

DIPA NUSANTARA AIDIT

A Short History of the
Communist Party
of Indonesia



Kacabenggala Editions

Publisher Note

The 80 million Indonesians are today among the proud makers of the continent of resurgent freedom, which is Asia today. The Bandung Conference and the recent Indonesian elections, especially the spectacular emergence of the Communist Party of Indonesia as a powerful and major force in the country captured the attention of the world.

D. N. Aidit, General Secretary of the Communist Party of Indonesia, in tracing the history of his Party gives us a cogent and analytical account of the Indonesian national movement.

From small beginnings in 1920, through the abortive uprising in 1926 and the struggle against Japanese occupation culminating in the August 1945 Revolution, we see the evolution of a powerful movement from stage to stage.

Developments since 1945 have been complicated and it is a tribute to the lucidity of the author that he unravels the events and sets them in a logical pattern which indicates also the path to the future. The Madiun massacre of 1948, the re-building of the united front, the coming to power of the Sastroamidjojo cabinet and the growth throughout of the democratic movement with the Communist Party in the forefront, are put in their proper setting with a rare precision.

Thirty-five years of hard-won experience are here summarised—in establishing the united front, in conducting armed struggle and in building the Communist Party. There is a lesson in it for all.

December 1955

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Introduction

THE Communist Party of Indonesia was founded on 23rd May, 1920. Thus, 23rd May, 1955 is the 35th anniversary of the CPI.

The birth of the CPI (Communist Party of Indonesia) thirty-five years ago was the birth of a party of the Indonesian working class. The development of this Party is the development of the history of the Indonesian working class in leading the peasants and other masses of the people in the heroic struggle against imperialism and its hirelings, in the struggle to overthrow the reactionary power and establish people's power based on the alliance of the majority of the people, that is, the alliance of the workers and peasants. Only such a people's power will make possible the attainment of a socialist Indonesia in the future.

The thirty-five years history of the CPI is not a tranquil and peaceful one; it is a history which has gone through many turmoils and many dangers, many mistakes and many sacrifices. But it is also a heroic history, a joyful history, a history with many lessons, a successful history.

D. N. AIDIT

The Foundation of the Party and the Struggle Against the First White Terror (1920-1926)

THE CPI is the synthesis of the Indonesian workers' movement with Marxism-Leninism. It was not by chance that the CPI was founded on 23rd May 1920; it was an objective fact. The CPI was born in the era of imperialism, after a working class had come into existence in Indonesia, after trade unions and the ISDV (Indonesische Sociaal Democratische Vereniging) had been established in Indonesia, after the 1917 October Socialist Revolution in Russia. The CPI was a true child of the period in which it was born.

That the CPI was born because of the necessity of the period becomes clear from the following statement of Stalin in his work, *Foundations of Leninism*:

Imperialism is the most barefaced exploitation and the most inhuman oppression of hundreds of millions of people inhabiting vast colonies and dependent countries. The purpose of this exploitation and of this oppression is to squeeze out superprofits. But in exploiting these countries, imperialism is compelled to build railroads, factories and mills there, to create industrial and commercial centres. The appearance of a class of proletarians, the emergence of a native intelligentsia, the awakening of national consciousness, the growth of the movement for emancipation—such are the inevitable results of this 'policy.' The growth of the revolutionary movement in all colonies and dependent countries

without exception clearly testifies to this fact. This circumstance is of importance for the proletariat inasmuch as it saps radically the position of capitalism by converting the colonies and dependent countries from reserves of imperialism into reserves of the proletarian revolution.¹

This statement of Stalin is fully in keeping with what happened in Indonesia at the beginning of the twentieth century. In view of the fact that capital investment in Indonesia rapidly increased at the beginning of the twentieth century, great changes were introduced in Indonesian economic life by foreign capital. It was forced to set up industries, to process raw materials such as sugar and rubber, it was forced to build harbours, railways and repair shops. Thus, even though imperialism strove to preserve feudal relations, it could not prevent capitalist trends from penetrating Indonesian society. Thus it was that new classes arose in Indonesian society, among them the proletarian class. This provided a new basis for the struggle for Indonesian independence and it was upon this new basis that the CPI was founded. The irregular peasant revolts which had always met with failure were now replaced by the organised struggle of the proletariat which led the peasants and other revolutionary classes.

The fact that the birth of the CPI was preceded by the establishment of trade unions and the ISDV may be explained as follows:

In 1905, a trade union of railway workers called the SS-Bond

¹*Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, 1953, pp. 18-19.

was formed. In 1908, the VSTP (Verenigingen van Spoor-en Tram Personeel) a militant trade union of railway workers was set up. But the advanced consciousness of the Indonesian working class already required an organisation which was not merely confined to trade union struggle. In May 1914, the ISDV, a political organisation which brought together Indonesian and Dutch revolutionary intellectuals and which aimed at spreading Marxism among the Indonesian workers and people, was established in Semarang. It was this ISDV which, on 23rd May 1920, became the Communist Party of Indonesia (CPI).

Concerning the October Socialist Revolution of 1917 which inspired the foundation of the CPI, I should like only to borrow the following words of Comrade Mao Tse-tung:

The salvoes of the October Revolution awoke us to Marxism-Leninism. The October Revolution helped the progressives of China and of the whole world to adopt the proletarian world outlook as an instrument for foreseeing a nation's future and considering anew one's own problems.²

The foundation of the CPI made it clear that the Indonesian progressives were not behind in welcoming the salvoes of that great October Revolution. In other words, Indonesian progressives and the revolutionary masses of the Indonesian people, precisely at the right time, joined in strengthening the new revolutionary front opposing world imperialism. With this, the struggle for Indonesian independence became

²On People's Democratic Dictatorship.

an inseparable part of the struggle of the proletariat of the world to smash capitalism.

The tasks of the Indonesian Communists was already made clear by Lenin in his appeal in November 1919, to the Communists of the peoples of the East:

Here you are confronted with a task which until now did not confront the Communists anywhere in the world: relying upon the general theory and practice of Communism, you must adapt yourselves to peculiar conditions which do not exist in the European countries and be able to apply that theory and practice to conditions in which the bulk of the population are peasants, and in which the task is the waging of a struggle not against capitalism, but against medieval survivals.³

From this call of Lenin it became clear that the Communists in the East, and therefore the Indonesian Communists as well, not only had to base themselves on "the general theory and practice of Communism" but also had to adapt themselves to *"the peculiar conditions which do not exist in European countries,"* and what Lenin meant by this was the peasantry.

The CPI is the party of a new class, that is the working class, which is required to bear the responsibilities of leadership. Why is it that the working class must bear these responsibilities? The Indonesian working class, although

³Address to the Second All-Russian Congress of Communist Organizations of the Peoples of the East, Moscow, 1954, p. 24.

not large in number (about six million wage-earners, among whom about 500,000 are modern workers or proletariat) is, however, different from the peasantry because the working class represents a new productive force. The working class is, also, not like the bourgeoisie because it has the determination to struggle consistently, because this class suffers from three types of oppression, i.e., the oppressions of imperialism, feudalism and capitalism. Because of the nature of its work, the working class is the most disciplined class; since it does not own any means of production, the working class is the most consistent class and it is not individualistic. It is because of all this that the working class, although not large in number, must bear the responsibilities of leadership.

The foundation of the CPI which subsequently became renowned as the champion of the struggle against Dutch imperialism was enthusiastically welcomed, not only by the Indonesian workers and peasants, but also by other sections of the people. It was welcomed, too, by the soldiers and sailors. The CPI grew very rapidly.

