Promoting Democracy in Africa

The Role of Governmental and Church Development Cooperation

GRARIA

Workshop,
Bonn, 7–8 June 1994

forum

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INTRODUCTION
Dr. Hartmut Bauer

The workshop: "Promoting Democracy in Africa: The Role of Governmental and Church Development Cooperation" carries on the process of discussion started in November 1992. At that time, KZE and EZE, on the occasion of their thirtieth anniversary organized a workshop with their African partners on: "Perspectives for the Churches' Contribution to Democracy and Development in Africa". The main results were:

- to enter into a more intensive dialogue with governments on the state, para-state and private involvement in social services
- to improve human resources for building up civil societies
- to promote participation of especially the poorer sections of the population in their society
- to expand the lobby and advocacy activities in the North.

The results of this workshop were presented to the public and discussed with the Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development as well as with the Committee for Development of the German Parliament. Our African partners returned to their respective countries and tried to integrate the ideas gained at the workshop into their daily work. Since then we have continued sharing our experiences.

In the present workshop we would like

- to analyze the role of local governments and decentralization; the role of justice and human rights; civil society and economic development; voters' education and political environment for elections
- to discuss and to exchange ideas, amongst others on possible forms of cooperation.

The African continent is certainly not a hopeless case for democracy, almost every country south of the Sahara is undergoing fundamental changes from one-party systems to multi-party democracy. The hopes of the people are presented in the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation.

In the past many African Churches have not regarded themselves so much as actors within their society, but concentrated on evangelism and social services. Some years ago they took up a stronger commitment for the poor and their interest within society, publicly accusing systems of injustice in Malawi and Kenya, for example. These actions provoked massive, even life-threatening counteractions on the part of the affected regimes. Furthermore, the Churches accompanied the process of free elections as in Zambia and Namibia. They also arranged peace

negociations between civil war opponents, e.g. in Mozambique and Sudan. In other countries Churches are actively promoting civil education not only prior but also after elections. The struggle against apartheid in South Africa had its strongest support from the Churches. All these achievements give us reason for hope.

The establishment of democracy is closely linked with economic development. Consequently, the African crisis is both a political and an economic crisis. More efforts concerning economic cooperation and financing are necessary to enable the people to effectively surmount the crisis and support the process of democratization. Otherwise, living conditions for many people in Africa can not change for the better.

Therefore, in a time of radical change and serious problems the Churches and NGOs in Africa have to take up new challenges. Accordingly, we have to listen to what our African partners report us about the situation in their countries and to representatives from governmental organizations. There is a growing necessity to work closer together with governmental institutions in both the South and the North; wherever possible I would like to stress our great interest in finding out ways of such a cooperation. Therefore, I hope that this workshop adds to our success and progress.

SUMMARY OF THE DISCUSSION
Dr. Sam Kobia

1. **Training and Popular Education for Critical Social Consciousness in the post election period to maintain and sustain democracy**

   - Contained in this is to know their rights, including education of the people to understand the constitution by translation into languages they can understand;
   - role of the Church as the conscience of society;
   - training in economic management;
   - education in Germany on topics such as arms trade and toxic waste disposal that mitigate against human rights in Africa, environmental racism.

2. **Linkages and Networking**

   - At the levels of concept, content and methodology: in terms of space - local, regional, Africa wide, Africa and Germany, international;
   - building Pan-African civil linkages including Pan-African human rights structures;
   - develop an African discourse on democracy and human rights;
   - seek ways and means of ecumenical joint action between Churches and NGOs in Africa and EZE;
   - need for joint reflection of EZE and African partners on areas of cooperation;
   - understand and make transparent the interest of the German government in dealing with Africa.

3. **Search for New Paradigms**

   - Church to provide a model in terms of values, accountability, transparency and democratic structures;
   - Church should read the signs of time and renew its structures, its vision vis-à-vis of emerging challenges;
   - democratic culture;
   - need to reaffirm sovereignity of Africa: its forms and its characteristics;
   - hand-grown democracies, not ape western democracies uncritically;

4. **Capacity Building**

- State government to government including reorientation of the apparatus of state (i.e. reorientation of the police force);
- NGOs and Churches so as to empower the people, not to replace the people or the state;
- sharing of information and communication. Those who control these have an impact on public opinion building, thus these organs must become people owned, people subjected, people produced;
- sharing of information between North and South;
- Churches' role in reconciliation and healing of conflicts in the process of democratization;
- monitoring, not only of the elections but of the economic performance and observance of human rights of the government, violence;
- sharing of human resources and expertise.

5. **Promote enabling environment for free and fair elections**

- Registration of voters as an ongoing exercise;
- North should recognize that advocacy for human rights in Africa by Africans has been part of African struggles for a long time.

6. **Government in Germany to provide space for input of EZE into policy formation**

- EZE's input to be informed by Churches and NGOs from Africa;
- identify ways in which African partners could help, could bring in their experience with SAP, Human Rights etc. for advocacy and lobbying in the North.

7. **Decentralization should not be just technical to strengthen civil society**

- Human rights: not from a mechanical point of view but focusing on the pedagogical element including human rights at a local level;
- role of Church as a credible social entity at grassroot level;
- Churches and NGO should use their infrastructures for peaceful resolution of conflicts and education;

- accompany the people in holding the elected representatives and government accountable to them.

8. **Research/Study/Lobbying**

- Develop tools of analysis for Churches and NGOs, e.g. study and evaluation of SAP from the standpoint of the Church and the people; orientation of research to be experience of the victims of SAPs: World Bank calls them beneficiaries; we call them victims.

- Lobbying in the North to put pressure on African governments.

- Research to understand globalization of the economy and global governance and its effects on African role of TNCs; these will be more influential in global governance.

- Question of global governance (trilateral commission, World Bank, IMF, GATT serve the interests of transnational organizations, their politics are also affecting the economies of the North).

- Serious consideration of diplomatic sanctions on the part of the North in extreme cases. Conditionalities should include the non-recognition of military governments by the German government.

- Need to do research into the richness of African traditions vis-à-vis democracy, human dignity, justice.

OPENING SPEECH

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: EXPERIENCES AND FUTURE PERSPECTIVES

Dr. Sam Kobia

Following the end of the cold war, the world is entering a new era in which it is not immediately clear what form and character the domination and control of the powerless by the powerful will take. In the last century or so imperialism manifested itself through colonialism, neocolonialism and super power ideological war. In the period following the end of the Second World War the Soviet Union emerged as a superpower and competed with the West for sphere of influence in the so-called 'Third World'. In particular Africa became a battlefield of proxy wars between the USA and the USSR. Neo-politics assumed a critical role in international affairs even as the superpowers competed for control of regional strategic areas. Dictatorship, whether through military or single-party regimes, became the dominant form of political control. The local dictators were propped up by either of the superpowers. That era appears to have come to an end. What is to replace it is being contested between forces which are attempting to reform neocolonialism and those seeking more fundamental structural transformation. Both are using the fashionable language of human rights and democracy. The reformists seem to be adopting the language of democracy and human rights as tactical means and as taming devices. The transformists, for their part, employ human rights and democracy as strategic goals, as well as weapons in the process. What the outcome will be is yet unclear. But it is important to analyze the process and ask the critical question as to the place of the African people - the masses on whose behalf various forces claim to be working.

The shape and form of the emerging democracy in Africa are better understood if seen in the context of the contradictory and contending approaches mentioned in the above paragraph. In this paper we will also examine the socio-historical context that gave rise to the current situation in Africa. We shall try to identify the key players and ask what interests motivate them to be involved. Here we shall try to identify the emerging trend in Africa. To illustrate various aspects of the trend I shall use our experiences in Kenya - where the Church was fully involved in the process for social change.

The final part of the paper will consider the prospects for success of democracy in Africa. Here we contend that the prospects are good depending on how three critical conditions are fulfilled - popular education for social consciousness of the people, organization for power to enable the people to hold the elected representatives accountable and action to effect change in the interest of the people.

Promotion of Democracy in Africa

The struggle for democracy in Africa is not new. It is important that we correct, right from the outset, the misconception that the promotion of democracy in Africa started only five years ago with the end of the Cold War. The collapse of communism in Europe caught the West napping as far as the promotion of democracy and advocacy for human rights in Africa are concerned. So what has happened since 1989 is that the West rushed to institute a political process through which it could legitimize African political leaders with whom it could continue to do business. That is why, for the West, democratization in Africa means merely holding elections (and to it this is new because, for many African countries, no elections were held for almost thirty years). But to us democracy in Africa is more than just elections. It is a process of liberation from a culture of silence and apathy to popular participation in the economic, social and political life of the African countries.

The struggle for the rights of African people has been going on for a long time. Africans have fought for their rights ever since they started to be violated or taken away from them. The struggle against colonialism was a struggle for human rights. But that was not seen as such because there is the erroneous belief that struggles for human rights are alien to Africa because they are a product of the West. This must be corrected if we are to see democratic struggles in their proper socio-political perspective.

Part of the problem is the separatist stance on human rights. Separating human rights in three generations has done a lot of damage both to the understanding and application of human rights. Civil and political rights are seen as the 'first generation' rights, while the 'second generation' is economic, social and cultural rights and the 'third generation' is collective rights of people such as right to peace, to development and self-determination. Furthermore, the three 'generations of rights' were hierarchically ranked with the 'first generation' being accorded highest status and the third the least. In most cases, therefore, it was people involved in the advocacy for civil and political rights that were recognized as fighting for human rights. Those involved in the other 'two generations' of rights were labelled dissidents or even leftist agitators. Unless all the three so-called 'generations of rights' are integrated, the promotion of democracy and human rights in Africa will continue to be misinterpreted and misplaced.

In his recent book entitled "Human and Peoples' Rights for the Oppressed", Shadrack Gutto argues that:

"The earlier views by some establishment ideologues that only civil and political rights are worth of considering as 'human rights', or, on the other hand, that only economic, social and cultural rights are proper 'human rights', must now

be rejected and have in fact been rejected by a multi-ideological intellectual community." 1)

It is because of the separatist stance on human rights that the struggle for human rights for Africans and by Africans has been given little attention, even by the media in the West, as well as in Africa. Similarly the promotion of democracy in Africa by Africans has not been recognized as such by the African bourgeois intellectuals and by the West. It is for that reason that the promotion of social justice that has characterized the African struggles for many years was dismissed as agitation by leftists and not as promotion of democracy. In fact, until recently the African governments were supported by the western democracies, notorious among them USA, Britain and France, to suppress such struggles. During the 1970s and earlier '80s the protagonists of democracy and advocates of human rights in Africa were repressed, detained or forced into exile without a shred of protest by the governments in the North including Eastern Europe. The campaigns in the West for release of political prisoners in Africa were supported only by action groups and progressive individuals themselves viewed as irresponsible leftists by the body politic.

The process of shaping socio-political consciousness among Africans can be traced back to the early years of this century. The ANC (African National Congress) of South Africa, formed in 1912, is perhaps the oldest political organization whose objectives included a struggle for democracy and human rights. Many Africans from countries other than South Africa were members of the ANC. Those included students in South African universities and migrant workers. Others were inspired by the spirit of the ANC and formed or joined political organizations upon return to their respective home countries.

As early as 1945 the ANC demanded clearly for the first time, one man (person), one vote, the repeal of the Pass Laws, and equal justice for all. Following the intensification of racial oppression in the wake of election into power of the Nationalist Party in 1948, the ANC challenged the vicious undemocratic policy by adopting its well known Programme of Action. Among others the programme laid down new methods of struggle which included civil disobedience, strikes, boycotts, non-cooperation and open defiance of unjust laws, with the main objective being the building of the national liberation movement into a powerful, democratic movement embracing all sections of the people. The chief architects of the Programme of Action are well known - Walter Sizulu, Anton Lembede, Oliver Tambo and Nelson Mandela. Fifteen years later, during the famous (or was it infamous?) Rivonia trial, Mandela explained, in no unclear terms, that the ANC was formed to further the struggle for justice and democracy through constitutional and peaceful methods. Asked to comment on the one-party system he said:

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1) Gutto Shadrack B.O., Human and Peoples' Rights for the Oppressed, 1993, p.123.

"... it is not a question of form, it is a question of democracy. If democracy would be best expressed by a one-party system I would examine the proposition very carefully. But if democracy could best be expressed by a multi-party system then I would examine that carefully. In this country, for example, we have a multi-party system at present, but so far as the non-Europeans are concerned this is the most vicious despotism you can think of." 2)

What inspired people like Mandela and others to get involved in the struggle was the yearn for justice, human dignity and democracy. The formation of the ANC was the initiative of Africans. It was not at the instigation of any foreigners. At the opening of his defence during the Rivonia trial Mandela rejected the suggestion by the state that the struggle in South Africa was under the influence of foreigners and communists. He stated: "I have done whatever I did, both as individual and as a leader of my people, because of my experience in South Africa and my own proudly felt African background, and not because of what any outsider might have said." 3)

What Mandela said in 1963 echoed what was said by other prominent African personalities in their defence. Kwame Nkrumah in 1948 and Jomo Kenyatta in 1952, to mention but two, defended themselves by stating clearly that theirs were struggles for justice, democracy and rights of the African people. They both rejected the proposition that they had been influenced by communists or foreigners.

It is important to comment briefly on the method adopted by Africans who defended the objective of their struggle as promotion of democracy and justice. Almost without exception they stated that they believed in constitutional, non-violent means. For thirty-seven years (1912-1949) the ANC adhered strictly to a constitutional struggle. It put forward demands and resolutions; it sent delegations to the government in the mistaken belief that they would be listened to. Violent means of the struggle were adopted only as the very last resort. Mandela says that the ANC "had always agreed, in the hope that by merely pleading their cause, placing it before the authorities, they, the authorities, would change their hearts and extend to them all the rights that they were demanding", but of course that was not to be and so the ANC was left with no choice but to adopt other methods of pressure in 1949. Julius Nyerere was very clear about the use of non-violent methods. He advised the people of Tanganyika not to be provoked by the colonial government into using violence so as not to give the latter the excuse of using force. He was convinced that Africans in the then Tanganyika could achieve democracy through non-violent means. He considered three things to be essential to democratic government: discussion, equality and freedom - the last being implied by the other two. He goes on to argue

2) Mandela, N., Nelson Mandela speaks, p.12.
3) Ibid, p.83.

that "those who doubt the African's ability to establish a democratic society cannot seriously be doubting the African's ability to 'discuss'. That is the one thing which is as African as the tropical sun. Neither can they be doubting the African's sense of equality, for aristocracy is something foreign to Africa." 4)

What we have stated above should not be seen as a simplistic and naive way of mistaking liberation struggles for promotion of democracy. At any rate, one might wonder, whatever happened to the democracy that the leaders of liberation professed to want to promote. The point we want to make here is that the spirit, logic and concept of democracy were at the root of the African struggle against domination, denial of human rights and for participation in matters that vitally affected their lives. In the pre-independence period that we have discussed above, it is clear that the Africans genuinely believed that discussions, appeals and presentations of demands would change the hearts of the colonizers and grant them (Africans) their rights. After all the white person believes in reason and justice! We have no reason not to believe that the Africans genuinely sought greater democracy in their struggle against colonialists. In any case, almost without exception, the leaders of the liberation struggles were educated African elites who basically sought integration into the white peoples' system of governing.

Secondly, we would like to point out that it was through socio-political consciousness that the Africans were led to participate in the struggle for democracy and justice. A casual analysis of the African leaders of the pre-independence period shows that they started by seeking to be included in the system. After a reasonably high level of education they settled in good jobs and so objectively belonged to the same class as the white people. It was only through the experience of being rejected (in spite of their good selves), excluded and socially marginalized that they became conscious of how despotic and unjust the systems were and sought to change them. Well shaped socio-political consciousness is prerequisite to the struggle for justice, democracy and human dignity.

Thirdly, it is our contention that the dominant class would not want to attribute democracy, justice and human rights to the struggle for liberation. If they did, then they will trap themselves and would be at pains to explain why they are then against the liberation struggles. They must find other terms by which to describe the struggles of the people: hence the labels such as 'communist' and 'terrorist'. You can justify why the communists and terrorists must be eliminated but can the white people seek to annihilate the promoters of democracy and justice and advocates on human rights? Never!

Let us now look at the promotion of democracy in independent Africa.

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4) Nyerere, J., 1966, Freedom and Unity, p.103.

Political leadership in independent Africa is best known for its repression, denial of human rights, corruption and undemocratic ways of ruling. The misrule and totalitarianism of the African leadership have attracted a lot of interest among the scholars, the media and policy makers. On the other hand, efforts at promotion of democracy in Africa during the same period have attracted very little attention. Hence, in terms of literature, there is surplus on part of the former and deficit on part of the latter. In my attempt to deal with promotion of democracy in independent Africa, I am not, nevertheless, trying to balance the two. I am merely doing justice to the history of the Africans' involvement in democratic change in their own contexts.

Following his release from detention in 1978, the well known Kenyan writer and scholar, Prof. Ngugi wa Thiong'o stated in a press interview that "he has learnt about democracy from the peasants and the people". Although he had said a great deal more about his experiences in detention, it is the above statement, more than anything else, that most attracted the press. Further interviews were sought with him so that he could explain what he meant by that statement. Ngugi was a scholar, and university professor who had visited many parts of the world. One would have expected him to say that he learnt democracy from anywhere else other than from the peasants and the people.

I have made the above reference to illustrate a basic problem with regard to understanding democracy in Africa. The standard notion is that the concept and practice of democracy belong elsewhere and therefore are alien to Africa. Furthermore, democracy is too sophisticated to be understood and practised by the simple-minded and uneducated lot such as the peasants and workers of the African population. That notion is held both by non-Africans as well as by many of the African élite.

Like I have argued elsewhere, there existed democracies in African traditions. We consider democracy to be a way of life that is based on certain conceptions of humanity and how society should be managed to optimize and equalize services, opportunities, and resources. Democracy has to do with improving and extending relationships within society, to bring about peace, justice, and stability and to advance the human dignity. In that case democracy is not alien to the African traditional societies. In the African memory, therefore, the concept and practice of democracy have survived in spite of colonialism and neo-colonialism. Which is why it is not strange for Ngugi to admit that he had learnt democracy from the peasants and people.

By the end of the 1960s it had become very clear that the African political leaders had become just as repressive as the colonial masters they had replaced. The curtailment of basic human rights increased even as the ideals on which the liberation struggle were waged were sacrificed at the altar of greed and corruption. No opposition was tolerated because everybody had to be busy 'building the nation'. By mid 1970s

governing by decree was the rule and parliamentary democracy the exception. It was also in this period that the population of political prisoners increased by leaps and bounds. Those who escaped detention without trial either went underground or into exile. It is beyond the purpose and scope of this brief paper to go into detail about this subject. What is immediately relevant for us is to find out the reasons behind this political trend.

Some of the most insightful and powerful social and political commentaries are to be found in the African novels. A good analysis of the writing of the African novelists will help one to understand the political history of Africa. This body of literature best captures the deteriorating state of affairs of the African leadership in a way that an average reader can understand. It is not the political scientist, nor the historian who conscientizes the people the way the African artists do. It is for that reason that in the 1970s and 80s you were likely to find more artists than historians and political scientists in detention and in exile.

Although the culture became the focus of the Africa writers, a deeper analysis reveals that promotion of democracy and human dignity was the centre of their concern. The decade of 1970s represented the most active years of the universities in Africa. More than any other institution, the university actively promoted the ideals of democracy and human rights. That was the case right across Africa. Writers such as Sembene Ousmane (Senegal), Ngugi wa Thiong'o and Micere Mugo (Kenya), Chinna Achebe und Wole Soyinka (Nigeria), Ayi Kwei Armah (Ghana), Okot p'Bitek (Uganda), Taban Lo Liyong (Sudan), Can Themba and Peter Abrams (South Africa) have had tremendous impact on the reforming of social consciousness of the African people. Other artists were singers who composed songs that had similar effects. Those prepared the mentality of Africans who would, a decade later, go even further by getting organized to fight repression and promote democracy.

As long as the intellectuals limited their involvement to writing and confined themselves within the university milieu, they could have been tolerated by the government authorities. But as soon as they ventured out of the university the state moved swiftly. It is considered a felony for the intellectuals to educate and organize the masses. The African intellectual is supposed to be insulated in the university cocoon and be oblivious to the suffering of the people. He has no business leaving his natural habitat of the university and going to be with the people even in his own village of origin. Ngugi learnt that the hard way when he formed a drama club composed of ordinary folk in his village and staged one of his plays in Kikuyu (his native language). The play "Ngahika Ndenda" (I will marry when I want) stirred up the social consciousness of the people in all parts of Kenya. There eyes were opened in a way that no formal education or training could have done.

After the play had been going on for a short time the state took action. The play was banned. Ngugu wa Thiong'o was

detained without trial. Three of his colleagues, including the director and stage manager of the play went into exile. Later on quite a number of Ngugi's students at the University of Nairobi were either imprisoned or forced into exile.

As it was to be learnt later, the state explained that part of the reason for banning the play was because the business community (both local and international) expressed concern about the effect of the play. Some complained that they couldn't go about their business without being confronted by very ordinary people with questions they (the business people) could not answer. Some of those questions had to do with the undemocratic way of acquiring land and wealth. In Limuru constituency, the venue of the play, the people demanded that their member of parliament be accountable to them. That was unheard of at a time when members of parliament considered themselves as being accountable only to the ruling (and the only) party and its head. Many of them went back to their constituencies only to solicit votes after which they disappeared into Nairobi. Yet they claimed to be representatives of the people. That practice was criticized by the play and the people sought to bring it to an end.

On their part the authorities considered the initiatives such as that of Ngugi to be a very dangerous precedent. They accused him of poisoning the minds of the people who were otherwise law-abiding citizens and content with their conditions. Also they accused him of being an agitator who had been influenced by foreign ideas especially communism. They must have reasoned out that since the education system was safe, designed not to produce such critics; the media had been effectively muzzled; then it must be foreigners who must have influenced such people. Hence something must be done about them. What was done was to be more ruthless in suppression of ideas and those who possessed them. Closure of universities became more frequent. The universities were infiltrated by the intelligence masquerading as students. In Nairobi University the department of literature which was headed by Ngugi was the main culprit. It was purged of all the 'bad elements'.

The role of intellectuals has been treated with some detail to illustrate that in the 1970s the process of the struggle against totalitarianism and the promotion of democracy in independent Africa was already under way. Others who were involved in the process were a few lawyers and even fewer clergy. The trade union and other civic institutions were at this time in the decline.

