economic development in East Timor will continue to be impeded until its political status is determined in accordance with international law. Both in terms of Indonesian state law and in terms of the customary law of East Timor, the birth of the "province" was marked by many "irregularities".

As we know from the mass media and from Indonesian schoolbooks, on 31 May 1976 a 28-member "People's Consultative Committee" in Dili decided that East Timor would immediately be integrated into Indonesia *without a referendum* (Tempo, 12 June 1976:19-20; repeated in *Tempo,* 23 November 1991:21). Apparently the referendum plan was suddenly cancelled. According to Mario Carrascalão, a former UDT figure then representing the (Indonesian) Provisional Government of East Timor in Jakarta and New York, the type of referendum requested by the UN with every individual casting one vote, was difficult to implement in East Timor at that moment, especially considering the large part of the population living in the interior and having very little education. For this reason Carrascalão believed that except in the towns of Dili and Baucau, the wishes of the people could better be expressed through their traditional leaders, who would form a "People's Consultative Committee" of 400 to 500 members *(Topik,* June 1976:7).

Two years later Carrascalao's thinking was echoed by Guilherme Goncalves, a former Apodeti leader who had become the first head of the Regional People's Representative Committee (DPRD) of East Timor. Asked "what is the best way to establish the aspirations of the people now that there are no more political parties?", he answered as follows:

> Political parties in Timor are actually a new phenomenon which first appeared only after the revolution in Portugal. But for the moment, the aspirations of the people can be established through their *liurai* (kings) and the traditional structures beneath them. Ordinary people usually place more value on the traditional leaders with whom they are more familiar. And the *liurai* cannot make decisions on their own. First they have to obtain the agreement of the tribal chiefs below them. A *liurai* can be removed from his position if his policies are opposed by the chiefs.
>
> At the same time the tribal chiefs, who are chosen by the clan or *knua* heads, have to justify their policies in turn to the clans within their tribal groups. And so on down to the family heads. In the Portuguese period too, although there was a colonial bureaucracy represented at local level by the *administrador* (regent) or *chef de posto* (district head), the success of a policy pursued by the governor in Dili depended on the support of these traditional leaders *(Tempo,* 8 Juli 1978:7-8).

The importance of the *liurai,* whom the Portuguese constantly had to try to control, is confirmed by a number of anthropological studies in East Timor (see,

for example, Grey, 1984:27-28; Hicks, 1985:15). But if we now accept the premise that the judgement of the *liurai* would have reflected popular aspirations in East Timor more accurately than that of the political parties which appeared only after the Revolution of Flowers in Lisbon, then the validity of the decision made by the East Timor "People's Consultative Committee" (MPR) in Dili on 31 May 1976 must also be questioned. For this MPR, later to become the East Timor regional assembly (DPRD), only included seven of the 35 *liurai* who had been present in East Timor before the war. According to Goncalves, the others had either "disappeared", "died in the fighting", or were "possibly being held prisoner by Fretilin in the jungle" (*Tempo,* 8 July 1978:8). The decision of seven *liurai,* just 20 percent of the prewar total, can clearly not be regarded as representing the aspirations of the whole population of East Timor. The opinions of the new *liurai* replacing those who had "disappeared" or "died", and of those apparently "held prisoner" by Fretilin, should also have been ascertained if it was true that the *liurai* represented the East Timorese majority better than the political parties.

Stranger still, if a referendum on the "one person, one vote" principle was indeed inappropriate to social conditions in East Timor except for Dili and Baucau, how is it that Indonesian general elections - which are also based on one person, one vote - were held in East Timor in 1977, 1982, 1987, and 1992? Are the results of these four elections in East Timor valid? If so, then the people of East Timor have been ready for a "one person, one vote" referendum since 1977. If not, then the victories won by Golkar in those four elections must also have been invalid.

Because the right of self-determination was denied to part of the population of East Timor (I say "part", because there were also some who genuinely desired union with Indonesia) in 1975-1976, a guerilla war has now continued in the jungles and towns for 17 years. Let us not be under any illusions that this war will immediately come to an end, in Timor or even in Java, now that Xanana has been captured. He is already the third leader of Fretilin - and, *ex officio,* the third president of the Democratic Republic of East Timor[51] - to fall into Indonesian hands. Francisco Xavier do Amaral was captured on 7 September 1977, and Nicolau dos Reis Lobato was shot on 31 December 1978. We should not underestimate the ability of the guerilla group which Xanana leaves behind to regenerate itself - or transform itself into something new.

