

THE COMMUNIST UPRISINGS OF
1926-1927 IN INDONESIA:
KEY DOCUMENTS

Edited and with
an introduction by

HARRY J. BENDA
and
RUTH T. McVEY

TRANSLATION SERIES

Modern Indonesia Project

Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York

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PREFACE

The rebellion of the Indonesian Communist Party in 1926-27 was a significant event which had a considerably greater impact on Indonesia's subsequent political development than the actual strength marshalled by the Communists might suggest. Very little has been written about the rebellion and its background, and the documents necessary for its study have been extremely difficult of access, even to those who read Dutch. We have felt that translation and publication of the three reports here presented would be useful to those seeking a fuller understanding of this period of Indonesia's modern history -- one which has remained nearly as obscure as it is important. The Introduction should help the reader see these documents in their proper context and give him a fuller appreciation of the nature of the rebellion and the conditions which nurtured it.

The two editors -- Dr. Harry Benda, Associate Professor of History at Yale University, and Ruth T. McVey, Research Associate in the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project -- have both done extensive research in modern Indonesian political and social history, Ruth McVey being currently engaged in completing a major study of Indonesian Communism during the period 1920 - 1927.

The first of the three documents here presented, the report of January, 1927 by the Governor General of the Netherlands Indies, was not secret, but enjoyed a very limited circulation, primarily in the Volksraad (the largely advisory council of the Netherlands Indies) and the Dutch Parliament. Its full official title is: Politieke Nota over de Partij Kommunist Indonesia: Rapport Waarin is samengevat wat gebleken is omtrent de actie der Partij Kommunist Indonesia, (Nederlandsche - Indische Kommunistische Partij), sectie der 3de Internationale, vanaf Juli 1925 tot en met December 1926. / Political note concerning the Indonesian Communist Party: Report wherein is summed up information which has come to light concerning the action of the Indonesian Communist Party (Netherlands Indies Communist Party), a section of the Third International, from July, 1925 up to and including December, 1926. /

The second document, generally referred to as the Bantam Report had a very restricted circulation, and today apparently only a few copies exist. Its full official title is: Rapport van de commissie voor het onderzoek naar de oorzaken van de zich in de maand November 1926 in verscheidene gedeelten, van de residentie Bantam voorgedaan hebbende ongeregelheden, ingesteld bij het Gouvernements-besluit van Januari 26, No. 1^x (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1928). / The report of the Commission installed by Government decision No. 1^x of January 26, 1927, to investigate the causes of the disturbances which took place in various parts of the residency of Bantam in November, 1926 (Weltevreden: State Printing House, 1928). /

The third document, the political section of the West Coast of Sumatra report, has as its full and official title: De Gang Der Kommunistische Beweging Ter Sumatra's Westkust, Deel I (Politiek gedeelte) Rapport van de Commissie Van Onderzoek ingesteld bij het Gouvernements-besluit van 13 Februari 1927 No. 1 a (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1928). [The course of the Communist Movement on the West Coast of Sumatra, Part I (Political Section), Report of the Investigation Committee appointed under the Governmental Decree of February 13, 1927, No. 1 a (Weltevreden: State Printing House, 1928).] This was marked "Geheim: Voor den Dienst" [Secret: for the Service] by the Netherlands Indies Government, and not until shortly after the conclusion of the war did the Dutch Government grant permission for publication of the valuable sociological section of the report based upon the analysis of the highly respected Dutch scholar, Dr. B. Schreike. This important service was provided in the first volume of Indonesian Sociological Studies: selected writings of B. Schreike, W. van Hoeve and the Institute of Pacific Relations, (The Hague, 1955). Apparently however, neither the Netherlands Indies Government nor the Dutch Government has ever granted permission for the extremely important political section of this report (that part which is here presented) to be declassified and released to the public. I wish to express my appreciation to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia for having granted me permission to publish this document.

The Cornell Modern Indonesia Project is indebted to Mrs. Elizabeth Maijer for translation of the Governor General's Note and the Bantam Report, and to Professor Harry Benda for translation of the political section of the West Coast of Sumatra Report.

Ithaca, New York
November 15, 1959

George McT. Kahin
Director

Continuing demand for this study has lead the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project to issue this second printing. Increased publication costs over the past 10 years has necessitated an increase in the price above that charged in 1960.

November, 1969

George McT. Kahin
Director

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Introduction

I

The revolts in West Java and on the West Coast of Sumatra dealt with in the documents translated in this volume were, at one and the same time, traditional and modern phenomena. They were traditional in the sense that such predominantly rural uprisings had punctuated Dutch colonial rule in the Indies for several decades, if not for centuries. In many respects - not least in the part played by local Islamic leaders - the events of the 1920's not only closely resembled the rural unrest of earlier times, but they seemed to flow from the same, or at least very similar, causes as had inspired their predecessors. The distinguishing modern features of these insurrections lay in both their size and the character of their leadership. Unlike the revolts of the earlier centuries, those of the twentieth were not limited to one region or even to one island; and it was only in the twentieth century that a central leadership, largely urban in origin and inspired by modern ideologies and organizational tactics, had sought to direct traditional peasant unrest into new channels. In fact, the events of 1926-1927 were unique only to the extent that they were Communist-led, for it is equally true that, as such, they constituted not a beginning, but rather the end of what might be called the proto-nationalist phase in modern Indonesian history. That movement had started with the meteoric rise of Sarekat Islam two decades before, and it was the last sparks of that earlier mass movement which some communist leaders fanned into short-lived and suicidal insurrections in the mid-1920's.

In the context of colonial history, the rebellions of 1926/27 mark a decisive turning point. They irrevocably closed a chapter in colonial policy, even if its demise was never officially proclaimed or admitted by the Netherlands. The policy that was quietly being interred, the so-called Ethical Policy, enunciated by young Queen Wilhelmina in 1901, had inaugurated a new era in Dutch colonial thinking. Its originators had sought to replace the exploitation of earlier times, whether governmental or private, by an etatisme aimed, on the one hand, at building a protective wall between the population and Western enterprise, and, on the other, at introducing reforms designed to accelerate the social, economic and political evolution of Indonesia under govern-

mental aegis. It is true, of course, that the implementation of both these aims had encountered stiff opposition from vested economic interests at home and from equally vested bureaucratic and other interests in the colony. But the men of Leyden (Leyden University was the center of the Ethical movement, and its Indological Faculty was providing Indonesia with increasing numbers of expertly trained and liberal-minded administrators) had fought a valiant, and by no means unsuccessful, battle for the acceptance of their paternalistic liberalism in the Indonesian civil service, in the Netherlands parliament and in public opinion in the metropolitan country, if not in the colony itself. The first world war had, moreover, signally aided the spread of liberal notions concerning colonial administration and the concomitant ascendancy of the Ethical movement was reflected in the persons selected to serve as colonial minister and governor-general, and in the reforms - implemented or envisaged - in the colony during and immediately after the war.

Before long, however, the pendulum started to swing away from welfare policies, innovation, experimentation and liberalization. As a result of perturbing Indonesian developments, the Ethical movement and its propounders increasingly found themselves on the defensive from the early 1920's on. Little by little the pre-Ethical conservatism in colonial policy - even though it came to use an at times misleadingly modern vocabulary - gained the upper hand. When the Communist-led rebellions took the authorities and European investors and residents by surprise, the men of Leyden were accused of having brazenly conjured up the very monster that was threatening Dutch authority in the islands. Dutch liberalism in matters colonial was not, it is true, dead; but it never was able to recoup its strength sufficiently to affect the post-rebellion colonial policies of the Netherlands to a marked degree.

To what extent, we may well ask, were the critics of the Ethical policy correct in blaming its propounders for the turbulence of the 1920's? To the extent only that reforming zeal had indubitably accelerated Indonesian social and political evolution. In fact, the men of Leyden had not only been overly hasty in their grandiose plan for the rapid modernization of Indonesian society at all levels, including the village level; they had also, perhaps, sinned in naively assuming that their social engineering could proceed along evolutionary channels which, in turn, could be controlled and guided from above. They had, in other words, failed to realize that the new era, however skillfully and paternalistically induced, would tend to lead to a chain reaction of change

not all of which would be desirable - from either the Dutch or the Indonesian point of view - or for that matter foreseeable and hence controllable. When, therefore, the twentieth century produced an increasingly revolutionary climate in Indonesia, the Ethici found themselves in the unenviable position of sorcerers' apprentices unable to stem the tide of violence and turbulence engulfing their good intentions and unable, too, to disclaim responsibility for their unwanted offspring.

Yet, while Ethical reformism may well have been the unwitting midwife of revolution in Indonesia, it was by no means the evil deus ex machina (any more than was communism) of its vehement critics. It is only too obvious that these critics chose to ignore that the revolts of the 1920's, as much as the preceding unrest under the aegis of Sarekat Islam during and immediately after World War I, were basically no more than modern versions of traditional unrest, especially peasant unrest, in the islands. Essentially, agrarian unrest was the well-nigh inescapable concomitant of economic and social forces generated by the collision of Western enterprise and colonial rule with the traditionally static societies of the Indonesian peasantry. The resulting social disintegration had gained momentum during the nineteenth century, when modern Dutch political and economic control had started to penetrate the archipelago ever more profoundly.

If the enemies of the Ethical movement thus to all intents and purposes refused to recognize the real causes of the recent revolts - even though these were by no means ignored by the two commissions of inquiry appointed by the colonial government - they seemed to be equally oblivious of the fact that it was impossible effectively to insulate Indonesia from the outside world, and that, to a large extent, the Indonesian revolts - soon to be followed by others elsewhere in Southeast Asia - were but one of the signs of a larger Asian awakening in the twentieth century. If progressive colonization had helped to loosen the traditional ties of Indonesian life, outside events, whether in the Middle East or in other parts of Asia, had generated an atmosphere of restlessness and change, a potentially revolutionary climate, from which Indonesia could not be excluded, irrespective of the specific colonial policies followed by the Netherlands in the islands.

The impact of Western economic and political control had, for generations, been silently undermining the fabric of Indonesian society. In spite of the traditional 'indirect' rule practised by the Netherlands, the authority and prestige of the Javanese nobility, the priyayi, had suffered a steady

decline under Dutch rule. Nominally still vested with their age-old prerogatives, and at some periods (notably during the Culture System, between 1830 and 1870) in fact granted additional arbitrary powers, the priyayi elite had nonetheless in fact been degraded to a hereditary bureaucracy entirely dependent on Dutch support. In subsequent decades, priyayi prestige - and to a lesser extent that of traditional heads in the other islands - was being progressively eroded when private entrepreneurs, in search of land leases and agricultural labor, by-passed the aristocracy and sought direct contact with village heads, and when administrative centralization - vastly accelerated by the welfare policies of the Ethical era - more or less openly and more or less impatiently tended to relegate the indigenous bearers of traditional authority to insignificance.

This gradual breakdown of the Indonesian political hierarchy took place in a peasant society whose isolation was likewise waning under the impact of new economic vistas. Opportunities to produce and sell cash crops, as well as opportunities to seek wage employment in European estates and urban enterprises broke through the walls of the closed Indonesian community of the past. Would-be entrepreneurs and laborers - a nascent middle class and a nascent proletariat - were contracting out of the prescriptive adat of their ancestral environment, seeking new avenues for social promotion and personal expression, opposing the status quo and its representatives and thus constituting a potential clientele for political radicalism. Admittedly these newly emerging social strata formed but a tiny minority within an as yet more static agrarian landscape; yet the commotion they brought with them, the feeling of change generated by, and through, them was bound to spill over into wider layers of the peasantry. Rural unrest was bound to grow whenever the new groups saw their ambitions thwarted or, conversely, when these ambitions had caused disruption within their communities. It was bound to erupt whenever the grievances, of whatever kind, could be sharply focussed under a determined leadership able to direct social malaise against a specific adversary.

It was, as we indicated, the kind of leadership that was the really novel feature of twentieth century unrest in Indonesia. At earlier times, the most frequent and, for that matter, the only logical candidates for such leadership had been the local Islamic teachers and scribes. It was they who in pre-modern times had constituted the only elite stratum independent of the priyayi aristocracy in Indonesian rural society, and, as in other Muslim lands, for the greater part living in a world of semi-hostile seclusion from the powers-

that-were. Traditionally, revolts of the Indonesian peasantry against authority, native or alien, had tended to crystallize around the Muslim ulama, and the age-old suspicion of the nobility towards the scribes was paralleled by Dutch fears of Islamic 'fanaticism' throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.

As the reports in this volume indicate, the Muslim ulama still played a far from insignificant role in both the Javanese and Sumatran uprisings of the 1920's. But however vital their role at the village level had remained, they were no longer the prime actors in the revolutionary drama. In the twentieth century they had ceded that role to urbanized, partly Westernized, Indonesians, who were not only newcomers on the social and ideological scene of the colony but who also welded the local or regional discontent of earlier times into nation-wide, or at least supra-regional, mass movements without precedent in Indonesian history.

These young men formed yet another new stratum in Indonesian society, an intelligentsia of a socially very heterogeneous origin. Some of its members were recruited from the nascent urban bourgeoisie or the new landowning class mentioned before; but others were descendants of aristocratic families, and others still came from the peasantry and had risen through education, whether Islamic or Western, to some prominence. Their ideological significance lay in the fact that, irrespective of their place on the political spectrum, they were the first important links between Indonesia and the outer world in modern times. In the early part of the century, the new Indonesian intelligentsia had primarily been influenced either by Dutch liberalism or by Islamic reformism. Before long Continental socialism and, especially after the October Revolution in Russia, Marxism came to claim many adherents in the colony. Nationalism proper, largely born among Indonesians educated at overseas, primarily Dutch, universities was relatively late in arriving on the scene, and belongs organizationally to the post-revolutionary period of the mid-1920's.

During the first two decades of the century ideological cleavages between reformist Muslims, liberals, socialists and communists were less pronounced than the radicalism and anti-colonialism which united them. Indeed, so powerful was the trend towards radical action that it appeared to silence potential internal contradictions not only within the new intelligentsia but also those existing between the urban newcomers and the orthodox ulama in the countryside. This blurring of the lines typified the early leadership of

Sarekat Islam, whose mass support - reaching some two million 'members' in 1918 - stemmed from peasants led, as of old, by local ulama, but which was yet guided by a conglomerate of 'national' leaders comprising modern Muslims (among them the movement's charismatic leader Tjokroaminoto) and atheistic communists. As will be later seen, the marriage of convenience between reformist Islam and communism was officially ended in the early 1920's. But both reports in the present volume show that that divorce was achieved more completely at the summit than in the country at large. In Bantam Residency as well as on Sumatra's West Coast communist leaders had been able to elicit widespread Islamic support, particularly among the less sophisticated orthodox village scribes. In Bantam, most Islamic Sarekat leaders had held aloof from the insurrections, whereas in Sumatra some reformist zealots had worked hand-in-glove with the communists.

In the eyes of Dutch administrators, especially those hostile to the Ethical policy, the appearance of the new intelligentsia - of whatever ideological orientation - and the ease with which it had to all intents and purposes been able to arrogate to itself the leadership of the Indonesian masses caused profound alarm. Even among the Ethici, who were eagerly awaiting a positive Indonesian response to the educational, social and economic stimuli of their programs, the growing turbulence of these early responses created something of a shock. But what to the men of Leyden appeared to be regrettable if in many ways perhaps unavoidable growing pains of a rapidly maturing Indonesian society seemed to the conservatives the beginning of the end of Dutch control in the archipelago. The debate between these two interpretations was gaining momentum during the early post-war years which witnessed the mass agitations, petitions and demonstrations of the Sarekat Islam. The violent upheavals of November, 1926 and January, 1927 to all intents and purposes ended it, with conservatism emerging triumphant.

Fundamentally, the conservative critics - soon reinforced by the persuasive arguments of Dutch legal scholars of the Indonesian adat, or customary law - argued that the rebellions had demonstrated the dangers inherent in a loosening of Dutch administrative control, and in particular in the progressive undermining of traditional native authorities (the priyayi aristocracy on Java and the chiefs in the other islands) that had accompanied the reforms of the recent past. Losing faith in its traditional leadership, so the critics argued, the peasantry had fallen prey to the newcomers, the new intelligentsia, and had been swept along in the tide of revolution against its own will, if it had not - as both reports

attest - frequently been coerced to join by means of terrorism. In this reading of the facts, the gradual undermining and, in the Ethical era, the virtual abandonment of 'indirect rule', the cornerstone of Dutch colonial policy of earlier times, had created a dangerous vacuum between ruler and ruled; it was this vacuum that had served as an opening wedge to the radical 'rabble rousers' of the Sarekat Islam and, quite recently, to the communists. Both commissions hinted that the priyayi corps might have been ignorant of the impending storm or, worse still, that it might have failed to report the signs of the gathering clouds to their Dutch superiors. A two-fold alienation - of the people from their traditional leaders and of the priyayi from the Dutch - thus clearly lay at the bottom of all the colony's recent ills.

This analysis of the causes underlying the insurrections logically led to the reorientation in Dutch colonial policy which we have already referred to in passing. Though outwardly the Netherlands did not abandon the welfare theme of the Ethical era, and though the institutional structure erected in the preceding years was retained, the 'agonizing reappraisal' of the 1920's was to leave the constitutional shell designed in the Ethical era emptied of its most essential content matter. The far-reaching powers vested in the governor general and the wide powers of arrest in the hands of the police with its rapidly expanding Political Information Service, which had already increasingly impeded political activities before the insurrections, were now broadened to include exile, banishment or imprisonment of anyone suspect of radical leanings. These repressive measures were accompanied by the strengthening, often the artificial propping, of the authority of the traditional elite groups in the archipelago. This seeming return to 'indirect rule' in actual fact was to serve as a cloak for more stringent Dutch control behind the façade of the priyayi and their counterparts in the outer islands. The primary aim was, quite clearly, to preserve, or rather restore, the 'closed community' of the Indonesian village as much as possible, and thus to insulate the Indonesian peasantry from the urban agitator.

The new colonial policy was not, however, without its intellectual rationale. Repression and even retrogression of the new trend could partly be rationalized by the notion formulated by Dutch legal scholars who themselves were all but 'reactionaries' - that it was dangerous to force social engineering on the Indonesian community from above as long as that community was not yet ready for it. Rather than attempting rapid Westernization by means of education, welfare

programs of vast dimensions and political experimentation with quasi-democratic and quasi-national institutions, the various Indonesian group communities, all with their own distinctive adat, traditions, mores, and established authorities, should be allowed to grow organically - and under continued overall Dutch tutelage - into more modern and viable polities.

Whatever the attractions and merits of this colonial philosophy, it seemed to dovetail only too conveniently into the conservatism of the Dutch colonial bureaucracy, of parliamentarians in the Netherlands, and of public opinion, especially among the European and Eurasian inhabitants of the colony whose aversion to Ethical reformism had turned into panic during the revolts. In terms of short-term effectiveness, repression and the new 'indirect rule' seemed to yield the desired results. The waves of unrest, fanned for the last time in the abortive insurrections, subsided, and rural apathy - already, as we shall presently see, on the increase before the events of the mid-1920's - became well-nigh universal in the wake of the insulation of the peasantry from urban leaders. Economic disaster, following the world-wide depression of the 1930's, forced the Indonesian peasant to concentrate on problems of sheer survival, and thus quelled the last remnants of latent political radicalism in the countryside.

The most stubborn agitators, communists and others, had either fled the colony or had been exiled to the Boven Digul detention camp in New Guinea. The era of turbulence in colonial Indonesia was a matter of the past. Rust en Orde (Tranquillity and Order), outwardly at least, were to reign supreme until the end of Dutch rule. It was in this era that Indonesian nationalism proper had to make its hesitating debut and to suffer the restrictions of police surveillance and administrative conservatism bequeathed to it by the traumatic events analyzed in the reports in this volume. Little wonder that so many members of the Indonesian intelligentsia, whether 'secular' nationalist or Islamic in their orientation (the communists having been virtually eliminated or reduced to utter impotence), frustrated in their social, political and ideological aspirations, were to welcome the soldiers of Greater Japan with a sigh of premature relief, if not with enthusiasm, in March, 1942.

II

Having briefly sketched the significance of the communist-led revolts of 1926 and 1927 in the context of colonial history, we will now try to assess their intrinsic meaning.

Our subsequent account of communist organizational activities will lend substance to our thesis that these revolts were primarily Indonesian; internal uprisings in which international communism and its spokesmen in the colony played tangential, rather than originating or causal, roles. It is understandable that the commissions appointed by the colonial government to inquire into the causes of the revolts were doing their utmost to stress the evil influences of an alien world conspiracy upon Indonesian events; yet both commissions - and in particular that entrusted with the Sumatran inquiry - presented more than sufficient materials to show that if some communist leaders had succeeded in instigating the outbreaks (and as will be seen they were in a small minority, and acted without approval from Moscow), they had not created, but had found fertile soil for revolutionary action in parts of Indonesia at that time.

The locales of the two major uprisings require a short comment, primarily for the purpose of barring too hasty generalizations about the Indies at that time. The communist leaders, it is true, had aimed at a large-scale rebellion, which was to have engulfed many parts of Java and Sumatra, but it may have been more than accident that open and more or less sustained insurrections were limited to Bantam Residency at the western end of Java and to the Minangkabau region on the West Coast of Sumatra. Neither region, however, was (or for that matter is nowadays) typical of Indonesia, or even of Java. While exhibiting vast differences between them, they yet shared certain characteristics which facilitated the spreading of radical agitation.

Both areas were, by Indonesian standards, fairly wealthy, fairly thinly populated, and, in addition, free from Western estates. The relative wealth stemmed from private entrepreneurship in both regions; in ever increasing numbers, individual Indonesians had in recent decades moved into agricultural production of cash crops which in the post-war years had tended to yield good - though by no means steady - profits. The economic condition of the colony had, moreover, been steadily improving since the short-lived recession of the early post-war years. Taxation, as both reports make clear, had not noticeably burdened either the Minangkabaus or the Bantamese - at any ~~rate~~ rate, it had not risen pari passu with the increasing accumulation of wealth.

Bantam was not only distinguished from the rest of Java by its relative wealth and low population pressure. One of its outstanding characteristics was, indeed, intimately connected with its prosperity, for Bantam was Java's individual-

istic province par excellence. Settled over the centuries by a variety of immigrants from other parts of the island, Bantam had not followed the rest of Java in copying the communal and familial pattern which is the backbone of the Indonesian peasant communities elsewhere. The absence of this traditional bond of integration had, at one and the same time, allowed economic individualism to flourish without inhibitions and made Bantamese society unstable, unruly, and difficult to govern. What the region lacked in social cohesiveness it made up for with a fanatical Islamic orthodoxy. Apparently stubborn individualism had combined with religious fanaticism to create an atmosphere of sullen opposition to colonial rule which could easily be ignited into insurrection by both communist and Muslim leaders.

If Bantam is a good example of anomie rooted in the absence of integrative social forces, the Minangkabau region is an equally good example of a 'closed community' exposed to the disintegrative pressures of the modern world. Where individualism seemed to flow naturally from the heterogeneous character of Bantamese society, it erupted with increasing vehemence in the tradition-bound matriarchal village republics of Sumatra's West Coast. Once modern communications had linked the area to the outer world and thus opened up possibilities of catering for the export market, many young Minangkabaus - among the most energetic and most intelligent of Indonesians, whose share in the republic's elite groups is far out of proportion to their community's size - had thrown themselves with gusto into new economic opportunities. Others had thronged into education, religious as well as Western. Before long, the newly rich (or semi-prosperous) and the newly literate (or semi-literate) found themselves at loggerheads with the established authority of the adat chiefs and established mores, especially the communal adat concepts regarding land tenure and inheritance laws. These new frictions, heightened by the spread of Islamic reformism in recent decades, had been superimposed on the long-standing feud between adat authorities - allied to the Dutch since the Padri War of the nineteenth century - and Muslim ulama. Obviously, there was enough ferment, enough pressure on age-old institutions by malcontents, to render the Minangkabaus susceptible to radical propaganda and insurrectionist activities. Indeed, the Sumatran rebellion, in spite of its territorial limitations, was bloodier and of longer duration than its Javanese predecessor, and the military had to be called in to pacify the area.

What, then, was it that had attracted Bantamese and Minangkabaus to the cause of rebellion in the 1920's? For

all but a very few of those swept into the insurrections it certainly was not communism as such, nor yet a vague longing to live under a Soviet system of alleged plenty and equality (for we must not forget how little had at that time been achieved by the Bolsheviks and how much less most Asians knew of Russia then). Communist party propaganda, as long as it had strictly adhered to the Marxian gospel, had fared very poorly among the bulk of the rebellions' supporters - the second of the concentric circles of the communist party's following, as we shall presently call it. Wherever communist leaders had managed to rally to their cause large-scale support they had done so by playing on the grievances and ill-defined aspirations of Indonesians in many walks of life, though significantly enough rarely among the poorest strata of the population.

The revolts were certainly not bred in misery among poverty-stricken or exploited peasants and laborers living under the yoke of Western imperialism. Tenancy, population pressure and the proletarianization of coolie labor - generally the most common causes of agrarian unrest in Asia - were absent in both areas that had nurtured the insurrections. Rather than despair it was very likely hope that had inspired so many Indonesians to believe in the cause of revolution; or rather, variegated, and contradictory, hopes of different classes and groups, that seemed to converge. These hopes, together with the frustrations accompanying their tardy fulfillment, had led thousands of Indonesians into the communist-led uprisings.

What seemed to be in the air was the feeling of change. To some, mainly the beneficiaries of economic and social improvement, change was perhaps too slow, too obstructed by alien overlords, foreign capitalism and their native allies. To others, change had taken place too fast and too incomprehensibly: they desired a return to allegedly better, more tranquil, more orderly days; and, once again, they could place the blame for all their grievances on the colonial power. The communists, close to all these accumulated ill feelings, were ready to promise everything to everyone: More riches to the rich, no taxes to the poor, more mosques to the pious, more jobs to the semi-literates.

If frustration and anti-Dutch sentiment were, then, the twin pillars of the insurrections, nationalism proper was as yet by and large absent from the events of the mid-1920's. These were proto-nationalist revolts rather than nationalist risings. The slogan reverberating in Bantam and in the Minangkabau was "Kemerdekaan!" (Freedom) rather than the

"Indonesia Merdeka" (Free Indonesia) of later years. The notion of an Indonesian national state was, in other words, weak, or even unborn, among either the leaders or the followers of the revolts. The freedom for which they were fighting was an anarchistic, individualistic freedom - a freedom from colonialism, a freedom to attain personal goals, rather than an ordered freedom in a new national polity.

III

The three accounts of the Indonesian uprisings translated in this collection throw light on the role of the Communist Party in the revolt from differing angles: the Bantam report concentrates on the sources of support for the party among the general population of the area; Schrieke's account of Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra concerns itself chiefly with the activities of local and regional Communist organizations; and the account issued by the Governor General describes the activities of the party's central leadership and its relations abroad. This variety of approach provides us with a broad picture of the rebellion's social and political background, one of the few glimpses we have into the sources of Communist activity in an Asian land. At the same time, the accounts overlap enough so that to some extent we can check their accuracy by comparing them, a precaution which is particularly necessary in the case of the reports concerning the activities of the central party leadership in preparing for the revolution. This is perhaps the weakest point in the accounts, since Dutch knowledge of the party's activities gained largely from police reports and the confessions of minor party officials, was none too accurate or complete; but since at the same time the reports do sketch the history of an area and period of Communist activity about which we know all too little, we should perhaps treat the histories presented here as much with tenderness as with care. (1)

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- (1) The account issued by the Governor General is a particular sinner in this matter, partly because its compilers were governed by an evident desire to paint the uprisings as the product of a well-directed plot by Moscow in their selection of materials to report. There does exist a more detailed version of this report which notes more extensively the sources for its information and makes greater mention of variant accounts of the events leading up to the revolts; this edition, however, was allowed only very limited circulation and has not yet been released for general publication.

On reading these accounts of Communist activity during 1925 and 1926 - the period preceding the uprisings - we are struck by the grave state of disorder which seemed to prevail in the central party's relations with its units in the provinces. Local Communist officials, it seems, worked as much on the basis of rumor as on the inspiration of instructions from the center; regional organizations sometimes followed, sometimes rejected the Central Committee's instructions. Conflicting factions existed within the party, and an important role in Communist activity was played by groups which functioned as movements almost completely autonomous from the regular party leadership. In the end, we see the central leadership itself split apart, so that just before the uprisings there were no less than three factions claiming to head the party: an emigré leadership in Singapore, which had decided for revolution and had sent to Moscow for approval of its plan; a central committee in Batavia, which had concluded that rebellion would be suicidal and had declared itself independent of the Singapore leadership; and a revolutionary council which rejected the authority of the Batavia center and aimed at immediate revolution, with or without the Comintern's imprimatur.

The growing disorganization of the Indonesian Communist movement can be ascribed in part to the difficulty in communication caused by the increasing restrictions on party activities imposed by the colonial authorities and in part to the fact that the PKI was never the well-articulated monolith a Communist party should ideally be. However, this is by no means the entire story. The bonds which linked the movement's elements were also strained and, in the end, broken by a crisis within the party which had been a matter of urgent concern for the PKI's leadership at least since 1924. It was a crisis which the party leaders were unable to resolve, and their decision to embark on a near-hopeless rebellion was in a sense a surrender on their part to the forces which they had been unable to bring under control. In this sense, the decision to revolt was taken from weakness and not from overweening strength; it was marked by a decline in Communist power and discipline that continued until the movement wiped itself out in an abortive and disorganized revolt.

The crisis to which we refer had its roots in the variegated composition of the PKI's following. We can best describe the nature of the party's support as consisting of two concentric circles, though the boundary dividing these groups was anything but distinct. The inner circle was drawn largely from city workers and from individuals with some education who supported the party not only because of

its promise to throw out the Dutch but also from a general sympathy with Communism's social and economic views. This group was generally associated with the party itself or with the Communist-oriented labor unions, while the largely rural outer circle of the PKI's following was gathered about the party-directed "people's unions", or Sarekat Rakjat. The outer circle was far larger, and it was only by virtue of the fact that the PKI enjoyed its support that Indonesian Communism was a movement of serious political importance, since the Indonesian urban proletariat and disaffected intelligentsia of that time were hardly an adequate base of support for a major party. At the same time, however, the task of maintaining the support of this mass following presented problems of so grave a nature that the party leadership found itself seriously tempted to sacrifice this major source of strength.

The Communist Party united these sources of its strength on one point only, that of revolution against the Dutch. The party's mass support looked for the rapid achievement of this goal and if it seemed that its fulfillment lay far in the future they rapidly concluded that they had nothing further in common with the movement and lost interest. This naturally placed the PKI under great pressure to produce tangible evidence that it was working to bring about the promised revolution, a necessity which involved the party in adventures which incurred the government's wrath. The party thus found itself in a political vise, squeezed between a following which demanded action and a government which viewed Communist activity with an increasingly jaundiced eye.

This situation is, of course, not at all an uncommon one for a revolutionary movement claiming mass support, and it had been experienced in Indonesia only a few years before by the Sarekat Islam. As we have remarked, the SI expanded greatly in membership and revolutionary fervor during the first years of its existence. By 1921, however, the more moderate SI leaders were forced to conclude that they would have to abandon revolutionary agitation if the movement was not to be crippled by the government or captured by its most rebellious elements. As a result they broke with the Communists, who had hitherto existed within the Sarekat Islam in the same fashion as the Chinese Communists did within the Kuomintang of the 1920's, and turned the organization into a religiously-oriented party. The Communists gathered up the revolutionary elements of the Sarekat Islam into the Sarekat Rakjat, which they founded in 1923, and in so doing they inherited the Sarekat Islam's major strength and its major problem.

It may be argued - though opinion one way or the other can only be speculation - that the PKI might have found relief from its dilemma if it had been able to find a source of unity for its following other than that of rapid revolution, even if it were nothing more complicated than a leader who could make himself recognized as the representative of the masses. This, however, was much more easily said than done. For one thing, the party did not lack in leaders who might have provided the charismatic touch necessary to rally a considerable following - Tan Malaka provided excellent evidence of this in later years - but since the government found it expedient to exile or imprison indefinitely its more outspoken opponents it was impossible for one person to remain long in the revolutionary spotlight. As for a social or economic program that would unite the party's following, we have seen from the varied composition of the PKI's following how very difficult it would have been for the party, had it been so inclined, to develop its activities in such a way as to maintain popular enthusiasm and yet avoid bringing down the government's easily-aroused anger. Islam, had the party been able to fully embrace that cause, was not a sufficient basis, as was witnessed by the dwindling membership of the non-revolutionary Sarekat Islam. The atheist credo of Communism was a disadvantage to the PKI, as the party's leaders pointed out in vain to the Comintern. Nonetheless, there was a large Islamic Communist movement under the suzerainty of the PKI, and in the last few years before the revolt the local Communist units paid less and less attention to whatever qualms the center had about enlisting religion in their cause.

It is an open question as to whether the international nature of the Communist movement seriously hampered the PKI in utilizing the cementing force of nationalism, but we are inclined to think on the basis of existing indications that had the PKI been of a purely national nature it would not have greatly altered its situation. We must remember that the party did make considerable use of nationalist appeals to gain public support, while on the other hand nationalism was not then the driving force in Indonesian politics which it later became. The Sarekat Islam, for example, had been notably internationalist at its most popular period, its two major wings being attracted to the internationalisms of Pan-Islamism and Communism. The Indonesian sense of political unity during this period seems to have arisen from common opposition to Dutch rule rather than from a feeling of national character or identity.

The PKI's position was made more difficult by the fact

that after 1920 popular discontent began to recede. The restlessness that had accompanied World War I grew less marked with the return to relative economic well-being and the restoration of the normal state of governmental affairs. Moreover, people began to lose interest when they realized that political organizations, no matter how great their support or violent their threats, could not stir the colonial government to significant reforms; and the authorities' increasingly unfavorable attitude toward opposition led many erstwhile revolutionaries to agree that discretion was the better part of valor. After 1919 the Sarekat Islam's membership began to dwindle, and by 1921 apathy had made serious inroads in its support. The quarrel with the Communists cost both wings of the movement a good deal of support, since the intra-party struggle disillusioned many of its followers with politics. The revolutionary remainder over which the PKI assumed leadership was a chronically disaffected *mélange* whose political activity tended to swing between outbursts of anti-Dutch terrorism and apathy at the party's inability to produce the promised revolution. In spite of Communist efforts to organize this following into disciplined units and to instill into it some attachment to Marxist ideas, it remained extremely difficult for the PKI to hold its interest and to prevent it from endangering the party's safety by unnecessary terrorist adventures.

This problem of maintaining enthusiasm was compounded by the unfavorable development of the government's attitude towards political opposition which heralded the approaching eclipse of the Ethical Policy. Although it was not until 1925 that the Dutch abandoned all pretence of applying the Ethical Policy to the revolutionary movement, it was evident for some time before this that the policy's advocates were on the defensive and that governmental opinion regarding mass participation in Indonesian politics was growing increasingly unfavorable. The new restrictions imposed by the authorities hit the PKI particularly hard, and it became more and more difficult for the Communists to carry on legal activities and to maintain open communication with their following. Long before the government finally declared the PKI illegal, the open existence of the movement had been rendered all but impossible.

The dilemma posed by these circumstances had become a pressing problem for the PKI by 1924, and at the end of that year the party held a conference in Jogjakarta - further described in the reports translated here - at which it attempted to find a solution for the problem. There were, the Communist leaders considered, two possible courses to

take. One was to give up efforts to maintain the outer circle of the PKI's following and to concentrate on its proletarian core; for only in this manner could the movement maintain itself as a disciplined unit capable of surviving government persecution and making long-range plans for revolution. While it was true that the Indonesian proletariat was minute numerically, the Russian working class at the time of the October Revolution had not been much larger; what was necessary was not a large and unruly following but an elite that would be capable of taking advantage of a revolutionary opportunity when it occurred. The Central Committee, sponsoring this argument, proposed the disbandment of the Sarekat Rajkat and the concentration of Communist attention on improving the strength and discipline of the urban proletariat. The committee's view was, however, opposed and defeated by the rest of the conference, a striking indication of the central leadership's weak control over its branches. The dissident opinion held that the urban proletariat was too weak a reed to lean on, an opinion that was rather well borne out the following year, when the Communist labor unions launched a disastrous series of strikes; the reprisals against the unions and their adherents which were the chief product of this effort so crippled the revolutionary movement among the city workers that that group made only a peripheral contribution to the 1926/27 revolts.

Instead of relying entirely on the Indonesian proletariat's still infant strength, the opposition argued, the party should seek revolutionary support from all possible sides; for since the government gave every sign that it was moving towards an elimination of communism in the Indies, it was essential that the communists prepare to overthrow the Dutch regime before it succeeded in reducing the Communists to political impotence. The final decision was a compromise: the Sarekat Rakjat was not disbanded but was instead to be allowed to die gradually, its most reliable members being absorbed into the party itself. At the same time, it was decided to make plans for the carrying out of rebellion in the not-too-distant future. The decision on the Sarekat Rakjat was an unsatisfying one, and the issue continued to divide the movement, eventually even exciting Comintern participation in the debate. The PKI's rapid development toward rebellion and the worsening communications between the center and the local units prevented the party's plans for the SR from being carried out before both movements were declared illegal. At the same time, the second aspect of the Jogjakarta program - the decision to prepare a rebellion - created new dissensions.

Now that the time had come to make specific plans for rebellion, a number of the party's leaders balked at the idea that it would be possible for the PKI in its deteriorating condition to touch off a successful revolution. Plans would have to be delayed, they argued, until the party had more assurance of popular support and/or until approval and assistance had been gained from the Comintern. The less patient party leaders replied that a revolution would have to come quickly if it were to come at all, and that once it had been set off the Indonesian people would surely rise in its support. Moreover, many of them assumed, a rebellion against the Dutch was such a worthy cause that outside support would be automatically forthcoming. The debate continued for nearly two years, right up to the eve of the Javanese revolt, and it split the party hopelessly. In the end, as we have seen, there were three centers of PKI leadership, each with different plans regarding the timing of the revolt; and the local Communist units existed in almost complete confusion as to the revolutionary schedule.

The reports translated in this collection relate the activities of the PKI during this last period of preparation for the rebellion. They describe the party's efforts to nerve itself for the undertaking, to secure for itself a maximum of support, and to prevent impatient elements from taking arms before the appointed date. From the portrait they paint emerges an image of the PKI as a movement which, having gained momentum towards a goal, has become possessed by that momentum and finds that it cannot alter or slow down its course. In the process, the official leadership of the party became less and less able to direct the course of events, and influence over the party passed into the hands of the most radical elements. In 1925, Tan Malaka and his supporters were still able to persuade a good portion of the party to postpone the revolt; but a year later the decision of the Central Committee in Batavia to delay the revolution was ignored, and even the Comintern's advice against rebellion was rejected by those who received it.

IV

In this discussion of the conditions within the PKI which produced the attempt at revolution, we have thus far ignored the Comintern's influence on the party's policies, and some explanation for this should now be made. There are two reasons why we consider the role of the International in the creation and resolution of the PKI's crisis to have been a peripheral one. First of all, the pressures which

brought about the Indonesian party's dilemma were internal ones, arising mainly from the nature of the party's support and the tightening government attitude towards disloyal activities. It was a crisis which could have affected any Indonesian revolutionary movement, and, as we observed, it had in fact confronted the Sarekat Islam in its radical period. Secondly, the basic policies of the Indonesian Communists during almost the entire period were determined by or forced on the party leaders without the direct participation of the Comintern. This is understandable, since distance and Dutch opposition rendered communication between the International and Indonesia uncertain and tardy. The Comintern was generally ill-informed of conditions in the Indies, and specific instructions to the party, when given, were often inapplicable to the situation in which the party currently found itself. Thus the International urged the restoration of the alliance with the Sarekat Islam long after all possibilities for cooperation between that movement and the PKI had ceased to exist and after the SI had ceased to be of great value as an ally. Moreover, the Comintern's Asian policy was determined largely by its view of the Chinese situation, which was on most points quite different from that in Indonesia.

It is understandable in this light that the Indonesian Communists tended increasingly to interpret the Comintern's advice in such a way as to fit their own ideas of what the party's policies should be. A good example of this is the discussion at the Jogjakarta conference of December 1924 over the implications for the party's program of the decisions made by the fifth Comintern congress and the Pan-Pacific Labor Conference, held earlier that year. If we read the Comintern's accounts of these meetings we discover that their message was, in spite of the radical slogans and the emphasis of proletarianization of the Communist parties, an essentially conservative one as far as rebellious activity and cooperation with non-proletarian groups was concerned. This was not how the radically-inclined PKI leaders presented it to the conference, however; and in this light it is not surprising to learn the Profintern representative to the Pan-Pacific meeting had complained of the leftist stand adopted by the Indonesian delegates, who had only been persuaded with difficulty to accede, with reservations, to the Comintern-proposed program for cooperation with nationalism.

In the two years preceding the Indonesian revolts the Comintern came to devote more attention to Asia, largely as a result of its apparent successes in China. By this time, however, government restrictions had reduced the always-thin

line of communications with the Indies to a mere wisp; and at the same time the Indonesian Communists had proceeded far along a road from which it was more than difficult to return. The International's advice to concentrate on legal activities and to broaden contact with other parties must have seemed irrelevant to a movement whose possibilities for legal activity were approaching the zero point and which possessed very little opportunity or inclination for working with other existing parties. As a result, the Comintern's advice was generally ignored, to the annoyance of the International. Stalin's only comment on the PKI was made in this period, when he unflatteringly portrayed it as the prime example of leftist deviation in a colonial communist movement.

All this does not mean that the radical leaders of the PKI considered the defiance of Moscow's recommendations to be a declaration of independence from the International; there seems rather to have been a feeling that if the Comintern were aware of the actual state of affairs in the Indies it would adopt the same view they held. This, as well as the hope of gaining material aid, seems to have been the purpose of the expedition to Moscow undertaken by the pro-rebellion PKI leaders. It seems unlikely that they expected that the International would say no, although that, it seems clear, is what the Comintern did. The revolt did take place, and apparently not without the encouragement of the emissaries to Moscow. Even this, however, did not mean a break with the International, for after the rebellion the two leaders returned to Moscow and shortly thereafter appeared as officials within the Comintern itself.

As the above shows, distance and the fact that the International's honor was not deeply involved in the events in Indonesia lent a suppleness to Comintern-PKI relations that was at times little short of amazing. In this most important sense the situation of the PKI was quite different from that of the only other important Asian Communist movement of the time, the Chinese Communist Party. The pressures on the PKI in this period arose from conditions inside Indonesia and not from outside influences; it can thus be studied as a purely Indonesian phenomenon much more easily than can the concurrent history of Chinese Communism, which was so deeply affected by Russo-Chinese relations and the decisions laid down by the Comintern against the background of the feud between Stalin and Trotsky.

V

In retrospect, we may observe the rebellions of 1926/27 from three points of view in evaluating their meaning for Indonesian history. For both the development of Netherlands Indies colonial policy and the growth of Indonesian political organizations they marked a turning point of major importance. As we have seen, the rise of the revolutionary movement forced the proponents of the Ethical Policy to the wall, and the revolt dealt them their mortal wound as a dominant political force. The uprising also marked the final agonies of the first Indonesian mass political movement, and as such closed an era in modern Indonesian history. The new-found hopes and ambitions which had fired popular enthusiasm for the Sarekat Islam and which had turned to bitterness and rebellion under the PKI now subsided into apathy. None of the political movements which arose in the colonial period after 1926 were able to achieve the mass following once boasted by the Sarekat Islam and the Communist Party; and it was not until Japanese rule replaced the Dutch that the masses again played a role in Indonesian politics.

In these two respects the revolt marked a turning point in Indonesian history. In the third sense, however, the uprisings represent not a beginning or an end but rather the sudden, violent illumination of a process of social change which was and still is deeply affecting Indonesian society. We have already remarked those circumstances which subjected the social fabric in the Bantam and Minangkabau areas to such a strain that at those points it was torn by revolt. The rents were patched, but could not be rewoven; nor could the stress be eliminated, for the process of change has not ceased.

PART I

The Governor General's Report of January, 1927

Politieke Nota over de Partij Kommunist Indonesia: Rapport, Waarin is samengevat wat gebleken is omtrent de actie der Partij Kommunist Indonesia, (Nederlandsche-Indische Kommunistische Partij), sectie der 3de Internationale, vanaf Juli 1925 tot en met December 1926.

/Political Note concerning the Indonesian Communist Party: Report wherein is summed up information which has come to light concerning the action of the Partij Kommunist Indonesia (Netherlands Indies Communist Party), a section of the Third International, from July, 1925 up to and including December, 1926./

CHAPTER I

THE ILLEGAL METHOD IN PRINCIPLE AND EXECUTION

The action carried out by the Communist leaders in the period from July, 1925, to the end of December, 1926, may chiefly be regarded as in rigid compliance with the resolutions adopted at the fifth world congress of the Communist International in Moscow (mid-1924) and at the Djogjakarta conference of Communists (December, 1924).

Those of the world congress fall under two headings: (a) reorganization of the parties by means of the so-called cell-system (in trade unions, political organizations, factories, workshops, desas, kampungs,*etc.); (b) Bolshevization of the parties, i.e., the increasing of each member's propaganda and agitation activities to as great an extent as possible.

To that end the organization commission of the Executive Committee of the Comintern (ECCI) has drawn up draft statutes for all sections of the Third International, which have been incorporated in a publication of the Third International of January 29, 1925, and which were adopted at a sitting of the Enlarged Executive held in March/April, 1925.

The decisions reached at the world congress are clearly reflected in the so-called "Report of the PKI executive" drawn up by Aliarcham for the Djogjakarta conference, in which the writer concludes by saying that PKI action must among other things aim at establishing and supporting revolutionary trade unions as fully as possible; at the overall enlargement of those sections having an effective potential in the revolutionary movement against capitalism; at disciplining members, and increasing their quality; and at spreading revolutionary propaganda and carrying on agitation everywhere.

At the Djogjakarta conference itself Aliarcham elucidated certain points by saying that the PKI is a dangerous party, because it comes within the province of proletarian leadership, and the proletariat, because of its circumstances in life, will be forced at a given moment to rebel. It will then be the duty of the PKI to give revolutionary guidance to the workers in their struggle, and it will not be sufficient to call strikes, even if these are combined with sabotage, but an attempt will also have to be made to assume power, for which purpose there ought to be a revolutionary organization. Hence, according to Aliarcham, the party ought to consist of groups of ten (ten-men groups) who have the courage to act individually.

Aliarcham's recommendation is completely in line with a statement made by Semaun in the now-defunct Pandoe Merah, No. 5 (September 1924), in connection with the proceedings at the fifth world congress in Moscow which he had attended. Commenting on the Leninist doctrine which had provided the driving force of the Moscow congress, he advised extremists to impress upon their minds Lenin's theses that the struggle against capitalism must be transformed into a rebellion of the people in their native country supported by the strength of the peasants, and that when the revolution had been successful there should be established a dictatorship of the workers and peasants (a Soviet government) which would repress the capitalists by force of arms (which arms must be in the hands of the workers and peasants).

*Ed: Desa: Indonesian village, or, in some areas, a group of hamlets.
Kampung: Indonesian village or quarter within a town or city.

In the recommendations of the leaders Aliarcham and Semaun may be seen an incitement to the practical application of a stipulation in the statutes of the Communist International—the stipulation that the latter's aim is to struggle with all available means, including armed force, for the destruction of the international bourgeoisie and the establishment of an international Soviet republic as a transitional stage towards the complete abolition of the state. They also urge the practical application of what is laid down as a commitment of the various sections in point 3 of the conditions for admission into the Communist International, viz. that alongside the legal organization a corresponding illegal one should be established which would assist the party at decisive moments in performing its duty towards the revolution, and that it is of vital importance to combine the legal work with the illegal in all countries where the Communists as a result of martial law or emergency laws are not in a position to carry out all their work within the law.

As has also become apparent from the instructions issued by the PKI executive in the first half of 1925, (1) it is, in this connection, clear that the executive started to establish illegal fighting organizations by means of the ten- (or five- or three-) men groups in order to comply with the commitments imposed on the sections by the Communist International. These groups were in due course to render armed assistance to the party in the struggle for power.

It must here be mentioned that Aliarcham also pointed out at the Djogjakarta conference that the incendiarism and bomb-attacks which had taken place in some parts of Java (2) had been completely ineffective because of insufficient organization, and that those persons who were prepared to commit such acts of terrorism

- (1) One point mentioned in these instructions is that it is the duty of the Communists (who are already working under difficult conditions, but whose task will be even heavier in the future, viz. when the government of the state is in their hands) to gather forces which will be courageous in battle as well as in their convictions. As regards convictions, group leaders ought to be well informed of the leaders' intentions concerning the action to be carried out in order to gain power in the state. In this connection skill in the explanation of Communism is not sufficient; there must also be skill in applying the tactics which can lead to the victory of the people's movement led by the party. These two factors, courage to fight and conviction, cannot be separated, since the mere will to start fighting, without any tactics, gives rise to an unorganized situation, the final result of which is by no means certain. Hence in the preparations for battle tactics should first be considered by the central executive, which is best acquainted with the strength of the whole army and the party. Thus in the interest of the future struggle the members should maintain discipline, in other words every member is forbidden to deviate from the plan set up by the whole party and the central executive. Furthermore everything should be done to educate the people to as great an extent as possible, and those elements who are presumed to be adherents of a Sarekat Hedjo* or suchlike organization should be drawn into the party, so that they can assist in defeating the enemy, whereby it must be remembered that a party member, who also acts as commander in the Communist army, is of greater importance to the leaders if he remains steadfast at his post and does his utmost to cause the downfall of the enemy in battle (let alone a battle against the Sarekat Hedjo, which only exists for a certain time) than if he withdraws from the battle out of fear.

- (2) In Central Java in 1923.

*Ed: Sarekat Hedjo : the "Green Union", an Indonesian anti- communist strong-arm organization, which, not without sympathy from the authorities, broke up PKI and Sarekat Rakjat meetings, intimidated Communist supporters, etc.

(arson and murder) would therefore first of all be provided with revolutionary training, while they should be given a sense of organization by being admitted to the PKI.

Certain points were defined in more detail by Alimin at a meeting held March 22, 1925, at the central office of the PKI in Weltevreden, (3) a meeting which was attended by a number of people of bad reputation. There the agitator explained the PKI's objective, pointing out among other things that the party is not hostile towards those who steal from the enemy because this would bring the government into difficulties and would prevent the money which had been obtained by bleeding the little man dry from being put by or taken to Europe or used for the benefit of governmental institutions (police), in which connection the PKI proposed to search the kampungs for criminals (pendjahat) who would then assume the leadership over fellow-criminals. A third of the goods obtained by crime would be for the offenders and two-thirds for the PKI.

From this it is likewise apparent that the party leaders also intended to enlist criminals in the illegal groups. That this was a means of propaganda recommended by the Communist International is confirmed not only by the passages quoted above from the statutes and conditions for admission into the Communist International, but also by what the press reported early in 1924 concerning revolutionary activities in Bengal following the attempted murder of the head of the Sakanritolla post office. It then came to light that political clubs had been formed there with the aim of committing murders and driving the Europeans out of the country; the clubs planned first to organize large-scale robberies in order to accumulate the necessary funds to carry out the plan. Another way in which the above statement has been confirmed is through knowledge acquired concerning the preparations made by the Communist Party in Germany in the fields of politics and military strategy, viz. that the German Communist Party's organization of armed force is planned along the lines of hundred-men groups (in factories, etc.) which can be united into regiments and battalions and (if they have had no previous military experience) trained in the use of fire-arms and street-fighting. Furthermore there is the so-called Reichscheka as a section of this military organization at the disposal of the party--which "Cheka" was straightforwardly labelled an "organization for murder" in connection with what came to light at the Leipzig trials in February, 1925.

(3) Transferred to Bandung, May, 1926.

CHAPTER II

REVOLUTIONARY TRADE UNION ACTIVITY AND STRIKES

Since the propaganda drive carried on by the executive in the second half of 1925 fell principally within the realm of trade union activities, it is desirable to deal with this point first. This activity was first and foremost a logical consequence of the decisions taken at the Pan-Pacific Labor Conference held in Canton in the second half of June, 1924, and attended by Alimin and Budisutjitro as delegates for Java. In connection with this congress the Russian Wojinsky* wrote in a Third International publication of September 6, 1924, that, among the colonial and semi-colonial countries in the East, South China was the only place where the delegates of the oppressed peoples could peacefully meet each other in order to discuss methods of combatting world imperialism and establishing national revolutionary organizations, and that the opinion expressed by the Javanese delegation at the congress, to the effect that all the revolutionary organizations of the islands and shores of the Pacific Ocean should be called upon to join hands in the defense of this area against imperialism, clearly reflected the political significance of this congress of workers in the Pacific for the near future.

The decisions of the Canton conference, which was attended by both representatives of the Communist International and of the Red International of Labor Unions (Profintern), were summarized by Alimin and Budisutjitro at the Djogjakarta conference, where Alimin stated that the following were the principal subjects discussed at the congress:

- (a) the unity of the transport-workers in the whole of Asia, the strength of which could be employed as a weapon when the time for radical action had come;
- (b) cooperation with all political movements of a revolutionary nature in the whole of Asia, in order to rebel against Western and Eastern imperialism by force, in which connection--according to the speaker--the Red Eastern Labor, of which Ibrahim Datuk Tan Malaka was also a member, had been established at Canton.

This body was designed to maintain the link between the transport-workers' associations, in particular those of the dock-workers and seamen in Asia, viz. China, Japan, the Dutch East Indies, the Philippines, India, Singapore, Siam, etc. The Communists should not, however, confine themselves to working among the dock-workers and seamen (though these should be canvassed first and foremost), but should also try to obtain influence and leading positions among transport-workers, industrial workers, and miners, in order to be prepared at the outbreak of war in the near future in Asia and the Pacific, when America and Japan would be the first belligerents. These statements were supplemented by Budisutjitro, who declared that, although the Kuomintang action in China and the movement in the Philippines were largely nationalist revolutionary movements, the Communists championed not only the class struggle (the struggle against capitalism) but also the struggle against imperialism (foreign domination), and that for this reason the Javanese delegation at the Canton conference had been prepared to cooperate with all revolutionary movements in the whole of Asia, regardless of whether those movements were based on Communism.

*Ed: "Wojinsky": Voitinsky, one of the major figures in the Comintern's Far Eastern Bureau, later accused of Trotskyism.

It is in the light of the afore-mentioned perfectly obvious as to why the Communist leaders decided, as a result of their conferences held at Djogjakarta and shortly after at Surabaya (December, 1924), to extend their activities, which had previously been limited to trade unions already under their control (among others the Vereeniging van Spoor- en Tramweg Personeel / V.S.T.P., or Association of Railroad and Trolley Employees / (4) and Sarekat Postel), by organizing workers in the sugar mills in a union Sarekat Buruh Gula and by amalgamating the small unions of dock-workers and seamen under various names which acted independently here and there, e.g. in Batavia, Semarang and Surabaya, into one union: Sarekat Pegawai Pelabuan dan Lautan.

Thus during 1925 a strong propaganda drive was opened practically everywhere by the Communists within the existing trade unions large and small, and a similar drive for the establishment of new unions. Special mention should in this connection be made of the Association of Railroad and Trolley Employees (V.S.T.P.), the Sarekat Postel and the Sarekat Pegawai Pelabuan dan Lautan, the Sarekat Buruh Bengkel dan Electrisch (the union of workers in the metal industry, the electricity companies and similar concerns), the Sarekat Buruh Tjetak (printers' union) and the Sarekat Pegawai Rumah Sakit Indonesia (native hospital-workers' union). The result was the outbreak of various strikes among the workers thus organized, in Semarang among the employees of the Semarang Steamship and Proa-ferry Company (Semarangsch Stoomboot- en Prauwenveer), of the Central Civil Hospital and of some printing firms, separately organized in the S.P.P.L., the S.P.R.I. and the S.B.T. (August, 1925); in Batavia among employees of the Central Civil Hospital, organized in the S.P.P.L. (September, 1925); in Medan (Belawan) among employees in some government services and private concerns, organized in the S.P.P.L. (October, 1925); and in Surabaya among those working in the metal industry and with the dry-dock company, organized in the S.B.B.E. and S.P.P.L. respectively (November/December, 1925).

The strikes, which involved cases of terrorism, intimidation and sabotage, were quickly suppressed by the enforcement of article 8a of Staatsblad 1919 No. 27 in the city of Semarang and on the East Coast of Sumatra and later by the more far-reaching ban contained in article 8b of the above-mentioned Staatsblad on the S.P.P.L., the V.S.T.P., the S.P. and the S.B.B.E.

During the first local strikes in Semarang it had undoubtedly been intended that those actions should develop into a general strike. This plan was specially discussed at a secret meeting held there August 5, 1925, and attended

(4) The V.S.T.P. has been affiliated with the Red Labor International since March, 1923. In the Antwerp Matin of June 30, July 1 and July 2, 1922, Mr. G. Alexinsky, the former Socialist representative for Petrograd (Leningrad) in the Duma pointed out in his articles "Les Bolsheviki et Les Indes Néerlandaises" that the Third International Secretariat for the Far East had in its reports drawn attention to the fact that the Communists controlled the Central Office of Trade Unions in Java; this very probably is a reference to the V.S.T.P. office in Semarang, where the executives of several trade unions in Semarang under their control were situated, and an indication that that group had succeeded in giving the movement a revolutionary and Bolshevik character, while the Secretariat was also correct in asserting that the railroad syndicate--and this refers to the V. S.T.P. itself--is controlled by Bolsheviks.

by twenty representatives of various trade unions, among whom were those of the V.S.T.P. A general strike was in fact decided upon, though without the approval of the V.S.T.P., which did not consider the time to be propitious. (5) A statement by Tan Malaka to the effect that he was very proud of Semarang's courage, but that he regretted that the other organizations, particularly the Sarekat Buruh Gula, were still so weak, indicates that the leaders had not wished to let matters rest at these limited labor conflicts.