This trend was not confined to Kenya but was a general trend in Africa. It should be understood that those involved then did so as individuals who were not organized or linked together in a movement. That is why they did not get very far and most of their efforts were nipped in the bud. The process, nevertheless, had tremendous pedagogical value even on those who were key players in it. After his detention it dawned on Ngugi wa Thiong'o that:

"Demcoracy and justice can only be achieved when the various interest groups voice their positions and fight for them. Until democratic-minded Kenyans, workers, peasants, students, progressive intellectuals and others, unite on the most minimum basis of a patriotic opposition to imperialist foreign domination of our economy, politics and culture, things will get worse not better, no matter who sits on the throne of power. No country can consider itself politically independent for as long as its economy and culture are dominated by foreign interests." 5)

Following what happened in mid 1970s the repression was so effective that for the next seven to ten years there was a lull in open democratic struggle in most of the African countries. But in mid 1980s and towards the end of that decade the democratization process became alive again. This time round the key player was the Church. When all other voices had been silenced, through intimidation or direct repression, the Church risked its own credibility if it also succumbed to the pressure.

The systematic destruction and disablement of civil institutions left the one-party dictatorship reigning supreme over the lives of people. That is why the Church had a daunting task in being the voice of the voiceless majority. Needless to mention it, the Church was ill-prepared for the task that history had thrust upon it. But a brief observation of the role the Church has played and is playing in the democratization process in Africa shows that it is no mean achievement. In Zambia, Ghana, Kenya, and more recently Malawi, the Church has been in the forefront of the democratic transitions. After advocating for change the Church accompanied the people in voters education and elections monitoring. Two cases, the Zambian and the Kenyan, are worthy examining in some detail.

In 1991 general election in Zambia, the Elections Monitoring Coordinating Committee fielded 3,000 election monitors throughout the country. The committee was a consortium of seven Christian and secular groups. The secular groups joined the committee which had been originally formed by three Christian organizations; the Christian Council of Zambia, the Zambia Episcopal Conference, and the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia.

It is important to note that these Christian groups, especially the Evangelical Fellowship of Zambia, had first to overcome their traditional reservations about the Christian role in politics. They had to adopt a more interventionist attitude to politics. This socio-political commitment and concern does not always come easily to Churches. And yet, once the Church is seen as having concern for society its credibility is enhanced, its relevance to people's concerns becomes more focused.

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5) wa Thiong'o, N., 1981, Detained, A Writer's Prison Diary

The Church in Zambia provided excellent leadership. The other groups that joined hands with the Church to form the consortium were the Law Association of Zambia, the Press Association of Zambia, the Women's Lobby, and the University Students' Union.

The Zambians recognized the role of the Church in the democratization process of their country. As Chituba Bantungwa comments:

"The church-dominated ZEMCC quickly swung into action. It called on citizens of Zambia to pray for peace and God's guidance. A vigorous civic education campaign was mounted. Registered voters were urged to show political maturity by voting responsibly and in accordance with the dictates of their conscience." 6)

The influence of the Church was critical in Zambia, and remains critical in other areas. In many cases, as already pointed out, the Church is the only viable if also lone voice, as only the Church has the credibility and the clout to press for change. The Church can galvanize opinion and act as a magnet around which other groups can gather in ways that would otherwise not be possible in Africa.

In Kenya the involvement of the Church may be traced back to 1986 when NCCK strongly opposed the infamous queue-voting. That is the method of voting whereby candidates line up behind candidates of their choice. The decision on queue-voting had been made by the all-powerful KANU (Kenya African National Union) which was then the only party. Its voice on anything was final and it shocked, not only the authorities but the Kenyans in general that anyone could dare oppose the decision of KANU. But the NCCK had tremendous support of the many "secret disciples". The only other organization to oppose the queue-voting was the Law Society of Kenya, but soon enough its voice feebled when the establishment put a wedge between its (LSK's) membership. The NCCK remained unmoved on its stance and paid by losing three of its members who were intimidated into withdrawing their membership; they cited the Council's involvement in politics as reason for their action. The World Vision which had partly sponsored the National Pastors Conference where the decision to oppose the queue-voting was made, withdrew its financial support to NCCK. The WVI further disowned the NCCK's position publicly.

Thereafter the NCCK was subjected to constant harassment by the authorities. Its duty-free 'privileges' were withdrawn. The staff of the Council were constantly intimidated especially in their encounter with government officials in course of their (NCCK) official work. In contrast the public kept encouraging NCCK to continue for indeed they considered its voice to be their voice. The NCCK campaign was successful in that the

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6) Fr. Ives Chituba-Bantungwa, "The Role of the Church in the Democratization Process in Africa: The Zambian Experience", The Courier (Brussels: ACP-EEC, 1992), No. 134, July-August 1992, p.70.

ruling (and the only) party amended its decision to use queue-voting to nominate its candidates for final elections which would be by secret ballot. But there was a catch to it! If in the queue-voting a candidate garnered 70 per cent of those turning out to vote, he/she will be declared elected unopposed.

In 1987 the NCCK joined the LSK in strongly opposing the proposed amendment of the constitution to remove the security of tenure of the Attorney General and the Chief Justice. The move was considered as a strategy of limiting the freedom of the judiciary.

The first time the queuing system was put into practice was in the general elections of 1988. The elections confirmed what the Church had said all along: it compromised the integrity of the voter, whose freedom was affected by fear of being seen to vote against those he/she thought should not be given the instruments of power. Secondly, the elections confirmed the fears of many Kenyans that the undemocratic rule was fully in place.

NCCK was the only organization which monitored the 1988 elections and exposed the massive rigging that characterized both the queue-voting at the so-called nomination stage and the secret ballot at the final stage. Through the queuing system 51 candidates were declared elected unopposed. All of them without exception had been hand picked by the party and instructions given to the returning officers that they must be "elected". NCCK adjudged the elections as not free and fair and declared them a sham. After an editorial entitled "Democracy takes a nosedive", the NCCK magazine "Beyond" was banned and the chief editor was later imprisoned on framed up charges.

The 1988 elections were a turning point as far as democratization process in Kenya. The NCCK continued to pressure for change. Several prominent Church leaders spoke out more boldly through the press and in their Sunday sermons from the pulpit. Bishop Henry Okullu, Rev. Timothy Njoya, the late Bishop Alexander Muge and Bishop David Critari were key amoung them. By 1990 the pressure for political change mounted. Voices of other clergy included Rev. Mutava Musyimi (then Pastor of the Baptist Church Ngong Road and now NCCK General Secretary) and Archbishop Manases Kuria. On 1 January 1990 Rev. Njoya in his new year sermon called for the end of one-party rule in Africa, following the collapse of communism. In September of 1990 the NCCK issued the document "A Kairos for Kenya" which was circulated very widely. The document outlined what the Council considered to be the agenda for change in Kenya. The government declared publicly that NCCK was now the unofficial opposition party in Kenya and called on the council's member Churches to withdraw their membership to show where they stood.

In particular, the head of state, in a public address, challenged the Methodist Church in Kenya to withdraw its membership from NCCK. (It is to be noted that as an ordained minister of the MCK which meant if it withdrew its membership from NCCK I

could not have continued as the Council's General Secretary). Of course the MCK did not oblige but two other Churches did.

It was also in 1990 that two prominent politicians who were former cabinet ministers called a press conference and openly called for a campaign to end one-party rule and usher in a democratic system of governance. Following that move, Kenneth Matiba and Charles Rubia were detained without trial. But this time round Kenyans were not to be intimated into silence. Calls for their release were made from many circles. The Roman Catholic Church, too, added its strong voice in calling for social change.

1991 was a decisive year as far as political change in Kenya was concerned. On January 1, 1991, the late Oginga Odinga declared that this would be the year of multi-party system in Kenya. Within a few months, a formal pressure group was formed to mobilize the public and lobby national and international support for change in Kenya's political system. Named the Forum for Restoration of Democracy (FORD), the group announced its membership to be nine, thereby managing to circumvent the law requiring that any group with ten or more members must be registered with the government. That technicality out of its way, FORD attracted massive support among Kenyans from all over the country. FORD was recognized also internationally as a legitimate pressure group. What hitherto had been a small stream for socio-political change became a mighty river that threatened to sweep away KANU and all that it represented.

In May 1991 the NCCK envisaged its programme of Education for Participatory Democracy (EPD). When I announced the programme to the public I was personally attacked by the powers that be who retorted that Kenyans knew everything about democracy and therefore needed no education by the NCCK. Undaunted, we launched the programme in December 1991 by issuing the first voters education material, "Why You Should Vote". The initial press run of 100,000 copies of the booklet were distributed within the first week. The demand was so big that within the first three months of 1992, 500,000 copies were printed and distributed.

In December 1991, the section 2A of the Kenya constitution was amended thereby making Kenya a multi-party system. The jubilation of Kenyans from all corners of the country is beyond description. Finally, the peoples' will was done.

The booklet was the main resource material for voters education by the Churches, political parties and many other organizations. Seminars, workshops and even plays were different methods of voters education. Two other publications were issued in the course of 1992. These were **Towards Multi-Party Democracy in Kenya** and **Multi-Party Electoral Process in Kenya.** Other educational materials were posters, newspaper articles and handbills. The national radio and TV refused NCCK access even though the latter was prepared to pay for the services.

By mid 1992 several other organizations were involved in voters education. The main ones included ICJ (International Commission of Justice) Kenya Chapter and FIDA (International Federation of Women Lawyers) Kenya Chapter, and PCDL (Professionals Committee for Democratic Change). The NCCK and Kenya Catholic Secretariat formed the NECEP (National Ecumenical Civic Education Programme) through which coordinated approach could be achieved.

The NCCK's role in promotion of democracy was further intensified by its involvement in two other areas: fighting against the ethnic clashes and convening of the political parties to enhance dialogue. The so-called ethnic land clashes were politically motivated terrorist activities that apparently had two purposes. One, to validate the claims that multi-partyism would usher in tribalism and violence, and two, to force members of certain ethnic groups to flee from certain districts in order not to register to vote there.

The Churches were the first to condemn the clashes as politically motivated, and Church leaders spoke out continuously and strongly. Kenya's Catholic Bishops issued a very sternly worded encyclical letter to the President, saying flatly that he was wrong if he thought that there was not political motivation behind the clashes. The NCCK challenged the government to prove its legitimacy on account of failure to end the clashes. The Council further fielded a task force to investigate the clashes in April 1992, and published the findings in the booklet, "The Cursed Arrow - A Report on Organized Violence Against Democracy in Kenya".

Convinced that dialogue among the political parties would greatly further the course of democratization, the NCCK sponsored and convened two inter-parties meetings. They were very well attended not only by the registered political parties which by May numbered ten, but many pressure groups and citizens organizations which had started to spring up in the wake of political pluralism. The objective of the meetings was to discuss and agree on strategies that would ensure smooth and peaceful transition to a democratic Kenya. The only party that turned down the invitation and failed to attend was KANU. The initiative was roundly denounced by the government, and NCCK was threatened with banning. The General Secretary was, during this period, routinely summoned to the Office of the President to respond to questions, and there was the usual harassment by the Special Branch. Threats to my life became more frequent but that did not intimidate us into silence.

When it became clear that the elections would be called any time, the organizations mentioned above (NECEP, FIDA, PCDC, ICJ) formed NEMU (National Elections Monitoring Unit) to plan ways and means of election monitoring. We also formed the NEMU Council of Elders composed of eminent Kenyans who would play a brokerage role. It was the Council of Elders who would announce NEMU's assessment of elections. NEMU was accredited as a local monitor by the Electoral Commission.

In September 1992, NEMU assigned itself a most daunting task of mobilizing 30,000 people to monitor the elections throughout Kenya. Those were to be recruited, trained and deployed within a period of three to four months. The organization experienced enormous problems especially from financial point of view. The Democratic Change Group (which was a grouping of the main foreign missions in Nairobi) promised funding but in reality it amounted to very little. At that point the project was threatened with failure and we became frustrated.

At this juncture I would like to pay deep tribute to EZE for rescuing the NEMU plans. The way EZE responded to our request is a clear demonstration of what ecumenical solidarity is all about. EZE showed tremendous understanding in the nick of time and gave the desperately needed grants. I have no doubt in my mind that EZE made remarkable contribution to the promotion of democracy in Kenya.

In the event, NEMU deployed monitors in all the parts of Kenya except Northeastern Province which was unreachable for security and logistical reasons. The area has a modicum of infrastructure and could best be reachable by helicopter. A prominent foreign mission in Kenya had promised to supply with such means of transport but, for reasons better know to themselves (and perhaps to Kenya authorities), declined at the last minute. The role that NEMU played in the elections monitoring was greatly lauded by the people of Kenya and the local press. The election monitoring by NEMU was the culmination of the process that NCCK had started several years earlier. On looking back it is evidently clear that through that process the Church in Kenya contributed tremendously in promotion of democracy in Kenya.

That role continues hitherto. Following the December 1992 general elections, the political terrain is much more complicated. Things are no longer in terms of black and white. There are many grey areas. But we have no doubt that the NCCK in particular and Kenyan Churches in general will continue to play their part in consolidating the democratic gains and nurture them into maturity.

The Prospects for Democracy in Africa

First of all let us make an observation of the nature of the change taking place in Africa. Although there are observable elements of change, the situation is still transitional. One characteristic of the transition is the need to move from illegitimate to a legitimate social and political order. For the most part, African governments lost their legitimacy to rule when they deviated from ascending to power through democratic elections. That was done by military coups or establishment of one-party dictatorship. Either way such a political order, if order it be, is illegitimate. To the extent that multi-party elections have taken place at all, a step in the right direction has occurred.

The second characteristic of the change is that people have gone and are going through a process of education. The critical social-political consciousness among the electorate and the people in general means that they have started to overcome the culture of silence and fear that had engulfed and dominated them for the last two decades. There should be no let up in this endeavour. For democracy to have good prospects there is need to have a permanent social vigil. The people of Africa should not allow themselves to be cheated into political slumber such as it happened after attainment of political independence.

During the struggle for independence people were educated and mobilized. After independence the political leaders immobilized the people and lured them into depositing all their power with the leader. Today, through another process of education, the people want to withdraw their power and use it in a democratic way for their own benefits.

By being involved in that change process the people have learnt that to attain democracy is a struggle. The struggle is not a touch and go affair. The main point in the struggle is that the means by which you attain it must be sustained and organized. Just like the struggle for freedom, the struggle for democracy is never over. It is a permanent revolution.

The role of internal and external forces is critical to the success of democracy. In both cases there are interests to defend and advance. The elements responsible for local repression and their sycophants are main obstacles in the democratization process. They use every rule in the book to discredit democracy. When they fail they use corruption to bribe the socially and financially vulnerable out of the process. On the other hand those nationals who believe in and are committed to democracy are the only ones who can guarantee its future. They should unite their efforts to form a strong civil society to provide the necessary checks and balances of power as well as to continue educating and organizing people.

The role of the external forces must be analyzed very closely indeed. The external forces from both the West and Eastern Europe supported African despots to the hilt. Their interest of course was to have hegemony in Africa. The turn about, following the collapse of the Soviet Union empire, to support democracy in Africa is less than a principled act. Of particular mention here is the USA which has a history of undermining efforts at democratization in the Third World. The secret documents that have now been de-classified (because of the thirty years law) reveal frightening reality of how the US government crushed emerging democracies in Latin America. Here it is worth quoting Noam Chomsky at some length. He says that:

"A study of the inter-American system published by the Royal Institute of International Affairs in London concluded that, while US pay lip service to democracy, the real commitment is to 'private capitalist enterprise'. When the rights of investors are threatened, democracy has to go; if these rights are

safeguarded, killers and tortures will do just fine. Parliamentary governments were barred or overthrown, with US support and sometimes direct intervention, in Iran in 1953, in Guatemala in 1954 (and in 1963, when Kennedy backed a military coup to prevent the threat of return to democracy) in the Dominican Republic in 1963 and 1965, in Brazil in 1964, in Chile in 1973 and often elsewhere. [...] The point is to crush independent nationalism and popular forces that might bring about meaningful democracy." 7)

The threat of a good example has been applied by US in dealing with popular democracies. After Allende was democratically elected, the US saw the danger signs for the whole region. In fact not only just Latin America. According to Kissinger, "Chile was a virus that would infect the region with effects all the way to Italy." It is to be remembered that the rotten apple theory was promulgated by Secretary of State Dean Acheson in the late 1940s but is practised by US to this day. Acheson warned that "one rotten apple can spoil the barrel". For public consumption the "rotten apple theory" is called domino theory.

In mid 1970s the Trilateral Commission issued a report which was concerned about 'governability of democracies'. The discourse on the problem of democracy is an interesting one to follow. In the report it is argued that:

"What is needed in the industrial democracies 'is a greater degree of moderation in democracy' to overcome the excess of democracy. [...] The effective operation of a democratic political system usually requires some measure of apathy and non-involvement on the part of some individuals and groups." 8)

Other political thinkers supported the idea of dealing with excessive democracies. Prof. Ithiel Pool once explained that in Vietnam, the Congo and the Dominican Republic,

"Order depends on somehow compelling newly mobilized strata (read civil society) to return to a measure of passivity and defeatism. [...] At least temporarily, the maintenance of order requires a lowering of newly acquired aspirations and levels of political activity." 9)

Could it be that those ideas are at play in Africa today? This is worth discussing in this conference.

I have decided to dwell a bit on the above point because it got me thinking as to why NEMU and NECEP in Kenya got so little support from the foreign aid donors in Nairobi. Most of them admitted that they had lots of funds for promotion of democracy in Africa, and yet it became very difficult for our organizations to get funded. According to the initiatives we

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7) Chomsky, N., 1992, What Uncle Sam Really Wants, PP.21-22.
8) Chomsky, N., 1978, 'Human Rights' and American Foreign Policy, p.83
9) Op. cit.

had taken it was impossible for foreigners to infiltrate or influence our course. What is likely to happen is that new civil institutions will be initiated and sponsored through willing (or may be unsuspecting) nationals through which some brand of democracy, other than popular democracy will be promoted.

Fourthly is the method of achieving the desired change in the short run. Negotiation and dialogue are critical in this respect. In a good number of African countries, national or constitutional conferences were used as spaces for dialogue and negotiation. This approach is likely to be more peaceful than in a situation like Kenya where the ruling persons ruled out dialogue with other parties - or with anybody else for that matter.

Given the ethnic factor in the social-political life of many African countries, formation of government of national unity should be given very serious consideration. Of course, there is an ethical question involved. Should the emerging parties negotiate and even form government of national unity with an illegitimate political order. Yet in the interest of peace and stability, the situation demands pragmatic approach. South Africa seems to have provided a model that could be emulated by many others. It remains to be seen how well Malawi will follow suit. At least President Mulusi has invited Chihana to join him and form a government of national unity.

When all is said and done though, the question of impunity must be faced. Shall the African dictators who are responsible for deaths, including murders of thousands of innocent citizens go scot free? These African dictators were, needless to say, sponsored by the Northern liberal democracies who observe some standards of human rights in their own countries. We consider cases like what has happened in Rwanda as genocide which cannot be carried out with impunity. In the case of Rwanda the international community has a moral obligation to act. But as a matter of principle, those who have committed crimes against humanity such as ethnic cleansing in Kenya and Zaire ought to be identified and punished. That will augur as deterrent measure. We agree with Gutto that:

"Those guilty of (human) rights violations in all these situations ought to be identified and some appropriate measure taken to ensure that they do not enjoy impunity. Failure to adopt such measures will naturally reinforce the culture of impunity that was inherited from colonialism, and which has been used ever since the time of independence in most of the countries." 10)

The appropriate measures could take many forms. In some cases it could be that just a public admission of guilt would do. Such would have healing effect both to the offender and the victims or their relatives if the latter are dead.

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10) Gutto, S., Op. cit., p.66

Finally I think that following the formal end of apartheid, the Organization of African Unity (OAU) ought to re-examine itself, its 'raison d'être' and what its role will be vis-à-vis member states. At a time when Africa is experiencing economic and social isolation and the daunting task of democratization, OAU cannot continue with business as usual.

In conclusion I wish to reiterate the role of the Church in promotion of democracy in Africa. The Church must continue with civic education in order to enhance and sustain critical social consciousness of the African people. It must be involved in enriching the national debate for democracy and good governance. For there can be no economic development in anarchy. As someone has said, "the key planks of good governance are level of political stability, institutional capacity for policy formulation and implementation, checks and balances necessary to ensure transparency on policy formulation and implementation, and accountability at both political and administrative levels." The role of the Church in the transition, then, is very large indeed. The people have great expectation of the Church, and it must not disappoint them. The Church in Africa must stand firm and maintain a strong, calm voice, uphold its prophetic calling and help to assure that democratization and constitutional crises do not precipitate chaos.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND DECENTRALIZATION - THE CASE OF GHANA

Rev. David A. Dartey

The issue of decentralization in the administration of a country is dear to the hearts of all true lovers of democracy. The concept of applying the principles of Local Government in the administration of Ghana has had a long history behind it.

We may here acknowledge that in 1884, the Southern sector of the Gold Coast was virtually handed over to Governor Maclean in the Cape Coast Castle. Subsequently in 1884 the entire territory except for the Volta Region was demarcated in the international share-out circumscribed in the treaty of Berlin in 1884 and the British worked towards making the proposition of the territory of the then Gold Coast realized. This realization was achieved early at the turn of this century except that the Volta Region was then part of the German colony of Togoland. After the versile treaty of 1919, the present territory occupied by Ghana was determined. We might here ignore the rather indecisive interregnum when Cape Coast was the centre of the seat of the Central Government. The Administration of the country has been centralized and transferred to Accra in the early 1850's. Since that time, every effort has been made to centralize the administration as a colony with the Governor who derived his powers for the administration of the country from White Hall in London.

It must be noted in this regard, that it was not intended that this arrangement in the administration of the country should be subsidised from U.K. Nor can it be deduced from the principles of the British colonial administration that the British tax-payer could even remotely be considered the financier of any development arrangements in this subservient territory.

Essentially, the colony was regarded as a possession of Britain to boast the importance of the U.K. internationally and be a profit-making concern in terms of trade and also be supportive militarily to the colonial power which Britain then was. In one sense the colony was in itself a unit which should be able to fend for itself. Every arrangement made therefore for its sustenance was to marshal resources within the country itself to carry it. Against this background, we need to recognize the multiplicity in ethnicity in the composition of Ghana. This has been both an asset and a liability in the governance of the country. It suited the colonial administration to divide the people on ethnic lines in order to facilitate rule unchallenged.

