
NEW APPROACHES TO PEACE AND CONFLICT

MERDEKA AND THE MORNING STAR:
civil resistance in West Papua



Jason MacLeod

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Jason MacLeod is an educator, organiser and researcher. He teaches community development and politics at a number of different universities and co-ordinates civil resistance training and education for people in non-democracies. Together with Dr Eben Kirksey, he is the co-chair of the West Papua Project based at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, Sydney University. He lives and works on Jagera Country in Inala, Brisbane.

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For Petrus Tabuni

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Professor Kevin P Clements
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Foreword

Many people are currently living in situations of vulnerability, ongoing violence and exploitation. Those of us who live in situations of comparative privilege and follow current events in the news are familiar with social movements that are reckoning with precarious political and economic situations in diverse corners of the globe: Tibet, Palestine, Burma and Baltimore. Black lives matter. But certain black lives matter more than others in contemporary circuits of global news and in the realm of international policy. Even as important debates are taking place in the United States about the killing of black men and boys, the lives that continue to be lost in West Papua go largely unnoticed.

Indonesian travel bans mean that few people are capable of making the ongoing genocide in West Papua tangible, legible and knowable. Jason MacLeod has taken great risks upon himself to tell vitally important stories from this seemingly faraway part of the world. This book is a chronicle of how 'Papuans continue to dream, plan and act in pursuit of self-determination and decolonisation.' *Merdeka and the Morning Star: Civil Resistance in West Papua* offers a critical update at a time when events on the ground are proceeding at a lightning pace.

'Rapidly changing demographics and the presence of large numbers of migrants make conflict in West Papua unstable and potentially explosive,' MacLeod writes. In many ways West Papua is a worst-case scenario: 'An internationally isolated and internally divided indigenous people facing a genocidal occupying army.' Yet, people still harbour hope.

MacLeod advances our understanding of *merdeka*, the keyword of West Papuan freedom dreams. This word, he shows, contains desires for a world of human dignity and divine justice, a world where hopes for liberation from oppression and violence intermingle with indigenous dreamings for an alternative world order. If our current world is dominated by transnational corporations, this book describes achievable visions of autonomy and peace. MacLeod introduces us to Papuan youths who imagine a world where love and care might disrupt and counterbalance the legacies of colonialism and capitalism.

Alongside hopeful visions, *Merdeka and the Morning Star* recounts essential background for anyone who seeks to understand the situation. Difficult facts – horrific evidence of the very worst crimes against humanity – need to be known. Eyewitness accounts of torture, public executions and disappearances are accompanied by accounts of survivors who have embarked on their own healing journeys. Rebelling and seeking solidarity, these survivors are no longer just abject victims, but potent agents of social change.

MacLeod chronicles the struggle of savvy indigenous politicians who have learned how to minimise threats and exploit opportunities. His discussions of the Special Autonomy Law are necessary reading for anyone who wishes to understand the recent political history of West Papua. Papuan intellectuals and their Indonesian allies crafted a nuanced and just framework for resolving long-standing issues relating to social and economic justice. *Merdeka and the Morning Star* describes how the Special Autonomy plan failed at the implementation stage, as it was thwarted by the security forces and the Jakarta elite.

Rather than offer us a view from nowhere, rather than use the 'God's eye' trick that has been critiqued by esteemed philosophers like Donna Haraway, MacLeod offers thoughtful commentary on a social movement from the perspective of someone committed to long-term solidarity work. MacLeod's positions on critical issues are clear. He makes an extended argument for the use of nonviolent action on ethical and tactical grounds: 'It will become much harder for the opponent to justify its violence if the commitment to nonviolent resistance becomes

widely known and the movement demonstrates credibility over time.' He also carefully describes the high stakes of this sort of peaceful political action, noting, 'civil resistance is not always law abiding, particularly in a context like West Papua, where the legal system criminalises basic rights like the freedom of expression'.

Merdeka and the Morning Star serves as a timely reappraisal of tactics and strategies for social movements by a well-respected insider. Jason MacLeod offers a roadmap to readers in the international community who desire to act in solidarity with the Papuan people.

Eben Kirksey
Author of *Freedom in Entangled Worlds*
New York City, May 2015

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
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What's in a name?

A note on nomenclature

West Papua is located on the western rim of the Pacific. It is one half of the island of New Guinea. The eastern half is Papua New Guinea, an independent state since 1975. The western half is West Papua, made up of two provinces, Papua and West Papua. The land of Papua, Tanah Papua in Indonesian, another name West Papuans give to their country, has been forcibly occupied by the Indonesian government since 1963. It is the Pacific's Palestine, less well known but greener – 75 per cent of the mountainous interior is cloaked in rainforest – and bluer – West Papua is the heart of the world's coral reef biodiversity. It is also much closer to Australia than you'd think. From Boigu Island in the Torres Strait, Australia's northernmost islands, you can wade across to Papua New Guinea. From there you can trek to the West Papuan border. West Papua may only be a swim and walk away from Australia but it may as well be the dark side of the moon. The country is a secret story, hidden from the world by the vagaries of geopolitics and a policy that keeps foreign journalists, human rights workers and even diplomats out.

The act of naming something is a powerful intervention that invests whatever is named with certain meaning. West Papua is the name used by most Papuans (Papua Barat in Bahasa Indonesia, the lingua franca in West Papua) and by those in the international community who support self-determination. West New Guinea and Netherlands New Guinea refer to the Dutch names for West Papua during the period of Dutch colonialism. At the time of the dispute between Indonesia and the Netherlands the territory was also known as West Irian (Irian Barat).

From 1969 until the 1998 fall of Suharto in Indonesia the province was called Irian Jaya. The territory was then briefly called Papua before being divided into two provinces. The eastern province retained the name Papua while the western province was initially called Irian Jaya Barat before the name was changed to Papua Barat (Ploeg 2002; Singh 2008).

The meaning of the words Irian and Irian Jaya, and more recently Papua Barat, demonstrates the symbolic importance of names and the ways they have been associated with various claims and counter-claims related to sovereignty. Papua Barat – meaning 'West Papua' in English – for instance refers to the western province, while West Papua – Papua Barat in Indonesian – is associated with the entire territory, particularly by those who support self-determination, and especially those outside the country. The term Irian Jaya is often explained as a combination of Irian, an Indonesian acronym that stands for *Ikut Republik Indonesia Anti Nederland* ('Join the Republic of Indonesia against the Netherlands') and the Indonesian word *Jaya*, meaning 'victorious' or 'glorious'. However, the veracity of this meaning associated with the term 'Irian' is disputed by Bilveer Singh (2008, pp. 30–1) and others. Markus Kaisiepo and some other early nationalists, for instance, proposed Irian as a name for West Papua given its positive association with the Biak language (from an island off the north coast of West Papua and a language group that stretches from Cendrawasih Bay to the Raja Ampat archipelago, north-west of Sorong). In Biak, *Irian* means among other things 'hot land/land and sea' and refers to the mainland of West Papua (Sharp 1994, p. 19; Singh 2008, p. 28). Anthropologist Anton Ploeg, citing the work of Dutch scholar Sollewijn Gelpke and the extensive research of Dutch missionary and ethnographer Frederik Kamma, suggests that the word Papua comes from the Biak words *sup I papwa*, 'the land below [Sunset]', a phrase that increasingly became associated with not just 'the islands west of the Bird's Head, as far as Halmahera', but mainland West Papua as well. Anton Ploeg (2002, p. 77), following Gelpke, surmises that the use of Papwa/Papua to describe other parts of West Papua predated colonial times, disputing the popular association of the word Papua or *pua-pua* with an old Malay word, meaning 'fuzzy' or 'frizzy haired'.

In response to West Papuan demands for greater recognition of their distinct cultural identity the name of the territory was officially changed to Papua by the Indonesian president Abdurrahman Wahid and later endorsed by president Megawati's administration in January 2002. However, in 2003 Papua was divided into two provinces and since then there have been pushes, so far unsuccessful, to create new provinces. (The creation of new districts and sub-districts has, however, mushroomed, enriching the local Papuan elite and bloating an already ineffective and inefficient bureaucracy.) These name changes have complicated the meaning of Papua, which is now associated with both a province and the entire territory. In response, some scholars use the phrase Indonesian Papua to describe both provinces, perhaps seeking to avoid the connotations of support for self-determination associated with the name West Papua, or perhaps recognising the political reality of the Indonesian government's claim, or simply to try and avoid misunderstanding. The use of the name West Papua has also become confused. West Papua in Indonesian (Papua Barat) refers to the western province while West Papua written in English is associated with political claims for independence for the entire territory. Papuans, particularly those associated with the churches, also use the name Tanah Papua to refer to both provinces. All this makes the choice of names problematic to say the least.

I use either 'West Papua' or 'Land of Papua' to refer to the entire territory (which in early 2015 consisted of both the provinces of Papua and Papua Barat). I use the term 'Papua Barat' to refer to the western province of the territory and 'Papua' to refer to the eastern province. I refer to the indigenous inhabitants living in West Papua as 'Papuans'. By this I mean people with one or both parents who are indigenous Melanesians from West Papua. I refer to Indonesians from other parts of the Indonesian archipelago that live in West Papua as 'migrants'. This reflects local orthographical practice and scholarly convention. It is also less cumbersome than the phrase 'Indonesians from other parts of the archipelago'.

Timeline to resistance

16th century to 1945	Dutch East Indies controlled. The territory was known as West New Guinea/ Netherlands New Guinea or West Irian (Irian Barat – Indonesian name); sporadic resistance against foreign incursions
Second World War	Japanese occupation; widespread resistance against both the Japanese and Dutch
17 Aug 1945	Indonesian independence
1950s	Dutch belatedly prepare West Papua for self-government
1961	The First Papuan People's Congress
1961	Indonesia invades
15 Aug 1962	New York Agreement; West Papuans are not consulted
1 May 1963	United Nations departs after nine months and the Indonesian government takes over
1969	The 'Act of Free Choice', and called Irian Jaya by Indonesia under President Suharto
May 1998	Suharto overthrown in Indonesia by an unarmed uprising led by students
23–26 Feb 1999	Mubes – the grand consultation takes place in Jayapura
26 Feb 1999	A team of 100 travels to Jakarta to meet President Habibie and demand independence
May–Jun 2000	The Second Papuan People's Congress
2003	Papua and West Irian Jaya Province created
2007	West Irian Jaya Province renamed Papua Barat Province

2007	Tongoi Papua mineworkers strike at the Freeport mine
Apr–Jul 2010	ForDem's Hand Back Special Autonomy campaign
2011	Freeport mineworkers go on strike again, this time for three months
17–19 Oct 2011	The Third Papuan People's Congress
30 Nov–6 Dec 2014	West Papua Leaders' Summit on Reconciliation and Unification, Port Vila, Vanuatu; United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) created
26 Jun 2015	ULMWP gains observer status of the Melanesian Spearhead Group

In writing about Papuans as indigenous people from West Papua, I do not intend to exclude those migrants who either consider themselves Papuans or who have invested in building a just, peaceful and inclusive society in West Papua. Many migrants born or raised in the territory are considered as Papuans by the indigenous population. Agus Sumule is an example. Sumule helped draft the Papuan version of the Special Autonomy Law. He has a conversational command of Mee, one of the indigenous languages of the Paniai highlands, and was nominated as a local member of the Papuan Panel during the heady days of 1999 and 2000, when many felt the territory teetered on the edge of a new day. Another example is 'Mahmoud', a young Javanese Muslim man I met in 2002 whose male sometimes-lover is Papuan. Mahmoud is a person whose experience in the world is entangled with both indigenous independence activists and the Indonesian security forces. He grew up in West Papua, was orphaned at a young age and brought up in a military family. Mahmoud is deeply attached to West Papua and considers himself Papuan. He has not aligned himself with a rigid political position for or against independence. When opposing political forces clash, as they often do, Mahmoud's politics rest on the hope he will not become a target by virtue of his ethnicity (or sexuality). Beyond that, he told me,

he simply wants to live his life in peace, whoever is in power and whatever political arrangement prevails. His views, and others like it, often get subsumed in the polarised political environment in West Papua.

Many of the resistance leaders I interviewed have good personal relationships with Indonesian migrants. A number have married migrants. Despite a few isolated examples of politically motivated ethnic violence between Papuans and Indonesian migrants – notably in Wamena in October 2000 – examples of horizontal violence are rare. The mainstream culture of the Papuan resistance movement opposes continued Indonesian government rule while simultaneously accepting Indonesians as people. There is not a sense among the overwhelming majority of Papuans whom I've met that Indonesian migrants would be forced to leave if the movement gained independence, though some migrants do indeed fear that.

When referring to specific periods in history I use the name associated with the time and with the particular political perspective of the party I am talking about. For instance, in the period up to the 1969 transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia, West Irian is used to describe the Indonesian, US and UN perspectives and West New Guinea to describe the colonial Dutch perspective.

Indonesians call the 1969 act of self-determination PEPERA, an acronym for *Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat*, which translates as 'Determination of the People's Opinion'. The widely accepted English translation 'Act of Free Choice' is used in the text. Papuans call this the 'Act of No Choice'. Those already familiar with the history will appreciate why. Indonesian words have been spelled using the standardised spelling based on the 1972 reform of the Indonesian language.

The people and places I mention really exist and all the events really happened, but for obvious reasons I have changed the names of some of the inhabitants. In some cases, where my informants/friends/colleagues have insisted I do so, or when they have passed away, or where what they have said is a matter of the public record, I have used people's real names. Otherwise I have erred on the side of caution and used pseudonyms.

Prologue

In November 2005 I received an unexpected invitation to attend a clandestine meeting of West Papuan resistance leaders in Yambi, Lae, Papua New Guinea. What transpired changed the direction of my work as a practitioner–scholar accompanying those searching for ways out of Indonesia's and the Pacific's longest-running political conflict. It also changed me.

The Lae meeting brought together representatives from inside West Papua, spanning the spectrum of West Papuan society: church leaders, ex-political prisoners, women, youth and student activists, and members of the Tentara Pembebasan Nasional–Papua Barat (TPN–PB or West Papua National Liberation Army, TPN for short), a loose grouping of guerrilla fighters that wage a low-level armed struggle against the Indonesian state. A Papuan New Guinean pastor, who led prayers each morning and evening, and I were the only people not from West Papua present. I had been invited by members of what was then called the West Papua Peace Task Force (PTF), a group of human rights defenders who had turned their attention to the work of unifying the independence movement and nurturing the transition from armed to unarmed struggle.

Members of the PTF asked me to give a presentation about some of the relevant lessons from other nonviolent struggles and to speak about the kind of nonviolent strategies and tactics that might be employed in the West Papuan context. The West Papuan organisers of the meeting felt the indigenous people in West Papua were facing 'slow-motion genocide'. This, combined with the fact that men who had spent more than 30 years fighting Indonesian forces in the jungles and mountains of West Papua would be present at the meeting, along with a number of ex-political prisoners who had spent long periods in jail, meant it was an invitation I felt somewhat nervous about.

For three days and nights participants discussed their grievances against the Indonesian state. They argued about history, representation of the movement and strategies of resistance. Then, on 1 December 2005, West Papua's national day, all present formally founded the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL). For a movement long riven by factionalism, the decision to form a united coalition of resistance groups committed to realising the long-cherished goal of a sovereign West Papua was electrifying, even though the unity it engendered was short lived.

The meeting built on earlier encounters in Nieuwegein, Utrecht (the Netherlands), in 2003, and Port Numbay (Jayapura) and Sydney in 2004, attempts to consolidate the TPN over many years, and efforts to unify resistance by the Presidium Dewan Papua (PDP or the Papua Presidium Council), a pan-Papuan resistance organisation, in 1999 and 2000. Other meetings in support of national unity were held in Wewak and Schotiau, both in Papua New Guinea, in 2007; in Ipoh, Malaysia, in 2007; and in Port Vila, Vanuatu, in 2008. The Wewak meeting was organised by the West Papua National Authority (WPNA), which by then had split from the WPNCL to form a competing coalition, Papua Consensus, which later became the nucleus of the National Federal Republic of West Papua (NFRWP).

One of the people present at the 2005 Lae meeting was Petrus Tabuni. Tabuni was the internal affairs spokesperson for the TPN based in and around Markas Victoria, a guerrilla camp in the northern border region of Papua New Guinea/West Papua. With his crisp navy blue suit, pig tusk necklace and cuscus fur hat, Tabuni cut an imposing figure. Since 1975 he had been living on and off in the jungle, shuttling between TPN bases in Papua New Guinea and West Papua, interspersed with two long periods of incarceration. His body bore the scars of extensive torture. Tabuni was first arrested in 1980 for raising the Morning Star flag and was subsequently imprisoned in Kalisosok Prison in Surabaya, eastern Java, between 1980 and 1992. After being released he returned to the jungle, taking up arms with Mathias Wenda in Markas Victoria. He was arrested again in 1993 and nearly died after being beaten and shot by the military (Farhadian 2005, pp. 161–2). When he was released in 1996 he returned to the jungle.

During the meeting Petrus Tabuni, and others, sought me out as an ally. Tabuni wanted to talk about how nonviolent strategies might advance the struggle for liberation in West Papua. He was a supporter of the movement for West Papua as a Land of Peace promoted by religious and *adat* ('customary') leaders – one of the campaigns examined in this study – and wanted to discuss the associated challenges involved with civil resistance. He explained that he was not ideologically wedded to using violence for achieving political goals. In fact, his first act of political defiance was a nonviolent flag raising. It was because of a perceived lack of choice that he took up arms, he said.

Two months after the Lae meeting, in February and March 2006, when Tabuni had returned safely to his jungle hideout, a wave of protests against the Freeport mine erupted in Jayapura (capital of Papua), Timika and Jakarta (capital of Indonesia). On 15 March 2006 students gathered outside the University of Cendrawasih in Abepura, blockading the main road connecting the airport in Sentani with the capital, Jayapura. The following day the road remained cut, blocked by felled trees, burning tyres and rocks strewn across the bitumen. The protest attracted sympathy from thousands, not only indigenous Papuans but everyday Indonesians as well, angered at a range of injustices centring on the giant gold and copper mine. The protest then turned violent. In the ensuing melee, four police officers and one member of the air force

were killed, brutally stoned to death, allegedly by West Papuan demonstrators. I have watched video footage taken by Reverend Peter Woods, an Australian pastor and eyewitness, along with footage compiled by West Papuan activists, human rights defenders and journalists. All capture the chaos and visceral rage that seemed to explode on the streets that day. Aside from the five security personnel who lost their lives, 21 civilians and nine police were also injured.

In the days following the clash, members of the Mobile Brigade Police Force (BRIMOB), a paramilitary Indonesian police force, went on a rampage, shooting up eighteen student dormitories and indiscriminately attacking West Papuans, irrespective of whether they had been involved in the demonstration or not. Dozens were beaten and 51 people were arbitrarily arrested. Nineteen of the Papuans detained by the police were tortured. One, Jeni Hisage (22 years old), died as a result of being stabbed in the back, left arm and stomach by members of the security forces. Outside the BRIMOB base in Kotaraja, a suburb of Jayapura, police stopped vehicles and pulled Papuans out their cars. Their only crime it seemed was to be young and black. Some were dragged by their dreadlocks back to the BRIMOB barracks in acts of unrestrained retaliation. Hundreds fled to the jungle and sought refuge in camps in Papua New Guinea (Office for Justice and Peace of Jayapura et al. 2007, pp. 92–5).

The following month, in late April 2006, a manila envelope from Tabuni, postmarked Papua New Guinea, arrived on my doorstep. Inside were two documents written in Bahasa Indonesia and stamped with a TPN seal from Markas Victoria, Wenda's command on the PNG–West Papua border. One outlined historical grievances, summing up the decolonisation process as fraudulent. It described in some detail the betrayal by the governments of the Netherlands, United States, United Kingdom and Australia during the 1960s and the United Nations' collusion in this process. The other document mounted a case against Freeport, calling for the mine to be closed. Attached to the two documents was a newspaper article from the *Cendrawasih Post* reporting on the events of 16 March and a cover letter dated 4 April 2006. In the

letter Tabuni said some 700 students had fled to Papua New Guinea and another 500 wanted to seek asylum in Australia but that the Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI or Indonesian Armed Forces) and Polisi Republik Indonesia (Indonesian National Police) had closed all escape routes (*tutup jalan maka susah keluar*). The letter continued, saying two students had died, sixteen were still being hunted by the security forces and a further seventeen were suffering injuries. At the heart of the letter was this ominous warning: 'Consequently, the Revolutionary Council [of the TPN] is ready to activate the armed wing to carry out acts of political violence, either within the week or next week, we are ready for the battlefield.'[1]

By the time I had received this letter, Tabuni, a companion, a university student and two Indonesian soldiers from Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat (Kostrad, the TNI's elite Army Strategic Reserve Command) Battalion 509 were already dead, killed in a TPN offensive on the military base at Wembi (*Cendrawasih Post* 2006a). The attack on the Kostrad base took place around dawn on 10 April 2006, near the town of Arso, Keerom District. It is a large transmigration and palm oil plantation site near the Papua New Guinea border, a place where there has been long-standing grievances over land and repeated incidents involving the security forces and local Papuans. Tabuni and his men, accompanied by a small number of students who had fled after the 16 March crackdown, travelled across to Wembi from the border region. When I spoke to Jonah Wenda, a spokesperson for the TPN, he told me that Tabuni's objective appeared to be to inflict maximum damage on the Wembi military post and to capture weapons and ammunition before melting back into the surrounding jungle (Wenda 2007; see also *Cendrawasih Post* 2006a, 2006b).

The gathering of resistance leaders in Yambi, Tabuni's letter and the events surrounding his death raised troubling questions for me. Leaving issues of morality aside, from a strategic point of view, the events of 16 March and its aftermath clearly demonstrated some of the movement's challenges: poor discipline, ill-conceived strategy and tactics, international isolation, competing factions and a decentralised armed

struggle in the mountains and forests of West Papua not subordinated to non-military political leadership. Despite the fact that there was a numerically larger group of civilians employing nonviolent tactics in the cities and towns, more often and with more effect than the armed groups, there was still widespread enthusiasm for armed struggle, at least among young people. In the face of a struggle to survive I began to wonder how viable nonviolent strategies and tactics were to enlarge the prospects for self-determination in West Papua.

The Lae meeting and what followed shaped my engagement as an academic in another critically important way. I knew that I could not be disengaged. As much as possible I wanted to sit inside the Papuan struggle for freedom, understand strategy and civil resistance from the movement's point of view and, to the extent that I could, make a small but useful contribution to a just and sustainable peace in West Papua. But before the meeting in Papua New Guinea I was not entirely clear how I was going to proceed. Lae provided a pathway to clarity.

After my presentation on civil resistance one of the organisers approached me about 'making concrete' some of the ideas I had discussed. If I felt anxious before the Lae meeting, I was doubly so after.

CHAPTER 1

Research horizons

There is a street in the heart of Jayapura, the picturesque capital of West Papua, called Jalan Irian, 'Irian Street' in English. It is not long, only a couple of hundred metres. Although it is set a block back from the waterfront, if you turn to the north from the eastern end of Jalan Irian you can still see the glistening calm azure expanse of Yos Sudarso Bay. The eastern shore of the bay points towards the independent country Papua New Guinea, visible where the mountains plunge into the sea. The border is a boat-ride away, a short drive by car, or a long walk through the jungles and mountains. There, Asia abruptly ends and Melanesia begins. But that is a political view – impermanent and partial – Papuans tell me. For them, the whole island of New Guinea, from Sorong in the north-west to Samarai in the south-east, is Melanesian land. Numerous Papuan tribes and clans straddle both sides of the border, food gardens on one side, homes on the other.

Jayapura – 'victorious city' in Sanskrit – was once known as Sukarnapura ('Sukarno's Town') and, for a brief period, Kota Baru ('New City'). Before that, it was called Hollandia by the Dutch.

Independent-minded Papuans know it as Port Numbay. The city is nestled in a small valley surrounded by verdant, vertiginous hills cloaked with unplanned housing, rising upwards, eating up the forest, prone to landslides. In the central business district an orgy of modernist development is sprouting skyscrapers competing for space on the narrow valley floor. At one end of Jalan Irian is Imbi Square, most of which is taken up by a run-down park dominated by an enormous statue of Yos Sudarso. The figure – constructed in a Soviet-realist style once popular with Indonesian nationalists – depicts an Indonesian naval officer who died fighting the Dutch for control of West Papua. Sudarso, an anti-colonial hero for most Indonesians, stands defiantly in his uniform, hat on, feet apart. His arms are outstretched, muscles rippling, binoculars in one hand. Sudarso was killed in battle against the Dutch in the Arafura Sea in 1962 but he still stares intently in that park, ready to repel unseen enemies.

Across the road from Imbi Square's park is a nondescript two-storey building on Jalan Irian. In the late 1950s and early 1960s it housed the Nieuw Guinea Raad, or West Papuan Parliament, the site where the now-banned Morning Star – the West Papuan national flag – was first raised, and then raised again in 1999 and 2000. But you would not know that unless a Papuan furtively told you. Now the building is dilapidated, unused but not forgotten. I have tried to take pictures of the building a few times but every time I went to do so my Papuan colleagues urged me not to: 'Not here. Not now. It is not safe. Too many people are watching,' they'd say. More than five decades ago Papuans poured their hopes into that building, believing Dutch promises that they would soon be masters of their own destiny. I am told there is an arts centre on the second floor but it is rarely frequented by either Papuans or Indonesians and I have been cautioned not to go inside least I attract unwarranted attention. In the transition from the colonial Dutch government to a new set of colonists, historical places like this building have become physically neglected.

The Morning Star

Mixed-heritage, Laguna Pueblo author Leslie Marmon Silko has written evocatively about the power of story in indigenous social movements. In her novel *Ceremony* (1977) one of the protagonists says:

> I will tell you something about stories. They aren't just entertainment. Don't be fooled. They are all we have, you see, all we have to fight off illness and death. You don't have anything if you don't have stories. Their evil is mighty but it can't stand up to our stories. So they try to destroy the stories, let the stories be confused or forgotten. They would like that. They would be happy because we would be defenseless then.

An ocean and time away Silko's words still resonate.

To the outside observer the West Papuan struggle might appear hopeless. But the Papuans have an irrepressible belief, anchored in story, that one day they will be free. The Morning Star, which appears on their flag, is central to this dangerous idea. It is underpinned by indigenous knowledge and shaped by a liberatory reading of sacred texts: the Bible and the Qur'an. Different groups have different versions of the story but the underlying message of coming change is the same.

One well-known rendition about the Morning Star comes from the island of Biak (also spelled Byak). The versions vary: some are sung, some told, but they all share the same core narrative. Biak islanders sing of an epic of a woodcarver, a man who embodied great spiritual power named Manarmakeri (Rutherford 2003, pp. 146–59). *Manarmakeri* means both 'scabious old man' and 'old man of the star'. Once a warrior who glimpsed the coming of a new age, at the beginning of the story/song he is old, rejected and living in isolation. One retelling goes like this:

> One day, on top of the mountain, Yamnaibori, a spirit from the land of souls, spoke to Manarmakeri from a flat stone in his food

garden, telling him he was like a flower about to open, ready to begin a long journey. Manarmakeri descended the mountain and travelled to the island of Meok Wundi where he took up the practice of distilling palm wine.

One morning he discovered his wine had been stolen. When it continued to happen he hatched a plan to catch the thief. Hiding, he caught Kumeseri (also called Mak Meser or Sampari), the Morning Star, stealing his wine. As light began to glow in the east the old man held the star tight, refusing to let go. Frightened because of the coming dawn, Kumeseri offered Manarmakeri a secret, the gift of transformation and renewal, to share with his people.

Manarmakeri refused to keep the secrets for his tribe alone. Instead he desired peace and prosperity for all people. To this Kumeseri agreed and Manarmakeri let the star go. Kumeseri told Manarmakeri to throw a particular fruit at the breasts of a young woman when he returned to his village. Manarmakeri did as Kumeseri said and a young woman, Insokari, soon became pregnant and gave birth to a son. No one knew who the father was until Insokari's son, Konori, recognised the old man.

Manarmakeri appeared as *Manseren Mangundi*, 'the Lord Himself', with the power to perform miracles. He stood in the fire, burnt his old skin and was renewed as a young man. Seeing his skin was too light, he stepped back into the fire. This time, his skin was the right shade. He then drew a boat in the sand, which became real and left his village, to go on another journey. He travelled towards Sorong then overseas.

Some say Manarmakeri went west – to Europe, to Australia, to the United States, to Palestine. Others say he went east to Melanesia and the Pacific Islands. Others say he did both and that the scabious old man is still travelling, recruiting support for a free West Papua, still speaking, still cajoling, still performing miracles, preparing the ground for freedom. Jacob Rumbiak, a West Papuan leader, suggests to me, smiling as he does, 'Maybe he is trying to recruit you right now?' Whatever the case Manarmakeri/Manseren

departed West Papua and is yet to return. When he left, Papuans became poor and oppressed. But one day Manarmakeri/Manseren will come back. And when he does he will bring others with him. His return will herald a new age of freedom, peace and justice.

Manarmakeri becoming Manseren points to the path of transformation. An abiding belief in the power of transformation and the hope of a coming promised time is the reason the Morning Star was chosen for the flag of West Papua, where it shines today. The Morning Star, of course, is also another name for the spirit and power of God. The rest of the flag is made up of the colours blue, white and red. Blue signifies 'faith', white 'peace', red 'courage' (Kamma 1972, p. 158). The seven blue stripes represent the seven regions of West Papua. The three colours are also said to be the Dutch tri-colour reversed – 'a metaphor for the turning round of the existing state of affairs' (Sharp 1994, p. 54). The Star, 'an indelible imprint of a divine power', says anthropologist Nonie Sharp, represents the story of Manarmakeri, Manseren Mangundi and Kumeseri, the Morning Star.

Like all good stories its power lies in the ability of the reader to interpret it. It is at once a story of human interactions, the relationship between the human and the divine, and a story of liberation and solidarity. It inspires Papuans to participate in what people of the north coast of West Papua call *koreri*, literally the 'changing of one's skin', the art of renewal and transformation.

Outside the old Nieuw Guinea Raad, just around the corner from the main police station on Jalan Ahmad Yani, Papuan women line the footpath. Indonesian traders run the shops behind them. The women sell betel nut, fruit and vegetables and *noken*, the distinctive West Papuan string bag. Once I bought a *noken* on Jalan Irian from a woman from Paniai in the highlands. It was an exquisite work of beauty made for everyday use – woven twines painstakingly made from bark, tightly wrapped in yellows and black, orchid leaves that years later still retain their vibrant colours. Her friend sold me a more contemporary *noken*, colourfully emblazoned with the Morning Star and the words

'West Papua'. The woman teased me, smilingly asking if I recognised the flag boldly woven into the *noken*. I did. We both understood that by exposing such symbols, her through selling it and me buying it, that we were committing civil disobedience, an act in blatant defiance of a 2007 Indonesian law banning displays of Papuan nationalism.

On the surface Jalan Irian presents itself as a sanguine centre of consumerism dominated by local and international symbols of capitalism – Kentucky Fried Chicken and the Hotel Yasmin, a favourite haunt of the Papuan elite and Indonesian intelligence. But every now and then Papuans gather here to protest, drawn by the historical magnetism of the place: the anger of denied political dreams and irrepressible hope for a better future. The day of 4 June 2000 was one of those times. Then, for the first time since 1 May 1963 when the Indonesian government forcibly took control of West Papua, permission was granted for the Morning Star flag to be displayed. Tens of thousands of people stood solemnly outside the old Nieuw Guinea Raad, fixated as the Papuan flag was raised beside the red and white Indonesian flag. Many participants were openly crying, expressing years of suppressed emotion. The Papuans present were civilians, all unarmed. Active members of the guerrilla forces were there but they were unarmed and represented a tiny fraction of those Papuans present. Indonesian police stood at the back, their guns lowered. Behind the gathered Papuans was the statue of Yos Sudarso and behind him the bay that bears his name. That day Papuans turned their backs on Sudarso's statue, intensely focusing on the Morning Star flag and their desire for a different kind of tomorrow.

In the past Papuans attending events like the 4 June flag raising were shot dead or arrested, tortured and thrown in jail. Back in 2000, perhaps they were encouraged to put their fear aside by the fall of former Indonesian dictator Suharto and a new Indonesian president, Abdurrahman Wahid. Wahid, affectionately known as Gus Dur, was deeply influenced by an inclusive vision of Islam, one that emphasised social justice, democracy, human rights and peace. While not supported by mainstream nationalist politicians or the army, Gus Dur took advantage of a weakened central government in the aftermath

of Suharto's demise to extend the hand of détente to the Papuans. He unbanned the Morning Star flag – it would be banned again when he later lost power – and even went as far as funding a national gathering of Papuan independence activists organised by the PDP, the group that planned the June flag raising. A few months later, as the army began to reassert its hold on power, security forces would again use lethal force to prevent flag raisings. But for the moment, in the uncertain freedom of the 'Papuan Spring' (Chauvel 2005), the masses gathered in Imbi Square, waiting and watching pensively as the flag was slowly raised.

On Jalan Irian that day in June, Papuans rejected their Indonesian identity and embraced a different way of being, a longing for a different kind of political community. They sang the banned national anthem, 'Hai Tanahku Papua', wore traditional dress and danced traditional Papuan dances. If, in some respects, the flag raising mirrored Indonesian nationalist rituals there was one vital difference. Indonesian nationalist events recount armed struggle against the Dutch and military defence of the state, thus legitimating the contemporary role of Indonesian security forces. Papuans, in turning their backs on Sudarso's statue, rejected being Indonesian and part of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (Negara Kesatuan Republik Indonesia), while implicitly opposing armed struggle as the primary means of liberation. The flag raising outside the old Nieuw Guinea Raad was part of a pattern of determined, civilian-led, mass-based, unarmed resistance, the primary method of struggle for Papuan self-determination.

Merdeka and the Morning Star documents the decisive nonviolent resistance in West Papuans' long struggle for freedom, charting its trajectory from May 1998 to the Indonesian presidential elections on 9 July 2014. West Papuans are turning to civil resistance more often and in greater numbers rather than guerrilla war. But how viable are nonviolent strategies and tactics to enlarge the prospects for self-determination in West Papua? Bound up with the notion of viability is the question of success. Determining the likelihood of this in a struggle that is still ongoing is, of course, a fraught exercise. It is not about divining the future but exploring the dynamic interplay of

internal and external factors that minimise and maximise the effectiveness of civil resistance.

For those new to West Papua or more familiar with romantic images of Papuan guerrillas clad in traditional clothes, a clutch of arrows and a bow in one hand, automatic rifle in the other – or indigenous people waging a last-ditch battle against the tide of modernity – I want to state at the outset that there is a nonviolent struggle in West Papua. Its leaders are savvy and sophisticated. They are as adept at walking the corridors of global power as maintaining ancient connections to land, language and culture. These unarmed civilian-led insurrectionary forces are far more numerous and widespread than the armed resistance (see chapter 5).

Although many Papuans feel intense pride for the guerrillas in the mountains and jungles who continue to wage armed struggle, few Papuans are willing to risk their lives committing to a strategy of guerrilla war that has little prospect of success. Papuans also know they need international support, including the active assistance of Melanesian countries. That support will be far less forthcoming if the independence struggle is waged through violence. Nonviolent action is also more numerous and more regular than politically motivated violent action. Barely a week, or even a day, goes by without some kind of nonviolent protest in the cities and towns of West Papua, over violations of basic rights or demands for 'full freedom'.

Ironically, the security forces are often more cognisant of the power of nonviolent resistance than many Papuans. For example, the top fifteen 'enemies of the state', writes the journalist Alan Nairn (2010), who cites leaked Indonesian army documents, are all civilian leaders: church leaders, students, members of parliament and leaders of the Papuan Customary Council. The Indonesian military considers nonviolent resistance 'much more dangerous' because they have 'reached the outside world' with their 'obsession' with *merdeka* ('independence/freedom') and persist in 'propagating the issue of severe human rights violations in Papua ... murders and abductions that are done by the security forces' (ibid.). In the past decade that influence has become possible because the unarmed civilian movement has grown exponentially in strength, used mobile communication technologies to their advantage, and enacted better strategy, even as the movement faces considerable obstacles.

Papuans in 2015 desire freedom just as much, if not more, than Papuans who desired freedom back in 1963, when the Indonesian government first took over administrative control of the country. This desire is not just held by independence activists but members of the political elite and Indonesian bureaucracy who, even while being employed by the state, hold little commitment to it (Braithwaite et al. 2010, pp. 133–4). Although there are diverging views about what freedom means and whether it can or cannot be achieved within the context of the Indonesian state, for most Papuans, freedom is independence from Indonesia (Kirksey 2012).

There are two major positions within the Papuan freedom movement about how to enlarge the possibilities of political freedom. Some parts of the movement favour dialogue between West Papua and Jakarta mediated by representatives from the international community. Some are starting to use the words 'political negotiations' instead of 'dialogue'. Other parts of the movement argue for a referendum on independence. The NFRWP wants recognition that they are already an independent nation. Of course, these positions are not mutually exclusive. If a strategy of recognition fails, the fallback position could be a referendum. A referendum could also be the result of political negotiations.

At the same time as demanding political independence Papuans want recognition of their basic rights as indigenous people living on their customary land. The struggle for independence and demands for basic rights cannot be separated. One influences the other. As a leader of the DAP (Dewan Adat Papua or National Council of Customary Chiefs in West Papua) cautioned, 'Clamouring for basic rights is not the enemy of independence' (MacLeod 2012). Internationally the struggle for independence is widely known, and it is around this goal that Papuan-led civil resistance, armed struggle and diplomacy has coalesced.

Can there be a strategy for success?

Since the fall of Suharto in May 1998, Papuans have relied primarily on civil resistance to oppose Indonesian rule. For them to secure further advances, Papuan challengers need to increase participation levels in the movement and enhance strategic skilfulness within three domains:

1. inside West Papua, which will always remain the primary site of resistance
2. inside Indonesia
3. in the societies of Indonesia's international allies.

More Papuans need to move from passive sympathy to active involvement in the struggle, the circle of dissent needs to be enlarged and co-ordinated. This means not just increased numbers but also more social groups participating and greater unity as well. Papuan politicians, civil servants, church congregations and workers need to actively and collectively oppose Indonesian governmental rule by nonviolently raising political and economic costs for the Indonesian government's continued refusal to enter into a comprehensive problem-solving process. These social groups are sympathetic to the cause of freedom but they have not actively and consistently embraced it. But it is not just a numbers game; Papuans also need greater consensus about how freedom will be won and a coherent plan for achieving it.

A hypothesis – one that I developed at the conclusion of fourteen years of fieldwork, from 2002 to 2015 – of how the contours of freedom might be enlarged in West Papua can be expressed as an 'equation':

> {(*mass* + *momentum*) × *unity in three domains*} + *diplomacy* + *political opportunities* = **merdeka** (*'freedom'*)

- **Mass** equals large numbers of people plus the numbers of organised diverse groups participating in the struggle.
- **Momentum** is strategy, a coherent plan for success. Strategy gives mass momentum. The effectiveness of mass and momentum is multiplied to the extent that there is unity between the different components of the struggle.
- Organised people and strategically applied extra-parliamentary collective action needs to take place across **three domains** – West Papua, Indonesia and internationally. Civilian-based nonviolent action in support of Papuan-led aspirations also needs to take place in Indonesia and the societies of Indonesia's elite allies, including Asian countries, the United States, Europe, Australia, Africa and, most importantly, the Pacific, particularly the Melanesian countries that are West Papuan's natural allies.
- Extra-parliamentary civil resistance inside – and outside – the country (West Papua) needs to be augmented by skilled **diplomacy** outside West Papua that is deeply connected to and driven by the struggle inside the country. Conventional politicking (diplomacy) needs to make use of various national, sub-regional, regional and international processes and mechanisms, including forums like the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG), the Human Rights Council, the UN Special Committee on Decolonization, and other treaty and charter bodies of the United Nations. But because these processes and mechanisms are state-centric, extremely resistant to the idea of challenging Indonesian sovereignty, West Papuans also need to go beyond diplomacy.
- Then there are a range of **political opportunities** and threats that influence outcomes and impacts. Examples of threats include the way the Indonesian government is developing militia groups in West Papua like Barisan Merah Putih (BMP or Red and White Garrison, in reference to the colours of the Indonesian flag) and the Lembaga Missi Reclassering Republik Indonesia (LMRRI or Mission for Re-education for the Republic of Indonesia). Examples of opportunities include the 2014 visit to West Papua by a delegation of Melanesian foreign ministers and the 2014 presidential elections. Threats need to be minimised, opportunities exploited.

Expressed as an equation, it is more like a grand strategy, a conceptual framework, or big-picture theory of change, the component parts of which need to be activated and maximised in a co-ordinated way. This requires iterative and interactive planning. An unarmed, unified mass of civilians driving resistance inside West Papua, combined with co-ordinated transnational diplomacy and nonviolent solidarity outside West Papua, is a promising framework to advance Papuan aspirations for freedom (see chapter 6, where I expand on this theory of change in more detail).

As for the end game, ***merdeka*** equates to visions of freedom encapsulated in a thick description of self-determination (see chapter 3). This does not mean more effective civil resistance is easy, or even likely to succeed. On this note there is good news and bad.

The good is that there is a great deal of clarity and agreement among Papuans about the root causes of conflict in West Papua: historical grievances and lack of political recognition, state violence and impunity, discrimination and racism, and economic marginalisation and neglect (see Giay 2000; Tebay 2005, 2006a; MacLeod 2007b; Widjojo 2009). The Indonesian government has compounded irresolution of the conflict through blocking open access to West Papua from media, international agencies and diplomats, although there are signs that the Indonesian government is succumbing to pressure to open up West Papua to foreign press. But limited media access is not the only obstruction to a just peace. The Indonesian government continues to pursue a policy of large-scale industrialised development that disadvantages traditional landowners. It encourages unfettered migration of non-Papuans and refuses to recognise customary land rights. Then when there is resistance, or to pre-empt insurgency, the police and military are used as tools to repress and divide Papuan dissent.

Papuans understand these strategies of rule. There is clarity, agreement and unity about the purpose of the West Papua freedom movement, at least at the broadest conception of strategy. Papuans want political self-determination and respect for their basic rights as indigenous peoples. They want to be masters of their own destiny, to live freely in the land of their ancestors. This emerging consensus is worth celebrating. It is the fruit of much struggle and discussion. It is also a sign that there has been significant progress around building greater trust and unity among Papuans, greatly assisted by the formation of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) in Port Vila in December 2014.

There is more good news. Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (2011) compiled and then analysed a data set of 323 conflicts (violent and nonviolent) between 1900 and 2006, all waged for maximalist political goals, national liberation, democracy and equal rights. The authors found that major nonviolent campaigns have achieved success 53 per cent of the time, compared with 26 per cent for violent resistance campaigns; 51 per cent of nonviolent transitions sustain a democratic transition, as opposed to 3 per cent of violent transitions; and the probability that a country will lapse into civil war after successful civil resistance is 28 per cent versus 43 per cent for a violent movement.

The bad news is that when this data – which includes anti-dictatorship, anti-occupation and secessionist struggles – is desegregated, anti-occupation struggles, irrespective of the means used, fail far more often than they succeed. The success rate is 35 per cent for nonviolent campaigns and 36 per cent for violent campaigns (ibid., p. 73). This difference is not statistically significant. In other words, civil resistance and armed struggle have roughly an equal chance of succeeding in anti-occupation struggles. However, when we look at secessionist struggles (45 major campaigns from the total data set of 323) the margin for success – fully achieving the movement's stated political goals – dramatically decreases, falling to 10 per cent for violent struggles and 0 per cent for nonviolent struggles. This is not good news for the West Papuans – or people waging anti-colonial struggles in places such as Palestine, Tibet, Kanaky, Bougainville, Maohi Nui, Nagaland, Western Sahara and elsewhere.

One important caution: it is not easy to define the difference between secessionist and anti-occupation struggle. Anti-occupation struggles resist occupation by a foreign power backed up by an occupying

military force. Secessionist struggles seek to separate territory from an existing state and establish a new state. Chenoweth and Stephan classify the Papuan struggle as an anti-occupation struggle, whereas many call it a secessionist struggle. They argue (ibid., pp. 69–73) that achieving Special Autonomy in 2001 constituted a partial success for the West Papuan freedom movement at the time. Most Papuans, from government and civil society, would now (in late 2015) declare Special Autonomy – and its successor Special Autonomy Plus – an abject failure, prompting a downgrade of Chenoweth and Stephan's classification to 'not yet successful'. Chenoweth and Stephan also classify the independence struggles in East Timor, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania as examples of successful nonviolent anti-occupation struggles, whereas many other scholars classify them as secessionist struggles. In other words, there is good reason to say that the figure of 0 per cent for successful nonviolent secessionist struggles is contested and likely to be revised.

Low success rates for secessionist struggles do not necessarily diminish the utility of unarmed resistance. Success or partial success by Palestine, Western Sahara, Kanaky, Maohi Nui, Bougainville, Tibet, Nagaland and a range of other self-determination and decolonisation struggles by unrepresented peoples will alter the statistics and make even the impossible seem possible. In a world where state borders, such as in Syria and Iraq, are being redrawn, political and economic turbulence is undermining the ability of so-called great powers to continually assert their interests. The permanency of the post-colonial state and current global power arrangements cannot be guaranteed. A multifaceted crisis is accelerating that will dramatically alter current political and economic power arrangements. Civil resistance in West Papua is, in many ways, a representation of a much wider and deeper transnational struggle to fundamentally transform political and economic power. All empires eventually fall.

Nonetheless, the statistics compiled by Chenoweth and Stephan, combined with their rigorous analysis, illustrate the undeniable reality that self-determination struggles are much harder to resolve than anti-dictatorship or national pro-democracy struggles, irrespective of

the strategies – armed struggle, civil resistance or diplomacy – used. This is for a number of reasons. First, self-determination movements are pursuing difficult goals, more difficult than overthrowing a dictatorship, which is hard enough. Just ask activists engaged in the Arab Spring. Second, there are often much higher stakes involved. In the case of West Papua, that not only includes tearing at the fabric of Indonesian national identity, it also involves a contest of who controls the country's massive resource wealth, not to mention destabilising an important US, Australian and European ally and growing economic power. Third, self-determination struggles in West Papua involve starkly different interpretations of history. They are sites of vigorous contestation over whose values and identity are recognised and therefore respected. Finally, self-determination movements are strongly affected by variables outside their control, such as sources of power external to the occupied territory, as well as by the interests of the international community (Burrowes 1996).

This poses significant challenges for the struggle for freedom in West Papua and is a central puzzle around which this book is organised. There is a fundamental strategic imperative to extend the nonviolent battlefield from the occupied territory to the occupier's own society and the societies of their elite allies (Stephan and Mundy 2006). Fortunately, all occupiers have human and material resources over which they exercise tenuous control. In the case of West Papua the Indonesian government is more dependent on domestic and international support than ongoing Papuan subservience. Fifty years of occupation show that West Papua's land and resources are much more important to the Indonesian government than the Papuan people are, who, in the words of one Papuan, are treated as if they are 'half animals' (Karma 2014). Waging the struggle in these three domains is necessary to probe and ultimately exploit the Indonesian government's dependency relationships that maintain the occupation.

There are other challenges specific to the West Papuan context. Perhaps the most obvious challenge is continuing state violence and neglect towards Papuans by the Indonesian security forces and an

inability to stem a tide of migration that marginalises indigenous Papuans and their concerns. The Indonesian state is also unwilling to expend their political capital by investing in a peace process, including dialogue, with Papuans. That was the dominant narrative of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's (SBY's) presidency: positive rhetoric about his commitment to supporting resolution of the conflict coupled with a complete lack of follow-through. To put it bluntly, West Papua has not yet become enough of a political problem – either domestically or internationally – to compel Jakarta to seriously tackle the root causes of violence.

Papuans know that the Indonesian state will do all it can to stop them realising their aspirations for self-determination. This includes continued preparedness to use extremely ruthless violence and deny open access to West Papua. The failure of the movement to hold SBY accountable to his expressed desire to address violence and inequality in West Papua is a missed opportunity that requires serious introspection by the movement.

There are also significant internal movement challenges. These include overcoming global isolation, inadequate political analyses, lack of strategic planning, lack of co-ordination and insufficient strategic capacity. The movement also struggles with a lack of resources and attracting sufficient domestic and international allies. Significant mistrust and disunity between various components of the struggle, both inside and outside West Papua, also hampers progress. In many ways West Papua is a worst-case scenario: internationally isolated and internally divided indigenous peoples facing a genocidal occupying army.

In spite of these challenges, Papuans continue to dream, plan and act in pursuit of self-determination and decolonisation. Significant diplomacy, lobbying and legal work is being undertaken at the international level. This activity strengthens resistance to Indonesian rule inside West Papua. There have been some important local wins such as the securing of a domestic marketplace and instances of affirmative action for indigenous women market sellers. There have been substantial

improvements in wages and conditions for Freeport mineworkers. The closing of BHP Billiton's nickel mine on Gag Island and inter-religious conflict prevention work are all significant successes.

What is civil resistance?

Drawing on Gene Sharp (1973), Kurt Schock (2005), Adam Roberts and Timothy Garton-Ash (2009) and Erica Chenoweth and Maria Stephan (2011), I define civil resistance as sustained, organised, unarmed and extra-parliamentary collective action in the pursuit of political, economic and social goals. It includes acts of commission and omission, or both (Sharp 1973). Conventional institutional actors can still engage in collective action that falls within the bounds of civil resistance if they do so in ways that transgress parliamentary politics. To advocates of civil resistance, such as the leader of the Indian independence movement, Mohandas Gandhi, civil resistance has been as much about laying the foundations for a new equitable, participatory, sustainable, peaceful and just post-conflict future as it is about resisting direct violence and systemic oppression. The term 'civil resistance' foregrounds the strategic, organised and disciplined soul of political struggle waged by ordinary civilians who, lacking conventional political and military might, seek to construct and wield another type of power. In order to keep the focus on the political and strategic dynamics and trajectory of civil resistance in West Papua, I consciously let a discussion of Papuan philosophical views of civil resistance slip into the background, even as I recognise the central importance of the values, norms, dialogue and aesthetics to transforming conflict (Vinthagen 2015).

Civil resistance is also known as people power, nonviolent struggle, nonviolent resistance, unarmed resistance, nonviolent conflict, or political defiance. Papuans use a variety of Bahasa Indonesia/Logat Papua terms to describe the dynamics of civil resistance. The most common ones are *tindakan anti-kekerasan* ('action against violence'), *aksi non-kekerasan* ('action that is not violent'), *gerakan anti-kekerasan* ('movement against violence') and *perlawanan tanpa kekerasan* ('resistance without violence').

Civil resistance is in fact both action that is 'not violent' and action that is 'against violence' (Vinthagen 2015). April Carter et al. (2013) argue that what is often defined broadly as civil resistance is in fact a continuum (see also Stiehm 1968; Burrowes 1996). On one end is the nonviolent resistance of Gandhi, Martin Luther King Jr, Aung San Suu Kyi and others: collective action underpinned by a clear ethical and value-based framework. At the other end is the pragmatic praxis of oppressed people who do not resort to armed struggle but whose collective unarmed defiance does not necessarily revolve around a conscious articulation of particular moral principles. Although I privilege the term 'civil resistance', I use it and the words 'nonviolent resistance' and 'unarmed resistance' interchangeably, to reflect the diversity of perspectives present within the Papuan movement for freedom. More importantly, even when the motivations of the protagonists vary, the underlining contest between different conceptions of political power remains. When I use the phrase 'nonviolent action' I refer to particular tactics that are nonviolent while 'civil resistance' refers to a broader framework of political struggle.

It is also important to clarify what civil resistance is not (see Schock 2003). Civil resistance in West Papua, and elsewhere, is not the avoidance of conflict, submissiveness, inaction, or passive resistance – a descriptor that was put in the academic dustbin by scholars of nonviolent action a long time ago. Civil resistance is not the same as peaceful dialogue, or negotiation. It is, however, necessary for creating the preconditions for dialogue, political negotiations or some kind of problem-solving process to resolve the conflict.

Civil resistance goes beyond legal action. It is predominately concerned with extra-parliamentary action. Papuan leaders engaging in nonviolent action will, at times, engage in disruptive, potentially illegal and unarmed collective action. In other words, civil resistance is not always law abiding, particularly in a context like West Papua where the legal system criminalises basic rights like the freedom of expression. It is imprecise to only equate civil resistance with legally sanctioned collective action.