The fact that the railroad organization had not been idle in the meantime was evident from an assignment received by Winanta to visit the V.S.T.P. sections in West Java. This he could not accomplish immediately owing to lack of time; however, he reported to the V.S.T.P. executive that he was going to carry out the assignment with respect to Batavia. At the same time he requested money to cover expenses and a mandate to prove that he, as a member of the PKI executive, had been appointed propagandist for the V.S.T.P. He was also of the opinion that the executive of the V.S.T.P. would have no objections to his limiting his visit to each section to only one day and one night in order to get an impression of the morale in each section, and that it was not necessary for him to call a meeting of the local executive or of members everywhere.

That it was here the intention to test and strengthen the organization for the future struggle is also apparent from a statement made by the V.S.T.P. executive to Winanta, to the effect that his assignment to visit the sections in West Java was linked with the strike which broke out in the Semarang harbor the previous August, since if this strike had spread over the whole of Java and had had sufficient support from the people under the leadership of party members, the V.S.T.P. would not only have been compelled to support the strikers but also to take part in the action in order to maintain itself; so that also with a view to similar events in the future, an organization was necessary which would be prepared for all eventualities, otherwise future actions would be quashed just as in 1923.

In the meanwhile the leaders also embarked upon a more intensive execution of the decision taken at the Djogjakarta and Surabaya conferences (December, 1924) to make Surabaya--which was considered a main artery of trade and industry--the most important field of action.

The executives of the various trade unions under Communist leadership such as the Sarekat Postel, the Sarekat Pegawai Pelabuan dan Lautan, the Federatie Sarekat Buruh Bengkel dan Electric, the Sarekat Buruh Gula, the Sarekat Buruh Marine Etablissement, etc., were housed in the office Tambakbajan No. 2--the local Communist headquarters.

This amalgamation of the executives of various trade unions naturally resulted in more Communist leaders settling there and carrying out intensive work in the expansion of the revolutionary trade unions by means of fostering cells and holding meetings of members and educational courses for workers from various concerns and government services. As a consequence the membership of the S.B.B.E. rose within a short time to 2,600, more than 2,000 of whom were in Surabaya alone,

- (5) It was resolved at the meeting that details concerning participation in the strike should be decided upon by each trade union individually at its own meetings, and since this was rendered impossible by the government's decision that article 8a should immediately become effective in the city of Semarang, nothing came of the general strike.

while the membership of the Surabaya section of the V.S.T.P. rose to more than 900, of the Sarekat Postel to more than 450, of the S.P.P.L. to more than 1,500, etc.

The PKI national executive in Batavia had meanwhile taken the initiative in establishing, also in Surabaya, a section of the afore-mentioned Secretariat of the Red Eastern Labor of Canton, which section should under the name of Secretariaat Vakbonden Merah Indonesia (Secretariat Red Labor Indonesia) also be a member of the Red International of Labor Unions in Moscow. The executive had already sent the draft statutes for the Secretariat to the executives of the S.P.P.L., the V.S.T.P., S.B.G. and Sarekat Buruh Pelikan Indonesia (S.B.P.I.) or Sarekat Buruh Tambang (S.B.T.)—the miners' union—and remarked in its accompanying letter on the matter that consistent perserverance in the revolutionary class struggle would not be possible in the Dutch East Indies without unity of purpose among the industrial and transport organizations in Asia.

Although it has not become apparent whether this step led to the desired results, (6) the series of strikes which broke out in Surabaya in November and December, 1925—in which nearly all metal trades were involved—must undoubtedly be ascribed to the systematic action of the Communists. It is by no means improbable that these strikes, which were quickly suppressed, broke out earlier than the leaders themselves wished, since the sugar-mills, which had placed large orders with the machinery factories for the season beginning in May, 1926, would also have been hard hit by a strike at a later date, e.g. in January, 1926: then their orders would not have been delivered in time, while the machinery manufacturers would have thereby been exposed to heavy fines.

The party-leaders' intentions were clearly revealed in what Alimin said on the subject at a secret meeting of members of the PKI held in Djogjakarta on June 27, 1925, where he intimated among other things that his party desired the freedom of the country and its people; that freedom, however, was only to be obtained by revolution, which ought to be preceded by local strikes followed by mass-strikes, especially in the railroads and harbors, in order to shut off the country economically. (Read: to cause a famine.)

Furthermore it cannot be doubted that the Secretariat Red Labor Indonesia which was set up in Surabaya should be regarded as a section of the Canton secretariat, while it has also become clear that the Communist leaders were closing the chain of Third International (or Red International of Labor Unions) contacts in the Far East—there were similar propaganda centers in Shanghai and Manila—and that it was thought that a strong base for action on Java had been found in Surabaya.

(6) This organization broke up shortly afterwards.

CHAPTER III

CONTACT BETWEEN THE THIRD INTERNATIONAL AND THE PKI
VIA THE EAST, WITH SINGAPORE AS PRINCIPAL LIAISON-CENTER

The statement made by the party leaders at the Djogjakarta conference to the effect that a section would be established in Singapore, with the task of providing contact between the Indonesian Communists and those of other countries, was confirmed in a statement received to the effect that Singapore would be made into a direct secret center for propaganda work in Indo-China and the islands of the Dutch East Indies, in view of which a combined bureau of the E.C.C.I. and the Red International of Labor Unions would be organized, consisting of representatives from Chinese, Japanese, Australian, Indo-Chinese, and Javanese Communist parties. The bureau would consist of two sections, one for propaganda work and one for direct action, with a total staff of thirty persons.

By means of the close contact, personal and by correspondence, which has since been proven, between Communists here and abroad, has come the confirmation of the existence of a secret propaganda center in the Straits, while it may be stated with certainty that the chiefs of the Communist movement in this country are to be found partly in Java (Bandung) and partly in Sumatra, as will become more apparent further on in this report. Among the most prominent leaders who have recently left for abroad are: Sardjono, (7) Mohamad Sanusi, (7) Alimin, (8) Winanta, (7) Budisutjitro, (7) Sugono, (9) Subakat, Sutan Said Ali, (7) Perpatih(7) and Musso(8).

The chain of connections which has been forged in the last few years in the Far East at the instigation of the Third International and the Red International of Labor Unions is doubtless also a consequence of the decisions taken at the fifth world congress of the Comintern (mid-1924) to wage an even stronger propaganda campaign than had previously been done in Eastern countries. This is evident from the fact that in point 17 of the resolution accepted at that congress, it is declared that the executive should not only render assistance to the peasants and oppressed national minorities but should also assume leadership over revolutionary activities for the liberation of the colonial peoples of the East. It is also apparent from Semaun's appointment to the E.C.C.I. (10) as well as from

(7) Have since returned to this country and are now in detention.

(8) December 18 last, arrested in Johore. They had arrived there a few days previously from Canton via Bangkok and were found to be provided with false passports under the names of Po Ngah Kam and Po Ngah Sam, issued by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Canton, November 26, 1926, while they were also in the possession of \$1,100 and \$1,400 respectively in U.S. banknotes which, according to their statement, had come from people in the Philippines who sympathized with the action.

(9) Since deceased.

(10) At the seventh sitting of the Enlarged Executive Semaun was appointed to the Presidium of the E.C.C.I.

point 9 of the resolution of the organization commission of the E.C.C.I., in which it is stated among other things that the organization commission must work in close cooperation with the Eastern section in order to promote the development of the organization and the formation of cells especially in the Eastern countries, whereby the Communist parties in the mother countries of the colonies were especially obliged to assist in the development of the organizations and in particular in the formation of the cells in the colonies.

From various facts it may be deduced that contact between the party here and Moscow has long since been maintained more intensively via the East than via Holland, and such deductions are supported by Semaun's proposal to the executive to reply to a communication from the Comintern of May 5, 1925:

- ...that the means of our letter, dated 17 December 1924, was only:
1. to demonstrate that comrades Semaon, Malaka and eventually other new comrades, which we send probably from Java, are our real representatives, which we believe to work in the interest of the Comintern and Profintern, thus also in the interest of the revolutionary movement in Indonesia in general; (P.K.I., Red Labor Unions, etc.);
 2. that consequently other representatives in Holland and somewhere can be only those comrades who are elected by comrades Semaon, Malaka and other real representatives;
 3. that Holland is too far from Indonesia and that the revolutionary movement there is very complicated, so that we can not be responsible for the detailed work of the Perkomind* in the Dutch movement and others, but in this matter we believe in comrade Semaon as our real representative, so that he is responsible also for election of our second representative in the Perkomind bureau Holland.

*Ed: Perkomind: Persatuan Kommunis di India, Communist Association of the Indies (early name of the PKI).

CHAPTER IV.

TERRORISM, WITH THE BAND OF CRIMINALS DRAWN

INTO THE PARTY AS AN ORGANIZED FORCE: RESULTS

Meanwhile the party leaders had not been idle in other fields, and hard work was being done to draw the population, and also the undesirable elements in it, into the party, by means of the ten- and later five-men group system, this in accordance with the instructions issued on the matter by the national executive. This was partly in order to raise the number of (regular) members, which was 1,140 at that time, as quickly as possible to 3,000, and partly to carry out what was recommended by Aliarcham at the Djogjakarta conference and by Alimin at the secret meeting held at the head office of the PKI, March 22, 1925, viz. the organization of criminals.

A start had been made in the first half of 1925 in attracting undesirable elements into the party (in organizations under the name of Anti-ribut bands* in the regions of Batavia (the capital), the former Priangan regencies (Tjiandur), Pekalongan, Djogjakarta, Surakarta and Kediri). In this connection the manufacture of explosives and the perpetration of arson were subjects for discussion, and five fires were set alight in sugar cane in Kediri. The fact that first the peoples' movement in the Sarekats Rajat*, launched by the Communist leaders, and then the trade union movement, were firmly repelled, resulted in the leaders' taking more initiative to bolster illegal activities, this aiming at a struggle in the literal sense of violence against the government.

In connection with the propaganda carried on in this direction it was apparent particularly in the months of February and March of last year that the Communists were planning to create disturbances by means of strikes, arson and murders carried out by organized bands of criminals.

Although nothing then came of the more or less organized disturbances, probably owing to insufficient organization, a series of incidental acts of terrorism took place in the course of 1926, which indicates that the illegal action of the Communists was becoming stronger in certain areas.

In this connection mention should be made of the disturbances in the division of Tegal in March of last year, when an armed band of approximately two hundred persons forced its way into the house of an anti-Communist in order to attack certain native officials present in the house, whereby a native policeman and a desa-head were wounded, the furniture destroyed and money and goods stolen; the attempt of several Communists in March of last year, which was discovered in time and thus frustrated, to blow up one of the storehouses of the Royal Arsenal in Djogjakarta; the disturbances in the division of Banjuwangi (late in April), in which a band of between four and five hundred Communists rebelled against the native and desa administration, whereby three of the rebels were wounded; the disturbances in Pulu Tello in May last, when a band of armed Communists terrorized the population and broke open the prison; the theft of money from the public treasury by some Communists in Kuta Radja (May); the Communist conspiracy (discovered in time) for a surprise attack on the camp in

*Ed: Anti-Ribut Band: Anti-Ruffian League, a strong-arm organization to counter the Sarekat Hedjo. Sarekat Rajat: People's Unions, established in 1923 by the PKI to contain non-proletarian sympathizers of the party.

Blangkedjeren in the Gaju and Alas areas of Achin; the removal of explosives and a bomb from some Communists in Bandung (July); the murder of an adat head in Kamang, Padang Highlands (September); the shooting at a negeri head in the Solok area (September); an outbreak of incendiarism in the Surakarta area (June through August); the attempted murder of the president of the district court Mr. Andree Wiltens at Surakarta followed by the murder of a detective there (September); and the throwing of bombs on the fair grounds in Surabaya (October)---in all of which the hand of the Communists was to be detected.

With the murder of the adat head in Kamang there came to light the existence of a Communist conspiracy in which native heads were involved and which aimed at overthrowing the authorities by means of actual rebellion and by murdering opponents of the rebellion.

One of the Communists found in the possession of explosives in Bandung had when interrogated given information concerning a secret organization, the so-called Double or Dictatorial Organization, called D.O. for short, which was established within the PKI alongside the outward organization with a view to using violence and terrorism to counteract governmental measures for combatting Communism. Shortly after the transference of the PKI executive from Weltevreden to Bandung the leadership of this movement was placed in the hands of the treasurer Winanta (now both secretary and treasurer), who had moved to Tjitjalangka for the purpose, and who from there maintained contact with other party members in Batavia, etc., who had the task of supplying him with explosives and firearms so that the planned illegal action could be launched at the proper moment.

The more forcible execution of this illegal action is without doubt linked with an order probably emanating from the PKI executive in the middle of last year. In it the recommendation was made, under the pressure of circumstances, to embark upon the illegal action recommended by Aliarcham at the Djogjakarta conference of Communists (December, 1924), which action--according to the order--had been agreed upon by party members at that conference, without its being carried out by the sections and sub-sections on a large scale. This order furthermore contains an incitement to show no mercy in murdering traitors among party members.

Reports continued to come in from various quarters concerning illegal terrorist organizations under the name of D.O. which aimed at drawing criminals into the party to commit thefts, etc., in order to enlarge party funds with part of the loot, while mention was also frequently made of attempts to collect money to buy firearms (explosives) in order to put reactionary officials (read: officials who hampered party action) out of the way.

CHAPTER V

TERRORISM IN THE FORM OF STRIKES, RIOTS AND REBELLION
IS THE DIRECT RESULT OF A WELL-CONSIDERED PLAN
OF THE COMMUNIST LEADERS BOTH HERE AND ABROAD

That the Communist leaders, here and in the Straits, had an undeniable hand in this course of events is proved by the fact that, at their meeting in Surakarta late in 1925 they decided, in the expectation of financial aid from Moscow, to provoke disturbances (revolution), which were to begin in Padang and to spread to Java.

This decision was, however, disapproved of by the leaders abroad, particularly by Tan Malaka, who pointed out in a number of "theses" that creating a revolution is not dependent upon the acquisition of money, but on the strength of the followers (the people), which at the time was insufficient and would first have to be increased by means of constant mass-action, an uninterrupted series of strikes and demonstrations, etc. Hence the leaders ought to wait until the time was really ripe for a general rebellion and meanwhile restrict themselves to local actions, whereby the local leaders could be allowed a large amount of autonomy.

Tan Malaka explained this attitude in detail at a personal meeting (probably in the Philippines) with Alimin, who went to inform him of the Surakarta decision; whereupon Tan Malaka gave him the afore-mentioned theses so that his views might be made known at a later meeting of the Javanese leaders in Singapore.

This meeting consequently took place, but Alimin, who was a keen advocate of the Surakarta decision, held back the theses and was thus able to see that the Surakarta decision remained unchallenged for the time being.

Malaka, however, was able to make his opposition felt at a later date, after he had given Subakat a copy of his theses at a personal meeting with the latter, whereupon Subakat informed the executive of Malaka's real point of view and of the role Alimin had played--this in order to push through his own ideas, which differed from those of Malaka.

It was on account of Malaka's opposition that Alimin and Muso planned, in the event it should prove impossible to reach an agreement with Malaka, to go either to Moscow or Canton in order to have a meeting with the Comintern leaders in Moscow or with the representatives of the Comintern in Canton, for which purpose they requested a mandate and funds for travelling expenses.

The difference of opinion existing between Malaka and Alimin only had bearing on the speed with which the action should be carried out. In principle there was no difference between them; both endeavored to bring about strikes, riots and revolution well-nigh as quickly as possible.

In this respect mention should be made of a statement by Malaka to the effect that the promotion of strikes and disturbances at that time ought to be looked

upon as an initial test which could be very profitable but which could also entail great losses; he further stated that on account of the many difficult problems attached to it, one might not and could not instantly accept the responsibility for such a test without consulting the various leaders also with regard to the secret organization charged with the preparations for strikes and disturbances, (11) while the time and the method for action could only be decided upon once the strength of the rebel movement and its enemy were sufficiently known. In his statement it was also said that Moscow would not contribute finance or support as long as it did not expect sufficiently rewarding results and until it was well-informed of the strength of the PKI and the (red) army; furthermore mention was made among other things of plans for creating disturbances not only in Java, but also in other regions such as Sumatra (Padang), Palembang and Ternate.

Malaka went on to add that his fellow party members in this country were apparently not well-informed, for which he could not blame them, since Moscow was far off and there was no Russian representative in their organization in Java, as was the case in Germany and China.

Mention should also be made of another statement by Malaka to the party leaders here, concerning the friendly relations existing between Holland and America, in connection with which it was reported that America was seeking a thousand acres of arable land in Java and Sumatra to put under cultivation for experimental purposes. (It considered the Philippines less suitable owing to its unstable political situation.) In order to counteract this invasion of foreign capital, which would be even larger if the experiments were successful, Malaka considered it vital that the party leaders should organize mass-strikes or at least demonstrations and protest meetings, to be publicized in Philippine newspapers, thus acting as a deterrent to American plans.

The expansion of American capital--and this is largely what his argument amounts to--would also strengthen the common enemy, and since America desired strict supervision of its enterprises that could result in aerial patrols, as had also been the case in Morocco.

Many of these points are in complete agreement with what was evident concerning the proceedings at the congress of Toilers of the Far East held in Russia in January, 1922, which was called as a counterpart to the Washington Conference. As a result of this congress Rosta*News Bureau addressed a manifesto to the toilers of the Far East, the workers and peasants of China, Korea, Japan, Mongolia, the Pacific islands, Indo-China and the Dutch East Indies, in which it was said that the East had already suffered for many decades from the wild vagaries and looting of European, American and Japanese thieves. In the manifesto particular attention was drawn to the secret agreements made at the Washington conference concerning further plundering of the Eastern countries. The manifesto then continues:

We, the representatives of the oppressed peoples of the Far East, demand equality; we proclaim the holy struggle; we know that we cannot receive freedom from the hands of our leaders; we know that the struggle for liberation will be hard; but we want to live and we will use force to capture what is our due.

(11) This apparently refers to the illegal (Double or Dictatorial) organization of the party leadership.

*Ed: Rosta: Russian Wire Service, the predecessor of TASS.

We are in the majority, and there are hundreds of millions of us; our strength lies in our unity. We do not declare war on life, but on the death of the Japanese, American, French, English and other thieves. We will fight for liberation, we will crush our oppressors and we will create a just social order.

At that congress Semaun stated that the Javanese proletariat had long had to work for foreign capital, that the Washington Conference had been detrimental to the problem of the worker, that the imperialists were determined to exploit the Dutch East Indies, but that such a situation could not last much longer, and that the Javanese proletariat would play no mean role in the great struggle between capital and labor.

Certain facts have made it obvious that the strikes and disturbances initiated by the party leaders must also be regarded as part of the higher political plan of those leaders, designed to obstruct the further invasion of foreign capital into this country, to which action the Third International seems prepared to give its support, providing it yields sufficient results.

Insight into the danger of the action carried out by the Communist leaders is given by the booklet entitled Naar de Republiek Indonesia (Towards the Republic of Indonesia) written by Tan Malaka, printed in Canton, April, 1925, and reprinted in Tokio, December, 1925. In it the following statements are made:

We must use all our strength to bring all revolutionary organizations to the place where the enemy has amassed his principal armed forces and where we will be victorious.

If we choose Indonesia as our battlefield, then we will find that the full force of the enemy (economic, political and military) is not gathered together in one place, but dispersed.

The military forces are centered in Priangan. The political center is now in Batavia, but this may soon be united with the military forces in Priangan. One can say that the economic center is the Surakarta valley, i.e. the residencies of Djogjakarta, Surakarta, Madiun, Rembang, Kediri and Surabaya, where there are large numbers of sugar mills, railroads, ships, palm oil refineries, machinery shops and other concerns. Thus it is apparent that Dutch imperialism in Indonesia is not concentrated in one particular region.

As has been said above, an attack can be successful if it is carried out in an area where we can amass a large fighting force and where we can annihilate the enemy.

If the Dutch imperialistic forces, viz. the economic, political and military forces, were ever concentrated in one city, then we would have to select that city for our revolutionary activities and annihilate the enemy there first.

If our plans were successful there then the other parts of Indonesia would fall into our hands either automatically or with very little difficulty.

But because Dutch imperial power is dispersed over the three above-mentioned areas, we must also divide our revolutionary forces and select the place which is the most important for our victory.

If we consider the matter carefully, then we arrive at the conclusion that the Surakarta valley is the most important of these places for us. There we may more readily expect to be victorious and to be able to hold our position than in Batavia or Priangan. The industrial workers

are concentrated in the Surakarta valley, and also the economic resources which can make the victory more permanent. We can consolidate a political victory if it goes hand in hand with an economic victory (embracing factories, agriculture, transport and banking institutions).

We must therefore concentrate the principal force of our army in the Surakarta valley, in order to obtain the best results for the whole of Indonesia from our tactics and strategy.

If we can maintain our position temporarily in the Surakarta valley and also make an attack on other centers such as the East Coast of Sumatra, Palembang, Balikpapan, etc., and establish ourselves there and in the military centers of Priangan, Magelang, Malang, Achin, etc., then we can look upon the Surakarta valley as the foundation on which the freedom of Indonesia can be constructed.

Particularly once we have established a sufficient number of cells among the military and naval forces, it will become very difficult for the enemy to send its soldiers, sailors and artillerymen to the Surakarta valley. The red flag will soon fly from every factory and red propaganda will spread from there to other regions of Indonesia and the rest of Asia.

Although the Surakarta valley is ideal for our victory, places like Priangan and especially Achin and Ternate are extremely vital for the creation of diversions designed to mislead the enemy.

When we have made a successful attack on these places, the enemy will be compelled to transfer its military forces in Java to the remote areas.

That is, to say the least, extremely favorable for the morale of the revolutionary movement.

The enemy will moreover have to go to great expense to carry out such maneuvers, and hence will be forced to raise taxes. The people will thus be hard-hit economically, which will strengthen their desire for revolution throughout Indonesia.

A victorious attack in Priangan, Achin or Ternate is thus of great significance and can lead to strategic victory.

The strategic blow which will then be dealt at a suitable moment in the Surakarta valley (in the milling season in the sugar mills) is a sword of Damocles always hanging above the head of the enemy--that is to say, our threat, which can be put into execution at any time in the Surakarta valley and which can annihilate the enemy.

In accordance with the great importance of the Surakarta valley in our endeavors to acquire freedom, our parties must from now on use all their strength, energy and conviction to put our army into action in factories, workshops, mines, plantations and such concerns, with a view to training our army for the future struggle.

Insight and determination will be more effective if they go hand in hand with party discipline. All the troops under the command of the PKI must be subjected to a central authority. Every fighting group must go to the assistance of any other group which is in difficulties. It must advance if the central authority deems it necessary. On the other hand if the general staff considers it advisable that the troops withdraw then they must not be ashamed of withdrawal. For strategy can only yield results if the general staff can in vital moments count on the troops which have to be brought into action.

If we consider things carefully we realize how important the present-day situation is in Indonesia. Not to advance is the same as to yield. There is no alternative, no other path open for us but to advance in a straight line and to educate the Indonesian people in such a way that it becomes aggressive by nature.

If after skirmishes small and large, today in Java, tomorrow in Sumatra, today in the trade-unions, tomorrow in the political parties, we have proved that we possess insight, determination, ability and enthusiasm, then the last blow to be dealt will be dealt by us, with such force, in the right place and at the right time, that Dutch imperialism will fall, and its fall will be heard in all the other colonies in the East. If the blow is really hard then the other colonies will individually draw strength from it in order to defeat their own enemies. Then the liberation of Indonesia will lead to the liberation of the other colonies in Asia.

A few passages may also be quoted from another interesting propaganda pamphlet written by Tan Malaka, entitled Semangat Moeda (The New Spirit), (12) since they give such a clear picture of the propaganda methods indirectly recommended by the writer for illegal terrorist actions and since they also betray the poisonous character of his propaganda. To quote:

But even if we do not place much hope in freeing Indonesia by means of anarchism, anarchism can arise in connection with the people's attitude in Indonesia. As long as the people can still listen to the discussions held on their destiny, on protests and on our aims, they can be kept under control by means of an organized action.

But if the government blocks up the crater of the movement the revolutionary fire will break out elsewhere, e.g. the sugar cane will burn, bridges will be destroyed, trains will be derailed and the Europeans will be murdered.

It is not the PKI which wants this to happen, it is exclusively the will of the people who have been made desperate and have fled from our organization. (13)

Of course a parliament in Indonesia can only be called after there are signs and evidence showing that the impoverished people are ready for revolution.

For instance when the people, who are fifty-five million strong, choose death rather than a life as slaves and laugh when they see the mounted police with their billy-clubs; when the prisons are broken open and the leaders freed; when the railroad-workers and the ships' crews refuse to transport their leaders to places of exile; when the soldiers refuse to suppress the movement and to shoot at the innocent unarmed masses, when the Europeans go to sleep with a revolver in their hand and do not dare to eat before their food has been examined by a doctor.

This is all proof of the fact that the spirit of revolution has taken firm root, is spreading everywhere and can only be cured by freedom. (14)

(12) On the cover is printed: Kasi batja kawan! Awas sama musuh! Simpen baik, baik! (Pass this on to other party members! Beware of the enemy! Take care of it!).

(13) Pp. 74 and 75, chapter V, section 2: Revolutie in Indië (Revolution in Indonesia).

(14) Pp. 85 and 86, chapter V, section 5: De Volksvergadering in Indië (Parliament in Indonesia).

CHAPTER VI
THE MOHAMMEDAN RELIGION IN THE SERVICE
OF COMMUNIST PROPAGANDA

Also recommended in this pamphlet is the making of propaganda by means of religion in Surakarta, Djogjakarta, Achin and Bandjermasin, among other regions.

The fact that the Communist leaders have taken this advice to heart is proved by a remark from that quarter to the effect that the people of Minangkabau are particularly fanatical as a consequence of their religion, as they only consider themselves to be perfect if they uphold Islam. Although as a Communist one is inwardly not religious--the statement continues--it is nevertheless of importance, and even vital for the expansion of Communism, that one should pretend to believe in the purity and sublimity of religion.

That fanaticism is brought about by the strict religious upbringing which the people have had during their youth. Hence one cannot eliminate it instantaneously.

CHAPTER VII

INCREASE IN PKI AND SR MEMBERSHIP SINCE THE DJOGJAKARTA CONFERENCE
 AS A RESULT OF THE CAMPAIGN BY THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE, WHICH HAS
 LONG SINCE AIMED AT VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE LEGAL AUTHORITY

In the entire archipelago there were at the end of December, 1924, thirty-six sections of the PKI with a total membership of 1,140, while the number of sub-sections (Sarekats Rajat) was thirty-one with a total membership of 31,124.

At the Djogjakarta conference it was decided to increase the number of PKI members to three thousand, which was considered possible in connection with the automatic cessation of the Sarekats Rajat (conversion into the PKI) which was expected here and there.

Around May, 1926, there were sixty-five PKI sections, from which it may be concluded that the leaders had been to a great extent successful in strengthening the disciplined core after the Djogjakarta conference.

Various facts, then, provide clear proof that, in contrast with the West, in the East a small group of well-disciplined Communists with proper organization, and misleading slogans and promises, such as freedom from taxation and forced labor, distribution of property, etc., can create such discontent (also among the members of trade unions) that it can lead to spontaneous outbursts and mass rioting against the existing state of affairs, as has already occasionally been seen in practice. To this end no means of terrorism such as threats and mistreatment are neglected as a way of forcing the population to join the party.

The serious disturbances which broke out in the night of November 12 last, principally in West Java (Batavia, Tangerang, Bantam, East and Central Priangan), the series of outrages which took place here and there elsewhere (principally on the West Coast of Sumatra and also in Surakarta), and preparations made for such disturbances in still other places (Pekalongan and Banjumas) may accordingly doubtless be considered as a consequence of the decision taken at Surakarta by the national executive to create disturbances. This decision directly led to violent propaganda for illegal terrorist action, which was carried on rather intensively in the very areas where the disturbances occurred.

January, 1927.

PART II

The Bantam Report

Rapport van de commissie voor het onderzoek naar de
zich in de maand November 1926 in verscheidene
gedeelten van de Residentie Bantam voorgedaan
hebbende ongeregeldheden, ingesteld bij Gouvernements
besluit van 26 Januari, No. X (Weltevreden: Lands-
drukkerij, 1928).

/The Report of the Commission installed by Government
decision No. X of January 26, 1927, to investigate
the disturbances which took place in various parts
of the Residency of Bantam in November, 1926
(Weltevreden: State Printing House, 1928)./

CHAPTER I

BANTAMESE SOCIETY

It was only in the northern part of Bantam, which is the most densely populated area, that there was rebellion or the threat of it. (1) That part consists of all seven districts of North Bantam, one district of Rangkasbitung, and the three northern districts of Pandeglang (actually only the northern half of Menes). In the south everything was quiet. This report is therefore only concerned with North and Central Bantam.

The Existing SituationCharacter of the People

It has been known since early times that the character of the Bantamese people is different from that of the rest of the population of Java. Although the first impression made by this deviation is not a favorable one, on closer contact the people exceed expectations. Numerous favorable testimonies have been given by persons who have become better acquainted with the country and its people; among them European administration officials and planters also. Good qualities of the population are moderation, thrift, seriousness, and devoutness. The regular temporary emigration to the Lampong region and Batavia demands and proves that they are energetic. The people are moreover level-headed and very individualistic, their own interests come first; a quality related to this is their aversion to coercion. Family life is more successful than elsewhere in Java, and divorces rarely occur. There is, generally speaking, a very high opinion of the Bantamese woman; she is said to be a strong and virtuous housewife and a good mother; she is supposed to be the strongest force in Bantamese community life, and to be of a higher moral standing than the women in the rest of Java.

A people with mothers like this must be fundamentally a good people. Nevertheless, even on closer inspection, less favorable and more dangerous qualities remain apparent.

It is striking that in numerous regions it is the young men who are very fond of comfort and who work very little. Religious hatred and religious fanaticism which flare up frequently are really not fictitious; piety and antipathy towards authority have led and still repeatedly lead to excesses.

In this case the rebels showed themselves to be murderous but quickly disheartened by setbacks. There are local differences. In the course of the nineteenth century by far the most excesses occurred in Javanese-speaking North Bantam. (2) Although the population there descends from immigrants and vagabonds, (3) it feels itself to be more independent and also of a somewhat higher

(1) Cf. Sketch map Appendix II.

(2) Cf. the map Appendix I.

(3) C. Snouck Hurgronje, Verspreide geschriften (Collected Writings), IV, (Bonn and Leipzig, 1924), Part Two, 255.

standing than that of the other regencies. In North Bantam it was the "chronic rebellious spirit" of the population and the "bigoted, fanatical variety of the Islam faith which it professes" (4) which emerged most clearly.

In Lebak and in the sparsely-populated south the population is more like that of Priangan, but without the friendliness of the Sundanese there.

The three northern districts preserve a middle course between these two; there, there are the more or less peaceful Sundanese masses with a restless, troublesome surface layer.

There are two things of uppermost importance for the question dealt with in this report. The first is the undeniable fact that the population is more fiercely religious than that of the rest of Java, has more inclination towards adventure, and is less docile. The second is that particularly in the beginning the population gives the impression to everyone who comes from outside of being very reserved.

Economic and Intellectual Development

Economically Bantam is almost entirely dependent on native agriculture. The preponderant part of the people's income is gained from the cultivation of rice and coconuts. To a greater extent than elsewhere in Java the rice is used for domestic consumption; the coconuts bring money into the area. The northeastern part of the region is not strong economically. In the northwest, in Tjilegon, Anjer, and the two southern regencies, the situation is much better; measured by Javanese standards the districts of Tjaringin and Menes are definitely prosperous.

The standard of education--religious life will be discussed later--is in this region far behind that of the rest of West Java but only slightly behind the average for the whole island.

Social Structure

In their social structure and social differentiation the people here vary perhaps even more from those of the rest of Java than in their character.

In the summary of the investigation on land-rights (5) it is asserted that the population of Bantam "has no class distinctions." This assertion ought to be read to mean that on account of their pronounced individualism in all sorts of arrangements, as for example compulsory service, and village services, the Bantamese--apart from the one important exception of the orthodox--neither made nor make any distinction between various groups. The social distinctions

(4) Ibid.

(5) W. B. Bergsma, editor, Eindresumé van het bij Gouvernementsbesluit van 10 Juni 1867 No 2 bevolen onderzoek naar de rechten van den Inlander op den grond op Java en Madoera samengesteld door den /gewezen/ Chef der Afdeeling Statistiek ter Algemeene Secretarie... (Final Summary of the Investigation into the Land Rights of the Native on Java and Madura Commissioned by Government Decision of 10 June, 1867, No 2, Compiled by the Former Head of the Statistical Department of the General Secretariat). Three volumes, Batavia, 1876-1896.

which are so characteristic, particularly in Java, and which were based partly on descent and office and partly on possession of property, and the division of villagers liable for service into different "classes" are unknown here. However, there are on the other hand other grounds for differentiation. Economic power, and even more important, religion and criminality assume greater significance than elsewhere in Java.

The masses: Here too the basis of society is the agricultural population. As has been stated there is little differentiation made here: a clear distinction between, for example, landowners, house-owners, and those who have no property is unknown here. Possession of property is very individualistic; those liable for services have equal obligations. There is nowhere in Java where there are as many landowners in proportion to the population as in Bantam. A large number of those possessing no land work as sharecroppers and thus they feel themselves to be independent farmers; there is relatively little large-scale ownership of land, while the conditions for sharecropping are constant and not unfavorable for the sharecropper. A class of unpropertied persons who are exploited is non-existent, because of the possibility which is often made use of in North Bantam of earning money as a coolie in Batavia and more particularly in the Lampong regions.

Economic differentiation: In Bantam the number of well-to-do people is in relation to the size of the population greater than elsewhere. Perhaps the income of these economically stronger members of the community is not more than that of the well-to-do elsewhere, but as a result of their moderation their property is certainly greater. And this property does not give rise to jealousy or hatred; the wealthy are generally respected. It is because the Bantamese is moderate and practical in money matters that there is here more rather than less respect for money in comparison with elsewhere.

Religion: There is a clearer differentiation in religious life than there is in the economic sphere. There is, moreover, an interplay between the two. Gifts pour in for influential religious teachers. Persons rising above the masses, economically speaking, display religious zeal, go on pilgrimages and establish langgars* or mesdjids.* (6) A distinction can be made here between gurus ngadji Koran, gurus ngadji kitab, and gurus tarekat. Although they are not genuine religious teachers, the possessors of ngelmu*, the dukuns, must also be mentioned here on account of their influence on the uneducated.

The gurus ngadji, who only teach Koran recitation, are also sometimes influential over others who ask and receive advice from them in all kinds of important matters concerning their lives. Their influence seldom extends further than their own hamlet and the neighboring ones. Naturally they almost exclusively give lessons to children, where it is a question of teaching the pupils the principles of recitation and the most vital religious rituals. Lessons in reciting strictly according to the rules of the art (the so-called tadwid), which can be given only by the more accomplished gurus ngadji, are also attended by adults. The influence of gurus ngadji kitab extends much further; it can sometimes -- although not as a rule -- involve a whole region, in the sense that, if the guru expresses his opinion on certain matters, virtually everyone in that region

(6) A memorandum on Moslem religious teaching in Java and Madura compiled on the basis of a report by Dr. C. Snouck Hurgronje has been used for the following data.

*Ed: Langgar: pavilion where village meetings are held and prayers are said.
Mesdjid: mosque. Ngelmu: supernatural power.

accepts his decision. Gurus of this kind, whose repute is so great that they obtain pupils from outlying districts on whom they retain an influence, are not to be found in Bantam nowadays. There are, furthermore, many pesantrens,*but although some gurus have a greater name, the number of their murids*living in the pesantrens is in proportion relatively small. This used to be different. The pupils were then more concentrated in a few places. In the kampung Kenanga, the home of Kiai Mohommad Saleh, who died recently, there were forty pondoks* some twenty or so years ago. On the one hand the number of gurus has increased greatly since then, while on the other more modernistic religious schools such as the one in Menes where there are 300 pupils make many pesantrens superfluous.

The gurus tarekat, the leaders of the mystic brotherhoods, are in closer contact with their pupils than are the other religious teachers. One must not, however, imagine that there are regular meetings between the guru and his adepts. There are but few pupils who try to acquire the highest level in the cult of mysticism (in the language of the people: tasawuf) from a guru of repute. The most outstanding among those few obtain permission (idjazah) from their teacher to propagate the doctrine of his sect. If the concentration necessary for this is only granted to very few, the obligations, in the form of recurrent recitation, are so binding that no tarekat pupils are to be found among young people. As a rule this mysticism is only practiced by those over thirty-five years of age and for the vast majority it is confined to a series of consecutive meetings with the guru who then gives his pupil lessons in wisdom and teaches him or has him look up formulas, the regular recitation of which opens up for him the possibility of obtaining deeper knowledge.

After this first course of instruction called talkin (literally: repetition), further meetings called tawadjuh (literally: sitting face to face) follow at irregular intervals, frequently years apart. These meetings are often no more than a single encounter, at which the pupil does not neglect to offer gifts to his teacher and the latter provides his disciple with more food for the spirit.

This elaboration was necessary to counter the error, generally widespread with reference to Bantam as well, that a tarekat teacher is continually in a sort of ecstatic condition with his pupils. The form of tarekat instruction described here strikes a balance between two others. (a) The reading of texts of famous writers by advanced pupils: this makes very high demands on the teacher. (b) At the other extreme, the noisy reciting together of so-called ratips with persons of little education, frequently under the leadership of gurus of a dubious standing, whereby the participants sometimes become mentally overwrought: it need scarcely be said that this does not occur under the leadership of the gurus of repute.

On account of the very much closer spiritual contact existing between the tarekat teacher and his pupils, the influence which he has on them is greater than that of other gurus. What frequently increases this influence even more is the reputation of sanctity which distinguished tarekat teachers enjoy and the ability ascribed to them of having secret knowledge.

The last category, that of the dukuns possessing ngelmu, exercises its influence on all levels of the population. There is no complaint for which they do not know a cure, no desire for which they do not know a formula which makes the gratification of it probable. These "gurus," if one can call them that, can have a corruptive influence on the superstitious masses by working on their baser instincts. Where there is disquiet among the population the gurus who preach invulnerability still play a part.

*Ed: Pesantren : school for religious instruction, usually united around one teacher. Murid: pupil. Pondok: house, dormitory.

There are religious teachers who also act as dukun. Among them must be mentioned in the first place the kiai* of Tjaringin, to whom not only his pupils but also numerous other people used to come every week to ask his blessing, healing from illness, or otherwise success in some undertaking or other.

Descent: Descendents of the sultan (tubagu) rise above the masses on account of their birth. Also of importance are the titles entol (especially in Menes) and agus. The significance of the title mas which is also used in Bantam has diminished greatly.

The bearers of titles do not differ in appearance from others and are to be found in all classes of society. However, in all those classes their rank always gives them some prestige. It is noteworthy that in some desas the nobility lives together in large numbers.

Criminality: The status which criminality gives a person is expressed in the typically Bantamese djawara-ism. Djawara, a word which used not to have this unfavorable meaning, denotes someone who has the courage to defy the laws of the land and who is prepared and able to force others to do his will by threat of injury, deprivation, or death. Formerly these people dressed in a particular way and carried their special weapons quite openly: the trident (siku-siku) and in the north the buffalo jaw filled with lead (tjareham), which was sometimes an unsought-after opportunity for banding together and thus for even more intimidation of the population.

Public service: Being in the service of the infidel government is in view of the frankness and beliefs of the people not nearly as great a source of esteem and influence as in the rest of Java.

Desa administration: The desa as a legal community alive in the minds of the people, the desa as we are familiar with it in Java, does not exist here. There are no real desa festivals (i.e. festivals only for people of a certain desa), no desa meetings, no desa places of worship, and no desa regulations. In so far as there is anything which is remotely like a community it is the hamlet, the ampian, and not the desa. Everything which is a desa institution, superimposed or otherwise, in the rest of Java (communal property, lands assigned to an official, desa funds, lumbungs, balais, etc.) is entirely or almost entirely non-existent here. In such circumstances the desa administration which is frequently a source of esteem and influence elsewhere in Java could never assume that importance here.

It is only the head of that administration, the djaro, who stands out. Under the desa head, there is in many hamlets a head of the hamlet, pengiwa. There are furthermore the penglaku or village messenger and the amil or village religious official. Special desa police officials such as there are in other regions of Java under the name of tamping, kapetengan, etc. do not exist here. Since early times pengiwas and penglaks seem to have been recruited from the dregs of society. They are paid by the desa head and are to all intents and purposes his servants. Sometimes a group of from five to ten desas has a communal village clerk or tjarik who is supposed to do the administrative work of the various desas. The djaros of a sub-district often also jointly pay one

*Ed: Kiai: religious teacher.

clerk who is employed at the assistant wedana's* on behalf of their desas. This is the so-called tjarik onder or sub-tjarik.

A remarkable feature, particularly in Pandeglang, is the institution of the desa elders, the kekolots. They are former desa heads, religious teachers, and well-to-do people who are chosen by public opinion as it were automatically, thus without meetings or formal arrangements. They are sometimes consulted by the head of the desa. This institution is apparently diminishing in significance.

An institution which existed in Menes (it is said to be of fairly recent date) was that of the orok landjang which were united in groups each under its own leader: these groups consisted of the young unmarried people of the desa. This institution has almost entirely disappeared. Those who are familiar with the operation of the desa administration elsewhere in Java will understand that the formation of the desa administration in Bantam, as has been outlined above, is absolutely inadequate. The djaro does not have a sufficient number of desa officials under him to enable him to conduct village affairs properly; he feels his impotence and either lets things take their own course or governs arbitrarily and extortionably.

In addition to this there is the extremely poor salary of most djaros. If one studies the incomes of the djaros on paper, they prove to be no worse than the average incomes of the lurahs* in other regions of Java. But that is only on paper. For in practice those incomes prove to be far, far lower.

Fields assigned to desa heads are only to be found very sporadically in Bantam. Most djaros have to live chiefly on the 8% fee for the collection of taxes and the payment for commutation of patjen* services. Payment for the latter usually comes in very late and then only a small portion of it. This is also because the djaro has no authority over his people. In February 1927 we met a djaro who had only received a third of the patjen moneys due to him for 1926. In view of the above-mentioned facts it is easy to understand that corrupt practices in the registration of land taxes are the order of the day. In addition to all this is the fact, which has been mentioned before, that the djaro still pays the pengiwas and penglakus from his paltry income.

The serious aspect of the fact that the salaries for desa administrators are too small is that the officials are, as it were, forced into fraudulence. If action is then taken against such frauds, it can, of course, yield useful results but it entails the great disadvantage that the desa heads are being deprived of income, so that they are stimulated to the commission of still more frauds or to discontent.

It is not surprising after what has been said above that the urge to become and remain djaro is generally very slight. It happens rather frequently that there are among the kekolots four or more desa heads who have been honorably discharged at their own request--this without even mentioning the many djaros who have not been discharged honorably. On enquiry those ex-djaros usually prove to have been village head for no longer than six months to two years, and to have requested their discharge because the position of djaro was too much susah. Of the 549 desa heads in Bantam there are at the present time 367 with less than five years service; in the case of the so-called desa administrators it is even worse: there are entire districts where there is not one desa administrator with more than five years service.

*Ed: Wedana: district head. Lurah: village head. Pantjen: services or rice payment made to the desa administration.

It is obvious that with this state of affairs most djaros have neither the respect nor the confidence of the population. They are tolerated and that is all. It must be admitted that the administration of desas elsewhere in Java also still leaves very much to be desired, but there the lurah often clearly is and remains the first among his equals and he is usually honored and obeyed by the population. The djaro of Bantam is, however, more or less a negligible quantity in the eyes of the people and if he has any prestige at all, then it is not by grace of his office, but because of his personal qualities. And the serious aspect of this is usually that he often abuses his personal influence grossly. In earlier days it was repeatedly confirmed, by Snouck Hurgronje amongst others, that the djaro is not a leader of the people. He is more of a supervisor paid by the desa, or if one wishes, a mandur of the people. And unfortunately a bad supervisor or a bad mandur* into the bargain.

Local Differences

The social structure in Bantam is of course not the same everywhere; in various regions relationships between the different groups and their importance diverge greatly.

Menes: The conditions in Menes are very unusual. There the young men are even less inclined to work than elsewhere, the group of entols is restless, troublesome, and inclined to be rebellious, and the action and glory of the djawaras was greater there than elsewhere. It is a custom in the event of a dispute to destroy or soil possessions of the opposing party as a form of revenge. Even a wedana has experienced this more than once. There were and are particularly in that locality a few gurus whose doctrine is less tolerant than that of others elsewhere. The Sarekat Islam caused greater difficulties there than elsewhere. In the European Administration Menes is said to be the most difficult district in Bantam apart from Tjilegon. It is remarkable that there is no mention of these conditions in older documents and that it was this region in particular that was looked upon as being easy to manage. The spirit of rebellion seems to have awoken in the last two decades.

Labuan: Labuan owes its reputation to the unpleasant character of part of its population. After the establishment of the railroad many people from elsewhere came to live in this small town which was already somewhat troublesome on account of its being apart with a fairly large singkeh* population. It goes without saying that these new inhabitants were not peaceful elements and the fanatical atmosphere of this place close to Tjaringin does not help to better the situation.

Tjilegon and Anjer: Since early times Tjilegon and Anjer have been the most turbulent regions of the province. There are many well-to-do people and various surly intolerant religious teachers.

Social Changes

Economic Changes

In which direction is the above-depicted society moving?

The changes which took place in the economic life of the population during and after the World War were apparently of less importance in Bantam than elsewhere. Since farmers generally suffered least from the events of the crisis, it had

*Ed: Mandur: overseer, foreman. Singkeh: first-generation Chinese resident in Indonesia.

fewer serious consequences in Bantam than elsewhere, in view of the fact that properties are so large here. As pilgrimages came to a standstill a great deal of money remained in the region. Moreover, there was here also an increase in money; at the present time a larger part of the rice harvest is sold and the number of padilumbungs* in the holdings has decreased.

It is clear that generally speaking production has risen and is still rising, if one considers the population as a whole. A general statement of this sort does not, however, convey enough. For the situation may and does vary for different places, different sources of income, and different sections of the population. Thus it is the general complaint that the padi harvests are deteriorating in the whole of Bantam. This does indeed seem to be the case in numerous areas. Particularly Northeast Bantam has suffered in this respect. And seeing that it is moreover this region which embraces the rice-importing districts the situation was definitely less favorable there in the years following the war. There is on the other hand the fact that the cultivation of coconuts has expanded enormously and--in spite of the fall of prices--the total output as well (not the output per bahu*). The construction of the railroad has apparently also brought progress to Rangkasbitung; Pandeglang, however, which was formerly the junction of the roads, is no longer a center. Labuan has apparently progressed, but this is of comparatively more advantage to the Chinese than to the Native population, for it is obvious that the Chinese are able to appropriate a considerable part of the yield of the coconut plantations, among other things, by their money-lending practices.

As far as consumption is concerned, the same less assuring signs are to be found in Bantam as elsewhere in Java. The same words are to be heard everywhere and from persons of all ranks and positions: there is more money but it slips more easily through everyone's fingers. People have become more demanding in all aorts of ways, for instance in the need for better clothes. The outlay for religion has risen also (new mesdjids, langgars, pilgrimage, djakat*). On the other hand, the festivals, the hadjats, have, as one is told everywhere--sometimes with a touch of regret--decreased in number and splendor.

The real value of the taxes (7) fell heavily at first, without its being realized. After this there was a rise which was more perceptible. Taking into account the higher price index the taxes in Bantam are, as a whole, not higher than in 1914. As far as this is concerned Bantam is in a more favorable position than the greater part of Java. And seeing that the poll tax forms a large part of the total amount of taxes, its abolition will also be of more importance here than elsewhere. Neither are the total taxation figures higher than elsewhere; in some places where the desa taxes are less faithfully paid they are even lower. But the figures from North Bantam are certainly higher, which implies that it is the rebellious region of Menes and Labuan which is in a privileged position in this matter as well. It is also striking that it is in the Lebak district, where the propagandists of the Partai Komunis Indonesia (P.K.I.) have failed to gain a hold on the population, that there is least prosperity and in some districts even poverty.

Religious Life

Bantamese religious life displays various remarkable changes. The prescribed rules for fasting are nowadays often publicly broken. In connection with the pilgrimage a common abuse must be mentioned, which appears to be a particularly

(7) Appendix VII.

*Ed: Padilumbung: rice storage barn. Bahu: about 1.75 acres. Djakat: tithe.

Bantamese one. Those who have not enough money to go on a pilgrimage and also those who want to have more money at their disposal slaughter a buffalo or divide up a roll of cloth to sell at a very high price, a kati of meat or a yard of cloth, to their fellow-villagers who consider it their duty to give the price asked, even if they have to pawn some of their own goods for it. This abuse is called taijan: the word is said to be of Chinese origin. (8)

Nevertheless despite phenomena of this sort religious life has, generally speaking, undergone a great revival everywhere. New langgars and new mesdjids are constantly being built. The people are fulfilling their religious duties more faithfully. (9) Daily prayers are said more than formerly and this is done corporately in the houses of worship more than was once the custom. The prominent kiais complain, however, that this revival of what one might call outward and more superficial religious life is going hand in hand with a decrease in the number of persons who have a profound religious knowledge and also--the statement was made by Kiai Rujani--a decrease in the number of those who possess a profound religious feeling. However, the mass phenomenon just referred to, which, moreover, has been taking place over some decades, as appears from the report on diminishing prosperity, (10) does not become less striking or important.

It is difficult to fathom the deeper reasons for this religious revival. The improvement of the means of transport are without doubt a very important factor in it. On the one hand more Bantamese go to Mecca because of that fact, on the other Mecca itself has for the selfsame reason become a more frequented world-center which is growing stronger every day. A second reason is that the attitude of the numerous Moslems who observe their religious duties faithfully has doubtless not become more favorable as a result of the political organizations with which they are associated.

The influences which modern education and increased means of transport exert on the system of Islam as it is still practiced in its old forms in Bantam have not, as is apparent from the preceding, penetrated very far into this region. Nevertheless here also the strong tendency which Native society displays to be absorbed into our cultural life will have to assert itself (11) in the course of

- (8) This taijan is sometimes also made use of by the djaros, completely apart from the pilgrimage. The moneys are then collected by force if necessary.
- (9) Because kampung holdings were included in the land tax assessment for dry ground numerous peasants from the kampung have moved to a new house on their (farm) land which has already been assessed. By this means new hamlets (ampians) have arisen. Where these arose, langgars and sometimes mesdjids were built. However, the great increase in the number of religious edifices (cf. Appendix X) cannot be explained by this fact alone.
- (10) Cf. the detailed survey in Onderzoek naar de mindere welvaart der inlandsche bevolking op Java en Madoera (Investigation into the Diminishing Prosperity of the Native Population on Java and Madura), Twelve volumes in eighteen parts, Batavia, 1905-1914.
- (11) Cf. C. Snouck Hurgronje, "Politique musulmane de la Holland" (Moslem Policy of the Netherlands), Verspreide geschriften (Collected Writings), IV (Bonn and Leipzig, 1924), Part Two, 296. (Translation of Nederland en de Islam, Leiden, 1911.)

time and old forms will have to make way for new.

A factor which has not failed to make its influence strongly felt on religious life in other parts of Java, the new movement which is mainly expressed in the associations Mohammadijjah and Irsjad, is as yet as good as absent in Bantam. The very conservative kiais in Bantam offer violent opposition to its representatives and the attempts of the latter to become accepted have yielded nothing but insignificant results. Although the followers of the two associations are by no means less serious in the pursuit of their religious duties, they are, on account of the modern methods according to which religious instruction is given in their circles, less prejudiced against whatever is unavoidably linked with the Western character of the government. As such, the influence of this movement which is still so detested in Bantam works mitigatingly on the sharp contrast which exists between the secular and spiritual authorities. It may be expected that the penetration of this movement in the years to come will, after the unavoidable friction which must be a consequence of it, facilitate the laying of contacts with the spiritual leaders of the population and in the long run bring about the decline of the great influence of the kiais of the old school. Thus a difference of opinion can exist as to the desirability of the new movements' gaining ground. It is not to be entirely approved of for Bantam, but points in favor of it cannot be denied.

Associations

Since 1908 associations of varying strength have arisen throughout Bantam. By far the most important association was the Sarekat Islam which arose in many places between 1913 and 1915. (At the height of its power circa 1914 it had ten sections all over Bantam with a total of approximately ten thousand members.) It is indicative of the infertility of the Sarekat Islam and the disposition of its members, that the leaders of those local Sarekat Islam sections which were at one time described as being dangerous (Menes, Labuan, Petir, Tjadasari) are now to be found leading the rebellion. Elsewhere in Java many Sarekat Islam sections developed into the so-called red Sarekat Rakjat, a transition with the same underlying causes. After the death of the founder and first leader of the Sarekat Islam, Raden Hasan Djajadiningrat, the association collapsed, apart from in Menes and Labuan. In 1925 the section Labuan and part of the section Menes together with their leaders Achmad Chatib and Entol Enoh gathered around the flag of the P.K.I. The remainder of the Sarekat Islam continued its work in the Persatuan Sarekat Islam (P.S.I.), which is now only active in Menes, has approximately a thousand members, and among other things runs six schools.

The association Pirukun Pribumi founded by Hasan Djajadiningrat about 1908 was designed particularly to strive after more or less economic objectives. Some members of the executive and some ordinary members later went over to the Sarekat Islam. Some of the leaders of these associations, Entol Enoh among others, are now also to be found among the members of the resistance. In the years 1908-1910 the Pirukun Pribumi apparently sold a large number of shares at ten guilders a share to prijaji* and well-to-do people (particularly in Tjiomas and at Temuputih, Tjilegon). There were government clerks who bought up to a hundred guilders worth of shares. There is virtually nothing left of that money.

The so-called Santewe association seems to have been founded about thirty years ago by Chinese in Batavia as a reaction to the terrorism which was being exercised there by bands of the Batavian buaja Quartero. It was thus intended

*Ed: Prijaji: aristocracy, in the Dutch East Indies identified with native officialdom.

as an organized means of combatting crime in and around the capital. Between 1910 and 1920 sections of the Santewe were also brought into being in Bantam, among other places at Bodjanegara and Balagendong under the leadership of H. Nawawi and H. Burhan respectively. Gradually, however, all kinds of criminal elements have crept into the association, so that towards 1920 the Santewe in Northwest Bantam was synonymous with "rogues association." After this degeneration the Santewe went out like a light in this region. The exact meaning of the term Santewe is unknown.

The association of the Orok Landjang at Menes (which may be roughly translated by "unattached young people") is sometimes compared with the institution of the sinoman in East Java. However, the Bantamese institution has quite a different character. The foundation of the Orok Landjang seems to have occurred quite recently, viz. circa 1890. It was intended to be a society for mutual aid and support for widows and orphans. In the beginning the association really did have a very good name with the public. The attitude of the Native Administration at Menes towards the Orok Landjang also seems to have been very sympathetic at that time, perhaps even too sympathetic. Thus a retired European Administration official who served in Menes for a considerable time in the nineties informed us that the enquiry into robberies was often delegated to the Orok Landjang. It sometimes occurred that in such a case the executive of the Orok Landjang came after a time to the wedana concerned with the suspects, witnesses, and recovered property. Our informant seemed to find such proceedings quite natural and even very sensible.

When the most rebellious entols and desperados or djawaras of Menes joined the Orok Landjang later on, they naturally were grateful for the opportunity of abusing the privileged position of their association. If an official did not act in accordance with the desires of the Orok Landjang, the latter made his life a burden to him with all sorts of annoyances. Between 1900 and 1910 it happened not infrequently that Native Administration officials in Menes did not dare to refuse an invitation by the Orok Landjang to attend a hadjat* of that association. Officials attended such celebrations with loaded revolvers in their pockets. A hadjat of this kind often gave rise to more or less mass batjok* fights of the Orok Landjang among themselves. More than once the police were forced to search the participants and deprive them of their side-arms at the beginning of a hadjat. Only after measures taken by the constabulary was an end made to the situation and the association of the Orok Landjang met its doom.

The association of nobles, Ruku Asli, established in 1925 by Tubagus Hilman was originally a burial society, but after the inception of the P.K.I. it merged into the latter almost immediately. Tubagus Hilman went over into the P.K.I. executive.

The Vereeniging van Spoor- en Tramweg Personeel (V.S.T.P., or Association of Railroad and Trolley Employees) had a total of approximately 240 members and four sections in Bantam. In Rangkasbitung the V.S.T.P. was apparently at the head of the Communist activities, while there was suspicious contact between railroad officials and communist leaders in Tjilegon and Labuan as well. Serang remained the most peaceful region. It was moreover the V.S.T.P. which introduced Communism into Bantam in 1925 at a public meeting in Pandeglang, where Musso and Alimin were speakers.

Even more than elsewhere, is it a feature of this area that associations have always had and still have something questionable about them. Without doubt

*Ed: Hadjat: ceremonial feast. Batjok: fighting, usually with knives.

they may partly be considered as expressions of and thus consequences of unrest and dissatisfaction prevalent there, but they are also to a much greater degree the cause of that unrest rather than the result. It is more evident in Bantam than anywhere else that the effect of these associations is to enlarge the feeling of dissatisfaction which exists among some people on the one hand and to spread that feeling among a much larger number of people on the other.

Influence of Changes on the Various Groups

Economic differentiation between members of the population has not increased in recent years: no proletarian class has arisen alongside or below that of the land-owners; there even seems to have been a leveling of economic contrasts rather than an intensification of them. The position has not changed much for those who rise above the masses on account of social differentiation such as their birth, but where there were changes, they have not been to their advantage.

The group of religious leaders has become larger. The total number of their pupils has increased. It cannot be said that the respect shown to them is now greater than it used to be; the extreme veneration which a number of well-known gurus enjoyed half a century ago is now only accorded to a very few. But their group as such is still greatly respected.