The concept of development was never a policy of the colonial power. All it needed was law and order to achieve its ends deem profitable to facilitate the exploitation of the colony in the interest of the "Mother Country".

For instance, it is significant that the more sophisticated administrative apparatus particularly at all levels have been agents of the central government rather than of the local government.

Ghana's political history after independence reveals that out of 37 years of nationhood, Ghana has enjoyed only 13 1/2 years under constitutional rule. The remaining 21 1/2 years of Ghana's independence have been spent under military rule. Whilst under the military rule, the governing of the nation had been highly centralized with the effect that local authorities have almost always looked up to the central government for everything. The highly centralized system of governance has been the concern of all governments in the country before and after independence. Decentralization has been recognized as a way of speeding up the socio-economic development of the nation. It is worth mentioning that even in the colonial period, the British used the idea of decentralization in the form of native administrative institutions to initiate local participation in development.

Serious attempts, nevertheless, have been made particularly since the fall of the first civilian government in 1966, to map out the programme for decentralization for the administration of the country and giving due recognition to local governments. This was to pick up the recognition also that the local government unit will provide the basics for determining the people's will in development and even more importantly, promote accountability of agencies of government of the responsibilities they wield. It is against this background, that the people welcomed the former PNDCs decision to re-introduce a decentralized local government administration in 1987, by enacting the present District Assemblies' Law. The objective was to give a measure of autonomy to the districts, to strengthen them to be viable in the implementation of government policies and utilization of resources, especially those emanating from the district. In this regard, the districts were expected to raise their own revenue and to plan and execute development projects relevant to their own situations in consultation with the appropriate government department. The 1992 Constitution which gives support to this decentralized administration of the country makes provision for 5 per cent of National revenue to be shared among local government units to facilitate their operations. The 1992 Constitution has gone further to enhance the non-partisan nature of local government.

The composition of the District Assemblies under the present constitution differs from the previous ones with all the members elected on non-partisan lines. Under the PNDC, two-thirds of the members of the District Assembly were elected by universal adult suffrage. The members do not contest on political parties ticket. They are not allowed to use symbols of political parties. The election is funded by the central government. The remaining one-third was appointed by the Chairman of the PNDC. The Fourth Republican Constitution says in Section 242 (a) that one person from each government electoral area within the district should be elected by universal adult suffrage. The President appoints the District Chief Executive with the "approval of not less than two-thirds of majority of the District Assembly members present and voting at the meeting." The leaders of the assembly appoint the presiding member themselves.

The 1992 Constitution, however, has safeguards for the District Chief Executive. He does not preside over the District Assemblies and can be removed from office with a declaration of no confidence buttressed by the votes of not less than two-thirds of all the members of the District Assembly. Despite this limitation, the District Chief Executive still wields political power and influence.

The decentralized local government administration now in place in Ghana has its advantages as well as disadvantages. Mr. Joseph R.A. Aryee, Senior Lecturer, Department of Political Science, University of Ghana, has summarized these as follows:

Advantages

In the complex society of today, opinion needs to be organized to be effective. Individual opinion cannot possess the width of specialized knowledge necessary for the management of modern administration, nor can it (except in rare cases) carry sufficient weight to command attention. Non-partisan politics in local government produces both the accumulation of the necessary specialized administrative techniques and the weight of concerted opinion (Baber 1974).

Disadvantages

Local discussions tend to be taken in prior party meetings rather than in open local government council meetings. The council may, thus, be in danger of becoming a mere rubber stamp of party decisions already taken. It also takes away from the public view the discussion of matters which in the public interest need to have been discussed openly. (Screenwood and Stewart, 1986).

These observations cannot just be brushed aside. It is therefore my hope, that the newly elected District Assemblies would put aside partisan politics and unite to develop their areas. The role the local Church can, and has to play in this exercise cannot be overemphasized. Already, most Churches have participated actively in the life and work of the District Assemblies. Indeed some Church members have found their way into the assemblies and have acted successfully as District Chief Executives. But a more significant role awaits the Church - that of being the bridge builders within the District to reconcile disagreeing factions. Promotion of active participation in local matters and the building of bridges to reconcile disagreeing factions is an important role of the Local Councils of Churches.

The Christian Council of Ghana has embraced the decentralization process because it is seen as a means of empowering the rural people to take part in the development of the nation. The mobilization of the Local Council of Churches with the view to creating a strong ecumenical base for development has been one of the programmatic thrust of the Council. The empowerment of the Local Councils of Churches by the Christian Council of Ghana will also go a long way to help in our process of nurtu-

ring a democratic culture in Ghana. It is hoped that when the local people become aware of their democratic right, they will be able to make meaningful contribution to nation building.

To this extent, the Christian Council of Ghana considers it as essential to cultivate and develop Local Councils of Churches (LCC's) and inspire them as ecumenical institutions to recognize the essential role they must play in development in furtherance of the promotion of democratization in its vital sense in their respective communities. This, essentially, is a new area for Churches which have hitherto in this regard operated as denominations.

It must be noted that the Christian Council of Ghana's demarcation of Local Councils is not based on political local government boundaries. It refers more to towns in which various denominations are found. In urban centres and the cities we have area Council of Churches as referred to as Local Councils of Churches. Where you have a number of Local Councils of Churches in a municipality or a city, they create their forum of consultation to deal with matters of common concern.

The Christian Council of Ghana has provided guidelines for the structuring and functioning of the Local Councils of Churches. In this regard, the Christian Council has been guided by its own principle: "Doctrine divides, service unites" to the extent that Churches are acceptable for what they stand in the performance of the social message of the gospel. The Local Councils of Churches therefore are always encouraged by the Christian Council of Ghana, to identify in their respective communities what they can tackle ecumenically for promoting understanding, peace, reconciliation and resolution of conflicts as well as pursuing goals consistent with the practice of a democratic way of life in their respective communities. The Christian Council of Ghana recognized in this regard that it must afford training of the leadership of the Local Councils of Churches.

There are other important services which the Christian Council, utilizing the services of the Local Councils of Churches, do provide in the Ghanaian society. Mention has already been made of ethnicity in the country. Ethnic differences can promote enrichment in the society on the basis of the diversity inherent in them. We as a Church are constantly reminded that in Christ there is no east nor west and the gender as well as race and all such differences that could be used for dividing people are also simultaneously the very instruments which in the hands of God promote harmony and such beauty as one finds in a well kept garden. The Church has the capacity and experience and in fact charged with the responsibility to promote the will of God in this regard. The means used in achieving this include the programming of seminars, workshops and training for leaders in LCCs for an understanding of the society and the stresses under which they live.

We recognize that we do not live in an ideal world and therefore we encounter difficulties. We have noted in this regard, for instance, the insistence of some in leadership of

the Christian Council itself seeking to require that Local Councils of Churches should subscribe to the same membership as the member Churches of the Christian Council do at the national level. This overlooks the functional roles which bring together Christian groupings who are unable to accept the membership of the Christian Council of Ghana even while they are willing to co-operate with it in its social message.

At the Local Council level, there are indications that some of the leaders would wish to seek authorization for their accommodation of local programmes from the headquarters of their respective denominations. Where this is not readily obtainable, for a variety of reasons, this reflects in weaknesses in the operation of the Local Councils of Churches in matters regarded as particularly political in nature.

It has been unmistakably clear that the national politics in Ghana have been started, particularly during one party political ideologies or non-party political one for that matter to toe the line of the party in power. This psychophantic frame of references, unfortunately, weighs so much with some of the leaderships of the Churches at all levels that this obscures the virtue of the Church making its witness to God's truth, love and mercy within an absolutely non-partisan ethos. This creates difficulty to be watched at the national and local levels constantly for the Church to be true to its mission.

We encourage Church members at the local level to seek political offices where practicable in order to witness to their faith in the discharge of their obligations as responsible citizens in their localities.

The means for commanding the resources for Churches to engage in the requisite programmes for achieving democratic goals are necessarily limited in Ghana. This is due to the economic environment in which the citizenry operate. They are largely producers of primary products for overseas markets for which the prices of commodities produced are determined by the overseas buyers. Even where they manufacture commodities, tarif walls are raised against them through organizations such as European Union. Would that our overseas partners would search for ways to obtain reasonable considerations to eliminate such frustrations that we experience.

Overseas grants for supporting development programmes and other current projects in the areas of agriculture, education, health and social welfare have for sometime enjoyed exemptions from tax liabilities. While we may admit that there have been abuses of this privilege its complete and indiscriminate withdrawal would seem to prejudice what support overseas partners of Churches and those charitable on humanitarian enterprises in Ghana could structure for the benefit of Ghana. This is a matter which at the local and overseas partners' level could appropriately raise for imaginative and just review.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

NAMIBIA

Ms Nangula E. Kathindi

Through the process of decentralization the central government is able to channel its services and resources to the people at the grassroot levels. Local authorities at the region have got autonomous powers to carry out their functions, make decisions on policies and by-laws.

Local governments have got some power and their communities participate democratically in the running of municipal councils and management committees. Local governments are democratic to some extent because the councillors are elected by the people.

In Namibia the Churches play an important role in the running of local governments and the decentralization process. First of all, the people who elect local authorities are themselves Christians and members of the Churches. The involvement of Churches is so crucial because Churches have got direct access to the communities they serve. Therefore in most of our municipal councils and management committees we have pastors/ priests working as mayors, chairpersons of the committees, governors etc. They are contributing towards maintaining law and order, making by-laws and standing orders, planning for development, delivering services to communities, e.g. water, electricity and in mobilizing for resources.

A careful consideration, however, needs to be taken in how the relation between the local governments and the Churches is to be maintained. There has been a misunderstanding from some Church authorities on the question of pastors/priests functioning as mayors, governors, etc., at the local government level. This conflict led to the dismissal of these pastors/ priests from their Church duties, while on one hand it could have rather been a harmonious situation of Church and state when we have pastors/ priests functioning in both institutions at the same time. More efforts are needed in reaching consensus on the working relationship of the local government and Churches.

The government needs to continue recognizing the Churches' representation when planning and developing policies starting from the local, regional and national levels. The Churches will have to respond to the people's expectations of the Churches to adapt changes and bring about spiritual reconstruction e.g. counseling and healing services.

Non-governmental organizations

The Namibian non-governmental organizations are not very much decentralized because they lack structures on the ground. However, efforts are being made to build structures. There are, however, few who have established themselves in regions, for example, the Namibia Development Trust which is running

projects which also include women development. The Legal Assistance Centre through the Human Rights Centres help the population in giving legal advice on various subjects like maintenance, land rights, etc. Churches have been cooperating with the government and international NGOs to carry out various projects like consultation on needs in regions, training people at the regional levels to be responsible in running the projects which have been established. Cooperation has also taken place when communities were provided with clinics, hospitals, schools, community halls, water, electricity and telephones. Cooperatives, food security programmes, income generating activities have also been established.

Useful information to farmers, small scale businesses have been provided by specific ministries, e.g. the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Local Government and Housing.

Women in the democratic process

Even though the situation of women still remains to be that of poverty and difficult life especially in the rural areas, slight improvements are taking place in the country as a whole. We have two women ministers among twenty ministers. Among thirteen regional councillors, only one is a woman. Our National Assembly has got 72 members and 5 (7%) of them are women.

Since women in Namibia make up 51% of the population they are only represented by 7% of the nation's legislature. The improvement here is only that there were no women represented during colonial times. Even though the Local Government Act provides for participation of women, when we had elections at the regional levels the Namibian population indicated clearly that they were not ready to elect women into positions. So far we do not have a woman governor. At the local government level we have more women represented as out of twelve, five councillors are women among the first seven on the list. Recently an Association of Media Women was established, however, it seems to be mostly Windhoek based.

At the Church level some Churches have started ordaining women pastors/priests and accepting women to be part of the decision-making bodies. Women also have got an opportunity to air their views through their women organizations at Church and government levels, but it will take some time for participating at local and national level on a broader basis.

THE ROLE OF JUSTICE AND HUMAN RIGHTS - THE CASE OF KENYA

Rev. Mutava Musyimi

The ongoing democratization process in Kenya could not be analyzed without recognizing both the internal and external forces which have played significant roles in that process. The forces would include the people of Kenya, referred to as the mass; the politicians; the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which include the trade unions, pressure groups like the Church(es) and other religious communities and to a lesser degree the political party(ies). The external forces would include the end of the Cold War coupled with the collapse of the eastern block states; the international community of donors both bilateral and multilateral; and the so called new order with its demand for transparency and accountability.

It is not easy to identify a certain date as the beginning of the process. However, though the people may have started to feel the urge for change and demand it the behaviour of the rulers had actually accelerated the quest for the democratization process. From the mid-eighties onward the political leadership started becoming more and more dictatorial and absolutist.

The electorate was getting increasingly disenfranchised and was therefore not entirely free to choose leaders. Their rights of association had been curtailed by the entrenchment of section 2A in the Constitution which made Kenya a de jure one party state in 1982. Those expelled from the ruling party had been denied the right to form another political party. The one party system made it easy for the state rule with minimum accountability. The abuse and violations of human rights were on the increase. Citizens could not speak without looking over their shoulders.

The need for reform in Kenya was resisted with all vigour. It was argued that the country could not allow competitive politics of multipartyism because the society was not cohesive yet. With increasing pressure the ruling party KANU opted first to review its policies. What had started as a committee to review its disciplinary and election methods ended up as review of all sorts of policies in the country. The KANU Review Committee, chaired by Prof. George Saitoti, the country's Vice President toured the country and listened to all views. Different interest groups including Churches presented their views - these were the views which long had been denied legitimate expression.

The repealing of section 2A of the Constitution in December, 1991 was a great relief to the country. The registration of the Forum for the Restoration of Democracy (FORD which had begun as a pressure group) on 31st December, 1991 was received with obvious celebration.

Unfortunately the year also marked the beginning of the politically motivated ethnic clashes which had been dubbed as

"Land Clashes". Though many reasons have been fronted as to the cause of these clashes one undisputable fact is that the government of Kenya has not acted in a manner that demonstrates its impartiality. This has remained as one of the bottlenecks in the way of success for a smooth transition to democracy.

The transition

With the registration of FORD (which has so far split into two FORD(A) and FORD(K)) Kenyans started to breathe anew, so to speak. Other parties were also registered. To date the country has four major political parties. One sad observation is that these political parties seem to be formed along tribal basis.

All kinds of speculation was rife as to where the elections would be called. Dates between March and June in 1991 were speculated. However, those fronting these speculations miscalculated the process towards successful multiparty elections. Instead of calling for a period to educate Kenyans on what is involved in the new political set up politicians were busy calling for elections. The fact that Kenyans were and still are ignorant of what is meant by competitive politics makes it difficult for them to contribute effectively to the democratization process.

The other bottleneck is that adequate constitutional reforms were necessary so as to make our constitution conform to a multiparty democracy. These have yet to be put in place.

The registration of voters was called but it was first resisted by the new political parties. They called for a boycott of the registration. Some of the reasons advanced were factual. Others were far-fetched, the main reason advanced was that the playing ground was not level. The Church was also partly involved in the calling for the boycott. Eventually the boycott call was withdrawn. It was later argued that the rigging of the 1992 general elections began with the registration of voters. The representation in the electoral commission - the Chairman in particular - did not improve the situation.

The election date was another contentious issue. The Attorney General changed the law to suit the ruling party. His action was, however, challenged in the High Court and he was subsequently overruled.

The election campaigns were themselves neither free nor fair. The ruling party campaigned without any hindrances often taking advantage of the government machinery. A case in point was the use of the administration and the state media. The opposition campaigned under harsh conditions. Sometimes their meetings were cancelled or disrupted by the police or the KANU Youth wingers. Much money was also used to bribe the voters. This continues to date and is a great hindrance to the democratic process. People have adopted the idea that leadership can be bought.

The role of the Church

The Church which has also been involved in calling for political changes found itself with a new role come to the era of political pluralism. As mentioned earlier Kenyans were not conscientized in what these political changes entailed. Neither the Government nor the ruling party had been willing or were indeed prepared to educate the people on the subject. In fact there was much negative publicity about competitive politics from the government side. The state radio and television have helped to give the idea negative press. This applies also to other government organs. The other political parties were not able, due to financial constraints, to educate the people. The other non-governmental organizations did not have the facilities either, although now they have come in. The Church therefore found itself with this responsibility.

An agressive programme on political education was launched. This was mainly carried by the National Council of Churches of Kenya (NCCK) and the Catholic Church. NCCK had started its campaign in November, 1991 before the introduction of multiparty politics in our constitution. The campaign involves seminars and publications in voters education. The challenge of this campaign was that there was not enough time and resources. The campaign was also difficult because it did not offer voters education.

The NCCK has now entered its second phase of civic education. This concentrates on sustaining and consolidation of democracy. The overall goal of this campaign is to facilitate through education and training the building of a civic society in which the citizens gain power, capacity to participate fully and meaningfully in all affairs that affect and shape their socio-economic and political future.

We need to add that the Church was also involved in the election monitoring. This it did in conjunction with other NGOs. They joined together and formed the National Elections Monitoring Unit (NEMU).

The election results

NEMU declared that the elections were not altogether free and fair. This was in contrast with the Commonwealth Observer Group. Other observer groups had the same conclusion as that of NEMU. The election results, however, gave KANU the mandate though not with very commanding statistics. This has had its impact and it appears to produce discriminated development in the country. This has been worsened by the ruling party's initial reluctance to fully recognize the opposition.

Democracy as a way of life

Neither multipartyism nor the holding of elections is democracy. These only enhance it. The failure of democracy in Kenya can to a large extent be attributed to the fact that the ruling party appears unwilling to accept, much less appreciate, the need for competitive politics.

The government does not encourage democratic institutions and practices. Instead it is busy wooing the opposition to defect to KANU so as to render it ineffective. The opposition is not allowed to operate freely. It is suppressed and intimidated by the administration and in some cases is unable to hold public rallies. However KANU has numerous rallies, often addressed by civil servants.

The press is intimidated and threatened. Whenever it reports some unpalatable news it is accused of being seditious. But amidst this hostility there is some limited freedom. The judiciary has not been seen to act impartially either. Many of the opposition activists have also been jailed or prosecuted on framed up charges. The feeling is that the country is now reverting back to dictatorship.

The ethnic cleansing and the excuse that clashes have been caused by the democratization process is a bid to threaten the democratization process in Kenya. A solution seems not to be found on this evil which has caused death to hundreds of Kenyans and rendered tens of thousands homeless.

The decentralization of government operations and the ideal of a strong local government would have been good to the democratization process. However, there is too much control from the central government and the local authorities cannot act independently. Sessional paper no. 1 of 1986 had been developed the country towards decentralization. However, too much central government supervision has stifled this noble process. The same happens to local civil institutions e.g. women groups.

Economic situation

Economic growth is slow. Corruption is at a very high level in all sectors. Failure to prosecute those involved especially politicians in the ruling party and senior civil servants is a major fact of our economy. The Goldenberg scandal is a case in point.

The Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) have severely affected the vulnerable. Although SAPs were meant to help the people, they lack humaneness and render these policies harsh and unfavourable. Cuts in subsidies and cost sharing are but examples. The international community, local civic organizations and private individuals need to show more interest on the SAPs.

The international community

Our international ecumenical partners could help in many ways. For example they could lobby their governments to demand for more accountability and transparency from the Kenyan authorities. They could encourage them not to give only lip service to the democratization process but to embrace it fully and protect it. They should be asked to respect and protect human rights.

The partners should urge their governments and other non-governmental organizations to support financially Churches and other civil institutions which are involved in the democratization process. Civic education is but one example of such help. However other development activities which empower the community towards transformation should be assisted.

The ethnic cleansing has reached alarming proportions. The international community could provide relief and rehabilitation aid also to initiate and support peace and conflict resolution. Relief and rehabilitation should not be left to the government alone for implementation. The international donors must insist that the local NGOs and Churches be involved.

The Church will continue with her civic education as funds and time will allow. It will also continue to preach the good news of the kingdom of God and continue to call for kingdom ethics as well as sound moral values. Through prayers, pastoral letters, press releases and other efforts, it will continue with its prophetic ministry to the Nation and endeavour to demonstrate the same values in the internal management of its own affairs.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

NIGERIA
Fr. John Patrick Ngoyi

There can be no democracy without social justice and the respect for the fundamental human rights of every person. The African Charter for Popular Participation emphasizes the need to re-direct resources "to satisfy in the first place, the critical needs of the people, to ... achieve social justice and to emphasize self-reliance...". 1) It calls for the "extension and protection of people's basic human rights and we urge all governments to vigorously implement the African Charter on Human and People's Rights and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, ..." 2)

This underscores the importance of social justice and human rights in promoting democracy in Africa. The Church and Human Rights was the theme of a workshop organized jointly by the Human Rights Committee of the Justice and Peace Commission of the Ijebu-Ode Catholic Diocese and the Civil Liberties Organizations (CLO), at the Pastoral Centre Ijebu-Igbo, Ogun state, October 29-31, 1992. About 80 participants from Lagos and Kaduna Archdioceses, Ibadan, Ekiti, Ondo and Ijebu-Ode dioceses of the Catholic Church, human rights organizations and the press participated.

A workshop organized by the Church could have no other foundation apart from Jesus-Christ, we went from the assumption of Jesus-Christ that only the Truth about ourselves could set us free. So I was given the challenge to open the workshop with a talk on the Church and human rights. Most of what was said is compiled in a book, we looked at the position of the Church vis-à-vis human rights in history. By Church I mean Catholic and Protestant. The verdict was: GUILTY. So, as a Church member I had to assume my past and confess the sin of my fathers and mothers. Then I turned to myself as an African and my society with all the catalogue of human rights violations in various African countries. It is here that I had to look at the impact of the slave trade and colonization on my personality. For those who know kiswahili they certainly know what Muzungu means. This is the name my own mother calls me when I am back home. Why? Go through slave trade and colonization. This is symptomatique of a certain inferiority complex she had developed while the Europeans had developed the complex of superiority. The first duty of mine as a Church man is to restore the dignity and the self-confidence of my mother and all others in her position. Believe, they are millions. I can do that in my continent. It is the role of the Church men and women on this side to the same. We all need to confess as to be free and deal with each other as God's children, brothers and sisters, children of the same Father in spite of all our

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1) Article 9, African Charter for Popular Participation in Development.
2) Article 17, ibid.

differences. The latter are meant to make God's World beautiful, not ugly or a battle field. We are all guilty, we have all failed in the respect of the human dignity and human rights. May God forgive us all and give us the grace to start anew. Amen.