Civil resistance does not assume or expect the Indonesian government will respond to Papuan resistance in a lawful and peaceful fashion. Papuans would, of course, prefer the Indonesian security forces and government to adhere to the rule of law, including the Indonesian state's own constitution, which recognises the right to freedom of expression, but that has not been the experience of the last 50-plus years. Suharto was responsible for killing over half a million Indonesian citizens, yet ultimately a movement of unarmed people, mostly led by students, overthrew him. When resistance – unarmed or armed – threatens powerful vested interests, it will be met with violence by power-holders. Violence is not the decisive determinant in an asymmetrical conflict that pits a people against their rulers. State violence can be used to the movement's advantage to trigger greater support for the movement's goals (Martin 2007). Repression does not equal defeat as long as it does not lead to demobilisation. The key question is not the extent to which the state responds to a civil resistance movement with violence, even extremely brutal repression, but whether challengers are resilient, and persist, even in the face of violence. And as Sharp (1973), Ralph Summy (1994), Robert Burrowes (1996, 2014), Schock (2005), Brian Martin (2007), Kristina Thalhammer et al. (2007) and MacLeod (2015a 2015c) assert, there is much that can be done to strengthen movement resilience in the face of extremely ruthless repression.

Another misconception that surfaces in the West Papuan context is that civil resistance will result in high numbers of casualties. In fact, the historical record overwhelmingly shows that although nonviolent movements should prepare for casualties, the number of deaths and injuries will almost certainly be far lower than if the struggle is waged through violent action (see Keyes 1991). Still the fear of a violent response from the state apparatus remains. Many Papuan activists organising large nonviolent demonstrations against Indonesian rule fear facing a ruthless military willing to kill large numbers of demonstrators. But from a dictator's point of view will this strengthen or weaken their rule? Roland Francisco (2005), a social movement scholar, looked at this question. He investigated the effect of massacres

on mobilisation, asking, 'Does a massacre enhance stability and the endurance of a dictatorship?' Francisco found that massacres do not help dictators maintain control. Public killings of large numbers of demonstrators by the authorities nearly always increases mobilisation of oppositional forces in the short term, and in the long term – though it may take a very long time – massacres hurt dictatorships. The Indonesian government knows this (Setiawan 2014, pp. xiii–xiv). The 12 November 1991 Dili massacre hastened the end of the Indonesian occupation in East Timor. The effects of mass killings in West Papua, such as in the highlands in 1977, and in Biak on 6 July 1998, continue to generate organised Papuan political opposition to Indonesian rule. As a result, the Indonesian government has changed its strategies of rule away from mass killings to using torture, random acts of brutalisation and the fear of mass killing to limit organised nonviolent resistance and mobilisation (Hernawan 2013). And just in case public killings do happen, the state maintains a ban on open media access.

The Indonesian state, for the most part, is cognisant of the reality that it is totally counterproductive for them to carry out massacres. For this reason there is a kind of mutual dependency between the violence of the state and the counter-violence of the resistance. The state needs the military to maintain control of West Papua's land and resource wealth. But to do this it has to criminalise Papuan resistance. It is far easier for the Indonesian state to justify their presence and use of violence against Papuans when resistance is violent.

There is an assumption that successful civil resistance in West Papua will require 'progressive leadership' in Jakarta – a 'partner' willing to facilitate change. Ending the Indonesian occupation of West Papua will require some level of negotiation with Jakarta. However, that does not mean the freedom movement has to convince the Indonesian government that the occupation is morally wrong. Ultimately, the Indonesian state will only negotiate under pressure. That pressure will come jointly from within West Papua, from within Indonesian society and internationally, as challengers raise the economic and political costs of the occupation and continually assert international norms surrounding

negotiation and nonviolent conflict resolution. In the event that an authoritarian ruler like Suharto, or his protégé Prabowo Subianto, does assume power in Indonesia that may not be all bad news for the people of West Papua. The evidence from the literature on revolutions indicates that a personalist dictatorship can, in fact, be beneficial because it can unite internal and external opposition (Foran 1997).

Finally, civil resistance movements do not need charismatic leaders to succeed. In many contexts a collective leadership structure is more effective than a single charismatic leader like King or Gandhi. The movements in Chile (1983–88), the Philippines (1986) and Serbia (2000) were all led by some form of collective leadership. Effective leadership is essential. However, there are various models of leadership that provide cohesion while encouraging the kind of local self-organisation, innovation, co-ordination and organisational resilience necessary for long-term struggle. What is vital in a collective and group-centred form of leadership is a shared vision and strategy, underpinned by a decentralised network structure that facilitates effective communication and co-ordination among all the components of the struggle.

False or partial understandings of the power of civil resistance can lead challengers away from seriously exploring or developing nonviolent extra-parliamentary collective action to its full potential. A false or partial understanding of civil resistance might also result in people in key social institutions – the media, academia, civil society, religious institutions, and policy communities, in particular – to discount, overlook or misunderstand the dynamics of civil resistance. This would be a mistake because unarmed collective action is a potent force for change that deserves more attention. The dangers of accepting any one of these misconceptions should now be clear.

What is self-determination?

At the Lae meeting (referred to in the prologue) I rose to deliver my presentation and took a deep breath before acknowledging the traditional owners of the land we were staying on. I acknowledged the sweat and tears of those in the room, and the sacrifice of people who

have since passed on. In formal Indonesian I thanked the organisers for the invitation, then with all the courage I could muster, I told those present that 'I don't support independence'.

You could have heard a pin drop. This was a meeting of independence activists and resistance leaders. Many had spent years in jail for their political beliefs. To my left was Richard Yoweni, the leader of the TPN (West Papua National Liberation Army) faction of the north coast who later headed up the WPNCL (West Papua National Coalition for Liberation), a man considered by many in the room to be the Supreme Commander of the guerrillas. I don't think I will ever forget his intense gaze on me at that moment. Kelly Kwalik, the legendary guerrilla leader who would be killed by Indonesian troops in December 2009, had sent a representative who was now sitting directly in front of me and eyeing me suspiciously. I continued:

> I am an outsider. It is not my role to campaign for independence. It is up to you as Melanesians living in the land of your ancestors. And while I am committed to standing in solidarity with you in the pursuit of peace with justice, ultimately it would not be Australians like me who would pay the political costs for campaigning for independence. It will be people like you. For me as an outsider, to argue for independence would be to assume a colonial mantle. I have no right as an outsider to presume that I can speak on behalf of what you, as West Papuans, want. Instead, I am committed to accompanying you on your journey.

The principle that guides that journey is self-determination, a founding principle of both indigenous politics and international relations. Self-determination has been enshrined in Article 1 of the United Nations Charter and is recognised as a right of all peoples in the first article common to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR), which both entered into force in 1976. Paragraph 1 of the ICCPR and the ICESCR provides, 'All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.' The term 'self-determination' is also central to the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. In practice, however, there has been a failure to apply this right beyond post-Second World War cases of decolonisation, as articulated from the perspective of the great powers. There are two competing perspectives at stake: those who see self-determination as a right and those who regard it as a principle. These are old arguments in international relations.

Many Papuans back up their deep-seated desires for self-determination with a reference to international law, citing Article 1, Section 1, of both the ICCPR and the ICESCR and, more recently, the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples. Many Papuans will argue that West Papua remains a trust territory of the United Nations because the United Nations never fulfilled its obligations under the 1962 New York Agreement and UN Charter.

The exact legal meaning of self-determination in the above three international human rights instruments, however, is contested. Western states like Australia, Canada and New Zealand rule out the creation of independent nations within existing state borders (and have poor records when it comes to more limited indicators of self-determination and wellbeing of their indigenous populations). The meaning of self-determination for those countries with secessionist struggles where the borders were defined during the colonial era is even more contentious. The Indonesian government argues that self-determination was already granted to West Papuans when the territory was finally handed over to the Indonesian government to administer on 1 May 1963, following a protracted campaign against the Netherlands. According to Jakarta any remaining question of legitimacy was settled when the United Nations accepted the results of the 1969 Act of Free Choice (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia to the United Nations, New York, 2003). The doctrine of *uti possidetis juris*, also known as the successor state principle, the convention that the 'territories of post-colonial states

should match those of the colonial territories they replaced' (Saltford 2003), has also been invoked by the Indonesian government. They insist that its territorial integrity is defined by the borders they won from the Dutch during the war of liberation (Drooglever 2009). In practice, however, whether a particular state's rights and legitimacy over contested territory is recognised and upheld by the international community varies over time. It depends a lot more on politics than law, particularly the nature of conflict and resistance unfolding in the territory in question (Matsuno 2011).

Colonial boundaries are not inviolable. The recent cases of East Timor, Kosovo, Sudan and Crimea are all evidence of this. Akihisa Matsuno argues that in both Kosovo and South Sudan there was no firm ruling on self-determination by the International Court but the right to secession was recognised. In the case of Kosovo, statehood was affirmed as a political remedy to address years of state violence by the Serbian government towards Kosovar Albanians. In East Timor, the 1999 referendum was a delayed exercise of the right to self-determination and subsequent independence. Although the Indonesian government referred to the August 1999 referendum as a 'popular consultation' and domestic process, in reality it has created a precedent for a future determination of the collective will of whether Papuans want to remain in Indonesia or separate from it. Equally, the post-referendum violence unleashed by the Indonesian military underlines a possible response to the desire to separate from Indonesia. Matsuno argues that the referendum in East Timor effectively amounts 'to recognition [by the Indonesian government] of the right to secession, although it has never been presented as such' (ibid., p. 186).

The ethnic distinctiveness of the resisting population, levels of violence, contemporary failure of governance (not only historical grievances) and the extent to which the resisting population was able – either violently or nonviolently – to disrupt the occupation and render their territory ungovernable were all factors contributing to independence for Kosovo, South Sudan and East Timor. The right to self-determination may be receding in its ability to resonate with

the international community but other norms are coming to the fore. These include fundamental moral concerns over secession and the sustainability of an occupying government to continue its rule without ongoing turmoil and violence. Norms concerning human rights and responsibility to protect are also being used to frame international intervention. What scholars like Matsuno are arguing is that legality is no longer the only, or even the most important, issue at stake in determining state borders. The ability of a state to protect its citizens and function as a governing authority is perhaps more important. The cases of Kosovo, South Sudan and East Timor all demonstrate that questions of political legitimacy – not just in framing intervention but also in challenging state rule – are of fundamental importance in the political contestation over state boundaries.

How has a commitment to self-determination influenced this particular research project? The principle of self-determination operated as a kind of compass to help navigate the research journey. Maori scholar Linda Tuhiwai Smith (1999) was my principal guide on this journey. She argues that researchers working with indigenous people need to 'privilege indigenous concerns, indigenous practices and indigenous participation' (ibid., p. 107). Peter Reason and Bill Torbert argue this inevitably involves 'turning to action' (cited in Kincheloe and McLaren 2005, pp. 314–15). Drawing from her experience as a Maori researcher/activist/educator, Smith outlines an indigenous research agenda that contributes to indigenous people's aspirations for self-determination. She is clear that research practice requires respect. Research and researchers need to make tangible contributions to host communities. Smith reinforces the notion of self-determination as a political and also ethical concept. She defines self-determination in broad terms:

> Self-determination in a research agenda becomes more than a political goal. It becomes a goal of social justice, which is expressed through and across a wide range of psychological, social, cultural and economic terrains. It necessarily involves the processes of transformation, of decolonization, of healing

> and of mobilizing of peoples. The processes, approaches and methodologies – while dynamic and open to different influences and possibilities – are critical elements of a strategic research agenda (1999, p. 116).

Self-determination, therefore, exists as an ideal, process and outcome. As an ideal, self-determination refers to the realisation of the collective aspirations of indigenous peoples living within defined cultural, linguistic and geographic territories and the ability of those peoples and groups to fully participate in the decisions that affect their lives. As a process, it refers to the difficult, contested and ongoing practice of securing, maintaining and fulfilling desires for political, economic, social and cultural rights that impact on peoples' and groups' abilities to determine their own future. This requires ongoing struggle, one that does not end with attaining a cherished political goal (Scheiner 2006). As an outcome, self-determination refers to the claim to the right of self-government within the boundaries of a given territory. That may include independence or it may not. In West Papua, self-determination includes Papuans' participation in a referendum over the territory's political status but it is also not limited by this.

More localised demands for self-determination can be translated into demands for greater administrative and legislative rule, local indigenous control over land and resources and the ability to define and direct development activity. This includes the right to say no to development, exercise control over migration and the freedom to express distinct cultural and religious identities. Respecting a population's development rights requires that a state's security forces be brought under civilian control and subject to stringent human rights mechanisms and laws. Support for self-determination as an ideal, process and outcome is about aligning a research agenda with indigenous and community-led visions and strategies entwined in the pursuit of real and tangible benefits for the host community. It is, as Mario Blaser et al. (2004) assert, about aligning a 'research project' with a community's 'life project'.

In this sense, the goal of self-determination is both more and less than a simple demand for independence. As an outcome, one milestone in the long struggle for freedom could be an independent state. But while independence may result in the removal of an aggressive occupying military and police force it will clearly not resolve other causes of conflict and violence. These include ongoing questions of corruption, capacity and governance; entrenched racism; horizontal conflict between competing ethnic groups; demands for justice and equality in the health and education sectors; and desires for equitable development and local visions of self-determination in an economy currently heavily dependent on the resource extraction sector. There are other more limited political arrangements that point to possible political outcomes that reflect aspirations for self-determination. These include some kind of genuine and equitable autonomy or self-government arrangement based on creative and mutually agreeable solutions to core grievances that meet human needs (qualitatively different from the current form of Special Autonomy). Other options are free association with Indonesia along the lines of some Micronesian countries and a comprehensive land rights-based approach, possibly echoing similar arrangements adopted by the Canadian government and Inuit population. There could also be some sort of genuine federal realignment of the Indonesian state or something else that reflects indigenous beliefs and traditions in West Papua. As Kevin Clements, Volker Boege, Anne Brown and Wendy Foley (2007) remind us, between the modern Westphalian state and traditional forms of governance is a world of political hybridity (and possibility).

It is important to acknowledge, however, that Smith's more expansive interpretation of self-determination is not shared by some Papuan nationalists struggling for liberation. A number of Papuan and solidarity activists, for example, frame self-determination in far more limited terms: as a process, the right to a referendum on sovereignty, and as a goal, the right to separate statehood. The danger of doing so is that they play into a zero-sum game: independence or nothing. It is a game in which, failing seismic geopolitical shifts and/or economic

collapse, the interests of the Indonesian state, transnational capital and the international community, at least at this stage, are nearly always aligned. At the same time it is important to acknowledge that virtually all Papuans I have met, including pragmatic individuals who work for the state, harbour independence dreams even while they cultivate allies from within government and the security forces and work towards more limited campaign objectives. The research process and outputs have, in small ways, attempted to unsettle this all-or-nothing view – not to repudiate Papuan demands for independence, which are understandable and many would argue (including myself) legitimate, but to make space for other, more expansive and localised perceptions. To do this we need to resist narrowing or restricting the definition of self-determination – on either end of the spectrum.

Biography, literature and methodology

Three important research horizons have shaped this study: my personal history, to make visible some of my values and biases; the literatures that have shaped my inquiry; and the methodology that has yielded the data upon which my argument for a nonviolent strategy for self-determination is based.

I first went to West Papua in 1991. Restless and dissatisfied with university, I dropped out of law and then an arts degree. I hitched north to Cairns and made my way to Papua New Guinea in search of adventure. I walked the Kokoda Track, climbed Mount Wilhelm, then walked back down to Madang on the coast before flying to the Ramu River. On the banks of the Keram River, a tributary of the mighty meandering Sepik River, I collapsed and slipped into a malaria-induced coma. Two Papuan health workers, Chris and Marilyn Manggon, saved my life. I was nineteen years old. When I regained consciousness three days later, I began to re-evaluate what I was doing with my life.

My previous plan had been to travel the world in search of ever-wilder experiences. But, as I looked around, that plan no longer made any sense. The people of Bunam village where I fell sick had nothing

in terms of Western material wealth. Their food came from the river or gardens. Their houses were made of bush materials. There were no shops, no roads, no cars, and no electricity. But the people of Bunam gave me my life back and asked nothing in return. When I left the village and continued on my way by canoe to Angoram they gave me gifts. I was utterly overwhelmed. In an instant everything came into focus. I became part of a Melanesian cycle of gifts and obligations. Suddenly the only choice that made sense was to give back to society, to embrace a web of interconnectedness and mutuality, to try to fulfil obligations that I could never repay, and to do so with a sense of irrepressible joy and gratitude. I decided I would go back home and try to figure out what it meant to serve others. In that moment I experienced a deep and abiding sense of solidarity, one that has fundamentally become about being on a perpetual journey of curiosity and discovery.

The most interesting route home seemed through Indonesia. I also needed to pick up my passport and an Indonesian visa at the post office in Wewak on Papua New Guinea's north coast. When I landed in Jayapura, the capital of West Papua, I was still recovering from the illness that sent me to the frontiers of oblivion. I had lost close to 20 kilograms and I am not a big person to begin with. The food in Indonesia was delicious so for a while I did little but prioritise putting on weight. One day I was eating *es buah-buahan*, a bowl of condensed milk dribbled over shaved ice, fruit and jelly, from my favourite street stall in Imbi Park when an old man came up to me and told me his story in broken English. I did not understand every word but the meaning was crystal clear. Tears streamed down his face as he recounted how his whole village and entire family had been wiped out in the massacres that took place in and around Wamena in the West Papuan highlands in 1977. Then he took my hand and asked me if I could get him guns. I laughed, but mostly out of surprise and shock. I knew nothing about guns. I did promise that I would return home and recount his story.

When I came back to Australia I learned how much my country had betrayed the West Papuans – and that that history had been kept

from me. I discovered that in 1969 on Manus Island Australian police arrested Wim Zonggonau and Clemens Runawery on no charge, forcibly preventing them from boarding a light aircraft to alert the international community to the bloodstained travesty of democracy that was taking place in West Papua. I learned how Australian (and other) transnational mining corporations like Rio Tinto, International Purveying Incorporated and BHP Billiton exploited West Papua's enormous resource wealth, while successive Australian (and other) governments helped facilitate this plunder by arming and training the Indonesian security forces. I joined the ranks of the newly outraged.

Back in April 1991, as I travelled overland from Tanah Papua to Australia, I encountered another side of Indonesia. I was completely enthralled by Indonesia's vibrancy and diversity. Other narratives different from the violence perpetrated by the security forces were being created. In the hull of a Pelni ferry from Biak to Manado I started to learn Bahasa Indonesia. Among my many enthusiastic teachers were TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) soldiers returning home. And so 'the other' was humanised. Every year since, I have travelled back to Indonesia. In 1993 I smuggled medicines to the resistance in East Timor and in 2000 joined Peace Brigades International's Indonesia Project, where I supported work in Acheh[1] and served on the peace education, strategy and Papua sub-committees for a number of years. I share this simply to illustrate that I have tried in my own life to cultivate a rich and nuanced view of Indonesia – her history, cultures, politics and her diverse peoples – that, like everywhere, is made up of light as well as shadow. It is a combination of those many experiences that set me on a journey that has led, in part, to this book.

The second research horizon is the way scholarship has shaped my study. The central body of literature informing my investigation is the growing field of civil resistance studies. This is complemented by the literature on contentious politics. These two literatures are grounded in a third – studies of the political, social, economic and cultural context that shapes civil resistance in West Papua – the literature on West Papua and Indonesia. Together these three theoretical and disciplinary

perspectives focus interrogation of the structural, cultural and strategic dimensions of civil resistance in West Papua.

I am particularly interested in the overlap between these three literatures, which has not been thoroughly examined. Civil resistance scholars investigate the strategies and tactics employed by activists and the dynamics of how nonviolent action works. The literature on contentious politics, historically informed by Marxism and a privileging of the use of political violence for social change, has tended to be descriptive and analytical – interesting, but offering few practical tools for activists. Leading scholars in the field have also tended to be sceptical of generalisable theories about the causes of success or failure of contentious political action. More recently, Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly (2001) have isolated particular 'mechanisms' and 'political processes' that help precipitate change but insist that the way these combine and intersect is uniquely influenced by particular contexts. Research into nonviolent action with its Gandhian, feminist and anarchist roots offers practical advice for the activist but has, for the most part, been marginalised by the academy. Nonviolent action theorists have been preoccupied with skills, particularly the strategies, tactics and organisational abilities of activists. But in the process the geopolitical and socio-cultural context in which resistance takes place has often been insufficiently examined. Civil resistance scholars have also taken for granted the necessity of mass struggle but have not sufficiently examined the processes that lead to the formation of organised social groups and how they are mobilised to transform state power. This problem has received more attention from those researching social movements and contentious political episodes. John Foran's theory of revolution (1997) has further enriched my study by highlighting particular ways the structure of the regime, economy and the country's position in the global world order influences revolutions. Jean-Pierre Reed and Foran (2002) and other scholars of revolutions (such as Chabot and Vinthagen 2007) have also given attention to agency through interrogating 'political cultures of resistance' – the ways subjective experiences, beliefs, ideas and culture contribute to

revolutionary outcomes. Historically, however, scholars of revolutions have been concerned with violent insurrection. They have been slower to shed light on the dynamics of unarmed civilian mobilisation for change. This study benefits from bringing together all these different perspectives. Each one mutually enriches the others and shapes the approach taken in the research.

The methodology of this study (see figure 1.1 below) involved three elements:

1. performing research – utilising a multi-method (Creswell 2003), multi-sited (Marcus 1995) approach with interviews and participant observation over fourteen years between 2002 and 2015
2. practising a pedagogy of solidarity – through facilitating introductory, advanced and 'train the trainer' community workshops on strategic nonviolent action
3. praxis – informed by the theory of civil resistance and the practice of nonviolent solidarity (see Summy 2000).

This framework revolved around a particular practice of politics: accompanying West Papuans in their struggle for self-determination and a commitment to working locally and globally for environmental and social justice.




Figure 1.1: The research framework

Three principles in particular informed the research: self-determination, relationship and solidarity. This approach takes up the challenge for nonviolence research to better engage with the experiences of communities in a participatory and rigorous way. It aims to bridge the theorist–practitioner divide and produce usable knowledge.

In an article published in *Peace and Change*, Brian Martin (2005) wrote that one of the future directions of study into the phenomenon of civil resistance is 'to pioneer participatory methods of research'. To date, mainstream scholarly research into nonviolent struggle has not ventured far into collaborative, participatory and action-orientated realms. Social movement research that draws from a broader tradition fares little better. For example, while the book *Social Movement Research* by Bert Klandermans and Suzanne Staggenborg (2002) broke new ground by discussing research methods applicable to the study of social movements, there was no chapter exploring applied research. This theorist–practitioner divide, laments Caelie Frampton and colleagues (2006), means that 'the knowledge created by social movement theory is often of little use to activists inside social movements and does not map out the social relations of struggle'. The search to find ways of researching civil resistance that contributes to theoretical knowledge and at the same time is useful to West Papuan activists in their campaigns for peace, justice and environmental sustainability led me to participatory action research (PAR) (see Lewin 1946; Fals-Borda 1979; Foote-Whyte 1991; Kemmis and McTaggart 2000; Stringer 2007).

There are four reasons why I adopted a PAR methodology. First, PAR explicitly supports a commitment to meaningful social change. Second, it creates space for and validates indigenous and activist ways of knowing. Third, it integrates theoretical knowledge and practice, supporting activists to be involved in the process of interrogating, testing and building theory. It ensures that any new knowledge generated has a better chance of being applied to the social setting of the host community. Finally, PAR allowed me to make stronger knowledge claims. My commitment and history of accompanying West Papuans allowed me to build high levels of trust with local activists. In the

process I found out things that I would never have otherwise known using more detached, less applied social science methods.

I explicitly combined 'insider' emic methods (qualitative and constructivist ways of doing research) with etic (outsider ways of doing research) (Druckman 2005). Emic research methods included participant observation and community workshops with Papuan leaders, activists and community members or leaders. Etic approaches included comparative analyses of three discrete campaigns of nonviolent action and a quantitative analysis of key documents. Participant observation emphasised the unique context of West Papua and the meaning ascribed to the movement for self-determination by the participants themselves. This multi-method approach enabled thick descriptions of conflict, resistance and resilience in West Papua. In particular, the approach I took enabled me to elicit and in a participatory way critically evaluate the nonviolent strategies and tactics used by West Papuans to sustain action and enlarge the prospects for self-determination.

I have been building relationships of trust with Papuans since I first went to West Papua in 1991. These relationships were critical to gaining entry to the host community. I was able to interview a number of key movement leaders and activists in depth. In turn they facilitated interviews with others. In addition to co-training over 450 Papuan activists I entered into dialogue with them inside and outside workshops. I also conducted over 150 interviews with a range of groups and individuals from West Papua. Most of the interviews – and all the workshops inside West Papua and Indonesia – were conducted in Indonesian, which I have been learning since 1991.

Interviews with West Papuans were primarily conducted with members of three groups: civil society actors, semi-legal resistance organisations and illegal or underground resistance organisations. Civil society interviewees included church activists, non-government organisation (NGO) activists, women's groups, human rights lawyers, survivors of human rights violations by the security forces, journalists, civil servants, business people, employees of resource extractive industries in West Papua and official political representatives from the

provincial and local government. Semi-legal resistance organisations included the PDP (Papua Presidium Council), DAP (National Council of Customary Chiefs in West Papua) and local *lembaga masyarakat adat* (indigenous peoples organisations or customary associations) – both government-sponsored groups and traditional indigenous governance structures. Illegal or underground resistance organisations included student resistance organisations, members of the TPN, former political prisoners and their families, WPNA (West Papua National Authority), WPNCL (West Papua National Coalition for Liberation), KNPB (West Papua National Committee), PNWP (West Papua National Parliament), Negara Federal Republik West Papua (Federal State Republic of West Papua) and others.

Interviews were either recorded by a small digital recorder or notes were taken in my field notebook, depending on the person and the context. Most of the interviews in Papua were conducted in Bahasa Indonesia (which I speak), except when the person spoke fluent English and the context was a formal interview. Interviews were then transcribed. A copy was returned to participants to validate. Quotes that found their way into the text were again returned to the interviewees to check whether they accurately reflected what had been said. If necessary they were changed or deleted. Interviews were either conducted one on one or in groups, depending on the preference of those interviewed. Many were informal discussions I recorded in field notebooks. Interview sampling occurred through one of four processes: interviews with key informants I had existing relationships with, snowballing, interviews organised as part of the follow-up of workshops, and by intentionally seeking out people whose names and stories I had heard about and wanted to follow up.

Some of the interviews focused on understanding specific campaigns of nonviolent intervention. These campaigns all pursued more limited or minimalist objectives, in the sense that the protagonists were focused on achieving things like better wages and conditions for workers, and also the end to a particular government policy or economic justice for women. These were all goals that could be achieved

within the framework of the existing Indonesian state and fell short of independence. In the course of the interviews for the three case studies I attempted to understand the plot and the characters involved as well as the meaning-making processes and strategies and tactics of the protagonists. Following Chaiwat Satha-Anand (1997), this marked a deliberate return to the art of storytelling as a method of researching nonviolent struggle.

The three case studies I undertook are the:

1. Papua Land of Peace campaign
2. successful prosecution of a labour struggle waged by Tongoi Papua in 2007, the first independent labour union in West Papua that secured tangible victories for indigenous and non-indigenous mineworkers employed at the giant Freeport-McMoRan/Rio Tinto mine and the subsequent strike waged by Freeport branch of the All Indonesian Workers Union in 2011
3. campaign to hand back Special Autonomy to the Indonesian government.

The case studies reflect core Papuan grievances identified by Indonesian researchers from the Lembaga Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia (Indonesian Institute of Sciences). They span the diversity of West Papuan society: traditional (*adat*) leaders, religious leaders, women, students and young people, farmers, and human rights defenders as well as urban and rural and highlander and lowlander constituencies. The three case studies were chosen after initial research into a wider range of cases.

The challengers represented in the case studies had mixed success. The Tongoi campaign was successful. It could be argued that the Papua Land of Peace campaign was partially successful in the sense that it arguably helped reduce the levels of horizontal conflict, particularly the use of state-sponsored militia groups, although that assertion is virtually impossible to prove, given we are talking about something not happening (militia violence) as an indication of success. The third case study, the campaign to hand back Otsus (the abbreviation of *Otonomi Khusus*, the Bahasa Indonesia name for Special Autonomy), did not achieve the protagonists' stated objectives.

Each case represented distinct but inter-related and overlapping struggles for independence, land, identity, and rights. Together they represent the political struggle for *merdeka*. Some targeted the Indonesian government. Others were concerned with local power-holders, some of whom were Papuan. There is insufficient space in this book to explore each one of those case studies in depth but my immersion in the plot, characters and outcomes of each has shaped this study.

In many ways the failure or perceived partial successes described in the case studies contributed to an escalation of the movement's tactics, vividly represented by the Declaration of Independence at the Third Papuan People's Congress 17–19 October 2011. In reality the independence movement is polycentric and fluid (Kirksey 2012). At times it presents as a (semi) unified and driving desire for an independent state. But always the movement is made up of multiple, sometimes distinct, sometimes overlapping, localised struggles to expand the limits of freedom in West Papua. Some of which could, in theory at least, be realised within the framework of a unified Indonesia. Although with the formation of the ULMWP (United Liberation Movement for West Papua) in December 2014, that reality may be changing.

While I privileged Papuan perspectives in carrying out research – after all, my research is about the nonviolent strategies and tactics of those wanting to enlarge the prospects of self-determination in Papua – I also carefully sought out and attuned my attention to the voice of Indonesian migrants living in West Papua and the perspective of Indonesian officials in the security forces and government. Indeed, this was important, not only to analyse the sources and operational effect of the application of Indonesian government power in West Papua, but also because a number of migrants passively or actively support the aspirations of the indigenous population in West Papua. I wanted to avoid cultivating 'enemy images' or contribute to the negative positioning, marginalisation or dehumanisation of 'the other'. I remain mindful of the need for a more nuanced view of Indonesian government

policies and practices than is sometimes presented by supporters of a free West Papua. Ultimately, Indonesian rule in West Papua has never been a monolithic entity. I do seek to investigate the shifting configurations of power, entanglements and resistance of key constituencies who at first glance might seem to support those in power. I am curious about divisions among political elites in West Papua and among those in Jakarta. What conditions created them? To what extent are these elite divisions being exploited by the strategies and tactics utilised by the self-determination movement?

The research project also had a strong ethnographic edge to it. As a participant–observer and observer–participant of the West Papuan self-determination movement, I was involved in the activities of the movement/s. With the exception of joining demonstrations inside West Papua and Indonesia (which was clearly too dangerous for me and the host communities, not to mention illegal under Indonesian law), I took part in the kind of activities that activists do. I helped publicise human rights violations. I wrote media releases, contacted the international press and conducted media interviews. I helped organise speaking and cultural tours of West Papuan activists and organised and participated in nonviolent solidarity actions. To support the movement I helped secure funding for campaign work, brokered external assistance for activists and campaigns of nonviolent action, arranged meetings with representatives of foreign governments and conducted training alongside Papuan trainers and activists. As well as organising and participating in a range of West Papua solidarity campaigns, I undertook research with and on behalf of local communities. In doing so, I let go of the drive to practise 'perfect research' and became content with what Nancy Scheper-Hughes (1992) calls 'good-enough ethnography'. This meant mediating the pursuit of knowledge through real and messy relationships and the always flawed, always partial, practice of solidarity (see also Rayfield[2] and Morello 2012 for a discussion on solidarity education).

To paraphrase George Marcus (1995), I followed the struggle. In other words, my ethnographic fieldwork was multi-sited. I 'follow[ed] the people', the 'plot' and 'conflict' in three places: West Papua, Indonesia and the international community. And while I did not visit all the global sites of contentious politics surrounding West Papua or interview all the key players in the self-determination movement, their allies and opponents, and while I do not promise to exhaustively map the transnational terrain of the struggle, I was able to conduct interviews with a number of key informants in West Papua, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu, Yogyakarta, Australia, London, Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands. In addition, I met with key Papuan activists at conferences organised by the West Papua Project at the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies at Sydney University as well as at gatherings and meetings of Papuans in Australia, Papua New Guinea, Vanuatu and the Netherlands.

Multi-sited fieldwork took me to interesting and diverse locations at both the centre and peripheries of power: the global headquarters of multinational mining companies operating in West Papua, offices in Jakarta, remote villages of the West Papuan highlands, back rooms of Indonesian police stations in occupied West Papua (in all occasions as a foreign suspect), and to the headquarters of international non-government organisations (NGOs) in Australia, England and the Netherlands. In undertaking fieldwork in locations as diverse as Jakarta, Yogyakarta, West Papua, Canada, London, Brussels, the Netherlands and Australia, I was following the footsteps of many Papuan leaders as they criss-crossed the globe seeking to highlight the concerns of their people and advocate for political change. Some of these trips, for example, to Canada, Vanuatu and research trips in Australia, Indonesia and West Papua, were undertaken in the company of Papuan leaders.

As listed above, community workshops on civil resistance took place in Melbourne (2006 and 2008) and the Gold and Sunshine coasts (2012) in Australia, Papua New Guinea (2007, 2009 and 2013) and West Papua (2007, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013 and 2014). The community workshops provided a pathway to open access and elicit data. Where possible the details of stories, events, analysis, perspectives, values and beliefs, and the special skills and knowledge of participants, and their richly layered histories (Denborough 2008)

revealed in workshops were followed up in interviews. When I specifically wanted to use someone's exact words spoken in a workshop context, I checked that I had understood what they were saying and sought verbal permission to use the data. During the workshops I explicitly talked about my identity as an educator and solidarity activist while not privileging my identity as a researcher. This emphasis was reversed when conducting follow-up interviews with participants as a result of what I had learned during the workshops.

The workshops developed as a result of invitations from key West Papuan constituencies who wanted to develop and reflect on campaigns of nonviolent action designed to enlarge the prospects of self-determination. The participants in them were chosen by Papuan partners, often working as an organising committee. Whenever possible I co-facilitated with at least one other Papuan colleague. Introductory workshops were anywhere from two hours to ten days in length and were often designed around variations of the following four objectives:

1. develop skills to build consensus around analysis of the problem, vision, goals, strategy and nonviolent tactics to create change
2. build relationships of trust among West Papuan leaders in a safe environment
3. develop skills for co-operative problem-solving, decision-making and communication
4. create a supportive space for applying strategy skills.

The methodology used was grounded in the tradition of popular education pioneered by Brazilian educator Paolo Freire (1972), the 'spiral model of education' developed by the Doris Marshall Institute (Arnold et al. 1991), the direct education pedagogy of Training for Change (Lakey 2010), and the pedagogical approach of John Paul Lederach (1995). These workshops were guided by the principles of self-determination (as expanded above), nonviolent resistance (we only worked with those wanting to explore civil resistance), non-partisanship (we worked with all Papuan resistance groups) and non-interference (we tried to make space for dialogue and avoided telling people what to do or how to do it) (Rayfield and Morello 2012).

In many cases document analysis allowed me to test the veracity, rigour and validity of the data obtained from interviews, participant observation and community workshops. Newspapers (Indonesian and English language sources), human rights reports (from human rights organisations like Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, TAPOL and the Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian [SKP or Catholic Office for Justice and Peace] in Jayapura; sources of political analysis and news like the West Papua Advocacy Project, West Papua Media, International Crisis Group reports and the United States Government State Department Reports) and official documents were all analysed.

My research was theory driven, a deductive inquiry in order to develop a coherent framework that would guide my questioning. At the same time it was also inductive. I asked open-ended questions to understand the perspectives and actions of those involved, elicit themes and explore West Papuan strategies and tactics used to undermine state power, attract the support of third parties, and remain resilient in the face of repression. I am curious about what civil resistance looks like in the context of liberation struggle for self-determination and decolonisation.

Outline of chapters

In chapter 2, I discuss the causes of the conflict and examine the sources of Indonesian power in West Papua and the strategies the state uses to maintain its rule. In chapter 3, I explore the idea of *merdeka*, the nuanced Papuan perspectives of freedom, and the various visions that this inspires. Deepening the conversation about what Papuans want is a vital ingredient to opening up transformative spaces. Chapter 4 sketches some historical and contemporary narratives of civil resistance. This is a hidden history. Making these Papuan initiatives, their power, visible and the untapped possibilities available to a wider audience is a key reason I wrote this book. Chapter 5 involves a slight shift of gaze. The complex transition from armed to unarmed struggle is analysed in

light of the mechanisms that have contributed to a shift in movement strategies. Chapter 6 revisits the grand strategy equation I introduced earlier. The epilogue includes a collective narrative testimony edited by me and three colleagues, two of whom are Papuans. In the Papuans' own voice it presents narratives of special skills and knowledge around surviving, resisting and holding on to hope. At the risk of sounding like I am pleading: if you don't read much more of this book at least read the epilogue. Due to rapidly moving events between November 2014 and June 2015, while this book was being written, I've also added a postscript. The decision by Melanesian leaders on 26 June 2015 to grant the ULMWP observer status of the MSG (Melanesian Spearhead Group), an important sub-regional forum in the Pacific, is perhaps the most significant win for the struggle in the past 50 years. It opens the door to political negotiations.

Finally, I want to say something about voice. Within this book, and already within this chapter, the reader will encounter different voices. A reflective voice, a journalistic voice and a scholarly voice are all discernible. I value each of these – and any others – even as they fall short of describing the richness of West Papua. But I do not presume to speak on behalf of the Papuans. They best tell their own story themselves. In this sense the overriding voice is one of a critical (in the scholarly sense of the word), faithful friend speaking to the movement and a wider audience. I hope it adds to the conversation about ways out of the occupation.

CHAPTER 2

Historical and political dynamics of the conflict

West Papua – a Melanesian nation-in-waiting – is a land in crisis. A former Dutch colony, Indonesia gained administrative control of the territory on 1 May 1963 after protracted diplomatic pressure backed up by a brief armed invasion. The government of Indonesia ruled the territory on behalf of the United Nations on the condition there would be an act of self-determination. The transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to Indonesia in 1969 took place over a period of several months. It occurred under highly contested circumstances that included widespread allegations of manipulation, intimidation and human rights violations (Saltford 2003; Drooglever 2009). Conflict and violence continues to the present day in varying degrees of intensity. The causes appear at once clear and simple, then simultaneously frustratingly complex. It is a conflict within conflicts, wrapped up in Indonesia's tumultuous transformation from dictatorship to democracy. It is a conflict that many Papuans argue is threatening their very survival as a people. Here I will summarise the historical background to this conflict, analyse its root causes, discuss the sources of the Indonesian government's power, interrogate why the conflict has been

resistant to resolution, and examine the Indonesian government's core strategies of rule.

Historical roots

In 1848 the Netherlands, in agreement with the Germans and the British, arbitrarily partitioned the island of New Guinea in two, along the 141st meridian east of Greenwich (Verrier 1986). Originally established as a buffer zone to protect the Dutch East India Company's lucrative spice trade, this artificial colonial boundary became the eastern extent of official Dutch rule in the archipelago, with vast tracts of West Papua beyond the reach of 'the light hand of Dutch colonial neglect' (Chauvel 2003a, p. 1).

Richard Chauvel (2009) argues that while in other parts of the Dutch East Indies the Dutch maintained their power and authority through pre-existing local indigenous institutions and leaders, in West Papua they chose not to do this. Instead the Dutch operated a kind of 'dual colonialism', with a second layer of administration run by Indonesian migrants brought in from other parts of the archipelago. This experience deepened Indonesians' – and by that I mean people-other-than-Papuans' – sense of nationalism and attachment to a state that included all of the former Dutch East Indies. Chauvel makes the case that the presence of migrants from Ambon, Sulawesi, Java and elsewhere, who ran the day-to-day affairs of the territory, was a source of great resentment for West Papuans.

When Indonesia gained independence in 1949, the Dutch retained control of the territory. They argued that West Papua (or Netherlands New Guinea and later Nieuw Guinea, as it was then called by the Dutch) was a distinct political entity from Indonesia with no significant administrative, historical or cultural connection with rest of the Indonesian archipelago (Bone 2009, pp. 55–7). This claim was vehemently rejected by Indonesian representatives, who insisted to the United Nations that West Irian (as it was then called by the Indonesians) was part and parcel of a united Indonesia that included all the former Dutch East Indies (Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia 2003). In doing so, Indonesia was following the successor state principle, *uti possidetis juris* – that is, the understanding that decolonisation would not change the borders established by the colonial power – which, for better or worse, guided much of the post-war decolonisation process (Saltford 2003, pp. 8–9). Few Papuans, however, advocated integration with Indonesia, and during the 1950s the Dutch slowly started to prepare Papuans for self-government. At this time self-rule was also supported by the Australian government, and Papuan delegates actively participated in regional forums. They were present when the South Pacific Commission, a forerunner to the Pacific Island Forum, was established in Canberra in 1947 and again in Samoa when the Pacific Conference of Churches was formed.[1]

Belatedly, the Dutch started to create Papuan-led institutional forms of self-rule in preparation for independence, which the Dutch timetabled for some time in the 1970s. In 1961 Papuans were inducted into a national legislature, the Nieuw Guinea Raad. On 19 October, a date that would resonate 50 years later, an emergency meeting of 72 members of the Papuan legislature was called and a national committee elected. Either on this date or on 21 October, the committee selected national symbols – a flag, coat of arms, national anthem, name and motto – which were adopted by the national council on 30 October 1961 (Drooglever 2009, pp. 556–7).

On 1 December 1961 the Dutch government acknowledged Papuan demands for an independent state and the Papuan symbols of nationalism were formally unveiled. 'Hai Tanahku Papua' ('Oh my Land of Papua'), composed in 1923 by IS Kijne, a Dutch educator and missionary, became the national anthem. The name Papua Barat (West Papua) was agreed upon and the Morning Star was adopted as the national flag. Although there was never an official declaration of independence,[2] many Papuans believe this date marks the beginning of West Papua as an independent sovereign state.

These moves triggered the Indonesian government's plans for an invasion. In 1961, in a bid to strengthen Indonesian unity and perhaps to avert attention away from domestic discontent and notably spiralling

economic woes, Indonesian President Sukarno issued the 'Trikora commands for the liberation of West Irian'.[3] The speech, in which Sukarno said he would 'destroy the Dutch created Puppet State of West Papua', is seen by Papuans as evidence that the Indonesian government did in fact recognise West Papuan independence. More a symbolic invasion to back up diplomatic efforts than a full-scale war, Sukarno's actions, particularly his willingness to court Russian support in the form of soft loans and a transfer of military equipment, prompted an anxious US government, embroiled in the Cold War politics of the time, to intervene.

The impasse was broken when the determination of the Indonesian government, the weariness of the Dutch, and the self-interest of international onlookers – notably the United States and Australia – led to what became known as the New York Agreement. The agreement was brokered by the Kennedy administration and signed on 15 August 1962 by Indonesia and the Netherlands under the auspice of the United Nations, pursuant to the aims of the United Nations Charter. Under the New York Agreement, all parties – the United Nations, the Netherlands and Indonesia – agreed to guarantee Papuan rights to free speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of movement in order to resolve West Papua's political status (Saltford 2003; Drooglever 2009). Papuans, however, were neither involved nor consulted during this process, despite an embryonic Papuan parliament already being formed, a fact that continues to generate anger. John Saltford (2003) argues that although the agreement is illegitimate, because Papuans were excluded from the process that developed it, it was the basis of an international decision that resolved that Papuans be given the right to determine their own future.

After the New York Agreement was signed but before the transfer of sovereignty took place, the Indonesian government took over administrative control of West Papua from the United Nations. From this date – 1 May 1963 – Indonesian nationalists felt that their mission to liberate West Irian was finally complete. Herlina (1964, p. 235), a Javanese woman who volunteered in the Trikora campaign and

witnessed the departure of the United Nations, aptly describes the Indonesian feeling of the time: 'We had at last freed the people of West Irian from their colonial shackles and they could truly join the free and independent Indonesian people.' This remains the dominant view of Indonesian nationalists.

Despite the undemocratic process that led to the New York Agreement and the fact that the Indonesian government was now in de facto control of governing the territory, the process set up by the New York Agreement remained in place. The agreement stipulated that Indonesia – with the 'advice, assistance, and participation' of the United Nations – was required to carry out 'an act of self-determination in accordance with international practice' (Article XVIII of the New York Agreement) no later than six years after Indonesia took over as the transitional authority. Papuan nationalists widely interpreted that clause to mean universal adult suffrage: one person, one vote. Jakarta argued that due to the difficult terrain and the lack of political and economic development in the territory, universal suffrage was neither possible nor appropriate. As a compromise, the UN chief representative in West Papua, Bolivian diplomat Ortiz Sanz, proposed a 'mixed method' that would include voting in the urban areas and 'collective consultation' in the rural areas.

Eventually, the mixed method was abandoned in favour of 'collective consultation'. Consequently, 1025 participants with one late addition (less than 1 per cent of the population) were handpicked by Indonesian authorities. The process of selection of participants for the Act of Free Choice was not observed by the United Nations, or independent observers or the international press. In a series of 'consultations' spanning a couple of months, 100 per cent of the 1022 Papuans (four were sick) participated in the Act of Free Choice, indicating their desire to remain with Indonesia (Saltford 2003). Papuans call this the Act of No Choice, PEPERA (*Penentuan Pendapat Rakyat*) in Indonesian. Leading up to the Act of Free Choice, the Indonesian military – in full knowledge of the United States, Australia and the United Kingdom – bombed Papuan villages from the air, strafed Papuans with machine-gun fire,

detained dissidents without trial, and tortured, disappeared and executed those who dissented against Indonesian control (Osborne 1985; Budiardjo and Liong 1988; Saltford 2003; Drooglever 2009).

In the end there was no vote as such. After a presentation by an Indonesian military official and a few rehearsed speeches by Papuans, those selected were simply asked to raise their hands if they wanted to remain with Indonesia (Osborne 1985, pp. 46–8). The acquiescence of the international community was justified in the words of a British diplomat who stated, 'I cannot imagine the US, Japanese, Dutch, or Australian governments putting at risk their economic and political relations with Indonesia over a matter of principle involving a relatively small number of very primitive people' (Saltford 2003, p. 94).

In his final report to the United Nations, Sanz expressed a number of reservations. These included evidence of violence by Indonesian security forces, failure to adhere to a number of the articles of the New York Agreement, and irregularities in the conduct of the Act of Free Choice. In addition, there were protests from Papuans and some members of the United Nations General Assembly – notably a delegation of fifteen African states led by Ghana, spurred on by diplomatic work spearheaded by the late Ben Tanggahma, an original member of the Nieuw Guinea Raad who by that stage was living in exile in West Africa. However, it was not enough to stop the transfer of sovereignty. On 19 November 1969 the UN General Assembly 'took note' of the results of the Act of Free Choice and West Papua was formally integrated into the territory of Indonesia and removed from the list of non-self-governing territories awaiting decolonisation. Papuans want that decision reversed. Like Maohi Nui (French Polynesia), a French colony of the South Pacific that was relisted on the UN Special Committee on Decolonization in 2013, Papuan nationalists also want their country relisted as a non-self-governing territory awaiting decolonisation.

Of course, none of this information is new. Historians John Saltford and Pieter Drooglever have established the case that the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the Indonesian government was fraudulent. Not surprisingly, the Indonesian government does not

accept this. They argue that the Act of Free Choice was recognised internationally as 'an open act of real-politik' at the time (see Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia 2003). Some scholars (see Rodd McGibbon cited in Saltford 2011, pp. 196–7) seem to suggest that the best thing to do is move on, accepting that Papua will always be part of Indonesia. Anything less, the critics argue, only raises Papuan expectations, which will make matters worse, including provoking state violence in response to Papuan demands for self-rule. Unsurprisingly, the overwhelming majority of Papuans disagree. The fraudulent Act of Free Choice violates the principle of self-determination, the very basis on which the international system is founded. Papuans argue that they have the right to determine their own future, which includes the option of secession and independence.

Moreover, as Saltford (2011, p. 197) argues, 'in the face of stubborn denials by Jakarta and general international ignorance on the issue, the collation of a comprehensive body of evidence is nonetheless necessary to demolish Indonesia's own particular myths of what took place'. Continued rule by the Indonesian government in West Papua is founded on the myth that the transfer of sovereignty from the Netherlands to the Unitary Republic of Indonesia was free and fair. It was not. Events surrounding the transfer of sovereignty remain a core Papuan grievance. This grievance is not just historical. It has a contemporary dimension. The lack of willingness to discuss history contributes to the Papuan perception that there has been a 'death of democracy' in West Papua (Giay 2010a). This perception is honed in light of an ongoing failure by the central government to include Papuan leaders in the design and delivery of policy, absence of affirmative action, state neglect in the fields of health and education, and continual reliance on a security-based approach to governance. Reverend Dr Benny Giay (2000), the moderator of the KINGMI Papua Church, and others argue that either the Indonesian government needs to abandon its distorted view of history as an obstruction to efforts to resolve the conflict, or have an open conversation about history.

Root causes of the conflict

Papuan nationalism and civil resistance campaigns in the territory have emerged in response to a complex interaction of five long-standing, deeply rooted, and mutually reinforcing causes: historical grievances; ongoing military operations and state violence; economic exploitation characterised by large-scale projects in the resource extraction sector that have also resulted in ecological destruction, expropriation of land and socio-cultural dislocation; displacement and marginalisation created by Jakarta's promotion of migration to West Papua; and institutional racism contributing to what Papuans call a 'crisis of identity'. The competing claims on history and the forms of direct, structural and cultural violence (Galtung 1969, 1990) in West Papua all reinforce one another, making the conflict extremely resistant to resolution (see figure 2.1 below).




Figure 2.1: Root causes of the conflict

Historical denial of self-determination

As explained, the dominant Indonesian view is that the Act of Free Choice was the last stage of a decolonisation process involving the transfer of a territory that was always meant to be part of the Republic of Indonesia. That result, the government of Indonesia argues, has been officially and democratically endorsed by the United Nations. The dominant Papuan view, on the other hand, is that the whole process was fraudulent. It fundamentally violated Papuans' civil and political rights, and was backed up by state violence with the full knowledge and acquiescence of the international community. This view is not just held by Papuan activists. The perception that Papuans were betrayed by the international community has been so thoroughly socialised throughout the territory that I have had the experience in remote villages – days' walk from the nearest town – of Papuans launching into an animated and in-depth discussion of how the governments of the United States, Australia, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands sold the Papuans' right to self-determination on the altar of Cold War expediency. Exclusion from the New York Agreement, and lack of participation and forced manipulation during the Act of Free Choice are widely viewed by Papuans as dehumanising. This is in a culture that values talking, exchange and participation. These perspectives on how Papua was integrated into the Unitary Republic of Indonesia are so polarised it is as if the two parties are talking about two entirely different historical events. By the time the Act of Free Choice was endorsed by the United Nations, Jakarta believed that justice was finally achieved, while the dominant view held by Papuans was that a terrible travesty had just taken place and that their fundamental rights to self-determination were denied. It is because of these polar convictions that Papuans, like Father Neles Tebay, and Indonesian academics, such as the late Muridan Widjojo from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, have urged Jakarta to dialogue with Papuans.

A commitment to self-determination and addressing Papuans' historical grievances, argues Giay (2000, pp. 36–7), may, or may not, lead to a referendum. The Papuan preoccupation with 'straightening

history' (*meluruskan sejarah*) is about Papuans casting off their status as the objects of politics so that they might play a more active role in determining their own future. It is not about Papuans holding the absolute truth about what happened, asserts Giay, but about loosening Jakarta's monopolisation of Papuan history.

State violence

Since Indonesia took control of the territory, Papuans have been subject to ongoing military operations carried out by the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) and acts of violence perpetrated by the Indonesian police. While no one knows exactly how many Papuans have died, killings by the Indonesian military and related deaths have been on such a scale that all Papuan families know relatives or friends who have been detained, disappeared or killed. More than 30 military operations have been carried out between 1963 and 2014, all of which have resulted in the deaths of Papuan civilians. A death toll of 100,000 is routinely quoted in both academic and activist literature and often attributed to Amnesty International (see Singh 2008, p. xii). Papuan leaders like Benny Wenda and Jacob Rumbiak claim the figure is much higher, up to 500,000.

A death toll of 100,000 to 500,000 is disputed by the Indonesian military and government. Agus Sumule (2003c, pp. 233–4), an academic sympathetic with Papuan grievances, cites 891 killed between 1963 and 1997. Very few comprehensive baseline studies of killings by the Indonesian security forces have been carried out in West Papua and those that have are partial and subject to considerable logistical constraints, not least of which is cooperation from the state (see Ballard 2002b; ELSHAM Papua 2012). Aminruddin Al Rahab (2006, pp. 19–20), an Indonesian scholar with the Indonesian Institute of Sciences, concurs. 'The total numbers of Papuans murdered by the security forces is not clear,' he says. Given the challenges of undertaking research in the midst of the occupation any figure on the death toll will be contestable and, to a certain extent, unprovable. However, it is clear 'that there have been serious human rights abuses in Papua' (ibid.), that these have overwhelmingly been committed by the military and police and that they continue to take place largely in the context of impunity (International Coalition for Papua 2013).