Within a short period, the Communists had gained influence in the PPKB (United Movement of Workers) whose congress in August 1920 in Semarang was attended by twenty-two trade unions with a total membership of 72,000. The Communists exerted this influence mainly through the militant VSTP. This was the beginning of the great tradition of the CPI in the workers' movement.

In 1920, strikes took place in Java and Sumatra which in

general resulted in victories for the workers. These victories gave courage and joy in the struggle to the workers, educated them as to the importance of organisation and discipline and opened the eyes of the workers and the people generally to the bankruptcy of the colonial labour regulations and of the colonial government.

The advances achieved by the workers' movement struck fear into the government, and the most frightening thing for them was that the influence of the Communists was growing. The government tried to influence the Serikat Islam (Islamic Union) and to sharpen the contradictions between the Communists and the SI reformist elements in the PPKB. The latter were supported by the Dutch government, thus sharpening the contradictions between the revolutionary trend and the reformist trend.

At the CPI congress in Kota Gede, Jogjakarta, in December, 1924, it was registered that the CPI had 38 sections with 1,140 members while the Serikat Rakjat (People's Union), a "substructure" of the CPI had 46 sections with 31,000 members. The number of CPI members in 1924 (1,140) was very large by comparison with the membership of the Communist Party of China which numbered only 900 before the May 30th Movement of 1925. This is proof of the fact that the CPI grew rapidly even though it faced great obstacles from the Dutch colonial government. The speedy growth of the Serikat Rakjat was an indication of the enthusiastic welcome of the peasants to the CPI, since the membership of the Serikat Rakjat was mainly composed of peasants.

But the Party was not able to consolidate the broad sympathy of the masses and the many members of the Party. The Party did, indeed, carry out the important task of arousing the spirit of anti-Dutch imperialism among the people, but it was not able to consolidate what it had already achieved.

The basic mistake of the CPI leaders at that time was that they had fallen prey to "leftist" slogans, that they did not seriously endeavour to explain the situation, that they wanted to solve all problems at one blow—liquidate feudalism, free the country of the Dutch, smash all imperialists, overthrow the reactionary government, liquidate the rich peasants, liquidate the national bourgeoisie. Of course, the result of all this was that unity grew between the real enemies and those who could become enemies and be aroused into opposing the Party. This resulted in the Party isolating itself which greatly weakened it. The Party did not sufficiently draw the attention of the members to small practical activities, to insignificant actions which were linked with the everyday needs of the workers, the peasants and the working intelligentsia. And yet, it was only here, in such activities that the Party could unite the broad working masses around itself. It is of course true that such work is not pleasant nor is it without difficulties, but there is no other way to make closer the links of the Party with the working masses.

As was stated in the general report to the Vth CPI National Congress in March, 1954, in this first stage:

The Party was still completely unaware for uniting with national bourgeoisie, in which the Party's slogan was 'so-

cialism now,' 'Indonesian soviets' and 'dictatorship of the proletariat.' This 'left' deviation of the Party was criticised exactly and correctly by J. V. Stalin in his speech before the students of the University of the Peoples of the East on May 18, 1925 in which he said that this left deviation contained within it the danger of isolating the Party from the masses and converting it into a sect.

The disease of "leftwing Communism" with which the Party was afflicted did indeed convert it into a sect, it isolated the Party from the broad masses of the people and thus made it easier for the barbaric colonial power to smash the Party. What J. V. Stalin said was very correct indeed: that "a resolute struggle against this deviation is an important condition for the training of truly revolutionary cadres for colonial and dependent countries in the East." The truth of Stalin's words was keenly felt in the subsequent development of the CPI.

It was not possible for the building of the Party to receive proper attention from the Party leaders at that time. There was no Marxist-Leninist theoretical education in the Party; opportunist elements had infiltrated into and gained control of the Party leadership; the Party did not yet know anything about criticism and self-criticism and about the method of collective leadership. These factors made the Party very weak in the ideological, political and organisational spheres.

In a situation in which the Party was isolated from the masses and in which the organisation of the Party was extremely weak, the crisis in Indonesia deepened, the living

conditions of the people grew worse and worse, and unorganised acts of resistance of the people against the government increased. It was in such a situation that Dutch colonial government provocations followed one another in quick succession, in the form of dismissals of strikers, arrests of peasants, the closing down of schools set up by the CPI or the Serikat Rakjat, bans on workers' newspapers, arrests of workers' leaders, etc. Especially in order to deal with the peasants, the Dutch created terrorist gangs such as, for example, the Sarikat Hedjo in Priangan. All this led to the outbreak of a people's revolt on 12th November 1926 in Java, and in the beginning of 1927 in Sumatra. Following the outbreak of this revolt, the CPI came forward to give it leadership, as far as possible. The CPI's attitude of speedily giving leadership to this people's revolt was a correct one.

During and after this revolt, the weaknesses of the Party became very apparent, for example: the lack of unanimity in the Party leadership concerning this revolt, the lack of preparations to safeguard the Party cadres and leaders, the lack of co-ordination between actions in one place and actions elsewhere, the lack of any link between the actions in the countryside and those in the towns, etc. Apart from this, there were also such people as Tan Malaka, at that time a leader of the CPI, who did not take resolute action prior to the revolt but condemned the revolt after it had broken out. More than that, he and his clique openly adopted Trotskyite practices by setting up a new party, the PART (Indonesian Republican Party) in a situation when the CPI was faced with the white terror of the colonial government

and its lackeys. This split in the CPI made its work, already difficult as it was, even more difficult and helped the disruptive policies of the Dutch within the CPI and in the national independence movement in general.

Thousands of members and functionaries of the CPI were hunted down and sentenced, some of them were hanged. Many were exiled to the swamps of Digul in Irian. Only a few CPI leaders succeeded in escaping abroad, among them being Musso, a Central Committee member.

Most of the CPI members and functionaries, even though they had not been Party members long, were imbued with a strong Party spirit. Without any regrets and with smiles on their lips, they went to the gallows or accepted prison sentences of deportation to places of exile. The CPI's consistent anti-Dutch imperialist policy and the heroic stand taken by the CPI members and functionaries in face of colonial power at that time, raised the prestige of the CPI's policy in the eyes of the genuine fighters for independence, and in the eyes of the Indonesian people. This increased the confidence and love of the oppressed people for the CPI.

The 1926 revolt ended in defeat for the CPI and the revolutionary Indonesian people. But there is one thing which cannot be forgotten and that is that this revolt showed the Indonesian people that the Dutch could be thrown into confusion, that colonial power could be shaken, that this power was not eternal. This is why the 1926 revolt was of exceptionally great significance in raising the political consciousness of the Indonesian people.

The conclusion from all this is that the CPI leadership was not yet able to combine the general truth of Marxism-Leninism with the practice of the Indonesian revolution because they did not yet possess Marxist-Leninist theory and they did not yet have an understanding of the historical conditions and of Indonesian society, of the peculiarities of the Indonesian revolution and of the laws of the Indonesian revolution. The result was that the Party did not know the basic demand of the Indonesian people was the demand for the elimination of imperialism and feudalism and the attainment of national independence, democracy and freedom. Further, the Party leadership was not aware that in order to attain this basic demand, a broad united front had to be built of the working class, the peasantry, the urban petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie, based upon the alliance of the workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class. As a result of the lack of understanding of all this, there arose within the then Party leadership erroneous views to the effect that "the peasants cannot be relied upon in every action," that "the middle classes and the educated people have already become the tools of the capitalists," that the CPI must be "anti all capitalism," that the CPI slogans should be "socialism now," "a soviet Indonesia," "dictatorship of the proletariat" and the like.