The criminals, the djawaras who dressed as such and appeared quite openly, have almost disappeared. But in spite of this security has decreased; this is asserted repeatedly with reference to the coconut plantations where, it is said, much less used to be stolen. A desa head put it this way: "If you look at clothes, the djawaras have disappeared, but if you could look into men's hearts, you would see that there is a larger number of them than there used to be." The power of these unorganized elements, which relies on fear and terrorization, is at any rate still something out of the ordinary and of particular importance in Bantam.

Traditional desa ties have loosened considerably in the past twenty years. They have been dealt a heavy blow by the consolidation policy. In practice nothing has come of the only advantage offered by a consolidation of desas, viz. that the income of the desa head is enlarged, because the pantjen from the population of the associated desas is not as forthcoming as formerly. The fact that the desa head's influence on the population has, generally speaking, decreased greatly, is moreover not so much the result of each of them now having less influence than they had formerly but of their numbers having decreased so sharply. In the hamlet where the desa head lives everything is just as it used to be. But the critical point is that the head's influence is so slight in the other hamlets. Similar phenomena are to be found outside Bantam also, but the situation is far worse in this region, where the ties between the djaro and the people are loose enough already. It is striking that the kekolots of the hamlets which have been joined together never hold meetings; if the desa head consults them, he does so for each ampian separately. For the rest the position of the djaro in the associated ampians is not to be envied: if he used to have a hold on the people, this has often now been reduced to absolutely nothing; he suffers from a great deal of passive and active opposition on the part of his fellow villagers. Because of this the well-known wakil system with all its resulting evils comes to the fore. For the djaro, incapable of controlling his newly-acquired territory efficiently, shrugs all these new difficulties off his shoulders with a nonchalant gesture and in the newly appended desas privately

appoints wakils,* who thus form another undesirable element within the desa community which is weak enough already. In addition to this the hamlets in this region are smaller than elsewhere in Java and the number of desa officials, which was already less than elsewhere, has been greatly decreased by the consolidation of villages.

Thus the dubious result has been obtained that there are now numerous hamlets with virtually no administrative body. According to confidential statements made by several Native Administration officials there must even be ampians where the desa head just does not dare to show his face.

The standard of desa heads was not improved by all this, that of the assistants remained constant only because it had already reached the lowest level imaginable under the former conditions. As regards the desa religious officials: in various places a larger part of the tithes now bypasses them and goes to the kiais than was formerly the case.

When summing up what has been mentioned concerning the various changes in the differentiation of the population, the general conclusion may be that there is a frequently unconscious, but nevertheless striking group formation among the population, one which is developing quite separately from the traditional desa ties. On the other hand the traditional desa ties, which were already weak enough, have been clearly and consistently further weakened in recent years.

*Ed: Wakil: deputy.

CHAPTER II

THE ADMINISTRATION

Organization

The principal and fatal characteristic of the organization of the administration is that it has always been undergoing changes. And it must be stated first and foremost that these changes bore practically no relation to the changes which were taking place in society.

Boundary Changes

The most important revisions have been those concerning the boundaries of the administrative areas: the separate patih*ship of Tjilegon has disappeared, together with the regency of Menes, and the boundaries of almost all the districts and sub-districts have been changed, while all desa boundaries have suffered the same fate.

Unfortunately the conclusions concerning all this reorganization cannot be called encouraging. The treasury may have saved some money here and there, but the alterations have seldom if ever proved to have been of any advantage to the population or to officials in carrying out their duties. They have even been quite obviously disadvantageous to large sections of the population and to extensive areas far from roads, where there are still no methods of transport other than by foot.

Delegation of Authority

A second alteration which has taken place is the transference of authority from the European to the Native Administration. The effect of this change, which was intended to give the Native Administration more self-confidence and a higher position, has not been entirely favorable. As has been said before the corps of European officials has not decreased in number with the new state of affairs. It has only been changed in character. Practically speaking it amounts to this: Europeans are introduced with more specialized knowledge instead of assistant residents with a general knowledge of their division and complete responsibility. Taxation experts are an example of this, but of even more primary importance is the institution of the constabulary controlled from headquarters. Whereas the old assistant residents talked of and felt for "their division" where they had to keep everything running smoothly, the police officials, no less faithful to duty but more limited in their task and education, have by virtue of their office to concentrate their attention on one particular case or other, or on one place where, it is rumored, "there is something wrong." If one considers the European Administration as a whole, it must be admitted that the administrative reform has made not only the knowledge, development, and task but also the mentality of that body more specialized.

In the enlarged administrative areas the work, particularly the office work, of the Native Administration has increased and so broadened the gap between it

*Ed: Patih: the head of a district which is between a kewedanaan and a regency in rank; the patih is usually an assistant to the bupati (regent) rather than being considered the head of his own area.

and the population. Seen from this angle the administrative reform has only brought about an increase in friction and a severance of contact.

This is not to say that the preservation of the old organization could have prevented all this. But it must be stated as a definite fact that the entire administrative system, in Pandeglang particularly, but not only there, gives the impression of not being a coordinate whole. Independently of each other, a venerable and thoughtful kiai and an eminent European planter interested in these matters have expressed the opinion that everything is disorganized here from the resident down to the desa head. In any case this is thus the impression the administrative system makes on those who have to deal with it.

Transfers

The inability of this system to function efficiently was aggravated even more by the continual transfers which took place particularly among the European officials. Especially in Pandeglang it was repeatedly the case, sometimes year after year, that the controleur was transferred within a year.

Administrative Corps

The European Administration

With some outstanding exceptions, the European administrative officials who serve in Bantam often lack the energy which they display elsewhere.

All the European officials who serve in Bantam know other regions of Java; they automatically compare these with Bantam, and the comparison is mostly to the detriment of Bantam. The people lack the friendliness of the Sundanese, the courtesy of the Javanese, the frankness of the Madurese. In this region everything is overshadowed by religious fanaticism. Distrust of that fanaticism is often stronger than is afterwards deemed necessary, but that does not alter the fact that such distrust exists; the memory of what happened at Tjilegon has not yet entirely disappeared either in the minds of officials or private persons.

The rapid and frequent changes often deprive the administrators of the specialized knowledge so desirable for their understanding of the conditions which are peculiar to this region. The intractability of the population, on whom the administration has less influence than elsewhere, can frequently be sensed; the perintah halus*, which could be applied with success in other parts of Java, is often a failure here. There is something irritating about the people's unwillingness and the impotence of the administration. It is a fact that officials were often handicapped because--for reasons which will be mentioned later--it was more difficult and less pleasant to come into contact with Native officials here than elsewhere. Finally, being appointed to a remote district such as Bantam is often considered as a punishment, both by the Department of the Interior and by the person appointed himself.

All these objections are felt even more strongly because of the growing tendency of Europeans in the Dutch East Indies to prefer living in the cities in as European a manner as possible.

*Ed: Perintah halus: rule by gentle pressure.

In the course of the years all these factors have weighed heavily on the European Administration in this region and have systematically had an unfavorable influence on its energy and on the results to be obtained by devotion to duty. The tragic consequences are being reaped here of the government's disregard, year after year, of the repeatedly-given advice that the standard of the administrative corps should be made as high as possible. Equally tragic are the consequences of the fact that a special policy was never designed for Bantam and that from early times onward the wrong sort of people were frequently selected for the occupation of administrative posts in Bantam.

The administrative reform has not improved these far from ideal conditions. On the contrary, the task of the European Administration became even more ill-defined, and awkward lacunae also made themselves felt. Firstly it became evident that the assistant residents were not informed of what was happening in the field of politics. Otherwise highly-active and attentive officials were not informed of events which occurred in their own areas and which were connected with the rebellious movement. Naturally they knew even less of what was happening elsewhere in the region. From this it may be concluded that the discussions at the monthly meetings held in each regency are not sufficient to give officials--and this applies also to regents--the necessary insight into measures taken in the political field. It has happened in a regency where cooperation between the European and the Native Administration was otherwise completely satisfactory that the Native officials in particular had at first considered arrests made elsewhere in the region as a highly exaggerated measure. Misapprehensions of this nature would have been out of the question if information based on the extensive but conveniently-arranged policy reports had been made available to both administrative corps.

It is not surprising after what has been said above that the administrative reform has not created an ideal situation for the Native Administration either. Here the complaint centers particularly on the increase of office work, as a result of which the other more important side of the job is neglected.

Native Administration

With some outstanding exceptions which may be noted here also, the Native Administration in Bantam has never had a good reputation. Complaints are made about the officials' lack of industry and honesty. One of the most fundamental reasons for this is the extreme difficulty of their position. The heads of the sub-districts are forced to work together with largely unreliable and almost always powerless desa administrators. The assistant wedana himself has to carry out the smallest tasks, which are easily done by the lurah and his staff elsewhere in Java. He has to keep up the administration of his desas as well as he can with the aid of the above-mentioned tjarik onder. He feels, as we have heard it put somewhat cynically, that he is less of a sub-district head above desa heads than of a head mandur above desa mandurs. He lacks the most essential equipment. He can place no confidence in the desa administration and he never sees any results, or at least any permanent results, of his work. It is difficult for him to make contacts with the people--in the eyes of the religious the prijajis are and remain representatives of an infidel government: the question as to whether governmental service is haram* has always been a moot point in Bantam. With regard to the more senior Native officials the situation is not much better, they too realize how powerless they are. The stronger personalities among the regents, patihs, wedanas, and assistant wedanas try to do their duty as well as is possible

*Ed: Haram: forbidden by Muslim religious law.

despite pressures in the other direction; the common run of officials, however, seek the way of least resistance. It is obvious that the chance of corruption is very large among so many disheartened spirits. The unsatisfactoriness of the situation is also proved by the large number of wedanas and assistant wedanas who have been dismissed because of reprehensible actions in the past few years.

Another consequence of all this is the existence of clans which harass and try to run down each other. Jealousy and fear play a large role in the Bantamese prija group. It has been proved more than once (for instance earlier at Tjilegon and now at Labuan) what disastrous results the notorious Bantamese intrigues can have for proper administration. For the very reason that things were not going as desired in Bantam Sundanese officials were transferred there. In itself this is understandable and desirable, even unavoidable, and many of the officials were satisfactory and able to adjust themselves to the conditions, but nevertheless this brought about an increase in the number of antitheses in this region already so full of friction.

Finally the attitude towards the European Administration is not ideal because, as a consequence of the situation, the latter is always more or less distrustful of the Native officials. The well-known fact that there was constant friction between the European Administration and the previous regent of Serang and in the past year between the European Administration and the regent of Pandeglang also has had an unfavorable influence in this connection. For, while the European Administration was of the opinion that administration was worse than elsewhere and it therefore was inclined to exercise closer supervision, the regents were at the same time aiming at emancipation from such supervision.

In this connection the operation and use of constabulary deserves a special mention. When the constabulary was established in Bantam it was more than once used not only to keep a check on desa heads but on Native officials as well and to investigate complaints made against them. Although this was easy to account for and often also produced direct results, indirectly it had undeniably grave disadvantages. For, while the constabulary was intended to support the administration, including the Native Administration, it now assumed quite a different position with respect to the latter. It became a spy and bogey man and automatically so involved in all sorts of administrative affairs that the good Native officials became annoyed and resentful. It thus unintentionally helped to aggravate the relations between the people and the administration. All these circumstances made the position of the Native officials insecure. They feared that hostile colleagues would inform upon them to the resident or the constabulary. There was no longer a local European Administration which at least knew the ins and outs of local needs and intrigues, and the regents were not able to confide in the residents who replaced each other in quick succession. Those who understand all this and have seen the Bantamese assistant wedanas living in crude, rented shacks in out-of-the-way places among an often-unfriendly population are actually only surprised that the situation is not even worse than it is. In other parts of Java it is considered intolerable if desa heads do not hold the reins tightly enough, but here it is constantly felt that for all sorts of reasons--among them unfortunately also financial ones--the prijajis cannot stand up to the most important people or groups in their area.

This facet of the situation is not the fault of the officials either, for the advice given for instance by Snouck Hurgronje in 1893 to establish a reliable corps of officials has not been taken, despite the fact that it has been continually repeated before and since. There has never been sufficient inter-

vention in the secretly-culminating conflict between the European Administration and the former regent of Serang and latterly the regent of Pandeglang, so that this conflict was gradually aggravated instead of being toned down or ended.

The Administration in Operation

How did the above-described administrative system function? In order to obtain a brief but clear picture, it is sufficient to examine three of the system's most important characteristics more closely.

Firstly there is less integrity among both the prija group and desa administrators than elsewhere in Java. The number of prijajis dismissed in disgrace on account of embezzlement is seriously high. There is no point in describing the various sorts of fraud in detail; generally speaking it can be stated that extortion by desa heads--in contrast to that practiced by disloyal prijajis--often takes the form of forcing benefits away from the population.

The second characteristic feature of administration in Bantam has been that while on the one hand the administration has never been able to do as much as really should have been done (a large number of cases never reach the lawcourts), on the other attempts were frequently made to extend activities further than was possible in practice. The system of irregular influence, of more or less stringent perintah halus, successful elsewhere, has ever since early times been a constant source of disappointment in Bantam. The Culture System which radically influenced the whole of society in so many other places was a failure here. Resident Buyn tried to "introduce" communal property around 1850 but abandoned the attempt later. Resident Hardeman--we can of course only give a few examples from the many--tried to introduce a special method of sowing padi (the sebar) around 1900 but also gave up the attempt. Later the introduction of desa lumbungs and desa banks was attempted and ended in dismal failure. A single glance at the figures available concerning desa life shows us that of all the diverse measures which have been introduced elsewhere in Java, not one has been successful in Bantam. The introduction of desa schools, which moreover only met with a very limited success, is to a certain extent an exception, but here too results are behind those of the rest of Java and far behind those of the Priangan.

The third striking feature of the administrative system in operation is that it does not oppress the population. The administration as a whole has not--and this must be emphasized--injured the population in the execution of its duty. The administration as a whole cannot be reproached for having done anything which caused or could cause the population to rise against the government. At first sight this might seem rather strange in connection with the two points first mentioned but on closer investigation of the questions involved it is quite understandable.

It must be considered quite out of the question that the extortion practiced by native heads has caused the population to be discontented with the Dutch authorities. For the population knows quite well that the government does not wish such extortion to occur. This is proved by the repeated mention of the fact in memoranda of officials to their successors, and now also in public recognition of it, that the appointment of European officials is appreciated, especially because it enables the people to bring forward their complaints. As far as is known this is not so pronounced anywhere else in Java; in connection with the religious life of the population and with the fact that contact between the popu-

lation and the infidel officials is more difficult than elsewhere, it is a very remarkable symptom.

The reason that the administration's constant overreaching of itself did not cause any discontent and embitterment is that the population has always retained its freedom and had its own way. Of course the inevitable friction entailed by such overreaching was undesirable, but the lasting harm caused by all this is not that the population feels oppressed by the administration but that it does not feel the presence of the administration enough. The unsuccessful attempts at "improvement" are not disadvantageous to the population but to the position and prestige of the administration.

The conclusion may be that administration and people are here living side by side, but aloof from each other. The bridge between them, which is formed elsewhere by the presence of a desa administration, is absent here. It is this, and not any particular administrative actions, which causes a feeling of uneasiness among the population.

However much it may appear from the above that the administration has not given rise to any general grievances it is obvious both in connection with the character of the people and the economic and social phenomena of recent years that in Bantam also the population--if its opinion is asked--has brought a number of grievances to the fore.

Grievances of a General Nature

These grievances are partly of a general nature. Thus it is often the complaint that times are bad and always that goods are expensive. And then there is of course the complaint about the pressure of taxation. The same phenomena, which were to be seen elsewhere in Java in this respect, are to be found here too, but if anything to a lesser degree. It is not so much the fact that taxes are higher than elsewhere and higher than they used to be (before the boom years), but that for various reasons they are felt more nowadays, particularly--although this may sound paradoxical--among the more well-to-do. Various features of this matter have been described and elucidated in the report made by Meijer Ranneft and Huender on the pressure of taxation. (12) Concerning Bantam it was again pointed out emphatically that what irritates--irritates rather than oppresses--the people there is especially the large variety of taxes. It should, moreover, be stated here that the figures given in the report denote too high a pressure for the desa taxes because in practice the pantjen moneys are irregularly paid or not paid at all in numerous hamlets.

Grievances Concerning Religious Questions

It has often been explicitly asked whether the government and its officials had injured religious feelings in any way. That has been emphatically denied

(12) J. W. Meijer Ranneft and W. Huender, Onderzoek naar den belastingdruk op de Inlandsche bevolking (Investigation into the Pressure of Taxation on the Native Population; Weltevreden, 1926), 24/26 (general), 42 (land tax), 57 (native ground tax), 80 (income tax), 89/90 (tax on houses, property, etc.), 117/118 (local taxes), 145 (desa taxes).

everywhere, and this denial deserves attention considering the fact that other general grievances are always aired so promptly.

Criticism has only been received on three points, but did not come from the population itself. The first concerns the government's interference into the matter of child marriages which often take place in North Bantam in particular. (13)

According to a penghulu*this was considered as unnecessary interference. Secondly it has been heard that people were "ashamed" to have to ask permission to hold the Friday service in newly built mosques. The desa population sometimes has to pay more than is desirable for the advice given by the penghulus in such matters.

The final point is more important; it was stated by some kiais that the posts of penghulu had sometimes been sold or at least that money had been employed in order to obtain those posts. This sometimes brought about the appointment of penghulus who did not have the respect of the kiais and the religious orthodox and thus widened the gap between religion and the government. This is not, it is true, directly related to the contact between the administration and the population, but despite that it remains a matter of importance and concern.

Special Grievances Concerning the Administration

There were naturally also grievances applying to Bantam in particular.

1. The levying of regional or regency council taxes is felt to be offensive and oppressive, but the street tax and the tree-felling tax are the most annoying of all. This growing grievance, which may be heard over the whole of Java, is frequently repeated here.

2. In North Bantam in particular the assessment of income tax seems to have been very strict. The following system was used: a man is alive and therefore he must have an income of ten guilders a month. In this way many people who had previously been exempt from income tax were assessed as having an income of one hundred and twenty guilders a year in the 1925 assessment.

The assessment commissions in both other regencies were less revenue-orientated. The assessment for 1927 has since taken a much milder form.

3. In some of the desas in Labuan complaints have been aired concerning mistakes which are said to have been made when land was classified and surveyed for the recent revision of land taxes. These mistakes may partly be ascribed to the fact that the population was not sufficiently cooperative in the activities which were connected with land taxes, but that does not alter the fact that the mistakes were made.

4. In numerous places the lack of a stipulation exempting the dry grounds from tax, just as the sawahs are exempted if they do not yield anything, is complained about in the desas.

(13) Cf. the detailed survey in Onderzoek naar de mindere welvaart der inlandsche bevolking op Java en Madoera (Investigation into the Diminishing Prosperity of the Native Population on Java and Madura), vol.: Economie van de desa: Samengetrokken verslagen (Desa Economy: Collected Reports; Batavia, eg. Bantam, 17-20.

*Ed: Penghulu: highest official at a mosque.

5. One of the most important grievances is that concerning the distances which must be traveled to reach administrative officials, law courts, and the penghulus, who are consulted in certain disputes which arise frequently between married couples, and in whose presence some special marriage formalities must take place. An increase in the number of administrative officials, desa police, and law courts (particularly the religious council) is requested.

6. Typical of Bantam is a complaint about irrigation. People refuse to put down tertiary pipes and have serious objections to the golongan*arrangements. The administration feels this arrangement to be reasonable and wishes to carry it out. Considered rationally there is indeed little to be said against it, but that the government is bringing about an improvement remains a remarkable fact and one that is difficult for outsiders to comprehend; the result is however, unsatisfactory, due to conditions in Bantam. This only applies to North Bantam.

7. Of course grievances are also heard concerning the combatting of hookworm, which has entailed "inducing" the population to build toilets and drink medicines. The aversion to medicines, which have intentionally been made unpopular by calling them baju serani, is combated with the aid of penghulus and gurus. This grievance also only applies to North Bantam.

8. In North Bantam strong measures were taken where there was disease among cattle, and these were considered to be offensive by the population.

9. A grievance which has apparently been circulated by Communist propaganda is that among officials the non-Natives were always aided before the Natives. It is out of the question that a grievance of this kind could arise spontaneously in Bantam, where priajais have rather too little prestige than too much among some groups of the Native population.

If the whole question is surveyed this list of grievances will be seen to be of little importance. This is emphasized by a memorandum drawn up by the former chairman of the P.K.I. section in Serang, who, when responding to an invitation to list the administrative measures or abuses which had promoted discontent, could not get any further than the enumeration of a few general grievances concerning the increase in taxation and the cost-of-living.

*Ed: Golongan: group; here teamwork.

CHAPTER III

THE REBELLION

Characteristics

To begin with we may note three characteristics of the revolt which broke out in this society, the nature and administration of which has been described above.

I The revolt is closely connected with Communism; it is a result of the all-round Communist attack which has been made in Java. Thus it is in this respect fundamentally different from former risings in Bantam. That does not, however, alter the fact that other factors, such as local character traits and religious hatred, play the same part they did in previous disturbances.

II The important point about these disturbances is to be found not so much in the facts of actual or near revolt in Labuan, Menes, Petir, and Serang (Pantjur), but in the fact that in a far greater number of places a large number of people were prepared to revolt. This is moreover closely connected with what has been said under I; the Communist conspiracy is more important than the acts of rebellion in which it eventuated.

III Everywhere, even in the centers of rebellion, it was only a part of the population which joined in. This feature is also a result of I; it was a rebellion of persons instigated by the Communists and not a rebellion of the people as a whole.

The Rebels

As has been said, the extent of the rebellion coincides with the sphere of Communist influence. Appendix XIV and Maps II and III give some of the main outlines of it.

The police have now stated that there was a total of approximately four thousand party members; this figure is far smaller than the number of people who bought membership cards at one time or other. This difference is easily explained, for a number of those who bought cards did not at the time know anything about a definite rebellion. The Communists had created the first bond between them and the organization and in the vast majority of cases this bond was continually strengthened in the course of time. It is striking that there were in the long run far fewer members in the rebellious areas of Labuan Menes and Petir Tjadasari than in the region of Serang--Taktakan--Gunungsari which did not join in the uprising. The two centers Anjer and Tjilegon Merak are also of importance.

The persons who were ready for action came from all sections of the population; there was in proportion an equal number of those possessing no land, common desa people, desa heads, the more well-to-do, and religious leaders. There was a proportionately large number of hadjis and djawaras. Only a very small number of officials or former officials joined in and there was not one

administrative official or real intellectual among the active rebels. There were, it is true, two members of the regency council of Pandeglang among them and some desa heads. There were various members among the Chinese, but otherwise the latter kept cleverly in the background. There is still little known about the part the Chinese, especially the large numbers of singkeh Chinese, played in Labuan. (Labuan is one of the few Chinese settlements in Java with a majority of singkehs.)

Apparently the Communists are to be found particularly among the youth; they were sought there intentionally: "there were cards for sale for the young people," one of the participants in Menes has said.

Nevertheless there were very many middle-aged and old people among them. Women remained entirely in the background in this religious country. Despite this fact there were some who had bought cards and there was one female promotor.

Relations between the participants concur with the social structure of the society described in Chapter I. This is also proved by the fact that the number of members was increased by persons with a certain influence going over to the movement and bringing with them virtually all those who came under their influence. Nevertheless a group of this sort did not join all at once. The most prominent went over first, often members of one family which little by little joined in its entirety; only after this had happened did the hangers-on follow suit quickly or gradually. Soon after some influential person had been won a large increase in membership would become apparent.

The Causes of Rebelliousness

In analyzing the causes of the rebellion three motives may be distinguished from each other: (a) grievances against the existing order; (b) expectations for the future; (c) the possibility of revolution.

The aggregate impression of the inquiry has been that the main causes of the rebellion were those under (b) and (c). It is certain that neither the economic situation nor the existing religious sentiments alone could have given rise to any serious reasons for unrest. The feelings which were intentionally motivated by a third party, and which otherwise also made the grievances weigh more heavily, are what tipped the balance.

Grievances

Nevertheless it would be incorrect and incomplete if we were not to mention everything which was capable in some way or other of moving things in the direction of discontent. This all follows from the contents of the preceding chapters. In Bantam too there are repercussions of the international events which bring disturbances in their wake everywhere.

Here too just as elsewhere many experience the feeling of dissatisfaction and an undefined discontent which usually accompany what we call "awakening" or "becoming conscious." But this is neither more intense nor more important than the same feelings elsewhere. This and the reasons why the population's economic conditions were not the cause of the rebellion have already been discussed. The

rebellion also broke out in what were economically the most prosperous areas, and many of the rebels could by no means be called poor. Special investigations have been made to discover whether indebtedness could have perhaps been the cause of refractoriness or despair but in this respect also it has appeared that the rebels were not as a rule among the most oppressed: there are fewer credit abuses in Bantam than elsewhere in Java.

Specific grievances which could have been directly the cause of an uprising have already been mentioned. The list is not impressive. Although all these individual observations naturally deserve a greater or lesser degree of attention, if one takes stock of the collected grievances it is quite obvious that they alone cannot have been the cause of the rebellion.

There is not a district in Java and probably not a country in the world where it would not be possible to compile exactly the same sort of lists. There has probably not been one period in Bantam's history when lists of this kind could not have been made, but this fact did not cause an uprising then.

Finally there have also been some personal questions at stake in the disturbances. The man who played an important part behind the scenes at Menes, the dishonorably discharged desa head Entol Enoh, bore a personal grudge against the wedana because, while he had been given the impression that he would not be dismissed, he had been made to collect the back taxes of his desa, which he partly paid from his own pocket, and had then been discharged after all.

Personal grievances also played a part in Mr. Benjamins' murder. It is possible and probable that personal motives drove certain people to assisting in the murders of opases.*

In Labuan the rebels sought--in vain--for the penghulu there, as the Communist leaders saw in him a dangerous enemy on account of his position and his activities directed against them. Various opases were also deliberately sought after in Labuan. An opas usually has enemies. Personal motives of this kind are of course of little importance for the question as a whole.

The Promised Utopia

The Communists showed great skill and keen insight in the way in which they spread expectations of the success of the rebellion and promises of a Utopia. For every group they had ready a separate ideal suited to the group's conditions. This ideal was always called kemerdekaan,* but each group had its own ideas of what that meant.

The more well-to-do were promised a Utopia where they could keep everything they possessed, would not have to pay any taxes, and would even get positions with the new government.

The descendants of the sultan and the other title-bearers were promised the establishment of a new sultanate and "their own sultan"; this state was represented as an Islamic state to the religious orthodox.

The followers of the religious leaders who were preparing for the rebellion were enticed with the prospects of the glories of paradise, the reward which would await them as warriors victorious in Allah's name, or as martyrs who have died for his cause.

*Ed: Opas: watchman, generally also performing janitorial and messenger duties.
Kemerdekaan: freedom.

Where it was of service the common man was given visions of sama rasa sama rata*; but this did not often occur, as it proved sufficient to win the support of eminent citizens. However, everyone was led to expect the blessings of cheap rice or free rice and free transport in cars and trains, etc. But nothing much was said about distribution of property belonging to the wealthy because an attempt was made to get the wealthy to join also.

Side by side with the illusions of fortune for those who would rebel were of course the threats for those who would not. They would not partake in the advantages of Utopia; on the contrary they would be oppressed: their property would be confiscated for the founders of the new community.

The Possibility of Success

Even more important than the notions formed about a Utopia were those concerning the possibility of the success of the rebellion. The crux of the whole problem is that the Bantamese do not like rule, whether it be Dutch or other. And thus the main feature of the Communist action apparently consisted of impressing upon the minds of the population the possibility of rebellion succeeding. To put it even more forcibly, the Communists convinced the people that a rebellion would arise and that the pergerakan* was strong and powerful, irresistible and inevitable.

Thousands of members were prepared, part of the police was on the side of the Communists, together with the majority of "the soldiers of Tjimahi" and "Batavia," likewise various prominent gurus, among them the kiai of Tjaringin. This even made an impression on members of the constabulary. What will you be able to do with sixty men if we turn up with two hundred thousand? The rebels in Menes and Labuan were instructed that after the first rebellious actions "the soldiers of Tjimahi" would arrive and decide what was to be done with the officials who had not yet been murdered.

By intentionally suggesting that the rebellion must succeed the Communists were cleverly taking into account the milieu in which they were working. While the aid of Russia and China was promised elsewhere in Java, here it was the irresistible Mustafa Kemal who would bring real aid in airplanes. The reason why suggestions of the certainty of success are so dubious is that one of the conditions under which the holy war may or even must be started is that there must be a chance of success. Threats were often employed in this usually very vague description of what was going to happen.

Religion

Religion is, generally speaking, of such paramount importance in Bantam that a separate study of its influence on the movement cannot be considered out of place here. The opinion expressed by many, even prior to the uprising, that a mass rebellion--for this is what it became in the Labuan area--would not be possible in Bantam without the religious sentiments of the population becoming involved, has proved to be correct.

Whereas other areas endeavored to liberate themselves of the foreign tyrant in order to attain the promised Utopia, many of the Bantamese wished to free themselves of the infidel tyrant in order to pay greater honor to Islam. Perang sabil* was the means to this end.

*Ed: Sama rasa, sama rata: equality for all. Pergerakan: movement.
Perang sabil: holy war.

The advantages expected in this world were the same in both cases and the propaganda was also mainly aimed at the realization of these advantages.

In troubled times the afore-mentioned dukuns, the possessors of ngelmu, prove to play a not insignificant part. (14) When there is a movement on foot or when there is unrest among the people, they know that they can convince the common man that he can become invulnerable by means of their half religious, half magical practices.

In North Bantam it became apparent shortly after the arrests made in August that several people had fasted rigorously as the last stage of the ritual which had to be followed in order to become invulnerable. This also proved to be the case in Tjidasari, near Pandeglang, while the same thing occurred among members of the rebel groups in Menes and Labuan, as has been learned from the interrogations held after the riots. Members of these groups were even sent to Hadji Dulhadi of Banko by their leaders. The latter received payment for training invulnerable warriors, who proved their ability by dancing on chopping knives while some of them allowed their invulnerability to be put to the test by gun-powder and parangs*-without success, however. All the gurus who taught the doctrine of invulnerability played an important personal part in the rebellion. Hadji Selah of Balagendon (North Bantam), whose father and grandfather were killed in the rebellions against the government in 1888 and 1850, was in his turn killed in Tjaringin.

Although practices like mati geni (the name for this rigorous fasting) are denounced by the law of Islam, they were without doubt carried on with the approval of gurus ngadji Koran and less important kitab guru. Many leaders belonged to these two categories. (15) Communist propagandists won them over to the rebellion, not because Communism was made acceptable to them on the basis of texts from the Koran but because their rebellious spirit and their hostile sentiments made them highly susceptible to this sort of propaganda. Propaganda in the manner of Hadji Misbah and his followers, who were never tired of pointing out the principles of Communism in the text of the Koran, was seldom used in Bantam as far as is known. Nevertheless, well-known propagandists belonging to the guild of religious teachers seem to have made use of some texts such as: "Allah has command over everything in the hills and on earth" (Koran 3: 186) and "they fear the people, just as they fear Allah" (Koran 4: 79). Communism was moreover represented as a stay for Islam and a means of advancing the religion. The idea of rebelling found a response in the fanatical elements among the hadjis and gurus. Wherever they acted as leaders or promoters, they worked on the religious sentiments of the masses, and it is apparent from the final preparations for participants in the attack on Labuan on the November 12th to 13th and the afternoon of the 15th that an attempt was made to influence them in such a way that they went to those plantations on the sabil-illah.* On November 15th the rebels were together at the Bama mosque from eight o'clock in the morning. On account of the large number of participants the sembahjang* was performed in three groups in the afternoon, and after the final ritual ablutions they set out behind the bearer of a white flag embellished by a well-known maxim from the Koran. In the speeches which had previously been delivered it was pointed out that the death of the brothers who had fallen in the rebellion of a few days

(14) See under Social Structure, Religion p. 21 f..

(15) Out of a total number of approximately 340 executive members and propagandists of the P.K.I. in the whole of Bantam more than thirty were gurus and kiais.

*Ed: Parang: cutlass. Sabil illah: holy war. Sembahjang: formal prayers.

before must be revenged, and that the rebels must have faith in Allah and utter their intention to fight for him..

In the attack on the house of the assistant wedana of Petir the dzikr*with which the assailants approached could be heard from afar, and in Menes, where the religious motives were least pronounced of all, they were nevertheless apparent from the inclination--unfortunately shortlived--to spare the overseer Benjamins when the latter said he would embrace Islam, and from the fact that the Javanese stationmaster could save his life by saying the creed.

When religious leaders were won for the Communist action, they proclaimed the perang sabil to their followers. Numerous arguments were, however, presented by reputable gurus, some of whom preserved a more or less neutral attitude towards the movement, regarding what was, in their opinion, an entirely erroneous interpretation of the precepts of the holy war. They all agreed that the conflict could only have been considered as djihad, holy war, if there had been religious oppression. In their opinion, however, the government had in no way obstructed believers in the execution of their religious duties.

No one can tell what their attitude would have been if the rebellion had not been suppressed immediately. It has definitely been established, however, that some very reputable gurus openly warned against taking part in the movement. The rebellion would have doubtless become far more widespread if these influential persons had also displayed their approval of it.

The attitude of the kiai of Tjaringin, Hadji Muchmad Asnawi, has been a matter for much dispute; his son Hadji Emed collaborated in the preparations for the rebellion, while his son-in-law Hadji Achmad Chatib was one of the fiercest and most influential religious leaders who incited rebellion. More than twenty of approximately sixty propagandists in the districts of Menes and Labuan were among his pupils. The fact that both these persons lived in the immediate vicinity of the kiai of Tjaringin, and that the latter never in any way expressed his disapproval of the Communist action openly, has made it suspected that he approved of the movement.

Other reports which strengthened this suspicion brought about his arrest. It is certainly beyond doubt that his name was used to propagate the rebellion. The people took his silence to mean approval. They were convinced that even if he had not been informed of the secret objectives of the rebels, he would know of them by means of the supernatural powers ascribed to him. Nevertheless, in spite of close inquiry it has not been proved that the kiai took part in the conspiracy. In order to judge the kiai's attitude and convictions impartially it is necessary to appreciate his attitude to the outside world and his habits, which differ so greatly from the environment in which he lives.

Propaganda Methods

When the propagandists introduced Communism early in 1925, they made one mistake: they turned against religion. But they understood as early as the end of the same year that it would not work, and seeing that the main objective of Communist action is rebellion, they soon changed their tactics.

When the head of the movement, Puradisastra, temporarily compromised himself by being caught drinking a cup of coffee during the fasting month in 1926 he was

*Ed: Dzikr: chanting of the name of God.

immediately removed from office. This was definitely aimed at obtaining more connections. Pergerakan Komunis lantas merangkas agama, stated one of the leaders. In Menes and Labuan they soon went even further: "Those who do not join are not Moslems." They cleverly adapted themselves to the social structure in other respects as well. It is well-known—Snouck Hurgronje repeatedly points it out in his publications—that the spirit of rebellion can only become dangerous if it is accompanied by organization. The P.K.I. system amounts to a determined attempt to make use of the conditions and groups existing in Bantam which formed as it were a natural organization. The system of the "conscious" superstructure with the five-men or ten-men groups below it was quickly dropped. There were, it is true, propagandists for influencing specific groups of prominent persons. Often, and apparently intentionally, a number of such persons bound together by family ties were won over together. The great difference between the method followed here and elsewhere was that these persons were not made "conscious" members of the P.K.I. but, as has already been said, influenced according to their own needs.

Unlike elsewhere each participant was here called a P.K.I. member; the leaders were sometimes called promotor and also pemimpin; sometimes the P.K.I. titles were dropped altogether. As leaders above, or if one prefers it, alongside the promoters and other local leaders were the more genuine Communist "conscious members" (the most prominent leaders were apparently well acquainted with the term "conscious member," and also used it).

There was little contact with related organizations. The V.S.T.P. had relatively little significance. There was one important duplicate organization which seems particularly to have been intended to have a bogus executive which would intercept action by the police. In Petir there seems to have been an association of hadjis who practiced organized terrorism.

The Bantamese system was profitable to the Communists in that they gained far more members far more quickly than elsewhere, and that those members paid far more for firearms than elsewhere. But it also had the drawback that these irregular auxiliary troops were less controllable and grew impatient, having in mind the promises which had been given them, so that an impulse to begin in November, 1926, does indeed seem to have emanated from Bantam as well.

Here too a distinction can be made between two types of propagandists. One group established relations without these being sought after: they were traders, watch-makers, and warung*keepers. It was disastrous that an agent of the Pandeglang Bank in the sub-district of Pandeglang near Labuan was a propagandist, for only Communists could borrow money. Because of his work the P.K.I. leader Suleiman, who was a cattle mantri*, came into contact with the group of cattle-dealers and butchers, which is rather restless everywhere in Java.

The second group is that of the people who arrived somewhere and then began to make intensive propaganda. The most prominent promoters and sub-section officers were in the majority of cases people who came from another area and married in the desa in question. The Communists know better than anyone else that while a prophet is rarely honored in his own country, a large local reputation is nevertheless a prerequisite for the successful spreading of propaganda. It is striking that a number of the most dangerous leaders in Menes and Labuan, Ahmad Chatib and Hadji Dulhadi Bangko for example, have come from other parts, mostly from North Bantam. It scarcely ever happens that South Bantamese play a part in North Bantam. People were contacted and won over to the cause by means of the above-mentioned unsought-after house-to-house visits, public meetings, and later on,

*Ed: Warung: small cafe, food stall. Cattle mantri: government veterinary officer.

when the time for rebellion approached, especially by secret gatherings. A serious and important point is that these secret gatherings took place in mesdjids and langgars. At first the propagandists held their speeches in the entryways, but gradually they grew bolder and moved inside. Meetings were also held in the forests, something which is rarely done in other parts of Java but which is a tradition in Bantam.

People who bought cards were not immediately troubled with discussions about the revolution. First they were told that the card would exempt them from poll tax, sometimes also from pantjen, and (in North Bantam) they were promised reduced prices in tokos*run by certain Chinese. When a person had been a member for some time the fact was gradually impressed upon him that he was attached to a powerful, awe-inspiring, mysterious, and religious organization which he would soon know more about.

The abolition of poll tax which was being considered by the government was one of the most cleverly exploited pieces of propaganda. It now proves to have been a mistake, unfortunately an inevitable one with our existing legislation, to allow such a long time to elapse between the discussion of this measure and its proclamation. For as it was, the Communists used it as a means of propaganda. On the one hand they represented it as being the first step taken by the Communists to ease the people of their burdens and on the other hand they hoped in this way to give something in exchange for the contributions which had been collected.

It neither seems possible nor necessary to give a complete list of the ways which were continually being sought and all too often found to influence the masses. There was scarcely a method neglected. An example of one of the extremes is the marketing of a large supply of red material for making trousers; a large number of red trousers creates the impression of a large number of members already openly displaying their convictions. Another example in quite a different field is the fact that one of the four persons who seem to have driven round in a car to give the signal for rebellion was dressed in a soldier's uniform. A stratagem of importance which is in yet another field is the previously-mentioned suggestion that the kiai of Tjaringin supported or at least approved of the movement.

Finally what was done to intimidate those who did not want to join in is of lugubrious significance. Of course it used to be completely impossible to obtain keterangan (information) in these cases, and it is still difficult. But it has definitely been established that bekot (boycott) was often made use of. Bekot was still well-known from the time of the Sarekat Islam, and implied the refusal of assistance, the expulsion from the community, and even the threat of maltreatment. It has also been rumored that murders were committed, which rumor is, considering the mentality of the P.K.I. leaders, not at all unlikely. In spite of the apparent invalidity of many statements made by the rebels who have been apprehended, to the effect that they were forced to take up arms, it is obvious that real pressure was exercised even before the actual rebellion and it may moreover be assumed that there was a vague but wide-spread fear of what would happen to those who broke discipline.

*Ed: Toko: small shop.

Influences Against Communism

Non-Communists in the Desa

The attitude of the non-Communists is important in as far as there always appears to have been a fairly sharp distinction between those who had already joined the party and those who had not. It has been said but never confirmed that before the outbreak of the revolution clashes sometimes took place in remote hamlets.

Otherwise the non-Communists exercised little positive influence. It is the common phenomenon of the weakness of a large majority with no particular aim handicapped over against a fanatical minority with an object in view. The obvious weakness and internal dissension of the administration, which was certainly not concealed from the population, will not have been without influence in this matter.

The regent of Pandeglang held speeches against Communism or authorized them to be held everywhere in his regency. However, the influence of these speeches remained far below the regent's expectations.

Apart from a few admirable exceptions the desa heads behaved disgracefully, and showed that they could not be relied upon.

The Sarekat Islam

A somewhat peculiar force against Communism was to be found in the Sarekat Islam in Menes. A year before a violent personal dispute had arisen between members of the Sarekat Islam executive.

In Menes Entol Enoch and a considerable number of members went over to the P.K.I. In Labuan Ahmad Chatib and his followers broke away from the Partai Sarekat Islam because they did not wish to accept the party discipline demanded by it. Thus Sarekat Islam was by no means undividedly a counterbalance; however, the present Partai Sarekat Islam, which is led by Hadji Jasin, Entol Entot (a government school teacher) and the guru Abdulrachman, has apparently played no part in the rebellion. Nevertheless, in spite of the fact that the Partai Sarekat Islam had introduced "discipline," so that no member of the Party could be a member of the P.K.I., there were several members of the Sarekat Islam among the rebels. When arrested they acted as if they were rather surprised at being taken into custody in spite of their being members of the Sarekat Islam. It may nevertheless be assumed that the branch of the Partai Sarekat Islam at Menes did not collaborate in the conspiracy.

Islam

In Bantam the religious leaders' attitude towards the movement is of course of the greatest importance. As has already been mentioned, there were kiais who deliberately turned against Communism. The government is greatly indebted to them. It is now quite obvious that certain kiais (16) (Ru'jani of Kadupinang,

(16) Some noteworthy facts concerning Kadupinang, Baros, and Pasauran are shown in the sketch map in Appendix II.

Muhamad Arif of Pasirkelapa, and some kiais from Baros, among them Mh. Sidik and Arsuddin Muhamad Arif of Serang) were instrumental in making a group of people, sometimes even a whole region, impervious to Communist propaganda. There is a branch of the religious school in Menes in the sub-district of Pasauran (kampung Kepuh). The gurus attached to this school also had a beneficial influence. (17) In their hands Islam became a weapon against Communist influence.

The Attitude of the Central Government

The most important influence against Communism was the attitude of the central government. It is an established fact that the legal measures which could be taken against Communism were deficient. This had on the one hand the immediate result that the Communists were given the opportunity to carry on with their violent propaganda, and on the other that the local administration felt itself to be hindered in the execution of its duties. It is a particularly important fact that the measures by which Communism is now suppressed were only taken and could only be taken after the rebellion. It was only then that the local administration obtained the necessary authority.

The "ban on meetings" was very influential. A difference of opinion may well exist concerning both the efficacy and the necessity of promptly enforcing the "ban on meetings" against activities of a revolutionary nature. As a consequence of the ban, activity is without doubt carried on underground and thus becomes uncontrollable, as was apparent at the outbreak of disturbances. One of the drawbacks of the ban is always that the entire movement goes underground and that it becomes impossible for the police to draw conclusions concerning the further activities of the movement from what happens at public meetings.

There is on the other hand the fact that public meetings lead to public clashes with the police supervising those meetings, and that these clashes can assume such proportions that a continuation of these trials of strength is no longer admissible.

It is furthermore certain that secret meetings, where discussions take place which it is desirable to conceal, will also be held in secret even if no ban on meetings exists. The prime motive for the ban on meetings is moreover that if the ban is absent, the publicity which the meetings will receive and the increasing number of them will lead to the movement prospering--the very thing desired by its leaders.

Seeing that local conditions diverge greatly in the various parts of Java it is difficult to come to any general conclusions.

The pros and cons have also made themselves felt in Bantam. The necessity of the measures taken can be acknowledged without losing sight of the fact that the propaganda which was carried out secretly would never have been perfected to the extent revealed, if the bans imposed had not forced the leaders to make their system completely efficient.

(17) Ibid.

Local Administration

To a certain extent the local administration can be considered as as "underlying cause" of the disturbances. But—and this must be emphasized once more—not because it aroused the resentment of the population or because it was unable to prevent the birth of a conspiracy on such a large scale.

It is only natural, given the defective apparatus of the administration--defective because of the lack of a desa structure, and the small amount of support of the law and the central government—that the situation here should be practically the same as in many other places, but because of some particular local circumstances more vicious in character.

Otherwise in general more was known about the conspiracy—at any rate in North Bantam--than elsewhere in Java. The conditions in the Bantamese prija group and the notorious Bantamese prija intrigues undeniably furthered the creation of a situation in which the rebellion could break out unexpectedly. Thus among other things the friction and misunderstanding which obviously existed in the administration in Pandeglang played its part here. It is a matter for serious consideration that some officials almost certainly knew something of the rebellion and neglected to report the fact and furthermore that some desa heads joined in the rebellion, but that not one of them all was killed or wounded by the rebels.

All these typically Bantamese abuses and errors are, however, undoubtedly of secondary importance. However paradoxical it may sound, they have even been of some use in certain respects, because they brought about the premature outbreak of the rebellion in conflict with the plans of the P.K.I. executive, and because it could thus be more easily suppressed. If the uprising had been prevented in Bantam by certain measures such as the dispatch or retention of troops, a presumably more serious rebellion would certainly have broken out elsewhere. For in the long run the feature of prime importance is not that rebellion broke out in Bantam but that the organization could arise as it did over the whole of Java, and the local administration in Bantam can of course not be held responsible for this fact.

The Impression Made on the Population by the Government's Attitude

Perhaps the most disastrous effect was the fact which has become apparent that the government did not adopt strong enough measures towards Communism before the outbreak of disturbances, as this gave the Communists confidence and made the population think that the end of Dutch authority was approaching. The fact that leaders who repeatedly preached rebellion everywhere remained at liberty made the population lose all faith in the power of that authority.

Finally, as has been said before, it did not remain a secret, or at any rate not to the leaders, how deficiently the machinery of administration was running in Bantam, and this strengthened the belief in the weakness of a regime thought to be nearing its end.

CHAPTER IV

PROPOSED MEASURES

Basis

The basis of all measures taken in Bantam must be a deliberate attempt to impress upon the entire population the fact that the government is powerful, just, and well-informed on all affairs. To accomplish this a strong administrative organization is necessary on the one hand and on the other the formulation of a clear policy, kept as simple as possible, to be followed by this well-organized administration.

Organization

The Principal Fault of the Present Organization

The principal fault of the organization of the administration in Bantam was that there was not nearly enough coordination between the different official bodies. As has previously been explained there are various reasons why such a situation should arise and remain in existence: the character of the people, the religion and many others. The Commission recognizes the diversity of influences which have had an unfavorable effect. But it, nevertheless, believes that of all these influences there is one of pre-eminent importance: the absence of a true desa structure.

In the whole of Java one of the soundest foundations of law and order is the desa. The Commission realizes quite well that things are by no means perfect in the desa and that there is room for improvement. But it is nevertheless of the opinion that even in their present form the influence of the desa and the desa administration on the smooth course of events can not be easily over-estimated. Without this last and indispensable link in the chain of administration the most able European Administration and the best Native Administration possible would in the long run be incapable of working profitably, either here or elsewhere in Java. And it is this very institution which is lacking in Bantam. It is this deplorable void which must be filled if any step taken is to be successful.

If, for instance, we put the hypothetical case that the authorities should wish to solve this problem by taking the step, which is of course useful in itself, of placing the very best European and Native officials in Bantam, then it might be expected that those officials would wish to and begin to carry out all sorts of improvements. However, after a few years they too would have to realize that their work was essentially nothing but the embellishing and patching up of an unstable structure and that there was also no chance of the situation changing. Then after a time the feeling of despondency would inevitably take possession of the Native Administration and that of resentment and distrust take hold of the Europeans as a consequence of their feeling of impotence. Then the administrative abuses now existing in Bantam would slowly but surely return with other less desirable conditions.

The prerequisite for finding a means of improving the organization of Bantamese administration lies in the recognition of the great significance of the absence of a desa structure. For on the one hand a deliberate attempt will have to be made to create this final link between the government and the people and on the other it will have to be understood that because this final link is at present still missing in Bantam, the other links will first have to be made quite different, much stronger and even more costly than those elsewhere in Java.

The Desa

In Bantam it is not a question of an improvement in the desa administration but of a complete reconstruction of it starting at the foundations. We must proceed from the realistic starting-point which has already been clearly indicated by Snouck Hurgronje and others, that there are no real desa administrators in Bantam but, as we stated before, only people living together with no attachment to each other, living not under heads but under mandurs, or overseers of the people who are for the most part of a dubious character.

The first thing required to bring about an improvement in this situation is that these people are replaced by others who enjoy the confidence of both the administration and the population. Once this has been done it will with the help of these new desa administrators be possible to construct proper desas.

Division of desas: The desas must not be too large if the new desa administration is to have close contact with the people. This has been learned by experience in Bantam. The Commission suggests that the number of desas, which has been greatly decreased by the consolidations which have taken place, should be increased again by re-dividing a large number of the desas, e.g. half of them. The Commission is aware of the fact that this measure has all the disadvantages to be expected in the restoration of a situation which was only changed with difficulty in the first place. But it considers that it is more dangerous to allow the present situation to continue and that this is an example of a situation where it is better to stop half-way than to persevere in an error. In order to avoid unnecessary trouble it could be stipulated that the present desa heads remain in office in the reduced desas.

Remuneration of desa heads and desa administrators: Desa heads and desa administrators must be reasonably paid. The problem will be who is to meet these expenses. If the population is to bear them, this can only be put into effect by force, thus by laying yet another burden on the population, which will of course be very unwelcome. The difficulty is that a measure of this kind will lead away from the objective, which is to obtain a strong and popular desa administration, instead of leading towards it.

That this region has rebelled makes it difficult for the government to bear the expenses. It would seem then as if rebellion was to be rewarded. It is a great pity that a decision was not taken immediately after the disturbances to continue levying the poll tax in Bantam for another year and to devote the proceeds to methods of improving desa administration. However, since this was not done it is impossible to do it now, directly after the abolition of poll tax.

On the basis of these considerations the Commission believes that governmental assistance is after all necessary for this particular case. It considers this

to be in agreement with the fact which, as has already been mentioned, was put on record by Snouck Hurgronje, that the desa heads and desa administrators are in reality public servants. Moreover it desires this aid to be considered as given for all time. Sooner or later of course the population will have to contribute a considerable amount itself. However, in order to be able to regulate those contributions sufficiently and with success, it seems desirable that the government should take its share as well. This would facilitate the making of well-considered regulations, firstly for instance a regulation stipulating that the pantjen moneys be efficiently collected with the aid of and under the strict supervision of the Native officials. It is neither necessary nor desirable to convert the pantjen moneys into taxes but if necessary a start could be made with taking legal steps for collections. It is not easy to decide upon the way in which the desa heads should be remunerated. The granting of salaries leads to expenses which cannot be borne by the government. At first glance it seems more reasonable to purchase fields to assign to office holders, which is the method so often applied with success in Native society in order to ensure an annual yield. Unfortunately it is in practice very difficult to purchase good fields near the desa for the use of officials.

In the opinion of the Commission there is at present no way of solving this problem unless the government makes available a large lump sum, in the form, for instance, of a fund to be managed by the resident of Bantam, which can be used, when the opportunity arises, to buy fields for official use and the interest of which can furthermore be devoted to bringing about permanent improvements in the position of desa administrators and their staff. We should like to see three million guilders available for this purpose, this being the result arrived at if one calculates how much money would have to be spent on fields for official use, if they were obtainable. However, even in this way a remuneration for desa heads--very small at first--is acquired.

Election of desa heads: The Commission considers it desirable for Bantam--this also being in agreement with the opinion of the vast majority of the administrative officials--to revise the rules in force for the election of desa heads in such a way that the administration, for example, selects candidates in consultation with the so-called kekolots or desa elders where this is possible and where they exist. The candidates must come from the desa concerned.

This important deviation from the system followed for many years and up until the present day is thought by the Commission to be perfectly justifiable in connection with the conditions which are unique to Bantam. This measure, which is of great practical importance, also coordinates logically with the proposal that the government should make funds available for the payment of desa heads. In this way the government obtains a right to more say in the choice of desa heads, as the level-headed Bantamese population will quite well understand.

The desa elders: The Commission advises strongly against reforming the desa by means of desa councils. When there are not even actually desas in Bantam, it is obvious that a desa council would be such a completely incomprehensible innovation for the population that it would only increase the existing difficulties. It is quite a different matter to take into account the institution of the kekolots which still exists in numerous places. It is advisable to recognize this institution more or less officially by registering the names of the kekolots and, as was previously stated, by allowing the kekolots some influence in the choice of desa heads. However, the administration should definitely avoid interfering in the way in which the kekolots are chosen.

The Native Administration

With regard to the Native Administration the Commission considers the following to be desirable:

Restoration of the regency of Tjaringin: A new regency under good leadership is in itself a strong organization, particularly if the memory of its previous existence is still alive in the minds of the population. The restoration of the old regency of Tjaringin will in itself be conducive to the regaining of prestige of the Native Administration which has suffered in the whole of Bantam and in Menes and Labuan in Particular. The increase in the number of regencies in Bantam is moreover justified, since, because of the closer supervision of Native officials, it will to some extent fill the gap created by the inefficient functioning of the desa administration. Thirdly this measure will promote the development of a desa system.

This restoration of the former situation will without doubt make a deep impression on the population. The local inquiries made by the Commission repeatedly confirmed the views recorded in older memoranda to the effect that the abolition of the former regency had been unpopular and that the restoration of it would be appreciated. The Commission is conscious of the fact that this proposal has its disadvantages, arising from the administrative organization which has come into operation for West Java and the changes in local regional boundaries which preceded it. Neither does the Commission underestimate the difficulties attached to the establishment of a regency council and all that is attendant on it. However, it considers the advantages attached to the establishment of the regency of Tjaringin to be greater than the disadvantages, and is of the opinion that alteration is imperative in all reforms of this kind, which are after all designed to be beneficial to the population, as soon as it is demanded in practice as is the case here. The regency of Tjaringin will have to comprise the districts of Labuan, Menes, and Tjibaliung. The regency of Pandeglang would only retain the district of Pandeglang and would have to be extended with the district of Tjomas and the sub-districts of Petir and Tjikeusal of Pamarajan district.

However, if the government considers that it is undesirable to establish the regency of Tjaringin in connection with the necessary modifications in boundaries and the fresh alterations it would entail, then it would nevertheless be very desirable, according to the widespread opinion of officials interviewed on the subject, to select Menes as the seat of the regent instead of Pandeglang. Pandeglang is in the northeast corner of the regency and thus not easy to reach from the west.

More officials: The Commission proposes an increase in the number of sub-districts with approximately one to every three. The larger number of Native officials which this measure, together with the measure proposed below, entails would make up for the comparative inactivity of the desa head and the absence of a desa administration. If this proposal is accepted the wedanas in all district headquarters would be supported by an assistant wedana. Although this means that the wedana has less direct contact with the population in a part of his area, that disadvantage is more than counterbalanced by the advantage of better supervision of desa affairs in the sub-district concerned. A separate assistant wedana naturally has more time available for this.

Choice of officials: A systematic change is desirable in the present policy of appointing officials. Firstly it is recommended that three wedanas and thirty assistant wedanas from Priangan and from regions such as Krawang and Cheribon where Javanese is spoken be temporarily appointed in Bantam for a period of not longer than five years. In exchange twenty Bantamese prijajis, for example, should then be temporarily appointed in Priangan.

When a Native official is promoted in Priangan, then he should be transferred to Bantam. If there is no vacancy in Bantam, one should be made by transferring a Bantamese official to another place in the province, with the retention of his rank. This course of action should be maintained until there are three Priangan wedanas and twenty-seven Priangan or Krawang assistant wedanas working in Bantam. If those thirty Priangan prijajis serve for four or five years in Bantam they will be able to create order where there is none, being in possession of a more highly developed sense of organization. Their attitude to Bantamese affairs is an unbiased one and their numbers make it possible for them to support each other.

On the other hand the horizons of the Bantamese who are transferred elsewhere will be broadened. They will see a more organized administration and participate in the well-organized desa system, and must inevitably make comparisons between the djaro in Bantam and the lurah in Priangan or Krawang. When they return to Bantam after a few years they can apply the experience gained elsewhere in their own region.

Although transfers from other areas to Bantam are already taking place, as has been stated by the resident for Bantam, the Commission feels it is necessary to emphasize the desirability of this once more, because it considers the systematic exchange of officials to be of the greatest importance.

The Commission is of the opinion that it must advise against the permanent appointment of prijajis from outside Bantam. It considers that if the principle that a region should be governed by officials belonging to its own population is to be upheld anywhere, it should be upheld in Bantam. However, the Commission feels it its duty to point out once more that care should be taken not to allow family relationships between officials to become too close.

Training of more Bantamese for administrative service: These young people ought to be chosen from Bantamese prijaji families; it would be extremely desirable if members of the families of penghulus and kiais could also be encouraged to enter the administrative service.

Up to the present the number of young people who have been admitted to the Opleidingsschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren (Training School for Native Administration Officials, O.S.V.I.A.) in Serang has been kept far too small. The Commission considers this to be a definite mistake; it is of the opinion that it is not possible to overemphasize the great importance of training a sufficient number of prospective Native Administration officials. The factors which may be considered of prime importance in this matter have been clearly brought to the notice of the government by the authorities concerned. (18)

(18) The Commission is in complete agreement with the letter from the assistant director of the O.S.V.I.A. in Serang, dated February 11, 1925, No. 26, which is supported by the letter from the Native Schools Commission, February 20, 1925, No. 14/I.S. (included as Appendices XV and XVI).

