

***THE PEASANTS' REVOLT OF BANTEN
IN 1888***

VERHANDELINGEN

VAN HET KONINKLIJK INSTITUUT VOOR
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SARTONO KARTODIRDJO

THE PEASANTS' REVOLT OF BANTEN IN 1888

ITS CONDITIONS, COURSE AND SEQUEL

A CASE STUDY OF SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
IN INDONESIA



'S-GRAVENHAGE — MARTINUS NIJHOFF — 1966

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PREFACE

The primary purpose of this study is to deal with certain aspects of social movements involving broad layers of the common people in Indonesia. The treatment of a subject of this nature has been rare indeed in Indonesian historiography, the only outstanding example being Schrieke's analysis of Communism on the West Coast of Sumatra (Schrieke, 1959, pp. 85—166). Like Schrieke I have confined myself to one specific movement in one specific region. I have studied the Banten uprising of 1888 against the background of 19th-century Banten society, and, with regard to the religious revival discussed in Chapter V, within the framework of a general religious movement in 19th-century Java. It is hoped that this work will only mark the beginning of this kind of study and that it will perhaps be used as an example in future research on the subject. In this way we may hope to achieve a better understanding of the implications — economic, social, political and cultural — of the impact of Western domination upon traditional Indonesian society on the one hand, and of the role played by the common people in shaping Indonesian history on the other.

Living in an age of crises, which bring reform and revolution in their wake, we should find the study of social movements not only interesting but also fruitful. Furthermore, in a period of conflict and tension brought about by rapid social change, there is an increased need for an understanding of the moving forces within society. The purpose of this case study of social movements is not only to convey factual information about the Banten rebellion of 1888, but also to contribute to the illumination of the general process of social change in 19th-century Indonesia. Insight obtained into the nature of social movements in the past can frequently be applied to the study of movements in the present and in the future.

It should perhaps be pointed out that the term "native" is used throughout to refer to the non-European indigenous elements in Indonesian society. The name Batavia refers to the present Djakarta. These words are to be taken simply as convenient appellations in accordance with official terminology during the colonial period, and it seems hardly

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necessary to state explicitly that they do not imply a particular point of view.

A word must be said about the orthography of Indonesian words, including Bantenese, Javanese, Sundanese, and Malay words. I have tried throughout to spell these words in accordance with current usage in Indonesia today. Words derived from Arabic are written according to the current Indonesian pronunciation and spelling. The spelling commonly used by specialists in Islamology is given in the glossary. For the sake of convenience, the plural forms of Indonesian words have been used throughout, for example: *gurus*, *hadjis*, *kjais*, etc. In some cases, I have retained the old Dutch spelling, such as in the names of newspapers.

Few investigations are completed without the accumulation of indebtedness. In my own case, my reliance on the encouragement, assistance and interest of my intellectual mentors was certainly considerable during the last four years which I spent as a student at Yale University and the University of Chicago, and as a research worker at the University of Amsterdam. I am deeply grateful to Professor Harry J. Benda and Professor Karl J. Pelzer, both of Yale, for the support and encouragement they have given me. My interest in the subject with which this book deals was aroused during the seminar-meetings led by Professor Harry J. Benda. I was fortunate in that I had the opportunity of following courses given by eminent scholars at Yale and at the University of Chicago, which provided me with some of the tools and concepts of interdisciplinary work in the social sciences.

I wish to thank Professor L. O. Schuman, of the Institute for Modern Near Eastern Studies of the University of Amsterdam, for his patience in discussing with me the many Islamological points and for his expert criticism, which saved me from making certain errors. I am also indebted to Professor A. J. F. Köbben, who read chapters that touched on his special field, and I am grateful for his most illuminating criticism.

In particular, I owe an intellectual debt to Professor W. F. Wertheim, of the Department of Sociology and Modern History of Southeast Asia of the University of Amsterdam, who sponsored me during my stay in Holland. He has encouraged my study in every way, has patiently nurtured the growth of this work through numerous conferences and discussions and has, in fact, seen this work through to publication. His sociological approach to the history of Indonesia is fundamental to much of my work, and my debt to him is incalculable.

I recall with a sense of gratitude the stimulus and enlightenment

which I received from discussions with Professors G. F. Pijper and G. W. J. Drewes, Dr. Th. Pigeaud, and Drs. R. Nieuwenhuys. Professor Drewes was kind enough to give me the opportunity of reading the MS of *Sedjarah Hadji Mangsur* from the Collection of Snouck Hurgronje. Dr. J. Noorduyn, Secretary of the *Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, kindly allowed me to consult unpublished material.

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Without the facilities and practical assistance made available by the Department of Sociology and Modern History of Southeast Asia of the University of Amsterdam my task would have been much more difficult. To Drs. J. B. van Hall, Librarian at the Central Library of the Royal Tropical Institute in Amsterdam, and his staff, I am deeply indebted for assistance in acquiring publications. I should also like to thank the library staffs of the University of Amsterdam and the *Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde* for their kindness to a foreign student.

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Many acknowledgements are due the people who helped make this study possible. I am particularly grateful to the Faculty of Art and Culture of Gadjah Mada University and its Department of History, for the support they gave me in undertaking this study; they had the vision to see value in such a study as I proposed and gave me the privilege of a long leave of absence. I hereby acknowledge my gratitude to Professors H. Johannes and Siti Baroroh-Baried, Drs. T. Ibrahim Alfian, Mr. Soeri Soeroto M.A. and many of my colleagues.

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An award from a generous Ministry of Science and Education of the Netherlands allowed me to bring my investigations to completion. Gratitude is also acknowledged to this Ministry, and particularly to

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I would also like to thank my parents-in-law, R. M. E. Kadarisman Pusposudibjo, for their kindness in taking care of my children during the years my wife and I were abroad. To my wife go my thanks for her invaluable assistance and her patience during the preparation of this book.

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In spite of all the help I received from many sources, this work is, of course, my own responsibility, and the errors contained herein are mine.

S. K.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

THE NATURE OF THE SUBJECT-MATTER

The rebellion of 1888 dealt with in this study occurred in the district of Anjer in the extreme north-west of Java. Although it flared up during a relatively short period — from the ninth until the thirtieth of July — the social ferment which preceded the outbreak of the revolt must be traced back to the early 'seventies. This revolt was only one of a series of risings which took place in Banten during the 19th century and it was also an instance of the social convulsions which were sweeping across Java. The records of the Colonial Office for the last century tell of many risings and attempts at insurrections by the peasantry.¹ Millenarian movements, a concomitant of social unrest and turmoil, appeared in various parts of Java, while religious revivalism manifested itself in the mushrooming growth of religious schools and mystico-religious brotherhoods throughout Java. In fact, the nineteenth century was a period of social unrest accompanying social change, brought about by the growing impact of the West. An increasing modernization of the economy and the polity could be observed. The whole transition from traditionality to modernity was marked by recurrent social upheavals, akin to the insurrection of 1888 in Banten. The risings, which occurred in almost all the residencies of Java and in the Principalities,² exhibited

¹ In the records, different terms were used to denote this category of disturbances. They were clearly distinguished from large-scale insurrections with war-like proportions, like the Atjeh War or the Java War. The terms used are: *onlusten* in Vb. Jan. 13, 1859, no. 15; *ongeregeldheden* in Vb. Dec. 16, 1864, R¹³ Kab.; *complot* in Vb. Oct. 2, 1865, E¹⁵ Kab.; *samenscholingen* in Vb. Oct. 8, 1866, C¹² Kab.; *woelingen* in Vb. Nov. 27, 1871, no. 20; *onrust* in MR 1886, no. 90*; *rustverstoring* in MR 1888, no. 413. In this study, no clear distinction is made between these two categories of risings, since they have many characteristics in common; both are traditional and regional, in contrast to modern national movements. They must also be considered as differing from palace revolutions or wars of succession.

² The numerous rebellions in Java during the period from 1840 until 1875 are listed by de Waal (1876, pp. 228-229). According to him, only in 1844, 1847, 1860, 1863, 1871 and 1874 did no uprising occur. This list is in-

common characteristics. They were traditional, local or regional, and short-lived. As social movements they all lacked modern features such as organization, modern ideologies, and nation-wide agitation.³ Most of the peasant uprisings were local and disconnected. The peasants did not know what they were fighting for; they had a vague desire to overthrow the government, but did not feel consciously that they were taking part in a social revolutionary movement. There was certainly no realism in the aim professed by the rebels. It is very likely that even the leaders lacked the understanding of politics to make realistic plans in the event of success. These risings were therefore doomed to failure and the same tragic sequel of repressions followed all the outbreaks.⁴

The significance assigned to this type of revolt is not so much related to its impact on the political development, as to the fact that its endemic occurrence during the 19th century can be regarded as a manifestation of the agrarian unrest which formed an undercurrent of the political mainstream during the period of the "*Pax Neerlandica*".⁵ Up to the time of the fall of the Dutch regime, there seemed to be a constant simmering of widespread discontent just below the surface. Most contemporary writers regarded the risings as an outburst of fanaticism or a riot against an unpopular tax. They were mostly content to ascribe

complete, some risings have been omitted, e.g. 1864 in Klaten; 1865 in Tjirebon, Tegal, Jogjakarta, and Kedu; 1872 in Pekalongan. Movements with a specific character are separately described. This is an indication that the colonial government was already aware of the significance of this kind of movement. De Waal was for some time Secretary of the Central Government in the Netherlands East Indies, so that he had access to official documents.

³ In this study, Hobsbawm's distinction between archaic, and urban or industrial movements is used; see Hobsbawm (1963, p. 6). These modern characteristics can be found in modern social movements as meant by Heberle, e.g. labour movement, farmer movement, Naziism, Zionism, Communism. His concept of the social movement is so broad as to include also nativistic movements and peasant movements. See Heberle (1949, p. 6).

⁴ The suicidal nature of peasant revolts in Java is inherent to the magico-religious form in which their strivings were expressed. Here we come across the real difference between these and modern, political movements with their secular ideology and effective organizational devices. We have to bear in mind, however, that there is a continuum from pre-modern religious revolts to full-fledged secular revolutionary movements. The Banten revolt of 1888 should be localized somewhere in the continuum. See Talmon in *AES*, Vol. III (1962), pp. 125-148.

⁵ The '*Pax Neerlandica*' refers to the period of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia during which peace and order could be enforced throughout the Archipelago; the so-called pacification of many parts of the Outer Provinces had already come to an end.

the risings to either religious or economic factors. In fact, various grievances came to a head during such disturbances: economic and social as well as religious and political.

In the context of contact between Western and Indonesian culture, peasant risings can be regarded as protest movements against intruding Western economy and political control, which were undermining the fabric of traditional society.⁶ With the introduction of money economy, wage-labour, and central administration, a general breakdown of the traditional economic and political structure was brought about.⁷ The disturbance of the old equilibrium of traditional society undoubtedly caused general frustration and deprivation, which feelings, once communicated, grew into widespread restlessness and excitement. This was bound to erupt whenever it could be focused under a leadership capable of directing the aggressive potency either against certain hostile objects or towards the realization of millenarian ideas. In regions where religion played a dominant role, religious leaders easily succeeded in assuming leadership in popular movements by couching their millenarian message in religious terms. Consequently, the insurrectionary movements they launched can be safely identified as religious and millenarian movements as well.⁸

This study is concerned chiefly with insurrectionary movements in what has always been the most disturbed region of Java, namely Banten.⁹ Compared with peasant rebellions in other countries and of other

⁶ The explanation of peasant movements or millenarism in terms of a clash between colonial power and traditional society can be found in many studies, e.g. Bodrogi (1951), Balandier (1953), Emmet (1956), Worsley (1957), Köbben (1959), Pieris (1962), Lanternari (1963). It is relevant to this study, since it refers to conditions created by colonialism and to events, processes and tendencies contributing to the rise of anti-Western currents.

⁷ It suffices here to refer to existing standard works on the transformation from traditionality to modernity, e.g. works written by Burger (1949-1950), Schrieke (1955), Wertheim (1959).

⁸ Very helpful in searching for the identity of peasant revolts and social movements in Java in the 19th century, are recent inclusive studies on millenarian movements by Guaraglia (1959), Mühlman (1961), Thrupp (1962), Lanternari (1963). As far as movements in Indonesia are concerned, these works do not refer to data with regard to other 19th century movements, except those presented by Drewes (1925). The material of this study is intended to provide new data for cross-cultural comparison of special aspects of these movements.

⁹ Most of the rebellions in Banten were mentioned or described in the works of Roorda van Eysinga, Vol. IV (1832), pp. 87-88; Francis, Vol. II (1856-1860), pp. 51-78; de Waal, Vol. I (1876) p. 219-222; see also articles in *TNI* (1859), no. 1, pp. 135-187; *TNI* (1870), no. 2, pp. 325-341.

periods, the rebellion of 1888 in Banten was not of great stature. This revolt has been chosen as subject-matter, not so much for its consequences, but rather as a typical symptom of social change and its concomitant, social unrest, which loomed large in 19th-century Java. Furthermore, an attempt will be made to investigate problems which conventional historians have considered less significant, in order to make Indonesian history more comprehensive. Indispensable for this purpose is broadening the scope of the problems, not the topic — and refining the relevant methodology.

The term "Peasant revolt" needs some clarification. It does not denote that the participants are exclusively peasants. Throughout the history of peasant rebellions, the rebel leaders were very rarely ordinary peasants. They belonged to wealthier or more eminent groups of rural inhabitants, and were religious leaders, members of the old nobility or people belonging to the rural gentry, people therefore, whose status facilitated the assessment of a movement's goal and who could function as a symbolic focus of identification. It is only in a limited sense that any rebellion that occurred in Indonesia in the 19th century may be said to have been a peasant revolt, pure and simple. The role played by other groups in the rebellions will be examined later on. The leaders formed an élite group, which developed and transmitted the time-honoured prophecies or vision of history concerning the coming of the *Ratu Adil* — the righteous king — or the *Mahdi*. In many cases, it was the religious leaders who gave this prophecy a popular form and translated it into action by inciting the masses to revolt. Peasants furnished the numerical strength in the movements, but the organizing leadership was in the hands of the rural élite. As we shall see, the religious teacher or the mystic leader figured prominently in almost all the large-scale — relatively speaking — uprisings on record.

EXISTING HISTORICAL ORIENTATIONS

Current literature on colonial historiography of Indonesia gives the impression that no description has been devoted exclusively to peasant revolts, that they were only mentioned in passing.¹⁰ But it would be

¹⁰ It can be said that recent works on Indonesian history generally overlook the peasant revolts or only mention them in passing. Works of the 19th century evidently paid more attention to them. Van Deventer and Veth wrote short descriptions of some disturbances; see van Deventer, Vol. II (1886-1887), p. 72, 110; Veth, Vol. II (1896), p. 404. Stapel's description of the Banten revolts covers half a page, see Stapel, Vol. V (1938-1939), p. 285. In de Graaf's and Vlekke's books, this topic is not to be found.

incorrect to conclude that the peasantry did not play any role whatsoever in the history of Indonesia, that it was indifferent, remained docile and accepted its lot silently. The recurrent peasant riots and uprisings, which became a social epidemic in the historical scene of 19th-century Java, bear witness of the historical role played by the peasantry. The historical picture of that century will gain in vividness if the emphasis is no longer put on mere political and economic history, which records only parliamentary debates concerning colonial reforms and official government acts.¹¹

My criticism of the conventional approach in colonial historiography is based on the fact that it assigns a very passive role to the people in general and the peasantry in particular. In the first place, colonial historiography dealing with the 19th century places great emphasis on the broad framework of government institutions, and the making of laws and their enactment, and seldom goes beyond the level of formal structures.¹² In the second place, Neerlandocentrism views Indonesian history only as an extension of Dutch history, and no active role has therefore been ascribed to the Indonesian people.¹³ Thus the history of 19th-century Indonesia becomes largely the history of the Dutch colonial regime.

And yet, however flat and uniform the history of the peasantry in Indonesia may have been in colonial historiography, it contains currents flowing straight into modern times. There were conspicuous signs of peasant unrest and active agrarian revolutionism during the 19th and 20th century. Up to now, very little, if anything, has been written about the Indonesian peasantry and their rebellions and the documents relative

¹¹ Pierson (1877), Colenbrander (1925-1926), Stapel (1938-1939), Vlekke (1959).

¹² This kind of approach is in accordance with the concept of historiography of the conventional historian. All facts outside the political stage and the primary actions of the government are left out. Typical representatives of colonial historiography on Indonesia are Meinsma (1872-1875), van Deventer (1886-1887), Veth (1896). The latter's work also indicates that the history of non-Western peoples had been emancipated and had become autonomous, separated from the field of ethnology.

¹³ One of the first attempts to depart from this point of view was made by van Leur (1955). Schrieke's works (1955, 1957) also reflect new viewpoints. In the post-war period, Resink (1950) worked out some concepts of Indonesia-centrism. The problem of this new approach was dealt with extensively during the Seminar on Indonesian History in Jogjakarta, in 1957. See also more recent writings on new approaches, Smail (1961), Benda (1962), Soedjatmoko, Mohammad Ali, Resink and McT. Kahin, eds. (1965), Wertheim (1965).

to them have rarely been studied. These revolts, which were social movements in the broad sense of the word, have been overlooked by colonial historians¹⁴ because they were considered pre-political and inarticulate, unconnected with the grand historic events. The facts relating to those social movements also have little meaning for historians who do not probe deeper than the official and mainly political accounts of history and who postulate that the web of political history is held together by the framework of well-known personalities, political bodies and wars. This politics-ridden history seems unsatisfying in its narrow perspective; we have to penetrate the surface of national events on the "grand stage" of colonial history and investigate the underlying forces at work in colonial society. We have to depart from the approach of colonial historiography, which followed the general trend of the conventional historical study by absorbing facts concerning grand political events and episodes. We have to penetrate to the level of factors conditioning the events. Viewed from this standpoint, the unique historical events become surface manifestations of more fundamental forces.

Another weakness in the first-mentioned approach is the fact that it pays no attention to structural aspects of Indonesian history; it thus fails to discover not only social processes which underlie political processes, but also the whole matrix of economic, social and political relationships of Indonesian society in the past. Obviously, a structural approach to Indonesian history will shed more light on the various facets of Indonesian society and their patterns of developments.¹⁵ This approach will in part eliminate the Neerlandocentric bias of colonial historiography on the one hand, and will enable one to reconstruct historical patterns within an Indonesia-centric frame of reference on the other hand.¹⁶

¹⁴ Essays of significance about peasant risings are mostly contemporary articles in journals or newspapers: *TNI* (1870, 1871), *IG* (1886, 1888, 1889, 1891, 1892), *WNI* (1888-1889, 1889-1890); *De Locomotief* (1888, 1889), *Java Bode* (1886, 1888), *Bataviaasch Handelsblad* (1888).

¹⁵ For the structural approach to Southeast Asian history, see Benda in *JSAH*, Vol. III, no. 1 (1962), pp. 106-138. The present author has attempted to employ the multi-dimensional approach with special reference to the history of the National Movement in Indonesia; see Sartono Kartodirdjo in *JSAH*, Vol. III, no. 1 (1962), pp. 67-94.

¹⁶ Quite essential for the Indonesia-centric point of view is the active role of the Indonesian in Indonesian history in contrast to the supernumerary role the colonial historians have them play in colonial historiography. The employment of the structural approach will be helpful in detecting various aspects of historical development inside Indonesia, whereby the *dramatis personae* will be the Indonesians themselves.

SOME STUDIES REVIEWED

Among the few writers on social movements in Indonesia, we may mention in the first place Drewes.¹⁷ His interests obviously did not coincide with those of the present author and it would be pointless to criticize him for failing to do what he had no intention of doing. Drewes' work begins with a thorough account of the life history of three Javanese religious teachers, their activities and their subsequent elimination by the colonial government; the second portion is devoted to an intensive consideration of their teachings, while the third part treats various messianic expectations and eschatology. In fact, Drewes was mainly concerned with a textual analysis of millenarian or messianic teachings. This philological study almost entirely neglected what van der Kroef called "the cultural dynamics of the messianic currents".¹⁸ We differ from van der Kroef in being more interested in the sociological aspects of those social movements. The factual wealth of his study makes it a good starting-point for questions in the light of recent theories or concepts. In which groups was the messianic teaching anchored? What social conditions prevailed at the time of its emergence? What kind of conflict existed and what was the function of the teaching in it? Questions like these remain unanswered by Drewes or are, at best, implicitly dealt with in the description of the development of the movements. To be sure, we here meet with a type of history of ideas rather than a history of social movements. The sources Drewes evidently made use of lend themselves excellently to answering the questions mentioned above.¹⁹ Although Drewes' *De Drie Javaansche Goeroes* is limited in scope, its appearance filled one of the great gaps in Indonesian historiography on social movements.

Drewes was not the first to write this type of study about messianic teachings in Java; Wiselius, Cohen Stuart, Brandes, and Snouck Hurgronje had preceded him.²⁰ The first three scholars dealt with the development of the idea of the coming of "the righteous king" —

¹⁷ Drewes (1925).

¹⁸ Van der Kroef in *CSSH*, Vol. I (1958-1959), p. 299.

¹⁹ As far as we know, the narrative he presented about the movement in Banjumas can partly be identified with the report written by the Resident of Banjumas, of January 12, 1889, in *MR.* 1889, no. 41; for a previous report, see *Exh.* Feb. 3, 1887, no. 68.

²⁰ Each of them made a philological study of the ideas and conceptual constructs; these were interpreted and submitted to critical evaluation; the authors did not pay much attention to the meaning which those ideas had for the people. See Wiselius (1872), Cohen Stuart (1872), Brandes (1889), Snouck Hurgronje (1923).

Ratu Adil — and with millenarian hopes throughout Javanese history, which were traced back to changes in philological structures over the years. Their observations on this subject do not go beyond the constitutive ideas of traditional Javanese millenarian movements. In Cohen Stuart's and Brandes' writings, one finds a presentation of the individual carriers of those ideas, but no facts pertaining to social collectives as the support of the movement are brought to light. These remarks also hold good with regard to Snouck Hurgronje's work, which illuminated the idea of the coming of the *Mahdi* as it developed in Muslim countries. A structural analysis of those messianic ideas leads the present author to the conclusion that messianism, viewed as a kind of philosophy of history, contains the ideas of a linear movement of human history incorporating some cyclical elements.²¹

A recent review of various types of expressions of millenarian expectations has been given by van der Kroef.²² He distinguishes five categories of millenarian ideas, but no reference is made to the case of Banten, which in my opinion cannot be classified under one of the following headings: (1) the prophecies of *Djajabaja*; (2) the Balinese *paswara*; (3) the *Erutjakra-Ratu Adil-Mahdi* complex; (4) the Samin and Samat movement; (5) messianic currents in free Indonesia. As will be shown, the millenarian idea of the Banten rebels included neither the prophecies of *Djajabaja* nor what van der Kroef calls the *Erutjakra-Ratu Adil-Mahdi* complex. Furthermore, it is still debatable whether the new national ideology, like the *Pantjasila*, or other political doctrines, such as *Pantjasetia* or *Pantjadarma*, can be related to messianic currents, in the way van der Kroef assumes in his study. In this connection it should not be overlooked that the process of secularization and modernization had already made headway during the rise of the Indonesian Nationalist movement and the Indonesian Revolution. Discerning the distinction not so much in their functional aspect, but rather in their rationality aspect, essential differences between messianic expectations and the above national ideology or political doctrines can be detected. The present author is more inclined to identify the *Pantjasila*, *Pantjasetia* and *Pantjadarma* as formulations of political ideals in political philo-

²¹ An earlier study by the present author deals with some structural aspects of the messianic ideas which developed in Java, and it was concluded that the Javanese philosophy of history as expressed in various messianic ideas through the ages conceives the course of history as a linear development with some cyclical features. See Sartono Kartodirdjo (1959).

²² Van der Kroef, in *CSSH*, Vol. I (1958-1959), pp. 299-323.

sophy rather than messianic expectations. In the study of social movements in Indonesia it is essential to make a clear distinction between archaic and modern ones,²³ the former referring to Javanese messianic movements and the latter to Nationalist and Revolutionary movements.

The social disturbances in 19th-century Java themselves, whether manifestations of millenarianism or not, have, of course, not lacked attention; a number of scattered contemporary studies, mostly of a descriptive character have been written on the subject.²⁴ It seems worth noting that these descriptive works will be useful in accumulating factual data relative to millenarian movements before searching for the available documentary material on those movements. As they are, however, often only tentative, partial and sketchy accounts, they must be regarded as more or less questionable sources for a historical study.

With reference to the Banten rebellion, the anonymous article in *De Indische Gids* can be regarded as the most extensive account to date.²⁵ Its merit lies in its detailed factual information about the events connected with the rebellion. The author presumably had easy access to contemporary records, but it is regrettable that no indication was given of the sources at his disposal. It is very likely that the author made use not only of contemporary newspapers, but also of official government documents. The chronology of the preparatory activities of the rebels can probably only be known from government records,²⁶ since the movement remained a secret up to the moment of the outbreak. The seventy pages constitute a narrative account which states no problem and makes no analysis. No special colouring can be pointed out. Only at the end is mention made of probable causes which, according to the author, were mainly religious: a conspiracy of Muslims threatened the

²³ Hobsbawm (1963), p. 6; this concept of the dichotomy of social movements needs some refinement. It may be better to conceive of the different forms of social movements as instances of a continuum from religious to secular movements. As to the Banten revolt of 1888, the problem is to define the role played by magico-religious or messianic ideas in the movement. For a critical examination of the theoretical assumptions of recent studies on social movements, see Talmon in *AES*, Vol. III (1962), pp. 145-146.

²⁴ To mention a few instances: the conspiracy of Mangkuwidjojo in 1865, in *TNI* (1871), no. 2, pp. 206-210; disturbances in Bekasi, in *TNI*, (1873), no. 2, pp. 305 f; the Pulung affair, in *IG* (1886), no. 1, pp. 231-238, 378-380; the Tjiomas affair in *IG* (1886), no. 2, pp. 941 f; the Srikaton affair, in *IG* (1889), no. 1, pp. 216-221; also in *IG* (1889), no. 2, p. 1776; riots in Tjampea, in *IG* (1892), no. 2, pp. 1920-1926.

²⁵ *IG* (1891), no. 2, pp. 1137-1206.

²⁶ Compare *IG* (1891), no. 2, pp. 1148-1162 with the report of the Controller of Serang of May 19, 1889, no. 16, to be found in *MR* 1889, no. 376.

Dutch colonial regime, and skilfully exploited popular religious feelings.

In 1892, van Sandick published a book dealing with socio-economic and political conditions in the Banten of the 'eighties.²⁷ Obviously this work relied heavily on contemporary newspapers and magazines. It is useful insofar as it gives valuable hints for factual research. The author conspicuously displayed a keen interest in and a vivid sympathy for the sufferings of the population, of which feelings his criticism of the policies of the colonial government gives unmistakable evidence. The book is also worth mentioning because it provides us with useful information concerning details rarely to be found in government records.²⁸

A quick survey of the literature on millenarian movements in various parts of the world shows that both a wealth of material and extensive studies exist on the subject.²⁹ Among the numerous studies on these movements, there are many which deal with movements in colonial situations which involve a rejection of the domination of foreign rulers.³⁰ The forms in which those social protests or nativistic movements manifested themselves are rather interesting.³¹ Much work must be done on the subject of the many social movements that flourished in Indonesia in the 19th and 20th century, in order to furnish the general body of theories on social movements with material sources from Indonesian history. Furthermore, the growing theoretical interest in social movements elsewhere suggests that the social movements of Indonesia is a subject worth investigating.

THE SCOPE AND PURPOSE OF THE PRESENT STUDY

The present study is almost exclusively concerned with social movements in 19th-century Banten. The limitation has been made for a definite reason: this investigation can advantageously be confined to

²⁷ Van Sandick (1892).

²⁸ Van Sandick (1892), pp. 28-86, in which the cattle plague is dealt with. The author spent some time in the region and was acquainted with the living conditions which prevailed at that time. For a criticism of van Sandick's view, see H. Djajadiningrat in *Handelingen* (1921), p. 309; cf. Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, no. 1 (1924), pp. 251-256.

²⁹ A few examples: Abegg (1928), Wallis (1943), Schlosser (1949), Balandier (1955), Barnett (1957), Cohn (1957), Worsley (1957), Anderson (1958), Köbben (1959).

³⁰ Bodrogi (1951), Guiart (1951), Balandier (1953), Pieris (1962); a comprehensive survey of millenarian movements as a struggle against alien rule is given in Lanternari's work; see Lanternari (1963).

³¹ Manifestations like Cargo cults in Melanesia, the Ghost dance in North America, Kimbanguism in Africa, Mahdism in North Africa and other Muslim countries, have all been thoroughly and exhaustively studied.

one area, which is more circumscribed geographically and culturally. The study is planned on lines described elsewhere, and its aim is to define clearly the cultural and religious background of the problem, and to relate the historical phenomenon of peasant revolts as a social movement to definite social, economic, and political conditions in Banten.

From the above explanation it is clear that the purpose of this study is not only to describe what happened and when, but also how and why it happened. These questions obviously refer to problems of causation or conditional factors.³² We have to uncover the various lines of development and to disclose the mounting propensity to rebellion. The constitutive elements or the factorial aspects of the situational condition prevailing at the time of the movement should be traced back to their particular setting in order to detect their identity and continuity. A genetic and analytical investigation will therefore be conducted simultaneously. The arrangement of the chapters in this study is adapted to this theoretical design. Relevant factors will be picked out and examined in their historical development in order to explain the movement in terms of these factors, which are conditions necessary to the genesis of the movement and its continuity.³³ Because conditions imply the seed of future developments, we have to explain the social movement in terms of conditions existing several decades before the outbreak of the revolt. Furthermore, the ways in which they have become interwoven must be understood. Since the social condition of a society is clearly related to both its economic and its political state, the forces that bring about change in the one, also bring about some sort of change in the other.

THEORETICAL ORIENTATION AND APPROACH

It is generally known that social movements as a process are extremely complex. The conditions mentioned above refer to various dimensions or aspects of the movements. They may be approached by a variety of

³² No philosophical discussion will be entered into, suffices it to refer to authors like McIver (1943), Morris Cohen (1947), Dovring (1960), van Dyke (1960), Aron (1961). The concepts "social causation and condition" are used as a mere methodological device. The whole procedure of analysis and synthesis should be based on a theoretical design, of which concepts are the main elements. Defined broadly, the term "condition" refers to a motive, a variable or a cause. See van Dyke (1960), p. 39.

³³ Conditions are said to be necessary when their presence is essential to the occurrence of the phenomenon in question; they are said to be sufficient when their presence is enough to assure its occurrence; see van Dyke (1960), p. 39.

methodological routes or theoretical perspectives, the most important of which are the economic, the sociological, the politicological, the cultural-anthropological. For analytical purposes, some aspects of the complex phenomena can be isolated, but this should be done in such a way that the given context is not distorted. We may assume that the conjunction of several factors brought about the historical event. Before reaching the point of conjunction, each of the factorial aspects undergoes its own development. In the light of this theoretical consideration, we will deal separately with the socio-economic, the political and the religious aspects, which represent the conditional factors of the movement.

In addition, it should be pointed out that the complex situation can also be viewed in terms of incidents and sequences of incidents which establish causal relationships between variable factors, whether economic, social, political or religious. Relative importance must be assigned to a given causal factor or a determinant of the social movement. The historians who would contend that a single factor is the sole determinant in the movement are probably few and far between.

In order to give an adequate explanation, we have to employ many analytical tools. Because of the great complexity of the subject-matter, an historical description alone will not suffice. The very nature of social movements requires that the genetic explanation be supplemented by an analytical one. In this connection, other approaches can be subjoined to the historical approach. Other disciplines, like sociology, social anthropology, and political science are in a better position to analyze the phenomenon of social movements. Their conceptual constructs or theories certainly have greater explanatory power than plain historical narration. Consequently, in looking for clues to causal conditions of social movements, we have to make a rapprochement between those disciplines. Some use of the insights gained by these disciplines will inevitably reinforce our analysis and widen our view of the movement.

The one subject-matter which certainly does exhibit the actual or potential interdependence of history and sociology, is the social movement. The choice of this topic gives ample opportunity to combine the two lines of inquiry.³⁴ It is not my intention to make a sociological

³⁴ In some recent studies, the rapprochement between sociology and history was brought about, namely by Worsley (1957), Wilson (1960), Cohn (1961), Hobsbawm (1963). The recourse to these disciplines was imposed largely by the very nature of the subject-matter and the material available.

analysis, since my approach in this study will be first and foremost an historical one, focussing on sequential activities and sequences of events. My approach will be limited to the use of sociological concepts, both as selective criteria in compiling data and in constructing the historical narrative. The multi-dimensional approach is used to enrich the historical treatment of the problem. New dimensions will be opened and will aid the understanding of social movements. As these movements become the focus in the understanding of social, economic, and political processes, basic problems with regard to the movements will be selected through reason of the common interest which the various disciplines have in these problems. The study of social movements embraces problems of group solidarity and conflict and we cannot avoid putting emphasis on group behaviour, organization, alignment, leadership, ideology, etc. My intention is to point out the dynamic relationship, i.e. the causal interplay of social groupings in the movement. An explanation will be given in terms of the status and role of the élite group. We are also concerned with the social configuration, social institutions, norms, and values, and with ideological attitudes as well, insofar as they shape and condition the movement. Students of Indonesian history have shown much interest in political history, while problems of social change, disintegration and disorganization, and their concomitants — social unrest, conflict and mobility — have been neglected. The problem of social conflict between the different classes in Banten society is certainly one of the most ubiquitous.³⁵

In analyzing social conflicts in Banten society, one has to take into consideration the traditional and religious value systems, as a conservative force against westernization. The various degrees of acculturation resulted in factionalism, which in turn accelerated the disintegration of Banten society. Banten society was no longer in a static state and in equilibrium, but was made up of competing groups, antagonistic towards each other and full of strife, which brought the society to the point of disruption.³⁶ Integral to this kind of analysis is the study of changes in the shape and composition of the value patterns in Banten

³⁵ All these aspects of social movements have been studied from the sociological angle, e.g. by Yoder (1927-1928), Meadows (1943), Steward J. Burgess (1944), Heberle (1949), King (1956).

³⁶ Recently, more and more studies are stressing the crucial aspects of social conflict in society, while the theory of social equilibrium has been heavily attacked. See Leach (1954), Gluckman (1963), Firth (1964), Wertheim (1965). Banten society in the 19th century is an example of a chronic conflict situation.

society. The effort to correlate social trends and political events with cultural patterns involves a socio-anthropological approach.³⁷

The millenarian idea employed by religious leaders to instigate the people to revolt can be explained from the point of view of both sociology and social anthropology in terms of a religious orientation or ideology of deprived groups which aimed at the restoration of what they believed the traditional order to have been.³⁸ As regards the role of prophets or religious leaders in the revolt, concepts from social anthropology, and political science are extremely useful in handling problems in this connection. A complete understanding of the determinants of social movements necessitates taking into account the political process as a concept which refers to the interaction of various social elements contending for the allocation of authority.³⁹ This type of analysis can only be carried out successfully by employing concepts and theoretical constructs borrowed from political science.

Previous approaches to social movements in Indonesia lacked socio-historical validity. Furthermore, problems such as those summed up above are not usually posed by orthodox political historians writing on Indonesian history. In this study, the intention is to compensate for the narrowing of the topic with the widening of the perspective. By increasing the variables and by broadening the frame of reference, the problems can be tackled more competently and with greater range and depth. Such treatment of historical material will not only place the narrative structure of events in proper perspective but will alter the impression given by the colonial historian's point of view. Let us now examine the historical sources.

SOURCE MATERIAL

I have used a limited number of sources in this study; the most important are the documents of the Colonial Office. We shall find that the documents are vestiges of only a small part of the reality; they record the activities of government officials and army officers, and

³⁷ According to Evans-Pritchard (1961, pp. 14-15), social movements, because of their basic features, become a common ground for several disciplines. Compare: Talmon in *AES*, Vol. III (1962), p. 126.

³⁸ According to some social anthropologists in Great Britain, the scope of social anthropology is identical with that of what continental scholars call sociology, from the point of view of field and method; see Evans-Pritchard (1948).

³⁹ See Max Weber (1964); the concept of traditional, charismatic and legal-rational authority can be put to the test with regard to political development in 19th-century Banten.

administrative transactions of governing bodies. Even this set of records is quite restricted, because the metropolitan colonial archives only carry the correspondence between the colonial government and the metropolitan authorities. For example in many cases the minutes and procedural notations of the colonial government were not included. Copies of some of this material found their way into the metropolitan archives, but this depended on the policy of the colonial power.⁴⁰ Obviously, revolts and disturbances were always given close attention, for they were regarded as of a political character and formed a potential danger to the colonial power's maintenance of "Peace and Tranquility".⁴¹ The archives of the Colonial Office contain little, if any, material on records of the local administration as might have been expected. These are, however, invaluable sources for social and economic history and are very illuminating concerning social relationships on the local level. Only in very exceptional cases were a few attached to documents sent to the metropolitan authorities. Since the Banten revolt was a serious concern to the Dutch government, the documents of the records of the colonial government have found their way to the metropolitan archives. For our purpose, the reports and missives of officials, government resolutions, military diaries, dispatches, minutes of conferences, memoranda, and other administrative and political transactions are of vital importance. Mention should also be made of records of courts.

The documents most relevant to the Banten revolt are the following:

⁴⁰ The documents stored in the archives of the former Colonial Office are categorized under the following headings: *Geheim- en Kabinets Verbaal* (secret and cabinet's minutes), *Exhibitum* (all incoming correspondence of the Colonial Office), *Mailrapport* (mail report containing copies of correspondence, reports, decisions), *Geheime Oost-Indische Besluiten* (secret resolutions), *Oost-Indische Besluiten* (resolutions), *Verbaal van het Departement* (minutes of the Department). Mail reports were sent to Holland as from 1872. The documents can be searched for by means of agenda's, indices and registers. As to the case of the Banten revolt of 1888, the relevant data are to be found in all those categories of documents, but a large part of them can be looked up in the *verbaal*, *exhibitum*, *mailrapport* and *Oost-Indische Besluiten*. Local and regional matters were given no attention by the metropolitan government, unless they were relevant to the revolt. For archival sources, see van de Wal (1963), p. xvii f.

⁴¹ In the *Koloniale Verslagen* and also in the *Politieke Verslagen* of earlier date, i.e. before 1856, mention is made of disturbances as events of first importance, e.g. the political report, covering the period 1839-1848, in Exh. Jan. 31, 1851, 27 bis; idem, over the year 1849, in Exh. Aug. 27, 1851, no. 220, *geheim*; idem, over 1851, in Exh. Dec. 14, 1852, no. 438, *geheim*; idem, over 1852, in Exh. May 27, 1853, no. 225, *geheim*.

the report of the Director of the Department of Interior, including the voluminous appendices;⁴² reports and missives — either open or secret — of government authorities; advices of the Council of the Indies; dispatches from regional officials to the central government; military diaries containing a large part of the data concerning the course of the revolt; minutes of the court trials of rebels; the governor general's resolution concerning the appointment or dismissal of civil servants, and the banishment of rebels. It should be noted that the authenticity of those documents can be taken for granted, and no effort has therefore been made to subject them to external criticism. On the other hand, internal criticism is very much needed. As might be expected, the government documents were written from the standpoint of colonial officials. Generally speaking, various subjective factors came into play. In fact, official documents were written almost exclusively from the government's standpoint. Government officials, with their special competence in administrative routine, were often inclined to regard the reports continually required of them as a routine and a formality which was to be dispatched quickly rather than accurately. Even with the best intentions it must at times have been impossible to complete the huge amount of paperwork on time and accurately.⁴³ Of course, documents that involved matters of grave consequence were given more careful treatment. Nevertheless, it is doubtful whether the judgment of the Dutch officials on a population living in a cultural framework entirely different from theirs can be trusted implicitly. In the case of the Banten revolt, the highest functionary of the Department of Interior was appointed Government Commissioner and given the task of making an investigation.⁴⁴ Since this work was handicapped by various factors,

⁴² The material of first importance for this study is taken from the set of documents, codified in the Colonial archives as Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4. It consists of 163 documents, the most voluminous of which is the report of the Director of the Department of Interior. The appendices of this report refer to e.g. the list of people killed and wounded, the list of religious teachers in the *afdeling* Anjer, a list of holy places, abstracts of hearings of detained rebels, reports of the number of *hadjis*, of the trade tax, etc.

⁴³ It is a well-known fact among contemporaries that the colonial administration was overburdened with "paperwork". There was a general complaint about the formidable amount of work to be done in order to produce the reports, from *desa* reports to the annual report of the minister of the colonies to Parliament; see *WNI* (1889-1890), pp. 749-750. One of the grave consequences was that the civil servants had no time to investigate the needs and wishes of the people; see *WNI* (1889-1890), p. 1312.

⁴⁴ The Director of the Department of Interior was appointed according to a

the result was far from conclusive. The time at the investigator's disposal was restricted, so that no extensive investigation could be made. The situation after the rebellion and the position of the civil servants in relationship to the people were in no way conducive to an open interview. People evidently did not seize the opportunity to air their complaints or grievances unrestrictedly. On the contrary, they were quite reserved and extremely suspicious of any action on the part of the civil servants.⁴⁵ Moreover, those who carried out the investigation had no sociological frame of reference in mind, with the result that no class analysis was made and no attention was paid to the lower classes of Banten society. It is not surprising that official documents rarely tell us what the exact socio-economic position of the rank and file of the rebellious group was.

It may be said that the reports written shortly after the revolt were based too much on precarious assumptions and superficial testimonies with a great lack of evidence.⁴⁶ It was suspected that regional officials had attempted to appease the central government. The latter was strengthened in its suspicion by the fact that the outbreak was a total surprise to the local authorities and that they failed to provide detailed and exact information directly after the outbreak.⁴⁷ No wonder that an

resolution of the Governor General of July 15, 1888, no. 4. Besides the task of investigating the situation in Banten, he also had to make a report, especially about the causes of the rebellion.

⁴⁵ Only 18 informants were interviewed about the causes of the revolt and 19 informants about the motivation of the rebellion. No extensive investigation could be performed. See Appendix D and H of Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4. In many cases, people refused to disclose the hiding-places of the rebels; see Cable of July 12, 1888, no. 826 from the Commander of the Army to the Gov. Gen. in MR 1888, no. 484; Cable of July 16, 1888, no. 143 from the Resident of Banten to the Gov. Gen., in MR 1888, no. 496.

⁴⁶ Besides the report of the Director of the Department of Interior, we also have the report of the Resident of Banten of July 17, 1888 L^a B, in MR 1888, no. 496; and another report by the resident, of Sept. 22, 1888 no. 77, in Exh. Dec. 27, 1888, no. 117. The first was comprehensively criticized by the Council of the Indies, which stated that it was inaccurate and too much biased by *a priori* judgments. It relied entirely on statements by regional officials; no investigation was made in the villages. Particularly with regard to the causes of the revolt, the Council of the Indies considered the report unconvincing; see Advice of the Council of the Indies, Oct. 5, 1888, in Exh. Dec. 27, 1888, no. 117.

⁴⁷ On 9 July 1888, in the afternoon, no information could be sent to the Gov. Gen. concerning the whereabouts of the Resident, the Assistant-Resident of Anjer, and the Regent of Serang, nor about further developments in Tjilegon; see Cable of July 9, 1888, no. 69 in MR 1888, no. 484. Even on 10 July 1888, the officials in Serang still did not know of the

investigation concerning the shortcomings of the regional administrative personnel was considered urgent.⁴⁸

The officials, being involved directly in the events, made their observations subjectively and were not totally free from prejudice. This is reflected in many places by their interpretations. Fear of fanaticism and of Muslim conspiracies reflected a state of mind which was widespread among the European population.⁴⁹ In order that they might take appropriate measures to prevent the spread of the rebellion or its recurrence, the officials were much concerned with the causes and motives which led to the atrocities and violence. Their records were, therefore, very detailed in many respects, especially with regard to statistical data. Noteworthy is the fact that their descriptions of the atrocities and horrors committed by the rebels were written in objective language and without much emotion. We must, however, bear in mind that even where wilful distortion was not practised, errors and omissions could not be avoided. Some of their information is tantalizing but stops short of making matters clearer to us.⁵⁰ It is to be expected that the current thought, ideas, activities and social relationships of the people were mostly not recorded. Their voice was almost unheard.⁵¹ Consequently, the government documents do not directly reflect much of the life of the people, especially that of the peasantry. Their activities did not as a rule engage the attention of the officials and therefore remained largely unrecorded. Many concrete realities of life in both small towns

causes of the revolt; see Cable of July 10, 1888, no. 81 in MR 1888, no. 484. The incapability of the Resident to provide the central government with information caused it to lose confidence in him; see Missive Gov. Gen. to the Minister of Colonies of July 15, 1888, no. 973 in Exh. Aug. 18, 1888, no. 13; see also Resolution of the Gov. Gen. of July 15, 1888, no. 4.

⁴⁸ See *Oost-Indisch Besluit* (hereafter cited as O.I.B.) of July 15, 1888, no. 4.

⁴⁹ In most reports, fanaticism was mentioned as one of the main causes of the revolt; see Missive Resident of Banten, July 17, 1888 L^a B, in MR 1888, no. 496; see also Report of the Director of the Department of Interior, July 19, 1888, L^a B, in MR 1888, no. 506.

⁵⁰ In many resolutions, mention was made of secret missives from residents which presumably provided information to be used in making decisions for promoting, degrading or dismissing officials; these missives must be very informative concerning their personalities, but unfortunately most of them are difficult to obtain as a result of the way in which they are organized.

⁵¹ For the available information regarding the informants noted above, see note 45. It appears that the sources used in this study are one-sided and that it is very hard to detect the true motives behind the actions of the rebels. This lack of articulateness seems to be a general feature in traditional movements. See Hugenholtz (1959) about one-sided sources in peasant revolts.

and rural areas were usually overlooked. In this connection it is worth noting that the bearers of the revolutionary ideas were by no means inarticulate, but apparently did not leave any written accounts of their movement.

To return to the report of the Director of the Department of Interior: from the outset it was greatly coloured by certain assumptions concerning the causes of the revolt, such as fanaticism, economic stringency and misgovernment. We have to be on our guard for distortions made by the informants of the Director, in order to plead for their cause or interest as lower officials, secure their personal perspectives or blame their opponents. They provided information with various motivations, such as obtaining approval, or suggested a reform or a solution in order to enhance their position. The officials felt the need to respect the authorities and to follow the general policies of the government. Furthermore, we cannot say that senior officials were always able to treat their subordinates equally and objectively; criticism was launched against recalcitrant subordinates, while protégés were defended.⁵² In this connection it is worthwhile to compare the opinions or the records of the officials with the short life histories or comments which their contemporaries made about them.⁵³ Of course, the latter's judgments will be assigned weight in proportion to their sympathy or antipathy towards the civil servants.

In reading through the various official records, one has the impression that many officials were reporting the same facts from the same source. They often relied on or borrowed from each other. First-hand information usually originated from government spies or *mata-mata*, who must be regarded with suspicion, since it is known that they distorted or falsified information in many cases.⁵⁴ With regard to the accounts

⁵² An instance can be pointed out in the report of the Director of the Department of Interior, where he put the blame on the Assistant Resident of Anjer, Gubbels, while the Resident, Engelbrecht, was not criticized at all. Very helpful in evaluating the Director's judgment is the article concerning his life history, in *WNI* (1889-1890), p. 252; pp. 621-625. To quote the article: "The pen of van Vleuten is sharp, quick, and vivid, therefore it is sometimes hasty, and now and then fantastic".

⁵³ Short sketches of the life histories of officials can be found in *WNI* (1888-1889), e.g. that of officials in Banten; Haga, the Commander of the Army; André Wiltens, the Vice President of the Indies; many residents of Java, etc.

⁵⁴ Reports of government spies are sometimes attached to the minutes of court trials; see *Proces Verbaal* (hereafter cited as P.V.) May 1, 1889, in Exh. June 24, 1889, no. 76. A notorious spy who launched false charges was a certain Mas Hadji Mohamad Sadik, employed by the Controller

of the activities of the religious leaders during the preparatory period, one may say that these were far from accurate and complete, for the very reason that these activities were almost totally kept secret until the last moment. The narrative *post eventum* was reconstructed from the fragmentary confessions of captured rebels. As appears from the minutes of court trials, only a small volume of data concerning the rebels' activities could be gained because a steadfast denial of charges by the defendants became almost an attitudinal pattern in court hearings.⁵⁵ Owing to the limited number of records and the very nature of the documents, the gaps will remain numerous. In this respect newspapers not only furnished a good deal of supplementary information but also disclosed informal relationships and situations which would never be recorded in government documents. It is well-known that prevailing situations and social conditions were taken for granted, while intricate and intimate relationships between officials, both European and native, and the non-official world were usually left unrecorded.⁵⁶ Although a considerable number of newspapers were marred by partiality, their value as a source should not be underestimated, because they were markedly opposed to the colonial government and revealed many facts regarding political attitudes in colonial society at the time of the revolt. As representatives of public opinion they can be used as a check on official sources; they often reflected the ideas, attitudes and interests of social groups outside the official world, such as plantation-owners, businessmen, and of course journalists. Although the newspapers were rather superficial, yet much remains that can be used as source material. We can make use of them to cross-examine the data, the facts and the opinions given in the official records. In fact, in colonial society with its mighty bureaucracy, the newspapers constituted the critical-minded public, and an influential body of opinion. It functioned as a tool which gave publicity with good effect, and events and actions taken by officials were revealed to the public. Sharp criticism of government policies and

of Serang, de Chauvigny de Blot; see A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 234. Cf. Note of Snouck Hurgronje of August 15, 1892, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), pp. 1986-1999.

⁵⁵ The minutes of those court trials bear witness to this attitude; see Exh. Jan. 28, 1889, no. 74; Exh. Feb. 11, 1889, no. 77; Exh. Feb. 23, 1889, no. 68, etc. See also Ch. VIII, note 96.

⁵⁶ For a description of the situation in Banten, and also the relationship among the Europeans and the attitude of the Resident, see *Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Mail editie* (1885), pp. 509-511, 620-621, 691-692. In this respect, other newspapers may be consulted, such as *Java Bode*, *Indische Mail*, *De Locomotief*.

prominent figures in the official world was sometimes given.⁵⁷ Biographical sketches of senior officials are very helpful in providing a background for the evaluation of their writings. Compared with the official records, the newspapers were less accurate in handling the facts. The former are more dependable and reliable, because it was in the interest of both the officials themselves and the army officers to give an accurate account. Their interest was served by accuracy rather than inaccuracy. In addition, it was at this time assumed that government officials had the facilities to obtain a greater volume of information. Insofar as they stated matters of record and not opinions or suppositions, it can safely be said that the information is reliable: complete credence is usually given to official records.

SUMMARY STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEMS

This study rests on the hypothesis that religious movements, being essentially social movements, can be expected to stand in specific relation to social classes, to their prevailing economic and social conditions, and to the cultural ethos within such social groups. In Chapter II the author will attempt to show the relationship between the ideological orientation of the movement and the social groups from which it recruited its participants. The persistent social cleavage in Banten society can be explained in terms of the socio-economic position of the conflicting groups. The impact of Western culture accelerated this social conflict.⁵⁸

In Banten, as in the whole of Indonesia, the 19th century was marked by increasing contact with the Western world. As has been shown, money economy, uniform taxation, central administration and modern means of communication were concomitants of the gradual penetration of colonial rule. Fiscal, administrative and judicial policy formulated by the central government had to be carried out by native officials on the regional and local level as well. The introduction of personal tax, corvée regulations, and vaccination no doubt penetrated deeply into the life of the peasantry and consequently brought about disturbances in the rural areas. Since the peasant revolt was an almost entirely rural pheno-

⁵⁷ See *WNI* (1888-1889), esp. the articles "Letters from a civil servant". For articles dealing particularly with officials in Banten, see *WNI* (1888-1889) pp. 7-11, 42-44. See also the articles '*Bantamsche brieven*' (Letters from Bantam).

⁵⁸ It is worthwhile to study previous cases of conflict in Banten during the sultanate, in order to detect to what extent it was accelerated by Western intrusion. See van der Aa, in *BKI*, 4th series, Vol. V (1881), pp. 1-125.

menon, the question is to what extent there was any correlation between the penetration of the Western economic system and the instability of the social situation with the propensity to revolt.⁵⁹ Did additional pressures exist, which made the instability more acute? The answers refer to many facets of the phenomenon.

Since we have assumed that there is a correlation between the movement and the social classes in Banten, the social stratification of Banten society must be analyzed. From which strata were the participants recruited? And from which the leaders? What socio-economic position did they generally occupy? In defining the social status of the rebelling group, economic factors like landownership, land tenure, and landholding, will be regarded as relevant determinants. The process of change as a concomitant of progressive intrusion of Western culture produced new social groups and a re-stratification in Banten society. The nobility, i.e. the traditional aristocracy, was degraded and dispossessed, and consequently deprived of political power, although they still retained social prestige. In facing cultural disintegration, both the traditional aristocracy and the peasantry were slow in rejecting their traditional roles. As will be shown, they joined forces in many instances to resist further penetration of Western systems of values. The increasing Dutch political control caused much deprivation and frustration among the religious élite, which naturally sought its political alignment with the two other groups. The new group can be identified as the modern aristocracy, made up mainly of civil servants or bureaucrats. It emerged simultaneously with the expansion of Dutch administration, as a new élite, advocating modernization, and at the same time still clinging partly to traditional values. The old aristocracy saw in this trend an opportunity to maintain its social prestige and power, while making attempts to restore its old position by strengthening its affinity with the new élite. Thus we arrive at problems dealt with in Chapter III.

The general impact of formal Dutch authority upon Banten's political system will be the subject of interest in this chapter. It was from the juxtaposition of Dutch authority that an increasingly unstable political situation arose. This situation was expressed in recurrent violent uprisings. The colonial government gradually set up a bureaucratic system, imposing legal-rational measures on the people. The dispossessed nobility and the religious leaders became forces resisting the colonial rulers.

⁵⁹ A work which should be compared with the present study is the Bantam report (Benda-McVey, 1960), dealing with the Communist uprising in 1926-1927. Factors causing the propensity to revolt have to be searched for.

The tension between the traditional autocracy and the religious élite on one side and the new aristocracy on the other, was much more in evidence. For several decades, uneasy alliances were frequent; as the incorporation of the latter group into the colonial administrative system proceeded, open hostility grew. Agitational activities from the side of the religious leaders were directed against the new élite and the colonial rulers as well. They resorted to millenarian movements and violence, while the new élite became reconciled to accomodating itself to the dominant element in Banten society, namely, the colonial ruler. It will be pointed out that different social groups in Banten society were differently affected by the process of westernization and that, accordingly, people belonging to the various groups were differently involved in the institutional conflict. The religious élite and a part of the old aristocracy maintained their orientation towards traditionality, while the new élite was more inclined to accept modernization, although a duality of institutional allegiance still existed. As a result of the affinity between the new élite and the nobility, the prestige of the former was enhanced. Explained in terms of acculturation, we can regard social movements in Banten as a form of conflict between distinct groups with opposing norms and values. Under Western influence, Banten society became divided into opposed groups on the basis of adherence to traditional or introduced institutions. The Western impact had unsettling effects on traditional patterns of political integration and the firmly entrenched control of the Dutch made it difficult for traditional forces to retain their hold on the society. The only means of reacting against the disruptive effect on traditional institutions was to mobilize the peasantry and to fight against colonial rule.⁶⁰

Chronic social unrest (see Chapter IV) was one of the symptoms of the disintegration of Banten society after the fall of the sultanate. It was the result of the instability of the political system which had prevailed in Banten since the first quarter of the 19th century. On the one hand, there was a clash between traditional and modern values, and the crumbling away of the old social forces, while on the other hand, no integrative force took their place. The alignment of the new élite with the dominant power enhanced its position, but for a long period its power was ineffective, because the people habitually regarded the colonial government and political authority with an attitude of disrespect, contempt, and even defiance. Local unrest was a striking

⁶⁰ The role of religious leaders in the rural areas and their opposition to secular rulers are dealt with by Benda (1958, pp. 15-18).

feature, and reflected the decay and ineffectiveness of the administration. Local officials failed to maintain peace and order in the rural areas. The state of disorder manifested itself in brigandage, banditry, robbery and outlawry.⁶¹ They flourished because of the deterioration of local administration and the impotence of the police. It would be worthwhile to examine the relationship that existed between unruly elements and the people in general, and the civil servants or the rebels in particular. It is a fact that disorderly elements in Banten were aided and abetted by local people, and often won the sympathy and admiration of the populace. Instances are known where they secured intercourse with civil servants; in other cases they joined political rebels. Within the situational framework of Banten society in the 19th century, social unrest may be regarded not only as a symptom of the disruption of the order of life, but also as the crucible out of which emerged a religious revival on the one hand and revolt on the other.

A religious re-awakening (see Chapter V) spread throughout Java and large parts of Indonesia in the course of the second half of the 19th century. It correlated with an increased number of pilgrims, the circulation of the last message of the Prophet, intense activity of wandering preachers, and the mushrooming growth of both Muslim brotherhoods and religious schools. This religious revival was capable of eliciting emotional response to disturbing or frustrating situations. The luxurious growth of brotherhoods was rather conducive to fanaticism, while the eschatological ideas of Islam transformed members of the brotherhoods into militant revolutionary groups, aiming at the overthrow of colonial rule.⁶²

In the study of social conflict as one of the main aspects of social movement, we have to pay attention to the crucial role of the religious élite, because it consisted of rural inhabitants, as did the peasantry, and resisted modernization and sought to prevent social change in Banten. Religious values served to reinforce traditional ones and to counteract the impinging Western influences which undermined the effectiveness of traditional norms. The traditional élite was gradually curtailed by

⁶¹ These symptoms of social unrest have never been a subject of serious study; see Wulfften-Palthe (1949) and Meyer (1949-1950) about banditry of recent date; see also Groneman (1891) about 19th-century banditry.

⁶² For general studies on sects, see Simmel (1906), Gillin (1911), Niebuhr (1929), Wilson (1961). For contemporary writings on Sufi brotherhoods in Java, see van den Berg (1882), Holle (1886), Schuurman (1890), Snouck Hurgronje (1924), and Pijper (1934). See also articles in *TNI* (1869, 1870, 1889), *MNZG* (1884, 1887, 1888, 1892).

those in power, and was forced to become aggressive. It developed a set of practices according to certain brotherhood systems of norms, on which its claim to high social prestige and also to a monopoly in the use of coercion was based. This normative system generated political authority, with the result that the religious élite emerged as a vigorous antagonist of the colonial bureaucrats. Authority and social control gravitated away from the officials into the hands of religious leaders. By founding brotherhoods and religious schools, the latter succeeded in maintaining their power. At the same time, the mystical brotherhood as a social institution grew into a power system, ruling by means of coercion and authority. In fact, such brotherhoods formed a potential threat to both local and central authority. As the state of disorder increased, the ambition of religious leaders was no longer confined to the local community, and the struggle for the control of the peasantry prompted them to seek support and additional sources outside their own community and group. Although a link was established between the religious leaders, no country-wide organization with a central body of leadership came into existence. As a result of this, they remained weak as leaders of the movement and were incapable of acting collectively in a large scale rebellion. In this connection, emphasis should be put on the function of mystical brotherhoods as an organizational tool for increasing in-group consciousness or for providing an effective mechanism to develop solidarity and to accelerate agitation. Their development was supported and facilitated by the revival campaigns, which swept through the country for more than one decade. These campaigns built up an atmosphere of excitement and exhilaration, accompanied by ill-feelings towards the secular élite. As this group was already contaminated with foreign and infidel culture, they could not be accommodated in the charismatic authority structure. The brotherhoods obviously had a strong appeal for the peasantry, which belonged to the lower social strata. The preparatory period of the rebellion (see Chapter VI) should be thought of in terms of this vigorous revivalistic atmosphere.

In Chapter VI, a narrative account is given of the main events preceding the outbreak of the revolt, as they passed from the preliminary stage of mass excitement into the formal stage of actual preparation. The general restlessness manifested itself in increased agitation among the disciples of the religious schools, in the journeys made by religious leaders to visit centres of religious institutions in various parts of Java and in the increasing prestige and power of the religious leaders among the peasantry. Moreover, there was increased talk of revolt and "Holy

War" among members of the brotherhoods. All these phenomena may be regarded as symptoms of the initiation of a revolutionary movement. As the time of the rebellion approached, there was heightened activity among the religious leaders, while the attention of the people was focused on the idea of the Holy War, and on the expectation of the restoration of the sultanate. Finally, a revolutionary political purpose took shape, namely, the destruction of the colonial government. Collective excitement among the brotherhood members served to integrate unrest and discontent; these brotherhood members could at any time be mobilized as active crowds to engage in a common undertaking, i.e. the actualization of the millenarian idea.

The time of preparation is the period during which the leaders emerged, communication among the leaders was established and strengthened, and plans and tactics were set up. Propaganda means were, among others, campaigning against the colonial ruler, simultaneously indoctrinating the Holy War idea, and making sweeping promises, like the abolition of taxes and the founding of an Islamic state.

Chapter VII is devoted to a description of the actual uprising which broke out on the night of the 9th of July, 1888. The major uprising took place in Tjilegon, where the largest concentration of rebels burst into violence, murdering, torturing and looting. Terror became a feature of the short period during which Tjilegon was occupied by the rebels. We have to investigate what the crowd's objective was. Who fell as a victim to the killing and torturing? Who were the original targets of the rebels? Did a reign of terror exist? Was there evidence of hatred towards foreign rulers, and the native officials who paid allegiance to them? Against whom was the popular hatred directed? Was there any desire for looting?

The description is intended to cover the entire process, from the first attack until the capture of the main leaders of the rebellion. The last stage of the revolt is dealt with in Chapter VIII, and mainly concerns the rescuing of victims who survived the bloodshed and the long hunt for the leaders.

The main points put forward in Chapter IX come under the heading "The Sequel". Among the drastic actions performed by the government were: the stationing of small troops in places regarded as centres of rebellion, the dismissal of officials who were considered guilty of administrative abuses which aroused discontent and hatred in the people, the withdrawal of resolutions and regulations concerning the levying of various kinds of taxes. Besides these measures, long-term ones were

taken by the government to prevent the recurrence of revolt. Religious schools and religious teachers were to be subjected to the supervisory control of the government. A new policy had to be adopted concerning the regulation of compulsory labour, the land rent, trade tax, and capitation tax. In order to detect the main causes of popular discontent, an extensive investigation was organized by the central government.

METHODOLOGICAL NOTE

In this introduction, some of the most crucial variables which influenced the development of the movement have been pointed out; but we have not as yet dealt with the different concrete historical combinations of those variables and with their concrete effect on the outbreak of the revolt. The analysis of these problems is important for the understanding of the dynamic working of groups, institutions and values, as they lead to the ripening of the rebellious spirit. In this study, the factorial approach is employed in complement to the processual analysis, which discerns the sequences of developmental stages. In the following chapters, the processual approach is stressed, while the final chapter will deal with some analytical aspects of the movement. This methodology is based on the principle that it is necessary to view a social movement such as this from the temporal and developmental perspective, before any systematic comparison or theoretical analysis can be made. The final analysis is aimed at highlighting configurations and enlarging the dimensions of the movement.

As noted above, the revolt as the outcome of a long-standing social movement can be thought of in terms of acculturation in general and millenarism in particular.⁶³ Culture contact led to a dynamic of institutional change, bringing about destructuralization and differentiation of norms, values, and symbols. From the sociological point of view, we can easily detect processes of social change and their concomitants — social conflict, social disorganization and reintegration.⁶⁴ An explanation in terms of sociology of religion will recognize essential processes such as secularization, group identification and escapism.⁶⁵ In fact, this analysis should include essential elements of social movements, such as

⁶³ The correlation between millenarism and acculturation has been studied by Barber (1941), Linton (1948), Wallace (1956), Herskovits (1958), Mair (1958).

⁶⁴ For studies on religion and social change, see Wallis (1943), Yinger (1957).

⁶⁵ For a good synopsis of recent theories on the correlation between religious movements and the struggle for power, see Mair, in *CSSH*, Vol. I (1958-1959), pp. 112-135; see also Yinger (1963).

goals, ideology, group cohesion, organization, and tactics.⁶⁶ Lastly, the political transformation occurring in the course of the 19th century may be analyzed in terms of the transfer from traditional to legal-rational authority, and the movement itself in terms of the exercises of charismatic authority.⁶⁷

⁶⁶ For general studies on social movements, see Steward J. Burgess (1943-1944), Heberle (1951), King (1962).

⁶⁷ Almond and Coleman (1960), Parsons (1960), Eisenstadt (1961), Max Weber (1964).

CHAPTER II

THE SOCIO-ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

GENERAL LOCALE AND RELEVANT ECOLOGICAL FACTORS

Banten, located in the extreme west of Java, covers approximately 114 square miles. According to the official statistics, Banten's population in 1892 numbered 568,935; the most densely populated region was the district of Tjilegon.¹ Relevant to the density of population is the state of land cultivation, which in turn depends largely upon the physical environment. The region can be divided into two markedly different parts. The southern part, a mountainous region, was mostly covered with forest and was very thinly populated. It was rarely the scene of momentous events in the history of Banten.² North Banten, on the other hand, consisted largely of cultivated land in the last decades of the 19th century and consequently had a considerably greater density of population.³ Many towns in this region, Banten, Tamiang, and Pontang, among others, are very old; their foundation can be traced back to the 16th century.⁴

The sultanate of Banten, founded by colonists from the Javanese kingdom of Demak in 1520 and abolished by Daendels in 1808, had the northern coastal area as its core region, while its outer provinces consisted of the highlands of Banten, the western part of Bogor and Djakarta, and also the Lampongs in South Sumatra.⁵ Sunda Bantam,

¹ See *Koloniaal Verslag*, 1888-1889, Appendix A¹, p. 10. Tjilegon had a population density of 15,693 per square mile. (1 geogr. mile = 7407,4 m; see ENI, II). The average population per hectare of cultivated land was 2.8 in the district Tjilegon and 0.7 in the district Lebak.

² An exceptional case should be mentioned, namely the so-called Lebak affair which arose from the conflict between Douwes Dekker, assistant resident, and Karta Natanegara, regent, both of the Lebak region. Owing to the widespread publicity of the former's writings, dealing with the above issue, the Lebak affair is quite well-known. See Multatuli, *Volledige Werken*, Vol. IX (1956); for disturbances in the 'thirties, see below, Chap. IV, note 48.

³ North Banten: 10,131 per sq. mile, South Banten. 2,787 per sq. mile.

⁴ Armando Cortesão, Vol. I (1944), p. 170; coastal towns in West Java were mentioned, e.g. Sunda Bantam, Pontang, Cheguide, Tangara, Sunda Kalapa.

⁵ The town of Banten was Islamized in 1525, Sunda Kalapa in 1527, when it

as it was called by Portuguese travellers, had been a centre of the pepper trade since the olden days; it flourished after the capture of Malaka by the Portuguese in 1511, but had rapidly been waning as a trade centre since the establishment of Batavia by the Dutch in 1619.⁶

The region is accessible from many sides. The famous *postweg* (post road), built in 1808, begins at the western tip of Java, namely at Anjer, and runs through the island longitudinally. Railroads were built in 1896 and connected Banten straight with Batavia. There are many small ports, the most important of which is Anjer.

The largest ethnic group in Banten is the Sundanese, living mostly in South Banten. The Javanese are to be found in the northern part, while the Badujs have their settlements in the southern mountains. The northern part, stretching from Anjer to Tanara, was administratively divided into two *afdelingen*, namely Serang and Anjer. The population in that region descends from Javanese migrants originating from Demak and Tjirebon, who in the course of time mixed with Sundanese, Buginese, Malays and people from the Lampongs.⁷ Besides differences in language and custom, both the physical appearance and the character of the North Bantenese differed noticeably from those of the Sundanese and the Javanese of Central and East Java.⁸ Among the Dutch, the North Bantenese were notorious because of their religious fanaticism, their aggressive attitudes and their rebellious spirit. In fact, they were not the kind of peasants found in South Central Java, but formed bands of enterprising migrants.⁹ Among the ingredients of their cultural make-up, traits of Hindu-Javanese civilization were scarcely to be found. In point of fact, the penetration of Islam was very intensive.

The conspicuous differences between North and South Banten should undoubtedly be ascribed partly to the differences in natural environment, an ecological factor, as well as to differences of a socio-cultural or historical nature. The natural environment exhibits a three-fold appear-

was re-named Djakarta. See H. Djajadiningrat (1913).

⁶ Concerning the decline of Banten, see Schrieke (1955), pp. 49-65.

⁷ Roorda van Eysinga, Vol. IV (1832), p. 169; see also *TNI*, Vol. VII, part 1, (1845), pp. 353-363.

⁸ The distinctive characteristics of the people of North Banten were referred to by several writers, e.g. Snouck Hurgronje's Note of August 15, 1892; Spaan, in *Almanak der Indologische Vereeniging* (1893), pp. 222-285; van Vollenhoven, Vol. I (1918), p. 697; H. Djajadiningrat, in *Handelingen* (1921), pp. 309-324; Multatuli, in *Volledige Werken*, Vol. IX (1956), p. 535.

⁹ Spaan, in *Almanak der Indologische Vereeniging* (1893), pp. 222-285; cf. Note of Snouck Hurgronje of August 15, 1892.

ance. A mountain range runs through a great part of South Banten; in the west, the range continues from that southern mountain group northwards up to the peak of Mt. Gede. A vast hilly region stretches around these mountain masses, covering a large portion of the total area. In the west and north, the hills gradually slope down and the plains covered with rice fields spread farther down to the sea. Within the region there is a good deal of variation of landscape type and consequently of modes of land use. The plains and mountain slopes in the north contrast with the hilly area in both North and South Banten on the one hand and with the mountainous region in the south on the other.¹⁰ It was on the mountain slopes and the plains in North Banten that the most irrigable rice lands were to be found. Local tradition tells us that, in the past, *sawah* had been laid out in the northern plain by Javanese colonists and that therefore the domains of the sultan were to be found there.¹¹ Being dry and unirrigable, the mountainous and hilly regions in the south were regions where dry-rice cultivation, either *tipar* or *huma* cultivation, was practised. *Tipar* cultivation was also practised in the hilly regions in the north, but the most characteristic crops there were sugar-cane, beans, cotton and coconut. Besides the cultivation of commercial crops, there was also some industry. Its existence brought about a concentration of population in this region, especially in the district of Tjilegon.¹² Obviously, economic factors favoured the north, which comprised the main granaries and was located close to trade routes and centres.

SOCIAL STRUCTURE AND AGRARIAN ECONOMY

In this study, attention is paid to the question to what extent economic factors correlate with the social structure of Banten society in general and the peasants society in North Banten in particular. Do the economic classes correlate with the social and political distinction made within these societies? With the development of agrarian unrest in mind, the problem of conflict between various social groups must be investigated in much greater detail, in order to detect the socio-economic determinants of the social movement which led to the outbreak of the peasant

¹⁰ Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I, part 2 (1902), p. 30.

¹¹ Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I, (1901), p. 17^a; see also *Eindresumé*, Vol. II (1880), pp. 1-4.

¹² See Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I, part 2 (1902), pp. 29-33. As to the industry, the fabrication of coconut oil by the so-called *orang kuntjeng*, who were specialists in this industry and had their factories in other parts of Banten, e.g. in Tjaringin and Pandeglang, was well-known.

rebellion. A class analysis will be employed here, and Banten society will be regarded as an arena of social conflict between those classes.¹³ For analytical purposes, it is inadequate to explain Banten society in terms of the classic bi-modal class division; in order to illuminate the intricate inter-relationship between the various classes, the group analysis will therefore be subjected to refinement.¹⁴ Furthermore, the emphasis on dynamics in this analysis makes it necessary to give an account of social shifts over the years and of the political process as well. It is indispensable to trace the historical development of the matters of interest in this study to the period of the Banten sultanate, insofar as sufficient reliable data can be obtained.

It is a commonplace remark that, in an agrarian society, land is the main source of production and wealth, and its possession is therefore very high in prestige rating; consequently the traditional classification of villagers is based on landownership. Rights and duties are accordingly distributed on the same basis. This generalization is certainly valid with regard to a large part of 19th-century Java, but it is doubtful whether it is relevant to Banten during the period dealt with here. Besides landownership, various ecological and historical factors came into play, so that a development into the rigid, typically Javanese modes of land use and of social organization, of the essentially static village society of the great rice plain areas, presumably did not come about.¹⁵ It has been said that Banten "has no class distinction".¹⁶ Of course, this is rather a stereotype than a reliable assessment of the situation but this stereotype may find some basis in social reality. Let us look more closely at the social structure of 19th-century Banten and its agrarian background features.

In Banten with its predominantly agrarian economy, the average villager was a peasant and a rice cultivator, either as a landowner or as a share-cropper. It is remarkable, however, that a considerable number of villagers earned their livelihood by trading, fishing, or handicraft, or

¹³ The concepts "class" and "status" are here used in the Weberian sense; see Gerth and Mills (1958), pp. 180-195.

¹⁴ The dichotomous concept of traditional society, comprising the gentry and the peasantry, looms large in Hagen's theory, see Hagen (1962). The trichotomy of Kautsky's division of traditional agrarian society is too generalized, so that it is hardly applicable to Banten society; more elaborate stratification, relevant to historical societies, is very much needed; see Kautsky (1962), pp. 13-17.

¹⁵ Geertz (1956), p. 7; ter Haar (1948), p. 72.

¹⁶ Benda and McVey (1960), p. 20.

by running some industry.¹⁷ Mention should also be made of a category of peasants who were engaged in various industries and occupations as a means of earning a subsidiary income. Actually, these enterprises were not full time but were merely casual occupations, or undertakings accomplished in the agricultural slack season. To a great extent, these alternative sources of income had been developed traditionally.¹⁸ A conspicuous instance is the well-known seasonal migration to Batavia or the Lampongs, stimulated by the labour shortage in these places and by the good communications.¹⁹ Compared with the total number of labourers, it was only a small trickle of migrants, and most of them were only away for short periods between the busy seasons.²⁰ It still holds true that the overwhelming majority of the people were farmers, while a small percentage of the working population made a livelihood by trade and handicrafts. Despite the existence of migrant labour, it was generally stated that there were no indications of overpopulation.²¹ In addition, taking the ratio of the main resources of village economy into account, no economic stringency can be supposed to have existed during the last few years preceding the rebellion.²²

As in most agrarian societies, two sets of facts are particularly important among the conditions that govern life and labour in the rural areas, namely, those concerning landownership and land tenure on the one hand, and those concerning the techniques of agricultural practice on the other. These factors are of the highest importance, for they ultimately determine who will perform the necessary labour and what the

¹⁷ According to *Koloniaal Verslag*, 1888-1889, Appendix A, pp. 12-13, the following specification was made: peasants 141,172; traders 7158; fishermen 3465; smiths 200; fishbreeders 614; civil servants 598; religious officials 1084; village heads 6132; *hadjis* 4512; religious teachers 706.

¹⁸ Some industrial enterprises were local specializations for generations, as e.g. the leather industry, iron smiths; from such villages came the migrants to Batavia and Lampung; see Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I, part 2, (1902), p. 38. The word "Lampongs" is derived from "Lampung".

¹⁹ Annually about 2000 people went to Batavia and about 3000 to Lampung; see Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I part 2, (1902), p. 34, 38.

²⁰ At the end of the century the proportion of migrants to the total number of able-bodied men was 1100 to 21,000; see *Adatrechtbundels*, Vol. IV (1911), p. 454.

²¹ *Ibidem*; there was already a group of landless people, among whom may be reckoned the *menumpangs*, *budjangs*, *kulis*, vagabonds, etc.; see also *TNI* (1869), no. 2, p. 496; see below p. 58.

²² There was a surplus of *padi*; compared with Java as a whole, the ratio of the number of buffaloes to the acreage of arable land and the population in Banten was more favourable than the ratio for Java; see Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I, part 2 (1902), p. 36.

individual's share of the produce will be. The system of land tenure in 19th-century Banten went back to the time of the sultanate, although it had been very considerably modified by the intrusion of the colonial administration. In the late 'sixties problems in landownership and land rent had their origin in the land grants made to members of the sultan's family and state officials, as well as to religious institutions, whose land-holdings were located mainly in the old core region of the sultanate.

It is said that the colonization led by Muslim conquerors from both Demak and Tjirebon employed a new agricultural technique on a large scale, namely wet rice cultivation. Rice fields described as *sawah negara* seem to be the oldest ones under cultivation. The cultivators of those *sawah negara* or royal domains consisted of two categories of people: the *mardika*, who had been granted free status for submitting to the conquerors and adopting the Muslim creed, and the *abdi*, who had been forcibly subjugated and enslaved.²³

The institution of *sawah negara*, which dates back to the early period of the sultanate and still existed in the second half of the 19th century, refers not only to the conditions under which land was held, but also to the social and political importance of holding land. The *sawah negara* were actually all the *sawahs* which had been laid out by the command of the sultan or his appanage holder and which belonged to him.²⁴ These *sawah negara* were generally regarded as the royal domains. It was, however, not enough for the sultan to own land. It brought him no profit unless it was worked; therefore it was necessary for him to grant land or the use of it, in return for labour. The *sawah negara* which spread over the plains around the Bay of Banten were distributed among the peasants on condition that they tilled the land and paid a tribute to the sultan, amounting to one-tenth of the produce.²⁵ In fact, the privilege of using the land within the area of the royal domains was coupled with a taxation on the harvest and services to the king as well.²⁶ From the outset, rights of ownership to the *sawah negara* were ultimately held by the sultan or his grantee. It seems that those who had opened up the country, and their descendants, had the

²³ *Eindresumé*, Vol. II (1880), pp. 1-2; Kern in *IG* (1906), no. 1, p. 698; van Vollenhoven, Vol. I (1931), p. 693.

²⁴ *Eindresumé*, Vol. II (1880), p. 4; van Vollenhoven, Vol. I (1931), pp. 736-737.

²⁵ *Eindresumé*, Vol. II (1880), p. 5; van Vollenhoven, Vol. I (1931), pp. 739-740.

²⁶ *Eindresumé*, Vol. II (1880), p. 4; van Vollenhoven, Vol. I (1931), p. 733, 740.

first claim to usufructuary rights, although the sultan or his grantee appeared to be entitled to evict any peasant who displeased them;²⁷ as Yule put it in his report, "the cultivators are liable to be turned out at pleasure".²⁸ It is also reported, however, that the cultivators might relinquish their land whenever they liked.²⁹ Relevant to this problem is the question how the rights in land came to pass to members of the political élite. To what extent did landholding correspond with political office on the one hand, and to what degree was it associated with the ruling class on the other?

As the protective function of the sultan had brought about economic control, the mobilization of production served to support his household, his family, and state officials. They relied for their income not only on the trade taxes levied, but also on the produce of the rural areas.³⁰ It appears to be an ancient practice that one meets with in agrarian bureaucratic states: the division of land among the chief's personal retainers — household officials, relatives, personal favourites — invariably followed the conquest of a region and the founding of a state. The land granted was called *sawah gandjaran* or *pusaka laden* or *petjaton*,³¹ and was termed differently according to whom it was granted to: *ka-wargaan*, when it was allocated to children of the sultan by his legitimate wives; *kanajakan*, when it was assigned to the sultan's children by concubines and to the sultan's favourites as well; *pangawulaan*, when it was granted to officials, who retained the profits from it for their personal maintenance during their tenure of office.³² The first two groups of grantees were not only entitled to the share of the crops originally owed to the sultan, but could also exercise the right to employ

²⁷ Kern in *IG* (1906), no. 1, pp. 709-710; van Vollenhoven, Vol. I (1931), p. 740.

²⁸ Yule's report as cited by Kern, in *IG* (1906), no. 1, pp. 709-710; cf. Bastin (1954), pp. 106-107.

²⁹ Ibidem.

³⁰ A comparison with conditions in 18th-century Mataram is revealing, esp. relative to the rigidification of land tenure and the appanage system; see Rouffaer, in *Adatrechtbundels*, Vol. XXXIV (1931), pp. 233-378; cf. Adviser of Native Affairs to the Gov. Gen., Aug. 24, 1921, no. 560; he contended that there was a strong tendency in agrarian development towards conditions which were to be found in the so-called *nagara agung*, i.e. the core region of Mataram.

³¹ See *Resumé van het Onderzoek naar de Regten van den Inlander op den grond in de Residentie Bantam* (hereafter cited as *Resumé*), 1871, pp. 70-71. See also a copy of the report, in Vb. Apr. 12, 1870, no. 28.

³² Ibidem; see also *TNI* (1872), no. 2, p. 371; *Eindresumé*, Vol. II (1880), p. 3; van Vollenhoven, Vol. I (1931), p. 742.

people for opening up new land or to have them render various services.³³ Since the sultan and the land grantee usually remained at court, they appointed agents, who represented their interests and were therefore also endowed with some authority.³⁴ It should be noted that *pusaka laden* granted to relatives of the sultan were considered to have been granted on a permanent basis, and were commonly inherited, but could not be alienated without the sanction of the sultan.³⁵

Because the rights on *sawah negara* as *pusaka* were limited, many land grantees started to open new plots of land by employing the compulsory services attached to their *pusaka* lands. In so doing they not only increased their income, but came into possession of land to which they had full rights. The land opened up in this way was called *sawah jasa*. Of course common peasants also started to lay out *sawah jasa*, encouraged by the advantage of *sawah* cultivation. Another stimulus might perhaps have lain in the fact that cultivators of *sawah jasa* had to pay tribute to the sovereign or the land grantee as a token of submission; this was the so-called *pakukusut*, which in fact was less than the *lelandjan* levied on cultivators of *sawah negara*.³⁶ It is an established fact that taxation was one of the most urgent concerns of the sultan's bureaucracy. The land and labour imposts in particular certainly constituted the main sources of revenue of the sultanate.

The prevailing agricultural situation during the sultanate has been dealt with at some length, since a clear picture of it is indispensable for a better understanding of institutional changes in 19th-century Banten and the conflict generated by them. Rural institutions and agrarian conditions in the area in question, at the time of the uprising studied, had their roots in those existing during the sultanate.

In 1808, Daendels abolished the royal domains and the compulsory labour attached to it, and introduced the levying of one-fifth of the yield as land taxation for the whole area of the low lands of Banten. A few years later, Raffles made the land rent the sole land taxation.³⁷

³³ For categories of land and *sawah*, see further *Resumé* (1871), pp. 72-73; also in *TNI* (1872), no. 1, pp. 364-384.

³⁴ There were in Tjibeber 4 agents representing their respective chiefs as appanage holders; see *Eindresumé*, Vol. II (1880), p. 3; see also *Resumé* (1871), p. 146; Yule's report, in Bastin (1954), pp. 106-107.

³⁵ *Resumé* (1871), p. 71; also in *TNI* (1872), no. 1, p. 371. See also Yule's report, in Bastin (1954), pp. 106-107.

³⁶ *Eindresumé*, Vol. II (1880), pp. 3-4; see also the report of Spaan, in *Eindresumé*, Vol. II (1880), Appendix A; van Vollenhoven, Vol. I (1931), p. 699, 714, 719.

³⁷ *Eindresumé*, Vol. II (1880), Appendix A, pp. 14-15; van Vollenhoven,

Holders of *pusaka* land were compensated for the loss of income from tributes and services, while possessors of *sawah jasa* were allowed to retain their rights on *pakukusut*. This arrangement had, however, given rise to serious abuses. As time went on, both the hereditary rights on *sawah negara*, either as *pusaka* or *petjaton*, and on *sawah jasa*, became sources of corruption and malpractices among civil servants. Obviously, the sultan's relatives and the officials of the sultanate, the main beneficiaries of the old system, were inclined to favour a reversion to traditional practices, and therefore attempted to retain their rights, although they had already received indemnity.³⁸ Moreover, the land grantees vigorously opposed the enactment of the said measures because it also meant a great loss of political influence to them. Those measures therefore aroused much discontent, to which the disturbances in Banten up to 1830 were ascribed.³⁹ From the outset, the government was prevented from acquiring exact information about the state of the royal domains, so that the land grantees could continue to assess their traditional tribute. In this way, the people were given the impression that the double exaction had been sanctioned by the government; thus a situation was created in which the government was seriously discredited. In fact, there was also another opportunity to exploit the ignorance of the common people: in the course of time it became difficult for the people to discover whether land which had been laid out by means of compulsory labour was destined for the state or for the grantee. What the actual cultivators regarded as *sawah negara*, was claimed by grantees as *sawah jasa* with all its inherent rights. As regards the first category of *sawahs*, the right of their possession was held by the actual cultivator, after the change to Dutch rule, but the tribute previously levied by the sultan or his grantee was assessed by the government in the form of land rent. In the case of the second category of *sawahs*, those with the right of their possession were entitled to assess *pakukusut* from the actual cultivator. Here a conflict of interest came to the fore which loomed large in Banten society until the outbreak of the revolt. Some cases will illuminate this enduring conflict situation. The report on land rights in Banten of 1870 gives us a revealing account of cases in North Banten.⁴⁰

Vol. I (1931), p. 719. See further Bastin (1954), pp. 105-112.

³⁸ *Resumé* (1871), p. 74; also in *TNI* (1872), no. 1, pp. 374-375.

³⁹ *Ibidem*.

⁴⁰ All cases under discussion are to be found in the report in question, published as *Resumé* (1871), esp. pp. 146-155; also in *TNI* (1872), no. 2, pp. 101-109.

CONFLICT OVER LAND RIGHTS

The *Kliwon* of Serang used the pretext of having received *sawah pusaka* from his father, Raden Satja, to lay claim to *pakukusut* from a plot of *sawahs* in Kubanglaban Kidul. No evidence could, however, be found to support his claim. Strangely enough, that plot of *sawahs* had been entered in the register of 1866 as *sawah jasa*, while it had been listed as *sawah negara* in previous registers. In order to avoid conflict, the Regent of Serang ordered the people to pay *pakukusut*.⁴¹ In another village, Klangen, certain relatives of the *kliwon* retained the right to levy *pakukusut* from the actual cultivators of certain fields, recognized as *sawah jasa* in the possession of the *kliwon*'s relatives.

An instance of illegal appropriation of *sawah negara* by civil servants or their relatives can be shown in the case of Badamusalam. In 1868 about 25 *baus* out of 90 *baus sawah negara* were cultivated by the villagers, while the rest was abandoned, because many people had died and others had left the village. Of the cultivated land, 5 *baus* had been apportioned to the *djaro* and the *pangiwa* for nearly thirty years. In 1858, the father of the chief-*djaksa*, Aria Nitidiwiria, said he was prepared to share the produce with them. His pretext was that he made use of waste land temporarily, so long as the people were not able to cultivate it themselves. After six years the people's demand that the land be returned was abruptly refused by the chief-*djaksa*. Finally, a *demang*, authorized by the Regent of Serang, appropriated 30 *baus*. For superstitious reasons 15 *baus* remained waste land.⁴²

Another interesting case is the claims for ownership of *sawah negara* or *sawah jasa* set up by the sultan's relatives. During the period of the sultanate, the people of Tras had to pay tribute to the sultan, amounting to two *sangas* per *tjaeng*. Pangeran Chalzie, who acted as the sultan's agent, tried to claim two *sangas* for each *bau*, but the people would only pay two *sangas* for twelve *baus*. After the death of Pangeran Chalzie, the people ceased paying this levy for two reasons: firstly, the land rent had been introduced in the mean time, and secondly, the levy had been a personal favour granted to Pangeran Chalzie. The Regent of Serang, R. A. Mandura Radja Djajanegara,⁴³ offered to provide the

⁴¹ *Resumé* (1871), p. 147; also in *TNI* (1872), no. 2, pp. 101-102.

⁴² *Resumé* (1871), pp. 149-150; also in *TNI* (1872), no. 2, pp. 103-104.

⁴³ The regents of Serang, i.e. of the Northern Regency, were successively: Ratu Bagus Dipaningrat, R.A. Adisantika, R.T. Pringantaka, R.A. Djaja Kusumaningrat, R.A. Radja Mandura Djajanegara, R.A.A. Tjondronegoro, R.A.P. Gondokusumo, R.T. Sutadiningrat, R.T. Djajawinata; see *Regeeringsalmanak*, 1821-1900.

seed and buffaloes needed for cultivating the *sawah*, and to pay half the land rent, on condition that he received half the yield. The people accepted the offer for a period of three years, for the reason that they did not have the means to exploit their land because of famine, and also for fear of the regent's power. He was replaced by R. A. A. Tjondro-negoro, who required a levy amounting to half the yield, because he regarded the fields as his private property. In 1865, his wife sold the fields to the *Demang* of Trumbu, with the result that the villagers opposed all claims made by the regent from that time on. In fact, the villagers only recognized as such the private property of Pangeran Chalzie, amounting to only twelve *baus*. Furthermore, according to Banten genealogy the most direct heir of the sultan was Sultan Alih rather than the wife of the regent, Ratu Siti Aminah.⁴⁴

As a last example we mention a similar case, which occurred in Sedaju. This village had never been bestowed as an appanage, and the sultan himself received one-tenth of the paddy harvest. After the annexation by Daendels in 1808, the tribute was no longer paid. In 1863, however, the wife of the Regent of Serang, referred to above, set up a claim to the one-tenth tribute. This was based on the fact that she was a direct descendant of the sultan and was consequently entitled to the *sawah negara* as *pusaka* land. Her various proposals were turned down and even her threat of selling the *sawah* had no effect. In 1865, at about harvest time, an agent was sent to levy the tribute, but the people refused to render it. It must be noted that in this issue the *demang* and the village head sided with the princess, although her claim was utterly groundless. This is quite understandable, because it appears that all the members of the village administration and the *demang* had illegally appropriated *sawah negara*, which were exempted from levies to the princess. Similar claims were made to *sawahs* in villages, e.g. in Ragas, and Kanari.⁴⁵

The division of *sawah negara* in Kadikaran exhibited the malpractices of the élite more conspicuously. Out of 16 *baus sawah negara*, 4 *baus* were appropriated to the village head as a field for official use, 2 *baus* were exploited by the *Patih* of Lebak as a coconut garden, 3 *baus* were

⁴⁴ See Appendix no. III.

⁴⁵ Ratu Siti Aminah's claims were rejected for the following reason: 1. Sultan Alih and his children were still alive; 2. her brother Hasan-in's right would precede hers according to Islamic law; 3. there was no evidence that those persons had ceded their rights to her. See *Resumé* (1871), pp. 153-154, or *TNI* (1872), no. 2, p. 109.

apportioned to the chief-*djaksa*, while 7 *baus* were divided into 28 parts and apportioned to the villagers.⁴⁶

Another interesting instance of malpractices was the mortgaging of *sawahs*. It is reported that Djajakusuma, after his dismissal as *Patih* of Lebak, recommended to the people of the district Tjiruas that they should mortgage their *sawah* to him. If they followed up his advice, the mortgagee claimed 5 % as the annual dues of the loan plus half the yield,⁴⁷ and then paid the land tax. It is recorded that in 1869 about 40 or 50 *baus* were mortgaged to Djajakusuma for the amount of about four or five thousand guilders.⁴⁸ No attempt will be made in this context to describe the principles of mortgages and leases; suffices it to point out that the practice of leasing and mortgaging land was already common in the northern part of Banten in the late 'sixties.

Out of the 52 *desas*, where *sawahs* were to be found, there were 42 in which the custom existed whereby the *sawah* might be mortgaged upon receipt of a loan. In the remaining 10 villages, such a form of *sawah* transaction was not known. There were various forms of stipulating an agreement of land transaction.⁴⁹ Other arrangements of land transaction already to be met with in Banten were land pledging and share-cropping, respectively called *nglandjak* and *memaro* or *mertelu*. In 34 villages out of 52, the share-cropping agreement was very common.⁵⁰ Two other institutions were connected with share-cropping. The first, called *mlajang*, refers to an agreement whereby the landlord had to turn over part of the product to the cultivator, usually about 10 *sangas* for every 3 *baus*.⁵¹ The second institution is called *hedjoan*, i.e. lending money to be repaid in crops; for instance, for the loan of one guilder the lender had to repay 40, 60, 80, or 100 *katis*. This system of advance payment was known in 18 out of the 52 *desas*.⁵²

This account reveals some aspects of the change that had occurred in the agrarian economy of Banten. Firstly, the relationship between the peasantry and the élite was already imbued with recurrent conflicts and clashes of interest precipitated by subsequent reforms in the traditional

⁴⁶ *Resumé* (1871), p. 151; also in *TNI* (1872), no. 2, p. 105.

⁴⁷ P.V. Nov. 16, 1869 in Exh. Sept. 6, 1870, Z¹¹; cf. Soebroto (1925), pp. 26-27, 42.

⁴⁸ P.V. Nov. 16, 1869 in Exh. Sept. 6, 1870, Z¹¹.

⁴⁹ *Resumé* (1871), p. 113 or *TNI* (1872), no. 2, pp. 469-471.

⁵⁰ *Resumé* (1871), pp. 120-121 or *TNI* (1872), no. 2, p. 474; see also van Vollenhoven, Vol. I (1931), pp. 742, 746.

⁵¹ *Resumé* (1871), p. 122 or *TNI* (1872), no. 2, p. 475.

⁵² *Ibidem*.

agrarian economy. Secondly, this social cleavage was aggravated by other issues relating to compulsory services, which were inherent to the traditional economy and were inseparable from landownership. Thirdly, the disturbing effects of penetrating money economy were already running their course, bringing about alienation and concentration of land.

COMPULSORY SERVICES

The labour service imposts, like landownership, had their origin in the period of the sultanate. At that time there was a clear line of demarcation between two basic taxes — taxes in produce and taxes in labour — and the obligation to render taxes in labour was incumbent upon persons of various status. All cultivators of *sawah negara*, either *abdi* (serf) or *mardika* (freeman), were obliged to render public services, such as the construction of public roads, levies for warfare, the opening up of new land. Besides these services, the *abdis* were also required to render a certain number of personal services, either to the sultan or the chiefs, e.g. as attendants at their houses, in carrying their persons or baggage on journeys.⁵³ In connection with the situation in the area where the *sawah negara* were to be found, it was often assumed that compulsory labour was inherent to landholding.⁵⁴ This contention holds good as far as it concerns the region of the royal domains where, at the initial stage of the Javanese settlement land and labour were inseparable for the development of wet-rice cultivation. Since the situation in the late 'sixties can be regarded as a petrification of that prevailing at the time of the sultanate, the distinction made above is essential for a better understanding of the development of compulsory labour in 19th-century Banten.

With regard to duties of compulsory labour in Banten, it is therefore of primary importance to distinguish the region of the *sawah*

⁵³ These services were required from *abdis* living in Saminten, Mundu, Bodjong, and Parigi; bearers of the *tandu* were recruited from Kranggan, Serdat, and Patjet. For a comparison with the situation in the Principalities in Central Java, esp. that of inhabitants of the so-called *pangrambe*-land and the various services to be performed by the peasantry, see *Resumé* (1871), p. 229; *TNI* (1872), no. 2, p. 352; Rouffaer, in *Adatrechtbundels*, Vol. XXXIV (1931), pp. 233-378. Concerning the *abdi*, see van Vollenhoven, Vol. I (1931), pp. 706, 718, 721, 732; cf. *Eindresumé*, Vol. II (1880), p. 2; *Eindresumé*, Vol. III (1896), pp. 2-3.

⁵⁴ That compulsory services had nothing to do with landownership was clearly stated in several reports, e.g. Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I (1901), p. 18*; secret missive of the Resident of Banten, February 27, 1889, no. 58, in Vb. Jan. 28, 1890, no. 8.

negara or the royal domains from the rest of the area. As noted above, the usufructuary rights of the cultivators of the *sawah negara* were connected with compulsory services to be rendered either to the sultan or to his grantee. After the annexation of the sultanate in 1810, the peasantry retained its old rights and duties.⁵⁵ Consequently, those who did not hold fields belonging to the *sawah negara* were exempted from compulsory services, although they were liable to be called up for special services. In the 'eighties these comprised mainly the so-called *kemit-services* — the guard duties — and those connected with the construction, repairing and maintenance of public works, e.g. roads, bridges, irrigation works, etc. The services connected with levies for warfare had been abolished long ago. This development did not, however, nullify the demand for peasant labour, which was often imposed by the aristocracy in their attempts to acquire individual ownership and to increase their income. It is not certain whether they always provided capital for the cultivation of land, or whether they merely used their traditional rights and placed pressure on the peasants to retain it. It is no exaggeration to say that the situation in the rural areas in 19th-century Banten was pregnant with potentialities for conflict; and one of the main reasons for this might have been the excessive utilization of rural labour.

An illuminating example of the exploitation of peasant labour is afforded by the case of Kadikaran, the village previously mentioned. In court records of 1869, it was reported that a charge of fraud concerning labour recruitment had been brought against Djajakusuma, who had previously served as *demang* in the district of Tjiruas. The facts were as follows: as noted above, 2 *bau sawah negara* in Kadikaran had been appropriated by Djajakusuma; he afterwards began to exploit the peasants, using their services to lay out his coconut garden.⁵⁶ Village heads were required to supply two to four people every day, who received neither payment nor food from Djajakusuma. The villagers had to supply young coconut plants whenever a marriage had been contracted.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I (1901), pp. 17^a, 18^a; van Vollenhoven, Vol. I (1931), p. 719. The regulations applying to the region of the domain lands were enacted in the rest of Banten after the annexation.

⁵⁶ The coconut garden in question has been referred to before, see above, p. 39, see also P.V. No. 17, 1869 and P.V. Nov. 21, 1869, both in Exh. Sept. 6, 1870, Z¹¹

⁵⁷ P.V. Nov. 21, 1869. The laying out of the garden involved 44 *desas* and 25 village heads.

In the mid-'fifties, Lebak was also a region where such malpractices were especially notorious. The attention of the colonial government was called to the fact that the exploitation of the common people by the ruling élite had become a cause of both unrest and deterioration.⁵⁸ A contemporary observer substantiated this alarming view by pointing out that persistent oppression as a result of misuse of civil servants' privileges had caused much suffering among the population. Besides having to deliver tributes of various kinds, like rice, buffaloes, and money, people were required to render various services, such as guarding the civil servants' houses, cleaning their gardens, collecting fire-wood for them, cutting grass for their horses, etc.⁵⁹ In this connection, we might recall the charge which the Assistant Resident of Lebak brought against the regent: that of exploiting the people's services.⁶⁰

GOVERNMENT REFORMS

The problem that now arises is to what extent did the Western reforms succeed in promoting free labour, reducing exploitation, and regulating landownership so as to protect the peasant from usurpation by the ruling classes? It is therefore necessary to investigate the local practice of reforms concerning the abolition of serfdom, the re-distribution of the royal domains and the transformation of taxation in kind into money taxation. The slowness with which the reforms were put into practice is generally known.⁶¹ There seems to be little doubt that the well-known dualistic socio-economic policy of the Dutch was one of the main factors responsible for the retardation in the realization of these reforms. On the one hand, the reforms in question may be regarded as efforts to establish modern economic settings, while on the other hand, attempts were made to preserve the traditional socio-economic order. The introduction of money taxation was to be accomplished within the framework of agrarian household economy. Consequently, this irregularity of change set limits in bringing about the reforms.⁶² Socio-economic conditions in

⁵⁸ Multatuli, *Volledige Werken*, Vol. I (1950), pp. 233-257; 391-419.

⁵⁹ Multatuli, *Volledige Werken*, Vol. IX (1956), pp. 445, 462.

⁶⁰ Multatuli, *Volledige Werken*, Vol. I (1950), pp. 401-419, esp. his missive to the Resident of Banten, Feb. 24, 1856.

⁶¹ The abolition of the compulsory services took more than half a century, i.e. 1855-1916; in 1882 the *pantjendiensten* were abolished. The head tax was introduced in 1882, but it was only in 1914 that a uniform amount was fixed; as to the land rent, the individual levy of 1872 was replaced by a communal one in 1885. See Schoch (1891); *ENI* under the headings *belastingen* and *herendiensten*.

⁶² See about unevenness of change, Eisenstadt (1961), pp. 14-15.

