
"IS THERE AGRARIAN REFORM UNDER PRABOWO'S COMMAND?"



2024 Annual Agrarian Report
Consortium for Agrarian Reform

KONSORSIUM PEMBARUAN AGRARIA
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Annual Agrarian Report
"Is there Agrarian Reform under Prabowo's Command?"

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WELCOME ADDRESS

Is there an Agrarian Reform Agenda under President Prabowo's Command? This statement inherently reflects the hopes of millions of Indonesians who have long relied on land and agrarian wealth for their lives and future.

As a year of political transition, 2024 serves as a meeting point for the convergence of disappointment and renewed hope for improving the fate of millions of people who, for decades, have awaited the arrival of agrarian justice in Indonesia.

Disappointment, because during his decade-long administration, Jokowi has exacerbated agrarian conflicts and the chronic inequality of land ownership. Instead of fulfilling his promise to implement agrarian reform as a pathway to equitable prosperity for all Indonesians.

Over a decade of Jokowi’s leadership, Indonesia has witnessed the highest levels of "agrarian conflict" since the establishment of the republic. This is the outcome that millions of Indonesians must endure due to policies that consistently accommodate corporate interests and land-hungry infrastructure development, compounded by legacy of unresolved agrarian conflicts.

Hope, because in 2024, Indonesia has a new President. A leader who will steer the nation for the next five years. Change always brings hope. As someone with extensive experience in engaging with the lives and struggles of peasants, President Prabowo is expected to find solutions to the structural problems faced by tens of millions of peasants and rural communities.

In his Vision and Mission, President Prabowo places agrarian reform as a priority program. However, on the other hand, he also continues policies inherited from Jokowi that are counterproductive to resolving agrarian conflicts and redistributing land to the people.

The first 100 days of his administration serve as the initial moment to observe the policy direction of President Prabowo. While it may not provide a complete picture of his administration's direction, it can at least offer an initial glimpse into where agrarian reform will be directed under his command.

As we begin 2025, the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (Konsorsium Pembaruan Agraria) presents a record of agrarian conflict situations and policy dynamics at the national level throughout 2024. We also include the results of monitoring and analysis of agrarian conflicts over Jokowi's decade in office and the first 100 days of President Prabowo's administration.

In conclusion, hope must always be placed between optimism and pessimism. This serves as a reminder that the agrarian reform agenda should not merely remain as outlined in the President's Vision and Mission. It requires strong political commitment, supported by organized people's movements.

May this report deepen the understanding and awareness of all stakeholders, especially the government, regarding the urgency of implementing agrarian reform in Indonesia. Let it become a new energy to navigate 2025.

Happy reading, and Happy New Year 2025.

Jakarta, January 20, 2025

Sincerely,
Consortium for Agrarian Reform

Dewi Kartika
Secretary-General

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION



I.1. Looking Back at 2024

After a full decade steering Indonesia's government, President Joko Widodo finally ended his term. His successor, President-elect Prabowo Subianto, was not only a former minister in Jokowi's cabinet but also his rival in two previous presidential elections. What made this transition notable was Prabowo's partnership with Jokowi's son, Gibran Rakabuming Raka, as Vice President.

As Jokowi stepped down, it is essential to revisit the legacy of agrarian issues resulting from his administration. Was the Agrarian Reform promise he proclaimed throughout his leadership fulfilled? On National Peasants' Day, September 24, 2024, the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA), alongside hundreds of peasant organizations and civil society movements under the Coalition Against Land Grabbing (GERAM TANAH), declared that systematic violations of the Agrarian Constitution had occurred during Jokowi's decade-long rule. The coalition identified at least 18 types of agrarian violations.

Under Jokowi's administration, agrarian conflicts increased by more than 100% compared to the previous decade under President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Beyond that, Jokowi and his ministers manipulated the nation's constitution. A striking example was the government's collusion with the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI) to rapidly revise over 70 laws and pass the Omnibus Law on Job Creation in just seven months. This act constitutes a collective violation of the 1945 Constitution, particularly Article 33 Paragraph 3 and the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA).

The Omnibus Law on Job Creation introduced controversial policies, such as the establishment of the Land Bank Agency (BT), the reintroduction of the domain verklaring principle through the Management Rights (HPL) policy, and a system resembling forced cultivation (cultuurstelsel) under the Food Estate policy. The forestry sector's compliance policy, known as forest amnesty, became a red-carpet pardon for forestry-related business violations. Instead of returning the land to indigenous peoples and communities whose territories were seized, forest amnesty merely imposed administrative sanctions on violators. Moreover, the National Strategic Projects (PSN) program became a new mantra for development policies, sparking hundreds of agrarian conflicts nationwide.

Jokowi's political manoeuvres did not stop there. To advance his flagship project of building the new Nusantara Capital City (IKN), Jokowi enacted a law that allowed the issuance of land use permits (HGU) and land building rights (HGB) for two consecutive cycles. This effectively grants future IKN investors premium-class concessions, such as 190 years of HGU and 160 years of HGB. This constitutes yet another violation of the constitution.

As if that were not enough, just two days before leaving office and ahead of Prabowo's inauguration, President Jokowi signed another controversial policy, Presidential Regulation 131/2024, which established the North Sumatra Food Estate Area Management Authority.

Between optimism and pessimism regarding the new government, such expectations for improvement cannot be entirely relied upon. It is important to note that Prabowo-Gibran still represents a continuation and extension of Jokowi's administration.

The bleak situation described above aligns with the progress of agrarian reform implementation. According to KPA records, Joko Widodo was only able to reclaim 77,000 hectares of abandoned land from expired land use permits (HGU) and building licenses (HGB). This figure represents merely 1% of the 7.24 million hectares of abandoned land potential identified by the government. This falls far short of Joko Widodo's promise to implement agrarian reform over 9 million hectares, targeting the resolution of agrarian conflicts and land redistribution. The unfulfilled promises include areas derived from expired HGU and HGB, as well as abandoned lands that communities had fully taken over. Agrarian conflicts experienced by peasants, indigenous peoples, and fisherfolks—whether classic cases involving State-owned enterprises like Perhutani, PTPN, and private HGU licenses, or disputes over forest areas and industrial forest plantations (HTI)—remained unresolved. In practice, agrarian conflict resolution and land redistribution made minimal progress.

Even the relatively straightforward cases of land redistribution from private HGU licenses achieved insignificant results. The government primarily emphasized land certification (PTSL) as its main accomplishment when reporting on agrarian reform progress.

Amid declining policies and stalled agrarian reform operations, agrarian conflicts and violence on the ground worsened significantly. During Joko Widodo's second term (2019–2024), agrarian conflicts steadily increased, accompanied by growing inequality between the majority (99%) and the elite (1%) in Indonesia.

National strategic projects (PSN), a hallmark of Joko Widodo's administration, turned into a "monster" feared by the people. Across the country, these projects were rife with conflicts, evictions, and violence. PSN projects were executed recklessly, often marked by manipulation, private interests, abuse of power, and a lack of meaningful public involvement. Implementation on the ground frequently involved authoritarian and repressive actions by the government and law enforcement.

Given this reality, Joko Widodo failed to fulfill his promise of implementing agrarian reform to resolve land disputes and deliver distributive justice. Instead, over the past decade, millions of peasants, indigenous communities, fisherfolks, urban marginalized groups, and women lost their land and suffered from agrarian violence.

As of October 20, 2024, Prabowo and Gibran were officially inaugurated as Indonesia's President and Vice President. Each transition of power brings renewed hope for improved living conditions. However, optimism and pessimism toward the new government are

tempered by the reality that Prabowo-Gibran is an extension of Jokowi's administration. Prabowo has repeatedly affirmed this continuity in various statements.

In their vision and mission, Prabowo-Gibran listed agrarian reform as a priority agenda. In its 2023 Year-End Report, KPA analysed the vision and mission of the candidates at the time. KPA noted that, like Jokowi, Prabowo-Gibran viewed agrarian reform in a narrow and fragmented way. They also pledged to continue policies like Food Estates, National Strategic Projects (PSN), and the Land Bank, which under Jokowi's administration had caused widespread agrarian conflicts and evictions.

These concerns were quickly validated. Shortly after taking office, President Prabowo enacted several controversial policies that risk escalating agrarian conflicts nationwide.

Food self-sufficiency and energy programs initiated by Prabowo started causing casualties. While food self-sufficiency is a positive and much-needed policy—given Indonesia's status as an agrarian nation and its frequent food deficits—the program is being implemented through the contentious Food Estate initiative. Concerns about "militarized food policy" have also emerged with the establishment of a Food Brigade.

President Prabowo instructed the military and police to accelerate the national food program. Meanwhile, pesants, such as those in Ria-ria Village, Humbang Hasundutan, or indigenous communities in Merauke, are left marginalized on their own land. The new administration seems to signal that Indonesia's food policy will no longer rely on its primary food producers—peasants.

Prabowo's plan to build three million homes also poses a significant threat to productive agricultural lands in Java. Minister of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (ATR/BPN), Nusron Wahid, announced in mid-December that farmland in Java could be converted for housing and industrialization. If implemented, this program will likely trigger further agrarian conflicts, land conversions, and a decline in food production centres.

Even if the government attempts to create new rice fields on other islands, such as Papua, Kalimantan, or Sumatra, this may not adequately address national food needs. Java remains the primary food producer and a critical foundation for national food security. Forced development of new rice fields will only exacerbate land-grabbing and agrarian conflicts.

Legislative developments also show troubling signs. The 2025–2029 National Legislation Program (Prolegnas) proposed by the House of Representatives includes a plan to revise Law No. 5 of 1960 on Basic Agrarian Principles (UUPA 1960). This landmark law, which guarantees the people's rights to land and natural resources, is now under threat from a pro-business and liberal regime. Revisions to UUPA are listed in the long-term legislative agenda, signalling an effort to undermine the legal foundation established by Indonesia's founding fathers.

If the liberalization and capitalization of agrarian resources continue unchecked through Prolegnas, the past decade's agrarian injustices will become even more entrenched. If left unaddressed, Indonesia and its people will lose sovereignty over their land and water resources.

This is a brief reflection on 2024, marking the final decade of Jokowi's administration—specifically the last 10 months of his leadership and the first 2 months of Prabowo's presidency.

To delve deeper into this issue, KPA publishes its 2024 Year-End Report (Catahu KPA), which provides analyses and insights based on field evidence and evolving policy dynamics.

I.2. Scope and Definition of Agrarian Conflict

This KPA Year-End Report, presented to the readers, is the result of KPA's monitoring, analysis, and advocacy regarding the situation of agrarian conflicts and policy dynamics in Indonesia throughout 2024.

The objectives of this report are:

1. To capture the current agrarian situation nationally, based on actual events in the field happening during the reporting period;
2. To present data and in-depth analysis of agrarian conflicts based on field findings and empirical experiences of agrarian conflict resolution advocacy;
3. To provide data and analysis on agrarian policies derived from policy desk studies as well as empirical experiences of policy advocacy and agrarian reform;
4. To build public awareness of the ongoing agrarian crisis and human rights violations related to land rights in Indonesia;
5. To encourage policy recommendations and effective mechanisms for resolving agrarian conflicts, including improvements to government and law enforcement procedures in handling conflicts and responding to agrarian violence; and
6. To strengthen the urgency of implementing Agrarian Reform in Indonesia.

The agrarian conflicts described in this report are structural agrarian conflicts, which are conflicts caused by policies or decisions made by public officials. These conflicts involve large-scale land areas and significant numbers of victims. Structural agrarian conflicts also result in multidimensional impacts, encompassing social, economic, political, ecological, and cultural dimensions. The concept of structural agrarian conflicts in this report reflects the manifestation of land and natural resource grabbing by the government, state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and private businesses, facilitated by laws and dominated by business interests. From the perspective of affected communities (the victims), structural agrarian conflicts in this report involve peasants, fisherfolks, indigenous peoples, and marginalized groups in both rural and urban areas, who face direct opposition from the government, corporations, and law enforcement authorities.

This report excludes ordinary land disputes, such as individual land disputes, inheritance disputes, conflicts between private groups, or disputes between government agencies or institutions.

In this report, agrarian matters refer to Law No. 5 of 1960 on Basic Agrarian Principles (UUPA 1960), where agrarian refers to all land, water, space, and the natural resources contained therein. The term "land" encompasses the surface of the earth, the subsurface, and the space above it. The term "water" (the right to use water) includes the right to access water, channel water over someone else's land, and rights related to fisheries management

and capture. Therefore, the concept of agrarian issues in this report extends beyond merely land.

The agrarian conflict sectors monitored include: 1) Plantations; 2) Forestry; 3) Mining; 4) Agribusiness; 5) Infrastructure development; 6) Property and real estate; and 7) Military facilities.

For coastal and small island sectors, starting this year, we have categorized the analysis based on landscape data rather than sector-specific data. This policy reflects input from various parties to KPA as part of the ongoing effort to strengthen and improve this report.

I.3. Monitoring and Data Collection Methods

The methods for monitoring and recording agrarian conflict data in this report are based on the number of conflict eruptions (incidents) in a particular region during the year in question. Therefore, agrarian conflicts that arose in a region during a previous year may be recorded again in this report if new conflict eruptions and/or other agrarian emergencies occurred. Agrarian conflict eruptions refer to incidents of eviction, land grabbing, acts of violence, and criminalization that trigger conflicts and protests from affected communities, often culminating in physical clashes.

The information and data presented in this report were collected from: 1) Direct complaints from communities affected by agrarian conflicts; 2) Field investigations and studies on specific cases that required deeper analysis and further data collection; 3) Monitoring of agrarian conflicts across various regions during the reporting period; 4) Monitoring of agrarian conflict coverage in mass media; 5) Field investigations and studies conducted by KPA; and 6) Emergency responses and conflict resolution efforts by the National Agrarian Reform Committee (KNPA).

The collected information and data on agrarian conflicts were then compiled and recorded, followed by analysis through a process of re-examination and the use of comparative data to enhance the validity, reliability, and quality of the data. Further investigation was conducted to verify the accuracy of information and to avoid errors in data collection and final analysis conclusions.

However, the data presented in this report may not fully represent all incidents of agrarian conflict eruptions and violence that occurred during the reporting period. This is due to limitations in the organizational structure and resources available to record various agrarian situations on a daily basis, as well as challenges in monitoring remote conflict areas. There are also limitations regarding the completeness of case chronologies, the types of information, and the data collected from the aforementioned sources, including those derived from mass media.

CHAPTER II

AGRARIAN CONFLICT REPORT 2024





There was a 21% increase in agrarian conflict eruptions in 2024 compared to 2023, which recorded a total of 241 cases.



II.1. Agrarian Conflict Eruptions in 2024

The political contestation frenzy of 2024 could not stem the escalation of agrarian conflict eruptions in Indonesia. Monitoring conducted by the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) throughout 2024 revealed a significant increase in agrarian conflict eruptions, accompanied by rampant violence and criminalization in conflict areas.

Throughout 2024, KPA recorded at least 295 agrarian conflict eruptions across all sectors. These eruptions affected 1.1 million hectares of land (specifically 1,113,577.47 hectares) and impacted 67,436 families in 349 villages.

This represents a 21% increase in agrarian conflict eruptions compared to the 241 cases recorded in 2023. Upon closer examination, during President Joko Widodo's second term, agrarian conflict eruptions have consistently risen, particularly following the COVID-19 pandemic that affected Indonesia and the world. This trend starkly contrasts with the political promises regarding agrarian conflict resolution and land redistribution. More community land has been seized for various development projects than redistributed or recognized as belonging to the people.




Figure 1. Percentage Trends of Agrarian Conflict Eruptions During Jokowi's Second Term

The plantation and infrastructure sectors once again dominated as the primary causes of agrarian conflicts in Indonesia throughout 2024. Agrarian conflict eruptions in the plantation sector recorded 111 eruptions spanning 170,210.90 hectares and impacting 27,455 families. Meanwhile, the infrastructure sector recorded 79 eruptions covering an area of 290,785.11 hectares, affecting 20,274 families.

The third-highest sector of agrarian conflicts was mining, with 41 eruptions covering 71,101.75 hectares and affecting 11,153 families. Following this, the property sector experienced 25 eruptions over an area of 92.58 hectares, impacting 941 families.

Ranking fifth, conflicts related to forestry involved 25 cases, affecting 7,056 families. Although the number of cases is lower compared to other sectors, the area affected by agrarian conflicts due to government and private forest area claims was the largest, reaching 379,588.75 hectares. Finally, the agricultural/agribusiness and military facility sectors recorded 8 and 6 agrarian conflict eruptions, respectively.

The extent of agrarian conflicts in the agribusiness sector is also noteworthy. These eight cases occurred over an area of 200,581.18 hectares, affecting 250 families. Such extensive conflicts were caused by the development and expansion of food estate projects in Merauke, Papua, which targeted indigenous lands and forests. Meanwhile, agrarian conflicts arising from military facility development spanned 1,217 hectares and affected 307 families.




Figure 2. Agrarian Conflict Eruptions by Sector in 2024

II.2. Agrarian Conflicts per Sector 2024

A. Plantation

The plantation industry remains the highest contributor to agrarian conflicts in Indonesia. At least 111 eruptions of conflict were caused by plantation company operations in various regions, including decisions to issue/renew cultivation rights (HGU) permits and location permits. This figure shows an increase compared to 108 cases recorded in 2023. These conflicts occurred over an area of 170,210.90 hectares, affecting 27,455 families.

> **The high number of agrarian conflict eruptions in this sector is still dominated by palm oil plantations. Of the 111 cases, 67% were due to palm oil business activities, covering an area of 127,281.30 hectares and affecting 14,696 families.**

The high number of agrarian conflict eruptions in this sector is still dominated by palm oil plantations. Of the 111 cases, 67% were due to palm oil business activities, covering an area of 127,281.30 hectares and affecting 14,696 families. This figure far surpasses conflict eruptions in other plantation sectors, which average below 10 eruptions.




