

GEORGE M. T. KAHN

THE WILOPO CABINET, 1952-1953;
A TURNING POINT
IN POST-REVOLUTIONARY INDONESIA

HERBERT FEITH

MONOGRAPH SERIES

Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Department of Far Eastern Studies
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1958

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PREFACE

The Wilopo Cabinet was something of a watershed in post-revolutionary Indonesian politics. During its fourteen months of existence basically important changes developed in the constellation of political power among the major political parties, the President, and the army. And within one of the major parties there occurred a shift in the relative strength of leadership groups of such importance as to bring about significant changes in the party's political posture and in its relationship with several of the other parties. It was during this period that cabinet government was seriously undermined and parliament lost much of its prestige and power; and it was during these fourteen months that were set in train many of the developments which have dominated Indonesian political life in the last few years.

The key political events of this period are complex and confusing and have generally been but imperfectly understood outside of Indonesia. Yet failure to understand them can result in more than inability to understand the period itself. It will also make difficult any full and sound comprehension of the important developments of the past few years. Herbert Feith, in my judgment, has probed much further into the events of this period than any other non-Indonesian scholar. He has searched out a great deal of significant new data which he has analyzed with tools sharpened by long residence and research in Indonesia, interviews with many knowledgeable Indonesians and a full mastery of the Indonesian language. I believe he has presented as clear a picture of an important period of Indonesian history and of its shaping of subsequent events as is likely to emerge for some time.

Formerly at the University of Melbourne, Mr. Feith is currently Research Fellow in the Modern Indonesia Project at Cornell University.

Ithaca, New York
August 1, 1958

George McT. Kahin
Director

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FOREWARD

Most of the material for this monograph was collected while I was employed by the Indonesian Ministry of Information between July 1951 and August 1953 and again between August 1954 and August 1956. I wish here to express my gratitude to the heads of the Ministry for the generous interest which they took in my studies and the opportunities they gave me to meet politically active persons both in Djakarta and in a number of other parts of Indonesia.

I am equally grateful to the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project which has supported me financially since my return from Indonesia to Australia in August 1956. The assistance of the Project made it possible for me to work and travel in Indonesia between May and August 1957 and subsequently to come to Ithaca. Finally I would like to record my thanks to all the many individual persons who have given of their time to help me come closer to an understanding of Indonesia's problems. I am, of course, myself solely responsible for all opinions expressed.

The point of departure for this study was an M.A. thesis on "Political Developments in Indonesia in the Period of the Wilopo Cabinet, 1952-1953" submitted to the University of Melbourne in July 1954. The present monograph discusses the same period on the basis of additional material collected in the course of subsequent research in Indonesia. It undertakes to look at the period more analytically and in the context of the eight and a half years of the post-revolutionary period. My aim has been to write a case study of the general political framework of the post-independence period and to show the Wilopo cabinet as a focal point in the country's political development in this period.

Although I have been particularly fortunate in the amount of material to which I was given access by the Ministry of Information and in the range of associations which my work there enabled me to obtain, also in the wealth of library material which is available to me thanks to being at Cornell, I have nevertheless found many types of information important to this study to be outside my reach. Partly for this reason, partly because so little study has been done of Indonesian politics, and partly also because of the nature of research on current political developments anywhere, I have found time and again that my evidence is incomplete or not wholly reliable. Where this was the case I have, for the sake of the completeness of the monograph, included my own conjectures with an indication of the degree to which they may be relied upon.

Herbert Feith

Ithaca, New York
August 1, 1958

CHAPTER I

BACKGROUND: POST-REVOLUTIONARY INDONESIA

On December 27, 1949, the Republic of the United States of Indonesia was formed, on the basis of the results of the two-month Round Table Conference at the Hague. Considering its background--more than four years of intermittent warfare--it was a remarkable achievement of compromise. Men from both sides will continue to debate whether it was primarily American pressure or primarily the military strength of the Indonesian Republic which finally convinced Holland that she had to accept a predominantly Republican Indonesia. However that may be, it was this realization on Holland's part, and the strength of the moderate leadership of the Indonesian Republic, which made the Round Table Conference Agreement possible. At this point there came an end to the similarity in political paths between Indonesia and Indo-China.

Indonesia was independent--and yet not in the way she had wanted to be. The new state was in many ways predominantly Republican and yet its very structure reflected the Dutch policy of "divide and rule." The Republic of the United States of Indonesia included the old Republic of Indonesia in a definitely leading position, but also the 15 other states and territories, which had been established by the Dutch in the areas under their control between 1946 and 1949.

Of greatest concern both to the men of the revolutionary Republic of Indonesia and to the representatives of the Dutch-sponsored federal states were two other aspects of the Agreement. Firstly it placed a heavy national debt on the new federation's shoulders. The R.U.S.I. had to accept 4.3 billion guilders (nearly \$1.13 billion) of the Netherlands Indies state debt, a large part of it the costs of the campaign to reimpose colonial rule. And, significantly for future Indonesian-Dutch relations, the status quo was to be maintained in Irian or West New Guinea, which had until then been regarded as part of the Netherlands Indies, "with the stipulation that within a year from the date of transfer of sovereignty to the Republic of the United States of Indonesia the question of the political status of New Guinea be determined through negotiations" between the two parties. (1)

- (1) See Round Table Conference Results, Secretariat-General of the Round Table Conference, The Hague, 1949; Perjuangan di Konperensi Meja Bundar (The Struggle at the Round Table Conference), Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 1949; George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, Cornell University

On December 20, 1949, Drs. Mohammad Hatta, who had been, and in a formal sense remained, Vice-President of the "Republic of Indonesia," was installed as Prime Minister of R.U.S.I., with a cabinet consisting of eleven leaders from the Republic of Indonesia and five from the federal states. This cabinet was most strongly supported by the two largest political parties, the Moslem party Masjumi and the Indonesian Nationalist party P.N.I., the two parties which had given fullest support to the last pre-R.U.S.I. cabinet of the Republic to secure ratification of the Round Table Conference Agreement. It contained members from these two and two smaller parties. None of the ministers however were candidates of their parties. For this was not a coalition cabinet, but a "national business cabinet," formed on the basis of a largely uncontroversial short-term program. (2) Parliament was unable to overthrow it. (3)

The situation facing this cabinet at its formation was one of triumph and chaos, a victory and yet in the eyes of many who had fought for it most passionately, a Pyrrhic one. Dr. H. J. van Mook, Lieutenant Governor-General of Indonesia till 1948, wrote of the situation in these terms: "The new government is, at its installation, faced by the terrifying task of governing a country without an administration that is in running condition, with only few organized sources of income, with an inflation that increases daily, and, worst of all, with an uncertain but large number of armed groups and individuals who will obey its order only in part." (4)

As the fire of the successful revolution spread from its centers in the mountains of Java and Sumatra to every part of the archipelago, the

Press, Ithaca, 1952, pp. 433-445; and C. Smit, De Indonesische Quaestie, Brill, Leiden, 1952, pp. 224-282. For a semi-official Indonesian analysis of the results of the conference see Kementerian Penerangan (Roeslan Abdulgani), Tindjauan Politik dan Ekonomi kita pada Dewasa ini (A Review of Our Political and Economic Situation at the Present Time), Publication Penra No. 5, Djakarta, 1951.

- (2) The "business cabinet" (zaken-kabinet) established in Dutch constitutional procedure, enables persons of special ability, both party and non-party men, to receive portfolios, and makes it possible for a multi-party cabinet to be selected with a view to maximum possibilities of teamwork.
- (3) This was not because it was a business cabinet. The 1949 constitution of the R.U.S.I. was written on the assumption that this would be a short-lived cabinet, holding office only until a Constituent Assembly had been elected and had prepared a constitution. It was expected that Constituent Assembly elections would be held in the course of 1950.
- (4) The Stakes of Democracy in South-East Asia, Allen and Unwin, London, 1950, p. 252.

country indeed breathed hope and resolution. But the tasks were enormous. A unity had to be created from two governments and two bureaucracies of the Republic and the federal states. The Dutch and Netherlands Indies armies had to be replaced by the army of the Republic--and the Netherlands Indies army in part absorbed into the latter. The fiery idealism of Jogjakarta and the days of guerrilla fighting had to be accommodated in the Dutch-established structure of Djakarta. Devastated by eight years of war and hunger, and saddled by the Hague agreement with an enormous national debt, Indonesia had to be able to afford the radical changes which alone, it seemed, would keep its old nationalist fighters from returning to violence.

The achievements of the Hatta cabinet in its eight months of office were considerable. It succeeded in unifying the currency and checked the dangerous inflation by the forced loan it exacted by bank-note cutting in March 1950, and in the same month it greatly stimulated exports by a kind of partial devaluation with the introduction of the system of foreign exchange certificates. (5) Already before the outbreak of the Korean war the position of Indonesia's export industry had improved considerably, despite a very large number of strikes, and with the Korean war boom in raw materials prices the situation showed further great improvement. Much of the Hatta cabinet's attention was able to be devoted to the urgent tasks of restoring industries and means of communication which had been damaged or destroyed. For the rest it was concerned with the smoothing of the huge changes which had to be made, particularly as a result of the urgent need for demobilization and of the turmoil existing in the government service.

Whereas the Hatta cabinet was little hampered by parliamentary opposition or internal political strife, it was prevented from devoting its attention fully to the social and economic tasks it had set itself, by military challenges to its authority. Many Republican irregulars were unprepared to be demobilized, and established themselves in mountain areas in many parts of the archipelago to defy the government, at least until it would demobilize them on better terms.

But of greater danger to the state were the old Netherlands Indies Army soldiers. Groups of these allowed themselves to be used by colonialist and separatist elements in three important "affairs." The first of these was the Westerling revolt in West Java in January 1950, planned, as was later discovered, as part of a design of the federalist Sultan Hamid of West Borneo to seize control of the army; the second, in April,

- (5) Under this system foreign exchange was available to importers only if, as well as paying the official rupiah equivalent, they had bought "foreign exchange certificates" for an additional 200% of the value they required. Exporters were given foreign exchange certificates to the value of 100% of the values they sold abroad, as well as receiving rupiah currency at the official rate.

was the short-lived Abdul Aziz affair, the seizure of Makassar to prevent the landing of ex-Republican R.U.S.I. troops there; and the third and most troublesome was the one of the "Republic of the South Moluccas" which caused a small-scale but bitter military campaign on the islands of Ambon and Ceram lasting from July to November. (6)

It was the Hatta cabinet which saw the creation of a unitary state. The federal states which with the Republic of Indonesia composed the R.U.S.I. were mostly unnatural units, and all had lacked real independence from the time of their inception. Most important of all, from the point of view of the tremendous nationalist feeling which was abroad, they were Dutch creations. (7) When once it was clear that the central government was predominantly Republican, most of the groups which had hitherto supported these states for their own interests, began to change their loyalties. And so within five months of December 27, all of the states had dissolved themselves into the Republic of Indonesia, or had agreed to join with the R.U.S.I. in the creation of a new unitary state. (8)

On May 19 the R.U.S.I. and the Republic of Indonesia agreed "to implement in cooperation the formation of a Unitary State as a materialization of the concept of the Republic of Indonesia aimed at in the proclamation of August 17, 1945." (9) Then in the two months which followed, representatives of the two states completed a new interim draft constitution, which was finally approved by the two houses of the

(6) See Kahin, op. cit., pp. 454-460; Persadja, Persatuan Djaksa-djaksa seluruh Indonesia (All-Indonesian Public Prosecutors' Association) ed. Proses Peristiwa Sultan Hamid II (Court Proceedings in the Affair of Sultan Hamid II), Fasco, Djakarta, 1955; J. Leimena, The Ambon Question, 1950.

(7) It was this fact which led to their collapse, rather than any feeling against federalism as such. In the words of Moh. Hatta, "Although a federal system is in fact suitable for such a far-flung archipelago as Indonesia and might be expected to strengthen the feeling of unity, the manner and timing of the move by the Netherlands Indies Government had aroused such antipathy towards ideas of federation that it was found necessary to make the change from a federal to a unitary state before a constituent assembly could be formed to draw up a definitive constitution." "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, April 1953.

(8) Only in the case of the states of East Indonesia and East Sumatra was there sizeable opposition to this course of events and even there popular feeling was strongly against the federal system.

(9) Charter of Agreement between the Governments of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and the Republic of Indonesia. See Kahin, op. cit., p. 461.

R.U.S.I. and the Working Parliament of the Republic of Indonesia, and adopted on August 15, 1950.

Under this constitution a new unicameral provisional parliament was established, consisting of the members of the R.U.S.I. House of Representatives, (148 members) and Senate (29), of the "Working Parliament" of the Republic of Indonesia (46) and its Supreme Advisory Council (13). Further, the constitution laid it down that a Constituent Assembly should be elected as soon as possible on the basis of one member for every 150,000 residents. (10)

On August 17, 1950, the fifth anniversary of the original proclamation of independence, the new unitary Republic of Indonesia was formally inaugurated. The Hatta cabinet thereupon resigned and a new period in Indonesian political history began.

The cabinet of Mohammad Natsir of the Masjumi, formed on October 6, 1950, was the first to be able to give its attention primarily to the long-term problems which had so long been put aside as a result of the priority given to military and political issues demanding immediate decisions. It was a cabinet based principally on the Masjumi (four seats), the Socialist Party (two seats), and the P.I.R., Greater Indonesia Union (two seats), with single representatives from the Democratic Fraction, the P.S.I.I. (Islamic Association Party), Parindra (Greater Indonesia Party), and the two Christian parties (the Protestant Parkindo and the Catholic P.K.R.I.), and also contained five prominent non-party men in leading positions. A united cabinet--regarded by some parties as a "business cabinet"--it was, however, handicapped by its lack of a reliable parliamentary majority.

In its seven and a half months of office, the Natsir cabinet was able with its "Sumitro Plan" for co-operatives, small industries and activization of the peasant section of the economy, to make a beginning with the basic central policies which were to be pursued in the economic sphere in the following years. Seeing the economic problem as central,

- (10) The new constitution was a revision of the R.U.S.I. one, with a number of "ideological" clauses from the Republican constitution of 1945 incorporated. These latter include equality before the law and the right to work and to a reasonable standard of living. Also, "The state shall be based upon the belief in the one God" and "shall guarantee the freedom of the people to profess and exercise their own religion," and "The economy shall be organized co-operatively." The relation of the organs of government to one another was left largely as under the R.U.S.I. Constitution, but the possibility of a presidential cabinet was eliminated. It had been arranged under the R.U.S.I.-R.I. Agreement that Soekarno should be President of the new state, and that, subject to ministerial discretion, the laws and regulations of the states were to remain in force pending the introduction of new legislation.

it pursued a strong policy directed towards the elimination of armed bands, and in its foreign policy sought to bring about the sort of relations with foreign countries, particularly Holland and the United States, which would make economic co-operation in Indonesia's interest more easily possible. At the same time it endeavored to bring the seriousness of the country's difficulties squarely before the public.

Its weakness vis-a-vis Parliament, due in the first place to the fact that the large P.N.I. was ranged in opposition to it, was accentuated by its stringent financial measures, such as the heavy Turnover Tax of November 1950, and by its inability to persuade Holland to surrender her de facto authority in Irian (West New Guinea) by December 27, 1950. It was finally forced to resign on March 20, 1951, as a result of the impasse created when Parliament upheld its strong stand on the motion of Hadikusumo of the P.N.I. passed two months earlier. This motion called for dissolution of the interim regional councils established in Java and Sumatra on the basis of Government Regulation 39, 1950 (of the former member state, Republic of Indonesia), which in practice worked to favor the Masjumi.

It was widely thought at the time that only with a cabinet including both the P.N.I. and the Masjumi could Indonesia have stability of government. However the big differences existing between these two powerful parties made the task of forming such a cabinet most difficult. One attempt, that of Mr. Sartono of the P.N.I., failed; the other of Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo (Masjumi) and Sidik Djojosukarto (P.N.I.) succeeded only as a result of considerable and widely criticized personal intervention by President Soekarno. P.I.R. (Greater Indonesia Union) obtained three seats in this new cabinet. Five smaller parties, Parindra, Labor, the Democratic Fraction and the two Christian parties, were given one seat each, and there were two non-party members.

By contrast with its predecessor, this Sukiman cabinet, which was officially termed a coalition cabinet, was strong in parliamentary support. It was strong also because it was better able to work in co-operation with President Soekarno, but on the other hand it was weak because of the disunity in its ranks. This latter was evident, in the early months of its period in office, in a series of policy zigzags on the freezing of the already established regional councils, the freeing of political prisoners held under Martial Law regulations, and the United Nations embargo on the export of strategic materials to China. Its effects were to be seen also in the patronage which the government felt it necessary to dispense, for instance its very large delegations to overseas conferences.

Stating that it accepted the general outlines of the Natsir cabinet's economic policy, this Sukiman cabinet was however less clear and careful in its budget planning and this earned it a reputation of wastefulness. With its anti-Communist raid of August 1951, (11) its strong policy against strikes, and its readiness to yield further to United States pressures

in the field of foreign policy, it based its economic policy to a considerable extent on the hope of increased external assistance. At the same time there were very considerable similarities in policy between this cabinet and that of Natsir.

High rice prices and the government's lack of success in solving the security problem, prepared the situation for the Sukiman cabinet's fall. This was eventually to be precipitated by an issue of foreign policy, which again brought the internal divisions in the Masjumi and P.N.I. to the fore.

These were the main political developments of the period of the first two cabinets of the unitary state. But what were the most important problems facing the governments of the period? How did the Natsir and Sukiman governments tackle these problems and what were the central features of the situation they bequeathed to their successor, the Wilopo cabinet? (12)

Some of the most important problems were those being faced in the administrative apparatus. The Hatta cabinet had dealt with the difficult beginnings of the problem of welding two administrations into one, but the Natsir cabinet and its successors were left the task of creating efficiency where the immediate past had left open political wounds. The feeling between "nons" and "cos"--between those with an unblemished record of work for the Republic and those who for reasons of conviction, expediency or necessity, had co-operated in one of the Dutch-sponsored administrations--provided a basis for the clique systems which were to continue to be one of the main problems of the administration.

With the rapid exodus of large numbers of Dutch and Indo-European civil servants, the problem of lack of trained technical and administrative personnel became increasingly serious. (13) When it is realized

- (11) This raid followed a series of violent incidents in West and East Java and was described by government spokesmen as an attempt to forestall a Communist revolt. 15,000 or more persons, including 16 members of parliament, a majority of them Communists or Communist suspects, were arrested in the three weeks following August 16, mainly in Java and North Sumatra. A large number were released within a few months of their arrest, following the government's inability to document its case for the existence of a plot.
- (12) See G. McT. Kahin, "Indonesia's Strengths and Weaknesses," Far Eastern Survey, September 26, 1951.
- (13) Under the Round Table Conference agreement Dutch citizens were guaranteed their 1949 salaries for a period of two years. By the end of this time the great majority had left Indonesia. Those remaining consisted of a small category of persons who accepted

that the prewar Dutch policy of denying education and training to Indonesians was carried to such lengths that in 1940 only 37 Indonesians graduated from university colleges in the country, it is not surprising that personnel in the higher ranges of skill were in extremely great demand.

At the same time the government faced a real problem in retaining highly skilled persons in its service. The egalitarianism of the Revolution had in radical manner leveled the very steep ratio of high to low wages which had characterized the prewar Dutch administration, (14) and the effect of this was to make government wages for persons in the higher ranges of skill considerably lower than wages obtainable in outside employment. Whereas the attraction of the considerable power and the prestige, both traditional and nationalist, of work in the government service, militated against the tendency for trained men to leave, there can be no doubt that a considerable depletion of skilled personnel did occur, particularly from among the ranks of the "cos." The lack of strong financial incentives in government work also produced a considerable discipline problem; for the assumption of many officials in the middle as well as the upper ranges of skill, that their presence in the government service was a favor conferred upon it, made the pursuit of fair and consistent personnel policies extremely difficult. The low salaries of responsible officials also contributed to an increase in corruption, which, although not yet as widespread as in most other Southeast Asian countries, nevertheless constituted a serious problem. Not unrelated to these evils was the growth of political party nepotism.

If lack of trained personnel was one central problem of the government service, superfluity of untrained staff was certainly another. Faced with the task of rewarding the fighters to whom it owed its victory, and of preventing these from becoming a source of political instability, the revolutionary government accepted large numbers of these into its service. The Hatta government of 1950 had contemplated a radical reduction of its employees but this proved politically impossible, and so by early 1952 the number was 571,243 as compared with 144,974 in the Netherlands Indies

regular Indonesian salary scales and a larger number given expert or semi-expert status and salaries. In early 1952 the total number of government servants of foreign nationality, of whom the majority were Dutch, or Eurasians who had retained Dutch nationality, was 7111. Keterangan dan Djawaban Pemerintah atas Program Kabinet Wilopo (The Government's Statement of the Policy of the Wilopo Cabinet and Its Replies to Parliamentary Criticism), Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 1952, p. 178.

- (14) The ratio between lowest and highest government salaries which had been 1:112 $\frac{1}{2}$ in 1938, was 1:8 in 1951. See Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Indonesia Dipersimpangan Jalan (Indonesia at the Crossroads), Penerbit Harian Abadi, Djakarta, 1951, p. 17.

government service of 1930. (15) There were grounds for the charge that the government service was a charitable institution! (16) A very similar situation existed in the 200,000-strong heterogeneous army.

These shortcomings were of particular importance because Indonesia's situation and the social ideals of its leaders demanded that the government should play a major role in the economic and social rebuilding to be done.

One particular shortcoming, with administrative as well as political effects, was the lack of any real regional autonomy. For all this period the situation was in this respect a very confused one, with a high degree of centralized power in Djakarta and relations with the 12 provinces, the 149 regencies and regency-level municipalities, and the larger number of districts and sub-districts, based on a series of ad hoc and temporary measures. This led to considerable jurisdictional conflicts and many delays, and there can be no doubt that resentment was felt at the lack of real power, and particularly of the right of initiative on financial matters, of the various governing and legislative councils of the regions. The situation was further complicated by the fact that some of the newly established provincial boundaries were strongly resented by the leadership of such regional and ethnic groups as the Achinese of North Sumatra who sought separate province status, and by the further fact that approximately 300 petty principalities, almost all of them outside Java and Sumatra, continued intact.

The Natsir and Sukiman cabinets were obliged to give a great deal of attention to problems of security. The South Moluccas revolt had been broken by November 1950, but it was not until early 1952 that most of its leaders, who had fled to the interior of Ceram, were taken. Even then several bands continued to be active on this island, but they were of little military importance. With the defeat of the "Republic of the South Moluccas" the challenge to security of old soldiers of the Netherlands Indies Army was virtually over--although in West Java some of Westerling's men remained active.

The problem of old Republican soldiers took a longer time to solve. Despite the strenuous efforts of governments to provide adequate civilian employment for these men--with rehabilitation centers and with resettlement projects to take large numbers from Java to South Sumatra and South Sulawesi--considerable discontent remained among them. So it was that

(15) Keterangan dan Djawaban Pemerintah atas Program Kabinet Wilopo, p. 178; Indisch Verslag 1933 (Netherlands Indies Report 1933), pp. 347-363. Both figures include police personnel. The 1930 figure does not include the category of "public functionaries paid according to special regulations" of whom there were 55,494 in 1926.

(16) E.g. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, op. cit., p. 29. The situation is

an important minority of the group, consisting largely of men uprooted from village life but without training for any outside occupation, returned to the life of shooting. Many of their bands, in parts of North Sumatra, South Kalimantan (Borneo), North and South Sulawesi and a number of parts of Java, were based not on particular political convictions, but merely on general dissatisfaction with the government. Some in West Java and parts of Central Java joined the radically Moslem Darul Islam bands and others there came under the leadership of men of the national-communist Partai Murba, who had played a prominent part in the fighting against the Dutch in these areas. Many in East and Central Java were bands of the Indonesian Communist Party, P.K.I. (17)

Some success was achieved by the Natsir government in November 1950 as a result of its arms round-up and its call to members of armed bands to surrender and receive clemency and employment. Its subsequent measures were stronger, as were those of the Sukiman government. Consequently by mid-1951 the bands had been virtually eliminated in all parts of the country except West Java.

However, in the second half of 1951, there were new outbursts of anti-government military activity. One of these occurred in South Sulawesi on August 17, 1951, when the old guerrilla leader Kahar Muzakar, who was negotiating with Republican authorities for the incorporation of his units into the National Reserve Corps of the regular army, fled the conference table for the mountains, taking with him his 4,000 men and the more than two million rupiah cash and military equipment which had just been turned over to him. The other outbreak which began on December 7, 1951, resulted from the defection of Battalion 426 of the Army, stationed in the Magelang area of Central Java, to Darul Islam. This was a less serious affair but, involving approximately 1,000 men, it also attracted considerable attention.

But it was in fact in West Java that the security problem was most acute. It is in this province that irregulars of the non-political type and ordinary robber bands were best able to maintain themselves. Here, too, the "People's Army" and "Bamboo Spear" organizations, regarded as the illegal arm of the Partai Murba, held considerable stretches of mountain territory. But of greatest importance, in terms both of numbers and activity, was the Darul Islam movement of S. M. Kartosuwirjo, a movement working for, and actually claiming to be, an Islamic State. (18)

wittily satirized in Pak Prijana Winduwinata, M. M. M. dan lain-lain tjerita binatang moderen (M. M. M. and Other Modern Animal Stories), Kementerian P.P. & K. (Education Ministry), 1954, Second impression.

(17) See G. McT. Kahin in W. L. Holland (ed.), Asian Nationalism and the West, Macmillan, New York, 1953, pp. 150-154. Also generally regarding the Natsir and Sukiman cabinets.

(18) Cf. C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuize, "The Darul Islam Movement in West Java," Pacific Affairs, June 1950.

This "state" operated in rugged mountain areas in southern and central West Java, where reactionary and anti-urban Islam had long been strong. A number of old arms dumps, Japanese, Republican and Dutch, were at its disposal; and with large sums of money from estate robberies, and access to parts of the coastline, it was able to deal with international smugglers.

Every government appreciated the seriousness of the country's security problems and their effects on production, morale, and political stability. As early hopes of negotiated settlement declined, with the failure of the Wali Alfatah Mission to the Darul Islam in December 1950 and the double-dealing of Kahar Muzakar in South Sulawesi eight months later, the government came increasingly to emphasize the military aspects of a settlement. Despite the restraining influence exercised by Masjumi cabinet ministers, the Sukiman government pursued a fairly active policy against the Darul Islam, carrying out attacks on Darul Islam-held areas and arresting a number of members of legal Moslem organizations in West Java who were suspected of co-operation with the rebel movement. It also established a network of army "forts" in the villages of the troubled area. But its lack of well-trained and disciplined soldiers, and the need to have these stationed in a great many other parts of the country as well, made its task most difficult. In the first quarter of 1950 the situation in West Java was still a very serious one. 428 persons were known to have been killed by irregulars in this period, and 3,052 homes to have been burnt. The total direct material losses, according to the minimal statistics of the government, amounted to R 9,981,000. (19) Insecurity in the growing number of areas of South Sulawesi controlled by Kahar Muzakar's men presented the government with a second serious challenge.

The problems which the post-revolutionary cabinets faced in the fields of administration and the maintenance of security are in fact part of their central economic problem. How could Indonesia raise her productive capacity and achieve the economic well-being for which her leaders said the Revolution had been fought? How could the inertia of traditional methods of production be overcome, and economic activity stimulated, particularly in the deflationary peasant sector of the economy, so that unemployment and under-employment might be relieved, and the whole economic wheel be made to move faster? How could the country's economy be changed from a colonial one, based largely on raw materials exports and acutely sensitive to fluctuations in world market

- (19) Antara News Bulletin, June 7, 1952. These official figures are of bandit attacks about which reports were made to government authorities, and so do not include those in areas where communication with government offices was difficult or where the rebels were in control. The total number of bandits in West Java, as officially estimated some months later, was 10,000. (Sultan Hamengku Buwono to New York Times, September 18, 1952.)

prices, to one based on a wider home market and with an industrial sector capable of supplying a large part of this market? Finally, how could Indonesians be brought to occupy the positions of leadership in economic life which had been and remained the province of the Dutch and Chinese?

The immediate task when rehabilitation had once been got under way, was to expand production in the existing enterprises. In the case of the export industries, the rubber, tea, copra and quinine, grown both in plantations and by small holders, and the tin, oil and bauxite mines, on whose earnings Indonesia's whole economy and government are so dependent, considerable success was achieved in the years 1950 and 1951. (20) At the same time it appeared to be extremely difficult to raise the overall output of this sector even to the pre-war level. This was partly because of insecurity but more particularly because of welfare state-like labor legislation and the strength of the newly flourishing trade unions, their frequent strike activities and the government's propensity to favor their claims, which together produced a rise in labor costs, a shortening of the working week, and regulations designed to make dismissals of workers difficult.

Towards the end of 1951, when the Korean war boom was over, the problem of the competition of synthetics again began to assume serious proportions in the case of a number of these industries. With the future of the plantation crops regarded as uncertain, there were numerous estate closings and relatively little new planting was being done. In the case of the mineral industries little was being done to discover new resources to be tapped when the present ones were no longer economically workable.

In the field of peasant agriculture the task was conceived as principally one of doing better what was already being done. The government's activity was limited largely to information campaigns about seed selection, fertilizers, animal husbandry and fishing methods, and to the provision of more village credit. The former village credit banks were in many areas converted into co-operatives. Credit went in particular to rice co-operatives--for elimination of the need for rice imports was an important policy objective--and to co-operatives for tobacco, sugar, kapok, copra and other types of export production. Some progress was made with experimental farms and with various pilot projects in the fields of agriculture, animal husbandry and fisheries.

Agricultural mechanization was not regarded as possible on any large scale for some time. To promote economic activity in rural areas the government embarked upon its two-year "Sumitro Plan," named after the Natsir government's Minister for Commerce and Industry. Under this

(20) See Report of the Java Bank 1951-2, Djakarta, 1952, pp. 135-183.

plan, attention was concentrated on small industries and cottage industries. (21)

A number of industrial "centers" equipped with light machinery were established in rural areas to promote the village production of such items as ironware, leather goods, ceramics, batik textiles and parasols, and these did something to offset the severe handicaps being suffered by those industries as a result of the competition of imports.

In addition the government promoted the establishment of a number of printing works, and textile and desiccated coconut factories, as well as a number of smaller experimental undertakings with ex-soldier management and labor in the fields of brick and tile making, lime manufacture, saw-milling, and so on. In the establishment of these enterprises great emphasis was placed by government agencies on the co-operative form. (22)

With the small industries program and extended rural credit facilities, the various inter-insular migration schemes, the land reclamation projects in islands outside Java and the many and varied training schemes--all these coming on top of the large salaries bill, the large military budget and the various forms of patronage for which governments felt obliged to pay--some budget deficits were unavoidable. In fact the problem of government finance and the prevention of inflation was one of the most serious problems facing the country at this time, despite the high export revenues and the credits which had been made available by Holland and the Export-Import Bank. (23)

Two basic shortages with which Indonesia was faced are of capital and skills. It was estimated that to attain a 3% annual increase in overall production it would be necessary to invest at least 20% of Indonesia's national income every year. Yet at the period under discussion only an estimated 7-8% was being invested--despite the very

(21) Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, "Our Way Out," Economic Review, Djakarta, March 1951.

(22) By December 1951 the total number of co-operatives was 5,820 as compared with 1,154 in the previous year and 521 in 1938. 1,577 of these were directly classified as producer's co-operatives, 1,378 as village co-operatives, 1,272 as consumer's co-operatives and 978 as credit co-operatives. Large numbers existed in the fields of textile production, small holders rubber, coconut growing and fisheries. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Facing the Situation, Ministry of Information, Djakarta, September 1952, p. 39.

(23) The Export-Import Bank loan for \$100 million was approved by parliament November 3, 1950. A Dutch loan of 280 million guilders (approximately \$73 million) was contracted on January 26, 1951.

favorable conditions created by the Korea boom. (24) Overseas economic aid obtained in this period was of only relatively small amounts, tiny in comparison with what other Asian countries were receiving. Loans were for more substantial amounts but still inadequate to finance any effective program of economic development. Even more important, the country's administrative system was such that she could only slowly absorb the capital which her government was able to import. As far as private foreign capital is concerned, there was some of this newly invested but far too little, and there was in fact some withdrawal of capital. Partly this is to be explained in terms of the disturbed security conditions and increased labor costs, and in part it sprang from the inability of governments to enunciate a clear policy on investment conditions--possibilities of profit remission and repatriation of capital, security against early nationalization, and so on.

The achievements on the side of skills or training were considerably greater. Every government agency expanded its training facilities rapidly. Every firm, foreign as well as Indonesian, was obliged to train Indonesians in management and technical skills. Remarkable success was achieved in the many schemes for technical and vocational education, and as a result the numbers of persons receiving such training rose steeply. (25) The training schemes for co-operative administrators produced 4,750 trained persons in their first year of operation. And very large numbers of older as well as younger persons were able to receive training overseas either at Indonesian government expense or under one or other of the overseas fellowship programs sponsored by the United States, the United Nations or the Colombo Plan.

At the root of a great many of the economic difficulties which the governments of the immediate post-revolutionary period had to face were political factors.

The owners of capital being overwhelmingly foreigners and so politically weak, governments were under disproportionately strong pressure from the new and active trade unions. This fact coming on top of the strong egalitarian ideas and practices of the Revolution, contributed considerably to the great difficulties of labor productivity. Governments had to face vociferous opposition when they decided on strong action

(24) Drs. A. Oudt, adviser to Ministry of Finance, Antara News Bulletin, January 4, 1952. See also S. Daniel Neumark, "The National Income of Indonesia, 1951-1952," Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia (Economics and Finance in Indonesia), June 1954.

(25) The number of secondary school level technical and vocational schools in 1951-2 was 257 and these had 35,982 pupils. Comparable figures for 1939-40 are 74 and 10,947. Appendix to Presidential Message, August 17, 1952, in Hope and Facts, Ministry of Information, Djakarta, 1952, p. 25.

against strikes. (26)

On the whole the governments found it extremely difficult to pursue firm policies of the sort which would retain the foreign capital invested in the country and attract more investment to it, partly because the dominant hold of nationalist ideologies made it difficult for them to take the side of the foreign employers, and partly because they were themselves in large measure committed to socialist principles. Also the fact that strong elements in the government parties had a political interest in emphasizing radical nationalist claims, partly in order to be better able to compete with the communist groups, made it more difficult for the government to impart a realistic understanding of the demands of the economic situation. The "demonstration effect" which resulted from the many overseas trips, the large numbers of foreign and especially American films and the luxury items which the Sukiman cabinet in particular allowed into the country, aided the inflationary tendency for quick consumption. By the same token it strengthened the political forces which demanded the immediate attainment of Western-scale prosperity.

Increasingly too, the involvement of members of the Indonesian elite in capitalist enterprise made consistent economic planning difficult. The policy of giving Indonesians the opportunity to attain positions of leadership in the economy, tended as a result of political pressures to become a policy of wasteful subsidies to Indonesian and Indonesian-Chinese, "Ali Baba," firms. (27) The great political power of the new Indonesian importers, especially those favored by membership of the "Benteng group," produced a considerable drain on government finance. Commercial cliques developed as offshoots of political groups. The increasing association of Indonesian nationalist leaders with Chinese capital helps to explain why so little political light was shed on the big problem of peasant indebtedness. (28)

- (26) A government military regulation of February 13, 1951, outlawed strikes and lockouts in "vital enterprises"--transport, the oil industry, gas, electricity, water supply, hospitals, etc. An emergency law of September 17, 1951, replacing this regulation, laid it down that strikes in any industry were illegal, unless 3 week prior notice had been given to a government conciliation commission. The total number of strikes in 1951 was 541; they involved 319,530 persons and caused the loss of 3,719,914 working days. This was a considerable improvement on 1950 when the figures were 7,784,271 and 144,490,539. Report of the Java Bank 1951-2, Djakarta, 1952, p. 128.
- (27) These are firms under Indonesian titular management and de facto Chinese control. With a large number of Chinese being officially classed as Indonesian citizens as from December 27, 1951, government policy favored not "Indonesians" as distinct from "Chinese," but the "economically weak" as distinct from the "economically strong."
- (28) This was suggested by the Wilopo cabinet's Minister for Agriculture, Moh. Sardjan. Antara News Bulletin, May 31, 1953.

The great achievements of the governments of this period lay largely in non-political fields such as education. (29) Where important political factors came to be involved, it frequently happened that a bottleneck situation was created. Partly this resulted from the extreme slowness of parliamentary procedure. (30) Of perhaps greater importance however was the fact that politically contentious issues frequently forced cabinets to inaction, the alternative being to risk falling as a result of parliamentary opposition or internal division. The multiplicity of parties and the fact that governments were unable to count on the full backing of all the groups which officially supported them, goes far to explain why no firm policies were being pursued on such issues as the structure of the regional legislative councils, relations between central and provincial governments and conditions of foreign investment. What appeared as the one solution in sight to this situation of near-deadlock was nation-wide elections—but the elections question itself was one on which no firm policy could be pursued for these same reasons.

A further factor adding to the instability of politics was the widespread "oppositionism"—unrealistic hostility to all activities of governments. This was partly a legacy from the colonial period when Indonesians were denied responsibility and so became permanently "against." Particularly was such an attitude in evidence among groups of ex-guerrillas and others who had been fully involved in the Revolution but were later left without responsibility to adequate employment because of their lack of formal training.

Finally something should be said of the general climate of thought in the country at the time when the Wilopo government assumed office. There can be no doubt that considerable disillusionment with the fruits

- (29) Numbers in primary schools were 5,812,000 in 1950-1, as compared with 2,283,136 in 1939-40. Numbers in junior high schools (general courses) were 65,707 in 1952 as compared with 8,778 in 1939-40 and in senior high schools, 18,381 as compared with 5,273. Teachers college figures for the end of 1952 and 1939-40 were 38,979 and 1,229, and University figures for the same period, 12,909 (not including the larger numbers at private tertiary institutions) and 1,246. Statement of Dr. Bahder Djohan, Education Minister in the Wilopo cabinet, April 20, 1953, Pewarta P.P.K. (Education Ministry News), Kementerian P. P. dan K. (Education Ministry), June 1953.
- (30) Of the 117 bills submitted to parliament by the Hatta, Natsir and Sukiman governments, 83 had not been dealt with when the Sukiman government fell. Further, 28 emergency laws had yet to be debated in parliament. Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo, director of the President's cabinet, March 20, 1952, in Roeslan Abdulgani, Fungsi Penerangan di Indonesia (The Function of Information Work in Indonesia), Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 1953, p. 61. Dutch legalism or a perfectionist nationalist conception of democracy?

of the Revolution had set in. There had been economic improvement, but it was small compared with what was expected. On the other hand the moral tension and sense of purpose which had made the material sufferings of the revolutionary period bearable, was now fast disappearing. Disappointment was felt at the laziness and irresponsibility in the government service and the patronage that the government disposed. Resentment was expressed at the luxuries which the new elite of Indonesians could afford, and at the growing gulf between this group and the masses to whom they had been brought so much closer by the Revolution. (31)

The tasks of state administration were as disuniting as they were complicated. Inevitably honor and position were distributed in ways not according with the values of the Revolution. And inevitably too, the incentives of the Revolution were losing their effectiveness. The frequent appeals of political leaders did little to arrest this development.

It would be quite wrong to conclude from this that the general framework established by the nationalist Revolution was no longer generally accepted. The extremes of political disillusionment were felt only in the bigger cities and particularly in Djakarta. Whereas considerable inchoate discontent with economic conditions existed in the village population, this did not endanger rural stability in any serious way, partly because comparisons were made with the period of Japanese occupation, when living standards were considerably lower. The new egalitarian tendencies in rural social relations, and the wide educational opportunities that had been created, militated against social instability. In city and village alike, the breadth of opportunities for personal advancement--educational and thus occupational and social--was providing the Republic with a vitally important source of strength. The commonly held and binding ideals for the upbuilding and development of Indonesia, strong particularly among young people, were an appreciable factor pulling in the same direction. There can be no doubt however that within the group of politically conscious people, there was a strong feeling of disappointment--in the cabinet, in parliament, in the government machinery and in the progress of the country generally. The word "crisis" was in frequent use. Among many groups of people there was a sense of anticipation--of something which could set a new course.

- (31) E.g. the articles of Sugardo in the Djakarta weekly Mimbar Indonesia and the cartoons of Soebantardjo in the Jogjakarta students' monthly Gadjah Mada. For some views of artists on the situation and its cultural manifestations see Indonesia, Madjallah Kebudayaan (Indonesia, a Cultural Magazine), January-March 1952 (issue on Second Cultural Congress) or Pramoedya Ananta Toer, in Mimbar Indonesia, March 15, 1952. Also Symposion tentang Kesulitan-kesulitan Zaman-Peralihan Sekarang (Symposium on the Difficulties of the Present Period of Transition), April 26-27, 1952, Balai Pustaka, 1953.

CHAPTER II

BACKGROUND: PARTY POLITICS

It has been said that power in present-day Indonesia is primarily in the hands of intellectuals. The assertion is striking and it contains a great deal of the truth. The Indonesian intellectuals--we shall use the term in a specific form of its common Indonesian meaning, to refer to persons of Western university or senior secondary education--have been a central component of the country's political elite throughout the post-revolutionary period. This is clear from a biographical investigation made by Soelaeman Soemardi of the 146 persons who had been cabinet ministers between 1945 and 1954, the 234 persons who were members of parliament in 1954 and the 61 highest-level civil servants of that time. Soelaeman found that 83% of the cabinet ministers, 59% of the parliamentarians and 100% of the senior civil servants had obtained either a University or a senior high school education. He also found that 94% of the ministers (irrespective of their level of education), 91% of the parliamentarians and all of the civil servants had been educated in Western, as distinct from Islamic, schools and Universities. (1)

Indonesia's national revolution was led by such intellectuals, men who had appropriated much of Western liberalism and radicalism, and who, more than any other group, possessed the technical ability to take charge of a modern state, the necessary knowledge of Western languages and Western-type legal and administrative procedures. Many of these persons had been able to obtain their Western education because of the wealth or high social position of their families. But, as members of the revolutionary elite, their power and prestige depended much more on their educational attainments (and nationalist political record) than on the position of their parents, usually members of one of the small Indonesian business groups or one of the vestigial (and in most cases bureaucratized) aristocracies. The intellectuals had come to exercise power as an independent group, not, or only to a lesser extent, as spokesmen for the older groups from which their members had emerged. (2)

- (1) Soelaeman Soemardi, "Some Aspects of the Social Origins of the Indonesian Political Decision-Makers," Transactions of the Third World Congress of Sociology, International Sociological Association, London, 1956.
- (2) See G. McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 27-36; W.F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition, van Hoeve, The Hague, Bandung, 1956, pp. 140-152; H. J. Benda, "The Intellectual as Makers of History in South East Asia," unpublished paper read before 10th Convention, Association for Asian Studies, New York, April 3, 1958.

But at no point have the intellectuals had a monopoly of social control, even at the level of the political elite. If our definition is to be in terms of formal educational background--and this has not only heuristic justification but also a basis in the thinking of the group itself--then one must point immediately to another group with which the intellectuals have had to share power within this elite. These are (by definition) the persons without Western University or senior secondary education. Their power rests not on understanding of the functioning of a modern state but rather on narrowly political skills, on an ability to act as mediators and organizers in relation to the politically organizable mass, and to exercise influence over the lower-level leaders of parties and mass organizations. This role has been played in the main by persons of junior secondary or primary Western education (many of them persons who might have had higher training had their parents not been too poor or of insufficient social standing to make this possible). (3) In some cases it has fallen to people of Islamic secondary education, and in a number of cases to those whose most important educational experience was afforded by the military or political-organizational training given by the Japanese in their period of occupation. Most of the men of this group of mass leaders came to prominence only through the Japanese occupation or the revolution--for indeed mass organization had been virtually impossible under the prewar Dutch regime, except for bodies established on a religious or regional, but not primarily political, basis. (4) Having had less

- (3) The division at the line between junior and senior secondary schooling is arbitrary. A case might be made for its being drawn at another point. Moreover if the level of education is regarded as a measure of the extent and impact of formal Western training, one must consider also the differences between types of Western training available to Indonesians. One relevant factor which would have to be taken into account in a further development of this concept of the Indonesian intellectuals is whether prewar education was obtained wholly in Indonesia or partly also in Holland. And, in the case of education obtained in Indonesia, the type of school attended should properly be taken into account. For major differences existed in the prewar educational system, differences of curriculum as well as of socio-political orientation, between the schools intended primarily for Indonesians (H.I.S., M.U.L.O., A.M.S., etc.) and those established for Dutch pupils but admitting a minority of Indonesians (E.L.S., H.B.S. etc.).
- (4) The Sarekat Islam (Islamic Association) was a mass movement in the early 1920's, and this may perhaps be said also of the Communist-led Sarekat Rakjat (People's Associations) of the time. But after the suppression of the Communist-led revolts of 1926 and 1927 Communism had only a shadowy underground existence and political Islam came to be divested of its mass character as the colonial authorities denied its leaders access to the peasantry. The later attempts of Soekarno and other secular nationalists to establish mass political organization had only very short-lived success. See Kahin, op. cit. pp. 64-100.

or different formal training and a different type of experience of the West, having come to power in very different times, being mostly younger and owing their power to a completely different political role demanding a different type of competence and outlook, the mass leaders in the political elite stand in strong contrast to the intellectual members of this elite. Their role being more directly political than governmental, it is not surprising that Soelaeman Soemardi, in his investigation of three categories of political decision-makers, found the proportion of mass leaders (as compared with intellectuals) to be greatest among parliamentarians, second-greatest amongst cabinet ministers and least among highest-level government servants.

One may then view the political elite of post-revolutionary Indonesia in terms of the association of two main categories of leaders, corresponding roughly to two main political functions: the intellectuals on the one hand, the mass leaders on the other. The categories are anything but clearly delineated, and the overlappings are many. Many intellectuals, in the sense of persons of Western university or senior secondary training, are highly effective mass leaders. On the other hand a number of men without such training are in fact shouldering highly complex governmental responsibilities. Nevertheless the dichotomy is useful for an understanding of the dynamics of conflict within the political elite. As we shall see, it is useful also in throwing light on divisions inside particular parties.

The Indonesian political elite we shall define as those persons who contribute actively to the decision-making which produces political crises or the consensus which ends them. But the breadth of the membership of this group is extremely difficult to delineate. It includes the effective leaders of various social power centers--the army (or sections of it), veterans organizations, trade unions, regional groupings and some religious ones, as well as political parties and the various sections of the bureaucracy--and also a number of powerful individuals, some newspaper editors, some business men, mainly of the new "bureaucratic capitalism", and a handful of political leaders of great prestige not dependent on any party function. But how many leaders of each of these types have fitted our definition at any one time in the post-revolutionary period is extremely difficult to determine. The figure has probably never been lower than 200 or higher than 500. (5) Of these an overwhelming majority have been Djakarta residents.

The concept of the political elite is not to be confused with that of the social elite. But a comparison of the two categories suggests a significant relationship: whereas the intellectuals have had to share

(5) Mysbergh speaks of the group as having "a hard core of probably not more than two hundred". James H. Mysbergh, "The Indonesian Elite," Far Eastern Survey, March 1957.

political decision-making with the group we have called mass leaders, they have not had to share social leadership. Social status has been determined mainly by the criteria established by them. Djakarta high society in our period has been virtually closed to persons without Western university or higher secondary education; it has excluded those without formal Western schooling virtually regardless of their political power. At least among older persons a mastery of idiomatic Dutch has been almost an absolute condition of entry. And, significantly, the intellectuals' terms for social status have been accepted by those who do not comply with them. Thus one finds the mass leaders particularly concerned that their children should obtain a Western type education; no Islamic mass leader, however strong his opposition to the "godless" government high schools, has been prepared to deny his children the opportunity to attend them. In this important social sense the post-revolutionary regime has been a regime of the intellectuals.

Indeed the intellectuals have been the main beneficiaries of the post-revolutionary regime. They have had an immediate interest in it and their representatives have had primary governmental responsibility. Whatever efforts individuals of the group may have made to use their governmental positions for private gain, the group as a whole has been motivated by a far-sighted concern for the viability of the regime. But they have had much less power than responsibility. The mass leaders on the other hand have had a great deal of influence over government, but relatively little responsibility for it. It is true that as individuals a number of them had come to have a heavy stake in the regime; just as many of the intellectuals in the political elite had come to have business interests so had many of the mass leaders. But the basis of the mass leaders' strength has been in particular collective power centers, and so they have been bound to represent the interests and attitudes of segments of the politically articulate public, the activists of particular political parties, sections of the army, regions, religious groups and trade union groups. Unlike the intellectuals the mass leaders have had no basis of common interests. Therefore they have been in no position, as a group, to present alternative policies. Major incompatibilities have existed between policies advocated by different sections of the mass leaders.

With the end of the revolution the independent role of intellectuals within political organizations declined, as these developed responsibility to particular centers of social power. But power did not, as after some revolutions, pass to traditional groups with an interest in restraining the pace of social change. Such groups were weak, either for political reasons--as in the case of the European and Chinese owners of capital and the various aristocratic groups which had worked with the Dutch against the revolutionary Republic--or for economic reasons--as in the case of the small Indonesian business and land-owning groups. Therefore power passed in large part to mass organizations representing particular politically articulate segments of the population, which were demanding

further social change in a variety of directions. (6) Thus was created the situation where power was shared between intellectuals on the one hand and mass leaders on the other with tension between the two groups underlying many political divisions.

But to understand the relative strength of intellectuals and mass leaders at the level of the political elite one must look at the levels of political effectiveness outside this elite. For whereas enormous power is concentrated in this very small top group, the group must act on many matters within limits set by much wider sections of the population. Political effectiveness is indeed a relative thing; there is a continuum of gradations of it stretching from the political elite to the most isolated village. But for our purposes one may fruitfully draw a line at one point in the continuum and speak of two main levels of political effectiveness, that of the relatively powerful newspaper-reading public and the relatively powerless non-newspaper-reading public or mass.


At the end of 1951 the total circulation of daily newspapers was 515,700. Thus probably between a million and a million and a half people were then reading newspapers regularly or semi-regularly. (7) Most of the members of the newspaper-reading group were city or town dwellers, but some village leaders were among them. The registered membership of political parties was (until the later development of mass election campaigning) composed almost entirely of members of the group. In one sense the newspaper-reading group may be regarded as "public opinion," at least as far as the day-to-day and month-to-month politics of the capital are concerned. Its members have been in a position to press, through a variety of organizations, for particular sectional interests. At the same time their feelings on political issues have been important in keeping government action within the limits of common nationalist consensus.

It is at the level of the newspaper-reading public that the national revolution wrought the changes which became characteristic of the Indonesian political process. For it created an uprooted generation of poli-

(6) For a discussion of the growing power of collective entities and their leaders see Wertheim, op. cit., pp. 164-166.

(7) The circulation of Indonesian language newspapers, as distinct from ones published in Dutch or Chinese was then 372,800. Almanak Pers Indonesia, 1954-55 (Indonesian Press Almanac, 1954-55), Lembaga Pers dan Pendapat Umum (Press and Public Opinion Institute), Djakarta, 1955, p. 196. On the estimate that Indonesian language newspapers were read by an average number of three citizens per copy, and that the average issue of a Dutch or Chinese language daily found one reader who was an Indonesian citizen, the number of citizens reading newspapers with a high degree of regularity may be reckoned to have been 1,262,300.

Levels of Political Effectiveness
and Categories of Political Participation



Levels of Political Effectiveness

1 = The level of the political elite

2 = The newspaper-reading public

3 = The non-newspaper reading public

Categories of Political Participation

1a = Intellectual elite members
1b = Mass leaders within the elite

2a = Non-revolutionaries
2b = Ex-revolutionaries

3a = Traditional village areas
3b = Detraditionalized areas

tically articulate persons. As a result of the revolution, and the Japanese occupation which preceded it, at least half a million young men were torn out of civilian life in cities, towns, and villages, particularly in Java and Sumatra. (8) These men, then the soldiers, propagandists and organizers of the revolution, have consistently been the most dynamic section of the newspaper-reading public in the post-revolutionary period, for they have been equipped with political training enabling them to provide leadership at the level of the mass or the non-newspaper-reading public. In particular, they have been in a position to speak for the many millions of workers and peasants who are adversely affected by the continuing social change of the present period. Their role within the group of the newspaper-reading public has been a dominant one in the parts of the country heavily affected by the revolutionary upheaval.

Diverse as the composition of this ex-revolutionary group has been--as regards social origins, educational background, and adjustment to post-revolutionary society--one may speak of it as the bearer of a particular political mood, the mood of messianic revolutionary nationalism. Substantially ambivalent in its reaction to the impact of the West, this mood is characterized both by egalitarian political idealism and by authoritarian collectivism, both by assertions of faith in the people and by an emphasis on the necessity of their being given leadership. It is a radical mood, rooted in a strong belief in the efficacy of political action and propaganda. Yet its characteristic political expression is "oppositionism," a negative attitude toward governments arising from an impatience of compromise and a refusal to acknowledge the practical difficulties facing the country. The flavor of this mood is contained in such words as liberation, revolutionary, dynamic, movement and struggle. Its symbols, such as the Pantja Sila (Five Principles: Faith in the One God, Nationality, Humanity, People's Sovereignty and Social Justice), gotong rojong (mutual community assistance), anti-imperialism, anti-capitalism, building a new society and the return of West Irian, constitute a framework within which all governments of the post-revolutionary period have had to work. (9) Extreme forms of this mood have been

- (8) 500,000 is given as a minimal figure by the two prominent military leaders and writers, Major-Generals T.B. Simatupang and A.H. Nasution. See Simatupang, Pelopor dalam Perang, Pelopor dalam Damai (A Pioneer in War and Peace), Jajasan Pustaka Militer, 1955, p. 65, and Nasution, Tjatatatan mengenai Politik Militer Indonesia (Notes on Indonesian Military Policy), Pembimbing, Djakarta, 1955, p.311. A more recent statement of a spokesman of the Ministry for Veterans Affairs gives the number of registered veterans as approximately 800,000. Antara News Bulletin (New York edition) March 27, 1958.
- (9) For a discussion of this mood in sociological categories, see J.M. van der Kroef, Indonesia in the Modern World, Masa Baru, Bandung, Vol. I. (1954) pp. 94-132, Vol. II (1956), pp. 244-252.

prevalent throughout the period since 1949 among that section of the ex-revolutionaries for which the regime has failed to find suitable employment. It is from this unaccommodated sector that the mass leaders at the political elite level have obtained their most positive support. But the mass leaders have obtained support also from many relatively well-accommodated members of the ex-revolutionary group--though usually not from those of higher Western education.

The non-revolutionaries who have formed the counter-piece to the ex-revolutionaries within the newspaper-reading public are a very heterogeneous group. They have included a small minority of persons who were actively opposed to the national revolution--some members of aristocratic groups, some Christians, mainly in East Indonesia, and large sections of the Chinese and Indo-European minorities. But the majority of the group has consisted of persons who were at least partly sympathetic to the revolutionaries, but were not drawn into an active role in their ranks, either because they were too old (or too young), because they had business interests to pursue, because they were city dwellers with families to provide for, or simply because there was no effective revolutionary resistance to the Dutch in their area.

There are few common aspects to the role of this group in the post-revolutionary period. Sections of it have had high political effectiveness by virtue of property interests or traditional social position; other sections, lacking such qualifications, have been politically weak. In general however one may say that the group has stood at a disadvantage in post-revolutionary politics because it has lacked access both to the symbols of revolutionary nationalism and to the techniques of mass organization. The intellectuals of the political elite have drawn their support mainly and increasingly from this group; but they have obtained considerable backing also from the more highly educated of the ex-revolutionary group.

The lowest level of political effectiveness, the level of the non-newspaper-reading public or the mass may be characterized in terms of a division between areas of traditional village society and "detraditionalized" areas. The line of cleavage here is not a sharp one; but its nature is readily perceived when one compares cities, towns, plantation and mine areas and export-producing areas generally, with areas where traditional social structure has as yet suffered no major blows at the hands of economic change. For most of the post-revolutionary period--in fact at all times except during campaigning for the 1955 elections--it has been only in such detraditionalized communities as exist in cities, or in oil, rubber, copra or sugar areas that the non-newspaper-reading person has had any significant degree of national-level political effectiveness. It is in these areas that political parties and their affiliated mass organizations could easily establish themselves; they concentrated on these areas partly for organizational reasons and partly

because detraditionalized communities provided them with an important role to play as agents of social reintegration on a new basis. (10) Inasmuch as parties and mass organizations have been phenomena of detraditionalized areas, one may speak of a rough correspondence between the traditional-detraditionalized division at the mass level and the ex-revolutionary-non-revolutionary dichotomy at the level of the newspaper-reading public. (See the chart on page 24.)

With this framework in mind let us proceed to an examination of functioning political units. In the immediate post-revolutionary situation political parties existed in great profusion. The personal ambition which had been dammed up by colonialism and surged forth with the outbreak and victory of the revolution, was expressing itself first and foremost in politics. Nineteen parties had representation in the temporary parliament, perhaps as many as 30 wielded significant power either nationally or at a provincial level, and many more were able to achieve public recognition, and sometimes a measure of patronage, by means of bluffing techniques.