19th-century Banten offer a striking example of the insufficiency of modern legislation as a means to correct social evils when the basic agrarian economy of the region still follows the traditional pattern. With regard to the compulsory services, the many regulations enacted in the course of the 19th century are clear indications of the worst abuses connected with the imposition of various burdens on the peasantry by the civil servants, who were entrusted with both the recruitment of forced labour and the collection of taxes.⁶³

Two different forms of burdens borne by the peasants, which had existed for at least three centuries, disappeared in their *de jure* forms. Serfdom was abolished by Daendels in 1808, simultaneously with the abolition of the royal domains, which were afterwards distributed among the people. After the first reform, in 1856, the compulsory services were gradually reduced in several successive five-year terms, with the result that it was soon possible for the individual to be exempted from certain kinds of compulsory labour through payment,⁶⁴ and that forced labour owed by the villager to native officials — the *pantjen* service — was finally replaced in 1882 by the capitation tax of one guilder per head.⁶⁵ As regards the culture system in Banten, its effects were almost negligible in the latter part of the 19th century, because as a consequence of the failure of the various crops, most of the cultures had been abolished around the middle of the century.⁶⁶

Although according to the regulations they had long been abolished, the services which the peasants had to perform for their local and regional heads survived in various forms and guises.⁶⁷ No doubt these were even increased, for the power and class structure in traditional society made it appear natural that tributes and duties be imposed on

⁶³ Resolution of September 3, 1864, no. 1: the regulation and limitation of the various services; Ordinance of September 26, 1867: the limitations of the number of work days regarding *pantjendiensten*; Resolution of June 14, 1872, no. 66: the limitation of the distance of the work to be performed; Ordinance of July 1, 1882: the reduction of the number of work days from 52 to 42 each year and the abolition of the *pantjendiensten*.

⁶⁴ *ENI*, I (1917), pp. 76-82.

⁶⁵ For the whole development concerning the gradual abolition of the compulsory services, see Schoch (1891), also *ENI*, esp. the article on *herendiensten*.

⁶⁶ *Resumé* (1871), pp. 181-226; also in *TNI* (1872), no. 2, pp. 272-301; for the coffee cultivation, see Nederburgh (1888), p. 13.

⁶⁷ On various occasions it was difficult to make a distinction between compulsory services and free labour performed in order to help either a fellow villager or the authorities, e.g. at festivities. According to the *adat*, various tributes were freely given on special occasions. See Hadiningrat, quoted in *Eindresumé*, Vol. III (1896), pp. 294-295.

the lower classes, and this sanction of tradition did not explicitly state limitations.⁶⁸ With regard to Banten, this generalization concerning the relationship between the peasantry and the aristocracy should be examined thoroughly; on the one hand, the traditional peasant attitude, which slavery and *corvée* services had given rise to in the form of respect for and a sense of obligation to authority and status, had persisted throughout the period of the sultanate; on the other hand, a reluctance to pay taxes and to render services was quite conspicuous after Banten came under the direct rule of the Dutch. In this connection, it should be noted that the underpayment of government officials and the considerable expenses necessary in order to maintain their standing were not conducive to enhancing their prestige and influence among the population.⁶⁹ Banten history is remarkable for enduring agrarian unrest generating disturbances and rebellions. It certainly is not true that there was an apathy among the peasantry in Banten as regards material and political conditions. It is against the background of these issues that the condition of Banten peasantry should be viewed.

PERSISTENT EXACTIONS OF COMPULSORY SERVICES

It is outside the scope of this study to review the complicated operations of reform administrations to abolish the compulsory services after 1856. We are mainly concerned with the many kinds of forced labour in Banten and the class system with which it was connected. As in other regions of Java, compulsory services in Banten consisted mainly of labour on public works — or *herendiensten*, on local projects — or *desa-diensten*, and of labour owed to officials — *pantjendiensten*.⁷⁰ With the exception of the region of the *sawah negara*, one able-bodied male member of all households was obliged to perform these duties.⁷¹

⁶⁸ The common folk's ethos was that they must feel satisfaction in depending on the élite above them and in submitting to their authorities. The *prijaji* on the contrary, regarded their prerogatives and position by virtue of their noble birth as quite natural. See Hagen (1962). In this connection the so-called "*knevelarijen*" in Banten in general and in Lebak in particular should be re-examined thoroughly. See Multatuli, *Volledige Werken*, Vol. IX (1956), p. 549. See also Nieuwenhuys' point of view, which put more emphasis on the ethos of the native aristocracy, in his "*Tussen twee werelden*", (1959), pp. 159-197.

⁶⁹ In furnishing the means for their extravagant expenditures, the officials usually resorted to the corruptive exercise of their administrative power, and exacted extraordinary services and tributes from the people; see Multatuli, *Volledige Werken*, Vol. IX (1956), pp. 420 ff.; see also *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 10-11.

⁷⁰ Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I (1901), pp. 23-27.

⁷¹ According to the Resident of Banten, it was stated in his reply to the

In 1886, the total number of work days amounted to 972,032, and affected 102,886 persons; this does not include work days of labour on local projects.⁷² A distinction should be made between the *baku*, the able-bodied male who represented a household and was for that reason liable to compulsory services, and the *sambatan*, the helper, i.e. all other able-bodied males. On special occasions, e.g. the *gugur gunung*, they were called up. The number of work days was limited to a maximum of 52, but it is very likely that this limit was often exceeded.⁷³ It has been mentioned that in Serang and Tjilegon people were required to come up twice every week instead of once.⁷⁴ Furthermore, the distinction between public works and local projects was sometimes blurred, so that work days classified under the former could be transferred to the latter without violating the regulations, and no limit was fixed to the *desadiensten*. The *pantjendiensten* were notorious for overburdening the people, for in spite of the restrictions they were subjected to, officials still managed to requisition labour and services for their private benefit.⁷⁵ Examples of excessive demands made by officials are readily found. The case of Lebak is illuminating. A report by the assistant resident relates that the regent, the *Demang* of Parang Kudjang, and other officials forced the villagers to perform not only household work but also preparations for special occasions.⁷⁶ It should be noted that, in the face of these persistent malpractices, the peasants were generally unprepared to defend their interests against oppression by local officials. A number of clashes between European and native officials, occasioned by such situations, can be ascribed to one of the main aspects of the colonial administrative structure, namely the dual bureaucracy. It is hardly surprising that native officials were at the time guided by tradi-

Government Secretary that the compulsory services were based on the land. See Bergsma, *Eindresumé*, Vol. III (1896), Appendix K¹¹, p. 148; cf. Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I (1701), p. 20.

⁷² Nederburgh (1888), pp. 16-17; cf. Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I, part 2 (1901), pp. 16-17; the numbers as fixed in the registers according to the proposals of the committee of 1888: 1,357,733 workdays; in the register of 1885-1890: 1,644,474.

⁷³ According to the Ordinance of February 15, 1866. This was revised by the Resolution of May 17, 1882, no. 2, which determined the number of workdays with a maximum of 42 days.

⁷⁴ Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I, part 2 (1902), p. 23.

⁷⁵ According to the Ordinance of September 26, 1867, the following was fixed: a regent's allotment was 40 men, a *patih* 15, a district head 12, a *kliwon* 8, an assistant-district head 6. See Bergsma, *Eindresumé*, Vol. III (1896), pp. 294-295.

⁷⁶ Multatuli, *Volledige Werken*, Vol. IX (1956), pp. 417-422, 551.

tional norms in their bureaucratic practices, rather than by highly rationalized modern bureaucratic rules. Obviously, in a traditionally orientated society like 19th-century Banten, patrimonial views were still held by native civil servants.⁷⁷ This dualistic policy of the colonial government resulted in much pressure on the population and was, moreover, not conducive to the enhancement of rational-legal bureaucracy as a necessary pre-requisite for opening up Java to world trade.⁷⁸ The abolition of the *pantjendiensten* in 1882 can be regarded as a step towards modernization of the colonial bureaucracy but the burden still had to be borne by the peasantry, from whom a head tax was exacted instead of the *pantjen*.

It should be emphasized that the various impositions mentioned did at no time extend over the whole of the population. Besides exceptions made on the basis of age, and physical and matrimonial conditions, the members of certain classes were exempted from compulsory services, e.g. civil servants and their families, village authorities, religious leaders and officials, and a group of villagers who performed certain services on a permanent basis.⁷⁹ Furthermore, everybody was entitled to buy off his duty to perform compulsory services on public works by paying taxes. In villages such as Labuan and Njamuk, where lived many fishermen and traders, labour for the maintenance of public roads or irrigation works was replaced by a tax payment in cash. Labourers who temporarily migrated either to Batavia or to the Lampongs, usually acquitted themselves of their duties by cash payment. On the other hand, young people who went to study at a *pesantren* in East Java were exempted from paying a substitute. Many religious people in the village, such as the *panghulu* and all religious officials, the personnel of the mosque, the religious teachers and pilgrims, were classed among the privileged, and had no services to perform. In fact, it can easily be shown that the

⁷⁷ For an analysis of "dual bureaucracy", see Hoselitz, in La Palombara (1963), pp. 182-183.

⁷⁸ This dualistic policy created favourable conditions, such as cheap labour and security of rights. As Furnivall put it: "free enterprise eventually became from a social and economic ideal to be almost a byword for capitalist exploitation". See Furnivall (1948), p. 225. As regards this penetration of capitalistic enterprise, Burger's study was too much concerned with the liberation of land and labour from traditional ties, but overlooked the pressures still exerted on the population and legalized by the new system; see Burger (1939).

⁷⁹ For the list of categories of people exempted from compulsory services, see Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I (1901), pp. 20-22; also *Resumé* (1871), pp. 249-250, or *TNI* (1872), no. 2, pp. 366-367.

privileged were those who possessed prestige, power, and wealth. It is no mere coincidence that even retired civil servants, those who opposed the village head, and "prosperous" peasants were freed from compulsory services. On the other hand, many people from the lower classes were also exempted simply because they were attached to the civil service, the village administration, or religious institutions, in one way or another. Curiously enough, some members of the old nobility who lived in rural areas were liable to the various taxes and services.⁸⁰ As noted in the report of 1870, there was no uniformity concerning exemptions, and local practices varied widely; in some villages authorities were only partially exempted, in other places exactions were made from the *hadjis* and the retired civil servants as well.⁸¹ No explanation was given for these local variations in the aforesaid report. In this connection, it should be kept in mind that in North Banten the population often showed reluctance to render services, especially *kemit*-services; so it seemed that the regulations could not simply be imposed on the villagers. They tended to bargain about rights and duties and to protest against excessive demands. Some cases will be dealt with at the end of this chapter. In any case, it was the village authorities that decided who was to be exempted from and who was to be called up for compulsory labour, whether they were in a position to allocate services and distribute allotments or not. In Banten, the village heads did not enjoy as much prestige and power as their colleagues in other parts of Java.

To complete our discussion on compulsory services, some remarks should be made about the *desadiensten*, which were never described in detail in the colonial reports. In order to give the reader some idea of the volume of labour performed by the common villagers, we have to sum up the various categories of *desadiensten*, which were by no means the only services that the villagers had to perform. They were: the *kemit* or guard service, to be performed in the village; the *ronda* or patrol service, to be performed either in the village, in the sub-district, or on highways; the *djaga surat* or mail service; the *gundal*, i.e. the duty of escorting travelling civil servants; the transportation of prisoners; the construction and repair of roads, bridges, and irrigation works; the upkeep of the village and the graves. Of course, no regulations existed which listed the number of workers to be recruited for the various services, and no limitations were fixed regarding the number of work days per villager. It is noteworthy that the intra-village distribution

⁸⁰ *Resumé* (1871), p. 250; also in *TNI* (1872), no. 2, p. 367.

⁸¹ *Ibidem*.

of the different kinds of services was regulated so that every compulsory worker rendered each kind of service in turn. The complaints made by the village heads about the reluctance of the villagers to render local services may be due to the fact that the system was not deeply integrated with local customs and with the *desa* as a social organization. As is generally known, the *desa* organization in Banten had been established in 1844; it was therefore not so homogeneous as the *desa* in Central or East Java. Lack of statistical material makes it difficult to obtain a clear picture of the compulsory services imposed, and the registers offer only an approximate estimation.⁸² In general it may be said that the peasantry was underprivileged and had to bear overburdensome exactions of both taxes and services. This formed an important factor which contributed to agrarian unrest in Banten.

THE STATUS SYSTEM

In studying the socio-economic conditions, enquiry must also be made into the status system in Banten society. We must know what the social stratification of 19th-century Banten was and must identify the social class or status group which can be labelled "rebellious". Apart from this, we must discover whether there was social mobility and, if so, to what extent it was conducive to social conflict. The present problem necessitates us to question the correlation between the conflicting groups and their economic position.

It has often been asserted that there were no class distinctions among the population of Banten.⁸³ A popular notion of stratification, however, did exist, and was denoted by the term *undakan*. Banten society, like every traditional society, is usually conceived of as presenting a bi-modal class division. The great majority of the people, or the common folk, comprising peasants, craftsmen, traders and labourers, was called *djalma leutik*. The word *orang tani* was used for the social classification of

⁸² Most of the statistical data in either official registers or the annual reports were only rough estimations and not in accordance with what was actually performed. See Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I (1901), pp. 15-16. An example of the distribution of labour in a village: out of 150 men, 110 had to perform services on the highway; 41 on irrigation; half the men liable to render services had to occupy the guard-house at the highway, the other half had to perform patrol duties in the village. Another instance: out of 70 men, 50 had to render services to the district head, the rest had to perform duties on the highway. See Bergsma, *Eindresumé*, Vol. III (1896), Appendix L, p. 157. For complaints of the *djaro*, see *Eindresumé*, Vol. II (1880), p. 18. In South Banten the population was commonly more co-operative.

⁸³ See Benda and McVey (1960), p. 20.

people such as tillers, craftsmen, and traders, but fishermen were not included. A small upper class, consisting of the bureaucratic élite and the nobility, was designated as *prijaji*.⁸⁴ As will be shown, the power structure was parallel to the class structure. Although these classes were distinctly differentiated from each other, mobility between them was possible throughout the 19th century. In dealing with the social stratification of a society in transition, one should always bear in mind the period under discussion. In fact, the dual character gradually took shape during the course of the century, and was itself a product of social change. Hence social mobility was conspicuous, and newly-emerging classes or status groups could hardly be fitted in a sharp dichotomy. Let us first investigate the social structure in Banten at the time of the sultanate, to which further developments can be traced.

The traditional status hierarchy consisted of the following classes. At the top of the social structure was the hereditary ruling class formed by the sultan's family group. Beside this high nobility, and distinguished from it, was the low nobility, made up of people with less, if any, of the hereditary aura of kingship, i.e. descendants of legendary heroes from the time of the Islamization of Banten, of the second sultan's daughter, and of forefathers possessing the title of *raden*.⁸⁵ Then followed the ranking officials, who were originally personal clients or followers of the sultan.⁸⁶ Being invested with legal powers, a number of religious leaders were incorporated into the bureaucratic élite.⁸⁷ The

⁸⁴ Compare this with the Central Javanese social dichotomy of *prijaji* and *wong tjilik*, see Koentjaraningrat, in Murdock, ed. (1960), pp. 89-93. He regards the nobility as a separate group insofar as the social structure in the Principalities is concerned. Geertz' trichotomy of *prijaji-santri-abangan* does not conform to the classification prevalent in Javanese society itself, which follows the dichotomy mentioned above, while the classification along religious lines is: *santri-abangan* or *putihan-abangan*. As to Banten, almost all *prijajis* belonged to the *santri* group. See Geertz (1960). In other works no distinction is made between *prijaji* and *ndara*, see Palmier (1960), *passim*; Van Niel (1960), *passim*. The term nobility is very confusing, since many *prijajis* were not of noble origin.

⁸⁵ See van den Berg (1902), p. 18. The title *raden* is of Javanese origin and members of the Banten nobility who went to Central Java changed their title from *tubagus* to *raden*.

⁸⁶ For the bureaucratic élite in Banten during the sultanate, see *BKI* (1856), pp. 155-164.

⁸⁷ The religious officials, like the *kadis*, all mosque personnel, and those in charge of holy places, were attached to the sultanate's bureaucracy and were retained by the colonial government after the annexation. The most prominent was the *Fakih Nadjamudin* who occupied the post of president of the court in Banten.

group of *mardika* or *kaum* came next. As noted above, those who freely embraced Islam and their descendants may be included among them. At the bottom of the hierarchy were the *abdīs* or serfs, people who had been defeated by Muslim conquerors and converted to Islam by force. The *utangan* also belonged to this class; they were compelled to serve as soldiers fighting against pirates.

At the apex of the hierarchy was the sultan himself. He was the head by descent of the powerful aristocratic lineage. The royal family formed the superior rank, and all its members were entitled to land grant, the *pusaka kawargaan* or *kanajakan*, and to claims on the people's services and tributes. Within the group of the nobility, gradations of rank and privilege were recognized; descendants of the sultan up to the third generation were called *warga*, and those further down the genealogical line were called *najaka*. *Pangeran*, *Ratu* and *Tubagus* were titles of members of the former group, while *najakas* were mostly allowed to use only the title of *Tubagus* or *Ratu*. In Banten there was also a group of noblemen that did not belong to the sultan's family, and that used titles as *Mas*, *Entol*, *Apun*, *Ujang*, and *Raden*, for the men, and *Aju* for the women.⁸⁸ The titles *Bagus* and *Agus*, which did not indicate nobility, were used by decent people who enjoyed prestige among the people.

The highest echelon of the bureaucracy was occupied by the *patih*, the grand vizier; below him were the *tumenggungs*, one of whom was president of the court, others were supervisors of trade and customs, or exercised administrative authority over provinces or regions; the *sjahbandar*'s function was to act as liaison officer between the sultan and foreigners.⁸⁹ At the lower level of the bureaucratic hierarchy were the *demang*, or head of a district, the *mantris*, the servants in the sultan's household, and the *lurah*, or village head.⁹⁰ There was a much better-known official class in the Banten sultanate at the end of the 18th century than at its beginning, although the bureaucratic hierarchy was

⁸⁸ Van den Berg (1902), pp. 18-19; *Resumé* (1871), pp. 2-3 or *TNI* (1872), no. 1, p. 243-244.

⁸⁹ For the function of the *sjahbandar* in various parts of the Archipelago, see Purnadi Purbatjaraka, in *JSAH*, Vol. II no. 2 (1961), pp. 1-9.

⁹⁰ Compare this with the bureaucratic personnel in other traditional states, like Malaka, Mataram, or Madjapahit. The 4 *sjahbandars* in Malaka were in charge of the administration and supervision of foreign traders. The head of the ecclesiastical court in Malaka was the *kadi*, in Mataram the *panghulu* and in Banten the *Fakih Nadjamudin*. See van den Berg, *BKI*, Vol. LIII (1901), pp. 1-80. For the bureaucracy in Madjapahit, see Pigeaud, Vol. III, IV (1960); for Malaka, see Cortesão, Vol. II (1940), pp. 229-289.

not as highly developed as that in agrarian states, such as Mataram, in the same period.⁹¹ It should be noted that a clear demarcation between the ruling élite and the commoner could already be observed.

Because of the important position which the bureaucratic élite — designated as *prijaji* — occupied in the traditional status hierarchy, its genesis requires further explanation. As is generally known, the selection of members of the class of officials was at the outset based on individual merit, but there was a strong tendency for the offices to be held by the same families for generations. The *prijaji* originally consisted of persons who, through kinship or traditional clientage, or through talent and apparent devotion to the ruler's cause, were accepted by the ruler. In various ways, this élite group maintained itself and enhanced its prestige; for instance, they might marry into the nobility. It is noteworthy that the offices held by the *prijaji* might be confiscated by the sultan at any time with or without reason, and without recompense to the family. Compared with other Javanese kingdoms, the Banten sultanate did not possess a fully developed administrative system; the scale of the bureaucratic hierarchy was therefore also limited. As a result, the ranking of social class positions along bureaucratic lines gave place to status grouping along lines of noble descent to a large extent.

The colonial government based the administrative mechanism on a western model and converted part of the personnel of the sultan or his family into bureaucrats. As elsewhere in Java, the evolving bureaucratic élite constituted a distinctly functional status group. Its members were drawn from various walks of life, not only from the nobility or the traditional bureaucracy, but also from the commoners. Throughout the 19th century, the most distinguished components of the civil service class consisted of members of the Banten nobility or at least people who had kinship affinity with them. As will be shown in a later part of this study, heirs of superior social rank were preferred in the formation of the administrative bureaucracy in Banten. This was in accordance with the basic colonial policy in the transition from so-called "indirect rule" to "direct rule".⁹² Remarkable is the fact that the southern regencies —

⁹¹ For the description of the situation in Banten and its bureaucracy in the 16th and 17th century, see van Leur (1955), pp. 3-4, 137-141; for that of the 18th century, *BKI* (1856), pp. 314-362.

⁹² The term "indirect" is not precise; in fact, it is considered one of the most confusing expressions in the colonial lexicon. As regards Banten, the 19th century witnessed a gradual shift from the system of "indirect" rule to that of "direct" rule. A concomitant of this process was the development

Lebak and Tjaringin — which had no native ruling élite of their own, got many of their rulers from the Sundanese aristocracy, originating from either Prijangan or Bogor.⁹³

At the beginning of the period following the annexation, favoured commoners were promoted to the position of bureaucratic sub-alterns by the grace of the colonial government. Men who had started out as office clerks, tax collectors or cashiers, had a chance of being elevated to higher ranks.⁹⁴ It should be noted that the numerical balance between the high- and low-born in the civil service was gradually reversed during the course of the 19th century. In order to facilitate the enforcement of colonial policy, it indeed proved opportune at the outset to appoint long-established aristocrats, the Banten nobility or bureaucrats who had affinity with them, as top-officials. They were to be the link between the central government and the villagers, who had to be won over to the colonial government; but ineffectiveness, abuses, and corruption or even sabotage compelled the colonial rulers to revise their policy. The preponderance of the nobility in Banten society was on the wane, and the modern bureaucratic élite as a new aristocracy became the core of the status group.

Being for the most part bureaucrats, the *prijaji* built their culture around a very intense concern for status. They felt a need to imitate court culture and tradition in their homes, and to live in great style. They were distinguished by their residences: the location, size, and structure all indicated the owner's status. They maintained a host of servants; their differentiation of dress, and various other symbols, claimed deference from the commoners. They were the protectors and interpreters of the art and manners of the inherited pattern of aristocratic life.⁹⁵

Let us turn now to the social groups outside the ruling class, which comprised the agriculturists, craftsmen, and traders — the *orang tani*;

of the colonial bureaucracy which — in the course of the century — degraded the position of the Banten authorities until they were mere tools of the regime. See the three alternative conceptions of Lugard (1922, p. 194).

⁹³ Examples are: R.T. Karta Natanegara from Bogor; see *TNI*, Vol. VII, no. 3 (1845), p. 484; Suria Nataningrat, see van Sandick (1892), p. 18; see further Chap. III.

⁹⁴ *TNI* (1850), no. 2, p. 211; A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 4, 92-95; see further Chap. III.

⁹⁵ See A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 25, 28-32, 33-36, 58-60. We do not regard the mystical belief as essential to the *prijaji* culture as is Geertz' contention; see Geertz (1960). This certainly does not hold as regards the *prijaji* in Banten. It must be noted that there was a lesser degree of secularization among the Banten *prijaji* than among the Central Javanese.

fishermen, and men of religion, like the *kjai* and the *hadji*. In addition, we must mention the *abdi*, or bondmen, who up to the end of the 19th century were still to be found serving their *gusti*, or lord.⁹⁶ Among the non-ruling class may be reckoned the members of the lower nobility, many of whom lived in the rural areas. Most of the aforesaid groups were rural inhabitants. In a religion-minded community like Banten, many of the traditions and customs had become identified with religion, with the result that the distinction between rural and urban culture was partly blurred. But even a cursory examination would show that the differences were noticeable. It is not without significance that the *prijaji*, as the main exponents of urban culture, preserved many of the characteristics of indigenous culture, either Javanese or Sundanese,⁹⁷ which were manifested in their distinctive style of life.

THE RURAL ELITE

For the purpose of the present study, our attention should be focussed on two prominent segments of the peasantry, namely the village authorities and the religious leaders, who made up the rural élite. Their social role and its attendant status in the village sphere were obviously of crucial importance; especially with regard to the religious leaders, the part they played in the social movement was essential.

From the point of view of their outward appearance, there were two different kinds of villages at this time. The first consisted of separate homesteads or enclosures, surrounded by gardens. The second was made up of clusters of houses resembling those still to be found among the Badujs. Originally, they were the settlements of people belonging to the same kin group.⁹⁸ With the passing of time there was a general movement away from the villages consisting of clusters of houses and towards the "open field" villages. In this way people attempted to evade the control of the government and village authorities.⁹⁹ Viewed against the

⁹⁶ Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. I (1901), p. 20.

⁹⁷ See above, note 95; many non-Muslim elements can easily be detected in the urban culture of the Banten *prijaji*. See also A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 70-73, about lessons in Javanese way of life. The remarkable difference between style of life is expressed in the saying "*Nagara mawa tata, desa mawa tjara*", i.e. the city has its order and the village has its custom. The connotative meaning of this saying refers to superiority feelings of the the urban élite.

⁹⁸ See *Resumé*, (1871), p. 40.

⁹⁹ *TNI* (1859), no. 2, p. 166. The scattered homesteads had been set up for various reasons, e.g. to avoid the compulsory services attached to landownership, and to protect their rights on land, much of which had been illegally

background of this development it is understandable that the village administration was not able to operate effectively before 1844. In that year, the reform of Resident Buyn put an end to the scattered location of the homesteads of "landlords" and new villages in the form of clusters of dwellings were established.¹⁰⁰ Obviously, this administrative measure aimed at improving the political control over the rural inhabitants and strengthening the authority of the village administrators. To be sure, about half a century later, shortly after the rebellion civil servants were still to be heard complaining that the *djaro* generally lacked power and prestige.¹⁰¹ A closer look at the organization of the village administration may illuminate the position and role of the village authorities.

During the period of the sultanate, the village head was appointed by the sultan or by the appanage holder, to whom land in the village was granted as *petjaton*. His main task was to look after their interests, such as the levying of tributes and services.¹⁰² It often happened that in one village there were several *djaros*, each representing his own master who, as land grantee, had got land there as *petjaton*. From the annexation of Banten up to 1844, the *djaros* seem to have been appointed by the government on the basis of suggestions made by the village elders or the *demang*.¹⁰³ As from 1844, the *djaro* was elected by the people and the choice afterwards sanctioned by the government. It is remarkable that among the *djaros* in Banten, twenty-two were entitled to use the title of *lurah*; they were also authorized to convey orders from the district head to a number of *djaros* in the neighbourhood.¹⁰⁴ The main function of the *djaro* was to act as a link between the local population and the broader administration system. He dealt largely with the local administration, such as the levying of taxes, the mobilization of people for compulsory services, the execution of orders from superiors and

appropriated. The situation was not conducive to keeping order and to the enhancement of village authority.

¹⁰⁰ Ibidem; see also *Resumé* (1871), p. 40. For the ineffectiveness of the village administration, see *Adatrechtbundels*, Vol. IV (1911), p. 87; also in *Onderzoek Mindere Welvaart, Economie der dessa*, Vol. IX (1911), pp. 87-88.

¹⁰¹ Missive of the Resident of Banten, February 27, 1889, no. 58, in Vb. Jan. 23, 1890, no. 22; for an earlier account of the prestige of the village administrators, see *Statistiek van Java en Madoera*, esp. the residency Banten, written in 1836, in document no. 3044 of the *Algemeen Rijksarchief*, the division of the Ministry of Colonies.

¹⁰² *Resumé* (1871), p. 6.

¹⁰³ *Resumé* (1871), p. 7.

¹⁰⁴ *Resumé* (1871), p. 5. During the period of the investigation (1870) there were 22 *lurachs* in the region where it was conducted, which included 56 villages.

providing small administrative services to the villagers, like issuing various licences. In his daily work, the *djaro* was assisted by the following functionaries: 1. the *pangiwa* or *panglaku*, in charge of issuing orders; 2. the *djuru tulis* or secretary of the *djaro*; 3. the *djagakersa* or policeman; 4. the *kapetengan* or *pantjatang*, i.e. the postman; 5. the *amil* or tax collector, especially in charge of collecting the *djakat*; 6. the *merbot*, the *modin*, and the *ketib*, all mosque personnel; 7. the *kolot-kolot* or *tuwa-tuwa*, i.e. the village elders.¹⁰⁵ These members of the village administration were chosen by the *djaro*, mostly from less prominent villagers rather than from the village élite. Naturally, they did not enjoy deference among the villagers, nor were they clothed with power and influence. This resulted in the fact that the villagers were never annoyed by a drastic and strong action of the village administrators. It even happened that the administrators were chosen by less reputable villagers, so that they would not be disturbed in their illegal practices. Cases are known in which notorious people were appointed in order to facilitate the curbing of criminal acts.¹⁰⁶

As regards the qualifications of the *djaro* and his assistants, the following points should be made. Contrary to what one might expect, the degree of literacy was not all that low, especially when one takes into account the number of people who could read and write Malay characters.¹⁰⁷ Secondly, the appointment of the *djaro* was often exposed to the manipulations of interested groups in and outside the village, among whom may be mentioned the *hadji*, prosperous peasants, and civil servants. The third point, which is closely connected with the second, is that as long as the position of *djaro* was regarded as nothing more than that of an errand boy or a factotum, no competent candidate could be found. Of more importance was the position of *lurah*, which apparently enjoyed more prestige than that of *djaro*. In fact, the former's standing was higher than that of the latter and was recognized as such in the neighbouring *desas*. It would be quite interesting to know how local politics focusing on the role of the village head were operating,

¹⁰⁵ *Resumé* (1871), pp. 5-12; cf. Fokkens, *Eindresumé*, Vol. II (1901), pp. 9-13; also Bergsma, *Eindresumé*, Vol. III (1896), p. 221.

¹⁰⁶ See A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 123-124; 136-139; 159-169.

¹⁰⁷ Out of 1522 *djaros*, 707 could read and 447 could write Latin characters; as to Arabic characters, the number were 966 and 714 respectively; see Holle in *TBB*, Vol. VI (1891-1892), pp. 275-289. See also the data in *Onderzoek Mindere Welvaart Economie v. d. Desa*, Vol. IX (1911), p. 47; in the district Tjilegon 96 %, in Anjer 50 %; in Kramat Watu 35 % of the *djaros* could read and write Malay (i.e. Arabic) characters.

but the sources only provide tantalizing bits of information. In this context it is not out of place to refer to the few instances in which we do have some information.

As noted above, the villagers preferred to choose an ignorant or obedient man rather than a strong one who might impose his will upon others. Any support rendered by religious leaders in a campaign represented a guarantee that the villagers' interest would be safeguarded on matters such as the allocation of compulsory services and taxes. In fact, the *djaro* was regarded neither as a representative of the village inhabitants nor as the real authority in their realm. It can easily be understood why the *djaros*, under the pressure of super-village authorities, lent themselves to manipulations with land to the disadvantage of the common villagers. Notorious were the *djaros*' frequent attempts to allot domain lands to members of the nobility, the civil servants and the village notables themselves. He often lent a hand in converting this category of land when in fact the tenants were still in lawful occupation of it.¹⁰⁸ In this connection, it should be pointed out that there were actually other factors which cut across the village hierarchy. Although they performed only a ceremonial function in the village administration, the elders or *kolot-kolot* commonly enjoyed authority over the villagers. Their acting as jury in intra-village conflicts provides clear evidence of their position. In a region as well-known for its religiosity as Banten, it is quite natural that the *panghulu* or *amil*, who was officially in charge of collecting the *djakat*, occupied a key position in the village. His power often surpassed that of the *djaro*, and his appointment was more or less controlled by the religious leaders of the region. In its search for the causes of the revolt, the colonial government regarded the *djaro* as a weak link in the colonial administrative chain between the central government and the village, and attempts were therefore made to enforce the *djaro*'s authority and prestige by granting more appanage-land, attached to his position.¹⁰⁹ Two more factors which cut across the village hierarchy may be pointed out, namely the group of the *djawaras* and the group of religious men. The first group largely

¹⁰⁸ Here, by tenant is meant one who holds land, in this case *sawah* belonging to the category of *sawah negara*. His interest in the *sawah* in question ceases when he leaves it uncultivated and when the dikes — indicating that the state of land does not allow appropriation — have vanished.

¹⁰⁹ In Banten there were 1256 *desas* without appanage lands, See missive of the Director of the Department of Interior, April 8, 1889, no. 1957, in Vb. Jan. 28, 1889, no. 8. The proposal made by the Resident of Banten that the *djaro* be exempted from paying land rent was rejected.

consisted of people without permanent occupation who often engaged in criminal activities.¹¹⁰

Before dealing with the status and role of the religious leaders, mention should be made of two social groups forming the lowest strata of the social hierarchy, namely the group made up of people who were deprived by the aforementioned socio-economic condition, and who tended to rebel by engaging in activities which were conventionally considered anti-social and criminal, such as robbery, vagabondage and outlawry. This will be dealt with at length in Chapter IV. The second group comprised the so-called *budjangs*. This group of *budjangs* converted their labour power into services performed according to the demands of the landowners. Actually, the prevailing social economy was already partly based on a wage system. In many villages it was quite common for the *madjikans* (landowners—employers) to make labour agreements with *budjangs*, and working in a household for board and lodging was frequent. Of course, there were various terms of agreements on which *budjangs* were hired as labourers.¹¹¹ But here we are more concerned with the social status and role of the *budjangs*. They were deprived of possessions which the *madjikans* did have, but according to the *adat* they were not burdened with duties like the landowners themselves were.¹¹² It may be justifiable to regard the *budjangs* as the main constituent of a rural proletarian group. The proportion of people who held land as compared to agricultural labourers who had no land is an important question into which, regrettably enough, it is not easy to acquire insight. The surveys on land rights are invaluable for giving information about the holders of landed property, but do not enable us to calculate the number of those who lived entirely by their labour.¹¹³ The existence of rural wage labourers in 19th-century Banten is a fact attested to by the observation that the wage rate had already been subjected to a permanent arrangement according to local custom.¹¹⁴ The question now arises. did the existence of the *budjangs* as a landless, agricultural labourers' group involve an antagonism towards other social groups? It is of importance to discover whether the insurrection-

¹¹⁰ For an account on *djawaras*, see Loze, in *KT*, Vol. XXIII (1934), pp. 171-173; see also Meyer, in "*Japan wint de oorlog*" (1946), pp. 22-24, or his article in *Indonesië*, Vol. III (1949-1950), pp. 178-189.

¹¹¹ Concerning the various terms of labour contracts, see *Resumé* (1871), pp. 125-139.

¹¹² *Resumé* (1871), p. 247.

¹¹³ *Resumé* (1871), pp. 134-136.

¹¹⁴ *Resumé* (1871), pp. 125-139.

ary movement of 1888 constitutes evidence that this kind of antagonism did exist. In this respect the sources available will be disappointing: they will tell us almost nothing about the landownership, which can be regarded as the main determinant of the socio-economic status of the participants of the rebellion. Such matters were obviously beneath the notice of authors of government reports of that time.

To return to the group of religious men: it is quite natural that, in a region where almost everyone was a Muslim, the status of both *kjai* and *hadji* should rank high and that they should be regarded as symbols of social prestige. Three categories of *hadjis* can be distinguished: (1) people who went to Mecca of their own free will and at their own expense; (2) people who were sent by their parents or kinsmen in order to study theology and who usually had a long stay in the Holy Land; (3) people who had a bad reputation and who were urged by their families to make the *hadj*, in order to do penance. In the first category, the most energetic, industrious and dynamic people were to be found. The second kind of *hadji* gained a great deal of knowledge and mostly became *guru* or *kjai* on his return. Some of them became adventurous and engaged in bad practices, using their experience from abroad. *Hadjis* of the third group usually continued their old way of life after their return from the *hadj*.¹¹⁵

The *hadjis* received their income from various sources: landownership, cattle breeding, and mercantile activities were main sources of income. Teaching was an important source of *hadji* income. Besides trading, money-lending was also one of the business operations of the *hadjis*. One of the official services rendered by them was the management of mosque affairs. There were also some *hadjis* who occupied the position of village head. Besides these occupations, the *hadjis* often acted as spiritual adviser to their former students and their families, while some became magical healers.¹¹⁶

Most *hadjis* owned land, and some were prominent landowners. This

¹¹⁵ See *Onderzoek Mindere Welvaart, Economie v. d. Dessa*, Vol. III, part 1 (1911-1912), pp. 26-29. The various categories of *hadjis* were described in detail, but no exact numbers were given. See also *Adatrechtbundels*, Vol. IV (1911), pp. 36-45.

¹¹⁶ The occupational groups mentioned under note no. 17 were not mutually exclusive. The *hadjis* were to be found among other occupations, e.g. the group of traders, and of religious teachers. Cf. *Koloniaal Verslag* (1888-1889), Appendix A, pp. 12-13. Mention is made of *hadjis* owning large lands, esp. in Serang and Tjilegon, but no exact data are given. See *Onderzoek Mindere Welvaart, Economie v. d. Dessa*, Vol. III, part 1 (1911-1912), pp. 10-11.

made them more or less economically independent, and it also invested them with authority over a group of economic dependents. It is not surprising that this further advantage which the *hadjis* had from their landed property only enhanced their political position in the village realm.¹¹⁷

In Banten, teaching was regarded as an honourable profession for the *hadjis*. Teaching, though a respected occupation, was also understood to bring in less income than most of the other occupations held by the *hadjis*. Nevertheless, many *hadjis* were religious teachers.¹¹⁸ It should also be pointed out that a number of *hadjis* were concurrently engaged in both teaching and one of the above occupations. The *kjais* naturally enjoyed greater prestige than the common *hadji* teachers, although this does not imply that the former had a much larger income. The *kjai*, as an established religious scholar directing his own religious school, had long occupied the focal position in the social structure of rural society. The *kjai* can be regarded as a specialist in communicating Islam to the peasants.¹¹⁹ His social role, as the main connecting link between the local system and the supra-village sphere or, in Redfield's terminology, between the Little and the Great Tradition,¹²⁰ was pregnant with possibilities for both securing and enhancing his social power. To the villager in North Banten, where Islam had become a powerful belief, the *kjai* was both a powerful sacred figure and an influential secular one. He derived his sanctity not from the sanction of the secular authority, as was more or less the case during the sultanate, but from his knowledge of Islam, his pilgrimage and his distinct way of life. His position in the rural areas was impregnable and the leadership he assumed became a latent menace to the secular authority in general, and the colonial ruler in particular.

Starting out with property, skill and broad experience, many *hadjis* maintained and enhanced their power and wealth. Their business operations were facilitated by the extensive communication means they had at their disposal. Clearly, the *hadji* status was an important asset

¹¹⁷ According to the numerous court records, most of the *hadjis* were identified or identified themselves as *landbouwer*, i.e. farmer. See Appendix IX.

¹¹⁸ See Appendix V.

¹¹⁹ On the function of the *kjai* as cultural broker, see Geertz, in *CSSH*, Vol. II (1960), pp. 228-249.

¹²⁰ Redfield (1976). Since the impact of Islam was quite strong, not much was left of the Little Tradition in Banten. In this context, studies about the *Badujs* will be illuminating, see Geise (1949). As noted before, the traditional Javanese layer — another Great Tradition — is quite tangible in North Banten. See note no. 95.

in carrying on both mercantile and financial activities. As pointed out above, *hadjis* participated in money-lending and the pawnshop business. There are references which prove that the merchants in the rural areas were chiefly *hadjis*.¹²¹ In fact, the *hadjis* had in the course of time emerged as the "prosperous" class among the peasantry, symbolizing political and financial power. They had more leisure at their disposal, which they could devote to religious activities. Their religious prestige in turn enhanced their social power. They were skilful in transforming honour and prestige into practical values: materially, the flow of tributes from the peasantry, and politically, the support of their rural following. How they recruited a mass following and inculcated ideologies and why they assumed a hostile attitude towards the colonial government are questions which will be discussed in the following chapters. Suffice it here to indicate the socio-economic conditions of the religious leaders, who played a crucial role in the recurrent social upheavals in 19th-century Banten.

One aspect of the social stratification still remains to be examined, namely the fluctuation of social mobility in 19th-century Banten. Due to polygamy on the one hand, and the abolition of the sultanate on the other, the nobility inevitably underwent a social degradation *en masse*. At the same time, a mutual gravitation of noble women and ranking officials could be observed in the course of the century. As for the new bureaucratic élite or *prijaji*, they may be regarded as the rising aristocratic group, and as long as the colonial administrative system was expanding, offices in the administration still had room for younger members. It is a remarkable fact that the diverse composition of the civil service undoubtedly reflected the current social mobility. Since religion played a minor role in the secular colonial government, it could not provide channels of social elevation, at least not within the framework of the dominating political system. On the whole, Banten society did not show a rigidity in status system and there were many instances which testified that vertical circulation frequently occurred. On the other hand, the dissociation of the bureaucratic élite from the religious élite, a concomitant of the secularization of the government, deprived the latter from one of the main avenues of upward mobility. Although the religious élite had considerable symbolic prestige, it apparently did not have equivalent political rank.¹²² Without a doubt, this deprivation was one of the main causes of the rebellion.

¹²¹ *Adatrechtbundels*, Vol. IV (1911), pp. 35-45.

¹²² In defining social rank, various criteria may be employed: age, wealth,

POPULAR DISCONTENT EXCITED BY REFORMS

At this point we have to touch on some socio-economic problems which had a direct bearing on popular discontent in North Banten and which were closely connected with reforms enacted in the course of the latter half of the 19th century.

Within the framework of the gradual abolition of compulsory services, a decree was issued in 1882 which abolished all compulsory services to officials (*pantjendiensten*) and substituted a head tax.¹²³ According to this ordinance, only those who were liable to render compulsory service (*herendienstplichtigen*) had to pay the head tax. In enacting this ordinance, Resident Spaan of Banten ordered that all able-bodied males between 15 and 50 years of age should be assessed.¹²⁴ Obviously, this regulation was based on Spaan's incorrect notion about the prevailing custom concerning compulsory services. His contention was that it was originally a kind of taxation on land.¹²⁵ As the head tax was a substitute for compulsory services, he regarded it as a taxation of individuals. In this connection, it must be added that Spaan's administrative policy aimed at avoiding a diversity of regulations concerning the levying of the head tax in the residency of Banten. As noted before, with respect to the liability for compulsory services, we must, for this region, make the distinction between the area where the previous *sawah negara* were to be found, and the rest of the realm. In the former area, only one member of each household — its male head or the *baku* — was liable to the service in question. The enactment of Spaan's regulation led to the overburdening of the household heads, who had to pay the head tax for all able-bodied males between 15 and 50 years of age that were members of the family or *menumpang*s serving the household. The situation worsened, for the compulsory services in Banten were badly regulated and insufficiently supervised, with the result that an increasingly larger number of people — who were not liable according to the *adat* — were required to render services.¹²⁶ Discontent was awakened in the *afdeling* of Anjer, because a part of the

skill, occupation, style of life, etc. Obviously, during the period under examination no overall scale was to be found in Banten; discrepancies can be pointed out between the scale used among the *prijaji* and the one valued by religious men.

¹²³ Ordinance of May 17, 1882, in *Staatsblad* no. 137.

¹²⁴ Missive of Resident Spaan, Apr. 7, 1882, no. 2143, in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4.

¹²⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹²⁶ Holle to Gov. Gen., Sept. 23, 1888, in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4.

population had to pay the head tax, although they had been promised exemption. Briefly stated, this came about as follows: at the beginning of the year 1888, an investigation was made into the principles upon which the compulsory service regulation had been based in previous years. After detecting that these principles were unjust, the officials had to revise the registers, leaving out the names of those who were not liable to compulsory service. In the meantime the people concerned had been informed of this step, but at the last moment the assistant resident — Gubbels — issued an order that the names of these persons be included in the register of 1888. Small wonder that the people deeply resented this apparently inconsistent action of the officials.¹²⁷ According to contemporary observers, the issue of the head tax can be regarded as one of the causes of the rebellion. Our contention is that it was at least one of the economic factors conducive to popular discontent in the area.

One of the major issues relative to the agrarian reforms involved the levying of the land rent. Numerous surveys had been made, e.g. cadastral surveys and surveys on procedures of levying. Fundamental to the latter was the problem of the communal or the individual levy of land rent. One of the ardent reformers in favour of the communal levy was Sollewijn Gelpke, whose advice was adopted in Banten in the beginning of 1885.¹²⁸ In introducing this communal system, the total sum of the land rent to be paid to each *desa* was fixed on the basis of newly acquired figures for the cultivated area and its productivity. The payment of this "communal land rent" had to be divided among the villagers according to their own judgment. Theoretically, the division was under close supervision of the civil servants, but in fact this could hardly be done, since they did not possess exact data about the area owned by each cultivator and its condition. To be sure, the data were revised on the basis of old *desa* registers so that the total sum was equal to the aforementioned "communal" sum. On the basis of these mostly fictitious data, the intra-village partition was performed. In view of these conditions, it is clear that the partition was made to the advantage of the dominant groups in each village, among which were certainly members of the village administration. As has often been reported by

¹²⁷ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Oct. 25, 1888, no. 106, in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4.

¹²⁸ Director of the Dept. of Interior to the Gov. Gen., March 15, 1889, no. 1414, in Vb. Jan. 23, 1889, no. 22.

officials, the partition was subject to abuses of the *djaro*.¹²⁹ The rural élite was in a good position for paying relatively less taxes, because they could exert pressure on the village authorities to reduce their allotment. Consequently, the extra burden had to be borne by the commoners.

Another administrative measure which promoted discontent was the assessment of trade tax. The increase of this tax added to the numerous grievances of the population. In the district of Bodjonegoro in particular the assessment of trade tax for owners of proas seems to have been very strict. In some of the *desas* of the district in question, i.e. in Bedji, Njamuk, and Bodjonegoro, complaints were made that the trade tax on proas had been excessively increased. 35 proa-owners sent a petition to the Resident of Banten in the beginning of 1887, demanding the reduction of the trade tax.¹³⁰ How did the increase come about? In previous years, the trade tax for proas had been fixed without taking into account the cargo space. As he considered this regulation unreasonable, Gubbels ordered a revision in that very year. The crucial problem was what kind of criteria should be employed in fixing the trade tax on proas. At a meeting of civil servants, it was agreed upon that ten guilders would be assessed for each *kojang* (a unit of tonnage) without taking into account the size of the proas. Nor was the destination of the proas taken into account. The average income from each journey was closely connected with these two factors. Viewed in this light, the owners of small proas were clearly in a disadvantageous position. What made things worse was a mistake made in measuring the proas with the result that their tonnage as registered exceeded the actual one.¹³¹ Moreover, the year 1887 was unfortunately a bad one for proa-owners. All in all, the trade tax was felt to be oppressive and the growing grievance was once again manifested by a petition sent to the Resident of Banten by people from the district of Kramat Watu and Tjilegon.¹³² In both cases the petitions were not acceded to. After the rebellion, Gubbels was blamed for handling these issues in a careless way on the one hand, and for having stubbornly clung to a decision although

¹²⁹ Ibidem. See also the minutes of the conference of civil servants at Serang, on Aug. 28, 1885, in Vb. Jan. 23, 1889, no. 22.

¹³⁰ Assistant Resident of Anjer to the Resident of Banten, May 17, 1887, no. 527, in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4, as Appendix L. See also Appendix I.

¹³¹ Report of the Director of the Department of Interior (hereafter referred to as Report DDI), Sept. 18, 1888, no. 5162 (in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4), p. 166.

¹³² Report DDI, p. 171.

he had seen its inconsistency from the outset, on the other. In addition it may be noted that one of the reasons for refusing the request was, as Gubbels put it: "Since the people have sent a petition for reduction there is no question that it will be granted, otherwise they will become insolent."¹³³ In fact, Gubbels was trying to enact uniform measures concerning the trade tax in his region without taking into account the differences in local conditions. For Anjer, with its booming trade with South Sumatra, the measures were less harmful than for Bedji, Bodjonegoro and Njamuk. Having no other means of redress, the proa-owners in these places threatened to stop navigation if their petition was not granted. It is hard to tell to what extent this matter contributed to heightening the tension among the rural population, but it is noteworthy that a considerable part of the rebellious group was recruited from this area.¹³⁴

In addition to the aforementioned cases concerning tax assessment, the levying of a special kind of trade tax in Tjilegon, i.e. the market tax, is of particular interest. On the basis of article 14 of the Ordinance of January 17, 1878, the Resident of Banten ordered that market-goers were liable to pay the market tax. In Tjilegon its assessment seemed to be very strict, and serious objections relative to people who occasionally sold some produce were not taken into consideration. All market-goers had to pay at least one guilder. If the tax due from them had not been paid, the administration used imprisonment or the exaction of a fine amounting to 15 guilders as a sanction. It once happened that those at the market who did not possess the tax bill were taken into custody and that the panic-stricken population fled from the market. For some time the place remained deserted on market days.¹³⁵ According to the report 16 people were put on trial in a period of two months, i.e. July and August 1887. As the charge sheets were burnt during the revolt, it cannot be calculated how many people had been summoned by the police and how many of them did not appear. It may easily be imagined that this case added to the burden of taxation in the region. There were naturally more grievances applying to the

¹³³ Report DDI, p. 168.

¹³⁴ The petitioners came from Njamuk, Bedji, and Bodjonegoro; from the region whence the most prominent leaders of the rebellion came, i.e. H. Wasid; and H. Mahmud. A large section of the rebels was also recruited from this area. Cf. A. Djajadiningrat (1936, p. 120), referring to Bodjonegoro as a place notorious for its thieves, smugglers, prostitutes. See also Appendix I.

¹³⁵ Report DDI, pp. 186-187.

afdeling Anjer but the above-mentioned may be regarded as the most relevant to the socio-economic conditions prevailing in the area during the years shortly before the outbreak of the rebellion.

ECONOMIC STRINGENCY CAUSED BY PHYSICAL DISASTERS

There is little doubt that during the decade preceding the rebellion socio-economic conditions imposed unfamiliar and unexpected pressures and demands and therefore became a cumulative source of frustration. It is noteworthy that the whole region had suffered very badly from recurrent physical disasters during the years preceding the revolt. The cattle plague in 1879 reduced the total stock to one-third so that there was a decided lack of buffaloes and very many rice fields had to be abandoned. The method taken to prevent the spread of the disease — simply killing the cattle *en masse* — caused much damage, and anxiety among the people. It was obvious enough that the whole agronomy of the region was considerably disturbed.¹³⁶

The following year witnessed a fever epidemic which caused the death of more than ten per cent of the population. Because of the great shortage of manpower, many rice fields were abandoned and even the harvest could not be reaped. Consequently, a period of great famine was bound to follow.¹³⁷

The people had not yet recovered from all this misery when the big eruption of Mt. Krakatau in 1883 ravaged the region to an immense extent; indeed, it was the worst eruption in the recorded volcanological history of Indonesia. More than 20,000 people lost their lives, many prosperous villages were destroyed and fertile rice fields were changed into barren lands. It took the population several years to recover from the enormous damage.¹³⁸

Undoubtedly the cattle plague and fever epidemic, and the famine resulting from them, and the volcanic eruption which followed, affected

¹³⁶ Up to July 1880, 46,229 buffaloes were killed. See van Kesteren, in *IG* (1881), no. 1, p. 682. See further: *IG* (1882), no. 1, p. 559 ff.; *TNI* (1882), no. 2, p. 253.

¹³⁷ In a period of four months, i.e. from January until April 1880, the number of the dead was 12,162; see *IG* (1881), no. 1, p. 690. Only 6107 *bau* of rice fields were cultivated as compared to 28,825 *bau* in previous years; see van Kesteren, in *IG* (1881), no. 1, p. 683.

¹³⁸ For the eruption of Mt Krakatau, we refer to the description by van Sandick (n.d.) in his "*In het rijk van Vulkaan*". See also the report of the Resident of Banten, in *Javasche Courant*, Oct. 5, 1883, in which he pointed out that within two months a large part of the region had recovered from the damages.

the population heavily: due to the reduction of both cattle stock and manpower, about one-third of the arable land was left uncultivated during those ravage years (1880—1882), while the eruption of Mt. Krakatau added a vast acreage of uncultivated land, especially in the western part of the *afdeling* of Tjaringin and Anjer. Failure of the crops in many years (1878—1886) aggravated the situation.¹³⁹ The scope of this study, however, does not permit us to deal with those physical calamities at length, but insofar as they had a direct bearing upon the propensity of the population to revolt, they will be touched upon in due course. This omission can be justified by the fact that our particular interest is focused not so much on unique historical events with their abrupt impact in the socio-economic sphere, but rather on the socio-economic structures, patterns, and tendencies which made up the framework in which the social movement under study can be placed.

¹³⁹ For the economic consequences of the catastrophes, see Nederburgh (1888) in his "*Tjilegon-Bantam-Java*". Data and figures were based on *Koloniale Verslagen* from 1872-1887. On the basis of those figures it may be inferred that the economic consequences of the Mt. Krakatau eruption were certainly not greater than those of the previous catastrophes. Heavy damages were mainly confined to the coastal region of Tjaringin and Anjer, while the cattle plague and the fever epidemic were widespread.

CHAPTER III

POLITICAL DEVELOPMENT

CONCEPTUAL SCHEME

Political transformation, as it took place in Banten in the nineteenth century, is the central theme of this chapter. We shall attempt to delineate the process of change from traditional political structures to modern ones, which were modelled after political structures in the Western world. The process of transformation in this context involves a shift of institutional patterns away from the traditional patterns of authority and towards the acceptance and institutionalization of a set of political norms and objectives which were primarily Western in their inspiration. In this study an attempt will be made to detect the essential distinction between traditional and modern political institutional structures in the light of various historical instances. Special attention will be paid to the inter-group conflicts inherent to institutional change. The political participation, aspirations, and goals of the various social groups inevitably imposed important boundaries on the process of modernization. The extent to which the different social strata furthered the development of modern political institutions, and the extent to which these strata impeded such development will be investigated. The emphasis should be shifted from large-scale political historical studies to more detailed institutional studies which enable us to understand more clearly how people adapted themselves, their ideas, and their actions to the new situations with which they were confronted. In this connection it should be stated that the political process is seen mainly as a group process and that the political situation is described as consisting of the interaction of various social elements.¹ This analysis refers to the old Banten aristocracy, the colonial civil servants, the religious leaders, and the peasantry rather than to government regulations and

¹ The concept of government as a group process can be found in the works of Bently (1908), esp. Chap. VII; Truman (1951), esp. the first four chapters; for Easton's concept of a political process in terms of the interaction of various social groups, see Easton (1953), pp. 171-200.

ordinances. Political norms and goals are dealt with as the representative values of the social groups engaged in the political struggle. Furthermore, in the setting of Banten society, political institutions do not simply refer to "the state" or "government" but tend to be associated with other social units, such as the family, the lineage group, and the religious community.

The general theoretical presuppositions which underlie this study relate to two major components. Firstly, use is made of Weber's conceptual scheme referring to the institutionalization of authority, which seems suitable for a comparative analysis of traditional and modern social institutions in Banten. The process of structural differentiation in the social system over time resulted in the emergence of distinct types of authority.² Secondly, the typology of social value-orientation as constructed by Parsons will be helpful in casting more light on the structural differentiation and variability of traditional and modern social systems. The pattern variables of diffuseness versus specificity in the expression of authority, of ascription or achievement based status, and of universalistic versus particularistic norms, can be pointed out in the various instances of political transfer.³

This study adopts as its point of departure the description of the traditional system in Banten, for the following reasons. It was traditional society that became disorganized under Western impact but at the same time it was the traditional patterns which were still dominant in the life of many social groups in 19th-century Banten. The outcome of the process of modernization is also conditioned heavily by the nature of the society's traditional heritage. The changes imposed were limited by traditional attitudes and alignments. The dominating influence on the polity in 19th-century Banten was the tradition of old loyalties and values, which showed remarkable persistence. The emergence of new political groups in Banten often meant that these groups and the forms of authority associated with them assumed many characteristics of traditional society. It must be added that the political development during the period under study showed all too clearly that new loyalties and associations had come into being, while old alliances had been broken. Under conflict conditions, the traditional ruling groups sought to entrench their power and privileged position, while new groups, backed by the colonial ruler, challenged them. The ascendancy of the latter led to alliances between those not in a position of power and

² For the three types of authority, see Weber (1964), pp. 324-429.

³ Parsons (1951), pp. 101-112.

control, namely the noblemen and the religious leaders. Rivalries were expressed in political alignments which in turn found their expression in support or obstruction of the colonial authorities. In this connection we are also concerned with factionalism or intra-group conflict, each group exhibiting cleavages within its own ranks, either as individuals or as groups.

As has been indicated above, the traditionally oriented system will be taken as basis for our description and analysis. This is quite logical, since the structural modification exerted by Western political organization did not operate in a political vacuum. It remoulded the traditional political system to a modern one.

TRADITIONAL POLITICAL STRUCTURE AND ITS DISRUPTION

In the structure of the traditional state it was the sultan's power which had the prerogative in both political and religious matters. Immediately below the sultan were the royal princes and other members of the nobility. Some of them were in charge of the supervision of the palace guards and the slaves, but as members of the sultan's descent group they were usually not included in the administrative organization.⁴ As was the case in other traditional Javanese states, administrative authority was delegated to members of the bureaucratic gentry. At the head of the central bureaucracy was the *patih* (grand vizier), while the highest religious-judicial function was exercised by the *Fakih Nadjamudin*. The former was assisted by two *kliwons*, who were also commonly called *patih*. Below these highest ranking officials was the *punggawa*, who was in charge of the administration and supervision of pepper cultivation, production and trade. Then came the *sjahbandars*, whose task was the administration and supervision of foreign trade in the ports.⁵ Of equal rank as these prominent office-holders in the ports were the regional chiefs, namely the *Bumi* of Lebak, the *Pangeran* of Tjaringin, and the *Bupati* of Pontang and Djasinga. Then followed a host of *punggawas*, *ngabeujs*, *kliwons*, and *paliwaras*,⁶ functioning as supervisors of warehouses and of household services at court, or as liaison officers. Although the administrative staff originally consisted of commoners, ties of affinal kinship were frequently used to strengthen the bond between the royal patron and the commoner client. After a few generations this political

⁴ See *BKI* (1856), pp. 155-159; compare Malaka and Mataram; van den Berg, in *BKI*, Vol. LIII (1901), pp. 45-63.

⁵ For the various functions of the *sjahbandar*, see Chap. II, note no. 89.

⁶ Van Vollenhoven, Vol. I (1931), p. 714; see also *BKI* (1856), pp. 107-170.

mechanism of "built-in" affinal relations brought about the emergence of a new élite. It must be noted that bureaucratic positions were officially not hereditary, although ties of kinship with the bureaucratic élite gave one advantages and facilitated one's access.⁷

In the beginning of the 19th century, *punggawas* were employed by the sultan as administrators of parts of the sultanate. At the lowest level of the bureaucratic hierarchy, the *ngabeuj* and the *lurah* were entrusted with the control over a number of households. Their main task was to collect taxes and tributes, and to keep public order. The position of *ngabeuj* was often hereditary, and was considered somewhat patriarchal. In exercising their authority, the *ngabeujs* still required the support of a higher authority.⁸

Important as landholdings were, control over them was not the exclusive material basis of the political authority of the Bantenese rulers. Commercial transactions were always subject to superintendence and taxation by the sultan's officials. Furthermore, monopolies of staple products — like pepper — were one of the economic prerogatives of the state. Besides land grants, the income of the aristocracy and members of the sultanate's bureaucracy consisted of allowances drawn from taxes, leases, and shares in the profits of commercial undertakings. Our sources inform us that the economic policies and measures employed by the sultan included import and export duties imposed on trade in pepper, tobacco, *gambir*, cotton, etc., and taxes levied on cattle, houses, and proas. Furthermore, the sultan was also assured of the necessary income from farming out sovereign levies on markets, sugar mills, landed property, etc.⁹ As the trade in Banten degenerated in the course of the 18th century, agriculture gained in prominence in Banten economy, with the result that the remuneration of office-holders consisted mainly of land grants.¹⁰

⁷ An exception was the post of regional head of Tjaringin, which was hereditary; see van Vollenhoven, Vol. I. (1931), p. 714.

⁸ Compare the function of the *bekel* in the Principalities, where the usurpation of the king reduced this village authority to a tax collector; see Rouffaer's "Vorstenlanden" in *Adatrechtbundels*, Vol. XXXIV (1931), pp. 233-378. Under Dutch rule the position of the *ngabeuj* was occupied by the so-called *mandoor*. See Bergsma, *Eindresumé*, Vol. III (1896), Appendix, pp. 170-171.

⁹ For the structure of patrimonial administration, see Bendix (1962), pp. 346-347; also van Leur (1955), pp. 137-139. Cf. van der Sprenkel, in *History and Theory*, Vol. III (1964), pp. 348-370; in this article an appraisal and criticism were given of Weber's theory on patrimonial bureaucracy, with special reference to Chinese society.

¹⁰ *BKI* (1856), pp. 107-170.

As regards the political struggle within a traditional state, besides the royal princes the potential rivals of the ruler were the bureaucratic and the religious élite. We have seen that the bureaucratic élite was unable to generate an autonomous force, since they were economically and politically controlled by the ruler. Frequent intermarriage with members of the royal family weakened their position as a political group. As to the religious élite, in the Banten sultanate a segment of it was incorporated into the general framework of the administrative system. From the ruler's point of view, the free-floating religious leaders could jeopardize him personally, because they commanded great charismatic power and were able to stir up vehement religious movements. It is generally known that in traditional Islamic states an antagonism can be observed between the autonomous religious teachers and the religious officials.¹¹ With regard to the royal princes, these noblemen can be thought of as potential usurpers. In the course of the history of the Banten sultanate, revolts occurred which were led by rebellious princes, who used their ascribed fitness to rule to challenge the paramount authority of a new ruler.¹² It should be noted that traditional revolts frequently resulted in changes of personnel but did not alter the system. With the introduction of Western administration, the system began to undergo gradual but fundamental alteration. We must examine the political activities and roles of major groups among the political élite. The process of modernization brought about a large scale readjustment of status hierarchy from which the patterns of political allegiance emerged. The normative aspirations of the different status groups were reflected in the different ways of reacting towards modernization.

When the Dutch took over the sultanate, they met with a society which already possessed a long history of bureaucratic rule. Having emerged as a harbour principality, the sultanate had in the course of its existence developed a professional bureaucracy of its own. It had not, however, grown into a full-fledged bureaucracy as was to be found in other traditional bureaucratic states, like Mataram.¹³ Unfortunately,

¹¹ The uprising led by Kjai Tapa from 1748 to 1751 is an excellent example of the political role of religious leaders in a traditional state; see Stapel, Vol. IV (1938-1941), pp. 197-198; also van der Aa in *BKI*, S. IV, Vol. V (1881), pp. 1-128. For a general account of the antagonism between the two segments of the religious élite, see Pigeaud, *Javaansche Beschavings-geschiedenis*, MS no. H. 717 a-c of the *Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*.

¹² Wars of succession in Banten occurred in 1682, 1748 and 1805; see *BKI*, S. IV, Vol. V (1881), p. 1-128; Kielstra (1917), p. 34-58.

¹³ See Rouffaer, in *Adatrechtbundels*, Vol. XXXIV (1931), pp. 233-278;

the decade before the annexation of the sultanate by the Dutch witnessed a rapid deterioration of Banten, once a mighty and prosperous state with the largest port of Indonesia. The reigns of the last sultans were full of strife and intrigues, so that anarchy and disaster prevailed. Although the region surrounding the sultan's court was relatively peaceful, the more remote areas were terrorized by brigands, bandits, and outlaws.¹⁴ Internally divided the sultanate and its ruler could not resist the pressures and levies imposed by the Dutch.

After the annexation of the Banten sultanate by Daendels in 1808, the sultan and the political machinery were retained, but were put under close supervision of the Dutch government. Banten was declared its domain, while the realm was considerably reduced.¹⁵ Sultan Abu'n-Natsr Mohamad Ishak Zainu'l Mustakin was exiled to Amboina and was succeeded by Sultan Abu'l-Mafachir Mohamad Aliudin.¹⁶ He was allowed to use the title of sultan, but was in fact only a figure-head,¹⁷ since Banten was now incorporated within Dutch territory. His "power" turned out to be unfavourable for Banten society, because he was at the mercy of cliques of religious leaders and court ladies, who secretly supported a conspiracy of malcontents. It is remarkable that the reforms of 1808 inflicted a considerable blow on the privileged Banten aristocracy.¹⁸ They feared losing their incomes from their landholdings or offices, which conferred on them power, prestige, and honour. Furthermore, as fervent Muslims they naturally disliked the overrule of infidel

also *BKI*, (1856), pp. 107-170. Cf. Chap. II, note no. 30.

¹⁴ See Roorda van Eysinga, Vol. IV (1832), pp. 167-168; also the report of Resident Tobias in *TNI* (1870), no. 2, pp. 319-327.

¹⁵ Lampung, Tangerang and Djasinga were brought under other administrative units according to the regulation of Nov. 22, 1808; see Daendels (1814), p. 56.

¹⁶ For the complete list of the Sultans of Banten, see Lekkerkerker (1938), pp. 346-347. The last six sultans were:

1. 1802-1805 S. Abdulfath Mohamad Muchji'din Zainu's Salihin
2. 1805-1808 S. Abu'n-Natsr Mohamad Ishak Zainu'l Mustakin (brother of 1)
3. 1808-1810 S. Abu'l-Mafachir Mohamad Aliudin II (son of 2)
4. 1810-1813 S. Mohamad bin Muchji'din Zainu's Salihin (son of 1)
5. 1814-1815 S. Mohamad Safiudin
6. S. Mohamad Rafiudin (son of 5)

¹⁷ In terms of status and power, a distinction should be made between the regents in the various regions of Java, such as West Java, Central Java, East Java and Madura. See Resink's articles on the regent's position, in *ITR*, Vol. CXLIX (1939); Vol. CL (1940); esp. Vol. CXLIX (1939), pp. 732-775.

¹⁸ For the declaration of Banten as a government's domain and the abolition of serfdom in 1808, see Daendels (1814), p. 56.

foreigners. Their aim was therefore to discredit the Dutch government in the eyes of the people on the one hand and to make the Dutch reluctant to govern Banten on the other. Both goals could be achieved by keeping the country internally divided and by perpetuating the state of anarchy. They achieved their aim in part, for the Dutch abandoned South Banten in 1810 and ceded it to the sultan.¹⁹ This political situation did not last long, because in 1813, in accordance with an agreement between Raffles and Bagus Mohamad, South Banten had to be surrendered to the British colonial government. In return the sultan was allowed to keep his rank and was allotted an annual stipend from the government.²⁰ In 1832, the last sultan was deported to Surabaya where he lived in exile together with two of his predecessors.²¹ Their personal role in Banten politics was annihilated, but it will be shown that the sultanate still maintained its symbolic significance for the Bantenese throughout the 19th century. Moreover, the Banten nobility as a community of descendants of sultans not only kept the memory of the sultanate alive among the population, but was also engaged in political activities which were aimed at its restoration. Historical evidence clearly indicates that the nobility was often involved in rebellions and conspiracies to overthrow the colonial government.

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE NOBILITY

It would be too much of a generalization to speak of a militant and rebellious Banten nobility. In fact only a few powerful and energetic individuals were concerned; they skilfully exploited their high status and prestige in order to assume leadership, and then managed to acquire power over the new ruling class by weaving an intricate network of interests and loyalties among them. In contrast to this category of noblemen, many descendants of the sultans were impoverished and depended for their livelihood on grants from the Dutch government. It was notorious that the brothers and sons of the sultan in exile lived as *bons vivants* in Surabaya and were deeply in debt because of their

¹⁹ According to the regulation of Aug. 22, 1810, the lowlands were divided into regencies, the western and the northern one, while South Banten was ruled by the Sultan; see Daendels (1814), Appendix no. VII.

²⁰ Van Deventer, Vol. I (1891), pp. 147-148.

²¹ See note no. 15: Sultan Zainu'lMustakin was exiled to Batavia by Daendels in 1808 and later deported by the British to Surabaya, where he died in 1848; Sultan Aliudin II was dethroned in 1810 and exiled to Batavia, and in 1826 was removed to Surabaya, where he died in 1849. See Report of Resident Tobias, in *TNI* (1870), no. 2, pp. 319-320; see also Roorda van Eysinga, Vol. III, part 2 (1842), p. 308.

prodigality.²² As exiles, they were deprived of power and had no social roots, and therefore could not take part in any hostile activity against the colonial government. Viewed in this light the case of the pretender, Sabidin, will be interesting as an instance of a movement aiming at the restoration of the sultanate.

As regards the nobility in Banten, their position was quite different. During the sultanate, the body of the noblemen was constantly being enlarged. Families of royal kinsmen were to be found all over the country, because polygamy was practised by members of the royal family on an extensive scale. This matrimonial institution inevitably led to social degradation *en masse*. The Banten nobility was graded from the royal princes down to simple country gentlemen, who led a life hardly distinguishable from that of a peasant.²³ Even after the abolition of the sultanate the nobility formed the most noteworthy component of the aristocracy, not only in numbers but also in prestige and opportunity. It must be admitted, however, that the said event bereft them of the head of the powerful aristocratic lineage, who could continually replenish the nobility. It was quite logical that they attempted to overcome this setback by all the means at their disposal: enlargement of landownership, intermarriage with the new ruling class, enhancement of their religious prestige, or even employment in the colonial service. In fact, in many respects the nobility continued to enjoy great initial advantages, because noble status not only remained a special asset, but was also a badge of eminence. It was generally realized that with the introduction of the colonial bureaucracy and its concomitant, a new power élite, the nobility was put on the defensive. Throughout the 19th century, they were successful in their attempt to preserve their privileges, prestige and power, to the extent that in Banten politics the colonial government had to reckon with them. For our purpose we are much concerned with the role they played in contending for power and with their position in the alliances within the framework of the multi-cornered political struggle. In order to obtain insight into this complex process, a few historical cases will be examined later on.

From the outset the nobility continued to enjoy great initial advan-

²² Sultan Rafiudin lived with his family in the southern part of Surabaya. He was quite passive and was dominated by his wife. His income of 400 guilders per 10 days did not prevent him from getting into debt, because of the wastefulness of his family; see *TNI* (1859), no. 1, pp. 29-30.

²³ In 1856, 14 members of the sultan's family received a monthly subsidy ranging from 100 to 8 guilders, depending on the grade of nobility; see *O.I.B. Apr. 22, 1856, no. 4 and May 17, 1862, no. 25.*

tages in the political arena in Banten after its annexation, for the very reason that the new colonial administration could not get ahead without the force of the prominent influence of the Banten nobility. It proved opportune that either members of the nobility or those with affinity to it were appointed as top officials during the initial stages of Dutch rule, in order to facilitate the enforcement of colonial policy in this rebellious area. The Banten nobility was still thought worthy of the political loyalty of the Bantenese. In fact, in the eyes of the Bantenese, the Banten nobility was of higher standing than the civil servants — at first the civil servants who were commoners did not enjoy the high regard of the population.²⁴ The policy made the numerical superiority of the high-born in the upper ranks of the colonial bureaucracy conspicuous.²⁵ The colonial government intended that they should perform the task of cementing the interpenetration of the new political system and the old order of Banten society. In short, they had to be won over to the colonial cause. The state of chronic socio-political unrest in Banten during the first couple of decades of Dutch administration was an indication that the Dutch did not derive great benefit from the adaptiveness of the Banten nobles who succeeded in capturing high positions. We may assume that they were not so much concerned with promoting the consolidation of the Dutch regime, but rather with perpetuating their position in upper-class society. This failure to domesticate the Banten nobility forced the Dutch to adopt another policy, which we may denote as the policy of the ennoblement of the civil service.²⁶

As the nobility's attempt to bolster its traditional superior position through professional government service was not quite successful, visible signs of another process of readjustment could be observed. There was yet another avenue to regaining their prestige, namely intermarriage with the new ruling class. New civil servants of non-noble origin, inclined to surmount their deficiencies in genealogical inheritance, married into the Banten nobility. They made attempts to lift themselves to the status

²⁴ The title of the regent reminded the people of an occupation during the sultanate which ranked rather low in the hierarchy; there were *tumenggungs* who were in charge of the royal stable, kitchen or garden. See *De Locomotief* Nov. 3, 1888.

²⁵ See *Regeeringsalmanak*, 1821-1833. To mention a few: P.A. Adisantika, P.A.A. Senadjaja, R.B. Dipaningrat, R.A. Djaja Kusumaningrat, R.B. Nitinegara.

²⁶ As in other regions, the appointment of a new regent was also based as far as possible on the hereditary principle, on condition, however, that other qualifications should not be ignored. See Schrieke (1955), pp. 187-188.

of the nobility and to be absorbed into them. As it often happened that men who were married to noble women appeared to be more successful in attaining high appointments, this intermarriage was not only encouraged but tended to become fashionable. Apparently the fusion of the two originally distinct sub-groups — the bureaucratic élite and the old nobility — reinforced their leadership position. In line with this trend, the civil servants in 19th-century Banten were headed by a special segment of the Banten nobility made up of nobles of descent and nobles of ascent as well. As civil servants, they derived much benefit from their inherited station in life and from the tacit recognition of their superior qualities of leadership. Prominent regents in Banten, who may well be categorized under the said type of civil servants, were Mandura Radja Djajanegara, Tjondronegoro, Sutadiningrat, all Regents of Serang for the last term of their service; and Natadiningrat, Regent of Pandelwang.²⁷ They were related by marriage to the sultan's family and to each other. Within a span of three generations a whole network of kinship ties was built up among the bureaucratic élite, but rivalries and dissensions prevented it from growing into a powerful ruling class. During the same space of time the importance of noble origin lessened, so that a movement like the Sabidin affair inevitably failed, simply because it lacked the full support of the population among whom the nobility no longer had primacy.

THE ROLE OF PRINCESS RATU SITI AMINAH

Ratu Siti Aminah was certainly one of the most prominent figures in Banten politics during the second half of the 19th century. As a cousin of Sultan Safiudin she belonged to the high-ranking royal princesses in Banten.²⁸ Her marriage to the Regent of Serang, Tjondronegoro, was an advancement in social status, which provided greater means and better opportunities. In 19th-century Banten, intermarriage between noble women and ranking officials had become a general trend.²⁹ In the 1880s, Ratu Siti Aminah was described as a rather active and energetic aged lady. She was the dominant figure in the

²⁷ O.I.B. July 5, 1839, no. 14, referring to Mandura Radja Djajanegara; O.I.B. Sept. 16, 1849, no. 12, referring to Tjondronegoro and Natadiningrat; O.I.B. Sept. 28, 1874, no. 8, referring to Sutadiningrat.

²⁸ See Appendix III.

²⁹ A few examples: Mandura Radja Djajanegara was married to Ratu Siti Aissah, Tjondronegoro to Ratu Siti Aminah, Kusumanegara to Ratu Madju, Sutadiningrat to Ratu Siti Saodah and later, also to Ratu Hamsah. See Appendix III.

sultan's family. Furthermore, she was also — as the Dutch report put it — the incarnation of orthodox Islam, which was a typical feature of the sultanate.³⁰ Her powerful influence extended not only to the descendants of the sultan, but also to the religious élite in Kasunjatan, Banten, and Kanari, the religious centres of the residency Banten.³¹

As has been described previously, her claim to what used to be domain lands was rejected in 1868.³² As her income had shrunk considerably, she played a more and more restricted role in Banten society. The more she lost her grip on society, the closer was her association with the religious élite. She regained her social power to some extent by assuming the leadership of the orthodox party. It must be noted that the popular devotion to the sultan's family was mainly confined to the northern part of Banten. Ratu Siti Aminah realized that only a small part of the population would support an attempt to restore the sultanate. Her main aim was to uphold and aggrandize her family and simultaneously to defend the Muslim creed. In order to attain these goals she continually intrigued. A well-known instance of her intrigues was the notorious Sabidin affair of 1882. Undoubtedly Ratu Siti Aminah derived such benefit not only from her inherited station, but also from her position as mother of the Regent of Serang, and as mother-in-law of the Regent of Pandeglang.³³

The Regent of Serang, Gondokusumo, did not dare oppose his mother; it was often out of fear rather than love that he obeyed her. Consequently the regent was not autonomous in his actions, which were dictated by his mother. Among the civil servants he was therefore known as a rather weak ruler, who could not manage the religious leaders.³⁴ His reluctance to mix with Europeans was ascribed to pride, but some suspected that it was fear which withheld him from associating closely with Europeans; he was afraid that the religious leaders would charge him with being pro-Dutch. In fact, he realized fully that his position depended wholly upon the power of the colonial regime.

Another prominent member of the sultan's family was the wife of

³⁰ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Dec. 18, 1883, in MR 1884, no. 26.

³¹ Official documents relating to the Tjilegon rebellion give no indication that Ratu Siti Aminah was involved in the conspiracy.

³² Referred to in Chap. II, p. 39.

³³ See Appendix III.

³⁴ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Dec. 18, 1883; see also Secret missive of the Resident of Banten, July 7, 1889, no. 249, in MR 1889, no. 597. To the author's mind, Gondokusumo's weakness should rather be ascribed to his membership of the Kadiriah *tarekat*. See WNI (1888-1889), p. 110.

Regent Sutadiningrat of Pandeglang, Ratu Hamsah, the daughter of Ratu Siti Aminah.³⁵ It was said that she took after her mother. Her pride and her lust for power were quite notorious. Moreover, her prodigality was remarkable, hence her chronic financial troubles. In government circles it was feared that this might endanger the position of her husband.³⁶ For various reasons Ratu Siti Aminah was on more intimate terms with her than with the Regent of Serang. Firstly, the latter was more or less "enlightened" and had already adopted some Western ideas. Secondly, his wife was not very religious. Small wonder that the old Ratu preferred to stay in Pandeglang rather than in Serang. It is very unlikely, however, that she was able to exert any influence on the population in Pandeglang, since its ties with the sultan's family had never been so close as was the case in the environment of Serang, the old core region of the sultanate. We may assume that her influence in Pandeglang was limited to the direct environment of the regent's family. Within the family circle her intrigues were allowed free play.³⁷ It must be admitted that she was generally not loved because of her great ambition.

THE SABIDIN AFFAIR

The way in which intrigues were performed among the nobility and the civil servants by manipulating kinship bonds, privileges, prestige and power, is clearly shown in the Sabidin affair, which occurred a few years before the outbreak of the revolt. It is an instance of the incessant attempts on the part of the old Banten aristocracy to stir up the people and to revive their longing for the glorious past of the sultanate. The ambiguous attitude of many high-ranking officials gave free play to such practices. Contemporary records regarded the Sabidin affair as a manifestation of the strong craving of part of the Banten élite for the restoration of the sultanate.³⁸ Whatever the motives were, the affair

³⁵ Ratu Hamsah was a daughter out of Ratu Siti Aminah's marriage to Tubagus Machmud; see A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 40; she was the second wife of Sutadiningrat. See missive of the Resident of Banten, July 7, 1889, no. 249. She was better known as R.A. Pudjaningrat; see Groenhof (1920), p. 3.

³⁶ For the prodigality of Sutadiningrat's second wife, see missive of the Resident of Banten, July 7, 1889, no. 249.

³⁷ Her role reminds us of that played by Ratu Sjarifa, who managed to make her nephew the crown pretendent, although he was not of noble origin. See *BKI*, S. IV, Vol. V (1881), pp. 1-128.

³⁸ *Java Bode*, Aug. 18, 1888, p. 194. This article was based on court records related to the prosecution of Sabidin. Cf. Missive of the Resident of Banten, May 19, 1882, Lⁿ P, in *MR* 1882, no. 592.

threw light on the political role which the Sultan's family was able to perform and the means they had access to. The intricately interwoven relationship between the civil servants and the nobility made it possible for an adventurer like Sabidin to be successful in performing his role as a pseudo-prince for a considerable length of time.

According to the *Java Bode*, Sabidin was born in Jogjakarta, the son of an Indonesian woman called Piet. (sic)³⁹ When he was twelve years old, he went to Surabaya where he found employment in a navy workshop. He was successively employed as designer and as steersman. He happened to become acquainted with the well-known painter Raden Saleh, who took him to Paris as one of his attendants. Back in Batavia, Sabidin acquired new acquaintances, among whom was R.M. Sunario, a grandson of the Mangku Negoro. He later exploited this relationship skilfully. As he was still attracted by navy life, he became a steward, on board of first the "Angus" and then the "Zee-meew". After a while he quit his job and disembarked at Onrust, from where he headed towards Karangantu and then to Kasemen. There he came into contact with the retired *patih* of Lebak, Djajakusuma, son-in-law of Ratu Siti Aminah.⁴⁰ The old *patih* thought he recognized Sabidin as Pangeran Timur, the son of Sultan Safiudin, then in exile in Surabaya. Djajakusuma's conviction was strengthened when Hadji Mohamad Arsjad, who became Head *Panghulu* of Serang afterwards, also identified Sabidin as the sultan's son. Under this identity he was then presented to Ratu Siti Aminah and to the regent of Serang, who, without any suspicion or reserve, treated him as such. Furthermore, his physical appearance, his cultured manners, and his ability to recite the *Qur'ān* supported them in their belief in his very noble birth.

The new Resident of Banten, A. J. Spaan, who knew the region thoroughly from previous service, was suspicious of the whole affair; the Regent of Serang had to assure him that Pangeran Timur was a decent person, who had no aspirations whatsoever to occupy the throne of his fore-fathers. By keeping Pangeran Timur at his house, the regent could keep an eye on his behaviour and all his activities. As the resident still doubted Sabidin's royal origin, Ratu Siti Aminah urged Sabidin to go to Tjirebon and obtain authentic papers of his identification. There he was honoured as a saint and the name of Hadji Maulana was

³⁹ *Java Bode*, Aug. 18, 1888, p. 194; also in van Sandick (1892), p. 131.

⁴⁰ For Djajakusuma, see Chap. II, pp. 39-40.

conferred upon him. It must be noted that this honorific title was rarely given, usually only to people of very noble birth who were regarded as prophets or founders of a Muslim state. In the meantime he had managed to get a sea-pass from the Secretary of the Resident of Tjirebon, but on his return journey he took the landroute via Bandung, Tjiandjur, and Bogor back to Banten. Eight days after his arrival in Serang he married the daughter of Djajakusuma, Sapirah. Shortly afterwards he plunged into a second marriage, also to a noble woman, namely Nji Siti Zainah, daughter of Hadji Tubagus Michlar — who was also a *sentana*.

During his travels Sabidin was cordially received firstly by the *Patih* of Lebak, Djajapradja, a brother-in-law of the Regent of Pandeglang, and then by Hadji Ijang in Tjiandjur and Hadji Saripah in Bandung. Especially in Lebak his reception was tremendous, because the *patih's* boast was that he was connected to the sultan's family by his marriage with a sister-in-law of Ratu Hamsah, the daughter of Ratu Siti Aminah. Sabidin's visit gratified his feelings and solidified the ties between the nobility. Meanwhile rumours were spreading in Banten that Pangeran Timur intended to attempt to regain the rights of the sultanate, supported by his six brothers. The European civil servants were soon alarmed. Realizing how dangerous the situation was, the only thing Sabidin could do was to leave Banten as soon as possible and to travel back and forth between Prijangan and Tjirebon. At last he was arrested and after a confrontation with the real members of the sultan's family in Surabaya, Sabidin's deception was easily revealed. He was sentenced to four years' forced labour.⁴¹

According to contemporary records, the main instigators of the Sabidin affair were the retired *Patih* of Lebak, Djajakusuma, and the incumbent one, Tubagus Djajapradja.⁴² Dutch officials undoubtedly feared that the credulity of the people might be skilfully exploited in order to recruit followers, and that the pauperized population, which had to bear the heaviest burden of taxation, were susceptible to agitation. What happened in the old mosque of Banten is a clear instance of this susceptibility. A stream of people went there every Friday to get some of the water with which Sabidin had washed his feet before taking part in the Friday prayers.⁴³ In fact, the bulk of the population was credulous

⁴¹ *Java Bode*, Aug. 18, 1888, p. 194; see also van Sandick (1892), pp. 131-138.

⁴² Secret missive of the Resident of Banten, May 19, 1882, L^a P.

⁴³ Van Sandick (1892), p. 136; Missive of the Resident of Banten, Feb. 27, 1889, no. 58.

enough to believe in Sabidin's holiness and was ready to worship him as a saint. What puzzled the European civil servants most was the fact that high-ranking Bantenese civil servants and even prominent members of the sultan's family were not only ready to recognize Sabidin as Sultan Safiudin's son, but were also eager to please him and to make sacrifices for him such as marrying their daughters off to him. Why Tubagus Djajapradja venerated Sabidin even after he had been unmasked, in this way endangering his own position, cannot be simply explained in terms of deception and adventure. A satisfactory explanation cannot be given as long as the records lack inside information, but in retracing the roles played by the said noblemen and civil servants one might find a clue. In this connection we refer to a conspiracy in the late 'sixties which was led by Djajakusuma himself.⁴⁴ His failure at that time might not have withheld him from making use of a second opportunity in which he could keep out of harm's way. Furthermore, as long as the close kin members of the sultan were still alive, the nobility maintained the fiction of rebellious appeal as a means to restore the sultanate. The excellent performance of the pseudo-prince certainly served to strengthen that idea regardless of what the outcome of the movement might be.

What concerns us here is the fact that the Sabidin affair was symptomatic for Banten society in transition. Besides its significance as a movement to restore the sultan's party, it clearly shows that descent groups consisting of members of extended families played an important role in Banten politics. Bonds between kinsmen and/or agnates rather than abstract principles commanded loyalty. This aspect of traditional relationship clustered round the sultan's family as the first family in Banten. In this connection, further explanation of how the new social roles of the new bureaucratic élite had evolved largely from this traditional relationship is required. Of particular interest is the problem of how the nobility endeavoured to establish enduring relationships with members of the civil service on the one hand, and how the latter had to consolidate their position by amalgamating with the old established sultan's family on the other.

POLICY OF RECRUITMENT TO GOVERNMENT OFFICE

The Banten civil servants must be dealt with at length, since they no doubt were key factors in the political development of transitional

⁴⁴ Some aspects of the conspiracy will be dealt with in Chap IV. We have already mentioned Djajakusuma in connection with the illegal occupation of land; see Chap. II, p. 39.

Banten. Besides the kinship aspects mentioned above, patterns of recruitment are also relevant to the understanding of the formation of the new bureaucratic élite. As a creation of the Dutch regime, it certainly bore the stamp of the colonial policy in matters of appointment and succession. Of course the introduction of the colonial bureaucracy had been performed in the context of Banten institutions and political relationships. As it was to be firmly anchored in the traditional order, it had to be accommodated to old loyalties and values at the outset. The existing hierarchical structure in Banten society facilitated the setting up of the colonial bureaucratic system, so that in this respect no radical changes in the power structure were to be expected. The fact that the bonds of political obligations and dependence partly followed the lines of hierarchical bureaucracy and partly those of affinal relationship, inevitably had its repercussions on the design of colonial policy. In further discussions we shall have to focus on the crucial role of the regent in the colonial bureaucracy. The following outline gives some developmental stages of the formation of the civil service with special reference to the regent.

Banten was made more vulnerable to penetration by the Dutch by recurrent internal struggles. Sultans and princes were constantly on the lookout for a powerful ally and the Dutch were ready to supply such aid in exchange for tributes and later on for overall control. Since 1684, Banten had been a dependency of the Dutch Company, but the sultanate and all indigenous political institutions had been left undisturbed.⁴⁵ After the abolition of the sultanate, a new bureaucratic system was introduced, according to which Banten was divided into three regencies: the northern, western, and southern regencies. The last regency was ruled over by a sultan until 1813.⁴⁶ As has been mentioned before, the colonial government from the first aspired to ally its own interest and those of the old aristocracy by giving appointments to members of the nobility and to their in-laws as well. During the first half of the 19th century the colonial government was therefore geared to rather limited objectives in Banten. It was fully realized that a sudden authority shift, in which entirely alien rules and roles were imposed, might incur the risk of arousing much frustration and discontent, which could mount to rebellion. The drastic measures of 1813 had to be recalled, because they had resulted in a disorderly situation bordering

⁴⁵ De Jonge, *Opkomst*, Vol. VII (1873), pp. 394 ff.

⁴⁶ Daendels (1814), Appendix no. VII; van Deventer, Vol. I (1891), p. 147.

on anarchy.⁴⁷ In fact, throughout the 19th century Banten was notorious as a region which was hard to govern. The civil servants were often rendered powerless. It should be noted that in the 'twenties the handful of European officials lived mostly in the capital of the residency. As a result of this political situation, the Dutch had to rely heavily on Banten authorities in handling the administration of the region. Its weak position naturally placed the colonial government at a disadvantage in recruiting civil servants.

Of relevance to the problem of recruitment is that of succession, which was regarded by the colonial government as one of the principal factors determining the stability of their regime. In the course of the 19th century the problem of succession acquired a pivotal role in the colonial policy of bureaucracy. This certainly holds good with regard to Banten, which was reputed for its lack of respectable individual authorities who could be employed for the purpose of local government administration. The enduring unrest revealed the painful fact that the civil servants were not the real leaders of the people. When at the end of the 19th century the civil servants had become repositories of authority, this was nothing more than the result of a long-standing policy of trial and error on the questions of appointment and succession. This result was achieved only after many upheavals and disturbances had been caused. The case in Tjilegon is but one of many instances. The following cases will be dealt with first.

After the death of R. A. Mandura Radja Djajanegara, Regent of Serang, in 1849, neither his son, R. Bagus Djajakarta — *Patih* of Serang — nor his sons-in-law, Tubagus Suramardja, *Kliwon* of Serang, and Mas Wireleksono, *Demang* of Tjiomas, were appointed to succeed him, for the reason that it was felt that they were not capable of fulfilling the civil servant's task. According to the Resident of Banten, R. Bagus Djajakarta was ignorant, uncivilized, indolent, with no sympathy for the people, and was addicted to opium; Tubagus Suramardja had once been dismissed and was reappointed only out of consideration to his father-in-law; and Mas Wireleksono had too little prestige.⁴⁸ It must be noted that the regent did not have a son by his first wife. His marriage with this first wife, Ratu Siti Aissah — mother of Sultan Safiudin — gave his position a strong backing, but his ill-treatment of her caused much indignation and hostility among the Banten nobility.

⁴⁷ Report of Resident Tobias, in *TNI* (1870), no. 2, pp. 321-332.

⁴⁸ Report on the political situation in Java, and esp. in Banten; in Exh. Aug. 27, 1851, no. 220, pp. 1-7.

Finally the government nominated R. T. A. Tjondronegoro — then Regent of Pandeglang — as Regent of Serang. He was not only capable but also possessed great influence in the entire residency. Moreover, by reason of his marriage to Ratu Siti Aminah, he was closely related to the sultan's family. His old position was given to Mas Ario Nitinegara — *Patih* of Tjaringin — who was also married to a princess.⁴⁹ In the same year, the Regent of Tjaringin, R. T. A. Wiriadidjaja, passed away, and was succeeded by his son, R. T. Kusumanegara.⁵⁰ Both originated from Bogor; they were not liked, in spite of the fact that the latter already had affinity with the sultan's family by his marriage to the sister of Ratu Siti Aminah.⁵¹ It was to be expected that the appointment of Kusumanegara would arouse a strong reaction; in fact, it mounted to a large rebellion, usually known as the Wachia rebellion. Here we meet with a policy of appointment which had grave consequences. It was quite natural for Djajakarta to instigate the revolt, simply because he had been passed over twice. His expectations had undoubtedly been high, since at that time the hereditary succession had more or less become a general pattern in Java.⁵² As to Banten, this general trend can be observed there as well.

R. A. A. Tjondronegoro was succeeded by his stepson, R. T. P. Gondokusumo, previously Regent of Pandeglang. The former was of commoner origin; but by marrying into the sultan's family, he established a family of orientation of a higher stratum position, which in turn facilitated the official advancement of the latter.⁵³ During their lifetime extra-bureaucratic factors still largely determined the official advancement of Banten civil servants. This was also the case in our second example. R. T. A. Natadiningrat, Regent of Pandeglang, was succeeded by his eldest son, R. T. Sutadiningrat, who was later promoted to Regent of Serang after the Tjilegon affair. His younger brother, R. Bagus Djajawinata, succeeded him as Regent of Serang. After his death in

⁴⁹ Ibidem.

⁵⁰ Wiriadidjaja was better known as Bontjel in his boyhood; owing to the patronage of a European at Bogor he made a good career in the civil service. See A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 111.

⁵¹ O.I.B. Nov. 8, 1864, no. 18. See also Appendix III.

⁵² The hereditary rights of regents became customary, although not officially established. Because of the faithfulness of the regents in the Java War (1825-1830), these rights had been solemnly promised. For the development of these rights, see van Delden (1862), and a more recent work, Schrieke (1955), esp. pp. 201-221.

⁵³ For some illuminating facts relating to Tjondronegoro's and Gondokusumo's backgrounds, see A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 40.

1899, R. A. Djajadiningrat, the eldest son, occupied the regent's position at Serang. Both Natadiningrat and Sutadiningrat were married into the sultan's family and this act decidedly improved their stratum position. It cannot be denied, however, that both were social climbers primarily because of their ability and fitness for the civil service. To complete the list of prominent regents' families, in which the position of regent was held by at least two successive generations, there were R. T. Karta Natanegara and his son, R. T. Djajanegara; and R. T. Suta Angunangun and his son, R. T. Surawinangun. The former were Sundanese and originally came from Bogor,⁵⁴ while the latter were South-Bantenese and of commoner origin.⁵⁵

From the above list it is obvious that the government upheld the hereditary right of regents insofar as it coincided with essential bureaucratic requirements such as ability, diligence, and faithfulness.⁵⁶ Obviously the granting of hereditary right to a regent's family was intended to assure their support of and faithfulness towards the colonial government. These people could naturally be assumed to be sympathetic towards a situation in which their prestige and position were guaranteed and upheld. A rather disagreeable consequence of the continuation of hereditary rights was the growth of nepotism in the area.⁵⁷ Indeed, after two or three generations, families clustering around high-ranking civil servants built up a network of relationships and affiliations, which grew into a clique monopolizing the offices in the region within a few

⁵⁴ Karta Natanegara was a son of Raden Mohamad Tahir and brother to the regent of Bogor, Wiranata, see *TNI*, S. VII, Vol. 3 (1845), p. 484; van Sandick (1892), p. 218.

⁵⁵ O.I.B. March 8, 1876, no. 17; *Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Mail editie* (1885), p. 510; see also van Sandick (1892), pp. 14-15.

⁵⁶ See van Delden (1862), p. 42. These criteria were always taken into account in appointing regents in Banten. See report on the political situation in Java, in Exh. Aug. 27, 1851, no. 220 and also Exh. Dec. 14, 1852, no. 438. For abuses in the appointment of native civil servants in the latter part of the 19th century, see Note of Snouck Hurgronje, Aug. 15, 1892. See also below, Chap. IX p. 312.

⁵⁷ High-born and low-born civil servants were not equally treated; abuses made by the former had none of the serious consequences of those made by the latter; see *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 10-11. Compare with cases in other parts of Java, see van Helsdingen, in *KT*, Vol. I (1912), p. 196. In one residency there were two regents, 12 *wedanas* and assistant-*wedanas*, 2 *djaksas* and 5 *mantris*, all belonging to the same family. Another example was mentioned in *IG* (1881), no. 2, pp. 625 f. In one residency there were one regent, one *patih*, one adjunct-collector, 5 out of 6 *wedanas* and 2 out of 6 assistant-*wedanas*. Especially as regards Banten reference should be made to Djajadiningrat's family; see Appendix III.

decades. This situation was to be found in Banten in the late 'eighties, so that complaints were uttered by civil servants to the effect that they could not get ahead by any means simply because they did not belong to the ruling families.⁵⁸ Needless to say, lineage affiliations still held an important place in the Banten civil service in general and in the selection of its members in particular. In this connection, one should not overlook the fact that it was also the policy of the colonial government to recruit only people from the region itself as far as possible.

We have previously made mention of "strangers" in the Banten civil service. If there was a lack of competent officials when an office became vacant the Dutch government was compelled to nominate officials from outside Banten, mostly from either Bogor or Prijangan. We know that R. T. A. Wiriadidjaja, Regent of Tjaringin, and R. T. Karta Natanegara, Regent of Lebak, both came from Bogor, while R. T. Suria Nataningrat originated from Prijangan. Special mention should be made of Raden Penna, the incumbent *Patih* of Anjer at the time of the rebellion, who was born and bred in Batavia.⁵⁹ It is doubtful whether this policy was convincingly legitimized by putting forward the lack of local candidates that were considered fit for the job. The government certainly knew that the appointment of outsiders would arouse frustrations and embarrassment, if not worse, among the corps of Bantenese civil servants. Some residents quite rightly regretted that such nominations had been made and regarded them as a political blunder.⁶⁰ Despite the fact that as members of the Sundanese aristocracy they were placed in regions where the population was mainly Sundanese, their Bantenese colleagues regarded them as outsiders and intruders, whom they mistrusted and envied. It is quite understandable why the "strangers" were described by the Dutch as being more intelligent and active, honest and trustworthy. Planted in a strange environment and without any traditional bonds with its population, they had to rely on the colonial power. Their unwavering loyalty to the Dutch on the one hand, and their detachment from religious institutions on the other, were perceived as an assault on the Bantenese aristocracy. Some "foreign" officials therefore

⁵⁸ See *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 11.

⁵⁹ For his personality, see the description in Report DDI, pp. 153-160.

⁶⁰ The appointment of Suria Nataningrat as Regent of Lebak was considered a political blunder on the part of Spaan; see missive of the Resident of Banten, July 7, 1889, no. 249. The nomination of Karta Natanegara was successful. See further: *De Locomotief*, July 28, 1888. Concerning Suria Nataningrat, see also van Sandick (1892), pp. 17-22; Levyssohn Norman in *Eigen Haard* (1888), pp. 94-96.

attempted to improve their position by marrying into the Banten aristocracy or assuming leadership in religious affairs. These kinds of affiliations appeared to be quite effective for establishing bonds with the population. They at least lessened the potentiality of friction brought about by the presence of "foreign" civil servants in Banten. In this connection it must be remarked that in the first half of the 19th century there was no tendency on the part of the Bantenese civil servants to form a relatively cohesive "inner élite"; nor could any signs of the mobilization of kinship ties be observed which militated against the recruitment of civil servants from outside Banten. During the last decades of the century, the consolidation of the Bantenese officials' position seems to have made the ruling élite somewhat more compact and self-perpetuating than it had previously been. We already know that during the first period, civil servants of non-Bantenese origin, like Tjondronegoro, Wiriadidjaja, and Karta Natanegara were nominated, and by their great adaptability to regional conditions were successful in establishing core-families in Banten.

It may be useful to refer to instances of appointments of "foreigners", of which the consequences turned out to be quite disruptive for the colonial administration in Banten. Kusumanegara's nomination as Regent of Tjaringin in 1849 aroused much discontent among the descendants of his predecessor who, supported by religious leaders, launched the well-known Wachia revolt in 1850. It was not surprising that the members of the Banten nobility R. Bagus Djajakarta, Tubagus Suramardja and Tubagus Mustafa, respectively son and sons-in-law of the previous Regent of Tjaringin, bitterly resented the appointment of a successor who did not belong to the family. In a separate section we shall examine the social elements mobilized in the rebellion somewhat more closely. The second case, with no less serious consequences, was Raden Penna's nomination as *Patih* of Anjer. His role in the Tjilegon affair was of considerable importance. In the Report of the Director of the Department of Interior, Raden Penna was described as a Western-educated man, who in his speech and manners was European rather than Indonesian.⁶¹ Born in Batavia and educated in a Western environment, Raden Penna had adopted a Western way of life. Many aspects

⁶¹ See Report DDI, pp. 153-160. See also complaints launched against R. Penna as stated in 4 anonymous letters sent to the Director of the Department of Interior; Government *renvooi* (reference) of July 16, 1888, no. 12,372 and no. 12,373; July 28, 1888, no. 13,240; in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4, as Appendix I of Report DDI.

of his behaviour as a civil servant can be traced to this cultural background. He conspicuously exhibited his feelings of rivalry towards the Regent of Serang, and this animosity between two top officials naturally caused much embarrassment in the civil servants' world in Banten. Raden Penna simply refused to pay a courtesy visit to the regent on his arrival in Banten. Furthermore, he also flatly refused to render homage to the regent and to his European superiors in the traditional way, namely by sitting on the ground in front of them. The hostility was accelerated by rumours, according to which the Resident and the Regent of Serang were to be dismissed because of the Sakam affair. It was said that their respective positions were to be taken by Czernicki and Raden Penna, because both had done excellent work in the Tjiomas affair.⁶² There were other reasons why Raden Penna was alienated from the Banten civil servants. He was the very image of the modern bureaucrat, who did not accept presents, even if they were given as a token of sympathy and not as a means of bribery. He always kept himself at a distance from his subordinates, and his remoteness made him isolated in his own region. What made his position worse was his attitude towards religious matters. Because of his cultural background, Raden Penna did not show the proper respect for Muslim practices in Banten, such as the performance of prayers and *dikirs* aloud, so that the religious feelings of the populace were grievously injured.⁶³

It has already been stated that religious enthusiasm was one of the main ways of reaching the hearts of the people in Banten and it was skilfully practised by a number of "low-born" civil servants in order to enhance their position. R. T. Suta Angunangun, a Regent of Lebak, conspicuously showed his religious zeal. He acted as a minister in Friday prayers. Although his action was quite natural according to Muslim notions, in the eyes of Dutch officials his religious fervour was excessive.⁶⁴ Here we meet with one of the most crucial points in Banten politics: what was the colonial attitude towards the population's religious ideas and practices, and what political role did the religious leaders play in counteracting the colonial policy on religious affairs? For the moment it suffices to point out that the colonial government had already become suspicious whenever civil servants exhibited great zeal in religious

⁶² Report DDI, p. 156.