The Justice and Peace Commission plays the role of catalyst, somehow, specializing in humanity in Jesus name. The Church has got so many arms, both locally and internationally to speak for the underprivileged, to be the voice of the voiceless in Africa. Let me just mention a few instances where the Church ought to speak for the little one of our money-power dominated world.

1. The annulment and silencing of people's choice and voice like in Nigeria and Zaire. To promote justice the Church ought to have stood by the people and influenced the international community to isolate the dictators. Churches and governments in the rest of the world should do the same. People of Africa cannot understand that the Church keeps quiet when their voice is silenced by those who make use of the arms they received and piled up during the Cold War. Why should governments of the European Community, now Union, not decide to withdraw all their ambassadors as a powerful sign that they are determined not to deal with dictators anywhere? Instead what we see is European ambassadors shaking hands with dictators the day following a coup. Worse still, bilateral aid continues with dictators making them more powerful and ever ready to clamp down on any democratic force. Then it becomes most difficult for us to comprehend how under the sun, people who value so much democracy in their own countries support oppressive regimes in Africa? I feel all the more sad and guilty when I realize that those doing this are Christians. Do not forget that Nigeria is a multi-religious country.

2. Exploitation of the poor and the mismanagement of public funds by public servants. The Church is in better position to speak on behalf of the exploited by denouncing this flagrant injustice. Most of you know the case of Ogoni People in Nigeria fighting for their rights in an oil producting zone being polluted by the multinational oil company Shell without any compensation. Innocent people have lost their lives in the process. The international community has been seized of the case. Not much support is forthcoming.

Rwandans are dying in their thousands. The greatest thing the international community did was to remove Americans and French and Belgian citizens after dropping more arms for Rwandans to continue killing themselves. Why should this be? Are Rwandans not human beings?

We believe that European governments should assist in the formation of managers for countries with democratic governments. As for countries where dictators are still in power, any cooperation with established governments will amount to strengthening dictatorships while weakening the opposition which is already very poor in most cases. In this case our call would be to strengthen the civil society by supporting

popular organizations and assisting projects that help in the formation of people at the base. To be able to control the government and make it accountable, it is a necessity for the civil society and human rights groups to have some experts. European governments should help in this. I also personally call on European governments to allow the civil society in Africa have access to money granted to their governments so as to ask for account since they are the ones repaying debts and suffering the hardships of IMF.

3. Arms sales to poor countries and the dumping of toxid wastes in Africa. The right to life for most Africans has already been suspended by the conditionalities of IMF and the World Bank. As if this was not enough, the west is "donating" arms to the dying SAP-victims African people to destroy themselves. Worse still Africa has also become the dumping place, not only for agricultural products but also of toxic waste like in the case of KOKO in Nigeria by Italians. Do we really have to disappear as a continent this early?

4. Supplementary role in the formation of the conscience of the people. The justice and peace contribution in the formation of political consciousness. I am of the opinion that the Church should participate in civic education to enable people to know their rights and duties so as to serve society responsibly. The Church should not take the place of NGOs and the Civil Society. Whichever physical project undertaken should be as a sign of the Kingdom rather than a professional business of the Church.

The above mentioned workshop prescribed the following tasks, among others, for the Church and believers in the struggle to promote and defend human rights and social justice:

- "It is incumbent on all Christians to involve themselves in the work of social justice and promotion of human rights. The Church should play a leading role in helping people become aware of their rights and in empowering them to secure their rights.

- The Church should espouse the cause of the poor, oppressed and all those marginalized by society, and work to defend their rights and uphold their dignity.

- The Church should be more vocal in condemning human rights violations and injustice in society.

- The Church should collaborate and exchange information with human rights organizations and other interest groups to achieve greater strength and solidarity in defending and promoting human rights." 3)

This position has been confirmed by the just concluded Special Synod of Bishops for Africa. The Synod Fathers de-

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3) Human Rights Committee, Justice and Peace Commission, Ijebu-Ode Catholic Diocese and Civil Liberties Organization, The Church and Human Rights, October 1992, pages 116-118.

nounced every structure that kept Africans in a situation of sub-human, from international structures to internal and self-made structures in Africa. They went even farther to make a self-examination, I quote:

"Churches in Africa are also aware that, insofar as their own internal affairs are concerned, justice is not always respected with regard to those men and women who are at their service. If the Church should give witness to justice, she recognizes that whoever dares to speak to others about justice should also strive to be just, in their eyes. It is necessary therefore to examine with care the procedures, the possessions and the life style of the Church" (The Church in Africa and her Evangelising Mission towards the year 2000, p.18).

The Ijebu-Ode Catholic Diocese has in the past few years been working closely with the Civil Liberties Organization (CLO) in the specific areas of human rights education, empowerment and institutional development in furtherance of these objectives. The result of every workshop was sent to various Churches in the spirit of brotherhood. Interestingly enough, more Churches in Nigeria, including the Anglicans, Methodists and Baptists have agreed to collaborate with the CLO in the same attempt to empower the people. One should note for example the regular interventions of the Anglican Archbishop in Lagos, calling the military government to hand over power to a democratically elected president, whose election was annulled by the Babaginda junta.

It is important to note that governmental agencies can collaborate fruitfully with the Church in promoting and defending human rights only when the government is sincerely committed to human rights protection. The Nigeria experience is to the contrary. Although successive governments (especial military regimes) profess a commitment to human rights, they observe them only in the breach. They use human rights as a slogan, bait or sleeping tablet to deceive people at the time they install themselves in power.

Conclusion

Churches are certainly one of the organizations that reach grassroots in Africa. The failure of democracy in the African continent is not without implicating a certain conception of the Church's mission in society. A Church in the service of the Kingdom, which is a Kingdom of justice, cannot do without forming the conscience of the faithful to the necessity of building a just, democratic and fair society. It has become imperative to revisit the social implications of the faith in Jesus-Christ. Most of African leaders who today block the democratic process in Africa were trained and formed in Christian schools. Why don't they have a Christian conscience? We need, as Churches, to re-examine our pastoral priorities as well as examine our own ways of life. To make other witnesses we need to be ourselves witnesses. The fate of Africa concerns Christians from Africa and the North in general, especially because it is Christians who colonized the continent.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

ZIMBABWE
Ms. Rudo M. Chitiga-Machingauta

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains universal values that serve as guidelines for each country. However, it is necessary for each country to develop its own code of human rights taking into account its social and cultural values. This process is necessary to construct a national sensibility to human rights.

In Zimbabwe the power and impartiality of the judiciary is guaranteed by the constitution. The rule of law has therefore been observed except in few cases particularly those that involve politics.

The constitution of Zimbabwe still excludes gender as grounds for discrimination. Many women have fought for an amendment of the constitution but the battle seems futile.

The constitution has not yet been translated into the vernacular languages of Shena and Ndebele. This would have made it a tool for civil society groups to understand and discuss their rights. The discussion of human rights in Zimbabwe has generally floated in legal jargon making it a preserve of a few. It was only in 1992 that a local organization for human rights was formed. This has helped to demystify issues of human rights. NGOs until then have generally shied away from issues of human rights preferring to leave them to the Churches. NGOs concentrated on legal aid and women's rights. NGO human rights organizations found it safer to operate at regional level. This was also because a state of emergency existed in many countries of the region. There was generally an atmosphere of intolerance. In Zimbabwe we have the bulk of our police force trained from mid 60s to 1992 unaware of human rights because they were trained during the state of emergency. Programmes to retrain the police force are therefore a priority in development cooperation with our government.

There is a need for intensive NGO and Church participation in human rights definition and education. This activity should not be left at academic level but involve all groups of civil society.

Such an exercise would enable us to come up with our own national priorities regarding human rights and social justice. A national vision of social justice should be evolved based on fair distribution of resources, equal chance and opportunity for all citizens to participate in the economic, social, cultural and political life. This is the only way to cultivate a democratic culture.

Globalization of media and cultures poses a threat to the process of evolving a democratic culture. In Zimbabwe today we see the greatest violator of human rights being economics. The

structural adjustment policies of World Bank and IMF which are strangely supported by western governments have resulted in the following:

- cuts in social spending - remove the right to life and social security

- cost sharing - remove the right to education and health

- removal of subsidies - remove the right to food and survival.

What is left is in fact the right to vote but for what?

The demand for investment and market friendly environment which is one of the conditionalities of SAPs and also BMZ raises the following questions on human rights and justice:

- In most cases a market friendly environment means cheap labour and the exploitation of women in export promotion zones.

- In Zimbabwe the market friendly environment and the need to attract foreign investment has taken away the most fundamental right of Zimbabweans which was the main reason for a 16 year war of liberation, i.e. the right to land. Land can no longer be redistributed because of pressure from the Paris Club of donors and the World Bank. It appears to me that we are sacrifying human rights in Zimbabwe and other countries to give the West the right to be rich.

What are the economic rights of civil society? It seems we have been denied the right to create wealth. Assistance to us could be to support large scale economic activities at grassroots level. Most wars that are being fought, particularly tribal clashes, are a result of the denial of economic rights.

The trust in the state as a vital actor for its citizens has to be reinstated.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

GERMANY
HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT
Dr. Klemens van de Sand

Development means full respect for human rights

In the history of development cooperation there have been various attempts to define what development really means, and what development cooperation aims at.

The most convincing and most human definition was offered by the World Conference on Human Rights in June 1993. In essence, the final declaration of the Vienna conference states that the substance and the aim of development are determined by human rights. In other words, development is the attainment of civil, political as well as social human rights. In my view, this definition is the real political signal to come out of Vienna.

The declaration supported the view that development, democracy and respect for human rights and basic liberties are interdependent and are mutually reinforcing. Any restriction of individual liberties in the name of development was clearly rejected. This refutes the theory that democracy and human rights are a luxury that only the developed world can afford. The mention of the right to development is also important. The right is not to be perceived as a lever in international law by which the developing countries can place demands on the industrial states, but is first and foremost a right that the individual can claim from his/her own government.

Long before Vienna conference, the end of the ideological, economic and ecological deviations in the East robbed many developing countries, particularly in Africa, of their old and beloved excuses. The current regimes and ruling élites can now no longer blame external factors, such as an apparently unfair world economy order, as the sole reason for their lack of development. It is annoying just how much time and energy has been wasted in international discussions because theoreticians on imperialism and dependency, along with many well-meaning politicians and NGO representatives, have allowed themselves to be strung along by dictators demanding aid as compensation for the exploitation of their countries, when in fact all that was being sought was a support system to keep a privileged few in power with no popular mandate. Of course, we must not allow the pendulum to swing to the other extreme and permit the industrial nations to shirk their responsibility for the increase of mass poverty in a number of countries, which they have, for example, caused by their finance and trade policies. Despite the fact that the combination of external and internal factors affects each country differently, one thing is certain: the misery to be found in poor countries in particular has been caused to a large extent by tutelage, poor government, coun-

terproductive state intervention in the economic sphere, debt run up by state enterprise, corruption, repression of minorities and civil wars. The last decades have clearly shown that those regimes which abuse civil, economic and social human rights have little to show in terms of development.

Human rights mean democracy

Until late in the eighties development policy restricted its focus mainly to solving the economic and social problems in the Southern hemisphere. Economic considerations stole the limelight and left political, legal, social and cultural questions to wait neglected in the wings. How wrong we were. We cannot expect to overcome poverty if the protagonists of economic progress - that is, individual citizens - are denied fundamental human rights: economic shortcomings have always been primarily the result of political mismanagement.

In view of this situation, the criteria governing German development policy, introduced in 1991, put the spotlight on the conditions within the recipient country itself. The criteria are: respect for human rights; popular participation in the political process; the rule of law; a social market economy which respects the principles of the market and competition; and finally the recipient government's own commitment towards development, shown for example in its readiness to cut back on excessive arms expenditure and invest as much as possible in human resources. Many other donors have introduced similar criteria.

The introduction of these benchmarks is neither a new form of colonialism nor is it the imposition of a western system of values, as some developing countries complained in the run up to the Vienna conference.

Of course, no one can deny that different cultures give rise to different institutions through which the population is given the opportunity to participate in political life. Democracy in African countries should, therefore, not be judged in terms of different constitutional models and political systems in the industrial world but must simply display the requisite features of democratic order. These include democratic election procedures, freedom of association, of speech as well as freedom of the press. These are the civil rights which have been recognized in international conventions and thus by the developing countries for a long time.

Quite another matter is how, and how quickly, the protection of human rights and popular participation can be improved without endangering the economic progress that has already been made. This question can only be answered with regard to the society in a given country. In the industrial countries, however, and in many of the developing countries, history has shown that a lack of freedom does not lead to prosperity for all but, at best, lines the pockets of a small ruling minority. Above all, we must remember that cultural differences are never a justification for torture or arbitrary action by the state!

No future for development cooperation without democratization in the developing countries

High on the agenda of current development policy is the translation of the international consensus achieved in Vienna into sustained action. Above all, this means that development cooperation must become more political. It must aim for improvements in political conditions because, firstly, the extent to which human and participatory rights are respected determines the quality of an individual's existence, irrespective of economic considerations, and secondly, these rights are also a prerequisite for economic development.

German development policy has in the past supported many projects, run by political foundations and NGOs to promote human rights, democracy and administrative reform. Our official bilateral aid now places even more emphasis on these aims. This help cannot, however, be limited merely to assistance for the holding of national elections. In a living democracy, where the individual's human rights and self-determination are guaranteed, it is more important to support social groups, such as trade unions, self-help organizations as well as local government bodies, which represent the interests of the people, particularly vis-à-vis state institutions. Without participatory bodies at grassroots level, no democracy, irrespective of form, can achieve the consensus it requires to survive. Without this basic consensus, elections are merely a superficial exercise and are meagre proof of democracy. Isolated support for elections, which some donors seem to think fashionable, is evidence to me of the old "top down" approach to development which failed and thus spawned the demand for "participatory development" now on the lips of all development politicians.

In this context, other important fields for action in development cooperation are the promotion of the rule of law, an independent and efficient system of justice, the demobilization of armed forces, assistance for the military and the police to become more democratic and for the civilian governments to establish their political primacy over the security sector.

Like other donors, we are willing to offer greater support to those partner countries which wish to respect their international commitments and seek help in creating the right political and social conditions for development. In our activities we apply the following principle: persuasion is better than punishment, incentives better than sanctions. The crux of the matter is to pursue a political peace dividend instead of the material one, which may or may not exist, and use that in the service of development. What I mean is that large injections of money from the industrial countries into the developing world will be useless unless everyone pulls together in the developing countries towards a political system, founded on political and economic competition, in which all sectors of the population participate on an equal basis. To put it plainly: the monopoly hold that small elites have on political and economic life must be dismantled; povery alleviation is a

question of power. No one has expressed this more convincingly than the Nigerian Nobel Prize winner Wole Soyinka at an international conference in Bonn in December 1993: "Progress on our continent has been blighted by a minuscule proportion of its vast humanity, a self-appointed and self-centred band whose mission is to dominate, by whatever means, but primarily by the very means of our common material resources, at the expense of their optimal development, and at the expense of the bulk of humanity that these minority groups claim to represent". Soyinka, too, stated clearly that the apparent contradiction between individual rights and the demands of society, commonly cited by the opponents of the universal validity of human rights, is almost always an excuse to restrict those rights for dictatorial purposes.

No one can deny that we must be self-critical and realistic in our approach to development in general and human rights in particular. The third winter of war in a row in Bosnia and the continuation of atrocities against the civilian population is a horrible reminder to us in Europe that we have failed to protect human rights in our own back-yard. Missionary zeal hardly becomes us: before we point a finger at others, we Europeans must ask ourselves what is to be done in Europe to protect minorities, to achieve equal rights for women and to rid our continent of the scourges of war and racism. All this, however, is no reason to succumb to resignation. We must remind ourselves time and again that sustainable development is only possible if basic liberties are respected and opportunities created by which each individual can develop in his or her society. If these conditions are not in place, then efforts for development will be in vain.

EUROPEAN UNION

ON HUMAN RIGHTS, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT
Commission to the Council

In 1991, November 28th the Council of the European Union and of the Member States' Meeting in the Council adopted the Resolution of Human Rights, Democracy, and Development. Parts of the report of 1994 are published here describing positive actions supported by the Commission to help the developing countries and the measures taken by the EU and Member States.

Guidelines followed by the Commission in implementing positive action

The Resolution of November 1991 gives high priority to incentives as a means for the European Union to encourage the democratic transition process in developing countries to consolidate democracy in those countries and promote observance of basic human rights.

On this basis, and in line with the general principles contained in the Resolution, the European Union worked out a whole set of guidelines to enable it to diversify its action in this area.

In accordance with the criteria drawn up and set out in the report it presented to the Council in 1992, the Commission continued and intensified its support for the projects in what had been identified as prioritiy areas.

These include the following main topics:

Operations linked with the exercise of public authority and following two broad lines:

(i) operations to strengthen the rule of law:
- at institutional level (support for parliaments, the judiciary, the drawing-up of consitutions or electoral legislation, etc.);

- and also in terms of the transparency of public administration (good governance);

(ii) operations to support consultations of the population (referendum, elections, etc.), especially in countries making the transition to democracy.

Operations to strengthen civil society:

to ensure that a lasting effect is achieved, the operations in this particularly sensitive and important area were designed to create and consolidate a social fabric which underpins and at the same time guarantees a democratically organized society.

They included:
- support for local associations and membership organizations;
- support for freedom of the press;
- strengthening of education schemes.

Support for vulnerable groups.

Description of operations

In all, during the first ten months of 1993, the European Union supported 143 projects in the developing countries to the tune of ECU 39.2 million.

The financial instrument used to promote human rights and democracy and development objectives were as follows:

- budget heading B7-5053 - Support for operations promoting human rights and democracy in the developing countries. The sum allocated to this heading was ECU 16 million in 1993 as compared with ECU 10 million in 1992.

- budget heading B7-5078 - Support for the democratization process in Latin America. The ECU 15 million entered for this item represented an increase of ECU 5 million over 1992.

It is worth noting that the operations which received funding from these two headings were initiated by, or benefited, either public-sector bodies (governments, courts, parliaments, etc.) or private organizations including those in the South (NGOs which defend human rights, NGOs which protect children and bodies which protect the rights of indigenous communities or minorities, etc.).

- EDF resources
  (the mobilization of these resources requires a prior request from the authorities of the ACP States)

- funds earmarked for financial and technical assistance and economic cooperation with the ALA developing countries

- counterpart funds generated by various Community instruments for financial development cooperation with the ACP countries.

Suppport for electoral processes and the consolidation of the rule of law

A total of ECU 13.4 milion was channelled into these operations in 21 countries, including Madagascar, Eritrea, Malawi, Jordan, Uganda, Cambodia, Mozambique, Honduras, El Salvador, and the Central African Republic. The breakdown of the funds mobilized being as follows:

- EDF: ECU 5.4 million
- counterpart funds: ECU 0.4 million

- heading B7-5053: ECU 6 million
- heading B7-5058: ECU 1.6 million.

Community support focused on the preliminary measures (in particular census of and information for voters), the practical and logistic aspects (ballots boxes, electoral cards and voting slips, etc.) and the technical assistance in form of teams of observers (including members of the European Parliament) sent when the election actually took place, in accordance with the principle of political neutrality.

The European Union decided to provide assistance for the preparation of elections which where to be free and fair. This was done in close conjunction with the Member States and the main suppliers of funds.

The very large amounts assigned to these operations were nevertheless on a smaller scale than in 1992. The reason was that in the course of 1992 a large number of countries, particularly in Africa, started the transition to democracy, and some of them needed very significant sums owing to their size and the complexity of their domestic situation (Zaire, Angola, Madagascar, Yemen and Mozambique, etc.).

The rate of requests for suppport for these transition processes in Africa slowed down in 1993 and the amounts earmarked fell as a result. This nevertheless meant that more funds could be channelled at the population, freedom of the press and protection of minorities.

The reverse trend was seen in Latin America, however, and the financial support granted for this purpose by the European Union to these countries increased by over a half.

The funds mobilized to promote the transition to democracy acted as a kind of trigger for the transition process. Other resources, particularly from the EDF, were usuallly combined with these funds. In addition to the fact that the combination of funds avoided the need to try and cover requirements from the fairly limited means provided by the specific budget heading, the use of EDF resources as a supplement (and sometimes even as the only source of financing) generally tended to make the ACP States assume their joint responsibility more readily and so demonstrate their willingness to get more involved by making a more direct commitment to the success of the transition process.

Measures and reactions in the event of serious violation of human rights or a breakdown in democratic processes

The Community approach is geared to the principle that international cooperation must focus especially on positive measures providing incentives for the promotion of democracy and human rights; the use of sanctions should be considered only if all other means have failed.

A kind of rising scale of what could be described as negative or restrictive measures can be drawn upon, as follows:

- confidential or public démarches;
- change in the content of cooperation programmes or the channels used;
- deferment of signatures or decisions needed to implement cooperation;
- reduction of cultural, scientific or technical cooperation programmes;
- deferment of the holding of a joint committee meeting;
- suspension of high-level bilateral contract;
- postponement of new projects;
- refusal to act on partners' initiatives;
- trade embargoes;
- suspension of cooperation with the states concerned.

In these cases, the European Union is careful not to penalize the actual population of the countries; humanitarian and emergency aid, which goes to the most vulnerable sections of the population, is maintained.

Throughout 1993 the European Union and its Member States made public condemnatory or warning statements and adopted trade embargoes. The European Union did not take any decisions suspending financial and technical cooperation in addition to those already in force in 1992 (e.g. Haiti, Sudan and Zaire), as indicated in the 1992 report.

Conclusions

In the light of the account contained in the preceding pages, the following remarks can be made:

1) Firstly, after two years of experience of the implementation of the 1992 Resolution, the validity of the guidelines laid down in it can be reaffirmed. They meet the objectives which the European Union is seeking to attain in this sphere. All the guidelines have not been followed to the same degree, but, compared with 1992, there is evidence that the operations adopted by the European Union on the basis of the Resolution and also the conclusions of the Council of November 1992 are being intensified and also extended in scope.

2) A great deal of attention has been paid to the process of consulting the population. This is a positive aspect of the Community's action in that the European Union has in this way made a specific contribution to the expectations of a considerable number of countries, particularly in Africa, where sincere aspirations towards political and economic liberalization are making themselves felt.