Moreover, the ideal of an independent East Timor, free from Indonesia, has also been regenerated even among a young generation of Timorese educated entirely along Indonesian rather than Portuguese lines. The news that underground organisations opposed to integration have been dismantled in several East Timorese regency capitals, as reported on television recently and repeated in the press, is open to various interpretations. Right now they are indeed surrendering. But how could cells of such organisations have become so widely spread in East Timor? And what guarantee is there that those who surrender now will not "relapse" again later if the domestic and international political situation changes drastically? Or, indeed, that they have not already passed on the baton to younger brothers who are still at school?

We should realise, therefore, that recognition of the right of self-determination for the *whole* population of East Timor, and not just to those who support integration, by means of a referendum supervised by the UN, is an urgent necessity. All the more so, because the 17-year war in East Timor has already swallowed so much of resources, blood, reputation and energy.



School children in kampung Bauro, Iralafai, Los Palos
Jakarta Post 22 November 1991



A woman villager and her daughter in her hut in Laline, Viqueque
Jakarta Post, 22 November 1991



A woman carrying a heavy can of water at the coast of Dili
Pelita, 9 November 1991

9. Conclusion

This, then, has been a brief sketch of the grim situation of a neighbour of Indonesia, who, like the gagged and bound victim of a rape, is deemed to have enjoyed its own violation.

There are still a few rays of hope in this sombre picture. Since the massacre of 12 November 1991 in Dili, some Indonesian students have begun to question the legitimacy of East Timor's integration 16 years ago. In a press release dated 18 November 1991, for instance, the committee of the Yogyakarta Students Association wrote as follows:

> For the sake of humanity and our common wellbeing we ask the government to reconsider the fake process of integration in East Timor, which seems to claim more and more lives out of any proportion to the level of support for integration among the East Timorese people. We suggest that a referendum supervised by the UN should be held immediately in order to establish the real wishes of the population of East Timor.

Five days later, eleven student councils from Java declared at a meeting in Bandung, especially organized by Bandung student activists to respond to the Dili massacre:[52]

> [We] demand that the government of the Republic of Indonesia withdraws all of its armed forces as quickly as possible from East Timor, and grants a full and free "right of self determination" to the people of East Timor, in order to minimalise further loss of life.

Let us hope that the voices of these students will be heard and amplified by other Indonesian groups which at present, out of ignorance and fear, still give their blessing to the oppression of the East Timorese people. Because if voices like these continue to be silenced, economic development in East Timor will continue to be obstructed by all the Indonesian resources, lives and energy which will be required to maintain (in)security in the towns of East Timor and the *Foho* (mountains) of Ramelau.

What may become the result of all those cultural changes discussed above? Hopefully, not a tremendous reduction of all the cultural diversity of the East Timorese people, with which they have been blessed by the Almighty, through nature, through history, and through their own ingenuity and endurance.



An old East Timorese man dressed in traditional clothes
Jawa Pos, 2 September 1993