Although at this stage, the Party organisation grew, the Party was not consolidated. Party members and cadres were not ideologically and politically strong and they did not get the required Marxist-Leninist education. The active

elements in the Party could not be made into the backbone of the Party. In a critical situation of coping with provocation and the First White Terror, the elements in control of the Party leadership were not able to lead the entire Party in such a way as to save it.

Basically, in this first stage, the CPI had no experience with regard to two fundamental questions, namely: (i) the question of the united front, and (ii) the question of building the Party.

Twenty Years Underground and the Anti-Fascist Front (1926-1945)

AFTER the 1926 revolt, the CPI was banned by the Dutch colonial government. Since the CPI could no longer work legally and since it had been attracted by left slogans, the revolutionary masses who had previously been led by the CPI welcomed the left-wing nationalist party, the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) which was established in 1927. Many CPI cadres and members entered this left-wing party and also entered mass organisations. But the activities of the CPI cadres and members were not well led at that time because the Party did not yet have a new central leadership.

After the defeat of the 1926 revolt, a period of decline set in in the Indonesian national independence movement. It became clear that the Dutch colonial government meant not only to suppress the CPI and the revolutionary mass organisations under its leadership, but also the PNI, which it did under various provocations, by obstructing all its activities and by exiling its leaders.

This situation in which the CPI and the left-wing nationalist party were being beaten down by the colonial government was utilised by the

right-wing nationalists whose main strength was in the Party of the Indonesian Nation (PBI), to strengthen co-operation with the Dutch government. They concentrated their activities on what they called "positive" work, aimed at setting up co-operatives, schools, trade associations and so on. Within certain limits, the right-wing nationalists did succeed in expanding their activities to some of the regions, even right up to the villages. The Dutch were fond of calling them "healthy nationalists" because their activities were not in conflict with the interests of the Dutch government. And, as a result of this they obtained the necessary facilities from the Dutch government.

But the period of decline in the independence movement did not last long. The world crisis followed by the impoverishment of the mass of the people, through taxes, mass dismissals and the like hindered the peaceful collaboration between the right-wing nationalists and the Dutch government. Radical voices from among the workers, the peasants and the intelligentsia were becoming increasingly distinct. This crisis period is best known as the "depression" or, as the Indonesian peasants call it, the "period of misfortune."

Then, like a sudden flash of lightning on a hot summer's day, in February, 1933, the Zeven

Provincien (Dutch warship) mutiny occurred, an event which was warmly welcomed by the workers of many countries. This event was important in reviving the spirit of resistance of the Indonesian people against Dutch colonial power. Later, in July 1933, there was the threat of a railway strike in Java which the Dutch government managed to prevent only with great difficulty and with the help of the Indonesian reformists.

In the regions resistance grew, mostly in the form of individual actions—evidence that the spirit of resistance was increasing. Dutch suppression of workers' actions and people's resistance was facilitated by the fact that the CPI had not yet succeeded in properly reforming its central leadership.

From 1932, the CPI worked underground basing its activities on an 18-point programme which, among other things, called for: complete independence for Indonesia, the release of all political prisoners and the liquidation of the Upper Digul concentration camp, the rights to strike and to demonstrate, equal pay for equal work, struggle against every cut in wages, state assistance to the unemployed, land to the peasants and confiscation of the land of the imperialists, landlords and moneylenders, opposition to a new imperialist war and so on. This programme was

drawn up before the fascists came to power in Germany.

In March, 1933, the German fascists, under Hitler's leadership, rose to government power. J. V. Stalin said, among other things, at the 17th Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union that this victory of fascism in Germany:

. . . must be regarded not only as a symptom of the weakness of the working class a result of the betrayal of the working class by the Social-Democratic Party which paved the way for fascism; it must also be regarded as a symptom of the weakness of the bourgeoisie, of the fact that the bourgeoisie is already unable to rule by the methods of parliamentarism and bourgeois democracy, and, as a consequence, is compelled in its home policy to resort to terroristic methods of administration—as a symptom of the fact that it is no longer able to find a way out of the present situation on the basis of a peaceful foreign policy, and that, as a consequence, it is compelled to resort to a policy of war.¹

In other words, in order to overcome the very severe economic crisis, in order to overcome the deepening general crisis of capitalism and to cope with the increasingly revolutionary masses of the working people, the bourgeoisie in power sought defence in fascism.

¹*Problems of Leninism*, Moscow, 1953, p. 585.

By means of fascism, the imperialists strove to throw the entire burden of the crisis on to the shoulders of the working people. They sought to solve the problem of markets by enslaving the weak nations, by further intensifying colonial oppression and redividing the world in a new war. They wanted to obstruct the growth of the revolutionary forces by smashing the revolutionary movement of the workers and peasants as well as by launching a military attack on the Soviet Union—the bulwark of the world proletariat.

G. Dimitrov said in his speech to the Seventh Congress of the Comintern in August 1935, that:

Hitler fascism is not only bourgeois nationalism, it is bestial chauvinism. It is a government system of political gangsterism, a system of provocation and torture practised upon the working class and the revolutionary elements of the peasantry, the petty bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia. It is medieval barbarity and bestiality, it is unbridled aggression in relation to other nations and countries.²

The change in the international situation which took place with the coming into power of the fascists in Germany greatly influenced the political situation in Indonesia. The Soviet Union directed its struggle above all to the creation of a peace front against the aggressor states, and the Comintern, at its Congress in August 1935,

²*The United Front*, International Publishers, New York, 1933, p. 11.

in Moscow, adopted a programme aimed at the formation of a united front in the workers' movement and the formation of people's fronts and people's governments to oppose war and fascism. This meant that broader co-operation was required between the Communists and the democratic bourgeois elements.

It was in order to work out and practise this anti-fascist political line that Musso returned to Indonesia in 1935. He not only brought this new political line but he also succeeded in drawing together again the cadres of the CPI and building a new Central Committee. But Musso could not remain in Indonesia for long; he had to leave the country quickly because the Dutch government had got wind of his activities. Thus he did not have the opportunity to do much towards building the Party and so the CPI leaders worked without any firm guiding line on how to build a party of the Lenin and Stalin type.

On the initiative of a few left-wing nationalists and a few Communists, a legal people's organisation called GERINDO (Movement of the Indonesian people) was formed. The formation of the GERINDO gave new strength to the national independence movement and the anti-fascist movement. On the initiative of the GERINDO and some other democratic parties, the GAPI (Indonesian Political Union) was set up; this was a

united front of parties which aimed at the creation of a parliament for Indonesia and which offered co-operation to the Dutch government to resist fascism, in particular Japanese fascism which was threatening the Asian peoples.

On 23-25, December 1939, the GAPI convened an Indonesian People's Congress in Jakarta which was also attended by organisations which were not political parties such as trade unions, social organisations and the like, at which the question of the parliament was the most important item on the agenda. The Congress considered the establishment of a parliament in Indonesia as an important condition for mobilising the forces of the people against the danger of fascism. Later, the Indonesian People's Congress, on the decision of its leaders, became the Indonesian People's Assembly which was regarded as representing the entire Indonesian people. This was done in preparation for establishing a parliament. But this fact was ignored by the Dutch government. The appeal of the GAPI and the Indonesian People's Assembly to the Dutch to co-operate in face of a Japanese fascist attack was not responded to by Holland right up to the time of the Dutch surrender on 9th March 1942.