Knowing the exact numbers, however, may be less important than understanding the effect of terror and state violence on the population. Yohanas (Budi) Hernawan (2013) asserts that torture has been used by the state primarily to govern Papuans, not to extract information. Indeed, many of the victims do not even speak Indonesian. Hernawan, whose doctoral study documented 431 cases of torture by police and military since Indonesia took control, illustrates that acts of torture, sexual violence and brutalisation are often carried out in public view – in fields, on the street, in villages and in the open grounds of military and police compounds – in contrast to being secret, 'hidden' acts of torture used, for instance, by the US military in Abu Ghraib Prison, Iraq, or Guantánamo Bay detention centre, Cuba. The purpose of the Indonesian state's use of torture, says Hernawan (2009, pp. 3–4), does not aim at extracting real information on the TPN (West Papua National Liberation Army). Instead, torture represents a large machinery that aims to control the whole community by conjuring and maintaining the spectre of terror. The survivors of torture remain living with their families and communities and thus share their stories with them. By telling their stories, the survivors inadvertently transfer and reproduce the mark of terror into the community and that reinforces its impact on their lives. The authorities might assume that such practice will deter the whole community from joining the resistance movements and eventually eradicate the TPN. That assumption, Hernawan goes on to write, is incorrect. In spite of decades of state terror against Papuan insurgents, acts of resistance against the Indonesian state continue to rise. Tellingly, of the 431 cases in Hernawan's data set only two involved non-state armed actors. The remainder were either innocent civilians or nonviolent challengers. Most of those tortured were from rural areas and could not speak Indonesian.

In addition to targeted assassinations and military operations, the army is also forming, arming and training nationalist militia

groups. They are replicating the same strategy of low-intensity conflict interspersed with military operations that was used in East Timor, while trying to avoid the negative publicity and backlash (Martin 2007) associated with mass killings (Akhmad Kusaeni cited in Setiawan 2014, pp. xii–xiv). Members of state-supported militias are mainly drawn from the large pool of non-Papuan migrants with the objective of inciting and waging a proxy war on the state's behalf. Indonesian militias, like BMP (Red and White Garrison), have been established in Wamena (International Crises Group 2002), Sorong, Timika (Sinar Harapan 2003) and Jayapura.[4] As well as creating nationalist militias, it has become an 'open secret' that the TNI has a symbiotic relationship with elements of the TPN, which it uses to ferment conflict, justify counter-insurgency operations, and play off factions of the armed struggle against one another (Tebay 2005, p. 10).

Economic exploitation

Since Indonesia gained control of West Papua in 1963, the government has been determined to 'modernise' the territory. To achieve this objective it has promoted large-scale projects in the mining, oil and gas, timber and fishery sectors to exploit West Papua's abundant natural resources. Developed and implemented by US-trained economists, this policy produced 'phenomenal growth rates' in the early years of Indonesian rule in West Papua (McGibbon 2005, p. 15). Economic growth was facilitated by migration from Java, Sumatra and Sulawesi to West Papua to provide a surplus of cheap, skilled (non-Papuan) labour. The Indonesian military protected investment and the Indonesian government, advised by neo-liberal economists, created attractive investment conditions and tax breaks for multinational corporations.

These projects enriched a small percentage of elites and lifted up the managerial class of migrants recruited to work on development projects. In the absence of a government that actively campaigns against disadvantage and champions affirmative action and an organised civil society, the net result produced little or no benefit for Papuans and

wreaked socio-cultural and environmental havoc. Indonesia's development policy in West Papua has failed to address Papuan poverty and disadvantage. Now, a new wave of migration is being facilitated by the central government's policy of *pemekaran* ('flourishing'), the creation of new administrative regions. With each new district or sub-district generated, construction migrant crews arrive and, although Papuans generally head up each administrative unit, new bureaucracies are predominately staffed by migrants. Not surprisingly, the government's development policy, coupled with uncontrolled migration, fuels Papuan demands for *merdeka* (Elmslie 2002).

The contribution of the resource-extractive sectors to Indonesia's and West Papua's economy is considerable. Freeport is a classic example. The company provides 1.59 per cent of Indonesia's gross domestic product. Between 1992 and March 2011 the company made direct payments to the Indonesian government totalling US$12.1 billion. This is made up of $7.3 billion in corporate income tax; $2.3 billion in employee income tax, regional tax and other levies; $1.2 billion in royalties and $1.2 billion in dividends (*Jakarta Post* 2011).

Economic exploitation in West Papua is entwined with the TNI's predatory role in the conflict economy. The territorial command structure and the TNI's involvement in politics is the military's 'dual function'. Its network of extensive legal and illegal business interests is its unstated but vital third function (McCulloch 2000). The TNI receives 25 to 30 per cent of its budget from the state. Consequently, 70 to 75 per cent of its operating budget is obtained from legal and illegal business activity supported by a network of military/business foundations and organisations (Lowry 1996). Although the Indonesian parliament ordered the TNI to divest itself of its businesses by 2010, it has simply shifted ownership to a network of proxies. This allows the TNI to maintain control of its business interests (*Human Rights Watch* 2010; Mietzner 2006).

Tanah Papua remains an extremely lucrative frontier posting for TNI soldiers. The TNI's extensive business interests include legal and illegal resource extraction, the provision of security for mining

companies, brothels, and a range of other enterprises. Central to this network of legal and illegal businesses is the TNI's territorial structure that enables the Indonesian military to maintain a presence at every level of politics, from cabinet to the smallest hamlet. The TNI's territorial structure provides local officers and soldiers with opportunities to develop businesses and illicit income streams. Consequently, the TNI has a vested interest in maintaining enough conflict to justify its presence and protect its economic interests. Not so much, though, that it will provoke domestic and international backlash. These financial incentives, the social distance between Indonesian soldiers and Papuans, combined with the low numbers of Papuans in the armed forces serving in conflict areas, dramatically reduce the likelihood of mass defections or significant security force divisions, a decisive factor in many other nonviolent resolutions (Binnendijk and Marovic 2006; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; Nepstad 2011).

The giant gold and copper mine run by the US-based mining company Freeport-McMoRan and its Anglo-Australian partner Rio Tinto is a good case in point. Freeport is Indonesia's largest taxpayer (Blair and Phillips 2003, p. 51). According to academic Lesley McCulloch (2000), Freeport payments to the TNI included a one-off payment of US$35 million and annual 'contributions' of US$11 million. This practice continues. In early 2003, as a result of shareholder activists asking persistent and searching questions in the wake of the murder of two US citizens and an Indonesian citizen allegedly by the TNI (Kirksey and Harsono 2008), Freeport admitted that they had paid $4.7 million in 2001 and $5.6 million in 2002 to the TNI to 'support costs for government-provided security' (Kosich 2005). A 2005 report by Global Witness alleged that the former military chief in Papua, General Mahidin Simbolon, who had been linked with militia operations when he was a commander in East Timor in 1999, received US$247,705 between 2001 and 2003 in payments for unspecified humanitarian projects, military celebrations and for 'security services'. Perlez and Bonner (2005), writing in *The New York Times*, claimed that between 1998 and 2004 Freeport paid the TNI a staggering US$20 million. When responsibility for protection of the

mine shifted to the police the practice continued. In a letter written on 19 April 2011 and addressed to Kontras Papua (Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Korban Kekerasan – The Commission for Disappearances and Victims of Violence),[5] Dr Rudolf Rodja, the chief commissioner of police in Jayapura, acknowledged that the police and military received money from Freeport to provide security. In 2010 that amount was US$14 million. The local Mimika police chief called the assistance 'lunch money' (Allard 2011).

The nexus between Indonesia's development policy in West Papua, the failure to alleviate poverty, the denial of indigenous rights, militarism, and human rights violations have led Benny Giay to conclude that Indonesia's development policy is simply 'killing in the name of development' (2000, p. 31). Yet more large-scale development projects continue to be proposed. In addition to Freeport-McMoRan/Rio Tinto, BP is operating a massive natural gas project in Bintuni Bay; Australian miner Clive Palmer and a network of Indonesian/Chinese mines are exploiting nickel in the world's most diverse tropical marine environment; the Australian mining company Paniai Gold, a wholly owned subsidiary of West Wits Mining, is operating in Paniai; Arc Exploration and Anglo American are carrying out gold exploration in the Birds Head region; and Indonesian and foreign-owned companies are conducting oil and gas operations in Sorong, Raja Ampat and Sarmi. In addition there is a host of Indonesian and foreign companies investing in coal, fisheries and forestry.

At the heart of cultural and environmental degradation has been the denial of the Papuan people's spiritual, economic, cultural and material attachment to land. Military-backed land and resource theft in West Papua is facilitated by Article 33 of the Indonesian constitution, which does not recognise the existence of indigenous people, let alone indigenous land rights (Blair and Phillips 2003, p. 51). In theory, indigenous landowners have the right to legal recourse through the Basic Agrarian Law 1960 but can only attempt to claim land when the court deems such a claim would not impede national interest. The result is little to no legal protection for indigenous communities. Chris Ballard (2002a) writes:

In one famous case, a district court in 1985 awarded compensation for the appropriation of a 62-hectare plot belonging to the Ohee and Onge clans to Hanoch Hebe Ohee, a traditional landowner from the Sentani region near the provincial capital of Jayapura. A process of appeal by the provincial government saw the original ruling upheld at both the High Court and Supreme Court levels in 1988. The provincial government then stalled the process of compensation until 1995, when Chief Justice Soerjono simply overruled the court's final verdict with a memorandum.

So, in practice, Papuan communities are either forced to accept exploitative arrangements with resource-extractive companies or resist.[6] If they resist – either through violent or nonviolent action – opposition is routinely framed by the Indonesian state as an act of subversion, justifying repressive military and police action. Exceptions to this rule are Papuans like Franzalbert Joku, who has been able to extract revenue for the use of his clan's traditional land in and around the Sentani Airport in return for loyalty to the Indonesian state and advocating resolution of the conflict through existing Indonesian government frameworks. For the masses, however, without elite patronage and protection, their experience is that the economic development policy coming out of Jakarta is designed and implemented without their consent and participation.

This lack of consultation, and the detrimental effects on the environment and Papuan culture, deepens feelings of exclusion. Papuan opposition to resource extraction is not a widespread rejection of development. In many cases Papuans argue for respect to their right to development (Dale and Djonga 2012). What they ask is what kind of development, for whom, and on whose terms? Papuans' experience of modernity has left them estranged. It has eroded traditional institutions and values. Papuans have repeatedly said that they want to be able to participate in the design and implementation of development policies in ways that result in tangible improvements in their daily lives. They have also said they want to be supported to re-empower

local communities to manage their lives according to their own traditions and 'life projects' in contrast to 'development projects' that are perceived to be solely in the interests of capital. Indigenous-led, culturally and ecologically sustainable development also includes the rights of local communities to say no to projects proposed by governments and corporations (Kirsch 2014). Development also needs to be accompanied by affirmative action (Dale and Djonga 2012).

Migration and changing demographics

The Indonesian government's modernisation strategy in West Papua, consisting of interlinked development and migration policies, has mutually reinforcing economic and security objectives. 'Not only is it meant to boost national development, but such policies have sought to stimulate economic interactions across ethnic and regional lines and thereby promote a sense of belonging to a single nation' (McGibbon 2005, p. viii). After 50 years it is abundantly clear that this strategy is not working. In fact, it has had the opposite effect to the stated intention. Indonesia's development and migration policy has led to the enrichment of migrants (and a handful of Papuan political elites) at the expense of the majority of Papuans, particularly those in the rural areas, who have experienced greater impoverishment. Migration has intensified a sense of shared Papuan identity. It has fanned the fires of greater resentment and resistance. 'Far from enhancing national integration ... the government's policy of modernization has spurred local resistance ... and undermined the territory's integration into the state' (ibid.).

Migration has increased to the extent that Papuans are now a minority in their own land. According to Jim Elmslie (2010), the Papuan population (for both Papua and Papua Barat provinces) is 1,760,557 (48.73 per cent) out of a total population of 3,612,854. The indigenous population consists of some 312 distinct groups, with the seven largest groups making up 80 per cent of the Papuan population (McGibbon 2005, p. 31). The migrant population is 1,852,297 (51.27 per cent) (Elmslie 2010). In the urban areas, particularly the oil,

gas, mining and timber town of Sorong, where migrants are drawn to increased employment opportunities, anecdotal observations suggest that the migrant population could be as high as 70 per cent (Telapak/EIA 2005; McGibbon 2005, pp. 25–6; MacLeod 2002–15). These figures are reversed in rural villages. However, in the interior, where schools are non-existent or the teachers absent and health clinics are out of stock of life-saving medicines, alienation from the state is deeply felt. Researchers working with the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) observed while undertaking fieldwork in the highlands of West Papua that in the remote villages the only interaction Papuans have with the Indonesian state 'comes in the form of men wearing camouflage' (Howard et al. 2002, p. 14).

These changing demographics, from Papuans comprising 96.09 per cent of the population of West Papua in 1971 to 48.73 per cent of the population in 2010 and predicted to make up just 29 per cent of the population by 2020 (Elmslie 2010), have coalesced in the popularisation of a powerful master frame: a 'slow-motion genocide' has taken hold. Elmslie and Webb-Gannon (2013) then go further, asserting that since 1962 the Indonesian government has *intended* to exterminate pro-independence West Papuan activists as a group, in whole or in part. 'Papuans have been killed by Indonesian soldiers and police following orders. Their actions and the instructions they have followed have been intentional' (ibid., p. 19). Elmslie and Webb-Gannon (ibid., p. 22) pose two uncomfortable questions:

> Is the international community, given its obligation to prevent genocide, really prepared to ignore the brutality of Indonesian rule in West Papua in return for good relations with Jakarta? ... And is Indonesia really going to allow its international image to be dominated by another bloody occupation, as was the case with East Timor?

The experience of demographic change and the fear that Papuans will disappear as a people resonates broadly and deeply. This structural violence is reinforced by the cultural violence of racism and a dehumanised view of Papuans as enemies of the state. It animates and gives urgency to resistance.

Racism

The daily experience of Papuans is one beset by racism. This is manifested in oft-repeated comments by non-Papuans that Papuans are stupid (*bodoh*), lazy (*malas*), drunk (*mabuk*), and primitive (*primitip*) (Giay 2000, pp. 5–6; Timmer 2000a, pp. 278–9; King 2004, p. 63; Karma 2014). 'According to Indonesians,' says Benny Giay (2001a, p. 129), 'Papuans are primitives and backward tribal people. They are bearers of stone age cultures holding them back from being able to participate in the whole process of modernization.' This attitude gives rise to, and in turn is reinforced by, processes (particularly exclusion from decision-making), policies and structures ostensibly designed to 'civilise' Papuans but which in reality only benefit non-Papuans while further excluding and marginalising indigenous Papuans.

Since the beginning of Indonesian rule in West Papua, Papuans have been forced to deny their identity. Under Suharto's New Order, laments Papuan priest and journalist Neles Tebay (2003, p. 127), 'Papuans were not allowed to call themselves Papuans or Melanesians.' Instead, they were given the fictitious identity of 'Irianese' from 'Irian Jaya', which was celebrated as an integral part of Indonesia. While Indonesians from other parts of the archipelago are freely encouraged to incorporate local traditions and culture as part of an affirmation of Indonesian unity, Papuan cultural identity is more often seen as a direct threat to national integration and as such is denied and criminalised. One example of this is the 1984 murder of Arnold Ap and his colleague Eddie Mofu from the cultural music group Mambesak. Ap and Mofu were killed by Indonesian Special Forces because their work of collecting and performing Papuan songs and dances from throughout West Papua, in order to celebrate indigenous culture, was seen as promoting Papuan nationalism (Glazebrook 2004; Rayfield 2004). The task of strengthening Papuan culture and traditions is still viewed as suspect by the

TNI. Traditional leaders are regularly regarded as being 'subversive' and efforts to restore traditions and indigenous forms of governance are marginalised and treated with great suspicion by the state. One elder commented to USAID researchers that the government 'regards us as the enemy' (Howard et al. 2002, p. 23).

According to John Rumbiak (2003a), the former international co-ordinator of the Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy in West Papua (ELSHAM or Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia di Papua Barat), racism born of a culture of fear and dehumanisation is at the heart of human rights violations in Papua. The reality is that Papuans feel like they 'have not been treated as human beings but as objects; objects of policy, objects of military operations, objects of economic development, objects of tourism, and so on', which in turn gives rise to Papuan demands for *merdeka* (van den Broek and Hernawan 2001, p. 73).

Tragically, decades of Jakarta's colonial approach have resulted in many Papuans internalising the racist and inferior view non-Papuans hold of them, leading to a variety of social ills such as alcoholism and a belief that outsiders are needed to save them. Thom Beanal (cited in Giay 2000, p. 13) has concluded that Papuans need to regain their self-belief and recognise that the struggle for a better West Papua is largely and ultimately in the hands of Papuans alone. Other leaders like Herman Wainggai and Benny Giay agree. Echoing Steve Biko and the Black Consciousness movement in South Africa, Giay (2001c) declares that Papuans need to get themselves 'emancipated from being spiritual Indonesians'. By this he means that Papuans need to decolonise their minds, liberate themselves from internalised oppression, and rediscover and reaffirm their own history, knowledge, culture, traditions, religious beliefs and values as a basis for indigenous-led civic re-empowerment. It goes without saying that this is very difficult. It is made more so because it involves tackling the external and internal dynamics of deep-seated racism as well as the way racism is embedded structurally and culturally. It is a task that Western countries, in particular, have had little success with. However, the concern for Indonesia, says Brigham Golden (2000, p. 34), an anthropologist who has worked in West Papua, is that a discussion of racism 'is not even on the table'.

In brief, as the situation progresses with the aforementioned root causes unresolved and festering below the surface, a number of secondary or proximate causes of conflict have arisen, which have created an extremely fragile and unstable situation characterised by corruption and competition between Papuan elites scrambling for political positions (see Timmer 2005); deep suspicion between Papuan moderates and politicians in Jakarta; and low-level horizontal conflict between Papuans and non-Papuans, between Papuans and Papuans, and between Papuan elites and grassroots.

The corrosive symbiotic relationship between militarism, large-scale resource-extractive projects, migration and racism in West Papua has only sharpened the importance Papuans attach to historical grievances, intensified Papuan demands for independence and transformed Papuan discourse from a struggle for self-determination to a struggle for survival.

Structural and cultural dimensions of slow-motion genocide

Genocide is an emotive and shocking word. It conjures up disturbing images of mass killings. Rwanda. Srebrenica. The Holocaust. Armenia. The Crusades. All these and more come to mind. We are talking about the very worst of human history. Some might argue that it is too extreme a word to be applied to what is happening in West Papua.

Genocide means the deliberate extermination of a race or nation. For extermination to be genocide there must be intent by the perpetrators to destroy a group 'in whole' or 'in part'. That is a difficult test. Elmslie and Webb-Gannon (2013) argue that in West Papua the group comprises 'pro-independence Papuans'. They maintain that there is a deliberate policy by the Indonesian state to extinguish pro-independence Papuans. This intent, they contend, came into force when the Indonesian government invaded West Papua and continues to drive state decisions today.

The reality is that the overwhelming majority of West Papuans harbour the desire to be free, to be masters of their own land and destiny. Whether that desire is expressed as part and parcel of the Indonesian state or separate from it, or expressed through the forces of armed rebellion or disciplined nonviolent action, it is still viewed as seditious by the police, Indonesian military, intelligence services and Indonesian government. Any articulation of that desire either in word or deed is considered ample justification for extreme repression by the state. Papuans call it the 'stigmatisation of separatism'. Behind those words is Papuans' experience of torture and state murder. It is a dynamic has been a constant since the beginning of the occupation.

Direct violence, which at the most extreme end includes mass killings, is but one element in the process of exterminating a group in whole or in part. Although persistent acts of direct violence – torture, killings and the like perpetrated by the Indonesian security forces – continue to take place, I would argue that the real drivers of creeping genocide in West Papua are structural and cultural.

In peace and conflict studies these words – direct violence, structural violence and cultural violence – have very specific meanings (Galtung 1969, 1990). A soldier killing a protester is direct violence. Structural violence is violence that is built into the structures of society – when repeated killings take place in a policy environment that supports impunity, that is structural violence. When killings are justified by a culture that celebrates the perpetrators as 'heroes' of the nation and the 'victims' as separatists who deserve to be killed, that is cultural violence. Galtung argues that these three aspects of violence – direct, structural and cultural – are mutually reinforcing.

Direct violence is often obvious. The dynamics of structural and cultural violence, however, are not so obvious. It is particularly hard for those situated in a 'mainstream' culture observing those in the 'margins' (Mindell 1995) to clearly identify and acknowledge structural and cultural violence. It is even harder for mainstream populations to 'see' cultural and structural violence in the context of ongoing colonialism. Doing so involves acknowledging degrees of complicity and

responsibility in the violence as well as acknowledging that certain privileges often flow from ignoring, denying or accepting such violence, even when one is far removed from any kind of direct responsibility. The work of understanding the dimensions of violence for mainstream populations located in a colonial or neo-colonial context is profoundly unsettling, even if ultimately liberating. That is why many Australians find it hard to see the ongoing structural and cultural violence towards Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people or refugees. It is why many decent Indonesians react with anger and hurt at the suggestion that the Indonesian state operates West Papua as a colony, behaving far worse than the Dutch ever did. For mainstream populations, 'seeing' is painful. This difficulty is compounded in Indonesia by a deep culture of denial of state violence, including the massacres of hundreds of thousands of communists and sympathisers in 1965.

We need to talk about these dynamics if we are to transform colonial violence. In their book *Paradoks Papua*, Papuan authors Cypri JP Dale and Father John Djonga (2012) lay the dynamics of structural and cultural violence devastatingly bare in their forensic examination of social policy in Keerom, West Papua, a group of districts adjacent to the border of Papua New Guinea. Through their research, the structural and cultural dimensions of the conflict become manifest alongside the root causes of the conflict. Dale and Djonga use the words 'social injustice' (*ketidakadilan*), 'abuse of the right to development' (*pelanggaran hak atas pembangunan*), and the 'failure of affirmative action policies' (*kegagalan kebijakan afirmatif*) to describe structural and cultural violence, but the underlying meaning is the same.

Prior to the occupation of West Papua, the population of Keerom were all indigenous Papuans living on the land of their ancestors. That demographic has since changed. By 2012 Papuans comprised 40 per cent of the population, a minority in their own land, while migrants (Indonesians from other parts of the archipelago) made up the rest. If current trends continue, by 2020 Papuans will make up 15 to 20 per cent of the population, a figure worse than Jim Elmslie's (2010) projection of 29 per cent. Indigenous Papuans are not only displaced, they

experience disadvantage and deprivation, and are subject to more intense military control than the migrant population.

The process of structural violence, resulting in dramatically fewer opportunities for Papuans to reach their full life potential, had several stages. First the land was taken. This was often accompanied by direct violence, including forced evictions. Forests were logged. At the same time Keerom became a transmigration site. Poor Indonesians, mostly Muslims from Java, were given land and start-up packages: a house, seeds and agricultural equipment. Papuan landowners were not recognised and not compensated. These new settlements became homogenous communities with little interaction between Papuans and migrants. Today many migrants speak only Javanese, not Indonesian. More recently, the economy shifted from logging and agriculture to massive palm oil plantations. One project in Arso Timur is 36,000 hectares. While Papuans, the overwhelmingly majority of whom were Christian, did secure some low-skill work in these operations, most jobs went to migrants. This kind of 'development aggression' is accelerating in Keerom.

The next stage was to shift the local government capital from Waris, a predominately Papuan area, to Arso, which is inhabited by mostly migrants. (Arso is the town that Tabuni and his men attacked in the story in the prologue.) Originally Law No 21/2002 on the Establishment of the District of Keerom, which was developed pursuant to Special Autonomy and designed to lift the socio-economic status of Papuans, stated that the capital city and government services would be located in Waris (Section 21, Point 2). However, after eight years, government services and the centre of administration were also relocated to Arso. The construction of new government offices went to migrant contractors, fuelling more migration. The need for civil servants also attracted a new set of migrants (although Dale and Djonga do point out that the composition of civil servants in Keerom is split roughly evenly between migrant and Papuan populations). However, political representation overwhelmingly benefits migrants. Of 21 local parliament members, only five are Papuans.

Moving the capital to Arso meant health and education services – along with roads and electricity infrastructure – in Waris and other Papuan areas deteriorated. In many places services simply do not exist. At the same time as these administrative changes came a massive injection of Special Autonomy funds. This was later augmented by funds from the Unit for the Acceleration of Development (UP4B), a government agency headed up by retired Lieutenant General Bambang Darmono tasked with promoting economnic development,[7] and Special Autonomy Plus. The policy rationale was that the problem in Papua was lack of development. These monies were intended to address that. When funds were distributed they went equally to migrant and Papuan communities. Although this sounds fair and reasonable, the levels of disadvantage were not equal. As a result, in the absence of targeted distribution, appropriate development and affirmative action, migrant communities benefited more than Papuan communities. The gap between rich and poor, the centre and the periphery, migrants and Papuans, Christians and Muslims, all widened. The end result was an Apartheid-type scenario.

Furthermore, Papuans are subjected to the state's security approach in a way that migrants are not. There are more military posts and security forces in rural and remote areas compared with the migrant areas of Arso and Skanto. The security forces are predominately migrants, not Papuans. Colleagues who live and work in Keerom tell me that militia groups have also been established in migrant areas. Dale and Djonga (2012) question why is the state able to consistently send troops to the areas where most Papuans live but cannot send teachers or doctors? They conclude that, for the Indonesian government, security is top priority, not the quality of life of Papuans.

This unequal dynamic, the authors are at pains to point out, is not 'natural'. It is by design. It is structural, reinforced by a set of cultural attitudes. Inequality is stimulated by the local government's decision to move the district capital from Waris to Arso. It is a result of state and corporate seizure of Papuan lands for forestry, aggressive development of palm oil plantations and militarisation of rural areas. With no

affirmative action, the policies of Special Autonomy, Special Autonomy Plus and UP4B have exacerbated, not lessened, disparities between migrant and Papuan populations. This dynamic has turned indigenous Papuans into a marginalised minority in their own land.

With foreign press not allowed into West Papua, intense pressure not to tell 'bad news stories' and endemic corruption, it is difficult to hold public officials accountable through conventional political processes. When Papuans step outside established processes and resist either through armed or unarmed action, the full forces of the state come bearing down. Is it little wonder that Papuans are seething with anger?

Sources of the Indonesian government's power

As well as analysing the root causes of the conflict, it is vital to uncover the sources of the power the Indonesian government depends on in order to rule, as well as the strategies it uses to maintain its ascendancy. Sound civil resistance strategy is built on an analysis of those three mutually reinforcing things: root causes of the conflict, the opponent's sources of power and their strategies of rule (see also Helvey 2004, pp. 165–6; MacLeod 2015c).

Power-holders depend on the following six key sources of power: authority or legitimacy to rule; human resources; skills and knowledge; intangible factors; material resources; and sanctions (Sharp 1973; Burrowes 1996, pp. 85–96). The first is authority or legitimacy to rule but, as discussed, Jakarta's legitimacy in West Papua is extremely vulnerable because Papuans never gave their consent to be governed. Since 1963 the Indonesian government has relied on the Indonesian security forces – the police, intelligence services and the military – whose presence in West Papua is ubiquitous – to maintain their rule. Force substitutes for political legitimacy – although only up to a point.

State violence is a blunt instrument and not sustainable indefinitely. In addition to the use of repression (see sanctions below) as a tool of control, the Indonesian government maintains its authority through a montage of confusing and contradictory policies that have functioned to undermine opposition by generating elite competition and

by playing Papuans against one another. The Indonesian government also controls – and divides – Papuans by ruling through local political structures run by indigenous public servants, and Papuans strengthen Jakarta's rule by arguing for more and more administrative areas (provinces, *kabupatens* or districts, and sub-districts called *kecematan*). Even though the 1969 Act of Free Choice was illegitimate, mass Papuan participation in the local, provincial and national elections since then makes it difficult for Papuans to argue that they do not consent to continued Indonesian rule.

Despite the pretence of democracy in West Papua, Jakarta is the final and decisive arbitrator of policy. Even Papuan politicians are routinely not consulted about policy decisions that affect West Papua. Examples include the Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate, the creation of the UP4B in West Papua and the announcement of Special Autonomy Plus. Although local governments in West Papua at the *kecematan*, *kabupaten* and provincial levels are headed up by Papuans, which gives the appearance of political legitimacy, final policy decisions are made in Jakarta. Decision-makers include key ministers, cabinet, senior members of the security forces and the various committees of national parliament (based in Jakarta), and also the Badan Intel Nasional (State Intelligence Agency), the Deparmen Dalam Negri (State Department) and the National Resilience Institute (Lemhannas), who all advise on matters related to security.

Human resources are the second potent source of power. All rulers need individuals or groups who obey, co-operate or assist them. In West Papua these include civil servants, Papuan members of parliament, members of the Majelis Rakyat Papua (a kind of indigenous upper house established in the provinces of Papua and Papua Barat but with no power to veto or make decisions), Papuan members of the security forces, Papuans who work in the resource-extraction companies, teachers, students, members of religious groups, and government-established organisations like local *lembaga masyarakat adat* (indigenous peoples organisations). Human resources also includes an international dimension such as shareholders and investors who fund

foreign companies in West Papua, union members who support foreign companies, and citizens of countries whose governments arm and train the Indonesian military.

The Indonesian government's legitimacy and ability to rule in West Papua is heavily dependent on these external sources of power: political, economic and military support willingly provided by the Indonesian government's elite allies (the United States, Australian, English, Dutch and Japanese governments and other ASEAN countries, in particular) and their domestic constituencies (such as workers, arms manufacturers and investors).

The third source of power is the skills and knowledge needed by the power-holders to maintain their rule, and supplied by co-operating persons or groups. In West Papua it includes the skills and knowledge of Papuans in the civil service, security forces, educational institutions and resource-extraction companies, as well as the skills and knowledge of many non-Papuans on whom Jakarta directly and indirectly depends to maintain the occupation. Jakarta maintains control over the local Papuan elite in four key ways:

1. All Papuan political representatives are required to give oaths of loyalty to the Indonesian state.
2. A range of financial incentives and offers of political influence are employed to stimulate personal ambition and elevate local clan and tribal loyalties over loyalty to a broader Papuan cause, thereby keeping disunity firmly in place. This is a major driver of *pemekaran*, the Indonesian government policy of dividing West Papua up into smaller administrative units. *Pemekaran* functions to divide the Papuan political elite into those who derive benefits from the creation of new districts and sub-districts, and those who do not (International Crisis Group 2011; Timmer 2005). It also facilitates increased migration as Indonesians arrive to build new government facilities and work as civil servants.
3. Jakarta has banned local Papuan political parties. By ensuring that all political representatives are members of national (Indonesian) parties, the state is able to constrain Papuan aspirations and exert greater control over local candidates.
4. If all else fails, the Indonesian government uses repression (see sanctions below). And just to make sure that Papuan political representatives do not get out of line, military officers have been inserted into all levels of the local political structure to induce and, if necessary, enforce obedience.

The fourth source of power, intangible factors, is psychological or ideological factors that induce people to obey or assist the rulers. In West Papua such beliefs include the assertion that Indonesia is too strong and powerful to resist. It is a falsely held, internalised belief that Papuans are not capable of organising to win freedom or that outsiders need to 'save' them. Religious beliefs that serve the Indonesian government's occupation include telling Papuans to be passive in the face of injustice, to wait for the afterlife and to not become involved in movements for peace with justice here on earth. Other internalised, self-limiting beliefs have also played a role, such as tribal divisions and state neglect in education and indigenous leadership. Disunity and competitive Melanesian 'big men'[8] politics have also been manipulated by the Indonesian government to maintain control.

Another intangible factor is Indonesians' view that they are the rightful rulers of West Papua. For many Indonesian people West Papua represents a place of exile for nationalist heroes who resisted Dutch rule. The territory has become, in Ben Anderson's words (2006, p. 176), a 'sacred place in the national imagining' and a rallying point for Indonesian nationalism. It was a matter of national pride, therefore, that the man who would become the first president of Indonesia, Sukarno, launched a 'liberation campaign' for an independent Indonesia that included the entire Dutch East Indies, from 'Sabang to Merauke' (Sukarno cited in Bone 2009, pp. 85–6).

Ironically, the ensuing military struggle against the Dutch that was led by Suharto was viewed as a continuation of Indonesia's revolution and fight against colonialism, and was perceived as such by many

countries and leftists at the time. Many Indonesians still perceive Indonesia as the liberator of Papua. The 'endorsement' of the 'return' of the territory by the international community through the United Nations serves to further reinforce Indonesian perceptions of the legitimacy of Indonesian sovereignty over Papua (see Permanent Mission of the Republic of Indonesia 2003).

Richard Chauvel (1997) argues that for early Indonesian nationalists the idea of a sovereign state was not related to religion or ethnicity, but was 'rather a shared history, suffering, [and] fight against a common adversary'. According to the Indonesian argument, it was precisely because of the ethnic and religious differences between Papuans and Indonesians that the incorporation of the territory of West Papua became so important – a living demonstration that Indonesia was a political concept and not a state based on religion or ethnicity.

Indonesia's maintenance of a multi-ethnic state is still a source of pride for Indonesian nationalists. Moreover, few if any states view with equanimity the prospect of losing territory. Indonesia is a complex archipelago made up of myriad islands (between 13,000 and 17,000, depending if one counts on the high or low tide) and a multitude of different languages and cultures. Capturing and holding this complexity within one state is an extraordinarily challenging task, particularly given that Indonesia is also facing the gamut of difficulties that beset post-colonial states. For many Indonesians, national unity is seen as inherently valuable and significant, and the risk of fracturing into smaller entities is a very real threat. It is this threat that has been used over the years as justification for the extraordinary and extensive power of the Indonesian military within every level of national life. Secessionist drives (regardless of whether they are violent or nonviolent) within West Papua resonate in government in Jakarta as a threat to the viability of Indonesia itself – a possible step towards a deeper unravelling. Unfortunately, Jakarta's fear of disintegration often obfuscates legitimate and deeply seated grievances that fuel demands for *merdeka*.

These beliefs function as a bulwark against solidarity from Indonesian citizens who otherwise might support Papuan aspirations.

Resistance will be even stronger if Papuan demands are framed as independence or nothing. However, significant prejudice and institutional racism also undermine social, cultural and political solidarity between Papuans and Indonesians, particularly those living in other parts of the archipelago, those who have no knowledge or understanding of Papuan culture and history. This distance works against the creation and maintenance of effective alliances and coalitions for change. It also frustrates West Papuans' ability to influence political, social and economic elites in Jakarta.

The fifth source, material resources, is the control of, or access to, property, natural resources, financial resources, economic systems and means of communication and transportation systems. As discussed, West Papua is a leading contributor to Indonesia's national economy, generating massive amounts of revenue from its extensive gold, copper, oil, natural gas, nickel, fisheries and timber reserves for the state and for the military, in particular, which runs a network of legal and illegal businesses centred on economic development projects.

The sixth source of power, sanctions, is the use of force and punishments, threatened or applied, to ensure that people submit to or co-operate with the regime. In West Papua sanctions include military operations, arrest and torture, imprisonment, threatening and harming family members, and the strategic use of targeted and random terror. These sanctions generate pervasive fear that hinders people from realising their own power to create change.

The Indonesian state's control over these sources of power makes the occupation extremely resilient to change. The multi-sited, diffuse nature of the Indonesian government's power is critical. Although it would make the occupation more palatable if Papuans could be induced to support it, the reality is the Indonesian government does not need Papuan consent and cooperation to maintain their rule. They certainly do not need their labour to administer the territory. When new districts (*kabupaten*) or sub-districts (*kecematan*) are created, migrants are brought in to staff them. Tom Beanal, former co-chair of the independence organisation the PDP (Papua Presidium

Council), wonders if the Indonesian government wants the loyalty and participation of the Papuan people. 'Could it be that the Indonesian government is drawn to Irian Jaya not by its people but by its natural resources?' he rhetorically asks (cited in Kennedy and Abrash 2001, p. 93; see also Giay 2000, p. 30). Although a withdrawal of West Papuan consent and cooperation is vital to undermining the Indonesian government's legitimacy in West Papua and for catalysing transnational solidarity, by itself it may not be enough to leverage political concessions from the Indonesian government. This is because an insufficient dependency relationship exists between the Indonesian government and West Papuans (Summy 1994; Burrowes 1996). This is the same dynamic that exists in Israel/Palestine (Rigby 1991; Dajani 1994; King 2007), Morocco/Western Sahara (Zunes and Mundy 2010) and China/Tibet (Kramer and Moser-Puangsuwan 2000). Lack of dependency between Papuans and the Indonesian government has important implications for the development of any effective strategy for change in West Papua. It requires Papuan challengers to wage the struggle simultaneously in three domains: inside West Papua, inside Indonesia (particularly Java) and in the international societies of Indonesia's elite allies and desired sphere of influence.

Currently, the movement is doing much to erode the pillars of support within West Papua. For decades the movement has also reached out to selected international allies, although not always in a co-ordinated and strategically directed fashion. (Much international activity has previously focused on either lobbying government elites or has been more generalised awareness raising.) What is needed are systematic campaigns that target and alter the ways domestic constituencies in the societies of Indonesia's Western and regional allies directly and indirectly support violence and exploitation in West Papua. In addition, there is a need for a strong solidarity movement led by Indonesians working hand in hand with West Papuans to target the Indonesian-based sources of power for the continued occupation.

Armed struggle is counterproductive because it functions to strengthen domestic Indonesian and international support for the occupation. Indonesian leaders frame violence against the state as a threat to political and economic order, enabling the government to deftly sidestep underlying questions surrounding the legitimacy of their rule. Armed struggle is impractical. Any violence is heavily weighted in the Indonesian government's favour. Except as a source of inspiration to Papuan challengers and an irritant to the state, armed struggle is no longer viable.

Armed struggle gets framed by the state as terrorism. That is true in Papua New Guinea as well as Indonesia. There is also no state sponsor to support prospective guerrillas. Even if Papuans secured arms, ammunition and training, they can never compete with the Indonesian Armed Forces. Libya, which once provided limited weapons and training to the Free Acheh Movement (Gerakan Acheh Merdeka) as well as to a handful of insurgents from Kanaky (New Caledonia), has been obliterated from without by Western air strikes and from within by factional in-fighting after the killing of Colonel Muammar Gaddafi. No country, not even Papua New Guinea, is willing to provide sanctuary to the West Papuans. The Papua New Guinea police and defence force's Operation Sunset Merona in 2011 demonstrated this. West Papuans are realising the pragmatic and strategic import of these calculations. As a result, the centre of gravity (Clausewitz 1832; Burrowes 1996) of the struggle is beginning to shift from armed to unarmed resistance, playing to Papuans' strengths and throwing the Indonesian state off balance.

Conflict irresolution

Before we examine the three central strategies the Indonesian government employs to maintain the occupation, it is useful to briefly recap the two reasons why the conflict remains resilient to resolution. First, as stated in the introduction, the Indonesian government does not need to expend political capital to resolve a conflict that barely registers on the national, let alone international, political agenda. And once it does register on regional and international agendas, powerful state and corporate interests will come into play in the same way that they did during the 1950s and 1960s. Second, the West Papuan people

have not, until recently, been united – either in purpose, organisation or strategy – allowing the Indonesian state to play different groups against one another.

Some commentators have privately and publicly (Singh 2008) expressed doubt that there will be any change in the situation failing significant geopolitical shifts, like a global economic crisis that significantly weakens the Indonesian state. Political opportunities matter. But so does the ability of movements to recognise, exploit and even create advantageous political situations. As social movement scholar Doug McAdam writes, 'movements may be largely born of environmental opportunities, but their fate is heavily shaped by their own actions' (McAdam et al. 1996, p. 15). This dynamic can be seen in East Timor. Economic downturn and the fall of Suharto helped create favourable conditions for a referendum in East Timor, but these conditions had to be exploited by the Timorese, who not only waged the struggle inside East Timor but gained support from pro-democracy activists inside Indonesia as well as the international community (Fukuda 2000; Simpson 2004; Stephan 2005). That process was the fruit of decades of work. So geopolitics is important. They influence what is possible. But movements need to be ready to take advantage of political opportunities and, if possible, even create them. Movement agency can make the impossible possible.

One revolutionary group in West Papua considered a confrontational strategy for pre-empting international intervention along the same lines as East Timor. For a while serious discussion revolved around creating a 'super Santa Cruz' scenario. The strategy was named after the 1991 Santa Cruz massacre in East Timor by the Indonesian military, which led to the internationalisation of the East Timor issue. This group of Papuan activists proposed creating a crisis – either through violence, mass civilian-based disruption, or a combination of violent and nonviolent action – that would act as a catalyst for international intervention. While some international analysts (International Crisis Group 2010a) condemned such a strategy, particularly the willingness to consider violence to catalyse the intended heavy-handed response, it

illustrates how frustrated some Papuans have become (Braithwaite et al. 2010). Many also forget that provoking violence from the security forces was the same strategy used by Martin Luther King Jr in Birmingham, Alabama. King knew the obstinate police chief Bull Connor would respond with force, even in front of television cameras (Halberstam 1998, pp. 431–43; D'Emilio 2003, pp. 332–3). The civil rights activists anticipated that the sight of unarmed protesters peacefully demanding equal rights being beaten by armed representatives of the state would promote widespread support for the civil rights movement. Of course, the United States in the 1960s is a very different context from West Papua. King was anticipating the use of dogs, fire hoses and beatings, not mass killings. King's strategy of confrontation reveals two essential conditions: nonviolent discipline – so the focus remains on the injustice and the violent response against nonviolent demonstrators to generate widespread outrage – and an audience who can mobilise on behalf of the oppressed. In West Papua to date, those two preconditions are lacking. But that too is changing.

The public declaration of independence at the Third Papuan People's Congress on 19 October 2011 by Forkorus Yaboisembut and Edison Waromi is an example of the kind of disruption that some Papuan activists are proposing. This bold act of political defiance was answered with violence from the Indonesian police and military, leaving five dead. It resulted in more sympathy for the Papuans and less sympathy for the Indonesian military and government (Rayfield 2011a, 2011b, 2011c). And although there were no international journalists present, the Papuans were armed with mobile phones. They communicated with West Papua Media editor Nick Chesterfield, enabling him and his colleagues to quickly mobilise the international press. The events during and immediately after the congress prompted one religious leader, a widely respected commentator on Papuan society who has lived in Papua for decades (van den Broek 2011), to write, 'the Papuans … have proved to be serious with their nonviolent way of gaining back their true rights. The nonviolent aspect has gained respect inside and outside the country.'

Strategies Indonesia uses to maintain power

In order to maintain its rule the Indonesian government employs three central strategies:

1. 'modernisation', an interlinked two-fold process promoting large-scale development projects
2. in-migration to service developments that primarily benefit migrants
3. repression, including the widespread use of torture and acts of 'random' violence, which is both targeted and indiscriminate.

Since the Act of Free Choice in 1969 until Suharto's fall in May 1998, West Papua was a military operations area and closed off from outside scrutiny. The region still remains off limits to international journalists, diplomats and international human rights organisations. The police and military continue to apply a security-based approach, criminalising dissent and covering up or denying human rights violations. While Indonesia moves towards greater democratisation elsewhere, West Papua remains a semi-authoritarian enclave. Foreign journalists, humanitarian organisations and even international diplomats are routinely denied permission to visit the territory, particularly areas where there are military operations. Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch and even the Red Cross have been denied access. During the height of Apartheid, the South African government permitted the Red Cross access to political prisoners. Not so in West Papua. A complicated system of permission (the Surat Jalan system), administered by multiple government agencies in Jakarta and security forces in West Papua, effectively denies access for journalists, diplomats and others.

These strategies are becoming more and more unsustainable. The strategy of modernisation is generating backlash, not only from remote indigenous communities in places like Merauke and Timika but even from Papuan elites like the governor of Papua Province, Lukas Enembe, who has threatened to reject transmigration (Leon 2014). The strategy of repression is breaking down under the weight of its own contradictions.

The tighter the steel grip of the Indonesian security forces the more their legitimacy – and Papuan obedience – slips through their fingers. And in the age of mobile internet communication technologies that can easily bypass Indonesia's media blackout, West Papua is becoming less and less isolated.

Conclusion

In examining the interplay between root causes of the conflict, the Indonesian government's sources of power and the strategies it employs to maintain its rule there is one aspect that is worth celebrating: although the conflict in West Papua is complex, a common perception of the causes is clear. This fact is the fruit of much struggle and discussion (see Giay 2000; Tebay 2005, 2006b; Widjojo 2009). It is also a sign that there has been some progress around building greater trust and unity among Papuans, at least at the level of analysis. The discussion on Indonesia's sources of power and strategies of rule now gives way to an investigation of Papuan strategies of resistance to counter these. The starting point is an exploration of vision, the broadest conception of strategy.

CHAPTER 3

Visions of *merdeka*

The development of a nonviolent strategy to resolve the conflict in West Papua requires an ability to understand the deeper meanings of Papuan demands for *merdeka*, and to translate these meanings into a coherent vision of the future, which in turn supports the development of functional and achievable goals and objectives. While the causes of conflict in West Papua – historical grievances, a history of military occupation, and direct violence in the form of gross human rights violations at the hands of the security forces – appear at once clear and simple, they have made resolution more complex because of the presence of structural violence in the form of economic exploitation led by the resource extractive industries, the symbiotic economic relationship between business and the military, and the exclusion of Papuans from many of the decision-making processes that affect their daily lives.

Direct violence and inequitable and discriminatory social, economic and political structures in West Papua are further reinforced, legitimised and justified by the cultural violence of racism (Galtung 1990). Historical grievances combined with direct, structural and cultural violence, along with rapidly changing demographics and the

presence of large numbers of migrants, make conflict in West Papua unstable and potentially explosive. One hope of avoiding plunging into the abyss lies in facilitating not only a deeper analysis of the root causes of the conflict, but also a deeper understanding of the multiple and layered meanings of *merdeka*. Doing so might help break down the rigid polarisation of positions held by those who support *merdeka* and those who support Indonesia's territorial integrity. Such an exercise might open up surprising common ground for dialogue as well as assisting the formation of functional strategic objectives for Papuan challengers.

The meanings of *merdeka*

Papuans and politicians and policy-makers in Jakarta (and other outsiders, for that matter) frame *merdeka* in critically different ways. For Indonesian nationalists embroiled in a liberation struggle against colonial Dutch rule between the early 1900s and the 1940s, it was the 'battle cry with which the citizenry was summoned to support the cause. It was the salute with which revolutionaries would greet each other, the cry of solidarity at every mass rally, and the signature at the end of every republican document.' (Reid 1998, p. 155) This popular understanding of '*merdeka* as independence' is reinforced through symbols and national rituals like Independence Day celebrations held across the country every 17 August. For Papuans, however, *merdeka* 'holds a sublime, almost spiritual significance' (Golden 2000) that, while meaning both more and less than political independence, has simultaneously come to be viewed by many Papuans as unattainable without independence (Webb-Gannon 2011; Kirksey 2012). Together with the emergence of an animating ideology of *adat* ('tradition'), *merdeka* has become a powerful, unifying and transformational ideology that overcomes class and tribal affiliations.

Despite the fact that Papuan nationalists associate *merdeka* with independence, many Papuan aspirations inherent in the word, such as protection of local community land, resources, traditions and identity, and the desperate need for health and educational services,

do not necessarily point to independence as a single-step pathway or to the Westphalian state as the endpoint of the liberation struggle. Issues like corruption, governance, lack of local capacity, freedom of speech, and a participatory development policy that simultaneously meets local needs for employment and services and protects the fragile environment and diverse Papuan culture will not necessarily be resolved by independence. Political aspirations wrapped up in these grievances and issues could be framed as intermediate political objectives. Activists could pursue campaigns of nonviolent resistance to achieve these objectives within the context of the Indonesian state. Doing so would enable the movement to build political power for bigger political aspirations. Yet the desire for *merdeka* in West Papua has often been solely represented – with tragic outcomes as the Indonesian military brutally represses Papuan aspirations – as the desire for independence.

Papuan demands for *merdeka* are far more nuanced than the simple demand for a separate and sovereign state. And yet, at the same time, a full realisation of *merdeka* necessarily involves the right to freely choose one's destiny. Benny Giay (cited in Webb-Gannon 2011, p. 127) argues that Papuans have been historically denied the right to chart their own political future and that this right is still being denied. Giay says, 'Papuans have a right to choose! And I think one of the sins of the world and of Indonesia ... is that Papuans were given the right to choose [but were then denied that right]. That is a sin! And I think ... that goes against God. I mean ... freedom is from God, and once you deny one's freedom then you are in trouble.'

Oridek Ap, the son of murdered ethnomusicologist Arnold Ap, explained the meaning of *merdeka* to Camellia Webb-Gannon (2011, p. 130):

> When I talk about *merdeka*, when most Papuans talk about *merdeka*, they mean independence. *Merdeka* is a word, an Indonesian word, but what we mean by *merdeka* is 'independence'. You know, we want to be free, free from occupation, free from oppression, free from exploitation. You know, that's independence – we can arrange our own things. We want to have the opportunity to solve our own problems ... That is what we want, *merdeka*.

Papuan understandings of *merdeka* represent an ongoing individual and collective struggle for liberation that encompasses at least seven overlapping and mutually reinforcing meanings:

1. the struggle for an independent and sovereign political state
2. as *hai*
3. a Papuan liberation theology
4. an *adat*-led restoration and recovery of local traditions, indigenous forms of governance, and identity
5. as *mobu*
6. a movement to restore human dignity
7. self-reliance.

These meanings have their roots in West Papua's long history of resistance to all forms of oppression and colonialism.

Merdeka as the struggle for an independent and sovereign political state

Merdeka is overwhelmingly portrayed by Papuans as a demand for an independent and sovereign Papuan state. Stimulated by a potent combination of injustice and repression, Richard Chauvel (2005, p. 1) states this demand 'is stronger today than it was in 1961, when the Morning Star flag was first raised', and is growing stronger. However, as Eben Kirksey (2002) rightly points out, even as Papuans demand '*merdeka* as independence' that does not necessarily mean they all consider the endpoint of the struggle to be the establishment of a sovereign state. Some of the newer generation of Papuan activists are critical about the way the modern state has been locked into a globalised and exploitative capitalist economy (Stiefvater 2008). Indeed, as Kirksey (2002, p. 3) notes, many Papuan activists express hopes 'for new systems of

governance based on indigenous modes of authority' that transcend the state and break from the stranglehold of global capitalism. In a similar vein to discussions in the Solomon Islands about 'Melanesianising' the state, there has been discussion among Papuans of, for example, small self-managing communities for each indigenous group in West Papua, held loosely by guidelines laid out by a national parliament in a highly devolved state (Kirksey 2002, p. 97; Richards 2002, pp. 24–5).

Merdeka as *hai*

West Papua has a long history of what anthropologists describe as 'cargo cults', or millenarian movements that coalesce around the belief that a major transformation of society is coming. Instead of the phrase cargo cults, West Papuan anthropologist, sociologist and theologian Benny Giay (1995a) prefers to use the Amungkal word *hai*, which he (and other Papuans) describe as 'the irrepressible hope and expectation of an oppressed people for a future that is peaceful, just and prosperous'. Giay argues that *hai* is a universal phenomenon, expressed whenever popular movements struggle for a more peaceful and just world, free from oppression and domination (Kjar 2002, p. 54). However, it is also important not to romanticise *hai*. Some of the socio-political-religious movements that have emerged in West Papua are exclusive in nature, carried out by groups who are less concerned with the liberation of West Papua as a whole and more preoccupied with their own localised hopes for terrestrial paradise (Giay 1995b; Timmer 2000b). Often local *hai* movements fuse Christianity with indigenous belief systems, creating new religious movements with socio-political aspirations. Regardless of their focus, *hai* movements can sometimes inspire unrealistic expectations of what *merdeka* will bring (an intoxicating belief that has seized some Papuan protesters, for example, of a world where everybody will have unlimited wealth and no one will have to work).

Merdeka as a Papuan liberation theology

Merdeka has also been described as a kind of Papuan liberation theology, 'in which a Christian desire for a world of human dignity and divine justice is finally manifest in Papua' (Golden 2000). This reflects the role of the church in Papua as an institution that is viewed as independent and uniquely Papuan. The church, says Benny Giay (2000, p. 9), is a 'liberating institution ... a fortress of last resort, [and] the bearer of a new hope', whereas the Bible 'portrays a new world, free from manipulation, intimidation and trauma. It lifts up the eyes of those who are oppressed to a new world. Sometimes people see in this new world a New Papua, an independent West Papua', where freedom from all kinds of oppression and violence are guaranteed.

Merdeka as an *adat*-led restoration and recovery of local traditions, indigenous forms of governance, and identity

For many Papuans living in isolated areas, *merdeka* can be understood as an *adat*-led restoration and recovery of local forms of community governance, traditions, culture and identity. It means being able to control their lives, resources and identities. It also means the right to veto development projects and receive just compensation when land is appropriated by the state. After years of being marginalised by successive colonial authorities and state-led development schemes, *adat* leaders (*tokoh adat*) from the Baliem valley, speaking to a group of USAID researchers (Howard et al. 2002, p. 29) studying indigenous governance and the revitalisation of *adat*, said that they were less concerned about the political status of West Papua and more concerned with being able to meet the needs of their communities.

