

REPORT FROM BANARAN: EXPERIENCES DURING THE PEOPLE'S WAR

T. B. Simatupang

Translated by Benedict Anderson and Elizabeth Graves

With an Introduction by John R. W. Smail

TRANSLATION SERIES

Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1972

No. 55

Price — \$6.50

SEAP Publications

CMIP # 55

File Copy

Do not remove from room 213

640 Stewart Avenue

REPORT FROM BANARAN: EXPERIENCES DURING
THE PEOPLE'S WAR

T. B. Simatupang

Translated by Benedict Anderson and Elizabeth Graves
With an Introduction by John R. W. Smail

TRANSLATION SERIES
(Publication No. 55)

Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1972

© 1972 by the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction by John R. W. Smail	1
Preface	11
Introduction: Kudadu and Banaran	12
Chapter	
I. December 19, 1948	14
II. With the Siliwangi Division	28
III. Turn of the Year	38
IV. Banaran	50
V. Wandering through Java	63
VI. Preparations Pending Negotiations	91
VII. The Rum-van Royen Agreement	99
VIII. General Report from Banaran: Developments since December 19, 1948	113
IX. Return to Jogjakarta	139
X. Pak Dirman Arrives	146
XI. Tracé Baru	161
XII. Report from New Delhi	168
XIII. Report from The Hague	171
Conclusion: Mataraman and No. 56, Pegangsaan Timur	183
Index to Biographical Footnotes	185

MAPS

Java after the Renville Agreement	8
The View from Banaran	10
Simatupang's Travels December 19, 1948 - January 12, 1949	42
Simatupang's Travels February 25 - March 31, 1949	73
Sudirman's Travels December 19, 1948 - April 1, 1949	154



T. B. Simatupang

INTRODUCTION

The Indonesian Revolution (1945-1950) was the occasion by which Indonesia achieved political independence. But the way in which this common twentieth century event came about, in the general violence and exaltation of a true revolution, made it far more important than that. Like the Mexican, Russian, Chinese and Vietnamese revolutions, the Indonesian Revolution has been the central event in its country's whole modern history. For this reason, any addition to the small stock of good English-language writings on the Revolution, like *Report from Banaran*, is doubly welcome, not only for what it can tell us about the event itself but also for what it can tell us about the Indonesian condition in modern times. General Simatupang--a Christian Batak with a Dutch education who helped lead a guerrilla war in the Javanese countryside, a man who while still in his twenties was simultaneously one of the principal founders of the Indonesian army and one of the key figures in four years of diplomatic negotiations with the Dutch--is well qualified by background and experience for his subject.

Two short periods stand out in the history of the Indonesian Revolution: its first great explosion between August 1945 and mid-1946, and its climax--which is the main subject of *Report from Banaran*--between December 1948 and July 1949. The first set its stamp on the whole. The sudden surrender of the Japanese on August 15, 1945 created an immediate vacuum of power which neither the British (acting for the victorious Allies), nor the Dutch, nor the Republic, hastily proclaimed on August 17, could possibly fill. Out of the void emerged the most powerful single force of the ensuing Revolution, a mass movement of *pemuda* (youths) caught up in a fervent Indonesian nationalism and committed to an uncompromising *perjuangan* (struggle) for freedom. Absolute idealism led naturally to violence, first against Japanese posts and British occupying forces, then to a more general assault on social groups privileged under the old Netherlands Indies order: Chinese, Eurasians, Christian Ambonese, traditional elites, and village and clan leaders through most of Sumatra and Java.

The enormous energies of the *pemuda* movement--only later partly channeled into the institutional form of the Indonesian army, itself built from the bottom up by *pemuda*--were what made the Indonesian Revolution a true revolution, a social upheaval, and not simply a case of decolonization. From the beginning, however, the upper-level politics of the Revolution were conducted as a diplomatic contest between two much smaller groups, the Dutch and the Indonesian civilian nationalist elite. The key to this contest was the comparative weakness of both parties. The prewar nationalist elite, led by Sukarno and Hatta, which founded the Republic in August 1945, rode precariously on the tide of *pemuda* militancy, in the early months generally unable to stem the prevailing anarchy and later never fully in control of the *pemuda* army. For the most part rather conservative in its goals and in any case not at all willing to take second place in a *pemuda*-led *perjuangan*, the elite preferred *diplomasi*, an effort to obtain independence by negotiating with the Dutch and by gaining the support of world opinion. *Diplomasi* was the direct opposite of *perjuangan* and became the most emotion-laden issue in the internal politics of Indonesia during the

Revolution. Every cabinet that fell during those years did so mainly because of the diplomasi issue; every new cabinet, whatever its political party make-up, carried on as best it could with the same basic policy.

The Dutch, for their part, suffered from the aftereffects of the German occupation and, more fundamentally, from the vast disproportion between the size of their homeland and that of the colony they hoped to regain. In these circumstances they followed a cautious step-by-step policy of building up a series of "federal" states, based politically on local aristocracies and minorities frightened by the pemuda revolution, in the areas outside the Republican heartlands of Central Java and Central and North Sumatra. This required some political concessions to the federalists, as they were usually called, but the colonial government could hope to control this congeries of member-states and use them to enclose and eventually bring to heel or snuff out a shrunk-en Republic. Meanwhile, like their counterparts in the Republican leadership, the Dutch were ready to negotiate and were consistently very sensitive to world opinion.

The main feature of the middle years of the Revolution, from mid-1946 to late 1948, was the steadily increasing pressure exerted by the Dutch. As Holland recovered, the Dutch gradually built up their armed forces in Indonesia and began to exploit their greater organizational efficiency and economic resources. The result was an oddly regular alternation of negotiated agreements and military clashes, each one more disastrous for the Republic. First came the Linggadjati Agreement (initialled November 1946, ratified March 1947), a compromise reached under British mediation but satisfactory to neither party, which provided for a three-state Indonesian federation, with the Republic as one member, quite closely linked to Holland. In July 1947 the swift successes of the first Dutch "police action," as they called it, showed that the pemuda army could do no better than the politicians' diplomasi. In the ten days before the UN intervened with a ceasefire resolution, the Dutch seized the economically important areas of East and South Sumatra and East and West Java. These conquests were then ratified by the Renville Agreement of January 1948, mediated by the UN, in exchange for an ambiguous commitment to a national plebiscite (which was never held). Finally, after the Madiun Affair of September 1948, a brief but bitter civil war in central Java between communist and anti-communist Indonesian forces, the Dutch launched their second "police action" in December 1948.

By the logic of this progression the second "police action" should have ended the story with the extinction of the Republic. For a time, indeed, it seemed to have done so. The Dutch quickly took control of almost all towns and roads in the territory of the already much diminished Republic, captured Sukarno and Hatta and many other political leaders, and prepared to present their final fait accompli for international ratification. But instead, the climax brought paradox, sudden and cruel to the Dutch and many among those who had cooperated with them. Tactical triumph could not disguise their wholly inadequate resources, the Indonesian army began a guerrilla war planned for since the first "police action" and soon showed that it could never be overcome. The UN and especially the United States now turned against the Dutch who were forced quickly to a volte-face. The imprisoned Republican leaders were ready as ever for diplomasi. A final round of negotiations, marked by the Rum-van Royen Agreement of May 7 and the Agreement of June 22, was sealed by the formal restoration of the Republican government to its capital in Jogjakarta on July 6. In effect

the Dutch had committed themselves to complete independence for Indonesia, though on rather favorable economic terms, and to a federation in which the original Republic was to be a single pre-eminent member state among sixteen.

The last climactic months between December 1948 and July 1949 were a perfect complement to the first crucial months of the Revolution, a period in which the major issues established in the former were brought to swift and dramatic resolution. What followed before the story was closed--the Hague Agreement on November 2, formal transfer of sovereignty on December 27, the collapse of the Dutch-made federal states in the early part of 1950, and formal restoration of the original unitary Republic on August 17, 1950--was denouement, the working out in detail of what had been determined in its essentials by mid-1949.

The same months were the climax of the Revolution in its domestic as well as its international aspect. Domestically, too, it was a time of sudden and paradoxical shifts of fortune which swiftly resolved many of the major issues established at the outset of the Revolution. The federalists, numbers of whom had Republican sympathies, felt the increasing pressure of guerrilla activity in areas long secure for them and saw their indispensable bulwark of Dutch support melting away. By February 1949 many were in full swing toward the Republic, pinning their hopes on similarly-minded groups and old associates among the nationalist elite. By mid-year most of the federal states were in complete disarray and the bulk of the federalists had come in principle to terms with the Republican leadership. The Inter-Indonesian Conferences of late July and August, whose crucial provisions reflected concessions by the federalists, and the liquidation of the federal states in the course of the following year only ratified this basic settlement.

The pemuda movement, by this time more or less effectively absorbed into the army, was struck by a more surprising and painful paradox. After December 19, with the bulk of the civilian leadership captured, the rest scattered and ineffective, and the Dutch everywhere, the main hope of the cause at last seemed to rest on an army-led guerrilla movement, the all-out perdjungan that they had always longed for but never really had a chance to try. This they proceeded to do, not only in what had been Republican areas in December but in most of the federal areas of Java and Sumatra as well, and with considerable and growing success. Yet within a month or two, as the imprisoned civilian leaders launched their last round of diplomasi, army men and pemuda generally began to see the fruits of success--both for their long-cherished ideology and for their potential claim to national leadership--slip between their fingers. The Rum-van Royen Agreement of May 7 showed only too clearly what was happening; the negotiated restoration of the Republican government to Jogjakarta on July 6 all but settled the issue. When the ever-independent army commander General Sudirman--the one man who could have refused to accept the negotiated settlement and led the pemuda back to a final war against the Dutch--returned from his guerrilla base to Jogjakarta on July 10 and called on Sukarno and Hatta *before* reviewing his troops, diplomasi won its final triumph. It was an empty meeting--they talked of the weather--but a moving occasion, as the well-known statue of Sudirman in the old army overcoat he wore that day testifies. It marked the end of perdjungan and a subordination of the pemuda army to civilian leadership that endured for a decade or more.

As for the civilian leaders, they pulled off their greatest political coup from inside Dutch jails. Within six months of their capture they had in effect not only edged the Dutch out of Indonesia but had also drawn both federalists and pemuda under their wing as leaders of what was soon to be the fifth largest nation in the world.

Report from Banaran deals with this second decisive phase of the Revolution. It opens with the beginning of the "police action" ("second war of independence") on December 19, 1948 and in Chapter X reaches its climax with a description of the return of General Sudirman to Jogjakarta on July 10, 1949. The last three chapters pass quickly by the anti-climactic events of the second half of 1949. It is the first full-length book in any language devoted to the oddly-neglected climax of the Revolution.

General (then Colonel) Simatupang was well placed to observe the events of this period. As de facto Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, specializing in high-level liaison between the army and the civilian leadership, he had a good deal to do with nurturing the guerrilla movement and at the same time played a part in many of the major negotiations of the time. About a third of the book consists of the texts of important contemporary letters and reports--including his own "Report from Banaran" of June 19, 1949--most of which are published here for the first time. One can therefore gladly read this book for the high-level inside information which it contains. On one subject at least, military-civilian relations inside the Republic, it is extremely valuable in just this way.

But the reader who merely quarries the book in this spirit will be cheating himself. The bold literary stroke in the title Simatupang has chosen shows us from what perspective his book is to be read: it is from Banaran, the hamlet near Jogjakarta where he had his base during the guerrilla campaign of early 1949. *Report from Banaran* is written by one who was a twenty-nine year old colonel in that year and who can write in his Preface, "For us, the Generation of the Proclamation [of Independence], the war of independence was not merely an historical event. For us, it was an experience which determined the whole course of our lives." Finally it is from an individual, that is, it is an autobiography, with all that this implies. Vantage point is what is decisive here. Historical events, like mountains, must be seen from many angles to be properly appreciated. *Report from Banaran* gives us a new view.

The view is from Banaran because Simatupang spends almost three-quarters of the book in that hamlet or walking through the nearby countryside of Central Java on various missions. There rises very naturally out of this narrative a persistent rural-urban theme. At times he renders this in a mildly sentimental vein: he describes life in Banaran and this summons up memories of life in his family village in Tapanuli; he relishes for the first time in years the pleasure of walking barefoot along muddy paths; he rediscovers with surprise and nostalgia the immense silent peasant mass which is ordinarily so completely forgotten by educated urban Indonesians. He records the influence of prophecies and old tales on ordinary Javanese. He shows in various ways how the strength of General Sudirman rested on his natural bent for speaking directly to the folk mind (he insisted on making his re-

entry into Jogjakarta in peasant clothing rather than a general's uniform). From time to time he suggests the sociological significance of his theme: "In only two days [after retreating to the countryside] our whole conception of the meaning of roads, towns, and mountains had changed completely. While we were in the towns we really paid attention only to the towns and the roads connecting them; we hardly ever thought about the areas to the right and left of these roads, or about the mountain regions" (p. 33). Reading the many such passages in which the rural-urban theme is touched on, one is drawn on to explore its rich implications for the history of the Revolution. The Indonesian "we" who could earlier see only the towns and the roads connecting them were in one sense the direct heirs--not the antithesis--of the colonial Dutch who soon after, during the guerrilla war, could likewise see only towns and roads. It was not chance, either, that during the Revolution the normal expression for going over to the Dutch was *masuk kota* (entering town), nor incidental that the civilian leaders of the Republic were quite incapable of leading a rural guerrilla movement. The rural-urban theme which Simatupang develops is suggestive rather than substantial; he is sensitive to milieu and has a fine historical instinct but he is too deeply involved in national affairs and too urban himself to want to write peasant history. But by placing himself in Banaran and looking outward from there he reminds us that the history of the Revolution has hitherto been seen almost exclusively from the urban, and elite, point of view.

It is the second aspect of Simatupang's vantage point, the army and pemuda view, that is most important in *Report*. This perspective, like the rural-urban theme, rises naturally from the way he has chosen to write his book. It is nonetheless striking how thoroughly it permeates what he is saying, and how different the events of the period look when seen from that side. One way to check this is to notice how the word "we" refers to when it appears in his text. Sometimes it refers to his small band of companions in Banaran, more often to Republicans in general. At least as often, however, it refers to we, the army, as distinguished from the civilian politicians (the "Bangka/Djakarta group"). Often, too, the latter cases occur in the more anxious or rueful passages, where Simatupang's feelings are showing through most strongly ("... we could not reject the Rum-van Royen Agreement.").

Another way in which Simatupang's perspective shows up most clearly is his treatment of certain topics. Chapter X, in which Sudirman returns to Jogjakarta, is the dramatic climax of the book for various reasons. For one thing no one was quite sure until the last minute that Sudirman was going to accept the predominance of Sukarno and Hatta (see, for an example of the intensity of Sudirman's opinions slightly earlier, his Message of May 1, pp. 103-104). Also Sudirman was living on borrowed time (he died of tuberculosis in January 1950) and this added adventitiously to the pathos of the occasion. But beyond that Simatupang is recreating the tragic mood which that day, almost a day of surrender, evoked in nearly all army men at the time. Likewise, his noticeably cursory treatment of the face-saving rituals enacted shortly after Sudirman's return to Jogjakarta suggests how hollow these seemed to him. Finally it is striking how small a proportion of the book he devotes to the tremendously busy months from July to December--in which, moreover, he personally played a more direct and publicly prominent role than in those of the first half of the year--and how flatly these chapters read when compared to the earlier ones. As historian

and major participant he describes those diplomatic events, but his heart is clearly in the guerrilla days at Banaran and the poignancy of the army's political eclipse at the height of its success.

All this is particularly impressive if one keeps in mind that Simatupang himself--by virtue of his education, exclusively staff career, and specialization in political liaison--was hardly a typical pemuda or army man. He was, after all, a key figure in the diplomasi of the Republic almost from the beginning, and he had much in common with the somewhat older political leaders, Dutch-speakers like himself. (It is a measure of his sensitivity and his value to the Republic, however, that he had so close a personal as well as professional relationship with General Sudirman, an utterly different kind of man.) It is clear, too, from his book that he saw the coming success of civilian diplomasi early and clearly, and worked hard to forestall the danger of a serious break between the army and the government (see, for one example, his report of May 15, especially the last section, pp. 104-107). Reading between the lines (pp. 106-107) one can imagine the efforts he was making as he rode into Jogjakarta with General Sudirman on July 10 to make sure that the latter would not break openly with Sukarno and Hatta.

Nevertheless, the strength of those old army feelings of 1949 comes through clearly in *Report*. The view is especially valuable because, while we have a number of works which give a good picture of the first major phase of the Revolution from a pemuda point of view, there is no other full-length work besides *Report* that satisfactorily conveys a pemuda view of the climactic phase in 1949.

Report, finally, gives a different view because it is autobiographical. In some ways this makes things rather difficult for the reader. Since Simatupang spends almost three-quarters of the book in Banaran and in the nearby countryside, and since he sticks quite closely to his expressed purpose of recording only what he experienced himself, we are compelled to share his restricted vision of what was going on in the larger world outside the hamlet during those months. It is frustrating at times to catch only glimpses of the important negotiations in Djakarta, Bangka and elsewhere, and one sometimes feels that one has lost track of the main course of events. But at the same time it is a salutary experience. Guerrillas everywhere live in perpetual twilight. More generally, one all too easily forgets that researched history is an artifact, that in history, as it is experienced, everyone perceives events imperfectly, incompletely, and day by day, without knowing what is coming next. No other substantial work on the Revolution brings home this indispensable truth so sharply.

There is another contribution which the personal view of this book can make. The Indonesian Revolution is the pivot on which modern Indonesian history has turned. With its prelude, the Japanese occupation, it was a dark time of cruelty and suffering between the Indian summer of Dutch rule in the late 1930's and the hopeful years of constitutional democracy in the early 1950's; it was equally a time of exaltation and high idealism. In this period change ran faster, deeper, and more turbulently than in ordinary times. The Revolution stamped a whole generation, Simatupang's "Generation of the Proclamation," with its special mark; it changed the quality of life for all Indonesians then and since. Such events cannot be comprehended fully unless one takes every opportunity to try to see them from the inside.

Report from Banaran--like Simatupang himself, calm, rational, moderate
--is written from the eye of that tremendous storm.

John R. W. Smail
Madison, Wisconsin
July, 1972



JAVA AFTER THE
RENVILLE AGREEMENT


shaded areas equal
Republican territory

REPORT FROM BANARAN

by

T. B. Simatupang

THE VIEW FROM BANARAN



PREFACE

In this book no effort has been made to write a complete history of our war of independence.

For us, the Generation of the Proclamation [of Independence], the war of independence was not merely an historical event. For us, it was an experience which determined the whole course of our lives.

Based on notes made by the author during an important period of the war of independence--that from the fall of Jogjakarta on December 19, 1948 up to the ceremony of the recognition of sovereignty in Djakarta on December 27, 1949--this book describes only those events directly experienced by the author himself.

The author would like to thank Captain E. W. Sinaulan and the Secretariat of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for their help in the preparation of this book.

Djakarta, July 21, 1959

It is with gratitude that the author acknowledges the suggestions, assistance, and concern with regard to the manuscript of this book afforded by the late Mrs. Suwasti Pardede, Chief of the Planning and Editing Division of Pembangunan Ltd.

Djakarta, March 17, 1960

Note from the Translators: The translation which follows is based on the first edition of T. B. Simatupang's memoirs, which was published in 1960 under the title Laporan dari Banaran: Kisah Pengalaman Seorang Pradjurit Selama Perang Kemerdekaan by P. T. Pembangunan of Djakarta. The text itself accords with the original version; the translators have provided additional information in the form of explanatory footnotes and maps. Where available, biographical information has been given on the pre-1950 careers of the figures mentioned in the text and an index to these biographical footnotes has been provided. The spelling of proper names has been changed to conform with current Indonesian practice. The help of T. B. Simatupang and Nugroho Notosusanto in providing biographical information is gratefully acknowledged, but the translators accept all responsibility for any errors which may occur in the footnotes.

INTRODUCTION: KUDADU AND BANARAN

In 1292, King Djajakatwang of Kadiri considered the time ripe to take revenge on Emperor Kertanegara of Singosari, since a major part of the Emperor's army had been sent to the island of Andalas [Sumatra] on an expedition called "Operation Pamalaju." As a small troop from Kadiri approached the northern gate of the capital city of Singosari, Commander-in-Chief Radèn Widjaja advanced with his warriors to crush the rebellious enemy. But, all of a sudden, a larger force of Kadiri troops appeared at the southern gate of the capital. They entered the empty, defenseless city and Emperor Kertanegara fell inside his own palace. To save himself, Radèn Widjaja was forced to flee together with a few loyal followers. They swam across the Brantas River and were warmly welcomed in the village of Kudadu by the people and the village chief. Later on, when Radèn Widjaja became the first ruler of the Empire of Majapahit under the honorific name of Kertaradjasa Djajawardhana, he erected an inscribed monument in the village of Kudadu, and as a token of gratitude the people of Kudadu and their descendants were exempted from paying taxes by His Majesty the Emperor.

On December 19, 1948, the Dutch considered the time ripe to crush the Republic of Indonesia, since they calculated that its strength had been exhausted by the recent Madiun Rebellion. The Dutch Commander-in-Chief therefore landed his troops by air at Maguwo airfield, and on that same day Ngajogyakarta hadiningrat, the capital of the Republic of Indonesia, fell into their hands. Panglima Besar Sudirman managed to escape from the city together with his troops, and they were warmly welcomed by the people in the villages.¹ It was indeed these villages which became the bases for the people's war waged for several months against the Dutch troops.

The author himself, after leaving the capital, crossed the Progo River on a raft and lived for several months among the people of Banaran, a hamlet in the village of Bandjarsari, Samigaluh District, Kulonprogo Regency, Jogjakarta Special Region. Whereas Radèn Widjaja, after becoming the sovereign of the Empire of Majapahit, showed his gratitude to the people of Kudadu by erecting a monument and by exempting them and their descendants from paying taxes, the author can only compose this humble book, calling it "Report from Banaran" as a token of gratitude to the hospitable and generous people of Banaran.

¹The term Panglima Besar has not been translated as Commander-in-Chief because the English would not convey the traditional resonances of the Indonesian, which refers back to a high military title of the pre-colonial period. General Sudirman was born near Rembang, Central Java, probably in 1915. In the late colonial period, he worked as a teacher in a Muhammadiyah secondary school. During the occupation, he enrolled in the Japanese-sponsored Peta (Fatherland Defense Force) army, formed in 1943. After the Revolution broke out in 1945, he became Commander of the Fifth Division of the Indonesian National Army, in Banjumas. On November 12, 1945, he was elected by his fellow divisional commanders and other senior military men to the position of Panglima Besar.

For the author, the name Banaran has become a symbol of the tens of thousands of villages in our country which served as bases for the people's war during the war of independence. Will these villages be able to enjoy progress and prosperity now that Indonesia's independence and sovereignty have received international recognition?

CHAPTER I

DECEMBER 19, 1948

The events of December 19, 1948 in Jogjakarta undeniably represent an historic episode. Let me note here my experiences on that day and those preceding it.

At that time, I held the post of Second Deputy to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces was Pak Dirman,¹ who was concurrently Panglima Besar of the Armed Forces. His first deputy was Col. Hidajat² who for several months had been on duty in Sumatra as Sumatra Army and Territory Commander. Consequently, I carried on the functions of Deputy Chief of Staff.

There were two Commands under Pak Dirman as Panglima Besar: the Sumatra Command under Col. Hidajat and the Java Command under Col. Nasution.³ The headquarters of the Java Commander in Jogjakarta was called the Java Command Headquarters. The Sumatra and Java Commanders were respectively in charge of the defense of the islands of Sumatra and Java, under the general leadership of Pak Dirman.

¹Pak is an abbreviation of bapak (meaning father), which is used as a form of familiar but respectful address. In accord with common Javanese practice, Sudirman's name is shortened to Dirman.

²R. Hidajat Martaatmadja was born in Tjiandjur, West Java, in 1916. He was graduated from the Royal Military Academy in Breda (Netherlands) and joined the Royal Dutch East Indies Army (KNIL) in 1938 as Second Lieutenant. During the occupation, he worked in the land transport division of the Japanese military administration. In 1945, he was Chief of Staff of the Bandung Regiment. After the formation of the Siliwangi Division (May 1946), in 1947 he became Commander of the Fourth Brigade ("Guntur"), stationed in Garut, and later during the same year, Deputy Commander of the Siliwangi Division. Shortly before the second Dutch action, he was assigned to Sumatra and succeeded Suhardjo as Sumatra Army and Territory Commander.

³A. H. Nasution was born in Kotanopan, Tapanuli, in 1918. In 1939, after graduation from the Teachers' College in Bandung, he was assigned to Palembang. In 1940, he enrolled in the Royal Military Academy (KMA) in Bandung, and when the war broke out he was commissioned as Second Lieutenant in the KNIL. During the Japanese occupation, he worked for the Bandung Municipality administration and was active in the youth movement. In the fall of 1945, he became Commander of the Third Division (in Bandung), and, in May 1946, became the first commander of the subsequently famous Siliwangi Division. As a result of the Renville Agreement, he and his troops were evacuated to Central Java. In 1948, he served as Deputy Panglima Besar and Chief of the Operations Staff of the Armed Forces Headquarters. He was the chief planner of the operation for crushing the insurgents during the Madiun Affair. In another major reorganization of the Armed Forces, he was made Java Army and Territory Commander and functioned in that capacity during the second Dutch action. In December 1949, after the Round Table Agreement, he became the Chief of Staff of the Army.

In my capacity as Deputy Chief of Staff, I assisted Pak Dirman in drawing up the recommendations for dealing with defense problems, which were to be submitted to the government, and also in designing the fundamentals of our defense strategy. In addition, however, I was adviser to the delegation which, assisted by the Three-State Commission,⁴ was negotiating with the Dutch. Since these negotiations were held alternately in Kaliurang⁵ and Djakarta, I frequently had to be outside Jogjakarta.

The negotiations dealt with the implementation of the Renville Agreement. *Renville* was the name of a US Navy transport ship sent by the United States government to the Bay of Djakarta, towards the end of 1947, at the request of the Republic and the Dutch. At that time, negotiations between us and the Dutch were about to be resumed on the basis of a Security Council resolution. However, Bung Amir,⁶ our Prime Minister, refused to hold the negotiations in Djakarta, as an expression of his mistrust of the Dutch, who had attacked us on July 21, 1947.

Since the Dutch did not want to hold negotiations outside Indonesia, for instance in Singapore, Hongkong, or Switzerland, as proposed by Bung Amir, a middle road was taken. Negotiations were to be conducted on neutral territory, namely on board a ship of the United States Navy to be anchored in the Bay of Djakarta.

The negotiations on board the *Renville* were assisted by the Three-State Commission composed of representatives of three countries--one country designated by the Republic, one by the Dutch, and the third appointed jointly by representatives of the countries designated by the Republic and the Dutch. All this was in accordance with the Security Council resolution.

We designated Australia, the Dutch chose Belgium, and the Australian and Belgian representatives jointly appointed the United States. I think this led to the request for the United States government to provide a warship as a place for the negotiations.

I myself took part in the negotiations resulting in the Renville Agreement as a military adviser to our delegation. The Renville Agreement was by no means a favorable one from the point of view of the

⁴The Three-State Commission, often referred to as the Committee of Good Offices, was set up by the UN Security Council in August 1947 following the first Dutch military action against the Republic.

⁵Kaliurang is a mountain resort to the north of Jogjakarta.

⁶Bung, literally meaning brother, was a popular form of address during the Revolution. Amir Sjarifuddin was born in Medan in 1907. In the late colonial period, he was a top leader of Partindo and Gerindo, two relatively radical nationalist political parties. During the war, he led an anti-Japanese underground and was sentenced to life imprisonment by the occupation authorities. When the Revolution broke out, he helped form the Socialist Party (PS) and served as Minister of Defense in the three Sjahrir cabinets (1945-47) before assuming the prime ministership himself on July 3, 1947. He fell from power on January 23, 1948, following his initialling of the Renville Agreement. He became involved in the Madiun Affair in the fall of 1948 and was executed by the Indonesian Army shortly after the onset of the second Dutch action.

Republic. When I think back to the atmosphere which prevailed as the agreement was about to be concluded, the first thing that comes to mind is the psychological pressure on our people, in Djakarta as well as in Jogjakarta, caused by rumors (rumors which I think were intentionally spread by the Dutch) that an impasse in the negotiations would mean a follow-up attack or *doorstoot* by the Dutch. On the other hand, I remember the belief then prevailing among us, that if we accepted the agreement reached with the assistance of the Three-State Commission, this would imply a guarantee by the latter that the implementation of the agreement would proceed without violence or the threat of violence by the Dutch. Our reasoning at that time was more or less that the Three-State Commission would ensure that the struggle would shift from the "bullet" to the "ballot," and we were convinced that through the "ballot" we would be able to drive the Dutch out. Today, one may consider this belief rather naïve. I still remember how enthusiastically the members and military observers of the Three-State Commission were welcomed everywhere in our territory as though they were the gods of justice who had come to help those in the right and to punish those in the wrong--as always happens in the old fairy tales and stories which still greatly influence our people's way of thinking.

In the days prior to December 19, 1948, one could feel the situation getting increasingly tense. Nonetheless, most of us still firmly believed that, in spite of the tense situation, the Dutch would not attack so long as the negotiations being conducted with the assistance of the Three-State Commission, which was at that time at Kaliurang with its full staff, were still going on. For this reason, we took apparently contradictory actions. The Java Commander, together with all the senior officers at the Java Command Headquarters, left for East Java several days before December 19, and bombs were removed from underneath the Maguwo landing strip. But at the same time, orders were issued to all troops to be on the alert. Precisely on December 19, 1948, orders were given everywhere for maneuvers to be held in the face of a possible attack.

On the morning of December 18, I visited Pak Dirman, who had been bedridden for three months. On this occasion, I told him that, although we considered the situation very tense, our political leaders believed that the Dutch could not afford to attack so long as the exchange of notes through the United States representative on the Three-State Commission was still proceeding. Under such circumstances, an attack by the Dutch would be the policy of madmen--such was the general opinion in political circles. Nonetheless, Pak Dirman evidently had a premonition that the Dutch would attack after all. That same day he announced that he had taken the command into his own hands again. He intended this announcement, of course, mainly as a psychological measure, because at that moment Pak Dirman had by no means recovered. He had received me lying on his bed.

On the afternoon of December 18, I left for Kaliurang. The Vice-President, who then concurrently held the posts of head of the Presidential Cabinet and Minister of Defense, was resting at Kaliurang. While I was having my dinner at the Kaliurang Hotel together with the other guests (most of them staff members of the Three-State Commission), the radio, apparently tuned to Djakarta, announced that early the following day the High Commissioner of the Dutch Crown would give an important address.

Immediately after dinner, I went to Bung Hatta's⁷ quarters. I explained to him that I was worried by this Djakarta radio broadcast, since, early on the morning of July 21, 1947, we had also heard an important address by van Mook, the Dutch Lieutenant Governor-General,⁸ announcing that Dutch troops had begun an attack the previous night. Was it not possible that tomorrow, December 19, 1948, High Commissioner Beel would make the same kind of speech?

Bung Hatta said this was of course a possibility. On the other hand, Mr. Cochran⁹ had left for Djakarta only the day before with a reply from Bung Hatta to a letter from the Dutch--a letter which had been brought by Mr. Cochran himself: Would it not constitute a great insult to the United States if the Dutch started their attack while the exchange of notes through this American representative was still going on? In other words, the conclusions reached during this discussion with Bung Hatta were the same as those we had drawn earlier, namely: Unquestionably the Dutch could attack; but wouldn't this mean that they had gone mad?

In spite of this, I could not feel quite at ease. That same night, I left for Jogjakarta accompanied by Lt. Masdulhak.¹⁰ I hoped to delay the departure of the aircraft--if I am not mistaken a Filipino plane chartered by AURI [Angkatan Udara Republik Indonesia, Air Force of the Republic of Indonesia]--due to take off at dawn for Tandjungkarang [South Sumatra] with about 25 recent graduates of the Military Academy. Should the Dutch in fact attack, the availability of an aircraft would allow at least some of our leaders, perhaps one of the Dwitunggal,¹¹ to leave Indonesia, or at the very least the island of Java.

⁷Mohammad Hatta was born in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, in 1902. He was an important leader of the Perhimpunan Indonesia in Holland in the late 1920's, and, on his return to Indonesia, he assumed leadership of the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia, one of the two groups into which Sukarno's PNI had split after his arrest in 1929. Hatta was imprisoned in 1934 and was not released until the Japanese conquest of the Indies. During the occupation he held a number of positions which established his status as the number two nationalist leader, after Sukarno. In August 1945, he was elected Vice-President of the Republic. After the fall of Amir Sjarifuddin's cabinet, Hatta formed a so-called Presidential Cabinet, on January 29, 1948, which lasted until the formal transfer of sovereignty on December 27, 1949.

⁸When Governor-General Tjarda van Starkenborgh-Stachouwer resigned in 1945, the Dutch government did not appoint a successor, thus making van Mook de facto the highest Dutch official in Indonesia. In November 1948, Dr. L. J. M. Beel, formerly prime minister of the Netherlands, was appointed to the top position in the Indies with the new title of High Commissioner.

⁹Merle Cochran was appointed the American representative on the Committee of Good Offices in August 1948, following the recall of Coert DuBois in July.

¹⁰Masdulhak was born in 1925. In 1946, he was attached to the Army's liaison office in Djakarta; subsequently, he was assigned to the Indonesian delegation during the Dutch-Indonesian negotiations of 1947-48.

¹¹Dwitunggal, or duumvirate, refers to Sukarno (President) and Hatta (Vice-President), regarded then as the inseparable twin leaders of the Indonesian Revolution.

The car we used, as was the case with most cars in the territory of the Republic, was no longer in good condition. At a sharp turn in the road, the driver cried out that the brakes refused to work properly. But somehow or other the car was eventually brought safely to a standstill by the side of the road. "It seems I'm meant to have a long life," I told Masdulhak. We needed to find a local government office with a telephone in order to ring up Jogjakarta and ask if there was a car available which could be sent to us. We had to wait for hours, and by the time we finally approached Jogjakarta, dawn was breaking. Just as we entered the city, we heard the noise of an airplane taking off and heading west.

So we missed the last chance to send people out of Java in the event that the Dutch started their attack that morning. Later on we would hear that the aircraft had landed safely at Tandjungkarang, had taken off again the same morning, and had landed back at Maguwo. In the meantime, Maguwo had been occupied by the Dutch, and the plane, along with its passengers, had been captured. The young officers who had been flown to Tandjungkarang had continued their journey in accordance with their orders. At Banaran several months later, I received a brief radiogram from the leader of the group, reporting that all the officers had reached their respective destinations. Some of them must have traveled thousands of kilometers from Tandjungkarang to reach their posts in South, Central and North Sumatra, completing the greater part of the journey of foot. When I received this radiogram, I exclaimed: "How can this Republic disappear so long as it has such young men?" But we are now months ahead of our story!

After reaching my house at No. 8 Djalan Merapi, I lay down on a couch without getting undressed. Perhaps only a short while after I had fallen asleep, the noise of planes woke me up. It was getting light already, and as I looked up through the window, I saw a number of planes with Dutch markings. Ngajogyakartahadiningrat, our beloved capital city, was under attack. Was the death knell of the Republic being tolled this morning? Or would our Republic survive this test? All would depend on us, who called ourselves Republicans. The day of our trial had come. Were we brass? Or gold?

Without bathing or even washing my face, I drove to Suriadarma's¹² house, also on Djalan Merapi not far away. Suriadarma was already up. Was there anything that could be done? While we were talking, a big dummy dropped from one of the enemy planes and fell in front of the church close by Suriadarma's house. "They're going to drop parachutists," Suriadarma said. I suggested, "Then let's go to the palace." But he answered, "Wait until things have calmed down a bit."

I then went to the Java Command Headquarters. On the main street opposite the headquarters, I saw Zulkifli Lubis.¹³ As usual he was not

¹²R. Surjadi Suriadarma was born in Banjuwangi, East Java, in 1912. After graduating from the Royal Military Academy in Breda, he joined the KNIL and soon transferred to its infant air arm. During the occupation, he worked in the police in Bandung. After the outbreak of the Revolution, he was summoned to Jogjakarta to guide the formation of the Republic's tiny air force.

¹³Zulkifli Lubis was born in Tapanuli. During the occupation, he was among the first to be recruited into the Peta, and specialized in intelligence work. During

in uniform; he was walking along with a perfectly calm expression, almost smiling. In his left hand, he held a big cigarette lighter. I had arrived in Jogjakarta at about the same time as Zulkifli, in October 1945, when the central Army leadership was first being established, but I still found him very mysterious. No senior officer had arrived at headquarters as yet. I asked who was the senior officer in charge, for I knew that the Panglima Besar and his staff were out of town. Somebody told me that it was Lt. Col. Sukanda.¹⁴ But Sukanda was then working in the Territorial Staff and not in the section of the General Staff which was in charge of operations.

On leaving headquarters, I dropped in for a while at the City Military Command. Latif¹⁵ was discussing "scorched-earth" tactics with his staff. I thought his position that morning a rather difficult one. He was the City Military Commander, but the troops in the town were not under his command.

From the City Military Command, I went to the headquarters of the coding service, in Djalan Batanawarsa. This service was in charge of sending our radiograms to Bukittinggi.¹⁶ I asked Dr. Rubijono,¹⁷ our code expert, to try to keep the connections with Bukittinggi open, since it was very likely that the cabinet would be sending cables there as soon as a session could be held.

I then went to the Presidential Palace. This building served not only as the residence of the President and his family but also as the center for all activities of the Republic's high command while the latter was in Jogjakarta. Cabinet sessions were held there, as well as important meetings with delegations, sessions of the Military Strategy Council, and important state ceremonies. Thus, my first reaction, when it became clear that we were under attack, was: To the Palace!

the early part of the Revolution, he functioned as the effective head of Section Five of the Ministry of Defense, responsible, among other things, for intelligence and for sabotage behind enemy lines.

¹⁴Sukanda Bratamenggala was born in West Java in 1917. He was graduated from a teachers' college and joined the Peta during the Japanese occupation. After the Japanese surrender he was active in several fighting units in West Java, particularly in the area between north Bandung and east Krawang. After the formation of the Siliwangi Division, he became Commander of its First Battalion ("Tirtajasa"). In 1948, he was made Deputy Chief of Staff of the Java Command. After the second Dutch action began, he joined the Siliwangi Division units in their "long march" back to West Java from Central Java.

¹⁵Abdul Latif Hendraningrat was the second highest Peta officer in the Djakarta area during the occupation. In 1949, he served as the City Military Commander for Jogjakarta.

¹⁶Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, was the headquarters of the Emergency Government of the Republic, established under Sjafruddin Prawiranegara after the capture of Sukarno, Hatta, and the bulk of Hatta's cabinet, on the first day of the second Dutch action, December 19, 1948.

¹⁷Dr. Rubijono Kertopati was born in 1914. He was graduated from the Medical College in Surabaya. In 1946, he was assigned to be the chief medical officer of the Ministry of Defense. In 1947, he was head of Technical Services, Ministry of Defense, and in 1948, he was in charge of the coding service of the Armed Forces.

When I got there, things still seemed rather quiet. In the left-hand wing of the Palace, in front of the bedrooms reserved for guests, I saw Bung Sjahrir¹⁸ and a few others. Bung Sjahrir was then serving as adviser to the President, and he came over quite frequently from Djakarta, where he lived, probably to take counsel. For the past few days, as the situation became increasingly tense, Bung Sjahrir had been staying in Jogjakarta at the Palace. In one respect, it was lucky that few people were around the Palace; even the President was apparently still in his room. As a result, I had a chance to eat some fried rice and drink a cup of coffee undisturbed. "Who knows when we will get another chance to eat today?" I thought.

Suriadarma came and told us that Maguwo had been attacked, and probably was already occupied by the enemy. Communications were evidently no longer operating smoothly, however, since he could not give us any details about the situation at Maguwo. Over and around Jogjakarta, one could see Dutch aircraft flying about quite freely, since we could not take any action against them. We had no fighters, and our anti-aircraft weapons were limited to a few machine guns. Now and then the Dutch planes dropped rockets and fired their machine guns, but the Palace itself was not directly attacked from the air.

Gradually, the members of the cabinet assembled at the Palace: Dr. Leimena,¹⁹ Djuanda,²⁰ etc. The Sultan²¹ also came a little later.

¹⁸Sutan Sjahrir was born in Padang Pandjang, West Sumatra, in 1909. While a student in Holland, he became secretary of the Perhimpunan Indonesia and, on his return to Indonesia, worked with Hatta in the Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia. He was imprisoned along with Hatta in 1934 and was only released in 1942 after the Dutch collapse. During the occupation, he avoided public office and attempted to create an underground organization. After the outbreak of the Revolution, he became a major spokesman for elements hostile to the so-called collaborators with the Japanese. Partly for this reason, he became Prime Minister in November 1945. Together with Amir Sjarifuddin, he led the then dominant Socialist Party. He headed three successive cabinets until his fall from power in June 1947. As special adviser to the President, he was assigned to represent the Republic when the Security Council debated the "Indonesian Question" in the early fall of 1947. In early 1948, he broke with Amir Sjarifuddin and formed a minority party, the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI), which supported the Hatta cabinet.

¹⁹Johannes Leimena was born in Ambon in 1905. Aside from his medical practice, he was active in Moluccan and Protestant political organizations. He was Deputy Minister of Health in both the Amir and Hatta cabinets. Given strenuous Dutch efforts to elicit support from Protestant and Moluccan minorities, Leimena's adherence constituted a significant political asset to the Republic.

²⁰R. Djuanda was born in Tasikmalaja, West Java, in 1911. Before the war, he was a top member of the Sundanese regional political party, the Pagujuban Pasundan. He served as Deputy Minister of Communications in the second Sjahrir cabinet, and as Minister of Communications in the third Sjahrir, the Amir, and the Hatta cabinets.

²¹Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX was born in Jogjakarta in 1912. He was enrolled in Leiden University but had to interrupt his studies and return home due to the illness of his father. He succeeded his father as Sultan of Jogjakarta in 1939. When the Revolution broke out, he identified strongly with the Republic. He was Minister of State without portfolio in the third Sjahrir, the Amir, and the Hatta cabinets. He was to be made responsible for security in the Jogjakarta region when the Dutch

For the last few days he had been ill, and it was obviously still difficult for him to walk when he emerged from his car and entered the Palace. Pak Dirman, who had been bedridden for the past three months, also arrived by car. Slowly, he got out of his car and walked carefully into the Palace, supported by some of his adjutants and Dr. Suwondo,²² his personal doctor. By now the President had also come out of his room. It remained to wait for Bung Hatta who was still at Kaliurang. The Sultan and Bung Sjahrir offered to go and fetch Bung Hatta at Kaliurang. Sasra²³ had already taken him a pass with a Staff of the Armed Forces stamp, in order to avoid difficulties in case our troops stopped them on their way. They met Bung Hatta a few kilometers outside Jogjakarta. On the way from Kaliurang, Bung Hatta's car had been fired on from the air, and Hutabarat,²⁴ who was in the car behind Bung Hatta's, was reported to have been hit.

What decision would the cabinet take? Pak Dirman had already issued an order over the radio announcing that we were under attack and declaring a state of war. I suggested to a number of cabinet members that a cable should immediately be sent to Bukittinggi transferring power to Minister of Finance Sjafrudin Prawiranegara,²⁵ who was there at that time. I said that orders had been given to maintain continuous connection with Bukittinggi for the sending of government cables. I also proposed that the President, the Vice-President, and the other leaders should leave town immediately and go to Wonosari. The Sultan had already given orders by telephone to reserve the Regent's residence at Wonosari for that purpose. I had myself already sent a letter from the Palace asking Lt. Col. Daan Jahja,²⁶ Chief of Staff of the Siliwangi Division, to reserve some troops to escort the President and the others to Wonosari. When asked whether Wonosari would be safe,

troops left that area as a result of the Rum-van Royen Agreement. Later, in December 1949, he became Minister of Defense in the first cabinet of the United Republic of Indonesia (RIS) led by Hatta.

²²This appears to refer to the Suwondo who served in the Peta in East Java during the occupation and who, in 1948, became Chief of Staff of the newly formed Brawidjaja Division there.

²³Sutarto Sasraprawira was born in 1920. On the eve of the war, he was enrolled at the Reserve Officers' Training School in Bandung. From 1945 to 1947, he was secretary to the Army's Directorate-General in Jogjakarta. In 1948, he was secretary to the General Staff of the Armed Forces.

²⁴Hutabarat was a personal aide to Vice-President Hatta.

²⁵R. Sjafrudin Prawiranegara was born in Banten, West Java, in 1911. He worked in both the colonial and Japanese administrations, specializing in taxation problems. He became Deputy Minister of Finance in the second and Minister of Finance in the third Sjahrir cabinets. He served as Minister of Economic Affairs in the Hatta cabinet.

²⁶Daan Jahja was a medical student during the Japanese occupation. After the Republic was proclaimed, he and others initiated a military academy in Tangerang, west of Djakarta. He was a Brigade Commander under Nasution in the Siliwangi Division and later became Chief of Staff of the Division. He took part in the Round Table Conference in The Hague as a member of the military staff attached to the Republican delegation. In December 1949 he became military governor of the Djakarta area.

I explained that, under the circumstances, no place could be considered absolutely safe--any place could be attacked at any moment by land or from the air. Even if Wonosari were still safe that day, this would not mean that the President and the others could stay there the next day or the day after. In other words, those leaving the town would have to get used to the idea of roaming from one village to another until a general settlement could be reached. Of course, it would also involve the risk of being shot or captured, shortages of food and medicine, and so on. All these problems were inevitable in the only method of warfare open to us, a people's war.

The members of the cabinet began to assemble on the back verandah; I was not invited to attend the meeting. I could see Pak Dirman still sitting in his chair, so apparently he was not invited either. Later on he left the Palace. I departed too. I went to the Java Command Headquarters, which I found empty. Headquarters had been moved to a house not far away. I met Sukanda who informed me that the headquarters would be transferred outside the city, to the Kutu area, on the road between Jogjakarta and Magelang.

After discussing the situation with Lt. Col. Sukanda, who was at that time the senior officer in charge at the Java Command Headquarters, I returned by car to the Palace. The streets were empty. When I arrived at the Palace, the ministers had begun to disperse. They said the cabinet had decided not to leave the city. When I asked why, nobody had a clear answer. Apparently, the cabinet felt that even if the President and the others left, they still risked being captured later. Evidently, it was believed that such a situation would have more adverse consequences than if things were clear right from the start, namely, if the President, the Vice-President, and the ministers were immediately captured by the enemy. At least, that was more or less as I understood things; as I noted previously, no one was prepared to give me a full explanation. As Bung Hatta was about to leave the Palace, I had a chance to propose that the government should at least make a statement calling for the continuation of the struggle even if its members were captured by the enemy.

Bung Hatta answered, "Good." Harjono,²⁷ who had accompanied me, hurried off to find paper and a typewriter. In the presence of Bung Hatta and myself, he typed an official statement to the effect that, whatever might happen to members of the government, the struggle must continue. Bung Hatta signed it in his capacity as chief executive. We saluted and shook hands with him.

This document would provide the legal basis for continuing the struggle after the head of state and members of the government had been captured. Later on, we distributed copies of it, but as a matter of fact, during the people's war, I never met a single person who believed

²⁷Harjono was born in Surabaya in 1924 and was a student at the Medical College until the later part of the occupation. He then joined the Peta. From the earliest period of the Republic he was involved in liaison work and cease-fire negotiations, first with the British and later with the Dutch. In 1946 he was appointed secretary of the National Defense Council and an official of the Ministry of Defense in charge of staff work for truce negotiations. In August 1949, he went to The Hague as secretary to the military staff attached to the Republican delegation at the Round Table Conference.

that the struggle should not have been carried on if there had been no such document. I did not see Bung Karno.²⁸ Apparently, he was either on the back verandah or in his room.

On leaving the palace, I went to Pak Dirman's house in Bintaran. It was quite empty. Pak Dirman had already left town. Opposite the Pakualam Palace, I noticed Lt. Col. Surjosularso²⁹ standing under the trees at the side of the road. He seemed to be taking temporary shelter from the planes which continued circling and shooting. I stopped and asked him where he planned to go. "To Imogiri," he said. And myself? "Perhaps to Imogiri too, perhaps to Kutu," I told him. Indeed I did not know at the time.

I stopped for a moment at my house. I put a knapsack containing some clothes, a toothbrush, and soap into the car. We left immediately, because heavy firing could be heard from the direction of Maguwo. The actual situation was unclear. Had the Dutch already reached the city from Maguwo? Had they dropped parachutists at Maguwo, then landed troops by plane after gaining control of the airfield, and subsequently proceeded into the city? Or had they, while attacking Maguwo, simultaneously advanced towards Jogja via Magelang or Purworedjo? I did not know at that time.

At any rate, I thought, I should try to drive to Kutu. But a few minutes before our car reached Gondolaju Bridge, one of the planes circling above fired at the moving vehicle and scored a direct hit on the rear end with a machine gun bullet. The car caught fire, but I managed to get out in time. Once again, as on the previous night between Kaliurang and Jogjakarta, I said to Pak Untung, the driver of my car: "It seems I'm meant to have a long life." However, I had had no time to get the knapsack out of the car.

At that moment, I caught sight of Sasra walking quickly toward the ravine of the Tjode River. He evidently intended to cross the river without going over the bridge. Without further thought I followed him. We forded the small river, walked through a kampung, and then crossed the main street, Djalan Malioboro, near Toko Oen. After that, we walked straight out of town in the direction of Demakidjo. We did not see the enemy, but the shooting sounded closer and closer. I did not know the time when we left town, but I guessed that it was already past two o'clock.

²⁸ Sukarno was born in Surabaya, East Java, in 1901. He was graduated from the Technical Faculty in Bandung in 1926. In 1927, he rose to national prominence as the founder of the PNI. From late 1929 to late 1931, he was imprisoned by the Dutch. On his release he joined the Partindo, but he was soon rearrested. He was exiled to Flores and then Bengkulu from February 1934 to the end of the colonial period when the Japanese released him. He was the top Indonesian national figure of the occupation period, serving as leader of both Putera and the Hōkōkai. After the Proclamation of Independence, the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (PPKI) elected him President of the Republic. He also headed the first cabinet, which lasted until November 1945.

²⁹ Surjosularso was born in 1916. He was graduated from the Royal Military Academy in Breda. During the Revolution, he was instructor at an Army Training Institute, Director of Personnel at the Ministry of Defense, and in charge of the Army's Communications Service.

It was an odd coincidence that I left the town with Sasra. More than three years before, at the beginning of October 1945, Sasra and I had gone together by train from Bandung to Jogjakarta to assist in the formation of the central leadership of the Army, which at that time had just been officially established. I still remember how Suriadarma, who had been working with the police in Bandung since the Japanese period, had arranged service cards for Sasra and me as police inspectors, to enable us to travel by train free of charge. It was funny that it was as fake police inspectors that we had arrived in Jogjakarta to take part in setting up the Army Headquarters. When we left Jogjakarta on the afternoon of December 19, however, we were too sad to think of anything humorous.

I took nothing with me on leaving town except the shirt and pair of pants I wore. They were the same clothes I had worn at Kaliurang the day before. My friends often called that shirt and pair of pants "diplomat's clothes," because the shirt was foreign-made and I wore the grey woolen pants only when I went to Djakarta or Kaliurang to take part in the negotiations. Now they were the only clothes I had. A few weeks later, when the situation had become less chaotic and we could begin to laugh again, I was often teasingly referred to as "the diplomat who got lost." I walked from one village to another during the people's war wearing the grey woolen pants and the foreign-made shirt, which I used to wear only when negotiating with the Dutch and the Three-State Commission.

At Demakidjo we met Maj. Muslimin.³⁰ Demakidjo had a sugar processing plant which had been made over into an arms factory. Maj. Muslimin was in charge. In accordance with his instructions, he had destroyed the factory, and now he intended to accompany us. He told us that he knew Central Java very well, as he had often hunted wild pigs there. He used to sell the pigs to supplement his household budget.

From Demakidjo we walked to Godean, and from there in the direction of Kutu. Day had become night. Someone who lived in one of the houses by the roadside invited us in and offered us cassava. Our people are indeed generous. I had not eaten or drunk anything since morning, so the cassava and hot coffee tasted very delicious. At Kutu nobody knew where the Java Command Headquarters was. We therefore walked west intending to cross the Progo River. On the way we heard heavy explosions. Evidently the sugar factories and other buildings were being destroyed in line with instructions which I myself had signed a short time before. We felt quite satisfied hearing these explosions. If the Dutch think that their attack will allow them to put the factories back to work, just let them see what really happens, I thought. Didn't the Dutch realize, before they started their attack, that we genuinely would rather see our country reduced to rubble than endure Dutch colonialism once again? At Minggir we slept in a guard-house while waiting for dawn, since there was no raft to take us across the Progo before morning.

Although I was exhausted, I could not fall asleep immediately. The day before, on December 18, I had been driving around in a car in

³⁰ Muslimin was born in 1911. He was given special training in the weapons workshop of the KNIL and, in 1945, he was made head of the arms workshops of the Ministry of Defense. During the second Dutch action, he was in charge of arms workshops for the area of Military Governor III.

Jogjakarta as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. That afternoon I had eaten my dinner at the Kaliurang Hotel as a "diplomat" together with members of our delegation and those of the Three-State Commission. Later I had met His Excellency the Vice-President of our Republic. And now I was here, in a guardhouse at Minggir on the bank of the Progo. No one could predict what would happen to me now. Such is life, I thought; it has its ebb and flow, just like the sea.

How odd that, at that moment, a passage from a poem by Kipling came into my mind. At the very time when I was being hunted by the Dutch imperialists, I found pleasure in the work of a poet who praised British imperialism.

If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster,
 And treat those two impostors just the same;
 If you can bear to hear the truth you've spoken
 Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools,
 Or watch the things you gave your life to, broken,
 And stoop and build 'em up with worn-out tools:
 If you can make one heap of all your winnings,
 And risk it on one turn of pitch-and-toss;
 And lose, and start again at your beginnings
 And never breathe a word about your loss;

 If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue,
 Or walk with Kings--nor lose the common touch,

 Yours is the Earth and everything that's in it,
 And--which is more--you'll be a *Man*, my son.

Jogjakarta had fallen. The President, the Vice-President, and our other top leaders had been captured. But was this the end of our Republic? There is a writer (Machiavelli, if I am not mistaken) who once said that the last fortress of a state existed in the hearts of its soldiers. Whether our Republic would live or die now mainly depended indeed on the question of whether or not it was still alive in the hearts of the officers, noncommissioned officers, and soldiers of the Indonesian National Army. The answer to this question would be given by developments in the days and weeks to come. My own fate, as Tahi Bonar Simatupang, Colonel in the Indonesian Army, also hung on this answer.

Nonetheless, my heart was quiet and serene. For some time now, I had been getting used to the idea that a Dutch attack was inevitable. We would have to swallow this bitter medicine to its last drop as a test of our sincere desire to live as an independent nation and state. But the test had come sooner than I had first expected.

I remembered a conversation with Capt. Nusjirwan in Djakarta some time before, as we rode back in a car to No. 56 Pegangsaan Timur from a negotiating session at the Hotel Des Indes. The meeting that day had been quite brief. The Dutch had made a proposal which in essence called for the dissolution of the Indonesian National Army during what they called an "interim period"; I had immediately made it clear that such a proposal could not even be considered. So the meeting was adjourned. In effect, this was the last meeting of the Military Commission, for the subsequent negotiations, at Kaliurang, were held directly between a number of Dutch ministers and our government.

Later, in the car, I had said to Nusjirwan, who was my secretary at that time: "If it is the fate of this Republic to perish, I will perish with it. For me there is no road back, nor any other road forward."

I was already committed, and therefore I was quiet and serene. Yet as I lay in the guardhouse at Minggir, my thoughts turned for a while to my mother who was living in Pematang Siantar in Sumatra. No doubt she would be praying for my safety once she learned from the radio that Jogjakarta had fallen into the hands of the Dutch.

Of course, all soldiers, noncommissioned officers, and officers of the Indonesian National Army had fathers, mothers, even wives and children whom they had had to leave behind to continue the struggle. My own position was not so bad, as I was still unmarried.

All of this was for Indonesia's independence.

Eventually I fell asleep. When the cocks crowing to one another in the villages around the guardhouse woke me up, the sky in the east above Mount Merapi had begun to lighten. There is an exquisite sentence in the Book of Genesis in the Holy Bible, which I used to read in the Batak language and later in Dutch, when I was at the Christian Junior High School in Tarutung [Tapanuli] and subsequently at the Salemba Christian Senior High School in Djakarta. "Dungi bot ma ari, terang ma ari muse, ima ari pardjolo." "En het was avond geweest, het was morgen geweest, de eerste dag." It means: "So the morning had become evening and the evening had become day, the first day." The first day of the second war of independence had ended and the second day had come.

I woke Sasra and my other friends, who were still sound asleep in the guardhouse at Minggir on the banks of the Progo that was flowing quietly to the Southern Sea as it had done for centuries.

It would perhaps be useful if we now answered some questions which may arise with regard to the events of December 19, 1948. Could Jogjakarta have been defended against the Dutch attack? I do not think we were in a position to defend it for an unlimited period. Could Jogjakarta have been defended for a limited time, for instance, two or three days? Theoretically, I think, this would not have been impossible. For example, if the Maguwo airfield could have been held and effectively sabotaged on the first day, we might have gained two or three days before Jogjakarta fell. But our belief that the Dutch would not attack so long as the exchange of notes through the Three-State Commission, or, more accurately, through the United States representative on the Commission, continued, prevented us from taking the necessary measures.

What would have happened, if the fall of Jogjakarta could have been delayed for two or three days? Such a delay would mainly have had a psychological impact, both at home and abroad. After a few days, Jogjakarta would have had to be abandoned anyway. Of course, the delay would have given us more time to effect our scorched-earth tactics before leaving the city.

In this regard, it should be noted that the state leaders were not captured, on December 19, 1948, because they had no time to leave

Jogjakarta. They remained in the city as a consequence of a political decision consciously taken following considerable deliberation in a cabinet meeting held on the morning of December 19, 1948, at the Palace. Even if the fall of Jogjakarta could have been delayed for two or three days, it is questionable whether they would have made a different decision.