Broad co-operation between the leaders of parties and organisations, which was not, however,

backed up by the broad masses of the people, resulted in failure of the movement around the demand for a parliament and in the failure of the people's movement to force the Dutch government to take an active part in the anti-fascist struggle together with the Indonesian people. This happened because the CPI was not yet a party which was rooted in the masses, which was able to draw together and activate the broad masses of the people, above all, the workers and the peasants. The resolutions of the GAPI and the Indonesian People's Assembly were never followed up by mass actions in the form of demonstrations or other actions which could bring significant pressure to bear on the Dutch colonial government.

As a result of the fact that the anti-fascist movement in Indonesia was not strong enough, the Japanese troops were able to occupy the country, without any resistance, not only without any resistance from the Dutch army but also without any resistance from the people's movement. Both materially and morally, the people were inadequately prepared to face Japanese fascism. The consequence was that, in the early stages, the CPI was in an isolated position in its resistance to Japanese fascism. At the beginning of the Japanese occupation, many members of the Central Committee and important cadres

were arrested by the Japanese and some of them executed.

A few months after the Japanese occupied Indonesia, the Indonesian people, on the basis of their own experiences, became conscious of the brutality and bestiality of Japanese fascism. The anti-Japanese spirit spread among the people, anti-fascist organisations sprang up everywhere, of which many were under the leadership of CPI members and cadres, many of whom were, at the time, being hunted by Japanese spies. The Japanese unceasingly persecuted the Communists. Due to the lack of a well-knit organisation, the Japanese were frequently able to arrest important CPI cadres. But despite that, Japanese cruelty did not extinguish the people's resistance. Revolts broke out everywhere, such as in Singaparna, Indramaju, Semarang and elsewhere. Even in the ranks of the PETA (Defend the Fatherland) Army, (set up by the Japanese and consisting of Indonesian soldiers and officers under Japanese leadership) revolts broke out, and the most famous of all was the PETA army revolt in Blitar, Kediri (East Java).

Concerning the anti-fascist front, both before and after the Japanese occupied Indonesia, the general report to the Vth CPI National Congress stated:

This anti-fascist front (before the Japanese occupation) which not only succeeded in drawing in the national bourgeoisie, but also, a section of the compradore bourgeoisie added further strength to the anti-Japanese front. But after the Japanese armed forces occupied Indonesia, the majority of the national bourgeoisie and virtually the entire compradore bourgeoisie pursued a policy of collaboration with Japan. The national bourgeoisie pursued a policy of collaboration with Japan after seeing that the forces of the people resisting Japan were not very great, and because they were under the illusion that Japan would give "independence" to Indonesia.

But, with the increase of the anti-Japanese spirit and, even more so, after the peasant and army uprisings had taken place, the loyalty of the Japanese hirelings to their masters became weaker and weaker. Finally, not a few highly-placed people established contact with underground anti-Japanese movement. Groups of Indonesian students and school-children also played an important part in the resistance against Japan.

The conclusion to be drawn from all this is that, although the anti-Japanese and anti-Dutch spirit of the people overflowed, although the political prestige of the Party was very high as a result of

its consistent anti-fascist policy, although the situation at home and abroad was very favourable for a revolution, the task of engaging in the revolution which broke out in August, 1945 was a very heavy one for the Party because it had not drawn the conclusions from its experiences with regard to the united front and because it still had no experience in the question of building the Party. Besides that, the Party also had no experience in armed struggle—which is very necessary in a period of revolution.

The August Revolution and the Struggle Against the Second White Terror (1945-1951)

DURING the period of the August Revolution, the CPI was in a position in which it had not yet drawn the conclusions from its experiences of the united front, in which it still had no experience either of building the Party or of the armed struggle.

Under the pressure of the masses whose spokesmen were the still young revolutionary leaders, among whom were CPI members who had led underground organisations during the Japanese occupation, the Republic of Indonesia was proclaimed on 17th, August 1945. This 17th August 1945 Proclamation was a manifestation of the yearnings of the Indonesian people for independence, which had never been extinguished during the three centuries of Dutch colonisation and which had grown stronger during the Japanese occupation.

The workers, the peasants, groups of progressive youth and students of Indonesia, following the example of many countries in Europe that had liberated themselves from imperialism after the defeat of the fascist army, and also drawing inspiration from the great freedom struggle of the Chinese people, understood the possibilities of a revolution which had already been determined by history. At the time of the Proclamation, there were no other military troops in Indonesia (excluding W. Irian) with the exception of the

defeated Japanese army. This favourable situation was correctly utilised by the Indonesian people.

The workers, peasants and groups of progressive youth and students stubbornly defended the Republic of Indonesia, in the beginning against the Japanese army, later on against the British army, and then against the Dutch army during two colonial wars.

Despite the fact that the blood of patriots flowed in this struggle and despite the various military attempts made by the Dutch imperialists to crush the Republic, it remained in existence.

The Dutch only succeeded in their attempts to weaken the Republic by making use of British and American advisers as well as with the help of their hirelings among the Indonesian people themselves, by traversing the long road of "peaceful negotiations," intrigues and provocations, and agreements advantageous to imperialism concluded under the threat of guns and bombs.

The right-wing socialists under the leadership of Sutan Sjahrir, who had controlled the government ever since the beginning of the Revolution, played an important role in assisting the policy of "peaceful negotiations" under the threat of guns and bombs. This was made possible because the Indonesian people, as a result of the long period of colonial suppression, did not have a corps of people who had sufficiently mastered the revolutionary teachings of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin.

The August Revolution was a revolution of the united national front in which the main blow was concentrated on and directed against foreign imperialism, and to which the national bourgeoisie gave its support.

Concerning the united national front during the revolution (1945-1948), the following, among other things, was stated in the general report to the Vth CPI National Congress:

The national bourgeoisie re-entered the united national front after seeing that the strength of the people's revolution was great. The great strength of the people's revolution caused the national bourgeoisie to adopt a firm attitude during the first years of the revolution.

But it stated further, "The weaknesses of the Party in the political, ideological and organisational spheres made it incapable of providing leadership though the objective situation was, at that time, very favourable."

Concerning the Party and its relation with this national bourgeoisie, it said:

During this revolution, the Party departed from its political, ideological and organisational independence and did not place any importance on work among the peasants. These are the basic causes for the failure of the revolution. The weakness of the leadership of the revolution resulted in the revolution continually experiencing military, political and economic defeats and these defeats caused the national bourgeoisie to waver and finally side with the compradores

and the imperialists. The resolution, 'The New Road for the Republic of Indonesia' which was approved by the CPI conference held in August, 1948, was the way out of the difficult situation which the Republic of Indonesia faced at that time. But before this resolution could be implemented, the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir Government succeeded in engineering the Madiun provocation.

One extremely fortunate thing was that, at the beginning of the revolution, theoretical books on Marxism-Leninism were brought in from Australia and Europe. But these books were written in foreign languages, mainly in English and Dutch, so that the number of cadres who could study them was extremely limited. Very little attention was paid to the work of translating theoretical books into Indonesian by the dominant elements in the leadership of the Party at that time. But nevertheless, these theoretical books made possible the birth of a backbone in the Party from among those cadres who had the opportunity to read them. Although these were not yet large in number, this was nevertheless the first opportunity for the CPI to have a corps of theoretically equipped cadres from among its ranks, and this was one of the important guarantees of the further growth of the Party.