Figure 3. Distribution of Agrarian Conflicts in Plantation Sector in 2024

One of the cases this year involves a conflict between the residents of Sungkai Hamlet, Tugang Village, Kelapa Subdistrict, West Bangka Regency, Bangka Belitung, and PT Bumi Permai Lestari (BPL), which resulted in the death of a resident named Beni (48).

This conflict has been ongoing since 1991. Initially, PT BPL promised to establish plasma plantations if the residents handed over their land to the company. However, to date, the company has made no effort to restore the residents' land rights or fulfill its promise of plasma plantations. Instead, the company deployed security forces to suppress any efforts by the residents to fight for their land rights. This included accusations against Beni and other residents of stealing palm oil.

Repressive actions that often lead to violence are characteristic of agrarian conflicts in the plantation sector. Companies, whether private or state-owned, frequently avoid dialogue when facing objections and protests from local communities. Manipulation in land acquisition processes, the establishment of plantations, and a lack of transparency have been key triggers for conflict eruptions. Instead of seeking resolutions, the responses of plantation companies and the government to agrarian conflicts are often accompanied by the deployment of security forces.

In North Bengkulu, on July 12, 2024, a conflict erupted between residents and PT Agricinal. Two peasants suffered gunshot wounds while defending their land from eviction by the company. Such incidents are not isolated. Throughout 2024, three major conflicts have occurred in the same area, resulting in violence and abuse against 17 peasants, 10 of whom were women.

PT Agricinal has been operating since the 1980s in Putri Hijau Subdistrict, North Bengkulu Regency. Part of the company’s land use permit (HGU) overlaps with residential and farming areas of the local community. In 2024, the company’s HGU is under renewal, as reported by the Bengkulu Peasants' Union (STaB) following a hearing with the Regional Land Office (ATR/BPN), the North Bengkulu Government, and the company. The renewed HGU is reduced by 2,000 hectares, from 8,000 to 6,000 hectares. However, there is no clarity on the location of the revised area, leaving peasants uncertain about their claims.

Also on Sumatra Island, a conflict arose between peasants in Nagari Kapa, Luhak Nan Duo Subdistrict, West Pasaman Regency, West Sumatra, and PT Permata Hijau Pasaman I (PHP I), a subsidiary of the Wilmar Group. At least nine clashes occurred between peasants and the company in 2024, leading to the criminalization and abuse of 27 peasants by the police, 14 of whom were women, including mothers.

The conflict began with PT PHP I’s claim over farmland and settlements. Peasants argue that this claim is unfounded, as HGU No. 54 of PT PHP I does not include Nagari Kapa but is instead located in Nagari Sasak, Sasak Ranah Pesisir Subdistrict, still within West Pasaman Regency.

According to the peasants, the company has been operating illegally since 1996, and there has been no effort from the government to resolve the conflict. Adding to the irony, Nagari Kapa has been designated as a priority area for agrarian conflict resolution under the Agrarian Reform Task Force (GTRA). However, this designation has failed to prevent the company from taking counterproductive actions on the ground.

> **The high number of agrarian conflicts erupting annually in the plantation sector reflects the overreliance of our economy on plantation businesses, particularly the palm oil industry.**

During President Jokowi's administration, numerous agrarian conflicts have erupted in areas that were designated as priority locations for agrarian conflict resolution. Many of these locations had even been directly instructed by the President for expedited resolution. This reality highlights a lack of consistent political will and state alignment, including sectoral egos and the absence of effective collaboration between ministries and agencies (both central and regional).

Back in Bengkulu Province, the repressive actions of security forces in agrarian conflict zones resulted in a pregnant woman losing her unborn child. The conflict involved PT Daria Dharma Pratama (DDP) and local residents. The agrarian conflict in Muko-Muko Regency is an enduring issue that remains unresolved to this day. Over the past year alone, there have been at least five agrarian conflict outbreaks. The public likely still remembers the mass arrests by security forces in mid-2022, where 55 people were criminalized for protesting against the company's actions in evicting them from their land.

Agrarian conflicts in the plantation sector are not limited to private enterprises; state-owned companies, such as PT Perkebunan Negara (PTPN), have also frequently been the source of agrarian conflicts across various regions. One example is PTPN IX in Cilacap Regency, Central Java. The company deployed military personnel to intimidate peasants in Bantar Village, Wanareja District.

They justified their actions as part of the government's food security program, which they claimed required reclaiming the land cultivated and inhabited by the peasants. However, the peasants rejected this move, as 468 families in the village have been using and farming the land since 1980. The land had even been designated as a Priority Location for Agrarian Reform (LPRA) during President Joko Widodo's administration.

PTPN's arbitrary actions have also been seen in South Sulawesi, specifically in three villages—Mantadulu, Tawakua, and Taripa in East Luwu Regency. Peasants staged a land reclamation (reklaiming) protest against PTPN, which had controlled the land since December 11, 2024. Their actions are rooted in the fact that PTPN XIV has unilaterally controlled the land since 1994—meaning the state-owned company has seized the peasants' land for three decades. Worse still, it was recently revealed that the state plantation operations lacked a valid land-use permit (HGU). This discovery was made when the community filed a lawsuit in court.

The peasants' reclamation efforts stem from their long-standing frustration and disappointment. Their numerous attempts to resolve the issue were ignored by the government. Back in 1999, Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas HAM) sent a letter to the Governor of South Sulawesi urging resolution of the case, in response to earlier complaints from the community. Most recently, in 2023, the peasants staged a protest, blocking access to the company's roads and appealing to the district legislature (DPRD). However, the government once again responded repressively by deploying paramilitary police (Brimob).

Violence and repressive measures have become inseparable from agrarian conflicts in the plantation sector. Throughout 2024, the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) recorded at least 207 cases of criminalization, 41 incidents of violence, two shootings, and one death—all stemming from a repressive approach to handling community grievances.




Figure 4. Cases of violence and criminalization in the plantation sector

The high frequency of agrarian conflicts each year in the plantation sector reflects the overreliance of our economy on plantation businesses, particularly the palm oil industry. Meanwhile, the plantation sector remains stagnant, with no systemic reforms, including improvements in governance. Palm oil plantations, especially those operated by private and state-owned enterprises, often engage in evictions and land grabs against local communities. These actions are frequently accompanied by repressive measures against residents in agrarian conflict areas.

The moratorium on palm oil plantation permits issued by Jokowi during his administration was insufficient to curb the expansion of the palm oil industry, which continues to fuel agrarian conflicts. The moratorium was not designed to address problematic palm oil concessions or restore community rights. This policy was inconsistently implemented and ultimately faded without any resolution. The president's directive through this regulation amounted to mere lip service.

B. Infrastructure Development

Similar to agrarian conflicts in the plantation sector, agrarian conflicts arising from infrastructure development projects consistently rank as one of the top two contributors to conflicts. Throughout 2024, the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) recorded at least 79 agrarian conflict eruptions spanning 290,785.11 hectares and affecting 20,274 families.

This year's agrarian conflicts in the infrastructure sector were partly triggered by the acceleration of National Strategic Projects (PSN). Of the 79 cases, 36 eruptions were caused by land acquisitions for PSN, which included the development of industrial zones,

new urban areas, tourism zones, dams, airports, power plants, and tourism infrastructure. The remaining cases involved other projects such as railway construction, toll roads, main roads, irrigation systems, and social and public facilities.




Figure 5. Subsectors of Agrarian Conflicts in 2024 in the Infrastructure Sector

One of the prominent cases this year involves agrarian conflicts arising from the development of the Pantai Indah Kapuk 2 (PIK 2) area, a joint venture between Agung Sedayu Group (ASG) and Salin Group (SG) in Jakarta and Tangerang. This 1,755-hectare project is an extension of the previously successful PIK development. PIK 2 has been designated by the government as one of the National Strategic Projects (PSN), alongside 14 other newly declared PSNs financed by the private sector on March 18, 2024.

The implementation of the PIK 2 project has reportedly been fraught with numerous violations during the land acquisition phase. There have been widespread reports of coercion against the local community to relinquish their land. Residents were intimidated and forced to accept inadequate compensation, with their land valued at only IDR 30,000–IDR 50,000 (about USD 1,80 to USD 3.00) per square meter. Furthermore, even residents who agreed to compensation terms have yet to receive payments from the PIK management.

The designation of PIK 2 as a PSN is highly questionable since it is essentially a private project that does not qualify as a national strategic project. There are strong allegations that

the designation of PIK 2 is tied to political favours from Joko Widodo to Aguan, who has been instrumental in the development of the new capital city (IKN) in East Kalimantan. The construction of this project has effectively expropriated land, agricultural areas, and fishing grounds that communities have relied on for farming, fish farming, and fishing activities.

In North Kalimantan, another agrarian conflict related to PSN emerged from the development of the Indonesian Green Industrial Estate (KIHI), previously known as the International Port Industrial Estate (KIPI). This industrial zone spans 30,000 hectares across the villages of Mangkupadi, Tanah Kuning, and Binai in Tanjung Palas Timur District, Bulungan Regency. The project is estimated to cost approximately IDR 1,848 trillion.

The problem stems from the fact that the project is located on community-owned land, leading to agrarian conflicts. Affected residents reported that land they had occupied for decades was taken over by companies involved in the KIHI project. Companies have also forcibly relocated residents, intimidating them and coercing them to accept compensation as low as IDR 30,000–IDR 50,000 (about USD 1,80 to USD 3.00) per square meter.

Most of the affected residents, who are primarily fishermen, have been disrupted by industrial activities encroaching on their fishing areas. Approximately 115 traditional fishing structures are under threat due to the expanding industrial operations.

The KIHI project has also triggered disputes between corporations. Around 9,500 hectares of KIHI land overlaps with several plantation business rights (HGU) owned by PT Bulungan Citra Agro Persada (BCAP), partially owned by Garibaldi Thohir (as reported in the "Green Lies" report, 2023). These HGU rights were converted into building rights (HGB) for the project. Additionally, KIHI areas reportedly overlap with plantation permits (IUP) owned by PT Sawit Berkat Sejahtera.

KIHI is managed by a consortium of major corporations, including PT Kalimantan Industrial Park Indonesia (KIPI), a subsidiary of the Adaro Group; PT Indonesia Strategis Industri, owned by entrepreneur Tjandra Limanjaya; and PT Kayan Patria Propertindo (KPP), owned by entrepreneur Lauw Juanda Lesmana. The consortium is led by Garibaldi Thohir, also known as Boy Thohir, the head of Adaro Group. Planned industrial activities in KIHI include petrochemical industries, steel industries, polycrystalline manufacturing (solar panels), aluminium industries (electric vehicle materials), and captive coal power plants (PLTU).

In North Sumatra, agrarian conflicts erupted in Amplas Village, Percut Sei Tuan District. Two residents were killed by thugs allegedly hired by PTPN II. This incident occurred on October 22, 2024, as part of a larger eviction effort that has been ongoing since 2021. At that time, the government designated the community's area as part of the Deli Megapolitan Zone.

The Deli Megapolitan Project is a collaboration between PTPN II and Ciputra Group, planned on 8,077 hectares of land at an estimated cost of IDR 128 trillion. Although initially proposed by PTPN II in 2011, the project only began in 2021 in partnership with Ciputra Group.

From the outset, the Deli Megapolitan Project has been problematic, exacerbating long-standing agrarian conflicts between the community and PTPN that have persisted for decades. The designation of the Deli Megapolitan Zone incorporated the ancestral lands of the Badan Perjuangan Rakyat Penunggu Indonesia (BPRPI) into its plans. These

unresolved conflicts, dating back to 1953, have been further aggravated by the involvement of a new actor, Ciputra Group, which brought the Deli Megapolitan Project to the fore.

Several expired PTPN land use rights (HGU) covering community lands are now being converted into building permits (HGB) to benefit the PTPN II and Ciputra Group project. If building permit (HGB) is granted to Ciputra Group, it will confirm the presence of land mafias entrenched within the government, perpetuating practices of maladministration and corruption in the field.




Figure 6. Agrarian Conflicts Arising from National Strategic Projects in 2024

C. Mining Industry

Throughout 2024, the mining industry has caused at least 41 agrarian conflicts, affecting an area of 71,101.75 hectares and displacing 11,153 households. Most agrarian conflicts in this sector are triggered by the operations of nickel and coal mining companies.

Notably, coal mining has resulted in 14 conflicts, while nickel mining has caused 11 conflicts. The remaining conflicts stem from gold mining (8 cases), sand mining (4 cases), and one case each involving laterite, zinc, copper, and tin mining.




Figure 7. Types of Agrarian Conflicts in the Mining Sector

One of the prominent cases arising from the nickel industry this year is the conflict between the residents of Torobulu Village, South Konawe, Southeast Sulawesi, and PT Wijaya Inti Nusantara (WIN). A total of 32 villagers were criminalized by the company on charges of obstructing nickel mining activities.

In reality, the villagers' actions were an attempt to protest against the company's operations, which have caused distress and harm to the community. Since 2019, the company has been conducting mining activities behind an elementary school in the village and near residential areas.

In East Kalimantan, a conflict erupted between the residents of Muara Kate Hamlet, Muara Langon Village, Muara Komam District, Paser Regency, and PT Mantimin Coal Mining (MCM). The company obtained its operating permit through the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources Decree No. 441.K/30/DJB/2017, which adjusted the activity stage of the Coal Mining Concession Agreement (PKP2B). The permit, covering 5,900 hectares, spans three regencies in South Kalimantan: Tabalong, Balangan, and Hulu Sungai Tengah. Specifically in Hulu Sungai Tengah (HST), the mining permit includes 1,398.78 hectares of secondary forest, 51.60 hectares of residential areas, 147.40 hectares of rice fields, and 63.12 hectares of rivers.

Since the company's operations began, residents of Muara Kate Hamlet have consistently protested against coal transport trucks using public roads. The activities of PT MCM have repeatedly resulted in fatalities. In response, residents set up a monitoring post to ensure the safety of the Muara Kate environment. The situation escalated on November 15, 2024, when an attack at the monitoring post resulted in one resident's death and another being seriously injured. Strong suspicions point to the perpetrators being linked to the company.

Beyond this conflict, at least eight agrarian conflicts have erupted in East Kalimantan over the past year, involving several other companies, including PT Kaltim Diamond Coal (KDC), PT Mitra Indah Lestari (MIL), and PT Berau Coal.

According to records from the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA), agrarian conflicts in the mining sector have surged significantly in recent years, particularly in the nickel industry, which has become a key focus of the government. While the government claims to be transitioning toward renewable energy, the reality on the ground suggests otherwise, as it remains heavily reliant on the coal industry. This implies that the rhetoric surrounding renewable energy is merely lip service, serving as an opportunity to capitalize on trends promoted in global trade.

D. Property Business

In the property business sector, agrarian conflicts erupted 25 times this year, affecting a total area of 93.58 hectares and impacting 1,321 households. The majority of these conflicts stemmed from housing development projects by private developers (7 cases), followed by local government asset claims (6 cases), industrial zone construction (5 cases), and office complex developments (5 cases). Additionally, there was one case each related to the construction of an elite cemetery and a university campus.




Figure 8. Types of Agrarian Conflicts in the Property Sector

One of the most significant agrarian conflicts erupted in Pundenrejo Village, Tayu District, Pati Regency, Central Java. A 7.3-hectare plot of land occupied by 140 families was claimed as a right to build (HGB) concession of PT Laju Perdana Indah, a subsidiary of Indofood, since 2020.

Initially, the land in Pundenrejo was under Dutch control. In 1973, it was claimed by PT BAPIPPUNDIP under the jurisdiction of Kodam IV Diponegoro. The land was designated as HGB status until 1994 and later extended until 2024. However, in 1999, BAPIPPUNDIP

went bankrupt, leaving the land physically abandoned. The residents resumed using the land until it was eventually transferred to LPI, which intended to develop employee housing.

Despite its HGB status, the land was never used according to its designated purpose, either by BAPIPPUNDIP or LPI. Instead, LPI planted sugarcane on the land, which was not in line with its intended use. Legally, this misuse classifies the land as abandoned, meaning the government should take regulatory action to ensure that the residents' land rights are protected.

E. Forestry

The forestry sector recorded 25 agrarian conflict outbreaks throughout 2024, affecting a total area of 379,588.75 hectares and impacting 7,056 families. Agrarian conflicts in this sector were once again dominated by the operations of Industrial Plantation Forest (HTI) companies, accounting for 14 cases. Additionally, there were 7 cases related to production forests (HP), 2 cases in conservation areas, and one case each involving Energy Plantation Forests (HTE) and Forest Utilization Business License for Ecosystem Restoration (IUPHHK-RE).




Figure 9. Types of Agrarian Conflicts in the Forestry Sector

One of the major conflicts that erupted this year due to forestry industry operations was caused by the land claim of PT Toba Pulp Lestari's Industrial Plantation Forest (HTI) in North Sumatra. This conflict spread across three regencies: Toba Samosir, Simalungun, and South Tapanuli. The operations of PT TPL have led to at least eight clashes with indigenous communities throughout the year.

The conflict between residents of the three regencies and PT TPL has actually been ongoing since the 1980s. At that time, the company was still known as PT Inti Indorayon Utama (IIU). The company logged timber from indigenous forests belonging to the Indigenous Peoples. Despite various efforts made by the residents, PT TPL's heavy machinery has never ceased clearing their customary forests, continuing to this day. The agrarian conflict throughout 2024 has resulted in the criminalization of 12 community members, with three men and one woman subjected to physical assault.

In Central Java, Perhutani unilaterally demarcated the farmland cultivated by peasants from the Independent Peasants Union (STaM) in Cilacap, specifically in Cimrutu and Rawaapu Villages, Patimuan District. This conflict has persisted for decades since 1967, when Perhutani claimed ownership of the area. The location has actually been designated as a priority for conflict resolution through the Priority Location for Agrarian Reform (LPRA) approach, proposed by the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) along with affiliated peasants' unions.

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Although the biomass industry has caused only one recorded conflict outbreak in 2024, it warrants serious attention moving forward. The government is aggressively promoting biomass as an alternative energy source.