More housing for assistant wedanas: This is an urgent necessity, but the method followed will have to differ from those previously employed in Java. In a few years time, in the Commission's opinion, good, well-fenced-off houses ought to have been constructed in well-chosen places throughout the region.

The European Administration

The field of activity for assistant residents: The most striking phenomenon concerning the European Administration is that the new system does not make the most satisfactory use possible of the presence of the assistant residents.

The ideal relationship in the new system seems to be that the assistant resident plays the part of the regent's younger brother, just as he used to play the part of the regent's elder brother in the old system. In this position he will no longer be able to order but only to advise. In order to be able to do this as it should be done he will have to try to acquire a thorough knowledge of conditions in his area and for this he will have to be able to rely on the unconditional aid of the Native officials. By visiting the desa and constantly acquainting himself with matters which are of importance to the desa he will induce the wedanas and the assistant wedanas to pay more attention to their areas, which procedure must be of benefit to the administration as a whole.

Together with knowledge of the desa the assistant resident will have to have a clear insight into the intentions and local operation of the central administration. Knowledge of the way in which the police force is organized is an implicit part of this.

Once these conditions have been fulfilled, once the assistant resident is well-informed on the subject of the Native society on the one hand, and equipped with insight into the aims of the local head of administration on the other, a natural basis will have been formed for the correct division of work between European and Native Administration. The European officials will automatically become the advisers of the Native officials. In any case their advice is more likely to be accepted than that of members of the police force, who are not welcomed by the Native Administration as a source of advice and information, however meritorious their work may be in other respects.

The Commission hopes and even expects that a suitable arrangement on the basis set out here will be found for Bantam as well. But it must admit that the situation was still unsatisfactory at the time of the investigation and that the administrative reforms have increased feelings of uneasiness, dissatisfaction and antagonism among members of the administration. And the Commission feels that it must emphasize once more the fact that if a solution to the question of the new division of authority which is satisfactory to both the European and the Native Administration is not found it will not be possible to obtain a system of administration which is reliable in all respects.

More European officials: Even if the regency of Tjaringin is not re-established the Commission considers it desirable to appoint either a second European official in the regency of Pandeglang with the title of assistant resident or an administrative official to be attached to the assistant resident of Pandeglang and located in Menes. The same move is advised with respect to Tjilegon. At the talks held in Tjaringin the population emphatically declared that it would appreciate it if a European official was stationed close at hand. It apparently

desires the presence of someone who is entirely unprejudiced in the investigation into complaints. This discovery is of importance considering that various other suggestions made at these talks were often quite clearly dismissed.

Choice of officials: Furthermore, the Commission thinks it must once again point out how imperative it is, in the new circumstances in particular, that care should be taken in the choice of officials for Bantam, below the rank of resident as well.

Resident's office: The Commission considers it vital that the resident's office be well staffed. There must always be an experienced secretary who can settle current business, so that the resident can devote all his powers to carrying out the heavy task of straightening out affairs which have been neglected for so long in this region.

The Police and Army

Constabulary: The establishment of a detachment of constabulary in Menes is an urgent necessity. As matters now stand, the distance between Pandeglang and Labuan (twenty-five miles) makes it impossible to cover Labuan, not to mention Tjibaliung, from the base in Pendeglang.

The detachment at Menes ought to number at least fifty men. A patrol to the outlying district of Tjibaliung will always have to go out for a few days, while the coastal fishing village of Labuan, which is progressing well, may not be left without constabulary for long periods on end. Too much economy should not be practiced in the purchase of fast means of transport for the constabulary. The use of Ford trucks is highly advisable; in urgent cases they allow a rapid concentration of a large number of constabulary in a particular place. The detachment can also be easily transported by truck when long journeys have to be made, and then the demand can be made that the men patrol on foot to the left and right of a given place, particularly and preferably along all sorts of small roads through kampungs and along the lonely forest tracks, because it is along these little-used roads that the riff-raff tends to move.

As the situation is at present the constabulary patrols too much along the large roads on horseback or by bicycle and not enough on foot through the desas.

In the presence of a well-functioning and sufficiently strong regional criminal investigation department the constabulary should be chiefly restricted to the task of preventing crime and be transferred to repressive activities only when it receives orders from the administration or a request from the regional criminal investigation department, apart from cases where wrongdoers are caught red-handed. The actual detective work and gathering and utilizing reliable information should remain chiefly in the hands of the regional criminal investigation department and the administrative police. We recognize the great merits of the constabulary in this field and the successes they have scored, but we are nevertheless of the opinion that the frequent use of agents of the constabulary for criminal investigation has in the long run an undermining influence on discipline. Detective work is a profession for which much aptitude and training is necessary and to which one's entire attention must be devoted. However meritorious it may be, dillettantism in this subject can, along side of any success it might have, give rise to less desirable situations.

Regional criminal investigation department: (19) The establishment of an efficient regional criminal investigation department is perhaps more necessary than anything else for the time being. The character of the man who is to be appointed head of such a department is of great importance. In our opinion he must be someone with a good education who has won his spurs in police work. He must not only conform to the requirements of ability and integrity but must have, moreover, an unbiased and clear understanding of Bantamese conditions, and first and foremost have the subtle gift of being able to obtain the willing cooperation of all sections of the population and all branches of the administration in the region. He must feel himself united with the police and constabulary and he must fully realize that this is the only way he can carry out his task successfully. The best person for the position will presumably be a well-respected patih or wedana who is not too old and who has a liking for police work. He will also have to have sufficient staff at his command.

The chief of the regional criminal investigation department must come under the direct authority of the resident and be on an equal footing with the chief of the constabulary. The latter will need all his powers to keep up the standard of the constabulary in the five detachments and thus should not be troubled by the actual detective work.

In the use of these forces, the police, the constabulary, and the regional criminal investigation department care should be taken to see that they are never played off against each other.

It is only in this way that mutual understanding between the administration, constabulary, regional criminal investigation department and the people can be created and prosper.

Police: It is only possible to bring about an effective improvement in the police (police officers working with Native Administrative officials) if there is a more careful selection of recruits, a thorough training at the police school, a service contract, and concentration in barracks. If the latter is impossible it should be replaced by yearly refresher courses in the barracks of the constabulary. Seeing that this plan will have to remain wishful thinking for the

- (19) We suggest that the staff of the regional criminal investigation department in Bantam should be as follows:
- a) An official e.g. patih or wedana with known abilities in the field as head.
 - b) Four assistant wedanas, three of them each having a division to superintend, while the fourth assistant wedana is specially charged with the task of checking smuggling in opium and clandestine fire-arms. The latter ought to be stationed in Labuan and pay particular attention to what is happening in Labuan and Pulomerak.
 - c) Ten police mantris. The chief of the regional criminal investigation department and each of the assistant wedanas should have two mantris at their command.
 - d) Twenty detectives. The chief of the regional criminal investigation department and each assistant wedana should have four detectives at their command.

The headquarters of the chief of the regional criminal investigation department must be at Serang, that of the four assistant wedanas at Serang, Pandeglang, Rangkasbitung, and Labuan respectively.

The chief of the regional criminal investigation department should have an official car at his disposal and each of the assistant wedanas of the department should be allocated a motorcycle.

time being on account of its financial consequences, we should like to recommend as an emergency or transitional measure an arrangement, (20) whereby the police are systematically attached to the constabulary for a time.

(20) In Bantam an arrangement of this kind, could be carried out in the following way for example.

-In Bantam there are three hundred policemen; four of them from each division, chosen each time from the same district, could be attached to the constabulary based at the divisional headquarters for a period of two weeks; thus there are always, $3 \times 4 = 12$ policemen from the entire region attached to the constabulary. During this period these policemen participate in all the duties of the constabulary. Thus they obtain some idea of drill, the use of arms, and shooting, learn to pay attention to appearances, equipment, and abode, and gain an elementary knowledge of police activities and the range of police authority. They become somewhat cognizant of the most important articles of the penal code and of the contents of the most prominent ordinances of the central government and the provincial and regency authorities. After a fortnight they are relieved by twelve policemen from other districts.

After $300 : 12 = 25 \times 2$ weeks = 50 weeks the first group of twelve men returns to the barracks for a refresher course for another two-week period, etc.

After the policemen have undergone three two-week training periods with the constabulary, refresher courses of one week instead of two will be sufficient on subsequent occasions.

In this way, however deficient such emergency training may be, the standard of the police will rise appreciably in the course of a few years.

It goes without saying that the wedana who has to do without four of his men for a fortnight must receive the support of a number of constabulary men, who must patrol the district regularly.

This measure will of course also cost money. In the first place twelve bicycles would have to be purchased so that the policemen could participate in the cycle-patrols. That is therefore an immediate expenditure of 12×100 guilders = 1,200 guilders for the three barracks of the constabulary.

During their period of service with the constabulary the policemen would each be allowed to claim 50 cents a day; for twelve men this is twelve times 50 cents, or 6 guilders a day or 365×6 guilders = 2,190 guilders a year.

One guilder per bicycle per month can be estimated for the maintenance of the bicycles or twelve guilders per bicycle per year, which works out at 12×12 guilders = 144 guilders per year.

Thus this means that there is an immediate expenditure of 1,200 guilders for the region of Bantam and an annual expenditure of 2,190 guilders plus 144 guilders = 2,334 guilders.

It should be impressed upon the Native officials that policemen who are trained in this way should only be used for duty. Each wedana and assistant wedana should be granted an opas who can deliver letters and do other errands.

The army: With respect to the army, the Commission is happy to agree with the opinion which is, as far as is known, generally recognized, that a sufficiently large number of troops must be stationed in the region of Bantam. The Commission leaves the question as to where these troops must be stationed to the authorities concerned.

Policy

The basis of the policy advisable for Bantam will have to be that of making it clear to the population that the government is strong and desires to be of benefit to them.

Policy of the Central Government

Preventive action: The government's strength will in the first place have to be apparent from measures which are taken by the central authorities. If it is evident anywhere, then it is evident in Bantam that a change in policy is necessary, so that the administration will no longer just wait and see if there is going to be a rebellion somewhere, as it has done up until now, but actively oppose the tendencies towards rebellious action.

Action during and after disturbances: The Commission considers that it must add to this that it is not only the governmental policy pursued in the prevention of disturbances which needs to be changed radically, but also the policy pursued when measures are taken during and after disturbances.

In the Commission's opinion, it is a serious omission that there is no central office which has, in cases such as this, experienced detectives available and can give advice concerning the apprehension and pursuit of persons and investigation into the situation. We by no means wish to reproach the local administration and the local police in this matter--the Commission here gladly acknowledges the fact that the administration and police in Bantam have, under the guidance of the resident, carried out a difficult task in a spirited way--but it is a fault in the organization. In various matters the P.K.I. was better equipped than the government. Another serious matter is that law suits have to take so long. It is in principle a good thing that members of the judiciary should be selected to prosecute and judge mass cases of this kind. The only question is that this was all done on much too small a scale. The Commission does not dare to venture an opinion as to whether an alteration of the law is necessary in order to expedite trials, but it does not seem out of the question.

Finally it is disastrous that all the prisoners have to be imprisoned together in large rooms, as this greatly hampers investigation and it is only natural that it will not be as successful as it would otherwise have been. If in November work had been started on building separate cells--employing the Engineers Corps if necessary--the investigations would now have been much easier. Generally speaking it narrows down to this: the government should be prepared, in the event of a recurrence of outbreaks such as these, a recurrence which is doubtless possible and probable, to guarantee a much more efficient and rapid settlement of affairs.

The Commission has gone into this matter somewhat thoroughly because it is of the opinion that one of the most important underlying causes of the rebellion

is the dwindling respect for the government. It therefore seems reasonable to recommend any measure which, in its opinion, will strengthen the impression of the government's authority.

Local Policy

As regards local policy it is advisable to pursue a line of conduct in which on the one hand the execution of all regulations which must really be carried out is vigorously enforced, but in which on the other hand the number of these regulations is deliberately reduced to a minimum and in which continual care is first and foremost devoted to the delicate question of religion.

The relationship to the kiais: As far as the latter is concerned a few words must be devoted to the relationships between the Native Administration and the kiais. This question must be approached with great care. On the one hand there is the danger of the priajis paying too much honor to the kiais, on the other the danger of an undesirable alienation between the kiais and priajis.

Generally speaking the penghulus are the officials who are most suitable for the maintenance of contact with the Moslem scholars. The administration also relies on them for information concerning the nature of the religious instruction given by those teachers. In times of unrest among the population the administration will always have to take into account the great influence of these scholars. Not only must an attempt be made to check the influence of possible propagandists, but first and foremost the gurus of repute must be induced to express their opinions openly to the population. They must learn to understand that silence may well be interpreted to their disadvantage.

As few measures as possible: Apart from the legal regulations, which should be restricted as far as possible, the population must be allowed the greatest possible freedom. There should be no measures such as perintah halus, "persuasion," "tactful action," or "inducement," the use of which it does not comprehend. This does not mean that there should be no attempt to make the population understand eventually the use of certain measures by means of patient discussion and explanation. However, a formal, superficial discussion, in which the objections raised by the population are not taken into account, must not be considered as being sufficient. And when the population really objects it should be left in peace when there are no legal coercive measures.

A policy of this kind will demand, particularly of a number of European Administration officials accustomed to Javanese conditions, a change in mentality. They will have to accustom themselves to accepting the fact that the population sometimes does not wish to cultivate its land properly and keep its plantations tidy.

Measures such as were taken to combat hookworm seem to be ineffective and undesirable in a region such as this. Where irrigation is concerned measures will have to be taken which have the approval of the population, even if they may seem incorrect from the economic or "irrigation" point of view.

The policy recommended with respect to the desa is in complete agreement with this. It is a well-known fact that the population of Bantam pays less tax than is paid elsewhere in the Dutch East Indies and is moreover more unwilling to

contribute anything to furthering common interests or even the interests of the desa. But it seems undesirable at the moment to impose desa taxes on the people in opposition to their wishes, e.g. in the form of lévies for fields for officials or labor for tertiary irrigation canals.

The first thing necessary in Bantam is that the population becomes accustomed to carrying out orders given. Therefore as few orders as possible must be given. This should be constantly pointed out to the regency councils: their tendency to levy taxes should always be severely restricted by means of annulment of regency decrees.

Special Measures

The Commission considers it advisable to suggest only a small number of other special measures.

Measures concerning non-religious matters: The Land Rent Service is advised to consider the possibility of permitting the exemption of dry lands in particular cases. It is to be desired that the Land Rent Service assumes the supervision of the exemption itself. The Commission gladly supports the proposal as submitted by the resident for Bantam concerning this matter.

Although this does not lie within the Commission's field of inquiry and although there has been no Communist activity in the region concerned, the Commission should, in its opinion, not refrain from drawing attention to the fact--acquired from a reliable source--that at least as far as South Pandeglang there is widespread dissatisfaction with the huma regulation which restricts the rights of the population to dispose over forest areas. This restriction is reported to be considered oppressive on account of the lack of sufficient areas suitable for dry rice cultivation or for sawahs.

The Commission feels it to be its duty to draw the government's attention to this matter in particular, in order that the administration may institute a further investigation of the matter.

Measures concerning religion: 1. Child marriages: With respect to child marriages the measures taken in the three regencies of the residency of Bantam are not quite identical. However, they mainly amount to the fact that in the first place the couple to be married must appear before the penghulu or assistant wedana in order that an inquiry may be made into their ages, in particular that of the bride, and that secondly sometime after the marriage the assistant wedana investigates at the home of the bride's parents whether she is living with her husband or not, in cases where the wife is still too young.

Child marriages occur most frequently among the agricultural population. The vast majority of these are cases of kawin gantung,* as is apparent from periodic reports. Then husband and wife only start living together after a number of years.

Although in connection with the liberty allowed to marriageable girls, who are not kept at home here as they are elsewhere, one cannot speak of objections of a religious nature to the bride's appearance before the penghulu or Native Administration official, the interview can give rise to dissatisfaction. However, objections were reported to have been made exclusively because of the expenses incurred when the bride has to be taken to an official living some distance away.

*Ed: Kawin gantung: marriage contracted between young children, cohabitation not taking place until a later age.

The Commission is of the opinion that it is desirable that this stipulation be withdrawn if this appears possible in other places as well from reports received at a later date concerning the extent of the evil of child marriages. Thus the inquiry into the question of whether the young people are living together or not should be carried out as unobtrusively as possible. The danger of marrying off young girls too early should continue to be pointed out on suitable occasions.

2. Religious teachers: With respect to the supervision of the religious instruction given by the kiais, all unnecessary opposition to these teachers should be avoided. However, this may not degenerate into a complete negligence of the supervision prescribed in the guru ordinance. Apart from a few exceptions the existing regulations have not been enforced properly during the past three years. In a region like Bantam this is, however, undeniably necessary in more than one respect. The excellent means given by these regulations to further the nature of the instruction and its influence need not be mentioned here in detail. (21) After the introduction of the guru ordinance of 1925 the number of gurus including the gurus ngadji Koran has, in the regencies of Serang, Pandeglang, and Lebak, increased by more than 270, almost 40, and approximately 20 respectively. In the regency of Serang there are now 225, and in each of the other two regencies 70 kitab and tarekat gurus, over whom some supervision is necessary. In order to make this supervision, which can scarcely be carried out successfully by Native Administration officials, effective, suitable penghulus must be appointed.

It seems desirable to the Commission that a plan should be made as soon as possible for a systematic investigation into the matter. The penghulus concerned would have to receive a monthly allowance to cover the cost of the journeys to be made, as they can hardly be expected to do so at their own expense.

3. Marriages and divorces: From various quarters objections have been raised concerning the fact that in those cases where the mediation of the authorities is necessary for the celebration of a marriage, the parties are obliged to go to the residence of the penghulu of the regency who fulfills that function on behalf of the regent.

Islamic law allows the so-called wali hakim* who performs this function to appoint a substitute for each individual case. These problems are solved if the parties in question inform the district penghulu of the required mediation of the government-appointed wali whereupon the district penghulu requests the regency penghulu to entitle him to celebrate the marriage. Then the parties in question need not go any further than the district seat.

An objection of this kind arises in cases in which a decision on a divorce by pasah* has to be asked of the religious council.

This objection can be removed when the proposed conversion of the jurisdiction by the religious council, presided over by the penghulu district court, into the penghulu jurisdiction is carried out. However, the penghulu, as sole judge assisted by an assessor to be appointed for the principal towns of the district, can regularly preside over sessions in those places as well.

The Commission is, therefore, of the opinion that it must urge as immediate an introduction of this jurisdiction as possible. Together with many other advantages this also entails the improvement of the very important position of

*Ed: Wali hakim: person authorized to perform marriages, etc.; roughly, a justice of the peace. Pasah: mendakwa paseah, any divorce which may be asked for by the wife.

penghulu, as judge of differences which must be decided upon according to local religious law. There is no need to enter further into the question of how significant it is for Bantam that the importance of this office become apparent to the outside world by means of the considerable improvement of position proposed in the above-mentioned regulation.

4. Institution of Friday services: In order to avoid abuses in the investigation into the admissibility of a Friday service, the penghulu who is commissioned to study the local situation should be allowed to claim traveling expenses incurred in the course of his duty. This will obviate complaints concerning the extravagant expenditures of the penghulus appointed having to be reimbursed by the population.

The institution of Friday services often leads to violent dissension among the population. Therefore, supervision of this institution by the regents seems indispensable for the time being. Governmental decisions in differences of this kind, however unavoidable they sometimes are, are seldom satisfactory. They are continually being brought up for discussion again. It is advisable for parties to appoint by mutual deliberation a scholarly arbiter from a neighboring district who is unprejudiced and who enjoys the confidence of both parties. In this way, without excluding governmental leadership, an attempt can be made to have the population settle such often-profound differences themselves.

CONCLUSION

In agreement with what has been mentioned above in outlining the basis for a new policy all these measures, generally speaking, arise from the principle that the population must first and foremost become accustomed to obeying and respecting the government, while the government on its part must constantly take into account the peculiarities of the population, which are not always agreeable. It is only in this way that law and order can become a possibility. The Commission realizes that the expense entailed by the proposed measures will be considerable, even very high. But it is convinced--and it believes itself to be supported in this by the opinion of all local administrative officials--that the high expenditure is justified. For not only the peaceful development of extensive regions which have been rather neglected by the authorities in the past is at stake but--and experience has unfortunately shown that this is no idle talk--also the lives of government officials.

Finally the Commission wishes to state emphatically that it is well aware that, however efficient all the proposed measures may be in themselves, however well the administrative system and organization visualized may function--quite apart from the fact that there will never be sufficient means or sufficiently trained persons available--the root of the evil will not be eradicated. A people such as the Bantamese, and the same applies to the population of many other parts of the Dutch East Indies, will always be greatly susceptible to propaganda which tempts them with the prospect of liberation from foreign rule. Therefore certainly no less important than the measures necessary locally to render the population less receptive to the activities of propagandists, which come from outside in the first instance, is the attempt to deprive such activities of their strength. Hence this must not only be effected by imbuing the object of these activities, the population, with more resistance to their influence, but also by attempting to guide the activities of their leaders into other channels.

The course of events has clearly indicated that the leaders of the movement could organize themselves in spite of police, administration, and the criminal investigation department with the regulations which are at the disposal of these bodies, and that they could embrace thousands in the organization designed by them. The intellectuals who did not join that organization did not turn against it either.

This time it was so-called Communists, another time it will be extreme nationalists or others who attempt the same thing. The urge for freedom which stirs the best among these people--inferior elements need not be considered here--is not to be checked by any contrived system of preventive or repressive measures, but perhaps the excesses to which it gives rise in these regions may be prevented by always and unreservedly granting the population a voice in administrative affairs corresponding to its own development. As the population's share in the settlement of its own interests becomes larger, counter-forces may be developed which will turn against any organizations which jeopardize authority. At the moment, no substantial measures can be indicated for Bantam as to a solution of this extremely difficult problem. Nevertheless it is certain that attention must, in the future, remain focused on what may be achieved in this direction. It is also certain that in Bantam's case compulsion alone can never solve the problem.

In this report the considerations and conclusions are laid down to which the three members of the Commission have come after a partially joint but chiefly individual inquiry and after mutual discussions. The Commission visited almost the whole of the area which had been in rebellion, but particularly the districts of Pandeglang, Menes, and Labuan (Tjaringin) as well as Serang. They have not only tried to obtain the views of active or retired officials but also to learn the opinions of the Native inhabitants of the region. To this end they have interviewed people from the desas in many places.


As complete unanimity was achieved concerning the fundamental items directly connected with the assignment, there was no reason for any of the members of the Commission to submit a minority report.

Finally the Commission wishes to thank all those within and without Bantam who have, at its request, given their very willing assistance.

The Commission of Inquiry,



E. Gobée, Sumitro, Ranneft.

APPENDIX I


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The figures indicate the dates of rebellions in the various places in the nineteenth century.


APPENDIX II

**Legend**

= Large number of members of the P.K.I. in relation to the size of the population.




= Moderately large number of members of the P.K.I. in relation to the size of the population.



= Small number of members of the P.K.I. in relation to the size of the population.

White = Free of Communists.

APPENDIX III



LegendPlaces with members of the P.K.I.

0 - 100 = ●

100 - 300 = ○

300 upwards = ⊙

Promoters10 - 20 = 20 - 50 = 50 upwards = Sub-section P.K.I. = XArmed resistance = Boundaries and other indications

Residency of division boundary = + + + + +

Regency boundary = - - - - -

District boundary = - - - - -

Sub-district boundary =

Highways = —————

Railroads = ————

Place namesRegency of Serang

1. Bodjanegara
2. Pulomerak
3. Tjilegon
4. Kramatwatu
5. Kasemen
6. Pontong
7. Tanara
8. Anjer
9. Mantjak
10. Blagendong
11. Taktakan
12. Serang
13. Tjiruas
14. Tjarenang
15. Gunungsari
16. Walantaka
17. Padarintjang
18. Tjiomas
19. Baros
20. Petir
21. Tjikeusal


Regency of Pandeglang

22. Tjadasari
23. Mandalawangi
24. Tjening
25. Labuan
26. Pagelaran
27. Menes
28. Tjiandur
29. Batubantar
30. Pandeglang

Regency of Lebak

31. Warunggunung
32. Rangkastitung

APPENDIX IV

Legend

The figures at the various places indicate the maximum numbers of members of the Sarekat Islam between the years 1918-1927.

APPENDIX V

Criminality 1926

Crimes

Regency	Number of crimes recorded											
	Petty thefts Article 364 Penal Code		Major thefts with aggra- vating cir- cumstances Articles 363, 365, etc. Penal Code		Manhandling				Sedition, insulting authorities etc., politi- cal offenses		Other crimes	
					Slight		Grave					
	Total	Number cleared up	Total	Number cleared up	Total	Number cleared up	Total	Number cleared up	Total	Number cleared up	Total	Number cleared up
Serang	469	429	466	227	258	245	92	86	37	37	422	394
Pandeglang	199	178	110	61	96	90	27	24	148	148	43	43
Rangkasbitung	236	174	86	52	127	122	22	20	5	5	26	19
	904	771	662	340	481	457	141	130	190	190	491	456

APPENDIX VI

Criminality 1926

Misdemeanors

Regency	Number of misdemeanors committed									
	Violation of the ban on meetings		Violation of the <u>guru</u> ordinance		Slander		Clandestine exploitation of land		Other misdemeanors	
	Total	Number cleared up	Total	Number cleared up	Total	Number cleared up	Total	Number cleared up	Total	Number cleared up
Serang	100	91	-	-	22	22	21	21	1197	1115
Pandeglang	13	13	-	-	17	16	32	32	147	147
Rangkasbitung	4	4	-	-	6	6	101	101	509	478
	117	108	-	-	45	44	154	154	1858	1740

APPENDIX VII AND FOUR TABLES

Proceeds (in florin) from the Various Taxes and Levies Paid by

Government Tax (Tax Assessment Direction)	1913	1914	1915	1916
Poll tax	125,869	308,167	311,941	313,601
Land tax	806,985	739,570	710,668	770,116
Fishpond tax	3,465	3,512	3,641	1,897
Huma rent	16,276	19,406	24,130	23,509
Native ground tax	-	-	-	-
Trade tax	39,273	39,451	39,540	38,447
Income tax	-	-	-	-
Surtax on Income tax	-	-	-	-
Tax on houses, property, etc.	-	-	-	-
European ground tax	4,041	4,041	4,041	4,041
Total	995,909	1,114,147	1,093,961	1,151,611
<u>Indirect taxes paid</u>				
Slaughter tax	49,118	38,850	37,853	51,918
Import duty	215,300	193,525	198,875	227,400
Export duty	2,107	1,427	2,303	3,062
Excises	104,720	132,600	145,320	143,900
Stamp duty	378	338	238	312
Public auction dues	1,638	1,800	2,094	2,244
Total	409,261	368,540	386,683	428,836
<u>Local taxes paid</u>				
Regional tax	95	-	-	-
Municipal tax	-	-	-	-
Principalities irrigation district tax	-	-	-	-
Total	95	-	-	-
<u>Monopoly taxes paid</u>				
Salt	210,337	192,192	213,706	175,097
Pawnshops	12,000	20,000	25,000	27,000
Salt duty <u>Grobogan</u>	-	-	-	-
Total	222,337	212,192	238,706	202,097
<u>Levies paid</u>				
Education	7,488	-	-	-
Regional levies	14,675	-	-	-
Municipal levies	-	-	-	-
Principalities levies	-	-	-	-
Principalities school fees	-	-	-	-
Total	22,163	-	-	-
Grand total	1,649,765	1,694,879	1,719,350	1,782,544

the Native Population of Bantam between the Years 1913-1924

1917	1918	1919	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924
317,005	317,811	315,657	313,992	361,624	371,210	417,479	426,074
754,442	749,209	717,632	724,579	807,117	837,959	919,440	945,256
3,792	3,912	3,894	3,613	3,972	4,249	12,566	3,032
14,256	15,871	15,731	18,079	17,130	17,302	20,964	19,253
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	6,832
37,682	39,666	45,382	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	89,129	36,197	70,063	64,135	60,909
-	-	-	-	-	8,470	7,192	6,395
-	-	-	4,472	1,833	2,516	5,021	6,135
4,041	361	361	361	361	361	400	400
1,131,218	1,126,830	1,098,657	1,154,225	1,228,254	1,311,430	1,447,197	1,474,286
58,950	43,644	60,440	63,351	39,328	69,874	80,714	71,101
221,650	242,225	284,325	613,300	621,450	541,700	520,075	542,625
2,741	1,682	5,845	5,572	11,569	14,692	17,245	20,680
146,340	131,780	142,060	172,340	225,880	303,960	295,520	265,280
332	312	364	446	518	736	696	662
2,266	2,600	2,788	2,876	3,386	4,134	4,058	4,238
432,279	422,243	495,822	859,885	902,131	935,096	918,308	904,586
-	170	-	-	-	16,471	17,159	22,822
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	170	-	-	-	16,471	17,159	22,822
189,696	187,283	166,877	153,604	149,177	151,352	145,557	149,941
24,000	30,000	32,000	60,000	13,000	24,000	37,000	59,000
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
213,696	217,283	198,877	213,604	162,177	175,352	182,557	208,941
-	-	-	15,000	17,296	25,877	28,538	61,961
-	18,329	-	-	-	25,676	54,835	54,835
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
-	18,329	-	15,000	17,296	51,553	83,373	97,805
1,777,193	1,784,885	1,793,356	2,242,714	2,309,858	2,489,902	2,648,594	2,708,440

Table 1

Trade Tax -- Natives

Number Assessed:

Region	a. below f120	b. f120-f600	c. f600-f1000	d. f1000 upwards
1912				
Bantam	8,887	6,432	72	8
The whole of Java	770,802	193,827	2,033	986
1913				
Bantam	12,355	4,312	72	19
The whole of Java	818,891	188,584	2,582	1,006
1914				
Bantam	13,250	4,439	68	10
The whole of Java	836,531	196,874	2,768	1,036
1915				
Bantam	14,321	3,879	49	12
The whole of Java	861,422	205,220	2,710	1,042
1916				
Bantam	14,160	3,694	48	16
The whole of Java	889,432	216,426	3,203	1,264
1917				
Bantam	12,593	3,691	65	9
The whole of Java	915,447	226,923	3,640	1,468

1918				
Bantam	13,871	3,973	69	17
The whole of Java	904,513	224,022	3,748	2,151

1919				
Bantam	13,481	4,318	67	17
The whole of Java	836,472	217,975	4,128	1,886

1920				
Bantam	-	20,772	706	648
The whole of Java	-	708,454	28,039	16,979

1921				
Bantam	-	9,079	261	234
The whole of Java	-	806,672	36,952	22,371

1922				
Bantam	-	15,002	548	462
The whole of Java	-	870,337	41,525	27,486

1923				
Bantam	-	14,804	494	497
The whole of Java	-	913,272	52,479	23,039

1924				
Bantam	-	14,743	614	338
The whole of Java	-	983,145	32,282	17,939

1925				
Bantam	-	29,172	684	393

1926				
Bantam	-	27,359	824	373

Table 2

Taxes

Condensation of information gathered by means of sampling
Source: administrative reports
I. Regional income-groups and percentage of tax paid by
inhabitants of country areas

Bantam							Total %	
	Number of cases investigated	Income per head in guilders	Taxes on income in guilders in percentages				Bantam	Java
			Govern- mental	Local	<u>Desa</u>	<u>Djakat</u> or <u>Pitrah</u>		
A. Government officials.....	6	166.17	3.7	1.2	-	0.4	5.3	3.1
B. <u>Desa</u> heads and members of <u>desa</u> administration.....	3	87.41	2.87	0.3	0.3	1.7	5.1	6.9
C. Religious officials and religious teachers.....	5	27.04	4.3	-	0.3	3.4	8.-	4.3
D. Full time workers in enter- prises, factories or employed by Europeans and Chinese.....	2	29.93	1.3	-	2.4	0.9	4.6	3.5
E. <u>Sawah</u> or <u>tegal</u> owners who are wealthy (<u>kaja</u>).....	3	119.77	10.3	-	0.4	2.0	12.7	12.1
F. <u>Sawah</u> or <u>tegal</u> owners with a reasonable income (<u>sedang</u>).....	7	77.34	5.8	-	0.3	2.6	8.7	10.8
G. <u>Sawah</u> or <u>tegal</u> owners who are poor (<u>miskin</u> , <u>melarat</u>).....	12	51.11	8.9	0.9	1.0	2.4	13.2	10.5
H. Sharecroppers, not owning land....	5	18.88	3.5	-	1.4	4.4	9.3	4.1
I. Agricultural workers employed exclusively in Native agriculture.	4	19.50	3.1	-	1.6	2.9	7.6	2.7
J. Whole-sale merchants or owners of a Native industry with employees (<u>batik</u> industries, cassava factor- ies), owners of fishing proas.....	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
K. <u>Tukangs</u> , retailers etc. with self-supporting industries.....	6	46.74	2.7	0.2	0.7	0.7	4.3	4.2
L. Coolies employed casually.....	8	28.64	2.8	-	1.5	0.9	5.2	2.4

Table 3

Pressure of Taxation per Capita in Guilders

Source: see note 11.

b. Changes since 1913

Region	1913	1920	1921	1922	1923	1924	Difference between 1913 and 1924
Bantam	1.85	0.93	1.18	1.52	1.72	1.69	---

Table 4

Taxes in guilders

Tax imposed by local council	1913		1914	
	Total revenue collected	Of which estimated to have been paid by natives	Total revenue collected	Of which estimated to have been paid by natives
1. Fire-work tax	-	-	-	-
2. Entertainment tax	-	-	-	-
3. Surtax on govern- mental tax on the sum total of the:				
a. house and property tax	3,279	{ - 95*	3,241	-
b. ground tax			6,198	170*
c. governmental income tax	-	-	-	-
4/5. Tax on using roads with vehicles	-	-	-	-
6. Street tax	-	-	-	-
7. Road tax	-	-	-	-
8. Tax on unbuilt-on premises or insufficiently built- on premises	-	-	-	-
9. Municipal income tax	-	-	-	-
10. Lighting tax	-	-	-	-
11. Tax on alcoholic beverages	-	-	-	-
12. Dog tax	-	-	-	-
Total	3,279	95	9,439	170
Total arrears	60	-	4,205	20

* Rough estimate

1922		1923		1924	
Total revenue collected	Of which estimated to have been paid by natives	Total revenue collected	Of which estimated to have been paid by natives	Total revenue collected	Of which estimated to have been paid by natives
-	-	400	-	200	-
7,832	5,220*	6,721	4,480*	4,584	3,056*
6,056	1,000*	5,438	1,000*	7,099	2,000*
40,055	200*	22,524	200*	11,382	200*
-	-	4,888	1,500*	11,881	3,000*
11,039	9,226	14,822	8,797	15,753	10,457
-	-	5,140	995	11,839	4,107
17,151	825	11,375	182	17,997	-
-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-
-	-	-	-	-	-
851	-	1,179	-	1,328	-
-	-	200	5	355	2
82,984	16,471	72,687	17,159	82,418	22,822
19,460	8,694	22,446	9,325	22,017	10,467

APPENDIX VIII

Region	Relationship of <u>desa</u> heads to former <u>desa</u> heads		
	son	other relation	no relation
Priangan.....	160 12%	382 30%	708 58%
Kedu.....	518 40%	330 26%	428 34%
Semarang.....	235 22%	324 30%	512 48%
Madiun.....	229 19%	309 27%	613 54%
Pasuruan.....	138 14%	260 27%	584 59%
Bantan.....	41 7%	97 18%	411 75%

APPENDIX IX

Regency	Number of <u>desa</u> heads with a term of office of				Number of members of <u>desa</u> administration with a term of office of				Number of <u>desa</u> heads dismissed in the last three years			Number of <u>desa</u> heads related to former <u>desa</u> heads		
	Less than 5 years	5 - 10 years	10 - 20 years	20 years upwards	Less than 5 years	5 - 10 years	10 - 20 years	20 years upwards	Honorable discharge	Dishonorably on account of		Son	Other relation	No relation
										Tax-ation fraud	Other rea-sons			
Serang	205	39	28	10	1386	82	50	13	128	23	58	16	50	216
Pandeglang	79	22	27	9	729	38	21	10	36	5	16	23	32	82
Rangkasbitung	83	29	12	6	617	41	44	19	22	1	14	2	15	113
Total	367	90	67	25	2732	161	115	42	186	29	88	41	97	411

APPENDIX X

Religion

Regency	Year	Total number of religious edifices extant at the end of the year					
		Balai	Pesantren	Mesjid	houses of		
					Guru kitab	Guru ngadji	Guru tarekat
Pandeglang.....	1917	696	118	91	37	136	5
	1918	609	121	103	28	143	5
	1919	621	121	120	27	150	4
	1920	639	121	124	28	156	5
	1921	648	126	153	29	158	5
	1922	867	187	209	54	198	5
	1923	744	148	192	60	168	5
	1924	745	149	195	61	168	5
	1925	758	160	204	65	194	4
	1926	773	174	206	68	200	4
Rangkasbitung..	1917	122	58	99	38	62	-
	1918	122	59	99	42	64	-
	1919	125	61	99	46	68	-
	1920	139	65	101	47	84	-
	1921	137	70	102	51	97	-
	1922	279	78	116	62	113	-
	1923	303	100	122	62	138	-
	1924	309	123	124	58	162	-
	1925	329	112	131	71	161	-
	1926	351	110	129	71	172	-
Serang.....	1917	2384	145	404	74	230	7
	1918	2394	152	404	107	333	6
	1919	2409	167	406	122	405	11
	1920	2666	181	461	121	458	13
	1921	2877	187	490	123	494	13
	1922	3005	212	504	126	516	13
	1923	3055	212	511	145	517	12
	1924	2997	226	532	146	568	12
	1925	3073	240	546	180	597	16
	1926	3288	244	559	204	775	21

APPENDIX XI

The number of persons who went on pilgrimage was: (North Bantam)

1913	744
1920	19
1921	368
1922	838
1923	668
1924	953
1925	---
1926	507

APPENDIX XII

The Number of Hadjis

Regency	District	Number of <u>hadjis</u>	
		Total	Of which the following were <u>desa</u> heads
Serang	Serang	1567	5
	Tjiruas	861	8
	Pontang	694	3
	Pamarajan	722	3
	Tjilegon	1316	7
Lebak	Anjer	730	4
	Tjiomas	876	4
	Total	6766	34
	Rangkasbitung	488	2
	Lebak	271	1
Pandeglang	Parungkudjang	214	—
	Tjilangkahan	229	1
	Total	1202	4
	Pandeglang	1073	3
	Menes	505	3
Serang	Tjaringin	820	2
	Tjibaliung	63	—
	Total	2491	8
	Grand total		
	Serang	6766	34
Lebak		1202	4
Pandeglang		2491	8
Total		10459	46

APPENDIX XIII

I Number of Desa Heads Discharged

II Number of Officials Discharged

During the year	Discharged honorably				Discharged dishonorably							Details
	On request	Illness	Unfitness	Consolidation of <u>desas</u>	Reprehensible actions	Misconduct	Untrustworthiness	Theft	Embezzlement	Serious neglect of duty	Other reasons	
1917	I 60 II 3	16	10	6	7	-	6	4	-	13	2	From 1918 through 1920 no figures were received concerning <u>desa</u> heads dismissed. x. 5 of which went to Mecca a. 3 of which on account of long service
1918	I II 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1919	I II 3	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	
1920	I II 2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1921	I 85 II 2	10	12	6	5	-	13	-	-	1	3	
1922	I 98 x II 4 a	-	12	247	15	-	10	-	1	17	-	
1923	I 48 II 4	-	10	364	10	-	2	-	-	22	-	
1924	I 38 II 2	-	10	72	12	-	5	-	-	10	-	
1925	I 48 II	-	16	-	30	2	-	-	-	21	-	
1926	I 44 II	-	20	-	20	-	5	-	1	7	2	
			1	-	1	-	-	-	1	-	1	

APPENDIX XIV and Table

Executive Members and Promotors of the P.K.I. (Report by the Wedana of Police)

Section	Sub-section	Number					
		Dictator		Chairman		Vice-Chairman	
		<u>Non-hadji</u>	<u>Hadji</u>	<u>Non-hadji</u>	<u>Hadji</u>	<u>Non-hadji</u>	<u>Hadji</u>
Bantam	-	1	-	1	-	-	1
	Serang	-	-	1	-	-	-
	Tjiomas	-	-	1b	-	-	-
	Tjilegon	-	-	-	1	-	-
	Kramatwatu	-	-	-	1	-	-
	Anjer	-	-	1	-	-	-
	Petir	-	-	1	-	-	-
	Tanara	-	-	-	1	-	-
	Rangkasbitung	-	-	1	-	-	-
	Pandeglang	-	-	1	-	-	-
	Labuhan	-	-	1d	-	-	-
Total		1	-	8	3	-	1

Number								Details
Secretary		Treasurer		Commissioner		Promotor		
<u>Non-hadji</u>	<u>Hadji</u>	<u>Non-hadji</u>	<u>Hadji</u>	<u>Non-hadji</u>	<u>Hadji</u>	<u>Non-hadji</u>	<u>Hadji</u>	
1	-	-	1	3	-	-	-	a. among which one Chinese
1	-	1	-	1	-	38a	12	
-	-	-	-	-	2	18	2	b. also Secretary of Serang
-	-	-	-	1	1	4	3	
-	-	-	-	1	-	6	7	c. among which two Chinese
-	-	-	-	3	-	14	3	
1	-	-	-	-	1	26	29	d. and e. both also Commissioner for Bantam
-	-	-	-	1	1	2	1	
-	-	-	-	2	-	4c	-	
1	-	-	-	-	2	21	14	
1e	-	-	-	-	3	36	59	
5	-	1	1	12	10	169	130	

Table

District	Number of P.K.I. leaders	Dealers in					Profession or trade						Others
		<u>Kain</u>	Tobacco	Fish	Cattle	Sundries	Tailor	Barber	Driver	Cart-driver	<u>Tukang</u>	Smith	
Serang	68	-	4	3	1	8	3	2	-	1	1	4a	2b
Tjiruas	16	1	1	-	-	3	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pontang	6	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pamarajan	33	-	1	1	-	12	-	-	-	-	-	-	1
Tjilegon	12	-	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Anjer	16	-	1	-	-	1	1	-	1	-	-	-	-
Tjiomas	30	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Pandeglang	32	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	-
Menes	26	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Tjaringin	87	-	-	-	-	1	2	-	-	1	3	-	2
Rangkasbitung	5	1	-	-	-	2	-	-	-	-	1	-	1
Total	331	2	7	4	1	29	9	2	1	2	6	4	6

Keepers of		No regular profession or trade	No profession or trade at all	Government employees			Religious teachers in		Farmers	Independent occupations	Coolies	Details
<u>Tokos</u>	<u>Warungs</u>			<u>Officials</u>	<u>Clerks</u>	<u>Desa administration</u>	<u>Ngadji</u>	<u>Kitab</u>				
-	-	1	3	-	1	1	2	-	27	1	2	a. goldsmith
-	-	1	4	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	b. among which
-	-	-	1	-	-	-	-	-	5	-	-	one <u>dukun</u>
-	-	5	1	-	-	-	5	-	6	-	-	
-	1	-	-	-	-	-	1	-	5	-	-	
-	-	-	3	-	-	1	-	-	8	-	-	
-	-	-	3	-	-	-	2	-	25	-	-	
-	-	-	7	-	-	-	1	-	22	-	-	
-	-	-	1	-	-	1	-	1	23	-	-	
1	1	1	4	-	-	2	10	1	58	-	-	
-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
1	2	8	27	-	1	5	21	2	184	1	2	

APPENDIX XV

CopyNo. 26

Serang
February 11, 1925

(Via the Commission for
Native schools at Serang
and the Inspector of
Native Education in the
second division at Bandung.)

Re: Admission of a Full First Class

I beg to state that I have been informed that the very limited number of pupils to be admitted to the O.S.V.I.A. at Serang in 1924 was not intended for the course 1924/25 alone, but that the same will hold for future years as well.

In this connection I have requested the residents of Bantam and Batavia to inform me of the number of officials which they consider to be necessary every year in order to fill the vacancies. The resident of Bantam responded that at least five were necessary, preferably six. The resident of Batavia failed to respond even after a second request, but, as the residency of Batavia is divided into twenty-three districts as opposed to fifteen in Bantam the number required may be estimated at 23/15 x 5 or 6 or at least eight, preferably nine.

In view of there being five classes in the school, these figures approximately agree with the maximum number admitted: 37 for Bantam, 38 for Batavia; which number it would be advisable to change into five classes x 10/6 x 5 or 6, or fifty for Bantam and five classes x 10/6 x 8 or 9, or seventy-five, owing to the fact that only circa 60% of the pupils admitted finishing their studies.

As the O.X.V.I.A. at Serang is now only training an extremely small number of pupils (six) for the Outer Territories and will in future be training none at all, as will be known to you from the Staatsblad No. 20 of this year, the figures would not exceed the capacity of the school.

The situation is at present:

Present:

Number of pupils to be admitted for:	1st class (temporarily at Bandung)	2nd class	3rd class	4th class	5th class	Total
Bantam 37	4	14	4	6	6	34
Batavia 38	2	5	4	7	2	20

This number is of course reduced by those who are expelled from the school on account of failing twice (lack of aptitude), and those who leave, ashamed of not having passed.

On searching for motives which led to the decision of 1924 to admit the limited number of three pupils for Bantam and four for Batavia, it became apparent to me that the Director of the Interior at the time calculated as follows:

The annual appointment of a supplementary number of qualified candidate Native Administration officials (G.A.I.B.'s) ought to keep pace with the number of appointments to the position of wedana; this in connection with the desirability of filling all wedana posts with qualified men. This is per annum approximately a seventh of the number of district heads; thus the supplementation will have to be:

for Bantam $1/7 \times 15$ or circa 3 G.A.I.B.'s

for Batavia $1/7 \times 23$ or circa 4 G.A.I.B.'s

which means that either three or four pupils ought to be admitted.

It seems to me, however, that in determining these numbers, practical factors have not been taken into account. The points mentioned below are in my opinion clearly indicative of this.

- (1) Of the pupils originally admitted an average of approximately 60% finish their studies.
- (2) Those qualified are of course at the time of their appointment to the position of G.A.I.B. only theoretically suitable to act as Administrative officials; it is only then that their practical training for occupying higher positions in the Native Administration begins. See clause 11 of the regulations for appointments published in Bijblad 8167.
- (3) In the course of time by no means all of those mentioned under section 2 prove to be suitable for the office of wedana.
- (4) Between the admission and graduation of pupils there is a period of at least five years; between the appointment to G.A.I.B. and promotion to wedana at least twelve years (clause 12, regulations for appointments). Taking into account the above-mentioned motives such as expulsion on account of lack of aptitude etc. and also factors like death, misconduct, and unfitness for promotion, it is, in my opinion, self-evident that a group of between three and four can never remain intact over a period of at least seventeen years.

The following figures taken from the register referred to in clause 11 (sub 2) of the regulation for appointments, seem to me to confirm this entirely:

1920 one graduate, unfit for promotion to wedana and now posted outside Bantam at a lower rank.

1921 one graduate who after a very precarious career finally became junior clerk in the residency office and was honorably discharged at his own request in June of this year.

1922 one graduate, ~~pren~~naturally deceased.

1923 nil.

1924 three graduates, one of which was soon discharged and is now being prosecuted; the second will have to be passed over as he is unfit for promotion, and the third appointed wedana.

For 1925 two graduates, one of which was honorably discharged from government service in 1924 because of unfitness, so that only one remains.

For 1926 two graduates, one of which has since died.

For 1927 two graduates.

For 1928 three graduates, the eldest of which was discharged in 1924 and is now being prosecuted.

For 1929 four graduates, one of which will probably never be fit for promotion to wedana on account of his health; it remains to be seen whether, in the course of the four years to come, the remaining three will prove fit to occupy the position of district head. The same question may, moreover, be asked with slight variation concerning the three preceding years.

One reason why some graduates do not continue in government service is the compulsory medical examination which was first introduced in 1924. If as a result of rejection one or more of them is not appointed G.A.I.B., this is of course detrimental to the region concerned as it does not receive its due.

Nor does the basis of the calculations seem to me to be quite correct:

The number of young men to be admitted to an officers' training course is not dependent on the number of generals to be retired. The fact seems to have been lost sight of that the lower ranks must also be filled by fresh graduates from the O.S.V.I.A.s, for it is prescribed in Bijblad 8167 that the graduates of an O.S.V.I.A. should take precedence over all other candidates for the positions of police mantri and assistant wedana; here there is as a result of the numbers a sufficient supply.

It seems to me to be more advisable to determine the number of graduates needed yearly according to the number needed in practice, and to have a wider selection of candidates for the position of wedana. This seems to have been the guiding thought in determining the maximum number of pupils to be admitted: 37 and 38, (1) and also in establishing the O.S.V.I.A. at Serang which would otherwise have been quite unnecessary since the equivalent institution in Bandung could easily have accepted the five classes.

I hope that I have clearly indicated that it is necessary to raise the numbers at the O.S.V.I.A. at Serang to their former strength, or even to increase the latter, and therefore beg to request of you that you initiate a policy according to which classes will be accepted on the following principle:

1/5 x 37 pupils for Bantam

total 16

1/5 x 38 pupils for Batavia

or increase the strength and accept annually a class of

1/5 x 50 pupils for Bantam

total 16

1/5 x 75 pupils for Batavia

With a view to the peace of mind of Bantamese parents, who are already discussing their sons' futures and who may destine them to enter other institutions against their will, (2) which might even make it impossible to fill the new class, and also taking into account the ordering of books and school requisites in time for the next year, I beg to request you urgently that you make a decision in the matter under consideration as soon as possible.

Assistant Director of the O.S.V.I.A.
at Serang.

(Signed) De Goede.

For true copy:
Division Secretary,
(Signed)

To the Director of Education
and Religion at Weltevreden.

- (1) Determined by your decree of September 13, 1910, No. 16550 and as far as is known to me still in force. I desire to draw your particular attention to this.
- (2) In 1924 there were as many as thirteen candidates from Bantam alone for the entrance examination. A number which--as has become apparent to me in various ways--would have definitely been larger, but for the unfounded rumors which were spread concerning the proposed closing of this O.S.V.I.A., because of which many did not enter their children and heard to their regret when it was too late that they had been led astray.

APPENDIX XVI

Copy

No. 14/I.S.

Serang, February 20, 1925

Enclosures: 1.

Subject: Admission to the First
Class of the O.S.V.I.A.,
Serang.

To the Director of Education
and Religion at Weltevreden
(via the Inspector of Native
Education in the second
division at Bandung.

For the following reasons our Commission agrees entirely with the contents of the enclosed letter from the director of the O.S.V.I.A. at Serang.

In the letter from the Director of the Interior, dated July 12 of last year, No. D 20/2/3 addressed to the resident of Bantam, the desirability was stated of appointing qualified officials to the position of wedana. This, however, is impossible if there is in the lower ranks an insufficient number of candidates for this position or none at all; the statement made by the director of the O.S.V.I.A. in this respect is quite correct. It is, furthermore, of importance to the administrative service that it should have at all times and in all ranks well-trained staff at its disposal; this is doubly important on account of the severer demands which can now justifiably be made as a consequence of the change in circumstances. If the cases of honorable discharge because of unfitness which have frequently occurred in the last few years, together with discharge because of fraud etc. or on account of a completed term of service are taken into account, then the necessity for a regular replacement with graduates of the O.S.V.I.A. becomes perfectly clear and also that it can by no means be considered a luxury to have a wide choice for the position of wedana--as it stated by the head of this institution. This leads to the appointment of the best type of man to the higher positions, while the standard of the lower ranks is automatically raised, because they will be filled with good staff. It goes without saying that the Administrative service can only be benefited by this.

For these reasons our Commission cannot but grant its whole-hearted support of the proposals made by the director of the O.S.V.I.A. in the conclusion of his communication.

On behalf of the Commission for Native
Schools:
Chairman, (signed) J.C. Bedding
Secretary, (signed) H.A. Lincklaen Westenbergh

For true copy:
The Division Secretary,
(signed)

PART III

De Gang Der Communistische Beweging Ter Sumatra's Westkust, Deel 1 (Politiek gedeelte) Rapport van de Commissie Van Onderzoek ingesteld bij het Gouvernements besluit van 13 Februari 1927 No. 1a (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1928).

[The course of the Communist Movement on the West Coast of Sumatra, Part I (Political Section), Report of the Investigation Committee appointed under the Governmental Decree of February 13, 1927, No. 1a (Weltevreden: State Printing House, 1928).]

TRANSLATOR'S NOTE

In this translation, Indonesian personal and geographic names have been rendered in their current, Indonesian spelling, rather than in the Dutch spelling used in the original. The only exception to this rule concerns names of publications and of pre-War organizations cited in the text, which are reproduced in their original spelling.

The original Report contains several, frequently rather extensive, extracts in foreign (i.e., other than Dutch or Indonesian) languages. In particular, most Comintern publications and works by leading Communist writers, as well as those of some other authors, are in the text cited in German; some few references also occur in French. In consultation with the editors of this Translation Series, no endeavor has been made to search English translations of such documents or books for authentic and official English versions. While it would doubtless have been preferable to substitute quotations from, and references to, existing English translations, the work involved would have been excessively time-consuming and, at best, incomplete, since several of the works used in the Report are not readily accessible. Foreign language passages are, then, translated from the original versions cited in the Report; for the same reason, page references in footnotes have on the whole been taken over verbatim. Only where a note refers to a book in general, rather than to specific passages in it, has the translator quoted the titles of English translations, wherever they were known to him. Deviating from the versions used in the Report, however, all Russian names are rendered in their usual English spellings.

The present translation is complete with the exception of three charts, two of which reproduce the structure of the local Communist Party organizations on the West Coast of Sumatra, the other showing a ground plan of the village of Silungkang, center of the Communist insurrection of January, 1927.

Brackets in this translation denote additions, usually of an explanatory nature, inserted by the translator. Parentheses are either taken over from the original text or are used for Dutch and/or Indonesian terms used in the original; they are usually preceded by English equivalents of such terms.

Harry J. Benda

CHAPTER I
THE COURSE OF THE COMMUNIST MOVEMENT
ON THE WEST COAST OF SUMATRA

Communist Activities in the Years 1923 through 1925

Baars on Communism and Nationalism

Writing in Het Vrije Woord, at that time organ of the P.K.I. [Communist Party of Indonesia], on November 20, 1920 (Vol. VI, No. 3, p. 22), after the trial of Sosrokardono, A. Baars took the opportunity of expressing "frankly and straightforwardly, the P.K.I.'s attitude vis-a-vis the affair of the so-called Afdeeling B [Section B] of the Sarikat Islam in the Preanger districts. The Party, it should be added, was then on the point of approving by formal vote its adhesion to the Communist International, proposed by the Party Executive, at an extraordinary party congress (Christmas 1920). In this article, Baars wrote as follows: "Yes, it is we international Communists who alone have the right to condemn the actions of the C.S.I. [Central Sarikat Islam, the national Sarikat Islam organization]. It is only our Party, none of the existing organizations, not even the Government. They, all of them, are flirting with nationalism, and although they may at this moment hypocritically declare that they do not approve of the kind of nationalism of Afdeeling-B, they are still only reaping the harvest which they themselves have helped to sow.... This has been another striking illustration of the fact that nationalism is decidedly no "Eastern" product, but, on the contrary, that it displays the same barbaric features here as it does with the Celtic Irish or the Slavic Poles, or wherever else, for that matter. It is a purely negative ideology, and is more securely anchored in hatred of other races and groups than in love for one's own race.... Nationalism is the ideology of 'unity of the [East] Indians', and we have always declared that the contradictions within native society are far too great and crass for any such unity.... That accursed, nonsensical, and narrow-minded nationalism, that speculation on men's basest animal instincts, retards the masses and bars the road to their feeling of social solidarity, which must be the basis for each movement for the advancement of the suppressed. The Affair B has proved us correct, and with ever-increasing vehemence shall we therefore fight all those people whom we shall call would-be-murderers, however sweetly and innocently they may present their own brand of nationalism."

As was mentioned above, this article appeared at the time when an extraordinary party congress was about to be called in order to decide on adhesion to the Third International. By way of introduction to that congress, the Party Executive (under the chairmanship of Semaun) apparently found it most advisable to reprint, in the same issue of Het Vrije Woord, the theses on the national and colonial questions which had just been adopted by the Second Congress of the Communist International at Moscow. (1)

(1) See Statuten und Leitsätze der III. Kommunistischen Internationale, beschlossen auf dem II. Kongress vom 17. Juli bis 7. August 1920 zu Moskau (Zürich, September, 1920).

In these theses, drafted by Lenin and considerably amended at the Congress, it is stated i.e. that the entire policy of the Communist International with regard to the national and colonial questions should be based on the joining together of proletarians and working masses of all nations and countries in the revolutionary struggle for the overthrow of landowners and bourgeoisie; moreover, wherever possible peasants and other exploited strata are to be organized in soviets, thus forging the closest possible link between the Western European Communist proletariat and the revolutionary peasant movement in the East, in the colonies and backward countries. "It is, however, necessary to wage a relentless struggle against the endeavor to give a Communist tinge to those liberation movements in backward countries which are not truly Communist at all." The Communist International has the duty of assisting the revolutionary movements in the colonies and backward countries, but with the sole purpose of gathering the parts of future proletarian parties--i.e., the real, and not only the nominal, Communist parties--in all backward countries, educating them to a realization of their special task. This task consists of the struggle against the bourgeois-democratic tendencies among their peoples.

"The Communist International must accept temporary agreements, and even alliances, with the revolutionary movement in the colonies and backward countries; it may, however, never coalesce with that movement, but must definitely maintain the independent character of the proletarian movement, even in its embryonic form." It is, indeed, necessary to fight Pan-Islam, the Pan-Asian movement, and similar tendencies; all these movements are endeavoring to combine the independence struggle against European and American imperialism with a strengthening of the power of Turkish and Japanese imperialism, as well as that of the nobility, great landowners, the clergy, etc.