During the Revolution, the Party had its armed forces, but it was not in a position to control them. In an irregular fashion, Party cadres studied military science and the science of revolutionary warfare. Learning from the revolutionary war of the Chinese people, Comrade Amir Sjarifuddin, who several times held the post of Minister of Defence in the

government, fought for the victory of the idea that guerilla warfare is one of the correct forms of struggle to win a revolution. Amir Sjarifuddin had to fight hard against the ideas of military leaders who had a low opinion of guerilla warfare. While on the one hand, Amir Sjarifuddin did succeed in securing victory for his idea, on the other hand, obstacles were placed in the way of its implementation because it was opposed by those who belittled guerilla warfare, because of a shortage of military cadres who understood this point and because things were made difficult by the absence of a correct policy on the united front and on the building of the Party.

One of the basic mistakes of the Party in studying from the Chinese revolution at that time was that the Party only tried to find out the similarities between the Chinese revolution and the Indonesian revolution, but did not try to discover the differences, did not notice the peculiar conditions of Indonesia.

According to experiences in China, for an under-developed country such as Indonesia, guerilla warfare, the creation of liberated guerilla areas and the organisation of a people's liberation army in these areas is one of the correct forms of struggle to achieve complete national independence. But in Indonesia, this form of struggle did not have the broad possibilities available in China. This is because of the peculiar conditions in this country.

The most advantageous conditions for guerilla warfare are extensive regions, mountainous areas and forest lands both

wide in extent and far from the towns and the highways. The conditions in Indonesia met only some of these requirements.

Further, we know from the experiences of the Chinese Communists that it was only after they had reached the North-east area, which borders on the Soviet Union, that they had a rear on which they could rely. With the Soviet Union as their rear, Chiang Kai-shek could no longer encircle the Chinese revolutionary forces. Moreover, after being able to prevent the possibility of enemy encirclement, the Chinese Communists were in a position to launch planned attacks on the Chiang Kai-shek troops.

The Indonesian revolution did not possess such conditions. Indonesia is a country composed of islands. An Indonesian people's liberation army cannot rely upon a friendly neighbouring country as its rear because it does not have one.

In putting forward the above facts, does it mean that guerilla warfare cannot be operated in Indonesia? Not at all. But what we should have done to make guerilla warfare methods more effective under the prevailing conditions in Indonesia, was to combine the method of guerilla warfare with the revolutionary actions of the workers in the towns occupied by the enemy, with economic and political strikes of a general character. Under the conditions in Indonesia, especially significant are the workers' actions in all spheres of transport—railway, motor, sea and air—since general strikes by these detachments of the proletariat could paralyse the enemy of the revolution and in this way render

substantial support to the guerilla struggle. Work in the Dutch-occupied regions aimed at organising the workers and leading workers' actions was very much neglected by the Communists during the August Revolution.

Apart from that, during the August Revolution, the CPI did not carry out intensive work in the ranks of the Dutch armed forces which, to a not inconsiderable extent, were composed of peasants' and workers' sons who could have been won over to the side of the revolution. And yet, intensive revolutionary activity among the armed forces of the enemy can greatly weaken the enemy's strength and this means rendering important assistance to the guerilla struggle.

Thus, guerilla warfare during the August Revolution could have spread and been consolidated if the CPI had based its work on combining these three forms of struggle, namely the guerilla warfare in the rural districts (mainly consisting of peasants), revolutionary actions by the workers in the towns occupied by the Dutch and intensive work in the ranks of the Dutch armed forces.

The defeats sustained in the armed struggle and the decline of the revolutionary spirit in the armed forces every time caused setbacks in the work of the united front and of building the Party. Symptoms of the defeat of the August Revolution became evident after some sections of the armed forces, under the influence of reactionaries, opposed the workers' and peasants' movement.

In a situation in which the August Revolution was meeting

defeat, the CPI at its conference in August 1948, on the proposal of Musso, approved a resolution entitled "The New Road for the Republic of Indonesia" as the way out of the complicated situation facing the Republic of Indonesia at that time.

This resolution reminded the Party of its most important tasks which had been neglected or completely overlooked during the August Revolution.

Concerning the united front, it said that during the revolution:

. . .the Communists neglected the establishment of a national front as a weapon of the national revolution against imperialism. Although they later became conscious of the importance of this national front, they did not properly understand the technique of its creation. Various forms of national fronts have been set up during the past three years, but they always remained only on paper, they just consisted of conventions between organisations or between leaders, so that as soon as there was any dispute between the leaders, the national front just broke up. The CPI is convinced that at the present time, the party of the working class cannot possibly complete the bourgeois democratic revolution on its own and that is why the CPI must co-operate with other parties. The Communists should already have been striving to reach unity with members of other parties and organisations. The only form of unity of this type is the national front.

Concerning the initiative which the Communists must take

in forming the national front, it said that this initiative:

. . . does not to the slightest degree mean that the Communists should force other parties or people to follow it, but the CPI must patiently persuade honest people that the only way to achieve victory is by forming a national front supported by all progressive and anti-imperialist people. Every Communist must be absolutely convinced that without a national front, victory will not be achieved.

Concerning the armed struggle, this resolution stated that this struggle must be given priority. The armed struggle had to get priority because the Dutch imperialists were constantly trying to increase their strength. It went on to say that:

. . . the army as the most important weapon of state power must receive special attention. Its cadres and members must be given special education in keeping with the tasks of the army as the most important apparatus to defend our national revolution which also means to defend the interests of the working people. The army must unite with and be loved by the people. The army must be led by progressive cadres. Obviously, and above all among its cadres, the army must be cleansed of reactionary and counter-revolutionary elements.

This resolution criticised the neglect of the living conditions of the members of the army and police, in particular, and of the working people in general (workers and government

employees).

Concerning the Party, this resolution said that the basic mistake of the Communists had been to minimise the role of the CPI as the only force which should lead the working class in carrying out a revolution. Based on a recognition of this mistake, the resolution said that the CPI had decided to advance the proposal:

. . . that, as quickly as possible, the three parties which recognise the principles of Marxism-Leninism, the CPI, the Socialist Party and the Indonesian Workers' Party (DNA), which are now associated together in the People's Democratic Front and which have carried out common actions on the basis of a common programme, should fuse into a single party of the working class with the historic name of the Communist Party of Indonesia. . . .

In connection with the CPI support to the reactionary policies of the right-wing socialists led by Sutan Sjahrir, the resolution said that, by supporting this right-wing socialist policy, the CPI had committed two mistakes:

The first mistake was that it had not understood the revolutionary teaching that "an anti-imperialist national revolution in the present period is already a part of the world proletarian revolution," that "the national revolution in Indonesia must be closely bound to the other anti-imperialist forces of the world, that is, the revolutionary struggle throughout the world, both in colonial and

semi-colonial countries as well as in capitalist countries...."

The second mistake was that the CPI "did not sufficiently understand the balance of forces between the Soviet Union and Anglo-American imperialism after the Soviet Union had succeeded in rapidly occupying the whole of Manchuria. At that time, it had already become clear that the position of Soviet Union in the continent of Asia was extremely strong and that it held down much of the military strength of American, British and Australian imperialism and thus provided a favourable opportunity for the Indonesian people to start with their revolution. At that time, the Indonesian Communists had overestimated the strength of Dutch and other imperialisms and had underestimated the strength of the Indonesian revolution and of the other anti-imperialist forces."