Through various advocacy efforts, the government issued Decree No. 420/KPTS/Um/1981, which regulated the resolution of this conflict. The decree ruled that 5,776.33 hectares of farmland, which had long been used as rice fields, would be excluded from the forest area claims. However, Perhutani's intimidation tactics have not ceased. Most recently, on November 21, 2024, Perhutani approached the peasants, offering conflict resolution through the Land Tenure Settlement for Forest Area Management (PPTPKH) scheme. The peasants rejected the offer, believing it to be a trap designed to legitimize Perhutani's control over their land.

Another agrarian conflict occurred between Indigenous communities in Bara Village, Air Buaya District, Buru Regency, Maluku. Their customary land, which is legally recognized with 62 communal land certificates, was seized by PT Inagro Cipta Nusantara for a biomass energy project that began in 2022. The community has received no compensation for their losses. They suspect that the company employed a divide-and-rule strategy by persuading certain traditional leaders to facilitate the acquisition of their communal land.

Although the biomass industry has caused only one recorded conflict outbreak in 2024, it warrants serious attention moving forward. The government is aggressively promoting biomass as an alternative energy source. According to Indonesia's energy transition plan, wood-based biomass is projected to generate 19.7 TWh (terawatt-hours) by 2025, with 64.5% coming from co-firing in coal-fired power plants. Forests designated as energy plantations are expected to supply half of this demand.

According to data from PLN (National Electricity Company), the government claims that the total potential land area for energy plantations (HTE) reaches 1.2 million hectares, spread across various regions. However, this program poses a significant risk of escalating agrarian conflicts, particularly in forest areas. Many villages still overlap with forest zone claims. The Ministry of Forestry (formerly KLHK) reports that 25,863 villages are currently classified within forest areas. Given the scale of the government's biomass expansion plans, agrarian conflicts will be inevitable if the program is not carefully managed.

F. Large-Scale Agriculture and Agribusiness

The agriculture and agribusiness sector recorded 8 agrarian conflicts throughout 2024, covering a total area of 200,581.18 hectares and affecting 250 families. Conflicts in this sector were caused by the Food Estate National Strategic Project (PSN), which triggered 3 conflicts, agribusiness with 3 cases, and food security programs involving the military (TNI) and police (Polri) with 2 cases.




Figure 10. Types of Agrarian Conflicts in the Agriculture and Agribusiness Sector

One of the agrarian conflicts triggered by the food security program occurred in Cibenda, Kertajati District, Majalengka Regency, West Java. PT Sindangkasih Multi Usaha (SMU) began evicting the farmland of members of the Majalengka Peasants' Union (SPM) in mid-2024, justifying their actions based on a business permit from Perhutani.

PT SMU is a Regional Government-Owned Enterprise (BUMD) of Majalengka Regency. They introduced the food security initiative with plans to cultivate maize and peanuts, in collaboration with PT Garuda Food.

However, Perhutani, specifically the Cibenda Forest Management Resort (RPH), stated that they were unaware of this permit. Perhutani later clarified that the business permit was an agreement between PT SMU and Sahbandar Village. Instead of resolving the agrarian conflict, Perhutani, PT SMU, PT Garuda Food, and Sahbandar Village authorities reported

SPM peasants to the Kertajati Police Chief, accusing them of obstructing the maize and peanut food security program.

The involvement of PT SMU and PT Garuda Food in the food security program has further complicated the agrarian conflict in LPRA Sahbandar. For 24 years, SPM peasants have been waiting for a resolution to their land dispute with Perum Perhutani.

A different conflict occurred in Cijeruk District, Bogor Regency, specifically in the Kina Block, Pasir Pogor, Cipelang Village. This dispute involved the military (TNI), claiming to be carrying out a food security program under the authority of the Commander of the Indonesian National Armed Forces. The eviction process began in March 2024, with the TNI demarcating peasants' land without presenting any legal documents or supporting evidence. However, peasants have occupied and cultivated the land since 1991 and 1997, and they even possess official cultivation certificates issued by the village head.

G. Military Facility Claims

Throughout 2024, military claims over farmland and residential areas have triggered six agrarian conflicts. These conflicts have occurred over a total land area of 1,217.20 hectares and have affected 307 households. The majority of these conflicts stem from unilateral claims by the military over land designated as TNI assets, accounting for five cases. The remaining conflict outbreak was related to the construction of a military shooting range. However, KPA has been unable to determine the exact land area or the number of affected victims resulting from the shooting range construction.



Figure 11. Types of Conflicts in the Military Facility Sector

One of the cases that occurred was the conflict between the residents of Kampung Bara-Baraya in Makassar City and Military Command/Hasanuddin (Kodam XIV). The conflict has been ongoing for several years and flared up again this year. The actions taken by the Military Command were deeply regretted by the residents. This is because the Makassar District Court, through decision No: 225/Pdt.G/2017/PN.Mks, ruled that the land claimed as a military asset was rejected by the court, and the residents of Kampung Bara-Baraya were declared rightful owners of the land.

Furthermore, an agrarian conflict due to the Armed Forces' asset claims also occurred in Punti Kulo, Sumay District, Tebo Regency, Jambi. The residents had been occupying the area since 1910 and cultivating approximately 214 hectares of land. However, in 2015, the military suddenly arrived and claimed that the land was their asset. The conflict escalated again this year. Unwilling to accept the military unilateral actions of demarcating their land, the residents protested by removing the boundary markers. This protest took place on May 17, 2024.

II.3 Regional Distribution of Agrarian Conflicts in 2024

A total of 295 agrarian conflicts erupted across Indonesia throughout 2024, affecting all major islands in the country. Based on regional distribution, these conflicts occurred in 34 out of 38 provinces. This means that only four provinces—Papua, Southwest Papua, Highland Papua, and Central Papua—reported no agrarian conflicts. However, this does not necessarily mean that conflicts did not occur in these provinces; rather, limitations in data collection methods may have led to the omission of cases from monitoring.

This year, South Sulawesi recorded the highest number of agrarian conflicts in Indonesia, with 37 incidents. North Sumatra followed in second place with 32 cases, while West Java and East Kalimantan each recorded 16 conflicts. Other provinces with significant cases include East Java (15 conflicts), Central Sulawesi (13 conflicts), West Sumatra (12 conflicts), South Sumatra (11 conflicts), Jambi (10 conflicts), and Central Kalimantan (9 conflicts) *(for more details, see Figures 12 and 13).*






Figure 12. Distribution of Agrarian Conflicts in 2024 by Province

Agrarian Conflicts in South Sulawesi this year were caused by the plantation industry with 13 outbreaks, infrastructure development with 8 cases, industry and mining businesses with 8 cases, forest area claims with 2 outbreaks, real estate businesses with 3 outbreaks, and military asset claims with 3 outbreaks.

One of the conflicts that erupted in South Sulawesi was the dispute between the Polongbangkeng Peasants in Takalar and the State-owned enterprise PTPN XIV (now PTPN I Regional 8) over 6,650 hectares of land, involving 1,500 families. The escalation of agrarian conflicts in this province is noteworthy, as it has increased by almost 100% compared to the previous year's 19 outbreaks.

According to KPA's analysis, besides classic sectors like plantations and mining, the rise in agrarian conflicts is driven by claims over regional government and state-owned assets. The lack of clarity regarding status and data is the main cause, especially since these asset claims affect residential areas that have been occupied for decades, with some residents even holding land ownership certificates (SHM).

PTPN I's land use permit (HGU) has expired and has not been renewed to date. Despite this, PTPN I continues to operate and manage sugarcane on land belonging to the Polongbangkeng Peaants in Takalar. In some areas, these activities are guarded by security forces, including police, mobile brigade units (Brimob), and the military. Over the past year, at least five agrarian conflicts have erupted, resulting in the criminalization of one peasant.

In North Sumatra, 32 agrarian conflicts were recorded, predominantly in palm oil plantation areas with 11 cases, infrastructure conflicts with 10 cases, forestry sector conflicts with 9 cases, and mining and real estate sectors with one case each.

One of the major conflicts this year involved residents of Rambung Baru Village, Sibolangit District, Deli Serdang Regency, and PT Nirvana Memorial Nusantara. The conflict has been ongoing since 2018 when PT Nirvana entered the community's land and destroyed their crops. Investigations revealed that the signatures on PT Nirvana's Deed of Sale and Purchase (AJB) were from residents of Bungkawan Village, not Rambung Baru. PT Nirvana Memorial intended to convert agricultural land into the luxurious Nirvana Memorial Park Medan cemetery.

Agrarian conflicts in North Sumatra also led to two fatalities this year. The incident stemmed from disputes between the community and Ciputra Group and PTPN regarding the development of the Deli Megapolitan New City Area, located in Medan and Deli Serdang.

Meanwhile, agrarian conflicts in West Java this year were driven by plantation businesses with 9 cases, real estate businesses with 2 cases, the agricultural sector with 2 cases, military asset claims with 2 cases, and mining conflicts with 1 case.

Among these conflicts was a dispute between peasants in Agrog Village and Ciandum Village, Cipatujuh District, Tasikmalaya Regency, and PTPN VIII. The peasants are members of the Pasundan Peasants' Union (SPP) in Tasikmalaya. The conflict began when PTPN unilaterally destroyed the peasants' crops under the pretext of renewing its land use permit (HGU). However, the land had long been cultivated by the peasants. The conflict involved 200 hectares and affected 172 farming households.

In East Kalimantan, agrarian conflicts were mainly driven by the mining sector, with 8 cases, infrastructure development with 7 cases, and plantation-related conflicts with 1 case.

One of the most notable cases involved the criminalization of Amat Long, the customary leader of Merasa Village. PT Berau Coal reported him to the Berau Police, accusing him of disrupting company operations by halting activities. However, Amat Long's actions were aimed at protecting customary land from corporate encroachment that had destroyed community farms and crops.

Repressive actions have accompanied agrarian conflicts. In one case, a resident of Muara Kate Hamlet, Muara Langon Village, Paser Regency, was killed. Russel died from deep lacerations caused by a sharp weapon, while his companion, Anson, was seriously injured. They were attacked by unknown assailants while guarding a resistance post established by villagers during their struggle against the company. The attack is strongly suspected to be linked to the community's conflict with PT Berau Coal.

In East Java, agrarian conflicts were triggered by plantation company operations with 6 cases, real estate businesses with 5 cases, and infrastructure development with 4 cases.

One case involved the eviction of residents of Rusunawa Gunungsari in Sawunggaling Village, Wonokromo District, Blitar, by the city government on May 16, 2024. The government justified the eviction by claiming the residential land as a government asset. The evicted residents were previously victims of displacement from Stren Kali Jeger.

In Central Sulawesi, of the 13 agrarian conflicts recorded in 2024, infrastructure development was the leading cause with 5 cases, followed by plantations with 4 cases, agricultural sector conflicts with 2 cases, and mining and real estate conflicts with 1 case each.

A major dispute involved residents of Ambunu, Topogaro, and Tondo villages in Morowali against PT Indonesia Huabao Industrial Park (IHIP). Residents repeatedly blocked roads to stop PT IHIP from seizing their farmland roads. The company also occupied their land without consent, threatening their livelihoods. In the past year, three conflict outbreaks led to the criminalization of 10 residents, including one woman. KPA records indicate that the agrarian conflict in this area covers 1,200 hectares.

In West Sumatra, agrarian conflicts were primarily caused by plantation company operations, which accounted for 10 conflict outbreaks throughout the year. Additional conflicts were triggered by toll road construction and government asset claims, each causing one case.

PT Permata Hijau Pasaman I (PHP I) was the main culprit behind conflicts in the province. In recent years, PHP I repeatedly evicted residents of Nagari Kapa, Luhak Nan Duo District, West Pasaman Regency. The Wilmar Group subsidiary deployed joint security forces to expel peasants and force palm oil planting on their land. Over the past year, at least 33 peasants faced criminalization and violence, including 14 women. The conflict affected 181 farming households and 924 hectares of land.

Similar to West Sumatra, agrarian conflicts in South Sumatra were largely due to plantation company operations. Of the 11 recorded outbreaks, 8 occurred in plantation areas, while 2 were caused by mining industries and 1 by the forestry industry.

A significant case involved residents of Agung Jaya Village, Lalan District, Musi Banyuasin Regency, and PT Banyu Kahuripan Indonesia (BKI). The conflict impacted 218 families and 436 hectares of land. PT BKI criminalized two residents, Umbara (29) and Sapei (57).

In Jakarta, agrarian conflicts in 2024 stemmed from infrastructure development (5 cases), the property business (5 cases), and agribusiness (1 case).

One case involved the eviction of retired Customs officers from the Bea Cukai Complex, Jl. S Parman Kav 98, Palmerah District, West Jakarta, to make way for new housing for active employees. Residents who resisted were assaulted by Customs officers. Their opposition was based on historical rights, as the houses were built independently without state funds. A total of 15 families were evicted for the new apartment complex of the Directorate General of Customs and Excise.

In Jambi, 10 agrarian conflict eruptions occurred this year, mainly caused by plantation company operations (5 cases), the forestry industry (4 cases), and military asset claims (1 case).

A prominent case involved the criminalization of Dewita, a female peasant from Pemayungan Village, Tebo Regency. The conflict stemmed from a land dispute between villagers and PT Alam Bukit Tiga Puluh (ABT), a forest ecosystem restoration company. Throughout the year, the company erected boundary markers on community land, totalling 14,000 hectares.




Figure 13. Major Provinces Contributing to the Highest number of Agrarian Conflicts in 2024

> **The government's response and approach to handling agrarian conflicts throughout 2024 have remained unchanged from previous years. It often involves the mobilization of security forces and repressive actions. Frequently, authorities resort to arbitrary arrests of peasants, indigenous peoples, and activists defending their land rights.**

II.4 Violence and Criminalization

The government's response and approach to handling agrarian conflicts throughout 2024 have remained unchanged from previous years. It often involves the mobilization of security forces and repressive actions. Authorities frequently resort to arbitrary arrests of peasants, indigenous peoples, and activists defending their land rights.

Throughout 2024, at least 556 people fell victim to violence and criminalization due to the involvement of security forces in agrarian conflict areas. Among these victims, 399 individuals faced criminalization, 149 were subjected to persecution or violence, 4 were shot, and 4 others lost their lives due to reckless actions by the authorities.




Figure 14. Cases of Violence and Criminalization in Agrarian Conflict Areas 2024

Repressive measures in handling agrarian conflicts have once again claimed lives. The death toll from agrarian conflicts this year has risen to four victims, up from three the previous year.

The first fatality occurred in Tunggang Village, Kelapa District, West Bangka Regency, Bangka Belitung. Beni (45), a villager, was shot and killed by police officers deployed during a conflict between villagers and PT BPL. Beni and several others were accused of stealing palm fruit from the company. Ironically, the police, acting on behalf of the company, failed to verify the allegations before resorting to repressive actions against the villagers.

In Amplas Village, Percut Sei Tuan District, Deli Serdang, North Sumatra, two residents lost their lives in the conflict. Bungaran Samosir (51) and Adam Djhorgi (27) were killed by thugs allegedly hired by PTPN II. This repressive violence is not an isolated incident—over the past year alone, there have been seven outbreaks of conflict in the region.

The final death occurred in Muara Kate Village, Muara Komam District, Paser Regency, East Kalimantan. Rusel (60), a villager, lost his life after being attacked by an unidentified individual while guarding a resistance post he had built with other villagers. They were involved in a conflict with PT Mantimin Coal Mining (PT MCM), which had seized the villagers' land.




Figure 15. Death Toll in Agrarian Conflict Areas 2024

In East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), eight members of the Indigenous Soge and Goban communities in Sikka Regency were criminalized on October 25, 2024. Among them, two women were targeted. This case stems from an ongoing conflict between the community and PT Krisrama, which has persistently attempted to forcibly seize the customary lands of Pu'an Soge and Pu'an Gobe over the past two years. During this time, the community has faced intimidation, including the destruction of their crops. Tragically, the local government has also pressured the community to approve PT Krisrama's application for the renewal of its land-use permit (HGU), despite the legal relationship between the company and the land had long been terminated.

In North Sumatra, the repressive actions of PTPN III resulted in two women being victims of violence. Silvia and Ramadhani were assaulted by PTPN III. Silvia suffered a serious head injury, leading to bleeding and unconsciousness. Eyewitnesses reported that one of the perpetrators even committed sexual harassment against her. This incident is a consequence of the ongoing conflict between residents of Gurilla Subdistrict, Pematang Siantar City, and PTPN III. The conflict has been escalating since 2022 and continues to this day.

In Bengkulu, the repressive actions of security forces caused a mother to lose her unborn child. This tragedy occurred amidst a conflict between villagers and PT Daria Dharma Pratama (DDP), which has been ongoing since 1997.

Between 2015 and 2024, at least 79 people have died in agrarian conflict zones due to the repressive approach of security forces and acts of thuggery mobilized by the government or private companies. Repressive measures and a legal-formal perspective have become the standard response of the government to agrarian conflicts across various regions.

Police officers and company representatives are the primary actors responsible for the violence and criminalization cases mentioned above. Of the violent and criminalization incidents recorded throughout 2024, police were involved in 129 cases, the military (TNI) in 37 cases, public order agents (Satpol PP) in 44 cases, and the highest number—148 cases—involved thugs or individuals linked to companies.





Figure 16. Perpetrators of Violence and Criminalization in Agrarian Conflict Areas 2024



CHAPTER III

THE PORTRAIT BEHIND AGRARIAN CONFLICTS



The phrase "a harvest of agrarian conflicts" aptly describes the situation of agrarian disputes that have unfolded during Jokowi's 10 years of leadership.

III.1. Critical Notes on Agrarian Conflict 2024

A. Agricultural Land and Peasants Most Affected

The eruptions of agrarian conflicts across various sectors and regions throughout 2024 have increasingly marginalized peasants and caused agricultural land in Indonesia to shrink further.