It would be a good idea for the contribution made by the European Union and the Member States in this area to be more clearly perceived by the population and rendered more visible.

The Commission nevertheless realizes that aid for consulting the population must be accompanied by a whole set of measures aimed at giving the popuplation a role or a greater role in decision- making processes (e.g. operations for ecudating voters) or strengthening the rule of law.

The Commission acknowledges that owing to a lack of well thougth-out projects presented by reliable partners it has not yet made a sufficient contribution towards attaining the latter objective, despite the fact that in this area it has played more of an active than a reactive role. Special attention should therefore be given to this aspect in future in order to facilitate the establishment and consolidation of democratic institutions in the wake of elections.

3) The Commission considers that it should grant priorities in the future to strengthening the rule of law, in particular in countries which have had successful transition to democracy. There are a number of possible ways of achieving this strengthening, namely:

- support for parliaments and other democratic, newly elected institutions;

- support for the legal systems and their independence;

- drafting of constitutions.

4) The principle of good governance or transparency in the management of public affairs is another priority. The Commission should support all substantive reforms (decentralization, effective supervisory bodies, tax reform, etc.) which will make it possible to establish, on solid foundations, plans for transparent, open public administration.

This prioritiy and that referred to in the preceding paragraph concerning the strengthening of the rule of law shaped the proposals made by the Commission as part of the Lomé IV mid- term review.

5) Another equally important area must not be neglected, namely the strengthening of civil society, in which Community assistance is needed in the following sectors:

- literacy campaigns, this being an essential prerequisite for the building of a culturally sound society which is open to civic and political information, before citizens' rights can be effetively exercised;

- the consolidation of a social fabric through effective support for local and grassroots associations, which are ideal contexts for edcuation and the dissemination of ideas;

- means of communication as special instruments for dissemination and exchanging ideas will continue to receive increased suppport from the Commission, with special attention being payed to audiovisual media and in particular

radio, which has a good cost/effetiveness ratio and which plays an essential role in countries with a low literacy rate.

EUROPEAN UNION, The Council 5329/94, Brussels, 3rd March 1994.

EU's policy explained by Mr. B. Ryelandt.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

GERMANY
HOW CAN TECHNICAL COOPERATION SUPPORT DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESSES?
Ms. Andrea Vermehren/Dr. Armin Bauer

The mandate of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Technische Zusammenarbeit (GTZ) is to implement Technical Cooperation (TC) projects and programmes in the emerging countries on behalf of the German government. The goal of the GTZ in this context is to help raise the capability of individuals and organizations in the partner countries and thus make a contribution to their sustainable, self-determined development.

The GTZ operates in the field of bilateral government development cooperation and in the past it mainly addressed government organizations in partner countries. During the 80s, however, a change in the understanding of the role of the state led to a stronger promotion of non-governmental institutions. In addition to supporting governments in building up an efficient government-operated sector, the GTZ also began efforts to strengthen the "civil society" and help it to become a competent and confident partner in negotiations with the government, an area which NGOs had occupied to date. This strong social policy approach in cooperation for development is a basis from which Technical Cooperation can support processes of democratization. For the GTZ, promoting democratization does not mean simply transferring a western-style political, multi-party system. The core element is rather to empower all groups of the population to participate in designing the development of their own society. When democracy is understood to equal co-determination, it is not an end in itself but the foundation on which sustainable development can grow. Essential elements are:

- provision of support for institutional diversity (pluralism) and
- the empowerment, of disadvantaged population groups especially, to participate in decision-making processes (participation).

After the end of the "Cold War" approaches to change this development paradigm were reflected above all in the policy of the Federal German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development (BMZ), which in 1991, with the **five new political criteria** (cf. the article by Dr. van de Sand) took account of the fact that not only economic, social and cultural conditions, but also the **political conditions** must be considered more strongly in development cooperation.

The natural consequence of this realization was that in 1992 the **political function of TC** was formulated in explicit terms. It was now officially recognized that TC is always located in a sphere occupied by power and interests, that in turn it influences this sphere itself. This "new" socio-political

dimension of TC led GTZ staff to consider more strongly how democratization processes in partner countries could be directly or indirectly supported by TC measures.

An analysis of ongoing measures brings to light a systematic division into **three categories of direct, structural and indirect** promotion of democracy.

Direct promotion of democracy includes measures which assist in formulating political demands and objectives, help to create public attention and strengthen the rights of disadvantaged interest groups to participate - in other words, measures with a socio-political dimension. Examples of this are projects which

- support the holding of elections (Nicaragua);
- support the observation of human rights (Human Rights Centre in Burundi);
- contribute to bringing peace to a country/region, for instance by demobilization of armed forces (Uganda, Ethiopia), support for refugees (Tanzania), or provision of emergency funds (Peru);
- support the media (radio, print media); and
- which promote self-help organizations in such a fashion that they carry more weight in the interplay of social forces.

Structural promotion of democracy is provided by GTZ in projects with a regulatory, administration-oriented dimension. These comprise both measures related to structuring and improving the administrative structure of the state (strengthening local authorities, promoting separation and monitoring of powers in the form of "checks and balances") and measures intended to promote interaction between government and non-government institutions. Such projects are found in the following fields of intervention:

- decentralization/regionalization;
- legal consultancy/constitutional and judicial reforms;
- financial reforms/budgetary policy;
- reform of the civil service (especially in countries undergoing a transformation process);
- promotion of intermediary organizations.

Indirect promotion of democracy includes projects which support the democratization process by economic and social measures (social and economic dimension), for example:

- self-help promotion in the sector of social infrastructure;

- assurance of basic services in the public sector, e.g. schools and health care;
- social and labour market policy, including social security systems;
- small-scale loans system;
- support for structural adjustment and a social market economy system.

The GTZ attaches great importance to the criteria that TC activities to promote democracy must be designed on a **regional- and/or country-specific** basis. In **Africa** processes of democratization are comparatively young. As we see it, the issue here is to promote a dialogue between differing social forces (strengthening the "civil society"), as well as to provide support in building up democratic elements, e.g. establishing an electoral register or elaborating constitutional reforms. It is also necessary to safeguard young democracies, for instance by demobilizing excombatants. Our core efforts in **Latin America** are directed at the structural promotion of democracy, chiefly in the regulated decentralization of responsibility and resources to regions and local communities, as well as in the field of legal stability and law enforcement. The political framework in **Asia** necessitates concentration on more indirect promotion of democracy, with measures such as consultancy on economic and social policy or credit programmes for poor population groups.

Discussion on how democratic processes can be promoted sustainably by TC is in its infancy. The objective of TC is still to support economic and social development. Sustainable development processes call for active participation and cooperation on the part of the population groups affected. TC has to gear its work right at the planning stage to those social groups which are to benefit. There can be no blueprint remedies here. The specific situation in each country calls for a high level of political and socio-cultural sensitivity. This approach will make it possible to assess the real situation in partner countries more frankly and comprehensively in future and to support emancipatory social development - whenever it occurs.

Two examples of GTZ projects promoting democracy

Legal Consultancy Services in Niger

Free, democratic, parliamentary and presidential elections were held in Niger at the beginning of 1993. This social change from a military dictatorship to a parliamentary democracy which has been taking place since the end of the 80s was the basic precondition for a TC project in the State Chancellery of the Cabinet of the Prime Minister and the Secretary General of the Government.

The **purpose** of the project is to upgrade the capacity of the Legal Division of the State Chancellery (formerly the Presidential Office) by means of counsultancy services on reviewing and commenting on planned legislation and its dissemination, so that this division is better equipped to assist in designing legislative and executive plans which will promote development.

Key areas of work were participation in drawing up the constitution for Niger in the transformation from a military dictatorship to a democracy. In addition to assisting with the constitution, the project provided inputs for the electoral code, the law governing land and water, landlord and tenant law, the law concerning administrative reform and decentralization, family law (especially regarding the position of women) and dissemination of the laws (e.g. cooperation with NGOs devoted to dissemination of law or contributions to popularity campaigns for the draft constitution). Discussion is currently in progress about establishing a centre to promote observation of human rights.

The project has made a noteworthy contribution to upgrading the **position of women** in connection with basic rights (equal rights for women), the constitution (separation of state and religion), public law (cessation of the discrimination of women in the public sector), commercial law (freedom for women to run a commercial business) and above all family law (introduction of a mixed family law with both traditional Muslim and modern claims concerning responsibility, contributions and legal rights).

Human Rights Centre Burundi

Since the new democratic constitution was adopted in March 1992, Burundi has found itself in the process of change from a moderate military dictatorship to a democratic, multi-party, constitutional system. The GTZ has been supporting this process since 1992 by implementing a project on behalf of the BMZ to promote human rights.

The **project purpose** of the ongoing promotion phase 1/93-12/94) is to train the direct users (civil servants in the defence and the judiciary sectors) and multipliers of human rights and other affected target groups in the civil society, in other words primarily judicial officers, the police, the army, university teachers and priests, in the protection of human and civil rights and the transfer of this knowledge to broad-based population groups.

To this end, the demands and claims of the target groups regarding human rights are to be publicised (teaching materials are to be prepared for schools, churches, NGOs etc.), institutions which promote and defend human rights are to be strengthened (churches, human rights leagues etc.), the Human Rights Centre is to be supported (including personnel training and support in building up a documentation unit) and application of human rights is to be disseminated (training work, regional cooperations etc.).

The project executing agency is a public institution reporting to the Ministry of Justice. The members of the governing body of the Human Rights Centre include representatives of the judiciary, the Churches, the chamber of lawyers, a women's rights NGO, the press council and the faculty of law of the university. The Centre cooperates with two non-governmental human rights organizations and is also supported by other donors (France, USA, EU, Friedrich Naumann Foundation).

Both the first democratic elections and the attempted coup in October 1993, as well as the current unstable political situation (ethnic conflict between the Hutu [82% of Burundi's population] and the Tutsi [14%] together with the Rwanda conflict) have inhibited the impacts of the project. Up to October 1993, however, in cooperation with the human rights organizations, the project was able to achieve a certain increase in the **populations's sensitivity to human rights** by means of educational events and public relations work. In the current political situation the course of the project has come to a halt.

CIVIL SOCIETY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT (SAP) - THE CASE OF ZAMBIA

Rev. Violet Sampa-Bredt

Civil society: the Church, NGOs and other social groups

Groups that comprise civil society are key in the success of developmental programmes. Owing to historical circumstances, civil society in Zambia has not really played the advocacy role it is intended to execute (exceptions of course exist). This has been compounded by factors beyond the focus of this presentation, although it is important to indicate that most African societies are at pains to find local remedies to their problems.

The Church: This is one of the oldest institutions in Africa and the world as a whole. With the passing of time, the Church has had to re-examine its mandate and role in society. Its mission as of now well transcends beyond its constituency and has played a significant role in social transformation. The questions before this forum therefore are: What role can the Church meaningfully play in community welfare? Is the Church able to adapt and articulate issues so that its programmes can reflect cooperation with other social groups?

Referring to the post-colonial state in Africa, Zambia is no exception. The state is at the blink of economic collapse, therefore leaving a huge gap for the Church particularly in the area of promoting dialogue among political parties. The political temperatures continue to rise, clearly indicating that all we have been addressing in the past and today are symptoms whose answers require a much more coordinated and focused Church (and others) intervention. The Church and other religious groups have a moral obligation to society. Elements of fanaticism or extremism for instance must be addressed by religious leaders - for their genesis is religion.

NGOs: In some parts of the world, NGOs are popularly known as "Voluntary Organizations". Compared to other social groups like professional associations, the NGO concept is fairly new to Zambia. Consequently, the challenges facing NGOs as viable alternative institutions are many and require attention sooner than later. Zambian NGOs, like most existing NGOs elsewhere, are very dependent on donor support. On the other hand, foreign NGOs working in Zambia are well funded and therefore in a much better position to articulate their objectives. Much as Zambians appreciate the presence and good work of the foreign NGOs, they will not always be there. It is therefore imperative that local NGOs receive adequate support to build their capacities.

Another question which has to be addressed is: What actually is an NGO? I am of the opinion that since NGOs are supposed to be community based, it is important that they are accountable to communities for all their activities, including

programme priorities, funding etc. Most foreign NGOs working in Zambia, including a good number of local NGOs do not have a constituency per se. This invariably brings in the question of transparency and accountability. Democratic principles which these NGOs seem to stand for are in the majority non-existent in their structures.

Associations: Professional associations in Zambia are more visible than other social groups. Most of these associations depend mostly on volunteers to carry their work through. Very unfortunately, the hostile economic climate obtaining in the country almost makes voluntary work impossible. Salaries are generally low and professionals would rather utilize their "free time" on an income generating venture to supplement the monthly purse.

Efforts to organize viable co-operatives have generally failed due to many factors, but mostly related to the difficult economic environment obtaining in the country.

Democratization and economic development in context: Zambia

The advent of multiparty democracy has rejuvenated hopes for accelerated development in Zambia. These hopes arise primarily due to the need for political parties in power to respond to the aspirations of the populace in their quest to remain in government. Additionally, party programmes and manifestos are designed to appeal to the people's needs and therefore attract the people's vote. However, democracy per se extends beyond the political arena, i.e. beyond the freedom to vote for a government. The right to choose should extend to the economic arena if democracy is to be wholly attained.

Economic liberalization has been recognized as the engine for strengthening democracy. Through economic liberalization, it is assumed that the economy will grow, incomes will grow, thereby empowering the majority of the citizens to participate in the political arena. However, it has been observed that the design and implementation of economic liberalization policies has brought about untold misery for the majority of the population.

Given the high level of illiteracy prevalent in Zambia, the ability to discern and debate on socio-economic-political issues is greatly reduced. The rights of the majority to participate in the democratic system which is unfolding is therefore curtailed twofold: (a) their inability to discuss issues and (b) inability to foresee possible negative impacts of economic policies, which they purportedly voted for.

The structural adjustment programme in perspective

The International Monetary Fund and the World Bank are two institutions which are extremely unpopular in Zambia. SAP, for short, is an economic norm practised in most economies of the world. The problem in Zambia has never been the structural adjustment programme per se but rather the manner in which it

has been designed and implemented. For instance, Germany itself is going through economic adjustment programmes in the quest to synchronize the "West" and the "East". Because of the negative consequences SAP has had in Zambia, it is associated with well orchestrated destruction of the social fabrics of society. For indeed, although the government has received praises from the World Bank, we in the Church are very worried, as the consequences could reverse all the little that has been achieved in the process of democratization.

For reasons which are not for this platform, IMF/WB inspired structural adjustment programmes have usually been successfully administered under dictatorship in some third world countries. We are all therefore keen to see how Zambia will withstand the backlash of the draconian policies which have lashed a wave of unemployment, devaluation of the local currency, destruction of local industry in the name of liberalization, instignated the breakdown of law and order not to mention the ever growing scourge of corruption. The list of vices is long.

I personally think there is nothing wrong with economic policies designed to uplift the standard of living through increased production, creation of jobs, school opportunities, health facilities etc. At all times, the integrity of citizens must be protected. Unfortunately, the SAP in Zambia has clearly benefitted those who are already rich and the political leaders. It is not a secret that some leaders led extremely humble lives before ascending to power. Suddenly, they are swimming in wealth! How does this augur with the struggle to create awareness among the people, in a country where illiteracy is so high - a factor attributed to the IMF/WB policies?

It is so nice to talk about "resolute action from African governments". Resolute by whose definition? Zambia is a member of the Bretton-Wood institutions, where membership is on the basis of "one dollar one vote". If assistance from donors must fit into a concept of structural adjustment, usually drawn up by the World Bank and the IMF, what options exist in a situation where the requirements entail massive sufferings for the populace? Is it not only fair and democratic that the social dimensions of adjustment are considered by all the parties involved?

What we are saying is that (1) adjustment is necessary (2) it must be executed within context. As early as 1974, twenty years ago, government leaders continued to see the light at the end of the dark tunnel. Today, 1994, the message from government is the same. People started adjusting their belts twenty years ago, how far are they expected to re-adjust their belts?

Government bureaucrats can afford to propound ideas which are unworkable, because they themselves are not as affected as the common people. Programmes designed by government bureaucrats together with their partners at the IMF/WB are hostile and not compatible with party manifestos, the basis upon which a political party forms government.

What role for the Church, NGOs and other social groups

Whilst it makes good reading talking about the important role such groups play, it would be erroneous to ignore the extremely fluid and oftenly rough terrain within which these groups operate. It takes a lot of courage to speak out against policies which are inhuman before a government which is not flexible to dissenting views. The Church as an institution is certainly in a better position to articulate the issues involved, but lacks the required capacities.

Further, it is important to appreciate the fact that governments shall remain key and dominant players in policy formulation and implementation. Obviously, governments differ from country to country. In the case of Zambia, the government has been accused, even from within, of playing politics of appeasement which often do not go well with rational socio-economic strategies. A situation obtains where the head of state declared the country a Christian Nation. In my opinion, this has been a self-defeating pronouncement at two levels (a) the pronouncement has witnessed the growth of fanaticism or extremist Christians and (b) practice in government viz levels of alleged corruption are not consistent with Christian practice. Whether real, or imaginary, such a development ridicules the Church and could affect its mission and witness.

On the other hand, development assistance to Zambia from western countries has sky-rocketed as a result of the country's willingness to implement economic policies that unfortunately are likely to dismember society. The important point to note here is that such official assistance is only guaranteed if and when a country has the backing of the IMF and the World Bank. There is no running away from the fact that some donor countries are behind the policies that have been severely criticized at home. Indeed one after the other, representatives of donor nations in Lusaka have shown satisfaction at government economic policies! Is it impossible to find a middle line policy that is acceptable to the IMF/WB, the donor community and the government and its people? Is it not worthy to spend some time to attempt to look for other solutions?

There is no doubt that the Church, NGOs and other social groups have a role in economic development and the on-going process of democratization. However, I hasten to underline once again that their role, particularly in the present circumstances, will be determined by their respective capacities to intervene at various levels. In other words, they do have serious handicaps which I will briefly highlight in the way of recommendations or suggestions to make them responsive to society and the process at hand.

a) The atmosphere in the country is conducive to mounting social action programmes that enhances the democratic process. The hostile economic climate has however generated lots of apathy as people fail to see the benefits of a market economy as preached by the leadership. The situation has not been

helped at all, by the ever increasing illiteracy levels and the general failure by the population to comprehend the unfolding situation, as a result.

The primary task of the NGO alliance is to develop outreach programmes targeted at educating the people of their civic responsibilities. This requires a joint initiative by parties involved so that the programme(s) can be spread in the most effective manner and in all parts of the country. Because of its central and strategic role, the Church is certainly in a better position to encourage leading NGO's in articulating the issues involved.

b) The alliance is identified above needs to develop its advocacy skills and capacity so that they can achieve the necessary competence to meaningfully contribute in the desighing of national policies. Governments are much more likely to listen to any group that develops serious ideas for incorporation in the national development plans - if any. This type of work would require resources so as to realize the goals and objectives of the NGOs and associations concerned.

Conclusion

If the Church, NGOs and association in Zambia can come to terms with their potential, their contribution towards strengthening the ailing democracy would yield fruitful results. Similarly, if such efforts are properly coordinated, friends of democracy the world over, would come to the assistance of those initiatives which aim at advancing the cause of democracy.

On my part, I see my role, and indeed that of the Church as a facilitator. We shall continue to support legitimate initiatives and I would like to take this opportunity to appeal to the Ministry of Development Cooperation, the Church in Germany and our partners to give us a platform, listen to our needs, and in that way, assistance to the people of Africa will be appreciated. Development assistance programmes that involve the beneficiaries at all stages of design stand a better chance of success.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

ZIMBABWE
Mr. Tawanda F. Mutasah

Definition of civil society

One of the most comprehensive definitions of "civil society" is the one that has been given by Larry Diamond. 1) In Diamond's view, civil society is the realm of organized social life that is voluntary, self-generating, (largely) self-supporting and autonomous from the state. It is distinguished from the "society" in general in that it involves citizens not just loosely "organized" say by virtue of staying in the same locality but consciously and deliberately organized to achieve certain goals.

Elements of civil society in Zimbabwe

Civil society has been conceived to include neither "mass political organizations" 2) nor "the inward-looking activities of parochial institutions and organizations that seek to win a formal state in the place altogether" 3) But in an operational context like Zimbabwe, this point seems to be negated. Mass political organizations like the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions engage in multi-dimensional initiatives encompassing developmental, educational, health and safety as well as group-interest advocacy programmes. Indeed in many cases such organizations are the conduit pipe through which metropolitan funding agencies sponsor social programmes of such character and magnitude that they "compete" against the state's. Within this type of social matrix - usually a Third World Model - it is difficult to overlook the role played by "mass organizations" in the formation and consolidation of civil society. They are part of civil society.

Development NGOs

There are a number of NGOs concerned primarily with developmental work. Examples include:

Africare
Intermediate Technology Development Group
Redd Barna
Plan International.

Although most of the NGOs in this category are autonomous from the state in a true sense, in practice a great number of

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1) Diamond, L., "Civil Society and the Development of Democracy; some international perspectives and lessons" - a paper presented in Dakar, Senegal, as quoted in Otieno N., vide 4).
2) Ricardo, H., "Democracy, Civil Society and the State in South Africa: Past, Present and Future" (University of the Western Cape), paper presented at the University of Zimbabwe Summer School, January/February 1992, p.1.
3) See Larry Diamond, supra.

them operate in conjunction with the state. For instance, Africare recently launched a Hepatitis B project in conjunction with the Ministry of Health and Child Welfare.

Group interest advocacy and lobby

Considering the broad popular base of interested groups and mass organizations in Zimbabwe, the tenacity of the struggles in which they are involved, and the way they sometimes play a substitutive role to state social programmes, my inclination is to conceive of them as part, indeed an essential part, of civil society.

In Zimbabwe examples include:
The Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Unions (ZCTU)
The Women's Action Group (WAG)
The Zimbabwe National Students' Union (ZINASU)
The Organisation of Collective Co-operatives in Zimbabwe (OCCZIM)
The Zimbabwe Farmers' Union.

Social programmes oriented
(e.g. with a human rights, community health, or educational/ training speciality):

Examples include:
Legal Resources Foundation (LRF)
Citizens' Advice Bureau
Zimbabwe Human Rights Association
The Red Cross Society
The Musasa Project.