10. Notes

1. Although other commodities, including slaves, were exported from Timor, its trade was focused primarily on the rich sandalwood reserves. Compare Schulte-Nordholt, H.G., 1971.
2. For a description of the social, political and religious system during the Portuguese colonial period and the present day situation, see Mubyarto, Loekman Soetrisno, *et al.*, 1991.
3. See Dunn, J.S., 1983.
4. Compare e.g. Glen, F., 29 October 1960.
5. *Klibur Oan Timor Aswain (KOTA),* Sons of the Mountain Warriors; *Partido Trabalhista,* Labour Party; *Associacão Democratica Integracão Timor-Leste Australia (ADLITA).*
6. Provisional statues of the Timorese Democratic Union published by its organizing Committee in Dili, 1 August 1974.
7. *Nacroma* (ASDT Newspaper), 1, no.1, 31 August 1974; compare Ramos-Horta, J., 1984.
8. Manifesto of the *Associacão Popular Democratica Timorense,* Dili, 27 May 1974. Compare Evans, G., February 1975.
9. See Hill, H.M., 1978.
10. A visit the US State Department labelled "the big wink".
11. Compare e.g. Amnesty International Publications, 1985, pp.24-29; Kohen, Arnold and Taylor, John, 1979, Chapter 2.
12. Kohen, A., and Taylor, J.G., 1979.
13. See Taylor, J.G., 1991, Chapters 7 and 8.
14. See the comment of Mario Carrascalão on the word *Maubere, Editor,* 15 June 1991, p.91-92. Compare Traube, E., 1984. According to Carrascalão, the formulation of the *Maubere-ism* by Fretilin was partly inspired by Soekarno's *Marhaen-ism*, namely the philosophy of the small farmer (Pak Marhaen).
15. Statement of the Apostolic Administrator and the Presbyterian Council of the Dili Diocese, 1 January 1985.
16. Australian Government Printing Service, 1983, Appendix 35, pp.207-213.
17. See e.g. de Magalhães, A. Barbado, 1992, Chapter 9.
18. See, e.g. Injustice, Persecution, Eviction. A Human Rights Update on Indonesia and East Timor, Asia Watch, New York, 1990.
19. Bearing in mind the seven points below, I continue to regard "East Timor" as a separate political entity which is not part of the political entity known as "Indonesia". This point of view is based on:
    (1) Indonesia's historical claim to the former colonial territories of the Dutch East Indies.
    (2) the knowledge that what is known as the "Balibo Declaration" for integration with Indonesia was drafted by only five East Timorese politicians in a hotel in Bali under pressure from special military intelligence units *(Opsus),* to be handed over to the late Foreign Affairs Minister Adam Malik in Atambua (East Indonesia) as a reaction to the declaration of independence made by the Democratic Republic of East Timor in the presence of the people of East Timor in Dili, on the 28 November 1975.

(3) the fact that the decision taken by the People's Consultative Council of East Timor which requested integration with Indonesia was only attended by 7 out of 35 *liurai* in East Timor.
(4) the fact that international law does not recognise East Timor as being legally a part of the Republic of Indonesia.
(5) the constitutional duty of every citizen of the Republic of Indonesia to uphold the right of self-determination for all peoples (first article in the preamble of the 1945 Constitution).
(6) the fact that the independence movement in East Timor has not yet been eradicated, but is moreover continuously being regenerated.
(7) the fact that a referendum, in which the desire of the majority of the East Timorese to integrate with Indonesia can be confirmed, based on international principles has yet to be held in East Timor.

20. Prior to the decision of the Diocese of Dili to adopt Tetun as their major liturgical language, a similar step had already been taken by Fretilin, in their party platform as well as in their actual programme, namely their Paulo Freire-style literacy programme among the hilltribes.
21. When I first visited East Timor in April 1974, I met a Mozambiquean *administrador,* or head of a *concelho* (district) in Liquica.
22. It is interesting to note that some of the outstanding leaders of the "Anti-Communist Revolutionary Movement" (MRAC = *Movimento Revolucionaria de Anti-Communista),* the coalition of four parties which "invited" Indonesia's invasion to kick out the "Communist" Fretilin from Dili, came from the families of *desportados* and *liurais* who had been very supportive of Portuguese rule before and were large *fazenda* owners. I am talking here mainly of the Carrascalao and Goncalves families.
23. Mario Carrascalao, for instance, received his agronomist degree in Portugal. While Jose Goncalves, the oldest son of Guilherme Goncalves, received his economics degree in Belgium.
24. The term "Caladi" probably comes from the Portuguese word, *caladoja,* an adjective meaning silent or quiet.
25. See the debate continuously reported by two Indonesian dailies, *Jawa Pos* and *Suarya,* from September till December 1993.
26. This shows how little respect the Indonesian authorities have for one of the signatories of the so-called "Balibo declaration", which was actually signed in a hotel in Bali.
27. After the withdrawal of the Diocese of Dili from the Portuguese conference of bishops, the Pope has directly taken over the role as Bishop of Dili, while Mgr. Belo is merely administrating the diocese on behalf of the Pope.
28. One has to take into consideration, though, that the Rotinese pride themselves of speaking 18 different "languages", originating from the 18 small kingdoms in their island (see Fox, 1977:80-81).
29. Catholic church sources have estimated that between 200 to 400 people were executed at Builico in the district of Ainaro between 1981 and 1983. Due to this the place earned the title of "the second Jakarta" *(Jakarta Kedua),* since many Fretilin suspects had also been "invited" for "trips to Jakarta" by helicopters, which actually plunged them into the sea. To com-

memorate those victims, the local parish has erected - ironically, with the support of the local military unit - a large cross at Builico, where Timorese people passing by used to stop to pray briefly near the cross.