Throughout 2024, the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) recorded peasants as the group most affected by the agrarian conflict eruptions. Of the 295 total cases, 173 involved peasants as victims. The second-most affected group was the urban poor, who faced eviction or displacement in 56 cases. The third-most affected group was Indigenous Peoples, with 53 cases. Lastly, fisherfolks were victims in 13 cases.




Figure 17. Categories of Agrarian Conflict Victim Groups 2024

From the four groups mentioned earlier, three serve as the frontline defenders in ensuring the nation's food supply. Ironically, their lands and livelihoods are increasingly threatened. Various data and scientific studies on the strategic role of peasants as food producers and the crisis of peasant regeneration seem powerless to stop business operations and government projects that evict these food heroes from their agricultural lands.

Throughout the year, these peasants faced not only legal uncertainty and unresolved agrarian conflicts but also persistent threats of eviction, whether by plantation companies, mining firms, industrial forest plantations (HTI), or infrastructure projects claimed to be in the national interest.

The figures above reinforce data from Indonesia's Central Statistics Agency (BPS) regarding the peasant crisis reported in 2023. BPS data indicate that over a decade, from 2013 to 2023, the number of small-scale farmers increased from 14.25 million to 17.24 million farming households. Overall, the total number of peasants declined from 31 million in 2013 to 29.34 million in 2023.

Additionally, data collected by the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) over the past decade (2015–2023) show that the top ten provinces contributing the most to agrarian conflicts are also regions experiencing high levels of land fragmentation. These provinces include Aceh, North Sumatra, Riau, Jambi, South Sumatra, Lampung, East Java, West Java, Central Java, and South Sulawesi.

The agrarian crisis described above is an ongoing irony across various regions in Indonesia. Peasants and food heroes of the nation are increasingly squeezed by the tide of national development, which heavily accommodates the interests of large-scale businesses. Even more ironic is that peasants, fishermen, and these food heroes are often displaced from their lands or denied access to their fishing grounds to pave the way for private and government projects. There is also a strong trend of food-related matters being handed over to large-scale business entities, major entrepreneurs, and even the police and military.

The Food Estate projects in Humbang Hasundutan and Merauke are examples of agrarian issues that have gained public attention, where peasants and Indigenous Peoples have become victims. Similarly, food security programs often managed by the military target agricultural lands that belong to farmers, as seen in Cilacap, Central Java, and Tasikmalaya, West Java.

The saying "already down, hit by the ladder" seems to perfectly describe the unfortunate fate of peasants today. Amid shrinking agricultural lands and increasingly marginalized livelihoods, their lands often become the battleground for large business interests, remaining unresolved agrarian conflict zones for decades.

From an agrarian landscape perspective, farmland owned by the people is the most affected by agrarian conflicts, consistent with the data above. Out of the total 295 recorded conflicts, 178 occurred on farmland, covering a total area of 326,224.34 hectares, affecting 46,642 farming households. When averaged per household, at least 93,284 peasants (men and women) were victims of agrarian conflicts throughout 2024. This estimate might be higher, as rural and agricultural community practices in Indonesia often involve household-scale farming, where not only husbands and wives but also children assist in working the land.






Figure 18. Eruption of Agrarian Conflict Based on Landscape

The second most frequently affected area by agrarian conflicts in 2024 was residential settlements, with 53 cases covering 57.81 hectares and impacting 8,043 families. This was followed by Indigenous Territories, with 51 cases spanning 774,346.40 hectares and affecting 12,228 families. Lastly, the areas used for fishing and aquaculture recorded 12 cases covering 12,907.60 hectares and impacting 287 families.

Special attention needs to be given to Indigenous Territories impacted by agrarian conflicts. Although the number of cases is not as high as those involving peasants, the total area affected is more than double that of agricultural land conflicts. This can be attributed to two main factors. First, Indigenous Territories in various parts of Indonesia are vast in terms of landscape. Second, much of these areas consist of agricultural and communal farming lands. Culturally, Indigenous communities in Indonesia rely heavily on farming and agricultural cultivation. This suggests that the total area of agricultural land affected by agrarian conflicts throughout 2024 could be said to approach nearly one million hectares.

On the policy front, the government has increasingly leaned toward cutting subsidies and benefits for peasants and fishermen. Policies such as the Farmer Card, Fisherman Card, Fertilizer Distribution Zoning, Fishing Zones, restrictions on self-supplied seeds, and increased tax burdens have all brought hardship to peasants in Indonesia. For example, the Farmer Card, which was intended to facilitate and guarantee farmers' access to subsidized fertilizer, has instead become a business opportunity for fertilizer cartels and rent-seeking bureaucrats, leading to fertilizer shortages due to monopolization by capitalists. Similarly, the fishing zone policy has disadvantaged small-scale fishers, as it tends to favour large vessels due to the zoning regulations.

Meanwhile, even though the Law on Peasant Protection and Empowerment (UU Perlintan) has been enacted, peasants' freedom to organize without being streamlined into formal peasant groups (poktan/gapoktan) continues to be violated. Agricultural and food programs still discriminate against independent peasant unions. Additionally, the institutionalization and recognition of Indigenous Peoples, which has been championed through regional

customary laws (perda adat), following Constitutional Court Ruling No. 35 (MK 35), have not significantly improved. This ruling has yet to make it easier for Indigenous Peoples and their territories to gain official recognition.

B. The Accumulation of Smoldering Conflicts Sparks Escalation

Throughout 2024, KPA recorded that the outbreaks of agrarian conflicts were primarily the resurgence of old conflicts reignited by unilateral actions of the government, business entities (both private and state-owned), and even security forces. In addition to the conflicts re-emerging, these incidents also resulted in casualties.

> **Special attention must be given to the Land Bank Agency and the Authority Bodies, which have emerged in recent years as new actors driving agrarian conflicts.**

Out of the 295 agrarian conflict cases, most were either conflicts that had persisted over the past decade or new cases that arose during the Jokowi administration. The remainder comprised older (latent or manifest) agrarian conflicts that had persisted for decades but remained unresolved. These conflicts were triggered by public protests against unresolved disputes, unilateral actions by corporations or government agencies/institutions, or the emergence of new actors and/or new regulations that transformed latent agrarian conflicts into manifest ones, causing them to resurface explosively.




Figure 19. Duration of Agrarian Conflicts that Erupted in 2024

The escalation of agrarian conflicts throughout 2024, which continues to rise, underscores why the government must urgently prioritize resolving agrarian disputes. This is a demand consistently voiced and pushed by the agrarian reform movement across various regimes, at least since the New Order era, which saw a surge in agrarian conflicts due to the aggressive drive for development and investment at the time.

Long-standing agrarian conflicts, if left unresolved, will accumulate and mutate into increasingly complex disputes, claiming more victims. According to KPA's analysis, the absence of mechanisms to address these decades-long conflicts has led to several prolonged impacts:

First, allowing these conflicts to persist will make the root causes increasingly difficult to untangle, with victims becoming more widespread as the cases intertwine with emerging new policies and actors. Meanwhile, Indonesian agrarian law emphasizes the importance of land tenure history. Agrarian conflicts lasting over 20 years risk losing the first generation of involved parties, both victims and government representatives, making it likely that the parties will lack historical context. In this scenario, agrarian conflicts become an inherited issue. Many younger generations are forced to grow up in conflict zones, reaching adulthood under such conditions, perpetuating these disputes across generations to their descendants.

Second, chronic agrarian conflicts, if left unresolved without proper resolution channels, can mutate into other forms of social conflicts. These may include ethnic or religious conflicts, disputes between local residents and newcomers, conflicts between peasants or indigenous communities and workers, political conflicts (stigmatization/communist sentiments), and others.

Third, the neglect of conflicts will become a breeding ground for agrarian collusion and corruption between officials and private parties, as well as fertile ground for land mafia networks. The more "opaque" a case becomes, the greater the potential for land grabbing as part of capital accumulation. Large-scale lands with their statuses seemingly left unresolved by the government become opportunities for political and business interests to exploit, further worsening the situation and harming the people.

Fourth, the economic and political independence of the people will decline due to the shrinking availability of land and living space as the basis of production for meeting their essential needs, especially food, as well as access to education and healthcare.

"Philosophically, public interest is understood as, "The public interest is the interest of the nation, state, and society, which must be realized by the government and utilized to the greatest extent for the welfare of the people".

Fifth, unresolved agrarian conflicts in rural areas will lead to issues of urbanization, migration, and poverty. The uncertainty of community rights will push people to migrate "en masse" to new areas, large cities, or even abroad. Former peasants in villages will turn into informal workers, low-wage labourers, urban poor, and migrant workers. The loss of land, assets, access to education, access to food sources, homes, and other agrarian resources due to land grabbing and unresolved agrarian conflicts will significantly harm the communities affected.

Sixth, the neglect of the conflict situations faced by communities will gradually erode public trust in the government, ultimately diminishing their sense of belonging to Indonesia and their nationalism. Many victims of conflicts eventually choose to resist the system and engage in reclaiming (independently taking back their rights), as the state has failed to uphold the constitutional rights of the people.

> **"The government's response and approach to addressing agrarian conflicts throughout 2024 have not changed from previous years. It often involves the mobilization of authorities and repressive actions. It is not uncommon for authorities to arbitrarily arrest peasants, indigenous people, and activists defending their land rights.**

C. Actors Behind the Conflict: Dominance of the Private Sector and New Faces of Land Grabbing

Throughout 2024, the operations of private business entities have been the main cause of the increasing outbreaks of agrarian conflicts. The presence and activities of large-scale private enterprises have caused 181 agrarian conflict outbreaks, covering an area of 788,614.37 hectares and affecting 39,549 households.

Next, the parties most frequently involved in conflicts with communities are state-owned enterprises (SOEs), especially PTPN (state plantation companies) and Perhutani (state forestry companies). The operations of these two SOEs have caused at least 46 conflicts, covering 14,994.10 hectares and impacting 10,631 households.

The government, particularly local governments, has been involved in 42 conflicts with communities, covering an area of 1,514.56 hectares and affecting 5,771 households. Typically, these conflicts arise from unilateral claims over land or government programs imposed on settlements and agricultural lands belonging to communities.

Additionally, authority bodies have been involved in 14 conflicts with communities, covering 271,499.44 hectares and affecting 10,715 households. Following them is the Land Bank Agency, with 7 conflict outbreaks over 35,724 hectares and impacting 570 households. Lastly, the military (TNI) is implicated in 5 conflict cases, involving an area of 1,231 hectares and affecting 200 households.




Figure 20. Actors Causing Eruptions of Agrarian Conflict in 2024

Special attention should be given to the Land Bank Agency and Authority Bodies, which have emerged in recent years as new actors contributing to agrarian conflicts. The enthusiasm for creating special authoritative bodies to implement national strategic projects has exacerbated the escalation of agrarian conflicts in various regions. These bodies have been granted full authority, from determining locations, land acquisition, and measurement, to distributing land allocations and collaborating with third parties.

Frequently, these new agencies unilaterally acquire people's land. Their operations on the ground have become obstacles to the implementation of agrarian reform. Cases such as BP Batam in Rempang; the Land Bank Agency in Cianjur, Sigi, and North Luwuk; and the Authority Bodies of the New Capital City (IKN), Lake Toba, Komodo Island, and most recently, the Food Estate Authority Body in North Sumatra, are examples. Interestingly, the establishment of the North Sumatra Authority Body was signed by President Jokowi just two days before he left office.

On the other hand, private enterprises are also predicted to trigger even wider agrarian conflicts. This year, the government has provided the "National Strategic Project (PSN)" cover for projects heavily influenced by private interests to be included in the PSN list, such as the Bumi Serpong Damai (BSD) and Pantai Indah Kapuk 2 (PIK 2) projects. Looking further back, there was the Lido project led by the MNC Group.

Over time, PSN, which was initially claimed to prioritize national interests and be of strategic importance, has increasingly transformed into an arena for economic and political power-sharing among business and political elites. The mechanisms for determining, evaluating, and ensuring accountability for PSN have become increasingly unclear and rife with abuse of power. The development of PSN has caused numerous negative impacts on communities, such as putting them in vulnerable positions and stripping them of their basic rights due to PSN location designations, land acquisition, and construction.

Affected communities, often without consent, are forced to relinquish their land rights or accept so-called "anti-loss" compensation schemes—frequently twisted into "profit-sharing"

schemes to appear beneficial to the public. This ultimately severs their legal ties to the land they occupy. Furthermore, many individuals who refuse to relinquish their land have ended up imprisoned, subjected to violence and/or intimidation, and stigmatized as anti-development.

D. Agrarian Corruption in the Heat of Agrarian Conflicts

Monitoring and analysis conducted by KPA throughout this year have uncovered patterns of corruption, collusion, and manipulation behind ongoing agrarian conflicts. These corrupt practices manifest in the form of land mafia operations, maladministration, systemic and structured neglect of abandoned lands, land swaps, deforestation, land buying and selling, and illegal mining operations. Ultimately, the people become the victims of these corrupt practices.

> **The results of monitoring and analysis conducted by KPA throughout this year reveal patterns of corruption, collusion, and manipulation underlying the agrarian conflicts that have occurred.**

KPA identified 108 cases stemming from illegal practices by business entities, both private and state-owned. Meanwhile, 21 cases involved land mafia activities, and the remaining 23 cases were due to prolonged neglect of lands abandoned by companies. This neglect often becomes a modus operandi for entrepreneurs to secure funding from banks by using Land-Use permit (HGU) or Land-Building license (HGB) as collateral.




Figure 21. Types of Corruption Crimes Behind the Eruptions of Agrarian Conflict in 2024

Corruption in the agrarian sector involves various modus operandi, often implicating government officials, entrepreneurs, and individuals with political and economic power. Numerous examples of unresolved agrarian corruption cases handled by Indonesia's Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) indicate that the country's anti-corruption system remains primitive and stagnant since its establishment in 2002. The KPK has overlooked

the networks connecting business actors (corruptors) and government officials who collaborate for mutual benefit in agrarian conflict cases.

This process is often referred to as "state capture," where policymakers are influenced by personal or corporate interests to facilitate land monopolization and the exploitation of other agrarian resources. The corruption cases that are tackled primarily revolve around bribery, gratuities, and project overpricing within ministries, without targeting higher-level mafias and corruptors. This collaboration perpetuates structural corruption, causing long-term harm to society.

On the occasion of National Peasants Day 2024, KPA released findings on agrarian corruption practices in Indonesia, identifying at least four patterns and modus operandi:

1. **Forest Designation Corruption by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK):** Officials designate forest areas without obtaining the consent of local communities to expedite the issuance of forestry business permits for entrepreneurs. This unilateral action enables the Minister of Environment and Forestry to collect taxes and other revenues without compensating peasants for their lands. This practice disregards the social, environmental, and economic damages incurred by affected communities.

2. **Corruption by the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (ATR/BPN):** This involves allowing illegal oil palm businesses to continue operations. Despite government regulations requiring companies to possess land use rights (HGU), only 10.13 million hectares of the 25 million hectares of oil palm plantations controlled by entrepreneurs have valid HGUs, according to Sawit Watch (2024). Oddly, ATR/BPN's official HGU records only account for 10.13 million hectares.

3. **Corruption in Land Acquisition for Public Use and National Strategic Projects (PSN):** The Land Acquisition Committee, local governments, the Ministry of Public Works and Public Housing (PUPR), ATR/BPN, and the judiciary manipulate land condition data, inflate land sizes, increase the number of compensation recipients, and reduce compensation payments.

4. **Corruption by the Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources (ESDM) and Investment Ministry:** This includes granting amnesty to illegal mining, oil palm, and timber businesses in forest areas.

One case arising from the abuse of public authority (maladministration) is the conflict between PT Bumi Pari Asri and PT Bumi Griya Nusa, both subsidiaries of PT Bumi Raya Utama Group, which are in conflict with residents on Pari Island, Kepulauan Seribu Regency, Jakarta.

The company claimed ownership of 62 Land Ownership Certificates (SHM) and 14 Building Rights Certificates (HGB). This maladministration was documented in the Final Examination Report (LAHP) of the Ombudsman Representative Office in Jakarta, Number 0314/LM/IV/2017/JKT, dated April 9, 2018. The LAHP stated findings of procedural deviations, abuse of authority, and neglect of legal obligations by the North Jakarta Land Office.

On Wawonii Island, Konawe Kepulauan Regency, Southeast Sulawesi, PT Gema Kreasi Perdana (GKP) has conducted illegal operations for the past seven years. The conflict escalated until the Supreme Court eventually granted the cassation appeal of Wawonii Island residents.

In 2014, the court ruled that the Decree of the Minister of Forestry Number SK.576/Menhut-II/2014, dated June 18, 2014, concerning the Forest Area Borrow-Use Permit (IPPKH) for Nickel Ore Production Operations and its Supporting Facilities in Limited Production Forests and Convertible Production Forests on behalf of PT GKP (Gema Kreasi Perdana) in Konawe, Southeast Sulawesi, covering 707.10 hectares, was **null and void**. The court also obligated the defendant, the Minister of Forestry, to revoke the IPPKH. PT GKP did not comply with the court decision and continued its illegal mining activities.

This illegal operation issue is not limited to private companies. State plantation companies also engage in similar practices. One such case involves PTPN IV (formerly PTPN III). A conflict erupted as PTPN IV persisted in claiming former land use rights (HGU), even though its validity had expired in 2004. The land has since been reclaimed and cultivated by the residents of Gurilla Subdistrict, Pematang Siantar City.

The expiration of the company's HGU was confirmed through a letter from BPN RI No. 3000-310.3-D dated September 19, 2007, stating that PTPN III's HGU had not been extended. Moreover, in 2004, there was a Mayor's Decree in Pematang Siantar and a request to the North Sumatra Regional Office to not renew PTPN III's HGU.