Prewar Indonesian nationalism had been characterized by a multiplicity of parties. (11) The Japanese occupation abolished parties as previously existent, but established statist mass organizations on the basis both of Islam and of secular nationalism. For nine days in the first two weeks after the proclamation of independence, government policy aimed at the creation of a one-party regime. (12) But thereafter a multi-

(10) See van der Kroef, op. cit., Vol. I, pp. 121-125.

(11) See Kahin, op. cit., pp. 64-100. Also J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Nationalistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie (The Nationalist Movement in the Netherlands Indies), Tjeenk Willink, Haarlem, 1931; J. Th. Petrus Blumberger, De Communistische Beweging in Nederlandsch-Indie (The Communist Movement in the Netherlands Indies), Tjeenk Willink, Haarlem, 1935; A.K. Pringgodigdo, Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia (A History of the Indonesian People's Movement), Pustaka Rakjat, Djakarta, 1950; D.M.G. Koch, Om de Vrijheid. De Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesie (Towards Freedom, The Nationalist Movement in Indonesia), Pembangunan, Djakarta, 1950; L.M. Sitorus, Sedjarah Pergerakan Kebangsaan Indonesia (A History of the Indonesian Nationalist Movement), Pustaka Rakjat, Djakarta, 1951; J.M. Pluvier, Overzicht van de Ontwikkeling der Nationalistische Beweging in Indonesie in de jaren 1930 tot 1942 (A Survey of the Development of the Nationalist Movement in Indonesia between 1930 and 1942), van Hoeve, s'Gravenhage, 1953.

(12) See Roeslan Abdulgani, "Partai dan Parlemen (Parties and Parliament)," in Fungsi Penerangan di Indonesia, Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 1953, pp. 115-121.

party system was officially called into existence and quickly came into reality. The revolutionary KNIP (Central National Committee or Outer Parliament) was constituted and reconstituted on a system whereby President Soekarno, in consultation with Vice-President Hatta and the cabinet, estimated party strengths and asked party leaders to name representatives up to the number he named. This aimed at giving representation to all significant groups in Indonesian society--as under a Proportional Representation voting system--and so created a multiplicity of parties (and a strong position for the party councils of the various parties). Probably influenced in some degree by the model of Holland, government leaders encouraged the existence of a multi-party system, rather than for instance a two-party system. In the post-revolutionary period the multiplicity of parties was recognized and further encouraged by the composition of parliamentary committees and other committees established by the government on a representational basis; for a large number of these consisted of one representative from each of a large number of parties, more or less regardless of their size and importance. A similar method was used when regional legislative councils were established in 1950 and 1951, on the basis of the controversial Government Regulation No. 39 of 1950.

With a multi-party system officially sanctioned, and with party strengths unable to be measured in anything like an objective manner, tiny parties could arise and maintain a claim to have popular support merely on the basis of political bluff. Political bluff indeed became the order of the day. Extravagant claims of party membership and organization were placed in news bulletins and, where possible, in government publications. So for instance, the P.R.N. (National People's Party), an organization with only a shadowy existence outside Djakarta, wrote in a publication of the Ministry of Information that it had a membership of 2,000,000 persons. (13) At yearly or two-yearly conferences parties sought to have attendance from delegates from as large as possible a number of branches, which in many cases existed merely on paper.

The situation was further complicated by the great power of individuals, many of them outside parties or little bound by their loyalties to them. Writing in 1954 Robert C. Bone Jr. compared political life to a "kind of poker game played by a few thousand people, all of whom have known each other much too long and too well." (14) The general pattern of party alignments was so confused by regional feelings, family loyalties, bapakist (literally father-like) teacher-disciple and leader-follower relationships, and the personal likes and dislikes nurtured through the hectic social and political changes of the previous fifteen

(13) Kepartaian di Indonesia (Parties in Indonesia), Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 1951, p. 194.

(14) Robert C. Bone Jr., "The Future of Political Parties in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, February 1954.

years, that it was tremendously difficult in any situation to discern the centers of power.

Furthermore government through parliament and parties was something new. Its implications had not yet been fully explored even by its chief actors. One central problem, as they saw it, was whether the new system would be able to accommodate such important centers of extra-parliamentary power as the army, and particular sections of it, and President Soekarno.

Both the army leadership and President Soekarno had great power and revolutionary prestige. A large part of the army, both officers and men, were highly political in outlook, regarding themselves as the vanguard of the revolution, and therefore the rightful ultimate custodian of its goals. They had exercised wide political powers and numerous administrative functions in the period of armed struggle, and were subsequently extremely loath to abjure their political role. Highly heterogeneous in composition, and divided by its susceptibility to local and party political pressures, the army had nevertheless a certain cohesion of outlook as well as interests, which made it possible for it to wield power at the Djakarta level.

President Soekarno's prestige and power is rooted both in his role as the foremost leader of the struggle for independence and in his extraordinary oratory and charismatic powers. Soekarno symbolizes Indonesia's independence and "national struggle" in a unique way and his popularity and influence over mass audiences in any part of the country is unmatched. In a sense, therefore, he has been too big for his constitutional functions as a figure-head President, and under constant temptation to exert power beyond the limits of these functions.

The same is in some senses true of Vice-President Hatta, who had long worked with Soekarno in a political partnership almost equivalent to a co-presidency. In this partnership, heralded as the *dwitunggal* (duumvirate), Soekarno was seen as representing Java and Hatta as representing the rest of Indonesia. Also Hatta had played the central role in executive policy-making for much of the period of the revolution. But his power was much less than Soekarno's in the post-revolutionary situation because he lacked Soekarno's oratorical skill and popular appeal. (15)

Constitutionalism thus operated in a fluid situation where both the army and the President (and in lesser measure the Vice-President) had numerous opportunities to continue to wield political power. Would the prestige of constitutionalism be strong enough to prevent them from

(15) See A.K. Pringgodigdo, The Office of the President as Defined in the Three Constitutions in Theory and Practice, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1957.

doing this, or at least to persuade them to do so only to the extent that it was possible through parties and parliament? To this question there was as yet no answer. But the question was a dominant aspect of political life. Parties operated in a context of uncertainty as to where the limits of their own power lay.

Political decision-making being heavily Djakarta-centered, parties were chiefly concerned to exert power at the level of the capital. In the words of Roeslan Abdulgani in 1952, "Political parties at this time are still concentrating mainly on parliamentary and cabinet struggles, paying scant attention to efforts in society". (16) A number of parties had functioned extensively at the village level in the period of the revolution, and were to do so again in the one to two years of campaigning which preceded the elections of 1955. But in 1952 they were generally in a period of hiatus as far as village-level activity was concerned. Inasmuch as they operated outside the capital, they concentrated their efforts on areas of high national-level political effectiveness, on such detraditionalized areas as cities, residency and kabupaten (regency) towns and areas of capital-intensive export production.

There were indeed parts of the country, including many areas in East and Central Java, where significant party activity existed at the village level in 1952. In these areas party-associated religious, social and educational organizations flourished and many local power conflicts were seen in generalized ideological terms. But this was largely autonomous activity, for the organization binding parties as between Djakarta and the villages was extremely loose even in these areas. The national party offices were little concerned with village activity, for there were few ways in which it could be made to bear directly on developments at the level of the capital.

The central executives of most parties had only a very general idea of the size of their own membership. Thus in 1951 it was possible for Mr. Jusuf Wibisono of the Masjumi to write, "Based on the number of its branches, the membership of the Masjumi is estimated at 13 million, but only 600,000 persons are registered with the Secretariat of the Party Executive Council, and only 400,000 have been given membership cards." (17) The situation was similar in the case of most of the other parties. Dues, though stipulated in the constitution of virtually all parties, were rarely collected except in the higher echelons--though an exception should be made here in the case of the Communist Party. There was probably no party whose financing was based mainly on membership dues. Such funds.

(16) Fungsi Penerangan di Indonesia, p. 107.

(17) Jusuf Wibisono, "Masjumi di Masa Datang (The Future of the Masjumi)" in Indonesia dalam Pembangunan (Indonesia in Development), Panitia Mukhtar Masjumi ke-5 (Committee for the Fifth Convention of the Masjumi), Alvaco, Djakarta, 1951, p.22.

as were required for congresses, party periodical organs or the salaries of the full-time party workers were raised mainly from a small number of large personal contributions, made in many cases from funds obtained as a result of bureaucratic power. In general, and again excepting the Communists, party organization was simple and loose. At the same time most parties were lacking in strict discipline. Intra-party divisions were of great importance and were openly admitted in the case of most parties--not however in the case of the Communist Party or the Socialist Party. In fact much of the energy of the leaders of most parties was spent in internal political struggle.

Weak organization, lack of mass membership and lack of internal cohesion, combined with the relatively important part played by parliamentary representatives, establishes most of the Indonesian parties of this period as similar to what Duverger has called nineteenth century type caucus parties, parties of weak articulation. (18) But at the same time parties and party-linked organizations were already playing an important role in many small towns and villages, contributing to the process of transforming local and traditional loyalties into national and ideological ones, and acting as agents of upward social mobility. (19) It required only the long campaign which preceded the 1955 elections to establish an organizational relationship between this village-level activity and the activity of parties at the level of national politics--and thus to make the parties into something far more like the mass parties of the twentieth century West.

We may now proceed to look at certain of the more important of the Indonesian parties, to examine the situation in which they found themselves at the time when the Sukiman cabinet was about to fall and to be replaced by the cabinet of Wilopo. (20) We shall begin by discussing the Socialist and Communist Parties, for these two parties set many of the issues on which political competition centered. At the same time it should be said that these two were untypical of Indonesian parties of the time, in that they were cohesive and fairly well-disciplined, and had developed clear policy viewpoints.

- (18) Maurice Duverger, Political Parties, Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State, Methuen, London, 1954, pp. 1-3, 40 ff.
- (19) See for instance Clifford Geertz, The Social Context of Economic Change, An Indonesian Case Study, Center for International Studies, M.I.T., Cambridge, Mass. 1956, pp. 135 ff.
- (20) For the development of parties in the revolutionary period see Kahin, op. cit., passim. For a survey of the parties covering the period until 1952, see G. McT. Kahin, "Indonesian Politics and Nationalism," in W.L. Holland (ed) Asian Nationalism and the West, Macmillan, New York, 1953, pp. 73-110, 134-146.

The Indonesian Socialist Party.

The Partai Sosialis Indonesia or P.S.I. headed by the former Prime Minister Sjahrir, was a small party dominated by its Western-thinking leaders. More than any other party it was led by the type of persons we have defined as intellectuals. It had 15 representatives in the temporary parliament. However, it exercised an influence on Indonesian politics quite disproportionate to its size. This was partly because of the caliber of its leadership and partly because its ideas received wide support in other parties and from persons without party allegiances. It had played an important governmental role in the Natsir cabinet but was not included in the cabinet of Sukiman.

The party's policy emphasized economic development and reorganization. Its Marxism, conceived as a method of social analysis rather than a guide to planning, was of relatively little importance here. The tenor of the party's thinking, with its emphasis on rational organization of administration and the economy, was rather a Fabian one. It believed that foreign capital would be needed for a considerable period, though it condemned large-scale reliance on overseas economic aid. Socialism was seen as a long-term goal and an attractive political symbol.

With the emphasis on economic development and planning went opposition to extreme nationalism and anti-foreign feeling. Undue emphasis on the claim for West Irian (West New Guinea) was publicly condemned by the party's leaders as scapegoatism. Faith in radical slogans was castigated as a legacy of Japanese rule. (21)

In foreign policy, the party was influential in giving specific content to the generally accepted "independent foreign policy." Sophisticated anti-Communists, its leaders were sympathetic to association with Western Europe and the countries of the British Commonwealth. But their main attention was focused on the development and extension of the India-Burma-Indonesia group of states as a balance factor in the world struggle. After Sjahrir's trip through Europe and Asia in the middle of 1951, the party was particularly active in international work. (22) It played a major part in the preparations for the first Asian Socialist Conference held at Rangoon in January 1953. Pan-Asian ideas did not, however, play any part in the party's thinking. Its members were, in

(21) See for instance S. (Sjahrir?) in Sikap (party weekly), Djakarta, September 29, 1952.

(22) See. L. M. Sitoroes, "Laporan Organisasi dari Pebruari 1950 sampai 12 Pebruari 1952" (Report on Organization, February 1952 to February 12, 1952) in Suara Sosialis (party periodical), Djakarta, April 15, 1952.

Sjahrir's words, "internationalists with a correct understanding of nationalism." (23)

Ever since 1950, the P.S.I. had been a strong advocate of early elections, and it pressed its demands for these in the last months of the Sukiman cabinet. (24) Advocating that governments recognize the existence of divisions between ethnic groups, the party favored the establishment of an Upper House to represent such groups of the population, and asked that the election law should provide for a large number of electorates, to be established with these groups in view.

The party stressed strict interpretation of the 1950 constitution as far as the powers of the President are concerned. Hence it opposed all claims that the President has special rights and powers over and above those of a constitutional head of state. It was in fact more critical of President Soekarno than any other party. Important as both a cause and an effect of this was the three-year-old breach in personal relations between Soekarno and Sjahrir.

Organizationally the P.S.I. had some features of a militant party. Abjuring mass propaganda techniques, it sought to be a small party of well-trained and well-disciplined political workers. (25) In 1952 it was freer than most other parties from publicly evident internal division. Sjahrir's position was unchallenged, although there were a number of other men of great ability in the party's top leadership, such as Djohan Sjahroezah party theorist, Subadio Sastrosatomo, parliamentary spokesman, and Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, economics professor and former Minister for Trade and Industry.

A heavily city-centered party, the P.S.I. had the support of a sizeable group of ex-revolutionary students and other persons of higher education. In addition it was backed by a section of persons of higher Western education from what we have called the non-revolutionary sector of the newspaper-reading public, including some influential members of the Chinese and Indo-European minorities.

- (23) Nationalism and Internationalism, (Address to the first Asian Socialist Conference), Asian Socialist Conference, Rangoon, January 1953.
- (24) See for example the statements of Sjahrir, Antara, January 22, 1952, and Subadio Sastrosatomo, Antara, January 24, 1952.
- (25) In this respect it may be considered an heir of the prewar Club Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (Club for National Indonesian Education or New P.N.I.) of Hatta and Sjahrir, which stood out from the P.N.I. of Soekarno chiefly because of this approach to campaigning and organization.

Its influence on the press was probably greater than that of any other party. It also had a large number of members and supporters in very high government posts, particularly in the capital; its influence at the level of departmental and divisional heads was second only to that of the P.N.I. Within the top leadership of the army it could count on more sympathy than any other party. Most important of all it acquired power by fulfilling a brains trust function in relation to other parties. Its policies found general support among large sections of other parties, in particular the Masjumi and to a lesser extent the P.N.I. On the other hand strong enmity towards it existed in certain sections of these and other parties, partly still in consequence of the vociferous attacks which Sjahrir had made in the early months of the revolution on all who had worked with the Japanese authorities during the occupation. (26)

The party's mass level support or potential support was almost negligible. In the parliamentary elections of 1955 it was to emerge as the eighth strongest party, with a mere five seats.

The Communist Party and the Partai Murba

The P.K.I., Partai Komunis Indonesia, the other of the two parties characterized by internal cohesion and clearly formulated policies, stood in sharp contrast to the Socialist Party as regards the social function of its leadership and the groups to which it appealed. Its leadership came from what we have called mass leaders rather than from intellectuals and its appeal was directed towards the former revolutionaries at the level of the newspaper-reading public and the detraditionalized areas at the level of the mass. It would be possible to regard it as constituting the prototype of the party led by mass leaders, if it were not for the fact that its role was affected in crucial ways by the fact that it was an orthodox member of the international Communist movement. (27)

The beginning of 1952 found the P.K.I. a fairly weak party far

(26) See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 164-172.

(27) Although the P.K.I. was and is in every sense a party growing out of the Indonesian environment, its role cannot be explained without reference to its foreign borrowing of ideology, organizational principles and potential support, or its commitment to strategies laid down outside the country. Thus it has not always pursued a political course of a type to appeal to mass organizations or active revolutionaries; in the first two years of the revolution it supported the cabinets of Sjahrir in their policies of negotiating with Holland, policies which did violence to radical nationalist feeling.

removed from the center of governmental power, but vigorously and imaginatively led. For much of 1949 and 1950 it had been largely ineffective, partly because of internal divisions and theoretical disagreement, and partly because of the blows which had been delivered to both its organization and its nationalist prestige by the crushing of the "Madiun Affair," the Communist revolt of September 1948. In January 1951, however, a crucial change in party leadership provided the basis for a new internal cohesion. Power now passed into the hands of a new Politburo of young men: D.N. Aidit and M.H. Lukman (both recently returned from China and Vietnam), Njoto, Sudisman and Alimin; of these all except the veteran Alimin were men under 31 years of age. All the five, with the possible exception of the theorist Njoto, were "mass leaders" in terms both of their educational attainments and the skills to which they owed their position.

Once in power the new leaders bent all their efforts towards reorganizing the party, emphasizing that it should be a single party, small, disciplined and theory conscious, and that it should concentrate on political work among the masses rather than on parliamentary politics. (28) By early 1952 they had succeeded in eliminating publicly evident dissension within the party to the extent that it was possible in March to begin a large membership expansion; in addition they had reorganized a number of its front organizations to be more effective agencies of its policies. On the other hand the beginning of this year found the party still hampered by disabilities resulting from the Sukiman cabinet's raid of August 1951, with some of its leaders still in gaol or hiding.

The party's stand on national issues centered on its opposition to the Round Table Conference Agreement, which had, the P.K.I. argued, left Indonesia in a semi-colonial state. Pointing to the difficulties and disappointments of the situation immediately after the transfer of sovereignty, the party declared that only the abrogation of the Round Table Conference Agreement could provide a way out. (29)

The party opposed the governments of Hatta, Natsir, and Sukiman on almost every issue of constitutional, financial and labor policy. It attacked their foreign policy, inasmuch as this included partial approx-

(28) See "Membolsewikkan P.K.I. (Bolshevizing the P.K.I.)," Bintang Merah, Vol. VII, No. 5, March 1, 1951; also "Tentang Tan Ling Djie-isme (On Tan Ling Djie-ism)," Bintang Merah, Vol. X, No. 2-3, February-March 1954.

(29) Statement of Ngadiman Hardjosubroto, Sin Po, December 14, 1949. For the text of the P.K.I. motion for the abrogation of the Round Table Conference Agreement see Pedoman, October 7, 1950.

imation to the U.S.-led bloc of states, calling at the same time for the condemnation of U.S. aggression in Korea, the withdrawal of all foreign armies in Asia, the freedom of Vietnam, French North Africa and so on, and the banning of the atom bomb. Prior to the Sukiman government's August 1951 raid the party had also effected a strategy destructive to the economy, by political strikes, by sabotage and cargo-pilfering in ports, and by the organization of ex-guerrillas and local criminal elements for terror raids on tobacco and sugar plantations in East Java.

Furthermore the P.K.I. was frequently prepared to attack national and nationalist symbols. It denounced Soekarno and Hatta, not only for the role they had played during the "Provocation of Madiun" but also for collaborating with the Japanese between 1942 and 1945. It branded the independent foreign policy as a sham. At a number of public meetings of the party the National Anthem was sung half-heartedly, often with a leader singing solo and the rest of the meeting silent. The P.K.I. was making little or no attempt to find a basis which its own anti-imperialist ideology could share with the nationalism of the Indonesian revolution.

The party's greatest strength lay in the trade union movement. The American Federation of Labor's Free Trade Union Committee representative in Indonesia, writing in June 1952, stated that the P.K.I.-led trade union federation S.O.B.S.I. (Central All-Indonesian Workers Organization) had between 800,000 and 850,000 members, including a little over 350,000 in SARBUPRI (Association of Plantation Workers)--out of an estimated 2,000,000 organized, and 3,000,000 organizable workers. (30) But S.O.B.S.I. was stronger than these figures suggest. This was partly because it had a dominant position in strategic sections of the economy--transport, oil, waterside workers-- and in politically crucial parts of the country--Djakarta, Surabaya and the East Sumatra area around Medan. More particularly it resulted from its relationship to its several rivals. These were still very weak at this time, S.O.B.S.I. having gained an early lead in the rapid unionization which developed after December 1949. S.O.B.S.I. organization and financing was much superior to that of any of its many rival unions and trade union federations. S.O.B.S.I. gained from the divisions between these bodies, many of them merely the creations of rival political parties established to strengthen these parties.

(30) Harry Goldberg, Gerakan Buruh di Indonesia (The Labor Movement in Indonesia), Djakarta, 1952, p. 15, 19. Goldberg warns that these are rough approximations. See also H.J. Wijnmalen, "Aantekeningen betreffende het ontstaan, de ontwikkeling en het optreden van de vakbeweging in Indonesie na de onafhankelijkheidsverklaring van 17 Agustus 1945" (Comments on the Origins, Development and Behavior of the Trade Union Movement in Indonesia after the Proclamation of Independence of August 17, 1945), Indonesie (s'Gravenhage), 1951-52, pp. 434-461, 539-563.

Furthermore, most of S.O.B.S.I.'s rivals were forced, because of the inexperience of their leadership and their lack of an appealing program, to take a defensive attitude towards S.O.B.S.I. or merely echo S.O.B.S.I. demands. Though by early 1952 the strength of S.O.B.S.I. was less than it had been a year before because of the mass arrests of August 1951, it remained greater than that of any or all of its rivals.

The party's position among the peasantry was considerably weaker. It could count on a sizeable group of potential supporters in many areas where it had built up a strength between 1945 and the Madiun Rebellion of 1948, and indeed in a number of districts where it had been powerful before the abortive revolts of 1926 and 1927. Furthermore it enjoyed the sympathy of groups of former guerrilla fighters, particularly in Java, who had returned to their villages and failed to make a satisfactory adjustment to village economic and social conditions. In some areas it was strongly backed by groups of squatters on estate lands. And it had the nucleus of a Yen-an-like territorial base among peasants in a small mountain area of Central Java. But the overall picture was one with which the party was understandably dissatisfied. The Communists had as yet no peasant organization over which they could exercise undisputed control. Even as late as October 1953, after a very large membership expansion, "as yet only about 7% of the peasantry (were) organized under the leadership of the Party." (31) A great deal of grassroots political work had still to be done before the party could obtain 16.4% of the national vote and 39 seats in the parliamentary elections of September 1955. (32)

In 1952 there were few intellectuals or persons of tertiary or completed secondary education in the party; it also found little support among students. There is a pointer here to a significant strength of the nationalist regime in the immediate post-revolutionary period, the fact that it readily offered power and position to everyone, young or old, who had education or training.

Among the 2,500,000 Chinese in the country, proud of the successes of the Peking regime, and resentful of the discrimination they were suffering in Indonesia, were many, particularly intellectuals and urban workers, who were susceptible to Communist influence. In addition the heavily-staffed Embassy of the Chinese People's Republic was so active

(31) D. N. Aidit, "Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia," Bintang Merah, September-October 1953, p. 462.

(32) In the temporary parliament the P.K.I. had 16 representatives (in 1952). In addition it could generally rely on some twelve votes from two small fractions, Golongan Buruh (Labor Group) and Fraksi Kedaulatan Rakjat (People's Sovereignty Fraction) and individual P.K.I. sympathizers who belonged to no fraction.

in this period in giving assistance to the P.K.I. in the form both of money and literature, that the government was under strong pressure to take steps to limit the freedom of movement of its staff. (33)

Finally something should be said of a general tolerance towards Communist ideas in Indonesia, which was undoubtedly a strong factor in the P.K.I.'s favor. The Madiun Affair notwithstanding, only very few groups in Indonesia regarded the Communist Party as a party radically different from all others in the way in which it is widely regarded in the West. Thus, although in 1951 Indonesia had a relatively strongly anti-Communist government, it rarely occurred that the national Indonesian press contained attacks on Communism or Soviet or Chinese policies. (34) Denunciation of Dutch and U.S. imperialism on the other hand, were very frequently published. The mood of Indonesian politics at this time was such that only a few could run the political risk of being branded as reactionary and pro-imperialist, by publicly taking a strongly anti-Communist stand.

The national-communist Partai Murba (Proletarian Party), considerably weaker than the P.K.I. in 1952 and yet an important rival of it, may be regarded as the prototype of the party led by mass leaders, as the P.S.I. is the prototype of the intellectual-led party. Its leadership of 1952 was dominated by men without higher education, who had come into prominence as leaders of mass organizations and military formations in the Japanese occupation and the revolution, and its appeals were directed particularly to unaccommodated ex-guerrillas and wage laborers. As a party of extreme nationalism and messianic social radicalism (whose inchoateness was only mildly tempered by the Marxist and Leninist theory to which it laid claim), it was a citadel of "oppositionism," the politics of refusing to recognize the practical difficulties of governments; indeed it had never taken part in any government of the revolutionary or post-revolutionary period. Thus, in terms of our spectrum of leadership and the direction of appeals, the Partai Murba occupies the position which might have been occupied by the P.K.I. if the latter had not at the same time had a peculiar relationship to the world Communist movement.

(33) See the press statements of Mr. A.M. Tambunan and Mr. M. Yamin, October 15, 1951, which were strongly supported by a wide section of the press. The government was at this same time facing considerable difficulties, both diplomatic and practical, in combatting the open propagation of Communist teaching in Chinese schools. See also Ruth T. McVey, The Development of the Indonesian Communist Party and its Relations with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, Center for International Studies, M.I.T., Cambridge, 1954, pp. 66-71, 87-95.

(34) Anti-Communist views were spread among Indonesians by the Dutch-owned (Dutch-language) press and certain of the Chinese-owned, Indonesian-language papers.

The Murba leaders, followers of the former P.K.I and Comintern leader, Tan Malaka, had enjoyed great influence in the Republic in the early days of the revolution because of their strong opposition to all negotiations with the Netherlands. But their strength was declining from 1950 or 1951 onwards. Weaker organizationally, financially and in terms of the cohesion of its leadership, Murba had only one advantage over the P.K.I., its greater appeal to nationalism. By 1952 its relative position vis-a-vis the P.K.I. had declined considerably. However, its influence was still much greater than suggested by its four seats in parliament. (35) This was partly because it had numerous sympathizers in other parties and among independent members of parliament, partly because of its close association with the "People's Army," "Bamboo Spear" and other small bands of old revolutionaries in the mountains of West Java, and partly because of the continuing possibility that it would at some stage be recognized by either Moscow or Peking. (36)

The Masjumi and P.S.I.I.

The Masjumi, a heterogeneous party, generally considered the country's largest in 1952, illustrates better than the P.S.I., the P.K.I. or even the Partai Murba, the organizational features described in the first section of this chapter as characteristic of Indonesian political parties of this period. A loosely knit organization, whose membership was in practice not clearly defined, it exacted little discipline of its members. It was different from other Indonesian parties in that it was a "party of indirect structure", having not only individual members, but also "corporate members", namely eleven Moslem religious, social and educational organizations, the most important of these being the modernist Muhammadiyah and the more traditional Nahdatul Ulama. (37)

As the party which had provided the first two Prime Ministers of the post-1950 unitary state, the Masjumi played a major political and governmental role. But this was widely considered to be less than was merited by its potential power as a party claiming to be the only party for Moslems, in a country approximately 85% of whose citizens are at least nominally Islamic. In a parliament of 222 active members it had only 48 representatives (with other specifically Islamic political groups

(35) A considerable decline in its relative strength in the years between 1952 and 1955 accounts for the fact that it obtained only two seats in the country's first parliamentary elections.

(36) This possibility was sometimes discussed in relation to the possibility of a breach between Moscow and Peking.

(37) Cf. Maurice Duverger, op. cit. pp. 6-17. A comparison may be drawn with the British Labor Party, and the representation which it accords to trade unions, cooperative societies and Socialist societies.

holding seven seats). In the middle and upper levels of the civil service the number of its supporters was small. This situation may be traced back to the period of armed struggle; for within the revolutionary leadership, both in its intellectual and its mass leader sectors, the group of devoted practicing Moslems, or santri, such as would be likely to give active support to a specifically Islamic party, was considerably under-represented as compared with the merely nominal adherents of Islam. (38) The consequence was underrepresentation of Moslem parties in the political constellation of Djakarta in the post-revolutionary period. Both supporters of the Masjumi and its opponents believed that an important discrepancy existed between the Masjumi's actual strength as produced by the revolution and its potential strength as would be shown in elections, and this belief was of great importance in the politics of our period.

In Islam the Masjumi had the basis of a political ideology, but it lacked a specific political program to which all groups in it were fully committed. It was in fact a deeply divided organization, so much so that its policies are most easily discussed in terms not of the party itself but of its constituent factions. In discussing these we shall take the normally accepted lines of cleavage along firstly religious and secondly political lines, examining them in the light of a third line, namely that between groups led by intellectuals and ones led by mass leaders.

The most important religious group within the Masjumi was that of what we may call the religious liberals, those seeking a return to the Koran and Hadith and emphasizing the necessity of interpreting these in the light of the requirements of the modern world. The backbone of this group was the most influential of the Masjumi's constituent organizations, the Muhammadiyah. This religious, social and educational body of forty years' standing had played a central role, particularly in the prewar period, in confronting the Moslem community of Indonesia with the challenge of the modernist reform doctrines of the Abduh movement in Egypt. In the early 1950's it was continuing to fight the battle for a purer Islam devoid of the many traditional Moslem practices--both imported and of Indonesian pre-Islamic origin--which it considered ir-

(38) This remains as yet largely unexplained. It is partly related to the fact that a great part of the revolutionary fighting took place in East and Central Java, areas where santri Islam has always been relatively weak and where it has found a strong challenge in the rival tradition of agama Djawa, the "Javanese religion" in which Hindu and pre-Hindu animistic influences predominate. It may be related also to the role of many santri leaders as traders, which disposed them against an active role as full-time revolutionaries. As far as the party's numerical weakness among the intellectual members of the revolutionary elite is concerned, this may be explained largely in terms of the fact that relatively few santri had enjoyed higher Western education, many of them having gone to Islamic schools.

rational or unkoranic. (39)

The Muhammadijah and smaller organizations of the same type stressed the necessity for Moslems to adapt to the new situations created by the impact of the West, and particularly the necessity to master science and technology. Thus these organizations provided the basis of the very strong positions which persons of higher Western training occupied within the Masjumi leadership. The Masjumi was indeed dominated by its small number of intellectuals. Virtually all the top leaders of the party, including both Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo, the chairman of the party legislative council in 1952 and Mohammad Natsir, the chairman of its executive council, were intellectuals of the group of religious liberals. This may be explained in part in terms of the major role played by intellectuals generally in this period, a role of much greater independent power than they later came to play. In particular it has much to do with the importance of intellectuals to a government party which was supported by social groups with an interest in such governing as would restrain the pace of social change; the Masjumi professed the aim of "continuing to be a stabilizing and consolidating factor". (40)

Rivaling the religious liberals within the party was a second group, led predominantly by persons we are designating as mass leaders. This was the conservative group of the Nahdatul Ulama (Religious Scholars Association), led by Kiai Hadji Wachid Hasjim, who had held the Religious Affairs portfolio in the Hatta, Natsir and Sukiman cabinets. The Nahdatul Ulama, a constituent member of the Masjumi, had been established as a religious organization in 1926 (by Wachid Hasjim's father, K.H. Hasjim Asjari), constituting a conservative counter to the growing strength of the modernist Muhammadijah. Its religious viewpoint was essentially defensive. It stood opposed at once to an accommodation of Moslem social regulation to the demands of modern life and to the attacks of the Muhammadijah reformers on what the latter regarded as accretions to basic and pure Moslem doctrine and practice. At the same time it acted as a spokesman for what was the mainstream of Javanese Islam, a tradition which had evolved in the course of four centuries as a result of the

(39) See Leslie H. Palmier, "Modern Islam in Indonesia: The Muhammadijah after Independence," Pacific Affairs, September 1954. Also Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun, van Hoeve, the Hague, 1958, pp. 47-50. For a discussion of the Muhammadijah's role in relation to the development of an indigenous Indonesian capitalism see Clifford Geertz, Another World to Live In: A Study of Islam in Indonesia, unpublished monograph, Harvard University, January 1952.

(40) Kepartaian di Indonesia (The Party System in Indonesia), Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 1951, p. 14.

fusion of Moslem beliefs and practices with those of Hindu and pre-Hindu Java. Of the leaders of this group some, like Zainul Arifin, owed their position to their role as leaders of Moslem guerrilla troops in the revolution. A larger number, men like Wachid Hasjim and the old and widely revered K.H. Abdulwahab Chasbullah, had come to prominence as leaders of the prewar Nahdatul Ulama.

In addition one can distinguish a third religious group, although far less clearly than the other two. This one may call the group of radical fundamentalists. Having its origins in the anti-traditionalist "Protestant" movement (41) of which the Muhammadiyah was the main channel, this group represented another, more illiberal and anti-secularist current. Perhaps the chief mentor of this group was Kiai Ahmad Hassan of the Persatuan Islam (Islamic Association) centered in Bandung, but not all of Hassan's followers can be classified as belonging to the group. One important political representative of the group was the militantly anti-secularist and anti-Communist chairman of the Masjumi of West Java, Kiai Isa Anshary.

Of these three religious groups only one, that of the Nahdatul Ulama, functioned as a single political force. In the case of the religious group of the radical fundamentalists the correspondence with a particular political entity is only partial. Isa Anshary did indeed come to play an independent role as the head of a faction within the party, a faction led by men of predominantly Moslem rather than Western education, men whose role was rooted principally in their power over mass organizations. But he was never in a position to command the loyalty of the radical fundamentalist religious group as a whole.

The situation is considerably more complicated with regard to the dominant intellectual-led group of the religious liberals. The group was divided into two highly independent political factions, the faction of the associates of Natsir, whose politics largely paralleled those of the Socialist Party, and the one of the associates of the more conservative Dr. Sukiman. This division between the followers of each of the two most prominent leaders of the party had been commented on frequently during the Revolution (42), and assumed increased importance in the years immediately after the transfer of sovereignty. Though not always sharply delineated, it was nevertheless very real. In matters of day-

(41) The term "Protestants of Islam" is used by some leaders of this movement in explaining their position e.g. discussion of the author with Kiai A. Hassan, Bangil, East Java, May 19, 1955. Like Protestantism, the Indonesian reform movement is divided as between a liberal (though not necessarily heterodox) wing and a fundamentalist one.

(42) Kahin speaks of the division between "religious socialists" (Natsir and his followers) and those outside this group. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, p. 157.

to-day politics it overshadowed the religious divisions, with the Nahdatul Ulama leaders supporting Dr. Sukiman (and wielding relatively little power themselves) and the radical fundamentalists frequently ranged with the followers of Natsir.

At the time under discussion the interesting position existed that the Natsir and Sukiman groups each exercised power in a separate and competing organ of the party. Under the existing provisions--changed in August 1952--the party was ruled by a 12-man Leadership or Executive Council chosen by the party conference and a 61-man Party Council with powers to review the Executive Council's decisions, chosen on the basis of composite representation. It was impossible to be a member of both councils. On actual political issues the two councils not rarely took opposing stands. This was the case for instance on the important issue of Indonesia's signature of the San Francisco Peace Treaty with Japan, when the Executive Council backed its chairman, Natsir, in opposing ratification, and the leaders of the Legislative Council its chairman, Sukiman, in supporting it.

The extent of the division may be seen from the fact that when the Natsir cabinet fell, its successor, quite differently composed and pursuing distinctly different policies on a number of issues, was the cabinet led by Dr. Sukiman. Mr. Jusuf Wibisono, a prominent member of the Sukiman group, had been one of those who called for the resignation of the Natsir cabinet. Furthermore it was by disregarding the views of the Executive Council of the Masjumi that Dr. Sukiman was finally successful in forming his cabinet, and in this no members of the Natsir group of the party accepted seats. The Japanese Peace Treaty issue again brought this division to the attention of the public, but, despite rumors, there was no open breach. (43)

While the followers of Natsir pursued policies similar to those of the P.S.I. and cooperated with this party, the Sukiman supporters, rejecting these policies and averse to working with the Socialist Party, preferred cooperation with the anti-P.S.I. elements in the P.N.I. and other smaller parties, elements both conservative and radically nationalist. In economic policy the two groups had a number of ideas in common. Both were against any major nationalization moves in the immediate future; spokesmen of both advocated a return from the seven-hour to the eight-hour day and firmer government policy towards trade union claims; and both were emphatic that steps should be taken to protect existing foreign enterprises and attract larger amounts of foreign

(43) On August 23, 1951 Mr. Moh. Roem, a prominent member of the Natsir group stated that it was no longer a secret that there were two schools of thought in the Masjumi. On September 1, 1951 Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo, a leader of the Sukiman group, made a statement denying that the Masjumi was splitting and a "Masjumi Merdeka" (Free Masjumi) being formed.

investment.

On the important issue of the President's powers and his right to a say in cabinet affairs, the division was abundantly clear. The Natsir group took the narrow view of his prerogative and the Sukiman group was prepared to justify his playing a political role and to cooperate with him in this. While Natsir's cabinet had been publicly in conflict with the head of state, that of Sukiman was strongly supported by him.

But of all the issues between the two groups the one most discussed was in the field of foreign policy. The Natsir group here followed almost completely the P.S.I. formulations of the "independent foreign policy", while the Sukiman group favored considerably greater alignment with the U.S.A., both for the economic benefits which would accrue from it and for assistance against Communism.

The role of the Nahdatul Ulama in the Masjumi attracted little outside comment until the time of the formation of the Wilopo cabinet, when it was brought to a head by the Masjumi's refusal to reendorse K.H. Wachid Hasjim for the Religious Affairs portfolio. Several months later on July 31, 1952 the Nahdatul Ulama was to renounce its membership of the Masjumi and establish itself as a separate political party. (44) The great importance of this severance was seen only much later, when the 1955 elections showed the N.U. to be a party only slightly less powerful in voting appeal than the (rump) Masjumi. (45)

However the issue goes back a good deal further. Tensions between Muhammadiyah and Nahdatul Ulama had been acute in a number of areas of Indonesia before the war, and it was only during the Japanese occupation that the two were able to be brought into a single all-Islamic organization. (46) In the post-war period Nahdatul Ulama separatism was stimu-

(44) On this date eight members of the Masjumi parliamentary fraction resigned to establish a fraction of the Nahdatul Ulama. On August 30, 1952 the Nahdatul Ulama joined with the P.S.I.I. (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Islamic Association Party of Indonesia) and the Perti (Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islamiyah, Islamic Educational Association), a smaller Islamic party established in Sumatra, to form a consultative body called Liga Muslimin Indonesia (Indonesian Moslem League).

(45) The Nahdatul Ulama obtained 45 seats as compared with the Masjumi's 57. (The specifically Islamic parties together obtained 115 of the 257 seats contested.)

(46) See Mohammad Rasjidi, L'Evolution de l'Islam en Indonesie (Java), doctoral dissertation, Sorbonne, Paris, 1956, pp. 130-177. Also Harry J. Benda, op. cit., pp. 150 ff. et passim.

lated not only be the dominance of Muhammadijah members and sympathizers in the Masjumi leadership, but also by the minor role to which the Western-educated governmental leaders within the party relegated its religious leaders.

This situation was particularly strongly resented at a time when the prospect of elections was much discussed. For the Nahdatul Ulama leaders were conscious of the great political strength at the grass-roots level of the religious leaders who supported them. Personal antagonisms between K.H. Wachid Hasjim on the one hand and men like Mohammad Natsir and Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara on the other, brought these religious and political issues to a head.

As the Nahdatul Ulama emerged as a separate political entity it was impossible to know what stand it would take on political issues other than ones of a religious kind. The importance of the political role it could play, once independent, was not widely appreciated.

The emergence of the Isa Anshary group as an independent political force had barely begun by early 1952, although K.H. Isa Anshary himself was already then chairman of the Masjumi of West Java. This second, less formidable, revolt of mass leaders of Moslem education against intellectual leaders of Western education took anti-Communism as a key part of its political armory.

In the case of the Masjumi, as of the P.N.I., the relevance of our analytical categories of "intellectuals" and "mass leaders" is lessened by the fact that these parties did represent social classes with an interest in the status quo. Kahin, writing of the period of 1945-49 states that the Masjumi attracted "most of the vestigial Indonesian commercial and industrial middle class (in Java, Madura and Sumatra, and)...the majority of the larger Indonesian landowners." (47) This is to be explained in terms of the historic connection, increasingly close in the last two centuries, between the devotedly Islamic santri community and entrepreneurial activity. (48) But in speaking of the post-revolutionary period a distinction should be made between the older capitalist groups which were largely Masjumi-oriented and the small new bourgeoisie of the larger cities, largely an outcrop of the bureaucracy and developing rapidly as a result of government support, whose loyalties went primarily to the P.N.I.

(47) op. cit., p. 157.

(48) See for instance Clifford Geertz, The Development of the Javanese Economy: A Socio-Cultural Approach, Center for International Studies, M.I.T., Cambridge, April 1956, especially pp. 99-104. Also Robert R. Jay, Santri and Abangan, Religious Schism in Rural Central Java, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1957.

The Masjumi's support came in part from the cities but more particularly from the towns and villages. In Java Masjumi supporters were prominent in all the older sectors of capitalist enterprise where Indonesians had been able to hold their own against Chinese, particularly in such fields as the production and trading of batik cloth and cloves cigarettes, but also to some extent in other distributive trade. Supporters of the party were also numerous in the group of the landowners of Java, a powerful group in certain areas such as West Java, though very weak in Indonesia generally in comparison with other Asian countries. In the outer islands too the party was the main political representative of the indigenous trading groups, which here had not generally suffered as near-complete a demise in the colonial period as in Java. And here, particularly in Sumatra and Kalimantan, it was supported by the important quasi-capitalist group of growers of small-holders' rubber. In virtually all areas it was supported by the local religious leaders, professional and semi-professional, the ulamas and kiais (religious teachers or scholars), hadjis (returned Mecca pilgrims), mosque officials, and religious functionaries of the village councils. (49)

To the extent that these groups were both important to the Masjumi and concerned that it should take political action on their behalf, one must regard the Masjumi leaders, as acting as spokesmen for these interest groups, rather than as either mass leaders or representatives of an independent social force of intellectuals. But the leaders' freedom of movement should not be underrated. The interest groups have certainly been important in determining the general pattern of the Masjumi's political action. But their power to influence the party's actions from day to day and month to month, and to affect the relative strength of various factions within it, was limited, particularly in the period we are discussing, by the relatively low level of political effectiveness of the country areas as compared with the cities, and **especially** by the great power of Djakarta in the country's system of political articulation.

The Masjumi's greatest potential source of strength was among the peasants. It benefited greatly from the burgeoning of organizational activity at the village and small town level which characterized the revolution and the immediate post-revolutionary period. Thus when the

(49) In the 1955 elections when the Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama were strong rivals there was a tendency for the Masjumi to attract votes in urban areas and areas of greater capitalist development, and the Nahdatul Ulama in remoter areas less affected by recent social change. However the lines of division were in large measure regional. The Nahdatul Ulama, strong in East and Central Java and South Kalimantan had the support of a majority of local religious leaders in these areas, and of a sizeable group of santri traders and landlords there, and the Masjumi similarly in the other Moslem parts of the country.

Natsir government in 1950 and 1951 created province and regency level legislative councils on the basis of giving equal representation on electoral colleges to every established organization, it secured Masjumi domination of the councils that were created. Although the process of establishing these councils came to an abrupt end with the passing of the contentious Hadikusumo motion against them in January 1951, and some existing councils were actually frozen, enough were still functioning to make the Masjumi the dominant force in regional party politics in Java and Sumatra. (50)

Apart from the many denominational-type social and educational organizations of Moslems whose task it was to give the Masjumi general support, there existed a number of specifically political organizations of the party. These were the Islamic Youth Movement of Indonesia, G.P.I.I., the Women's organization, Muslimat, and the small S.B.I.I. (Islamic Labor Association) and S.T.I.I. (Islamic Peasants' Association).

One further factor adding to the Masjumi's strength was the Ministry of Religious Affairs. This Ministry's task has been defined as "to consolidate and develop sound religious denominations", (51) in line with the Pantja Sila concept of "Faith in One God" as a part of the basis of the state. Until July 1952 when the Nahdatul Ulama left the Masjumi it could be said that this Ministry was dominated by Masjumi members on all levels. The fact that religion is officially recognized and sponsored, and that the body through which this sponsorship is expressed was dominated by a single party, naturally gave this party tremendous prestige. To a small extent the Masjumi was in this way put in the position of a state party. There is no doubt that the status which it thereby obtained and the attraction of the posts over which it disposed were important factors adding to its political strength. (52)

(50) The Councils of the West and Central Java provinces were functioning. Regency Councils established on the basis of Government Regulation 39 were functioning in the three provinces of Java and parts of the provinces of North and Central Sumatra.

(51) See "Religious Observances in Indonesia", Indonesian Affairs (Ministry of Information, Djakarta), April-May 1953. Also C.A.O. van Nieuwenhuijze, Mens en Vrijheid in Indonesie (Man and Freedom in Indonesia), van Hoeve, s'Gravenhage, 1949, pp. 40-84, and J.M. van der Kroef, "Conflicts of Religious Policy in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, September 1953.

(52) The important political role of the Ministry's employees is seen in the fact that 37 of them were among the 257 persons elected to parliament in 1955. Of these 21 were Nahdatul Ulama members, 15 representatives of the Masjumi and one a P.N.I. representative. Statement by R. Mohammad Kafrawi, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Religion, Abadi (Djakarta), April 3, 1956.

The P.S.I.I. (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia, Islamic Association Party of Indonesia) had split off from the Masjumi in April 1947, proclaiming itself as the same party which, as Sarekat Islam and later as P.S.I.I., had been the most prominent of the prewar Moslem political organizations. The leaders of this party, "mass leaders" both of the prewar period and the periods of Japanese occupation and revolution, were not united by a common position on outstanding religious issues. They had left the Masjumi because they resented the ascendancy within it of rival political groups, particularly the group of intellectual leaders around Natsir. Since the split the P.S.I.I. had consistently failed to cooperate with the Masjumi, despite the frequent statements of leaders of both parties that the differences between the two were minor. (53) Whereas its national strength did not at any time grow to be comparable with that of the Masjumi, it did obtain the loyalty of local religious leaders in certain of the areas where its prewar forerunner had been strong. It had four representatives in the temporary parliament and was to have eight, elected principally from West Java, South Sumatra and Sulawesi, in the parliament elected in 1955.

The P.N.I., the Minor Nationalist Parties and the Christian Parties

The P.N.I., the second-largest party in the country according to the common estimates of 1952, stands in strong contrast to the Masjumi in a number of respects. It was predominantly a city party in its power base as the Masjumi was predominantly a party of the towns and rural areas. Its leaders had arisen from out of the vestigial aristocracies; virtually none came from a commercial background. Unlike the Masjumi it was a party strong in the bureaucracy; such links as it had with capitalism were with the bureaucratic capitalism nurtured by post-revolutionary governments. Finally the P.N.I., unlike the Masjumi, was a party favored by the political balance of the revolution. It included more of the prominent leaders of both the prewar nationalist movement and the revolution than any other party; it was the main beneficiary of the patronage distributed when independence was finally achieved in 1949; and it could exert greater power in the Djakarta politics of the immediate post-revolutionary period than was consonant with its grassroots potential. (54) As a party it stood to lose from such stabilization as lessened the relevance of the symbols of the revolution.

But there were also considerable similarities between these two major parties. The P.N.I. too was a loosely organized body. It too

(53) The party entered electoral agreements with the P.N.I. in the Minahasa elections of June 1951 and with a Communist-led coalition of parties in the Jogjakarta elections of August-October of the same year.

(54) Its parliamentary strength in 1952 was 36. In 1955 it was to obtain 57 seats.

lacked effective party discipline. It too was handicapped by serious internal divisions. Like the Masjumi it was bound together by a set of ideological orientations whose cohesive power was inadequate in the face of the cleavages which resulted from interest conflicts brought to the fore by the day to day processes of government.

P.N.I. ideology is centered in the revolution. It is the formulation par excellence of the mood of nationalist political messianism which we have described as characteristic of the old revolutionary fighters. This formulation, which is yet to be given its final form, is "Marhaenism" (usually translated "proletarian nationalism") or "Socio-Nationalist Democracy". (55) It is a political creed stressing national unity and national culture and socialist or collectivist economics. It upholds democratic rights and opposes dictatorship, but condemns liberalism and individualism. Based on an eclectic selection from Western socialism, Japanese nationalism and traditional Indonesian social thinking, Marhaenism reflects both the P.N.I.'s attachment to the symbols of the nationalist revolution and the difficulties which the party faced in establishing a highest common factor of ideological orientations. (56)

In cultural and religious orientation the P.N.I., more than any other party, represents "Javanism". Most of its leaders were Javanese, and members of the social group of the prija, the vestigial Javanese aristocracy which had in large part remained little affected by Islam. Combining a nominal adherence to Islam with contempt for Islamic orthodoxy, these Javanese aristocrats held syncretistic mystical beliefs which owe more to Hinduism than to any branch of Islam. Proud of traditional Javanese culture, they saw this as the basis for a new Indonesian civilization and looked to it to provide an alternative to cosmopolitan culture. (57)

In the period immediately after the transfer of sovereignty, the P.N.I. was the most strongly nationalistic of the major parties. It

(55) For the formulation officially accepted in 1954 see Kepartaian dan Parleментарia di Indonesia (The Party System and Parliamentary Affairs in Indonesia), Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 1954, pp. 26-42.

(56) The most significant contributions to the work of creating a cohesive P.N.I. political ideology are contained in the speeches of President Soekarno and Roeslan Abdulgani, then Secretary-General of the Ministry of Information, in the articles of Sajuti Melik (particularly in Pesat, Jogjakarta) and Asmara Hadi (particularly in Pikiran Rakjat, Bandung), and in the books of the Taman Siswa educator, Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro.

(57) See for instance Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro, The Philosophical and Cultural Foundation of our Education System, Djakarta, 1945 (?)

played a major role in the movement for a unitary state. It strongly urged the quick withdrawal of all Dutch troops remaining in Indonesia. More than any other party it took the side of the men from Jogjakarta as they came to take over and be fitted into the administrative structure of the federal states. More than any other, it emphasized the importance of the national claim to West Irian.

Its policies in the field of foreign affairs reflected the divisions in the party. One group, roughly the "older intellectuals", appeared to favor a relatively close relationship with the United States. But a majority of the party leadership supported a more strictly neutralist policy. (58) The party did not at this time identify itself with efforts such as the Socialist Party pursued for the establishment of a "third force" by association with India and Burma. In the words of its chairman Sidik Djojokusarto the party's foreign policy "does not follow the Moscow policy, nor the (American) dollar policy, nor the (British) third force, but is based upon the national potential". (59)

For a major party which (except in the Natsir cabinet period) was strongly represented in the government, the P.N.I. did little to urge consistent economic and social policies or to promote wider understanding in the reading public of the difficulties which the country faced. It confined itself in the main to appeals for national unity and for the spirit of self-sacrifice which had existed in the days of revolution. A number of observers remarked upon the sharply contradictory attitudes which characterized P.N.I. leaders in office and P.N.I. leaders in opposition.

Divisions inside the P.N.I. were less clearly delineated than those in the Masjumi. Some observers spoke of the existence of two main groups in the P.N.I., others thought there were three, and others again gave the number as four. In no case is it possible to establish clear identifications between a party faction and a particular social group which supported the party. However one can speak of the existence of three main power centers within the party and hazard generalizations about the sources of their support within the party, as long as it is borne in mind that the situation was both fluid and extremely difficult to discern. Indeed one must discuss the role of factions if the party's political behavior is to be intelligible.

The first main power center was one of a group of older leaders of great prestige who had been prominent in the prewar P.N.I. founded by

(58) The issue had been brought to a head by the question of whether Indonesia was to sign the Japanese peace treaty. The P.N.I. party council decided to oppose the signing of the treaty, but not to withdraw its ministers from the cabinet over the issue.

(59) Antara, September 13, 1951.

Soekarno in 1927. This was an intellectual group, including a number of lawyers, men such as the chairman of parliament Mr. Sartono, the (then) Ambassador to the United States, Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, and the Sukiman cabinet's minister for the interior, Mr. Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo. These men and those associated with them had refused to be government servants under the prewar colonial regime, but agreed to accept fairly prominent positions under the Japanese and rose to higher political and administrative posts in the revolution. In the immediately post-revolutionary period the group furnished a number of P.N.I. cabinet ministers and high civil servants. It could cooperate with President Soekarno and the Sukiman group of the Masjumi in the moderate, socially conservative, mildly pro-American and anti-Communist policies which characterized the Sukiman cabinet--so long as these policies were associated with appeals to nationalist symbols. Its conservatism gained for it the support of older aristocratic elements from which it had previously been sharply separated. In particular it acquired the support of many higher officials of the quasi-aristocratic pamong pradja corps, (the general civil administration), from residents, regents (bupati), and district heads (wedana), who had been ambivalent in their attitude to nationalism in the prewar period and non-party (or supporters of the small P.I.R. or Greater Indonesia Union Party) in the period of revolution.

A second main center of power was a group of younger intellectuals, many of them also lawyers, such as Mr. Wilopo, the former Finance Minister Mr. Lukman Hakim, and Mukarto Notowidigdo, who was to be Foreign Minister in the Wilopo cabinet. This group had no long-standing political record, having first appeared as an entity in the revolutionary period. In 1951-52 it was probably the weakest of the three P.N.I. power centers. Its power in the P.N.I. was exercised mainly through the more highly educated of the party's younger members, but beyond that it is by no means clear where its social base lay. The political outlook of the group paralleled that of the Socialist Party; thus it was opposed to extreme nationalism and emphasized planned economic development. Its relationship to the older intellectual-led group of Mr. Sartono and Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo was somewhat parallel to the relationship which the Natsir group in the Masjumi had to the Sukiman group (except that there was a major difference in the internal power relationship as between the two parties, the Natsir group being much stronger in the Masjumi than the Wilopo group in the P.N.I.). Whereas the older intellectual group sought to work in cooperation with President Soekarno, supporting somewhat conservative policies which were popularized by appeals to radical nationalism, the younger group sought to limit the President's role, emphasizing the symbols of reconstruction rather than those of the revolution just past.

The third group, which we may designate as that of the radical nationalists, was not one led by intellectuals. Its leaders, men like

the party's chairman, Sidik Djojokusarto and its secretary-general Manai Sophian, were mass leaders, men without higher Western education who had come to political prominence in the Japanese occupation and revolution, frequently through their leadership of mass organizations, some of them military or quasi-military. These leaders many of whom were deeply influenced by the ideology and methods of the Japanese military authorities, were extreme in both their nationalist and their socialist demands and strongly "oppositionist" in their attitude to governments in much the same way as were the leaders of the Partai Murba. Unlike the Murba leaders however, the radical nationalists in the P.N.I. wielded considerable power over the operations of governments. By virtue of their close relationship with many former revolutionaries, the men of this group were very influential in the party. Thus they could dictate policy to cabinets, on several issues although they themselves did not accept cabinet portfolios. In general this group of mass leaders was not the dominant power center in the party in this period. But there can be no doubt that the power of mass leaders vis-a-vis intellectuals was already considerable, much greater than in the Masjumi. The mass leaders' role in the P.N.I. was decisive as regards the formulations of the ideology of the party. In intra-party struggles the radical nationalist leaders most frequently cooperated with the older intellectuals around Sartono and Ali Sastroamidjojo, to whom they were linked by a common interest in the symbols of the revolution. But this was not the case in early 1952 when oppositionist feeling was running high against the Sukiman cabinet (in which the P.N.I. portfolios were held mainly by men of the Sartono-Ali Sastroamidjojo wing), because of this cabinet's anti-Communist and pro-American policies. Again it must be stressed that these three groups did not have well-organized bodies of supporters, that factors such as common regional origin, family relationships and purely personal associations frequently affected relationships inside the leadership of the party.

The main basis of the P.N.I. support lay in the lower rungs of the Indonesian aristocracies, particularly the aristocracy of East and Central Java with its own particular prija religious and cultural orientation. This is the group which provided the greatest numbers of pupils of Dutch secondary schools before the war and the greatest number of civil servants. Thus the party had considerable support, and greater potential support, among many groups and most ranks of government employees. Initially it offered more attraction to the employees of specialized departments of the government service--teachers, health and agricultural extension workers, information officers and so on--than it did to the regents and district and sub-district officers of the pamong pradja corps who were frequently of higher aristocratic origin. But by 1952 it had secured at least the passive loyalty of a sizeable section of the pamong pradja as well, and this not only in Java but also in a number of other areas. In the cities its support came not only from a high proportion of the large number of civil servants, but also from many white collar workers in private employment. Its youth organization

was active in cities and towns, and it could and did exercise considerable influence through several major women's organizations. Finally its urban strength was greatly enhanced by the support of the new bureaucratic capitalists, particularly importers, who had entered business after the transfer of sovereignty, as a result of the government's policy of encouraging the growth of Indonesian-run enterprise. (60) Though still small in 1952, this group was very important to the party and able to exercise great influence in it.