Yet these directives still allowed, according to Baars, too much room for the nationalist movement within the ramifications of Communist policies in this country. "It will be obvious to everyone," so he wrote in Het Vrije Woord of December 4, 1920, on p. 34, "that here [i.e., in the resolutions of the Comintern] specific reference is made to British India and Egypt. There the situation is different, since there exist real revolutionaries among the nationalists of those countries, people who, entirely motivated by idealism, are not scared by any difficulties whatsoever; thus in those areas the attitude of the Communists can also be different from what it has to be here.... While it is true that the Communist International has rid itself of the hollow phrase that 'national liberty' must precede the class struggle, too much is still expected of nationalism, and it is therefore treated much too mildly.... Here, on the other hand, nationalism is not revolutionary...[and] we can thus proceed along the lines which we have hitherto unwaveringly followed.... In the Tribune, [the Dutch Communist leader] Wijnkoop has already made it clear that no other movement than the S/arikat I/slam may qualify for our support. In its actions the S. I. can therefore count on our support; besides, we have already been following the precept of mercilessly uncovering Communist camouflage wherever it is being used to hide inferior content-matter, even before we had cognizance of it."

The Character of the Communist Movement on the West Coast of Sumatra in the Initial Period

These tenets were also followed by the first Communists who were neutral in religious affairs, in effect thus anti-religious and internationally-oriented, and who carried the slogan of the class struggle to Western Sumatra. It was in those very days that Abdul Muis commenced a new propaganda campaign.

The political atmosphere was at that time (1923) deeply perturbed on account of several important questions, viz. the tax on family homes (cf. Staatsblad van Nederlandsch-Indië [the official Gazette], 1920, #679), the delimitation of woodlands, and the projected introduction of the land tax. In the interests of maintaining peace and order, which the then-Resident of the West Coast of Sumatra felt to be threatened by the agitation of Abdul Muis, the latter was expelled from domicile in the Outer Provinces by Government Decree #1x of January 19, 1924. As a consequence of this action, however, all moral pressure had been eliminated which might have caused the administration to pay heed to the very real grievances of the population, which stemmed from a hurt sense of justice (especially in the case of the grievances against the Forestry Department); and, at the same time, a natural counter-weight to the rising Communist movement had been similarly removed. It should be noted that ever since Abdul Muis' arrival, the few Communists on the West Coast--there were only a score or so members in the Padang branch of the P.K.I., organized in March, 1923--had resumed the attack against this S.I. leader, who had been their old opponent in the struggle for the leadership of the Sarikat Islam on Java.

Expelled from the Sarikat Islam at that party's Surabaya Congress (2) of October, 1921, the P.K.I. had, ever since its Semarang Congress, held at Christmas-time, 1921, been endeavoring to set up Red Sarekat Islam's or Sarekat Ra'jat, thus taking in hand the organization of a "proletarian movement--be it in its embryonic form only," in accordance with the wishes of Moscow in 1920.

These efforts were, however, not vigorously pursued--especially after Semaun's return from Moscow (May, 1922)--as a result of the United Front (3) tactics of the Communist International (promulgated at its Third Congress in 1921), which aimed at the maximum degree of broad cooperation (4) with some nationalist parties in an endeavor of usurping the initiative in Sarikat Islam activities in this way. When this aim of forming a United Front, (5) or of again

- (2) At the Second Congress of the Communist International (1920), the question of how much support should be given by the international proletariat to nationalist movements had been discussed, without arriving at a concrete answer at that time. Until the question re-appeared on the agenda of the 5th Congress, the International judged each individual case on its merits. "We know...that it [the International] has allowed the Communists on the island of Java to participate actively in the local Workers' and Peasants' Party (Sarikat Islam)." (Manuilsky, at the 5th Congress of the Communist International; Protokoll, II, p. 624). On this occasion (Ibid., I, p. 384) Semaun said, "In reality, however, the revolutionary movement in Indonesia has only gained strength under the influence of the Russian Revolution and with the aid of the Executive...."
- (3) The United Front tactics do not, it should be added, exclude criticism of the leaders of the other parties; rather, the contrary is true! These tactics the Comintern had started to prepare in 1922; they were formulated in 1921 and vigorously enacted as late as 1923.
- (4) This was already apparent at the Communist Congress held at Semarang in December, 1921, thus after the Surabaya Congress had expelled them from the Sarikat Islam. In October, 1920, Darsono's coup had failed which should, in a surprise move, have given the Communists the leadership of the Sarikat Islam (see below, Note 6).

gaining firm hold on the Sarikat Islam, had failed, Darsono on his return from abroad at the beginning of 1923 resumed (6) the criticisms of the leadership of C.S.I., i.a. at the P.K.I. Congress of March, 1923; at the same time, the formation of Sarekat Ra'jats, as an underpinning of the P.K.I., was again energetically taken in hand. This line was in accordance with the then prevailing policy vis-a-vis Western social democratic parties, formulated by the Executive (at its conference of June 1923), and which, by analogy, continued to determine that to be followed with regard to Eastern nationalist movements. Without, therefore, in any way diminishing the tactics of organizing cells within closely related parties (especially the Sarikat Islam), the Communists continued their action against leading Sarikat Islam men (Tjokroaminoto, Salim, Abdul Muis), which they had previously conducted from within the Sarikat Islam, as fiercely as before, even though they had now been excluded from that movement. The presence of Abdul Muis on the West Coast thus presented the Communists there with a favorable opportunity. (7)

The removal of Abdul Muis in fact allowed the party freely to develop its activities, the more so since its other ~~representative~~, Bagindo Djamuludin Rasad, had lost prestige among the population. Yet even so initially its influence remained limited, because Communist propaganda only appealed to specific sectors of the population, viz. the small merchants, who felt the effects of the economic crisis, and the railroad personnel through the V.S.T.P. Trade Union of Railroad and Streetcar Personnel; the latter group felt itself endangered by the economy drive and dismissals and by the revision of salary scales coupled with the cancellation of cost-of-living allowances. But at Padang Pandjang, in particular, the Party was successful in gaining a permanent footing among other layers of the population, primarily among the pupils of the government school and those of the religious school of the Soematra Tawalib; this remained true even after the arrests of Hadji Datuk Batuah and Natar Zainuddin (November 11, 1923) who were interned at the beginning of 1925. Elsewhere, however, as e.g. at Solok (8) Communist influence remained limited to the previously mentioned groups. In those areas Communism was and continued to be a pure and typical crisis-phenomenon;

- (5) Cf. also the position of the P.K.I. vis-a-vis the Trade Union Central Organization (Vakcentrale) (September, 1922; fusion of the two organizations Jogja and Semarang); the Autonomy Committee (cf. Tribune, February 17, 1922), and the Radical Concentration (Radicale Concentratie) (January, 1923). The Sarikat Islam Congress at Madiun (March, 1923) again expelled the Communists. The Revue du Monde Musulman, No. 52 (December, 1922) features a survey of the political developments in this country, written by one "Paul Eyquem," and based i.a. on an article by Bergsma and Tan Malakka in the Moscow Izvestia of October 29, 1922, and several articles in the Tribune.
- (6) The famous first attack was published in the Sinar Hindia of October 6, 7 and 9, 1920, just before the Sarikat Islam Congress which was then scheduled to meet on October 16. The Congress only took place in March, 1921. Cf. on this point Overzicht van de Gestie der Centraal Sarikat Islam in het jaar 1921 [Survey of the Leadership of the C.S.I. in the Year 1921] (Weltevreden: Landsdrukkerij, 1922).
- (7) Official announcement of the Central Committee of the P.K.I., in Soeara Ra'jat of May 1, 1923 (Vol. 9, No. 9-10): "Padang: Immediately after the arrival of Abdul Muis, the enemy of the Communists in this town, a small but very powerful branch of the P.K.I. has been set up, powerful in its convictions, and powerful in combatting its enemies."

it was the Marxian teaching of economic crisis which found a hearing, the Verelendung (immization) of which one believed oneself to be a victim, and which one learned to blame on capitalism. At the numerous public meetings organized by the Sarekat Ra'jat's at Padang Pandjang during 1924, this seemed to be the well-nigh inexhaustible theme, which almost came to set the pattern. As long as government--so the argument ran--is not true people's government but one based on capitalism, no enduring improvement can ever take place; the crises are inexorably bound up with capitalism, and they must by their nature inevitably increase in frequency and severity, with the progressive immization of the masses proceeding pari passu with this development. Nor is this phenomenon limited to Sumatra only; rather, it is the lot of the proletariat all over the world. Salvation--even in the case of the small trader (9)--can only be expected from Communism. We Communists also have, after all, our comrades in Europe, who are quite prepared to bypass importing houses and deliver all required goods to their Indonesian comrades at a reasonable cost unencumbered by the capitalists' excess profits. It is true that our enemies, here as elsewhere, are endeavoring to put ever more obstacles in our path, but as long as we are determined and united, the people's government will and must arise, if not today, then tomorrow. Let us derive inspiration from the Russian example!

A people's government is not identical with the national governments of the so-called independent states. Only a people's government brings real liberty, the liberty for all. In national states the people as such, because of capitalism, remain as suppressed as they are in the colonies.

Even at that early stage, however, other, purely nationalist voices had sporadically come to the fore in such papers as Djago-Djago and Pemandangan Islam;

"Oh, my compatriots, children of India [the Indies]
From all over the islands
You are fleeing from misery,
Standing on your own feet, as in years gone by
In times past we were self-reliant
Not governed by people from foreign lands
It is only now are we being ruled [by others],
But the air is changing every day....

- (8) At Solok, intensive propaganda only commenced as late as July, 1924. It originated among B.O.W. [Public Works Department] personnel, such as Idrus et al. Before that time, a local club with the name of Medan Moesjawaratan had existed there, in which Communist elements had endeavored to propagate their ideas. At Katjang propaganda was disseminated by railroad employees.
- (9) The 1925 courses were also quite emphatic on this point: "Let there be no misunderstanding. He who seeks profit only is not necessarily a capitalist. There are many traders who are not capitalists at all, such as vegetable vendors e.g.; although they trade, they are not capitalists themselves but rather victims of capitalism. They do not seek riches with the sole purpose of growing fat and lazy, they merely seek a bowl of rice, and they are suppressed by capitalist enterprises which have swallowed up their entire livelihood." Cf. also the article "Pedagang ketjil dan pergerakan" [The Small Trader and the Movement], in Api, March 2, 1926, No. 49.

Instead of attacking the egotistic and antagonistic attitude of international capitalism, the Communists were, as time went on, increasingly directing their attacks against the "reaction" in this country; by this term they invariably and unmistakably alluded to the government. Yet this does not alter the fact that, even among the widely dispersed traders from Sianok and Silungkang, Communism, wherever its propaganda was successful, initially exhibited typical crisis characteristics.

Another aspect soon entered the picture. At Silungkang, where Communism had been inaugurated by Idrus, a Public Works Department surveyor, who had been transferred thither from Solok because of his Communists sympathies, a class struggle had been going on for several years. Under the impact of growing trade, the traditional social hierarchy had for a long time been undermined; this hierarchy consisted of an adat-aristocracy, a "middle-class" and a "lower class" together with the erstwhile slave class who, mainly domiciled in the surrounding area (Muaram Kelaban, Padang Sibusuk), were working the rice fields for the Silungkang landlords. It was mainly this "middle class" who had started to revolt against the traditional privileges of the aristocracy (such as heading adat festivals, enjoying marriage privileges, etc.). When in recent years the latter group had started to get organized in a Sarikat Islam with white membership cards, the so-called "middle class," under the leadership of Sulaiman Labai and Datuk Bagindo Ratu, reacted by creating a Sarikat Islam with red membership cards. Thus the Silungkang red-white antithesis rested on an entirely different basis from its edential counterparts elsewhere, as e.g. at Padang, where it was the result of a religious quarrel between the kaum mudo [modernists] and the kaum kuno [orthodox Muslims], or on Java, where the Sarikat Islam with red cards had for some time indicated the Semarang (Communist) orientation, while the white cards had represented that of the Jogja branch. When the Sarikat Islam movement at Silungkang had spent itself, Sulaiman Labai created the association "Bidjo Baik," with the purpose of again organizing the antagonism against the adat-aristocracy. It can, then, be easily imagined how avidly the Communist slogan of "Equality for all" ("sama rata sama rasa") was accepted by this group; it is equally understandable that the ambitious Sulaiman Labai--whose rice business had badly suffered, especially since the creation of the Railroad Cooperative--and Dato Bagindo Ratu became the obvious leaders of the local Communist movement, and that most of the Communist leaders there belonged to the "middle class." The preaching was quite successful: In 1925, the first marriages took place between girls from the aristocracy and men from the "middle class," and this was crowned by the marriage of Sulaiman Labai with a bangsawan (noble) girl in 1926.

The Communist movement in Solok, on the other hand, retained its crisis character right through 1925, so that the economic improvement spelled its end, despite the holding of organized and regular courses. The movement was there, moreover, as late as October 1925 unable to cope with certain problems which had elsewhere already been settled to some extent. Communists there still held to the old prescription: (10)

"We declare that in our days the terms 'nation' and 'religion' have become sharp weapons for suppressing and exploiting people." It was explained that Communism had nothing to do with nationality or religion, but that it rather was

(10) Cf. also N. Bukharin and E. Preobrazhensky, Das A.B.C. des Kommunismus (1923), p. 240, para. 89: "Why Communism and Religion are Irreconcilable." See also V. I. Lenin, Ueber Religion (Berlin: Verslag für Literatur und Politik, 1926).

a science like medicine, the technical sciences, etc. In making such an attitude, however, Communist leaders very often encountered great difficulty in introducing their internationally-oriented, irreligiously tinged Communism to a population steeped in religion. As recently as October 1925 letters were written to the Central Committee on Java, asking how to reconcile Islam and Communism. After all, so it was explained, the Islamic law of inheritance is based on private property and can thus, as much as any other religion, serve as the backbone of capitalism; on the other hand, again, the belief in predestination and the inclination to put up with one's lot must surely have a debilitating effect on any action aimed at changing the world ~~order~~. It might therefore be most advisable to observe pro forma one's religious duties; in fact, of course, one knew better than that, but for the sake of propaganda the prejudices of the masses should be taken into account. (11) At the same time, it is interesting to note that at Padang Pandjang the editors of Pemandangan Islam, Hadji Datuk Batuah and Djamaluddin Tamin, had already in 1923 succeeded in reconciling the "science of the regulation of the community for the benefit of the masses living in misery and poverty," with the "intentions and the requirements of the true Islamic faith!"

It would, however, be entirely misleading to interpret this endeavor as a serious quest for a synthesis between Islam and Communism. Side by side with purely Communist articles, in which there was no room for religion as such and where, for example, Pan-Islam and Pan-Asianism were bitterly attacked, journals like Pemandangan Islam and Djago-Djago also carried pronouncements according to which Communist action was in complete agreement with the postulates of Islam and of the times. Readers were told that capitalism pursued "unclean" aims, at odds with the teachings of Islam, and they were enjoined to fight for freedom "in accordance with the prescriptions of the Koran." Even then, however, the statutes of the Sjarikat Raa'jat Sumatra Barat / Association of the People of Western Sumatra of September, 1924, explicitly state that "the aims and objectives of the Sjarikat Raa'jat Sumatra Barat, being based on the principles of the P.K.I., aim at the unity of workers and agricultural proletarians in Western Sumatra, without regard to nationality or religion, in one free political organization which will lead them in the class struggle." From correspondence confiscated by the police in May 1926 from the files of the Central Committee of the P.K.I., it appears that even the top leadership of the Party did not follow a straight line with regard to the religious problem in 1925. In general, the Central Committee seems to have adhered to a policy of neutrality in religious affairs, local leaders being permitted to take into consideration conditions in their areas. Yet it advised one of those leaders as follows: "It has come to our knowledge that you, comrade, have your own private religious convictions, but we do hope that you will keep religion out of the affairs of the Party leadership."

- (11) "You, comrades, are certainly aware of the fact that the influence which religion exerts upon the fanatical population, particularly in the Minangkabau, is still very great, indeed. As a consequence, whosoever does not highly esteem religion is bitterly resented by the people there. This state of affairs forces us—even though personally we do not wish to have any dealing with religion, and in spite of the fact that religious doctrine, if properly thought through, is altogether illogical—to give the appearance of believing in the nobility and holiness of the Islamic faith, in order to advance the influence of Communism."

Organization and Extent of the Movement

The center of Communist propaganda in the Padang Highlands (the so-called Bovenlanden) was situated at Padang Pandjang. At the outset conducted through a so-called "International Debating Club," it was thereafter aided by the two periodicals, Pemandangan Islam and Djago-Djago, and later still by a Ra'jat school People's School. Endeavors were also made to obtain influence among the pupils of the government grade school and those of the religious Islamic school, Soematra Tawalib, which latter institution the Communists later succeeded in entirely bringing under their influence. Important changes likewise took place in the organization of the movement. Since September, 1924, (12) the individual Sarikat Ra'jat of the West Coast of Sumatra had been united in one Local, domiciled at Padang Pandjang; (13) local groups consisting of at least 15 members were thenceforth styled Sections. In the course of the general meeting of the Padang Pandjang executive and local delegates, held between February 5 and 11, 1925, it appeared that in several localities such local Sections had already been in existence for some time, in the main as a result of the propaganda which had been conducted during the second half of 1924. Where on June 1, 1924, the total membership had only amounted to 158 (less six expelled members) on December 31, 1924, it had already reached 660. This total was distributed as follows:

<u>Section</u>	<u>Members</u>
Kota Lawas	101 (including 36 women)
Solok	79
Pajakumbuh (14)	21
Sungei Sarik (Pariaman)	110
Lubuk Basung (15)	114
	<u>425</u>

(12) Before that date there had only been scattered members of the Sarikat Ra'jat, who had subsequently been organized as Sections, each maintaining a direct relationship with the Central Committee on Java. After that date the Local at Padang Pandjang was interposed as an intermediary.

(13) Between the general meeting of September, 1924, at which the statutes and the constitution of the organization had been adopted, and the conference of February, 1925, the local executive of the Sjarikat Ra'jat Sumatra Barat had been composed of the following members:

Hadji Muhammed Nur Ibrahim	Chairman
Basjaruddin	Secretary
A. Murad	Treasurer
Baharuddin Saleh	Member-at-large
Dato Madjo Lelo (S. Sarik, Pariaman)	Member-at-large
Tenek	Member-at-large
Rustam	Member-at-large
Ramaja (Fort de Kock)	Member-at-large
Idrus (Solok)	Member-at-large

(14) This Section was led by the propagandist Basaruddin from Achin. It very soon went out of existence, only to be resuscitated to some extent during 1925.

(15) The total membership of this Section was alleged to have in fact exceeded 200, but owing to confiscation of its files, the correct number could not

Carried Forward	425
Silungkang	25
Fort van der Capellen	24
Fort de Kock	54
Muaro Labuh (16)	24
Sawah Lunto (17)	49
Katjang (Solok) (16)	25
Tikalalah (Solok) (16)	28
Scattered members	6
	<u>660</u>

In February 1925 the total had, in fact, already risen to 884, with a nominal cash balance amounting to Fl. 32.-; in reality, however, to only Fl. 2.-.

At the abovementioned general meeting the local Sections of the Sarikat Ra'jat and the Padang Pandjang Local were in principle disbanded, in accordance with the resolution of the P.K.I.'s Jogja Congress of December, 1924. (18)

These Sarikat Ra'jat were now alleged to have "deteriorated" into a petit-bourgeois movement, which in the long run could not serve as the sub-structure for the P.K.I. for which they had originally been intended. The Jogja (Kuta-gede) Congress had taken the point of view that, while the Sarikat Ra'jat did indeed attract dissatisfied elements, they yet constituted a hotchpotch without internal strength. The Central Committee therefore decided to concentrate all efforts on the trade union movement, and to allow the Sarikat Ra'jat to "wither away"; the Conference agreed with this decision. The Jogja Conference thus marked the end of the policy which had only recently been inaugurated at the P.K.I. Congress of June 1924 at Batavia: At that Congress the Central Committee had argued that the movement could not restrict itself to action among the proletariat only, but that work would also have to be carried out among the peasants. Since then, however, the executive had come to realize that a compromise with the petit-bourgeois elements could endanger the purity of Communist principles; they had therefore come to Jogja with the proposition to disband the Sarikat Ra'jat.

But what should be done with the members of the already existing Sarikat Ra'jat? If they were allowed to enter the P.K.I. en masse then, it is true, the ranks of the Party would be swelled, but it would be increased with petit-bourgeois elements, who would carry with them their typical class-interest, thus infecting

be listed. Very intensive counter-action of the opposition party soon forced this Section into dissolution. At Sungai Sarik the movement had similarly elicited a very strong reaction, leading to diminished activities even before February, 1925.

(16) This Section had also enjoyed a very short existence only.

(17) Here, the P.K.B.T. [the Mine Workers' Union] had already been in existence for some time, which had tried to gain influence among miners.

(18) On that occasion Hadji Muhammed Nur Ibrahim (Lubuk Buaja, Padang) reported on the Jogja conference of December 12, 1924; he had up to that time been chairman of the Local at Padang Pandjang, and had attended the Jogja Conference as delegate of the West Coast of Sumatra. At the Congress Sutan Said Ali had been appointed member-at-large for the West Coast of Sumatra of the Central Committee of the P.K.I.

the Party with petit-bourgeois bacilli. If the Party, on the other hand, were to adhere to the stringent regulations governing admission to the P.K.I., then the members of the Sarikat Ra'jat might fall an easy prey to the Sarikat Islam, or to other organizations with a petit-bourgeois program. These were the considerations discussed at the Jogja Conference, to which we will return in more detail below.

The general meeting at Padang Pandjang therefore resolved that the former Sarikat Ra'jat members should become provisional members of the P.K.I., who would have to undergo training in Communist teachings under the leadership of the local P.K.I.-Sections which were to be called into being. (19) Though in February 1925 the total membership of the P.K.I. on the West Coast of Sumatra amounted to only ten, (20) P.K.I.-Sections were in due course founded at Padang Pandjang, Solok, Silungkang and Sawah Lunto. (21) The Section at Padang Pandjang had under its jurisdiction the following branches: Pariaman, Fort de Kock, Manindjau, Lubuk Basung, Pajakumbuh, Dangung-Dangung, Tiakar (Suliki), Fort van der Capellen, and others. The trade-unions S.P.P.L. at Emmahaven and P.K.B.T. at Sawah Lunto, as well as the peasant-unions, or Sarikat Tani, (which were cells of the P.K.I.) at Gunung, Panjalaian and Batipuh stood under the jurisdiction of their respective P.K.I.-Sections.

After the Padang Pandjang Conference of May, 1925, these local Sections had been placed under the control of a Central at Padang. (22) As of September 6,

- (19) See also Instruction of the C.C. of the P.K.I. No. 6B, dated June 5, 1925 (based on the resolutions of the 5th Comintern Congress of mid-1924). The P.K.I.-Section at Padang had been founded as far back as March, 1923. "With the concurrence of the comrades of the Sectional Executive at Padang," a P.K.I.-Section had then been set up at Padang Pandjang, on November 4, 1923. Its executive consisted of the following members:

Hadji Dato Batuah	Chairman
Djamaluddin Tamim	Secretary-treasurer
Natar Zainuddin	Member-at-large
Dato Mangkudum Sati	Member-at-large

- (20) According to a circular dated Padang Pandjang, February 15, 1925, Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim, A. Wahab and Sutan Said Ali were each--in accordance with a resolution of the Jogja Conference--to receive Fl. 300, and Basaruddin F. 200, in annual payments from secret Russian funds (Circular of the C.C., No. 5).
- (21) According to data in the archives of P.K.I. headquarters, P.K.I.-membership towards the end of 1925 was distributed as follows: Padang - 190; Sawah Lunto - 13; Padang Pandjang - 38; Solok - 25; Silungkang - 19.
- (22) The so-called "staff" of the Padang Pandjang Section consisted of the following members" Mangkudum Sati - Kota Lawas; Abd. Azis - Padang Pandjang; Mahmud - Sitjintjin, Padang Pandjang; M. A. S. Perpatih - Kota Lawas; Achmad Chatib - Kota Lawas.

The composition of the P.K.I.-Section "staff" at Padang was as follows:

Zainun (a former railroad conductor in Achin)	Chairman
A. Wahab	Secretary-treasurer
Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim	Member-at-large
Nurdin (another former railroad conductor in Achin)	Member-at-large
Tibbin	Member-at-large

1925, the organization was once again changed in accordance with Instruction No. 6B from the Central Committee of the P.K.I., dated June 5, 1925: The Central was henceforth styled Section, the old Sections, in turn, becoming Subsections.

Such Subsections existed for longer or shorter periods at Padang, Padang Pandjang, Fort van der Capellen, Solok, Sawah Lunto, Fort de Kock and Pajakumbuh. Some of them had, in fact, already ceased to exist at that time.

In the spring of 1926 the seat of the Sectional Executive was again transferred to Padang Pandjang, with Arif Fadlillah (23) taking the place of Sutan Said Ali as general P.K.I.-leader on the West Coast.

The so-called "ten-men units" have not been markedly prominent on the West Coast; the organization of these units had likewise been decided upon at the Jogja Congress (see Instruction No. 3 from the C.C. of March, 1925) and at the February Conference at Padang Pandjang. Padang Pandjang was, in point of fact, the only place where a serious endeavor in this direction had been made by appointing ten "officers" (pembantu) who were placed under the "staff" of the Sectional executive (May 1925). It was, however, not possible to organize a complete corps, consisting of 10 pembantu, 100 first-class members and 1000 second-class members. The creation of such units was, indeed, temporarily suspended by a C.C. circular of June 5, 1925, No. 1256/B.I., which accompanied Instructions Nos. 6A and 6B.

In the meantime Sutan Perpatih had during 1925 also tried to organize his propaganda activities at Fort de Kock by means of 5-men and 10-men units. Very few such 5-men units (C.C. Instruction No. 6B) in fact appeared on the West Coast of Sumatra. The purpose underlying the creation of these units had been the realization of "democratic centralism." The envisaged organizational pattern foresaw that Subsection executives should have under their command so-called kampung-commissions of three men; these commissions, in turn, should have jurisdiction over so-called pengurus, or leaders, each in charge of groups of 25 members, consisting of five pembantu [aides], each of whom was to be responsible for five members. The only partial endeavor at realizing this pattern took place at Fort van der Capellen during 1926. (24)

Communist Literature and Courses in 1925

The Jogja Congress had also emphasized the necessity of instructing the masses along Communist lines by means of literature (25) and lecture courses.

As for Communist literature, in addition to newspapers (26) some people on

(23) Arif Fadlillah had spent the first few months of 1926 on Java for purposes of a "study visit."

(24) Moves in this direction were also made at Solok and Padang in 1926.

(25) Cf. Instruction, Executive of the P.K.I., 1925, No. 7.

(26) In addition to such Java newspapers as Soeara Ra'jat, Api, Proletar and Njala, the previously quoted Djago-Djago and Pemandangan Islam (Padang Pandjang) were being read. Furthermore there were the more Communist-tinged Doenia Achirat (Fort de Kock), Soeara Tambang, Sasaran Ra'jat, Petir Torpedo, Panas, etc; all these were published on the West Coast and all of them have led a more or less ephemeral existence.

the West Coast seem to have been more or less acquainted with the following works:

Padoman P.K.I. /The P.K.I. Compass/ (Semarang, 1923);

Partai Reglement dari P.K.I. /Party Statutes of the P.K.I./ (1924);

Axan Zain, Kommunisme /Communism/
 Series I (Semarang, June, 1925)
 Series II (Semarang, July, 1925).

Sukindar, These bagi kiadaan Social dan Ekonomi serta tjara bagi mengadakan Organisatie dan taktiek di Indonesia /Thesis Concerning the Social and Economic Situation, and Instructions Concerning the Organization and Tactics to be followed in Indonesia/ (1924).

Manifest Kommunist oleh Karl Marx dan Friedrich Engels /Communist Manifesto by Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels/. (Two translations of this work were in circulation, the latter by Axan Zain, the former by Partondo, reprinted from Soeara Ra'jat, 1923).

Tan Malacca, Naar de "Republik Indonesia" /Towards the Republic of Indonesia/, (first printing: Canton, April, 1925, reprinted Tokyo, 1925); partly translated into Malay, mimeographed and sent out to Sections by the Central Committee. In content this work is to a large extent identical with "Semangat-Moeda," De Jonge Geest, /The Young Spirit/, likewise written by Tan Malacca (printed at Tokyo in January, 1926).

A pamphlet by Mahmud, entitled Tjontoh jang baik /A Good Example/, was of course well known. It contained a speech delivered at a women's meeting at Penindjauan, Padang Pandjang, on Wednesday, November 11, 1925.

Also in circulation were some crudely duplicated pamphlets, composed and distributed among his followers by Sjamsuddin, the well-known active propagandist and former Communist leader at Langsa, who, having been sent back from Achin, had tried to organize a strike at Emmahaven in the second half of 1925. For many Communists on the West Coast he has been either directly or indirectly, the "guru" /teacher/ par excellence. Among his works we mention the following: Keadaan Doenia dan Datangnja Sociale Revolutie /The World Situation and the Coming of the Social Revolution/ (June, 1925) and Perang Doenia jang Kedoea /The Second World War/, which deals with petroleum and politics.

If 1924 had been the year of public meetings, 1925 was that of Communist lecture courses. These courses dealt with the three stages of social development, viz., primitive communism, feudalism, and capitalism.

In the period of primitive communism people were engaged in hunting and fishing, and later on in pastoral and agricultural pursuits. In the absence of private property, all trade was as yet exclusively limited to barter. At that time the people still enjoyed true freedom, a freedom which is no longer encountered nowadays, not even in the so-called "free" countries. Those are the countries that are independent or, in other words, countries that possess a national government, but in which, as a matter of fact, the people are as unfree as they are in the colonies, seeing that in both they are enslaved by capitalism.

As yet, no suppression by princes or capitalists existed. Nor were there obligations towards the powers-that-be (such as taxes, forced labor, etc.). Everyone could provide for his own needs, without being deprived of part of his labor by another person (employer), and without being exploited, as is the case nowadays. But that early state of mankind was still very similar to that of the animals. Gradually people started to live in communities, tribes were coming into existence, and by general agreement the oldest, wisest and strongest men were elected to lead them (just as happens nowadays with the election of a president of an association); elections of such elders took place in accordance with the requirements of the times or the tribe, for purposes of defense against external dangers (such as wild beasts), but not for the exploitation of the members of the tribe.

This social development went hand-in-hand with technical developments. No longer did the people limit themselves to the shooting down of animals (which is destruction of capital goods); they rather started to engage in pastoral and agricultural pursuits. This, in turn, led to the end of nomadic life and to the creation of permanent settlements. The land, however, was not distributed but communally worked, and the community as a whole provided for its livelihood. Purchase and sale were an unknown as such words as "expensive" and "cheap"; there only existed communal property. There were neither rich nor poor, there were no classes, and all were equal. "One for all and all for one" characterized that way of life. Communism formed the basis of that society, but it was not yet organized, unlike modern revolutionary Communism, which is necessarily developing out of the suppression of capitalism, and which therefore is not just an invention of Marx. Traces of this primitive communism can still be found in all countries. Formerly it existed also in Russia under the name of "mir." Nowadays it can still be found in Switzerland and Scandinavia, but also on Java (villages with communal property) and in the Minangkabau. These, however, are only traces. As a social organization primitive communism is dead. We may regret this development, but we need not be surprised at it. It was product of its time, a time which knew of no private property. But the progress of time automatically brought changes in its wake. The intensification of labor (agriculture) left no time for other activities (such as weaving, etc.); this led to the division of labor and to the growth of free crafts; barter trade gave rise to the development of a class of commission-agents or brokers (who later became merchants). In the end these developments brought about the money economy and the growth of trading capital. Commerce acted as a stimulant for the improvement of techniques and in the long run gave birth to competition which, in turn, led to class division (between employers and employees) and also to the development of industry.

The elders who had originally been appointed and dismissed by community vote gradually developed into hereditary heads. The heads, that is to say, were devising schemes for maintaining their functions, which secured them lazy and comfortable lives, and for passing their offices on to their children. Aided by some members of the tribe whom they had brought under their influence, they set about to make their positions permanent. From elected presidents they became hereditary princes (radja). Land titles passed from the tribes to the chiefs' private hands. This was the origin of what is called feudalism. As population increased these chiefs developed into kings. At that period of history one distinguished between two estates, that of the rulers (ningrat) and that of the ruled or the people (kromo). The ruler's powers were unlimited. He alone issued all decrees without consulting anyone else. His will was law. In the West this historical period is called the Era of Absolute Monarchy. In order to guard against violations of his will, the king employed officials and

organized an army. He, moreover, lent support to the superstition that he e.g. was invested with supernatural powers (sekti), that he himself was a descendent of heaven, etc., all of which would lead the population to hold him in ever greater awe. Religion itself was also subjected to the ruler's political machinations, in order to make people believe that he was the vicar of God on earth and that his will was in fact God's own will. Priests (ulama, kiyahi, pandita) were his willing tools in the propagation of these concepts.

Feudalism, which succeeded in surviving into the 18th Century, was finally superseded by capitalism. Apart from the introduction of private property, the early stages of feudalism had wrought few changes in the mode of living of the stupid masses of the people, if compared with the stage of primitive communism; the standard of living being low, the upper-classes were satisfied with a relatively small part of the yield of their landed estates. Gradually, however, the wants of the ruling classes and, with them, the burdens imposed on the people had been increasing, until, during the 16th and 17th Centuries, the growing dissatisfaction found expression in a rising revolutionary sentiment. The whole nation, poor and rich alike, wanted to put a brake on the King's absolute power and to replace it by a popular government, at the same time transforming the royal domains into public property for all. In this movement the rich, by virtue of their influence over greater part of the masses, played the leading role. Their slogan, "Liberty, Equality and Fraternity!", swept the others along: this was the beginning of the French Revolution of 1789, the revolution of the bourgeoisie, supported by the poor who served them as soldiers. The result of this revolution was that the feudal rights of king and nobility were replaced by private (not communal) property, and that the monarchy gave way to a capitalistic republic, but not to a true people's government. Through the consolidation of private property and the conquest of the governmental apparatus the capitalists had strengthened their position still further. The bourgeoisie had secured for itself both economic and political power. As far as the people were concerned, the revolution had to all intents and purposes not resulted in any changes: as we say in Indonesian, the people had exchanged "the jaws of the tiger for the mouth of a lion, and of a very hungry lion at that!" This revolutionary transformation did not remain limited to France, but gradually also spread to most other countries. From that time on, history entered the Era of Capitalism. The power previously wielded by kings had passed to the hands of the capitalists; in those countries where monarchies were retained, they became, through constitutions and the parliamentary system, the tools of the capitalists. The liberty which had been won in the French Revolution was, then, merely the liberty for the capitalists to subjugate and exploit others. The proletariat had been duped in its expectations. The process was later still further accelerated by the Industrial Revolution; handicrafts were ousted by mechanized industry which reduced thousands of free laborers to the status of wage-slaves of the industrial capitalists. This state of affairs has lasted to this very day, with the sole exception of Russia, where both political and economic power reside with the workers and peasants.

Everywhere we can see riches increase, yet the lot of the masses is getting progressively more miserable: the riches which could assure happiness and well-being to all are accumulating in the hands of the few. Thus society is being divided into two classes, a small yet all-powerful class, the capitalists and employers, and, side by side with it, the powerless yet hundreds of times larger class of the slaves of the capitalists, the proletarians, who possess nothing but the strength and will to work. The existence of the proletariat makes it clear to us that slavery, which allegedly had been abolished by "civilization,"

has continued to exist and has in fact become worse than ever before. Slavery has, indeed, not disappeared, but its character has changed: it has been replaced by wage-slavery. Only the possessor of the means of production can in this capitalist era impose his will on others. By placing his labor power at the service of the capitalist, the worker can assure to himself a meager existence; his puny wage represents only part of the yield of his own labor, which goes to swell the riches of the employer. Only part of this "surplus value" is needed for the satisfaction of the capitalist's own wants; the rest is added to his capital--a process known as the accumulation of capital. From these accumulated funds, the "usurer-capitalist" can provide capital for the "commercial capitalist" and the "industrial capitalist." Thus what is called surplus value, rent or profit is, in fact, nothing but the unpaid labor of the worker. In other words, the capitalist has stolen his plantations and factories, his money, the automobile which he uses for pleasure rides, his expensive clothing, the delicious foods and drinks which he consumes--they are all stolen from the workers. "All these are illegitimately gotten, stolen goods! And the thieves, we know, are those capitalists who dominate the whole world while they pretend to love civilization and mankind. Capitalism, in short, is the science of large-scale theft of plunder."

Whose duty, then, is it to apprehend and bring to justice these thieves? It should, of course, be that of the police and the judges. And where are they? It is we proletarians, who labor by day and night under the yoke of capitalism, who must be police and judges at the same time; not only, however, we proletarians here, but rather the proletariat of the whole world in joint action. The world revolution must put an end to this system of organized theft. There will be no more private property after the revolution; the Era of Communism will then have arrived.

The summarized exposition rendered in the above paragraphs represents the quintessence of four lecture courses: not surprisingly, they sound familiar in Western ears. These materials had likewise already provided the subject-matter of "lectures" at public meetings during 1924. It goes without saying that a separate evening class was also devoted to a more detailed discussion of economic crises, in the course of which the following topics were dealt with: anarchic production, over-production, retrenchment, unemployment, depression and social unrest. In special lectures devoted to recapitulation, the material was once again repeated. Thus a lecture on parliamentarism called renewed attention to the repressions and extortions of the absolute monarchy, which had caused the revolt of the bourgeoisie and given rise to parliaments. A discussion of capitalist governments and constitutional monarchies concluded the lecture. A subsequent evening was more especially devoted to the different manifestations and forms of capitalism, such as small-scale industry, large-scale industry, protective tariff policies, overproduction, and imperialism. Imperialism was, in turn, again separately discussed with a view to its relationship with war and nationalism. Similarly, a special discussion was devoted to militarism: the standing army, the militaristic education and the strict discipline coupled with the more intensive divide-and-rule policy, to which it has allegedly given rise in this country (by playing off the various nationalities in the [colonial] army against each other). This divide-and-rule policy received further and fuller consideration in a lecture course devoted to education, in which it was urged that talent become the sole rational criterion for educational differentiation. In a lecture concerning the state, the dominating position of finance-capital in the contemporary world order was emphasized. Special lessons were, again, devoted

to politics and the trade union movement. The former presented a survey of the history of political movements in this country: Budi Utomo, Sarekat Dagang Islam, Sarekat Islam, S.D.A.P., I.S.D.P. /both Social-Democratic parties/, N.I.P., P.K.I. and S.R.; the survey culminated in the gleeful assertion of the bankruptcy of the nationalist movement. The second of these lectures, after once more tracing the development of the proletariat, again stressed its exploitation and suppression by the capitalists; it also dealt with the growth of mechanization, the wage system and with female and child labor. A discussion of trade unionism and syndicalism finally led to a peroration extolling either profit sharing or the socialization of the means of production. The world crisis and the social revolution formed the subject-matter of a following evening, which was devoted to the factors which were to pave the way for that revolution, viz., the universal crisis, giving rise to general discontent which finds expression in a general strike. In two further lectures the importance of the Soviet as a political organization was discussed by means of a comparison between the capitalist and the socialist republics; this was followed by a discourse on the socialization of the means of production and its effects on commerce, and by a discussion of Communist ideals in the realms of education, hygiene, law and order. The concluding lectures dealt with the significance of the dictatorship of the proletariat as a necessary transitional stage from capitalism to pure Communism, and with the preparation for that dictatorship by revolutionary trade-unionism and political action in the era of capitalism. Confidence in the certainty of the coming world revolution was instilled, on the one hand, through an analysis of the current political situation, which included China, British India, strikes in England, political crises in Germany, etc.; on the other, through a prognosis of political developments in the Far East, such as the probability of an American-Japanese war, the attitude of Russia and England to, and the influence of the working class movement in the West upon, such a war, as well as the chances for revolution in the East which might grow out of such a conflict.

The Failure of the Movement of 1925 and the Sentiment among the Leaders

"Conviction is the source of strength of any party or organization. A party whose members are not convinced of its aims and principles cannot act as it wishes to, however many members it may have; it will be like a shadow, incapable of achieving positive results."

It is necessary for each party that its members participate with full conviction in its activities, otherwise it is powerless, however many members it may have. This holds especially true for the B.K.I., whose every member must act as a leader in the class struggle for the liberation of the proletariat. The lecture courses had been instituted with the aim of giving effect to this ideal, but the leadership had overlooked that a society must be receptive to Communist preachings, lest they become a voice in the wilderness. As can be seen from the archives of the C.C. of the P.K.I. which were confiscated in May, 1926, this fact had certainly not been lost sight of by all the leaders. But during 1925 the Central Committee, (27) and in particular its secretary, Budisutjitro, showed little interest in the movement on the West Coast of Sumatra, "because the situation is most important on Java, where the people have already become proletarians in the truest sense of the word, while the population outside Java enjoys a better and more comfortable standard of life."

(27) Cf. the standpoint of the C.C. regarding the Sarekat Ra'jat and its pronounced sympathy with the trade union movement during the Jogja conference.

Tan Malaka, too, was sufficiently versed in Marxism to know that "the material substructure determines the spiritual superstructure," and that the petit bourgeoisie could not be turned into proletarians by means of lecture courses. We will presently discuss this matter in greater detail; for the moment, suffice it to say that Tan Malaka's advice was to develop the revolutionary qualities latent in the petit bourgeoisie and to make them subservient to the plans of the Communists.

In spite of careful pedagogic planning the lecture courses ran to seed. Their content-matter, also because of the many foreign words, was beyond the grasp of the listeners. (28) The usual procedure in these courses was, that after the leader had finished his presentation the members had to repeat what they had heard; blackboard diagrams were used to illustrate the spoken word; the material was again and yet again repeated. ...The courses disintegrated, in spite of the fact that members united in singing the International, the song "Saja Mariana Proletar" [I am Marianne, the Proletarian], (29) the Song of the Six-Hour Work-Day and the Song of the Barisan Muda [Youth Corps]: (30)

"In the East the sun starts rising,
Wake up, comrades all,
Let's go forward to battle!..."

In spite of all this the participants fell asleep, the courses petered out, the membership decreased, and contributions could not be collected....

Thus the lectures for members were discontinued, while those for propagandists were carried on; but there were many complaints about the propagandists: they were blamed for no longer bringing new members into the movement and for not making headway with the collection of contributions. But was all this really surprising? With the sole exception of Communist action among the miners at Sawah Lunto--which was nipped in the bud thanks to the vigilance and prudence of Assistant-Resident Karsen--Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra was basically a petit-bourgeois movement whose intrinsic nature had been accentuated by the opening of complaint bureaus for the population. The magnificent economic recovery of 1925 thus inevitably led to the decline of the movement.

Yet, even though Communism had not fallen on fertile soil, Communist propaganda had, as we shall explain in the following chapter,* succeeded in touching some sympathetic chords in the hearts of the people. In the early stages, how-

(28) From the numerous lecture notes which we have collected and compared it would appear that even many of the leaders themselves had only poorly understood the contents of the courses.

(29) "On the day when the hour of freedom has arrived he shall be my husband who has courageously fought by my side ...--Come, Marianne, be our leader and save the world ..."

(30) Collections of these Communist songs had i.a. been printed by the P.K.I.-Sections at Solo and Bandung; they were also copied by hand later on.

* This chapter can be found in Indonesian Sociological Studies: Selected Writings of B. Schrieke (The Hague/Bandung: W. Van Hoeve Ltd., 1955), Part One, pp. 83-166: "The Causes and Effects of Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra." [Translator's Note].

ever, administrative officials were primarily concerned with the irritating arrogance, brutality and defiance displayed by various Communists vis-a-vis adat-chiefs and native as well as European administrators--attitudes well known in Europe from the days of the rising working class movement and from the early post-war period. It is only human that the native administrative officers, in particular, reacted by repaying in kind, as far as lay in their power....

In the special lecture course devoted to "reaction," it had been explained that this phenomenon consisted of three elements: folk customs, government and diplomacy. Diplomacy as an instrument of reaction was hardly in evidence. As for more stringent government measures, these only reached the West Coast when the movement had largely spent itself, and after the Central Committee had ordered moderation in public action. (31) It was the first of the three factors, the adat (folk custom) which caused the Communists the greatest trouble. In the course of 1925 this reaction gained momentum in many places, as it already had the year before at Lubuk Basung and Sungei Sarik. Thus at Fort van der Capellen e.g. the movement was destroyed by fascist action of the opposition party in 1925.

It is, then, not surprising that in its letter of November 1, 1925, No. 16 A. I., the Sectional executive of Padang struck a pessimistic note. "With a view to the powerful reaction which has set in since August of 1925 all over Western Sumatra, we consider it essential that Subsection leaders should be exclusively recruited from among natives of their respective areas. This has become necessary because of the restrictions which have recently been placed on the freedom of movement by panghulu /adat-chiefs/ in the interior of the country, wherever the old adat is still powerfully entrenched, or where it is now being enforced at the instigation of our enemies [i.e., the government].... Reaction in Java is one thing, that in Western Sumatra is quite another thing...."

It is easy to understand how this state of affairs affected the mentality of many leaders, whose entire livelihood depended on the party. On the one hand, they saw that the movement was the longer the more disintegrating; (32) on the other, "reaction" taught them that traditionalism still possessed formidable strength. It is true that, embittered as they were, Communist leaders on the West Coast had recourse to ever fiercer language, also for purposes of fanning the decreasing interest in the movement and of supplying material for further discussion; but the threat of indictment before the criminal judge hung over their heads. One could easily put up with imprisonment, but who stood to benefit from it? When, finally, the C.C. of the P.K.I. in its Instruction No. 8 of August 5, 1925, counseled moderation, the majority of the local leaders did not see fit to abide by these new orders. The new line--corresponding with the resolutions adopted at the Third Congress of the Communist International--took cognizance of the fact that the world revolution had been delayed beyond expectation, and that an apparent stabilization of capitalism had taken place. Consequently Communist tactics would have to be adapted to these developments. Yet even Arif Fadlillah, who later became Section-leader on the West Coast, disregarded

(31) See its Instruction No. 8, dated August 5, 1925.

(32) Waning public interest in Communist activities should not, however, be interpreted as a slackening of party-life, nor should it make us underestimate the influence of the ideas propagated by the movement among the masses. We shall deal with this problem in the second chapter of this essay "Indonesian Sociological Studies, op. cit., pp. 83-166" at greater length. See also Robert Michels, Zur Soziologie des Parteiwesens (2nd ed., 1925), pp. 58 ff.

the new instructions in his propaganda activities in the nagari's [village republics] of Pitalah, Bunga Tandjung and Tambangan (Padang Pandjang). He was in point of fact even accused by his colleagues of conducting anarchistic propaganda among the Sarekat Tani [Peasant Associations] in those localities. (33) Also well-known for his fierceness was Mahmud, who in the November days of 1926 was to play an important role in Batavia. Sutan Said Ali of Padang, at that time member-at-large of the C.C. of the P.K.I., was likewise known to have quietly propagated a revolution in 1926 in those early days. In his autobiography the Communist propagandist at Pulau Tello, Zainul Hasan (a disciple of Sneevliet, Baars and Darsono of 1919-vintage), reports that he received a letter from Sutan Said Ali in August, 1925, in which "I was informed that in the course of 1926 the Central Committee of the P.K.I. at Batavia would launch the socialist revolution throughout the Netherlands Indies." Sutan Said Ali also wrote to other members along similar lines at that time.

"Our revolutionary fervor is growing by the day," was the sentiment expressed at a meeting in the Padang Pandjang P.K.I.-Office on October 16, 1925.

This phenomenon finds a parallel in similar developments among the Communist parties in Europe, where the turbulence which accompanied the end of the war was followed by apparent social stabilization. In this situation, writes Sinoviev in his Die Taktik der Kommunistischen Internationale (pp. 21-22) "there developed among the most impatient elements, who notwithstanding their wholehearted dedication to the Revolution were not always sufficiently farsighted, the following psychological attitude: 'The wall of passivity must be broken through by an active, daring minority. The minority organized in the Communist Party must immediately proceed to the offensive. Then the ice will break and the resolute minority will sweep the masses along with it!'" A similar attitude was expressed by the left-wing radical group of the German Communist Party (K.P.D.): "An all-encompassing center of will-power, ready to fight, will suffice to make the great masses of the working people advance in a united front, and bent on fighting."

This is the so-called "theory of offensive" of the left wing, which was repudiated by the Third Congress of the Communist International. (34)

Communism in 1926

The Solo Resolution of December, 1925 and Its Consequences on the West Coast of Sumatra

It was in such a mood that the leaders of the P.K.I.--sobered by the failure of strikes in Semarang, Batavia, Padang, Medan and Surabaya between August and

- (33) See the secret, hand-written enclosure attached to the letter of the Assistant-Resident of Batipuh and Pariaman to the Governor of the West Coast of Sumatra, No. 270, dated October 23, 1925, being the report of the Assistant-Demang [District Head] of X Koto, No. 25-G, dated October 21, 1925.
- (34) See also Lenin's "Radicalism," An Infantile Disease of Communism, and cf. Curt Geyer, *Der Radikalismus in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung* (1923), pp. 11-12. As is well-known, these are typically Blanquist ideas, ideas which incidentally can also be encountered in Communism itself--an a peculiar admixture with Marxist notions; they have, again, been incorporated into Syndicalism.

December, 1925--convened for a secret meeting in December 1925 (35) at Solo (actually at Prambanan) under the leadership of Alimin; at that meeting Sutan Said Ali represented the West Coast. It was furthermore attended by the following Communist leaders: Budisutjitro, Aliarcham, Jahja, Sugono, Surat Hardjomartojo, Jatim, Sukirno, Suwarno and Kusno. Those present were above all perturbed by the poor financial state of the Party. In an official memorandum dated December 16, 1925, signed by Sardjono, Winanta and Budisutjitro, the Central Committee issued the following report on this Conference: "We shall now use all our strength and energy to prepare for the unleashing of the Revolution in the month of July, 1926."

The plan gave primary consideration to Sumatra where the revolution should commence, with Java following suit at a predetermined moment. Alimin was to be responsible for obtaining funds from Moscow. In accordance with "the theory of the revolution," preparatory strikes were in the meantime to be organized (on Java, for example, in the sugar industry, etc.).

Sutan Said Ali, who had been away from Padang since November 20, 1925, at long last returned to the West Coast towards the end of January 1926, after repeated requests from the Section-executive, which considered his presence indispensable for the correct guidance of the movement. Back in Padang, he reported on the Solo resolutions to local leaders such as Idrus, the leader of Solok, whom he charged with the transmittal of the orders to Silungkang and Sawah Lunto. The orders caused great surprise in these quarters, where they were initially not taken to represent Central Committee directives. This hesitating attitude partly also stemmed from the distrust engendered in local leaders by Sutan Said Ali's relations with a girl by the name of Umi, with whom he lived. Thus the Sub-sections of Solok, Sawah Lunto and Silungkang jointly decided to bypass their Section-leader, Sutan Said Ali, and to send Sarun as their official representative to Java, where he was to obtain further elucidation while at the same time justifying the Subsections' undisciplinatory conduct. Idrus explained the situation by means of a semi-official letter addressed to the Chairman of the Central Committee on January 21, 1926. Though Sarun was not officially received in Java, he was yet privately kept informed by Dahlan. In reply to Idrus' communication, the C.C. of the P.K.I. in a letter dated February 1, 1926, No. 59, simply referred the Subsections to its member, Sutan Said Ali, "who is at present our representative for the whole area of Sumatra and who knows his assignment.... He is in charge of the entire direction of the movement."

The C.C. made it clear that plenipotentiaries who by-passed its own official representative would not be received in the future, since such action might cause frictions. In these difficult time--so it was argued--when all depends on closing the ranks, such practices cannot be tolerated. Moreover, so the letter concluded, the complaints raised against Sutan Said Ali were based on a misunderstanding. In spite of this assertion, however, Sutan Said Ali, after repeatedly changing his domicile in the course of several months, finally again moved to Medan in May, 1926.

Idrus was jailed on account of two offenses against the Press Law, even before the Central Committee's reply to his letter arrived. Though released from jail in August, 1926, he took no part in further activities. The Solok Subsection virtually ceased to exist. Measures taken by Assistant-Resident

(35) The leaders had ostensibly met with the aim of attending a Congress of the V.S.T.P. [the Transport Workers' Union] at Solo, which was cancelled by the authorities under Art. 8 b.

Karsen prevented the expansion of the P.K.B.T. at Lawah Lunto; it gradually went out of existence, its leaders seeking a livelihood elsewhere.

As far as we know, local leaders in Padang Pandjang did not object to the new tactics of "activization" of the masses as a preparation for open rebellion.

We have already mentioned that Sutan Said Ali had towards the end of January gone to Padang Pandjang in order "to breathe new life into the Subsection of Padang Pandjang." By the end of 1925 this Subsection had, in fact, disintegrated, its books and other possessions having been handed over to Mahmud. At the secret conference of January, 1926, it had i.a. been decided to organize strikes; it was furthermore resolved to "educate Party-members in the arts of destruction, including, where necessary, arson and murder; to make an appeal to all layers of the population to the effect that the Party will admit all who want to join it, including also criminals; thus when the time has come, the people will be ready to stage a successful rebellion."

As appears from documents and other information confiscated on the East Coast of Sumatra, the West Coast Section of the P.K.I. communicated the new plans without delay to its East Coast counterpart by letter of February 12, 1926. Padang was ready and it was the East Coast that had stayed behind. Therefore the movement in that area had to be energetically taken in hand and accelerated as quickly as possible, since the rebellion was set to start no later than in August, 1926. According to the autobiography of the previously mentioned propagandist for Nias and Poelau Tello, Zainul Hasan, Sutan Said Ali who had come to the East Coast of Sumatra by way of Singapore, in February, 1926, presided over a secret meeting of representatives from Achin and the East Coast of Sumatra in the Asahi-Hotel at Medan. "The meeting has resolved that all Sections and Subsections of the P.K.I. arm themselves, for this very year we will attain our goal of liberation from Dutch rule."

According to the documents confiscated at Langsa (achin), a messenger from Padang by the name of Abdulgani had been sent to Langsa in February 1926, announcing the revolution for November, 1926, at the latest and urging the procurement of fire-arms. Propaganda, so he insisted, had to be transformed into direct action at once. On April 9 arrived another messenger from the West Coast of Sumatra (Abdul Muluk from Padang Pandjang) to notify members of an All-Sumatra conference, scheduled for May 22 with the purpose of deciding upon the necessary preparatory measures. No such conference actually took place, but in April extramist leaders met at Singapore, on which occasion they i.a. discussed the most appropriate means for conducting revolutionary activities among B.P.M. [i.e., Bataafsche Petroleum Maatschappij], a large oil company/ personnel at Pulau Brandan, Pulau Susue and Perlak, etc. The same subject matter was discussed at a meeting of representatives from Achin at Takengon on May 22. On that same day Sutan Said Ali was arrested in Medan. This arrest, followed on June 23 by that of Abdul Hamid gelar Sutan Sinaro Perpatih--appointed plenipotentiary in matters of propaganda for the East Coast of Sumatra by the C.C. of the P.K.I.--dealt a severe blow to the propagation of the revolutionary movement.

The arrival of Abdul Hamid, alias Hasan Karuni--a native of Pasar Rebo who had participated in Communist actions at Sianok (Agam) during 1924-1925--at Balige (Tapanuli) and his endeavors to settle there as a religious teacher (February - March, 1926) may also have been connected with P.K.I. activities on the West Coast at that period. Tapanuli had for quite sometime stood under the jurisdiction of the Sectional executive of the West Coast of Sumatra. While up

to the end of 1925 the political situation in Tapanuli could be called calm, an entirely different situation prevailed during the first six months of 1926. In the latter period, that is to say, Communism in the area was vigorously propagated, in the main directed from the West Coast of Sumatra. (36) The arrests which took place in May and during August and September, 1926, deprived this movement of its principal leaders, thus preventing its growth.

The Minangkabau propagandists also extended their activities to Bankulen. Among others, Sadruddin, who belonged to the Sectional executive of Padang Pandjang, was active in that area. (37) In July, Mahmud worked in that area for some weeks, too. (Arif Fadlillah himself likewise participated in the propaganda activities beyond the Minangkabau area proper: in March he was e.g. at Pulau Pundjung, having then just returned from his "study trip" to Java, referred to in Note 23, above).

Minangkabau Communism also spread to Djambi. In 1925, and even in early 1926 still, Hadji Djala ran a small store at Muaro Tembesi. For many months Radjo Katjik ran his clothing trade on board the stern-wheeler "Insulinde." Thereafter Limin was still employed at Djambi as a clerk as late as February, 1926, whence he left for Java. Tajjib, too, lived for a long time at Djambi. All these four men were to play important parts in the rebellious movement at Silungkang, but at Djambi they were to all intents and purposes possessed by the prevailing gold-fever. Their Communist activities were limited to warming their hearts with the reading of "Api" and "Njala." They had no influence on the local population.

In the following months propaganda activities were almost exclusively directed at Minangkabau coolies employed in the rubber estates. The people of Djambi themselves were far too busy with their rubber plantations. They associated the propaganda of the "kaum merah" /the Red comrades/ with the Sarikat Abam or Sarikat Merah which had instigated the rebellion of 1916, the memory of which was still fresh in their minds. Moreover, unlike the former Sarikat Islam action, Communist propaganda did not originate in Java, which they considered superior to themselves; in fact, it was carried to Djambi by the less esteemed Minangkabaus. This explains why the rebellious propaganda of Adjam and Harun in Muaro Bungo of December, 1926 remained limited in its appeal to Minangkabau people.