The resolution declared that the CPI hereby altered its policy, that is, it firmly rejected the Linggardjati and Renville agreements which had in practice become the source of various conflicts between the leaders and the common people. The rejection of the Linggardjati and Renville agreements also signified a sharp self-criticism in the ranks of the CPI.

The conclusion drawn in the resolution was that the CPI's principal mistakes during the August Revolution had been caused by the weaknesses in the Party's ideology. In view of this, it was decided that Party members must study Marxist-Leninist theory. It was made compulsory for every Communist to read and study revolutionary theory and to hold courses among the workers and peasants so that, in

this way, they would always be able to link up theory closely with practice. Theory which is not linked with the masses cannot be a force, but on the contrary, if closely linked with the masses, it is a mighty force.

Thus it was that with the resolution, the foundations were laid for better work by the CPI in the sphere of the united front, the armed struggle and the building of the Party. The resolution constitutes a merciless verdict against the opportunists inside and outside the Party. It was an important step towards saving the Indonesian revolution which was then in danger, and the first important step towards building a party of the Lenin and Stalin type.

The CPI's new policy made possible the development of a new upward trend in the Indonesian revolution. Public meetings held by the CPI, at which the CPI's new programme was explained, were attended by tens and hundreds of thousands of people. The masses enthusiastically welcomed the CPI's call to continue the independence war against Dutch imperialism. A beginning was made in tearing aside, in front of the masses, the masks of the reactionary government in power at the time and the masks of the anti-Communist Masjumi party. The masses began to understand that the new road indicated by the CPI was the only way to win the revolution.

Afraid of the new upward swing in the Indonesian revolution, Dutch and American imperialism and its Indonesian hirelings intensified their activities and decided upon measures to smash the CPI and the independence movement

led by the CPI.

Eventually, at the end of August, 1948, provocations took place in Solo and later in several other places. Revolutionary army officers were murdered in a cowardly fashion. The offices of trade unions and of the Indonesian Socialist Youth (PESINDO) were occupied by force by certain army troops. The right-wing socialists, the Trotskyites and the Masjumi were active assistants to the imperialists in realisation of their anti-Communist policy.

In the middle of September, 1948, an incident occurred in the army in Madiun between the group which agreed to the then government's reactionary and provocative policy and the group which remained faithful to the revolution. This event was manoeuvred by the Hatta government and it was said that in Madiun the Communists had carried out a seizure of power and that they had established a soviet state. On the basis of this lie, the government called on its entire apparatus to hunt down, arrest and murder members and sympathisers of the CPI. Thus, the Second White Terror broke out, a duplicate of the white terror of the Dutch government in 1926-27. But this second one was much crueller and more bestial than the first. Masjumi members were also mobilised to hunt down, arrest and murder Communists. In such a situation, there was nothing else for the Communists to do but to take up arms and defend themselves with all their might against the white terror which was then raging.

The Madiun provocation was a preparation for the new

Dutch colonial war which took place in December, 1948, and all this was in preparation for forcing Indonesia to make further capitulations to Dutch imperialism. Indeed, not long afterwards, there was a ceasefire with the Dutch which was followed by the Round Table Conference in Holland.

During the war against the Dutch, from the end of 1948 to the beginning of 1949, CPI cadres and members including those who had been released or who had escaped from the Hatta government prisons, courageously took part in defending the Republic of Indonesia in the most advanced position. This fact opened the eyes of the people to the falseness of the slanders which the reactionaries had levelled at the CPI during the Madiun Affair. The CPI's stubborn resistance to the Dutch army raised the prestige of its policy in the eyes of the people and this made it quite impossible for the government to outlaw the CPI.

On 2nd November, 1949, the treacherous Round Table Conference agreement was signed by Indonesia and the Dutch kingdom. During the negotiations, the USA had placed Marle Cochran in Holland as the man who gave out instructions left and right.

Concerning the situation of the united front from the time of the Madiun Provocation (1948) up to the downfall of the Masjumi government—the Sukiman Cabinet (1951)—the general report to the Vth CPI Congress states as follows:

The national bourgeoisie split away from imperialist united national front and sided with the Hatta-Sukiman-Natsir government which

provoked the Madiun Affair. The national bourgeoisie joined for forces in capitulating to imperialism by agreeing to the treacherous RTC agreement The policy of the national bourgeoisie which had split away from the united national front was heavily felt by the Party because the Party, as result of the weakness of its work among the peasants, was not yet able to rely on the peasants. This situation forced the Party to adopt tactics of gaining time in order to draw the national bourgeoisie back into the anti-imperialist united national front and to improve as well as strengthen the Party's work among the peasants. The correctness of these tactics of the Party was proven by the new political developments in the country which began to take place in 1952.

The conclusion from all this is:

The August Revolution (1945-1948) met with defeat because, in coping with this revolution, the CPI had not yet drawn the conclusions from its experiences in the question of the united front and was not experienced on the questions of armed struggle and of building the Party.

But even though this revolution was defeated, it gave the CPI experiences with regard to the united front. The revolution gave the CPI important experiences concerning the wavering nature of the national bourgeoisie—under certain conditions, this class can participate and firmly side with

the revolution, but under other conditions, it can waver and betray. Because of this, the proletariat and the CPI must always and unceasingly draw the bourgeoisie into the revolution, but they must also guard against the possibility of their betraying the revolution. The dual character of the Indonesian national bourgeoisie greatly affects the political line and building of the Party. The progress or decline of the Party and of the revolution depends to a great extent on the Party's relations with the national bourgeoisie and vice versa,

In uniting with the national bourgeoisie, the Party must not abandon its independence and must not neglect its most reliable and most numerous ally, the peasantry.

The revolution also made the Party experienced on the question of building the Party, gave its cadres a better understanding of the conditions prevailing in Indonesian society, of the peculiarities and laws of the Indonesian revolution, made it possible for CPI cadres to study Marxist-Leninist theory and to study so as to combine Marxist-Leninist theory with the practice of the Indonesian revolution.

One experience also gained was that, in a revolution, armed struggle is the most important form of struggle. The development of the Party, besides depending greatly on the united front, also greatly depends on the armed struggle. The advance or decline of the armed struggle greatly influences the advance or decline of the united front and of the Party.

Although not completely, the New Road resolution drew

generalised conclusions from the experiences during the revolution. The resolution was the first important step towards creating a bolshevised Party, which is nation-wide in scale, has close links with the masses and is consolidated ideologically, politically and organisationally.

The Madiun Affair had made the CPI cadres and members more vigilant and more militant.

The Broadening of the United Front and the Building of the Party (1951-. . .)

THIS period began with the Central Committee Plenum in April 1951, which succeeded in drafting the CPI constitution. This draft, after being sent out to the lower organisations, gave rise to widespread discussion in the Party. Without awaiting its adoption by the Congress, the entire Party was simultaneously prepared to use this draft constitution as a basis for the everyday activity of building the Party and the practical experiences gained during its implementation were to be used for drawing up amendments.

The discussion and implementation of the CPI draft constitution greatly stimulated the growth of the Party, raised the political level of Party members, brought to life inner-Party democracy and criticism and self-criticism in the Party, strengthened the discipline, ideology and unity of the forces of the Party. The Party began to understand and implement its two basic tasks, that is, the task of building a united front and the task of building the Party. All this took place with a reactionary government in power, the Sukiman (Masjumi) government.