The USAID paper was written in 2002. Thirteen years later, *adat* is showing signs of developing into a political ideology entangled with *merdeka*, politically charged, motivating indigenous communities to seek ways to regain control of their lives. This necessitates the revival and re-creation of indigenous forms of governance. Forkorus Yaboisembut (cited in Webb-Gannon 2011, p. 128), the president of the NFRWP (National Federal Republic of West Papua), explains:

> There is a future for the Papuans if they don't disappear; their culture, land and resources must be preserved, government must

> be maintained, and it must issue policies on land that must not be sold. Mining must be controlled, and schools established for cultural education and democratic structures. But the Indonesian government regards all these as separatist activities ... My hope is that West Papua must be independent first so we can have a better future. We are not able to do that under the Indonesian system. We have tried but it is impossible.

For the younger generation, as well as for their elders, the desire for freedom is entwined with cultural resistance, particularly maintaining a distinct Papuan identity. Antonio, a youth activist in an interview with the author in January 2007, expressed it like this:

> *Merdeka* is something very broad. I feel we need to be free from so many different kinds of oppressions. For me *merdeka* has a particularly cultural meaning. Our Papuan culture helps us to love and care for one another. In this way – even though we are still colonised – we are already free. When we live inside our culture we are free.

Merdeka as *mobu*

In a land where foreign companies like Freeport-McMoRan make US$18 million per day but schools remain empty, chronic hunger in parts of the highlands prevails (precipitated in most cases by security operations on the part of the police and military), and a lack of medical care results in widespread morbidity, the demand for basic services necessary for a healthy life animates many Papuans' desire for *merdeka*. Virtually all Papuans I have spoken to over the 24 years of my association with the freedom movement equate the demand for *merdeka* with the need for education and health services and full and fair participation in the economy. The Mee people of the central highlands articulate the realisation of this desire as *mobu*, which literally translates as 'full' or 'satisfied'. Theo van den Broek (2003, p. 11), formerly of the Catholic Office of Justice and Peace in Jayapura, says that *mobu* 'implies a sense of material and spiritual satisfaction where no one need suffer from hunger, poverty, or disease'. This concept exists among other indigenous groups. Among the Dani, for instance:

> The duty of a leader is focused on 'ensuing fertility', which means that all members of the community should be given the opportunity to develop and have equal access to collective forms of wealth, such as land and resources. Similarly, each member of the community deserves equal right to be healthy and educated. In brief, welfare means that all basic needs of every person, not just a minority of people, are fulfilled (ibid.).

Merdeka as a movement to restore human dignity

The story of suffering in West Papua is often recounted as a story in which Papuans describe themselves as being treated as if they were less than human, as if they were animals or, as jailed Papuan leader Filep Karma (2014) writes, 'as if we were half animals'. *Merdeka*, therefore, is also about an end to the destructive racism that pervades Papuan society. Given the way Papuans have been marginalised and displaced by migration, addressing Papuan disadvantage has to include the ability for Papuans to restrict and control migration. Animating culture to direct positive social change, and celebrating and being proud of indigenous Papuan identity are also seen as an important means of addressing discrimination. Indeed, self-belief and cultural pride are an end in themselves.

Merdeka as self-reliance

An additional oft-repeated meaning of *merdeka* is 'self-reliance'. While some Papuans still look to their leaders and members of the international community to deliver them from their suffering, there is a sense from other Papuans that the movement needs to draw much more on its own individual and collective endogenous resources to realise the cherished desire for freedom. This has been a recurring theme of Benny Giay's leadership. In a sermon to members of the KINGMI Papua

Church on the occasion of the International Lawyers for West Papua conference in Oxford in August 2011, Giay observed that Papuans became 'hypnotised' by this gathering of international lawyers. Giay acknowledges the importance of international solidarity, but on this occasion Giay emphasised the problem of internalised oppression. One of the reasons Papuans are fixated on the need for external support, he said, is because they have long internalised the beliefs about Papuans that are held by outsiders – the missionaries, the Dutch and now the Indonesians. Many of these beliefs are derogatory. They are racist ideas about who Papuans are. Beliefs that emphasise Papuans' lack of capacity and inability to create positive change. As a result of this internalised racism, said Giay, Papuans have 'looked to outsiders to save them'.

Giay's sermon, addressing the Indonesian government with its 'culture of violence' and 'controlling of our thoughts and destiny', admonished the Indonesian state – its politicians, soldiers and police:

> Stop trying to be the captain of our life. You [the Indonesian government and military] go and sort out your own NKRI [Unitary Republic of Indonesia] ship, your own failed country. We [Papuans] will now start to be the captain of our ship. And we really mean this. We are not just saying it.

This is the reason why Giay and others from the KINGMI Papua Church have fought so hard to keep it as an independent Papuan church, with its own synod separate from the Indonesian synod, despite constant intimidation from the security forces and their proxies (see Rayfield 2011c). The need for self-reliance has been a constant theme throughout the struggle.

The need to foster greater self-reliance is not just expressed by church leaders. The late John Otto Ondawame (2000, p. 73) acknowledges that one of the reasons Papuans have not succeeded is because they have 'tended to become overly dependent on others, expecting too much from external support, particularly from Western allies'. Papuan independence leader Herman Wainggai (2009) talks about the need for

Papuans to develop self-belief and self-confidence. Oridek Ap (cited in Webb-Gannon 2011, p. 130) says Papuans need to be free to make their own mistakes. Benny Wenda (2014), when he tells how highland mothers carry their newborn for the first few years of their life before letting them walk on their own, says the same thing. International solidarity is vital but the role of outsiders is to amplify the voices of Papuans who are struggling inside the country, not to substitute them. Papuans need to be the 'captain of their own lives', as Giay says, and that includes being the ones leading the struggle.

Peace as a vision of *merdeka*

The problem for Papuan strategists is that, despite the strength of feeling and detailed thinking surrounding *merdeka*, Papuans have not clearly consolidated the diverse meanings and articulated them as a concise and compelling vision of the future, one that immediately animates action. This has implications for planning. As the Cheshire Cat told Alice when she stood at the crossroads, if you don't know where you are going, 'then any road will take you there' (Carroll 1865). Neles Tebay, speaking to anthropologist Cammi Webb-Gannon (2011, p. 177), explains his views on the need for a vision, a roadmap and indicators against which progress can be evaluated:

> I ask [Papuans calling for independence]: 'So suppose if you are my leader, do you have any vision for an independent West Papuan state?' And they have no idea. No idea. So … I have come to realise we have [fewer] leaders who really have a vision. So fighting, fighting, but fighting for what? No idea. For separation from Indonesia, that's all. And then what? And then what kind of society do you want to set up here? … Therefore I think, myself, if you want to know my personal position, I am committed [to] peace in this land of Papua … My position is, whether West Papua is still under Indonesian rule or becomes an independent state, peace must be there.

The concept of 'peace', of course, is different from 'freedom' and, equally, as indistinct. However, much work has been undertaken to articulate an ideal vision of Papua as a 'Land of Peace', one that does not reflect the current social situation but a vision worth struggling for. This vision has been expressed in relation to nine core values:

1. justice and truth
2. participation
3. sense of security and comfort
4. harmony/integrity
5. fellowship and appreciation
6. recognition and self-esteem
7. communication and information
8. welfare
9. autonomy.

Since these were first articulated by religious leaders, Tebay and his colleagues from the Indonesian Institute of Sciences have gone on to develop a list of indicators for peace that plot progress against the roadmap they have been working on (Widjojo 2009). This work, undertaken through the efforts of the Jaringan Damai Papua (JDP or Papuan Peace Network) – which, incidentally, includes prominent independence leaders – reflects the polycentric, overlapping and shape-shifting nature of how the freedom movement is organised in West Papua. The JDP's list helps determine the extent to which the goal of peace (or *merdeka*, for that matter) has been achieved, or not. The 44 indicators are spread across the five areas: political, law and human rights, economics and the environment, security and social-cultural rights. They define specific changes, including recognition of Papuan views of history and a resolution of the political roots of the conflict, the withdrawal of all combat troops, the re-establishment of a human rights court for West Papua, the rehabilitation of forests and other natural areas and their ongoing management by customary landowners, respect of local land rights under Indonesian law and concrete improvements in health and education. These indicators were produced by a drafting committee established after the Papua Peace Conference, held from 5 to 7 July 2011. The drafting committee included pro-independence leaders, some of whom are now in jail charged with treason following their declaration of independence on 19 October 2011. The conference also appointed five Papuan negotiators. The peace negotiators were all independence leaders living overseas – lest they wind up dead like previous independence leaders Arnold Ap, Thomas Wainggai and Theys Eluay. The composition of the drafting committee and the appointment of the peace negotiators reinforced the popular desire for *merdeka* as independence.

The JDP's 'vision' articulates some of the contours of *merdeka*. But some Papuans, notably radical activists from the PNWP (West Papua National Parliament), KNPB (West Papua National Committee) and NFRWP, view such a list with suspicion. According to these groups the JDP indicators are state-centric and oriented towards a capitalist market economy. They assume West Papua's continued integration within the Indonesian state and the continued presence of large-scale development projects like the Freeport mine have been the two most prominent actors driving an assault on Papuans' lives and landscapes. They also argue that any talk of indicators seems to favour graduated change, which is seen as the opposite of revolution.

A vision of tomorrow

While the radical activists' suspicions have merit, it is a mistake to reject the need for concrete changes that are less than full independence. A maximalist demand like independence requires people power. Winning shorter-term campaigns around intermediate objectives is an excellent way for movements to build social and political power. Think of them as stepping stones in the journey from one side of the river to the other. Both short-term reformist and long-term radical goals are more likely to be achieved if they stem from a clear vision. As Peter Senge (1993, pp. 205–10) writes, clearly articulated and positive shared visions of the future are powerful tools for change:

> They are exhilarating, creating the spark, the excitement that can lift a movement out of the mundane to a sense of immanent expectation and possibility ... They change people's relationship with the [movement] so that it is no longer 'their [movement]' it becomes 'our [movement]' ... They compel courage so naturally that people don't even realize the extent of their courage. Courage is simply doing whatever is needed in pursuit of the vision ... They establish an overarching goal, [be that democracy or independence or something else] ... The loftiness of the target compels new ways of thinking ... A shared vision also provides a rudder to keep the learning process on course when stresses develop ... Powerful shared visions foster risk taking and experimentation ... They also foster deep commitment that helps people hold to a vision that can be realised only over the long term.

Veteran civil resistance activists and educators Srdja Popović et al. (2007, p. 16) concur. A movement's vision:

> provides a picture of the future society you are striving towards. Once formulated, the Vision of Tomorrow becomes your movement's primary objective. It is a permanent guideline for your movement's supporters. Your strategic nonviolent struggle becomes a journey towards achieving that vision.

There is an important caveat, a paradox for strategists to wrestle with. All successful nonviolent struggles over the past 30 years have mobilised popular support around a negative vision – something that people are against, an abhorrent policy, dictatorship or a foreign occupation, for example. At the same time, revolutionary movements need to build the capacity – organisational structures, skills and experience for self-rule – and develop a plan for taking over the country. This requires serious and sustained effort. Lack of parallel institutions and capacity to fill the power vacuum was a key reason for the failure of the 1988 uprising in Burma. In West Papua, resistance leaders continually tell me, it is easier to mobilise people around goals, like independence and a referendum, that emphasise what the movement is against. Paradoxically, however, intermediate campaigns may help achieve this in the long term by deepening Papuan capacity to run the country in the short term. At the same time, resistance needs to (re-)build the structures, processes and relationships that embody freedom. The considerable challenge for Papuans and their allies designing campaigns, tactics and constructive alternatives is to stem the tide of 'slow-motion genocide' to give them time to realise a New Papua.

Robert Burrowes (1996), Peter Ackerman and Christopher Kruegler (1994) and others remind us that functional goals and unequivocal demands are more easily developed from a clear vision. The JDP indicators are useful starting points for developing goals that will galvanise civil society in West Papua. Whether or not these goals then lead to a series of campaigns around intermediate objectives is a choice the movement needs to make. But a clear vision is essential. Although Papuans have not articulated a collective vision of a New Papua in a single document in the way that the African National Congress did in their Freedom Charter in 1955 or the Serbs from Otpor! did in their public communication with other Serbs, the contents of such a vision are present in the perspectives on *merdeka* and the JDP's peace indicators. What remains to be done is for the vision, demands and some intermediate campaign goals arising from the indicators to be further developed, articulated and communicated. This needs to be through a process that is owned by the people.

While still a partial expression of Papuan hopes for the future, the JDP indicators make concrete many Papuan aspirations for freedom. The content of the indicators echoes many of the demands made by Papuan youth, students, women's groups, farmers, pastors, and *adat* groups in recent years. Indicators like the 'freedom of expression' and 'the release of all political prisoners' also bring into sharp focus the fact that West Papua still remains a non-democratic enclave of the Republic of Indonesia. Because these kinds of indicators have been framed

within the context of the existing Indonesian state, yet at the same time take the movement closer to their goal of *merdeka*, they present a dilemma for the Indonesian government. If the government refuses to guarantee freedom of expression or release political prisoners it gives credence to the notion that there is a lack of democracy in West Papua, damaging the Indonesian government's international reputation. But if it concedes to demands for freedom of expression and/or the release political prisoners it expands the political space available to the movement. These kinds of 'dilemma goals' and 'dilemma campaigns' are ideal for campaigns of nonviolent action because they generate a win–win situation for the movement and a lose–lose situation for the opponent (Sorenson and Martin 2014). Papuan activists could well use dilemmas, 'indicators' and a shared vision to pursue and set the agenda for change.

Articulating a clear and compelling vision sharpens strategy. It clarifies who the protagonists are and what is at stake. It compels the leadership to communicate with ordinary people so that the vision becomes a shared future worth fighting for. If the dominant frame, the one that Papuans return to again and again, is *merdeka* as an independent state, then Tebay is right: the contents of that vision remain to be filled in. That content is different from articulating the governance structure of an independent state, something the NFRWP has been working on for many years. Developing the framework for a parallel government or a new state is important but it is too technical, too dry, too constrained by the strictures of the modern state. It is not aspirational enough for a vision. It also runs the danger of replicating the kinds of domination many Papuans are trying to get away from.

Explicit commitment to nonviolent resistance

From a shared vision it becomes possible to develop long-term and intermediate goals. In turn, these goals direct strategy and tactics. The means by which a movement wages the struggle – its strategy and tactics – need to be informed by a clear conception of nonviolent resistance.

Individual leaders – and even organisations like the PDP (the Papua Presidium Council), NFRWP, WPNCL (West Papua National Coalition for Liberation), PNWP and KNPB – have publicly expressed their commitment to nonviolent action. As Reverend Benny Giay says, 'Resisting without violence is not something foreign to us, it is part of our history. Not just in one place but in many places in Papua' (interview April 2008). The aforementioned resistance organisations all recognise nonviolent resistance as a widely held norm they need to adhere to in order to attract widespread international support. Reverend Herman Awom, for instance, the former moderator of the Evangelical Church of West Papua and member of the PDP, said, 'Even when we were imprisoned we tried to keep a nonviolent struggle. When the news reporters interviewed us in prison we told them to tell the people not to riot. Since we want to fight peacefully, there is no room for violence' (Farhadian and Babuljak 2007, p. 150). However, a shared conception of what nonviolent action means has never been clearly articulated by the component parts of the movement or debated by the different movement actors. Papuans need to articulate their own conception of, and rationale for, nonviolent resistance and fashion a consensus around this. This strategic shortcoming is now being recognised by some Papuans. Father Neles Tebay (2006a, p. 58), for example, writes:

> Given the peaceful resistance by indigenous Papuans to Indonesian rule and oppression, there is a need to promote the concept of nonviolent resistance. Theological, philosophical, political and cultural explorations of nonviolent resistance are required. Historical examples of how nonviolent resistance has proved successful in various parts of the world should also be explored. These studies should involve different religions and experts.

Developing and clearly articulating a shared conception of nonviolent action and communicating that understanding to constituents, opponents and third parties are important processes for multiple reasons (Burrowes 1996, pp. 179–84):

- It helps increase participation in the struggle (see also Chenoweth and Stephan 2011).
- It helps undermine state power by attracting the support of key social groups who might otherwise support the opponent. For instance, not only does an explicit commitment to nonviolent resistance enable people other than fit young men to participate, it also encourages other third parties like migrants to participate. On numerous occasions, such as the Second Papuan People's Congress and the 2008 Tongoi Papua strike, migrants have shown support for Papuan aspirations. In 1984 Arnold Ap was even able to persuade nearly 100 Papuan members of Battalion 751 to defect en masse and join the movement for freedom (Singh 2008, p. 141).
- It will become much harder for the opponent to justify its violence if the commitment to nonviolent resistance becomes widely known and the movement demonstrates credibility over time. When the opponent uses violence it is much more likely to be seen as violating international norms.
- It helps to trigger backfire (Martin 2007). Even when the opponent uses propaganda and agent provocateurs to try to portray the movement as violent, an explicit commitment to nonviolent action makes it much harder for the charge of violence to stick.
- It helps people control and overcome their fear due to an explicit commitment to resist nonviolently. This enhances self-esteem and self-respect.
- It provides a powerful counter-narrative to the dominant racist portrayal of Papuans as 'wild'.
- It helps build trust among activists by increasing confidence in the predictability of fellow activists' behaviour.
- It provides an activist with a framework for making quick decisions and then to enact those decisions with unity.
- It helps leaders deal with disruptions, breakdowns in discipline and identify agent provocateurs.

- It helps activists withstand repression, particularly because maintaining nonviolent discipline requires rigorous training and advance preparation.
- It helps communicate the importance of the issue. It keeps the focus on the issue and the behaviour of the opponent, rather than on the behaviour of the challengers.

Vinthagen (2015) argues that when developing a conception of civil resistance to guide the struggle it is useful to do so through multiple lenses:

- strategy
- the kind of norms and culture the movement and its component parts want to develop
- how the conception of nonviolent resistance supports the creation of a new, more socially just, peaceful and environmentally sustainable society; in particular, what new processes and structures need to be created or reclaimed
- how the conception of nonviolent struggle enables and faciliates dialogue and political negotiation.

Burrowes (1996, p. 181) maintains that 'while it is important to make an explicit commitment to nonviolence and to make this commitment widely known, these are not enough. It is also necessary to develop the level of discipline required to carry out the defence strategy.' This is because the dynamics of nonviolent struggle are activated when participants adhere to rigorous standards of behaviour, even in the face of violence from the opponent. In order to maintain such behavioural norms it is helpful to develop a code of discipline. Several other movements, including the Indian independence struggle, developed codes of discipline.

Breaking polarisation

In civil resistance, vision guides a resistance strategy that – ideally – creates the conditions for a problem-solving dialogue to take place

(Burrowes 1996). Eventually, Papuans and Jakarta will need to sit down and talk. A central purpose of civil resistance is to transform conflict so that enemies can begin to reach a just, peaceful and lasting settlement – one that meets everyone's needs. Once the political negotiations begin, the different discourses around the meanings of *merdeka*, peace, liberation and justice become essential to hammering out the details of a peace agreement.

Although *merdeka* is translated as 'freedom' in Bahasa Indonesia, Jakarta currently equates Papuan demands for *merdeka* with the narrow meaning of freedom as 'independence' and the desire for a sovereign state. In doing so, legitimate Papuan objectives, such as a discussion about the history of West Papua, as well as demands for greater equality, participation in decision-making, and an end to the impunity of the Indonesian military, are marginalised. For Papuans, however, the deeper meaning of *merdeka* is more akin to 'liberation' (*pembebasan* in Indonesian). The problem for Jakarta is that given the history of the past 50 years and the lack of trust Papuans have in the government, few Papuans believe that their aspirations for peace, justice, equality and democracy can be met within the framework of the Indonesian state.

The meaning of *merdeka* is often summed up in the oft-heard desire 'to be rulers of one's own land' (*tuan di atas tanah*), expressing a deep understanding of self-determination that has meanings that are at once national and particular, both more and less than the desire for independence. Nonetheless, much of the substance of the wider meaning of *merdeka* inherent in Papuan demands is consistent with the goal of social justice for all, the fifth pillar of *Pancasila*,[1] the Indonesian state ideology. By understanding *merdeka* only as independence, security forces and policy-makers in Jakarta – as well as outside activists, development practitioners and policy-makers – lump all Papuan aspirations together. This makes it difficult to respond to the demands for *merdeka* that can be met within a framework that does not necessarily imply support for a political outcome of independence. The polarisation of all Papuan demands for *merdeka* as being synonymous with the demand for independence has tragic consequences for Papuans who suffer persistent and horrible human rights violations at the hands of the security forces who have repeatedly responded violently to any perceived threat to the territorial integrity of the Indonesian state. Jakarta's fear of *merdeka* as independence, and the consequent security-based approach to prevent this, ironically pushes Papuans further towards identifying the realisation of *merdeka* with the goal of political independence. In the process, the wider meaning of freedom as social justice, equality and democracy becomes clouded or is lost.

As long as *merdeka* is understood by Jakarta only as a threat to nationalist symbols or political sovereignty, the government will ignore and even violate the very moral tenets that could form the basis of compromise. In this way Jakarta would ensure that *merdeka* comes to signify only 'political independence', and thus ensure its nightmare of disintegration (Golden 2003).

To facilitate understanding and the possibility of creative and peaceful solutions it is helpful if all parties involved in West Papua study and respond to the deeper and more subtle meanings underlying Papuans' use of the term *merdeka*. For Papuans this will also mean breaking down the demand for *merdeka* into functional strategic objectives that are clearly defined and achievable. For outsiders it is also critical to support Papuans reconstructing indigenous governance structures that facilitate the realisation of the wider meaning of *merdeka*. Golden (ibid., p. 33) also suggests a broad renaming and reframing of political solutions, like the Special Autonomy legislation as *daerah independen* (an 'independent region'), for example, and sincerely implementing the law so that the moral aspirations inherent in *merdeka* are met. In this way the deficit of trust in the territory might begin to be restored. Perhaps then, says Golden (ibid.), conflict resolutions initiatives like Special Autonomy will be seen as encompassing people's longing for *merdeka*, and not in opposition to it.

Conversation over West Papua quickly becomes polarised once it shifts to questions of territory, but remains open if the discussion focuses on other substantive issues captured by the wider meaning of

merdeka. By emphasising the meaning of *merdeka* in the Papuan context as a fearless and shared commitment by migrants and Papuans alike to justice, equality and democracy, it might become possible to start to talk about how to resolve conflict, while in the short term avoid the more difficult question of sovereignty and political self-determination.

A deeper appreciation of the meanings of *merdeka* gives rise to a consideration of what it would take to bring about the kinds of changes Papuans want. Civil resistance scholars (Sharp 1973, 2005; Bond 1994) speak about four distinct ways change happens: conversion, accommodation, coercion, or disintegration. Movements need to debate not only what they want but how they think they will get what they want. That discussion will have a profound effect on movement strategies. If, for instance, the movement determines that it wants to remain within the Indonesian state but under a more equitable arrangement, that outcome will eventuate as a result of conversion or, more likely, accommodation. If the goal is a change of policy it makes sense to pursue a strategy like dialogue augmented by extra-parliamentary nonviolent collective action. If, however, the movement wants independence or a more radical restructuring of the Indonesian state, that requires coercion or even disintegration of the opponent's power structure. Reformist goals, like civil rights legislation, are more likely to be won through persuasion. Revolutionary goals, like independence, are more likely to be won through nonviolently coercing the opponent or bringing about a complete disintegration of their system of rule. That is exactly what happened in East Timor. Determining how change comes about will inform choices of strategy. If independence is the goal then the movement needs to be building the capacity to carry out massive economic, political and social noncooperation and develop parallel systems of rule.

That is at the level of strategy. At the level of tactics all four mechanisms still have a place. Even movements with revolutionary goals will still need to think about who they can convert to support the movement or how to accommodate people's interests in order to enable them to participate in the movement. Villagers or student activists, for instance, can be readily converted to the cause. Even members of the opponent's ranks may be converted. A low-ranking Papuan policeman, for example, might be convinced that as a Papuan patriot he needs to secretly supply information to pro-independence activists. Accommodation, on the other hand, means that a person may not have a change of heart but accepts that some level of compromise is required. A *bupati* (mayor), for example, may be persuaded that it is in his interest to quietly resource the struggle because large numbers of pro-independence supporters live in his electorate even though he may have private doubts about the merits of independence.

Conclusion

A New Papua. A free West Papua. Papua, Land of Peace. These expressions essentially amount to the same thing: a vision of a just and sustainable peace. Papuans have already articulated a clear analysis of what is wrong (as summarised in chapter 2). Obviously the contours of what Papuans want remain a work in progress. Still, the key features of Papuan-led visions for their country are clearly discernible. A deep appreciation of these features could open up more space for dialogue. There should be room for concrete changes within the current framework of the Indonesian state but support for reform among many Papuans, certainly among the network of resistance groups, is closing. At the heart of anger about Indonesia's occupation of West Papua is the simple desire for Papuans to be the authors of their own destiny, or at least partners, equally respected. Articulating a clear vision of a future West Papua and developing an explicit commitment to nonviolent resistance and making it widely known will help maximise the power of civil resistance.

CHAPTER 4

Civil resistance in West Papua

Suharto's fall from power in May 1998 released long-repressed hopes for freedom in West Papua. It led to a temporary but uneven openness at a time when the central government and military had not yet consolidated their power. Democracy was in the air around the whole archipelago (O'Rourke 2002). But in West Papua it was independence the people wanted, not reform.

In July 1998 Papuans gathered around the water tower in Biak City. For four days they sang hymns, prayed, danced, hoisted the Morning Star flag and demanded freedom. Protest leader Filep Karma stressed that he was engaged in a bold experiment. Several years later, while in prison, Karma candidly reflected on the events in July 1998 and his naïve reasons for taking the action he did (Karma 2014; see also Karma 2013):

> I said that Papuans must fight peacefully. This was a new method for us. Before 1998 Papuans thought we should engage in combat with violence and firearms. But I called for us to fight by peaceful means. I stressed this over and over. I began telling this to all the Papuan people, especially those living in Biak. Let's fight peacefully. There is no need to be scared. No need to run to the forest. Let's put down our arms. Let's not give the police a reason to use violence arbitrarily. That is what I told people under the tower. I then told the people that my objective in raising the Morning Star flag at the Biak water tower was to tell the world that the Papuan nation desires to be free. You see I was trying to demonstrate a political theory ... told by our parents and leaders before us.
>
> Since that time I have not found any reference to this theory. I do not know whether this theory exists or whether it is true or not. They [my parents and elders] said that if a nation wants to be free and independent, and the flag of this Nation is raised and kept flying for 24 hours, and is not taken down, then the United Nations would grant this Nation independence ... This was something that I believed at the time, since I was young. I wanted to test that theory. So I raised the flag and I made sure it stayed up for at least 24 hours.
>
> I learned about West Papua's history of struggle through my elders who raised the Morning Star flag in the past. When you raise the flag in the jungle it is ineffective. Soldiers don't reach that area. No one sees it. But if you [raise the flag] in the town a lot of people can see it including the media and automatically the story gets disseminated globally. Well before I [raised the Morning Star flag in Biak] no one had ever done it. No one had kept the flag flying for 24 hours. When I did it in Biak I told my brothers and sisters who helped me, to keep it flying for more than 24 hours. Now we managed to do that. We kept the flag flying for four days; that is 4 x 24 hours. We raised it on Thursday at 2am and kept it flying until Monday 9am when it was taken down. That is what happened.
>
> So the theory that the United Nations would recognise you if you kept the flag flying at mast for at least 24 hours is totally wrong. So for those Papuans who are still doing the same based

on that theory I want to tell them that this theory is not true. So let us explore more realistic options. Let's organise ourselves and redirect our struggle.

In 1998 in Biak City, West Papuans may not have had the most nuanced understanding of the vagaries of international politics but the Indonesian military was fully cognisant of the millenarian momentum behind Karma's movement (Kirksey 2012). Indonesian politicians understand the power and value of symbols and rituals. Openly allowing expressions of Papuan sovereignty was not a view they were prepared to tolerate. In the days leading up to 6 July 1998 troops had been gathering in Biak City. Three Indonesian navy warships – at least one of which was sold to Indonesia by the then East Germany government – and C-130 Hercules planes, the kind of aircraft the Australian government eagerly donated to Indonesia, brought in heavily armed troops – Hassanuddin Company from Sulawesi and Pattimura from Ambon, two neighbouring provinces. Local villagers from the surrounding hamlets were press-ganged into militias and told to arm themselves with sharp implements. Captain Andrew Plunkett, a former intelligence officer who worked at the Australian embassy in Jakarta, was quoted saying it 'was a dress rehearsal' for the militia-backed, military-led bloodletting and destruction that occurred post-referendum in East Timor in 1999 (Biak Tribunal 2013).

Agus (2013), a primary school student at the time, remembers what happened:

On the first day of the demonstration we heard people on the street. They were yelling, 'Papua Merdeka'. At that time I did not understand what they were shouting about. We just followed the people to the tower. People were praying and singing. I saw a different flag flying from the top of the tower and I was really surprised. There were so many people and lots of police. The police saw us in our school uniforms. They told us to go back to school then they took us back to school. When the principal saw us he was angry. He said if anyone goes to the tower they will get a penalty.

On the 5th of July the headmaster closed the school but we had to stay because we were living at the school. The only other person at the school was a school security guard. No one went outside. No one went to the market. The headmaster and the teachers just told us to stay at school for our own safety. People everywhere were preparing to leave but we did not know what was happening. I remember it was Sunday. There was no adult to care for us; they had all left. No one thought to get us something or do something for us. All of us, young people aged between twelve and fifteen, huddled together in one room.

The massacre was on a Monday. The night before – Sunday and the following morning – we heard everything. Our school is surrounded by a big fence. We couldn't see anything but we could hear what was happening. You need to know that a military police post and army complex is next to our school. So when the army moves we can hear everything. On the Sunday night we could hear heavy boots running beside the fence. Lots of boots. Running. We could not see but we could hear. We were so scared. We just sat there terrified, crying, listening to the sound of heavy boots running close to where we were. At that time we thought something would happen and we were really afraid. We just sat there hugging each other.

Around 4am or 4.30am on Monday 6th July we heard gunshots. It was before dawn. We sat there in that room in the school hugging each other and crying. The shooting kept going. I was one of the youngest. The oldest was around fifteen. We did not know what to do except shed tears. All we could do was say, 'Oh God, what is happening?' The guns kept shooting until around 7am.

When the shooting stopped my older brother came round to pick me up ... About two blocks from the tower a woman ran

up to the car begging for help. She was covered with blood. My brother quickly helped her get into the back of the car. When I turned around he told me not to look at her.

About a week later when I was back in East Biak I heard my parents tell of fishermen who were pulling up bodies in their nets. The bodies they pulled up had turned white. Some people said it was from the tsunami that happened in Papua New Guinea. In one place called Orwer people used a small canoe to bring one body to shore. It was a woman. The fishermen put the body in a sack then they buried it. I was there. I saw the body and I still remember the place where it was buried. It was only 500 metres from the street. My parents made a small cross and they wrote 'unknown' on the cross. I asked my parents about the body. They said it was a long and sad story and that when I was older I would understand. I still think about what happened that day. It has made me become a quiet person.

After a month we went back to school. The headmaster forbids us to talk about what happened on that day. He said, 'Do not talk about the past.' He said that school could not be responsible for our safety. Two of our friends had disappeared. Their names are Johanes Orboy and Hermanus Fakdawer. They were both twelve years at the time. They were my friends but we never knew what happened to them and I did not dare ask. We just had to keep these things inside and leave them there.

... Even now I can't talk about what happened that day in Biak with my father, my brother or anyone else in my family. But I know my brother helped people that day. He picked up the wounded in his car. I am so proud of my brother. All these bad things that happened to him have never brought him down. He believes there will be a good change in the future ...

I don't wish for big things because big things are too hard. So I wish for little things. This is easier. One of my wishes is that my parents will be okay ...

*

A week later Edmund McWilliams, political counsellor at the US embassy in Jakarta, arrived in Biak but it was many months before muted news of the massacre hit the foreign press (see Murdoch 1998). McWilliams (2013) saw the bullet holes, chest high, pockmarked over the water tower. It is not known how many died that day and in the days that followed. Some estimate over 100. Many Biak islanders who witnessed it say in excess of 150 people were killed. No independent investigation has ever taken place. None of the mass graves dotted around Biak have been exhumed so the missing have not been accounted for and the dead have not been given a proper burial. Like other human rights atrocities, such as the bloodletting after the 1965 coup, the Indonesian government refuses to even acknowledge what happened. The truth – just like the truth of what happened in so many other places in West Papua, such as Paniai in the mid-1960s, the Baliem Valley in 1977, Abepura in 2000, Wamena in 2000 and 2008, Waisor in 2001, Enarotali in 2014 – has been buried.

If protesters thought the killings would end with the shooting at the water tower they were mistaken. Much worse – unimaginable horror – was yet to come. Tineke Rumkabu, who was caught up in the army attack, gave evidence through an interpreter to a quasi-legal citizens tribunal at Sydney University in 2013 about how she was imprisoned by police in what can only be described as a rape camp. She was questioned by Nicholas Cowdery, professor of law, former director of public prosecutions in New South Wales and former president of the International Association of Prosecutors (1999–2005). This abridged version of the transcript[1] contains graphic and disturbing material:

> **TR:** [On the morning of 6 July 1998] I went out with food in a box and a water, coffee in my left hand, we walked down to the harbour shore ... We saw trucks and soldiers ... We ran into a small path, the path led to the tower. So when they saw us running they said, 'Stop running, stay still or you will get shot.' So we ran and ran but they got us. So the first shot it was us they shot and then they shout. There were big shootings everywhere and then

we saw a helicopter flying past and also shooting out and also ships from the harbour. I was hit in my back here [indicates back of head] and then I fell. Before that they used the coffee and threw it all over my head. So after I fell out on the asphalt, they dragged me in by my legs. The soldier kicked me in my leg and then my tummy and then the leg again. I kept yelling, 'God help me' and they said, 'Go ahead, call your God, better you begin to pray for the last few days to help you.' But another soldier drag me, also hit me with the gun, but he said, 'Run, we are the same religion so you run.' So I ran into a house of an employee of the department of health around that neighbourhood, then I hide in a room. I didn't know that my friend was also hiding in another room at the same house, and then she said to me there is a septic tank and we can hide there. And then we hide there. We hide there for four hours until 7 but we couldn't stand there … and they caught us.

NC: Now, you say you saw a ship. What ship did you see?

TR: It was a huge ship.

NC: Where was the shooting taking place?

TR: So the shooting was from the tower into most of all the areas around Jalan [inaudible].

NC: Now, you told us you were caught again, what happened then?

TR: When we ran and they caught us they threw me onto a truck. When they caught me they put my hands tied behind and closed my eyes with a black cloth. When I fell into the truck I felt … humans. I felt so many people …

NC: Were these people moving, were they alive?

TR: Yes they were still moving and some of them were yelling for help. I felt wet. Lots of people yelling, 'God help us, God help us.' I heard women, men, adults, but also kids.

NC: I think you said that you were wet in the truck. What were you wet from?

TR: I think that it was blood.

NC: Please continue.

TR: They took us to a place but we didn't know where. I didn't see because they close my eyes, I didn't see my friends but I could hear their voices and they ask us to take off our clothes. We were tortured with weapons – they make a cut on my hands and burn me with cigarettes.

NC: Now, you are indicating your arm, is that where this happened? You are showing your right forearm, an area just below your elbow. What are you showing to us there?

TR: They cut with a sharp bayonet, then they pour acid. When I scream they burn me with cigarettes on both hands. I also heard my friends screaming. They said, 'We don't want to get raped, we don't want to be raped.' So this official opened wide the legs of this woman and they brought candles and they burn out the candles then they put it inside, into my vagina.

NC: Let's just pause there for a moment. Where did this happen? Have we moved from the [truck] to a building? Where was this happening?

TR: It was in the office of the military.

NC: How many women were in this area?

TR: Twelve women.

NC: Tell us what happened then.

TR: At that time I was still blindfolded, I didn't really see how many of them but they were screaming and then they took off the [blindfold] from my eyes. This guy took off the cloth from

my eyes and said, 'Look, your friends are all being tortured' and then I saw one of my friends, Martha, who was also tortured with the candles, but I saw then that the bayonet was straight into her chest. Martha was screaming, 'If you rape me you better kill me.' Then I saw a man showing us a little knife, the one you use to shave, and then he said, 'We are going to use this to cut off your vaginas, from above and below, and from the left and from the right.' I saw a little girl, they raped her and then she died. All over the place it was blood everywhere because women's vaginas and clitorises had been cut out and they had been raped many, many times. They also hit another woman with a bayonet and then cut off the neck and also the breasts of the woman.

NC: You mentioned the lady, Martha, is that Martha Dimara?

TR: Yes, Martha Dimara was beheaded.

NC: How did that happen? Was there something she said before that?

TR: Martha said that 'I would rather be killed than that you rape me'.

NC: And what happened then?

TR: They put a bayonet in her neck and then in the vagina and also cut off her breasts and beheaded her.

NC: What happened to you?

TR: I was also tortured. The candle was put inside me and then they also cut off my clitoris and they raped me.

NC: Do you know how many women were killed in that room?

TR: Eight women were killed and they let four of us stay alive. There was a soldier who knew us, he let us go. So I asked him, 'How can we run, we are naked, we have been tortured like this' and he said, 'Just run, go wherever you can'. When we ran it was very dark, we did not know what time it was, and we were naked, running naked. We ran ... and then there was a couple. They saw us running naked and the husband told the wife to hide us and they [took us home]. The wife gave us tea and then gave us toast. Then she prayed for us. She was also a Christian, the same religion, so she prayed for us ... She said that, 'You can't stay here for a long time because this is a base, a military base, you won't be safe, so I will take you back.' So around midnight she took us back to our village. We didn't go home. I hide in the forest, the jungle, for two months.

When Tineke Rumkabu came out of the jungle she was arrested again and thrown in jail. The massacre may have occurred many years ago but the survivors are still being harassed. When I travelled to Biak in January 2015 I met with some of the survivors of that massacre. They had formed a support group, United for Truth (*Bersatu untuk Kebenaran*), and had begun advocating not just for themselves but for survivors of other human rights violations in West Papua as well. We had just fifteen minutes together before immigration and police intelligence raided the meeting. They did not want us to talk to the survivors. One man, the same age as my younger brother, had told me that after the security forces raided the water tower he was detained and taken onto one of the waiting navy vessels, where he was forced to watch soldiers rape a woman then execute her in front of him. They then made him eat her genitals. This young man hid in the galley. Indonesian navy personnel working in the kitchen felt sorry for him because he was so young. They hid him. When the trash was thrown overboard he was thrown out too. He then managed to swim ashore.

According to ELSHAM (Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy in West Papua 1999) and witnesses like Tineke Rumkabu, the dead and dying were dumped in trucks and taken to the wharf where they were loaded onto three waiting warships, KRI *Kapap*, KRI *Telek Berau* and one other. We know this from the pictures Eben Kirksey took from his hotel window at the time. Many of those still alive were

then killed. The bodies were mutilated then thrown overboard. In the days following 6 July, corpses and many body parts washed up on the beaches of Biak. Irene Dimara, now a refugee living in Cairns, Australia, told me a fisherman found her brother, Dance Korwa: 'His penis had been cut off, he had no eyes, his teeth had been pulled out and he had more than five stab wounds in his belly' (2013).

When news did start to trickle out about the massacre, the Indonesian authorities could not hide all the bodies. Instead, they claimed that the corpses were from the 17 July 1998 tsunami, the epicentre of which was off Aitape, on the north coast of Papua New Guinea, over 700 kilometres from Biak. However, the bodies that washed ashore did not wash up elsewhere in West Papua. One witness described a cadaver clothed in a Golkar shirt (an Indonesian political party). Another said the Morning Star flag could be seen, painted on the victim's chest.

It is hard to digest this, let alone make sense of such cruelty. What is remarkable is that some Papuans, Rumkabu included, have managed to not only embark on their own healing journey, but to revolt and seek solidarity as they transform a narrative of abject victimhood into stories of potent human agency (Hernawan 2013). Sadly, the Indonesian state and the culture of impunity that exists in West Papua continue to frustrate those journeys. Instead of prosecuting the perpetrators, the government jailed the victims. Nearly two decades later, people in Biak are still scared of talking about what happened. The survivors continue to be harassed. Many Papuans in Biak project their anger (and fear) at the victims and blame them for what happened.

Papuans call it *Biak Berdarah* (translates literally to 'Bloody Biak'), the 'Biak Massacre' in English. Many questions remain unanswered about it. Although human rights investigators from ELSHAM visited Biak a week later and interviewed survivors and witnesses, they were not able to conduct their work openly. Their detailed 69-page report, 'Graves without Names; Names without Graves' (ELSHAM Papua 1999), is the most comprehensive information we have but it remains, because of the circumstances – then and now – incomplete. Human Rights Watch (1998) also sent an undercover reporter but still there are substantial gaps. Further evidence, compiled during the Biak Massacre Citizens Tribunal that took place in Sydney fifteen years after the bloodshed, includes testimony from survivors, witnesses, journalists and investigators.

Eighteen months after the tribunal, when I travelled to Biak, survivors spoke of mass graves in hushed tones. I was furtively shown sites and told of others. No forensic investigation has ever taken place. Even under Widodo's current presidency, nearly twenty years after Suharto's New Order, the massacre is not one of the cases of state violence and gross human rights violations that will be reopened and subjected to a human rights court. But we know from the testimony of witnesses it was a massacre.

It is the Biak Massacre, its horror, the colluding silence in the domestic and international press; the complicity of Western powers who continue to train and arm the Indonesian military and police; the opportunistic avarice of the foreign corporations who exploit Papuan resources, giving nothing but crumbs in return; and the determination of Papuans to resist the occupation – all these things sharpen the focus on the history of civil resistance in West Papua.

Early resistance movements

The nonviolent resistance that coalesced around the water tower in Biak was shaped by earlier resistance movements. Indigenous Papuan nations have been resisting incursions from outsiders for centuries. From the 1850s to 1939, the Dutch colonialists, seeking to protect the spice trade, faced no fewer than 42 rebellions – both violent and nonviolent.

By 1911, twenty years before Gandhi launched the Salt Satyagraha (the march from Ahmedabad to Dandi to protest British tax on salt) in India, Papuan resistance leaders were urging followers not to pay taxes and to withhold labour. These tactics were repeated twenty years later in a nonviolent movement that was unmistakably nationalistic, both in terms of its geographic scope and goals – the unity

and self-determination of diverse tribes. Angganeta Menufandu, a *Konor* (indigenous prophet), articulated grievances and incited dissent through *Koreri*, an indigenous ideology from Biak that she infused with Christian symbols and rituals. During the late 1930s and early 1940s, she urged her followers to engage in mass noncooperation with Dutch orders to participate in forced labour gangs, collective tax resistance, and mass defiance of government and mission bans on *wor* (ritual singing and dancing). For Angganeta, a commitment to nonviolent discipline was central, for the shedding of blood 'bars the way to *Koreri*'. The Dutch tricolour flag was inverted – a reversal of the colonial political order – and the Morning Star and a cross were added, symbolising a coming Papuan kingdom. Two decades later, this flag would inspire the design of the Papuan national flag.

The movement continued until 1943 and aroused strong religious fervour. As Angganeta's influence spread, pilgrims visited her, disregarding Dutch and mission bans. The Dutch sent police to torch movement leaders' homes, provoking outrage and increasing the movement's popularity. By now Angganeta was known as Angganeta Bin Damai ('Angganeta woman of peace'). When she was arrested, Biak erupted in riots. After completing her sentence, Angganeta returned to the island of Insumbabi, where she was enthusiastically welcomed. Visiting pilgrims breached Dutch bans on performing *wor* and drinking palm wine, shedding their Western clothes for traditional Biak loincloths, and following food taboos handed down in Manarmakeri stories, traditional Biak and north coast folklore of salvation and transformation. Jan Victor de Bruijn (1951), a Dutch administrator at the time, saw Angganeta's movement as 'far less a religion than a self-conscious Papuan nationalism'.

When the Japanese invaded they were initially welcomed as expelling the Dutch but, after incidents of cruelty, the movement sought freedom from all foreign control. In 1942 Angganeta was jailed again. Movement leadership passed to Stephanus Simiopiaref, a Biak man in jail for murder. He escaped and tried to free Angganeta. Now the movement became more nationalistic and martial, replete with units, ranks and wooden rifles. Simiopiaref proclaimed himself 'General', acknowledging Angganeta as 'Queen'. Previously, leadership had rested with women, and 'peace women' even banished those 'who wanted war and had shed blood' to the neighbouring small island of Rani (renamed Gadara) as a way of maintaining nonviolent discipline. These exiles now became warriors in Simiopiaref's movement.

'The core of Stephanus' message and political propaganda,' writes Susanna Rizzo (2004, p. 307), an academic, 'was the attainment of political independence and national unity.' Despite favouring armed struggle, Simiopiaref's analysis of power would fit in a nonviolent action manual: the source of Papuan servitude was their willingness to obey foreign orders. Building on Angganeta's reclamation of traditions, Simiopiaref further fused Papuan identity and Christianity into a nationalist ideology of resistance based on promoting mass withdrawal of consent and refusal to co-operate with foreign rule: 'From the moment the foreigners arrived we had to obey orders and were no longer free people in our own land. But our time is coming; the masters will be slaves and the slaves masters' (Rizzo 2004, pp. 307–8).

The Japanese responded ruthlessly to the call for armed resistance, eliminating resistance groups and killing leaders, including Angganeta, who was executed in mid-1942 (Kamma 1972; Rutherford 2003; Rizzo 2004). On 10 October 1943 the Japanese massacred between 600 and 2000 Biak islanders. At this point the violent uprising imploded. The rebels attacked not only the Japanese, but also collaborators and bystanders. The violence continued in 1944 when the United States drove the Japanese out of Biak at the cost of thousands of lives, both Japanese and islander.

Papuan nationalism was now out of the box. After Angganeta and Simiopiaref's movement and a simultaneous Papuan rebellion against Dutch rule in Tanah Merah in the south, resistance movements began to promote unity and the explicit idea of a free and independent West Papua. Following recognition of Indonesian independence in 1949, after a fierce struggle against the Dutch, Papuans engaged in diplomatic

efforts during the 1950s and 1960s. Supported by their former colonisers, Papuans established the first Papuan People's Congress, electing sixteen representatives supported by a further twelve appointed members, one of whom was a woman, Dorcas Tokoro-Hanasbey (Drooglever 2009, p. 532). When the council was officially installed on 5 April 1961, representatives of the governments of England, France, Australia and the Netherlands, as well as the governor of Australian New Guinea, were in attendance (ibid., p. 534). Meeting regularly they debated the contours of a new state and pushed for rapidly increasing education and to Papuanise[2] the civil service. Leaders like Nicolaas Jouwe, Markus Kaisiepo, Clemens Runawery, Z Zacharias Sawor, Ben Tanggahma, Herman Womsiwor, Wim Zonggonau and others intensely followed the diplomatic debates unfolding in The Hague, Washington, Canberra, New York, Rome and Jakarta. A number of Papuans managed to travel abroad to lobby officials about the outcomes of these discussions but they remained essentially locked out of a process that favoured continuing with the Act of Free Choice, even as the Indonesian government's intransigence became clear.

Cultural resistance

During the 1970s, Papuan activists challenged Suharto's attempts to impose a hegemonic Indonesian identity. The cultural music group Mambesak, founded by Arnold Ap and Sam Kapissa, collected and performed songs and dances from all over West Papua, fashioning a pan-Papuan identity transcending tribal differences. According to anthropologists Diana Glazebrook (2008) and Danilyn Rutherford (2003), Mambesak initially framed their cultural action as a contribution to diversity in a unified Indonesia; but, for Papuan audiences, the implicit message of songs in their own languages, local dances and other hidden transcripts kept alternative ideas and identities alive, evoking pride in being Papuan.

Occasionally Mambesak were overtly political, as in 1977, when they danced naked to protest bloody Operasi Koteka.[3] This military operation in the remote highlands was designed in part to forcibly stop the Dani wearing the *holim* (penis sheath). Operasi Koteka turned the Baliem River red and left thousands dead.

Inspired by Mambesak, Papuan performance groups proliferated in the early 1980s. Through music and dance Papuans came to see themselves as a distinct people with their own culture, different and separate from Indonesian culture and identity. Songs commemorating the suffering of the people at the hands of the state were passed down orally. As performances spread across tribal boundaries, Papuans began seeing their experience under Indonesian rule as a collective injustice and Indonesian rule as intolerable. Performing local dances, playing the *tifa* (a Papuan drum) and composing songs on the ukulele all became ways for Papuans to simultaneously express themselves and communicate that they were not Indonesians until a new wave of repression hit them.

In November 1983 Ap was arrested and imprisoned, and in April 1984 he and another Mambesak member, Eddie Mofu, were killed, allegedly while trying to escape. These murders were part of reprisals in the wake of a foiled attack by Papuan guerrillas. Once again traditional songs and dances were banned, and once again performing these became acts of civil resistance. To draw international attention to the grave situation, some 11,000 Papuans took part in an organised mass exodus east to Papua New Guinea (Glazebrook 2008).

Another key leader in the early years of the nonviolent struggle was Dr Thomas Wainggai, a West Papuan intellectual, who studied Gandhi and looked to nonviolent struggle in South Africa as a source of inspiration. Wainggai advocated a two-fold strategy of disruptive nonviolent action against Indonesia and creative human-centred development based on West Papuans' distinct identity as Melanesians. He set up discussion and prayer groups to initiate a movement designed to reorient West Papuans to think of themselves as Melanesians living on the western rim of the Pacific. On 14 December 1988 Wainggai, together with several hundred other West Papuans, organised and participated in an illegal but open flag raising, using a new flag. He called the flag 'West Melanesia', to represent the vision of a united Melanesia that has

been held by many Papuans, particularly since the 1950s. Wainggai was quickly arrested by the Indonesian authorities and sentenced to twenty years' imprisonment. Several other leaders who helped organise the protest also received lengthy prison sentences. His Japanese-born wife was sentenced to six years' jail for simply sewing the flag used in the demonstration. Wainggai died in prison in Jakarta in March 1996. The cause of his death is not known but many West Papuans believe he was murdered by the Indonesian military.

The development of oppositional consciousness in West Papua has been a necessary prerequisite for nonviolent action. The work of Arnold Ap, millenarian movements, and early nonviolent actions such as flag raisings helped reframe the private trials and tribulations of West Papuans as a national concern. In the process these actions and movements laid the foundations for later, more extensive political actions.

During the early years of Indonesian rule the most politicised way of expressing Papuan identity was through raising the Morning Star flag – a symbol imbued with hidden, almost mystical Papuan understanding of the inevitability of transformation. That is true even today. The Indonesian authorities, recognising the power of symbols, see displaying the flag as tantamount to declaring independence, which is why they sentenced Filep Karma to fifteen years' jail for raising the Morning Star at a nonviolent demonstration in 2004. Since then he has been offered a pardon by former Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono if he accepts his guilt. Karma has refused: 'Why should I say sorry? I have done nothing wrong. It is the Indonesian government who should say sorry. Not just to me, but to the entire Papuan people. And they should return our sovereignty!' (2015).

Sovereignty is something fashioned in the furnace of struggle. It is not given on a golden platter by kings to patient, compliant subjects. As a result, flag raisings and their inherent insistence that Papuans are not Indonesian remain a subversive challenge to state power. Although President Yudhoyono moved to ban the Morning Star flag and other symbols of independence through promulgating Law 77/2007 – a law that clearly demonstrates the extent to which peaceful freedom

of expression is criminalised in West Papua – Papuans have circumvented this by painting the flag on their bodies, stitching it into *nokens*, the distinctive Papuan string bags, and wearing it as clothing. As one young Papuan activist recounted to me in November 2011, when she was arrested for having the Morning Star painted on her face she told the police, 'This is not a flag, it is a face paint!' Now Law 77/2007 has become almost impossible to enforce. At the same time the movement has matured from isolated tactics-led messianic flag raisings to a mass-based movement.

Papuan resistance since the fall of Suharto

It is possible to map a number of overlapping phases of the struggle since Suharto's fall in 1998 until early 2015:

1. Papuan Spring
2. collapse of Special Autonomy and return to repression
3. decline of the overt independence movement and emergence of more limited campaigns
4. movement for dialogue and Papua as a Land of Peace
5. noncooperation spreads to state institutions
6. independence declared, again
7. Papuan-led nonviolent transnational action
8. resurgence of the diplomatic struggle.

Phase 1: Papuan Spring

The fact that the post-Suharto state responded so brutally to the peaceful Biak uprising was a rude awakening to those moderate West Papuan leaders who hoped that human rights violations and repression in the territory would end with the demise of Suharto and his New Order. The Biak Massacre acted as a catalyst for the formation of FORERI (Forum for Reconciliation in Irian Jaya), which was formed in August 1998 by church and human rights activists. FORERI aimed to rebuild the self-confidence of West Papuan society that had been weakened by years of authoritarian rule. Its purpose was to promote reconciliation

within West Papua, particularly within tribal and religious groups. FORERI also wanted to open up political space for an 'open, honest, and democratic dialogue' between the state and the people concerning their grievances and aspirations.