30. The Jakarta weekly magazine, *Tempo,* has estimated that about 5,000 persons had been in jail on Atauro in 1982/1983, which was nearly as much as the number of Atauro's indigenous inhabitants (27 August 1988:22). Meanwhile, according to other sources, 387 inmates had died in 2 1/2 years on Atauro, due to the bad prison condition. After protests from the ICRC, the surviving inmates were removed and resettled in several "prison villages" on the mainland of East Timor.

31. As a journalist who wrote and edited reports about East Timor for *Tempo* magazine, I am able to point to an error contained in the caption of the photograph. It was supposed to be taken by one of *Tempo*'s own staff. In fact the photograph, taken by former *Tempo* journalist Sjahrir Wahab, shows Indonesian troops landing in Atapupu in West Timor (Indonesia), in advance of the invasion of East Timor. All the troops landed with LST ships of that kind had their insignia indicating rank and regiment removed, to support the impression that they were civilian volunteers landed to help the anti-communist front in East Timor. Both the invasion of Dili on 7 December 1975 and the previous attacks on towns bordering with West Timor, such as Balibo, Maliana and Bobonaro, were closed to all Indonesian journalists, including *Tempo*. It is therefore not possible for *Tempo* to possess a photograph of the *landing in East Timor* taken by one of *Tempo's* own journalists.

32. The most recent example of these false reports is that of the many people who have been forced to take the "blood oath" (*sumpah darah*) as a sign of abandoning clandestine organistions in the regency of Ainaro and Aileu. High school students (SMP) as well as civil servants who, it should be noted, included Golkar cadres and members of the official Indonesian national youth commission (KNPI), were included. An older example is that of torture and subsequent imprisonment of a government employee, Dominggus S., in several prisons in East Timor, Bali and eventually in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta for a period of 11 years after he had been involved with the defence of a number of families which were to be forcibly moved from their homes in Dili.

33. The Indonesian mass media still often mistakenly calls the guerrilla movement Fretilin. In fact, on the initiative of Xanana Gusmao, since 1986 the East Timor Liberation Force or *Falintil*, was released from being under the Fretilin hierarchy. They changed from a paramilitary force of a particular political party into a unit of the national armed forces, directly under the highest command of the CNRM, whose members include all East Timorese who struggle for the independence of East Timor.

34. According to Franz Fanon, the satisfaction of sexual needs by soldiers of an occupying force using women of the region occupied does not merely represent the fulfillment of biological needs. It also represents an attempt by the soldiers to reinforce their self-confidence, undermined by the opposition from the local populace to their presence, especially in terms of

vengeance for not succeeding in breaking the resistance of the local men (see Fanon, 1967).

35. As in the case of the late Petrus Tomae, Lobo, who originates from east Nusa Tenggara, Indonesia, had already lived for years in East Timor and had also joined the workforce recruitment scheme of *Yayasan Tiara Indonesia*. As I heard from my sources, there were indeed a number of Indonesians originating from the East Nusa Tenggara and Sulawesi islands, who joined Tiara's recruitment scheme. As fellow workers who felt cheated by Tiara, they associate very closely with their East Timorese colleagues.

36. Stress is recognized as a constraint to limit the time of service in East Timor. During intense fire-contacts with the Timorese independence fighters, the Brawijaya soldiers were rotated every three months. During less intensive fire-contacts, their service times were extended to six months periods. But during more "peaceful" times, as East Timor is currently classified, they could be stationed in the territory for up to one year periods.