To very many Indonesians in small towns and villages the P.N.I. was eminently the party of the revolution and of independence. It had the support of many of those who, while lacking strong political ambition and having no definite views on political issues, nevertheless sought to gain prestige as patriots and responsible citizens by joining a political party. It had had considerable success in rural Indonesia in establishing itself as the heir of the prewar nationalist movement, in all except its specifically Islamic sections. Thus the local leaders not only of many of the short-lived political parties of the 1930's but also of the progressive nationalist Taman Siswa schools and of the prewar nationalist scout organizations were drawn mainly to the P.N.I. In many areas the party continued to be regarded as the leading champion of educational advancement and social progress despite its considerable ties to the status quo. In addition it attracted support in Hindu Bali and in the predominantly Christian areas outside of Java (particularly Tapanuli in North Sumatra and Minahasa in North Sulawesi) because of its opposition to links between Islam and the state.

Finally the P.N.I. was strengthened by two associations which gave it some characteristics of a state party. In the first place its members occupied a very strong position within the Information Ministry. Whereas it could not exert the virtually undisputed control over this Ministry which the Masjumi had over the Ministry of Religion before mid-1952, it was in a position to exercise strong influence over both the ways in which statements of government ideology were formulated at the center and the ways in which such ideological formulations were presented to village Indonesians. The Ministry's offices extended to the sub-district level and a large number of its employees were regularly sent into the villages to expound and explain the ideology of the government.

In the second place the P.N.I. was strengthened by the peculiar relationship which obtained between it and President Soekarno. Soekarno had been chairman of the prewar party of the same name, and, although he had not been a member of any party since the outbreak of the Revolu-

(60) See N. Amstutz, The Development of Indigenous Importers in Indonesia, 1950-55, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School, 1958. Also the forthcoming Cornell Ph.D. dissertation of John O. Sutter, Indonesianisasi, A Historical Survey of the Role of Politics in a Changing Economy from the Second World War to the General Elections, 1940-1955.

tion, his name had been used time and again by certain of the P.N.I.'s leaders. A number of the President's oldest and closest associates were members and leaders of the P.N.I., and particularly of its Sartono-Ali Sastroamidjojo wing. The P.N.I. leaders, especially of this older intellectual group and of the radical nationalist section, were the foremost protagonists of the view that President Soekarno was entitled to powers as a leader of the people, over and above his powers as a constitutional head of state, because of his own personality and record. (61) By implication the P.N.I. laid claim to a special relationship to the Pantja Sila or Five Principles of State which Soekarno had formulated in 1945: Faith in the One God, Nationality, Humanity, People's Sovereignty or Democracy, and Social Justice.

The minor nationalist parties were generally similar to the P.N.I. in ideological orientation, but most of them lacked the support of any strong interest group. Commanding only the most perfunctory organization, they were little more than parliamentary groups, owing their existence to the tendencies for party fragmentation described in the early part of this chapter. But although considered to have few long-term prospects, they were able in our period to play a role of considerable importance, not only in parliament but also in cabinets. Intellectuals controlled the leadership of most of these parties, but they had to share power with men of the mass leader type in one or two of them.

Partai P.I.R. (Partai Persatuan Indonesia Raja, Greater Indonesia Union Party), considered the largest of the minor nationalist parties, was somewhat untypical of this group in that it did command the partial support of a significant social group. Formed in Jogjakarta in 1948, it had the backing of a number of older pamong pradja aristocrats, both in Java (prijajis antagonized by the radical nationalism of the P.N.I.) and outside of Java (persons who had worked in one of the Dutch-sponsored federal governments). Nevertheless it had little organization. Whereas it had 18 seats in parliament in 1952 it was due to have only two after the 1955 elections. Led by intellectuals, it had a policy of conservatism in rural social relations, of seeking to reestablish governmental and social stability by a strengthening of the pamong pradja system of administration. It sought to work in cooperation with some of the more conservative regional groups such as Parki (Nationalist Party of Indonesia) of West Java, and the Democratic Fraction, an eleven-man parliamentary group of former federalists, mainly from East Indonesia. In the Sukiman cabinet P.I.R. held three ministerial posts (and the Democratic Fraction one).

(61) For presentations of this view see the editorial articles in Merdeka (Djakarta), February 21, 1952, and Pesat (Jogjakarta, weekly), December 27, 1952.

Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya, Greater Indonesia Party) was a splinter party formed in November 1949 by R. P. Soeroso, who had been a leader in the larger prewar party of the same name. It was led by men of the same aristocratic background as P.I.R. but had no general support. In stated policy it stood somewhere between P.I.R. and P.N.I. But its record suggests that its policy viewpoint was less important than the personal interests of two or three of its top leaders. The 1955 elections were to cost it all of its five seats.

P.R.N. (Partai Rakjat National, National People's Party) also appears to have had personal factors as its principal raison d'être. Formed in July 1950 as a result of a split in the ranks of the P.N.I., it was branded by P.N.I. leaders as right-wing and capitalistic. But the political course it subsequently pursued was characterized chiefly by oppositionism. It had never been accorded a cabinet post. Of its eight seats in parliament it was to lose all but two in 1955.

S.K.I. (Serikat Kerakjatan Indonesia, Indonesian People's Association) was established in South Kalimantan in 1946. Its stated policy resembled that of the P.N.I. and the political orientation of its three parliamentary representatives was generally oppositionist. It also had never participated in a cabinet. It had three representatives in the temporary parliament, but was to win no seats in the elections of 1955.

The Partai Buruh or Labor Party was a rather more significant organization, because of a certain amount of support from organized labor and considerable influence within the Ministry of Labor. Formally espousing Marxism, it was nevertheless primarily a nationalist party. Within the party there appeared to be considerable conflict between those supporting "oppositionist" P.N.I. and Murba policies on the one hand and Socialist Party-sympathizing intellectuals on the other. The Labor Party had one representative in the Sukiman cabinet. It had six seats in the parliament of 1952 and was to save two of these in the 1955 elections.

Finally something should be said of the two Christian political parties, Parkindo (Indonesian Christian Party) and Partai Katholik (Catholic Party of the Republic of Indonesia). These were minor parties of a different type; there were "permanent minority parties," rather than "personality parties" as the minor nationalist parties were. (62) With a reliable basis of mass support, there clearly had a more certain political future than the minor nationalist parties. (63) Although

(62) See M. Duverger, Political Parties, pp. 290 ff.

(63) The Catholic Party had eight members in the existing temporary parliament and Parkindo five, whereas in the elections of 1955

there were only three million Protestants in Indonesia and approximately one million Catholics, the influence of the two parties was considerable. This was partly because of the disproportionately large number of Christians in the civil service and in business enterprise, and partly because of the individual prestige of leaders such as Dr. J. Leimena and Mr. A.M. Tambunan of Parkindo, and I.J. Kasimo of Partai Katolik. The main policies of these parties were directed towards the maintenance of the groups' sectional interests and of religious liberty. Both parties were dominated by intellectuals and were moderate in their approach to nationalism and the economic tasks facing governments, Parkindo standing somewhat closer to the nationalist parties than the Catholic Party.

the two parties were to receive six and eight seats respectively. A sizeable number of Protestants sat in the temporary parliament and sit in the present one as representatives of parties other than Parkindo. The link between the political party and the religious community is a closer one in the case of the Catholics.

CHAPTER III

THE FALL OF THE SUKIMAN CABINET
AND THE FORMATION OF THE CABINET OF WILLOPO

By early 1952, as we have seen, a number of circumstances existed which weakened the position of the Sukiman cabinet. Furthermore the political forces with an interest in a change of cabinet had gained considerable public support.

The story of the actual fall of the cabinet--over acceptance of the terms of American Mutual Security Agreement aid to Indonesia--deserves our detailed attention. Although the fall of the cabinet was a real and present possibility in the earlier situation, the occasion of its fall was in itself a major political crisis. It was the most serious conflict on a foreign policy issue to have arisen since the transfer of sovereignty, and played a significant role in marshalling the forces which were to come together in the cabinet to succeed that of Sukiman.

By the United States Mutual Security Act of 1951, responsibility for all military, economic, and technical assistance was vested in a single person, the Director for Mutual Security. In President Truman's words "the change in emphasis of the economic aid program--from recovery to defense support--intensified the need for co-ordination between the Economic Co-operation Administration and the Department of Defense." (1) The Director of Mutual Security was charged with co-ordinating the work of the following agencies:

1. The Department of Defense, administering military assistance programs;
2. The Mutual Security Agency, to be engaged "primarily in administering the defense support programs and certain other economic assistance programs";
3. The Technical Co-operation Administration of the Department of State which would administer programs of technical co-operation with under-developed nations, except in South-East Asia. South East Asian countries would have so-called M.S.A. S.T.E.M.s (Special Technical and Economic Missions) to replace E.C.A. or T.C.A. missions, because it was thought necessary that "technical

(1) First Report to Congress on the Implementation of the Mutual Security Act of 1951, December 1, 1951.

assistance and the economic support programs (should be) more directly related to a defense build-up there." (2)

This reorganization would not, in Indonesia's care, involve major changes of staff, but it was expected to have effects on the extent of Indonesian obligations to the U.S.

The Mutual Security Act required that all nations wishing to continue to receive any sort of assistance should declare themselves committed to certain agreements, somewhat different from those they had already entered. Economic and technical aid would be given to a state under Section 511b of the Act if the giving of this aid would "strengthen the security of the United States and further world security, provided that the receiving State has committed itself to co-operate in the furthering of international understanding and goodwill and the promotion of world security and to take steps as agreed upon for the abolition of international tensions." (3) If on the other hand a state wished to receive military as well as economic and technical assistance it was obliged, under Section 511a of the Act to commit itself to the following:

- "1. To take joint steps to further international understanding, goodwill and world security;
2. To take steps as agreed upon for the abolition of international tensions;
3. Fulfill the military obligations which it has already accepted in bilateral or multilateral treaties of which the United States is a partner;
4. Make a full contribution, consistent with its political and economic capacity, its population, natural resources, facilities and general economic situation, to the development and maintenance of its own defenses and to the defensive strength of the free world;
5. Take the necessary steps to develop its own defensive strength;
6. Take reasonable measures to ensure the most effective use of the economic and military aid provided by the United States."

In a note to U.S. Ambassador Merle Cochran the Indonesian Foreign Minister, Mr. Subardjo, on January 5, 1952, committed Indonesia to acceptance of Mutual Security aid on the basis of Section 511a of the Act, it being made clear that his note had the force of an international agreement. He did however, or so it appears, insist on two modifications

(2) Ibid.

(3) Mutual Security Act, November 10, 1951.

of the conditions laid down in the act. (4) The third of the points in Section 511a fell away entirely--not a very significant change--and the words "and military" were omitted from point 6. Significantly, this important step was taken without any cabinet discussion. Ambassador Cochran's note of January 4 asked for a reply by January 8, thus providing sufficient time for a cabinet meeting to be called for the purpose. But this was not done. Prime Minister Sukiman was informed of Subardjo's decision, as were several other cabinet members. It is probable that President Soekarno knew of it. Certainly however the Minister of Defense, Sewaka, was not informed. And, still more important politically, neither were any members of the Armed Forces high command.

It was not until a month later that the agreement became public knowledge. On February 4, the Ministers of P.I.R. (Greater Indonesian Union), roused by the report of Defense Minister Sewaka on approaches made to him on the matter by United States officials, asked for a cabinet discussion. But no immediate step was taken. The following day the news came out in the Djakarta daily Abadi, the voice of the Natsir group of Masjumi. On February 7, Indonesia Raya, often called the paper of the army command, headlined a rumor that the defense section of parliament would bring in an interpellation on the matter. Public interest was mounting rapidly.

On the following day, the 8th, the issue was for the first time discussed in cabinet. Objection was taken particularly to the conditions laid down in point 4 of Section 511a of the Mutual Security Act, and Mr. Subardjo was instructed to do his best to persuade the U.S. Ambassador to accept a post facto change on this point. He was to try to have the point omitted altogether, or, if this proved impossible, to have the words "and the defensive strength of the free world" left out, or if this was also unacceptable, to obtain a statement that the U.S. accepted Indonesia's interpretation of the words "free world."

It was eleven days before the U.S. ambassador's reply to these requests would come to hand, and these days were critical for the Sukiman cabinet. On the 11th, Moh. Sadak, deputy leader of the parliamentary fraction of P.I.R., announced that the Party Council and parliamentary fraction of his party had decided at a conference with the party's three Ministers two days before, to demand Subardjo's resignation. This statement was a day later described as "too rushed" by P.I.R. Education Minister, Wongsonegoro; and the P.I.R. Party Council declared the same day that its objection was to the procedure that Subardjo had adopted and not to the government's foreign policy generally. Nevertheless what

- (4) Opposition critics suggested that these changes were in fact not made in the original note of January 5, but included in a subsequent backdated copy of this note, written after the outburst of public criticism of the agreement in February. The writer is not in a position to confirm or deny this suggestion.

Sadak had said had aroused the reading public to see Subardjo's step as a matter for serious concern.

Those sections of the press which had long been attacking the cabinet now said it was about to collapse, urging that it be replaced by a "business cabinet" to carry on till general elections were held. (5) The reasons why their case against Subardjo and the Sukiman cabinet met with so ready a response are worthy of detailed consideration.

The immediate circumstances of the case were the most obvious basis of resentment. The rapid passing on the February 14th of a parliamentary motion of Mr. Sunarjo (P.N.I.), to the effect that all foreign treaties signed by any sovereign Indonesian government required to be ratified by parliament, reflected the state of feeling against "secret diplomacy." (6) Neither Subardjo nor Cochran were personally popular in Indonesia. (7) Thus the fact that they had seen fit to conceal their agreement and had for so long succeeded in this, combined with the lack of a clear public explanation of the matter even when it had become a crucial political issue, together produced the strongest of suspicions. (8)

(5) Pedoman, February 11, 1952. Pedoman had close links with the Socialist Party. Also Indonesia Raya, Abadi.

(6) This motion, sponsored by the Foreign Affairs section of parliament called for the strict interpretation of articles 120 and 121 of the (interim) constitution. The government accepted the interpretation as set forth by Mr. Sunarjo.

(7) Mr. Achmad Subardjo had become a member of Masjumi only at the time of the formation of the Sukiman cabinet. His background is chequered in the extreme. He was chairman of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association) in Holland in the middle 1920's, subsequently spending a period of something over a year in Moscow. During the Japanese occupation period he emerged as Chief of the Counselling Office on Political Affairs of the Japanese Navy in Java. In 1945 he emerged as Indonesia's first Foreign Minister, and later became involved with the national-communist Tan Malaka in the "3rd July affair" of 1946. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 115, 135.

H. Merle Cochran, a career diplomat, had played an extremely important role in Indonesian developments ever since his appointment as the United States representative on the United Nations Good Offices Commission in the second part of 1948. In the early post-revolutionary period sections of the Indonesian press voiced the charge that he was entrenching himself in Indonesian politics.

(8) According to the New York Times of February 25 the State Department's communication to Cochran had suggested that an economic agreement under Section 511b of the Act would suffice for Indonesia, but the

But more important in explaining the resentment which was felt, is the general Indonesian attitude towards the United States and particularly towards American attempts to bring her into fuller alignment with the U.S.-led bloc of states. It is a question of the whole basis of Indonesia's "independent foreign policy." The "politik bebas" or independent policy had been one of the cardinal doctrines and symbols of the Indonesian Republic virtually since its birth. (9)

In one sense the "independent policy" is less than a policy--merely the agglomeration of the ideas of all groups of the nationalist movement about foreign policy generally. For such is the prestige value of the term "independent policy" that, like "democracy" or "progress," it has been applied by all groups to their own varying concepts of policy.

It was certainly given a variety of meanings. For some groups it meant an isolationist independence of the two world blocs, while others emphasized that independence was necessarily a relative thing not to be considered except in relation to Indonesia's concrete national interests. For some it meant a commitment to neutrality in the event of war, while others merely emphasized not being committed in advance to either side,

Ambassador had asked the State Department to reconsider this advice, undertaking instead to induce Subardjo to accept the terms of Section 511a. This same source has it also that Cochran refused to allow the chief of the M.S.A. mission in Indonesia to participate in drafting the agreement, even declining to see him for a period of three weeks. See Kahin, in Asian Nationalism and the West, p. 193.

- (9) For general discussions of the policy, see Moh. Hatta, "Indonesia's Foreign Policy," Foreign Affairs, April 1953; Kahin in W. L. Holland, Asian Nationalism and the West, pp. 169-178. Also Mohammad Roem, Politik Indonesia 1952 (Indonesian Policy, 1952), Penjiaran Ilmu, Djakarta, 1952; Tinjauan Politik dan Ekonomi kita pada dewasa ini (A Review of Our Politics and Economics at the Present Time, Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 1951; and "The Historical and Philosophical Background of Our Independent Policy," Indonesian Affairs, Ministry of Information, Djakarta, Vol. I, No. 7, July 1951. More recent contributions to discussion of the policy are found in the contributions of Roeslan Abdulgani, Suwito Kusumowidagdo and Soedjatmoko to the "Symposion tentang Politik Luar Negeri Indonesia" (Symposium on Indonesian Foreign Policy), Vivat (monthly publication of the Student Senate of the Foreign Service Academy), Djakarta, December 1955. The military rationale of the independent foreign policy is discussed in a number of the writings of T. B. Simatupang, then Armed Forces Chief of Staff, for instance, Soal-soal Politik Militer di Indonesia (Problems of Military Policy in Indonesia), Gaya Raya, Djakarta, 1956, pp. 64-81. See also A. H. Nasution, Tjatanan sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia (Notes on Indonesian Military Policy), Pembimbing, Djakarta, 1955, pp. 182-196.

preferring to defer all mention of what would happen in this event. Advocates of closer alignment with America found it useful to use the term, arguing that an independent policy was one which took Indonesia's internal requirements seriously. Communists used the term to mean the same as an "anti-imperialist" policy. No one was against the independent policy, not at any rate in public. It was aptly said that it was a sort of ideological prism through which all practical policies had to be refracted.

Nevertheless there was, at least within the main body of the nationalist movement, a commonly accepted core of meaning, which gave the term a certain precision and made it more than a mere prestige word. Practically all nationalists agreed that it was a policy of optimum independence of outside countries, that it was based on Indonesia's national interests, which included world peace, and on the desire for maximum opportunity for Indonesians to shape their society as they themselves wanted to, to prevent Indonesia from becoming an ideological battlefield. A considerable majority of these nationalists agreed that this involved working for a degree of independence of the two power blocs which permitted good relations with both and established a position from which third party moves to promote conciliation would be possible. They added that such a degree of independence would eliminate the possibility of either bloc having to fear that Indonesia would be used aggressively against it by the other. For quite a number of them the policy involved working for an independent Asian or Asian-Arab bloc which could ultimately perhaps hold a balance of power in world politics.

It is in the light of this type of thinking that the resentment of the Subardjo-Cochran agreement is to be understood. It is not clear how far Indonesia would have been committed to U.S. policies by the agreement if it had not been subsequently superseded. But the very language of it, the insistence that Indonesia should make a formal ideological surrender by putting its signature to a statement of the ideas of the U.S. Congress about the nature of the world struggle--this was certainly irksome.

The supporters of the agreement argued that it was merely an executive step, not involving a policy change. (10) They pointed to the fact that since the little publicized Constabulary Agreement of August 1950 Indonesia had been receiving, as well as economic and technical aid, small amounts of military equipment--vehicles, radio sets, small arms, and so on--for its police force, appropriated under the Mutual Defense Assistance Act of October 6, 1949; (11) and they went on to argue that the present agreement was an organizational arrangement for continuation of this, not a political step towards greater dependence on America. Others argued that it was necessary for Indonesia to accept aid under

(10) Keng Po (Djakarta), February 12, 1952.

(11) See Third Semi-Annual Report to Congress on the M.D.A.P., House Document No. 179, June 25, 1951.

Section 511a of the act, rather than 511b, because this would enable her to buy arms and equipment which had been unprocurable in the U.S.A. or Europe except in exchange for political guarantees. (12) All these groups held that Indonesia's need for U.S. military supplies was greater than that of countries like India, Pakistan or Burma which had accepted aid under Section 511b only, because they were either receiving military equipment through the Commonwealth or had arms factories of their own.

As against these groups, the great majority who opposed the agreement recalled the fact that the Natsir government had refused the terms on which the Melby mission of the U.S. Departments of State and Defense had offered military aid when it was in Indonesia in October 1950. (13) They drew attention to the note which Ambassador Cochran had sent to the government on January 22, 1952, asking for a guarantee, which the cabinet did not give, that controls would be placed on Indonesian exports to countries of the Soviet bloc. They argued that for internal security and political stability it was better to do without overseas equipment if the cost of obtaining it was a further strengthening of those groups in Indonesia who alleged that the revolution had been betrayed by compromise with foreign powers. National unity required that the cold war be kept out. If Indonesia was to continue to yield to America's endeavors to include her in an anti-Soviet bloc, there would soon, it was insisted, come a point of no-return as far as any independent policy was concerned.

On February 12 came a major blow to the cabinet. The Executive Council of the Masjumi, the party on which the cabinet had hitherto relied most strongly, decided that "the Masjumi is unable to be responsible for the signing of the agreement concerning Mutual Security Agency aid which has taken place." (14) This was followed four days later by a decision of the P.N.I. executive that "the cabinet should return its mandate to the President in order to overcome the present difficul-

(12) E.g. Jusuf Wibisono in Mimbar Indonesia (Djakarta), April 19, 1952. According to Kahin (Asian Nationalism and the West, p. 193) Indonesia desired some help in purchasing additional small arms during 1952. This was to be done outside M.S.A. or other U.S. government agencies but would have required some help in obtaining priorities.

(13) Under these terms Indonesia would have had to provide to the U.S. information on the size of its armed forces and equipment and on plans for military development.

(14) Jusuf Wibisono in Mimbar Indonesia (weekly, Djakarta), April 19, 1952. He stated that the decision of the Executive Council (under the predominant influence of Moh. Natsir) was not the Masjumi's final decision as it still had to be approved by the Legislative Council (headed by the Prime Minister, Dr. Sukiman). However, as no meeting of the Legislative Council was held to review the Executive's decision, the latter was binding on the Masjumi ministers.

ties." (15) There was however no indication of when the P.N.I. would want the mandate to be returned, and this was interpreted in the light of earlier statements by P.N.I. leaders to the effect that a cabinet crisis should be avoided while negotiations were going on, as they then were, with the Netherlands about the future of Irian and the Netherlands-Indonesian Union.

For some days the issue was held in abeyance. The parties were known to be at variance on whether cabinet should take a decision to uphold or repudiate the Subardjo-Cochran agreement. The small parties wanted a cabinet vote on the issue, but both the Masjumi and the P.N.I. were against this, partly because of fear that this would further add to their own internal divisions and partly because they feared that such a vote might make the task of forming a new cabinet more difficult.

On February 19 came Ambassador Cochran's reply to the requests cabinet had made of his government at its meeting of the 8th. The State Department, it read, was not prepared to agree to a post facto omission of the fourth point of the agreement which Subardjo had signed. But it had agreed that this point should be interpreted as follows:

Make a full contribution, consistent with its political and economic capacity, as determined by the Indonesian government and with its population, natural resources, facilities and general economic situation, to the development and maintenance of its own defenses and to the defensive strength of the free and sovereign countries.

The answer did slightly strengthen the position of the supporters of the cabinet. But it had come too late. It was clear that feeling against the government was too strong. On February 21 cabinet passed a motion disapproving Subardjo's handling of the matter, whereupon the Foreign Minister, in accordance with his letter to cabinet of February 11, resigned. Even this however was not enough. Prime Minister Sukiman had certainly shared responsibility with Subardjo for the agreement, and so had several other cabinet members; therefore the sacking of Subardjo alone was regarded as unprincipled. (16) In any case it was clear that the cabinet could not execute policy having a bearing on Mutual Security aid. It faced the prospect of having to give a full explanation of its actions in reply to a parliamentary interpellation on the matter, which was to be debated on February 25. (17)

(15) Antara, February 17, 1952.

(16) Abadi, February 13. Statement of Mr. Djody Gondokusumo in Indonesia Raya, February 23.

(17) This interpellation was initiated by Mr. Djody Gondokusumo (P.R.N.) and signed by S. M. Abidin (Labor), A. A. Achsien (Masjumi), O. Rondonuwu (People's Sovereignty), Ahem Erningpradja (Labor Group) and Z. Baharuddin (Independent).

There seemed only one way out of the situation. On February 23 cabinet decided unanimously to return its mandate to the President. It did so, it stated, "to improve the political atmosphere so that the difficulties which have arisen from the signing of the Mutual Security Agreement may be able to be overcome." It had not taken any attitude or decision on the agreement itself. A government broadcast of the same day stated that "the resignation of the cabinet should not be construed as meaning that the State would shirk its obligations arising from an agreement with a foreign country." (18)

What can be said in retrospect of the causes of the fall of this cabinet? And which are the groups which were most directly responsible?

The Mutual Security Agreement issue was certainly a major cause of the fall. So also were a number of other issues, including deadlocks between the two major parties over ratification of the San Francisco treaty and the proposed new regulation to replace Regulation 39 on the interim composition of the regional councils, disagreements on the handling of the Irian issue and relations with Holland generally, and conflicts on import and budgetary policies.

The groups which had been working most actively for the downfall of the cabinet were two. On the one hand the Socialist Party was working to convince sections of the Masjumi and the P.N.I. and of several smaller parties that their own interests could be best served along the lines of the Socialist Party's suggestion that Indonesia could be governed through a "business cabinet" until elections had been held. On the other hand the B.P.P. (Political Parties' Consultative Council) stood in outright opposition to some of the most basic policies not only of the Sukiman cabinet, but also of the Natsir and Hatta ones which had preceded it, and insisted on radical demands along P.K.I. and Murba lines. This group hoped that a "national coalition cabinet" might be formed on the basis of all parties except the Masjumi. (19)

In the first three weeks of February, which decided the fate of the Sukiman cabinet, it was the first group which took the offensive with the second group lending its vociferous support only a little while after the first had launched the attack and, as it seemed, rather unwillingly. The Socialist Party itself remained largely in the background. But it worked actively in co-operation with the Masjumi and P.N.I. groups which had long been critical of the government's policy, particularly with the younger intellectual leaders of these two parties, the men of the Natsir and Wilopo groups.

(18) Indonesian Affairs, Vol. II, No. 1, February-March, 1952.

(19) See statements of B.P.P. and P.K.I., Indonesia Raya, February 26, 1952.

The line of division within the P.N.I. was difficult to trace. For this party, concerned always to carry radical nationalist sentiment with it, had been careful not to appear to assume responsibility for the cabinet's foreign policy. (20) In the case of the Masjumi on the other hand, it was very clear. Jusuf Wibisono's statement on February 19 to the effect that the decision of the party's Executive Council was not its final decision, as it still had to be approved by its Legislative Council, made it even clearer than had previously been the case, that as between the groups controlling these two councils, there existed an all but open breach. The Natsir-Roem group stood strongly opposed to the Sukiman-Wibisono group. The small Isa Anshary group backed Natsir.

The influence of the Socialist Party was exercised most strongly through the press, in particular the Djakarta press. Pedoman, reflecting P.S.I. policy fairly closely, and Indonesia Raya, also politically akin, were its strongest supporters. The widely read Abadi, generally considered a spokesman for the Natsir group of the Masjumi, was an influential ally, as were a large number of other papers both in the capital and outside. Of the country's most important dailies only the liberal Chinese Keng Po and the radically nationalist Merdeka (whose proprietor is a relative and political supporter of Subardjo) stood out against the attack, and even these two papers did not put up a strong defense. On February 25 Abadi stated that: "Directly or indirectly, the press helped to throw out the old cabinet." A Pedoman cartoon of the same day was headed "A Victory for the Press."

It is impossible to do more than speculate on the role which President Soekarno played in these changes. The Sukiman cabinet, to whose formation the President had contributed so much, had co-operated considerably more closely with him than had its predecessor, the Natsir cabinet, with its more narrowly legal view of his powers. The influence he exercised in matters of day-to-day government policies was probably greater in the period of Sukiman than it had been since the Soekarno presidential cabinet of August-November 1945. In addition it is probable that Soekarno believed in the necessity of considerable amounts of U.S. assistance for Indonesian development. These factors point to the likelihood of his having taken Subardjo's side. On the other hand there is no evidence of a concerted effort by the President to prevent the fall of the cabinet. Concerned to retain his position as the central focus of nationalist feeling, he was presumably unwilling to defend the cabinet with all the weapons at his disposal, when it had become clear that the Subardjo-Cochran agreement had outraged the newspaper-reading public to the extent that both the P.N.I. and the Masjumi were obliged to repudiate it.

- (20) It is clear however that the party's decision to return its mandate was a blow to the conservative Ali-Sartono group, and that it was made as a result of a coming together of many members of the radically nationalist faction of Sidik Djojokusarto with the Socialist-sympathizing faction of Wilopo. This had been the division at the time of the party's decision not to support the signing of the Japanese peace treaty.

However one should not exaggerate the role of public opinion--even in the limited sense of the politically effective public, roughly the equivalent of the newspaper-reading group. Although the evidence is meager, there is reason to believe that the army leadership, representing an enormous center of political power, played a role of importance in ousting the cabinet.

It is clear that the top leadership of the army and the Defense Ministry were frequently at odds with the Sukiman cabinet and its Defense Minister, R. T. A. Sewaka. They were impatient of the restrictions placed upon them in their work of reorganizing the army and resentful of the political limitations which they felt made it impossible for them to pursue a consistent policy against the Darul Islam and other rebel-bandit groups. (21) The army leadership had co-operated fairly closely with the cabinets of Hatta and Natsir, but the Sukiman cabinet period saw numerous frictions. In June 1951 the army leaders had insisted on re-arresting a number of Murba-sympathizing leaders of mountain rebel groups released by the Sukiman cabinet's Justice Minister, thus bringing about his resignation. They had also refused to co-operate in the use of the extraordinary legal provisions of the State of War and Siege regulation against persons arrested in the anti-Communist raid of August 1951. (22) Although it is unlikely that their role was active or co-ordinated, we may assume that their known feelings towards the Sukiman cabinet were used effectively by political leaders attempting to persuade their parties to disavow the cabinet and that this played an important role in persuading the leaders of the cabinet to resign. (23)

There followed a 35-day period of cabinet crisis. Five days after the cabinet's resignation had been received, the President began his series of hearings with party leaders. Significantly, he called only representatives from the parties which had held seats in the Sukiman cabinet. The justification given for this by Vice-President Hatta was that the Sukiman cabinet had returned its mandate at its own initiative, and not because of parliamentary opposition. In their meetings with the President--and in some cases also the Vice-President--the party leaders gave their views on what type of cabinet should be formed, and who should, in their opinion, be charged with the task of forming it. (24)

(21) A. H. Nasution, op. cit., p. 180.

(22) Ibid., pp. 160-163, 168-172.

(23) Interesting comparisons may be drawn between the role of the army here and its more active, co-ordinated and overt role in bringing about the resignation of another cabinet which relied heavily on the support of President Soekarno, the first cabinet of Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo (July 1953 - July 1955). See J. R. W. Smail, The 27th June Affair, unpublished paper, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1957.

On March 1, President Soekarno announced the appointment of two formateurs, Prawoto Mangkusasmito and Sidik Djojokusarto, the nominees of the Masjumi and P.N.I. respectively. He did not specify that the cabinet should be either coalition or business but defined the formateurs' task simply as the formation of "a strong cabinet with sufficient parliamentary backing." These two men together appeared at first to be able to form a cabinet which would meet both President Soekarno's specifications and the demands of the two parties whom they represented. But after nineteen days they admitted defeat and returned their mandate to the President. On the same day, March 19, the President appointed Mr. Wilopo of the P.N.I. as formateur. In this case the appointment was not on the nomination of any party, but made by the President on the basis of what he had observed of developments during the earlier attempt at formation. (25) By the 28th of the month Wilopo had handed a list of cabinet post candidates to the President, and three days later these were approved and the Wilopo cabinet took office.

These were the principal developments of the 35 days. But what struggles lay behind them? What were the political factors which made agreement so difficult to obtain?

(24) The question of the President's prerogative in the appointment of formateurs, and of the freedom with which this might be exercised, had for some time been a controversial one. Some resentment had been felt, particularly by the political groups with a narrow, strictly legal view of the President's powers, at what was thought to be a tendency on President Soekarno's part to prefer coalition cabinets before business cabinets and to favor P.N.I. men, and men from the Sukiman group of the Masjumi, as formateurs.

Again the parties which had at the time of the formation of the Sukiman cabinet, formed the Communist-led Badan Permusjawaratan Partai-Partai (Political Parties' Consultative Council), were concerned to be considered for the formateurship. This group, through its spokesman, the Communist M. P. Hutomo Supardan, moved a motion in Parliament to the effect that in the appointment of formateurs, preference should not be given to parties whose policy in the previous cabinet had been opposed by either parliament or the rest of cabinet, if the opposition parties were capable of forming a new cabinet. This motion, supported by the P.K.I., Murba, Labor Front, Peasant Front, Progressive Fraction, and P.S.I.I., was defeated 81:30 on February 29. See A. K. Pringgodiglo, The Office of President in Indonesia as Defined in the Three Constitutions, in Theory and Practice, Translation Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1957, pp. 26-27, 43, 57.

(25) According to press accounts Wilopo had been considered for the post of Prime Minister by Sidik and Prawoto, and had then been found to be acceptable to both major parties. Although not a nominee of his party for the formateurship, Wilopo was given the P.N.I. executive's approval for his work.

It was not the question of agreement on a stated program which made the formateurs' task as difficult as it was. Seven days passed before Sidik and Prawoto were in a position to publish their statement, but subsequently the points of this were not criticized, and indeed they were taken over by Wilopo as a basis for his attempt at a formation, and so finally accepted as the basis of the Wilopo cabinet. The six points were very similar to those of the Natsir cabinet's program and not very different from those of the Sukiman cabinet, differing from them only in particular emphases. They are as follows:

"1. Organization of the State

- a. To realize general elections for the Constituent Assembly and the Regional Councils.
- b. To finalize the implementation of, and to give content to, regional autonomy.
- c. To simplify the organization of the central government.

2. Prosperity

- a. To raise the living standard of the population by means of increasing national production, particularly of primary foodstuffs.
- b. To continue agrarian reforms.

3. Security

To seek to overcome the security problem with all means available to a juridical state, to improve the organization of the instruments of power of the state, and to develop the powers within society for the maintenance of security and order.

4. Labour

To complete labour legislation with a view to increasing the labour level so as to safeguard the process of national production.

5. Education

To speed up the endeavors to make improvements aimed at the reform (renewal) of education and training.

6. Foreign Affairs

- a. To give content to the independent foreign policy through activities towards world peace which conform to Indonesia's responsibilities within the family of nations and to the national interests.

- b. To complete the conversion of the Indonesian-Netherlands relations which are based on the Union Statute, into relations based on ordinary international treaties, with the elimination of parts of the Round Table Conference agreements that are detrimental to the country and the people.
- c. To continue efforts to include West Irian into the territory of Indonesia in the shortest possible time." (26)

Of much greater importance than the rather general points of this program were several current political issues on which any strong cabinet would have to be able to take a united stand. The first and most obvious of these was the complicated M.S.A. issue. It seemed improbable that any cabinet could function unless it was based on a commonly accepted conception of how Indonesia could find her way out of the impasse which the events of February had created as far as U.S. aid and the whole question of relations with the U.S. was concerned. Perhaps more difficult still was the question of ratification of Indonesia's signature of the San Francisco peace treaty with Japan. Here the Masjumi and the P.N.I. stood committed to diametrically opposed policies, the Masjumi supporting and the P.N.I. opposing ratification, and it was difficult to imagine a cabinet being able to weather the storms that this matter--and the closely related one of Japanese trade and reparations--would raise, unless it had initially found a modus vivendi on it.

To vex the situation further the regional councils issue had raised its head. With the P.N.I. pressing for a new regulation to replace the controversial Regulation 39, and the Masjumi insisting that early regional elections were the only solution it would accept, the situation was one of deadlock. Yet, without a solution on this issue there could be no fundamental assault on the very important problems of decentralization and regional autonomy. Already too the question of nation-wide elections, and when and how they should be held, was an important issue in behind-the-scenes negotiations. The Socialist Party for instance made a large number of electoral districts one of its conditions for participation in a cabinet.

There was a source of party division also in the issue of the negotiations with Holland which had been carried on in Holland by the mission led by Prof. Supomo and had come to an abrupt end with the fall of the Sukiman cabinet. (27) Whereas the Masjumi was principally concerned

(26) Pedoman, March 7, 1952. This translation is taken from Indonesian Affairs, Vol. II, No. 1, February-March, 1952.

(27) Agreement had been reached on a number of points related to the replacement of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union by a series of normal international agreements. But on the Irian issue the situation had remained one of deadlock. See Supomo statement, Pedoman,

to have the Netherlands-Indonesian Union replaced by a series of normal international treaties, the P.N.I., with its greater emphasis on the claim for Irian, opposed any solution of the Union question which was not at the same time a solution of the question of Indonesian sovereignty in Irian. Again particular politically contentious demands like that of P.I.R. for the abolition of the Ministries of Religion and Information created difficulties for the formateurs. Finally there were serious differences of policy between the main parties on financial questions, army questions, and the question of how to restore security in the disturbed parts of the country.

It is not surprising when one considers all these divisions between the main parties (and with them the fact that a considerable number of parties would have to be represented in a cabinet if it was to be able to maintain a parliamentary majority), that wide support existed for the idea of a business cabinet. Such a cabinet, it was argued, would minimize the effects of bitterness between parties, and prevent the tension from becoming worse. It would have internal unity, urgently necessary in view of the many contentious issues to be decided, which no cabinet whose members could always be easily withdrawn by their parties could have.

These were the arguments of Socialist Party supporters, and of a considerable number of non-party persons like the former chairman of parliament, Mr. Assaat. But they were seriously contested by a number of other groups, most strongly, significantly, by those who had defended the outgoing cabinet and its Subardjo-Cochran agreement. Mr. Jusuf Wibisono, of the Sukiman group of the Masjumi, opposed the idea of a business cabinet as extra-parliamentary and unworkable. Dr. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo stated that he thought a coalition cabinet better able to ensure political stability, and the P.N.I. chairman, Sidik Djojokusarto, who had been co-formateur of Dr. Sukiman's coalition cabinet, took the same stand. (28) The arguments of these men gained strength when it appeared during the President's "hearings" that practically none of the parties was prepared to limit its own power by foregoing the right to exercise control over any ministers it might have in a cabinet. (29)

In the early stages of the cabinet crisis the issue between a coalition and a business cabinet was presented as one of principle. Neverthe-

March 6, 1952. The "way-out" proposal of the Supomo mission for joint responsibility over the area as a temporary measure was informally known to be unacceptable to Holland.

(28) Merdeka, February 2, 1952; Abadi, February 25, 1952.

(29) See statements in favor of a coalition cabinet, from P.I.R. (February 25), Parkindo (February 25), Parindra (February 26), Fraksi Demokrat (February 26), B.P.P. (February 26), Partai Katolik (February 28).

less the two types were clearly more important as political symbols than as legal categories. The call for a business cabinet was made by groups which wanted the formation of a cabinet with the political emphasis of that of Natsir (which had sometimes been officially described as a business cabinet). Those who were against a business cabinet, affirming the desirability or necessity of a coalition, were primarily concerned for a cabinet politically similar to that of Sukiman. The argument for internal cohesion and technical competence was a political argument of the P.S.I. and P.S.I.-paralleling parties and party factions; the counter-argument for responsibility to parliament was that of their Soekarno-allied opponents, conservatives and some "oppositionists." The business cabinet was an attractive political symbol, rationalizing the interests of the "younger generation" of persons of higher Western education who looked to Natsir, Wilopo and Sjahrir for political leadership; for these men stood to gain from every emphasis on technical as against political qualifications.

Later, when the President had left the question of coalition or business open, and so for formateurs and parties to work out, it became clear that the whole matter was one of degree. For a formateur it was a matter not of any particular legally-defined relationship between parties and the cabinet, but rather of obtaining maximum cabinet unity and convincing the parties to be content with making suggestions to be taken up by their ministers, rather than absolute demands of the sort that force a cabinet to choose between inaction and internal collapse. The political difference was one of the extent to which a formateur was prepared to go to attain internal cabinet unity, where the cost of this was the danger of not being able to maintain the full support of the government parties.

This difference came out most clearly in the "statement warfare" which Sidik Djojokusarto and Prawoto Mangkusasmito, the first formateurs, conducted after their attempt at formation had met with failure. Prawoto, whose associations were primarily with the Natsir group of the Masjumi, although he had close relations also with the Sukiman group, stated that the failure had resulted from differences in interpretation of the meaning of "strong cabinet," adding that the central difficulty in selecting persons for ministerial posts had been to place individuals in line with a "specified composition." On the other hand Sidik, representing the two sections of the P.N.I. which were most strongly opposed to the ideas of the Socialist Party and of Natsir, emphasized not any specified composition but rather party and parliamentary support. Refusing to accept Masjumi ministers who were representative of the Natsir group only, he stated that "no cabinet which did not include a compact Masjumi could fulfill the conditions set by the President."

In this respect it is clear that Wilopo's policy as a formateur was much closer to that of Prawoto than to that of his party colleague, Sidik. Whereas Sidik had encountered opposition from the leaders of the army, Wilopo immediately gained their confidence by accepting their candidate for Defense Minister, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Jogjakarta, and

co-operating closely with him in the further work of forming the cabinet. For the purposes of his task Wilopo stated that he did not see what were called the Natsir and Sukiman groups of the Masjumi. At the same time he emphasized what he called his "conception" of a cabinet. The fact that Wilopo was prepared to run the risk of uncertain party and parliamentary support rather than sacrifice the "conception" which would provide unity and teamwork in his cabinet, is central to an understanding of the whole period of the cabinet which he came to lead.

The formateurs' tasks were difficult also for reasons of small party, personal and sectional politics, reasons only barely relevant to major party issues. Prawoto gave the following reasons: "There was one candidate for a certain ministry who was made an absolute condition. Then there was a candidate of the same kind whose inclusion would have brought about internal discord within the cabinet itself and insufficient backing from parliament. There was one party which did not like to accept a different party, not for reasons or difference in policy, but because it felt fed up. There was a party which formed a bloc with another in order to be able to strengthen its absolute demands. There was also a party which would only state whether it would participate or not when it already knew what was the last placing for the complete cabinet." (30)

An interesting aspect of the behind-the-scenes bargaining and juggling was the light it threw on the parties' conceptions of the relative importance of particular portfolios. One of the central problems which Sidik and Prawoto had to face was the one of the Prime Ministership, which was at that time demanded by both of the major parties. Political commentators pointed to the importance of the agencies over which a Prime Minister could exercise authority, in particular the Public Prosecutor's Department and the police force. Yet the Interior portfolio was at least as highly bidden for as the Prime Ministership. (31) This must be seen in the light of the P.N.I.'s determination to maintain the strong position of its supporters in leading positions in the pamong praja corps (hierarchical general civil administration) and the Masjumi's aim to change this situation. (32) It probably reflects also the belief

- (30) For the series of statements of the two leaders see Pedoman, March 19 and 20, 1952.
- (31) See the tentative cabinet lists published in Sin Po of February 14 and Pedoman of February 15. These two papers are of very different political directions.
- (32) This factor had gained new significance in the period of the Sukiman cabinet because Mr. Iskap Tjokrohadisurjo as the P.N.I. Minister of the Interior had named P.N.I. men as governors in two provinces previously headed by men of other parties, West Java and Sulawesi, thus creating a situation where five out of the twelve regional governors were avowed P.N.I. members and a sixth a P.N.I. sympathizer.

that the long-promised nation-wide elections (in which control of the Ministry of the Interior and its governorships would be a crucial political factor) would be organized in the life of this cabinet. The most important portfolios after these appeared to be Defense and Finance; and the fact that these two went to the Socialist Party and Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (who had associated himself with the party during the formation struggle) suggests that the P.S.I.'s position in the Wilopo cabinet was a very important one.

In this period again new light was shed on divisions in the Masjumi and P.N.I. In the Masjumi the strongest indications of disunity came from the Nahdatul Ulama. It had become clear early in the period of cabinet crisis that the party was not prepared to re-endorse the N.U. leader Wachid Hasjim for the Religious Affairs portfolio which he had held in the last three cabinets. So he seized the initiative by announcing that he would not participate in the new cabinet, because of the "unharmonious situation" in the Masjumi. In what was clearly a threat of secession he said that "if the Nahdatul Ulama joins in the political bickering, its character of a religious movement will disappear." (33) At the same time feeling between the Natsir and Sukiman groups of the leadership was so strong that it was widely thought that if and when the Nahdatul Ulama seceded from the Masjumi a large group of Sukiman supporters might follow it out. (34)

In the P.N.I. itself the signs of division were much fewer. The considerable differences between Sidik and Wilopo in their policies as formateurs were commented on, and there was discussion of "groups" in the party. But there was no airing of dirty linen in public as in the case of the Masjumi. In fact only when the Wilopo cabinet was formed and the P.N.I. Party Council was slow to give it its backing, did it become possible to foresee the fierce internal conflicts of the party which were to be of such importance to this cabinet.

(33) Antara, March 18, 1952.

(34) Dr. Sukiman and the top members of his group were not members of Nahdatul Ulama. In fact most of them belonged to the N.U.'s main Moslem opponent, the modernist religious organization Muhammadiyah. However N.U. leaders hoped that some of them would join the N.U. political party in preference to remaining within the rump Masjumi, where their power vis-a-vis the Natsir group would be considerably reduced. The Nahdatul Ulama wanted Sukiman to return as Prime Minister. See statements of K. H. Abdul Wahab Chasbullah, Antara, March 7, 1952, and Sin Po (Djakarta), April 24, 1952, and of H. Mohammad Dahlan, Antara, April 5, 1952. With the Sumatran Isa Anshary supporting the Sumatran Natsir and the predominantly Javanese Nahdatul Ulama leadership backing the Javanese Sukiman, the division appeared as in part a regional one. However Dr. Sukiman and the great majority of his followers remained in the Masjumi.

Finally, a word should be said about the acceptance of Wilopo's cabinet list by President Soekarno. Wilopo submitted the list on March 30, a list of Ministers from the P.N.I. and Masjumi (four seats each, and representing in the main the Wilopo and Natsir groups), the P.S.I. (two seats), the P.S.I.I., Labor Party, Parindra and two Christian parties (one seat each), and three non-party men. But the President did not immediately accept this list, stating that he would not come to a decision until he had discussed the matter with Vice-President Hatta who was then out of Djakarta. This step, unprecedented in Indonesia's constitutional history, led to considerable protests. Mr. A. M. Tambunan of the Christian Party and first Vice-Chairman of Parliament, argued strongly that it was unconstitutional, and papers like the pro-Socialist Pedoman did the same. On the other hand men like Mr. Jusuf Wibisono, and the widely-read commentator Sajuti Melik, defended the President's action. Not only did they point to the possible weaknesses of the cabinet that Wilopo had formed--the opposition of P.I.R. and the Democratic Fraction, the ambiguous position of Nahdatul Ulama, and the doubtfulness of P.N.I. support, and to personal factors such as the President's opposition to Wilopo's Foreign Affairs candidate Mukarto Notowidigdo (35)--but in addition they argued that it was not necessary for Indonesia to follow Western constitutional precedents mechanically. Sajuti Melik strengthened his case by pointing to a statement of the President made several days earlier: "Our people's sovereignty (of the Pantja Sila) is not merely parliamentary democracy as in the West; that must be coupled with leadership." (36) Here again it appears that the political alignment was roughly between the forces grouped around the President and those grouped around the Socialists. The issue did not assume large proportions, however, because after two days the President had approved Wilopo's list.

The cabinet as announced on April 4, when the swearing-in ceremony took place, was as follows:

Prime Minister	Mr. Wilopo (P.N.I.)
Deputy Prime Minister	Prawoto Mangkusasmito (Masjumi)
Interior	Mr. Mohammad Roem (Masjumi)
Foreign Affairs	Mukarto Notowidigdo (P.N.I.)

- (35) Mukarto, then Deputy Representative to the United Nations, was objected to in a number of circles, particularly in the Foreign Ministry, because of his youth and relatively low diplomatic status.
- (36) Sajuti Melik in Mimbar Indonesia (weekly, Djakarta), April 5, 1952. Quoting from an address of the President to the students of a staff training course of the Information Ministry. Sajuti Melik had been a member of the Central National Committee, or outer parliament, during the Revolution, representing the Murba Party. In 1954 he was Chief Editor of the P.N.I. daily Suluh Indonesia. It is not clear whether he was a P.N.I. member in our period. He was a close associate of President Soekarno.

Defense	Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX (Independent)
Justice	Mr. Lukman Wiriadinata (P.S.I.)
Information	Arnold Mononutu (P.N.I.)
Finance	Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo (P.S.I.)
Agriculture	Mohammad Sardjan (Masjumi)
Economic Affairs	Mr. Sumanang (P.N.I.)
Communications	Ir. Djuanda (Independent)
Public Works	Ir. Suwanto (Catholic Party)
Labor	I. Tedjasukmana (Labor Party)
Social Affairs	Anwar Tjokroaminoto (P.S.I.I.)
Education	Dr. Bahder Djohan (Independent)
Religion	Fakih Usman (Masjumi)
Health	Dr. J. Leimena (Christian Party)
Personnel Affairs	R. P. Suroso (Parindra) (37)

The reactions at the time of the announcement of the cabinet were certainly positive, more positive than they had been in the case of either of the other two cabinets of the unitary state. The Information Ministry's Indonesian Affairs commented that the cabinet "gives the impression (of being) of the 'younger' elements in Indonesian political life" adding that "for that reason many people feel that there is a hope of a 'new atmosphere' in political affairs." (38) Particularly from students and the younger section of groups of people of higher Western education, did the cabinet receive acclamation, and from many groups outside political parties who had hoped for a government above the petty bickerings of the parties. In addition the reaction of Indonesians overseas was very favorable.

Not only was it stressed that this appeared to be a cabinet of people who could work together, but the caliber of its individual members drew very favorable comments. Not a few observers thought that in terms of their ability and integrity, the ministers of the Wilopo cabinet were the equals of those of any other cabinet of the Republic. (39)

(37) Indonesian Affairs, February-March, 1952. Mukarto's name had not been on the list announced on April 1, which included Mr. Wilopo as Foreign Minister ad interim. A day later it was announced that his inclusion had been approved by the President. Wilopo passed over his Foreign Affairs responsibilities to him as soon as he had returned from New York.

(38) Ibid.

(39) Dr. J. Leimena, who had been a member of every cabinet of the Republic since early 1946 and had consistently stressed the importance of personal factors in the work of the cabinets, commented later that the Wilopo cabinet was in these ways the best in which he had worked. Discussion with the writer, July 7, 1953.

Mr. Wilopo, a forty-three year old law graduate and former teacher in "Taman Siswa" schools, (40) had been Secretary-General and then Minister of Labor, and later Minister of Economic Affairs in the Sukiman cabinet. He had won for himself a reputation for political and administrative ability, careful work, fair mindedness and sympathy for the working class. At the same time he was known as a man for whom party loyalties were relatively unimportant and who could therefore work well with men from other parties. His calm, cautious and unspectacular ways of working and his independence of mind were to leave their mark on the developments of the next 14 months.

Mr. Mohammad Roem, a man of similar age and training, was better known, and in his work, first as Minister of the Interior, then as one of the chief architects of the Round Table Conference Agreement, and later as Foreign Minister in the Natsir cabinet, had made a number of political enemies. He was known as a strong political figure and at the same time eminently reasonable.

Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Jogjakarta, a man of forty who had spent almost ten years of his life in Holland, was perhaps the most striking of the men of the cabinet. A descendant of the rulers of the Mataram Kingdom, he is nevertheless a man of democratic inclinations. During the Japanese occupation and the revolution he had won enormous prestige and popular affection. He was perhaps the only man in Indonesia with charismatic authority approaching that of President Soekarno. Active in military affairs during the revolution, he enjoyed wide respect in the army. He had been Defense Minister in the Hatta Cabinet of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and Deputy Prime Minister in the cabinet of Natsir. Though a non-party man, he stood with the Socialists on many issues.

Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, the Finance Minister, was the youngest and most intellectually distinguished of the team. At thirty-four he had been Chargé d'Affaires in Washington, Minister of Trade and Industry (in the Natsir Cabinet) and first Dean of the Faculty of Economics at the University of Indonesia. He had been a strong critic of the Sukiman government's financial policy, and had resigned from his position as its adviser in protest against it. (41)

(40) These are private, nationalist schools existing since 1922 when the movement for them was begun by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro. Their educational methods are liberal and their cultural orientation "Javanist." See Taman Siswa 30 Tahun (Thirty Years of Taman Siswa), Taman Siswa, Jogjakarta, 1956.

(41) Most of Prof. Sumitro's many writings of this period are collected in Persoalan Ekonomi di Indonesia (The Economic Problem in Indonesia), Indira, Djakarta, 1951.

Other men who appeared to be both personally readily accepted and technically well-suited to their portfolios were Dr. Bahder Djohan, the Education Minister, Ir. Djuanda, the "veteran" Minister for Communications, who was to become Prime Minister in 1957, and Dr. Leimena, who was again given the Health portfolio.

But if the general reactions to the cabinet were favorable, there were less favorable reactions from the leaders of a number of the political parties. Thus doubts arose about the government's likely strength in parliament. Having gained the parliamentary support of the P.S.I. and P.S.I.I. but lost that of P.I.R. and the Democratic Fraction, it had twelve less votes in parliament than the Sukiman cabinet. The likely secession of Nahdatul Ulama from Masjumi could cause it the loss of eight more, which would mean it had a majority of only 18. And more important than any other augury of weakness was the rather grudging acceptance which characterized the attitude of the P.N.I. executive to the cabinet. It appeared that as a cabinet which was internally strong, "something between a business and a coalition cabinet, but rather more like the former," (42) it would have to pay in terms of parliamentary opposition to it. This danger appeared greater for the fact that the cabinet was not in a position to base itself publicly from the outset on particular policies on the outstanding issues, like the regional councils and the San Francisco treaty, on which important differences existed between the main parties.

But for all the dangers that were visible on the horizon, it is clear that the atmosphere at the time when the Wilopo cabinet began its work was one of confidence and hope. At least, it seemed, there was a chance that a positive economic program would be pursued, that solutions would be found to some of the problems of administration, that nationwide elections would be held before long, and that in this way new hope would be born and an end put to the "moral crisis." The next fourteen months were to show how far these hopes were justified.

It was clear however from the time of the cabinet's assumption of office that it did not wish to engender any hopes which were false. This attitude underlies the statements of policy which Mr. Wilopo made to parliament, first in introducing his cabinet on May 9 and then in replying to the questions and criticisms of the parliamentarians on June 3 and 19. As there was little that was new in the program of Wilopo as formateur, so also in his statements as Prime Minister the policies outlined were old ones--a fact which disappointed a number of persons who expected radical changes from a cabinet of "the younger generation" of politicians. The same policies had been enunciated, and to a greater or lesser degree followed, by all of the cabinets of the period. The differences were ones of stress--and here Wilopo's statements paralleled closely those of Natsir as Prime Minister in October 1950.

(42) Sajuti Melik, Mimbar Indonesia, April 5, 1952.

It is most important here to consider those policies and emphases of policy which have direct bearing on political party activity. The cabinet's policy for elections was certainly one of these. On this matter the statements of Wilopo made it clear that action was intended. This had been indicated by the fact that elections for a Constituent Assembly and the regional legislative councils had been placed first in the cabinet's program, and, as we have seen, it found a reflection in the political struggles of cabinet formation. Wilopo stated that the government had made enough preparatory investigations--through its delegations to Australia and India and in its regional council elections in Minahasa, Jogjakarta and Makassar--to enable it to establish an elections system suitable for Indonesia. It was now therefore preparing an elections bill. Before submitting this however it would submit a simple bill for the registration of voters, which would enable an important preliminary of elections to be begun very soon.

On this issue too, however, Wilopo did not give specific information where politically contentious aspects were involved. He stated that the government "tended to favor" direct over indirect elections. He said that the regional councils functioning would continue to do so until new ones were elected and that no new ones would be formed until then. However he did not say whether elections for the Constituent Assembly would be held before elections for the regional councils, nor did he set any dateline, or reply to the parliamentarians who asked about the type of electoral bill he would initiate.

Foreign policy, while of very great importance in terms of its impact on party political divisions, was placed last among the points of the cabinet's program, and given little time in the statements of the Prime Minister. Emphasis was placed on maintenance of an active independent policy and on linking foreign policy with the requirements of the internal situation. The government stated that it would reopen negotiations with the United States with a view to replacing the Subardjo-Cochran agreement with "another agreement with conditions which do not deviate from the framework of international cooperation in general and the spirit of the United Nations Charter in particular." (43) It would receive only economic and technical, not military, assistance. With reference to relations with Japan the Prime Minister said no more than that the government was giving detailed attention to these, and that it would establish only consular, not diplomatic, relations with Japan. He opposed suggestions of unilateral abrogation of the Union with the Netherlands but said the government intended to resume the negotiations with Holland on this and related questions, which were broken off in February. He announced that it would exchange diplomatic envoys with

(43) Keterangan dan Jawaban Pemerintah atas Program Kabinet Wilopo (The Government's Statement of the Policy of the Wilopo Cabinet and its Replies to Parliamentary Criticism), Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Information), Djakarta, 1952, p. 186.