After a series of discussions with high-ranking Indonesian politicians and bureaucrats, known as the Jakarta Informal Meetings, a team of 100 people (called Team 100) was invited to Jakarta for a special meeting with the then Indonesian president BJ Habibie in February 1999. The purpose of the meeting was to discuss West Papuan grievances and a process of resolution. Prior to the meeting with Habibie, the West Papuan activists decided to limit discussion to problems related to development. However, emboldened by the knowledge that several members of US Congress had sent a letter to Habibie and his most powerful opponent, Amien Rais, calling for dialogue on the political status of East Timor and West Papua, several political leaders involved with Team 100 began to privately re-evaluate their objectives to include full independence.

When Team 100 met with Habibie, a number of West Papuans launched into an impassioned plea for independence. Stunned and clearly misinformed about the depth and extent of discontent in West Papua, Habibie put aside his prepared response and in an emotional appeal urged the delegation to reconsider its desire for the territory to separate from Indonesia. Although there was no clear outcome from the meeting, the West Papuan struggle had exploded onto centre stage. The long-suppressed desire for independence was now on the table and Team 100 returned home to a hero's welcome. FORERI as an organisation, however, soon broke down over internal disagreements concerning strategy. One group went on to form ELSHAM to pursue a human rights agenda. Another formed the PDP (Papua Presidium Council) to promote Papuans' political rights.

After returning from the meeting with Habibie a number of prominent West Papuan political leaders immediately began preparations for a national consultation called Musyuwarah Besar, often shortened to Mubes, on the causes of conflict in West Papua and strategies to achieve

merdeka. Mubes, which was held in February 1999, attracted thousands of West Papuans from all around the country. Some highland delegations walked through the mountains and jungles for a month or more just to attend. Three years later while walking through the Yali highlands I met youth delegates who had made that journey to Port Numbay on foot. Gumboots were the footwear of choice. They proudly showed me their ID cards, the Morning Star emblazoned next to a picture of Jesus.

Mubes was a public act of political defiance. The long-banned Morning Star flag flew free and the desire for independence was expressed openly. Delegates held elections to form the PDP, a kind of parallel government made up of a 31-member executive (the Presidium) and a 500-member panel of local representatives from every region of West Papua. The Presidium was made up of nine pillars, comprising the different sectors of Papuan society: religious leaders, traditional (customary) councils, public and private professionals, students, women, youth, former political prisoners, those who played a historical role in the formation of Papuan nationalism, and the political dialogue group. Traditional Chief Theys Eluay was elected Chair, and Thom Beanal, a longtime critic of Freeport who had worked with human rights activist John Rumbiak and who later became a Freeport Commissioner, was elected Vice-Chair. Beanal, an Amungme man from the highlands, speaking on behalf of the entire PDP leadership, pledged to pursue independence through peaceful means. Delegates agreed to hold a congress six months later – the Second Papuan People's Congress, taking its name from the 1961 national congress that had formed the West New Guinea Raad, the parliament established by the Dutch.

In a communiqué released at the conclusion of Mubes, Eluay and Beanal issued the following statement:

> We condemn outright the illegal transfer of sovereignty of the Papuan people from the Kingdom of the Netherlands to the Republic of Indonesia via the United Nations [that] concluded on 1st of May 1963. The transfer is deemed illegal as we, the

> very people directly affected by the decision, have never been consulted nor given any opportunity to have any say whatsoever through our national legislature, The Papuan National Council, the mandated body in existence at the time that should have ultimately been responsible for determining the political destiny of the Papuan people.

The Second Papuan People's Congress, held between 29 May and 4 June 1999 in Port Numbay/Jayapura, was attended by West Papuan leaders living in exile and representatives from every sector of society and region in West Papua. Outside the meeting tens of thousands of West Papuans who could not fit into the packed auditorium danced and held vigil, applying moral pressure on even the most moderate West Papuan leader to support independence. Based on photographs from the time and interviews with participants and witnesses, I estimate around 50,000 West Papuans were in attendance.

The PDP targeted the Achilles' heel of Indonesia's occupation: its legitimacy to rule West Papua. They rejected both the 1962 New York Agreement and the sham UN-sponsored Act of Free Choice.

Building on years of movement work by various political groups and individuals who self-identified as members of the Free Papua Organisation (OPM or Organisasi Papua Merdeka) as well as the TPN (West Papua National Liberation Army), Presidium leaders quickly embarked on a strategy of international elite lobbying. At the grassroots level, Presidium and panel members held discussions about the conflict in West Papua, sharing the discussions and decisions of the congress. The Presidium's goal was a third party-mediated dialogue on the political status of West Papua. Unfortunately for the PDP, the space for dialogue with Jakarta had clearly closed after the meeting with Habibie. There was no longer a credible and powerful enough movement in West Papua to compel Jakarta to sit at the table. Moreover, in the wake of 'losing' East Timor, renewed nationalist vigour in functioned to harden the government's position. The chance of dialogue with Jakarta, when the opening bid was independence, was clearly non-existent.

Despite its shortcomings, the ability of the PDP to mobilise popular support for *merdeka* – and the explicit and widespread commitment to nonviolent action by West Papuan political leaders as a means of carrying out the political struggle for independence – constituted a challenge to Indonesian authority and legitimacy that the armed struggle had never been able to achieve. The formation of the PDP also acted as a catalyst for third-party support, dramatically raising the profile of the struggle, leading to renewed grassroots movement-building work in Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand. In the face of a persistent and disciplined nonviolent movement and growing international support that exposed human rights violations by the Indonesian state and questioned Jakarta's legitimacy in West Papua, the Indonesian government, eager to maintain its newfound reformist image, found it increasingly difficult to justify repression and military operations in the way it had been able to do in the past.

Enlarged democratic space in Indonesia enabled the formation of indigenous human rights organisations in West Papua. ELSHAM was registered in May 1998, just days before the fall of Suharto. ELSHAM's origins date back to 1995 when West Papuan civil society activist John Rumbiak carried out investigations into human rights violations in and around the Freeport mining concession area. The subsequent report, 'Trouble at Freeport' (Rumbiak 1995; Elmslie 2005), released under the name of the Australian Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA) in order to protect Rumbiak's identity and safety, attracted an unprecedented amount of interest. Bishop Muninghoff from the Catholic Church in West Papua ordered an independent investigation and Australia's foreign minister Gareth Evans directed Australia's then ambassador to Indonesia Alan Taylor to visit Timika to assess the situation. US embassy staff, members of the international media and the Indonesian National Human Rights Commission (KomNasHAM or Komisi Nasional Hak Asai Manusia) also made visits in the period immediately following the release of 'Trouble at Freeport'. Muninghoff's, Taylor's, and KomNasHAM's subsequent reports all verified Rumbiak's original findings. Critical links between West Papuan activists, Indonesian

NGOs (non-government organisations) and international NGOs were formed and strengthened. The resulting publicity sparked widespread demonstrations across Indonesia by West Papuan students. In the capital Jayapura, student activists occupied the provincial parliament. It was 'the first time the people in West Papua had a feeling that there is some freedom; that the embryo of freedom is coming', John Rumbiak said (MacLeod 2007a, p. 11).

The experience of the Freeport investigation led to collaboration between individuals from the Catholic and Protestant churches, academics, community leaders and NGO activists, who formed the Irian Working Group for Justice and Peace in 1996. Critically, the number and density of linkages between West Papuan and Indonesian activists also increased, raising the issue of West Papuan grievances within other parts of Indonesia. The use of human rights discourse increased the West Papuan activists' influence and leverage in a way that had not been possible when using indigenous rights discourse, previously favoured by West Papuans and their allies.

ELSHAM's rights agenda and the growing power of the PDP attracted the ire of the Indonesian state. Intense repression from the security forces included an attempt by the TNI (Indonesian Armed Forces) to sue the organisation for defamation. The court case, an attack on the ELSHAM office in Jakarta by 'persons unknown', and a leadership vacuum created by the departure of key staff (some of whom were receiving credible death threats and violent attacks on family members) took a heavy toll on the organisation. The Indonesian state's strategy to reassert its control in West Papua, after losing ground to the PDP, was made clear in a leaked letter entitled '*Rencana Operasi Pengkondisian Wilayah dan Pembangunan Jaringan Kommunikasi dalam Menyikapi arah Politik Irian Jaya untuk Merdeka dan Melepaskan Diri dari Negri Kesatuan Republik Indonesia*' ('Operational Plan for Changing Conditions in the Territory and the Establishment of a Communications Network in Dealing with the Direction of Political Developments in Irian Jaya in Favour of Independence and Demanding Separatism from Indonesia'). The letter outlined a carrot-and-stick approach that included decapitating the West Papuan leadership, military operations to eradicate separatism, establishing pro-Indonesian militias, and improving social welfare.

Phase 2: Collapse of Special Autonomy and return to repression

The carrot to complement the Indonesian government's stick was at first Special Autonomy, and then administrative division or *pemekaran*, a policy ironically translated as 'expansion' and sometimes as 'flourishing'. On paper Special Autonomy was a far-reaching proposal that sincerely attempted to address core West Papuan grievances within the framework of a united Indonesian state. However, its promise has not been realised. Papuan's health and income levels have actually deteriorated under Special Autonomy, despite a substantial amount of mining, oil and gas revenue being directed away from Jakarta and back to the provincial government in West Papua. As pro-democracy activists in other parts of Indonesia worked to institutionalise the 1998 reform agenda, in West Papua human rights violations, including torture, increased (Hernawan 2013).

In the beginning, the drafting and then acceptance of Special Autonomy was a partial win for the movement. Jakarta was never in favour of the Papuan Bill and only accepted it in order to placate growing political mobilisation led by the PDP. Seizing a political opportunity afforded by the reformist presidency of Abdurrahman Wahid, a man who was more sensitive to Papuan concerns than his predecessors, the initial bill was drafted by a team of Papuans comprising the Papuan governor at the time, Jaap Salosa; Agus Sumule, an Indonesian migrant from Sulawesi and lecturer at the State University of Papua (UNIPA) in Manokwari; Frans Wosparik, the rector of the University of Cendrawasih in Jayapura; and staff from local development and human rights NGOs. The team began an extensive consultation process. Their purpose was to break the deadlock that had emerged after the Team 100 visit to President Habibie in Jakarta. This was an either/or choice between two mutually exclusive positions: 'M' for *merdeka*, conceived narrowly as 'independence' in this instance, and 'O' for *otonomi*

(autonomy), which for many Papuans was simply code for the 'repressive status quo'. For Sumule, who co-ordinated the Special Autonomy (Otsus) drafting team, a man who had lived most of his life in Papua and was well regarded by many Papuans, Otsus was a win–win situation containing the aspirations of 'M' and 'O', which in Sumule's words were 'both the rights of the people' (Sumule 2003b). However, this point was hard to sell. Under time pressure, more work went into lobbying Jakarta and Papuan elites than negotiating with activists and the PDP.

The PDP rejected Otsus. They declared that they had no mandate to campaign for anything less than independence. (Although, later on, one of their members, Franzalbert Joku, split from his colleagues and began to back the Indonesia state.) In many regions, particularly in the highlands and Timika, consultation meetings were angrily – but nonviolently – disrupted, and sometimes closed down before they even began. This prompted Theo van den Broek from the SKP (Catholic Office for Justice and Peace) to caution the drafting team against 'rushing into conclusions however accurate they might be if the people did not have enough sense of participation and ownership' (van den Broek 2002; King 2004, p. 82). The division in society was along distinct class lines: pragmatic and often cautious support from a narrow band of the Papuan elite and urban intellectuals, and vehement opposition from farmers, students, people in the villages and all independence groups.

The drafting team, however, was under pressure to finish the document. Fourteen drafts later the final bill was a far-reaching proposal giving Papuans control over virtually all matters of self-government with the exception of external defence. It was effectively independence in all but name only. But as the bill passed from the periphery (Jayapura) to the centre (Jakarta), it underwent significant changes. A special committee, Panitia Khusus or Pansus for short, of parliamentarians and advisors was formed to hold a further series of consultations. Members of the TNI, who in 2001 were still guaranteed non-elected seats in the national parliament, and a group of Indonesian nationalists led by Megawati Sukarnoputri's P-PDI (Partai-Perjuangan Demokratis Indonesia or Party of Democratic Struggle) opposed key sections of the bill (Sumule 2003).

The military and civilian nationalists argued that Special Autonomy would concede too much to the Papuans, further encouraging separatism. Nonetheless, the bill was eventually passed by parliament but with substantial amendments. Gone was the provision to control migration. So too was the referendum on independence to be held after five years. The proposed Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papuan People's Assembly) was stripped of its veto powers. The TNI's combat troops would remain. The legislation did allow Papuans to display the Morning Star flag and sing the anthem 'Hai Tanahku Papua', but they were permitted to do so only as cultural expressions. What this meant, however, was not clearly defined. This would later have disastrous consequences when the military and police sought to prevent flag raisings (King 2004, pp. 85–9).

The 'Red and White' version of Otsus (named after the colours of the Indonesian flag), as opposed to the Papuan version, still secured a number of Papuan demands. The centrepiece was the provision for a kind of Papuan senate, the Majelis Rakyat Papua (Papuan People's Assembly or MRP), and an increased return in revenue raised from mining (80 per cent return of revenue) and oil and gas projects (70 per cent return of revenue) back to the territory to help fund the necessary changes in governance and to provide a much-needed boost to development. The MRP was to be made up of 36 Papuans elected for terms of five years, comprising twelve equal members drawn from three major consistencies: religious communities, women, and customary leaders, three of the most embattled groups in Papuan society. The purpose of the MRP was to help safeguard Papuan traditional and religious values and advise the provincial parliament.

The PDP's allies in Jakarta and the active participation of Wosparik, Salosa and Sumule was a sign that the movement had developed what Thurber (2015) calls 'social overlap'. Influential individuals with relational connections to the centre of power in Jakarta were active in the movement. Sumule, who was an indispensable ally for Papuan moderates, decamped to Jakarta to guide the bill through its passage to law. Despite the fact that the Papuan version had been rejected, for Sumule and many Papuan elites, Otsus represented a partial victory for the

nascent freedom movement and directly addressed many of the Papuan people's core grievances. Otsus was also widely supported – celebrated even – by the international community. The passing of the legislation by the national parliament in Jakarta allowed Western governments like the United States, the Netherlands and Australia to sidestep the vexed question of West Papua's political status and their own complicity in obstructing genuine self-determination in the 1960s. With Special Autonomy passed and the illusion of a deflated freedom movement, business could continue as usual. Western powers kept training and arming the Indonesian military and transnational corporations continued their economic exploitation of workers. Within West Papua it was a different story. Despite the attempt at conflict resolution, Otsus failed to build a new political consensus between Jakarta and Jayapura. It reinforced the sense that Jakarta was unable or unwilling to listen to and understand core Papuan grievances.

Special Autonomy is a failure. This position is held even by many Papuan members of the provincial parliament and by all founding members of the inaugural MRP who finished their term in February 2011. It is demonstrated by:

- deteriorating human rights and an increase in state-sanctioned violence
- increased migration
- corruption and the lack of capacity
- the absence of affirmative action
- the lack of rigorous monitoring and evaluation to correct shortcomings
- the lack of political will, in Jayapura and Jakarta, to implement the policy.

Even as Special Autonomy was instituted, Jakarta's iron fist came down hard. Efforts to keep the Morning Star flag flying in Wamena were brutally repressed in October 2000. In the early morning of 6 October, police, BRIMOB (Indonesian Mobile Brigade Police Force) and the army launched a series of co-ordinated raids on at least seven community centres or communication posts (*posko* in Indonesian), which had become loci of pro-independence activity, in the Baliem Valley. Morning Star flags were forcibly removed and scores of Papuans were arrested. The response from the community was impassioned and instant. In the village of Wouma two migrants were murdered in unexplained circumstances. By the afternoon independence supporters from around the valley had streamed into Wamena, protesting and 'burning and looting shops as they went' (*Human Rights Watch* 2001). The police and army responded with live fire, taking up positions from inside migrant houses. In the ensuing melee 'at least seven Papuans were shot and killed and twenty-four non-Papuans were killed' (ibid).

Five prominent Papuan leaders, all PDP panel members – Reverend Obed Komba, Reverend Yudas Meage, Yafet Yelemaken, Murjono Murib, and Amelia Yigibalom – helped quell the violence, mediating between the security forces, migrants and Papuans who had taken to the streets. Far from eliciting the Indonesian government's gratitude, their involvement made the five leaders targets of a police investigation. When the police failed to apprehend the alleged Papuan perpetrators of the fatal attacks on the migrant community, the five were held responsible. Two months later they were arrested, accused of fomenting pro-independence sentiment but without any evidence that they were involved in the 6 October riot. On 10 March 2001 Komba and the other four PDP leaders were each sentenced to between four and four-and-a-half years' imprisonment. It was a sign of things to come.

On 10 November 2001 the flamboyant Chair of the PDP, Theys Eluay, was strangled to death by soldiers from Komando Pasukan Khusus (Kopassus or Indonesian Special Forces Command) after attending a dinner party as the military's guest of honour. And while individual members of the PDP continue to be politically active, the jailing of PDP leaders, followed by the assassination of Theys Eluay, was a blow from which the PDP never recovered.

The military also renewed security operations, particularly in the highland areas. One such operation in 2005 left over 6000 internally

displaced people barely eking out an existence in the mountains and jungles as hundreds of homes, schools, churches, and health clinics were burned to the ground (Wing and King 2005). Another military operation in December 2006 resulted in similar numbers of internally displaced people being too scared to return to their homes. In addition, a network of militias was established. By 2000, reports started circulating that Laskar Jihad, a Muslim militia group, had established itself in West Papua and begun a program of training and recruitment. In the highlands the militia group BMP (Red and White Garrison) was formed. In Timika, Eurico Gutteres – the notorious East Timorese militia leader out on bail for his part in the post-referendum violence that was organised and perpetrated by the TNI and their militia proxies in East Timor – formed the Red and White Defenders Front.

It was clear that by 2001 the brief Papuan Spring that burst into flower so dramatically in 1998 had come to an end.

Phase 3: The decline of the overt independence movement and emergence of more limited campaigns

This phase overlapped with widespread disillusionment about Special Autonomy. As Jakarta squeezed the political space for pro-independence campaigning, new and more localised struggles emerged. Some were widespread, like the successful campaign that scuttled plans for a third province. Others were initially less visible, such as the Papuan women market sellers' successful campaign for their own marketplace in the capital and the indigenous landowners and environmentalists who kicked BHP Billiton off Gag Island in Raja Ampat, the world's most diverse marine environment.

With the development of more localised campaigns, students demanded the closure of the Freeport-McMoRan/Rio Tinto mine. The campaign, however, dissipated after a demonstration against Freeport in Jayapura turned violent in March 2006. It was a searing lesson of the importance of maintaining discipline. Papuans blocked the road outside the University of Cendrawasih. Road access between the capital and the airport was completely cut. On the second day, as the security

forces attempted to clear the road, a riot erupted. Papuan stoned five members of the security forces to death. BRIMOB retaliated, shooting up student dormitories and randomly arresting and beating Papuans. Hundreds fled to neighbouring Papua New Guinea. The campaign was over as the security forces reframed the problem as one of law and order. Core student organisers were either arrested or went into hiding. The issues of land rights and equality were lost. The lack of discipline and premature escalation of tactics by student leaders set back organising for years.

Conditions for workers at Freeport – and landowners – remained dire. Tongoi Papua, the first independent labour union in West Papua, was formed in 2006 by indigenous workers of the Freeport gold and copper mine, uniting highlanders and islanders who had previously been separated by decades of mistrust and mutual suspicion. In April 2007 mass demonstrations and a 6000-strong labour strike won Papuan workers improved conditions, doubling the wages of the lowest-paid workers. Four years later, 8000 Papuan and Indonesian Freeport mineworkers again went on strike, over low wages, conditions and the right to organise as workers. By December 2011 the strike was into its third month. Several miners were shot dead by unidentified assailants. Freeport was losing a staggering US$18 million per day.

The strikes revealed two critical things about power in West Papua. First, that the cosy protection and privilege Freeport had enjoyed under Suharto (Leith 2003) was over. Second, Freeport emerged as a kind of feudal enclave in West Papua, dependent on worker support with vulnerable supply lines prone to disruption. As James Elmslie (2011) wrote in the wake of the second strike:

> The mine and the company [Freeport] will now live forever in the shadow of the events of the past six weeks. The next attack will always be hanging imminent: maybe tonight; maybe never. But the illusion that the mine is safe and secure is gone forever. It is, for the time being, a defenseless victim which can be brought to a grinding halt at will. The security bought with the tens of

millions paid to the TNI and police has proved to be no security at all; on the contrary those payments have made the mine even more vulnerable.

Phase 4: The movement for dialogue and Papua as a Land of Peace

Despite localised successes and the important learning about organising and resistance that came with them, the larger picture remained grim. The Indonesian military was quickly reasserting its control over the territory. Religious leaders were concerned that the formation of militias like Laskar Jihad could ignite the kind of inter-communal violence between diverse ethnic and religious communities that had occurred in Central Sulawesi and Maluku. In this context the idea of Papua as a Land of Peace began to take shape. According to Benny Giay (2001b), the idea first emerged in Serui at a meeting of Papuan youth and students in June 1999. Inspired by a combination of local myths, Christian teachings and their own historical experience, the young people proposed a 'Zone of Peace'. A month later, on 17 July 1999, *adat* leaders and non-Papuan community leaders signed a 'communiqué for peace', pledging to keep the region peaceful and to 'work together to prevent any... provocateurs [coming] to Papua to create more conflict and violence'.

The idea of Papua as a Land of Peace was taken up again by Marten Tanawane, a traditional leader from Serui, Yapen Waropen district, in June 2000. After meditating and spending time in prayer, Tanawane felt God calling him to 'create an atmosphere of love and peace in West Papua'. A public declaration to this effect was made in the presence of Papuans and non-Papuans in Serui on 17 September 2000. The extraordinary thing about this meeting was that Tanawane was able to recruit the support of both the police and military. The public declaration in Serui involved a foot-washing ceremony, where the local military commander washed the feet of the organisers. Tanawane and his colleagues then proceeded to wash the feet of the police chief. While in the 1950s Serui was a centre of pro-independence support, in the intervening years it had become a pro-independence stronghold, a fact that made the foot-washing ceremony all the more remarkable.

Around the same time, the concept of Papua as a Land of Peace emerged at a consultation facilitated by the United Evangelical Mission (UEM) in Biak on the proclamation of the Gospel and work for peace (Saud 2005, p. 96). Moved by Tanawane's vision and actions, the DAP (National Council of Customary Chiefs in West Papua) discussed the idea of a peace zone in more detail and gave its backing to the creation of West Papua as 'a territory free from violence, oppression and grief' (Tebay 2006a).

Tebay (Scott and Tebay 2005, p. 609) articulated five goals of the Papua Land of Peace campaign:

1. Third party-mediated dialogue between the Papuan people and the government of Indonesia over the root causes of the conflict
2. Investigation of all alleged human rights violations and justice for the victims. Religious leaders and their NGO allies to encourage the Indonesian government to invite the UN Special Rapporteur on Extra-judicial, Summary or Arbitrary Executions and the UN Special Rapporteur on Torture to visit Papua
3. Withdrawal of all combat troops, disbanding of all militia groups and a cessation of the Indonesian military's involvement in commercial activities (legal and illegal) in the territory
4. Full implementation of the Special Autonomy Law by the Indonesian government
5. Truth-telling about the conduct of the Indonesian government before, during and after the Act of Free Choice in West Papua in 1969, and also the conduct of the United Nations and the US, Australian and Dutch governments.

The Land of Peace concept captured the imagination of Papuan church leaders and human rights activists from ELSHAM. These two groups then decided to sponsor a peace conference for West Papua. In doing so, they were seeking to send a clear signal to both the military and the central government that Papuan civil society wanted to resolve the conflict through peaceful means. The conference, which was held on

15 and 16 October 2002, was attended by a wide cross-section of Papuan society. Papuan civil society activists, elected members of the provincial House of Representatives, Governor Salossa, as well as NGOs, women's groups, *adat* groups and religious leaders, all participated in the conference. The police also strongly supported the conference. Made I Pastika, who was then police chief, was a keynote speaker.

The military's public position, however, hardened. The army's chief of staff at the Trikora Command refused to attend the conference. The TNI claimed that there was no need for a peace conference because the territory was already peaceful. I was in West Papua at the time and did not risk attending the conference but I spent a lot of time with the organisers. I recall both the anticipation leading up to the conference and the apprehension surrounding the snub by the military. For Papuan human rights activists there was sense of foreboding, a fear that the military could escalate the conflict at any time. There was also another power struggle playing out: a division between the police and military in West Papua. This was a division that human rights activists tried to exploit. But even in post-Suharto Indonesia the military proved too powerful an institution to challenge.

The 2002 peace conference outlined three essential elements of a Zone (later Land) of Peace in Papua (Hernawan 2005, p. 55):

1. freedom from physical and psychological conflicts
2. the need for all policies, particularly development policies, to be based on the social and cultural conditions in Papua
3. the need to formulate the idea of a Zone of Peace into law.

As a result of the conference a Peace Commission was formed. This later became the Peace Task Force (PTF), which engaged in citizen diplomacy with guerrilla groups.

The concept of Papua Land of Peace gave direction to a movement traumatised by the murder of PDP Chair Theys Eluay in November 2001. On 1 December 2002, at a speech in Port Numbay/Jayapura celebrating West Papua's national day, PDP's Deputy Chair Thom Beanal

officially declared West Papua as a Zone of Peace (Tebay 2006a). He called on all parties, including government, the Indonesian military, police, non-ethnic Papuans and all Papuan communities in the territory, to work together to realise this humanitarian vision of peace. This call from the PDP was particularly powerful because one of its senior leaders was Thaha Al-Hamid, a Papuan Muslim from Fak-Fak. Despite the fact, or perhaps because of it, the vision of Papua as a Zone/Land of Peace was so ambiguous, meaning different things to different people, the concept was supported by the provincial government and legislative council. The backing of the provincial government, which had only a slight majority of Papuan members at the time, demonstrated the breadth of support for the concept. The campaign directly challenged the military approach to ruling the territory, but it stopped short of advocating independence. The campaign was framed as defending Papuan society. In doing so, Papuan leaders sought to restrain guerrilla groups as much as the state-backed pro-nationalist militia groups like Laskar Jihad.

Guided by religious leaders and human rights defenders inside West Papua, the inter-faith network on West Papua, an international alliance of NGOs, centred their lobbying around three core demands:

1. full implementation of Special Autonomy
2. demilitarisation, specifically a withdrawal of non-organic or combat troops and an end to military impunity
3. third party-mediated dialogue.

The main tactics used to pursue these demands were lobbying the European Union and other governments, making space for Papuan human rights defenders to speak at the UN Human Rights Court, organising speaking tours, and using the media. These tactics are all forms of conventional political processes.

Most importantly, the Papua Land of Peace campaign created a dilemma for the military. Would the military speak out against the campaign and risk signalling its resistance to peace in West Papua as

well as alienating religious leaders, one of the most respected constituencies in Papuan society? Or would it support the concept of Papua being a Land of Peace, thereby undermining its ability to ferment militia activities? Although TNI military commanders in West Papua emphasised that there was no need for the campaign because there was already peace, the campaign most likely played an important role in constraining more covert militia operations. By late 2002 Laskar Jihad was officially disbanded and by the mid to late 2000s reports of militia activity had virtually ceased. While rumours of other Muslim and nationalist militias continued, their activities were low level, confined to training and meetings, and never reached the peak of the early 2000s. On the side of the pro-independence movement there were changes as well. Papuan guerrillas stood down and for several years publicly committed to giving space for peaceful dialogue to work.

By 2004 the TNI had resumed overt military operations in Puncak Jaya in the highlands. Direct violence, economic exploitation and marginalisation, alienation from traditional lands, cultural dislocation, plus a steady stream of mass migration from other parts of Indonesia combined with institutional racism were giving rise to a discourse of 'slow-motion genocide'. Papuan activists across the political spectrum from religious leaders to armed and unarmed resistance leaders still talked about the desire for political dialogue with Jakarta. But they were no longer talking about Papua as a Land of Peace. Instead they used the phase 'Papua, Zone of Emergency' (Papua Zona Darurat). By 2008/9 the campaign was essentially over.

Inside West Papua there was confusion about grand strategy. While religious leaders emphasised dialogue to resolve long-standing grievances like human rights violations and exclusion of indigenous Papuans from political decision-making, the Indonesian government was in no mood for talking. The Land of Peace campaign had no strategy for non-violently coercing the Indonesian government and military to sit at the table. It was conventional politicking without activating people power. When survivors of human rights violations sought justice through the courts, the justice system failed them. A Human Rights Court for West Papua was meant to be established under Special Autonomy. The first (and only) case brought to the Human Rights Court against two BRIMOB officers accused of crimes against humanity collapsed in 2005 when the defendants were released. There has not been a Human Rights Court in West Papua since.

One of the reasons religious leaders emphasised conventional political processes over extra-parliamentary peaceful collective action (unarmed or nonviolent resistance) was concern over their own safety. In April 2010 Neles Tebay remarked in an email to me that 'many religious leaders [both Papuans and non-Papuans] tend not to address injustices because if they do this, they will have to contend with the reaction of the government and the security forces'. That fear is considerable, palpable, and understandable. But it supports the occupation. Excessive prudence can also play into the hands of those who advocate armed resistance (Clark 2009).

Some church leaders resisted the Papua Land of Peace campaign for theological reasons. Tebay (2010) says:

> ... it is because they emphasise the salvation of souls, or the life after death, not earthly life, in their ministry. They have never been educated [in] a down-to-earth theology. Therefore their attentions are too much focused on prayer service. They do not see the Peace campaign as part of the mission of the church. Some church leaders and congregations have dualistic view. They believe that the church is to work for heavenly things, not earthly things. They do not see the link between prayer service and peace on earth. Peace campaign is then considered as a duty of secular institute, such as Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs), and the governments, not the church's ... Therefore not many religious followers of all religions are involved in this Papua Land of Peace campaign. So the religious leaders have to educate its followers while participating [in] common activities for the sake of Papua Land of Peace campaign.

Tebay's comments underscore the need to develop cultures of nonviolent political opposition, including a theology of nonviolent liberation, to help strengthen and catalyse nonviolent resistance.

There were other challenges as well. Inside Indonesia there was little domestic alliance building between Papuan and Indonesian civil society. This problem was exacerbated by a lack of macro-political analysis and strategy. One religious leader reflecting on the campaign said he was:

> ... becoming convinced that you need to raise awareness of the Indonesians to win Papua. There is so little information and knowledge of Indonesians about Papua. What they know has been inherited from the '60s ... from the Suharto time. Papua is still seen as the last territory we [Indonesians] have to save ... liberate from the Dutch ...
>
> Papuans need to work with other Indonesians to uproot the territorial command structure. Unless you dissolve this structure you can't really have a democracy. [But] it is hard to work with groups in Jakarta because of the geographical and the mental distance as well. We [Papuan civil society] need to engage civil society in Jakarta because they can work for you to engage the Indonesian public. But there are lots of prejudices, on both sides. So little has been done to work together – between Papuan civil society and other Indonesians – on this issue [demilitarisation and dissolving the Indonesian military's territorial command structure]. Little work has been done, by anyone, I think. We need to be specific and quite concrete in what we want (Hernawan 2010).

On the positive side because the churches have a clear commitment to nonviolence, because of their respected central role in Papuan society, and because the call to work together to create Papua as a Land of Peace speaks to the Papuan people's lived experience of fear and repression, the message is seen as credible and resonates. The fact that the concept

is based on a modest defence of universal values also means that the call for Papua to be a Land of Peace appealed to mainstream society, not just in West Papua but also in Indonesia and in the international community, particularly among the risk-averse and politically conservative international NGO community. Given that the Papua Land of Peace concept was actively promoted by religious leaders from across the religious spectrum, it was also much harder for elements in the military and central government to dismiss it as a separatist strategy, despite efforts to do exactly that. As Bishop Leo Laba Ladjar (2005, p. 90) writes after reflecting on a visit with the military commander in Jayapura:

> ... with respect to the role of the churches, we are voicing our concern for human rights and working to build peace as a necessary condition for people to realise their basic rights. We want to affirm that this is a mission inherent in our faith and not motivated by a political goal.

In this regard, as an example of nonviolent social defence (Martin 1993), the Papua Land of Peace campaign was enormously successful. While the neighbouring Maluku was engulfed in sectarian violence with Laskar Jihad assuming an active role, West Papua avoided overt and large-scale incidents of sectarian violence, despite a number of provocations and the formation, arming and training of nationalist militias. The Papua Land of Peace campaign helped people understand that armed resistance to state and militia violence would play directly into the military's hands, by giving the state the opportunity to frame the conflict as a horizontal conflict and use that to justify repressive action against Papuan separatists.

In contrast, the Papuan student leaders framed the Papua Land of Peace campaign as a struggle for social change, not social defence. Social change is about changing policies and people in power. It is about transformation of the structures of power – revolutionary changes if you like, dramatic shifts from dictatorship to democracy or from occupation to liberation. It is these goals that appeal to the mainstream of the

freedom movement. And unfortunately it is these goals that the Land of Peace international backers were not ready to support or help finesse. As a social-change campaign, Land of Peace was less than successful.

Despite the confusion, the campaign still achieved some social-change goals. The involvement of the religious leaders, a public commitment to nonviolence (even though this was articulated more as about communal harmony rather than as work for justice), and the minimalist goals (goals that eschewed independence) meant that the concept has been widely supported by international networks. The international and transnational Faith Based Network on West Papua, in particular, and later the International Coalition for Papua emerged to disseminate information about the campaign. In recent years they have strongly advocated for Jakarta–West Papua dialogue (Tebay 2008, 2009, 2012; Widjojo 2009) and effectively functioned to strengthen the number and density of linkages between international NGOs and civil society in West Papua.

Though church leaders hesitate to be drawn into political work, the Papua Land of Peace campaign did assist many church leaders to find their prophetic voice. After years of silence from the church, Reverend Saud (2005, pp. 95–6) writes that the churches are now at the forefront of investigating and addressing human rights violations. They reject violence as a means to resolve conflict and 'promoting nonviolent ways to struggle for justice, human dignity and rights, peace, and the integrity of creation'. According to Tebay (2006a) religious leaders are compelled by their faith to:

> speak out courageously for the rights of the powerless and against all forms of injustice no matter what the source of such abuse may be; to take a stand against the violations of human rights in any form; to promote and defend human dignity; to give a voice to the voiceless; to transform unjust social structures; and to enable the victims of injustice and oppression to achieve responsibility for, and participation in, the decisions to determine their lives.

Not surprisingly, church leaders like Reverend Benny Giay, Father Neles Tebay, Reverend Sofyan Sokrates Yoman, Reverend Selvia Titihalawa, Reverend John Baransano, Helen Matuan, Reverend Herman Saud and many others continue the work of nonviolent change-making in West Papua. Whether the Christian church as a whole in West Papua, beyond the work of its courageous leaders, assumes a more explicit role in mass nonviolent action like the church did in the Philippines, Poland, East Germany, the United States (in the Civil Rights struggle), South Africa and Latin America remains to be seen. As Saud (2005, p. 99) writes:

> There will be no peace in Papua if the campaign for Papua as a Land of Peace is conducted only at the regional level, or the national or international levels. It requires the involvement of all the people in Papua as well as national and international support. The struggle to create the Papua Land of Peace will be a long and difficult journey. It requires commitment and sacrifice of the kind we learn from Jesus Christ.

Phase 5: Noncooperation spreads to state institutions

By 2005 the gloss had well and truly worn off Special Autonomy. The newly formed DAP organised a large mobilisation of 10,000 to 15,000 people to march with a coffin marked 'Otsus' through the streets of Jayapura to the Provincial Parliament Building. While the demonstration laid the symbol of the death of Otsus at the door of the provincial parliament, the protesters' demands were mainly centred on external targets. The international community was a key focus. There were also maximalist demands for independence framed around calls for a referendum and political dialogue. By 2009/10, Papuan leaders felt that a more forceful approach was needed. That opportunity arose in 2010. Simultaneously, Papuan activists were starting to critique the Papuan elite as well as those in Jakarta.

Frustrated by the lack of progress implementing Special Autonomy, the MRP (Papuan People's Assembly) and civil society leaders from Jayapura's NGOs and church networks took the initiative and drafted

policy and law declaring that all candidates for elected office at the sub-provincial level had to be indigenous Papuans. The decision, known as SK14 (*Surat Keputusan Nomor 14* – Letter of Decision Number 14), was widely supported by broad sections of the Papuan community who saw it as an affirmative-action policy. In strategic terms it was an intermediate objective that tapped into widely held concerns: discrimination and displacement. This supported grassroots radicals and moderates working in the administration. As part of the process of debating the policy and drafting the legislation, the MRP was careful to frame SK14 as an extension, a fulfilment, of Special Autonomy, not a repudiation of it. Special Autonomy, after all, already stated that the governor and deputy governor had to be indigenous Papuans. SK14 simply extended the sentiment of Special Autonomy to the next level down in the political structure. It did so in ways that were consistent with other regional autonomy movements in other parts of Indonesia and were clearly delinked from demands for independence. By itself, however, the MRP had no power to legislate, so in accordance with due process the draft was sent to the provincial government and then on to the central government. In Jakarta, however, the International Crisis Group (2010b, p. 1) reported:

> The Ministry of Home Affairs rejected the decision as discriminatory and in violation of a national law on local government.
>
> It was not just the flat rejection that irritated the Papuans who were privy to the process; it was how it was done: without any acknowledgement of the concerns behind SK14; without any effort to understand that 'special autonomy' meant something different than the blind application of national law; and without any attempt to meet them half way. Jakarta's reaction underscored the powerlessness of the MRP and the contemptuous disdain of officials toward its attempt to assert authority.

Papuan anger towards the central government's treatment of the MRP and the lack of sensitivity from the Ministry of Home Affairs towards their need for recognition and respect was palpable. Concerns over discrimination were probably not the real reason SK14 was flatly rejected. Since the institution was formed in 2005 – some four years after Special Autonomy came into effect – the MRP was viewed as a pro-separatist body by both the local intelligence services in West Papua and the central government. A secret intelligence document entitled 'Papuan Political Conspiracy' asserted that even the Papuan elite, including the governor, who at the time was Barnabas Suebu, and Agus Alua, then Chair of the MRP, and many other Papuan politicians, supported independence (Cookson 2008, pp. 48–52).

The insistence that national law overrides local law is symbolic of a hardening of position in Jakarta and a desire to limit the authority of the MRP. Stating that a local law cannot override a national law was interpreted by Papuans as code for 'Special Autonomy was a mistake and gave too much encouragement to those who want to separate from Indonesia.' Jakarta approached the problems in West Papua as economic ones whereas for the Papuans the roots of their grievances were political. Former vice-president Jusuf Kalla summed up the government's position well when he said, 'We're subsidising them [the Papuans] to the tune of more than a billion dollars each year. People in Papua think that Jakarta exploits them but we don't take a single cent from them now. What is there to negotiate?' (International Crisis Group 2010b, p. 12). The 'subsidy' he was talking about is not extra money but a return of a percentage of taxation from resource extraction in West Papua. Kalla's comment underscored the Indonesian government's public communication that the problem was economic not political. The irony is that the hardening of positions in Jakarta was fuelling the very sentiments the state was seeking to avoid and pushing moderates into the arms of the freedom movement.

The government's decision to reject SK14 acted as a 'suddenly imposed shock', crystallising Papuan anger about their treatment by Jakarta and the failure of Special Autonomy. In April 2010 members of the MRP, other church leaders and NGO advocates met to discuss their response. In doing so, members of the MRP, particularly the

late Agus Alua, together with other leaders – Reverend Benny Giay, activist Marthen Goo, MRP advisor and former human rights defender with the SKP Frederika Korain, former Papuan civil servant and businessman Salmone Yuname, Septer Manufandu from the NGO Network, Foker LSM and others – created a political opportunity of their own.

The group decided to do two things. First, to lobby the Papua Provincial Legislative Assembly (DPRP) not to go ahead with local elections. Despite Governor Suebu's reticence to support SK14 and his desire to proceed with the local election, the coalition succeeded in suspending elections for a few months. Second, they agreed to organise an open consultation to evaluate Otsus. Invitations to 200 selected people were sent out. Three times that number turned up with all sectors of society represented and political opinion spanning from radicals to moderates.

The conclusion of the consultation – held on 9 and 10 June – was that Otsus had 'totally failed'. As Benny Giay, a spokesperson for Forum Demokrasi Rakyat Papua Bersatu (ForDem or Democratic Forum of the United Papuan People) who helped organise the meeting, exclaimed, 'Otsus threatens the existence of indigenous Papuans in the land of their ancestors. That is why we say Otsus has totally failed' (International Crisis Group 2010b, p. 7). Participants then broke up into small groups to discuss problems and propose recommendations. A few days later a core group met to synthesise the discussion into a series of demands that went beyond concerns about SK14 and the failure of Special Autonomy to include closing down Freeport and a referendum on independence.

A few days after the consultation, on 18 June, several thousand demonstrators (reports vary from between 2000 to 15,000) from seven districts co-ordinated by ForDem converged on the provincial parliament in Jayapura to officially hand over the people's decision. ForDem leaders demanded that the DPRP sign an agreement to hand back Otsus to Jakarta in no less than three weeks. The MRP, reports Frans Wosparik, rector of the University of Cendrawasih, 'faced a dilemma. They reasoned that with thousands mobilised, refusal to go along could result in violence. On the other hand, if they joined the protesters, they would be seen by the government as pro-separatist militants. They decided to go with the marchers' (International Crisis Group 2010b, p. 8). In doing so, representatives of the MRP tried to emphasise that they acted as the facilitators of Papuan opinion. Demands for a referendum, for instance – what Agus Alua called a 'hot agenda' – was not the official MRP position. In Jakarta's eyes, however, the MRP's role in the mobilisations of June and July 2010 only confirmed their suspicion that the MRP had become a pro-separatist organisation.

In the past the Papuan movement had targeted Jakarta and the international community to give them independence. This time was different. Papuans were targeting their own leaders, the Papuan political elite in the provincial government who were supportive of Special Autonomy. Since the original objective, for SK14 to be passed into law, had been all but lost, ForDem and the coalition broadened their objective during the June and July mobilisations. The coalition was now demanding that the DPRP convene a special session to return Special Autonomy to Jakarta. That goal is more difficult than it might appear to outside observers. Unlike Acheh, where local political parties are permitted, a concession secured by the Helsinki Peace Agreement, in West Papua local political parties are banned. All political parties in West Papua must be national Indonesian parties with membership in other parts of the country. That means Papuan political interests are constantly mediated by what is acceptable to party representatives in Jakarta. This problem is exacerbated by two other factors: the population in West Papua is only a tiny fraction of the national population and people in the rest of Indonesia know little, if anything, about West Papua. Because of these determinants, Papuan concerns are marginalised.

ForDem's decision to choose an intermediary campaign objective that fit the SMART criteria – that is, specific and strategic, measurable, achievable (doable), realistic (within the capacity of the movement to realise) and time-bound – and to carry out this plan through disciplined and escalating nonviolent tactics, was very deliberate. Historically,

Papuans have clearly articulated their grievances. But problem-saturated conversations in West Papua turn quickly into demands for independence or a referendum. What have been missing are solutions and a clear plan to implement them. Short- to medium-term goals that tap into grassroots discontent have not been developed. There has not been an appreciation that well-selected short-term objectives can help bring the movement closer to its ultimate goals and also build power in the process. This was the major shortcoming of Mubes (Musyuwarah Besar) in 1999 and the Second Papuan People's Congress in 2000. The PDP failed to articulate a realistic strategic plan for achieving independence or some milestones along the way that more limited campaigns could be built around.

When I asked Benny Giay (2010c) why ForDem chose to focus on SK14 and handing back Special Autonomy he used the following metaphor to explain the need for intermediate objectives and a strategy for realising them:

> I am a Highlander. So for me desiring freedom is like wanting to eat a banana. In the Highlands if you want to eat a banana you have to begin at least six months before. You have to clear land for a garden. You must nourish the soil. You need a fence so the garden is not destroyed by animals. You have to find a banana sucker, plant it, water it, care for it, make sure it's not overcome by weeds. Only when the banana plant has grown and the fruit has been harvested do you get to eat it. It is the same with *merdeka*. We Papuans need a strategy; we need a plan. We have to think long term. *Merdeka* is not just waving flags and shouting 'Freedom' a couple of times a year. We must plant and care for a garden now if we want to eat the fruit tomorrow.

During the 18 June 2010 demonstration, Papuans gave members of the DPRP until 8 July to hand back Otsus. That time expired with no indication from the DPRP that they would even publicly discuss the issue.

So on the morning of 8 July demonstrators mobilised outside the MRP building in Kotaraja and began a long march into the DPRP building in Jayapura (approximately 10 kilometres away). Accounts of exact numbers vary. The International Crisis Group and police reported 2500 to 3000 demonstrators but several photos and eyewitness accounts I have obtained indicate that the number was in excess of 10,000, and possibly as high as 25,000.

When members of the DPRP failed to receive them – the Speaker of the House John Ibo was away in Jakarta – a smaller group of a few thousand demonstrators decided to occupy the parliament overnight. Simultaneous demonstrations were organised in Timika, Manokwari, Merauke and Wamena. Privately a small block of a dozen parliamentarians supported the protesters' demands but, caught between the government in Jakarta who demanded loyalty to the state and their constituents who were clamouring for a referendum, the group felt too scared to say anything publicly. By 5pm on Friday 9 July, nearly 36 hours after the Papuans first occupied parliament, police were getting ready to forcibly remove the demonstrators.

Late on Friday afternoon I spoke to some of the student organisers from different radical resistance groups in the crowd and asked them what they planned to do. The response was clear: 'We will wait for the command from the field organisers.' Both the KNPB (West Papua National Committee) and WPNA (West Papua National Authority) activists said this without hesitation. The decision to peacefully disperse was made a few hours later. When it was given, everybody – a few thousand people representing a range of different groups and with different ethnic affiliations – left the parliament grounds. This nonviolent discipline in itself was remarkable. Contrast this to when protesters threw stones in 2006, killing five members of the Indonesian security apparatus. Back then the police reacted with deadly violence. As a result of the killing of the Indonesian officers, any moral high ground the protesters might have had evaporated. This time, in July 2010, there was a clear organising structure and discipline was maintained, which kept the emphasis on the message – the failure of Otsus – rather than

on protester behaviour. And although the action was high risk no one was injured or killed.

The protesters did not succeed in achieving their most immediate objective – a special session of parliament to debate the failure of Otsus – but they did secure some concessions. On 14 July, two days after a meeting between Papuan protest leaders and Speaker of the House John Ibo, Minister for Home Affairs Gamawan Fauzi announced that President Yudhoyono would instruct cabinet to discuss the issue of returning Special Autonomy. On 23 July 2010, members of Indonesia's national parliament 'acknowledged that implementation of Special Autonomy had been "less than optimal" and that more evaluation was needed' (International Crisis Group 2010b, p. 12). The same day President Yudhoyono said that an 'audit' of Special Autonomy was necessary.

Yudhoyono's announcement of an 'audit' was followed by two other decisions. First, to set up a crash economic program, the UP4B (Unit for Acceleration of Development in Papua and Papua Barat), headed by Lieutenant General (ret.) Darmono, an organisation that would later be disbanded by President Joko Widodo. The second decision was to re-boot Special Autonomy under the rebadged name 'Special Autonomy Plus'. For many Papuans these decisions reinforced deeply held views: that Jakarta regarded the root of the conflict as economic and that its knee-jerk reaction lacked a deep understanding of the situation, a systematic plan for responding and comprehensive follow-through.

By late 2010 the campaign to hand back Otsus collapsed and the political situation in West Papua had become polarised. Both the independence movement and the Indonesian government were rejecting Special Autonomy, but for different reasons. The Indonesian government rejected it because it gave too much leverage to independence activists. The Papuans rejected it because it was seen as a repudiation of independence. Jakarta felt they were giving the Papuans too much. Papuans felt they were not getting enough. Moderate positions on both sides – greater autonomy within the framework of the Indonesian state or a focus on achieving more limited goals – received little airing in either Jakarta or among radical activists. It was in this context that

Forkorus Yaboisembut, the leader of the Customary Papuan Council, declared independence on 19 October 2011.

Phase 6: Independence declared, again

Faced with intransigence on the part of the Indonesian government, Papuan leaders escalated tactics. On the last day of the Third Papuan People's Congress – a three-day gathering of unarmed resistance groups in October 2011 – Papuan leaders formed the NFRWP (National Federal Republic of West Papua) and declared independence. The response from the security forces was swift and brutal. About an hour after the congress concluded, the security forces opened fire. Three Papuans were shot dead. Two were fatally stabbed. Three hundred people were arrested and beaten. Six leaders were jailed, charged with treason. The police – who shot, stabbed, beat and tortured people – received warning letters.

The killing of protesters at the congress – relayed by mobile phone, Facebook, YouTube and mailing lists – outraged Papuans and their supporters outside the country. The arrest, beating and killing of protesters even divided political elites inside Indonesia. It attracted more third-party support for the West Papuan cause and revealed the extent to which the Indonesian state would go to deny Papuan aspirations for freedom.

The occupation of the provincial parliament in June 2010 and the Indonesian security forces' fatal attack on unarmed Papuans at the third congress in October 2011 were also evidence that the social media revolution had well and truly arrived in West Papua. In July 1998, when the Indonesian military opened fire on activists under the water tower in Biak, it took weeks and months for the news to get out. Even now we do not have a comprehensive forensic account of what happened. But in October 2011 the news was instantaneous, even though no international journalists were present. I don't think I will ever forget the frightened voices of Papuan friends who called me from the Catholic Seminary where the third congress was held. In the background I could hear the sound of gunshots. By 2013 social media was influencing the

opinion of heads of state. At the MSG (Melanesian Spearhead Group), an important sub-regional forum with links to both the Pacific Island Forum and the United Nations, Gordon Lilo, former prime minister of the Solomon Islands, said that social media was highlighting human rights violations in West Papua, calling the situation a 'cyber war' with Indonesia and likened social media posts to 'cyber bullets' (Dorney 2013). In February 2015 Peter O'Neill, prime minister of Papua New Guinea, was even more forthright (Garrett 2015). In an extraordinary speech he embraced West Papuans as 'our people':

> I think as a country the time has come for us to speak about the oppression of our people. Pictures of the brutality of our people appear daily on social media and yet we take no notice. We have a moral obligation to speak for those who are not allowed to talk. We must be the eyes for those who are blindfolded. Again, Papua New Guinea, as a regional leader, must lead these discussions with our friends in a mature and engaging manner.

Then on 10 May 2015 Indonesian President Widodo issued a surprise announcement: foreign journalists would be free to visit West Papua. However, less than 24 hours later, Minister for Security and Political Affairs Tedjo Edhy Purdijatno, told the Indonesian media that nothing had changed: journalists would still need permission from various government agencies. Indonesian military commander General Moeldoko confirmed Purdijatno's statement separately, saying that the previous rules remained. Papuan police also announced that foreign journalists would still be required to report to them and that their activities would be monitored. As long as the Indonesian government values propaganda over a free press, the battle for open access to West Papua will be ongoing. The Surat Jalan system, the architecture through which the police and intelligence services try to monitor foreign visitors, remains in place.

The details are still being worked out but West Papua's media isolation is effectively over. Denying access is hurting the Indonesian government's reputation. Besides, social media is making it impossible to enforce. The challenge for the movement is to use citizen media activism more productively, to extensively cover the geographic expanse of West Papua, to record and disseminate accurate data, and to skill up the movement more systematically, in order to promote and direct moral outrage. The state may still try to maintain the Surat Jalan system but some foreigners, including a group of eleven religious leaders encouraged by their Papuan hosts, have been experimenting with open noncooperation (Hess 2015).

Returning to the events of late 2011, the 'backfire' dynamic, combined with the ability of mobile communications technologies to assist mobilisation, was again evident at demonstrations on 1 December 2011. Despite being shot at during the congress, senior leaders organised nonviolent independence celebrations across the country. The six jailed independence leaders urged Papuans to 'celebrate independence in an atmosphere of peace, safety and calm' (Yaboisembut 2011). Tens of thousands of Papuans – in Jayapura, Sentani, Manokwari, Sorong, Merauke, Timika, Puncak Jaya, Paniai, Wamena and inside Indonesia in Jogjakarta and Jakarta – waved the banned Morning Star flag and shouted, 'Freedom'.

Phase 7: Papuan-led nonviolent transnational action

As Papuan political leaders were jailed others moved in to the vacant political space. The KNPB, WPNA and a range of other youth, student and women's groups kept up a steady spate of political protests. Even as the Indonesian state summarily executed 22 KNPB leaders in 2012 (Bachelard 2012) and refused permission for Papuans to demonstrate, protests continued. These protests inspired transnational action that became increasingly co-ordinated inside and outside the country.