37. Coffee plantations were first established in Ermera by SAPT in 1899 (Taylor, 1991:11).

38. Apart from Robby Sumampouw's involvement in the clove monopoly of President Soeharto's son Tommy, as well as in the abolished national lottery, SDSB, East Timor has been the "gold mine" from where the Sumampouw Brothers' wealth has grown astronomically. Robby (50 years) and Hendro (48 years), both born in Solo, Central Java, possess a combined wealth of US$ 161 million, making them No.42 on the list of Indonesia's sixty richest families in 1993. Last year Robby himself became the 34th highest personal income tax payer in Indonesia. Their wealth began by their involvement in the coffee monopoly of PT Denok, which made an estimated profit of US$ 20 - 25 million between 1976 and 1980. Currently, they do not only control the 14 members of the Batara Indra Group in East Timor through their adopted brother, Alex Matindas Sumampouw, but also several other business consortia. In PT Branta Mulia, a nylon tire cord company, Robby is one of the directors, Hendro is the company's president director, while Gunadharma, a son of the Indonesian minister for industrial and economic affairs Hartarto, also sits on the board of directors. Last year they began to operate the US$ 43.7 million luxury casino on the Australian territory of Christmas Island, a joint-venture between Robby Sumampouw (63% shares), Lauw & Sons from Singapore (27%), and the Perth-based Frank Woodmore of Australia (10%). Under the banner of the Gunung Madu Tama Group, a consortium of 25 companies, they are planning to construct a new hotel in Kramat Raya, Central Jakarta, in a joint-venture with the US-based Park Inn International Worldwide Group. Meanwhile, under the banner of PT Safari Junitex group, Robby is planning to build a huge textile factory in the district of Boyolali in his home province, Central Java which will occupy 40 Ha of land and employ 3.000 workers (sources: *Far Eastern Economic Review*, 23 May 1980; *Bernas*, 28 february 1993; *Prospek*, 6 March 1993; *Tiara*, 12 September 1993; *Info-Bisnis*, April 1994; *Jakarta*

Post, 9 April 1994; *Kedaulatan Rakyat*, 21 April 1994; *Kompas* and *Bernas*, 17 May 1994; *Properti Indonesia*, June 1994:103).

39. In the Indonesian statistics this is documented as *perdagangan antara pulau*, or "inter-island trade", since the Indonesian state legally regards East Timor as an integral part of its territory.

40. Foreign loan projects for East Timor are also free from the obligation to carry out proper environmental impact assessment. For example, the project to eradicate malaria via the wide-spread spraying of DDT was financed by loans from US-AID at the beginning of the 1980s, even though an environmental impact assessment was a compulsory element of US-AID procedure.

41. I have once read that plows were introduced to Western Indonesia from China, while in Eastern Indonesia, including Central Sulawesi which also has an old tradition of wet-rice farming, soil is also prepared by letting buffalos trample the mud.

42. I am using the term "transmigrant" with apostrophes, because according to international law, they are actually immigrants who have moved from one state to another state, and not transmigrants who only moved from one island to another island within one state.

43. In the village of Casabau (subdistrict of Tilomar, regency of Kovalima) 500 Ha of land belonging to indigenous East Timorese were reported to be grabbed by Javanese transmigrants in the region of Salele four years ago (*Fakta*, 1 May 1989:54). According to what I was told by an informant, this group of transmigrants at first declared themselves Catholic, but after having settled in Salele, they converted back to Islam.

44. In several places, for example in the regencies of Lautem and Baucau, the residents have to report to the local military post before they go to their garden or to the forest, and then report once again when they return. In addition to the changes in the location of the village, close to the main road, this type of security intervention can give rise to ecological implications which are supposed to be beneficial. An example of this is the decrease in the logging of yellow sandalwood for wood carving for which Lospalos is famous. On the other hand, intervention also results in ecological consequences which are detrimental. An example of this is the decrease in frequency of weeding in the gardens resulting in an increase in growth of imperata.

45. During the Portuguese time, the Catholic church in East Timor enjoyed a near-monopoly for religious propagation in the territory, based on a 1940 Concordat between the Holy Seat and Portugal.