III.2. The Portrait of Agrarian Conflicts During a Decade of Jokowi's Administration

A. Decade of Harvesting Agrarian Conflicts

Over the past decade, our country has effectively "harvested" agrarian conflicts. This conclusion is fitting to describe the agrarian situation during Jokowi's 10 years of leadership. Throughout his tenure, Jokowi set a record as the President who presided over the highest number of agrarian conflict eruptions in Indonesia's history.

From 2015 to 2024, at least 3,234 agrarian conflict explosions occurred, spanning 7,422,838.47 hectares and affecting 1,826,744 families. The plantation sector emerged as the leading cause of these conflicts, followed by property businesses, infrastructure projects, mining, forestry, agriculture-agribusiness, projects in coastal areas and small islands, and military facility developments.



Over the past decade, our country has successfully "harvested" agrarian conflicts. This conclusion is fitting to describe the agrarian situation that has occurred during Jokowi's 10 years of leadership.




Figure 22. Number of Agrarian Conflict Eruptions During Jokowi's Administration (2015-2024)

Jokowi's policy approach has consistently favoured business groups. This is evident from the various government measures to enact laws and regulations that greatly facilitate land acquisition for business groups, particularly agrarian and natural resource-based companies such as plantations, forestry, mining, and National Strategic Projects (PSN). Such liberal and capitalistic economic orientation inevitably leads to increasingly widespread agrarian conflicts in Indonesia.

Amid the growing accumulation of agrarian conflicts with no resolution channels, the state continues to pressure people to relinquish their land. These land-grabbing practices are often justified by claims that the communities lack legal ownership over the land.

In many cases, the state imposes a narrow legalistic perspective on land rights for citizens, categorizing those unable to prove formal legal ownership as illegal occupants. This approach disregards the perspective of fulfilling and restoring rights that have been neglected due to the state's failure to meet its responsibilities. Since 1960, the government has failed to register the people's lands as mandated by the Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA).

This situation is deeply concerning, as Jokowi initially proclaimed his administration would implement agrarian reform and avoid land-grabbing practices in the name of investment and development. However, reality has shown these promises to be far from fulfilled.

> **The common thread that can be drawn from the agrarian conflicts throughout 2024 is rooted in two main pillars of the Jokowi administration's policies during the past two terms: extractive business practices reliant on the plantation and mining industries, and development projects labelled as National Strategic Projects (PSN).**

In addition to the worsening situation on the ground, Jokowi's administration has continuously employed legal and political manoeuvres to create an illusion of lawfulness while forcefully seizing people's land. A growing number of legal regulations now aim to facilitate these practices.

Starting with the Job Creation Law (UU Cipta Kerja), various derivative regulations have emerged, further marginalizing communities and vulnerable groups such as peasants, fisherfolks, and indigenous peoples, leaving them with little bargaining power. Notable examples include Government Regulation (PP) No. 42/2021 on the Facilitation of National Strategic Projects, PP No. 64/2021 on the Land Bank, PP No. 19/2021 on Land Procurement (a revision of Law No. 2/2012 on Land Procurement for Public Interest Development), and PP No. 18/2021 on Management Rights. This includes revisions to the Mining Law (UU Minerba), which significantly simplify the exploration and exploitation of natural resources by mining companies.

When development and investment policies requiring vast amounts of land and natural resources are implemented without first carrying out agrarian reform, the result is a widening gap in agrarian inequality and deepening poverty.

B. Main Triggers of Agrarian Conflicts

The underlying cause of agrarian conflicts throughout 2024 can be traced to two central pillars of Jokowi's administration during his two terms in office: extractive businesses relying on plantation and mining industries, and development projects labelled as National Strategic Projects (PSN). These triggers are deeply intertwined with forestry issues, as the lands in question often come from the confiscation of community land or are sourced from conservation forests that should have remained untouched.

The dominance of agrarian conflicts stemming from these three sectors has defined Jokowi’s administration over the past decade. From 2015 to 2024, these sectors—especially plantations and infrastructure development—have consistently been the largest contributors to agrarian conflicts in Indonesia each year.

1. The Plantation Industry

The plantation sector requires a complete overhaul as it is rife with agrarian corruption. Plantations have been the leading contributor to agrarian conflicts throughout Jokowi's administration. The high levels of conflict in this sector are largely driven by the palm oil industry, managed by both private corporations and state-owned enterprises.



Figure 23. Eruptions of Agrarian Conflicts Due to the Plantation Industry During a Decade of Jokowi's Administration

Year	Number of Conflicts	Extensive (Ha)	Victims (KK)	Affected Village	Victims of Violence							
					Killed		Shot		Criminalization		Abused	
					L	P	L	P	L	P	L	P
2017	-	95,565.27	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
2018	83	132,926.66	23,547	-	1	-	-	-	23	-	15	2
2019	69	188,764.06	17,295	69	2	-	-	-	43	4	5	0
2020	35	59,439.06	7,982	47	2	-	-	-	12	-	2	-
2021	58	254,956.06	20,272	118	-	-	2	-	84	-	3	-
2022	80	347,998	96,609	184	1	-	2	-	131	4	8	8
2023	88	103,113	29,486	115	3	-	1	-	228	2	37	9
Total	**413**	**1.087.196,85**	**195.191**	**533**	**9**	**0**	**5**	**0**	**521**	**10**	**70**	**19**

Table 1. "Eruptions of agrarian conflicts and violence in oil palm plantation areas from 2018-2024"*
*) In 2017, KPA only recorded the extent of agrarian conflicts in oil palm plantations.



2. National Strategic Projects (PSN)

Infrastructure development, particularly through National Strategic Projects (PSN), has been a key driver of the surge in agrarian conflicts, especially during Jokowi's second term. Mining businesses, which have long been associated with agrarian conflicts and environmental destruction, were integrated into these ambitious projects. Beginning with amendments to the Mineral and Coal Mining Law (UU Minerba) and the enactment of the Job Creation Law (UU Cipta Kerja), mining businesses gained special privileges under the PSN banner. To justify the urgency of these projects, the government employed the narrative of Indonesia's energy transformation toward renewable energy. However, since 2021, the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) has mockingly referred to PSN as "National Scale Evictions," highlighting the escalation of agrarian conflicts caused by these projects, which undermined their stated goal of boosting economic growth through infrastructure development.

"Since 2021, KPA has labelled PSN as "National-Scale Evictions." This critique refers to the escalating agrarian conflicts caused by these projects, which, instead of boosting economic growth through infrastructure development, have led to widespread displacement.

The government leveraged post-pandemic economic recovery as a momentum to accelerate both the PSN and mining sectors, arguing that they were key to revitalizing Indonesia's economy after the devastation of the global pandemic-induced crisis of 2020–2021. Ironically, it was the agricultural sector, not infrastructure or mining, that sustained Indonesia's economy during the crisis, preventing it from falling into a deeper economic pit.



Figure 24. Agrarian Conflicts Due to Infrastructure Development During a Decade of Jokowi's Administration

PSN is the government's mantra for lifting Indonesia's economy out of stagnation. However, this comes at a high cost: rampant evictions and worsening agrarian conflicts, as PSN eradicates livelihoods across various regions.

In mid-2021, Airlangga Hartarto, then Coordinating Minister for Economic Affairs, claimed that accelerating PSN would create 11 million jobs. But the pressing question remains: what kind of jobs are actually available to people amid the surge in development? On the ground, PSN has become a new tool for land grabbing, stripping communities of their homes, livelihoods, and means of sustenance.

Between 2020 and 2024 alone, PSN caused 154 agrarian conflicts, affecting one million hectares and displacing 103,000 families. This troubling reality highlights how the implementation of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation undermines the nation's agrarian

constitution. Economically, socially, culturally, and politically, PSN have caused widespread harm.

Indonesian law has meticulously outlined precautionary principles for land acquisition in infrastructure development. Article 19(1) of Law No. 2 of 2012 on Land Acquisition for Public Interest Development clearly states: *"Public consultation on development plans shall be conducted* ***to gain agreement on the location*** *of the development plan* ***from the community."*** *Only after such an agreement can land rights be relinquished through deliberations on compensation, as stipulated in Article 37(1): "The National Land Agency (BPN)/Land Acquisition Committee shall* ***conduct deliberations with the community*** *to agree upon and determine the form and/or amount of compensation."*

The revocation of property rights for public interest, with equitable compensation, is also regulated under Article 37 of Law No. 39 of 1999 on Human Rights. Additional guarantees for land rights protection are provided by the Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA) and Law No. 11 of 2005, which ratifies the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights. Even the 1945 Constitution, in its Articles 18B(2) and 33(3), ensures that indigenous communities can own and control their customary rights, with the government obligated to guarantee their fulfilment, respect, and protection.

Philosophically, public interest is defined as: *"The public interest represents the interests of the nation, state, and society that must be realized by the government and utilized for the greatest welfare of the people."*

Therefore, policies under the banner of public interest must meet the following criteria: (1) Fulfil the needs of the people; (2) Improve public welfare; (3) Serve the public good; and (4) Be non-profit-driven. If these criteria are not met, it is unjustifiable for the business interests of political elites, government officials, or corporations to be labelled as serving the public interest.

In November 2024, the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA), alongside the Front of People Against PSN coalition, issued the "East Pejaten Resolution," outlining five fundamental issues with PSN:

1. PSN has become a new tool for land grabbing, expropriating indigenous territories and fishing grounds across the nation.
2. PSN has triggered agrarian, social, economic, and environmental crises that have far-reaching and critical impacts.
3. PSN has destroyed livelihoods, food sources, and people's means of sustenance, exacerbating systemic, structural, and widespread poverty.
4. PSN has been implemented in some regions through repressive, intimidating, manipulative, and corrupt practices, sidelining meaningful and transparent public participation.
5. PSN has, in several cases, mobilized state funds to serve the interests of business groups.




Figure 25. Eruptions of Agrarian Conflicts Due to National Strategic Projects (PSN) 2020-2024

The escalation of agrarian conflicts related to mining has continued to rise during Jokowi's second term, particularly after the revision of the Mining Law (UU Minerba). One of its most crucial changes was the removal of the rights of affected communities to reject mining projects, leaving them vulnerable to forced industrial expansion. Additionally, many mining projects have been reclassified as National Strategic Projects (PSN), granting them preferential treatment in the permitting process. These developments have been framed under the narrative of renewable energy, with the nickel industry positioned as a key pillar.

At the surface level, the nickel industry appears to align with Indonesia's ambition to build a clean energy sector, drawing global stakeholders' attention. However, what does its implementation look like on the ground? Findings from the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) reveal that the nickel industry is no cleaner than other extractive industries. It has led to forced evictions, environmental destruction, and the perpetuation of exploitative labour practices akin to modern slavery.

Furthermore, KPA's monitoring throughout 2024 confirms that, despite the push for renewable energy, the government continues to prioritize the coal industry. Numerous agrarian conflicts have stemmed from coal mining operations, proving that the government remains heavily invested in the sector despite its environmental and social consequences.




Figure 26. Escalation of Agrarian Conflicts in Mining after the Revision of the Minerba and PSN Law

C. Repression: The State's Approach to Handling Agrarian Conflicts

Mass summons and arbitrary arrests of citizens by security forces have become a defining characteristic of Jokowi's administration in responding to agrarian conflicts across various regions. There is no principle of prioritizing justice or focusing on restoring the rights of victims. Worse, the mobilization of security forces—equipped with batons and firearms—is always directed at the people.

> **Mass summons and arbitrary arrests of citizens by security forces have become a defining characteristic of Jokowi's administration in responding to agrarian conflicts across various regions.**

The change of presidents, ministers, and even leaders of the police and military institutions has not guaranteed any shift in the government's approach to handling agrarian conflicts. The model remains the same—repressive and intimidating. During Jokowi's administration, at least 2,841 cases of criminalization, 1,054 cases of assault, 88 shootings, and 79 deaths have been recorded.




Figure 27. Cases of Violence and Criminalization During Jokowi's Administration (2015-2024)

This series of violent incidents has left deep scars on the victims, not only causing lasting trauma but also forcing many to endure the loss of family members who lost their lives in clashes between residents, security forces, and corporations. Throughout Jokowi's administration, agrarian conflicts have claimed lives every year. This reality underscores the lack of genuine evaluation by the President regarding his administration's actions. The lives of ordinary citizens are treated as expendable, deemed less valuable than the business and investment interests of the elite.




Figure 28. Fatalities of Agrarian Conflicts During a Decade of Jokowi's Administration

A special note must be directed at the police force. During Jokowi's second term (2020–2024), the trend of violence and criminalization by law enforcement has continued to rise. Despite the series of cases involving police brutality and civilian casualties, the Bhayangkara institution has failed to reform itself. On the ground, the public witnesses an increasing tendency for the police to take unilateral actions, often resulting in harm and suffering for the people. It is imperative for President Prabowo to conduct a fundamental and extensive evaluation of the police institution. If left unchecked, it is the lives of the people that will remain at stake.




Figure 29. Police Involvement in Cases of Violence in Conflict Areas (2020-2024)

3. The First 100 Days of the Prabowo Administration

During Jokowi's ten years in power, the government failed to address land ownership disparities and agrarian conflicts. Many people were left disillusioned, having witnessed widespread land dispossession affecting communities across the country.

With the official inauguration of President Prabowo and Vice President Gibran, their administration faces a major challenge: how to resolve land inequality and ongoing agrarian conflicts. A new sense of hope has emerged for the incoming government, particularly in the context of conflict resolution and the implementation of agrarian reform.

Unfortunately, despite the administration still being in its infancy, agrarian conflicts persist. According to monitoring by the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA), within the first three

months of the Prabowo-Gibran administration—between October 2024 and January 2025—at least 63 agrarian conflicts erupted.

Meanwhile, Prabowo has repeatedly expressed his commitment to pro-people policies driven by nationalism. His key programs include food self-sufficiency, energy independence, poverty alleviation, and the construction of three million homes for the people.

The public eagerly awaits how these policies will unfold. However, while hope is justified, people should also remain cautious. Reflecting on the past, Jokowi made numerous populist promises, only for them to result in failure and deep disappointment among peasants across the country. The question remains: will the new administration prioritize resolving agrarian conflicts and redistributing land under Prabowo's leadership?

Before making further predictions, the first three months serve as an initial benchmark to gauge the administration's direction and its level of seriousness in addressing the structural agrarian issues inherited from Jokowi and previous presidents. What breakthrough policies will this new government introduce?

So far, KPA's findings indicate that agrarian conflicts have not subsided during Prabowo's first three months in office. The 63 recorded conflicts have affected a total of 66,082.19 hectares of land, impacting 10,075 families.

Explosion of Agrarian Conflict	Luas (Ha)	Korban (KK)
63	**66.082,19**	**10.075**

Table 2. Agrarian Conflict Eruptions in the First 100 Days of Prabowo-Gibran Administration

On one hand, it would be unfair to place the full responsibility for these agrarian conflicts on President Prabowo, who has only recently taken the leadership of the government. These conflicts are the result of policies implemented during previous administrations. However, such escalations could have been prevented if Prabowo had issued clear instructions to all relevant parties—particularly government agencies, security forces, corporations, and authorities—to exercise restraint and maintain stability on the ground. Unfortunately, judging by the developments of the first 100 days, this has not been the case.

On the other hand, KPA has found that several agrarian conflicts during Prabowo's first 100 days were triggered by his own priority programs, particularly those related to food self-sufficiency and food security. One such case is the eviction of peasants in Sahbandar Village, Kertajati District, West Java.

In the Kertajati case, PT Sindangkasih Multi Usaha (SMU), a regional government-owned enterprise in Majalengka, was responsible for the eviction. The company collaborated with PT Garuda Indofood, leading to a situation where 250 families, who had been cultivating 399.98 hectares of land, now face displacement.

The companies claimed that they had obtained authorization from Perum Perhutani, the state forestry company, and planned to use the land for peanut and corn cultivation to support Prabowo's food security program. However, this has only worsened the situation for the 250 farming households in the area.

Meanwhile, in Merauke, Papua, the ancestral lands of the Malind, Maklew, Khimaima, and Yei indigenous communities—spread across the districts of Ilwayab, Ngguti, Tubang, Malind, Eligobel, Kimaam, and Okaba—have been targeted for the Merauke Food Estate project. As part of the National Strategic Projects (PSN), this initiative aims to transform over 2 million hectares into food and energy production zones, including new rice fields, sugarcane plantations, and a bioethanol factory.

Ultimately, these agrarian conflicts have erupted as a direct consequence of efforts to advance food and energy self-sufficiency under the Prabowo administration.



CHAPTER IV
EASE OF LAND GRABBING





Research and analysis conducted by KPA indicate that the Omnibus Law (UU Cipta Kerja) primarily serves the interests of corporations and business projects.



IV.1 The Job Creation Law: The Root of the Problem

Agrarian conflicts are largely driven by government policies designed to facilitate development projects by both the state and private sector, often requiring vast amounts of land and natural resources. This is why KPA defines these disputes as structural agrarian conflicts, where the involvement of government and private entities leads to widespread social, political, and economic repercussions—while simultaneously marginalizing local communities.

One of the key policies that has directly contributed to agrarian conflicts in the past five years is the Job Creation Law, also referred to as the Omnibus Law (UU Cipta Kerja, UUCK). The law prioritizes private sector interests in profit accumulation over expanding economic opportunities for the people, making land dispossession easier.

> **”**
>
> **The policy that has directly contributed to agrarian conflicts over the past five years is the Job Creation Law (Omnibus Law).**

Among the thousands of provisions in the Job Creation Law, there are virtually no regulations that protect peasants, fisherfolks, indigenous peoples, or women in securing land ownership or access to land-based enterprises. Instead, the law is heavily skewed toward facilitating business licensing, land acquisition, forest area designation, and the planning and implementation of National Strategic Projects (PSN).

Below is a general overview of how the Job Creation Law has negatively impacted various agrarian sectors, including agriculture, plantations, forestry, spatial planning, coastal and marine areas, energy, and the environment—all under the pretext of promoting investment.