Mexico, Brazil and Argentina, but had not yet taken decisions as regards the placing of the diplomatic representatives in Yugoslavia, Spain, or the U.S.S.R. This was significant in view of the fact that Mukarto had stated, before leaving New York to be the cabinet's Foreign Minister, that he would initiate the establishment of an Indonesian Embassy in Moscow. (44) In this further area of P.N.I.-Masjumi disagreement Masjumi pressure had been effective.

There was little detailed information given on the government's stand in the question of policy to eliminate internal insecurity. However Wilopo made clear his stand on the related question of civil-military relations. He stated that the greater part of the country had reached a stage where security could be maintained by the civil authorities. Therefore, he said, the government intended to begin lifting the State of Siege imposed under the 1939 State of War and Siege (Martial Law) regulations. By the time of his second statement of June 3 this had been done for South Sumatra, and it was to be done for the rest of the country in July--with the provision that the milder State of War regulations (which give military authorities a smaller range of emergency powers) would be effective in certain insecure areas. Further, Wilopo stated, the government would within a short time have released approximately 70% of the 20,000 persons, rebel-bandit suspects and quasi-political prisoners, held at the time of its assumption of office under the State of War and Siege provisions. (45)

The heavy emphasis of Wilopo's statements however was on the economic situation and the situation of the government's finances. With grim realism Wilopo outlined the situation of the country's economy, which he described as being in "a decline of which one cannot yet see the end." (46) He pointed in particular to the disastrous falls in export earnings due to the raw materials slump which followed the Korea war boom--to falls in the prices of raw materials such as rubber, tin and copra, and to the difficulties being encountered in facing the competition of other raw-material-producing countries. Explaining that 75% of Indonesia's state revenue came from indirect taxation and 63% from duties and excises, he estimated that revenues in the year 1952 were likely to fall short of those of 1951 by R 2,610 million. With previous commitments amounting to R 3,800 million, the government would be likely to face a deficit of R 4,000 million, with revenues totaling less than R 9,000 million. (47)

(44) Antara, March 30, 1952.

(45) See Daniel S. Lev, Aspects of the Regulation on the State of War and Siege, unpublished paper, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, Ithaca, 1957.

(46) Keterangan dan Djawaban Pemerintah atas Program Kabinet Wilopo, P. 16.

(47) Op. cit., pp. 58-65. The earlier commitments, which led to deliveries in the second half of 1952 and in 1953, were the result of an over-generous planning of expenditures, which was prompted by the desire to start urgently needed schemes of rehabilitation and devel-

A balanced budget was an impossibility under these circumstances, but drastic cuts in government expenditure and strict avoidance of waste were necessities. As far as possible the cuts would not affect productive enterprises stimulated by the government.

Economic policy was on the whole to follow the lines laid down by previous cabinets. There were to be no new schemes, for Indonesia was already "overplanned." However there would be a concern with long-term economic planning. Immediate policy would be based on conceptions similar to the ones of the Sumitro Plan and would concern itself with relieving the bad condition of the domestic textile industry, encouraging entrepreneurial activity in the provinces--with emphasis first on Sumatra and the Moluccas--and stimulating rice production to eliminate the need for expensive rice imports. The government would take steps to decrease expenditure for consumption purposes. With the financial situation as it was, Wilopo said it "certainly could not draw up any ambitious economic program." He stated that it would draw up a statement on conditions for foreign investment in the country.

The manner in which the new government would attempt to meet the situation created by the decline in export prices was to be its sternest test. The decline in the country's earnings presented it with a problem whose political implications were all too direct. In view of this it is interesting to note the retrenchment which it introduced immediately upon assumption of office. Wilopo stated to parliament that whereas his cabinet would not reverse the policy of the Sukiman cabinet of raising the basic salaries of civil servants by 20% as from May 1, it would discontinue the recently introduced scheme of rice distribution for civil servants and would not give bonuses for the Moslem festival of Lebaran in June. A number of demonstrative decisions such as the one not to implement the increases in salaries and allowances of ministers and departmental heads, which had been decided on by the Sukiman cabinet, set the tone for a new austerity and severe retrenchments in government spending.

Having put forward his policy Wilopo, on June 19, told parliament that "the government will continue in its work--unless parliament thinks differently." Thus he did not ask directly for a vote of confidence. A motion giving the cabinet "an opportunity to work" was passed on the same day by 125 votes to 5. (48)

opment and by the optimism created by the buoyancy of revenue at the time of the Korea boom. See Economic Report of Asia and the Far East 1953, ECAFE, Bangkok, 1954, p. 76.

- (48) Only the Partai Murba and S.K.I. were opposed but the Progressive Fraction, P.R.N., P.I.R., the Democratic Fraction, a number of independents and several individual members of Masjumi abstained from voting. See Sajuti Melik, Mimbar Indonesia (weekly), June 28, 1952. A Progressive-Murba motion asking that a vote should be taken on the issue of confidence had been defeated immediately before.

CHAPTER IV

COMMUNISM AND NATIONALISM

One of the most significant political changes of the Wilopo cabinet period was the change in relationships between the Communist Party and nationalist parties. It was in this period that the P.K.I. came to withhold emphasis from the more radical aspects of its program, gave support to the government and succeeded in drawing the P.N.I. and other nationalist parties into alliance with itself.

The Communist Party had stood in outright opposition to the Hatta, Natsir and Sukiman cabinets. It had strongly and consistently attacked every one of these as reactionary governments and instruments of imperialism, and sometimes as fascist. At the same time it had made little attempt to associate itself with the symbols of the nationalist revolution. It is unlikely that it overestimated its strength so greatly as to have been preparing for an early uprising against the nationalist regime--as the Sukiman government alleged at the time of its mass arrest of Communists and others in August 1951. But the emphasis of its work was on weakening the economy and intensifying anti-government feeling. It did not at this stage attempt the other strategy open to it, that of appealing to commonly shared nationalist symbols, according the government limited support and working with some government parties to divide these from the other more positively anti-Communist parties of the government group.

In terms of the P.K.I.'s own writing of this period of history the fundamental change in its strategy came at the January 1951 meeting of the party's Central Committee at which the Aidit group captured the leadership of the party. P.K.I. statements of the subsequent period stress that it was then that the party began to implement the National Unity Front policy--a policy which had been accepted in August 1948, after the return of the veteran P.K.I. leader Muso from Moscow, but betrayed by the Tan Ling Djie leadership in the period after Muso's death in the Madiun uprising.

Indeed a number of crucial changes date back to January 1951. It was within three months of the change of P.K.I. leadership that the first indications appeared of the possibility of cooperation with the P.N.I. against the Masjumi. The P.K.I. gave vociferous support to the attempts of the P.N.I. to overthrow the Masjumi-led cabinet of Mohammad Natsir. When the Natsir cabinet fell on February 20, 1951, the Communist Party took immediate steps to create the basis for a new cabinet excluding the Masjumi.

Thus on February 27 the inaugural meeting was held of what was soon to become the B.P.P. (Badan Permusjawaratan Partai-Partai, Consultative Body of Political Parties), a loose association of parties established on the basis of a Common Program, and for a short time it seemed that this would form the basis for Communist cooperation not only with such organizations as the splinter Moslem party P.S.I.I. and national-communist Murba Party but also with the P.N.I. This hope was dashed when the P.N.I. refused to join the B.P.P., and, with the establishment of the Masjumi-P.N.I. cabinet of Sukiman, the B.P.P. became largely inactive. (1) But the P.K.I. continued to emphasize the B.P.P. Common Program adopted on March 31 as its basis for cooperation with other parties in an anti-fascist National Unity Front. This program consisted mainly of policies of a broadly nationalist type--policies for a "truly independent foreign policy," freedom from the Round Table Conference agreement, a hastening of the return of West Irian to Indonesia, the lifting of the State of War and Siege and of limitations on freedom to strike, faster freeing of political prisoners, elections, nationalization of vital industries, industrialization, a "just distribution of land to the peasants," etc. (2)

In the following year the P.K.I.'s relations with the Murba Party improved considerably, and it gained the cooperation of the Socialist Party in parliamentary opposition to the Sukiman cabinet's mass arrests of August 1951. But no government party cooperated with it. Throughout this period the theoretical statements of the party bore the strong imprint of Mao Tse Tung's concept of four-class unity as between the workers, the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, emphasizing particularly the common anti-imperialist interests which the

- (1) The eleven members of this body at its inauguration on March 31, 1951, were the small Moslem parties P.S.I.I. and Perti (Pergerakan Tarbiyah Islam-ijah), the Labor Party, the national-communist Partai Murba, the minor left-wing groups Permai (Association of the Proletarian People of Indonesia) and Partai Tani Indonesia (Indonesian Peasants Party), the Communist Party and four nationalist parties, Partai Rakjat Nasional (National People's Party), Parindra (Greater Indonesia Party), Partai Rakjat Indonesia (Indonesian People's Party) and Parti Indo Nasional (Indo-Europeans' Nationalist Party). See Bintang Merah (Red Star), P.K.I., Djakarta, Vol. 7, No. 6-7, March 15 - April 1, 1951, p. 168. See this also for the B.P.P.'s Manifesto of Common Agreement and a Communist account of its formation.
- (2) Ibid., pp. 170-171. The P.K.I.'s own Program for a National Coalition Government, issued on March 28, was somewhat similar in tone, but contained more points of a more specifically Communist nature with regard particularly to American activities in Asia and the atom bomb, nationalization and implementation of the policy of "land for those who work it." Ibid., p. 166.

national bourgeoisie shared with the proletariat. (3) But the emphasis remained, as with Mao Tse Tung and Muso, on the hegemony of the Communists within the National Front.

After the mass raids of August 1951 the party withdrew its support of terrorist activity going on in mountain areas of East and Central Java. Its new Agrarian Program dated December 1951 was moderate and cautious in tone, no longer including demands for land distribution. (4) But other changes were still to come, changes of less significance in P.K.I. theory, but greater practical importance.

To trace the development of the new policy one must begin by looking at P.K.I. reactions to the onset of the new crisis caused by the fall of the Sukiman cabinet on February 23, 1952. Three days after the cabinet's fall the P.K.I. repeated the demand it had made eleven months earlier for a cabinet without the Masjumi. Its statement called for a "progressive anti-fascist National Coalition Government," and urged that the parties who had opposed the Sukiman cabinet should be considered for the formateurship. The same statement attacked the Masjumi for its alleged associations with the Darul Islam. This was a new charge which reflected the P.K.I.'s emphasis on its loyalty to the nationalist regime. On March 10 the party stated that it did not insist on People's Democracy immediately, but wanted "a cabinet based on the B.P.P., P.S.I. and P.N.I. with a concrete and bold program."

Throughout the cabinet formation period the Communist Party was active in demanding that the B.P.P. should be included in the new cabinet, and, more vehemently, that the Masjumi should be excluded. But when it became clear that Mr. Wilopo would form a cabinet of the type which did emerge, based on the P.N.I. and Masjumi and including, from the B.P.P. parties, only three men, all little amenable to Communist pressure, the party's Central Committee made an offer without precedent. It stated that it would support Wilopo's cabinet as long as it was "progressive and national," even if the P.K.I. was not included in it. In particular it stressed two demands relating to its own freedom of movement. One was for the freeing of all political prisoners, including those of the August raid, the other for the lifting of the State of War and Siege. (5) The terms on which it was now prepared to support a cabinet were clearly more minimal than in March 1951.

(3) Ruth T. McVey, The Development of the Indonesian Communist Party and its Relations with the Soviet Union and the Chinese People's Republic, Center for International Studies, M.I.T., Cambridge, 1954, p. 75.

(4) See Bintang Merah, Vol. 7, No. 16, December 1951.

(5) Harian Rakjat, March 26, 1952.

When the Wilopo cabinet had been formed the party's stated attitude was one of "wait and see." Ir. Sakirman, the party's parliamentary leader, gave it as his view that there were in the cabinet a number of individual men known as honest and sincere. From the point of view of the cabinet's program, he said, the P.K.I. was unable to support it. But it had the opportunity to prove itself on other scores, and so his party would watch the practical steps of the government to judge whether it was honest and capable.

In practice however the party's attitude was already more positive. Immediately after the cabinet's formation it began to instruct its followers in the requirements of the new situation. The party daily of April 8 reports the establishment of cadre courses whose task it was to "combat apathy and left deviation, by training cadres to an understanding of the Indonesian situation...of the role of the state...and of the program and methods of the National Front." (6) At the same time the party appears to have sought to assure the government of the conciliatoriness of its attitude. On April 29 it deputized the chairman of the Public Works Workers Union (and parliamentary leader of the P.K.I.), Ir. Sakirman, to go to Central Java to persuade his union members there to accept difficult terms in order to end a current strike against the autonomous agencies of this province. (7) Six days later the S.O.B.S.I.-affiliated oil workers union, Perbum, called off a threatened strike of 30,000 oil workers against two large oil companies.

There were signs in the cabinet's first month of office to suggest that the Communists' immediate demands would indeed be met. One such was the decision, announced on April 21, that the State of War and Siege would be gradually lifted. Another was that a number of prominent Communists would be released from gaol. Furthermore it was known that the government intended very soon to release large numbers of those detained under the State of War and Siege relations.

Another aspect of a shift in P.K.I. policy came to the fore first on May 20, National Awakening Day. This day was to commemorate the establishment of the first modern nationalist organization, Budi Utomo

- (6) Harian Rakjat, April 8. I am indebted to Miss Ruth T. McVey for drawing my attention to this report, as well as to a number of other aspects of the P.K.I.'s policy changes of this period.
- (7) Sin Po (Djakarta), April 29, 1952; Keng Po (Djakarta), May 3, 1952. The Sin Po report of April 29 referred to a S.O.B.S.I. order to stop all strikes in accordance with the new policy of supporting the cabinet, but the truth of this report was denied by S.O.B.S.I. on April 30. Some government persons believed this to have been a case of a deliberate "leak" to the press, intended to evince a higher degree of permissiveness on the part of the government with regard to P.K.I. May Day rallies.

(High Endeavor) in 1908, and was regarded, like all nationalist festival days, as the occasion for appeals for national unity. Significantly the Communist Party was able to secure an important place on the National Awakening Day committee and, probably, to influence the text of the "Joint Statement" which this committee urged all parties to sign. (8) This gained the support of 69 parties and organizations but not of the Masjumi, the P.S.I.I., the two Christian parties or the Socialists. Here was the first real success of the National Unity Front policy.

The Communist Party leadership explained a number of its policies at the celebration of the party's 32nd anniversary several days later. Speaking on this occasion, the Secretary-General of the party, D. N. Aidit, declared that it was the P.K.I.'s duty to "urge other parties--any who are prepared to and honest--to cooperate with the P.K.I. to support a national unity front, and unity fronts amongst various groups, workers, peasants, intellectuals, artists, women, young people, entrepreneurs and so on." (9) This was not radically new in itself, particularly as it was followed by a statement stressing the continued necessity, as under the old "united front from below" policy, to distinguish between, on the one hand the democratic and progressive members and lower functionaries of other parties, and on the other hand the higher leadership of these parties. But it was significant that the P.N.I. was not listed among the parties whose members and lower functionaries would have to be apprised of the shortcomings of their leaders. (10)

(8) The 69 organizations agreed to:

"1. Continue and perfect the efforts to forge unity of attitude, program and action, which were begun on May 20, 1948, also in facing the danger of a possible outbreak of a world war, which threatens the people and the state of Indonesia and which may lead to destruction, poverty, misery, and the annihilation of mankind;

"2. Express preparedness to work for the speedy realization of this aim, in order to

- a. implement democracy in all fields,
- b. achieve the people's welfare and social justice,
- c. annul all treaties with other countries which are detrimental to the people and state,
- d. bring West Irian back into the Republic of Indonesia;

"3. Express preparedness to work for the reconstruction of the nation forthwith, in the sense of fostering closest relations between the Army, the Police, and other apparatus of the state and the people, in order to overcome difficulties arising from within or without." Indonesian Affairs, Ministry of Information, Djakarta, April-May 1952.

(9) Menempuh Jalan Rakjat (Walking the Road of the People), Pembaruan, Djakarta, 1952, p. 9.

(10) The parties named were the P.S.I., Labor Party and Murba Party, and, in the third edition of the pamphlet published in August 1952, also the Masjumi. Op. cit., p. 14. Third edition, p. 22.

In the same speech Aidit placed great stress on cooperation with the national entrepreneurs and the middle peasantry. The national entrepreneurs, he said, like the proletariat, were suffering under imperialism. The P.K.I. was absolutely against their liquidation or nationalization of their capital, and set itself to defend their right of individual property. (11) Similarly the party sought the abolition of large landlordism in order to create a free peasants' community, a community of the middle peasantry, as an important condition for the development of a modern national economy.

At the same time the P.K.I. leader set a new tone for party statements about the earlier government by referring to it as the "Sukiman-Wibisono-Subardjo government," thereby emphasizing the Masjumi's strength in this cabinet and leaving unstated the fact that the P.N.I., the party of the national entrepreneurs by clear implication, shared responsibility in equal measure for its policies.

In subsequent statements of Aidit and others the National Unity Front was given a basis in terms of the history of the nationalist movement. Aidit quoted Ki Hadjar Dewantoro, "We have always won when we have been united," taking as examples various prewar and postwar federations of political parties which achieved success. (12)

At the same time the party came to be much more positive in its attitude to the cabinet. On July 28 Aidit stated that it supported the Wilopo cabinet, adding that this was because it gave it a better chance for political activities than other cabinets.

- (11) This emphasis is foreshadowed, but less specific, in the Central Committee resolution of March 1, 1952. Kewajiban Front Persatuan Buruh (The Duties of the Labor Unity Front), Pembaruan, Djakarta, 1952.

A Harian Rakjat editorial of April 7 went as far as to justify the existence of a differentiation in wage demands as between workers in modern foreign-owned industries and those in small Indonesian-owned ones, on the grounds that the former can afford to pay more.

It is not clear in any of this discussion of the national entrepreneurs whether the term includes Chinese employers of labor. In Indonesia as in other parts of South East Asia, Communist class analysis virtually ignores the peculiar position of the Chinese minority. See T. H. Rigby, The Soviet View of South East Asia, unpublished M.A. thesis, University of Melbourne, 1952.

- (12) Statement of the Central Committee of the P.K.I., Sin Po, August 16, 1952. Also D. N. Aidit, "Benarkah Front Persatuan Nasional 'taktik Moskow'?" (Is it true that the National Unity Front is a Moscow Tactic?), Pembela (The Defender), S.O.B.S.I., Djakarta, August 17, 1952.

Under the new policy none of the earlier slogans were entirely put aside. Communist-led unions continued their strike activities in a number of places. (13) But the emphasis in all of the party's work and the work of its unions was on nationalist symbols and slogans. Even such government slogans as "national upbuilding" were accepted. The official party attitude towards President Soekarno changed entirely. No longer was he termed a collaborator with the Japanese. No longer was he classified with Hatta, Sjahrir and Tan Malaka as a "false Marxist." No longer was his name associated with the policies of the Hatta, Natsir and Sukiman cabinets. (14) Communists and their sympathizers ceased their condemnations of the pomp of his palace and the large number of his cars. At meetings and rallies of the party his picture was displayed with those of Marx and Lenin. By contrast, there was no change in the attitude of the party to Vice-President Hatta.

More vehemently than ever before the party emphasized the national claim to Irian. Similarly it exploited every situation which could be used to intensify hostility towards Holland--such as the attempt made on May 21 by three followers of the Dutch adventurer Westerling to assassinate the Indonesian military attache in the Hague, Lieutenant-Colonel Harjono. Also from its newly assumed vantage point of identification with the symbols of the nationalist regime it could campaign effectively against the U.S.A. on the occasion of the visit of President Quirino of the Philippines in July; for a wide section of the Indonesian press regarded this visit as an attempt to influence Indonesia towards entering a Pacific equivalent of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. At the same time P.K.I. statements were placing much less emphasis on anti-American slogans of the type laid down by the Stockholm Peace Conference (and in many cases of little relevance to Indonesia).

The measure of the P.K.I.'s success in establishing its nationalist respectability could be seen from the fact that on August 17, the seventh anniversary of the proclamation of the Republic, the P.K.I. had positions of great influence in celebration committees throughout the archipelago. Just twelve months earlier the P.K.I. leaders had been arrested on the grounds that they were planning to overthrow the state!

- (13) One of the more serious of the strikes was that of the S.B.G., Sugar Workers Union, in July. The union went on strike against the decision of the Central Conciliation Commission to reject its claim for bonuses for the Lebaran festival.
- (14) For two examples of such charges in the preceding year see Njoto, "Pemalsuan Marxisme" (The Falsification of Marxism), Bintang Merah, Vol. 7, No. 1-2, p. 16, and "Bahaja Fasisme dan Kerdjasama dengan Partai-Partai" (The Fascist Danger and Cooperation with Other Parties), op. cit., Vol. 7, No. 11, p. 293.

The Communist Party had set off on an entirely new course in three important respects. Faced with a cabinet whose Prime Minister had included its arch-enemy, the Masjumi, as co-leader of his team, and refused to include Communists or Communist-supported persons in it, the party nevertheless decided to give this cabinet its support--and this involved not merely public proclamations but also the imposition of some degree of restraint on its supporting labor organizations. In addition it actively wooed the P.N.I., thus creating a National Unity Front alliance of a type which involved no insistence on Communist hegemony; similarly it sought to gain support from President Soekarno. Finally it infused a new type of nationalism into its propaganda, namely the nationalism of the existing regime.

The implications of this three-fold change were to become clear as the new policy worked itself out in the course of the next few years. However it may be fruitful to examine the causes of the change here, even if to do so entails arguing from evidence of a later period.

In the first place the Communist Party of early 1952 was very much concerned for its own freedom of movement. The arrests of August 1951 had apparently crippled much its organization. Its statements suggest that it was most anxious to emerge from the position of semi-illegality under which it had been placed by the Sukiman cabinet. Similarly it must have been concerned to minimize the possibility of a further wave of repression.

At the same time the party had been made conscious of its weakness. It was a very small party--with only 7,910 members in March 1952 according to the statistics it published later--and, according to its own statements, had little support among the peasantry. In the terms of Aidit's account of this period, given in October 1953, the P.K.I. needed to gain time in order to expand its membership, and had therefore to concentrate on cooperation with the national bourgeoisie, even to the extent of neglecting its work among the peasantry. (15)

In the second place the party hoped by the new policy to use and widen the existing divisions between the Masjumi on the one hand and the P.N.I. on the other. For it had become clear on the one hand that the policy of direct opposition to both of the main parties of the nationalist regime had brought disappointing results, and on the other hand that a new Left tendency, more specifically a new tendency towards cooperation with the P.K.I. rather than the Masjumi, existed in the P.N.I. (16) Wilopo himself, though shown by his formateurship not to be a representa-

(15) "Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia" (The Road to People's Democracy for Indonesia), Bintang Merah, Vol. 9, No. 9-10, pp. 460-61, 464-65.

tive of this tendency, had earned some Communist sympathy by his policies as Secretary-General of the Labor Ministry and was frequently praised in Communist publications as young and progressive. (17)

Later party theory described the change as resulting from a decline in the strength of the forces of reaction, which had created a balance favorable to the forces of democracy. Its success is ascribed in part to the implementation of the P.K.I.'s strategy decided upon as early as January 1951, of drawing the national bourgeoisie away from the comprador bourgeoisie and bringing the former back into the ranks of the anti-imperialist front, where it had stood in the years 1945-48. (18) However this is a case of back-dating the significant change, for the National Unity Front policy of 1952 was different from the policy of 1951, certainly in practice, but probably also in (Communist) theory. For there seems to have been no deviation before March 1952 from the Mao Tse-tung - Muso insistence that Communist hegemony must be maintained within the National Front. (19)

A third factor was the party's good name. To regain this had been of vital importance in the party's thinking since its abortive revolt at Madiun in 1948, when it had exposed itself to the charge of betraying the Republic's unity in the face of a probable imminent Dutch attack. The Aidit-Lukiman-Njoto group of the party had fought the Tan Ling Djie-

(16) It is not clear when the Communist leadership first recognized the possibility of gaining major support from a large section of the P.N.I., or how sudden or gradual the recognition was. Personal and family links may well have provided the machinery. Some Indonesian observers have pointed in this connection to Ir. Sakirman, chairman of the P.K.I.'s parliamentary fraction, who is a brother-in-law of the P.N.I. leader Mr. Sartono and had been a close associate of Soekarno and a number of men later to be prominent in the P.N.I. in the colonial and Japanese periods. Sakirman was to be promoted to membership of the P.K.I. Politbureau in October 1953, in what has been the only change in this body's membership since January 1951.

(17) E.g. Harian Rakjat, April 4, 1952; Pembela, July 15, 1952.

(18) "Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia," loc. cit., p. 464.

(19) It is in fact not clear whether the Aidit leadership of the party had always been prepared to cooperate in a National Unity Front which the P.K.I. could not dominate (and had not done so earlier because neither the P.N.I. nor any other important party was prepared for such cooperation and because the Sukiman cabinet was actively hostile to it), or whether on the contrary there was a change in theoretical orientation at some point between January 1951 and April-July 1952.

Alimin group on the issue of "liquidationism," that is on the latter group's demand that the party should work within other parties to overcome the stigma of Madiun. The liquidationist group had been defeated in January 1951, but the victorious Aidit group was left with the task of finding an answer to the problem. The new nationalist tactic was an attempt to achieve just this. Whereas the older foreign-trained leaders of the Tan Ling Djie-Alimin group had been concerned to prove the party's loyalty to democratic and parliamentary processes, the group of Aidit, Lukman and Njoto emphasized rather its loyalty to nationalism. All of them children of the Indonesian revolution, the new young leaders realized the power not only of nationalist symbols as such, but of the symbols of the nationalist revolution and the existing nationalist regime which was its heir. (20)

Finally there is some reason to believe that the Communist leaders saw their switch also in terms of a long-range policy of infiltrating the government. They could certainly hope to gain a degree of influence over it. This could conceivably become an effective weapon with which to prevent the execution by the existing regime of effective policies of economic development. Certainly it would increase American hostility to Indonesia. And it would lessen the likelihood of Indonesia being drawn into the U.S. military system. In the long run the P.K.I. could perhaps force an entry into cabinet.

Certainly the new policy involved risks. If too much emphasis came to be placed on good relations with the P.N.I. and other nationalist parties there was a danger that the distinctiveness of the party and its strict theoretical orientation would become submerged. Thus it could conceivably lose its position as the major focus of the forces of social radicalism. There were to be warnings later of the danger of "rightist deviationism which exaggerates the importance of the national bourgeoisie and underestimates the importance of leadership of the working class and the worker-peasant alliance," the danger of "the party losing its independence...(and) dissolving itself in the bourgeoisie." (21) Again there was the danger that the nationalists would achieve such strength as would enable them to turn against the Communists. But all of these risks seemed to be worth taking.

The fact that they were taken appears to find sufficient explanation in the four factors outlined above. It seems most unlikely that they were taken on the basis of Soviet directives. They certainly represent a change in National Front strategy, for which there was no basis in

(20) Officially there has been great loathness to admit the change in the party's attitude to nationalism. The important and striking change in the party's attitude to President Soekarno has never been admitted or explained.

(21) "Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia," op. cit., pp. 464-5.

contemporary Communist theory elsewhere. They pre-date the later Soviet tendency to woo Asian neutralism. There was no comparable change in the policy of any other South or South East Asian Communist Party at the same time. (22) And furthermore Soviet comment on Indonesia made at the time suggests that the P.K.I. was leading Moscow rather than following. Soviet comment was moving in the direction of greater appreciation of the force of Asian nationalism and of the possibility that neutralism could work to its advantage, but this was not incorporated as a major part of its approach to Asian problems until some time in 1953. (23) The indications are that the party's new policy was the product of an empirical assessment of the domestic political situation made by a group of party leaders who were confident of having Russian trust and confident also, perhaps on the basis of communication, of being able to maintain it with the adoption of the new policy.

But--and this is the more important and probably the more difficult question--why did the P.N.I. agree to cooperation with the Communists? How did it happen that a party which was a main beneficiary, perhaps the main beneficiary, of the regime established by the nationalist revolution, agreed to cooperate with a party pledged to the supplanting of this regime?

It was in fact some time before P.N.I.-P.K.I. cooperation became full-fledged. Throughout the period of the Wilopo cabinet it was only one section of the P.N.I. nationalists which pursued policies paralleling and supporting those of the Communists. Neither this section nor its strategy in relation to the Communists achieved clear dominance in the party till the period of the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet. Moreover the change in the P.N.I.'s policies came gradually. It is much more difficult to date than the change in Communist policy; for certain indications of the new P.N.I. strategy were evident in the party's actions as early as the end of 1950, and some manifestations of the old strategy could be seen as late as the beginning of 1955.

But a change there undoubtedly was, and a great part of its unfolding came in the fourteen months of the Wilopo cabinet. Indeed it was central to the change in political alignments which evolved in the period of this cabinet; and it had a role of primary importance in bringing about the political turbulence which frustrated and ultimately toppled the cabinet.

(22) Keng Po of November 7, 1952, drew a comparison with the policy of the Iranian party towards the government of Mossadeq, but this would appear to have been a case where immediate Russian interests were of much more importance, as compared with general revolutionary strategy, than in Indonesia.

(23) Here I am indebted entirely to Miss McVey and the thorough study she has made of the Soviet and international Communist press in this period.

The manifestations of the change were only beginning to be visible in the first few months of the Wilopo cabinet's existence. They came at various nationalist celebrations when the P.N.I. and P.K.I. worked together on a basis which excluded such parties as the Masjumi and the P.S.I. socialists. The change was seen in parallel statements made by P.N.I. and Communist spokesmen urging strong action against the Darul Islam, vigilance in the face of foreign subversive activities and determined retaliation against Dutch insults. The evidence was to become much stronger later, in the stands assumed by the two parties in the army crisis of October 1952, in a number of questions relating to the forthcoming elections, and, finally, on the issue of the continued existence of the Wilopo cabinet. Already from some time in mid-1952 however it was clear that a major and increasingly powerful section of the P.N.I. disapproved of the Wilopo cabinet's policies, opposed the type of compromise with the Masjumi (and P.S.I.) on which this cabinet was based, and moved in the direction of cooperation with the Communists against the Masjumi. How is this fact to be explained?

The simplest explanation given is in terms of Communist infiltration of the P.N.I. Indeed there were some Communist sympathizers in the P.N.I. leadership, men like Saleh Umar of the North Sumatra branch of the party, who was active in Peace Movement activities, and Ahen Erningpradja, who was a leader of the trade union federation S.O.B.S.I. In addition it is conceivable that some P.N.I. leaders, holding the then widespread view that the P.N.I. had no political future, had turned to the Communist Party and been directed to be its agents in the party in which they were prominent. But there is no evidence whatsoever to suggest that the influence of such men could have been of decisive importance. No party of the size of the P.N.I. could have been directed into a course which could not be justified in terms of its own interests. In fact infiltration is more difficult in a country whose political elite is as small as Indonesia's.

Much more important is the fact that P.N.I. cooperation with the Masjumi and P.S.I. as expressed in the policies of the Wilopo cabinet was not advancing the interests of the P.N.I. as a party. This was particularly clear as regards the army. For, as will become clear in the following chapter, the Wilopo cabinet pursued or sanctioned a vigorous policy of army reorganization confirming and strengthening the position of the top leaders of the army and the Defense Ministry, men who had frequently exercised power at the cabinet level and many of whom had P.S.I. sympathies and sought to restrict and counterbalance the political influence of President Soekarno. This caused a definite power shift away from the P.N.I.; the promotions and transfers implemented by Sultan Hamengku Buwono as Defense Minister in the Wilopo cabinet weakened the influence of P.N.I. sympathizers in the officer corps, and the demobilization policy which the Sultan proposed would probably have had a similar effect at lower levels had it been implemented by him.

Wilopo's policies threatened P.N.I. interests also inasmuch as they incorporated a fairly determined approach in the matter of the early holding of the long-promised nation-wide elections. Not only did the Wilopo cabinet act more quickly in this matter than had its predecessors--one of its first legislative actions was to introduce a bill for the registration of voters in July--but in addition the press and politically effective public opinion was more strongly in favor of early elections than it had been in the period of the Sukiman cabinet.

But most P.N.I. leaders believed that elections would lessen their power, unless it would have been possible to increase their party's vote-getting strength before they were held. Ever since Japanese occupation policy had effected a massive consolidation of the organized power of Islam in the villages of Indonesia, (24) non-religious nationalist leaders had been afraid of any contest with Moslem parties at the grass-roots level. Their fear at this time may be explained in part by reference to the results obtained by P.N.I. candidates in earlier local and regional elections. In regional elections held in a number of parts of Java in 1946, and in the closely watched 1951 elections in Jogjakarta, the P.N.I. had fared badly as compared with the Masjumi. (25) Only in the 1951 elections in the Christian and socially untypical areas of Minahasa and Sangihe-Talaud in Sulawesi had the P.N.I. emerged as the leading party. (26) For whatever reason, it is a fact that in 1952 P.N.I. leaders, like the leaders of most other political parties, believed that early elections would result in a Masjumi victory. Hence they favored a post-

(24) See H. J. Benda, "Indonesian Islam under the Japanese Occupation 1942-45," Pacific Affairs, December 1955.

(25) For instance the Masjumi had won 43 of the 80 elected seats on the Kediri residency council (July 11, 1946) and 104 of the 125 elected seats on the kabupaten councils in the residency of Solo (December 10, 1946). Neither of these two areas had been traditionally a center of Islamic influence. See Satu Tahun Badan Pembaharuan Susunan Komite Nasional Pusat, Djuli 1946 - Djuli 1947 (A Year's Activities of the Council to Renew the Composition of the Central National Committee, July 1946 - July 1947), Badan Pembaharuan Susunan, Jogjakarta, 1947.

In the Jogjakarta regional elections of August-October 1951 the Masjumi had gained 18 seats out of the 40 and the P.N.I. 4 seats. See Sekitar Pemilihan Umum di Djokjakarta (Concerning the Elections in Jogjakarta), Kementerian Penerangan (Ministry of Information), 1952, and Herbert Feith, "Elections in Jogjakarta," Australia's Neighbours (Australian Institute of International Affairs), November 1, 1951.

(26) The party had obtained 11 of the 15 seats in the Sangir-Talaud regional elections of May 15, and 13 of the 25 seats in the elections for the Minahasa regional council of July 14.

ponement. Thus it was that until the Wilopo cabinet's formation the P.N.I. had continued to press for regional legislative councils to be established on an interim appointive basis (but different from that of the ill-fated Regulation 39 of 1950 over which the Natsir cabinet had fallen), whereas the Masjumi was advocating regional elections. There is no public statement from a P.N.I. spokesman suggesting that the party favored postponement of parliamentary elections--as there is from a spokesman of P.I.R. (27)--but the point is nevertheless clear. To those P.N.I. leaders whose principal concern was the power of the party there can have been little virtue in a cabinet which worked for early elections at the same time as affording no opportunities to the party for any rapid enhancement of its grassroots vote-getting strength.

A somewhat similar picture will emerge when we examine the Wilopo cabinet's economic policies. Faced with the highly adverse balance of payments situation which resulted from the post-Korea slump in world prices for raw materials, the cabinet had to initiate sharp retrenchments in spending. It decided to do this by means of budget, credit and import policies which placed the burden principally on the social groups most closely associated with the P.N.I., on the new group of native Indonesian importers and bankers, on civil servants and, generally, on the people of the cities.

To many P.N.I. leaders therefore, the Wilopo cabinet appeared to be a cabinet established on the terms of the Masjumi (and the P.S.I.). As dissatisfaction with the cabinet grew, so also did the inclination to abandon cooperation with the Masjumi, or at least to make use of the possibility of cooperation with other parties, and particularly the P.K.I., as leverage to achieve better terms in the relationship with the Masjumi.

For any party, and certainly for the P.N.I., led largely by men with a love of the political game for its own sake, there is great importance in the mechanics of its power position. In relation to the Masjumi and the Communists, the P.N.I. occupied a balance position. The terms of its cooperation with either of these parties would be favorable to the extent that it left the possibility open that it would cooperate with the other instead. It was in fact not new for the P.N.I. to use its position in such a way that the Masjumi had reason to fear that it would work with the P.K.I. In the cabinet crisis which followed the fall of the Natsir government, the party had associated itself with the initial Communist-sponsored moves to establish the B.P.P. (Consultative Council of Political Parties), thereby strengthening its position in the bargaining with the Masjumi which determined the political basis and composition of the Sukiman cabinet. Similarly when the Sukiman cabinet fell, the P.N.I.

(27) A. R. Djokoprawiro, deputy leader of P.I.R. in parliament, said that his party would work for the postponement of elections until the situation of the supporters of the Pantja Sila was stronger. Sin Po (Jakarta), April 19, 1952.

chairman, Sidik, had stated that the P.N.I. was prepared to form a cabinet without the Masjumi. (28)

It would appear however that in 1952 the Sidik group of the party decided on a much more thorough exploration of the possibilities of cooperation with the Communists. It is not clear whether any of the main leaders of the party actually determined at this stage to work towards a situation such as they achieved in the period of the Ali Sastro-amidjojo cabinet, where a P.N.I.-led government was able to govern despite Masjumi opposition, partly because of Communist support. But, granted that the P.N.I. was always in a position to force the Wilopo cabinet to resign, and came close to doing so in the height of the army crisis in October, one must assume that this possibility was at least seriously considered. In any event it is clear that a section of the P.N.I. leadership was henceforth prepared to assist in a strengthening of the P.K.I.'s position, and in particular to help the party regain nationalist respectability. For these men the P.K.I. represented no immediate threat to the P.N.I.; from its own actions and statements it was clearly weak. The Masjumi on the other hand was both strong and an immediate danger. To strengthen the P.K.I. and weaken the Masjumi was demanded by the very mechanics of the P.N.I.'s power position.

In this connection it is necessary to understand the strength of P.N.I. fears of the Masjumi. Many P.N.I. leaders, viewing the political situation as it existed in mid-1952, were overawed by the power of Islam. The results of the 1955 elections suggest that they probably exaggerated its grassroots strength. They certainly had no realization at this time of the significance of the Nahdatul Ulama's secession from the Masjumi which had just occurred. But they were correct in assessing that the Masjumi had incomparably greater grassroots organization and power than they did.

Demagogic appeals to Islamic mass feeling--such as were made with great frequency in the second half of the Wilopo cabinet period by the Masjumi leader, Kiai Isa Anshary--were particularly abhorrent to the P.N.I. leaders, and appeared to them to be almost as dangerous to their class position as Communist social radicalism. And they were alarmed by the continued strength and confidence of the Darul Islam, in their eyes the illegal wing of the Masjumi. (29) So they believed Islam to be a

(28) Quoted by Harian Rakjat, March 13, 1952.

(29) One sign of this was the fact which became known in May 1952 that Kahar Muzakar, the hitherto reputedly Murba-sympathizing leader of the rebels in South Sulawesi, had seen fit three months earlier to have himself appointed a regional commander of the Darul Islam army under Kartosuwirjo (and actually persecuted Christians in areas under his control, thereby causing the defection of many of the Christians among his own followers). A similar sign was the series

major challenge to their power. As they saw it they had led the nationalist revolution; now they were to be supplanted from the places of privilege which this leadership had secured them.

Nor was this an issue merely between two political parties. It had its roots in socio-religious cleavage. The P.N.I. was and is predominantly a party of the Javanese. Most of its leaders are members of the ethnic group of Javanese, of East and Central Java, and the party was to obtain 65.5% of its national vote from these two provinces in the parliamentary elections of 1955. In East and Central Java, the social division between the aristocracy and indigenous traders has long been deep. The effect of economic and social change in the last 125 years has been to sharpen the division, cast it in religious terms and project it deeply into village society. Thus there has developed a situation of vertical social and religious cleavage, running from city to village, as between the santri, serious and orthodox Moslem, and the abangan and priajai, nominal Moslems, who however hold strict Islam in contempt, and whose real beliefs and religious practices are those of the Islam-tinged predominantly Hindu and animist "Javanese religion." (30)

This cleavage was an important aspect of the politics of the nationalist movement in the prewar period. It was given particularly clear organizational expression in the period of the Japanese occupation, when mass political organizations were established separately on Islamic and (secular) nationalist lines. Finally, with the rapid efflorescence of political activity in the years of revolution, bitter struggles took place at the village level between santri and abangan parties. The intense violence which characterized both sides in the abortive Communist revolt at Madiun in 1948 was in large part an expression of inter-village and intra-village hatreds built up over a long period on the basis of the santri-abangan cleavage. (31)

of approaches to foreign embassies in Djakarta which Darul Islam envoys made in September 1952. It was widely believed that Darul Islam expected to receive U.S. backing in the event of the outbreak of World War II. See "Gangguan Keamanan di Indonesia" (Security Disturbances in Indonesia) in Mimbar Penerangan (Information Forum), Ministry of Information, May-June 1953.

- (30) The term "priajai" denotes aristocracy, the term "abangan" commoners. The antithesis is brilliantly characterized by Clifford Geertz in "Religious Belief and Economic Behaviour in a Central Javanese Town: Some Preliminary Considerations," Economic Development and Cultural Change, Vol. IV, No. 2, pp. 134-158. See also Robert R. Jay, Santri and Abangan, Religious Schism in Rural Central Java, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University, 1957.

- (31) Jay, op. cit., pp. 201-203, 204 ff.

Thus the Javanese leaders of the P.N.I. were afraid of Islam for reasons which were religious and social as well as political. Thus they were particularly afraid of the radically reformist Islam of the Muhammadiyah, the organization whose religious and cultural orientation was least capable of compromise with the abangan-priajai tradition, and which was increasingly powerful inside the Masjumi with the rise of Natsir in the party. (32) For the same reasons they were not altogether hostile to Communism. As representatives of a vestigial aristocracy they certainly had reason to fear a movement which could stimulate and organize village social radicalism. The horizontal cleavages of Javanese society spoke strongly against a P.N.I.-Communist alliance. But there was also the factor of the vertical cleavage between santri and priajai-abangan. Javanese Communism is essentially an abangan phenomenon. (33) To the extent that the Javanese P.N.I. leaders thought and felt in terms of the socio-religious antithesis between santri and abangan they were prepared to cooperate with the Communists.

At another level the P.N.I.'s change to cooperation with the Communists may be seen in terms of the increasing necessity for the party to speak the language of nationalist (and quasi-socialist) radicalism. This indeed had always been the language of an important section of the party. A particularly radical formulation of the party's goals had been adopted by its congress of May 1950, and this continued to be formally binding on its leadership. (34) Indeed the P.N.I. leaders had an interest in constantly restimulating revolutionary nationalist sentiment; every shift away from the symbols of the revolution was for them a political loss.

But there was in fact little movement away from revolutionary nationalism. Political radicalism was called forth by the socio-economic situation--insecurity, lack of rapid economic progress and particularly

(32) The Natsir group's primacy of power in the Masjumi, furthered by the secession of the Nahdatul Ulama, was confirmed by the Masjumi congress of August 1952. This congress adopted an organization change which involved the abolition of the system of legislative and executive councils, and in the one "executive council" established, Moh. Natsir was elected chairman and Dr. Sukiman first vice-chairman. The Natsir group was subsequently able to secure a majority on the council on most issues.

(33) Clifford Geertz, The Social Context of Economic Change, An Indonesian Case Study, Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1956, pp. 134 ff. Also Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1957, pp. 31-33, 82-87.

(34) Among the decisions of this conference, held at Jogjakarta, was the demand for the creation of an Anti-Capitalist Bloc.

the existence of a great number of revolutionary fighters who were still jobless--and it continued to find expression mainly through nationalist channels. One contributory factor here was the fact that Holland was assuming a more and more strongly anti-Indonesian position at this time, and specifically inaugurating a new policy of refusing to negotiate on the question of sovereignty over West Irian. There was then pressure on every party to speak and act in the terms of radical nationalism. For the P.N.I. this took the form of pressure against the moderate politics of the Socialist-sympathizing Wilopo group and the more conservative Sartono-Ali Sastroamidjojo group, and in favor of the radically nationalist "oppositionist" group of Sidik Djojokusarto, which was the forerunner in the move to closer association with the Communists.

Finally one must consider the important factor of the role of President Soekarno. The President's political viewpoint appears to have changed in 1952 in a manner almost exactly paralleling the change in the stand of the P.N.I. Thus there are clear signs of his opposition to the Wilopo cabinet, beginning at the time of its installation and growing, and becoming increasingly public, with the onset of the army crisis. Whereas his speeches in the period of the Sukiman cabinet had emphasized the necessity of the people working hard, there was little of this in what he said in the Wilopo period. Instead he now placed added stress on the need to complete the national revolution. On November 10, 1952, he attacked "those who act as if the national revolution were completed... who don't mention the words 'national revolution' any more." At the same time he called for a tougher stand in the struggle for West Irian: "Let the history of our as yet incomplete national revolution speak its own language." (35) And on the Communist issue itself the change was specific. As late as May 20 the President had urged caution as regards the Communists' role as advocates of national unity, "lest one party not be sincere in its concern for national unity and cause another Madiun affair." (36) But this emphasis was not continued.

The President had certain personal reasons to feel antagonistic towards the Wilopo cabinet. The cabinet contained a number of the men with whom he had come into conflict in the period of the Natsir cabinet, and it indicated as soon as it had taken office that it would insist as the Natsir cabinet had (and the Sukiman cabinet had not) on a sharp limitation of the President's prerogatives. The matter came to the fore at the very beginning of the Wilopo cabinet's period of office when the cabinet obliged the President to cancel arrangements made by him, and the

(35) Text of Speech of the President of the Republic of Indonesia on Heroes Day, November 10, 1952, at Surabaya, Ministry of Information, Jakarta, 1952.

(36) Quoted in Sajuti Melik, "Sekitar Pernyataan Bersama" (Concerning the Joint Statement), Mimbar Indonesia (weekly), Jakarta, May 31, 1952.

ex-Foreign Minister, Mr. Subardjo, for a presidential visit to Italy. The cabinet was to remain consistent in its attitude towards presidential powers. It limited the number of occasions on which the President was able to deliver speeches and reduced the budget allocations made for the Cabinet (Office) of the President. (37)

President Soekarno had long been hostile to the Socialist Party and to the politically allied "younger generation" groups in other parties. The Wilopo cabinet represented these very groups, and, as a team it was both internally united and impatient to get ahead with the implementation of its policies. Furthermore a number of these policies were in diametrical opposition to the President's own interests as an independent center of political power. This was particularly true of the changes which the cabinet was making inside the army. But it applied also to its policy for early elections; these would be a threat to Soekarno's position inasmuch as they resulted in a victory for the Masjumi, now dominated by Natsir.

In considerable measure then the President's interests ran parallel to those of the Sidik group of the P.N.I. To the extent that the Sukiman group no longer wielded major power in the Masjumi, the President's political associations were more and more heavily concentrated in the P.N.I. Also it was to this party that he was closest in terms of cultural and religious orientations. He was and is, culturally, a prija. And it was with the P.N.I. leaders that he had his closest personal associations--particularly with the men of what we have called the Sartono-Ali Sastroamidjojo group but also with some of those of the Sidik group of leaders of the party.

One can do little more than speculate as to the effect on the P.N.I. of President Soekarno's changing orientation. The President and the P.N.I. had always been mutually inter-dependent and they were so in greater measure now. It is extremely difficult, therefore, to know whether this change was the cause or the effect of the change in the P.N.I. Very possibly it was both. Some observers, both Indonesian and foreign, who maintain that President Soekarno has played a deus ex machina role throughout the post-revolutionary period, have argued that Soekarno was the initiator of the change. He may have been, if any one man was. It may be that his personal intervention brought the men of the Sartono-Ali Sastroamidjojo group of the P.N.I. leadership to accept the standpoint of the Sidik group on the new strategy. But certainly the change could not have been implemented had it not accorded with the interests of the party, or for that matter of the Sartono group of the party. Probably the greatest importance of President Soekarno lay in the confidence which he gave the P.N.I. leaders that they could always hold the balance against the Communist Party, even if it had become much

(37) See "Pengeluaran untuk Presidenan" (Expenses for the Presidency), Waktu (weekly), Medan, December 20, 1954.

expanded. They could out-maneuver the Communists, the P.N.I. leaders believed, as long as the President stood with them--and they had no doubt that he would side with them in any showdown with the Communists.

The P.N.I. leaders were aware that they were taking risks in supporting the growth of P.K.I. strength. They had not forgotten the Communists' attempt to seize power at Madiun four years earlier--although indeed their resentment of this was modified by the abangan-prija identification which focused their attention on the cruelties which Masjumi supporters had inflicted on the revolvers at that time, and by the Masjumi's success in making political capital out of the affair. There is no doubt that they saw the danger of the P.K.I. to their interests, as a party of the vestigial aristocracy and of a nascent bureaucratic capitalism. (38) Yet they entered the association. First a minority and later a majority of the leaders of the party came to see its certain and immediate advantages as outweighing its possible dangers. To most of them it was a short-term tactic, to last for only a few months, or only until the elections. Naiveté, an underestimation of the differences between the Communists and other parties, a faith in Indonesia as somehow unique, and a tendency to exaggerate the importance of nationalist and religious sentiments as forces making her immune to Communist overthrow--these factors were operative among some of the party's leaders. For the rest the association was a calculated risk.

(38) Communist rule naturally appears a less frightening possibility to groups like these, closely related to the bureaucracy, than it does to independent business groups, such as tended to give support to the Masjumi.

CHAPTER V

THE STORM IN THE ARMY

The "October 17 Affair" which climaxed three months of deepening political crisis, was the most momentous development of the Wilopo cabinet period. It was of crucial importance for the cabinet's power to effect its policy goals. It sharply accentuated the incipient tendencies for change in political alignments. It occupies a place of key importance in the history of parliamentary institutions in Indonesia and the attempt to confine political struggle to them. Finally it illuminates a number of the key problems involved in the effort to create and maintain a unified structure of government in the context of archipelago geography and revolutionary history.

But if we are to understand the October 17 affair we must look first at certain background factors, particularly ones having their roots in the country's economic situation. "By the middle of 1952," Professor Higgins has written, "it was clear to the fiscal authorities in Indonesia that the country was facing a first-class financial crisis." (1) The first major series of price falls for her exports occurred in the second quarter of 1952. The price of Indonesia's main export product, rubber, which had been 2.60 Straits dollars per pound in February 1951, had fallen to 73 Straits dollar cents by the end of September 1952. (2) The level of physical exports was fairly well maintained in 1952, but the receipts which accrued from them were alarmingly low. The country's general terms of trade index fell in 1952 to 77% of what it had been in 1951 (approximately 76% of what it had been in 1938). (3) To make matters worse the rice crop was disappointingly low; there had to be an increase in the already large expenditures on imported rice. The consequences of all this were a dangerously large unfavorable balance of payments, a rapid drain on gold and foreign exchange reserves and sharp falls in government revenues.

- (1) Benjamin Higgins, Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development, I.P.R., New York, 1957, p. 2.
- (2) Report of the Java Bank 1952-3, Djakarta, 1953, p. 160. These figures are for No. 1 ribbed smoked sheets.
- (3) Monetary Research Section, Ministry of Finance, "Economic Review of 1952 and Outlook for 1953," in Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia (Economics and Finance in Indonesia), May 1953; Report of the Java Bank 1952-3, p. 105.

Here then was a fiscal and economic problem with immediate political implications. (4) The Korean war boom had tided the country over many of the difficulties of the immediate post-independence situation. Although the period between the middle of 1950 and the beginning of 1952 had provided no general rise in levels of living, it had made revenues buoyant in a number of sectors of the economy. It had made it possible for the government to meet rehabilitation expenses and initiate a number of development plans, to dispense patronage fairly generously (among other ways by a generous policy of admissions to the civil service), to finance the entry of a number of members of the political elite into business, particularly importing, and still to maintain a budget surplus in 1951 of R1.3 billion. Henceforth this would be impossible. The slump made it necessary for the government to make painful choices between alternative ways of allocating its truncated resources. What was to be its system of priorities? Was developmental investment to be the chief victim of retrenchments? Was financing to be from large budget deficits, at the expense of a rapid inflation which would make havoc of all developmental planning? Or would the economies be at the expense of patronage? Would they come in the form of a rationalization of the bureaucracy? Would the burden be passed on to the new bureaucratic capitalists, with a deemphasis of the policy of Indonesianization of business?

The economics-minded cabinet of Wilopo decided that development would not be allowed to suffer. Work would go ahead on the scale planned in the developmental enterprises which the government had undertaken to support. Again inflation financing would not be permitted. A small budget deficit was allowable in the view of the Finance Minister, Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, but a serious effort had to be made to balance the budget as early as possible.

To bring about an improvement in the balance of payments situation, the cabinet concentrated on stimulating exports. Soon after its accession to office it decided to lower export duties and to cheapen and finally abolish the "dollar exchange certificates" which its predecessor had introduced as a device to raise revenue at the expense of export goods whose market position was strong. To stimulate domestic production the Wilopo cabinet introduced tax reductions, particularly for the lower income brackets, and raised the ceilings for property values free from property tax.

But these measures merely aggravated the problem of the budget. And they were not adequate in themselves to solving the balance of pay-

- (4) For a full and highly stimulating discussion of this problem in a wider economic and political context see the forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation of the University of California (Berkeley) by Hans O. Schmitt, The Economics of Social Conflict in Indonesia, 1950-57.

ments crisis. Other far less popular measures were required, in particular import restrictions. Thus the government introduced a system of surcharges and advance payments for importers. By the regulations of August 12, surcharges of 100% were placed on such items as watches, linen, drill, men's and women's clothing, shoes, stationery, cheese, etc. and surcharges of 200% on such items as ice-chests, car radios, and various jewelry items and toys. The aim was to reduce the demand for relatively non-essential imports, and secondarily to raise revenue for the government. The total economic impact of these measures was limited, as 86% of the value of imports remained on the free list. But its political impact must have been considerable as suggested by the considerable rise in the cost of living for the high and middle income groups, much of which is directly traceable to these regulations. (5)

As for the importers themselves they were hit particularly hard by the requirement introduced on August 28, that they should submit a 40% prepayment of the total value of their imports at the time of receiving an import license. They were affected adversely too by the allocation system for imports introduced on September 1, whereby direct control was established over total expenditure of foreign currency for imports. Naturally it was the small, less well-established and financially weaker import enterprises which suffered most from this series of regulations, and among these were many if not most of the national Indonesian firms who had recently entered the field on the basis of government assistance. Thus the cabinet had placed the main burden of retrenchments on middle and upper income city-dwellers and importers, particularly national importers. This fact had significant political consequences.

But, equally important, the burden of the slump was to be borne by the government service. The Wilopo cabinet's policy called for an elimination of many forms of patronage, for strict budget planning and careful supervision of all spending by government departments, and, most controversial of all, for rationalization of military, and later perhaps civil, personnel. Something has been said already of the austerity measures taken by the Wilopo government in its first months of office. These were followed by a number of similar steps, each implemented in such a way as to educate the newspaper reading (and radio-listening) public to the gravity of the country's position. Thus, after a solemn radio address by the Finance Minister on September 10, the

- (5) The Java Bank's cost of living index for Djakarta shows that whereas the cost of living for office workers on low incomes remained practically stationary in 1952--largely as a result of government policies of stabilizing foodstuffs prices--the figure for workers of the middle and high income group showed a rise of between 6% and 9%, the greatest part of which occurred directly after the import regulations of August. See Report of the Java Bank, 1952-53, p. 127

government enacted a regulation radically restricting the use of motor vehicles by government officials, and making it impossible for them to be used outside office hours. (6) Government expenditure abroad, on delegations to international conferences and on foreign missions, was subjected to severe economies. The number of those who went from Indonesia to the 1952 meeting of the U.N. General Assembly was four, compared with the 21 who had left the country for the meeting of 1951.

With the various ministries operating almost as independent business enterprises and the implications of the slump as yet only dimly appreciated, it was difficult to establish systematic limitations on government spending immediately. However a "freeze" was imposed on the spending of various ministries and a new system was introduced whereby expenditures above a certain minimum would require the approval of the budgetary control section of the Ministry of Finance. (7) At the same time every effort was made to construct a budget for 1953 which would minimize deficit spending. In November the government presented the 1953 budget to parliament, along with the 1952 one, in what was the first (and at the time of writing the last) time that an Indonesian budget was presented to parliament before it came into effect. Allowing the existence of a deficit of R. 1.8 billion, the 1953 budget nevertheless called for a reduction in government outlays from R. 17.6 billion to R. 13.2 billion.

If government spending was not to be reduced at the point of capital outlays--roadbuilding machinery, schools, military equipment, etc.--the reduction would have to come, in part at least, from the very large salaries bill. (8) Accordingly the Finance Minister urged, as those responsible for economic policy had in the period of the previous two cabinets, for a reduction of military and bureaucratic personnel. According to Professor Higgins, who acted as a U.N. adviser to the Ministry of Finance at the time, it was expected in this Ministry that the re-

(6) For an English text of the radio address see Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Facing the Situation, Ministry of Information, Djakarta, 1952. The words "For Public Use" were painted on the cars of all except ministers and department heads. Roeslan Abdulgani, Secretary-General of the Ministry of Information estimated on March 3, 1953, that the result of the regulations in their first year, in Djakarta alone, would be a saving of Rp. 131.8 million. Fungsi Penerangan di Indonesia, p. 140.