Conscious of the danger which threatened from the revolutionary people's movement and from

the CPI which was in a process of growth, seeing that the Madiun provocation had not "killed" the revolutionary movement and the CPI, the foreign imperialists and the domestic reactionaries became infuriated and drew up a new plan to smash the CPI. This time, it was not with a provocation in Solo or Madiun but with an "attack" on a police post in Tandjung Priok (Jakarta harbour), which the Sukiman government proclaimed as a "Communist attack." About 2,000 Communists and other progressives were arrested and put in jail. But under the pressure of the people, they were all released after having been in prison for many months without it being possible to bring a single person up before court. Sukiman's (Masjumi) failure with his August *Razzia* was an indication that the revolutionary movement in Indonesia had been rebuilt and that it had strength.

While the atmosphere of the August *Razzia* was still present, the CPI held a National Conference at the beginning of 1952 which thoroughly discussed the policy of the Sukiman government. The Conference decided that the Sukiman government must be overthrown by the formation of a broad anti-Sukiman government front, by striving to draw in the national bourgeoisie. Concerning the Darul Islam and the TII (Indonesian Islamic Army) which was then waging large-

scale terror in West and Central Java, the Conference took the stand that these gangs were weapons in the hands of the imperialists and the domestic reactionaries. Their aim was to squeeze the revolutionary people's movement in between the reactionary forces in the towns and those in the rural districts and thus be able to crush the revolutionary movement and gain complete power throughout the country. The Conference decided that all the forces of the Party should be mobilised and, together with the state apparatus and other democratic parties and organisations, smash the DI-TII terrorist gangs. Apart from that, the Conference took important decisions to strengthen the Party ideologically and organisationally. In order to be able to carry out these difficult and intricate tasks of the Party, the Conference decided to expand Party membership.

Under the continuous pressure of the democratic people's movement, as the national bourgeoisie inclined more and more to the left, and as a result of the contradictions within the domestic ruling clique, the Sukiman government was forced to resign and on 1st April, 1952, there was established the WILOPO (Partai Nasional Indonesia) cabinet, the progressive aspects of whose policy were supported by the CPI. There were also Masjúmi and PSI (right-wing socialists) ministers in this WILOPO government.

Because of the anti-people measures carried out by the Masjumi and PSI ministers, the entire democratic forces, including the PNI itself, brought about the downfall of the WILopo cabinet. Under the stronger pressure of the people, the Ali Sastroamidjojo (PNI) government was formed on 30th July 1953 without the Masjumi or PSI. The CPI supported the progressive aspects of the Ali Sastroamidjojo government's policy.

The formation of a government whose policy contained progressive aspects, and which was supported by the working class and the masses of the people, proved that there was an upsurge in the revolutionary movement in Indonesia. It indicated the growing unity of the national forces, including the national bourgeoisie in face of the reactionary forces from abroad and at home. In such a situation, the revolutionary movement and the CPI were able to grow within certain limits.

During this upsurge of the revolutionary movement, a Central Committee Plenum was held in October, 1953 in preparation for the Vth Party Congress. At this Plenum, amendments were introduced to improve the draft constitution, a draft CPI Programme was drawn up, the general report to the Congress was made and a decision taken concerning Tan Ling-djie-ism, that is, an

opportunist trend in the Party which wanted to return the Party's political line and organization back to the situation of before the New Road resolution. This Plenum formulated proposals to the Congress for the solution of all the important and basic problems of the Indonesian revolution.

In March 1954, the historic Vth CPI National Congress was held with the purpose of answering all the important and basic problems of the Indonesian revolution, of improving the Party's work in building the united front, of answering all the basic problems of the building of the Party and of strengthening the CPI's ties with the masses. At this Congress, all the documents drawn up by the Plenum of the Central Committee in October 1953 were approved. Apart from that, the CPI General Election Manifesto was adopted and it was decided to expand the Party membership and organisations.

After analysing the conditions in Indonesian society, the CPI Programme declared that Indonesia is now a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country. In connection with this it stated:

As long as the situation in Indonesia remains unchanged, that is, as long as the domination of imperialism is not overthrown and the survivals of feudalism not abolished, the people of Indonesia will not be able to do away with poverty, backwardness, inequality and indefensibility in face of impe-

rialism. Imperialist rule and the survivals of feudalism will not be liquidated in Indonesia as long as the state power in the country is held by the feudal lords and compradores who are closely connected with foreign capital because they want to retain the imperialist yoke, and feudal survivals in the country, because they fear the Indonesian people most of all.

If Indonesia is to develop from a semi-colonial and semi-feudal country into an independent, democratic, prosperous and advanced country, it is essential above all to remove the government of feudal lords and compradores and to create a government of the people, a government of the people's democracy.

Concerning the people's government, the CPI Programme said that this government:

. . . will be a government of a united national front, formed on the basis of the alliance of workers and peasants under the leadership of the working class.

Taking into account the country's backwardness, the Communist Party of Indonesia considers that this government must not be a government of the dictatorship of the proletariat but a government of the dictatorship of the people. This government will effect not socialist but democratic reforms. It will be a government capable of uniting all anti-feudal and anti-imperialist forces, of transferring the land to the peasants without compensation, of ensuring democratic rights of the people; a government capable of defending national industry and trade against foreign competition, of

improving the material conditions of workers and abolishing unemployment. In a word, it will be a people's government capable of securing the national independence of the country and its development along the path of democracy and progress.

But what is the way out of a semi-colonial and semi-feudal situation and what is the way to form a people's government? The CPI Programme gives the answer:

The way out lies in shifting the balance of forces between the imperialists, landlord class and compradore bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the people on the other. The way out lies in rousing, mobilising and organising the masses, above all the workers and peasants.

Concerning the role of the workers in shifting this balance of forces, it stated:

The working class must head the struggle of the whole people. With this aim in view the working class itself must increase its activity, educate itself and become a strong and conscious force. The working class must not only wage a struggle to improve its living standard, it must also raise its tasks on a broader scale and higher level. It must support the struggle of the other classes. The working class must support the struggle of the peasantry for land, the struggle of the intelligentsia for its vital rights, the struggle of the national bourgeoisie against foreign competition, the struggle of the whole Indonesian people for national independence and democratic liberties. The people can count on victory

only when the working class of Indonesia becomes an independent, conscious, politically mature and organised force capable of heading the struggle of the whole people, only when the people will see in the working class their leader.

Based on an analysis of the classes in Indonesian society, the CPI Programme clarified who were the genuine friends and who the enemies of the revolution. Based on this analysis, too, the CPI Vth National Congress decided to place an important task before the Party, that is, the task of forming a united front of all the national forces of the revolution, that is, the workers, the peasants, the petty bourgeoisie and the national bourgeoisie. This united front must be formed on the basis of the alliance of the workers and peasants, it must be as broad as possible and must be a product of the revolutionary struggle of the masses. This is the pre-condition for the Indonesian Indonesian people to establish a people's government, to defeat the enemies of the revolution that is, the imperialists, the landlord class and the compradore bourgeoisie.

To build a real united national front, the primary task of the CPI is to draw the peasants into it. Concerning this question, the general report to the Vth National Congress stated

. . . . in order that the peasants can be drawn in, the most immediate task of Indonesian Communists is to eliminate the survivals of feudalism. . . . The first step to be taken in our work among the peasants is to assist them in the struggle for their everyday needs, for the winning of their

partial demands. In this way, it will mean organising and educating the peasants to a higher level of struggle. This is the foundation on which to create the alliance of workers and peasants as the basis of a powerful, united national front.

Concerning the parliamentary struggle and the CPI's support to the WILOPO government and later to the Ali Sas-troamidjojo government, the CPI Programme states:

The CPI does not regard its work in parliament as the main work of the Party nor the parliamentary struggle as the only form of struggle.