Our conclusion is that Jogjakarta's fall was inevitable; at the most, we could have delayed it a few days. Such a delay, however, would probably not have fundamentally affected further developments.

Our experience with the fall of Jogjakarta underlines the truth of the military maxim: "Always expect the unexpected."

CHAPTER II

WITH THE SILIWANGI DIVISION

Early on the morning of December 20, 1948, we crossed the Progo on a raft. On the other side of the river lay a bigger village, Dekso. I had come across the name of this village in a history book about the struggle of Prince Diponegoro, but this was the first time I had seen it myself. It is certainly favorably situated for carrying on a people's war. Dekso is protected from an attack from the east by the Progo, which is rather wide there; around it there are rice fields and gardens, while not far away there are hills to fall back to if necessary. It is not surprising that Dekso and the area surrounding it served for a long time as Prince Diponegoro's base while he waged his people's war against the Dutch. Now, 120 years later, quite accidentally, we, too, arrived at Dekso. As soon as I saw Dekso for the first time it flashed into my mind to seek a suitable site in the area for a fairly permanent base for the Staff of the Armed Forces during the people's war.

First of all, however, I intended to get in touch with the Java Command Headquarters, as it was this headquarters that had been assigned to direct the defense of Java. Theoretically, the Staff of the Armed Forces was supposed to coordinate the defense of both Java and Sumatra, indeed the whole of Indonesia as well. It was also to coordinate defense measures with our political, diplomatic, economic, and other policies. At the moment, of course, this was all purely theoretical. In my capacity as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, I first had to establish contact with the Java and Sumatra Commands; only then could further steps by the Staff of the Armed Forces be considered. In addition, it was essential to establish contact with Pak Dirman as soon as possible.

At Dekso, nobody knew the location of the Java Command Headquarters. One battalion of the Siliwangi Division was here, under the command of Maj. Daeng,¹ and it was heading for West Java. Daeng had told me that his battalion had received orders to leave immediately for West Java if the Dutch attacked. For some time now, he had been studying which route to take to avoid the main roads. Indeed, some time ago an order known in the army as the Panglima Besar's Instruction No. 1 had been issued which mapped out the actions each unit should take in case of a Dutch attack.

From Dekso we walked some miles south to Kenteng. There we met Lt. Col. Sudarto. Sudarto had been a student at the Technical Faculty in Bandung before the Japanese came, and, during the occupation, he had been a high school teacher in Jogja. At the time of the Dutch attack, he commanded the Seventeenth Brigade. This brigade had been assigned

¹Daeng commanded the Fourth Battalion of the First Siliwangi Brigade in 1948. The brigade was quartered in Jogjakarta as a consequence of the post-Renville evacuations. Like Daan Jahja, he was captured by the Dutch in the course of the second action.

to consolidate the units organized since 1945 in a number of regions by students who had joined the armed struggle.

Sudarto informed us that some time ago, he and his staff had selected and prepared the area around Kenteng as a base to fall back on in case of retreat, and that therefore when it became clear that the Dutch had started to attack on December 19, his group went to Kenteng. Sudarto, too, had no idea where the Java Command Headquarters might be. I suspected that its members had not yet reassembled, having left Jogja the day before in small groups.

The reports I got from Daeng and Sudarto were typical of what happened everywhere in those days. Each unit had known for some time where it should go in case of a Dutch attack and, as far as possible, preparations had already been made. Some units had to travel only a few kilometers to reach their fall-back positions, as was the case with Lt. Col. Sudarto's staff. Others had to march hundreds of kilometers through the mountains before arriving at their base areas, such as Daeng's battalion, which was heading for West Java. In general, the troops that had been evacuated from West Java, the western part of Central Java, and the eastern part of East Java, in accordance with the Renville Agreement, had for some time been preparing themselves for the return to their respective regions if the Dutch attacked. Apparently the same thing took place on Sumatra, though on December 20 we had no idea about what was happening there. In fact, my knowledge of events on Java at that time was still limited to what I had personally seen and heard.

Our organization had not yet been restored as a working unit. Nonetheless, as the examples noted above clearly demonstrate, parts of this organization had carried out the steps previously decided upon. Apparently the Dutch had no inkling of all this. Perhaps they were intoxicated with their victories in Jogjakarta and Djakarta and believed that with the surprise seizure of Jogjakarta and other towns, the Republic and its Armed Forces had met their end. Perhaps, too, they thought that the capture of our top leaders would break the spirit of the people and the Armed Forces. If the Dutch really let themselves be guided by such expectations--and from my earlier conversations with members of the Dutch delegation at Kaliurang I had got the impression that such indeed was the trend of their thinking--they were living in a dream world.

From Kenteng we went back to Dekso. Since I concluded that the Java Command Headquarters had not yet been reorganized, I decided first to try to contact Col. Bambang Sugeng,² the Military Governor of the Third Region, whose area of responsibility covered the western part of Central Java, i.e., the regions of Jogjakarta, Kedu, half of Semarang, Pekalongan, and Banjumas. I wanted to ascertain whether or not our organization from the level of Military Governor on down had already

² Bambang Sugeng was born in Tegalredjo, Magelang, Central Java, in 1913. He received a high school education, and in the 1930's worked in the Department of Internal Affairs, Lampung, and later in the kabupatèn office in Temanggung, Central Java. During the occupation he was a company commander in the Peta, stationed in the Magelang area. After the Revolution began, he headed the Wonosobo Regiment in the Fifth Division under Sudirman. Subsequently, he became Chief of Staff of the Second Division in Purwokerto, and in May 1948, he was made Commander of the Diponegoro Division. At the time of the Madiun Affair, he was Military Governor of the Third Region.

been restored. My best plan of action would be to join the Siliwangi troops moving westwards. Later on, I could part company with them, for they would continue heading west, while I would have to go north to the Mount Sumbing area, where Bambang Sugeng and his staff were located. Afterward, I would return here to the Dekso region because it was a good place for a more permanent base, and furthermore, as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, it was better that I not be located too far away from Jogjakarta. Somehow or other, contact with our people in the city, and through them with Djakarta, would eventually have to be restored to enable us to cope with further political developments. Perhaps by the time I returned here, the nature of the general situation would have become clearer. The most important problems concerned the extent to which the Java Command Headquarters could be reconstituted, communication with Sumatra restored, and contact with Pak Dirman achieved.

From Dekso we walked in the direction of Samigaluh. At dusk we bivouacked, together with one of the units heading for West Java. Among others, we saw Rukana there.³ Early the next morning, we reached Samigaluh. Here we met the staff of the Siliwangi Division under the command of Daan Jahja. Taswin,⁴ now a [deputy] brigade commander, and Kemal,⁵ a battalion commander, were also there. I also saw a white man, Princen.⁶ Mokoginta,⁷ the Commander of the Military Police, was there too. Evidently, most of the Siliwangi troops had chosen the route through Dekso, Samigaluh, and on west. This unquestionably caused increasing difficulty in finding food in these areas, since as a rule the troops purchased their supplies through the *lurah* or the *tjamat*⁸ in places along their route.

³Rukana commanded the military police battalion in the Bandung Regiment in the fall of 1945.

⁴R. Taswin Almalik Natadiningrat was born in Serang, West Java, in 1922. He was a student at the Medical Faculty in Djakarta before the war. In 1945, he joined the Badan Keamanan Rakjat (People's Security Organization), a forerunner of the Indonesian Army, and in 1946 he served as chief of the organization and personnel section of the Tangerang Regiment under Daan Jahja. In 1946-47 he was Chief of Staff of the Second Brigade of the Siliwangi Division. In 1948, he was assigned to Solo and Jogjakarta. When the second Dutch action was launched, he returned to West Java with his men; when the cease-fire was proclaimed, he represented the Republican forces on the Cease-fire Joint Board in the Serang area.

⁵Kemal Idris was born in 1923. During the Japanese period, he joined the Peta, and, after the Revolution began, he became commander of a battalion in the Tangerang area. He later headed the First Battalion in the First Siliwangi Brigade, which was quartered in Jogjakarta in 1948.

⁶Princen, a deserter from the Dutch army, went over to the Republican side and became attached to the Siliwangi Division.

⁷A. J. Mokoginta was born in 1921. He attended the Royal Military Academy in Bandung on the eve of the Second World War. From 1946 to 1947, he served as Chief of Staff of the Third Brigade of the Siliwangi Division. For a period he also served as ADC to General Urip Sumohardjo. In September 1948, he replaced Gatot Subroto as Commander of the Military Police for the Java Command.

⁸A *tjamat* is a sub-district chief; a *lurah* is a village chief.

I learned from Lt. Col. Daan Jahja that on the morning of December 19 he had received the orders (which I had written at the Palace) to have troops ready for escorting the President and others to Wonosari. However, when by midday he had received no further news, he and his men had left the city for West Java.

Daan and Taswin had been medical students in Djakarta during the early days of the Japanese occupation. In line with efforts to "Japanize" and militarize, or at least "semi-militarize," everything, the Japanese had required students to shave their heads. Since during the Dutch period it had been constantly emphasized that students should be independent, too independent perhaps, the Japanese measure had resulted in student resistance. Daan Jahja had been among those whom the Japanese considered the ringleaders of the resistance, a serious crime to a totalitarian regime. Later, he had attended a Peta training course and, after the Proclamation of Independence, had taken part in founding the Military Academy at Tangerang.⁹ The cadets were generally young men from families resident in Djakarta. Among the *pemuda* [activist youth] buried at the Tangerang Heroes' Cemetery, for instance, are two children of the Margono¹⁰ family and a child of the Hadji Agus Salim¹¹ family.

Many wives and children accompanied the troops. Apparently they had left West Java earlier when their husbands' units had been evacuated. Now, as the troops set off home for West Java after the Dutch attack, what else could the wives do but follow? What would have been their fate had they been left behind in the towns occupied by the Dutch, in the midst of a strange community? During the four days of my journey westward with the Siliwangi troops, I saw wives and children joining the march, setting off into the dark, crossing rivers, and climbing steep, slippery hills. I heard about cases of children who had drowned while crossing flood-swollen rivers during pitch-dark nights. Truly, we did not receive our independence as a gift.

That same day, December 21, we walked with Daan Jahja and some members of his staff to Banjuasin. After four days of irregular meals,

⁹In November 1945, the Republic sponsored the founding of a military academy in Tangerang, near Djakarta. Maj. Daan Mogot served as its director, but, given its proximity to Allied-occupied Djakarta, the academy did not long survive.

¹⁰R. M. Margono Djojohadikusumo was born in Probolinggo, East Java, in 1894. He was graduated from the Civil Service Academy in 1911. During the colonial era he pursued a career in the civil service, particularly in sections concerning government credit and cooperatives. In 1942, he was made director of the People's Bank. After the Revolution broke out, he became chairman of the Supreme Advisory Council, set up in September 1945, and also the first chairman of the Indonesian State Bank. Two of his sons, Subianto and Sujono, were killed on January 25, 1946, in Tangerang. Another son, Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, subsequently became the most prominent member of Margono's family.

¹¹Hadji Agus Salim was born in Kota Gedang, near Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, in 1884. He was one of the best known of the prewar nationalist leaders. He served as a top leader of the Sarekat Islam and of its successor, the PSII, and was an important publicist for modernist Islamic thinking. He was Deputy Foreign Minister in the second and third Sjahrir cabinets and Foreign Minister in the Amir and the Hatta cabinets. Several of his relatives, for example Sutan Sjahrir, also achieved prominent positions in the Republic. His son, Ahmad Sjaudet, was killed in 1946.

that afternoon Daan Jahja provided us with delicious food. He had bought a goat from a villager and we ate plain rice with *saté* and *gulai*.¹² "This is not a *galgenmaal*," Jahja said. "I hope not!" I answered. *Galgenmaal* in Dutch means the delicious meal given to somebody just before he is led to the gallows.

After the meal, we talked about how we had come to the present situation and what was in store for us in the future. I said that, in my own view, both sides had incorrectly assessed the situation following the Renville Agreement. I thought that Bung Amir had been well aware that, from the military as well as from the economic point of view, the Renville Agreement was disastrous for us. Yet he had believed that, by yielding to the pressure of the Three-State Commission, in particular the urging of Dr. Graham,¹³ he could "buy" a political guarantee, especially from the United States, against another Dutch attack. It seemed to me that many of our leaders had accepted this line of thinking at that time. If the implementation of Bung Karno's slogan "From the Bullet to the Ballot" could have been guaranteed by the Three-State Commission, then history would have recorded the Renville Agreement as beneficial to us. Our mistake was that we had overestimated the effect of the Three-State Commission. Probably Bung Amir himself had also overestimated Dr. Graham's personal statements. This is not to imply that Dr. Graham tricked Bung Amir. My impression had been that Dr. Graham was an honest person of real good will but that van Zeeland, the Belgian representative on the Three-State Commission and a veteran European diplomat, was probably far more shrewd. Furthermore, immediately after the signing of the Renville Agreement, Dr. Graham had been called back to Washington. Perhaps this episode demonstrated that we were still green in matters of diplomacy and international politics.

In several regions, particularly in East Sumatra and East Java, production had increased several times over after we had evacuated them in compliance with the Renville Agreement. In my conversations with members of the Dutch delegation at Kaliurang, they had stressed this fact. Apparently they had concluded: "If we carry through our offensive until the whole area of the Republic is occupied, we will soon have production running smoothly, and 'peace and order' will be assured again, as is the case in Dutch-occupied East Sumatra and East Java."

In these conversations, I had explained that the Dutch had drawn a false conclusion. East Sumatra and the occupied area of East Java had only become "secure" because the Republic had withdrawn its troops and pemuda from these regions, while awaiting the time of their return to the fold of the Republic through the ballot. I warned the Dutch that, in case of attack, all this would radically change. The army and the pemuda would return to these regions, which they had left because of their faith in the slogan "From the Bullet to the Ballot," and then Dutch "peace and order" would automatically disappear. I stressed over and over again that, if the Dutch attacked, the Republic would also be bound to use every means available against them, and that they should not assume that a flood of anti-Dutch hatred, once released, could easily be dammed, like stopping the flow of water from a pipe by merely turning the tap.

¹²Saté is an Indonesian barbecued-meat dish and gulai is a curry.

¹³Dr. Frank Graham was the first American representative on the Committee of Good Offices (the Three-State Commission).

We had wrongly assessed the capability of the Three-State Commission when we accepted the Renville Agreement. On the other hand, the Dutch had also miscalculated with regard to our power and capabilities when they began their second attack. Just as we were bitterly disappointed in the Three-State Commission, so too the Dutch would certainly be disappointed in their expectations about their attack.

I remember telling my friends about a half-funny, half-serious conversation between several members of the Dutch delegation and myself the last time they had come to Kaliurang, before the attack on Jogjakarta. We had talked about van Mook's farewell speech over the radio, when he retired from his position as Lieutenant Governor-General. He had said, "We are standing on the top of Mount Nebo, we have seen the promised land, but we have not yet entered it." What van Mook had meant, no doubt, was that he was leaving Indonesia on the very threshold of the formation of the United States of Indonesia. Those of us on the Republic's side had thought van Mook's statement rather comic, since he seemed to be making himself out as a prophet who had brought Indonesia to the threshold of prosperity and happiness, like Moses, who had brought the children of Israel to the gates of Canaan. In choosing this comparison, however, van Mook had evidently forgotten that in punishment for a sin which he had committed, Moses had not been allowed to lead the children of Israel into the promised land but had only been permitted to view it from the top of Mount Nebo. From the point of view of the Republic, van Mook had sinned by launching the attack of July 21, 1947. Did van Mook realize this as he made his speech?

So I had said, rather sarcastically: "Why did van Mook speak as though he had the opportunity to see the promised land only from the top of Mount Nebo? Surely, you gentlemen must know why Moses was not allowed to enter the land of Canaan?" The Dutch had acted rather embarrassed for some moments. However, one of them then counterattacked by asking: "But perhaps you, sir, know who replaced Moses?" I had nodded, acknowledging the appropriateness of the reply. Moses had been replaced by Joshua who then led the Jewish troops in their attack on Canaan. Joshua attacked Jericho, his troops encircling the town walls. He sounded his trumpets and the walls of Jericho collapsed. I had not misunderstood the subtle threat implied in the remark of the Dutch delegate.

Now the threat had become reality. As with Joshua who attacked Jericho after replacing Moses, so Beel had attacked Jogjakarta after replacing van Mook. Joshua had sounded his trumpets and the walls of Jericho had fallen. Beel had made a radio speech on the morning of December 19, and, that very day, Jogjakarta had fallen into Dutch hands.

Such was the course of our conversation in the house of the lurah of Banjuasin during the evening of December 21, as we sat around after eating our fill of saté and gulai.

The next morning, December 22, the troops accompanying us were going to cross the main highway between Magelang and Purworedjo. They had chosen a point near the village of Djati. In only two days, our whole conception of the meaning of roads, towns, and mountains had changed completely. While we were in the towns, we really paid attention only to the towns and the roads connecting them; we hardly ever thought about the areas to the right and left of these roads, or about the mountain regions. After the towns had been attacked, our troops had had to abandon them and head for the mountains. Seen from this perspective, the towns and highways now represented alien things

associated with the enemy. Beyond the towns and the highways, we could maneuver and hold sway. At times, towns would have to be attacked, as would the enemy using the main roads. Crossing a main road meant entering enemy territory or, at the least, a no-man's land; therefore, the move should preferably be taken at night and after thorough preparations.

The operation was to be conducted after sundown. Troops would be stationed on both sides of the crossing point to guard against a surprise attack. When sunset approached, the units that were going to cross had already assembled some distance from the road. It was drizzling and the village paths were slippery. Many civilians had joined the troops; among them was Chaerul Saleh,¹⁴ who apparently intended to accompany the troops to West Java.

The signal was given. In single file, the troops moved forward, crossed the road, went up a path, descended into a valley and forded a swollen river, eventually reaching the village of Sukowuluh. Those of us who carried nothing but a light knapsack--the staff of the Siliwangi Division had provided me with a knapsack and some clothes--were very tired when we finally reached Sukowuluh after midnight. Naturally, the wives and children were even more exhausted. We slept in a house in Sukowuluh, but Daan Jahja and Daeng went on ahead to see to the troops in the vanguard.

Some time later, we heard shots, though it was not clear from where they came. Dawn was breaking. The troops were evidently on the alert and patrols were sent to reconnoiter. Soon afterwards we heard more shots. Apparently a small enemy unit had been firing from a hill-top but it rapidly withdrew as our forces in the Sukowuluh area were fairly strong. For some hours patrols were deployed around the area, but the enemy had apparently already left. Oddly enough, Daan Jahja and Daeng had not yet reappeared. From various sources of information, we later concluded that they had been sleeping in a small shop; at dawn, a small enemy unit had attacked the shop and captured them.

The first shooting evidently had occurred during this attack. After capturing the two men (who happened to be a divisional Chief of Staff and a battalion commander), the enemy had hurriedly retired. Later, another enemy unit had opened fire--just to create anxiety among us. It seems that the feast at Banjuasin the day before really had been a galgenmaal for Daan. (Only after our final return to Jogjakarta would he be released from internment at Tjilatjap.) In a war like this, a great deal depends on luck. If we had not stayed at Sukowuluh when Daan Jahja and Daeng went ahead, perhaps we too would have had to await the cessation of hostilities in a Dutch prison.

After the loss of Daan Jahja, the Siliwangi Division had no leader; there had been no Division Commander, only a Chief of Staff, and

¹⁴Chaerul Saleh was born in Sawahlunto, West Sumatra, in 1916. He was active in radical student politics while enrolled at the Law Faculty in Djakarta in the 1930's. During the Japanese occupation, he was among the most prominent pemuda in Djakarta. He was one of the leaders of the celebrated "kidnapping" of Sukarno and Hatta, on August 16, 1945, designed to force the two older leaders to declare Indonesia's independence. He subsequently became involved in Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan coalition which opposed the diplomatic strategy of Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin, and, in March 1946, he was arrested. Though soon released, he was rearrested after the July 3, 1946 Affair, tried, and sentenced to prison. He escaped shortly before the second Dutch attack.

he now had to be regarded as missing. In theory, as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, this was not my problem but that of the Java Command. But as I happened to be on the spot when the problem developed and as it was not clear for the moment where the Java Command was, I felt that I should take some action. As I remember, the Brigade Commanders of the Siliwangi Division at that time were: Lt. Col. Sadikin,¹⁵ Lt. Col. Kusno Utomo,¹⁶ and Lt. Col. Taswin;¹⁷ of these Sadikin was senior. For this reason I issued an emergency order appointing Lt. Col. Sadikin as Acting Commander of the Siliwangi Division. As I wrote out this order of appointment, Sitorus and Silitonga were beside me. I gave the letter to Sitorus, who commanded a battalion, to be delivered to Lt. Col. Sadikin.

It was very hard for me to part with the Siliwangi troops at such a moment. But I felt that I could not go with them to West Java; I had to stay within reach of Jogjakarta to be able to follow further developments. From Sukowuluh the Siliwangi troops would go further west, and I would go north to inspect the situation in the Mount Sumbing area. I would then return to the Jogjakarta region.

What I had experienced during the couple of days I had marched with the Siliwangi troops, they would certainly experience many times over before reaching West Java--crossing roads and rivers, facing attacks, walking on slippery mountain paths at night. In spite of this, I could sense a kind of joy infusing these men, perhaps because, whatever else was happening, they were heading toward their own homes in the beautiful Parahijangan [Priangan] region.

After the signing of the Renville Agreement, I had been sent by the government to West Java to arrange the "Hidjrah" of these troops.¹⁸ Now it was as though I was escorting them as far as Sukowuluh on their march home to West Java.

It reminded me of a day just before the final decision had to be made whether or not to accept the Renville Agreement. If I remember

¹⁵ Sadikin was born in Purwokerto, Central Java, in 1916. He was trained at the non-commissioned officers' school of the KNIL, served with the KNIL from 1935 onward, and attained the rank of sergeant. During the occupation, he was in the Heihō auxiliary troops, serving in Djakarta, Surabaya, and Semarang. When the Revolution broke out, he became a battalion commander in the Djakarta area, and, in 1946, he headed the Sixth Regiment (Tjikampek) in the Third Division. In February 1948, he commanded the Fourth Siliwangi Brigade in Tasikmalaja, and, after the post-Renville evacuation, he headed the Second Siliwangi Brigade, located in Surakarta. He led the Siliwangi forces in putting down the Madiun uprising.

¹⁶ Kusno Utomo was born in 1919 and was a cadet in the Reserve Officers' Training Corps (CORO) on the eve of the war. In November 1945, he was with the Regiment Headquarters in the Tasikmalaja area and in December 1945 was assigned as military police commander in the Tangerang area. In May 1947, he was Chief of Staff of the Tjirebon Brigade and in May 1948 he commanded the First Siliwangi Brigade, stationed in Jogjakarta.

¹⁷ The Third Brigade was in fact headed first by Lt. Col. Edi Sukardi and subsequently by Maj. Sjamsu, not by Taswin.

¹⁸ Hidjrah [Hegira], the classical term for the Prophet Mohammad's flight to Medina before his triumphant return to Mecca, was commonly used in the Revolution to describe the evacuation of Republican troops from parts of West Java to Central Java following the stipulations of the Renville Agreement. Use of the word of course expressed the hope of an eventual triumphant return to West Java.

correctly, Bung Amir could not leave Djakarta that day, so Dr. Leimena and I flew to Jogjakarta in a Beachcraft airplane belonging to the United States Navy. We had to return to Djakarta the same day, bringing the Jogjakarta decision. Because time was limited, the President and Vice-President came personally to Maguwo to hear the message we brought and to make an immediate decision. Only the two of us were in that small plane. From the very outset, both of us had followed the developments leading up to these last moments in the negotiations. The military commission, headed by Dr. Leimena, had conducted the initial negotiations prior to the arrival in Djakarta of the political delegation under Bung Amir. By the time the political delegation began to negotiate, the talks between our military commission and its Dutch counterpart had in fact already reached an impasse. The Dutch based their stand on the "van Mook Line,"¹⁹ but we considered this "line" only a figment of their imagination. We had traveled to and fro between Djakarta and Jogjakarta. Together with the delegation members, we had followed the never-ending sessions of the "giant" cabinet, presided over by Bung Amir, which were held at the Presidential Palace in Jogjakarta whenever our delegation returned to report. We had attended the meeting at Kaliurang between the leaders of the Republic and the members of the Three-State Commission, at which Dr. Graham had pronounced his ambiguous words on being asked what the position of the Republic would be in the event that the Renville Agreement was accepted: "You are what you are." Nonetheless, at a quiet moment in the Beachcraft plane, I posed the question, as it were, to myself: "Is this the right road?" Oom Jo²⁰ responded: "As fathers we will never give something bad to our children. I have been thinking over the problem we are confronting and I am convinced we are on the right road." And I knew that, when he said "our children," he meant, among others, these boys of the Siliwangi Division who still had to walk some hundreds of kilometers from Sukowuluh before arriving back home in West Java.

From Sukowuluh, Sasra, Muslimin, and I walked northward, together with a number of young students who wanted to accompany us, through Djumbleng, Tunggan, and Pandansari until finally we reached Kali-tengah. At Pandansari we met Maj. Wilujo;²¹ he had been ordered by Col. Bambang Sugeng to make contact with his Brigade Commanders, Lt. Col. Jani²² in Kedu-Semarang, Lt. Col. Suharto²³ in Jogjakarta, and Lt. Col. Bachrun²⁴ in Pekalongan-Banjumas.

¹⁹The name applied by the Dutch to the military demarcation line established after their first attack.

²⁰Dr. Leimena was often called Oom Jo by his close friends. Oom is the Dutch for uncle and is used in much the same way as Pak, but especially for Ambonese and Menadonese. Jo is an abbreviation for Johannes.

²¹Wilujo Puspojudo was born near Pekalongan, Central Java, in 1919. During the Japanese occupation, he was a middle-ranking Peta officer in Pekalongan. In the early Revolution, he served as a staff officer in the same area. In 1947, he became an intelligence officer attached to the Seventeenth Regiment within the Third Division. In 1948, he performed the same function at Third Division Headquarters in Magelang. He became Assistant to the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in Jogjakarta in 1949.

²²Achmad Jani was born in Purworedjo, Central Java, in 1921. He was enrolled for special training in the Military Topography Service in 1940 and underwent field training as a KNIL sergeant in 1941. During the Japanese occupation, he first joined the Heihō in Magelang and in 1944 enrolled in the Peta. From 1945 to 1947, he headed

The lurah of Kalitengah received us enthusiastically. He told us he was a descendant of one of the followers of Prince Diponegoro. Though we could not ascertain if this pedigree was accurate, his assertion showed clearly that the stories about the Diponegoro war remained a living thing for the people in this region. This would obviously be a great advantage in carrying on the present people's war. Perhaps, for the people of these villages, the difference between the Diponegoro war of 120 years ago and the present one was not so great. In the past, Prince Diponegoro's allied princes and their followers had been warmly welcomed by the lurah and villagers everywhere; now the lurah and the villagers warmly greeted the colonels and their followers. Pak Lurah and the people of Kalitengah entertained us cordially that night.

the Fourth Battalion of the Fifth Division in Magelang. In 1948, he served as Commander of the Ninth Brigade of the Third Division.

²³Suharto was born in Jogjakarta in 1921. He received military training in 1940 under the Dutch. During the Japanese occupation, after a short period with the police, he joined the Peta in Jogjakarta and Madiun. During the Revolution, he rose rapidly from company commander until, in 1948, he was Brigade Commander for the Jogjakarta Area.

²⁴Mohammad Bachrun was born in Purwokerto, Central Java, in 1911. During the colonial period he was a school teacher and active in the Jong Islamieten Bond and the Gerakan Ahmadiyah Indonesia, serving as secretary to the latter organization. During the Japanese occupation, he joined the Peta and, when the Revolution began, he became Commander of the Fifteenth Regiment in the Tjilatjap area. Subsequently, he commanded the Sixteenth Regiment in Purwokerto and became Brigade Commander in that region after May 1948.

CHAPTER III

TURN OF THE YEAR

We stayed for three days at Kalibaru, a village not very different from others where we had slept. We now went barefoot, for in the rainy season we could walk more quickly on the slippery village paths without shoes on. If we wore our shoes, after three or four steps, they became encased in mud, making each step difficult. The shoes also made us slip easily, but if we walked barefoot, our toes automatically spread apart, making our feet grip the slippery soil. So we had put our shoes away in our knapsacks. In only a few days, we had become accustomed to living like villagers.

We stayed at Kalibaru over Christmas, from December 24 to 26, 1948. We had no celebration at all, though we did discover why the Dutch had given our people a "Christmas present" in the form of a military attack.

Capt. Sudjono, who had shared my house in Jogjakarta, came to see me at Kalibaru on his way to Pekalongan. He knew that region well and intended to join the guerrilla movement there. Many officers who no longer had any duties--for example, those who had worked in Jogjakarta in the various administrative staffs--now set off for areas they knew well in order to help organize the people's war there.

On the 27th we walked to Ropoh, as we had heard that the Governor of Central Java, Mr. Wongsonegoro,¹ was there. I was anxious to meet and talk with the Governor who, though already quite elderly, had nonetheless managed to escape from Magelang when the Dutch came. We got to Ropoh late in the afternoon. Some military people there confirmed that the Governor was on the slope of Mount Sumbing but said we would have to climb for a few hours more in order to meet him. Since it was already getting dark, I wrote a letter and left it at Ropoh to be delivered to the Governor; it outlined the events of December 19 and my views on further developments. Essentially, I believed that intervention by the Security Council, and the world generally, would probably not lead to an early solution; we had, therefore, to concentrate our efforts on building a people's war front at home. In this regard, the role of the *pamong-pradja*² was extremely important, and the presence of a Governor on the frontlines of the people's war was both valuable and praiseworthy.

¹Mr. K. R. M. T. Wongsonegoro was born in Surakarta in 1897. During the colonial period he rose steadily in the civil service and also participated actively in such nationalist organizations as Budi Utomo and Parindra. Toward the end of the Japanese occupation, he became Vice-Resident of Semarang, and, after the Proclamation of Independence, full Resident. Not long afterward, he was made Governor of Central Java.

²Pamong-pradja is the name used since 1946 for the elite corps of the colonial regional administration, previously known as the pangreh-pradja.

The military people at Ropoh told me that, according to the rumors, a cease-fire order had already been issued. The news apparently emanated from nearby Magelang. However, they had no further, detailed information. We spent the night at Kapalogo.

We then walked to Kalibawang since, according to the military people at Ropoh, Col. Bambang Sugeng was somewhere near there. At Kalibawang, we learned that Col. Sugeng, along with some members of his staff and a few bodyguards, moved around continuously from one village to another in the Kalibawang area. I wrote to Sugeng that I would like to meet with him. Lt. Col. Bachrun, a Brigade Commander, was also in the area, but his base was to the north of the main road between Bandjarnegara, Wonosobo, and Magelang. I wrote to him too, just to inform him that I was in the area, but saying that I might not be able to meet with him. I gave the letters to the lurah, who assured us that they would be delivered safely. It was my impression that the villages we passed through had already become components in a people's war apparatus. The local pemuda had organized as a sort of village guard, and on our journey they acted as our guides, accompanying us as far as the next village and turning us over to the pemuda there.

Maj. Sudarsono Rahardjodikromo also came to Kalibawang. He had left Jogjakarta only some days after the Dutch occupation, and he related the stories circulating among our people in Jogjakarta at the time he left--that the President and six ministers were in Singapore; that Wiranatakusumah,³ Head of the State of Pasundan, had resigned in protest against the Dutch attack on the Republic; that Adil,⁴ the Prime Minister of Pasundan, and Anak Agung,⁵ Prime Minister of East Indonesia, had been arrested by the Dutch; that Djumhana⁶ had been appointed to form a new cabinet in Pasundan; that the resolution on the withdrawal of Dutch troops had been rejected in the Security Council by 7 votes to 4; that the cease-fire order proposed by America had

³R. A. A. Wiranatakusumah was born in Bandung, West Java, in 1888. In the pre-war period, he was successively Regent of Tjiandjur and Bandung. He was a member of the Volksraad. Under the Japanese, he became senior adviser to the Department of the Interior. After the Proclamation of Independence, he served as Minister of Internal Affairs in the Sukarno cabinet (August to November 1945) and later as a member of the Supreme Advisory Council. In 1948, he was elected Wali Negara (Head of State) of the Dutch-sponsored state of Pasundan in West Java.

⁴Adil Puradiredja, a Sundanese aristocrat, was the first Resident of Priangan after the Proclamation. Later he joined Pasundan.

⁵Anak Agung Gde Agung was born in Gianjar, Bali, in 1919, the son of the ruler of Gianjar. During the colonial period, he studied at the Faculty of Law in Djakarta. The Japanese appointed him the Kepala Daerah of Gianjar. After the Japanese defeat, he became Foreign Minister in the first cabinet of the Dutch-sponsored state of East Indonesia. He served successively as the Deputy Prime Minister in the second cabinet, Minister of the Interior in the third, and Prime Minister in the fourth such cabinet. He was a founder of the BFO and the vice-chairman of its delegation to the Round Table Conference in The Hague.

⁶Mr. R. Djumhana Wirjaatmadja was born in Tjiandjur, West Java, in 1904. He obtained a law degree from Leiden University. He worked in the colonial civil service and was briefly a top leader of Jong Java. He rose to become Regent of Pandeglang, West Java. He served as Minister of the Interior in the Dutch-sponsored state of Pasundan. He was known to be sympathetic to the Republic.

been adopted by the Security Council; that the Dutch were carrying on a reign of terror in Jogjakarta; and that Mr. Masdulhak Nasution and Mr. Santoso, the husband of Mr. Maria Ulfah,⁷ had been shot.

I merely listened and took notes. Though I felt that not all of them were 100 per cent correct, yet certainly they contained an element of truth. Clearly, fresh developments had occurred, both in the Security Council and in the Indonesian states founded by the Dutch to counterbalance the Republic. Nonetheless, the reports spreading in Jogjakarta about arrests and resignations in these Dutch-created states probably represented a bit of wishful thinking. The news, however, strengthened my conviction that I should return to the Jogjakarta region after obtaining a general overview of the situation during the first weeks after the Dutch attack.

On December 31, 1948, we were at Medono. Pak Budiono,⁸ the Resident of Banjumas, had chosen this village as the "capital" of the Residency during the people's war. Previously, he had moved the seat of his administration to Bandjarnegara, after the original capital, Purwokerto, had been occupied by the Dutch after their first attack. Sumendro, the Regent of Wonosobo, was also at Medono.

I saw the wives of several pamong-pradja officials there too. They had obviously joined their husbands on evacuating the towns. No wonder there was a city flavor in the dishes served at dinner that night. Exactly at midnight on December 31, 1948, we drank a toast from glasses filled with *legèn* [unfermented palm sap] in place of champagne.

The atmosphere at this New Year's party at Medono exuded confidence and hope. Having observed the situation for the more than ten days following the Dutch attack on Jogjakarta, I personally believed that the Dutch did not have sufficient strength to crush us, though it was also true that we were still in no position to launch large-scale attacks on the towns, indeed we were still not even completely reorganized. Yet if the Dutch proved unable to crush us, eventually time would be on our side. Were the confidence and hope reflected on the faces of the others present based on similar calculations, or did their conviction of our ultimate victory have a deeper source? At Sitikan, a couple of days later, Ali Budiardjo⁹ explained that the year 1879 of the Javanese calendar, that is to say, between November 1948 and November 1949, was a year of calamity, but that in November 1949, i.e., the

⁷Mr. R. A. Maria Ulfah Santoso Wirodihardjo was born in Serang, West Java, in 1911. During the colonial and Japanese periods she worked in the civil administration and was active in nationalist women's organizations. She served as Minister of Social Affairs in the second and third Sjahrir cabinets.

⁸R. Budiono was born in Bodjonegoro, East Java, in 1905. He was educated at the Civil Service Academy and, during the Dutch and Japanese periods, had a successful career in the civil service. When the Revolution began, he became a member of the Central National Committee of Indonesia (KNIP), attached to the Prime Minister's office. After August 1946, he was Resident of Banjumas and later Governor of Central Java.

⁹Mr. M. Ali Budiardjo was born in Jogjakarta, Central Java, in 1913. Before and during the war, he worked for the government in a legal capacity. He served as the private secretary to Sutan Sjahrir during the latter's three administrations. Thereafter he joined the Republican delegation in negotiations with the Dutch. At the end of 1949, his sister married Simatupang.

beginning of the year 1880 of the Javanese calendar, the situation would improve. To what extent did this belief strengthen and encourage our people on the island of Java during the people's war against the Dutch?

Once, prior to the second Dutch attack, I had visited Pak Budiono and Sumendro at Wonosobo and Bandjarnegara. I think it was Sumendro who told me about a peculiar interpretation of Djojobojo's¹⁰ predictions then current among a number of "leaders" staying in the Wonosobo area. According to this interpretation, when the golden age was about to dawn, every "leader" would have two wives, that is, at least two. Accordingly, as Sumendro told it, the "leaders" in the area were rushing to take wives under the slogan: "Let's follow Djojobojo."

On January 1, we heard from one of the posts we passed through that Beel had made a speech stating that an agreement had been reached with all "member states" [*deelstaten*] except the Republic. Apparently the Dutch were trying to sell the idea that they had attacked the Republic on behalf of the member states. What was the real attitude of people in these member states, people like Adil, Anak Agung and the others? Beel reportedly had also said that the cease-fire had become effective on Java on December 31, 1948, and would be extended to Sumatra several days later. This was definitely nonsense, illogical. Who could be deceived by this statement? The outside world would certainly realize that it made no sense whatever. How could a cease-fire be declared unilaterally, in a situation where there was no clear demarcation line between the armies on each side? Well, we concluded, let the Dutch drown in their own lies.


On January 2, 1949, we arrived at Dempel in a mountainous area south of Wonosobo. Tobing and Amir Hamzah Siregar happened to be there. They were with a Siliwangi unit heading for West Java. Amir Hamzah was a former "Digulist."¹¹ During the Second World War, the Dutch had moved him to Australia, and he had only returned to Indonesia after the war was over. Recently he had become an assistant to the Information Staff of the Defense Ministry. His thinking was as clear and penetrating as ever, his heart as enthusiastic as always, but physically Amir Hamzah had been ruined by his internment. This, too, was for the sake of Indonesia's Independence.

At Dempel, I met Col. Bambang Sugeng. I learned that the town of Magelang had been abandoned after destruction of its main buildings. Later, I saw for myself that Magelang had probably been the most "perfectly" destroyed town at the time of the second Dutch attack, in line with our scorched-earth tactics. Generally speaking, all the plans laid down in advance had now been carried out; the command headquarters and fighting units now occupied the fall-back positions previously prepared. Some units had already moved "à la Wingate"¹² to regions earlier

¹⁰ Djojobojo was a twelfth-century ruler of Kediri to whom many millenarian prophecies are attributed by Javanese tradition.

¹¹ A "Digulist" is a former internee at the Dutch prison camp in Boven Digul, West Irian.

¹² The reference is to General Orde Wingate (1903-1944). This British Army officer won an initial reputation in Palestine in the mid-1930's when he helped to organize and lead guerrilla forces during the Arab revolt. He further showed his talents for unorthodox military operations in successfully leading Ethiopian and



evacuated under the Renville Agreement. Naturally, everything seemed somewhat confused at first, and psychologically it took time to adjust our thinking and way of life to the new circumstances. Nonetheless, gradually things began to run smoothly. I had got this same impression during my ten days of traveling. Now we headed back to Dekso.

While at Dempel something rather funny and strange happened. As we were resting in one of the houses there, we heard angry voices in the kitchen. Apparently our host was having a quarrel with his wife. In itself this was no surprise: Is there anyone who has never quarreled with his wife? What was strange was that they spoke in French. I could not judge whether it was good French or not, but they spoke it quickly and fluently. Later on we discovered that the family had lived for a long time as laborers in New Caledonia, a French colony. Who would have expected to hear a villager and his wife quarreling in French in the mountainous area south of Wonosobo?

We learned at Kalitengah that Harjono was looking for us and had left only the day before for Pandansari. Under circumstances where reliable news was rare and inadequate, the air was full of rumors. At Kalitengah, for example, we heard stories that the President and the ministers were in Djakarta and that they had been released by the Dutch. Was it possible that this news had been circulated in the towns by the Dutch themselves? Reports said that the Sultan had been offered the post of Recomba¹³ by the Dutch, but had refused it. Another rumor was going around that Tan Malaka¹⁴ planned to establish a new Republic. Hearing all these various rumors, I concluded that we must arrange for a systematic flow of information to the people.

Sudanese forces against the Italian occupying forces in Abyssinia in 1940-41. He reached the peak of his fame, however, by his command of a mixed brigade of British, Gurkha, and Burmese guerrillas, later known as the "Chindits" or "Wingate's Raiders" in Burma in the years 1942-44. Supplied from the air, his small force was able to penetrate and remain for weeks far behind Japanese lines, largely as a result of his flair for guerrilla warfare.

¹³ Recomba is an acronym for Regeringscommissaris voor Bestuursangelegenheden (Government Commissioner for Administrative Affairs). He was the chief official in the military government of the Dutch-sponsored states and directly responsible to the High Commissioner.

¹⁴ Sutan Ibrahim gelar Datuk Tan Malaka was born in Suliki, West Sumatra, probably in 1897. He was one of the most prominent of the early leaders of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). For a time he acted as Comintern representative for Southeast Asia. Because he actively opposed the decision to launch the 1926-27 communist insurrection in Indonesia, he fell out with other party leaders, being branded by them as a Trotskyite. After many years in exile, mainly in China, he returned to Indonesia clandestinely, in 1942, shortly after the Japanese attack. After the Proclamation of Independence, he led the Persatuan Perdjuangan, a coalition opposed to the Sjahrir-Amir governments. He was arrested in March 1946, but was released during the Madiun Affair in September 1948, in the hope that his supporters would then help the government to crush the orthodox communist leadership. After the second Dutch attack, he moved to East Java and apparently tried to rally resistance around himself by claiming that the Sukarno-Hatta leadership had betrayed the Republic. He was captured and shot by an Indonesian army unit in February 1949.

At Kalibaru, we met Lt. Col. Sarbini's staff. Lt. Col. Sarbini¹⁵ had charge of the Sub-Territory Command in the Residency of Kedu. From his staff, I learned that gradually the military and civilian organizations in the Kedu region had started to work again.

At Sitikan we met Ali Budiardjo. Ali had been in the delegation that had negotiated with the Dutch and the Three-State Commission prior to the Dutch attack. He had fled the town along with Suwarto¹⁶ and a number of members of the Student Brigade. The latter, however, went on to West Java, while Ali remained in Central Java. In Sitikan there was an emergency hospital with fairly complete equipment and staff. This hospital had been prepared some time before the beginning of the Dutch attack.

We left for Bopon to cross the main highway between Purwokerto and Magelang, but our military post there thought it better to wait a while, since the road still was considered unsafe. For several days, we reconnoitred around Siruho where Maj. Murdiman, the City Military Commander of Magelang, was staying with the local Regent. The latter, though an elderly man with white hair, had not hesitated to join in leading the people's war in his region. Since leaving Magelang, he had assumed the "nom-de-guerre" of Yudonegoro.

At Gedangan, we were visited by Lt. Col. Abimanju.¹⁷ He was on his way to West Java carrying a letter from Col. Nasution, the Java Army and Territory Commander, appointing him Commander of the Siliwangi Division. The news that Lt. Col. Daan Jahja had been captured was evidently now well known so that the Java Army and Territory Commander felt it necessary to designate a new commander, apparently not knowing that I had already appointed Lt. Col. Sadikin. As a result, throughout the people's war, there were two Siliwangi Commanders in West Java: Lt. Col. Sadikin, with headquarters in the Sumedang area, and Lt. Col. Abimanju with headquarters in the Tjirebon area. Only after the government's return to Jogjakarta was the problem of this double leadership settled.

On January 12, 1949, we arrived at Dekso via Bopon, Tjatjaban, and Argosari. Here we learned that Lt. Col. Sukanda, who had been the

¹⁵Sarbini had formerly been a Peta officer in Kedu. During the Revolution he became Regimental Commander in Magelang. In 1948, he headed the Kedu Sub-Territory Command and served as the Military Governor of Kedu during and after the Madiun Affair.

¹⁶Suwarto was born in Semarang, Central Java, in 1921. He studied at the Bandung Technical Faculty and on the eve of the war enrolled as a cadet at the Reserve Officers' Training School. During the Japanese occupation, he worked in judicial institutions in Magelang and Semarang. After the Proclamation of Independence, he was active in coordinating the various student military groups and became deputy commander of the students' military units in Jogjakarta which were incorporated into the Siliwangi Division after May 1948.

¹⁷Abimanju was born in 1919 and was a subordinate of Sudirman's in the Peta of the Banjumas area. Later he was Sudirman's first ADC when the latter became Panglima Besar. In 1946, he succeeded Bachrun as Commander of the Tjilatjap Regiment. After May 1946, he headed the Fifth Brigade of the Siliwangi Division, stationed in the Tjirebon area. In September 1948, he became Chief of Staff to the Military Governor of Surakarta and in 1949 he was attached to Java Command Headquarters in Jogjakarta.

senior officer in charge at the Java Command Headquarters at the time of the Dutch attack on Jogjakarta on December 19, 1948, had first assembled the staff of the Headquarters at Dekso, but, a few days prior to my arrival there, had then left for West Java along with Lt. Col. Suprajogi and Lt. Col. Dr. Rubijono. That night, over the jungle radio, news broadcasts by various stations gave us a rather complete picture of world developments with regard to the war in Indonesia.

At Dekso I heard that, on his way back from East Java, Col. Nasution had ordered his train to stop somewhere before Jogjakarta, since the Dutch were already there by then. Subsequently, he and the officers in his retinue, including Col. Dr. Mustopo,¹⁸ settled on the southern slope of Mount Merapi. As a result, it seemed in the beginning as if there were two Java Command Headquarters, one at Dekso under Lt. Col. Sukanda and another on the slope of Mount Merapi. Soon the problem was settled by denoting the headquarters at Dekso as an ordinary post under the Java Command Headquarters, one of many similar posts gradually increasing all across Java. I was able immediately to establish regular correspondence with the Java Army and Territory Commander through a courier.

We still had no definite news about Pak Dirman, but we did find out for certain that he had headed east, after initially going south at the time of the Dutch attack on Jogjakarta.

Communications with Sumatra still had not been reestablished, but some officers from the Signal Corps said they expected that before long it would be possible to send the first cables there. As a matter of fact, telecommunication with Sumatra was restored by the end of January, and after that we could send news via Sumatra to our representatives in New Delhi. Later on I learned that telecommunication between Sumatra and New Delhi always had to make use of an intermediary station, Rangoon, where the Burmese Army put a transmitter at the disposal of our men. During this period, Radio New Delhi frequently broadcast news items sent by us from Java; this naturally had a very favorable effect on our morale.

Communications with the city of Jogjakarta were also rapidly reestablished. On the second day after our return to Dekso, I was able to send a letter to Dr. Halim,¹⁹ who was in the city, and soon afterwards I received his answer.

So one could say that within approximately one month after the Dutch attack, we had restored our basic organization, though naturally on a different basis than when we were still in Jogjakarta. Our various headquarters which had once been in the cities were now in the

¹⁸Dr. R. Mustopo was born near Kediri, East Java, in 1913. He obtained a degree in dentistry before the war. During the Japanese occupation he became a high officer in the Peta. He was a leading figure in the defense of Surabaya against the British assault in November 1945. In March 1946, he was appointed to the Political Staff of the Ministry of Defense. He was subsequently active in the Biro Perdjuangan organized by Amir Sjarifuddin as a body to coordinate non-TNI paramilitary groups.

¹⁹Dr. Abdul Halim was born in Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, in 1911. He was graduated from the Djakarta Medical Faculty in 1940. A close friend of Sjahrir, he belonged to the fifteen-member Working Committee of the KNIP, formed in October 1945, which made possible Sjahrir's elevation to the Prime Ministership in November.

mountains in the regions of Menoreh, Mount Merapi, Mount Sumbing, Mount Lawu, Mount Kawi, and so on. Our troops were both in the mountains and in the plains around the occupied cities, and inside these cities, of course, we still had our organization. By establishing a system of couriers which gradually covered almost the whole area of Java, correspondence could be maintained regularly, though naturally rather slowly.

How did we evaluate our situation at this stage? Were we satisfied? Obviously not. We were aware that our situation was by no means perfect, but at least we could say that we had not been crushed nor could we be crushed. By making the best use of our time, we would be able to form an organization that could develop with ever increasing complexity within the limits of our capabilities.

As an example of the direction of our thinking in those days let me quote parts of my diary.

EVALUATION OF THE SITUATION AS OF DECEMBER 29, 1948

(Written at Kalibawang)

I. International intervention

Reports received on the international reaction to the Dutch aggression are still very limited. Several countries did take measures prior to the Security Council session. The following actions are known: India has banned Dutch aircraft from landing in its territory; Australia has boycotted Dutch ships; Egypt has closed the Suez Canal to Dutch ships; and the United States has suspended Marshall Plan aid to the Netherlands.

Meanwhile, according to the news, the Security Council has held a session at the request of the United States, and a cease-fire resolution has been adopted. The complete text of the resolution and its proper interpretation are by no means clear as yet. We only know that the Three-State Commission is searching for ways to implement it. It is not clear to what extent the resolution makes the Three-State Commission responsible for the realization of the cease-fire. It is also still not known to what extent the Security Council resolution has given us the right to demand the withdrawal of Dutch troops to a definite position.

The situation is certainly very complex. The Dutch have occupied the big towns throughout Java; practically speaking, all Regency capitals and probably most of the District capitals are occupied. Some of our troops have crossed the status quo line. How will it be possible, under such circumstances, to carry out the cease-fire order while maintaining conditions essential for the people's livelihood? The order can only be carried out if the Dutch troops are withdrawn, or if the Republican army is abolished. Unquestionably we are aiming at the former.

To achieve our objective, we need to make the following efforts: (1) the Indonesian problem should remain on the agenda of the Security Council and the United Nations; (2) sanctions and boycotts against the Dutch should be continued; (3) the influence of the United Nations and the Three-State Commission should be used to prevent the Dutch from expanding the deployment of their military forces in Indonesia (the presence in Indonesia of the Dutch Armed Forces will cost a great deal of money every day); and (4) we should rapidly improve our organization for waging a protracted and total people's war. The first three items are diplomatic problems, whereas the fourth is a domestic military-political-economic problem, which we must tackle with all the energy and strength at our disposal.

II. Improving our organization for a protracted total people's war

In our system a total people's war is based on two factors: the existence of a complete territorial organization in the political, economic, and military sense; and the existence of mobile units capable of launching limited as well as more extensive operations so as to shift the initiative into our hands.

The Security Council resolution is likely to slow down operations temporarily to a considerable extent. We should quickly avail ourselves of this opportunity to overcome the mistakes and shortcomings which have become obvious during these first weeks.

III. Territorial organization seen from the political-military-economic perspective

Without waiting for the reformation in a wider sense of the Staff of the Armed Forces and the Java Command Headquarters, the lower territorial organizations (the levels of Military Governor; Sub-Territory Command, covering a Residency; Military District Command, covering a Regency; Military Sub-District, covering a Sub-District; and the village) should be rapidly improved and strengthened, since these are the real foundations for carrying on our struggle.

In this respect priority should be given to organizations carrying out this territorial work. Experience so far has shown that the lurah are hardly aware of any leadership from the Military Sub-Districts.

Generally speaking, the lurah show great willingness and competence in performing their duties; nonetheless, clearly the lurah need to have a military man alongside, someone who knows something of the possibilities of utilizing village manpower in a people's war--for instance, maintenance of field security (including alarm-giving, collecting and transmitting news, counter-espionage, spreading rumors to deceive the enemy), destruction of roads, and so on. This military man must also be capable of training the village pemuda, of giving simple political information, and, together with the lurah, of supervising donations given by the village to our struggle. In other words, the presence of this military man should ensure the continued functioning of the village as a Republican village, even in the event that vertical communications links are broken or become considerably restricted.

As there are now a great number of military personnel with no definite duties, we should select some who, after being given instructions and brief training, can be assigned permanently to certain villages. At the Military Sub-District level, we should consider whether the personnel who have been assigned are really capable of discharging their duties. At the Military District Command level, a section may be established to unify the political nuclei in the Regency by forming a political front against the Dutch.

IV. Mobile units

So far we have apparently still not taken the initiative into our hands in a great number of regions. In addition to our defense and supply capabilities, both of which are the duties of the territorial organizations, we must also create a strike capability. This should be the task of more mobile units. The army can only maintain its popularity if mobile troops achieve some victories. We should, therefore, launch offensives continuously, whether major or minor.

On January 12, 1949, I went over a number of problems in my diary. First of all the social developments during the people's war are bringing the townspeople and villagers closer together. Will this trend contain the basis for closer links between village and town in the days to come, when the people's war is over? It would be very regrettable if this closer relationship were to be confined to the period of this people's war.

From the economic point of view, the present struggle is a contest between the urban economy and the village economy or, more broadly, the rural economy. If we are preparing to wage a protracted people's war, then we must consider more carefully and thoroughly what are the strengths and possibilities offered by the rural economy and the weaknesses (or the "Achilles heel") of the urban economy.

The political aspects touched on in my notes concerned the need to have an official leadership for the struggle in Java, one that would be representative vis-à-vis the government in Sumatra and, if necessary, vis-à-vis third parties in Java. What I had in mind was how to avoid any question about who were the competent people, in the event we in Java had to face some fundamental political decision.

Accordingly, in a cable to the government in Sumatra, I proposed establishing a Directorium in Java, whose members would consist of the Panglima Besar of the Armed Forces and the ministers active locally in the people's war, i.e., Ministers Supeno,²⁰ Maskur,²¹ Susanto,²² Kasimo,²³

²⁰Supeno was born in Tegal, Central Java, in 1916. On the eve of the Second World War, he was a nationalist student leader in Djakarta. During the occupation, he worked in the Department of Justice but was also a leading figure in semi-underground youth activities. Closely associated with Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin, he became an important member of the KNIP's Working Committee in October 1945. He was a top Socialist Party leader and took Sjahrir's side when the latter broke with Amir in the spring of 1948. He was Minister of Development and Youth in the Hatta cabinet.

²¹K. H. Maskur was born in Singosari, East Java, in 1899. He received a religious education in Java and became a religious teacher in Singosari. He was a leading figure in the traditionalist Islamic organization, Nahdatul Ulama. He served as Minister of Religion in the Amir and Hatta cabinets.

²²Mr. M. Susanto Tirtoprodjo was born in Surakarta, Central Java, in 1900. After obtaining his law degree from the University of Leiden in 1925, he worked in the colonial judiciary. He was active in the conservative nationalist political party, Parindra. In 1941, he was appointed Mayor of Madiun and continued in this post under the Japanese. Later he became, successively, Regent of Patjitan, Regent of Ponorogo, and, after the Proclamation of Independence, Resident of Madiun. He was Minister of Justice in the third Sjahrir, the Amir, and the Hatta cabinets.

²³Ignatius Josephus Kasimo was born in Jogjakarta, Central Java, in 1900. He worked in the civil bureaucracy under both the Dutch and Japanese regimes. He served in the Volksraad from 1931 to 1942 and was an active member of Catholic political organizations. He became First Deputy Minister of Prosperity in the Amir Cabinet and Minister of People's Food Supply in the Hatta cabinet. He was also a top leader of the Catholic Party. He sat on the Indonesian delegation in the talks with the Dutch.

and Sukiman.²⁴

The government in Sumatra believed that political power and military leadership should be kept separate and, therefore, disapproved the Panglima Besar's participation in the proposed body. Eventually on the basis of a decision by the government in Sumatra, a Central Government Commissariat in Java was formed.

Thus, the center of the government at that time was in Sumatra, only its "Commissariat" was in Java. While at Dekso (which lay quite close to the temples of Borobudur and Mendut), I noted jokingly: "Some scholars think that the temples of Borobudur and Mendut were built when the center of the government was in Sumatra, at the time when Sriwidjaja and Central Java were ruled by the Sailendra dynasty. Perhaps, now that the center of the government is in Sumatra, a new epoch of grandeur for our nation is about to begin."

In mid-January, I recorded the following conclusions in my diary:

After four weeks of fighting the extent of the influence exerted by international factors has become clear. We can also assess the strength and the determination of the Federalists as well as our own internal strength. But, taken together, these factors still cannot guarantee an early settlement of our dispute with the Dutch.

I noted that we faced three main problems:

1. How to make this people's war more effective, that is to say, more widespread and with more tangible results, including in relation to the international community.
2. How to make sure that we can wage a long war if it proves necessary.
3. How to create the conditions needed for national prosperity when the war eventually ends.

However, I also added to these notes that there was no need to discuss the third problem extensively for the time being.

²⁴Dr. H. Sukiman Wirjosandjojo was born near Surakarta, Central Java, probably in 1898. He obtained a medical degree from the University of Amsterdam in 1925 and during his study was active in the Perhimpunan Indonesia, serving as its chairman in 1924. On his return to Indonesia, he participated actively in Tjokroaminoto's modernist Islamic political party, the PSII, but later broke with the leadership and founded his own party, the PII (Indonesian Islamic Party). When the Revolution broke out, he was elected chairman of the largest Islamic party, the Masjumi. He served as Minister of the Interior in the Hatta cabinet.

CHAPTER IV

BANARAN

During the sessions of the Military Strategy Council in the months prior to the Dutch attack, I had argued that, in the event of an attack, the enemy would do their best to crush our forces in the first stages of the fighting. In the words of Clausewitz, the Dutch would attempt a rapid *Vernichtung* (annihilation) of our forces. For our part, we should first avoid this *Vernichtung* and thereafter try to exhaust the enemy and destroy his will to continue a long drawn-out struggle. The German military historian, Hans Delbrück, termed such a program an *Ermattung* (attrition) plan. To activate this strategy, I suggested that we form major and minor defense areas called *Wehrkreise*, each with the capability to continue the struggle even in total isolation. (A great number of German books on military theory were being studied by some of the officers in Jogjakarta in those days.)