In Jakarta, Papuans formed the National Papua Solidarity (NAPAS) – and later Papua Itu Kita (We Are Papua) – in order to reach out to and draw in Indonesian citizens to support Papuan demands. In October 2013, during the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) conference in Bali, three activists from the Alliance of Papuan University

Students (Aliansi Mahasiswa Papua or AMP) occupied the Australian consulate in Denpasar, attracting unprecedented global attention to the West Papua issue. The AMP activists insisted they were not demanding independence and staged their action at a time when the world's attention was focused on the APEC forum to generate intense domestic and international debate about Jakarta's ban on foreign media in West Papua and rising incarceration of political prisoners. Meanwhile, Benny Wenda, an exiled Papuan leader, established International Parliamentarians for West Papua and its corollary, International Lawyers for West Papua. Wenda opened up Free West Papua offices in England, the Netherlands, Papua New Guinea and Australia, much to the ire of Jakarta.

One of the boldest transnational actions took place in 2005/6. Independence activist Herman Wainggai and his compatriots built a traditional canoe and sailed it for six weeks around West Papua. As they made their way along the north coast, around the Birds Head down the Asmat coast to the south in Merauke, Wainggai picked up Papuan activists fleeing from military repression (Nichols 2006). When those 43 West Papuan refugees arrived in Australia in January 2006 they successfully claimed political asylum, igniting a political firestorm. Seven years later, some of those refugees sailed back to West Papua with the Freedom Flotilla. The West Papuans, Aboriginal elders and other Australian supporters on board the flotilla carried a message of peace and solidarity, and reignited ancient connections that predated colonial borders (MacLeod 2013a). At the same time they clearly put the Indonesian government on notice that sovereignty over West Papua is contested.

Phase 8: Resurgence of the diplomatic struggle

On the diplomatic level Papuans also continue to organise, employing both human rights mechanisms through the UN Human Rights Council and political mechanisms through the MSG. There is also ongoing exploration of the possibilities of legal challenges to Indonesian sovereignty. In addition, Papuan churches are renewing

their links with the Pacific Conference of Churches. Perhaps the most visible sign that the struggle has become internationalised occurred at the MSG meeting in Noumea, when leaders agreed to an Indonesian and Fijian government proposal for Melanesian foreign ministers to visit West Papua. This decision was made in response to an application for membership by the WPNCL (West Papua National Coalition for Liberation). The purpose of the visit was to ascertain what West Papuans thought about becoming members of the MSG. Of course, the Indonesian government never had any intention of allowing such a popular consultation of the people's will. Instead the visit became a stage-managed trade delegation. In the words of Markus Haluk (2014), the delegation 'avoided all contact with real Papuans.' The point, however, is that this level of internationalisation – allowing a delegation of foreign ministers to visit West Papua – as a result of a Papuan-led intervention was unprecedented in West Papua's history.

Significantly, the issue of West Papua's membership did not go away. At the MSG meeting in 2014 Melanesian leaders rejected the WPNCL's application for observer status. However, MSG leaders encouraged the West Papuan delegation to resubmit a new application with greater support from other political groups. Papua New Guinea Prime Minister Peter O'Neill also urged West Papuans to consult with the Indonesian government. West Papuan leaders responded angrily. They argued that because Indonesia already had observer status with the MSG, Papuan leaders who supported continued integration with Indonesia, such as Franzalbert Joku and Nicholas Messett, already had a place at the table.

The government of Vanuatu seized this as an opportunity to broker greater unity among the movement. With widespread support from the Vanuatu Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs, the Vanuatu Council of Churches and the Pacific Conference of Churches, the Vanuatu government hosted a meeting of the three major groups – WPNCL, the NFRWP and the PNWP (West Papua National Parliament) – along with several non-affiliated groups in Port Vila in November/December 2014. That meeting resulted in the formation of the ULMWP (United Liberation Movement for West Papua).

Building unity

Building unity has been a priority ever since Barak Sope, the former prime minister of Vanuatu, facilitated reconciliation between guerrilla commanders Jacob Prai and Seth Rumkorem in the 1980s. Reconciliation and unity gained new urgency after the fall of Suharto and the formation of the FORERI (Forum for Reconciliation in Irian Jaya) in 1998. ELSHAM (Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy in West Papua) broke away from FORERI and went on to establish the West Papua Peace Task Force (PTF), which by 2002 was proactively reaching out to Papuan guerrillas to unify the armed struggle, link it more closely with civilian activists and secure a unilateral TPN (West Papua National Liberation Army) ceasefire in order to support political dialogue.

The PTF's role was less about persuading the TPN to stand down and more about facilitating greater unity and co-ordination among the TPN, a goal that was supported by most of the guerrillas themselves. To do this, PTF activists travelled deep into the mountains and jungles. They 'went to Yogi [in Paniai], Kelly [Kwalik], the border region in Papua New Guinea, and to visit [Bernard] Mawen in the south', one activist told me in 2007. By eating, sleeping and talking with the guerrillas on their turf, by emphasising common goals – the desire for freedom in West Papua – and by drawing on a shared history of collective action through documenting human rights violations and confronting the Indonesian military over acts of violence against Papuans, the PTF was able to establish a strong basis of legitimacy and trust. Often PTF activists would use local people, members of ELSHAM's extensive human rights network or church groups linked to local TPN members through kinship relations to establish contact with the guerrillas. The PTF went to great lengths to include, not marginalise, the TPN. In this context of trusting relationships, the PTF was able to persuade the TPN to support the goal of Jakarta–Papua negotiations, mediated by an international third party. By 2002 all armed-struggle commanders agreed to give dialogue and third-party mediation a chance.

In December 2005 activists met in Lae, Papua New Guinea, to form the WPNCL. In a clear departure from the PDP, whose hierarchical structure made it vulnerable to repression by Indonesian security forces, the WPNCL attempted to reorganise the resistance movement as a co-ordinated network of autonomous groups, unified by a shared vision, shared political goals and strategy to achieve them rather than by charismatic leadership. Twenty-nine resistance organisations drawn from civil society, political organisations, and the TPN have since become members of the coalition.

At the same time the TPN underwent its own internal process of consolidation. Civil society activists were concerned that guerrillas could be provoked by the Indonesian military. Resuming armed struggle would justify military operations. At a clandestine meeting in Madang in July 2006 some members of the TPN agreed to work towards a unified command structure and reiterated their support for nonviolent struggle. Since then the process of reorganising the TPN into a coherent single structure has stalled.

Meanwhile, the WPNCL was also showing signs of strain; by 2007 the WNPA had left the coalition. Together with the remainder of the PDP and the DAP, WPNA activists formed a new coalition, Papua Consensus. In October 2010 these previously competing coalitions – the WPNCL and Papua Consensus – formed the Office for the Papuan Nation (SeBaPa or Sekretariat Bangsa Papua) that for a short time facilitated greater communication and co-ordination. Reconciliation was facilitated by the work of Father Neles Tebay, a Catholic priest and journalist who set up the JDP (Papuan Peace Network). SeBaPa, while important, was short lived as momentum for a Third Papuan People's Congress began to build. Ostensibly framed as a unity-building process, the result of the congress drew clearer lines of demarcation between groups. Following the congress there were accusations that the meeting and the formation of the Federal State of West Papua did not sufficiently represent the movement. Young people, frustrated by the infighting of their elders, started meeting in secret. These mid-level leaders represented each of the three major alliances inside West Papua:

the WPNCL, NFRWP and the PNWP. For more than eighteen months they built relationships, clarified perceptions, analysed the movement's failures and hammered out the beginnings of shared agreements (see Haluk 2015, pp. 46–7). Informal discussions were also supported by church leaders.

By the time their leaders met in Vanuatu in November/December 2014 the groundwork for unity had already been laid. On 6 December the ULMWP was formally launched. The agreement to form the ULMWP and a five-person secretariat to co-ordinate international lobbying efforts, written down in the Saralana Declaration, was sealed in a traditional ceremony led by the Paramount Chief of Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs, Chief Senimao Tirsupe Mol Torvakavat. The signing ceremony was witnessed by current and former prime ministers of Vanuatu, government dignitaries, and senior leaders from the Vanuatu Council of Churches and the Pacific Conference of Churches. The full text of the Saralana Declaration reads:

> We the undersigned; the Federal Republic for West Papua (NRFPB), West Papua National Coalition of Liberation (WPNCL), West Papua National Parliament (PNWP/New Guinea Raad), have conducted the Summit on West Papuan Unification at Saralana, Port Vila, Vanuatu, from 30th November – 6th December 2014.
>
> In the name of the people, the nation and the land of West Papua, we do declare that today the 6th December 2014 at the Chief's Nakamal, at Saralana, Port Vila, Vanuatu, that the undersigned groups have united and established the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP), a body representing all resistance organisations both inside and outside West Papua.
>
> We declare and claim that all West Papuans, both inside and outside West Papua are united under this new body and that we will continue our struggle for independence.
>
> This meeting has been conducted pursuant to the decision made by the Melanesian Spearhead Group [MSG] in Port Moresby, Papua New Guinea in June 2014, that West Papuan independence organisations must first unite before an application for membership can be re-submitted to the Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG). We are now united and will resubmit an application under this new body, the ULMWP.
>
> We are determined that the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP) becomes the co-ordinating body to support all international efforts to regain our sovereignty. In order to support this, we have formed a secretariat of five people; Benny Wenda, Jacob Rumbiak, Leonie Tanggahma, Octovianus Mote and Rex Rumakiek, and representing the three largest resistance organisations and also all non-affiliated resistance organisations that support our struggle. We will maintain our existing organisations but commit to be united by the co-ordinating efforts of the United Liberation Movement for West Papua.
>
> This important and historic declaration has been made possible through the faithful efforts of the Vanuatu Government, Malvatumauri National Council of Chiefs, the Vanuatu Christian Council, the Pacific Conference of Churches and the commitment of the following liberation organisations: National Federal Republic of West Papua, WPNCL and the National Parliament of West Papua.
>
> This Declaration is signed at the Chiefs' Nakamal, Port Vila, on this day Sixth of December, Two Thousand and Fourteen, by:
>
> Edison Waromi (Prime Minister, NFRWP)
> Buchtar Tabuni (PNWP)
> Rex Rumakiek (WPNCL)

The Honourable Barak Sope, the former prime minister of Vanuatu, was among the witnesses of the declaration. Exhibiting a nuanced understanding of the dynamics of civil resistance and the vagaries of international relations, Sope (2014) remarked before a closed meeting of independence leaders:

> The struggle for independence needs to be a peaceful one. I say this because it will help the governments in the Melanesian Spearhead Group help you. It may be a big ask for it to be a peaceful struggle but that is the way to bring the other governments on board so we can move forward. Many governments want to help you. From the MSG we can go all the way up to the United Nations. But becoming a member of the Melanesian Spearhead Group is the first step.

On 4 February 2015 representatives of the ULMWP converged again on Port Vila to strategise then submit their membership application to the MSG. The delegation of leaders from inside and outside West Papua was formally received by MSG secretariat. One of the leaders, Edison Waromi, said, 'We were welcomed not just as if we were already a member but as if we were already a state!' (Waromi 2015). The ULMWP was granted observer status by the MSG leaders at their annual summit in Honiara in July 2015.

Movement unity in West Papua is still ongoing but much progress has been made. The importance of co-ordinated decentralised network structures as opposed to single hierarchical organisations is becoming more accepted, as groups reflect on the assassination of Theys Eluay and the detention of the six NFRWP leaders following the Third Papuan People's Congress. The idea of unity of purpose is also gaining traction. Benny Wenda's maxim of the need for a 'shared agenda' has become a dominant narrative among members of the ULMWP. The importance of organising mass support – unity of people – has also informed the creation of the ULMWP. There is also work being undertaken on unity of planning – specifically forming functional co-ordination and communication mechanisms between the three main coalitions and non-affiliated groups. That process is happening among the diaspora leaders of the ULMWP secretariat but it is also underway inside the country as well.

Conclusion

Since 1998 nonviolent means for addressing Papuan grievances and pursuing Papuan aspirations have been used more regularly and more extensively than violence or conventional political activity. In July 1998 Papuans kept the flag flying hoping it would herald independence. Seventeen years later, in 2015, the movement has matured into a co-ordinated international force, committed to a strategy of nonviolent resistance and diplomacy.

Papuans recognise the futility of violent resistance. The Indonesian army is more numerous and better equipped than any armed challenge Papuans could hope to mount. Nonviolent resistance is attracting greater international support than armed resistance. A commitment to unarmed struggle also ensures that leaders from inside West Papua can continue to travel around the world to lobby the international community. And when the TPN does use violence, reprisals by the security forces exact a heavy cost on the civilian population. 'That is why we need to keep our political struggle nonviolent,' says former political prisoner Reverend Obed Komba (Farhadian 2005, p. 61).

Nonviolent resistance by Papuans draws on continuous traditions stretching back to at least the 1850s. It relies heavily on indigenous and cultural frames as well as Christian narratives. Over many decades civil resistance has formed and reinforced collective Papuan identity and Papuan nationalism. It gives Papuans a means to defy successive colonial powers, while casting the Papuan struggle as one that is civilised, dignified and blessed by God. At the same time, this deeply rooted collective identity/nationalism has helped to strengthen civil resistance by mobilising Papuans and forging unity among disparate tribal groups.

Although at the time of writing the formation of the ULMWP is still recent, it remains, in my view, the most significant event in the history of Papuan resistance. Eschewing brittle hierarchical forms of organisation, the ULMWP has established a decentralised network structure with visible leadership based outside the country and a hidden collective leadership structure inside the country. To date the secretariat

seems to be negotiating this complex inside/outside arrangement with mature agility. In addition, the ULMWP has selected an intermediate campaign objective: full membership of the MSG (see the postscript). This goal has wide and deep support in West Papua. Cooperation continues even as each of the ULMWP member groups have their own diverse strategies unified under a shared self-determination agenda. As a result, the ULMWP is attracting broad-based support from allies across the Pacific.

At the same time, other campaigns continue. Papuans continue to agitate to free political prisoners and secure open access for foreign journalists but pressure on President Widodo is increasing. Landowners in places like Merauke and elsewhere continue to resist aggressive development by a coterie of transnational corporations. And in villages and towns around the country Papuans continue to speak their language and sing their songs – a potent form of everyday resistance.

Merdeka may still be a distant dream, but it is one that is more tangible than ever before.

CHAPTER 5

From armed to unarmed resistance

In West Papua the transition away from guerrilla war and towards nonviolent struggle has been geographic and generational. From 1965 to 1998 the core of resistance to Indonesian rule was waged by poorly armed and numerically small numbers of Papuans operating in a network of decentralised guerrilla groups based in the rugged mountains and dense jungles of the interior. The post-1998 generation of nonviolent challengers in West Papua is younger and predominantly based in urban areas. While they sympathise with the goals of the armed struggle, and in many cases have connections with the guerrillas through kinship relations or via political affiliations, they are not personally involved in violent resistance. Influential individuals in a number of key guerrilla groups have also turned away from armed struggle to embrace unarmed resistance.

A caveat: when I write about the West Papuan freedom movement's transition from violent to nonviolent resistance, I do not mean to suggest that this transition has been linear or straightforward. The transition has been complex and has occurred in uneven and inconsistent spurts. At times and in some places the movement even appears

to be transitioning back to violent resistance. And yet, when you take a longer view, looking at the transition from 1963 to 2015, you can confidently report that Papuans are much more actively engaged in nonviolent rather than violent resistance to Indonesian rule and that this tendency is increasing over time.

From the late 1960s through to the early 1990s the independence struggle was represented by a decentralised network of poorly armed but committed guerrillas. The overriding image from this time was of a semi-naked muscular Papuan man wearing a headdress of cassowary feathers. A single, bolt-action Second World War rifle is slung over his shoulder and he stands against a backdrop of mountains and forests partially obscured by a swirling mass of clouds (Bohane 2013, p. 182). These fighters, many of whom had spent decades in the jungle, symbolised and embodied the early days of West Papuan resistance to Indonesian rule. They were the ones interviewed by the few international journalists willing to risk documenting the struggle, so it was the guerrillas' perspectives that shaped the bigger story of how Papuans were resisting the Indonesian state (Bob 2005). A different story, one of nonviolent Papuan resistance to successive outside incursions since the 1800s, remained a concealed feature of a conflict that rarely moved beyond the murky margins of the international community's consciousness.

Armed struggle continued after the fall of Suharto and so the image of a semi-naked muscular Papuan man carrying a rifle and bow and arrows still resonates with diverse audiences, inside and outside the country. Indeed, it is in the Indonesian security forces' interest to promote a narrative of armed resistance to justify their continued presence. But the story of West Papuan resistance has become richer. It does not solely revolve around the actions (or inaction) of the guerrilla groups. The ideology, strategy and tactics of violent resistance are being displaced by civil resistance, diplomacy, civilian-based media activism and transnational advocacy.

For the most part, this transition has not come about as a result of non-state armed actors in the mountains or jungles deciding en masse

to pursue a new strategy. Instead, a fourth 'generation' of more youthful actors in the cities and towns has emerged. The previous three generations of struggle include early Papuan nationalists active in diplomatic efforts during the 1950s and 1960s, guerrillas who rose up during the early 1960s, and the work of Arnold Ap and Mambesak, the cultural music group. Small groups of fighters remain active in the mountains and villages of the interior where 80 per cent of the indigenous population still lives. Despite the seductive appeal of political violence for some Papuans, the prominence and influence of armed actors has been overtaken by a new hegemonic force, even as this polycentric nonviolent movement continues to acknowledge and appreciate the ongoing contribution of the armed struggle.

To sketch that complex story, a transition that pivots more on the emergence of a new set of actors in the urban areas and less on the transformation of methods employed by armed guerrillas in the forests and highlands, this chapter supplements the previous discussion on the history of the movement, unity building and the diverse composition of movement actors. A brief history of armed struggle in West Papua gives way to an analysis of how the armed struggle is organised. Then the mechanisms underpinning the dynamics of transition from armed to unarmed struggle within the broader Papuan movement for freedom, the primary unit of analysis, precedes a second set of complex, and at times contradictory, dynamics exhibited by various groups that make up the armed struggle. The chapter concludes with an exploration of some key lessons and mechanisms underpinning a shift in movement praxis, ordered around Veronique Dudouet's framework (2015) in her book on transitions from armed to unarmed conflict transformation in resistance/liberation struggles.

While debates about how to resist continue, radical Papuan activists are clear that the Indonesian government's continued military occupation must be challenged: 'We must resist Indonesia, we must!' one student emphatically remarked to me during a conversation in April 2012 about her experience in the Papuan freedom movement. This young Papuan woman was expressing frustration with some of her

elders whom she felt were cautioning her and others. She and members of her group felt pressure to tone down their activities in order to preserve themselves and their activism. But they did not want to 'seek a position of safety', as another Papuan student activist described it. Neither did they wish to support limited political change for West Papua. They questioned the wisdom of using official channels, methods such as diplomacy, dialogue and NGO advocacy: 'How can we achieve our desire for our own state when there are no official mechanisms that support this? All the mechanisms at the United Nations are biased towards existing states. The United Nations is not good at supporting decolonisation.' Activists like her did not want to be limited to focusing solely on an agenda of basic rights as opposed to independence. Both are important.

In contrast to relying solely on tepid and timid diplomacy, Papuans active in the Papuan freedom movement emphasise the need for resistance as something different from conventional politicking. They view the protection of rights as impossible without political freedom. By resistance, they mean either armed struggle or collective nonviolent action in pursuit of political goals. For freedom-minded Papuans what is most important is that they resist Indonesian rule. How they go about doing that, the relative effectiveness of different approaches to change, the specific goals being pursued, the strategies and tactics proposed to achieve those goals, the kinds of structures and processes that need to be put in place to build the movement's capacity to realise their goals are, for most, secondary questions. My experience has been that when discussion validates the pursuit of self-determination, decolonisation and the need for resistance to achieve these goals, people are open to discussing the merits – or not – of civil resistance.

Armed struggle in West Papua

The best organised, early armed resistance groups were led by police officers, civil servants and military personnel trained by the Dutch prior to the Indonesian government taking control of the country (Osborne 1985; Budiardjo and Liong 1988; Djopari 1993; Ondawame 2000; Singh 2008). Some armed groups were also led by tribal leaders traditionally tasked with defending their people from external attacks. In a few cases Papuan pastors took up arms after witnessing massacres and other atrocities committed by the Indonesian state security forces (Giay 2011b). Like other countries that have experienced guerrilla war, armed resistance was sustained by a broad network of active support from both rural villagers and urban sympathisers. Political scientist Bilveer Singh (2008, pp. 136–68) describes five periods of armed struggle between 1962 and the overthrow of former Indonesian dictator Suharto on 21 May 1998:

1. October 1962 to 1 July 1971
2. 1 July 1971 to mid-1984
3. 1984 to 1995
4. 1996 to mid-1998
5. Armed resistance in West Papua post-Suharto.

Early underground armed resistance groups started to form in response to Australian diplomat Elsworth Bunker's proposed diplomatic solution to the crises, the 1962 New York Agreement – a so-called solution that failed to include any Papuans in the process. This gained momentum after Indonesia took administrative control of the territory on 1 May 1963 when it became dramatically clear that the Indonesian state would brook no open democratic opposition to its plan for forced integration. In late 1962 in Jayapura former civil servants like Aser Demotekay began meeting to plan an armed insurrection. The following year a more militant group, led by Terrianus Aronggear, Hendrik Joku and Permenas Ferry Awom, emerged in Manokwari. From the beginning this group linked with and supported a political process: a transitional government under the leadership of Markus Kaisiepo and Nicolaas Jouwe. In May, Aronggear and a number of other cadres were arrested. This prompted Awom to launch an attack against the Indonesian state in Manokwari on 26 July 1965. Two days later thousands of Arfak tribesmen attacked the Indonesian army battalion in Manokwari, an

event immortalised in the struggle song 'Yamewero',[1] which was sung under the Biak water tower in July 1998 and continues to play a part in the harmonic narration of Papuan resistance.

The Arfak rebels were organised under the leadership of Johan Ariks, Lodwijk Mandatjan and his brother Barents Mandajatan. They enjoyed a brief month-long military success when they captured Manokwari in 1967. Armed rebellion continued in Biak, Jayapura, the PNG–West Papua border region, Timika, Makbon, Merauke, Paniai, Sorong, Wamena and elsewhere (Djopari 1993, pp. 109–31; Singh 2008, pp. 137–9). By the 1970s a number of these fighting units were organised under the leadership of Seth Rumkorem and Jacob Prai, who declared independence from Indonesia on 1 July 1971.

After the Rumkorem–Prai split in 1976, due mainly to personality differences, there were further uprisings. Three significant guerrilla raids between 1976 and 1996 were carried out. They included armed sabotage of Freeport's mining operations in 1977 and 1978 by forces led by Kelly Kwalik and a failed insurrection in 1984. Although armed attacks were foiled by the Indonesian state, a significant civil resistance component briefly catapulted the struggle into the international headlines. Nearly 100 Papuan members of Battalion 751 defected and fled to Papua New Guinea after word got out that the Indonesian military knew of their plans to launch an armed insurrection. In the aftermath of a brutal crackdown by the Indonesian troops, a further 10,000 Papuans crossed the border to Papua New Guinea. According to refugee families I interviewed in Wewak, Papua New Guinea, in 2007 and 2009, seeking exile en masse was part of a conscious strategy planned by Papuan anthropologist Arnold Ap and others in order to internationalise the struggle. It was not just a reactive flight from Indonesian state violence. Thousands of Papuans who fled in 1984 still dwell in exile. Their children and grandchildren are now continuing the struggle.

By 1978 Prai and Rumkorem were both forced into exile in Europe, after being arrested by Papua New Guinea officials and then found to be refugees. A new generation of leaders emerged but struggled with

the challenge of unity and organisation even as Prai and Rumkorem reconciled in Vanuatu in 1985. While guerrilla operations continued and exiles like Prai, Rumkorem, Rex Rumakiek, John Otto Ondawame, Moses Werror, Nicolaas Jouwe, Markus Kaisiepo and his son Viktor, and others helped launch diplomatic efforts, the more regular – but unpublicised – resistance inside the country was nonviolent, including by people who identified as part of the armed resistance. This included flag raisings by women like Priscilla Jakadewa and the emergence of a new movement led by Thomas Wainggai, who called for an independent federated West Melanesia. While Wainggai died in prison in 1996 his vision helped reorientate people's awareness that they were Melanesian and that West Papua was located in the Pacific, not Asia. His son and nephew later escaped to Australia by dugout canoe in January 2006 and successfully sought political asylum with 41 others.

By 1996 the guerrillas had embarked on a new strategy: kidnapping. The act of taking a team of foreign and Indonesian ecologists hostage in 1996 reignited international interest in the issue (Start 1997). However, the political currency of this tactic was short lived. By the early 2000s, in the face of diminishing international column space, the hostage-taking tactic fell into disuse (Harris 2005).[2]

Analysing the composition and dynamics of armed struggle[3]

The fall of Suharto followed by independence in East Timor generated a sense that unarmed strategies might be able to secure political gains where violence had failed. Those aspirations have been frustrated by the Indonesian state's determination to use repression and material inducements to break the resistance, rather than participate in a problem-solving dialogue, a deeply help Melanesian value. Although movement activists under the leadership of John Rumbiak negotiated a unilateral ceasefire around 2002 and many commanders of the armed struggle agreed to give dialogue a chance, the hopes of both the guerrillas and civil society activists that there would be political negotiations have not been realised.

Indonesian military intelligence puts the numbers of the armed resistance movement at approximately 1200 full-time guerrillas in possession of around 130 weapons distributed among anywhere between eight and 30 groups, depending on how affiliations are recorded (Elmslie et al. 2011). This is consistent with Singh's research (2008, p. 135). He estimated the strength of full-time TPN fighters to be around 1805 full-time members spread across 23 factions. However, most armed liberation groups are not formally structured around clear regulations, roles and lines of accountability. Consequently, the membership of many groups is fluid and the extent to which different groups are active varies considerably.

As of February 2015 there were seven active non-state armed groups:

1. Two groups operating under the name of the TPN, led by Goliat Tabuni, in the Puncak Jaya and Mimika area and closely allied to the PNWP (West Papua National Parliament)
2. A group in Yapen Island (with links to Manokwari and across to the Birds Head), led by Rudi Orari, Fernando Worabai and Erik Makatori and allied to the WPNA and NFRWP. This group is known as the West Papua National Army (Tentara Nasional Papua Barat or TNPB)
3. A group in the Lanny Jaya and Tolikara district, led by Puron Okino Wenda
4. A group led by John Yogi in Enarotali, in the Paniai highlands - both Wenda above and Yogi refer to their fighters as members of the TPN
5. A group – also known as the TPN – located between the border and Jayapura, particularly around the Depapre area (on the north coast east of Jayapura), led by Richard Yoweni and allied with the WPNCL
6. Another group based between Jayapura and the border, particularly in the Keerom, led by Lambert Pekikir, who also refers to his group as the TPN
7. A long-standing group led by Mathias Wenda based on the Papua New Guinea–West Papua border and allied with the WPNCL. Wenda recently renamed his group the West Papua Revolutionary Army (Tentara Revolusi Papua Barat or TRPB).

All three main political coalitions described in chapter 3 – the WPNCL, NFRWP and the NPWP – have links to the armed struggle. However, it would be inaccurate to say that in every case the armed struggle is subordinated to a clearly defined political policy and leadership. Most armed groups operate independently or the political leaders exercise influence but not full command and control. There are also 'floating groups' not closely allied to political resistance organisations. Furthermore, a number of armed groups that share the same organisational name, such as the TPN, are not necessarily structurally integrated into one organisational command.

All the armed groups are located in either the remote and rugged interior, or rural coast. The unarmed resistance movement is predominately urban based. Most of the firearms used by these earlier armed resistance groups came from the Dutch or were relics from the Second World War. A few modern automatic weapons have since been stolen or traded with the Indonesian security forces, often for gold extracted by artisanal miners. More recently it is alleged that firearms have been obtained through contacts in Papua New Guinea.

Collectively the armed struggle lacks a unified command structure or shared strategy. In many cases there is limited infrastructure or processes in place for communicating between different factions or engaging in co-ordinated collective objectives. Local commanders act autonomously in places that conform to clan territories and geographic and linguistic boundaries of indigenous Papuan tribes subsumed by the Indonesian state. Some of these tribes, like the Muyu, Malind Anim and Mountain Ok, have territory on both sides of the West Papua and Papua New Guinea border. Guerrilla groups from each organisational unit are centred around clans and extended family, sustaining themselves largely through subsistence agriculture, hunting and trade with Papuan villagers.

Most fighters live with their family. Their overwhelming desire is to remain living on the land of their ancestors. When attacked or threatened by the encroachment of the security forces, the state and/or economic activity, armed non-state groups will, at times, use violence to defend themselves. When armed attacks are launched, women and children will often join the men to repel what are often considered occupying forces. This was almost certainly the case in the remote Tingginambut area, Puncak Jaya, in February 2013 when Goliat Tabuni's forces attacked Indonesian military patrols. Sources with access to Tabuni claimed that they attacked the troops because the Indonesian army insisted on building a military post on a sacred burial ground despite repeated requests not to do so (Giay and Yoman 2013). There are also examples of collective armed action, where guerrilla forces have gone on the offensive.

Many guerrilla fighters first started resisting the Indonesian occupation when as young people they experienced distress and trauma. Many have done so after they and/or their families suffered extreme violence by the Indonesian state. Many I have interviewed first used nonviolent tactics to protest the occupation. When they joined the guerrillas they continued to use those methods. Most fighters are not ideologically wedded to armed struggle. They have taken up arms because they feel there is no other way. It has been my experience that members of the TPN (and now TRPB and TNPB – West Papua Revolutionary Army and West Papua National Army, not to be confused with the TPN – two new factions that have emerged in the last few years) are interested to learn about unarmed ways the occupation can be resisted so long as they feel their decision to resist the occupation and desire for genuine self-determination are understood. Perhaps this openness is assisted by the fact that nonviolent activists and armed guerrillas have remained relationally connected. I would argue that the movement has not become polarised along violent versus nonviolent resistance.

Since 2002 the armed struggle has become more integrated into unarmed resistance strategies. Members and leaders of non-state armed groups attended shared gatherings in Nieuwegein, the Netherlands, in 2003; Sydney, Australia, in 2004; Port Vila, Vanuatu, in 2004; Papua New Guinea in 2005 and 2006; Ipoh in Malaysia in 2007; Utrecht, the Netherlands, in 2007; and Port Vila in 2008 and 2014. These gatherings helped to develop a consensus around a series of concrete demands, including the willingness by some actors to consider a range of intermediate goals, like the release of political prisoners, the opening up of West Papua to the international media and the appointment of independent human rights monitors. Despite growing social connectedness among Papuan resistance groups and between the armed and unarmed sides of the movement, there is virtually no social overlap between armed guerrillas and the Indonesian political elite in Jakarta (Thurber 2015). The social and cultural distance (Galtung 1989) separating Papuans from political leadership in Jakarta remains vast.

The armed struggle is not going away. If anything, it is becoming more organised. Despite this, the trend, particularly since 1998, has been towards de-escalation, a shift from armed to unarmed resistance.

Exploring the dynamics of temporal and spatial shifts from armed to unarmed resistance

When the dynamics of the different non-state armed resistance groups are analysed, a complex picture emerges. Membership and allegiance in both the armed struggle and groups committed to nonviolent resistance are fluid. In the recent period, since 1998, one can observe the eight sub-dynamics among armed non-state groups:

1. Transition from support for peaceful dialogue back to armed struggle: In Paniai, for instance, the TPN under the leadership of Tadius Yogi pledged support for peaceful dialogue (West Papua Peace Task Force 2007; see also van Hest 2010). After the leadership passed to Yogi's son John in around August 2011, the TPN re-engaged in armed struggle, targeting Indonesian police, particularly members of BRIMOB (Indonesian Mobile Brigade Police Force), which triggered a major offensive by the police and military against the TPN beginning in December 2011. As of

February 2015 it appears that a more symbiotic relationship exists between John Yogi and BRIMOB around control of illegal artisanal gold mining in Paniai, particularly along the Degewo River.

2. Co-option of the TPN: On the north coast Nicholas Messett, a former TPN commander from Sarmi, pledged his allegiance to the Indonesian Republic. Messett has now been travelling the world as an ambassador for continued Indonesian rule in West Papua (Kirksey 2012). He was given substantial oil and gas permits to the Sarmi region by Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono and set up his own company, Sarmi Papua Asia Oil Ltd (Messett 2011).
3. Preparation for armed struggle and formation of new armed groups: This is particularly the case on the north coast around Manokwari and Yapen Waropen, parts of the Birds Head, the Keerom area and the north-western border area around Markas Victoria. TNPB commanders in Manokwari and Yapen have recruited local youth and conduct regular training and drill sessions. There is some evidence (photographs viewed by me) that they have also been able to secure a handful of modern weapons. Forces under the command of Lambert Pekikir around the Keerom area also appear to be positioning themselves as a distinct fighting unit. However, up to early 2015 there was no active engagement in offensive attacks by the guerrillas. From interviews with activists who have connections to the TNPB and the WPNA and NFRWP, to which the TNPB pledges allegiance, it appears there is some overlap in membership and leadership between these armed groups and the nonviolent movement. Interviews with members of these groups suggest that parts of the movement wish to keep their 'options open', reserving the right to engage in violent action, not just as a defensive posture but with the view of being ready should the time come that they need to reconsider a change in strategy. Disturbingly, there has also been some debate among people close to the TNPB about a policy of 'punishing traitors', Papuans who collaborate with the Indonesian government, police and military.

This decision, if enacted, could be exploited by the Indonesian security forces to promote deep divisions and conflict between different parts of the West Papua freedom movement.

4. Escalation of armed struggle: In Puncak Jaya the TPN, under the leadership of Goliat Tabuni, has escalated armed struggle. The most deadly attack to date occurred in February 2013 when Tabuni and others, including women and children, allegedly attacked and killed eight Indonesian soldiers and four civilians on patrol in the remote Tingginambut area.
5. Decapitation of TPN leadership: In December 2009 Indonesian police from the controversial counter-terrorism group Detachment 88 killed West Papuan guerrilla leader Kelly Kwalik, who led a guerrilla group from the Timika/Amungsa region. Kwalik's leadership has since been replaced and this group is allied with Tabuni's group in Puncak Jaya.
6. Decline of the armed struggle: In Merauke and southern Papua the TPN under the leadership of Bernard Mawen has aged and been in decline. The leadership of other non-state armed groups, including Yoweni's group on the north coast, is also ageing. In some instances – like the armed resistance group led by Melkianus Awon in Biak – ageing leadership has resulted in armed groups becoming inactive.
7. Ready but in abeyance: In the border region of Papua New Guinea/West Papua, the TRPB has been in abeyance after an attack by Papua New Guinea's defence forces destroyed West Papuan refugees' homes in camps during operation Sunset Merona in January 2011 (West Papua Media 2011).
8. A conscious decision by the leadership to change strategies: The engagement of Richard Yoweni's group first by the PTF (West Papua Peace Task Force) and then by the leadership of the WPNCL has resulted in a conscious shift in strategies.

Firearms and ammunition used in attacks by guerrilla forces most likely come from illicit purchases from individual Indonesian military

and police officers, theft from the Indonesian military or police, the provision of firearms from the Indonesian military or police as part of covert activity by the Indonesian security forces to create the justification for law and order operations, and a renewal in firearm trade across the border with Papua New Guinea from sympathetic parties interested in Melanesian solidarity and, in some cases, economic gain.

During 2012 there has also been an increase in fatal shootings and non-fatal bombings attributed to the KNPB (West Papua National Committee). Some in the Indonesian government argue that the KNPB is an urban civilian front for the guerrillas. Although the police, media and even some analysts, notably the International Crisis Group, have tried to apportion blame to the group, the only conclusive evidence is that one civilian, Teyu Tabuni, was shot dead by an off-duty Indonesian police officer. There are also numerous eyewitness reports that KNPB activist Mako Tabuni was shot by Indonesian police in June 2012. Tabuni was taken away alive in a police van. An hour later it was reported that he died while detained at Bhayangkara police hospital in Jayapura. Papuan church leaders argue that Chief of Police Tito Karnavian 'has failed to investigate' shootings and 'created the impression that he is allowing the illegal sale of weapons to go ahead' (Giay 2012; Giay and Yoman 2013). Viktor Yeimo, the leader of the KNPB, has repeatedly denied its involvement with the armed struggle and insists the group is nonviolent (Rotheroe 2013). However, speculation of links between the KNPB and the TPN remain rife. Papuan lawyers and human rights activists such as Gustaf Kawer insist that the rule of law rather than extra-judicial killings should be used to determine any individual's guilt or innocence. Currently, whenever there is violence, both the TPN and the army/police will routinely blame each other for the violence.

It will be extremely difficult for the Indonesian military to completely defeat the TPN, or the newly emerged and little understood TNPB and TRPB, because they maintain control of inaccessible terrain – dense forests, waterlogged lowlands, sparse savannah and rugged mountains – and because the Indonesian state is virtually universally perceived as an occupying force. However, the TPN, TRPB and TNPB will also never outgun or outnumber the Indonesian military. Papuan guerrillas have no navy, no air force, nor armoured vehicles, no heavy artillery and few modern weapons of their own. They also have limited munition supplies. No state is willing to engage in military action on their behalf and neighbouring states, including Papua New Guinea, are unlikely to offer Papuan guerrillas sanctuary, training or matériel. This fact is unlikely to change in the foreseeable future, even as support grows within Melanesia. The use of violence to achieve political goals favours fit young men and involves high levels of commitment and risk that reduce the ability of large numbers of people to participate in the struggle. Despite the persistence of the presence of the armed struggle, the guerrillas are not considered a serious threat by Indonesian intelligence services because they 'hardly do anything' (Nairn 2010).

Mechanisms activated during the transition from armed to unarmed resistance

Armed resistance against Indonesian rule began even before the Indonesian government formally took control of the country on 1 May 1963. Armed struggle was the pre-eminent form of resistance until the fall of Suharto in May 1998. The dictator's departure ended West Papua's categorisation as a military operations area (Daerah Operasi Militer). The political space opened up Indonesia's pro-democracy *reformasi* ('reform') movement, creating the conditions for the Papuan Spring.

When students across Indonesia forced Suharto to step down, long-repressed Papuan desires to be free of oppression were finally released, expressed through a heady clamouring for independence that reverberated around the country. But change had been brewing for a while. Human rights defenders from ELSHAM, the PTF and the churches worked hard to create the conditions for peaceful dialogue, even going as far as brokering an informal unilateral ceasefire with the commanders of the various armed-struggle groups. Unfortunately, the Indonesian government did not respond to this opportunity. When Rumbiak succumbed to a debilitating stroke, the Indonesian government lost a valuable opportunity and potential partner who might have been able

to help negotiate a political settlement. When the centre, momentarily weakened by the departure of Suharto, reconsolidated itself under President Megawati Sukarnoputri, the police, military and intelligence services renewed repressive action against Papuan dissenters.

The relationships established by the PTF precipitated the formation of the WPNCL. Key armed groups that joined the coalition, such as Richard Yoweni's TPN group on the north coast, have since favoured political struggle over violent resistance. As of February 2015, Yoweni is the current chair of the WPNCL. Through the efforts of the WPNCL's leadership in exile and the government of Vanuatu, Yoweni has now been drawn into the diplomatic struggle. In turn, Yoweni has been persuaded not to engage in armed struggle to prevent the WPNCL being proscribed as a terrorist group. This would severely constrain the WPNCL's opportunities to engage in international diplomacy and Yoweni's ability to travel.

Two periods – the Papuan Spring from 1998 to 2001 and movement consolidation that took place between 2002 and 2005 – and the associated mechanisms of a change in the state's approach to repression and coalition building gave way to a less-defined third period between 2006 and 2014. During this period there have been two sets of contradictory dynamics. On the one hand, the unarmed struggle inside West Papua and its diplomatic wing outside the country have become more organised, emerging as the dominant force in the political struggle. On the other hand there has been a renewal of armed resistance by some components. In parallel with increased radicalisation by some parts of the armed struggle has been de-escalation by other non-state armed resistance groups. There are various mechanisms that underpin the mainstream Papuan freedom movement's transition from armed to unarmed resistance.

Strategic reassessment of how to wage conflict

This is influenced partly by the movement's developing theory of change, or increased shared understanding among movement activists and leaders about how nonviolent resistance can enable Papuans to achieve their goals for self-determination. This ideational shift is also influenced by a growing frustration with the lack and pace of change brought about by armed struggle and engagement with conventional political processes, particularly at the domestic level (inside West Papua and Indonesia). There is a growing critical appreciation among movement activists, particularly the younger generation, that civil resistance is more effective than armed struggle. As one movement activist commented to me in 2010:

> Before ... a lot of the actions would end up with shops being burned and houses being set on fire ... When I analyse the impact of the nonviolent movement in Papua I notice it [nonviolent action] attracts more support not only from inside Papua but also from other Indonesians and outsiders as well. [I feel that] people outside Papua used to have an understanding that Papuans are violent or bad or emotional; that we were not able to resolve the conflict through peaceful means. People only know negative things about Papua, that Papuans are bad and that they kill people. Now I feel that nonviolent resistance has more potential and it is less likely that there will be higher levels of victims if we wage the struggle through nonviolent means.

Because of the isolation of armed groups and the reticence of funders and external actors to support armed resistance, civil resistance groups are more able to leverage greater access to material resources, salient information and useful transnational networks than armed groups. Papuans are cognisant of the fact that strategy, persistence and the ability to organise diverse groups of people dramatically enhance the effectiveness of civil resistance.

Ageing leadership

Some armed groups, such as Bernard Mawen's, have ceased armed struggle as the leadership ages or has been killed.

Civilian diplomacy to armed groups

This factor can be best illustrated through the role of the PTF described above. Perhaps more than any other initiative the PTF helped facilitate a shift from armed to unarmed struggle from within the ranks of the guerrilla movement.

Fatigue over the high cost of armed struggle

The high cost of armed struggle as a result of retaliation by the Indonesian security forces has always been borne disproportionately by rural populations, many of whom were not involved in the original attacks. In general, this has led to declining Papuan enthusiasm for violent resistance and increased support for nonviolent resistance. What has been critical in this regard is that Papuan challengers frame nonviolent action as resistance against the occupation, a struggle through other means than violence, rather than nebulous calls for peace.

Lack of state sponsor for armed struggle

Unlike the Free Acheh Movement that received training in guerrilla war from the late Colonel Muammar Gaddafi in Libya during the 1980s, the TPN has not been able to access training, weapons or ammunition from a foreign state, a critical factor in the success of armed struggle (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). There are a few very marginal individuals – mainly foreign ex-mercenary or ex-military types – in the United States, Europe and Australia who support armed struggle. They have latched on to equally marginal West Papuans (Oakes 2012; Zaitchik 2015) who lack an insurgent base inside West Papua. Without large-scale investment in weapons, training and infrastructure, and a secure sanctuary rebels can retreat to, these fractious internal groups will never be able to mount any serious or sustained challenge to the Indonesian state.

Emulation of other movements that have previously been successful

Some Papuan leaders have looked to other movements – the independence movements in East Timor, the anti-Apartheid movement in South Africa and the unarmed pro-democracy movements in South Korea, the Philippines and Indonesia – and observed that nonviolent movements have been able to achieve their goals more often than violent movements. Even violent liberation movements in Kosovo and Sudan had significant nonviolent phases and groups. The independence of South Sudan, Kosovo and Timor-Leste are also powerful sources of hope for Papuan activists. The violent conflict in post-independent states like South Sudan has also reinforced the view among some of the more internationally experienced Papuan leaders that armed struggle is more likely to erode post-conflict democracy and peace, even if independence is achieved.

Cross-border transmission of skills and knowledge about civil resistance

Enhanced appreciation of other successful nonviolent struggles has been assisted in part by cross-border transmission of skills and knowledge about civil resistance and new media and the corresponding transnational contacts and relationships this work fuels. Training and education has enabled Papuan activists and leaders to reflect on how they wage the struggle, conduct a cost-benefit analysis of the relative effectiveness of different methods, and at the same time build strategic capacity by bringing diverse groups of activists together and supporting collective reflection of what has worked, what has failed and why, and most importantly what might Papuans need to do differently in the future in order to achieve their goals (see Rayfield and Morello 2012; MacLeod 2015c). Of course, none of this guarantees success and passionate discussions about strategy and tactics are ongoing.

Dynamic lessons of transition from armed to unarmed struggle since 1998

Although many Papuans feel intense pride for the TPN (and TNPB and TRPB), few of them are willing to risk their lives committing to a strategy of guerrilla war that has little prospect of success. In contrast,

nonviolent action plays a more prominent role in daily Papuan life. The barriers to participation are much lower (Chenoweth and Stephan 2011). Barely a week, or even a day, goes by without some kind of nonviolent protest in the cities and towns of West Papua over violations of basic rights or demands for 'full freedom'.

Ironically, the security forces are often more cognisant of the power of nonviolent resistance than many Papuans. For example, the top-fifteen 'enemies of the state', writes the journalist Alan Nairn (2010), who cites leaked Indonesian army documents, are all civilian leaders: church leaders, students, members of parliament and leaders of the Papuan Customary Council. The Indonesian military considers nonviolent resistance 'much more dangerous' because they have 'reached the outside world' with their 'obsession' with '*merdeka*' and persist in 'propagating the issue of severe human rights violations in Papua'; that is, 'murders and abductions that are done by the security forces' (ibid). In the past decade that influence has become possible because the movement has grown exponentially in strength. Kopassus (Indonesian Special Forces Command) estimates the strength of the nonviolent movement as 16,000-plus full-time activists, drawn from every sector of society, including the Papuan political elite (Elmslie et al. 2011).

Since 1998 there have been two temporal peaks signifying the ongoing and deepening transition from violent to nonviolent resistance: one in 1999/2001 (the Papuan Spring) and another in 2010/2011 (the 'hand back Special Autonomy' campaign and the Third Papuan People's Congress). Both peaks were followed by renewed repression by the state. During the second congress in 2000 the PDP (Papua Presidium Council) mobilised 30,000 to 50,000 people. The PDP brought people into a parallel political structure with the explicit goal of independence. Unfortunately, their clarity about the problem (occupation) and goal (independence) was not matched by a clear strategy that encouraged mass participation. After the PDP mobilised up to 50,000 people during the Second Papuan People's Congress, they elected not to pursue further mass organising in favour of lobbying foreign elites to support the goal of third-party mediation. The PDP could have developed a parallel system of government. Instead, their impressive structure was neglected and fell into disuse.

During 2010 the campaign to reject Special Autonomy mobilised around 25,000 Papuans. The campaign had a clear intermediate objective: the call for affirmative action in the electoral process. This objective later mutated into an evaluation and rejection of Special Autonomy. The campaign, which had an explicit commitment to nonviolent resistance, engaged grassroots constituencies and developed a structure for organising them. But there was no follow-through by core organisers. ForDem (Democratic Forum of the United Papuan People), the group that organised protests between April and July 2010, and their campaign for an intermediate political objective became co-opted by activists who demanded independence.

Frustration at the lack of change radicalised the movement. In October 2011, the NFRPB declared independence from Indonesia at a peaceful open-air congress. The declaration electrified the Papuan people. However, questions were raised about the process, particularly the formation of the leadership group and the alleged exclusion of some other parts of the movement from the leadership.

There are several important lessons arising from the strategic application of nonviolent resistance between 2000 and 2011. In 2000 the movement had no strategy except a vague appeal to external political elites to 'save the Papuans'. The masses were not engaged even as they expressed enthusiasm for *merdeka*. By 2010/11 strategic capacity was more developed, but the 2010 campaign had no follow-through, while in 2011 haste undermined participation of a broad cross-section of the movement and perhaps prematurely launched the leadership into high-risk action.

The state has also been learning. In response to the 1999 to 2001 Papuan Spring, the Indonesian Special Forces assassinated PDP leader Theys Eluay. The PDP never recovered, revealing the limitation of a hierarchical structure. In 2011, in response to Forkorus Yaboisembut's declaration of independence, the Indonesian government opted for jailing the president-elect of the NFRWP and other leaders rather than

assassinating them, but not before opening fire on unarmed protesters, killing five. After 2011, the KNPB gained prominence as a key movement actor. Again the Indonesian republic resorted to violence, opting to paint the KNPB as a violent group, ostensibly to justify extra-judicial executions. The KNPB has responded by forming a national parliament – the PNWP (West Papua National Parliament). Similarly to the NFRWP's approach the formation of a parallel government structure has extended its legitimacy and nonviolent credentials, and emphasised the determination of the movement to prepare for statehood.

At the same time as these temporal peaks, there has been a spatial shift in types of resistance methods employed by the Papuan freedom movement against Indonesia. Unarmed resistance in the cities and towns has increased and armed resistance in the jungles and mountains has declined.

Although resistance in West Papua has undergone a transition from violent to nonviolent action, this shift has been neither linear nor simple, nor has it occurred uniformly across time and space. The picture that emerges is threefold. First, civil resistance has escalated. Not only have the numbers of protests and participants in nonviolent action been increasing, there are also signs that the movement is evolving its strategy from a series of event-based tactics disconnected from a strategic plan to mobilising and organising key constituents to achieve clear and concrete goals. Second, there has been a corresponding de-escalation of the armed struggle. Although most guerrilla soldiers did not become active in nonviolent resistance, many did stand down in response to civilian diplomacy. Third, the struggle is becoming more internationalised. This approach was encouraged by the PDP in 1999 and more recently accelerated by the formation of International Parliamentarians for West Papua and the ULMWP.

The Indonesian government's inability to abandon a realist security approach to dealing with Papuan grievances and defiance continues to backfire. Repression by the security forces generates more Papuan grievances, resulting in greater numbers of movement participants. As Papuans become increasingly adept at using new media to get the story out, they use stories of human rights violations and nonviolent action to attract more international attention to the occupation and lack of democracy in their country.

Mechanisms underpining transitions from armed to unarmed resistance

Drawing on Dudouet's (2015) framework we can categorise transitions from armed to unarmed struggle in West Papua according to the level of analysis (intra-group, group–society, group–state, and group–international) and the mechanisms of change that have been activated. Intra-group refers to the dynamics within non-state armed groups. Group–society refers to inter-movement relationships and between the movement for freedom in West Papua and other constituencies in West Papua and Indonesia. Group–state refers to the relationship between the (armed and unarmed) movement for freedom in West Papua and the Indonesian state. Group–international refers to the relationship between the movement and international allies, comprising state, bi-lateral institutions, multilateral institutions and international civil society. As we reflect on these mechanisms it becomes clear that while the broader geopolitical environment influences the dynamics of how the struggle is waged there is space for careful agency.

Level of analysis	Mechanisms underpinning transitions
Intra-group	• strategic reassessment of how to wage conflict • ageing leadership • pressure from social allies (internally from kin) • fatigue over the high cost of armed struggle
Group–society	• strategic reassessment of how to wage conflict

	• pressure from social allies (external church leaders and from human rights activists)
	• civilian-led diplomacy to armed groups
Group–state	• democratic transition (the fall of Suharto in May 1998) and momentary opening up of political space
	• state repression – repression has negatively and positively affected transitions in West Papua. In some cases, like the assassination of Kelly Kwalik or attacks on the NFRWP, it has led to renewed armed resistance. In other cases repression has led to a deeper commitment to civil resistance
	• decapitation of the leadership (such as the killing of Kelly Kwalik)
Group–international	• lack of foreign support
	• search for new allies
	• emulation of successful international models
	• cross-border transmission of skills and knowledge

Conclusion

The struggle for freedom in West Papua is still being played out. Violent and nonviolent resistance continues alongside one another but the bigger pattern that emerges is a transition from armed to unarmed struggle. There is growing internationalisation of the conflict, a spatial shift from rural to urban-based resistance and, with it, the emergence of a new set of more youthful actors committed to civil resistance (for pragmatic as much as philosophical reasons). While armed resistance by the TPN (and TRPB and TNPB) has not gone away it has been largely quarantined by the geographic separation between armed and

unarmed groups. Compared with nonviolent civilian-based resistance, the numbers of active members of armed guerrilla groups are low, reduced by high barriers to participation, the lack of international political support for armed struggle and the difficulty of attaining weapons and munitions. In contrast, the nonviolent 'wing' of the Papuan freedom movement outperforms the armed struggle both in terms of numbers of individual participants, numbers of active allies, frequency of activity, and effectiveness.

The key mechanisms underpinning this transition have been:

- democratisation of the state
- strategic reassessment of how to wage conflict
- ageing guerrilla leadership
- civilian outreach to armed groups to persuade them to shift strategy
- fatigue over the high cost of armed struggle
- the lack of state sponsor for armed struggle
- emulation of other movements that have previously been successful
- cross-border transmission of skills and knowledge about civil resistance.