Church institutions

Having Church institutions comprising a special category, a deliberate acknowledgement of the envied place which Church institutions enjoy in developmental and civil work - the listed examples of Church and ecumenical institutions involved in multi-faceted social work are:

The Zimbabwe Council of Churches
The Catholic Development Commission Christian Care
The Catholic Commission for Justice and Peace in Zimbabwe
The Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe
Silveira House
Zimbabwe Students Christian Movement.

Chrystallising the functions and role of civil society

From the foregoing scan, the following aspects of the role of civil society in the democratization process in Zimbabwe present themselves.

The developmental mission of civil society is visible. NGOs and Churches in Zimbabwe continue to provide much needed material development assistance, for instance sinking boreholes, setting up and sustaining micro-agrarian projects, conducting reafforestation programmes etc., etc.

By virtue of some elements of civil society's work in advocacy and group-interest lobbying, concessions are won from the state and this is an important facet of democratization.

The existence of a strong and conscious civil society operates as a checks-and-balances mechanism against state power.

Civil society acts as a vehicle for the facilitation of the process of individual self-actualization of citizens by developing other facets of personhood which are, so to speak, "non-material" (not immaterial), for instance race and gender-dignity and academic freedom.

There are other aspects however which do not appear ex facie the nature of the aforementioned elements of civil society, and whose appreciation therefore needs some degree of extrapolation.

Civil society provides the bedrock for the development and sustenance of a democratic culture.

It provides the missing link in an age of political cynicism. In Zimbabwe for instance, the impoverished working class and peasant populace are generally indifferent to the politics of both the ruling ZANU(PF) Party and the group of opposition parties. They consider, and legitimately so in my view, that the political race between the political parties as currently constituted is just essentially a race "between the predators". That the "elections-every-five-years" type of democracy is simply an opportunity for the deprived masses to go and "elect" who should exploit them "for this coming five-year round". One therefore sees a huge boycott of elections, which in fact is a collective class vote against bourgeois politics. In this situation, the phenomenon of people organizing in civil structures is a viable option.

"When government is left entirely to the political parties in a weak civil society then every crisis in the political realm produces socio-economic tragedies ... it is the civil society that provides the matrix for the development of a democratic culture" 4)

Civil society provides the general populace with an opportunity to participate in geo-historical socio-political and economic discourse determined by no-one else but themselves 5) and this gives them a sense of citizenship. The civil society terrain is also an avenue for broadbased popular democratic practices.

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4) Otieno, N., "Communication for Civic Education" - paper written for EDICESA, 1994, at p.3.
5) Ricardo, H., supra at p.13. But it must be noted that there is a pitfall regarding the nature of a number of civic institutions in the Third World. Because they subsist on aid from the North/West, sometimes their programmes are hijacked and even used in pursuance of further exploitation of the Third World countries concerned.

Civil society can become the new centre of gravity for national socio-political endeavour as the spotlight shifts from the state. The tragedy, if it was one, of Eastern European history lay in the way the highly bureaucratised and a-monolithic State edifice sought to usurp the position and name of the masses. State interests were made synonymous with the public good. Says Friedman in offering a counter-perspective to this sort of development:

"The State is no longer a suitable instrument of social change. The public good must be defined by Civil Society. There must also be a new form of ownership - not based on state ownership or private capital, but community ownership." 6)

Since a cornerstone of the democratization process is the development of human resources who can then form the materials needed to build "a new civilisation" in the nation-state, civil society is also a great contribution to democratization through its training programmes. In Zimbabwe for instance, the Church and ecumenical institutions have a wide network of training institutions and programmes, including the Ecumenical Human Resources and Leadership Development (ZCC Training Centre) in Hatfield, Harare, Silveira House in Chishawasha, Harare, Murimi Training Centre of the Salvation Army, The Vashandiri Study Centre of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in Zimbabwe, Dinde Methodist Community Centre, The United Theological College etc. etc.

Some problems faced by civil society in Zimbabwe

Networking and management information systems. Sometimes there is duplication of efforts and an unsystematic development promotion process. If this operated ideally, civil society could contribute more to the wholistic development function.

An inhibitive legal infrastructure, e.g. Law and Order, Maintenance Act, Official Secrets Legislation, which limits the scope of civil society to access vital information (state information) which would have been useful for complementary social action, advice and social advocacy.

Thematically fragmented conceptual approaches. In trying to combat this at the Zimbabwe Council of Churches we have contrived to offer, inter alia, a "Learning of Transformation" curriculum where we train the students in subjects ranging from gender, development, morality, planning etc.

Capacity and skills limitation. We have also designed a programme where we inject human rights and justice as well as legal components into what the Council is already doing in order to build capacity in the areas the Churches have already built an infrastructure.

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6) Friedman, S., "Bonaparte at the barricades: The colonisation of Civil Society" as quoted in Ricardo H., supra.

Structural adjustment programmes and economic development

Structural adjustment programmes, the Zimbabwean one being no exception, represent a strong ideological offensive by metropolitan finance capital against the Third World. They are exotic. In fact, in the Government of Zimbabwe's Structural Adjustment (SAP) blue-print, titled "Government of Zimbabwe: A Framework for Economic Reform, 1990-95" the word "labour" is spelt the American way, as "labor". One Zimbabwean academic recently joked that the only original word in the Zimbabwean SAP blue-print is the word "Zimbabwe"! 7) That the SAP launched in Zimbabwe is not benefitting the woman-on-the-street is borne out by the fact that whereas Zimbabwe has gone through four years of what government has said will be a five-year programme, all that has been witnessed is sky-rocketing prices of basic commodities, deterioration of health and other services, massive retrenchments (redundancies) of employees, social frustration etc.

I shall now attempt to comment on economic development and SAP under three headings as follows:

Economic development and democratization

After Zimbabwe's attainment of flag Independence in 1980, new contradictions set in which brought to the fore the stark enormity of the economic deprivation in which the vast majority of the masses of the country, especially blacks, live. It has thus become increasingly clear that economic development is a sine qua non to the democratization ethos.

Yet economic development per se although necessary, is not sufficient. Do prevailing income distribution patterns economically empower the deprived masses?

It is because of a new realization of the urgency of this question that civil society in Zimbabwe, apart from executing a developmentalist programme in the communities has of late taken an increasingly eloquent social-popular advocacy role. The Zimbabwe Council of Churches for instance in 1993 commissioned a Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Unit to spearhead its social gospel initiative.

SAPs and democratization

Adding that concomitantly, by mortgaging the human resources of Zimbabwe through so-called balance of payments obligations, and by progressively disenfranchising the national citizens as the national political leadership becomes more and more accountable to metropolitan finance capital, the IMF and World Bank are undermining the democratization process in Zimbabwe.

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7) Makumbe, J., "Why ESAP will fail in Zimbabwe", lecture delivered at the Cresta Jameson Hotel in Harare, 17th March 1994

The interface between civil society and SAPs

Although the conceptual and discussional linkage between civil society and SAPs is not easy, functionally the two have significant reciprocal effects on each other. Negative repercussions of SAP and civil society as witnessed in Zimbabwe include:

the depletion of membership for instance in mass organizations like the Zimbabwe Congress of Trade Union (ZCTU) as a result of retrenchments which have drastically cut union membership;

the concomitant depletion of resources material, human etc. For instance, retrenchments of workers in Zimbabwe have resulted in depletion of trade union dues (financial contributions) thus threatening the ZCTU's viability;

impoverishment of the civic political culture as the people are depoliticised in their pre-occupation with issues of survival.

And, dialectically, the SAP in Zimbabwe has also had a positive impact on civil society. Aspects of this include:

Civic struggles are becoming more "universalized" that is, nationalized, as civic organizations, realing under the same (economic) pressures, build cross-sectional civic linkages.

As the SAP prescribes, inter alia, the trimming of the state bureaucracy, this could (in a quantitative sense) obviate the risk of emasculating co-option of civic institutions into the state.

It has become easier to build organic political constituencies around which citizens can be mobilized into an authentic, progressive political force. This is on the basis of at least two primary reasons:

(a) Issues around which mass mobilization can take place are assuming a broader magnetic field of social impact because people are progressively demobilized from state politics.

(b) NGOs are becoming more visible agents of social development as government abdicates a chunk of its social (welfare) responsibilities.

Conclusion

Civil society building and consolidation is one of today's most viable options in the struggle for democratization in Zimbabwe as in the rest of Africa.

The Economic Structrual Adjustment Programme (SAP) in Zimbabwe poses a serious threat to not only the struggle for the democratization of economic relations in Zimbabwe but to socio-

political democratization. Genuine inward-looking national development, with a built-in democratic income distribution effect, is a prerequisite to democratization. The long term impact of SAP on the development of civil society in Zimbabwe will be to strengthen it as, dialectically, from the seedbed of mass economic deprivation caused by SAP relations of production shall/should sprout a new and higher collective socio-political consciousness - the requisite fabric for Zimbabwe (and Africa)'s future march towards democratization.

While we have hailed civil society as one of today's most important answers to "the African problem", if civil society in Zimbabwe is not definitionally authentic especially in that it continues to dance to the tune of its western/ northern "allies on the civic plane", then it would be doing a disservice to the Zimbabwean people as it would be helping prop up the neo-colonial edifice in an even more dangerous, because more subtle, form.

Conversely, civil society in Zimbabwe must locate itself within the new African developmental paradigm. And Zimbabwean civil society - NGOs, associations, Churches - if it is to genuinely service the country's democratization process, must draw up and implement an unequivocal African agenda.

I propose an urgent item for this agenda: Pan-African civic linkages. In this connection the establishment of the fellowship of Christian Councils in Eastern and Southern Africa (FOCCESA) is, it seems to me, a most visionary initiative. May FOCCESA now appreciate even more the depth of its own mission and take full advantage of such structures of great potential in the democratization process as it has already established - notably the Ecumenical Documentation and Information Centre for Eastern and Southern Africa (EDICESA).

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

GERMANY
STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT AND ITS EFFECTS ON THE AFRICAN POOR
Dr. Henning Andresen

Following the reference by several participants of our workshop to the sad social consequences of structural adjustment I was asked by EZE to explain KfW's views about structural adjustment. KfW, the German development bank in Frankfurt, has acquired substantial experience in cofinancing adjustment programmes in Africa and has also participated in the international discussion about the past effects and the future role of adjustment policy. I am glad to have the opportunity to present to you at least **how I see the matter.**

There is **no doubt about the severe deterioration of the situation of poor people in Africa** during the adjustment period. I **will try**

- to put this unfortunate development into a broader perspective;
- to see to what extent the World Bank (or IMF or bilateral donors) or others are to blame for this; and
- to show how the process of adjustment is already being improved in the interest of the poor.

First of all I should like to point out that **adjustment in Africa was unavoidable.** In the years prior to the adjustment period there was a decline of the international competitiveness of the region associated with higher foreign borrowing and indebtness. Undoubtedly, the excessive overvaluation of the exchange rates (on the average 30%) substantially contributed to these problems. In many countries one also observed decreasing per capita incomes and a deterioration of infrastructure due to a lack of funds for maintenance. Low agricultural producer prices contributed to low agricultural production and rural impoverishment. Excessive state intervention facilitated corruption and led to lower efficiency of economic activity. A positive aspect was the safeguarding of a minimum standard of living at least for parts of the urban population, but the subsidy system, though expensive, did not reach all the poor and - to the extent that it worked in the interest of the more vocal and politically more influential urban population - it was at the expense of the rural poor.

Apparently the situation could not be maintained. And it was not "only the problem of two or three citizens keeping their money in a Swiss Bank" (mentioned by a previous speaker in defence of African sovereignty) that made donors insist on structural adjustment.

There has always been a discussion on the extent to which **external factors** such as protectionist trade policies by the

North or the unfavourable development of Africa's terms of trade have also contributed to Africa's problems, and there have been demands for adjustments also in these fields. In principle, I am fully in favour of such adjustments and more could have been done, but, to be realistic, the protectionism of the North is not the major impediment to development in Africa and the possibilities of softening the consequences of world market prices changes are rather limited. It seems doubtful to me whether a completely different world market system instead of the present one would be in the interest of African countries. What is more important: no such other system would be accepted by the industrialized countries. **Africa has to face the fact** that there will be continued and even increased **international competition in the export markets** and - at the same time - **shrinking real foreign aid flows,** what makes adjustment within Africa more urgent.

As to the **effects of adjustment programmes** there exist a number of studies the most recent of which are a new World Bank report on adjustment in Africa and a very thorough study (still unpublished) of the American Cornell University on the effects on the poor.

The **major results** are the following:

- although there has been some improvement of economic policy in Africa, the policy is not yet good;
- economic development has clearly been better for relatively strong African adjusters but even their economic progress has not yet been sufficient;
- there has been no general worsening of the situation of the majority of poor people in adjusting countries;
- where such worsening occured it has mainly been in countries with weak adjustment programmes;
- strong adjusters could at least arrest the previous deterioration of the situation of the majority of the poor; and
- not less but more adjustment would have been in the interest of the poor.

Some of these results, especially the last one, might be difficult to understand or even seem provocative to you. The authors concede that in some cases adjustment has been to the detriment of the urban poor and that, while some deterioration of their situation was unavoidable, **one could and should have better safeguarded certain critical social expenditures. However,** apart from their insistance on better targetting of food subsidies it was not the Bretton Woods institutions that demanded certain types of expenditure cuts but, where it happened, it was **the African governments** themselves that preferred a contraction of basic needs expenditures (for example for preventive medicine and primary education) to cuts in high-cost curative medicine for better off people or to cuts

in their military expenditure. One could only blame the Bretton Woods institutions for having left alone the African governments in making the necessary analysis and expenditure decisions.

The main reasoning of the authors of the studies refers to the **effects of adjustment on the rural poor** normally constituting between 80% and 90% of all low-income people of African countries. According to the studies strong adjustment programmes leading to more efficient marketing and higher agricultural producer prices had a tendency of helping the rural poor although other persistent bottlenecks (such as scarcity of trucks or rural roads) prevented many countries from immediately getting the full benefits. One can deplore this, but, unfortunately, one has to face the fact that in the real world a perfect fine tuning of measures for resolving all the bottlenecks of development is not possible.

At least in principle there is now **common understanding** among most African governments and donors **about necessary changes of adjustment programmes** (a.o. safeguarding of critical social expenditures, to avoid extreme poverty and to increase the economic role of the poor, supplementary infrastructure investments) **and about changes beyond structural adjustment** (democracy and good governance), and recent programmes increasingly include these aspects.

An example of the new adjustment policy is the **Economic and Social Adjustment Programme in Zambia,** envisaged for German cofinancing. Apart from continuing the macroeconomic policy (a.o. to avoid renewed high inflation) the programme aims at improving the provision of services in the social sectors, namely health, education, water supply/sanitation and social safety nets. To this end the World Bank has agreed with the Zambian government on higher budget shares for social sectors, higher allocations for basic requirements within the sectors, decentralization and more user participation as well as other measures for increasing the efficiency of service delivery. Interestingly enough, such agreements to the benefit of poor people require an even greater involvement of donors into "international affairs" of African countries.

Let me **summarize my view** as follows:

- structural adjustment of African economies has been and will remain necessary;
- hardship of people during the transition period cannot completely be avoided, although in the past some of the extreme cases could and should have been avoided;
- African governments and donors have learnt their lessons from past mistakes; and
- there is scope for increased participation also of the Churches in the adjustment process.

VOTERS EDUCATION AND THE POLITICAL ENVIRONMENT FOR ELECTIONS - THE CASE OF TANZANIA

Dr. Rogate Mshana

The 1st of July 1992 marked a significant turning point in the history of Tanzanian politics. It was then permissible for credible politicians to come out and register political parties which can operate in opposition to the ruling CCM. At the moment 12 parties have been registered. CCM which has ruled the country for 30 years is credited for unifying the people of Tanzania and for having given them a solid national identity, but more especially for having stabilized that unity. The peace enjoyed was based on former President Nyerere's philosophy and style of leadership. The commendable work which CCM has done over so many years to make the country what it is in terms of its politics and human relations is exemplary in Eastern and Southern Africa.

The achievements were, however, not without cost of the country's economic performance. There have been many varied mistakes in our national economic management. Despite our vast natural resources, thirty years after independence we are still poor and too dependent on external aid our political stability not withstanding. We are still unable to provide the basic necessities of life and to raise the dignity of the people of Tanzania. There are potential dangers to our communities if this economic crisis is not addressed. The CCM government made several attempts through the policy of Ujamaa to bring about economic recovery without success. The social sector grew. All the social sector achievements were eroded due to the collapse of the economy.

Economic policy reform as a challenge to all political parties

Questions that are related to economic recovery have dominated Tanzanian politics for several years now, but CCM leadership seems to have considerable difficulty about articulating its basic economic policy reform. They have chosen to take actions with implications which obviously show a shift from the basic tenets of the Arusha Declaration. With the emergence of new political parties, it is now apparent that no political party can afford to be ambiguous about economic reforms, either in terms of policy pronouncement or in real actions. The people of Tanzania do not expect significant differences in economic policy. But they expect to see differences in the art of policy execution and in the use of national resources for the social and economic development of Tanzanian citizens. The transition from constitutionally backed socialism of the CCM government to market-oriented economic system calls for all parties to articulate their programmes of actions which can convince the electorate about their ability to clean up the present economic mess. The new parties are now struggling to capture political power through elections in 1995 but most of them are dissatisfied with the present political environment dominated by the ruling party.

Constraints to fair elections

By-elections scenario

Three elections have been held under the new multiparty era. The CCM won all of them. Complaints from the parties about unfair voting environment surfaced. During the recent Kigoma by-elections, CHADEMA, one of the new parties, filed a petition to the High Court that illegal campaigns were made for and on behalf of the CCM candidate by the President of the United Republic, the Deputy Premier and the Home Affairs Minister and the Communications and Transport Minister. The High Court has also been told that the CCM candidate corruptly gave his house valued at 80 million shillings to be used as a hospital so as to secure votes (The Express, May 11, 1994). Regarding the President, it is alleged that on February 10 this year, he used a government aircraft from Dar es Salaam to Kigoma for purpose of campaigning for the CCM candidate. The President also used state motor vehicles in the high profile campaign, the fact which was announced by Radio Tanzania and state owned newspaper, Daily news (The Express, May 11, 1994).

Control of the media by the ruling party

All the opposition parties are accusing CCM for not allowing them room for fair play in expressing themselves to the people.

The present media policy especially as regards Radio Tanzania and Television, clearly indicates that true democracy is under serious questions. Family Mirror reported: "Having amassed all the media arsenary on its side, including that of the only English and Kiswahili dailies, Radio and the soon to be established Television network, the CCM government unashamedly tells its opponents to join in a duel (election)." Is this the kind of democracy the ruling part so proudly claims to have initiated? (Family Mirror November, 1993).

Determined to strengthen its hold on the masses within the cage of one party system where most Tanzanians had been accustomed to live through 30 years of rigorous indoctrination, the CCM government has on one hand set out to defy all the norms and rules on the path for true democracy which on the other hand, CCM claims to have set on motion (Family Mirror ibid). The Registrar of Political Parties and the Chairman of the Electoral Commission are not regarded as fully impartial. Once the registrar of parties forewarned that opposition parties should not expect the ruling party (CCM) to lay down its arsenary easily.

"They have to struggle for it." This advice entails the opposition parties to stage a real struggle to attain full independence of the media, including Radio and TV. Short of that political observers advise all political functions organized by CCM and its government should be boycotted completely by the opposition. This boycott by the opposition should also be directed towards the directive which requires the opposi-

tion parties to seek permission from local officials who, in most ways, are CCM appointees, such permission if need be should be obtained from the Department of Justice through its regional and district offices. CCM sees the opposition as arch enemy and (CCM) does what it can to struggle it (opposition) in every field. The former president had told CCM leaders that they would be doing a grave mistake to have the opposition and consider it as an enemy. (Family Mirror November 1993).

Continuous indoctrination of the children and adults

CCM continues to indoctrinate children in CCM Branch Offices. One of the systems which Tanzania under the one party regime adopted from its eastern socialist and communist mentors is that of arresting a child mind right from the tender age of between three and five years and enslaving it under the york of unwavering party allegiance through indoctrination through the whole of the child's life. Indoctrination process in Tanzania is divided into five stages, nursery, pioneer (chipukizi, youth, cadres and elders (wazee). The sixth stage is that of offering some form of training to mature aspirants for qualification to party membership. Without a party card there was no further studies or good career. Students who failed the political education subject received no certificate even if they scored high in other subjects. The latter type of indoctrination is slowly fading out. Schools are now required to teach civics but text books for the subject are not yet available. Education for democracy should be promoted in schools. This is a potential area for NGOs. Under the prevailing situation of indoctrination, the first priority of the opposition parties might be to ensure that the indoctrination machinery under the ruling party is defused with immediate effect. Short of that their role will for ever remain that of escorting the ruling party nominees into parliament during elections while they remain as receivers of crumbs in form of government subsidies as dues for their escorting part.

It must be recognized that the long period of over 30 years of indoctrination by the ruling party has turned Tanzania into a nation of brain washed people. Most of the people will continue singing CCM … CCM … CCM as a recorded disc until such time when the indoctrination machinery is fully defused. In fact, both the registrar of political parties and the chairman of electoral commission should feel duty bound and assist in defusing the indoctrination machinery. They could place as one of their conditions for all political parties to avoid using offices as centres for child indoctrination and all other forms of mass indoctrination. Without these conditions no fair elections and free elections will be exercised.

Unfavourable legal environment

The commission of inquiry appointed by the president to collect views from the people regarding one party or multiparty rule came up with the famous Nyalali report. One of the significant recommendations made by the report was that there are 40 repressive laws which must be repealed if adequate poli-

tical space is to be realized. The report reiterates that the question of democracy is really the question of how the people are participating in the running of the country; it is the question of the democratic management of political parties and other people's organizations; it is the question of the freedom with which the people are asserting themselves. All these issues relate to the expansion of the arena of democracy which is a permanent issue. The Political Parties Act, however, goes quite far in instituting controls, some of which seriously diminish the scope of freedom of association.

It is noted that the registrar of political parties who is appointed by the president has considerable powers of regristration and de-registration. More over the registrar carries out his/her functions in consultation with the minister.