From earlier conversations with the Dutch, it was clear that they (particularly their military men) did not understand the nature of the forces they were facing. They had adequate information on the strength of our army, i.e., our armaments, the disposition of our troops, the names and biographies of our commanders. This we knew from the NEFIS¹ reports which occasionally fell into our hands. Sometimes these NEFIS reports contained more complete information concerning our troops in different regions than was available to the leadership of our own Armed Forces. Apparently, however, the Dutch had not comprehended how the spirit of our people had changed since 1942, when the Japanese kicked the Dutch out of Indonesia. They could not understand the strength of the aspirations that constituted the driving force of our struggle, both among the members of the Armed Forces and among the general public.

It was difficult, of course, for these Dutch military men with their conventional military training to understand the forces they now faced. Many of them had served in the former Netherlands Indies for so long that they continued to view the new situation through their old spectacles. Obviously they had convinced the Dutch government that a surprise attack and the capture of the Republican political leaders would soon crush the Indonesian National Army, or at least force it to surrender. They apparently also believed that, once this was achieved, the outside world would allow them a free rein in Indonesia.

One month after the Dutch attack on Jogjakarta, we at Dekso concluded that, for us, the most critical phase of the war was over. We had managed to preserve ourselves from *Vernichtung*. However, we were not in a position to crush the Dutch military forces or drive them into the sea in the foreseeable future. My own observations over the past month confirmed this evaluation. In addition, two things strengthened my view; the first was something I learned from Lt. Col. Sudarto, the other something I saw and experienced myself.

¹NEFIS is an acronym for Netherlands Eastern Forces Intelligence Service.

At Banter, a short distance from Kenteng, there was a small Dutch post; its force amounted at most to one company. Sudarto said that we had already attacked this post three times using units from the vicinity of the post plus reinforcements brought in from elsewhere, including some from near Wates. Yet our efforts failed. This showed that we could not as yet seize or rout a fairly weak Dutch position, even by concentrating all the available troops for the attack. One could also say, however, that the Dutch did not gain much by retaining their post at Banter, since only a few hundred meters beyond it, our village administration could function normally and our military forces could be freely deployed.

The second thing I witnessed myself during a visit to the command of Lt. Col. Suhud on the western fringes of Jogjakarta. After evacuating the city, he had gathered some armed units together into a Wehrkreise. At the time of the Dutch attack, Suhud had not commanded any troops, since he held a position at the Ministry of Defense. At the very moment of my visit to the Wehrkreise--I still remember the date, January 28, 1949, since it was my twenty-ninth birthday--the Dutch attacked. They almost captured Suhud, Latif, and me, because we were busy talking in a kampung house when the shooting broke out. We only just managed to escape into a nearby corn field. Soon the shooting died down, and the Dutch troops apparently returned to the main road. Dozens of people had been wounded or killed and several homes had been burned by the enemy, including the one which had served as the headquarters for the Wehrkreise.

In spite of this, the Wehrkreise immediately resumed its operations after the "intermezzo" of the Dutch attack, launching small-scale night attacks on Dutch posts in the fringe areas. This experience demonstrated to me that a Dutch attack was incapable of destroying a Wehrkreise, even one which had only a small armed force as its nucleus and which functioned only a stone's throw from Jogjakarta--headquarters of the Tiger Brigade, the pride of the Dutch Army.

Given the existing circumstance of a military stand-off, in what direction would the situation now develop? The answer depended on three points: would the Dutch be able to increase their forces drastically in the coming months; would we be able to increase our own forces; and would international forces be able to exert a decisive influence on developments in Indonesia?

In view of these problems, we would have to pursue the following course in the coming months: first, to direct our efforts toward weakening the Dutch forces and preventing their reinforcement; to increase our own forces; and to work to ensure that international forces would exert an influence favorable to us. On the other side, the Dutch would undoubtedly pursue similar goals vis-à-vis the Republic.

To what extent would the Dutch be able to increase their forces drastically during the coming months? We at Dekso believed that the Dutch had been at the peak of their strength when they attacked us, and that they could not send many more fresh troops from the Netherlands, partly now that so many Asian countries had banned the Dutch from passing through them.

How far would it be possible for us to increase our own forces substantially in the near future? Our organization and work methods left considerable room for improvement, though, on Java, the instructions being issued by the Java Command Headquarters would gradually

bring about such improvements. Further experience and training would also increase our military skills. Fresh manpower could be mobilized, both from the villages and the towns, particularly among the students. The people's war could be extended gradually to those regions in Java and Sumatra which the Dutch now considered "secure." It was not impossible that, at some future date, the people's war could even be carried to other islands, in particular Sulawesi and Kalimantan. All this meant that there existed possibilities for us to increase our strength in the months and, if need be, the years to come.

Alongside these advantages, however, were factors detrimental to any fundamental increase in our strength, that is, fiscal, economic, and armaments problems. On an elementary level, we could finance the people's war by relying upon the economic capacities of the villages--for example, by collecting donations in the form of rice and so on. The long-range problem was more difficult, and sooner or later we would have to find ways of printing our own currency. More difficult still was the question of arms. We could build any number of small workshops for repairs, but the problem of how to import arms and ammunition from abroad seemed insoluble for the time being. Of course, there remained the possibilities of seizing arms from the enemy or buying them clandestinely in the occupied towns, but the latter would only be possible if the enemy troops became so demoralized that they would be willing to sell their arms. Furthermore, we would need money to buy them. In conclusion, though plenty of opportunity existed for gradually increasing our strength by improving our organization and methods of work, mobilizing fresh manpower, developing our skills through experience, and conducting intensive training, nonetheless the potential for any fundamental increase in our strength during the coming months was tightly restricted by financial, economic, and armaments factors.

To what extent would international forces have a decisive influence on developments in Indonesia in the near future? Before the second Dutch attack, our people had tended to overestimate the significance of the international factor, which we saw as being represented in our country by the Three-State Commission. We had calculated that it would be able to prevent the Dutch from carrying out their plan to attack us. After the Dutch assault on Jogjakarta, the concern of the outside world over developments in Indonesia, rather than declining, increased. The Asian nations convened a special conference in New Delhi to discuss what kinds of punitive steps they could take against the Dutch, and the Security Council discussed the Indonesian question on several occasions. It appeared that, in the following months, these international forces would continue to influence developments in Indonesia. As it seemed likely that neither we nor the Dutch would achieve a definitive military victory in the near future, it was not impossible that international developments would have a rather decisive influence upon events in Indonesia.

What could be accomplished by the Armed Forces Staff in the next few months? It seemed to me that the Armed Forces Staff needed to follow very carefully both military developments (our own and those of the Dutch) and the course of international politics, seeking to influence as far as possible events in the direction most favorable to our cause.

I asked Maj. Gani,² who was in charge of the Java Command Head-

²Abdul Gani Suradipura was born in Djatibarang, West Java, in 1920. During the occupation, he was a middle-ranking Peta officer and was stationed in his native

quarters post at Dekso, to locate a suitable place in the immediate surroundings which could serve as a permanent headquarters of the Armed Forces Staff for the duration of the people's war. From my first arrival at Dekso, on December 20, 1948, this region had attracted me as being eminently suitable for the kind of headquarters required by the type of war in which we were engaged. Surely it was no accident that Prince Diponegoro, during the last stages of his war against the Dutch, had lived in this same mountainous area, between the Progo River to the east and the Bogowonto River to the west. By setting up headquarters near Dekso we could also effectively use the Java Command Headquarters courier system, which had gradually achieved a capability to connect all commands on the island of Java, from the farthest point west to the farthest east. Because the area was quite close to Jogjakarta, a courier could get here from the city within a single day. This might prove of great significance later if we should need a continuous exchange of views with our men in the city on the further course of our struggle--for instance, in case of new developments in the international field. With the installation of a small transmitter, which Capt. Dartojo³ promised to attend to, radiograms could be relayed to the bigger transmitters at Wonosari and at Balong, on the slope of Mount Lawu. These transmitters could then relay the radiograms to Sumatra which could send them on to the outside world.

In mid-January, we left Dekso and went to the place Gani had selected. At first we followed the road to Samigaluh for half an hour. Then we crossed a small river. On the other side of the river, at the foot of some hills, was a cluster of houses. Harjono and some other officers took up residence here, and for several months these houses served as the headquarters of the Information Section of the Armed Forces Staff. From here, Harjono would issue communiqués, some of which would be disseminated via couriers in the cities of Jogjakarta and Djakarta and some broadcast by radio to Sumatra and New Delhi. Not far away, Dartojo had set up the small transmitter. Col. Wijono,⁴ who had fled the city along with a child still of primary school age, was staying nearby.

Pak Wijono had taught for a long time with the Taman Siswa school⁵

Tjirebon area. At the beginning of the Revolution, he headed the military police in the Second Division and later became Chief of Staff of the Tjirebon Regiment. Prior to the first Dutch attack, he was made Chief of Staff of the Fifth Brigade of the Siliwangi Division, and, during the attack, was attached to the brigade headed by Abimanju. After the Renville Agreement, he moved with the Siliwangi Division to Surakarta. During the second Dutch attack, he became Second Assistant to Nasution at the Java Command Headquarters and served as officer in charge of the command post at Dekso.

³Dartojo was born in Kebumen, Central Java, in 1917. He was a cadet at the Reserve Officers' Training School before the war. During the occupation, he was employed as a school teacher in Surakarta. After the Proclamation of Independence, he joined the TNI and specialized in communications. During the first Dutch attack, he had charge of communications at Supreme Headquarters, Jogjakarta, and, during the second attack, he performed the same function for Nasution's Java Command.

⁴Wijono was a top leader of the Socialist Party and a founding member of the BTI (Indonesian Peasant League). He sided with Sjahrir when the latter split with Amir Sjarifuddin.

⁵The Taman Siswa was a nationalist educational organization formed under the guidance of Ki Hadjar Dewantara in the 1920's.

system in various places, including Bali. Following the reorganization of the Armed Forces at the beginning of 1946, a new body, called the Army Political Education Staff (abbreviated in Indonesian as Pepolit) was formed under the leadership of Sukono Djojopratignjo,⁶ with the rank of Lieutenant General, and Wijono, Dr. Mustopo, Sumarsono,⁷ H. Farid Ma'ruf,⁸ Anwar Tjokroaminoto,⁹ and Kjai H. Mukti,¹⁰ each with the rank of Major General. None of them had had any previous military experience except Dr. Mustopo who had been a Daidanchō¹¹ during the Japanese period. The others owed their appointments to the suggestions of the political parties, some from parties of the "left," others from the Islamic parties. Pepolit was intended to educate the military on non-military matters, particularly those with political and social significance. The high rank accorded to these Pepolit officers, however, naturally provoked the envy of military men. Moreover, the Pepolit officers, in general, acted on the instructions of their respective parties, and as a result their activities created tension rather than serving any useful purpose. Sukono was later killed during the Madiun Affair while fighting on the side of the rebels; Sumarsono disappeared without a trace. The only person of that group who remained was Wijono, no longer as a member of Pepolit but serving as an information officer. His rank had been reduced to Colonel, doubtless as a result of a widespread feeling that all ranks in the Indonesian National Army should be reduced; at one point, no less than sixty generals wandered about in Jogjakarta every day, each with a yellow flag on his car, just like the Japanese generals during the occupation.

From Harjono's place, we still had to climb a steep path for three-quarters of an hour before we arrived at the place selected by Gani--the hamlet of Banaran, part of the village of Bandjarsari, in the district of Samigaluh. Our host was Karyoutomo, the head of the hamlet.

⁶Sukono Djojopratignjo, a former official in the Posts, Telegraph and Telephone Service, was a member of the Socialist Party (PS).

⁷Sumarsono was a prominent pemuda leader in Surabaya during the fighting there in the fall of 1945. He subsequently became a top leader of Pesindo (Indonesian Socialist Youth), the armed pemuda organization affiliated to the PS. He sided with Amir Sjarifuddin at the time of the split with Sjahrir and was among those most responsible for the outbreak of the Madiun Affair in September 1948.

⁸H. M. Farid Ma'ruf was born in Jogjakarta in 1908. After graduating from the Al-Azhar University in Cairo in 1932, he returned to Indonesia. He assumed a top position in the modernist Islamic organization, Muhammadiyah, and later in Sukiman's PII. He was a prominent member of the executive of the Masjumi, an Islamic federation sponsored by the Japanese; after the Revolution broke out he held a similar post in the Masjumi when it was reconstituted as a political party.

⁹R. M. Anwar Tjokroaminoto was born in Surabaya, East Java, in 1909, the son of the celebrated nationalist leader H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto. Before the war, he was active in his father's political party, the PSII, and also in journalism. He became a prominent pemuda leader during the period of the Proclamation of Independence. He was a member of Masjumi and served in the Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet as Minister of State without portfolio.

¹⁰Kjai Hadji Mukti was an important prewar leader of the Muhammadiyah and later of the wartime and postwar Masjumi.

¹¹Daidanchō is the Japanese title for a battalion commander.

(In 1951, two years after the recognition of sovereignty, we who had once been guests for several months at Banaran made a special trip from Djakarta to visit it again. On our return, Karyoutomo accompanied us on the plane to Djakarta. He was our guest in Djakarta for several days before going back to the people of Banaran. What tales he must have told them about our national capital!)

Karyoutomo also acted as our barber while we were at Banaran. Whenever my hair got too long, I would sit down on a bench in his *pendopo* [front porch for receiving guests] while he took his place beside me with his scissors. Each time the following exchange took place between us:

"Excuse me, Pak!"

"Ye-es."

"Excuse me, Pak!"

"Ye-es."

"Excuse me, Pak!"

"Ye-es."

Only after excusing himself three times would he start using his scissors. In Eastern culture, touching the head of a high-ranking person is not something to be taken lightly.

Banaran consisted of a few dozen scattered houses. The area was very hilly, with the houses in clusters, some on the tops of hills, others at their feet. The land was not very fertile. The rice harvest was never enough to feed the population throughout the year. Cassava, corn, breadfruit, and other crops supplemented the villagers' diet. Fortunately, we newcomers did not increase their burdens, because we could have foodstuffs brought in from more fertile regions, for example the rice fields around Nanggulan. We were told that the people of Banaran used to eke out their income by weaving, but since the Japanese occupation it had become very difficult to get the needed materials. The local youngsters attended the elementary school at Balong, not far from Banaran. Most spoke Indonesian fluently. These youngsters helped us considerably during our stay at Banaran; they took letters to and from Harjono's quarters and stood watch at night. Did they learn something useful while we were at Banaran? Some of us tried to teach them; Ali, for instance, gave English lessons. Whether any of this benefited them by reducing the backwardness and poverty of life in their village, I do not know.

Only a few of us lived at Banaran: Sasra, who acted as secretary, and his assistants; Ali Budiardjo, who advised on non-military matters; Mokoginta, who stayed a long time; Widya, who, aside from quoting learned passages from Lin Yu-tang, often had new ideas; Piet Sundoro, who looked after security and housekeeping matters; Suleiman alias Arselan, who served as my faithful adjutant throughout the people's war; plus a number of other officers, NCO's, and privates.

Usually we got up early in the morning along with the villagers, who had to leave for the rice fields or tend their livestock before the sun was up. Banaran had a few wells, but we preferred to bathe, wash our clothes, and so on in the river, even though this entailed clambering down a steep bank. After that we would discuss the situation in the light of the letters, radiograms, and newspapers we received as well as the radio broadcasts we monitored. Every morning also, Dartojo would send us transcriptions of broadcasts by the most important stations at home and overseas. Taking all of these into consideration,

we composed our letters, radiograms, or analyses. At times we had guests, some staying overnight, others only long enough to eat. I did not find it difficult to adapt to village life in the countryside of Central Java, for life there resembled, in broad outline, village life in Tapanuli. Although I had not been born and raised in a village environment, before going to school in Java I had often stayed in my family's home village at Laguboti during the long vacations.

Comparing the life styles and thought processes of the people in the *desa* [villages] of Central Java with those of the people in the *huta* [villages] of Tapanuli, I became increasingly convinced by the theory that Indonesia's ethnic groups had a common origin. Even some words are *almost* the same. *Manuk* in Javanese means bird. This is almost exact--in Batak, *manuk* means chicken. Houses in Central Javanese villages have earthen floors, while in the *huta* of Tapanuli, houses are built on stilts. But, on one of the bas-reliefs of the Borobudur, I once saw depicted a house built on stilts, not very different from the houses of the Batak and the Toradja. Presumably this type of house was common in Java when the Borobudur was built. But with the reduction of Java's forests--causing both a decline in wood supply and a decreased danger from wild animals--the Javanese gradually stopped building their homes on stilts. This was, of course, only my own theory.

Nevertheless, differences existed between the villagers in Central Java and those in the *huta* of Tapanuli, and more generally between their two societies as well. Probably the main cause of such differences was the long and deep influence of Indian civilization on Java; whereas in Tapanuli its influence was never very strong. If it is true that the influence of Indian civilization began to spread in the island of Java during the first century of the Christian era, then by the fall of Majapahit at the end of the fifteenth century, it had had ample opportunity to influence all aspects of community life on that island. The names now used in Java, for example, originate from India; yet there must originally have been indigenous Indonesian names in Java as well. Indian influence among other things created a rather strict system of stratification in Javanese society (although never as rigid or absolute as in India); in Tapanuli no such social hierarchy ever existed. So, on the island of Java, royal palaces and a princely culture appeared, and it penetrated downward into the population through aristocratic and *prijaji* groups who lived outside the village community. Tapanuli, on the other hand, prior to the establishment of Dutch rule at the beginning of the twentieth century, had no groups living outside the *huta*, nor any external power limiting local sovereignty. These factors taken together were bound to create differences in mentality.

From the tops of the hills around Banaran we had a view of the plain of Jogjakarta, guarded by Mount Merapi to the north and fenced by the Kidul mountain range to the south. Now and then, smoke billowed up from one of the dark green patches in the plain below. This indicated that a Dutch patrol was busy introducing "security and peace" to one of the villages. Perhaps Prince Diponegoro had also once surveyed the plain of Jogjakarta from the tops of these hills. Over there, to the south, at Imogiri, Sentot had surrendered. On the slopes of Mount Merapi to the north, on a certain ill-omened day, Kjai Modjo had been captured by the Dutch. Afterward only a few had remained with Prince Diponegoro, as he had roamed through this mountainous region before accepting General De Kock's proposal to open negotiations in Magelang. When the Prince rejected the Dutch terms, he was arrested despite the fact that he had come to the town as a guest at the invitation of the General.

At Banaran, our attention was concentrated at first on internal national developments. How to increase our ability to prolong, extend,

and intensify the people's war, militarily, politically, and economically. We were beginning to have a clearer picture of the situation of our ministers and leaders. The Dutch had interned President Sukarno, Hadji Agus Salim, and Sutan Sjahrir at Prapat. Vice-President Hatta was detained at Bangka, along with Ali Sastroamidjojo,¹² Mohammad Rum¹³ and others. Dr. Leimena was in Djakarta and Ir. Djuanda in Jogjakarta. We were not yet sure whether they had been put under city arrest or whether the Dutch had decided to leave them alone. Mr. Sjafrudin Prawiranegara was in Sumatra; he headed the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia together with a number of new ministers whom he had apparently appointed himself. In Java, Ministers Sukiman, Kasimo, Supeno, Susanto, and Maskur were outside the Dutch-occupied towns, but apparently these guerrilla ministers were not together in one place. Mr. Susanto and Supeno were in East Java, while Dr. Sukiman and Kasimo were in Central Java. Meanwhile, we were trying to think through the financial and economic problems arising from a protracted people's war, but we did not come to any satisfactory conclusions. During this period, I issued the Decree of the Armed Forces Chief of Staff on the Mobilization of Students.

Gradually developments in the international field demanded our increased attention. After the convening of the New Delhi Conference of Asian Nations, activity in the Security Council on the Indonesian question accelerated markedly. After that came new moves by the Dutch and the Three-State Commission. The impression that negotiations were unavoidable gradually materialized, both for us and for the Dutch. Were we prepared to face this eventuality? Could we just ignore the possibility of a future resumption of negotiations? Given international developments, such questions became more and more pressing with each passing day.

My diary reflects this growing concern with international developments:

January 12, 1949. The Conference of Asian Nations seems to be influencing attitudes among the Great Powers, including the United States.

January 15, 1949. It is possible that the United States, Cuba, Norway, and China will submit a draft resolution to the Security Council on the character and time-frame for a political solution in Indonesia.

¹²Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo was born near Magelang, Central Java, in 1903. He received a law degree from the University of Leiden in 1927. During his studies he was active in the Perhimpunan Indonesia, and on his return to Indonesia, in 1928, he joined Sukarno's PNI and later the Gerindo. He practiced law before the war, and served in the military administration during the occupation. He became Deputy Minister of Information in the Sukarno cabinet, Minister of Education in the Amir cabinet, and Minister of Education and Culture in the Hatta cabinet. In the last two cabinets, he represented the PNI.

¹³Mr. Mohammad Rum was born in Parakan, Central Java, in 1908. He obtained a law degree from the Djakarta Faculty of Law in 1939. He was a protégé of Hadji Agus Salim and was closely associated with the latter's political activities as well as his modernist Islamic propagandizing. Rum did not play a prominent role during the Japanese period but became an important leader of the postwar Masjumi. He was Minister of the Interior in the third Sjahrir and part of the term of the Amir cabinets. He was serving as chairman of the Indonesian delegation in Djakarta at the time of the second Dutch attack.

January 18, 1949. The Dutch report that the fighting has spread to East Java (Tretes, Prigen, Probolinggo) and West Java (Garut).

The United States, through a draft resolution to the Security Council, is apparently trying to stop the fighting and destruction in Indonesia. It is a two-pronged approach: using the influence of Sukarno and Hatta; and setting terms for a solution of the Indonesian dispute based on a Three-State Commission with expanded powers, a definite date for a transfer of sovereignty, general elections under UN supervision, and so on. As far as we know, the main points of the American plan are as follows:

1. immediate cessation of hostilities;
2. release and return to Jogjakarta of the captured leaders;
3. resumption of negotiations;
4. based on these negotiations, establishment of an interim government before mid-March;
5. subsequent determination of the Republic's territory by the Three-State Commission, which will have its jurisdiction extended to cover the whole territory of Indonesia and will have broader powers (not yet clear to what extent);
6. calling of general elections for October 1949;
7. transfer of sovereignty in April 1950.

This plan gives rise to various questions: How should a cessation of hostilities be arranged under existing conditions? If our leaders are released, will their position be that of "prominent personalities" (the Dutch concept) or of government authorities (our concept)? What will form the basis for negotiations? What powers will the interim government have? What position will the Dutch military forces have in relation to this interim government? What will be the status of the Indonesian National Army under such a government? In previous talks with Stikker,¹⁴ and later with Sassen,¹⁵ it was clear that problems relating to the position of the Dutch military forces and the Indonesian National Army during the transition period could not be resolved. The Dutch maintain that during the transition period their military forces must have free rein throughout Indonesia, since during this period the Netherlands will still be the legal sovereign. Our side argues that the Dutch military forces should be forbidden to take any action at all. We believe that during the transition period the Indonesian National Army, as the nucleus of the future national army for the whole of Indonesia, should be strengthened and perfected. But the Dutch evidently want the Indonesian National Army to be dissolved or "screened" during this period.

January 19, 1949. The most interesting events have been the arrival of Sutan Sjahrir in Djakarta from Prapat, where he has been interned with Bung Karno and Hadji Agus Salim, and his talks with Dr. Drees¹⁶ in Djakarta. It is not yet clear how these talks got started nor what their nature and substance were. Do the Dutch want to establish direct contact with the leaders of the Republic? All this is still an open question.

January 29, 1949. The resolution submitted by Cuba, the United States, China, and Norway was adopted by the Security Council on January 28, 1949. With its adoption by the Security Council, a new situation has arisen.

¹⁴Dirk Stikker was Foreign Minister of the Netherlands at the time of the second Dutch attack. He was chairman of the Party of Freedom and Democracy.

¹⁵Dr. E. M. J. A. Sassen was Minister for Overseas Territories at the time of the second Dutch attack. He was a member of the Catholic People's Party.

¹⁶Dr. Willem Drees was Prime Minister of the Netherlands at the time of the second Dutch attack. He was a member of the Labor Party.

If we reject the resolution, we have two alternatives. We can work for a new resolution more favorable to us, or we can completely ignore the Security Council in our further struggle, basing this struggle solely on the people's war--if possible (and this is quite speculative) with material aid from Asian and other countries (Russia).

The diplomatic influence of the Asian countries has already been exercised and it seems clear, therefore, that there is little possibility of getting the United Nations to adopt a new resolution, one more favorable to us. The present resolution probably represents the maximum which diplomacy within the United Nations can achieve at this time.

To reject the resolution therefore implies abandoning the diplomatic road of the United Nations and basing our calculations solely on armed struggle. This course of action has certain drawbacks. The possibilities for obtaining concrete material aid from Asian or other countries are not yet clear. The Dutch will certainly exploit the United Nations issue against us if we ignore it. At the same time, obviously, the implementation of the resolution is no easy matter; it is even possible that the question of a cease-fire and the problems inherent in an interim government may prove insoluble.

The Republic has probably no other alternative than to accept the Security Council resolution, even though we know that its implementation will be extremely difficult, perhaps even impossible. The question arises, will the Dutch accept the resolution? Be that as it may, in the event that the Republic accepts the resolution, we should speedily formulate our ideas on several problems:

1. The procedure for returning Jogjakarta to our side.
2. The procedure for the cease-fire.
3. The position of the Dutch military forces prior to the establishment of a United States of Indonesia.
4. The development of the Armed Forces of the United States of Indonesia and the role of the Indonesian National Army therein.

We should waste no time in beginning a serious analysis of these problems.

February 9, 1949. Ten days have passed since the adoption of the four countries' resolution by the Security Council, but still we have no definite news about its fate. From the start, we have assumed that the Dutch will evade the obligations imposed upon them by the resolution. According to reports received yesterday, Cochran, who is now in the Netherlands, was informed of the Dutch attitude during a reception given by Drees and Sassen.

Cochran will arrive in Djakarta this weekend. From the attitude taken by the Commission afterward, we should be able to guess the essence of the Dutch government's communication to Cochran concerning its position on the resolution. For our part, and notwithstanding the acceptance by the Security Council of the four countries' resolution, we should continue efforts to improve our organization and strengthen our forces in the people's war, pending a definitive solution acceptable to our side. Such a solution is evidently still a long way away.

February 14, 1949. Today Merle H. Cochran is expected to arrive in Djakarta. When hostilities opened on December 19, 1948, but before the exchange of notes between Bung Hatta and the Dutch through the intermediary of Cochran was broken off, the latter went to the United States. He apparently played an important role in the formulation of the Security Council resolution. With this resolution, the United States (represented by Cochran as before) is guaranteed a significant role in Indonesian developments during the coming months.

Cochran stopped in the Netherlands on his way back to Indonesia and met with the Queen and her government. After he left the Netherlands, political

problems arose there. Sassen resigned as Minister for the Colonies, and the possibility exists that the whole Dutch cabinet will do likewise.

Speculation suggests that, after staying in Djakarta for a couple of days, Cochran will go to Bangka to meet President Sukarno (in the meantime transferred there from Prapat by the Dutch) and Vice-President Hatta. Such speculation in itself shows the extent of Cochran's influence on developments in Indonesia. Our information on Cochran, though incomplete, does permit certain assessments. He is intelligent and quickly comprehends the essence of a situation. A shrewd man, he can choose the right moment for putting forward his proposals and adapt his manner of presentation to the personal characteristics of the prominent leaders with whom he is dealing. If necessary, he will bypass formal procedures. He is strong-willed and will work incessantly to achieve his aim. He is a realist.

Clearly, Cochran will play an important role in Indonesia during the coming months but, just as clearly, his task will be to safeguard the political objectives of the United States here. Hopefully, he will manage to accomplish his task in a not too unsympathetic manner. The political objectives of the United States with respect to Indonesia (as contained in the four countries' resolution) are: peace between the Republic (using the influence of Sukarno and Hatta) and the Dutch; and subsequent guarantees for the restoration of security and production in Indonesia.

Within limits, these do not conflict with our objectives and interests. However, dangers do exist of which we should take cognizance. If the political settlement leaves the Dutch with considerable power and influence in Indonesia, this will give rise to difficulties. If the political settlement leaves us too dependent on the United States, then we may be branded as American "puppets."

Though we cannot ignore the reality or importance of Cochran's (i.e., America's) role, we must constantly keep in mind and never give up our own objective: an independent Indonesia, self-reliant politically, economically, and militarily, and rooted in the energies and aspirations of its own people.

February 17, 1949. It is still hard to predict what will happen. The United States apparently intends to give the Dutch government a chance to convince the Dutch parliament that they have only two alternatives: to obey the Security Council resolution or to reach an agreement with the Republic directly. This supposition is supported by the postponement of the deadline from January 15 to March 1.

Here in Indonesia signs have appeared suggesting new developments within the BFO,¹⁷ a body uniting leaders from the Dutch-created states. The Representative of the Dutch Crown, Dr. Beel, has asked the BFO for its opinion on the Security Council resolution. According to reports from Djakarta, opinions within the BFO vary: some simply follow the Dutch line, some side more closely with the Republic, and others stand in the middle. Nonetheless, all this has apparently increased self-confidence in BFO circles and they now want to take the initiative, i.e., to present their own views to the Republic (Sukarno and Hatta) and also to convey proposals to the Dutch representative (Dr. Beel). This situation will lead to a sort of tug-of-war between the Republic and the Dutch, as each tries to win the BFO people over to its side.

Dr. Beel reportedly will draw up a "plan," on the basis of his talks with the BFO people, which he will then present to the Dutch government.

¹⁷ BFO stands for the Bijeenkomst voor Federaal Overleg (Federal Consultative Assembly) established in July 1948. It was a committee, under Dutch sponsorship, composed of representatives from the various Dutch-created federal units. Each unit had one vote in BFO decisions regardless of its size.

Perhaps we, too, will eventually try to work out a joint program with the BFO for use against the Dutch. Our policy toward the BFO is bound to include two often contradictory aspects. On the one hand, we are trying to win them over to our side against the Dutch, but, on the other hand, we cannot consider them as the representatives of the people living in their "States." Accordingly, a proposed policy toward the BFO people could be as follows: work together with them to end Dutch power and together with the people to determine the fate of the Dutch-created "States."

February 18, 1949. Col. Bambang Sugeng, the Military Governor of the area covering Jogjakarta, Kedu, Banjumas, Pekalongan, and part of Semarang (currently visiting the Jogjakarta region) has arrived and is spending the night at Banaran. Sugeng is an emotional person and won't be satisfied if Jogjakarta is merely "returned" to us one day. He believes it must be re-taken by force of arms. At the very least, he wants us to organize a large-scale attack on Jogja so that history will record that, even if the Dutch abandon Jogja, we did not receive it simply as an unearned gift. He believes we should show that we have the power to make the Dutch position in the city untenable.

I explained to him that, since the date and the procedure for the transfer of Jogjakarta have not yet been settled, we still have plenty of time to launch an attack on the city. Absolutely no ban whatever exists to prevent our taking the offensive, and, from the diplomatic angle, I believe that each spectacular attack will only strengthen our position. We also discussed the size of the forces Col. Sugeng could muster for this attack, his plans, and so forth.

February 21, 1949. The Dutch parliament has approved the policy of the Dutch government. In outline, it includes four basic points. First, Republican leaders will not be released, but they will be given the freedom necessary for the conduct of negotiations. In other words, the Dutch want to "negotiate" with people they hold in prison. Second, the Republic will not be restored to its previous position. Third, an interim government will be formed immediately, if necessary without the participation of the Republic. Fourth, sovereignty will be transferred as soon as possible, but with numerous conditions.

The Dutch have thus openly rejected the Security Council resolution and have decided to pursue an extremely unrealistic policy. Apparently the Dutch in The Hague still live in a dream world, in a bygone age when all matters involving the Indies could be resolved merely on the basis of negotiations between the political parties represented in the Dutch parliament. Apparently, they still have not woken up to the fact that they can no longer say to the Republic: "Over U, maar zonder U."¹⁸ (In other words, they can no longer make decisions about us without our approval.)

How much longer will it take for these "clever" Dutchmen to understand the reality of the Indonesian problem?

Approaching the end of February 1949, some two and one-half months after the Dutch attack on Jogjakarta, the situation has changed radically from that of the first weeks following the attack. During the first month after the onslaught, the Republic successfully avoided a Vernichtung, in the second month, international factors began to operate more clearly. The main objective of the Dutch battle plan--to destroy the military power of the Republic while ignoring the international factor in developments--has proved a complete failure.

Although the Dutch continue to close their eyes to the realities, the latter will eventually prove to be more powerful than Dutch wishful thinking.

¹⁸ Meaning: "About you, but without you."

The Dutch would apparently like to substitute their own plans for the Security Council resolution of January 28, 1949. But so long as the Republic does not accede to this, such plans will vanish without a trace. The Republic has enough winning cards.

Who is included in the term "Republic" as used in the context of recent international developments? This opens up a new issue. For Cochran, clearly, the Republic means Sukarno and Hatta, supported by the leaders now in Bangka and Djakarta; Cochran obviously influences the Three-State Commission, whose own position has been vastly strengthened by the Security Council resolution. Nothing indicates that Cochran intends to contact the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia, nor do our men in Bangka and Djakarta seem about to say: "We have no authority at present; please contact the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia."

Furthermore, it is becoming clear that the BFO, a coalition of political forces brought to life by the Dutch to counterbalance the power of the Republic, will also play a role in further developments. Its members will probably participate, in one way or another, in the negotiations.

Can we prevent developments of this kind? Certainly we could send a letter to our men in Jogjakarta, to be relayed to Djakarta and Bangka, stating that we will not recognize any agreements resulting from negotiations between them, the Three-State Commission, and the Dutch. We could also adopt an attitude of indifference--pretending that any negotiations between the Three-State Commission and our people in Bangka and Djakarta are non-existent. But there is a third option: We can transmit our views to the men in Bangka and Djakarta before they begin their negotiations so that our wishes and opinions will be taken into consideration.

These questions arose as it became clear to us at Banaran, that neither ourselves nor the Dutch could avoid negotiations for long. We felt deeply concerned about the need to answer these questions, for, if caution were not used, at some future date the forces led by the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia might come face-to-face with Sukarno and Hatta. Such a development would doubtless spread confusion and antagonism within our own ranks, allowing the Dutch merely to wait until we undermined each other's strength?

I personally did not feel that I could supply immediate answers to such questions. As Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces (in actuality, heading the Armed Forces Staff at that time), I felt that I could not simply sit still and await further developments. Towards the end of February, therefore, I began a month-long tour in order to observe the situation, to sense the atmosphere and mood in our ranks, to exchange views with the ministers who comprised the Central Government Commissariat for Java, and, as far as possible, to establish contact with the Panglima Besar and the more important commanders.

The first stage was from Banaran to Wonosari, where Minister Kasimo was known to be at that time. On the same day that I left Banaran, Dr. Beel left The Hague following his talks with the Dutch government. According to Dutch reports, Beel would announce a plan upon his arrival in Djakarta. Beel flew by plane from The Hague to Djakarta, while I went on foot from Banaran to Wonosari. He arrived in Djakarta and made the announcement of his plan a few days before I reached Wonosari. Figuratively as well as literally, we waged the people's war by standing and walking on our own feet.

CHAPTER V

WANDERING THROUGH JAVA

On February 25, I left Banaran along with Dartojo, Nurhadi, Muslimin, Suleiman alias Arselan, and a few others. Muslimin, as usual, carried a hunting rifle with him, while the rest had only pistols. Our proposed journey would be a "long" one, by the standard then prevailing: on foot from Banaran to Wonosari, in the southern part of the Jogjakarta region; from there to Mount Lawu, on the border between Surakarta and Madiun; and eventually back through the northern Surakarta and Jogjakarta regions. If at all possible, we hoped to meet Pak Dirman, who was reportedly in the Ponorogo area.

Our Territorial Organization was sufficiently coordinated by now so that we did not have to take anything with us except some clothes; everywhere, the organization would provide us with guides, porters for our luggage, beds, food, and, in unsafe areas, guards. The nucleus of this territorial organization in a given area was the local civil service administration and the military personnel stationed there permanently. If the enemy appeared, they would withdraw temporarily but would not leave the region. The Dutch planners probably only took into account the troops of the Indonesian National Army--and indeed the latter carried weapons considerably inferior to those of the Dutch. Had the Dutch in fact faced only the TNI, without the territorial organization which allowed it to move everywhere like "fish in water," then they might have achieved their goal of eliminating our army, as they estimated that they could do.

From Banaran we walked to Kenteng and then followed the main highway to Nanggulan and on to Wates. Pedestrians and bullock carts crowded the road. In the people's war, this had significance; empty roads usually meant that the enemy was operating in the vicinity. A great many women were walking northwards, stooped under the load of their wares. Perhaps they carried salt from the south coast to the mountain areas in the north. An economist would probably note that, after the occupation of the towns by the enemy, our economy had again become a village one. Life went on as though the towns did not exist. This proved that the struggle and the administration could be carried on for some time purely on the basis of the village economy, although, naturally, on a more simple basis than before.

Wates--which we reached about midday--had been destroyed in line with our scorched-earth tactics. All reasonably large buildings had been reduced to shambles, only half-ruined walls remained standing. A Dutch patrol, coming from the direction of Purworedjo, had happened on Wates. This had triggered the activation of the scorched-earth plans. The civil servants, military personnel, and police had removed their headquarters to the mountains several miles north of the town. Wates lies in the middle of a fertile lowland plain of ricefields and coconut trees.

Later in the afternoon, we reached Pandjatan, south of Wates. The Sub-District Chief and the Military Sub-District Commander welcomed us. They lived close to one another and administered the government,

justice, the economy, and the defense of this sub-district cooperatively. The Military Sub-District Commander was still quite young; he had just been graduated from the Military Academy in Jogjakarta when the Dutch attacked. The people's war gave considerably "autonomy" to the village, the sub-district (called a *panewon* in this area), and the regency. Each theoretically could function as a self-contained unit in matters of defense, administration, economy, and justice, even if completely isolated from outside contact.

The following day we crossed the Progo River at Brosot. The long bridge at Brosot had not yet collapsed, but its roadway had been destroyed and replaced by sparsely placed boards. We had to make big leaps from one board to the other to reach the other side of the river. We went through Srandakan and Kretek, where we crossed the Opak River and reached Srunggo. The soil here was as hard as coral. It is said that the Gunung Kidul lay at the bottom of the sea in the past and only later emerged above the surface as a barren coral mountain range. In this area, we found it more comfortable to walk in our shoes than in our bare feet.

At Srunggo, we spent the night with the Sutrisno Sudomos. When the Dutch had attacked, some of the evacuees had headed north to the slopes of Mount Merape. Some had moved westwards to the region around Dekso. Others, like the Sutrisno Sudomo family, had walked south to the Srunggo area.

The troops under the command of Brigade Commander Lt. Col. Suharto had by and large remained in the Jogjakarta plain, while a few operated on the fringes of the city. Subsequently, some were moved into "pockets" within the city itself. The Brigade Headquarters moved from place to place. I visited it once when it happened to be at Gamping, not far from the edge of the city.

Sutrisno Sudomo was the head of the Quartermaster General's department in the Ministry of Defense. He estimated that there were approximately 5,000 members of our armed forces in the Jogjakarta region alone and that, on the basis of calculations made before the Dutch attack, the maintenance expenses of these troops would require 25 million rupiah a month. The Ministry of Defense was at this time in no position to provide this monthly sum to each brigade and, in practice, each area would have to find its own resources.

Such autonomy and financial independence on the part of troops and regions is to be applauded in a people's war situation. But might it not become a "habit" hard to eliminate once life had returned to normal? According to Sutrisno Sudomo, efforts had begun to print banknotes in one of the villages south of Jogjakarta, but considerable difficulties remained. Even if a printing shop could be organized, its capacity would be inadequate to finance even one region.

The following day, on February 28, we reached a village named Banaran, close to Plajen. (In Java many villages are called Banaran, Kalibawang, etc.) A radio transmitter, previously kept at the AURI airfield near Wonosari, had just been moved to a place not far from Banaran. I learned from the Air Force officer who was our host that day that, aside from the transmitter at Wonosari, we had other powerful transmitters working in Kotaradja near Bukittinggi, in Bengkulu, in Pakanbaru, in Djambi, in Tandjungkarang, on Mount Lawu, and in Madiun. In addition, the Emergency Government also had a mobile transmitter. Most of these were AURI transmitters and, during the people's war,

AURI made a great contribution in establishing and maintaining radio communication.

From this same AURI officer, I got a transcript (taken from a monitored broadcast) of the Dutch proposal as announced in Djakarta. Although I had left Banaran on the same day Dr. Beel departed from The Hague, he had reached Djakarta long before I got to Wonosari. I studied the Dutch announcement. On March 12, that is to say in two weeks' time, they intended to open the Round Table Conference, in which representatives of Surinam and the Antilles would also participate. The "leaders" of the Republic would be invited to attend this conference, but without returning to Jogjakarta first. On May 1, the Dutch would surrender their authority, thus ushering in a period of transition.

This plan struck me as being nothing but an improvization. The Dutch still seemed under the illusion that the Indonesian problem could be solved by a "reconstitution" of the Dutch Kingdom. Their expressed intention of dragging Surinam and the Antilles into the proposed conference clearly demonstrated this outlook. They apparently still nursed the hope that eventually the leaders of the Republic could be absorbed into an interim government, and then the Dutch army could eliminate the TNI on behalf of and on the responsibility of this interim government. Presumably, the Dutch still believed that we would hesitate to reject their proposal because of the "threat" that the interim government would be formed anyway, but without the Republic. In my opinion, this Dutch proposal did not even merit our serious consideration. I set out these points in a radiogram, which I gave to the AURI officer for transmission to the Emergency Government.

On March 1, 1949, after passing through the Regency capital of Wonosari (already destroyed in line with our scorched-earth tactics), we arrived at Wiladek not far from Ngawen. Here we met Sumadi and Ir. Dipokusumo, who jointly headed the Information Staff of the Central Government Commissariat in Java. They were awaiting reports from Jogjakarta; on that very day, March 1, 1949, our troops were scheduled to launch an "SO," or Serangan Oemoem [General Assault], on the city. Bambang Sugeng and I had discussed this attack earlier at Banaran. Sumadi and Dipokusumo were all set to broadcast the news of this SO via the radio transmitter near Banaran to Sumatra and New Delhi, where it would be disseminated around the world. At this time, when the Dutch were acting so pigheadedly, the fairly sensational news item of a general assault on Jogjakarta was bound to have a very favorable effect.

Several months later, when I sat at the conference table in The Hague face to face with Maj. Gen. van Langen, who had been the Dutch commander in Jogjakarta at the time of the SO on March 1, I heard the term SO used several times as an abbreviation for *Souvereiniteits-overdracht*, meaning "transfer of sovereignty." At that time, we were discussing the withdrawal of the Dutch Armed Forces from Indonesia following the SO, i.e., following the transfer of sovereignty. This reminded me of March 1, when we waited at Wiladek in a state of great tension to hear reports of the SO on Jogjakarta.

"Do you know what SO meant to us when we faced you outside the conference room?" I asked Gen. van Langen. When I explained, using the example of the general assault on Jogjakarta, the General just smiled.

At Wiladek I managed to have a talk with Sudiro,¹ the Resident of Surakarta, who, alone with his staff, appeared to be "taking a break" here in the Jogjakarta area. Or perhaps Wiladek belongs to the Mangkunegaran enclave like Ngawen? I do not know. Resident Sudiro filled me in on the situation in Surakarta. In Jogjakarta, the Sultan's attitude served as a powerful example for everyone, whether military man, civil servant, pemuda, schoolboy or villager. Everywhere in the Jogjakarta region, stories circulated about the Sultan's rejection of Dutch offers and about his defiant manner when receiving Dutch delegations. One could not always tell what had really happened and what was popular imagination. But true or not, the stories were beneficial for our struggle, and no doubt they also contained a core of truth.

From my talks with Resident Sudiro, I got the impression that the situation in Surakarta was very different. The Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro² had, from our point of view, taken a rather ambiguous position, and this had apparently caused real problems outside the city. At the very least, one could say that the atmosphere in Surakarta was not as harmonious as that in Jogjakarta. I then remembered that, almost 200 years earlier, in 1755, the Dutch had also managed to take advantage of conflicts between Jogjakarta and Surakarta and impose the Treaty of Gianti which divided the Kingdom of Mataram into two parts, Jogjakarta and Surakarta. The Dutch called this an *Evenwichtspolitiek*, a policy of building up counterbalancing or rival powers against every adversary. Even now, they pursued this policy. They had created the BFO as a counterbalancing force against the Republic. Was Surakarta being prepared as a counterbalancing force against Jogjakarta? Even though the Dutch jackal was old and toothless, its characteristic cunning had not changed.

At Ngawen, I had long discussions with Minister Kasimo, who was living there together with Maj. Gen. Suharjo,³ Prawoto Mangkusasmito,⁴

¹Sudiro was born in Jogjakarta, Central Java, in 1912. During the Dutch period, he was active in the Taman Siswa nationalist school system. Under the Japanese, he became Deputy Chief of the Barison Pelopor (Vanguard Corps), the activist arm of the Japanese-sponsored mass organization Djawa Hökōkai. In the early Revolutionary period, he was prominent in the PNI and helped lead the Barisan Banteng (Wild Buffalo Corps), a paramilitary organization which grew out of the remnants of the Barisan Pelopor. After July 1946 he became Deputy Resident and then Resident of Surakarta and later, in 1949, Resident of Madiun.

²The Susuhunan, Paku Buwono XII, was a young man who had only ascended the throne of Surakarta in 1944. Mangkunegoro VIII ruled the small Mangkunegaran principality in the Surakarta area. Like the Susuhunan, he was a young man and had only succeeded to the throne in 1944.

³Suhardjo Hardjowardojo was born in Surakarta, Central Java, in 1901. He received military training and served in the Mangkunegaran Legion with the rank of captain. Just prior to the war, he moved to Lampung, and, during the occupation, served as Chief of Police for Tandjung Karang. After the Proclamation of Independence, he was assigned to head the Sumatra Command with headquarters in Bukittinggi. Just before the second Dutch action, he was transferred to Jogjakarta to become Inspector-General at the Ministry of Defense.

⁴Mohammad Prawoto Mangkusasmito was born near Magelang, Central Java, in 1910. He studied for four years at the Faculty of Law in Djakarta but did not gain his degree. He became a schoolteacher and was active in nationalist and modernist Islamic groups such as Jong Java, Indonesia Muda, and the Jong Islamieten Bond. In 1940, he

R. P. Suroso,⁵ and Zainul Arifin.⁶ Minister Kasimo was then Minister of People's Food Supply. Pak Hardjo, after his replacement by Col. Hidajat as Commander in Sumatra, had been appointed Inspector-General at the Ministry of Defense, while Prawoto and Zainul Arifin were members of the Working Committee of the KNIP.⁷ Pak Suroso was at that time a senior official in the Ministry of the Interior. During the Volksraad⁸ period, he had already been one of our veteran champions.

They happened to be in Surakarta on December 19, 1948. When the Dutch attacked, they left the city and stayed for a while on the slopes of Mount Lawu, not far from Military Governor Subroto's⁹ group. Later they left, crossed the main highway between Surakarta and Patjitan, and for some time now had camped in the area around Ngawen. During my stay with this group, I noticed that the people who worked most actively to maintain contact with the military for the sake of the group's security were Pak Hardjo and Zainul Arifin, the former Commander of the Hizbullah. Perhaps some of the troops in this region consisted of former members of Hizbullah.

joined Sukiman's PII and became one of its top leaders. Both before and during the war, he was active in the Muhammadiyah. After the Proclamation of Independence, he became an important leader of Masjumi and served on the KNIP Working Committee, eventually becoming its chairman.

⁵R. P. Suroso was born in Porong, East Java, in 1893. He was one of the most prominent Indonesian civil servants of his generation. He was a long-time member of the Volksraad and, at various times, active in the Sarekat Islam and the Parindra. During the occupation, he was Resident of Kedu. After the Proclamation of Independence, he served briefly as Governor of Central Java before being replaced by Wongsonegoro and transferred to be Government High Commissioner for the four principalities of Central Java.

⁶Hadji Zainul Arifin was born in Baros, Tapanuli, in 1909. He received a religious education and, during the colonial period, worked in the Djakarta municipal administration. He was active in the Nahdatul Ulama, and, under the Japanese, became a leading figure of the Masjumi federation. During the Revolution, he headed the Hizbullah, a cluster of Islamic-oriented paramilitary organizations which, in 1948, were partly incorporated into the TNI. He was a member of the KNIP Working Committee and then of the Central Government Commissariat staff after the second Dutch attack.

⁷KNIP, the Central Indonesian National Committee, was a quasi-legislative body appointed by Sukarno and Hatta in consultation with leading Djakarta political figures in late August 1945. The Working Committee was a small standing body of the KNIP, established in late October 1945, to conduct business when its parent body was in recess, as was generally the case. Consequently, real power in the KNIP rested with the Working Committee.

⁸The Volksraad was the largely powerless quasi-legislative council of the Dutch colonial period.

⁹Gatot Subroto was born near Purwokerto, Central Java, in 1909. He was a long-time veteran of the Dutch colonial army, and, in the Japanese period, became a senior Peta officer. From 1945 to 1948, he commanded the Second Division in the Purwokerto area. In 1948, he was made head of the Military Police, and, during the disturbances leading up to the Madiun Affair, was appointed Military Governor of Surakarta. During the second Dutch action, he was again placed in charge of the Second Division.

I heard another story from them about something that happened when Minister Kasimo and his retinue were crossing the main highway between Surakarta and Patjitan in the dead of the night. As they crossed the road, Pak Suroso, who was already quite old and ill, fell into a rather deep ditch. Without panicking, he got up again and continued on his way--or so he thought. Without realizing it, however, he had turned 180 degrees in the opposite direction when he fell into the ditch. So when he got up from his fall, he actually walked back in the direction from which he had come. He was quite astonished when he arrived at a village he knew very well, the same village from which his group had started out. "Why, here I am back again," was all he said. I did not know whether to laugh or not when I heard this story. It sounded funny, but I was also moved on hearing about this ailing old man's experience in the people's war. After the Dutch left Jogjakarta, he had had to be hospitalized for some time.

Prawoto is a very calm person. I cannot imagine him getting angry, irritated, or impatient. When we discussed the attitude of the people in the people's war, he said: "The people accept this war the way they accept natural disasters. It's something inevitable, but also, like a natural disaster, something which will run its course in time." I asked myself: "Is this also Prawoto's personal point of view?"

Minister Kasimo was formerly well known as a Catholic representative to the Volksraad, so he, too, belonged to the "veterans" group, by the standards of the people's war. He was, however, much younger than Pak Suroso. Long after saying goodbye to Pak Kasimo, I still remembered vividly his simple words on that occasion: "God bless you." Though ordinary words, commonly used at times of parting, somehow they made a deep impression on me at that moment.

When Minister Kasimo's group left Surakarta and first arrived in the Ngawen region, Dr. Sukiman, then Minister of the Interior, had accompanied them. But later, he had gone back into the city and never returned.

Minister Kasimo had had no contact with Ministers Susanto and Supeno, who were reportedly in East Java together with Miss Susilowati,¹⁰ a member of the KNIP Working Committee. Nor had there been any contact with Minister Maskur. The so-called Central Government Commissariat in Java consisted, in fact, of ministers who never met. I stayed with Kasimo's party for two days. It seemed to me that under present circumstances Minister Kasimo and the others were in no position to give practical leadership; their presence here, however, at least gave the impression that the government remained intact and in the midst of the people and the army in their struggle. This was a very important factor, both for now as well as for the future.

I did not discuss directly with Minister Kasimo what position we should take if talks were held in Djakarta between the Three-State Commission and our leaders in Bangka, even though the Emergency Government, in fact, now led the struggle and ran the administration. Even so, I had the impression that, if Sukarno and Hatta concluded an agreement, the Central Government Commissariat in Java would feel compelled to accept it. Everywhere on my journey, the sentiment was the same:

¹⁰Susilowati was born in Djember, East Java, in 1913. She was prominent in the Taman Siswa and in the women's education movement. She was elected to the KNIP Working Committee in November 1945. She was generally regarded as close to Sjahrir.

if Sukarno and Hatta made an agreement, it would be considered as binding, even if they were in Bangka at the time.

At Ngawen, I also met Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo.¹¹ He represented a very different type from his party colleague Prawoto Mangkusasmito. Mr. Kasman could not stay calm and quiet; he had to keep moving. He had been in the Bodjonegoro area at the onset of the Dutch attack. Subsequently, he had moved all over the place, to Madiun, to Ponorogo, to the Semarang area, and now here. He would continue moving to other regions. According to his own calculations, he had covered 1,000 kilometers since the Dutch attack, mainly on foot.

I heard a lot from Mr. Kasman about his experiences and his assessment of the situation and the authorities in the regions he had visited. In his opinion, the cooperation in Bodjonegoro between Umar Djoy,¹² the Sub-Territory Commander, Mr. Manu,¹³ the Resident, and Lt. Col. Sudirman,¹⁴ the Brigade Commander, was good. They had a radio transmitter, and the food supply was adequate. The Regents carried out their tasks from outside the town. Pati, on the other hand, had been completely abandoned by civilians as well as by the military. Maj. Ali Machmudi¹⁵ was in the Mount Muria region, Col. Sunarto¹⁶ in

¹¹Mr. R. Kasman Singodimedjo was born near Purworedjo, Central Java, in 1908. He received his law degree from the Djakarta Law Faculty in 1939. Before the war, he first taught in various modernist Islamic schools but eventually joined the government agricultural service. He was active in Jong Java, became chairman of the modernist Islamic Jong Islamieten Bond from 1929 to 1935 and was chairman of the Djakarta branch of Muhammadiyah from 1939 to 1941. During the occupation, he joined the Peta and became the senior officer in the Djakarta area. After the Proclamation of Independence, he was for a short time chairman of the KNIP and later Attorney-General. He was concurrently a top leader of the postwar Masjumi. He served for a short time as Deputy Minister of Justice in the Amir cabinet and was adviser to the Republican delegation to the Round Table Conference.

¹²Umar Djoy was Chief of Staff of the Third Division in Jogjakarta in 1946 but was later dismissed from this post as a result of his involvement in the July 3, 1946 Affair.

¹³Mr. Tandiono Manu was born in Banjuwangi, East Java, in 1913. He obtained a law degree from the Djakarta Law Faculty in 1941. Before the war, he was active in the nationalist organizations Jong Java and Indonesia Muda. During the occupation, he worked in the judiciary of the military administration. When the Revolution began, he became a judge in Jogjakarta. He was later appointed Resident of Bodjonegoro, East Java, in 1947. He was a member of the Socialist Party.

¹⁴This Sudirman was born near Bodjonegoro, East Java, in 1913. He attended a teachers' college and, after 1931, became an elementary school instructor. During the Japanese period, he was a high-ranking Peta officer in his home district. After the Revolution broke out, he became, successively, battalion, regiment, and brigade commander in Bodjonegoro.

¹⁵Ali Machmudi was a battalion commander in Bodjonegoro in 1946-47 under Lt. Col. Sudirman.

¹⁶Sunarto Kusumodirdjo was a platoon commander in the Peta in the Surakarta area. After the Proclamation, he became commander of the Second Regiment in Surakarta. He commanded the Semarang front prior to the first Dutch attack and represented the Indonesian army in local cease-fire arrangements for the Semarang area. After the May 1948 rationalization of the Army, he became the first commander of the Surakarta Sub-Territory.

Sragen, and Maj. Munadi¹⁷ at Djepara. The train service still operated in the region controlled by us around Kradenan. In Madiun, the situation was not so favorable, as we had only a few troops there. To the east, there was the Police Mobile Brigade, Sukowati's¹⁸ troops were operating to the west, and the people's guerrilla movement was active around Ponorogo.

Mr. Kasman had met Col. Bambang Supeno¹⁹ in a village near Madiun. He said that Supeno was busy drawing up guidelines for Military Sub-District Commands and village cadres. In Magetan, Sarangan, and Plaosan, there were no Dutch troops and our administration was in the hands of the Military Regent and the Military District Chiefs. Resident Ardiwinangun²⁰ wanted Madiun to be transferred to the territory of the First Military Governor (East Java), Col. Sungkono,²¹ i.e., to be removed from the jurisdiction of the Second Military Governor (Eastern Central Java), Col. Gatot Subroto. Mr. Kasman had met Governor Murdjani²² in Kediri. There was a transmitter at Sarangan under the

¹⁷Munadi was battalion commander in Rembang, Central Java, from 1945 through 1947. At the time of the second Dutch attack, he headed the Pati Sub-Territory under Gatot Subroto's command.

¹⁸Suprpto Sukowati was born in Sragen, Central Java, in 1923. During the occupation, he served as a middle-ranking Peta officer in Madiun. He commanded the Ponorogo battalion from 1945 to 1947. From 1948 to 1949, he commanded first the Maospati Battalion and then the Eighteenth Brigade in the Madiun area. He took an active part in the Madiun Affair on the government's side and, in January 1949, succeeded Suadi as commander of Wehrkreise II, Madiun.

¹⁹Bambang Supeno was born in Kepandjen, East Java, in 1924. During the occupation, he was a lower-ranking Peta officer. In the early Revolution, he commanded the military police in the Malang area; by 1948, he had risen to become Commander of the Seventh Division in that same region. Subsequently, in 1949, he became Chief of Staff of the Java Command.

²⁰M. Ardiwinangun was born near Tasikmalaja, West Java, in 1900. He was graduated from the Civil Service Academy in 1921. During the colonial and occupation eras, he rose steadily up the civil service hierarchy, becoming Patih of Indramaju and then Bupati of Tjiamis (during the Japanese period). After the Proclamation of Independence, he became Resident of Priangan. In July 1947, he was appointed Minister of Social Affairs for the Pasundan state, but soon resigned. At the time of the Madiun Affair he was transferred to become Resident of Madiun.

²¹Sungkono served in the Dutch colonial navy before the war, and was involved in the well-known mutiny on the *Zeven Provinciën*. During the occupation, he became a senior Peta officer in Surabaya and took an active role in the fighting against the British in that city in the fall of 1945. After the May 1946 Army reorganization, he became Commander of the Sixth Division, covering the Kediri-Surabaya-Madiun region. During the Madiun Affair, he was appointed commander of all Republican forces in East Java, and later became the first Commander of the Brawidjaja Division after its formation on December 17, 1948.