The only exception to this rule was the Muaro Tembesi action of Muhammed Ali, a native of Djambi. He was an agent for the Singer Sewing Machine Co. who, in August, 1926, had--under the influence of Tajjib, Limin and Sulaiman Labai--become a P.K.I.-member at Silungkang, whither he had come for the collection of outstanding debts. Soon after his return to Muaro Tembesi, he was arrested and

(36) East Coast influences were also at work there, in addition to Communists who had been sent back to Tapanuli from other parts of the archipelago.

(37) Between February and July, 1926, Sadruddin had been active as propagandist on the West Coast, particularly in the Solok district. On July 23, 1926, the Solok magistrate by verdict No. 194 condemned him to three months in jail for vagrancy; on expiration of that period he was sent back to Kroß. - The P.K.I.-Section of Benkulen was only set up in August, 1926, its leaders being in the main Minangkabaus. Propaganda in the Benkulen area was also directed from Palembang, where the leading propagandists were, again, people from the Minangkabau, viz., Achmad Chatib, alias Latip, alias Bujung from Padang Pandjang, and Rusli, alias Hamid, alias Usam gelar Sutan Keadilan, alias Daud, the former editor of Njala.

condemned for embezzlement and forgery, which limited his propaganda work. He nonetheless saw a chance of remining in touch with Party-members and the military of the garrison while in jail, and he even succeeded in maintaining contact with the revolutionary movement elsewhere; more than that, still, he even managed to conduct propaganda from his cell for a rebellion which was to be coordinated with those in Java and on the West Coast.

The purchasers of P.K.I.-membership cards at Muaro Tembesi and the two P.K.I.-members at Tandjung (Muara Tebo, Djambi) were actually from the Subsection of Silungkang. The propaganda action in Djambi may thus have constituted an offshoot of the agitation center at Silungkang in Sidjundjung and Batanghari (Pulau Pundjung), whose chief targets had been among coolies in rubber plantations.

The West Coast was also the propaganda center for Taluk (Kuantan, Indragiri). As Taluk itself it was to a large extent in the hands of people from Sulit Air (Solok), viz., Taim, Lias, A. Hamid and Manan. The Lubuk Djambi propagandists hailed from the Subsections of Fort de Kock and Silungkang, those at Kari from the Padang Pandjang Subsection. The P.K.I.-branch at Lubuk Ambatjang stood completely under the direction of Silungkang. Propagandists at Tjerenti and Kalajang were the well-known Muhamad Zen from Tandjung Ampalu and H. Sulaiman from Padang Sibusuk, as well as Bagindo nan Pandjang from Silungkang. The action which had started in May reached its zenith in September, 1924. Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono and Talaha gelar Sutan di Langit (both from Silungkang) had spent some time there. In Kalajang (Indragiri) it was Djajaluddin from Tarusan who proclaimed the rebellion, first for January 21st, later for the 27th. Further intensification of these activities was prevented by forceful intervention of administrative officers in August and September, 1926. By October, 1926 the majority of the Minangkabau leaders had fled. At Lubuk Ambatjang the "five-men unit"-system was put into operation.

In this connection it should also be borne in mind that the native population of the Sub-District of Taluk counts well over 40,000 people, all of Minangkabau origin, while in addition there are some five to six thousand Minangkabaus proper, quite apart from the non-resident Minangkabau rubber-tappers, whose numbers vary seasonally.

The New Tactics

The concluding comments of the previously cited letter of the C.C. of the P.K.I. dated February 1, 1926, No. 59, are of interest in connection with the new tactics, since they to some extent convey an elucidation of these tactics which had been requested by Section-leaders: "The time for talking has passed, that for organizing our units has arrived. Existing trade unions must be strengthened wherever they are already in existence, but where no such unions are yet in existence, none should be set up, since that would only cause a loss of time. On estates which so far have no union, however, we must plant cells which should exert great influence on the plantation workers, so that they will be ready when the time comes. Furthermore all tani / peasants / should follow us even though they are neither members nor provisional members of our party, as long as they sincerely agree with the movement and our leadership. (38)

(38) In a letter of March 4, 1926, No. 305, the C.C. gave virtually identical advice with regard to the personnel in the gold mines to the Minangkabau-leader Zainuddin at Muaro Aman (Bankulen).

The Communist action of the year 1926 was characterized by three factors:
 (a) the collection and manufacture of weapons (hand-weapons, firearms and bombs);
 (b) the so-called illegal action which is, by its very nature, closely connected with the first factor; and (c) agitation among the peasantry.

The collection and Manufacture of Arms. By circular letter of January 23, 1926, No. 52, the Central Committee had provided Section-executives with a number of printed circulars for distribution among Subsections, and containing an appeal for the strengthening of finances. While these circulars only refer to "normal" deficits in the P.K.I.-budget, they also stress that "costs have increased because of the ban on public meetings and other obstructions which are forcing us to work harder; this is the more difficult since we are forced to change our tactics." These circulars go on to press for immediate transfers of these monies, for it is not impossible that the forces of reaction will "also seek new ways of paralyzing us, e.g. by means of a blockade, (39) which will prevent us from receiving funds (by confiscating postal money orders, etc.)."

Yet the immediate transfer of funds was not given the priority which one would lead us to believe, for in its letter No. 211 of March 11, 1926, the C.C. instructed the Padang-Section to the effect that, while contributions were to be regularly forwarded to headquarters, gifts (wang derma) were to be held over, pending further dispositions from Sutan Said Ali. (40) "Concluding this letter, we herewith order all comrades to consult Comrade Said Ali, C.C.-representative for all of Sumatra, in all matters and we also enjoin you, comrades, to give top priority to organizational matters and to abide by Party discipline!"

Whatever the case may have been elsewhere, on the West Coast of Sumatra these "gifts" were assumed to be intended for the purchase of arms, and they were used for that purpose. (41)

Hadji Mohammad Nur Ibrahim is also said to have been in direct contact with Alimin and Muso in the Straits Settlements, and to have received arms from there. Furthermore, Mr. Van Eck of the firm of Boon supplied the necessary clandestine weapons which he not only sold to Communists, but also to well-to-do people, who--lacking confidence in police and administration--thought it advisable to

(39) Instruction No. 6 A reveals that the C.C. had been worried by this eventuality as far back as June, 1925.

(40) It was, indeed, intended to retain these monies in Sumatra. Part of the expected financial aid from Moscow was earmarked for the West Coast of Sumatra, and the revolution was scheduled to commence on receipt of these funds.

(41) The contribution lists for these "gifts" which were being circulated in Palembang read in part as follows: "Our Committee hopes that comrades will enter their names on this list of contributions destined for extremely urgent organizational expenditures of our Party...and will thereby help to strengthen our People's Army. All comrades are asked to help, since with the help of their monetary contributions our just and noble ideal will the sooner be realized." Elsewhere similar lists were being passed around, ostensible for the aid of the victims of the earthquake at Padang Pandjang, or for the erection of a mosque.

arm themselves in defense against Communist robberies. (42) Arms were also bought by traders and rubber tappers commuting to Boven-Djambi and Kuantan for protection against assailants en route.

As became evident in the course of the testimony of Maliki gelar Datuk Sipado, the fourteenth defendant in the Kamang-affair during the court hearing of January 24, 1927, local committees, i.a. at Padang Pandjang and Silungkang had been entrusted with the Communist trade in weapons, in which Section-leader Arif Fadlillah had himself been directly implicated. (43) In August, 1926 the accused had been ordered to purchase a pistol from Ramaja, the Communist chief at Kamang, at Padang Pandjang, for which purpose he had i.a. to contact Arif Fadlillah. Having paid the required amount to Arif Fadlillah, he was given a receipt for Mankudum Sati at Kota Lawas, the former S.R. Sarekat Rakjat president, to whom we have referred above (See Notes 19 and 22).

Mangkudum Sati was, indeed, the center of the illegal trade in weapons at Padang Pandjang; he was aided by the following: Tadjuddin from Air Angat, Achmat, the Eurasian, Keling, and Zainuddin gelar Sutan Palembang. These men stood in contact, among others, with Radjab at Fort de Kock and Mohammed Jatim at Padang. Tadjuddin i.a. also instructed a certain Na'amin in the Padang area in the manufacture of bombs. As early as June, Sarun was already transporting bombs from Padang to Silungkang.

Bludgeoning weapons were i.a. manufactured at Lintau, bomb cases at Sungai Puar, the bombs being locally filled with explosives both at Padang Pandjang itself and in its environs, as well as at other places.

Some time after the puasa Muslim fasts of 1926 Arif Fadlillah summoned the executive of the Silungkang Subsection to Padang Pandjang, there to acquaint them with the fact that the Sectional executive had been transferred thither from Padang. On that occasion he also gave the following order to Sulaiman Labai, the representative from Silungkang: "We must now start to stock cutlasses (rudus) for the uprising." From then on Arif Fadlillah used to channel the requisite orders through Limin, secretary of the Silungkang Subsection, who maintained regular written and oral contact with him.

At that time (May, 1926) a beginning was made with the reorganization of the executive of the Silungkang Subsection on an illegal basis, in which the actual leaders of the movement, excluded from the official executive, formed the so-called "Double Organization." This will be discussed at greater length below.

(42) The largest number of arms were concentrated in the Subsection of Paraman, of old a center of the clandestine importation of weapons; after the thorough cleanup by the military, the following equipment was rounded up, viz., 3 dummy pistols, 1 dummy revolver, 5 parabellums, 82 brownings, 512 revolvers (in various states of usability), 67 home-made pistols and 38 bombs—all this distributed among a population of 200,000. Also found were 5 breech-loaders, but it must be kept in mind that these rifles were also used for the extermination of rabbits which are infesting this cocoanut-growing region. Considering the fact that Pariaman had for many years past had the reputation of being the center of the clandestine importation of arms, the above figures cannot possibly represent the actual amount of all clandestine weapons in the area.

(43) Sutan Said Ali's part in these activities has already been discussed above.

The Illegal Action in General: The Instructions from the Central Committee of the P.K.I. Relating to This Action and the Standpoint of the Communist International. The second factor of Communist activities during 1926 consisted of the illegal action. It will be necessary to devote some more time to this factor, in order to gain a proper understanding of this action within the framework of Communist tactics in general. It would, that is to say, be erroneous to assume that it is limited to the so-called radical "left wing" of the Communist International.

Instruction No. 2 of March 24, 1925, had already called for the creation of cells on agricultural estates and for the strengthening of both fighting spirit (in other words, the will to use force), and conviction (that is, concerning the final Communist aim of conquering political power in this country); in carrying out these three points the strictest discipline would have to be observed, lest the action degenerate into anarchism. Only the Central Committee, being able to assess the overall situation, could determine the right moment for action.

The importance of planting cells among the workers--so the Instruction continued--lies not only in the fact "that the worker will be attracted for purposes of small scale action (by this, nota bene, is meant trade union action!) but the main aim is to use these cells for the great struggle, namely the conquest of political power in the country; once this struggle has succeeded we will make use of these cells for the realization of Communism, in other words, for the organization of the state on a proletarian basis, which will be preceded by the establishment of proletarian dictatorship."

"The planting of cells is of especially great importance among those workers who are still under the leadership of other parties. By means of these cells we will be able to eliminate these other parties who up to now have been their leaders, and we will be able to replace them by assuming that leadership ourselves."

The third paragraph of this Instruction deals with the importance of the formation of cells in kampongs [native living quarters in towns and cities], where people of different classes, such as petit-bourgeois elements, officials, etc. live side by side with workers; while these elements do not in themselves form a strong base for the development of Communism, they yet have identical interests which render them susceptible of agitation against the existing political order. This action can in due course be coordinated with that among the proletariat itself.

The fourth Paragraph of the Instruction deals with the problem which is of the greatest importance to our present discussion. Taking as its starting point the anti-Communist activities of the so-called Sarikat Hidjau's [Green Associations] in the Preanger district [of Western Java], the Instruction argues that these organizations cannot, in fact, be compared to the Fascist movement in Italy. The Sarikat Hidjau, so it is alleged, is not a popular movement with distinct political aims, but rather only a small band of paid scrappers, of whom we, Communists, need not be afraid. It is true that up to now we have been losing out to them, because they have been armed and we have not; but this kind of row never lasts very long. Furthermore..."with the use of all our cunning and conviction we can actually win these people over to our side." This kind of people can be easily won over by accepting them into our own organization. The comrades in areas outside the Preanger can learn from the experiences gathered there and can already now work in this direction. They should therefore speedily

draw into the movement those elements whom the adversaries of Communism might otherwise recruit for their Sarikat Hidjau's.

When, in 1926, direct rebellion became the aim on the West Coast of Sumatra, this Instruction could therefore quite easily serve as a starting point. It goes, then, without saying that Section-leader Arif Fadlillah strictly adhered to these precepts when he announced that new members, i.a. at Fort van der Kapellen and Pariaman, were to be recruited from among the intellectuals, the rich, and the habitual fighters.

The above-quoted Instruction No. 2 was incorrect to the extent that it made it appear as if illegal action were the answer to the Sarikat Hidjau. In his Die Taktik der Kommunistischen Internationale (1921), Sinoviev, the opponent of the left-wing in 1921, says (on p. 74) that the Communists must never "forget that their most important task is the preparation of the illegal organization. The Communists must never lose sight of the fact that the majority is not only conquered in the legal arena, but that it can, and must, be attained by other means." In an earlier passage, he enumerates among the tactical rules the following: "Participation in all workers' organizations, from workers' councils to sporting associations and music circles; unceasing propagation of the idea of proletarian dictatorship in each one of these organizations. Conquest of the majority of the working class for Communism, systematic, stubborn and unrelenting preparation of the working masses for the struggles ahead; untiring work in the creation of illegal organizations; patient and unceasing arming of the workers."

Similar directives were laid down by the resolutions of the Second Congress of the Communist International concerning the conditions for the acceptance of new parties in the International: "In almost all countries of Europe and America the class struggle is now entering the phase of civil war. Under these conditions the Communists cannot put any trust in bourgeois legality. They are forced to create everywhere a parallel, illegal organizational apparatus, which at the decisive moment will aid the party in the fulfillment of its duties vis-a-vis the Revolution...."

In accordance with this precept, Instruction No. 6 of the C.C. of the P.K.I. (May, 1925) already stated that since the Communists' final aim was revolution which doubtless would entail bloodshed, the Party could not restrict itself to propaganda but would have to train its members for the coming struggle. (44) "Those members of our revolutionary party who in future will have to fight, we may call soldiers of the party. Therefore we should also now already treat them as soldiers."

Party members, then, who show adaptness at espionage work will be used as spies. Others must penetrate as members such non-Communist organizations as Budi Utomo, Muhammadiyah, various youth clubs, etc. in places where those organizations are powerful, with the aim of propagating Communism within them by these means. "Let us make soldiers of courageous and hardened members...and, if necessary, let them take turns at guarding the houses of leading comrades at

(44) See also V. I. Lenin, Die internationale Kommunistische Bewegung (1924):

"Secondly, legal action must be combined with illegal action. This the Bolsheviks have always demanded, especially in the War of 1914-1918.... A Party...which does not systematically and thoroughly employ illegal tactics in opposition to the laws of the bourgeoisie and of bourgeois parliaments is a party of traitors and good-for-nothings, who by paying lip-service to the revolution dupe the people."

night time against surprise attacks by provocateurs (such as the Sarikat Hidjau, the police, and others."

Illegal action is also posited as an indispensable organizational tool by Tan Malaka. He urges the formation of Red Battalions (barisan merah), primarily for the protection of meetings and demonstrations against break-ups by the police, and for joining battle with police forces.

Distinct so-called "black-bands" already existed on Java; they were systematically organized on the West Coast only as a consequence of a Central Committee letter written towards the end of March, 1926. Thereafter anarchistic organizations (Sarikat Djin) gradually came into existence in different areas, particularly in the environs of Padang and in the adjacent part of Pariaman. (45) In the Kamang-affair, too, such a "black-band" played a role, which had been personally planned by Ramaja. We shall later return to these groups, as well as to the so-called Double Organization (D.O.) proper, at some length.

The Action among the Peasantry. The third aspect of Communist activities on the West Coast during 1926 was the work among the peasantry.

As early as October 2, 1925, the P.K.I.-leaders had gathered in the Padang Pandjang P.K.I.-Office, in order to map the course of action to be taken in the light of the waning influence of the movement. Mangkudum Sati had on that occasion stated that the situation on the West Coast of Sumatra markedly differed from that in other areas. On the West Coast, so he said, the Party was working for peasants (*petite bourgeoisie*), whereas elsewhere activities were centered on the workers. Since this state of affairs was in fact contrary to Communist principles, it would--he continued--be better to concentrate on the workers only in future. While other speakers admitted that the situation on the West Coast indeed differed from that in other areas, they added that this was due to the different social structure of the region. Communist action had, in fact, to adapt itself to these various social structures, and such adaptation did therefore not run counter to P.K.I.-tactics. The meeting agreed with this latter opinion. It was likewise shared by the Central Committee, which acted in accordance with the tactics of the Communist International. But before going into further detail, we must briefly refer to the antecedents which explain the discussion at Padang Pandjang.

As was previously mentioned, the Batavia Congress of the P.K.I. of June, 1924, had decided in favor of propaganda among the peasants. Their only awareness of the outside world--so the argument had run at that Congress--stems from the fact that they constantly have to pay more taxes; they argue that, since the taxes are imposed by the Dutch, the Dutch are their enemies. It must, therefore, be the task of the Communists to explain to the peasants, through the medium of the Sarikat Ra'jat, why their lot is so hard. This was Darsono's proposition which the Congress had approved. We already mentioned, however, that the Jogja (Kuta-gede) Conference of December, 1924, had reversed this line. Indeed, already during the June Congress Sikindar pleaded against the admission of too many petit-bourgeois elements into the ranks of the Party, lest they endanger its proletarian character. That Congress had also occasioned a veritable flood of jeers

(45) The Tarusan (Painan) P.K.I. initially even styled itself "anarchistic-communist." At Palembang, P.K.I.-cards were being sold bearing the imprint P.R.I. (Penjokong Revolutive Indonesia /Supporter of the Indonesian Revolution/).

directed at the bourgeois character of the intellectuals in B.U., N.I.P. and S.I., which is the more readily understood if we remember that the majority of P.K.I.-leaders at that time were trade union leaders! At the Jogja Conference the Central Committee had proposed to disband the Sarikat Ra'jat, which, though they attracted discontented elements, yet constituted a hotch potch without internal strength. It had, on the other hand, been emphasized that the future of the European petit-bourgeois element was not identical with that of the Indies. Whereas in Europe it could develop in a capitalist direction, here they were--mainly as a result of Western capitalism--destined to be absorbed by the proletariat. In other words, the economic development of this country would as it were naturally tend towards the progressive identification of the contradiction between employer and employee with that between ruler and ruled. The majority of the Jogja Conference therefore decided that the dissolution of the Sarikat Ra'jats would be premature; instead of disbanding them, they should be allowed to disintegrate. In the meantime the Party, in accordance with the resolution of the Central Committee, was to re-direct all its energies to the revolutionary-political trade union movement, and to proceed from agitation to direct workers' action. The basis of the P.K.I. are, so it was stated, trade unions. (46) As a consequence of this resolution the general meeting in Padang Pandjang of February, 1925, had disbanded the Sarikat Ra'jats on the West Coast of Sumatra, at the same time, however, incorporating its members as provisional Party-members under the leadership of P.K.I.-members proper, who were entrusted with the task of instructing them in Communism by means of lecture courses.

1. The changed tactics of the Communist International and their causes: In the meantime the tactics of the Communist International had, however, undergone change. In the beginning, it is true, the International had sought its center of gravity in the working class movement of the West as the harbingers of world revolution, while it regarded the movement in the colonies as at best a welcome complement. But in the intervening years the Russian leaders had learned to understand that an early world revolution could no longer be expected; this was the inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the disappointments in Munich, Hungary and Italy, between 1919 and 1920, from the repeated failures in Germany in early 1919, March, 1921, and October, 1923; from the course of events in Rumania, Yugoslavia, Poland and Spain, and from the stabilization of capitalism in the West in general. Admittedly Russia had concluded treaties with adjacent states which offered a measure of protection against direct attack from abroad, but even then her economic position and the internal situation forced her to embark on a series of concessions to capitalism. (47) One Communist principle after

(46) The discussion reproduced above repeated several arguments which had also been adduced in the internal struggle of the Russian and Chinese Communist Parties.

(47) Cf. the most recent apology (and recognition) in the "Letter of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union to all Sections of the Communist International" dated January 13, 1926, following upon the 14th Party Congress. The letter is reprinted in Die Kommunistische Internationale (1926), Part I.

From the point of view of the development of the taxation system in the Soviet Union it is extremely interesting to consult the book Das Steuersystem Sowjetrusslands (1926), by Professor Paul Haensel, economic adviser to the Finance Commissariat of the U.S.S.R. As is known, even inheritance rights have again been recognized. The time-honored institution of the village gathering (Schod) is again replacing the village soviets. Just as in pre-

the other had to be abandoned. The agrarian policy of the Soviet Union, over 80% of whose population are peasants, no longer contains a trace even of Communism. The share of private capital in small-scale industry now already amounts to 90%, but even in large-scale industry capitalist enterprise has again started to play a modest role. Class-differences are increasingly being accentuated. All that is left of the original Communism is a fairly extensive industrial enterprise managed by the state, (48) which from an economic point of view is by no means flourishing, though production has just again reached its pre-war level. Even then, however, the organization of this enterprise is cast in a capitalist mold. (49)

As a consequence, all expectations now turned to the colonies, where it was possible to strike at the all-powerful foreign capitalism in its imperialistic form. (50) It is from the colonies, after all, that capitalism obtains its raw materials, it is there that it finds its markets and there its capital is invested. If a blow could be struck at the life-strings of capitalism in the East, the crisis in the West would ensue which would prepare the road to social revolu-

revolutionary times, the rich peasants (kulaks) are again the leaders of the Schod's! The question of whether to neutralize the so-called "middle-peasants" or to seek an alliance with them formed the core of the struggle between Stalin and Sinoviev. The majority now says with Stalin, "With the middle-peasant against the kulak." Finally, let us recall Bukharin's characteristic slogan, "Enrich yourselves!", given out at one time during 1925; though it caused a powerful commotion at the time, the Central Committee did not allow it to be discussed in public. When Stetzki defended this slogan, be it in somewhat diluted form, in the central organ of the Communist youth organization, the Secretariat merely replied on June 2, 1925, as follows: "This slogan is not our slogan....Our slogan is that of socialist accumulation. We are eliminating the administrative barriers which stand in the way of increased agricultural welfare. No doubt this operation facilitates all kinds of accumulation, socialist as well as private, capitalistic; but at no time has the Party said that private accumulation as such was its slogan...." In other words, it was not considered opportune to call a spade a spade at that time.

(48) The foreign trade monopoly is merely a form of protectionism.

(49) Cf. Simon Zagorsky, La renaissance du capitalisme dans la Russie des Soviets (Paris, 1924); Lenin, Bukharin and Rutgers, The New Policies of Soviet Russia (Chicago, n.d.); Russia: The Official Report of the British Trades Union Delegation to Russia in November and December 1924.

(50) See also: Aurelio Palmieri, La Politica Asiatica dei Bolscevichi (Bologna, 1924); E. Hurwicz, Die Orientpolitik der 3. Internationale (1922); Paul Olberg, "Sowjetrusslands Politik im Orient," Archiv für Sozialwissenschaften und Sozialpolitik, No. 50 (1922); J. Castagne, "Les Indes et l'Egypte vues de Russie," in Revue du Monde Musulman, No. 50 (1925), pp. 213-271, and the same author's "Les majorities Musulmanes et la politiques des soviets en Asie Centrale," in ibid., pp. 147-211, and his "Les Bamatchis" (1925), in ibid., No. 63 (1926), pp. 96-126. See also Revue du Monde Musulman 51-52 (1922); 50 (1922), pp. 28-73; 56 (1923), pp. 167 ff. Cf. "La politique de la Nouvelle Russie en Asie Centrale," Revue de Paris, September 1, 1927.

tion. (51) Because of the growing political importance of the Pacific area after the World War, attention was primarily focused on this part of the world.

Sinoviev had already recognized this importance in his speech to the first Congress of Communist and Revolutionary Organizations of the Far East, held in Moscow in January, 1922: "The main trend of the present post-war period is, so it seems to me, the fact that this time no longer European questions, but Asian questions, the questions of the Far East are ever more relentlessly pressing to the fore.... The foci of imperialist competition are moving to Asia. By this very fact the problem of the Far East is becoming a thousand times more urgent than it has up to now been; it is becoming the problem of all problems, the axis of all world politics, as well as the axis of the emancipation movement of the proletariat and of the suppressed peoples.... Comrade Lenin has many times said that the hundreds of millions of inhabitants of the Far East are, to quote his own words, the last reserves of mankind. The last reserves of mankind they, indeed, are. For many years now, the Russian proletariat has been bleeding on its post as vanguard of the proletarian world revolution. Yet even if victory were to be ours within the European framework, it would not be a tenable victory unless the last reserves of mankind, unless the countless millions of the masses in the countries, whose representatives you are, were to rise, too.... For you, the many million of peoples of the Far East, are the only so far not apportioned tidbit in the world. At this moment when the bourgeoisie of the world itself has no realization of the nature of present events and does not know what lies in store for it when it wakes up tomorrow..., now you are the decisive weight in the scales."

Indeed, according to Stalin, "the road to the successful revolution in the West leads through the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement in the colonies and the dependent countries against imperialism" (52) The deliberations of the Enlarged Executive of the Communist International at its meeting in Moscow from March 21 to April 6, 1925 (Protokoll, pp. 121-122) ran along similar lines: "The more we favor the formation of organizations among the suppressed peoples of the East the more shall we be able to influence them to rise against their exploiters. And the more we can do this the more shall we destroy the economic system of capitalism. It is for this reason that the question of the colonial peoples must not be viewed sentimentally; we must not be motivated by the belief in an abstract right to independence of the colonial peoples--which, of course, exists--but rather by a clear recognition of the fact that European workers cannot be emancipated as long as the colonial peoples are kept in subjection and exploitation by the imperialists. If we wish to save ourselves, if we want to destroy capitalism in order to establish our own power, then we must support the peoples of the Orient, must encourage them, and aid and strengthen them in their struggle against imperialism. It is from this point of view that we, as Bolsheviks, have to consider the question of the Oriental peoples." (Gallacher). (53)

The shifting of the center of Russian foreign policy to the colonies and backward countries necessitated a changed policy vis-a-vis the nationalist movements in those areas.

(51) The origin of this change of front dates from the report of Karakhan to the Communist International of February 2, 1919.

(52) Probleme des Leninismus, p. 125.

(53) See also Bukharin in Protokoll, pp. 228-229.

In the first pages of this chapter we already indicated that Lenin's thesis at the Third Comintern Congress had prescribed a more or less reserved attitude towards nationalist parties. A similar point of view had also been taken by Wijnkoop, at that time the Communist leader in the Netherlands, as well as by the P.K.I.-leadership in this country [i.e., the Netherlands Indies]. Even then, however, the supplementary thesis submitted to the same Congress by the Indian Communist leader, Roy, (54) already contained the following statement:

"In its first stages the revolution in the colonies will not be a Communist revolution. But if from the very outset the leadership is in the hands of the Communist vanguard, the revolutionary masses will not stray from the correct path, but will move forward through the successive developmental stages of revolutionary experience. The attempt to solve the agrarian problem in many oriental countries in accordance with pure Communist principles would, indeed, constitute a serious mistake. In the first stages the revolution in the colonies will have to be carried out by means of a program in which a good many bourgeois stock-in-trade, such as land-distribution, may have to be incorporated.

Similar pronouncements followed in due course; among them Safarov's preliminary report to the First Congress of Communist and Revolutionary Organizations of the Far East in Moscow in January, 1922: "In the initial period the revolutionary movements in China and Korea must inevitably bear the characteristics of a national-revolutionary movement.... (55) The Communist parties must win the broad masses of the working people over to their side, and through gradual and stubborn work assume the position of the leading vanguard of the national-revolutionary movement; they will attain these goals by their implacable struggle against imperialism, based on class organization and on Communist education of the workers and the semi-proletarian peasant masses; and by their struggle to link the national-revolutionary movement in the Far East with the international struggle of the proletariat.... Proletarian revolutionaries may not hold the erroneous point of view that only the proletarian movement in the colonies must be supported. It is not the fault of those backward countries but rather their misfortune that the proletarian layer in their societies is extremely limited in numbers. Only in alliance with the proletarian movement can these suppressed peoples attain their liberation; only this alliance enables them to throw off the rotting and rusty chains which are binding them now. The result of our today's deliberations should give us a clear understanding of the fact that the possibilities for the victory of the national-revolutionary movement will increase in the measure that the proletarian masses will come to play an independent role in that movement and in the measure that the Proletarian element among those suppressed peoples will become the leader in this national-revolutionary struggle.... It should by now be perfectly obvious to all that only an orientation towards Soviet Russia, only an orientation towards the Communist International, towards the working class as an international force can save the suppressed masses of Korea, China and Mongolia...."

(54) Cf. M. N. Roy, Indien (2nd ed., Verlag der Kommunistischen Internationale, 1922), and the same author's La liberation nationale des Indes (Paris: Editions Socialistes Internationales, n.d. [1927/]).

(55) Contrast with this dictum Baars' article in Het Vrije Woord, previously quoted at the beginning of this chapter: "The Communist International has advanced beyond the state of the slogan that 'national independence' must precede the class struggle...!"

2. The effect of the changed tactics on the writings of Tan Malaka: The basic principles sketched above received further elaboration for Indonesian conditions in the writings of Tan Malaka. He provides no answer to the question whether a speedy disintegration of capitalism can still be expected, or whether the recession years might be followed by a peaceful period of capitalist development, even though he considers the chances for the former alternative less favorable than it had been in the first few years after the Russian Revolution. (56) He does, however, argue that the increasingly conflicting interests among the capitalist nations, together with the military and naval activities of the countries bordering on the Pacific Ocean, tend to increase the probability of a new world war in the Pacific, on a scale grander and more horrid than the last world war. The growing solidarity and consciousness of the world proletariat threatens, on the other hand, to transform any imperialist war into a class war. We Indonesian Communists cannot make our policy entirely depend on the hope that all capitalist countries of the world must collapse first. If Dutch colonial capitalism were to collapse today or tomorrow then we must be prepared to create a new and firmer order in Indonesia. As a matter of fact, the situation is for us by far more favorable than it is in e.g. Egypt, British India or the Philippines, because of the fact that there exists in Indonesia no class, no national bourgeoisie of any importance which would help Dutch imperialism back on its feet. On the other hand, the "immization" (*Verelendung*) of the masses is constantly increasing; (57) the contrast between ruler and ruled is daily gaining in intensity; the honeyed voice of the Ethical Policy has given way to the monotonous sound of the policeman's baton and to the rattling of sabres; yet revolutionary sentiment is growing in spite of intimidation and brute force. It is true that to all appearances official quarters, cognizant of the changed mentality, have behind the scenes schemed to lessen their harsh opposition to the Indonesian people and to improve the economic condition of the population; but we Communists, who know the economic and social structure of Indonesia venture to say that the wielders of power cannot escape from their own narrow bureaucratic confines. How, indeed, can Dutch imperialism now all of a sudden undo the damage of centuries?

The material required for the bridging of the gulf, and the starting point even for a compromise are both lacking. The seating of an additional two or three Indonesians in the Volksraad /the Legislative Council/ is, therefore, as meaningless as the granting of some more political concessions to the Indonesians; unlike that of Egypt, British India and the Philippines, the Indonesian contra-

(56) The discussion concerning the collapse of capitalism has been a periodic feature in Russia. For the most recent theoretical analysis of the official standpoint, see the resolutions of the seventh plenary session of the E.K.K.I. (December, 1926).

(57) In an article entitled "Neue Stürme in Indonesien im Anzuge," one "Kjai Samin" writes in Die Kommunistische Internationale (1927, No. 38-39, p. 1906): "In essence the intensification of these racial conflicts merely reflects a change in the intensification of class conflicts. We have already mentioned that there is no native bourgeoisie in Indonesia with whom the imperialists could defend common interests. The native petite bourgeoisie is in a process of continuous disintegration. The rapid increase in invested capital has had a strongly disintegrative impact on the peasantry, reducing many peasants to propertyless coolies. Wages of laborers, manual as well as intellectual, are persistently declining as a result of ever fiercer competition. Unemployment among the intellectuals, hitherto non-existent in Indonesia, is steadily increasing...."

diction is in the first place not a political, but an economic problem. For this reason our path must lie outside of Parliament. In British India, Egypt, and the Philippines there exists, after all, a strong native bourgeoisie, whose economic interests coincide with those of the imperialists, (58) and to whom the imperialists can therefore gradually transfer political power without qualms. In those countries, in other words, the road towards national liberation can, with a greater or lesser degree of support from the masses, lead through dominion-status and a "National Parliament." (59) Not so, however, in Indonesia. Even if capital were available, a national industry cannot suddenly be created out of nothing. A strengthening of army and navy thus remains the one and only salvation for the maintenance of Dutch capitalism. This, however, requires money and leads to increased taxation and growing discontent. In the absence of national industry and national commerce the non-proletarian elements among the Indonesians therefore find themselves in the same miserable condition as the industrial workers. As a result no Indonesian stands to lose anything in an eventual clash between Dutch imperialism and the Indonesian people. In Indonesia we can therefore—says Tan Malaka—use a variation on Marx and call out to the entire people: "You have nothing to lose but your chains."

Tan Malaka goes on to say that the treason of the social democrats is responsible for arresting the world revolution in Europe and for retarding the implementation of Communist theory in Russia. The Bolsheviks were consequently forced to embark on an economic and tactical retreat in 1921, which is called the "New Economic Policy" [N.E.P.]. Under this policy, peasants and petit bourgeois elements in the cities were again allowed to own private property, and thus to trade and produce on a capitalist basis. By these tactics, so Tan Malaka asserts, the peasants were won for the workers' state. The N.E.P. is of particularly great importance for Indonesia. (60) Here, too, it will not be possible to introduce Communism immediately after the attainment of national independence. Capitalism in Indonesia is a colonial capitalism, which has not organically developed from within native society itself, as was the case in Europe. It was superimposed on an Eastern, feudal society by force by a Western imperialist state, and for Western needs. No large-scale industries exist, and there are

(58) See also, J. V. Stalin, Probleme des Leninismus, 2nd impr., (1927), pp. 214.

(59) The above passage parallels Roy's analysis of the reconciliation between the bourgeoisie in British India and British imperialism presented to the Fifth Congress of the Communist International. "The national bourgeoisie has expressed itself in favor of imperial federation. Why? Because the new economic policy of imperialism is advocating the industrialization of the colonies. This is what the native bourgeoisie is demanding at the present moment. They will be completely reconciled with imperialism as soon as certain political rights are conceded to them." Cf. J. Castagne, "Les Indes et l'Egypte vues de Russie," in Revue du Monde Musulman, 59 (1925), pp. 213-271; M. N. Roy, La liberation nationale des Indes. Roy likewise wants to turn the proletariat into the vanguard in the struggle for "national liberation," in opposition to imperialism and the national bourgeoisie.

(60) Cf. Bukharin, "Perspektivender chinesischen Revolution," in Die Kommunistische Internationale, 1927, p. 669: "At each stage of this development (i.e. of the revolution in China) a more or less intensive struggle will have to be waged against capitalistic tendencies; a certain measure of capitalistic conditions will have to be tolerated, in all probability by far exceeding those in the Soviet Union."

qualitatively and quantitatively few workers. In Indonesia a pure dictatorship of the proletariat could in the early stages seriously impair economic life, particularly so, if the world revolution does not take place simultaneously. (61) The non-proletarian majority of the population would be driven into opposition against the numerically small working class.

It will, therefore, be necessary to allow these non-proletarians on a limited scale to own private property and to carry on capitalistic enterprises. More than that even, the state will have to lend them material and moral support in order to increase production. It goes without saying, of course, that large-scale enterprises will immediately be nationalized. (62) Tan Malaka expects that by these means the economic activity of the population can be developed without creating an important class or group of people which would exploit and suppress another class or group. The economic balance between proletarians and non-proletarians can thus be attained and maintained which will then be automatically followed by the political balance. (63) The non-proletarian majority must be given an opportunity for making its voice heard. This will be possible if the minority, the workers, form the vanguard of the entire population in the event

(61) Cf. Bukharin, op. cit., p. 671: "In China, on the other hand, we cannot today set such a proletarian dictatorship as our goal. This is the original feature of the situation in China. At the present moment our Party must aim at a dictatorship sui generis, a dictatorship based on a bloc between the working class, the peasantry and the petite bourgeoisie. Our endeavors must be directed towards this goal. The main task and the chief problem of the Chinese Revolution today is the victory over the imperialist enemy. This is the central task.... The working class of China, is, however, not capable of independently governing a country which is economically more backward than that is our Soviet Union at present. By itself, the working class can neither economically nor politically lead the country solely with the support of the peasantry, as is the case in the U.S.S.R. But it can do so in concert with the broad layers of the peasantry and the petite bourgeoisie, at the same time maintaining and safeguarding its leading role, and with the strong international support (!) from our Union...." The kind of "support" Bukharin has in mind was outlined by him at the meeting of Moscow Party functionaries. On that occasion he said i.a. that "if the victory of the Chinese Revolution is achieved with the aid of the Soviet Union, the difficult position of Western European capitalism can be exploited. Thus the transit of goods from Germany could e.g. be organized through our monopoly of foreign trade via the territory of our Union." (Die Kommunistische Internationale, No. 14, April 5, 1927, pp. 669-670). A pity, indeed, that the state industry of the U.S.S.R. is as yet incapable of meeting the internal demands of the country; otherwise it, too, could "help"! Roy, (op. cit., p. 84) also advocates that the Indian struggle for national liberation be brought about by a bloc similar to that advocated by Bukharin for China. "The social elements which will have to participate in the liberation struggle are the intellectuals of the petite bourgeoisie, the artisans, the small traders, the peasants and the proletariat."

(62) Cf. Bukharin, op. cit., p. 671.

(63) Tan Malaka is here obviously endeavoring to apply the so-called "theory of balance" developed by the well-known Russian Communist theoretician, Bukharin. (Cf. his Theorie des historischen Materialismus, 1922; Oekonomie der Transformationsperiode, 1922).

of a war for national liberation. In such a case the large-scale enterprises and, with them, political power will fall into the workers' hands. (64) The many millions of guilders which are now flowing into the pockets of the parasites at The Hague can then be devoted to the education and hygiene of the Indonesian people; they can be used for the advancement of Indonesian industry (65) (textile and machine factories, wharfs, hydro-electric stations), and for subsidies to peasants, retail traders and small-scale industrialists, in order to stimulate production. (66) According to Tan Malaka's prognosis--which on this point is somewhat more "optimistic" than that of Lenin himself--the small entrepreneurs will gradually come to realize that state enterprises can produce faster, better and more cheaply, than can they themselves; in the measure that they gain this understanding, they will voluntarily surrender to these enterprises and be merged with them. (67)

(64) See Thesen und Resolutionen der Erweiterten Exekutive (March-April, 1925), p. 58: "It will likewise be possible for colonial countries to by-pass the stage of capitalist development if in the process of the revolution the proletariat asserts its predominance in the powerful industrial centers.... This does not mean that there will not be any capitalistic development whatsoever in these countries. The whole process there will be characterized by contradictory forms, and the capitalistic forms will unavoidably stand out in this development. On the other hand, however, there will also exist a powerful tendency of a socialist character which will determine the whole process in its widest content."

(65) Cf. Bukharin, Theorie des historischen Materialismus, p. 306. A typical aspect of this theory is the developmental process of the revolution: "Political Ideology--Conquest of Power--Utilization of this Power for the Transformation of the Relations of Production," (p. 309); we thus get the pattern: "From ideology to technology" (p. 307). The starting point for the whole theory remains "the disturbance of the balance between the forces of production and the relations of production. This manifests itself in the disturbance of the balance between the various parts of the relations of production. This disturbance, in turn, leads to a disturbance of the balance between the classes and finds its principal manifestation in the destruction of the psychology of public peace. Furthermore, a sudden disturbance of the political balance takes place, which is followed by its restoration on a new basis. This is, again, followed by a sudden disturbance of the economic structural balance and its restoration on a new basis, followed finally by the construction of a new technical foundation." (pp. 306-307). Communist theory does not regard the Russian Revolution as a specifically Russian phenomenon, but as a general prototype, from which general "laws" can be deduced.

(66) Cf. the "Economic Directives" for Russia, issued by the C.C. of the C.P.S.U.: "Realization of industrialization, increase in the specific weight of the working class, aid to the poor, and support for the middle, layers in the villages."

(67) On this point see Thesen und Resolutionen..., p. 60.

This process automatically (68) marks the disappearance of petit-bourgeois politics which given place to the politics of the workers. (69) The further development will comprise two phases, viz. 1) the phase of the Soviet State (i.e., the transitional period from capitalism to pure Communism, in which the dictatorship of the proletariat is being realized and in which the proletariat imposes its will on the bourgeoisie); and 2) the phase of pure Communism. The speed with which these two phases will be attained will depend on the international situation as well as on the development of industries in Indonesia itself. (70)

The main problem then, says Tan Malaka, is, that the leadership from the very beginning remains in the hands of the proletariat, embodied in the P.K.I. As soon as the inhabitants of the large cities on Java and those of the Outer Islands realize that the program of the P.K.I. aims at a general increase in the welfare of the people rather than at disregarding the non-proletarians, they will as a whole accept the leadership of the P.K.I. The S.R. (Sarekat Rak'jat) has to be increasingly transformed into an organization of all enemies of imperialism. (71)

(68) This again represents a significantly more optimistic view than that expressed by Lenin himself, ...in spite of the proletarian dictatorship in Russia. See Lenin's Left-wing Radicalism, an Infantile Disease of Communism, and J. V. Stalin's summary in Lenin und der Leninismus (2nd ed., 1925, pp. 54 ff.).

(69) Cf. Bukharin, Perspektiven der chinesischen Revolution, op. cit., p. 672.

(70) What, we may ask, is left of the former point of view of the P.K.I. as expressed by Baars, whom we quoted at the beginning of this chapter? See, however, Section (3), below and also Stalin in Die Kommunistische Internationale, 1927, No. 38/39, on the various stages of the Chinese Revolution. On China, in December, 1926, see also the resolution of the Seventh Enlarged Plenary Session of the E.K.K.I., which indicates as the next stage of the Chinese Revolution "the democratic dictatorship of the proletariat, the peasantry and the urban petite-bourgeoisie under the hegemony of the proletariat," which is to act as "the anti-imperialist revolutionary government of the bloc of these three classes." According to the Comintern, "the next task of the revolution in China is not the realization of the socialist revolution, but the completion of the national revolution, with the imperialists as its main target. In the course of this developmental process this revolution will gradually grow into the socialist revolution." We know that Trotsky was opposed to these tactics and that he has found justification for his point of view in the later developments in China. The E.K.K.I.-Plenum repudiated his views on May 30, 1927. The Communist Party of China itself has now, in fact, been accused of Trotskyism! The official analysis of this accusation can be found in the resolutions of the C.C.-Plenum of the C.P.S.U. of August 9, 1927 (cf. Die Kommunistische Internationale, 1927, Nos. 34 and 35), in which it is claimed that the present policy is in harmony with the theories developed by Lenin at the Second Comintern Congress.

(71) The model for this organizational pattern was no doubt derived from the Chinese Kuomintang and from the tactics adopted vis-a-vis that movement by the Communist International. See also Tan Pin Shan in Die Kommunistische Internationale, November 2, 1926, No. 7, p. 292. Identical tactics were incidentally also applied to Egypt, British India and Central Asia: cf. Revue du Monde Musulman, 59 (1925), pp. 147-271; see also Roy, loc.cit.

"Thus our chief aim is to bring together all layers of the population who are dissatisfied with Dutch imperialism, and to lead them in all actions." Consequently the standpoint expressed by the C.C. of the P.K.I. at the Jogja Conference in December, 1924, was incorrect; it was wrong in advocating the dissolution of the S.R. and its fusion with the P.K.I. on account of the former's petit-bourgeois nature. "It should, therefore, be already quite clear that the respective positions of P.K.I. and S.R. do not correspond to the division between substructure and superstructure; let there be no distinction between participants and non-participants in lecture courses, none between high and low (is it not true that, we, together with the entire population, are striving for the era of equality?); the distinction is, rather, between two suppressed classes, but classes which differ in their needs and aims, and which therefore must be organized in two divisions." Thus, on the one hand, we must aim at national solidarity which, once Dutch overlordship has collapsed, will act as a barrier against the divide-et-impera policies of imperialist thieves like England, Japan or America; on the other hand, the revolutionary leadership must remain in the hands of the workers. This is reasonable since, in the absence of national capitalists, the class of industrial workers--being the most consolidated and most developed class--is the only class capable of creating a powerful economic and political organization and to formulate a clearly defined goal. Where the Indonesian non-proletarians do not form a distinct class, (72) they can hardly formulate clear-cut aim, let alone give firm leadership to the Indonesian people; this is proved by the failures of B.U., N.I.P. and S.I. (73) The P.K.I. must, then, form the vanguard in the struggle for national liberation, if it wishes to retain the leadership in its own hands. (74)

- (72) Tan Malaka prides himself on having been the originator of a political program based on a socio-economic analysis of society. His is, therefore, allegedly the only program of real importance. In this argument he is again, however, following the prescriptions of Lenin. Cf. Sinoviev at the conference of the Enlarged Executive of March-April, 1925 (which also adopted the resolution concerning the policy to be followed by the P.K.I. in the Indies), Protokoll, pp. 46 ff.; see also Note 83, below.
- (73) It is typical that Tan Malaka in this instance again bases himself on the thesis defended by Roy at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern; this thesis was at that time (1924) still opposed by the "Chief Rapporteur" Manuilski, who denied the importance of the developing class contradictions within colonial societies which Roy had stressed; Roy himself had of course been thinking in terms of British India. Cf. the following remarks by Roy: "It will be necessary to examine the conditions in the individual countries in order to determine which social class in each of them is objectively the most revolutionary, to enter into relations with that social class and in this way to organize the entire population and to aid it in its struggle against imperialism." (Protokoll, II, p. 650; cf. also Protokoll of the Fourth Congress, pp. 590-598). We thus find here the same tactics of the anti-imperialist united front with the aim of taking the leadership of the nationalist movement out of the hands of the bourgeoisie, and of keeping the bourgeoisie itself on the hook. See also Stalin, Probleme des Leninismus, 2nd impr., (1927), pp. 214-215, and Roy, La liberation nationale des Indes.
- (74) On the West Coast the active elements were called barisan di muka /vanguard/ while those people who were recruited by such means as intimidation, etc., were designated as barisan di belakang /rearguard/.

Because of these considerations, the strategic blow (75)--in other words, the final battle in which we will deploy all our forces for the attainment of the strategic victory, breaking the organic communications of the enemy in order to destroy him thereafter--this blow must strike at the Solo-Valley (Jogja, Solo, Madiun, Kediri, Surabaya), center of industries, plantations, communications and banks, rather than at Batavia (the political center), or Bandung (the military center). (76) A modern political and military victory can only be maintained if we have the economic instruments of power in our hands. For purposes of diversionary maneuvers, offensives in such areas as the Preanger and primarily also in Achin and Ternate are very important, but the Solo-Valley is decisive. If we can maintain our position there, while at the same time successfully defending ourselves in the economic centers (the East Coast of Sumatra, Palembang, East Borneo) and in the political and military centers (Batavia, Bandung, Magelang and Achin), then we can use the Solo-Valley as the base for the Indonesian Republic. This will be easier still if our propaganda and influence can also be carried into the army and the navy, in which case it will be far from easy for the Dutch imperialists to make use of their instruments of military power. The voices of the workers from the Solo-Valley will be heard by other workers in Asia, Europe and America, and this will make it difficult for the foreign imperialists to exterminate the Indonesian workers. Above all, however, the Third International will also endeavor to call a halt to the imperialist slaughter.

But before the General Staff of the P.K.I. can decide on waging this strategic battle, we must first prove our enthusiasm, courage, skill, insight, discipline and perseverance in tactical battles, i.e., in battles with a limited aim. Undeniably our political organizations and unions will first have to experience a great amount of struggle. The timing of the strategic battle, moreover, not only depends on the quality of our organizations, but also on the politico-economic situation, both within the country and abroad. Tan Malaka considers the present time most opportune; we hold off for quite some time: no nation can for long be subjected to the tension of a threat which it does not immediately feel. It is, moreover, very questionable whether such a war would provide the opportune moment, since England and America would demand the absolute safety of Indonesia, which they might feel to be endangered by revolution; at the same time they would possess the military and naval powers to lend strength to their demands. Nor, again, can we afford to make our revolutionary tactics dependent on the coming of the world revolution, which very likely will be preceded by a long period of peaceful development; if we wait, the people may go its own way and we are losing the leadership. If we hesitate until the completion of the Singapore naval base and until the Dutch naval programs have been executed, the best chance for obtaining national independence in Indonesia may well have passed unused. If, on the other hand, we take as an example the situation in China--where the powers, motivated by mutual jealousies, have not dared to intervene--then we conclude that, with a view to the commercial and strategic position of Indonesia in the Pacific area we should make use of the division among our enemies; motivated by fear of a new world war and the threatening danger of world revolution which such a war may entail, they will again not dare to intervene. If they do intervene,

(75) Thesen und Resolutionen der Erweiterten Exekutive (March-April, 1925), p. 58.

(76) Tan Malaka's more or less comprehensive discussion concerning strategy and tactics echoes the well-known Leninist theories concerning these subjects. Cf. J. V. Stalin, Lenin und der Leninismus (2nd ed., 1925, pp. 100 ff.), and V. I. Lenin, Zweierlei Taktiken: Der Radikalismus.

however, then we only stand to benefit from the world revolution. But the strategic battle will have a greater chance of succeeding if we now can successfully complete every single political and economic action on which we embark. This means that even if we cannot achieve complete victory now, we must to the best of our ability avoid a defeat which would paralyze our organization for a long time to come.

The above discussion explains why Tan Malaka disapproved of the revolutionary movement in 1926. He very well realized that it would be premature, because of insufficient preparation and organization, and also on account of an overestimation of Communist strength; he realized, too, that the rebellion was doomed to failure and thus would cripple the P.K.I. According to his tactical insight, its organization had been wrongly conceived: for one thing, the so-called "strategic offensive" had been entirely omitted, since there was not even a trace of intensive work among the masses in the Solo-Valley. The situation of 1926 did not fulfill any of the three conditions which Tan Malaka had laid down as a sine qua non for the success of the revolution, viz., 1) that the Party maintain an iron discipline, 2) that the Indonesian people stand under the leadership of the P.K.I.; and 3) that the enemies, at home as well as abroad, be divided. Tan Malaka was against guerilla warfare, such as Abdulkarim's in Morocco, against putsch, small-scale rebellion, and individualistic anarchism; he came out strongly for the education of the masses for organized mass action and for disciplined handling of weapons in the first place, and for strikes, boycotts and demonstrations. Then only could positive action be taken with a fair chance of success.

Tan Malaka shared the standpoint of the Communist International: "The Congress was quite aware of the fact that our largest parties must prepare for direct struggles, which are unavoidable and necessary in the immediate future; partial defeats in these struggles cannot stand in the way of our final victory. In its tactical resolutions the Congress has pointed out that under the existing labile 'balance' in Europe, any mass strike and any large-scale parliamentary conflict even may become the cause for revolution, for the immediate struggle for power...." (77) On the other hand, "...the Congress dissociated itself from the idea that an obvious minority can, at any time of its own choosing, and in particular at a time like the present, by a bold coup break through the passivity of the masses, surmount all other obstacles and emerge victorious from armed conflict. The Congress rejected the theory of the 'activization' of the working class movement by 'forceful means' in a situation lacking in all presuppositions for revolt." (78)

While, then, Tan Malaka was in disagreement with the revolutionary movement of 1926--a problem which we will discuss in some more detail below--he did agree

(77) Tan Malaka himself points out that the revolutionary movement shows quantitatively as well as qualitatively great fluctuations, which are conditioned by the politico-economic situation in each country. If an entire population suffers great misery and if the forces of reaction are callous and short-sighted, then the waves of revolutionary fervor can suddenly gain such momentum all over the country that the P.K.I.'s General Staff may find at its disposal an army of dimensions far beyond its wildest dreams. If, therefore, the P.K.I. can e.g. count on 50,000 members today, tomorrow the entire people might rally to the Communist flag, in protest against such measures as the introduction of the ground-tax on native lands or other kinds of economic pressure.

(78) Sinoviev, Die Taktik der Kommunistischen Internationale (1921), pp. 22-23.

with the abandonment of pure, Communist principles for purposes of propaganda among the non-proletarians. He recommends very flexible P.K.I. tactics vis-a-vis that group, which should take their material interests into consideration. The P.K.I. must be able to set in motion the revolutionary forces latent among the non-proletarians and to coordinate them with those of the proletariat. Here again we hear an echo of Roy's thesis: "During the first stages, the revolution in the colonies must be carried out with a program containing many a bourgeois stock-in-trade, such as the distribution of land, etc." Following Roy as well as the tactics of the Communist International, Tan Malaka stresses that the P.K.I. must form the vanguard in the struggle for national liberation, assuming and maintaining the leadership of the entire nationalist movement (79) with the aim of the ultimate realization of Communist ideals. (80) The other "objective-revolutionary" (81) groups must therefore be solely used as a means for the carrying out of the will of the "subjective-revolutionary" Communists. But if--so Tan Malaka continues--we wish to assume the leadership of the non-proletarians who constitute the vast majority of the population in the Outer Islands, then our propaganda will have to be adapted to the local differences, and we must wherever necessary gain an understanding of the religious mentality of these people; (82) we must also be able to explain to them that all obstacles now encountered by retail traders, peasants and small entrepreneurs in the Outer Islands will disappear once imperialism has been destroyed.

- (79) For the most recent theoretical discussion of the Comintern's standpoint concerning the revolutionary task of Communist parties, see the resolutions of the Plenum of the C.C. of the C.P.S.U. (August 9, 1927); Tan Malaka's discussion is, of course, in agreement with these resolutions.
- (80) To quote Sinoviev's explanation to the Fourth Comintern Congress, subsequently repeated by him at the Fifth Congress: "Our use of the slogan of a Workers' and Peasants' Government on no account means that we are surrendering the dictatorship of the proletariat. We cannot deviate from this basis by a single inch."--"The basic problem of Leninism," writes Stalin, "is not the peasant question, but the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat, the question concerning the conditions for its attainment and its safeguarding." (J. V. Stalin, Lenin und der Leninismus, p. 67). "...This is the question: Have the revolutionary potentialities, dormant in the peasantry on account of its peculiar mode of existence, already been exhausted or have they not? If not, is there reasonable hope that these potentialities could be successfully exploited for the proletarian revolution? Lenin answers this question in the affirmative in the sense that he ascribes to the majority of the peasants revolutionary potentialities, and that he considers it possible to exploit these in the interests of the proletarian dictatorship." See also Stalin, Probleme, pp. 125 ff.
- (81) This is typical technical terminology of Communist dogmatism. "Objective" as used here means: necessary, unavoidable, in contrast with "subjective" which means: active, militant.
- (82) Cf. also Tan Malaka's report to the Fourth Congress of the Communist International (Protokoll, pp. 186-189), and the instructions to Asian propagandists, in Revue du Monde Musulman, 59 (1925), pp. 237-238.

3. The Moscow instructions to the C.C. of the P.K.I. of May 4, 1925, and their significance for the Communist tactics of 1926: Thus far the counsel of Tan Malaka. Identical advice was received by the Central Committee of the P.K.I. from the Communist International itself which had adopted a resolution concerning these matters in March, 1925. This resolution is in complete agreement with the general political directive then laid down at a conference of the Enlarged Executive, (83) a directive which i.a. prescribed the proper course of action for the Chinese Communist Party. The same resolution can also be found in summarized form in a letter by "Kjai," dated Moscow, May 4, 1925, No. 268/c.c.v., (84) and addressed to the "Central Committee of the Communist Party of Indonesia"; it reached the P.K.I. via Holland through the intermediary of Semaun. This letter was written on behalf of the Communist International, and, as we already mentioned, it was based on a resolution adopted at a meeting of the Enlarged Executive held at Moscow between March and April, 1925; this resolution carries into effect one of the decisions of the Fifth Congress of the Communist International. (85) Tan Malaka's Naar de republiek Indonesia, which we summarized above, thus constitutes neither more nor less than an elucidation on the above resolution of the Executive.

The letter from Moscow of May 4, 1925, reads i.a. as follows: "The task of the Communist Party of Indonesia is to intensify and extend the revolutionary struggle in Indonesia, to attract to it the broad masses of the people, while bearing in mind at the same time its fundamental aim, viz. the stoutly defense of the interests of the working class." Similar to developments in Russia, (86) the Comintern places particular emphasis on attracting the peasantry. (87) "The experience of the International Communist movement has shown that there is not a single country in the world where the proletariat can count on success in the struggle unless it obtains the active support of the majority of the peasantry. The peasantry has its own interests; consequently the whole of the peasantry can be drawn into the anti-imperialist struggle only if this fight is conducted in defense of its interests. In general these interests coincide with the interests of the whole of the Indonesian people, and do not contradict the interests of the

(83) Hence the correspondence between the tactics recommended by Tan Malaka with those prescribed for China, British India, and Central Asia (see also Notes 70, 71, 74 and 61, above). Tan Malaka's writings are thus original (see Note 72, above) in the sense that he has fitted the Indonesian conditions into the framework of the officially-decreed schema, in other words, into the dogmatically-determined mold.

(84) The reply to this letter was dated August 25, 1925.

(85) In addition to the resolution concerning the tactics to be followed by the P.K.I. in this country, the meeting drafted general theses concerning the Bolshevization of Communist parties, the peasant question, the struggle for unity in the international movement, etc. See Thesen und Resolutionen der Erweiterten Exekutive (March-April, 1925).