(7) Higgins, op. cit., p. 6.

(8) As it was public service salaries amounted to 52% of total government revenues in 1953. See Herbert Feith, "Some Problems of Government Administration in Indonesia," Australia's Neighbours (Melbourne), November 1954.

trenchments of the 1953 budget would require the retirement of 60,000 civil servants, 60,000 soldiers and 30,000 policemen. (9) With regard to civil service personnel no action was taken--except for the issuing of a strongly worded instruction forbidding the acceptance of new employees other than ones with special qualifications. But the government did act speedily to begin the retirement of soldiers, and in implementing its policy in this field it soon found itself confronted with the formidable power of the groups its policies had defied. The challenge to its military policies was in an important sense a challenge to all its policies, and in particular to the policies it adopted in the face of the balance of payments crisis.

But the challenge to the Wilopo cabinet's military policies was not merely the result of its plans for demobilization. These acquired crucial importance only in the context of already existing dissatisfactions and cleavages inside the army.

The army of the immediate post-revolutionary period was extremely heterogenous in composition. It contained a very small number of pre-war soldiers of the K.N.I.L. (Royal Netherlands Indies Army) who had espoused the revolutionary cause, and in some cases become high officers of the national army. It also contained some 23,000 men who had served in the K.N.I.L. and K.N.I.L.-linked forces in the revolutionary period and been selected for acceptance into the national army after December 1949. A much larger number were men who had been given elementary military training in the auxiliary army of Indonesians established by the Japanese, the PETA (Pembela Tanah Air, Defenders of the Fatherland), a force which had attained a strength of 120,000 men before the Japanese surrender. Finally a very large and highly heterogeneous group came into the revolutionary army directly. Most of these had had experience in one of the numerous types of mass organizations established by the Japanese in Java and Sumatra. Some were members of local bands gathered around a religious or dacoit-type leader of charismatic qualities, bands which were then incorporated into the army. On the other hand many were young University and secondary school students who joined the army in 1945 and quickly came to assume positions of leadership. During the revolution the army had been anything but a unified, disciplined force. Local commanders had been able to follow their own political and tactical ideas largely without interference from the central command, and the distinction between the army and independent guerrilla units had in practice been highly blurred. This is especially true of the more distant areas, particularly outside Java, where communications with the revolutionary capital of Jogjakarta were difficult.

For two and a half years the government had wrestled with the task of making this heterogeneous body into the unified army of a modern national state. It had had considerable success, thanks in part to the

(9) Higgins, op. cit., p. 10.

vigorous, coordinated and highly capable leadership of the Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Colonel (later Major-General) T. B. Simatupang, the Army Chief of Staff Colonel A. H. Nasution and the Secretary-General of the Defense Ministry Mr. Ali Budiardjo. In 1952 the army was smaller and very much better integrated and disciplined than in 1950, and a variety of training schemes had been set in motion, some using personnel from the Netherlands Military Mission. The central army command still occasionally met obstruction when it sought to investigate the expenditures of divisional and regimental commanders, but its power to impose its will on them was incomparably greater than it had been.

But the reorganization had been highly unpopular in many sections of the army. Many bapakist (literally "father-ist") local leaders, who had been given high rank in the revolution in order to bring about the incorporation of their units in the army, were now demoted. (10) Others had been transferred from areas where their influence was established. Others again had been separated from their troops, their anak buah ("children") and so deprived of their source of power. The new military techniques placed Japanese-trained officers at a disadvantage. The new training schemes penalized those without basic formal education. Semangat, the dynamic ardor which the Japanese had fomented and which had stood the Republic in such good stead in the revolution, was now accorded less and less value. Bapakism and local political influence were henceforth as much a liability as an asset. Charisma was ceding ground to bureaucracy. The intellectuals were gaining at the expense of the mass leaders.

Now this process was to be carried considerably further. It had the full support of Sultan Hamengku Buwono, who indeed had been one of its principal initiators in his period as Defense Minister in 1950. And it was to be combined with large-scale demobilization. Since late in 1951 government policy had called for the eventual institution of compulsory military service. To make this possible, it was argued, it would be necessary to transform the existing army into a highly trained "core" army. (11) But now the budgetary situation of the country necessitated

(10) Bapakism, a key word in Indonesian political vocabulary, denotes a relationship of intense mutual loyalty between a leader and his followers. The bapak (father) is assured of the support of his anak buah (children) for whatever political action he may take; at the same time he has far-reaching responsibilities for their welfare and accords them protection against all parties, including, if need be, the law.

(11) This was a policy which had been approved by the Sukiman cabinet. See letter of Defense Minister Sewaka to Colonel Nasution, December 22, 1951, in Risalah Perundangan D.P.R. (Parliamentary Records), October 1, 1952.

that this be done immediately.

In 1952 the army had received a budget allocation of Rp. 2,625 million, and the navy and air force together Rp. 1,075 million. Altogether this represented 28% of the budget. Seventy five percent of it was being spent on wages and welfare services, leaving only 25% for the purchase of supplies and the cost of operations. Even so the amount per head for soldiers was considerably less than for members of the police force and very much less than had been spent in K.N.I.L. (Royal Netherlands Indies Army). (12) And the 1953 budget, it was estimated, would give the army only approximately Rp. 1900 million. The army leaders would have to act quickly if budget cuts were not to force them to do without new supplies entirely so they decided that by the end of the year a beginning would be made with the gradual demobilization of 80,000 of the army's 200,000 men. Approximately 40,000 of these would be soldiers asking to leave or ready to be pensioned off, but another 40,000--an earlier government figure had been 60,000--would be those unable to fulfill physical and health requirements, and those of whom it could be proved that they possessed "unsoldierly characteristics." (13)

This was certainly disquieting for those who expected to be discharged, despite the government's plans for generous financial assistance to such persons; for, not only did military work bear high prestige, but, in addition, it would be extremely difficult for many old soldiers to find alternative employment. As far as the army itself was concerned the scheme would undoubtedly result in a further improvement in the position of those with technical and administrative skills and a further decline in the position of the bapakist revolutionary and their followers. The officers with prewar Dutch training and a revolutionary record--both Major-General Simatupang and Colonel Nasution belonged to this group--stood to gain. So did those who had entered the army as University and secondary school students. So also did some of the former K.N.I.L. troops who had been taken into the army after 1950. But rationalization would mean a further decline in the status and influence of many former officers and soldiers of the Japanese-sponsored PETA, and of others who had entered the revolutionary army directly and had little or no formal education.

But the bapakist revolutionary leaders and their followers--they were frequently spoken of as the PETA group (14)--had considerable

(12) See Statement of the Minister of Defense, Risalah Perundingan D.P.R. (Parliamentary Records), October 1, 1952.

(13) Ibid. Also A. H. Nasution, Tjatan sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia (Notes on Indonesian Military Policy), pp. 203 ff., 262-295, 316 ff.

(14) This is in fact a somewhat misleading term, in view of the fact that many former PETA men did adjust to the requirements of the reorganization and became its beneficiaries. However the group of those who could not adjust did justify their position in terms of the ideology of PETA. Many of them had been strongly imbued with the Japanese "Young Officer Group" view of the army as the soul of the nation.

political resources. They had close personal and political connections with the P.N.I. (particularly its Sidik group) and several smaller oppositionist parties. Some of them had equally close links with President Soekarno. It was through these associations that the internal conflict in the army was projected into the political community at large.

President Soekarno had long been critical of the policies being pursued in the army. Many of the personnel changes which the army leaders had effected in 1951 and the first half of 1952 had clearly lessened his influence within the army. On at least one occasion in 1952 he had intervened against the army leaders' personnel policy by refusing to sign a decree. This was in the case of the transfer to East Java of the North Sumatra territorial commander, Col. M. Simbolon. The man whom Simbolon was to replace, Colonel Bambang Sugeng, a senior officer closely associated with the President, was to be "exiled" to a military attacheship overseas. The President resented particularly the army leaders' decision to close down the Chandradimuka Military Academy at Bandung, a sort of ideological refresher school for army officers, where a number of his personal associates, men of the PETA group, occupied positions of leadership.

For some time before July 1952 the former head of the Chandradimuka Academy, Col Bambang Supeno, an old PETA officer from East Java and a distant relative of President Soekarno, had urged that Col. Nasution, the Chief of Staff of the Army, be replaced. He had approached the President to discuss this matter with him and had subsequently travelled in several parts of Indonesia collecting signatures of officers supporting Nasution's removal. To counteract this development the Armed Forces' Chief of Staff Major-General Simatupang called a meeting of territorial commanders and other high officers at his home on July 12. At this meeting, at which Col. Nasution was not present, Major-General Simatupang asked Col. Bambang Supeno to give an account of his activities. Tempers were aroused and before long Col. Supeno walked out.

On the following day Col. Bambang Supeno wrote a letter to the Defense Minister, the Prime Minister and the Defense Section of Parliament, declaring he no longer had faith in his superiors because these had swerved from the original goals of the revolutionary struggle. In addition he criticized a number of aspects of military policy, particularly personnel policy, educational policy, and the policy being pursued in relation to domestic insecurity. Four days later he was suspended from all duties by the Army Chief of Staff, Colonel Nasution.

At the same time the Defense Minister, Sultan Hamengku Buwono, with Major-General Simatupang and Col. Nasution, went personally to the President to discuss the issues with him. As a result of references to the President's own role in the Bambang Supeno affair the conversation became

heated, particularly between Soekarno and Simatupang, and the meeting finally ended without any agreement being reached. Subsequently Simatupang wrote a letter to cabinet explaining the position of the army leadership in terms of the violation of military discipline involved in Bambang Supeno's actions.

Meanwhile however the matter had been taken up by the Defense Section of Parliament and its chairman, the non-party member and strong critic of the leadership of the army, Zainul Baharuddin. As a result of the Defense Section's concern, a series of four plenary sessions were held--in secret--beginning July 28, to discuss "questions arising from the letter of Col. Bambang Supeno". Whatever was discussed in those sessions, it is clear that very great tension was created. The four secret sessions were followed by no less than 17 public ones. In the ten weeks before October 16 parliament gave a great part of its time and almost all of its attention to a debate which was the occasion for criticism of virtually every aspect, major and trivial, of the policies pursued by the army leaders and Wilopo's Minister of Defense.

One main target for the parliamentarians' attack was rationalization. A few days before the opening of the debate the Minister of Defense had submitted four bills to parliament which together represented the government's request for a mandate for its rationalization policy. (15) Parliament decided to defer debating these formally, but they were fully discussed in the context of the general debate. The critics of the army leadership argued that Indonesia could not in the near future fight anything but a guerrilla war. Therefore she needed an army close to the people. It was revolutionary morale and close association with the people which had given the army its victory over the Dutch; yet these were the very qualities which were being sacrificed as a result of the "westernizing" and "internationalizing" orientation of the army leaders. In addition demobilization was dangerous. If the discharged men were not given treatment commensurate with their revolutionary services, as the parliamentary critics feared, this might well drive them into association with rebel and bandit groups.

The same opposition to remodelling of the army on the basis of international military standards expressed itself in many other ways.

- (15) These were bills to lay down a basis for the recruitment of new volunteers, to regulate the legal position of members of the armed forces, to oblige temporary members of the armed forces to remain in them, and to establish a basis for retirement from the armed forces of members unable to renew their service contracts. The Defense Minister had described them as urgent, partly in view of the forthcoming expiry, at the end of 1952, of the three-year contracts on the basis of which a great number of soldiers were employed.

It expressed itself in resentment of the Ministry's demands for certain scholastic qualifications in new recruits. It expressed itself in condemnations of the changes made by the army leaders in such matters as saluting, uniforms and the way of marching, changes away from the Japanese forms which the revolutionary army had used. It expressed itself in strong attacks on the way in which troop units had been shifted about and split and on the army leaders' attempts to establish a network of territorial commanders with a fundamentally similar approach to army organizations. (16) Case after case was cited of celebrated revolutionary commanders whose services had been spurned. Strong feelings were stirred by attacks on the 900-man Netherlands Military Mission, which was said to have hoodwinked the army leaders and sabotaged the fight against the Darul Islam. (17) Similar appeals to sentiment were made in connection with the charge that old K.N.I.L. soldiers were being preferred to men who had served in the revolutionary T.N.I. (Tentara Nasional Indonesia, Indonesian National Army).

With regard to the case of Col. Bambang Supeno himself, the parliamentary critics argued that his suspension was illegal, not having been given the approval of the President. Giving President Soekarno's own interpretation of the ambiguous provisions of the 1950 constitution with regard to his powers as Commander in Chief of the Armed Forces, they argued that no officer of Supeno's rank could be suspended without the President's specific endorsement. (18) Again they demanded that the composition of the Military Court which was to be instituted to hear Supeno's appeal against his suspension should be determined by an act of parliament, and, further, that the President should sit on this court.

Finally the parliamentary critics charged that the army was being fashioned as a stronghold of the Socialist Party. (19) A number of high

(16) In the words of Zainul Baharuddin "the Army Chief of Staff has about him only men of his own opinions," Risalah Perundangan D.P.R., October 1, 1952.

(17) The initials N.M.M. were commonly said to stand for Nederlandsche Mata Mata (Dutch spies)! Considerable evidence existed of the involvement of Dutch persons in Darul Islam activities. See Subversive Activities in Indonesia: The Jungschlager and Schmidt Affair, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Indonesia, 1957, especially pp. 75 ff.

(18) See A. K. Pringgodigdo, The Office of President in Indonesia as Defined in the Three Constitutions in Theory and Practice, Translation Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1957, pp. 27-29.

(19) See Ichtisar Parlemen, September 23, 1952, the speeches of Kobarsjih and Ir. Sakirman and October 14, the speech of Zainul Baharuddin.

army officers and Defense Ministry officials were branded as P.S.I. members or sympathizers. The Socialist press was said to be favored in bulk orders of newspapers for soldiers. Political articles written by Major-General Simatupang were pointed to as suggesting Socialist partisanship in the Armed Forces Chief of Staff. A number of cases were adduced of actions taken by army leaders at times of cabinet crisis, actions which favored the Socialist Party's interests. Almost all of the many charges of corruption which were made were directed at members or sympathizers of the P.S.I. All other charges culminated in the accusation that the whole policy of rationalization, reorganization and training of the army was being pursued to enable the P.S.I. to strengthen its hold, so that it would be in a position to use the army in staging a coup d'etat.

The parliamentarians who contributed most actively to criticism of the army leaders' policies were from "mass leader" and "oppositionist" groups. In fact a listing of them is virtually a listing of the "mass leader" elements in Indonesian political life. The most prominent critic was Zainul Baharuddin, the non-party chairman of the Defense Section of parliament, who was a relative and close associate of the head of one of the army's intelligence agencies, Lieut. Col. Zulkifli Lubis. Among the others were leaders of the national-communist Partai Murba, of the Communist Party, and of the newly formed Progressive Fraction, which included supporters of both Murba and the Communist Party. (20) Also prominent were such Moslem "mass leaders" as Arudji Kartawinata of the P.S.I.I., Zainul Arifin of the new political party of the Nahdatul Ulama, and Isa Anshary of the Masjumi. And support came too from several minor nationalist parties, particularly P.R.N. (the National People's Party), and, more importantly, from the Sidik group of the P.N.I. In the Djakarta press the group had its strongest support--and this amounted to a strong and sustained campaign--from the Merdeka of B.M. Diah (which had been the strongest supporter of the Sukiman cabinet in the M.S.A. crisis) and the Mimbar Indonesia (daily) of the Murba-sympathizing non-party parliamentarian Mr. Mohammad Yamin.

It is difficult to say how far the multifarious charges were justified. There can be no doubt that the grievances which the members of the Defense Section of parliament discovered on their tours of the provinces were real ones. When they pointed to the complaints of various neglected army units, when they listed the numbers of officers and men who wanted to resign from dissatisfaction with their conditions and the atmosphere of their work, when they marshalled evidence of a

- (20) Formed on February 29, 1952, this new nine-man fraction or parliamentary caucus of the former Golongan Buruh (Labor Group) and Fraksi Kedaulatan Rakjat (People's Sovereignty Fraction) and several persons who had previously had no tie to any party or fraction.

thousand and one cases of injustice, due to rivalry between cliques, or to sheer inefficiency, when they alleged that a gulf had developed between the army and the people in many areas--then their criticisms were valid. Indeed Sultan Hamengku Buwono himself acknowledged many of them.

But if there was factual evidence for many of the charges of the parliamentarians, other charges were made largely for their appeal to political feeling. Many of the charges and insinuations were sensational but vague and barely substantiated. The use of anonymous letters and threats and of terms like "a certain colonel" and "a certain party", contributed to create an atmosphere "like when someone at a market shouts 'pickpocket'". (21) This reached a boomeranging degree of absurdity on October 6 when the P.R.N. leader Bebas Daeng Lalo called the Sultan a-national and pro-Dutch. But in general it was effective political tactics. In such an atmosphere it was difficult to defend the use of a military mission of Dutchmen, and almost as difficult to make out a case for a military pattern different from that of the Republic in the period of revolution. Government speakers appealed time and again for objectivity and a business-like approach, and condemned the use of a "scape-goat". But largely in vain. For this was not an argument about policies; it was a struggle between groups for political power. With such great interests at stake the parliamentary critics were not prepared to abandon their weapons. The content of their charges must be viewed in the light of this fact.

The most difficult question in this regard was that of the role of the P.S.I. Was the army indeed being made into a stronghold of this party? That it was was suggested by the fact that the trend in the army was towards a decline of the influence of men inimical to this party. The men of the so-called PETA group, who supported the actions of Bambang Supeno and sought to have the President as their patron, were vociferous enemies of the Socialist Party. A similar conclusion is suggested by a number of the actions taken by the leadership of the army and the Ministry of Defense in cabinet-level politics. The picture here is not quite clear; for when political pressure was applied by the army in the 1950-52 period it was usually with regard to matters directly related to the army's own interests, for instance in the selection of a Minister of Defense. But it cannot be denied that the effect of such pressure was a major strengthening of the P.S.I. The army leaders did not press for Socialist Party members for the Defense portfolio, or even for Socialist Party sympathizers as such. They sought to have as their political head a man of prestige who shared their own outlook in army affairs. But in practice the candidates whom they said to be acceptable to the army, in the first place the Sultan of Jogjakarta, were men of a fundamentally

(21) S., Sikap, October 6, 1952.

similar outlook to that of the Socialists. In the same way the Socialist Party gained from the army leaders' effective exertion of influence against the attempts of the Sukiman cabinet to replace Mr. Ali Budiardjo.

However the army leadership was not dominated by the P.S.I. in such a way as would make it possible for P.S.I. interests to prevail over army interests at any point. Mr. Ali Budiardjo, not a member of any party, was nevertheless a man who had had close associations with the Sjahrir group. The same is true in lesser degree of Major-General Simatupang, who was Ali Budiardjo's brother-in-law. Both men may be regarded as P.S.I. sympathizers, though each one had considerable independence of mind and neither was in any way dependent on the Socialist Party. Colonel Nasution on the other hand had the army as the center of his political orientation. A comparison of his writings with those of Simatupang shows clearly that he is a man of very different, more authoritarian and militaristic, outlook. He had no ties with the P.S.I., but on the contrary some enmity towards it. Close cooperation was possible between Nasution on the one hand and Simatupang and Ali Budiardjo on the other because they could agree on an approach to the building up of a unified and powerful army. It would have been impossible to achieve such cooperation on a basis which involved control of the army by an outside political group. For indeed there were many more persons of Nasution's political outlook than Simatupang's at every level of the service. Although there were many high and middle-ranking officers who harbored generalized sympathies for the ideas of the party and supported its stand on a number of then topical issues, there were very few who could be counted on to act for the party in a crisis situation. There can be little doubt that the P.S.I. was making endeavors to build up a position of power in the army. But the similarity between its political stand and that of the army leadership at this time was much less the product of success in such P.S.I. endeavors than it was the result of a limited parallelity of interests between these two centers of power. Of this we shall see more as we come to examine what happened on October 17.

But, whereas the initial target of the parliamentary attack was the P.S.I.'s influence in the army, it became clear in the latter part of September that many supporters of the offensive meant it also to bring the whole Wilopo cabinet to fall. The general stand of the "oppositionist" groups was to deny that this was their aim. But Merdeka and Mimbar Indonesia were specific in their suggestions that a cabinet crisis was not altogether undesirable. (22) And there was evidence a

(22) Merdeka, September 18, 1952. Indonesia Raya (attacking Merdeka), September 19, 1952. Also Merdeka, October 4, 1952.

little later that important leaders of both the PNI and the Masjumi held the same view.

The issue came to a head as a result of a series of motions. The "oppositionist" motion of Zainul Baharuddin (signed also by members of Murba, the Labor Party, and the P.R.N. and another independent as co-signatories) was submitted on September 23. In its original form it was a statement of "no-confidence in the policy adopted by the Defense Minister to end the conflicts within the armed forces" and a call for a state defense law and other laws. Subsequently on October 10 the sponsors agreed to incorporate considerable modifications as suggested by the P.K.I. parliamentary leader Ir. Sakirman. So modified, in what appeared to be an attempt to bring the P.N.I. to its support, the motion called for "reformation and reorganization of the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and the Armed Forces", for a national defense law and for "the establishment of a special parliamentary commission to investigate administrative and financial fraud in the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces". (23)

Although this motion was not specifically directed against the Minister of Defense, and was said by its proposers to be primarily against the "big three", Ali Budiardjo, Simatupang, and Nasution, the Minister insisted that he would treat it as one of non-confidence in himself. It soon appeared that the P.S.I., the Christian Party, and possibly also the Catholic Party, would maintain solidarity with the Minister of Defense and withdraw their own ministers if Sultan Hamengku Buwono resigned. As it was hardly conceivable that the cabinet should be able to survive the resignation of four or five of its ministers, it was thought highly probable that the passing of the Baharuddin motion would mean the fall of the cabinet. This fact worked in the Defense Minister's favor. With the cabinet fighting for its very life the issue appeared more and more as one between cabinet and parliament. A number of prominent supporters of the cabinet made statements denying the right of the legislature to make decisions in such matters as personnel policy and charges of corruption. (24) The Socialist Party was no longer politically isolated.

(23) Ichdisar Parlemen, October 14, 1952.

(24) A lawyers' battle raged on this point. Mr. Sunarjo (P.N.I.), Mr. Daljono (Masjumi), Mr. Iwa Kusumasumantri (Progressive) and Mr. Moh. Yamin (Independent), upheld the rights of parliament, arguing that it was parliament's task to secure full discussion of all matters, administrative as well as legislative. Mr. A.M. Tambunan (Christian Party), and Mr. Assaat, a non-party sympathizer of the P.S.I., denied this, stating that any evidence of corruption should have been given to the Attorney-General and that for parliament to take decisions on personnel policy was the thin edge of the wedge to delivering all government servants to the mercy of parliament.

Within major sections of the army this later stage of the debate saw the development of very strong feeling against "politicians" and their parliament. Feeling of this kind was no new phenomenon, for the army had a political tradition of its own. As a revolutionary army it had attracted men of strong political impulse, and in the course of the struggle against the Dutch it had exercised wide political and administrative powers. Subsequently it never renounced the right to play a major political role. Independence had cost too much soldier's blood, so ran the argument, to be now left entirely to civilian politicians. Thus Colonel Nasution has written of "the historic competition, dating back to the Jogja period, between parties and the army, a competition which is never spoken about but is present in every action". (25) Now, with the parliamentary debate on the army approaching a climax, anti-politician feeling was stirred. Many army men who were not otherwise supporters of Simatupang or Nasution grew strongly resentful of the way in which army "dirty linen" was aired in the parliamentary public. They were particularly angered by Zainul Baharuddin's use of parliamentary privilege to read out classified documents of the army.

In late September and early October the Socialist Party made a bid to associate itself with this anti-politician feeling in the army. For some years the party had taken pains to gain and maintain a reputation as a party of principle unsullied by political horse-trading, a party which could be supported by persons who felt fed up with parties as such. In the period of the army debate the Socialist and Socialist-sympathizing press had made frequent attacks on parliament. It had stressed the major numerical strength in it of men who had supported the Dutch-sponsored federal states. It had castigated the M.P.'s for luxurious living, irresponsibility, and wasting time. In particular it had condemned their loathness to make an elections law, and their moves to make elections less urgent by filling the vacancies in the existing parliament. (26) Now, however, the party's tone became stronger. On September 26, Sjahrir was reported as saying that "if parliament is once

(25) Op. cit., p. 173. Nasution has himself contributed some of the most important formulations of the anti-politician ideology. See op. cit., pp. 63 ff., 105, and Tentara Nasional Indonesia (The Indonesian National Army), Vol. 1, Jajasan Pustaka Militer, Djakarta, 1956 passim. For an important later formulation of this type of army ideology see the Orders of the Day of Acting Chief of Staff of the Army, Col. Zulkifli Lubis, of July 8 and July 17, 1955 in Gad-jah Mada (organ of the Military Police Corps) Vol. 6, No. 2. August 1955, pp. 13-14, 19-20, quoted in J.R.W. Smail, The June 27th Affair, unpublished paper, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, 1957.

(26) See for instance Sbs, "Parliamentary Politics" in Sikap (the official Socialist Party weekly) August 11, 1952. Also Sindo, "Where is this 'Temporary' Parliament going?", Sikap, September 29, 1952.

swept clean it will be difficult to establish it in its position again." From that time on the Socialist papers attacked the "temporary parliament" constantly. Pointing to the current debates as a disgrace to Indonesian parliamentarianism, the pro-Socialist Pedoman argued that the irresponsible attitude of the parliamentarians was making the people lose faith in democracy. Subadio Sastrosatomo, the party's parliamentary leader, warned that the danger of a cabinet crisis was relatively small compared with the threat to the whole democratic structure. (27)

At this state the government initiated what it hoped would be a concerted move of the parties supporting it to ensure that the Baharuddin motion would be defeated. This took the form of a counter-motion sponsored by I. J. Kasimo of the Catholic Party, which was introduced on October 13. Representatives of Masjumi, the Labor Party, the Christian Party and Parindra, were co-signatories of the motion with Kasimo, but the P.N.I. party council decided after some hesitation that none of its members could sign. The motion was worded to the effect that the government should immediately establish a State Commission representing both parliament and the government, but with a majority of parliamentary representatives, to examine carefully and objectively all questions raised in the parliamentary debates, and within three months to present to the government concrete suggestions concerning "the possibility of improvements in the structure of the Defense Ministry and Army Forces." Further it called for a "hastening of the end of the Netherlands Military Mission's work," and asked that the State Commission be charged with reporting to the government within two months as regards concrete steps towards this end. Only after a hard struggle within the Masjumi had the Natsir group succeeded in bringing the party to support a motion like this, which was aimed at avoiding the risk of a fall of the cabinet. The decision was finally taken on the 9th, reportedly by a 7:5 majority in the party's Executive Council. This was reported as the reversal of an earlier decision taken by a vote of 8:4 to introduce a motion calling for the replacement of Mr. Ali Budiardjo and Major-General Simatupang. (28)

Inside the P.N.I. the support for a "strong" motion was greater. Here too there was evidently a wide internal division. Here too the group most strongly supporting the cabinet was in difficulty because of the commitments which members of the opposite group had made in the party's name in the course of the parliamentary debate. Sidik had stated on the 9th that the P.N.I. was "certainly not afraid of facing a cabinet crisis over this matter." An official statement of the party council

(27) See Pedoman, October 9, 1952. Also S. "The Home Situation," Sikap, October 13, 1952, for a discussion of the sociological problems involved in the operation of democracy in Indonesia.

(28) Pemandangan, October, 1952. Major-General Simatupang is a Christian.

a day later was milder in tone, but emphasized that it wanted the repatriation of the Netherlands Military Mission by the end of the year and wanted any State Commission to be specifically charged with investigating the possibility of changes in the leadership of the Ministry of Defense and Armed Forces. It was clearly very difficult then for the Wilopo group to bring a majority of the party to support the Kasimo motion. On the 14th the P.N.I. itself submitted a third motion, stronger than the one of Kasimo. Sponsored by the P.N.I. Secretary-General, Manai Sophian, this motion was signed also by representatives of the P.S.I.I. and Nahdatul Ulama. It was identical with the Kasimo motion except that it included among the tasks of the State Commission that of reporting on "the possibility of improvements in the leadership and organization of the Defense Ministry and Armed Forces".

The last few days before the voting on the three motions were ones of intense political activity. On the 8th a meeting was held of all Secretary-Generals of Ministries, reportedly to consider the threat to Mr. Ali Budiardjo's position. On the 10th a large meeting of colonels and lieutenant-colonels was held in an effort to close the divisions inside the army in the face of what were thought of as insults and threats from outside. The 11th saw an extraordinary meeting in Djakarta of all the seven territorial (divisional) commanders. Furthermore these territorial commanders remained in Djakarta pending further developments. There were rumors of very great restiveness in the army units in and near Djakarta. From the 14th on Parliament was heavily posted with military guards. Party councils were conferring frequently. Pessimistic members of the "oppositionist" groups spoke of their fears that the army leaders might use force against parliament. (29) Optimists among them were broadcasting the names of their candidates to replace Ali Budiardjo, Simatupang, and Nasution. (30)

By the evening of October 15th, when the Defense Minister was to give his final reply to the criticisms made of him, tension was very high. Voting on the three motions was to take place that evening, immediately after the Defense Minister's reply. The Kasimo motion was accepted by the government at the last minute. The Baharuddin motion would, it was predicted, be defeated; no government party would support it. The crucial question was whether the Manai Sophian motion would win support. Hearing the Minister's speech of reply, parliamentarians were surprised to note that there was no reference in it to the

(29) Zainul Baharuddin spoke on October 14 of the dangers of a military coup, citing recent happenings in Egypt and Thailand. Nadjib-nadjiban ("doing a Naguib") had become part of Djakarta's political vocabulary.

(30) Mr. Moh. Yamin suggested that the choice should be from ex-Major-General Sudarsono, Col. Dr. Mustopo, Col. Bambang Sugeng, ex-Major-General Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo and ex-Major-General Abdul Kadir.

Sophian motion. They later found the explanation: at a meeting of the P.N.I. Council in the late afternoon Wilopo had succeeded in getting majority support for the proposal that the motion be withdrawn. This the Prime Minister had told to the Sultan, who then gave his speech anticipating that Manai Sophian would announce the withdrawal immediately afterwards.

But Sophian did not withdraw his motion. Instead the P.N.I. parliamentary leader Hadikusumo asked that the vote be postponed until the next morning. A further reversal of P.N.I. policy was in the making. Great as were the contradictory pulls to which the party was subjected, its behaviour was incomprehensible to most of the members of parliament. Only later did it become known that President Soekarno had called Mr. Iskaq and Mr. Sunarjo to the palace on the evening of the 15th and applied pressure on these P.N.I. leaders of the older Ali-Sartono wing in support of Manai Sophian's motion. In a tightly balanced situation the President's voice had been decisive.

The voting took place on the morning of October 16. The Baharuddin motion was put to the vote first, and defeated by 80 votes to 39. Then the Manai Sophian motion was put, and accepted, 91:54. The Masjumi, P.S.I., Parindra, and the two Christian parties opposed it, while the Democratic Fraction and most members of the Labor Party abstained. All other parties and fractions, including the P.N.I., supported the motion.

The situation was one of impasse. The Minister of Defense was almost committed to resigning. He had made it clear that he would not accept any motion which was a priori in character, and that he regarded attacks on the leadership of his Ministry as attacks on himself. And the Sultan was known as a stubborn man. But clearly the problem was one in which the cabinet as a whole was involved. Yet a resignation of the government was impossible; the situation was far too tense. For it was unlikely that the army leaders would remain silent. Mohammad Natsir voiced a fear of untoward developments, which was widespread in and near the political elite: "I don't know what will happen now."

But before going on to an account of the subsequent developments, let us examine the alignments in the army debate a little more closely. One may say that the main protagonists in the debate were the Defense Minister and his supporters and the "oppositionists" and theirs. Ranged with the Defense Minister were, most prominently, the Socialists, also a majority group of the Masjumi led by Natsir, a minority group of the P.N.I., led by Wilopo, the two Christian parties, and majority sections of the Labor Party and Parindra. In the oppositionist group were Murba, the Progressive Fraction, a number of radically nationalist independent M.P.'s and the Sidik faction of the P.N.I., and this group attracted the


support of the Communist Party. (31) But, most significantly, it received some support also from groups which are neither "oppositionist" in their attitudes to governments in general nor led by what we have called mass leaders. These groups, the Ali-Sartono group of the P.N.I., the Sukiman faction of the Masjumi and the aristocratic P.I.R., all led by intellectuals with hostility towards the Socialists, may be loosely termed "conservatives". They had wielded major power in the period of the Sukiman cabinet, working in close association with President Soekarno. Finally the "oppositionists" drew support from such smaller groups as Nahdatul Ulama and P.S.I.I., the Isa Anshary group of the Masjumi, and the minor nationalist P.R.N., S.K.I., all groups with a less clearly defined political position, but which may be seen as standing between the "oppositionists" and the "conservatives".

The chart on page 122 shows this division in relation to our earlier dichotomy between the intellectual and mass leader elements in Indonesian political life. Forcing the evidence somewhat we may speak of the existence in 1952 of two main groups of intellectual-led political forces, the "Socialist-sympathizers" and the anti-Socialist "conservatives". In the general heading of groups led by mass leaders one may distinguish two main functional units, the "oppositionists" and the Indonesian Communist Party (which is "oppositionist" but in a peculiar way), and in addition a group of smaller Moslem and nationalist groups with ephemeral ties to both the "conservative" and the "oppositionist" groups.

The relevance of these categories emerges as one compares this set of alignments with the one existing at the time of the M.S.A. crisis. In both cases the crucial divisions virtually by-passed party lines. In the army debates the P.K.I. and the "oppositionist" groups were again ranged against the government. But the other two main groups, Socialist-

(31) It is difficult to establish the exact role of the Communist Party in the debates. The party's spokesmen were as radically nationalist as any who spoke in the debates, and in fact the most heated exchanges were between Ir. Sakirman the floor leader of the Communists, and Subadio Sastrosatomo, the P.S.I.'s leader in parliament. But on the other hand it was Sakirman who introduced the important modifications of the Baharuddin motion, and, more significantly, the Communist members did not support even this modified version of the motion with their votes, but abstained, and supported only the motion of Manai Sophian. It would appear that the party's main aims were to remain close to the P.N.I. and to strengthen the Sidik group within that party. The P.K.I. certainly saw the army leadership as its enemy and a very important one too. But it appears to have been concerned that its efforts to weaken or supplant this leadership should not result in the cabinet's fall, or at least not in its fall in such circumstances as might lead to the emergence of the "new Sukiman government" which a number of political observers were predicting.

A SCHEMATIC VIEW OF POLITICAL ALIGNMENTS IN THE 1952 ARMY DEBATES



x-line denotes the line of cleavage in debates

sympathizers (Socialists, the Natsir group of the Masjumi, the Wilopo group of the P.N.I., and the two Christian parties) on the one hand, and "conservatives" (the Sukiman Masjumi, the Ali-Sartono P.N.I., and P.I.R.) on the other, were fighting one another from diametrically opposed situations. Whereas at the time of the M.S.A. crisis the Sukiman government

faced the opposition of the Socialist-sympathizers (as well as that of the "oppositionists" and Communists), the Wilopo government in October faced opposition from the "conservative" factions and parties (as well as of the "oppositionists" and Communists). One of the two main groups of intellectual leaders had replaced the other, with a consequent transposition of roles. (32)

But there is significance in the fact that when the crucial vote on the army issue was taken on October 16, the Masjumi and the P.N.I. were on opposite sides, with party discipline obeyed by almost all of their respective parliamentarians. The Natsir group had achieved dominance in the Masjumi on the issue and the Sidik group, winning the support of the group of Ali and Sartono, had succeeded in imposing its will on the P.N.I. Although both parties remained internally sharply divided, it is significant that they did vote against one another on this occasion, the Masjumi with the Socialists and the P.N.I. with the Communists and oppositionists. Here was the beginning of a process of realignment whereby the issue between Socialist-sympathizing groups and conservative groups came to be eclipsed by the issue between the Masjumi (and the Socialists) on the one hand and P.N.I. (and the Communists) on the other.

(32) Interesting parallels could be drawn also with the situation at the time of the "July 3 Affair" of 1946. In 1946 the government was headed by Sjahrir and conducting a highly unpopular policy of negotiations with Holland. The opposition front, Persatuan Perjuangan (United Struggle), which based its appeal on extreme nationalism, was led by Tan Malaka, Mr. Yamin, Mr. Subardjo, Major-General Sudarsono, Sukarni, and Mr. Iwa Kusumasumantri. Within the already large Masjumi and P.N.I. there was a bitter struggle between pro-Sjahrir and pro-Tan Malaka groups and the alignment between the two groups within each of these and some of the other parties were closely parallel to those in October 1952. But in 1946, unlike 1952, the Communists were fully supporting the government, and so was President Soekarno. The July 3 affair itself was an attempt to force President Soekarno to replace the Sjahrir government by one of Persatuan Perjuangan supporters--as the first step towards the ultimate replacement of Soekarno by Tan Malaka. See Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia, pp. 147-195. Also Putusan Mahkamah Tentara Agung Republik Indonesia di Djakarta tgl. 27 Mei 1948 (Decision of the Military Supreme Court of the Republic of Indonesia at Jogjakarta, May 27, 1948), van Dorp, Djakarta (?), 1949, and Mr. Mohammad Yamin, Sapta Dharma, Patriotisme Indonesia (The Seven Duties, Indonesian Patriotism), Medan, 1950.

On the morning of October 17 a surprise demonstration appeared in the streets of Djakarta. By eight o'clock a crowd of approximately 5000 men, city and country laborers, had gathered outside parliament. There was no indication on its many well-painted banners and placards of who had organized the demonstration. But the demonstrators' demands were clear: "Dissolve Parliament," "Parliament isn't a Coffee Shop," "Parliament for the sake of Democracy, not Democracy for Parliament's sake," "The People Must Judge," "Purge the Corruptors," "Elections Immediately," "Use Section 84 of the Constitution," (33) and so on. They soon broke into parliament, broke some chairs and, ironically, smashed up the parliamentary cafeteria!

From there the crowd moved on around the city, attracting larger numbers, mainly of the curious, to themselves. After presenting a petition to Vice-President Hatta and after some minor incidents in which several Dutch flags were pulled off their masts and torn up, the crowd, by now perhaps 30,000 strong, arrived in front of the Presidency. After some time the President came out and walked, among general cheering, to the fence where the demonstrators were standing. Then, in a masterly speech from the Presidency steps, he both rebuked and soothed them. There would be elections as soon as possible, he said. But meanwhile he could not simply dissolve parliament. To ask him to do so was to ask him to become a dictator, to bring to naught what the people had fought so long and hard to win..... So Soekarno sent the demonstrators home. The cheered him and went. He had once more demonstrated his power. (34)

No special precautionary measures were taken by the army or police until some time after the demonstration was first seen. But then a sudden burst of army activity appeared as the President was beginning his speech to the demonstrators. Then he could see before him two tanks, several armored cars and four cannons with some of the cannons and some of the machine guns on the armored cars trained on the Presidency. One army unit was inside the Presidency and many more outside. At 10:15 and 10:30, immediately after the President had concluded his address, two groups of senior officers, 17 altogether, and including five of the seven territorial commanders, arrived to see him. (35) Some of these men had

(33) This is the dissolution clause. It reads "The President shall have the right to dissolve Parliament. The President's declaration of dissolution shall at the same time be an order for the election of a new Parliament within 30 days."

(34) This account is based on the reports of the Aneta and Antara news agencies, on the description by Adinegoro, Pemilihan Umum dan Djiwa Masyarakat di Indonesia (Elections and the Spirit of the Community in Indonesia), Bulan Bintang, Djakarta, 1953, on the government statement of November 22, 1952, and on the writer's personal observations.

(35) Those present were the Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major-General T. B. Simatupang, the Chief of Staff of the Army, Col. A. H. Nasution,

spoken to the President before the demonstrators had arrived at the palace. The group had first called at the office of the Prime Minister, where they had obtained the approval of the Prime Minister and Minister of Defense for their action of going to talk directly with the President. Then for an hour and a half they conferred with the President, who called the Vice-President, the Secretary of the President's cabinet, Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo, Prime Minister Wilopo and the Acting Chairman of Parliament, Mr. A. M. Tambunan, to be present at the meeting.

What transpired at this historic meeting was not immediately made public officially, and so was reported in a great variety of forms by different interested persons. In fact it became the subject of vehement controversy, not only between newspapers and political parties but even between different official spokesmen for the armed forces. Thus it was and is difficult to know precisely what happened. But the general pattern is clear.

The officers' main aim was to have the President dissolve parliament. Their main spokesman, Deputy Chief of Staff Lieut. Col. Sutoko, told Soekarno that the group felt that the existing unrepresentative parliament was the root of the country's political instability, which had meant that none of the recent cabinets had been able to live long enough to implement its program. Col. Maludin Simbolon, the North Sumatra commander, spoke of the dangers of direct political interference in the placement policies of the army. And Col. A. E. Kawilarang of the crucial command of West Java, of which Djakarta was a part, spoke of the explosive state of feelings among his soldiers and of the consequent danger of catastrophic consequences if the questions agitating them were not settled, or if there were further provocation of any kind. (36) All this, it was said, was evidence of the necessity for the President to break the deadlock by dissolving parliament. Thus Lieut. Col. Sutoko presented the President with a statement which the officers had drawn up after their meetings of October 16 and the early morning of October 17, which decided "to urge the Head of the State to dissolve the present temporary parliament and form a new parliament in the shortest possible time in a manner which takes the wishes of the people into consideration." (37)

the North Sumatra territorial commander, Col. M. Simbolon, the acting commander in South Sumatra, Lieut. Col. Kosasih, Col. A. E. Kawilarang of West Java, Lieut. Col. Bachrum of Central Java, Lieut. Col. Dr. Suwondho of East Java, Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Lieut. Col. Sutoko and Lieut. Col. Dr. Aziz Saleh, Military Police Head, Lieut. Col. S. Parman, Col. G. P. H. Djatikusumo and Lieut. Cols. Suprpto, A. Gani, Sukania, Askari, S. Sudarso and Sumantri. See the circular letter of the Biro Penerangan Staf Umum Angkatan Darat (Information Bureau of the General Staff of the Army), Pedoman, December 6, 1952.

- (36) Ibid. See also the press interview of Lieut. Col. Sutoko, Antara, October 31, 1952, and Indonesia Raya, October 31, 1952.

But the officers meant to go further than this. Their statement urged also the "retiring of the elements in the present Parliament with tendencies such as described above"--spreading secrets of the armed forces, intentionally interpreting them destructively, etc.--and "the taking of steps against functionaries of the armed forces who have violated their duty to keep armed forces secrets." (38) This, however, was not officially admitted, the text of the statement appearing publicly only as the result of a "leak" to the newspaper Merdeka made more than a month later. Thus there were also many false rumors to the effect that the officers had asked the President to assume dictatorial powers, that they had asked for the existing cabinet to be replaced by a triumvirate of Soekarno, Hatta and the Sultan of Jogjakarta, that they had threatened the President, and so on. (39) In any event it is clear that the President did not yield to the demands which were made of him. He would not endorse the army leaders' statement, nor would he commit himself on the question of the dissolution of parliament. This he said he would have to discuss with the cabinet. So he sent the officers away. When they had left the Presidency, Soekarno, Hatta and Wilopo, in consultation with the acting chairman of parliament, Mr. Tambunan, urged the Consultative Committee of Parliament to declare for a prolonged recess. This the Committee did forthwith.

Meanwhile however army activity was increasing outside the Presidency. More and more soldiers came out onto the streets of Djakarta. At eleven o'clock telephone and telegraph communications, both internal and overseas, were stopped. Ship and airplane departures from Djakarta were delayed, and an eight to five curfew was imposed. All meetings of more than five persons were banned by order of the Djakarta city command. Six M.P.'s--Dr. Sukiman and Mr. Kasman of Masjumi, Bebas Daeng Lalo of P.R.N, A.B.M. Jusuf of the Labor Party, and Mr. Yamin and Sjamsuddin Sutan Makmur, independents--were placed under arrest. Two dailies, Merdeka and Berita Indonesia, and two weeklies, Mimbar Indonesia and Mingguan Merdeka, were banned. The atmosphere was highly tense and remained so throughout the 18th, with meetings of top army officers continuing.

But within three days almost all of the army's emergency measures had been revoked. The arrested men were free and the ban on publications had been lifted. Army activity in the streets of Djakarta had been reduced to the normal level. The stage was set for a new political battle.

(37) For the full text see Merdeka, November 24, 1952. The authenticity of this text was certified by Col. Nasution. See the circular letter of the Biro Staf Umum Angkatan Darat, Pedoman, December 6, 1952.

(38) Ibid.

(39) See, for instance, Merdeka, October 31, November 1, and the statement of the Biro Informasi Staf Angkatan Perang (Information Bureau of the Armed Forces Staff), Merdeka, December 5 and 6.

But before looking at this let us attempt to examine further the events of October 17. Did they constitute an attempt to "do a Naguib"? Did the army leaders act out of anger and panic, or was there a clearly conceived plan of defending their positions by changing the whole balance of power? Did their desire for the dissolution of parliament spring from a wish to see the existing cabinet more capable of carrying out its policy? Or was their main aim to place the whole government in a position of dependence on themselves, or to displace it? These questions continued to be debated vehemently for many months.

In the first place it is clear that the demonstration was substantially an army-organized affair. It is true that feeling against parliament was high; for the luxurious living of the M.P.'s, their business success, and the connection between their role and the slowness of government action, had made it easy for the P.S.I. and other groups to make them scapegoats for the inchoate general feeling of disappointment with the fruits of the new independence. But a number of those who took part in this rapidly and efficiently organized demonstration had traveled into the city in army trucks. Some in fact were identified as soldiers in civilian clothes. Furthermore Col. Dr. Mustopo, the eccentric head of the army dental services, actually stated in a press interview published on the morning of October 17 that he had organized the demonstration. (40) It is clear that several officers of the General Staff knew on the previous day that a demonstration would take place.

A number of those who took part in the demonstration were either personal followers of Dr. Mustopo, a man whose influence in working class Djakarta was very considerable at this time, or members of gang-like village guard organizations such as KOBRA (Komando Organisasi Barisan Rakjat, Organizational Command of the Brigade of the People) with which he had associations. Others who took part are known to have done so for money. But in addition certain parties appear to have been involved. There is a good deal of circumstantial evidence here which points in the direction of the Socialist Party, or, at least, certain groups in it. It was Pedoman and Indonesia Raya, the papers supporting the Socialist Party, which on the morning of the 17th demanded the dissolution of parliament. In addition there was almost certainly participation by

(40) In his account the action was taken at his own initiative. He explained that President Soekarno had come to know of it and asked him on October 16 to call it off. He would try to prevent it from being held, Mustopo claimed to have told the President, but he feared that this would no longer be possible. Finally he said he had told Col. Nasution on October 16 of the forthcoming demonstration. Sumber (Djakarta), October 17, 1952. Mustopo's role was later described by Sutomo (Bung Tomo), who had been a close associate of his. According to Sutomo, Mustopo was used by a "certain group" and was himself "a small screw of a large machine." Merdeka, October 28, 1952.

significant numbers of members of the national-communist Partai Murba and the smaller Permai (Persatuan Rakjat Marhaen Indonesia, Indonesian Proletarians' Union) and P.R.I. (Partai Rakjat Indonesia, Indonesian People's Party). (41) However, principal responsibility for the demonstration must be attributed to sections of the army leadership, including some high officers of the General Staff as well as the individual Col. Dr. Mustopo.

What then were the purposes which activated the army leaders who were the main actors of the drama of October 17? To answer this question it is necessary to look at a number of earlier developments inside the armed forces leadership. Despite some conflicting evidence, it may be regarded as established that Col. Nasution was engaged, for several months before October 17, in working out plans for a type of military coup. It seems that his plans, to which the Minister of Defense and Major-General Simatupang were opposed, involved using the Siliwangi Division, the West Java territorial division commanded by Col. A. E. Kawilarang, to effect a change which would make for stronger government by giving greater power to President Soekarno, at the same time making him partly dependent on army support. (42) Nasution had discussed much

(41) Murba involvement is to be explained partly in terms of personal associations between some Murba leaders and one or two men high in the central leadership of the army and partly in terms of a concern to participate in and heighten any potentially revolutionary situation. M. H. Lukman of the P.K.I. described it as one of a series of anarchist type actions to which the Trotskyists were then resorting. "Kerdjasama Kaum Sosialis Kanan dan Trotskyis dalam Peristiwa 17 Oktober" (The Cooperation between the Right-Wing Socialists and Trotskyists in the October 17 Affair), Bintang Merah, Vol. VII, No. 2-4, October-November, 1952, pp. 105 ff.

(42) There had been signs of dissatisfaction with the weak government produced by the existing parliamentary regime. A number of leaders of both the P.N.I. and the Masjumi favored a return to the presidential system which had been adopted in August 1945 and abandoned three months later. Several P.N.I. leaders were known to want President Soekarno to take dictatorial power into his hands, and several leaders of the Masjumi were in favor of Vice-President Hatta assuming greater powers than he had under the existing constitution. The P.I.R. leader Abbas Surianataatmadja had stated at a congress of this party on September 22 that Indonesia needed a strong man like Ataturk or Naguib. Mrs. Rasuna Said, an independent M.P. of "oppositionist" leanings, had proposed dissolution of the existing parliament in the course of the first reading debates on the program of the Wilopo cabinet. See Keterangan dan Djawaban Pemerintah atas Program Kabinet Wilopo (The Government's Statement of the Policy of the Wilopo Cabinet and its Replies to Parliamentary Criticism), Kementerian Penerangan, Djakarta, 1952, p. 45.

of this with President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta some time before the October crisis and he is reported to have received some encouragement from the former. Also, several days before October 17, he had spoken about his plans to the Prime Minister.

Then an important disagreement developed between Soekarno and Nasution. The President would not approve a list submitted by Nasution of officers and politicians to be arrested at the time of the proposed coup. The changes made by Soekarno in this list were resented particularly by a group of younger officers of the General Staff who had been supporting Nasution. The result was that by October 16 the initiative in planning the action had passed from Nasution to these younger men, in particular to the Deputy Chiefs of Staff, Lieut. Col. Sutoko and Lieut. Col. Dr. Aziz Saleh and the Military Police head Lieut. Col. S. Parman. This group was not held together by any common political viewpoint other than the anti-politician ideology of the army, although some of its members had Socialist Party sympathies. What these men sought to do remains unclear, but there can be little doubt that there were some plans for a coup type action. (43)

The larger group of army leaders who met on October 16, and again in the early morning of October 17, were faced with a situation at once exasperating and highly confused. Some of them had been angered by the behavior of parliament. They had been bewildered by the zigzags of P.N.I. policy. Many were afraid of having their work undone and some of losing their positions. Some too were seriously concerned lest army disunity should erupt in violence. This could be triggered, they believed by the actions of the Black Dragon type organization of the armed forces intelligence head Lieut. Col. Lubis, an active leader of the "PETA group." Something had to be done. But what?

Relations between parliament and cabinet were at a deadlock. For these army leaders it was imperative that parliament should yield and not cabinet; this pointed to dissolution. But dissolution was constitutionally dubious and in practice impossible without the approval of the President. (44) Now it was true that Soekarno had given certain indications

(43) On October 15 the English language daily Times of Indonesia, edited by the editor of Indonesia Raya which had very close connections with the army leadership, published a version of the Djojobojo prophecy. In what were obvious references to Soekarno and the Sultan of Jogjakarta, the piece ended "The Leader would soon pass from power and his place would be taken by a prince of the ancient land, Java."

(44) The statement of the 1950 constitution, "The President's declaration of dissolution shall at the same time be an order for the election of a new Parliament with 30 days," was interpreted by many as meaning that there could be no dissolution if it was technically impossible to hold elections within a thirty day period. According to a strict interpretation of the constitution the right of dissolution is vested not with the President as a matter of prerogative, but rather with cabinet. See A. K. Pringgodigdo, The Office Of President in Indonesia, pp. 26-27. However President Soekarno had shown on

that he shared the army leaders' general feelings against parliament. And he had entered into political cooperation with Nasution on this basis. Yet this cooperation had broken down, and those of the army officers who had long nurtured antagonisms against the President were confirmed in their view that he had to be opposed. Now apparently he had thrown his weight on the side of the sponsors of the Manai Sophian motion, or so at least some of the officers believed. The President was the key to the whole situation, but his position on the central issues was unclear. Thus the question was: If action was to be taken should it go only as far as was possible with the cooperation of the President, or should it be pressed further if need be?

Action was particularly strongly urged at these meetings by the group of Lieut. Cols. Sutoko and Dr. Aziz Saleh of the General Staff and Lieut. Col. S. Parman of the Military Police, and it appears that this group was supported by certain of the divisional commanders from the provinces, particularly Col. Kawilarang of West Java. But the nature of the action which these men proposed is not clear. Nor is it clear what breadth of agreement was reached at these meetings. What is certain is that a number of the most important of the actions of October 17 were not the result of agreement by the larger officer group which met on the 16th and 17th.

These actions in fact resulted from the independent initiative of a number of army elements. Thus most of the divisional commanders were taken completely by surprise by the occurrence of the demonstration--as indeed was the Defense Minister. Whatever the role of Dr. Mustopo in organizing the demonstration (and whatever interpretation one places on his account of his statements to Soekarno and Nasution) he was certainly not acting as a disciplined member of a putsch group. And even at the palace there were contrasts in the behavior of different members of the officer group. While the attitude of some of them to the President was one of challenge and defiance, Lieut. Col. Sutoko and Col. Simbolon actually had tears in their eyes as they spoke. Similarly the burst of army activity, which had first appeared on the streets while the President was addressing the demonstrators, was the result of planning not by all the officers who later went to the Presidency but by a smaller General Staff group cooperating with the Djakarta city commander, Lieut. Col. Taswin. It was this smaller group which cut communications, ordered the arrests, press bans and curfew and banned public meetings. And it is probable that the important and provocative decision to train cannons on the Presidency was taken at a still lower level of responsibility, by a single battalion commander.

The confusion and lack of coordination which characterized these developments goes far to explain why it was that the officers were prepared to accept the President's refusal to accede to their demands. It

previous occasions that he would not be bound to strict interpretations of his constitutional role. Moreover some of the cabinet's legal advisers maintained that, by analogy with Dutch constitutional practice, a deadlock of this kind could be broken by a prerogative action of the head of state, in which he either dismissed the cabinet or dissolved parliament.

is a fact that certain groups within the army leadership wanted some sort of a coup, an assertion of military power which would radically change the power balance. But this group had only partial support from the army leaders who went to the President. The group as a whole had made a timing mistake by going to the President after he had addressed the demonstrators. And they had allowed the President's antagonism to be aroused by the guns which faced the palace. Thus when Soekarno stood firm against the demands which they brought to him, majority opinion within the group turned against the party which wanted to force the issue at stake.

When this group presented its point of view again at the subsequent meetings later in the day and on October 18 it was clear that further action could be taken only if the army felt itself strong and united enough to take power into its own hands. This was all the clearer for the fact that Vice-President Hatta, who had previously encouraged the army leaders in their demand for the dissolution of parliament, was not prepared to become involved in an army action taken in defiance of the President. In addition Bambang Supeno, Lieut. Col. Zulkifli Lubis and other members of the "PETA group" had by now had considerable success in organizing opposition to the army leaders, using the name of the President. And, as Major-General Simatupang stressed in these meetings, the army leaders had no clear conception of what they would do with full powers over civilian affairs once they had assumed them. (45)

It is therefore impossible to give a clear-cut answer to the question of whether or not there was an attempt at coup d'etat. There was an attempt to intimidate the President, but it was not pressed. There were important groups of the army leadership which wanted action which would result in a radical change in the balance of political power. But these groups did not have any carefully elaborated plans. And their influence within the leadership as a whole was not clearly predominant. No one can say what political change or how much they would have introduced if they had taken state power into their own hands.

For some days after October 17 bewilderment prevailed. On October 18 it was announced that the cabinet would continue in office, with consideration of the Manai Sophian motion postponed. There was no indication that Sultan Hamengku Buwono would resign. There would be no cabinet crisis, it seemed. As the army's emergency measures were undone one by one and the territorial commanders returned to their own commands, a reassuring uneventfulness came over the political scene. But the atmosphere remained strained. The press, Merdeka and Mimbar Indonesia (daily) on the one hand, and Indonesia Raya and Pedomani on the other, was unusually circumspect and uninformative. The numerous appeals of government and government-supporting leaders for moderation were evidence that the

(45) See T. B. Simatupang, Pelopop dalam Perang, Pelopor dalam Damai (A Forerunner in War and Peace), Jajasan Pustaka Militer, Djakarta, 1954, pp. 101-105, for a discussion of the practical case against military dictatorship.

surface calm gave no proper cause for relief. (46) Meanwhile a tremendous variety of explanations of the events of October 17 were in circulation and there were rumors of intense behind-the-scenes political activity both inside and outside the army.