²²Dr. Murdjani was born in Tulungagung, East Java, in 1905. He was graduated from the Djakarta Medical Faculty in 1930. During the colonial period, he was active in Jong Java, Indonesia Muda, the Jong Islamieten Bond, Dr. Sutomo's PBI, and the Parindra in West Java. Under the Japanese regime, he headed the Putera nationalist organization for Priangan and held a middle-ranking civil service post in Indramaju. After the Revolution began, he rose rapidly in the civil administration, becoming Resident of Indramaju, Governor of West Java, and, in 1947, Governor of East Java. In February 1949, the Dutch captured him.

control of Dul Arnowo.²³ The forces actively fighting around Semarang consisted of troops under the command of Sudiarto.²⁴

I listened attentively to Mr. Kasman's reports since I would probably not have the time during the people's war to visit these regions myself. I got basically the same picture from his stories as I had from my own observations in Kedu, Jogjakarta, and Surakarta. The Dutch occupied the cities, but, outside, our army and administration continued to function actively.

We stayed for several days at Gelaran as the guests of Maj. Hadjid, the Military Regional Commander. The Mount Kidul region has one peculiarity--rivers which all of a sudden disappear, flow several miles underground, only to come up again as ordinary rivers. The rice crop is inadequate for the people's needs, but they also grow many kinds of beans, corn, and cassava.

During our stay at Gelaran, the radio broadcast the refusal of the Republic--meaning, apparently, our leaders in Bangka and Djakarta--to attend the Round Table Conference proposed by the Dutch. The Three-State Commission, now called the UN Commission for Indonesia [UNCI], also published its report on the Indonesian situation. It was very unfavorable to the Dutch. The report stressed, among other things, that the Dutch were in no position to control events in Indonesia. Widespread reports of the assault on Jogjakarta had succeeded in changing the general view of the real situation. The Government of the State of East Indonesia appeared also to have read the signs of the times; it announced that it would reconsider its position. All this gave us at Gelaran the impression that the situation in Djakarta could develop very rapidly in the coming weeks. The Dutch would be unable to maintain their present attitude; our leaders in Bangka and Djakarta would agree to negotiate; and gradually Mr. Cochran would succeed in bringing the Dutch position closer to ours.

From Capt. Tjokropranolo, one of the officers accompanying Pak Dirman, I received further information on Pak Dirman's experiences after his departure from Jogjakarta. Pak Dirman had been in the Ponorogo area when Tjokropranolo left him on orders to go to Jogjakarta.

On March 10, we left the Kidul mountains. On precisely that day, the Dutch attacked Wonosari. Early in the morning, I witnessed from Gelaran a kind of repeat performance of the Dutch attack of December 19, 1948 on Jogjakarta. I saw with my own eyes at least 27 aircraft

²³Dul Arnowo was a journalist before the war and active in nationalist politics. After a brief imprisonment by the Japanese, he became head of the Surabaya Hökōkai branch. When the Revolution began, he became the first chairman of the Surabaya KNI. He was elected to the KNIP Working Committee in December 1945 as representative for East Java. He subsequently became a senior adviser to Surjo, Governor of East Java from 1946 to 1948. During the second Dutch attack, he was captured.

²⁴S. Sudiarto was a former Peta officer from the Semarang area. In 1946, he commanded a regiment in the Kendal-Purwodadi region of Central Java. After the rationalization of May 1948, he was placed in charge of the Sixth Brigade. He was involved, on the losing side, in the Madiun Affair and was captured and imprisoned. He was released after the second Dutch attack and took an active part in guerrilla operations against the Dutch. He was reinstated in the army and, in January 1949, was appointed commander of Wehrkreise III, Semarang. In May 1949, he resumed command of the Sixth Brigade.

in the sky--three bombers, six fighters, and eighteen transport planes. Apparently, the Dutch believed that the troops which had attacked Jogjakarta on March 1 had their headquarters or base at Wonosari. I shrugged my shoulders as I watched; I had already seen for myself that Wonosari was an abandoned town, almost completely destroyed as part of our scorched-earth tactics. The more spread out the Dutch forces, the better for us, I thought.


It was mainly the common people who suffered from such Dutch attacks. All along the way from Gelaran to Ngawen and on to Tjandiroto, that day, there were casualties among the people who had been strafed from the air. In some places where markets were crowded at the time of the raids, the casualty figures were quite high. Did the Dutch hope systematically to demoralize the people? In general, however, the spirit of the people seemed quite unbroken. Once, at Ngawen, we took shelter for some moments from the planes haphazardly strafing us from above; a policeman who happened to be with us told me that, according to the old prophecies, the history of the Dutch in Indonesia was near its end. I had heard these predictions everywhere, and I began to be influenced by them myself.

We arrived in the Surakarta area on March 11. In Seban, the first village we stopped at, Suleiman told me that the local population spoke with a different accent, one more refined than that of the Jogjakarta region. Personally, I could not tell whether this was true. From the first days of my stay in the Surakarta area, however, I could feel a difference in the atmosphere of the struggle from that in Jogjakarta. The situation here was far more complicated. Was there perhaps some connection between this more complicated situation and the more refined language described by Suleiman? It was not impossible; a more refined language would seem to reflect a spirit more cautious, less determined, and less inclined to adopt a firm attitude--precisely the main difference between the situation in Jogjakarta and in Surakarta. In Jogjakarta, the Sultan had publicly refused Dutch offers, and privately he had firmly supported and helped our struggle. The entire civil service and the people in that region had followed his example. In Surakarta, the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegoro had adopted a more "refined" attitude, and the civil service, naturally, had followed suit. In Jogjakarta all the Regents fought outside the Dutch-occupied towns, but, here in Surakarta, it was said that newly appointed Regents lived in places occupied by the Dutch, such as Klaten and Wonogiri, while our Regents continued their struggle outside these towns.

Before crossing the main road between Surakarta and Patjitan, I saw Lt. Col. Mursito,²⁵ Commander of the Military Sub-Territory of Surakarta. I also managed to have a rather long talk with Ir. Sanusi and Slamet, Commander of the Military Sub-District of Tjawas. Sanusi lived at Bajat together with the Commander of the Military District of Klaten. The Bajat region is historically famous as the main center for the early dissemination of Islam in the southern part of Central Java. Ever since, the region has been a "green" district--meaning that devout Muslims have very great influence there. During the people's war, this region had a uniqueness of its own--a large group of students and professors who had fled Jogjakarta and Klaten when the Dutch attacked. Ir. Sanusi and I discussed the possibility of mobilizing the students

²⁵ Mursito was made Deputy Commander of the Fourth Division (Senopati) on its formation in mid-1946. On the outbreak of the second Dutch attack, he was made Commander of the Surakarta Sub-Territory under Gatot Subroto.

SIMATUPANG'S TRAVELS
FEBRUARY 25 - MARCH 31, 1949



in a more systematic way, so that after a short training period they could bring in a fresh spirit as cadres of the Military Sub-District Commands. I also heard of the need for paying closer heed to guaranteeing the people's legal rights. Under current abnormal conditions, cases sometimes occurred in which legal norms with respect to detention, justice, and so on had been ignored.

After crossing the highway between Surakarta and Patjitan and taking a boat across the Solo River, we spent the night in the house of Maj. Pramudjo, in a cold village on the slopes of Mount Lawu. We could see the lights of the Dutch outpost at Tawangmangu from here.

The Surakarta region differed from Jogjakarta not only with regard to its political atmosphere and the attitude of its civil service, but also to a certain extent with regard to the military situation. This is understandable, for the Dutch attack on Surakarta took place before our troops there could recover from the wounds caused by the Madiun rebellion. We should also not forget that the disturbances within the Army which culminated in the Madiun rebellion began in Surakarta. Considering all this, we should thank God that after the Dutch attack even a few units emerged to become the nucleus of the people's war in this region. Three names I heard mentioned with pride throughout this region were Achmadi²⁶ of the Student Army, Slamet Rijadi,²⁷ and Maj. Wiria²⁸ of the Indonesian Air Force.

We left Maj. Pramudjo's quarters late in the afternoon, accompanied by Lt. Purba. That night we crossed the road between Surakarta and Tawangmangu, passed through Metisih (where, according to Purba, a large number of Student Army soldiers had recently died in battle), and, about mid-afternoon, arrived in the village of Balong.

In our dreams about independence, we had often imagined that it would bring electricity to the villages. Here at Balong this dream had come true. Maladi,²⁹ of Radio Republik Indonesia in Surakarta, and Damanik, of the Military Communications Service, told me that hundreds, even thousands, of common people had carried the machines and other

²⁶ Achmadi was born in Surakarta in 1927. During the Revolution, he led the so-called Student Army (Tentara Peladjar, TP) in Surakarta and, in 1948, was City Military Commander for Surakarta. In January 1949, he headed Sub-Wehrkreise 106 within Wehrkreise I, Surakarta, under Slamet Rijadi.

²⁷ Ignatius Slamet Rijadi was born in Surakarta in 1926. During the early years of the Revolution, he was among the most respected and important of the military commanders in the Surakarta area. From July 1947, he commanded the Twenty-Sixth Regiment, and, after the second Dutch attack, he became commander of the Fifth Brigade, in Wehrkreise, I, Surakarta.

²⁸ Wiriadinata was born in 1920. At the outbreak of the Revolution, he joined the small Indonesian air force and was placed in charge of the Panasan airfield near Surakarta. In January 1949, he became commander of Sub-Wehrkreise 105 (Sragen) in Wehrkreise I, Surakarta, under Slamet Rijadi.

²⁹ R. Maladi was born in Surakarta, Central Java, in 1912. During the Japanese occupation, he was named director of the Surakarta radio station. After the Revolution began, he became head of RRI, Radio Republik Indonesia. During the second action, he was appointed Information Officer for the Java Command and, from this office, ran the RRI.

equipment required to electrify the village from the lowland plain high up the slopes of Mount Lawu to Balong. This electric power was primarily used to operate a radio transmitter, one of our main radio stations in Java during the people's war. After discussions with Maladi and Damanik, I wrote in my notebook: "History must not forget the role played by radio and radio technicians in this war."

That same afternoon, we went to the village of Slendjingan, about half an hour's walk from Balong, to meet the staff of the Military Governor, Col. Gatot Subroto, who happened to be away. He had left a couple of days earlier to visit the Pati region. Col. Suprpto,³⁰ the Chief of Staff, and Lt. Col. Surjosularso, Maj. Suhardi, Maj. Bustomi, and Maj. Achmadi were all there, however. I had known Suprpto since he was a freshman at the Military Academy in Bandung. Bustomi, a civil servant who had become a Peta officer during the Japanese occupation, had worked for several years as my deputy in Jogjakarta.

The work of the Military Governor's staff was running smoothly. At first they had had a sort of crisis, but this was not surprising, since the Dutch had attacked while the staff was still preoccupied with the remnants of the Madiun rebellion. The troops under the command of the Military Governor had not yet been reorganized, and the Siliwangi troops, which had constituted the main force countering the Madiun rebels, had left for West Java immediately after the Dutch attack began. At first, therefore, there were practically no Republican troops in several of the regions under Military Governor Gatot Subroto, as for example, in Pati, Madiun, and Semarang.

I had a long talk with Maj. Kusumo, who was in charge of ordnance for the area, mainly about our real position with regard to ammunition. According to him, grenades could be produced in great quantities. The stock of TNT was sufficient, though the supply of fulminate of mercury was running low. Landmines were still available. I urged him to have them distributed as quickly as possible. With regard to bullets, however, after a lengthy discussion, we concluded that the only way to get them was from the enemy--by purchase, theft, or seizure.

While at Slendjingan, several TP youngsters from Surakarta offered to take letters to Djakarta. I sent one to Mr. Sudjono,³¹ the secretary of the Indonesian Delegation, who lived in Djakarta. I asked him to inform our men in Djakarta and Bangka that our position was quite strong and, therefore, they need not concede too much to the Dutch.

³⁰R. Suprpto was born in Purwokerto, Central Java, in 1920. He attended the Royal Military Academy in Bandung on the eve of the Second World War. He joined Sudirman's staff at the outbreak of the Revolution when Sudirman still commanded the Fifth Division. He served as Sudirman's adjutant from 1946 to 1947, after the latter had become Panglima Besar. In 1948, he became Chief of Staff of the Diponegoro Division under Gatot Subroto.

³¹Mr. R. Sudjono was born in Adikarto, near Jogjakarta, in 1905. He received his law degree from Leiden University in 1930. As a student in Holland, he participated in the Perhimpunan Indonesia. He practiced law for some years after his return to Indonesia and was active in Jong Java and Parindra. In 1938, he went to Japan and taught Indonesian in Tokyo. In 1942, he returned to Indonesia along with the Japanese army and became a senior adviser to the Chief of the Military Administration. After the Proclamation of Independence, he joined the PNI and helped establish the Republic's Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He became head of this ministry's legal section and served as secretary-general of the Indonesian delegation at the Renville and Round Table talks.

We wondered if we would still have a chance to visit Pak Dirman's headquarters and go to East Java. On March 21, a courier came from Pak Dirman's headquarters, bringing the general's radiograms for transmission to the Emergency Government in Sumatra via the Balong radio station. That morning Balong came under fire from Dutch guns, and for some time the transmitter could not be operated. According to the courier, it had taken him seven days to travel from Pak Dirman's place to Slendjangan.

The radio news included reports on the last Security Council discussions which indicated a trend toward finding a solution based on a middle road between the idea of the Round Table Conference as proposed by the Dutch, and the Security Council resolution of January 28, 1949 accepted by the Republic as a guideline. These reports gave the impression that talks between the Dutch and our men in Djakarta and Bangka, with the assistance of the UN Commission for Indonesia, would start before very long. I was anxious to return to Banaran before the talks began so that I could present suggestions to our men in Djakarta prior to their negotiating with the Dutch. If I went to Pak Dirman's headquarters, it would mean seven days travel from Slendjangan and another seven days for the journey back, plus several days more for discussions and for rest. In brief, it would require about twenty days in all. Perhaps in the meantime the talks in Djakarta would have already started. Consequently, I wrote to Pak Dirman from Slendjangan outlining my views and expressing my regret that we must quickly return to the Jogjakarta region so that someone would be there in case negotiations started in Djakarta. We left Slendjangan on March 22 and walked northward.

I was sorry I did not meet Col. Gatot Subroto. In many respects, his life story parallels the development of our army. First of all, he comes from Banjumas. I do not know why, but quite a number of army leaders came from Banjumas and Kedu: Sungkono, Sadikin, Bambang Sugeng, Gatot Subroto, and, one should not forget, Pak Urip³² and Pak Dirman. It is said that the Banjumas dialect is more "militant" than the speech of any other part of Java. I often jokingly called these men the Prussians of Java.

Gatot Subroto had served as a noncommissioned officer in the Netherlands East Indies Army for a considerable time and had become familiar with various regions in Indonesia during his years of service. During the Japanese occupation he was a Peta officer. At the outbreak of the Revolution, he became a Brigade Commander in Tjilatjap under Pak Dirman, then Division Commander in Purwokerto. When Pak Dirman became Panglima Besar, Gatot Subroto replaced him as Division Commander in Purwokerto. He once served as Commander of the Military Police Corps. The chaotic situation in and around Surakarta, which eventually triggered the Madiun rebellion, forced the government to dispatch an iron-fisted man to deal with it. Gatot was sent. Not long after the Madiun rebellion had been quelled, the Dutch launched their attack. As Military Governor of the Second Region, Gatot Subroto now had the task of leading the people's war in the eastern part of Central Java.

³²R. Urip Sumohardjo was born in Bagelen, Central Java, in 1893. He joined the KNIL in 1914, and, on his retirement in 1939, was the highest-ranking Indonesian in that army. In 1945, the Republic's leaders called on him to build the TNI, giving him the position of Chief of the General Staff. He held this position, after Sudirman was elected Panglima Besar, until his death in November 1948.

Each great revolution gives birth to a new army, and in this army noncommissioned officers and even privates of the old army often have an opportunity to obtain the highest ranks by virtue of their abilities. Michel Ney for instance, one of Napoleon's most outstanding generals, was only a private at the outbreak of the French revolution in 1789. Subsequently Ney became a Marshal of France and was granted the title of Prince of Moscow. Simeon Michailovich Budenny was a noncommissioned officer in the Tsarist army. He later became Marshal of the Soviet Union. Gatot Subroto and Sadikin were formerly noncommissioned officers in the Dutch army, and Sungkono a noncommissioned officer in the Dutch navy. Now they led the people's war--Sadikin in West Java, Gatot in Central Java, and Sungkono in East Java. Who could deny that our army is the child of the revolution, just like the French army after the French revolution and the Russian army after the Russian revolution?

Following my notes on my experiences and discussions in the region of Mount Lawu, the next entry in my diary contained seven names, without any further clarification--Amir Sjarifuddin, Oey Gee Hwat,³³ Djokosujono,³⁴ Ronomarsono,³⁵ Maruto Darusman,³⁶ Suripno,³⁷ Sardjono.³⁸ While in

³³Oey Gee Hwat edited a left-wing peranakan Chinese newspaper, Sin Tit Po, in Surabaya in the 1930's. He was a member of Liem Koen Hian's Indonesian Chinese Party (PTI) and was close to the underground communist group in Surabaya. In 1945, he was one of the top leaders of the Socialist Party, and, after the Amir Sjarifuddin-Sjahrir split in 1948, he followed Amir.

³⁴Djokosujono was appointed Commander of the Central Biro Perdjuangan by Amir Sjarifuddin. The Biro played an important role in bringing the irregular military groups under Amir's influence.

³⁵Ronomarsono was a labor union leader in the Surakarta area. He was subsequently associated with the People's Democratic Front (the FDR), a left-wing coalition led by Amir Sjarifuddin after his fall from power.

³⁶Maruto Darusman, while a student in Holland in the late 1930's, was an important member of the Perhimpunan Indonesia during the time when that group came under strong communist influence. During the war, he participated in the anti-Nazi underground in Holland and only returned to Indonesia in 1946, whereupon he joined the PKI led by Sardjono and Alimin. He remained in the top echelon of the PKI up until the Madiun Affair. He served as Minister of State without portfolio in the Amir cabinet, representing the PKI.

³⁷Suripno, like Maruto, had been a member of the Perhimpunan Indonesia and had participated in the anti-Nazi underground. He too returned to Indonesia in 1946. Shortly before the first Dutch attack, he was sent as Republican representative to Eastern Europe where he negotiated a consular treaty with the Soviet Union. He returned to Indonesia in August 1948, along with Muso, the top prewar leader of the PKI. He became a member of the PKI Politbureau after Muso's reorganization of it, and had special responsibility for youth and foreign relations.

³⁸Sardjono was a communist leader in West Java and, in 1924, had succeeded Aliarcham as chairman of the PKI. Under his guidance, the party launched the 1926-1927 insurrections. After their failure, he was interned in the Boven Digul concentration camp. During the war, he was taken, along with the other detainees, to Australia. There, in accord with the Dimitrov line, he cooperated up to a certain point with the Dutch colonial authorities. He returned to Indonesia in 1946 and was able to reestablish his control over the PKI in May of that year. On Muso's return in 1948, he was demoted to a junior position in the Politbureau.

the Mount Lawu area, I had heard that they had been shot during the first days after the Dutch attack on Surakarta. I had not enquired how it had happened; an atmosphere of anger, fear, and disorganization must also have prevailed in Surakarta in those days, similar to what I had seen for myself in Jogjakarta. I only mused for a moment while recording these names in my diary, adding no particulars whatsoever.

I had known all of them but Ronomarsono. I had known Sjarifuddin and Djokosujono very well indeed. From the early days of the Supreme Command until approximately a year ago, I had shared the same house in the Gondokusuman with Djokosujono. At that time, I had moved to Djalan Merapi, but Djokosujono and I had remained friends. He was the type of young man who around 1930 was attracted by the speeches and courses given by Bung Karno, Bung Hatta, Bung Sjahrir, and other leaders of the nationalist movement. Subsequently, he became a cadre of the movement. He came from Madiun and he had been imprisoned by the Dutch in Djombang or Modjokerto for a considerable time. During the Japanese period, he joined the Peta in the Madiun region. When the Supreme Command was founded in Jogjakarta, he became chief of its Organization Section, and I became his deputy. Later on, after a broad reorganization put through while Bung Amir was Minister of Defense, Djokosujono was appointed Head of the Biro Perdjungan, charged with merging the various irregular armed units into the official army. The lessons he had received in politics, history, sociology, organization, socialism, and Marxism had taken deep root and assumed the character of dogma for him. The mental and emotional traits common to members of a movement who believe themselves persecuted had become second nature to him; he had a deep sense of solidarity with fellow victims and comrades-in-arms with whom he had shared frequent suffering and occasional joy, and he had a deep hatred for the enemy (the Dutch) and for the "aristocracy," the "bourgeoisie," and the "*prijaji*."³⁹ To a certain extent, I had come to understand this way of thinking and feeling when we lived and worked together in Jogjakarta.

Bung Amir was a different type of person altogether. Born into a prominent Dutch Indies civil servant family in Tapanuli, he was graduated from the Gymnasium in the Netherlands and the Faculty of Law in Djakarta. Later he became one of the top young leaders in the nationalist movement, ranking after Bung Karno and Bung Hatta. Although he came from a Muslim family, he became a leader of the Indonesian Student Christian Movement in the pre-Japanese period. An excellent orator and organizer, he made a very attractive and dynamic leader, though at times he gave an impression of mental disturbance and irritability.

Before the Japanese occupation, I had met Bung Amir several times in the clubhouse for Christian Youth at No. 44, Kebon Sirih, in Djakarta. As a high school student, I had deeply admired his lectures, which were given in fluent and beautiful Dutch. At the Gapi⁴⁰ Congress at Gang Kenari, I found his fiery speech in Indonesian very attractive. During the Japanese occupation, Bung Amir spent most of his time in prison because of his subversive activities against the Japanese authorities. It is said that he had actually been sentenced to death

³⁹ A prijaji is a member of the Javanese bureaucratic upper class.

⁴⁰ The Gabungan Politik Indonesia (Federation of Indonesian Political Parties) was formed in May 1939 to unite eight of the most important nationalist organizations of the day. It was led by Amir Sjarifuddin, M. H. Thamrin and Abikusno Tjokrosujoso. It called for cooperation between the Dutch and Indonesian peoples in the face of the growing international crisis and on the basis of more democratic rights for Indonesians. Its main proposal was to convert the Volksraad into a broadly based representative body having real power.

by a Japanese military tribunal but that intervention by Bung Karno and Bung Hatta with the Japanese Commander-in-Chief had prevented the execution of the sentence. Bung Amir once told me about his cellmate in the Japanese prison. This man was a Buginese sailor. So strong was his longing for the wide sea and the open sky that he covered the walls of the cell with drawings of Buginese boats. Nonetheless, with each passing day, his will to live seemed to diminish and eventually he stopped moving altogether while his glazed eyes remained fixed on the drawings on the walls of his tiny cell.

Following the Proclamation of Independence, Bung Amir was released from prison in Malang and subsequently was given a seat in our first cabinet as Minister of Information. In this position he contacted former officers of the KNIL, the Dutch colonial army, with Didi Kartasasmita⁴¹ acting as the liaison officer. At one point these former KNIL officers issued a statement over the radio, within the country as well as abroad, declaring their allegiance to the Republic. I do not know whether this was Bung Amir's first contact with military matters. At that time, along with Askari,⁴² I used to go and see Bung Amir at his home close to Djalan Guntur.

When Bung Amir became Minister of Defense, I was working at the Supreme Command Headquarters in Jogjakarta. I worked closely with him in building up our defense strength and in negotiating military issues with the Dutch and the British. I accompanied him several times to Djakarta, where Bung Sjahrir (Prime Minister and concurrently Minister of Foreign Affairs) then had his residence, at No. 56, Pegangsaan Timur.

Given the personalities and work methods of Bung Sjahrir and Bung Amir, I often used to describe Bung Amir as the motor and Bung Sjahrir as the rudder of our ship of state. To separate them meant having a motor without a rudder or, conversely, a rudder without a motor. Though this is, of course, a great exaggeration, it still has some truth in it.

I had known Bung Sjahrir since the beginning of the Japanese occupation. After my release from detention by the Japanese, the first

⁴¹R. Didi Kartasasmita was born in Tasikmalaja, West Java, in 1915. He was the first native Sundanese to graduate from the Royal Military Academy in Breda. On his return to Indonesia, he joined the KNIL and fought against the Japanese in 1942. He was captured and interned for ten months. After his release, he took a civil service position in Bandung. At the outbreak of the Revolution, he became an important figure in the planning and development of the TNI, working closely with Urip Sumohardjo. For a short time, he was senior military officer in West Java, but subsequently moved to Jogjakarta, where he took charge of the Infantry Section of the Ministry of Defense.

⁴²Askari was born in 1919. He was a member of the 1940 class at the Royal Military Academy in Bandung, along with Nasution, Simatupang, and Kawilarang. He was married to Kawilarang's sister. During the occupation, he held a civil service job, but he returned to the army after the Proclamation of Independence. In 1945, he became Chief of Staff of the Second Division (Tjirebon area), and, when the Siliwangi Division was founded in May 1946 under Nasution, he became its Chief of Staff. During 1947-48, he was commander of the Tarumanegara Brigade of the Siliwangi Division. Just prior to the second Dutch action, he was member of a group of officers sent to Sumatra from Jogjakarta, and was assigned to the staff of Hidajat, then head of the Sumatra Command.

question I faced was: Are our people really as pro-Japanese as it appears? To avoid attracting suspicion, I bought several dozen Japanese textbooks, and used selling them as an excuse to visit various offices and homes in Djakarta, Bogor, Sukabumi, Bandung, Tegal, Pekalongan, Semarang, Magelang, Jogjakarta, Surabaya, and Malang. I concluded that the anti-Dutch feeling ran deep and was sincere, but also that the people were essentially opposed to the Japanese. As a military man, I believed that the Japanese offensive had run out of steam, and, therefore, time favored the Allied Forces. We needed to determine what the future held in store for us under these circumstances. In Djakarta, however, I met no one who wanted to think about this, until one day I came across Sutan Sjahrir. My first conversation with him made a deep impression on me and from then on we met frequently. Conversation with him prodded me to think and read further. Sjahrir's most important service during the Japanese occupation was surely that he preserved and encouraged a way of thinking quite different from that imposed on the society by the Japanese and their agents.

In the Sjahrir Cabinet, Bung Sjahrir guided our diplomacy in Djakarta and Bung Amir guided the building of our armed forces in Jogjakarta. After the Proclamation of Independence, we constantly had to deal with the problem of the proper equilibrium between diplomacy and force of arms in our struggle. Some held the extreme view that we should depend solely on the build-up of our armed forces and ignore diplomacy altogether. Others wanted to rely entirely on diplomacy, entrusting our fate to the "new" forces which had emerged after the end of the Second World War, while relegating our armed forces to a minor role. The Sjahrir government tried to assign a suitable role both to diplomacy and to force of arms. But different assessments naturally arose about the proper weight assigned to each.

When the Linggadjati Agreement was initialed, Bung Amir supported it fully. Later, a number of military incidents occurred and differences emerged between the Indonesian and Dutch interpretations of the agreement. As a result, Bung Amir and I went to Djakarta several times by special train to resolve these military problems with the Dutch. On one occasion two young men, Subijakto⁴³ and Siahaan, traveled with us from Djakarta to Jogjakarta to join the navy of the Indonesian Republic. They had been officers in the Dutch navy during World War II but had resigned after our Proclamation of Independence. In Jogjakarta, the location of Defense Ministry headquarters, one could feel that the emphasis was on the building up of our armed forces. But on the train between Jogjakarta and Djakarta one could sense that, at a certain point, we passed out of the sphere of influence of the Defense Ministry in Jogjakarta and entered that of the Foreign Ministry in Djakarta. Bung Sjahrir adopted a completely pragmatic attitude on whether force of arms or diplomacy should be emphasized--in his view, if the Dutch could be expelled by military force, so much the better. The attacks on Bandung, Semarang, and Surabaya failed completely, however. (Bung

⁴³Subijakto was born in Banjumas, Central Java, in 1917. He studied at a school for candidate reserve officers in the Royal Dutch Navy in Surabaya, graduating during World War II. Afterward, he served with the Dutch navy in European and Australian waters. After the war, he studied at the Technical Faculty in Delft and then returned to Indonesia after the Linggadjati Agreement. He was then appointed an adviser for naval affairs to the Minister of Defense. In March 1948, he became Naval Chief of Staff. His wife is the younger sister of Mrs. Hatta.

Tomo⁴⁴ had said in a speech in Malang that he would celebrate Lebaran⁴⁵ in Surabaya!) Commonly, an army born in revolution is not powerful enough to launch a general offensive. When the Linggadjati Agreement was signed, Bung Amir refused to attend the ceremony, in protest against the Dutch attack on Modjokerto. At that time, he and I were at the East Java Combat Headquarters in Madiun, established as a response to the Dutch attack on Modjokerto. One important figure at this headquarters was Dr. Mustopo, who had a command train at his disposal. Following the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement, conflict with the Dutch over its interpretation continued. As a result, Sutan Sjahrir resigned as Prime Minister, and Amir Sjarifuddin became Prime Minister and concurrently Minister of Defense.

How did it happen that Bung Amir was swept up in the Madiun rebellion? Many theories have been proposed, but a complete and satisfactory answer to this question will probably never be found. As far as I know, Bung Amir himself left no notes.

Nowadays, some suggest a "provocation theory," that is, that the Madiun Affair resulted from previous decisions taken jointly by the leaders of the Republic and the representatives of the United States at a conference in Sarangan. Personally, I do not really believe in this theory. In Jogjakarta, I myself had witnessed that the highest ranking leaders of the Republic had received the news of Madiun with utter consternation. On the night before Bung Karno made the historic speech in which he had asked the people to choose between Sukarno-Hatta on one side and Muso⁴⁶ on the other, I had been at Kaliurang sitting in on negotiations with the Three-State Commission; I had received a telephone call asking me to come immediately to the Palace. A cabinet session had been called to consider the news from Madiun. If the "provocation theory" were true, then the atmosphere at that session should have been one of relief and people should have been saying: "Thank God, they've fallen into our trap." Actually, exactly the reverse was true. In a conversation outside the meeting, Bung Karno was still asking me: "What does Amir really want?" Bung Hatta said: "Now it is a matter of life or death. Er op of er onder." These were certainly not the words of men who felt relieved because their adversaries had fallen into a cunningly laid trap of "provocation."

⁴⁴Sutomo was born in Surabaya, East Java, in 1920. During the colonial period he was an active member of Indonesia Muda, Parindra, and the KBI (Indonesian National Scouts). He came into prominence in October 1945 as a result of his fiery leadership of pemuda groups in Surabaya. So popular were his radio broadcasts that he became widely known by the familiar title of Bung Tomo. He formed his own paramilitary organization, the Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia, which played an important role during the early years of the Revolution.

⁴⁵Lebaran is the Muslim holy day celebrating the end of the fasting month.

⁴⁶Muso was born in the Kediri region of East Java, in 1897. During the colonial period, he was active in Insulinde, Sarekat Islam, and the Indies Social Democratic Association before becoming an important leader of the PKI. He joined in the decisions which led to the 1926-27 insurrections. The uprisings broke out while he and Alimin were abroad and afterward he lived in the Soviet Union. Apparently, he made a secret visit to the Indies in 1935 to revive an underground communist party, but did not stay long. He did not return again to Indonesia until August 1948, at which time he took charge of the PKI once more.

According to another theory, the arrival of Setiadjijid⁴⁷ and others from the Netherlands, of Muso and Suripno from Moscow and Prague, and of Supeno⁴⁸ and others from a conference in Calcutta, brought the leftist movement in Indonesia increasingly under the influence of Moscow. According to this theory, Moscow had already decided that revolutions should be sparked off in Asian countries in opposition to the incumbent "national bourgeois" groups. Aware of these developments, then, Bung Amir feared that his influence in the leftist organizations would vanish if he could be branded as insufficiently revolutionary and leftist by comparison with those who had just returned from abroad. He therefore declared that he had long been a member of the Illegal PKI, and he refused to be outdone in preparing armed resistance. At least, that is the theory; I have no material to confirm or deny it.

There is another theory which makes some sense. I heard from Bung Amir himself that he had accepted the Renville Agreement in the belief that a basic political solution could be reached within a few months, possibly even a few weeks, after its signing, and that a plebiscite would end Dutch rule in the areas we had abandoned on the basis of the Agreement. In his speech on the occasion of its signing on board the *Renville*, Bung Amir had said: "If I may cite the ideas expressed at the beginning by Dr. Graham, the head of the American delegation, the cease-fire and principles agreed upon today imply abandoning the road of fighting and violence, and adopting the road of democracy." Did he mean to say by this: "We have accepted the ideas submitted to us by Dr. Graham, head of the American delegation, and now he has a moral obligation to help implement them." I do not know. Bung Amir experienced his first disappointment at this time, for, not long after the signing of the Agreement, Dr. Graham was recalled by his government. Bung Amir had accepted the Renville Agreement after a meeting between all the leaders of the Republic and the members of the Three-State Commission at Kaliurang, and perhaps he had therefore believed that all the major political parties would support him. As a consequence, he experienced a second disappointment: not long after the signing, Masjumi withdrew its ministers from the cabinet. Bung Amir had to return his mandate as Prime Minister. Did he perhaps feel disappointed and abandoned by the people and groups he had at first expected would support him in the implementation of the Renville Agreement? In this emotional state of mind, was he therefore more inclined to listen to

⁴⁷Setiadjijid, like Suripno and Maruto Darusman, belonged to the Perhimpunan Indonesia during the late 1930's when it was under strong communist influence. He too participated in the anti-Nazi underground and returned to Indonesia with the others in early 1946. He then joined the Indonesian Labor Party (PBI) and took control of it at the end of 1946. He served as Deputy Minister of Communications in the third Sjahrir cabinet and Deputy Prime Minister in the Amir cabinet. He was a leading figure in the People's Democratic Front.

⁴⁸This appears to be Supeno Hadisiswojo, who was born near Kediri, Central Java, in 1916. During the colonial period, he worked as a teacher in Taman Siswa schools and also as a journalist. He was active in both Partindo and Indonesia Muda. During the Revolution, he edited the newspaper *Revolusioner* in Jogjakarta. He was a member of the Pesindo executive and represented it in the Congress for Indonesian Youth Organizations. He was the Congress delegate to the Conference of Youth and Students of Southeast Asia Fighting for Freedom and Independence, which was held in Calcutta in February 1948. He subsequently joined the PKI. In some quarters, it is believed that at this Calcutta conference, instructions from Moscow were transmitted to the delegates which resulted in the left-wing insurrections of 1948.

the "radical" and "revolutionary" arguments of his comrades, particularly those who had just returned from abroad? This too is only a theory.

Amir Sjarifuddin is no more. Was he a nationalist, did his heart burn with the ideal of building a strong, just and prosperous Indonesia, and was he prepared to make the highest sacrifice for this ideal? Who could doubt it? Was he a Christian? So far as his fellow-men could ascertain, he was a faithful Christian. Was he a communist? How is one to answer this question? Was he a communist in its formal sense, that is to say, was he a member of the Communist Party of Indonesia? According to his own statement, he had long been a member of the PKI while it was still an illegal organization. Some do not believe this and think that it was merely a tactical move to prevent Muso and others from destroying Amir's influence in the Indonesian left. Can this now be confirmed or refuted? Was he a communist in the sense that, deep within him, he was caught up by the humanitarianism and egalitarianism in Marx's writings? Or was he a communist of the kind exemplified by Lenin and later Stalin? Or was he a communist in the sense that his ultimate loyalty went to a world communist movement?

Could it be that he had not yet found in his own heart a synthesis of nationalism, Christianity, and communism, and that, for this reason, he sometimes gave an impression of instability and a lack of inner peace? Will these questions ever be answered?

Whatever the final evaluation of future historians with regard to Bung Amir as a political figure, those who knew him well will always remember him as a kind and friendly human being, a quick and sometimes brilliant thinker, an orator second only to Bung Karno, and a firm and disinterested fighter and worker. Returning from a visit to Bung Amir's grave after the recognition of our sovereignty by the Dutch, Mangara Tambunan⁴⁹ said to me: "He faced death calmly and peacefully."

I had known and respected Amir Sjarifuddin, and I had asked myself: "How did Bung Amir come to the conclusion that he had to take the road to Madiun?" The whole Madiun question obviously raises far more complex questions than those of Amir's personal motives. I am convinced that the ordinary boys, the soldiers and pemuda who fell on both sides during the Madiun Affair, knew nothing of the issues behind this national tragedy. I am certain that the last prayer of all these boys was for the happiness and greatness of the same Fatherland. After Madiun had been taken by the Siliwangi troops, I went there in a worn-out Japanese aircraft along with Suprajogi and Daan Jahja. Col. Gatot Subroto arrived the same day from Solo and Col. Sungkono came in from the east. We held a meeting at the Merdeka Hotel. "It's like the meeting of the American and Russian troops in Berlin," I said. While studying at the Military Academy, I had always heard that a civil war aroused much deeper emotions and hatred than an ordinary war. "Now the truth of this lesson has been brought home to my people," I thought after hearing and seeing for myself what had happened during the Madiun rebellion. I also visited Tjepu with Gadis Rasjid, a lady journalist from Djakarta who had followed the operations with a Siliwangi battalion.

⁴⁹Mr. Albert Mangara Tua Tambunan was born in Tarutung, Tapanuli, in 1911. He earned his degree from the Djakarta Law Faculty in 1940. During the Dutch and Japanese colonial periods, he worked in the judiciary. After the Revolution broke out, he became a top leader of the Protestant party, Parkindo, and served as a member of the KNIP Working Committee after November 1945.

On our way there, we had to pass bridges wholly or half-destroyed by the rebels. On my return to Jogjakarta, I asked Pak Dirman's permission to take a few days rest at Kaliurang. I was physically and mentally exhausted, and moreover, I wanted time to comprehend the tragedy that had befallen us.

What was the central dispute that had led to so much bloodshed and tears at a time when everyone knew that a Dutch attack was inevitable, even though it was not certain when? Was it a difference of opinion on the proper policy to adopt in facing the Dutch? Oddly enough, Bung Amir himself had signed the Renville Agreement. Was it merely a struggle for power? Or was it the result of ideological conflict? Was communism, the product of nineteenth-century Western Europe fused with the ideas developed by Lenin and Stalin in early twentieth-century Russia, continually to cause Indonesians to fight Indonesians in mid-century? I am no expert on Marxism. But it has been said that Karl Marx himself once declared, "I am not a Marxist." What I have read of Marx and Engels often captivates me, for one can often feel echoing in their words the tears and lamentations of workers who functioned as modern slaves during the early stages of the large-scale industrial development of Western Europe. The works of Stalin and Lenin often astound me by their penetrating and daring analysis. But does this mean that we have to introduce into our nation the endless mutual recriminations, so characteristic of Western (including Russian) thought, between Marxism and non-Marxism, between revisionism and non-revisionism, and so on? Must this lead us to hating, and even killing, one another? Is it impossible for us to lead our people toward prosperity and happiness without repeating all the developments and conflicts experienced and not yet overcome by the societies of the West, including Russia?

If ideological conflict among our people inevitably leads to killing one another, will armed conflict not eventually develop between Islamic and non-Islamic ideologies? Will our boys, our soldiers, also have to "settle" such conflicts later on? Where, then, is the end of the road that we shall have to travel if ideological antagonism in our country leads to large-scale armed conflict? Our thinkers must give direction and substance to the philosophies of the various groups in our country. Achmad Tirtosudiro and some of his friends came to see me at Kaliurang at that time; they urged me to study Islam in order to find a means to prevent problems between Islamic and non-Islamic ideologies from leading to armed conflict so as to avoid another Madiun-style tragedy. I promised to try. Some months before writing these memoirs, while lecturing at the Army's Staff and Command School in Bandung (ten years after our talk at Kaliurang), Lt. Col. Achmad Tirtosudiro, now an instructor, reminded me of my promise. Yet I doubt whether I will ever feel competent to propose any answer to the problem.

Be that as it may, let us return to our story of the people's war against the Dutch.

After leaving Slendjangan on March 22, we reached Simo in the northern part of the Surakarta region on March 25, 1949, passing through Djombongan, Masaran, Plupuh, Gemolong, and Katjangan. We crossed the main roads at night; where necessary, troops provided by Military Sub-District Commanders escorted us. We spent our nights at places recommended by the commanders we visited on our way. The day

before we arrived at Simo, we met Deputy Governor Winarno⁵⁰ in one of the villages. He was also "touring" the region.

Long before we got to Simo we saw that the bridges had been completely destroyed. At Simo we met Ir. Effendi Saleh,⁵¹ among others. Perhaps he had given the technical instructions for the destruction of these bridges. Dr. Aziz Saleh,⁵² Ir. Effendi's brother, Lt. Col. Rudi Pirngadi,⁵³ and Maj. Supardi⁵⁴ were also at Simo. As had been the case in Jogjakarta, some of those who had left Surakarta had gone north. This group was now based in Simo and its surroundings. Others had fled south and were living on the slopes of Mount Lawu.

Dr. Aziz is a very hardworking person. He is a boy scout leader, and, in the best sense, he is a grown-up who has remained a boy scout deep down inside. He hoped to turn Simo into a base for "Wingate" operations in the Semarang region. But he had first to solve two serious problems: how to increase the number of troops and how to train cadres. But Dr. Aziz never lost hope. As a good boy scout he kept smiling in the face of problems which I personally felt were almost insoluble.

On March 26, we left Simo with an escort from the Student Army led by Muktio. Muktio told me that about 135 members of the Surakarta Student Army had been killed since the Dutch attack. I had no idea whether this estimate was accurate, but certainly a large number of these boys has been killed. The Student Army had been playing a highly important part in the people's war.

That night I wrote in my notebook: "One of our future problems is going to be planning for the students who have now been fighting for the Republic for almost four years. How we solve this problem will help determine Indonesia's future."

After an eight-hour walk from Simo, we arrived at Bedji. Col. Dr.

⁵⁰R. Winarno Danuatmodjo was born in Klaten, Central Java, in 1909. During the Dutch period, he worked as a bookkeeper and editor. After the Proclamation of Independence, he joined the civil service and, by 1948, had risen to the rank of Resident, seconded to the staff of the Governor of Central Java. He was affiliated with the PNI.

⁵¹Ir. Mas Mohammad Effendi Saleh was born in Djakarta, in 1912. He was graduated from the Technical Faculty in Bandung in 1939. During the colonial period, he served in the technical branch of the civil service. After the Revolution began, he held a position in the central railway office.

⁵²Dr. Aziz Saleh was born in Djakarta, in 1914. He was graduated from the Djakarta Medical Faculty in 1942. During the Revolution, he served as a physician in the army and in 1948-1949 commanded the Semarang-Pati Sub-Territory.

⁵³Rudy Pirngadie was born in 1917 and was trained in the colonial artillery in West Java before the war. During the occupation, he worked as a censor at the military radio station in Djakarta. After the Proclamation of Independence, he served as communications officer with the Seventh Division in the Malang area and later with the Engineering Battalion of the Fortieth Regiment in the Seventh Division. He later joined Nasution's staff and, in 1949, after the Dutch military action, became the Deputy Chief of Staff, Java Command Headquarters.

⁵⁴Supardi commanded a battalion in Patjitan, East Java, in the Fourth Division.

Pratignjo and Lt. Col. Suriosumarno⁵⁵ had been killed near here shortly after the Dutch attack.

On March 27 we reached Manisrenggo, then the seat of the Java Command Headquarters. At the time of our arrival, the Secretariat was busy at work in one of the houses. Many youngsters were typing up instructions and letters. Maj. Sukendro supervised all this work. He was a Bandung high school student who had taken part in building up the Army after the Proclamation of Independence. In West Java, the number of university and high school students who joined the Army after the Proclamation exceeded that in other provinces, probably because Djakarta and Bandung had always been the main centers for university and high school education. Our army in West Java developed an air distinct from that of the army in other regions, at least in part because it included many officers raised in all parts of Indonesia and just out of high school or university.

Boy Djajadiningrat,⁵⁶ a Lieutenant Colonel in the Navy, had apparently been "misplaced" and had become a middle ranking officer at the Java Command Headquarters. As a result, many instructions issued by the Headquarters on the Java mainland were signed by an officer of the Indonesian Navy.

On March 28, I had a discussion with Col. Nasution, the Java Army and Territory Commander, who lived not far from the Headquarters Secretariat. I had known Nasution since we had attended the Military Academy in Bandung together. Nas had first been a teacher, but he had also passed his senior high school examination at the same time as getting his teacher's certificate. After spending a year in South Sumatra as a teacher, he became a cadet at the Military Academy in Bandung, together with Kawilarang,⁵⁷ Askari, Kartakusuma,⁵⁸ and myself. At the time

⁵⁵ Suriosumarno was a former KNIL officer. After the military reorganization of 1946, he had charge of the Artillery Section of the Ministry of Defense.

⁵⁶ R. B. Djajadiningrat was one of the few Indonesians trained in the Dutch Naval College in Rotterdam. During the occupation, he was interned for a short while. After the Revolution began, he joined the Republic's navy and soon assumed an important position in it.

⁵⁷ Alex E. Kawilarang was born in Djatinegara, Djakarta, in 1920. He was a classmate of Simatupang and Nasution at the Royal Military Academy in Bandung in 1940. During the Japanese occupation, he worked in Sumatra in various private capacities. In 1945, he returned to Djakarta and joined the Republican Army. He first served as Chief of Staff of the Bogor Regiment, and then, when it was incorporated into the Siliwangi Division, in 1946, as its commander. In February 1948, he commanded the Second Brigade of the Division, quartered in Sukabumi, and later the First Brigade for a brief period. He joined the Hidjrah and took his brigade to Jogjakarta. He was next transferred to Sumatra and during the second Dutch action, he commanded Sub-Territory VII (North Sumatra), based in Sibolga.

⁵⁸ Mohammad Rachmad Kartakusuma was born in Tjiamis, West Java, in 1920. He studied at the Bandung Royal Military Academy in 1940. He was serving in the KNIL at the time of the Japanese invasion and briefly imprisoned. On his release, he worked in the central railway office in Bandung. In 1946, he commanded the Tasikmalaja-Tjiamis-Garut Regiment and then served as Chief of Staff of the Third Division in Tasikmalaja. He was transferred to Banten as Chief of Staff of the Division there under the command of Col. K. H. Sjam'oen. After that he was appointed Chief of Staff of the Second Division in Tjirebon replacing Askari. He moved next to Jogjakarta to assume the post of Chief of Staff to the Director-General of the Ministry of Defense, and later went to Sumatra, becoming Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Sumatra Command. He served in this latter post throughout the second action.

of the Japanese aggression, Nasution commanded a platoon in East Java. During the Japanese occupation, he lived in Bandung and was very active in various semi-military youth movements, such as the Seinendan, Barisan Pelopor, and others.

In the second half of the Japanese occupation, I too came to live in Bandung. Askari, Kartakusuma, Nasution, and myself, together with Sasra and Badjuri (who had both been reserve officers before the Japanese attack) often used to practice fencing on the flat roof of the Bumi Putera building where Nas lived. Kawilarang was then hiding on a plantation in South Sumatra, after escaping from a Japanese concentration camp. In those days, we worked to widen and intensify our military studies, interrupted by the arrival of the Japanese. Reading Clausewitz gave me the impression that the textbooks at the Military Academy gave only superficial quotations and adaptations from the work of this German writer, who was a real *Denker und Dichter*. The works of Liddell Hart and de Gaulle, which were not covered in the lessons at the Military Academy (the textbooks there were simply copies of those used at the Breda Military Academy in Holland, the most important of which was a text on strategy by Captain Spoor) introduced me to the new ideas developed in Western Europe between the two world wars. A book by Tom Wintringham, written when Britain was threatened by German invasion, and particularly a number of books dealing with the people's war in China, opened my eyes and mind to a type of warfare based on a politically conscious population.

We began to think more deeply about the military problems we might soon encounter, given new developments in Indonesia, should the course of the war, particularly in Asia, take a different turn. In the meantime, the Japanese had set up Peta battalions which gave military training to a considerable number of our young people. Later on, after the Proclamation of Independence and the founding of our Armed Forces, myself and a number of young officers in the Army, Navy and Air Force (such as Martadinata,⁵⁹ Hasanuddin, and Saleh Rahardjodikromo) started a special club in Jogjakarta for the study of military science with the idea of promoting fresh thinking on the problems of warfare. At the suggestion of some philologists, we called the club Yudha-gama, which they said meant science of war. (Since 1950, a magazine published by the Ministry of Defense in Djakarta, a theoretical journal devoted to the development of our system of national defense, has used this name.)

After the Proclamation of Independence, Nasution was at first assigned to the West Java Command, then led by Maj. Gen. Didi Kartasasmita. Subsequently, he replaced Arudji Kartawinata⁶⁰ as commander of one of the three divisions then existing in West Java. When these

⁵⁹ R. E. Martadinata was born in Bandung, West Java, in 1921. He enrolled in the Dutch naval school but only completed his training during the occupation. In the early years of the Revolution, he was one of the officers important in the planning and organizing of the Republic's navy. In 1948, he was appointed Deputy Commander of the navy for Atjeh-North Sumatra.

⁶⁰ Arudji Kartawinata was born in Garut, West Java, in 1905. During the colonial period, he was active in the PSII, and served as its secretary-general from 1936 to 1940. During the occupation he joined the Peta and served as battalion commander in Tjimahi, near Bandung. In October 1945, he acted briefly as Commander of the Third Division but was soon replaced by Nasution. He was Deputy Minister of Defense in the second Sjahrir cabinet (representing Masjumi) and also in the Amir cabinet (representing the PSII, a splinter breakaway from Masjumi).

three divisions were merged into one division with the name of Siliwangi, Nasution became its first commander. After the first Dutch attack and the signing of the Renville Agreement, the Siliwangi Division was "evacuated" to Central Java. Among all the commanders who led the people's war during the first Dutch attack, Nasution alone made a report which could serve as the basis for conclusions about the best preparations for any subsequent Dutch aggression. His analysis of the people's war during the first Dutch attack showed that he was a capable tactician and organizer. Now, in the face of the second Dutch attack, the Java Command was in his hands, while that of Sumatra was held by Col. Hidajat, who also had experience in the people's war in West Java as a deputy division commander during the first Dutch attack.

Hidajat was a graduate from the Military Academy at Breda. He, Surjosularso, and Suriadarma belonged to the last group of graduates before the German occupation.

In March 1949, Nasution and I discussed the different possibilities the near future might hold in store. On the basis of radio reports and the newspapers, we felt that the return of our people from Bangka to Jogjakarta was only a matter of time. The Dutch could no longer prevent this, so our problem was: what to do next? We decided that we must give definite, concrete advice to the government, after first meeting in Jogjakarta with the Panglima Besar.

That same day, I also talked with Col. Djatikusumo,⁶¹ who was quartered not far from Manisrenggo. A Solonese prince, he had been an engineering student in the Netherlands. For a short period prior to the Japanese attack, he had trained in a reserve officers' course in the Dutch East Indies Army. During the Japanese occupation, he served as a Peta officer, and, after the Proclamation of Independence, he became Division Commander first in Salatiga and later in the region of Pati and Bodjonegoro. At the time of the Dutch attack on Jogjakarta, Col. Djati was Governor of the Military Academy. After the attack, he and some of his cadets had slipped out of the city and headed northwards. He pointed out to me the places where these cadets had fought and suffered casualties. We discussed the general situation, preparations for re-entering the city (in which the cadets would have a role to play), and the problem of military education in the future. But I also noticed that Prince Djatikusumo gave no less attention to developments in Surakarta than to these military problems.

On March 29, we left Manisrenggo, a fertile area on the slopes of Mount Merapi where the rivers run small and clear. We crossed the main road between Jogjakarta and Kaliurang not far from the point where my car had broken down on the night of December 18, 1948, only a few hours before the Dutch attack. After spending the night in the *salak* orchards

⁶¹G. P. H. Djatikusumo was born in Surakarta, Central Java, in 1917. He attended the Institute of Technology in Delft and, on the eve of the war, returned to Indonesia and enrolled in the Reserve Officers' Training School. During the occupation he served with the Peta in the Solo area. After the Republic was proclaimed, he was the first commander of the Fourth Division, covering the Pekalongan-Semarang-Pati area. He then headed the consolidated Fifth Division (Ronggolawe) in the Pati-Bodjonegoro area after the May 1946 reorganization. In 1948, he was assigned to the Army General Staff of the Ministry of Defense before being placed in charge of the Military Academy in Jogjakarta.

south of Kaliurang, we crossed the road between Jogjakarta and Magelang. We continued walking, crossed the Progo River, stopped for a short while at Dekso, and finally arrived at the hamlet of Banaran on the afternoon of March 31.

I am not a Javanese; I am an Indonesian born in Tapanuli. Nonetheless, in all my wandering around Java during this war of independence, I never once felt like a stranger. Sjafrudin, a son of West Java, who directed the entire people's war from the mountains of Minangkabau, certainly felt no stranger there. It was the same with Hidajat, also from West Java, who led the people's war in Sumatra; with Simbolon,⁶² who was born in Tapanuli and led the people's war in South Sumatra; with Kawilarang, hailing from the Minahasa region, but leader of the people's war in Tapanuli and East Sumatra; with Nasution, who was born in Tapanuli and served as the Java Commander; with Sadikin, from Banjumas, who headed the people's war in Solo; and with Sungkono, again from Banjumas, who led the war of independence in East Java. What better evidence could there be that the people's war was a national war, even though conditions required its organization on a regional basis?

Yet the people's war also had its specific regional aspects. Waging war on its own resources, even within a broader framework, naturally increased a region's confidence and self-respect. Within each region tales of local heroism were born and swelled the pride of its inhabitants. The sense of sharing a common destiny among military leaders, government officials, and community leaders in each region was also unquestionably strengthened during the people's war. Moreover, the local traditions of each region were widely used to mobilize the people for the war. I saw myself how the memories of Diponegoro's struggle were a living factor in the area around Banaran. In Central Java--and apparently also in East Java--Djojjoboyo's predictions gave strength and guidance to the people. In other regions, different symbols were used to bind the people to the cause. Java waged its people's war quite separately from Sumatra, although both recognized the leadership of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia and of the Panglima Besar. But each region, great or small, waged the people's war on the basis of its own resources. Perhaps one could say that the people's war increased our consciousness and self-respect as a nation at the same time that it strengthened each individual region's consciousness of its own value, strength, and identity.

The forces that were awakened during the people's war could be compared to the power of a river in flood. I often wondered what would happen to this power when the war ended. Could we use the immense power of the river to generate electricity? Could we use the abundance of water to bring fertility and freshness to the ricefields and gardens of our people? Or would this powerful force and these agitated waters create misery and suffering for our people, after their wartime target, Dutch rule, had been swept away? We would need social engineers capable of harnessing the tremendous forces generated during the people's

⁶²Maludin Simbolon was born in Tarutung, Tapanuli, in 1916. He was graduated from the Teachers' College in Surakarta and was a teacher in Palembang from 1938. During the Japanese occupation, he enrolled at the Officers' Training School of the Giyūgun, the Sumatran equivalent of the Peta. From 1945 to 1946, he headed the First Sumatra Division, South Sumatra, in Palembang. In 1947, he was assigned to the headquarters of the Sumatra Command but was active again in the South Sumatra region during the second Dutch attack.

war, in order to bring about happiness and prosperity rather than misery and poverty.

Such were my thoughts and feelings as I came back "home" to Banaran, after wandering for almost forty days, from village to village and mountain to mountain, in the regions of Jogjakarta and Surakarta, where the heart of Java has beaten since the dawn of our history.

CHAPTER VI

PREPARATIONS PENDING NEGOTIATIONS

After our return to Banaran, I recorded the following impressions in my notebook. "In general, the front formed by the people and the military is satisfactory. Finance and ammunition continue to pose difficult problems. The internal information service needs improvement. We should try to ensure that the coming negotiations do not create discord, either between us and the men in Bangka and Djakarta, or among ourselves."

By this time, it was already definite that negotiations would take place. On March 23, 1949, the Security Council had instructed the United Nations Commission for Indonesia to take the initiative in holding a preliminary conference between the Republic and the Dutch. It would cover three questions: the return of the Republican government to Jogjakarta; cessation of hostilities; and the possibility of holding a Round Table Conference. The problems we faced in relation to these negotiations were not easy to solve.

At Banaran, we analyzed the situation as follows. The Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia was the official government authority, internally as well as externally, while our leaders in Bangka were officially prisoners of the Dutch. But, clearly, the Security Council and the UN Commission for Indonesia intended to conduct negotiations with the Bangka-Djakarta leadership, for there were no indications that the Commission planned to contact the Emergency Government. It seemed that the Bangka-Djakarta leadership would agree to negotiate with the Dutch, with the assistance of the UN Commission for Indonesia. The Emergency Government could not repudiate the Bangka-Djakarta leaders by issuing a statement that the latter had no right to speak on behalf of the Republic. Such a statement would weaken our external position and might create internal disunity. If the Bangka-Djakarta leaders reached an agreement with the Dutch and the UN Commission for Indonesia, it would be even more difficult for the Emergency Government to repudiate it. On the other hand, if the results achieved were not satisfactory to us, then a split might develop between those in favor and those against.

What could be done? The best solution, of course, would be to arrange a pre-negotiations meeting between the President, the Vice-President, and the Bangka-Djakarta leaders, on the one hand, and the Emergency Government, the Central Government Commissariat for Java, and the Armed Forces leadership, on the other. But Dutch facilities would be required to conduct such a meeting, and these would clearly not be given.

The Emergency Government and the Armed Forces leadership could, of course, send representatives to Djakarta. But this, too, required the consent of the Dutch, who were still in control in Djakarta. Moreover, psychologically it would be very strange if the Emergency Government and the Armed Forces leadership, while leading the people's war, sent delegates to Djakarta to assist leaders imprisoned by the Dutch

to negotiate with their wardens. In fact our leaders in Djakarta did at one time ask the Armed Forces Command to send a delegation to Djakarta, but the Command had no choice but to reject this request.

The only remaining alternative was to send a letter by courier to our leaders in Djakarta and Bangka. We had the opportunity to do this; Minister Djuanda was in Jogjakarta and he had already flown to Djakarta several times in the UN Commission's airplane in order to help prepare for the negotiations. This was also the case with the Sultan. Our courier to Jogjakarta could easily deliver a letter to the Sultan or to Minister Djuanda, who could then take it to Djakarta.