The Indonesian government has continued to respond to movement agitation for greater political freedom with overt and covert violence and a suite of contradictory policy initiatives: a tired security approach, a hangover from the Suharto era; an emphasis on large-scale development; material inducements; and dividing West Papua into smaller and smaller administrative units. These have failed to mute Papuan political defiance. In fact, civil resistors have become more determined. In many cases they have become more fearless. Nonviolent resistance has enabled Papuans to leverage greater participation in the struggle and helped them expose the continued use of violence by the Indonesian state and lack of democratic freedoms in West Papua in order to attract greater international support. The question then becomes: how to deepen and maximise the effectiveness of civil resistance towards a New Papua?

CHAPTER 6

Towards a framework for nonviolent liberation

We began with a question: 'How viable are nonviolent strategies and tactics to enlarge the prospects for self-determination in West Papua?' The short answer is that unarmed resistance has already enlarged the prospects of freedom in West Papua. Civil resistance has been used more often and more extensively to support movement goals than either diplomacy or armed struggle, and with much greater effect.

If the central government in Jakarta thought they could ignore political problems in West Papua because there was no armed struggle of any real significance and therefore no threat to the continued viability of Indonesian rule, events since the fall of Suharto have proved them wrong. Civil resistance in West Papua has evolved from sporadic localised protests like the demonstration around the Biak water tower in 1998 to a unified push for membership of the MSG (Melanesian Spearhead Group) that is accelerating the internationalisation of the struggle. Between 1998 and 2015 several campaigns of nonviolent resistance have flourished:

- Papua Land of Peace campaign for inter-communal harmony and peaceful dialogue
- Hand Back Otsus campaign
- devastating worker strikes at the Freeport mine in 2007 and 2011
- public declaration of independence in October 2011
- campaign to become members of the Melanesian Spearhead Group.

In addition there was also a successful campaign by women traders to secure their own marketplace in the centre of Jayapura, plus the closure of BHP Billiton's proposed Gag Island mine by an alliance of human rights, indigenous and environmental activists. This is by no means the extent of Papuan dissent; there have also been ongoing campaigns to release political prisoners in West Papua and for open media access. These examples, however, represent broad grievances and illustrate the dynamics of political contention in the territory between the fall of Suharto in May 1998 and the end of 2014. The trajectory the movement for freedom seems to be taking leads to an exploration of the draft framework for liberation expounded in chapter 1. The extent to which this framework is applicable to other self-determination struggles for national liberation, however, is untested.

Civil resistance in West Papua threatens vested interests. It undermines Jakarta's legitimacy, and imposes heightened economic and political costs on the Indonesian state. Newfound international interest is starting to provoke greater political attention from Jakarta. It is also clear that solutions focused solely on economics will not fix the problem, just as economic progress has not quelled the clamouring for independence in Kanaky (New Caledonia). In West Papua, economic development imposed without consultation by a government that is not pro-Papuan threatens to make demands for independence worse. Continued military and police impunity is also unsustainable and counterproductive to Jakarta's desire to maintain control of West Papua.

A grand strategy for change

In order to further oppose Indonesian government rule in West Papua and hasten Papuan-led visions of *merdeka*, a promising strategic framework could be based on the unarmed resistance. Notwithstanding the salience of favourable geopolitical conditions, I argue that success hinges on:

- increased movement participation
- enhanced strategic skilfulness
- greater unity
- the ability to attract greater support from within Indonesia
- internationalisation of the struggle
- taking advantage of political opportunities.

This would necessitate extra-parliamentary struggle operating in tandem with diplomatic efforts. This framework was expressed in chapter 1 in the following equation:

> *{(mass + momentum) × unity in three domains} + diplomacy + political opportunities* = merdeka (*'freedom'*)

Of course, this does not suggest a single pathway to liberation, nor does it guarantee success. Self-determination struggles are extraordinarily difficult. What I propose is a grand strategy: a broad conception of the kind of elements that challengers need to consider when developing more specific strategic plans.

In relation to participating in this grand strategy two points are important. First, within West Papua more people need to be actively involved in the struggle. But it is not just about numbers. Papuan challengers to Indonesia need to enlarge the circle of dissent so that different kinds of social groups – Papuan politicians, civil servants, church congregations and workers – also withdraw their consent and cooperation from Indonesian government rule. Second, enhanced strategic skilfulness, defined as momentum in the above formulation, has internal (West Papua) and transnational dimensions. Strategies need to target the West Papuan, Indonesian and external sources of the Indonesian government's power.

In 2015 the harsh reality is that, failing a seismic shift in the Indonesian and international geopolitical landscape, there is no indication that Papuan resistance groups will achieve their goal of national independence in the short term. Ironically, Indonesia's shift away from authoritarian rule under Suharto towards democracy under President Joko Widodo has probably, according to theorists like John Foran (1997) at least, made the Papuans' task of persuading international third parties to support their struggle more challenging. The Indonesian government's portrayal as a democratic success story, which in many ways it is, and the Indonesian government's position as a valuable Western ally, makes it harder to draw attention to its authoritarian rule in West Papua. That does not mean independence is impossible or that domestic or international geopolitical and strategic interests are the only deciding factors in determining self-governance. It just means that independence is highly unlikely in the short term. This is largely because success is dependent on circumstances outside the movement's control.

This is not only the case with the West Papuan struggle. As Donald Horowitz (1985, p. 230) surmises, the outcomes of self-determination campaigns are 'determined largely by international politics, by the balance of interests and forces that extend beyond the state'. Other self-determination struggles – Western Sahara, Palestine, Tibet, Kanaky, Bougainville, Maohi Nui, Nagaland among them – are plagued by a similar problem. The opponent state depends less on the resisting population and more on external sources of power, including domestic support and ongoing assistance of international political elite allies, to maintain the occupation. In civil resistance terms the oppressor does not sufficiently depend on the continued consent and cooperation of the oppressed. That makes self-determination struggles more difficult to resolve, hence Horowitz's proposition that geopolitics are of primary importance. Of course, while deep-seated grievances remain, resistance

groups in occupied territories will continue to struggle for liberation irrespective of what commentators might say the odds of success are. As Neles Tebay (2011, pp. 128–9) says, 'We do not have to wait for another tsunami like that of Acheh's or another massacre as happened in East Timor to justify the importance of peace talks between the government and indigenous Papuans.'

The world system is in a constant state of flux. As the cases of Acheh, East Timor and more recently Kosovo and South Sudan show, when it comes to whether or not the international community supports self-determination struggles, the interests and positions of great powers are not permanently fixed nor aligned. Political interests can change. State boundaries are not immutable. They are dynamic, even if altering those borders is extraordinary difficult to realise. So, although Papuans will continue to struggle, even if the geopolitical conditions are unfavourable, they can be certain that unforeseen political opportunities (and threats) will arise. In order to take advantage of – or even create – these opportunities, preparation is essential.

The capability of self-determination movements to create the conditions for change is more constrained and contingent on international solidarity networks than in anti-regime struggles. Such movements require more sophisticated transnational strategies and a dense network of ties between the resisting population and transnational allies (in the case of West Papua that includes Indonesians, groups, organisations and networks in other countries). The role of an extensive and persistent transnational solidarity network is to constrain and disrupt the external sources of power upon which the opponent state is indirectly dependent. One of the reasons politicians in Jakarta have not entered into political dialogue with the Papuans is because they do not need to. Why should politicians in Jakarta expend political capital if the conflict is only 'low intensity'? Voters in other parts of the Indonesian archipelago are largely indifferent to the fate of West Papua, provided the Papuan separatist movement does not pose a threat to the unitary state of the Republic of Indonesia, and the issue barely affects Indonesia's international relationships. The Papuan freedom

movement needs to generate substantial political and economic costs to create the conditions for problem-solving talks and compel Jakarta to negotiate. I argue that nonviolent resistance is a more effective – and less bloody – method for imposing costs than violent struggle. The Papuan freedom movement and their allies may need to make West Papua ungovernable for Jakarta and a risky economic proposition for transnational corporations. Internationalising the struggle will also raise political costs for Jakarta.

So how can the margins of success for a civil resistance struggle in West Papua be widened? As painful as it is for Papuans and their allies to face, and as unpopular as it is to say, a failure of the West Papuan movement to realise maximalist political goals like a referendum that will lead to independence is not just a result of the geopolitical and economic interests of the Indonesian government and their corporate and political elite allies. Nor is lack of action by the international community the only reason the issue has not gained the attention and support of a wider audience. A number of strategic shortcomings on the part of the movement also bear on trajectories and outcomes.

There are two dimensions influencing trajectories and outcomes. The first relates to the ability of movements to recognise, take advantage of, and even create political opportunities. The second concerns strategic skilfulness. Let us look at the example of the East Timorese struggle for independence. When Suharto was removed from power by the 1998 Indonesian pro-democracy movement (itself a partial product of another political opportunity, the Asian Economic Crisis), the Timorese and Papuans were in different positions to take advantage of this political opportunity. The Timorese, who had spent years building up links with the Indonesian pro-democracy movement, and had developed a strong transnational solidarity network, were more able to mobilise support for a referendum. The Papuans, on the other hand, had less-developed relationships with the pro-democracy movement and a less-extensive transnational solidarity network. As a result, while the Timorese and their transnational allies were able to press then Indonesian President Habibie and the international community

to accede to their demands for a referendum, the Papuans were much more isolated both within Indonesia and internationally. Despite this, they were still able to achieve partial success – the Special Autonomy package of 2001. However, they were unable to secure the Papuan version of that law or maintain popular support to ensure that it was fully implemented.

Self-determination struggles involve a slightly different logic and dynamic from classical anti-regime or anti-dictatorship struggles. I explored that dynamic during the course of my research and particularly in workshops. It is to this framework and the implications for praxis that we now turn.

Participation levels in the struggle for freedom

Chenoweth and Stephan (2011) found that the reason why civil resistance was more than twice as effective as armed struggle was that it enabled more people to participate. Successful nonviolent movements lower the physical, moral, informational and commitment barriers to involvement. This translates to large numbers of participants as well as a broad base of people from different social groups engaging in the struggle. These large numbers of diverse people erode the opponent's legitimacy and raise the political and economic costs of not resolving the conflict. Successful armed struggles, in contrast, depend more on external state sponsorship.

Five decades of Indonesian government control of West Papua has not translated into widespread Papuan loyalty towards the Indonesian state. Desire for freedom, however, has not been matched by active participation in the movement. During the Hand Back Special Autonomy campaign, movement participation peaked on 8 and 9 July 2010. Approximately 25,000 people were on the streets of Jayapura, plus there were demonstrators in Sorong, Serui and Manokwari. Assuming that the numbers of these regional demonstrations totalled approximately 15,000 people (which is possible but optimistic), that brings the total measurable participation in the Hand Back Special Autonomy campaign up to 40,000. The total indigenous population in West Papua

is approximately 1,500,000 people (based on the 2000 census, the last year for which data based on the ethnic composition of the province can be obtained). That means just 2.6 per cent of Papuans were involved at the height of the July 2010 campaign. There was only one other time between 1998 and the Indonesian presidential elections in 2014 when participation was higher. That was during the Second Papuan People's Congress in June 2000. At that point peak participation in the West Papuan freedom movement rose to a maximum of 50,000 people, or 3.3 per cent of the West Papuan population. Participation was also much more diverse. In 2000, in addition to including people converging on Jayapura from all over the country, migrants, tribal chiefs, religious leaders and intellectuals were also actively involved, assuming leadership positions.[1]

Of course, 3.3 per cent, or even 2.6 per cent, active participation is a significant number given the longstanding and repressive nature of the occupation and the difficulties of organising across a territory with no roads linking major cities and over 250 diverse languages. In some places and times, such as France in 1789, participation of 2 per cent of the population was enough to bring about a revolutionary change. In the Soviet Union less than 1 per cent participated in the overthrow of communism (Kurzman 2004, pp. vii–viii). Rarely does participation in large-scale social movements ever rise above 5 per cent (Lichbach 1995). Chenoweth (2013) argues 3.5 per cent participation is sufficient to bring about change, particularly in pro-democracy struggles. Self-determination struggles are different. The figures from France and the former Soviet Union are percentages based on the national population, whereas the figures of 3.3 and 2.6 per cent are only participation figures for West Papua, not the whole of Indonesia. When we look at peak participation in the movement in 2000 during the Second Papuan People's Congress in relation to the entire population of Indonesia, the percentage of active participation in the movement drops dramatically. According to the Indonesian Bureau of Statistics, the total Indonesian population in 2000 was 206,264,595 people. Fifty thousand people on the streets of Jayapura translates to 0.02 per cent of the total Indonesian

population – hardly a threat to sustained Indonesian government rule, particularly if there was no simultaneous agitation on the streets of Jakarta and the capital cities of the Indonesian state's international allies. Because Papuans represent a small fraction of the total Indonesian population (outside of West Papua), even sustained dissent by the Papuans at this low level will be insufficient to bring about political change. Change is even more unlikely if the mainstream Indonesian population is not involved. (Lack of engagement, of course, is assisted by Jakarta's and Jayapura's policy of restricting foreign media access to West Papua.)

Contrast the figures from West Papua with participation levels in the movement for freedom in Acheh, Indonesia's other restive periphery, at the height of the struggle for freedom. In 1999 between 16 and 50 per cent of the entire Achehenese population, depending on whose figures you use, were actively involved in pressing for independence (see Reid 2004, p. 309). In September 1999 a province-wide general strike shut down the Achehnese economy and government for two days. Active participation in the struggle peaked two months later in November 1999, when between half a million (approximately 16 per cent of the population) and two million people (almost half the citizens of Acheh) attended a rally for a referendum at the main mosque in Banda Acheh. Both the strike and rally were nonviolent. The civil resistance organisations Acheh Referendum Information Committee (SIRA – Sentral Informasi untuk Referendum di Acheh – a student coalition made up of 104 student groups) and Student Solidarity with the People (SMUR – Solidaritas Mahasiswa Untuk Rakyat) played a vital role in mobilising the population, organising people geographically as well as through established social groups, particularly the Ulama, an influential network of Muslim religious leaders, who endorsed the push for a referendum on independence. Even with these large numbers the end result of the movement for freedom in Acheh was enhanced autonomy, not independence, and this only occurred when conflict in Acheh attracted international attention in the wake of the 2004 Boxing Day tsunami. Following the Helsinki Agreement the

Free Acheh Movement (GAM – Gerakan Acheh Merdeka – a guerrilla group that represented Achehenese in the peace talks) successfully transitioned from an armed movement to a political party. As part of the autonomy agreement local – not national – organisations like GAM were allowed to form political parties and contest provincial elections. In contrast, only political parties with an Indonesia-wide membership are permitted in other parts of the country. An OPM (Free Papua Organisation) political party, for instance, would be banned in West Papua. So even with 8 to 25 times the participation levels of West Papua (depending on whose figures you accept), Achehenese challengers were still not able to secure independence (although admittedly international solidarity for Acheh was far less widespread than for West Papua).

In West Papua, 25,000, or even 50,000, people on the streets of the capital for two days, combined with thousands – even tens of thousands – elsewhere did not constitute a significant threat to Indonesian government control. The impact of these numbers was further lessened because contentious collective political action was not sustained. Visibility of civil resistance was reduced by the Indonesian government's media blackout. There was also little to no co-ordinated transnational solidarity, and challengers shifted their demands from minimalist to maximalist demands midway through the campaign without the social power (civilian mass) to back them up.

Analysing the diversity of participation in the Hand Back Otsus campaign, we see that although members of the MRP (Papuan People's Assembly) joined the campaign, the first time a state institution in West Papua openly defied the central government, other key sectors of Papuan society were not involved. The groups not active in the July 2010 insurrection included Papuan politicians. Although a block of a dozen Papuan politicians supported the challengers, they did not do so publicly. Large numbers of Papuan members of church congregations, workers, civil servants and migrants were also passive. In addition, the involvement of the MRP in the campaign was momentary, extending from April to July 2010. When church organisers of the July occupation

called for noncooperation by candidates and incumbents of the MRP during the election in January 2011, this did not eventuate (Somba 2010). Together the above-mentioned constituencies, or 'pillars of support' as they are known in the civil resistance literature, comprise significant Papuan sources of Jakarta's power. By not being actively involved in the Papuan movement for freedom these groups effectively strengthened Indonesian government control in West Papua. These two factors – reduced numbers of people 'on the street' and the absence of active participation of key social groups and existing institutions in West Papua – corresponded with diminished movement leverage. Reduced participation in the freedom movement undermines the credibility of claims by Papuans and their allies that Jakarta's rule lacks legitimacy.

Contrast participation in the 2010 Hand Back Otsus campaign to worker participation in the 2007 and 2011 Freeport strikes. According to Tongoi Papua informants and Associated Press and Reuters media reports at the time, in 2007 some 5000 to 6000 workers (most of them Papuan) participated in the three-day strike. That is just under one-third of the total workforce, an impressive feat for a group that was not organised until Tongoi Papua was formed. This was the first time employees at the giant gold and copper mine went on strike. Significantly, it was the first time an independent trade union was formed in West Papua, although Freeport refused to recognise Tongoi Papua as a trade union. Tongoi Papua brought highlanders and islanders together to strike on behalf of Papuan and Indonesian workers. Tongoi Papua also secured the participation of migrant workers and the active support of the migrant community, including local mosques. As a result, Tongoi Papua won a 98 per cent wage increase for the lowest-paid mineworkers, a win unprecedented in West Papua's history.

In 2007 and then again in July 2011 workers won most of their demands, a feat that corresponded with high levels of participation - 40 per cent in 2007 and 52 per cent in 2011 – and the ability of the workers to generate massive economic and reputational costs for the company. The strikers also enjoyed considerable support from powerful allies. In 2007

third-party support included the chief of police, local religious leaders and members of the local government. In 2011 Freeport workers were able to increase the number of international allies. The striking mine workers demonstrated the key role Freeport plays in relation to national politics in Jakarta, and therefore the future of any political agreement over the status of West Papua. This evidence supports Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) assertion that both increased numbers and broad-based participation positively correlate with the ability of nonviolent movements to achieve their goals. Of course, this was made easier in the case of Freeport because it was a limited goal, but the same dynamic applies to winning maximalist goals.

Organising citizen participation

How do movements generate mass participation? The civil resistance literature is relatively silent on this point. Many civil resistance scholars (and scholars of revolution) accept that mass participation is essential to generating change but generally focus on the dynamics of struggle once there is already a mass movement. Less attention is given as to how the quantity and quality of citizen participation needed to affect change can be generated. The literature on community organising addresses this question although there has been insufficient attention on examining organising in repressive contexts outside of Western-liberal democracies. In my view, the two cases in West Papua that are most instructive about how to organise social groups are the women's campaign for a marketplace and the Tongoi Papua strike of 2007. The lessons from both groups could be scaled up and applied to the overall struggle for liberation. I focus on these campaigns in particular because in each case the leadership favoured building new relationships then forming new political structures that enabled sustained collective action. In contrast, other campaigns or strategies have emphasised mobilisation or tactics-led or event-based activism – getting large numbers of demonstrators in one place at one time – without building new relationships or new structures that support the participation of key social groups.

The activists involved in the Tongoi Papua campaign built more and qualitatively better relationships within different parts of the workforce. This work was undertaken for years before the strike. Tongoi Papua leaders gave particular attention to bringing together highlanders and islanders who historically had been divided, division that had been fostered by both Freeport and the Indonesian government, and before them the Dutch. The Tongoi Papua leadership then focused on bridging relationships between different sectors of the Freeport workforce. This was a challenge because all the sectors rarely meet in one place. The workers came together only twice a day for ten minutes, when they were gathered at the tram station at the start or end of each shift. Tongoi Papua maximised these ten minutes to share information and to build stronger connections between different workers. The communication, organisation and trust that developed in these ten minutes, twice each day, were essential to carry out the strike. Strengthening and building relationships within organisations and working out a system to communicate and co-ordinate between organisations, or social groups, are what enables unified action.

In each campaign large numbers of people got involved because they understood that it was in their self-interest to do so. The leaders in both the Tongoi Papua and the women's marketplace campaigns appealed to people's financial interest and the tangible improvements in people's material lives. That is not to say that only pecuniary interests can mobilise large numbers of people. In the Hand Back Special Autonomy campaign, ForDem (Democratic Forum of the United Papuan People) narrowed the broader problem of a lack of Papuan political power down to a single issue, declaring that all candidates for elected office at the sub-provincial level had to be indigenous Papuans. ForDem mobilised people around politics. But they still appealed to self-interest. ForDem then went on to link this with broader Papuan aspirations.

New leaders emerged in both the women market sellers and Tongoi Papua campaigns. Many of these leaders had never taken political action before. In the market-sellers case, some leaders were illiterate but they developed the self-confidence and self-belief to confront

local and national power-holders. Women like Mama Yuliana even demanded action from Joko Widodo when he came to West Papua on his presidential election campaign. These leaders developed core leadership teams within organisations and mechanisms that facilitated collaboration between different groups. This was particularly the case in the Tongoi Papua campaign. That campaign organised discrete groups who were responsible for specific tasks. Tongoi Papua then developed a collaborative leadership structure that facilitated communication, trust and co-ordination between the various movement components.

Both campaigns indirectly drew on – and developed – cultural resources to sustain collective action. The activists involved wrote and performed songs. They told personal stories of their subjective experience of suffering as well as their hopes for change. They engaged existing institutions, notably religious and traditional leaders who provided practical support, and they linked localised action to powerful ideas about freedom, justice and liberation (Reed and Foran 2002; Chabot and Vinthagen 2007; MacLeod 2015c).

Lastly, strategists concerned about the larger struggle for freedom need to initiate and sustain processes that lead to better co-ordination between movement leaders taking action inside West Papua, inside Indonesia and internationally. This was not evident in either the women market sellers or Tongoi Papua campaign, although both campaigns did have some national and international dimensions to their tactical repertoire. These community organising lessons, however, cannot be separated from the need for strategic skilfulness.

Strategic skilfulness

Participation in nonviolent resistance is essential but by itself it is not enough. Successful nonviolent movements also rely on high degrees of strategic and tactical skilfulness. Strategy is a plan to get you from where you are to where you want to be. It is comprised of the following elements (see Sharp 1973; Ackerman and Kruegler 1994; Burrowes 1996; Jasper 2006):

- **Analysis:** A breakdown of what the problem is, who supports it and how they support it needs to be undertaken. In situations like West Papua where the problem is large and difficult to resolve it is helpful to break it down into smaller more manageable issues. These smaller issues can then become the basis for campaigns of nonviolent action. Issues also need to be analysed with particular attention given to who supports the problem and why.
- **Conception of nonviolent resistance:** Nonviolent resistance movements need a clear and shared understanding of the norms and behaviours that guide the conduct of individuals.
- **Vision:** It is useful for large-scale movements to have both a negative vision based on what needs to change and a positive vision of what they want the future to be. Interestingly, most successful revolutions during the last 30 years mobilised people primarily around a negative vision of something they did not want.
- **Goals and objectives:** Goals are medium to long term. Objectives are short term, no more than one to two years. Independence is a goal. A particular desired policy change is an objective. Objectives need to take the movement closer to the goal. They are based on a sound analysis of the problem and situation. Objectives should be strategic, measurable, achievable, realistic and time-bound (SMART).
- **Critical path:** This is a sequence of changes or outcomes that will take you from where you are to where you want to be, that is, the vision of your goal and/or objective being realised. It is one way to conceptualise a strategic plan. Critical paths need a timeline.
- **Organisational considerations:** Papuans have particular organisational challenges. They need organisations that are resilient to repression but still enable communication and co-ordination across social and political difference. Decentralised network structures with high degrees of co-ordination and robust mechanisms for communication are best suited to repressive environments like West Papua. Campaigns of nonviolent resistance will also need a team of people who have a clear division of roles and responsibilities. The campaign team will also need to deal with resourcing and budgetary issues as well as considering how consultation and strategy planning takes place.

- **Leadership:** Attention will need to be given to how the movement structures leadership. The empirical evidence suggests that decentralised and co-ordinated leadership with high degrees of consultation and deliberation, combined with the ability to act decisively when needed, will serve the movement best (see Burrowes 1996; Schock 2005; Chenoweth and Stephan 2011; and MacLeod 2015a).
- **Allies, opponents, constituents and targets:** All campaigns of nonviolent action must interact with their own support base, key decision-makers, opponents and allies. Strategists need to get beyond generalisations about who is with them and who is against them to develop a deeper analysis of those they are trying to influence and what they want them to do. It is useful to differentiate between primary and secondary targets. Primary targets are the people who can give you what you want. They can be a single decision-maker or a group of individuals within government or corporations. These people have names and addresses. Challengers need to understand not just the target's position but their underlying needs, interests and fears. Secondary targets can influence primary targets. In West Papua, where there is wide social, cultural and even geographic distance between the oppressed and oppressors, it is vital to identify key allies who can bridge this distance and consider how to work with them or even bring them into the movement.
- **Tactics:** Tactics are the heart of any campaign and movement. It is useful to have criteria to consider how to select, sequence and escalate tactics.
- **Communications:** All strategies of nonviolent resistance need a communication plan. This plan needs to take into account how to frame and communicate key messages in order to facilitate collective action. In West Papua, a communication plan needs to

include strategies for bypassing the Indonesian state's restrictions on international media access, and the associated challenges of West Papua's rugged terrain.

- **Monitoring and evaluation/success indicators:** As well as understanding what success looks like and articulating this in a vision statement, goals, objectives and a plan, it is important to be able to plot progress to recalibrate strategy and tactics. Movements need critical feedback to ensure they are able to respond to changing conditions and new opportunities. It is useful to plot progress at the level of outputs, outcomes and longer-term impacts.
- **Risks, contingencies and advance preparations:** In a conflict setting like West Papua where there are high levels of repression and significant risks for engaging in political action, risk management and contingency plans are essential. Building resilience needs to be factored into planning at the personal, tactical, strategic, and organisational levels (MacLeod 2015a).

This framework shaped, and was shaped by, workshops held between 2005 and 2014. I will now briefly consider key lessons from applying this framework at the level of the larger movement for freedom before examining strategy lessons from individual campaigns. Other elements of strategy, such as building unity, developing resistance in different domains of struggle and responding to threats and opportunities, are discussed later.

At the level of grand strategy there are three recurring dilemmas the movement for freedom in West Papua is still wrestling with: vision, a theory of change and, related to this, a clearly articulated and widely embraced commitment to civil resistance. As discussed in chapter 3, although there is widespread consensus, at least among resistance groups, that Papuans are struggling for independence, the contours of what that means and why it is important have not yet been fashioned into a document that can be widely endorsed, perhaps something similar to the African National Congress's Freedom Charter. Related

to vision is the need to clearly articulate a public commitment to civil resistance that can guide the struggle.

Typically, other nonviolent resistance movements have expressed this as a brief statement coupled with public agreements around behaviour and maintaining discipline (see Burrowes 1996; MacLeod 2015c). These agreements need to be shaped by, accepted by and widely communicated to movement participants. In many conflicts, including the Indian struggle for independence led by Gandhi and the struggle against Robert Mugabe in Zimbabwe led by WOZA, activists committed to maintaining nonviolent discipline. These were detailed in agreements that were made public. In many cases they were signed and oaths were given. Such nonviolent agreements have an important strategic function. They undermine the ability of the opponent and its agent provocateurs to provoke incidents in order to discredit the movement and justify violence against activists. A public commitment to concrete nonviolent behaviours reassures members of the opponent's class or society – like migrants in West Papua – that the movement will not use violence against them. When this commitment is reinforced by activists refusing to be provoked into violence, combined with action to protect life and property of the opponent or members of the opponent's society and class, it functions psychologically to create division from within the opponent's ranks. In turn, this leads to increased participation and greater support from other third parties.

There are still differing understandings of what it would take for Papuans to win freedom. At the broadest conception of strategy this is a discussion about the extent to which the struggle is pursued through diplomacy, armed struggle or nonviolent resistance (MacLeod 2011). These ideational currents influence participation and bear on movement dynamics and outcomes. Debating these ideas matters because different beliefs about how Papuans realise their goals will support different degrees of movement participation.

The struggle for freedom in West Papua is overwhelmingly being waged through nonviolent means. However, as chapter 5 on transitions indicates, there is still ongoing discussion and debate about the use

of violent action. Until the conflict is resolved it is unlikely that the struggle will ever be waged exclusively through civil resistance. Even at the height of the Indian independence movement, Gandhi had to contend with Indian nationalists committed to guerrilla war and acts of terror. It is possible though – as was the case in East Timor – that the armed struggle may stand down to give greater space to politics by peaceful means. The PTF (West Papua Peace Task Force) and, later, the WPNCL (West Papua National Coalition for Liberation), for instance, negotiated a unilateral ceasefire for several years between 2002 and 2009. It was a political opportunity of which the Indonesian government did not take advantage.

If armed struggle has not yielded major concessions from Jakarta, the years since the fall of Suharto have also shown that conventional political approaches employed in the West Papuan case – legal strategies, diplomacy, elite level negotiations, and lobbying – have also not resolved the core political grievances. According to Chenoweth and Stephan's (2011) empirical research, a key strategic deficiency of conventional political strategies and armed struggle is that they do not actively promote and support participation in collective unarmed resistance. However, conventional political processes often support and enhance the leverage of nonviolent strategies (Roberts and Garton-Ash 2009; MacLeod 2011). In that regard they are complementary in the ways that nonviolent resistance and armed struggle is not. In West Papua a consensus seems to be emerging that ongoing resistance will be waged through a combination of diplomacy and civil resistance.

There is, however, disagreement among Papuan activists over the types of nonviolent strategies that need to be pursued. Strategies like Jakarta–Papua dialogue, recognition of West Papua as an independent state, a referendum on independence, a legal challenge (MacLeod and Martin 2012), and pursuing political mechanisms such as membership of the MSG (Melanesian Spearhead Group) and the relisting of West Papua on the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization are being waged by Papuan resistance groups. These strategies are all valid.

Indeed, there is wisdom in a multi-pronged approach. Who knows what strategies, or combinations of strategies, will succeed?

It is equally true that some approaches are less likely to yield results. Dialogue without being backed up by power, for instance, will not compel Jakarta to sit at the negotiating table (MacLeod 2011). Seeking recognition of the Papuan state is also a long and difficult road. This is the path Palestinians have taken. As of 30 October 2014, 135 of the 193 member states of the United Nations recognise Palestine. Even more states recognise the Palestinian Liberation Organisation as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people. The conflict has been on the international agenda for decades but Palestinians are no closer to independence. In contrast, only one member state of the United Nations – Vanuatu – recognises West Papua. Meanwhile, the demographic balance is tipping in favour of permanent integration and ever-smaller percentages of indigenous Papuans. That fact seems to suggest that a strategy of recognition is unlikely to bear fruit.

More localised strategy lessons emerging from case studies

The shift to localised campaigns illustrates that some Papuan strategists are trying to break people's big aspirations into smaller steps by building campaigns focused around intermediate objectives. It is no accident that the campaigns that achieved the majority of their objectives – the Freeport mineworkers' strike, for instance – were self-limiting campaigns. Tongoi Papua's goal was not a free Papua, although it is fair to say the majority of the Papuan workers do indeed desire political freedom. Instead, its goal was delinked from independence and focused on labour rights. At the same time, the workers built a stronger organisational base and gained valuable experience of what it means to struggle for their rights. Tongoi Papua also linked the granting of labour rights and problems with Freeport to the broader political context. In contrast, the Papua Land of Peace campaign was very broad and diffuse. The Papuan Peace Network's goal is process-orientated: dialogue between Jakarta and the Papuans. The strength of the Papuan

Peace Network's Land of Peace campaign is its grassroots engagement and articulation of concrete peace indicators. Their moderate goals, however, cast the demand for dialogue as reasonable in contrast to the more radical demands of independence.

The Hand Back Otsus Campaign did articulate concrete and functional strategic objectives. This was informed by an analysis of power that examined how Papuans, Papuan policies and Papuan institutions supported the problem. However, the leadership of the campaign was not able to maintain the focus on more limited objectives. The critical point where the leadership of the campaign lost control was in the April 2010 consultation. Participants insisted on a conflation of objectives centred on 'Papuanisation' and affirmative action (SK14, Letter of Decision Number 14) with the call for a referendum and independence. In the process they isolated key allies in the provincial and even central government who were unable to concede to maximalist demands. The leadership of the SK14 campaign tried to regain control by formulating a process demand – a special session of parliament to discuss Otsus – but they were unsuccessful. Just as they were gaining traction ForDem lost the SK14 campaign. It became a tactics-led occupation of parliament. Tellingly, ForDem's allies who called for maximalist goals failed to get any more traction towards their demands for a referendum. Although the leadership successfully maintained discipline, the combination of escalated tactics and the demand for a referendum meant that by this time there was little popular support for the SK14 campaign. No doubt a shift to maximalist demands would have pleased politicians in Jakarta. It allowed them to dismiss the campaign's demands as unreasonable. It gave politicians in Jakarta, who did not want to see greater Papuan political representation, a way to marginalise and reject ForDem.

These campaigns also illustrate different approaches and understandings of how change happens. On the one hand there are Papuan activists whose methods are based largely around protests. Their modus operandi is getting people on the streets to participate in public demonstrations, often with relatively little involvement of ordinary people before or after, and sometimes involving assertive nonviolent

confrontation with the security forces. It is essentially event-based activism. In contrast, ForDem activists and Tongoi Papua members seek to organise a much broader political base and support them to be active through both an organisational structure and a much more diverse range of nonviolent tactics than demonstrations. Tongoi Papua began their campaign with more low-risk and semi-public political actions. In the case of Tongoi Papua they are explicitly non-political in the sense of not calling for independence. In the terms in which Jakarta–Jayapura politics are cast, forming independent trade unions or, in the case of the Mama-Mama campaign, creating independent grassroots traders organisations become a kind of 'non-political' – or at least non-separatist – politics. The differences between event-orientated mobilisation on the one hand and community organising on the other are significant. The regime can handle protests repeatedly organised by the same groups, but an ever-widening group of Papuan constituencies engaged in collective action and the presence of growing mass-based organisations are far more difficult to contain. ForDem, which sadly is now defunct, called community organising 'building people power'. Currently, however, community organising as an approach to social change in West Papua is still marginal.

Culture of resistance

Regardless of how Papuans are organising for change, all resistance groups inside West Papua employ culture and performance for political ends. They do this through tapping into subjective experiences of suffering, mobilising people around the 'ideologies' of *adat* and Christianity, operating through organisational structures like the church and traditional governance arrangements, and by employing popular cultural traditions, particularly song, dance and oral storytelling (Reed and Foran 2002; MacLeod 2015c). In West Papua, culture cannot be separated from politics. As one Papuan explained to anthropologist Diana Glazebrook (2004, p. 1), 'Teaching performance art is like sharpening the blade of a knife.' Cultivating a distinct Papuan national identity through culture – not a sub-national identity

that exists in harmony with a national identity but a Papuan identity that is essentially in competition with being Indonesian – undermines the Indonesian government's project of creating a unifying national identity.

At the level of strategy, mobilising people around a national Papuan identity works well in transcending tribal differences but it poses problems in creating external networks of support. A narrow framing of grievances and solutions around a Papuan national identity is less likely to resonate with potential Indonesian allies. It is more likely to arouse fears that Papuans and their allies are seeking to unravel the Indonesian state. This is especially a problem for Papuans because the central government could control Papuan land and exploit their resources even if the Papuans withheld their cooperation. To maintain the occupation, Jakarta depends less on Papuans than on sustaining domestic support for a greater Indonesia. Papuans need Indonesian allies. However, when Papuans exclusively appeal to indigenous identity and Christianity, frame their grievances around historical injustices, and communicate their aspirations in ways that emphasise independence, they unwittingly limit their ability to mobilise support from Indonesians who are overwhelmingly nationalist and Muslim. As a result, Papuans reduce their chances of winning over a key influence on the Indonesian government: the Indonesian people.

Framing the struggle

Neles Tebay told me in 2008 that when he talks to Papuan students about the need for allies they often complain that progressive Indonesian students will support protests against the Freeport mine or for demilitarisation but will not join them in demanding a referendum for independence. They do not seem to care about historical injustices that happened in the 1960s. Tebay said his response to the Papuan students is something like:

> Psychologically it is always going to be difficult for Indonesian students to support Papuans wanting to address historical grievances. Their understanding of history is too different from Papuans and the emotional attachment to a unitary Indonesian state of even the most progressive Indonesian student runs deep.

Instead, he counsels Papuan students to find out what Indonesian students are passionate about. 'Perhaps it is the environment, or corruption, or anti-militarism. Find this issue and then work together,' he said.

This highlights a strategic conundrum for Papuan activists. There is a perception that working for intermediate objectives means 'selling out' the long-term goal of independence. Yet to build Indonesian support for Papuans and pressure on the government requires framing campaigns around intermediate objectives like freedom of expression, environmental protection, cleaning up corruption, sustainable development, universal access to education and health services, accountable government and human rights. This does not mean giving up on larger goals like independence, but rather looking to a process of Papuans building their power through reaching out to potential allies and winning more limited campaigns. Such campaigns can simultaneously strengthen Indonesian democracy and build Papuans' international reputation. Winning intermediate campaigns will leave Papuans in a better position to realise larger aspirations.

A further danger of depending primarily on a collective Papuan identity to mobilise resistance relates to vision. Papuans urging a more expanded notion of 'we' argue that a New Papua is best built on an inclusive vision and a deeper articulation of the multiple meanings of *merdeka*. Benny Giay (2000) urges that this 'vision of tomorrow' needs to include not only diverse Papuan tribes, but also Indonesian migrants. Rumbiak (cited in Elmslie 2005, p. 57) argues that 'independence [is] a long term battle'. Part of that struggle is defending the human rights for everyone, not just the Papuans. At times that means criticising the independence movement:

> I have to be critical of the government and at the same time of the pro-independence movement with the hope that it would force

them to be rational, to understand things better and to strategise and not to drive the people from a feeling of euphoria ... We have got one million migrants here (ibid.).

Mobilisation through an exclusive Papuan identity will create a fragile unity, perhaps liable to break down under stress and certainly incapable of carrying through an agenda for democratic transformation. It is globally significant that large parts of the movement are waging unarmed resistance for justice and peace in the Land of Papua that is built on pluralism and not the foundations of ethnic chauvinism.

More than a few Papuan activists have told me that independence will solve everything, 'ushering in the promised land' and 'a time of plenty when no one will have to work'. Yet an independent West Papuan state could replicate problems Papuans have with current governance arrangements, or generate a new set of problems without resolving the underlying causes of injustice. For instance, resource conflict generated by mining and logging companies will not necessarily be resolved through independence. This is why unarmed resistance needs to be waged in ways that prefigure the kind of society Papuans want.

As articulated in the discussion of multiple meanings of *merdeka*, part of the problem concerns the diagnostic and prognostic frames associated with Papuan articulations of freedom and the way those serving in the institutional corridors of power understand those meanings. Although *merdeka* is translated as 'freedom' in Bahasa Indonesia, the central government in Jakarta and even some civil and political leaders in Jayapura equate Papuan demands for *merdeka* with the narrow meaning of freedom as 'independence' and the desire for a sovereign state. And, of course, Papuans have obscured the deeper contents of their desire for freedom by conflating it with potentially shallower, but understandable, demands for a referendum closely followed by independence.

The other part of this strategic conundrum, however, is that at some stage, if Papuans do desire to pursue maximalist goals like a

referendum or independence, they will need to abandon campaigns around intermediate/minimalist objectives to combine their energy and resources. Minimalist and maximalist goals are not necessary in competition. It is about strategic timing and building power. Papuans can use self-limiting campaigns like student campaigns for free speech, open media access to West Papua or the release of political prisoners that can be realised within the current framework of the Indonesian state and simultaneously build political and social power in ways that move them closer to being able to realise a more expansive desire for freedom. As these campaigns gain traction they will create dilemmas for the Indonesian state. If the Indonesian government denies the Papuans their goals or uses repression, it casts the state in the worst possible light while increasing the likelihood that domestic and international parties will support the Papuans. If the state agrees to the demands of a dilemma campaign, it expands the political space available to the movement. Dilemma campaigns generate lose–lose scenarios for the state and win–win scenarios for the resistance. Then when Papuans do decide to make a united push for independence, framing this demand around democracy rather than self-determination will resonate more with the international community. Indonesia's claim to be a democracy will always be contested while Papuans have been denied the chance to freely and fairly determine whether they want to remain part of the Indonesian state or not.

Unity

Papuans know that lack of unity among the various leaders and resistance groups has held them back from achieving greater political freedoms, including independence. Chapter 4 documented some of the progress towards unity. Unity is important but achieving 100 per cent unity is not realistic. I know of no liberation struggle anywhere that has achieved that. Indeed, several struggles have succeeded even when there was serious disunity. The Indian independence movement, the South African anti-Apartheid struggle and the East Timorese

resistance are all cases in point. Each one of those struggles developed unifying structures – the Indian Congress Party, the African National Congress and the National Council for Timorese Resistance – even as some resistance groups were on the outer. A determined resistance with a superior strategy can succeed and carry a sense of national integrity even when unity is imperilled.

Yet enhanced unity is still desirable. One of the lessons that has emerged out of the experience of the past few years concerns how to structure unity. Since the collapse of the PDP (Papua Presidium Council) after the assassination of Theys Eluay there has been a greater movement towards forming decentralised network structures. It was not only state repression that helped cause the PDP to collapse; its hierarchical structure made it vulnerable to such repression. This was a major factor in the WPNCL developing a decentralised network structure.

Kurt Schock (2005) identifies five reasons why decentralised network structures are more resilient than hierarchical organisations. First, a decentralised movement structure is more likely to withstand state repression because one organisation or leader cannot be targeted. Second, devolution of leadership means that the movement can continue to function when movement leaders are imprisoned or murdered by the state and/or state/corporate-backed militia groups. Third, decentralised network movement structures are likely to be more democratic, which increases the commitment of the activists involved, makes the leadership more accountable, decreases the likelihood of co-option and lays the foundations for a new democratic society. Fourth, decentralised network movement structures are more likely to develop an oppositional consciousness among the population. A strong oppositional consciousness – which is more often than not grounded in highly developed political cultures of opposition (Reed and Foran 2002; Chabot and Vinthagen 2007) – enhances the ability of diverse groups to work together towards a common goal despite a lack of ideological consensus. Finally, because of their flexibility and capacity to distribute information horizontally, decentralised network

movement structures are likely to be more creative in developing innovative tactics than more hierarchical and rigid organisational forms.

Despite clear advantages over hierarchical structures, decentralised network structures have one recurring deficiency: less efficient and effective communication and co-ordination. Clear mechanisms for command and control are the strength of hierarchical organisations. The question then is how to maintain the strengths of both forms while not replicating their structural flaws. The ULMWP (United Liberation Movement for West Papua) has tried to address this through a collective leadership structure. Members of the ULMWP's five-person secretariat represent all three coalitions inside the country. And although they reside outside the country they are in close contact with the leadership inside the country. What remains underdeveloped is a communication and co-ordination structure inside the country that enables different parts of the movement to regularly communicate with each other and co-ordinate campaigns of mass civilian-based resistance, even as they pursue diverse nonviolent strategies. A mid-level leadership tier of youth leaders from all affiliated ULMWP coalitions and non-affiliated groups is making good progress on this front through regular informal communication forums as well as the formation of a nascent co-ordination council.

Unity, however, is not just about people: it is also about leadership, decision-making processes, organisational structure, and social groups that support the struggle. A shared assessment of the problem and vision of the kind of society worth fighting for can unify. So too can strategy. All these elements of planning helped propel nonviolent movements in India, the Philippines, Serbia and elsewhere to success.

Domains of struggle: extending the nonviolent battlefield

So far, strategy in West Papua within a typical civil resistance strategic framework has been discussed. The dynamics of contemporary civil resistance struggles for self-determination are more complex than

anti-dictatorship struggles. Self-determination struggles involve the pursuit of more difficult goals. The desire for independence challenges the current order of states. In many cases, and certainly in the West Papuan case, self-determination struggles threaten powerful corporate interests backed up by state power. In self-determination struggles such as those in Tibet, Western Sahara, Palestine and West Papua, the occupier does not sufficiently depend on the consent and cooperation of the oppressed to maintain its rule, as is the case in anti-regime struggles. Instead, the occupier depends on domestic support inside the society of the occupier and international support and acquiescence. In West Papua, this reality requires the Papuans to 'extend the nonviolent battlefield' (Burrowes 1996; Stephan and Mundy 2006). As a result, Papuans need to do three things:

1. expand the struggle to arenas outside West Papua
2. activate a 'communication chain' that bridges the social and cultural distance between Papuans and the Indonesian government, thereby undermining domestic support for the occupation
3. nonviolently sever or strain the opponent's 'capability chain', thereby undermining the opponent's power to maintain the occupation.

Expand the struggle

In successful self-determination struggles, and certainly in West Papua, nonviolent resistance needs to be waged simultaneously in the territory under occupation (West Papua), in the territory of the occupier (Indonesia), and in the societies of the occupier's elite allies such as the United States, the European Union, Japan and Australia (see figure 6.1). This is necessary to undermine the diffuse nature of the opponent's power and to internationalise the struggle, focusing specifically on state and corporate actors that support the occupation.




Figure 6.1: The three domains of struggles for self-determination

Activate the communication chain

One of the Indonesian government's sources of power in West Papua is domestic support for the occupation, particularly from within Java. This support is maintained in part because of the physical, social and cultural distance that lies between Papuans and Indonesians. Port Numbay (Jayapura) is more than 3000 kilometres from Jakarta. Indonesians, in general, know little about West Papua and its indigenous peoples. The assumption that Papuans are 'primitive' and 'backward tribal people' pervades mainstream Indonesian society (Giay 2001a, p. 129). This attitude gives rise to, and in turn is reinforced by, policies and structures ostensibly designed to 'civilise' Papuans but which in reality only benefit non-Papuans while further excluding and marginalising indigenous Papuans.

Politically, Jakarta has shown little interest in resolving Indonesia's longest-running separatist conflict. One argument is that because Papuan resistance is low level and does not threaten the territorial integrity of the Indonesian state, there is no pressing need to resolve

the conflict. This argument is in part based on a faulty analysis that the major threat to further unravelling comes from the armed struggle. Civil resistance is also able to disrupt state rule, although it is yet to reach its full potential in West Papua.

When the central government does get involved in Papuan politics, its understanding of both the causes and solutions to the conflict is invariably framed around variations of economic development and the need for greater security. By economic development Jakarta means large-scale development projects, often resource-extractive projects. Large-scale development projects and migration, which inevitably accompanies these kinds of development projects, in turn generate more problems than they solve.

In many respects the dynamic of race relations in West Papua is similar to the situation faced by black Americans in the South during the US Civil Rights struggle or the experience of black South Africans under Apartheid. During these struggles key groups, particularly the white churches (and in South Africa, white women like those involved in the Black Sash movement), helped bridge the social and cultural distance between the oppressed and oppressor. Papuans need to find the Indonesian third-party equivalent of white churches and white women (and men) who can help close the geographic, social and cultural distance between Papuans, Indonesian power-holders and the domestic constituencies the Indonesian government depends on. In other words, Papuans need the support of Indonesian allies who can help humanise them and generate deeper understandings of their grievances in the eyes of the Indonesian government. That includes not only migrants living in West Papua but also Indonesians in Java who are able to influence the 'centre'. To some extent, Papuans are finding Indonesian allies but their numbers are small, and most are individuals, not representatives of larger organisations committed to solidarity work. The need to activate a communication chain is depicted in figure 6.2.




Figure 6.2: Activating the communication chain to close social distance

Nonviolently sever the opponent's capability chain

Drawing in third parties inside Indonesia who seek to alter the will of those in Jakarta to maintain the Indonesian government's rule in West Papua is important, but it may not be sufficient to bring about the kind of fundamental change/s Papuans want. It might also be necessary to undermine the capability of the Indonesian government to maintain the occupation by targeting its external sources of power (Burrowes 1996). Papuans will need to target, strain and even nonviolently 'sever' the 'capability chain' that supplies the Indonesian government, military and foreign and domestic corporations with much needed sources of power – legitimacy, cash, labour, material and political support, reputation, raw materials, consumers and products.

A capability chain is much more than a company's supply chain. The vulnerabilities of governments and corporations maintaining occupations are their points of production, supply, distribution, decision-making, investment, promotion and consumption (see figure 6.3). These are vital nodes on a capability chain that enable the opponent to maintain business as usual (Piven and Cloward 2000, p. 413; Reinsborough and Canning 2010). The fact that, for companies like Freeport, this chain extends across three sites of resistance – West Papua, the rest of Indonesia, and societies of the

Indonesian government's elite allies – makes Indonesian government rule in West Papua vulnerable to disruption. Transnational corporations like Freeport, in particular, have capability chains that are stretched thin. They are exposed in multiple locations and in multiple ways – economically, reputationally, logistically and politically. In West Papua, extractive industries are located in close proximity to outraged populations of Papuans. Internationally, transnational corporations are proximate to committed members of international solidarity groups living close to points of supply, distribution, investment, promotion and consumption. These groups could be persuaded to take action in support of Papuan demands.




Figure 6.3: An opponent's capability chain can be nonviolently severed (or strained)

By targeting capability chains of transnational corporations, a co-ordinated transnational strategy could be used to impose and further raise economic and political costs on both the Indonesian government and transnational corporations. The main concern of transnational corporations is political stability, which facilitates profit. At a fundamental level they are less concerned with who rules at a political level as long as they can continue to do business. Evidence

for this assertion is that Freeport-McMoRan and BP – two companies with massive resource-extraction operations in West Papua – helped fund the Second Papuan People's Congress, a pro-independence event. Then as the Papuan Spring continued to gain steam, Freeport funded members of the PDP to travel around the world and advocate for independence (Richards 2002b). Even when Freeport withdrew its support for the organisation, PDP leaders mistakenly continued to show loyalty to the company by directing their ire at the Indonesian government and away from Freeport. The company had no such loyalty problems. Profit remained their master.

By raising the political and economic costs for transnational corporations in particular, Papuans could persuade executives to pressure the Indonesian government to negotiate. Even if CEOs, directors and boards themselves are unwilling to pursue this path, they may be compelled to do so by shareholders, investors and contractors whom corporate leaders indirectly depend on. These groups can persuade corporate leaders that the economic cost of not resolving the conflict is greater than the cost of political negotiations. Their motivations may be ethical but it is more likely that they will be driven by economic incentives. In any case it does not matter. Shareholders, investors and contractors are important secondary targets, vital vehicles for increasing leverage over the Indonesian government.

Political opportunities and framing the diplomatic struggle

To summarise, a tentative strategic framework for self-determination suggests that Papuans need to address challenges associated with mass (the numbers of people and key social groups active in the struggle), momentum (strategy), unity (of purpose, people and planning based on enhanced co-ordination between diverse movement components) and extending the nonviolent battlefield from West Papua to Indonesia and the societies of Indonesia's allies.

There are some additional lessons from the experience of political struggle since the fall of Suharto. These include the need to:

- Expose the direct, cultural and structural violence of the Indonesian government. In doing so, the sources of the Indonesian government's power need to be systematically targeted. The 2010 campaign to hand back Special Autonomy is a good example of how to do this and why it is essential.
- Make visible both the repression and ways Papuans are nonviolently working for change to transnational networks who can mobilise on behalf of Papuans (Martin 2007). The ongoing development of citizen media is critical in this regard (Chesterfield 2011).
- Expose the ongoing failure of governance and total lack of legitimacy in West Papua by withdrawing consent and cooperation from or co-opting state institutions like the Papuan People's Assembly, DPRP (Papua Provincial Legislative Assembly) and the civil service. Historical grievances are important and continue to motivate Papuans with a burning sense of injustice. However, it is essential that the contemporary and continuous problem of the Indonesian government occupation is made visible and pressing.
- Emphasise ethnic distinctiveness. Akihisa Matsuno (2011) argues that one of the lessons from Kosovo and South Sudan is that Papuans need to emphasise their ethnic distinctiveness without falling prey to a narrow ethno-nationalism. This approach is not without its challenges. However, the experience of both the East Timorese and Balts (in Lithuania, Estonia and Latvia) emphasises that ethno-nationalism does not necessarily mean resisting populations need to perpetrate ethnic violence. Ethno-nationalist struggles for self-determination can be a tool for conflict transformation, not an impediment to it. Having said that, emphasising ethnic distinctiveness in the West Papua case needs to be balanced with winning over the support of progressive Indonesians around limited goals that are delinked from independence. The extent to which Papuans emphasise ethnic distinctiveness or seek to attract progressive Indonesian support will require some difficult strategic choices. This is because if the Papuans do want to pursue self-determination as an independent state, then at some stage, ideally when power has been sufficiently built, delinked campaigns around more limited goals will need to be abandoned in favour of a much more confrontational, high-cost (in terms of loss of life), high-risk strategy that pursues a referendum and independence.

Of course, all these choices are for the Papuans themselves to make. I am simply seeking to lay choices and consequences out as I see them.