On October 21 came the first official attempt at clarification, in a radio address of Prime Minister Wilopo. There was no cabinet crisis, the Prime Minister stated, adding that the Consultative Committee of parliament wished the cabinet to continue in office, and further that the territorial commanders together had made a statement of loyalty to the government. He referred to "undesirable aspects" of the happenings of October 17, but said that these happenings also "reflect a desire to check a trend in parliamentary development which had produced an atmosphere in which a government cannot do its work." (47) Wilopo was clearly more concerned to appeal for calm and moderation than to provide a full explanation of what had happened. Many who had expected detailed clarification were disappointed. The newspaper-reading public continued to be bewildered and in many cases anxious, sensing that this was a situation in which new and unpredictable political forces were at work.

This sense of bewilderment was heightened when it became clear that the political battle of October 17 was shifting from Djakarta to the regions. It was not long before it appeared in one or other form in the center of every one of the seven military commands. Demonstrations like the one in Djakarta on October 17, with organizationally unidentified persons demanding the dissolution of parliament, appeared in Semarang on October 20, in Bandjarmasin (Kalimantan) on October 24, in Medan on October 27 and in Bandung on November 8. In the three other centers of military power there were happenings of much greater significance--bloodless coups to overthrow the local territorial commander.

The first of these remarkable coups was in the East Java division. East Java had long been the main stronghold of the "PETA group," of the sections of the army opposed to the policies of the Defense Ministry. However the acting territorial commander there, Lieut. Col. Dr. Suwondho, who was in charge while Col. Bambang Sugeng was on sick leave, was not a member of this group. When he returned to Surabaya from Djakarta on October 19 Suwondho found that a number of leading "PETA group" officers, including Col. Bambang Supeno, Col. Sungkono, Col. Suhud and Lieut. Col. Sapari, had arrived in East Java before him. These men had been asked by President Soekarno to rally opposition in East Java to the Djakarta leaders of the army, and in this they were quickly successful. Lieut. Col. Suwondho's position was weak, but on October 21 he struck back. In a strongly worded order of the day he attacked those members of the army who had

(46) See for instance the statements of Mohammad Natsir, Aneta, October 18, Mr. Mohammad Roem, Antara, October 18.

(47) Government Statement, Ministry of Information, October 21, 1952.

been "screaming with the opportunists among the politicians, who had promised them positions." At the same time he appealed for army unity, stating that the alternative was "balkanization of the state." (48)

But Suwondho could not hold his position. Almost immediately after he had issued this statement he was arrested by order of the Bambang Supeno supporters in the divisional headquarters. The General Staff in Djakarta sent Lieut. Cols. Parman and Suprpto to Surabaya, armed with a mandate to take whatever action they thought necessary, but these men could do no more than legitimize the power change which had taken place. On October 22 the divisional headquarters in Surabaya announced that Suwondho had been dismissed by the General Staff delegation from Djakarta, that the most senior regimental commander in East Java, Lieut. Col. R. Sudirman, had been declared acting territorial commander, and that he had revoked Suwondho's Order of the Day. Two days later Sudirman issued a long statement. He asserted that Suwondho's leadership of the division had become unacceptable because of his active participation in the undemocratic actions of October 17. He proclaimed as unjustifiable "firstly the acts of those armed forces functionaries who had used the powers of their offices to take action directed towards a dissolution of parliament and secondly the repressive measures which had been taken in close connection with these actions." Finally he professed his loyalty to President Soekarno and expressed the hope that he, as Supreme Commander, would effect a settlement of the whole affair. (49)

Both the Minister of Defense and the Chief of Staff of the Army visited East Java in early November. But Sudirman maintained his position as acting territorial commander and made no concessions in his attitude to the army leaders in Djakarta, but on the contrary made several public demands for punitive action against those who had been involved in the October 17 affair. It was clear that President Soekarno was supporting the Sudirman group. Faced with a political situation which was both complicated and highly dangerous--so much so that civil war was a seriously discussed possibility--the army leadership did nothing against Sudirman.

One consequence of this inaction was to encourage similar coups elsewhere. Thus on November 16, Col. Gatot Subroto, territorial commander of East Indonesia with headquarters in Makassar, was arrested and supplanted by his Chief of Staff, Lieut.-Col. J. F. Warouw--in this case with the active cooperation of the P.N.I. governor of Sulawesi, Sudiro. Again there had been a visit from unofficial couriers of the President. Again the coup was made as a protest against the actions of the territorial

(48) Aneta, Surabaya, October 22, 1952.

(49) Aneta, Djakarta, October 26, 1952. See also the account of these developments in Sumber, (Djakarta), October 29 and in the statement of Lieut. Col. Sutoko, Indonesia Raya, October 31.

commander in relation to the actions of October 17, although in fact Gatot Subroto had not been among those who went to the presidency on that day. Again too the name of the President was used by the man usurping authority, and again the hope was expressed that the President would settle the whole army conflict. (50) One important difference lay in the fact that Lieut. Col. Warouw's statements were cast in stronger language than those of Lieut. Col. Sudirman had been. Warouw spoke of the events of October 17 as an attempt at coup d'etat and as intimidation of the head of state, and declared that he would be unprepared to meet Sultan Hamengku Buwono or Col. Nasution on their planned visit to Makassar unless they carried a specific mandate from the President. Furthermore there were signs that regionalist and anti-Javanese feeling had become associated with the affair, which some people in the area saw as the ouster of a Javanese by a Sulawesi. Lt. Col. Warouw hails from Minahasa in North Sulawesi.) (51)

A week later a parallel situation developed in South Sumatra. Here the position of the "anti-October 17 group" in the army had just been strengthened by what President Soekarno had said in a five-day speaking tour of the area. Headed by the brigade commander Lieut. Col. Kretarto, this group finally took action on November 23, taking power out of the hands of the acting territorial commander Lieut. Col. Kosasih. Kosasih was said to be unwilling to take a firm stand on the October 17 problem and unable to surmount the conflicts existing in the army under his command. In this case the government was able to find a solution which was acceptable to those who had made the coup and at the same time saved it from the humiliation which it had suffered in East Java and East Indonesia. On November 24 it issued a statement condemning the Kretarto action and the next day it reappointed the pensioned Col. Bambang Utojo, a man of the "PETA group" who had been territorial commander of South Sumatra until September 1952.

There was indeed little that the cabinet could do to assert its authority in the face of these challenges in the regions. Military action against East Java or East Indonesia was scarcely conceivable. There did exist the possibility of organizing counter coups against the usurping commanders. But action of this kind would have involved a degree of partisanship with the central leadership of the army for which the cabinet was not prepared. Indeed most of its members were personally inclined to support the Djakarta army leaders, viewing their actions of October 17 with sympathy or at least without strong hostility. But from a number

(50) One accusation which Warouw leveled against his superior, Col. Gatot Subroto, was that the latter had told a group of officers that he would take orders only from the Vice-President and Defense Minister. Antara, November 18, 1952.

(51) See Pedoman, November 18 and the denial by Lieut. Col. Warouw, Antara, November 18.

of the parties of the cabinet, and particularly from the Prime Minister's P.N.I., there was heavy pressure for a policy against these army leaders. Furthermore President Soekarno pressed the cabinet strongly to take action not against Sudirman, Warouw or Kretarto, but rather against Nasution, Simatupang and Ali Budiardjo. And with the army itself so deeply and openly divided, it no longer constituted a counterweight to the President's pressure, as had so often been the case in previous political crises. The political balance had swung sharply to the advantage of the anti-October 17 forces.

The cabinet's policy was one of slow and cautious adaptation to the realities of the new power situation. Though it realized that its own interests were tied closely to those of the pro-October 17 officers it was incapable of effecting a solution which favored this group. Even so it continued to be attacked strongly by the anti-October 17 group both in and outside the army. It appeared to be able to please no one. Yet its policy of dexterous compromises and ingenious face-saving formulas--the Wilopo overkappingspolitiek or "all under one roof policy"--was successful in saving the country from bloodshed.

The basis of its policies for a settlement was given in a government statement of November 22. In this the government presented a much fuller account of what had happened on October 17 than it had previously given, but it made no reference (or at most one very indirect one), to the army coups in the regions. Maintaining that the demonstration of October 17 "must be understood in relation to the previous debates in parliament," it nevertheless declared as unjustifiable "the participation of several officers and men of the armed forces in the organization of this demonstration," the "large amount of army activity, exceeding what was required for the maintenance of security" and "the demand of the army leadership for the dissolution of parliament." There had been no seizure of power, and there should be no exaggerated interpretations of the events of the day. But the government "would not tolerate the above-mentioned actions taken in violation of the limits of the army's role and would take the necessary steps wherever they had occurred."

It was not long before a beginning was made with these steps. Parliament reassembled on November 27. On December 5 the cabinet announced the first of a series of changes in the central army leadership. Col. Nasution and Lieut. Cols. Sutoko and Parman were suspended. On December 16 Col. Bambang Sugeng, the inactive commander of the East Java territorium, who was generally regarded as the most moderate and capable of the "PETA group" men in the army, was appointed as acting Chief of Staff to replace Nasution. But the Sultan and Bambang Sugeng were committed to widely different ways of tackling the problem of army disunity, and, with Bambang Sugeng in a politically stronger position, Hamengku Buwono's position was virtually intolerable.

It was East Indonesia which afforded the showdown. Col. Bambang Sugeng returned from a trip to Makassar committed to legitimize the position of Lieut. Col. Warouw as acting commander of the territory. (52) When the cabinet decided on January to uphold this decision, the Sultan announced his resignation. The Deputy-Prime Minister, Prawoto Mangkusasmito of the Masjumi, took over interim charge of the Defense portfolio, only to give it to the Prime Minister a few days later. Then on January 2, the same day as Lieut. Col. Warouw was ceremonially installed in Makassar as acting commander, the cabinet reversed its stand. In what was an attempt to prevent the threatened resignation of the two P.S.I. ministers, it appointed another man, Col. Sadikin, then divisional commander in Kalimantan and a man who had kept a neutral position between the two main rival groups in the army, as East Indonesia commander. Presented with this volteface Col. Bambang Sugeng immediately offered his resignation. But this was not accepted and the acting Chief of Staff remained at his post. Sadikin, it then became clear, was not prepared to go to East Indonesia. Lieut. Col. Warouw remained in charge of the East Indonesia command till 1956. The P.S.I. ministers accepted the rebuff and remained in the cabinet.

For the political parties the two months following October 17 were full of intense activity, their press organs and central and branch committees frequently issuing statements on the changing situation. The first series of such statements concerned itself mainly with the question of dissolution of parliament. A number of minor organizations and a larger number of newspapers supported dissolution, and argued that elections should be held on the basis of emergency laws. (53) The great majority of parties opposed it and demanded that parliament should reassemble immediately. (54) These included not only the P.K.I., P.N.I.,

(52) To install a person formally as the acting functionary in a particular military or civil post is a common technique in Indonesian governmental practice. It represents the first stage of a process of legitimation which is two-fold. A person formally installed in an office on an acting basis has the opportunity to create for himself the support he needs to continue in that office. If he succeeds and maintains his superiors' trust he may be accorded full status. If he fails it will be easy to withdraw him. But in many cases he will continue as the acting functionary for a period of many months or even years, exercising all the powers of the office but enjoying only some of its prestige, because the government prefers not to confer full legitimacy on him.

(53) See the statement of Partai Kedaulatan Rakjat (People's Sovereignty Party), Antara (Makassar), October 22, and the editorials of Indonesia Raya, October 25, Indonesia Berdjwang (Bandjarmasin), October 21, and Suara Rakjat (Surabaya), October 25, 1952.

(54) Up to the time of the reassembling of parliament on November 27, 340 letters had been sent it by organizations and groups of organiza-

P.S.I.I. and P.I.R., but also the Masjumi and its youth organization G.P.I.I. All without exception stated that they favored early elections. There was no statement from the Socialist Party, except Sjahrir's of October 18, in which he laughed off the charge that he had called for the dissolution of Parliament. The Partai Murba on November 1 attacked parliament as a stronghold defending the Round Table Conference Agreement, but on the other hand made no specific demand for its dissolution. It also denied having participated in the demonstration.

After the coup in the territorial command of East Java the political issues became more complicated. The Socialist papers, which now saw it as politically disadvantageous to advocate dissolution of parliament, concentrated on the case for government action against the usurper of military power in the division, Lieut.-Col. Sudirman. On this issue they were better able to win outside support, and a number of groups inside other parties, and particularly the Masjumi and Christian parties, took their part. The opposition concentrated on the events of October 17. Their most commonly used technique was the joint statement signed by the representatives of a large number of parties and other organizations--trade unions, veterans', women's and youth bodies, etc.--in a particular town or area. (55) These joint statements were usually made as the result of joint P.N.I.-P.K.I. initiative. The local branches of the minor nationalist party P.I.R., the Moslem P.S.I.I. and the national-communist Murba were involved in almost every case, and some of the more moderately phrased statements were signed also by representatives of Masjumi and the Christian parties in the particular areas. All of these statements supported the continued functioning of parliament until elections could be held, and some demanded that it should reassemble immediately. Several affirmed the signatories' agreement with the contents of the President's speech to the demonstrators of October 17, and others used such terms as "fascist," "coup d'etat" and "dictatorship" in condemning the actions of the army leaders on that day. The most strongly worded denunciations of these actions came from different parts of East Java, suggesting that the political atmosphere in this province had been strongly affected by the coup which had taken place within its military command. (56)

tions in support of its continued functioning. See Gusti Majur, "Pintu Pemilihan Umum" (The Threshold of Elections), Mimbar Indonesia (weekly), December 20, 1952.

(55) See for instance the statements of 13 organizations at Jogjakarta, Berita Indonesia, October 24, of 8 organizations at Bukittinggi, Antara, October 31, of 15 organizations at Surakarta, Antara, October 31, of 21 organizations at Semarang, Aneta, November 3, of 43 organizations at Palembang, Aneta, November 16, and of 15 organizations at Kutaradja, Tegas, November 17, 1952.

(56) See for instance the joint statements of organizations in Lumadjang (November 5), Malang (November 6), Madiun (November 20), and Surabaya (December 6).

Here then was another focus of political conflict--between those who demanded a solution in the center first, and those who insisted that the East Java problem, later the problem of the three territories, should be settled before any others. The argument was rather like the egg-or-chicken one. One side, the "pro-October 17 group," stressed the necessity for government action to deal with the coups in the territorial army commands. The other side, the "anti-October 17 group," insisted that these were merely actions taken in response to the far more fundamental constitutional violations of October 17. Thereupon the first side took the argument back to what they said had evoked the happenings of October 17, the irresponsibility of the parliamentarians in their criticism of the army leaders. And from the second side came further castigations of the policies of the army leadership in the previous period.

The post October 17 period presents a double situation as far as party alignments are concerned. Immediately after October 17 there existed a temporary alignment of P.N.I. and Masjumi against the Socialist Party--inasmuch as the Sukiman group had established a position of temporary ascendancy within the leadership of the Masjumi. There was sharp resentment in the Masjumi of the Military Police's arrest of its leaders, Dr. Sukiman and Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo, and thus on October 29 the Executive Council of the party voiced its disapproval of "the dissolution of Parliament at the present time in any way which is unconstitutional" and asked that parliament should reassemble immediately. (57) For a time it seemed as if the basis was being laid for a renewal of cooperation between the "conservative" leaders of the Masjumi and the P.N.I., and it was widely speculated that this cooperation could create the basis for a new cabinet like that of Dr. Sukiman. This was one interpretation placed on the demands made by Mr. Sartono of the P.N.I. and a day later by Dr. Sukiman, for the resignation of Sultan Hamengku Buwono. (58)

On the other hand however there was a very much stronger tendency for the P.N.I. to cooperate with the Communist Party and "oppositionist" groups and thereby to alienate the Masjumi and strengthen the hold in it of the P.S.I.-oriented Natsir wing. The Communist Party was a strong and willing ally of the groups in the P.N.I. who favored a "strong" solution, severe in its punishment of the army leaders of the pro-October 17 group, and its help was considerable in mobilizing the impressive demonstration of opinion represented by the many joint statements. In party terms the main beneficiary of these was the P.N.I. For the shifts in army personnel worked clearly in this party's favor: the new acting

(57) Abadi, October 30.

(58) Mr. Sartono, Harian Umum (Surabaya), December 5, Dr. Sukiman, Merdeka, December 6. See also the statement of Dr. Sukiman on November 7, in which he denied that he sought the fall of the Wilopo cabinet, but added that if it fell it would have to be replaced by a presidential cabinet.

Chief of Staff Col. Bambang Sugeng, the reinstalled South Sumatra commander Col. Bambang Utojo and a number of the leading men of the groups which had seized military power in East Java and East Indonesia were sympathizers of the P.N.I. The Communists asked no price in terms of army appointments; they hoped for no more than to see P.S.I. influence in the army weakened and to strengthen their own association in the public mind with the P.N.I. and President Soekarno.

Within the P.N.I. the concern for an anti-October 17 solution united the oppositionist Sidik group with the conservative group of Sartono and intensified their strength vis-a-vis the group of Wilopo. Both of the first two groups were beneficiaries of the post-October 17 changes in the power situation in the army. Leaders from both groups had cooperated closely with President Soekarno in bringing these changes about. Thus when the party held its sixth congress at Surabaya on December 6-11, the Prime Minister was subjected to vigorous criticism with regard to his handling of the October 17 affair. In a particularly strongly worded pronouncement the congress resolved:

1. "to condemn the October 17 affair as a violation of democracy;
2. to justify the efforts made in the provinces to prevent further violations of democracy;
3. to urge the government to act faster towards a solution of the above affair, it being understood that its efforts must be based on agreement between it and the President as Supreme Commander; and
4. to urge all members of the party to remain alert in struggling for democracy." (59)

Wilopo had been all but disavowed by his own party. At the same time it had become clear that the Masjumi continued to be a strong supporter of the cabinet. With the P.N.I. so successful in turning the October 17 affair to its own advantage, Masjumi opinion had swung away from the anti-October 17 group again, and so the Sukiman group lost its momentary ascendancy in the party. The overall result was a major widening of the breach between the dominant leaders of the country's two main parties. With Masjumi-P.N.I. cooperation thus undermined and the power of the Socialist-sympathizing groups generally greatly reduced, the cabinet was seriously weakened. It is only slight exaggeration to speak of it as existing in a "political oxygen tent" from October 17 to the time of its fall. (60) But the October 17 affair had strengthened its position with regard to one point of its policy, that of preparing elections.

(59) Aneta (Surabaya), December 10, 1952.

(60) Robert C. Bone Jr., "The Future of Political Parties in Indonesia," Far Eastern Survey, February 1954.

CHAPTER VI

TOWARDS ELECTIONS

The country's first general elections had been promised and scheduled for a very long time. They were initially planned to be held as early as January 1946. But the circumstances of the revolution did not permit the holding of more than regional (residency and regency) polls--except in certain of the Dutch-sponsored states, where however there was considerable official interference with the freedom of the ballot. In the period after December 1949 every cabinet made elections for a Constituent Assembly an important part of its program. The Hatta cabinet initially planned to conduct elections so that it would be an elected Constituent Assembly which would decide between a federal and a unitary state structure. But it was impelled to bring about a unitary state by more direct means, and little was done about elections.

The Natsir cabinet did introduce an elections bill in February 1951, a bill for elections on an indirect suffrage, and its Education Minister, Mr. Wongsonegoro, stated then that he hoped elections would begin in August 1951. (1) But the cabinet fell before the bill had been discussed in parliament. Its successor, the Sukiman cabinet, organized four series of elections in selected areas, direct universal suffrage elections in Sangir-Talaud and Minahasa (both in North Sulawesi) in May and June, 1951, indirect universal suffrage elections in the Jogjakarta area in August and October, and direct elections on a literacy franchise in the town of Makassar in early February 1952. At the same time it agreed to support the bill which the Natsir government had submitted to parliament. But on August 1, 1951, it was informed in a joint report from the sub-divisions (non-specialized committees) of parliament that this bill was unacceptable. Parliament asked for elections on a direct franchise. However, no government bill on this matter had been submitted to parliament when the Sukiman government fell in February, 1952. The promise of this cabinet's Minister of Justice, Mr. Yamin, in June, 1951, that a Constituent Assembly would be sitting by December of that year, remained unfulfilled. (2)

When the Wilopo cabinet acceded to office, at a time when the much publicized Indian elections were nearing completion, there were signs of a renewed emphasis on the importance of early elections. One of the

(1) Antara, February 5, 1951.

(2) Antara, June 7, 1951.

cabinet's first acts was to table a bill for the registration of voters. This it did in July. The Minister of the Interior, Roem, stated that he hoped that this would be dealt with quickly, adding that the elections bill would follow upon it. Mononutu, as the cabinet's Minister of Information, said in May that he hoped the elections would be completed by the middle of 1953. (3) However, the sub-divisions of parliament did not discuss the Registration of Voters Bill till September and then replied with a statement of objections to some of its most important features. In particular the parliamentary sub-divisions objected to the principle that the final onus of registration should be on the voter. They took the stand that the village registration committee should be finally responsible. On the other hand, parliament had in July used its right of initiative to move for a measure for filling its currently vacant seats on the basis of party nominations. (4)

It was the October 17 affair which put an end to this cabinet-parliament "ping-pong." (5) For some months before October 17 a number of newspapers sympathetic to the Socialist Party had charged that it was the parliamentarians' concern with their personal fortunes which was delaying the making of an electoral law. These attacks were intensified as the parliamentary debates on the army approached their climax, and they attracted support from most sections of the newspaper-reading public. After October 17 "early elections" constituted a political symbol to which all parties were obliged to accord respect. The demand that elections be held soon was included in virtually all of the hundreds of statements and joint statements of political organizations in this period, and in almost all political editorials. The advocates of the dissolution of parliament were most clearly in favor. Many of them proposed elections on the basis of an emergency law made by cabinet. However their opponents, who advocated the continued functioning of parliament until elections could be held, were challenged to declare their support of early elections as determinedly, and did so. Thus there was, particularly in October and November, an element of competition between the parties as regards the positiveness with which they advocated elections.

(3) Antara, May 25, 1952.

- (4) This draft bill, prepared by a committee headed by Mr. Sunarjo of the P.N.I., was adopted by parliament on the basis of its right of legislative initiative on June 30, 1952. The P.S.I., Christian Party and Labor Party, opposed it. The government postponed action on the matter. Action was subsequently taken by the cabinet of Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, and a government bill of similar provisions became law on December 31, 1953.
- (5) This term is used derisively in Gusti Majur "Pintu Pemilihan Umum" (The Threshold of Elections), Mimbar Indonesia (weekly), February 20, 1952.

Elections were widely seen as a way out of the situation of political instability, which had reached new heights in the period of the October 17 crisis. It was argued that the frequent postponements of elections had had a politically demoralizing effect. Elections would have a salutary effect as a filter of political parties, and with the existence of an elected parliament an important source of political unrest would be eliminated. The journalist Darsjaf Rahman argued that elections would lead to the tapping of new sources of leadership and strengthen the ties between government and people. (6) Mohammad Natsir cautioned that "elections would be no magic Open Sesame" but added that they "would give a real picture of political strengths and, by bringing about greater stability, purify and strengthen democracy." (7)

In addition there was a high degree of sensitivity within the political elite to the repeated recommendations of foreign observers that elections should be held with maximum speed. (8) Some Indonesian leaders accepted the overseas advice at its face value, and believed that elections would indeed produce greater political stability. Others accepted it as a challenge to their pride in the democratic nature of the Republic. Thus Sajuti Melik believed that elections would produce a worse parliament than the one then in existence, but advocated them nevertheless, because "indeed we are rather embarrassed, for our 'democratic state' has now been in existence seven and a half years, and still there have been no elections for parliament or a Constituent Assembly." (9)

For the Wilopo cabinet, faced with a political whirlwind and unable to do much more than keep a tenuous balance between the many conflicting forces struggling for dominance, the pressure for elections provided a unique opportunity. Reduced to political impotence with regard to many aspects of its original program, it could, by virtue of the strong pro-elections feeling of the newspaper-reading public, act quickly in this one field, thereby restoring some of its lost prestige. Furthermore to work towards elections was one thing which the government could do which was expected to favor the Socialists and Socialist-sympathizers, at a

(6) Darsjaf Rahman, "Pemilihan Umum, untuk ketenangan politik dan Saringan partai politik" (Elections for Political Peace and as a Filter of Political Parties), Mimbar Indonesia (weekly, February 9, 1952).

(7) Hikmah, April 11, 1953.

(8) These recommendations did not by any means come from Western sources only. They were made with great frequency by Indian journalists and commentators, particularly after the Indian elections had got under way at the end of 1951. See Phyllis Rolnick, Indian Attitudes toward Indonesia, Fall 1950-Spring 1955, unpublished paper, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1958, pp. 18-27, 53.

(9) Pesat (weekly, Jogjakarta), March 8, 1953.

time when politically effective opinion was obliging it to take a number of steps, particularly in army personnel policy, which favored anti-Socialist groups.

Thus on October 21 the cabinet took a formal decision to hasten the holding of elections for the Constituent Assembly. On the 25th Foreign Minister Mukarto stated that the elections would begin in the middle of 1953. Three days later the Ministers of Economic Affairs and the Interior, Sumanang and Roem, ordered the printing within a month of 50 million "voter's cards" intended for purposes of registration, and on the same day the Minister of Justice, Lukman Wiriadinata, announced a cabinet decision for elections on a direct voting system. A number of heads of provincial electoral offices in Java and Sumatra issued statements at the same time concerning the preparations which had been made in their areas. (10) The government had clearly decided to draw maximum and speedy advantage from the new sense of urgency about elections.

But to understand the significance of the changes which the October 17 affair wrought with regard to action towards elections it is necessary to examine the causes of the earlier delays. Technical factors, such as the inadequacy of communications, trained personnel and government finances, and the serious disturbances of order in parts of the country such as West Java and South Sulawesi, are certainly part of the explanation. But more important are political factors.

In the first place a number of individual M.P.'s owed their seats to circumstances and anomaly and realized clearly that elections would unseat them. Many of these were independents or members of small parties and parliamentary fractions with little or no mass backing. Others who were in parties with favorable elections prospects did not curry favor with the leadership of their parties. All of these men expected to lose their seats. (11)

- (10) In Java and Sumatra more than 2000 electoral offices had been established. See statement of Mr. Soebagio Reksodipoero, Secretary of Central Electoral Office, Antara, May 10, 1952. These were mainly on the sub-district level. The offices were those of the general civil administration (pamong pradja), and members of election committees had access to them for matters related to elections. As the legal basis for these offices was in a law of the year 1948, with validity only for Java and Sumatra, election offices and committees could not be established outside these two islands.
- (11) Only 63 of the 230 persons who were members of the temporary parliament on August 1, 1954 were among the 257 elected in the elections of September 1955. (This includes those who resigned their membership immediately after assuming it in order to become ministers of the second cabinet of Mr. Ali Sasroamidjojo. It does not include those who regained membership by government appointment--as representatives of minority groups or members for West Irian.)

A factor of even greater importance was the fear of a major swing towards the specifically Islamic parties. In the existing parliament these held less than 25% of the seats. This arose from the fact that the santri or persons of strongly Islamic orientation were under-represented in the leadership of the revolution. It also reflected the fact that it was aristocratic elements, usually relatively weak in their Islamic loyalties, which had occupied positions of greatest prominence in the Dutch-sponsored states. Yet it was taken for granted that in any election based on universal suffrage Islam would be the strongest single election symbol. The dominant position which the Masjumi had achieved in the regional legislative councils established in Java and Sumatra on the basis of Government Regulation No. 39 of 1950 confirmed a number of the non-Moslem parties in their fears of elections. (12) And these fears grew when the Masjumi proved itself able to secure 18 seats of the 40 in the elections in Jogjakarta--generally considered anything but a Moslem stronghold.

Virtually all observers, Indonesian and foreign, were expecting the Masjumi to emerge from nation-wide elections as the strongest single party. The newly independent Nahdatul Ulama had barely begun to organize politically, and its potential strength was almost entirely unappreciated. Most discussion of the likely outcome of elections centered on whether the Masjumi's plurality would be such as to enable it to govern by itself and on which of the factions inside the Masjumi would have ascendancy after the elections. Among members of non-Islamic parties the fear was widespread that elections would mean the end of the state based on the "Pantja Sila" or Five Principles and its replacement by an "Islamic State." Some thought this would mean merely a difference in the wording of the Preamble to the Constitution. But others were afraid that it would entail a major shift of power affecting the whole community, and especially the whole civil service. (13)

Again it had been clear for a long time that any electoral system

(12) The members of these councils were elected in each province, regency or municipality by electoral colleges composed of the representatives of all established organizations of the area.

(13) Mr. Jusuf Wibisono of the Masjumi had stated after the last congress of his party that "the parties which are less strongly in favor of the early holding of parliamentary elections do not yet fully understand the ideals of the Islamic community, and specifically the Masjumi, in their bearing on the form of the Indonesian state." Nieuwsgier, August 28, 1952. Abikusno Tjokrosujoso, executive chairman of the P.S.I.I. (Islamic Association Party) had said that he was convinced that the holding of elections would lead to "a very big shift in the political balance, which might harm the groups now occupying the leading position in the state." Indonesia Raya, September 4, 1952.

consistent with the provisions of the interim constitution would result in weaker representation for the areas outside Java (which were in fact considerably over-represented in the existing parliament). The economic consequences of this could be considerable--for the tendency for Java to benefit from the revenue earned by the exports of the richer Outer Islands might well be accentuated. And quite apart from this economic factor, there was the long-standing anti-Javanese feeling in the outside provinces, which in the post-revolutionary years had tended to coalesce with anti-Djakarta feeling, and so to grow as dissatisfaction with the fruits of the revolution grew. Where such feeling was strong, there was every reason to believe that the prospect of increased Javanese representation in Parliament would not be welcomed.

Finally it was believed that a number of social groups would lose from the local changes in power relations which would result from the social ferment of campaigning. Fears of this sort were widespread, but they existed particularly outside Java and Sumatra, where the impact of the Japanese occupation and revolution had been felt least, and where some 300 petty principalities continued to exist. The stimulus of elections to political party life in these principalities might well, it was thought, be enough to cause their rulers to fall. Many of these rulers had been given a role of importance in the Dutch-sponsored federal states and thus they had relatively strong representation in the existing parliament.

These factors go far to explain the slowness of parliament in moving for elections. In the case of the successive cabinets, who share the responsibility for delays in almost equal measure, there are also other factors to be considered, factors which bear on the whole problem of weak government in the post-revolutionary period.

In the first place the members of every cabinet had to bear a heavy load of administrative responsibility. With no clear lines of responsibility established within the government service, many ministers were constantly burdened with a host of day-to-day decisions such as are delegated to civil service functionaries in more firmly routinized bureaucracies. Moreover many of these decisions were inevitably political. For political parties had established power centers in most government agencies, and in each of these it was necessary for administrative decisions to be taken in the light of a particular political balance. Furthermore each of the cabinets of the 1950-52 period had to face a succession of immediately critical political issues. Such tasks as the holding of elections, which were not immediately pressing, were pushed to the side of the governmental table.

But there were other consequences too of the complicated political situation within which each of the cabinets of this period had to maneuver. These cabinets were not only kept busy by the directly political tasks confronting them; they were frequently hamstrung by them. All

of the cabinets of the period were short-lived. Whenever a seriously divisive issue arose and a cabinet took action upon it, it almost always fell. Thus its successors were warned against resolute action. The Natsir government fell on the issue of the structure of the regional councils; and such was the heat of party antagonism aroused on this question that successive cabinets were obliged to avoid taking any action on this matter. Deadlock at this point, particularly between the Masjumi and P.N.I., was an important cause of the long and costly inaction of the central government in the whole matter of regional autonomy. The Sukiman government fell on the issue of acceptance of American aid on the terms of the Mutual Security Act. The Wilopo cabinet which followed it was obliged, as will be seen later, to evade a number of foreign policy issues which, if acted upon, would have split the Masjumi-P.N.I. coalition.

The cabinets of Natsir, Sukiman and Wilopo, were indeed incapable of resolute action on a number of the most basic long-term problems besetting the country. In this context it is understandable that to bring in an election bill was thought of as playing with political dynamite. The fall of the Natsir cabinet, on the regional councils issue, was recalled. Any measure which bore on the future voting strengths of the parties could well arouse divisions great enough to cost a cabinet its life, it was believed. The issue of direct versus indirect elections had still not been finally decided. The question of methods of registration of voters had been shown to be contentious when parliament had debated the government's bill on the matter. The number and size of electorates had been the subject of newspaper controversy. Most important of all there was considerable evidence that a number of parties, including some government parties, were afraid of early elections. To press vigorously for an elections law in circumstances like these, could easily produce an intensity of conflict between government parties which would give a cabinet no alternative but to resign. This was the situation which elections, it was hoped, would change. But meanwhile the situation existed.

Finally there was government hesitance about the wisdom of holding elections. Party and factional conflict at the Djakarta level was bitter. The tapering off of the Korea War boom was likely to bring a further sharpening. Was it wise to hold elections in an atmosphere like this, when campaigning could be expected to intensify the conflict and infuse it into many lower layers of society, at a time when the army, many of its cliques and groups subject to influence from different political parties, could not be relied upon to remain outside? (14) Would elections

(14) The Armed Forces Chief of Staff, Major-General Simatupang wrote, "With the approach of elections the competition between political groups to widen their influence will be greater and sharper. The effort to ensure that the armed forces continue to act as a single united and disciplined organization standing outside this competition will be...more difficult." T. B. Simatupang, "17 Agustus 1952

not lead to every sort of extremism? Would they not make the conflicts between the democratic nationalist parties so bitter, that the outgroups which were the would-be heirs to the existing democratic regime, the Communists and Darul Islam, and perhaps their foreign backers, would succeed in their efforts to be involved in these struggles? Hesitant on grounds like these, politically weak, administratively overburdened and faced by parliamentary hostility, governments relegated elections to a place of low priority.

After October 17 however government action was speedy. An ad hoc ministerial committee consisting of Mr. Roem and Mr. Lukman, of Justice and the Interior respectively, worked rapidly to prepare a draft elections bill for submission to cabinet. By November 25 the bill, as approved by cabinet, had been submitted to parliament. When parliament reassembled two days later, for the first time since October 17, it began immediately to discuss this bill.

In the following 18 weeks the elections bill was debated in three readings and then clause by clause with a consideration of amendments. The bill received wide attention and support. There were popular expositions of the idea of elections and of the particular bill under discussion in a variety of government and private magazines. At the same time a rush of booklets by lawyers, journalists, politicians and government servants, on the same subjects, came from the publishing houses. (15) Parties began establishing special election committees, and emphasizing elections as an occasion demanding heightened party loyalty.

However, for a considerable time after the October 17 affair, there was hope in some quarters that the passing of the elections bill could be prevented, or at least postponed. The most cursory glance at the press of the time indicates that some sections of it were much more enthusiastic supporters of elections than others. All sections indeed wrote supporting editorials, but in the case of some sections, generally those which had been opposed to the army leadership in the debates before October 17, there was a distinct coolness on the subject from December onwards. These papers placed their central emphasis on "settling the October 17

dan Persoalan-Persoalan Kemiliteran kita," Mimbar Indonesia (weekly), August 17, 1952.

- (15) Rustan Sutan Palindih, Rakjat Berdaulat dan Pemilihan Umum (The Sovereignty of the People and Elections), Bulan Bintang, Djakarta, 1952; Sakirman, Tentang Pemilihan Umum (Concerning Elections), Pambaruan, Djakarta, 1952; Rachmady dan Husny Abbas, Pemilihan Umum, Politis dan Technis (Elections, Political and Technical Aspects), Endang, Djakarta, 1953. For an annotated list of the books and booklets on elections published after the bill became law see Adi Negoro, Pemilihan Umum dan Djiwa Masyarakat di Indonesia, Bulan Bintang, Djakarta, 1953, pp. 4-6.

Affair," by which they meant punishing those who, in their opinion, had attempted to enact a coup d'etat. "Settle the October 17 Affair" and "All Attention to Elections" became rival slogans. By implication the "Settle the October 17 Affair" groups made it clear that they did not support the elections bill inasmuch as it was the result of the events of October 17. Merdeka, for instance, wrote that "there would not be anything fishy about the general elections, if they were not interpreted by some critical people as having been prompted by the October 17 Affair." The same editorial outlined a number of difficulties with regard to elections, the possibility of interference by persons who took different stands on the October 17 Affair, the bad economic conditions of the country, the lack of security in areas like West Java, and the apathy among the mass of the rural population. (16)

In private a number of M.P.'s of the anti-October 17 group gave it as their opinion that the rush to get elections was a P.S.I. maneuver to detract attention from what had happened on October 17. The same men argued that both the elections bill and the preparations for elections had to be given the full and detailed attention of government and parliament and were, therefore, not to be dealt with hastily. (17) Their opponents asserted strongly that there was obstruction of the elections bill in parliament--and this accusation came not only from Socialist-sympathizing newspapers and magazines but also from official and semi-official organs of the Masjumi. (18)

One attempt to prevent the passing of the elections bill was a series of motions which distracted attention from the elections issue. The first of these was an amendment proposed by Djaswadi Suprpto of the P.N.I. to a government bill on company tax. This amendment asked that limited companies earning an annual profit of between R 100,000 and R 500,000 should be taxed progressively at rates of between 25% and 35%, rather than at an overall rate as proposed by the government, of 40%. Djaswadi moved the amendment, he said, in order to protect national enterprises. The Minister of Finance opposed it because he estimated that it would cost the Treasury R 200 million. Nevertheless the amendment was passed on February 4, with the P.N.I. and P.S.I.I. voting with the Communists, Murba, Progressive Fraction, P.I.R., P.R.N. and Nahdatul Ulama. Only the Masjumi, the P.S.I. and the two Christian parties supported the government. It had been thought that the Finance Minister might resign if the amendment was passed, but he merely stated that

(16) Quoted in weekly press review of Times of Indonesia (Djakarta), February 18, 1953.

(17) Cf. Mimbar Indonesia (daily), November 5, 1952; Sunday Courier (Communist-sympathizing weekly), December 24, 1952.

(18) Suara Masjumi (The Voice of the Masjumi), monthly, Djakarta, Jan.-Feb. 1953; Hikmah, weekly, Djakarta, April 11, 1953; Abadi, January-April passim.

cabinet had yet to come to a decision on the matter, as in every case of amendment of a government bill.

A second motion, introduced on February 9 by Mr. Iwa Kusumasumantri (Progressive), asked for the establishment of a separate Ministry for the Navy and Air Force. Its other signatories included members of the Murba and Labor parties and the independent Mrs. Rasuna Said. Here clearly was an attempt to bring the issues of October 17 back into the center of the political arena. But the Consultative Committee of Parliament decided that discussion of this motion should be postponed.

The third and most important of the motions was introduced a day later, on February 10. This was the motion of Otto Rondonuwu, of the Progressive Fraction, signed also by representatives of P.R.N., the Labor Party, P.I.R. and Murba, for the establishment of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R. by the end of the current year. As a corollary of the independent foreign policy in almost any of its many interpretations this had general appeal. It was dangerous to the cabinet because of the two main parties' commitment to opposite points of view on it. On the one hand the Rondonuwu motion paralleled a demand in the P.N.I.'s urgency program. Furthermore the P.N.I. Foreign Minister, Mukarto Notowidigdo, was personally committed to the early establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union. (19) On the other hand the Masjumi, as now became widely known, had insisted on inaction in this matter as the price of its participation in the Wilopo cabinet, when this cabinet was being formed. (20) For some time it appeared as if this motion would drive the elections bill off the political stage, and even that it would cause the cabinet's fall, which was much discussed at this time. But it was eventually decided by the Consultative Committee of Parliament that further discussion of the Rondonuwu motion would be postponed until after the elections bill had become law.

Each of these three motions had important intrinsic aims. But there can be little doubt, in view of their timing, their political contentiousness and their common basis of support—in the minor nationalist parties, "oppositionists," P.N.I. and P.K.I.—that considerable sections of their supporters were motivated by a desire to sidetrack the elections bill and were not averse to causing the cabinet's fall by their actions.

These efforts to delay passage of the bill reached a climax in early March, as parliament began the clause by clause stage of its discussion of the bill. No less than 200 amendments were tabled at this stage, and

(19) Before leaving New York to take up his cabinet post Mukarto had stated that the establishment of an Indonesian Embassy in Moscow could not be postponed any longer. Antara, April 24, 1952.

(20) See Mimbar Indonesia (daily), quoted in Times of Indonesia, February 18, 1953.

the debate proceeded very slowly, with a great deal of time being devoted to minor clauses. At the same time however press opposition to delaying tactics reached a peak of intensity. The Medan daily Waspada wrote, "What seems like a majority of the honorable members are now acting as if they were intentionally sabotaging the bill so that their seats in parliament can be safe still longer." (21) Isa Anshary bluntly accused the P.N.I. of being afraid of elections. Mohammad Natsir was indignant at a Communist-sponsored amendment for a census to precede the holding of elections. If passed, he said, this amendment would lead to a delay in elections of from one to two years. (22)

At this point the would-be delayers conceded defeat. On March 12 the Consultative Committee of parliament took the important decision to postpone parliamentary discussion of the Rondonuwu motion and all other matters until after the elections bill had become law. Several days later the chairman of parliament, Mr. Sartono of the P.N.I., initiated a new procedure in debate. Thenceforth all amendments to the elections bill were first discussed in committee, between their signatories, the two government ministers, Roem and Lukman, and the chairman and vice-chairmen of parliament. The result was unprecedented legislative teamwork which led to the passing of the amended bill on April 1.

Ironically it was in the last two weeks of the debate, when amendments were being discussed rapidly and systematically, that the parties and the various sections of the press were most concerned to accuse one another of attempting to produce delay. Almost all groups joined in the accusations at this stage. Quaintest of all was the one from Merdeka. This paper, hitherto a leader of opposition both to the Wilopo cabinet and to early elections, praised the P.N.I. and P.K.I. for doing their best to prevent "a certain group" (Merdeka's term for the P.S.I.) from delaying elections and causing a cabinet crisis--only to add that it was already too late to prevent the fall of the cabinet. (23) Qui accuse s'excuse.

The evidence is considerable that a number of parties which were afraid of early elections, worked for a large part of the time when the elections bill was being debated, for the postponement of its passage. However, at a certain point which came in early March, when it was clear that strong public support existed for early elections, and that further delaying or sidetracking tactics would be dangerous to the prestige of parliament, these groups evidently decided to abandon these, and immediately took a strongly positive stand in favor of the early passage of the bill. One may assume that they hoped to exert influence in other

(21) Waspada, March 12, 1953.

(22) Keng Po, March 13, 1953.

(23) Merdeka, March 16, 1953.

ways against the holding of early elections. One such way was to create difficulties for the execution of the numerous governmental measures necessary to implement the law. Another was to attempt to unseat the Wilopo cabinet.

But before going on to discuss the situation which existed when the elections bill had become law, we should look back at the course of the bill in parliament. (24) Indirectly this provides an important source of information on the politics of the elections issue. As submitted to parliament on November 25, the bill was for universal suffrage elections for both a Constituent Assembly (elected, according to the interim constitution on the basis of one member for every 150,000 residents, with appointees to represent Indonesian citizens of the Chinese, European and Arab minority groups) and a Parliament (elected similarly, but on the basis of one member for 300,000 residents, with similar provision for appointees). Literates would be able to vote either for the list of a party or organization or for one candidate within such a list; illiterates only for a list as such, by choosing a symbol marked on the ballot paper.

The basis of the government's bill was proportional representation. This was never publicly challenged. (25) But there was considerable controversy as to the number of electoral districts for which separate lists were to be constructed. The government bill, itself a result of a long series of compromises, posited 15 electoral districts, three in Java and twelve outside. The number of representatives for each electoral district

(24) See Rantjangan Undang-undang Pemilihan Anggota Konstituante dan Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat (Draft Bill for the Election of Members of the Constituent Assembly and Parliament), Kementerian Penerangan, November 21, 1952. The law which finally emerged was published as a booklet of the Ministry of Information, For the Election of Members of the Constituent Assembly and of the House of Representatives, 1953. For discussions of the law see Boyd R. Compton, "The Indonesian Election Law," Far Eastern Survey, April-May 1954, and Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, pp. 1-5. Deeply influenced by Dutch constitutional and electoral practice, the bill also incorporated features which had been observed by the teams of electoral officers sent to Australia and India. More particularly it reflected the lessons learned in the trial elections held in Indonesia, particularly the elections in Minahasa and Jogjakarta.

(25) In personal conversation the writer found several Indonesian leaders to believe a single member constituency system to be preferable. But these men also thought that it would be impossible for such a system to gain the approval of the existing parliament, dominated as it was by small parties which stood to gain from proportional representation.

would be determined on a population basis. The undistributed votes of the various parties and organizations in each electoral district would be centrally pooled in a second state of allocation of seats. In this system the fact of a multiplicity of districts favored the relatively sparsely populated areas outside Java, and particularly areas where the rate of voting participation could be expected to be low, whereas the pooling arrangements, which ensured that virtually no votes would be "lost," promised to work to the advantage of the large population districts in Java.

Challenges to this system came from several sides. A Catholic Party amendment for one all-Indonesian electoral district, apparently favoring medium-sized parties with support distributed in many parts of the country, drew support from the P.K.I., Murba, Progressive Fraction and P.S.I.I., but was defeated 92:29. An amendment of the Socialist Party for 33 districts, delineated according to ethnic-linguistic criteria, and apparently favoring parties with strength in East Indonesia, drew support from the Democratic Fraction, but was also defeated, as was one from P.I.R. for 24 districts, which the two Christian parties and the Democratic Fraction supported. The only amendment which secured a majority was the one of the Labor Party, supported by the Masjumi and P.N.I., which increased the number of electoral districts by one, by the separation of Greater Djakarta from West Java. This favored parties strong in West Java and worked against those with more than proportionate support in Djakarta.

A surprise amendment came from the P.N.I. member I. A. Moesis. This asked that the number of seats per electoral district be determined not strictly according to population but according to the number of regencies (kabupaten) in each. It was defeated, despite support from the P.I.R., P.S.I., the Labor Party and the Progressive and Democratic Fractions. If passed, this motion, which the government spokesmen declared unconstitutional, would have radically changed the balance of representation in favor of the areas outside Java. The outer islands would have received 250 seats as compared with 263 for Java, whereas on a population basis the ratio would have been approximately 175 to 338. (26)

Another proposal favoring the areas outside Java, that of Sahetappy Engel of the Democratic Fraction, asked that each electorate be assured a minimum of 10 seats in the Constituent Assembly and 5 in the new Parliament. It was supported by the P.N.I. and P.S.I., but was

(26) In this writer's view it is conceivable that the P.N.I. should have expected less electoral success in Java than outside. P.N.I. sponsorship of this amendment could be explained on the supposition that the parliamentary party knew that the amendment would be defeated in parliament, or not accepted by the government as being in conflict with the constitution.

also defeated. However a modification of this amendment, with the minimum figures as six and three, was accepted by the government.

Just as important was the franchise issue. The government bill proposed universal franchise of everyone over 18. It is a reflection of the extent to which liberalism has influenced the thinking of this predominantly Moslem country that the female franchise was not at any stage publicly questioned. Nor was the idea of a direct election challenged--although there had been strong support for indirect elections earlier. (27) On the other hand, amendments were proposed for the further extension of the franchise. A Communist amendment for the lowering of the minimum age to 16 was defeated by 93 votes to 28. On the other hand a Masjumi amendment for the suffrage to include also persons under 18 who are or have been married, was carried by 58 votes to 54.

The government maintained that the bill under discussion should be for the election of a Constituent Assembly and a Parliament either together or within a very short time of one another. It defeated a P.I.R.-Murba amendment for the holding of only Constituent Assembly elections. According to the interim constitution this would have involved the Constituent Assembly carrying out the functions of parliament, with most legislative work done by a Working Parliament of about 50 elected from its membership. This amendment does not appear to have been rooted in any calculated concern for party advantage. (28)

The parties' tactical interests were more easily detected when the

(27) This is suggested by the fact that both the Natsir and Sukiman cabinets favored the indirect system. However public statements favoring the indirect system were very few, particularly after the parliamentary report of August 1, 1951, favoring the direct system. The shared ideology of the newspaper-reading public demanded of parties that they should profess their faith in the people by affirming the direct elections principle. That the Masjumi was the strongest advocate of the indirect system is suggested by a statement of support for this system made by the party's Secretary-General K. H. Taufiqurrahman as late as October 23, 1952. But Mr. Roem, the Masjumi Minister for the Interior, was one of the main architects of the government bill providing for direct elections, and no Masjumi parliamentarian opposed the direct voting principle in the course of the parliamentary debate on the bill.

(28) It is clear to the writer from his discussions with parliamentary leaders at the time that in the case of many of the amendments the parties did not carefully consider the implications of particular technical provisions in the light of their own interests. Under these circumstances the influence of a party leader's favorite constitutional theory could be important, as could persuasion by members of a cooperating party.

debate turned to procedures of registration, candidacy and voting, and to the division of electoral authority between various ministries and various layers of the administration. While the original bill had placed final responsibility for registration of voters at the regency level, an amendment of the Masjumi and smaller government parties, which the government subsequently accepted, placed it lower, at the level of the sub-district. A P.N.I. amendment to place the final onus of registration on the registration committee rather than the voter, was rejected. Apparently the P.N.I. expected support particularly from government officials, and more support at the higher levels of the administration than at the lower.

The government proposal that illiterates should vote for a party or other list by its symbol, and that literates should have a choice between this method and that of writing the name of either a party or one individual candidate on the ballot paper, was upheld. A Catholic Party amendment for a system of registration receipts to be produced on election day, as in the Jogjakarta election, was rejected.

A P.N.I.-Progressive motion to have all electoral bodies placed directly under the Prime Minister, was defeated by 79 votes to 56, and a subsequent motion of the independent Zainul Baharuddin with support from the P.N.I., the Progressive Fraction, P.S.I.I., and Murba, to have all bodies under the Minister for the Interior was rejected by 71 to 50. Finally a Masjumi amendment for the reconstitution of the electoral committees which had been established in Java and Sumatra under the 1948 law was carried by 56 votes to 50. (29)

Throughout the debate on the bill government parties frequently voted with the opposition. This and the fact that so many amendments were proffered led to the fear that the final product of the debate would be a hotch-potch. (30) But this can hardly be said to have been the case. The elections act as proclaimed on April 4 bears marks of ultra-democratic imagination, which promised to be both expensive and burdensome to efficient administration of elections, in a country which had never before had them on a national scale. But it constitutes a workable system. With the bill passed the government was in a position to take a number of thereto legally impossible steps towards elections. Political factors apart, there was no reason why nation-wide balloting could not be held within a year. (31)

(29) Concern had been expressed because the existing Central Electoral Office was headed by a member of the P.N.I. executive, Mr. Soebagio Reksodipoero.

(30) See for instance Pedomam, March 14, 1953.

(31) The Minister of the Interior, Mr. Roem, stated in early March that elections would take place no later than 10 months after the final passage of the bill. Aneta, March 27, 1953.

However political handicaps were to be faced even in the two months following the passage of the bill. Cabinet moved fairly rapidly to the task of appointing a Central Electoral Committee. According to its conception, this Committee was to consist of one representative of each of the government parties. The independent M.P. Mr. Assaat was to be chairman and the Masjumi's parliamentary leader Mr. Burhanuddin Harahap deputy-chairman. The composition of the committee was decided upon at the cabinet's meeting on April 28. But no P.N.I. member was named. Nor was the decision publicized. P.N.I. opposition to the cabinet's approach in the matter meant that no Committee had been formally established when the Wilopo cabinet resigned on June 2.

The great importance of the elections question for the political parties is clear. Which parties then were the ones in favor of the postponement of elections? And how did the issue between postponers and hasteners affect the general pattern of political alignments?

Of central importance in this regard was the P.N.I. It was the P.N.I.'s support of delaying and sidetracking endeavors, most of which were actually sponsored by members of minor nationalist parties or "oppositionist" groups, which gave these endeavors their importance. On any of the many estimates then made, the P.N.I. would lose much of its power from elections, unless it had somehow succeeded in strengthening its position greatly by the time they were held. Of significance in P.N.I. thinking in this connection was the fact, much discussed at the party's congress in December 1952, that it had next to no electioneering funds. It was impossible for any major party to take a stand against elections as such. For by March 1953, when strong public pressure for elections had been sustained for five months, the majority of political leaders felt that--unless there were unforeseen developments such as a breakdown of the democratic nationalist structure--elections would have to be held. But it was possible for the P.N.I. to work for a postponement of elections. And it was possible to work for a situation in which the P.N.I. as a party would gain greater advantages from occupancy of government power than was the case under Wilopo. It is this double course to which the P.N.I., or rather its two strongest groups, of Sidik Djojokusarto and Mr. Sartono, became committed. In the top counsels of the party it was only the relatively small group of Mr. Wilopo and his associates who advocated early elections. These men argued that the political stability which elections promised to bring, would lessen the prospects of extreme groups like the Communists and the Darul Islam. But the interests of the party overrode them.

Much of the initiative for the sidetracking ventures came from the minor nationalist parties, Parindra, the Labor Party, P.I.R., P.R.N., S.K.I. and the Democratic Fraction, and from the national-communist Partai Murba and its sympathizers. Oppositionist attitudes were strong among these parties, particularly those of them not represented in the

cabinet. All of them except Murba were substantially without a basis of grassroots support, and all were afraid of an increase in the power of Islam in government.

The Moslem League parties, P.S.I.I. and Nahdatul Ulama, were associated with the P.N.I. in some of the activities which appear to have been motivated by the fear of early elections, although they were expected to increase their parliamentary representation in elections, and although they sought to create some sort of an Islamic State. One possible explanation of this is in terms of the bitterness of rivalry between these parties and the Masjumi. In addition it is probable that these parties wanted to use to the full the situation then existing, where their usefulness to the P.N.I. and associated parties gave them considerable bargaining power.

The Communist Party's attitude towards elections is to be understood in a similar way. On most estimates the P.K.I. was expected to attain either second or third position in an election. Furthermore its leaders, carefully noting the experience of their fellow-Communists in the Indian elections, foresaw the great advantages which the electioneering situation would give them in their task of creating class consciousness and stimulating popular demands for economic betterment. (32) But the P.K.I.'s overriding concern was for the continuance of its alliance with the P.N.I. It was the P.N.I. which was the chief guarantor of the Communists' freedom of movement, a freedom which had gained them very great successes in the Wilopo period, but which was endangered by that very fact. According to the P.K.I. itself the number of its members and candidate members had risen from 7910 in March 1952 to more than 100,000 in February 1953. (33) This prompted a much publicized appeal by Dr. Sukiman in March that Indonesia should, like India, adopt a firmly anti-Communist policy in internal affairs. To guard against this possibility the P.K.I. stood greatly in need of backing from the P.N.I. Communist policy was therefore oriented to supporting the P.N.I. in its efforts to have elections postponed.

The party which had advocated elections most consistently throughout the post-revolutionary period was the P.S.I. This in itself requires explanation when it is considered that the Socialists were likely neither to increase their representation in elections nor to benefit from a further association of Islamic religion with government. Socialist

(32) See Sakirman, Tentang Pemilihan Umum (Concerning Elections), Pembaruan, Djakarta, 1952, pp. 14-23.

(33) M. H. Lukman, "Kewaspadaan dalam Peluasan Keanggotaan Partai" (Vigilance in the Expansion of Party Membership), Bintang Merah, Vol. IX, No. 2, February 1953, p. 53; D. N. Aidit, "Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia" (The Road to People's Democracy for Indonesia), Bintang Merah, Vol. IX, No. 9-10, September-October 1953, p. 401.

leaders explained their stand in terms of their concern for political stability. They saw political stabilization as a first prerequisite for economic development and believed it to be in their own interest in that their party could not operate effectively in a political situation dominated by irrationality. Some of the party's leaders argued further that for stability it was necessary that Islam be given greater political power. The alternative, they said, was to encourage the Masjumi to turn towards Darul Islam.

Moreover the P.S.I. expected to be able to benefit directly from a Masjumi electoral victory. Sjahrir told a Manchester Guardian correspondent that he was confident that "places would be found for Socialists in the government if the Masjumi Party won the election." (34) He added that his party did not "take too seriously Masjumi talk about making Indonesia an Islamic State."

The two Christian parties took a similar position of positive support for the elections program of the cabinet, although they had not frequently appealed for elections in the previous period. Their basis of potential voting strength was, if not large, at least reliable. On the other hand they were exceedingly apprehensive of the possibility of an Islamic State. This latter factor produced pressures, particularly in the Protestant Parkindo, for an abandonment of support for the Masjumi-Socialist policies of which the energetic pursuit of elections was a central component. But both parties remained committed to these policies.