We would need to carry on extensive propaganda among the rank and file of the people's guerrilla forces in preparation for the coming negotiations. Up to now, our internal propaganda had been aimed solely at igniting the spirit of resistance to the Dutch. Negotiations were bound to create a new situation. The motives of our leaders in Djakarta and Bangka in conducting the coming negotiations would have to be carefully explained to our people. Otherwise, a situation might arise where the people would receive the results like a bolt from the blue and feel consternation and anger.

As Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, I sent letters, through Minister Djuanda, explaining the attitudes, outlook, and psychology prevailing among our rank and file, hoping thereby to prevent the Djakarta-Bangka leadership from making unacceptable decisions. At the same time, I had to explain to the rank and file what motives and objectives would guide our leaders in the coming negotiations.

It was not very pleasant to find myself caught between the Djakarta-Bangka leaders and the rank and file in the countryside as negotiations with the Dutch approached. In such a position, I could only too easily be accused by the men in Bangka and Djakarta of being "extremist" and by the rank and file of being too "soft." Though unhappy about placing myself in such a position, I felt that, as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, I could not evade this responsibility.

Under these circumstances, I sent the following letter from Bana-ran to Minister Djuanda in Jogjakarta:

6 April, 1949

Your Excellency,

Following Your Excellency's return from Bangka, we eagerly await your impressions of that visit, especially with regard to the views prevailing in Bangka (and Djakarta) on the strategy for carrying on the Republican struggle. We are particularly interested in: the agenda of the coming negotiations; our tactics in these negotiations; Your Excellency's own opinion of the perspectives of these negotiations; the problem of a cease-fire; the question of a Round Table Conference; the issue of the return of Republican territories (in conformity with the Security Council Resolution of January 28); the role of the BFO people and the Republic's tactics towards them; and efforts to unite all the Republican groups. These efforts have been isolated from each other as a result of the Dutch aggression and each has developed in its own way, leading to rather different positions on the principles of our struggle and different assessments of the importance of the various factors involved.

As I explained in my previous letter, I see the most pressing problem as the need to unify as many of the scattered Republican groups as possible under a government with true internal and external authority. Accordingly, the unconditional return of the Republican government to Jogjakarta, prior to any cessation of hostilities or a political settlement (Round Table Conference, etc.), is essential. This means that the only acceptable item on the agenda for preliminary negotiations should be the return of the government to Jogjakarta. Only after its return and after consultations with the Emergency Government, the leadership of the Armed Forces, and probably with the political parties or what is left of the Working Committee of the KNIP, can negotiations on a cease-fire and a political settlement have the prospect of winning support from the majority of the people and from the Armed Forces.

From the reports reaching us here, we conclude that the Dutch will not accept such a procedure. So I presume that, even on the question of the agenda, conflicts will probably emerge which may lead to a deadlock. The Dutch will doubtless pressure the Republic to accept an invitation to a Round Table Conference and to issue orders for a cease-fire prior to any decision on the return to Jogjakarta. The Dutch, moreover, apparently intend to bargain for the return to Jogjakarta by establishing various conditions and restrictions. If this proves to be the case, then we must decide whether we can compromise or whether we should refer the question back to the Security Council with the *reasonable* hope that the majority will support us. It is absolutely essential for us to know the views prevailing in Bangka and Djakarta in order to coordinate our actions effectively.

The Dutch will no doubt present the formal argument that the recent Security Council resolution declared that talks should concern: the cessation of hostilities, the return of the Republic to Jogjakarta, and a conference in The Hague. They will also, of course, present the political argument that, if the Republican government returns to Jogjakarta without any commitment to a cease-fire and participation in a Round Table Conference, it will come under the influence of extremist groups and the Armed Forces. It follows that the Dutch will probably propose the following solution: The Republican government may return to Jogjakarta, but the Dutch government "considers itself responsible" for preserving the Republic from "pressure" by extremists and armed groups. Therefore, the Dutch will propose that their military forces remain in Jogjakarta, or at least, that our military forces do not re-enter the city. This clearly will cause a stalemate. But the question arises as to when, according to Bangka, would be the best *moment* to reach this deadlock. The General Assembly will meet soon, and the Dutch may delay the moment of deadlock until after this session is over.

From here it is obviously difficult to determine to what extent our leaders in Bangka will have to accede to the wishes of the BFO groups in order to ensure that a majority will join us in a united front. We should also make sure that our position does not make it too difficult for outside groups eventually to support the government's political line. Admittedly, achieving a balance between these different currents of opinion will be difficult, and every mistake will be exploited by the enemy for their own benefit. The problem of a cease-fire is a case in point. As I mentioned in my previous letter, the Republic's stand in this matter must be determined only after consultations with His Excellency the Panglima Besar. By the terms of the Security Council Resolution of January 28, the government must be able to consult with whomever it thinks fit as soon as it returns to Jogjakarta. In my opinion, at the very least, His Excellency the Panglima Besar, the Staff of the Armed Forces, and the Java and Sumatra Army and Territory Commanders should be provided with transportation. I think we have a convincing argument for delaying the talks on a cease-fire until the government has consulted with the Panglima Besar.

It should be emphasized that a cessation of hostilities must be negotiated first; the problem is very complicated, and Dutch instructions so far cannot be interpreted as implementing the January 28 Resolution. It should also be stressed that the eventual cease-fire must apply not only to the Republic, but also to the Dutch. To participate in such negotiations, the Republic must also send along technical experts. Theoretically, the Dutch or the Commission may counter that such experts only be allowed to attend a conference in Djakarta. This, however, is unacceptable. The psychological consequences of any such negotiations would be very detrimental.

If discussions on the technical aspects of a cease-fire are held (i.e., following the return of the government to Jogjakarta and consultations with the Panglima Besar), they will be very difficult because the overall situation is so complex (as already analyzed in Col. Nasution's memo). But we will have achieved one concrete result already--the return of Jogjakarta--and this will strengthen our position organizationally, politically, and psychologically. A deadlock might still arise in the technical negotiations, but I suspect that somehow a solution would eventually be found, since both parties would need one. Whatever happens, some way out will ultimately be found if both parties feel it is imperative.

The Dutch are now launching a campaign alleging that leftist groups are so powerful in the area south of Jogjakarta that a civil war may break out if the government comes back. This is absolutely untrue; we are strong enough to control the situation inside and outside the city in the event that the government returns; all preparations have been completed.

It is true that certain political groups are now systematically trying to undermine the government's prestige and are urging a change in the government (and in the Army leadership). But these groups are not very powerful, certainly no more powerful than before the Dutch aggression. It is most important that the Armed Forces be able to concur in the government's policy. If we can achieve this, then we shall control the situation. It would be better still, of course, if the cabinet could be strengthened by increasing its size and replacing some ministers. How does Bangka feel about this?

In case of a deadlock in the preliminary negotiations, either on the composition of the agenda or in the negotiations themselves, then the Indonesian question will be referred once again to the Security Council (and possibly discussed in the General Assembly). But, here in Indonesia, the fighting and political activity will continue as before.

In Sumatra the Dutch seem to have achieved some results--perhaps only superficial ones, but still useful to Dutch propagandists. In Solo and Pasundan, too, they have apparently succeeded in infiltrating "separatist ideas" even into the military. The extent of their success here is as yet unknown. Nonetheless, the number of Dutch soldiers killed and the frequency of our attacks have certainly not declined.

I think that noncooperation is actually decreasing, and, at the same time, the political position of the federalists is moving closer to that of the Republic.

All this leads to the question: Which of us has time on his side? Who does it weaken more, us or the enemy? This question requires thorough analysis, but, for the time being, allow me to conclude this letter by expressing my *conviction* that we shall triumph.

Second Deputy Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces

(T. B. Simatupang, Colonel)

P.S. May I kindly request Your Excellency to pass on the substance of this letter to Djakarta.

The above letter gives an idea of the policy pursued "externally" at that time from Banaran. The following observations were sent "internally" to the Panglima Besar, the Java Army and Territory Commander, Military Governors I to IV, the heads of departments, and the Information and Documentation Division of the Armed Forces Staff for wide dissemination. Copies of these observations, as in the case of other letters, were "mailed" at the Java Command post at Dekso, just as someone in an "ordinary" community would mail letters at a regular post office. Couriers took them from Dekso to their respective addressees. Our guerrilla PTT [postal service] operated quite satisfactorily, though naturally more slowly than the PTT in the Dutch-occupied regions.

OBSERVATIONS

April 8, 1949

I. General

The work of consolidating and perfecting our organization continues everywhere, though the mobilization of students is still not running smoothly. Efforts to provide legal security for the people have continued; they include the establishment of a (military) police force, courts of justice, and actions against disruptive elements. The problem of financing the troops and the civil service and of social security for their dependents living inside and outside the occupied towns remains one of the most difficult and important problems. The best solution would be to establish *official committees* in the towns to act on behalf of these dependents and, if possible, to provide these committees with support from outside of town. We face a difficult problem concerning ammunition and explosives. Aside from economizing on ammunition, we should provide coordination between the regions for distribution and exchange of the supplies as needed and also on their seizure, theft, or purchase from the enemy.

Efforts to extend our territorial organization into long-occupied regions and to pursue military operations there have continued in spite of the slow progress so far achieved. The number of enemy casualties remains virtually constant, indicating that our resistance has not abated. Experience has proved that the enemy cannot achieve significant results so long as the morale of our army remains good and the people's front supports it. The enemy tries, therefore, to undermine the resistance by *indirect* methods: by political activities (Surakarta, Pasundan);¹ by spreading false reports designed to create mutual suspicion; by breaking the people's spirit (bombing kampung and market places, burning down houses, and other atrocities), and perhaps by agitating against our leaders (the government and the military high command).

Indications suggest that the enemy will intensify attempts to agitate in and lure regions distant from the center (West Java, East Java). We must, therefore, step up communications and personal contacts with these rather isolated areas to prevent them falling easy prey to enemy provocation. Contact with Sumatra and foreign countries continues uninterrupted.

II. International events likely to affect us

The American (and West European) bloc and the Russian bloc are strengthening their respective positions. Russia has achieved considerable success

¹This perhaps refers to the Dutch promise that the special status of the Surakarta Principalities would be restored if the rulers would cooperate with the Dutch. Their special status had been abolished after the 1946 social revolution.

in China, while the American bloc has intensified its internal organization (the Atlantic Pact). Signs portending an early outbreak of world war have *not yet* appeared; both sides are apparently still in the *preparatory stage*.

The Atlantic Pact is creating closer ties between the Dutch and the United States. This may result in either of two alternatives: America may exert more pressure on the Dutch to resolve the Indonesian problem speedily, or America may adjust its own position to Dutch policy, giving the Dutch money and arms. As for the United States itself, some signs have appeared that it wants to pressure the Dutch to settle the Indonesian problem first before giving them money and arms within the framework of the Atlantic Pact. For the present, then, one cannot know definitely what effect the Atlantic Pact will have on the situation in Indonesia. We have seen that so far the Asian nations are not in a position to give more than moral and diplomatic support. They are trying to bring the Indonesian question before the General Assembly of the United Nations, but this too will have only moral and diplomatic significance. In brief, *no* significant international developments have occurred which change our position; the outcome of the conflict depends mainly on events in Indonesia itself.

III. Possibilities for negotiations

In pursuance of the Security Council recommendation of March 23, 1949, the UN Commission for Indonesia has invited the Republic and the Dutch to hold preliminary negotiations in Djakarta concerning: the return of the Republican government to Jogjakarta; a cease-fire; and the possibility of holding a Round Table Conference. The Dutch have accepted the invitation, but with the reservation "that the negotiations cannot lessen Dutch responsibility." The Republic has also accepted, but with the reservation that, in the first instance, it is prepared to discuss only the return of the government to Jogjakarta. In other words the government must return to Jogjakarta first; it must have time to settle down there as a government and to hold necessary consultations (including, of course, with the Emergency Government, the Commissariat of the Central Government, and the military high command); only then can negotiations on a cease-fire and a political solution begin. Given these circumstances, the UN Commission will no doubt try to find a way out and if this proves impossible, the Indonesian problem may once again be referred back to the Security Council.

In the meantime, fighting and political activity will continue in Indonesia. Should we eventually reach the point of holding detailed technical discussions on implementing a cease-fire, clearly such discussions will be very difficult, because the troops of each side occupy positions in the "sphere" of the other. Dutch strategy seeks to achieve an agreement with the Republican government on a cease-fire and a political settlement before a return to Jogjakarta because this will create conflicts later between the Republican government on the one hand, and the political groups and the Armed Forces on the other. Such conflicts would weaken the position of the President and Vice-President, and by extension our position as a whole. Our leaders in Bangka, however, want to reestablish a cohesive unity, centered in Jogjakarta, between the government, the military, and the political groups. Such a unity would enable us to counter the Dutch from a single strong position.

IV. Political events in Indonesia

The majority of "states" which the Dutch founded to counterbalance the Republic now support the Republic against the Dutch. A small fraction under Dr. Mansur² remains subservient to the Dutch. Our leaders in Bangka face the

²Dr. Mansur, an East Sumatra aristocrat, was made head of the Dutch-sponsored state of East Sumatra, formed in December 1947.

problem of finding a position acceptable both to the great majority of the federalists and to the Republicans, a position on which we can build a powerful front against the Dutch. The Dutch are busily manipulating feudal groups and regionalist sentiment (for example, in Sumatra and Pasundan) to undermine our unity.

Without abandoning our vigilance, we should carefully avoid making any "enemies" when we can achieve greater results by using tact. We have already received a report from Lt. Col. Abimanju, Deputy to the Fourth Military Governor, on developments in Pasundan that the Dutch have been loudly exploiting in an effort to weaken our morale. His report makes it clear that there has been no cooperation, only a local cease-fire called by two battalions, because they wanted to deal with Darul Islam first. Nonetheless, he emphasizes that this cease-fire contravenes our organizational principles, since external relations are the prerogative of the government of the Republic. Some way should therefore be found to annul the results of those local talks.

Efforts should also be made so as to concentrate the Darul Islam's energies solely on the fight against the Dutch. The Pasundan affair shows how inadequate communications and contacts can be exploited by the enemy as part of a strategy of "divide and rule." We must work unceasingly to establish *contacts*, from top to bottom, from bottom to top, from left to right, and from right to left.

V. Conclusion

In the current situation, with its numerous possibilities--negotiations, deadlock, etc.--we must ignore agitation and whispering campaigns. We must work to preserve unity and increase ties with all groups. We must preserve our fighting spirit, but at the same time improve our territorial organization and extend it to include the entire population in an active role for the defense of our independence. In this regard, we need to expand the battlefield to regions occupied prior to the Second Dutch Aggression which until now have remained quiet. We must rectify our mistakes and shortcomings.

In the field, April 8, 1949
Second Deputy Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces
(T. B. Simatupang, Colonel)

I sent an abridged version to our leaders in Djakarta and Bangka, and I cabled a survey of the attitudes prevailing among our rank and file to the Emergency Government in Sumatra. I also sent a letter to Dr. Leimena in Djakarta urging that talks on the technical problems involved in a cease-fire be delayed until after our return to Jogjakarta.

As I mentioned in my "Observations" above, the Darul Islam was a problem in West Java. Reports made it increasingly clear that in several parts of West Java a sort of triangular warfare raged between the Republic, the Darul Islam, and the Dutch. Although our troops had been withdrawn from West Java after the signing of the Renville Agreement, the people's resistance against the Dutch had never ceased. But leadership of this people's war had gradually passed into the hands of groups previously enrolled in the Hizbullah. Officially, the Hizbullah had merged with the TNI during Amir Sjarifuddin's period as Minister of Defense. Kartosuwirjo,³ then the top Hizbullah leader in West Java,

³S. M. Kartosuwirjo was born in Tjepu, East Java, in 1905. He was active in the Jong Islamieten Bond before becoming private secretary to Tjokroaminoto in

had even been officially appointed Deputy Minister of Defense in the Sjarifuddin Cabinet. As far as I know, however, he never went to Jogjakarta to assume his post. Prior to the second Dutch attack, we in Jogjakarta had always believed that the people's war in West Java basically supported the Republic, even though its methods did not conform with official policy. When the first Siliwangi troops arrived back in West Java after the second Dutch attack, they had expected the Darul Islam troops to welcome them as old friends. And to be sure, first reports did indicate that our troops were cordially entertained, but later on, the Darul Islam suddenly launched an all-out attack. Among the officers killed in this tragedy was Maj. Simon Tobing, a cheerful and courageous young man and a capable commander, whom I had known very well. Obviously, the Darul Islam considered itself at war with us, and it waged this war according to its interpretation of the Islamic laws of war, for example, those on confiscation of property, prisoners of war, etc.

When we received these reports at Banaran, I recalled my conversation with Achmad at Kaliurang a couple of days after the Siliwangi troops had taken Madiun. Had armed conflict stemming from antagonisms between Islamic and non-Islamic ideologies already begun at the very moment when the nation as a whole faced the Dutch? I was neither an expert in Islam nor a follower of the Islamic religion. I therefore found it difficult to agree when Achmad and his friends asked me to study the problem of Islam in our state and nation in the hope that we could prevent an armed conflict between Islamic and non-Islamic ideologies such as had already occurred between the Communist and non-Communist ideologies. I felt that others were better qualified to make such a study.

I was convinced that the demise of Dutch rule in Indonesia was only a matter of time, as soon as the ruling circles in Holland made further progress in their mental outlook and political awareness. "They cannot easily abandon the old idea of a kingdom comprising the Netherlands, the East Indies and the West Indies, with which they have been indoctrinated since childhood. But though it may be difficult psychologically, they must soon realize that this old idea can no longer be maintained," I explained to Noes Mokoginta at Banaran. We faced a more critical problem: once Dutch domination of Indonesia officially ends, would we be able ultimately to settle the antagonisms between Communist and non-Communist ideologies and between Islamic and non-Islamic beliefs which exist in the hearts and minds of our people, without experiencing endless armed conflict? In the history of Western Europe, the Catholics waged war against the Protestants for almost one hundred years before both parties accepted a new principle--the idea of nationalism--which made it possible for Protestants and Catholics to live as brothers in one "nation," in spite of their religious differences. Surely one hundred years of armed conflict and hatred would be too long to wait before building a powerful, "just and prosperous" Indonesia?

1927. In 1931, he became PSII general-secretary and, on Tjokroaminoto's death, vice-chairman of the party. Throughout the 1930's, he led the most bitterly noncooperating wing of the party. Finding himself in a minority, he retired from the party in 1939. During the occupation, he served nominally as secretary of the Masjumi but spent most of his time organizing a militantly Islamic training center near Malangbong, West Java. He was elected to the leadership of the post-independence Masjumi but concentrated his efforts on military activities. He declined an offer to serve in Amir's cabinet because he preferred to remain behind enemy lines in West Java, where he led Hizbullah units very effectively.

CHAPTER VII

THE RUM-VAN ROYEN AGREEMENT

On April 9, 1949, I wrote in my notebook: "Van Royen¹ will arrive in Djakarta on April 12. The Dutch government evidently plans to give *plein pouvoir* to his delegation. Van Royen's position will differ sharply from that of Elink Schuurman² and Abdulkadir."³ As we at Banaran saw it, in our analysis of April 9, van Royen's position compared with that of van Vredenburg⁴, for, like van Royen, he had been vested with great powers to conduct negotiations on board the *Renville*, following the first Dutch attack.

Nonetheless, van Royen's position vis-à-vis our delegation would not be as powerful as van Vredenburg's had been. During the Renville negotiations, van Vredenburg had threatened that the Dutch would launch a doorstoot if an agreement were not quickly achieved. At that time, such a threat had a considerable effect on us. Initially, we had believed that the Three-State Commission, representing the United Nations, would nullify the Dutch threats.

Early in January 1948, Simbolon, Dahlan Djambek,⁵ and I were spending the night at the Independence Proclamation Building at No. 56, Pegangsaan Timur. Cols. Simbolon and Dahlan Djambek had been sent by the Sumatra Command to sit with me as members of the Military Commission during the negotiations. After graduating from the Christian Dutch-Indies Teachers' College in Surakarta, Maludin Simbolon started out as a teacher in South Sumatra. During the Japanese occupation he

¹Dr. J. H. van Royen was the Dutch representative to the UN at the time of the second attack. He subsequently headed the Netherlands delegation to Djakarta, in April 1949, which resulted in the Rum-van Royen Agreement.

²T. Elink Schuurman was chairman of the Netherlands delegation just prior to the second Dutch attack.

³R. Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo had been attached to the Netherlands Indies government-in-exile during World War II. In the fall of 1945, he was made head of the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration. He was chairman of the Dutch delegation to the Renville discussions, for which purpose he had been elevated to the post of Deputy Lieutenant Governor-General.

⁴Jhr. H. F. L. K. van Vredenburg headed the Dutch Special Committee to the Committee of Good Offices concerned with supervising the truce after the first military action. Subsequently, he led the Dutch delegation to the Renville talks along with Abdulkadir.

⁵Dahlan Djambek was born in 1917. After the Proclamation of Independence, he was commander in the Bukittinggi area and in 1946, the first commander of the Third Sumatra Division, covering West Sumatra and Riau. He later became Commander of the Central Sumatra Sub-command, and, in 1947, was Chief of Staff to the Sumatra Command Headquarters in Prapat. In 1948, he was assigned as military adviser to the Republican delegation in the Renville negotiations.

was an army officer, and after our Proclamation of Independence he became one of the most prominent military leaders in Sumatra. Dahlan Djambek, also a prominent Sumatran leader, was the son of a famous Muslim scholar from West Sumatra. We had been fellow students at the Christian Senior High School at Salemba (Djakarta) for three years. During the Japanese occupation, he became an army officer in West Sumatra. Both Simbolon and Dahlan showed great talent and considerable tact as "military diplomats" during the course of the negotiations.

That night we were awakened by members of our delegation who had just come from a meeting with the Three-State Commission on the *Renville*. At this meeting, the Commission had informed our delegation that, in talks between the Commission and the Dutch delegation at the Ryswyk Palace [Istana Negara], van Vredenburg had threatened that his government would "resume its freedom of action" if the Republic refused the Dutch proposals. In other words, van Vredenburg had issued an ultimatum to our delegation and used the Three-State Commission as his courier.

The Commission's report had caused panic among our delegates, and they had immediately left the *Renville* and returned to No. 56, Pegangsaan Timur, where they awakened the three of us. But what could we do? The effect of van Vredenburg's threat was strengthened further by our realization that the Three-State Commission, which we had formerly expected would protect us from Dutch threats, had proved either incapable or unwilling to act and had simply passed the ultimatum on to us.

In April 1949, however, the threat of a doorstoot no longer caused us concern. The Dutch had already tried it, and the only result was that now they had to negotiate with us once again. The only weapons that van Royen could use would be promises, flattery, and his own shrewdness as a diplomat.

Did this mean that Rum would hold a strong position in the coming negotiations? In a negative sense, this was true, because he did not have to worry about a doorstoot in case agreement could not be achieved. Nonetheless, Rum's position had its weak side too: he would not be free until an agreement had been achieved.

Calm reflection showed that both Rum and van Royen were in weak positions because both had to achieve an agreement--otherwise Rum would remain in Bangka and van Royen would lose the Indonesian question back to the United Nations again, where the Dutch influence had reached its nadir! This situation put the United Nations Commission,⁶ or, to be more exact, Mr. Cochran, in a strong position in the coming negotiations. It seemed certain, therefore, that eventually some kind of an agreement would be achieved.

On April 22, 1949, I recorded in my diary: "Anak Agung and other BFO leaders have gone to Bangka." The Dutch had created the BFO to offset the Republic, but now that the Dutch had failed to crush the Republic in battle, the BFO held the balance of power. Both we and the Dutch wanted to win over the BFO and get its support in the upcoming negotiations. At the very least, each party would seek to prevent the

⁶In January 1949, the UN Security Council reconstituted its Committee of Good Offices (Three-State Committee) as the UN Commission for Indonesia. The new body had enlarged powers and could make decisions by a two-to-one vote.

BFO from siding completely with its adversary. Presumably the BFO would take advantage of its position to seek concessions from both sides.

In the economic field, perhaps it would turn out that another "third party," in this case the Chinese, had gained the greatest benefit from our conflict with the Dutch. While the Dutch and the Republic were engaged in a life and death struggle, the Chinese had clearly succeeded in occupying strategic positions in the economy.

We reached these rather discouraging conclusions at Banaran as we analyzed the reports on the visit of Anak Agung and his BFO friends to the island of Bangka on April 22, 1949.

The entry for April 26 noted: "Yesterday Bung Hatta arrived in Djakarta from Bangka. The Sultan has also just come from Jogjakarta." When we received this news at Banaran, I concluded that the negotiations in Djakarta had reached a decisive stage. We presumed that Bung Hatta had come from Bangka to give his and the President's final decision, while the Sultan's arrival was no doubt connected with the return of the Jogjakarta region to our own people.

All this strengthened our conviction that the Emergency Government and the Armed Forces High Command would have no alternative than to support the agreement now being prepared in Djakarta, in spite of the fact that we at Banaran still did not know its form and substance. As we saw it: "How can the Emergency Government, and specifically the Armed Forces High Command, reject an agreement which, judging by the course of the negotiations, will get the blessing of the President and Vice-President?"

Early in May 1949, a courier came from the city with a letter from the Sultan, together with two draft statements that would be read respectively by Mr. Rum and Dr. van Royen at an official meeting to be held between the two delegations under the chairmanship of the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. As the documents we received were reportedly only in "draft" form, we studied them carefully and then composed a note to the delegation with our proposed amendments. However, before it could be sent to Jogjakarta for transmission to Djakarta, Djakarta radio announced that an agreement, called the Rum-van Royen Agreement, had been reached between the Republic and the Dutch. It was identical to the "draft" we had received at Banaran, and ran as follows:

I. Statement of the Delegation of the Republic of Indonesia.

(Presented by Mr. Moh. Rum)

In my capacity as head of the delegation of the Republic I have been authorized by President Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammad Hatta to declare their personal willingness, in pursuance of the Security Council Resolution of January 28, 1949 and the guidelines of March 23, 1949:

1. to issue an order to the armed followers of the Republic to end guerrilla warfare;
2. to cooperate in restoring peace and in maintaining law and order; and
3. to participate in a Round Table Conference in The Hague with the objective of accelerating the genuine, complete, and unconditional transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia.

President Sukarno and Vice-President Mohammad Hatta will urge the acceptance of such a policy by the government of the Republic of Indonesia as soon as possible after its return to Jogjakarta.

II. Statement of the Dutch Delegation

(Presented by Dr. van Royen)

The Dutch delegation has been authorized to declare, in connection with the willingness just expressed by Mr. Rum, its consent to the return of the government of the Republic of Indonesia to Jogjakarta. It further agrees to the formation of one or more joint committees under the auspices of the UN Commission with the objectives:

1. to undertake the necessary investigations and preparations before the return of the government of the Republic of Indonesia to Jogjakarta.
2. to study and advise concerning appropriate measures to be taken to implement the end of guerrilla warfare and cooperation to restore peace and maintain law and order.

The Dutch government agrees that the government of the Republic of Indonesia should be completely free to carry on its proper functions within a region covering the Residency of Jogjakarta, and that this constitutes a step taken in conformity with the sense of the Security Council's directives of March 23, 1949.

The Dutch government once again confirms its readiness to guarantee an immediate cessation of all military operations and to release forthwith and unconditionally all political prisoners arrested since December 17, 1948, within the Republic of Indonesia.

Without prejudicing the right of self-determination of parts of the Indonesian people as recognized in the principles of Linggadjadi and Renville, the Dutch government will not form or recognize states or regions in the territory controlled by the Republic prior to December 19, 1948, and will not expand states or regions at the expense of the aforementioned territory of the Republic.

The Dutch government agrees that the Republic of Indonesia shall be one of the constituent states in the United States of Indonesia. In the event that a provisional house of representatives for Indonesia is formed and accordingly the number of representatives of the Republic in this body has to be determined, this number shall be half the total number of all members, excluding the Republican representatives.

In accordance with the sense of the Security Council's directives of March 23, 1949 with regard to a Round Table Conference in The Hague, and to ensure that the negotiations referred to by the Security Council Resolution of January 28, 1949 be held as quickly as possible, the Dutch government will make a sincere effort to convene the conference immediately following the return of the government of the Republic of Indonesia to Jogjakarta. This conference will work out the procedures needed to accelerate the genuine, complete, and unconditional transfer of sovereignty to the United States of Indonesia in conformity with the Renville principles.

For the sake of cooperation in restoring peace and maintaining law and order, the Dutch government agrees that, in all regions outside the Residency of Jogjakarta where civil servants, members of the police force, and other officials of the Indonesian government (the Dutch government in Indonesia) are not now performing their functions, the civil servants, members of the police force, and other officials of the Republic, where they are still continuing to perform their functions, will remain in office. It goes without

saying that the Dutch authorities will assist the government of the Republic wherever necessary, and on the basis of reasonable considerations, to contact and hold consultations with anyone in Indonesia, including those holding civil and military positions in the Republic. The technical details will be worked out by both sides under the supervision of the UN Commission for Indonesia.

The agreement had become a reality. The sequence Linggadjati-Renville now had been increased by a new term, Rum-van Royen, which itself would lead before long to yet another--Round Table Conference.

How would our people react--in particular those who had till now been waging the people's war--to the Rum-van Royen Agreement? For us at Banaran it was already clear that the agreement would arouse suspicion and disappointment and that voices raised for and against it might create dissension in Republican ranks.

So far this had always been our experience each time we reached an agreement with the Dutch, i.e., the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements. In addition, feelings of hatred and revenge towards the Dutch had grown deeper and more widespread during the people's war. I had seen this with my own eyes near Dekso. The corpses of some white men, apparently Dutch soldiers killed in the fighting around Magelang, were found drifting seaward in the Progo River; the villagers--men and women, old and young--all lined up along the banks of the river to watch with beaming faces. When I met with van Royen for the first time after the Dutch troops abandoned Jogjakarta, early in April [August], I told him about this unforgettable experience in order to give him a picture of the emotions left in the hearts and minds of the people by the second Dutch attack.

Suspicion, concern about possible internal divisions, and anger with the Dutch were clearly evidenced in the message issued by Panglima Besar Sudirman on May 1, just a few days before the announcement of the Rum-van Royen Agreement.

The Panglima Besar of the Armed Forces of the
Republic of Indonesia

Message to All Unit Commanders

1. Discharge your oath and your duty as soldiers of the Republic of Indonesia, prepared to guarantee the security and safety of the homeland.
2. Preserve unity within the military, and make it a unified, unbreachable, and mighty bastion in the face of any enemy.
3. Maintain military discipline faithfully and wholeheartedly.
4. So long as the enemy still rampages in our territory, commanders should refuse to be lured into considerations of possible negotiations, because this will only undermine our defenses and our struggle.
5. Remember and realize that the bitter sufferings we have endured since December 19, 1948, came about because the majority of our leaders, civil as well as military, were so hypnotized by "negotiations" they forgot that the Dutch stood fully prepared for war on our very doorstep.
6. Leave the problem of negotiations completely to the High Command, which is responsible for the safety of the Armed Forces as a whole.

7. I am fully prepared to present to our government conditions and proposals which accord with the present burning spirit of the resistance among our Armed Forces and people, bearing in mind and taking into account the views of our commanders, above all those directly in charge of the fighting.
8. Do not waver in the face of suffering, for the closer we come to the achievement of our goals, the harder will be the suffering that we must endure.
9. Be confident and have faith that the independence of a state founded upon its people's innumerable sacrifices of lives and property can never be destroyed by any human being whoever.
10. Continue the struggle. I remain in command of you all. God willing, our sacred struggle will earn His blessing.

Headquarters, May 1, 1949

Panglima Besar of the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Indonesia

Lt. Gen. Sudirman

Nonetheless, an agreement had already been reached, and had become a reality. Our prime task now was to provide guidance and outlets to the feelings and opinions within our ranks which already existed or were developing as a consequence of the Rum-van Royen Agreement. At Banaran, we spent a great deal of time analyzing this problem. Eventually we reached the following conclusions, which I submitted to the Emergency Government and the Panglima Besar in the form of a memo.

The definitive position of the Armed Forces High Command will only be determined after a meeting of the Military Strategy Council, immediately following the government's return to Jogjakarta.

In the meantime, vis-à-vis the outside world, we should continue to support the position of the President and Vice-President, since a split between the President, Vice-President, and the leaders in Bangka and Djakarta on the one hand, and the Emergency Government and the Armed Forces High Command on the other, would prove catastrophic for us and advantageous for the Dutch.

Internally, we should preserve and increase our strength, in other words maintain a "second front" and prepare for every possibility in case the negotiations eventually end in deadlock.

This later became the basis for a "second line" theory, i.e., that on the "first line" we would conduct negotiations while on the "second line" we would continue to build up our forces to be able, if necessary, to resume the people's war.

In my capacity as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces I composed, on May 15, 1949, the following circular:

51 (SK) GSAP/49.

SECRET

Ministry of Defense
Staff of the Armed Forces

May 15, 1949

From: Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces

To: 1. H.E. the Panglima Besar of the Armed Forces of the Republic of
Indonesia.
2. Central Government Commissariat in Java.

3. Inspector-General of the Armed Forces.
4. Java Army and Territory Commander.
5. Military Governors I to IV.
6. Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Java Command Headquarters I/II.
7. Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Java Command Headquarters III/IV.
8. Deputy Chief of the General Staff of Java Command Headquarters Operations Command.
9. Chief of the Army General Staff (III).
10. Director of the Military College for Intelligence Officers.
11. Chief of Staff of the Military Territory of Jogjakarta.
12. Information and Documentation Division, Armed Forces Staff.
13. Military Attorney-General.
14. Chief of the State Police.
15. Governor of Central Java.
16. Col. Wijono.
17. Res. Maj. Maladi.
18. Capt. Sahid.
19. Information Staff of Student Mobilization.

OBSERVATIONS ON THE SITUATION AS OF MAY 15, 1949

1. New problems

The agreement reached in Djakarta on May 7, known as the Rum-van Royen Agreement, forces us to review our position and revise our strategy. So far our guiding principles have been simple: mobilize all energies and forces, organize them as effectively as possible, and use them in every way possible to hurt the enemy. Like all agreements, the Rum-van Royen Agreement will result in a more entangled, more complex, and more difficult situation than that which existed before. It will force us to deal with a considerable number of questions and factors hitherto not of immediate concern to us. Whether or not we resent this situation, because we are responsible for the resistance movement, we cannot escape our duty to respond firmly and adopt a definite stand toward the new problems we face.

2. Permanent basic principles

Whatever changes occur, a few basic principles remain as guides to action. Our resistance against the Dutch continues, that is to say, a conflict persists between us that can only be solved by a test of strength, intelligence, and tenacity. We must continue to mobilize and organize all energies and forces. The methods for doing this may have to change, however, if the Agreement is accepted by the governments and populations on both sides. As we know, the Agreement has already created difficulties on the Dutch side--Dr. Beel has resigned in protest. Tensions quite possibly will also develop on our side, perhaps precipitating a crisis. The most important question we will face in the weeks to come is whether we are capable of overcoming these tensions and crises without internal schisms.

3. One strategy and one leadership for the different fronts

We know that up to now our resistance--or "guerrilla war"--has been part of an overall resistance effort by the Republic which includes, aside from the guerrilla war front, the noncooperation front in the towns, and the propaganda and diplomacy front in Djakarta and abroad. We may debate which front is most important, but it is imperative that the different fronts have a united leadership and strategy. Furthermore, alongside the Republic's resistance, is the resistance, or at least the attempts, made by Indonesians outside the Republic in the cause of independence. It will be to our advantage if we can also establish a united leadership, or at least a united

strategy, with them. Otherwise, the Dutch will simply use them against us. Whether unity in leadership and strategy can be maintained and improved now that the Agreement has been negotiated will depend on forthcoming developments.

4. On negotiations, fighting, unity, and strength

The Agreement signifies we will seek to end the fighting and, for the umpteenth time, will try to solve our conflict with the Dutch through negotiations. The first problem in this connection is that nobody trusts the Dutch, and rightly so. Just on general principles, one should never trust one's enemies, and, more to the point, we have already experienced Dutch treachery and deceit. Whatever attitude and policy we eventually adopt, they must not be based on trust in the Dutch.

Does this mean, therefore, that, without further ado, we should annul the Agreement and behave as if it did not exist? Obviously, to answer this question, we need first to consider carefully all the eventualities, possibilities, and consequences of our forthcoming decision--not just as it will affect us but also its impact on the history of Indonesia's struggle for independence. A decision to annul the Agreement will almost certainly precipitate a tremendous internal split, arraying against the supporters of the Agreement and their followers [those who want to carry on the resistance]. Such a situation will hand victory to the Dutch without their lifting a finger. Certain people and groups here at home will also enthusiastically welcome such a split, for they themselves have always wanted to create one. The opinions and hopes of such people differ from ours.

On the other hand, to maintain unity, the negotiations will have to continue and we shall have to give them a chance, even if only a temporary one, until they end--in deadlock or success. If the negotiations have satisfactory results, we will devote our energies to developing our country. If they fail once again, then we shall have to continue the resistance. Therefore, even if we permit negotiations to proceed, we must continue to demand conditions which will allow us wide scope for maintaining and increasing our strength. We should take the following principle as our guideline: *Maintain unity, provide an opportunity for conducting negotiations, maintain our strength, and remain alert for a resumption of hostilities if the negotiations fail.* The final decision on this matter will be made in Jogjakarta after the government's return.

5. Possibilities arising from the Agreement

So far, all we know about the substance of the Agreement comes from the newspapers. We do not know yet whether it can be implemented in harmony with the guidelines mentioned above. This must still be discussed with the government. However, one of the articles in van Royen's statement implies that, as a start, in areas outside Jogjakarta, de facto control will be taken as the basis for administration. Despite the difficulties of establishing criteria acceptable to both sides for determining who holds de facto authority in a certain region, it is our duty, especially the pamongpradja and the police, to create conditions which clearly demonstrate that the greater part of Sumatra and Java is under our de facto administrative control.

6. A meeting between the government and the Armed Forces High Command

To ensure that decisions pertaining to the national resistance are taken only after every angle has been analyzed and all views carefully considered, it is essential to arrange a meeting between the government (including the Emergency Government and the Central Government Commissariat for Java) and

the Armed Forces High Command (the Military Strategy Council) immediately after the government's return to Jogjakarta. Whatever the results of this meeting, unity or division, continued hostilities or renewed negotiations (while constantly maintaining our strength), at least there will be some assurance that the decisions will be taken responsibly on the basis of careful deliberations.

Resistance does not mean only aspirations. It means, above all, what can realistically be achieved at any given stage. Rarely does it happen that an individual's aspirations coincide completely with joint decisions on common interests, in this case the struggle of our State and Nation. Yet, however great the divergences between an individual's aspirations and opinions, and the guidelines laid down for the national resistance, this is no reason to accuse those with different views of treachery and defeatism.

Second Deputy Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces

Signed/Sealed
(T. B. Simatupang, Colonel)

On June 6, 1949, Pak Dirman wrote a letter to me in his own hand. I received it only on June 19. It took the guerrilla-PTT thirteen days to bring an "express delivery" letter from Pak Dirman's place to Bana-ran. This letter expressed his dissatisfaction with a number of the proposals put forward by our delegation in Djakarta.

Headquarters of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia

No.: 29/P.b./49.
Subject: Delegation/Negotiations
Nature: Top Secret
Enclosure: One Letter

To:
The Deputy Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces,
Col. T. B. Simatupang.

Merdeka

Received yr letters with great interest. The political/military/economic analyses, etc. they contain have given me much valuable material for consideration. I should inform you I recently received a letter from H.E. Mr. Rum, via the Sultan, asking me to send military representatives to Djakarta immediately, mentioning yr name among others.

I have *rejected* this request since it does not conform with previous stipulations contained in the official documents and in the report on the proceedings of the Prel Conf in Djakarta, wh I received some time ago. For yr further information, I enclose herewith a copy of my answer to H.E. Mr. Rum, via the Sultan.

It is my desire that you, too, *hold firmly to the stand* expounded in yr own letter that everything should be *discussed in Jogjakarta and not in Djakarta*.

May God continue to protect us both so that we can soon meet again safe and sound. Amen.

Supreme Headquarters, June 6, 1949
Panglima Besar of the Armed Forces
Signed/Sealed.

On June 27, 1949, I replied.

No. 83(SK)GSAP/49

Secret

Ministry of Defense
Staff of the Armed Forces

June 27, 1949

From: Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces
To: Panglima Besar of the Armed Forces
of the Republic of Indonesia
Subject: Negotiations

I have received and read attentively Your Excellency's letter No. 29/P.B./49 of June 6, 1949.

Early in March this year I traveled eastward to meet with Your Excellency. But, while I was in the area of Mount Lawu, negotiations in the Security Council ended, and it was obvious that negotiations might start very soon in Djakarta. I therefore felt compelled to return to the Jogjakarta region in order to follow the negotiations, even from that great distance, and to submit reports on the real situation outside the towns occupied by the Dutch.

During the preliminary stages, I strongly urged that our delegation agree to nothing less than the Republic's unconditional return to Jogjakarta and that, if the Dutch refused, the Indonesian problem should immediately be referred back to Lake Success. The delegation itself initially adopted this same stand, but apparently, after a time, it came to the conclusion, together with H.E. the Vice-President, that a rather different position would be more advantageous. And so the Rum-van Royen Agreement was born.

When I received the text of this Agreement, I realized immediately that it would lead to great difficulties and that only the utmost tact on the part of all persons responsible would prevent the catastrophe of a split. I wrote to our delegation urging them to refuse to discuss problems relating to a cease-fire until after the government returned to Jogjakarta.

Later I received word that a commission to discuss the cease-fire had been set up but that its discussions would be unofficial. In my experience, however, so-called unofficial discussions usually end up as binding, and so I suggested to the delegation that, as a commission on a cease-fire had already been set up, its discussions should be dragged out until the preparations for the return of Jogjakarta were finished. At most, only the general political basis for a cease-fire should be discussed.

Accordingly, the deliberations of the commission on a cease-fire have advanced very slowly indeed. Indeed, a sort of crisis in the negotiations has recently developed, because the Dutch have delayed the return of Jogjakarta in response to our dragging out the discussions on a cease-fire. I have not yet received the latest reports, but Radio Djakarta announced the day before yesterday that an agreement on a cease-fire has already been signed.

In view of the most recent letters and documents I have received from Dr. Leimena, it seems possible that both sides have already accepted Cochran's draft plans, though probably with some modifications. According to Dr. Leimena's letter, the relevant documents will be submitted later to both the cabinet and the High Command of the Armed Forces, whereupon each will form its own attitude. I have already cabled the Emergency Government so that Col. Hidajat will come to Jogjakarta to participate in the discussions.

Even if it is true that both sides in Djakarta have already agreed, the most important problem, that of the technical military aspects of a cease-fire, has yet to be worked out. These aspects presumably will be discussed later after the cabinet and the Armed Forces High Command define their positions.

At this moment various opinions exist within the Armed Forces. I would like to mention the following examples.

When he met H.E. the Vice-President in Kotaradja, Col. Hidajat reportedly stated he would carry out any decisions and would only discontinue if they proved impossible to implement.

Col. Nasution has proposed that we find some way to avoid a cease-fire, because, according to his calculations, if the fighting continues, the Dutch will be so exhausted by September that they will be forced to accept all our demands.

Lt. Col. Abimanju believes that a cease-fire is only possible after a political settlement. Nonetheless, if the government gives orders to cease hostilities, they will be carried out. He asks only that the Dutch remain confined to the towns and that scorched-earth tactics be continued.

Lt. Col. Jani says that he is prepared to wage a long-term struggle, provided that the problems of ammunition and support for dependents are dealt with effectively by higher authorities.

Maj. Sudarsono fears that, in the event of a cease-fire, our popular support will decline, the enforced idleness will lower our military morale, domestic political problems will increase, and the Dutch will continue to train their cadres. Indeed, reports from the Netherlands indicate that training for "The Indies" continued.

I have not yet heard any reactions from East Java.

In order to form a firm plan and position for the entire Armed Forces, one which conforms with government policy as much as possible, these questions should be thoroughly discussed by the Military Strategy Council. My personal opinion is that negotiations cannot be stretched out for longer than three or four months; after that, either war will break out again or there will be a general settlement. We must work to strengthen the government's external position while building up our internal strength and maintaining unity.

I think we can use the documents sent to us from Djakarta to achieve the abovementioned objectives. If the war flares up again after three or four months, we must ensure that in the meantime we have improved our equipment, organization, etc. If, on the other hand, a general settlement is achieved, it must be one that is satisfactory for a majority of the groups involved. In the event of a settlement, we will face a large number of problems, most importantly: how to form an all-Indonesian military force; and how to overcome the effects of the resistance in a constructive manner which will benefit the country (for example, the problem of the students, etc.).

I hope Your Excellency is in good health and that we shall soon meet so that we can discuss these issues further.

Second Deputy Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces

Signed/Sealed
(T. B. Simatupang, Colonel)

Copies:
Inspector-General of the Armed Forces
Java Army and Territory Commander

How were our men in Sumatra reacting to the developments in Djakarta which had produced the Rum-van Royen Agreement? Presumably, they found it more difficult to follow developments in Djakarta than we did. Though we were then up in the mountains, we still received letters and newspapers occasionally from Djakarta and Jogjakarta; our men in Sumatra, however, could only follow developments via radio broadcasts and the periodic cables we sent from Java.

Bung Hatta realized that special attention had to be paid to our people in Sumatra, specifically to the Emergency Government. On June 5, 1949, he led a party to Atjeh. I subsequently received from this group the following copy of a letter from Col. Hidajat, the Sumatra Army and Territory Commander, addressed to Mr. Sjafrudin:

Kotaradja, June 8, 1949

From: S.A.T.C.

To: Mr. Sjafrudin

Head of the Emergency
Government of the
Republic of Indonesia

Merdeka

In connection with the Vice-President's visit to Kotaradja, I must convey to you in great haste the following, through the intermediary of Dr. Halim or Minister Natsir.⁷

Obviously, the Sukarno-Hatta government (Bangka) is trying to *impose* its concept *as the sole alternative*. As formulated in a recent cable of the Emergency Government to the Vice-President, the question now arises as to whether the Emergency Government can repudiate the guarantees given by the President and Vice-President in the Rum-van Royen Agreement. The Armed Forces is in a difficult position.

Generally speaking, the second Dutch aggression has made our pemuda more extreme and radical, particularly concerning an agreement which they feel is "inadequate" (unsatisfactory) or too "cheap." In the process of achieving the Agreement, the formal leader of the resistance, the Emergency Government, appears to have been bypassed and ignored. Accordingly, the focus of the resistance is the Emergency Government, because its statement that it is "not yet in agreement" can be interpreted as meaning "does not agree" with the Rum-van Royen Agreement.

Furthermore, the technical military problems involved in a cease-fire are so great that a real cessation of hostilities is virtually impossible. Not only will a cease-fire *strengthen* the position (power) of the Dutch but our own guerrilla troops, scattered over a vast area and living off the people, *cannot, under conditions of non-belligerence, improve either their*

⁷ Mohammad Natsir gelar Datuk Sinaro Pandjang was born in Alahan Pandjang, West Sumatra, in 1908. In the late 1920's and early 1930's, he was an important leader of the Jong Islamieten Bond. He was well known for his work in modernist Islamic education and as a spokesman of the Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union) in Bandung. He was also active in Sukiman's PII. After the Proclamation of Independence, he became a principal figure in the reconstituted Masjumi. He was a member of the KNIP Working Committee and eventually became its chairman. Close to Sjahrir, he became Minister of Information during the latter's first cabinet, replacing Amir Sjarifuddin. He continued as Minister of Information in the second and third Sjahrir and the Hatta cabinets.

living conditions or their discipline. They may even go hungry because the people will give them little or no support, as security cannot be guaranteed so long as the Dutch are still in the vicinity. *Our resistance demands, however, that our military forces, though in a condition of inaction, pending a political settlement (transfer of sovereignty), should remain in a constant state of combat readiness* in case of a possible deadlock in the negotiations.

My own conclusions, which I have already submitted to the Vice-President, are as follows. We must avoid dualism or, more precisely, we must create a single focus for the resistance by bringing together the Emergency Government and Bangka (or by fulfilling the demands expressed by the Emergency Government in its cable dealing with the required guarantees). This will ease the problems faced by the military.

The government should not "prematurely" issue a cease-fire order and ignore the views of the respective military commanders (the Panglima Besar, Simatupang, Nasution, Sumatra [Command Headquarters], Sungkono, etc.); at the very least, it should assemble these men immediately following the return to Jogjakarta. Only then may *technical* decisions be reached.

We should strengthen our position in those regions not yet attacked by the Dutch and make them *bases for continuing the resistance* (Atjeh, South Sumatra, Jogja?). In this connection we should reapply the former government strategy of dispersing our strength in the following ratio: government in Jogja one-third, Atjeh one-third, Overseas one-third. To this end, I urge Mr. Sjafrudin, after contacting the government in Jogja, to return to Sumatra and *establish his headquarters* in Atjeh. Our forces in Atjeh (North Sumatra) can guarantee the government's safety against a Dutch attack there (according to reports received, during the next four to six months, the Dutch will not yet have enough troops to occupy Atjeh). Also with regard to *economic, financial, international, and specific regional problems*, it is essential that a central leadership be established in Atjeh.

I urge the immediate review of the decree giving absolute powers to Military Governors, and the *institution* of Regional Defense Councils. In principle, I have no objection to the appointment of Military Governors. But experience in Java and the serious defects evident in the implementation of the Regional Defense Councils indicate that the Military Governorship should not be coupled with councils of this kind. A Military Governor-*Resident*, whose staff consisted of former members of the Regional Defense Council, would be satisfactory. In Atjeh, the situation differs; the Military Governor does not come from the civil administration, and his absolute powers seriously endanger the civilian situation (safety).

I would like to ask whether there could be a political guideline allowing the revocation and abolition of the Military Governors' absolute power based on the *situation in each* region, and with the advice of the Military Command. On the other hand, a radical return to civil administration could endanger our defenses once again.

Yours faithfully,

Col. Hidajat

Col. Hidajat's letter depicted succinctly but clearly the position of the Emergency Government and the Armed Forces High Command, especially when he said, "to impose its concept as the sole alternative." In any event, the President and the Vice-President obviously would be returning to Jogjakarta in the near future. Accordingly, in my capacity as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, I sent Bangka a "General Report" discussing developments since the Dutch attack on Jogjakarta on December 19, 1948.

In his book *Vom Kriege*, Clausewitz wrote that war is like a chameleon, that is, its features and forms constantly change, adapting to the particular conditions of the society which wages it. Our war of independence thus took on the particular forms and features of our society.

Clausewitz also wrote that the statesman sees war as a means for attaining political objectives and believes it should be subjected to rational political calculation. Clausewitz also realized, however, that the military leadership views war as an arena in which one competes with the enemy in a "game" in which many factors are "accidental." For the common people and the lower ranks of the military, Clausewitz said, war is dominated by deep feelings of hatred and enmity, a kind of *blinder Naturtrieb*, or blind natural instinct.

As I wrote my report, I consciously tried to interweave the rational political considerations with the viewpoint of a military man attempting to comprehend the "chameleon of war." But I knew that I had not freed myself from the influence of *blinder Naturtrieb*, the hatred and hostility towards the Dutch that suffused our society and Armed Forces in those days.

CHAPTER VIII

GENERAL REPORT FROM BANARAN: DEVELOPMENTS SINCE DECEMBER 19, 1948

Composed for the Government of the Republic of Indonesia
By the Staff of the Armed Forces

I. Introduction

A. General Remarks

On December 19, 1948, only a few days before the night most holy to Christians, Dutch land, sea, and air forces attacked the Republic of Indonesia in a manner reminiscent of warfare in ancient times, when human beings still lived in savagery. With this treacherous act, the Dutch began implementation of a plan drawn up and prepared long in advance--to destroy the Republic of Indonesia by force of arms, without regard for international pressures (which, until then, had always blocked secret Dutch scheming) and to impose a "final settlement" on the Indonesian people solely in accordance with Dutch ambitions and interests.

Thanks to the determined resistance of the Indonesian people, which exceeded all expectations, and the concern of a great number of countries throughout the world, the Dutch plan has proved a complete failure. In the political sphere, the Dutch failure has been revealed by their various "improvisations" (such as the so-called Beel plan) and, in the military sphere, by their organized terrorism against the villages--a last desperate attempt to break the resistance of the Indonesian people.

The Dutch have now been forced to begin their retreat, both politically and militarily. Nonetheless, nothing as yet indicates that this forced retreat has persuaded the Dutch to abandon their basic policy, a policy which has brought great misery and widespread chaos to our nation and people.

The Republic has survived a tremendous ordeal over these last months. But, at the same time, this very ordeal has created a new situation, new relationships, and new perspectives for the Republic. These changes must be taken into account in any future efforts to find the most direct road to a free and prosperous Indonesia. Amid the chaos and darkness which pervade this country as consequences of the misguided Dutch policy, the Republic continues to shine brightly as a guiding star and a source of hope for the people who are fighting and suffering for the cause of real freedom.

B. Two Separate and Contradictory Roads

Ever since the Dutch unconditionally surrendered to the Japanese Military Forces early in March 1942 after an extremely brief resistance,

they and the Indonesians have gone their separate ways. Each had different experiences. When they came face to face again, it became clear how great were the differences and antagonisms which had accumulated since the Dutch surrender.

During the Japanese occupation, the Indonesian people, despite great sufferings, acquired wide experience in national administration, at levels from which they had been excluded in the past. This increased their sense of self-respect. National consciousness and aspirations for independence spread and intensified within all strata, beyond anything achieved by the Indonesian national movement during the Dutch colonial period. However, the most significant change was that this national consciousness and these aspirations took on a highly militant character. Among the youth, military knowledge and fighting spirit spread to the most isolated villages through the agencies of the Peta, Seinendan, Keibōdan, and Heihō.¹

After the Japanese surrender, these forces crystallized, becoming the Republic of Indonesia. This Republic combined elements which had been part of the national movement since the beginning of the twentieth century (though expanded and intensified during the Japanese occupation) with new attitudes and skills acquired during the war years. The Republic demanded complete independence for the Indonesian people and separation from the Netherlands. It was prepared to wager the lives of thousands of pemuda and, temporarily at least, the nation's economic well-being in support of this demand.

The Dutch underwent very different experiences after abandoning Indonesia to the Japanese. In response to worldwide criticism following the military and political fiasco of March 1942, the Dutch Queen made an address in December, designed to show the world the sincerity of Dutch intentions to grant independence to their "colonies." Armed with this speech and the confirmation of Dutch sovereignty over the "Netherlands Indies" given by the Allied forces at Potsdam, the Dutch confronted the Republic of Indonesia.

C. Differing Perspectives on How to Resolve the Conflict

Within each camp, there were different viewpoints about how to overcome the conflicting perspectives outlined above. Some groups on both sides took rigid and uncompromising stands: in defense of the Proclamation of Independence and the sovereignty of the Republic, on the one side, and, on the other, the sovereignty of the Netherlands. For these groups, a solution to the conflict could only be achieved through force of arms.

But, in both camps, there were also groups which tried to find a solution on the basis of common interests. First, both sides desired to see an independent Indonesia (thus the conflict between them could be narrowed to a difference of opinion about the way to achieve that independence). Second, both parties wanted to settle the conflict in a way that would avoid arousing lasting hatreds between the Indonesians and the Dutch. Third, both sides wished to prevent Indonesia from being devastated. Fourth, both sides recognized the advantages to be

¹The Seinendan was a semi-military youth organization. Keibōdan was an auxiliary policy force. Heihō were auxiliary troops attached to the Japanese army.

gained through cooperation as sovereign states. Fifth, the world desired a peaceful solution to the Indonesian dispute. In both camps, there were constant shifts of power between the two schools of thought; in both camps, there were also people who fundamentally preferred the first path but who, for reasons of tactical advantage, temporarily adopted the second.

The Indonesian tragedy has brought victory to extremism, but, even now, both sides continue in their official statements to praise the course of moderation. All the murder, arson, and torture which have occurred during the two military actions have consistently been pictured in Dutch propaganda as "preparations for Indonesia's independence and Indonesian-Dutch friendship."

D. Linggadjati

Linggadjati represented a victory for the second school of thought. It recognized both the reality of the Republic of Indonesia and the sovereignty of the Dutch (though this was not declared explicitly), and it clearly outlined a course containing specific stages and ending in complete sovereignty for Indonesia, or, in other words, the liquidation of Dutch sovereignty.

The fate of the Linggadjati Agreement demonstrated that the greater portion of public opinion on both sides could not accept this projected course. It became clear that the Dutch intended simply to use Linggadjati as an instrument to maintain their sovereignty and, furthermore, to utilize this sovereignty to negate recognition of the reality of the Republic and keep control of the time frame for the ending of Dutch sovereignty in their own hands.

The public could recognize this Dutch intent most clearly in actions connected with security and military affairs, where the contradictory viewpoints on both sides were translated into concrete issues: the Dutch army and police, or the Republican army and police. The Republican army had grown up in the Revolution and was inadequately equipped in terms of both matériel and personnel; naturally, it bore the marks of the time and the character of its growth.

The Republic argued that, with the recognition of its existence and the agreement to establish a sovereign United States of Indonesia, the position of the state apparatus of the Republic was also recognized. Based precisely on this recognition, the Republic planned to overcome its own deficiencies, especially those in matériel, and then use this improved state apparatus as "working capital" for the formation of the United States of Indonesia.

The Dutch, for their part, argued that they retained sovereignty and hence were responsible for security; moreover, they said, the Republican forces had demonstrated their own incapacity to guarantee this security. Thus Dutch forces should be deployed in Republican territory as well.

The Republic not only rejected the Dutch position but considered it in contravention of the de facto recognition of the Republic. Therefore, Linggadjati, an agreement which could have been carried out had there been honesty on both sides, was "buried." On July 21, 1947, the first war for independence erupted. This war did not settle the basic

conflicts. Each side drew its own conclusions from it, as will be outlined in more detail below.

E. Renville

The first war for independence introduced a new element into the Indonesian dispute, namely, direct intervention by the Security Council. (It turned out later that, to all intents and purposes, this meant intervention by the United States.) This resulted in a new agreement--the well-known Renville accords. It did not, however, eliminate the contradictions that had led to the first war for independence. On the contrary, several new ones were created, namely, over the method of determining the fate of Republican areas now considered Dutch-occupied territory under the Renville Agreement.