Even the initial goal of the Omnibus Law—to resolve overlapping regulations (regulatory disharmony) and improve the business climate—has not been fully achieved. The implementing regulations derived from the Job Creation Law, such as Government Regulations (PP) and Presidential Regulations (Perpres) (*see Figures 32 and 33: Post-Job Creation Law Regulations)*, still contain overlapping and contradictory provisions that continue to create legal uncertainty.





Figure 30. Articles in the Omnibus Law (UU Cipta Kerja) that Facilitate Land Grabbing

This has greatly harmed the wider community, as several provisions in the Job Creation Law (UU Cipta Kerja)—which serve as the basis for land grabbing while also obstructing Agrarian Reform—were swiftly enacted. Some of these include:

A. Land Bank and Strengthening of Management Rights (HPL)

The establishment of the Land Bank Agency (BBT), as regulated under the Job Creation Law, originated from the 2015-2019 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) as an alternative means of land provision for infrastructure development. It was later incorporated into the Job Creation Law, specifically in Article 125, which states that he Land Bank is a "special agency" that manages land, with its assets being separated from state wealth. Its functions include planning, acquisition, procurement, management, utilization, and distribution of land.

> **"The presence of the Land Bank Agency (BBT) not only reduces the availability of land for agrarian reform but has also triggered conflicts.**

The Land Bank Agency (BBT) is also linked to agrarian reform, as one of its stated objectives in Article 126, Paragraph (1) of the Job Creation Law is to allocate 30% of state land under its control for agrarian reform. However, this 30% allocation for agrarian reform contradicts the fundamental purpose of land acquisition by the BBT, which primarily consists of abandoned land—land that should fully serve as an object of agrarian reform.

The presence of the Land Bank Agency not only limits the availability of land for agrarian reform but has also triggered conflicts. The Land Bank Agency is unilaterally granted authority to plan and manage these lands, many of which have long been cultivated and occupied by local communities. Additionally, in terms of land use, the Land Bank Agency facilitates conflicts between businesses, individual investors, and local residents, as these lands can be offered for new economic ventures under the agency's control.

Further conflicts arise due to the restrictions imposed on people's rights within the agrarian reform framework dictated by the Land Bank Agency. The agency treats all the land it acquires as automatically falling under its Right of Management (HPL). Consequently, agrarian reform beneficiaries only receive land because the Land Bank Agency has chosen to grant them usage rights, not full ownership. This means that the people are only given the Right of Use (Hak Pakai), rather than full ownership rights (Hak Milik).

The Land Bank Agency and the government argue that land recipients will be granted full ownership after 10 years, provided they prove they have productively managed the land. However, this 10-year period is calculated only after the land has been formally granted under the Right of Use by the Land Bank Agency —completely ignoring the fact that many villages and farming communities had already cultivated the land for years, long before the Land Bank Agency claimed it under its Right of Management (HPL).

The Land Bank's version of agrarian reform is clearly disadvantageous and discriminatory. Under regular agrarian reform mechanisms (outside the Land Bank Agency's control),

communities receive full ownership rights from the outset, albeit with a restriction on selling the land for at least 10 years.

Beyond the Land Bank Agency, the Job Creation Law (UUCK) also redefines the status of the Right of Management (HPL). Previously, HPL functioned as a regulatory mechanism, but under the UUCK, it has been transformed into a legal “right”. As a result, HPL holders can now use this status as a legal basis to grant land rights to third parties for business activities. The Right to Build (HGB) on HPL has become a preferred legal instrument for investment projects, as most large-scale developments require HGB as their legal foundation.

Additionally, even if an HGB title has not yet expired, it can now be extended and renewed as long as the property obtains a Certificate of Feasibility for Use (SLF). This provision not only contradicts the Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA) but also effectively turns state-controlled land into private property, thereby distorting the state's Right to Control (Hak Menguasai Negara) over public lands.

B. Forestry and Spatial Planning

The Job Creation Law has triggered new agrarian conflicts in forest areas without resolving pre-existing disputes. *First*, it maintains a dual administration system for land (forest and non-forest areas). *Second*, it upholds claims over forest areas based on government designation. *Third*, it accelerates the establishment of forest areas based on state claims. *Fourth*, it simplifies the process for using forest areas for both forestry and non-forestry business purposes. *Fifth*, it facilitates the release of forest areas for business interests and national strategic projects. As a result, the law treats forests primarily as business assets, even conservation efforts are viewed through a commercial lens.

> **The Job Creation Law has also triggered new agrarian conflicts in forested areas without resolving pre-existing agrarian conflicts.**

To expedite the establishment of forest areas, the government introduced the concept of "strategic areas" in Article 36, Point 1 of the Job Creation Law, prioritizing them for accelerated forest zoning to maximize investment opportunities.

Additionally, the law eliminates the requirement that at least 30% of a watershed (DAS), island, or provincial administrative area must remain as forest. This change is further compounded by removing the role of the House of Representatives (DPR) in approving the reallocation and repurposing of forest areas, as well as the use of forests for non-forestry developments such as highways, reservoirs, dams, and mining projects.

Regarding spatial planning, the law introduces nine key amendments to Law No. 26 of 2007 on Spatial Planning:

1. Elimination of space utilization permits.
2. Simplification of spatial planning by removing strategic provincial and district areas, as well as rural spatial planning.
3. Centralization of permits and institutional authority.

4. Blurring the connection between the Strategic Environmental Assessment (KLHS) and the Detailed Spatial Plan (RDTR).
5. Resolving spatial overlaps with permits and forest areas using a pragmatic approach (adjustment and even legalization) instead of the precautionary principle.
6. Removing the minimum 30% forest area requirement.
7. Adding a new criterion for reviewing spatial plans within less than five years, namely the presence of "strategic national policy changes."

This new criterion is vague and does not require implementation through formal regulations, unlike other criteria.

8. Reducing public participation, including limiting access to justice.

9. Changing the formulation of criminal sanctions from a formal offense to a material offense, making it harder to prove violations and impose penalties for spatial planning offenses.

C. Food Policy

The Job Creation Law (UUCK) has, in fact, made it easier to import food products. As seen in Figure 30, several provisions within the law have contributed to Indonesia's ongoing struggle to achieve food self-sufficiency. Food and smallholder agricultural areas are not considered matters of public interest or national strategic issues.

> **"The provisions of the UUCK actually facilitate the process of food imports.**

Although the 2019 Sustainable Agricultural Land Protection Law was introduced to control the conversion of paddy fields, particularly those with technical irrigation, to support national food security, agricultural land designated under the Detailed Spatial Plan (RDTR) remains vulnerable to conversion for non-agricultural purposes. If an agricultural area coincides with a proposed project designated as being in the public interest, it may still be repurposed. Amendments to Law No. 41 of 2009 on Sustainable Agricultural Land Protection (UU PLP2B) and Law No. 22 of 2019 on the Sustainable Agricultural Cultivation System (UU SBDPB)—as included in the Job Creation Law—have further facilitated the conversion of agricultural land for development projects.

Evidence that the Job Creation Law primarily benefits food industry cartels, enabling them to flood traditional markets with imported products, is reflected in the staggering volume of food imports, which reached 35.92 million tons between 2020 and 2023 (BPS).




Figure 31. Volume of food imports after the enactment of the Omnibus Law (UU Cipta Kerja)

D. Mining

Article 39, point 1, which adds a new article to the Mining Law (UU Minerba), and Article 39, point 2, which amends Article 162 of the same law, indicate special treatment for mining companies. This special treatment includes a 0% royalty rate for mining businesses. This provision directly contradicts Article 33, paragraph 3 of the 1945 Constitution, as it provides no welfare benefits to the public but instead favours business owners. The article appears to have been deliberately inserted to open investment opportunities for mining entrepreneurs. According to an investigation by Auriga in 2019, at least 376 regional head candidates were found to own shares and hold positions in 931 companies, including mining companies. Additionally, 574 members of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) were found to own various businesses, including mining ventures.

E. Coastal Areas and Small Islands

First, Article 18, point 1 of the Omnibus Law on Job Creation (UU Cipta Kerja) introduces a new definition in Article 1 of the Law on the Management of Coastal Areas and Small Islands. It defines the National Strategic Area Zoning Plan (RZ KSNT) as a plan formulated to determine spatial utilization directives in specific national strategic areas. The addition of this definition broadens the scope of what qualifies as a National Strategic Area, thereby increasing the risk of land and marine resource seizures under the pretext of national strategic development.

Second, Article 18, point 8 repeals Article 12 of the Law on the Management of Coastal Areas and Small Islands, which eliminates the oversight role of fishermen in spatial planning and licensing in coastal areas.

Third Article 18, point 12 introduces Article 16A, which further increases the risk of land dispossession for fishermen, peasants, and Indigenous communities. Under this provision, they may be deemed illegal occupants of their ancestral lands due to a lack of official permits, thereby granting greater flexibility for authorities to confiscate their land.

IV.2 Everyone Can Be Evicted Because of the Job Creation Law

Since its drafting in 2020, the Job Creation Law (UU Cipta Kerja) has faced strong opposition from various civil society movements, including peasants, workers, students, and others. This resistance has taken multiple forms, such as mass protests, policy papers, and critical discussions.

Beyond the issue of hyper-regulation, another major concern is the direct impact of the law on communities. Peasants, workers, fishermen, Indigenous peoples, women, and other marginalized groups—who should be prioritized in national development—are now experiencing its negative consequences. The Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) conducted monitoring of the law's implementation in several regions between February and November 2023.

> **"Apart from being confronted with hyper-regulation, another finding is that communities have begun to feel the impacts of the Job Creation Law. Specifically, this relates to the effects experienced by peasants, labourers, fishermen, indigenous communities, women, and other marginalized groups who should be prioritized in national development.**

The monitoring of the impact of the implementation of the Omnibus was carried out even after the law remained in effect despite the Constitutional Court's ruling No. 91/PUU-XVIII/2020, which required the government and the House of Representatives (DPR) to revise this Law within two years while ensuring meaningful participation from the public. However, the law was still enforced without addressing these concerns.

Several locations were monitored, including Batulawang Village in Pacet District, Cianjur Regency, West Java, where land was claimed as an asset of the Land Bank. In Siabu Village, Salo District, Kampar Regency, Riau, the law was used to legalize illegal palm oil businesses. In Labota Village, Keurea Village, and Bahodopi Village, Bahodopi District, Morowali Regency, Central Sulawesi, the law supported the downstream nickel mining industry under a National Strategic Project (PSN). In Golo Mori Village, Komodo District, West Manggarai Regency, East Nusa Tenggara, it enabled road construction for the Golo Mori Special Economic Zone (KEK). Findings from the monitoring indicate that the Job Creation Law poses significant risks, including obstructing agrarian reform, legalizing illegal businesses, and endangering the livelihoods of 6,158 people or 1,700 families.

For example, in Batulawang Village, Cianjur, which has been claimed as a Land Bank asset, 16,632 people or 4,795 families are at risk of losing their land rights. This area has strong potential for agriculture and tourism, yet local peasants are now threatened with eviction as the Land Bank takes control of former plantation land previously held under a Land Use Right (HGU) permit by PT Maskapai Perkebunan Moelia (MPM).

The Cianjur Land Bank is just one of many Land Bank-managed areas that contradict the principles of agrarian reform. Instead of ensuring equitable land distribution, the Job

Creation Law further consolidates land ownership in the hands of large investors, rather than promoting fair land access for the people.



Figure 32. Distribution of HPL (Land Bank Management Rights) in Indonesia

Another finding from the monitoring indicates that the Job Creation Law also provides an opportunity for the legalization of illegal businesses that have already encroached on forest areas. The monitoring results show that, according to data from the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK) in 2023, approximately 3.3 million hectares of oil palm plantations have encroached on forest areas in Indonesia, which will also affect the implementation of agrarian reform.

> **Another finding from the monitoring shows that the Job Creation Law also provides an opportunity to legalize illegal businesses that have already encroached on forest areas.**




Figure 33. Data on Palm Oil Plantations Located Within Forest Areas

From the image above, 44% of the area consists of limited production forests, 33% is convertible production forests, 15% is permanent production forests, 3% is protected forests, and 3% is conservation forests. These are the total areas of oil palm plantations that the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (KLHK) intends to grant amnesty for illegal businesses within forest areas. This means that companies already operating within forest areas will be legalized simply by paying fines to KLHK.

> **The Job Creation Law instead complicates the regulatory framework.**

The legalization of illegal plantation businesses leads to ongoing conflicts, land inequality, and agrarian injustice; alters traditional farming practices; impoverishes communities; legitimizes corporate environmental crimes and deforestation; and damages ecosystems.

Another finding from the monitoring is the model of land grabbing that results in environmental destruction within the battery industry. PT IMIP, located in three villages in Morowali Regency, Central Sulawesi, is a site for the downstream industrialization of nickel mining under the National Strategic Project (PSN). The monitoring identified several impacts, including labour conflicts between foreign and local workers at one of the nickel mining companies in North Morowali (PT Gunbuster Nickel Industry). Additionally, there are socioeconomic issues such as inadequate housing and poor working conditions, widespread online loan debt among workers and communities, and increasing cases of sexual violence in densely populated villages like Bahodopi in Morowali.

Besides being used to justify projects that cause agrarian conflicts, the Job Creation Law has been claimed as a breakthrough to accelerate national development by facilitating business operations, increasing investment, and simplifying regulations. However, instead of streamlining laws, this law has complicated the regulatory framework. Since its enactment, there have been 1,114 regulations issued in the form of laws, government

regulations in lieu of laws (Perppu), government regulations (PP), and presidential regulations (Perpres), with 237 of them specifically governing agrarian matters, including




Figure 35. Regulations after the Enactment of the Job Creation Law




Figure 34. Sectoral Legislation in the Agrarian Field after the Enactment of the Job Creation Law

plantations, forestry, spatial planning, agriculture, the environment, energy, and investment (KPA, 2024). The table below shows the total number of regulations issued from 2020-2024.

So many regulations during Jokowi's administration until the transition of power to the Prabowo-Gibran administration seem to have been made without public participation, failing to account for the impact of their implementation on the people.

CHAPTER V

IS THERE A PRESIDENT PRABOWO AGRARIAN REFORM COMMAND (?)






Asta Cita emphasizes that the goal of agrarian reform is to increase production across a wide range of agrarian sectors under the umbrella of food self-sufficiency.




V.1 The Agrarian Reform Concept of Prabowo-Gibran


Referring to the *Asta Cita* document, the Agrarian Reform policy is included in the second *Asta Cita* under the Food Self-Sufficiency Program. Specifically, it states: *"Implementing the Agrarian Reform agenda to improve the welfare of peasants in a broad sense while also supporting increased production in the agriculture, plantation, forestry, livestock, fisheries, and marine sectors."*

Within this framework, *Asta Cita* positions agrarian reform as a means to boost production across various agrarian sectors under the umbrella of food self-sufficiency. Furthermore, the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2025-2029 provides a more technical formulation of the Agrarian Reform framework under the "Regional Development and Infrastructure Policy." The translation of *Asta Cita* regarding food and agrarian reform within the RPJMN can be seen in the diagram below.



Source: President Prabowo's 2024 Vision and Mission Document





Source: Presidential Vision-Mission Document and RPJMN Bappenas, 2025

Figure 36. Food and Agrarian Reform in Asta Cita and the 2024-2029 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN)

It is evident that Agrarian Reform in *Asta Cita* is positioned as a fundamental basis for agricultural development. However, in its interpretation by the National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), Agrarian Reform has been reduced and translated merely into a land certification program. In fact, in the 2025-2029 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN), only the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (ATR/BPN) is tasked with implementing Agrarian Reform. This is problematic, as the scope of Agrarian Reform is much broader, encompassing forestry, marine affairs, rural development, agriculture, public works, and many other institutions. As a result, there is a disconnect between *Asta Cita* and the RPJMN in translating the Agrarian Reform agenda.

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It can be observed that Agrarian Reform in Asta Cita is positioned as the foundational basis for agricultural development. However, in its interpretation by Bappenas, Agrarian Reform is once again diminished and translated merely as a land certification program.

Under Prabowo’s administration, the implementation framework for Agrarian Reform by the Ministry of ATR/BPN is directed towards:

(i) land redistribution through the allocation of Land Object of Agrarian Reform (TORA) and land certification, complemented by community land empowerment assistance.
(ii) improving land management through a positive land registration system, digital-based land services, land acquisition for public interest and National Strategic Projects (PSN) under the Land Bank, as well as reliable land valuation.

It appears that the old mindset remains unchanged. The Ministry of ATR/BPN itself has yet to fully grasp the far-reaching implications of its elevation from the National Land Agency (BPN) to the Ministry of ATR/BPN. It continues to function as if it were merely a technical ministry handling land administration. Within this framework, the Agrarian Reform agenda led by the Ministry of ATR/BPN is limited to land redistribution under TORA and land certification. This approach fails to position Agrarian Reform as a strategic agenda aimed at addressing land ownership inequality, resolving conflicts, preventing land monopolies, and ensuring the protection of people's land rights.

Rather than improving the previous Agrarian Reform policies, this perspective actually reflects a lack of reorientation and policy changes under Prabowo's administration. Thus, it can be concluded that the implementation framework for Agrarian Reform will adhere to Presidential Regulation 62/2023 on Accelerating Agrarian Reform and the Government Regulation on the Land Bank Agency.

The Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) criticizes the model of Agrarian Reform formulated by Bappenas, stating that it merely continues the policies of the Jokowi administration. This approach, according to KPA, has distorted and deviated from the true agenda of Agrarian Reform.

These distortions include:

1. Reducing Agrarian Reform to a mere process of land certification and administrative services for those who already own land.
2. Failing to address the inequality in land ownership by restructuring land tenure systems and resolving agrarian conflicts.
3. Neglecting the systematic efforts to redistribute land to the people and improve their welfare.

Moreover, unlike the previous administration, which set a clear target of 9 million hectares for Agrarian Reform, the Prabowo-Gibran administration has not committed to a specific amount of land to be distributed to peasants. This lack of a concrete target represents a regression compared to the prior government's efforts.