⁶³ See the list of complaints, note no. 61. Cf. Raden Penna's own statement as regards the religious gatherings in H. Makid's compound. See Raden Penna's statement of Dec. 6, 1888, in Exh. Jan. 28, 1889, no. 74.

⁶⁴ Missive of the Assistant Resident of Lebak, July 28, 1876, no. 1051/19, in Exh. Feb. 10, 1887, K².

matters, and readily stamped them as fanatics. The colonial government thus acquired an effective weapon for discouraging Indonesian officials from religious practices and for detaching them from the religious leaders. Particularly after the Tjilegon affair, the civil servants feared nothing so much as being identified as fanatic, so that the status of civil servant seemed to be incompatible with being a good Muslim.⁶⁵ At the end of the century, the secularization of the civil service in Banten had already made headway.⁶⁶ Before dealing with the religious élite as a third power group in the political arena of Banten, some important points on the development of the Bantenese civil servants as a body should be made.

COLONIAL BUREAUCRATIC STRUCTURES AND INSTITUTIONAL CONFLICTS

It has by now been made clear that the Dutch in their administration gradually disrupted the structure of traditional political relationships. The transformation from the traditional pattern of authority to the rational-legal one was enforced step by step. In fact, the juxtaposition of two essentially distinct authorities — respectively represented by the resident and the regent — brought about an ambivalent system in administration.

Viewed in terms of appointment and succession to offices, the colonial bureaucracy in Banten cannot be identified as a purely rational-legal one, in which technical qualifications were the main basis for the selection of officials. On the contrary, extra-bureaucratic factors, such as the stratum position of one's family, whether one was related to the Banten nobility or not, and whether one was a member of an upper-class family or not, largely determined both the appointment and promotion of civil servants. At the same time, other determinants of promotion, such as ability, merit and accomplishment were also taken into account to an important extent. This dualism means that on the one hand, the colonial policy still reckoned with particularistic factors, such as family background, while on the other hand, it also laid stress on universalistic aspects such as technical qualifications.⁶⁷ A slow but steady progression towards the latter can be observed. The appointment of both commoners

⁶⁵ See Note of Snouck Hurgronje, Aug. 15, 1892; see also below, Chap. IX, p. 312.

⁶⁶ An instance of the process of secularization is the life history of Achmad Djajadiningrat; see his autobiography, A. Djajadiningrat (1936).

⁶⁷ Parsons (1951), pp. 101-112; also Hoselitz: *Levels of economic performance and bureaucratic structures*, in La Palombara, ed., (1963), pp. 181-183.

and "foreigners" promoted the enforcement of rational-legal principles and thus of colonial power itself: as a matter of fact, one essential criterion was particularly emphasized, i.e. faithfulness to the colonial government.

The progressive penetration of rational-legal administration evidently caused much strain and instability in Banten society. This political change engendered institutional conflicts which exposed the civil servants to recurrent conflicting role performances. For a better understanding of the general attitude of Banten civil servants, this aspect of political development cannot be overlooked. Particularistic ties often came into conflict with civil service norms. The civil servant's highly diffuse and solidary kinship relations urged him to treat individuals as kinsmen, but his role as an official required disinterestedness and impersonal treatment of individuals. As power, wealth and prestige clustered about the regent, he was continually pressed to use his position and prerogatives to the advantage of his kinsmen. He was expected to help the members of his extended family, and this constituted a drain upon his resources.⁶⁸ The demands made by kinsmen were obviously incompatible with the norms imposed by the colonial government. The great number of civil servants dismissed because of corruption or so-called *knevelarijen* must be explained in terms of institutional conflict.⁶⁹ The significant consequences of the situation were permanent financial weakness of the civil servants and the fact that a large number of dismissed officials were more or less imbued with antipathetic feelings towards the colonial government. Small wonder that such officials were always to be found among participants of rebellions.⁷⁰

It was apparently characteristic of the bureaucratic structure not only in Banten but throughout Java during the 19th century, that

⁶⁸ Two reasons can be given in explanation of the heavy material burden of the civil servants, namely, the spirit of mutual helpfulness and the bilateral kinship structure; the nucleus of the extended family was always shifting and tended to cluster around prominent members. It must be added that civil servants were required to provide various facilities to the superiors who made a tour through their region. See *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 9-10.

⁶⁹ This refers to the well-known accusations made by Multatuli against Karta Natanegara; see Multatuli, *Volledige Werken*, Vol. IX (1956), pp. 411-480. Here we meet with a lack of understanding of the background of Javanese patrimonial-bureaucratic structure; cf. Wertheim (1964), pp. 127-130. See also Chap. II, note 68.

⁷⁰ The Wachia rebellion in 1850, the Usup affair in 1851, the Mas Pungut affair in 1862, the Kolelet conspiracy in 1867, the Tjiruas affair in 1869, and finally the Tjilegon rebellion in 1888. All but the last will be dealt with in the next chapter.

abuses committed by native civil servants loomed large in the development of the colonial administration.⁷¹ While the central administration was run along the lines of modern bureaucracy, regional and local governments continued to conform partly to traditional values and norms. Native officials received a fixed salary for performing administrative tasks on the regional or local level, but besides this, the accretion of prestige and power in the traditional sphere could easily be converted into income of various sorts: traditional tributes or services. These features are reminiscent of the personal prerogatives enjoyed by the ruler and his servants in a patrimonial government. As a matter of fact, during the period of political transition no strict separation could be made between private matters and official ones.⁷² Crucial instances of administrative abuses can easily be pointed out: for example, the case of Karta Natanegara, Surianegara, and Djajakusuma,⁷³ who were charged with appropriating taxes and man-power and exploiting them as if they were private property. In these instances we encounter something that may be considered inherent to the dualism of the colonial bureaucracy.

THE POLITICAL ROLE OF THE RELIGIOUS ELITE

The religious élite was differently involved in the institutional conflict. Whereas the civil servants on the whole showed conformity to the political system introduced by the Dutch, the religious élite tended to reject it. The more the process of modernization — and its concomitant, secularization — progressed, the more vehement their resistance was, because they were unreservedly committed to Muslim norms and values, with which the secular system was considered totally incompatible. Their social position was at stake.

Since each sultan was recognized as the head of Islam in his realm, the religious institutions were given full recognition and protection as organs of the established religion by the state. Many of the religious élite were incorporated into the general framework of the administrative

⁷¹ For instances of *knevelarijen* in other areas, see *TNI* (1851), no. 2, pp. 35-43; 246-266; *TNI* (1853), no. 2, p. 259; *TNI* (1854), no. 1, p. 35; *TNI* (1860), no. 2, pp. 258-260.

⁷² Wertheim (1964), pp. 115-117.

⁷³ Concerning Karta Natanegara, see secret missive of the Assistant Resident of Lebak to the Resident of Banten, Feb. 25, 1856, no. 91, in du Perron's *Verzameld Werk*, Vol. IV (1956), pp. 278-283; see also Multatuli, *Volledige Werken*, Vol. IV (1956), p. 551. Concerning Surianegara, see Secret Resolution of June 24, 1868, L^a V. For Djajakusuma's abuses, see below, Chap. IV, p. 132.

system, forming a religious administrative class alongside the secular one. The presidency of the Supreme Court of Justice was held by an *ulama*, who usually bore the official name *Fakih Nadjamudin*. The religious élite had strategic positions on both the local and the central level, so that it had easy access to the court and the higher regions of the bureaucracy. In this connection it must be noted that there were elements of the religious élite that had no bureaucratic power and that maintained their opposition to both the secular and religious functionaries.⁷⁴ After the abolition of the sultanate, the religious élite was deprived of the opportunity to participate in matters of policy, despite the fact that the office of *Fakih Nadjamudin* was retained up to 1868 and that religious courts were still administered by religious officials. The main difference was that the role of religious functionaries — *panghulus*, mosque personnel — was reduced to that of ordinary officials and was subjected to more strict government control. For the rest, a large segment of the religious élite still maintained its independence in performing its major functions, such as organizing religious activities, running religious schools, and even setting up *tarekats*. With regard to the pilgrimages, the government made efforts to check the flow of pilgrims by enacting restrictive regulations in the course of the century, but nevertheless there was a steady increase in the number of pilgrims over the years.⁷⁵ In fact, with the passing of time those institutions which generated militant forces against the colonial government grew into bulwarks of Muslim revivalism. How this actually came about will be dealt with in Chapter V.

For our present purpose, it is necessary to investigate what alliances the religious élite made in playing their political role. As the process of modernization proceeded, a rift between the religious and the secular élite became more and more apparent. It is obvious that the traditional pattern of allocating positions to the religious élite was incompatible with the very nature of modern secular government. As mentioned above, some of the religious élite allowed themselves to become in-

⁷⁴ The antagonism between the official religious élite and its independent members is a general feature in traditional Islamic states; see Cahen, in von Grunebaum, ed. (1955), pp. 132-163; Wertheim (1959), p. 197; Gibb (1962), pp. 3-32. For an account of this factionalism in Javanese states, see Pigeaud, (MS, 1943-1945), p. 125.

⁷⁵ For figures representing the number of pilgrims that had left and returned since 1876, see report of the pilgrimage over the years 1888 and 1889, in Vb. Jan. 29, 1889, no. 46, and Vb. Jan. 24, 1890, no. 53; see also Vredendregt, in *BKI*, Vol. CXVIII (1962), pp. 91-154.

strumental in supporting the civil service and to be incorporated into the general framework of the colonial administration. By doing so, however, they lost their grip on the Muslim population and their power became almost negligible. The relationship between the religious and the secular élite turned out to be ineffective insofar that it did not bring about a mutual reinforcement of authority. It is remarkable that antagonism already existed between the officials and the non-official segment of the religious élite during the sultanate; this antagonism became more visible under colonial rule. Certainly, symbols of Islam and the closely related ideology no longer served as the basis of the modern political institutions. Religious and political roles were sharply separated. The religious élite were no longer needed to support the authority of the regent, who had to rely more and more on the colonial ruler. It would be no exaggeration to say that the role of the religious élite in the colonial administration was degraded to a ritual or ceremonial one.

By furthering co-operation with the colonial government, the civil servants alienated themselves more and more from the *umat*. Moreover, in their eagerness to please the colonial overlord, they were careful to avoid showing any signs of religious zeal or fanaticism and so lost touch not only with the religious élite but with the whole Muslim community, to whom rule by infidels was a matter of contempt. Religious ideas entered into almost every aspect of life; this is important especially with reference to Banten, which was well-known for its fervently religious population. Particularly during the period of the religious revival everyone was measured on a religious scale in terms of piety, learning, or membership of a *tarekat*. The prestige scale based on religion contrasted with those for both the Western and the secular élite; each employed diverse determinants of status. It is therefore not surprising that during the revival the *kjais* and *hadjis* in North Banten received more deference than the civil servants. What made things worse for the latter was that political support of the population was deflected from them as a result of their low rank in the socio-religious scale. It is remarkable that while *tarekat* membership was regarded as socially low-grade in other regions, in Banten it conferred prestige.⁷⁶

The political authority that the *kjais* and/or *hadjis* held as *gurus* (either *guru tarekat* or *guru ngadji*) was clearly shown by the case of the Kadiriah *tarekat* and *pesantrens* which were to be found in abun-

⁷⁶ See van den Berg, in *TBG*, Vol. XXVIII (1883), pp. 161 ff.; also *IG* (1891), no. 2, pp. 1143-1144.

dance in the North Banten area during the 'seventies and 'eighties. Particularly the *kjais* as *gurus tarekat* were regarded with respect and awe by most villagers, and in the course of time acquired very considerable influence.⁷⁷ The reputation of prominent *kjais* frequently preceded other factors as a source of their authority. Of course, their property could often be used as support in their claim to political authority. Their relatively independent political position was the result of the availability of resources, such as landownership, profit from petty trade or money lending, and pious gifts from disciples or followers. Another material base worth mentioning is the collection of religious taxes, the *djakat* and *pitrah*, according to Muslim tradition, the allotment of which was still under the control of the religious élite.⁷⁸

Of significance for the problem of political alliances in 19th-century Banten is the relationship between the religious élite and the Banten nobility. The development of Banten politics and the conflicts and tensions which ensued were reflected in the distribution of those ties of alliance. The Banten nobility was composed of several sub-groups and tended to dovetail with a group of religious men, for many of its members had become *hadji* or *kjai*. In fact, the two groups had a common goal to attain — the maintenance of the traditional status system. As has been stated previously, the two groups were greatly transformed and lost most of their political predominance; therefore they always participated actively in political upheavals. Both groups constituted disorderly and troublesome elements in the political arena in Banten throughout the 19th century. The inseparable association between Hadji Wachia and Tubagus Djajakarta on the one hand, and between Hadji Wasid and Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail on the other, is a clear instance of the recurrent alignment of those factions of the traditional groups.⁷⁹ We have seen how Ratu Siti Aminah, in attempting to re-establish her family, sought the support of the religious élite in the old Muslim centres of Banten.⁸⁰

⁷⁷ *IG* (1891), no. 2, pp. 1143-1144; Report DDI, pp. 213-219; see also Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2, (1924), p. 420.

⁷⁸ For the *djakat* and *pitrah*, consult *Adatrechtbundels* Vol. XIV (1931), pp. 118-120; see also *Resumé* (1871), pp. 237-244 or *TNI* (1872), no. 2, pp. 358-363. H. Wasid seems to have been entitled to collect *djakat* from Tjibeber, see Appendix VIII.

⁷⁹ For the alliance between H. Wachia and Djajakarta, see the Wachia revolt in Chap. IV; that of H. Wasid and H. Tubagus Ismail in the Tjilegon rebellion is to be dealt with in Chaps. VI, VII, and VIII.

⁸⁰ Old religious centres were: Banten, Kasunjatan and Kanari, where respectively 60, 40 and 20 religious men were in charge of the old sanctuaries

This alliance was only a partial one, since the princess' alignment to Banten's highest-ranking regents restrained her from total commitment to the religious élite. After all, the religious élite was meant to support her in regaining her old position. In contrast to the alliances formed by R. Tubagus Djajakarta and Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail, the princess was presumably not inclined to materialize potential participation in open resistance to the colonial government. Viewed in this light, it is quite understandable that the civil servants in general and the Regent of Serang — Gondokusumo — in particular adopted a negative or ambivalent attitude towards the religious élite. In this multi-cornered political struggle, the religious élite and part of the nobility were predisposed to develop more extreme political orientations and to participate in radical social movements.

The powerful influence of the religious élite was not only exercised among the lower strata of the population, but was also manifested over the corps of Bantenese officials, of both high and low rank. They treated the *kjai* with conspicuous deference and distinction. This went so far that even in official matters the civil servants often informed the *kjai* of the action to be taken and asked their assistance in enforcing it among the people.⁸¹ If one takes into account the fact that many civil servants were members of the Kadiriah *tarekat*, such subservience and obedience can easily be understood. Moreover, they had been trained by religious teachers and inculcated with antipathy toward the colonial government since childhood. It is true that, as a Resident of Banten put it, the civil servants disliked the Dutch at the bottom of their hearts, although relations between them were apparently friendly.⁸²

RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN BANTENESE AND EUROPEAN OFFICIALS

One more aspect of the political development in Banten will be discussed. Since adequate studies regarding the Dutch colonial policy in the 19th century are abundant, it is sufficient to refer to them insofar as they concern the political development on the central level.⁸³ What occurred particularly on the regional level, as in Banten, must be

dating from the period of the sultanate; see Exh. May 14, 1868, no. 5. For the description of the sanctuaries, see Groenhof (1920).

⁸¹ Secret missive of the Resident of Banten, Feb. 27, 1889, no. 58; cf. *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1144.

⁸² Ibidem. For the inculcation of hatred towards the infidel rule, see A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 21-23.

⁸³ To mention a few: Pierson (1877), Clive Day (1904), Stokvis (1912), Rutgers (1937), Welderen-Rengers (1947), Furnivall (1948).

investigated with the focus on the relationship between the European civil servants and the Bantenese ones in particular, and the population in general.

A concomitant of the declaration of the domain status for Banten made by the Dutch government, was the establishment of the framework of modern legal and administrative practices as ingredients of the colonial bureaucracy. Here a new civil service was developed: a network of Dutch administrators was rapidly constructed, and political authority was distributed among them; they were in charge of controlling the activities of the regents and their subordinates. These Dutch administrators were bureaucratic elements, posed between the central government and the native civil servants on the one hand, and the people on the other. This penetration of the regional levels of the administrative structure with alien personnel of the colonial bureaucracy resulted in a shift of the focus of authority and responsibility away from the traditionally legitimate power of the regents to that of Dutch rule. An immediate consequence was a state of subservience of the regents, who were reduced to mere agents or "*wajang*-puppets" of the Dutch overlords.⁸⁴

In the hierarchy of officials established by the Dutch, the resident merely became a higher rung of the ladder of authority on which the native officials were the lower rung. The administration of the residency — an artificial district marked out by the colonial government — was entrusted to the resident, who for that purpose was endowed with extensive powers that exceeded the authority which the native chiefs had possessed in the traditional organization. The resident was responsible for the peace, welfare, and good order of his region, and supervised the functions and activities of all local officials, both European and native.⁸⁵ As regards the objectives of the administration, the colonial civil service was apparently more concerned with the collection of revenue and the maintenance of law and order than with economic and social development.

The native civil servants always felt their subordination to the Dutch keenly, despite the fact that their European superiors often adopted a "diplomatic" strategy in issuing orders to them. It has often been said that the Dutch civil servants ruled with iron hands within velvet

⁸⁴ Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2 (1924), p. 157; cf. his Note of August 15, 1892.

⁸⁵ For the development of the civil service, see de Kat Angelino, Vol. II (1930), pp. 74-102; this deals particularly with the civil service in Java.

gloves.⁸⁶ This subordinative relationship was also clothed in traditional garb by being denoted in kinship terms. The regent was regarded as a "younger brother" of the resident.⁸⁷ Actually, a force of Dutch civil servants, interspersed throughout the colonial service in dominant positions, performed what might be termed the function of the "Big Brothers". The watchful eyes of the Dutch officials were "omnipresent" since the institutionalization of the "duumvirate" made up of the regent and the assistant resident on the one hand, and the *patih* or *wedana* and the controller on the other. The controller was the main link between the Dutch and the Banten civil service, because his supervising function brought him into direct contact with the lower levels of the native civil service and with the village. He was in charge of supplying all the information needed by the resident. He functioned as a veritable contact-element between European and native officialdom.⁸⁸ Because of this unique position, he was always on the move and had ample opportunities for person-to-person relationships with the population. Nevertheless, one cannot say that he had intimate personal contact with the people. Besides the absence of moral ties, the lack of a satisfactory common medium of communication prevented the development of mutual understanding. The controller may occasionally have become a participant, but never a member of Banten society. In most cases the controller had to rely on information provided by the village heads and sub-district officials. Because of frequent transferences, the associations between European and native administrative officials were relatively brief. Particularly in Banten the Dutch administrators had to face an exasperating complex of suspicion, misunderstanding, negative opposition and sabotage. It also seems that the European officials encountered a strong *esprit de corps* among the Bantenese civil servants with the result that administrative abuses were seldom brought to light. This tendency to "*tutupen*" was quite conspicuous,⁸⁹ not only among the Banten officials but also among the Dutch administrators.⁹⁰

⁸⁶ Burger, in *Gedenkboek* (1956), p. 90; mention should be made of the so-called "*perintah halus*" (literally "the soft command") method in issuing orders.

⁸⁷ De Kat Angelino, Vol. II (1930), p. 40.

⁸⁸ De Kat Angelino, Vol. II (1930), p. 91.

⁸⁹ "*Tutupen*" literally means to close or to dim; in this context it refers to the officials' policy of holding back information from their superiors in order to avoid further investigation or the blame for administrative blunders or negligence.

⁹⁰ Secret missive of the Resident of Banten, Feb. 27, 1889, no. 58; not until

As regards the Tjilegon affair, close contacts between Bantenese and Dutch officials were entirely lacking for a number of years before the outbreak of the rebellion. The sudden outburst therefore took the Dutch officials by surprise, for they were totally uninformed about the real situation in the area. Their ignorance was almost unbelievable and consequently the public doubted whether the Dutch officials in Banten were fit for their task. For a better understanding of the prevailing situation we must consider some of the Dutch officials in greater detail. To begin with, Resident Engelbrecht: he was described by his contemporaries as being not only inconsistent in his policy but also unapproachable for his subordinates. He was great in small matters, like the so-called bat-circular and the prohibition of planting fruit-trees on waysides; but he neglected the building of roads, bridges, and *pasanggrahans*, all so badly needed in Banten. What aroused much discontent was his policy of appointing and dismissing civil servants. Apparently he had a special preference for members of prominent Banten families.⁹¹ Neither among the Banten civil servants nor among the Dutch population was Engelbrecht popular. He sometimes meddled in the private affairs of his subordinates.⁹² To complete the list of his deficiencies, we must mention the fact that, as regards his ability as an administrator, Engelbrecht's weak policy very much damaged the prestige of the European civil service. It was said that he was easily influenced by the Regent of Serang; and of course the resident, with only a short stay in Banten behind him, was no match for the old-timer Gondokusumo, whose authority was rooted in Banten society. It was generally known that the frequent replacement of Dutch officials was very advantageous to the Bantenese civil servants.⁹³

Most of the Dutch civil servants of the late 'eighties were considered

8 days after the outburst of the rebellion were the Assistant Resident of Lebak and Tjaringin informed about it officially; see *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 44.

⁹¹ See *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 10-11.

⁹² Once he forbade the retired Regent of Lebak to choose a plantation administrator, a good friend of the regent, as the president of a committee in charge of arranging a feast on the occasion of the circumcision of the regent's grand-children. The main reason was that the resident wanted to support the Assistant Resident of Lebak, who was hostile towards the said administrator; see *Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Mail editie* (1885), pp. 510-511.

⁹³ Between 1816 and 1890 there were about 23 residents, each therefore with an average service of about 3 years in the region. See *TBB*, Vol. II (1888), pp. 270-271. From 1839 until 1889, there were only 3 regents in Serang; Karta Natanegara ruled from 1839 until 1865.

to be out of place in Banten. Despite the good qualifications which some of them possessed, they failed to form a good administration. It must be observed in passing that Banten had always been a difficult residency to govern and that being placed there was commonly felt as a kind of punishment. As a result the Dutch officials stationed in Banten did not always belong to the *fine fleur* of the civil service.⁹⁴ In reviewing Banten's Dutch administrators we first mention the Assistant Resident of Tjaringin, van der Meulen. His experience in Prijangan and his knowledge of the people, their language and their culture, made him technically well-equipped for his position. He could perceive all that happened in his environment but could not help keeping the people at a distance. In contrast to van der Meulen, his colleague in Lebak, van der Ven, had only a scanty knowledge of Malay, which considerably hampered his communication with Bantenese officials. The latter most strongly disapproved of the slow manner in which he handled administrative matters. A similar complaint was made about Borgerhoff van den Bergh, Assistant Resident of Pandeglang. He showed his indifference to the routine work in administration and, as an anonymous author put it: if the same thing happened in his region as happened in Tjilegon, he would certainly fall a victim to slaughter.⁹⁵ Before describing Gubbels, one of the main *dramatis personae* in the Tjilegon affair, the controllers should be mentioned. De Chauvigny de Blot of Serang, Maas of Tjaringin and Hermens of Pandeglang were all three diligent, meritorious and fairly ambitious officials; their colleague in Gunung Kentjana, Meyer, on the other hand, could not get along with the native civil servants because of his bad temper. It was, however, regrettable that none of them had either much contact with the population or enough experience to know much of what happened among the population. De Blot knew nothing of the conspiracy and the plans of the rebels in his region beforehand.⁹⁶

Last but not least, we must centre attention on Gubbels, the Assistant Resident of Anjer at the time of the revolt. In private life, he was

⁹⁴ Misrule, the main cause of the recurrent revolts, was brought about by a basically bad colonial policy, the aim of which was only to prevent Banten from becoming a financial burden to the colonial government, for the land rent and the compulsory culture did not yield enough. As Banten was notorious for its disorderly state, the best civil servants succeeded in avoiding nomination in Banten. See Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2, (1924), pp. 421-422.

⁹⁵ *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 114.

⁹⁶ *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 113-115.

known as an honest fellow, a good husband and father, and an educated man. He had a strong inclination to live in isolation and to busy himself with studying Italian and Spanish or scientific works. It was therefore not surprising that he remained a stranger in his administrative realm, for he restricted his contact with the Banten officials to the most necessary occasions. The monthly conference was replaced by an individual "briefing" in the assistant resident's house. It was doubted whether Gubbels had any interest in the people's affairs. It was said that he intended to stay in Indonesia no longer than necessary and that all he wished was to get his pension as soon as possible in order to enable him to live quietly in Holland with his family.⁹⁷ His wife was bad-tempered, of a weak constitution, and constantly home-sick. This added to the family's unpopularity in the environment and to their isolation.

Although there is no denying that a too intimate association between Dutch administrators and Banten officials had its dangers, aloofness and self-contained social life bereft the official of the prerequisite to good administration, namely personal knowledge of the region and its people. As stated previously, the high frequency of transfer was also responsible for the fact that the Dutch officials had no sufficient opportunity to acquaint themselves with the region they administered. An even more serious and more frustrating source of friction was the suspiciousness of all the Bantenese concerning the colonial government's motives for continually changing their regulations, in general, and concerning the government's attitude to religious matters, in particular. This matter was the most important focus for misunderstanding.⁹⁸

Besides a good working knowledge of the society, something more was needed in order to succeed in carrying out the delicate task of cautiously relinquishing authority, and in acquiring the confidence of the people. This helps to explain why officials like Engelbrecht, Gubbels, and most of the body of Dutch civil servants in Banten in the late 'eighties inevitably failed and why they, what is worse, unconsciously provoked widespread anxiety and with it the propensity to revolt. Broadly speaking, Dutch and Bantenese officials came into social contact with each other with fundamentally different values and belief systems.

⁹⁷ See Report DDI, pp. 150-153.

⁹⁸ Regulations concerning the levying of taxes, such as the introduction of the communal levy of the land rent and its repartition among the villagers, the trade tax to be paid by proa-owners in 1886, the head tax replacing *pantjen* services after 1882; see Chap. II.

As we shall see, the main issue in the Tjilegon affair was not so much the racial discrimination, but rather the foreign political domination and its concomitant, rule by "infidels".

THE POLITICAL SITUATION IN THE 1870S AND 1880S

Our final observations refer mainly to some aspects of the political situation in Banten during the last two decades preceding the outbreak of the rebellion in 1888. Unmistakable evidence of the enduring political instability in Banten was provided by the many fortifications spread throughout the region: Serang, Anjer, Tjaringin, Tjimanuk, Rangkasbitung, Pandeglang, and Tanara. Military units of about twenty-five men each were stationed there. As early as 1870 some of these detachments were considered superfluous, but they were not abandoned before 1876, namely those in Tjaringin, Pandeglang, Rangkasbitung, and Tanara. This withdrawal seems a premature move to us, but the Dutch only realized this afterwards.

It is obvious that the existence of those fortifications was a constant reminder that the colonial government was at any time ready to use force to suppress popular revolt. In truth, suspicion regarding the activities of the religious leaders loomed large in government circles.⁹⁹ Special attention was always paid to such activities in the officials' reports. In referring to the political situation in the early 'seventies, the reports stated that the people in Banten lived peacefully and that the influence of the religious leaders was almost negligible.¹⁰⁰ This was perhaps true insofar as it concerned the influence of the *panghulus*, who were appointed by the Dutch government after the abolition of the post of *Fakih Nadjamudin* in 1868.¹⁰¹ In fact, no successor had

⁹⁹ They were always closely watched and special attention was paid to all their activities, as evidenced by government reports. See the political reports of 1839-1849, of 1850 and 1851, respectively in Exh. Jan. 31, 1851, no. 27 bis; Exh. Dec. 14, 1852, no. 438; Exh. May 27, 1853, no. 225.

¹⁰⁰ Report of the Commander of the Army, July 19, 1870, in Vb. Sept. 16, 1870, no. 25. The reliability of this report is doubtful, since it was the result of a short tour through Banten, written without enough background knowledge of the region. Perhaps it may be true in part, if we bear in mind that the activities of H. Abdul Karim of Tanara started in 1873; see Chap. VI.

¹⁰¹ According to the regulation of 1859 (*Staatsblad* no. 102). The regent was charged with the supervision of religion in his region. The post of *Fakih Nadjamudin* was a survival of the religious institution during the sultanate, which was still retained after the downfall of the state. See also Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. I (1957), p. 772; also Vb. May 14, 1868, no. 5.

been appointed as *Fakih Nadjamudin* since the death of Hadji Mohamad Adian in 1859.¹⁰² As from the same year, the regent was actually in charge of the supervision of religious matters in his region.¹⁰³ This important step towards secularization did not bring about violent reactions from the side of the religious élite, who only looked on with regret when one of their autonomous institutions was torn down by the government. Mention should be made of another factor which was also considered responsible for the recurrent political turmoil in Banten. The region appeared to be small for the formation of a self-contained administrative unit within the framework of modern bureaucracy. Transfer of officials from and to another region encountered the vigorous resistance of the indigenous civil servants, whose ultimate concern was to retain their deep-rooted position in the area. In this respect the Dutch officials regarded this class of civil servants as a cancer in the political situation in Banten.¹⁰⁴

In conclusion it should be pointed out that in Banten society, the ruling élite did not consist of one group wholly committed to civil service universalism and of another group wholly committed to kinship particularism; it consisted rather of individuals attempting to follow both patterns. This duality of institutional allegiance among Banten civil servants actually marked the halfway stage of political development from traditional towards modern government, based upon rational-legal authority. In the societal framework of Banten, that development generated resentment and resistance among the religious élite, who exercised effective charismatic power on the population. Viewed in this light, it was quite natural that enduring political tensions often appeared in the form of conflict between intransigent groups — the *kjais* and the *hadjis* against the modern civil servants — committed to opposing norms and values.

¹⁰² The last two *Fakih Nadjamudins* were Tubagus H. Abubakar, who died in 1835, and H. Mohamad Adian, who died Apr. 4, 1859. According to the Resolution of July 3, 1819, no. 10, the monthly salary of the *Fakih Nadjamudin* was 80 guilders, a part of which he had to pay for expenditures of the mosque of Banten and a small remuneration of the *Panghulu* of Kanari; the sum was kept by the *Fakih Nadjamudin*. See Vb. Aug. 3, 1867, no. 86 and Vb. May 14, 1868, no. 5.

¹⁰³ *Staatsblad* 1859, no. 102. For the actual practice, see Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. I (1957), pp. 742-762.

¹⁰⁴ *WNI* (1889-1890), pp. 564-566.

CHAPTER IV

SOCIAL UNREST

SOME FEATURES AND FACTORS OF SOCIAL UNREST

There are various reasons for centring our attention upon social unrest in 19th-century Banten. Firstly, it may resolve itself into social movements which dominated the historical scene in that area.¹ Social upheavals accompanied by the disruption of traditional values were marked by discontent, excitement and restlessness among the population. Such a situation was fraught with social tension and conflict, which were conducive to outbursts of rebellion. Secondly, the account of social unrest and some of the political consequences is intended to illustrate the propensity to revolt or the presence of a tradition of rebellion in Banten. The prevalence of popular unrest expressed itself in recurrent outbreaks not only of risings but also of conspiracies or social banditry. When the people were prevented by the situation from releasing their tension by means of rebellious activities, they could find an outlet for their frustrations in religious movements. Thirdly, social unrest should also be explained in terms of social phenomena, reflecting the unofficial distribution of power in an oppressed society. Besides the élite groups or power holders mentioned in Chapter III, what concerns us in this section particularly is the revolutionary élite, who apparently possessed effective power outside the political realm of those formally in power.

¹ Various instances of social unrest can be distinguished, e.g. revolutionary unrest, agrarian unrest, religious unrest, etc. The term "social unrest" as used in this section also refers to a state of tension and restlessness among the population as a symptom of the disruption or break-down of the socio-cultural order. It can be seen as a condition of the unorganized, unregulated activity of the people and also as the crucible out of which emerged new forms of organized activity, such as social movements, rebellions, religious revivalism, etc. Seen from this point of view, social unrest may develop into a social movement. Of course, the relationship between both social phenomena also has a reciprocal character; social movements, in their turn, can accelerate social unrest. See Blumer, in McLung, ed. (1963), pp. 170-221.

The enduring unrest in Banten is a striking feature reflecting the decay of the regional administration.

Banten served as the theatre of rebellion throughout the 19th century, so that one can justifiably say that it was a well-known hotbed of disturbances.² A glance at the historical map of North Banten shows that there was not a single district which was not affected by social disturbances.³ Indeed, rebellion in 19th-century Banten was not sporadic but general, endemic, and symptomatic for its society. The historical records give an impression of the recurrent flaring up of popular risings, varying in the degree of vehemence and extension. We cannot omit raising the question why such proneness to revolt was to be found in Banten, although we are actually more interested in the social make-up of the revolting groups. Explanations in terms of the particularly individualistic personality of the Bantenese are speculative rather than conclusive.⁴ Insofar as we can speak of a "tradition of rebellion", a historical explanation with special reference to social factors will be more illuminating.

The factors that contributed to social upheavals and unrest were complex and varied. Factors such as the disintegration of the traditional order and its concomitant, the deterioration of the political system, and religious hatred against alien rulers, figured prominently in the numerous uprisings in 19th-century Banten. With the breakdown of the sultanate, the traditional system of control was thrown out of gear. A more or less general chaos reigned during the last days of the rapidly declining sultanate. The unsettled conditions in the region that followed the collapse of the sultanate, and the general anarchy which later prevailed,

² The number of insurrections between 1810 and 1870, as reported by de Waal, (1876), amounted to 19; most of them are dealt with in this chapter. See de Waal, Vol. I, (1876), pp. 219-222. For the phrase "hotbed of disturbances", see de Klerck, Vol. II (1938-39), p. 547.

³ See Appendix I, in Benda and McVey (1960), p. 67; the map only indicates places as centres of rebellion and not the areas covered by rebellious movements. Even the focal points of some rebellions are not correctly indicated, e.g. those of the rebellion of 1850, which were Budang Batu and Pulau Merak. Places involved in the insurrections of 1851, 1862 and 1870 are not indicated.

⁴ In his report, Resident Buyn ascribed the individualistic personality of the Bantenese to the institution of individual ownership; see *TNI* (1859), no. 1, p. 167. The Banten report speaks of a "chronic rebellious spirit", see Benda and McVey (1960), p. 20; also Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 1 (1924), p. 255. Cf. Spaan, in *Almanak der Indologische Vereeniging* (1893), pp. 222-223; H. Djajadiningrat, in *Handelingen* (1921), pp. 309, 322-324.

contributed in some measure to the rise of unruly elements which engaged in turbulent activities time and again. As long as the Dutch administration was not consolidated and the entire institutional structure was insecure, the state of insurrection continued. Especially during the first half of the 19th century, Banten experienced widespread lawlessness, while disturbances arose almost every three years. The government machinery failed to operate effectively with the result that unruly elements held sway over the rural areas. Administrative authority and control gravitated away from the officials.⁵ Even later in the century, when the colonial government was considerably consolidated, administrative neglect still loomed large, giving tangible form not only to the conditional loyalty of the civil servants but also to the aggressive pressure of covert social forces. It is remarkable that the motivations advanced by the rebels both to justify their actions and to win popular support, did not relate so much to resentment against local administration but rather to the mere fact of being ruled by alien overlords. We must not overlook the fact that some conspiracies were instigated by civil servants with sour grape attitudes towards the colonial government.⁶

It is noteworthy that the political aspect was prominent in all the social movements dealt with in this chapter. The popular hatred for the Bantenese civil servants was almost as intense as the hostility to the foreign rulers. Resistance to the land rent was chronic wherever agents of the colonial government attempted to enforce it. It is therefore not surprising that strenuous opposition to the levying of taxes developed into full-fledged revolts.⁷ The grievances of the people as regards taxation were made more intense by the scarcity of money and the low prices paid for agrarian products. It would be no exaggeration to say that the recurrence of social disturbances was the direct consequence of the penetration of money economy in Banten society. On top of these grievances, the colonial government menaced the privileged

⁵ During the second decade, a kind of bureaucratic absenteeism existed among European officials; some who held positions in Pandeglang still lived in Serang. Not until 1819 were European officials stationed in Lebak and Tjilangkahan; see the report of Resident Buyn, in *TNI* (1870), no. 2, pp. 324-325.

⁶ E.g. the insurrectionary movements of 1850 and 1870; in almost all the rebellions, incumbent or retired or dismissed officials were to be found as participants.

⁷ E.g. the rebellion of Tumenggung Mohamad in 1825, see *TNI*, S. VII, Vol. 3 (1845), p. 90; Francis, Vol. II (1856), p. 54; Roorda van Eysinga, Vol. IV (1832), pp. 227. Also the Tjikandi Udik revolt in 1845, see *TNI* (1859), no. 1, p. 142.

position of the old aristocracy and the religious élite. Their political dislocation obviously made them susceptible to rebelliousness which canalized their discontent and resentment, and this rebelliousness was exacerbated by their religious feelings against "infidel" rule. Most of the risings no doubt had these religious undertones.

In considering the characteristics of the rebellions in 19th-century Banten, one generalization is permissible: the hostility to foreign rule formed an outstanding feature of the insurrections. Actually, the rebellions were revolutionary in the sense that their aim went beyond the destruction of corrupt officialdom; it was to overthrow the system of government as introduced by the alien ruler. The revolts may be viewed as efforts to wrest political control from the group of colonial civil servants. In the final test of strength the colonial power always won, for the revolting groups were deficient in the organizational and strategic faculty which the European rulers had developed. Moreover, they conspicuously lacked sophistication and articulateness. The fatal outcome also had to do with another salient characteristic of these movements, which may be labelled "traditional".⁸

As the historical records tell us, besides grievances about taxes and extortionate demands for services, the restoration of the sultanate was a general theme. The available documents do not supply much information as to what exactly they had in mind with this revivalism. What we do know is that the dream of returning to the sultanate was occasionally associated with the promise of liberation from paying taxes.⁹ Furthermore, one wonders whether the rebels identified the period of

⁸ A conceptual distinction must be made between modern and traditional social movements in terms of their goal-orientation aspects. The latter's aim does not involve a basic change in the social system, while the former's does. The traditional character of revolts in Banten is conspicuous; their goal was the restoration of the old sultanate. For this differentiation, see Heberle (1951), pp. 6-7; cf. the distinction made by Hobsbawm (1958) between archaic and modern agitation. In the Hobsbawmian sense, the revolts in Banten should be categorized as pre-political and archaic. Since the goal-orientation aspect of the insurrections in Banten usually concerns both a change of rulers and an alteration in the form of government as introduced by the colonial power, no distinction is made between rebellion and revolution. Some small cases might more correctly be termed riots. The term "insurrection" may cover all these rebellious movements.

⁹ Besides the idealistic aspects of the rebellions, the materialistic ones were also stressed — as in the revolts of 1825, 1839, 1845 — namely the abolition of corvée labour or land rent and other taxes. See Political report, 1839-1849, in *Exh. Jan. 31, 1851*, no. 27 bis, esp. about Banten; also *TNI* (1859), no. 1, pp. 140-142, and *TNI* (1870), no. 2, p. 324; see also Veth, *Vol. II* (1898), pp. 404-405.

the sultanate with the golden age. It may be assumed that for the rebels in their fight against innovations brought about by the colonial ruler, the sultanate represented a traditional value and could therefore be utilized as a rallying symbol. This political myth, expressed in statements which hinted at an impending restoration of the old sultanate, clearly underlined the traditional character of most of the insurrections. Insofar as the hope for a return of the sultanate was present in these movements, they may be described as millenarian. The millennial aspect of the ideal of the sultanate may, in fact, be conceived as the idea that the colonial situation might come to an end and that the old harmony of the traditional order might be restored.¹⁰ Here one of the main characteristics of millenarianism can clearly be pointed out, namely, the profound and total rejection of the present situation. It is also conspicuous that the movements were fundamentally vague about the way in which the sultanate would be restored. Furthermore, as long as direct descendants of Bantenese sultans were still alive, the candidacy of other members of the nobility could only have a symbolic rather than a substantial function. It is therefore not likely that the restoration of the sultanate was conceived of as a concrete political aim. In fact, the sultanate can be viewed as an essential element of the traditional order which the movement attempted to re-establish.

These two features were usually coupled with a religious one: the result was a militancy rooted in the doctrine of the Holy War, in which a strong longing for the restoration of the sultanate and the extermination of alien rule were interwoven. The doctrine of the Holy War was a latent belief held by the Muslim community, which in time of stress proved to be an inspiring force to move the masses. With the rising tide of the religious revival in the latter half of the 19th century, this ideology intensified the aggressive potency of the population in Banten tremendously. The smouldering hostility against the Dutch, the minor commotions that occurred from time to time, and the great upheaval of 1888, can all be attributed to religious fervour, if not fanaticism, invested with the idea of the Holy War.

In this connection a strong religious or magico-religious bent is noticeable, which manifested itself in the widespread and frequent use of

¹⁰ For the essence of millenarianism, see Hobsbawm (1963), pp. 57-58; according to this author it is present in all revolutionary movements. For the restoration of lost harmony, see van der Kroef, in *CSSH*, Vol. I, no. 4 (1959), pp. 299-323. As to the social movements in 19th-century Java, their goal-orientation was more realistic and not as abstract as van der Kroef conceives it.

djimat among the rebels. Confidence in their cause was reinforced in a positive way by their belief in the magical efficacy of these *djimats*, which were supposed to protect the user effectively from all kinds of evil and bad luck and which could eventually be used as a means to become invulnerable. In serving the need for physical and material security, the *djimat*-cult gave tremendous spiritual impetus to the struggle against the infidels. In short, their fighting spirit was so completely at one with their faith that the rebels felt certain of achieving victory over the modernly-armed forces of the colonial power.¹¹

REVOLUTIONARY LEADERSHIP

For a better understanding of the nature of the insurrections it is indispensable to deal with the problem of leadership. Social movements were swelled by general discontent, and an outburst was only dependent upon the emergence of leaders. Shortly after the abolition of the sultanate, when considerable confusion prevailed and the whole social order seemed on the verge of disruption, leaders appeared who were destined to lead the discontent in defying the dominant forces. It was the underdogs, outside the orderly elements of the new political situation, who organized the rebels for revolt. The old rural élite, consisting of the landed gentry and the religious élite, who were embittered from the start, carried on a campaign of strenuous resistance. Indeed, the incessant stirring of this revolutionary élite made Banten a turbulent area for several decades. With the passing of time various social elements mingled in the rebellion: civil servants, noblemen, religious men, village authorities and outlaws. A large section of them belonged to the "in-élite" in the old traditional order, while a minor group had always occupied the position of "outs". We may safely say that the revolutionary élite was drawn from various social strata and that the movements throughout the 19th century were never exclusively the work of any one social class in Banten society. It is certain that the common villagers were not the only participants in the insurrections. As has been pointed out before, almost all the rebellions were led by persons who were no ordinary peasants. They were capable of giving expression to the inarticulate wishes of the bulk of the peasantry and of channelling the peasants' unorganized strength into effective pressure. The peasantry constituted the main physical force and therefore the

¹¹ The general deficiency of strategic faculty is not only conspicuous in the social movements of 19th-century Java, but is a global phenomenon, see Pieris, in *CJHSS*, Vol. V (1962), pp. 18-28.

indispensable ingredient of the uprisings. The main sources of revolutionary leadership were the old rural gentry, the religious élite and the nobility.¹² It is quite natural that the recurrent social and political crises in Banten society were important factors in the formation of these revolutionary élites. It is also evident that the crises in question may themselves have been precipitated by conflicts among or within the power élites in Banten.¹³ Mention should also be made of the fact that some civil servants were implicated in the rebellion because of personal grievances, while others had been creatures of the moment and joined the rebels because they had been released by them from imprisonment. In some instances this category of leaders could be held responsible for inaugurating either conspiracies or revolts. A close examination of the history of insurrections in Banten reveals that there was a circulation of revolutionary élites, starting with the old rebellious gentry, followed by the traditional aristocracy, and ending up with the religious élite. So much for the revolutionary élite.

THE ROLE OF DISORDERLY ELEMENTS IN PROTEST MOVEMENTS

Another aspect of social unrest that we have to deal with briefly refers to robbery, banditry, brigandage and outlawry; in short, disorderly elements which were roaming about the country. These are inevitably the product of an ill-regulated society, manifesting the protest by active hostilities directed against the community that has failed to ensure order and justice. Particularly in the first half of the 19th century the so-called robber, bandit or brigand in Banten was often a dispossessed member of the landed gentry or the old aristocracy, driven to this "illegal" course to defend himself and vindicate his rights. It is therefore not surprising that these "bandits" were often forced into common action with the rebels against law-enforcing officials. On the other hand, rebels could easily turn into robber bands, so that no rigid boundary could be drawn between rebels and brigands. Both rebellion and brigandage

¹² The rural gentry may be distinguished from the nobility; it may be thought of as a category of social strata placed between the aristocracy (including the nobility) and the peasantry. It may also be defined as the class of more prosperous peasants or rural inhabitants. For a conception of the rural gentry, see Eisenstadt (1963), pp. 204-205. Many *hadjis* of Banten may be classified as belonging to this gentry.

¹³ A conflict situation fraught with social tensions naturally conduces to the outbreak of disturbances and rebellions. Members of the power élite may assume leadership and organize the mechanism and means of a social movement. In this context social unrest may be regarded as a conditional factor rather than a consequence of the movement. See note no. 1.

must be regarded as manifestations of prevailing social unrest and as popular protests against oppressive situations as well. Furthermore, brigandage or banditry also clearly mirrored the state of general apathy to public order as imposed by the colonial government. By openly defying the authorities, the rebellious bandits gained the latent sympathy of the population. In this connection, attention should be paid to the different degrees of rebellion treated in this section.¹⁴ Bantenese history shows that in the first half of the 19th century, the bandit rebels evidently assumed a distinctly political character by stirring up prolonged resistance to the colonial government. By the 1880s, however, the bandits had become mere robbers and brigands, who had no commitments to rebellious movements and whose object was mainly indiscriminate plunder. They were able to continue their careers in crime for a number of reasons: firstly, there was a lack of cohesion and co-ordination among the law-enforcing agencies; secondly, distrust of the civil service was so heavily ingrained in the people that they showed no inclination to co-operate with the officials in the apprehension of disorderly elements; thirdly, besides these political and social conditions, the configuration of the landscape with its mountains, forest, etc., afforded excellent haunts for protection and concealment. As the social space for outlawry began to shrink, religious communities gained in importance as rallying foci for conspiracies and rebellious movements. In order to give substance to this broad observation concerning these general patterns and trends, an account of various instances will be given.

A DECADE OF POLITICAL DETERIORATION (1808—1819)

At the beginning of this chapter it was suggested that the rebelliousness of Banten had become proverbial. Indeed, during the decade immediately following the introduction of direct rule, a tendency towards vicious deterioration was clearly discernible in Banten — a process which precipitated recurrent social disturbances that erupted with reckless fury. Local uprisings broke out with persistent frequency, some of them developing into full-scale rebellions. It was in 1809 that a band of so-called pirates raised the flag of rebellion in response to the excessive demand for *corvée* labour made by Daendels.¹⁵ Those extortions were skilfully exploited by the rebellious chiefs to

¹⁴ The term "degree" here refers to both spatial and temporal dimensional aspects, and to goal-orientation aspects as well. The degree of rebellion ranges from outlawry, brigandage and rioting, to rebellion and revolution.

¹⁵ Hoek (1862), p. 100.

arouse hatred against the colonial government; the kindling of the flame of revolt was meant to make the colonial government reluctant to continue its rule in that turbulent area. In the midst of this political confusion, anarchy, breakdown of administrative systems, and successive waves of violence, the sultan was reinstalled to reign over South Banten in 1810. This experiment was made in order to enable the sultan to enlist the loyalty and the support of the population on the one hand, and to operate the institutions of control on the other. No improvement of the situation actually took place under the sultan, for his administration, insofar as the maintenance of internal order was concerned, was inherently weak and corrupt. The conditions of disorder and insecurity in Banten prevailed for many years that followed.

During the period of the sultan's reign, the rebellious groups remained quite active. Some of them indulged in brigandage, while others were engaged in the perennial struggle of defying the authorities. There was no way of distinguishing between the partisans, fighting for the restoration of the sultanate, and the ordinary brigands. The bands of partisans, led by Ngabehi Adam, Hadji Jamin, Ngabehi Utu and Ngabehi Ikram, were composed of vagabonds, pirates, slaves and deserters. To these rebels, riches gained from looting might be not so much an end in themselves but rather a means of supporting their followers, and of inducing more people to join them. This shows that their goal orientation was predominantly political. In strong contrast, the groups of brigands under the leadership of men like Mas Bangsa, Mas Bima, Satron and Noriman, were chiefly driven by a lust for gain, despite the fact that they often paid lip-service to political ideas about the restoration of the sultanate and the liberation from European subjugation.¹⁶ By taking joint action they could stand their ground, with the result that the region was covered with their savage incursions for many years and consequently devastated. Local campaigns made by small bands varied with grand assaults made by a substantial force, and this sort of guerilla-tactics made it virtually impossible for the colonial government to cope with the situation effectively. In 1815 this unceasing warfare culminated in the besieging of the palace of the sultan in Pandeglang. Noriman, also known as Sultan Kanoman, was

¹⁶ Report of Resident Tobias, in *TNI* (1870), no. 2, p. 321. Consult also: "*Overzicht van de staatkundige betrekkingen met de Inlandsche vorsten op Java, 1596-1830*", written in 1844, in document no. 2962 of the *Algemeen Rijksarchief*, the division of the Ministry of Colonies. (Hereafter referred to as *Overzicht*).

in command of the brigands. Although government troops succeeded in repelling his offensive and in compelling his band to withdraw, it was difficult to defeat them completely as long as they enjoyed both the support and the allegiance of the people.¹⁷ The groups of partisans began to disperse as soon as some of their prominent leaders either died or entered the government's service. The years of disorder were not yet past, because the groups of brigands were still roaming about and devastating the rural areas where there was no efficient policing or where communications were difficult due to terrain conditions. Especially the hilly and mountainous regions could easily harbour predatory elements. The government troops were never given a chance to encounter them in a decisive battle; the brigands dashed off or melted away at their approach. Obviously the physical environment served as a safe natural hideout, but their power base was mainly formed by the assistance of the local population. In this connection it should be kept in mind that the incredible career of some of the legendary brigands was surrounded with an aura of romanticism and commanded the admiration of large sections of the people.¹⁸ The brigands' position was reinforced by gaining support from outside Banten in the form of armaments and ammunition. Furthermore, it would seem that their communication system was more effective than that of the government.¹⁹ It must be emphasized that in these insurrections, the role played by the leaders was of special importance. Most of their activities depended on the initiative of the individual leader. This means that the deaths of outstanding leaders such as Armaja, Wahud, Satron, Pangeran Sane and Mas Bangsa were a tremendous setback to their cause.²⁰ Nevertheless, the bands rapidly recovered their strength as new leaders came to the fore. In the late 1810s, Hadji Tassin, Moba, Mas Hadji and Mas Rakka were at the head of rebellious bandits and marauders that included runaways and deserters. They started carrying

¹⁷ For Noriman, see *TNI* (1865), no. 1, p. 88; also *TNI* (1870), no. 2, p. 322.

¹⁸ The names of Mas Tanda and Mas Djakaria are mentioned in the Bantenese historiography which is known as *Sedjarah Hadji Mangsur*; see Javanese MS in the collection of Snouck Hurgronje, number 10.

¹⁹ *TNI* (1870), no. 2, p. 323; for more information about the communication systems of rebels, *TNI* (1859), no. 1, p. 163. Special agents were employed, among whom members of the secret service were sometimes to be found. This was also the case during the 1850 revolt.

²⁰ Report of Resident Tobias, in *TNI* (1870), no. 2, pp. 320-321; see also O.I.B. Jan. 18, 1819, no. 19 and O.I.B. Jan. 30, 1819, no. 18; *Overzicht* (1844). See further, Roorda van Eysinga, Vol. IV (1832), pp. 88-89; Hoek (1862), pp. 106-107.

on their depredations without fear of apprehension, because law-enforcing and preventive agencies were practically lacking. Indeed, there was almost an administrative vacuum in the whole of South Banten. The civil service system and the revenue establishments were totally inadequate to perform their duties and, as Resident de Bruyn saw it, the colonial administration could make itself felt only by resorting to considerable military force.²¹ The rebels could still rid the people of hated officials: the Mandoor of Lebak was killed after giving lodging to the inspector of the land rent. Later, in the rising at the end of 1818 and the beginning of 1819 several civil servants in charge of collecting the land rent also fell victims to merciless assault. In this way the rebels could win the population to their side and inspire them with awe by means of their image as defenders of the people's interests. As a result, the officials were insulated and government power was swept from the rural areas. It is not surprising that most of the civil servants of higher ranks remained in the cities at that time.²² Because of administrative negligence and absence of government control, a situation prevailed that created favourable conditions for the rebels. This situation lends credence to the contention stated above, that during the first decade of colonial regime Banten was in a state of vicious deterioration: its failure to provide the people with legal protection weakened the position of the government, which in turn gave the bands of brigands the opportunity of expanding their forces, and so on.

THE PERIODIC REBELLIONS BETWEEN 1820 AND 1845

The setting up of a new administrative organization in the middle of 1819 can be viewed as a step taken by the government in its determination to improve the situation in Banten, which was on the verge of disruption.²³ It is still doubtful whether this measure was effective in achieving the said goal. As a contemporary put it a few years later: after the abolition of the sultanate in Banten, no year went by without witnessing an outburst of rebellion.²⁴ The fragmentary data available

²¹ Hoek (1862), pp. 106-107; van Deventer, Vol. I (1891), p. CLXVI.

²² Report of Resident Tobias, in *TNI* (1870), no. 2, p. 324; See also O.I.B. Jan. 24, 1843, no. 6; *Overzicht* (1844).

²³ O.I.B. July 3, 1819, no. 10, 11, and 33; these refer to the appointment of P. Suramenggala as Regent of the Northern Regency; of P. Senadjaja as Regent of the Southern Regency; of R. B. Mulafar as *patih* in the Northern Regency; and furthermore, the appointment of 7 chiefs of *Djajengsekar* troops. See also *Overzicht* (1844).

²⁴ Francis, Vol. II (1856), pp. 53-54.

mention at least four major insurrections during the twenties, namely, those occurring in 1820, 1822, 1825, and 1827.²⁵ As regards the first two risings, it suffices to point out that the source of the 1820 turbulence under Mas Raje lay in the introduction of vaccination, while in 1822 the rebels, about 500 men strong, laid siege to Anjer without success.²⁶

The person who actually instigated revolt at the end of 1825 was Tumenggung Mohamad, a *Demang* of Menes. He and his followers practised tax evasion, a movement which degenerated into riots against tax collectors. Summoned by the resident, he refused to appear and took refuge in the bulwark built to keep government forces at bay. The offensive launched by government troops was, however, too much for the rebels, so that they were easily dispersed and had to take to the hills. Tumenggung Mohamad and six of his adherents crossed the top of Mt. Pulosari, fled to the border of Pandeglang and thence to the swamps of Panimbang. Hot in pursuit, government troops under Lieutenant de Quay traced them up to Menes, but soon lost track of the group. The factors which helped Tumenggung Mohamad and his band in eluding government forces were not only the difficult nature of the terrain in which they operated, but also the deep respect and fear that he inspired in the people. It should be remarked that the troops were often misled by false information in their search for the rebels; another positive proof of the popular support that Tumenggung Mohamad enjoyed was that the village head of Menes was hand in glove with him during the pursuit. Among Tumenggung Mohamad's followers, many religious men were to be found. It was therefore too much to expect that the persecution would result in the immediate capture of the rebel, notwithstanding the fact that he had been outlawed and a price had been fixed on his head. When all other methods had failed, the authorities resorted to moral persuasion. The government would give the rebel chief a fair deal by rehabilitating him if he would come forward to surrender. After being granted amnesty by the resident, Tumenggung Mohamad and his band left their hideout and surrendered.²⁷ The policy of pardon thus produced results according to the

²⁵ De Waal, Vol. I (1876), p. 219.

²⁶ In 1820 Mas Raje headed a movement against the introduction of smallpox vaccination; in 1822 Anjer was attacked by 500 armed rebels; see de Waal, Vol. I (1876), p. 219; Report of Resident Tobias, *TNI* (1870), no. 2, p. 326. In this report it is pointed out that detailed accounts of early risings are quite scarce in the Archives of Banten.

²⁷ Cf. the five sources: Roorda van Eysinga, Vol. IV (1832), p. 227; Roorda van Eysinga, Vol. III, part 2 (1842), pp. 313-315; *TNI*, S. VII, vol. 3

expectations of the government: it reduced the power of the turbulent elements.

Two years later, however, a new spark rekindled the wild-fire of rebellion. This time an old-timer among the rebels of Banten made his reappearance; it was the notorious Mas Djakaria, whose personality already had a mythical aura in the eyes of the people. In 1811, he had overrun Pandeglang, the court city at that time. He was afterwards captured and detained, but in August 1827 he managed to escape. Thereupon a price amounting to one thousand Spanish piastres was fixed on his head. Owing to the great reverence in which he was held, Mas Djakaria soon succeeded in mustering a large following, and in that same year he besieged Pandeglang again, putting the members of the military detachment to death.²⁸ Then followed a period of wandering, evading government troops who hunted him unceasingly. In persecuting the rebels they forced people to make confessions and set fire to villages, evoking fear and terror among the population. Mas Djakaria's outlawry came to an end when he was captured a few months later and then sentenced to death. He was beheaded and his body was burnt.²⁹ His career both as a rebel and as an outlaw was spectacular; he was held to be invulnerable, and an aura of holiness was attached to his name. It is regrettable that we have no information as to the details of his activities; the historical documents available cover only data regarding his kinsmen.³⁰ In the historical tradition of Banten, the so-called *Sedjarah Hadji Mangsur*, the name of Mas Djakaria was mentioned in connection with disturbances during the reign of Sultan Ishak, in which he had already played an important role.³¹ Furthermore, it was told that Mas Djakaria's genealogy went back to the well-known Kjai Santri, whose holy grave is to be found in Kolle. The

(1845), p. 90; Francis, Vol. II (1856), pp. 54-56; Hageman (1856), pp. 165-166.

²⁸ O.I.B. Sept. 28, 1827, no. 11, which stated that Djakaria had already lost a large part of his followers; see also *Overzicht* (1844); Report of Resident Buyn, in *TNI* (1859), no. 1, 144; Francis, Vol. II (1856), p. 66.

²⁹ Roorda van Eysinga, Vol. III part 2 (1842), p. 313; Francis, Vol. II (1856), p. 66.

³⁰ The list of the members of the Djakaria family banished to the Outer Provinces is to be found in O.I.B. Sept. 16, 1846, no. 18. They were: Mas Agus, Mas Maji, Unjar, Nuraipa, Mas Tjingak, Sakudin bapa Kamidin, Tjulung bapa Arbaja, and Nidian; see also O.I. B. Apr. 14, 1840, no. 6, which mentions Mas Djebeng, Mas Anom, Mas Serdang, and Mas Adong.

³¹ See *MS Sedjarah Hadji Mangsur*, in the collection of Snouck Hurgronje, no. 10, pp. 22-23. For Sultan Ishak, see the list of sultans, note 16 tot Chap. III.

latter was venerated by the people as a saint, whose blessings were invoked before important undertakings. During his lifetime, Kjai Santri manifested great influence over the people and assumed leadership in a prolonged resistance to the sultan. It is noteworthy that even during the sultanate, the members of the Djakaria family belonged to the "out-élite", which means that they were placed in an antagonistic position with regard to the ruling class. After the abolition of the sultanate, they not only retained that position but became more and more a band of outlaws constituting part of a rural underworld in Banten. In fact, they were exiled or they voluntarily exiled themselves from society, and in order to subsist and retaliate, they formed themselves into armed bands. Here we meet with a subterranean power group which in the period under study had already established a tradition of rebellion. Djakaria's father was a notorious rebel and almost all of his descendants played an important role in insurrections occurring in the 'thirties and 'forties. These arch-rebels cannot be put into the same category as the bandit rebels who were greedy of loot and spoils. Bearing in mind the persistence of their struggle and the succession of revolts that they had initiated since the time of the sultanate, they may be designated as a revolutionary élite, whose political role was primary. Obviously, the recurring crises in the political arena of Banten were quite favourable for the performance of that role. As we know, the rural areas were not undividedly controlled by the authorities in power, and the influence of unruly elements was keenly felt up to the end of the 19th century. Of course, the political vacuum existing during the early part of that century provided rebel leaders with an unprecedented opportunity to gain power, not only by force or intimidation but also by means of their charisma. It was generally believed that Mas Djakaria would rise from the dead, and his reappearance was awaited with fear and with deference.³² It is therefore quite understandable that rebel leaders could easily win the support or help of rural inhabitants without employing shrewd methods. With the passing of time, the Djakaria family and other groups of the revolutionary gentry were building up local strongholds around which power clustered, harbouring a potential menace to the colonial government. The government gradually eliminated this kind of "parallel system" or "shadow power-system" by banishing the prominent members.³³ As the colonial administration

³² Francis, Vol. II (1856), p. 66; see also Report of Resident Buyn, in *TNI* (1859), no. 1, p. 144.

³³ O.I.B. Apr. 14, 1840, no. 6; O.I.B. Sept. 16, 1846, no. 18. Three of Dja-

became more and more effective, and the Banten aristocracy and the foreign rulers coalesced, what remained of the band of rebels was left isolated and helpless, losing territorial links and local support. The result was that this condition forced many rebels and outlaws to become professional bandits.

At the end of the third decade, disturbances evidently began in the vicinity of Serang. While the government troops were hunting rebels who still roamed in South Banten, a large band of insurgents advanced to Serang and threatened to overrun it. In this grave situation, a military body consisting of cavalry and infantry was mustered and ordered to launch a counter-attack. The Regent of Serang himself led the attack; some of the rebel leaders were captured and the rest of the insurgents were driven off. Because of the hurried retreat of the rebels, rioting and pillaging in the capital could be warded off.³⁴

The 1830s again witnessed a succession of risings and conspiracies: in 1831, 1833, 1836, and 1839. These dates actually represent points of culmination in a disturbance which continued throughout that decade. As in previous insurrections, the captured leaders were exiled. After the suppression of the 1836 rebellion, some participants were at large in the residency for about three years until a new rebellion broke out.³⁵ Among its instigators were to be found some of the fugitive leaders of the 1836 rebellion: Ratu Bagus Ali, also known as Kjai Gede; Pangeran Radli; and Mas Djebeng, one of the sons of Mas Djakaria. Followers were acquired by promises that freedom from compulsory labour would follow if the rebellious enterprise was successful. The main leaders had the misfortune to be caught before the rebels went into action. The years that followed were still turbulent, because there were so many insurgents roaming about the country. Mas Lamir was able to gather about him a large following, which could not be subdued directly. Mas' Djamir, a notorious rebel in the 1828 and 1836 troubles,

karia's sons had escaped out of exile, viz. Mas Anom, Mas Serdang, and Mas Adong, see O.I.B. Nov. 28, 1842, no. 2.

³⁴ Roorda van Eysinga, Vol. IV (1832), pp. 227-231.

³⁵ The roaming of rebel bands led by Kjai Gede, Mas Djebeng, Njai Gumpara, Mas Lamir, Mastar Djago, and Hadji Tassin, is mentioned in O.I.B. Sept. 6, 1831, no. 16; O.I.B. Jan. 6, 1833, no. 19; O.I.B. Apr. 14, 1840, no. 6. See also Political report, 1839-1849, with special reference to Banten, in Exh. Jan. 31, 1851, 27 bis.

Concerning the years of the outbreak of rebellions, cf. Veth, who refers to 1832, 1834, 1836 and 1839 as the years when the rebellions broke out; see Veth, Vol. II (1898), pp. 404-405.

made his reappearance, but was soon overrun and killed.³⁶ This was undoubtedly a far cry from rooting out the turbulent forces. The killing of a European supervisor of "*nopal*" cultivation was quite symptomatic of the deteriorating situation.³⁷ The situation worsened further when three rebel leaders, i.e. Mas Anom, Mas Serdang, and Mas Adong, all sons of Mas Djakaria, joined the rebel forces after escaping from imprisonment in Banjuwangi.³⁸ It was soon discovered that they intended to stir up unrest again at the beginning of the fasting period of 1841. The situation was so critical that the officials stayed away from the villages. The great outburst did not, however, come about before the end of 1845. During the intervening five years, insurrection and brigandage were rampant, despite the fact that captured rebels were detained in increasing numbers.³⁹

THE TTIKANDI AFFAIR IN 1845

The disorders at the end of 1845 are better known as the Tjikandi affair, named after the estate which became the main focal point of murderous assault. On the 13th of December, the rebels seized the country house of Tjikandi Udik, and killed the landlord, Kamphuys, his wife and five of his children. The lives of none of the Europeans in the neighbourhood were spared by the furious mob, except of the three other children of Kamphuys, who were saved by Bapa Sarinten, one of the rebel leaders.⁴⁰ Looting, however, did not occur, for it was strictly prohibited. The rebels set up their headquarters in the country-house, where the flags of rebellion were raised. Ritual ceremonies took place, reminiscent of rituals of homage to royalty. Meanwhile the number of rebels already amounted to about six hundred. It seemed that they tended to remain in their bulwark. This tactic gave government troops a chance to engage in decisive battle. Comprehending the

³⁶ O.I.B. Dec. 18, 1840, no. 10.

³⁷ *Nopal* is derived from *Nopalea Coccineleifera*, a kind of a shrub cultivated for cattle forage, or the cultivation of cochineal, an insect producing red colouring matter. See Bruggeman (1939), p. 252; also van Hall and van de Koppel, Vol. II A (1948), p. 744.

³⁸ O.I.B. Nov. 28, 1842, no. 2.

³⁹ According to O.I.B. Sept. 16, 1846, no. 18, 26 persons were banished to Menado, Banka, and Timor respectively; according to O.I.B. Apr. 14, 1840 no. 6, 35 persons, to Menado and Banjuwangi respectively; according to O.I.B. Jan. 24, 1843, no. 6, 12 persons.

⁴⁰ *Javasche Courant*, Jan. 14, 1846. Report of Resident Buyn, in *TNI* (1859), no. 1, p. 145; see also Missive of the Resident of Banten, Jan. 30, 1846, no. 130, in Vb. Feb. 27, 1846, no. 45.

seriousness of the situation, the resident begged for military assistance from Batavia. What he feared was that the incident in Tjikandi Udik would become a sign for unruly elements in other areas to raise the banner of revolt. The whole residency would then immediately be swarming with rebels and the small military outposts in Warung Gunung, Pandeglang and Tjaringin would easily be overrun. The resident was therefore determined to engage the rebels instantly. A detachment of about 80 men was sent to besiege the country-house, the rebels were provoked into battle, and after a slight withdrawal they were defeated and dispersed. It must be noted that the rebel leaders recklessly made a last assault on the government troops, relying wholly on their imagined invulnerability.⁴¹ Their great defeat diminished the rebels' morale, and the disturbances gradually faded away. We shall pass over the rescue work done by the government troops, and investigate the leadership in this revolt and what it actually stood for.

One of the main instigators of the rebellion was Amir, an inhabitant of Bajuku, a hamlet located in the said estate. Being unable to pay the tax to his landlord, he was compelled to sell his buffalo or leave the hamlet. With disturbed feelings he went to Bapa Sarinten for advice and moral support. Like all *kjais* and *dukuns* in the area, Bapa Sarinten had quite a great deal of prestige and influence. To his mind, Amir's case was of the first degree of importance and could only be settled by force. This desperate enterprise, however, needed secret and extensive preparation. The first step in realizing this plan was to approach Mas Endong and Mas Rila from Tjikupa, and Mas Ubid from Kolle. Bapa Sarinten then travelled eastward and later through the central, western, and southern part of the residency for about five months, recruiting people and winning them over to his insurrectionary plan. On his return, he was accompanied by Kjai Gede and Bapa Sapingi, both from the surrounding country of Batavia. The next step was to enlist Mas Ubid for the cause and to ensure his co-operation in acquiring the support of the inhabitants of Kolle and Pamarajan. Last but not least, kinsmen of Mas Djakaria and their allies had to be invited to join the insurrection. Names such as Mas Anom, Mas Djebang, Mas Serdang and Mas Semarang had a direct appeal to the sympathy of the people. As pointed out previously, the fact that the Djakaria family had engaged in the rebellious movement in Banten for decades made them popular heroes, and their names therefore served as a rallying force. It went so

⁴¹ Report of Resident Buyn, in *TNI* (1859), no. 1, p. 153.

far, that a certain Kasidin assumed the role of Mas Djakaria's father after receiving a revelation from the sound of a *gong*; a disciple of Kasidin's, Ujang, was recognized as a younger brother of Mas Djakaria, while a man called Antonie (sic), represented a son of Mas Djakaria.⁴² However strange this may be, the adoption of these imaginary roles was quite effective in mobilizing participants. As to the real descendants of Mas Djakaria, mention should be made first of a female rebel chief, namely Mas Andjung, who played a pivotal role in the conspiracy. In spite of being married to the *Demang* of KOLELET, Mas Utjim, she meddled with conspiratory intrigues behind his back. In the meantime, rumours were circulating about the presence and activities of the three sons of Mas Djakaria, who were wandering through Banten as runaways. Of course these rumours aroused much excitement among the population; for a long time every attempt of the government to capture or annihilate those astute and slippery rebels failed.⁴³ To complete the list of rebel leaders, we may mention Mas Ubid, a nephew and son-in-law of Mas Djakaria; Raden Jintan; Pangeran Lamir; and another female rebel, Sarinam.⁴⁴

Let us turn now to the discussion of the goal-orientation aspect of this uprising. The ceremonies mentioned above reveal that this movement held some revivalistic traits, particularly with reference to the restoration of the sultanate. The granting of titles such as Mas Gusti to Bapa Sarinten, and Pangeran to Amir, is in this respect an obvious indication.⁴⁵ This revivalistic tendency was obviously anti-foreign, aimed at the termination of European rule.⁴⁶ The extermination of the European settlement in Tjikandi Udik speaks for itself. The confessions extracted from captured rebels confirmed the supposition maintained by the resident that this affair was not an isolated incident, but that it was originally meant only as a signal or a spark which must kindle the wild-fire of revolt in the whole of Banten.⁴⁷ There is sufficient

⁴² Report of Resident Buyn, in *TNI* (1859), no. 1, pp. 158, 161.

⁴³ Rumours were circulating during the fasting periods in 1844 and 1845. At that time the sons of Mas Djakaria had evidently escaped out of exile; see O.I.B. Nov. 28, 1842, no. 2.

⁴⁴ Report of Resident Buyn, in *TNI* (1859), no. 1, pp. 149, 163; see also O.I.B. Aug. 8, 1846, no. 25.

⁴⁵ Report of Resident Buyn, in *TNI* (1859), no. 1, p. 160.

⁴⁶ See O.I.B. March 3, 1846, no. 7; also O.I.B. Aug. 8, 1846, no. 25 and O.I.B. Aug. 28, 1846, no. 1.

⁴⁷ Report of Resident Buyn, in *TNI* (1859), no. 1, p. 149. The plan was that Tanara and Pandeglang would be overrun; communication would be maintained with the surrounding countries of Batavia and South Bogor. In case of defeat the rebels would retreat to Tjaringin.

evidence that the conspiracy had extended its branches to the neighbouring country of Batavia. The plotters also had a common cause with the rebels in the south headed by Njai Perbata, who was the mother of Njai Gumpara, the notorious female rebel chief of 1836.⁴⁸ Indeed, the defeat of the rebels in Tjikandi Udik destroyed a general rising in the bud.

Lastly, some short remarks about a few religious traits. As indicated before, the rebels showed a fanatical fury in battle because they were convinced that their *djimat* made them invulnerable. They had prepared to undertake a kind of Holy War, as evidenced by their wearing white linen clothes. In addition, their pilgrimage to the holy grave of Kjai Santri before starting the revolt can be regarded as a token of the sacred mission they felt they were going to fulfil.⁴⁹

In concluding this section on the disturbances in Banten during the first half of the 19th century, we must give our attention to what were supposed to be the main cause of the epidemic recurrence of insurrections. One of the chief sources of discontent and resentment was the deprivation of the old Banten aristocracy, whose memory of past glory was still vivid. Another cause was rooted in the institution of private landownership, one of the consequences of which was the shaping of a well-to-do class of landowners on the one hand, and a pauperized group dependant on the landowners on the other.⁵⁰ A third cause was the well-known religious zeal of the Bantenese. Furthermore, the prolonged disorders were also ascribed to imposed government institutions, which did not take root in Banten soil.

THE WACHIA REVOLT OF 1850

Among the numerous social risings which were to punctuate the history of Banten, we may include the revolt of 1850, which for the

⁴⁸ Political report: 1839-1849, in Exh. Jan. 31, 1851, no. 27 bis, esp. with reference to Banten. Njai Perbata operated from Sawarna in South Banten; her goal was the restoration of the sultanate.

⁴⁹ Report of Resident Buyn, in *TNI* (1859), no. 1, p. 144.

⁵⁰ Mention was made of the tendency towards concentration of land on the one hand, and the dispossession of the small peasants on the other; see Report of Resident Buyn, in *TNI* (1859), no. 1, pp. 106-107. The former process was due to the usurpation of land rights or illegal appropriation of *sawah negara* as *sawah jasa*. See Chap. II, pp. 38 ff. Dispossession was also caused by mortgaging or selling *sawahs*, see *Resumé* (1871), pp. 93-94, 119. The renting of land during Raffles' rule also gave rise to a small group of landowners with large holdings, see van Deventer, Vol. I (1891), p. 147; see also Bastin (1954), pp. 107-112, esp. p. 109 on which people with large holdings are listed.

sake of convenience will henceforth be called the Wachia revolt. It was on the 24th of February that the *Demang* of Tjilegon and his staff were killed in Rohdjambu, while on an inspection tour. They were totally unaware of the advancing rebels and, receiving no warning from the village head, Nasid, they walked into the trap. In January, rumours about conspiracies and riotous gatherings had actually been circulating, but no confirmatory evidence was to be obtained. The available data directly connect this story with the subsequent operations undertaken by government forces to subdue the rebels.⁵¹ Of far greater importance for our present purpose is what was going on within the circles of the conspirators. As noted previously, the chief instigator of this revolt was Raden Bagus Djajakarta, *Patih* of Serang.⁵² The fact that he had been twice passed over in the appointment of regents strengthened his determination to resort to violence in order to relieve his feelings of resentment.⁵³ He sought vengeance upon the Regent of Tjaringin in particular, the colonial government in general. In order to realize his rebellious plan, he tried to gain the assistance of influential local leaders, because he himself no longer commanded the support of the people after the death of his father, R. A. A. Mandura Radja Djajanegara. Moreover, his prestige declined because of the conflict between him and his step-mother, Ratu Siti Aissah, concerning his father's heritage. As a result he could not possibly count on the backing of the influential Banten nobility. From the outset he was closely associated with his brother-in-law, Tubagus Suramardja, and the latter's brother, Tubagus Mustafa, who worked incessantly to ferment a disturbance. Its realization demanded joint action with rebellious local leaders, such as Tubagus Iskak or Djekak, Mas Derik, Mas Diad, Satus, Nasid, Asidin, Hadji Wachia, and Panghulu Dempol. Tubagus Iskak, a dismissed *djaro* from Kedung Tjindik, was on intimate terms with discontented elements and brigands in the residency. Mas Derik felt hostile towards the *djaro* of his village, and bluntly refused to obey his orders. It was said that he was not officially allowed to use the

⁵¹ At the time of writing this study, a report of the military campaign to suppress the Wachia revolt was available, see Vb. Jan. 15, 1851, L^a C, no. 23. For the news about the outbreak, see *Javasche Courant*, March 6, 1850.

⁵² See Chap. III, pp. 85, 88; also Political report of Banten, 1850, in Exh. Dec. 14, 1852, no. 438.

⁵³ The appointment of Tjondronegoro as Regent of Serang and Kusumanegara as Regent of Tjaringin; O.I.B. March 10, 1848, no. 23 and O.I.B. Oct. 21, 1849, no. 17.

title Mas, but that the Banten nobility could not do anything about it. Mas Diad may be described as a vagabond and an unruly element. He and Mas Derik were charged with recruiting from Lampung men who had always played an important role in disturbances in Banten. There are unmistakable indications that many Bantenese were to be found among the people of Lampung; they had fled thither in order either to elude the strong arm of the colonial government or to evade oppressive measures imposed by the officials.⁵⁴ Hadji Wachia, a well-to-do inhabitant of Budang Batu, had been a fugitive for some time. In evading the police, he took refuge in Lampung first, and afterwards went on a pilgrimage to Mecca. In 1847 he returned to his village as a *hadji*. He once again evaded paying taxes and registering, so he was summoned to appear before the resident himself; but to no avail, he simply did not show up. Out of fear of unpleasant consequences, no arrestation was made. Indeed, his prestige among the population in Budang Batu must not be underestimated; he was venerated as a saint. Another factor of importance was the ardent hostile feelings that the inhabitants of Budang Batu harboured against the government. They had previously given expression to their hostility by killing the whole staff of the district administration, consisting of fifteen officials.⁵⁵ Nevertheless, the murderers had never been persecuted, with the result that the people showed increasing boldness. The government's lack of resolution fortified their pride and their readiness to follow any leader. In short, their self-esteem and capacity for spasmodic violence rendered them suitable material for rebellion. In addition, Budang Batu had been notorious for its rebelliousness since time immemorial, even in the period of the sultanate. It was therefore the inhabitants of Budang Batu and its environment that the conspirators wanted to make the backbone of the revolt. It was Tubagus Iskak who engaged Hadji Wachia to join their insurrectionary plan. Hadji Wachia's appeal seems to have been responded to with sparkling alacrity, and the people of Budang Batu pledged themselves to join the rising to fight for their faith. The preparations for the Holy War were constantly made under the leadership of Panghulu Dempol.

Another rallying place was Pulau Merak and environment, where

⁵⁴ See Kielstra (1917), pp. 67-68; also Multatuli, *Volledige Werken*, Vol. I (1950), p. 87; O.I.B. Sept. 30, 1851.

⁵⁵ This happened during the administration of Resident Melwerda, the 6th resident of Banten, who held this position from 1822 to 1827. See *TBB*, Vol. II (1888), p. 270.

the band of Lampungese under the command of Mas Diad was to be harboured. For this purpose it was necessary to gain both the loyalty of the local chiefs and their material support; the said Satus, Nasid, and Asidin were certainly the right men for the rebels to befriend. Because of lack of prestige, the personality of the *patih* had no appeal, and so another device had to be invented. A social myth was created, similar to the one that circulated during the Tjikandi affair. A certain Kadjif was made to adopt the role of Tubagus Urip, with whom he was identified. The name Tubagus Urip was that of a rebel chief who lost his life in an insurrection. It was told that he was extraordinarily brave, and gifted with supernatural powers, such as being able to keep dry in the rain, and having no need of sleep, food and rest. He had supposedly been able to call up storms and earthquakes at will. On the basis of the popular belief in his immortality, the rebels made the people believe that he had been resurrected in order to become king of the faithful. His advent promised great events: the existing rule must be overthrown. Those who recognized the new kingdom would be endowed with both titles and rewards, while those who clung to the foreign rule would be exterminated. In order to confirm this belief, the people were made to believe that another hero, Hadji Djamud, had also risen from the grave to head the rebels from Lampung. Fully secure in their belief, the village heads were also ready to receive *djimat* from the hands of a *kjai* called San.⁵⁶

During the insurrection, leadership was in the hands of men of great popularity and influence; both factors were required in order to form and to lead a band of rebels. Mas Diad, Tubagus Iskak, Mas Derik, and Nasid headed the band formed at Pulau Merak, which consisted partly of people from Lampung, while Hadji Wachia and Panghulu Dempol led the inhabitants of Budang Batu and its environment. In the meantime the main instigators, R. B. Djajakarta, his brother-in-law, and the latter's brother remained behind the scenes, so that the government authorities were in the dark as to the causes of the disturbance during the first few weeks. No drastic measures could be taken as long as the chief plotters were not known. The situation became critical when after three weeks they had not been able to capture a single rebel head. One of the main reasons was that, in contrast to the Tjikandi affair, the bands were more mobile and more widely scattered. The band led by Mas Derik and Nasid was located in the mountains east of Pulau

⁵⁶ Van Rees (1859), p. 27.

Merak, another band under the leadership of Mas Diad and Tubagus Iskak was roaming the district of Banten, while Hadji Wachia and Panghulu Dempo and their following were operating in the region west of the hills of Simari Kangen.⁵⁷ Another reason was that the landscape of the territory — within the triangle of Serang, Anjer and St. Nicholas point — was rough and mountainous, covered by forest for a large part.

It would be outside the scope of this study to give a detailed narration of the campaign fought between the rebels and the government forces. For about three months the rebel bands moved back and forth, intermittently making attacks on villages or small cities, such as Tandjak and Anjer. As time went on they were put more and more on the defensive. Although they did not gain any victories, they were never decisively defeated. The battle of Tegalpapak on the third of May was a serious blow to the rebels and their morale. The leaders were captured one after another, but two of the chiefs rebels, Tubagus Iskak and Hadji Wachia, managed to escape and took refuge in Lampung.⁵⁸ There the latter once again took part in a revolt launched by Pangeran Singabranta and Raden Intan, the same Lampung chiefs that had granted protection to fleeing insurgents from Banten. In 1856 he finally fell into the hands of government troops and was sentenced to death;⁵⁹ he left a wife and children behind. Two of his sons, Madinah and Afar, remained in Lampung, while his wife returned to Banten, accompanied by two of his daughters, Nji Aminah and Nji Rainah, and by his son Mesir. Freed from their imprisonment in Serang, they settled in the home-village of Hadji Wachia, later better known as Ardjawinangun, where they enjoyed considerable prestige among the people.⁶⁰

The inactivity of the rebels after the battle of Tegalpapak was presumably due more to the arrest of the *patih*, which deprived them of guidance.⁶¹ It should be noticed that at the time of his arrest it had long been widely known what role he had played in the rebellion. In the markets, people frankly said that the government was searching for rebel chiefs far and wide throughout the country, while the chief

⁵⁷ Report of the military campaign, in Vb. Jan. 15, 1851, L^a C, no. 23; cf. van Rees (1859), p. 67.

⁵⁸ Report of the military campaign, in Vb. Jan. 15, 1851, L^a C, no. 23; cf. van Rees (1859), p. 86.

⁵⁹ Van Rees (1859), p. 86; Kielstra (1917), p. 170.

⁶⁰ See Note on P.V. March 26, 1889, in Exh. May 14, 1889, no. 121.

⁶¹ R. B. Djakarta was arrested on 15 April 1850, simultaneously with R. B. Suramardja; see Report of the military campaign, in Vb. Jan. 15, 1851, L^a C, no. 23.

plotters were moving around freely in Serang.⁶² In fact, the *patih* skilfully employed government spies for his communication with the rebel leaders in the field. It was evident that the central leadership of the whole operation crumbled with his arrest. The joint action ended at this point. All the surviving rebels who were captured were exiled.⁶³

Obviously, local support mattered a great deal in this movement. There were villages which freely rendered assistance to the rebels, e.g. Parakan, Kedung Kemiri, Rohdjambu, Tjigading and Tjiwindu; other villages did it under pressure, e.g. Tandjak. A great many of the village heads, however, remained loyal to the government, although some of them had to be compelled to help capture the rebels.⁶⁴ The military troops in co-operation with the officials succeeded in detaching the populace from the rebels, though often by means of atrocious tactics like burning down villages or using intimidation.⁶⁵

The Wachia revolt is a revealing instance of the fact that frustrated civil servants, whose success in officialdom fell short of their ambitions, played a decisive role in starting insurrectionary movements. The resentment and desperation of certain local leaders contributed to the outburst of this rebellion. As a result of inducement or compulsion the peasants joined the movement, in which they only played a subordinate part. Considerable reinforcement was rendered by unruly elements. Both ideology and social myth were furnished for the development of the movement, but it remained feeble, because the units were only loosely knit together.

MAJOR DISTURBANCES BETWEEN 1851 AND 1870

For the next two decades disturbances were still rampant in Banten. In order to illuminate more clearly their pattern of development, characteristics and underlying structures, four of them will be dealt with at some length, i.e. the Usup affair in 1851, the Pungut affair

⁶² Ibidem.

⁶³ Djajakarta was exiled to Menado; Suramardja and Mustafa, Lurah Nasid, Diad, Derik and 8 others to Ternate; 12 to Ambon; 130 to Banda. 30 of them were exiled for 10 years, 56 for 8 years, and 44 for 5 years; there were many village heads among them; see O.I.B. Oct. 30, 1850, no. 2.

⁶⁴ Five *lurachs* were compelled to try and capture the rebels and were threatened with punishment if they did not succeed. It was reported that in a later stage of the campaign all village heads were mobilized to chase the rebels; see Report of the military campaign, in Vb. Jan. 15, 1851, L^a C, no. 23.

⁶⁵ The prosperous village Tegal Tongling was burnt to the ground and so were all other villages that offered assistance to the rebels, see van Rees (1859), pp. 58, 66.

in 1862, the Kolelet case in 1866, and the case of Djajakusuma in 1869.⁶⁶

No more than one year after the Wachia revolt, a new conspiracy was detected. On the 15th of April 1851, Mas Usup, *Djaro* of Tras Daud, and his family were slain by two unknown men. This incident was no isolated event; its background can be traced back to the long-standing feud between Mas Usup and Panghulu Nur. The latter always opposed Mas Usup's orders. In the month before the murder took place, rumours that disturbances would occur had already been circulating. It was no surprise when officials heard about the gathering of a band of about 17 men in Tegalpapak and shortly afterwards about the attempt to kill the resident. All these events were connected with the conspiracy instigated by Mudin, who predicted that the colonial government must fall. He called himself Madalim Basri and identified himself as a descendant of the Prophet. While wandering and "preaching" he managed to win people over to his aim. His main assistants were Kamud and Nur. The murder was supposed to serve as a signal to starting the revolt.⁶⁷ With the capture and banishment of twenty rebels the movement came to an end.⁶⁸

In the latter half of 1862, Banten officials were busily engaged in a man-hunt which had as its object a certain Mas Pungut and his comrades, who roamed the country and not only threatened to destroy peace and order in Banten, but also incited unrest. The device which Mas Pungut employed to attract followers was his pretence that he was both a relative of the sultan and a son of Mas Djakaria.⁶⁹ He extorted tokens of deference from the people and was ready to commit offences if these were denied him. On the 19th of September Mas Pungut and his following were espied in the forest of Tjilangar. The officials decided to lure him to the hamlet Tandjung and then to encircle him. Kaiji, the village head of Tjidoro, actually succeeded in persuading Mas Pungut to enter Usip Bapa Asid's home, and in the meantime 25 men were lying in ambush for the rebel. In a desperate attempt to escape Mas Pungut was shot to death.⁷⁰

⁶⁶ See de Waal, Vol. I (1876), p. 221; mention is also made of preparatory activities for launching disturbances in 1855; in 1864, 500 armed men mustered at Bongkok and were ready to overrun Rangkasbitung, see *Koloniaal Verslag*, 1864, p. 4.

⁶⁷ Consult Political report, 1851, in Exh. May 27, 1853, no. 225, esp. with reference to Banten.

⁶⁸ O.I.B. Dec. 2, 1851, no. 12.

⁶⁹ Missive from the Resident of Banten to the Gov. Gen., Sept. 22, 1862, in Vb. Nov. 18, 1862, no. 23.

⁷⁰ Cable from the Resident of Banten to the Gov. Gen., Sept. 19, 1862, in

We will now turn to the next two instances of social unrest, which are more accurately denoted as conspiracies. They are of considerable importance insofar as they furnish a proof of the perennial existence of movements purporting actual resistance against the powers that be. From this point of view it does not matter much whether they had far-reaching consequences or not.

The focal points of the conspiracy in 1866 were the district Koelet — after which the affair is named — and the estate Tjikandi. As planned by the plotters, the insurrection was to be launched in the night of the 27th of July — or the 14th of the Javanese month Mulud — by attacking and burning down Pandeglang. The timely discovery of the plot prevented a mutinous outburst such as the town had often fallen victim to in the preceding few decades. Besides this outrageous attempt, anonymous letters had been sent to both the resident and the regent a few days previously, warning them that their lives were in danger. At about the same time, seven persons had been arrested on the ground that they had sold *djimat* and were guilty of swindle. Mention should also be made of the arrest of a certain Asmidin on a charge of selling *djimat* and of spreading the news that people in the districts of Tjikandi, Tjiruas and Tanara were ready to launch a rebellion. The sources tell us that it turned out that the last two facts had nothing to do with the conspiracy.⁷¹ They are nevertheless noteworthy, because they clearly depict the general unrest which prevailed in these areas.

One of the main suspects was Mas Sutadiwiria, a former *Demang* of Baros. He travelled a great deal in the regencies of Serang, Pandeglang and Lebak, searching for cases of abuse and corruption among the high-ranking officials.⁷² Government circles in Serang suspected that he was the person who had written the anonymous letter mentioned above. Another suspect was the former Regent of Pandeglang, R. A. A. Natadiningrat; further investigations had given rise to the surmise that he had a hand in the conspiracy. It was said that he had appeared before the Assistant Resident of Pandeglang, in order to make his *acte de présence*. After the arrests had been made he did not appear in public, on the pretext of being ill. The suspicion was strengthened

Vb. Nov. 18, 1862, no. 23.

⁷¹ Missive from the Resident of Banten to the Gov. Gen., Aug. 4, 1866, in Vb. Oct. 8, 1866, C¹².

⁷² O.I.B. Apr. 20, 1866, no. 5, referring to the dismissal of Mas Sutadiwiria; see also the missive from the Resident of Banten to the Gov. Gen., Aug. 4, 1866.

by the fact that some of the persons arrested were either relations or friends of his.⁷³

The people under arrest were thirty-two in number; they were mostly from the districts of Kolelet, Tjikandi, Lebak and Kramat Watu. When we look into the list, what strikes us is the number of persons who had been involved in other disturbances. Djudin had belonged to the following of Mas Pungut, while Mas Marup had participated in the Tjikandi uprising of 1845. Among the group was also to be found a grandson of Mas Djakaria, namely Mas Atar. Obviously, the populace of the estate Tjikandi had taken an active part in the conspiracy. This is not surprising, for Tjikandi was notorious as a rallying place for villains and discontented people.⁷⁴

In one respect our sources are disappointing: they do not furnish concrete data concerning the aspirations of the plotters and their religious activities. With regard to the next instance, on the other hand, records exist which provide us with more detailed information about those aspects of the movement.

We now enter upon the last stage of insurrectionary movements in Banten before the rise of the religious revival. As we shall see, the movement led by Tubagus Djajakusuma already exhibited striking similarities with the revivalistic movement as manifested by the religious brotherhoods. To begin with, since 1866, Tubagus Djajakusuma, then *Patih* of Lebak, had been preaching the so-called *Ilmu Tarik*, a teaching which, as he professed, was *sui generis*.⁷⁵ As a rule, the first part of the

⁷³ Natadiningrat's retirement, according to O.I.B. March 10, 1866, no. 13, was granted by the government on his own request. The charges against him could not be confirmed, since a confrontation with two participants in the conspiracy did not reveal anything. It was decided that he must live in Serang, so that all his activities could be controlled; see O.I.B. May 17, 1867, no. 26. This issue reappeared in Banten politics in connection with the candidacy of A. Djajadiningrat — his grandson — as Regent of Serang, see A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 111-113.

⁷⁴ Of the 32 suspects, 9 were from the district Tjikandi, 13 from Kolelet, 3 from Lebak, 4 from Kramat Watu, and 1 from Tangerang. See list of captives, Aug. 3, 1866, in Vb. Oct. 8, 1866, C¹². Tjikandi Udik and Tjikandi Ilir were two landed estates situated on the eastern part of the residency of Banten; being outside the jurisdiction of the government authorities, they could safely harbour fugitives. Furthermore, the landlord did not employ a police force. Only the so-called *tjungkaks* — village foremen — were appointed to assess taxes services. For the history of the Tjikandi estates, see Faes (1895).

⁷⁵ The initiation rites of the *Ilmu Tarik* movement strikingly resemble those of most of the brotherhoods. Owing to these resemblances the present author is inclined to identify this *Ilmu Tarik* as a kind of Sufi brotherhood. The documents do not give concrete indications on this matter.

initiation was performed by faithfully observing regulations as prescribed by Djajakusuma. After they had prepared themselves by a fast, a spiritual retreat, and prayer during eight months, the candidates formally entered the religious community. The formal initiation ritual began with the candidates being given a bath and thereafter they were seated on a piece of white cotton. The novices then declared a vow of solidarity with the teacher, *sehupfu* (sic). After this the distribution of the *golok* and the *keris* to each of the novices took place. It was believed that people were safe from disaster, especially in turbulent times, after being initiated. It must be emphasized that on the ground of the vow the disciple owed absolute obedience to his spiritual superior.⁷⁶ No wonder that the people interrogated by the colonial government did not say anything about Djajakusuma's plan. This feature of the religious "club" of Djajakusuma provided government officials with a ready pretext to label it as dangerous for peace and order.⁷⁷

The question that now arises is, what was actually the goal that Djajakusuma aimed at? Because no sufficient proof was afforded by the disclosures made by the interrogated, the following testimonies do not convey to us their full import and significance. Firstly, it was said that Djajakusuma had ordered Durachim to kill both the Resident and the Regent of Serang. Secondly, Durachim and Abdulkarim were charged with the recruitment of followers for the movement in Batavia, Tangerang and Tjampea, and also with collecting weapons in Batavia. Thirdly, Djajakusuma had made an agreement with the *Demang* of Tanara, Mas Sadik, that the latter should recruit followers in both the eastern and the western part of Banten. Fourthly, information conveyed by Djajakusuma to Alwan referred to the launching of a rebellion in Todjing as soon as Djajakusuma had enough followers and his house in Banten had been restored. Lastly, it was also testified that a certain Agus Sabrim had been urged to go to Surabaya on the pretext of trading; his main aim would have been to get information about the annual income of the Dutch civil servants. Afterwards he was to have gone on pilgrimage and to have proceeded to Spain in order to beg its support in ousting the Dutch.⁷⁸ Although the Resident of Banten and

⁷⁶ See considerations and advice of the Supreme Court, Nov. 18, 1869; also Alwan's testimony; both documents in Exh. Sept. 6, 1870, Z¹¹.

⁷⁷ Missive from the Resident of Banten, Oct. 19, 1869, L^a DVI; also the resident's missive of Sept. 17, 1869, L^a MVI; both missives in Exh. Sept. 6, 1870, Z¹¹.

⁷⁸ Considerations and advice of the Attorney General, Nov. 18, 1869, in Exh. Sept. 6, 1870, Z¹¹.

the Attorney General in Batavia confirmed those charges, the Council of the Indies declined to support their proposals and advised that the accused be set free on the ground of lack of evidence.⁷⁹

It may be illuminating to penetrate more deeply into the background of the personalities of Djajakusuma and his following. Tubagus Djajakusuma was at the time living in retirement in Tjiruas, the place where he had occupied the function of *demang* before his appointment as *Patih* of Lebak. As a member of the sultan's family he was quite influential, and he was reputed to be a very capable civil servant.⁸⁰ These were presumably the reasons that the colonial government had always treated him kindly despite his administrative abuses. In this connection it must be noted that he had been prosecuted for misusing his position of *demang* by enforcing people to sell or to pawn their land to him,⁸¹ by disowning people's *sawahs*, and by compelling them to work in his gardens.⁸² Besides this affair, his divorce from Ratu Hamsah gave him the reputation of a trouble-maker. He was at that time suspected of poisoning Tubagus Mohamad Arif, the *Djaksa* of Pandeglang, to whom Ratu Hamsah was married after the divorce. To make matters more complicated, Djajakusuma applied to the Governor General charging the Regent of Serang, R. T. Tjondronegoro, with having had a hand not only in the divorce, but also in disclaiming Djajakusuma's paternity of the child that Ratu Hamsah had borne. However, the regent denied having played any role in the divorce and made charges against his ex-wife, Ratu Siti Aminah. At any rate, this affair clearly manifested both the feud between the Regent of Serang and Djajakusuma, and the ambitious intrigues of the latter.⁸³ He had accepted his dismissal grudgingly, and his intense resentment required vengeance on the colonial government. For this purpose he built up his following, organized as a kind of a religious "club" and indoctrinated with the idea of the Holy War.

The members of the religious "club" were of various walks of life.

⁷⁹ On the basis of the advice of the Council of the Indies, the Governor General ordered that Djajakusuma be set free, O.I.B. May 24, 1870, L^a X.

⁸⁰ For his kinship relations, see Appendix III; see also Missive of the Resident of Banten, Oct. 19, 1869, L^a DVI.

⁸¹ Consult the minutes of the investigation made by the Regent of Serang, the Controller of Serang and the chief-*djaksa*, see P.V. 16, 17, 18 and 21 Nov. 1869, in Exh. Sept. 6, 1870, Z¹¹.

⁸² P.V. Nov. 17 and 21, 1869. As to the forced labour that he employed for his coconut garden in Kadikaran, see Chap. II, p. 42.

⁸³ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Oct. 19, 1869, L^a DIV.

As mentioned above, Mas Sadik — the *Demang* of Tjiruas — took an active part in recruiting followers, especially from Tjilegon, Budang Batu, and Karengat. His negligence in administrative matters had already aroused the dissatisfaction of his superiors; nevertheless he was retained, for the simple reason that it was difficult to find a capable and reliable district head in the region.⁸⁴ A number of *hadjis* were members of the religious “club”; Hadji Mursid, the district-*panghulu*, figured prominently among them; mention should also be made of Hadji Bali from Tjiterep, Hadji Ikram and Hadji Bufangi from Madjasem and a *hadji* from Rangkasbitung, whose name was unknown.⁸⁵ The disciple most immediately subordinate to Djajakusuma was undoubtedly Durachim, who has been mentioned previously. He was a vagabond, but could easily reach Djajakusuma. What is known of the plans shows that he had a leading part to play. Other close associates of Djajakusuma’s were: Mas Ali, Djajakusuma’s neighbour, who functioned as his messenger; Mas Taffar, his father-in-law; Mas Kusen, a disciple already initiated; Abdulkarim, nicknamed Baba Karim (sic). It was discovered that he was actually a Eurasian, born in Batavia of an Indonesian woman, just forty days after his father had been killed in the Java War.⁸⁶ As stated, he was charged both with recruiting followers in Batavia and Tjampea and with buying weapons originating from Banten. Noteworthy are the following four persons, who were under suspicion only because they were adherents of the *Ilmu Tarik*: Agus Suta Angunangun, the *Patih* of Lebak, Agus Mulafar, *Mantri* of the irrigation-works, Raden Mesir and Raden Sastrawidjaja.⁸⁷

This kind of mystico-religious community will not be unknown to readers of Indonesian history. Especially with regard to Banten, mystical brotherhoods that afforded an organizational framework for insurrectionary movements evidently flourished in the 1880s. In this respect the religious “club” set up by Djajakusuma may be regarded as a forerunner of these *tarekats*, for they had the following in common: a community fundamentally religious, in both its doctrinal and its ritual aspects, which was gradually imbued with political sentiments.⁸⁸ Djaja-

⁸⁴ Ibidem.