The Republic was prepared to make serious sacrifices, when signing Renville, in the hope that continued direct intervention by the Security Council would pave the way for a satisfactory agreement and would prevent the outbreak of another war. Apparently, this calculation overestimated the capabilities of the Three-State Commission (read the United States).

The Dutch, it seems, drew two main conclusions from the first war and the Renville Agreement. First, because the Republic had been driven to the most densely populated and poorest areas of Sumatra and Java, the Dutch believed that an economic blockade (continued under the very eyes of the Three-State Commission, which took no action other than to report it to the Security Council) would cause the Republic internal difficulties and force it eventually to accept Dutch terms. Second, should the above not occur, the Dutch obviously believed (based on their experience during the first war) that, if they attacked the Republic, its resistance could quickly be smashed and that any resistance various groups might carry on could be stopped with the help of the Republican leaders themselves.

It was true that the Republic experienced difficulties following Renville caused by economic factors, as in southern East Sumatra; caused by disturbances created when units withdrew from areas which had become Dutch-occupied regions according to Renville, as in Tapanuli; and caused by internal political problems. The best example of the last sort of difficulty was the Madiun rebellion, in which, although economic and social factors played a contributing role, the prime cause was the incapacity of those considered the political leaders of the Republic to reach a consensus.

The Republican side had drawn different conclusions from the first war for independence and the Renville Agreement. Some groups believed that the Renville Agreement provided the Republic with a basis for existence (for a long time, if necessary) until a general agreement could be drawn up with the assistance of the Three-State Commission (America). To this end, the Republic should rationalize its internal structures, thereby enabling it to prolong its existence on the present basis should this prove necessary. At the same time, other groups believed that a settlement could not be achieved through negotiations and, therefore, that preparations for war in all spheres should be encouraged.

This antagonism was felt most profoundly in matters of defense. In an effort to meet these different views, the Ministry of Defense

drew up a rationalization plan designed to prepare the Republic for three possibilities: war, a general settlement, or a state of protracted conflict. Based on an analysis of experiences during the first war, particularly in West Java, a plan was drawn up which would reduce the size of the armed forces but, at the same time, increase its fighting capacity by improving its organization and its personnel selection. In addition, a territorial organization would be set up which could serve as the basis for a protracted people's war.

F. Events Prior to the Second War for Independence

When the present Dutch government came into office, it was already expected that Dutch policy toward Indonesia would become extremely reactionary. It was speculated that the new government's plan would be to seek a solution to the Indonesian problem "excluding the Republic and the Security Council."

At that time, Republican groups were not particularly apprehensive because it was believed that the international situation would hinder any hard-line Dutch policy. It was assumed, therefore, that the new Dutch government would abandon its hard-line approach after it had been in office for a while and had understood the dictates of international opinion.

History has shown that this view was based on an overly optimistic assessment of Dutch stubbornness.

It turned out that the hard-line Dutch policy was based on three elements: the United States, Dutch military power in Indonesia, and the so-called federalists.

Soon after the formation of the present Dutch government, Minister Stikker visited the United States. He took with him "evidence" collected by NEFIS which purported to show that the Republic was communistic. He hoped thereby to gain aid, or at least consent, from the United States which would help the Dutch crush the Republic. These visits did not produce the desired results, and Stikker (one of the most anti-Republican Dutch leaders before becoming Minister) consequently proposed a change in Dutch policy toward Indonesia.

The second element in Dutch calculations, namely the Dutch army under Gen. Spoor,² naturally strongly supported the hard-line policy. After the Renville Agreement, the Dutch army's sole preoccupation was creating a situation "ripe" for the outbreak of war. They published false documents, circulated rumors about Dutch women allegedly detained forcibly in Republican territory, provided "evidence" that the Republic was communistic, and so on. Especially after the Muso rebellion, the Dutch army information service incessantly spread reports implying to the world that the Republican government could not restore security. This war-mongering campaign continued, even though it had often been shown that the circulated news was false (for example, the reports concerning the petroleum plants in Tjepu) and despite the fact that the Three-State Commission had asked the Dutch several times to stop.

²Lt. Gen. Simon Spoor was Commander-in-Chief of the Dutch forces in Indonesia from 1946 until his death early in 1949.

The third element in the policy of the present Dutch government was the "federalists." These people allowed the Dutch government, for whatever reason, to use them as tools to "legitimize" its hard-line policy against the Republic. If they had not reached an agreement with the Dutch (the BIO),³ then it is very likely that the Dutch government would have abandoned its hard-line policy, particularly after it had failed to gain United States support or approval.

Because of the Dutch government's viewpoint, negotiations between the Republican and Dutch delegations were found to fail. Ever since the Dutch government came to an agreement with the federalists, its only policy has been to impose this agreement on the Republic as well.

One of the greatest obstacles in the negotiations following the Renville Agreement was the military and security problem. The Dutch demanded the abolition of the TNI (the Indonesian National Army). The Republic wanted the formation under a national government of a national armed force for the whole of Indonesia and, in the formation of this, the TNI would take part according to procedures determined jointly by a (national) interim government and the Republican government. From the very outset, this national armed force would be under a national command, separate from the Dutch armed forces.

Three-State Commission assistance could not smooth the way for settling the conflict between the Republic and the Dutch, because the Dutch wanted to impose their agreement with the federalists on the Republic.

Mr. Cochran came to Indonesia after the Republican delegation at Lake Success had promised that, so long as he was working to reach a settlement, the Indonesian problem would not be brought before the Security Council. As a matter of fact, from the time Mr. Cochran arrived in Indonesia until the Dutch attacked the Republic, the Indonesian question was not discussed by the Security Council. Reports circulated a few days before the Dutch attack, that, in view of the extremely critical developments in Indonesia, the Security Council would take up the Indonesian problem. But after the arrival in Paris of Mr. Cochran's representative from Indonesia, the session was cancelled. Many things surrounding these events remain unclear.

Before they launched their second attack, the Dutch sent two cabinet missions to Jogjakarta. The first, that of Minister Stikker, though at first considered only a propaganda move in advance of an attack, did arouse some hope that an agreement was not impossible. Nonetheless, the government regarded the situation as critical, and, on November 20, 1948, the entire Armed Forces were ordered on the alert.

The second Dutch mission consisted of Ministers Sassen, Stikker, and Neher.⁴ During this visit, an insurmountable difference of opinion

³The BIO (Bewind Indonesië in Overgangstijd, Indonesian Interim Government) Decree, of December 14, 1948, established the guidelines for an interim federal government and also the Dutch plan for the final form of the Indonesian state. The blueprint was, ostensibly, the joint product of the Dutch government and the BFO.

⁴Minister of Public Works and Reconstruction Neher was appointed plenipotentiary of the Netherlands government, together with van Vredenburg, in February 1948. They were to work along with van Mook in place of the disbanded Commission-General

arose concerning the status of the TNI and the use of Dutch military forces during the interim period.

The Vice-President's trip to Djakarta did not solve these issues either. He returned with the impression that the Dutch government planned to form an interim government excluding the Republic in early January and that the attitude taken by this government would influence subsequent developments, regardless of whether or not war broke out.

After the departure of the Dutch government delegation, Mr. Cochran took the initiative in establishing an exchange of notes between the Vice-President and the Dutch government. In the meantime, the Armed Forces were ordered on the alert. The large-scale maneuvers planned for December 19, 1948 were indeed intended precisely to put the Armed Forces in a state of readiness.

When the Dutch attack began, the exchange of notes through the good offices of Mr. Cochran had not yet been broken off, and, only one day prior to the attack, he had flown to Djakarta carrying an answer to a previous Dutch letter. Consequently, on December 18 no one imagined that the Dutch would attack the following morning. Moreover, since the Three-State Commission was at Kaliurang at that time, many people believed that war would not begin "just yet."

As a result, the Dutch attack came as a surprise and this provided initial military advantages. History will show whether these advantages, achieved by such a shameful attack, have not proved insignificant compared with the moral and political disadvantages suffered by the Dutch because of the nature of their attack.

II. Dutch Plans: Overly Speculative

A. Main Dutch Mistake: Facing New Problems with Obsolete Criteria

The Republican Proclamation of Independence forced the Dutch to reach a decision on their own attitude toward the desire of the Indonesian people for independence. Many Dutch leaders tried to sidestep the issue on the pretext that the Republic was a Japanese creation, or that it fomented only chaos, or for some other reason. In other words, these men tried to base Dutch policy positions on a few excesses or imperfect expressions of the Indonesian desire for freedom.

This attitude was strongest among those groups formerly involved in ruling the Netherlands Indies: colonial civil servants, colonial military people, and colonial capitalists. These groups have dominated Dutch policy-making during the past four years. One can summarize their view in terms of three main points. First, they argue that the masses of the Indonesian people desire only security, which the Dutch are best able to provide. Second, those who oppose the Dutch return

and thereby to ensure that The Hague could exercise effective supervision over van Mook. The former Commission-General for the Netherlands Indies had been established at the end of August 1946 to assist van Mook in negotiating with the Indonesians and to prepare for constitutional reform in the Indies. Its membership, announced on September 10, consisted of: Prof. Schermerhorn, recently resigned Prime Minister and leader of the Labor Party; van Poll, permanent parliamentarian of the Catholic People's Party; and de Boer, a shipping magnate.

represent only a small fraction, mainly some intellectuals and "armed gangs." Their opposition stems mainly from opportunism. Third, if attacked, this minority group could be quickly eliminated, and afterward the people would support the Dutch (and be grateful to them).

These groups believed that a fairly small military force could crush the "armed gangs" of the Republic. They based this assumption on past experiences with rebellions during the van Heutsz⁵ era of pacification. They further believed that the intellectuals could be bought off (without endangering the Dutch position) through the creation of legislative councils, ministerial posts, etc., and that as a result they would soon be "domesticated." In this manner, the people would be pacified, and Dutch rule could be restored with only minor and superficial changes.

These Dutch groups, who represent the dominant political trend even now, have never taken seriously the power and dedication of nationalism. It is their attempt to justify their views that has led to chaos and suffering for Indonesia.

B. Spoor's Note

Some time after the Linggadjati Agreement, Gen. S. H. Spoor, commander of Dutch military forces in Indonesia, sent his government a note which has apparently become the Dutch policy guideline for Indonesia.

This note contained five main points and knowing them helps in understanding Dutch policy. First, the Union will have no meaning unless Dutch military forces stay in Indonesia. Cooperation in defense matters, one of the underlying principles of the Union, should be used to perpetuate Dutch military power in Indonesia. Second, the KNIL, the Royal Netherlands Indies Army, will be reorganized, and, under Dutch leadership, will constitute the backbone of the military forces in Indonesia. Third, to satisfy the demands of Indonesian nationalism without hazarding the Dutch position, territorial battalions (basically, territorial auxiliaries) will be established. Fourth, the TNI must be crushed, because it would be impossible to include it in the aforementioned plan. Technical matters can be put forward as a pretext, but the main reason obviously is the TNI spirit which cannot be harmonized with Dutch programs. Fifth, in order to crush the TNI, it must first be isolated, that is to say, efforts should be made to prevent the political influence of the Indonesian leaders from aiding the TNI. In this way, crushing the Indonesian National Army can be pictured as a measure designed to wipe out criminal gangs (subsequently adding "communists" in keeping with the anti-communist spirit so popular in the world today).

Along with the Romme-van der Goes van Naters motion,⁶ the Spoor

⁵J. B. van Heutsz won his reputation by his harsh "pacification" of Atjeh (1898-1903) and was consequently rewarded by appointment as Governor-General of the Indies from 1904 to 1909.

⁶Prof. C. P. M. Romme (an influential member of the Catholic People's Party) and van der Goes van Naters (a member of the Labor Party) submitted a joint motion to the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament which approved the draft Linggadjati

Note has been the sharpest Dutch knife used to stab the Linggadjati Agreement in the back.

C. Dutch Conclusions from Military Events Prior to the Second War for Independence

The Dutch were convinced that the Linggadjati Agreement occurred because the Republic was able to bluff negotiators into believing that it was strong, and as a result Dutch politicians gave a great number of concessions. But Dutch military people were sure that, in fact, the Republic was militarily very weak. As proof of this proposition, they pointed to the Dutch military operations in Krian-Sidoardjo [East Java] and subsequently in Modjokerto [East Java] and Palembang, where Republican resistance was quickly and easily broken. They may also have considered their experience in Bali and South Sulawesi as evidence that the old colonial army axiom remains valid, that is to say, armed force may be used to channel nationalism in such a way that it poses no danger to Dutch power.

From my own discussions with these Dutchmen, I have discovered that they believe the truth of the above assessment was demonstrated during the first Dutch aggression and the subsequent Renville Agreement. The Renville Agreement used Republican political influence to end the people's resistance in areas newly occupied by the Dutch. In East Java and East Sumatra, especially, the situation calmed down following the Renville Agreement, enabling the Dutch to increase production considerably. In West Java, difficulties continued (for which the Dutch blamed the Republic), but even so the economic situation improved.

From these experiences, the Dutch apparently became convinced that, if they attacked the Republic, the political groups would be prepared to use their influence to end any resistance and that, as a result, the entire territory of the Republic could quickly be pacified under Dutch control. Events have shown that this view underestimates the moral strength of the Republic's political leaders, the fighting ability of its armed forces, and, in particular, the fighting spirit of the Indonesian people.

D. Dutch Plans

The planned Dutch *pembersihan* [lit. clean up, or purge] was originally scheduled for the interim period when the government would include prominent Republican leaders, among others, but when the Dutch would retain responsibility for security. According to this plan, such an interim period would provide the Dutch army with the best opportunity to eliminate unwanted elements, and, moreover, the operations would be carried out under the responsibility of and supported by the political influence of a national government (the interim government).

Agreement on the basis of the Commission-General's "elucidation" of that Agreement (one highly favorable to the Dutch). The motion was adopted on December 19, 1946.

Since this intent underlay Dutch proposals, it was responsible for the failure of the negotiations with the Republic concerning the interim period. The Republic rejected the Dutch plan, the main purpose of which was to give them an opportunity to carry out the programs mentioned above.

Following the failure of their strategy, the Dutch still hoped to establish an interim government excluding the Republic and to use this government to carry out the "liquidation," which represented the main Dutch reason for introducing the idea of an interim period. Subsequently, this plan too was abandoned, perhaps because it was suspected that the federalists who would sit in an interim government would oppose the liquidation, or perhaps because the Dutch believed that the political influence of an interim government which did not include the Republic would be too weak to launch the purge. Whatever the case, the military operation began before an interim government was established.

The substance of the Dutch political plan in connection with this second attack is not completely clear. One thing is obvious--the Dutch are using this attack deliberately to isolate the politicians from the Armed Forces, which are referred to in their announcements as "would-be soldiers." They formulated this idea as a result of impressions gained during the Sassen mission. Dutch politicians believe that "decent" Republicans are, in fact, willing to cooperate with the Dutch on Dutch terms, but that they are frightened by the "would-be soldiers." Thus the Dutch conclude that, if they strike at the Republican Armed Forces, the politicians (freed from their fear of the soldiers) will automatically cooperate. Consequently, the TNI will be isolated politically and can thereafter be destroyed easily. Beyond this, one cannot say with certainty what Dutch political calculations have been.

Did they intend initially to force the Republic to accept the BIO after the first military strike? Or did they intend to establish an interim government excluding the Republic after the first stage of the attack? The answer is not apparent, nor do Dutch actions indicate what their initial political plans were. It turns out that the Dutch had various small-scale political plans for the Republican areas. After delivering the first military blows, the Dutch then tried to breathe new life into political forces which, though not completely defunct, had not been able to stand alone without Dutch military protection, as, for example, the feudal elements.

The Dutch have proved that they can still make shrewd use of the classical devices of colonial policy, but, beyond that, any broader political plan which they may have hoped to combine with the second military action has turned out to be a tremendous fiasco.

Dutch political plans vis-à-vis the outside world are evidently based entirely on the predicted results of their policy toward the Indonesians and their military successes. If the Republic's resistance can be broken quickly and if an agreement can be achieved with its leaders (or alternatively if an interim government excluding the Republic can be established), the outside world will be forced to accept the fait accompli.

Dutch military strategy is quite simple. The towns that constitute political and military centers will be occupied by quick surprise operations using all the modern weapons of land, sea, and air warfare.

Scorched-earth tactics will be prevented by quick operations accompanied by threats. Consequently, the material and organizational conditions for a protracted resistance by the Republic will be eliminated.

Dutch statements, such as those by Minister Stikker, assert that, according to Dutch calculations, organized resistance will cease soon after the Dutch operation and that the entire TNI will be mopped up in six months. Clearly, Dutch military and political plans are based on highly speculative assessments, and their calculations regarding prevention of scorched-earth tactics have turned out to be sheer wishful thinking.

The speculative aspects of Dutch planning are as follows. There is no guarantee that Republican military resistance can be broken quickly. It is doubtful that scorched-earth tactics can be prevented. It is not certain that any political leaders will cooperate with the Dutch after the military operation is over. Foreign countries may not accept a *fait accompli*.

Dutch policy has increased the difficulties of Indonesia and caused great devastation and misery. The government of a nation which pursues a policy containing so many speculative elements has in fact exposed itself as being without the moral right to demand responsibility for determining the future of the Indonesian people.

III. The Republic's Plans: Protracted Resistance

A. All Governments of the Republic Pursue a Peace Policy

From its inception, the Republican government has based its policy on one main idea--to find a peaceful solution and avoid a force-of-arms settlement. In line with this, the Republic has invited the attention of foreign countries, has sought cooperation with Dutch groups which also reject force of arms, and has threatened to carry out scorched-earth tactics and to wage protracted guerrilla warfare if attacked.

Now, after being guided for more than three and one-half years by this policy, the Republic finds that almost the whole of Java and Sumatra have become battlefields. This experience inevitably compels us to search for a new approach.

Several reasons lay behind the Republic's peace policy. Most important, all successive governments apparently considered the Republic's Armed Forces as being too weak--in organization, discipline, experience, knowledge, and weaponry--to be employed as the sole means for driving the Dutch from Indonesia, or at least from Java and Sumatra.

There may be other reasons as well, i.e., that the resources of a country should be preserved for use in development. This includes its manpower, especially its youth. Many believed that a protracted war would reduce the conditions for stable and democratic political development.

In pursuing its peace policy, the government of the Republic has always faced two main problems: from the Dutch with their policy of the past four years which could not be accepted by any Republican government without creating domestic rebellion or disturbance; and from

within the country from groups opposed to the government's policy. Some opposition has stemmed from the belief that Republican military power is sufficient to drive out the Dutch, or at least, that it once was. A larger group maintains that if the Republic carries on protracted and large-scale people's resistance, eventually the country will be in such chaos that the Dutch will no longer have any reason to stay. In other words, they believe that the Dutch will leave Indonesia because it can no longer provide profits for them. But the most important consideration for us, the people of Indonesia, is: Would such a devastated Indonesia be able to provide a livelihood for the Indonesian people themselves?

The Republican government has thus always been squeezed between pressure from the Dutch, with their unacceptable and unreasonable demands backed by their military threats, and pressure from groups at home wanting a more radical anti-Dutch policy. If Dutch proposals were accepted, it would cause chaos within the country. On the other hand, if the government adopted the proposals of the internal groups as official policy, war would surely break out in a few days.

Consequently, the Republic warmly welcomed the direct intervention of the Security Council, which was seen as an authority which could pressure the Dutch to move closer to Republican views and to adhere to a peace policy. Meanwhile, the Republic had to be on the *qui vive* in the event of a possible Dutch attack.

The Republican government, by seeking to avoid war if possible but at the same time being prepared for war if peace policies failed, has been placed in a difficult position. It has given an impression of weakness and sometimes of fear at home.

B. Developments Following the Linggadjati Agreement

Large elements of the Republic received the Linggadjati Agreement with great satisfaction. But the atmosphere after the conclusion of the agreement was unfavorable because of the Modjokerto Affair and the continuous transportation of Dutch troops to Indonesia. The cloud of war began darkening the horizon from the day the agreement was signed.

Because of the worsening situation, the Republican government's plans to implement a policy of construction and consolidation following Linggadjati could not be carried out. At the same time, plans to reduce drastically the size of the Armed Forces and to consolidate them had to be abandoned because of the threat of war which daily came nearer in the form of increasingly aggressive war-mongering activities by the Dutch army propaganda service. The Republic, consequently, had to take measures to counter the imminent Dutch aggression.

Republican preparations were carried out in the diplomatic and the military fields. Considering the state of its armaments, the Republic had no other alternative than to wage a guerrilla war supported by the people and accompanied by scorched-earth tactics in the event of attack. The broad guidelines for the guerrilla war were laid out in a document which became famous under the name of the "Note of the Panglima Besar." The principles of the people's support, called "people's defense," were outlined in State Defense Council Regulation No. 85.

C. The First War of Independence and the Renville Agreement

The Dutch attacked the Republic of July 21, 1947. The Republic had no other choice than that of war. Otherwise, it would have lost all the results achieved through strenuous effort since August 1945. This war was forced upon the Republic by the Dutch.

Guerrilla war immediately flared up in West, East, and parts of Central Java, in East Sumatra, and in parts of West and South Sumatra. The war raged for seven months, Security Council resolutions notwithstanding. Then the Renville Agreement ended hostilities.

The Republic cherished considerable hope (even profound belief) that the Renville Agreement might lead to a further settlement with the Dutch, which would end all conflict and provide both nations with the opportunity to develop their respective countries and to ensure prosperity for their peoples. Republican government policy after the signing of the Renville Agreement was, at first, based simply on this hope and belief. It soon appeared, however, that these expectations were ill-founded. It became evident that the Dutch had no sincere desire to achieve an agreement and also that the Three-State Commission, on which the government had pinned its main hopes, was in fact incapable of pressuring the Dutch to relinquish their obstructionist policies and come closer to the Republic's viewpoint. The Republican government thus found itself in a difficult position.

Because of the Dutch blockade, economic problems in Republican territories in Sumatra and Java increased. Communication with several isolated regions, such as Banten and the southern part of East Sumatra, became very difficult. Threats of war by the Dutch, who had resumed their war-mongering propaganda, were increasingly felt. The failure of the government's negotiation policy contributed to a growing strength in the opposition. In such uncertain circumstances, overshadowed by threats of war, naturally internal rationalization, such as that carried out within the Armed Forces, could not be entirely successful.

Despite government assurances that the rationalization of the Armed Forces was intended, among other things, as a preparation for the possibility of war, opposition continued to grow from those who charged that the government was ignoring the threat of war.

These political, economic, and social tensions eventually exploded in the Madiun Rebellion, generally known as the Communist Rebellion. At bottom, this affair was precipitated by a variety of complicated factors. For a short time afterward, Republicans hoped that the government's demonstrated power in coping with Madiun would prompt the world, in particular the United States, to pressure the Dutch to move closer to Republican views in an effort to achieve an agreement which would be satisfactory to both sides. Various American groups aroused hopes in Republican circles that some measure of material help would be given. All these hopes turned out to be pipe-dreams. Once again the Republic faced an uncertain political situation, while the Dutch made increasingly hard and threatening statements.

D. The Republican Plan to Counter the Second Dutch Aggression

Plans for dealing with a possible second Dutch aggression were discussed in detail at meetings of the Military Strategy Council

and at a number of cabinet sessions. The first problem to be resolved was whether Republican strategy should emphasize Java or Sumatra.

After analyzing the problem from various angles, it was decided that, in view of its vast area, Sumatra would offer a better location for the government's headquarters in the event of war, but, in view of its population density, popular political consciousness, and the experience, quality, and quantity of leadership, Java would continue to provide the focus for protracted people's resistance. In the months prior to the second Dutch attack, Col. Hidajat and several selected officers were sent to Sumatra to increase the number of experienced leaders there.

As was also the case before the first war for independence, the Republic's plan contained four main elements: diplomacy to mobilize world opinion, scorched-earth tactics, noncooperation in occupied towns, and a protracted people's war.

According to the plan, the President would leave for India to take charge of diplomatic activities personally. The Vice-President would lead the resistance from somewhere in Sumatra. The main feature of this plan was protracted people's war, which, together with noncooperation and scorched-earth tactics, would have to continue until the diplomacy built on their results could achieve a satisfactory agreement, or until the enemy was sufficiently exhausted and drained of fighting spirit to agree to our demands.

In order to prepare for the people's war, the experiences of the first war for independence were analyzed and used to improve the structure of the Armed Forces and to establish an organization for mobilizing and directing popular energies. Of importance in this effort was Col. A. H. Nasution, Division Commander in West Java during the first war for independence and later appointed the Java Army and Territory Commander. His analyses, based on his own experience in West Java, served as the main basis for the rationalization plans for the Armed Forces. These plans, as mentioned earlier, were intended, among other things, to prepare the Armed Forces and to organize national defense in general along the lines of a protracted people's war. The preparations for Java were outlined in the instruction known as "Order of the Panglima Besar No. 1."

The main points of the Order were: immediately after the Dutch launched their attack, strong military units, accompanied by pamong pradja, would cross the cease-fire line and head for the regions formerly evacuated by Republican troops in accordance with the Renville Agreement; further, protracted people's war would be waged throughout Java, directed by military men, in cooperation with pamong pradja, from centers located outside the towns. The Order also mapped out scorched-earth tactics.

In general, the operations in occupied regions would be carried out by troops which had been "evacuated" from these areas at the time of Renville. Within the Republic's Armed Forces, such operations were popularly known as "Wingates," after an English general who had led military operations far behind enemy lines in Burma during World War II.

The objective of any war is to break the spirit of the enemy and thus to force it to accept one's will. The side which believes that it has sufficient matériel and other assets attempts to achieve its aim

by destroying the forces of the other side. This was the road chosen by the Dutch. The Republic, by contrast, did not have sufficient armaments, etc., to destroy its enemy quickly. It had to take a different path, that is: in the first instance, to avoid being crushed; and, in the second, to mount a resistance, together with its people, which would completely exhaust the enemy and drain its spirit over the course of a protracted struggle. Thus far, experience has not invalidated this strategy.

IV. A Brief History of the Resistance after December 19, 1948

A. The Events of December 19, 1948

On December 19, 1948, at 5:45 a.m., the Dutch began their air attack on Jogjakarta. The President and most of the ministers were in Jogjakarta, and the Vice-President was at Kaliurang. Many factors had prevented the President's planned departure for India. The Vice-President had remained at Kaliurang, rather than departing for Sumatra, because the exchange of notes with the Dutch government was still under way through the good offices of Mr. Cochran. Of the ministers, Mr. Sjafrudin Prawiranegara was in Bukittinggi, others happened to be outside Jogjakarta, and Minister Maramis⁷ was abroad.

It became clear, early in the morning, that the Dutch attack was aimed directly at Jogjakarta and that no possibility to leave the country remained. Consequently, after the Vice-President arrived in Jogjakarta, a cable was sent to Bukittinggi authorizing Minister Sjafrudin to continue the administration in case the government in Jogjakarta was incapacitated by enemy action.

An important question was then discussed at the Presidential Palace: What should the President and the ministers do? In the morning, a move to Wonosari was contemplated as a first step, and orders were sent to Wonosari to prepare to receive the President and the government. Later, towards midday, the government decided to remain in Jogjakarta.

The main reason behind this decision was apparently that even if the President and the government went to Wonosari, one could not know for sure what would happen afterward. The possibility that they would eventually be captured was considered very likely. It was believed that this would be more detrimental to the people's spirit than if it were obvious from the very beginning what the situation was--i.e., that the government had been captured!

⁷Mr. A. A. Maramis was born in Menado, North Sulawesi, in 1897. He obtained his law degree from Leiden University in 1924. While in The Hague he was briefly secretary of the Perhimpunan Indonesia, and, on his return to Indonesia, became secretary of the Persatuan Minahasa. During the colonial period, he worked as a private lawyer. Under the occupation government, he was an adviser to the Japanese Navy's liaison office in Djakarta. After the Revolution began, he became a member of the KNIP Working Committee. He succeeded Dr. Samsi as Minister of Finance in the Sukarno cabinet on September 24, 1945; he had previously been Minister of State without portfolio. He served as Minister of Finance in the Amir cabinet (representing the PNI) and in the Hatta cabinet.

In view of this decision, the President and the government would obviously be captured by the enemy if Jogjakarta were occupied. The Vice-President issued an order of the day directing the Armed Forces and the people to fight on, no matter what might happen to members of the government.

The Dutch occupied Jogjakarta that same day.

B. The First Stage: The Dutch Achieve Tactical Gains but Suffer Strategic and Political Failures

The Dutch quickly succeeded in occupying all residency capitals and virtually all regency capitals within the Republic, with the exception of Atjeh. Dutch radio reports and newspaper articles described the state of intoxication with victory rampant in Dutch circles. These reports contained items favorable to the Dutch: dispersion of the Republic's Armed Forces; prevention of scorched-earth tactics; seizure of TNI supplies and capture of its commanders; beginnings of cooperation by the people with the Dutch; and, consequently, a belief that TNI remnants would quickly be completely wiped out and security restored.

Before long, however, it was obvious to the world that Dutch achievements were only superficial. It became clear that the resistance could not be broken by taking a number of towns. On the contrary, the people's war was only just beginning at the time the Dutch were announcing to the world that operations were completed. Moreover, it also was becoming evident to the world that our scorched-earth tactics had to a large extent been successful.

Dutch policy in Indonesia and toward the outside world achieved no results. Therefore, even supposing they had ever had a political plan before launching the second attack, this plan had already failed.

During the first stage, events had conformed with, or did not differ much from, Dutch plans. However, within a few weeks, it turned out that the resistance had not been broken and that the people did not support the Dutch as had been predicted. Clearly, Dutch strategy had failed.

The Dutch, therefore, could no longer control the political situation in Indonesia and, consequently, their international position also became increasingly difficult. The Dutch plan, as a matter of fact, was too speculative and, after achieving some successes, its weaknesses and its fallacies were revealed. Afterward, Dutch actions were improvisations and reactions. History has shown, however, that such actions cannot rescue a plan which has already failed because it is based on fundamental miscalculations.

C. The First Stage: The Republic Suffers Tactical Losses and Grave Difficulties, But Achieves Its Strategic and Political Aims

From the beginning, it was realized that the Republic would not be able to hold the towns during the first stage. At this point the Republic's aim was merely to avoid being annihilated and to prevent the enemy from enjoying any economic or political benefit from their opera-

tions. At the same time, the Republic would preserve the conditions for a protracted resistance and subsequently convert the whole of Java and Sumatra, including the occupied regions, into combat zones.

The Republic's objective has been achieved, despite the fact that at first the situation often looked quite gloomy: a large quantity of supplies that should have been transported outside the towns was left behind; communications were broken; and enemy propaganda worked actively to break our fighting spirit.

But before long, communications were restored with Sumatra and also New Delhi. Enemy propaganda was counteracted by broadcasts from New Delhi and Singapore. Gradually, it was realized that enemy forces were inadequate to enlarge the regions under their control, and in fact, in the occupied towns and on the roads connecting them, the enemy proved unable to secure even the safety of their own forces. Thus, they were in no position to guarantee public security.

The Republic had passed its critical moment and its fortunes began to rise.

These developments were accompanied by political events at home and abroad which proved disappointing to the Dutch. All this helped to arouse Republican fighting spirit and increase confidence in victory.

D. Improvisations, Disorganized Actions, and Dutch Tricks

The Dutch failure has been revealed most clearly by their own actions, which no longer show any clear design. In the political sphere, these have included: the arrival of P. M. Drees; subsequently, the Beel plan; then the Sumatra conference; finally, the Rum-van Royen Agreement and Dr. Beel's resignation. Throughout, the Dutch government has remained in office. All of this creates a very strange impression.

Dutch attempts to establish "federal troop units" and to persuade prisoners to enlist, because few others were interested, have revealed their difficult position. Militarily, they have carried out terrorism against the people, including murder and arson, and have attempted to conduct local negotiations. Much has already been written about atrocities by Dutch troops. Such atrocities did occur, but it would be unfair to blame them on Dutch soldiers or on the commanders of the Dutch troops. These soldiers and their commanders were ordered to break the broad people's resistance, but they were not given the necessary military force to do it. Consequently, whether intentionally or otherwise, they have practiced terrorism and committed cruel and shameful acts in the hope these will break the people's resistance.

History offers many examples of military forces in the position in which Dutch troops now find themselves employing the same methods which the Dutch troops now use. Having given the orders to their military forces in Indonesia, the Dutch government alone bears the final responsibility for all the savagery: in South Sulawesi, on the death railway, at Rawahgede, at Peniwen, and in hundreds of other places unknown to the public.

E. Continuous Improvement on the Republican Side

1) Military Administration

Soon after the war broke out, a military administration was established on Java. It was designed to continue the administration under the existing difficult conditions and to serve as an instrument of the resistance for mobilizing all energies and resources. It was authorized by a decree issued by the Java Army and Territory Commander, and later endorsed by the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia. The structure of the military administration was set out in instructions from the Java Command Headquarters.

The military administration was based on three principles. First, the Republic would continue to resist as a state and using the instruments of a state. Second, no matter how difficult the circumstances which the war created, the administration would have to continue--even, for instance, in regions which had become isolated, were frequented by Dutch patrols, or in which permanent Dutch military posts had been established. To this end, civil servants at all levels would have to be paralleled by military personnel, and extensive authority should be delegated to the regions. Third, the military administration was first of all a means of resistance, that is, a means for mobilizing and organizing all fighting forces and a means for using local resources in the resistance.

The existence of this structure brought about great changes: broad autonomy for the regions in all fields; civil servants moving from place to place and taking part in the solving of defense problems; numerous inexperienced military men having responsibility for administration, finance, justice, etc.; new balances of forces; and so on. Consequently, quite a number of minor problems and controversies arose, particularly at first. These have been gradually resolved, however, and the structure of the military administration has increasingly improved. Nevertheless, many problems have not yet been definitively settled.

Experience indicates that such a military administration constitutes a principal means, perhaps even the main basis, for a protracted people's war. The issuance of new regulations pertaining to the judiciary, police, taxation, and local autonomy has completed and improved the structure of this military administration.

To assure that the military administration has men with the moral and intellectual qualifications demanded by their great responsibilities, action is continuously being taken against those found unfit or dishonest, and new cadres, particularly from among the "mobilized" students, are being trained.

2) The Central Government Commissariat in Java

The Dutch capture of the President and the government created a vacuum at the top level of the Republic's administration. Opposition movements exploited this, spreading the idea that "the government no longer exists." The Emergency Government provided leadership to the resistance and administration on Java only in very general political matters. It was therefore felt that a center for political leadership on Java should be established.

Initially, the Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces submitted a proposal to the Emergency Government that a Central Commissariat should be established, composed of the Panglima Besar and all ministers engaged in the resistance (Ministers Kasimo, Sukiman, Susanto Tirtoprodjo, Supeno, K. H. Maskur). The head of the Emergency Government opposed seating the Panglima Besar on the Commissariat, on the grounds that political leadership should remain separate from military leadership. Consequently, the Central Government Commissariat on Java was composed only of the ministers mentioned above.

The leadership of this Commissariat, for various reasons, has not made much of an impact on the everyday resistance, and its relationship to the military command in Java has never been fully defined.

3) Mobilization of Manpower

A strategic factor which greatly favors us is manpower. But, at the same time, the number of leaders is quite limited when compared with the number of people who can be mobilized.

Since the establishment of the military administration, practically the entire population has become involved, through the offices of the pamong pradja, in the activities of the resistance. Villagers have been organized so that they can actively support the resistance, for example, as guides, provisioners, and couriers for the military. On the instructions of the Java Command Headquarters, villages have formed guerrilla units, consisting of pemuda, to assist in maintaining security and to carry out very limited tactical assignments. In this manner, an inexhaustible supply of reserve forces has been created and trained.

To meet the pressing need for leadership cadres, two sources have been exploited--civil servants evacuating the towns, and students. Many of the refugee civil servants are now employed in the various agencies of the military administration, depending on their respective skills. Many of them have made valuable contributions, such as the Attorney-General, Mr. Tirtawinata.⁸

The most extensive pool of leadership cadres during the resistance, however, has been the students. These students have long been organized in armed units under such names as the Tentara Peladjar (TP), the Tentara Republik Indonesia Peladjar (TRIP), and the Tentara Geni Peladjar (TGP). All these are now organizationally incorporated into one brigade, the Seventeenth Brigade. Throughout Java, and in several places in Sumatra too, student units have attained a respected name among the Armed Forces, the people, and even the enemy. These student units have suffered some of the highest casualties. So long as a wholehearted struggle for national independence at the risk of one's life remains highly valued, the names of TP, TRIP, TGP, etc., will be honored. During the first Dutch attack and after the Muso uprising, the government mobilized students who were not yet enrolled in organized units to assist the resistance and the efforts to reconsolidate the administration and reassure the people.

⁸Mr. R. Tirtawinata was born in Bogor, West Java, in 1900. He obtained his law degree from the Djakarta Law Faculty in 1931. During the Dutch and Japanese periods he worked in the legal administration, rising continuously in its hierarchy. He became Attorney-General in 1946.

In view of the need for leadership cadres to conduct the resistance, especially in the military administration, the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces issued a decree on the "Mobilization of Students," on February 1, 1949. The decree stipulated that "all high school and university students not yet organized into armed units should be mobilized." Subsequent procedures determined how this mobilization would be carried out, and how students would be trained and assigned specific tasks.

So far, this program has produced satisfactory results, but the mobilization of students will have to be continued until a general settlement is achieved. This means that high schools and universities cannot yet be reopened. At the same time, measures should be considered which can maintain knowledge and cultivate enthusiasm for study among students now performing tasks in the resistance.

One as yet unsolved problem of the resistance is the mobilization of medical personnel. Prior to the second Dutch attack, the Ministry of Defense held discussions with the Ministry of Health about this problem, but they did not achieve any results. Consequently, after the Dutch attack, only a very small number of medical personnel were on duty outside the towns to provide medical care for the people and the military. This problem should be settled when the Ministry of Health resumes operations.

Yet another unsolved problem is how to provide an opportunity for political organizations to participate in resistance activities. When the Dutch attacked, the domestic political situation was very precarious. The consequences of the Front Demokrasi Rakjat [People's Democratic Front], or FDR, rebellion had not been surmounted, and restrictions on political activity were still in force. The FDR had previously been the most powerful and best organized of all the political organizations, trade unions, and youth organizations in the Republic.

Both the conflict between the former FDR groups and other political groups and the restriction on political activities continued during the resistance. Local attempts have been made to form political fronts to include all groups in a particular region in opposition to the Dutch. But, at the same time, other ideas, particularly the belief that all political activity should be ended or banned, which were already present in various Republican circles prior to the Dutch attack, have also become more powerful, particularly in certain Armed Forces circles.

These issues should be settled in a statesman-like way, for they are some of the basic problems which will determine the structure and bases of political development within the Republic for a long time to come.

Other difficulties concern the financial and material needs (including technical needs) of the resistance. A printing shop to produce currency has been built, but its capacity cannot meet the need. Efforts continue to establish armaments factories, etc.

One may conclude, however, that satisfactory solutions to these two problems will only be found if a new road in that direction is discovered.

F. Some Important Communications

The Vice-President, concurrently Minister of Defense ad interim, issued an order of the day, on December 19, 1948, which called for the beginning of a people's war. Even though communications links were broken at first, we found out subsequently that all troops had carried out the plans mapped out in advance.

As a result of the Dutch attack and the military operations and political-administrative measures taken by the Republic in the occupied regions (established by Renville), the difference in status between various regions in Java and Sumatra has disappeared and the status quo lines have ceased to exist. This new situation can *not* be overturned, and any settlement must inevitably make the *same* arrangements for all of Java and Sumatra.

In a couple of weeks, it was possible to restore communications in Java, though so far links with certain regions have not been perfected. Communications with Sumatra and the outside world (New Delhi) were successfully re-established in the middle of January 1949, and, despite occasional difficulties, we have been able to maintain them up to now.

The persistence and determination of members of the Armed Forces' communications service, with the assistance of many people from Radio Republik Indonesia, the PTT, and others, have enabled the establishment and maintenance of all these communications which are so crucial to the resistance.

On June 11, 1949, Maj. Maladi sent a report stating: "The activities of colleagues of the communications service of Military Governor II, guided by God the Most Just, enabled the establishment, on June 7, of telecommunications with stations in almost every part of the world--including Los Angeles, Seattle, Liverpool, Birmingham, Brazil, Berlin, Zürich, and Holmstadt [?]. These communications will facilitate world-wide dissemination of news about the Republic, transmitted by us under the name of 'Rep Indon Press,' in the same manner as information was formerly distributed by the Antara Press Bureau. Hopefully, news from the Republic will soon be published by Reuters, the Associated Press, and other world press agencies."

Truly this accomplishment is a product of persistence that is worthy of note.

1) Communications with the Emergency Government and Representatives Abroad

On January 19, 1949, the Second Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces sent the first cable to the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia. It contained a report on the situation following the Dutch attack of December 19, 1948, undertaken "when the exchange of notes through the intermediary of Cochran was still under way." The report included the following assessments:

Ds have taken the towns, but as their military force has proved insufficient, they seek control situation by reign of terror. Result is continual fighting, arbitrary arrests, killing, burning of settlements, and political and economic chaos. The people suffer greatly, and only withdrawal of forces will bring normalization of situation and cease-fire.

Subsequently, the Java Army and Territory Commander has made periodic reports on the situation in Java. The Central Government Commissariat in Java, the Panglima Besar, and the Inspector-General of the Armed Forces have also frequently sent reports on the situation to the Emergency Government and to our representatives overseas. These reports have allowed the Emergency Government and our representatives abroad to determine Republican policy and to provide information on the real situation in Indonesia. In particular, each time the Security Council schedules a meeting on the Indonesian question, efforts are made to give the Republican delegation at Lake Success an idea of the current situation and opinions in Java.

In view of an announced Dutch plan to nullify the Security Council Resolution of January 28, 1949, the Second Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces sent a cable to the Emergency Government and our representative in New Delhi on February 28, 1949. This cable ran in part as follows:

SC Res designed to negate results of D aggression and to enable holding fair negotiations once again. But D plan is intended to use Rep leaders to legalize results of aggression and use prestige these leaders to facilitate continuation of aggression.

They intend settle the Indon problem within framework of reform of Kingdom. D plan obscure. No guarantee results of plan will be supported by majority of Indon people, hence no guarantee it can lead to lasting solution.

Given the possibility that the Dutch would attempt to find a solution which bypassed the Republic, I sent a cable on March 3, 1949, stating:

The govt which D will prob set up w/out Rep participation will encounter genl opposition. Auth and power of Rep will eventually overthrow such govt. We will not recognize any commitments it may make.

On March 19, 1949, exactly three months after the Dutch attack on the Republic, a cable on the general situation was dispatched to the Emergency Government and our representatives in New Delhi. It contained the following:

Three mos ago, D began attack under very eyes of SC and UNC. For three mos D have continued aggression witnessed by the Comm. and despite SC Res calling for end to attack.

Describing the situation after three months of aggression, and reporting that "the greater part of Java and Sumatra are controlled by the Republic," I submitted the following conclusions:

D attack has caused many deaths both sides and large-scale destruction; has jeopardized prestige of SC and made more difficult reach settlement in Indon; has brought losses to Ds, to Indon, and to world in genl.

There are two approaches to a solution: first, continue fighting until one party is exhausted, and second, negotiations. The first road entails total destruction of this country, but we are prepared to take this path if no alternative. Basic precondition for following second road is Rep territory must be returned. Negotiations cannot be based on legalization of gains from aggression or undertaken from position as prisoners.

On April 11, 1949, I cabled the following:

Van Royen's strategy demanding cease-fire and a pol solution bef govt return Jogjakarta contravenes common sense. Apparently, he proposes it only as part of D plans to delay settlement. If van Royen's demand is accepted, situation in Indon will become even more difficult and chaotic. This apparently is in keeping with D policy toward Indon, which is to create greatest possible chaos.

In connection with the talks on the return of Jogjakarta, I cabled the Emergency Government on April 30, 1949:

In principle, current negotiations concern question of whether Rep govt will return Jogjakarta in strong or weak position. Even if negotiations are successful and Ds abandon Jogjakarta, does not mean resistance over or things will be easier. Return of Jogjakarta signifies only new stage in resistance which shd be exploited to utmost.

After the Run-van Royen Agreement, it was evident that the Emergency Government still distrusted Dutch policy and wanted international guarantees against Dutch treachery. In this connection, I cabled the Emergency Government on May 18, 1949, as follows:

Suggest following course to EG. Externally, shd back Pres and Vice-Pres and take steps assure govt will have opportunity to conduct negotiations from most favorable position. Internally, shd form a second defense line and build our strength in case deadlock occurs. To this end, EG shd remain where it is, even after govt return Jogjakarta. EG shd be reconstituted as Sumatra Commissariat, but may be changed into EG again any time.

Further:

TNI troops shd remain in place until sovereignty transferred or until deadlock occurs and fighting resumes. Definitive settlement regarding TNI troops after transf of sov can be reached jointly by govt USI and govt Rep Indon; in short it is national issue and D intervention shd be opposed.

Concerning the visit of the Vice-President to Atjeh, on June 4, 1949, I cabled the Emergency Government as follows:

In this context, have proposed fundamental problems re cease-fire and defense and security generally be discussed jointly by Pres, Vice-Pres, head of EG, Central Govt Comm in Java, Pang Bes, and other armed forces commanders in Mil Strat Council after return govt Jogjakarta.

In each step, attempts must be made prevent, repeat, prevent, any loss or weakening of our present strength under EG (incl ability wage protracted people's war) until transf of sov achieved.

Also worthy of note was the cable to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Emergency Government, in New Delhi, which requested him to arrange the shipment of medicine from abroad.

2) Communications with Our Delegation and Our Leaders in Bangka

At first, all attempts to make contact with Djakarta and Bangka failed. The first letter sent by the Staff of the Armed Forces to our delegation was dated March 17, 1949, and was addressed to its secretary.

In the letter it was stressed that: "It is a condition sine qua non for the success of our resistance that some coordination of strategy should exist between the Republican groups which were separated by the Dutch aggression and in their own ways are currently carrying out, respectively, diplomacy, noncooperation, scorched-earth tactics, or broad people's resistance." Then, the danger of the present situation was pointed out: "It is obvious that the enemy is going out of his way to create divisions in our ranks and seeks to crush us one by one or, worse yet, to conclude some sort of alliance with one or more groups to crush the others."

Since delegation members received daily news only from the Dutch side, it seemed necessary to emphasize the following:

Let us not be influenced by the enemy's bluff. The enemy will never be able to control the situation in this country so long as we mount a resistance. If need be, this resistance can continue until the enemy is exhausted. Admittedly, our sacrifices have been great, but they have been made and will continue to be made willingly. Do not take these casualties into account when making decisions.

The letter closed with the following conclusions:

Based on this analysis, I note the following as the essential conditions for a settlement:

1. Republican groups must be reunited as one integrated organization enabling the government to exert its influence and power.
2. The restoration of security and order must not be interpreted as tantamount to continued aggression (as the Dutch intend). Rather a termination of aggression should be regarded as the first step toward security and should be followed by others, including withdrawal of Dutch forces.

There will be no peace in Indonesia if these conditions are not fulfilled.

Early in April, the ministers in Jogjakarta had the opportunity to go to Djakarta and Bangka. Since then, it has been possible to establish broader contact with Djakarta, and, indirectly, with Bangka.

In addition to providing the delegation with a picture of the situation and viewpoints which exist outside, the letters sent by the Staff of the Armed Forces were based on the belief that negotiations should be conducted in such a manner as to restore a powerful unity among groups divided by Dutch aggression.

On April 6, 1949, I wrote the following:

Only after the government has returned to Jogjakarta and has held consultations with the Emergency Government, the Armed Forces High Command and, possibly, the political parties (or what remains of the KNIP Working Committee) can negotiations on a cease-fire and a political solution be conducted with any likelihood of support from the majority of the people and the Armed Forces.

A "technical note" from the Java Army and Territory Commander has explained to Djakarta and Bangka that, merely from the technical military angle, a cease-fire will be extremely difficult, if not impossible, to implement.

The delegation's suggestion that the Second Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces be allowed to establish "broad contacts" with it has been rejected on the grounds that, if such communications were officially established, we would have to settle the cease-fire problem prior to the government's return to Jogjakarta.

The achievement of the Rum-van Royen Agreement has changed the situation and the problems involved. Letters sent by the Staff of the Armed Forces after this agreement contained the following considerations. First, the agreement gambles with the position of the President and Vice-President, on the one hand, and, on the other, it contains elements unsatisfactory to major groups. It will consequently create tensions, and efforts must be made to prevent such tensions from resulting in splits. Second, the agreement has not removed the old antagonisms, and it has created new ones in addition, for example, with regard to the fate of regions outside Jogjakarta.

Whether or not a general agreement can be achieved on the basis of the Rum-van Royen accords depends wholly on Dutch policies and American actions. Consequently, the possibility of a new outbreak of war is very great. This implies that it is imperative that we continue to preserve our strength.

In this connection, we have repeatedly requested our delegation not to discuss a cease-fire until after the government's return to Jogjakarta and after consultations with the Armed Forces High Command. Therefore, it has been impossible to comply with the delegation's request that "two military experts," i.e., the Second Deputy Chief of Staff and someone else, be sent to Djakarta. The delegation indicated in their request that the Dutch wished to impose restrictions on the wearing of uniforms by officers visiting Djakarta. This provides another reason for rejecting the request, because accepting such restrictions would mean that the status of the Republican Armed Forces is open to question.

3) Other Communications Links

Among the other communications links established, the most important have been those with the military observers. These have always been of an informal nature. On January 19, 1949, the Second Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces wrote the first letter to the Military Executive Board, noting that:

If international pressure does not compel Dutch military forces to withdraw, during the coming months the Three-State Commission and its military observers will witness a life and death struggle between the Dutch military, with all their modern equipment, and the Indonesian people fighting for their right to live in freedom, using all their power and the simple means at their disposal. This will indeed be an irony of history.

Another section of the letter read:

It will not be possible to conduct war only against the TNI. Any attempt to eliminate the TNI will mean war against the Indonesian nation.

At present, it is not possible to predict the outcome of such a struggle, for it will be determined by many factors--the extent to which the Indonesian people are prepared to make the highest sacrifices for their independence; how far Asian countries will support the resistance; and by the constantly changing world situation in general.

A few things will certainly result from such a struggle, however. This country will be devastated. Political developments among the Indonesian people will move toward extremism. Dutch interests will no longer have any place in the independent state of Indonesia which is bound to emerge eventually. Perhaps, at this moment, the process has already reached the point of no return.

And further:

Consequently, I personally consider it a crime that the Dutch attempt to settle the Indonesian problem by force of arms even though their forces have proved inadequate to achieve a speedy solution and, as a result, will cause a long period of confusion and endless suffering for the people.

The letter concluded with a reminder to the Military Executive Board of Djojobojo's prophecies.

Other letters have frequently been sent as informal communications in order to provide the military observers with a picture of the general situation. These military observers turned down an invitation to visit regions in Java under Republican control.

June 19, 1949

Second Deputy Chief of Staff
of the Armed Forces

(signed)

T. B. Simatupang, Colonel

CHAPTER IX

RETURN TO JOGJAKARTA

The fall of Jogjakarta and the capture of our top leaders on December 19, 1948, certainly constituted a moral blow to our people and Armed Forces. But, as I myself experienced, within two or three weeks, our administration and military organization for the people's war were already in operation. During this war, as I wandered from village to village, I never encountered an atmosphere of pessimism, let alone despair. Everywhere, I heard and felt the positive conviction that, at some favorable moment, the war would end in victory for our side.

In the course of conversations, I frequently said, jokingly, that by the standards of lawyers and conventional military maxims, we were doubtless already considered defeated when our capital city, our large towns, our head of state, and members of our government were captured on December 19. Fortunately for us, the majority of our Armed Forces and our people had never heard the opinions of lawyers and military experts, and so they continued to fight. It is a good thing that they were not "experts."

This was, of course, only a joke. Nonetheless, I think it is true that our Republic was safeguarded during the people's war because of the optimism and militancy of the masses of people and the Armed Forces, in combination with organizational structures, skills, and armaments. What was the mainspring of this optimism and militancy? Did they stem from the nationalist education and propaganda during the colonial period, the Japanese occupation, and the Proclamation of Independence? Was the militancy the legacy of a tradition of people's resistance against the Dutch under the leadership of Prince Diponegoro and other heroes? Was the optimism the legacy of our nation's history and tradition, which tells of past defeats and the exile of leaders, followed by ultimate victory? Airlangga, for instance, fled from his capital city and lived among ascetics before he finally climbed the throne of his kingdom. Radèn Widjaja once ran from the persecution of his enemies but later founded the Kingdom of Madjapahit. Gadjah Mada, while still in the king's guard, took flight together with the king before becoming the Patih of Madjapahit. Perhaps the optimism of the masses and the Armed Forces was also influenced by Djojobojo's prophecies.

Did our Islamic tradition encourage the conviction that we were bound to be victorious? I still remember how depressed we first were when the Renville Agreement was accepted because it stipulated that our troops, who had waged people's war behind the so-called Van Mook Line for some months, had to withdraw to the region now demarcated as Republican territory. To dispel the depression, we rationalized that this evacuation would pave the way for victory, because the struggle would shift from the bullet to the ballot. Who was not convinced that if the people were asked to choose between the Republic and the Dutch, we would win? A new slogan was launched: "From the Bullet to the Ballot." To my mind, this explanation proved less important in

restoring morale than the word *Hidjrah*. Pak Dirman chose this word to denote the withdrawal operation because it expressed both the conviction that withdrawal was temporary and the notion that, at a more favorable time, we would return to these places as victors. One source of Pak Dirman's greatness was his profound sensitivity, which enabled him to understand and stir the thinking, feelings, and imagination of the masses and the soldiers.

After the Rum-van Royen Agreement became a reality, our return to Jogjakarta remained only a matter of time. Nonetheless, no sense of relief or enthusiasm existed during those days. Negotiations would doubtless resume after the withdrawal of Dutch troops from Jogjakarta. Psychologically, conducting negotiations is far more difficult than waging people's war. Personally, I had felt as if a heavy burden had been lifted from my shoulders a few days after the Dutch attack of December 19, 1948. During the people's war, we felt that we marched forward together with the current of the people's aspirations and strength.

Negotiating implied that we would have to find a compromise between the aspirations of our people, on one side, and the wishes of the Dutch, on the other. At the same time, we would have to take into consideration the balance of forces and international factors, particularly the United Nations Commission for Indonesia. During the people's war, we did not need to consider all of these things. We had only one aim--to build the most powerful force possible, one capable of inflicting losses on the Dutch, and to attack them using all ways and means. During a people's war, one feels more healthy physically and more at ease than during negotiations.

After the evacuation of Jogjakarta by Dutch troops, negotiations would begin again. But, in the meantime, hatred and suspicion towards the Dutch had become more profound and widespread. In addition, the BFO would officially take part in the coming negotiations as a party on the same level as the Republic. Nevertheless, we could not reject the Rum-van Royen Agreement which had received the blessings of the President and Vice-President.

How would the Dutch react to the Rum-van Royen Agreement? Reports from Djakarta informed us that Dr. Beel had resigned as the representative of the Dutch Crown because he could not support the agreement. News from Jogjakarta indicated anxiety among the Dutch troops after the agreement was announced. It was understandably so. For years, propaganda had flooded the Dutch military forces to the effect that everything would be settled once Jogjakarta had been taken and President Sukarno captured. On December 19, Dutch forces had accomplished both these tasks; now their government had signed an agreement which would return President Sukarno to Jogjakarta, and Dutch troops would have to abandon the city. Apparently, activities began among the troops to impede the return of Jogjakarta. They spread rumors that the TNI would terrorize the city after Dutch troops left. Some of our people apparently believed these stories, and they left the city with the Dutch convoys to go to Semarang or Djakarta.

One day Dr. Hutagalung,¹ then working on the staff of Col. Bambang

¹Dr. Hutagalung was active in the resistance against the British in Surabaya in 1945. In February 1948, he was appointed as an army representative to the Hidjrah Committee which was responsible for arranging the withdrawal of Republic forces from Dutch-occupied territory.

Sugeng, arrived at Banaran out of breath. He had hurried over to bring important news he had just heard on the radio, namely, that Gen. Spoor had died in Djakarta. According to general belief, it was Gen. Spoor who had advised, and even urged, the Dutch government to launch the first and second attacks on the Republic. Having initially succumbed to his advice, or pressure, the government was now going to beat a retreat, and at this point the General died. Together with him would also be buried the idea of establishing an Indonesian armed forces by disbanding the TNI and creating a Dutch-Indonesian Union armed forces. He had set forth this proposal in a note after the signing of the Linggadjati Agreement. This note had formed the basis for the proposals concerning a gendarmerie made prior to the second Dutch attack, and also for Sassen's proposals on the position of Dutch armed forces during the interim period.

I had not known Gen. Spoor very well. Before the Dutch attack on Jogjakarta, my counterparts at the negotiations in Djakarta and Kaliurang had been Gen. Buurman van Vreeden² and Col. Pereira. Spoor had served as a captain on the General Staff of the KNIL at the time of the Japanese attack on the Indies in 1942, and he had managed to leave Java before the Japanese occupied it. In Australia, he had charge of NEFIS, the abbreviation for the name of the Netherlands Indies armed forces' intelligence service. Even after Spoor became Dutch Commander-in-Chief in Indonesia, after the Japanese surrender, we continued to associate him with NEFIS. In general, we believed that NEFIS was very efficiently organized and extremely dangerous. Whenever serious difficulties arose among us, we always attributed it to NEFIS. Any person who disliked someone tried to brand that person as a NEFIS agent. One might regard all of this as evidence that the Dutch intelligence service organized by Gen. Spoor had indeed successfully conducted its "psychological warfare," creating terror and panic among us. But, it seemed to me that NEFIS generally failed to assess Republican strength accurately, and as a result Dutch policies were based on an erroneous evaluation of the situation which existed. Dutch failures to achieve their political objectives in Indonesia during the first and second attacks on the Republic, despite considerable sacrifice and expense, demonstrate the truth of this. Possibly, in evaluating the strengths and weaknesses of our Republic, Spoor and his NEFIS relied too heavily on the Republic's technical and organizational deficiencies in the military and the administrative fields. Possibly they also failed to comprehend the historical forces which the Republic represented.