Conclusion

I have examined the viability of nonviolent strategies and tactics to enlarge the prospects for self-determination in West Papua. Methods of nonviolent action are used more often than conventional political processes and armed struggle. In the process, Papuans have won some partial successes. The most significant was Special Autonomy in 2001. There have also been limited gains around economic justice for women market sellers and better wages and conditions for Papuan mineworkers. The far-reaching gains represented by Special Autonomy, however, have never been fully realised and the rules and regulations necessary to operationalise the legislation have not been fully implemented. Since then there has been a return to repression by the Indonesian security forces and, by default or design, growing competition among the Papuan elite for power and resources. Despite this, the polycentric movement for freedom in West Papua has made some progress. The greatest change has been a slow and cautious opening up of political space, characterised by the continued ability of semi-legal groups to organise, the formation of new groups, regular protests, the unbanning of books, pressure mounting on the Indonesian government to end restrictions on access to West Papua and growing international support.

Where the conflict could go from here is unclear. Given the central importance – politically, economically and ideologically – of West Papua to the Indonesian state, and the economic and political importance of Indonesia regionally and internationally, it is not unreasonable to conclude that structural conditions are not conducive to

independence any time in the foreseeable future. A renewed, even genuine, autonomy deal perhaps? But a referendum on independence is still highly unlikely.

The most pessimistic – and sadly, entirely possible – scenario is that Papuans could become a marginalised minority in the land of their ancestors, a similar fate as Native Americans or Australian Aboriginal people. Their lands will be all but taken, their languages and culture swamped by the mainstream culture. In the process, anger and despair will be turned inwards, resulting in lateral violence, self-harm and a disproportionate prison population. The projected demographic change is that by 2020 West Papuans will be 29 per cent of the population. By 2030 West Papuans will comprise 15 per cent of the population, with migrants making up the remaining 85 per cent. Could it be that this is the Indonesian state's most effective strategy for ensuring that West Papua is integrated once and for all into the Republic of Indonesia?

On the other hand, continued Indonesian government control of West Papua is vulnerable on a number of counts. Jakarta cannot maintain its rule without continued repression, yet with each act of state violence, resentment and lack of trust towards Indonesian rule grows. The regime is also learning. The nature of Indonesian government repression has changed over time. In post-Suharto Indonesia there has been a shift from large-scale military operations and overt repression of dissent to a more open political community with financial benefits for a select group of Papuan elite who support the status quo. These arrangements are carefully managed by the state to limit dissent. Political détente is combined with closing the province off to foreign media, restricting freedom of expression, and a somewhat random and indiscriminate use of public violence and torture that operates side by side with more targeted surveillance and detention of nonviolent political activists. Greater openness by the state, however, does not change the fact that for now, at least, the Indonesian government still substantially depends on a currency of fear and repression in order to maintain control.

It is certainly possible that hawkish officers in the military and/or politicians among a large body of conservative Indonesian nationalists could decide to step up the state's use of violent repression. Certainly, a massacre would increase mobilisation of the freedom movement. However, unless the Indonesian military makes a grave strategic error, that is unlikely. Instead of increasing military operations we can expect to see a push to intensify the arming, training and organising of militias, similar to what occurred in East Timor, combined with a steadfast denial from the state that this is happening. The existence of the BMP (Red and White Garrison) and LMRRI (Mission for Re-education for the Republic of Indonesia), growing numbers of migrants, and increasing cleavages between the two communities are indicators that militia-led violence is a distinct possibility. In order to justify greater militarisation of the conflict and the use of force by the state, the Indonesian military might try to provoke violence from the armed struggle or even use agent provocateurs to create the pretext for violence. The key for the movement in this regard will be to maintain nonviolent discipline and expose the violence. The state will also continue to use financial and political incentives to persuade the Papuan elite and even independence activists to throw their support behind the Indonesian government. This was the strategy used to coax Nicholas Messett, Nicolaas Jouwe and Franzalbert Joku – all former outspoken independence leaders – to return to West Papua from exile as standard bearers of the Red and White (the Indonesian flag). It is the same strategy that has turned all but a few provincial politicians into ceremonial perfunctories. These methods will continue to be backed up by migration of non-Papuans to the province, alienation of Papuan land, and state violence.

Another scenario could be that West Papua descends into bloody ethnic conflict. That too is sadly possible and the distance between migrants and Papuans is growing. Apartheid in West Papua exists. Migrants can spend years living in West Papua with minimal interactions and no real personal relations with Papuans. The demographic make-up of towns like Sorong, Manokwari and even Wamena are unrecognisable from fifteen years ago. In the past fifteen years

horizontal violence between migrants and Papuans has occurred on more than one occasion. However, an eruption of large-scale and sustained horizontal conflict along Papuan/Papuan and Papuan/migrant fault lines that we have seen in places like Africa is possible but, in my view, unlikely. Papuan civil society, particularly the churches and the DAP, by far the strongest institutions in West Papua, have cultivated a strong norm of nonviolence and dialogue that have militated against violence. Most Papuan activists so far differentiate between the Indonesian government and the people, and a number of pro-independence leaders have Indonesian wives. Even the more radical groups like the KNPB (West Papua National Committee) and WPNA (West Papua National Authority), or at least the mainstream leadership of those organisations, insist on a commitment to nonviolent action and discipline.

Having said that, a failure of nonviolent action to produce quick results could also lead to an uptake of violence and a soft target could be migrants. One hypothesis is that the more fully the dynamics and rich potential (Vinthagen 2015) of nonviolent resistance are understood and the more the capacity of the movement – including its transnational reach – develops, the less likely resistance groups will abandon a commitment to nonviolent action. Regular, careful and candid analysis and ongoing evaluation of strategy and tactics will also assist the making of wise strategic choices.

There is another scenario that will see pressure build on the Indonesian government to open the territory up even as it continues to wage security operations in the remote interior, in places like Puncak Jaya and Paniai. Citizen media in West Papua is expanding rapidly and the growing number and quality of transnational linkages is making closure impractical, even if the authorities still desire it. Evidence suggests opening up the province will not work in the Indonesian government's favour. The opening of political space in non-democracies tends to result in an increase of mobilisation, rather than a reduction it (Schock 2005). The Indonesian government is caught in a dilemma. If they open West Papua up it will most likely encourage mobilisation.

However, if they continue to isolate West Papua it gives greater credence to Papuan claims that the Indonesian government has something to hide and that democracy in the easternmost extremity of the country is little more than pretence. Opening up the territory could occur as part of a Jakarta–West Papua dialogue, where Papuans secure a renewed autonomy deal and concessions like the release of political prisoners. Even limited success like this would require Papuans to substantially raise the economic and political costs for Jakarta not negotiating. However, as discussed in the Hand Back Otsus section in chapter 4, a renegotiated autonomy deal is deeply unpopular with both Jakarta and Papuans, albeit for fundamentally different reasons.

A closely related scenario is that Papuans and the transnational solidarity networks they are cultivating will lead to a growing internationalisation of the conflict, eroding Indonesia's international image and capacity to maintain the occupation. Despite the illusion of the state's monolithic invincibility, in reality the Indonesian government's rule in West Papua is fragile. The challenge for Papuans, however, will be finding the right framing that resonates with international networks and appeals to their interests. Neles Tebay suggests that given West Papua contains the world's third-largest tropical forests and a number of biodiversity hotspots of global importance – Raja Ampat, the Foja Mountains and the Lorentz World Heritage Area, to name but a few – environmental concerns, including climate change, may be key. Other master frames that have salience are human rights, democracy, and racism, three areas where Jakarta's performance in West Papua is not yet consistent with international norms.

It is not only international solidarity that represents a political opportunity for the movement. The structure of the conflict economy also makes Indonesian government rule in West Papua vulnerable. The Papuan economy is heavily driven by resource extraction led by transnational companies – Freeport-McMoRan/Rio Tinto, BP and a host of other foreign companies, including a dense network of Chinese, Malaysian and Korean timber and mining companies. Most vulnerable are the big Western-run multinationals that are more dependent on a

positive market image and are governed more tightly. By recognising that any negotiations over West Papua's political status will not only include the Indonesian government and Papuan resistance groups but powerful transnational corporations, resistance groups could embark on a strategy of imposing economic costs through 'go slow' actions, sustained and escalating strikes, boycotts and other forms of disruptive action that functions to compel corporations to increase pressure on the Indonesian government to negotiate a political settlement. This scenario is not as far-fetched as it might seem. Freeport workers have already cut their teeth with a number of impressive strike actions and there is increasing co-ordination and communication between workers, students and indigenous communities. Freeport also exists as a kind of fiefdom within West Papua and it can be brought to a standstill. A challenge (and opportunity) for the movement is that there are significant parts of Indonesian society (including sectors of the military) that want to nationalise Freeport.

Finally, it is worth reminding ourselves that while the international system of states is far from unravelling, after independence in East Timor, Kosovo, South Sudan and the breakdown of Syria and Iraq, the solidity of post-colonial boundaries is on decidedly more shaky ground. So, while an independent West Papua appears highly unlikely, it would be presumptuous to think it will never happen.

Aside from speculating on where the conflict could go, it is important to also discuss where the theory could take us. As stated previously, the theory related to the dynamics of nonviolent action for self-determination in general, and by indigenous people in particular, is underdeveloped. The West Papuan struggle is one specific self-determination struggle that could shine a light on this dynamic, and the grand strategy outlined above needs to be tested and refined against other self-determination struggles. This study has privileged strategy; more work needs to be undertaken on the other dimensions of nonviolent resistance (Vinthagen 2015). More attention needs to be paid to the role of culture and identity in self-determination struggles and the way this interacts with and enables and constrains strategic

and tactical choices. In addition, we need more research on the role nonviolent resistance plays in slowing and even reversing genocide, not only the 'slow-motion genocide' taking place in West Papua but the full range of genocidal regimes. A focus on the limits and potential of dehumanised and targeted populations to defend themselves in the face of mass annihilation is a necessary corrective to the discourse of 'Responsibility to Protect' with its preoccupation on external state-led military intervention.

Finally, what does the conflict tell us about the theory? Even in worst-case scenarios – situations where indigenous communities have long faced, and still continue to face, extreme direct, structural and cultural violence from armed state actors – nonviolent resistance can still 'work'. In the case of West Papua this has happened despite a number of strategic deficiencies. There is clearly still much to learn and progress falls far short of desire. The last three decades have seen great theoretical and strategic gains made in the realm of nonviolent anti-regime struggles. It is time to extend that social learning into the sphere of self-determination struggles.

Since 1998 the movement for freedom in West Papua has undergone a transformation from a numerically small-armed struggle in the mountains and forests to a mass-based, unarmed insurrection in the cities and towns. In the process, the movement has secured a number of important gains and been hampered by strategic deficiencies and the movement's marginal international position. However, this only emphasises the point that civil resistance is a promising framework for securing further advances. In writing this I do not wish to appear overly optimistic or deterministic. The prospects of nonviolent resistance leading to fundamental transformation towards more socially just, peaceful and ecologically sustainable outcomes in the Land of Papua remain low. Nonetheless, much has changed. Much more needs to change still. Success is by no means guaranteed, but the historical record and the logic of the theory suggests that the margin of success can be widened. As a Papuan friend once told me, 'We don't worry about the future. We have a hope.'

Epilogue

In July 2013 and again in February/March 2015, Tineke Rumkabu, Danny Rayar, David Denborough and I gathered together a selection of double-storied testimonies (Denborough et al. 2006; Denborough 2008). The Papuans we consulted told us stories of great suffering and the effects of the many injustices they have experienced. They also shared insights into how they survive, honour those who have died, take action, fashion unity in the midst of great hardship, and keep culture alive. They spoke of how they hold on to hope, are able to laugh and how, despite everything, they still sing and dance. In many respects this book has been an attempt to reflect the praxis of holding together multiple narratives – stories of horror and hope. This epilogue presents a concentrated form of this kind of double-storied testimony in the words of Papuan protagonists. It is an attempt to celebrate the *communitas* (Esposito 2010) that has been encountered and experienced in the course of this work. It reflects that Papuans are not passive recipients of the occupation. They continue to take initiatives to transform their own lives, the lives of their communities and the trajectory of their struggle. In consultation with the co-editors of the collective testimony, I have included it here as a way of honouring the diversity and unity of Papuan friends, colleagues, compatriots and comrades I have worked with, particularly those who have passed on since I first went to West Papua in 1991.

Like the traditional mats from across the Pacific that people sit on, sleep on and conduct ceremony with, this document was woven from strands, voices and vignettes; it contains words retrieved from the people Rumkabu, Rayar, Denborough and I consulted, combined with those I have interviewed in the course of fourteen years of fieldwork. Because of its message of hope and defiance, and because it contains the words of Papuans themselves, it seems fitting to close this book with this collective document.

We have come to testify

We have come to testify. There is much that we want the world to know.

We want you to travel with us to the remote places of Papua – Wamena, Paniai, the Jayawijaya highlands, the Star Mountains, Mindiptana, Timika, Arso, Mamberamo, Biak, Merauke, Asmat and many other places. We want you to hear stories of suffering from the mouths of ordinary people. Our memories are clear and sharp.

'In this river our father was murdered.'

'On that mountain slope there used to be villages. They were destroyed by the military.'

'On that open field, our old men were forced to burn their *koteka* [penis sheaths] because they were considered primitive.'

'In the past that mountain was ours, now people have destroyed our mother.'[1]

We want you to travel with us to the sites of the massacres. We want to testify about the killings and the beatings with rifles.

We want to testify about the people who were disappeared, those who were imprisoned and those who were tortured. There have been many forms of torture – the burning, the stabbing of the genitals, the rape of women.

These are some of the injustices that we want the world to know.

On some days bombs have fallen like rain. We have been up against Hercules aircraft and helicopters and boats. They had overwhelming power.

And after the massacres or murders, the injustices always continue.

Rather than acknowledge the truth, they tell lies.

The perpetrators are promoted not punished, while the victims are dragged into court. Those who resist face continuing discrimination. We are excluded from employment and education.

Some of us have spent years in prison. One of us was jailed for fifteen years simply for raising our Morning Star flag.

Over years we have faced one injustice after another and then another. There has been violation after violation since 1963. Entire villages have been destroyed. And Papuan people have been turned against other Papuans.

Injustices continue to this day. Today we face human rights violations, economic injustice, and every week thousands more migrants come in white ships and planes. We have become a minority in our land. So much is already controlled by the coloniser. Our biggest fear is that we will all but disappear as a people.

Many of our health clinics are empty. There are often no doctors or nurses. When staff are present, the clinic is often empty of medicines. When the government ignores sickness it feels like another way they are killing us. Sometimes this happens on purpose. Pigs infected with disease have been dropped in the highlands by the military. When our people eat them they get sick and die.

Our Melanesian culture has also come under attack. Our culture is seen as an 'enemy of the nation'. Our history and culture are not taught at school. Instead of speaking our language, some of us now speak in Malay dialect. Instead of singing Papuan songs, some of our children learn Indonesian songs. And even our churches are not safe. Some are burned down or replaced with mosques.

And for our women, it has been worse. They suffered the rapes and assaults and then even more. They were shamed by their own families and often marriages broke apart. These are forms of double injustice and women's suffering that no one should ever have to face.

These are just some of the injustices that we are testifying to today. We want the world to know about this.

We also want to testify to the effects of these injustices.

Some of our bodies bear the scars.

And so do our souls. We will never forget the sound of the killings. Some of us still feel the fear. For those who fled we don't know if we will be safe when we return.

Other survivors have been left with physical disabilities and troubles in the mind.

The rapes brought shame – so much shame that some women did not seek medical help.

And sometimes survivors may feel guilty for being alive. The killings can make us doubt that we have a right to live.

There have been effects for children too. Fear came to the children who did not go to school for months.

When the foreigners have taken our land, cut down our forests and destroyed our rivers, this destruction affects us too. The loss of our sacred places has brought sickness to our people.

And sometimes we feel like we are slaves in our own land. Some of us have to struggle everyday just to feed our families and send our children to school.

But there is more that we want you to know.

We want you to know our testimonies of remembrance.

We are survivors and also witnesses. We have always remembered those who were killed. We will remember them until we die. There are many ways that we do this.

We have cultural ways of joining in memory and in prayer. We place stones or wreaths of flowers. And there are traditional songs that we use to connect us with those who have died and with the ancestors. These are songs we can sing to those who have passed. We do this in a quiet place, a garden, a beach.

Or we remember through making statues of our loved ones, or photos, or lighting candles. We commune with our ancestors.

But we never forget them. They are with us. Those of us who are still alive have a responsibility to keep progressing the struggle. I have dreams of those who were killed in the jungle. They come to me in my dreams and they encourage me to keep going. I dreamt of them just last week. I listen to their voices.

If they knew that we were meeting together now, if they knew that we were gathering this testimony, they would be very happy. This would mean something to them.

They have gone over there to another world. We will always remember them.

We also want you to know the stories of our resistance, action and rescue.

Our people have a long, long history of resistance. We Papuans have been resisting outsiders for centuries. Back to the 1850s, the Dutch who were seeking to protect their spice trade, faced more than 40 Papuan rebellions – both violent and nonviolent. Diverse tribes came together to resist. Angganeta Menufandu, a *Konor* [indigenous prophet] from Biak Island, led a mass defiance of government and mission bans on *wor* [ritual singing and dancing] and urged her followers not to pay taxes and to withhold labour. When the Japanese invaded, towards the end of the Second World War, they were initially welcomed but, after acts of cruelty, the movement for a free and independent West Papua began again. The killings and massacres began in these times. And our resistance continued.

Our struggle for freedom continued after the Second World War when the United States drove the Japanese out of West Papua at the cost of thousands of lives. And since 1963 we have resisted Indonesian government rule. Our religious leaders have been a voice for us. Many Papuan priests have been arrested and killed as they have tried to protect us.

We remember our long history of resistance. This history raises us up. We carry it on.

Many of us have formed organisations of action. We come together for survivors of human rights abuses, for women, for people all over Papua. We form resistance groups. We are students, young people, older people, women, men, religious leaders and traditional leaders. We take action on behalf of those who are living and those who are no longer alive.

Some of us who witnessed massacres were involved in acts of rescue on the days when bullets were raining down, and when the sky was on the fire. After the Biak Massacre our family gave shelter to two men who were fleeing for their lives. My father gave them his clothes. He sat my sisters on their laps. We sat down quietly and we opened all the doors and all the windows. When the soldiers came in with all their weaponry, we stood there shaking. As they held their guns at us, and asked us if we were hiding anyone, we said no. We were all shaking, my father, my sisters, myself, but we survived, and the two men survived too. For four days they stayed with us. We had almost no food but my mother found a way to feed us. We are survivors, rescuers and resistors.

We are facing our enemy who has machine guns sent by the Americans, the Australians, and people from Europe. Against this firepower we have little. Bows and arrows are symbols of our resistance. We also resist with our bare hands ... with no weapons except the truth that God created us and our land and put us in it. We know we are overwhelmed but we fight back. We will survive and our culture will survive.

Right across Papua, and for so many years, we have continued to resist, to rescue and to raise the Morning Star. When we cannot fly our flag we have painted it on our bodies, stitched it into *noken* string bags. When one of us was imprisoned for fifteen years for raising our flag, he was offered amnesty if he apologised, but he refused.

'Why should I say sorry? I have done nothing wrong. It is the Indonesian state that has to say sorry. And not just to me but to all the Papuan people. They have to return our sovereignty.'

And even though it is risky for us there are many times we have

come out on to the streets in our thousands, even in our tens of thousands, to demand freedom.

These are just some of our stories of resistance. There are stories of resistance all over Papua.

We want you to know that building unity is not easy – but we are doing it.

The Indonesian government and corporations use many methods to divide us, to turn Papuans against Papuans. If some people raise their voice, the company will come – or the government will come – and say, 'Hey, come into the office, let's talk.' They then give that person money, or a scholarship, or a good job. These are some of the ways our opponent uses to break our resistance.

But we keep taking steps to come together. There is a long history to this. When the Amungme have a problem we build a traditional house. In this house – this *tongoi* – people come, sit down and talk. We invite every leader and chief from every village. People come together in one mind. When people then go out of the *tongoi* they are going to bring a change. These are traditional ways of calling up assistance. In our culture, no one can stand up by themselves. Everyone needs everyone.

So we keep taking steps to come together. We have now formed the United Liberation Movement for West Papua (ULMWP). Inside this united movement are the National Federal Republic of West Papua (NFRWP), the West Papua National Coalition for Liberation (WPNCL), the West Papua National Committee (KNPB), the West Papua National Parliament (PNWP) and other non-affiliated groups. We are strengthening our struggle and as we do so more and more people join us. People in other Pacific nations are raising their voices.

Our resistance is like a mat or *noken* – many strands woven together to become one.

Our resistance is like a spear, sharp and dangerous.

Our resistance is like a drum that speaks with the voices of the ancestors.

We want you to know about Papuan skills in survival.

Despite all the injustices we have faced, we are survivors and we have many skills. We are wise about when to speak, when to stay quiet, and when to sing our songs. Some of these songs were written in prison for the future of West Papua. Some of our singers have been arrested and murdered. But we continue to sing freedom.

We also have our dances. We wear our traditional dress, and dance traditional Papuan dances. Our Papuan culture helps us to love and care for one another. When we live inside our culture we are free.

We have prayer, faith in Jesus Christ, and God as our witness.

And we have each other. We are among friends and we want to acknowledge all those who have stood with us.

There are other Papuan survival skills too.

Like mothers' skills of endurance. Mothers who sell fruit and vegetables to feed their families and send their children to school display their produce on hessian mats by the side of the road. Rain, hail, sun and dust they sit. They survive.

Some of us travelled by canoe with 43 others all the way to Australia to seek another life. Years later, some of us sailed back to West Papua with the Freedom Flotilla. The West Papuans, Aboriginal elders and other Australian supporters on board the flotilla carried a message of peace and solidarity, and reignited ancient connections.

And we have skills in humour, in jokes and in laughter. Even in the hardest times, we pray, we sing, we dance, and somehow we find a way to laugh.

We want you to know about our hopes and our dreams.

We carry a big hope together ... a free West Papua. We have held on to this hope for many, many years.

As we lift up these injustices to the light, then all the other cases will also be lifted up.

And we carry a hope for justice – international justice, Western justice, West Papuan justice, spiritual justice.

That is why we are testifying today.

We are sharing with you testimonies of injustice.
We are speaking about the effects of these injustices.
We are sharing testimonies of remembrance.
We are sharing stories of resistance, action and rescue.
We are sharing the ways we build unity.
We are sharing our Papuan survival skills.
And we are testifying to our hopes and to our dreams.
What we are testifying here has been an open secret. We have always known this, God has always known this, but now you will know it too.
This means that now you are also witnesses.
So these stories and our hopes will now also be carried by you.

Thank you.

Postscript: 'Now we take our message to the world'

Markus Haluk's eyes are moist. It's June 2015 and we are standing inside a portside warehouse in Honiara, the capital city of the Solomon Islands. Haluk carefully unwraps the first of five large 27-kilogram packages encased in hessian. Inside each parcel are two large A4-sized books, parts of a massive paper petition. Each book is around 40 centimetres thick – they make *The Oxford Dictionary* look like a comic book. Haluk was the lead organiser tasked with collating the hefty tomes and getting them safely out of West Papua. Yosepha Alomang, a 50-something-year-old stalwart of the West Papuan independence movement, worked alongside him and she is also now in the warehouse. Alomang reaches out and touches the books. Turning to me she says, 'These are the blood and bones of our people.'

Alomang means what she says. During the signature-raising campaign, Indonesian security forces shot dead Obangma Giban, aged 32 years, a village chief from Yahukimo.[1] In the month of May alone 487 activists were arrested for participating in the campaign (Papuans Behind Bars 2015a). Some of those were tortured. BRIMOB officers in Manokwari stubbed out cigarettes on Alexander Nekenem's body while

the head of the Manokwari Regional Police, Tommy H Pontororing, denied him and his compatriots access to lawyers (Papuans Behind Bars 2015b). Police also demolished 'communication posts' (*posko*) at places like Cendrawasih University, where people could go to sign the petitions. Countless scores were savagely beaten.

While Indonesian President Joko Widodo was trying to reassure Melanesian leaders that Indonesia was a new democratic country, Indonesian police were undermining him. As West Papua seethed in unarmed insurrection the security forces were desperately trying to violently pacify the population.

The paper petition is in support of the ULMWP's (United Liberation Movement for West Papua's) campaign to become a member of the MSG (Melanesian Spearhead Group), an important sub-regional forum, part of the Pacific Island Forum, and with status at the United Nations. But because of the Indonesian government's ban on foreign media virtually no news of the petition campaign reached an international audience until the packages were carefully unwrapped in Honiara. The Indonesian government had tried to stop the petition leaving the country, seizing copies at the airport as Papuan leaders attempted to take them to the Solomon Islands in their luggage. But Haluk, Alomang and the team had made several duplicates, sending them by different routes to Honiara. This package arrived by international courier. There are five copies, one for each Melanesian leader. Haluk tells me it cost a small fortune.

At a time when digital petitions land in our inbox every day, 55,555 signatures may not sound like much, but don't be fooled. This is no collection of easy Facebook likes. ULMWP organisers travelled the length and breadth of West Papua – by ship, plane, car and on foot – to collect each of those signatures.

The petition not only includes the names, addresses and signatures of the petitioners, people's state-issued identification cards were also copied and included as further proof of authenticity. Not just radical pro-independence Papuans signed, many Indonesian migrants did too. Those who could not sign their name supplied a fingerprint. In addition, all the churches signed letters of support. So too did the DAP (National Council of Customary Chiefs in West Papua), women and student groups, Papuan intellectuals, armed guerrilla groups and individual civil servants and politicians working for the Indonesian government (ULMWP *tim kerja* 2015, p. 3). The petitions, letters and the presence of nearly twenty West Papuan residents in Honiara clearly demonstrate that the ULMWP has deep and broad support within its homeland. Papuan citizens may not have a country but they are the engine that is driving the ULMWP forward. And still there are tens of thousands of more signatures that did not make it to Honiara because they did not get to the ULMWP work team in time to be sent with the documents out of the country.

When Benny Wenda sees the petitions he is emotional. Referring to the fraudulent Act of Free Choice, discussed in chapter 2, he says, 'In 1969 the Indonesian government deceived the international community with 1022 people who were forced to say they supported Indonesia. Today we have over 55,000 signatures.'

West Papua's desire for freedom is the Indonesian government's nightmare of unravelling. That is why the police and military respond with such ferocity to the petition, a political act that has become routine and blasé in many countries. The rest of Indonesia may be a democracy but in West Papua freedom of expression is prohibited. For the security forces signing the petition is tantamount to sedition.

A herculean task

The ULMWP's decision to focus on the MSG was important for external and internal reasons. Internally, the intermediate objective of securing membership of the MSG immediately became a vehicle for collective action, glue that bonded the organisation together. Externally, West Papuan leaders knew there would be little international support for their cause unless their Melanesian kin and neighbours stood up for them. But gaining membership of the MSG was a herculean task. Not only did the ULMWP need to demonstrate massive support from inside West Papua, they also had to organise their efforts across five countries:

Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, Fiji, Vanuatu and Kanaky (New Caledonia). Moreover, they only had six months to do so. This was not a level playing field. On one side was the Indonesian government with deep pockets, hard power at their disposal and the backing of the Papua New Guinean and Fijian governments. On the other was the ULMWP with limited financial resources but increasingly organised people, with the support of the Vanuatu government, the Front de Libération Nationale Kanake et Socialiste (FLNKS or Kanak Socialist National Liberation Front) and the people of Melanesia. What was uncertain at the beginning of the campaign was how the government of the Solomon Islands would respond.

There was sympathy from people within the Solomon Islands government but political representatives were starting from a low knowledge base about the reality of the occupation. Moreover, the previous Solomon Islands government had been courted by Indonesian officials eager to present a raft of economic development opportunities in return for political support. As the campaign progressed the ULMWP was hindered by repression within West Papua and climatic disruption without. Tropical Cyclone Pam devastated Vanuatu in March 2015, leaving nearly half the country homeless. It completely destroyed the ULMWP's administrative office and made it more difficult to draw on Vanuatu's assistance to lobby other Melanesian leaders. Around this time Obangma Giban was shot dead as he organised a ULMWP fundraiser for humanitarian relief in Vanuatu.

Then there were political challenges. Prime Minister Peter O'Neill from Papua New Guinea said a lot of nice words. He called West Papuans 'brothers' and 'kin' but refused to meet with both Octovianus Mote, the ULMWP's general secretary, and Wenda. In late March, O'Neill even went as far as deporting Wenda. In a somewhat embarrassing move for many Fijians, former military strongman Prime Minister Voque (Frank) Bainimarama pronounced on the front page of the *Fiji Sun*, his government's mouthpiece, that the Indonesian government did not need to worry about his country's position on the ULMWP's application: 'Indonesia, we're with you,' crooned Bainimarama (Bolatiki 2015).

We know from public record that the Indonesian government invested US$20 million to derail the ULMWP's campaign. Fiji benefited handsomely. So too did Papua New Guinea. In the months before the MSG Leaders' Summit, the Indonesian president and foreign minister criss-crossed Melanesia in their private jet. We don't know what deals were done behind closed doors but we do know that the Indonesian government did not even want the ULMWP in the room; that is why it shot dead a ULMWP activist in West Papua. That is why it jailed over 500 activists even as Indonesian President Widodo announced he was freeing five, trying – and failing – to demonstrate that all was fine in the territory. As far as the Indonesian government was concerned, West Papua was part of Indonesia. End of story. Except it is not.

Political machinations

It was always going to be a tough campaign. Then in the week before the Leaders' Summit in Honiara things got tougher. The pro-West Papuan government of Joe Natuman in Vanuatu was deposed in a no-confidence motion, ushering in Sato Kilman, a pro-Indonesian politician, a man whose previous election campaign was allegedly funded by the Indonesian government. The mood on social media in Vanuatu was ugly. The ULMWP leadership team met with representatives of the Vanuatu government. With less than a week before the Leaders' Summit, they were still unsure who would be representing that government in Honiara. The balance of power was shifting in the Indonesian government's favour. Mote immediately embarked on an emergency diplomatic mission to Port Vila. Although Mote was assured that the Vanuatu government's *Wantok Blong Yumi* Bill 2010 tethered governments of all stripes to enduring support for the liberation of West Papua, Prime Minister Kilman was unavailable to meet.

Then there were internal challenges. After the Port Vila meeting in December 2014, the president of the NFRWP (National Federal Republic of West Papua), Forkorus Yaboisembut, withdrew his support for the ULMWP. As a parallel government pushing for international

recognition of West Papua as an independent state, Yaboisembut argued that all groups should instead unite under the NFRWP. According to Yaboisembut the NFRWP was both more representative and, as a government in waiting, had greater political authority than the ULMWP, which was formed as an umbrella organisation. I was part of a small delegation that met with Yaboisembut at his home in February 2015. The three of us tried to explain what had occurred in Port Vila, including the clear message that the MSG would not support an application for membership from a 'government', but there was no changing his mind. Yaboisembut announced that he would submit a new application for membership. The decision caused the NFRWP to split. The overwhelming majority of the NFRWP, including the WPNA (West Papua National Authority) and DAP, united under the leadership of Edison Waromi, who reiterated his support for the ULMWP.

Political machinations continued. The Indonesian government, in an ambitious act of numerical contortion, announced that after years of criminalising Melanesian identification, including killing songwriters like Arnold Ap and Eddie Mofu for simply singing Papuan songs, that they were suddenly a Melanesian country. In fact, they boldly claimed they were the most Melanesian country with eleven million Melanesians, more than the entire population of the other five Melanesian countries combined. As a result, the Indonesian government argued, they needed to be embraced as a member of the MSG. To facilitate this they proposed that the five governors of Indonesia's easternmost provinces – Papua and Papua Barat, plus Maluku Utara, Maluku Selatan and Nusa Tenggara Timur – would represent the Indonesian government at the MSG and duly submitted an application for associate membership. Franzalbert Joku masterminded the plan and O'Neill enthusiastically backed it.

The overwhelming majority of the population from the Indonesian government's three 'recently discovered Melanesian provinces'[2] are Muslim Malays, not Melanesian. I met the rather large Indonesian delegation in Honiara. There were only two Melanesians in the delegation, Franzalbert Joku and Nicholas Messett, and both are former pro-independence fighters now induced to travel the world as enthusiastic ambassadors for the Indonesian government. The rest of the delegation was Malay Indonesians.

Interestingly, the proposal that the five governors of eastern Indonesia represent the Indonesian government was not actively supported by the governors of Papua Barat and Papua, Indonesia's only real Melanesian provinces. In a stunning act of noncooperation, when President Widodo tried to meet with Lukas Enembe, the governor of Papua province, Enembe switched off his phone for three days. He told a trusted insider, who declined to be named, that, 'The MSG has nothing to do with me.' Both he and Papua Barat Governor Abraham Atururi refused to attend the MSG Leaders' Summit. These two facts – the non-attendance of the West Papuan governors and the lie that Indonesia had a sprawling population of Melanesians – were quietly ignored by Papua New Guinea and Fiji. They embraced the governors' application and argued against the ULMWP becoming full members, no doubt looking to benefit from the hundreds of millions of dollars of trade the Indonesian government promised.

A wave of solidarity builds

Meanwhile, Mote kept travelling and Benny Wenda, Jacob Rumbiak, Rex Rumakiek and Leonie Tanggahma kept meeting MSG officials and leaders. In June 2015 the governments of both Samoa and Tonga expressed support for freedom in West Papua and the ULMWP. While diplomacy with governments continued it was grassroots support that created the incentive for political leaders to take a clearer position. And still a wave of solidarity was building. In Fiji, where the Pacific Conference of Churches had its head office, the proliferation of support for the ULMWP required the formation of a solidarity council. The Pacific Conference of Churches also helped reignite solidarity in the Solomon Islands. In March they brought church and secular civil society leaders together in Honiara. The local solidarity group, Solomon Islands in Solidarity for West Papua, suddenly went from a group with half a dozen individual members to an organisation of organisations.

Churches, local non-government organisations who provided essential services, the young women's in parliament group (one of the members that included Christina Sogavare, Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare's daughter), artists, journalists and customary leaders all got involved.

When the MSG meeting started on 17 June, Honiara's two newspapers, the *Solomon Island Star* and *Island Sun*, enthusiastically followed the story. On each day between the 17 and 27 June, the day after the decision, the front pages of both papers, and often pages two, three and four, were devoted to some aspect of the ULMWP's campaign for membership. In the month of June over 140 newspaper articles were published in the Solomon Islands alone. For many in the Solomon Islands it was not just an issue of solidarity with their Melanesian kin. They saw their government's position on West Papua as a litmus test on an independent foreign policy and the willingness of the police and local civic authorities to permit people to freely march and protest as a sign of the health of local democracy.

It was not just the population in the Solomon Islands that was growing restless. The leaders of the Melanesian countries began to express concern too. In an article in Vanuatu's *Daily Post* (2015), Prime Minister Kilman referred to comments from ordinary people circulating on Facebook and declared that Port Moresby, Honiara and Port Vila could easily riot if Melanesian leaders were seen to be backing away from supporting West Papua.

The door is pushed ajar

On 26 June the decision was made. West Papua represented by the ULMWP was granted observer status and the Indonesian government represented by the five governors of the country's easternmost provinces was assigned, associate membership. The MSG leaders tried to offer something to both West Papua and Indonesia, disappointing both. They recognised Indonesian sovereignty over West Papua but they also rebuffed the Indonesian government's diplomatic efforts to deny the ULMWP entry. In their 20th Communique (Point 8, Sub-point xxva) MSG leaders referred to the ULMWP as an organisation 'representing

Melanesians living abroad', presumably to reassure the Indonesian government that they respected the country's territorial integrity. At the same time MSG leaders acknowledged West Papua as separate from Indonesia. The door has been pushed ajar to some kind of political negotiations and it won't be just the central government in Jakarta doing all the talking. The five governors will also have a voice. And some of them, like Enembe, have shown independent thinking and a willingness to propose creative solutions.

The Indonesian government was less than pleased. For years Jakarta had vigorously resisted calls for dialogue by West Papuans or any suggestion that the causes of conflict were political in nature. In the words of Engelbert Surabut, the head of the Lapago Council of Customary Chiefs, 'The Indonesian government is allergic to dialogue.' For years the state had avoided any suggestion that Jayapura, the capital of West Papua, was equal to Jakarta or that a discussion of independence was on the table. But when Jakarta closed down the space for dialogue it left Papuans demanding political freedom with no domestic avenues left for expressing why they wanted freedom. So they took their concerns to the Pacific, to Melanesians with a shared identity and with whom their cause would resonate.

Internationalising the West Papua issue like this is exactly what Jakarta was trying to prevent. Suddenly, in the face of the ULMWP's push for greater recognition among Pacific Island states, the Jakarta-West Papua dialogue that Father Neles Tebay and others had been encouraging for the best part of ten years might look moderate and reasonable. On the other hand, the elevation of the ULMWP might give cause for hardliners within the Indonesian government to push harder. But there is no going back. For the time being, at least, the political dynamics have become much more complex and unpredictable, full of possibility. Sogavare was particularly explicit: 'A forum where the two political groups can engage in dialogue' has now been created (*Island Sun* 2015). Whatever the case, the Indonesian government will have to respond.

Relentless unarmed resistance inside West Papua and unprecedented

solidarity outside the country – in West Papua's Melanesian neighbours – have turned West Papua's long-running struggle for freedom into a cause célèbre in the Pacific. The MSG has become West Papua's first international forum for dialogue. West Papua and Indonesia will sit across the table from each other. Vanuatu and the FLNKS have confirmed their support. The Solomon Islands government has emerged as a stronger ally. Papua New Guinea and Fiji will have to deal with sustained, organised and growing domestic discontent. That will only increase as other Pacific Island countries like Tonga, Samoa and Kiribati begin to stir, expressing support for the ULMWP's aspirations. On 26 June the MSG finally brought West Papua back to the Melanesian family. As Benny Wenda says, 'With the region firmly behind us we will now take our message to the world.'

Markus Haluk and Yosepha Alomang have returned to West Papua resolute in their commitment to nonviolent resistance. 'We have to finish this,' Haluk tells me. 'Freedom will come.'

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This book has not been a solo project. Countless Papuans, allies, scholars, donors, family and friends all stepped in at various times to assist and encourage. It is my pleasure to acknowledge them here. Of course, it is always dangerous to list people by name in case anyone is missed out so please forgive me if I have done so.

My research was carried out over a fourteen-year period, from 2002 to 2015. During that time it has been a privilege to be trusted as a receiver of stories, analysis and knowledge of Papuan friends, colleagues and interlocutors, whom I thank deeply. I have tried to make sense of these gifts as best as I have been able. To what I have received I have added my own analysis, insights from the literature, and my own research. I now offer the results back to the movement in the form of this book and its companion volume, *What Would it Take?* (published by Irene Press). In doing so I want to stress again that I have taken care not to share secret knowledge – knowledge not already available in the public domain – that has been entrusted to me, and I am indebted to those who put their faith in me.

For obvious reasons there are many Papuans inside the country

who have assisted the project whom I cannot name. These include not only interviewees and participants in workshops but also people in government, civil society organisations and the resistance movement who enabled the research through their contacts, encouragement and practical assistance. In addition, a number of Papuans from the diaspora helped: Andy Ajamiseba, Benny Wenda, Herman Wainggai, Jacob Prai, Jacob Rumbiak, the late John Ondawame, John Rumbiak, Leonie Tanggahma, Octo Mote, Om Zachi, Nicolaas Jouwe, Nancy Jouwe, Oridek Ap and his family, Paula Makabory, Rex Rumakiek, Ronny Kareni, Seth Rumkorem, and the late Viktor Kaisiepo. I also want to express my appreciation to John Rumbiak and Benny Giay who have become important friends and mentors to me and remain a source of inspiration.

As well as Papuans living inside the country and in the diaspora there were a number of individuals and organisations that acted as bridges between West Papua and the outside world. These people and groups collect and amplify stories of repression and resistance. They help make visible not only oppression and repression but also lift up the nonviolent ways Papuans continue to resist and introduce these stories and events to an audience who can take action on behalf of the Papuans. Without these efforts my own work would have been much more difficult. Thank you to the folks from Human Rights Watch, Institute for Papuan Advocacy and Human Rights, independent journalists from Jubi and other independent Papuan-run media outlets (Majalah Selangkah, Suara Papua and others), TAPOL, West Papua Advocacy Team, West Papua Media, the West Papua Project at Sydney University, Anne Noonan, Joe Collins from the Australian West Papua Association and John Miller from the East Timor Action Network as well as the growing network of unpaid citizen journalists inside Papua working at great personal risk to get the story out.

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Anyone who has ever undertaken any research in West Papua will attest to the fact that doing fieldwork there is not only difficult, it is very expensive. I have been assisted in this regard by an Australian Government Postgraduate Award scholarship and a University of Queensland research grant. Over time a network of funders – most of whom I cannot name because they are active in Indonesia, West Papua, and the Pacific – emerged to support the training and education work in West Papua, which in turn created space for research. These include international donors, civil society organisations and a network of private individuals. Because of the way the training and education work was integrated into the research I would not have been able to finish without their support. Those I can name include: the Religious Society of Friends (Quakers), the Marion Arnold Peace and Social Justice Fund, the Herb Feith Foundation and the Morawetz Foundation, Zonta Ipswich, the Sisters of Mercy (Brisbane), and David Hartsough. Thank you all!

Finally, it is worth celebrating the fact that the civil resistance training and education work integral to this research project has now been placed on a sustainable footing.

My sincerest thanks to all of those who contributed to this work. All author royalties from this book will go to support civil resistance in West Papua.

Glossary

Adat	'Custom' or 'tradition'
BMP	Barisan Merah Putih or Red and White Garrison (in reference to the colours of the Indonesian flag), a militia group
BRIMOB	Mobile Brigade Police Forces, a paramilitary Indonesian police force
DAP	Dewan Adat Papua or National Council of Customary Chiefs in West Papua
DPRP	Papua Provincial Legislative Assembly
ELSHAM	Lembaga Studi dan Advokasi Hak Asasi Manusia di Papua Barat or Institute for Human Rights Study and Advocacy in West Papua
ForDem	Forum Demokrasi Rakyat Papua Bersatu or the Democratic Forum of the United Papuan People, a short-lived coalition that organised the Hand Back Otsus campaign in 2009/10
FORERI	Forum for Reconciliation in Irian Jaya
JDP	Jaringan Damai Papua or Papuan Peace Network
Kabupaten	An administrative area or district
KNPB	Komite Nasional Papua Barat or West Papua National Committee
Kopassus	Komando Pasukan Khusus or Indonesian Special Forces Command
Laskar Jihad	A Muslim militia group that arrived in West Papua from the Malukus around 2000. It officially disbanded in late 2002 although the core network and ideology that promotes sectarian violence in 'defence' of the Indonesian state still exists
LMRRI	Lembaga Missi Reclassering Republik Indonesia or Mission for Re-education for the Republic of Indonesia, a militia group with links to the Indonesian military
Merdeka	'Freedom' and/or 'independence'
MRP	Majelis Rakyat Papua – the Papuan People's Assembly
MSG	Melanesian Spearhead Group, a sub-regional forum made up of Fiji, Papua New Guinea, Solomon Islands, Vanuatu and the FLNKS, a coalition of pro-independence Kanak political parties of New Caledonia
Mubes	Musyuwarah Besar, a large consultation (or gathering/consensus-building meeting) that took place in 1999 in West Papua. The MRP Mubes refers to the MRP gathering/consultation to evaluate Special Autonomy in 2011
NFRWP	National Federal Republic of West Papua
NGO	Non-government organisation
OPM	Organisasi Papua Merdeka or Free Papua Organisation/West Papua Liberation Army, a term that refers to the armed struggle but also expresses the blurred lines between armed and civil resistance. The majority of actions carried out by the armed struggle, flag raisings and political education, for instance, are nonviolent. Historically, the Indonesian government has not distinguished between armed and unarmed groups, classifying both violent and nonviolent resisters as 'separatists' or 'terrorists' intent on destroying the Indonesian state (see TPN-PB)
Otsus	Abbreviation of *Otonomi Khusus*, the Bahasa Indonesia name for Special Autonomy
PDP	Presidium Dewan Papua or the Papua Presidium Council, a pan-Papuan resistance organisation

Pemekaran	Translates as 'flourishing' in Indonesian; in the Papuan context it refers to a policy to divide West Papua into two or more provinces
PNWP	Parlamen Nasional West Papua or West Papua National Parliament, a pro-independence parallel national parliament
PTF	West Papua Peace Task Force, a group set up by John Rumbiak and ELSHAM
SK14	*Surat Keputusan Nomor* 14 – Letter of Decision Number 14, a policy and demand put forward by the MRP to ensure that 'all candidates for elected office at the sub-provincial level had to be indigenous Papuans
SKP	Sekretariat Keadilan dan Perdamaian or Catholic Office for Justice and Peace
Surat Jalan	A 'letter of travel' issued by police and in some cases Badan Intelligence Nasional – National Intelligence Agency or BIN – and administered by the police and army
Tapol	*Tahanan politik*, political prisoner. TAPOL is also the name of a UK-based organisation that campaigns for human rights in Indonesia
TNI	Tentara Nasional Indonesia or Indonesian Armed Forces
TPN	TPN–PB, the Tentara Pembebasan Nasional–Papua Barat or West Papua National Liberation Army
ULMWP	United Liberation Movement for West Papua
UP4B	Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and Papua Barat, a government agency
USAID	United States Agency for International Development, an American government entity responsible for administering civilian foreign aid
WPNA	West Papua National Authority
WPNCL	West Papua National Coalition for Liberation

Notes

Prologue

1. The Indonesian text is as follows: 'Selantujnya Dewan Revolusi siap untuk memperkembangkan sayap untuk aksi kekerasan maka dalam minggu ini atau minggu depan siap untuk medan perang.'

Chapter 1: Research horizons

1. Acheh is the freedom movement's preferred spelling of their homeland.
2. Alex Rayfield was a pseudonym I used for much of the research period. It has now been compromised, hence my reason for abandoning it.

Chapter 2: Historical and political dynamics of the conflict

1. Papuan church leaders Reverend Kabel and Reverend Maloali of the Evangelical Christian Church were present at the founding of the Pacific Conference of Churches in 1961 at the Malua Theological Seminary in Samoa, and Papuan politicians Markus Kaisiepo and Nicolaas Jouwe were present at the founding of the South Pacific Commission in Canberra in 1947.
2. Karel Gobai first proclaimed independence of West Papua in Paniai in February 1969, at least nine months before the conclusion of the Act of Free Choice. Gobai was a civil servant, then district commissioner of Paniai. The second declaration of independence was by Seth Rumkorem, a commander of the TPN. It took place on 1 July 1976 at Markas Victoria, a guerrilla camp near the PNG/West Papua border (Ondawame 2000 pp. 67, 75–6). Michael Kareth, a Papuan leader allied with the West New Guinea National Congress, also declared independence from Indonesia in Brussels in 1997 (Webb-Gannon 2011, p. 225). Forkorus Yaboisembut

then declared independence at the Third Papuan People's Congress on 19 October 2011.

3. Trikora is an acronym for *Tri Komando Rakyat* (the three demands of the people). The first demand was to crush efforts to make West Irian a puppet government for the Dutch. The second was to raise the Indonesian flag on West Irian soil. The final demand was to integrate the territory into the Republic of Indonesia.
4. In April 2014 I interviewed respected non-government and church leaders who witnessed TNI officers from Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih training Papuan civilians and Indonesian migrants in automatic weapons handling. This took place at the headquarters of the institute with the LMRRI (Mission for Re-education for the Republic of Indonesia) in Waena, Jayapura. The witness allegedly saw the assistant territorial commander disassembling and reassembling what appeared to be an SS1 assault rifle.
5. A copy of letter B/918/IV/2011 is in the author's possession.
6. There is a current debate in Indonesia whether the Forestry Law of 1999 and the Village Law of 2014 combined with local regulations based on international declarations, like the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous People, could be used to provide additional protection of indigenous land rights in Indonesia.
7. UP4B was later disbanded by Indonesian President Joko Widodo. Papuan activists in Jakarta told me in January 2015 that UP4B not only supported development it also helped fund West Papua's extensive network of informers paying 1 million Indonesian rupiah (around $A100) per SMS message providing information about West Papuan resistance activity.
8. The phrase 'big man' is a type of polity associated with Melanesia. Big man is an Anglicisation of the *Tok Pisin* (Papua New Guinea Pidgin) words *bikpela man*. A big man has accumulated significant power and rank through a skilful combination of public oratory, informal persuasion, and exchanging public and private wealth, not inheritance. Big men are found particularly in Papua New Guinea and West Papua; however, the idea is also an unfortunate stereotype in ethnographies of Melanesia. In West Papua other types of leadership systems include the *ondaoafi* system, where chiefs are determined by following the male descent line rather than by merit. Another type is the kingdom system, which includes kingdoms in Raja Ampat and the north-west coast. Kingdoms vary in size and diversity and are characterised by the presence of formal political roles. There is also a mixed system of leadership, where leaders are sometimes selected on merit and in other cases on heredity. In all systems reciprocity, dialogue and consensus are highly valued (Mansoben 1995).

Chapter 3: Visions of *merdeka*

1. *Pancasila* was a founding state ideology articulated by Indonesian President Sukarno and further popularised during Suharto's New Order. The word comprises two Javanese words based on Sanskrit, meaning 'five' (*panca*) 'principles' (*sila*). These principles are inter-related and mutually reinforcing:
   - Belief in the one and only God (*Ketuhanan Yang Maha Esa* in Bahasa Indonesia)
   - Just and civilised humanity (*Kemanusiaan Yang Adil dan Beradab* in Bahasa Indonesia)
   - Unity of Indonesia (*Persatuan Indonesia* in Bahasa Indonesia)
   - Democracy guided by wisdom and unanimity arising out of deliberations of chosen representatives (*Kerakyatan Yang Dipimpin oleh Hikmat Kebijaksanaan, dalam permusyawaratan dan perwakilan* in Bahasa Indonesia)
   - Social justice for all people (*Keadilan social bagi seluruh Rakyat Indonesia* in Bahasa Indonesia).

Chapter 4: Civil resistance in West Papua

1. A complete version is available at www.biak-tribunal.org.
2. *Papuanisasi*, meaning 'Papuanisation', is a call to Papuanise all aspects of the territory. Essentially it is about affirmative action and control of in-migration. The policy was popularised by Papuan intellectual Benny Giay (2000) in his book *Menuju Papua Baru* ('Towards a New Papua'). The desire to Papuanise West Papua and the specific demand for affirmative action was taken up by the PDP and later helped animate the SK14 campaign.
3. *Koteka* is an Indonesian word used to refer to the *holim* (a Lani/Dani word), the penis sheath worn by highland Papuan men.

Chapter 5: From armed to unarmed resistance

1. The song begins with the words 'In '65 on the 28th of July the army base at Markas Arfak was demolished (*bongkar*) by Papuan forces'. The song continues in the Biak language: '*Yamewero / Yamewero yabe women*

kakerdi / Yanan ke yanan bayo / Yana ke yanan bayo / Yama risen yoresro mangundaya.' The English translation is: 'I won't / I won't / be a slave anymore / If I don't eat / If I have something or not / It doesn't matter / I am happy to be free.'

2. In November 2010, members of the KNPB and TPN jokingly debated whether they should kidnap my colleague Rennie and me. At the time we were facilitating a workshop on civil resistance inside West Papua. We used the kidnapping proposal as an opportunity to explore different tactics and their consequences. The serious point behind the discussion was how the Papuan freedom movement might get the international community to finally pay attention to both human rights violations by the Indonesian security forces and Papuan desires to be free. These activists had all but given up hope that Indonesians in Java and elsewhere would ally with them. They also felt extremely frustrated that their struggle for independence was being ignored by the international community.
3. As stated in the acknowledgements of this book, no secret knowledge of the movement is shared. What follows is an open-source analysis.

Chapter 6: Towards a framework for nonviolent liberation

1. A third peak occurred in 2015 when 55,555 people signed a paper petition in support of the ULMWP's application for membership of the MSG (see postscript). Papuan sources tell me that tens of thousands more signatures were collected but were not collated in time to take to Honiara where Melanesian leaders were meeting. Migrants as well as indigenous Papuans signed the petition.

Epilogue

1. These quotes are from Hernawan and van den Broek's work 'National Dialogue on Papua: A tale of "Memoria Passionis", the memory of suffering' (1999, p. 3).

Postscript

1. In some sources the deceased's name is spelled Obang Sengenil or Obang Sekenill. These sorts of discrepancies underscore the need for open access to West Papua for media and independent human rights monitoring.

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West Papua is a secret story. On the western half of the island of New Guinea, hidden from the world, in a place occupied by the Indonesian military since 1963, continues a remarkable nonviolent struggle for national liberation. In *Merdeka and the Morning Star*, academic Jason MacLeod gives an insider's view of the trajectory and dynamics of civil resistance in West Papua. Here, the indigenous population has staged protests, boycotts, strikes and other nonviolent actions against repressive rule.

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