⁸⁵ Considerations and advice of the Attorney General, Nov. 18, 1869; Letter from Alwan, see note 76. See also Missive of the Resident of Banten, Oct. 19, 1869, L^a DVI.

⁸⁶ Abdulkarim was also identified as Louis Meyer; further information about him is to be found in Considerations and advice of the Attorney General, Nov. 18, 1869.

⁸⁷ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Oct. 19, 1869, L^a WVI.

⁸⁸ Ibidem.

kusuma's religious "club" suffered from its weakness of the mechanism through which such a movement was able to grow; it apparently could not mobilize a large following from the rural population.

BRIGANDAGE, BANDITRY AND OUTLAWRY

In the foregoing section we have discussed the rampant insurrections and their main characteristics. We shall now examine other kinds of manifestations of social unrest, such as brigandage, banditry and outlawry.⁸⁹ As we already know, Banten witnessed not only open revolt, but also the development of a rural underworld of unruly elements. In the early part of the nineteenth century, these bandits appeared concomitantly with the outburst of rebellions, while later on the tide of their activity rose and ebbed according to the degree of administrative effectiveness. When the colonial government could by no means make its power felt in all places at all times, and when the arm of its law enforcing apparatus was all too often short, the area proved a refuge for desperate and unfortunate men of all sorts: common robbers, deserters, runaways, or fugitives from justice or the lack of it, the rural gentry discredited or dispossessed in endless political upheavals, reduced to extremes by the hard times in Banten. The records tell of "robbers" and rebels who could not be found. When such fugitives could not be caught, there was nothing for it but to make them outlaws or put a price on their heads.⁹⁰ The harsh treatment that the government gave these "law-breakers" testifies to its inability to enforce order. Since the dominating political system and the laws which supported it did not provide redress for these displaced elements, force and violence were the only way left open to them. They were forced to rely upon brute strength to defend themselves against the encroachment of the law-imposing powers that be. Their predatory acts inevitably impaired the peace in the rural areas and, if unchecked, could become a constant

⁸⁹ As to the terms "brigandage", "banditry", and "outlawry"; following Hobsbawm's conception, as forms of individual or collective rebelliousness these phenomena are in themselves socially neutral; see Hobsbawm (1963), p. 13. According to the political thought that colours the onlooker's point of view, these phenomena appear either as vicious criminality or as idealistic rebelliousness. The colonial ruler adopted the former point of view and in his reports or writings he always referred to "*rooverijen*" (robberies) without recognizing any of their insurrectionary aspects or aspects of social protest.

⁹⁰ Instance from the early period of Dutch rule in Banten: a premium was promised for the capture of Mas Djamir, O.I.B. Dec. 18, 1819, no. 10; also Usin and Kasin, O.I.B. Jan. 6, 1833, no. 19; and for that of Mas Lamir, O.I.B. Apr. 14, 1840, no. 6.

source of trouble to the government. The ideas held by the colonial government concerning the "robbery"-phenomenon were too absolute: these people were not just criminals or scoundrels.⁹¹ To denote any predatory activity as "robbery" without distinguishing the individuals or groups that performed it, is incorrect.

This line of thought will be made clearer if we take into account the relationship between brigands and the local population on the one hand, and between brigands and official power-holders on the other. It is generally known that "robbers" possessed supernatural powers in the people's eyes and that their exploits were surrounded by an aura of romanticism.⁹² Although they often fell victims to the brigands' pillage, the people not only showed deference to them, but also felt obliged to offer them tributes. It was not always fear of revenge that withheld them from betraying the robbers. It is not surprising that the latter generally met with no opposition in the villages. A general complaint made by Banten officials was that inhabitants of rural areas and local officials failed to report crimes and criminals. Of course, it is quite understandable that the vengeance of the brigands was fierce and that protection from the side of the government was uncertain and slow in coming. In any case keeping silent was less risky than reporting. In fact, the failure to report incidents was one of the main problems faced by the government in exterminating brigandage. Without local protection or the co-operation of local authorities the outlaws' survival would have been almost impossible. Particularly in Banten, these unruly elements could easily join issue with rebellious parts of the population, with the result that the perennial resistance movement, whose underlying spirit was traditional, was often "criminal" in function. Only when it began to run foul of the laws of the people as well as the laws of the occupying colonial power, was outlawry denounced and isolated. The elimination of "free-lance" bandits was rather easier for the officials.

The officials and the village authorities were commonly not to be expected to show much enthusiasm — let alone militancy — for destroying the troublemakers. Hence the passivity or even indifference of the civil servants in combating the "lawless" elements. The bands were often popular with the lower sections of the civil service, so that

⁹¹ E.g., Mas Djakaria and his family were regarded as robbers, see *Overzicht* (1844). Noriman, Mas Bangsa, Hadji Tassin, etc., see Hoek (1862), p. 106; van Deventer, Vol. I (1891), pp. CLXVI, 469-469. See also O.I.B. Sept. 6, 1831, no. 16.

⁹² For the magico-religious aspects of brigandage, see Wulfften-Palthe (1949), also Meyer, in *Indonesië*, Vol. III (1949-1950), pp. 178-189.

it frequently happened that the local authorities deceived the government for the sake of the bands. Pressure from higher authorities was met by a kind of working agreement with the chief of the band. Instead of co-operating with the government to curb "crime", they set up a conspiracy of silence. We lack records that tell us of their turning a blind eye to rascally enterprises for a share in the profits.

A few concrete instances may give us a fuller impression of the situation. The gloomy scene in the brigandage-infested Banten of the 19th century was enlivened from time to time by the action of notorious bandits like Sahab, Tjonat, Idja, Sakam, and Kemudin.⁹³

Sahab was a dreaded gangleader in South Banten, where he terrorized the people for many years. He had managed to escape from prison and had resumed his brigandage. He was captured once again, was set free before long and was even appointed *Demang* of Gunung Kentjana. In fact, this nomination was in accordance with the proposal made by the *Patih* of Lebak, Ngabehi Bahupringga. The latter's idea worked; as from that time, the law was enforced.⁹⁴ In this connection we may recall the platitude that in a period of turbulence, no civil servant can succeed against the brigands, but only in collaboration with them. Robber bands often functioned as a kind of "protective" body, or as a "shadow" government. Instances can easily be given of the exchange of security for money or valuable goods.⁹⁵ A rather weak civil servants corps will readily resort to such uncomfortable arrangements in facing brigandage. In such a situation, it makes no difference to the ordinary peasants which side the pressure comes from; they suffer in both cases.⁹⁶

Another instance will show how a working agreement between brigands and civil servants operated. In the estate of Tjikandi Ilir on the bank of the river Tjiudjung a small village was to be found where the gangleader of a notorious robber band, Idja, had his headquarters. Robberies

⁹³ For the story of Tjonat, see Pangemanann (1900). His operations were mostly confined to Djakarta and Bogor, but he also had to take refuge in Tjikandi for some time. For a short account of Kemudin, see *WNI* (1888-1889) pp. 989-990.

⁹⁴ A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 4-5.

⁹⁵ A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 172-173; relevant to our problem are the practices of bands of coconut thieves and fishpond thieves in Banten of more recent times, as described by Meyer (1946, pp. 19-27) or in his article in *Indonesië*, Vol. III (1949-1950), pp. 184-187.

⁹⁶ Although written in a romanticized form, the book by Boeka about Pah Troena (sic) depicts social situations in 19th-century Java which are quite relevant to our problem of the power relationship between the civil servants, the ordinary peasants, and common robbers; see Boeka (1901).

never occurred in the village, but always on government territory on the other side of the river. It happened that a European was robbed in that region. The whole village felt shame for this and made an intense search for the stolen goods. These were finally found in the house of Makmut, a notorious member of the robber band mentioned above. Makmut was captured and sentenced to five years' forced labour, but curiously enough, again moved freely around only one year later. The following explanation was given: the district head was deeply in debt to the robber band and the task of investigating the robbery was therefore not easy for him. Since the victim was a European, the robber must be found. It was agreed upon by the *wedana* and Idja that one of the members of the band would be handed over on condition that he would be allowed to escape. The condition was fulfilled by bribing the supervisor of the prison. This was considered a happy solution for both sides, for the officials were satisfied with having saved their reputation, while the robber band was safe. It is not surprising that the village police was not effective; this led to a considerable amount of "crime" and more escapades in violence. In fact, banditry challenged the authority of the government.⁹⁷

Similarly demoralized conditions are met with in cases where evidence was lacking. The officials would then continue to bring accusations against the suspect and would detain him for a considerable period. It often turned out that he was innocent and had fallen a victim to the seductive practices of officials. Being afraid of the bandit's revenge, they resorted to capturing somebody arbitrarily and persuaded others to give false testimony. It also happened that officials, particularly secret service men, used their position as a passport to illegal gains, e.g. by exacting dues, holding people to ransom, or exploiting pending cases as a lucrative source of semi-official blackmail.⁹⁸ This observation will be given substance by a description of the so-called Sakam affair.

⁹⁷ In order to give an impression of the social power of banditry or brigandage we have to refer to other areas of 19th-century Java, such as Surakarta and Jogjakarta, where robbery was rampant in the 1870s and 1880s; see Vb. May 4, 1868, no. 18 and Vb. July 16, 1868, no. 5; also Groneman (1887). In Banten it was still endemic in the 1890s, and was referred to as "itching ants", see A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 108.

⁹⁸ See A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 172, for malpractices of this kind on the part of the secret service; see also van Sandick (1892), p. 163, for Neumann's practices. Snouck Hurgronje pointed out false testimonies made against people suspected of taking part in the Tjilegon rebellion; see his Note of August 15, 1892; also Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2 (1924), p. 427.

No account of brigandage in Banten is complete that does not include the incredible career of the doyen of brigands — the notorious Sakam whose exploits in the 1880s caused the government to rack its brains. Sakam was a young peasant, who suddenly rose to prominence in the region where banditry had always been rampant. The fear that he inspired was mixed with an admiration tantamount to worship,⁹⁹ but he was not invested with the romantic aura of a rebel chief like Mas Djakaria or Tubagus Urip. The popular image of Sakam was that of a violent savage, who inhabited the forests and attacked villages, robbing and killing. Being tremendously powerful, he could be neither killed nor captured. Moreover, the savage environment gave him a great advantage and rendered pursuit by the police well-nigh impossible. The rumours of his spectacular exploits reached the central authorities in Batavia. The question arises how Sakam could hold out for so many years, continuing his rascally enterprises and terrorizing the area. This is impossible to understand without knowing the conditions prevailing in the Banten of the 'eighties.¹⁰⁰ Utter defiance of the law roused the government to activity, but its efforts do not seem to have had much success. The bandits merely shifted their ground. When the officials set out in pursuit the bandits had timely warning and made off. A price was put on Sakam's head, but without effect. Sakam continued his career of crime on and off. The force of the civil servants had to lay a continuous siege to the place where he had taken refuge. Once the *Djaro* of Kedinding, Alim, succeeded in luring Sakam to the house of a woman named Bojot. The *Wedana* of Tjikandi and his followers acted quickly and set up a cordon round the house. Sakam's capture seemed imminent. A pitched battle ensued in which Karidin — one of Sakam's henchmen — was killed. Sakam, however, managed to escape after injuring Raden Tisna, the *wedana's* brother. Once again he was successful in evading his pursuers.¹⁰¹ The course of events around Sakam was quite embarrassing, not in the least for the Governor General himself. He gave an urgent order, and soon somebody was captured and imprisoned. He was forced to make a confession that he was the Sakam whom the officials had so untiringly chased. When the court of Batavia put the case on trial in April 1886, the verdict was that the person who was charged with being Sakam, appeared to be a certain

⁹⁹ Van Sandick (1892), p. 161; a classic example is Ken Arok, the founder of the Singasari dynasty in the beginning of the 13th century.

¹⁰⁰ Corrupt practices in Banten are described in *Bataviaasch Handelsblad, Mail editie*, 1885, pp. 509-511, 620-621.

¹⁰¹ *IWR*, Vol. XXIV, no. 1192 (1886), p. 70.

Suhari, *Djaro* of Lembur Sawah. In fact, he had been charged by the *Patih* of Serang, Raden Surawinangun, with tracing Sakam in Batavia. After the scandal had been disclosed, all the witnesses sent to Batavia to identify Suhari were put in jail, namely his father, mother, and brother, and the incumbent *Djaro* of Lembur Sawah.¹⁰² It may be added that a certain Neumann, who belonged to Suhari's guard, skilfully made a lucrative business of the whole affair by receiving bribes from sympathizers of Suhari and by acting as broker between Bantenese and Indonesian soldiers.¹⁰³ Meanwhile the real Sakam was still moving around freely until he was finally taken by the Chief-*Djaksa* of Serang, Mas Djajaatmadja. While he lay asleep in his hiding-place in the midst of a sugar-cane garden, Sakam was encircled by the Regent of Serang and his following. This time he was killed after a brief encounter with Mas Djajaatmadja.¹⁰⁴ This was the end of the career of a brigand with many years of successful "crime" behind him. On learning the news of Sakam's death, government officials in Banten felt greatly relieved, but many people could not be convinced that Sakam was really dead, for in the course of many years of lawlessness and banditry, he had come to be looked upon as possessing supernatural powers and was talked of with a sense of wonder.¹⁰⁵

This discussion, it is hoped, has served to point out that the propensity to rebellion in Banten is attributable to complex and varied factors. General destitution, maladministration, economic inequities, personal ambition — all these factors figured prominently in the recurrent rebellions in 19th-century Banten. I have also tried to indicate the role played by the diverse segments of the population in building up a revolutionary élite which formed the core of a tradition of revolt. It may be said that the impact of Dutch rule contributed to the disturbances in 19th-century Banten, but it is difficult to determine the exact share which external pressure and internal decay respectively had in bringing about the turmoil. It can safely be said that Western impact hastened the disintegration of traditional society and increased the general disturbances.

¹⁰² *IWR*, Vol. XXIV, no. 1192 (1886), p. 71.

¹⁰³ Van Sandick (1892), pp. 163-164.

¹⁰⁴ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Oct. 20, 1886, no. 2665/18, in *MR* 1886, no. 681; see also *Java Bode*, Sept. 15, 1886; A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 94-95.

¹⁰⁵ Even in the search for the chief instigators of the Tjilegon affair, Sakam's name was mentioned, see *De Locomotief*, July 14, 1888.▲

CHAPTER V

THE RELIGIOUS REVIVAL

GENERAL TRENDS

One aspect of the problem raised in this study is centred on the religious background of the Banten revolt. The latter part of the 19th century was a period of religious revivalism and it is naturally interesting to inquire to what extent this stimulated the insurrectionary movement in Banten under study. The conditions prevailing in the socio-cultural environment of Banten as described in previous chapters undoubtedly prepared a fertile soil for the rise of religious revivalism. Not only were the people inveterate adherents of the Islamic religion; the disruption of traditional order and its concomitant, enduring social restlessness, favoured the increase of religious activities. As will be shown, this process contributed greatly to the acceleration of the preparations for the rebellion. In this connection it should be pointed out that religious protest movements are a product of the same social forces that sustain rebellious attitudes. The stage of development reached in the 'eighties suggests that the religious movement strove to sanction political aspirations. One encountered political deprivation on the one hand, and traditional reaffirmation on the other. The majority of the religious élite, deprived politically, acted as a protest group, opposing the newly-introduced institutions. Seen from this point of view, the religious revival in Banten can be identified as a religio-political movement, which accomodated various social strains. In the Banten of the 19th century, the religious revival and the other kinds of social movements obviously had notable points of resemblance, particularly in their millennial appeals and lower-class base. The rebellions that have been dealt with up to now were tinged with religion; nevertheless they can hardly be designated as religious movements, simply because religious institutions and communities did not play any part in these movements. It will be shown that during the religious revival religious bodies were conspicuously prominent and became centres of political protest. Although it must be assumed that at this stage the religious move-

ment provided an outlet for the discontent and frustration, which would otherwise have occasioned social disturbances, the movement appeared to take a revolutionary course. The resentment against forceful domination by the Dutch and the powerful anti-foreign hostility underlying the general unrest, now found another outlet in an allegiance with extremist religious movements. As a result the movements not only gained in vigour, but were also provided with a more effective institutional device, namely the *tarekat*. As we shall see, the religious revival became a means of recruiting men for the rebellion rather than a pure religious movement.

For several decades a large part of Java was swept by a religious revival that demonstrated a tremendous increase in religious activities such as the observance of daily prayers, undertaking pilgrimages, furnishing traditional Muslim education for the young, establishing branches of *tarekats*, the widespread distribution of sermons, etc. In the late 1850s, Holle observed that orders had still to be issued by regents, urging the people to observe their religious duties more strictly.¹ A few years later, a religious revival manifested itself in the increasing number of religious schools and pilgrims.² Furthermore, the erection of numerous mosques and small prayer-houses can also be regarded as a sign of more vigorous religious practices. Referring specifically to heavily Islamic areas, our informant pointed out that the people held the *hadjis* in high esteem at that time and that the *hadjis*, with their great prestige, could exert their influence to induce people to fulfil their religious duties far more conscientiously.³ To what extent this

¹ See Missive from Holle to the Governor General, Aug. 12, 1873, no. 125, in Vb. June 3, 1874, no. 31; Holle also referred to other religious activities of the regent as head of the *umat* in his region, e.g. giving sermons, controlling the treasury of the mosques, discussing dogmatic problems, etc. These activities were regarded as transgressing their authority. According to article 17 of the Instruction for regents in government regions (*Staatsblad* 1867, no. 114), regents were entitled to supervise the religious officials, and to compile the list of *hadjis*, *kjais* and *gurus*, all under the contemporary heading "priests" (sic).

² See the list of pilgrims, covering the period between 1852 and 1875, in de Waal, Vol. I (1876), p. 245. See also the list for the period 1879-1889, in Report on the pilgrimage of 1889, in Vb. Jan. 24, 1890, no. 53. Cf. Vredembregt in *BKI*, Vol. CXVIII (1962), pp. 91-154. See the list of the numbers of disciples of religious schools, in de Waal, Vol. I (1876), p. 252.

³ See Missive from Holle to the Governor General, Aug. 20, 1873, no. 126, in Vb. June 3, 1874, no. 31. Special reference was made to the *hadji* in Prijangan, where the religious movement gained momentum in the early 1870s. As regards the prestige and position of the *hadji* in Indonesia, they

aspect of religious awakening endangered the colonial regime will be subjected to special consideration. In searching for the external stimuli of the religious revival, many students of Indonesian Islam have overlooked the fact that the Russo-Turkish war — known in Indonesia as the so-called *perang Rus* — had a tremendous impact on the minds of Muslims living in “countries below the wind”.⁴ The Indonesian people were eager to learn of its development, and any victory on the side of the Sultan of Rum was enthusiastically celebrated with prayers and *sedekah*.⁵ Besides this instance of embryonic Pan-Islamism, we have to take into account the wide communication system in the Muslim world, established by the pilgrimage, which meant that news concerning the Muslim community could reach its most remote corner. In this connection it must be remarked that religious revivalism in many parts of the Muslim world commenced almost simultaneously with the imperialists' scramble for colonial territories in the latter half of the 19th century. It is generally assumed that a correlation exists between the expansion of colonial powers and Pan-Islamism or the religious revival.⁶ The question is whether this contention holds as regards the development of Islam in Indonesia in general and in Banten in particular.

An examination of the general development of Pan-Islamism and the religious revival indicates that they were both saliently marked by essentially anti-Western characteristics during this period. The conquests of Western Imperialism were rapidly advancing; in this critical period, thoughtful Muslims became fully aware that the Muslim world was in growing peril of falling under Western domination. Faced with Western encroachment, Muslims in large parts of the world of the crescent manifested militant fanaticism engendered by feelings of hatred against

varied from region to region; see Summary of the reports of residents, in Vb. June 3, 1874, no. 31.

⁴ The Russo-Turkish War, also known as the Crimean War, 1856. Its impact was also reflected in Malay and Sundanese literature; the so-called “*tjarita perang Rus*” gives a description of it. See Missive of Holle, Aug. 20, 1873, no. 126.

⁵ The “Sultan of Rum” here means the Sultan of Turkey; evidence of this popular notion is also given by an Indonesian version of the hagiography of the founder of the Kadiriah *tarekat*, Abdulkadir Djaelani; see Drewes and Poerbatjaraka (1938), p. 55.

⁶ See van den Berg's “Pan-Islamisme”, in *De Gids* (1900), no. 4; Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. I (1923), pp. 363-380; also his “*Mekka*” (1931), pp. 244-245. For Pan-Islamism in the 1890s, see Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), pp. 1615-1717. Especially as regards the correlation between Pan-Islamism and the Sufi orders, see Snouck Hurgronje, *VG*, Vol. III (1923), pp. 189-207.

the infidel conquerors.⁷ It is not surprising that the exacerbation of fanaticism and militant spirit in the Middle East and North Africa during the second half of the 19th century developed religious reverberations among the Indonesian Muslims. A closer contact between the widely separated sections of the Muslim world was facilitated by the pilgrimage which constantly increased with improved communications and transit. We shall confine ourselves to Indonesia in examining the various forms and phases of the religious revival.

In general, there was a certain reaction to westernization in the revival of religiosity, but there were clearly various types of responses and different degrees of speed of adjustment. One must keep in mind that the liberalistically tinged policy of the Dutch concerning religion left room for a wide range of religious movements, from peaceful, accomodative ones to radical, aggressive ones. Which of these emerged depended largely upon the socio-cultural setting and the power position of the religious élite in this context. In this connection the predominant fear among European civil servants of all movements with a conspicuously religious orientation can be traced back to a *hadji*-phobia.⁸ It must be admitted that, because no distinction is made in Islam between a religious and a political community, every religious protest movement easily turns into a political one. It is generally known that religious fraternities in many parts of the Muslim world were caught in this kind of religio-political movement. In this connection the *hadjis* constituted a potential danger to the colonial ruler insofar as they could assume leadership in a movement. As has been explained previously, the salient characteristic of the radical wing of religious movements in the second half of the 19th century was a strong condemnation of Western domination and vehement attacks on newly-introduced institutions.⁹

⁷ For the general development of the awakening of the Muslim world and its outstanding anti-Western character, see Stoddard (1921).

⁸ This *hadji*-phobia was clearly reflected in various reports, e.g. Missive of Holle, Aug. 20, 1873, no. 126; Missive of the Assistant Resident of Pandeglang, June 29, 1876, no. 864/8, in Vb. Feb. 10, 1877, K²; Missive of the Resident of Prijangan, March 31, 1886, no. 3030, MR 1886, no. 262, and its counterpart, Brunner's article, in *Java Bode*, Sept. 4 and 7, 1885. For *hadji*-phobia in the post-rebellion period, see Snouck Hurgronje, *VG*, Vol. II (1924), pp. 424-425; see also his letter to the First Govt. Secretary, Aug. 1890, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), pp. 1919-1923.

⁹ For general accounts about the reactions of the Muslim world against Western penetration, see von Grunebaum (1962), pp. 128-179; also Werner Caskel, in von Grunebaum, ed. (1955), pp. 335-360. Esp. as regards Indonesia in the 19th century, see Benda (1957), pp. 9-31; Wertheim (1959), pp. 195-235.

Since the protesting groups were conquered societies, whose religious protest derived from a distinct religious tradition, the movement tended to move in the direction of conflict. These extreme forms of religious movements resisted adjustment,¹⁰ and occupied an important place in the struggle for a sense of dignity and self-respect in the face of a situation of deprivation and discrimination.¹¹ As a student of Islam put it, "any existing inferiority was felt to be only external, that is, in terms of physical power, and not spiritual".¹² There were, on the other hand, religious groups that emphasized peaceful acceptance of Dutch rule and furthered accommodation to the new political system. The result was factionalism and conflicting groups in the development of the religious movements. A reference to specific movements in a later part of this section may be of use in analyzing this problem.

With regard to Banten in the 1880s, the *tarekats* developed into the most predominant revivalist groups. At their inception the *tarekats* were in essence religious revivalist movements, but they gradually developed into politico-religious bodies. They formed institutional devices for political extremism. They took up a strong position against the process of westernization and were determined to defend traditional institutions against Dutch influence and encroachment. Driven by xenophobia, they resorted to violence against Dutch overlords and also against fellow Muslims who collaborated with the Dutch. The development of this vigorous protest can be interpreted in terms of both the external social conditions and the specific stimuli prevailing in the Banten of the 'eighties.

As for the *Sufi* disciplines, we know with certainty that they were an early importation in Indonesia and dated back to the 16th or the beginning of the 17th century.¹³ The Satariah *tarekat* was originally propagated in Atjeh by Abdurra'uf of Singkel.¹⁴ From the 17th century onwards, the Satariah movement travelled from Atjeh to West Java and from there to Central and East Java. It was Sjech Abdul Muhji of

¹⁰ Von Grunebaum (1962), pp. 128-179; Werner Caskel, in von Grunebaum, ed. (1955), pp. 335-360.

¹¹ Their sensitivity concerning their dignity was once expressed in Malay as "*tanda diaku*" (sic); see the statement of the Head *Panghulu* of Bandung quoted by Holle in his missive of Aug. 12, 1873, no. 125.

¹² Werner Caskel, in von Grunebaum, ed. (1955), p. 340.

¹³ For a general account of religious life and Sufism in Indonesia in the 16th and 17th century, see Rinkes (1909), Kraemer (1921), Drewes and Poerbatjaraka (1938), van Nieuwenhuijze (1945), Schrieke (1956); see also Johns, in *JSAH*, Vol. II (1961), pp. 10-23.

¹⁴ Rinkes (1909).

Karang, a disciple of the said Abdurra'uf, who established the Satariah *tarekat* in West Java.¹⁵ A famous Kadiriah mystic was Hamzah al-Fansuri, who visited various places, including Banten, as a wandering dervish.¹⁶ Especially as regards Banten, contact with Mecca had already been established in the first half of the 17th century by repeatedly sending missions to Mecca to attempt to gain information on religious matters.¹⁷ During the latter part of that century, Banten was reputed as a centre of Islamic orthodoxy, where religious scholarship and a religious way of life were highly esteemed.¹⁸ There are strong indications that the Kadiriah order had penetrated Bantenese Islam before the 19th century,¹⁹ but it had not yet gathered any vital momentum. Viewed against this historical background, the development of the Kadiriah order in Banten during the latter part of the 19th century distinctly marked a revival in the true sense of the word.

To return to the consideration of the characteristics of the religious movement: an interesting feature was the development of cleavages which were prolongations of those to be found in the core region of the Muslim world — the religious bureaucracy against those established as religious teachers or as heads of brotherhoods, rivalries between various *tarekats*, factionalism in a *tarekat*. The revivalist activities led by brotherhood leaders were regarded with some suspicion and hostility by the official *ulama*. As its strength lay in its popular appeal, the brotherhood tended to become the basis of association for religious protest movements. The rivalry between the various fraternities in some regions frequently sapped their vigour and vitality to a large extent. In addition, the emergence of modernistic reformist movements later

¹⁵ For a life history of Sjech Abdul Muhji, see Rinkes, in *TBG*, Vol. LII (1910), pp. 556-589.

¹⁶ Kraemer, in *Djawa*, Vol. IV (1924), p. 29; Drewes and Poerbatjaraka (1938), pp. 10-11.

¹⁷ Djajadiningrat (1913), pp. 50-52, 126, 187. Mention is also made of the granting of the title of sultan to the chief of the Bantenese kingdom for the first time in 1638.

¹⁸ Drewes, in *Djawa*, Vol. VI (1926), p. 83.

¹⁹ The evidence consists of the following facts: the first Sultan of Banten was called Sultan Abulmafachir Mahmud Abdulkadir; the last name refers to the founder of the Kadiriah *tarekat*; see Drewes and Poerbatjaraka (1938), p. 11, also H. Djajadiningrat (1913), p. 51; the latter author also mentions the name of a certain trader, Hadji Dulkadir, also known in Banten as "*djuragan Kadiriah*", i.e. a Kadiriah trader; see H. Djajadiningrat (1913), p. 263. Furthermore: the wandering mystic Hamzah al-Fansuri must have visited Banten in the course of his travels, in any case his mystical teaching, the Wudjudiah, was well-known in Banten, see Drewes and Poerbatjaraka (1938), p. 12.

deepened the split between the religious revivalist movements.²⁰

The colonial government created an institutional religious structure made up of a hierarchy of professional men of religion, with recognized functions and powers.²¹ This group of official religious men commonly lent themselves to the Dutch colonial policy in repressing manifestations of activity by the brotherhoods in particular, and in stemming the tide of religious revivalism in general. They were induced to echo or sustain the secular ideas introduced by the colonial government. With the secularization the *ulama* as pre-eminent exponents of the Islamic religious heritage were divided into "secularists" and "revivalists"; the first group was granted formal status within the framework of the colonial bureaucracy, while the second group was denied it by the Dutch and continued to exist almost exclusively because of the devotion and support of the rural population. In facing the menace of this secularization, the latter group had to resort to the alliance of religious brotherhoods which, as a rigid form of social organization, became an instrument of protest movements and rebellions. It was to be expected that the revivalists would remain a strong traditional force, attempting to ensure a return to the cultural values prevailing during the sultanate and a return to their religious rehabilitation as well.

It would, of course, be an error to assume that doctrinal controversies were the main source of the conflict between the secularists and the revivalists. From the explanation given above it is plain that certain basic contributing factors were responsible for the split between the religious movements. The conflict was closely related to other aspects of the struggle for power among religious leaders on the one hand, and of that between the religious and the secular élite on the other.²² Modern trends threatened traditional institutions and traditional groups naturally resisted the progressive encroachment of the alien overlord vehemently. Especially as regards Banten, the conflict was deepened by the existence of a tradition of revolt which sometimes enlivened religious controversies. All in all, the religious movements in the second half of the 19th century involved a strong emphasis on group conflict. Seen

²⁰ For an extensive account of the attitude of modernistic groups, more conversant with Western culture and receptive to Western progress, see Hourani (1962), esp. as regards the ideas expressed by Jamal ad-Din al-Afghani and Muhamad Abduh.

²¹ Van den Berg, in *TBG*, Vol. XXVII (1882), pp. 1-47.

²² The conflict between the various segments of the élite in traditional Muslim society was related not so much to doctrinal matters but rather to a power struggle; see Pigeaud (MS, 1943-1945), p. 126.

in the socio-cultural setting of Banten in this period, the continued and even sharpened emphasis of revivalist groups on vigorous and even violent protest movements is not surprising. After "secular" protests had proved entirely inadequate, the affirmation of religious goals simultaneously with the affiliation with brotherhood movements revitalized the religio-political effort to re-establish the traditional order. Of great significance is the fact that the fraternities promoted group cohesiveness and group identification, which could intensify the religious strife. Small wonder that members of the brotherhoods became intensely involved in the conflict.

We shall deal with the main manifestations of the religious revival, with special reference to Banten, in the light of the general trends briefly sketched above. The first sign of revivalist sentiment was the continually increasing number of pilgrimages in the 19th century. The flourishing of this pious activity was of great importance not only for the spreading of innovations throughout the Muslim world, but also for the spreading of a corps of religious élite. For this reason, Mecca can be regarded as the heart of the religious life of Indonesia.²³ The second visible sign of the spirit of revival was the phenomenal growth of religious schools, which functioned as nurseries for militant participants of the revival movement. Other evidence of revived Islamic piety was given by the many newly-built mosques, which were jammed with worshippers during the Friday noon congregational prayers. Evidently, there was a conspicuous renewed interest in and a rigid fulfilment of religious duties. Itinerant *sjechs* or preachers found great audiences everywhere, and there was a growing demand for printed sermons and other religious publications. Of course, cases of pious ostentation were also known, such as the wearing of Arabian garb or the voluminous cloth draped around the head. For a few years, the so-called "Last letter of the Prophet" circulated widely; it urged people to fulfil their religious duties more strictly in preparation for the "Day of Judgment". Lastly, the most vital aspect of the religious movement was undoubtedly the revival of Islam mysticism, as embodied in the *tarekats*.

In discussing the religious revival, we must keep in mind that it may be understood within the context of the social movement in Banten. In its last phase before the outbreak of the revolt in 1888, the revival movement brought about the emergence of charismatic leadership, militant partisanship, effective recruitment organization and animating

²³ Snouck Hurgronje (1931), p. 291.

ideology, all essential ingredients of a forceful revolutionary movement. The pulse of the social movement should be measured by the intense expressions of religious revivalism which unmistakably underlay it. In this connection the progressive penetration of Westernism may be viewed as an accelerating factor, stimulating the emergence of religious revival.

THE PILGRIMAGE

It would be beyond the scope of this study to deal at length with the history of the pilgrimage; suffice it to refer to the authoritative and exhaustive writings of Snouck Hurgronje and other studies on this subject.²⁴ What is essential, from our present point of view, is to emphasize that the pilgrimage was a social source of the revitalization of religious life. According to the popular image among the European population, Mecca was nothing but a hotbed of religious fanaticism, where people were inculcated with hostile feelings against Christian overlords in their homeland.²⁵ The incessant disturbances in Indonesia in the latter part of the 19th century more and more drew the attention of the colonial ruler to the influence exercised by Mecca.

Various steps were taken to bring the whole pilgrimage movement under the control of the colonial government. The government not only made painstaking efforts to reduce all the risks and dangers to which the pilgrims were exposed, but also attempted to check and supervise all the movements and activities of the pilgrims in their home-villages, on their journeys, and in the holy town.²⁶ It was discovered that the potentially dangerous *hadjis* were not so much those who visited the holy places only for a short period, but rather those who settled in Mecca for some time. The former group scarcely had an opportunity

²⁴ Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. I (1923), pp. 1-125; *VG*, Vol. III (1923), pp. 45-64, 137-149, 299-311; *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2 (1924), pp. 173-199, 307-317. See also the collection of his advices, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), pp. 1307-1466. Also his "*Mekka*" (1931) with special reference to the *Djawah* colony. Other sources for comparison, Report of the pilgrimage over the years 1888 and 1889, in *Vb.* Jan. 29, 1889, no. 46, and *Vb.* Jan. 24, 1890, no. 53. See also Eisenberger (1928); Vredenburg, in *BKI*, Vol. CXVIII (1962), pp. 91-154.

²⁵ Snouck Hurgronje (1931), pp. 248-249; see also Report of the pilgrimage, 1888.

²⁶ For the *hadji*-policy of the Dutch, see Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2 (1924), pp. 175-198. For a detailed account of the various problems and difficulties encountered by the pilgrims, e.g. as regards transportation, sanitary measure, guides, and financial matters, see Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), pp. 1307-1466.

to exchange ideas with fellow believers from other parts of the Muslim world. The latter, being semi-settlers or permanent residents in the Holy City, had ample time and occasion to participate in various kinds of religious activities. This contingent of pilgrims from various parts of the Archipelago is generally known as the *Djawah*.²⁷

But to return to the significance of Mecca: it would be an exaggeration to regard every pilgrim as a fanatic or a rebel.²⁸ It is neither true that religio-political disturbances were instigated by Meccans, nor correct to regard *hadjis* as a type of ordained "priests". On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the pilgrimage constituted a powerful buttress of solidarity in the Muslim world and that pilgrims returned home inspired with the greatness and glory of Islam. Indeed, contemporary observers felt that the crucial point of the pilgrimage must be sought on the ideological plane.²⁹ It should be noted that a stay in Mecca for a considerable period resulted in exposure to "arabization", i.e. the adoption of the manners and customs of Arabico-Islamic civilization. What made things worse — from the colonial point of view — was the radical change in the pilgrim's view of Western nations. He became imbued with contempt and hatred for the infidel on the one hand, and was confirmed in his belief in the power and unparalleled influence of Islam on the other.³⁰ While living in Mecca, these pilgrims maintained their relationships, not only with kinsmen and fellow-villagers in their homeland, but also with those who were on pilgrimage in Mecca. In this way an avenue was created for the dissemination of hostile feelings against the colonial ruler. Moreover, it was feared by the colonial government that the recurrent return of some of these *hadjis* might worsen this "infection" in their home-village. As we shall see, some of the repatriated *hadjis* from the *Djawah* community emerged as ardent champions of a movement towards religious regeneration, aimed at strengthening the moral and religious fibre of their society; they combated laxity of conduct and attempted to restore the Islamic ideal in all its original austerity. It is not surprising that a full-fledged rebel-

²⁷ For a full description of the *Djawah*, see Snouck Hurgronje (1931), pp. 215-292.

²⁸ See Brooshooft as quoted by Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV part 1 (1924), p. 356.

²⁹ Van den Berg, in *De Gids* (1900), no. 4, pp. 228-269, 392-431; Snouck Hurgronje (1931), pp. 244, 245, 248-249; see also Report of the pilgrimage, 1888.

³⁰ Snouck Hurgronje (1931), p. 244.

lion against infidel overlords often developed in the wake of this vigorous campaign.³¹

There was still another reason for feverish anti-Westernism which was inherent in the spirit of Meccan circles, and which found its way to the Archipelago by means of the pilgrimage. As has been pointed out previously, in the second half of the 19th century, with the advance of Western Imperialism in the Middle East and North Africa, Muslim nations were weakened and were put on the defensive.³² During this period Mecca became a refuge of rigid Islamic fundamentalism. This conservatism enlisted the support and adherence of elements of the *Djawah* community.³³ One relevant fact worth mentioning in any consideration of the religious movements launched from Mecca is that the movements were sucked into a maelstrom of factionalism and dissipated their energies in contending with each other. The movements' factions, which stood in contra-distinction to each other, were the groups orientated towards formalistic Muslim learning, and the various groups steeped in mysticism, such as the Kadiriah, the Satariah, the Rifaiah, and the Naksibandiah brotherhoods.³⁴ Furthermore, sub-factions existed within the Naksibandiah brotherhood, namely followers of Sulaiman Effendi and the group led by Khalil Pasha.³⁵ Herein lay the weakness of the

³¹ The Tjilegon rebellion was to a certain extent the result of the ardent propaganda made by Hadji Abdul Karim, Hadji Ismail, and Hadji Mardjuki. See Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, dealing with the activities of H. Abdul Karim and H. Mardjuki, of Nov. 26, 1888, no. 797/19, in Vb. Jan. 11, 1889, no. 9; and of Dec. 25, 1888, no. 809/24, in Vb. Jan. 25, 1889, no. 19. Cf. Missive of Sparkler, Nov. 25, 1891, no. 700, in Vb. May 9, 1892, no. 40.

³² See van den Berg, in *De Gids* (1900), no. 4, pp. 407-410; Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG* Vol. IV, part 2 (1924), pp. 193-194; also his "*Mekka*" (1931), p. 244.

³³ Its most prominent members were: Juneid from Batavia, a learned teacher; Chatib Achmad Sambas and his disciple-successor, H. Abdul Karim, both leaders of the Kadiriah *tarekat*; Mohamad Nawawi from Banten, a specialist in legal knowledge; and Zainudin from Sumbawa, a learned teacher; see Snouck Hurgronje (1931), pp. 262-287.

³⁴ For an account of the Kadiriah and the Naksibandiah *tarekat*, see Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), pp. 1203-1207, 1218; for the Satariah *tarekat*, op cit. pp. 1193-1200; cf. Report of the Resident of Banjumas, Jan. 12, 1889, in MR 1889, no. 41; for the Rifaiah *tarekat*, op. cit. pp. 1197-1199; for the Rahmaniah *tarekat*, see Report of the pilgrimage, 1888.

³⁵ For a description of the controversy between Khalil Pasha and Sulaiman Effendi, see Snouck Hurgronje (1931), pp. 176-179; the doctrine of Sulaiman Effendi was condemned, see the circular letter concerning this condemnation, in MR 1886, no. 356.

religious movements; the divided allegiance of the Muslim community to the various brotherhood movements was certainly not conducive to a united mass movement against the colonial government. On the other hand, it cannot be denied that these institutions of popular Islam were capable of invoking effective appeal, especially in the rural areas. The saintliness of the leaders of the fraternities seemed to contribute considerably to their efficacy. The enormous increase in the number of *hadjis* generated a large body of vital elements in the movements. As long as the pilgrimage existed, a continuous stream of religio-political agents maintained the essential links between Mecca and the most remote Muslim community. It is therefore quite understandable that the colonial government watched the pilgrimage movement closely, generally under the guise of protecting the pilgrims against disease, swindle, theft, treachery, etc.

The colonial government could not have put a stop to the pilgrimage, even if it had wished to, for in the second half of the 19th century the custom of going on pilgrimage was in many regions extremely deeply rooted in the religious life of the people. This certainly holds true for Banten, where a strong tradition existed dating back to the early period of the sultanate.³⁶ Neither the dangers of travel nor great material sacrifices could withhold the candidate-*hadji* from performing this supreme act of faith. All warnings only had the opposite effect — namely they awakened the popular zeal to do the *hadj* or aroused the people's suspicion about the government's intentions.³⁷ Once the religious communication, channelled by the pilgrimage, has been established, it does not matter very much how large the annual number of pilgrims is.³⁸

On the other hand, these numbers are of great significance for a better understanding of the religious revival under discussion. Their steady increase since the middle of the century conspicuously exhibits a heightening of religious zeal. Certainly the improving conditions of transportation greatly helped to further this tangible manifestation of popular religiosity. It is noteworthy that the annual average of the number of pilgrims was about 1600 in the 'fifties and 'sixties; in the 'seventies it reached almost 2600, while in the 'eighties it grew to

³⁶ H. Djajadiningrat (1913), pp. 50-52, 187.

³⁷ Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), pp. 1318-1323, 1332-1335.

³⁸ Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), p. 1334.

4600.³⁹ With regard to the last figure we must take into account that the years 1880, 1885 and 1888 were years of the great pilgrimage — *hadj akbar* — which always show a record number of pilgrims.⁴⁰ Further statistical data concerning the pilgrimage reveal that there was a marked difference between the number of pilgrims leaving and the number of those returning over a certain period of time. Various factors were responsible for this discrepancy, among others, death caused by various diseases, settlement in the Holy Land, and enslavement.⁴¹ As stated before, the contingent of settlers from the Archipelago and adjacent countries became known as the *Djawah* community. As the pilgrim traffic from Indonesia was commonly one of the heaviest,⁴² the *Djawah* accordingly took a prominent place in the Holy City. As Banten was well-known as a pre-eminently Islamic region with the highest percentage of *hadjis* among its population,⁴³ it is not surprising that the number of pilgrims from that region was proportionately one of the highest.⁴⁴ The prominent place that Banten held in the pilgrimage movement was also more or less reflected by the Banten elements among the leading figures in the *Djawah* community. The pivotal role played by some of these Bantenese in the revolt of 1888 will be examined in

³⁹ See de Waal, Vol. I (1876), pp. 245-246; Report of the pilgrimage, 1889; for the figures concerning pilgrimages between 1891 and 1911, see Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2 (1924), pp. 314-315. See also Vredenburg, in *BKI*, Vol. CXVIII (1962), pp. 140-149.

⁴⁰ *Hadj akbar* refers to the years when the ceremonies on the plain of Arafat, held on *Dulhidjah* 9, fall on a Friday. This occurred in the years 1880, 1885, and 1888; the number of pilgrims in these years was respectively 9544, 4492, and 4328; see Report of the pilgrimage, 1888; see also the advice of Snouck Hurgronje, Sept. 7, 1888, in *Vb*. Sept. 11, 1888, no. 44; Vredenburg, in *BKI*, Vol. CVIII (1962), p. 147.

⁴¹ It is stated in the Report of the pilgrimage of 1889 that a considerable number of Indonesian slaves were to be found in Mecca and environment. There were also pilgrims who were put in bonds and were forced to work in coconut gardens in the island of Cocob, near Singapore, owned by As-Saggaf; see Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), pp. 1445-1447; for extensive reports on the As-Saggaf case, see *MR* 1885, nos. 67, 114, 130, 173; also *Vb*. Aug. 18, 1888, no. 10.

⁴² During the decade from 1879 to 1888 the minimum annual number of pilgrims from Indonesia was 4968 (in 1887), while the maximum was 13594 (in 1880) out of a total number that ranged from 25,580 to 59,659; see Report of the pilgrimage, 1888.

⁴³ In 1888 the number of Bantenese pilgrims was 160, out of the total 2869 from Java and Madura, in 1889, it was 132 out of 1337; see Report of the pilgrimage, 1889. According to statistical data of 1887, there were 4073 *hadjis* in Banten, comprising 0.72 per cent of the population; this was the highest percentage in the whole of Java; see also Appendix IV.

⁴⁴ See Appendix IV.

another context; for the moment we are concerned with a general consideration of the *Djawah* community, especially its spiritual climate and its activities.

Religious revivalism, it is worth repeating, was a widespread phenomenon in the latter part of the 19th century. In large parts of the Muslim world a renaissance came about in the Islamic faith, manifesting itself not only in a stricter observance of religious rules and rites, but also in an aggressive propaganda aimed at intensifying the power of Islam. It would be a mistake to regard the religious movement in Indonesia during this period as a parochial happening. Without adopting a Mecca-centric point of view, it is necessary to point out the many ties which linked the Islamic world in Indonesia with that religious centre. Mecca-trained or Mecca-inspired *ulama* or *hadjis*, either personally or through their disciples, instigated and championed the revival movements in various parts of Indonesia. The social core of these revivalists was to be found in the *Djawah* community. This group, being unfettered by regional tradition and colonial control and being in almost continuous contact with the religio-political kernel of Arabic-Muslim civilization, assimilated more rapidly, both intellectually and politically, into the Meccan power élite. In the Meccan situation the *Djawah* community had the advantage of being able to retain the links with their coming and going fellow-countrymen; thus they could perform a mediating role in relation to both religion and politics. The most influential among the *Djawah* were the teachers and students who, from Mecca, could control the religious community in their homeland.⁴⁵ Inspired by the general awakening of the Muslim world, the *hadjis* returned to their home countries with the determination to promote the revival there. The discipleship of many *hadjis* was in fact a bond of personal loyalty which could bridge the gap between the Meccan teacher and the common *santri* of the village.

Conservatism and fundamentalism characterized the *Djawah* teachers and their disciples, who shared the prevalent resentment against the Western powers in the centre of the Muslim world during the last part of the century.⁴⁶ In fact, explained in terms of anti-Western sentiment, the revival movement in various countries can be regarded as a manifestation of religious or Islamic nationalism.⁴⁷ As regards the *Djawah*

⁴⁵ Snouck Hurgronje (1931), p. 254; for a description of the *Djawah* about 3 decades later, see *IG* (1915), no. 1, pp. 538-540.

⁴⁶ Snouck Hurgronje (1931), p. 257.

⁴⁷ The term "Islamic nationalism" seems paradoxical, in that the adjective

community, among the various elements there was obviously quite a vivid consciousness of unity — although it was not explicitly expressed — simply as a result of the fact that the various elements had all broken through the regional insulation of their home-country. A new facet in the development of the religious revival among Indonesian Muslims was that factionalization along the lines of *tarekats* cut across ethnic boundaries and other traditional loyalties.⁴⁸ As we shall see, there was in the course of the religious movement a suggestion of the possibility of transcending regionalism and traditional institutional systems.⁴⁹ This factionalism between *tarekats*, while indicating their role in cutting across the boundaries of traditional loyalties, should not be taken as evidence that kinship ties were totally subordinate to *tarekat* affiliations. Lastly, religious revivalism had not only sharpened the sensitivity of the religious élite in Indonesia to progressive Western penetration, but had also pre-empted the field of religious protest movements. In this respect Mecca, as Snouck Hurgronje put it, provided the spiritual nourishment.⁵⁰

THE PESANTREN

Apart from the Pan-Islamic aspect — tangible in the passion for shaking off Western domination — the religious revival also included a profound revitalization of religious life through both local and cosmopolitan Islamic institutions. In the author's opinion, the *pesantren* — religious school — and the *tarekat* — the *Sufi* brotherhood — are the political counterparts of the Pan-Islamic movement. Although the revitalization of Islam constituted the constructive side of their common objective, the movement had no centralized direction, nor did any large-scale Muslim solidarity emerge. The dividing forces were discernible in various brotherhood movements, which developed an attitude both of exclusiveness and of uncompromising rivalry among themselves. The proselytizing pull of some brotherhoods was closely related

"Islamic" rather refers to something cosmopolitan; viewed in this light, the religious movement dealt with here can be regarded as a kind of half-way house between nationalism and cosmopolitanism.

⁴⁸ The Naksibandiah *tarekat* recruited adherents from Minangkabau, Langkat, Tjiandjur, and Banjumas; H. Abdul Karim from Banten had disciples from Bogor, Sambas, Solok, Bali, Madura, etc. See Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Nov. 26, 1888, no. 797/19.

⁴⁹ For instances of group affiliations within the framework of the *Sufi* orders, which transcend localism, see below, Chap. VI, *passim*.

⁵⁰ Snouck Hurgronje (1931), p. 258.

to the rapid expansion of traditional institutions of Islamic education which prepared the ground for conversion to these brotherhoods. In the light of this development we shall first deal with the growth of the *pesantren*, before describing the rise of the Muslim fraternities.

So little is known of the development of the *pesantrens* in the past that we can only speculate about their influence on the religious life of the people.⁵¹ Their wide distribution certainly did not date from before the last century, when Islam learning received a new impetus from the continually increasing flow of *ulama* returning from pilgrimage.⁵² The age old institution of the *pesantren* had undoubtedly gained new strength and popular attraction under the conditions created by the religious revival; a process of reciprocal enforcement of the various aspects of the religious movement made headway in the second half of the 19th century. In the 1860s the number of *pesantrens* throughout Java was estimated at about three hundred; a few counted more than a hundred pupils.⁵³ Among the most famous *pesantrens* we may mention the *pesantrens* of Lengkong and Pundjul, both in Tjirebon; of Daja Luhur in Tegal; of Brangkal in Bagelen; of Tegalsari and Bandjarsari, both in Madiun; and lastly of Sida Tjerma in Surabaya. Some of them dated back to the middle of the 18th century.⁵⁴ It is noteworthy that famous *pesantrens* attracted pupils from different parts of Java; people from Banten, Prijangan and Djakarta were to be found in the *pesantren* of Sida Tjerma, which was considered the most renowned in the latter part of the 19th century.⁵⁵ The fame of a *pesantren*, and its concomitant "national" attraction, depended largely upon the reputation of the teacher attached to it. As true foci and sources of traditional Javanese-Islamic culture, the *pesantrens* were looked upon as centres of training and points of reference. This accounts for the integrative force of Islam, superseding ethno-regional boundaries and accelerating the popularization of new currents in the religious field. It may safely be said that in

⁵¹ Descriptions of *santri*-life in the *pesantren* in former centuries are to be found in *Serat Tjentini* (1912-1915).

⁵² See the figures given by de Waal, Vol. I (1876), p. 245, referring to *hadjis* who returned between 1852 and 1875. A steady increase in their number can be observed, from 438 in 1852 to 2078 in 1875, while in 1873 the number reached 3242.

⁵³ See Brumund (1857), p. 27; cf. van den Berg, in *TBG*, Vol. XXVII (1882), p. 22.

⁵⁴ The *pesantren* of Tegalsari was founded during the reign of Paku Buwono III, about the middle of the 18th century; see Brumund (1857), p. 19; also Fokkens, in *TBG*, Vol. XXIV (1878), pp. 318-336.

⁵⁵ Van den Berg, in *TBG*, Vol. (1882), p. 22.

the 19th century many *pesantrens* were already of "national" dimension.

As a time-honoured institution the *pesantren* not only taught basic knowledge of Islam but also provided a training in Muslim ways of life and thinking.⁵⁶ Absolute obedience to the *kjai*, a rigid discipline in daily life, and equality and fraternity among the disciples were essentials in *pesantren* life. Indeed, while undergoing *pesantren* education, fundamental changes in personality structure frequently took place.⁵⁷ It is remarkable that in the second half of the 19th century there were many *hadjis* to be found among the *kjais*, running their own *pesantrens*.⁵⁸ In this connection it must be noted that many *hadjis* returned to their home-village without possessing more scholarly knowledge of Islam than when they departed; and yet nothing prevented them from giving religious instruction. As pointed out earlier in this chapter, there were also *hadjis* who remained in Mecca for years, studying the various branches of Islamic knowledge and participating in the Arabic-Muslim civilization.⁵⁹ They became acquainted with Islamic dogmatism, which contrasted with the traditional religious tolerance of their homeland. It is to be expected that among the returning *hadjis* there were those who, as carriers of a more orthodox Islam and of the religious and political ideals of Pan-Islamism, were inclined to militant courses and were definitely hostile to the colonial ruler. To regard every *hadji* as a fanaticist and a revolutionary would be utterly mistaken.⁶⁰ In Banten, there was an intensification of fanaticism in *pesantren* circles in the course of a few decades, and a hostile and aggressive attitude came to

⁵⁶ The four branches of religious knowledge taught in religious schools, as reported by the Regent of Pandeglang, are: *Ilmu Usul*, *Ilmu Faki*, *Ilmu Tasauf*, and *Ilmu Nahu*; see Appendix U of the Report of the Director of the Department of Interior; for the list of literature used in such schools, see van den Berg, in *TBG*, Vol. XXVII (1882), p. 25. Cf. Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), p. 1936.

⁵⁷ For a good description of *pesantren* life and education, see A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 20-24; see also Brumund (1857), pp. 17-29.

⁵⁸ In the districts of Anjer, Tjilegon, and Kramat Watu, out of 164 *gurus*, 67 were *hadjis*; see further Appendix V. It should be noted that there were various kinds of religious teachers, among whom trainers in *Qur'an* reading may be included; see Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), pp. 1162-1170.

⁵⁹ E.g. H. Abdul Karim, H. Mardjuki, Sjech Mohamad Nawawi, Chatib Ahmad Sambas, etc., and all those mentioned under note 33. Besides the description given by Snouck Hurgronje, see also the missive of the Consul of Djeddah, of Nov. 26, 1888, no. 797/19; of Dec. 25, 1888, no. 809/24; and of Nov. 25, 1891, no. 700.

⁶⁰ Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 1 (1924), p. 360.

be ingrained into the *santri* towards both the foreigners and the *prijajis*.⁶¹ They showed contempt towards everything which was not in conformity with Islam. As a writer on Indonesian Islam put it, "each *pesantren* was potentially a centre of anti-European and anti-*prijaji* sentiment."⁶² The social conflict inherent in this religio-political antagonism often found overt expression in the form of ridicule, which had Dutch officials and the *prijajis* as its principal objects.⁶³ Needless to say, the officials fully realized how hostile the people felt towards them, and the colonial government could hardly fail to see that the *pesantrens* were useful instruments of ideological control and that the instruction given was made subservient to the interest of the religious élite. Accordingly, immediately after the suppression of the Tjilegon rebellion, the government undertook to place all the *pesantrens* under close official supervision.⁶⁴ A more positive measure was the establishment of certain new types of secular schools, which were to serve to extend the influence of the colonial government and to counteract the overwhelming influence of the *pesantren*. Of course, the religious élite was bitterly opposed to the spread of Western educational systems, which would limit the advance of Islam. Although in the last quarter of the 19th century this penetration of Western culture was not yet profound, it was already keenly felt as a direct menace to the position of the *kjais*, for whom the issue was a matter of "to be or not to be". After all, by means of his *pesantren* and the *tarekat* the *kjai* could control the village community and could therefore easily mobilize both the material and the human resources of the peasantry.

THE TAREKAT MOVEMENTS

As has been mentioned previously, the *tarekat* was an excellent means of organizing the religious movement and of performing the indoctrination of revivalistic ideals. Only three *tarekats* — the Kadiriah, the

⁶¹ The *santris* constantly mocked the mannerisms, attitudes, and affectations of the civil servants. An instance of this was vividly described by A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 21.

⁶² Benda (1957), p. 18.

⁶³ A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 23.

⁶⁴ Government supervision in the post-rebellion period varied from region to region; it was carried out by testing candidate *gurus*, by issuing licences or permits to teach, or by requiring the registration of *murids*, etc. Before the revolt lists of *hadjis*, *gurus* and their *murids*, or at least of their numbers existed in every region; see Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), pp. 1149-1172. For government supervision in Banten in the post-rebellion period, see KT, VI (1917), p. 736.

Naksibandiah, and the Satariah — were of significance in 19th-century Java. Scattered groups under the names of Rahmaniah or Rifaiah were found, but were of little importance. In Java as a whole the Naksibandiah was the strongest *tarekat*, but this varied with each region: in Banjumas the Satariah, and in Banten the Kadiriah was the dominant *tarekat*.⁶⁵ As has been pointed out before, the last two *tarekats* were very old and well-established in Indonesia in general and in Java in particular. This may also be said of the Naksibandiah.⁶⁶ These three Sufi orders emerged as the spearhead of Islamic revival in certain parts of 19th-century Java. Their main missionary force consisted of *hadjis* who returned home as adepts of one of the *tarekats*,⁶⁷ and since direct communication with Mecca was not only maintained but also increased in the latter half of the 19th century, propaganda was considerably strengthened. Moreover, the *tarekats* introduced directly from Mecca contributed a great deal not only to fervent religious practices but also to intolerance and fanaticism. The Kadiriah and Naksibandiah *tarekat* stressed observance of positive precepts as well as of prohibitions; they were stricter than the other orders, hence their greater influence. The popularity of the Satariah, except in Banjumas, was declining in favour of the Naksibandiah *tarekat*, while the Rahmaniah, the Rifaiah or the Akmaliah affected only the population of small regions.⁶⁸ The ideals

⁶⁵ Mention has also been made by the Consul of Djeddah of the name Kadiriah-Naksibandiah, referring to the form of Kadiriah *tarekat* which had incorporated certain practices of the Naksibandiah *tarekat*. See Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Nov. 26, 1888, no. 797/19. Instances are known of people who belonged to two orders or were *sjechs* of two orders, e.g. of both the Kadiriah and the Naksibandiah *tarekat*. For these instances, see Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), pp. 1193, 1205, 1210, 1218; Naguib al-Attas (1963), pp. 33-35, 53.

⁶⁶ See above, notes 13-19.

⁶⁷ For an account of the process of becoming an adept of a *tarekat*, while in Mecca, see Report of the Resident of Banjumas, Jan. 12, 1889; mention is made of Mohamad Iljas of Sukaradja, and Mohamad Habib of Kebarongan. See also Snouck Hurgronje (1931), pp. 273, 276.

⁶⁸ The Rifaiah *tarekat* had adepts in Bogor, where it had been propagated by Raden Mohamad Sapi'i in the early 19th century; see Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), p. 1197; Akmaliah or Kamaliah adepts were to be found in Bandjarnegara, while those of the Halwaliah *tarekat* were simply mentioned in the report of the pilgrimage over the year 1888, no information was given about the location of its branches; see Report of the pilgrimage, 1888. Cf. Snouck Hurgronje's advice of March 10, 1891, where he mentioned the Halawiah or Alawiah *tarekat*; Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), pp. 1375-1377. For an account of the Satariah *tarekat* in Central and East Java during the first decade of the 20th century,

and aspirations of these *tarekats* diverged, but they were all inspired to ardent zealotry and extended their influence into many parts of the Archipelago, Muslim or pagan. They were on the whole not interested in teaching; their aim was rather to increase their power by augmenting the number of their adherents and canalizing all authority into the hands of the *guru-tarekat*. This religious development should be regarded as part of the religious revival that took place in Indonesia in the second half of the 19th century. Indispensable to this revival was the establishment of group solidarity by means of the revitalization of religious rituals and ceremonies.⁶⁹ The *tarekat* certainly lent itself admirably to this purpose.

Because of the crucial role played by the *tarekat* in the religious movement, especially in Banten, we have to deal at some length with certain of its organizational aspects. An important element in the organization of the *tarekat* which was relevant to the pattern of activities of the movement, was the establishment of a solid alliance between the *guru-tarekat* (teacher or leader of the brotherhood) and the *murid* (disciple). The bond between the *guru-tarekat* and the *murid* was officially inaugurated by the *bengat* (vow), according to which the *murid* promised faithfulness and absolute obedience to the *guru* as the deputy of *Allah*. The discipline imposed on the members of the *tarekat* also encouraged love for one's parents and solidarity among brothers of the *tarekat*, and prohibited relationships with religious leaders outside the *tarekat*. The duties of members were inscribed in the *idjazah* (certificate), which one received at the end of one's noviciate during the *bengat* ceremonies.⁷⁰

In addition to the above explanation it should be noted that the organization of the *tarekat* was rather loose, no statute existed; a common acceptance of certain rituals and special duties intended to uphold religious life was the basic principle which bound the members to each other. Blind obedience to the *guru* — the well-known *perinde*

see Henny, in *IG* (1921), no. 2, pp. 809-830, 895-919; cf. Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), pp. 1964-1973.

⁶⁹ The acceleration of religious sentiment and solidarity was ensured by means of one of the rituals, namely the *dikir*, i.e. the endless repetition of short prayers recited collectively, together with rhythmic movements of the body. For a full description of the *dikir* performance, see van den Berg, in *TBG*, Vol. XXVIII (1883), pp. 159-160; see also Archer, in *JMBRAS*, Vol. XV, part 2 (1937), pp. 105-107.

⁷⁰ For an account of the *bengat* ceremonies, see Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 1 (1924), p. 189; cf. Subhan (1960), pp. 88-91.

ac cadaver — was an indispensable rule, and the intimacy between the *guru* and the *murid* was essential for the transference of the essence of devotion in general and esoteric knowledge in particular. The role of the *guru* was obviously crucial in recruiting followers. In fact, *gurus* with an aura of holiness had great appeal for the people. Once recognized as a *Wali Allah* (saint), the *guru-tarekat* could command a following by virtue of his supernatural endowments and his charismatic authority.

It is noteworthy that the Kadiriah *tarekat* had no elaborate scale of ascendancy for its *gurus*; only the head in Mecca was recognized as the general leader, the so-called *murshid* (guide). He was considered the spiritual heir of the original founder and as such received his authority from his immediate predecessor. The teachings imparted in the *tarekat* are supposed to have been handed down via more or less continuous chains of succession originating with the founders. Such a chain is called the *silsilah*.⁷¹ In this way a kind of spiritual genealogy brought every new offshoot of the *tarekat* close to the religious core of Islam.

To return to the power aspect of the *tarekat*: certain orders obviously tended to acquire political power. The fact that they maintained a powerful hold over their adherents under the rule of the colonial government was of great political importance. Indeed, they became centres not only of religious revival, but also of political protest. The powers of resistance inherent in these fraternities made the protest movement take an extremist course. In the light of this development, conflicts with the socio-political order as established by the colonial ruler were inevitable.⁷² A few historical instances of the *tarekats'* influence and the conflicts they engendered now follow.

The popularity of the different *tarekats* varied: in Bogor, and West-Prijangan, the Naksibandiah order was the strongest *tarekat*, in Banjumas the Satariah *tarekat* was the most popular order, while in Banten, the Kadiriah order was the dominant *tarekat*.⁷³ Their development and

⁷¹ See Subhan (1960), p. 161; for an example of a Satariah-*silsilah*, showing the link between Abdurra'uf of Singkel and a certain Amad Saliha of Pati, see Rinkes (1909), pp. 94-97.

⁷² There are indications that Sufi orders in Malaya did not engage in political struggles and were less militant, see Naguib al-Attas (1963), *passim*.

⁷³ As regards the development of the *tarekat* in West Prijangan, see Missive of the Resident of Prijangan, March 31, 1886, no. 3030 in MR 1886, no. 262; for its development in Banjumas, see Report of the Resident of

spread in the different regions were marked by considerable rivalry and also by inevitable conflicts with regional authorities. In Batavia, the Naksibandiah *tarekat* was hampered by the Arabs, who regarded it with contempt and considered it an association for the lower classes.⁷⁴ Both in Jogjakarta and Surakarta, the order met with fierce opposition from the religious officials every time an attempt was made to propagate its teaching. On the other hand, in the neighbouring residencies of Kedu and Semarang, this *tarekat* was more successful in founding branches, although mostly among the lower classes of the population.⁷⁵ The popular unrest that arose in the wake of the preaching of Naksibandiah *gurus* aroused the suspicion of the religious officials and of the government authorities as well. The records available show that the Naksibandiah *tarekat* in the Priangan met with the same opposition on the part of the religious officials. In 1885 an extraordinary manifestation of religiosity could be observed in Tjiandjur. This religious awakening was due mainly to the activities of the Naksibandiah brotherhood headed by R. Hadji Abdulsalam and his deputy *guru* Waas. Among the outstanding members of the *tarekat* we may mention the Head *Panghulu* of Tjiandjur, the *Patih* of Sukabumi, and the Regent of Tjiandjur himself. The membership of these prominent civil servants became a political issue. Sharp accusations were made by the Head *Panghulu* of Garut, Hadji Mohamad Musa, backed by Sjech Umar and Holle.⁷⁶ The campaign was joined by Sajid Usman from Batavia and by Brunner. The former distributed a circular which made the *tarekat* suspicious to the public, while the latter wrote a sensational article on

Banjumas, Jan. 12, 1889, in MR 1889, no. 41; for its development in Bogor, see van den Berg, in *TBG*, Vol. XVIII (1883), p. 162.

⁷⁴ See van den Berg, in *TBG*, Vol. XVIII (1883), p. 161; as for the membership of the lower classes in Mecca, this is mentioned in the Report of the pilgrimage, 1888. A treatise on the nature of the *tarekat* was written by Sajid Usman, Honorary Adviser of Arabic Affairs, in which a warning was given against false *gurus*, van de Wall, in *TBG*, Vol. XXXV (1893), pp. 223-227.

⁷⁵ See van den Berg, in *TBG*, Vol. XXVIII (1883), pp. 163-164. The propaganda in that region was started by H. Abd al-Kadir from Semarang. In the 'eighties there were 13 schools and 15 *gurus*, of whom 12 were in Semarang, 2 in Kendal and one in Salatiga. Notice that H. Abd al-Kadir was a disciple of the well-known Sjech Sulaiman Effendi, referred to under note 35.

Missive of the Resident of Priangan, March 31, 1886, no. 3030. H. Musa was the father of the Regent of Lebak, R.T. Suria Nataningrat (1880-1908); according to the missive he belonged to the orthodox party. Sjech Umar was a scholar who was strongly backed by Holle, the Honorary Adviser for Native Affairs, see also *Java Bode*, Sept. 23, 1885.

the imminent Holy War.⁷⁷ He warned the European public about fanatical *hadjis* who, following in the steps of the *Mahdi* in the Sudan, would inevitably raise the flag of rebellion under the guise of waging a Holy War. A rumour which was circulating as early as the beginning of September 1885, concerned a plot whereby all the Europeans would be murdered during the horse-races at Bandung.⁷⁸ According to the Resident of Prijangan the whole issue was of a political rather than a religious nature; in his opinion, Hadji Mohamad Musa was eager to have his son, the incumbent Regent of Lebak, replace the Regent of Tjiandjur, and to have his youngest son become head *panghulu* there.⁷⁹ We are not concerned with the further developments of this issue, nor with its outcome; we only wish to point out that this was a case where a brotherhood movement evolved political strife, cleverly disguised by religious motives. In this connection it might be useful to speculate what would have happened if the Kadiriah *tarekat* in Banten had met with strong opposition. It must be added that opponents of the brotherhood movements were inclined to brand any outburst of religious enthusiasm as fanaticism which formed a serious threat to public order. So any such outburst had to be crushed in the bud.

One of the striking aspects of the brotherhood movements was the rivalry between the *tarekats*. This brotherhood rivalry derived neither from religious nor from social factors, but from the fact that the *tarekats* were competing in the proselytism or recruitment of adherents. In West Prijangan the contending parties were the Naksibandiah, the Kadiriah, and the Satariah orders. The first of these held a strong position, due to the popular leadership of Raden Hadji Abdulsalam. His successor was Hadji Waas, brother to the Head *Panghulu* of Tjiandjur, thanks to whom the Naksibandiah had gained the allegiance of certain prominent *prijajis*.⁸⁰ The residency of Banjumas was also the scene of intense competition between the orders: the Satariah was the most powerful and the most widespread; after that came the Naksibandiah; other

⁷⁷ *Java Bode*, Sept. 28, 1885.

⁷⁸ As to rumours, many articles in the *Java Bode* dealt with manifestations of the so-called fanaticism; see *Java Bode*, Sept. 4, 7, 12, and 22, 1885; Nov. 10, 1885. For the plot in Bandung, see *Java Bode*, Oct. 2, 1885; also Missive of the Resident of Prijangan, Sept. 29, 1885, in MR 1885, no. 647^a.

⁷⁹ H. Musa's youngest son was *naib* at Wanaradja at that time; see Missive of the Resident of Prijangan, March 31, 1886, no. 3030.

⁸⁰ Besides these three people mentioned, the *Wedana* of Sukabumi was also an adept of the *tarekat*. It was said that even the Regent of Bandung had been persuaded to become an adherent. Missive of the Resident of Prijangan, March 31, 1886, no. 3030.

orders were the Kamaliah and the Halwaliah. The Satariah enlisted many civil servants among its members, including the Regent of Banjumas himself. One of the main reasons for its popularity was the high degree of flexibility of its rules. Moreover, it had no rigorous requirements, in contrast to the Naksibandiah *tarekat*, which was well-known for its rigidity.⁸¹ Two more points should be made concerning this brotherhood rivalry. Firstly, faced with the opposition of orthodox religious officials and the suspicion of the colonial government, the tension between the various orders decreased to some extent. No outspoken denunciation of other orders took place, nor did physical clashes occur. It seemed as though the rivalry was based on the personal issues between the leaders of the orders rather than on religio-social factors. Secondly, according to the records, the *gurus* of the local branches were autonomous, working independently of each other, and no organizational ties existed which united them in a single synthesis of solidarity. Let us now turn to the development of the *tarekat* in Banten during the last two decades preceding the revolt.

As has been pointed out before, it was in Banten that the great movement of religious revival, which was mainly connected with the Kadiriah order, arose. In fact, this *tarekat* became the spearhead of religio-political protest against the colonial situation.⁸² Before the time of the re-introduction of the Kadiriah *tarekat* in the early 1870s, the *kjais* in Banten had been wholly mutually independent. Each *kjai* had run his own *pesantren* in his own way and had competed with other *kjais* for the reputation of learned scholar, power curer or adept mystic. The Kadiriah *tarekat* gathered momentum with the arrival of Hadji Abdul Karim in Banten at the beginning of the 'seventies. Under his influence the *tarekat* gained more and more ground within the circles of the *kjais* and established a link between them. At the same time the *kjais'* hold over their followers increased tremendously. Allegiance to the *kjai* and brotherhood among the *santris* were strengthened by joining the Kadiriah *tarekat*. Furthermore, the *kjai's* scholarly knowl-

⁸¹ Some of its main features were the strict observance of religious duties and blind obedience to the *guru*; the *dikir* constituted the most important religious performance. See Missive of the Resident of Prijangan, Jan. 26, 1886, no. 930 in MR 1886, no. 90*; also Report of the Resident of Banjumas, Jan. 12, 1889, in MR 1889, no. 41.

⁸² Other instances of *gurus tarekat* playing a prominent role in political disturbances are: the Gedangan affair in 1904; the Bendungan-Barong affair in 1907; the Priaman riots, 1908; see van der Lith, in *KT*, Vol. VI, part 1 (1917), p. 735; Henny, in *IG* (1921), no. 2, pp. 899-908.

edge and magical power sustained his essentially charismatic quality in the eyes of the *santri*.⁸³ It was conspicuous that the *kjai* generally enjoyed the people's deep affection and great respect and were regarded by them as symbols of rectitude and enlightenment. They were given religious contributions and could easily mobilize the villagers.⁸⁴ This faithful allegiance, which it was quite natural for the Muslim peasants to grant to their religious leaders, was augmented by their attachment to the *tarekat*.

The spread of the Kadiriah mission in Indonesia reached its culmination in the work of Chatib Achmad Sambas and his most distinguished disciple, Hadji Abdul Karim. Chatib Achmad Sambas was a great scholar whose knowledge included all the branches of learning, and in addition he had achieved the highest grade in the Kadiriah *tarekat*.⁸⁵ The distinguished teacher gained many followers with the result that adherents of the Kadiriah *tarekat* were to be found in Bogor, Tangerang, Solok, Sambas, Bali, Madura and Banten. All the disciples from all these regions, except Madura, were under the guidance of Hadji Abdul Karim; the Madurese were led by a man from their own region, Sjech Abdadmuki.⁸⁶ Propaganda for the *tarekat* was strengthened by the arrival of Hadji Mardjuki, an ardent disciple of Hadji Abdul Karim. As we shall see, the effect of this propaganda was that considerable militancy was aroused against the foreign overlords. The perennial Islamic belief in the Holy War certainly was voiced incessantly.⁸⁷

In its initial efforts Abdul Karim's revival movement showed a religious rigorism and had a strong puritanical tone. But Hadji Abdul

⁸³ This account still held good in the half century that followed; see Report of the Adviser of Native Affairs, Aug. 21, 1921; also Pijper (1934) pp. 99, 139.

⁸⁴ It was generally recognized that a *kjai* had higher status than the average *hadji*, see the testimony of Raden Penna, Dec. 6, 1888, in Exh. Jan. 28, 1889, no. 74. Referring to H. Makid, he stated that the *hadji* was already regarded as a *kjai* by his fellow villagers, but was not yet recognized as such in the *afdeling*.

⁸⁵ Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Nov. 26, 1888, no. 797/19; see also Snouck Hurgronje (1931), p. 276, and in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), p. 1863. Sjech Chatib Achmad al-Sambasi was a *sjech* of both the Kadiriah and the Naksibandiah order, see Naguib al-Attas (1963), p. 33. The combination or syncretism of elements of two different orders is of early origin and in Javanese designated by *daup*, which literally means marriage, see Zoetmulder (1935), pp. 147-148.

⁸⁶ Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Nov. 26, 1888, no. 797/19. Followers of Chatib Sambas and of H. Abdul Karim were also to be found in Malaya; see Naguib al-Attas (1963), pp. 35, 53.

⁸⁷ Ibidem; also Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Dec. 25, 1888, no. 809/24.

Karim was not a radical revolutionary; his activities were limited to demanding a strict observance of Koranic rules with special reference to daily prayers, fasting and giving *djakat* and *pitrah*. Of course, the performance of the *dikir* was essential. After Hadji Abdul Karim had left Banten, the movement began to turn away from mere revivalistic zeal, and a strong anti-foreign bias started infiltrating the *tarekat* practices. In the end, rebellious *hadjis* and *gurus tarekat* completely subordinated mystic discipline to the political goal.

ESCHATOLOGICAL ASPECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS MOVEMENTS

A fairly common feature of religious revival movements is the emanation of millennial ideas, in the present case, the Islamic eschatological idea, incorporating the expectation of the coming of the *Mahdi*. In this respect we might regard the rebellious Banten movement as a millennial movement of a classic Islamic nature. At a later stage the fervent words *perang sabil* and *djihad* began to spread amongst the members of the Kadiriah *tarekat*, words which had actually been known to the ardent Muslims of Banten. People were imbued with fervour for the Holy War and with a corresponding hatred of the "infidel government", and besides, they were also delighted by the prospect of the establishment of an Islamic state, in this case the sultanate. Here we meet with a Banten variant of Islamic chiliasm, in which a strong desire for the restoration of the Sultanate of Banten was interwoven.⁸⁸

The belief in the *Mahdi* has existed practically throughout the history of Islam. The name *Mahdi* appeared for the first time only half a century after the death of the Prophet. The distribution of the doctrine of the *Mahdi* was widespread, and included such countries as Persia, North Africa, India and Indonesia. One of the biggest movements occurred in the Sudan (1881—1888).⁸⁹ *Mahdi*, which literally means the well-guided, refers to a messianic figure who will appear when the end of the world comes and destroy the false prophet of the last hour,

⁸⁸ Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16, in MR 1889, no. 376; see also *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1149. For the idea of the restoration of the sultanate, see above, Chap. IV, *passim*; see also Report DDI, Appendix D.

⁸⁹ Darmesteter presented a complete description of the *Mahdi* movement in the Sudan, see Darmesteter (1885); cf. a more recent work, Holt (1958). The impact of this movement in Indonesia was mentioned in *Java Bode*, Sept. 7, 1885; Feb. 8, 1886; also *Indische Mail*, March 2, 1886. Van den Berg also mentioned the distribution of Arabic newspapers as a source of information concerning events in the Muslim world, see van den Berg, in *De Gids* (1900), no. 4, pp. 228-269, 392-431.

who is called *Dedjal*. The *Mahdi's* approach is characterized by a period of great disorder, unbelief and war. It was believed that at the proper time, the *Mahdi* would appear in order to restore tradition and the true faith; that he would renovate Islam, re-establish its old grandeur and exterminate the infidels.⁹⁰

As a latent belief among the *umat Islam* (the Muslim community) the idea of the *Mahdi* proved to be an inspiring force in times of stress, capable of moving the masses. In the revolutionary atmosphere of the last part of the 19th century, characterized by the penetration of Westernism, social unrest, and religious fermentation, conditions became favourable for manifestations of Mahdism. Throughout the history of Islam in Indonesia active manifestations have been almost completely absent, and during the Banten rebellion of 1888 the manifestation of the *Mahdi* belief was limited in scope and in effect.⁹¹ Simultaneously with other millennial or religious ideas it kindled a revolutionary flame which was to burst out into a conflagration of revolt and attack against the hated foreign oppressors. In Banten, the idea of the *Mahdi* was not only known, there was also an expectancy of his coming.⁹²

With regard to the Banten rebellion, several instances of prophecies concerning the coming of the *Mahdi* can be given. Before leaving for Mecca, Hadji Abdul Karim told the people that he would return to Banten at about the time that the *Mahdi* was expected.⁹³ On another occasion he said that he would not return as long as Banten still suffered under foreign domination.⁹⁴ Other tokens of the approaching end of the world were mentioned, such as earthquakes, mountain eruptions,

⁹⁰ Snouck Hurgronje presents the development of the *Mahdi* idea in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2 (1924), pp. 221-307; see also Darmesteter (1885). The coming of the *Mahdi* was also mentioned in one of the versions of the Meccan circular letter; see van Sandick (1892), pp. 150. Cf. the copy of the circular letter in *MR* 1883, no. 10; also Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. I (1923), pp. 134-139.

⁹¹ The captured rebels gave various motives for taking part in the revolt, e.g. heavy taxation, the government's disregard of the *kjai*, waging the Holy War against the infidel ruler, etc., but they did not mention the expectation of the *Mahdi*. See Report DDI, Appendix D and I; Appendix VIII. There are no sources which inform us that previous movements had been influenced by expectations of the coming of the *Mahdi*.

⁹² As regards the Javanese cultural tradition, the *Mahdi* idea is included in the so-called *Djajabaja* prophecies; see de Hollander (1848), pp. 173-183; Wiselius, in *BKI*, Series III, part 7 (1872), pp. 172-217; see also Schrieke (1959), pp. 81-95.

⁹³ Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16; see also *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1141.

⁹⁴ *Ibidem*.

blood rain, cattle plague, etc. These disasters and catastrophes were interpreted in terms of the prophecies and provoked abnormal emotions and caused much inquietude among the people.⁹⁵ In this period of social stress, when the people were full of frustration and suppressed resistance, the *Mahdi* belief was the appropriate device to stir them up against the domination of foreigners, whom the people thought to defeat by mystico-magical means.

Besides these eschatological elements the image of the imminent new world included the restoration of the Sultanate of Banten, which meant welfare and happiness for the people. In connection with this expectation it was foretold that when the *djohar*-tree had been planted along the roads in Banten, a black *radja* would reign again.⁹⁶ The immediate effects of these expectations were religious revivalism and the conspicuously frequent use of *djimat* as a means of becoming invulnerable and protecting oneself from all kinds of evil or bad luck.

What contributed more to the fervent intoxication of the people was a circular letter from Mecca, the content of which was known as the "Last admonition of the Prophet".⁹⁷ The *radja* (sic) of Mecca, who claimed to have received a revelation from the Prophet, disseminated propaganda of eschatological prophecy. The letter presented a description of the classic messianic woes and the appalling catastrophes which were to usher in the "Last Days".⁹⁸ It was a message fraught with eschatological meaning, strongly urging abstinence from blasphemy and adultery, pride and ostentation, and usury. It was also an appeal to the people to carry out the great purification of their spiritual life by doing

⁹⁵ Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2 (1924), pp. 424-425; van Sandick (1892), p. 151; the cattle plague was mentioned as one of the tokens which evidently made a deep impression upon the believers. The terrific explosion of Mt. Krakatau in August 1883 certainly augmented the expectation of the coming of the Day of Judgment.

⁹⁶ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1149. It is remarkable that the typical form taken by Javanese millennial thought — the expectation of the coming of the *Ratu Adil* — was entirely absent.

⁹⁷ Two versions may be pointed out: (1) the version as published by van Sandick and by Snouck Hurgronje; (2) the version as copied in the Mail report of 1883. The first was signed by Mohamad Dja'far bin Abd al-Chaliq, the second by Abdus Sarip, *radja* of Mecca. See MR 1883, no. 10; van Sandick (1892), pp. 143-151; Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. I (1923), pp. 134-139. For contemporary accounts of this aspect of the religious movement, see *De Locomotief*, July 1, 1884; also *IG* (1884), no. 2, pp. 739-744.

⁹⁸ See MR 1883, no. 10; van Sandick (1892), p. 143-151; Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. I (1923), pp. 139-744.

penitence and by observing religious duties strictly.⁹⁹ Special mention was made of both the sending of donations to Mecca and the pilgrimage. The letter also warned all those who ignored these eschatological signs and remained indifferent religiously; they were to be condemned and persecuted.

Between 1880 and 1885 a great many of these kinds of religious pamphlets had actually been circulating in Atjeh, Lampung, Banten, Djakarta and Prijangan.¹⁰⁰ At the end of 1883 the Banten police laid hands on such a pamphlet, which belonged to a certain Misru, whose brother, Asta, had bought it for him from Mas Hamim of Pakodjan. It was said to have been written by the *sherif* of Mecca in 1880, although there were strong indications that it had been written in Java.¹⁰¹ The Dutch officials suspected that it might arouse popular unrest among the people since a general wave of panic was still fresh after the severe epidemics and frightful natural calamities that had taken place between 1879 and 1883.¹⁰² Evidently, propaganda for the religio-political movement in Banten was greatly assisted by these plagues and catastrophes.¹⁰³ Because the brotherhood movement developed underground, the spread of this pamphlet did not seem alarming to the Dutch officials for the present. In their eyes it concerned mainly the recruitment of pilgrims and was primarily a commercial undertaking.¹⁰⁴

THE DJIHAD MOVEMENT

Religious revivalism was also coupled with the people's vivid awareness that their country was to be regarded as a *dar al-Islam* (territory of Islam) temporarily administered by foreign rulers. There was a strong conviction that, as soon as circumstances permitted, their country would be transformed by force into a true territory of Islam. Since non-believers were condemned as the enemies of the kingdom of *Allah*, their subjugation by the victory of Muslim weapons was regarded as a

⁹⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁰⁰ Van Sandick (1892), p. 143; Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. I (1923), p. 133.

¹⁰¹ Secret missive of the Resident of Banten, Dec. 18, 1883, L^a R¹ in MR 1883, no. 1173. According to the interpretation of the Regent of Pandeglang, the pamphlet originated from *sjechs* in Batavia, who attempted to awaken people's interest in the pilgrimage.

¹⁰² See above, Chap. II, pp. 66, 67.

¹⁰³ The circular letter was detected about 3 months after the eruption of Mt. Krakatau on 23 August 1883. The first attempt to murder a European occurred only one month later.

¹⁰⁴ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Dec. 26, 1883, L^a U¹ in MR 1884, no. 8.

holy cause worthy of sacrifice. This attitude was the result of the doctrine of the Holy War, according to which the Muslim community was by duty bound to wage war against people who had not as yet submitted to Islam. The main objective of the Holy War was to establish an independent Muslim state in which true Islam could be practised. This meant that, to the participants of the religious revival movement and the adherents of the *tarekat*, the *djihad* or *perang sabil* was a supreme act of sacrifice for bringing about that ideal state, the culmination of a life of dedication, of prayers, fasting, and pilgrimage.¹⁰⁵

Inherent in the *dar al-Islam* idea were feelings of hatred overtly exhibited by the attitude of the people not only towards Europeans but also towards all those who held infidels in regard and esteem, or kept company with them. Bantenese civil servants, who were regarded as the extended arm of the Dutch, were held in profound contempt. In the people's eyes they dishonoured their own religion, for a good Muslim should avoid contact with non-believers.¹⁰⁶ Furthermore, the *umat* tended to look upon civil servants as more or less corrupt and oppressive. The people showed a characteristic disinclination to have anything whatsoever to do with the Dutch government, its agents, and its actions, and regarded them all as inherently impure.¹⁰⁷ For this reason the penetration of the colonial administration into the village must be opposed vigorously and violently. It was the *kjai* who worked continually to inculcate his deep suspicion of the colonial government into the minds of the *santri* disciples and who gradually incited his followers to wage Holy War against the infidel rulers. This was the stage at which the character of the religious revival movement was transfigured by ardent fanaticism and transformed into a *djihad* movement. The Islamic formula struck a responsive note in the hearts of adepts of the *tarekat* in particular and in the hearts of *santris* in general. It is remarkable that the time and the place of the projected *djihad* was still vague when Hadji Abdul Karim set out for Mecca in 1876.¹⁰⁸

¹⁰⁵ For an extensive study of the Holy War in Islam, see Obbink (1901); also Veth, in *TNI* (1870), no. 1, pp. 167-177.

¹⁰⁶ A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 23.

¹⁰⁷ Ibidem; the *santris* not only charged the *prijajis* with maltreating them but also accused them of general moral delinquency. The *prijajis* were labelled *kafir indanas*, i.e. nominal Muslims, although compared with their fellow-*prijajis* in Central Java, the Bantenese *prijajis* showed more rigidity and strictness in observing their religious duties.

¹⁰⁸ Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Dec. 25, 1888, no. 809/24; *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1139.

WANDERING PREACHERS AND THE CIRCULATION OF SERMON-BOOKS

The militant movement of the revitalization of Islam in Indonesia was also accelerated by the influence of the wandering *sjerifs*, *sajids* or *sjechs* of mystic orders. The former were the agents of Meccan *sjechs*, who travelled in all directions to recruit pilgrims. The roaming mystics or learned men went from place to place, visiting princes and preaching in mosques under simulation of great holiness. Of course, gifts were bestowed on them abundantly. They appealed to the religious feelings of the people, who were easily persuaded to join religio-political movements. For this reason the colonial government feared that these men preached hostility against European rule to engender feelings of hatred and rebelliousness.¹⁰⁹ However, instances can be cited of wandering preachers who were peaceful, politically disinterested learned men or mystics.¹¹⁰

Another point of note is that the wide distribution of the sermon-books used in preaching in mosques on congregational Friday meetings was subjected to the close observation of suspicious authorities. In the middle of the 1880s the government was informed that sermons were held from a book called *Madjmu' al-Chatab*. This contained a number of texts of sermons and prayers written by a certain Abdul Rachman bin Ismail bin Nabatah al Miri. It was exported from Bombay and found a ready market in Central and East Java. It came into use in Tegal, Pekalongan, Semarang, Salatiga, Ambarawa, Kendal, Demak, and Surabaya.¹¹¹ In the text, the Sultan of Turkey was mentioned as the legitimate ruler who zealously combated infidels and the *umat* was urged to pray for him. The Dutch officials, being afraid that it had something to do with subversive Pan-Islamic movements, did all that was possible to control the preaching and the distribution of this sermon-book. Other

¹⁰⁹ These wandering religious men had great prestige, not only because the name of Mecca was holy in the eyes of the Muslims, but also because they were members of the Turkish order of knighthood or were reputed as learned men. Occasionally they sold amulets, holy water from Mecca, etc. Their visits to sultans, princes, and other native chiefs resulted in the establishment of relations with Mecca, threatening the prestige of the Dutch government. Missive of the Resident of Surabaya, July 31, 1885, in MR 1885, no. 148; Missive of the Resident of Banjumas, Jan. 18, 1886, no. 1/4 in MR 1886, no. 41; Missive of the Resident of Batavia, Feb. 28, 1886, in MR 1886, no. 148.

¹¹⁰ E.g. Sajid Abdallah, who successively visited Singapore, Pontianak, Riouw, Kutai, Batavia, and Surabaya; see Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adrianse, Vol. II (1959), pp. 1600-1608.

¹¹¹ Missive of the Resident of Semarang, July 7, 1885, in MR 1885, no. 148, and Missive of the Resident of Surabaya, July 31, 1885.

printed material imported into Java included the so-called *fatwa* written by outstanding Meccans, among whom were many learned men of the *Djawah* community.¹¹² Its virtual power to mould public opinion among the *umat* must not be underestimated. Undoubtedly this spiritual nourishment, for a great deal directly from Mecca, considerably augmented the spiritual life of the people.

ISOLATED OUTBURSTS OF RELIGIOUS FANATICISM

During the last few years preceding the revolt it was generally observed by civil servants that an atmosphere of religious fervour, almost bordering on fanaticism, pervaded social life in Banten. Instances occurred in their immediate environment: man-servants, who showed religious laxity on their arrival in Banten, began to perform their religious duties strictly after a few weeks. The reason was that they would otherwise be cut off from the local population.¹¹³ They often participated in the performance of the *dikir*. As we have seen, this fiery spirit of revivalism encouraged the populace to rise in seditious rebellion against its secular superiors. How explosive the situation in Banten in the 1880s was became apparent when some individuals, inflamed with religious fanaticism, started to show an aggressive attitude towards Europeans or their servants. Indeed, the battle cry "*Sabil allah*" was already in the air. Fear of fanaticism loomed large among the Europeans, who were aware of the fact that strong religious feelings usually aroused hostility and hatred against infidels. This resulted in a mutual suspicion between European and Bantenese officials.

Meanwhile, in 1881 a group of prisoners, among whom was a *hadji*, had run away from the prison in Rangkasbitung. Some of them attempted to start a Holy War but the majority of the fugitives was reluctant to follow their lead. The people hardly responded to their call.¹¹⁴

On the 2nd of October, 1883, a European fuselier, while buying tobacco in the market of Serang, was suddenly attacked by an unknown armed man. The victim was able to take refuge in a Chinese shop, and

¹¹² Snouck Hurgronje (1931), p. 258; a well-known *fatwa* is that which condemned the doctrines of Sulaiman Effendi; see Missive of Holle, May 19, 1886, in MR 1886, no. 356. For the text of the *fatwa*, see further MR 1886, no. 356.

¹¹³ Missive of the Resident of Banten, March 2, 1889, no. 443, in MR 1889, no. 183.

¹¹⁴ Van Sandick (1892), pp. 126-129.

the assailant ran away. Arrests were made but the offender was nowhere to be found.¹¹⁵

Another murderous assault occurred on the 19th of November. This time a man dressed in white attempted to force his way into the garrison of Serang. After wounding a sentry, Umar Djaman, he was captured. As to his motives, it was assumed that extreme religious zeal was the main driving force.¹¹⁶

The transformation of the religious revivalism into a Holy War movement was also noticeable in the residency of Prijangan. Around 1885 the news that a *perang sabil* would be launched alarmed the Europeans there; the plot in question has been mentioned previously.¹¹⁷ Because of lack of evidence it is doubtful whether this conspiracy really existed. We only know that contemporaries were indeed particularly struck by the religious zeal of the people, especially that of adepts of the Naksibandiah brotherhood. These brief remarks concerning some of the violent outbursts of religious zeal may indicate the course of events which were to reach their culmination in the Tjilegon rebellion of 1888. As yet radical protest movements were isolated and of a local nature.

CRUCIAL ELEMENTS OF THE PROTEST MOVEMENT

It should be realized that the two elements of the religious revival movement dealt with in this chapter constituted the main framework of the socio-political organization of the Banten revolt in 1888. The Banten revolt may be regarded as a dynamic social protest that utilized religious fervour. Emphasis should be given to the following significant elements of this protest movement: the organizational structure of the religious fraternities, and the political role of religious leadership. Both the *tarekat* and the *kjai* formed the nuclei of the forces which generated the Banten revolt. The impressive cohesion of the rebellious movement was certainly due to the charismatic leadership of the *kjai* and the *guru tarekat*. The *tarekat* was characteristically organized around a charismatic leader, in whom were centred the loyalties of the rank and file. The strongest binding force was the collective sentiment of mystical devotion.

¹¹⁵ Missive of the Military Commander of the first division to the Commander of the Army, Nov. 27, 1883, no. 958/764, in MR 1883, no. 1113.

¹¹⁶ Missive of the Resident of Banten to the Military Commander at Serang, Nov. 26, 1883, no. 8857/18, in MR 1883, no. 1113.

¹¹⁷ The information was given in the sensational article by Brunner, in *Java Bode*, Sept. 28, 1885; see above under note 78.

In the present context the Kadiriah *tarekat* can be thought of as a group which involved the total commitment of both the leader and the members. Other features of the *tarekat*, which were relevant to the revolutionary movement, were, firstly, the rigid formation of the in-group based on the organizational principles of the *tarekat*; secondly, the involvement of details of life, such as social attitude, clothing, recreation, etc.; thirdly, hostility towards infidels. One must bear in mind that the social unrest prevailing after intermittent disasters and social disturbances had increased the demand for a totalistic solution. The mental condition of the people made them receptive to the belief in deliverance from oppressive rule in general and to the belief in the Islamic expectation of the Mahdi in particular. Besides this eschatology, the idea of the Holy War and the restoration of the sultanate were the emphatic expressions of the basic orientation of the revivalists-*tarekat* members.¹¹⁸

In times of physical, psychological, economic or political stress, charismatic leadership comes to the fore. Because of their special position and authority, the *kjais* were designated charismatic leaders. The awe in which the *kjais* were held derived from their scholarly knowledge, and their magical and mystic powers. Another source of their authority was their traditional role as privileged mediator and adviser to others. But above all, their ability to perceive within themselves the essence of *Allah* sustained their essentially charismatic quality in the eyes of their disciples. Their extraordinary qualities, including their talents for communicating with the people and influencing large numbers of them to embrace a new life, and their magical appeal, are usually referred to as *keramat*. Some *kjais* in North Banten were reputed as *Wali* (saints) possessing *keramat*; they distributed *djimat* (fetishes), they healed the sick and they were able to foretell the future.¹¹⁹ Moreover, they were believed to be endowed with divine power, so that the people came to beseech their blessing in connection with particular enterprises. In circumstances of latent social tension, the *kjais* could increase their

¹¹⁸ See above under note 88, 91.

¹¹⁹ The well-known supernatural powers of the *Wali* included the ability to traverse long distances in moments, to walk on the surface of water, to fly in the air, and to predict future events. For a description of the characteristics of saints, see Subhan (1960), pp. 111-112. Every region in Java has its saints; in Banten it is Hadji Mangsur, see *Sedjarah Hadji Mangsur* (MS). For the hagiography of other saints in Java, see Rinkes, in *TBC*, Vol. LII (1910), pp. 556-589; Vol. LIII (1911), pp. 17-56, 269-300, 435-581; Vol. LIV (1912), pp. 13-206; Vol. LV (1913), pp. 1-200.

hold over their followers tremendously, and sometimes led them into a sudden, hopeless frenzy of armed rebellion against the colonial power;¹²⁰ in the people's eyes, the *kjais* were considered capable of seizing political authority and bringing about profound and basic changes in society. Usually such changes did not take place without violence. Since the charismatic leadership of the *kjai* demanded absolute obedience, it constituted a potential menace to the civil servants, both European and Indonesian, as holders of legal-rational authority. It must be added that the *kjai's* zeal in promoting religious revivalism countered the colonial government's attempt to change the society. In fact, the *kjai* can be regarded as the bulwark of conservatism.¹²¹ It was obviously in their own interest to prevent any innovation which meant a threat to their social prestige and privilege.

In dealing with the tension inherent in the relationship between the colonial officials and the *kjais*, the latter had the advantage of their strategic position. Their occupational locus made them fit to become the promoters of insurrectionary activities. As holders of charismatic power they were given honorific gifts, donations and all kinds of voluntary contributions. Of greater importance is the fact that the people had a strong sense of piety for and affinity with the *kjai* who championed a holy cause. In fact, the *kjais* were the natural leaders of Banten society; the legitimacy of their leadership sprang from their personal authority. The civil servants, on the other hand, did not share in the charisma, and therefore could not exercise authority in the same degree as the *kjai* did.¹²²

TO SUM UP

We have described the various manifestations of the religious revival: mainly, the increasing pilgrimage, the mushroom growth of both religious schools and Sufi orders, and the extensive circulation of eschatological prophecies. The reasons for this renaissance were partly religious, arising from sorrow for the laxity of the people's faith; and partly political, arising from distress, and resentment against the constant threat of Western encroachment. As a result the revival movement was coloured to a great degree by anti-Westernism. It often exhibited a passion for shaking off Western domination and for returning to the

¹²⁰ See above under note 82.

¹²¹ A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 19.

¹²² For the distinction between charismatic, traditional and legal-rational authority, see Max Weber's theory in Bendix (1962), pp. 298-416.

glorious epoch of the righteous Muslim way of life. So zeal for Islam and political conservatism went hand in hand. In this vigorous campaign the movement was handicapped because it had too many ramifications. Its efforts to recover Indonesia from the Dutch led up to torrential outbursts; they were, however, short-lived and limited in scope. On the other hand, the impact of the religious awakening on the re-orientation of religious faith and practice was more lasting. In the following chapters, the development of the religious revival in its revolutionary stage as it took place in Banten, where it rapidly gained momentum after 1886, will be examined.

CHAPTER VI

THE INSURRECTIONARY MOVEMENT

We are now approaching one of the most important phases in the history of the social movements in Banten, a phase of conspiracies and outrages which threatened the very existence of the colonial regime, and would probably have assumed vast dimensions if the rebellion had not been badly organized. To many contemporary observers the rising of 1888 seemed an isolated phenomenon.¹ But it was no sudden action on the part of ignorant peasants infuriated to religious frenzy, as some would have us think.² From the very first day it was obvious that this was a question of a prepared and planned uprising that stretched far beyond the confines of the townlet of Tjilegon.³ As will be shown, it was the culmination of a rebellious movement which for many years had been working above or below the surface. Events show that the *tarekat* — the closed association through which intelligence and communications could be distributed among the plotters — played an important role. Information passed along the *tarekat* so secretly that government authorities had hardly an inkling of what was happening. The outburst in Tjilegon on 9 July 1888 was literally a complete sur-

¹ The outburst was not ascribed to general discontent but only to some petty incident, see *Java Bode*, July 16, 1888; an article in *Soerabaiasch Handelsblad* mentioned a connection with the activities of the notorious Sakam, see *De Locomotief*, July 14, 1888; another article referred to an "affaire de femme", see *De Locomotief*, July 18, 1888; the assumption that the rising was linked with the Lampongs was refuted, see *De Locomotief*, July, 10, 11 and 18, 1888. See also the cable sent by the commander of the troops in Banten, no. 791, dated July 10, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 484.

² An anonymous writer in the *Java Bode*, August 4, 1888, regarded the outburst of the revolt as the action of murderers and rascals, and claimed that it had nothing to do with deep-seated causes; see also *Java Bode*, July 16, 1888.

³ The preparations and plans for the uprising should not be thought of in terms of the strategy and modern organization of modern movements, but rather in terms of the working out of the various steps and actions to be taken; an important aspect of the preparations was the co-ordination of the various branches of the Kadiriah *tarekat* in Banten.

prise to them. Later investigations revealed to what extent the conspirators had held meetings in various places; the *tarekat* was allegedly used as a centre for meetings in order to pray and to perform the *dikir* together. It was at such gatherings that the movement linked up the *kjais* as leaders of the plot in their respective regions. Under the cover of religion, experiences were exchanged and the campaign strategy was discussed. It is regrettable that no records of those meetings exist but no great stretch of the imagination is needed to know what was discussed on such occasions. Moreover, there are a number of records of court trials which supply us with sufficient data about the object of the discussions that took place at those meetings.⁴

If there is obscurity about the *tarekat*, there is also obscurity about the leaders of the revolutionary movement. We have some real knowledge about only a few of them, namely Hadji Abdul Karim, Hadji Tubagus Ismail and Hadji Wasid. With their pivotal role in the rebellion in mind, it is more convenient to focus our account of the insurrectionary movement mainly on the activities of those leaders. This, however, does not imply that other actors in the revolutionary drama will be overlooked. As the records indicate, some participants of the rank and file played a far from insignificant role in the uprising itself.