V.2 Momentum of Prabowo's Agrarian Reform Command

A. Food Self-Sufficiency Policy

In his inauguration speech, President Prabowo mentioned the word "food" three times and the word "poor" four times, signalling the government's commitment to achieving food self-sufficiency and eradicating poverty. However, the word "peasantr" was mentioned only once, and only in reference to peasants' contributions during wartime as providers of food for independence fighters.

Food self-sufficiency was a flagship program during the New Order era and remains a persistent aspiration of successive governments in the Reformasi era. Governments have seemingly spared no effort to achieve this goal. Over two decades, both the administrations of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) and President Joko Widodo (Jokowi) have been ambitious in pursuing food self-sufficiency under programs centred on food security and sovereignty. However, these efforts have largely ended in failure.

During the SBY and Jokowi administrations, several programs were introduced in pursuit of food self-sufficiency, including: 1. *Massive fertilizer and seed subsidies* aimed at increasing agricultural production. Under Jokowi, these were modified to require the ownership of a Farmer's Card (Kartu Tani). 2. *Stabilizing food supply and prices* through import policies, revitalization of BULOG (the national logistics agency), protection of rice prices, and setting maximum retail prices (HET). 3. *Promoting family-based farming programs***.** 4. *Protecting agricultural land* from conversion or repurposing, although this policy was ultimately undermined by the National Strategic Projects (PSN). 5. *Developing large-scale food estates*, such as the 1.2 million-hectare Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE), which Jokowi continued under the Food Estate program.

Why Did Food Self-Sufficiency Fail Under SBY and Jokowi? According to KPA, the primary reasons for the failure were:

1. **The absence of agrarian reform policies in the food self-sufficiency strategy.** Successive governments failed to address the plight of tens of millions of peasants, farm labourers, and cultivators who either lack land or have only small plots. Approximately 17.24 million peasants own less than 0.5 hectares of agricultural land. Meanwhile, fertile lands have been monopolized and converted into oil palm plantations, timber estates (industrial forests), and mining areas, covering a combined total of 61.99 million hectares (according to data from BPS, BKPM, ESDM, and the Ministry of Forestry in 2024).

2. **The lack of basic agricultural infrastructure development.** Most agricultural lands are subject to land conflicts, with no legal guarantees of land ownership rights. Consequently, supporting infrastructure cannot be developed effectively. For instance, there are 3,324 villages located within forest areas and 39,147 villages bordering forests (BPS-Kemenhut, 2019). Local governments are reluctant to build infrastructure in these areas due to the risk of legal violations, leading to potential findings by auditors (BPK) or law enforcement that result in criminal charges. A notable example is Bulupayung Village in Cilacap, a rice production area in Central Java. Despite its status as a definitive village and a key rice supplier, its land is claimed to be within a forest area, preventing local authorities from constructing agricultural roads and irrigation systems.

3. **The absence of policies ensuring fair prices, access to agricultural technology, expanded market access, and improved supply chain systems for small-scale farmers.** Between 2013 and 2023, at least 2.17 million peasants shifted from food crop production to non-food crops (BPS, 2023). This trend is attributed to the issues mentioned above and a lack of reforms in agricultural policies and market systems. Many peasants have likely transitioned to oil palm cultivation, as government policies favour palm oil expansion. Over the past decade, oil palm plantations have grown significantly. It is difficult for peasants to sustain food crop production when oil palm or rubber is seen as more profitable.

This challenge is compounded by the lack of access to advanced agricultural technology, which remains monopolized by large agribusiness and agricultural companies rather than being accessible to peasants, cooperatives, and peasant organizations.



4. **The Lack of Restrictions on Food Imports and Focus on Domestic Production.** The government should ensure that local peasants and domestic food production are not overshadowed by imported goods. Since both previous Indonesian presidents failed to reform policies and regulate food import players, President SBY had to import 9.37 million tons of rice from 2004 to 2014 (BPS, 2023). This record was eventually surpassed by President Jokowi, who, during his two terms, imported 9.40 million tons of rice (BPS, 2023) along with 50.69 million tons of wheat, soybeans, sugar, vegetables, and fruits (BPS Import Data, 2017–2024). Moreover, the Jokowi administration, in collaboration with the previous DPR RI, revised the Food Law through the Omnibus Law (UU Cipta Kerja), effectively reopening the floodgates for food imports.

From the above points, the current administration has a strong foundation and momentum to pursue agrarian reform as a means to achieve food self-sufficiency. The government should elevate its target to achieving food sovereignty, where agrarian reform serves as the foundation for agricultural and rural development.

B. Poverty Alleviation Policy

In addition to addressing inequality and resolving agrarian conflicts, agrarian reform aims to tackle poverty. Wealth redistribution through land redistribution and restructuring agricultural land holdings (from subsistence to sustainable levels) strengthens agricultural productivity, drives economic surplus, and fosters new markets as the basis for agricultural industrialization. In other words, poverty can be alleviated through agrarian reform, especially by redistributing land and implementing supportive programs—referred to as land reform plus or enhanced land reform within the framework of agrarian reform.

Currently, poverty is heavily concentrated in rural areas, while urban poverty largely stems from rural migration. Many of these urban poor are victims of land grabs or agricultural land conversions in their villages, highlighting the interconnectedness of these issues and the need for a holistic approach to address them.

Data on agrarian conflicts over the past decade demonstrates the failure of the Jokowi administration in addressing poverty. The primary cause is misdiagnosis and the wrong solutions. The root problems include lack of land ownership, fragmentation of smallholder farms, proletarianization of peasants, agrarian conflicts, and discriminatory development policies. However, these problems were addressed with short-term, palliative measures such as cash assistance, subsidized rice (raskin), food staples, subsidy cards, etc., instead of structural reforms and a shift in development paradigms.

As a result, the problems and solutions failed to align, and government programs merely became avenues for distributing business tenders or projects for fertilizer companies, food importers, heavy machinery suppliers, and so on. The data below illustrates the correlation between agrarian conflicts and structural poverty. According to data from KPA (2024) and BPS (2024), in 2024, 15 of the poorest provinces accounted for 82% of national poverty, or 20.64 million people. These same 15 provinces were also the epicentres of agrarian conflicts, with 178 cases recorded, contributing approximately 60.3% of the total conflicts nationwide.



Province	Poverty (million people)
East Java	3.982.690
West Java	3.848.670
Central Java	3.704.330
North Sumatra	1.228.010
East Nusa Tenggara	1.127.570
South Sumatra	984.240
Lampung	941.230
Aceh	804.530
Banten	791.610
South Sulawesi	736.480
West Nusa Tenggara	709.010
Riau	492.250
DKI Jakarta	464.930
DI Yogyakarta	445.550
Central Sulawesi	379.760

Source: National Socio-Economic Survey, BPS 2024

Table 3. 15 Centres of Poverty and Agrarian Conflict in 2024

The initiative to eliminate extreme poverty towards 0% within two years (Asta Cita VII, 2024) has not introduced significant improvements or paradigm shifts in development models. Instead, it mainly continues previous social welfare card programs such as the Indonesia Health Card (KIS), KIS for the Elderly, Indonesia Smart Card, Staple Food Card, Pre-Employment Card, MEKAR (Economic Empowerment for Family Welfare), and the Family Hope Program. The public is well aware of how political elites have exploited these programs for electoral gains and group interests. Other initiatives include credit schemes for farming, livestock, fisheries, plantations, food production, and financial assistance for young entrepreneurs.

The Prabowo-Gibran administration has yet to address the root cause of structural poverty—namely, the lack of land as the primary means of production for peasants, the accumulation of agrarian conflicts in rural areas, and the worsening process of land fragmentation (guremisasi) due to industrial expansion and pro-business development models. If President Prabowo repeats the approaches of his predecessors, achieving Asta

Cita VI will be impossible. Poverty alleviation cannot be resolved through business-as-usual policies and patchwork solutions.

C. Nutritious Free Meals and Food Assistance

The Nutritious Free Meals (MBG) program presents another opportunity to implement Agrarian Reform. If properly managed and directed to support peasants, livestock breeders, and fishermen, MBG could open a vast domestic market for agricultural, livestock, and fishery products. This would also provide an opportunity for local food diversity and wealth to become mainstream dietary staples for Indonesians.

However, the potential of MBG will be lost if the government relies on imported food supplies instead of domestic production. Likewise, if large corporate conglomerates monopolize the MBG program, small-scale farmers, breeders, and fishers will be left as mere spectators, eventually losing their role as food producers.

The concept of free meals for schoolchildren has existed since the 18th century. Japan introduced school lunch programs in 1889, initially offering free meals to underprivileged elementary school students (Historia, 2025). In the U.S., such initiatives began in the early 1930s and were formalized in 1946 with the National School Lunch Act. Interestingly, in the U.S., this program originated from concerns over economic crises and the inability of markets to absorb farmers' produce. With government intervention, agricultural products were purchased and distributed to schools.

In principle, the Nutritious Free Meals (MBG) program is a sound policy, ensuring that the state absorbs agricultural and fishery products, creating an alternative market beyond traditional ones. This provides peasant and fisher organizations with better economic opportunities. Additionally, the Nutritious Free Meals (MBG) program will generate employment in food service and supply chains.

According to the 2025 State Budget (APBN), the government has allocated Rp 71 trillion for the MBG program. However, the National Nutrition Agency has stated that this budget is insufficient to guarantee nutritious meals for 82.9 million children.

The MBG program could address both the food and agrarian crises, but only if President Prabowo has the political will to fix upstream issues—particularly by protecting land rights and safeguarding agricultural zones from land grabs by business and investment interests. If agricultural land continues to shrink, ensuring food supply for 82.9 million children will be impossible. The government must not allow food shortages from local peasants to justify increasing food imports.

This underscores why Agrarian Reform must serve as the foundation for rural and agricultural development to achieve food self-sufficiency. A comprehensive Agrarian Reform will strengthen local food production across all sectors—including farming, livestock, aquaculture, fisheries, and plantations.

Beyond MBG, other food assistance programs include the Non-Cash Food Assistance (BPNT) and 10-Kilogram Rice Aid, later incorporated into the staple food card and rice distribution programs for 16 million families. Among all policies of the current administration, food-related programs will require Rp 139.4 trillion from the 2025 national budget (Ministry of Finance, 2024).

Therefore, BPNT should be integrated with Agrarian Reform to prevent government funds from being wasted on charity-based, short-term solutions. The national budget should be aligned with Agrarian Reform efforts to enhance food production capacity and ensure secure land tenure for millions of peasants, agricultural workers, livestock breeders, and fishers.

If people's welfare improves, dependency on state-funded food programs will decrease, eliminating the need for short-term, charity-based policies.

V.3 Challenges of Agrarian Reform in Prabowo's Food Policy

President Prabowo's strong focus on food security brings hope that it could serve as a gateway for the implementation of agrarian reform. However, this hope could quickly fade, as current government food policies and their implementation in the field do not prioritize peasants.

In many areas, food (security) programs have proven counterproductive to peasants' rights, especially their fundamental right to land. While the president frequently expresses support for economic nationalism and reducing imports, this nationalism does not seem to favour the interests of the people. Instead, it primarily benefits national corporations, particularly state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private companies.

Several indicators highlight these challenges, including the operation of the Land Bank and the Ministry of Agriculture's plan to develop 21 National Strategic Projects (PSN) for dairy farming across 1.5 million hectares (Ministry of Agriculture, 2024). Additionally, the Ministry of Forestry is set to establish 3 million hectares of food estates.

Other contradictions arise in different ministries. For instance, the Ministry of Agriculture and the Ministry of Public Works (PU) aim to develop 1.3 million hectares of new rice fields (Ministry of Public Works, 2024). While expanding rice fields aligns with the goal of achieving food self-sufficiency, a fundamental question remains: Will these new rice fields be owned and managed by peasants and peasant cooperatives, or will they merely become lucrative contracts for businesses?

Another concern is the source of land for these new rice fields. Many similar projects in the past have failed, often relying on land acquisitions that displaced local communities. Meanwhile, existing rice fields are not being adequately protected or developed. In fact, many traditional rice fields have been converted or even cleared to make way for business interests.



Several threats to the agrarian reform agenda can be identified within the framework of Prabowo's food policies.

A. The Threat of Food Estates: A Red Carpet for Agribusiness Corporations

History shows that in 1984, Indonesia surpassed Japan and Taiwan in achieving food self-sufficiency. The United Nations, through the FAO, even awarded President Soeharto for this accomplishment. Regardless of the role played by the Green Revolution, GMO seeds, and other factors, this

success was not the result of food estate projects or the One Million Hectares Peatland Development Project (PLG) in Central Kalimantan. Instead, it was achieved through the collective efforts of rice production centres in Java, Sumatra, and parts of Sulawesi.

The failed Peatland Development Project PLG project was later revived by President Jokowi, only to meet the same fate—failure. The public and media have even joked about the project, saying, *"Plant cassava, harvest corn."* This failure reflects the incompetence of the Minister of Agriculture—who was later charged with corruption—in delivering on promises of food sovereignty through the new rice field expansion program.

Now, a similar policy to PLG and the Central Kalimantan Food Estate is being implemented on a massive and repressive scale. Around 40 villages belonging to Indigenous communities are set to be cleared for corporate interests. This is what is happening in Merauke, where a policy originally introduced under President SBY was revived by Jokowi and is now being continued by the Prabowo-Gibran administration. The food estate program is claimed to be the key to achieving rice self-sufficiency by 2027. Several business tycoons, including Haji Isam, Fangiono, and Martua Sitorus, have already started operations in these food estate areas. Currently, at least 10 companies are set to manage the food estate (Pusaka, 2024).



Figure 37. List of Companies in the Merauke Food Estate

They are spread across the districts of Tanah Miring, Animha, Jagebob, Eligobel, Sota, Ulilin, Malind, and Kurik in Merauke Regency, where 5 out of the 10 companies are controlled by Martias Fangiono (Pusaka, 2024), meaning he alone controls a total of 269,000 hectares of land. The push to increase the production of certain food commodities, such as rice, sugarcane, corn, or oil palm, is often carried out through large-scale plantation schemes that displace peasants and indigenous communities from their land. If President Prabowo-Gibran turns a blind eye, this Food Estate project will seize even more land.

It is worth noting that the mechanisms for accelerating land acquisition had been signed off long before. Article 123 of the Job Creation Law revised Article 10 of the Land Procurement Law for Development in the Public Interest. For the first time, the development of food security areas, which are heavily influenced by business interests, was classified as a public interest. As a consequence, food security programs such as food estates can acquire land through land procurement mechanisms, in addition to land swaps involving forest areas and deforestation, including the clearing of natural forests (customary forests) like those in Papua.

If the government were to adhere to the law, all agricultural ventures should be regulated under the Right to Cultivate (HGU) scheme. This would require private entrepreneurs to comply with rules prohibiting land monopolization, respect the rights of communities that

have historically occupied and cultivated the land, and remain subject to government regulations.

The food estate initiative increasingly appears to be an ambitious project rife with abuses of power, marked by the introduction of various new regulations and institutions. Notably, the Task Force for the Acceleration of Sugar and Bioethanol Self-Sufficiency in Merauke, South Papua Province, was established by President Jokowi through Presidential Decree 15/2024. This task force seems forced and indicative of power abuse, as it was issued in the final stretch of Jokowi's presidency. The decree is a derivative of the Job Creation Law, specifically implementing Presidential Regulation 40/2023 on the Acceleration of National Sugar Self-Sufficiency and Bioethanol Provision.

To secure business projects under the new administration, Bahlil Lahadalia has been handed command to oversee ministries and agencies related to the food estate program, including the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Kemenhut), the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning (ATR), and six other ministries. The involvement of these ministers is clearly intended to eliminate obstacles to land acquisition, whether under the authority of the ATR Minister or the Forestry Minister.


The issues surrounding the food estate development in Merauke are just one of 31 similar projects nationwide. According to findings from the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA), both central and regional governments have already targeted 3.13 million hectares for food estate development. The planned expansion and land acquisition targets are spread across Papua, Central Kalimantan, West Kalimantan, North Kalimantan, East Nusa Tenggara (NTT), Central Java, Lampung, South Sumatra, Bengkulu, and North Sumatra.

Another looming "time bomb" related to food estates is the government's loss of control over national food politics. Ideologically, conceptually, and practically, food estates have proven to be a means of shifting food production from peasants to corporate groups. This is where the real danger lies—when businesses are allowed to dominate the food sector from upstream to downstream, our food system will become heavily dependent on corporate products.

If the entire food supply chain is controlled by businesses, any attempt by the government to regulate it strictly will face resistance from corporate entities. Ultimately, the state and national food policies will be subordinated to large companies such as Wilmar, Sinarmas, and others.

This capitalist-driven food policy will turn food estates into "flying fields" for elite business interests. On the other hand, they will become a "blood-soaked" battleground for the people, especially Indigenous communities and peasants.

It is also dangerous if food self-sufficiency is interpreted solely as ensuring food stock availability. A supply-oriented approach will drive food security efforts toward large-scale private agricultural systems, such as food estates, rather than prioritizing sustainable, community-based farming.



Source: Ministry, Government and Local Publications, processed by KPA

If President Prabowo-Gibran were to learn from history, they should not repeat the same mistakes. Business figures like Haji Isam can easily exploit the Asta Cita food agenda to enrich themselves and their cronies, as can other business groups. In reality, achieving food self-sufficiency is impossible without the implementation of Agrarian Reform, which would strengthen production and reinforce the strategic role of peasants and fishermen as the primary food producers.

B. The Threat of Food Militarization

Another looming threat to Agrarian Reform is the militarization of the food sector. Over the past five years, the military has increasingly tightened its grip on government food programs. For instance, in May 2024, when Minister of Agriculture Andi Amran Sulaiman visited Ngguti Bob Village in Tanah Miring District, Merauke, he stated that *"the control of the one-million-hectare land clearing project is under the command of the Commander of the XVII/ Cenderawasih Military Region."*

It is no surprise that, in many instances, the military has entered villages and forced peasants to relinquish their land in the name of food security programs. One example is the Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between state plantation companies (PTPN) and state-owned enterprises (BUMN) with the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) for food security programs in Cilacap, Central Java, and Tasikmalaya, West Java.