Need for a constitutional conference

The present constitution was not made by the people. The process was engineered by TANU (The Tanganyika African National Union). Discussion of proposals to emend the 1984 constitution were made by allowing limited and defined people's participation. Now, with plural politics a conference to amend the present constitution by all parties people's organizations and religious institutions is demanded by the opposition parties. The ruling party has rejected this demand vehemently. Such a conference is necessary and was also supported by the Lutheran Bishops on their Bagamoyo statement produced in March, 1994. We are convinced that the parties have not exerted enough pressure on this issue.

Why the state should be democratically organized

The ruling party and others have not articulated the relationship of the state and the civil society. It is imperative for all parties to understand the relationship between the state and the civil society because there are political parties which ask for more power in the name of democracy while others advocate freedom for the few to accumulate property (and therefore power) in the name of democracy and yet democracy is supposed to empower the many and safeguard them against abuse of power.

The whole purpose of proposing certain structures of the state as opposed to others and the processes of arriving at those desirable structures (constitutional making) is to guard against the abuse of power. That is the alpha and omega of democracy. To talk about democracy is to ensure that the organization of the state is such that oppression of the people and abuse of power inherent in the state are minimized and that there are built in processes for protest, exposure and censure of such abuses when they take place. In short the exercise of state power should be open and accountable not behind the backs of the people on whose behalf it is legitimized in the first place. The ruling party should understand this concept.

The strength and weaknesses of the policital parties in Tanzania

Democratic rule is determined by the presence of viable political parties that serve as countervailing force to the government in power. Strong interest groups and other civil organizations are also important. In Tanzania, a question is asked, "What features do the existing political parties reveal and to what extent can they be relied as vehicle for democracy?" Mmuya recognizes one major weakness of the existing political parties, and that is the lack of roots in civil society organizations which leads to their "trunkated growth"1). He noted also several other grave weaknesses. There is proliferation of parties. They are likely not to be capable of securing a convincing victory so as to be able to provide an alternative to the incumbent party or even just be able to grow as an effective opposition by the time we get to the 1995 elections. Attempts at merger did not bear fruits. Each of their leaders would like to maintain their leadership.

They have also not been able to reach out to large masses of societies. There are also weaknesses in the internal organization structures as noted by Mmuya:

- Lack of regularized set of party activities.
- Disparity between members and leaders and no viable constituency.
- Leadership is personalized resulting in factionalism which dismembers the party.
- Some organizations are present in Dar es Salaam only or at most in regional/district urban/semi-urban areas.
- Little knowledge about the conduct of multiparty politics.
- Name calling for the purpose of destroying the other.
- Unnecessary factionalism over issues of common interest of comparison of available manifestos.

It is assessed that despite the mentioned weaknesses, the opposition political parties are now consolidating their base. The major political parties have had elections of their office bearers. These have come out boldly to check on government activities make it increasingly accepting the opposition parties as legitimate political organizations. According to Mmuya (Ibid) who examined the performances of these parties during the past three multiparty system by-elections held in Kwahani (Zanzibar) Ileje (Mbeya) and Kigoma in Kogoma region, the opposition had scored a mere 7.4% of the votes in Kwahani in April, 1993, 25% of the 18.27% votes in Ileje in January 1994 and 36.8% of votes in Kigoma in February 1994. This is a significant trend in the development of multiparty politics which needs to be boosted with the 1995 general elections in view.

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1) Max Mmuya, "Political Democracy and the Role of Churches in Tanzania", Bishops Consultation on Economic political democracy, ELCT, Bagamoyo, March 1994

The nature of the civil society

Due to the 30 years of propaganda by CCM, the civil society is meek and docile. It has very weak organizations and associations that fail to strengthen the opposition. They have very limited knowledge of democracy under a multiparty system and how to demand accountability from the government. The civil society has still no power to make their government do what they want before they can expect it to rule democratically. Several people assume democracy is a grant from the government to the people. It is necessary that the people must possess skills, strong civil institutions from which they can compel the government to rule in a way that is consistent with popular consent. There is therefore need to promote education for democracy on the one hand and checking the behaviour of the government on the other.

The Church and NGOs have over the years talked about empowerment in development. We have required people's participation in projects and programmes to be secured. We are asking ourselves these questions "Has that participation in our perception been more than just projects and programmes? Or does people's participation permeate all activities in communities and the whole society? Democracy is a prerequisite for real development because it is only through democracy that people can influence macro and micro policies in our country. In the process of promoting education for democracy the concepts of popular participation, good governance, accountability, empowerment and transparency will be taught and discussed in the context of our African society. The major goal is to come up with a good state and well informed powerful civil society that can effectively countercheck the behaviour of the state.

The weakness of the civil society is also historical. It results from one of the legacies of colonialism where accountability was demanded by the colonial state and not by the people. The people where conditioned to be loyal to the state without questions and the state with coercive machinery disciplined the civil society. After independence, very little change was introduced. The state continued to be less transparent and was not accountable to the people, at worst it forbade strikes and deprived people of their rights for association outside the ruling party framework. This scenario should be changed under pluralistic politics. There is therefore the need for creating awareness both at the state level and the civil society.

Education for democracy and voters education

1. Education for democracy and human rights is essential for a strong civil society. In the case of Africa, this education has to be preceded by the study and an understanding of the nature of the African Civil Society. Research programmes in this area are, therefore, imperative. There is also need to design new civics education syllabi for schools at all levels. Development of teaching and reading materials and production of cultural activities that promote democracy is essential.

Workshops to train trainers in democracy and to develop new syllabi will have to be organized. These aspects require financial support.

Assessment of the present education for democracy

At the moment there are few institutions that are educating the civil society in democracy which is not only limited to voters education. This type of education is basically non-existent in the country. With the electronic media monopolized by the ruling party, it will be difficult to reach the portion of the population in the rural areas. Radio is also an essential channel to reach the majority of the rural population who have no access to newspapers. Projects at the moment include establishment of FM freqency radio centres which can be used to educate people issues of democracy and development. Support for such radios is therefore essential. Some NGOs have already established such radios.

Those radios would help the opposition to make themselves understood by the people in the rural areas. At the moment education for democracy by the government is only limited to the requirement and interests of the ruling party and the government.

The role of the Church in promoting education for democracy

There is need to understand the involvement of the Church in the democratization process. It is apparent that the ideals which democracy stands for are very compatible with those of the Church. So goes the metaphor "Vox populi, vox Dei"; the voice of the people is the voice of God "which can be extended to mean" the state founded on sovereignty of the people (democracy) is God's State" (Mmuya Ibid). Following this formulation, the Church is founded on certain moral principles which socially unleashe energies and commitment to realize a specific goals act or advocate for a specific objective. It also unleashes a political dynamic that directs it (the Church) in the competition for power and legitimacy. This means the Church cannot, because of its principles, remain indifferent to a situation of abuse of power on denial of citizen rights, when even the minimum standards of decent management of public office are eroded. The Church must stand up and defend society against what it considers as moral decay.

- Steps taken by the Church to promote education for democracy

At the ecumenical level, we began with a workshop organized by the All African Conference of Churches Research and Development Consultancy held at Arusha, Tanzania in August 1992. The workshop was on Approaches and Skills in Advocacy for Development. The report produced was titled "The emerging power of civil society in Africa". From this Pan-African workshop, we organized a national ecumenical workshop in May 1993 at Dar es Salaam on democratization. Resource persons came from the National Council of Churches Kenya and the University of Dar es Salaam. Participants learnt from the Kenyan experience of

multiparty elections. An Ecumenical Committee on Democracy was appointed. I also personally visited the South Africa Council of Churches to study their democratization process. The Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania has drawn a programme for training in economic and political democracy now under the funding of Bread for the World and ICCO, a Dutch protestant Church organization. The EZE is financing our Workshop on Democracy and Mass Media. The ELCT's programme on democracy emphasizes the training of trainers in democracy, awareness building in democracy, developing syllabi for democracy both in the political and economical dimensions. Voters education is part of this programme. There are plans to translate good materials of democracy in Kiswahili and make them available to readers in the rural areas. Soon, a desk on democracy and human rights will be opened to deal effectively with the issues raised in this paper. The first attempt was to educate the leadership of the Church on democracy in a form of organizing a Bishops Consultation on economic and political democracy. The result of the consultation was the production of the Bagamoyo statement which was well received by the government.

So the Church will continue to embark on three major tasks in the democratization process:

- To exert popular pressure on the government to repeal the 40 oppressive laws as recommended by the Nyalali Commission and to convince it to hold a constitutional conference.

- Provide education for democracy with a focus of raising the competence of civil society in Tanzania.

- Play a mediatory role by forging links between and among the opposition parties so that they become a stronger countervailing force to the incumbent regime which still appears to monopolize power. It is also necessary to establish a report between the contending parties, the administration and civil society so that they may evolve a system of understanding, cultivation of tolerance and consensus in the 1995 elections. The Church could also monitor elections.

Both the popular pressure and education for democracy are understood under the Churches concept of advocacy. These could include seminars and workshops, books, leaflets, video, movies, radio programmes etc. At the moment it is absolutely necessary to raise the level of voters education, campaigns for good governance and put pressure on the government not to use government funds and property for the ruling party campaigns. The radio should be allowed to serve all citizens who provide their taxes for its running. Here donor support is absolutely essential.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

SOUTH AFRICA
Rev. M. Malusi Mpumlwana

A new experience

On the specifics of the South African election experience, I propose to speak on four points:

- The newness of the electoral experience
- Resistance to elections
- The factors impacting on the elections
- Considerations for future action
- Preparing for the 1999 election.

The non-racial democratic election was an experience without precedent in South Africa's history. It was a learning experience for everyone, including the whites who had always had the vote. The jump from about three million white voters to an estimated 20 million electorate was boggling the mind of the election administrators. There was no voters roll, and no time to register voters. Figures had to be estimated because apartheid had made it impossible for there to be proper and honorable population records.

The voters themselves were fearful of possible rigging, as the government party was not to be trusted. This was why an independent Electoral Commission was created. There was concern for secrecy - will someone ever know whom I voted for? There were reports of bosses intimidating their employees into supporting the parties of the employers, with claims that they would have ways of knowing how the workers had voted.

There were concerns over making mistakes inside the polling booth. For a first time experience, voting can be intimidating even for a fairly sophisticated person, what with first time voters including millions of illiterate and semi-illiterate people, shaky elderly people and people whose self-confidence had been utterly shattered by many years of dehumanization!

The most positive reality of this election, frightening as it was, was the excitement that underscored how valued it was. There was the recognition that it was a hard-earned franchise whose purpose was to unite the divided South Africans into one non-racial and non-sexist people. It was seen as a vindication of the struggle for liberation, democracy and national unity.

This new experience was blessed to have the strong and sympathetic attention of the international community which supported it materially and physically, through various forms of presence - the United Nations mission, the Organization of African Unity, the European Community, the International Red Cross, the Commonwealth, the World Council of Churches, individual national representatives, and those of various expressions of faiths and Church ecumenical solidarity.

Before I pass on to the question of resistance to the election, I must point out that South Africa was fortunate to have two significant factors that contributed to the eventual success of the birth of democracy.

The first of these is the political factor. While it could be expected that the indigenous people would be the ones who are violently refusing to accommodate the race that came to the country through colonial conquest, it has been the other round in our case. Our history is that of racial division, where the whites came from Europe, occupied and dominated the country, and, for generations, refused to see themselves as one national polity with the Africans that they had conquered. It is in this regard that the genius of the non-racial campaign of the African National Congress is to be appreciated. Its historic 1955 Freedom Charter, that proclaimed that "South Africa belongs to all who live in it", caused a lot of pain to die hard Africanists, but it was prophetic, and it laid the foundation for easy future accommodation of a non-racial political atmosphere. Such an atmosphere made for a pleasant voting experience during the election week. All that needed to happen was for the whites to come to the realization that there was enough sunshine in a democracy for all to enjoy. They only had to shed their cocoon and be part of the open human society.

The second factor was the growth during the late 70s and throughout the 80s, of a strong civil society, including over 50.000 NGOs of all types at all levels of society. While many, if not most of these, were to deplay their energies to voters and democracy education when election time came, there were some whose very purpose for existence was to champion human rights. A few of these, operating nationally, were:

- The Human Rights Commission, established in the latter half of the 80s with eminent names for its commissioners. The commission published a regular audit of human rights violations in the country, with well researched documentation and analysis.

- The Lawyers for Human Rights. It was established in the mid-eighties, and through its campaigns, raised the consciousness of the South African society to critical questions of human rights: prisoners concern, women's rights, land rights, children's rights, etc.

- The Institute for Democratic Alternatives in South Africa. Also established in the middle of the turbulent 80s, it did a lot to influence by exposure, many significant white South Africans, to feel comfortable about relating to and being seen to talk to elements of the liberation movement, without the skies collapsing.

- The Legal Resources Centre, a nationwide network of legal service offices which took on cases that had the snowballing effect of unlocking doors for many more disadvantaged people.

- The Black Sash, a liberal organization of much older vintage, that established a very extensive system of human rights advice offices in urban and rural areas.

There were a number of others like the Institute for Multi-Party Democracy, the Human Rights Trust, university centres for applied legal studies etc. Such organizations, together with the alternative media like The Nation, The Weekly Mail and South, saturated the South African public life. With these were the spirit of democratic consciousness and the value of human rights.

Resistance to change

A major feature of the 1994 South African election was the violence which represented mainly conservative resistance to the process of change. Prominent among the conservative elements were the white right wing Afrikaner organizations like the neo-nazi, militarist Afrikaner Weederstand Beweging (Afrikaner Resistance Movement), the white Conservative Party, the apartheid inspired black ethnic governments of Bophuthatswana, Ciskei and Kwa-Zulu. The latter was also closely associated with the Inkatha Freedom Party, whose president, Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi was also head of the Kwa-Zulu ethnic government.

For the white conservatives the success of electoral process meant the constitutional ending of exclusive white privilege, status and authority. For the black conservatives it meant the possible erosion of the ethnic power base which the apartheid constitutional dispensation guaranteed.

A variety of methods were used in resisting the changes. These included a violence campaign apparently involving elements in the security forces, with random killings in commuter trains and black operated buses; inexplicable massacres of people in townships; and increased terror operations like bombings and assassinations and attacks on political leaders and voters education personnel. The declared purpose of these campaigns was to frustate the election. Consequently, a "miraculous" halt to the violence has been experienced since the election.

In so far as these groups participated in the negotiations, they pushed for either a confederation of fairly autonomous states or at worst a federation with very strong powers in the regions, and very limited powers for the central government. This constitutional position remains a source of contention in the post-election period, with the right wing whites calling for a self-governing "volkstaat" 1), and the Inkatha Freedom Party calling for international mediation to challenge the present interim constitution on grounds that it is not sufficiently federal.

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1) "people's state"

Factors impacting on the elections

From these elections, there are a number of factors which I believe have a general impact on elections, and which need to be considered if a good environment for elections is to be created. These are the question of power; the credibility and integrity of elections; and the concern for human rights.

a) **The problem of power:** Since 1910, the South African elections have always been about the preservation of power for the white minority. In all electioneering campaigns, the question how to keep blacks out of the system was a central one. Out of this the apartheid government developed the "homelands" system with ethnically based powers for black leaders who were prepared to play along.

At the beginning of the negotiation process, both the African National Congress and the governing National Party vied for influence over the 10 African homeland leaders, and the three or so leaders of the Coloured and Indian parties participating in the 1983 Tricameral Parliament. The ANC succeeded in getting 7 of them to identify openly with it. Three identified with the right wing groups, as I have already mentioned; and the remaining three - two homelands and one Indian party - remained ostensibly non-aligned, although in practice this translated to indecision for change, in effect meaning undeclared identity with the National Party.

In the case of those that went with the ANC, uncomfortable decisions were made in securing positions for some of these apartheid era leaders, for the sake of keeping them in some form of prestige. The National Party did the same for its converts. Those who lost completely are those who remained indecisive, and those who went to the right wing, who therefore lost their black constituencies. The exception was Inkatha Freedom Party's Chief Buthelezi, whose strategy was a more sophisticated combination of tactics. He retained a fair size of influence in his own right.

It should be noted also that the South African elections would not have succeeded if F.W. De Klerk's National Party had not committed itself to the democratic process. In that case too, the question of power, or rather how to lose it with comfort and dignity, was very important. It was important for the politicians, the civil service, the security forces, industry and the money markets, and so on.

The matter for consideration here is that there needs to be a thorough analysis of the balance of political power forces on the ground, and prudent strategic action be taken in the promotion of democracy. This is especially so if a new constitution is brokered, which shifts power bases; and where elections are to be run, based on such a constitution.

The question of power, or the way in which it is to be lost, or tempered with, is a factor of critical concern. I believe that the atmosphere is created for a successful elec-

toral exercise, only where mechanisms are in place for addressing power considerations beyond the elections. Where such mechanisms are not satisfactorily settled ahead of the election, problems lurk behind the process, and can seriously undermine the process and its outcome. There are no easy solutions or formulas to it, but this is the lesson of Angola, Mozambique, Namibia and Zimbabwe. This is the lesson of South Africa.

b) **Credibility and integrity of process:** The next factor impacting on elections, which is closely related to that of power, is that of the credibility and the integrity of the electoral process. In Zimbabwe and Namibia there were other powers to give credibility and integrity to the elections. For Zimbabwe it was the British colonial power through its appointed transitional governor and the Foreign Office which hosted the constitutional talks. For Namibia it was the community of nations through the United Nations Organization and international non-governmental bodies like the World Council of Churches.

In South Africa, where there was neither a colonial power nor any constitutional United Nations involvement, the matter of credibility had to be settled through the creation of several transitional bodies to monitor government operations and influence. These were:

- The Transitional Executive Council to accompany the daily business of government, with sub-committees for critical functions like security, foreign affairs, etc.

- The Independent Media Commission to monitor the fairness of media coverage, and particularly the use of government related media like public radio and television.

- The Independent Electoral Commission, which had the full authority and responsibility to actually plan, conduct, and pronounce the results of the elections. This commission, while headed by a respected supreme court judge, included individuals who brought with them their own integrity, and the confidence of the various interested parties. In addition there were a few international participants with a good reputation and acceptable to all.

These transitional structures allowed for continuity of government during the transition, while they ensured that the government of the day did not become both player and referee in the transition and run-up to the elections. That gave credibility and integrity to the process, such that all parties would have to accept the transition and respect its outcome.

In this I believe there is something to be learnt for consideration in other new democracies. The recent Nigerian election dispute is a case in point.

c) **Human Rights concerns:** Here I want to make two points. First is that, unless elections are understood to have a

serious bearing on the fate and prospect of people's human rights in the holistic sense, elections lose their value and people become cynical and apathetic. This has not yet happened in South Africa because democracy is new. However, it can be borne out by comparing the voter turnout in the 1994 national elections on the one hand, with the very poor 11% in the homelands and the black constituencies of the tricameral parliament. This is a warning that governments which undermine human rights also effectively undermine faith in the democratic process, and the upholding of democratic values in social, economic and political relationships.

Secondly, I want to corroborate the point made eloquently by Dr. Sam Kobia in his keynote address to this meeting, that the recent fervent western commitment to human rights as it now influences foreign policy has, in fact, been the foundation of liberation struggles for decades. It is the western governments which are recent converts to the human rights question.

In the past the West condoned and supported governments whose very existence was a violation of human rights, such as military dictatorships and the apartheid regime, because it suited their interests to support such governments. The time has come for western governments to openly acknowledge the human rights basis of the philosophy of the liberation struggle that they refused to support in the past. For only if they do so, shall we, whose commitment to human rights stems from those struggles, take seriously the present wave of human rights demands in western foreign policy conditionality.

From the beginning, the South African struggle has always been about human rights. In this struggle, human rights were defined broadly, to include what was later categorized into three generations of rights.

Civil, political and legal justice rights: To this end the political struggles of the colonial wars translated into the nationalist struggles of the late 19th and 20th centuries. The spirit of this struggle for civil, political and legal rights is captured in "Nkosi Sikelel'i Afrika", the national anthem composed in 1897. The denial of these rights in the 1910 constitution led to the birth of the national congress of Africans, the ANC of 1912. It is the same campaign for so-called first generation rights that inspired the defiance campaign of the 1950's and the anti-pass campaigns that included the women's Pretoria march of 1956, and the Pan Africanist Congress' Sharpeville protest that left 69 people dead. The same human rights concern was behind the campaign against the 1983 constitution under the banner of the United Democratic Front and the smaller National Forum.

Social, cultural and economic rights: Apart from the colonial wars over land occupation, the struggle for cultural and economic rights began in earnest in the late 19th century, with

the discovery of the mineral wealth of South Africa. 2) It was also the time of the emergence of the Ethiopian movement, a Christian mass movement which sought to stake the African's claim to direct access to God without boundage to European cultural trappings. The understanding of the indigenous people in these struggles was always that these were issues of fundamental human rights.

Collective rights: The "third generation" rights include "the rights to development, peace, social identity, and a clean environment". 3) For me, this claim to these rights, in African terms, is a claim to the restoration of the state of communal "shalom", of holistic peace. While these collective rights were part of the elements of life taken for granted in pre-colonial African society, we can not romanticize the past in our assessment of the present. It is true that our present way of life negates and undermines these rights. Constitutional, educational and economic measures must be put in place for African governments to promote a life for grassroots communities where peace becomes the foundation that undergirds and embraces elements of positive self and national image for all, in the context of a healthy natural environment and development without exploitation.

The influential nations of the world, and the organs of international co-operation may have moved in three historic stages to pronounce on what is really one comprehensive package of human rights, but, with South Africa's Albie Sachs we should affirm that:

"The possessors of the rights are the same physical human beings, namely the citizens of a democratic South Africa. They do not exercise one set of rights in the morning, another in the afternoon, and a third at night. The web of rights is unbroken in fabric, simultaneous in operation, and all-extensive in character." 4)

Consequently, I believe that in an election, political manifestos should reflect the genuine commitment of the politicians to deliver a society where human rights are upheld holistically. When politicians are perceived to care very little over these questions, apathy sets in, and impacts negatively on the electoral process, and undermines democracy.

These three factors, the question of power, the credibility and integrity of the electoral process, and the question of human rights, have a powerful impact on any election. I suggest that these factors are inextricably related to the question of sovereignty. National sovereignty that is vested in the supreme dignity of the nation as a people, rather than the supremacy of the political parties and their leaders, is the best protec-

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2) Diamonds in 1867, and gold about 20 years later
3) According to Albie Sachs: Protecting Human Rights in a new South Africa (1990, Oxford University Press), p.7.
4) Ibid., p.8

tion for the democratic process as exercised through regular elections.