On the eve of the Dutch evacuation of Jogjakarta, Dutch radio kept warning that security conditions would deteriorate once their troops had left. The theme of these announcements was: So far the Dutch "Tiger Brigade" has maintained security through strenuous efforts, but what will happen when that Brigade withdraws? The Dutch apparently still did not understand that the "security problem" was not merely a matter of numbers of troops. They still did not realize that the more Dutch troops that were sent to a particular area, the greater the opposition to them and the more serious the security problem would be. They still did not comprehend that it was precisely the presence of Dutch troops that gave rise to the security problem in Jogjakarta. It had been a peaceful and tranquil area before the invasion by Dutch troops, and it would be as peaceful and tranquil again after Dutch troops left.

²Maj. Gen. Buurman van Vreeden was Chief of Staff of the Dutch forces in the Indies in the immediate postwar period.

Sultan Hamengku Buwono had full powers from Bangka to arrange everything to do with the return of Jogjakarta. Lt. Col. Suharto, the brigade commander, would command all armed forces in charge of maintaining security in places in the Jogjakarta region which the Dutch were evacuating. Col. Djatikusumo, together with the Military Academy cadets, would assist in this transfer of security responsibilities. Military observers from the UN Commission for Indonesia would witness the withdrawal of Dutch troops and the arrival of ours.

During the last days at Banaran, one question remained in connection with the forthcoming return of our troops to the city--the position of Armed Forces members who had not taken part in the people's war. Should they be considered as having left the Armed Forces, and perhaps even be prosecuted, as many among us demanded? I thought such an attitude unfair, for, among those who did not participate in the fighting, perhaps some had legitimate excuses. But, at the same time, to accept them just like that and act as though nothing had happened would be unfair to those who had participated in the people's war. Consequently, I issued a decision of the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces which provided that members of the Armed Forces who had been non-active during the war should consider themselves suspended, and, as soon as possible, they should answer for their conduct to a Board of Honor. If the Board accepted their justifications, the suspension would be revoked immediately. If the Board rejected their explanations, then it should submit proposals for their punishment. This decision later served as the basis for the formation of several Eereraad (Boards of Honor) after the evacuation of Jogjakarta.

The time had now come for us to say goodbye to the people of Banaran. In other villages of the Jogjakarta region as well, members of the Armed Forces, civil servants, and pemuda who had lived among the villagers for several months now took their leave of their hosts and returned to the city. Though we were not fully satisfied with the Rumvan Royen Agreement and though it seemed likely that subsequent developments would have their unsatisfactory aspects, there was still ample possibility that before long the whole world would recognize the independence and sovereignty of the Indonesian state and nation. I wondered what would be the fate of these villages in the future Indonesia, the world-wide recognition of whose independence had been achieved thanks to the people's war which had had its bases in these villages. Having lived for some months in the village of Banaran, would we in the future see an advanced and prosperous Banaran?

During the people's war, the Armed Forces, pemuda, and civil servants from the towns had returned to the villages to exploit the reserve of strength available in our countryside for the people's war. In times of peace, just the reverse always happens. Everyone who has obtained some school education leaves the village to make a better living in the city and consequently the village remains backward. Our problem in the future will be how to advance these villages to a level of progress such that those who are educated can find satisfaction working in a village environment. Some such plan represents the only way that the townspeople who lived in the village during the people's war can repay their debt to the villagers.

I am intimately acquainted with life in the huta of Tapanuli and in the desa of Central Java. Can this style of life be modernized? The overwhelming majority of our people live in villages. If we sincerely wish to establish a just and prosperous society in Indonesia,

this implies first of all establishing justice and prosperity in the villages. Do conditions exist for modernizing our villages? Do we have concrete ideas for bringing justice and prosperity to our desa and huta? I frequently asked myself this question while in Banaran. I also discussed it often with Ali Budiardjo. But, by the time we left Banaran, I still had not found a satisfactory answer.

Before entering Jogjakarta, we spent the night in the village where Lt. Col. Suharto had had his headquarters during the last phase of the people's war. When we arrived, an old woman told us that Pak Suharto had already left for the city. "Being a distinguished panglima," she said, "he will certainly be rewarded with a beautiful princess." People in this village still lived in the world of ancient legends in which a distinguished panglima always married the daughter of the king.

The Dutch troops withdrew northward from the city on June 29, 1949. Our troops entered from the south. My party entered the city the following day. Several brand new Landrovers awaited us at the city limits. On our way to the Kapatihan,³ then the center of all activity, the situation of the city and of life there seemed quite normal.

There was a great deal of bustle at the Kapatihan. Journalists, including some from overseas, were interviewing everyone who had just returned from outside the city. Military observers from the UN Commission were moving about. Everyone's attention focused on the Sultan, who wore a TNI General's uniform.

First we held a press conference, and then I received the military observers from the UN Commission. Afterward, a lengthy discussion took place between the Sultan, who had arranged the return of Jogjakarta very efficiently, Mohammad Natsir, a minister who had been in Djakarta during the people's war and therefore knew all about the negotiations there, and Ali Budiardjo and myself, just back from Banaran.

What would happen next? What problems and possibilities were in store for us?

First of all, Bung Karno, Bung Hatta, and other leaders would return from Bangka. Then Sjafrudin would come from the mountain ranges of Central Sumatra. Pak Dirman himself would be arriving. A consensus would then be sought between the Emergency Government, the Armed Forces Command, and the returning Bangka leadership. Although several psychological problems would have to be overcome, there seemed no other alternative than to accept the policy mapped out in Bangka. Afterward, a cease-fire would be instituted. From the technical point of view, many difficulties would arise, but these would probably not impede efforts to reach a definitive political solution.

In our efforts to achieve a final political settlement, we would have to begin by forming a common front with the BFO. Though this

³The Kapatihan was the official quarters of the Papatih Dalem, chief minister of the Sultanate and, during the Dutch period, the person who actually administered daily affairs. When the incumbent Papatih died during the Japanese occupation, the young Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX did not appoint a successor but rather assumed the Papatih's functions himself, and used the Kapatihan as his office.

could be understood in logical terms, emotionally it would create problems among us, because it would imply that we were accepting the BFO as a partner equal to the Republic. If a common viewpoint could be achieved with the BFO, then we and they could leave for The Hague to face the Dutch. The UN Commission for Indonesia, meanwhile, would assist at the conference in The Hague. It would be there that we would face the main problem: Would it prove possible for the Dutch, on the one side, and the Republic and the BFO, on the other, to reach an agreement? What would happen in case we became deadlocked in The Hague? Obviously, we could not stay there too long, for the situation in Indonesia following the cease-fire would remain explosive. If negotiations in The Hague resulted in deadlock, would it be possible to return to Indonesia and continue the people's war? This was one of the weaknesses of the approach outlined by Bangka and Djakarta. Officially, we would adhere to our principle of "negotiations while on the alert for war," but whenever a problem arose in the Hague negotiations, the UN Commission for Indonesia would represent an influential force for settlement, because it would prove difficult for either us or the Dutch to resume the war again after we had come to The Hague. What would the situation be later when the Republic of the United States of Indonesia had been established? Would we be able to use our Republic, including its Armed Forces, as a major "asset" within the new state? All these questions and issues were at the core of our discussions that day in Jogjakarta.

On July 6, 1949, a UN Commission airplane landed at Maguwo bringing Bung Karno, Bung Hatta, and other leaders from Bangka. Coming in from Maguwo, the motorcade, headed by an open car with Bung Karno and the Sultan, was feted by a huge crowd thronging the roadside. At the Palace, a deeply moving reception ceremony took place. Sukarno and Hatta had been captured by Gen. Spoor's troops on the morning of December 19, 1948. Now, six and one-half months later, they resumed their positions as President and Vice-President in Jogjakarta, and Gen. Spoor rested among his soldiers at the Mentengpulo Cemetery in Djakarta.

Force of arms does not constitute the only factor, nor even the most important factor, moving history forward.

Now Jogjakarta awaited the arrival of Sjafrudin Prawiranegara and Panglima Besar Sudirman.

I was also at Maguwo airfield on July 6 to welcome Sukarno and Hatta. I saw for myself how enthusiastically the people welcomed them all along the road and at the Palace. Who can deny that the Dwitunggal was a powerful factor, having an almost "magic" nature, during our revolution? The July 3 Movement and the Madiun Rebellion had demonstrated how difficult it was to oppose Sukarno and Hatta. The pemuda, who saw themselves as the pioneers of the Proclamation of August 17, 1945, also knew at that time that, if such a proclamation were issued, it would have to be signed by Sukarno and Hatta. Bung Sjahrir had negotiated the Linggadjati Agreement, but would the KNIP have accepted it without the unconditional support of Sukarno and Hatta? Bung Amir had conducted the Renville negotiations, but he too realized that he needed the support of Sukarno and Hatta. Consequently, before reaching the agreement, he brought Bung Hatta from Bukittinggi by a Three-State Commission airplane. Now once again the magic power of Sukarno and Hatta was demonstrated. In spite of their internment by the Dutch, once it became known that they had given their blessing to the Rum-van Royen Agreement, the Emergency Government and the Armed Forces High Command had virtually no other alternative than to accept it.

Bung Karno and Bung Hatta were born in the early years of this century. Certainly differences exist between them. Bung Karno is the product of the Indonesian society of East Java, where, in my experience, children learn wayang stories before they study Quranic verses, and where the priajai neither appreciate nor have any interest in commerce. Bung Hatta, on the other hand, comes from the Indonesian community around Bukittinggi, where religion, commerce, and adat are very important matters. Bung Karno spent the formative years of his youth primarily in Surabaya and Bandung, while Bung Hatta went from Djakarta to the Netherlands.

Despite the differences between the two leaders which resulted from their different characters and backgrounds, nevertheless, they were the primary leaders of the mature phase of our national movement in the 1930's, after it had passed through the Budi Utomo phase, the Sarekat Islam phase, and the PKI phase. The Dutch had exiled them, perhaps in the hope that the national movement would produce new, more moderate leaders. But no sooner had Bung Karno and Bung Hatta returned to the community after the Japanese defeat of the Dutch than they immediately became the "prime factor" among the people. The era of the Japanese occupation added a new element to our national movement, that is, the spread of military skills and highly militant attitudes among our pemuda. But after our Proclamation of Independence, Sukarno-Hatta continued to be the prime factor in our nation.

If the conflict between us and the Dutch could be definitively settled as a consequence of the Rum-van Royen Agreement that had been blessed by Sukarno and Hatta, then our people would face a weighty task. They would have to establish a New Indonesia which would give real meaning to the blood and tears shed during the war for independence. This New Indonesia would be built within the contemporary world where the ideological and competitive conflict between the forces of capitalism and communism are reaching their climax, 100 years after Karl Marx wrote his works at the Royal Museum Library in London.

What would be the role of the Dwitunggal of Sukarno-Hatta in the next phase?

CHAPTER X

PAK DIRMAN ARRIVES

Very early on the morning of July 10, 1949, Pak Hardjo and I left Jogjakarta for Wonosari in one of the cars which we had received from Djakarta as part of the agreement returning the Republican government to Jogjakarta. Pak Hardjo, as the most senior officer then in the city, and myself, as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, would together welcome Pak Dirman near Wonosari and accompany him to Jogjakarta the same day.

Soon after we had arrived at the simple village house where Pak Dirman would rest briefly before continuing the journey in our car, his party was spotted on the other side of the river. We could see Pak Dirman on a litter being carried by a number of men. Others walked on either side of him. Soon we recognized them: Suadi,¹ commander of the escort, carrying a rifle; Supardjo,² Pak Dirman's adjutant; and other members of the escort, most of them in black uniforms. Lt. Col. Suharto, commander of the Jogjakarta Brigade, was now also with Pak Dirman's party.

A large number of villagers from nearby places had lined up together with us to await Pak Dirman's arrival. As the party came nearer, we heard someone explaining to his child that it was the *Gusti Tentara* [Lord Soldier].

After the litter had been put on the ground, Pak Dirman stood up and we embraced wordlessly. Then we had a short conversation inside the house where we had been waiting for him. Our host served tea. Pak Dirman's face radiated his strength of will. I could see, though I am not a doctor, that his immense strength of will had been the sole source of strength for the Panglima Besar in the past months when he had only one lung. The life of Pak Dirman symbolizes the victory of a strong spirit over a weak and sickly body. It is said that nothing new happens under the sun. But as a student of history, I knew no

¹Suadi Suromihardjo was an important figure in the seizure of weapons from the Japanese in Surakarta in the fall of 1945. He served as a regimental commander in the Tenth Division under Purbonegoro and later under Sutarto. When the division was reorganized as the Fourth Division (Senopati) in 1946, he commanded the Twenty-Sixth Regiment (Surakarta), one of the two strongest in the division. He was active on the Central Java front and was a member of the military delegation to the Linggadjati talks. After the May 1948 rationalization, he became Commander of the Fifth Brigade under Sutarto and succeeded the latter after his murder in July. He was temporarily in disfavor because of his role in the prologue to the Madiun Affair, but he was restored to command in the second action, being placed initially in charge of Wehrkreise II (Madiun) under Gatot Subroto. After his replacement by Sukowati, he became commander of Sudirman's escort.

²Supardjo was born in Sukaradja, Central Java, in 1926. He received military training under the Japanese. In 1946, he commanded a platoon in the Fifth Division and served as ADC to the division commander. In March 1948, he became ADC to Sudirman.

story which resembled Pak Dirman's experiences during the past months--the story of a general leading a war of independence from a litter.

A general's attire could have been made ready at this place in advance, so that Pak Dirman could enter the capital city in full uniform. But he wanted to be dressed on this occasion in the clothes he had worn throughout the people's war, the simple clothes of an ordinary villager, with a thick army overcoat on top of them. This showed the greatness of his spirit and his honest attitude toward history. In this condition and these clothes, he had led the people's war, and this was how he was going to show himself to the people in the capital and the world. This demonstrated also a profound understanding of the psychology of the people. Pak Dirman entering the city on this day in his uniform as Panglima Besar of the people's war would live forever in the hearts and imaginations of our people as a symbol of our war for independence.

I first became acquainted with Pak Dirman at the end of October 1945. He was then Division Commander in Purwokerto, and I visited him as an emissary from Headquarters (or, in the terminology of the time, Supreme Headquarters). At that time, Supreme Headquarters had only just been set up, though BKR (People's Security Organization) units had already been formed earlier in the regions. On October 5, 1945, these units were converted into the TKR (People's Security Army). The government, still seated in Djakarta, called on Pak Urip, a retired major of the KNIL who lived not far from Jogjakarta, to organize the TKR. The government appointed him as Chief of the General Staff and gave him a mandate to carry out this task. He chose Jogjakarta as the seat for his headquarters and immediately left Djakarta. The confusion of the times can be imagined from the long interrogation which pemuda at the Tegal railway station gave Pak Urip, Chief of the General Staff, before permitting him to continue his journey to Jogjakarta.

Sasra and myself arrived there from Bandung a few days after Pak Urip. At that time, Pak Urip still had his headquarters in Room 23 of the Hotel Merdeka. Machmud, who had come from Djakarta with Pak Urip, went with me to look for a suitable place to serve as headquarters. Soon afterward, Supreme Headquarters moved from Room 23 to a complex of buildings near the intersection of Gondokusuman and Terban-Taman-Djalan Widoro. These premises at present serve as the regimental headquarters for Jogjakarta.

Pak Urip had been appointed the Chief of the General Staff. A Panglima Besar had also been appointed, namely, Suprijadi,³ a Peta officer who had led the Blitar uprising towards the end of the Japanese occupation. Some said that Suprijadi had been killed by the Japanese, but many more believed that he was still alive and that he would certainly reappear when the time was right. There were even stories that he was leading the fighting in various places, ranging from West to East Java.

From the very outset, the front room of Supreme Headquarters, to the left as one entered, had been reserved for Panglima Besar Suprijadi, who was never seen there. The room remained empty all the time.

³Suprijadi led the Peta mutiny in Blitar, East Java, in February 1945. His appointment as Minister of Defense of the Republican Army on October 5, 1945, was based on the reputation he had acquired as a consequence of the Peta revolt.

Even when other staffs and offices at Supreme Headquarters needed more space, this room was not used until Pak Dirman was appointed Panglima Besar.

As already mentioned, arms had been seized from the Japanese in the regions where BKR units had been formed before the establishment of Supreme Headquarters. After Supreme Headquarters was set up, these units were reorganized in line with its instructions. Some of the regions had large quantities of arms and ammunition at their disposal because they had succeeded in seizing the Japanese munitions which happened to be stored there. In Java, such "rich" regions were Malang and Purwokerto. At the same time, some regions were "poor," that is, either they had not succeeded in seizing stores of arms and ammunition from the Japanese at the beginning, or their areas had never had such stores in any quantity. These poor regions were soon engaged in the fight against the British and the Dutch, and they applied to Supreme Headquarters for arms and ammunition. Supreme Headquarters could only send emissaries to the rich regions to try to persuade them to give part of their own supplies to the regions which badly needed them.

During the early days of Supreme Headquarters, I frequently visited rich regions, such as Malang and Purwokerto, to ask for part of their supply of arms and ammunition for poor regions, such as Djakarta and Bandung, which needed them desperately. Each time we met, I could always expect Pak Dirman, the Division Commander in Purwokerto, to give willingly as much help as possible. At such meetings, Pak Dirman was usually assisted by his adjutant, Abimanju. Compared with troops in many other regions at that time, the Purwokerto Division had managed to establish good discipline from the start. Since the time of the Dutch, the Banjumas region had been a prime recruiting area for KNIL soldiers, so perhaps the military tradition was already deeply rooted among its population.

I next met Pak Dirman on a unique, historic occasion: the "election" of the Panglima Besar in early December 1945. Senior officers from Supreme Headquarters, division and regiment commanders from all over Java, and several officers who claimed to represent the army in Sumatra assembled in the Supreme Headquarters conference room. The Sultan and the Pakualam, both honorary officers, also attended. The main item on the agenda was the "election" of a Panglima Besar.

Panglima Besar Suprijadi had not appeared, and the military increasingly felt that a Panglima Besar capable of actively leading the army should be appointed. The name Suprijadi was wrapped in mystery, and, though this might have been useful at the beginning when the army was first formed, it was now felt that mystery alone was not enough. Following repeated balloting and a cooling-off period (the atmosphere had at times become tense), Pak Dirman was eventually declared "elected" as Panglima Besar and Pak Urip as Chief of the General Staff. The choice of Pak Dirman reflected his high prestige among the military at that time. This was due, among other things, to the expulsion of British troops from Ambarawa [Central Java] by troops under Sudirman's command some time before the "election."

The meeting did not only "elect" a Panglima Besar and a Chief of the General Staff. In an atmosphere of deep sincerity, votes were also cast to "elect" a Minister of Defense. At the first ballot, the Sultan had clearly won an absolute majority of the votes.

The results of this "election" were submitted to the government, then under the leadership of Bung Sjahrir. The cabinet seemed to comprehend that, under the prevailing circumstances, the army's "election" of the Panglima Besar and Chief of the General Staff must be accepted as a reflection of the atmosphere existing within this very youthful military. On December 18, 1945, the President appointed Pak Dirman as Panglima Besar and redesignated Pak Urip as Chief of the General Staff. The cabinet of the time, however, apparently considered the appointment of a Minister of Defense by military "election" as going a bit too far.

At the time of the Dutch attack of December 19, 1948, Pak Dirman had already occupied the post of Panglima Besar for three years and one day. They were years full of turbulence and trial for our Republic. At first, we were fighting battles with the Dutch and the British, while carrying out internal consolidations, such as that conducted by the Plenary Committee for the Reorganization of the Army. Subsequently, we faced the negotiations which resulted in the Linggadjati Agreement, which in its turn gave rise to bitter antagonisms within our own ranks. Afterward, we experienced difficulties in implementing this agreement. At this time, Pak Dirman submitted a complete set of proposals regarding the possibility of a Dutch attack, an analysis known as the Panglima Besar's Note. During this same period, Spoor's Note was circulating among the Dutch. Subsequently, the first Dutch attack occurred on July 21, 1947.

After this, negotiations were conducted with the assistance of the Three-State Commission. These ended in the Renville Agreement which in turn was followed by violent conflicts within our ranks culminating in the Madiun rebellion. Several reorganizations were carried out within the Armed Forces during those years, but Pak Dirman remained the central figure in the development of our Armed Forces throughout.

Supreme Headquarters had been formed at the beginning without regard to the fact that a Ministry of Defense would eventually be set up. No such Ministry existed at the time, only a Ministry of Security located in Djakarta. On January 4, 1946, this ministry was transferred to Jogjakarta and only on January 7, was the name Ministry of Defense introduced. That same day, it was also decided to change the name of the Tentara Keamanan Rakjat [People's Security Army] to Tentara Keselamatan Rakjat [People's Preservation Army]. But afterwards it was generally thought that this name was too close to the Bala Keselamatan Rakjat [Salvation Army], and consequently, on January 26, 1946, another name was introduced, the Tentara Republik Indonesia [Army of the Republic of Indonesia], abbreviated as the TRI. On that day also, the Plenary Committee for the Reorganization of the Army was set up and charged, among other things, with regulating the relationship between the Ministry of Defense and the Army High Command. I served on this committee.

The new organization of the army only became effective on May 25, 1946. Pak Dirman, who continued as Panglima Besar under the new format, declared in his oath: "I shall be faithful and loyal to the government of the Republic of Indonesia which executes its duties in accordance with the Constitution of the Republic of Indonesia and which unswervingly defends its independence." The next step within the framework of the reorganization was the merging of the TRI and the *lasjkar* [irregular troops] to create the Tentara Nasional Indonesia [Indonesian National Army], abbreviated as TNI. The TNI High Command

was inaugurated on June 28, 1947. Pak Dirman remained as the Panglima Besar.

The qualities needed to command an armed force such as ours, which was first created regionally and was composed of men with various educational and social backgrounds, in a situation full of turmoil and conflict, differ from those needed to command armed forces which are already organized in an orderly manner and during a period of calm. Each era determines certain roles for the characters on its historical stage. If the role is played by a person whose qualities are commensurate to the part, then history records him as a great leader. But if no one suitable for the role emerges, or if the role is seized by someone whose qualities are not equal to it, then history notes that a generation failed to solve the problems thrust upon it. Pak Dirman successfully led our Armed Forces through an epoch of trial and turmoil until the whole world recognized our sovereignty and independence. This proved his greatness, that is, that he possessed the qualities required by the role which history had cast for a Panglima Besar in our country at that time.

Pak Dirman was born in Banjumas and was educated in private Muhammadiyah schools. The Muhammadiyah reflected both our national awakening and, at the time, rejuvenation in Islam. He served as a teacher and boy scout leader at these same schools. During his childhood, he experienced sorrow and hardship; perhaps it was the memory of these which was reflected on Pak Dirman's sincere and modest face. During the Japanese occupation, he was a Peta officer and highly respected by his comrades.

Pak Dirman usually delegated to Pak Urip the technical military problems which the Military Command faced after the Proclamation of Independence. Pak Dirman's greatest service was his ability to keep all groups in the Armed Forces together in those days, without making the leadership something empty or vague. Under the circumstances existing then, meetings had frequently to be held to harmonize the numerous conflicting attitudes and viewpoints current among the military on key questions. When opening or closing these sessions, or whenever a decision was reached, Pak Dirman always stated earnestly: "Today on the ... (date) of ... (month), ... (year), at ... minutes past ... hours, I declare the meeting open, closed, or the following decision taken." Consequently, a sense of punctuality and an orderly atmosphere always reigned at meetings over which he presided. He generally permitted everyone who wished to speak to present his views as fully as he wished. Only after everyone felt that he had had his say would Pak Dirman state that, having heard and considered all viewpoints, he, as commander, declared: "I hereby decide this, or that, on the ... (date) at ... hours." Such a method of operating, of course, required a great deal of Pak Dirman's energy.

The problems facing him by virtue of his position were also a source of constant mental tension, and he could never free himself from them for a moment. He grew increasingly thin, and one day the doctors diagnosed that he had tuberculosis. Even so, he could not bring himself to relinquish his duties and responsibilities. His activities for the cause of Indonesia's independence aggravated his ill-health more and more. Rarely have I met a person with Pak Dirman's great sense of responsibility. A couple of times, we had our differences of opinion, but, generally speaking, I had to admit in the end that his viewpoint was wiser and more appropriate--though sometimes mine was better in a purely rational sense.

On December 18, 1948, exactly three years after Pak Dirman's appointment as Panglima Besar, I visited him at his sickbed to report that the situation had become critical. That very day, he issued an official statement announcing that he had resumed command of the Armed Forces. The following day the Dutch attacked Jogjakarta. After December 19, he had wandered through Central and East Java, while leading our war of independence. Today, on July 10, 1949, he was about to return to Jogjakarta.

What had Pak Dirman experienced during the people's war? Before continuing my own story, I would like to insert here some notes by a man who wrote of himself: "I knew and experienced myself everything which Pak Dirman went through during that period." The author of these words was none other than Capt. Supardjo, Pak Dirman's adjutant. His account now follows.

December 18, 1948. Gen. Sudirman is very ill. For three months he has been unable to get out of bed. Today he feels that war with the Dutch is inevitable.

December 19, 1948. 5:30 a.m. Gen. Sudirman received a report that the Dutch had launched an attack. He had already been asked by his staff to leave Jogjakarta a couple of days earlier, both as a tactical move and for the sake of his health. Completely equipped headquarters had been prepared for him in the event of a second military action. But he said he would leave the city only after the first enemy bomb had been dropped. He believed that to abandon the city before this happened would be tantamount to running away.

When he received the report that the Dutch had already begun their attack, it was as though he gained renewed strength. For the first time, after being bed-ridden for three months, he could stand up unassisted. At 8:00 a.m., Panglima Besar Sudirman sent Capt. Supardjo to see President Sukarno in order to obtain the central government's instructions and also, if necessary, to discuss other matters. At the same, Commodore Suriadarma came to report to the President on the situation at Maguwo.

President Sukarno was still in his pajamas. While Capt. Supardjo was at the Presidential Palace, many ministers and high ranking civilian and military personnel arrived, among them Col. Simatupang. Consequently, Capt. Supardjo could not immediately return to Panglima Besar Sudirman.

At 9:00 a.m., the latter was no longer content to await the Captain's return. Wearing a black overcoat over his pajamas, Pak Dirman, accompanied by Dr. Suwondo, Capt. Tjokropranolo, etc., went to see the President. Several ministers and leaders had already arrived at the Palace, among them, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Ir. Djuanda, Sutan Sjahrir, Dr. Asikin.⁴ Bung Karno told Pak Dirman, "Nothing important is happening. You are ill, so please go home and rest." Then the President said to Dr. Suwondo, "Mas doctor, would you mind taking Mas Dirman home to rest and please take good care of him."

Twice Bung Karno advised Pak Dirman to rest. The first time, he replied, "Thank you, but later." The second time, he answered, "I don't want to. I am going to stay here." Prof. Dr. Asikin then asked if he would like to rest at the Palace, in which case a room would be prepared. Pak Dirman answered, "I want to say here."

⁴Dr. R. D. Asikin Widjajakusumah was born in Tasikmalaja, West Java, in 1891. He received his medical degree from Leiden University in 1925. He was one of the best known doctors of his generation. During the Japanese occupation, he was a professor on the Djakarta Medical Faculty.

After most of the ministers had arrived, they held a cabinet meeting. Pak Dirman remained outside the meeting room. Meanwhile, Dutch aircraft were flying around, bombing and strafing various places in the city. Under the circumstances, Dr. Suwondo thought it likely the Presidential Palace would also soon come under attack from the air and that, therefore, those inside were in danger. He advised Pak Dirman to leave. Pak Dirman followed this suggestion.

While trying to find a place for Pak Dirman, we learned that quarters within the walls of the kraton complex had already been reserved for the families of state leaders. Dr. Suwondo was told to see Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, then participating in the cabinet session, to get permission for Pak Dirman to occupy the Mangkubumen building at Kadipaten, Jogjakarta. Permission was granted and Dr. Suwondo was told to make the place ready.

Having done this, Dr. Suwondo returned to the Presidential Palace to report. During his absence, Pak Dirman had instructed Capt. Supardjo to issue an urgent order to the entire Republican Armed Forces over Radio Republik Indonesia. Pak Dirman and his retinue returned to his house at Bintaran. He refused to rest there. He stood in the front part of the house watching the Dutch aircraft circling over the city and bombing various areas. Before long, the old Vredenburg Fort opposite the Presidential Palace was attacked.

Dr. Suwondo urged Pak Dirman to leave his house immediately because the Dutch surely knew where it was and it was not impossible that they would attack it. After first burning documents to prevent them from falling into enemy hands, Pak Dirman left, at about 11:30 a.m., for Kadipaten, via Bintaran, Mergangsan, Tunggak, Gading, the Alun-Alun Kidul, and Ngasem. He then rested for about an hour. At approximately 2:00 p.m., Col. Abdul Latif, City Military Commander for Jogjakarta, arrived at Kadipaten. He reported that the Dutch had already entered the city and that Pak Dirman should leave if he did not want to be captured.

In a very weak physical condition because he had not eaten or drunk anything since morning but impelled by the force of his will, Pak Dirman left the city and his family. He planned to go to Imogiri through Bantul, but this proved impossible because of the numerous road blocks. At 6:00 p.m., he arrived in Kretek, twenty kilometers south of Jogjakarta. Dr. Suwondo examined him, but his condition had not worsened, though he was weak from lack of food and drink. He was able to rest here for several hours. Only at 11:00 p.m. did he finally eat.

Panglima Besar Sudirman ordered two men to enter the city and ask Bu Dirman for jewelry to finance him during the guerrilla war. At 10:00 p.m., Lt. Basuki arrived from Jogjakarta along with an additional escort.

At midnight, Pak Dirman's party crossed the Opak River, with the aid of the Kretek sub-district chief, and headed for the village of Grogol. There they spent the night in the house of the lurah. Capt. Supardjo, Herukeser and Sgt. Maj. Utojo Kolopaking went straight on to Wonosari to arrange quarters for the party there and to establish contact with Col. Gatot Subroto's staff.

December 20, 1948. Pak Dirman was carried on a litter from Grogol to Panggang and then to Palihan. That same day, Utojo Kolopaking arrived from Wonosari to report on his arrangements.

December 21, 1948. Pak Dirman did not fall asleep until 1:00 a.m. The next day, he left Palihan for Plajen by litter, a two-hour march. Then he went from Plajen to the village of Semanu by dogcart. Pak Dirman's litter was left behind at Plajen. This was not the only litter used to carry him. It would be impossible to count how many times a change of litter had taken place. If somewhere the journey was continued by car, then the litter was

left behind. If no car or dogcart was available, or if it was impossible to make the journey by vehicle, then a new litter had to be made.

December 22, 1948. Left Semanu for Pratjimantoro, to the south of Surakarta, again on a litter. Arrived at Pratjimantoro at 7:00 p.m. Along the way at Bedojo, the people thought the person on the litter was Sultan Hamengkubuwono IX. Many came to kiss Pak Dirman's feet and ask his blessing. That night, the Divisional Staff of Col. Gatot Subroto sent a car from Surakarta to fetch Pak Dirman, and, without wasting any time, they left for Wonogiri. He arrived there at 11:00 p.m. and spent the night. But none of the party could rest because by then the enemy had reached Sukohardjo, sixteen kilometers north of Wonogiri. The escort was ordered to get ready and remain on the alert. Through all of this, Pak Dirman remained calm and never forgot to say his prayers, despite the fact that he was sitting or lying down.

December 23, 1948. At dawn everybody was prepared to leave Wonogiri. Left for Ponorogo at exactly 6:00 a.m. Within half an hour, Wonogiri was attacked from the air. The enemy no doubt believed that Pak Dirman was still there. The party arrived that same day in Ponorogo and rested at the house of Kjai Mahfudz, in the hamlet of Djetis south of Ponorogo. At 4:00 p.m., the party continued by car heading for Bendo, southeast of Tulungagung, via Trenggalek. Stopped for a while at Trenggalek. Capt. Supardjo got in touch with Col. Sungkono in Kediri, asking him to meet Pak Dirman's party. (It should be noted here, that after leaving the city, Pak Dirman had assumed the name of "Pak De.")⁵ After a long fruitless wait, the party continued on to Bendo, about 24 kilometers from Tulungagung.

December 23, 1948. At Bendo, the party was detained by Battalion 102 under Maj. Zainal Fanani. Capt. Supardjo, in his capacity as leader of the party, was taken to battalion headquarters. Pak Dirman, who was in the car, and the others waited outside. The escort was not disarmed.

Everywhere, in those days, an atmosphere of mutual distrust often arose. Among the military, such suspicions emerged particularly when two units met. At the battalion headquarters, Capt. Supardjo did not himself meet the Battalion Commander, only some officers he did not know. They said it was difficult for prisoners to see the Commander.


Capt. Supardjo was searched. They found on him a notebook full of defense sketches and other notes concerning military matters. This was not unusual, because he was Panglima Besar Sudirman's adjutant and doubled as his private secretary. For the moment, protest was ineffectual; Capt. Supardjo almost revealed the name of the man he was escorting. Fortunately, one of the officers said he would ask the Battalion Commander to come. Meanwhile, Panglima Besar Sudirman did not know that at battalion headquarters the Supardjo case had not yet been decided.

As it was already sunset, Pak Dirman asked permission to go to the mosque for Magrib prayers. Permission was granted and he was taken to a mosque not far from battalion headquarters.

Before long, Battalion Commander Zainal Fanani came along to see who the prisoner was. As he was about to enter the mosque, he met Harsono Tjokroaminoto,⁶ who was just leaving after prayers, and asked where the prisoner

⁵Pak De is a Javanese form of polite address to an elder brother of a parent.

⁶R. M. Harsono Tjokroaminoto was born in Magetan, East Java, in 1912. He was the son of H. O. S. Tjokroaminoto and the younger brother of Anwar Tjokroaminoto. Before the war, he was active in his father's political party, the PSII. He became general-secretary of the Djakarta branch of the MIAI Islamic federation and the



was. Not revealing the identity of the prisoner, Harsono said he was inside the mosque. Zainal Fanani went in and came up to the prisoner. He was astonished when he saw it was Panglima Besar Sudirman. He immediately saluted, deeply moved. Instantly Pak Dirman was transferred to an appropriate place.

All the troops, including the officers, wondered why the Battalion Commander saluted the prisoner--a man dressed in civilian clothes, wearing an old pitji, a green overcoat, and a pair of slippers. They were astonished on hearing that the prisoner was the Panglima Besar traveling incognito. That evening a number of men were sent to Tulungagung to try to telephone Kediri. A few hours later, a car arrived from Kediri to fetch Pak Dirman. Some of Col. Sungkono's staff officers came to collect the party, and it set off. Arrived in Kediri at 4:00 a.m. and was welcomed by Col. Sungkono.

December 24, 1948. In the morning, Pak Dirman conferred with Col. Sungkono. Then he rested briefly. At 5:00 p.m., Capt. Supardjo asked him to leave Kediri. He agreed, and, at sunset, he went to the west bank of the Brantas River to the village of Sukorame. Maj. Tjiptoharsono and Col. Santoso, who were then in Kediri, escorted him. That night, Pak Dirman was able to rest.

December 25, 1948. At 8:00 a.m., the enemy attacked Kediri by air. Feeling unsafe at Sukorame, Pak Dirman and his party left and moved on to Karangnongko, where they rested until nightfall. That night, someone came to Pak Dirman's quarters pretending to be looking for the Panglima Besar. The man was suspected of being an enemy spy.

At 5:00 a.m., Pak Dirman left his quarters and, along with Col. Bambang Supeno, went into the forest. Capt. Supardjo and a few others stayed in the house.

December 26, 1948. After sunrise, Capt. Supardjo ordered Warrant Officer Herukeser, who was built like Pak Dirman, to put on the green overcoat which Pak Dirman always wore. Subsequently, while many people looked on, Pak Dirman's double was carried southward on a litter and taken into a house. The purpose of the disguise was to deceive the spy, who had claimed the night before to be looking for the Panglima Besar, and to make him think that Pak Dirman had been moved to another house. Once inside, Herukeser took off the overcoat and, after making certain that no one was watching, left the house. Unnoticed by anyone, Capt. Supardjo and Warrant Officer Herukeser followed Pak Dirman north.

Late in the afternoon that same day, the house where Warrant Officer Herukeser had left the green overcoat was strafed by three Dutch fighters armed with machineguns.

December 27, 1948. Left Karangnongko and moved to the village of Guwo Liman on the slope of Mount Wilis. Pak Dirman sent Col. Bambang Supeno to make contact with the Central Government in Java, reportedly located on Mount Lawu. Shortly after the latter had left, Col. Sungkono came to see Pak Dirman.

December 28, 1948. Moved from Guwo to the village of Badjulan. Stayed there until January 6, 1949. During this period, tried to find a radio transmitter in the area around Ngandjuk. One was found and consequently

editor of its journal, Suara MIAI. During the Japanese occupation, he worked on the staff of the Dōmei news agency. He was one of the activist pemuda leaders in Jakarta at the time of the Proclamation of Independence. In the fall of 1945, he joined the Masjumi. He served as Deputy Minister of Defense in the third Sjahrir cabinet.

communications with other regions could be established and news from overseas received. Only then did it become known that Indian Prime Minister Pandit Jawaharlal Nehru had invited representatives of Asian countries to hold a conference on Indonesia in New Delhi. The situation at home and abroad became more or less clear. Meanwhile, another company of our troops arrived from Jogjakarta to help guard Panglima Besar Sudirman.

January 6, 1949. Left Badjulan and moved to the village of Salamdjudek. Stayed there briefly, spent only one night.

January 7, 1949. Left Salamdjudek and went to the village of Liman. Capt. Supardjo was sent to make contact with the village of Sawahan, where Dr. Murdjani and others had their quarters.

January 8, 1949. Left Liman and headed for the village of Serang, on the top of Mount Wilis. Did not stop there long, continued to the village of Djambu. All the time Pak Dirman was carried on a litter.

January 9, 1949. The march to Djambu took a rather long time. Arrived there only today. At the same time, the Dutch attacked from Ponorogo in the direction of Pulung, seat of the Ponorogo Regency administration. In the afternoon, Capt. Supardjo was sent to make contact with the ministers of the Central Government in Java. He met Minister of Development and Youth Supeno, Minister of Justice Mr. Susanto Tirtoprodjo, and KNIP Working Committee member Miss Susilowati at the village of Wajang, north of Pulung.

January 10, 1949. After Capt. Supardjo returned to Djambu and reported on his meeting with the members of the Central Government in Java, Pak Dirman and party moved to Wajang. That same day, Col. Bambang Supeno, who had been sent to make contact with the Central Government in Java on December 27, also returned.

January 11, 1949. From Wajang moved again, to the village of Banjutowo.

January 12, 1949. Pak Dirman met Ministers Supeno and Susanto at the house of Pak Ngali. At 9:00 a.m., a conference was held between Ministers Supeno and Susanto, Col. Bambang Supeno, and Capt. Supardjo. This was the last meeting between Pak Dirman and Minister Supeno. For several days afterward, many visitors from various towns and regions came to see Pak Dirman.

Stayed at Banjutowo until January 17.

January 17, 1949. A Dutch patrol from Ponorogo came to within one kilometer of Pak Dirman's quarters. Fighting took place between the patrol and our troops. Five of our men were wounded. During the fighting, Pak Dirman, the ministers, and the Regent of Ponorogo, along with their respective parties, left their quarters and headed into the forest to the village of Sedaju.

January 18, 1949. At 2:00 p.m., our patrol met a Dutch unit heading for Sedaju. There was no way of knowing whether the Dutch knew Pak Dirman was there. Fighting broke out. That night the Dutch captured the Regent of Ponorogo. During the battle, Pak Dirman and his party climbed up a mountain on foot. That night, the Dutch searched for Pak Dirman around Sedaju, using torches.

January 20, 1949. The Dutch continued their search at Sedaju. This indicated that they had in fact known that Pak Dirman was near Sedaju and were trying to capture him. They searched each house in the Sedaju area. Fortunately, they overlooked the one which had been occupied by Pak Dirman. Capt. Supardjo was there at the time. Had the Dutch entered the house, they would have found him as well as Pak Dirman's baggage and clothes. At 10:00 a.m., they left Sedaju but did not go far. They remained at the villages of Kesugihan and Singgahan. All the while the Dutch were searching Sedaju, Pak Dirman was resting in a rattan forest. Before long, the escort which had fought the Dutch the day before returned and met Pak Dirman in the forest.

January 21, 1949. The enemy encircled the forest. Several men were dispatched to seek a way out through the encirclement. Heavy rain fell that night. In the midst of the rain, Pak Dirman and his party left their place and came down the mountain and through the encirclement. The soil was too slippery to carry Pak Dirman on a litter or to support him while he walked in the rain. Consequently, he had to walk under his own power. When the effort proved too great, Dr. Suwondo and Capt. Supardjo would pull or push him. It was on this occasion that his health went from bad to worse. For one and one-half hours, he and his party walked in the heavy rain. During this journey, he asked the party several times to stop for a rest. He was exhausted from undernourishment. Since January 17, he had eaten no rice, only jackfruit and vegetables.

The entire supply of medicine was rainsoaked and damaged. In this miserable condition, the party came to a small house. Here a fire was made to warm everybody up. Because it was believed unsafe there, the break was very brief and the march continued until the party reached a hut in the middle of a cornfield. Here they spent a few days.

January 22, 1949. Pak Dirman and his party had not eaten rice for five days. Capt. Supardjo was sent out to find some. He took along a sarong and a shirt which he bartered for three kilos of corn and a chicken. These fed ten people.

January 23, 1949. After his early morning prayers, Pak Dirman came outside the hut. There he met a man named Karijo and two others, Pak Surang and Pak Wirjo. These three asked permission to join Pak Dirman's party, wherever it might go. Without hesitation Pak Dirman agreed.

January 24, 1949. Ready to leave early in the morning. Left Djambu for the village of Warungbung. On the march, Pak Dirman was again carried on a litter. Arrived at Warungbung late in the morning. Received a rice meal, for the second time in a week. Continued the journey to the village of Gunung Tukul that same day, guided by the *naib* [mosque official] of Warungbung.

January 25, 1949. Arrived at Gunung Tukul in the morning. Did not stop there. In the afternoon, rested a bit in a house. During this break, a man called Putih came and offered to join the party. Request granted. Putih became a guide. Journey continued to the village of Ngindong. Arrived at 3:00 a.m. Pak Dirman and party rested there. During the stay, they were well looked after by the people.

January 27, 1949. Left Ngindong for the village of Sawo. Added another guide, the village chief of Ngindong. Passed through Sawo and went on to the village of Tumpakpelem. On arrival there, stopped for the night. That night, Capt. Supardjo tried to make contact with the District Military Command of Trenggalek.

January 28, 1949. Left Tumpakpelem and headed for the village of Longsor, about five kilometers away. Pak Dirman and party spent one night there. From that day onward, the party got good food. At that time, Trenggalek was still in our hands and some vehicles were still available.

January 29, 1949. Moved on from Longsor to the village of Suruhwetan. Spent one night there.

January 30, 1949. The party left Suruhwetan by car and went to the village of Dongko on the south coast.

January 31, 1949. Resumed journey in the direction of the village of Panggul. Did not spend the night there. Left during the night for the village of Bedak, north of Panggul. Stayed at Bedak until February 3, 1949.

February 4, 1949. Left Bedak and continued on to the village of Nogosari in the Patjitan region. Aided by the lurah and the people there. The lurah knew the person on the litter. The lurah was the uncle of Mr. Iskandar Gondowardojo⁷ (currently Regent of Ngandjuk); his name was Padmowidjojo. Utmost courtesy was also rendered by R. M. Subekti, ex-Regent of Patjitan, currently Mayor of Solo.

During the journey, Capt. Supardjo constantly dispatched his men to inform District Military Commands regarding the party whereabouts. Enjoyed good care at Nogosari. Pak Dirman and party stayed there until February 6, 1949.

February 7, 1949. Left Nogosari and continued to the village of Pringapus. Arrived safely and stayed until February 14. During this stay things became more organized. Tasks and plans could be carried out better.

February 8, 1949. Dispatched several men to Jogjakarta, including: Harsono Tjokroaminoto, to gather political information; Lt. Basuki and Dr. Suwondo, to get medicine; and Capt. Tjokropranolo to visit the Sultan.

The entire armed troop was dispersed; only five men remained with Pak Dirman. They included Capt. Supardjo, Warrant Officer Herukeser, Cadet Sgt. Maj. Utojo Kolopaking, Sgt. Bambang Sumadio and Kaki Kasmi (alias Moh. Junus) chauffeur of the former Indian Vice-Consul, who had all this time been accompanying the Panglima Besar. The Dutch captured the men sent to Jogjakarta, except Dr. Suwondo and Capt. Tjokropranolo. After that day, Pak Dirman's code name, which had formerly been Pak De, was changed to Abdullah Lelono-putro.

February 15, 1949. Moved on from Pringapus to the village of Gebjur, still in the Patjitan region. Stayed three days.

February 18, 1949. Moved on again, to the village of Sobo, where help was given by Dr. Sukardjo, the Regency doctor of Patjitan. Stayed there one month. During this stay, day-to-day work was arranged in an orderly fashion with very satisfactory results. Worked from 8:00 a.m. to 4:00 p.m., with a break between 11:00 a.m. and 2:00 p.m. After sunset prayers, Pak Dirman held discussions with Capt. Supardjo and the others which usually lasted until midnight. The discussions covered political and military questions, as well as religion, education, and other matters.

During the stay at Sobo, many things happened, including visits of couriers from the divisions and from Sumatra. On March 3, emissaries arrived from Col. Gatot Subroto, along with a company of troops under Lt. Col. Suadi. The company had been ordered to escort Pak Dirman. Lt. Col. Suadi and his party had had great difficulty finding Pak Dirman. Once Suadi had asked a certain *djogobojo* (village watchman) in the village where Pak Dirman was staying, but the man had refused to give any information, even though threatened with death. Eventually, Lt. Col. Suadi was taken to the Military Administration for the area. Only after producing all his papers could he see Capt. Supardjo.

Meanwhile, Capt. Ranuwidjojo, Commander of the Patjitan Company of the Digo Battalion, had been taking care of Pak Dirman.

March 17, 1949. Left Sobo for the village of Nawungan in the Surakarta region. On leaving, many people gathered to accompany the party. There

⁷Mr. R. Iskandar Gondowardojo was born in Ponorogo, East Java, in 1912. He was graduated from the Djakarta Law Faculty in 1938. During the Dutch and Japanese periods, he worked in the judicial administration. He was a secretary of the Investigating Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence, which was established by the Japanese in March 1945.

were so many and they were so anxious to help that the soldiers had to carry only their own rifles. On the march, Pak Dirman rode on a litter.

The same day news was received that the villages of Kasihan and Pringapus, vacated by the party a month before, had been bombed by Dutch aircraft. Apparently, the Dutch believed Pak Dirman was still there.

On arrival at the village of Ngambarsari, the party had to stop because Pak Dirman was ill. For two days he had a temperature and shivered, and at first everyone was very worried. But afterward his condition gradually improved.

Met Maj. Digdo,⁸ Commander of the Digdo Battalion, at Ngambarsari.

March 21, 1949. Left Ngambarsari planning to cross over to the Tirtomojo region. The march proceeded slowly because Pak Dirman had not yet fully recovered. Covered only five kilometers a day.

March 23, 1949. Enemy aircraft attacked Ngambarsari. Fortunately, Pak Dirman and his party had already left the village. Received reports that Dutch patrols were very active in the Tirtomojo region. Had to cancel earlier plan to go there. For ten days, until March 31, Pak Dirman and his party circled around Tirtomojo, moving from one village to another, not daring to remain too long in any one place. Meanwhile, continuous efforts were made to find safe quarters. Eventually, found a safe spot at Sobo in the Pakis region, Nawangan Sub-District, Patjitan Regency.

April 1, 1949. Left for Sobo. Pak Dirman stayed here the longest during the guerrilla war. From that day until his return to Jogjakarta, he did not go anywhere else. At Sobo we could arrange our work as though in an office. Food and communications were good, and with the help of radio sets, we could get news about the situation at home and abroad. We had entertainment from a record player. Frequently, we got deliveries from Jogja and Solo.

The couriers were very faithful. Even when given letters to deliver to commanders of divisions whose quarters they did not know, they always executed their tasks faithfully. They delivered such messages even if they had to cover hundreds of kilometers. Although often delayed, they almost always found the persons they sought. Some of the couriers only found the person they were looking for after the government had returned to Jogjakarta. Many visitors came to Sobo. Minister Susanto Tirtoprodjo and leaders of all sorts of political groups frequently visited Panglima Besar Sudirman.

Pak Dirman had some objections to returning to Jogjakarta when the Republican government went back to the city. But, since he had received letters from Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Col. Gatot Subroto, and other leaders asking him to return quickly, in the end he returned to Jogjakarta.

This was Capt. Supardjo's report, simple but moving.

After resting for a time, Pak Dirman, Pak Hardjo, and myself got into the car which would take us to Jogjakarta. From our discussions in the car, I got the impression that, psychologically, Pak Dirman still could not completely accept recent developments. Understandably, those who had spent several months participating in the people's war had lived in a mental world quite different from that of our leaders

⁸Sudigdo commanded a regiment in Tamansari, Surakarta, in 1947. After the May 1948 rationalization, he headed the Thirteenth Battalion in the Fifth Brigade, under Suadi. In January 1949, he became Commander of Sub-Wehrkreise 102, Wonogiri, in Wehrkreise I, Surakarta, under Slamet Rijadi.

who had conducted the negotiations in Bangka and Djakarta. Nonetheless, in the course of the conversation, Pak Dirman did agree that we had no choice now but to support the agreement and, at the same time, to build up our strength. Still, he intended to advance proposals and suggestions which would prevent future disappointments. As a matter of fact, in his May 1, 1949 message, he had already stated: "I am fully prepared to present to our government conditions and proposals which accord with the present burning spirit of the resistance among our Armed Forces and people, bearing in mind and taking into account the views of our commanders, above all those directly in charge of the fighting."

When we arrived at the house which had been reserved for Pak Dirman on Djalan Widoro, Pak Hardjo and I suggested that he should first see the President and Vice-President before he went to inspect the parade at the Alun-Alun Lor. We said that it would prompt a lot of questions at home and abroad if the Panglima Besar did not see the President on this first day back. He did not answer for some moments. Eventually, he agreed with the amended schedule I had proposed. I went immediately to the Palace to report that Pak Dirman wished to call on the President and Vice-President that afternoon.

I accompanied Pak Dirman to the Palace. This first meeting since December 19, 1948 between, on the one side, the President and Vice-President, and, on the other, the Panglima Besar, was a moving event. Pak Dirman officially reported that the Panglima Besar had returned to the capital. Then we sat down for a while in the reception hall of the Palace and talked. Each side asked after the health of the other. Obviously, more wide ranging conversations would have to wait for another occasion.

During our war for independence and afterward, heated debates always occurred as to whether the Dutch could be driven out by force of arms alone or only by political and diplomatic methods. That afternoon as I sat next to Pak Dirman in the Palace reception hall, facing Bung Karno and Bung Hatta, I thought: "This present meeting answers that question. The political and diplomatic approach, symbolized by Bung Karno and Bung Hatta, clearly met defeat on December 19, 1948. From that day on, the military approach, i.e., force of arms, symbolized by Pak Dirman, took over. This approach has not yet succeeded in ousting the Dutch. It is diplomacy which has made possible holding the present meeting in Jogjakarta. But diplomacy would certainly have had no power without the existence of the people's war. It has been the combination of diplomacy and force of arms, not just one or the other, that has brought the results so far achieved."

I accompanied Pak Dirman from the Palace to the Alun-Alun Lor. The parade welcoming the return of the Panglima Besar to the capital was a simple military ceremony. The officers and troops just returned from the field did not wear uniform clothing; they had black, yellow, and green outfits. But those watching the parade would not quickly forget the atmosphere of this simple ceremony.

After inspecting the parade, Pak Dirman shook hands with Mr. Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, who was dressed in black and wearing a black pitji. He had arrived that same day by airplane from Sumatra.

The leaders from Bangka and Djakarta, the Emergency Government leadership, the Armed Forces Command, all were now together again in Jogjakarta. From here on, joint deliberations on the road to be taken would begin.

CHAPTER XI

TRACÉ BARU

Bung Karno first used the phrase *Tracé Baru* [new ground plan] as a political term in this country in speeches after his return from Bangka. This phrase meant embracing the BFO people and, in cooperation with them, hastening the recognition of an independent and sovereign Indonesia by the Dutch and the world at large. According to the Tracé Baru, the Republic and the BFO would establish a common front and then send their respective delegations to The Hague to attend the Round Table Conference, at which the United Nations Commission for Indonesia would continue its assistance toward an agreement. In contrast to the Linggadjati and Renville negotiations, at the Round Table Conference the BFO would participate on an equal basis with the Republic.

Before trying to form a common front with the BFO, a consensus of opinion had first to be reached within Republican circles. Consequently, on the night of July 13, 1949, the "Republic" which had negotiated with the Dutch in Djakarta and Bangka and the "Republic" which had waged the people's war met together in a cabinet session at the Palace.

Bung Hatta, speaking for the first Republic, said that, in the opinion of the Bangka leaders, the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia had been vested with complete internal authority. The Bangka leaders, therefore, had only assisted the Emergency Government in making contacts abroad because outside parties had wanted to make such contacts with the Republic but could not establish them directly. This was the practical aspect. In addition, Bung Hatta reaffirmed Palar's¹ statement that the Hatta government continued to be the legitimate government, though the Emergency Government ran the day-to-day administration so long as the Hatta government could not function. This was the formal aspect. Accordingly, Mr. Mohammad Rum and Dr. van Royen had reached an agreement, and the President and Vice-President had agreed to recommend its acceptance to the Emergency Government.

Mr. Sjafrudin, speaking on behalf of the second Republic, said that the radiogram dispatched from Jogjakarta, on December 19, 1949, which vested full authority in him, had never been received in Bukittinggi. The political and military leaders then in Bukittinggi had formed the Emergency Government on their own initiative after learning over the radio that the Dutch had occupied Jogjakarta. The Emergency Government considered itself the legitimate leader of the resistance.

¹Lambertus Nicodemus Palar was born in Minahasa, North Sulawesi, in 1902. He studied at the University of Amsterdam and was active in the Social Democratic Workers' Party in Amsterdam. During the war, he was in the anti-Nazi underground. He sat on the executive council of the Labor Party and became one of its members in the Second Chamber of the Dutch Parliament in 1945. He resigned from parliament after the first Dutch action and was appointed Indonesian representative to the Security Council. At the time of the Round Table talks he headed the Republic's Observer Mission to the UN.

Its main aim from the very beginning was to restore the government. Sjafrudin thought it necessary to explain that the leadership of the resistance in the Sumatran regions had not been placed in the hands of military officers, as had been the case on Java. In Atjeh, it was held by Tengku Daud Beureueh;² in Tapanuli-East Sumatra, by Military Governor Dr. Tobing³ aided by Lt. Col. Alex Kawilarang; in Central Sumatra, by Military Governor Mr. Sutan Mohammad Rasjid,⁴ aided by Lt. Col. Dahlan Ibrahim;⁵ and in South Sumatra, by Military Governor Dr. Adnan Kapau Gani,⁶ aided by Col. Maludin Simbolon.

Concerning the Rum-van Royen Agreement, Sjafrudin began by noting that it had been worked out without prior consultation with the Emergency Government. This had lowered the latter's prestige in the people's eyes, but the negative effects had largely been eliminated by Bung Hatta's visit to Atjeh to meet with the Emergency Government soon after the conclusion of the agreement. Sjafrudin then pointed out

²Daud Beureueh was born in Keumangan, Atjeh, in 1899. He received a religious education. Before the war, he led the PUSA (All-Atjeh Union of Religious Scholars), an anti-Dutch, reformist religious organization. He was a prominent figure in the ulama-led social revolution which occurred in Atjeh in 1945-1946. From 1947 to 1950 he served as Military Governor of Atjeh and Tanah Karo.

³Dr. F. Lumban Tobing was born near Sibolga, Tapanuli, in 1899. He was graduated from the Djakarta Medical Faculty before the war. In his youth he belonged to the Jong Batak and Jong Sumatra organizations. Prior to the Proclamation of Independence, he worked as a doctor. After 1945, he participated actively in the resistance, becoming first Resident of Tapanuli and later Military Governor of the same area.

⁴Mr. Sutan Mohammad Rasjid gelar Sutan Rangkajo Radjo Putih was born in Paria-man, West Sumatra, in 1911. He was graduated from the Djakarta Law Faculty in 1938. While a student, he was active in the Jong Sumatranen Bond, Indonesia Muda, and the PPPI. After graduation, he worked as a private lawyer. During the occupation, he served in the judicial administration in Djakarta and later in Padang. From 1945 to 1946, he was chairman of the West Sumatra KNI and Resident of West Sumatra. He served as Military Governor of West and Central Sumatra from 1948 to 1949 and was concurrently Minister of Labor, Social Affairs, Development, Youth, and Security in the Emergency Government.

⁵Dahlan Ibrahim was born in Batu Sangkar, West Sumatra, in 1916. He received a religious education in West Sumatra. During the occupation, he was a middle-level officer in the Giyūgun. After January 1946, he commanded the Second Regiment in Sawahlunto, part of the Banteng Division under Dahlan Djambek. In 1947, he became Chief of Staff of the Banteng Division. At the time of the second Dutch attack, he was the senior commander in Central Sumatra and acting Military Governor.

⁶Dr. Adnan Kapau Gani was born in Palembang, near Bukittinggi, West Sumatra, probably in 1905. He obtained his degree from the Djakarta Medical Faculty in 1940. He was a founder of Indonesia Muda and the PPPI. He was also active in Partindo and served as the first chairman of Gerindo. The Japanese detained him briefly, but he was subsequently rehabilitated. When the Revolution broke out, he was made Resident of Palembang. He founded the PNI in Sumatra during this time and was active in helping to form the Republican Army in Sumatra. In May 1946, he became Governor of South Sumatra. He was Minister of Prosperity in the third Sjahrir and the Amir cabinets. He was a member of the Indonesian delegation which signed the Linggadjati Agreement. From December 1948 until February 1950, he served as Military Governor of South Sumatra.

that: "The Emergency Government does not take any position with regard to the Agreement. It leaves that to the cabinet, the KNIP Working Committee, and the Military Command. The consequences of the decision will be borne together."