HADJI ABDUL KARIM

Hadji Abdul Karim, the great teacher and popular saint, stood out among the leaders. From the explanation given in the previous chapter it is clear that the early development of the *tarekat* movement in Banten was tied up with the career of Hadji Abdul Karim as a religious leader in general and as a *guru tarekat* in the Kadiriah brotherhood in particular. From his early youth he had been steeped in the teachings of Chatib Sambas, the head of the Kadiriah *tarekat*, and he became a very learned Islamic scholar of great reputation. He showed a strong desire to acquire knowledge and a great interest in Islamic learning. Because of his outstanding qualities, he was considered well suited to make propaganda for the Kadiriah *tarekat*.⁵ His first assignment was to

⁴ See minutes of the law suit (*Proces Verbaal*) against H. Abdulsalam, P.V. Apr. 9, 1889, in Exh. June 7, 1889, no. 51; also of that against H. Abdurachman from Kapuren, H. Mohamad Asnawi from Bendung Lampujang, H. Muhidin from Tjipeutjang, P.V. May 1, 1889, in Exh. June 24, 1889, no. 76; of that against H. Mohamad Arsad Tawil, P.V. June 3, 1889, in Exh. July 24, 1889, no. 74.

⁵ See Snouck Hurgronje, in his "*Mekka*" (1931), p. 276; cf. Missive of the

teach as a *guru tarekat* in Singapore, a position which he held for a few years.⁶ In 1872 he left for his home-village, Lampujang, where he stayed for about three years. He established a religious school, and as he was well reputed, he soon won unquestioning loyalty, devotion and obedience from his disciples. It is difficult to estimate the numerical strength of his following: in any case, he quickly emerged as the dominant figure among the religious élite. Not only did Hadji Abdul Karim enjoy a marked increase in prestige and power, he also drew great material benefits from the devotees, who were eager to buy rosaries, holy books, and other religious articles originating from the Holy City. His means enabled him to make trips through Banten, ceaselessly propagating his *tarekat*. Apart from the enthusiastic masses that he easily influenced, he also succeeded in winning over many civil servants to the cause of his mission. The Great Kjai at one time enjoyed tremendous prestige and the patronage of the Regent of Serang himself. A number of eminent persons, including the Head *Panghulu* of Serang and a retired *patih*, Hadji R. A. Prawiranegara, were his friends and were impressed by his ideas. Hadji Abdul Karim's widespread popularity and the deep veneration that the people felt for him made government authorities fear him. The Regent of Serang himself appeared in the district of Tanara and paid the *kjai* a visit. It was even said that the *kjai* accompanied the resident and the regent back to Serang in one and the same coach and that he was then the guest of the regent for a few days.⁷ The mere fact that the two highest authorities in Banten paid him a visit enhanced his prestige tremendously. In fact, he was the most venerated man in Banten.

Due to his extraordinary position, Hadji Abdul Karim's preachings exerted a strong influence on the population. In scouring the region he incessantly appealed to the people to regenerate their religious life by observing their religious duties more strictly. He declared that there was a need for intensive purification of religious belief and practice. In this connection the *dikir* became the focus of revitalized life. In many places *dikirs* were performed both in mosques and in *langgars* (chapels)

Consul of Djeddah, Nov. 26, 1888, no. 797/19, in Vb. Jan. 11, 1889, no. 9.

⁶ See Snouck Hurgronje (1931), p. 277; cf. Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Nov. 26, 1888, no. 797/19.

⁷ See *IG* (1891), no. 2, pp. 1771-1774. In this article, which was written by the retired Resident van den Bossche, it was refuted that Hadji Abdul Karim was in the same carriage with the resident. It is quite probable that rumours among followers had circulated the news; cf. *IG* (1891), no. 2, pp. 1139-1140.

as well, and on special occasions *dikir*-evening celebrations were held. *Dikirs*, recitations, incantations, and processions came to form a substantial part of religious life, which considerably augmented the religious fervour of the people. As mentioned before, there was vastly increased attendance at mosques. Indeed, during the short period that Hadji Abdul Karim wandered from place to place preaching, religious revival was in full swing in Banten.

In this spiritual climate it is quite natural that there should be a strong reverence for a man such as Hadji Abdul Karim. It was generally believed that he was a *Wali Allah* who had been granted *barakat* and consequently had the power to transmit *keramat* or miraculous grants. Later on he became better known as Kjai Agung, the Great Kjai.⁸ Among his prominent disciples may be included Hadji Sangadeli of Kaloran, Hadji Asnawi of Bendung Lampujang, Hadji Abubakar of Pontang, Hadji Tubagus Ismail of Gulatjir and Hadji Mardjuki of Tanara; all were to play an important role in the rebellion at hand. They were charismatic personalities because they were close to the source from which charisma radiated, namely the *Wali Allah*. As holders of charismatic power they were given honorific gifts, donations and all kinds of voluntary contributions.⁹

Of much greater importance than the flow of material benefit was the people's strong sense of piety for and affinity with these leaders. As a result, the religious élite, the *hadji* and the *kjai*, enjoyed high social prestige, especially in the rural areas. Here the prestige scale based on religion contrasted with those of both the West and the *prijaji*. The political consequence of this discrepancy was that in the eyes of the people the *kjai* or *hadji* ranked higher than the native civil servants, so that it was felt that the former not only deserved more honour but should also be obeyed first. No wonder that the *kjai* or *hadji* could easily recruit people for all kinds of purposes. The influence of the *gurus* became so predominant that the native civil servants had

⁸ Besides the event mentioned under note 7, two other facts were usually referred to as indications of his miraculous deeds, namely: (1) he was saved when the whole region was flooded by the river Tjidurian; (2) after H. Abdul Karim had been fined, the resident was replaced and the regent retired; see *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1138. For another example of H. Abdul Karim's *keramat*, see Snouck Hurgronje (1931), pp. 277-278.

⁹ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1143. From the traditional point of view it is quite natural that prominent persons had various gifts bestowed on them when they arranged festivities at weddings, circumcisions, funerals, etc.; these gifts are the so-called *sumbangan*.

to rely on their mediation in matters such as the levying of taxes or the mobilizing of man-power for public works.¹⁰

The matter became quite a menace to the colonial government when the growing deference to the *kjai* or *hadji* was exploited in order to enhance the religious zeal of the people. Sanctions were imposed on those who showed indifference concerning religious matters. The heightening of feelings of hatred towards the Europeans, who were regarded as infidels, was inherent in religious fervour. In fact, the annihilation of foreign rule became a basic aim of the religious movement.¹¹ Meanwhile Hadji Abdul Karim's sermons, promises and prophecies kept the people in a state of excitement. Evidently his predictions about the "Last Judgment", the coming of the Mahdi, and the *djihad*, gave rise to general religious fermentation; the *djihad* spirit was animated by vivid awareness that their country was to be considered as a *dar al-Islam* temporarily administered by foreign rulers, and that one day it had to be reconquered. The ultimate goal that the Great Kjai had in view was the foundation of an Islamic state.¹² As his popularity grew, his *murids* anxiously waited for his call to revolt. It was as though he drew the longings of the people to him. As Snouck Hurgronje tells us:

.... every evening hundreds eager for salvation flocked to where he was staying, to learn the *dhikr* from him, to kiss his hand and to ask, "If the time were at hand, and how long the Kâfir government would continue?"¹³

But when it came to the actions that were to bring about these predictions, Hadji Abdul Karim was always vague in the explanations he gave his zealous followers regarding such all-important questions as the restoration of the sultanate or the commencement of the *djihad*. He avoided giving definite answers by merely pointing out that in his eyes the time was not yet ripe for waging the Holy War. The solemn promise that he issued shortly before he left for Mecca raised the disciples' hopes for an ultimate realization of their goal. As we shall see, the impact of this expectation on Hadji Abdul Karim's disciples

¹⁰ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1144; by calling upon the *kjais* for assistance, the government authorities gave recognition to this "*imperium in imperio*"; this inspired in the religious men a great contempt for the authority of the law. For the *hadjis'* assistance in introducing vaccination, see Roorda van Eysinga (1856), p. 66.

¹¹ For H. Abdul Karim's statement to this effect, see Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16, in *MR* 1889, no. 376.

¹² *Ibidem*; see also Chap. V, pp. 165 ff.

¹³ Snouck Hurgronje (1931), p. 277.

was quite tangible in the course of the activities of the rebel leaders.¹⁴ It would be no exaggeration to say that the leaders of the movement who succeeded Hadji Abdul Karim already found the ground prepared for carrying out their mission of sowing more seeds of rebellion among the population.

Hadji Abdul Karim's popularity manifested itself time and again. How much the people venerated him was clearly shown in the case of the wedding festivities held for his daughter. Prominent *kjais* from far and wide — not only from Banten, but also from Batavia (Djakarta) and Prijangan — came and partook of the bountiful feast. The whole village — Lampujang — was lavishly decorated; two musical bands from Batavia added lustre to the wedding-party, which lasted about a week. The *kjai* did not need to spare any expense because his disciples felt highly honoured in being allowed to provide everything.¹⁵

The departure of Kjai Agung in the beginning of 1876 was another manifestation of his popularity in the region. Having been appointed successor to Chatib Sambas — the head of the Kadiriah *tarekat* — he had to leave Banten. Before taking his departure he once again travelled through Banten, everywhere summoning the people to observe the religious rules and to beware of laxity in religious practice. A few prominent *kjais* and *hadjis* were chosen to be entrusted with the welfare of the Kadiriah *tarekat*. The *kjai* also bade farewell to distinguished native civil servants, recommending to them the holy cause that the *kjais* in Banten were fighting for, namely, the regeneration of the religious life of the people. He also urged them always to seek the *kjais'* advice on religious matters. To his intimate disciples he disclosed the fact that he did not intend to return to Banten as long as it suffered under the yoke of foreign domination. Only on pure Islamic soil would he set foot again.¹⁶

The big news of the coming departure of the Great Kjai aroused great consternation among the population, especially among his disciples. They flocked to his home-village to see him for the last time.

¹⁴ After he had been driven out of Tjilegon, Hadji Wasid decided to take refuge in the mountains of South Banten, expecting the return of H. Abdul Karim, see Report of the Controller, May 19, 1889, no. 16.

¹⁵ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1140; cf. Snouck Hurgronje (1931), p. 278.

¹⁶ See Missive of the Resident of Banten, Oct. 15, 1889, no. 320, in *MR* 1889, no. 743, referring to the reign of the "*radja ireng*" (black king); see also Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16, referring to the period when the Dutch would have been driven out of the country and an Islamic state would have been founded.

They were busy arranging a fervent farewell all along the routes he would take on his way to Batavia. Indeed, Hadji Abdul Karim's departure was a momentous event. The people of a large part of North Banten were on the move; a great number of *kjais*, their disciples and devotees, were all eager to bid the "saint" farewell. The aura of holiness which surrounded the *kjai* accounts for this commotion. The veritable rush of people fostered fear in government circles, where nothing but trouble was expected from this kind of movement. Foreseeing disturbances, the Resident of Banten made a request to the *kjai* to alter his itinerary to Batavia. It had originally been planned that he would make short stops in the district of Tangerang, but now he must go by boat straight to Batavia.¹⁷

On the very day of his departure, Monday, 13 February, 1876, Hadji Abdul Karim left Tanara, accompanied by ten members of his family, six persons to act as his escort during his voyage, and thirty or forty people who accompanied the *kjai* to Batavia. It was estimated by local authorities that about three hundred people came to see the *kjai* off in Tanara.¹⁸ According to the report they were quite peaceful and well-disposed. In the meantime rumours were spreading that about 1500 or 2000 *hadjis* and *santris* from Banten and Batavia had gathered in Tanara.¹⁹ Many *hadjis* from the district of Tangerang and from Bogor had already left for Karawatji — $1\frac{1}{2}$ *paal* from Tangerang — the main rallying point for those who wished to see the *kjai* off. Among them were prominent figures like the *kjais* from Tjiasa and Pontang, Kjai Munira from Tjampea, and Kjai Hadji Imbron (sic) from Tigaraksa.²⁰ Moreover, a large meeting was to be held in the house of Raden Kentjana, widow of the Tumenggung of Karawatji and heiress of the private estate of Kali Pasir. Besides some of her relatives, like Raden Gadjali and Raden Hamdja, many religious zealots and a number of persons known as unruly elements in government circles would be present. Among the latter group were Raden Mega, a dismissed bailiff of the district court of Tangerang; Idris; and K. Endon, a vaccinator who claimed to be a descendant of the Sultan of Banten. The detention of Raden Mega was a precautionary measure, which had the result that

¹⁷ Missive of the Resident of Batavia, Feb. 7, 1876, L^a EII, in MR 1876, no. 112.

¹⁸ Missive of the Resident of Batavia, Feb. 12, 1876, L^a EVII, in MR 1876, no. 141.

¹⁹ Missive of the Resident of Batavia, Feb. 9, 1876, L^a EIV, in MR 1876, no. 112.

²⁰ Missive of the Resident of Batavia, Feb. 7, 1889, L^a EII.

the others did not make an appearance.²¹ In fact, the officials were on the alert, and suspected that unruly elements might exploit this movement by stirring up the people to revolt against the government. Precautionary measures on the part of the authorities could not prevent the glorious homage that was paid to Hadji Abdul Karim, for his disciples went out to meet him in proas from coastal villages like Pasilian and Mauk, in order to bid him goodbye.²²

KJAI HADJI TUBAGUS ISMAIL

Several years elapsed before a new leader came to the fore. Not until 1883 did the rebels become active again. With the arrival of Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail, a member of the Kadiriah *tarekat* and a disciple of Hadji Abdul Karim, the insurrectionary movement regained some of its old vigour. As his name indicates, he belonged to the Banten nobility, which had been deprived of all political influence but still enjoyed social prestige among the population. He had made the *hadj* several times, and his pilgrimages had augmented his hostile feelings towards the infidel rulers while the idea of inciting the people to rise against them had ripened. On his last voyage he told his fellow-travellers that according to Meccan sages Banten would have its own *radja* as soon as the *djohar*-tree had been planted along the roads.²³ Back in his home village, Gulatjir, he founded a religious school and a branch of the Kadiriah *tarekat*. He was thus in a position to increase his prestige and to recruit a large following. There were other reasons why his leadership prompted increasing recognition from the Bantenese; besides being of noble descent, he was known to be the grandson of Tubagus Urip, who had been regarded as a *Wali Allah*.²⁴ Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail himself was looked upon as a *Wali Allah*-to-be. Tokens of his future sainthood could already be observed: he did not have his hair cut as was the custom of the *hadji*; he hardly took food at parties. In this way he attracted the public's attention. Both *Wali Allah* veneration and *guru-murid* relationships tended to secure one a popular and faithful following. Having drawn attention to his personality, Kjai

²¹ Missive of the Resident of Batavia, Feb. 12, 1889, L^a EVII.

²² For H. Abdul Karim's occupation in Mecca after this journey, see Snouck Hurgronje (1931), pp. 278-281; see also Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Nov. 26, 1888, no. 797/19.

²³ See above, Chap. V, p. 167.

²⁴ See P.V. Jan. 3, 1889, in Exh. Feb. 23, 1889, no. 68; Tubagus Urip was a venerated rebel, a popular hero, and a comrade in arms of Tubagus Buang, who launched a rising in the beginning of the 19th century.

Hadji Tubagus Ismail started making propaganda for an insurrectionary movement against the rule of the infidels. At the outset of his campaign many famed *kjais* already shared his ideas and were ready to pledge their support to his holy mission. Hadji Wasid from Bedji, Hadji Abubakar from Pontang, Hadji Sangadeli from Kaloran, Hadji Iskak from Sanedja, Hadji Usman from Tunggak, Hadji Asnawi from Bendung Lampujang, and Hadji Mohamad Asik from Bendung, were all prominent *kjais* enlisted for the rebellious movement led by Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail.²⁵ In fact, Banten society had already become a hotbed for revolt, but it still took a few years before the spark of insurrection could be kindled.

THE RIPENING OF INSURRECTIONARY IDEAS

As early as 1884, the idea of insurrection had matured, and the leaders wanted action. It was decided at a meeting at Hadji Wasid's house in Bedji to recruit partisans among the *murids*.²⁶ The period that elapsed between this meeting and the actual outbreak of the rebellion must have been one of incessant activity, especially for the *tarekat*. It must be fairly obvious now to anyone reading the records that these years were used not only to build up the conspiratory body but also to design insurrectionary plans. Meetings were held in various places, at which most of the local rebel leaders were present. *Gurus tarekat* were sent out to propagate the idea and to recruit adherents. The conspiracy was carried out at the time considered by some of them most favourable for its success. European officials were alarmed at the extremely fervent activity in the religious life of the people, but their minds were set at ease by Bantenese authorities who could not see anything dangerous in these manifestations of religiosity.²⁷ What seemed strange and extra-

²⁵ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1150; cf. Missive of the Resident of Banten, Oct. 15, 1889, no. 320. From comparisons made between the article in *IG* (1891), no. 2, pp. 1137-1206, and the relevant government records, it may be inferred that the author of the article in question must have had at his disposal sources from governmental origin. According to Snouck Hurgronje the author was nobody but the Controller of Serang, de Chauvigny de Blot; see Snouck Hurgronje's note of Aug. 15, 1892, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), pp. 1986-1999. For his criticism on the said article, see below, pp. 192 f.

²⁶ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1150. The earliest date found in the available records in connection with the planning of the plot is the year 1886; see Missive of the Resident of Banten, Oct. 15, 1889, no. 320.

²⁷ In 1886 a warning had already been issued by the Attorney General in connection with the stirring up of the population of Banten by religious leaders, see *WNI* (1888-89), p. 111. See also the well-known articles by

ordinary to the former was taken for granted by the latter. For example, the Bantenese authorities thought it quite natural that the people eagerly made use of mosques which had been restored or newly built. It was afterwards disclosed that the most important meetings of the plotters were disguised as festivities, e.g. a wedding or a circumcision feast. Smaller meetings were held under the cover of *dikir* performances. The rebels made their plots with such secrecy that for years the colonial government was never able to discover any facts that might have led to their apprehension. Meanwhile the spirit of rebellion already loomed large in Banten society.

HADJI MARDJUKI

With the arrival of Hadji Mardjuki in February 1887, the movement reached a new stage. Because of the essential role he played in the movement, it will be worthwhile to point out some important aspects of his life history with special reference to the conspiratory activities in Banten. As Snouck Hurgronje put it, Hadji Mardjuki was a real bird of passage among the learned men in Mecca.²⁸ In 1858 he went to Mecca for the first time. According to the pilgrim registers, he afterwards embarked for Mecca again in 1867, 1871, 1876, and 1888.²⁹ It is also known that Hadji Mardjuki lived in Banten, in his home town Tanara, between 1874 and 1876, and from March 1887 until June 1888. In the latter period he already enjoyed an established reputation as a religious teacher, and a fame which considerably enhanced his prestige and power in the eyes of his fellow-*hadjis* in Banten. Moreover, he was elevated to the enviable position of being one of the most faithful and favoured followers of Hadji Abdul Karim. Small wonder that Hadji Wasid and Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail regarded him as a powerful ally whom they strongly entreated to join the rebellious movement. It was presumed by partisans that his recent arrival might be directly connected with the coming rebellion. He might have come at the special request of Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail, his bosom-friend.³⁰

Brunner in Java Bode, Sept. 4 and 7, 1885, about the Holy War or "*perang sabil*".

²⁸ See Snouck Hurgronje (1931), p. 273, also quoted by the Consul of Djeddah in his missive of Sept. 4, 1889, no. 1079, in Vb. Oct. 8, 1889, no. 48.

²⁹ See Missive of the Resident of Banten, Oct. 15, 1889, no. 320; it is not known in what year Hadji Mardjuki left Mecca. In the pilgrim register of 1887 he was already listed under the name of Hadji Mardjuki.

³⁰ Ibidem; see also Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Sept. 4, 1889, no. 1079, and Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16, dealing especially with H. Mardjuki's role in the conspiracy.

Some time in February 1887 Hadji Mardjuki arrived in Batavia. As he had no passport he was fined twenty-five guilders.³¹ He settled in his birth-place, Tanara, and occupied himself with teaching. He was also engaged in selling rosaries, copies of the *Qur'an*, *djimats*, and other religious articles that he had taken back with him from Mecca. He had no sooner arrived than he started to travel through Banten, Tangerang, Djakarta, and Bogor, everywhere propagating the idea of the *djihad*. As he acted by order of Hadji Abdul Karim, his propaganda rapidly found general acceptance. Shortly after his visits, intensified religious zeal could be observed. The mosques were packed, attendance at weekly meetings was vastly increased, in short, devotion and piety were ostentatiously displayed, not only by men, but also by women and children. It was reported that in Tanara the district authorities lent a helping hand at the request of the *kjais* in urging — if not compelling — people to attend mosques and *chataman* ceremonies.³² As stated previously, popular enthusiasm ran high, while religious feeling was stirred up by prophecies. The selling of *djimats* grew into an extensive and lucrative business.³³ In this way the population was gradually prepared for the coming Holy War.

Hadji Mardjuki continued his *djihad* propaganda by visiting the *kjais* of the Kadiriah *tarekat* in Tangerang and Batavia, including Hadji Kasiman of Tegalkunir and Hadji Tjamang of Pakodjan. Their sympathy assured him their substantial support; they were ready to send their disciples as volunteers to Banten. Hadji Mardjuki shared the work of propagating the Holy War outside Banten with Hadji Wasid, who was also quite successful in winning over *kjais* from various parts of West Java. In fact, the two *hadjis* became the life and soul of the movement. The question arises, which of them was actually the chief leader? On the basis of their investigations, certain government authorities in Banten were inclined to hold Hadji Mardjuki wholly responsible for the insurrectionary movement. His sudden departure shortly before

³¹ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Oct. 15, 1889, no. 320; he must have arrived at the beginning of February 1887, for his travel ticket was numbered 200 and dated 9 February, 1887.

³² Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16; *chataman* is derived from *chatam* or *katam* which means having finished reading the *Qur'an*; *chataman* refers to the celebration held on the occasion when a *murid* has finished the "reading" of the *Qur'an*; see Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 1 (1924), pp. 164, 265.

³³ Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16; in this report it was mentioned that the prices of *djimats* varied between 50 cents and two guilders 50 cents.

the outbreak of the revolt, however, seemed inconsistent with the function of chief leader. In this connection the findings of the Dutch Consul in Djeddah are illuminating.³⁴ Hadji Mardjuki was back in Mecca in August 1888, and soon resumed his old occupation as a teacher of *nahu* (*nahw*) or Arabic grammar, *saraf* (*sarf*) or Arabic syntax, and *pakih* (*fiqh*). Since he was reputed to be a learned man, the attendance at his lectures was always considerable. He never kept his political principles a secret. In his discussions with friends and disciples after his lectures there were no indications whatever that he was a zealot of a revolutionary movement among Muslims in Indonesia. Neither did he incite his disciples to revolt and throw off the yoke of the Christian overlords. He strongly condemned the rebellion led by Hadji Wasid as premature and a fruitless waste of lives. In his opinion, if any revolt was to have a chance of success, it must be organized in such a way that it would break forth simultaneously in different parts of the Archipelago; furthermore, the rebels must have sufficient amount of money and weapons at their disposal. In the light of this contention, put forward by Hadji Mardjuki himself, it is quite clear why an irreconcilable dissension arose between him and Hadji Wasid when it was decided to start the rebellion in July 1888. To complete the explanation of his sudden departure, mention must be made of the justification he gave to his friends: They were told that his ulcerated right hand prevented him from taking part actively in the struggle. Had he remained in Banten, he would have had to face the dilemma of either being killed by Dutch soldiers or remaining inactive and having to risk the vengeance of Hadji Wasid. There was one alternative left — to return to Mecca. The fact that his wife and children were there provided him with another reasonable excuse to leave Banten. It would be beyond the scope of this study to discuss whether or not these reasons were nothing but pretexts for getting away from the scene of action when the time of the outbreak of the rebellion was drawing near, proof that at the last moment he was only mindful of his own safety. It was also wondered whether his frequent repatriation was prompted by patriotic feelings or rather by the desire for material gain in selling religious articles to

³⁴ Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Sept. 4, 1889, no. 1079, which dealt exclusively with H. Mardjuki, with special reference to Mardjuki's opinion of the revolt of July 1888. For H. Mardjuki's attitude, see also Snouck Hurgronje in his missive to the Governor General, June 7, 1889, also in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), pp. 1080-1086.

his fellow-countrymen. So much for Hadji Mardjuki's leadership in the rebellious movement.

HADJI WASID

Hadji Mardjuki failed to complete his plan to revolt against the infidel rulers because he dissented strongly from the majority of the rebel leaders as regards the date of the outbreak of the revolt; Hadji Wasid devoted his efforts to the holy cause until he came to his tragic end in a battle with his pursuers. His ascendancy over the rebels did not start until a few years before the outbreak of the rebellion. He was shrewd enough to exploit the religious revivalism looming large in his environment by identifying his personal affairs with the common cause of his community. He was quite influential not only because of his position as a religious teacher but also because of his strong personality. He was furthermore known as a troublesome and short-tempered man with an inclination towards mysticism.³⁵ It is impossible to give a full picture of Hadji Wasid's personality because — as might be expected — next to nothing is known of his life history before he became connected with the movement. Of special significance is the fact that he came from a family of rebels. His father, Abas, took part in the Wachia rebellion of 1850; together with Lurah Nasid from Tjitangkil he fled to Medang Batu, where the two men sought the assistance of Hadji Wachia himself.³⁶ It may be added that Hadji Wasid's mother was a cousin of Lurah Nasid's father, Djin.³⁷ Another aspect of his personality is given by the writer of the report on the rebellion, who stated that Kjai Hadji Wasid was about 45 years old at that time and was born in Grogol; that he enjoyed apparent prosperity, which could presumably be deduced — as the writer put it — from his three wives.³⁸ What leadership qualities he possessed will appear from the description of his activities as an instigator and organizer of the rebellion.

The records disclose that Hadji Wasid participated vigorously in propaganda activities, especially those directed at *kjais* beyond the Banten area proper. He extended his activities to Batavia, Bogor, Tjiandjur, Bandung, and Tjirebon, where *kjais* belonging to the Kadi-riah *tarekat* were susceptible to the idea of the *djihad* and enthusiasti-

³⁵ Report DDI, p. 217; for a description of H. Wasid's appearance, see Extract M.J. July 19, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 496.

³⁶ Report DDI, p. 137; for the Wachia rebellion, see above, Chap. IV, pp. 123-127.

³⁷ Ibidem.

³⁸ Ibidem.

cally joined in the movement. Volunteers were to be recruited and sent to Banten; Kjai Ape from Dajeuh Kolot promised to come over himself. In Tjirebon, Hadji Wasid paid a visit to the holy grave of Sunan Gunung Djati; in so doing he observed a time-honoured tradition which constituted an essential part of the rituals directly connected with important undertakings. After he had been away for about two months he returned to Bedji, where he conferred with Hadji Mardjuki and Hadji Tubagus Ismail and gave them an account of what he had accomplished. They decided to notify the *kjais* of a meeting scheduled for one of the *malemans* of the fasting month (June 1887) at which reports were to be made of the achievements of the propagators, especially Hadji Wasid and Hadji Mardjuki.³⁹ The rebel leaders held their secret meetings under the guise of *maleman* festivities, the first time in Hadji Mardjuki's house, the second time in Hadji Achmad's home, while the third meeting was held in Bendung Lampujang, with Hadji Asnawi as host. The convention in June 1887 was given primarily to the consideration of the propaganda of the *djihad* idea and its concomitant, the recruitment of adherents, because the rebel leaders knew well that the revolt could only succeed if a large part of the population spread over a wide area was in rebellion. On the other hand they wanted to be sure that they could rely on all the men in the ranks to carry out their orders. What had been accomplished by the propagandists since the last conference in the middle of 1886, was the extension of the rebellious propaganda to certain *kjais* outside Banten. This meant that the revolutionary movement was no longer confined to the small circle of rebel leaders' disciples in North Banten; a great step towards the realization of the idea of a general revolt as put forward by Hadji Mardjuki.⁴⁰ At this conference it was not, however, possible as yet to fix the date for unleashing the revolution. All the men present — their number was greater than ever before — realized that the preparations for open rebellion were by no means complete. The period of about one year that preceded the outbreak of the rebellion was marked by vigorous propaganda, the intensification of preparatory activities, and the closing of the ranks. The role of Hadji Wasid came more and more to the fore. In this connection, we will continue our account of Hadji

³⁹ See *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1192; *maleman* refers to the celebration held on the 21st, 23rd, 25th, 27th, and 29th of the month *Puasa* (*Ramadan*); see also Geertz (1960), p. 78.

⁴⁰ Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Sept. 4, 1889, no. 1079. For the idea of a general revolt, see above, p. 188.

Wasid's action before entering into a more detailed discussion of the general preparations.

It may easily be imagined that the state of affairs as described above had a moral effect on Hadji Wasid's mentality and attitude. In this same period Hadji Wasid was entangled in certain provoking affairs. These were profitable to him in that they gained him greater popularity, and his personality gradually became the main point of the movement. In consequence, the centre of agitation shifted from the east to the west, i.e. from Tanara and its environment to Bedji and its surroundings. In September 1887 Hadji Wasid was summoned by the *Wedana* of Kramat Watu to account for failing to keep clean the garden of his third wife in Bodjonegoro. As soon as his *murids* learned about this summons, they declared themselves ready to escort him to Kramat Watu. Hadji Mohamad Anwar, an intimate friend and confidant of Hadji Wasid, was sent ahead to the *wedana*.⁴¹ The latter promised not to summon Hadji Wasid for trial on condition that the garden was kept clean in future. Hadji Wasid saw to this, but could never forget and forgive what the *wedana* had done to him. Actually, this case enhanced his prestige tremendously in the eyes of his disciples.⁴²

A few months after this incident another trial took place in which Hadji Wasid was directly involved. On 16 November, 1887, according to the verdict of the district court, a certain Abas was found guilty of having cut down a tree which he knew belonged to another man. He was sentenced to fourteen days' forced labour. On 18 May, 1888, this sentence was nullified by the High Court because of lack of evidence. Nobody but Hadji Wasid was pleased with this outcome. Why? The affair was undoubtedly of great importance, for the ins and outs of the case had a great effect on the course of the rebellious movement. There were questions which puzzled the officials of the central government. It was strange that the investigation had been limited to the question to whom the tree belonged, to Abas or to his neighbour, Nji Armah. It was doubted whether Abas had actually cut down the tree. Why had Hadji Wasid not been summoned to testify against Abas' statement, and to reveal that Abas had sold the tree not to Samidin but to Hadji Wasid? According to the testimony of some witnesses, including Riman and Djamil, Hadji Wasid had been among the group of people

⁴¹ For the role played by H. Abdulsalam from Bedji in gathering about 300 *murids* to escort H. Wasid, see P.V. May 1, 1889, in Exh. June 24, 1889, no. 76.

⁴² Report DDI, pp. 204-205.

— about 25 in number — who on Monday, the sixth of the month *Muharam*, cut down the *kepuh*-tree owned by Nji Armah.⁴³ In contradiction to this testimony, Abas testified in court before the assistant *wedana* that he had sold the tree to Samidin for the price of four guilders. In his report the Director of the Department of Interior put forward a reconstruction of the case, which can be epitomized as follows: the *kepuh*-tree in question was on Nji Armah's land, but stood just on the spot bordering on Abas' field. It was regarded as a holy tree with supernatural power, and people came to bring it offerings and to worship it. It is not surprising that orthodox Muslims took offence at this idolatry, and one day Hadji Wasid and his disciples, among whom was Samidin, came to cut down the tree. The Assistant *Wedana* of Krapjak was notified of this by the village head. One month later a charge was brought by Nji Armah to the *djaksa*, a relative of the Assistant *Wedana* of Krapjak, and a sworn enemy of Hadji Wasid. It is quite understandable that Hadji Wasid regarded this case as an attempt on the part of the *djaksa* to have him sentenced. He tried to prevent this by having both Samidin and Abas testify that the latter had sold the tree to the former and not to Hadji Wasid. Hadji Wasid did not even want to act as a witness in the case. In response to the *djaksa*'s summons he obstinately refused to be put into the witness stand. This elicited the *djaksa*'s insulting remark: "What kind of a *hadji* is he?"⁴⁴ It is quite natural that such disrespectful treatment aroused feelings of hatred and vengeance in Hadji Wasid. Moreover, the alleged rude intrusion into religious matters by government officials was bitterly resented. The grievances could be exploited as anti-government propaganda.

The rebel leaders clearly had other effective means at their disposal by which they could do great damage to the prestige of the civil servants. In this connection the successful intimidation mentioned above may be pointed to as a clear instance of undisputed power of the *kjais* over the people on the one hand, and the loss of control by government authorities on the other. From this point of view, the two affairs dealt with above are of great significance; they represent the power struggle between the religious and the secular élite, or between the *kjais* and/or *hadjis* and the *prijajis*. Furthermore, the Abas affair had a direct bearing on the time of the outbreak and to a certain extent also on the

⁴³ Report DDI, pp. 205-207.

⁴⁴ Report DDI, p. 211.

outcome of the rebellion. The date of the outbreak of the revolt was advanced at the urgent request of Hadji Wasid, who was afraid that he might be summoned to appear before court in connection with the second trial of the Abas case some time in the beginning of July, 1888. Hadji Wasid's proposal was to stage the revolt in the beginning of that month. What the consequences of this design will be examined later on. For the moment we are mainly concerned with the preparatory activities of the plotters.

THE SPREAD OF REVOLUTIONARY FERVOUR AND SOME PREPARATORY ACTIVITIES

In the first place it must be noted that the present author is assuming that preparations were indeed made for the rebellion; that the rebel leaders had certain goals, and that the preparations lasted many months. Opinions on the question of the preparatory activities must necessarily remain cautious. We have adhered to the account of the secret preparations as recorded in official reports — especially the report of the Controller of Serang, de Chauvigny de Blot — and in court records. But it must be borne in mind that these accounts are based upon evidence given by witnesses, who may have been biased in various ways. We know that no cross-examination of certain witnesses — e.g. government spies who acted as witnesses — took place and that perjuries were committed.⁴⁵ An examination of the testimony of one of the witnesses — wife of one of the victims — revealed that her memory played her tricks and that her testimony must be considered uncorroborated.⁴⁶ Snouck Hurgronje was quite sceptical about the value of the testimonies given by these untrustworthy witnesses, and accordingly discredited the controller's account of the development of the last phase of the plot, an account which seems to be based largely on evidence given by witnesses of dubious character.⁴⁷ Furthermore, Snouck Hurgronje did not agree with the controller's view of the religious movement in Banten, although he had to admit that the controller disclosed some significant facts.⁴⁸

It is extremely difficult to judge how much weight should be attached to this unfavourable judgment of the controller's account, a record

⁴⁵ Snouck Hurgronje's note of Aug. 15, 1892; see also A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 234.

⁴⁶ Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2 (1924), p. 426.

⁴⁷ Missive from Snouck Hurgronje to the Gov. Gen., June 7, 1889; *passim*; see also his note of August 15, 1892, *passim*.

⁴⁸ *Ibidem*; also in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), p. 1993.

upon which, as far as the factual data in relation to the events are concerned, our narrative of the preparatory activities of the rebellion leans heavily. As the rebels left no records, and practically no condemned rebels revealed the truth, it is almost impossible to cross-examine the testimonies presented in government records.⁴⁹ In view of this, one must be on one's guard against rash assertions that all the persons whose names were listed in official reports or court records were active participants in the rebellion. As, moreover, perjury was committed more than once, the evidence cannot always be trusted; yet, in spite of false evidence it may be assumed that meetings of rebel chiefs were held frequently. As regards events during the period of preparation, the report of the controller remains of interest since the facts stated, especially those related to these events, are harmonious with one another, and do not contradict other details we already know from other informants, e.g. civil servants, people interrogated, etc.⁵⁰ Furthermore, there are no refutations based on more reliable data. Without regarding the report of the controller as conclusive, we can accept the sequence of events as presented in it, as a framework into which the preparatory activities of the plotters may be cast.

After this digression we have to take up the story of the conspiracy. In the course of the last four months of 1887 the activities of the conspirators became feverish: they held meetings, travelled and propagated their cause on the one hand, and trained the disciples in martial skill on the other. By this time, rebellious fervour had gripped the members of the *tarekat*.

From the second to the fifth of September 1887, a big wedding feast was held by Hadji Tubagus Umar, father-in-law of the Head *Panghulu* of Serang, Hadji Mohamad Arsad.⁵¹ The former was a son of Tubagus

⁴⁹ See the minutes of the court trials, which are listed in Chap. VIII under note 96; the government spies who gave testimony remained anonymous; see their statements in Exh. June 24, 1889, no. 76. For the difficulty of getting information from the people, see Snouck Hurgronje in his missive to the Gov. Gen., June 6, 1904, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), pp. 1959-1960.

⁵⁰ See Report DDI, Appendixes D and H; Appendix H is included in this work, see Appendix VIII. For confessions made by captives, see Chap. VIII under note 120 and 125.

⁵¹ H. Mohamad Arsad's role in the insurrectionary movements of 1888 and May 1889 was quite controversial; see Missive of the Resident of Banten, May 21, 1889, no. 152, in MR 1889, no. 368; see also Missive of the Regent of Serang, May 15, 1889, no. 7, in MR 1889, no. 368. For the accusation levelled against H. Mohamad Arsad, see P.V. June 3, 1889, in Exh. July 24, 1889, no. 77. The man who made a plea for his rehabilitation

Baudjaja, the late *Patih* of Tjaringin.⁵² He was also a relative of the wife of Hadji R. A. Prawiranegara, who was the father-in-law of the Regent of Serang. With such distinguished affiliations, it is not surprising that Hadji Tubagus Umar was quite influential and highly esteemed. Besides all the famed *kjais* of Banten, many others were invited from far and wide, e.g. from Tangerang, Batavia, Bogor, Prijangan, and even from Ponorogo.⁵³ Of course, the top leaders in the conspiracy — Hadji Tubagus Ismail, Hadji Mardjuki, and Hadji Wasid — were among them. During the three days of festivity they had ample time and opportunity to discuss their plan. They were agreed that the movement had already made good progress, and decided to extend the preparations for the revolt to the people outside the *tarekat*. The place and date of the outbreak of the rebellion had to be kept rather vague. It is noteworthy that the series of conferences held during the wedding feast were presided over by Hadji Mardjuki. He did not omit to stress that their propaganda had not as yet met with much success outside Banten. As he advocated a general rebellion over a large part of the Archipelago, he therefore took upon himself the task of travelling to other parts of Java to propagate the plan. On that occasion he also appointed Hadji Mohamad Arsad Tawil as his representative. Other prominent *kjais* from North Banten were in full agreement with his plan and lent him warm support. It is very likely that the discussions had not been rounded off when the guests left Hadji Tubagus Umar's home.

On 29 September, 1887, the *kjais* of Banten convened for the second time within less than a month in Bedji, as the guests of Hadji Wasid.⁵⁴ This time their primary concern was the problem of the collection of arms. The leaders were of the opinion that they should not try to get guns, for the following reasons: firstly, the majority of the population

was Snouck Hurgronje himself; see his article in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2 (1924), pp. 417-436. For Mohamad Arsad's appointment as Head *Panghulu* of the Court in Serang, see O.I.B. Aug. 25, 1887, no. 21.

⁵² O.I.B. March 5, 1860, no. 12.

⁵³ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1154; cf. Missive of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16. Close associates of H. Mardjuki and H. Wasid were H. Abubakar from Kaganteran, H. Asnawi from Bendung Lampujang, H. Iskak from Sanedja, H. Tubagus Ismail from Gulatjir, H. Mohamad Arsad, the Head *Panghulu* of Serang, H. Mohamad Arsad Tawil from Tanara, and H. Achmad, the *Panghulu* of Tanara. The policy of banishing all those who had taken part in the festivities on the ground that their attendance showed that they must have been members of the conspiracy has been criticized by Snouck Hurgronje, see his missive to the Gov. Gen., June 7, 1889.

⁵⁴ Missive from Snouck Hurgronje to the Gov. Gen., June 7, 1889.

could not handle such a weapon; secondly, the importation of guns could hardly be hidden from government authorities; thirdly, they felt that they could simply rely on *klewangs* (swords) for they believed that the final victory in the coming Holy War was theirs.⁵⁵

The insurrectionary activities of the last quarter of 1887 and the first half of 1888 were characterized by the following factors: (1) the intensification of the training in *pentjak* (fencing); (2) the collection and manufacture of arms; (3) the continuation of propaganda outside Banten. Other activities were continued, such as agitating the people by arousing their enthusiasm with the preaching of prophecies and the doctrine of the Holy War, and encouraging them to carry amulets and to partake in religious gatherings. In fact, the movement was energetically taken in hand and accelerated, a tangible proof of which was the frequency of the meetings held by the rebel leaders: almost every week. Before dealing with these conferences we shall first discuss the three factors mentioned above.

Pentjak — fencing or wrestling — constituted a substantial part of *pesantren* education in Banten in those days. For many years it had been a popular sport in the villages, where people used to arrange *pentjak* matches on moonlit nights. This innocent popular entertainment never had and never would be suspected by the government officials. But at the same time people were also training themselves to fence with *klewangs* inside their homes. It could easily be observed during the period in question that *pentjak* rapidly gained in popularity. Obviously, this popular sport served as a screen to cover the chief training of partisans in martial skill.⁵⁶

With regard to the collecting of arms, these were in part manufactured by local smiths, while another part of the supply of clandestine arms was obtained elsewhere, mostly from Batavia. A certain Hadji Abdul-salam from Bodjonegoro was entrusted with purchasing weapons in Batavia. This was decided at a meeting of *kjais* held in Hadji Abdul-salam's house on a Monday in October 1887.⁵⁷ In the months that

⁵⁵ IG (1891), no. 2, pp. 1154-1155. This decision does not necessarily contradict H. Mardjuki's statement referred to above, since he only made mention of the collection of weapons — not specifically fire-arms — as an essential part of the preparations for revolt; see Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Sept. 4, 1889, no. 1079.

⁵⁶ IG (1891), no. 2, p. 1155; see also A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 24, where mention was also made of the so-called *udjungan*, i.e. fencing with sticks.

⁵⁷ See P.V. Apr. 9, 1889; see also P.V. May 1, 1889; present were H. Wasid, H. Usman, H. Sapiudin of Leuwibeureum, H. Nasiman of Kaligandu, H.

followed, Hadji Abdulsalam travelled back and forth between Bodjonegoro and Batavia or Lampung. It is regrettable that our information about the results of these trips is poor, but we are given greater elucidation of his activities during the last few weeks preceding the outbreak of the revolt. As was evident from the testimony given by Sangid, Kamim and Djapan,⁵⁸ the clandestine transportation of weapons allegedly went on until the last few days before the uprising. On 18 June, 1888, Hadji Abdulsalam came back from Batavia; two days later he conferred with Hadji Wasid, Hadji Usman, and Hadji Sapiudin, and learned that Hadji Wasid would start the revolt after the *Lebaran Hadji*, i.e. in September 1888.⁵⁹ Once again he was ordered to purchase weapons in Batavia, together with Hadji Dulgani. On 22 June he therefore headed for Batavia, and after staying for about eight days he returned to Bodjonegoro again, taking with him about 75 *goloks* (daggers). The actual number of all the clandestine weapons that he had transported in his earlier trips was not revealed.

According to the testimonies Hadji Abdulsalam was in charge of supplying clandestine weapons; he was aided by Hadji Dulgani and Hadji Usman. They had contact with Hadji Tjamang of Pakodjan, Batavia, who provided hospitable lodgings for *kjais* from outside Batavia.⁶⁰ Hadji Abdulsalam was not actually of Bantenese origin; he came from Demak and had settled in Bodjonegoro many years ago. He was regarded as one of the most influential *hadjis* in Bodjonegoro and its surroundings, partly because he was more educated than most of his fellow-villagers, and partly because he could be reckoned among the prominent — if not the most prominent — confidants of Hadji Wasid.⁶¹ It was suspected that he himself had been directly involved in the demonstration in Kramat Watu referred to above, simply by assembling

Alpian of Dukuhmalang, H. Mohamad Arip of Bodjonegoro and H. Dulgani of Bedji.

⁵⁸ See P.V. Apr. 9, 1889. In a letter to the Resident of Banten, H. Abdulsalam refuted the charges made against him by furnishing an alibi for the period of the rebellion; see H. Abdulsalam's letter, undated, in Exh. June 7, 1889, no. 51.

⁵⁹ P.V. May 1, 1888; for the special significance of the *Lebaran Hadji* in 1888, which was celebrated as a *hadj akbar*, see the advice of Snouck Hurgronje, Sept. 7, 1888 in Vb. Sept. 11, 1888, no. 44; cf. Groneman (1891), pp. 68-69; also Vredenburg, in *BKI*, Vol. CXVIII (1962), p. 147.

⁶⁰ P.V. May 1, 1889. In this section of the lawsuit records, mention was made of H. Sapir from Bedji and H. Djupri from Tjekek (Pandeglang) who also lodged in H. Tjamang's house.

⁶¹ See footnote of the *Proces Verbaal* of 9 April, 1889.

Hadji Wasid's disciples and inciting them to rebel.⁶²

We have no certainty whether meetings were held during the period between that conference on a Monday in October 1887 and the middle of February 1888. But there is evidence which indicates that some of the leaders were quite active outside Banten during this period. In the last part of 1887 and the first half of 1888, Hadji Mardjuki several times visited *kjais* in Tangerang, Bogor, Prijangan, and even Ponorogo,⁶³ either alone or accompanied by other *kjais*. Unfortunately we know almost nothing of the subject of their discussions. The meetings themselves were usually arranged simultaneously with the celebration of *sedekahs*, so that they did not attract the vigilant eye of the civil servants. The coming Holy War was clearly the main topic in the talks. A revealing instance was the *sedekah* held in Pasilian (Tangerang), some time in May 1888. Besides Hadji Mardjuki, Hadji Wasid, Hadji Iskak and Hadji Usman were present.⁶⁴ When Hadji Wasid was asked which commandment was the most important, he told the audience that — as he put it — “*Sabil hati atawa Sabil perang*” was of primary importance.⁶⁵ Then a certain Baung argued that it was impossible to observe this, since the people were not sufficiently equipped with arms. In the same month another meeting of *kjais* was held in Lontar in the same district. It was rumoured that the number of *kjais* enlisted as participants of the coming rebellion amounted to 19 in Tangerang and 15 in Bogor.⁶⁶ Although *tarekat* members were to be found in Batavia, the movement did not gain ground there.⁶⁷ People like Hadji Tjamang

⁶² P.V. May 1, 1889; see above, note 41.

⁶³ See Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16; circular letter from the General Secretary, June 4, 1889; Missive of the Resident of Batavia, July 24, 1889 L^a T⁴, in MR 1889, no. 515; Missive of the Resident of Madiun, Sept. 20, 1889, L^a U¹ in MR 1889, no. 768. The latter refers to a certain religious teacher, Sungeb, who was later also known as H. Mardjuki. He was of Bantenese origin, settled in Blimbing (Blitar) and after having moved twice he returned to Banten in 1888. The identification of this Hadji with Hadji Mardjuki is incompatible with the report of the Controller of Serang and that of the Consul of Djeddah. For another theory on H. Mardjuki's whereabouts after the Tjilegon rising, see Henny's note on the Satariah *tarekat*, in *IG* (1921), no. 2, pp. 808-830.

⁶⁴ Missive of the Resident of Batavia, July 24, 1889, L^a T⁴; another meeting was reported to have taken place in the same month, in the hamlet Lontar (Serang Dalem), in the district Blaradja (Tangerang).

⁶⁵ *Ibidem*; H. Wasid's answer means: “The war of the heart or the Holy War”.

⁶⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁷ *Ibidem*; see also Chap. V, p. 161; no *kjais* were to be found in Batavia at that time; the only *kjai*, Kjai Mansur from Pademangan, in Senen, had

and Hadji Abdulmadjit from Kebondjeruk (Manggabesar) presumably sympathized with many leaders of the movement personally, but there is no evidence that they were involved in the plot. As previously mentioned, Hadji Mardjuki also visited Ponorogo, where at his instigation meetings of *kjais* took place. In this connection it should also be borne in mind that one of Hadji Mardjuki's wives lived in that area.⁶⁸ We need not speculate about his main motivation for going to Ponorogo. Whatever the case may have been, influences of the rebellious movement were at work there, as evidenced by the fact that *kjais* from this area attended one of the gatherings in Banten.⁶⁹

THE LAST SIX MONTHS OF PREPARATION

Let us now return to the developments at the centre of the movement, where activities reached a great intensity in the next six months. The revolutionary fervour was growing by the day, the *kjais* and their disciples were in a state of great unrest: they considered it a time most favourable for carrying out a rebellion successfully. The strategy, tactics, and timing of the revolt urgently needed planning. For this reason the leaders convened frequently in order to map the course of action to be taken collectively and in co-ordination. The records tell us that they came together at least three times a month as from the middle of February 1888. They held the meetings in the homes of prominent *kjais* in North Banten; once in a while they gathered in Tangerang. As may be expected, Hadji Mardjuki and Hadji Wasid, as the chief leaders, were always present.⁷⁰

Of special significance was the meeting of the 12th of the month *Ruwah*, i.e. 22 April 1888, held in Hadji Wasid's home in Bedji.⁷¹ On

died shortly before. The head of the Naksibandiah *tarekat* was H. Abdulmadjit, Head *Panghulu* of the court of Djakarta, who lived in Kebondjeruk, in the district Manggabesar; a prominent member was R.M. Prawiradinigrat, Head *Djaksa* in Batavia. H. Tjamang was of Bantenese origin, but had lived in Djakarta for many years. The *tarekat* was keenly opposed by Sajid Usman from Djati Petamburan, referred to in Chap. V.; see Snouck Hurgronje in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 1 (1924), pp. 71-85.

⁶⁸ Missive of the Resident of Madiun, Sept. 20, 1889, L^a U¹; cf. Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16. In this respect the two documents correspond with each other.

⁶⁹ See above, with special reference to the meeting in H. Umar's house, pp. 194-195; however, no single name of a *kjai* or *hadji* from Ponorogo appears on the list of *hadjis* in *IG* (1891), no. 2, pp. 1156-1157.

⁷⁰ Ibidem; compare with the names appearing in Appendix VI.

⁷¹ P.V. May 1, 1889; see also Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16 and *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1157.

that occasion the rebels were entertained at a sumptuous feast. At the end of the festivity, the three hundred guests gathered in the mosque, where the *kjais* and their disciples swore an oath: firstly, that they would take part in the Holy War; secondly, that those who broke their promise, would be regarded as *kafirs* (infidels); thirdly, that they would not reveal the plan to outsiders.⁷²

Shortly after that, at the end of April 1888, the *kjais* again convened, in Kaloran, where the decision was taken that the outbreak of the rebellion would take place sometime in the month *Sura* (September 1888). It was also decided that Hadji Wasid, Hadji Iskak, Hadji Tubagus Ismail and other *kjais* of the district of Tjilegon and Kramat Watu would be in charge of the attack on Tjilegon; Hadji Mohamad Asik and the *kjais* of Trumbu, together with Hadji Muhidin, Hadji Abubakar and other *kjais* of the district of Serang, Tjiruas and Ondar Andir would make the assault on Serang and occupy the garrison. Hadji Mardjuki and Hadji Asnawi would attack in the district of Tanara and Tjikandi, while Hadji Sapiudin and Hadji Kasiman would take Anjer. After each group had finished their task in the appointed region, they would all head straight for Serang where the decisive battle would be fought. They solemnly pledged to kill all Europeans and all government authorities. Other decisions that were taken concerned the following points: for every forty men a group leader would be appointed; while clothes would be collected and worn in battle; all those who had taken the vow would sign its written confirmation.⁷³

The question that arises is how the majority of the Banten population and government officials could have been kept ignorant of the movement, while the above mentioned preparations were underway. As early as the beginning of 1888, rumours were circulating among the adepts, of the Kadiriah *tarekat* that a Holy War was near at hand, yet the people knew nothing of its date and place and against whom it would be launched.⁷⁴ At the end of March 1888, after the meeting in Bedji and about a hundred days before the outbreak of the revolt, the expectation became more ardent in large circles.⁷⁵ What is puzzling is that there were no indications of any leakage of information about the plotters' plans which reached government officials or their spies. After

⁷² Ibidem; see also P.V. June 3, 1889.

⁷³ P.V. May 1, 1889; Report of the Regent of Serang, undated, in Exh. July 24, 1889, no. 77.

⁷⁴ Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16.

⁷⁵ P.V. May 1, 1889.

the rebellion it was rumoured that many prominent Bantenese officials must have known what was brewing, and even that they had lent themselves to the conspiracy.⁷⁶ But we are running ahead of our story. Meanwhile the agitation was mounting by the day, and people were urged to sharpen their *klewangs* because a great rising was near at hand, in which all government authorities must be killed.⁷⁷ The meetings and journeys of the *kjais* went on during the two months that followed, *Puasa* and *Sawal* — i.e. from 11 May until 9 July, 1888 — reaching their apex between the middle of June and the outbreak of the rising. It was reported that some time in May 1888, in the fasting period — the month *Puasa* — a big conference was held in Kaloran, presided over by Hadji Mardjuki.⁷⁸ In that same month he went eastwards for about a fortnight together with Hadji Tubagus Ismail, visiting various places, e.g. Bandung.⁷⁹ At about the time that people were busily engaged in preparations for celebrating the end of the period of fasting, Hadji Wasid was told that he would probably have to appear in court in the beginning of July 1888 in connection with the second trial of the Abas case. Panic-stricken by this news, Hadji Wasid wanted to have the date of the rebellion advanced, whatever happened. It must be recalled that no definite date had as yet been named for the outbreak of the revolt; no consensus had been reached concerning an exact date. Hadji Mardjuki insisted that the revolt should not be started before the month of *Sura* (September 1888), while Hadji Wasid did his utmost to persuade his friends to support him in having the hour of the uprising appointed for an earlier date, namely the middle of the month of *Hadji* (*Besar*) on 23 August, 1888.⁸⁰ The law-suit concerning the Abas case resembled a political bomb-shell, which induced Hadji Wasid and his comrades to advance the date of the revolt. They were afraid that

⁷⁶ The following records refer to the ambivalent attitude of the Regent of Serang, Gondokusumo. Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16; Missive of the Director of the Department of Interior, July 20, 1889, no. 3895, in MR 1889, no. 597; cf. Snouck Hurgronje's note of Aug. 15, 1892. See also *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 110; A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 232-235; *Insulinde*, Jan. 7, 1896.

⁷⁷ Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16; Report DDI, Appendix H.

⁷⁸ P.V. May 1, 1889.

⁷⁹ *Ibidem*; accompanied by H. Mohamad Sangadeli, H. Tubagus Ismail seems to have visited certain *kjais* in Tangerang, in the environment of Djakarta, in Bandung and in Tjiandjur.

⁸⁰ P.V. May 1, 1889; Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16; also *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1158.

government officials had already discovered their conspiracy. This development had not been foreseen by the rebel leaders, so they had to confer and make critical decisions.

On 15 June, 1888, or the fifth of *Sawal*, certain prominent leaders met in Hadji Wasid's home in Bedji, on which occasion they mainly discussed the question of the date of the revolt. Besides the host, Hadji Tubagus Ismail, Hadji Abubakar, Hadji Iskak, Hadji Usman and Hadji Mardjuki were present.⁸¹ It was agreed that the rebellion was to start on July 12, on the third of *Dulkaidah*. All the *kjais* who would be participating would be notified of a big convention, scheduled for 22 June or the twelfth of *Sawal*. On that occasion the *kjais* would be persuaded that it was necessary to hoist the banner of insurrection on the third of *Dulkaidah*.⁸² Hadji Mardjuki made it clear that he felt that he had to vote against the adoption of this premature date, and told the other leaders that he would leave Banten before the outbreak of the revolt, and return to Mecca. Should the rebellion succeed, then he might invite Sjech (Shaik) Abdul Karim and Sjech Nawawi to come over to Banten and joint in the Holy War.⁸³ A few days later he left Banten, accompanied by his wife and children, taking with him a large amount of cash, which according to rumours amounted to about twenty thousand guilders.⁸⁴ Hadji Usman from Tunggak, his parents-in-law, Hadji Seran and his wife, Hadji Abdulrachman, Hadji Abdulkarim, and about fifty people from Tanara accompanied the *kjai* to Batavia.⁸⁵ One of his last pious deeds before he left was to pronounce the benediction over the white clothes to be worn in the war. This ceremony took place in the mosque at Tanara.⁸⁶

Meanwhile convocations for the big gathering were sent to all the *kjais* in Banten; Hadji Erab and Hadji Dullah brought the message to, the *kjais* of Trumbu, Bendung and Serang; Hadji Saban was the messenger who was sent to the *kjais* of Kapuren, Tjigohong, Bunar,

⁸¹ Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16; according to the Controller the date of the meeting was 16 June; 20 *hadjis* from Tjilegon were present; see also *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1159.

⁸² *Ibidem*.

⁸³ Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Sept. 4, 1889, no. 1079; cf. *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1159.

⁸⁴ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1159.

⁸⁵ Letter from H. Abdulsalam to the Resident of Banten, undated, in Exh. June 7, 1889, no. 51.

⁸⁶ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1159; for an account of the *Djawah* colony, in which H. Mardjuki occupied a prominent place, see *IG* (1915), no. 1, pp. 538-540.

Palembangan, Pamarajan, Kolelet and Baros. Furthermore, Bahok from Wanasaba delivered the letters to the *kjais* of Bendung Lampujang, Tanara, Mandaja, Tegalkunir, Banjawah and Kemanisan. Hadji Halim was sent to Tjimanuk, while Hadji Kasiman proceeded to Anjer. Hadji Tubagus Ismail was charged with announcing the plan to the *sentanas*.⁸⁷ All the *kjais* were not merely informed of the date on which the outbreak of the revolt was to take place; their opinions were also asked.

On the 12th of Sawal, i.e. 22 June 1888, the big convention took place in Bedji. It was attended by about sixty *kjais* and their close following; mostly from the *afdelingen* of Anjer and Serang. Actually, this date had been chosen because it was the founder's anniversary, on which occasion Kadiriah *tarekat* members used to arrange an elaborate annual celebration with special processions, recitations and *dikirs*. This time the festivities were opened with a big *slametan* (a ritual feast meal) for which nine goats had been slaughtered.⁸⁸ After the *slametan*, the feasting *kjais* proceeded to the great mosque of Bedji where the conference was held and the oaths of fealty and loyalty were sworn.⁸⁹ It was not to be expected that the date of the revolt as proposed in the meeting of 15 June would be adopted by a unanimous resolution, since some of those present were not prepared to co-operate in advancing it. Hadji Wasid and Hadji Iskak, however, made an overbearing appeal that the revolt be started without further delay: any postponement, they said, could only harm the holy cause and endanger the position of the plotters. Finally the issue was resolved in Hadji Wasid's favour. In addition it should be remarked that the dissenters were almost all *kjais* from the *afdeling* of Serang, whose repudiation of Hadji Wasid's proposal was apparently the result of the sudden departure of Hadji Mardjuki. As we already know, the latter, being the special envoy of Sjech Abdul Karim, exerted superior power among the religious leaders, particularly in the north-eastern part of Banten. Hadji Wasid was certainly not the person to be discouraged by this split; on the contrary, he immediately engaged busily in lobbying, pleading everywhere for his plan. Later, an agreement with the dissenters was reached, which means that they yielded to Hadji Wasid's persuasions.

In spite of his success in modifying the opinion of his hesitant comrades, Hadji Wasid's mind was still not set at ease. In his opinion,

⁸⁷ *IG* (1891), no. 2, pp. 1159-1160.

⁸⁸ P.V. May 1, 1889.

⁸⁹ *Ibidem*.

12 July was still too late as a date, for the simple reason that he personally felt the need to start the revolt as soon as possible. The day of the law suit drew nearer; it was, in fact, a time of intense expectation for Hadji Wasid. With all his might he pressed for an early start of the rebellion. After his return from the *afdeling* of Serang, he had a meeting with Hadji Abubakar, Hadji Sangadeli and Hadji Mohamad Arsad — the Head *Panghulu* of Serang — in order to deliberate anew on the date of the outbreak of the revolt. Hadji Wasid and Hadji Abubakar contended that by the end of *Sawal*, rebellious fervour would already have gripped the *murids*, so that government officials might be alarmed and put an end to the whole revolutionary design. The two of them had previously determined the proper date for proclaiming the revolt according to the traditional prognostical system.⁹⁰ The date that they had chosen as the correct one was Monday, the 29th of the month *Sawal* or 9 July, 1888.⁹¹

Incidentally, at this very time rumours were circulating, particularly in Bedji and environment, that the government authorities had issued a prohibition against praying the *adhan* and performing the *dikir*. During a court hearing about half a year later,⁹² a certain Hadji Makid was charged with having broadcasted this provocative news. It is interesting to know how it all came about. Hadji Makid's garden bordered on that of the Assistant Resident of Tjilegon, Gubbels. He was in possession of a *langgar* where his neighbours and friends came to say their daily prayers and to perform the *dikirs*. From the bamboo minaret — about 30 feet high — one of the devotees used to call the *adhan* five times a day. It must be remembered that Gubbels' wife suffered from chronic headaches at that time, so that the *adhan* and the prayers were annoying to her.⁹³ Her husband had told Hadji Makid not to be so noisy in performing the religious rituals. He had also made objections to the *dikirs* which usually went on far into the night. The Patih, Raden Penna, in conveying the order of the Assistant Resident to Hadji Makid, is reported to have made the insulting remark "that it was not necessary

⁹⁰ See Geertz (1960), pp. 30-35, where he deals with the Javanese prognostical system; also van Hien, Vol. I (1934), pp. 110-188.

⁹¹ Report DDI, Appendix D; Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16.

⁹² P.V. Dec. 6, 1888, in Exh. Jan. 28, 1889, no. 74; for the location of H. Makid's house with respect to that of the Assistant Resident, see the map of Tjilegon.

⁹³ See a note from Raden Penna of Dec. 6, 1888, in Exh. Jan. 18, 1889, no. 74.

to pray so loudly, not only because they hindered their neighbours, but also because God was not deaf." ⁹⁴ To complete the list of grievances of the people particularly with regard to religious affairs: people were not allowed to celebrate weddings and circumcisions with sumptuous processions, recitations, *gamelan* music and dancing performances.⁹⁵ It is quite natural that such issues made grievances weigh heavily at a time when religious sentiments ran high; feelings of hatred towards the infidels could be aroused intentionally.

In the meantime, many prominent civil servants from Banten, both European and Bantenese, were away from their posts, for they were attending the wedding festivities held by the Regent of Pandeglang from 28 June to 1 July, 1888.⁹⁶ The regent's son, Raden Padmadiningrat, was marrying the daughter of the Regent of Serang.⁹⁷ The ceremonies were as elaborate as could be. It is remarkable that among the spectators of the public games performed during the festivities many *kjais* were to be found, one of whom was Hadji Sahib, a prominent religious leader in the area.⁹⁸ One wonders whether this gorgeous wedding celebration in Pandeglang did not contribute to distracting the officials' attention from the symptoms of the forthcoming disturbances in their respective regions. At that time there was certainly widespread unrest among the population in the regency of Pandeglang, caused by the rumours that a *naga* (a mythical snake) was roaming the area, bringing illness and bad luck to the people.⁹⁹ It is certainly not easy to comprehend what this rumour was all about, but it is obvious enough that the prevailing unrest among the population contributed to a considerable extent to the preparation of favourable conditions for rebellion in the area.

THE EVE OF THE REBELLION

The week preceding the outbreak of the revolt was a week of throbbing activity, in which last minute meetings were held and last minute decisions and arrangements made. An account of these subterranean activities of the rebels must necessarily be fragmentary, since a great many of them went unrecorded. As appears from the available records, the necessary preparations were advanced under the stress of intense

⁹⁴ Report DDI, p. 202.

⁹⁵ Report DDI, p. 161.

⁹⁶ *Java Bode*, July 11, 1888; *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 700-702; see also A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 33-36.

⁹⁷ See Appendix III.

⁹⁸ *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 700-712.

⁹⁹ A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 33-36.

expectation in the course of that week. On 30 June, Hadji Muhidin from Tjipeutjang left for Bedji, accompanied by Mohamad Sadik and by Hadji Dullatip from Daragen, at the request of Hadji Wasid. The next day, Sunday the first of July, he arrived in Bedji where he had a meeting with Hadji Wasid, on which occasion he was appointed *panglima perang* (commander).¹⁰⁰ On his return trip he visited Hadji Mohamad from Baros and then proceeded to Trumbu, where on 2 July, i.e. Monday night, he conferred with other *kjais*, and discussed the measures to be taken before starting the revolt. As revealed later, it was also decided at this meeting that the *kjais* of Trumbu together with Hadji Mohamad Sadik from Bendung and Hadji Muhidin from Tjipeutjang would attack Serang.¹⁰¹

One of the *kjais* present at this meeting in Trumbu was Hadji Abdurrachman from Kapuren (Tjiruas). The next day, 3 July, he called a meeting at his home in Kapuren, in which the participants included Tanasi, Madin, Mudaram, Sarip, Ramidin, Muslim, Sahib, Dassim, Hadji Lasmana, Djalil, Maung and Ming Mulafar, all from Kapuren; Salli from Pangalawar, Musa from Kiawar; Deassen, Radi, Topong and Ramai, from Tjiruas; and Hadji Samud, Hadji Saleh and Samud, from Karantunan.¹⁰² Hadji Abdurrachman gave a report on the meeting in Trumbu, adding that he had been charged with murdering the *Wedana* of Tjiruas, the Assistant *Wedana* of Kalodran, and the *Panghulu* of the sub-district, after he had finished his task in Serang. He subsequently ordered those present to sharpen their *goloks*, and distribute *djimats* and white clothes. Two days after the meeting, on 5 July, Hadji Abdurrachman received a letter from Hadji Wasid, the contents of which are supposed to have had something to do with preparatory activities and the date of the outbreak of the rebellion. It is quite probable that the contents were directly connected with Hadji Abdurrachman's trip the next day, Friday the 6th of July. This was a pilgrimage to the holy grave in Tjigohong.¹⁰³ He was accompanied by the

¹⁰⁰ P.V. May 1, 1889.

¹⁰¹ Ibidem.

¹⁰² Ibidem.

¹⁰³ See testimony of spy D, in Exh. June 24, 1889, no. 76. This holy grave is not included in the list of holy places in the districts of Kramat Watu, Tjilegon and Anjer, see Appendix C of the Report of the Director of the Department of Interior. It is an age-old tradition to visit holy graves, either of forefathers or of regional saints or heroes, in order to obtain their blessings for important undertakings. In this case it need not necessarily be the grave of an Islamic saint.

panghulu of the village, Sani. On his return to Kapuren, he announced to his *murids* that the insurrection would be started on Monday, 9 July, 1888.¹⁰⁴ This deviation from the main line of the story was made to illustrate to a certain extent how decisions were communicated to lower leaders and how the rank and file were indoctrinated and equipped to be intrepidly ready for momentous action.

Towards the end of the week, on the evening of 5 July, some people from Ardjawinangun, about ten in number, came to Hadji Tubagus Ismail with the information that European and native officials were expected in Balagendung on Saturday, 7 July. On his way to Anjer, the Resident of Banten would make a stop in Balagendung and in Tjilegon. It was also reported that the Assistant Resident of Tjilegon, the Assistant Controller and the *Patih*, were to meet the Resident in Sajag and escort him on his tour through the *afdeling* of Anjer.¹⁰⁵ The group from Ardjawinangun urged Hadji Tubagus Ismail to allow them to kill these officials, but the *kjai* turned down their request, telling them that the day for revolt had not yet come. On Saturday, 7 July, while teaching his *murids* in his *langgar*, Hadji Wasid was interrupted by Hamim from Ardjawinangun, who brought the news that European and native officials were in Balagendung at that moment. Hamim saw in this fact, as he put it, "God's Providence to commence the revolt not in Tjilegon but in Medang Batu".¹⁰⁶ Hadji Wasid replied that he could not make any decision without consulting Hadji Tubagus Ismail. It seems that he was not inclined to have the rising start in Medang Batu, for he did not immediately go to Hadji Tubagus Ismail.

On that same Saturday, prominent *kjais* were invited to a feast held by Hadji Achija in Djombang Wetan. It was, indeed, a very welcome invitation, for under the guise of the festivities they had ample opportunity for last minute consultations. Participants in the deliberations were Hadji Sangid from Djaha, Hadji Sapiudin from Leuwibeureum, Hadji Madani from Tjiora, Hadji Halim from Tjibeber, Hadji Mahmud from Trate Udik, Hadji Iskak from Sanedja, Hadji Mohamad Arsad — the Head *Panghulu* of Serang — and Hadji Tubagus Kusen

¹⁰⁴ P.V. May 1, 1889; this record also mentions the fact that H. Mohamad Sangadeli had sent home his *murids* on July 7, because there would be a disturbance (*rusuh*) on the next Monday; see Missive of the Resident of Banten, May 2, 1889, no. 124, in Exh. June 24, 1889, no. 76; also *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1162.

¹⁰⁵ Report DDI, pp. 3-4.

¹⁰⁶ Report DDI, p. 5.

— the *Panghulu* of Tjilegon.¹⁰⁷ At about eleven o'clock that Saturday night, 7 July, a messenger from Nji Kamsidah — Hadji Iskak's wife — arrived to say that Hadji Wasid and Hadji Tubagus Ismail wanted to meet the feasting *kjais*. Shortly after midnight the *kjais* left Hadji Achija's house and went to Sanedja, where the meeting with the two top leaders of the revolt took place in Hadji Iskak's home. Besides the above mentioned *kjais*, many other rebel leaders attended the meeting, e.g. Hadji Abubakar, Hadji Muhidin, Hadji Asnawi, Hadji Sarman from Bengkung, and Hadji Achmad, the *Panghulu* of Tanara.¹⁰⁸ Remarkable was the absence of Hadji Mohamad Asik from Bendung, and the *kjais* from Trumbu, who had to start the revolt on Monday, the 29th of Sawal or 9 July, 1888. This decision would be conveyed to the leaders who had not participated in the meeting.

The next morning Hadji Wasid and Hadji Ismail proceeded to Wanasaba, where they conferred with certain *kjais* and *murids*, including Hadji Sangadeli from Kaloran. It is not known for certain how long that meeting lasted, but during the course of the day both leaders were to be found in Gulatjir at Hadji Tubagus Ismail's house. After the *magrib* prayers they left for Tjibeber, escorted by a number of disciples. A gathering was held in the mosque, also attended by Hadji Burak, a brother of Hadji Tubagus Ismail, Hadji Abdulgani from Bedji, Kjai Hadji Abdulhalim from Tjibeber and Noh from Tubuj.¹⁰⁹ They discussed the final measures to be taken immediately. In the meantime the crowd in front of the mosque was increasing; it comprised mainly people from Ardjawinangun and Gulatjir.

On the same day envoys were dispatched in various directions. As decided at the meeting at Hadji Iskak's house, Hadji Erab was sent to Hadji Mohamad Asik in Bendung, but the latter said that he could not trust a verbatim message and therefore sent a member of his following, Hadji Elias, to Hadji Wasid for further information.¹¹⁰ Hadji Mohamad Arsad and Hadji Abubakar were authorized by Hadji Wasid to contact Hadji Mohamad Asik and confirm the instructions.¹¹¹ After receiving a written message, Hadji Mohamad Asik immediately

¹⁰⁷ Missive of the Regent of Serang, May 6, 1889, in MR 1889, no. 368; see also P.V. June 3, 1889.

¹⁰⁸ IG (1891), no. 2, p. 1161.

¹⁰⁹ Report DDI, p. 7; P.V. May 1, 1889.

¹¹⁰ Missive of the Resident of Banten, May 21, 1889, no. 152, in MR 1889, no. 368; see also P.V. May 1, 1889.

¹¹¹ Missive of the Resident of Banten, May 21, 1889, no. 152; P.V. May 1, 1889; see also IG (1891), no. 2, pp. 1161-1162.

ordered his envoys to assemble his *murids*, armed and dressed in white.

From Bedji messengers were also sent to Tanara; Hadji Mahmud and Hadji Alpien carried the information from Hadji Wasid, calling on Hadji Abdulradjak to rise. The latter, however, could not summon the people to gather in arms, simply because nobody there was prepared to take part in the rising. The messengers met with more enthusiasm in Tirtajasa, where Kjai Murangi was ready to join the rebellion. In Bantardjati (Bogor), a small force of fourteen men was awaiting the call to rebellion from Hadji Wasid.¹¹²

The top leaders also attempted to get in touch with Kjai Hadji Sahib of Tjipeundeuj (Pandeglang); Nasaman and Samali from Sendanglor were sent to contact him, but found that he was not at home and took the message to his son-in-law.¹¹³

That Sunday night, Hadji Abdulhalim and Hadji Abdulgani left for Bedji and Tunggak respectively, where the latter was to meet Hadji Usman. Hadji Abdulgani and Hadji Usman had been instructed to collect combatants from the north-eastern part of the *afdeling* of Anjer that same night and to advance with the column to Tjilegon early the next morning.¹¹⁴ A similar order was sent to both Hadji Kasiman from Tjitangkil and Hadji Mahmud from Trate Udik; they were to assemble people from the western part of the *afdeling* of Anjer.

In the meantime, after the meeting at Hadji Iskak's house, many *kjais* had joined Hadji Achija's feast once again. On that same Sunday — 8 July — Tjilegon witnessed a white-robed festive procession moving through its streets; it started from Hadji Achija's house and ended in that of Hadji Tubagus Kusen, the *Panghulu* of Tjilegon.¹¹⁵ The *kjais* and their *murids* who took part in the procession were all dressed in white and a white rag was wound round their heads. Recitations and songs accompanied by *terbang* (drum) beating added lustre to the festivities. Two carriages loaded with white clothes formed part of the procession. It appeared as if all was serene.

Later during the night, a steadily increasing column, armed with *goloks* and lances, and led by Hadji Wasid and Hadji Tubagus Ismail, left Tjibeber in the direction of Sanedja, one of the main rallying points, where they awaited the prompt signal to strike.

¹¹² P.V. April 9, 1889.

¹¹³ Ibidem.

¹¹⁴ Report DDI, pp. 8-9.

¹¹⁵ Missive of the Regent of Serang, May 6, 1889; also Missive of the Resident of Banten, May 21, 1889, no. 152.

CHAPTER VII

THE OUTBREAK OF THE REVOLT

We have seen that, immediately before the outbreak of the rebellion in Tjilegon, Hadji Wasid had been in close contact with Hadji Tubagus Ismail and other prominent leaders of the rebellion. They finally decided that the time for action had arrived, and arranged that the revolt should commence in Tjilegon on Monday, 9 July, 1888 and that the attack on Serang should follow. After his final consultation with both Hadji Tubagus Ismail and Hadji Iskak in Sanedja on the Sunday night preceding the outbreak of the rebellion, Hadji Wasid immediately went northward in order to conduct the last preparations in the district of Bodjonegoro.

The opening scene of the bloody tragedy which ensued during the month of July was laid at the aforesaid village of Sanedja, which adjoins Tjilegon. Being the capital of the afdeling of Anjer, Tjilegon was the residence of both European and native civil servants, namely the assistant resident, the junior controller, the *patih*, the *wedana*, the *djaksa*, the assistant *wedana*, the adjunct-collector, the salt sales manager and other officials of the lower levels of the colonial bureaucracy.¹

THE FIRST ATTACK

To this village of Sanedja Hadji Tubagus Ismail directed his forces on that Sunday night 8 July. He was in command of a large body of partisans, drawn mainly from Ardjawinangun, Gulatjir — Hadji Tubagus Ismail's home village — and Tjibeber.² The rebels were

¹ At the time of the outbreak of the revolt, the assistant resident was J. H. H. Gubbels, the *Patih* was Raden Penna, the *djaksa* Mas Sastradiwirja, the *wedana* Raden Tjakradiningrat, the adjunct-collector Raden Purwadiningrat, the *panghulu* Hadji Tubagus Kusen. Furthermore, there was the junior controller C. W. A. van Rinsum, the salt sales manager U. Bachet, the clerk at the assistant resident's office H. F. Dumas, and the head of the drill works J. Grondhout; see *Javaansche Almanak* (1888), p. 18; Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 39; also Appendix VII.

² On Sunday night, 8 July, about 50 men from Gulatjir marched to Tjilegon, see P.V. Apr. 9, 1889.

joined by reinforcements from Sanedja and neighbouring villages, and marched to the residential quarters of the civil servants in Tjilegon. Then came the first recorded incident of the rebellion. The house of Dumas, a clerk in the assistant resident's office, became the first target of assault. It is not certain whether this attack on Dumas was made deliberately in order to start the rising, or whether it was an act of impulse. What is clear is that it would serve best to give the popular feelings of hatred unanimous expression. This becomes more understandable if one takes into account the fact that Dumas also occupied the position of clerk in the district court, an office which had become unpopular and unenviably notorious among the people. An accidental fact in this tragic event was that Dumas' house was the first one that the rebels came across as they proceeded from Sanedja to Tjilegon. Arriving at Dumas' house at about 2 a.m. on Monday, 9 July,³ the gang awakened Dumas and his family, and told him to open the door. Dumas was eager to know what was going on, and opened the door; thereupon four men immediately rushed into the house shouting the war-cry "*Sabil allah*", and assailed Dumas with their *klewangs*. In the confusion that followed and under cover of darkness, Dumas was able to escape and tried to seek a hiding-place in the house of his neighbour, the *djaksa*. Meanwhile his wife and his two eldest children thought to take refuge in the house of the adjunct-collector, Raden Purwadiningrat, by slipping out through the back door. As the house was surrounded they could not pass unnoticed. Dumas' wife was attacked and wounded in her right shoulder, but because the attackers thought she was a *babu* (maid-servant), no further harm was done to her. Meanwhile Minah, the *babu*, who carried the youngest child of Dumas in her arms, was mistaken for Dumas' wife. She was ordered to hand over the child; she not only refused to do so, but also made all possible attempts to protect it with her own body against the cuts of the assailants. Nevertheless the child was mortally injured, while Minah herself received numerous wounds.⁴ In the meantime the rebels assailed the house with great fury, and smashed the furniture.⁵

Awakened by the strident call for help of Dumas' wife, the *djaksa*

³ *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 17; according to *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1164, the attack on Dumas' house was at 3 a.m.; cf. Report DDI, p. 9.

⁴ *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 17; see also O.I.B. Aug. 1, 1888, no. 2, according to which Minah was honoured with a bronze medal.

⁵ *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 17; Report DDI, pp. 10-17. See also P.V. Jan. 3, 1889; P.V. March 26, 1889, in Exh. May 14, 1889, no. 121.

and the adjunct-collector rushed out of their houses armed with swords. The *djaksa* came across Dumas, took him to his house, and made him lie down. Dumas' wife and the children found asylum in the adjunct-collector's house. Meanwhile the attackers were still in search of Dumas; the clamorous crowd moved in the direction of the *djaksa's* house, having been told that he was there. Soon the *djaksa's* house was encircled by rebels, who shouted to the *djaksa*, and demanded that he deliver Dumas. As they heard no reply, they began to lose patience; they banged on the doors and pierced the bamboo walls with lances. It looked as if they were going to force their way in, but the shouting and bawling gradually faded away — in fact, the band marched off.

While these events took place in the south-eastern section of Tjilegon, a detachment of the rebellious band had been dispatched to the *kepatihan*. From the outset it was obvious that the *patih* was one of those whose life was sought by the rebels. The real clue to the *patih's* unpopularity among the people in general and the *kjais* in particular is provided by two anonymous statements referring to his cynical disregard for religious matters and to his forceful enactment of government regulations.⁶ On their arrival at the *kepatihan*, the band was informed that the *patih* was not at home and had gone to Serang. Thereupon the rebels withdrew. Later on it was rumoured that the fact that the *patih* was out of town at the time of the outbreak seemed to indicate that he knew that the people thought him obnoxious and was strongly aware of their growing discontent.⁷

The news of the assault was brought to the *wedana* by Djohar, a police-servant of the *djaksa*, via Nuriman, a police-servant of the *wedana* himself. As Djohar put it, there were *rampoks* (robbers) attacking Dumas' house. Nuriman, receiving no response at all from the *wedana*, went to the prison to secure the assistance of the prison guard. Accompanied by two of its members he set out towards Dumas' house; they found themselves confronted by a band of rebels threatening them with their lances. The three men felt that any effective defence was out of the question, and fled for their lives. In a last desperate effort, Nuriman

⁶ The causes of popular discontent, with special reference to Raden Penna's failings, are mentioned in 3 anonymous letters and the one sent by H. Mohamad; see above Chap. III, under note 61.

⁷ According to one of these anonymous letters, it would seem that on 15 June, 1888, the Assistant *Wedana* of Grogol, Mas Salim, brought to the *patih's* notice the rumours circulating among the people about the coming disturbances; see Government *Renvooi* of 26 July, 1888, no. 13079, in Report DDI, Appendix I.

directed his steps to the house of the *Djaro* of Djombang Wetan. The *djaro* was not at home, so Nuriman immediately went to the watchman's hut (*gardu*) in Pasar Djombang to give alarm by beating the *tong-tong*, but to no avail, for nobody came.

Dumas' wife and children were led by the adjunct-collector to the *kepatihan* as soon as the band of rebels had withdrawn at about 3 a.m.⁸ At the request of Dumas' wife people were sent out to search for her youngest child; both the child and Minah, the *babu*, were found in the middle of the ricefield, still alive, but seriously wounded. The child was given into the mother's care and Minah was taken to her house.⁹

Towards break of day, on Monday, 9 July, the *wedana* initiated action by conferring with the adjunct-collector. They decided to send messengers to both Anjer and Serang; the first messenger had to go to the resident to inform him of what had happened that night, while the second had to go for the doctor. Shortly afterwards, however, the second messenger came back, and told the *wedana* that he had been compelled to return because the cart-horse had refused to go any further. At about the same time a third messenger, sent by the *patih*'s wife, was on his way to Serang to bring the news of the nocturnal events in Tjilegon to the *patih*. In the meantime the *wedana* and the adjunct-collector had arrived at the *djaksa*'s house to see Dumas; on hearing their voices, the *djaksa* and his wife left their hiding place. After telling the story of the disaster that had befallen him, Dumas suggested that Kamid, a dismissed servant of his, be apprehended, for he suspected that Kamid had taken part in the assault.¹⁰ Afterwards, while the *wedana* and his following went to Kampung Baru to arrest Kamid, the *djaksa* and a police-servant, Abusamad, went to the assistant resident's house to call for Gubbels' wife, who was urgently needed to dress Dumas' wounds. The adjunct-collector went home to say his

⁸ *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 19; Report DDI, p. 14.

⁹ Minah was taken home by her husband, Kamid, and later on, on 13 July, was taken to a hospital in Serang, where she remained until 17 September; the baby died on 24 July; see *IWR*, No. 1337 (1889), p. 21; also Missive of the Director of the Department of Interior, July 1, 1888, L^a L., in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4. According to the account given by Djajadiningrat's uncle, Minah, although covered with many wounds, still managed to reach Serang, see A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 41. Judging from the accuracy of other data in the missive mentioned above, and from the evidence given by the informants, among others Raden Satja and Minah herself, the first reconstruction of the case is more reliable than the second.

¹⁰ This suspect, Kamid, was the same person mentioned under note 9, i.e. Minah's husband; see Report DDI, p. 19.

morning prayers. By sunrise Gubbels' wife was at the *djaksa's* house, bandaging Dumas. At the same time Kamid was arrested and brought to the *djaksa's* house, where he was questioned about the attack on Dumas' house.

When Grondhout, the head of the drilling works, heard of the events of that night from Karman, a police-servant of the *patih*, he sent Saunah, his maid-servant, to get a dogcart so that he could drive to Serang. Saunah was, however, told by the cart renter that it was impossible to go to Serang, because the road was barred by telegraph-wires. Thereupon she went to Djombang Masjid where she got a cart, but when she heard that the rebels were approaching Tjilegon, she ran back to her master.

THE GENERAL ASSAULT

A band of rebels under Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail and Hadji Usman of Ardjawinangun were indeed proceeding to the watchman's hut of Pasar Djombang Wetan at this time. Their faces were partly covered by white cloths. From all quarters, insurgents, either armed or unarmed, came flocking to the *gardu*.¹¹ Shortly afterwards, a very large band appeared on the road from Bodjonegoro, also moving in the direction of the *gardu*. Raising the great cry of "*Sabil allah*" they joined those who were gathering around Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail. The band from the north was headed by Hadji Wasid, Kjai Hadji Usman of Tunggak, Hadji Abdulgani of Bedji and Hadji Nasiman of Kaligandu. Still more people arrived and the crowd was ever increasing, so that a large concourse was formed.

The principal leader in this operation was Hadji Wasid. At his command, one part of the body of insurgents was to break open the prison and set free all the prisoners, another part was to attack the *kepatihan*, while yet another section was to advance to the house of the assistant resident. At the head of the first band was Lurah Djasim, the *Djaro* of Kadjuruan;¹² the second was led by Hadji Abdulgani of Bedji and Hadji Usman of Ardjawinangun, and the last troop was headed by Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail and Hadji Usman of Tunggak. The command to start the assault was met by the excited insurgents

¹¹ The *gardu* was situated at the point where the great post-road from Anjer to Serang and the road from Balagendung to Bodjonegoro crossed; a picture of it can be seen in A. Djajadiningrat (1936), facing p. 113; see also the map of Tjilegon.

¹² For Lurah Djasim, see P.V. Jan. 15, 1889, in Exh. March 6, 1889, no. 85.

with cries of "*Sabil allah*". This war cry reverberated thunderously and could easily be heard in all quarters (*kampongs*) in and around Tjilegon. The place of *rendezvous* was suddenly deserted; only Hadji Wasid and a small following remained.

While the insurgents had been assembling, the civil servants and their families, filled with terror, were seeking refuge. The *djaksa* and his wife fled to the adjunct-collector's house, and Gubbels' wife, the *wedana*, two police-servants — Sadik and Mian — together with other persons sought asylum in the prison. The wives of the *wedana* and their children were already there. Before entering the jail, Gubbels' wife asked Sadik to go and find her children for her. As the way to the assistant resident's house was already blocked by the rebels, the only thing Sadik could do was to flee into the rice-fields behind the *kepatihan* and away from Tjilegon, the townlet which on that Monday, 9 July, became the scene of bloody violence. The reign of violence and lawlessness continued the whole day and during these hours of horror almost all prominent officials of Tjilegon fell victim to the murderous weapons of the insurgents. In fact, the alien rule was confronted with the insurrectionary forces.

In the scene of bloodshed and devastation which ensued, Dumas was the first victim. He was seized in the house of a Chinese, Tan Keng Hok, by Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail, Kamidin, and others, and was slain in his hiding-place.¹³ It would seem that some one had seen Dumas fleeing from the house of the *djaksa* and entering that of the Chinese. A band of rebels under Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail entered the house shortly after Dumas. Tan Keng Hok was threatened with death, but managed to escape while the rebels were searching his house. While the Chinese was running away, he heard Dumas groaning and begging pardon. A few gun shots put an end to his life; his dead body was dragged outside and was later found on the side of the road to Bodjonegoro.¹⁴

The band under Lurah Djasim marched to the house of the *djaksa* and the adjunct-collector. On hearing the mob approaching, the women fled from their hiding place in the latter's house; the *djaksa's* wife hid in an empty house in Kampung Baru, while the adjunct-collector's wife, together with the *panghulu* of the district court, Mas Hadji Kusen, found a hide-out in the house of a certain Ijas of the same village.

¹³ *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 18.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

According to the testimony of the former, Njai Mas Aju Kamsiah, her house was wrecked and goods of considerable value were carried off.¹⁵ Mas Aju Rapijah, the adjunct-collector's wife, reported that the rebels broke into her house and smashed the furniture; goods to the value of about twenty-five hundred guilders were stolen.¹⁶ A similar fate befell the houses of the other civil servants.

From the information given in the report, it appears that the *djaksa* and the adjunct-collector were captured by the insurgents. Owing to the strong popular resentment towards them, they did not long survive. It must be remarked that in the adjunct-collector's house the assailants had to face the bravery of his son, Kartadiningrat. He defied the command of the rebels and risked his life to save his parents' house from being looted. Although his great skill in *pentjak* enabled him to lay low a number of attackers, the odds proved too great and at length he fell, borne down by the multitude of his assailants.¹⁷

Another scene of popular outrage on that eventful Monday was the house of the assistant resident. As mentioned above, a body of insurgents under Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail's guidance marched to this house. As soon as Abusamad, the police-servant, saw them approaching, he told the other servants to hide in one of the rooms at the back of the house. He himself managed to elude the rebels by leaping over the wall of the back-yard. All the other personnel of the assistant resident, i.e. two maid-servants, one house-boy, the wives of the cook and the stable-boy, and also two daughters of Gubbels, Elly and Dora, hid themselves in a room beside the stable. One of the children began to cry, and when one of the rebels heard this, he told the band. Within seconds the window and the door had been broken open. Elly ran into the garden, but the unfortunate girl was instantly seized by the insurgents and mercilessly killed. Later her dead body was found, badly mutilated; her head had been crushed with a big stone. A similar fate befell her sister Dora. She tried to follow the maid-servants, but got a cut on her leg and fell. Her assailants hacked at her body until she was dead. An eye-witness of this bloody scene was Kalpiah, the cook's wife, who had had no chance to run away.¹⁸ Merciful counsels prevailed and she was given a chance to save her life by swearing that she was

¹⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁷ Ibidem; see also A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 42-43.

¹⁸ *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 19.

a Muslim and by reciting the *sjahadat*.¹⁹ She was set free, and fled to the house of the *patih*'s clerk, where his brother Ketjil from Tjaringin was staying. They fled in the direction of Anjer. On their way they met the assistant resident and told him what had happened to his daughters.

Yet another outrage occurred that Monday, this time at the house on the west side of the *alun-alun* (square), which was occupied by Bachet, sales-manager at the salt-warehouse. Apart from the position he held, the very fact that he was a European official may, doubtlessly, to some extent account for the hatred which prompted the attack. From his house Bachet could watch the great swarm of insurgents dispersing in various directions. Besides his daughter Mary, there were two other children in the house at the time, August Bachet, a nephew, and Anna Canter Visscher.²⁰ At first he was determined to defend himself with his gun against the insurgents. When, however, he found himself confronted by a band of rebels and realized that any effective defence was out of the question, he decided to leave the house together with his housemates. They managed to conceal themselves in the house of Ramidin in the *kampung* behind Bachet's house. Bachet found a hiding place under Ramidin's bed, while the children hid behind the curtain. Because they found Bachet's house deserted, the rebels under Kjai Hadji Usman of Tunggak searched the whole neighbourhood and soon discovered that they were hiding in Ramidin's house. They broke into the room; Bachet sprang out of his hiding place and pointed his gun at his assailants. They shrank back, and Bachet fired twice; one shot killed Sadik from Petjek and the other hit Kimbu from Bedji in both eyes. Although his gun enabled him to lay low some of his antagonists, he was at last overpowered and killed. As for the children, they remained unnoticed and for a while stayed in Ramidin's house.²¹

Early the same morning, a section of the insurgent bands, headed by Lurah Djasim, advanced to the gaol, which they attacked and broke open. Before the door of the gaol had been forced, Gubbels' wife, the *wedana*, and the warder, succeeded in escaping via the back of the building. They climbed over the wall by means of a bamboo ladder, and once outside the gaol they hurried to the *kepatihan* via a short cut

¹⁹ See the EI, IV (1934), p. 25; see also Snouck Hurgronje's comment on the *sjahadat*, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 1 (1924), pp. 11-16.

²⁰ Mary Bachet was about 16 years old, and Anna Canter Visscher about 13; see A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 44.

²¹ *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 20; see also Report DDI, p. 49.

through the back-yard. At the same time the rebels forced their entrance into the gaol and immediately set free all the prisoners. At the time they were about twenty in number; a certain Agus Suradikaria was the best known. It seems that he had been imprisoned for various charges, among others rape and corruption. It must be noticed that he had been dismissed from his last position as Assistant *wedana* of Merak. It is regrettable that no records of his trial have been left to us, for it would be interesting to know to what extent it is true that — as was asserted in some contemporary newspapers — there was more to the matter than met the eye, namely a rivalry between Agus Suradikaria and a prominent civil servant in Banten.²² At any rate, there can be little doubt that Agus Suradikaria mechanically joined the insurgents in order to wreak his vengeance. As we shall see, after his liberation he not only played an active role in the disturbances, but also assumed leadership on various occasions. It would be a mistake, however, to regard him as the main instigator of the rebellion, let alone to ascribe the revolt to his trial.²³ Two men, Ardaman and Mian, were caught by the rebels; the former had accompanied Gubbels' wife and the *wedana* to the jail, and the latter was the police-servant of the *wedana*. They were dragged from their hiding place in the jail; their life was spared on condition that they joined the rebellion. Both men were brought to the *gardu* of Djombang Wetan to appear before Hadji Wasid, who was enthroned as "king" there.²⁴ They were afraid that they would be killed sooner or later, and soon managed to escape.

As has been pointed out before, the *patih*, Raden Penna, was regarded with very marked ill feeling and antipathy by the *hadjis*; naturally, his residence — the *kepatihan* — became one of the main targets of the assault. It is curious that in the course of that Monday morning the *kepatihan* also became a central place of refuge for the pitiable victims who had survived the first attack of the insurgents. Besides relatives and servants of the *patih* there were present, shortly before the arrival

²² See *De Locomotief*, July 18, 20, and 23, 1888; the role ascribed to the assistant *wedana* was rather questionable, in fact, both the data and the interpretation are defective. He was an ex-assitant *wedana* not of Bandjarnegara (sic), but of Merak.

²³ Later editions of the same newspaper contradict this interpretation, see *De Locomotief*, July 21 and 23; Aug. 10, Oct. 1, 1888.

²⁴ The information as to who was to become king is confusing; H. Wasid was often mentioned, see *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 20; also *IWR*, No. 1337 (1889), p. 22. Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail was mentioned in the Report of the Director of the Department of Interior, see Report DDI, p. 9; Agus Suradikaria in Report DDI, p. 69.

of the rebels: the wife of the *patih*, Raden Kenoh; his adult daughter, Raden Nuni; a few younger children; his mother, Njai Raden Arsian; Gubbels' wife, Dumas' wife with her three children, the *wedana* and the warder. On her arrival at the *kepatihan*, Gubbels' wife was so nervous that she was hardly able to utter a word; she only pleaded that someone should go and find her children and that assistance should be asked in Serang. But it was too late; before anyone could set out to rescue the children, the *kepatihan* was already encircled by the rebels. Although all the servants of the *patih* were armed, the assailants did not meet with any resistance. They launched the attack with cries of "Kill the *patih*" and "Save his wife and children".²⁵ One of the servants, Sadiman, was caught and slain. The *wedana* and the warder were also captured and were asked to recite the *sjahadat*; they also had to swear that they would join the rebellion. A search was made in the house, and the rebels knocked on the door of the room in which the women had locked themselves. The *patih*'s wife told the rebels that there were only women and children in the room. The rebels did not believe her; they insisted that the door be opened and that the women and children would not be done any harm. Raden Kenoh swore that her husband was in Serang, undergoing medical treatment. Then the door was opened, but the insurgents did not enter the room, having ascertained that there were no men inside. Afterwards the room on the opposite side was investigated in a similar way. Before the search was continued, the women and children were ordered to leave the building; they were told that room had to be made for the *kjais*. They fled from the *kepatihan* in various directions; what fate awaited them during these perilous days?

The mother of the *patih* was seized by a *hadji*, who threatened to take her life unless she informed him where her son was hiding. Fortunately, she was soon set at liberty. She proceeded in the direction of Serang, but had to stop at the house of a blacksmith, just beyond the *gardu* of Djombang Wetan, because she was quite exhausted. There she remained in hiding until the arrival of a military troop from Serang.

At the same time Raden Kenoh and her children fled into the rice-field behind the *kepatihan* and managed to reach Temuputih — a village on the road to Mantjak — where they stayed at the house of a

²⁵ Report DDI, pp. 39-40; also *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 19. At the outset it was decided that no harm would be done to women and children. It seems that later on the rank and file got quite out of hand, hence the attacks on women and children.

certain Kasan until about 4 p.m. Kasan, feeling uneasy about harbouring the refugees, suggested that it would be better for them to seek refuge further away from Tjilegon. They advanced to Kubanglesung, where the *djaro* refused to take them in because the harbouring of refugees had been forbidden by Kjai Mahmud of Trate Udik. They therefore put up at the dwelling of a common villager.

As to Dumas' wife, she and her children fled to the kitchen of an empty house in Kampung Baru, where they remained in hiding for a while. Gubbels' wife refused to follow them and evidently directed her flight towards Serang. She meant to take a dogcart; but on arriving at Sanedja, where she hoped to charter one, she found herself confronted by Njai Kamsidah, Hadji Iskak's wife, who not only refused to help her to get a dogcart, but also started attacking her. A furious fight raged between the two women. At Njai Kamsidah's call for help, two men appeared and attacked Gubbels' wife by spouting a kind of liquid at her eyes. The records give us no clue as to what happened to her after this. They only state that her corpse was later found by a certain Kamad. It lay on a spot south of the road to Serang, at a distance of about a quarter of a *paal* from Tjilegon.²⁶ Kamad also testified that he saw five people standing near the corpse, one of whom was identified as Njai Kamsidah.

In one respect this survey of the scene of the rebellion may be disappointing to its readers: it will tell us little, if anything, about epoch-making events on the "national" scale; instead, it presents only the detailed accounts of the rebels' activities, which are usually beneath the notice of the historian. For our purpose and from our point of view, however, these details are of great significance, because they show the rebel organization in action. It would be mistaken to assume that this survey will only lead to a whole list of detailed information which will make the reader shrug his shoulders and ask, "So what?" The point is that the events described will be of assistance in seeking insight into the essential features of the insurrectionary movement.

THE PURSUIT OF FUGITIVES

To return to the central theme of the story: the hunt for government civil servants which raged on 9 July displayed no slackness. A vigorous

²⁶ Compare Kamad's testimony with that of Mohamad Said, see *IWR*, No 1336 (1889), p. 19. The question whether Njai Kamsidah was or was not guilty of murdering Gubbels' wife became a big issue; see Missive from the Gov. Gen. to the Minister of Colonies, June 15, 1889, in *Vb.* July 22, 1889, no. 87; see also the article in *Bataviaasch Handelsblad*, June 14, 1889.

search was made for the remaining officials of Tjilegon who had escaped after the occupation of Tjilegon by the rebels. It was reported that, on learning of the approach of the rebels from the north, Grondhout hurried off home and together with his wife sought refuge in the *kepatihan* for a while. He felt that the situation was exceedingly dangerous, and decided to escape from Tjilegon with his wife and maid-servant. He obtained a weapon, and they set out westwards in the direction of Mantjak. On arriving at Temuputih a daughter of the adjunct-collector, Njai Mas Nganten, joined them; a little further on, they met Sadi, the police-servant of the assistant resident, who declined accompanying them as their guide; he only showed them a path leading to a sugar-cane garden. They preferred, however, to follow the main road. In Tjiwaduk they found the vaccinator, Mas Ranggawinata, and his wife and mother-in-law, with whom they agreed to advance to Anjer, where they hoped to meet the assistant resident. Passing by the *gardu* of Kusambu Bujut, at a distance of about four *paal* from Tjilegon, they were questioned by the watchman — Ojang — as to where they were going. About a quarter of a *paal* further they heard somebody call out to the vaccinator that it was not necessary to flee, because the *wedana*, the adjunct-collector and the *djaksa* were in the neighbouring village, Tjiwedus. Mas Ranggawinata recognized the voice of Dengi, the *Djaro* of Bagendung. They trusted his words, and went back. On their return to the *gardu* of Kusambi Bujut, they found themselves confronted by a band of insurgents. The rebels separated Grondhout, his wife and his maid-servant from the others without using force, and formed a cordon around them. Suddenly, Grondhout received a blow from behind; his wife and maid-servant fled for their lives, and the latter concealed herself in the high grass. She heard her mistress calling for help; it seems that she was slain on the spot, like her husband. This done, the whole band made a search for Saunah, the maid-servant who was very soon captured. She was questioned as to whether she was a maid-servant of Grondhout or the wife of a native civil servant. She denied both, and was given her liberty. It is said that the vaccinator, his wife and his mother-in-law, were told to go and see Lurah Kasar, the *Djaro* of Petjek. Set at liberty by the latter, they headed for Tjiomas and the following day proceeded to Serang.²⁷

The chief pursuers of Grondhout were Lurah Kasar himself, Hadji

²⁷ The available sources do not give any clue about the fate of the adjunct-collector's daughter.