The Masjumi itself did not have the P.S.I.'s record of demands for early elections. This may be in part because the party was loath to appear critical of the Natsir and Sukiman cabinets, both headed by Masjumi members. It may also be that pressure against elections was exerted by rural propertied groups within the party, who feared the stimulus which electioneering could give to social ferment. But in any event the Masjumi's leaders were prominent advocates of early elections in the period of the Wilopo cabinet. The pronouncements of Masjumi leaders made after October 17 were particularly strong on this point, those of Mr. Jusuf Wibisono, of the Sukiman group, no less so than those of Mohammad Natsir. On February 24, 1953, the party's Madjlis Sjuro (Religious High Council) issued an edict which stated that the holding of elections was an obligation under religious law. Preparations were being made at the same time for the Mukhtar Alim-Ulama dan Muballigh

(34) March 16, 1953. P.S.I. leaders were inclined to believe that the effect of elections would be to strengthen the position of the Natsir group in the Masjumi. P.N.I. men and persons from the Christian parties on the other hand tended to believe that elections would result in a strengthening of the reactionary and fundamentalist Islam associated with the name of Isa Anshary.

Islam se-Indonesia (All-Indonesian Conference of Religious Scholars and Missionaries) to be held in April, which was to issue further edicts on elections and on the future Islamic constitution. In the last stages of the parliamentary debate the Masjumi parliamentary fraction took steps to counteract the efforts to achieve delay. It first agreed to withdraw all but the most important of its amendments to the government bill, then proposed that the parliamentary recess be postponed until the bill had become law.

Thus the elections debates, coming upon and coalescing with the October 17 issue, further emphasized the tendency for political polarization described earlier. If fear of elections had been a factor urging the P.N.I. and the minor nationalist and "oppositionist" groups to cooperate with the Communists in the middle of 1952, it was all the more important a factor after October 17, when the possibility of the early holding of elections had become much greater. Similarly the P.S.I., increasingly thrown upon the Masjumi by the failure of the October 17 Affair, was able to draw closer to this party on the basis of a common stand on the issue of elections. The Wilopo group grew weaker inside the P.N.I. because its leader's policy for early elections was dangerous to the interests of the party. Contemplating the possibility of early elections, the Masjumi and P.N.I. were each forced to concentrate on closing its ranks and pursuing its interests as a party. Thus the two main parties grew increasingly hostile to one another.

The importance of the elections factor in driving a wedge between the P.N.I. and the Masjumi was all the greater for the fact that the elections which were planned were for a Constituent Assembly as well as a parliament. Inevitably therefore there arose the question of the role which Islam would be accorded in the new constitution. This came to the political foreground, both while the election bill was under discussion and soon thereafter, in the form of a debate between the supporters of the existing Pantja Sila or Five Principles of State and the advocates of a "state based on Islam."

This new phase of political controversy was sparked by a speech of President Soekarno at Amuntai in strongly Moslem South Kalimantan, on January 27. Commenting on a banner which asked "Indonesia a National State or an Islamic State?", President Soekarno is reported to have said, "The state we want is a national state consisting of all Indonesia. If we establish a state based on Islam, many areas whose population is not Islamic, such as the Moluccas, Bali, Flores, Timor, the Kai Islands and Sulawesi, will secede. And West Irian, which has not yet become part of the territory of Indonesia will not want to be part of the Republic." (35)

(35) Antara, January 29, 1953.

This speech was the cause of strong protest. The Masjumi leader Kiai Isa Anshary was the first to register objections. In a note to the government he declared the President's utterance to be undemocratic, unconstitutional and in conflict with the ideology of Islam which is professed by the great majority of Indonesian citizens. (36) After him the Nahdatul Ulama, the Masjumi's youth organization G.P.I.I., the Front Muballigh Islam (Moslem Missionaries' Front) of North Sumatra, the Central Sumatra centered Perti (Pergerakan Tarbijah Islamijah, Islamic Educational Association) and a number of other Moslem organizations registered their disapproval.

The G.P.I.I. stated that the President had exceeded his constitutional limitations, that his speech had sown seeds of separatism, and that it represented a taking of sides by the head of state with groups opposed to the ideology of Islam. The Nahdatul Ulama, in a similar declaration, expressed strong opposition to the idea that an Islamic government should be thought incapable of preserving national unity. The Front Muballigh Islam presented the view that although the Pantja Sila was not in conflict with Islam, it also did not fulfill all the requirements of the Islamic teachings.

A number of P.N.I. leaders came to President Soekarno's defense. Some argued for the special prerogatives of President Soekarno as a man who was a revolutionary leader and inspirer of his people as well as a constitutional head of state. Others referred to the long-standing divisions between Islamic scholars in Indonesia in the matter of nationalism and the role of the national state. (37) Pointing to the strongly articulated fears of Indonesian Christians of what their lot would be in an Islamic State, they spoke of the danger to democracy of oppression by a majority. At the level of polemic they singled out Isa Anshary and attacked him as a fanatic and unscrupulous agitator. The radical P.N.I. leader Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro referred to Anshary as a "new friend of the Darul Islam" (38) and this charge was echoed by the Communist Party, which was then engaged in a campaign to link the Masjumi in the public mind with the Darul Islam. Thereupon Isa Anshary, in a repeated call for a withdrawal of the President's Amuntai speech, said that this had helped the Darul Islam, by shutting the door for the Islamic community which was pursuing its ends through parliamentary channels.

This bitter controversy was a source of considerable embarrassment to the intellectual leaders of the Masjumi. These men saw Anshary's directness and his appeal to mass radicalism as a danger both to their

(36) Aneta, February 2, 1953.

(37) For instance Sajuti Melik, Negara Nasional atukah Negara Islam, Kedauletan Rakjat, Jogjakarta, February 15, 1953, p. 37.

(38) Sin Po, March 11, 1953.

own position in the party and to the party's relationships with other political organizations. Thus both Mohammad Natsir and Dr. Sukiman made statements which attempted to minimize the importance of the issues which had been raised. They argued that the disagreement was the result of a confusion of terms, and that the matter was an internal one of the Moslem community and not to be discussed in exaggerated terms outside it. (39)

But the controversy raged on. It reached a second stage shortly after the elections bill had become law. At a sports ground rally in Djakarta on the occasion of Mi'radj, the Prophet Mohammad's Ascension to Heaven, April 12, a number of leaders of Moslem political parties made challenging speeches centering on the hope of an Islamic electoral victory. The last and longest of the addresses, which was also the most uncompromising, was by Isa Anshary. Anshary came directly to the issues which the President's Amuntai speech had brought to the fore. "In Indonesia at the present time," he said, "there is a cold war between Islam on the one hand and on the other those who call themselves Islamic and aren't. The central question is whether the state is to be based on God's laws or not." Let there be a demarcation line, Anshary said, between the Islamic and the non-Islamic groups, let us be rid of those who are half and half. The Koran was totalitarian, he went on to say. The Islamic State, as established by Mohammad himself, ensured generous protection of the religious rights of Christians and Jews, but it gave no protection to hypocrite Moslems. An oblique reference made it clear that the speaker included the President among the latter. The heavy applause given to this speech of Isa Anshary stood in strong contrast to the cool and expressly unenthusiastic reception which President Soekarno received when he spoke at a large Mi'radj meeting held at the presidential palace on the same evening. (40)

But this impressive show of strength by Isa Anshary produced a wave of reactions. At a mass meeting of the P.N.I. in Bandung on April 19 four leaders of this party made election speeches. Isnaeni urged his listeners not to elect "double-dealers in religion." Gatot Mangkupraja challenged the voters to "choose between Isa Anshary and Bung Karno." Anshary hit back by accusing Gatot of "political chicanery using the name of the head of state." But it was the Masjumi leader who came in for most criticism when the press expressed its fears of the consequences of immoderate electioneering. Although the attitude of the Masjumi as a party was never expressed in this context and was presumably considerably different from the attitude of Isa Anshary, there is no doubt that this leader's radicalism heightened the fears of the P.N.I.--and of President Soekarno--of Masjumi strength.

(39) See Antara, March 6, and Aneta, March 21 for Natsir's views and Antara, March 5 for Sukiman's.

(40) These remarks on the atmosphere at the two meetings are based on the author's personal observations.

In April there was widespread apprehensiveness at the prospect of an election campaign in which all the contending parties would resort to unrestrained agitation. Observers noted that President Soekarno had found vehement support for his views on Islam in the state when he had traveled in Christian areas like Tapanuli and equally vehement opposition to them when he had spoken in such strongly Moslem areas as Atjeh. Some wrote of the possibility of civil war breaking out if the parties were too extreme in their campaigning. (41) Large numbers of editorials echoed the words of the chairman of parliament, Mr. Sartono, that parties should not forget the limits of good manners in their pronouncements about one another. (42)

In the same month of April there was an All-Indonesian Conference of Religious Scholars (Ulama) and Missionaries (Muballigh) held in Medan. This was a case unprecedented in recent times of the meeting of a large number of religious leaders of the Moslem community to confer and speak out on primarily political problems. The conference came to be held partly because elections were expected in the near future, and partly also because of the stimulus which the community of the orthodox had received as a result of the speech of the President at Amuntai. The organizers were supporters of the Masjumi. After five days of deliberation the 217-man conference issued a fatwa (decree representing a consensus of religious authority) and several keputusan (decisions). The fatwa instructed all Moslems to cast a vote in the forthcoming elections and to give it to "candidates committed to the implementation of the teachings and laws of Islam in the state." In one of the keputusan the conference set down a statement of what were the essentials of an Islamic constitution. This was true to Islamic fundamentals in providing that "the basis of law of the State shall be the Koran and Hadith" and that "the Head of State shall be an Indonesian citizen of Moslem faith." At the same time it was modern in its clauses on parliamentary government, on basic human rights, on equal rights for women and on government regulation (guidance) of the economy. (43)

Here then was a statement of the highest common factor of agreement within the religious community on the controversial question of the "Islamic state" or "state based on Islam." This was a significant

(41) E.g. Mohammad Ibnu Sajoeti (Sajuti Melik), Demokrasi Pantja Sila dan Perdjoangan Ideologis Didilamnja, Pesat, Jogja, Djakarta, 1953, p. 31 and passim.

(42) See for instance Berita Indonesia, April 23; Harian Rakjat, April 23; Pemandangan, April 24; Mimbar Indonesia (daily), April 25.

(43) See Dasar-dasar Perdjoangan Partai Politik Islam Indonesia Masjumi, Islamyah, Medan, 1954, pp. 104-107.

political achievement. The conference itself was an organizational achievement of major proportions--despite the fact that the members did not agree to the proposal for a continuing organization to represent religious opinion.

In the months of March and April there was considerable Darul Islam activity, raids by armed gangs particularly in West Java. At the same time a trial was proceeding in Bandung of Affandi Ridhwan, a leader of the Masjumi youth organization G.P.I.I., charged with associations with the Darul Islam rebels under Kartosuwirjo. A G.P.I.I. colleague Achmad Buchari was awaiting trial in Djakarta on a similar charge. Both were soon to be found guilty. The successful mass oratory of Isa Anshary and the organizational achievement of the Medan Ulama conference were therefore seen by secular nationalists in the context of their fear of the theocratic professions and terroristic practice of the Darul Islam. Non-Moslems and members of not specifically Moslem political groups believed they were facing a new confidence among the orthodox Moslems, and particularly the extremists among them. As a result they grew more and more afraid not only of a transformation of the Pantja Sila State into an Islamic State such as might result from elections, but also of an election campaign in which Islamic mass fanaticism could readily be aroused.

Subsequent events proved these fears to have been greatly exaggerated. But they were nonetheless real at the time. And they were an important factor in strengthening the association of the P.N.I. with all anti-Masjumi organizations, especially the Communist Party.

CHAPTER VII

THE FALL OF THE CABINET

In the three of four months before it fell on June 2 the Wilopo cabinet faced crisis after crisis. Such was the strength of opposition to it, and so strong the antagonism between its two major parties, Masjumi and P.N.I., that it all but fell on several occasions. In this period it found it particularly difficult to get on with its task of making political decisions. It could enact only governmental business of the most routine nature. More than at any previous time in its existence it could survive in office only by evading the contentious issues placed before it. The deadlock between the major parties which finally resulted in its fall, may be interpreted as the sign of a new alignment of political forces--P.N.I., minor nationalist parties, Moslem League parties and Communists against Masjumi, Socialists and Christians--to which expression was given later in the formation of the cabinet of Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo.

But to understand this development it is important that we should look at it in the light of the economic and social situation existing in the period. The country's economic position in the first five months of 1953 showed a significant improvement in comparison with 1952. Imports were cut radically--they amounted to 22% less than in the first five months of 1952--and this created a favorable balance of trade. (1) This was achieved despite the fact that the total value of exports for the first half of the year was only US \$63.9 million, \$11.9 million less than in the previous six months. (2)

In addition foodstuffs production had grown considerably and there had been a significant increase in the output of textiles. (3) The economic position of rural and lower class Indonesians had improved to a small but important extent. On the other hand the import cuts created inflationary pressures in the cities. Furthermore, many of the effects of the large budget deficit of 1952 came to be felt at this period. Thus there was a marked rise in urban retail prices between January and March. But the price index fell again as from April as a result of a regulation raising importers' pre-payment requirements, for this forced

(1) For this and many other pieces of information in this section I am indebted to Mr. Hans O. Schmitt.

(2) Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East 1953, pp. 10, 74-5.

(3) Ibid., pp. 72, 78.

importers to dump stocks to recover liquidity. A fairly satisfactory degree of price stability was thus maintained in the first half of 1953-- at the expense mainly of the importers. (4)

In the country's internal security there was some improvement, but not much. The picture in West Java gave cause for hope. There the Wilopo cabinet was applying a policy of increasing toughness against the Darul Islam and other bands. The result was an actual increase in the scale of bandit activity in the last three quarters of 1952, but an improvement in the first half of 1953. In the first five months of 1953 there were no major outbreaks of terrorism and the rebels appeared to have been reduced to operating in small bands. In May it was possible to announce a complete lifting of the curfew in Djakarta.

On the other hand the situation remained as serious as before in South Sulawesi. There the Kahar Muzakar group, which now described itself as part of the "Islamic State of Indonesia" (of the West Java Darul Islam leader Kartosuwirjo) became further entrenched in its power. By the middle of 1953 important areas of both the South-East and South-West legs of the island were in the group's hands. Following the seizure of military power in Makassar by Lieut. Col. Warouw there were a number of eruptions of regionalist and religious discord inside the Sulawesi units of the army, and one result of these was a decline in the pace of government action against Kahar Muzakar. The Prime Minister was forced to state that "restoration and maintenance of security will take a long time." (5)

Two indices of social stability and political health in post-revolutionary Indonesia are the level of regionalist feeling and the intensity of anti-foreign sentiment. The period of the Wilopo cabinet saw a definite increase in regionalist feeling. Already in July 1952 the Djakarta press had reported the wide circulation of a letter which

(4) Information from Mr. Hans O. Schmitt.

(5) Antara, April 1, 1953. For government statistics on the casualties and damages inflicted by the Darul Islam in West Java in 1953 and 1954 see Nasution, op. cit., p. 92.

sought support for the establishment of a "state of Sumatra." (6) At the same time there had been reports of gang violence between Javanese and Sulawesi students studying at the Gadjah Mada University in Jogjakarta. (7)

Such signs became more frequent in the first months of 1953. Thus the reburial in April 1953 of the Toba Batak king, King Sisingamangaraja XII, killed by the Dutch in 1907, was made the occasion for challenging calls for Batak and Tapanuli solidarity. Among the Minangkabau of West Sumatra regionalist and anti-Djakarta feeling was stirred at the same time in protest against the splitting up and disarming of several companies of the Minangkabau-manned "Pagarrujung Batallion," which had been stationed in West Java. Regionalist feeling among the Sundanese of West Java had prompted the establishment in March of the federalist Pagujuban Daja Sunda (Sundanese Cultural Association) and similar sentiment in Sulawesi led to the launching of the Gerakan Pemuda Federal Republik Indonesia (Federalist Youth Movement of the Republic of Indonesia) in Makassar in May. (8)

In all these areas resentment was felt at the lack of effective regional and local autonomy. In numerous parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi political leaders voiced their acute disappointment at the smallness of budget allocations given to their area, in comparison with the particular area's contribution to export earnings. And on top of these anti-Djakarta protests came ones directed against the ethnic Javanese, against the appointment of Javanese as high officials outside their own region and against what were described as efforts to Javanize Indonesian culture. (9)

Regionalism assumed its most challenging forms in Sulawesi. Here the Warouw army coup of November 16, 1952, had fanned the flames of regional and ethnic feeling and produced much disintegration of government authority. Accurate information on the state of affairs on this island was difficult to obtain outside it, as news censorship was

(6) Aneta, July 15, July 16, 1952.

(7) Nieuwsgier (Djakarta), August 7, 1952.

(8) Antara, April 7, Keng Po, March 23, Antara, May 18, 1953.

(9) See for instance the statement of H. Darwisj Djambek, chairman of the Partai Islam Indonesia, with headquarters in Central Sumatra, Aneta, April 5, 1953. Such protests were in fact made much more frequently than the newspaper record suggests. The fact that they were thought to do violence to nationalist feeling made press men loath to record them. For a full discussion of the development of regionalist attitudes in the post-revolutionary period see Gerald S. Maryanov, Decentralization in Indonesia as a Political Problem, Interim Reports Series, Modern Indonesia Project, Cornell University, forthcoming, September 1958.

imposed by the military authorities of the East Indonesia command. But certain disturbing facts were known. In December 1952 there had been pitched battles between two battalions of government troops at Pare-Pare. Two army officers were murdered in Makassar in January, and several others were kidnapped in the following months. At the same time there were repeated reports of the persecution of Christians in Central Sulawesi, not only by Kahar Muzakar followers but also by certain units of the government forces. In March the Djakarta weekly Siasat reported that several government agencies in South Sulawesi had begun to issue export licenses and exact customs and taxes on their own authority. It added that the situation was gradually developing into one which could only be called warlordism. (10) Whereas intense antagonisms existed between various ethnic groups of the island--the Christian and influential Minahasans, the strongly Moslem Buginese and Makassarese and the largely Christian Toradjas--a general opposition to Djakarta was common to all the groups.

In the first months of 1953 a number of Djakarta political figures and newspapers drew attention to the rise of regionalist feeling, warning of the consequences if the central government did not do more to win the regions' favor. (11) At the same time high government officials were seriously concerned about the danger of separatist movements not only in Atjeh (extreme North of Sumatra) where the Daud Beureueh rebellion was to break out in September, 1953, but also in the Moluccas. There clearly was cause for anxiety. Regionalist feeling was as yet very weak if compared with what it became later, particularly in and since 1956. (12) But there were numerous indications that dangerously strong centrifugal forces were at work.

Anti-foreign feeling, a second index of social ferment and political discontent, was given frequent expression in the Wilopo cabinet's period of office, and particularly in its last part. But here it is necessary to refer immediately to a number of actions on the foreign, and particularly the Dutch, side, which afforded strong stimulus to such feeling. A series of decisions by the Dutch government and Dutch courts provided wide scope for Indonesian protests.

(10) Siasat, March 8, 1953.

(11) See the statements of Otto Rondonuwu (Progressive Fraction) Antara, January 25; of Sjahrir, Keng Po, March 18; of F. A. Pitoi (P.I.R.) Keng Po, March 19; and of Mr. Jusuf Wibisono, Keng Po, March 20, 1953. Also the editorials of Sin Po, January 28 and Siasat (weekly), March 8, 1958.

(12) Organized smuggling, supported by local military commanders in rich exporting areas for the sake of regional development, was begun only late in 1954--significantly in Sulawesi. By this time inflation, disadvantageous particularly to exporters, had assumed much greater proportions than under the Wilopo cabinet.

In December 1952 the Dutch government summarily arrested two Indonesian students in Holland suspected of being Communist sympathizers, Go Gien Tjwan, director of the Antara newsagency in Holland and, Sunito, chairman of the Perhimpunan Indonesia (Indonesian Association). Later in the same month the P.K.I. leaders, Aidit and Njoto, who had arrived in Holland for a congress of the Communist Party of the Netherlands, were expelled from the country. And in April 1953 the Dutch government gave similar treatment to Chaerul Saleh, a former guerrilla leader of Murba or national-communist political orientation, who was studying in Holland on an Indonesian government assignment.

A similar occasion for protest was the surprising findings of the Netherlands court in January, in the case of the attempted assassination of the Indonesian Military Attache at the Hague, Lieutenant-Colonel Harjono. The decision of the judge in this case was to give one of the accused a sentence of one year, and declare the other free. (13) The contrast was stark between this decision and that of the court at Hollandia in West Irian or West New Guinea on January 30, which gave gaol sentences of up to 13 years to 43 Indonesians accused of infiltration into the uninhabited island of Gak which is part of West Irian. (14)

The issue of sovereignty over West Irian had excited strong nationalist and anti-Dutch feelings whenever it had been brought to the forefront of political discussion by one or other happening, and this had occurred roughly two or three times a year since the failure of the Irian talks between Indonesia and the Netherlands in December 1950. The Dutch government's attitude as from mid-1952, that there was no point in further negotiations on this matter, was the subject of frequent calls by Indonesian political leaders and editors for some sort of a "tough" policy against the Dutch. Thus on September 6, 1952, Mr. Djody Gondokusumo of the minor nationalist party P.R.N., who was then chairman of the Foreign Affairs section of parliament, stated that, in the event of negotiations failing to secure the return of West Irian, Indonesia should employ force to this end--rather than to use what Mr. Djody saw as the other way open, that of asking for United States help. Appeals for the government to take a firmly anti-Dutch stand came primarily from the side of the "oppositionist" parties and factions, sections of the P.N.I. leadership and the Communists, but some were made by representatives of almost every political group.

(13) Strong protests against this decision were made in the Dutch press at the time. E.g., Het Vrije Volk, January 6, 1953; Het Parool, January 7, 1953 (both Labor Party journals), de Volkskrant, January 7, 1953 (Catholic People's Party publication).

(14) The Indonesians were men from the neighboring island of Gebe (part of the Moluccas) who owned gardens on Gak.

In the first months of 1953 the West Irian issue was again made current by the Gak infiltration case of January and the Dutch report of larger-scale armed infiltration by Indonesians south of Vogelkop in May. The latter report was regarded in Djakarta as fictitious and an attempt to counter earlier Indonesian reports of the movements of Dutch submarines in the Moluccas area. (15) Whatever the truth of these various reports, it is clear that the situation was one in which anti-Dutch feeling could readily grow.

Throughout this period there were repeated reports of the involvement of individual Dutchmen in the bandit activity of the Darul Islam. This was the subject of sustainedly vociferous press and political party protests. All this coming on top of a four-year revolutionary war and a situation where vast economic power in the country remained in foreign, mainly Dutch, hands, created a situation in which a high level of anti-Dutch sentiment could be expected.

But this should not obscure the fact that anti-Dutch sentiment had also another aspect, as a form both of expression and of canalization of political discontent. Sjahrir, in our period, stressed its role in "blinding the people to reality," (16) and Mr. Jusuf Wibisono discussed it in the context of a quotation from Karl Mannheim on the scapegoat system. (17) This aspect helps to explain why there were relatively few manifestations of anti-Dutch feeling outside Java: discontent there could be channeled into resentment of Java.

Anti-Dutch feeling found much more expression in the press and in political party statements than it did in the actions of the cabinet or its agencies. It represented a political factor of major importance standing in the way of the Wilopo cabinet on matters related to foreign capital. Thus it contributed to the cabinet's failure to implement policies to which it was committed in relation to existing foreign plantation and mines and to the proposed regulations to attract new foreign investment.

As far as the Wilopo cabinet was concerned, it certainly had no policy of stimulating or channeling anti-foreign feeling, whether anti-Dutch, anti-American or directed against any other country. It attempted no spectacular ventures in the field of foreign policy, and, while adhering to the framework of the "independent foreign policy" as set by its predecessor's fall on the M.S.A. issue, it concerned itself principally with economically fruitful relations with other countries--in practice mainly

(15) See Nieuwsgier (Djakarta, Dutch-language), May 19, 1953.

(16) Sikap, August 18, 1952.

(17) "Popularitet dan tanggung-djawab" (Popularity and Responsibility), Mimbar Indonesia (weekly), August 17, 1952.

countries of the West. Placing a high valuation on economic development, it acted on the belief that Western countries and their nationals could play a positive role in this.

Nevertheless it was obliged to take some actions demanded by anti-foreign feeling. One example of this was the gaoling and subsequent expulsion of the Indo-European editress of the Nieuw Sourabaiasch Handelsblad, Mrs. Fuhrie-Mierop who for some time had editorialized against the government, the President and Indonesian nationalism generally. A more significant example was the government's attitude in the case of the group of Surabaya law students who in April 1953 smashed the offices of the Dutch-language daily De Vrije Pers after this newspaper had stated editorially that the Dutch language was a necessity for students of Indonesian law. The government censured the students, but it took no legal action against them and the Minister for Information, Mononutu, said the incident should serve as a warning to the foreign press not to regard Indonesian sensitivities lightly. This paralleled the government's stand in January, when it withdrew a moderately worded protest against the expulsion of Aidit and Njoto from Holland, in response to demands from the more radically anti-Dutch Foreign Affairs section of parliament.

To measure anti-foreign sentiment is next to impossible. Even the anti-foreign sentiment which is given political articulation is extremely difficult to measure. But it seems probable that politically articulated anti-foreign sentiment actually increased in the Wilopo cabinet period. It certainly remained at a high point--very high in terms of the requirements of the government's economic planning, although low as compared with its intensity in more recent periods. And it retained this intensity despite the fact that it was accorded much less government encouragement under Wilopo than it had been under Sukiman. Part of the explanation for this lies undoubtedly in the increasingly uncompromising attitude of Holland. But it would seem that another part of it should be sought in deeper pressures towards social and political discontent. These pressures, of which regionalism was another expression, had a basis both in the general situation of revolutionary aftermath--social dislocation, rapid growth of consumer expectations, the existence of a large group of uprooted ex-revolutionaries and so on--and in the particular economic difficulties arising from the post-Korea fall in prices for Indonesia's exports.

Such pressures towards social and political discontent could be seen also in other phenomena of the time. In particular there were a number of instances in which the government failed to impose its will in the face of defiance either by its own instrumentalities or by outsiders. Some of this was a consequence of the October 17 affair, and particularly of the regional military coups which followed it. The beneficiaries of these coups, having seen the cabinet's inability to take strong action against them, continued to challenge its authority. In April and May 1953, as we shall see, the territorial commanders of East Java and East

Indonesia, defied the cabinet demonstratively in ways which cost it a severe loss of prestige. The confusion and fragmentation of authority within the army command in Sulawesi had similar effects.

Wilopo's last months in office saw also the first major eruption of a clique conflict which had been going on inside the air force, in particular between the air force Chief of Staff, Commodore Suryadarma, and the head of the educational division of the force, Vice-Commodore H. Sujono. This struggle produced not only house arrests and en bloc resignations, but also an aerial demonstration over a part of Djakarta. (18)

Another type of challenge to government authority was in a series of attacks by politically irate youths and students on newspaper officers. For the attack on the office of De Vrije Pers was one of a series of similar incidents. Violence had been used earlier against the premises of the Dutch-language Malang Post at Malang, the Antara rooms at Semarang and the offices of Waspada at Medan.

This then is the background against which the party political developments of the period must be seen. It would be wrong to conclude that there had been nothing but deterioration in the socio-political health of the country, but there were certainly many signs of continuing, and in some cases increasing, instability. And the significance of this was perceived by many of the country's leaders. Whereas it is true that many members of the elite regarded the various phenomena as inevitable in a growing pains situation, yet pessimism was undoubtedly on the increase in the group as a whole. There was much discussion of the "danger of disintegration," (19) of "a sort of fragmentation of society" (20) and of "dangers to the standards of social morality." (21) Both disappointment and intense personal worry were felt by many in responsible positions.

(18) In a letter of May 13 to the President, Vice-President, Defense Minister and other high officers of the air force, Vice-Commodore Sujono declared that the air force Chief of Staff had abused his authority and should be investigated. Sujono was placed under house arrest by Suryadarma, whereupon his supporters in the air force staged their demonstrations. See Antara and Aneta, May 13-31 passim.

(19) Mimbar Indonesia (daily), May 26, 1953.

(20) Statement of the Health Minister, Dr. J. Leimena, Aneta, April 28, 1953.

(21) Siasat, April 26, 1953. This was in part a reference to the fact that there had been several disclosures of corruption immediately before this date. One much-discussed case was that of the "leak" of the examination papers for the nation-wide final examinations of junior and senior high schools.

April and May 1953 saw the development of a chain of political crises each of which came close to being the cabinet's last. This was at a time of sustained press and party controversy on the questions of Islamic State and Pantja Sila. At the same time four other issues came to the forefront of the political stage roughly in succession. These were in the fields of foreign policy, of army affairs, of financial policy and of foreign investment. Each case highlights a political problem of long-term importance. At least three of them show the new overall pattern of party alignments which had gradually crystallized in the Wilopo cabinet period.

The foreign policy issue arose from the motion of Rondonuwu of the Progressive Fraction for the establishment of an Indonesian Embassy in Moscow before the end of 1953. The "oppositionist" Communist and P.N.I. supporters of this motion argued that diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union were essential if a truly independent foreign policy was to be pursued and if Indonesia was to make her maximum contribution to world peace. They spoke of the people's resentment at the fact that the government had for three years promised the establishment of diplomatic relations with Russia "as soon as possible," yet in practice done nothing, and maintained that this was a violation of a "gentlemen's agreement" reached when the Soviet Union promised support for Indonesia's entry into the United Nations. Finally they stressed the possibilities of trade with the U.S.S.R. Deploring the very low prices then offered on the Western rubber and tin market, and the uncooperative attitude of Great Britain and the United States with regard to proposals for price stabilization agreements, they argued that Indonesia could only benefit from gaining access to an alternative potential market. (22)

The Masjumi, which led the opposition to the motion, based its case principally on a legalistic point. Affirming that it supported diplomatic relations in principle, it declared that the timing of any exchange of ambassadors was a matter that had to be left to the cabinet. At the same time however Masjumi speakers and editors stressed the danger that a Soviet embassy in Djakarta would play a Trojan horse role. Recalling the difficulties which the Sukiman government had faced with the heavily-staffed embassy of the Chinese People's Republic, they argued that Indonesia had nothing to gain by opening her doors to new possibilities of subversive activities.

- (22) The attitude of the U.S. and U.K. in the matter of price stabilization schemes had been demonstrated at the E.C.A.F.E. conference held in Bandung in February. The attitude of the U.S. was to become very clear at the Copenhagen conference of the International Rubber Study Group in May, for at this conference it was U.S. opposition which killed the proposal of the conference's working group, strongly supported by the natural rubber producing countries, for the establishment of "buffer stocks" of rubber.

But these latter arguments had little appeal in the prevailing climate of political thinking of the newspaper-reading public. Most of the Socialist and Socialist-sympathizing press supported the Rondonuwu motion. When the stand of the P.N.I. executive committee in favor of the motion was endorsed by its larger party council on March 8, it was clear that the motion would command a majority. It did, when it was put to the vote on April 9. Only the Masjumi, Parindra, Catholic Party, Nahdatul Ulama and Democratic Fraction voted against it, with the P.S.I. abstaining. As well as the P.N.I., three other government parties, the (Protestant) Christian Party, the Labor Party and the minor Moslem party P.S.I.I., all voted for the motion. Parliament had overruled the cabinet once more, and in a sense split it in half.

But the earlier predictions that this would mean the cabinet's resignation or disintegration were not fulfilled. Its Minister of Information, Mononutu, stated that "the major parties, including the Masjumi and P.N.I., do not want a cabinet crisis". (23) The Masjumi parliamentary leader, Mr. Burhanuddin Harahap, said on April 11 that his party would only consider withdrawing its ministers from the cabinet if and when the cabinet actually decided to establish an embassy in Moscow, and the Masjumi-sympathizing daily Abadi was hopeful that with the new post-Stalin "peace offensive" a situation would arise in which diplomatic relations would be possible. (24)

The vote on the Rondonuwu motion is significant for the fact that it was the first occasion in the Wilopo cabinet period when the issue of attitudes towards Communism played an important role. It was the first instance in the post-revolutionary period of an issue involving attitudes to Communism on which the two main parties as such took opposing stands. This suggests that the ensuing change in the pattern of political alignments in Indonesia was in some degree an accommodation to the terms of the cold war struggle.

The month of April saw the government challenged by critical developments in the army. In the three months since the resignation of Sultan Hamengku Buwono from the Defense Ministry the cabinet had continued to pursue its "all under one roof policy," seeking to heal the still open wounds of the October 17 affair by compromises which would allow all parties concerned to preserve a maximum of prestige. The toughest challenges to it came from the territorial commands of East Java and East Indonesia. These made repeated demands, which were "leaked" to the press, for the dismissal and punishment of all those involved in what had happened in Djakarta on October 17.

(23) Antara, April 11, 1953.

(24) Abadi, April 11, 1953.

The government made some concessions to this group. In January for instance it placed the former territorial commander for East Indonesia, Col. Gatot Subroto, on non-active service. But it ordered no arrests and laid no legal charges. At the same time it successfully steered through parliament a number of measures for army reorganization and demobilization, which were basically similar to those which had come under such heavy fire in the army debates of August, September and October of the preceding year. (25) The objection of certain "oppositionist" members of parliament that a basic defense law should be made first, was countered by the government when on March 31 it established a State Committee for Defense Affairs, consisting of representatives of parliament and the Defense Ministry, to draft such a law.

With this general course the "anti-October 17" officers were not satisfied. Particularly in the East Java division, whose acting commander Lieut. Col. Sudirman continued to cooperate closely with Col. Bambang Supeno, there were more demands for strong action against those who had instigated and led the affair of October 17. Moreover there was a clear use of sanctions. Thus on March 10, after the new acting Chief of Staff of the army, Col. Bambang Sugeng, had decided to transfer the former acting commander of East Java, Lieut.-Col. Dr. Suwondho to Djakarta, Sudirman declared that the East Java army leadership "could not take it upon itself to guarantee the safety of Lieut.-Col. Suwondho," if the latter went to Djakarta. Suwondho was then still under arrest. On the following day a report of an East Java army doctor was published to the effect that Suwondho was ill and so could not go to Djakarta.

In reply the government made no attempt to assert its authority. Instead it decided on March 31 to transfer the Secretary-General of the Ministry of Defense, Mr. Ali Budiardjo to a position as Deputy-Head of the National Planning Board, and placed in his post ex-Colonel Hidayat, a man regarded as standing outside the division between the "pro-October 17" and "anti-October 17" groups in the army. Five days earlier an Indonesian and a Dutch delegation had begun discussions for the repatria-

- (25) Parliament ratified two earlier emergency laws on army affairs and four new bills which represented a modification of the four bills submitted by Sultan Hamengku Buwono in July 1952. The most contentious of the bills provided for the retirement of soldiers who failed to comply with certain physical requirements, but these were less exacting than those in the 1952 bill, and the educational requirements were abandoned. Thus an estimated 50,000 soldiers would by stages leave the service, as compared with the earlier figure of 80,000. The plan of a new "core" army, for which young men of high educational qualifications should be recruited, remained the same. Col. Nasution later commented on the irony of the situation where his plans were adopted immediately after he and his colleagues were removed from the positions from which they could implement them. Tjatanan sekitar Politik Militer Indonesia, pp. 280-281.

tion of the Netherlands Military Mission, which had come under such strong parliamentary fire in the pre-October 17 debates. In April an agreement was reached whereby the mission would be repatriated at the end of the year. (26)

But the East Java command remained dissatisfied. At the same its limited success emboldened it. Thus on April 4 it wrote a letter to the government (with a copy to the Defense section of parliament), urging that "the investigation of the October 17 affair should immediately be officially turned over to the Chief Public Prosecutor (Djaksa Agung)", further that "the government should take firm steps against those who are regarded as the instigators of the October 17 affair" and that it itself "would not be responsible for the consequences" if these things were not done by April 15. (27) This was virtually an ultimatum.

Again the cabinet was forced to make concessions. Wilopo addressed a closed session of parliament on April 11. Subsequently the chairman of parliament issued a communique summarizing the government's statement. With an ambiguity which appeared to be intended, the communique said the government would "expedite the investigation (pengusutan)" of the October 17 affair, that "the Chief Public Prosecutor and Court had freedom to carry out their duties," and that the government itself would "expedite the reorganization of the structure of the Ministry of Defense and the reformation of the personnel of the army headquarters." (28)

Henceforth more and more persons who were or were thought to have been involved in the October 17 developments were called to in camera hearings at the Chief Public Prosecutor's office. This was seen as part of a full-scale pre-judicial investigation of the whole affair. Just before April 15 the government sent the Chief Public Prosecutor himself to East Java to confer with the army leaders there. And Keng Po reported that there would be transfers of 50 high and middle ranking officers in May. (29) All these were steps to conciliate the East Java leaders, and some of them were condemned as such by the Masjumi and Socialist-sympathizing press. (30) But they too failed to satisfy the East Java command. Lieut. Col. Sudirman and his supporters were particularly

(26) An exception was made for some 80 members of the naval arm of the mission, who would continue to work in Surabaya for some time longer. See Protokol Hasil Perundingan Penyelesaian Missi Militer Belanda (Protocol of Results of the Negotiations for the Termination of the Netherlands Military Mission), Ministry of Information, Jakarta, April 21, 1953.

(27) Quoted in Keng Po, April 15, 1953.

(28) Antara, April 11, 1953.

(29) Keng Po, April 15, 1953.

concerned that the last of the earlier triumvirate, the Armed Forces Chief of Staff Major-General Simatupang, should be taken out of his post. This demand was strongly supported by the President. But it was one to which Wilopo, with the cabinet behind him, had decided he would not accede.

On April 17 the Prime Minister, accompanied by the Defense Ministry Secretary-General Hidajat and the acting Chief of Staff of the army Col. Bambang Sugeng, set off on a tour of four military districts. The climax of the trip came in East Java. Landing at Surabaya's airport on April 26, the delegation was not met by any of the East Java military leaders--but instead by a group of tanks! Going on to the headquarters of the East Java district in Malang, they found the headquarters offices empty. They did find one prominent regimental commander, Lieut. Col. Abimanju, at his home, but he was prepared to speak to them only on his own behalf and not on behalf of the division. (31) Few greater indignities have been suffered by any Indonesian Prime Minister.

Wilopo's answer came in an announcement of the cabinet on April 30 that it would ask parliament for a vote of confidence on its handling of the October 17 affair. If this was not forthcoming it would resign. The announcement was directed primarily towards the Prime Minister's own party. Wilopo's aim was to present the P.N.I. with a choice: it should either overthrow him or give him its full support. With a substantial degree of P.N.I. support he could handle the East Java situation, he believed, but not without it.

But the P.N.I. had not been consulted by Wilopo before the cabinet's announcement, and there was strong feeling among the leaders of the party that the choice could only embarrass the party. These men did not want to endorse the cabinet's army policies because they regarded them as still too lenient towards the "pro-October 17 group" officers and their political supporters. But they also did not want the immediate fall of the cabinet, which would clearly follow if the P.N.I. voted against the government on the confidence issue. For this would be, in Sajuti Melik's words, "to force its fall without prior preparation." (32)

'Preparation' meant preparation of the composition of the successor cabinet. The fall of Wilopo was now spoken of by many as merely a ques-

(30) See for instance Haluan (Padang), April 15, Mimbar Umum (Medan), April 16, Mestika (Medan), April 18 and Sumber (Djakarta), April 21, 1953.

(31) See Pedoman, April 29, 30, 1953.

(32) Sajuti Melik, "Kabinet akan minta Votum kepertjajaan?" (Will the Cabinet ask for a Vote of Confidence?), Mimbar Indonesia (weekly), May 9, 1953. Compare the attitude of Mr. Sartono, Keng Po, May 4, 1953.

tion of time. The anti-Wilopo majority of the P.N.I. leadership was ready to force the cabinet's resignation on an appropriate issue at any time. But it wanted to wait till the political constellation was such as to give it maximum bargaining power in the cabinet formation struggles which would follow. And this time had not yet arrived. On May 5 the P.N.I. executive declared that the cabinet should work on and continue its efforts to settle the October 17 affair--without asking for a vote of confidence from parliament.

The cabinet revoked its decision on the following day. It would not ask parliament for a vote of confidence. This produced protest from the P.S.I.I. and from the cabinet's two remaining non-party ministers, Ir. Djuanda of Communications and Dr. Bahder Djohan of Education. The P.S.I.I. withdrew its minister, the Minister of Social Affairs, Anwar Tjokroaminoto, with the party's parliamentary leader Arudji Kartawinata stating that his party regarded the October 17 affair as a coup d'etat which had failed. For some time it appeared that the two non-party ministers would also resign. But by May 8 it was clear that they had been prevailed upon to reverse their earlier intention to do so. In a reshuffle of portfolios R. P. Soeroso of Parindra, the former Minister of Personnel Affairs, was appointed Minister of Social Affairs, and the Ministry of Personnel Affairs was abolished and replaced by a Personnel Affairs Board under the Prime Minister (with Soeroso as Deputy-Chairman). The P.S.I.I. did not implement its announced intention of joining with the Partai Murba to move a motion of no-confidence in the cabinet with regard to its handling of the army situation.

Thus the cabinet could work on. The P.N.I.'s statement had the effect of strengthening its position slightly. And there was some cooling off of feeling in the army in East Java as a result of the fact that Mr. Ali Budiardjo, Major-General Simatupang and Col. Nasution were all called to present testimony before the Chief Public Prosecutor. But the Prosecutor laid no charges against any of the persons investigated. And the cabinet was unable in the remaining three and a half weeks of its life to take any significant step towards an integrated solution of the army problem.

The government's economic and financial policies were a major factor producing challenges to its continued existence. These challenges too came to a head in April and May 1953. But to understand them one must go back to developments in the latter part of 1952.

Knocked off its appointed political course by the October 17 affair, the Wilopo cabinet decided to adopt what might be called a minimum policy and concerned itself with only two important goals, to create an elections law and to create a budget. It succeeded in the first, but failed in the second. At least it failed to get parliamentary ratification of its 1953 budget, which, though submitted in November 1952, was

not debated till after the fall of the Wilopo cabinet. Nevertheless the cabinet used this budget as a basis for its policies.

It was certainly an austerity budget. To keep the deficit down to R. 1.8 billion the ministries, particularly Defense and the Interior, were given sharply reduced allocations. Everything was done to prevent inflation; for it was seen that this would be seriously anti-developmental, hitting not only the consumer but also the exporter and the industrial entrepreneur who depended on imported raw materials. At the same time the budget scheduled increases in certain forms of taxation, including death duties and taxes on private cars. The cabinet was clearly persisting in its politically bold policies of placing the balance of payments burden on the shoulders of the bureaucracy, importers and the upper and middle income groups in the cities. It would continue to work for a demobilization of soldiers. On the other hand its budget message made no reference to civil service rationalization. (33)

The measures of the cabinet in the field of importing were a source of even greater controversy. On January 14 the Ministry of Economic Affairs announced that it would temporarily cease to accept new Indonesian importers into the favored "Benteng Group." (34) Eight days later there followed a regulation of the Economic Affairs and Finance Ministers revising and extending the import surcharge system. A thirty-three and a third percent surcharge was now placed on a number of goods previously on the free list, such as bicycles, condensed milk, caustic soda and many kinds of books and magazines.

This was in line with the cabinet's general policy of enforcing reductions at the expense of luxury, semi-luxury and semi-essential consumer goods, while allowing a constant supply of essential consumer items and at the same time increasing the proportion of imports of capital goods and of raw materials needed for economic expansion. But the regulation led to rapid price rises, particularly for non-essential goods. Heavy criticism followed in the press and parliament. The government defended itself by pointing to the fact that it had succeeded in the central task of maintaining stability in the prices of basic foodstuffs. But the criticism continued vociferously.

(33) This fact was criticized by the President of the Java Bank, Mr. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Report of the Java Bank 1952-53, p. 98.

(34) The firms in this group were allowed to import certain commodities from which "stronger" importers were debarred. By this time approximately 700 firms had been recognized as members of the "Benteng Group". See N. Amstutz, The Development of Indigenous Indonesian Importers in Indonesia, 1950-1955, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Fletcher School, 1958.

Then on April 1 the cabinet took steps to force prices down. It increased the required pre-payment on applications for foreign exchange from 40% to 75%. At the same time it entered into a "gentlemen's agreement" with the commercial banks to observe credit ceilings. These would, significantly, apply to national Indonesian importers as well as foreign firms. (35)

These measures were effective in undoing most of the earlier price rises, because they forced importers to sell their stocks cheaply in order to get liquid working capital. But they antagonized the importers strongly. They were hardest on small and medium-sized import enterprises, which meant on most of those operated as national Indonesian firms. As a result of them national importers received only 37.9% of the total foreign exchange allocation in the first four months of 1953, as compared with 42.7% in the year 1952. (36)

The significance of these acts of defiance of the interests of Indonesian importers is clear from the vantage point of 1958. In the five-year interval major strides have been taken in the direction of Indonesianization of business, not only in the importing field but also in road, sea and air transport, stevedoring, ricemilling, plantations, exporting and banking. (37) The biggest of these strides were taken by the Wilopo cabinet's immediate successor, the first cabinet of Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo--at the cost of serious inflation and a decline in the rate of investment.

The Wilopo cabinet's policies stand in strong contrast to these. Indeed Wilopo and his associates also sought to place greater economic power into the hands of nationals of the country. But the primary emphasis of their policies was on raising per capita income, and so they concentrated on promoting developmental investment and stability of prices. In a period when major government support for Indonesianization extended as yet only to importing (and some road and sea transport), Wilopo and Sumitro sought to restrict even this for the sake of other more long-range goals, many of whose beneficiaries were as yet politically inarticulate. By this policy they defied not only importers but all those in and near the political elite who demanded economic power.

(35) "The Government Import Regulations," Indonesian Affairs, September-October 1953. Also The Monetary Research Section of the Ministry of Finance, "Economic Review of 1952 and Outlook for 1953," Ekonomi dan Keuangan di Indonesia (Economics and Finance in Indonesia), May 1953.

(36) N. Amstutz, op. cit., Chapter II.

(37) See John Paul Meek, The Government and Economic Development in Indonesia, 1950-1954, unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Virginia, 1956. Also John O. Sutter, Indonesianisasi, 1950-1955, forthcoming Ph.D. dissertation, Cornell University.

The government had suffered severe criticism for its unconcern for the development of national enterprise at the time of the Djaswadi amendment on corporation tax in February 1953. There had been numerous allegations then that it was subservient to the economic pressures of foreigners, and, with P.N.I., P.S.I.I. and oppositionist support the amendment had been carried.

In March and April import policy became the main butt of criticism, but here a large number of parties took part in protesting against the government's measures. Thus it was the Masjumi leader K. H. Tjikwan, chairman of the Economic Affairs section of parliament, who on April 10 introduced a motion protesting against the surcharge regulations. Signed also by members of the P.N.I., Parindra, the Catholic Party, the Democratic Fraction, the Progressive Fraction, Murba and P.K.I., the motion asked the government to submit to parliament a bill incorporating the surcharge regulations of both August and January. Such measures, the signatories affirmed, ought to be taken on the basis either of laws or of emergency laws, not simply by government regulations.

In the debate which followed there was sharp criticism of the pre-payments regulations as well as the surcharges. For some time it appeared that the Tjikwan motion might be the issue on which the cabinet would resign. On May 28 parliament passed the motion by a vote of 97 to 0. But the Ministers of Finance and Economic affairs accepted the defeat. A stronger motion of Mohammad Sadak of P.I.R., which asked that the import surcharge regulations be immediately frozen, was defeated by 58 votes to 27 on the same evening, with none of the government parties supporting it. Economic and financial policy was not an immediate cause of the cabinet's fall. But it was of great importance in welding together the opposition which was finally to overwhelm the cabinet.

The issue which finally did precipitate the cabinet's fall was one over the position of foreign capital. This issue, which came to a head in the "Tandjong Morawa affair", arose from the existence of large numbers of peasant squatters on land leased to foreign estates in East Sumatra. Some of these persons, former estate workers and villagers from the surrounding areas, had begun to squat in the Japanese occupation; the Japanese authorities had urged them to grow foodstuffs, and they did so there, particularly on large areas of tobacco land lying fallow. Many others had come in the post-revolutionary period, mostly from the less fertile Tapanuli plateau, and were continuing to come in considerable numbers. By early 1953 there were approximately 62,000 families on the tobacco estates of the area alone. (38)

- (38) Statement of Abdullah Jusuf, P.N.I. parliamentarian, Antara, April 8, 1953. For a general discussion of the whole problem see Karl J. Pelzer, "The Agrarian Conflict in East Sumatra," Pacific Affairs, June 1957. Also Clark E. Cunningham, The Postwar Migration of the Toba-Bataks to East Sumatra, Cultural Report Series, South-east Asia Studies, Yale University, Newhaven, 1958.

But the foreign lessees who had cultivated these lands before the war, and in many cases between 1946 and 1949, continued to have legal claims to them. Most of these were guaranteed by the Round Table Conference agreement of 1949. Moreover the Indonesian government had an interest in the restoration of the lands to the foreign, mainly Dutch, companies which had leased them. This was partly because of their ability to earn badly needed foreign exchange. But in addition the government believed that the request for return of these squatter-occupied lands in East Sumatra (and the other request from Royal Dutch Shell for return of its North Sumatran oilwells, then in the temporary charge of an Indonesian government board) were seen overseas as tests of its willingness and ability to protect the foreign investment which it sought to attract.

In July 1951 Mr. Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo of the P.N.I., as the Sukiman cabinet's Minister for the Interior, had settled on a compromise basis for a solution. He came to an agreement with the tobacco planters' organization, D.P.V. (Deli Planters Vereniging), whereby the members of this organization would return 130,000 hectares of their 255,000 hectares of concession lands in return for a new 30-year lease for the remaining 125,000 hectares. The government would resettle the 62,000 squatter families found on the 125,000 hectares.

Little was done to implement the resettlement decision within the life of the Sukiman cabinet. But the Wilopo cabinet made a beginning. However its efforts were challenged almost immediately as a result of what happened on March 16, 1953 in the sub-district of Tandjong Morawa near Medan.

On this date East Sumatran peasant resistance to the land return program came to a head when police tried forcible dislodgement of a group of Chinese and Indonesian peasants by ploughing up their lands with tractors. The demonstrators replied by attempting to seize the policemen's weapons. The police started shooting, and five of the peasant demonstrators, four of them Chinese and one Indonesian were killed. Numerous arrests followed. (39)

The press outcry which followed the report of this incident led to the establishment of a number of committees of enquiry, both by particular parties and by parliament. Their investigations laid bare the explosiveness of the political and social background against which the Tandjong Morawa shooting must be seen.

Abdullah Jusuf, a P.N.I. member of parliament who was sent by his party to investigate the situation, concluded that the policy of the

(39) For accounts of this incident see Antara, March 17, 1953, Harian Rakjat, March 17, Keng Po, March 21 and Waktu (weekly, Medan), May 2. Also statement of the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Roem, Aneta, April 10, 1953.

Governor of North Sumatra, Abdul Hakim, of the Masjumi, in allocating land to estates and peasants respectively, was highly detrimental to the latter, who were given inferior land and inadequate compensation. Further, Abdullah Jusuf alleged that Hakim had received R. 600,000 from the D.P.V., officially as money to compensate the dislodged peasants, but in fact administered irregularly. Hakim, who was governing without a legislative council, was, according to Jusuf, creating an atmosphere of fear by the extent to which he used secret police. (40)

Very different explanations were given by representatives of the Minister of the Interior, and by the Masjumi members of the parliamentary commission which visited East Sumatra in late March and early April. These investigators emphasized the large role played by Chinese peasants in opposition to the government's land distribution program, and connected this with the journey to Medan at the time of the Tandjong Morawa affair of a representative of the Chinese consul in Djakarta, a journey against which the Foreign Ministry had expressed objections. Further they quoted the report of Sabiruddin, First Commissioner of Police in North Sumatra to the effect that the sub-section committee of the P.K.I. for Deli-Serdang was responsible for the incident which occurred. (41)

It is impossible to explain these developments without discussing factors of party politics such as these. For in East Sumatra at this time party competition was intense, not least so between different party-backed peasant organizations. The widespread opposition which existed to the strongly anti-Communist governor was a factor of considerable importance, as was the P.N.I.'s concern to replace him with a candidate of its own.

But this was more than a party issue. It was a conflict with deep social roots. One must indeed refer to Communist organizational stiffening in explaining the vigor with which the peasants of Tandjong Morawa were prepared to defend their land. But more important is the simple fact that they strongly wanted to remain on this land. They and their fellow-squatters naturally saw the government as acting in the interests of the estates, and the estates were in their eyes the remaining representatives of the same foreign imperialism against which the revolution had been fought. Thus the ground was fertile for peasant organizations which opposed the government's policies. For the P.N.I., then just establishing its peasant organization Petani (Persatuan Tani Nasional Indonesia) in North Sumatra, this was a crucial fact.

The Tandjong Morawa affair is a good illustration of the difficulties which the Wilopo cabinet and every one of its predecessors and successors has faced in the post-revolutionary period. Weak in terms of party

(40) Antara, April 8, 1953.

(41) See Antara, April 23, 1953, Pedoman, April 28, 1953.

support, the cabinet was incapable of surmounting the challenges which small determined groups like the squatters of East Sumatra could advance. It was particularly weak in issues involving foreign enterprises. This was partly because of the great power of trade unions and peasant organizations and their ease of access to party political influence. It resulted also from the political weakness in which all foreign enterprises were engulfed in post-revolutionary Indonesia because of their very foreignness. And, perhaps more important still, it arose from the weakness, primarily economic and also political, of the propertied groups of Indonesians who had an interest in siding with foreign capital against unions and peasant organizations. In this particular case the opposition of a small peasant group--and the violent reaction of the police to it--had the effect of bringing the cabinet's resettlement program to a virtual standstill. Between 1951 and 1956, Professor Pelzer writes, "the government was unable either to prevent further invasion of the tobacco estates by new squatters or to remove the old squatters." (42) The problem of squatting, not only on foreign-leased estate lands but also on public lands in towns and forests in many parts of the country, has continued as a major obstacle to consistent economic policies. (43)

(42) Loc. cit.

(43) The government faced a somewhat similar problem in the case of the North Sumatran (Pangkalan Brandan) oilwells of the B.P.M. (Royal Dutch Shell). These wells had been in Republican hands at the end of the period of armed struggle in 1949. Thenceforth they operated under an Indonesian government board on a temporary basis, producing at only 1-2% of their pre-war annual rate. The Masjumi advocated their return to Shell, as the only way in which their production could be restored quickly. On the other hand the P.N.I. party council, vociferously supported by the P.N.I. of North Sumatra, asked for their nationalization.

The Wilopo cabinet supported the Masjumi point of view in the matter, the P.N.I. Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. Sumanang, being convinced of the economic advantages of returning the wells. But Sumanang's announced intention to return the wells led to such trenchant criticism of both him and Wilopo at the P.N.I. congress of December 1952 that it became clear that the cabinet could not act. Thus the status quo, with which no party was satisfied, would continue for the time being. The only persons whose interests would have been directly affected by a return of the wells to the Dutch company were a small group of Indonesian managers. But the step was clearly in defiance of very strong nationalist feeling.

The situation has remained substantially unchanged to the time of writing. The difficulty of making a final choice as to the future of the wells has been a major factor handicapping all foreign oil work in Indonesia, for it has been effective in holding up mining legislation, which is required before new leases can be granted to any foreign oil company. See Higgins, Indonesia's Economic Stabilization and Development, pp. 104-5.

In the middle of May the government's land policy in East Sumatra was made the basis of a motion of no-confidence in the Minister of the Interior, Mr. Roem. This was moved by the P.K.I.-sympathizing representative of the SAKTI (Sarekat Tani Indonesia, Indonesians Peasants Association), Sidik Kertapati. Several days later it was modified, reportedly in an attempt to make it qualify for P.N.I. support, and from then on it merely demanded that the process of transferring land to the D.P.V. should be halted, and all persons arrested in connection with the Tandjong Morawa affair released. However, after the parliamentary debates on the (modified) motion on May 21 and 22 it became clear that the Minister of the Interior still regarded the motion as one of no-confidence, and that the Masjumi supported him fully.

Would the P.N.I. support the Sidik Kertapati motion? This was the crucial question. At a meeting of representatives of the P.N.I. and Masjumi on May 26, when a number of issues dividing the two parties were discussed, the P.N.I.'s attitude on the motion was still not known. However, by the time of the next meeting of Masjumi and P.N.I. representatives on June 1, the situation had changed. By this time the P.N.I. of North Sumatra had threatened to secede from the party if its parliamentary fraction did not support the motion. A majority of the P.N.I. executive had decided that Roem would have to go if the cabinet was to be allowed to live on. But this was quite unacceptable, to the Prime Minister as well as to the Masjumi.

The P.N.I.'s final offer was on a quite different matter, the question of a replacement for the P.N.I. Information Minister, Mononutu, who was soon to take up an appointment as Ambassador in Peking. The P.N.I. said it would abstain when the Sidik Kertapati motion was put if the Masjumi agreed to forego its earlier veto of the P.N.I.'s candidate for the Information Ministry, the Sidik group leader Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro. But the Masjumi rejected this offer.