But this does not mean that the CPI neglects the general elections and the parliamentary struggle, and that the CPI adopts exactly the same attitude towards all hitherto existing governments and towards the governments that will come into office up to the establishment of a people's democratic government.

The CPI bases its policy on a Marxist analysis of the concrete situation and the relation of forces. The CPI has taken and continues to take a most active part in the parliamentary struggle. The CPI, fully conscious of its political responsibility, treats parliamentary work with the utmost seriousness. The CPI did not take an indifferent attitude towards any of the former governments. In some cases, the Party was in opposition government and called upon the masses to overthrow it, in others the Party supported the government, and in still others, it participated in the government.

The parliamentary struggle and the CPI's support to the Ali Sastroamidjojo government must also be aimed at expanding and strengthening the united national front.

As was stated in the general report to the Vth National Congress, the task of building the united national front is the first urgent task of the CPI.

The second urgent task of the CPI is to continue to build itself up as a party, nationwide in scale, which has a broad, mass character and which is fully consolidated in the ideological, political and organisational spheres.

Concerning this, the Congress recalled the words of Stalin, that if we are to win in a revolution, then we must have a party of the Lenin type, or as Mao Tse-tung has said, of the Lenin-Stalin type.

Such a party cannot possibly be created if the CPI does not master Marxist-Leninist theory. The vanguard role of the Party is only possible if the Party is led by an advanced theory. Only a party which masters Marxist-Leninist theory can head and lead the working class and the other masses of the people.

The Congress also felt that the CPI can only fulfill its great and heavy historic tasks if it unceasingly carries out a merciless struggle against both the right and "left" opportunists within its own ranks. Based on this, the Congress supported and strengthened the decision taken by the Central Committee at its session in October 1953 concerning Tan Ling-djie-ism. The Congress adopted a special resolution

on Tan Ling-djie-ism and drew the conclusion that "in actual fact, Tan Ling-djie-ism dominated the CPI during the 1945-1948 revolution and up to the beginning of 1951." The Congress established that:

Tan Ling-djie-ism in the ideological sphere is subjectivism, it is the dogmatic and empirical trends in the Party which caused the Party to make rightist and 'leftist' mistakes which seriously damaged the growth of the Party and the growth of the revolutionary movement.

The Congress warned that the Party must not be conceited if it wins victories, the Party must always see the shortcomings in its work, it must be courageous enough to admit its mistakes and frankly and honestly rectify them. The Party will become invincible if it is not afraid of criticism and self-criticism, if it does not hide the mistakes and shortcomings in its work, if it teaches and trains its cadres to draw the lessons from the mistakes in the Party's work and to be skilful in correcting them in time.

Since Indonesia is a petty bourgeois country, that is, a country where there is still a wide prevalence of small-scale industry, this means that the petty bourgeois ideology, namely subjectivism, has a strong social basis. Therefore, the Congress decided that it is very important for the Party to oppose subjectivism in the Party. The two forms of subjectivism, dogmatism and empiricism are equally dangerous in the Party, they can cause the Party to carry out right and "left" opportunism. Subjectivism can only

be resisted if the Party teaches its members to use the Marxist-Leninist method in analysing the political situation and in estimating the class forces, and if the Party directs its members' attention towards research and study in the social and economic spheres.

In order to unite the broad working masses around the Party, the Party must direct its members' attention to tiny, insignificant, practical activities which are connected with the everyday needs of the workers, the peasants and the working intelligentsia. This work is neither pleasant nor is it without its difficulties. But it is the only way to strengthen the Party's links with the masses and to prevent it from again becoming a prey to "leftist" slogans.

Such are the basic principles decided upon for building the Party. With this, the second urgent task of the CPI becomes clear. This means that the CPI has learnt from its own experiences to build and make itself into a Party of the Lenin-Stalin type. Concerning the united front and the CPI's work for the united front since 1951, the Congress drew the following conclusions:

. . . (the) unity with the national bourgeoisie is getting closer and closer but the alliance of workers and peasants is still not strong. In other words the Party still does not have strong foundations. At this stage, the Party must fight resolutely against the right deviation which gives exaggerated significance to unity with the national bourgeoisie and underestimates

the significance of the leadership of the working class and of the alliance of workers and peasants. There is the danger of losing the Party's independent character, the danger of its merging itself with the bourgeoisie. Side by side with this, the Party of course, must also resolutely avoid the 'left' deviation, prevent sectarianism, that is, the attitude which places no importance on the policy of a united national front of a the national bourgeoisie; the Party must preserve united front with all its might. Since the compradore bourgeois cliques rely on different imperialisms, and because Party policy is at present directed in the first place against Dutch imperialism and not against all foreign imperialisms, increasingly sharp contradictions between the imperialists themselves, and these contradictions have naturally arisen among their compradores, too. The creation of a united national front with the national bourgeoisie opens up new prospects for the development and building of the Party and for the immediate task of the Party, that is, the building of the anti-feudal alliance of workers and peasants. The building of the Party and the building of the alliance of the workers and peasants are guarantees that the united national front will be under proletarian leadership.

The CPI Vth National Party Congress, learning from the

long history of the CPI and using Marxism-Leninism as its guide, liquidated the pre-1951 period in the CPI. With the success of this Congress, the dark period of our Party was definitely brought to a close for ever, and a new period developed rapidly, the period which began in 1951.

In November 1954, with the convening of the Second Plenum of the Central Committee, this new period was developed with the decision to further broaden the united front. Based on an analysis of the political situation in Indonesia, this session established the fact that the CPI had already become an important and great national force, which could not be ignored by either friend or foe. Based on an analysis of the history and the situation of the parties in Indonesia, the Central Committee decided that the CPI should actively strive to achieve co-operation between the CPI and other parties, in particular, the Nationalist parties and the parties based on the Islamic religion. The decision concerning this question stated, among other things:

. . . . co-operation between the Party and the Communist masses and the Nationalist and Islamic parties and masses is not something which has to last only until the forthcoming elections have been held, as Nationalist and Islamic leaders often declare. We favour co-operation after the elections as well, regardless of who wins. This is in keeping with the slogan of our Republic, 'Bhineka Tunggal Ika' (unity in diversity).

Another important decision taken by the Central Committee was concerning collective leadership:

. . . . as the indispensable condition for consolidating the Party in the ideological and organisational spheres, for making the Party more militant and strengthening its ties with the masses. With such a Party, the broader unity of all the national forces will definitely become a fact.

From the above outline, it becomes clear that, for the last thirty-five years, the process of building and bolshevising the Party is very closely linked with the Party's political line, with the fact as to whether the Party correctly solves the problem of the united front or not, and especially the problem of regulating its relations with the national bourgeoisie. Conversely, the more bolshevised the Party becomes, the more correct is the Party's political line and the more correctly the Party solves the problem of the united front, especially of regulating its relations with the national bourgeoisie.

Faithful to its heroic and patriotic history, learning from its experiences gained with the sacrifice of the best sons of Indonesia and guided by creative Marxism-Leninism, the CPI is continuing to accomplish its historic task. In the present situation, the CPI will ceaselessly and with all its might work for the broadening and strengthening of the united national front. Apart from that, it will unceasingly and with all its might continue to build and bolshevise itself as the basic guarantee for the safety and success of the united national front.

Long live the united national front!

Long live the Communist Party of Indonesia!

Long live the glorious, creative teachings of Marx. Engels,
Lenin and Stalin!