Masna of Petjek, Sarip of Kubangkepuh, Hadji Hamim of Temuputih, and Hadji Kamad of Petjek.²⁸ In their pursuit of Grondhout and his wife, the band of rebels marched to Mantjak. Near Temuputih they caught up with Sadi, who was compelled to inform them which direction Grondhout had taken. Sadi furthermore joined the band because he was afraid that he would be killed if he did not do so. It is interesting to note that Sarip, one of the pursuers, was among the prisoners who were set free when the jail was broken open.²⁹ We shall find that other convicts took the part of the rebels.

Meanwhile numerous bands were still running through the *kampongs* and villages, hunting for their victims. Afraid to stay in Ramidin's house any longer, Mary Bachet, August Bachet and Anna Canter Vischer set out northwards. Everywhere people refused to allow them to stay in the villages, because they were *kafir* (infidels). In Trate Udik, they underwent similar treatment; the *djaro*, however, advised them to state that they were prepared to become Muslims, if they were confronted with the rebels.³⁰ They left Trate Udik and concealed themselves in a sugar-cane garden, but were found without much trouble. Surrounded by their pursuers, and terrified by their threats, they begged for their lives. Mary Bachet declared that she was willing to be converted to Islam, while August began to pronounce the *sjahadat* very loudly. Apparently, the leader of the band, Kjai Usman of Tunggak, could not remain adamant, and ordered the children to go along with him. They went all the way back to Tjilegon, via the road to Bodjonegoro. When they reached the *gardu* of Djombang Wetan, they had to appear before Hadji Wasid. After paying homage to him and repeating that they were ready to embrace the Muslim faith, they were given milder treatment. They were even granted special protection and, accompanied by a guard, they went home to change their clothes. Afterwards they were ordered to go to the house of the assistant resident. On the way there they saw four corpses lying in the *alun-alun*.

It cannot come as a surprise to us that the lower civil servants, both European and Bantenese, shared the same fate as their superordinates, knowing as we do that all officials in the pay of the colonial government had evidently made themselves the object of both resentment and hatred

²⁸ See P.V. Jan. 3, 1889; also P.V. Jan. 23, 1889, in Exh. Feb. 11, 1889, no. 77.

²⁹ See P.V. Jan. 3, 1889. The total number of prisoners set free was twenty, see Report DDI, p. 36.

³⁰ *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 20; Report DDI, p. 49.

to the *kjais* and their disciples.³¹ At about the time that the rebel bands were marching into Tjilegon, Raden Awimba — a clerk in the district office — left his house with his wife and children via the back door and tried to seek refuge in Hadji Abu's house. This attempt to escape failed because the rebels soon caught up with him and seized him. At that moment he must have thought that the end was going to come soon. Fortunately for him, however, a great cry rang out, announcing that Bachet had been found. The attention of the band was diverted for a moment, so that Raden Awimba had a chance to run away. He directed his flight to Trate Udik, where he could conceal himself in the house of Mabengid. His freedom did not last long, for Raden Awimba had the misfortune to fall into the hands of another band of rebels, who at that time were mustering in and near the mosque. He made a *sembah* to Hadji Mahmud of Trate Udik, imploring for mercy, but one of Hadji Mahmud's counsellors, Agus Suradikaria, replied that clemency was out of the question, for the reason that all the civil servants had given false testimony when he was on trial. Another point of popular grievance that Agus Suradikaria mentioned was the relentless overtaxation of the people. When the insurgents were on the point of rushing at Raden Awimba, they were summoned by Hadji Wasid, and Raden Awimba once again got the opportunity to flee; he sought a hiding-place in a sugar-cane garden nearby. He was pursued by the rebels with relentless vigour, and soon was captured again. This time he was brought before Hadji Wasid and it seemed as if his death was certain. As he approached the *alun-alun* of Tjilegon, Raden Awimba heard a great howl — probably because Gubbels had been run to earth — and suddenly a wild band of rebels burst in upon him to slay him. He instantly fell on his knees before one of their leaders and begged him clemency; he was spared from instant death. Shortly after his arrival at the house of the assistant resident, Dumas' wife and her children were ushered in and the crowd surged out to see them. For the moment, Raden Awimba was completely forgotten, and for the third time he succeeded in escaping from the sacrilegious hands of the rebels.³²

³¹ According to the testimony of Usup of Djombang Wetan, H. Wasid had told the people that all those who earned their living by drawing government salaries had to be put to death, see Appendix VIII.

³² Owing to the excitement caused by the arrival of Dumas' wife, see *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 20.

THE PRINCIPAL SCENE OF THE REVOLT

And now, having sketched the course of events in and around Tjilegon with particular reference to the hunting down of fleeing officials and their kinsmen by the insurgents, we must give our attention to what had meanwhile taken place at the principal scene of action. The *djaksa* and the adjunct-collector were taken prisoner, together with Mian, the police-servant. The band conducted them, together with the *wedana* and the warder, to the *gardu* of Djombang Wetan, where Hadji Wasid and Hadji Iskak had their headquarters. The captives were ordered to sit down on the ground in front of the *kjais*, to make a *sembah* to them and to take an oath that they would make common cause with the insurgents. From the testimony of Mian, who managed to run away, it appears that everyone had to pay homage to Hadji Wasid, who was enthroned as a king in the aforesaid *gardu*.³³ The *wedana*, the *djaksa*, the adjunct-collector and the warder, were taken to the *alun-alun* and put to death. No clue is given us as to the motives for the killing. According to one account it would seem that the vengeance of Agus Suradikaria was the immediate object, but other reports say that the slaughter took place because of the *wedana*'s and the adjunct-collector's condemnation of the breaking open of the cash-box in the office of the latter.³⁴ The *djaksa* and the warder were slain, it is assumed, on account of their reluctance to swear allegiance to the insurgents. In this fierce assault, the first attack on the *wedana* was made by a certain Misal and by Kamidin of Kubangkepuh. Here we meet with evidence of the people's strong feelings against the civil servants and of the determined struggle which had been planned against them.

In relating the fate of the civil servants and their kinsmen as they were relentlessly pursued by the rebels, we have deviated from the strict sequence of events. While the general assault was in full swing, bands of rebels from all quarters, especially from the north, were still flocking in to join the main body. In fact, during the course of that Monday morning the insurgents had gathered a force of hundreds of armed and unarmed men. Hadji Wasid seems to have remained at Tjilegon for the whole morning of his short day of power. As described above, he sent out his associates to spread the revolt. As early as about seven o'clock, Hadji Wasid commanded a detachment to proceed to Serang.

³³ *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), pp. 19-20; see also P.V. Jan. 23, 1889 and P.V. Jan. 30, 1889, in Exh. March 19, 1889, no. 53.

³⁴ Report DDI, pp. 43-44; *IWR*, No. 1337 (1889), p. 21.

Urged on by Hadji Achija from Djombang Wetan, the first band set out in that direction. Shortly afterwards a second section left under Kjai Usman of Tunggak, Hadji Usman of Ardjawinangun, and Hadji Abdulgani of Bedji. At about ten o'clock a third band left for Serang under the command of Hadji Iskak. On their way to the capital, these bands halted at several places, presumably waiting for the arrival of Hadji Wasid and Hadji Ismail. The delay of their departure appears to be connected with the pursuit of the assistant resident, who had in the meantime arrived in Tjilegon. Meanwhile more bands were sent ahead, after they had been given money taken from the sacked offices.

From the various sources we know that Hadji Wasid established himself in the *gardu* of Djombang Wetan, and from there conducted the proceedings of the insurrection. It is interesting to note that the insurgents saluted Hadji Wasid as "king" or *radja Islam*,³⁵ a title which, during this period of confusion, was also given to Agus Suradikaria and Hadji Tubagus Ismail. In actual fact, the latter did not come to the fore as a principal leader in the rebellion, but contented himself with being the right-hand man and counsellor of Hadji Wasid. How it came to pass that Hadji Wasid commanded and the nobleman and *Wali-to-be* followed his lead, is a difficult matter to decide, but all the evidence shows that Hadji Tubagus Ismail, in spite of his superior status, was no more than one of the most prominent associates of Hadji Wasid. For the short period that he was in power, Hadji Wasid enjoyed undisputed authority and made decisions on matters of life and death. Although his enthusiastic followers hailed him as the paramount leader, he apparently refused the title of *radja* and recognized Hadji Tubagus Ismail as his superior and the *radja-to-be*.³⁶ We shall now gather up the threads of the story of that sanguinary outburst of popular fury again.

THE PURSUIT OF GUBBELS

Of great moment was the pursuit of the assistant resident. Gubbels was, as it chanced, absent from his domicile — Tjilegon — when the rebellion broke out. Two days before the outbreak he had left Tjilegon to join the resident in his inspection-tour through the *afdeling* of Anjer together with the junior controller. While the riotous proceedings were taking place, the resident and his escort were in Anjer, totally unaware

³⁵ Other testimonies refer to K.H.T. Ismail as the king-to-be and H. Wasid as the *patih* (grand-vizier), see Appendix VIII.

³⁶ Ibidem.

of the impending danger. Certain information, which reached Gubbels at about half-past seven on that Monday morning, was brought by Enggus, a police-servant of the *Wedana* of Tjilegon, but it did not impress Gubbels and his colleagues at all; the letter brought by Enggus only mentioned an attempted robbery in which Dumas had been wounded.³⁷ Questioned by the junior controller, Enggus added that before breaking open Dumas' house, people had knocked at the door of the *kepatihan*. The matter was considered of little importance, so that it took a little while before Gubbels made the decision to return to Tjilegon. Shortly after the departure of the resident and the junior controller on their journey to Tjaringin, Gubbels — escorted by Djamil, a senior police-servant and a few men — drove off in a dogcart. Apparently he did not realize the danger of his position, for he did not think of taking a weapon with him. He stopped at Tjigading, to get fresh horses, and heard the news that people had risen in arms and were occupying Tjilegon. From Kromo — his cook — whom he met there, he learned that his children had been killed. Kromo dissuaded him from going to Tjilegon, but Gubbels ordered the men to make haste with changing the horses. He was absolutely set on making his way to Tjilegon, and proceeded without hesitation and without a thought for his own safety. He dashed to Tjilegon at a furious pace. It appears that he had told people he would rather die if his children were dead. Near Kalentemu he met with a band of insurgents, about thirty in number, who blocked the road. Instead of stopping the dogcart, the driver drove it straight through the band. The rebels apparently gave way, but shortly afterwards they dashed out and attacked the assistant resident, his escort and the dogcart. One of the horses was stabbed in the belly, while Gubbels himself was hit in the breast by a lance. His assailant appears to have been a certain Samidin,³⁸ and the chief of this band of pursuers was Hadji Kalipudin. Despite this very unpleasant encounter with a band of insurgents and although he was seriously wounded, Gubbels ordered the driver — Jas — to proceed at full speed to Tjilegon. The rebels did not chase them, and Jas strained every nerve to get to Tjilegon; he spurred the horses on and safely fled in that direction. The final scene of the tragedy followed soon after their arrival there. The unfortunate Gubbels had certainly had to endure a long and agonizing drive. At about ten o'clock the dogcart drove into the *alun-alun*, and

³⁷ The letter from the *wedana* to Gubbels had been lost before the investigation took place, see Report DDI, p. 54.

³⁸ *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 20; also Report DDI, p. 53.

since the way to the assistant resident's house was blocked by dead bodies, Jas brought it to a standstill. The front-yard of the assistant resident's house was filled with a vast crowd of insurgents. Gubbels immediately saw that it was impossible to reach his house and, stepping out of his dogcart, he therefore directed his flight to the *kepatihan*. The crowd of insurgents caught sight of him and broke loose, all bursting into shouts and yells; some howled for his life. Before he had reached the *kepatihan*, a gun was fired at him. He was not hit and rushed into the right front room of the *kepatihan*. His pursuers followed him, Hadji Djahli at their head, armed with a loaded gun. At the approach of H. Djahli, Gubbels dashed out of the room and seized the gun. Thereupon the band dispersed. Embittered by what he had learned and by his own misfortune, Gubbels was determined to withstand the rebels and shouted defiant words at them. The mob thereupon withdrew.

While one group of rebels was engaged in the pursuit of Gubbels, another band was chasing Djamil, the police-servant who had escorted the assistant resident during his ride from Anjer. Djamil was captured near the house of the adjunct-collector, and was taken to the *gardu* of Djombang Wetan where, it is said, he was slain by the Samidin previously mentioned.³⁹ As for Jas, the driver, and the other members of the assistant resident's escort, they were all put to flight, horribly frightened. The dogcart and the horses were seized and afterwards sent to Bodjonegoro to get guns for a second assault on Gubbels.⁴⁰ As has been pointed out before, the departure for Serang was delayed considerably, owing to the presence of the assistant resident in Tjilegon. Gubbels would certainly be slain as soon as the insurgents could lay hands on him. In the meantime the preparations for the march to Serang neared completion; the bands of rebels set out one after another, all heading for the capital, the target of the final general assault. A body of insurgents under the joint command of Hadji Kasiman, Hadji Mahmud, Agus Suradikaria, Kjai Hadji Madani of Tjiawi, Hadji Koja of Djombang Wetan, Hadji Kalipudin and Hadji Achija, was charged with guarding Tjilegon.

As the multitude marched off from the *kepatihan*, Gubbels remained in the front verandah, seated on a chair and holding the gun. This period must have been one of deadly terror for the unfortunate man. At about noon, Dumas' wife no longer saw any rebels and, imagining that it was "all over", she left her hiding-place in Kampung Baru with

³⁹ Report DDI, p. 59.

⁴⁰ P.V. Jan. 30, 1889.

her children and returned to the *kepatihan* to make a search for her youngest child.⁴¹ She entered the house via the back door, and a little later saw Gubbels sitting in the front verandah. At his request she brought him water, and afterwards led him to one of the rooms and laid him on the bed. He was still holding the gun in his hand, waiting for what might come. Terrified by the idea that the rebels might return and slay her children when they were found in the same room with Gubbels, Dumas' wife and the children went into hiding in another room, despite the objections of Gubbels, who did not want to be left alone. They locked themselves in and barricaded the door with tables. As was to be expected, at about half-past two that afternoon, a body of rebels advanced in the direction of the *kepatihan*. On arriving there, a small section under the command of Rapenje, the *Djaro* of Tjiora, directed the attack on the house from the east side. Another section made an attempt to break through the front door; after some time this was accomplished, and they rushed towards the room where Gubbels was hiding. Once again they were confronted by a closed door, and it seems that it was necessary for them to procure tools before they could break it open. While this band was forcing an entry into the house, the other band fired their guns, shattering the windows. In fact, Gubbels was absolutely at the mercy of the insurgents, and nothing was more likely than that he would be slain on the spot by his furious assailants. At last the door gave way; the rebels burst into the room and rushed upon their helpless victim. From her room, Dumas' wife heard the rebels moving about and Gubbels groaning. Then all was silent. This was Gubbels' dreadful end. Afterwards his dead body was dragged out of the house and was received with a general howl of triumph; the assistant resident, regarded as the main instrument of the colonial government, was dead.

AT THE REBELS' HEADQUARTERS

Shortly after Gubbels had been murdered, the rebels banged at the door of the room in which Dumas' wife and her children had shut themselves up. The enraged rebels forced Dumas' wife to open the door under pain of maltreatment. She begged for mercy and said she was

⁴¹ Dumas' wife was only captured when she was found hiding in one of the rooms in the *kepatihan*, and not — as was told by Djajadiningrat's uncle — when she fled from her house shortly after the nocturnal assault; see A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 41; cf. *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 18 and Report DDI, p. 61.

willing to be converted to Islam. The rebels were satisfied with her statement and spared her and her children; they were led to the assistant resident's house where they had to appear before the *tuan radja*. There they met Mary Bachet, August Bachet and Anna Canter Visscher, who had arrived some time before.

As has been mentioned previously, a division of insurgents was stationed in Tjilegon, while a large part of the contingent was commanded to march on Serang. Shortly after the killing of the assistant resident, Hadji Wasid and Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail drove off in a dogcart, following the troops for the consummation of the revolt. Those who stayed behind were assembled in the house of the assistant resident. According to Mary Bachet's account, the house was sacked and its contents despoiled; money was stolen and distributed to the partisans. In the front verandah the leaders, among whom was Agus Suradikaria, held a deliberation. Being free to move around, Mary Bachet had ample opportunity to look about and to chat with some of the rebels. She came across the dead bodies of the daughters of Gubbels, that of the youngest lying on the door-step of the servant's room and that of the oldest in the garden. From afar she could also watch the sanguinary scene of the assault on the assistant resident at the *alun-alun*. She was given good treatment, because she had been elected to become the wife of the *tuan radja*.⁴²

Evidently Agus Suradikaria assumed command of the detachment in Tjilegon. This renegade civil servant who joined the rising presided over the conference of prominent *hadjis* in the front verandah. He sent out men to ransack the office of the adjunct-collector and ordered groups of insurgents to guard the exits from Tjilegon. He also held a sort of assize and decided the fate of Dumas' wife, after she had promised to embrace the Islamic faith. Agus Suradikaria thereupon recited certain prayers to Dumas' wife, which she had to repeat. She was then allowed to sit on a chair in the corner of the front verandah. Shortly afterwards people were sent to Bachet's house, to slaughter a cow. On that same afternoon a banquet was held, in which the people in and around the assistant resident's house took part. It is said that August Bachet had to take the part of a *tali api* boy at this gathering.⁴³ Then the people busied themselves with the destruction of the archives,

⁴² According to Mary Bachet's own testimony, see *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 20; see also A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 43.

⁴³ A *tali api* boy was in charge of giving a light to those who smoked during a feast. See Report DDI, p. 69.

burning a large number of documents carried off from the office of the adjunct-collector, the *djaksa*, and the assistant resident.⁴⁴ It seems that the burning of the archives was carried out by order of Hadji Wasid himself. Late in the afternoon more divisions of insurgents were dispatched; one headed for Anjer, another was to join the contingent marching on Serang, and a third had to reinforce the guards at the gates of Tjilegon.⁴⁵

RADEN PENNA TOOK ACTION

When the rebellion had started raging in Tjilegon, the *Patih* of Anjer, Raden Penna, chanced to be staying in Serang. On the morning of the ninth of July, Satja — a police-servant sent by the *patih*'s wife — brought him the news that Dumas' house had been broken into the night before and that Dumas himself had been badly wounded. As soon as he received this message, he instantly had a dogcart called and hurried off in the direction of Tjilegon. Evidently Raden Penna did not lose his head and made resolute efforts to deal with the troublemakers. Before leaving Serang, he requested doctor Jacobs, the physician of the residency, to accompany him so that Dumas could be given medical aid. The drive to Tjilegon was perilous: at any moment Raden Penna might meet with roving bands of insurgents. Before reaching Kramat Watu, he met Sedut, who told him that Tjilegon was occupied by a multitude of rebels. Further on, in Kramat Watu, more detailed news reached him about the rebels' early successes. The *patih* thereupon dispatched Sadik — who brought him the news at Kramat Watu — to Serang to get military assistance. He armed himself with a *klewang* and, accompanied also by the district clerk, he set forward on horse-back to Serdang. On the east side of Serdang he fell in with the *Wedana* of Kramat Watu and the Assistant *Wedana* of Serdang. They left Serdang together. They were just nearing Tjilegon, when they encountered a crowd of armed men and a dogcart with two or three persons in it. Suddenly one of the people in the dogcart got out and pointed his gun at the *patih*. Knowing that they would be fighting against fearful odds which would render their position exceedingly dangerous, they returned. But a little further to the east, near Tjibeber, they saw a large mustering of insurgents and drove hastily back in the direction of Serdang. Once they had passed Serdang, the *patih* and the *wedana* mounted their

⁴⁴ Report DDI, pp. 69-72; according to this report, some village archives were also burnt.

⁴⁵ *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 18.

horses, while the assistant *wedana* was ordered to seek refuge somewhere and Satja was sent back to Serang with the dogcart to ask for assistance. We know for a fact that the resolute and daring *patih* showed active energy in facing the insurrection. The *patih* decided to try to reach Tjilegon at all costs; he intended to take not the direct road, via Serdang and Tjibeber, but a more circuitous one which ran through Pagebangan. The *patih* and the *wedana* advanced to Temuputih in the hope that they would be able to enter Tjilegon from there, but here too, they encountered a big crowd, and did not dare to approach the place. Turning away from Temuputih in the direction of Djombang Kulon, they found themselves once again confronted with an assembly of rebels — about twenty in number — blocking the road. The *patih* addressed them and gave them the warning that military troops were on their way and would shoot at gatherings of people. Thereupon the people dispersed and went into the village. The road was thus cleared for continuing the ride to Tjilegon, but when they spurred their horses, that of the *patih* became restive. Raden Penna glanced round and saw that three men were approaching, slipping through the bamboo trees. Suddenly they made a dash at the *patih*, and only the timely warning of the *wedana* and a quick sidelong movement saved Raden Penna from being hacked with a *klewang*. After this dangerous encounter they abandoned their plan of going to Tjilegon and rode to Anjer in the hope of finding the assistant resident there. At about 3 p.m. they arrived at the house of the *Wedana* of Anjer Lor.⁴⁶ Here Raden Penna did his utmost to assemble people who were ready to march on Tjilegon and fight the rebels. As the people in Anjer Kidul had not yet recovered from their panic, it seems to have taken a long time to gather a sufficient number of volunteers to form a rescue team. As we shall see, the troop of rescuers under Raden Penna did not depart before the next day.

THE RISING IN THE SUB-DISTRICTS

To complete the picture of North Banten during this turbulent period, a brief account must be given of other parts of the region. On that Monday, while the disturbances in Tjilegon were in full swing, the flames of smouldering rebellion broke out elsewhere, e.g. in Bodjonegoro, Balagendung, Krapjak, Grogol and Mantjak.

The rebellion in Bodjonegoro broke out on Sunday night, the night preceding the outbreak in Tjilegon. Arriving at Bedji from Sanedja,

⁴⁶ For the whole "adventure" of Raden Penna, see *IWR*, No. 1337 (1889), p. 21, and Report DDI, pp. 69-72.

Hadji Wasid found a concourse of people waiting for him. He immediately sent a section of his band to Bodjonegoro to seek with murderous intent the assistant *wedana* of that place. The assistant *wedana*'s house was searched and ransacked, the archives were burnt, but the owner was not to be found. He was touring the villages in his sub-district. The band, however, found an outlet for their bloodthirstiness by killing the clerk of the assistant *wedana*, Asikin, who was found sleeping in his chief's house.⁴⁷ The following day the rebels searched the whole area around Gunung Awuran for the assistant *wedana*, but all in vain. It is interesting to note that one of the leaders of the insurgents had seized the dogcart of the assistant *wedana*, which was used to carry rebels to Tjilegon on that same Monday.⁴⁸

One of the acts of violence at Balagendung on 9 July was the assault on the house of the assistant *wedana*, who like all his colleagues was a favourite prey of the rebels. Fortunately for him, he had been given timely warning and had taken flight to Serang. His house too was destroyed; its contents were carried off and the archives were burnt. Evidently a certain Arsudin was compelled by the rebels to join them in the pursuit of the village head of Balagendung, whom they sought to slay.⁴⁹

It is reported that an attempt was made by a body of men to seize the Assistant *Wedana* of Krapjak, but he had taken timely flight to Serang, and was not to be found at his home. In this sub-district, as elsewhere, the destruction of the contents of the assistant *wedana*'s house and of the official documents appears to have been one of the main features of the activities of the rebels. In like manner the house of the Assistant *Wedana* of Grogol was destroyed on that same Monday and the archives were committed to the flames. On learning that disturbances had broken out at Tjilegon, the Assistant *Wedana* of Grogol immediately rode thither, but on his way he found himself confronted by a band of rebels, who attacked him and after slaying him threw his body into the river.⁵⁰

On the next day, 10 July, the insurgents under Hadji Sapiudin of Leuwibeureum, after having performed their morning-prayers in the *langgar* of the *hadji*, advanced on Mantjak and plundered the house of the assistant *wedana*. A gun was carried off, and the archives were burnt. Afterwards the band of rebels withdrew to Tjipeutjang, where

⁴⁷ Report DDI, p. 70; *IWR*, No. 1337 (1889), p. 22; P.V. Jan. 30, 1889 and also P.V. March 26, 1889, in Exh. May 14, 1889, no. 121.

⁴⁸ P.V. Jan. 30, 1889; P.V. March 26, 1889.

⁴⁹ P.V. Jan. 15, 1889, in Exh. March 6, 1889, no. 85; Report DDI, p. 70.

⁵⁰ P.V. Jan. 30, 1889; *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1180.

they were served a meal by the village head, Moiji.⁵¹ We are told that the assistant *wedana* had gone to Anjer Kidul to escort the resident to Tjaringin.

THE GATHERING OF REBEL FORCES AROUND SERANG

Turning from the *afdeling* of Anjer to that of Serang, we find ourselves confronted with a different picture. On 9 July the bands from the district of Serang and neighbouring regions all converged on Bendung, Trumbu, Kubang, Kaloran and Kaganteran; the first army of rebels was under the command of Hadji Mohamad Asik, the second was under the joint-command of Hadji Mohamad Kanapiah and Hadji Muhidin; the third was led by Katab, a tobacco-seller, and the fourth by Raim, an ex-village head of Kaudjon, and both of these armies were under the supervision of Mas Hadji Mohamad Sangadeli; the last contingent was headed by Hadji Abubakar.⁵² It must be recalled that after receiving a written message from Hadji Wasid to the effect that the rebellion would start on that very Sunday night, Hadji Mohamad Asik sent out his lieutenants, especially to Kubang, Kaloran, and Kaudjon, to spread the news and summon the disciples and partisans to prepare for the revolt.⁵³ The call to rebellion reached Hadji Mohamad Kanapiah through Hadji Muhidin, who, on Sunday evening, 8 July, called a meeting at Hadji Mohamad Kanapiah's house to discuss various matters concerning the coming rising.⁵⁴

The next morning people came flocking in to Bendung and Hadji Mohamad Asik, finding himself at the head of a large following, was ready to commence the march into the heart of Banten. All the combatants were ordered to drink holy water in order to make them invulnerable in battle, and Hadji Mohamad Asik himself pronounced a blessing over them.⁵⁵ In the meantime, another contingent of insurgents was assembled at Trumbu, headed by Hadji Mohamad Kanapiah, who was assisted by Hadji Achmad, Hadji Balki, and Dirham. In like manner, purifying rites were celebrated under the guidance of Hadji Mohamad Kanapiah himself.⁵⁶ Meanwhile Hadji Abubakar had

⁵¹ P.V. Jan. 3, 1889; P.V. Jan. 23, 1889; P.V. Jan. 30, 1889; P.V. March 26, 1889.

⁵² Missive of the Resident of Banten, May 2, 1889, no 124, in Exh. June 24, 1889, no. 76; for H. Abubakar, see Missive of the Resident of Banten, Apr. 3, 1889, no. 96, in Exh. May 20, 1889, no. 76.

⁵³ Missive of the Resident of Banten, May 2, 1889, no. 124.

⁵⁴ Ibidem.

⁵⁵ P.V. March 18, 1889, in Exh. May 2, 1889, no. 63.

⁵⁶ P.V. Sept. 23, 1889, in Exh. Nov. 23, 1889, no. 65.

gathered his following in Kaganteran and took the road to Karangantu, on the pretence of doing some work in his garden.⁵⁷ According to plan, the bands would start operations as soon as they got word from Hadji Wasid. Serang was to be attacked from different sides: the band under Kjai Ape from Dajeuh Kolot would approach the military camp from the south side, while other columns, led by Hadji Mohamad Asik and Hadji Mohamad Sangadeli, would enter the town from various points on the other sides. During the whole of Monday 9 July, the rebels were seen mustering in and around the great mosque of Serang, and in the *kampongs* of Kaloran and Kaudjon. Spies were sent to the town to make reconnaissance, and as they discovered that the *alun-alun* was guarded by soldiers, the leaders dared not give the command to strike.⁵⁸ After a whole day of painful indecision, on Monday night they finally received the news of what had happened in Tjilegon from Hadji Wasid. The bands tramped to Bendung and Trumbu, wholly sullen. They were mustered there until Wednesday, 11 July, when they disbanded.⁵⁹

SIGNIFICANT FEATURES OF THE REVOLT

Before continuing our account of the activities of the insurgents, certain significant features of the rising have to be examined. On reviewing the proceedings of the rebellion in general there seems to be good reason to believe that it was the result of a comprehensive design. The organization by means of which the rebellion was carried out extended throughout the *afdeling* of Anjer and the western districts of the regency of Serang. Evidently the eastern districts of that regency and the northern part of the regency of Pandeglang had not formed part of the main area of insurrection.⁶⁰ In these regions no disturbances took place which deserved any words of notice in contemporary records.

⁵⁷ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Apr. 3, 1889, no. 96.

⁵⁸ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1184; for the preparatory activities in Trumbu, Bendung, Kaudjon, Kaloran, see P.V. March 18, 1889; P.V. June 3, 1889, in Exh. July 24, 1889, no. 77; also Missive of the Resident of Banten, May 2, 1889, no. 124.

⁵⁹ P.V. March 18, 1889.

⁶⁰ The only band of rebels from outside the area mentioned was that under H. Muhidin of Tjipeutjang, a village which was situated in the regency of Pandeglang; there was no sign of activity in the eastern part of the regency of Serang. This fact might have been connected with the departure of H. Mardjuki shortly before the outbreak of the revolt; see above Chap. VI, p. 187. As regards Pandeglang, people followed the lead of H. Sahib, who seemed to be reluctant to join the rebellion; see Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), p. 1966.

It is impossible to form any accurate idea of the total numbers of the rebellious forces during the rising. At the nocturnal assault made on the house of Dumas, the attacking party was thought to number about a hundred men.⁶¹ On the occasion of the attack on Tjilegon on Monday morning, the body of insurgents from the north led by Hadji Wasid was estimated at about four or five hundred men.⁶² According to the records of court trials the number of rebels who mustered at Bendung was estimated at about four hundred men,⁶³ and according to the resident's account the muster at Trumbu comprised about six hundred men.⁶⁴ In the attack on the house of the Assistant *Wedana* of Krapjak a body of 60 men were employed.⁶⁵ At Djombang Kulon the number of men guarding the western exit of Tjilegon was only twenty.⁶⁶ Finally, at Tojomerto a body of about two hundred men was confronted by military troops from Serang.⁶⁷ I do not contend that these figures can be relied on as correct, but present them only to give an idea of the numerical strength of the insurrectionary force.

In connection with the presentation of these figures, an important question arises. To what extent was there active support on the part of the common people? Besides the zealous disciples of the *kjais*, there were many who became participants because of their veneration for the *kjais* or their grievances against officials. Of course, there were also people who acted under coercion and even under pain of death.⁶⁸ On the other hand, it is certainly not surprising that certain regions — where nuclei of the revolutionary élite were to be found — seem to have provided a large number of recruits, e.g. Ardjawinangun and Bedji.⁶⁹ As will be shown, the rebellion had no popular base at all outside the *afdeling* of Anjer and the western districts of the regency of Serang. It should also be noted that village heads were certainly

⁶¹ IG (1891), no. 2, p. 1164; the report of the Director of the Department of Interior only mentioned a crowd; see Report DDI, p. 11.

⁶² IG (1891), no. 2, p. 1167.

⁶³ P.V. Sept. 23, 1889.

⁶⁴ Missive of the Resident of Banten, May 2, 1889, no. 124.

⁶⁵ Report DDI, p. 52.

⁶⁶ Report DDI, p. 77.

⁶⁷ IG (1891), no. 2, p. 1176.

⁶⁸ E.g. Samad and Agung, who declared that they were compelled by Lurah Kasar to take part in the rebellion, see P.V. Jan. 3, 1889.

⁶⁹ The former was the new name for Medang Batu, a notorious centre of rebellious movements; many descendants of H. Wachia of the revolt in 1850 took part in the revolt of 1888, e.g. his two daughters, Nji Aminah and Nji Rainah; his son, Mesir; his son-in-law, Sakib; and his grandson, Abdurrachman, the son of Nji Rainah. See note in P.V. March 26, 1889.

represented at the musters of the rebels; it seems that some were eager partisans in the rebellion, while in other cases the active assistance of village heads was forcibly compelled by the insurgents.⁷⁰ There were only very few cases of ex-lower civil servants who actively engaged in the scenes of violence.⁷¹ Finally, it is certainly not surprising that the liberated convicts threw in their lot with the insurgents.

It is quite evident that the civil servants had made themselves the object of the insurgents' feelings of hatred and that they were persistently attacked during the disturbances. No doubt the actions of the rebels were largely influenced by the animosity they evinced to anyone who was charged with the enactment of government regulations, the levying of taxes, and the carrying out of the law. It is probably this popular resentment against the civil service which found expression in the destruction of the archives of government offices and the houses of the officials. Here we evidently meet with very prominent features of the revolt. In this connection it must be remarked that no signs of hostility were shown against foreigners other than Europeans, such as Chinese or Arabs. It seems that on rare occasions a few Chinese were molested,⁷² while one Arab was seen mingling with the crowd in the assistant resident's house.⁷³

An important question with regard to the aforementioned destruction is whether we here have to do with mere felonies or with definite social and political actions. In many instances we find that they searched for documents which were set ablaze. On two occasions the rebels stole important sums of money⁷⁴ — the money from the office of the adjunct-collector and that from the office of the salt sales

⁷⁰ To mention a few: Kamud of Bedji, Nurila of Tjitangkil, Djasim of Dukuh-malang; see P.V. Jan. 15, 1889. *Djaros* from Masdjid, Prijaji, and Kusambi Saba; see P.V. March 18, 1889; Saleh of Trumbu, see P.V. Sept. 23, 1889.

⁷¹ Mas Mohamad Kasim, an ex-clerk of the *djaksa*, took part in the killing of Gubbels according to the testimony of Dumas' wife; in later trials she contradicted her own testimony; see P.V. Jan. 3, 1889.

⁷² Lim Kim Soei of Serang, who happened to be at Bodjonegoro, was molested and his hair was cut; see P.V. Jan. 15, 1889. According to Tan Keng Hok's testimony, Chinese stores at the market were plundered, see *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 18. It is also said that the Chinese were compelled to embrace the Islamic faith; see A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 42.

⁷³ His name was Sjech Said bin Salim Madshi, and he came from Batavia; see Report DDI, p. 68.

⁷⁴ From the money in the adjunct-collector's office, an amount of at least f. 734.34, and from the money of the salt sales manager, f. 735.35; see *IWR*, No. 1337 (1889), p. 22. The loss that Dumas' wife suffered was estimated at about f. 1400, that suffered by the adjunct-collector's wife, about f. 2500; see *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 18; No. 1337 (1889), p. 21.

manager. There are also records of two court trials which refer to instances where the rebels were accused of stealing for private gain.⁷⁵ The evidence given by a Chinese related to incidents of shops being ransacked and merchandise looted.⁷⁶ We may certainly assume that these misdoings were committed by the rank and file of the rebel bands, since from what is known from the records it appears that disinterested motives prevailed among the rebel chiefs. It seems that the money and the gun of the Assistant *Wedana* of Mantjak were not stolen for personal gain but rather for the general good of the rebellion.⁷⁷ Furthermore, the fact that not one single house was set on fire after being attacked or its contents smashed, indicates some restraint among the rebels in carrying out their chosen task.

Before passing on to the outcome of the revolt, we have to consider the situation that confronted the insurgents as a result of their achievements. They held the *afdeling's* capital, Tjilegon, and the rebellion was sweeping through the region in every direction. But this victory did not last long. The contingents of rebels were made up, not of regular soldiers, but of ordinary peasants, who were not prepared to see a long campaign through. Furthermore, the leaders, perhaps overconfident and too trusting, had not prepared a far-reaching plan. Only as long as no effective armed force stood against them could the rebels maintain their position.

It remains to be asked what efforts were made to assemble some force to oppose the insurgents. We have seen that the rebels met with individual resistance only. In the next stage of the revolt, the defeat of the insurgents appears to have been due to the lack of a design for defensive action among the rebels rather than to prompt and vigorous action on the part of the local authorities. Both the rebel leaders and their followers, blinded by the conviction that they were invulnerable in waging the Holy War, failed to recognize that a more effective military organization and strategy were indispensable. The lack of such a strategy inevitably led to disaster.

⁷⁵ A gun was stolen during the attack on the house of the Assistant *Wedana* of Mantjak; see P.V. Jan. 23, 1889. The case of the silk socks belonging to the *patih* found in Kamidin's house lacked convincing evidence; see P.V. Jan. 3, 1889.

⁷⁶ The money was distributed among the rebels before they marched to Serang; see Report DDI, p. 60.

⁷⁷ *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889), p. 18. The various misdoings during the rebellion may have been due to the fact that robbers, gamblers and other criminals were to be found among the rebels; see A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 42.

CHAPTER VIII

THE SUPPRESSION OF THE REVOLT AND ITS AFTERMATH

The western districts of the *afdeling* of Serang can be said to have formed part of the main area of insurrection in July 1888. Before the wave of revolt could reach the capital of the residency of Banten, the reaction from the side of the government was already in progress. As has been described in the preceding chapter, just as the surrounding country of Serang was about to flare up into general insurrection, the rebels received the distressing news that their main force had been dispersed. The signs of approaching disturbances at once died down, and no rising took place in Serang.

After Tjilegon had been occupied and ransacked, the rebels turned towards Serang. As we know, Hadji Wasid led off his men toward this town on that very afternoon of 9 July. From the outset the rebels' chief project had undoubtedly been to seize the capital and to massacre its European and native civil servants. While the rebels were running riot in Tjilegon, all the bands from Trumbu and Bendung had flocked in to muster in Kaloran and Kaudjon — on the outskirts of Serang — and threatened to overrun the town. It is impossible to decide what the course of the rebellion would have been if the horde had been given the signal to enter the city gates. With this possibility in mind, it is obvious that the encounter between the rebels and the military troop in Tojomerto was a momentous event in the development of the revolt. If the encounter at Tojomerto had had another outcome, the insurgents would have attempted to besiege Serang according to plan, and slay the civil servants they hated so much. In fact, the plans of the rebel leaders as disclosed during the court trials later on hardly conveyed the information about the projected atrocities, which would be committed in the event of the seizure of Serang.¹

¹ P.V. March 18, 1889 and Missive of the Resident of Banten, March 18, 1889, no. 82, in Exh. May 2, 1889, no. 63; also P.V. May 1, 1889 and

THE ENCOUNTER AT TOJOMERTO

Whatever the case may be, on the afternoon of 9 July the rebels were in high spirits and felt confident that they would soon be in Serang. In the course of the morning, as we have already seen, bands of rebels had successively started for the capital; they massed together and, following the lead of Hadji Wasid *cum suis*, pressed on their way. On the same morning, after they had learned that this was a case of more than mere robbery, government authorities in Serang decided to send a military troop with 28 guns to establish law and order in Tjilegon. It was thither that the Regent and the Controller of Serang, together with Lieutenant van der Star — the commander of the troop — directed their march at the head of the military forces.² While the government was thus commencing its measures of repression, the rebel bands were only just beginning to move in the direction of Kramat Watu. On the outward journey the regent and the controller travelled together in one of the dogcarts. They left Serang at about 1.00 p.m., and proceeded along a few miles of flat straight road leading to the foot of the mountain range of Tjilegon. The convoy of military dogcarts was not molested until after they had passed Pelabuan. They were nearing a point where they had to pass a sunken road, when suddenly the column was attacked by rebels, who started hurling stones at the convoy from the top of the slopes. The soldiers returned a few shots, which sufficed to drive the rebels away from the road. A few more shots were fired at the fleeing insurgents who were disappearing into the wood.³ After they had safely eluded this ambush the convoy moved on in the direction of Tjilegon in battle-array and on the alert. As they neared Tojomerto, they saw a crowd of armed people blocking the road. While the troop was advancing, the rebels had been joined by reinforcements from different directions. It has been estimated that they amounted to two or three hundred men. At a distance of about two hundred metres from the crowd, the regent and the controller stepped out of their dogcart and went to meet the people. The regent attempted to dissuade them from carrying out their plan, but to no avail; the rebels simply burst into wild shouts of "*Sabil allah*". The

Missive of the Resident of Banten, May 2, 1889, no 124, in Exh. June 24, 1889, no. 76.

² Cable from the Resident of Banten to the Gov. Gen., July 9, 1888, no. 68, in MR 1888, no. 484; also Report of the Patrol Commander, July 14, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 496. See also *Java Bode*, July 10, 1888.

³ Report of the Patrol Commander, July 14, 1888; also *Java Bode*, July 18, 1888.

regent warned them that the soldiers would open fire if they did not disperse, and he also ordered them to drop their weapons. But no notice was taken of his warning and as a challenge a shot was fired at the regent and the controller. As the two men were afraid of being encircled by the multitude of rebels, the command was taken over by van der Star, who summoned the rebels to disperse three times. The troop thereupon fired; they killed nine rebels and wounded many others. The rest escaped under the cover of the trees.⁴ When the patrol approached the spot where the slain rebels lay, one of the victims jumped up and made a dash at the vanguard with his *klewang*. A brief struggle ensued between the assailant and a corporal named Daams. A few seconds afterwards a volley of shots was fired at the rebel, who was killed instantly.⁵ After this incident the patrol was able to march straight on to Tjilegon.

It gave the rebels quite a shock to realize that, in spite of their belief in their immunity from the enemies' bullets, the clash with government soldiers at Tojomerto had ended with the killing of a number of their comrades in arms and with many casualties. Furthermore, they were quite astonished when they observed for the first time the new kind of rifle — the repeating rifle — that the government troops were using instead of the breech-loader which had been used by military forces at the time of the Wachia rebellion in 1850.⁶ The effect was a widespread psychosis among the rebels that expressed itself in the form of disillusion; as a result, they were discouraged from continuing their fight for the cause of the rebellion. In fact, the morale of the rebels was largely broken and with the dispersal of their central forces after the battle at Tojomerto, the rebellion began to flicker. The defeat at Tojomerto can, therefore, be regarded as the turning-point in the course of the rebellion.

THE RESCUE

At about four o'clock in the afternoon, the patrol entered the centre of disorder, Tjilegon. The moment their approach was heard, the captives, who had been left behind by the fleeing rebels, hurriedly

⁴ For the list of killed/wounded rebels, see Appendix VII.

⁵ The assailant was identified as Mesir from Ardjawinangun. He was a son of H. Wachia, the rebel of the 1850 rebellion; his sisters, Nji Aminah and Nji Rainah, and his nephew, a son of the latter, took an active part in the revolt; see note in P.V. March 26, 1889.

⁶ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1176.

came to meet them. The local inhabitants, who had remained in the town, retreated as the military troop approached, without making the least show of resistance. In fact, the main body of rebels charged with guarding Tjilegon had fled the town. The troop marched to the gaol, where they fortified their position and provided themselves with victuals for a few days by carrying off goats, chickens, and rice from the deserted *kampongs*. During the night from 9 to 10 July everything seemed quiet in Tjilegon, except for the few shots fired by the guard at a band of rebels who made their appearance in the vicinity of the gaol.⁷ Because of the small number of the soldiers, the courage of many insurgents again rose and a plan was devised to take them by surprise during the night. At about midnight a large number of rebels under Hadji Wasid and Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail gathered at the *alun-alun*. Two attempts were made to approach the gaol, but each time a few shots were sufficient to drive the assailants off. At about three o'clock the rebels fired at the guard; the attack which was expected to follow did not, however, take place. The rebels melted away in the night. Undoubtedly nobody in the gaol could find rest that night.⁸ The next morning a messenger from Serang arrived, bringing the news that reinforcements from Batavia were under way. It should be noted that it was only at about 10.30 a.m. and only after a reward of fifty guilders had been offered that some one could be found who was prepared to take a written message to Serang. This is not surprising, for people knew that a multitude of rebels were still hanging about. Meanwhile, wives and children of murdered civil servants had left their hideouts and had taken refuge in the gaol. Little by little people came to seek the protection of the military troop. The village head of Djombang Wetan requested on behalf of his fellow-villagers that they be permitted to return to their homes. It should be noted that during the disturbances most of them had fled and had hidden themselves elsewhere. The request was granted on condition that the villagers supplied labourers from among themselves to do rescue-work — like burying the dead — and that the village head himself would remain as a hostage to guarantee the good behaviour of his fellow villagers.⁹

At this point we shall take up the story of another rescue-team which arrived in Tjilegon on that same day, 10 July. As has been pointed out

⁷ Report DDI, p. 86; also Report of the Patrol Commander, July 14, 1888.

⁸ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1185; cf. Report of the Patrol Commander, July 14, 1888.

⁹ *IG* (1891) no. 2, p. 1185.

before, on his arrival at Anjer Lor on Monday, 9 July, Raden Penna made a hurried attempt to assemble people who were willing to accompany him and proceed immediately to Serang. Frightened by the dreadful story of what had happened in Tjilegon, most of the Europeans in Anjer Lor not only refused to go but took refuge in the German ship "Elisabeth" lying at anchor in the harbour.¹⁰ The next morning, Raden Penna and van Rinsum had gathered about thirteen people; they started for Tjilegon, armed only with 2 Beaumont guns, 2 sporting guns, 2 muzzle-loaders and a few lances. They travelled in dogcarts as far as Tjigading; the rest of the way was covered on foot. Between Anjer Lor and Tjigading, not a living soul was to be seen, but as they neared Tjilegon they saw a crowd gathering at a distance from the road, which dispersed at the approach of the detachment from Anjer Lor. They also heard two cannon shots but not until they reached Tjilegon did they learn that a military patrol from Serang had already arrived.¹¹ Shortly after Raden Penna and his group had reached Tjilegon, a large contingent of insurgents under Hadji Sapiudin of Leuwibeureum crossed the highway from Anjer to Tjilegon, heading north. On learning this, they realized to how grave a danger they had been exposed.¹²

It was on that very morning that military troops from Batavia, one battalion strong, debarked in the harbour of Karangantu. The two aforementioned cannon shots were actually the signal of their arrival. At the same time a cavalry squadron was also on its way to Serang.¹³ The dispatch of these strong military detachments is explained by the fact that the rumours of the rising which reached Batavia spoke of a rebellion throughout Banten and the beleaguering of Serang by five thousand insurgents.¹⁴ It was also partly due to the fact that the central government had received vague information from the authorities in Banten during the first days of the rebellion.¹⁵ After it had disembarked,

¹⁰ Cable from the Commander of the Navy to the Gov. Gen., July 12, 1888, no. 812, in MR 1888, no. 484; Report DDI, pp. 91-92.

¹¹ Report of the Patrol Commander, July 14, 1888; Report DDI, pp. 87-95.

¹² *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1187.

¹³ Extract from the Military Journal (hereafter cited as M.J.) of the Commander of Troops in Banten, July 10, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 484; also Cable from the Commander of the Army to the Gov. Gen., July 10, 1888, no. 799, in MR 1888, no. 484.

¹⁴ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1188. For the hostility of the people in the vicinity of Serang, see Cable from the Resident of Banten to the Gov. Gen., July 10, 1888, no. 73, in MR 1888, no. 484.

¹⁵ See Cables from the Secretary of the Resident of Banten to the Gov. Gen., July 9, 1888, nos. 68, 69, 778; also July 10, 1888, no. 81, in MR 1888, no. 484.

the first company had to march on Serang and from there proceed to Tjilegon. As the detachment moved off towards Serang, there were many people along the road. As was discovered afterwards, they were no mere spectators but partisans from Trumbu and Kaganteran who had intended to attack the soldiers on their march. That nothing of the kind happened can be ascribed to the fact that the great number of soldiers deterred them from carrying out their plan.¹⁶

Of the fate of the insurgents after the encounter at Tojomerto we have a meagre knowledge. It would seem that the majority of them dispersed after that unfortunate encounter. With the flight of many leaders the main body of rebels was disbanded. The most prominent leaders, however, still kept a considerable number of followers together. They made up the band which evidently tried to attack the guard of the Tjilegon gaol on Monday night. They seem to have remained in the outskirts of Tjilegon for part of the following day. It is said that on this day the rebels began to gather with the aim of launching a second attack on Tjilegon. The two cannon shots mentioned above created much confusion among the leaders. Hadji Wasid and many other *hadjis* contended that they were the signal for the arrival of Kjai Agung, Hadji Mardjuki and other *sjechs* who would join the rebellion. Agus Suradikaria, however, defiantly insisted that the soldiers of the colonial government were marching towards Tjilegon. He reminded the rebels that in the revolt of 1850, military troops under Lieutenant-Colonel de Brauw had disembarked in Bodjonegoro; this time, the same measures might have been taken. On hearing this, many rebels from that district, more inclined to believe Suradikaria than Hadji Wasid, hurried back to their home villages to save their families.¹⁷ It is clear that under such circumstances Hadji Wasid was compelled to abandon the plan of launching a second attack altogether. In fact, the initiative had passed out of the hands of the rebels, and was now in those of government authorities, both military and civilian. With military reinforcements from Batavia, government officials at last felt safe and began to devise measures for capturing the rebel leaders who were still at large and for repressing the tumults which still raged in some places.

¹⁶ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1189; Missive of the Resident of Banten, Apr. 3, 1889, no. 96, in Exh. May 20, 1889, no. 76; also Missive of the Resident of Banten, May 2, 1889, no. 124.

¹⁷ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1189.

THE ACTIONS OF THE MILITARY EXPEDITION

In order to stamp out the last flickering of the fire of rebellion, expeditionary forces were sent out in various directions. The patrolling military troops were largely intended as a display of power; furthermore, they were charged with arresting and taking measures against the rebels. Although there were no signs of local disturbances in the vicinity of Serang, the villages in that area were daily traversed by military patrols because it was feared that the town would be overrun.¹⁸ It would seem that these patrols also had to appease many inhabitants of the capital who had not yet recovered from their panic. In fact, the government authorities together with the military units had their hands full in pacifying the *afdeling* of Tjilegon, for the insurrection had been very violent in that region. The first target in the operations of the expeditionary forces was the home villages of prominent rebel leaders, for the pursuers appear to have lost tracks of them and the information given by the people was often quite misleading.¹⁹ The search which was made of the whole environment of the home villages of the rebel chiefs was more successful because it formed the base of the rebels' operations. For our purpose it is not necessary to follow up all the actions of the military expedition; a few instances will suffice.

Shortly after their arrival at Tjilegon, the Resident of Banten and other authorities conferred on the situation and the measures of repression to be taken. Because they had been informed that many insurgents, including prominent leaders, had retreated to Bedji, they decided to send a punitive detachment with orders to capture the fugitives. Accordingly, shortly after midnight the first column under Captain de Brauw²⁰ marched northward past the following *desas*: Kapendilan, Beberan, Tangkurak, Kubanglaban Lor, then eastward via Kadjuruan and Kubangwatu up to Gunungsantri Kulon, where they waited for daybreak. The column had to move cautiously because many of the inhabitants of the villages had participated actively in the rebellion. On passing Kadjuruan it was observed that lights were still burning in the houses and that people were still awake. It would seem that many people were gathering, including strangers from other villages.

¹⁸ M.J. of the Military Commander at Serang, July 16 and 17, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 496.

¹⁹ Report DDI, p. 97.

²⁰ This Captain A. T. R. de Brauw, who headed the 2nd company of the 9th battalion was definitely not the same person as the above mentioned Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. de Brauw of 1850.

Suddenly two men appeared, armed with *klewangs*. The controller intimated to them that they must surrender and lay down their arms. At this summons, both men rushed forward, swinging their *klewangs*. The troop opened fire on them. The controller thereupon ordered the people to remain inside their houses, on pain of death. This summons was effective and people hastened to retreat to their houses. Except for this incident there was no show of resistance; the villagers simply withdrew.²¹ The main road to Bedji was the one which passed by Gunungsantri Kulon, but instead of taking this route, the column chose a more circuitous and inconvenient route. This was done because it was feared that the people of Gunungsantri Kulon might be alarmed by the approach of the troop. At about daybreak they were already at the border of the *sawahs* surrounding Bedji.

Meanwhile another attempt was made to reach Bedji via a different route. This was undertaken by the column under Captain Hojel, Raden Penna and van Rinsum, which took the short-cut via Petjek, Tunggak, Wadas and Gunungsantri. It arrived on the south side of Bedji at about the same time as the column under de Brauw. A cavalry unit was posted on the south side of the village.²² Bedji was surrounded as planned, and would be attacked at sunrise. The preparations were made secretly, so as to prevent the people of Bedji being informed in time. But they somehow received warning of the coming of military troops, because when the troops entered Bedji they found it almost deserted; only old men or sick people were to be seen. Judging from the lights still burning in the houses, it is quite probable that the villagers had left their homes hurriedly. The expedition had completely failed in its mission. While the soldiers were searching the houses, a fire somehow broke out in one of the houses and soon the whole village had burnt down. It is reported that a lamp was accidentally knocked over during the search.²³

On learning that the leaders of the revolt were hiding in Tjiora Kulon, the troops marched on westward, but on the way to this village it was decided that they would go to Kedung and Trate Udik first. These were notorious villages where the rebels were numerous. The

²¹ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1191; M.J., July 11 and 12, 1888, in *MR* 1888, no. 484.

²² *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1192; M.J., July 11 and 12, 1888.

²³ Extract M.J., July 11 and 12, 1888. H. Abdulkarim's house did not fall a prey to the fire despite the fact that it was located amidst the houses which had burnt down, see P.V. Jan. 23, 1889.

inhabitants of some of the *desas* that the soldiers passed were frightened by the sight of the military troops, fearing that their village might also fall a prey to the flames. They therefore eagerly showed their hospitality by presenting the troops with food and drink. In Kedung, however, no-one was to be seen except for two men sitting at the entrance of the village. On perceiving that they had been noticed they made an attempt to run away; one of them was captured while the other disappeared behind the houses. Thereupon the village was surrounded and the houses were searched, but all in vain; the fugitive could not be found. The village authorities were summoned and were told that the village would be burnt down if they did not inform the troops within a quarter of an hour where the fugitive was. The time expired and the fugitive's place of refuge was not revealed, so the village was set on fire. Within moments the fugitive and many other rebels had left their hideouts and were taken captives.²⁴

The next objective was Trate Udik. It was surrounded and thoroughly searched. An ex-village clerk revealed where Hadji Mahmud was hiding, and the soldiers marched to the spot instantly. He was found drinking a cup of tea in his house, and to the surprise of his pursuers he surrendered without offering any resistance. The man-hunt for the rebels was continued but to no avail. Faced with the people's "conspiracy of silence", the authorities had to resort to drastic measures. In Trate Udik as elsewhere, the houses were set on fire, and all the male villagers were taken prisoner. Their task being accomplished, the expeditionary troops marched off to Tjilegon, taking with them about fifty captives.²⁵

On 13 July, a detachment under Lieutenant van Winning was dispatched to the south-western part of the district of Tjilegon because the government had been informed that the married couple Grondhout had been murdered in the neighbourhood of Kusambi Bujut. The troop

²⁴ *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1193; *M.J.*, July 12 and 13, 1888, in *MR* 1888, no. 484.

²⁵ Report DDI, p. 99; according to the author of the *IG*'s article, the number of captives amounted to 400; *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1194. Kedung and Trate Udik were burnt by order of the controller, de Chauvigny de Blot, see *M.J.* July 12 and 13, 1888; Cable from the Commander of the Army to the Gov. Gen., July 12, 1888, no. 826, in *MR* 1888, no. 484; Cable from the Resident of Banten to the Gov. Gen., July 12, 1888, no. 98, in *MR* 1888, no. 484; for the prohibition against burning down houses as issued by the central government, see Cable of the General Secretary, July 13, 1888 and Cable from the Resident of Banten to the Gov. Gen., July 14, 1888, no. 118, in *MR* 1888, no. 484.

searched without result, for the local inhabitants did not intimate where the dead bodies had been hidden. For this reason the villagers, including the local chiefs, were suspected of being in alliance with the rebels. On the march to and from Kusambi Bujut the troop arrested two *hadjis* from Bangu, both dressed as common villagers; later on, two rebels were captured at Tegalwangi.²⁶ The *Wedana* of Kramat Watu intimated to the commander of the squad that neither Hadji Wasid nor Hadji Kasiman was to be found there. A nephew of the latter tried to escape into the *sawah* and did not respond to the summons of the cavalry to give himself up. As he seized a rein of one of the horses in an attempt to make its rider fall, he was cut down and captured. Hadji Kasiman's house was committed to the flames.²⁷ It is worth mentioning that on that same day another detachment was sent to Sanedja with the order to surround it and to capture Hadji Iskak. Of course, he had already taken flight.²⁸

Indeed, law enforcement really got well under way after the arrival of the expeditionary troops in the area. For three weeks they were busily engaged in persecutions in the various districts of the *afdeling* of Tjilegon. Not until the third week was the hunting-ground enlarged with the addition of the western part of the regency of Tjaringin and Lebak. Literally every spot where the rebel leaders might be supposed to be hiding was searched. Attempts were made to force disclosures which might lead to further arrests from both the captives and villagers. But the government authorities soon came to the conclusion that these tactics did not work, for the simple reason that they were often fooled by false information.²⁹

Let us revert again to the daily operations of the military detachments. On 14 July the troops were ordered to proceed in three different directions. The first column under Captain Hojel moved towards Tjibeber to make a search for rebels wounded in the battle of Tojo-merto. That same morning the troop returned, bringing not only a wounded man but also about 25 suspects. In the meantime another detachment marched in the direction of Bagendung to resume the search for the couple Grondhout. On the basis of information given by two captives who had been present at the bloody scene, the third column

²⁶ Cable from the Resident of Banten to the Gov. Gen., July 14, 1888, no. 115, in MR 1888, no. 484.

²⁷ Extract M.J., July 12, 13 and 14, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 496.

²⁸ Extract M.J., July 12 and 13, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 484.

²⁹ Extract M.J., July 11 and 12, 1888; also Extract M.J., July 12, 13 and 14, 1888.

was charged with scouring the *desa* Tunggak, where the wounded Kjai Tunggak and numerous partisans remained in concealment. The celebrated *kjai* had vanished; only the peaceful inhabitants had remained. On the way back to Tjilegon this column scoured two more *desas*, Mamengger and Petjek, but to no avail. Only three unfortunate suspects were taken captive.³⁰

Obviously no slackness was displayed in this rebel-hunt, but it would seem that the result was rather disheartening because of the failure to capture the rebel leaders, who after one week of fierce persecution were still at large. The story as recorded by the military journals tends to become dull because it tells only of the routine patrolling and scouring of the countryside. Meanwhile the number of captives amounted to about 150, but as pointed out before, the pursuers appeared to have lost all track of the prominent leaders of the rebellion. Their homes and those of their close relatives were deserted,³¹ and evidently they always managed to escape when the military forces encircled their villages. Indeed, how to capture the rebel leaders occasioned the government authorities much brainracking. After one week of fruitless persecution, all the village heads in the *afdeling* of Tjilegon were assembled by the resident on 17 July. The Regent of Serang addressed them and expounded the government's views and decisions on the situation. In his speech he placed the emphasis on their duty to assist the government in pursuing and capturing the rebel leaders and their adherents. The government offered a reward of five hundred guilders to any person who delivered Hadji Wasid, Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail and certain other prominent figures in the revolt, alive or dead. Thereupon the village heads offered their services with a concerted "*inggih*", but without making many protestations of devotion.³²

FUGITIVE REBEL BANDS FOUGHT ON

As a result of the burning down of villages, the rebels' strategy had to be switched to a purely defensive one. Hadji Wasid's endeavour to fight in his own region — the environment of Bedji and the Gunung Gede area — suffered a serious setback, because he had been deprived of his main base of operation. The re-assembling of large rebel bands was impracticable and the only alternative was to prolong the struggle as long as possible with hide-and-seek tactics. After the government

³⁰ Extract M.J., July 14, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 496.

³¹ Extract M.J., July 12, 13 and 14, 1888; also Report DDI, p. 100.

³² Extract M.J., July 17, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 496; *inggih* means yes.

troops had assaulted the region that was of the most vital importance for the rebels, they incessantly hunted down the roaming rebel leaders and their small followings. Although the first suppression campaign had not been quite successful, the most considerable bands of insurgents had already been dispersed. To be sure, the dramatic burning down of villages definitely lowered the morale of the local population on the one hand, and confirmed the position of the government forces in halting the rebels on the other. During the period of the repression of the revolt the people remained passive, although they still demonstrated a guarded leniency towards the rebels.

Before we continue with the story of the fate of the chief rebels and their cohorts, mention should be made of the outbreak of some isolated disturbances which occurred after the occupation of Tjilegon by military forces. Although these turmoils were on a very small scale, they nevertheless deserve our attention. They contribute towards completing the picture of the general situation during those stirring days. Obviously a political vacuum ensued after the outbreak of the revolt in the whole region of the *afdeling* of Tjilegon. For some time the civil servants did not dare to return to their posts for fear of falling victim to the sanguinary actions of the rebels still roaming in the area. Some instances show that their fear was accountable. It must be recalled that the assistant *wedanas* had manifestly been persecuted by the rebels and that their homes had been ransacked.³³ Although the disturbances in Tjilegon had died down, a sub-district head in an outlying post, Gudang Batu, was hunted by a rebel band which had concealed itself there. The authorities received timely warning so that it was possible for the man to be rescued by a detachment led by the village head of Palamunan.³⁴ The retreating rebels also resorted to sabotage, an instance of which was the burning of bridges located south of Petjek.³⁵ Another violent scene was enacted in Pasar Pulokali where the house of the *mandoor gardu* was set on fire. Nobody could say with any certainty what had motivated this destructive action. It might have had something to do with a personal feud or an act of retaliation.³⁶ Whatever the case may have been, it became clear to government authorities that it would not

³³ See above, Chap. VII, pp. 230-232.

³⁴ The Commander of the Army to the Gov. Gen., July 12, 1888, no. 457, in MR 1888, no. 484.

³⁵ Extract M.J., July 12, 13 and 14, 1888.

³⁶ Cable from the Resident of Banten to the Gov. Gen., July 19, 1888, no. 169, in MR 1888, no. 496; see also Extract M.J. July 19, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 506.

be possible to restore law and order before the influence of every single rebel chief had been annihilated. Their persecution must, therefore, be taken in hand vigorously. This is what actually happened during the last two weeks of the month of July.

We shall now again return to the hunted rebel chiefs. As has been noted before, the main body of the rebels had hurried away from Tjilegon, frightened by the advance of the military troops from Batavia. Hadji Wasid and his cohort made their way northward. It would seem that on 11 July Hadji Wasid was in Kaligandu, to the west of Bedji, where he halted at Hadji Nasiman's house for a while. The next day he proceeded to the house of Hadji Madani at Tjiora Kulon. He hastily reassembled the band, which numbered one hundred and fifty men. On 13 July the band under Hadji Wasid marched to Gunung Gede, which offered a formidable defensive position.³⁷ In the meantime they constantly had to face accumulating difficulties and handicaps. To mention two: the government troops had set fire to certain *desas* in the north, which bereft the rebels of a base for operation; furthermore, popular support began to wane owing to the fact that the local population was frightened by the severe measures taken by the government. In fact, as they were constantly chased and driven into the forest to hide, many of the insurgents not only had little fighting spirit but easily deserted the main body of rebels. Nevertheless, during this episode of distress and low spirits, there were still sanguine leaders who keyed up their men to a serious effort towards recovery. The most important question with which the rebel leaders were faced was, what were the best means to escape from that passive state and regain the initiative. They were deeply conscious of the fact that it was essential to create a new base, since remaining in the small peninsula of Gunung Gede would mean being encircled by government troops which would inevitably lead to complete annihilation. The locality in which the band would be able to operate and obtain the warm support of the people seemed to suggest itself. No region would suit their strategy better than the Balagendung area. The region was well-known as a centre of revolt in many episodes of Banten history, and at the time it held a number of families that proudly pointed to their forefathers as notorious rebels.³⁸ Another important fact was that it was the region where Kjai

³⁷ For H. Wasid's retreat to Gunung Gede, see P.V. Dec. 6, 1888; also Report DDI, p. 104.

³⁸ Many of the descendants of H. Wachia of the 1850 revolt were living at Ardjawinangun, formerly called Medang Batu; besides those mentioned

Hadji Tubagus Ismail came from and it was therefore to be expected that he would be able to mobilize a large following. In short, the region held bright prospects for building up a new revolutionary force and for coping with adverse circumstances as well. On these grounds the chief rebels decided to abandon Hadji Wasid's home territory — the peninsula of Gunung Gede — and to transfer their band to the Balagendung area by crossing the highway between Anjer and Serang somewhere in the west. This meant that they would have to make a break-through on the periphery of the area controlled by government troops. Another point of strategic importance would be to confuse their pursuers by spreading rumours and false information concerning their whereabouts. On 14 July, the band descended the slopes of Gunung Gede and marched in the direction of the west coast. It appears that they had their encampment that night in the woods near the seashore, close to the estuary of the river Krentjeng.³⁹ Not until two days later were government authorities informed that Hadji Wasid and his band were halting at that very spot. But on 17 July, when the expeditionary force arrived, they only found a camp-site and some food left behind by the rebels.⁴⁰ From the traces left behind it was inferred that the band was made up of about forty to fifty men. In the meantime the band had already advanced as far as Tjiasahan. On the way thither, it had passed Kepuhdenok, Blokan and Luwuk; by then Hadji Kasiman had detached himself from the group in order to make a search for Hadji Kola. Since the records make no mention of this, it is difficult to find out what motivated Hadji Wasid in charging his brother with this task. On its arrival at Tjiasahan the band halted in a *pisang* garden, where it slept for the rest of the night.⁴¹ The next day late in the evening the group broke up camp and set out on its nocturnal journey to the forests of Medang Batu. Meanwhile government troops hurried to Mantjak on information given them by the villagers at Tjitangkil. While they were searching the place, the troops were told by the *Patih* of Tjilegon and Pandeglang that they had been falsely informed and that a further effort to find the rebels should be made in Tjiora where many kinsmen

under note 5, there were Sakib (son-in-law to H. Wachia, married to Nji Rainah) and Abdurrachman (son of Sakib); see P.V. March 26, 1889.

³⁹ Extract M.J., July 18, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 506; Report DDI, pp. 104-105.

⁴⁰ Extract M.J., July 18, 1888; the number of the rebels was estimated at 30 to 40 men; according to Report DDI, about 40 to 50 men; see Report DDI, p. 109.

⁴¹ Extract M.J., July 18, 1888; Report DDI, p. 105.

of Hadji Wasid lived. Thereupon Tjiora and Tjiora Kulon were thoroughly scoured, but without any result, as was to be expected.⁴² And yet the *Patih* of Pandeglang, Raden Surawinangun, had travelled through the Medang Batu area on his way to Tjilegon and must have learned something of Hadji Wasid, who was roaming about in that area. In fact, the local population there had told the *patih* that Hadji Wasid had marched to Gunung Gede and might then be at Tjiora.⁴³ At about this time, rumours were spreading that Hadji Wasid had gone to Batavia and intended to leave for Mecca on a French ship.⁴⁴ The two stories were not incompatible since it could easily be imagined that Hadji Wasid might have embarked on a boat and set out on the voyage to Batavia from one of the coastal villages in the Gunung Gede area.

On hearing these reports the authorities were more than ever resolved to capture the rebels. On 18 July two detachments were dispatched for the purpose of hunting down and arresting the rebels. This was to be done by encircling Bodjonegoro; the patrol guided by van Rinsum approached the village from the west while the one guided by Hermens advanced from the east. The two detachments entered the village, which appeared to be completely quiet and showed no sign of the presence of insurgents.⁴⁵ On the next day, 19 July, the two columns advanced towards Tjiora, where a third detachment was to join them in searching the village. For two days in succession Tjiora was the scene of a rebel hunt. This thorough search proved fruitless again.⁴⁶ The government then raised the reward for the capture of the rebel chiefs to a thousand guilders each.⁴⁷

While the military troops were busily engaged in tracking the rebels, Hadji Wasid and his band had evidently reached the forest of Medang Batu. The main body of insurgents had been reduced to 27 men, and it well knew that it would require a desperate effort to defend itself successfully against an army.⁴⁸ It seems that as the band had to endure serious setbacks, dissensions ensued among the leaders. This internal discord manifested itself during a council of war, which was held to decide on the new strategy. This meeting can be regarded as a mo-

⁴² Extract M.J., July 18, 1888.

⁴³ Extract M.J., July 18, 1888; Report DDI, p. 110.

⁴⁴ Extract M.J., July 20, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 506; Report DDI, p. 112.

⁴⁵ Extract M.J., July 18, 1888.

⁴⁶ Extract M.J., July 19, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 506.

⁴⁷ Extract M.J., July 18, 1888.

⁴⁸ Report DDI, pp. 111-112.

mentous event in the history of the rebellion, since its outcome evidently determined the further course of the rebellion. One of the main problems that had to be solved was the choice of a new locality as a base for operation. On their arrival in the Medang Batu area they had learnt that the local population was no longer loyal to the cause and was reluctant to support the struggle, let alone join the band as combatants.⁴⁹ The unfortunate outcome of the encounter at Tojomerto had discouraged the people of Medang Batu from taking up arms again. As regards the strategy, divergent ideas were put forward by the leaders as to how the struggle should be continued. Kjai Hadji Madani and Hadji Djahli then announced that they were going to quit the band without giving any reason.⁵⁰ Agus Suradikaria made a plan for retreating to Tjikandi, long notorious as a favourite hide-out for rebels and brigands.⁵¹ Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail was an advocate of launching a decisive battle and dying as a hero. Weary of roving through forests and over mountains, he was determined to rally his *murids* in the region and plunge into a final attack on the *kafirs*; otherwise they would incessantly be hunted by superior forces. Lastly, Hadji Wasid tried to persuade his colleagues to retreat to the waste land in South Banten, taking the route along the west coast. This plan was based on Hadji Mardjuki's promise that he would come back and bring Kjai Agung and other prominent *sjechs* with him from Mecca to join in the struggle if they could pursue the *djihad* for one more year.⁵² Another consideration which carried much weight was that in the region south of Tjaringin — around Tjamara and Karangbolong — many people originating from Tjilegon would sympathize with their cause and support their struggle. Hadji Wasid's plan was approved of by the majority of the band; some of the dissenters, namely Hadji Madani, Hadji Djahli and Agus Suradikaria, separated from the group.

After a few days' marching towards the south, a few partisans of the rank and file had left the band, so that its strength was reduced to 21 men. As far as we know they had been prevented from slipping away on the way to Medang Batu, because they had been heavily guarded by the *kjais*.⁵³

It was apparently the ardent expectation of the return of the Great

⁴⁹ See above, note 4 and 5; also note 38.

⁵⁰ Report DDI, p. 105.

⁵¹ See above, Chap. IV, especially with reference to the rebellion of 1845.

⁵² Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16.

⁵³ P.V. Dec. 6, 1889.

Kjai rather than deliberate planning which made the retrograde march take so long. It could also be said that the last fighters were running for their lives. It is evident that this important step was occasioned by the unfavourable surroundings met with by the insurgents in their own region.⁵⁴ Before describing the long march to South Banten as the last episode of the rebellion, we have to deal with the events relating to some of the chief rebels who had left the main body of insurgents. In describing their actions, we will have to deviate from the strict sequence of events.

THE RESISTANCE OF THE "FREE-LANCE" CHIEF REBELS

On the morning of the 17th of July, an unknown man in plain native dress approached the sentry posted at the *gardu* of Benggala. He suddenly rushed at the sentry and attacked him with his weapon, without taking any notice of the summons to halt. The assailant prevented the sentry from shooting by grabbing hold of his gun. On seeing that the assailant meant to slay the sentry, the commander of the guard immediately aimed and fired at the assailant, who was killed instantly. On examining the body it was found that the man wore a turban under the conventional native headgear and a white *slendang* under his *sarong*: a rosary was found in his jacket. Afterwards the Head *Panghulu* of Serang identified the body; it was nobody else than Hadji Iskak from Sanedja, one of the chief rebels.⁵⁵ It would seem that shortly after the battle at Tojomerto, Hadji Iskak had fled to Palembang in the district of Ondar-Andir, where he was concealed by his relatives for a few days. In this way he furnished himself with plausible alibi. The brief encounter with the military guard posted on the south side of Serang occurred when Hadji Iskak was on his way back to his home village, just before he entered the capital.

Not long after this, on 21 July, the death of two of the fugitives, Hadji Madani and Hadji Djahli, came about in the following way. Separated from the main body of insurgents, both *hadjis* made their way to Tjipinang where they sought refuge in the village mosque. They apparently hoped to be able to remain in hiding, and counted on the support of the villagers. There they passed several nights and days in great anxiety and suspense. The embarrassment of the *panghulu* of the *desa* on hearing that two runaways were hiding in the mosque is quite under-

⁵⁴ As to the supply of food, it was taken care of by H. Rapali, *Panghulu* of Balagendung, see P.V. Jan. 3, 1889.

⁵⁵ Extract M.J., July 17, 1888; also P.V. July 17, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 496.

standable. Instead of having them dragged out of the sanctuary, he decided to deliver the political offenders up to the government authorities. So the news was communicated to the authorities, who lost no time in dispatching two detachments to Tjipinang, one cavalry squadron and one column of infantry, guided by the controller Hermens and the *patih*. They marched to the village and encircled the mosque as they approached. It should be noted that the mosque was built of brick and possessed only two entrances on opposite sides. As the soldiers approached the spot, they saw that both doors were closed. Without hesitating two infantrymen burst open one of the doors and rushed in, where they found everything silent and apparently deserted. Then one of the infantrymen was suddenly attacked from behind. At this he turned and grappled with the "malefactor"; a terrific struggle ensued, in which the infantryman suffered several blows, one of which was rather serious. By now other soldiers had joined in the battle. A withering volley of shots was fired at the two rebels, who were killed immediately.⁵⁶

A few days later, local authorities in the regency of Serang found traces of other fugitive rebel leaders, Agus Suradikaria and two of his followers. As soon as the military commander received word of this, he dispatched a patrol of four men guided by the *Patih* of Serang to Kusambisaba. On reaching the house where the three rebels were hiding, guards were placed at all the exits. The *patih* thereupon summoned the rebels to surrender. Two of the fugitives responded to this summons by charging the *patih*. Before they had done any serious harm they were killed. Meanwhile the third man tried to escape but was seized and bayoneted by a soldier; the man fell down dead. Later the two followers of Agus Suradikaria were identified as Hadji Nasiman and a policeman who had been attached to the *Djaksa* of Tjilegon.⁵⁷

At about the same time rumours were circulating that Hadji Kasiman was hiding near Tjigading, in a sugar-cane garden not far from the western seashore. Knowing the lay of the land, he had an advantage over his pursuers and could easily elude the grasp of the law, so he felt that he might pause for a while in his flight. But the rebel chase continued unabated and, as we have already seen, large sums were

⁵⁶ Extract M.J., July 22 and 23, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 506; see also *Java Bode*, July 23 and 26, 1888.

⁵⁷ Extract M.J. July 26, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 506; also Cable from the Resident of Banten to the Gov. Gen., July 26, 1888, no. 221, in MR 1888, no. 506.

offered for the capture of the insurgents and a regular army was employed in pursuing them. None of the fugitive chief rebels had found safe asylum; nor had Hadji Kasiman. Although quite a number of rumours had been circulating about him for some time, his hideout was not located until 27 July. On that same day spies were on his track and as soon as the authorities had been informed, a military column hurried to Tjitangkil. The house where Hadji Kasiman and Hadji Arbi were supposed to be hiding was carefully surrounded, and the soldiers were ready with their guns. Both *hadjis* had heard the sound of hoof-beats approaching — those of the cavalry horses — and had realized that the troop was coming. Hadji Kasiman at once availed himself of this timely warning and made an effort to escape. He dashed out of the house, followed by Hadji Arbi. The agile Hadji Kasiman managed to leap over a fence and disappeared into the wood. Hadji Arbi however, missed the chance to escape and seeing that it was now a matter of life or death for him, made desperate efforts to kill one of the cavalymen. Hadji Arbi inflicted several wounds on him with his *klewang*, but the following instant he was killed by gun-shots and sable cuts. In the meantime Hadji Kasiman fled rapidly, leaving his pursuers behind. The search for the fugitive ensued, but to no purpose. The villagers were therefore forced to participate in the man-hunt. They soon traced the fugitive and the cavalry thereupon rode hard towards the hiding place of Hadji Kasiman. Shortly afterwards the rebel found himself surrounded by his pursuers on all sides. The *djaro* summoned him to leave his hiding place. Although he was aware of the fact that he had no chance of escaping, Hadji Kasiman obstinately refused to surrender. Determined to fight to the death, he stood firmly in the middle of the *sawah*, holding his *keris* in his hand. In the face of his steadfast courage, the commander of the column reluctantly ordered his men to fire at him. The bodies of the two *hadjis* were carried away to Tjilegon.⁵⁸

The valiant resistance of the “free-lance” chief rebels may well appear to us as futile exhibitions, which suited the subduers of the revolt rather than its actors, but we must bear in mind that the individual endeavours of the “free-lance” rebels in various parts of the region may have been intended to distract the authorities’ attention from the main body of rebels so that a break-through could be made by

⁵⁸ Extract M.J., July 27, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 523; Report DDI, pp. 122-124. See also *Java Bode*, Aug. 3, 1888.

Hadji Wasid and his cohort. Whether it was done intentionally or not, it is an undeniable fact that in pursuing the "free-lance" rebels, the government forces were diverted from their pursuit of the main rebel band. The dissemination of falsehoods about the flight of the chief rebels, especially Hadji Wasid, also served to discomfit government authorities. That the news-mongers were quite successful is evidenced by the flow of confusing and contradictory information concerning the locality of Hadji Wasid. Besides the rumours about Hadji Wasid's impending voyage on a French ship, the Resident of Prijangan brought the government the news that Hadji Wasid and his band must have been in Tjiandjur.⁵⁹ Soon afterwards a captive stated that Hadji Wasid and his band were marching eastward and that Pamarajan — in the southern part of Tjikandi — was their destination.⁶⁰ Instead of stopping the circulation of false information the civil servants, who were more or less panic-stricken, contributed to its spread. The man-hunt seems to have passed beyond the borders of Banten and everywhere civil servants were on the look-out for the rebels whom the government wanted so badly. Suspects were arrested in Batavia, Purwakarta, and elsewhere.⁶¹ In consequence of the confusing flow of information, the authorities could not trace the exact locality of the chief insurgents on the one hand, and their suspicion was aroused of any information originating from the people on the other. At about the time that Hadji Wasid's band set out for the long march to the south, the government authorities still clung to the idea that there were two rebel bands, one under Hadji Wasid heading for Pamarajan, and the other under Hadji Sapiudin of Leuwibeureum roaming in the Mantjak Area.⁶² After this digression let us again take up the story of the long march of the main band.

THE LONG MARCH TO THE SOUTH

The departure of the band to the south took place shortly after the momentous decision at the conference in the forest of Medang Batu had been taken. It will be recalled that those who disagreed with Hadji Wasid's plan — which they considered wishful thinking — went their own way, while Hadji Wasid and the majority of the band set out to march southwards. The route that Hadji Wasid took was the

⁵⁹ Extract M.J., July 21, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 506.

⁶⁰ Extract M.J., July 23, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 506.

⁶¹ *Java Bode*, July 20 and 26, 1888; also Aug. 3, 1888.

⁶² Extract M.J., July 23, 1888; Report DDI, pp. 115-116.

most direct one which, although it passed through savage land with dense forests notorious for tigers,⁶³ gave the band a chance to penetrate into the Tjaringin area and to reach the south-west extremity of Banten. The band left on 20 July and took about ten days to reach Tjamara. Bearing in mind the primitive means that the band had at its disposal, this march was a noteworthy event in the history of logistics. In any case, the group travelled at a considerable speed, but it was not quick enough to shake off the pursuing government troops. Determined not to give the rebels a chance to rest, the authorities ordered that a blockade be set up, and that the places where the fugitives were supposed to be hiding be encircled. Soon after the rebels had crossed the river Tjidanu on 21 July, the authorities were informed of this move and of the rebels' intended journey.⁶⁴ They began to make arrangements for blockading all the roads leading to the south and the east. This measure was taken as a precaution to prevent a breakthrough of the rebels in the event of their fleeing to Tjikandi. A large part of the troops was furthermore stationed along the western border between Tjaringin and Anjer. This time the government intended to make sure that the rebels would not go free. Anticipating the possibility that the rebels would attempt a breakthrough along this border, the authorities deemed it necessary to double the guard at all strategic points and to intensify the patrol between the various posts. A detachment of infantrymen under the command of de Chauvigny de Blot was stationed at Brengas and was charged with the occupation of the Brengas-Tjinojong line.⁶⁵ In this campaign for encircling the rebels it was also necessary to station another detachment at Tjimanuk in the regency of Pandeglang, in order to prevent an escape via Gunung Asepun and Gunung Pulosari.⁶⁶ The passage in the north was guarded by a troop stationed at Tjinangka. This was the state of military preparation on the 25th of July.

Meanwhile Hadji Wasid's band was engaged in forcing its way through this unknown, savage, and rugged land. It seems that the rebels lingered in the forests of Malangnengah, Kubangkidul and Putri. In four whole days they advanced not more than a few miles south-

⁶³ See *WNI* (1889-1890), pp. 1201-1202; Tjaringin was also called *kebun maung*, i.e. tiger land. See Pleyte, in *TBG*, Vol. LII (1910), p. 138.

⁶⁴ Report DDI, p. 115; for the goal of the journey, see Extract M.J. July 25, 1888 (in *MR* 1888, no. 506), where it is mentioned as being Djungkulon.

⁶⁵ Extract M.J., July 22 and 24, 1888, in *MR* 1888, no. 506.

⁶⁶ Extract M.J., July 25, 1888.

wards. We do not know whether the digression towards Tjinangka that they made along their route was meant as a tactical gesture to deceive their pursuers or whether it was made for some other reason. What we do know from the records is that there was some reluctance to proceed further southwards via the *afdeling* of Tjaringin where they knew only a few people.⁶⁷ It must be added that the natural hazards of the region they were passing through seem to have hindered their progress. In any case, on the evening of the 25th of July the band had advanced only as far as Putri, and faced the advanced position of the military troops referred to above. With a brilliant strategic of their own the rebels managed to pass both the *gardu* at Putri and the border between Anjer and Tjaringin in safety.⁶⁸ They then sought cover in the forest of Tjinojong where they spent the night 25 July—26 July. On the evening of 26 July, as the moon was rising — as the report romantically stated⁶⁹ — they crossed the road from Brengas to Tjinojong at a point near Batiku. When it was discovered that the band had passed the Anjer-Tjaringin border on 25 July, the military commander had ordered that a strong guard be stationed in Brengas, Lampir and Tjinojong. Pandat had also been occupied, in order to cut off the passage to the south between Mt. Asepun and Mt. Pulosari. The band had succeeded in performing the break-through along the road from Brengas to Tjinojong despite this almost impermeable blockade. This second break-through was not detected until 28 July.⁷⁰ Meanwhile both civilians and troops gathered in the area between Tjaringin and Anjer and combed the mountains and forests. Strong guards were placed at all important exits to the south. Indeed, the hunt never slackened for one moment. The alarm of the authorities on learning that four rebels had been signalled in the neighbourhood of Tjaringin Lor on the evening of 28 July, may therefore easily be imagined.⁷¹ It was a confusing situation which required that both the civilian and the military authorities take immediate action in order to rectify their blockade strategy. The military posts with which they had thought to encircle the rebels had to be moved to more southerly points. A detachment led by the *Patih* of Pandeglang was posted at Tadjur, another was stationed some-

⁶⁷ Ibidem.

⁶⁸ Extract M.J., July 26, 1888; Report DDI, p. 124.

⁶⁹ Report DDI, p. 106; see also Extract M.J., July 29, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 523.

⁷⁰ Extract M.J., July 29, 1888.

⁷¹ Extract M.J., July 30, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 523; Report DDI, p. 125.

where between Pandat and Tandjolahang, while a group of policemen under the *Djaksa* of Tjaringin was ordered to watch the road leading to the south.⁷² The strategy of encircling the rebels was continued, but it was given a wider scope, and covered the entire region within the line connecting Brengas, Tjinojong, Tjirogol, Barengkok, Gasoli, Tjikembeureum, Pandat and Tandjolahang.⁷³ This time the strategy was based on surrounding Mt. Aseupan, where the fugitives were supposed to be roaming. In this way the pursuers also hoped to prevent the rebels from proceeding to the slopes of Mt. Pulosari.⁷⁴ Yet somehow the outlaws managed to slip through this net.

The newly planned strategy had scarcely been worked out when the news came that the band had crossed the Tjibungur river on the night of 28—29 July. The ferry-man had been forced to convey the band of rebels, numbering nineteen men in all, across the river. They had been armed with two guns, a few pikes and for the rest with daggers. Evidently they had looked exhausted and sullen. Three of them had seemed to be *hadjis*.⁷⁵ Having left the pursuing troops behind for a while, the band marched on along the coast with considerable haste. People were told that they were heading for Tjiseukeut, a deserted village near Tjiseureuheun. There was some speculation among the pursuers that the rebels might move on to Djungkulon — a peninsula in the south-western extremity of Banten — “to become heremits”, as a newspaper report put it.⁷⁶

THE ULTIMATE DEFEAT

In preparation for the campaign against the remainder of the insurgents, a conference of government and army leaders was held at Labuan on the evening of 29 July. Present at the meeting were the Assistant Resident of Tjaringin, van der Meulen; the *Patih* of Pandeglang, Raden Surawinangun; the Controller of Tjaringin, Maas; the *Djaksa* of Tjaringin, Tubagus Anglingkusuma; Captain Veenhuyzen, Lieutenant Visser, and Sergeant Wedel.⁷⁷ A decision was made to dispatch an expeditionary force under Captain Veenhuyzen to Tjiteureup in order to cut off the rebels' flight. On the arrival of this expeditionary force

⁷² Extract M.J., July 28, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 523.

⁷³ Extract M.J., July 28 and 29, 1888.

⁷⁴ Extract M.J., July 29, 1888.

⁷⁵ Extract M.J., July 30, 1888.

⁷⁶ *Java Bode*, Aug. 3, 1888.

⁷⁷ Report DDI, pp. 127-128.

at Tjiteureup, it received information about the whereabouts of the runaways to the effect that they had passed Tjiteureup on the morning of 29 July, and had proceeded southwards in the direction of Tjiseureuheun.⁷⁸ It was also reported that the *Wedana* of Panimbang, the Assistant *Wedana* of Katumbiri and a few police-servants had already gone in pursuit of the fugitives.⁷⁹ A very short time after the arrival of the troops, just sufficient to collect information and to 'size up the situation, a detachment under Lieutenant Visser was ordered to march to Sumur by land, while another led by Captain Veenhuyzen himself would advance to the same place by sea. The intention was that the two detachments would meet there and lie in wait for the rebels.⁸⁰ This meeting did not take place, for the troop under Visser, being quite exhausted, halted at Tjamara and waited to be transported by proa to Sumur. Once on their way to Sumur a strong wind compelled them to sail back to Tjiteureup.⁸¹ It had been planned that part of the troops would lie in ambush at Sumur. While the men were busily engaged in preparations for that purpose, the *djaksa* reported that at a turn of the road near Tjamara a group of people had been signalled wearing clothes which were not usually seen in that region.⁸² Thereupon Captain Veenhuyzen ordered a private, Neumann, to go forward and meet the band, and ordered his comrades to cover him. The rest of the troop took cover in a house which was admirably suited to be used as a stronghold. When Neumann summoned the rebels to surrender, they immediately fired their guns at him. At this Veenhuyzen and the rest of his men made their attack; at the same moment five men, armed with *klewangs*, leaped into the field and assailed the troop. Four or five bearers fled to safety in the high grass, while the rest of the band barricaded themselves behind the proas. Then a furious little battle ensued. Defending themselves as best they could, the rebels struck again and again, but the situation seemed desperate. In despair the rebel band fought to the bitter end. When the battle was over, the band was annihilated, except for a few who were able to flee for their lives. Thus the terrible tragedy was accomplished. The government troops had suffered some casualties; four men had been wounded, one rather seriously.⁸³ The troops

⁷⁸ Extract M.J., Aug. 1, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 556.

⁷⁹ Report DDI, pp. 129-130.

⁸⁰ Extract M.J., Aug. 1, 1888; *Java Bode*, Aug. 3, 1888.

⁸¹ Extract M.J., Aug. 1, 1888.

⁸² Ibidem; also Report DDI, p. 130.

⁸³ Ibidem.

departed from Sumur at ten o'clock on the morning of 30 July, taking with them the eleven corpses of the fallen rebels. Later on at Tjilegon the dead men were identified as the rebels that the government had wanted so badly, and included Hadji Wasid, Kjai Hadji Tubagus Ismail, Hadji Abdulgani and Hadji Usman.⁸⁴ It must be added that two dead bodies had fallen into the river, and were therefore missing, while another body was only found later on. It was also calculated that six rebels had run away: they were Hadji Djafar, Hadji Ardja, Hadji Saban, Achmad, Jahja and Saliman.⁸⁵ They remained at large for a while, but were finally captured. A noteworthy fact is that the government forces captured 3 guns, 11 *goloks*, 6 sabres, 3 *bades*, and 1 *kudjang*.⁸⁶ With the accomplishment of this campaign the rebellion had been crushed in less than one month. Although the main body of the insurgents had been destroyed, the remnants of the band were still at large.

THE AFTERMATH

As was to be expected, the success which crowned the pursuit of the fugitive rebel chiefs and their followers near Sumur on 30 July prompted the government authorities to make a search for the rebel leaders who were still missing. The cases of Hadji Sapiudin, Hadji Kalipudin and Hadji Abdulhalim are of special interest. It appears that no trace of these *hadjis* could be found in Banten, and the search for them was without avail. It is said that Hadji Sapiudin had sought a secure place of refuge in Pasang Tenang, and in Tjilurah and later on even in the neighbourhood of his home village, Leuwibeureum. The fear of falling into the hands of his persecutors seems to have compelled him to seek asylum in Batavia where he adopted a new name, i.e. Hadji Mohamad Rais. After living there for a while, he went successively to Deli and Singapore and thereafter to Mecca. It took about two years before his whereabouts could be traced, but even then he still managed to elude the grasp of the Dutch authorities in the Holy Land.⁸⁷ As to Hadji Kalipudin, in Bantenese circles in Mecca it was rumoured that he remained in concealment somewhere in Lampung.⁸⁸ Of the fate of Hadji Abdul-

⁸⁴ Ibidem.

⁸⁵ Report DDI, p. 131.

⁸⁶ Extract M.J., Aug. 1, 1888.

⁸⁷ Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Nov. 25, 1891, no. 700, in Vb. May 9, 1892, no. 40.

⁸⁸ Ibidem.

halim we only know that according to the Dutch Consulate's intelligence he was also supposed to have taken refuge in the Holy City, where he died in 1890.⁸⁹ So we see that the rage of persecution also passed to Djeddah and Mecca, where prominent Bantenese *kjais* such as Kjai Hadji Abdul Karim and Hadji Mardjuki were constantly watched by Dutch agents. As a matter of fact, the Dutch authorities branded these two *hadjis* as prominent engineers of the rebellious movement. As leaders of the Kadiriah *tarekat* they must in fact have had frequent intercourse with its adepts, among whom almost all the rebel leaders may be reckoned.⁹⁰ But further persecution could not be instituted against them since they were beyond the reach of Dutch authorities.

Meanwhile, in the three weeks of the man-hunt numerous rebels and accomplices in the revolt were captured. Unfortunately the records at our disposal do not give the exact number of the captives. But in one of the reports we find that at the end of the first week it already amounted to more than one hundred and fifty.⁹¹ Later many more insurgents and suspected villagers were overtaken by the wave of repression. Government agents diligently searched for the remaining crew of Hadji Wasid *cum suis*, and soon their practices deteriorated more or less into terrorism. We have reason to believe that any information given by a government agent was enough to effect an arrest.⁹² Furthermore, it is more than probable that certain survivors of the bloody man-slaughter on 9 July, e.g. Dumas' wife and Mary Bachet, committed perjury in giving evidence against many captured villagers who were supposed to have participated in the rebellion.⁹³ The number of individuals they identified is almost incredible; very likely they had

⁸⁹ Ibidem.

⁹⁰ Missive of the Consul of Djeddah, Nov. 26, 1888, no. 797/19.

⁹¹ Report DDI, p. 100.

⁹² In order to avoid retaliation witnesses remained anonymous and did not testify at a public trial; see information given by spies A and D with reference to 19 suspects, in Exh. June 24, 1889, no. 76; see also Missive of the Resident of Banten, Sept. 24, 1889, no. 297, in Exh. Nov. 23, 1889, no. 65.

⁹³ Mary Bachet testified against H. Rapali, H. Isra, Ikan and Samad; see P.V. Jan. 3, 1889; against H. Ramidin, H. Muhidin, H. Endung, H. Halari, H. Deli and H. Mardjaja, see P.V. Jan. 23, 1889; against H. Asim and H. Munib, see P.V. Jan. 30, 1889.

Dumas' wife testified against Otong and Entje Mohamad Said, see P.V. Jan. 15, 1889; against H. Muhidin, H. Endung, H. Halari and H. Mardjaja, P.V. Jan. 23, 1889; against H. Djapi and H. Ali, see P.V. Jan. 30, 1889; against Pakur, see P.V. March 26, 1889. See also their testimony against Samidin, in *IWR*, No. 1336 (1889); also No. 1337 (1889).

never seen many of them before. Writing in commemoration of the outbreak of the rebellion about a quarter of a century later, Snouck Hurgronje made mention of an illustrative case in relation to the uncorroborated testimony given by one of the aforesaid ladies. Because her capacity for recognizing suspected villagers was extraordinary, native observers began to doubt whether her evidence was trustworthy. A few native civil servants ventured to test her and confronted her with one of their members disguised as a coolie; she promptly recognized him as one of the *brandals* (rebels) and gave a lengthy account of his misdoings. This rather amusing instance demonstrates the unreliability of her evidence.⁹⁴

Another aspect of judicial terrorism was the employment of spies, some of whom turned out to be *mala fide* agents, eager to benefit by their position by committing perjury and by blackmail as well. They joined forces for this diabolic purpose and formed a *kongsi* (corporation).⁹⁵ Prosecution performed in such a manner was no longer possible without provoking bitter resentment among the population. It is not surprising that further investigations were hampered by the fact that reliable confessions could hardly be elicited from the captives.⁹⁶ Another clear indication of the attitude of the population in the post-rebellion period was the fact that it was extremely difficult to find informants and witnesses, which according to some accounts was due to the general fear of the revengeful *murids* of rebel chiefs that prevailed among the people.⁹⁷ As a result there were several unusual features about the manner in which the prosecution handled the cases against suspects. Because of the difficulty in obtaining witnesses to come forward to testify in the public court, many suspects had to be set free on the ground of lack of evidence.⁹⁸ Usually, however, a deportation order

⁹⁴ Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2 (1924), p. 426.

⁹⁵ See Snouck Hurgronje's note on conditions in Banten, Aug. 15, 1892.

⁹⁶ Most of the minutes of the court give evidence of the scarcity of confessions made by captives on trial; see P.V. Dec. 6, 1889; Jan. 3, 1889; Jan. 15, 1889; Jan. 23, 1889; Jan. 30, 1889; March 8, 1889; March 26, 1889; Apr. 3, 1889; Apr. 9, 1889; May 1, 1889; May 16, 1889; June 3, 1889; June 11, 1889 and Sept. 23, 1889.

⁹⁷ There was also a strong belief that the *murids*, if they did not retaliate on behalf of their *kjais*, might be cursed. See *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1202. The cattle plague which succeeded the rebellion was regarded as a curse of *Allah* upon the Banten population because they had not yet extinguished the *kafirs* (infidels); see *WNI* (1889-1890), p. 1534.

⁹⁸ See O.I.B. Dec. 27, 1888, no. 1; O.I.B. Jan. 21, 1889, no. 2; O.I.B. Jan. 31, 1889, no. 1; O.I.B. Feb. 5, 1889, no. 1; O.I.B. Feb. 13, 1889, no. 1; O.I.B. March 24, 1889, no. 4; O.I.B. Apr. 10, no. 20; O.I.B. Apr. 15,

was made out against these suspects shortly afterwards on account of the fact that they were regarded as unruly elements, and formed a constant potential threat to their environment. For the sake of peace and order the government found it prudent to place them in one of the outer provinces.⁹⁹ According to official reports 204 men were arrested, of whom 94 were later released; 89 were condemned to forced labour for between 15 and 20 years, and 11 were put to death.¹⁰⁰

It was almost a year after the outbreak of the revolt that the death penalty of these eleven rebels was executed. The first group was sent to the gallows on 15 June, 1889, and consisted of the following five insurgents: Samidin, Taslin, Kamidin, Hadji Mohamad Achija and Hadji Mahmud.¹⁰¹ This carnival of hangings took place in Tjilegon for the second time about four weeks later, i.e. on 12 July, 1889. The six condemned men who then stood upon the scaffold were Dulmanan, Sakimin, Hadji Hamim, Dengi, Ojang, and Kasar.¹⁰² The hangings were public and were performed in an open field about two kilometers north of Tjilegon. Scarcely any people came to watch the execution, simply because they were withheld from doing so by a popular superstition that at such events people were easily visited by the so-called *bradja*,¹⁰³ a malicious force especially affecting children and the old and the sick. A remarkable fact is that on the first day of the executions the people fasted, presumably under orders of the religious leaders, as a demonstration of their sympathy for the executed.¹⁰⁴ As regards the condemned men themselves, some of them appeared to be unmoved. Others were in a state of unconsciousness when they were taken to the gallows; this might partly be due to the bad conditions of the place where they were imprisoned, which turned them into physical wrecks.¹⁰⁵ It is most regrettable that we have no way of making sure whether these executions made an impression upon the population. For some

1889, no. 10; O.I.B. May 1, 1889, no. 1; O.I.B. May 8, 1889, no. 5; O.I.B. May 27, 1889, no. 12; O.I.B. June 18, 1889, no. 1; O.I.B. July 8, 1889, no. 80; O.I.B. Oct. 11, 1889, no. 8.

⁹⁹ Ibidem; see also Appendix IX.

¹⁰⁰ *Koloniaal Verslag*, 1889, Chap. C, p. 4; no mention is made of the rest of the arrested "rebels".

¹⁰¹ *Java Bode*, June 22, 1889; *De Locomotief*, June 17 and 21, 1889. See also *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 1532-1533, 1747-1750.

¹⁰² *De Locomotief*, July 18, 1889; *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 1887-1888.

¹⁰³ Missive of the Resident of Banten, June 26, 1889, no. 227, in *MR* 1889, no. 437. A Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 54.

¹⁰⁴ *Java Bode*, June 22, 1889.

¹⁰⁵ *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 1887-1888.

time they were a matter of controversy with which both the government authorities and the press were busily engaged. Some wished to have the death penalty inflicted on as many rebels as possible. This revengeful spirit was of course voiced by panic-stricken elements of the European community, who were suffering from a kind of *hadji*-phobia.¹⁰⁶ Others, however, were of the opinion that the severity of punishment would in no way check the rebellious movement. It also contended that these hangings were quite disgusting and that this kind of penalty should be abolished.¹⁰⁷ The records at our disposal disclose the attitude taken by the Dutch government, which ordered the central government in Indonesia to moderate the prosecution of all those who had taken part in the rebellion, and to reduce the number of death sentences.¹⁰⁸

Another controversial issue concerned the case of Njai Kamsidah, Hadji Iskak's wife. Charged with the murder of Gubbels' wife, she was sentenced to death, but was later granted pardon, and only condemned to 15 years' forced labour instead. This sentence aroused protestations from the press, who considered Njai Kamsidah a first degree murderer, more dangerous than some of the rebels already hanged.¹⁰⁹

SIGNS OF A NEW REBELLIOUSNESS

Although Banten seemingly settled down after the capture of the main rebels, the religious zeal had not yet abated and the rebellious spirit of the people had not been totally crushed. One day in the latter half of September, 1888, a *hadji* told a crowd in the market-place of Tjilegon that as soon as the imprisoned rebels had been liberated, another insurrection would be launched.¹¹⁰ At about this time the authorities also learned of attempts at insurrection by people from Bodjonegoro and Balagendung, who intended to avenge the death of Hadji Wasid; they simply could not endure the thought of the persecutors going unpunished.¹¹¹ Another rumour about revolt in Banten shocked

¹⁰⁶ *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 1749.