South Africa has gone through a very exciting introduction to democracy. The spirit generated by this experience can only be sustained and enriched if the extra-parliamentary structures of civil society are strengthened rather than weakened. The campaign culture developed in the mass democratic struggles must be translated into a mass based lobby that engages the democratic government on critical issues.

Those organizations that participated in democracy education should continue their work through post-election programmes. These should include analysis and interpretation that puts election results in perspective, for conciliation and nation-building. In addition there should be activities that:

- promote the culture of democracy in all spheres of life - socially, politically and economically;
- education on the constitution and human rights;
- critical analysis of government policy, with a view to encouraging democratic dialogue for improvements;
- promote the notion of national sovereignty with national identity;
- increase leadership capacity at all levels;
- invest in education and the building of positive self-image, especially for traditionally marginalized people - women, youth, the poor and rural folk.

Finally, may say, that the most urgent task for the creation and maintenance of democratic and a human rights culture in African government and society is the promotion of a Pan-African movement for human rights and culture. In this way the issues we are concerned with in this conversation, may become issues we carry across our various historical borders, in a spirit of solidarity and mutual sharing.

I have been reflecting on the South African election experience, therefore the remarks are essentially for the South African reality. However, in the new South African democracy joins a wider Pan-African democratic spirit. In so far as that is true, I believe the South African experience and its lessons, like that of Malawi, will be relevant for other African situations and perhaps other parts of the world as well.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

MALAWI
Rev. Dr. O.P. Mazunda

The question of whether democracy existed or not in Africa prior to colonialism, has exercised the minds of scholars, Church leaders, academics, and professionals of all kinds for many years. Most Africans argue that there were a variety of forms of participatory democracy in many tribal societies and cultures in Africa. Some societies allowed more participation than others, but it certainly existed.

In post-colonial Africa, it is obvious that independence brought many authoritarian and autocratic regimes into power, which denied basic freedoms to their fellow nationals. Undeniably, most African governments tended to reduce the liberties of their own people, and practice undemocratic forms of government, tightening their grip on power and denying the possibility of change.

Even so, people have understood when their basic rights were violated and many had a cultural tradition of democracy. These were important building blocks when the time came to actively promote democracy in my country of Malawi, and elsewhere. And the Church, with its mandate to "do justice, love mercy and walk humbly with God", (Micah 6:8) moved into the vanguard of the process of compelling governments in Africa to democratize. This was especially true in Kenya, Malawi and South Africa. The Church has played a critical role in the democratization of the continent, and hopefully, will continue its prophetic role in the new dispensations.

Situation in Malawi

Democracy, by one definition, is the equality of rights, opportunity and treatment. This being so, the role of justice and the protection of human rights is key to the establishment and maintenance of democratic rule. Authoritarian and autocratic regimes do not abide by the rule of law. When legal processes are bypassed or abused, human rights are violated.

When determining whether a system is just or not, one can begin by looking at the legal system and legal processes. Are there fundamental infringements of the right to a fair trial? Is there freedom of expression? Are there major failures of the police and administrators to respect the rule of law and the orders of the court?

By 1992 the above violations had become excessive and glaring. Malawi came under pressure from the Church and the international community to improve its human rights record. The international community withdrew all aid and there was significant internal pressure which led to a referendum on multiparty democracy on June 14, 1993. The people voted, overwhelmingly (63%) in favour of multipartyism. General elections

were held on May 17, 1994, which led to a change of government. Both justice and mercy (that is, no retaliation) have prevailed in our nation, so far, and we are deeply grateful to God. It is the Church's responsibility to see that people continue to pursue these ideals in their daily life and in their politics.

Malawi was under a one-party system of government for 32 years. The political environment was autocratic and repressive. There were no options or choices, and people were ruled by fear. Not until the system was broken open by the courageous pastoral letter of the Catholic Bishops and the subsequent pressure for policital and legal reforms from inside and outside the country, was there a need for "voters education". Once the referendum on multiparty democracy was set for June, 1993, the Churches and many other NGOs became vigorously involved in voters education throughout the country. This proved a challenge in a nation such as ours which has an illiteracy rate of 87% or more!

In preparation for the Parliamentary and Presidental elections of 17th May, 1994, the Church again, together with other NGOs and the Electoral Commission undertook the civic education of the voters. Unfortunately, this time the process was begun rather late. As a result there were more invalid votes than we would have liked, due to voters not knowing exactly what to do. Even so, the election deemed "free and fair" and the incumbent Malawi Congress Party accepted defeat at the hands of the United Democratic Front. As other countries have shown us, these things are not to be taken for granted, and again, we are grateful to God for his mercy towards us.

SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES

GERMANY
DEMOCRATIZATION ASSISTANCE OF THE GERMAN FOREIGN OFFICE

Fritz von Rottenburg

In the second half of the eighties a movement towards pluralistic democracy became apparent in a growing number of countries around the globe. It started in Latin America where one military government after the other and likewise one-party regimes had to give up power and handed over to democratically elected governments.

In East Asia Marcos of the Philippines was toppled and in South Korea a democratic government was elected after widespread demonstrations against the old regime. In the Soviet Union Gorbachev introduced a liberalization of the autocratic communist regime with the slogans of "glasnost" and "perestroika".

In the beginning of the nineties the "wind of change" also reached Africa. More and more African countries introduced pluralistic democratic systems with an improved respect for human rights. In various countries national conferences were convened to work out new constitutions and election laws.

A number of African governments soon had to realize, however, that the preparation and organization of elections was too costly for their limited budgets and therefore had to ask western donor countries for financial support. Besides, several African governments wanted to give evidence of the seriousness of their democratization policy and therefore invited foreign observers to watch the correctness of the election process.

In view of the considerable burdens on the German national budget caused by the reunification of Germany since 1990 it was difficult to get new budgetary means for the above-mentioned purposes. On the other hand, the federal government had along with its western partners praised the democratic system for many years as being superior and preferable to military dictatorship and one-party regimes. Besides, the participation of the people in the political decision-making and respect for human rights had been declared as two of the five fundamental principles to be regarded as political frame work for economic cooperation. Therefore, it was indispensable to give support to the democratization efforts in Africa, Asia, Latin America and the former eastblock countries.

Therefore the German Foreign Office decided to create a new democratization fund through savings with the equipment aid fund. The new fund started with a capital of 18.6 million DM and was soon increased to 27 million DM for a period of 3 years (1992 to 1994). It enabled the Foreign Office now to react positively to the numerous requests for financial equipment and advisory assistance for the preparation and organization of elections. These requests mainly concern the

financing of voters registration, voters education, the education of national election observers and the training of election officials, printing and distribution of ballot papers, voters identification cards and voters information material, the supply with ballot boxes, voting booths, tables, chairs and occasionally computers for polling stations.

For the democratization of a country not only national but also provincial, regional and communal elections are important. The German Foreign Office has given elections assistance in more than 45 cases in the last 2 1/2 years including the sending of election observers.

For the implementation of this assistance the Foreign Office not only uses its embassies abroad but also cooperates with political foundations, international organizations like the OAU and NGOs.

Besides, it cooperates with the administration of the Bundestag in the assistance for parliaments in new or newly restored democracies, mostly by donating technical equipment and juridical and political literature.

Also other donor countries, the European Union and especially the United Nations are active in the field of electoral assistance. This shows that democratization has become a global concern.

After the first democratic elections in a country it is often important to support and strengthen the newly created democratic institutions. Furthermore, an independent and free press, independent trade unions, human rights organizations and democratically organized professional organizations are indispensable elements of a democratic society. The German Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development in cooperation with the German political foundations have supported these institutions and organizations for many years already.

Unfortunately, the efforts for introducing a democratic order have not always been successful. The most unfortunate setbacks occured in Angola and Burundi.

Democracy funtions differently in every country. This is also true for Africa. However, it has become evident in the last years that in a growing number of countries the people are no longer willing to be incapacitated, humiliated, and tyrannized by their undemocratic governments. It has become evident that democracy is not just a western political philosophy but that around the globe there is a growing desire of the people to have a decisive say in the political decision-making of their country and a government which respects human rights.

A Common Agenda for

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA

Joint Declaration of EZE and African Participants of 9 June 1994

With the end of the "Cold War" the democracy movement in Africa has gained a new momentum. However, multi-party democracy still has to produce substantive results. "The wind of change" is still blowing through Africa but despite the recent positive developments in Malawi and South Africa, political changes have very often failed to improve the political and economic situation sustainably. In many African countries democratic political culture and institutions are still being stiffled by military regimes and repressive governments. We are witnessing disputes over elections, ethnic clashes, civil wars, military coups, and the unprecedented carnage in Rwanda. It is therefore increasingly important to reiterate and follow the principles of the African Charter for Popular Participation in Development and Transformation.

On the occasion of their 30 years anniversary in 1992, EZE and KZE held a workshop on "Perspectives for the Churches' contributions to democracy and development in Africa". It has been clearly stated that "the construction of a democratic society is becoming the main objective of development work in Africa." In many countries the Church has played a significant role in the process of political transition to democracy. The Churches in Africa today face new responsibilities and tasks as they are expected to publicly make a stand as a moral authority and as an influential social force. Their contribution to promoting democracy is undispensable, as it is their mandate to demand and promote justice for the poor.

As already expressed in the final document of the EZE/KZE 1992 workshop "the development of civil society will not be a straightforward and harmonious process. It is to be feared that it will take the course of conflict; differences between the elite and the masses, between town and country could intensify and turn into dangerous clashes following the abolition of authoritarian regimes. But conflicts cannot be avoided in the process of democratization."

In 1994 EZE once again invited leaders of some of its partner organizations in Africa to analyze and reflect the present situation on their continent and discuss at a workshop with German representatives of Church and governmental development organizations their respective roles and tasks in promoting democracy in Africa.

While strongly objecting to the growing opinion in the western world that Africa is a hopeless case and incapable of democracy, the participants unanimously agreed that concerted effort from Churches and governments in Africa and in the North is needed to support democracy as a prerequisite for social

and economic development. Democracy cannot be imposed and modelled from outside. Each African nation has to find its own way to establish a political system, which should include the essential elements of democracy: Rule of law, respect for human rights, peoples participation, good governance, and the ability to bring about a change of government peacefully.

Hope for personal und political freedom, social justice, and economical prosperity is inseparably linked to the democratization process. Church development organizations as well as government development organizations in the North have to clearly define and jointly work out, each with its specific role, appropriate ways to promote democracy in Africa.

Based on the common aim and commitment to promote and consolidate popular participation in development in a just and free society, workshop discussions centred on the following aspects of democratization:

- **Decentralization and Local Government - Civil Society and Economic Development**
- **Role of Justice and Human Rights**
- **Civil Education and Political Environment for Election**

Decentralization and Local Government

Decentralization and local government have been discussed so far as a national government issue and as an important part of the structural reforms within the Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAP). Democracy at national level cannot survive without democracy at municipal or local level. More power of planning and decision-making and better financial control should be shifted towards the local government. Foremost, on a local level, cooperation and coordination of governmental and non-governmental development work is necessary for sustainable progress and effective social services to the local people.

German government's financial and technical cooperation should support programmes for political, institutional, and financial decentralization aiming at the empowerment of the local people. Municipal and district levels are the entry points for promoting a civil society.

Churches and NGOs are particularly strong at this level and should be involved in the structuring and institutional set-up as this will be the immediate political frame for their development work. Churches and NGOs should particularly encourage and train for political participation at this level where vital interests of ordinary people are at stake.

National governments, World Bank, and governmental donor organizations should no longer neglect the potentials and assets of the Churches and NGOs at the local level and should seek their active involvement in development planning. The Churches should be more open to dialogue with their governments about their respective responsibilities in providing

social services to the people. Without adequate participation in local development planning e.g. the social services of Churches and NGOs cannot be sustainable. It is therefore crucial that Churches learn to understand themselves not only as providers of social services to the poor but also as important social and political forces in the interest of the poor.

Civil Society and Economic Development

In many African countries civil society is still very weak and unorganized. One-party systems and authoritarian regimes have monopolized and streamlined public opinion and political action. Trade unions, cooperatives, professional unions, media, NGOs and Churches are prevented from playing their role in the checks and balances necessary in a democratic society.

The German government should influence African governments to create conditions in which political and civil rights take root: the right to organize, the right to freedom of expression, free mass-media and human rights.

Churches all over Africa recognize that seeking justice for the poor demands the use of the Churches' social force and influence to press for political reforms, which allow for more participation of the poor.

In many cases only Churches and other religious organizations have prevailed and formed structures outside the governmental or party system, as they were considered to be harmless for a long time and Churches in Africa did not see themselves as a possible political force. Their service was understood primarily as a support for the spiritual and bodily needs, consequently, they concentrated their work on evangelism, education and health services.

It is also essential for the Churches and the NGOs in Africa to gain access to information on political and economic planning in their countries, in particular, the intentions and reforms planned within the "Structural Adjustment Programmes". For this purpose they need to increase their economic and political competence. Church donor organizations should intensify their dialogue with African partners on these topics and assist them through advocacy and lobby work in the North.

Recognizing the need for economical democracy and social transformation the Churches have objections to the way "Structural Adjustment Programmes" are planned and implemented. Important political decisions are often made in secretive manner. Agreements and treaties should be made public and information about the intentions and measurements of SAP must be accessable in the respective societies.

Reducing social services of governments without any adequate replacements is not only economically dangerous, as only healthy and educated people can contribute to economic growth, but has an adverse effect on the rights to education and health as essential for human development. The forces of civil society

should be involved not only as "subcontractors" of the World Bank for development projects, but also in the planning process of sector reforms under SAP.

In this context the Churches would appreciate more transparency in the bilateral development aid of Northern Governments because it could assist increasing accountability of government projects to the people and monitoring governments' development orientation.

The Churches should strengthen their role as the conscience of the nation and critically observe also people-friendly governments. The Church by its mandate is committed to raise its prophetic voice against unjust governments or unjust government actions or laws in order to protect and defend the poor in its society.

Role of Justice and Human Rights

Respect for fundamental human rights must be the basis for all government action as has been described and commonly agreed upon in the "African Charter on Human and People's Rights". But human right violations are endemic in Africa, law is not ruling but corruption. There will be no democracy without social justice and the respect for human rights.

Reflecting on the role of the Churches in promoting human rights, we confess that Churches have often failed to give the people hope through being a model and a good example for a just society. Tribalism, mismanagement, lack of participation, transparency, and accountability have distorted the Church as body of Christ. Acknowlegding these pitfalls Churches in Africa should sit together and self-critically discuss their role in the societies of Africa. They have much to share and to learn from each other.

Churches despite their weaknesses have considerable potential to initiate and support reconciliation and peacemaking processes in case of ethnic conflicts, land clashes, and even civil wars. Churches should search for structures and ressourcesto use these potentials most effectively.

Through its local, national, and international structures the ecumenical family should assist the Churches in Africa in lobbying and pressing governments to respect human rights. The Churches should more closely work together with human right organizations and other civil groups of their societies.

Churches in Africa are very much concerned about the trade in arms and in toxic waste dumped from Europe. This type of trade is endangering life in Africa in the most cynical way and is ridiculing our struggle for human rights. The international community should take up steps towards more restrictive arms trade and better control of toxic waste disposal.

Unlegitimized governments still persist and even new ones gain power through military force. In this respect, Churches

are very much concerned about the obvious inability of OAU and the international community to implement and follow the proclaimed democratic principles enabling usorpers and dictators to still attain international recognition. African Churches and their partners in the North should press their respective governments to isolate the dictators.

Civil Education and Political Environment for Elections

Churches in many African countries have been engaged in the progress of educating people why to vote ("vote on issues") and how to identify the right candidate regardless of the political party, colour, sex, ideology, or religious faith. After pressing for democratic changes they felt the need to prepare and educate people for the forthcoming multiparty-election and to monitor them in a non-partisan way. The postulates for democracy cannot become effective as principles immediately. Merely having a multiparty- system does not bring about democracy automatically. The rule of law, fundamental human rights, and participation of the people need institutional protection and permanent political structuring. Churches and NGOs as part of the civil society do therefore not stop at voters education. They should go beyond elections with follow-up civil education programmes for political and human rights. They will support processes which promote the understanding of democratic behaviour and democratic structures thereby enabling participation. Their civil education programmes should include the question of acceptance of different cultures and minorities. Leadership training for women should be a priority in order to ensure that women take an active part in the democratization process.

The Churches acknowledge that their own structures and behaviour have not always been democratic. It is the right time for Churches to start reflecting on their future structures and behaviour allowing for more participation and democracy.

Common Agenda

It is imperative that human sustainable development is linked to a democratic process allowing for people's participation. In taking up this task the Churches therefore give high priority to promoting of human rights and democracy in their development work.

The following areas of action have been identified and will be on the agenda of EZE cooperation with its partners in Africa; we invite all our partners and ecumenical umbrella organizations to join us in this agenda:

1. Reorientation and priority setting, search for new paradigms

- Churches recognize the need to reconsider their role in societies in transition;

- they shall undergo a process of theologically reflecting the "Church of the future" and prioritising their development work.

- Gender issues (custom, taboos, sexual division of labour) are to be reviewed under democratic structures.

2. Training and popular education

- Church staff shall be trained in topics such as human rights, democratization, debt, SAP, etc. in order to present the Churches' point of view in the country, for discussion and strategy planning with NGOs and for dialogue with and lobbying international institutions and governments.

- Concentration on civil and human rights programmes (with emphasis on the role of women) including discussion of traditional culture and values for civil education. - Community level projects shall concentrate on empowerment of the poor as partners for the local government bodies.

- Churches shall continue to develop and implement programmes for civil education regarding the different stages of their nations in the democratization process: pre-election and post-election programmes.

3. Research and studies

- Churches shall develop tools of analysis: macro-economic, social, and political issues, African traditional values that contribute to democracy and human rights.

- Churches and NGOs in and outside Africa are called upon to collaborate in this research.

4. Networking and dialogue

- Churches shall use or, where necessary, establish networks on different levels to strengthen this work with other Churches, religious organizations, NGOs and Human Rights groups to be more effective and efficient locally and exchange experiences regionally and African wide to strengthen their joint effort.

5. Capacity building

- Churches shall develop the necessary institutional set-up to plan and implement programmes for democratization and human rights.

- Churches shall support means of communication and information as important tools for people's participation.

- Churches shall continue to develop capacity and structures for conflict resolution and peacemaking.

6. Lobby and advocacy in Africa and in Germany

- Churches in Africa and their Northern partners should endeavour to influence national and international policies on the basis of their research and shall develop structures to identify and dialogue issues of concern among themselves and with national governments and international organizations. This could contain topics such as SAP, debts, election monitoring, voters registration and land law.

7. Cooperation with government

- EZE shall assist Churches in Africa and the German Government to identify areas of common interest and possible cooperation in the promotion of human rights and democracy. One possible area of action is the strengthening of civil society on the local level.

- Churches shall develop own programme ideas and programmes for coordination and cooperation with the government in the social sectors.

- Churches should endeavour to cooperate with their governments and civil society in drawing up joint actions to develop programmes for social services together.

- Dialogue with EZE and support from EZE for networking, know-how etc.

8. Cooperation between EZE and African partners

- EZE shall keep the African Churches abreast of the ongoing debates in Europe on human rights and democracy, new developments from international institutions and German government on human rights and democracy. Workshops and other fora to discuss these issues shall be continued.

Programme

Workshop

Promoting Democracy in Africa: The Role of Governmental and Church Development Cooperation, Bonn, 7 - 8 June 1994

Tuesday, 7 June 1994

14.00 h.		Opening session Address and welcome Dr. Bauer, Director of EZE
14.15 h.	Moderation Dr. Bauer	Opening speech Rev. Dr. Kobia, WCC, Executive Director Unit III, Justice, Peace and Creation Promoting democracy in Africa: experiences and future perspectives
15.00 h.		Discussion
15.30 h.		Coffee-break
15.45 h.	Moderation Dr. Wadehn	Local government and decentralization the case of Ghana Rev. Dartey, General Secretary Christian Council of Ghana Supplementary notes from Namibia: Ms. Nangula Kathindi Anglican Church of Namibia
16.30 h.		Discussion
19.30 h.		Dinner
20.15 h.		Sightseeing tour Bonn and visit of a local pub

Wednesday, 8 June 1994

08.00 h.	Breakfast	
09.00 h.	Moderation Rev. Chipenda	The role of justice and human rights - the case of Kenya Rev. Musyimi, General Secretary National Council of Churches in Kenya
		Supplementary notes from Nigeria: Father Ngoyi, Diocesan Coordinator Catholic Diocese of Ijebu-Ode
		Supplementary notes from Zimbabwe: Ms Chitiga-Machingauta, Director IRED
		Supplementary notes: Dr. van de Sand, BMZ, Bonn
		Supplementary notes: Mr. Ryelandt, Commission of the European Union, Brussels
11.00 h.		Coffee-break
11.45 h.		Supplementary notes: Ms Vermehren and Dr. Bauer GTZ, Eschborn
		Civil society (the role of associations, NGOs and Churches) and economic development (structural adjustment) in the democratization process - the case of Zambia Rev. Sampa-Bredt, General Secretary Christian Council of Zambia
		Supplementary notes from Zimbabwe: Mr. Mutasah, Justice, Peace and Reconciliation Officer Zimbabwe Christian Council
		Supplementary notes: Dr. Andresen, KfW, Frankfurt
12.30 h.		Discussion
13.00 h.		Lunch

Wednesday, 8 June 1994

14.00 h.	Moderation Rev. Sampa-Bredt	Voters education and the political environment for elections - the case of Tanzania Dr. Mshana, Development Secretary Evangelical Lutheran Church of Tanzania Supplementary notes from South Africa: Mr. Mpumlwana, Director Institute for Pastoral Education Supplementary notes from Malawi: Rev. Dr. Mazunda, General Secretary Synod of Livingstonia Supplementary notes: Mr. von Rottenburg Foreign Office, Bonn
15.15 h.		Discussion
15.45 h.		Coffee-break
16.00 h.		Summary of the discussion Rev. Dr. Kobia
16.15 h.	Moderation Rev.Dr.Kobia	Final discussion Expectations on local and German Government and bilateral cooperation, possible future tasks of governmental and church development cooperation, future tasks of the churches in the South and in the North
18.45 h.		End

List of participants

Workshop

Promoting Democracy in Africa: The Role of Governmental and Church Development Cooperation", Bonn, 7 - 8 June 1994

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