46. In spite of the official Portuguese policy to favor Catholicism in the territory, a certain degree of religious pluralism already existed in East Timor, prior to the Indonesian occupation. For instance, Duarte mentions in his study on Atauro, that from the 5.180 inhabitants of that island, about 1.000 of them were Catholics, about 2.000 Protestants, and the rest were followers of natural or cosmic religions (1984:15). The latest religious census during the Portuguese era also noted the existence of 2.550 people who professed to be Protestants. Meanwhile, according to Mar'i Alkatiri, a member of the Overseas Delegation of Fretilin (DEF) who resides in

Maputo, Mozambique, there were about 3.000 Muslims in Dili, 500 of them of Arabic (Hadramaut) origin, who regularly came to recite the Holy Qur'an in his father's house. Alkatiri's party also accepted religious pluralism, by appointing seven of its Central Committee members from the Muslim community in East Timor (Mar'i himself, who has left the country; three persons who have fallen in the guerilla war, namely Salim, Ali and Hamish Basarewa, also known by his nickname "Hatta", since he was an admirer of the late first Vice President of Indonesia, Mohammed Hatta; and three others who are still working in the clandestine resistance). And as far as the Chinese community in East Timor was concerned, they were also free to profess their Confucian belief during the Portuguese time.

47. Among the most outstanding NTT Catholics who had been very instrumental in the Indonesian take-over of East Timor were the late Louis Taolin. He was a son of the last king of Insana in Kefamenanu, West Timor, and dealt mainly with the East Timorese refugees and "partisans" from West Timor; Frans Seda, a well-known Indonesian diplomat who hails from Flores, who, with Ben Mang Reng Say, another Indonesian diplomat and former ambassador to Portugal, dealt mainly with the Portuguese government officials and generals, lobbying among them in favor of the Indonesian take-over.

48. It is interesting to note that while official Indonesian statistics have recorded the number of travelers coming in and out of East Timor by sea and air, there were no data available about the number of bus passengers - which entered the territory from West Timor.

49. Indonesian statistics show that after the opening up of the territory in 1988, the net-inflow of people who came by sea drastically increased from a net outflow of 248 persons in 1987 to a net inflow of 1.995 persons in 1989. Most of the new arrivals came from South Sulawesi.

50. I feel that the term "family planning" programme is actually incorrect. It should better be renamed into forced "female fertility control" programme, since that actually dominates the programme. See how many new techniques controlling women's fertility are constantly developed and introduced, compared to techniques controlling men's fertility.

51. This state, proclaimed on 28 November 1975, has been recognised by Vietnam, China, Angola, Mozambique, Guinea-Bissau, Cabo Verde, and Sao Tome e Principe, but *not* by Portugal, which still claims to be the administering power in East Timor. By way of comparison it can be noted that the Republic of Indonesia, proclaimed on 17 August 1945, was recognised only by a small group of Asian countries at the time, and *not* by the Kingdom of the Netherlands.

52. The eleven student councils who signed the 23 November 1991 petition in Bandung came from Universitas Indonesia (Jakarta), ITB (Bandung), Universitas Gadjah Mada (Yogyakarta), Universitas Diponegoro (Semarang), Universitas Pancasila (Jakarta), Universitas Ibnu Khaldun (Bogor), Universitas 11 Maret (Solo), Universitas Padjadjoran (Bandung), Institut Teknologi Indonesia (Jakarta), IKIP Jakarta and Institut Teknologi 10 Nopember (Surabaya). News about their statement was banned from all

Indonesian newsmedia. Only *Tempo* in its 30 November 1991 edition managed to publish a photo of the students' banners in the campus of the Parahyangan Catholic University in Bandung (pp.22-23). Nine student activists were arrested but released within several days by the security apparatus in Bandung.

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12. Glossary

The following list is a glossary of Indonesian, Portuguese and English abbreviations, acronyms and words used throughout the text.