¹⁰⁷ *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 1749-1750; for the lively debate about the death penalty in the press, see *TNI* (1889), no. 1, pp. 217-224.

¹⁰⁸ The Minister of Colonies to the Gov. Gen., Feb. 28, 1889, F³/ no. 12. See also Missive of the Gov. Gen. to the Minister of Colonies, May 7, 1889, M⁷.

¹⁰⁹ *Bataviaasch Handelsblad*, June 14, 1889; *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 1532-1533; 1642-1643; 1771. See also Missive from the Gov. Gen. to the Minister of Colonies, June 15, 1889, no. 1079, in Exh. July 22, 1889, no. 87.

¹¹⁰ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Sept. 19, 1888, no. 69, in MR 1888, no. 647. See also *Java Bode*, Oct. 8, 1888.

¹¹¹ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Sept. 19, 1888, no. 69.

the government officials when a certain Sadam, who was known to be insane, proclaimed everywhere that he was one of the rebel chiefs.¹¹²

In spite of the intensive and extensive work of purification and extermination performed by the triumphant authorities, North Banten had not yet been expurgated entirely in the first half of 1889. All through the months of April and May of that year the government was harassed by rumours that the rebellion was about to break out once more. The fact that the insurgents in the regency of Serang had never tried their armed force against that of the government, evidently made them feel guilty and responsible for the failure of the rebellion of July 1888. The participants in the conspiracy began to blame each other for breaking their oaths and forsaking their leaders, who had died or were in exile for the sake of their cause. They felt not only that their half-hearted attitude during the disturbances was something to be ashamed of but also their honour should be redeemed.¹¹³ The people got into a state of uncertainty and fear because of the rigorous persecutions, so that religious leaders easily found means of agitating them. During the persecutions, many prominent *hadjis* from the regency of Serang were imprisoned and later banished, namely Hadji Hadji Mohamad Asik from Bendung, Hadji Abubakar from Kaganteran, Hadji Mohamad Sangadeli from Kaloran, Hadji Mohamad Asnawi from Bendung, Hadji Muhidin and Hadji Mohamad Kanapiah from Trumbu, Hadji Mohamad Arsad Tawil from Tanara, Kjai Mohamad Ali from Mandaja, Hadji Achmad, the *Panghulu* of Tanara, Hadji Tubagus Kusen, the *Panghulu* of the district court of Tjilegon, and Hadji Mohamad Arsad, the Head *Panghulu* of Serang.¹¹⁴ These persecutions undoubtedly caused much alarm among the population and provoked resentment against the government among the *murids*. Indeed, the spirit of revolt became rife among them. There were about half a dozen cases of bands reassembling in Prijaji, the home village of Hadji Achmad, and of plotters who tried to rekindle the embers of rebellion at the end of May 1889.¹¹⁵ A group of people, numbering about forty men, who were plotting a new insurrection which was to take place at the close of the *puasa* — the month of fasting — gave full support to Hadji Achmad's proposal that all civil servants, both European and native, should be

¹¹² Missive of the Resident of Banten, Nov. 26, 1888, no. 13/24 in MR 1888, no. 802.

¹¹³ IG (1891), no. 2, p. 1203.

¹¹⁴ O.I.B. March 24, 1889, no. 4 and O.I.B. June 18, 1889, no. 1; see also P.V. March 18, 1889; P.V. June 3, 1889 in Exh. July 24, 1889, no. 77.

¹¹⁵ O.I.B. Oct. 11, 1889, no. 8; P.V. Sept. 23, 1889.

killed in retaliation of the banishment of Kjai Mōhamad Asik and other prominent *hadjis*. It was planned that this sanguinary task would be carried out when all the prominent officials of Banten were celebrating the end of the fasting period in the *kabupaten* of Serang.¹¹⁶ The meeting at which this decision was taken was held at Hadji Achmad's house some time in April.¹¹⁷ During the following month the conspirators seem to have been busily engaged in holding meetings, on 1 May at Dirham's house, on 3 May at Hadji Murabi's and on 14 May at Hadji Achmad's house.¹¹⁸ This attempt to organize another insurrection, based on the avowed intention to avenge the banished leaders of the convulsion of 1888, was unearthed in good time by the authorities; the leaders were arrested, and the movement was suppressed before it had reached the stage of action.¹¹⁹

There were several members of the conspiracy of 1888 who turned informer during their trials. One of the most prominent was certainly Hadji Abdulsalam, whom we have had occasion to mention before. He drew up a list in which he indicted all those whom he knew had played an active role during the disturbances, laying the blame on their shoulders.¹²⁰ It did not do him much good, because despite his so-called services, he was sentenced to be exiled.¹²¹ When several captives were interrogated shortly after the outbreak of the revolt, some information was given by a few of them, but it concerned mainly the rebel chiefs and their motivations for launching the rebellion.¹²² From the confessions from one of the rebel chiefs, Hadji Mahmud, it appears that there was lack of cohesion among the rebel chiefs during the critical days when they had suffered their first great losses.¹²³ The confession which was forced out of Njai Kamsidah not only included information about her husband, Hadji Iskak, but also indicted the *Panghulu* of Tjilegon who, according to her, had informed her husband

¹¹⁶ Note from the Ambulatory Court to the Resident of Banten, Sept. 13, 1889, in Exh. Nov. 23, 1889, no. 65; also O.I.B. Oct. 11, 1889, no. 8.

¹¹⁷ Note from the Ambulatory Court to the Resident of Banten, Sept. 13, 1889. Ibidem.

¹¹⁸ O.I.B. Oct. 11, 1889, no. 8.

¹²⁰ In his confession H. Abdulsalam mentioned the following people: H. Abdulgani, H. Kalipudin, and Mohamad Arip, all from Bedji; H. Dung, Ardja, Djafar; see H. Abdulsalam's letter to the Resident of Banten (n.d.), in Exh. June 7, 1889, no. 51.

¹²¹ O.I.B. May 1, 1889, no. 1.

¹²² See Appendix D of Report DDI.

¹²³ Ibidem.

about Hadji Wasid's plan.¹²⁴ Of course, there were also rebels who collapsed in the face of danger during the trial and made important confessions.¹²⁵ It is regrettable, however, that we have no evidence at all about the background to the relationship between the informers and the people they accused, so that we have no clue as to how such a movement could have produced people like Hadji Abdulsalam, Hadji Mahmud, Njai Kamsidah, and others. We have no means of discerning incidental features of factionalism in the region, representing sectional rivalries, local disputes or personal feuds.

Another matter which should not escape our notice is the role played by the native and European civil servants in the suppression of the revolt. The extermination of the rebels certainly brought honour, distinction and reward to a number of civil servants. As we have seen in passing, certain officials had rendered important services during the pursuit of the fugitives. The most outstanding among them were R. T. Sutadiningrat; R. T. Kusumaningrat, Regent of Tjaringin; Hadji Djamaludin, head of the *kampung* Kalianda (Lampung); Raden Surawinangun, *Patih* of Pandeglang; Pangeran Minah Putra, Head of Radjabasa (Lampung); Hadji Mohamad Said from Kalianda, and Akilali, *Lurah* of Anjer Lor; among the European civil servants van der Meulen, Assistant Resident of Tjaringin; de Chauvigny de Blot, Controller of Serang; Hermens, Controller of Pandeglang; and van Rinsum, Junior Controller of Tjilegon.¹²⁶ But the reverse befell the Regent of Serang, whose attitude before and during the disturbances caused much suspicion in circles of European officials. How he fared in the post-rebellion period will be dealt with in the next chapter.

Once the danger of rebellion had been averted, a thorough investigation into the motives of the rebels in particular and the causes of the revolt in general was imperative for the government authorities before taking measures not only to restore law and order but also to eliminate abuses in regional administration. In the next chapter we will deal with the kind of changes and reforms brought about by the government authorities in the wake of the rebellion.

¹²⁴ Ibidem.

¹²⁵ P.V. Dec. 6, 1889; P.V. Jan. 3, 1889; P.V. Jan. 15, 1889; P.V. Jan. 30, 1889; P.V. March 26, 1889.

¹²⁶ O.I.B. Nov. 9, 1888, no. 36.

A NOTE ON MILLENARIAN MOVEMENTS IN CENTRAL AND EAST JAVA (1888)

During the second half of the year 1888, a number of residencies of Central and East Java were the scene of persecutions against millenarian movements. In a cable dated 11 August, 1888, the Resident of Kediri informed the Governor General that in his region he had arrested a certain Djasmani and some of his followers, 15 in number, for being in possession of weapons, amulets, and documents breathing rebelliousness.¹²⁷ The investigation which was then made disclosed that Djasmani had already attracted followers over a fairly extensive area: among the fifty people arrested there were followers originating from Banjumas, Tjilatjap, Bagelen, Kedu, Ponorogo, Bangil, and Malang, while the great majority came from Surakarta and Jogjakarta.¹²⁸ It is clear that the movement under Djasmani had rapidly spread over the whole of the southern part of Central and East Java. During the latter half of August 1888 the European community in East Java, especially the people living on the plantations, was suddenly seized by panic and a hectic rush for guns and ammunition swept over the area.¹²⁹ Rumours were circulating among the population that disturbances would probably arise. The news of the Banten revolt which had taken place in the preceding month certainly helps to explain the frightened consternation with which the European population in East Java was overwhelmed.

Who was this Djasmani and what was his goal? Government records tell us that Djasmani was an inhabitant of the village of Sengkrong, situated in the *afdeling* of Blitar (Kediri). Apparently, at conferences he disclosed to his followers that he intended to establish a new kingdom at the end of the Javanese year *Wawu*.¹³⁰ He would then be proclaimed sultan and would take the name of *Sunan Herutjokro*¹³¹ or *Sultan*

¹²⁷ Cable from the Resident of Kediri to the Gov. Gen., Aug. 11, 1888, no. 333, in Vb. Nov. 21, 1888, no. 10.

¹²⁸ Cable from the Resident of Kediri to the Gov. Gen., Aug. 15, 1888, no. 492 and Aug. 18, 1888, no. 503, in Vb. Nov. 21, 1888, no. 10.

¹²⁹ Report of the Commander of the Army to the Gov. Gen., Aug. 18, 1888, no. 614, in Vb. Nov. 21, 1888, no. 10. See also *Java Bode*, Sept. 8 and 15, 1888; cf. *IG* (1889), no. 2, pp. 1783-1785.

¹³⁰ Missive of the Resident of Surakarta, Aug. 16, 1888, no. 42, in MR 1888, no. 578; Cable of the Commander of the Army, Aug. 17, 1888, no. 234, in Vb. Nov. 21, 1888, no. 10, referring to rumours about the coming disturbances among the population in Semarang. See also Groneman (1891), p. 69.

¹³¹ Missive of the Resident of Kediri, Aug. 16, 1888, no. 38, in MR 1888,

Adil.¹³² On the appointed day he and his following would march to the village of Birowo in Lodojo,¹³³ from where they would proceed westward along the south coast to Surakarta and Jogjakarta. In Tjemenung (district Ngunut, *afdeling* Ngrowo, Madiun), his father-in-law, Amat Mukiar,¹³⁴ and his following would join him. It should be noted that Amat Mukiar's intention was to launch a rebellious movement in support of Gusti 'Mohamad, a pretender to the Sultanate of Jogjakarta.¹³⁵ An essential aspect of their strategy was evidently the differentiation of assignment: Djasmani was charged with the attack of Surakarta, while Amat Mukiar would lead the assault on Jogjakarta.¹³⁶

In tracing the development of this millenarian movement it should be pointed out that Djasmani, a Solonese of origin, had migrated to Kediri about 16 years before, and after moving from one place to another for a while, he settled in Sengkrong.¹³⁷ It seems that he was here inspired by the millenarian idea of establishing a new kingdom. Not until 1886 did his plan begin to take shape, were disciples assembled and was a following recruited in Surakarta and Jogjakarta.¹³⁸ It is remarkable that Djasmani himself was no *hadji*, nor did he fulfil religious duties. His close associates were Amat Mukiar, his father-in-law; Mertojudo of Djambean; Dulrasit, a son-in-law of the latter; and Amat Sarpan.¹³⁹ Of great significance are the names which Djasmani intended to adopt once he had been proclaimed sultan. The names *Herutjokro* and *Sultan Adil* (sic) strongly remind us of the traditional Javanese messianic figure, *Ratu Adil*.¹⁴⁰ It can safely be said that the adoption of these names was a manifestation of a Javanese messianic

no. 578; the name *Herutjokro* is traditionally adopted by the *Ratu Adil*-to-be; see Wiselius, in *BKI*, Vol. XIX (1872), pp. 172-217; Brandes, in *TBG*, Vol. XXXII (1889), pp. 368-430.

¹³² The messianic figure is usually named *Ratu Adil*; for the name *Sultan Adil*, see Missive of the Resident of Kediri, Aug. 16, 1888, no. 38.

¹³³ Lodojo is well-known as a place of exile during the period of the Mataram kingdom; it is situated south of Blitar (Kediri); see *ENI*, II (1918).

¹³⁴ This name seems to be an abbreviation of Kjai Mohamad Mukiar; see Groneman (1891), p. 67.

¹³⁵ For an account of the court intrigues around Gusti Mohamad, see Groneman (1891), pp. 220-222.

¹³⁶ Cable of the Resident of Kediri, Aug. 15, 1888, no. 492.

¹³⁷ Missive of the Resident of Kediri, Aug. 16, 1888, no. 38.

¹³⁸ Ibidem.

¹³⁹ Ibidem.

¹⁴⁰ For extensive studies about the *Ratu Adil* figure, see Wiselius, in *BKI*, Vol. XIX (1872), pp. 172-217; Brandes, in *TBG*, Vol. XXXII (1889), pp. 368-430; Drewes (1925), pp. 130-137; Schrieke (1959), pp. 76-95. See also Pigeaud (MS, 1943-1945), pp. 146 ff.

expectation — as it always has been in the past.¹⁴¹ This messianic movement under Djasmani's leadership was nipped in the bud, for the government officials, still haunted by the horrors of Tjilegon, opened a resolute campaign against all its adherents. The Resident of Kediri fulfilled his task of persecuting all followers of Djasmani with great alacrity. In proof of his measures he reported to the Governor General the arrest of fifty people on the 15th of August and of thirty men three days later, while 26 disciples of Djasmani living in the various localities outside Kediri had had to be captured with the co-operation of the authorities in question.¹⁴² The persecution was extended to all people who showed more than ordinary zeal in their religious practices, so that it became a hunt for religious zealots. The ultra-rigorous measures taken by regional authorities alarmed the central government, which was fully aware of the fact that endless persecution would only provoke unrest and tension among the population. The fact that not every religious zealot should be identified as an element of danger for the government had to be taken into account.¹⁴³

It is not surprising that the messianic movement was a complete failure and that it seems that the whole thing had been a blind folly. Everything we know about the spread of its followers suggests that the extent of "organization" was considerable. It was discovered that Amat Mukiar was of Bantenese origin, a revelation frightful enough to arouse the suspicion of government officials, who readily assumed that he must have made common cause with the Banten rebels.¹⁴⁴

Another remarkable instance of the suspiciousness of officials as regards nation-wide conspiracies of *hadjis* and *gurus* was the Lobaningrat affair. The chief leader in this plot was Raden Lobaningrat, a dismissed Junior Regent of Jogjakarta. An investigation brought to light that he was in the possession of *djimats* and venerable documents belonging to an Arab. Judging from his correspondence, Raden Lobaningrat must have had connections in Tulungagung (Kediri). Certain

¹⁴¹ Ibidem.

¹⁴² Cable of the Resident of Kediri to the Gov. Gen., Aug. 15, 1888, no. 492; Aug. 18, 1888, no. 503; in Pasuruan, Kasanamat was arrested, see Cable of the Resident of Pasuruan, Aug. 16, 1888, no. 238, in Vb. Nov. 21, 1888, no. 10; in Banjumas, 5 people were arrested, see Cable of the Resident of Banjumas, Aug. 18, 1888, no. 103, in MR 1888, no. 578. See also Report of the Resident of Kediri, Oct. 18, 1888, no. 52, in MR 1888, no. 740.

¹⁴³ Circular letter of the General Secretary, Aug. 21, 1888, no. 135, in Vb. Nov. 21, 1888, no. 10.

¹⁴⁴ Groneman (1891), p. 67.

intelligence suggested that a cousin of Lobaningrat, Pangeran Mangku Bumi, had travelled back and forth between Klaten and Tulungagung. In the latter place, flags, banners with Arabic superscriptions, *djimat*s, white clothes, and weapons were found in the house of a *guru*.¹⁴⁵ Furthermore, the numerous *pesantrens* in Tulungagung attracted many *santris* from the Principalities, especially from Jogjakarta. And so the *hadji*-phobic officials drew the conclusion that the Lobaningrat affair was apparently connected directly with the movement under Djasmani.¹⁴⁶ Similarly, the Djasmani movement was supposed to be connected directly with the Banten rebellion, chiefly on account of the relationship — presumably matrimonial ties — which existed between Hadji Mardjuki and certain people in Ponorogo.¹⁴⁷ This supposition may have been strengthened by the information that *hadjis* and *kjais* from Ponorogo had been invited to celebrate certain festivities in Banten.¹⁴⁸ Because of the types of organizations and the alleged link between them, which did exist in the areas where the risings and conspiracies took place, many subscribed to the view that the plotters had formed a comprehensive plan consisting of a more or less co-ordinated attempt extending throughout Java.¹⁴⁹ Without going so far as those who see in the epidemic disturbances in Java in 1888 the outbreak of a nation-wide revolt, we feel that the following explanation is the most probable: firstly, the movement in Central and East Java may have been directly connected with a prophecy circulating among the people at the time, which referred to the coming of the new kingdom during the Javanese year *Wawu*, most probably in its last month, *Dulhidjah* or *Besar*.¹⁵⁰ Secondly, the growing agitation everywhere was

¹⁴⁵ Groneman (1891), p. 71.

¹⁴⁶ Ibidem.

¹⁴⁷ Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16; see also Missive of the Resident of Madiun, Sept. 20, 1889, L^a UI; cf. Henny's article in *IG* (1921), no. 2, pp. 825-826. In 1905, Henny, Consul at Djeddah, made mention of the fact that shortly after the outbreak of the Banten revolt a certain H. Mardjuki settled in Warungdjajeng (Kediri) for some time. Henny's assumption was that this man was the same H. Mardjuki mentioned by Snouck Hurgronje in his *Mekka* and thus one of the chief rebels of the Banten revolt. Cf. Chap. VI, note 63, p. 197.

¹⁴⁸ See above, Chap. VI, p. 194.

¹⁴⁹ *WNI* (1889-1890), p. 1311.

¹⁵⁰ Groneman (1891), p. 69; Missive of the Resident of Surakarta, Aug. 16, 1888, no. 42. Originally the Bantenese plotters had also planned to launch the revolt at about this time; see Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16. Snouck Hurgronje referred to *Djababaja* prophecies in his advice of Jan. 14, 1889, in Vb. Jan. 25, 1889, no. 19. Cf. Cable of the Resident of Jogjakarta, July 1, 1878, no. 68, in *MR* 1878, no. 452.

related to the convulsions of change, full of conflicting forces, which shook people out of their traditional way of life.

We must also give our attention to what took place at Srikaton (Surakarta), about two months later. A band of rebels, made up of fifty armed *gurus*, *santris*, and a few women and children, took the *pasanggrahan* (rest-house) at Srikaton, situated on the west side of Mt. Lawu's slopes close to the graves of the Mangkunegoro dynasty. They were dressed in the white clothes typically worn by the people when waging a Holy War, and were led by Imam Redjo, a villager from Girilaju. After this man had completed his ascetic exercises in Ngawi, he had assembled a considerable number of followers. His message urged people to adhere to the pure Islamic faith, and to perform the *dikir*, while the ultimate goal of his movement was the erection of an Islamic kingdom. He was to be proclaimed king of this kingdom, and to bear the name of Djinal Ngabidin, while Minto Menggolo, his brother, was to be appointed *patih* (grand vizier). According to Imam Redjo's plan, the rebels would march from Srikaton toward Ketanga (Ngawi) which was to become the capital of the new state.¹⁵¹ On the 12th of October, military troops, consisting of 30 men of the infantry, 30 men of the cavalry, and 10 dragoons, led by the Resident of Surakarta, his secretary, the prince, Prang Wadono, and the commander of the dragoons, proceeded towards Srikaton to besiege the *pasanggrahan*. After being summoned to give themselves up several times, the rebels in the building were attacked and defeated; nine men were killed, among whom was Imam Redjo himself; three men were wounded, and the rest surrendered.¹⁵² It is remarkable that Imam Redjo's preaching would seem to have been an expression of religious revivalism syncretized with traditional Javanese millenarianism.

¹⁵¹ Report of the Resident of Surakarta, Oct. 12, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 776; *De Locomotief*, Oct. 15, 1888; *Java Bode*, Oct. 18 and Nov. 1, 1888; *IG* (1889), no. 1, p. 216; no. 2, p. 1776; *Kolonial Verslag*, 1889, column 5-6.

¹⁵² *Ibidem*.

CHAPTER IX

THE SEQUEL OF THE REVOLT

Having dealt in detail with all the stirring events of July 1888 in North Banten, it only remains for us to examine the mark they left on the fabric of Banten society and on the nature of Dutch rule during the years that followed. Once the embers of the rebellion had been extinguished, the Dutch government found itself faced with the problem of making administrative re-arrangements, not only with regard to the simple day-to-day operations of the administrative machinery, but also for the purpose of a long-range, profound transformation. In fact, the events of July 1888 forced the Dutch to re-examine their colonial policy. The new colonial policy that emerged, considerably altered by the ordeal of the rebellion, was undoubtedly correlative with the view of the rebellion that prevailed in government circles. In this section the influence of the revolt on bureaucratic reform, taxation policy, religious education, the position of the religious leaders and military precautions will be assessed in detail.

IN QUEST OF EXPLANATIONS

As has been noted in passing, government officials in Banten were at a loss to account for the uprising during the first days of the disturbances. Taken by surprise and in search for some explanation, they put forward a bewildering array of conflicting opinions. The newspapermen's voracious appetite for information about the revolt was fed by military commanders, administrators, and survivors, each with their own conjectures or petty theories, which ranged from the idea of a country-wide revolt to the notion of a local affair. At the outset the *Java Bode* contended that the uprising had been launched by people from Lampung.¹ A few days later the *Bataviaasch Handelsblad* opined that the notorious "robber" Sakam was to blame for the outburst of rebellion;² the *Soerabaiasch Handelsblad* looked upon the rebellion in

¹ *Java Bode*, July 11, 1888.

² *Bataviaasch Handelsblad*, July 14, 1888.

much the same way, and regarded it as merely the result of accidental circumstances, in fact, as the outcome of an *affaire de femme*.³ This explanation was closely connected with the role played by Agus Suradikaria, who had taken advantage of the disturbances to vent his rancour in a personal affair. The *Bataviaasch Handelsblad* even believed that he was the chief instigator of the revolt.⁴

As the extent of the revolt became apparent, these explanations were shown to be insufficient, if not unsound. The course of events in the whole region of North Banten could not be reconciled with the theory that the rebellion was merely local and accidental in character. Instead, more stress was laid on the complex nature of the rebellious movement. The newspapers occupied themselves with questions such as the following: why was popular hatred directed against the civil servants, both European and native? Why were the chief leaders mainly *kjais* or *hadjis*? What were the grievances which moved the rural population to take part in the uprising? What were their demands or what kind of reform were they aiming at? Was the rising on the whole of a political character, or should it be regarded as a social upheaval provoked by religious fanatics? Did it have religious causes, and did the Muslim institutions contribute to it? Were there general causes which operated throughout the whole region? It is true that at the very beginning of the rising there was a tendency to emphasize certain features and disregard or minimize others. It is not surprising that people were prejudiced in searching for the causes of the uprising, for their emotions were involved to a greater or lesser extent. Some held the opinion that the rising had a predominantly political character, while others insisted that it was based on religious fanaticism.⁵ Yet another view of the crisis insisted that the overtaxation of the population was the main cause.⁶ Concurrent with this was the contention that the disturbances were the direct result of bad administration.⁷ This implied criticism of government policies for which the civil servants were responsible. It was

³ *Soerabaiasch Handelsblad*, July 18, 1888.

⁴ *Bataviaasch Handelsblad*, July 14, 1888.

⁵ For the first opinion, see *De Locomotief*, July 18, 1888; for the second opinion, see *Java Bode*, July 16, 1888, which refers to a contention that the revolt might have something to do with the '*zendingscirculaire*' (circular letter concerning the Christian mission) of the Minister of Colonies.

⁶ *De Locomotief*, July 13 and 26, 1888; see also Nederburgh (1888), pp. 14-29; van Sandick (1891), pp. 153-158.

⁷ *Bataviaasch Handelsblad*, July 21, 1888; *De Locomotief*, July 28, 1888; *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 9-11, 42-44.

argued that the general laxity of the civil servants in Banten certainly helped to pave the way for rebellion; as somebody put it, "There is much that is rotten in Banten".⁸ In short, the debate about the causes of the rebellion, which went on for a considerable period, revolved about the problem of singling out one causal factor and investing it with a decisive role in precipitating the rising. Most of the debaters already subscribed to the opinion that a multiplicity of factors was involved in the movement, especially as their knowledge of the movement became more detailed.

CONTEMPORARY VIEWS

We need not concern ourselves here with the complexities and ambiguities of contemporary opinion concerning the causes of the rising. We shall limit ourselves to pointing out the contemporaries' conception of these causes, which was of service to them in understanding and coping with the critical situation they had to face. In fact, their theoretical enquiries usually led to practical means of control and enabled them to make recommendations for the future and to advocate measures and reforms. As was to be expected, the Dutch in their home-country joined the quest for the causes of the revolt and the aforementioned debate was echoed in the Dutch press. On the other hand, the Indonesian people were far less articulate in this respect.

Besides public opinion there were the views of members of the colonial government, who from the outset were deeply engrossed in the practical investigation of the causes of the rising. Evidently they not only sought to understand, but also — if not mainly — to manipulate and direct the situation. After all they were not above blame and as has been pointed out previously, they had become the main target of popular resentment. Let us now look into certain significant contributions to the debate on the rebellion, including its causes and the counter-actions which were taken.

To begin with, the *Java Bode* simply held that the Tjilegon affair was a local rebellion, built upon religious fanaticism inflamed by leaders of the Sufi order.⁹ The colonial government's supposed attack on

⁸ *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 990.

⁹ *Java Bode*, Aug. 21, 22 and 23, 1888. This newspaper had a semi-official character; it had a "monopoly" of official news, and it fully supported government policy. For Koch's assessment of the character of this newspaper in the 1880s, see Koch (1956), p. 40; for the history of its development, see von Faber (n.d.), pp. 58-63. *De Locomotief* took an outspoken "colonial-liberal" standpoint, and was the voice of what was later known as the

Muslim religion and its disregard of the religious leader were, according to this newspaper, the basic cause of the revolt and the ultimate justification of the rebellion. It was further contended that the rebellion had nothing to do with the excessive exaction of taxes, although it was later admitted that various measures related to taxation had given rise to popular dissatisfaction,¹⁰ and had undoubtedly heightened the unpopularity of the government officers in the area. At the end of the series of articles a warning was conveyed to the colonial government to be on the alert for a general Muslim conspiracy.¹¹ Groneman's article in *De Locomotief* and in the *Nieuws van den Dag* also pointed out that there was a widespread propensity to revolt, which he ascribed to general dissatisfaction.¹² Indeed, he felt that the disturbances in various parts of Central and East Java in the latter half of 1888 might have given rise to the widely held theory of a Muslim conspiracy.¹³ Without mentioning the principal causes of the popular discontent, Groneman pleaded for reforms in the colonial policy which would do away with social and economic grievances.¹⁴

The *Standaard* looked upon the Tjilegon rebellion in much the same way as Groneman. The latter's opinion was cited with approval; the author of the article — Ottolander from Pantjur (Situbondo) — went somewhat further than Groneman in criticizing the government. As he put it, "the spirit of the East Indian Company still looms large in government circles".¹⁵ He drew up a list of causes which had kindled

"Ethical Policy" group; see Mühlenfeld, in *KT*, Vol. IV (1916), pp. 37-39; also von Faber (n.d.), pp. 65-68. *De Locomotief* can be regarded as the vehicle of the "colonial opposition". *Bataviaasch Handelsblad* was based on a moderate and humanitarian view; *TNI* (1858), no. 1, pp. 276-292; see also von Faber (n.d.), pp. 50-51. *Soerabaiasch Handelsblad*, under the editorship of Uilkens, during a large part of the 'eighties criticized Surabaya's mercantile community and government officials, while it later supported the view that the interest of Surabaya and the hinterland should be defended; see von Faber (n.d.), pp. 75-82; also Koch (1956), p. 49.

¹⁰ *Java Bode*, Aug. 22, 1888; for the said measures, see Chap. II, pp. 62-66; they were also dealt with extensively in the report of the Director of the Department of Interior, see Report DDI, pp. 161-198; 240-246.

¹¹ *Java Bode*, Aug. 23, 1888.

¹² *De Locomotief*, Aug. 25, 1888; *Nieuws van den Dag*, Feb. 5, 1889.

¹³ *Nieuws van den Dag*, Nov. 5, 1888; Feb. 5, 1889; see also *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 1311. Groneman pointed out that the Banten revolt could have been a prologue to a general rising, if the government had not eliminated various abuses.

¹⁴ *Nieuws van den Dag*, Sept. 7, Oct. 6, 1889.

¹⁵ *De Standaard*, Sept. 26, 1888; see also Koch (1960), pp. 70-80. This newspaper voiced the principles of the *Anti-Revolutionaire Partij* (Anti-

the disturbances and went on to advocate reforms such as the reduction of revenue assessments, the abolition of culture services, the improvement of means of communication, a better education for civil servants, and last but not least the evangelization of the whole Archipelago.¹⁶ The last point was put forward in accordance with the proselytizing policy of the party of which the *Standaard* was the vehicle.¹⁷ From another angle of the religious camp criticism against the colonial government was voiced by *De Tijd*. It attempted an analysis of the causes or nature of the rebellion, giving special attention to the so-called *hadji*-question. It also cited a wide variety of social and economic grievances such as the impoverishment of the people, and the pressures of tax exactions; in short, it sympathized with the natives, who had well-founded reasons for being discontented.¹⁸ Furthermore, *De Tijd* suggested that the government should seek a permanent solution of the *hadji*-question. At a much later date the *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* devoted a series of articles to an explanation of the causes of the rebellion. Although it did not believe in a "nation-wide" conspiracy, it felt that three elements should be regarded as potential enemies of law and tranquillity, namely, the roving Arabs, the *hadjis*, and members of the Sufi orders. It concluded that a close co-operation between European and native officials was indispensable in taking administrative measures with regard to religion. In any case, the government should take steps to destroy the popular prejudice that European civil servants were enemies of Islam.¹⁹ It also rejected the evangelical demands for a proselytizing policy, and suggested that more consideration should be given to the feelings of the Muslim population.²⁰ Evidently the press, reflecting the spirit of reform of the end of the 19th century, was ready to connect shortcomings and failures of the colonial government with the revolt. One wonders whether this reforming enthusiasm extended to the daily practices of regional or local administration.²¹

To return to *De Locomotief*, it should be noted that during the course

Revolutionary Party, one of the major parties of Protestants); *De Tijd* was a Roman Catholic newspaper; *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* was liberal. See Schneider (1943). The *Nieuws van den Dag* was more an informative paper than an opinion paper; see Schneider (1951), p. 22.

¹⁶ *De Standaard*, Sept. 26, 1888.

¹⁷ See above, under note 15.

¹⁸ *De Tijd*, Aug. 29, 1888.

¹⁹ *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant*, June 19, 1889, also cited in *IG* (1889), no. 2, p. 1427.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

²¹ *De Standaard* and *De Tijd* were in line with the colonial policy of the

of the debate about the causes of the revolt, this paper devoted many pages not only to facts but also to explanations of and opinions about the rising. From the outset the editors seemed to be perceptive to the complex character of the rebellion, as is evidenced of by the various theories posed in the numerous articles on the Tjilegon affair.²² In its issue of October 1, 1888, a list was drawn up of causes which had kindled the revolt. The more important were the severity of the revenue assessments, the natural catastrophes, religious fanaticism, the conspiracy of the Sufi order, and the shortcomings of colonial administrators.²³ This list does not include some minor popular grievances already dealt with in previous articles in the same newspaper, such as the appointment of "foreigners" in the civil service in Banten,²⁴ the intrigues of the sultan's party,²⁵ the utmost insolence and contempt with which some *hadjis* were treated by officials,²⁶ and the re-vaccination *en masse*.²⁷ Among the measures advocated by *De Locomotief* we may mention the following: the reduction of the land rent, the purification of the native civil service corps, the exile of all the members of the sultan's family, and the stationing of military detachments in certain towns in Banten.²⁸ This summary of press opinion is quite illuminating for the comprehension of the causes of the revolt, but it does not give a total picture of the complex background of this event. In the pursuit of this total picture we must enumerate the alleged motives of the rebels themselves.

A long list of grievances put forward by captured rebels to justify their actions was compiled during the investigation made by the Director of the Department of Interior. One of the main sources of dissatisfaction was the hated system of revenue assessment, including the exactions of the land rent, the capitation tax and the trade tax. People were fined and dragged into court if they failed to pay these taxes. Once the

religious parties in the Netherlands, which at the end of the century stressed evangelization, while the more "liberally"-tinged *Nieuwe Rotterdamsche Courant* opposed such a policy.

²² *De Locomotief*, July 26; Aug. 9, 11, 17 and 20, 1888.

²³ *De Locomotief*, Oct. 1, 1888.

²⁴ *De Locomotief*, July 26 and 30, 1888.

²⁵ *De Locomotief*, July 24, 1888.

²⁶ *De Locomotief*, Aug. 16, 1888.

²⁷ *De Locomotief*, Aug. 20, 1888; the introduction of vaccination gave rise to disturbances in 1820, see above, Chap. IV, p. 9; at about the same time the religious leaders' aid was called in to introduce vaccination in Prijangan, see Olivier, Vol. I (1827), pp. 301-302. Cf. Roorda van Eysinga (1856), p. 66.

²⁸ *De Locomotief*, July 26, 1888.

Muslim kingdom had been founded, the people would no longer be subjected to numerous taxes and fines. The rebels were also convinced that the government would eventually stamp out their religion. Apart from the interference with their religion, the contempt with which the people were treated by the civil servants stirred up a great deal of discontent. The rebels had wanted to wreak their vengeance and hatred particularly upon the *patih* and the *djaksa*. In fact, they had intended to start a *perang sabil* in which the life of all government officials would be taken. Furthermore, the people were extremely aggrieved because during the re-vaccination the honour of the women had not been respected.²⁹ A list of the *patih*'s acts was drawn up, acts of gross injustice which had provoked popular resentment and disaffection. The imposition of rigid regulations concerning religious practices on the one hand, and the harsh exaction of taxes on the other bereft the population of their own institutions and traditional way of life. To mention a few instances: the prohibition of performing the *dikir* in a noisy manner, of playing the *gamelan* at wedding and circumcision celebrations, of performances by dancing girls, and of holding processions as a part of wedding and circumcision ceremonies.³⁰ Mention should also be made of sources of disaffection on the part of lower officials which arose from measures taken by the *patih*, such as the continuous spying on their activities, their being controlled in their contact with the people, and the prohibition of accepting gifts from the people.³¹ In short, all the complaints about the *patih* clearly showed how his acts, presumably well meant, did much harm simply because of his disregard for popular opinion and regional tradition as well.

THE GOVERNMENT COMMISSIONER'S REPORT

It is undeniable that the outbreak of the rebellion was occasioned by the accumulated grievances of the population. In order to obtain a better idea of the grievous conditions prevailing in Banten before the revolt, we must examine inside facts rather than rely mainly on deduction or speculation. Suitable for this purpose is the aforementioned report submitted by the Director of the Department of Interior, J. M. van Vleuten. While military forces were occupied with persecuting and suppressing the rebels, the governmental machinery was also put into

²⁹ Appendix VIII.

³⁰ Report DDI, Appendix I, especially as regards the complaints against Raden Penna.

³¹ Ibidem.

motion, and a public inquiry was made into both the general situation in Banten and the origin and causes of the rebellion. Van Vleuten was appointed as Government Commissioner,³² and exactly eight days after the outbreak of the rebellion he was already on the spot to conduct a region-wide investigation. When finally — about two months later — his report was issued, it turned out to be a voluminous document consisting of some 260 written pages, not including the numerous documents accompanying the report.³³ It must be admitted that the report undoubtedly contains a wealth of information, but it should be read critically because, as has been pointed out before, it was biased by arbitrary assumptions and by a subjective point of view.³⁴ The state of affairs put forward in the report seemed to be little short of alarming. The report could not have been more damning to the reputation of the civil service in general, and the Banten officials in particular. It seems that the report also gave rise to some uneasiness in central government circles. If the multitudinous and undeniable facts were submitted to the public, they might shake the people's confidence in the colonial government.³⁵ The first section of the report, which contained the basic facts and the description of the development of the rebellion, was above controversy, but the second, which attempted to give an explanation and clarification of the causal relation of various factors, became the subject of attack from the side of top functionaries in the central government. Despite the bitter criticism to which the report was exposed, most of its proposals regarding future reforms were afterwards approved by the government. Many administrative measures and reforms taken in the post-rebellion period can therefore be regarded more or less as the outcome of the work of the commissioner. Since the report is quite relevant to the problems dealt with in this chapter, it deserves a more detailed examination.

In his first report, written shortly after his arrival in Banten, van Vleuten put forward the opinion that religious fanaticism was the main cause of the rebellion.³⁶ But he added that "the preaching of hatred against unbelievers constitutes only the fuel, which cannot burn without

³² O.I.B. July 15, 1888, no. 4.

³³ Report of the Director of the Department of Interior, Sept. 18, 1888, no. 5162, in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4.

³⁴ See above, Chap. I, pp. 16-19.

³⁵ Groneman (1891), pp. 102-103. Its publication was anxiously expected, especially by the press, see *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 252.

³⁶ The Director of the Department of Interior to the Gov. Gen., July 19, 1888, L^a B, in *MR* 1888, no. 506.

fire". He went on to say that the fire was provided by the various measures taken by the government.³⁷ In his final report, more stress was laid on the multiplicity of causes; the pressure of tax assessments and serious shortcomings of some officials in the area were considered two of the most influential. Of course, he did not refute the several explanations in terms of religious motives. On the contrary, the second part of his report began with a description of the whole background of the chief rebels, Hadji Wasid and Hadji Tubagus Ismail. He then indicated the conspicuous religiosity of the people, and the prominent role of *gurus* and *hadjis* in Banten society. Furthermore, a comparison was made between the number of *hadjis* in Banten and the number found in other residencies.³⁸ In another part of the same report he listed the grievances aroused by the officials' interference in religious matters.³⁹ The commissioner received great benefit from the works of van den Berg and Holle on the Naksibandiah *tarekat*, which he consulted on matters dealing with the leadership, the organization and the rituals of the Kadiriah *tarekat* in Banten.⁴⁰ In the same report Gubbels and Raden Penna were subjected to severe criticism, and it was suggested that their distant and contemptuous manner towards the people was one of the main sources of popular discontent.⁴¹ Furthermore, a statement was made about the personalities and the public and private lives of Gubbels and Raden Penna.⁴² The conclusion was drawn that both officials were hopelessly out of place in Banten society. The commissioner did not omit to mention the propensity of the Banten population to revolt, evidenced by the recurrent outbreak of disturbances during the course of the century.⁴³ Besides its account of this deeper root of popular hostility, the report also presented an account of the personal grievances of Hadji Wasid as one of the immediate causes of the outbreak. An attempt was made to disclose Hadji Wasid's motives, and the report suggested that Hadji Wasid had readily identified himself with the sacred cause and in a frenzy of despair had managed to accelerate the insurrectionary movement.⁴⁴ The commissioner went on

³⁷ Ibidem.

³⁸ Report DDI, pp. 133-150.

³⁹ Report DDI, p. 221.

⁴⁰ Report DDI, pp. 228-233; cf. van den Berg, in *TBG*, Vol. XXVIII (1883), pp. 158-175; Holle, in *TBG*, Vol. XXXI (1886), pp. 67-81.

⁴¹ Report DDI, p. 221.

⁴² Report DDI, pp. 150-159.

⁴³ Report DDI, p. 149.

⁴⁴ Report DDI, 203-215.

to say that Hadji Wasid had played an important causal role simply because he had provided leadership for the discontented.⁴⁵ At this point the commissioner touched off a lively debate with the *Java Bode*, which opined that the chief rebels incited the people to disaffection and to a common struggle against the hated infidel, rather than that the pressures of exorbitant revenue demands made them join the revolt.⁴⁶ We must remember that the *Java Bode* contended that religious fanaticism was the main cause of the rising.⁴⁷ Accordingly, the paper would not believe that the civil servants were to blame.

A very detailed and well-documented account of several administrative issues with regard to the assessment of taxes, which in previous years had given rise to notable disputes between the officials and the people, was given in the report. The government officers' policy of exacting taxes — land rent, trade tax, and capitation tax — in previous years may be discerned from this account. It also disclosed that in this respect the regional administration was unresponsive to the wishes and feelings of the people, and thus contributed to the spirit of unrest from which the rebellious movement gathered strength. In downright terms van Vleuten described the enforcement of measures and how the measures were received by the people. In order to avoid repetition it suffices here to refer to the account given in Chapter II.⁴⁸ It must be recalled that the most discontented were those who demanded the reduction of trade tax on proas, the exemption from capitation tax, and the assessment of land rent by individual levy. In seeking a solution, van Vleuten approached these problems with a clear understanding of regional customs and not with a rigid adherence to the government regulations. In fact, his report clearly shows how the rebellion forced the colonial government to reconsider many of the administrative reforms it had introduced. Van Vleuten readily admitted that, especially with reference to the liability to labour services and thus to the capitation tax, the whole system of individual property, the customs and the traditional revenue systems in Banten were adverse to such reforms.⁴⁹ He also acknowledged that government officers' malpractices and their abuses in carrying out regulations in the villages considerably enhanced popular resentment. He went on to advocate revision of the assessment list for the trade tax

⁴⁵ Report DDI, p. 214.

⁴⁶ *Java Bode*, Aug. 22, 1888; Report DDI, p. 214, 216, 226.

⁴⁷ *Java Bode*, Aug. 22, 1888.

⁴⁸ See above, Chap. II, pp. 62-66.

⁴⁹ Report DDI, p. 240.

as one of the remedial measures. Furthermore, he recommended that the individual levy of land rent replace communal assessment; in connection with the registration of land, he advised that the manipulation of influential groups in the village be guarded against. The capitation tax regulation should be revised to meet the demands of the people. The new regulation should ensure that only those liable to labour service according to Banten tradition had to pay capitation tax.⁵⁰ So much for his recommendations with regard to the assessment of revenue.

Van Vleuten regarded the rebellion as a disturbance in which religion did not play a major role; nevertheless, he realized that the religious leaders did exert far greater influence than the government officers and that the expansion of religion — i.e. of Islam — was conducive to the disturbance of order and tranquility.⁵¹ Despite his apparent adherence to the liberal neutrality policy and the ideals of toleration and religious liberty, the dreadful events in Tjilegon convinced him that redoubled efforts must be made to control religious practices. In his report he spelled out his views on what a "policy of religious control" entailed. Up to that time the government had done nothing to impede the spread of the so-called religious schools, nor had it investigated the characters of the teachers. Van Vleuten opined that virtually anybody could constitute himself a *guru* whether he had the indispensable qualifications or not;⁵² and that one must be aware of the danger which lay in the ample freedom that these men were granted by the government, since it might be used to arouse hostility towards the infidel ruler. From there he went on to recommend that the government enforce a regulation which forbade all those who did not first obtain permission from the government to act as a *guru*. The regent, as the official responsible for religious matters in his region, should be charged with the supervision of the *gurus*.⁵³ It is remarkable that most of the prominent Bantenese civil servants and religious leaders looked favourably upon this proposal, but what inclined them to this course is difficult to ascertain.⁵⁴ It is possible that they were revolted by the primitiveness of the rebels and the atrocities they had committed, or that they were eager to show indubitably their willingness to support the government. Of course Bantenese officials of all ranks tried to prove

⁵⁰ Report DDI, p. 244.

⁵¹ Report DDI, p. 246.

⁵² Report DDI, p. 249.

⁵³ Report DDI, pp. 249-257; see *Staatsblad* 1867, no. 114.

⁵⁴ Report DDI, p. 259; see note signed by the Regent of Pandeglang, Sept.

their loyalty and allegiance to the government in one way or another in such a time of crisis.⁵⁵ With the exception of his plan for controlling the religious teachers, the commissioner's proposals were in line with the government's policy — to avoid all semblance of interference with religious practices. Before the measure related to the supervision of the *gurus* could be enacted, its impact on native opinion must be assessed in detail. As to the *tarekat*, van Vleuten only said a few words about placing them under government supervision.⁵⁶ Van Vleuten was convinced that such a regulation would not form a threat to the Muslim religion and would therefore not alarm the people as would be the case if measures were taken against the pilgrimage.⁵⁷ He also raised the problem of the titles and positions of the so-called Muslim "priests" (sic) and of the *hadjis*; he asked the government to initiate inquiries on this subject.⁵⁸ Van Vleuten's opinions on religious matters provoked a great deal of comment from his fellow officials and it was felt that a more thorough investigation of the religious beliefs and practices of the people was very necessary. This could not, however, be undertaken seriously until the arrival of Snouck Hurgronje, whom the government considered the right man for the job.⁵⁹

The commissioner concluded his lengthy report with eight proposals. The first four referred to the appointment of van Hasselt as Assistant Resident of Anjer and the dismissal of Raden Penna as *patih* of the same region. The fifth contained a recommendation that an inquiry regarding the principles on which the labour services in the region were based be initiated and that the re-introduction of the individual assessment of land rent be prepared. The sixth proposed that van Lawick van Pabst be appointed assistant to the Resident of Banten, and charged with conducting the activities mentioned in the fifth proposal. The seventh recommended that the Director of the Department of Interior be accorded the authority to enact points five and six. The last item suggested that the Director of Education, Religion and Industry should be asked to devise a regulation according to which religious education

14, 1888, in Report DDI, Appendix U.

⁵⁵ In the post-rebellion period, native civil servants tended to avoid any semblance of religious zeal, see Snouck Hurgronje's note on Banten, Aug. 15, 1892; see also below, p. 312.

⁵⁶ Report DDI, p. 258; van den Berg, in *TBG*, Vol. XXXI (1882), p. 553.

⁵⁷ Report DDI, p. 258; see above, Chap. V, pp. 148 ff.

⁵⁸ Report DDI, pp. 250-254.

⁵⁹ Letter from the Minister of Colonies to the Gov. Gen., Sept. 27, 1889, no. 12, in *Vb.* Sept. 27, 1889, no. 12.

would be brought under the stricter control of the government.⁶⁰ From these recommendations concerning means of preventing future outbursts, the conclusion that the commissioner arrived at can be inferred. The multiplicity of causes of the rebellion can easily be discerned.

The proposals appealed to the Council of the Indies despite its objections on certain points. The most outspoken opponent of the commissioner was the Vice-President of the Council himself; he contended that any meddling with religion might well give serious offence to the religious feelings of the bulk of the people and could easily arouse the spirit of the *djihad* and popular opposition. The people would acquiesce in their subjugation if "they were allowed to retain the sacred heritage of their forefathers".⁶¹ He advocated that the government take preventive rather than repressive measures.

The standpoint of the *Java Bode* — that the government officials were not to blame — was shared by the anonymous writer in the *Indische Gids* and some members of the Council of the Indies.⁶² Although they admitted that Gubbels had his shortcomings, the members of this council contended that Gubbels had sincerely aimed at a judicious assessment of taxes. Moreover, they considered van Vleuten's condemnation of the assistant resident and the *patih* strongly coloured and partial, especially since not a single word of blame was said about the Resident of Banten, Engelbrecht.⁶³ In fact, this problem provoked more comments in the next few years. Van Sandick took much the same view of the rebellion as did van Vleuten, but placed more emphasis on the general popular discontent rather than on the religious fanaticism. Van Sandick extended his analysis somewhat further by pointing to social and economic grievances during the whole decade preceding the outbreak of the revolt.⁶⁴ A significant contribution to the debate on the causes of the revolt was the essay of Nederburgh, which was based upon figures from the colonial reports, and attempted to show that the pressure of taxation both in Banten and in the whole of Java was heavy

⁶⁰ Report DDI, pp. 260-263.

⁶¹ Advice of the Vice-President of the Council of the Indies, Oct. 5, 1888, in MR 1888, no. 1652.

⁶² *IG* (1891), no. 2, p. 1206; Advice of the Council of the Indies, Oct. 5, 1888, *Kommissoriaal* No. 16547, in MR 1888, no. 1652.

⁶³ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁴ Van Sandick traced the popular discontent to several hardships of the previous decade: the cattle plague (1879), the fever epidemic (1880), famine (1881-1882), the Mt. Krakatau eruption (1883); and also to excessive assessment of taxes, see above, Chap. II, pp. 62-66.

in the later 'eighties.⁶⁵ Nederburgh alleged that economic pressures had given rise to popular discontent, so that the population became prone to revolt. This essay can be regarded as a refutation of the article in the *Java Bode*, which was based on the same sources and opined that there was no overtaxation in Banten.⁶⁶

ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS

We shall now examine the administrative arrangements which had to be made during the vital month after the situation had been brought under control. The most pressing one concerned the appointment of an assistant resident in the *afdeling* of Anjer to occupy the position left vacant by the death of Gubbels. Van Vleuten felt that the best person for the post was van Hasselt, the incumbent Assistant Resident of Sumedang. Van Hasselt had served in Banten as an Assistant Resident of Tjaringin for about four years, and he had had experience in co-operating with both high and low Banten officials. He was not only on good terms with some of the regents of Banten, but could also get along with the people.⁶⁷ Shortly after the outbreak of the rebellion he was already on the spot in order to fill Gubbels' place temporarily. He seemed fit to restore the good relationship between European and native civil servants in Tjilegon. He was described by a correspondent of the *Weekblad van Nederlandsch-Indië* as "every inch a gentleman" or, as the Banten officials put it, a *menak*, and he had an unquestioned reputation as a civil servant. The present author is, however, sceptical as to whether the tranquility in the area was attributable to his administration.⁶⁸

The next step was to discharge Raden Penna from his duties. His position as a *Patih* of the *afdeling* of Anjer had been rendered untenable by the recent events, and he had to be disposed of in some way. As we have already seen, certain petitions had been presented, complaining about Raden Penna's conduct in carrying out his administrative duties.⁶⁹ Presumably the charge made against him to the effect that he had known of the plot beforehand, was intended to brand him as a *persona non grata*. The commissioner's view was that the *patih* could hardly be allowed to assume a position either in Banten or elsewhere.

⁶⁵ Nederburgh (1888) in his "*Tjilegon-Bantam-Java*".

⁶⁶ *Java Bode*, Aug. 22, 1888.

⁶⁷ Report DDI, pp. 233-234; see also *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 113-114.

⁶⁸ *Ibidem*.

⁶⁹ Report DDI, Appendix I; see above, Chap. III, under note 61.

It did not seem possible to find any other solution to this issue than to grant him a pension.⁷⁰ It seems that malicious rumours were not only intended to discredit the *patih* in the eyes of the government, but also pointed an ominous finger at the age-old, harassing problem related to the placement of "foreigners" in Banten. When the commissioner had a list drawn up of non-Bantenese officials in the area, rumours circulated that these officials would be removed from the region.⁷¹ As far as we can ascertain, no measures of that kind were actually adopted. As regards the fate of Raden Penna, he was soon appointed a member of the court of justice which was to adjudicate the Tjilegon case.⁷²

Although van Vleuten had dealt extensively with the causes of the revolt as far as the civil servants were concerned, there is one matter which he had strangely enough left untouched. He had not mentioned Engelbrecht, the incumbent Resident of Banten at the time of the outbreak, an omission labelled by some of his critics as an attempt to shield the resident.⁷³ However, the fact that Engelbrecht and his entire staff had been taken completely by surprise remained a source of dissatisfaction to the central authorities and the press, who pressed the question concerning Engelbrecht's conduct. As has been noted before, the *Java Bode* could find no other explanation for the baffling outbreak than that popular feelings had been stirred up by some fanatics. This newspaper's campaign, if it had been successful, would have helped to ward off all criticism and charges made against the resident.⁷⁴ Engelbrecht himself, however, realized that the scales were weighed against him and that there was nothing to be done but submit his resignation. His administration had been marked by laxity, and it could hardly be said that he had acted swiftly during the first few days of the disturbances and had brought order into the chaos.⁷⁵ In order to bring the situation in Banten under control, it would be necessary to nominate another resident. The most probable motivations for the appointment of Velders as Resident of Banten were that he had served in Banten

⁷⁰ Report DDI, pp. 236-240; see also *Java Bode*, Aug. 23, 1888.

⁷¹ *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 165, 1521.

⁷² *Ibidem*; by the court of justice is meant the co-called "*Rechtbank van Omgang*" (Ambulatory Court). Raden Penna's successor was M. Ng. Wirjadidjaja, see O.I.B. Jan. 21, 1889, no. 3.

⁷³ *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 76.

⁷⁴ *Java Bode*, Aug. 23, 1888; see Advice of the Council of the Indies, Oct. 5, 1888, *Kommissoriaal*, No. 16547.

⁷⁵ *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 77.

before and that he had a good reputation as an administrator. In any case, the commissioner considered him the best person for the post. During the vitally important month that followed the suppression of the revolt, when every effort had to be made to bring the situation under control and to remedy the grievances of the people, a man like Velders was badly needed. He had previously served as an Assistant Resident at Tjaringin and afterwards as a Resident of Lampung; he knew all the regulations by heart without enveloping himself in them totally; he was known to be courageous, upright and used to taking strong action.⁷⁶ The immediate and drastic action that Velders took was so different from the indecision shown on previous occasions that many felt very relieved, particularly in the European community. The numerous "Letters from Bantam" in the *Weekblad van Nederlandsch-Indië* present a full description of the improved state of affairs brought about by Velders' administration.⁷⁷ Some of the measures taken will be dealt with in due course. The speed of his actions was not always approved of by the central government, simply because this could worsen the situation instead of improving it. The issue regarding the position of the Regent of Serang is a notable instance.

One of the most important and far-reaching questions which was posed after the revolt was the extent to which the Regent of Serang, R. A. P. Gondokusumo, had been responsible for the outbreak of the revolt. Shortly after its suppression a rumour started circulating to the effect that he was going to resign. Opinion was divided as to the reason. Some said it was because he was suspected of having something to do with the rebellion; others that it was time for the government to grant him a pension now that he had been in service for about thirty years.⁷⁸ The truth may never be discovered. We must keep in mind that in those days of strife and intrigue, different views were very often held on public figures with special reference to their attitude towards the rebellion. Several years later, Mas Djajaatmadja related an instance of Gondokusumo's conduct at the time of the outbreak of which he had personal knowledge. Djajaatmadja's exposure of the state of affairs at

⁷⁶ *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 1257-1257; see also *Weekblad voor Indië*, Vol. III (1906-1907), pp. 894-895.

⁷⁷ *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 794 f., 895 f., p. 946, pp. 989 f., pp. 1191 f., pp. 1470 f., pp. 1520 ff., pp. 1642 f., pp. 1699 f., pp. 1815 f., pp. 1887 f., pp. 2181 f., p. 2251, pp. 2438 f., pp. 2602 f.; also *WNI* (1889-1890), pp. 72 f., pp. 194 f., pp. 459 ff., pp. 564 ff., pp. 681 f., p. 1032, p. 1085, pp. 1441 f.

⁷⁸ A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 233-234; *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 1815 f. See also Snouck Hurgronje's note of Aug. 15, 1892.

that time was certainly little short of scandalous. According to his story, the regent must have been informed about the coming disturbances by at least three people: Padmadirdja, an Assistant *Wedana* of Balagendung; Raden Hadji Ahlil, a retired *Patih* of Serang; and Mas Hadji Mohamad Arsad, the Head *Panghulu* of Serang.⁷⁹ The question was why he did not warn the government. It was stated by Gondoseputro, a son of the Regent of Serang, that his father had submitted a report to the government about the approaching troubles.⁸⁰ Whatever the case may be, we know for certain that Gondokusumo exercised a good deal of authority owing to the fact that he was a member of the sultan's family and also had a large following.⁸¹ It was therefore feared that his resignation might give rise to new troubles. Viewed in this light, the appointment of his successor was of crucial importance for the administration in Banten. Before going into this question, two more points concerning Gondokusumo's attitude towards the rebellion should be mentioned. Firstly, his ambiguous role in Banten politics should be explained in terms of his close affinity to the religious leaders. It must be recalled that the latter's prestige had been enhanced considerably during his administration, owing to the fact that he treated them with great deference.⁸² It was even rumoured that he was a member of the Kadiriah *tarekat*. Consequently, the European authorities strongly suspected that Gondokusumo had almost certainly known something of the revolt and had neglected to report what he knew. In fact, many officials were regarded with suspicion by the European authorities, and it was quite embarrassing to these officials that no investigation was made after the suppression of the revolt. The government's attitude in this respect was, in the eyes of the officials, too generous, or as they put it, "*gupernemen terlalu adil*".⁸³ The second point concerning Gondokusumo's attitude to the rebellion refers to the antagonistic, if not hostile, relationship between Gondokusumo and Raden Penna. Actually, from the moment that Raden Penna assumed the office of *Patih* of Anjer, Gondokusumo could not be held responsible for the disturbances in that area, for with Raden Penna's appointment the supervising function of the Regent of Serang over that area had been terminated.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 234.

⁸⁰ A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 235.

⁸¹ *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 1815.

⁸² *IG* (1891), no. 2, pp. 1142-1144.

⁸³ This means: the government is very judicious; see *WNI* (1889-1890), p. 565.

⁸⁴ *O.I.B. Apr.* 14, 1884, no. 10.

To what extent the notorious intrigues among the Bantenese *prijaji* can be considered as one of the causes of the disturbances will presumably never be revealed. We know too little about the activities of other groups of civil servants who could gain much in discrediting both top officials. The fact that a political struggle was going on among certain factions headed by prominent *prijajis* in that post-rebellion period, was revealed by the issue related to the appointment of a new Regent of Serang.

Among the recommendations of candidates for the position in question, the opinion of the Resident of Banten would obviously be dominant. Velders fully realized that under these circumstances care must be taken in choosing a Regent of Serang. According to him the candidate must meet the following requirements: (1) he must be of high standing and energetic; (2) faithfully loyal to the government of the Netherlands Indies; (3) dependably trustworthy; (4) sincere and religious but not under the influence of religious leaders. Measured by these principles, neither the son nor the son-in-law of Gondokusumo could be appointed as his successor. The former was considered mentally unfit for the work, while the latter, who lacked experience, might come too much under the influence of his father, R. T. Sutadiningrat, the incumbent Regent of Pandeglang.⁸⁵ As regards Sutadiningrat, the resident called him an elderly man who could no longer show initiative. Furthermore, the resident was of the opinion that Sutadiningrat was dominated by his second wife, a daughter of Ratu Siti Aminah, whose fanaticism was also undesirable in the eyes of the government.⁸⁶ It was thought likely that the resident would simply deviate from the tradition according to which the Regent of Pandeglang used to be promoted to Regent of Serang.⁸⁷

Velders mentioned four senior officials in Banten who could be considered potential candidates for the regentship of Serang — Mas Dja-jaatmadja, Raden Bagus Djajawinata, Raden Surawinangun and Raden Tumenggung Suria Nataningrat.⁸⁸ The first man was head *djaksa* at Serang; his career as a non-Bantenese was due to his ability and his dedication to his task. The resident recommended that he remain at

⁸⁵ Missive of the Resident of Banten, July 7, 1889, no. 249, in MR 1889, no. 597. See also O.I.B. Aug. 28, 1889, no. 14.

⁸⁶ Missive of the Resident of Banten, July 7, 1889, no. 249; see above, Chap. III, p. 79.

⁸⁷ E.g. in the past: Tjondronegoro, Gondokusumo; see above Chap. III, p. 85.

⁸⁸ Missive of the Resident of Banten, July 7, 1889, no. 249.

Serang in his present position.⁸⁹ As regards Djajawinata, whom we have had occasion to mention before, he was a younger brother of Sutadiningrat and father of the Djajadiningrats.⁹⁰ He had just been promoted to *Wedana* of Menes, and his nomination as Regent of Serang might arouse the hostility of Raden Surawinangun, the *Patih* of Serang. With the fact that the latter originated from South Banten in mind, the resident suggested that it would be rather fitting for him to be appointed Regent of Lebak.⁹¹ This was not possible, however, as long as Suria Nataningrat could not be transferred either to Prijangan or elsewhere. Since there was no vacancy in Prijangan, a suitable solution would be to transfer Suria Nataningrat to Serang. In his secret missive of 9 July, 1889, Velders therefore proposed the appointment of Suria Nataningrat as Regent of Serang and Surawinangun as Regent of Lebak. The first point of this proposal was inconsistent with the resident's standpoint that the appointment of officials from outside Banten was a political blunder.⁹² The resident's preferences were quite obvious; the central authorities doubted whether the acceptance of these proposals would be of benefit both to the administration in Banten and to the stabilization of the political situation there. The resident's proposals met with opposition from the Director of the Department of Interior himself. A notable dispute arose over two of the candidates mentioned above, i.e. Sutadiningrat and Surawinangun. The Director was of the opinion that the transfer of the former to Serang was not so objectionable as the resident would have the central government believe. As to the fanaticism and influence laid at the door of Sutadiningrat's second wife by the resident, he considered it a misrepresentation; it had been observed that she had not shown any fanaticism since her mother's death. Furthermore, she was afraid that the first wife would return and did not wish to give her husband trouble; so she would not do any harm. The appointment of Sutadiningrat would also have the advantage that the influence of the religious leaders would be curbed considerably, for the government knew him to be unorthodox.⁹³ When interviewed by the resident, Sutadiningrat stated that he would obey the orders of the

⁸⁹ A. Djajadiningrat (1936), p. 94. The resident seems to have intended him to become the future Patih of Anjer; *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 2602.

⁹⁰ For the genealogy of the Djajadiningrats, see Appendix III.

⁹¹ Surawinangun was a son of R.T. Suta Angunangun, see above Chap. III, p. 86; see *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 2438, esp. as regards his inauguration.

⁹² Missive of the Resident of Banten, July 7, 1889, no. 249.

⁹³ Note of the Director of the Department of Interior, July 20, 1889, no. 3895, in *MR* 1889, no. 597.

government unconditionally, although he would not leave Pandeglang without reluctance, because he was fond of both the healthy climate and the quiet way of life there. He went on to point out that he was the oldest regent with the longest period of service in Banten and enjoyed the confidence of the government. If he did not receive the appointment, it might give the impression that the government did not trust him. He reminded the resident that according to Banten bureaucratic custom the Regent of Pandeglang always succeeded his colleague at Serang.⁹⁴

With regard to the candidacy of Surawinangun as Regent of Lebak, the director was in complete disagreement with the original view of the resident. In this connection the director raised the painful question of the financial troubles in which Surawinangun was entangled. It was well-known that he had lived in grand style while he was stationed at Pandeglang. When he came to Serang as *patih*, he was therefore treated by its regent with much suspicion. It was known that the regent afterwards granted him an interest-free loan. Surawinangun had declared that it was safer to borrow from his superordinates than from his subordinates or the Chinese. The regent's action naturally caused a general suspicion of his real intention in lending money to the *patih*. Perhaps it was thought that the latter knew too much for the former's liking.⁹⁵ Another matter which aroused suspicion of both the *patih* and the regent was that after the loan in question had been contracted, the spies employed by the *patih* became totally silent. Because of lack of evidence it is impossible to decide to what extent this charge was deliberately trumped up to discredit both high functionaries. In the resident's opinion, the director's informants were attempting to put the *patih* in an unfavourable light so that he would be passed over by the government in appointing new regents in Banten.⁹⁶

The Regent of Lebak, Suria Nataningrat, was described as a diligent, polite, and humane official; he was also religious but not fanatical. He did not come from the area he governed, and he could scarcely have won the population's confidence during his eight years of administration.⁹⁷ To a certain extent Velders was right in regarding the

⁹⁴ *Kommissoriaal*, July 22, 1889, no. 703, in MR 1889, no. 597.

⁹⁵ Note of the Director of the Department of Interior, July 20, 1889, no. 3895.

⁹⁶ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Aug. 11, 1889, no. 279, in MR 1889, no. 597.

⁹⁷ Missive of the Resident of Banten, July 7, 1889, no. 279; *Kommissoriaal*, July 22, 1889, no. 703, in MR 1889, no. 597; also Missive of the Resident of Banten, Aug. 11, 1889, no. 279.

placement of the Sundanese Suria Nataningrat in Lebak as a political blunder. It might be disastrous if he were stationed at Serang. Suria Nataningrat himself was fully aware that in Serang he would not be able to gain the support of either the officials or the religious leaders. Moreover, he had severely criticized the activities of the Regent of Serang, Gondokusumo, and he feared that once he was in Serang the latter might contrive revenge and bring about his downfall. In fact, his eager wish was that he would be transferred to Prijangan.⁹⁸ Since there was no vacancy there, he had to retain his present position in Lebak.

In the scramble for the number one position in Banten, Sutadiningrat seemed to be winning. At the end of the bureaucratic dispute the resident was won over to the director's proposal, which had more advantages than his. A satisfactory solution was reached concerning the other candidates. Surawinangun was appointed Regent of Pandeglang in the place of Sutadiningrat, who became Regent of Serang.⁹⁹ These two important nominations were soon followed by the appointment of *patih*s, *wedanas*, etc., the most significant of which was that of Djajawinata as *Patih* of Tjaringin.¹⁰⁰

THE ESTABLISHMENT OF MILITARY DETACHMENTS

Meanwhile, throughout the latter half of the year 1888 the Dutch community in and outside Banten, stunned and shocked by the atrocities in Tjilegon, was overtaken by a frenzy of hatred and vengeance. The intense and passionate desire for vengeance was often satisfied at the expense of the first *hadji* that the Dutch came across.¹⁰¹ Having lost their sense of security, some began to arm themselves and others took refuge in the big towns. Any news, however insignificant, which referred to a disturbance somewhere in Java, was enough to arouse terror and panic.¹⁰² In fact, *hadji*-phobic feelings infected the Dutch throughout Java. They saw no point in granting clemency to insurgents and they desired a policy of vigorous repression and punishment.¹⁰³

⁹⁸ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Aug. 11, 1889, no. 279.

⁹⁹ O.I.B. Aug. 28, 1889, no. 14; for the inauguration, see *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 2438. For his activities during his administration, see his autobiography, MS in the collection of the *Bataviaasch Genootschap*, MS Holle, no. 266.

¹⁰⁰ O.I.B. Oct. 16, 1889, no. 27; see also *Regeeringsalmanak*, 1890, 1891; *Javaansche Almanak*, 1889, 1890, 1891.

¹⁰¹ *Java Bode*, Aug. 21, 1888; *Nieuws van den Dag*, Sept. 17, Oct. 6, 1888.

¹⁰² *Java Bode*, Sept. 8 and 15, 1888; also *IG* (1889), no. 2, pp. 1783-1785; see also Chap. VIII, pp. 269 ff.

¹⁰³ *Nieuws van den Dag*, Sept. 17 and Oct. 6, 1888; *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 946. *De Locomotief*, Aug. 11, 1888, referred to a "rebellion-mythus" circu-

It is not surprising that in this atmosphere extraordinary value was placed upon military power. Especially with regard to Banten, the government authorities realized that they must not be lulled into a false sense of security on account of the cessation of hostilities. Although no overt venting of the smouldering feelings could be observed, the position of government officials was still considered precarious. At the end of the year there were still military detachments in places where big contingents of insurgents had mustered during the rising, namely Tjilegon, Bodjonegoro and Balagendung. The detachments in the last two places, each 17 men strong, were to be withdrawn only after the sentence of the Supreme Court on the rebels had been executed. The Resident of Banten considered it advisable to retain the garrison at Tjilegon for the time being; it could gradually be reduced to 25 or 30 men under one officer. In the meantime the establishment of a detachment of *pradjurits* (soldiers)¹⁰⁴ in Tjaringin and Lebak was considered an urgent necessity. The resident had to admit that although the political atmosphere in these regions was fair, precautions should be taken so that the government would not be taken by surprise if any disturbance did occur. The long distance of Tjaringin and Lebak from the capital did not allow the government to act swiftly.¹⁰⁵ Each detachment ought to number at least twenty men, who were to be recruited from outside Banten. The resident went on to suggest that it was desirable to get recruits from Ambon, Menado, or Timor. What he actually had in mind was a military corps so alien, so different in its feelings and prejudices, that they would not ally themselves with the Bantenese, but would be ready to act in case of emergency. The proposal met with little opposition and passed through the central government bodies without difficulty. According to the resolution, detachments of constabulary would be established in the *afdelingen* of Tjaringin and Lebak, each consisting of 24 men under 2 corporals, 1 sergeant, and 1 European instructor. The men were to be recruited from Ambon, Menado and Timor.¹⁰⁶ In aiming at expediency

lating in various places; see Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), p. 1157.

¹⁰⁴ Missive of the Resident of Banten, June 15, 1889, no. 207, in Vb. Feb. 6, 1890, no. 14. The *pradjurits* may be regarded a native armed force, with a function inbetween that of a regular army and the police; they resembled the old corps of *djajengsekars*. Their field of operation was limited to their own region, see Vb. Jan. 23, 1890, no. 22, esp. the notes of Bureau A³ of the Ministry of Colonies.

¹⁰⁵ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Feb. 27, 1889, no. 58, in MR 1889, no. 154 or in Vb. Jan. 28, 1890, no. 8.

¹⁰⁶ O.I.B. Oct. 31, 1889, no. 5; see also *WNI* (1889-1890), pp. 194-195.

in its administration the colonial government held to the old Roman policy of "divide and rule".

THE PROBLEM CONCERNING THE POSITION OF THE VILLAGE HEAD

It was obvious that one of the most important and far-reaching problems with which the government was faced was how to consolidate the position of the head of the village, elsewhere in Java the "palladium" of peace. The nature of the disturbances during the rebellion doubtlessly played a part in exposing the powerlessness of the village head. What made this problem more serious was that investigations had shown that a number of *djaros* or *lurahs* had joined the rebel forces or had acted in concert with the rebels.¹⁰⁷ The general situation regarding the powerlessness of the village head had also been demonstrated clearly in the enactment of various agrarian regulations introduced shortly before the rebellion.¹⁰⁸ In the prevailing situation, the execution of these regulations at village level could hardly be enforced. It was therefore imperative that measures should be taken to strengthen the position of the village heads, and to make it more attractive. It very often happened that village heads handed in their resignations, while many who were still in office looked forward eagerly to the moment of their dismissal.¹⁰⁹ All this was due to the fact that the disadvantages and risks attached to their position were not sufficiently counterbalanced by the advantages. It seemed desirable to the resident that a plan be made for rewarding the village head. The resident suggested that the village head be remunerated in the form of an exemption from paying the land rent up to 25 guilders; the other members of the village administration were to be exempted from paying up to 15 guilders.¹¹⁰ Because objections were made to the resident's proposal, the Director of the Department of Interior advocated the granting of official fields to the village head and members of the village administration.¹¹¹ Higher officials then raised objections to this second proposal on the ground that the village could not provide the land to be distributed as official fields. It was suggested that an extensive investigation be made to decide to what extent domain lands could be used for this propose. If this was impracticable, an at-

¹⁰⁷ Appendix IX.

¹⁰⁸ Report DDI, pp. 161-198; 240-246; see above Chap. II, pp. 62-64.

¹⁰⁹ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Feb. 27, 1889, no. 58.

¹¹⁰ Ibidem.

¹¹¹ Note of the Director of the Department of Interior, Apr. 8, 1889, no. 1957, in MR 1889, no. 377 or Report of the Director of Finance, Apr. 5, 1890, no. 4988, in Vb. Jan. 28, 1890, no. 8.

tempt would be made to explore another possibility, namely the buying of land from the village. The government could perhaps advance the money for this purchase.¹¹² The director had calculated how much money would be needed for fields for official use. He arrived at the sum of 75,000 guilders for Banten only; there were 1256 villages without official fields.¹¹³ From the available sources we cannot ascertain whether the government did grant this sum; very likely it did not, since the problem of strengthening the power of the *djaro* was again raised in the nineteen-twenties.¹¹⁴

PROBLEMS REGARDING ASSESSMENT OF TAXES

Another important problem facing the government in Banten was the pressure of land revenue assessment. The pressure of this tax was keenly felt by the villagers and caused a great deal of concern among both villagers and administrators. Various efforts had been made to establish a workable revenue system and, particularly after the rebellion, the attention of the authorities was directed to the problem in question. As has been noted above, the commissioner in his report branded the communal levying of land rent as one of the sources of popular discontent and made a plea for a return to individual assessment. The Resident of Banten was, however, of the opinion that a reintroduction of the individual assessment was impossible in that year and not advisable for the near future. He contended that for the time being it would suffice to rectify the levying of the land rent, especially in the *afdelingen* of Anjer and Serang where dissatisfaction among tax-payers was often observed. For this purpose committees should be set up to conduct surveys to establish whether the land rent was or was not assessed reasonably according to the extent of each property. The committees would also have to find out whether the people had been treated judiciously by the village administrators at the time of the distribution of the assessments (*repartitie*). At the same time data should be collected concerning prices of paddy, the productivity of the plots, and of course the exact measurements of the plots. Besides these three factors, the state of cultivation of the plot would also have to be taken into account

¹¹² Letter of the First Government Secretary, May 27, 1889, no. 163, in MR 1889, no. 377 or in Vb. Jan. 28, 1890, no. 8.

¹¹³ Note of the Director of the Department of Interior, Apr. 8, 1889, no. 1957.

¹¹⁴ Benda and McVey (1960), pp. 52-53; Adviser for Native Affairs to the Gov. Gen., Aug. 24, 1921, no. 560, in Collection of the *Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, MS, no. H 797.

in determining its assessable capacity.¹¹⁵ Because of the formidable difficulties of classifying the assessment of land on the one hand, and the popular excitement and unrest which might be aroused by the uncertainty about the new assessment during the period of transition on the other, the resident strenuously objected to the re-introduction of the individual assessment. Without going into the details of his arguments, it is quite clear that he was sceptical as to whether the government, even with the assistance of experts, would be successful in designing a perfect system of land revenue assessment. The resident put forward the following counter-proposal: in order to overcome the objections against the distribution of the assessment according to the "*repartitie*" system, plot-measurement should be conducted and the mapping of the plots should also indicate the line of demarcation of the individual fields, while the estimates of the individual assessment should be made by the central government. A more detailed investigation should be carried out about the prices of paddy, since they constituted an important factor in determining the assessable capacity. In this connection the resident remarked that, because of the lack of good communications, the differences between local prices were quite conspicuous. There were even places where almost no paddy trade was to be found.¹¹⁶ The director flatly rejected the resident's arguments by stating that in many respects they were too exaggerated. The director contended that less time would be needed to classify the assessment tracts than to effectuate what the resident had suggested, if the government in Banten adopted the same procedure as in Prijangan. The director well knew that the resident's opinion was contrary to his own in many respects; he therefore doubted whether the central government could ever really command the co-operation of the resident in effecting the required measures for the return to individual revenue assessment. He suggested that the central government should nominate a functionary especially charged with conducting the entire reform.¹¹⁷

In the meantime, the resident had already begun to send committees to the villages, charged with the task of eliminating all imputations of injustice as regards assessment and of assisting the people in

¹¹⁵ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Jan. 7, 1889, no. 92, in Vb. Jan 23, 1890, no. 22.

¹¹⁶ Ibidem.

¹¹⁷ Note of the Director of the Department of Interior, March 15, 1889, no. 1414, in Vb. Jan. 23, 1890, no. 22. Mention was made of H. J. W. van Lawick van Pabst, whom he recommended as the right man to conduct the investigation.

re-apportioning their individual assessment. As the Chief Inspector of the Cultures testified, they did an excellent job. From his note to the director it can easily be inferred that he fully endorsed the resident's ideas and notions. He also made mention of the fact that according to the findings of the investigation the figures of assessment were far lower than the assessable capacity of the people in the *afdelingen* of Anjer and Serang. He considered it undesirable to carry out considerable reduction of assessment in those areas. On the other hand he felt it was advisable to wait for the results of the experiment on the revenue system in Prijangan before initiating a new system in Banten.¹¹⁸

The Council of the Indies, however, did not agree with the resident's and the Chief Inspector's plan for the retention of communal assessment, even though this assessment would be based upon more accurate data as regards the size of the plot, productivity and paddy prices. Instead, it stressed the urgent necessity of reintroducing the individual assessment of the land rent in Banten, but it also considered it desirable to wait for the result of the experiment in Prijangan mentioned above.¹¹⁹ Meanwhile van Vleuten, who had urged the central government to reintroduce individual assessment, resigned his position of Director of the Department of Interior. The afore-mentioned Chief Inspector of the Cultures, Kuneman, was appointed his successor. Evidently he and the Resident of Banten were not the sort of men to exact the proposed reforms with great determination.

As has been noted above, the complaint about the pressure of taxation also referred to the capitation tax and the trade tax. As regards the former, the resident was quick to enact administrative measures which promoted the return to the levying of capitation tax according to local custom.¹²⁰ The government furthermore conducted investigations, not only in Banten but throughout Java, the results of which would be used to revise the trade tax. The survey, which was initiated by the Resident of Banten, showed that in his region about 4300 individuals whose occupation was petty trade had an income of less than 50 guilders a month. A large majority of these petty traders performed their trading activities only on certain days of the week; their trade was only a source

¹¹⁸ Note from the Chief Inspector of the Cultures to the Director of the Department of Interior, Apr. 8, 1889, no. 1958, in Vb. Jan. 23, 1890, no. 22.

¹¹⁹ Advice of the Council of the Indies, May 31, 1889, *Kommissoriaal*, No. 8522, in Vb. Jan. 23, 1890, no. 22.

¹²⁰ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Feb. 27, 1889, no. 58.

of additional income.¹²¹ The Resident of Banten proposed that this category of petty traders be exempted from the trade tax.¹²² We know for certain that a revision of the trade tax regulation was later effected, according to which petty traders with an annual income of less than 25 guilders were freed from paying trade tax.¹²³

PROBLEMS REGARDING THE REVACCINATION

Since complaints had been aired concerning the revaccination, we must also devote attention to the measures that were taken to bring about an improvement in the health of the people, without distressing them, and by overcoming popular prejudice. In fact, rumours would have it that the Chief of the Public Health Service, who had been on an inspection tour in the days of the rebellion, would have been murdered if he had not altered his itinerary at the last moment. It was told that the assassins of Gubbels had sought information regarding the whereabouts of the Chief of the Public Health Service. It can easily be understood that resentment was directed against a person who had to enforce unpopular measures. It was a well-known fact that the people in Banten were slow to appreciate that vaccination was indispensable for combating disease and thus for improving popular welfare. In some districts the vaccination campaign was hampered by the failure of the *djaro* to persuade the people to let themselves be vaccinated; on another occasion the people turned up *en masse*, which gave rise to much embarrassment. It will be recalled that the protest made against the vaccinating of women and young girls involved an unusually forceful expression of popular feeling.¹²⁴ Because of the popular opposition, the vaccinations were performed in the presence of civil servants, whose influence was needed to attain effectiveness. According to the report of the Chief of the Public Health Service, in 1889 vaccinations could be carried out in Banten without interference or complaints from the

¹²¹ The Gov. Gen. to the Minister of Colonies, July 17, 1890, no. 11, in Exh. Aug. 28, 1890, no. 29. See further about the 1878 regulation concerning the trade tax and Brooshooft's criticism, Brooshooft (n.d.), pp. 175-178.

¹²² The Gov. Gen. to the Minister of Colonies, July 17, 1890, no. 11.

¹²³ *Staatsblad*, 1892, no. 275.

¹²⁴ See the testimony of the Assistant *Wedana* of Balagendung, in Appendix VIII. See further the note of the Chief of the Public Health Service, Jan. 16, 1889, no. 34, in MR 1890, no. 468 or in Exh. Apr. 21, 1890, no. 97. For an instance of difficulties in performing the vaccination after the rebellion, see A. Djajadiningrat (1936), pp. 150-154. For the way in which difficulties in introducing vaccination in Prijangan had been overcome, see Olivier, Vol. I (1827), p. 301-302; also Roorda van Eysinga (1856), p. 66.

people.¹²⁵ In addition it must be remarked that if one stigmatizes the attitude of the people in Banten as "reluctant" or "indifferent", then one has failed to recognize the fundamentally different outlook of the Bantenese, to whom vaccination was not in accordance with their moral and religious convictions.

Two major problems with which the government was faced remain to be examined: (1) the age-old but now pressing problem concerning religious matters, especially with respect to the position of the *hadji* and religious education; (2) the maladministration, the vicious and glaring abuses, for which Banten had always been notorious.

PROBLEMS CONCERNING RELIGIOUS MATTERS

Confronted with the difficult questions concerning religious matters, the colonial government throughout the pre-rebellion period tried to avoid the extremes of complete interference and complete non-interference. Religious neutrality thus remained the avowed basis of Dutch colonial policy. It is true, however, that some restrictions were placed on the pilgrimage in the course of the century. As has been noted previously, various abuses and evils of the pilgrimage had given rise to pressure for the enactment of some legislative remedy.¹²⁶ The phenomenal increase in the number of pilgrims and the recurrent stirrings agitated by *hadjis* fostered the anxious fear of the *hadjis* among the Dutch, some of whom had long clamoured for the total prohibition of the pilgrimage and the limitation of the activities of the *hadjis*. On various occasions, however, the traditional policy of religious neutrality was re-affirmed: the central authorities were not willing to take up such an extreme position. A notable instance from the early 'seventies may be cited to illuminate this policy. After the widespread disturbances at the end of the 'sixties and the beginning of the 'seventies,¹²⁷ a recommendation was made that the wearing of the *hadji*-dress be forbidden, that *hadjis* be excluded from government posts and that rigorous

¹²⁵ Note of the Chief of the Public Health Service, Jan. 16, 1889, no. 34; see also the report of the physician of the residency of Banten, May 17, 1889, no. 56, in Exh. Apr. 21, 1890, no. 97.

¹²⁶ For the various abuses and evils, see Advice of Snouck Hurgronje, June 20, 1889, no. 11, in Vb. Oct. 18, 1889, no. 54. See also his advices in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. I (1959), pp. 1306-1465.

¹²⁷ Bekasi (1869), Madiun (1869), Pekalongan (1872), Priangan (1872); see de Waal, Vol. I (1876), pp. 236-237.

control be exercised over the pilgrimage.¹²⁸ The Council of the Indies refused to bow to the clamour of those who advocated a harsh policy, and instead placed emphasis on caution and constructive measures in combating fanatical religious movements.¹²⁹ About two decades later these questions were again discussed, but in a far more agitated atmosphere. After the bloody events at Tjilegon, feelings of horror were running high and the campaign for the ruthless suppression of the insurgents evoked widespread acclamation and support among a large part of the Dutch community; the campaign pressed for outright prohibition of the *hadji*-dress, severe punishment of participants of the revolt and rigorous control of religious teachers.¹³⁰ In response to these emphatic recommendations, however, the central government refused to countenance any measures which involved the persecution of the *hadjis* simply because they performed their religious duties. It was felt more keenly than ever before that a more comprehensive and well-defined "Islam-policy" had become imperative. Meanwhile, the government also had to deal with the chronic *hadji*-phobia which, enhanced by the Tjilegon affair and the subsequent disturbances, prevailed in large circles of the Dutch community during the years that followed the rebellion. Decisive measures in these matters and in so many others concerning religion had, however, to await the coming of Snouck Hurgronje, who was charged with the investigation of the nature of the Islamic religion in Indonesia and with advising the government on Islamic matters. After Snouck Hurgronje had been employed as adviser, the government engaged upon the reform of religious matters, and it was Snouck Hurgronje's point of view that was adopted.

Before we proceed to examine the measures advocated by Snouck Hurgronje as regards the Tjilegon rebellion, reference should be made to measures proposed and policies adopted by the Resident of Banten himself. It would seem that from the outset he was more inclined to adhere to a harsh policy and to deal rigorously with the rebels. In one of his missives he opined that martial law should have been proclaimed immediately after the outbreak of the rising and that more villages should have been burnt down in order to subdue the rebels quickly.¹³¹

¹²⁸ Note of Holle, Aug. 20, 1873, no. 126, in Vb. June 3, 1874, no. 31.

¹²⁹ Advice of the Council of the Indies, Oct. 31, 1873, in Vb. June 3, 1874, no. 31.

¹³⁰ *Nieuws van den Dag*, Oct. 6, 1888; *WNI* (1888-1889), p. 946.

¹³¹ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Dec. 22, 1888, no. 175, in *MR* 1888, no. 863 or in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4.

He felt that proceeding against the insurgents according to the ordinary forms of law would make less of an impression on the people than the ruthless suppression he himself favoured. He went on to say that treating the people with humanity at a time when rigorous measures should be enforced might be interpreted by the people as a sign of weakness.¹³²

Turning first to some minor problems that the resident had to cope with: the prohibition by the Assistant Resident of Anjer of holding processions and playing music at feasts was soon abolished and in the future it was only required that the local authorities should be informed in advance. As regards the *dikir* performances, no particular regulations were enacted, it was left to the local officials to deal with the matter tactfully; under no circumstances were the *dikir* performances to be allowed to become a nuisance to the environment.¹³³

Although he disagreed with van Vleuten on various problems, the resident regarded his proposals concerning religious education with approval. Both alleged that the religious schools had aroused a good deal of unrest. Particularly the religious teachers of dubious character had spread disaffection and religious zeal bordering on fanaticism. Van Vleuten and the resident felt that these dreadful consequences were to be expected from the spread of religious schools. Before taking remedial measures, the opinion of certain prominent natives ought to be consulted. The resident found out that prominent and influential figures in Banten looked with favour on the restrictions placed on these objectionable practices and degrading performances associated with religious education.¹³⁴ It was advocated not only that religious teachers should be classified into various categories, but also that people should be subjected to examinations in order to qualify as religious teachers. The Regent of Pandeglang, Sutadiningrat, suggested a course of action in a statement submitted to the commissioner.¹³⁵ The resident recommended that these measures be enforced in the whole of Java. But before his measures could be enacted, the restriction on religious teaching had to be carefully weighed and its impact on the Muslim community closely assessed. Moreover, since Snouck Hurgronje had been appointed

¹³² Ibidem.

¹³³ Ibidem.

¹³⁴ Ibidem; see also Report DDI, Appendix U. One of the chief measures taken by the government to control religious education was to keep records on the religious teachers, the so-called *guru-register*. In Banten this register was better kept than in other regions; see *KT*, Vol. VI (1917), p. 736.

¹³⁵ Report DDI, Appendix U.

adviser, he was invariably consulted whenever regulations were proposed on religious matters. His opinion will be given shortly.

The problem of the *hadji*-dress, which had frequently been brought to the notice of the government, was also put forward by the resident in his above mentioned missive. He contended that the custom of wearing the *hadji*-dress was widespread in Banten and that in spite of its innocent appearance this custom was a potentially dangerous one, because a Bantenese wearing such garments was regarded with awe by the common villagers. The result was a very powerful inducement to exploit the commoners who were eager to render service to the *hadjis*. Prohibition of the *hadji*-dress would clear away both the economic and the political exploitation which arose from this relationship. Since such a drastic step, however, was likely to encounter strong opposition, its enactment should be left to the good sense and judgment of the local authorities.¹³⁶ In raising these proposals the resident was actually launching an outright attack on the traditional *laissez faire* policy of the government. The resident's programme was of course to a large extent a response to the sanguinary events of July 1888, but it also reflected the *hadji*-phobic mentality which loomed large during the years that followed the revolt. In central government circles the programme met with little support; it aroused controversy by its bold challenge of the age-old neutrality policy.

Holle, Honorary Adviser on Native Affairs, put forward his views of what, as he put it, "a golden mean policy" should entail.¹³⁷ After what had happened since 1873 the policy of complete non-interference could no longer be maintained. On the other hand the ruthless suppression of any kind of religious expression would do the government much harm. In his opinion the rigorous measures taken in Banten aroused a revengeful spirit among the population. The safest way would be to take preventive measures and to react against innovations without much fuss. The government should refrain from anything resembling compulsion or persecution. There would be no political danger if religious matters were entrusted to a regent who handled them tactfully. Holle's plan was not a mere design on paper but reflected the experience he had gained during his stay in Prijangan, where he had lived for more than 25 years. As regards the *hadji*-dress, he made a plea for a policy of moderation. On the one hand he opined that its pro-

¹³⁶ Missive of the Resident of Banten, Dec. 22, 1888, no. 175.

¹³⁷ Note of Holle, Sept. 20, 1890, no. 104, in Vb. Dec. 2, 1890, C¹⁵.

hibition would give the people cause for hostility; as he pointed out about two decades earlier, the prohibition might make the Muslims suspect that the government was trying to suppress their religion, while at the same time there was much chance that the prohibition would impose a martyrdom on the *hadjis* with the result that their prestige would be enhanced.¹³⁸ On the other hand, non-interference in this matter would mean giving offence to the *hadjis*, who considered their dress a token of prestige and privilege, only to be bestowed upon those who had made the pilgrimage.¹³⁹ Holle went on to remark that a detailed regulation was undesirable. The government should, however, be on the alert for those who abused the *hadjji*-dress by discriminating themselves against those of their co-religionists who did not wear the garments or by arousing feelings of hatred against infidels. However innocent the *hadjji*-dress might seem, it could become a source of fanaticism, the sworn enemy of the colonial government.¹⁴⁰ Neither exaggerated fear of the *hadjji*, nor burying one's head ostrich-like in the sand would have the desired effect in combating fanaticism. The *hadjji*-phobic mind was — in Holle's own words — a bad adviser; it only gave the *hadjji* eminence in the eyes of the people and it could alienate all those who were well-disposed towards the *hadjji* from the government. If the government had been constantly on the alert, what had happened in Tjilegon could have been prevented; severe measures taken by panic-stricken officials exacting indiscriminate vengeance could have been avoided.¹⁴¹ Holle had noticed that after the dreadful events in Tjilegon, it had generally been agreed upon by government authorities to make a stand against the Pan-Islamic propaganda. In this connection he also raised the question of religious education which in his opinion should be closely watched. He felt that the best people to do this were the *panghulus*, provided that they were carefully chosen. Consequently, the problem of the appointment of *panghulus* arose. In the past these men had not had enough influence or carried enough weight to make their support of any real value. In the near future the government should pay close attention to the appointment of *panghulus*, choosing them from among the most able and influential religious leaders in their respective regions. With their assistance, and utilizing their influence

¹³⁸ Ibidem.

¹³⁹ Ibidem; in the 1870s there was a tendency for Arabian dress to become popular; it was also worn by people who had not made the *hadjj* yet.

¹⁴⁰ Ibidem.

¹⁴¹ Ibidem.

over the people, religious movements and fanaticism could be effectively combated. This policy of appeasement with the help of the *panghulu* had been practiced successfully in Limbangan (Priangan).¹⁴² As regards the *tarekats*, Holle felt that it would be possible to stem their expansion by means of a widespread distribution of Sajid Usman's tract.¹⁴³ The success of this measure was tangible in the gradual diminution of the *tarekats* and their adepts in both Priangan and Banten.¹⁴⁴ In short, Holle made his standpoint clear by pointing out that a sound, progressive policy on religious matters was much needed; it would do away with the "hands-off" policy and adopting another one not based on fear or a spirit of vengeance, but on understanding and foresight.¹⁴⁵ In fact, Holle adopted much the same attitude as did Snouck Hurgronje and agreed with him on many points.

With the arrival of Snouck Hurgronje as Adviser on Arabian and Native Affairs in May 1889 the religious question was attacked expertly and vigorously. Snouck Hurgronje's training and experience enabled him to design at once a comprehensive and enlightened Dutch Islamic policy, which left a strong mark on the Indonesian scene. Following the outbreak of the revolt in Tjilegon, the government had decided to employ him as Adviser on Arabian and Native Affairs and to let decisive steps in religious matters await his arrival.¹⁴⁶ Within less than a month after he had arrived, Snouck Hurgronje had already submitted his advice about the Tjilegon rising. For a better understanding of the government policy as regards the Tjilegon affair, we must examine the suggestions made in this advice.¹⁴⁷

Snouck Hurgronje subjected the measures taken by the Resident of Banten to sceptical criticism; he saw no point in banishing so many suspected rebels who had been acquitted because of lack of evidence. He cautioned the resident against undue severity and made a plea for reducing the exiles to a minimum. Most of the suspects had been exiled

¹⁴² Ibidem.

¹⁴³ Ibidem; see also Note of Holle, Nov. 27, 1888, no. 50, in Vb. Feb. 8, 1889, no. 31; also Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 1 (1924), pp. 71-85.

¹⁴⁴ Reports on Banten in the post-rebellion period made still more frequent mention of the *kjais* in Banten, who were very powerful and enjoyed prestige among the population. See Adviser for Native Affairs to the Gov. Gen., Aug. 24, 1921, no. 560. See also Benda and McVey (1960), pp. 2-22.

¹⁴⁵ Note of Holle, Sept. 20, 1890, no. 104.

¹⁴⁶ Missive from the Gov. Gen. to the Minister of Colonies, Nov. 19, 1888, no. 1652, in Exh. Dec. 27, 1888, no. 117 or in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4.

¹⁴⁷ Note of Snouck Hurgronje, June 7, 1889, no. 7, in Collection of the *Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, MS, no. H 797; also in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), pp. 1980-1986.

simply because they were regarded as a danger to the order and tranquillity in the residency. It would seem that anyone who had taken part in either a meeting or a celebration held by one of the chief rebels had been charged with being a rebel and had been found guilty. Snouck Hurgronje pointed out that political banishment *en masse* would only exasperate the people and stir up feelings of bitterness and animosity. Such a measure would only contribute to the growth of fanaticism and discontent. Another important question was whether the punishments had not been based upon insufficient grounds or misunderstandings; the procedures of the trials and the sources of the investigations should be checked. In his opinion many exiles had become the victims of perjury committed by the fellow-Bantenese who were motivated either by self-interest or by the fear of falling into disgrace with the government. Their standpoint was in line with the idea that — as Snouck Hurgronje put it — “it would be better to exile ten people too many than one too few”. He went on to say that the exiling of so many people would be ascribed by the population to the weakness and fear of the government. He then suggested that it would have been sufficient to subject the suspects to the supervision of the police. This supervision would be maintained until the charge was refuted or confirmed so that a new trial could be conducted.¹⁴⁸ As was to be expected, the Resident of Banten was an outspoken opponent of Snouck Hurgronje’s theory concerning a policy of “forcible admonition and controlling supervision” of suspected participants in the rebellion. The resident did not see how the prestige of the government could be lowered by a policy which followed the dictates of forceful restoration of order and tranquillity. On the contrary, he considered that the exile of dangerous elements would be perceived by the people with respectful appreciation. Rejecting the theory of police supervision, he asserted that the native civil servants in Banten, including the police, were strongly influenced by the religious leaders. In his opinion almost all the religious leaders, either *hadjis* or *kjais*, belonged to a well-known Sufi order and accordingly had a higher status than any civil servant. In view of this situation, the system of police supervision simply would not work. Furthermore, the resident also challenged the contention that banishment *en masse* would give rise to the growth of popular dissatisfaction and fanaticism. He believed that if this measure was not enforced, the restoration of order in the region would not be realized for many years to come. Lastly, he could

¹⁴⁸ Ibidem.

not subscribe to Snouck Hurgronje's view that Hadji Mardjuki's role in the rebellion had been very much exaggerated. Instead, he still held that Hadji Mardjuki was one of the chief leaders, if not *the* chief leader of the rebellion, on the ground that he had presided at or participated in many important meetings during the preparatory period of the revolt. Furthermore, his signature was to be found at the bottom of a letter intercepted by the authorities, which had been signed by the *hadjis* who were known to be the chief leaders; the others were Hadji Wasid, Hadji Abubakar, Hadji Iskak, and Hadji Ismail. With these facts in mind, the resident opposed any suggestion that Hadji Mardjuki be allowed to return to Banten. This would mean nothing less, as he put it, than "dragging the Trojan horse within one's walls".¹⁴⁹

It is interesting to note in passing that the resident's policy of banishment *en masse* obtained a cold reception in central government circles. Because the flow of proposals for banishment seemed to be endless in the course of the first half of 1889, opposition was building up from the side of the Council of the Indies. There were several grounds for denouncing this policy; the inquisitorial investigation, which had been going on for many months, might foster popular feelings of unrest and create an atmosphere which was decidedly not conducive to loyalty towards the government on the part of the people; both the family and the relatives of the exiles could only be expected to harbour revengeful feelings towards the government; and it was feared that the exiles would be able to stir up the population in the place where they were exiled and agitate them to revolt against the government. Agreeing with Snouck Hurgronje's line of reasoning, the council advocated that the banishments should be brought to a stop and that the remainder of the suspects should be placed under the supervision of either the village head or the district head.¹⁵⁰

After this small digression let us turn again to what Snouck Hurgronje had to say about some of the pressing problems of the time, especially as regards Banten. When his opinion was solicited on the question of the *hadji*-dress, he strongly deprecated its proposed prohibition, on the ground that such interference would be entirely useless

¹⁴⁹ Missive of the Resident of Banten, June 24, 1889, no. 217 in Exh. Aug. 20, 1889, no. 59.

¹⁵⁰ Advice of certain members of the Council of the Indies, June 21, 1889, in Exh. Aug. 20, 1889, no. 59. For the influence of the exiles on their environment, see Missive of the Assistant Resident of Gorontalo, Apr. 16, 1889, no. 48, and that of the Resident of Menado, June 2, 1889, L^a U, in MR 1889, no. 483.

and would only stir up ill-feeling. In the past there had been good reasons not to abolish that age-old custom, and these same reasons became more forcible at a time when the religious life in the Muslim world was more fervent. Snouck Hurgronje was of the opinion that the government had other means at its disposal for combating the evil of fanaticism, and that any measures taken should be tactfully and peacefully effected without arousing the Muslim's suspicion that the Dutch government was hostile to Islam and attempted to humiliate its adherents.¹⁵¹ Another expression of his restrained attitude with regard to religious problems is found in his recommendation concerning the proposed supervision of religious education. He deeply regretted that shortly after the outbreak of the Tjilegon revolt the pent-up emotions of European civil servants had burst forth in a frenzy of persecution; throughout Java they had busily engaged in a relentless *guru*-hunt. *Gurus* and *santris* were arrested, questioned, and sometimes exiled. Certain regents had issued prohibitions against the instruction of the *kitab*s or the establishment of *tarekats* in their regions.¹⁵² During his tour through Java,¹⁵³ Snouck Hurgronje was strongly affected by the prevailing feverish agitation against any semblance of zealous manifestation of religious life. He set his face against any prohibition or strict regulation of religious education, for he saw that it would only arouse the exasperation of the people. Instead, he asserted that the religious teachers should be convinced of the government's real intention. Far from hindering their activities, it was the government's concern to know what was taught by the *gurus* to their *murids*; the *gurus* should know that all their doings were observed by the authorities; they should also realize that the government, without interfering with religious practices, could not be totally indifferent with regard to their religion, and everything connected with it. The government would adhere to its principle of religious neutrality only so long as religion was not misused as a weapon against it or as a cloak for hostile intentions which also had a disastrous effect on the peaceful population.¹⁵⁴

We have now arrived at a point where Snouck Hurgronje differed from his more avowedly *laissez faire* contemporaries. The core of his argument was that the paramount dictates of religious neutrality

¹⁵¹ Note of Snouck Hurgronje, June 7, 1889, no. 7.