Thereupon the P.N.I. party council decided to urge that the two main parties should together bring the cabinet to an end. On June 2, before a vote had been taken on the Sidik Kertapati motion, the cabinet decided to dissolve itself.

Which then were the forces which brought the cabinet down? From March 1953 onwards there were repeated calls for its resignation by Mr. Jusuf Wibisono of the Sukiman group of the Masjumi. Mr. Jusuf criticized the cabinet for its financial policies, its lack of a clear policy to attract foreign capital and its readiness to make concessions to organized labor. (44) But the cabinet did not fall as a result of opposition from the Sukiman group of the Masjumi; this group was by no means united in

(44) Keng Po, March 14, March 31, May 19, 1953.

support of the stand of Jusuf Wibisono. Nor did it resign because of any development of tensions inside itself. In his letter to the chairman of parliament in which Wilopo announced the resignation he made specific reference to the fact that "it has been possible to continue cooperation inside the cabinet itself in facing the problems which have recently arisen." The reason he gave for the resignation was that "in the present constellation of forces the cabinet cannot count on sufficient support... from the parties which support it in parliament." (45) The parties to which he referred may have included the minor Moslem P.S.I.I. and possibly also the Labor Party. But the reference was principally to the P.N.I.

Thus to explain the Wilopo cabinet's fall one must look first to the P.N.I. It is the increasing power in this party of the groups opposed to the Wilopo cabinet--and the growing hope of these groups that a successor cabinet could be found which would do more to implement their policies--which explains why the cabinet had eventually to concede defeat.

P.N.I. support for the Wilopo cabinet was unenthusiastic from the start. Already in the first months of the cabinet's term of office the party issued statements whose emphasis was strongly at variance with the policy approach of the cabinet. The army debates and the October 17 affair brought the differences to the point of conflict. Then at the party congress in early December 1952 there was a showdown.

This congress at Surabaya was an unusually stormy one. The October 17 dissensions had barely begun to subside. Through them the long-standing dislike of a majority of the P.N.I. leaders for the Socialist Party had been newly set aflame. The feeling at the congress was strong that the Wilopo cabinet was altogether too strongly influenced by the P.S.I., particularly in its army and economic policies. Mr. Wilopo was subjected to vehement criticism for hesitating to take strong action against the army leaders who had led the October 17 affair. The P.N.I. Minister for Economic Affairs, Mr. Sumanang, was attacked by almost every speaker on economic policy for his announced policy of returning the North Sumatran oil wells to Dutch Shell. All of the four P.N.I. ministers were charged with indifference to party discipline.

One demand which was frequently made at the congress was that the P.N.I. ministers in the cabinet should do more to promote the party's interests. This was urged particularly in relation to the forthcoming elections. The ministers were instructed to use their influence to strengthen the party and especially to overcome its poor financial situation. (46)

(45) Antara, June 3, 1953.

(46) Among the members of the sub-committee established at the congress for the purpose of collecting funds to defray the party's elections

The strength of the congress's hostility to the policies of the cabinet can be seen in the results of the party elections held at the congress. There Sidik Djojokusarto was re-elected chairman. Wilopo was displaced from the deputy-chairmanship by Soewirjo, a man of the older conservative group of Sartono. And the other three men elected to the five-man group which would be responsible for selecting the (large) party council were Mangunsarkoro, Sabilal Rasjad and Manai Sophian, all associates of the party leader Sidik. Wilopo himself was ninth in the vote, receiving only 424 votes as compared with Sidik's 2728. The Sidik group clearly won a resounding victory. This was confirmed in early March at the first meeting of the party council selected by the five men chosen by the congress. At this meeting a new twelve-man executive was elected and its membership indicates the clear dominance of the Sidik group in the party. (47)

Henceforth there was to be a protracted period of close cooperation between the radically nationalist Sidik group and the older, conservative group of Mr. Sartono and Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo. In fact it became common to speak of the "Sidik-Sartono group" (or simply the "Sidik group" to refer to the same persons) as one of only two major factions in the party.

The months following the congress saw little change in the cabinet's policies. Wilopo did give considerable concessions to the anti-October 17 group in his stand on the problems of the army. Sumanang ceased to press for the return of the North Sumatra oilwells to Shell (at the same time doing nothing about the P.N.I. demand for their nationalization). But in economic and financial fields the cabinet continued and intensified its defiance of important interests allied or potentially allied with the P.N.I., firstly national importers and secondly the whole upper and middle class of the cities. In the vital matter of advancing P.N.I. interests through government influence, particularly in relation to the forthcoming elections, the P.N.I. ministers continued to be uncooperative. While working resolutely for early elections--at a time when their party regarded itself as unprepared for these--they did next to nothing to strengthen the party's position in facing them. Mr. Sumanang appears to have been

expenses were Mr. Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo and Dr. Ong Eng Die. These two men had recently been appointed to the directorship of the newly formed "P.N.I. bank," the Bank Umum Nasional (National General Bank), Mr. Iskaq as its board chairman and Dr. Ong as its executive vice-chairman. In the Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet, which followed upon that of Wilopo, Mr. Iskaq emerged as Minister of Economic Affairs and Dr. Ong as Minister of Finance.

- (47) The five men dropped from the executive were Mr. Wilopo, Dr. A. K. Gani, Rahendra Koesnan, Sarino Mangunpranoto and Drs. Yap Tjoan Bing. They were replaced by Soetojo Mertodimoeljo, S. Hadikusumo, Mrs. Soedarman, Saleh Umar and Mr. Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo.

almost as quick to brush off requests for privileges when they came from the P.N.I. as he was when they came from individual P.N.I. businessmen. The contrast is sharp between this attitude and that of the P.N.I. ministers in the cabinet of Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo. The latter made a systematic attempt to use government power to strengthen their party's electoral prospects. They did this through pressure on the Ministries of Finance, the Interior and Information and on the Central Electoral Committee and through the system of the cabinet's first Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. Iskaq Tjokrohadisurjo, whereby "special licenses" were granted to importers who agreed to contribute to P.N.I. funds. (48)

With the P.N.I. ministers continuing to defy their party in a number of important ways, the party leaders' hostility to the cabinet increased. But this hostility was tempered by the fact that the composition of the cabinet which might be expected to succeed Wilopo's could not be predicted with any degree of certainty. During the period of the Sukiman cabinet it had been possible for the P.S.I.-led opposition to work on the assumption that the successor to the Sukiman cabinet would be one in which it would be more adequately represented. But in the situation in the first five months of 1953, it was more of a gamble for any group to assume that the cabinet which would succeed the existing one would give it greater power.

Roughly speaking, four possibilities existed. Possibly a cabinet like the one of Dr. Sukiman would be formed with a core of ministers from the conservative groups of the P.N.I. and Masjumi, and the support---perhaps even the personal leadership---of the President. A second possibility was a cabinet with a Masjumi-P.N.I. core, but with the P.S.I.-sympathizing elements of the two main parties, the Natsir and Wilopo groups. However this composition, essentially the same as that of the Wilopo cabinet, was thought to be possible only if the cabinet were led by Hatta. A number of Masjumi and P.S.I. leaders had advocated a Hatta presidential or business cabinet and were to do so more emphatically during the June-July cabinet crisis. (49) A third alternative was a new Natsir

(48) The Djakarta daily Sumber later gave it as one reason for the Wilopo cabinet's fall that the P.N.I. ministers in this cabinet had "failed to use their power in the interest of the P.N.I. in the coming general elections." August 3, 1953.

(49) The possibility of a presidential cabinet, that is a cabinet headed by the President or Vice-President, was not provided for in the existing (temporary) constitution. This important escape clause had been eliminated by the commission which made the 1950 constitution out of the 1945 and 1949 ones. Nevertheless a number of influential persons had urged repeatedly before and during post-1950 cabinet crises that Hatta should be called back to the Prime Minister's position, which he had occupied in the last two years of the armed struggle. Many of these persons argued that the President should take the unconstitutional step of asking him to be Prime Minister

cabinet, based on the Masjumi and smaller parties and excluding the P.N.I. Finally a number of observers were discussing the possibility of a cabinet such as was actually formed, basing itself on the P.N.I. and its allies and excluding the Masjumi.

In assessing these possibilities the tacticians of the parties had to bear three new factors in mind. One was the widened gulf between the Masjumi and the P.N.I. The Wilopo cabinet had seen a decline of the influence of the Sukiman group within the Masjumi and a decline of the Wilopo group within the P.N.I. These tendencies could be expected to continue as the approach of elections made each party close its ranks and concern itself increasingly with its interests as a party. This made any sort of P.N.I.-Masjumi cabinet (our first and second possibilities) difficult of achievement. There were in fact to be three separate attempts to form a Masjumi-P.N.I. cabinet of one of the two types (or a combination) in the cabinet crisis which followed Wilopo's resignation, and all were to fail.

A second factor was the increasingly noticeable divergence of political viewpoints between President Soekarno and Vice-President Hatta. This had developed in the course of the Wilopo cabinet period as the President had come to be more and more closely associated with the politics of the P.N.I. Hatta's views were closer to the positions of the Masjumi and P.S.I. This divergence was an important fact militating against the possibility of a Hatta presidential or business cabinet.

Thirdly the parties had to consider the implications of the increasingly active political role of President Soekarno. The President had become deeply involved in the politics of the army struggle. In the cabinet formation situation he could be expected to use his powers of prerogative to lessen the chances of a cabinet over which he could wield little influence. This factor lessened the likelihood of a Natsir-type cabinet. By a process of elimination there appeared to be favorable prospects for the fourth alternative, that of a cabinet based on the P.N.I. and no other major party. The prospects seemed good despite the fact that Mr. Sartono had failed to form a cabinet of this type when he was appointed formateur after the fall of the Natsir cabinet, and despite the further fact that it was unprecedented for the Masjumi, the country's largest party and the party most influential in the regional councils, to be excluded from a cabinet. Nevertheless every party had reason to be cautious.

It is impossible to know clearly how P.N.I. thinking on this crucial

while remaining Vice-President. Others were in favor of his forming a business cabinet and at the same time resigning from the Vice-Presidency (with the possibility of returning to it later). Hatta's own stated attitude was that he would resign from his office to form and head a cabinet if asked to do so by parliament. See A. K. Pringgodigdo, The Office of President in Indonesia, pp. 16, 29-30.

"succession problem" developed in the first months of 1953. But it would appear that there was a definite increase in the party leaders' optimism on this point at approximately the time of the first meeting of the newly selected party council in the second week of March. It was at this time that the newly elected second deputy-chairman of the party, Sarmidi Mangunsarkoro, stated that "the P.N.I. respects and is prepared to cooperate with any party on a basis of cooperation and goodwill." (50) This was the first of a series of statements by P.N.I. leaders on the possibility of greater cooperation with the Communists. (51) It was at this time too that the Djakarta daily Merdeka, not a P.N.I. organ but edited by a man in close touch with the leaders of the Sidik and Sartono wings of the party, began to call openly for Wilopo's resignation. (52)

By the end of April if not earlier, the P.N.I. leaders had decided to look for a way to overthrow the cabinet. By this time the cabinet was extremely weak and it seemed to many in the P.N.I., as it did to a number of other persons, that the only way to have a government which could govern by resolving issues rather than shelving them would be through the resignation of Wilopo and the abandonment of the Masjumi-P.N.I. coalition. At the same time the P.N.I. leadership considered that the risk involved in overthrowing the cabinet was worth taking.

It may well be that P.N.I. action against the cabinet was positively urged by President Soekarno. There were certainly strong indications of his hostility to the Wilopo cabinet, particularly because of its army policies and also because of personality conflicts.

Altogether the chances seemed good that the Wilopo cabinet's successor would be either a P.N.I.-centered cabinet excluding the Masjumi, such as was actually formed, or a cabinet of the Sukiman type, based on the conservative and anti-Socialist groups in the P.N.I. and Masjumi. In either event the P.N.I. leaders expected to benefit. They would certainly see to it that men of surer party loyalty held the portfolios allotted to the P.N.I. Thus from March or at least April onwards the Sidik and Sartono group leaders of the party appear to have concerned themselves not with whether the cabinet should fall but rather with when and how this should happen. (53)

(50) Sin Po, March 11, 1953.

(51) See the later statement of Sidik Djojokusarto "The P.N.I. can cooperate with any party on a basis of cooperation and goodwill" (Radio Surabaya, April 29, 1953) and the statement of the P.N.I. executive immediately after the cabinet's decision to resign to the effect that the party is "prepared to cooperate with anybody and any (political) current" (Keng Po, June 4, 1953).

(52) Merdeka, March 16, 1953. Also March 23, April 30, May 15 and May 20, 1953 (all editorials).

(53) It was often argued that the numerous crises of the cabinet's last two months--those arising from the Rondonuwu motion, from the East Java officers' "ultimatum" and the Tandjong Morawa affair--were created by the P.N.I. with the specific purpose of forcing the cabinet to stand down. The decision in March to choose the cabinet's Information Minister Mononutu as the new Ambassador in Peking was described as similarly motivated; it certainly did cause the cabinet additional difficulties.

It was the P.N.I. whose decisions were immediately determinative in the matter of ending the cabinet's life. No other party played anything but a secondary role in forcing the actual resignation. But the fall of the cabinet cannot be interpreted merely in terms of the internal developments inside one party. For the fall of Wilopo resulted from a basic refocussing of party alignments which was itself closely related to changes in the relative strength of the country's main political forces. In fact the fall of the cabinet was a product of the same chain of developments which led subsequently to the formation and long period of office of the cabinet of Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo.

When the successor cabinet of Ali was formed the main beneficiaries were the P.N.I., which obtained the Prime Ministership and three other major portfolios, the minor nationalist parties (P.I.R., with three portfolios, and four other parties with one each), the minor Moslem parties (Nahdatul Ulama with three seats and P.S.I.I. with two) and the Indonesian Communist Party. The Communist Party did not obtain any portfolios, but two persons often thought to be sympathizers of the party were included in the cabinet as representatives of the Progressive Fraction and the Indonesian Peasant Front (B.T.I., Barisan Tani Indonesia) respectively. The party itself acquired a position of importance as a government-supporting party, as the new cabinet was partially dependent on its support in parliament.

Now the emergence of this combination of forces was not able to be predicted with certainty when the Wilopo cabinet was still in office. We have seen that roughly four possible types of cabinet were able to be foreseen. But the whole story of the Wilopo cabinet is evidence that the pattern of alignments which emerged with the coming into office of the cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo was not accidental. Cooperation between the P.N.I., the minor nationalist parties, the minor Moslem parties and the Communists on the one hand and between the Masjumi, P.S.I. and Christian parties on the other was not merely the result of the clash of tactics in the period of formation of the Ali cabinet. On the contrary it was the fruit of a long and gradual process creating basically new political relationships.

One central aspect of these new relationships was the heightened inability of the P.N.I. and Masjumi to cooperate with one another. This we have discussed above. But another aspect is of equal importance. This is the fact that a number of developments of the Wilopo period made a P.N.I.-led cabinet which excluded the Masjumi a practicable possibility. The Wilopo cabinet period saw the creation of the Nahdatul Ulama as a political party outside the Masjumi. It saw a rapid rise in the size and influence of the Indonesian Communist Party. Finally it witnessed the crucial defeat of the pro October 17 group within the army. This was important both in itself and because it weakened the army as an extra-parliamentary power center and so indirectly increased the power of President Soekarno over cabinet politics. All of these changes streng-

thened the group of parties which attained power with the formation of the first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo. In one sense therefore one may regard the Nahdatul Ulama, the P.K.I. and President Soekarno as important agents with the P.N.I. of the process which brought the Wilopo period to an end.

In the case of the Nahdatul Ulama it is difficult to know how far there was conscious realization of the implications of the change. The role which the new party played while various attempts were being made to form a cabinet to succeed Wilopo's suggests that it itself was as yet barely conscious of its potential importance.

But there can be no doubt that the Communist Party saw the new possibilities. The party's theoretical organ Bintang Merah commented early on the overall power change which manifested itself after October 17 and opened the way for the P.K.I. to become involved in the divisions within the main body of the nationalist elite. In February 1953 it wrote editorially, "Whereas the question was until recently one of a struggle for power between the group of Sukiman as representatives of American imperialism and the group of Sjahrir as representatives of Dutch and British imperialism, it is now changed, thanks to the stand of our Party which has been followed by the whole People. It has become a struggle for the defense of democracy against the efforts to seize power of those who want to fascize the government." (54)

Between January and June 1953 the tone of P.K.I. pronouncements was one of increasingly strong opposition to the cabinet. Wilopo was increasingly separating himself from the support of the people, Bintang Merah declared, increasingly becoming one with the Sjahrir group. It was up to the Prime Minister to decide whether he would continue to base himself on the support of the people or to abandon this decisive factor. (55)

At the same time the party was growing more and more confident not only in its own strength but in the solidity of its cooperation with "democratic elements, including progressives in the P.N.I. and other parties." (56)

(54) Bintang Merah, Vol. IX, No.2.

(55) Loc. cit.

(56) D.N. Aidit, Menudju Indonesia Baru, Pembaruan, Djakarta, 1953. Returning from Czechoslovakia and other East European countries in mid-May, Aidit made statements strongly endorsing the party's policy of cooperation with the P.N.I. Eulogizing patriotism, he made special mention of the importance of honoring national heroes and poets. E.g. Antara, May 15, 1953. The P.K.I.'s parliamentary leader, Ir. Sakirman, also stressed patriotism in his address on May 20 as Vice-Chairman of the National Awakening Day Committee. The following day, Aidit attacked Vice-President Hatta, who had also spoken, for saying nothing about Indonesian patriotism. Sin Po, May 21, 1953.

Thus while in February it was still calling on its members to "fight with all our strength to prevent the return to power of the Sukiman-Subardjo-Wibisono-Kasman group," there appeared to be much less fear of this eventuality in April and May. The April issue of Bintang Merah editorialized that "the present situation is one where the government and state apparatus of Indonesia are still too much under the control of imperialist compradore elements and their followers, whereas the forces of democracy are growing fast." (57) The implication was clearly that the P.K.I. no longer had reason to fear a fall of the cabinet. Like the P.N.I. the Communist Party now saw the new alliance as sufficiently strong to make action against Wilopo worth taking.

Summing up one may say that the Wilopo cabinet fell as the result of a two-fold development. One central factor was the growing inability of the country's two main parties, Masjumi and P.N.I., to cooperate with one another. A second factor, closely related, was the increasing power of the P.N.I. and its new allies, that is, of the forces which had an interest in a particular type of successor to the cabinet of Wilopo.

At a more fundamental level the cabinet fell for the same reasons that it failed to implement a number of the most important policies to which it was committed. To these reasons we turn in our final chapter.

(57) Op. cit., Vol. IX, No. 4.

CHAPTER VIII

CONCLUSIONS

The record of the Wilopo cabinet is one of notable achievements and instructive failures. When it returned its mandate on June 2, 1953, it had been in office for fourteen months, longer than any of its three predecessors of the post-revolutionary period. The hard work, devotion and ability of the individual ministers who composed the cabinet was generally recognized, as was the spirit of teamwork which characterized its operations. The cabinet's leaders were men with a concern for systematic long-term planning and the solution of basic problems.

The most significant achievements of the cabinet were in the economic field. The measures it took to meet the balance of payments crisis were highly successful. The stringency of its measures in the field of importing, combined with the fact of unexpected surpluses from the oil industry, made possible a sharp reduction in the rate of depletion of foreign reserves. (1) The cabinet was unable to prevent rises in the level of domestic prices, but it succeeded in confining these principally to luxury and semi-luxury articles.

The cabinet had notable success too in the reorganization of government finances. The determination with which it pursued its austerity goals enabled it to persuade the separate Ministries to accept severe budget cuts. Thus a thoroughly detailed working budget for 1953 existed before the beginning of that year—a major achievement, despite the fact that parliamentary approval for the budget had yet to be given. Moreover the cabinet greatly enhanced the effectiveness of the budget control machinery of the Finance Ministry. (2) Its success in eliminating many forms of waste had salutary effects not only economically but also in strengthening political morality. At the same time it was able to achieve production increases in a number of important fields, particularly of such basic foodstuffs as rice, corn, cassava, fish and livestock. (3) The cabinet placed heavy emphasis on expanding rice production towards the goal of self-sufficiency in rice. Major production increases, combined with the system of "injections" of imported rice, enabled it to succeed—where its predecessor had failed—in keeping rice prices stable.

(1) Information provided by Mr. Hans O. Schmitt.

(2) Higgins, op. cit., pp. 6-7.

(3) Op. cit., pp. 11-12.

The country's textile output grew rapidly also. In the first half of 1953 it attained an annual rate of 41 million metres--as compared with the 23 million metres produced in 1951. (4) The cabinet was less successful with regard to the importation of cloth for the domestic clothing industry. Its policy of centralizing both the importation and the distribution of cambrics in the hands of a single cooperative organization of batik producers resulted in practice in marked shortages of cloth, some racket profiteering and an increase in speculative trading. (5)

The same period saw encouraging increases in the domestic production of industrial raw materials and in the licensed capacity of certain controlled industries for which statistics were made available. (6) The structure of imports in 1953 in evidence of success of the cabinet's policy of increasing the proportion of imports of capital goods needed for economic expansion. (7) In addition the period saw the establishment of several new institutions of significance for long-term economic development. The National Planning Bureau, an agency established to coordinate governmental planning and facilitate the channeling of economic advice by foreign specialists, was opened early in the life of the cabinet. Djakarta's first stock exchange was inaugurated at approximately the same time. In April 1953 the government introduced new statutes for the Java Bank nationalized 14 months earlier, thereby creating the machinery to regulate relations between this central bank and the government.

In such relatively non-political spheres of economic life as cooperatives, rural small industry, road and sea communications, transmigration or inter-insular resettlement and the expansion of educational and training facilities the cabinet pursued policies which were essentially similar to those of its predecessors, and with comparable significant success. (8)

(4) Economic Report on Asia and the Far East, 1953, ECAFE, Bangkok, 1954, p. 72

(5) N. Amstutz, op. cit.

(6) Higgins, op. cit., p. 12.

(7) Higgins, op. cit., p. 9. Also Djawaban Pemerintah atas Pertanyaan Seksi Perekonomian dari D.P.R. Sementara, yang diutjapkan oleh Menteri Perekonomian pada tgl. 31 Maret 1953 (Reply of the Government to Questions from the Economic Affairs Section of Parliament, given by the Minister of Economic Affairs, March 31, 1953), Ministry of Information, Djakarta, 1953.

(8) The number of persons resettled under one of the several inter-insular "transmigration" schemes in 1953 was 48,354. This was higher than in any earlier post-revolutionary year, but lower than in 1954. Biro Pusat Statistik (Central Statistical Bureau), Statistik 1956 (Statistics 1956), B.P.S., Djakarta, 1956, p. 16.

Politically it was effective in three significant aspects of economic policy. It was able to prevent the development of a dangerous inflation. It successfully defied pressures for rapid Indonesianization of business. Finally it was able to free itself in part from the constant pressure for ad hoc policies and thus could bring into existence a few of the prerequisites for long-term development planning.

In more directly political fields there are also a number of positive achievements to record. Strike activity declined markedly in the Wilopo cabinet period, so that it accounted for the loss of less than 1,000,000 man-days in 1952 and for only 50,000 man-days in the first half of 1953--as compared with 3,720,000 in 1951. (9) This was due in large part to the cooperative attitude of the P.K.I. to the cabinet. But it should be added that the cabinet took strong action against Communist-led strikes on at least two important occasions, the strike of autonomous region employees in Central Java in April 1952 and the East Java sugar strike of late July of that year. The period saw a rise in the influence of the small non-Communist labor federations--partly due to support from the Labor Ministry.

Within the government service the cabinet may be said to have "held the line" against pressures for expansion and greater politicization. There was an increase in the size of the bureaucracy, but it was principally in such fields as teaching which were still understaffed. Because the individual members of the Wilopo cabinet were as strongly loyal to one another as they were to their respective parties the number of political appointments made in the civil service, or at least in its higher echelons, was small.

Cabinet pressure against wasteful spending lessened the rate at which patronage was dispensed and kept outright corruption at a fairly low level. The country's vigilant press was able to unearth only a small number of cases of corruption in the whole 14-month period. Corruption was not the fact to be accepted which it became for much of the political elite in the period of the next three cabinets.

Legal norms were fairly satisfactorily maintained. The cabinet initiated several major political trials, those of Sultan Hamid II of West Borneo, who had been involved in the Westerling coup of January 1950, of Captain Abdul Aziz of the former Netherlands Indies Army who had led the Makassar revolt of April of the same year, and of Affandi Ridhwan and Achmad Buchari, leaders of the G.P.I.I. (Masjumi youth organization) charged with associations with the Darul Islam. All of these trials were conducted quietly and with decorum. Moreover major strides were taken towards the elimination of military jurisdiction in civil affairs through the lifting of the State of Siege in many parts of the country and of the milder State of War in some others. Of the 21,400 persons who were under

(9) Economic Survey of Asia and the Far East, 1953, p. 71.

arrest in May 1952 on the basis of the War and Siege regulations all but 7,500 had been set free by the end of that year. (10) Despite the fact that the government showed weakness in several cases of mob attacks on newspaper offices, the country's press did on the whole maintain its high degree of effective freedom.

In the field of foreign policy the government's achievements appear at first sight to have been conspicuous by their absence. Concerned with bread to the virtual exclusion of circuses, the Wilopo cabinet certainly made no attempt to use the field of foreign policy to bolster its home prestige. On the other hand it took a number of foreign policy steps which were of economic importance. It was able in January 1953 to come to an agreement with the USA for the continuation of its economic and technical assistance on a basis formally outside the Mutual Security Administration. It initiated Indonesia's entry into the Colombo Plan. Further it applied for the country's admission to the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development.

To end the list of the cabinet's political achievements, it succeeded in creating an election law.

But when all this has been said the fact remains that the cabinet failed in terms of its own goals. It failed signally in its policies for the army. Here the endeavor was made to implement large-scale reorganization. Those principally responsible saw this not only as a budgetary necessity. They saw it in long-range terms as a contribution to Indonesia's domestic security and defensive capacity and further to her political unity and stability. Again they sought, through reorganization, to canalize the dynamic energies of the former revolutionary army into a number of activities in the field of economic development.

All this was made impossible because the reorganization plans aroused such great antagonisms in the army. In the actual event the cabinet's policies in the army were almost entirely self-defeating. Divisions in the army grew more acute through closer links with political cleavages and the overall effect was a sharpening of these very political cleavages and their projection onto the geographical plane. The army's effectiveness against the disturbers of domestic security was lessened as the role of politics in the army grew and as budget cuts were made at the expense of equipment rather than salaries. (11) In fact, as we have seen, the government was unable to effect more than minor improvements in the security of the disturbed areas of the country. Attempting

(10) Statement of Major Imam Sukarto, Head of Army Information Department, Antara, March 23, 1953.

(11) Nasution, op. cit., pp. 258, 289-90.

to strengthen the army's ability to unite the archipelago republic, the cabinet produced instead an intensification of tendencies to warlordism. Hoping to divert soldier energies into the fields of reconstruction and development, it actually turned them to greater varieties of political activity and thereby added a new dimension to political instability.

It is true that the October 17 whirlwind had roots much deeper than the policies of the Wilopo cabinet. But it was this cabinet's determination to arrive at basic solutions, combined with the concurrent sharp fall in exports revenues, which brought the long-standing situation to a head. And this situation the cabinet failed to master. Instead it became its victim; for indeed it was the October 17 affair, more than any other single factor, which produced the cabinet's political crippling.

The Wilopo cabinet had a similar record of failure in the sphere of its policies to make use of foreign investment. The members of the cabinet did believe that they should make efforts to attract the private foreign investor. Indonesians should not place exaggerated faith in foreign investment, they thought; for the primary source of developmental capital was the Indonesian people themselves. But the attempt should be made to attract additional foreign capital in order that development and the achievement of a reasonable level of living might come more quickly. (12)

One way to do this was by the promulgation of an explicit set of terms for the operation of foreign capital in Indonesia, a statement telling the investor clearly what part of his profits he could transmit outside the country annually, what his obligations were to train Indonesian nationals, how long he would be secure against possible nationalization, and so on. It was the stated aim of the Wilopo cabinet, frequently reiterated, to issue such a statement. (13) One draft, which Professor Higgins describes as liberalized, was all but formally adopted. (14) But the fact is that no statement had been issued by the time the cabinet fell.

Of much greater importance is the fact that the cabinet failed in its policies towards the foreign capital already invested in the country. Its weakness here was clearly demonstrated in the Tandjong Morawa affair;

(12) See the statements of the Minister of Finance, Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Keng Po, November 29, 1952, and the statement of the Minister of Economic Affairs, Mr. Sumanang, Antara, March 18, 1953.

(13) See the statements of Information Minister Arnold Mononutu, Antara, July 3, 1952, Communications Minister Ir. Djuanda, Antara, August 28, 1952, Prime Minister Mr. Wilopo, Aneta, September 3, 1952, the official cabinet announcement of February 27, 1953, Antara, February 28, 1953, and the statement of Economic Affairs Minister Mr. Sumanang, Antara, March 28, 1953.

(14) Op. cit., p. 7.

it was shown there to be politically incapable of implementing its part of an agreement with foreign plantations. And if it failed by commission in the question of squatting on East Sumatran estates it failed by omission in the matter of the North Sumatran oilwells. There the political hazards of taking the action on which the cabinet had decided were seen as too great. The damaged wells were not returned to Dutch Shell, but continued in their uncertain status and very low rate of output.

The Wilopo cabinet period saw what was probably a slight increase in overseas confidence in the country's viability as a sphere of investment. But almost certainly the rate of disinvestment by foreigners, through estate closings and such indirect techniques as the indiscriminate tapping of rubber trees, was more rapid than the rate of new foreign investment.

In the important question of decentralization and regional autonomy the cabinet's record is one of postponement of major action. It decreed autonomy or self-governing status to some areas such as Kalimantan and certain parts of Sulawesi and the Moluccas which had hitherto had only administrative status. Early in its period of office it established two committees to recommend action in the field of financial relations between the central government and the regions, a ministerial committee consisting of the Ministers of Finance and the Interior, Dr. Sumitro and Mr. Roem, and a committee of officials, under the chairmanship of Mr. Nasroen of the Ministry of the Interior. (15)

But these committees worked slowly. Any basis for a settlement of financing relationships had necessarily to be a political basis, representing a positive government stand with regard to the interest conflicts which existed between richer and poorer areas of the country and between central government agencies and all others. Such a basis was never found. Despite demands from a number of regions for greater financing powers, there was no major step away from the existing system of financing regional needs substantially by central government subsidies determined on an ad hoc basis. (16) The long-promised law to regularize relations between the central government and the regional ones and increase the financial powers of the latter was not made.

Furthermore no step was taken to relieve the anomalous situation which existed in relation to the interim regional legislative councils

- (15) On the work of the Nasroen committee see J. de Bruine, "Financiele Verhouding tussen de Centrale Regering en de Daerhs," Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Vol. VI, No. 2-3, February-March, 1953.
- (16) See Douglas S. Paauw, "The Role of Local Finance in Indonesian Economic Development," Ekonomi dan Keuangan Indonesia, Vol. VIII, No. 1, January 1955.

established in many parts of Java and Sumatra under Government Regulation 39 of 1950. These continued to function in most of the provinces where they had been established in the period of the Natsir cabinet, but elsewhere there were no legislative councils. Masjumi opposition ensured that there was no alternative system of establishing councils on a temporary pre-elections basis. On the other hand P.N.I. opposition was effective against pressure for early regional elections. Thus the status quo, with which no party was satisfied, was maintained. The cabinet merely stated that regional elections would follow the elections for parliament and the Constituent Assembly and be conducted on similar lines.

One can add a number of other fields in which the cabinet failed to take decisive action. It did little or nothing to simplify the organization of the central government. This matter too was turned over to a committee, the Committee for the Organization of the Ministries under the chairmanship of Mr. A. K. Pringgodigdo, Director of the President's cabinet, and it was only on April 1954 that the committee submitted its findings. The plans for rationalization in the government services, plans which were actually never given cabinet endorsement, were in effect abandoned with the development of the October 17 crisis.

A similar situation existed in some aspects of foreign policy. Thus the cabinet did not implement its promise to resume the negotiations with the Netherlands which had been broken off with the fall of the Sukiman cabinet. In these negotiations the question of the Netherlands-Indonesian Union and the economic provisions of the Round Table Conference agreement of 1949 had been discussed together with the question of sovereignty over Irian (or West Irian). But when Holland subsequently refused to discuss the Irian question any further the P.N.I. opposed further negotiations on Indonesian grievances against other aspects of the existing treaty relationship. Similarly the cabinet took no action in the matter of the reparations negotiations with Japan which were begun under the Sukiman cabinet and temporarily abandoned in January 1952. (17) This was in part because of the parties' conflicting stands in the matter of ratification of the San Francisco treaty with Japan. Finally nothing was done in the matter of diplomatic relations with the U.S.S.R.--not even after the passage of the Rondonuwu motion.

In the field of agrarian reform the action promised in the government's program was not taken. The same may be said of the matter of educational reform. Finally in the field of labor legislation the government did prepare and endorse a number of bills but did not succeed in making them into law. (18)

(17) The cabinet had made no specific promises in this regard.

(18) In view of the great importance attached by the men of the Wilopo cabinet to economic development it should be said that the cabinet did not attempt to tackle the politically most difficult tasks

The Wilopo cabinet was bolder and more ambitious than any other cabinet of the post-revolutionary period. It was probably as successful as any other cabinet in terms of achieving a set goal. It had a longer life and more positive achievements than any of the other cabinets which attempted to tackle basic long-term problems, the cabinets of Natsir (September 1950-March 1951), Sukiman (April 1951-February 1952) and the second cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo (March 1956-March 1957). Slight as was its respite from the constantly recurring political crises which threatened its very existence, it nevertheless succeeded more than any other cabinet of the period in freeing itself from the pressure for ad hoc solutions to underlying problems.

How then are the cabinet's failures to be explained? We shall concern ourselves here with two types of explanations. We shall consider first the party political factors which limited the cabinet's operations and then go on to examine the general political framework and particularly the disproportion which existed between the tasks of government in post-revolutionary Indonesia and the resources available to governments.

Throughout its period of office and particularly towards the end of it, the cabinet was forced to inaction by the divisions between the parties represented in it, and particularly by divisions between the Masjumi and the P.N.I. This was the case in such foreign policy fields as the question of West Irian and of economic relations with Holland, the question of diplomatic exchange with the U.S.S.R. and the matter of resumption of reparations talks with Japan. It was the case also in questions related to the role of foreign capital in the country, particularly in the matter of the request of Dutch Shell for the return of its wells in North Sumatra. The same deadlock explains the cabinet's inaction on the issue of the composition of the regional councils.

Already at the time of the cabinet's assumption of power the two major parties had adopted mutually contradictory positions on a number of these matters--in some cases with the solemnity of congress resolutions. But this fact acquired new importance with the development of new tensions between the two parties in the cabinet's period of office.

The central aspect of these new tensions--and it was both a causal and a derivative aspect--was the change inside the P.N.I. The weakness of the Wilopo cabinet was a measure of the weakness of Mr. Wilopo and his followers inside their own party. As the Wilopo group lost more and

associated with a determined approach to economic development and modernization in countries such as Indonesia. There was periodic discussion at the governmental level of such recommendations as the lengthening of the working day from seven to eight hours, the re-organization of taxation to increase the rate of domestic capital accumulation and the institution of birth control programs. But neither the Wilopo cabinet nor any other cabinet attempted to take action in any of these fields.

more of its influence inside the P.N.I., so the cabinet lost the power to act as the independent team which it was in the early period of its term. By March or April 1953 it had lost almost all of its independence. The decisions of the regular Tuesday meetings of the cabinet were strictly circumscribed by what was decided at the Monday meetings of the executives of the two parties. The changed situation was reflected in the stand of the Masjumi executive at the time of the cabinet's resignation, that a "business cabinet" was no longer possible. (19)

In a wider sense both the increased tension between the Masjumi and the P.N.I. and the decline in Wilopo's position inside his own party were part of an overall change in political alignments. They were part of the polarization of forces which placed the Masjumi, P.S.I. and Christian parties on one side of the political fence and the P.N.I., the Moslem League parties (Nahdatul Ulama and P.S.I.I.), the minor nationalist parties and the P.K.I. on the other, stronger, side.

In the early period of the cabinet's life the crucial political issues were ones on which the two main parties were both internally divided. They were issues between two sections of the intellectual component of the political elite, between the P.S.I.-sympathizing groups on the one hand and the anti-Socialist conservatives on the other. (See the chart on page 122.) The mass leader elements had relatively little influence at this level.

By the time the cabinet was about to fall the divisions inside the two main parties had come to be much less important. In each case one group had achieved a position of clear preponderance. The Natsir group had come to wield predominant influence inside the Masjumi. The P.N.I. had come under the virtually complete control of an alliance of the conservative intellectual leaders around Mr. Sartono and Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo with the mass leaders around Sidik Djojokusarto. Furthermore the P.N.I. was cooperating increasingly closely with the P.K.I. The Communist Party and the minor Moslem parties were in any case growing in power. The P.N.I.'s need for anti-Masjumi allies made these mass leader groups a factor of importance in cabinet politics. Thus there developed a change of alignments of basic importance for the whole course of politics in the post-revolutionary period. The combination of forces on which the Wilopo cabinet was based was no longer viable.

A number of political party developments of the period of the Wilopo cabinet contributed to this change of alignments. One was the Nahdatul Ulama's secession from the Masjumi, formalized in July 1952. Another was the consolidation of the power of the Natsir group inside the Masjumi which resulted from this party's conference in August 1952. The process was carried much further by the October 17 affair which heightened tensions between Wilopo and his party, forged closer links between the

(19) Antara, June 3, 1953.

P.N.I. and the Communist Party, and brought President Soekarno into an increasingly active involvement with P.N.I. politics. A final contributory factor was the government's vigor in pushing for early elections. With elections to be held in a fairly short time, there was strong pressure on all parties to close their ranks and pursue their own ends as parties as vigorously as possible. The P.N.I., fearful of the grassroots power of Masjumi-led Islam, was anxious to postpone the elections for which the government was vigorously pressing. To be able to prepare itself for the elections in the way it wanted to, it needed to break its association with the Masjumi and to gain and hold government power without sharing it with its major rival. And for this it needed new allies.

At the level of extra-parliamentary forces there was a major power shift which also contributed to the change in party alignments. For the October 17 affair upset what was previously a delicate balance between the army leadership and the personal power of President Soekarno. With the pro October 17 officers removed from the leadership of the army this balance was destroyed. And with army divisions more acute and open the army ceased temporarily to play any important role at the level of Djakarta politics. (20) The power of President Soekarno grew correspondingly greater. This was an important factor strengthening the new alliance of the P.N.I. with the mass leader groups, for without it it is doubtful whether this group could have expected to win and keep government power.

But the change in alignments may also be explained at another level. It is certainly significant that the power of all mass leader and oppositionist groups was rising in our period. This is true not only for the P.K.I., the Moslem League parties and the Sidik group of the P.N.I., but also for the Isa Anshary group inside the Masjumi. Moreover the period saw a major victory of mass leader officers over intellectuals in the army.

One factor which helps explain this rising power of mass leader forces is the growing anticipation of elections; for electioneering requires the skills of the mass leader rather than those of his counterpart, the intellectual. But a more important part of the explanation lies in the existence of a diffuse but increasingly powerful political discontent. This discontent was reflected in the increase of regionalist feeling in the Wilopo period and in the fact of a continuing high level of anti-foreign sentiment. It was channeled in a variety of ways. But in every case mass leaders were the chief agents of the channeling process and the intellectuals' regime the chief target of their protest.

(20) This lasted till the ceremonial restoration of army unity at the Jogjakarta military conference of February 1955. Shortly after this important conference a substantially reunited army leadership acted decisively on the Djakarta political stage, forcing the resignation of the first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo. See Smail, op. cit.

Looking at the growth of mass leader influence in terms of rising political discontent, we come to more fundamental aspects of the Wilopo cabinet's failures. For this brings us to examine the general social and political framework within which all governments of the post-revolutionary period have had to work.

When one examines the political reactions which the Wilopo cabinet invoked against itself by its army policies and its policy in the squatting issue in East Sumatra it is impossible to explain its failures simply by reference to conflict between the government parties. For in these cases the party conflict was merely the projection of a wider social conflict. Moreover it was the projection of a necessary governmental dilemma, for the social conflicts in question were ones with which governments were forced to become involved to the extent that they pursued vigorous policies oriented to long-term solutions. In these cases the failures of the cabinet must be traced back to the geographical, economic and social realities of post-revolutionary Indonesia and to the lack of resources at the disposal of governments attempting to deal with these realities.

One basic reality is that Indonesia is a country whose very island nature and long history of divisions makes political consensus difficult to maintain. It is a country with a multiplicity of diverse and conflicting social interests and a wide diffusion of political power, where a powerful will to unity must contend with centrifugal tendencies rooted in both history and economic structure.

Her long period of colonial rule left Indonesia with acute economic problems. When independence came it came to a country whose agricultural capacity was increasingly incapable of keeping up with a rapid rate of population increase. It came to a country whose economic structure was one-sidedly export-oriented and whose governmental machine was heavily dependent on raw materials exports and the prices these fetched on a highly fluctuating world market. And it came in the aftermath of a period of great physical destruction. Moreover it came to a country whose people had not been trained to take over its government, but who on the contrary had been barred from political and administrative participation except at low levels.

The problems which this heritage presented for the governments of independent Indonesia were made even more formidable as a result of the revolutionary means by which independence was achieved. The revolution and the Japanese occupation which preceded it caused tremendous social ferment and high new expectations. In particular it created a new group of young men taken out of their traditional roles in villages and towns to become its soldiers, propagandists and organizers. These men, an

estimated 500,000, fired with militant political idealism, had been promised a stake in the new society of independence. But the post-revolutionary leadership had great difficulty in fulfilling this promise. The regime as a whole lacked the resources to integrate the group adequately in terms of the personal aspirations of its members and their ideological aspirations for the society as a whole. Thus every government had to face the fact that a large segment of its politically effective public opinion was dissatisfied with its role in post-revolutionary society and therefore prone to find political expression through various forms of "oppositionism."

The relative importance of these ex-revolutionaries within the newspaper reading public was all the greater because there existed no firmly rooted indigenous propertied class which could exert major countervailing power. And moreover the ex-revolutionaries were well equipped to provide political leadership for the much larger number of persons who were affected by ongoing social change and freshly stimulated expectations of material advancement.

The governments of the period faced additional pressures of a different kind at the level of the political elite. Here they had to deal with repeated demands from politico-commercial cliques clamoring to fill what was potentially an economic vacuum. They had to face a variety of claims for bureaucratic patronage. And they had to create minimal consensus in the face of a splintered and fractionalized system of parties. Furthermore this system was not merely an institutional barrier; it reflected the existence of a multiplicity of small power centers, each in a position to veto many types of government action. (21)

With such great achievements expected of them and at the same time such a variety of obstacles limiting their ability to implement consistent policies, the cabinets of the period were yet poorly endowed with governmental resources. The Wilopo cabinet had full disposition over a centralized and unified police force and the efficient pamong pradja corps or general civil administration. In addition it possessed important instruments of political control in the Ministries of Education, Information and Religion. But on the other hand its ability to use the army as its instrument was severely limited by the army's internal divisions and its aspirations to political influence. The power of the navy and air force, particularly important in archipelago conditions, was miniscule. And the level of efficiency of most of the country's administrative organs was low.

In addition the cabinet labored under constitutional disabilities. It could be overthrown by parliament but lacked effective power to call

(21) See Soedjatmoko, "The Role of Political Parties in Indonesia," in Philip W. Thayer, Nationalism and Progress in Free Asia, Johns Hopkins, Baltimore, 1956, pp. 128 ff.

for parliament to be dissolved. For in the matter of dissolution the President's decision was final. The fact that President Soekarno could and did exercise wide influence over government, through the use of independent and non-responsible power, was a major limitation on the cabinet.

Finally Wilopo had very little time. His cabinet survived for only 14 months and in the last eight months of that time it was so fully occupied with the political tasks of preserving its existence that little time was left for the actual task of government. The short life of cabinets is especially crippling in Indonesian conditions because so much of the country's planning is done at the ministerial level rather than within the civil service. Thus the members of the Wilopo cabinet had to think through many of the problems of their ministries anew. In many cases they did not press for parliamentary consideration of bills submitted by their predecessors until they had examined them. Yet these same men also bore a heavy load of administrative responsibility. They were called on to make decisions in a variety of matters of detail, which were however of political importance because of the lack of routinization of the Indonesian bureaucracy. Their ability to enact policy was further impeded by the time-consuming procedures which parliament used to deal with their bills. (22)

These were the fundamental limitations within which government operated in the Wilopo period and, mutatis mutandis, in the whole of the period since the end of the revolution. In all of the post-revolutionary period a major discrepancy has existed between what is expected of governments and what they can do to fulfill or channel these expectations. This discrepancy explains the growth of political ferment in its various forms. And it explains the weakening of the consensus which existed at the level of the political elite in 1950 and whose terms were set by the intellectuals. As this consensus has grown weaker power within the political elite has tended to shift from intellectuals to mass leaders (using these terms always in our particular sense). In fact the whole of the post-revolutionary period has seen a rise in the influence of mass leaders. Mass organizations have grown in political importance--labor and veterans' organizations, regionalist organizations and military units--and consequently there has been a rise in the power of their leaders, men skilled as organizers and mediators of ideas. Intellectuals have maintained their ascendancy in the bureaucracy and have continued to hold large numbers of cabinet posts. But their political influence has waned as they have been held responsible for the failure of governments to do what was expected of them. As the number of intellectuals has risen particular individuals of the group have become more readily dispensable. Intellectuals in government have tended more and more to act as the

(22) For a statistical survey of the laws, emergency laws, government regulations and presidential regulations enacted between 1950 and 1955 see Pringgodigdo, op. cit., p. 41.

representatives of collective entities outside their group. In part they have become spokesmen for propertied interests. But because of the relative weakness of these interests they have tended to fall back more and more on mass organizations and their leaders and to become representatives of these. This has made government generally weaker and more negative, for the power of different mass leader groups has tended to be effective in mutually contradictory directions.

This brings us finally to a discussion of the place of the Wilopo cabinet in the sequence of eight cabinets which have held office since December 1949.

The Wilopo cabinet's resignation was followed by a record 60-day crisis in which four distinct attempts to form a cabinet--of Mangunsarkoro and Mr. Roem, of Mukarto Notowidigdo of the P.N.I. (with two distinct commissions) and of Mr. Burhanuddin Harahap of the Masjumi--all failed. The crisis was finally terminated with the success of Mr. Wongsonegoro, chairman of P.I.R., who announced that he had been able to form a cabinet with Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo of the P.N.I. as Prime Minister and himself as First Deputy Prime Minister. This cabinet, now known as the first Ali Sastroamidjojo cabinet, was a coalition of the P.N.I. with the Moslem League parties and the minor nationalist parties. It held office for almost two years, supported by the P.K.I. and opposed by the Masjumi, the P.S.I. and the Catholic Party, (soon afterwards also by the Protestant Parkindo and the Democratic Fraction and later by a section of P.I.R.).

The successor of this first cabinet of Mr. Ali was the short-lived cabinet of Mr. Burhanuddin Harahap of the Masjumi (August 1955-March 1956). This was originally composed of the Masjumi, the P.S.I. and the Christian parties, most of the minor nationalist parties and the two large Moslem League parties, Nahdatul Ulama and P.S.I.I., but these last two subsequently resigned. It faced the opposition of the P.N.I. and P.K.I. and later of the Moslem League parties.

Thus the composition of these two cabinets represents the new alignment of political forces which evolved in the period of the cabinet of Wilopo. In the 31 months of their existence there was a firm alliance of the Masjumi with the P.S.I. and one almost equally firm between the P.N.I. and the Communists. The Christian parties swung definitely to the Masjumi and P.S.I. side, and the Moslem League parties more hesitantly to the side of the P.N.I. and P.K.I. The minor nationalist parties succeeded in selling their parliamentary votes to each side in turn, but at the expense of accentuating the internal divisions inside themselves--to the point of open breach in the case of the P.I.R. and P.R.N. The internal divisions inside the P.N.I. and the Masjumi grew less and less important. President Soekarno came to be more clearly and openly associated with the P.N.I. and its allies, and Vice-President Hatta with the Masjumi-led bloc. So the division between the two men became wider. It

reached a climax during the army crisis of June-July 1955, which led to the resignation of the first Ali cabinet and its replacement by the cabinet of Burhanuddin.

In terms of party alignments the period of these two cabinets was merely an unfolding of the tendencies whose beginnings we have observed in the period of Wilopo. But this unfolding was at the same time a process of consolidation. This was partly because each of these two cabinets, and particularly that of Ali, used government power widely for party ends. But more particularly it resulted from the increasing importance of regionalism and of conflict between Java and the outer islands.

For the lines of the inter-regional conflict ran parallel to those of the issue between parties. The Ali cabinet rested primarily on the parties strong in Java. The Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet on the other hand was based on parties strong outside Java, or at least outside East and Central Java, the main area of the ethnic Javanese. The election results made this clear, clearer than it had previously been seen to be. The P.N.I., Nahdatul Ulama and P.K.I. each obtained more than 85% of their votes in Java and more than 65% from Central and East Java. By contrast only 51% of the Masjumi's votes came from Java, and only a little over 25% from Central and East Java. The P.S.I. obtained 46% of its votes in Java and only 12% from the Central and Eastern areas. And neither of the Christian parties obtained as much as 11% of its voting support from the main island. (23)

The alignment pattern changed temporarily with the formation of the second cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo (March 1956-March 1957). One effect

(23) The population of Java was then reckoned to be 66.2% of that of all Indonesia, and the population of East and Central Java 45.6%. See Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955, p. 62.

To some extent this coalescing of party and regional alignments was the product of the policies of the Ali and Burhanuddin cabinets. It is a fact that the Ali cabinet placed economic burdens primarily on the areas outside Java. policy of inflation financing was hardest on exporters, whose strength is primarily outside the main island. And its rapid Indonesianization of shipping created serious impediments to the flow of inter-insular trade. Regionalism grew rapidly in the Ali cabinet period. The Burhanuddin cabinet reversed the tendency to inflation financing and rapid Indonesianization. The negative effects of its economic policies were felt most strongly by importers and more generally by the new business class of Indonesians, a class primarily centered in Java.

of the elections of September and December 1955 had been to awaken the long dormant P.N.I. fears of the P.K.I. Thus this cabinet, formed as the elected parliament was assembling, was one in which the P.N.I. and Masjumi were both represented. A P.N.I.-led cabinet, it included five ministers each of the P.N.I., Masjumi and Nahdatul Ulama. The P.K.I. was the one major party excluded. But it supported the cabinet.

But it was not long before the old divisions between the P.N.I.-led and Masjumi-led blocs of parties came strongly to the fore again. They limited the cabinet's capacity for action to an even greater extent than they had in the case of the cabinet of Wilopo. The Nahdatul Ulama cooperated chiefly with the P.N.I. And the P.K.I. was able to regain its close associations with the P.N.I. With the P.N.I. increasingly dominant in Djakarta and regionalist feeling mounting rapidly outside Java, there was strong pressure for the Masjumi to leave the cabinet. It finally did this on January 1957 after the resignation of the Sumatran Hatta from the Vice-Presidency and after the first of the bloodless coups by officer-led regional Councils, in Central and North Sumatra.

Since that time the pattern of alignments has been substantially as it was from the period of the Wilopo cabinet onwards. This pattern is reflected in the present cabinet, the "extra-parliamentary business cabinet" formed by the President and led by Ir. Djuanda (non-party). The main portfolios in this cabinet are held by P.N.I. leaders, leaders of the minor Moslem parties and non-party persons, and the cabinet is supported by the P.K.I. The Masjumi and Catholic party oppose the cabinet and the P.S.I. also in all except formality.

However the Djuanda cabinet period has seen major increases in the power of extra-parliamentary forces--of regional elites, of President Soekarno and of the military. Correspondingly it has seen a great decline in the power of political parties as such--with the exception of the Communist Party. The pattern of party alignments as described above has therefore lost much of its importance.

Examining the cabinets of the period since 1949 in terms of the political context in which each went about its work it is possible to establish a rough division into three main periods. The first four of the eight cabinets, those of Hatta, Natsir, Sukiman and Wilopo, all operated within a somewhat similar framework. In their period, between December 1949 and June 1953, the political elite was still substantially united on fundamentals. The intellectual leaders of the revolution retained a position of primacy within the elite and the most important political cleavages were between sections of the intellectual group. Constitutionalism operated slowly but fairly effectively, with the main extra-parliamentary power centers, the President and the army leadership, balanced off against one another. In this context it was possible for cabinets to concern themselves with long-term policies, and so to come to grips with some of the basic and difficult political tasks of government.

The political context was very different in the period of the next two cabinets, the first cabinet of Ali Sastroamidjojo and the one of Burhanuddin Harahap, between August 1953 and March 1956. By this time there was much less left of the unity of the nationalist elite on political fundamentals. This elite had been split as a result of a decline in the power of its unifying intellectual component. In the new bipolar situation, mass leader elements, including the Indonesian Communist Party, were involved in the main issues of cabinet politics. Also Cold War issues played a role of increased importance.

The deeper divisions within the elite, combined with the fact of impending elections, resulted in a lessening of respect for the rules of constitutional politics. Moreover the main extra-parliamentary forces, the President and the army, were now no longer delicately balanced against one another and so each in turn intervened on the central political stage--with greatly increased openness.

In their policy orientation the Ali and Burhanuddin cabinets represent a surrender to the forces which crippled and eventually overthrew Wilopo. They governed almost entirely on an ad hoc basis. Unlike their predecessors they made few attempts at long-term planning. They were interim pre-election cabinets and the work of each of them, and particularly of the Ali cabinet, was circumscribed by the requirements of elections politics.

The current phase since March 1956, the period of the second Ali cabinet and the present cabinet of Djuanda, has been characterized principally by the importance of the regional conflict and the projection of political divisions onto the geographical plane. In this post-election period the importance of parties has declined. But there has been a further rise in the power of mass leaders and a further increase in the role of extra-parliamentary forces. An attempt at long-term policies was made at the beginning of the period but the subsequent development of a series of acute economic, political and military crises has made government by ad hoc decisions a necessity.

The Wilopo period was a turning point in the politics of post-revolutionary Indonesia, as it marked the transition from the first to the second of these three main phases. In the first place the Wilopo period saw a decisive victory of mass leader forces over political forces led by intellectuals. Mass leaders were dramatically successful in the army in the October 17 affair. Moreover there was a sharp rise in their influence in party politics. The 14-month period saw the gradual ending of the situation which had prevailed thereto, where cabinet politics was substantially confined to intellectual-led political forces. In the early period of the cabinet the main contenders at this level were still the Socialist-sympathizing "younger generation" (Natsir, Wilopo, P.S.I.) and the more conservative Soekarno-allied "older generation" (Sukiman, Sartono, P.I.R., etc.). But with the development of the October 17 crisis,

the subsequent increase in Masjumi-P.N.I. tensions and the P.N.I.'s search for allies among mass leader political groups, the center of conflict shifted. Thenceforth there was no inter-party group of intellectual-led anti-Socialist conservatives. The increasing power of mass leader groups had created a situation where only one intellectual-led political force existed--roughly the equivalent of the Socialist-sympathizing group, but now more accurately described as a Masjumi-led group. The intellectuals of the P.N.I.-led group, mainly conservative anti-Socialists, were no longer able to wield independent power as intellectuals; for they were tied to an alliance of predominantly powerful mass leaders. With this major decline in the role of intellectuals, the unity of the political elite on fundamental objectives was severely impaired.

A second aspect of the watershed role of the Wilopo period is seen in the fact that it witnessed the first full showdown between the country's main extra-parliamentary forces, the President and the leadership of the army. Where previously these two giant spectators had intervened only indirectly in the arena of constitutional politics, they did so all but openly in the army crisis of 1952, the developments of October 17 in Djakarta and the subsequent military coups in Surabaya, Makassar and Palembang. This showdown issued in an overwhelming victory for President Soekarno and a great decline in the influence of the army. One result was to strengthen the political forces associated with the President for several years. Another was to weaken constitutionalism as a vehicle for political conflict. The constitutional framework inaugurated by the intellectuals declined in importance with the decline in power of the intellectuals as the unifying component of the political elite.

Finally the Wilopo cabinet period is of focal significance because this cabinet was able and willing to pursue policies oriented to long-term political and economic solutions. In this respect it stands in contrast to its successor cabinets, all of which were obliged by the political dynamics of their position to govern more exclusively on an ad hoc basis.

In a situation increasingly dominated by political ferment the Wilopo cabinet addressed itself with striking determination to what it saw as the basic long-term problems which Indonesian governments had to solve. The cabinet's period was one in which internal pressures to political discontent were accentuated by such external factors as the fall of international raw materials prices and the increasing intransigence of the policy of Holland towards Indonesia. It was a period of rising regionalist feeling and constantly high anti-foreign sentiment. Yet the cabinet dared to go ahead with the implementation of its unpopular policies, defying the sectional challenges to its authority, whatever their source. The very attempt was a major unrecognized achievement.