Mr. Susanto Tirtoprodjo spoke on behalf of the Central Government Commissariat in Java. First he reported officially on the death of Minister Supeno in the war for independence. He outlined what the Commissariat had done in the past months, including the publication of a "State Gazette." Mr. Susanto was Minister of Justice and he believed that the fact that a "State Gazette" could be published during the people's war was the clearest evidence that the government had continued to function.

Now it was time for Mr. Sjafrudin Prawiranegara to return his mandate officially and formally to Vice-President Mohammad Hatta. The history of the Emergency Government of the Republic of Indonesia thus came to an end. The two Republics became one again.

After settling the problem between Bangka and the Emergency Government, the next issue was: What was the position of the Armed Forces Command? I had sent a letter to Bangka from Banaran which said that the Armed Forces would determine their final stand only after a session of the Military Strategy Council had been held. This was the highest body for deciding state strategy. Its sessions were always attended by the President, Vice-President, Prime Minister, Defense Minister, Panglima Besar, and other ministers and officers as needed. The Military Strategy Council fulfilled a need urgently felt prior to the Dutch attack for a body in which the top political leadership could discuss state defense problems together with the supreme military command. Sessions of the Council had always been held at the Palace, but this time an extraordinary session was held at the Panti Rapih Mission Hospital because Pak Dirman was confined there. Dr. Suwondo, Pak Dirman's private physician, explained that, at most, Pak Dirman could attend for an hour and that it would be better to hold the meeting in the morning since Pak Dirman felt fresher then than in the afternoon.

At 10:55 a.m., on July 21, 1949, the Military Strategy Council opened its session at the Panti Rapih Hospital. The President, Vice-President (concurrently head of the cabinet and Minister of Defense), and the Panglima Besar attended. Also present were Mr. Sjafrudin Prawiranegara and Dr. Leimena, who had led the cease-fire talks in Djakarta. Officers present included Col. Hidajat, in his capacity as Sumatra Army and Territory Commander, Col. Nasution (Java Army and Territory Commander), and myself (Deputy Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces).

The session of the Military Strategy Council did not last long. The President, Vice-President, and Dr. Leimena gave the requested explanations to Pak Dirman and accepted his proposals. Then the further execution of the policies mapped out in Bangka and Djakarta was discussed. The most immediate problem was the cease-fire. The meeting designated which officers would take part in its implementation. Negotiations of a more fundamental nature would still be faced: first, with the BFO, at an Inter-Indonesia Conference, and, subsequently, with the Dutch, at the Round Table Conference. I was assigned to participate in these negotiations as the representative of our defense interests.

As the Military Strategy Council session met at the Panti Rapih Hospital, the Inter-Indonesia Conference (opened on July 19, 1949, in Jogjakarta) was already under way. This conference closed on July 22. Consequently, its discussions on defense problems, which could not seriously be begun until after the Military Strategy Council session ended, could have the character of general orientation only. The conference resumed later in Djakarta on July 31.

Dr. Leimena headed the Republican delegation at the discussions with the BFO concerning defense matters. I assisted him. Both of us had been negotiating with the Dutch delegation on defense problems since the Renville talks, and we knew quite well the problems this entailed. Our BFO counterparts were Sultan Hamid,⁷ Mr. Makmun Sumadipradja,⁸ and Col. Sugondo. The BFO had never before held defense talks, but they had long been exchanging views among themselves and with the Dutch on questions of defense and security.

We began the defense talks with the BFO by submitting several fundamental principles as the bases for a further exchange of views. We pointed out that the Republic of the United States of Indonesia, which would soon be created, would be a nation state and thus its Armed Forces would be the national Armed Forces, i.e., Armed Forces led by Indonesians. Therefore, the build-up of these Armed Forces constituted a national issue and could not be discussed with the Dutch at the upcoming Round Table Conference. The conference could only discuss the procedures and timing of the withdrawal of the Dutch Armed Forces, consider to what extent we would need Dutch experts in building our national Armed Forces, and determine how far the Dutch were willing and able to make available this personnel. We believed that cooperation within the framework of a Union was limited to contingent matters, that is, only when both sides believed it necessary to cooperate on particular matters.

In general, the BFO agreed with our proposed guidelines. At first, Sultan Hamid was still asking if it would not be better to consider creating a more permanent structure of cooperation with the Dutch in defense matters within the Union framework, for example, by establishing a Union staff. Subsequently, however, he agreed with us that cooperation with the Dutch could only be of a technical nature, such as in education; in the realm of strategy it could have no meaning since neither we nor the Dutch would be in the position to provide

⁷Sjarif Hamid Algadrie, Sultan Hamid II of Pontianak, was born in 1913. He was educated at the Royal Military Academy in Breda and served in the KNIL after the outbreak of World War II. His father, the ruling sultan, was killed after the Japanese invasion, and he himself was imprisoned by the Japanese. In 1945, the Dutch rescued him and installed him as sultan in October. In April 1946, he was appointed a special adjutant to Queen Wilhelmina and in May 1947, he became chief of the Special Region of West Borneo. From May 1948 to January 1949, he served as Vice-Chairman of the BFO. He later became its Chairman and led the BFO delegation to the Round Table Conference.

⁸Mr. R. Makmun Sumadipradja was born in Sumedang, West Java, in 1910. He was graduated from the Djakarta Law Faculty in 1935. During the Dutch and Japanese periods, he worked his way up through the civil service hierarchy. When the Dutch-sponsored Pasundan state was formed in West Java, he became secretary-general of its Department of Internal Affairs.

concrete assistance if the other partner in the Union were being attacked. Moreover, as KNIL officers, both Sultan Hamid and Col. Sugondo had a particular interest in the fate of those Indonesians who belonged to the KNIL. In line with the realization of the Tracé Baru, we showed an understanding of their interests, but within limits which we felt were compatible with prevailing TNI interests and emotions. Eventually we reached an agreement whereby the TNI would form the nucleus in the development of the Armed Forces of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia and Indonesians in the KNIL would be allowed to join on the basis of conditions yet to be determined.

The complete text of the agreement reached by the Security Committee of the Inter-Indonesia Conference was as follows:

The Armed Forces of the Republic of the United States of Indonesia are national armed forces. Every RUSI citizen is obliged and entitled to participate in the defense of the state. The President of RUSI shall serve as Supreme Commander of the RUSI Armed Forces. Indonesian nationals shall command the Army, Navy, and Air Force of RUSI. State defense is exclusively the prerogative of the RUSI government. Member states shall not maintain their own Armed Forces.

The establishment of the RUSI Armed Forces is exclusively a matter for the Indonesian nation. The government of the Republic shall form the RUSI Armed Forces. The Armed Forces of the Republic of Indonesia (TNI) shall form the core of the RUSI Armed Forces together with the Indonesian nationals in the KNIL, ML [Military Transport], KM [Royal Navy], VB [Security Brigade], and the Territorial Battalions, former KNIL members, and those of other military units. Conditions will be determined later.

Non-Indonesian nationals who are members of the KNIL and other units who become Indonesian nationals and wish to join the RUSI Armed Forces may also be accepted. Non-Indonesian members of KNIL and other units who do not wish to become Indonesian nationals may serve as instructors according to need. Their status shall be established as that of a military mission between the Netherlands and RUSI.

During the initial period of the RUSI, the Minister of Defense may hold concurrently the post of Panglima Besar of the Armed Forces of RUSI.

The matter of transferring equipment and installations of the KNIL and other units, including the ML, to the Armed Forces of RUSI will be discussed further with the Dutch government.

The RUSI government will negotiate with the Dutch government concerning the possibility of placing part of the Royal Dutch Navy at the temporary disposal of RUSI.

The entire Dutch Armed Forces (the KL) shall be withdrawn from RUSI territory. The procedure and time limits for the withdrawal shall be determined at the Round Table Conference.

Political and financial questions affecting the military relations between the Kingdom of the Netherlands and RUSI were not included in the Defense Committee's talks. Therefore, the bases for this relationship, as seen from the military angle, are as follows: Cooperation in military matters may be undertaken in cases where common military interests exist between RUSI and the Kingdom of the Netherlands. The procedures whereby the RUSI and Dutch Ministers of Defense, along with the military experts of both countries, will discuss the manner of implementing such cooperation will be provided for in the Statutes of the Union.

Further talks shall be held concerning the possibility of the Kingdom of the Netherlands providing the technical staff needed by RUSI as well as the relevant terms.

With the Inter-Indonesia Conference agreement between the Republic and the BFO, the first objective of the Tracé Baru had been achieved, that is, creating a common front to face the Dutch. As is true of every negotiation, this common front resulted from a "give and take" between the Republic and the BFO.

On the occasion of the second Inter-Indonesia Conference, held in Djakarta, I had the chance to talk at length with a BFO delegate outside the conference hall. After we had finished, he whispered to his friend (but loud enough for us to hear) that one could in fact talk to these TNI officers after all. Evidently, his past ideas of the TNI had been based solely on the information provided by the Dutch LVD [Army Information Service], which always painted the TNI as terrorists, extremists, rebels, and so forth. At the same time, from my conversations with these BFO people, I began to realize that not all of them had the same motives in (as we saw it) collaborating with the Dutch. When we were in the mountains, we had envisioned them all as puppets, but this turned out to be too broad a generalization. Some of them believed that the road taken by the BFO differed from that of the Republic because of the different circumstances which each had to face but that, nonetheless, they were pursuing the same goals.

To realize the second objective of the Tracé Baru, i.e., to hasten world, and particularly Dutch, recognition of an independent and sovereign Indonesia, we would send a delegation to The Hague. Dr. Leimena and myself were appointed to this delegation. Suriadarma, Subijakto, Daan Jahja (just released from Dutch internment in Nusakambangan), and Harjono would also participate in the defense negotiations at The Hague. We would leave Djakarta on August 20, 1949, except for Suriadarma, who would follow later because he still had matters to settle in Jogjakarta before he could go.

Before leaving, I had a long talk with Pak Dirman at his residence in Djalan Widoro. Given the significant and decisive nature of the negotiations to be held in The Hague, we needed to have a complete unanimity of viewpoint between those conducting the negotiations and those who stayed "at home." Any possibility of a split or conflict emerging after the negotiations should be avoided. I discussed these matters with Pak Dirman in my talk with him. In principle, he believed that we should stick firmly to the decision of the Inter-Indonesia Conference on matters of defense. In order to have more concrete directives, after our talk was over, I asked Pak Dirman to repeat the main points of his instructions while I wrote them down. I noted the following, which I reread to Pak Dirman before reporting to the Panglima Besar that I, Col. Simatupang, would carry out his orders to go to The Hague and negotiate with the Dutch.

1. In principle, hold firmly to the decisions made by the Inter-Indonesia Conference on matters of defense.
2. Dutch instructors may be accepted, but they are not to monopolize training. If worst comes to worst, they may be given "precedence." (Pak Dirman himself used the words "worst" and "precedence.")
3. Problems concerning Dutch and Indonesian KNIL members should be solved according to the decisions of the Inter-Indonesia Conference.

4. Dutchmen can become instructors but not members of the Armed Forces, because this would contravene the national base of our state.

5. Establish contact with Dutch government leaders and military commanders. Explain to them that the problem is simple, that cooperation can be established, and that Indonesia will forget everything that has happened if the Dutch act tactfully. Most important, Dutch troops must be withdrawn immediately to the cities and thereafter evacuated from Indonesia.

6. In discharging his duties, Col. Simatupang should adopt the standpoint that he is going to the Netherlands to struggle on behalf of the future of the country and in particular the interests of its Armed Forces. He should be faithful to the instructions of the Panglima Besar, bearing in mind the power of the Armed Forces and the people. This power may be used in formal negotiations and in providing information to the Dutch leaders and people.

7. Firmly urge the head of the delegation, on behalf of the Panglima Besar or of the Armed Forces, to adhere consistently to his conception on the transfer of sovereignty. This is the only policy that can be justified.

8. Communications between The Hague and Jogjakarta must be arranged speedily.

These were Pak Dirman's last instructions to me before I left for Djakarta and then for The Hague. One and one-half months after I had left Banaran, our party, headed by Dr. Leimena, left Djakarta for The Hague.

CHAPTER XII

REPORT FROM NEW DELHI

Our party, under Dr. Leimena, left Djakarta on August 20, 1949. Prior to departing, I said, in an interview with Arnold Brackman of United Press, that the present distressing conditions in Indonesia--a country which had not, thank God, suffered great damage during the Second World War--were the result of a misguided Dutch postwar policy toward Indonesia. "We are now prepared to negotiate, but we are also ready to fight," I said, in keeping with the "second line" tactic which the Emergency Government had adopted before the Dutch evacuated Jogjakarta.

On our journey to The Hague, we would stop over in India for two reasons. First, we wanted to study the settlement of defense matters after the transfer of power from Britain. Second, we had decided to stay in Delhi until the Round Table Conference had officially been opened. The Dutch were delaying the convening of the conference, even though our Vice-President and the members of our delegation (except the military delegates) had already arrived in The Hague. The BFO delegation too was in The Hague awaiting the opening of the conference. The Dutch gave as their reason for this delay the fact that shooting continued despite the cease-fire which both sides had ordered. "We cannot negotiate and shoot at the same time," the Dutch government said officially to Parliament. Because we were also aware that the conference could not operate fully so long as the TNI military delegation was absent, we deliberately planned to remain in Delhi until the Round Table Conference in The Hague had really opened.

On August 22, we arrived in New Delhi. Our representative in India, Dr. Sudarsono,¹ had arranged for us to meet Prime Minister Nehru, Defense Minister Baldev Singh, and Indian Army Commander Gen. Cariappa. From our talks with them we got the impression that the problems we had to settle with the Dutch were altogether different from those which resulted when Britain transferred sovereignty to India. We could visualize the Indian situation only if we presupposed an independent Indonesia whose Army would be the KNIL, this KNIL being transferred to the Indonesian government complete with its Dutch officers, and only afterward having these officers gradually replaced by Indonesians. Bearing in mind that Subhas Chandra Bose's army had been disbanded and its

¹Dr. Sudarsono was born in Salatiga, Central Java, in 1911. He obtained his degree from the Djakarta Medical Faculty in 1938. Afterward, he entered private practice first in Djakarta and then, after 1941, in Tjirebon. He was an important leader of Indonesia Muda after 1936 and later served as secretary to the Djakarta branch of the PPPI. During the occupation, he headed the Tjirebon branch of Putera and was involved in Sjahrir's underground. After the Proclamation of Independence, he worked closely with Sjahrir. In December 1945, he joined the first Sjahrir cabinet as Minister of Social Affairs. (He was, at the same time, a prominent figure in the Socialist Party.) He assumed the more important post of Minister of the Interior in the second Sjahrir cabinet and served as Minister of State without portfolio in the third.

officers put on trial when India became independent, to make the above picture complete we would have to imagine the TNI dissolved when Indonesia achieved independence.

When India became independent, it inherited from the British government a high quality Armed Forces which had gained experience on the battlefields of Asia, Africa, and Europe during World Wars I and II. These Armed Forces were "nationalized," in the sense that Indian officers gradually replaced the British, but the government of India did not act in haste. Replacements occurred only when there were available Indian officers with the same experience and skill as their British predecessors. At the time of Indian independence, the commanders of the Army, Navy, and Air Force were British officers seconded by the British government to the government of India. Gen. Cariappa was the first Indian national to become Commander of the Indian Army. During our visit to Delhi, the Indian Navy was still commanded by a British admiral. All Indian political leaders and officers who spoke to us expressed praise for the British officers who worked with the Indian Armed Forces after independence.

Having ourselves left Banaran only a little less than two months ago, we found this difficult to comprehend. How could we imagine an independent Indonesia borrowing a Dutch admiral to serve as Chief of Staff of the Indonesian Navy? The difference doubtless stemmed primarily from the peaceful nature of India's independence struggle; by contrast, our fight for independence had been carried out through force of arms. In addition, it seemed to me that the respect and appreciation shown by the Indians toward British culture and ways of life were much greater and more deeply rooted than any appreciation among us for the Dutch and their culture.

The conditions which we confronted and those faced by an independent India differed in another way. During World War II, industry had developed rapidly in India. Stimulated by war needs, ammunition and armaments factories expanded considerably. As a result, the country had considerable assets at its disposal at the moment it achieved independence. We, in Indonesia, by contrast, had suffered economic decline and devastation during the Japanese occupation and in the years of fighting which followed.

During our few days stay in Delhi, we met political and military leaders of a nation which was conscious and proud of its position as a great and independent nation but, at the same time, aware of its shortcomings in knowledge and experience in many fields. In order to overcome these weaknesses as quickly as possible, the nation, therefore, appreciated aid (in the form of experts) loaned by the previous colonizers. All these experiences created a very deep impression on us.

Some time prior to our party's arrival in New Delhi, Bung Hatta's group had also stopped over on its way to The Hague. According to Dr. Sudarsono, Bung Hatta had displayed great interest in the operations of the British Commonwealth during his stay in Delhi. The formation of the Commonwealth as a "free association," or a "form of free cooperation," and the fact that it did not have any permanent bodies but simply meant an exchange of views or "consultations" whenever required, had apparently given Bung Hatta ideas about the Union question. The issue would be whether psychological conditions could be created, on the one hand, and sufficient "objective" considerations could be found, on the other, to allow a type of cooperation between Indonesia and the Netherlands as apparently successful as that between India and Britain.

Having heard the ideas of the political and military leaders in Delhi and having sensed the atmosphere which prevailed, I personally was not convinced of the feasibility of all this. In my opinion, we could not revive among ourselves the kind of views and feelings toward the Dutch as existed in Delhi toward the British. I was still astonished that a newly independent nation acknowledged its shortcomings without shame and that it strove to overcome them by using the skill and experience of the previous colonizers without in any way reducing its own pride as a great and independent nation. After settling our own conflict with the Dutch, including its various manifestations (such as psychological problems), would we later be able to draw, in one way or another, lessons from the attitudes and experiences of India? I asked myself this question after finishing the official portion of my visit to Delhi, particularly as this issue related to defense problems which would have to be solved at the Round Table Conference in The Hague.

In Delhi, our party stayed at the Sudarsono residence. While there, on August 23, I heard an eyewitness account over Dutch radio of the opening of the Round Table Conference in The Hague. The Dutch radio announcer mentioned during his report that two seats among those reserved for the Republican delegation remained vacant. Indeed, Dr. Leimena and I were still in Delhi at that moment. Two days later, we set off to continue our journey to The Hague.

CHAPTER XIII
REPORT FROM THE HAGUE

Our party arrived in The Hague several days after the opening of the Round Table Conference. Bung Hatta, speaking on behalf of the delegation of the Republic at the opening session, had said: "Regardless of whether or not we have been recognized, we have lived as an independent state and nation since our Proclamation of Independence." From conversations with delegation members who had arrived earlier, we got the impression that the discussions were still at the orientation stage.

The Republican and BFO delegations were staying at the same big hotel in Scheveningen. I said to Harjono, "This is certainly different from life at Banaran. It is very easy to forget that we are supposed to represent and strive for the interests and future of the people who live in Banaran and other villages of Indonesia." The hotel doorman, who wore a much smarter uniform than my own, addressed every Indonesian who gave him a fairly good tip on entering or leaving as "Your Excellency." One day, I had to give him a large tip because I did not happen to have any small change. The man bowed lower than usual. "Your Highness," he said reverentially.

Money was indeed all-mighty in this society. We, who had lived for several years amid an atmosphere of resistance in Jogjakarta and Banaran where money did not yet govern so many everyday relationships, found it peculiar that to go to the toilet or use the elevator one had to tip someone. Would this also happen in Indonesia later on after we were sufficiently "developed"?

Our delegation consisted of ten members--Bung Hatta, Mr. Rum, Mr. Ali Sastroamidjojo, Dr. Sumitro,¹ Ir. Djuanda, Dr. Leimena, Mr. Sujono Hadinoto,² Prof. Supomo,³ Dr. Sukiman, and I. Periodically, we held

¹Dr. Sumitro Djojohadikusumo was born in Madiun, East Java, in 1918. He received his Ph.D. in economics from the University of Amsterdam in 1943. He returned to Indonesia in 1946 and was appointed an adviser to the Ministry of Finance. In August 1947, he was made a member of the Indonesian delegation to the UN with special responsibility for economic and financial matters.

²Mr. R. Sujono Hadinoto was born in Blora, East Java, in 1915. He was graduated from the Djakarta Law Faculty in 1942. Before the war, he was active in both Indonesia Muda and the PPPI in Djakarta. During the occupation, he worked for the Mangkunegaran enterprises in the Surakarta area. After the Proclamation of Independence, he worked in the administration of the Jogjakarta Special Region and was eventually made a member of the KNIP Working Committee. He was a founding member of the postwar PNI.

³Prof. Mr. Dr. R. Supomo was born in Sukohardjo, Surakarta, in 1903. He obtained his law degree from Leiden University in 1927. During the colonial period, he worked as a judge, an official of the Justice Department, and a professor at the Law Faculty. He was not politically active. In October 1943, he became adviser to

sessions to take stock of the progress of the negotiations, to make fundamental decisions, and to determine general policy to be followed. In addition, there were some forty advisers, experts, and secretariat members. At least once a week, the delegation met with all of the advisers and experts. Among them were a number of very prominent leaders, such as Mr. Muhammad Yamin,⁴ a lawyer, historian, politician, man of letters, in short, a sort of "jack-of-all-trades" or all-around person. Others were Chief of the State Police Sukanto,⁵ Navy Chief of Staff Subijakto and, arriving later, Air Force Chief of Staff Suria-darma, Chief Treasurer Mr. Sutikno Slamet,⁶ and Chief Justice Mr. Kusumaatmadja.⁷

The Round Table Conference had a central committee, better known by its English language name "Steering Committee." It was composed of the chairmen and two or three senior members of the Republican, BFO, and Dutch delegations. Members of the UN Commission for Indonesia, the UNCI, always attended its meetings also. The Steering Committee controlled the whole conference. It assigned tasks to the various committees, for example, the committees on the constitution, financial and economic affairs, the military, and cultural and social matters.

the Justice Department. In August 1945, he was made chief of the Justice Department and he became Minister of Justice in the Sukarno cabinet. He was the best-known legal scholar of his generation.

⁴Mr. Muhammad Yamin was born in Sawahlunto, West Sumatra, in 1903. He was graduated from the Djakarta Law Faculty in 1932. As a student, he headed the Jong Sumatranen Bond and was prominent in Indonesia Muda and the PPPI. After graduation he worked as a lawyer but remained active politically, first in Partindo and later in helping to found Gerindo (along with Amir Sjarifuddin and Gani). From 1938 to 1942, he sat in the Volksraad. In 1939, he quarreled with his Gerindo colleagues and left to form his own Minangkabau-based party, the Parpindo (Party of Indonesian Unity). In September 1943, he was appointed adviser to the Department of Propaganda and held this post until February 1945. In July 1945, he was arrested briefly for his connections with radical youth. After the Proclamation of Independence, he became a key figure in Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perdjjuangan and, as a consequence, was arrested in March 1946. He was released but rearrested in July 1946 in the aftermath of the July 3 Affair. He was sentenced to prison and only released in 1948, on the eve of the Madiun Affair.

⁵R. S. Sukanto Tjokrodiatmodjo was born in Bogor, West Java, in 1908. Originally enrolled in the Djakarta Law Faculty, he later transferred to the Police School at Sukabumi in 1930. After graduation, he entered the colonial police force. He rose steadily in the police hierarchy through the Dutch and Japanese periods. In September 1945, he was appointed Chief of the new National Police Force. In 1948, he was sent to the US to study police administration and resumed his post on his return to Indonesia in July 1949.

⁶Mr. R. Sutikno Slamet was born near Kediri, East Java, in 1914. He was graduated from the Djakarta Law Faculty in 1939. During the Dutch and Japanese periods, he worked in the Department of Finance, specializing in taxation. He continued in this capacity under the Republic.

⁷Dr. R. S. E. Kusumaatmadja was born in Purwakarta, West Java, in 1898. He obtained his doctorate in law from Leiden University in 1922. On returning to Indonesia, he rose rapidly in the judicial hierarchy. At the end of the colonial period, he was chairman of the Appellate Court in Semarang. After the Proclamation of Independence, he was named the first Chairman of the Supreme Court.

The various committees reported to the Steering Committee on their results and referred difficult problems to it for settlement. Bung Hatta, Mr. Rum, and Dr. Leimena were the Republic's members on the Steering Committee. One or two delegation members served on each of the other committees aided by advisers and experts. Dr. Leimena and myself were on the military committee, assisted by Col. Subijakto, Lt. Col. Daan Jahja, Maj. Harjono, and, after his arrival, Commodore Suria-darma, along with several legal experts including Hamid Algadrie.⁸

I had had experience in military negotiations in Indonesia before and after the Linggadjati and Renville Agreements. The atmosphere this time differed from that of previous negotiations. The feeling prevailed that this round would be the last.

At the opening session, it was decided that the conference should finish by early November, because it was believed that, by that time, the situation in Indonesia would again become explosive if no definite results had been achieved. Moreover, the Dutch, particularly those I had encountered during negotiations in Indonesia, displayed different attitudes and behavior here. They were more "normal." Perhaps the idea which Bung Amir had had after the first Dutch attack was on the mark after all, namely, that negotiations should be held outside Indonesia and the Netherlands. Perhaps the Dutch would have been even more "normal" if the negotiations had been conducted outside the Netherlands.

Dutch newspapers paid considerable attention to the progress of the conference. Did this mean that the Dutch public was following the negotiations with great attention and understanding? One day our delegation received an invitation from the municipal government of Amsterdam. At an official reception ceremony in the city hall, the Mayor of Amsterdam, a member of the Dutch Labor Party, expressed the hope that after the conference, the components of the kingdom (the *rijksdelen*) would live more harmoniously with one another under the Crown's protection. It was obvious that Bung Hatta was somewhat at a loss for words when it came time for him to reply to this welcoming speech. However, he diplomatically corrected the mistake in the mayor's speech. At the dining table, I talked with a *wethouder*, or alderman, about the city of Amsterdam and other topics. As we were about to leave, he asked me seriously: "Van welk leger bent U?" (From which army are you?) To what extent did the Dutch people follow the conference with attention and understanding?

Given the bustle of the conference, I did not have much opportunity to see the countryside. Everything looked small, flat, orderly, efficient, safe, tranquil, and prosperous. What an enormous difference between this country and the vastness of Indonesia, with its mountains, valleys, and forests, and its society which was turbulently pioneering the way to a new era.

⁸Mr. Hamid Algadrie was born in Pasuruan, East Java, in 1912. He was graduated from the Djakarta Law Faculty before the war. He participated actively in the Jong Islamieten Bond and was an important leader of the Indonesian Arab Party (PAI). After the Proclamation of Independence, he became a senior official in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs but later transferred to the Prime Minister's secretariat. He was a member of the KNIP Working Committee from 1947 and sat on the Republican delegations to the Renville and Round Table talks. He was close to Sutan Sjahrir.

I gained a clearer understanding of how difficult it was for the Dutch to comprehend what was happening in Indonesia at the present time. This impression became very strong when I spoke with Dutch party leaders who decided the political line which the Dutch government would pursue. They used the same criteria to view the Indonesian problem as were operative in debates within the Dutch Parliament, as though a turbulent Indonesia could be regulated in accordance with the results of the *Indonesisch Debat* [Indonesian Debate] in Parliament. They failed to understand that the Indonesian revolution not only had a different tone and language but also a completely distinct logic, from the tone, language, and logic which prevailed in debates within Parliament.

The delegation meetings I attended after our arrival from India led me to believe that the most delicate problems would be those of the Union and of finance. Already at the beginning of the conference, the Union had become a matter that could no longer be rejected. There remained only the question of its substance and form. We wanted a very loose Union, in the nature of a free cooperative relationship without any general, permanent organization. The Dutch were anxious to create a tight Union, providing for broad cooperation and a large permanent apparatus. As regards finance, the fundamental problem involved debts. We were only prepared to accept the debts of the Netherlands Indies up until the time of its capitulation to Japan. We did not want to be responsible for debts which had been contracted afterward and which, for the greater part, had been used to finance attacks against the Republic. But the Dutch maintained that we must assume all the assets and liabilities of the Netherlands Indies.

The cultural and social affairs committee would apparently not meet any serious difficulties. The questions to be handled by the military committee still had to be studied in initial meetings with the BFO and the Dutch delegates on the committee. The problem of Irian (or Papua as it was usually called in those days) had already come up in the Round Table Conference Memorandum of June 22, 1949, as part of the Tracé Baru brought back by our leaders from Bangka. But, I personally had not suspected at the beginning of the conference that it would create such tremendous difficulties by the end. In the memorandum, the Papua issue was included in the agenda item entitled "other business," along with international relations, legal position of civil servants, withdrawal of Dutch troops, etc.

We already knew the BFO members on the military committee from the Inter-Indonesia Conference, namely, Sultan Hamid, Mr. Makmun Sumadipradja, and Col. Sugondo, and we knew their views. At The Hague, the BFO delegation was reenforced by Capt. Tahya, a well-known KNIL and BFO military and political leader. The Dutch delegation was led by the State Secretaries for War and Navy from the Dutch cabinet, namely Mr. Fokkema Andreae and Rear Admiral Moorman. In Indonesia, we had always dealt with the Dutch Army Command and the Dutch Navy Command for Indonesia, but now we directly faced the Dutch government in negotiations over military matters. The Dutch State Secretaries were assisted by Maj. Gen. van Langen, Commander of the troops that had captured Jogjakarta on December 19, 1948. He had since been appointed Chief of Staff in Djakarta following Gen. Buurman van Vreeden's assignment as Commander-in-Chief replacing Gen. Spoor. The Dutch delegation also included Col. Thomson, whom I had known in Indonesia when he commanded the Dutch brigade in Bogor, and a number of Navy and Air Force officers from the Dutch Navy and War Ministries.

After several meetings of the military committee, the basic problems that had to be solved and the stand of each delegation toward them became clear. All agreed that the starting point was the agreement that at the moment of the SO, *souvereiniteits-overdracht* [transfer of sovereignty], Dutch military forces would be assembled at certain designated places. They would no longer retain any responsibility for security and defense in Indonesia but would simply await their transport to the Netherlands. The issue was: How much time would be needed to complete this evacuation? The Dutch presented statistics concerning the numbers of troops to be transported and the number and capacity of their transport ships. They concluded that the process could not be completed in less than eighteen months. The Republic and the BFO could not accept this. They were willing to allow six months time for completion of the troop evacuation. In private conversations with the Dutch, I said that our people would regard a speedy withdrawal of troops a test case of Dutch sincerity about beginning a new relationship with Indonesia. I also relayed to them the instructions of our Panglima Besar concerning this matter.

The next problem was that of the KNIL. All sides agreed that in the new conditions following the transfer of sovereignty there would no longer be any place for these units. As part of the Tracé Baru and its ramifications, an agreement had been reached with the BFO, at the Inter-Indonesia Conference, that Indonesians belonging to the KNIL would be accepted into the RUSI Armed Forces, according to conditions to be decided later. The Dutch, for their part, agreed to make their own arrangements for Dutch members of the KNIL. Despite general agreement on matters of principle, however, it turned out that many other issues remained with regard to the KNIL which caused differences of opinion.

A basic difference arose about the position of the KNIL. The Dutch maintained that the KNIL was the Army of the Netherlands Indies. Since in their view the future RUSI would be the heir of the Netherlands Indies, the KNIL automatically became RUSI's responsibility. The Dutch government would take care of the Dutch members of the KNIL only because it felt a moral responsibility to do so. We, on the other hand, regarded the KNIL as a tool of the Dutch. As proof we offered the fact that the use of the KNIL against the Republic had been sanctioned by a decision of the Dutch Parliament. A member of the Dutch delegation said, "But at that time, there were Indonesians too who approved of the decision." We answered, "You are now talking to the Republic and not to those Indonesians." In our view, the KNIL was a Dutch problem, but because RUSI was the government of Indonesia, it would be willing to take care of the Indonesians within the KNIL.

The BFO kept silent on this issue. Eventually, it was decided to settle the KNIL problem without recourse to any particular set of principles. All sides agreed to consider the question from a purely practical angle and on the basis that each side had a commitment to dissolve the KNIL in the best manner possible without bequeathing new problems. Morally speaking, the Dutch believed themselves duty bound to make sure that KNIL members were taken care of one way or another. Indonesia, for its part, realized that the matter might become the source of long-range difficulties if the KNIL were not disbanded in an orderly fashion. The Republican delegation proposed that it be stipulated that the Netherlands and Indonesia would work together to liquidate the KNIL. The Dutch had psychological objections to the word "liquidate," and they proposed the word "reorganize." We had no

objection so long as it was spelled out that: "At the end of the reorganization period, the KNIL shall no longer exist"; or, in Dutch, "Aan het einde van de reorganisatie-period houdt het KNIL op te bestaan." It was far into the night before the Dutch finally accepted this clause, during negotiations held in a room at the Dutch Ministry of the Navy, called *de rode kamer*, or red room, because its walls were painted pink.

At that moment, I was reminded of the negotiations on military matters which I had experienced for several years in Indonesia. In the present negotiations, the real point at issue was the conflict between our view that the KNIL should be disbanded and the Dutch view that the TNI should be. The inability to settle precisely this conflict on military issues had led to the first and second Dutch attacks. Now it had officially been determined that later the KNIL would no longer exist. To me, it represented a significant night, the night when the TNI triumphed over the KNIL.

Meanwhile, another question arose, with regard to the time-frame and the method to be used for the reorganization of the KNIL. We insisted that KNIL members who were Indonesian nationals should be admitted as individuals into the RUSI Armed Forces, of which the TNI would be the nucleus. Furthermore, we wanted the KNIL to cease its existence within six months after the transfer of sovereignty. The Dutch connected the reorganization of the KNIL to the evacuation of the Dutch Royal Army, on the grounds that in reality the two military units were currently linked together from top to bottom. This implied that they wanted eighteen months to reorganize the KNIL, something we obviously could not accept.

The BFO had their own opinions on the KNIL problem. They supported our stand that the KNIL reorganization should be finished up within six months, but, at the same time, they wanted the high command of the KNIL to be in the hands of Indonesian KNIL officers at the time sovereignty was transferred and further that the KNIL troops should be reorganized under this new command as national troops for the BFO territories. In other words, the BFO wanted the TNI to remain in Republican territory and the KNIL troops in the BFO areas; then later the TNI would merge with the reorganized KNIL. This would mean a merger between two armies with "national" status, the TNI and the ex-KNIL, with each maintaining security in its respective territory.

Naturally, we could accept neither the Dutch nor the BFO view. The debates over the KNIL problem were some of the most difficult which occurred within the military committee. Finally, all agreed that the KNIL reorganization would be completed within six months and that the Dutch Armed Forces Command would retain responsibility for KNIL members until they were individually accepted into the RUSI Armed Forces according to terms to be decided later by the RUSI government. Meanwhile, KNIL members whom the RUSI accepted would, as far as possible, be transferred to the Republic of Indonesia in regular units.

The problem of the Air Force and the Navy were settled on a basis analogous to the Army solution, namely, that at the time sovereignty was transferred, these two Dutch military services in Indonesia would

have no duties but would only await evacuation to the Netherlands. This would affect only the Dutch members; Indonesian nationals would have the chance to join the Indonesian Air Force and Navy on the basis of conditions to be established by RUSI. Equipment, arms, and installations which had been the property of the Netherlands Indies would automatically revert to RUSI.

In the meantime, special problems arose with relation to the Navy. We would not have any seaworthy ships at the time of the transfer of sovereignty. Could we afford to permit smuggling after the transfer? To prevent smuggling, therefore, it was deemed necessary that Dutch ships continue their duties for one year following the transfer of sovereignty, but at the instruction and on the responsibility of the RUSI government. It was expected that, within this period, our Navy would acquire its own ships (for example, through purchase from the Dutch) and would train crews to handle them. The Dutch tried to retain control of the Surabaja naval base, but, from the beginning, we rejected any such proposal.

Another issue centered on the matter of Dutch instructors and the Military Mission. Talks on this mission did not raise any great difficulties. Both sides agreed that it could operate only so long as both recipient and donor wished it. The agreement therefore provided that the mission would cease at any time if either side requested it. Consequently, several years after the transfer of sovereignty when the Indonesian Parliament decided to end the mission, the problem was limited to the arrangement of the technical and administrative aspects of its termination. The agreement also stipulated that, if we invited another mission to our country while the Dutch mission was present, the Dutch would be informed and could decide whether or not they would remain along with the new mission. In other words, the Dutch mission did not have a monopoly, and either side could end the arrangement at any time. The underlying idea for the mission was to help train instructors within our Armed Forces in order that educational institutions, such as exist in every modern armed service, would be operating as soon as possible with our own instructors.

Generally speaking, negotiations were conducted on weekdays, beginning in the morning and sometimes lasting until far into the night. No sessions were held on Sundays. But, in keeping with my promise to Pak Dirman on leaving Jogjakarta, the military members were always standing by in our quarters to compile full reports on the proceedings of the past week, both on official and unofficial negotiations. Every Monday, a courier left for Jogjakarta taking a diplomatic pouch. When we reached a critical stage in the negotiations, I sent Lt. Col. Daan Jahja to Jogjakarta as a special courier. I attached special importance to the maintenance of wide and regular contact with those who had stayed "at home." From my experience during the negotiations in Djakarta, I had seen that a gap could easily arise between the thinking of those involved in negotiations and of those "at home" if full and continuous communications were not maintained. Such a gap could very naturally lead to mutual accusations and distrust and, subsequently, to conflicts and splits.

The military committee's discussions led to agreement on many questions, but a number of fundamental problems remained unsolved. Consequently, from October 26 to 28, 1949, the Steering Committee invited the military committee to attend its sessions in an effort to reach an agreement on these issues. At that time, the whole conference

was under great pressure, because all sides knew that a complete agreement had to be reached before the end of October particularly in view of the conditions in Indonesia. The Sultan had sent a report from Jogjakarta saying that the situation was becoming increasingly volatile.

It was under such conditions that the Republican, BFO, and Dutch delegates from the military committee defended their respective positions before the Steering Committee on the issues of: the status of the Surabaya naval base; the procedures for determining the tasks of the Dutch Navy during the year after the transfer of sovereignty (to give the Indonesian Navy time to train crews to execute security operations at sea with their own ships); the procedure, timing, and financing of the KNIL reorganization; and the time limit for the evacuation of the Dutch Army from Indonesia. In the course of these discussions, the delegates of the Republic and the BFO generally presented similar views. As I had expected before leaving for The Hague, whenever the delegations were deadlocked, the UN Commission for Indonesia was asked for its recommendations. If all parties accepted its suggestions, then the question was considered as settled. But, generally, all parties tried to bargain over the UNCI recommendations, leading to more debates until eventually a formulation was achieved which, though satisfying no one, could no longer be rejected.

In the final outcome, it was firmly declared that the Surabaya base would be the property of RUSI, which would appoint a Dutch Navy officer to manage it during the transitional period. Certain Dutch Navy ships would patrol for one year under orders from RUSI. During this time, the Dutch would sell RUSI a destroyer and a number of corvettes. With regard to the evacuation of the Dutch Army, it was decided, after a long and heated debate, that the Dutch would try to finish within six months. If it turned out that they could not complete the job in that period, the matter would be discussed jointly. The KNIL would be reorganized within six months. The Dutch Military Command in Indonesia would carry out the reorganization, but the RUSI and Dutch governments would jointly provide directives governing it.

All things considered, these results were not too disappointing. On other matters as well, such as the Union and the financial questions, agreements were reached despite great difficulties.

One morning in the last week of October, sitting next to Mr. Muhammad Yamin in the hotel dining room, I raised my glass to him and said: "To the end of the conference." I did this because the work of the military committee was practically finished and I assumed the other committees too had almost completed their tasks. Yamin raised his glass and responded: "To everything we have not yet achieved." This was the first clear indication to me that Mr. Yamin's committee, the constitution committee, had run into a problem that could not be solved at the conference. I had been so busy during the previous days with the problems facing the military committee that I had not followed developments within the other committees. That same day, I contacted the head and members of our delegation to the constitution committee to learn the ins and outs of this evidently insoluble problem. It turned out to be the Irian question, or to be more exact, the question of Papua (the name we used at that time). Near the end of the conference, the name Irian was already being used though Papua was still mentioned. Muhammad Yamin had introduced the name Irian at a Steering Committee session, on October 29, in his brief refuting the Dutch

contention that the people of "Irian" were in no position to express their desires. To prove how wrong the Dutch argument was, he mentioned the existence of an independence movement called the Partai Kemerdekaan Indonesia Irian [Indonesian Independence Party of Irian], led by A. B. Karubuy.⁹ Responding to Yamin's statement, the Dutch delegate Krijger also used the name Irian.

The conference had to close on November 1 or 2, 1949. All parties realized this. At the October 29 Steering Committee session, the position of the Republic and BFO, on one side, and of the Dutch, on the other, were in complete contradiction. In principle, the Dutch refused to relinquish sovereignty over Irian. The Republic and the BFO, on the other hand, maintained that "a complete and unconditional transfer of sovereignty," which the Dutch themselves had announced to the world, implied ending Dutch sovereignty over Irian. The Republican delegation gave the BFO the lead in the Irian debate, apparently considering it an issue which directly involved the BFO state of East Indonesia, represented by its Prime Minister Anak Agung. Generally speaking, the Republic supported his statements in the Steering Committee session. Yamin supplied prehistoric, historic, sociological, economic, political, strategic, and other arguments to support Anak Agung's claim that Irian should be included within the transfer of sovereignty. The Dutch, for their part, brought forth all sorts of theories to prove that Nederlands Nieuw-Guinea must remain under Dutch control.

According to rumor, if the Dutch delegation agreed to transfer Irian to Indonesia, Parliament would not endorse its action, since some political parties had already decided to oppose any such step. Anak Agung proposed a compromise, that is, that Irian would be transferred to Indonesia but that a joint Indonesian-Dutch agreement would guide its development. He warned that if the Irian problem were not settled, it would become a source of continuous trouble and would even endanger the existence of the Union itself. Maarseveen, of the Dutch delegation, asserted that the Dutch could not relinquish their responsibility for the progress of the Irianese, but they were prepared to declare that sovereignty over Irian would not be transferred to a third party, that they would not change its status without prior consultation with Indonesia, that Indonesia's interests would be taken into account in the development of Irian, and that these interests would "as a matter of course" always be discussed within the framework of the Union.

Translated from diplomatic language into everyday terms: Anak Agung was warning, "If Irian is not transferred, the Union will break up"; and Maarseveen was answering, "So long as you remain within the Union, we will take your interests in Irian into consideration." Consequently, the Steering Committee session established nothing more than the fact of a deadlock in the talks. After the session ended, the UNCI submitted a recommendation which would, in essence, have left Irian under Dutch control but with the proviso that its political status

⁹ A. B. Karubuy was born in Mie-i-Wandamen-Manokwari, West Irian, in 1915. Before the war he was an associate of Dr. Supomo and worked in the colonial health service. While a student in Surabaya, he belonged to Indonesia Muda and to Supomo's Indonesian National Party (PBI). During the occupation, the Japanese interned him for two years in South Sulawesi. After the Proclamation, he joined the Republic but was later imprisoned by the Dutch for over a year. He was the leader of the PKII and participated in the Inter-Indonesia Conference as such.

would be determined within a year by negotiations between Indonesia and the Netherlands.

The following day, October 30, was a Sunday, but the Steering Committee met nonetheless. The Republican and BFO delegations stated that Indonesia could not accept the UNCI recommendation. In general, the Republic and the BFO had usually been the first to accept UNCI recommendations, but this time it was the Dutch. Anak Agung proposed that sovereignty over Irian be transferred but that the Dutch continue to administer it for a year while negotiations were conducted between the Netherlands and Indonesia concerning its future status. The Dutch immediately rejected this proposal. The situation was clear.

The next discussions, which entailed some dramatic moments, took place both within the Republican and BFO delegations as well as between them. Each delegate of the Republic and the BFO envisioned Indonesia as a vast archipelago, stretching from Sabang to Merauke. We could not accept the idea that one portion of what we felt to be our homeland would be separated from it, even if only temporarily.

On the other hand, what would happen if we continued to reject the UNCI recommendation? It would cause the complete failure of the conference. One suggestion was to adjourn the conference and resume it later in Djakarta. But would the UNCI and the Dutch accept this? Furthermore, what else could be discussed? The question was clear; we had reached a deadlock, and the UNCI recommendation for breaking it was accepted by the Dutch but rejected by the Indonesians. Would the situation change if the conference were adjourned and resumed later in Djakarta?

If the conference were to be declared a failure, the UN could resume debate on the Indonesian problem. What would happen there? The UNCI in this instance was closer to the Dutch stand than ours. There were no grounds for believing that the UN would arrive at a more favorable decision for us if the case were referred to it.

What would happen in Indonesia when it became clear that the conference had reached an insurmountable deadlock? Would the situation, described by the latest reports from the Sultan as explosive, become uncontrollable? If the conference ended in definite failure, would it be possible to continue the cease-fire which had been understood from the outset as a short term proposition, that is, until the Hague conference opened new perspectives. If fighting broke out once again, would it still be possible to return to the conference table later? What would happen to delegation members in The Hague? Would I be able to return to Banaran? Or would I be compelled to seek asylum in India? And what about Bung Hatta? He would naturally not be willing to return to Bangka.

Perhaps it would have been better if we had not come to The Hague to negotiate. But what else could we have done? While we were in Banaran, the Rum-van Royen Agreement had been reached in Djakarta and had received the blessing of Bung Karno and Bung Hatta. This created a situation in which, for all practical purposes, it was no longer possible to reject the agreement without repudiating Sukarno and Hatta. The Tracé Baru brought back from Bangka had brought us to the present situation. There was no "pleasant" way out of it. Rejection or acceptance of the UNCI recommendation would both have unsatisfactory consequences. The issue was to choose one of these unpleasant alternatives.

Feeling very upset (many members had tears in their eyes), our delegation decided in the end to accept the UNCI recommendation, but with the proviso that the final text would clearly state that Irian remained "under dispute." This dispute would continue after the end of the Round Table Conference, but the Dutch and ourselves would continue the dispute as two equal parties, both recognized by the world as independent and sovereign states. Previously, we had brought the dispute into an international forum in which the whole world recognized the Dutch as independent and sovereign but most countries had not yet recognized Indonesia as such.

Members of the Republican and BFO delegations each mourned inwardly as they attended the last plenary session of the Round Table Conference in the Ridderzaal, or Knights' Hall, in The Hague, on November 2, 1949. I commented to a member of the Dutch delegation whom I had gotten to know well during the conference: "For four years my country and yours have been separated by a wide and deep abyss. At this conference we have painstakingly built a bridge across it. On this last day, however, we are placing dynamite under that bridge which might destroy it."

The Round Table Conference had ended. For two months, the members, advisers, experts, and secretariat of our delegation had done their utmost to achieve the maximum results possible within the limits of the Tracé Baru. This Tracé Baru reflected the situation which had confronted us at the time it was mapped out in Bangka. Judged by the aspirations of our resistance conducted since August 17, 1945, the Round Table Conference results were certainly unsatisfactory. Be that as it may, the results would pave the way for further efforts and struggle toward these aspirations. Two significant results accomplished by the Round Table Conference were: first, we would forthwith be recognized by the world as an independent and sovereign state, and, consequently, whatever happened in Indonesia in the future would be regarded by the world as merely an internal question; second, for the first time in centuries, the last foreign soldiers would leave the shores of our Fatherland, except for Irian. The final withdrawal or disbandment of the Dutch Armed Forces would open the door to new developments, ones more fitting to the interests and desires of our people. I myself would immediately bring to Indonesia the stipulations regarding the timetable and procedures for the withdrawal of Dutch forces.

On November 3, Mr. Mohammad Rum, Harjono, and I left the Netherlands by plane, taking with us to Indonesia the first documents of the Round Table agreements. The day after our arrival in Djakarta, Harjono and I went on to Jogjakarta. Col. Bambang Sugeng met us at the Maguwo airfield. After calling on the Defense Minister, the Sultan, I reported officially to Pak Dirman that afternoon that I had returned from The Hague. I reported orally on everything that had happened since I had received Pak Dirman's final instructions on August 18, 1949, before my departure for Djakarta and The Hague. I left a written report and the complete text of the Round Table Conference decisions with Pak Dirman, drawing his particular attention to those which dealt with defense problems. I asked him to contact me if he should need any clarification and when, after studying the results, he had decided whether or not they were in keeping with his instructions.

Several days later, Pak Dirman sent for me. He said that he had studied the conference results, especially those concerning defense,

and that he could accept them as the accomplishment of the instructions given to me prior to my departure for The Hague. My tasks in pursuance of the decision of the Military Strategy Council session, held at the Panti Rapih mission hospital in Jogjakarta, on July 21, and Pak Dirman's instructions of August 18 had been accomplished.

I recalled the cabinet session held at the Presidential Palace in Jogjakarta on the night of July 13, 1949, at which Mr. Sjafrudin Prawiranegara had declared, before returning the mandate of the Emergency Government: "The Emergency Government does not take any position with regard to the [Rum-van Royen] Agreement. It leaves that to the cabinet, the KNIP Working Committee, and the Military Command. The consequences of the decision will be borne together."

The Round Table Conference decisions were the consequences of the Rum-van Royen Agreement, the consequences of the Tracé Baru. Would we bear these together? Would we be in a position to use these results as a stepping stone to continue our struggle together toward a powerful, just, and prosperous Indonesia, so that the tears and blood shed during the war for independence would not have been in vain.

For the struggle goes on.

CONCLUSION

MATARAMAN AND NO. 56, PEGANGSAAN TIMUR

In 1629, the army of the Kingdom of Mataram arrived at the bank of the Tjiliwung River under orders from Sultan Agung to drive the Dutch from Batavia, which they had founded in 1619 at a place previously called Djakarta. The Mataram troops made the area around the Tjiliwung River their base for the attack on Batavia. For that reason, the area has been known till now as Mataraman. Sultan Agung's army failed to drive the Dutch from Batavia, and, from this town, the Dutch expanded their sphere of domination until, in the end, the whole Fatherland of Indonesia was subjected to the Dutch colonial yoke.

Three hundred and twenty years later, on the afternoon of December 27, 1949, a delegation left the Proclamation Building at No. 56, Pegangsaan Timur in the Mataraman area to go to the Rijswijk Palace to attend a ceremony marking the official termination of Dutch domination of our Fatherland. After the recognition of our sovereignty the Rijswijk Palace was renamed the Istana Merdeka [Independence Palace]. As it happened, the head of the delegation was Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX of Mataram, a descendant of Sultan Agung.

On that same day, December 27, the Armed Forces High Command was formed. Commodore Suriadarma was appointed Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Col. Subijakto Chief of Staff of the Navy. The Java and Sumatra Commands were abolished. Col. Nasution, former Java Commander, became Chief of Staff of the Army, and Col. Hidajat, former Sumatra Commander, was appointed head of one of the most important sections of the Army Staff. Pak Dirman became Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces. He was at that time recuperating in Jogjakarta. I became Acting Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces, or, in the term of the time, "Fungerend KSAP."

The reader will perhaps forgive me now for a few words of a personal nature. On the first night of our second war for independence, as I lay in the guardhouse at Minggir on the bank of the Progo River, I told myself that, by comparison with those friends who had had to leave wives and children behind in order to continue the resistance, my own fate was not too bad. For at that time I was still single. Since December 12, 1949, Adik Budiardjo has been my wife, my companion in happiness and sorrow. Without her the bright days of my life would not be so enjoyable and the dark days would be even darker for me. When Rudyard Kipling wrote:

If you can keep your head when all about you
Are losing theirs and blaming it on you,
If you can trust yourself when all men doubt you,
But make allowance for their doubting too;
If you can wait and not be tired by waiting,
Or, being lied about, don't deal in lies,
Or, being hated, don't give way to hating,
And yet don't look too good, nor talk too wise;

If you can dream--and not make dreams your master;
 If you can think--and not make thoughts your aim,
 If you can meet with Triumph and Disaster,
 And treat those two impostors just the same;
 If you can bear to hear the truth you've spoken
 Twisted by knaves to make a trap for fools,
 Or watch the things you gave your life to, broken,
 And stoop and build 'em up with worn-out tools:
 If you can make one heap of all your winnings,
 And risk it on one turn of pitch-and-toss;
 And lose, and start again at your beginnings
 And never breathe a word about your loss;
 If you can force your heart and nerve and sinew
 To serve your turn long after they are gone
 And so hold on when there is nothing in you
 Except the will which says to them: "Hold on!"
 If you can talk with crowds and keep your virtue,
 Or walk with Kings--nor lose the common touch,
 If neither foes nor loving friends can hurt you,
 If all men count with you, but none too much;
 If you can fill the unforgiving minute
 With sixty seconds' worth of distance run,
 Yours is the Earth and everything that's in it,
 And--which is more--you'll be a *Man*, my son,

he apparently did not understand that in fortitude and greatness of soul a woman is no less than a man.

When Sang Surya spread his rays on our beautiful Indonesian archipelago on December 28, 1949, Sang Saka Merah-Putih waved proudly everywhere in our Fatherland, the symbol of triumph and of commitment to build a powerful, just, and prosperous Indonesia. Only in West Irian did the Dutch tricolor still fly. For how much longer?

INDEX TO BIOGRAPHICAL FOOTNOTES

- Abdulkadir Widjojoatmodjo, 99
Abimanju, 44
Achmadi, 74
Algadrie, Hamid, 173
Ali Machmudi, 69
Ali Sastroamidjojo, 57
Amir Sjarifuddin, 15
Anak Agung Gde Agung, 39
Ardiwinangun, 70
Arudji Kartawinata, 87
Asikin, Dr., 151
Askari, 79
Bachrun, 37
Bambang Sugeng, 29
Bambang Supeno, 70
Beel, 17
Budiardjo, Ali, 40
Budiono, 40
Buurman van Vreeden, 141
Chaerul Saleh, 34
Cochran, 17
Daeng, 28
Dahlan Ibrahim, 162
Dartojo, 53
Daud Beureueh, 162
Djajadiningrat, R. B., 86
Djambek, Dahlan, 99
Djatikusumo, 88
Djojohadikusumo, Margono, 31
Djojohadikusumo, Sumitro, 171
Djokosujono, 77
Djuanda, 20
Djumhana, 39
Drees, 58
Dul Arnowo, 71
Farid Ma'ruf, 54
Gani, A. K., 162
Gani Suradipura, 52
Gatot Subroto, 67
Goes van Naters, van der, 120
Graham, Dr., 32
Halim, Abdul, 45
Hamengku Buwono IX, 20
Hamid II, Sultan, 164
Harjono, 22
Hatta, 17
Heutsz, van, 120
Hidajat, 14
Hutabarat, 21
Hutagalung, Dr., 140
Iskandar Gondowardojo, 158
Jahja, Daan, 21
Jani, 36
Kartakusuma, 86
Kartasasmita, Didi, 79
Kartosuwirjo, 97
Karubuy, 179
Kasimo, 48
Kasman Singodimedjo, 69
Kawilarang, Alex, 86
Kemal Idris, 30
Kusno Utomo, 35
Kusumaatmadja, 172
Latif Hendraningrat, 19
Leimena, 20
Lubis, Zulkifli, 18
Lumban Tobing, 162
Makmun Sumadipradja, 164
Maladi, 74
Mangkunegoro VIII, 66
Mansur, 96
Maramis, A. A., 127
Martadinata, 87
Maruto Darusman, 77
Masdulhak, 17
Maskur, K. H., 48
Mokoginta, 30
Mook, van, 17
Mukti, K. H., 54
Munadi, 70
Murdjani, 70
Mursito, 72
Muslimin, 24
Muso, 81
Mustopo, 45
Nasution, 14
Natsir, 110
Neher, 118
Oey Gee Hwat, 77
Paku Buwono XII, 66
Palar, 161
Pirngadie, 85
Prawoto, 66
Princen, 30
Puradiredja, Adil, 39
Rasjid, Sutan Mohammad, 162
Romme, 120
Ronomarsono, 77
Royen, van, 99
Rubijono, 19
Rukana, 30
Rum, 57
Sadikin, 35
Saleh, Aziz, 85

- Saleh, Effendi, 85
 Salim, Hadji Agus, 31
 Santoso Wirodihardjo, Maria
 Ulfah, 40
 Sarbini, 44
 Sardjono, 77
 Sasraprawira, 21
 Saassen, 58
 Schuurman, Elink, 99
 Setiadjud, 82
 Simbolon, 89
 Sjafrudin Prawiranegara, 21
 Sjahrir, 20
 Slamet Rijadi, 74
 Spoor, 117
 Stikker, 58
 Suadi, 146
 Subijakto, 80
 Sudarsono, Dr., 168
 Sudiarto, S., 71
 Sudigdo, 159
 Sudirman, Gen., 12
 Sudirman, Lt. Col., 69
 Sudiro, 66
 Sudjono, Mr., 75
 Suhardjo, 66
 Suharto, 37
 Sujono Hadinoto, 171
 Sukanda Bratamenggala, 19
 Sukanto Tjokrodiatmodjo, 172
 Sukarno, 23
 Sukiman, 49
 Sukono Djojopratignjo, 54
 Sukowati, Suprpto, 70
 Sumarsono, 54
 Sunarto Kusumodirdjo, 69
 Sungkono, 70
 Supardi, 85
 Supardjo, 146
 Supeno, 48
 Supeno Hadisiswojo, 82
 Supomo, 171
 Suprpto, 75
 Suprijadi, 147
 Suriadarma, 18
 Suriosumarno, 86
 Suripno, 77
 Surjosularso, 23
 Suroso, 67
 Susanto Tirtoprodjo, 48
 Susilowati, 68
 Sutikno Slamet, 172
 Sutomo, 81
 Suwarto, 44
 Suwondo, 21
 Tambunan, 83
 Tandiono Manu, 69
 Tan Malaka, 43
 Taswin, 30
 Tirtawinata, 131
 Tjokroaminoto, Anwar, 54
 Tjokroaminoto, Harsono, 153
 Umar Djoy, 69
 Urip Sumohardjo, 76
 Vredenburg, van, 99
 Wijono, 53
 Wilujo Puspojudo, 36
 Winarno Danuatmodjo, 85
 Wingate, 41
 Wiranatakusumah, 39
 Wiriadinata, 74
 Wongsonegoro, 38
 Yamin, 172
 Zainul Arifin, 67