¹⁵² Snouck Hurgronje, in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. II (1959), p. 1157.

¹⁵³ A synoptic report of this tour is given by van Ronkel, in *BKI*, Vol. CI (1942), pp. 311-339.

¹⁵⁴ Cited by Holle in his note of Sept. 20, 1890, no. 104.

demanded that the various religious practices be tolerated, but that no political abuses of religion should be tolerated. In his opinion, more positive administrative measures should be enforced to improve the administration of religious matters. In this connection, one of the major problems facing the government was the nomination of the *panghulus*. Snouck Hurgronje felt that the government should take great care in appointing the *panghulus*; what kind of people occupied this position would be a matter of great consequence in the near future when the *panghulus* were to be charged with the supervision of religious education.¹⁵⁵

With reference to Banten, in Snouck Hurgronje's view, Islam had existed in its most unattractive form in this region for many centuries.¹⁵⁶ Because of its unique historical development it took the shape of a fervent, if not fanatical, religion, and was therefore quite liable to engender feelings of hatred towards infidels. The *kjais*, clothed with reverent honour by the people, were generally regarded as the fomenters of risings. Those who saw in various grievances the stepping-stone to political power could fan the flames of discontent, and place themselves at the head of a rebellious movement. In Banten any popular movement naturally took on a religio-political character. Snouck Hurgronje also observed that the Banten population exhibited a chronic propensity to revolt,¹⁵⁷ which could be kindled by sparks of disaffection of various kinds. As regards the Tjilegon affair, Snouck Hurgronje too made mention of its multiplicity of causes, but besides the peculiar character of Islam in Banten and the propensity to revolt, he stressed maladministration as one of the main causes.¹⁵⁸

THE CONDITION OF THE ADMINISTRATION

Maladministration was in fact one of the most vexing problems existing in Banten; the sanguinary events of the rebellion once again focussed attention on the degenerate condition of the administration in Banten at that time. Snouck Hurgronje perceived that the undesirable conditions, the administrative abuses and the administra-

¹⁵⁵ Ibidem.

¹⁵⁶ Snouck Hurgronje's note of August 15, 1892, also in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), pp. 1986-1999, esp. p. 1991. See also *VG*, Vol. IV, part 1 (1924), p. 254.

¹⁵⁷ Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 1 (1924), p. 255; also his note of August 15, 1892.

¹⁵⁸ Snouck Hurgronje's note of August 15, 1892; see also *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2 (1924), p. 421.

tive ineffectiveness made up a vicious circle. In his opinion the principal fault lay in the tendency to allow the European civil servants to run the whole administration by themselves according to their own ideas.¹⁵⁹ The native officials could do no more than perform the duties imposed on them from above, and adopt an attitude of — as they put it — “*turut angin*”,¹⁶⁰ i.e. trimming their sails according to the wind. In fact, the corps of native civil servants was reduced to a mere vehicle of the European administration. In addition, the Bantenese administrative officials, with some exceptions, were remarkably lacking in a broad outlook, an intellectual state which was designated *dusun* in Bantenese.¹⁶¹ Snouck Hurgronje ascribed their restricted intellectual horizon for a great deal to the fact that the government had seriously neglected the modern education of the Banten *prijaji*. In this connection, the sending of Bantenese *prijaji*'s sons to the *Sekolah Menak* at Bandung — the so-called “*Hoofdenschool*”, a school where *prijaji*'s sons were trained for the native civil service — may be regarded as a significant step to remedy this lack of modern education. It was, however, not until 1910 that such a school was opened in Serang.¹⁶² Another problem related to releasing the Banten *prijajis* from their insulation — which Snouck Hurgronje did not touch upon in his note¹⁶³ — loomed large in government circles in subsequent years; it was often advocated that in order to widen the outlook of the Bantenese officials a policy should be adopted of transferring them temporarily to another region, e.g. Priangan or Krawang, and conversely, that native officials from these regions should — also temporarily — be appointed in Banten. This latter aspect of the policy would seem to have been expedient for improving the condition of the administration in Banten.¹⁶⁴ In addition it must be noted that proposals had been put forward which went much further than the above policy; it was suggested that the residency of

¹⁵⁹ Snouck Hurgronje, in *VG*, Vol. IV, part 2 (1924), p. 422.

¹⁶⁰ Note of Snouck Hurgronje, Aug. 15, 1892; see esp. in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), pp. 1989-1990.

¹⁶¹ Ibidem. *Dusun* literally means village.

¹⁶² Ibidem; see also *Opleidingsschool voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren te Serang*, n.p. (1918).

¹⁶³ Note of Snouck Hurgronje, August 15, 1892.

¹⁶⁴ Unfortunately, several non-Bantenese officials had been promoted during their service in Banten, not because of their capacities or qualifications as civil servants, but because of their clientage to European officials; this gave rise to much resentment among the Bantenese against non-Bantenese officials; see Snouck Hurgronje's note of Aug. 15, 1892; also in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), p. 1990.

Banten should be abolished and incorporated into the neighbouring residencies of Batavia and Krawang, in order to facilitate the transfer of Bantenese officials to other parts of the newly-created residency.¹⁶⁵ On the other hand, there were still officials who clung to the idea that "foreigners" would mostly be unpopular in Banten and that their appointment should be considered as definitely objectionable. They therefore advised against the appointment of civil servants from outside Banten.¹⁶⁶

It would be no exaggeration to say that the whole atmosphere in the Banten of the 1880s was full of prejudice, distrust, resentment, and intrigues. Because of the outbreak of the Tjilegon rebellion, many of those abuses were brought to light. One of the main facets of the deplorable conditions was related to the internal strife among members of the Banten *prijaji*, who did not shrink from unlawful or dishonourable means in competing for administrative positions in the region. In Snouck Hurgronje's opinion, the European administrators in Banten were mainly to be blamed for this situation, since their judgment on the native officials was not based on "disinterested criteria".¹⁶⁷ For this reason, subserviency, favouritism, distrust, and intrigues flourished, and the lack of co-operation among the native civil servants hampered the proper functioning of administration. In addition, mention should be made of the disastrous effect occasioned by the attitude of the European officials towards the Bantenese officials in one particular respect, namely the fact that the European officials were obsessed by the criterion of fanaticism in their judgment of native officials. To the latter nothing was worse than being branded as a fanatic or, as it was pronounced in Bantenese, a „*panatik*".¹⁶⁸ They were therefore eager to avoid showing religious zeal in any way; the hunt for fanatics in the post-rebellion period was conducive to the development of subserviency, lip-service and distrust in the relationship between European and Bantenese officials. So much for the diagnosis made by Snouck Hurgronje. It certainly left its marks on the Islamic policy of the govern-

¹⁶⁵ The Adviser on Native Affairs to the Gov. Gen., August 24, 1921, no. 560.

¹⁶⁶ Ibidem; see also: the Adviser on Native Affairs to the Gov. Gen., Oct. 20, 1921, no. 11336, in Collection of the *Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde*, MS, no. H 797.

¹⁶⁷ Note of Snouck Hurgronje, August 15, 1892; also in Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), p. 1990. The term "*zakelijke motieven*" may denote the same as the Weberian term "legal-rational norms".

¹⁶⁸ Note of Snouck Hurgronje, August 15, 1892; see also Gobée and Adriaanse, Vol. III (1965), p. 1992.

ment in the following decades, not only as regards Banten, but also as regards Indonesia in general.

It would be beyond the scope of the present study to examine in how far and in what way the rebellion of 1888 effected a permanent change for the better in the condition of the population of Banten. But it may be of interest to note that after the rising efforts were made not only to alleviate grievances, but also to improve living conditions in the area. One of these efforts was directed at the construction or repair of bridges and roads indispensable for transportation.¹⁶⁹ From the activities of the Resident of Banten one can safely infer what his aim was; the events of the rebellion had made it politically and administratively expedient to maintain in Banten a strong government which brooked no challenge to its authority, on the one hand, and to press for substantial support from the central government on the other. What concerned him most was apparently the restoration of order and tranquillity; the material improvement of the people was a secondary consideration to him. It is, however, difficult to estimate what the subsequent improvements in the conditions of life were among the population in Banten. The more pervasive legacy of the rebellion is perhaps found in the intangible sphere of social and political relations between the Dutch and the Indonesians. In fact, the long days of July 1888 forced the Dutch colonial government to reflect afresh upon the nature of its relationship with the Muslim population. A monument erected to commemorate the victims of the rebellion constitutes a continuous reminder of one of the dark episodes in the history of Dutch colonial rule in Indonesia.¹⁷⁰

¹⁶⁹ *WNI* (1888-1889), pp. 1520-1522.

¹⁷⁰ *WNI* (1889-1890), p. 681; the monument was inaugurated on Dec. 22, 1889.

CHAPTER X

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the preceding chapters an attempt was made to offer an explanation of the whole background and the range of developmental stages of the Banten rebellion in 1888. Our explanation indicates that this Banten uprising, viewed as a social movement, was determined by many factors, as are all social phenomena. It can be placed in the context of economic, social, political and religious institutional developments. In order to obtain a clear insight into the revolt we have to take into account the multiplicity of the factors involved and the mutually dependent variables. To ascribe relevance to only one variable would be fallacious. The analysis of the complex of factors operative in the social situation in 19th-century Banten was made to ensure more adequate comprehension of the conditions which resulted in the occurrence of the insurrectionary movement. As has been shown, the interplay of these factors precipitated a structural conduciveness to the outburst of the revolt.¹ This approach to the history of the Banten revolt is simply a logical consequence of the multi-dimensionality of the insurrectionary movement as a conceptual construct.²

THE SCALE OF THE MOVEMENT AND RELEVANT FACTORS

An explanation of the scale of the insurrectionary movement and its operations should comprise several factors which may be tabulated as follows: (1) there was a tradition of revolt in Banten; (2) there was a

¹ By structural conduciveness is meant the structural arrangements which permit a given type of protest movement rather than other kinds of outbursts; see Smelser (1962), pp. 319-338. In Banten society the available means of redress or of expressing grievances were limited; one of the few outlets for feelings of aggression was the religious protest, i.e. protest movements in terms of religious values.

² For a good analysis of approaches based on the multi-dimensionality of social movements, see Yonina Talmon, in *AES*, Vol. III (1962), pp. 15-148; also Meadows, in *SSR*, Vol. XXVII (1943), pp. 223-228; and in *SF*, Vol. XXIV (1945-1946), pp. 408-412.

continuing aspect of tension in the region, compounded of political deprivation and a state of disprivilege of a large segment of the population; (3) the impact of the penetration of colonial domination gradually disrupted parts of religious life; (4) a revolutionary leadership was available, which gave the insurrectionary movement its rationale; (5) an organizational device was created by means of which operations could be directed and both human and material resources could be mobilized over space and time.

As has been shown, the idea of redressing felt grievances, resentment or alleged oppression through armed rebellion was traditional in Banten. The 19th century saw the rise of traditional revolutionism and especially between 1800 and 1850 rebellious outbreaks followed each other with a certain regularity, and reached a peak of intensity in 1850. They were still endemic during the next two decades. The period which then followed was a time of further movements which culminated in the great outburst of 1888. The rise of peasant revolutionism was not simply a reflex of conditions brought about by colonial domination, for during the pre-colonial period protest movements had also taken place, though presumably not with the same frequency as in the colonial period. The periodical recurrence of insurrectionary outbreaks stimulated the rise of a revolutionary élite whose members played a more or less prominent role from generation to generation in subsequent revolts. They not only constituted a potential reservoir for revolutionary cadres, but could also serve as primary rallying-points for all forces of social discontent. There were prominent families of revolutionaries, like the Djakarias, the Urips, and the Wachias, around which Banten rebellions were traditionally centred. In fact, the idealization of revolutionaries became a popular tradition.³

Because of the nature of the transitional stage in which Banten society found itself during the 19th century, long-standing tensions were stirred up, especially among the groups which had lost their traditional position. The painful facts of loss of privilege and collective humiliation that inevitably accompanied colonial rule generated intense resentment and frustration among these groups.⁴ In short, the condition of persisting

³ See above, Chap. IV, *passim*; see *Sedjarah Hadji Mangsur* (MS), esp. as regards Tubagus Buang and Mas Djakaria.

⁴ For explanations in terms of states of mind, see Aberle, in *CSSR*, Supplement II (1962), pp. 208-214, where he gives a survey of the so-called "Relative Deprivation Theory".

malcontent and deep distrust certainly provided fertile ground for turmoils.

In the setting of colonial society, a sharp disagreement existed between certain aspects of traditional religious practices and colonial institutions, which aroused bitterness among the natives, who felt that their own culture would deteriorate. Imbued with ideas of religious warfare against infidel rule, the defenders of tradition desired the restoration of the traditional order and fanned the hostility towards the colonial ruler. These people could not reconcile themselves to the new organization of Banten society, which they felt to be forcibly superimposed by governmental authority. Consequently, their way of assessing the colonial situation engendered a psycho-cultural tradition of resistance to whatever group represented the forces of colonial authority.⁵

The religious élite has been assigned the leading role in the insurrectionary movement of 1888 and their charismatic authority certainly was an important element in fostering the movement.⁶ The charismatic leadership required in the insurrectionary movement was the consequence of a complex combination of various conditions. Besides the high degree of social unrest and the lack of lawful means of expressing protests or grievances in Banten society, the undifferentiated religious outlook of the Banten population tended to define political protests against the colonial ruler in religious terms.⁷ The leaders therefore bolstered the possibility of the restoration of the sultanate as an Islamic state and stressed the Holy War theme. In fact, the Tjilegon affair clearly illustrates the emergence of the *gurus tarekat* as political leaders, and how these men used the *tarekat* to create a politico-religious organization.

One of the main strengths of the rebellious movement lay in the fact that it could employ the Sufi brotherhood as its organizational base.

⁵ The psycho-cultural tradition of resistance refers to the continual inculation of feelings of hatred towards the infidel rulers, see above Chap. V.

⁶ For the concept of charismatic authority, see Max Weber, *The Theory of Social and Economic Organization*, (1964), pp. 359-392; cf. the criticism made by Worsley (1957), pp. 266-272. The present author's contention is that the ideal type of charismatic, traditional and rational-legal authority can throw light on the conflict situation in 19th-century Banten society, although the authority possessed by the various élite groups should be placed along the line of a continuum ranging from charismatic to rational-legal authority. It would be irrelevant to look for pure types of authority.

⁷ For an account of political and other types of protest expressed in religious terms, see Engels (1927), Bodrogi (1950-1951), Balandier (1953), Worsley (1957), Köbben (1959), Cohn (1961), Lanternari (1963).

This added a new dimension to the pattern of revolt in Banten.⁸ It enabled internal cohesion to be solidified along lines of brotherhood discipline. The discipline not only had a binding effect on its followers, but it also imbued them with revolutionary zeal. Furthermore, the organizational structure of the movement enabled operations to be undertaken over large areas which transcended the village sphere, and over a considerable span of time, because these operations could be co-ordinated and controlled. It enabled a "holy cause" to be promulgated and a sense of fulfilment to be developed among the more militant segment of the population. From the description of the preparatory stage of the revolt it is plain that, in spite of the available organizational means, the mobilization of the movement's forces still took considerable time. Besides tactical and structural impediments to cohesion, dissension on strategical matters during the last stage of the preparations considerably reduced the scale of the rebellion, in both its spatial and temporal aspects.⁹

SOME ASPECTS OF THE MODERNIZATION PROCESS

Of special interest with regard to traditional revolutionary movements is the transformation from traditionality to modernity, also called modernization. In fact, the Banten rebellion of 1888 can be conceived of as an expression of social protest against or negative adjustment to social change imposed by Western domination.¹⁰ The apparent consequences of modernization in traditional society include the disturbance of traditional institutions, social maladjustment, and widespread feelings of insecurity and frustration. The disruption of the traditional ways of living brought about a revival among the Muslim peasants, who in a collective endeavour strove for the retention of traditional and religious values and ideals and various aspects of the traditional patterns of life.

⁸ Except for the Djajakusuma case in 1869, there are no indications that previous rebellious movements were organized by making use of religious institutions like the *tarekat*.

⁹ Besides leadership and internal cohesion, other components of social movements are ideology, goals, strategy and tactics. In order to decide to what extent the various elements were immediately related to actual development, one must appraise the particular situation in which a movement occurred; for an analysis of the internal factors of social movements, see King (1961), pp. 66-84.

¹⁰ For accounts of various reactions to social change, see Wilson (1945); Hagen (1962); especially as regards the analysis of reactions to Western domination, see Malinowski (1945), Burger (1949-1950), Bodrogi (1950-1951), Frazier (1957), Balandier (1959), Wertheim (1959), van Baal (1960).

Their attention again centred on the sacred symbols associated with Islam and the past, and on the establishment of an Islamic state and the restoration of the sultanate. Indispensable for this revival was the moulding of group solidarity by means of the revitalization of religious-magical rituals and ceremonies. Feelings of resentment towards the alien ruler and aggressive sentiment were fostered by means of religious indoctrination, magical practices and mystical exercises. In the socio-cultural setting of 19th-century Banten this nativistic movement undoubtedly played a crucial role in the development of resistance against modernization.¹¹ In terms of socio-cultural change, the Muslim community in Banten, headed by the religious élite, attempted to immunize itself against the penetration of new forces which accompanied the process of modernization; it found itself lagging behind the secular-urban élite which managed to retain its social status by proper adaptation to modern institutional settings. The process of modernization and its concomitants, secularization and acculturation, certainly engendered social cleavages ranging from conformity to rejection.¹² Solidarity groupings representing the various cultural forces generated potential friction and along with other factors undermined the fabric of traditional society. An examination of the political dimension of the socio-cultural change will shed more light on the conflict brought about by the resistance of the religious élite against the process of modernization.¹³

As has been indicated, in the course of the 19th century the colonial administration was gradually organized in accordance with Western notions of government, which involved the imposition of Western institutions as well as the enforcement of norms according to the same standards that the Dutch set for themselves. This transformation consisted of the establishment of bureaucratic administration, a hierarchy of civil servants, more rational modes of recruitment to office, etc. These innovations inevitably resulted in the weakening of the bonds

¹¹ For a classification of nativistic movements, see Linton (1943); cf. Köbben (1959), Smith (1959), Voget (1959). According to Linton's criteria the Banten revolt of 1888 can be regarded as a magical, revivalistic nativistic movement; according to Köbben's distinctions it can be identified as an eschatological-nativistic movement against foreign domination.

¹² For a typology of adaptation comprising conformity, innovation, ritualism, retreatism and rebellion, see Merton (1957), pp. 140-155.

¹³ The resistance to modernization was actually offered by a large section of the religious élite, while a small section of this group, commonly consisting of the official elements, was more adaptive. Although the resistance movement was mainly traditional in character, it also exhibited as a by-product a pre-modern feature, namely its integrative role, see below, pp. 323 f.

of traditional order. Traditional authority was threatened by the intrusion of secular-modern bureaucracy centred in the colonial authority.¹⁴ The most conspicuous effect of the new bureaucracy was that the centre of authority and responsibility was shifted from the regents to the Dutch administrators. The regents became mere figure-heads whose authority was dependent on the colonial power.¹⁵ In short, the colonial government modified the political mechanism so as to be able to control the regents' activities and prevent the traditional channels of leadership from being turned into mechanisms for the organization of resistance to the regime. The native civil servants were left in nominal possession of their functions and prerogatives only if they exercised their powers in accordance with the will of the colonial ruler. Their continued power was a source of resentment to the orthodox Muslim population. Indeed, large segments of the Muslim population became dissatisfied with the worldliness of their rulers or felt frustrated because of the rapid progress of modernization and the concomitant secularization. With the development of secularism in government and society, an increasing number of the members of the religious élite lost their traditionally sanctioned channels of gaining or maintaining status and the means of controlling the social order of the community. This naturally resulted in a propensity among the majority of the religious élite to direct their power in opposition to the colonial ruler and his collaborators. They were predisposed to develop extreme political orientations and to lead radical political movements. Their antagonism towards the infidel ruler evidently differed from their opposition to the traditional Muslim ruler.¹⁶ From its very nature the charismatic leadership of the religious élite was radical and it had always formed a potential threat to traditional authority in the old order; it now challenged the established practices of the civil service and the rational-legal order of the colonial government as well.¹⁷ Their revolutionary

¹⁴ For an account of the bureaucratic aspect of political modernization, see Eisenstadt (1961); also Hoselitz, in *La Palombara* (1963), pp. 168-169.

¹⁵ See Snouck Hurgronje's note on the Banten situation of 15 August 1892; it refers to the degradation of the position of the native civil servants in Banten.

¹⁶ In the pre-colonial period a persistent antagonism could be observed between official and non-official segments of the religious élite; the latter group commonly formed a potential threat to the traditional ruler's authority; see above, Chap. III. See also Pigeaud (MS, 1943-1945), pp. 125-126.

¹⁷ For an explanation of the nature of charismatic authority, esp. its radical and revolutionary character, see Bendix on Max Weber (1962), pp. 300-301.

zeal was sanctioned by the charismatic nature of their authority. Viewed in this perspective, social conflict within the context of a colonial situation appeared in the form of conflict between discrete groups committed to opposing norms and values. To be more specific, Banten society under colonial rule became divided into opposed groups on the basis of adherence to traditional-religious institutions or modern secular ones; the different social groups found themselves at different points in the modern political hierarchy. Successive impulses toward modernization intermeshed with the existing social structure and gave rise to differential patterns of political behaviour, ranging from conformity or innovation to rebellion, and adhering respectively to rational-legal, traditional and charismatic authority.¹⁸

THE NATIVISTIC ASPECT

A further problem in this rebellious movement is its nativistic feature.¹⁹ In our opinion, due consideration should be given to the appeal of the idea of the restoration of the sultanate on the one hand, and the appeal of the Islamic eschatological idea on the other. The glorification of the past as an appurtenance of the *Mahdi* idea provided a convenient compensatory mechanism in the face of adverse conditions such as physical distress, frustration through the presence of alien rulers or moral decadence. An attempt was made to revive certain aspects of a past culture which, employed as symbols of a period of glory, served to emphasize common values and basic loyalties; these aspects also displayed the main ingredients of regeneration or revitalization, such as the overthrow of alien rulers and the re-establishment of traditional order, which was conceived of as a renovated world, where the righteous nation would live in harmony and prosperity.²⁰ Viewed in this perspective, the rebellious movement in Banten can be classified as a nativistic phenomenon, embodying both revivalistic and millenarian aspects.²¹

¹⁸ See Max Weber (1964), pp. 328 ff.

¹⁹ For a description of typical features of nativistic movements, see Linton (1943), Balandier (1953), Herskovits (1958), Köbben (1959).

²⁰ One aspect of nativism is shown by the ascendance of one or more of the rebels to the position of *radja*; see Chap. VII, *passim*.

²¹ If we employ the functional-comparative approach of Köbben, the rebellious movement of 1888 may be classified as an eschatological-nativistic movement against foreign domination; the eschatological aspect can be discerned from the co-called "Last Letter of the Prophet"; see above, Chap. V, pp. 167 f., although during the actual outbreak there were no indications of expressions of an eschatological character. As regards its form (Köbben distinguishes 4 types of forms besides 5 types of contents), it can be

Eschatological undertones could also be discerned. Because they found no possible alternatives for redress, people were prone to join this nativistic movement which promised to eliminate foreign rule and to restore pre-colonial conditions. The violent and explosive movement can be viewed as an irrational flight from reality — a kind of escapism — and was doomed to failure because it relied wholly on supernatural forces and operated along mystico-magical lines which were completely inadequate in facing colonial forces with modern techniques and organization.²²

THE DEPRIVATION ASPECT

Another problem directly connected with this nativistic phenomenon, and concerned with the socio-psychological aspect of the movement, is the relevancy of explaining the movement in terms of “a state of deprivation”.²³ It is generally assumed — the assumption has frequently been referred to — that the sense of blockage constitutes one of the causes of millenarian or nativistic movements. One must acknowledge that not only economic evils such as hunger, pauperism or landlessness, but also deprivations caused by social displacement, political disfranchisement or cultural disinheritance may bring about acute frustration. One must not disregard the fact that the sense of political or cultural blockage is sometimes more important than the sense of economic distress. During the period of physical catastrophes — the cattle plague, the fever epidemic, the famine and the eruption of Mt. Krakatau — no social disturbances of any importance could be observed, whereas in the year of the outburst there was no severe economic stringency.²⁴ The evidence given by the captives clearly shows that the leaders of the movement were in quest of dignity and self-respect in the context of the colonial situation. The desire for the return of the sultanate and the establishment of the Islamic state kept their sense of identity intact, while the launching of the movement gave them the sense of fulfilling a holy mission.²⁵ Although from the economic point of view

identified as a movement led by a “prophet” — in our case, a *wali* or saint — and organized in part.

²² The belief in invulnerability is an outstanding feature of this sort of millenarian movement; see Chap. IV, *passim*.

²³ For the explanation of the “Relative Deprivation Theory”, see Aberle, in *CSSH*, Supplement II (1962), pp. 208-228.

²⁴ See above, Chap. II, *passim*.

²⁵ The sense of holy mission is inherent to charismatic leadership, see Max Weber (1964), pp. 360-361; see also Bendix (1962), p. 301 f.

the religious élite in Banten belonged to the more well-to-do class of peasantry, they remained painfully aware of the fact that there was a discrepancy between their economic standing and social prestige on the one hand, and their political status on the other. Within the framework of the political organization of colonial society they had no access to political functions. Owing to the liberal policy of the colonial government on religious matters, there were still social arrangements in Banten which were conducive to building up political power through religious institutions, so that the religious élite was able to emerge as a powerful "interest group".²⁶ They suffered not so much from severe hardships but rather from the effects of a sense of blockage in the political field. The religious revival movement satisfied their need for cultural re-orientation and the re-discovery of their tradition. In fact, during a period of strain caused by socio-cultural change a social movement frequently tends to adhere to traditional values.²⁷ In the case of the Banten movements the religious values formed an important element, which intermingled with the traditional values.

THE RELIGIOUS ASPECT

It is not surprising that the social movements in Banten readily took on a religious shape, for the world view of the Bantenese was religious, and consequently social protests invariably became defined in religious terms.²⁸ As has been pointed out before, the religious components in the millennial idea of the movement were quite prominent; the people could be mobilized by a religious appeal. Political protests therefore took on a religious form, and the boundaries of political and religious issues became more or less co-terminous. It can also be said that political and religious movements were found together. Since the Muslim community

²⁶ The term "interest group" here does not refer to the well-organized and bureaucratized pressure groups familiar in modern industrial societies, but simply refers to a social group that reflected interest tendencies of a segment of the population. For an account of interest groups, see Almond (1961), pp. 85-101.

²⁷ The sense of change among the people was reflected in prophecies, see Hoezoo, in *MNZG* Vol. XIII (1869), pp. 307-356; Vol. XXVII (1883), pp. 1-42.

²⁸ For explanations of the religious character of peasant struggles, see also Engels (1927), and Bodrogi (1950-1951); these authors already recognized that material class-interests were at play, but that the movement did not take the more realistic line of class struggle. In the African case Balandier identifies the movements on this level as total reactions, see Balandier (1953); Köbben prefers the term "prophetic movement"; see Köbben (1959).

made no distinction between political and religious issues, in contrast to the modern Western world, the protest movements tended to involve a total commitment to religious values. In many respects the insurrectionary movements may therefore be regarded as religious expressions of secular conflicts, either economic, social or political. It is also obvious that the hostile component in the religious orientation of the movement intensified the violence which accompanied its outbursts.²⁹ For this reason the hostile outburst that took place during the rising should be seen as a religio-political attack on colonial authorities rather than an eruption of racial violence. As has been noted before, hostile expressions were directed towards the colonial rulers as infidels rather than as Europeans. Furthermore, co-religionists who had attained the status of civil servant, also fell victim to the assault; the anti-civil servant sentiments found their justification in the idea that the category of civil servants was to be regarded as *kafir indanas* or half-infidels, and therefore as impure, for they had contact with infidels. In addition it must be recalled that some members of Dutch families in Tjilegon were spared because they stated that they were ready to embrace the Muslim faith.³⁰

THE INTEGRATION PROCESS

Attention must also be paid to the integrative role of religion in the development of the social movement. In fact, the movement showed a marked tendency towards modern development at least in its structural aspect. Solidarity groups comprising the leaders of the conspiracy developed a communication system in the supra-village sphere on an inter-regional scale. Furthermore, their political allegiance transcended their kinship loyalty and their loyalty to the local community. Lastly, the pilgrimage and the organizational structure of the Sufi orders made possible a "nation"-wide contact with co-religionists. Consequently, Islam became a rallying point for social forces opposing colonial domination. In this respect the rebellious movement under study, like similar social movements that took place elsewhere in Java during the same period, can be viewed as a proto- or pre-nationalist

²⁹ The hostile component refers to the idea of the *djihad* or *perang sabil*; for a study of the Holy War, see Obbink (1901).

³⁰ Mention should also be made of a Dutch convert of German descent, Handle, who was in the area during the rising and who was concealed from the rebels by a *hadji* whom he had befriended; his life was saved but he was later regarded with suspicion by the government and expelled from the country; see MS containing his autobiography.

movement, which anticipated the national struggle for independence.³¹ But this development is of course a modern trend with respect to its integrative role rather than its goal-orientation and organizational aspects. Indeed, compared with modern nationalist movements, fundamental differences can easily be pointed out: modern political doctrines, programmes, and ideals were missing.³² Nor can modern organization, tactics and strategy be observed in 19th-century social movements. They may therefore, be identified in the main as traditional, religious and millenarian movements.

CHARACTERISTICS OF BANTEN INSURRECTIONARY MOVEMENTS

Having summed up the main aspects of the insurrectionary movement of 1888 in Banten, we shall now very briefly consider the general features of the risings which took place in the same region before and after the 1888 rebellion. In this way light will be thrown on the peculiar nature of the Tjilegon rebellion as the convergence of various characteristics found in previous movements on the one hand, and as a half-way situation between the preceding movements and the rebellion of 1926 on the other.

In the first place, the predominant feature of these earlier movements is the rejection of and active resistance to foreign domination and its concomitant institutions. The wide variety of manifestations of this characteristic ranged from violent opposition to taxation or forced labour to open propaganda for the overthrow of Dutch rule.³³ A fundamental element of many of the movements, which was connected with the rejection of foreign domination, was the idea of the restoration of the old order, i.e. of the sultanate. Even PKI (Indonesian Communist Party) promoters in 1926 still hinted at the possibility of the realization of an Islamic state.³⁴ As has been shown before, in the revolts of 1888 and 1926 the nativistic character was linked with another very noticeable feature, the Holy War theme, which, of course, had a great effect on the Banten population. At this point one should not overlook the fact that in the two different revolts, two different types of connection

³¹ For more extensive explanations of movements on this level as pre-nationalist movements, see Wertheim (1964), pp. 85-101.

³² For studies dealing with the characteristics of modern social movements, see Heberle (1951); also King (1962).

³³ For an assessment of the promises made by the Banten rebels in 1926, see Benda and McVey (1960), p. 42; cf. Tan Malaka's statement, pp. 14-16.

³⁴ Benda and McVey (1960), p. 42; members of the Banten nobility were promised the establishment of a new sultanate.

existed between religion and politics. In the case of the Tjilegon affair Islamic ideologies were the real objectives which the chief rebels envisaged, while during the 1926 revolt the communist credo was preached very much in the style of the religious teachers and the PKI aims were presented to the various segments of the population in the light of their own particular ideas.³⁵ This means that in the latter case religious concepts were only used as a cloak and as a useful device by a movement which was essentially secular. With the actual situation and conditions prevalent in Banten at that time in mind, it is not surprising that Bantenese social movements evidently bore religious earmarks. Another recurrent feature common to the movements was the belief in invulnerability,³⁶ which in traditional society held a strong appeal and could function as a potent instrument in arousing aggression.

The Banten insurrectionary movements were based largely on the rural population, no matter which leadership faction dominated them on the different occasions. The rank-and-file unmistakably consisted mainly of peasants and other categories of rural inhabitants.

A general consideration of the *avant garde* of the various movements in Banten clearly shows that in the course of the 19th century there was a constant shift of leadership or a circulation of the revolutionary élite. In the early 19th century the predominant elements in social convulsions comprised dispossessed noblemen and members of the rural gentry, and wandering armed bands composed of outlaws, exiles and brigands. Certain members of the traditional revolutionary élite, e.g. the Djakarias, figured prominently. After the banishment *en masse* of these rebel leaders, the revolutionary élite was replenished through the rise of the religious leaders, i.e. the *kjais* and *hadjis*, in the rebellious movements. The ascendancy of the religious leaders culminated in the insurrectionary movement of 1888.³⁷ It is quite remarkable that a considerable number of leaders in the Communist revolt of 1926 also bore the *hadji* title.³⁸

³⁵ Benda and McVey (1960), p. 17; further also pp. 43-47.

³⁶ Even in the Banten revolt of 1926, the doctrine of invulnerability still played an important role, Benda and McVey (1960), p. 44.

³⁷ As regards the rebellion of 1888, the growth of the mystical schools should be stressed; this was the basic difference with the former movements, which were not pre-nationalist. See above, pp. 323-324.

³⁸ Benda and McVey (1960), pp. 88-89. There were 145 *hadjis* listed as executive members and promoters of the PKI out of a total number of 341 men. Furthermore, the number of religious teachers in the PKI amounted to 23, and that of farmers, 184; see Benda and McVey (1960), pp. 60-61.

The Banten revolt of 1926 showed novel features which differentiate it from previous rebellious movements: its type of leadership, its organization and its strategy. These features clearly showed modern patterns, common to modern movements.³⁹ In other respects, however, this revolt can be regarded as a modern version of the traditional rural unrest that prevailed in the region.

If the general characteristics of these movements are compared with those of movements in other regions in Java, we can safely draw the conclusion that in Banten society no long-established tradition existed which was comparable to traditional messianic expectation met with in the Javanese cultural realm. As has been pointed out above, the Banten movement took its colour from a version of the Islamic eschatology and from Mahdism, blended with nativistic elements of Bantenese culture. The Messiah figure, *Ratu Adil*, around which endemic Javanese messianic movements in the 19th century were focused, was totally unknown in Banten. The limited scope of this study does not allow us to undertake a further examination of this historical phenomenon. Our knowledge of social movements in 19th-century Java will remain incomplete and fragmentary as long as this category of millenarian movements has not been investigated. As stated at the very beginning of this study, the neglect of these movements had always been a typical feature of Indonesian historiography.⁴⁰ Judging from the abundance of historical records on this particular subject, much work is needed on the many millenarian movements that flourished in Indonesia, especially in Java, in the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth century, before any comparative study of social movements can be made.

We conclude by pointing out that the historical study of social movements will certainly add a new dimension to Indonesian historiography on the one hand and promote the shift of interest toward Indonesia-centrism on the other.

³⁹ Benda and McVey (1960), *passim*.

⁴⁰ Dingley's work deals mainly with movements of the 20th century and is not based on primary sources; mention should be made of more recent works dealing with millenarianism, i.e. those of Sartono Kartodirdjo (1959), Harjaka Hardjamandjaja (1962), and Dahm (1963).

APPENDICES

APPENDIX I

LIST OF PETITIONERS FROM NJAMUK, BODJONEGORO, AND BEDJI

Sources:

Missive of the Assistant Resident of Anjer to the Resident of Banten, May 17, 1887, no. 527/8, in Report of the Director of the Department of Interior, Sept. 18, 1888, no. 5162 (in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4), Appendix L. Letter of 36 petitioners from Njamuk, Bodjonegoro and Bedji, in Report DDI, Appendix K.

No.	Name	Residence	Volume of proa	Assessment		Estimate 1887**	Amount requested
				1886			
1.	Siman	Njamuk	2 ² / ₃ kojang	f 16,—	f 31,—		f 10,—
2.	Massidin	"	3 ¹ / ₃ "	f 16,—	f 36,—		f 10,—
3.	Kassin	"	3 ¹ / ₃ "	f 20,—	f 36,—		f 12,—
4.	Rodja	"	1 ³ / ₄ "	f 16,—	f 23,—		f 9,—
5.	Sapar	"	2 "	f 16,—	f 26,—		f 8,—
6.	Radji	"	2 "	f 16,—	f 26,—		f 8,—
7.	Rasdam	"	1 ³ / ₄ "	f 16,—	f 22,—		f 8,—
8.	Saman	"	2 "	f 16,—	f 26,—		f 8,—
9.	H. Satim	"	1 ¹ / ₃ "	f 16,—	f 19,—		f 9,—
10.	Satia	"	1 "	f 16,—	f 18,—	f 16,—*	f 7,—
11.	Sarpi	"	1 "	f 16,—	f 18,—	f 16,—*	f 7,—
12.	Kaen	"	1 "	f 16,—	f 18,—	f 16,—*	f 7,—
13.	Djasin	"	1 ¹ / ₂ "	f 12,—	f 21,—		f 5,—
14.	Lafi	"	1 "	f 16,—	f 18,—	f 16,—*	f 7,—
15.	H. Sangid	"	1 "	f 16,—	f 18,—	f 16,—*	f 7,—
16.	Samid	"	1 ¹ / ₂ "	f 16,—	f 21,—		f 7,—
17.	Kabib	"	1 "	f 16,—	f 18,—	f 16,—*	f 7,—
18.	Saidin	Bodjonegoro	3 ¹ / ₂ "	f 16,—	f 36,—		f 10,—
19.	Manan	"	2 ² / ₃ "	f 16,—	f 31,—		f 9,—
20.	Sangid	"	1 "	f 16,—	f 18,—	f 16,—*	f 9,—
21.	Saban	Bedji	2 ² / ₃ "	f 16,—	f 31,—		f 9,—
22.	Wasser	"	3 ⁸ / ₁₀ "	f 16,—	f 39,—		f 9,—
23.	H. Djapar	"	3 ¹ / ₃ "	f 16,—	f 36,—		f 10,—
24.	Sarpan	"	2 ¹ / ₆ "	f 16,—	f 28,—		f 9,—
25.	Mudin	"	2 ⁵ / ₆ "	f 16,—	f 50,—		f 9,—
			1 "				
26.	Wari	"	1 ¹ / ₂ "	f 12,—	f 21,—		f 7,—
27.	H. Djeli	"	1 ¹ / ₂ "	f 16,—	f 23,—	f 21,—*	f 7,—
28.	Warmin	"	1 ¹ / ₂ "	f 16,—	f 23,—	f 21,—*	f 7,—
29.	Bangid	"	1 "	f 12,—	f 18,—	f 16,—*	f 7,—
30.	Mus	"	1 "	f 12,—	f 18,—	f 16,—*	f 7,—

No.	Name	Residence	Volume of proa	Assessment	Estimate 1887**	Amount requested
				1886		
31.	Budin	Bedji	1 ⁵ / ₈ kojang	f 12,—	f 24,—	f 7,—
32.	Djasid	"	1 "	f 16,—	f 18,— f 16,—*	f 7,—
33.	Sanim	"	1 "	f 12,—	f 24,— f 16,—*	f 8,—
34.	Arfi	"	2 "	f 12,—	f 25,—	f 5,—
35.	Anim	"	1 "	f 16,—	f 18,— f 16,—*	f 7,—
36.	Arman	"	1 "	f 16,—	f 18,— f 16,—*	f 7,—

Note: Figures marked * refer to the amount of trade tax to be assessed in 1887, according to the records of the Assistant Resident of Anjer.

** According to the letter of the petitioners.

APPENDIX II

LIST OF FIGURES FOR THE TRADE TAX ASSESSED BETWEEN 1884 AND 1888

Source:

Report of the Secretary of the residency of Banten, Aug. 28, 1888, in Appendix P of the Report of the Director of the Department of Interior, Sept. 18, 1888, no. 5162, in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 7.

Year		Districts			
		Anjer	Tjilegon	Kramat Watu	Total
1884	Native	f 1.374,—	f 5.725,—	f 3.784,—	f 10.883,—
	Chinese	—	f 60,—	—	f 60,—
1885	Native	f 2.263,50	f 5.956,50	f 4.146,—	f 12.366,—
	Chinese	f 42,—	f 152,—	—	f 194,—
1886	Native	f 2.557,—	f 6.929,50	f 4.842,50	f 14.329,—
	Chinese	f 70,—	f 167,—	f 83,—	f 320,—
1887	Native	f 3.749,—	f 8.002,—	f 4.662,50	f 16.413,50
	Chinese	f 122,—	f 138,—	f 8,—	f 268,—
1888	Native	f 3.902,—	f 7.714,—	f 4.890,50	f 16.506,50
	Chinese	f 185,—	f 185,—	f 10,—	f 380,—

APPENDIX III

GENEALOGY OF BANTENESE FAMILIES

Pangeran Chalzie				
Ratu Siti Aissah x	Ipah	Ipol	Ratu Chalsum x T. Djajanalendra (2)	
1. Sultan Alih	Asikah	Ratu Siti Aminah x	T. Hasan-in Madju Endjang Djinab x	
2. Mandura Radja Djaanegara (1)	1. T. Mahmud		Kusumanegara (4)	
	2. Tjondronegoro (3)			
	Gondokusumo (5)	Ratu Hamsah x		
	daughter of Prawiranegara (7)	Sutadiningrat (6)		
	Gondoseputro (8)	daughter x Padmadiningrat (15)		
Ngabehi Bahupringga (9)				
	Natadiningrat (10)			
Sutadiningrat (6) x	Djajawinata (11)	daughter x T. Djajapradja (12)		
1. Ratu Siti Saodah (daughter of 1)				
2. Ratu Hamsah				
Tjakradiningrat (13)	Suraadiningrat (14)	Padmadiningrat (15) x		
	daughter of Gondokusumo			
1. Regent of Tjaringin, later of Serang (1839-1849)	8. Regent of Lebak 1925			
2. District head of Banten 1827	9. <i>Patih</i> of Lebak 1820s			
3. Regent of Serang (1849-1874)	10. Regent of Pandeglang (1849-1866)			
4. Regent of Tjaringin 1849	11. Regent of Serang (1893-1899)			
5. Regent of Serang (1874-1889)	12. <i>Patih</i> of Lebak 1882			
6. Regent of Pandeglang 1889, later of Serang (1889-1893)	13. <i>Wedana</i> of Tjilegon, murdered 1888			
	14. Regent of Pandeglang 1900			
7. <i>Patih</i> of Serang (1879-1884)	15. <i>Wedana</i> of Ondar Andir 1893			

Sources: Regeeringsalmanak, 1821-1825; O.I.B. Apr. 22, 1856, no. 4; O.I.B. May 7, 1862, no. 25; Missive of the Res. of Banten, July 7, 1889, no. 249; O.I.B. Aug. 28, 1889, no. 14; A. Djajadiningrat (1936), *passim*.

APPENDIX IV

**LIST OF THE NUMBER OF HADJIS AND RELIGIOUS
TEACHERS, IN PROPORTION TO THE FIGURES FOR THE
TOTAL NATIVE POPULATION IN JAVA AND MADURA
AT THE END OF 1887**

Source: Appendix F of the Report of the Director of the Department of Interior, Sept. 18, 1888, no. 5162, in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4.

Residency	N u m b e r			Percentage			Remarks
	Population	Able-bodied	<i>Hadjis</i>	Rel. T.	<i>Hadjis</i>	Rel. T	
Banten	561003	127311	4073	921	0.72	0.16	
Batavia (Djakarta)	937289	229060	3886	1134	0.41	0.12	
Prijangan	1668012	338701	7831	1162	0.47	0.07	
Krawang	333352	64037	261	110	0.08	0.03	
Tjirebon	1375306	287741	2427	1188	0.18	0.08	
Tegal	1020882	268559	1709	1020	0.18	0.10	
Pekalongan	539372	74187	1697	478	0.16	0.09	
Semarang	1409734	297302	7245	1723	0.31	0.12	
Djepara	859811	153622	2140	651	0.51	0.08	
Rembang	1198170	172697	1122	496	0.25	0.04	
Surabaja	1901655	431057	5731	1575	0.09	0.08	
Madura	1425402	275378	1216	2267	0.30	0.16	
Pasuruan	847445	172012	1556	762	0.08	0.09	
Probolinggo	507108	103556	357	685	0.08	0.13	
Besuki	597108	106175	688	1167	0.07	0.20	
Banjumas	1129553	281253	961	159	0.09	0.01	
Bagelen	1287098	269401	2191	259	0.17	0.02	
Kedu	739953	173368	1448	144	0.20	0.02	
Jogjakarta	651123	—*	485	187	0.07	0.03	* The figures supplied by the native civil servants were not reliable.
Surakarta	1115232	248189	834	4229	0.07	0.38	
Madiun	1038574	155119	1205	373	0.12	0.04	
Kediri	996385	205381	846	810	0.08	0.08	

APPENDIX V

LIST OF RELIGIOUS SCHOOLS AND TEACHERS IN THE AFDELING OF ANJER

Source: Report of the Director of the Department of Interior, Sept. 18, 1888,
no. 5162, in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4, Appendix E.

No. Location of schools	Name of Rel. Teacher	Number of Pupils	Remarks
District of Anjer:			
1. Anjer Lor	Hadji Kasan	19	
2. Bodjong	Hadji Selan	20	
3. Djaha	Hadji Mohamad Sangid	20	
4. Kamasan	Hadji Abdullah	25	
5. Kareo	Ki Gaper	15	
6. Liangdjulang	Hadji Unur	10	
7. Pamekser	Hadji Nuh	7	
8. Panawuan	Karim	20	
9. Pasauran	Hadji Kamim	7	
10. Saksak	Kaim	7	
11. Siring	Hadji Mohamad Karim	16	
12. Tandjak	Hadji Sapiudin	14	Rebel
13. Tjikokol	Hadji Usman	7	
14. Tjinangka	Hadji Murod	7	
15. Tjiromo	Agod	7	
		201	
District of Tjilegon:			
1. Bedji	Hadji Wasid	45	Chief Rebel
2. Bedji	Hadji Dulgani	40	Rebel
3. Bedji	Djamud	50	Rebel
4. Bodjonegoro	Hadji Dung	25	
5. Bodjonegoro	Masna	20	
6. Djombang Kulon	Rasmad	20	
7. Djombang Wetan	Hadji Pakor	20	
8. Djombang Wetan	Hadji Kasim	16	
9. Djombang Wetan	Hadji Makid	15	Rebel
10. Djombang Wetan	Hadji Djasid	10	
11. Grogol Kidul	Kamidin	10	
12. Kadipaten	Hadji Afiludin	18	
13. Kaligandu	Djafi	10	
14. Kapendilan	Gapar	25	
15. Kedungsoka	Pali	20	
16. Kiara	Sanid	20	
17. Kranggot	Hadji Kujing	17	

No.	Location of schools	Name of Rel. Teacher	Number of Pupils	Remarks
18.	Krapjak	Rodjif	13	
19.	Krentjeng	Gaudin	10	
20.	Krentjeng	Kamdjah	10	
21.	Kretnaden	Hadji Djamad	20	
22.	Kubangkalak Wetan	Kanid	10	
23.	Kubangkura	Hadji Monaf	15	
24.	Kubangkura	Masram	20	
25.	Kubanglaban Kidul	Djakid	30	
26.	Kubanglaban Lor	Kadir	50	
27.	Kubanglesung Kulon	Brahim	12	
28.	Kubanglesung Kulon	Muadi	10	
29.	Kubanglesung Wetan	Djamsari	10	
30.	Kubanglesung Wetan	Ranid	10	
31.	Kubangsaron	Rodi	13	
32.	Kubangwatu	Hadji Kapil	25	
33.	Kubangwatu	Hadji Ardja	25	Rebel
34.	Kubangwuluh	Hadji Mohad	11	
35.	Lebakkalapa	Mohali	10	
36.	Lembang	Sapi	10	
37.	Lembang	Madin	10	
38.	Njamuk	Hadji Nuh	20	
39.	Pabejan	Mucharam	12	
40.	Pangarengan	Arsi	30	
41.	Periuk	Daud	15	
42.	Petjek	Kamar	40	
43.	Ragasawuran	Djamudin	20	
44.	Ragas Tjikubang	Sangid	25	
45.	Rantjamerak	Saleh	12	
46.	Sanedja	Hadji Iskak	25	Chief Rebel
47.	Sempu	Sapar	50	
48.	Sempu	Afi	50	
49.	Sumurampel	Hadji Arsad	20	
50.	Sumurandja	Dung	25	
51.	Sumurandja	Kabun	20	
52.	Sumurmandjangan	Hadji Nawi	10	
53.	Tegaltjabe Ilir	Ardam	40	
54.	Tegalwangi	Hadji Lias	10	Rebel
55.	Tjibeber	Hadji Halim	28	Rebel
56.	Tjibeber	Matali	30	Rebel
57.	Tjibeber	Hadji Salah	20	
58.	Tjibeber	Hadji Samudin	30	Rebel
59.	Tjilentrang	Hadji Nasiman	10	Rebel
60.	Tjimaung	Hadji Soleman	20	
61.	Tjiora Kulon	Hadji Madani	30	Rebel
62.	Tjiora Wetan	Mosod	18	
63.	Tjitangkil	Nurila	41	
64.	Tjitatah	Rasmad	27	
65.	Tjitatah	Bustam	7	
66.	Tjiwedus	Mas Utu	26	
67.	Tjura	Kanid	10	

No. Location of schools	Name of Rel. Teacher	Number of Pupils	Remarks
68. Tjurug	Dulah	10	
69. Trate Udik	Hadji Mahmud	25	Chief Rebel
70. Trate Udik	Hadji Mohamad	22	
71. Tunggak	Hadji Usman	50	Rebel
72. Tunggak	Hadji Hasan	40	
		1573	
District of Kramat Watu:			
1. Ardjawinangun	Dulgani	50	Rebel
2. Batur	Usman	40	
3. Batur	Ismail	20	
4. Batur	Sali	20	Chief Rebel
5. Balagendung	Musa	10	
6. Bodjong	Mukni	20	
7. Bodjong	Hadji Asim	100	
8. Djambangan	Usup	7	
9. Djambu	Hadji Jusup	20	
10. Ganurit	Uding	30	
11. Ganurit	Mesal	60	
12. Gempol	Hadji Aliudin	5	
13. Gempol	Mussid	10	
14. Giripada	Hadji Kanidin	30	
15. Giripada	Makalil	6	
16. Giripada	Hadji Adam	10	
17. Gurait	Ripa	10	
18. Kabarosan	Akmud	20	
19. Kadipan	Achmad	10	
20. Kamasan	Hadji Achmad	15	
21. Kamasan	Hadji Abul	16	
22. Kamasan	Hadji Barusa	20	
23. Kamasan	Hadji Tasik	15	
24. Kawaron	Hadji Massod	40	
25. Kepuh	Unus	20	
26. Kesuban	Durachman	40	
27. Kodjajan	Hadji Musa	10	
28. Kodjajan	Hadji Nap	20	
29. Kramat Watu	Umar	20	
30. Kubangrawa	Umar	30	
31. Lamongan	Erdung	30	
32. Lebakpulus	Ending	20	
33. Lebakpulus	Kodim	10	
34. Lemakulang	Mus	30	
35. Margasana	Pakir	15	
36. Nangor	Hadji Brahim	30	
37. Nangor	Kariman	25	
38. Padjaten	Hadji Achmad	25	
39. Padjaten	Hadji Dusen	20	
40. Padjaten	Hadji Marip	20	
41. Padjaten	Pengi	35	
42. Pagadingan	Hadji Achmad	10	

No. Location of schools	Name of Rel. Teacher	Number of Pupils	Remarks
43. Pagadingan	Hadji Saudin	12	
44. Pagadingan	Hadji Bakar	10	
45. Pakembaran	Hadji Arwan	4	
46. Palamunan	Sami	20	
47. Palamunan	Hadji Dullah	20	
48. Pamengkang	Hadji Kodji	16	
49. Patjarikan	Ali	6	
50. Patjarikan	Nursaman	4	
51. Pembogwan	Aliman	12	
52. Plabuan	Kasbit	40	
53. Sampir	Bahi	10	
54. Sandahan	Amod	6	
55. Serdang Lor	Arsidin	50	
56. Serdang Lor	Mus	40	
57. Setu	Kanim	30	
58. Sidjati	Mail	12	Rebel
59. Sudimara	Usman	9	
60. Tegalmangun	Idris	30	Rebel
61. Tegaltandjung	Durachman	5	
62. Tendjalaut	Sawe	20	
63. Tjakar	Hadji Kadir	25	
64. Tjiasahan	Hadji Buang	30	
65. Tjibelut	Kalik	16	
66. Tjigadog	Brosah	20	
67. Tjigelam	Musa	25	
68. Tjigelam	Senidin	11	
69. Tjilia	Atuk	30	
70. Tondjong .	Sanidin	20	
71. Trate	Hadji Mutas	50	
72. Walikukun	Pengi	30	
73. Walikukun	Hadji Muhamad	50	
74. Wanagiri	Hadji Rapidin	40	
75. Wanasaba	Susah	40	
76. Wanasaba	Hadji Mahmud	60	
77. Wera	Kaniman	20	
		1817	

Recapitulation:

<i>Afdeling</i>	District	Number of Rel. Teachers	Number of Pupils
Anjer	Anjer	15	201
	Tjilegon	72	1573
	Kramat Watu	77	1817
Total		164	3591

Note: One should use caution in identifying some of these religious teachers as rebels; see Chap. VI, pp. 192-193.

APPENDIX VI

**LIST OF MEETINGS HELD BY THE "PLOTTERS"
BETWEEN FEBRUARY AND MAY 1888**

Source: Report of the Controller of Serang, May 19, 1889, no. 16, in MR 1889, no. 376.

- I. In the Javanese month *Djumadilachir* (Feb. 14-March 13, 1888)
 1. in Tanara at H. Mardjuki's house, attended by *kjais* from Serang, Anjer and Tangerang, including:
H. Wasid, H. Iskak, H. Abubakar, H. Asnawi, H. Mohamad Arsad, H. Mohamad Arsad Tawil, H. Achmad, H. Mohamad Asik, Kjai Mohamad Ali from Mandaja, and Kjai Murangi from Tirtajasa.
 2. in Trate at H. Asngari's house, attended by *kjais* from Serang and Anjer, including:
H. Mardjuki, H. Mohamad Arsad Tawil, H. Abubakar, H. Asnawi, H. Achmad, Kjai Murangi, H. Afif, the *Panghulu* of the old mosque of old Banten, and H. Abdulradjak.
 3. in Sanedja at H. Iskak's house, attended by *kjais* from Serang, Anjer, Pandeglang, including:
H. Mardjuki, H. Mohamad Arsad Tawil, H. Abubakar, H. Asnawi, H. Wasid, H. Muhidin, and H. Ismail.
- II. In the Javanese month *Redjeb* (March 14-Apr. 12, 1888)
 1. in Bedji at H. Wasid's house, attended by:
H. Mardjuki, H. Iskak, H. Mohamad Arsad Tawil, H. Abubakar, H. Muhidin, and H. Erab from Serdang.
 2. in Kaloran, at H. Mohamad Sangadeli's house, attended by:
H. Wasid, H. Iskak, H. Mohamad Asik, H. Abubakar, H. Asnawi, and H. Muhidin.
 3. in Bendung Lampujang at H. Asnawi's house, attended by:
H. Mardjuki, H. Mohamad Arsad Tawil, H. Wasid, H. Iskak, H. Mohamad Arsad, H. Achmad, H. Abubakar, H. Marup from Kalepian, H. Mufrad from Kamanisan Udik, Kjai Mohamad Ali from Mandaja, and Kjai Murangi.
- III. In the Javanese month *Ruwah* (Apr. 13-May 11, 1888)
 1. in Tanara at H. Mardjuki's house, attended by:
H. Wasid, H. Iskak, H. Abubakar, H. Asnawi, H. Mohamad Arsad, H. Achmad and H. Mohamad Arsad Tawil.
 2. in Bedji at H. Wasid's house, exactly on *Ruwah* or Apr. 22, 1888, attended by:

H. Mardjuki, H. Mohamad Arsad Tawil, H. Abubakar, H. Sahib from Tjipeundeuj (Pandeglang), H. Ismail, H. Sarman from Bengkung (Pandeglang), H. Aliudin from Kadulesung (Pandeglang), and many others.

Addenda: The meeting held in Bedji at H. Wasid's house on *Sawal* 12 or June 22, 1888, was attended by:

H. Ismail, H. Iskak, H. Usman, H. Abubakar, H. Asnawi, H. Waseh and H. Djaja, both from Kaloran, H. Djamil from Lamongan, H. Djamidin from Kasukon, H. Mardjuki, Kjai Mohamad Ali from Mandaja, *kjais* from Trumbu, and many others.

APPENDIX VII

**LIST OF PERSONS KILLED/WOUNDED
DURING THE REBELLION**

Source. Report of the Director of the Department of Interior, Sept. 18, 1888, no. 5162, in Vb. Feb. 7, 1889, no. 4, Appendix C.

A. List of persons killed by the rebels:

1. Mas Asidin, *magang* (candidate-official) attached to the Assistant *Wedana* of Bodjonegoro (district Tjilegon).
2. Ulric Bachet, salt sales manager in Tjilegon.
3. Mas Djajaatmadja, *mantri-ulu* (official of the irrigation-works) in the district of Tjilegon.
4. Djamil, head police-servant of the Assistant Resident of Anjer.
5. Djasim, servant of the Assistant *Wedana* of Krapjak (district Tjilegon).
6. Henri Francois Dumas, clerk in the assistant resident's office in Tjilegon.
7. Jacob Grondhout, drill engineer 2nd class in the mining department in Tjilegon.
8. Dora Gubbels, daughter of J. H. H. Gubbels.
9. Elly Gubbels, daughter of J. H. H. Gubbels.
10. Johan Hendrik Hubert Gubbels, Assistant Resident of Anjer.
11. Mas Kramadimedja, warder of the jail in Tjilegon.
12. Raden Purwadiningrat, adjunct-collector in Tjilegon.
13. Sadiman, servant of the *Patih* of Anjer.
14. Mas Sastradiwiria, *Djaksa* of the afdeling Anjer in Tjilegon.
15. Raden Tjakradiningrat, *Wedana* of Tjilegon.
16. Cecile Wijermans, wife of J. Grondhout.
17. Anna Elizabeth van Zutphen, wife of J. H. H. Gubbels.

B. List of persons wounded by the rebels:

1. Lurah Djami, village head of Kubangkalak Kulon, district Tjilegon.
2. Alfred Dumas, son of H. F. Dumas.
3. Mrs. Dumas, wife of H. F. Dumas.
4. Ganzweid, private in the 9th batallion.
5. Horter, cavalierist in the 3rd squadron.
6. Minah, servant of H. F. Dumas.
7. A. A. Veenhuyzen, infantry captain in the 9th batallion.

C. List of rebels killed:

1. Arab, from Balagendung, district Kramat Watu.
2. Budian, from Balagendung, district Kramat Watu.
3. Duradjak, from Ardjawinangun, district Kramat Watu.
4. Kadiman, from Ardjawinangun, district Kramat Watu.
5. Kusen, from Wanasaba, district Kramat Watu.

6. Mali, from Tubuj, district Kramat Watu.
7. Mesir, from Ardjawinangun district Kramat Watu.
8. Sadir, from Tojomerto, district Kramat Watu.
9. Usup from Ardjawinangun, district Kramat Watu.
10. Agus Suradikaria, alias Saliman, dismissed Assistant *Wedana* of Merak, district Tjilegon.
11. Hadji Arbi, from Tjitangkil, district Tjilegon.
12. Hadji Djahli, from Sumurmandjangan, district Tjilegon.
13. Hadji Iskak, from Sanedja, district Tjilegon.
14. Hadji Kasiman, from Tjitangkil, district Tjilegon.
15. Hadji Madani, from Tjiora Kulon, district Tjilegon.
16. Hadji Nasiman, from Kaligandu, district Tjilegon.
17. Saleman, police servant of the Assistant *Wedana* of Merak.
18. Hadji Abdulgani, from Ardjawinangun, district Kramat Watu.
19. Hadji Abdulgani, from Bedji, district Tjilegon.
20. Hadji Chatab, from Sempu, district Tjilegon.
21. Hadji Djaja, from Tjitangkil, district Tjilegon.
22. Kjai Hadji Ismail, from Gulatjir, district Kramat Watu.
23. Hadji Kasan, from Sempu, district Tjilegon.
24. Hadji Mohamad Ali, from Kubangwatu, district Tjilegon.
25. Hadji Rameli, from Gulatjir, district Kramat Watu.
26. Hadji Ratib, from Kubangwatu, district Tjilegon.
27. Hadji Tohar, from Mamengger, district Tjilegon.
28. Hadji Usman, from Tunggak, district Tjilegon.
29. Hadji Wasid, from Bedji, district Tjilegon.
30. Sadik, from Petjek, district Tjilegon.

Note: Nos. 1-9 were killed during the encounter at Tojomerto; nos. 10-17 at the time of their arrest; nos. 18-29 at the battle at Tjisiit; no. 30 by Bachet.

D. List of rebels wounded:

1. Achmad, from Ardjawinangun, district Kramat Watu.
2. Alwan, from Tjibeber, district Tjilegon.
3. Asman, from Tegalkedondong, district Tjilegon.
4. Mulapar, from Ardjawinangun, district Kramat Watu.
5. Hadji Kajud, from Tegalmangun, district Kramat Watu.
6. Saldam, from Tubuj, district Kramat Watu.
7. Salim, from Tangkurak, district Tjilegon.
8. Samad, from Ardjawinangun, district Kramat Watu.
9. Hadji Samidin, from Pembogwan, district Kramat Watu.
10. Sarip, from Balagendung, district Kramat Watu.
11. Hadji Usman, from Ardjawinangun, district Kramat Watu.
12. Hadji Pakar, from Trate Udik, district Tjilegon.
13. Satus, from Tjitangkil, district Tjilegon.

Note: Nos. 1-11 were wounded at the encounter in Tojomerto; nos. 12 and 13 during the search made of their villages; no. 14 was shot by Bachet.

APPENDIX VIII

**TESTIMONIES OF WITNESSES CONCERNING
THE MOTIVATIONS FOR LAUNCHING THE
DISTURBANCES AT TJILEGON ON JULY 1888**

1. Jachja from Bedji: "The disturbances were brought about by the prohibition against performing prayers issued by the government."
2. Raimin from Tunggalung. "Jachja from Bedji, Hadji Ardja from Marapit, and Hadji Djafar from Gunungsantri told him that the turmoils had been instigated to champion the cause of the common people, many of whom had to pay trade tax and capitation tax, although they were not actually liable to pay these taxes."
3. Usup from Djombang Wetan: "Hadji Wasid told me that all those who received their wages from the government were to be captured. Hadji Ismail opined that they should be killed instantly, while Agus Suradikaria added that the *kjais* had to liberate the people from paying the various taxes — the land rent, the trade tax, and the capitation tax."
4. Hadji Maki from Kubangwuluh: "Hadji Urip ordered me to gather the people together in order to establish a Javanese kingdom."
5. Abdul Wahab from Kedung: "Kjai Hadji Usman went to Hadji Iskak and told him that it was planned to put to death all those who were salaried by the government and even those who can write Dutch (sic); and that Hadji Ismail was to be proclaimed king. During the disturbances Hadji Wasid told a crowd that an Islamic state was to be established and the land rent, the head tax and the trade tax abolished."
6. Dulmanan *alias* Armadja *alias* Nasidin from Krapjak: "Hadji Wasid told the people that a Muslim state had been established and that Hadji Ismail had been proclaimed king; anybody who did follow him would be captured."
7. Nji Kamsidah, the first wife of Hadji Iskak from Sanedja: "Hadji Wasid said that he would detach himself from the world and did not care about money."
8. Nuriman from Djombang Wetan, a policy-servant of the *wedana*: "The insurgents told me that like all police-servants I would be put to death, because I was a *kafir*; but I would be granted a free pardon if I would have my hair cut and pronounce the *sjahadat*."
9. Ijas, a farmer from Djombang Wetan: "The *wedana* was told by the dismissed village head of Kepuhdenok, Rasid, that when the group who even levied taxes from excrement had been extinguished, it would not be necessary to destroy its possessions."
10. Ardja from Leuweung Sao: "I was ordered to go to Tjilegon to kill the assistant resident. Hadji Ismail would then be proclaimed king and Hadji Wasid would be made his *patih*; then a time would come when the common

man would be happy; no land rent would have to be paid, nor capitation tax, nor trade tax."

11. Hamim from Medang Batu: "Hadji Ismail told me that those who did not follow him, would be killed, because God had chosen him to become king and he was empowered to put people to death whenever he thought proper."
12. Hadji Madinah from Tjibeber: "Hadji Wasid told me that the levying of taxes was getting worse and worse; although the time of levying the taxes had not yet come, people already had to pay the various taxes; the villagers of Tjibeber — who also had to pay *djakat* to him — were heavily burdened, while the villagers of Kusambi were only assessed lightly; he hated the *Wedana* of Kramat Watu, who readily sent people to the capital for the slightest infringement of the regulations."
13. Achmad from Bedji: "When on the 10th of the month of *Sawal* — 19 June 1888 — I saw people from Medang Batu and other villages coming to visit Hadji Wasid, I learned that the *hadji* intended to start the *perang sabil*; thereupon I checked this rumour, and Hadji Wasid himself confirmed it by saying that a large assembly of people had decided to launch the rebellion on the following grounds: (1) there were two civil servants at Tjilegon, namely the *patih* and the *djaksa* who, in line with the Dutch, would not tolerate that the believers went to pray in the mosques and who were therefore in league to extinguish the people's religion; (2) the *patih* greatly increased the assessment of the tax on proas, so that the people had to pay a trade tax amounting to forty guilders for each proa; thereupon the people had submitted a petition to the Regent of Serang, but the latter had referred the petitioners to the *patih*, with the result that the tax assessment had not been lowered; (3) the main causes of the disturbances were not yet known exactly; but I have learned that they consisted of the heavy burden of the assessment of taxes, especially the trade tax; (4) *gardu wachmen*, who did not perform their duties properly, were severely punished; (5) the native officials employed too many spies, who were constantly on the look-out for the slightest infringements of the law; (6) the common people were embittered because they were treated badly; especially the *patih* and the *djaksa* were deeply hated. Furthermore, after the outburst of the rising, when the chief rebels were still roaming in the Gunung Gede area, Hadji Wasid proposed to the band that one of them should send a petition to the authorities at Tjilegon, enumerating the causes of the disturbances with special reference to the feelings of hatred towards and the desire for revenge against the *patih* and the *djaksa*, who both showed animosity towards the Muslim religion; and stating that they realized that their deeds were deplorable, but that the *patih* should not be allowed to elude his punishment. While tarrying in the forest of Panimbang (Tjaringin), Hadji Wasid told Hadji Ismail that he had started the rebellion because people had urged him to do so. People had come to see him, asking him to put himself at the head of an insurrection they wished to launch because they hated the government for the following reasons: (1) the traders had been assessed far above their assessable capacity and when they had requested the reduction of the necessary amount, the assessment was simply increased; (2) when a watchman of the village was found asleep during his watch-hours, he was immediately fined — one guilder on the first occasion, and as much as ten guilders on the following ones; (3) the officials completely disregarded the *kjais* and bore animosity towards their religion, which was manifested by their prohibiting people to pray loudly

and to build high *menaras* (minarets); (4) on every market-day the trade tax-papers were accurately checked and traders who did not have them were fined. Therefore it was agreed upon among people from Banten and even people from Bogor to resist the government vigorously, but the people from Bogor deserted us. Lastly during the flight to the south people began to wonder why the *wedana*, the adjunct-collector, the warder of the jail, and the wives and children of the European civil servants had been murdered, for at the outset it had been planned to put to death the *patih*, the *djaksa*, and the European officials, and also those who opposed our plans."

14. Pangeran Tiang Marga from the Lampongs: "When I visited Trate, Bedji and Bodjonegoro at the end of June, I observed that many mosques and houses were crowded with people who busied themselves with reading the *kitab*s; I asked Hadji Kasan what it was all about, and got the reply that this religious activity and fervour had been going on for quite a while and that Hadji Wasid or another *kjai* instructed people in the reading of the *kitab*s every Wednesday; this religious piety soon spread to other villages."
15. Kembu from Bedji: "When he was asked about the motives for intending to launch a rebellion — *brandalan* — Hadji Wasid said that he hated the government, without explaining why."
16. Nji Hadji Kasumah, the wife of Hadji Usman of Tunggak: "Hadji Usman took part in the *perang sabil* because the land rent was oppressive, and he preferred to die."
17. Abdurachman, Assistant *Wedana* of Balagendung: "According to my colleague in Serdang, the disturbances were brought about partly by the fact that during the inspection for vaccination and re-vaccination, the physician had ordered the wives of the *hadjis* to take off their *badju* (a sort of jacket); during an inspection in Serdang people began to utter their resentment and rancour by howling, and they only stopped howling after they had been summoned to do so three times by the assistant *wedana*."
18. Nji Kadisah, the wife of Hadji Wasid: "Villagers kept asking Hadji Wasid why adult persons had to be vaccinated, whereupon he replied that they should not bother themselves about that matter any more."

Source: Appendix H of the Report of the Director of the Department of Interior, Sept. 18, 1888, no. 5162.

APPENDIX IX

LIST OF EXILES

No.	N a m e	Birthplace	Age	Residence	Occupation	Exiled to	Remarks
1.	H. Abdulkarim	Bedji (Tj)	30	Bedji	Farmer	Tondano	Ill.
2.	H. Abdulmanap	Luwuk (P)	35	Pasirgadung (A)	Farmer	Gorontalo	Ill.; m. KH Sapiudin
3.	Abdulradjak	Tandjak (A)	25	Tandjak (A)	Farmer	Padang	nephew KH Sapiudin
4.	H. Abdulsalam	Pulo (Demak)	40	Bodjonegoro	Trader	Kupang	
5.	H. Abdurrachman	Kapuren (Tjr)	40	Kapuren	Rel. Teacher	Salajar	
6.	H. Abubakar	Lagon (Tjikandi)	44	Kaganteran (S)	Rel. Teacher	Kema	
7.	H. Achmad	Tanara	47	Tanara	<i>Panghulu</i>	Padang Sidempuan	
8.	H. Achmad	Tjibening (S)	35	Prijaji (S)	Farmer	Maros	
9.	Agung	Temuputih (Tj)	24	Temuputih	Farmer	Ternate	Ill.
10.	H. Ali	Djerukupis (OA)	25	Tjibeber (Tj)	Trader	Amboina	Ill.; m/br-i-l KH Abdulhalim
11.	Nji Aminah	Ardjawanangun (Kw)	40	Ardjawanangun	Rel. Teacher	Kupang	da. H. Wachia
12.	Arbi	Kubangkepuh (Tj)	40	Wadas (Tj)	Farmer	Muntok	Ill.
13.	Arpi	Balagendung (Kw)	34	Balagendung	Farmer	Muntok	Ill.
14.	Arwan	Bedji (Tj)	34	Bodjonegoro	Farmer	Padang	Ill.; ex-djaro Bodjonegoro
15.	H. Asnawi	Bendung		Bendung	Farmer; Rel. T.	Pajakumbuh	Many <i>murids</i> in Bogor
16.	H. Asim	Lampujang (T)	45	Lampujang	Farmer	Banda	Ill.; cousin KHT Ismail
		Wanasaba (Kw)	37	Wanasaba	Farmer		
17.	H. Balki	Sumursana (S)	45	Trumbu (S)	Trader	Bonthain	Ill.; m. KHT Ismail
18.	Buang	Tubuj (Kw)	56	Tubuj (Kw)	Farmer	Muntok	br. KHT Ismail
19.	H. Burak	Gulatjir (Kw)	30	Gulatjir	Farmer	Menado	Ill.
20.	H. Daud	Balagendung	40	Balagendung	Farmer	Tondano	Ill.; br. H. Moh. Ali
21.	H. Deli	Dukuhmalang (S)	42	Gunungsantri Kulon	Farmer	Banda	

22. Dirham	Trumbu (S)	35	Trumbu	Trader; Rel. T.	Salajar	
23. H. Djafar	Njamuk (Tj)	25	Njamuk	no occupation	Menado	Ill.; m. H. Wasid
24. H. Djamar	Bajur (Tj)	40	Pangrango (Tj)	Farmer	Kena	Ill.
25. Djamil	Trate Udik (Tj)	45	Trate Udik	Trader	Gorontalo	Ill.
26. H. Djapi	Tjibeber (Tj)	43	Tjibeber	Farmer	Amboina	Ill.; m. KH Abdulhalim
27. Djasim	Kubangkepuh (Tj)	35	Dukuhmalang	<i>Djaro</i>	Muntok	<i>Guru tarekat</i>
28. H. Duradjak	Tanara	35	Tanara	Farmer; Rel. T.	Tondano	Ill.; m. H. Wasid
29. H. Endung	Pangrango (Tj)	35	Pangrango	Farmer	Gorontalo	m. KHT Ismail
30. H. Erab	Serdang Lor (Kw)	30	Serdang Lor	<i>Chatib</i>	Amboina	Ill.
31. H. Gentol	Legokmenteng (Kw)	48	Legokmenteng	<i>Panghulu</i>	Banda	Ill.
32. Gesing	Karangdalan (Tj)	30	Karangdalan	Farmer	Fort d. Kock	Ill.
33. H. Halari	Tjibeber	50	Tjibeber	Trader	Kena	Ill.; m. KH Abdulhalim
34. Ikan	Kalentemu (Tj)	30	Kalentemu	Farmer	Benkulen	Ill.
35. H. Isra	Tjibeber	23	Tjibeber	Farmer	Banda	Ill.; m. KH Abdulhalim
36. Kadim	Kubangbatang (Tj)	40	Kubangbatang	Farmer	Banda	Ill.
37. Kamidin	Tunggak (Tj)	40	Tunggak	Farmer	Benkulen	Ill.
38. Kamil	Djalumpri (Kw)	35	Djalumpri	Farmer	Padang	Ill.; KHT Ismail
39. Kamim	Kepuhdenok (Tj)	45	Dringo (Tj)	Farmer	Menado	Ill.; ex- <i>djaro</i>
40. Kamud	Bedji	40	Bedji	Farmer	Benkulen	Ill.
41. H. Kanapi	Giripada (Kw)	45	Katileng (Tj)	Farmer	Gorontalo	m. KH Abdulhalim
42. H. Karam	Temuputih (Tj)	40	Tjibeber	Trader	Banda	Ill.; m. KH
43. Karis	Trate Ilir (Kw)	26	Katileng (Tj)	Farmer	Fort d. Kock	Abdulhalim
44. H. Kasan	Wanasaba (Kw)	35	Wanasaba	Farmer	Menado	Ill.; cousin KHT Ismail
45. Kasanudin	Tjitangkil (Tj)	26	Tjitangkil	Farmer	Padang	Ill.; nephew H. Wasid
46. Kasim	Tangkurak (Tj)	32	Petjek (Tj)	Farmer	Menado	Ill.
47. Kasim	Tjekok (P)	33	Wadas (Tj)	Fisherman	Padang	Ill.
48. H. Kidin	Tjilentrang	30	Katileng (Tj)	Farmer	Menado	Ill.
49. H. T. Kusen	Anjer	40	Kampungbaru	<i>Panghulu</i>	Ternate	
50. Leman	Telokbako (Tj)	40	Sempu (Tj)	<i>Djaro</i>	Priaman	Ill.

No.	N a m e	Birthplace	Age	Residence	Occupation	Exiled to	Remarks
51.	H. Mahmud	Bodjonegoro	38	Gunungsantri Kulon	Farmer	Saparua	
52.	H. Makali	Tjibeber	40	Tjibeber	Farmer	Kupang	Ill.; m. KH Abdulhalim
53.	H. Makid	Djombang Wetan (Tj)	35	Djombang Wetan		Banda	
54.	H. Mardjaja	Pasirgadung (A)	25	Pasirgadung	Farmer	Menado	Ill.; m. H. Sapiudin
55.	Moh. Ali	Mandaja (Tjikandi)	40	Mandaja	Rel. Teacher	Kupang	
56.	H. Moh. Arsad	Pasir (T)	40	Pegantungan (S)	Head <i>panghulu</i>	Kupang	
57.	H. Moh. Arsad Tawil	Tanara	34	Kopo (OA)	Rel. Teacher	Kema	
58.	H. Moh. Asik	Majabon (S)	45	Bendung (S)	Rel. Teacher	Temate	
59.	H. Moh. Asnawi	Tjibeber	27	Tjibeber	Trader	Menado	
60.	H. Moh. Kanapiah	Trumbu	40	Trumbu	Rel. Teacher	Balangnipa	
61.	H. Moh. Kasim	Serang	28	Djombang (Tj)		Padang	ex-clerk
62.	Entje Moh. Said	Palembang	35	Bodjonegoro	Trader	Patjiten	
63.	H. Moh. Sangadali	Sajabulu (S)	46	Kaudjon	Rel. Teacher; member R. Council	Bonthain	
64.	H. Muhidin	Trumbu	40	Tjipeutjang (P)	Rel. Teacher; Farmer	Maros	
65.	Mukiji	Katileng (Tj)	55	Tjibeber	Farmer	Amboina	Ill.
66.	Mulana	Trate Udik	25	Trate Udik	Farmer	Padang	Ill.
67.	Mungkad	Kadurangkong (P)	33	Leuwibeureum	Farmer	Fort d. Kock	Ill.; m. KH Sapiudin
68.	H. Munib	Tjibeber	27	Tjibeber	Farmer	Banda	Ill.; m. KH Sapiudin
69.	Moji	Tjipeutjang (A)	37	Tjipeutjang	<i>Djaro</i>	Padang	in possession of <i>Lurah</i> -title
70.	Nurila	Tjitangkil (Tj)	45	Tjitangkil		Priaman	Ill.; ex- <i>djaro</i>
71.	Otong	Kadjuuran (Tj)	35	Kadjuuran	Farmer	Fort d. Kock	Ill.
72.	Otong	Kapendilan (Tj)	37	Kapendilan	<i>Djaro</i>	Padang	
73.	Pakur	Tubuj (Kw)	45	Pembogwan	Farmer	Padang	Ill.; KHT Ismail
74.	Pelet	Karangdalan (Tj)	40	Sempu (Tj)	Farmer	Padang	Ill.
75.	Radjidin	Kubangkepuh (Tj)	32	Kubangkepuh	Farmer	Padang	Ill.
76.	Nji Rainah	Ardjawanangun (Kw)	45	Ardjawanangun	Farmer	Gorontalo	da. H. Wachia

77. H. Ramidin	Tjigeunah (A)	30	Mantjak (A)	Farmer	Tondano	Ill.; m. KH Sapiudin
78. H. Rapali	Sidjati (Kw)	56	Sidjati	<i>Panghulu</i> Balagendung	Amboina	
79. Sakib	Ardjawanangun	40	Ardjawanangun	Farmer	Kupang	Ill.; husband of Nji Aminah
80. Sakimin	Pasirgadung (A)	60	Pasirgadung	<i>Djaro</i>	Ternate	Ill.
81. Saleh	Sutji (S)	35	Prijaji (S)		Padang	Ill.
82. Salimin	Krapjak (Tj)	30	Kubanglesung (Tj)	Farmer	Padang	Ill.
83. Samad	Mantjak (A)	25	Mantjak	Farmer	Padang	Ill.; m. KH Sapiudin
84. Samad	Temuputih (Tj)	24	Temuputih	Farmer	Padang	Ill.
85. Samawis	Kadurangkong (Tjm)	35	Leuwibeureum	Trader	Padang	Ill.; m. KH Sapiudin
86. Sangidin	Karagdalan (Tj)	30	Karagdalan	car-renter	Padang	Ill.
87. Sarip	Kubangkepuh (Tj)	25	Kubangkepuh	Trader	Saparua	Ill.
88. Satip	Kubangwatu (Tj)	28	Kubangwatu	<i>Djaro</i>	Padang	
89. Satus	Tjitangkil	30	Tjitangkil	Farmer	Gorontalo	Ill.; nephew H. Wasid
90. Siman	Pasar Serang (S)	30	Anjer Lor (A)	Trader	Kupang	Ill.
91. Tadjia	Bodjong Gadung (Tj)	35	Sanedja (Tj)	Farmer	Amboina	Ill.
92. Tapa	Kaganteran (S)	36	Gulatjir	Farmer	Benkulen	Ill.; KHT Ismail
93. Tjangik	Tjipindah (Tj)	33	Kaligandu (Tj)	Farmer	Benkulen	Ill.
94. Tjapung	Tangkurak (Tj)	37	Tangkurak	Farmer	Saparua	Ill.

Source: P.V. Dec. 6, 1888, in Exh. Jan. 28, 1889, no. 74; P.V. Jan. 3, 1889, in Exh. Feb. 23, 1889, no. 68; P.V. Jan. 15, 1889, in Exh. March 6, 1889, no. 85; P.V. Jan. 23, 1889, in Exh. March 11, 1889-77; P.V. Jan. 30, 1889, in Exh. March 19, 1889, no. 5; P.V. March 18, 1889, in Exh. May 2, 1889, no. 63; P.V. March 26, 1889, in Exh. May 14, 1889, no. 121; P.V. Apr. 3, 1889, in Exh. May 20, 1889, no. 76; P.V. Apr. 9, 1889, in Exh. June 7, 1889, no. 51; P.V. May 1, 1889, in Exh. June 24, 1889, no. 76; P.V. May 16, 1889, in Exh. July 4, 1889, no. 76; P.V. June 3, 1889, in Exh. July 24, 1889, no. 77; P.V. June 11, 1889, in Exh. Aug. 20, 1889, no. 59; P.V. Sept. 23, 1889, in Exh. Nov. 23, 1889, no. 65.

Abbreviations: da = daughter; Ill. = illiterate; H. = Hadji; KH = Kjai Hadji; m. = *murid*; Rel. T. = religious teacher.

A = Anjer; Kw = Kramat Watu; OA = Ondar Andir; P = Pandeglang; S = Serang; T = Tanara; Tj = Tjilegon; Tjm = Tjomas; Tjr = Tjiruas.

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Note: Anonymous articles are cited under the heading of the journals in which they were published.

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

<i>AA</i>	<i>American Anthropologist.</i>
<i>AES</i>	<i>Archives Europeennes de Sociologie.</i>
<i>AJS</i>	<i>American Journal of Sociology.</i>
<i>ASR</i>	<i>American Sociological Review.</i>
<i>BJ</i>	Bibliotheca Javanica published by the Koninklijk Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen.
<i>BKI</i>	<i>Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde</i> published by the Koninklijk Instituut voor Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde.
<i>CIS</i>	<i>Cahiers Internationaux de Sociologie.</i>
<i>CJHSS</i>	<i>The Ceylon Journal of Historical and Social Studies.</i>
<i>CSSH</i>	<i>Comparative Studies in Society and History.</i>
<i>DDI</i>	Director of the Department of Interior
<i>EI</i>	Encyclopaedia of Islam.
<i>ENI</i>	Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indië.
<i>Exh.</i>	Exhibitum.
<i>Gov. Gen.</i>	Governor General.
<i>H.</i>	Hadji.
<i>IG</i>	<i>De Indische Gids.</i>
<i>ITR</i>	<i>Indisch Tijdschrift voor het Recht.</i>
<i>IWR</i>	<i>Indisch Weekblad van het Regt.</i>
<i>JRAI</i>	<i>Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute of Great Britain and Ireland.</i>
<i>JRASMB</i>	<i>Journal of the Malayan Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.</i>
<i>JSAH</i>	<i>Journal of Southeast Asian History.</i>
<i>KT</i>	<i>Koloniaal Tijdschrift.</i>
<i>M.J.</i>	Militair Journaal (Military Journal)
<i>MNGZ</i>	<i>Mededeelingen vanwege het Nederlandsch Zendelinggenootschap.</i>
<i>MR</i>	Mailrapport (Mail report).
<i>NZT</i>	<i>Nederlandsch Zendingstijdschrift.</i>
<i>O.I.B.</i>	Oost-Indisch Besluit (Resolution of the government of the Netherlands East Indies).
<i>PKI</i>	Partai Komunis Indonesia.
<i>P.V.</i>	Process Verbaal (Minutes of the court).
<i>R.</i>	Raden (a title indicating low nobility in Java).
<i>R A.</i>	Raden Adipati (a title showing the rank of a regent).
<i>R.A.A.</i>	Raden Adipati Aria (ibidem).
<i>R.B.</i>	Raden Bagus (title of Bantenese noblemen).
<i>R.M.</i>	Raden Mas (a title indicating nobility).
<i>R.T.</i>	Raden Tumenggung (a title showing the rank of a regent).
<i>R.T.A.</i>	Raden Tumenggung Aria (ibidem).
<i>SEI</i>	Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam.
<i>SF</i>	<i>Social Forces.</i>
<i>SIAH</i>	Schriften des Instituts für Asienkunde in Hamburg.
<i>SSR</i>	<i>Sociology and Social Research.</i>
<i>T.</i>	Tubagus (title of Bantenese noblemen).
<i>TBB</i>	<i>Tijdschrift voor het Binnenlandsch Bestuur.</i>

TBG	<i>Tijdschrift voor Indische Taal-, Land- en Volkenkunde</i> published by the (Koninklijk) Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen.
TNAG	<i>Tijdschrift van het Nederlandsch Aardrijkskundig Genootschap.</i>
TNI	<i>Tijdschrift voor Nederlandsch-Indië.</i>
Vb.	Verbaal (Minutes).
VBG	<i>Verhandelingen van het (Koninklijk) Bataviaasch Genootschap van Kunsten en Wetenschappen.</i>
VG	<i>Verspreide Geschriften</i> (Scattered Writings).
WNI	<i>Weekblad van Nederlandsch-Indië.</i>
WHS	Works issued by the Hakluyt Society.

GLOSSARY

Note: Bantenese words are marked *

Arabic words (given in parentheses) are spelled according to the EI or the SEI; for technical reasons some diacritical marks have been omitted. As regards their meaning I have closely followed the explanations given in the EI or the SEI. Abbreviation: D = Dutch.

abangan: a category of Muslims in Javanese society whose religious practices exhibit Javanese religious syncretism.

*abdi**: "serf" or "slave"; people who were forcibly subjugated and enslaved by the Muslim conquerors.

adat (adat): custom; customary law.

adjan (adhān): the call to attend the divine service on Fridays and the five daily prayers.

afdeling (D.): an administrative territorial unit administered by an assistant resident.

*Agus**: title given to people of good class who did not belong to the nobility.

*Aju**: title given to noble women who did not belong to the sultan's family.

Allah (Allāh): the Supreme Being of the Muslims.

alun-alun: open square in front of the residences of local authorities.

amil: village official in charge of collecting the *djakat*.

Apun: title given to noblemen who did not belong to the sultan's family.

babu: maid-servant.

bade: a kind of dagger.

*Bagus**: title given to people of good class who did not belong to the nobility.

baku: able-bodied male liable to compulsory services.

barakat (baraka): "blessing", everything connected with holy men: magical means of attaining all sorts of good fortune.

bau: 7096,5 sq. metres.

bekel: village official; tax collector during

the late Mataram period.

bengat (bai'a): official contract between guru and murid.

Besar: name of the 12th month of the Javanese calendar.

bradja: a malicious force which affected especially children, and the old and the sick.

brandal: rebel.

*budjang**: a category of landless agricultural labourers.

*bumi**: the regional head in Lebak during the sultanate.

*bupati**: the regional head in Pontang and Djasinga during the sultanate.

chataman: (See kataman).

dar al-Islam (dār al-Islām): any country where the ordinances of Islam are established.

daup: "marriage"; the combination of elements of two different Sufi orders.

Deddjal (al-dadjdjal): the false prophet of the last hour.

demang: district head in Banten and Batavia in the 19th century.

desa: village or hamlet.

desa-diensten (D.): compulsory services for village works.

dikir (dhikr): the glorification of *Allah*, whereby certain fixed phrases were repeated in a ritual order.

*djakakersa**: village policeman.

*djaga surat**: village postman.

Djababaja: historical king of Kediri in the 12th century; the prophecies of *Djababaja* refer to the coming of the *Ratu Adil*.

djajengsekar: troop of native recruits for local defence.

djakat (zakāt): the alms-tax; one of the principal obligations in Islam.

djaksa: public prosecutor in regional courts.

*djalma leutik**: the common people.

*djaro**: village head.

Djawah (Djawah): the Indonesian "colony" in Mecca.

*djawara**: a social group, made up of people who had no permanent occupation.

djihād (djihād): Holy War; the subjugation of the infidel by Muslim weapons.

djimat: amulet.

djohar tree: *Cassia siamea*.

Djumadilakir (Djumādā al-'Akhira): name of the 6th month of the Javanese calendar.

djuru tulis: (village) clerk.

dukun: healer.

Dulkaidah (Dhu'l-ka'da): name of the 11th month of the Javanese calendar.

Dulhidjah (Dhu'l-Hidjdja): name of 12th month of the Javanese calendar. (See also: Besar).

dusun: "Village"; limited intellectual horizon.

*Entol**: title given to noblemen who did not belong to the sultan's family.

Erutjakra: (See *Herutjokro*).

*Fakih Nadjamudin**: title/predicate of the highest religious official in the Banten sultanate.

fatwa (fatwā): a formal legal opinion given by a canon lawyer of standing.

fiq (fiqh): jurisprudence in Islam.

gambir: *Uncaria Gambir Roxb.*, fam. Rubiaceae.

gamelan: Javanese orchestra.

gardu: watchman's hut.

golok: a kind of dagger.

gong: a cymbal-like Javanese musical instrument.

gugur gunung: general compulsory services, for which all able-bodied men were called up.

gundal: person escorting officials on their inspection tours.

guru: teacher.

guru tarekat: leader/teacher heading a branch of a Sufi order.

gusti: "lord".

hadj (hadjdj): the pilgrimage to Mecca.

hadj akbar (ḥadjdj akbar): "the great pilgrimage", i.e. when the principal day of the *hadj*, the 9th of *Dulhidjah*, falls on a Friday.

hadji (ḥadjdjī): one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca.

*hedjoan**: lending money to be repaid in crops.

herendiensten (D.): compulsory labour on public works.

Herutjokro: synonym for *Ratu Adil*.

huma: field where "swidden" is practised.

idjazah (idjāza): certificate given to a novice in the *tarekat*.

kabupaten: the regency as an administrative unit; the regent's house.

kadi (kāḍī): the judge, who according to the theory of Muslim law has to decide all cases involving questions of civil and criminal law.

kafir (kāfir): infidel.

kampong: living quarters of natives in towns or townlets.

kapetengan: village postman.

kataman: ceremony held when a murid has finished reading the *Qur'an*.

kati: 1/60 of a *pikol*; 1 *pikol* = ± 122 or 125 pounds.

*kebun maung**: tiger land.

kemit: village police.

kepala somah: head of a household.

kepatihan: the *patih*'s house.

kepuh tree: *Sterculia foetida*.

keramat (karāma): token of honour; miracle with which a saint is credited.

keris: a sort of dagger.

ketib (khaṭīb): one who reads the sermon at Friday and *id*-prayers.

kiras (charaḍdj): a kind of household tax.

kitab (kitāb): the holy scriptures.

kjai: title given to religious teachers of standing.

klewang: sword.

kliwon: official of lower-middle rank in the bureaucracy of the sultanate.

knevelarijen (D.): administrative abuses committed by government officials whereby the services and tributes of the people were over-assessed.

kojang: ± 1667, 55 kg. (in Banten)

*kolot-kolot**: village elders.

kongsi: corporation.

kudjang: a kind of dagger.

kuli: labourer.

langgar: a small, (usually) private prayer house.

Lebaran Hadji: the Muslim feast celebrated on the 10th of *Dulhidjah*; usually called '*Id al-Aḡḡā*.

lelandjan: levy in kind assessed from *sawah negara* holders.

lurah: village head, higher in rank/es-teem than the *djaro*.

magang: candidate-official.

magrib (maghrib): the *salat-magrib*, i.e. the daily prayer at sunset.

Mahdi (Mahdī): Messianic figure in Islam eschatology; the divinely guided one.

maleman: the celebration held on the 21st, 23rd, 25th, 27th, and 29th of the month *Puasa* (Ramadan).

mandoor: foreman.

mandoor gardu: foreman (head) of the village guard-brigade.

mantri: (1) servants in the sultan's household; (2) officials of lower-middle rank in the colonial bureaucracy.

mantri ulu: official of the irrigation works.

*Mas**: title given to noblemen who did not belong to the sultan's family.

mata-mata: spy, secret agent for the government authorities.

memaro: land pledging and share-cropping whereby the pledger receives one half of the crop.

menumpang: a category of agricultural labourers; they were given lodgings by their employers.

merbot: those in charge of the maintenance of the mosques.

*merdika**: those who had been granted free status after submitting to the Muslim conquerors and adopting the Muslim creed.

mertelu: land pledging and share-cropping whereby the pledger receives one third of the crop.

modin (mu'adhdhin): official of the mosque who is charged with the public call to prayer.

murid (murīd): disciple, pupil.

*najaka**: descendants of the sultan of a later generation than the third.

naga: a mythical snake.

nagara agung: the core region of the Mataram kingdom.

nahu (nahw): Arabic grammar.

naib (nā'ib): deputy of the *panghulu*.

ndara: member of the nobility in the Principalities.

*ngabeuj**: official of lower- middle rank in the bureaucracy of the sultanate.

*nglandjak**: a form of *sawah* transaction in the northern regency of Banten, which preserved a happy mean between land lease and land pledging.

*orang kuntjeng**: people skilled in the fabrication of coconut oil.

*orang tani**: a social group which included tillers, craftsmen, and traders.

paal: 1506,943 metres.

*pakukusut**: levy in kind assessed from owners of *sawah jasa*.

*paliwara**: official of lower-middle rank in the bureaucracy of the sultanate.

*Pangeran**: title given to members of the higher nobility.

panghulu: head of mosque functionaries.

*pangiwa**: bearer of orders issued by the village head or higher authorities.

*panglaku**: bearer of orders issued by the village head or higher authorities. esp. in Tjaringin.

pangrambe: the appanage territory which was situated closest to the court.

Pantja Darma: the doctrine of the five duties.

*pantjalang**: village postman, esp. in Lebak.

Pantja Setia: the doctrine of the five loyalties.

Pantja Sila: the five corner-stones of the Indonesian state.

pantjen: the occasional labour owed by the villagers to the native officials.

pasanggrahan: rest house.

patih: vizier during the sultanate; high native official next in rank to the regent.

*patitiang**: head tax according to Islamic law.

pendopo: large front-verandah of traditional houses of princes and *prijajis* in Java.

pentjak: fencing.

perang sabil: war on the path of God (*sabil allāh*).

pesantren: seminary for students of various branches of Islamic knowledge.

*petjaton**: land granted to relatives, officials, and personal favourites of the sultan.

pisang: *Musa paradisiaca*.

pitrah: a kind of head tax, to be paid before the end of the period of fasting or on the first of *Sawal* at the latest (*zakāt al-Fiṭr*).

postweg (D.): the post road running between Anjer and Panarukan, built in 1808 by order of Daendels.

pradjurit: "soldier"; troop of native recruits.

prijaji: an élite group in Java, consisting mainly of the bureaucratic "gentry" and the intelligentsia.

Puasa: the month of fasting, the 9th month of the Javanese calendar, also called *Ramelan*.

*punggawa**: officials of lower-middle rank in the bureaucracy of the sultanate.

*pusaka laden**: synonym for *petjaton*.

Qur'an (al-*Qur'ān*): the sacred books of the Muslims.

Raden: title given to the low nobility.
radja: king.

radja ireng: black king.

Ramadan (Ramaḍān): name of the ninth month of the Muslim calendar.

rampok: robber.

Redjeb (Radjab): name of the seventh month of the Javanese calendar.

repartitie (D.): the division of communal land rent among the villagers according to their own judgment.

*Ratu**: title given to women of high nobility.

Ratu Adil: the messianic figure in the prophecies of *Djajabaja*.

rooverijen (D.): robberies.

Ruwah: name of the 8th month of the Javanese calendar.

sajid (saiyid): title given to descendants of the Prophet.

salasilah (silsila): genealogy.

sambatan: assistant for one day, who was given his board.

sanga: 1 sanga = 50 *kati*.

santri: (1) student of the various branches of Islamic knowledge; (2) a category of Muslims who observe their religious duties strictly.

sarong: part of the Indonesian traditional dress.

saraf (ṣarf): Arabic syntax.

sawah: rice field.

*sawah gandjaran**: land granted to officials, relatives, and personal favourites of the sultan.

*sawah jasa**: land opened up by employing the compulsory services attached to *pusaka* land.

sawah negara: land laid out by the command of the sultan or his appanage-holder; royal domain.

Sawal (Shawwāl): name of the 10th month of the Javanese calendar.

sembah: a traditional way of paying homage.

sentana: member of the sultan's family.

sjahadat (shahāda): the first pillar of Islam, the profession of belief in *Allah*.

sjahbandar: high official in traditional states, whose task was the administration and supervision of foreign trade in the ports.

sjech (shaikh): (1) one who bears the marks of old age; (2) title given to high dignitaries of religion, to teachers, scholars.

sjerif (sharīf): title given to people who can claim a distinguished position because of their descent from illustrious ancestors.

slametan: religious feast meal.

slendang: a piece of cloth worn over the shoulders; part of the traditional women's dress in Indonesia.

Sultan Adil: variant of *Ratu Adil*.

sumbangan: present or gift for special occasions, such as births, marriages or deaths.

Sunan Herutjokro: a synonym for *Ratu Adil*.

Sura: name of the first month of the Javanese calendar.

tandu: a litter.

tarekat (ṭarīka): a mystical path; Sufi brotherhood.

tasauf (ṭaṣawwuf): the act of devoting oneself to the mystic life.

terbang: a sort of drum.

*tipar**: dry rice cultivation.

*tjaeng**: 1 *tjaeng* = 40 *sangas* (see *sanga* and *kati*).

tjarita: story.

tjungkak: village foremen in landed estates, charged with the assessment of taxes and services.

tong-tong: hollowed tree trunk, used to make signals which conveys various messages to the villagers (Jav. *ken-tongan*).

tuan radja: my lord the King.

*Tubagus**: title given to noblemen who belonged to the sultan's family.

Tumenggung: high official in the bureaucracy of the sultanate; officials in charge of the royal stable, kitchen or garden; title given to regents under the colonial rule.

tutupan: "to close" or "to dim"; the officials' policy of holding back information from their superiors in order to avoid further investigation or the blame for administrative blunders or negligence.

*tuwa-tuwa**: village elders (see: *kolot-kolot*).

*uang bebuntut**: taxation on buffaloes and cows.

*uang lawang**: head tax according to Islamic law.

udjungan: fencing with sticks.

*Ujang**: title given to noblemen who did not belong to the sultan's family.

ulama ('ulamā,): pl. of 'alīm, one who possesses the quality *ilm*, knowledge, learning in a high degree; canonists, theologians.

umat (umma): religious (Muslim) community.

*undakan**: social stratification according to the notion of the Bantenese.

usul (uṣūl): the doctrine of the principles of Muslim jurisprudence (uṣūl-al-fikh).

*utangan**: serfs, people who had been defeated by the Muslim conquerors and converted to Islam; they had to serve as soldiers to fight pirates.

Wali (Wali): "protector", "benefactor", or "saint".

Wali Allah (Wali Allāh): messenger of God; saint.

*warga**: descendants of the sultan up to the third generation.

Wawu: name of the 7th Javanese year within a cycle of 8 years.

wedana: head of a district, i.e. of a sub-division of a regency.

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
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MAP OF TJILEGON

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| 1. House of Dumas | 11. <i>Gardu</i> of Pasar Djombang Wetan |
| 2. House of the <i>djaksa</i> | 12. Salt warehouse |
| 3. House of the adjunct-collector | 13. House of Tan Keng Hok |
| 4. House of the <i>wedana</i> | 14. Residence of the assistant resident |
| 5. Prison | 15. Office of the assistant resident |
| 6. <i>Kepatihan</i> | 16. House of Bachet |
| 7. District prison | 17. Mosque |
| 8. <i>Post</i> (station) of Tjilegon | 18. House of the <i>panghulu</i> |
| 9. House of Grondhout | 19. House of Hadji Iskak |
| 10. House of the junior controller | |