(86) See Bukharin and Preobrazhensky, Das A.B.C. des Kommunismus (1923), p. 105: para. 45; pp. 291-320: para's. 103-114.

(87) Thesen und Resolutionen der Erweiterten Exekutive (March-April, 1925), pp. 30-33, and 48 ff.

proletariat. A platform must be drawn up for the general national struggle, (88) which must give first consideration to the interests of the peasantry and must also contain a program minimum for the workers. The Sarekat Ra'jat must be gradually separated from the Communist Party of Indonesia and be converted into a genuine national, revolutionary organization, (89) working in conjunction with and under the intellectual leadership of the Communists."

Similarly, the presidium of the Krestintern (International Peasant Council) (90) with headquarters at Moscow, directed through the intermediary of Bergsma several letters to the P.K.I. in which it stressed the importance of political work among the peasants.

This emphasis on the interests of the peasantry need not surprise us in the least since it is entirely in line with the development of the present-day tactics of the Communist International.

(88) Cf. Tan Malaka, Semangat Muda (Tokyo, January, 1926), pp. 75-76: "Our tactics vis-a-vis the nationalist and religious revolutionaries must be to attract them to the S.R. It would not be a mistake if in due course we were to promulgate a National Platform...." Ibid., p. 77: "At the present moment our most important tactics must be to unify all islands and all classes on the basis of a minimum program which is approved by all inhabitants of Indonesia." --See also J. V. Stalin, Probleme des Leninismus, 2nd ed. (1927), pp. 214 ff., and Ein Jahr Arbeit und Kampf: Tätigkeitsbericht der Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale, 1925-1926, pp. 261 ff.: "The slogan of the United Anti-Imperialist Front, which was adopted for Indonesia by the Colonial Committee of the last EKKI-Plenum is finding an ever stronger response among the lower-echelon organization of the moderate nationalist organization 'Sarekat Islam' and 'Budi Utomo', etc. ... The process of revolutionizing the broad masses of the Indonesian people is without doubt the most significant factor in the present political life of the country.... The resolution of the last EKKI-Plenum concerning the gradual separation of the 'sarekat Rajats' from the Communist Party and their transformation into independent national-revolutionary organizations, standing in intimate touch with the broad masses, has as yet not been effected. On the other hand the political activity of the peasantry is increasing.... Unless the Party soon follows a correct line concerning the peasantry, the political movement of the peasants will by-pass the Party, as has partly already happened in the case of the radical nationalist elements. Only complete and unconditional implementation of the resolution of the last EKKI-Plenum can free the Party from its isolated position...."

(89) Let us note the change from the theses adopted at the Second Congress: "The Communist International has the duty to support the revolutionary movement in the colonies and backward countries for the sole purpose of concentrating the segments of the true, and not only nominal, Communist parties in all backward countries, and to educate them to the conscious understanding of their particular tasks, viz. to the truly democratic tendencies within their own Nation."

(90) The activities of the Krestintern were also reported in the newspaper Api (see e.g. the issue of January 23, 1926, No. 19). The same newspaper also alluded to other "secret" Russian letters, i.a. from the I.R.H., from P.K.I.-archives (Api, March 9, 1926, No. 55).

In his work Fünf Jahre Kommunistische Internationale (1924), Sinoviev wrote as follows: "To find the correct solution for the national and colonial questions in our program and our tactics, and correctly to organize Communist mass agitation in national and colonial questions in essence means to solve the question of the conquest of the peasantry." The problem of the peasantry had in the course of the years increasingly forced itself on the attention of the Communist International, not only as a consequence of the Russian experience, but also because of the social structure of other, predominantly agrarian, countries. While up to this time the Congresses had formulated theoretical directives concerning the national and colonial questions, they had not provided a practical solution to the question of how the petit-bourgeois peasant could be used for the realization of the interests of the working class; wavering, as a class, between the bourgeois and the proletariat, the peasantry form a potential reserve for either. After the Fourth Congress in June, 1923, the Executive therefore had promulgated the slogan, "Workers' and Peasants' Government," replacing the former "Government of the Workers"; this new slogan was also to be used in Europe. The change--alleged to be in accordance with the "class-political strategy of the proletariat," which had already been exemplified in the United Front tactics--was to be introduced "without in the least surrendering the idea of the dictatorship of the proletariat, and without destroying the class character of the Party." By broadening the base for the implementation of the only correct tactics for the attainment of the United Front under present conditions, the slogan of "Workers' and Peasants' Government" constitutes the true path to the dictatorship of the proletariat. (91) The correct interpretation of the slogan of "Workers' and Peasants' Government" will not only enable the Communist to mobilize the proletarian masses in the cities, but also to obtain important strongholds in the countryside and thus to

(91) In Russia this development of affairs is in itself extremely peculiar. "To an even more marked degree than the former governing minority of absolutism, the present, allegedly socialist, minority government is yielding to peasant interests, which basically prescribe the irrevocable course of the entire social development of Russia. As ever before, these new peasant masses, possessed of new property and a new life, are imposing their majority will on the quasi-rulers, who originated in the depth of metropolitan life. Without recourse to formal democracy and parliamentary coalitions--which are, after all, only the formal expression and recognition of conscious and open power-relationships--the peasants have been able to exert political influence on legislation and administration, be it rather unconsciously, to the accompaniment of prudent silence of all parties concerned." (Max Schippel). A similar development, i.e. an accentuation of the peasants' social importance, can also be observed in Czechoslovakia, Finland, Letland, Hungary and Rumania. Cf. G. Fenner and Dr. von Toesch, Die neuen Agrargesetze der ost- und südosteuropäischen Staaten (1923). Since May, 1927, the social democrats in Germany, and since November, 1925 those in Austria, have at long last officially broken with orthodox Marxism in their agrarian programs, subjecting it to a fundamental, reformist revision. As recently as 1920, the Russian Communists had still concentrated on the task of winning agrarian laborers and poor peasants as allies; but the Congress of the Russian Communist Party of late 1925 was already forced to give serious consideration to the interests of the so-called "middle peasants." --A compilation of characteristic utterances concerning the national and colonial problem can be found in Le communisme et la question nationale et coloniale par Lenine, Staline et Boukharine (Paris: Bureau d'Éditions, n.d.).

prepare the ground for the conquest of power by the proletariat.... (92) It goes without saying that the agitation under the new slogan must be conducted in accordance with the conditions of each individual country.... In any case the victory and consolidation of the proletarian revolution cannot anywhere be achieved without the support of the peasantry, of whichever kind it may be. A Communist party must be prepared to defeat the bourgeoisie tomorrow and for that reason it must today already formulate aims encompassing the entire population. (93) Therefore it has the task of attracting all those layers of the population which, because of their social position, can at the decisive moment render support of one kind or another to the proletarian revolution...."

Thus all along the line identical tactics are being systematically applied, which had reached their fullest development in Russia in the years 1923-1923, viz. the United Front tactics, which aim at bringing together other workers' organizations under Communist leadership and using them for Communist purposes; an alliance, furthermore, with nationalist groups, (94) for the time being based on a nationalist program and a program minimum for the workers, in order to bring about the realization of Communist ideals under Communist leadership; attracting the mass of the peasantry by the slogan, "Workers' and Peasants' Government," thus gaining its support in the conquest of power by Communist workers under Communist leadership. The so-called "strategy of the vanguard of the proletariat" (coupled with the policy of planting cells) and so-called "flexible tactics" must guard against the dangers inherent in these maneuvers.

We need, then, not be surprised that such identical advice, from the Communist International, the Krestintern, and from Tan Malaka, (95) caused the P.K.I. to devote an increasing amount of attention to the peasant question; nor is it surprising that--as previously discussed--the Sarekat Tani /Peasant Association/ became the instrument par excellence of Communist activities on the West Coast

(92) Sinoviev at the meeting of the Enlarged Executive of June, 1922 and at the Fifth Congress of the Comintern of 1924. See Protokoll, I, p. 488, and Note 80, above. The Fifth Congress was also attended by Semaun, whose report on that Congress appeared in Pandu Merah, No. 5 (September, 1924).

(93) Cf. also Semaun, Indonesien hat das Wort, pp. 37-38. In Die Kommunistische Internationale, 1926 (No. 9, p. 419), Darsono writes as follows: "The task of the Indonesian Communists is in this period identical with that of our Chinese comrades. They must with all their strength support the Indonesian national-revolutionary movement and endeavor to assume the leadership of that movement, while at the same time devoting special attention to the task of maintaining the Communist line intact."

Along the same lines the E.K.K.I. in December, 1926, ordered the Chinese Communist Party to participate in the leadership of the nationalist, Kuomintang Party, with the aim of gaining sole control; the Kuomintang was to be "transformed into a mass organization comprising many millions of people, proletarians, peasants and urban petite-bourgeoisie, and thus into an organ of democratic dictatorship" under Communist hegemony. (See also Notes 60, 61, 70 and 71, above.)

(94) As is well known, the opposition within the Russian Communist Party is opposed to such an alliance with bourgeois elements.

(95) See also J. V. Stalin, Probleme des Leninismus, 2nd impr., (1927), pp. 214-215.

of Sumatra during 1926. (96) Thus on February 1, 1926, the C.C. advised the Sawah Lunto branch of the P.K.B.T. as follows: "All peasants should join us, even those who are neither members nor candidates for membership in our party, as long as they are in sincere agreement with our movement and leadership." Similar advice went out to the S.R.-Executives at Ngabang in Western Borneo (March 2, 1926); to Wonosobo in East Java (March 3, 1926), and to the Sectional Executives at Banjuwangi in East Java (March 3, 1926), and at Tegal in West Java (March 2, 1926), etc.

Before entering into a more detailed discussion of this point, however, we should mention that C.C.-Instruction No. 6 of May, 1925, had already expressed the changed viewpoint of the P.K.I. vis-a-vis the nationalist movement. (97) The divide-and-rule policy of Dutch imperialism, so the Instruction says, renders the work of the Communists among the various peoples of Indonesia difficult: "To the outside world we are presenting our struggle in its international ramifications, as the struggle against capitalism and imperialism, but internally (98) we must also emphasize that our aim is to free the Indonesian people from the humiliation and degradation of Dutch imperialism. Instructions No. 6A and B, dated June 5, 1925, contain the Leninist "vanguard theory," of which the above-mentioned policy of planting cells constitutes an adaptation.

Both the point of view and the tactics which we have outlined above are poles apart from the point of view which the C.C. of the P.K.I. had adopted in its report to the Jogja Conference as recently as November, 1924; at that time it had advocated to dissolve the petit-bourgeois Sarekat Ra'jats, alleging that Indonesian experience had proved the petite-bourgeoisie always to be the losers. On the contrary--so Tan Malaka now argues--they have thereby demonstrated their will to fight--an a priori assumption, since "the petite-bourgeoisie is always and everywhere aspiring to work itself up to the status of capitalists"--and we, Communists, must make use of that revolutionary spirit. Let us also note the enormous difference with the spirit of Lenin's speech at the Third Comintern Congress (June 28, 1921), even though on that occasion he announced the N.E.P. Finally, let us recall the divergence from the old Bolshevik, anti-opportunistic sentiment of 1903!

(96) The propaganda action of 1926 was primarily conducted among the poorest layers of the agrarian population.

(97) It is also expressed in a letter from the Central Committee to Sugiman, Communist leader at Malang East Java, dated November 3, 1925, with reference to a brochure written by the latter: "Some sections in your book--in the light of the tactics to be adopted by our Party vis-a-vis the Indonesian nationalists, such as the B.U. and also the former N.I.P., at the present time--create a rather spiteful impression; we are therefore changing the passages, so as not to give offense to the nationalists whom we have hopes of winning over to cooperation with us."

(98) Nationalist propaganda was also officially conducted in the newspaper, Api. See e.g. the article "Kesatrija dan Revolutioner!!!" The Warrior and the Revolutionary in Api of March 27, 1926, No. 70, which openly advocates the admission of terrorists, nationalists and anarchists (nihilists) to the P.K.I. The P.K.I. must become the center of revolutionaries. In his pamphlet, Indonesien hat das Wort, Semaun also parades in the main as a nationalist, as does Tan Malaka in the Philippines. The same attitude is taken in Roy's book, La liberation nationale des Indes, which may be considered a counterpart to Tan Malaka's Naar de republiek Indonesia.

4. The foreign policy of Russia: We must now ask ourselves: what is the significance of this change of front in the policy of the Communist International? The clue is provided by Russia's foreign policy: (99) the main problem, in other words, is neither Dutch "imperialism," nor "national independence" for the peoples of the East; the final targets are not the Netherlands and the Indies, or yet China: the main target is England. (100) In an article, entitled "Ueber den Zusammenhang der Russischen Revolution mit der Befreiungsbewegung der östlichen Völker" / "Concerning the Relation between the Russian Revolution and the Liberation Movement of the Oriental Peoples", written on March 4, 1923, (Die Internationale Kommunistische Bewegung, 1924, pp. 33 ff.), V. I. Lenin wrote as follows: "What tactics can be derived from this state of affairs for our country?... In order to maintain ourselves against the imperialist countries abroad, we must adopt a conciliatory policy towards the peasantry, and we must as much as possible support and advance the colonial revolution until the world revolution takes place...."

"The road to the victorious revolution in the West leads through the revolutionary alliance with the liberation movement against imperialism in the colonies and the dependent countries. The national question is part of the general question of the proletarian revolution, of the question of the dictatorship of the proletariat.... This does, of course, not mean that the proletariat must support nationalist movements everywhere, always and under all circumstances.... The question of individual nationalist movements and their probable reactionary character cannot be understood in a purely formal sense of from the point of view of the interests of the revolutionary movement.... The nationalist movements in suppressed countries must not be assessed from the point of view of formal democracy, but from the point of view of the concrete results of the struggle against imperialism; in other words, it must not be considered in isolation, but in its world context." (101) In Imperialism, the Highest Stage of Capitalism, Lenin views imperialism as one entity, since "the individual national fronts of capitalism are transformed into links of a unified chain, into the front of world imperialism (with England as its main bastion), which must be opposed by the general front of the revolutionary movement in all countries.... Imperialism is the beginning of the socialist revolution."

(99) This was already expressed in G. V. Chicherin's Zwei Jahre auswärtige Politik Sowjet-Russlands (1920), p. 41: "The greatest historical fact which imprinted itself on our entire foreign policy this year, was the founding of the Third International...." "Rather than drafting nota's to governments, we have this year issued appeals to the working masses" (p. 44). The difference between the U.S.S.R. and the Communist International was recently explained by Stalin: while the former is of needs maintaining diplomatic relations with other powers, the latter is directly aiming at revolution in each country.

(100) For the latest confirmation, see the theses adopted at the 8th Plenary Session of the E.K.K.I. (May, 1927) and the resolutions of the combined plenum of the C.C. and C.C.C. of the C.P.S.U. (August 9, 1927). Cf. Die Kommunistische Internationale (1927), No. 34, p. 1646. See also Semaun, Indonesien hat das Wort (1927), p. 43, and "La politique de la Nouvelle Russie en Asie Centrale," Revue de Paris, September 1, 1927.

(101) J. V. Stalin, Lenin und der Leninismus, (2nd impr., Vienna, 1925), pp. 89-93; cf. Bukharin, "Perspektiven der chinesischen Revolution," in Die Kommunistische Internationale, 1927, pp. 663 ff.

"Formerly the proletarian revolution was exclusively viewed as the result of the internal development of each individual country. Today this point of view has become obsolete. Today the proletarian revolution must primarily be viewed as the result of the contradictions within the world-wide system of imperialism, as the result which emerges from the tearing asunder of the chain of the imperialist front in one country or another. Where does the revolution commence? Where, in what country, can the front of capitalism first be broken? To this question the following answer used to be given in former times: in that country where the proletariat is in the majority, where industry, where culture and democracy have reached their highest development."

"In accordance with Lenin's theory of revolution, however, we now say: 'No, it will not necessarily be in those countries where industry is the most highly developed, etc.' The front of capitalism will be broken wherever the chain of imperialism is at its weakest: the proletarian revolution is the consequence of the tearing asunder of the chain of the world imperialist front at its weakest spot; it can, therefore, happen that the country which has started the revolution and has broken through the front of capitalism may be capitalistically less developed than other countries in which the capitalist order is still continuing." (Stalin, Lenin und der Leninismus [2nd impr., Vienna, 1925], pp. 35-36. See also Note 64, above.)

We now have to answer the following questions: what is the origin of the suddenly increased solicitude for the peasants, ever since 1923-1924 and of the slogan? Whence the growing interest in the nationalist movements in the colonies, expressed in mid-1923 in an "Appeal" from the Executive to the slaves of colonialism," in which the Comintern urges them to rise against their masters? Let us recall that these new developments constitute an abandonment of the directives developed by Lenin himself at the Second Congress of the Communist International; it is true that at the Fifth Congress Roy had correctly argued that such an abandonment had, in fact taken place, but he had as a consequence been accused of nihilism (a la Rosa Luxemburg) in matters concerning the national question. Whence, we must ask again, this great interest? At the same time, all non-Russian parties are being reprimanded for lack of activity and interest and for incorrect understanding of both the agrarian question and the colonial problem, the Russian point of view being praised as the only correct one to follow.

The Fifth Congress even set up a commission with the aim of "taking concrete steps which will help us to spur on the nationalist movements in the various countries and to weld them into revolutionary shape. The time of declarations on a general character has passed; the phase of powerful, creative, revolutionary work in the colonies is approaching!"

The answers to our above questions can be gleaned from the Proceedings of the Fifth Congress itself: the Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (U.S.S.R.) (102) came into existence in the period between the Fourth and Fifth Congresses: "We

(102) Cf. N. N. Alexeyev, "Die Entwicklung des russischen Staates in den Jahren 1923-1925," Jahrbuch des Oeffentlichen Rechts, XIV (1926), pp. 316 ff.; Revue du Monde Musulman 56 (1923), pp. 176 ff. The creation of the Union forced the Russian Communists themselves (Tenth Party Congress) to find a solution for the nationalist question and the minority problem. Cf. J. Castagne, "Le Bolchevisme et l'Islam, I: Les organisations sovietiques de la Russie musulmane," Revue du Monde Musulman 51, (1922), pp. 17-26.

(i.e., the Communist Party of Russia and the Russian proletariat) understand quite well that we could never maintain the independence of the Soviet Republics in the midst of capitalist encirclement without the creation of the United Front (103) between the suppressed people and the proletariat, from the Baltic Sea to the most distant plains of Asia." The hope for world revolution in the West is diminished, and it is more and more realized that capitalism has stabilized itself; the Communists themselves have been forced to grant an increasing measure of concessions in their own country, while the social-democratic parties have shown little enthusiasm for a united front at their expense.... This is how Alimin described the situation to the Communist leaders from Java, gathered at Singapore in 1926: "A spirit of slackening, retrogression and dissension is prevailing in Moscow...." The last hope rests with the "many millions of Eastern peoples, the last reserves of mankind,..." who must save the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia at any price and by any means. (104) The Moscow conference of the Executive of the Communist International of February, 1926 consequently decided to equip propaganda activities in the colonies with a more centralized and better organizational apparatus. (105) In the Far Eastern Bureau the scepter is wielded by Borodin. (106)

The Insurrectionary Movement

The Effects of the New Tactics on the West Coast of Sumatra, Organization of the Movement in 1926

During 1926 Communist activities on the West Coast of Sumatra were thus characterized by illegal action, combined with the collection and manufacture of arms and propaganda among the peasantry. In these actions Padang Pandjang had led the way already in 1925; revolutionary propaganda among the "non-proletarians" had been conducted there by Arif Fadlillah and Mahmud through Sarikat Tani's. Elsewhere membership cards for the Barisan Merah (Red Corps), and cards for can-

- (103) See Alexeyev (op. cit., pp. 322 ff.) concerning the practice of the "national principle" in the Soviet Union. [Cf. also J. Castagne, loc. cit.; N. Timashev, "Das Nationalitätenrecht der Union sozialistischer Sowjet-republiken," Archiv des Oeffentlichen Rechts 52 (1927); Bogolepov, "Der Sowjetföderalismus," Archiv für Rechts- und Wirtschaftsphilosophie, XVIII, pp. 644 ff.; and Semenov, "Die nationale Frage in der russischen Revolution," Zeitschrift für Politik XIV (1924)7.
- (104) Cf. also Stalin's speech to the Plenum of the C.C. and the C.C.C. of the C.P.S.U. on August 1, 1927, in which he attacked the opposition (Trotsky, Sinoviev, Kamenev, etc.): "Were we right in supporting Canton in China and, let us say, Angora [Ankara] in Turkey, at the time Canton and Angoro were leading the struggle against imperialism? We were right, and at that time walked in the footsteps of Lenin, since the struggle of Canton and Angora was dividing the imperialist camp and thus facilitated the cause of the development of the heartland of the world revolution, the development of the U.S.S.R."
- (105) Cf. Protokoll der Konferenz der Erweiterten Exekutive der Kommunistischen Internationale, March, 1926; Thesen und Resolutionen der Erweiterten Exekutive, February-March, 1926.
- (106) See Documents illustrating the hostile activities of the Soviet Government and Third International against Great Britain (Cmd. 287, 1927).

didate P.K.I.-members and even for P.K.I.-members proper were being sold for the same purpose. Silungkang was such a center of activities, whence Communist propaganda was carried to the surrounding mountain villages (including also the environs of Solok: Air Luo, Tarung-Tarung, Pianggu, Sulit Air, the center of Solok itself having already ceased to function in 1926). Propaganda had also been carried eastward along the trading routes (by way of Padang Subusuk and Sidjungdjung to the Kuantan, Indragiri (107) by way of Sunggei Dareh to Djambi, etc.). Yet another center lay in the area adjacent to Padang /the so-called Padangsche Ommelanden/, whence the infection spread to Pariaman, which was also influenced by Padang Pandjang. Padang Pandjang likewise was instrumental in reviving Communist activities at Fort van der Capellen, whence they were carried further North by traders. Other centers were Kota Anau and Fort de Kock. As was previously mentioned, propagandists from the West Coast also penetrated to Tapanuli. Among other ventures, Mahmud endeavored to establish a Sarikat Pandaradaman /Association of the Enlightened/ through the intermediary of a propounder of the Naqshibandiyah-Tariqah /a mystical Muslim sect/. Through the vigilance of local administrative officers this enterprise was, however, nipped in the bud.

After the departure of Sutan Said Ali, the Padang Section of the P.K.I. had disintegrated. Without any formal transfer of command, Arif Fadlillah, Sadrudin and Djamaluddin Tamin took the initiative in reorganizing the Sumatra West Coast-Section and in re-establishing connection with the Subsections. They also constituted themselves the Sectional Executive at Padang Pandjang, to which they also admitted Mahmud. Later Djamaluddin Tamin escaped abroad, and in July Sadrudin was sent back to Kroë; thus after Mahmud's departure, in the same month, for Java by way of Benkulen Arif Fadlillah remained on his own. He co-opted Djamaluddin Ibrahim as secretary.

In order to illustrate the organization of the movement in 1926, we shall cite as examples the situation at Fort van der Capellen and at Pariaman.

As was already noted above, Communist activities at Fort van der Capellen had been suppressed in the course of 1925. After the puasa /Muslim fasts/ of March, 1926, however, it revived as a result of a five-day visit of Arif Fadlillah to Sungai Djambu. Several propagandists arrived from Bunga Tandjung (Pitalah, Padang Pandjang) who in various localities organized Sarikat Kaum Tani's /Peasant Associations/ which were to serve as P.K.I.-cells, from which the Communists could frequently recruit newcomers during 1925. Propagandists approached individuals in native restaurants, in addition to organizing a series of secret meetings in out-of-the-way places, such as woods, rice fields or religious schools, (108) in accordance with instructions received from the Central Committee

(107) Among the propagandists there was i.a. also Zainul Hasan. Having escaped from Pulau Tello to Padang Pandjang by way of Air Bangis in May 1926, he was sent to Silungkang by Arif Fadlillah; later he became propagandist at Rengat.

(108) Cf. Curt Geyer, Der Radikalismus in der deutschen Arbeiterbewegung (1923), pp. 98-99: "The Communist movement is permeated by a peculiarly strong inclination toward illegality. The teachings of the Communist Party have to all intents and purposes turned this innate phenomenon into a veritable political desideratum.... Behind this inclination towards illegality lurks the instinctive yearning for adventure.... The practice of the Communist

in March 1926. These propaganda activities reached their greatest intensity during June. Originally these organizations were placed under the jurisdiction of Padang Pandjang. Only towards the end of August, 1926, was Fort van der Capellen combined with Sungai Djambu and Padang Luar into a separate Subsection under the leadership of Amin gelar Malim Suleiman. (109) On September 27, 1926, Malim Suleiman was arrested and the leaders of the then-Subsection of Rao-Rao--where Communism had been introduced from Agam in 1925--fled as a consequence of that arrest; thereafter Samsuddin--who at that time belonged to the Sectional leadership at Padang Pandjang--was despatched thither with orders to merge the Subsections of Fort van der Capellen and Rao-Rao and to assume the leadership of the new Subsection. Five so-called "commandants" (utusan) (110) stood at that time under the authority of the Subsection Executive, one each for Lantai Batu, Padang Luar, Rao-Rao, Lintau and Sungei Djambu; in turn each of these contained a certain number of "branches," each with its own executive. The names of higher-echelon functionaries were only divulged to the leaders of their immediate lower-echelon units. The above-mentioned reorganization stood under the leadership of Samsuddin; though the Section had decided to introduce it as early as August, it was only given effect in October at a meeting in Rao-Rao, which was followed by two concentrated indoctrination sessions for the propagandists of 24 hours each. (111)

At Pariaman the organization had not as yet reached such an advanced stage of development. There, too, all kinds of peasant organizations under various names had been established on orders from Padang Pandjang and the Padang Ommelanden, which, like a football club (L.O.N.A.) at Pasar Pariaman and several fencing clubs,

Party exhibits an attractive combination of the instinct-conditioned and the conscious application of illegality. In its agitational practice, the Party uses illegality as a favorite tool for purposes of creating tension, in order to gain a psychological hold on the masses. Speakers are announced under commonplace names, which are, of course, not their proper names at all. Several days before the meeting is scheduled to take place, however, rumors are being circulated by word of mouth to the effect that the meeting in question promises a special sensation: the speaker billed as 'Müller' or 'Schultze' is it is now revealed, this or the other famous Communist leader, who for special political reasons is forced to appear illegally...." Communist agitators have i.a. also made use of this latter attraction at Fort van der Capellen.

- (109) Malim Suleiman had been removed from the Sungai Djambu Executive by Arif Fadlillah, who assigned him to the Subsection Executive in August.
- (110) In the Padang Ommelanden the hierarchy within the Party-executive was as follows: D.O. / "Double Organization" / --Executive--Branch leaders--Leaders (pemimpin)--Organizers (pengurus). No D.O.'s came into existence at Fort van der Capellen.
- (111) In a letter dated October 2, 1926, No. 48/Secret, the then-District Head (Demang) of Pariangan (Fort van der Capellen) report that Lintau, Salimpung, Mendabiling, Pasir Lawas and Kumango stood under the jurisdiction of the Rao-Rao "chief executive," and that the membership in this Subsection already exceeded two thousand.

were intended as P.K.I.-cells. (112) During the Tjampago conference of March, 1926, these cells were placed under a Central, led by Mahmud, with headquarters at Sampan (the so-called "Sampan Central"). After the arrest of some of the official and semi-official members and the withdrawal of others, this Central was converted into a Subsection Executive on orders from Arif Fadlillah in June, 1926. It was only on that occasion that chairman and secretary were admitted to Party-membership; they were, in fact, the only P.K.I.-members at Pariaman. A proper organization of the Pasar Pariaman Subsection never took place because of lack of contact between the Subsection Executive and the cells; the latter remained under the influence of the Communists at Padang Pandjang and in the Padang Ommelanden, while the Sectional Executive could apparently not fulfill the Subsection chairman's request for the despatch of a leader-organizer. The cells were consequently not united under "commandants" in this area. With one probable exception, no meetings were held under the leadership of the Subsection Executive. The chairman, Jusuf, was here, again, a strawman by-passed by the illegal action; the secretary, Junus, who had at one time been sent back from Achin, seems to have been the real link with the Communists outside Pariaman.

A second peculiarity in the organization of the executive can be seen at Padang and Silungkang, where a real "Double-Organization" (D.O.) existed. Side by side with the official executive, staffed by lesser gods, the real leadership was organized as the so-called "pemimpin-pemimpin bestuur" /leaders of the executive/.

Since the reorganization of October, 1926--in other words, since the visit of Baharuddin Saleh--the executive of the Padang Subsection consisted of the following members: Djamaluddin, chairman; Disat, Dulah, etc., members-at-large; above these stood the so-called "pemimpin-pemimpin bestuur," also styled "Comite Perlawanan" (C.P.) /Struggle Committee/: Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim, Pakih Tahir and Zainun, all of whom were at the same time also in charge of the arsenal.

The same kind of organization had already since May existed at Silungkang: Tajjib, chairman; Limin, secretary; Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono, member-at-large. Above these: Sarun, Sulaiman Labai, Dato Bagindo Ratu.

After the reorganization of the Padang Subsection on October 20, 1926, Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim had obtained for himself two authorizations from the "dummy"-executive. The first, dated October 29, 1926, empowered him to "give instructions concerning the organization and discipline in such matters as looting, and all other illegal activities to area-leaders and organizers, as well as to runaways and jailbirds." The second, dated November 5, 1926, stated that the bearer "may demand that branches provide funds for his expenses whenever and wherever necessary." (113)

At Padang Pandjang a similar D.O. seems to have existed, of which Mangkudum Sati was the leader. These D.O.'s were entrusted with both the guidance of illegal

(112) At the outset these clubs were not Party-cells, even though Rum, acting on instructions from Sutan Said Ali, had propagated their establishment e.g. at VII-Koto. At Sungai Djambu (Fort van der Capellen) there existed a Sarikat Adat, which only later was transformed into a P.K.I.-cell. The Communists thus clearly followed the procedure prescribed by the Central Committee.

(113) It is significant that these authorizations are not signed by the Secretary of the Executive, Disat, but by Zainun (under a pseudonym).

activities (in such organizations as Sarikat Djin, Sarikat Itam, etc.) and the collection of arms. For both of these purposes they, of course, co-opted the required helpmates.

This so-called "Double Organization" (D.O.), in which virtually all power is placed in the hands of people outside the official Party Executive, is said to be a consequence of "revolutionary" or "proletarian" discipline; in P.K.I.-terminology it is referred to as "Dictatorial Organization."

In accordance with Tan Malaka's instructions all propaganda was henceforth based upon the grievances which existed in various areas among the different strata of the population; (114) among these grievances religion was not overlooked, as we shall see in the following chapter.* Did this method, however, not succeed in inciting the populace and winning them over to the Party, then the Communists still had at their disposal another weapon, on which they ultimately seem to have almost placed their sole reliance: that of intimidation. This aspect of Communist propaganda can, in point of fact, not be over-emphasized; intimidation--in the final analysis--prevented the insurrectionary movement on the West Coast from becoming a popular movement like the tax riots of 1908. While it is probably true that fewer penghulu's [village heads] had participated in the 1908 rebellion than in that of 1926, it must be borne in mind that in 1908 the penghulu's themselves had instigated the rebellion. But the position of these heads is quite different now from what it was then. Even then the insurrection might doubtless have spread over larger part of the area within a short span of time, had the action at Silungkang been crowned with initial success.

In accordance with Sutan Said Ali's precepts, the propaganda for the Sarikat Tani (Persatuan Kaum Tani) in such areas as Pariaman e.g. primarily stressed such beneficial aims as mutual aid with regard to labor, funerals, celebrations, and fire fighting; the prospect of loans from the Association's chest for taxes or for payments in lieu of forced labor formed another attraction in that propaganda. If all this did not lead to the desired result, propagandists endeavored to win friends by stressing the grievances of the population. If that, too, was of no avail, then recourse was had to threats, to the effect that the Russians or the Communists would kill or deprive of his property whomsoever was not in possession of membership-card. On the other hand, those in possession of such a card would henceforth be freed from the payment of taxation and the performance of forced labor services. (Even the small fry among the leaders, who had received their instructions from Sutan Said Ali, knew quite well that the revolution would be the harbinger of self-government.)

An even more effective means was at the disposal of the leaders for forcing everyone to follow their dictates, viz. the illegal organization which had been formed in the various localities. There were gathered the criminal elements who had been accepted into the organization, and whose task it was to protect the secret meetings against police attacks while at the same time intimidating the village authorities in order to maintain secrecy by these means. They were furthermore also useful in removing opponents who created difficulties for the movement.

(114) Sutan Said Ali's order to Rum, propagandist in VIII Koto, ran as follows: "When talking to peasants, you must discuss the pressure of taxation and corvee-labor; when you speak to workers, discuss their wages and their work; and to traders you must stress their profits and taxes. In short, all grievances of the population must be stressed."

* [See Schrieke, Indonesian Sociological Studies, pp. 126-127 and 150-159.]

Since these opponents (115) were often hated by the population as extortioners, the Communists could count on the villagers' sympathy for that part of their activities. In areas like Pariaman, which for long had been infamous for its bandits, the Communists found it easy to organize such people and to use them for harrassing those who held aloof from the movement, forcing them to join and to extort money for the movement. (116)

As early as May 8, 1926--i.e., not quite one month after the Sarikat Djin had been established--Radio, a newspaper which then appeared at Padang, carried an article concerning the existence of this organization at Kota Tengah and Pauh (in the Padang Ommelanden); it was described as a secret band of approximately 40 members, led i.a. by Patai, and formed during the Muslim fasts (puasa) of 1926. (117) At that time the robbers Patai and Gandjil, together with the Communist leaders Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim, Hadji Imam Samat, Tawi and Zainun had already turned fugitives. (118) The newspaper report added to the above information that the members of the band were armed with brownings, pistols, etc., and that they were collecting "gifts" (derma) in aid of their prospective insurrection; in the meantime, the price of red membership cards had again risen....

The moral effect of this terrorism on the population was especially great, the more so since it was being whispered that even officials were taking part in it; in addition, there were no clues leading to the originators of the robberies, even in those cases which had been reported to the police. In fact, their number kept increasing:

- (115) In the course of 1926, a score of assassinations of lower administrative and police officials, government spies and village heads took place. In April, 1926 an attempt at terrorism was reported in Lubuk Basung (Manindjau) and in May similar attempts at Batabuh, Riario Gedang and Gadut (Agam). September 9 was the date of the so-called Kamang-case; it was the day of the assassination of Datuk Tanang Sati at Kamang; in the afternoon preceding the assassination he had been engaged in the compilation of a map showing the names and domiciles of suspected Communists.
- (116) Other methods used were the tarring of doors and furniture, the laying waste of garden plots, etc. In South Tapanuli a case of ringbarking rubber trees occurred. These terroristic activities had great effect on the morale of the rest of the population.
- (117) In October, 1926 another Sarikat Djin was established at Kota Anau (its first robbery occurred on October 31, 1926); in August, the Sarikat Itam at Aur Perumahan (Kamang) had come into existence, and in November, the Sarikat Maling (Hitam) at Gudung (Padang Pandjang). The latter stood under the direction of the former head-penghulu Dato Besar, its declared aim being the establishment of a reign of terror which would force the population to join the movement.
- (118) Tawi, Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim and Zainun had been on the run ever since November, 1925. They had found hideouts in the Padang Ommelanden and could there easily maintain contacts with bandits.

Reported Robberies at Pariaman

	<u>1923</u>	<u>1924</u>	<u>1925</u>	<u>1926</u>
June	1 (1)	1 (0)		1 (1)
July	1 (1)		1 (1)	4 (0)
August	4 (4)	2 (1)	3 (0)	4 (1)
September			1 (0)	5 (2)
October		1 (1)	3 (2)	7 (0)
November	2 (2)	2 (2)	4 (3)	6 (0)

Note: Number in brackets represent cleared-up robberies.

People were scared and felt powerless in the face of the secret power whose threats were mounting by the day, a power which seemed to be omnipotent and inviolable. In 1925 rumors were already spreading that the Communists were behind the increasing wave of robberies. In the course of time the situation deteriorated to a point where women no longer durst appear in the streets with their jewelry, people did not venture out-of-doors in the evening, and valuables were taken to the pawnshops. By May, fear--primarily centered on the arrival of Russian conquerors--had become so widespread among the village population in the areas around Agam and Padang Pandjang that people were afraid to leave their homes after sunset. Night patrols by military and police further added to the commotion. Many people believed that the enemy would strike any moment. News of the impending rebellion travelled from mouth to mouth, yet its source was never known and remained a matter of conjecture; all the time the threats grew increasingly reckless. Is it, then, surprising that in the eyes of many people May 1, the day of the international proletariat, became the most likely day for the outbreak of the insurrection? This expectation was prevalent primarily at Pariaman, but it also existed in such places as e.g. Fort van der Capellen, Solok and Fort de Kock. Villagers of Rao-Rao and Kumango bought up all the salt on the market at Fort van der Capellen. The Minangkabau coolies employed at Batang Toru (South Tapanuli) hurried back to the West Coast. Rumors were already circulating among the Minangkabau population in the Kuantan Districts (Indragiri) that the village-heads (demang) of Tilatang and Pariangan had been assassinated by the Communists.

The Communists had in point of fact originally intended to start the revolution with a strike on May 1. As we saw, the Solo Congress had decided that the revolution should commence in Sumatra, to be followed by Java. It was, however, to have been preceded by a vigorous campaign of strikes. After his return from Java in January, 1926, Sutan Said Ali had, indeed, designated May 1 as the starting day, and Sarun had also been told of the date by Dahlan in Batavia. Even so, the Pulau Tello revolt of May, 1926, was apparently not connected with this plan. According to the autobiography of the previously cited Zainul Hasan, propagandist for Mias and Pulau Tello, who at the instigation of Sutan Said Ali had devoted himself to the movement since August, 1925, the local leadership had lost control over the Pulau Tello revolt. It had been a premature outburst, and at that time the Pulau Tello leaders had not yet given effect to the orders of the P.K.I.'s Central Committee of late March, 1926 concerning the establishment of a "Double Organization" (D.O.), in effect an anarchistic organization of "plucky fellows willing to organize anarchistic activities against government officials." In the Padang Ommelanden and at Pariaman such groups of bandits had already been

organized. (119) It is not unlikely that the Communists cancelled the rising scheduled for May 1 as the result of the leakage of the contents of the Attorney General's secret, hand-written circular letter of the Heads of the Area Administration, dated March 27, 1926, No. 12/1320 A.P. The critical date had, to all intents and purposes, become too well known. The newspapers Api of April 8, 1926 and Panas of April 27, 1926, scoffed at the capitalists' "nightmare"!

The previously mentioned messages carried by West Coast couriers to the East Coast of Sumatra and to Langsa actually indicate that the date for the outbreak of the rebellion had in general been kept rather vague, and that further decisions were to have been made at the All-Sumatra Conference scheduled for May 22, which had been announced in April. On the East Coast itself, a circular letter from the Central Executive of the P.K.I. had arrived in February, which urged an intensification of activities "during May, in commemoration of the unity of workers all over the world." "The hour is approaching and the forces of reaction are hard at work; it is, therefore, necessary that Communist activities be expanded among trade unions. Understanding for the aims of Communism must also be implanted at meetings of village associations devoted to mutual aid....," etc. Towards the end of March, P.K.I.-members at Medan were circulating oral reports to the effect that a general strike was to be expected after May 1, 1926; with a view to that event, "the Central Committee on Java has ordered that, as soon as the sign has been given, the strike must commence in the port of Belawan, whence it must spread to the D.S.M.-plant at Pulu Brandan, the railroad personnel, to hotels, business offices, plantations, etc." "From now on, propaganda has to be intensified with a view to the impending strike."

This general strike was doubtless intended to mark the beginning of the "social revolution," in accordance with the theory of the true revolution. (120)

Whatever the original intention may have been, nothing happened on May 1. Where in former years May 1 had been commemorated in intimate circles in this country, in 1923 these celebrations had for the first time assumed the character of demonstrations, so that in 1924 "the forces of reaction" had obstructed the commemoration of this festive day, and in 1925 had broken up the meetings with a mailed fist. (121) A circular sent by the Central Committee to all P.K.I.-

(119) The decision to set up D.O.'s on Java seems to have been taken as early as January, 1926. Sutan Said Ali's order to establish such organizations on the East Coast of Sumatra was received in April; to begin with, each sympathizer was to be asked to contribute Fl. 1 as a "gift" (wang derma) for the purchase of fire arms. Once these had been obtained, each Subsection was to appoint five persons charged with the assassinations of the "lackeys of the reactionaries," irrespective of person.

(120) In the Sub-District of Karo-Lands (East Coast of Sumatra) an uprising had apparently been planned for July, as had been provided for in the Solo resolutions. After consultation with the autonomous rulers of the area, the administration succeeded in nipping these plans in the bud. It is therefore probable that similar plans may have existed elsewhere, too, unless countermanding orders had already been received from Alimin and Muso in Singapore. In June these two leaders informed Zainul Hasan that the social revolution was to take place between November, 1926, and January, 1927. See also Note 126, below.

(121) This was discussed in the Central Committee's Instruction No. 5 of April 13, 1925.

Sections, Subsections and affiliated groups in April, 1926 (122) consequently deemed it tactically advisable not to force the May Day celebrations on the eve of the revolution, seeing that such action--as a result of the ban on public meetings--would doubtless claim numerous victims whose energies "we need for the organization and strengthening of our army, so that the hour of the struggle will find us all prepared and victory will certainly be ours." The letters emanating from the Central Committee similarly exhibit a desire to avoid dissipating the available forces: thus Padang is permitted to publish the newspaper for which it has been clamoring, but on condition that good care is taken in avoiding offenses against the press-law which could weaken the ranks. Padang Pandjang may not expell comrades suspected of spying for the enemy. It would be preferable to keep confidential matters from such suspects, seeing that every single members is important to the movement.

On June 9, the C.C. of the P.K.I., now domiciled at Bandung, issued a new instruction, delineating the powers of couriers between Central Committee and Sections: "Representatives of the Central Committee have to be in possession of an authorization from us, written on the back of their personal photographs. These authorizations will also be provided with a rubber stamp from the Central Committee, and with the signatures of the Central Committee chairman and secretary or their alternates. Persons unable to produce photographs and authorizations as explained above are not to be accepted as our representatives." Thus--translated from the somewhat clumsy Malay of the Central Committee's acting secretary, Kamari, and its chariman, Sardjono--was the revolution being prepared.

Tan Malaka and the Insurrectionary Movement

Having learned of the Solo decision through the written report of Budisutjitro and Aliarcham and orally from Alimin (February, 1926), Tan Malaka immediately realized that the insurrection was premature. He therefore drew up a number of theses which he gave to Alimin with the intention of having them discussed by the P.K.I.-leaders on Java. In these Theses Tan Malaka argues that the dependence of the revolution on funds from abroad is a sign of weakness. Far from being a true revolution, such an uprising would be a putsch, originating from a small group rather than from the masses. Although money is admittedly necessary, a real revolution is automatically brought about by the situation of the country and that of the movement. If both are ripe for a revolution, then history teaches that the financial problem ceases to be a problem altogether, since money can be obtained within the country itself. As long as there exists no mass action on Java expressed in strikes and demonstrations; as long as there is no political or economic popular movement as in British India, Shanghai or in Germany; as long as the masses are still afraid of army and police, all such endeavors are doomed to failure and can only lead to the unnecessary postponement of the struggle for many years. Seeing that the Communist movement is still so young it is not surprising that revolutionary propaganda has not as yet caught on everywhere. Even in the West that process has taken years; how much longer must it of needs take in a country which still finds itself in a feudal stage, where superstition is still so prevalent and where sound reasoning in matters political and economic is still so scarce. Yet, because of the "immization" of the masses, we may, with sufficient tact, be able to conduct an action which tomorrow or the day after tomorrow could lead to a revolution, at the same time avoiding anything smacking of adventurism. As Marxists we may not build on

(122) Note that this circular was sent after the April Conference at Singapore.

the rage of a few individual Section-leaders or on unfounded suppositions of rightists and leftists alike.

Sufficient proof of such a situation might e.g. be the understanding by the entire population of our program minimum: let industrial workers be engaged in unremitting action for wage increases, profit-sharing, the right of assembly and association, workmen's insurance, work councils, the 7-hour work-day, etc.,-- action, in short, which would not recoil from a strike stretching over several months even at the cost of a few leaders' banishment. Let city dwellers, peasants, traders and students unceasingly campaign for abolition or reduction of taxation, abolition of the penal sanction, the right to strike, freedom of expression, abolition of the Governor General's exorbitant powers; for freedom of movement, amnesty for the exiled and jailed political leaders, general suffrage, the establishment of a national assembly. This kind of action could be combined with mass demonstrations and mass boycotts by the millions in this country who will then laughingly defy army and policy. (123)

In the absence of signs of such action, however, a revolution remains pure adventurism. The unleashing of our revolution will, then, neither depend on financial assistance from abroad nor on the reactions of our opponents, but on the stage, the consciousness and the will of the masses. But as long as the masses on Java, Sumatra and Celebes are not even ready to sacrifice two or three cents, how can they be expected willingly to sacrifice their lives? The more our movement grows the less must we allow ourselves to be provoked. The greater the strength of reaction, the more patience we must muster, so that later on we ourselves can determine place and time.

Tan Malaka thus made the following recommendations: 1. to call a conference of the delegates of the islands and various groups at Singapore; 2. temporarily to transfer the executive to Singapore; 3. to reorganize the P.K.I. and the Sarekat Rakjat along the lines indicated in his writings (and in accordance with the resolutions of the Comintern Executive).

In February Alimin had assured Tan Malaka of his wholehearted agreement with the latter's point of view, at the same time promising him to defend it to the utmost. But at a conference of Java leaders--Budisutjitro, Subakat, Winanta, and also Muso--held in Singapore in April, he did not even, as agreed, read Tan Malaka's theses, let alone pass them on to these leaders. After some introductory remarks concerning the laxity, retrogression and dissensions prevailing in Moscow, he merely mentioned in passing that Tan Malaka was not in agreement with the Wolo resolutions. Tan Malaka's position could, however, not be understood without further explanations, the more so since Alimin at the same time apparently hinted at the possibility of financial aid from Russia, (124) which certainly had

(123) "In all spheres symbolism thus plays an outstanding role in the tactics of radicalism.... In this respect the attitude of radicalism is closely related to that of the trade union movement [syndicalism], whose final aim is not the attainment of practical results at the end of the struggle. To syndicalists success is not the end and the struggle the means, but rather struggle becomes the end in itself, since they expect that struggle will steel the combative spirit and will awaken the masses to independent action." (Curt Geyer, Der Radikalismus, pp. 26-27).

(124) The autobiography of Zainul Hasan, Communist leader of Pulau Tello, has revealed that an amount of one million guilders had been expected, fl. 500.- of which had been earmarked for Pulau Tello.

no basis in fact. As a consequence of Alimin's report, no countermanding orders were issued. Thus Subakat, himself no advocate of revolution under present circumstances, only heard about the theses on Tan Malaka's arrival at Singapore in early June, 1926, whereupon he hastened to bring them to the notice of the Central Committee. (125) In an accompanying letter he declared to share Tan Malaka's point of view, and suggested for purposes of safety's sake to transfer the leadership to Singapore; he argued that, if the movement were to lose more leaders, it would be difficult to find replacements in the next ten years. Subakat and Tan Malaka repeated their views in several subsequent letters. After a conversation with both of these men, Suprodjo joined their side; returning from Singapore to Bandung by way of Bandjarmasin and Surabaya towards the end of June, he explained Tan Malaka's point of view to Communist leaders in the various places which he visited in the course of his inspection tour.

As a consequence of Tan Malaka's intervention the Central Committee sent messengers to the West Coast of Sumatra with orders to confirm the earlier instructions, at the same time postponing all plans until a later date in 1926 which was to be subsequently determined. (126) In response to this order, Padang Pandjang urged the Central Committee to proclaim the insurrection without delay. The Section threatened to act independently and to organize sabotage

(125) As a probable result of this communication, the P.K.I.'s Central Committee (acting chairman, Suprodjo; secretary, Winanta)--which, in the absence of a publication of its own, had lost contact with the Sections--on June 7, 1926, asked for detailed reports on the state of the movement. The reports were to give primary attention to the sentiment of the population: "Our activities are being rendered increasingly more difficult; now we no longer are allowed to publish a paper carrying information concerning the overall situation of our movement. We therefore very sincerely hope that you, comrade, will send us a detailed and clear report concerning all movements in your Section. In this report you are urged not to omit a description of popular sentiment vis-a-vis our movement..." etc. The Central Committee also requested statistical data concerning the number of P.K.I.-members, candidates for membership, S.R. and trade union-members. These questions clearly reflect Tan Malaka's analysis.

(126) Zainul Hasan recounts in his autobiography that he met Alimin and Muso in Singapore in June 1926. These two must thus have been in Singapore at the same time as Tan Malaka, a fact which does lend a certain piquancy to the whole affair; their presence also explains the hesitant attitude of Sardjono, who not only found himself between the devil and the deep sea, as it were, but who also had to take into consideration the fierce sentiment of his own entourage and among many leaders on Java. "Order, counter-order, disorder!" Zainul Hasan's confession reads as follows: "When I arrived in Singapore I had a meeting with Alimin, propagandist of the P.K.I. Central Committee, and with another member of the Executive as well as with Muso, all of whom ordered me to return to Sumatra. They told me that the socialist revolution would take place between November, 1926 and January, 1927. Together we all went to Bangkok (Siam), whence I returned with them to Singapore; thereafter I went to Medan and from Medan to Sibolga...." - In connection with this information it is significant that in June, 1926 Berahim gelar Mangkuto Sutan and Djamil gelar Sutan Malenggang were inciting the population i.a. at Gadut (Agam) to revolution, which was to take place "six months hence."

and assassination of several officials, if the Central Committee were not prepared to cooperate in speeding up the date of the rebellion. The reaction following in the wake of such terroristic activities would, so Padang Pandjang leaders argued, then force the Central Committee to join. In July, 1926, Banten, Benkulen (center of Mahmud's activities at that time) and Batavia similarly appealed to the P.K.I. Central Committee to proclaim the revolution before the termination of Governor General Fock's term of office. All of Sumatra then voted in favor, but on Java opinion was divided, as became apparent during Suprodjo's trip of the island in the same month. In a letter to Tan Malaka dated August 13, 1926, Sardjono (127) and others made it appear as if a misunderstanding concerning the Solo resolution were involved. That resolution, so they wrote, had not advocated a putsch, but rather the organization of strikes; the revolution was to begin if these were successful and if financial aid was received from Russia. These instructions, it was alleged, had been misunderstood by the Subsections (and by Tan Malaka). Now, since there had been no possibility of organizing the strikes, and since, therefore, the entire preparation had miscarried, the Central Committee's orders concerning the rebellion would as a matter of course not be issued. The letter concluded by stating that despite all this, sentiment among several Sections continued to be fiercely revolutionary...!

But it was not that easy to lead Tan Malaka, with private sources of information at his disposal, up the garden path. Basing himself on the documentary evidence, he asserted that there could be no question of a misunderstanding as far as he was concerned. The Central Committee had, moreover, taken no action to disabuse the Sections (in particular those in Sumatra) of their error and to restore discipline. On the contrary, it appeared to tolerate that contributions were no longer paid, that Communism was not being intensively propagated and that every Tom, Dick and Harry was accepted as a member as long as he declared himself in sympathy with the P.K.I. Finally, instead of calling off the revolution it had merely postponed it. Had Sardjono's interpretation of the Solo resolution been correct, then the trade unions on Java should have been properly organized, while the action outside of Java, as e.g. in Sumatra, should have been planned as diversionary tactics. According to Leninist-Marxist principles, the measures so far taken in Sumatra--dependent as they were on financial aid from Moscow--could lead to no more than mere rioting. Where, then, were the tangible proofs of the revolutionary sentiment of the population? In the interests of the movement and the people the Central Committee must, therefore, unequivocally revoke the Solo resolution. Confusion would ensue if this were not done.

Judging by the testimonies obtained at Padang Pandjang and Bandung, the Bandung Central Committee (acting chairman, Suprodjo) seems, in fact, to have endeavored to make a move in this direction. It has even been alleged that towards the end of August (?) (128) the Central Committee sent a letter in which it

(127) Budisutjitro, Suprodjo and Kusno were at that time already in agreement with Tan Malaka's point of view. Winanta--like Sardjono, a real die-hard--had been arrested on July 24.

(128) The date of this letter is uncertain. According to statements made at Padang Pandjang it had been received in August, and it had not dealt with the revolutionary committee, but rather with propagandists. This date was also confirmed by other testimonies from Padang Pandjang to the effect that some twenty-five days before the letter from the Suprodjo-C.C. had been received--according to yet another testimony, in July, 1926--Sutan Palembang, Achmad and Tadjuddin, all provided with authorizations from the Sardjono-

counselled against the insurrection. It was stated that the Central Committee had had no hand in the insurrectionary action, that such action ran counter to the Committee's will, and that it had to be ascribed to the taxity of the old C.C. Blaming harsher governmental measures for the loss of contact between Sections and the C.C., the letter announced that it had been decided to abolish the system of so-called "federative central"; this system, instituted at the Jogja Conference of December, 1924, had allowed Sections a large measure of autonomy within the limits set by the Party constitution and statutes. In the interests of restoring discipline it had therefore been decided to return to a strongly centralized organization, particularly so since the C.C. wished to institute a purge of the entire organization. (129)

Whatever the truth concerning this letter, however, at the end of August revolutionary fervor on the West Coast of Sumatra, in particular in the center of Padang Pandjang, was still at boiling point. The Kamang affair and nihilist action in the Padang Ommelanden and elsewhere are symptomatic of the extremist sentiment of those days. After news of the temporary postponement of the revolution had been received, the Padang Pandjang Sectional committee directed an appeal to Tan Malaka, requisitioning him to give the signal for the insurrection without further delay. (130) The letter reached Singapore on September 10, and on September 12 the leaders present in Singapore, under the leadership of Tan Malaka, decided to repudiate the advocacy of revolution advanced by Muso and his comrades, emphatically reiterating their orders for explicit countermanding of the Solo resolution. (Padang Pandjang was instructed along these lines at the same time.) It was furthermore resolved to establish a new Central Committee at Penang, headed by Tan Malaka.

C.C., had been ordered to deliver arms and bombs to Dato Mangkudum Sati. There were, as we saw, some leaders who wished to unleash the insurrection prior to the departure of Governor General Fock, and who aimed at August 31 as the target date. In some localities (e.g. in Southern Sumatra) preparations along this line had, indeed, been made. On the other hand, it cannot be ascertained whether similar preparations had been made on the West Coast of Sumatra. If such preparations had been underway, then the Central Committee's letter might merely have been intended to counteract a flare-up on August 31. In any case it is significant that, after a visit to Padang Pandjang, Duin was making propaganda for an August uprising among the population of Sulit Air. Similar propaganda activities were at the same time taking place at Talu (Amran), Air Bangis and Lubuk Sikaping. Activities were similarly stepped up at Fort van der Capellen. If these activities formed part of a systematic plan rather than having been expressions of a prevailing sentiment, then the letter from Padang Pandjang to Tan Malaka, received in Singapore on September 10, could be interpreted as a reaction to this particular letter from the Central Committee.

- (129) On October 23 Pakih Tahir and Zaini, on instructions from Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim, went to Padang Pandjang in order to consult Afir Fadlillah (who happened to be out of town) on the "new relationship between Sub-sections and Sections."
- (130) The letter was carried to Singapore by Zainun gelar Radja Marah and four others; Zainun came from the Subsection of Padang; he was a former street-car conductor in Achin, and tool of Sutan Said Ali (See Notes 21 and 118, resp.).

On November 10, the Section of Priangan and the Bandung Subsection at long last took the initiative in the holding of a referendum on the election of a new Central Committee among others, Suprodjo--who had already become treasurer and acting chairman of the Central Committee--was nominated for the chairmanship.

The Insurrection

By then, however, it was much too late. By mid-1926 (July-September), revolutionary fervor had also gripped the Communist leaders at Batavia, who were determined to push the revolution at all costs. In the Blanquist concept of Sukrawinata, it was not necessary that the entire Netherlands Indies participate in the revolution; Batavia, being the seat of government, would be quite sufficient. (131) Sukrawinata, acting chairman of the Batavia Section, subsequently reached an agreement with others--in particular with Mahmud, the well-known Padang Pandjang leader, who had returned to Batavia after a propaganda tour to Benkulen and a sojourn in Singapore--to establish an Executive Preparatory Committee of the Indonesian Republic, by-passing the Central Committee. This new Committee had as its chairman Baharuddin Saleh (132) from Kota Anau, who had played an important part in the movement at Padang Pandjang in 1924-1925 (see Note 13, above), and who had been released from jail in August, 1926. Mahmud was made secretary and Sukrawinata member-at-large of the Committee, which was joined by the following additional members: Herujono (in his capacity as trade union leader), Samudro (as leader of the Double Organization), Kamari (who, under Sardjono's chairmanship, had for a long time been acting secretary of the Central Committee of the P.K.I.), and Hamid Sutan. When in mid-October Dahlan (another Minangkabau and former Stovia-student) was sent back from Pontianak, he was appointed leader of the headquarters which were to organize the rebellion. Sukrawinata counselled him against seeking further contact with the Central Committee, because of the latter's "lax attitude." Other members of headquarters were Sukrawinata, Samudro and Herujono. In the meantime, envoys were sent to various regions to propagate the new plans: thus Mahmud went to Makasar, while Bakar (a tool of Mahmud's in the Pariaman area, who was wanted by the police and had taken refuge in Batavia) (133) was despatched to Palembang, Herujono to Solo, Surabaya, Semarang, Cheribon and Tegal; Sukrawinata went to Banten and the

(131) This opinion stands in contrast to Tan Malaka's tactical analysis which we have reproduced above.