ABRI	*Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia,* Indonesian armed forces
ADLITA	*Associacao Democratica Integracao Timor-Leste Australia,* Democratic association for integration of East Timor and Australia
AMDAL	*Analisa Mengenai Dampak Lingkungan,* Environmental impact assessment
Apodeti	*Associacao Popular Democratica Timorense,* Timorese Popular Democratic Association
Arjuna	handsome male hero of Indian and Javanese *Mahabharata* stories
ASDT	*Associacao Social Democratica Timor,* Timorese Social Democratic Association
AURI	*Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia,* Indonesian Air Force
BAKIN	*Badan Koordinasi Intelijen Negara,* Indonesian Military Intelligence Coordinating Agency
BIG	PT Batara Indra Group
BPN	*Badan Pengawal Negara dan Kota,* National Land Agency
bupati	head of a district *(kabupaten)*
Caladi	popular name for western East Timorese people
CIP	Contemporary Indonesia Programme, University programme of SWCU
CRET	*Comissao de Reforma Ensino de Timor,* East Timor Educational Reform Committee
CNRM	*Conselho Nacional do Resistencia Maubere,* National Council of Maubere Resistance
collegio	catholic centre, usually comprising a parish-church, a convent, a boarding-school and a tract of farmland
concelho	Portuguese administrative division, a district
CRET	*Comissao de Reforma Ensino do Timor,* East Timor Educational Reform Committee
CRS	Catholic Relief Service
CRT	*Comissao dos Refugiados do Timor Oriental,* East Timorese refugee organisation
CSIS	Centre for Strategic and International Studies
DEF	*Delegacao External do Fretilin,* Overseas Delegation of Fretilin
DPRD	*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah,* Regional House of People's Representatives
EDA	Excess Defense Articles
ESF	Economic Support Fund
Falintil	*Forcas Armadas de Libertacao Nacional de Timor-Leste,* former Fretilin army transformed into a national army
Firaco	popular name for eastern East Timorese people
FMS	Foreign Military Sales
Fretilin	*Frente Revolucionaria do Timor Leste Independente,* Revolutionary Front for an Independent East Timor
Golkar	*Golongan Karya,* Functional Group, political state party
hansip	*pertahan sipil,* civil defense corps, a paramilitary force
ICO	International Coffee Organization
IGGI	Inter Governmental Group on Indonesia
IMET	International Military Education and Training Programme
knua	clan, part of a Timorese princedom *(suco)*
Keamanan	*Operasi Keamanan,* Operation Security, 1981
KNPI	Indonesian National Youth Commission

komodo	*Operasi komodo,* Operation Giant Lizards, secret intelligence operation of the Indonesian government, aiming at annexation of East Timor
KOTA	*Klibur Oan Timur Aswain,* Sons of the Mountain Warriors
KPN	*Komisi Penyelidik Nasional,* National Investigation Commission
KUD	*Koperasi Unit Desa,* village unit cooperative
LBH	*Lembaga Bantuan Hukum,* Legal Aid Institute
liurai	Tetun word for a ruler of a Timorese kingdom, a head of several tribes *(sucos)*
LPM	*Lembaga Pengabdian pada Masyarakat*
MAP	Military Assistance Programme
MFA	*Movimento das Forcas Armadas,* the Portuguese Movement of the Armed Forces
MPR	*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat,* People's Consultative Assembly
MRAC	*Movimento Revolucionaria do Anti-Communista,* Anti-Communist Revolutionary Movement
NTT	*Nusa Tenggara Timur,* East Nusa Tenggara, lesser Sunda isles
Ojectil	*Organicao de Juventudes clandestine de Timor Leste*
OPSTER	*Operasi Territorial*
OPSUS	*Operasi Khusus,* Special Operations Unit of the Indonesian Government, military intelligence units
persatuan	*Operasi Persatuan,* Operation unity, an annexation operation launched on 17 August 1983
PIBBI	*Program Intensif Bahasa dan Budaya Indonesia,* Intensive Indonesian linguistic and cultural programme
PIDE	Portuguese secret police
ponta leste	eastern tip of East Timor
SAPT	*Sociedade Agricola Patria e Trabalho,* Society, Agricultural Fatherland and Labour
Seroja	*Operasi Seroja,* Operation Lotus, the Indonesian invasion of Dili and Baucau, 7 December 1975
suco	a Timorese princedom, part of a kingdom including several clans *(knuas)*
surat jalan	travel permit
UDT	*Uniao Democratica Timorense,* Timorese Democratic Union
UKSW	see SWCU
UUD45	*Undang-undang Dasar 1945,* 1945 Constitution
SWCU	Satya Wacana Christian University (Salatiga, Java)
YLBHI	*Yayasan Lembaga Bantuan Hukum Indonesia,* Indonesian Legal Aid Institute