(132) In September, Mahmud had spent fifteen days at Singapore where he no doubt had been in touch with Alimin and Muso, who in June, 1926 had already decided that the social revolution would take place between November, 1926, and January, 1927. See also Note 126, above.

(133) Bakar, in 1924 a pupil of the Soematra Tawalib-school, had been recruited as P.K.I.-member by Mahmud. From October, 1925 on he was chairman at V Koto (Priaman), his place of birth, and besides propagandist in the entire district as far as VII Koto (Priaman). In February, 1926, he was wanted by the police for having breached the ban on public meetings; he managed to go into hiding at VII Koto for two months, until in April, 1926, he escaped to Padang, together with Rum, Party secretary at VII Koto and propagandist trained by Sutan Said Ali (cf. Note 114, above). Bakar subsequently went to Sibolga where he remained for several months as religious teacher and political propagandist, while Rum escaped all the way to Medan. In August, Bakar secretly returned to V Koto where he hid until his departure for Batavia in September.

Preanger District, and Baharuddin left for the West Coast of Sumatra on October 8. With the exception of Banten and Preanger, enthusiasm was not particularly striking among the Sections on Java, which had already been influenced by Suprodjo. They either, as happened in Makasar, could not pledge themselves, or they voted against the new plan. Such a flat refusal was also voiced by Palembang where Djamaluddin Tamin (another former Padang Pandjang leader) had apparently succeeded in propagating Tan Malaka's point of view, in spite of the activities of the so-called "Hadji Affandi"; these had gone on for many months, reaching their apex in August.

In the course of his three weeks' tour of the West Coast, Baharuddin Saleh (who, as the result of a long visit to Bandung, had become quite well acquainted with the standpoint of Suprodjo) found that Padang and Silungkang were in agreement with the new plans. (134) Arif Fadlillah, on the other hand, declared himself opposed to the decision of the new committee, "because it was taken without the knowledge of the Central Committee." An agreement was, however, reached with Limin, secretary of the Silungkang Subsection, that, as soon as the date had been decided upon by Batavia, Silungkang would inform the other Subsections "to take part in the rebellion." Baharuddin Saleh was charged with transmitting the date by telegraph.

This agreement was communicated by Limin to the other leaders of the Subsection (some of whom had also met with Baharuddin Saleh), instructing them to be on the alert. That same night (October 13), however, the ring leader Sulaiman Labai was arrested; he, together with his fellow-committeeman Dato Bagindo Ratu and member-at-large Sarun, had been in the habit of taking all important decisions, without necessarily communicating such decisions to the other members of the committee. Sulaiman Labai's arrest was one day later followed by that of Radjo Taktik; both were based on paragraph 153 bis. Sulaiman Labai's place was subsequently taken over by Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono. After October 15, administrative officers at Sawah Lunto—who had for quite some time known that arms were being manufactured at Lintau and elsewhere—realized that the extremist leaders at Silungkang were preparing for insurrection.

Once informed of the plans hatched in Batavia, the Silungkang leaders thought it advisable to ascertain the opinion of Section-leader Arif Fadlillah. It was, therefore, decided to send Limin and Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono to Padang Pandjang. Arif Fadlillah, however, said that Baharuddin Saleh had not been authorized by the Central Committee at Bandung, and that as a consequence he could not be trusted in his own right. Arif Fadlillah therefore wanted to await further instructions. Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono thus (on October 26) decided to go to Java himself for further information. When no news had been received from the Section by October 31, Tajjib went to Padang Pandjang in order to reconnoiter; but Arif Fadlillah had no further news for him. On November 4, Dato Bagindo Ratu was arrested in connection with clandestine trade in arms. On October 23, a similar fate had already befallen Hadji Bahuddin, the main leader in Sawah Lunto.

On November 5, at 12:20 p.m., the expected telegram arrived in Silungkang,

(134) The Double Organization (D.O.) in the Subsection of Padang (October 20) and the terroristic activities at Kota Anau can be dated from the time of Baharuddin's sojourn on the West Coast.

having been despatched from Java on the previous day. (135) The telegram ran as follows: "Radjobandaro Silungkang. Send twelve packages of Abdualloh." (136) As had been previously agreed, Said gelar Radjo Bandaro handed the telegram unopened to Hadji Djala, who in turn passed it on to Limin; Limin then knew that the insurrection on Java would start on November 12. On receipt of the telegram, Limin, Tajjib and Hadji decided to consult Arif Fadlillah once more (Hadji Djala had been appointed to the committee to replace Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono, who had left Java; he acted as go-between because the others were hiding from the police). On November 7, Tajjib, Limin and Hadji Djala thus went to Padang Pandjang, only to find that Arif Fadlillah had not changed his mind. "This is being done outside the authority of the Central Committee, and therefore the order cannot be obeyed. The Central Committee is, in fact, opposed to the order, which only emanates from a Committee in Batavia." In spite of Limin's and Tajjib's remonstrances Arif Fadlillah prohibited the action without further ado. On the same day still, the three envoys communicated the result of their conversation to the other initiates.

On November 9, Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono returned from Java, and that very same night Tajjib, Limin and Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono met at Hadji Djala's. Talaha gave an account of his trip, in the course of which he had met Baharuddin Saleh at Batavia; he reported that he had attended a meeting of Sukrawinata, Baharuddin, Mahmud, Bakar and others, at which November 12 had been set as the target date. The Batavia Committee could reportedly count on the following Sections: Batavia, Makasar, Ambon, East Java (Surabaya) and Central Java, Palembang, Lampung and Benkulen; support was also expected from the S.P.P.L. [-Trade Union] at Batavia, the military at Batavia and Bandung, and from workers on private estates in Batavia and in the plantations of Preanger Residency. Talaha was, on the other hand, informed by the others that the Padang Pandjang Section had forbidden to participate in the rebellion. They therefore thought it advisable for Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono himself to approach Arif Fadlillah, who might conceivably be convinced by him. Thus on November 10, Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono, accompanied by Hadji Djala, went to Kubu Kerambil (Bunga Tandjung, Pitalah), where Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono had a private conversation with Arif Fadlillah, while Hadji Djala had to wait outside for three hours. On a previous the Section-leader had declared that, among others, Dahlan was in disagreement with the plans for the insurrection; Radjo Sampono could now inform him that on the Waterlooplein at Weltevreden [Batavia] Dahlan had in his presence declared himself in wholehearted ("suka hati") agreement with them. But even then he was forced to report back to the others that Arif Fadlillah refused to cooperate, since the plan did not originate from the Central Committee but only from the Special Committee at Batavia. Arif Fadlillah's attitude, as well as the desire of the Silungkang leadership to consult him, are consequences of the stiffened Party-discipline.

(135) The decision to strike on the 12th and 13th seems, indeed, to have been taken on November 4, since on the same day Bakar also received orders to transmit the signal to Sumatra. He left Batavia on November 6 and arrived at Padang on November 9.

(136) A similar telegram was likewise despatched from Batavia to the Benkulen Section on November 6, addressed to Wahab, care of Sidi Mudo at Benkulen. It read: "On this boat we are sending [you] twelve pieces of batik." 'This boat' stands for 'this month', and 'twelve' again indicates the date. Apparently an agreement had been reached with Benkulen, perhaps by Baharuddin.

When the Silungkang leaders (Tajjib, Limin, Radjo Sampono and Djala) gathered the next morning (November 11) at Limin's house they were therefore at a loss what to decide under these circumstances. On the one hand, participation had been prohibited by the Section-leader; but, on the other, it would be difficult to remain inactive if in due course Batavia, Padang, Pariaman, Painan, Fort de Kock and Sibolga were to rise. It was decided to postpone a final decision until the evening, when Rumuat would come over from Durian.

Ever since the return of Radjo Sampono, news of the rebellion on Java, which was to be joined by Western Sumatra, and primarily by Silungkang, had filtered through to the lesser gods of the P.K.I., such as e.g. Corporal Rumuat. Expelled from the army because of Communist leanings on July 3, 1926, he had been conducting Communist propaganda among the police under the overall guidance of Sarun; he was now summoned and arrived in the evening hours of November 11 at Silungkang, to receive the necessary orders from Sarun. In the absence of Sarun a meeting was held in the dim light of the new moon on a hillside cemetery in the vicinity of Talaha gelar Sutan Bagindo's home (see Note 152, below), attended by Rumuat, Tajjib, Limin, Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono, Hadji Djala, Salim Emek (a gambler and good-for-nothing, nephew of the nagari-head, whom he assassinated on December 29) and Kadim gelar Pono Alam (also a gambler and formerly a cloth merchant who had gone bankrupt). Talaha gelar Sutan Bagindo (the connecting link between the P.K.I.-leadership and Rumuat in his capacity as propagandist among the police) and Ma'li (a tailor who roomed with Tajjib and who was to take part in the assassination of Leurs on January 1) kept guard lest the plotters be surprised by the police. Questioned by Limin, Rumuat declared that the police stood ready to participate in the insurrection; thereafter Tajjib, Limin, Hadji Djala and Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono went into a huddle. Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono then again referred to his visit to Arif Fadlillah of the previous day, saying that he could not explain the latter's stand: if all was said and done, the Java-Sections themselves no longer recognized the Central Committee either. How, then, could Arif Fadlillah stubbornly insist on discipline? Moreover, as Rumuat had informed them, the police was under control, and a sufficient number of men were prepared to take part in the insurrection. Limin then urged to go ahead with the insurrection without paying further attention to Arif Fadlillah, but that made Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono waver again: "What will happen if we are left alone to fight it out and the others (Padang, Pariaman, etc.) won't follow suit? Or suppose the action in Java itself won't come off either? Let us first await news from Java, while in the meantime making all necessary preparations. It is even probable that Arif Fadlillah might by then change his mind, too."

When this whispered conclusion had been reached, the conferees rejoined the other three. Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono subsequently reported to those present on his trip to Java. He said that on Java the rebellion would start at midnight the following day. The agreement was that Sumatra and the other islands should follow suit in a few days. It was thus necessary to be on the alert, since further instructions would certainly arrive within the next two or three days. With the aid of a plan of Sawah Lunto the campaign was mapped out. Because of his military erudition, ex-corporal Rumuat was appointed commander-in-chief of the operations against Sawah Lunto. All preparations were made; red sashes and arms were being readied for the police-brigade which had joined the Communists and for other participants.

Pakih Ain was similarly alerted to advance with the auxiliary bands from Padang Sibusuk in case of need. Later on it was also agreed that limin would pass the signal to Rumuat--who was returning to sikalang--through the intermediary

of Talaha gelar Sutan Bagindo, and that the detonation of bombs would serve as the signal for the beginning of the revolt. On his own initiative Rumuat also approached Sigin, another corporal who had been dismissed from the police in July because of Communist activities, and who was disseminating Communist propaganda among military personnel at Padang Pandjang. They arranged that Sigin should inform the P.K.I.-Executive at Padang Pandjang which--according to Sigin--so far had no news concerning an uprising at such short notice. Having carried out these orders Sigin was to return with the latest information....

During these days of intense expectations, Rumuat apparently felt the need for distraction and as a consequence was in the habit of seeking daily relaxation with some actresses of a native operetta company; when the signal had not arrived before the evening performance, he spent the night of the 15th, on which the attack on Sawah Lunto was to have taken place, again with a pretty actress, Adjim, at Sapan; it was raining very hard, there was no car and his house was very far away.....

In fact, the signal was never given: in the course of another visit on November 13, Arif Fadlillah had--as we shall presently see--more forcefully still repeated his banning of the insurrection. Thus Sawah Lunto was not attacked on the 15th. In due course administrative officers, having been tipped off, unmasked Sergeant Ponto of the red police brigade and arrested Rumuat. The "Red-Brigade" of the Silalang police actually continued in existence until January 2, when it was at last disarmed and taken into arrest by Wartena. Owing to this belated arrest, the fiction that the police had sided with the Communists continued until that date. Relying on that illusion, the red columns marched on Sawah Lunto during the night of January 1 to 2.

Prior to these developments, however, envoys from Padang had arrived at Silungkang on November 12. Their dispatch was connected with Bakar's arrival at Padang on November 9; he came as delegate from the Executive Committee at Batavia, with instructions to assume the leadership of the revolutionary movement. He delivered his orders to Zaini, committee-member of the Padang Subsection. At 7 o'clock of the same evening (November 9), Zaini reported this event to Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim. Bakar had informed him that all Subsections on Java and all revolutionary trade unions were in disagreement with the Central Committee, which was opposed to the insurrection. As a result of this conversation, Zaini informed Bakar the next day that Padang was prepared to participate as long as the other West Coast Subsection were likewise in agreement with the plan.

On November 11, Bakar left for Fort de Kock, after Zaini had appointed Pakih Tahir as his alternate in case he himself would no longer be present at the time of Bakar's return. At Fort de Kock Bakar met the local P.K.I.-secretary, (137) Salim gelar Sutan Salim, to whom he communicated the Batavia orders. As a result of this meeting, the local P.K.I. immediately engaged in large-scale activities. At Sungei Sarik (Tilatang), e.g., it was announced that the insurrection would commence on November 16; a similar proclamation was i.a. made at Kubang Putih. The Subsection committee communicated the following information to Talu: "On Java the revolution had already started; Padang is ready to follow that example, and Solok and Pariaman will start as soon as the rebellion in Padang has become a fact; at Fort de Kock all preparations have likewise been made and the roles

(137) He had succeeded Abbas in this function in August, and subsequently resigned from the post in November, when he was wanted by the police. He was, in turn, replaced by Bulah.

have been assigned; Manindjau and Fort de Kock together are determined to take the initiative in starting the revolution even if Padang does not go through with it." Between November 22 and 25 the Talu leaders were openly bragging on the very market-place of Talu and in the nagari of Tjubadak that in the night of November 26 and 27 they would take up arms against the Netherlands Indies' authorities and arm others; they would assassinate all local officials together with the representative of the government (the controleur); they would, furthermore, cut telephone lines and destroy the road leading from Panti and Tjubadak to the Talu Sub-District, thus preventing the despatch of auxiliary forces from Fort de Kock; having done all this, they would themselves assume the reins of government.

Vigilance of the administrative corps and the display of military power--taken as a result of the news from Java--prevented the outbreak of riots at either Talu or Fort de Kock in the course of those days.

In the meantime, Bakar had proceeded to Sibolga on November 12, but being unsuccessful in meeting leaders (who had already been arrested) he on November 17 returned by boat, empty-handed, to Padang, where he arrived on November 19.

Nor had Padang, in the days between November 9 and 19, remained inactive. On November 9, Bakar had informed Padang that West Java had decided to start the revolt between November 12 and 13, 1926, and that Zaini had, according to his instructions, agreed that the West Coast should follow suit either simultaneously or at least within a few days. This news had been received like a message of deliverance at Kalumbuk Pauh IX--a center of Communist desperado's and bandits--whence the Subsection committee had been transferred as of October 20, 1926. (138) After initial consultations with some of the leaders on November 10, Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim called a meeting for the afternoon of November 11, in Pakih Tahir's deserted religious school (surau) at Tjubadak Air, in which i.a. the following participated: Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim, Pakih Tahir, Disat (secretary-treasurer), Djamaluddin (Subsection chairman), Sirin (139) and Zainun. At that meeting Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim gave a report on the meeting between Zaini and Bakar, adding: "This rebellion is organized by a committee of the P.K.I., but not by the ordinary Central Executive and without the latter's approval." It was resolved to set up a committee with dictatorial powers, consisting of Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim, Sirin, Pakih Tahir, and Zainun; this committee was authorized to make all future decisions. It subsequently held separate meetings and decided to attack Padang on November 16 at 10 p.m. The necessary preparations were immediately to be taken in hand. Though the date had been set in accordance with

(138) This was the date of Baharuddin Saleh's visit to the West Coast. Zaini acted as a vanguard in the city of Padang, as it were. On October 23, Zaini and Pakih Tahir had already gone to Kota Lawas (Padang Pandjang) to obtain information concerning the state of the movement there: "We in Padang are having quite some trouble. Our nagari is extremely rebellious and the atmosphere is full of murder. Runaways are plotting vengeance and are insisting on staging the uprising. The blood of our members is rapidly reaching the boiling point, and it is worse still among the ex-convicts. We can no longer control this fanaticism by reasoning. In the evening hours these criminals are constantly coming to our houses urging us to start the revolt, and they don't want to go away again." Zaini and Pakih Tahir had wanted to meet Arif Fadlillah, but did not succeed. In fact, they doubtless must have been acquainted with his point of view.

(139) Sirin gelar Tanalam had been in Java from April until September, 1926.

the wishes of the Batavia Committee, it was decided to consult with Silungkang before reaching a final decision in the matter. We shall presently return to this point in greater detail. In the meantime, the necessary preparations were made at Padang; bombs were distributed, etc. These matters were the responsibility of the commissioner for Padang (Zaini), aided by his helpmate, the barber Simu gelar Sutan Barahim, in his capacity as head of the Sarikat Djonggos /Association of House Servants/. Zaini was also despatched as plenipotentiary to Pariaman, there to proclaim the insurrection and to recruit auxiliary bands. (140) On November 12 at 5 p.m. Zaini met Junus, secretary of the Pariaman Subsection, on the market and informed him of the plans, inquiring at the same time about Pariaman's attitude to them. Junus told him that he had to submit the plans to his committee before making a definite commitment. Next morning Junus spoke to young Hamzah, the former chairman of the Barisan Merah (/Red Corps/; this was the former football club L.O.N.A. which had been transformed into a P.K.I.-cell), who also seems to have had a talk with Zaini. Junus then said that he saw no chance of organizing a revolt at Pariaman and went on his way. Zaini subsequently still visited Bagindo Lian, Chairman of the Sarikat Tani at Pauh Kambar (141) whereafter he was--in the opinion of Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim, as revealed in the notes found in his possession--arrested during the night of November 14. Thus neither at Pariaman nor at Pauh Kambar (Ulakan) a revolt took place.

The Padang leadership also sought contact with Painan. Thus in the afternoon of Tuesday, November 16 a meeting was held in the village of Djambah (nagari of Taluk Bajang) at which local and other leaders incited listeners to the overthrow of the government. That afternoon Murab Center was expected to arrive from Padang by automobile; he was to bring the signal for the beginning of the insurrection. This meeting was the result of conversations held at Zaini's Padang home on the afternoon of Sunday, November 14, which had also been attended by leaders from Painan. Thus here, again, Zaini was the contact. (142)

Because of the fact that no signal was received from Padang--in part also because of intervention by the administrative corps, which had been tipped off at the last moment--the revolt at Painan did not go through. Communist propaganda had nonetheless left its marks on the population, the more so since the local chief leader, Djalaluddin, was domiciled at Tarusan, i.e. at a fair distance from the center of District Administration.

At the above-mentioned meeting of November 11 Bakar's report had elicited the question why he had not sought contact with Arif Fadlillah, the Section-leader, rather than directly dealing with the Subsection. No doubt it was known to some of the conferees that Bakar's action had been caused by Arif Fadlillah's refusal

(140) According to information obtained from Radjo Sampono after his return from Java to Silungkang, Bakar was to have gone to Pariaman and Painan. Apparently with a view to speeding matters up, however, he had left these tasks to Zaini.

(141) We already mentioned that this Sarikat Tani had been established by Sutan Berahim from Padang. Bagindo Lian had succeeded Sutan Berahim as chairman--Hadji Tangsi, leader in VII Koto, stood in direct contact with the Padang leaders (Pakih Tahir, Zaini, etc.)

(142) The P.K.I.-committee at Pauh Kota Tengah had likewise received a letter about the revolt. Toboh Gadang allegedly received the news through a messenger from Patai.

to listen to Baharuddin Saleh's plans in October, a refusal based on considerations of discipline. Since Arif Fadlillah adhered to the standpoint of Tan Malaka and that of the Central Committee--an attitude which, far from satisfying the heated imagination of the Padang leaders, who for months had worked themselves into a frenzy, only aroused their distrust--the ringleaders did not feel like consulting Arif Fadlillah. By contrast, they were profoundly interested in Silungkang which, as Bakar had told them, was willing to join them. It was therefore thought advisable to establish contact and reach agreement with Silungkang before proceeding to the actual uprising, the more so since Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono was to have returned thither from Java with up-to-date information regarding the plans of the Batavia Committee. On the very evening of November 11, Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim, Pakih Tahir and Orang Tuo Leman consequently left for Silungkang by automobile. Having been told at Fort van der Capellen that the bridge at Talawi could not be used, they returned to Kota Lawas (Padang Pandjang) and spent the night there. Next morning (November 12) Pakih Tahir and Orang Tuo Leman on orders from Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim proceeded by train to Silungkang, while he himself stayed behind at Batipuh (Kota Lawas), center of illegal activities.

Having arrived at Silungkang at about 1 p.m., the two envoys that same Friday (November 12) approached Talaha gelar Sutan di Langit and requested him to be put in touch with the P.K.I.-committee. Since the P.K.I.-committee was nowhere to be found, Pakih Tahir had to content himself with meeting Hadji Djala and Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono in an empty house in the vicinity of the home of Talaha gelar Sutan di Langit. The Padang leader reported on the arrival of Bakar and on the decision to start the revolt of November 16. In turn, Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono disclosed what he knew of the Batavia plans. Arif Fadlillah's outright prohibition to participate in the insurrection had, however, caused Silungkang to decide in favor of awaiting the result of events on Java; therefore Silungkang could not yet agree with November 16 as target-date without Arif Fadlillah's agreement. It was decided to send Hadji Djala, Pakih Tahir and Orang Tuo Leman to Kota Lawas to confer with Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim and also to consult Arif Fadlillah.

That same day (November 12) at 5 p.m. they thus took the last train to Padang Pandjang via Solok. At Kota Lawas they met Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim with whom Hadji Djala had a long conversation in the evening; as the result of this talk they asked Arif Fadlillah to join them the next day (November 13) at about 11 a.m. In his talks with Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim--the others being excluded from the conversation which lasted over an hour--Arif Fadlillah upheld his point of view: as far as he knew, the social revolution was not to take place in the course of 1926.

After the conference, they all had lunch together, and on this occasion Arif Fadlillah declared: "We shall only attain our independence through joint action and by staging demonstrations." Thus Arif Fadlillah strictly adhered to Tan Malaka's instructions which he had intended to translate into fact by organizing a demonstration of the Red boy scouts on November 11. (143) Thereafter Hadji Djala returned to Silungkang. The next day (November 14), Hadji Muhammad

(143) It is probable that the prospected demonstration for the release of Upik Hitam (the propagandist of the Communist Women's Movement, Kaoem Iboe, at Padang Pandjang) had likewise been inspired by Arif Fadlillah. The demonstration was to take place at Fort van der Capellen, where she had been arrested, some time between the end of December and the beginning of January.

Nur Ibrahim sent Pakih Tahir back home on the early train. He himself left in the evening by car, accompanied by Orang Tuo Leman as far as Tabing (Lubuk Bua). Returning to Padang that same evening Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim was, however, by accident arrested (November 14): as a consequence of the news from Java, supervision and vigilance had been tightened up. During the arrest of Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim several of his notebooks were confiscated, which led to the arrest of some 20-odd persons. These notes also make it appear likely that Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim had been planning to proceed to the Straits Settlement for consultations with Alimin and Muso at Johore. It is also significant that his arrival at Kota Lawas led to the organization of a "black band" there. At Kota Lawas he had presumably stayed at the home of Mangkudum Sati (leader of the illegal action).

On his return to Kalumbuk, Pakih Tahir reported that the Section-leader had opposed the insurrection, and that as a consequence Silungkang was refusing to participate. A similar story was told by Orang Tuo Leman. Thus neither the prospected rising at Silungkang on November 15, nor that planned for Padang on November 16 took place, both having been obstructed by the prestige of the Section-leader.

On November 19 Bakar again returned from Sibolga to Padang, whence he was taken to Diris' home at Pauh IX for a new meeting with the runaway leaders. Bakar having been brought up-to-date with regard to developments which had taken place during his absence, the meeting resolved to despatch him to Silungkang for consultations concerning measures to be taken in the immediate future. In spite of Arif Fadlillah, they were determined to go through with the revolt at all costs, since they would not leave Java in the lurch. They knew, furthermore, that Silungkang was anxious to rise, too. Bakar was appointed secretary of the Revolutionary Committee (consisting of Pakih Tahir, Zainun and Sirin). In this committee, Zainun now took the place of Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim.

On November 21 Bakar and Orang Tuo Leman went to Silungkang, Bakar being neatly attired as a well-to-do merchant with wrist watch, etc. In the guise of a merchant he also contacted Talaha gelar Sutan di Langit, Van Eck's go-between in the clandestine arms trade. (144) Asked about Limin, Talaha referred Bakar to Hadji Djala who would be able to help him. Politics were not discussed. Hadji Djala then put the two delegates in touch with Limin. That night (November 21-22) Bakar and Limin reached agreement to revolt if and when the entire West Coast of Sumatra were to participate. While Silungkang was in agreement with the Padang plans, the revolution would be in vain without the cooperation of them all; but for the attainment of such unity Arif Fadlillah's agreement had to be obtained. Even though Bakar thought that he could vouch for Padang, Pariaman and Painan, the participation of the other Subsections was essential with a view to the example of Java. Moreover, Limin still had to consult Berahim who at that moment

(144) This Talaha was a petty trader, who was actually only interested in money-making. He had nothing to do with the P.K.I.-leadership. He had nonetheless disseminated Communist propaganda at Kuantan; prior to that, in the heyday of the Sarikat Islam, he had been a well-known S.I.-member at Silungkand, even then already a helpmate of Sulaiman Labai's. In 1926 he was again instrumental in procuring firearms, i.e. for Sulaiman Labai. (The latter was in charge of the P.K.I.-arsenal, while Dato Bagindo Ratu handled the financial administration). Revolvers, however, were individually purchased direct from Talaha gelar Sutan di Langit; they were available to everyone.

was in Sidjungdjung. (Sarun, perhaps, rather than Berahim?) That same night a conference took place between Tajjib, Limin, Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono, Hadji Djala, Salim Emek and another person from Solok, in the course of which Hadji Djala and Bakar were i.a. charged with consulting Arif Fadlillah at Padang Pandjang, while Limin was at the same time to sound out the other Subsections. They were ultimately to meet at Padang for further discussions. Because of stiffened police supervision--Talaha gelar Sutan di Langit having been arrested on November 23 in connection with his part in the clandestine arms deals--they all went into hiding on the 22nd; the next day, Bakar, Orang Tuo Leman and Hadji Djala walked to Sungai Lasi whence they took the train to Padang Pandjang.

By accident Bakar was on that occasion arrested at Solok for having registered under a false name. It took many weeks before it transpired that he was the person wanted by the Pariaman police for months, and that he was the delegate from Java. He managed to destroy his authorization from the Padang Committee in the prison toilet. The Batavia document had already been destroyed on an earlier occasion.

In the meantime Limin had on his own initiative gone to Fort de Kock where he met the P.K.I.-chairman, Si Saba of Taluk, Banu Hampu. He informed him of the impending insurrection which was to be proclaimed on a date yet to be announced, requesting the cooperation of Fort de Kock. Since Limin could not produce an authorization, he was not properly trusted by Saba. It is not certain whether Limin thereupon proceeded to Pajakumbuh. We do know, however, that in due course he and Hadji Djala went to Padang, where their arrival had already been announced by Orang Tuo Leman. After the arrest of Bakar, Hadji Djala had decided against a visit to Arif Fadlillah; he thus returned from Padang Pandjang to Silungkang where he fetched Limin. Together they went to Padang Pandjang, there to deliberate on their next moves under the prevailing circumstances.

While Bakar had informed Limin that Padang was planning to stage the uprising on December 1, (145) during the ensuing Kalumbuk talks with Pakih Tahir, Sirin and Zainun the latter spoke of December 2 as the date. Consequently December 2 was provisionally accepted as the target date. (Limin was no participant in these discussions, but remained in the background as advisor; he stayed on in Padang and made Hadji Djala go on to Kalumbuk.) Since Arif Fadlillah had given ample proof of his unwillingness to cooperate, they were determined--their revolutionary sentiment having by then grown into an obsession--to take the initiative themselves; but they still had to ascertain the sentiment of the other Subsections (Fort de Kock, Manindjau and Lubuk Basung, on the one hand, and Pajakumbuh, on the other). Limin was by no means assured of help from Fort de Kock. Seeing that Djala was not known there, Limin and a certain Udin gelar Malim Gintih were appointed envoys to Fort de Kock, the latter merely as a dummy, a role assigned to Orang Tuo Leman on previous occasions. This decision was subsequently communicated to the lower-echelon leaders who--again!--had been barred from the discussions between the Padang triumvirate and Djala. Since Limin and Udin (146) missed each other, in the end Simu gelar Sutan Berahim (the previously mentioned barber and head of the Padang Sarikat Djongos, who had replaced Zaini

(145) Originally as early a date as November 27-28 had apparently been considered.

(146) On November 25 at 2 p.m. he was told to go to Fort de Kock the next day. However, he only met Ripin and Bulah at Fort de Kock on the 27th. (See Note 127, above).

after the latter's arrest on November 14) and Udin gelar Malim Gintih--equipped with an authorization drawn up by Zainun and signed by Pakih Tahir and Sirin--went to Fort de Kock. They also carried a letter stating that Solok, Silungkang, Padang and Pariaman had already agreed and were ready to participate in the insurrection.

But at Fort de Kock Sutan Berahim and Udin learned that the chance for a revolt had passed, since administration and army had been alerted: "The nagari is already 'hot'." Thus upon returning to Padang on his own Udin reported that the revolt could not go through. Increased military action in the Padang Ommelanden, moreover, rendered a concentration of the fugitive revolutionary and criminal elements impossible. The arrest of Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim and Bakar had in fact eliminated the "intellectuals" among the leaders. The remainder were not of a caliber to prepare, let alone execute, large-scale operations: neither the criminal village teacher Pakir Tahir (a nephew kemanakan of Patai's), nor the self-styled "electrician" Sirin and the former tram-conductor Zainun, let alone that old illiterate, Orang Tuo Leman and Tawi, the discharged S.S.S. Sumatra State Railways lightman. The barber, Sutan Berahim, who in addition to distributing bombs had played a significant role in propaganda activities at Pauh Kamar and among house-servants at Padang, after his visit to Fort de Kock dissociated himself from the movement and decided to watch the course of events from Matur, his native nagari.

The Padang delegates' report concerning the willingness and readiness of Solok, Silungkang, Padang and Pariaman spread like wildfire among the leadership at Agam. As we saw above, the nagari was not too "hot" for some of them to continue incendiary propaganda. Although Padang abstained from further insurrectionary endeavors, terroristic action nonetheless continued, even culminating in a minor explosion, viz. the attack on Pasat Ambatjang on January 9-10, 1927. Had the Silungkang revolt succeeded, the tide would have risen in other places, too; nuclei existed almost everywhere, and they would then have taken the initiative, if need be by means of threats forcing the masses to follow suit, as was the case in Silungkang.

At Silungkang nothing was heard of the negative result of the Padang emissaries' mission to Fort de Kock. (147) As a result of this ignorance, Sarun, Limin, Tajjib, Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono and Hadji Djala--all of them wanted by the police and thus constantly risking arrest--during the last days of November, 1926, met in a dilapidated house in order to confer about the next moves. They decided to send Sarun to Arif Fadlillah for consultation with the Section-leader. In his testimony Tajjib alleges to have been told by Limin that in early December Sarun had returned to Silungkang with news from Arif Fadlillah to the effect that a world wide revolution would break out on January 1. Whatever the case may be--seeing that Arif Fadlillah has denied everything while Sarun and Limin have not yet been apprehended--there is no indication that the Silungkang leaders showed surprise at this sudden reversal on the part of Arif Fadlillah at that moment; apparently the authority of Sarun banned all doubts. In fact, had Arif Fadlillah indeed changed his mind, it would certainly have been expressed in new orders to all the other Subsections--and that most certainly was not the case. (148)

(147) Limin's visit to Fort de Kock may, however, not have taken place before his trip to Padang (November 24), but only on November 26. If so, he must have been informed of the situation at Fort de Kock.

During the plotters' nocturnal meeting on November 11-12, 1926, at the Guguk cemetery--where Rumuat had received his orders for the prospected Silungkang revolt on November 15--Limin had explained that in accordance with the original plan, the revolution on Java was to have broken out on the night of January 1, to be followed by Sumatra and the other Outer Islands in the course of two or three days. (149) According to information submitted by Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono, that plan had been abandoned at the insistence of the Communist military on Java.

Thus the Silungkang leaders were not surprised when on a day in early December--still before the arrest of Hadji Djala on December 14--Sarun brought the message that January 1 had been decided upon as The Day. As we already said, we do not know whence Sarun came and where he had heard this piece of information; this order, however, was also being circulated on Java. As early as August, 1926, January, 1927, had been indicated as the date for the social revolution in the propaganda activities among contract coolies at Muara Aman (Benkulen). Similar information likewise did the rounds at Fort van der Capellen (see Report of the Parangan Demang of October 14, 1926, No. 37/Secret). At Kuantan, too, in October, 1926, the revolution had been announced for January, 1927, when the Minangkabau people, together with the Russians, would march in. (See also Note 126, above). Originally, the target date of January 1 therefore did not cause any questioning among the leaders at Silungkang; their whole frame of mind was directed towards the coming revolution, and moreover Sarun's prestige was so high that, once he had spoken, none of the Silungkang committee members durst contradict, or even question, him; his prestige derived both from his higher education--he had been through grade school at Padang Pandjang--and from his personality, since he was the scion of an infamous family of bandits from Piangu....

- (148) The contrary is true. On January 4, efforts were made to start an uprising in the Pariaman area, following the example of Silungkang and at the behest of an unauthorized envoy from Padang Pandjang; but the Subsection chairman countered these endeavors on the basis of Arif Fadlillah's instructions. At Padang Pandjang itself, insurrectionary agitation only took place after Arif Fadlillah's arrest and after the rioting had started at Silungkang.
- (149) It is significant that this information should have come from Limin at that moment (a fact borne out by the testimonies of Rumuat and Hadji Djala). Even Rumuat then started to doubt: whose orders were to be binding on him? Those of Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono, who had spoken of November 12-13, or those of Limin, who now mentioned January 1? Thereupon Limin gave the above-quoted explanation, to the effect that Talaha had the most recent news. - Limin's information could conceivably only have been received from Baharuddin Saleh on October 13. Is it, then, possible that the Batavia Committee had originally aimed at January--whether or not that date was in agreement with Alimin's and Muso's wishes--and had it later on been forced to advance the date through fear of repeated interference from Tan Malaka and his followers on Java? It must be borne in mind that, as we said, the Bandung Central Committee (under the leadership of Suprodjo) only advocated a referendum for Central Committee elections on November 10. During his meeting with the other Silungkang leaders (Dato Baggingo Ratu, Sulaiman Labai and Tajjib) on October 13, Baharuddin Saleh had purposely not mentioned any specific date.

Yet in an endeavor to play safe, Limin and Hadji Djala were two days later despatched to Padang Pandjang in order to obtain further information from Arif Fadlillah; Sarun had again suffered an eclipse, his suggestive influence having been temporarily broken; furthermore, this time there were no fascinating outside elements (such as Bakar and Hadji Muhammad Nur Ibrahim) who previously used to put a momentary damper on the need for organized intellectual leadership, intuitively felt by these uneducated people.

Unfortunately, Limin and Hadji Djala did not find Arif Fadlillah. They pushed on to Padang, but there again did not encounter any of the leaders, who, put on the run by military action in the Padang Ommelanden, were ever harder pressed as time wore on. They durst not repeat their visit to Padang Pandjang in the subsequent weeks; the roads were being too closely guarded, and both Limin and Hadji Djala were still wanted by police and administration, so that they barely ventured into the open from their hiding places.

After their return from Silungkang, Tajjib, Limin, Hadji Djala and Talah gelar Radjo Sampono got together in order to deliberate on their next moves. They were joined by the gambler Salim Emek (who, since April, 1926, had been participating in all kinds of important consultations of the Subsectional committee) and by a new man, a rather repulsive creature, the illiterate Muhammed Jusuf gelar Sampono Kajo (a bankrupt cloth-merchant, now running a small native restaurant as well as a car-rental service; he had again suffered heavy losses on account of the decline in rubber prices; he had only recently joined the P.K.I.). They decided again to adhere to Sarun's order and to issue instructions for the insurrection on January 1. This resolution was subsequently carried into effect at a meeting of the Subsection committee, attended by several second-echelon leaders. In spite of the fact that preparations were being made, news was in the meantime still awaited from the Sectional committee.

Towards the end of December, Tajjib by means of letters alerted Muaro Kelaban, Koto VII, Pulau Pundjung, Padang Sibusuk, Tandjung Ampalu and Sidjungdjung. Summonses were sent to the Solok area. Propaganda for the rebellion was even conducted at Djambi by the jailed P.K.I.-leader Muhammad Ali from his very prison cell at Muara Tembesi, while Harun and Adjam were active among the Minangkabau coolies at Muara Bungo. Several Minangkabaus hurriedly returned thence to their own country. The Resident of Djambi notified his Padang colleague in a secret telegram dated December 22, 1926, of this state of affairs.

The Minangkabau exodus was, however, by no means always occasioned by personal initiative. After the November events [on Java] administrative officers at Djambi--European as well as native--advised many to go home, while others were expelled. Thereafter many left on their own initiative, feeling unsafe in the area. During the first month of 1927, this exodus also extended to Tapanuli, Rokan, Kampar and Kuantan...

Djambi as well as Kuantan remained, however, in contact with the insurrectionary movement on the West Coast. In Kuantan the uprising was planned for January 23, and Lubuk Ambatjang was ready to follow suit. The P.K.I.-leader at Muara Tembesi prepared the Djambi revolt for February 9.

Messengers were furthermore dispatched from Silungkang to Taratak Batjah, Sungei Tjatjang, Air Luo, Siaro-Siaro, Piangu and Tarung-Tarung, summoning several leaders to Silungkang, there to receive final instructions for the formation of auxiliary bands in their respective places from Muhammed Jusuf gelar Sampono

Kajo. Muhammed Jusuf instructed his helpmates, Berahim and the bandit Lawit, who operated his native restaurant on his behalf (Lawit was i.a. to participate in the assassination of the teachers on January 1) to purchase meat and rice for the troops who had been ordered to Silungkang.... "Come on to Silungkang! Muhammed Jusuf in the big house (rumah tinggi) has had a cow slaughtered!"

Thus January 1 arrived and still no news had been received from Arif Fadlillah. Limin therefore decided to take the last train to Padang Pandjang at 5 p.m. for last-minute consultations with Arif Fadlillah. He was to return by automobile.... Limin, however, did not meet him: after repeated urgings from the Assistant-Resident of Sawah Lunto, Arif Fadlillah had at long last been arrested and escorted to Sawah Lunto on December 29. Limin then decided not to waste his time any longer, and instead of returning to Silungkang, he fled abroad....

In the early evening hours young Tajjib, son of Hadji, Jahja alias Hadji Abdulgani, the Sawah Lunto merchant, arrived at Silungkang; on behalf of the Subsectional committee at Sawah Lunto he inquired whether news had been received from the Section, stating that Sawah Lunto would not cooperate without its sanction. Muhammed Jusuf gelar Sampono Kajo told Tajjib, who barely realized what was going on, that no news had as yet been received from Padang Pandjang; Tajjib then transmitted his orders and received the following answer: "If Sawah Lunto does not join us, it will be destroyed by Silungkang later on...." Only then did Tajjib suddenly understand what was at stake, and hastened back to Sawah Lunto. In the meantime the villagers who had been pressed into military formations, started to converge on the market of Silungkang.

Air Luo did not participate. Incited by the teacher Kamin, son of the banned laras-head of Supajang, these backward mountain-people had joined the movement, and in the course of the previous month had repeatedly gathered in their adat-house. Weapons had been inspected and cutlasses (rudu) and swords (klewang) had been sharpened. Kamin, who was leaving for Padang Pandjang on December 22, had undertaken to bring further information. Thus when Chatib nan Garang, the local leader, returned from Silungkang to Air Luo towards the end of December, his orders to gather the columns for the advance on Silungkang were disobeyed, since according to the original agreement Kamin himself was to have come to Air Luo. Kamin, however, had not come, but by way of Padang Pandjang and Bangkinang had gone on to the Straits....

In Tarung-Tarung and Siaro-Siaro, on the other hand, everybody, member or not, had been pressed into the formations; but out of the few hundred men who had marched away from Tarung-Tarung only 92 arrived at Silungkang; the others had on the way seen a chance for escape.

Later during the night, this column, armed with cutlasses and swords, and led by Abdul Muluk, left Silungkang in the direction of Sawah Lunto, up to about 3 miles from Muaro Kelaban; there they sat down on the road, waiting for another column, consisting of people from Rumbio, which was supposed to have followed them. Since Abdul Muluk did not feel capable of leading a detachment on his own, it had been arranged that the commander proper should join him with the other column, whereafter they were jointly to attack Sawah Lunto, re-enforced by yet another column from Padang Sibusuk and by bands from Bukit Katjik and Rumbio,

which were to advance along the railroad line. (150)

Wartena, having been informed by telephone of the first encounter in the vicinity of the old jail at Muaro Kelaban, left Sawah Lunto by automobile and rushed to the scene. On first sighting the eight policemen under his command, the forcefully recruited people from Tarung-Tarung started to panic and fled into the woods. After many wanderings they finally returned to their mountain village without taking part in any further action. (151)

(150) Led by Karim from Sungei Tjatjang, this group of approximately twenty men was afraid to enter the tunnel at night time; they therefore climbed the hill to the other side, only to run into some policemen under the command of Veldhuijsen at the tunnel exit; this caused them rapidly to disperse. These people had in the main come from Sungei Tjatjang and Muaro Kelaban. The Rumbio and Bukit Katjik gangs had already been dispersed in the vicinity of the police barracks at Muaro Kelaban.

(151) Seventeen of them, having fled to Padang Sibusuk and there participated in the revolt on January 2, wanted to return to Tarung-Tarung the next day (January 3); together with some other people from Padang Sibusuk--who were to show them the way--they were by way of Teratak Bantjah and Sungei Tjatjang brought to Silungkang, on orders from a certain Muluk from Muaro Kelaban, who had already played a leading role in the Padang Sibusuk insurrection on January 2. Pakih Ain had ordered the other members of the party--i.e., their guides--to go to Silungkang, there to collect arms, including bombs, for the continuation of the struggle. At Silungkang they, as well as the people from Tarung-Tarung, were subsequently forced to join the "Cheka" under the leadership of Talaha gelar Sutan Bagindo on January 3.

After a successful raid on Silungkang on January 2, the police had again left the village; on January 3 the leaders drummed up another column on the market. On that occasion Tajjib ordered the arrest of eleven people, who were locked up in a godown behind the kitchen of the big house (rumah tinggi), close to the railroad station and the market. They remained there even after the rioters, on hearing the approaching police, fled at about noon. At about 8 p.m.--when the police had again left--Talaha gelar Sutan Bagindo took eight of them from jail, one by one, at intervals of about fifteen minutes. They were bound by his accomplices and subsequently by the light of a lamp butchered with knives and swords on the river-bank. They had their throats cut, a punishment called hukum pantjong /severing of the head/--according to Malay tradition, a princely, sovereign privilege par excellence!

The victims of this butchery were: the poor retail trader Amat Bukit; Gana (Kirana), a butcher from Kota Anau; the harmless coconut reaper Suratan; the unfortunate coolie, Taalin, son of the former nagari-head, Maalin gelar Sutan Bagindo; the guardsman (dubalang) Taeran; the vice-panghulu Kiraman gelar Bandaro Putih; and Sokah gelar Datuk Bamuk, former headman of the nobility (bagsawan), and since December 31 head of the community; he was in addition mutilated by having his genitals cut off.

Though they were spared that night, a similar fate was later to have been shared by Manan, Maanin and Hadji Jusuf, who were incarcerated in the same room. But in the early morning hours Hadji Jusuf, hearing shooting exclaimed, "The soldiers are coming!", whereupon the guards took to their heels, thus enabling the prisoners to escape through the rear window.

The murder of Maalin was another act of personal vendetta on the part of Talaha gelar Sutan Bagindo. The others were butchered by the people from

But we were running ahead of our story. Another fifty-odd men from Siaro-Siaro arrived on the Silungkang square, who were later to block the railroad. Others, too, were approaching from the nearby villages. People were advancing from Rumbio and Bukit Katjik; 30-odd men had come up from Muaro Kelaban under instructions from Njamu, the local leader, and another twenty-five, commanded by a certain Kamin, had arrived from Sawah Teratak.

Later in the evening these people quickly took to their heels when they heard the police firing shots near the cantonment of Muara Kelaban. The men from Bukit Katjik tried enthusiastically to welcome as Communist brothers the two policemen whom they encountered on the way!

The leaders, equipped with revolvers, were stalking up and down, here and there urging recalcitrants to join up. Among them was e.g. Salim Langgang, who at one time had practiced the respectable trade of carrier, but who for months now had made a living on the movement. He was to participate in the murder of the teachers and the goldsmiths that same night; he also, together with Si Katun, was to press some hundred-odd inhabitants of Silungkang proper into the Red columns for a repeat attack on Sawah Lunto on January 3—one day after the police had again left Silungkang unguarded after their short but forceful raid on January 2. Finally, he was, on orders from Tajjib, that same morning to lock up the eleven unfortunate Silungkang men, eight of whom accused of loyalty to the government, who were to be slaughtered by the Cheka under the command of Telaha gelar Sutan Bagindo at 8 p.m..... (See Note 151).

Tarung-Tarung. It is significant that Maamin had accompanied Talaha on his unsuccessful mission to Sikalang in the late evening hours of January, while Manan had been a propagandist at Kota Baru (Batang Hari). Hadji Jusuf was a relative of Talaha's and was therefore spared by him.

These eight victims of the Cheka of January 3 were buried in a communal grave, together with eight others who had been blacklisted by Dato Bagindo Ratu even before his arrest on November 4; these were one by one killed and interred on the night of January 1-2, after the departure of the Red detachments. The list was headed by the community-head of Silungkang, whom his nephew, Salim Emek, had already killed on December 29. (Salim Emek, a weak and sickly young boy, had been looked after and brought up by his uncle!) Also included in the list was Mr. Leurs who, as is well-known, also fell a victim to the terror on January 1; he had had in his possession the keys to the dynamite store of the Department of Public Works. Others assassinated on that night were: the three teachers (Mahmud, Djumin and Rahman); the two goldsmiths (Kari Sutan and Menek, together with the latter's son, Suman); the assistant post-office clerk; the nagari-secretary Manan; the driver Malik; the ticket controller Sutan Pamuntjak who, sensing mischief, had started to ring the station bell over the sleeping people of Silungkang in the dead of night. (The station-master, too, was on the list, but he managed to escape; only his house fell a victim to the terror.) They were all accused of being in league with the government. The mere fact of being in government service sufficed to establish their guilt.

"We only have one thought, my dear sir," said the "Anacreon de la guillotine," Barere, the famous member of the committee for Public Safety, in connection with the Terror of 1793-94, "that of our own survival; only one desire—that of preserving our existence, which each of us fears to be threatened. You send your neighbor to the guillotine, lest your neighbor send you there. Let us live for the day—they will massacre us tomorrow!... No, no, it is only the dead who do not return!"

On the whole, however, Silungkang itself was soundly asleep while the columns were converging on the village during the night of January 1. The station was overcrowded with sleeping marketers awaiting the arrival of the first train. Only in front of the rumah tinggi (the big house with Muhammed Jusuf's restaurant facing the market-place) there was a constant coming and going of leaders and advancing columns.

In the meantime the chief actors were putting their heads together on the second floor of the rumah tinggi: there was no sign of Limin who was to bring news from Padang Pandjang. Was the revolt to go through or not? Downstairs the 300-400 men of the Red columns were regaled with rice, meat and dessert on the market-place. Lemonade and cigarettes were passed around. Berahim (152) and Lawit, Muhammed Jusuf gelar Sampono Kajo's helpmates who were in charge of the restaurant, were busily engaged in looking after everyone's needs....

Berahim and Lawit were soon thereafter to take part in the assassination of the teachers.... In the early morning hours, Berahim was to kill the ticket-collector, Sutan Pamuntjak, on the railway station for having rung the station bell in the sleeping village of Silungkang, which was as yet unaware of the dreadful events.... Berahim, finally, was to be the ringleader of the barbarous murder of Leurs.

Each of the members of the columns received a red sheath. Swords and chopping knives were distributed. It was, indeed, a lively scene. And when they finally stood in formation, each man was given a peppermint candy....

Should, then, the rising go through or not? Where was Limin? What would happen if the other West Coast Subsections failed to join the insurrection?

But the orders had already gone out to Padang Sibusuk, Tandjung Ampalu and Sidjungdjung. A car had been sent to Pulau Pundjung in the Batang-Hari district. Around 10 o'clock Talaha gelar Sutan Bagindo had likewise left by car for Sikalang (Sawah Lunto) in order to fetch the Red police detachment, which was to participate in the struggle. (153) There was no doubt that preparations were everywhere underway....

Preparations, it is true, were underway.... But at Sidjungdjung the man charged with setting the house on fire--this was to be the signal for the revolt--could not manage to get the fire going.... The fire of the assistant secretary's house, which he had first chosen for that purpose, was at the very outset immediately extinguished by the occupant. It almost looked as if the gasoline delivered by the Controleur's driver refused to do its duty; an old automobile on while he subsequently tried it out would not burn at all, the fire dying of its own accord. The Public Works Department shed, which came next, was adjacent to the house of the man's own brother, who immediately came running from his living quarters in order to put out the fire; at a loss, the incendiary could not but help extinguish it. Thus the fire alarm which was to have lured Controleur and demand from their houses failed to come off, and the would-be assassins who had been waiting for the signal decided to return home even before dawn. Identical

(152) A nephew (kemanakan) of the loafer and gambler Salim Emek.

(153) Two endeavors to reach the Sikalang police by car ended in failure through lack of courage of the occupants and through insufficient enthusiasm of the drivers.

action was taken by the men who had been detailed to deprive the two soldiers in the government rest house (pasanggrahan) of their rifles. Although they had to escort the mail-bags to Kuantan the following day, these two soldiers, instead of going to sleep, stayed up talking that night.... Even then, however, these sons of Mars were completely unaware of any impending danger! The telephone connection having been cut, the Controleur on the following morning suspected that trouble was brewing; he thus immediately sent for military assistance from Djambi.... On January 2 the Silungkang Communists went out to have a look at Padang Sibusuk, where they got embroiled in the rioting to their own detriment. The people of Sidjungdjung, who, incited by Munap, had started a commotion on the same day (January 2), immediately turned back when they sighted a few soldiers; having been exhorted by the demang--who had originally taken them for village patrols--they calmly went home.

And what had been happening at Padang Sibusuk? On December 30 Pakih Ain had received instructions from Tajjib at Silungkang, but in the end even Padang Sibusuk conducted its operations independently of Silungkang. In the afternoon of January 1 a meeting, attended by some sixty people, had been held in the woods there, in the course of which it was announced that the hour had struck. Those present were subsequently divided into two groups, one of which went out to assassinate the hated nagari-head (Datuk Sutan nan Gadang), while the other was being directed towards Sawah Lunto. This latter group, having roamed the woods for several hours, lost its way; it was raining pretty hard...and thus they finally returned empty handed to Padang Sibusuk. At Padang Sibusuk itself, the Communist leaders Pakih Ain, Muhammed Zen and Sutan Golek had in the meantime proclaimed Kupiah gelar Datuk Sutan Bandaro--leader ("putjuk") of the nagari and former head-panghulu--"radja" /king/. In the early morning hours of January 2, the tabuh larangan /the holy drum/ had been sounded and a few hundred people had assembled on the market-place. Several arrests were made by the Communists, the prisoners being locked up in the nagari-office.

Some of the drummed-up men were sent to Sawah Lunto in a car bedecked with red flags. They stood under the leadership of Muhammed Zen gelar Datuk Bidjo, the Tandjung Ampalu leader who had come to Padang Sibusuk to have a look. (154) On approaching Muaro Kelaban, however, they decided first to proceed to Silungkang, there to obtain information concerning the course of last night's fighting. Surprised by the police stationed in the Muaro Kelaban cantonment, this first troop under Muhammed Zen was, without a shot being fired, arrested by the courageous demang, Rusad. Two hours later the second troop had to suffer the same fate.

That same afternoon the columns which had remained at Padang Sibusuk, as well as other parts of the population, immediately turned to flight upon the arrival of the Assistant Resident and twelve policemen. On first hearing the train, they had planned to meet its occupants...with the aforementioned prisoners at the head of the procession! At Kapalo Koto, place of the encounter, Sutan Golek was wounded in his leg, which broke the morale of the masses, who, led by "radja" Datuk Sutan Banadaro, broke into flight. The Communist bands which had encountered the police train en route (at Lubuk Basung and Kabun) disintegrated in panic at the first sight of the powers-that-be. On January 3, rebels surrendered en masse to the Assistant Resident and the soldiers. Yet on that same day a deputation had still been despatched to Silungkang in order to obtain weapons for the continuation of the revolt (See Note 151, above).

(154) At Tandjung Ampalu itself only very few people had joined the P.K.I., the "rebels" being outsiders.

On January 2, some twenty inhabitants of Pamuatan, while on their way to their rice-fields as usual, were under threat of death forced to tear up the rails near Sililih (Pamuatan), approximately 3 miles above Padang Sibusuk. When the work was not proceeding sufficiently quickly, "General" Muhap--himself seated in the car of the Controleur of Sidjungdjung (155)--brought another 40-odd people from Tandjung Ampalu in the truck normally used for the transportation of corvee-laborers (the so-called rodi-car), to help them with their work. They broke into the Sungei Lintahan railroad station and destroyed the telephone. These people were led to believe that both the Assistant Resident and the Controleur of Sawah Lunto were already dead. Munap was all day busy pressing auxiliary forces into service, who for the greater part were armed with cutlasses, sometimes also with muzzleloaders and old hunting rifles; they were ordered to block the road from Sawah Lunto--Tandjung Ampalu to Fort van der Capellen. In the evening the poor devils from Pamuatan were likewise forced to take part in these strategic measures. Road-blocks, mostly consisting of felled trees, etc., stretched from about 2 miles before the bridge from Tandjung Ampalu in the direction of Fort van der Capellen. It was here that the unfortunate lieutenant Simons was destined to find his end, after he had already passed Tandjung Ampalu; yet this encounter with the Padang Pandjang military caused the improvised columns to flee with great haste and to abstain from further cruel war-deeds.... The grade school teacher-General, Munap, died that same night (January 2-3), when, at the head of a cavalcade of cars bedecked with red rags, he ran into the two relief brigades sent from Fort de Kock between Tandjung Ampalu and Muaro.

At Muaro Kelaban itself, the courageous action of the assistant-demang and a few policemen in the late evening hours of January 1 prevented the formation of a Red detachment.

All these developments could not be foreseen by the Silungkang leaders, who on that fatal night of January 1 were conferring on the second floor of the rumah tinggi, while downstairs in the restaurant the drummed-up auxiliaries were being treated to food and drink in the hope of a successful outcome. What were the leaders to do in the light of the fact that Limin had failed to return with a decision from Padang Pandjang? Tajjib, the young chairman, and Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono, who--considering himself a masterful orator--so much loved to hear himself talk, found that under the circumstances they had no choice but to call off the revolt. This, however, was too much for the bandits and unsavory characters who had been drawn into the movement, and who were bent on fighting. Such a one was Muhamad Djamil gelar Radjo Budjang, who later in the night was to burn the house of the station master, whom he was out to kill out of revenge for a three months' imprisonment which he had suffered at the station-master's instigation. Or take his younger brother, Kamaruddin alias Mangulung, the most infamous gambler in Silungkang who was to join him in the assassination of the teachers. In fact, when one of the teachers, sensing mischief, refused to let the assassins inside, Kamaruddin alias Mangulung himself managed to gain them entry by addressing the teacher personally. After all, he knew him well: the teacher was a fellow gambler of his with whom he had often been eating, drinking and gambling. He nonetheless killed him in cold blood, justifying himself later with a shrug of the shoulders, saying, "It was my fate!"

(155) The Controleur of Sidjungdjung had despatched the demang in his car to Sawah Lunto in order to carry information to the Assistant Resident. On the way this automobile had fallen into the hands of the rebels. Thus it came about that Munap had the car at his disposal, as well as the rodi-car, which was, of course, unguarded.

Then there were also Kadim gelar Pono Alam and Katab gelar Pono Sati, (156) both bankrupt traders who had hoped to find a livelihood in the Communist movement.

When Limin failed to return from Padang Pandjang, Tajjib and Talaha gelar Radjo Sampono had, as we saw, advised to call off the insurrection. They were contradicted by Muhammed Jusuf gelar Sampono Kajo, who soon was to lay hands on the possessions of the assassinated goldsmiths and teachers: "Further delay is impossible. We have gone too far already. The people from Pianggu have already arrived and Padang Sibusuk is doubtless already marching on Sawah Lunto!"

Later in the night Tajjib inspected the battlefield by automobile; having been informed of the unfavorable result of the encounter with the police at Muara Kelaban, he again urged to discontinue the revolt, seeing that the Communists could not silence the police barrage; but Muhammed Jusuf again insisted on carrying on, since it was impossible to retreat at that late stage....

Kamaruddin alias Manggulung, the cynical murderer, threateningly intervened in the discussion of the war council on the second floor of the rumah tinggi: How often had the comrades already come to Silungkang in order to talk about the revolt! "All we do is talk, talk and once again talk. We are having an endless string of meetings, but nothing else. This way we will never get anywhere. We will go on meeting until nothing comes of the whole rebellion. We can no longer go back. Whoever wants to stop us now gets killed--even if he is our own father, our own mamak /member of the matriarchy/! And if the Subsection committee itself goes against us, then it will die, too!..."

This, then, was the beginning of the insurrection. We need not here go into any detailed account of the course of events. They have been fully described in the reports of Assistant Resident Karsen and the accounts of the Resident Arends....

(156) Brother of the gambler and loafer, Salim Emek, and black-marketeer before he had turned political runaway.