Not wanting to be left behind, the police force has also drawn attention with the recruitment of non-commissioned officers (Bintara) specializing in agricultural sciences (Bakomsus). Similarly, the Ministry of Agriculture launched the Food Brigade program, aimed at

encouraging young people to become workers in the agricultural sector or labourers in food estates. Today, military-style rhetoric is increasingly shaping food policies in Indonesia, as if discussing food and agriculture could be done while completely overlooking the peasants themselves.

C. The Threat of Land Acquisition for Cattle Ranching Projects

The rush to acquire land continues as part of the government's food self-sufficiency goals. One of the targets is land procurement for meat and dairy production centres, with the government aiming to allocate 1.5 million hectares for cattle ranching zones.

But whose land will be taken to meet this target? There are strong indications that this 1.5 million-hectare target will be fulfilled through cooperation between the Land Bank Agency (*Bank Tanah*) and the State-Owned Forestry Enterprise (*Perhutani*). Unsurprisingly, in addition to collaborating with the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (ATR/BPN), the Ministry of Agriculture has also partnered with the Land Bank and Perhutani (*Ministry of Agriculture, 2024*).

The problem is that much of the land in villages, settlements, and agricultural centres—areas that have been the backbone of local food production for decades—is already entangled in long-standing conflicts with Perhutani, plantation companies (HGU and location permits), and the Land Bank. If the ATR/BPN Ministry and the Ministry of Forestry are not careful, the 1.5 million-hectare land acquisition for this mega cattle ranching project will only add to the long list of agrarian conflicts, potentially triggering a new wave of evictions of peasants and rural communities.

Lands under dispute, which are often unilaterally claimed as assets by the Land Bank and Perhutani, are being prioritized for this project because they come with lower production costs. In West Java, South Sulawesi, and Central Sulawesi, agricultural lands and customary territories have been marked as Land Bank assets. Meanwhile, across Indonesia, thousands of villages and over 100 Priority Locations for Agrarian Reform (LPRA) remain embroiled in prolonged conflicts with Perhutani.

The large-scale land requirements for cattle production centres must be addressed within the framework of Agrarian Reform. This means that instead of searching for new "fresh land," the Ministry of Agriculture, ATR/BPN, and Forestry should identify and prioritize agrarian reform objects and subjects together with peasants' unions and cooperatives. The government must first resolve land conflicts, recognize local land ownership, and integrate these locations into economic development programs for both agriculture and livestock farming.

D. The Hidden Threat Behind President Prabowo's "Nationalism" Narrative

At the end of 2024, President Prabowo announced plans to expand oil palm plantation areas. During this statement, he also reassured industry players that they should not fear deforestation-related concerns.

This declaration appears to signal Indonesia's negotiating stance in the global trade landscape. Wrapped in nationalist rhetoric, it positions the country as pushing back against global economic hegemony. However, when examined from a domestic perspective, this

policy could be counterproductive. It contradicts Prabowo's own agenda of strengthening peasants, achieving food self-sufficiency, and promoting a green economy. The palm oil industry has a well-documented history as the leading cause of agrarian conflicts and massive environmental destruction (see Table 1).

During President Jokowi's administration, there was a glimmer of hope with the promise of a moratorium on new palm oil permits. While this was a progressive step, it was never seriously enforced, allowing agrarian and environmental issues stemming from palm oil expansion to persist.

Amid this ongoing crisis—where palm oil business areas have become the epicentre of Indonesia's worst agrarian conflicts—the international trade system has not made things any easier for independent smallholder farmers. Instead, the global palm oil system has further marginalized small farmers on the ground.

Rather than expanding plantation areas, President Prabowo should focus on optimizing the existing 17 million hectares of oil palm plantations while resolving agrarian conflicts, improving palm oil governance to prevent soil degradation, and restoring people's land rights. This should include returning food-producing lands that were previously converted for the benefit of palm oil tycoons.

A concerning parallel issue is the government's proposal to allow the conversion of rice fields and agricultural land in Java to support the three million housing program and industrial downstream processing. This policy directly contradicts the government's own food self-sufficiency agenda, as farmland in Java is already shrinking at an alarming rate.

According to the 2023 Agricultural Census (ST) – Phase I, conducted by Statistics Indonesia (BPS), the number of smallholder farmers in Indonesia increased from 14.25 million households in 2013 to 16.89 million households in 2023. The proportion of smallholder farmer households relative to the total number of farming households also rose from 55.33% in 2013 to 60.84% in 2023. This aligns with Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (ATR/BPN) data from 2022, which reported that Indonesia loses 100,000–150,000 hectares of rice fields per year due to land conversion.

Food and energy self-sufficiency, a flagship program of President Prabowo, carries strong nationalist and pro-people rhetoric. Many Indonesians, frustrated by the large-scale plundering of agrarian resources by foreign conglomerates, are eager to see these promises fulfilled.

However, upon closer examination, these "nationalist" programs harbour a hidden time bomb. Prabowo's food and energy self-sufficiency efforts are heavily reliant on corporations and large-scale business enterprises, rather than being built on the collective efforts of the people. This contradiction threatens to undermine the very spirit of self-sufficiency and national resilience that the government claims to champion.


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CHAPTER VI

THE URGENCY OF PRABOWO'S ADMINISTRATION TO ENACTING AN AGRARIAN REFORM LAW



In addition to being mandated by the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA), Agrarian Reform is also a reform mandate as outlined in People's Consultative Assembly Decree (TAP MPR) No. IX/2001 on Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource Management.

As Head of State, President Prabowo has the authority to enact laws in collaboration with the House of Representatives (DPR). How should the Prabowo administration strengthen agrarian reform from a legal perspective?

In the formulation of the 2025–2029 National Legislative Program (Prolegnas), the DPR approved 40 draft laws (RUU) proposed by the government for inclusion in the 2025–2029 Prolegnas, with eight of them prioritized for 2025. Among these, several land-related draft laws were included, such as the Land Bill (RUU Pertanahan), Revisions to the Forestry Law, and Maritime Law. Strangely, however, the list also includes a proposal to revise the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA 1960).

Over multiple administrations, efforts to weaken or replace the UUPA 1960 have continued. Globally, the World Bank has pushed for its revision since the early reform era. This agenda has been echoed by government bureaucracies, academics, and private sector actors, arguing that the UUPA is outdated and restricts foreign investors from owning land while limiting land ownership for individuals and private businesses.

According to documents from the DPR Legislative Body, the proposal to revise the 1960 UUPA originates from the DPR itself. Investigations by the Consortium for Agrarian Reform (KPA) indicate that this proposal was initiated by members of the Gerindra Party faction. This is highly surprising, considering the historical ties between Gerindra's chairman (now President Prabowo Subianto) and the UUPA, especially its *"land to the tiller"* agenda under land reform.

VI.1 The UUPA and Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo

Prof. Dr. Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo, father of President Prabowo Subianto Djojohadikusumo, was a renowned economist and a figure in Indonesia's independence movement. He earned his doctorate in economics from Nederlandsche Economische Hogeschool in Rotterdam, Netherlands, in 1943, with a dissertation titled "Het Volkscredietwezen in de Depressie" ("People's Credit Systems During the Depression"). After returning to Indonesia, he worked in the government and eventually became an advisor to Prime Minister Sutan Syahrir.

What was Prof. Soemitro's role in preserving the UUPA 1960? During his tenure as Minister of State for Research (1972–1978), the New Order government faced mounting agrarian conflicts, leading to large-scale protests and criticisms. Concerned about these issues, President Suharto sought to regulate land use nationally—not only to address agrarian disputes but also to ensure land availability for national development and industrialization.

As a result, on November 8, 1977, during a meeting of the Economic Stabilization Council, President Suharto ordered the government to immediately regulate land ownership, control, and use (Luthfi, 2022). Consequently, a research team was formed in 1977 under the coordination of Minister of State for Research, Prof. Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo (Wiradi, 2002).

This "Land Issues Research Team" was established under Ministerial Decree No. 001/M/Kp/I/1978 on January 15, 1978. The decree stated that the team's purpose was to provide a concise yet comprehensive analysis of land issues in the context of national development (Luthfi, 2022).

Within three months, the team completed a report, faster than the six-month timeframe originally allocated (Luthfi, 2022). The report's key findings and recommendations included:

1. The UUPA 1960 remains valid and should continue to be enforced.
2. The land reform structure—including land reform committees and courts—should be clarified and properly funded.
3. Legislation on land to the tiller should be established (Wiradi, 2002).

As a result, in 1979, the government officially reaffirmed that the UUPA 1960 remained the fundamental legal framework for land issues, emphasizing that it was a national decision rather than a communist policy (Wiradi, 2002).

This stance was later incorporated into Suharto's governance policies, as seen in TAP-MPR No. IV/1978, which removed the stigma that land reform was a communist agenda and recognized land tenure regulation as part of the 1978 National Guidelines (GBHN) (Luthfi, 2011).

Following this, Indonesia presented its stance at the World Conference on Agrarian Reform and Rural Development (WCARRD) in Rome, Italy, in 1979, organized by the FAO (Food and Agriculture Organization). During the conference, Indonesia reaffirmed its commitment to the UUPA 1960 and endorsed the "Peasant Charter," which emphasized agrarian rights for peasants (Tjondronegoro, 2008).

Upon returning from WCARRD, the government further reinforced the UUPA 1960, and in 1981, it launched the National Agrarian Project (PRONA) to provide land certification for low-income communities.

Thanks to Prof. Soemitro Djojohadikoesoemo's efforts, the UUPA 1960 was preserved, successfully eliminating the stigma that it was a communist law. Although the New Order government did not fully implement UUPA, its legal status remained intact, largely due to the influence of Prof. Soemitro, Prof. Dr. Sediono MP Tjondronegoro, Dr. Gunawan Wiradi, and other agrarian experts.

Thanks to their contributions, the UUPA 1960 continues to serve as the foundation for Indonesian peasants' struggles for land rights. Given the historical context and legal significance of the UUPA 1960, attempts to revise it are no longer relevant. Instead, what is urgently needed is the enactment of an Agrarian Reform Law (UU Reforma Agraria) that translates the values and spirit of the UUPA into concrete legal protections.




Figure 39. UUPA 1960 dari Soemitro hingga Prabowo

VI.1 The Agrarian Reform Law as the Implementation of the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law

In addition to being mandated by the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA), agrarian reform is also a reform mandate outlined in the People's Consultative Assembly Decree (Tap MPR) No. IX/2001 on Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource Management. As a key reform agenda, every president during the reform era has planned to implement agrarian reform. However, its execution has been hindered by weak legal frameworks.

For instance, during President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's (SBY) administration, the government set a target of implementing agrarian reform over 9.25 million hectares through the National Agrarian Reform Program (PPAN). However, this program was never realized due to the absence of a legal framework for its execution. Instead, it was diverted into a land certification program through the *Larasita* initiative.

Similarly, under President Joko Widodo (Jokowi), agrarian reform was once again pursued, targeting 9 million hectares, divided equally between land certification and land redistribution (4.5 million hectares each).

One of the major weaknesses in both administrations was the lack of legal policy support. During SBY's presidency, there were no direct policies related to the implementation of agrarian reform. Meanwhile, under Jokowi, the government issued Presidential Regulation No. 86/2018 on Agrarian Reform as a legal framework for its execution.



Considering the lessons from the previous two presidential administrations, one solution is for the government to draft and enact a Law on Agrarian Reform. This is crucial to making Indonesia the fastest country in eliminating poverty, reducing land ownership inequality, and resolving agrarian conflicts in a fair and just manner.

KPA views the slow implementation of Presidential Regulation (Perpres) 86/2018, as amended by Perpres 62/2023, as being due to the fact that the institutional command for agrarian reform is not directly under the president. Additionally, it lacks executorial authority and cross-sectoral jurisdiction, which are essential for accelerating land redistribution, agrarian conflict resolution, and economic empowerment and development.

Learning from the experiences of the past two administrations, one key solution is for the government to draft and enact an agrarian reform law. This is crucial to making Indonesia the fastest country in eliminating poverty, reducing land ownership inequality, and resolving agrarian conflicts in a fair and just manner.

To achieve these goals, the Agrarian Reform Bill should provide a comprehensive legal framework for its implementation, including:


a. mapping and documenting all land in Indonesia, including forest areas, to obtain data on land ownership, control, use, and utilization structures;
b. accepting bottom-up proposals from communities to register agrarian reform locations;
c. resolving conflicts in disputed regions or villages;
d. redistributing land to reorganize ownership, control, use, and utilization of land and other agrarian resources in a just and ecological manner;
e. strengthening legal rights, including providing legal certainty and land tenure security; and
f. empowering beneficiaries by providing support programs to enhance people's land use, production, and economic capacity.

Agrarian reform is a strategic policy crucial for addressing land ownership inequality and natural resource control in Indonesia. Its ultimate aim is to ensure that land and agrarian resources are utilized for the greatest benefit of the people, in accordance with Pancasila and the 1945 Constitution.

CHAPTER VII

CONCLUSION

CLARIFYING AND STRENGTHENING THE AGRARIAN REFORM AGENDA UNDER PRABOWO'S LEADERSHIP





The aspirations towards food self-sufficiency, poverty eradication, and the welfare of the people must be accompanied by programs to address land ownership inequality and resolve agrarian conflicts. All of this rests in the hands of the President.



Conclusion

The aspirations for food self-sufficiency, poverty eradication, and the welfare of the people must be accompanied by programs to address land ownership inequality and resolve agrarian conflicts. All of this rests in the hands of the President.

Agrarian policies, in their broad dimensions, must be genuinely implemented for the benefit of the people, rather than serving the interests of specific groups, business entities, or corporations—or what the President refers to as "showcase projects." Policies that have been issued and have caused problems, particularly for the wider society, are not too late to be halted and thoroughly evaluated.

The new administration must avoid repeating the mistakes of previous governments. Entrepreneurs have been pampered for the past twenty years—it is time for President Prabowo-Gibran to prioritize the rights of the poor, particularly in terms of land, food, and welfare.

Recommendations

What is the future of agrarian reform under Prabowo's leadership? In previous administrations, agrarian reform has often been distorted and diverted from its noble objectives. The dominance of private and foreign entities over land and agrarian resources has long been facilitated, while for ordinary people, the struggle for even a small piece of land and basic resources remains complex and without clear resolution.

The explosion and accumulation of 3,234 agrarian conflict cases from 2015 to 2024, land ownership disparities, increasing landlessness, and the numerous casualties across the country all reflect the fact that land, water, and natural resources have yet to be fully directed toward ensuring the people's welfare.

Strong political will and a firm commitment to the people are essential for Prabowo to lead and strengthen the agrarian reform agenda over the next five years. Based on the facts, findings, analysis, and conclusions above, the government must adopt the following strategies to address Indonesia's structural problems:

1. Place peasants, farm labourers, fisherfolks, indigenous communities, and women at the core of national development to ensure that all government policies genuinely benefit the people.
2. Implement agrarian reform as a Pro-People National Strategic Project (PSN) in accordance with the 1945 Constitution and the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA) by redistributing land to smallholder peasants and farm labourers, resolving all structural agrarian conflicts, restoring the rights of those displaced and dispossessed, and ensuring state support for availability of capital, appropriate technology, seeds, fertilizers, irrigation, rural infrastructure, education, and fair market access.
3. Develop a five-year agrarian reform roadmap and annual acceleration plans with measurable progress, ensuring an inclusive and transparent process involving peasant movements and various social movements.
4. Draft and enact an Agrarian Reform Law and an Indigenous Peoples Law to strengthen the ideals of the UUPA while providing a legal foundation for land

redistribution, agrarian conflict resolution, recognition of indigenous territories, elimination of land monopolies, and protection of fishing grounds and rural agricultural development within the framework of agrarian reform.

5. Repeal the Job Creation Law, which is detrimental to Indonesia's poor, along with its derivative regulations related to Land Bank, Food Estate, National Strategic Projects (PSN), New Capital City (IKN), Special Economic Zones (KEK), Tourism Priority Zones (KSPN), Management Rights (HPL), forest amnesty, and others.
6. Investigate and prosecute abuses of power, corrupt and manipulative regulatory drafting, and constitutional violations, as well as agrarian corruption and land mafia practices that use National Strategic Projects (PSN) as a pretext to suppress democracy, violate rights, and seize people's land.
7. Conduct a comprehensive review of state land claims made under the guise of forest areas or state-owned forests by redefining forestry boundaries to exclude tens of thousands of villages, settlements, indigenous territories, community plantations, rice fields, aquaculture areas, and national food reserves belonging to the people.
8. Review and revoke land and natural resource permits, including HGU (Right to Cultivate), HGB (Right to Build), Right of Use, Industrial Plantation Forests (HTI), Mining Business Permits (IUP), location permits, and emerging forms of land control such as HPL (Management Rights) that have been proven to cause agrarian conflicts, land inequality, evictions, poverty, and environmental destruction.
9. Halt and strictly punish food import mafias that have had devastating impact on local peasants, fishers, livestock breeders, and salt farmers, weakening national food sovereignty and the right to food.
10. Dissolve the Land Bank Agency, which has expropriated people's land and diverted agrarian reform land for business and corporate land acquisition.
11. Release peasants, indigenous people, fishermen, women, urban poor, and agrarian activists who have been imprisoned or criminalized for defending land rights, and put an end to violent and authoritarian approaches in handling agrarian conflicts.
12. Protect coastal areas, small islands, and fishing grounds from monopolization and destructive investments that threaten the livelihood of fisherfolks, who play a crucial role in ensuring national food security.
13. Halt food estate projects that have led to agrarian conflicts and land dispossession. This requires a reorientation of national food policies, integrating rural, agricultural, plantation, forestry, fisheries, and livestock development within the framework of agrarian reform. By doing so, peasant-owned, fisher-owned, and small-scale industries can thrive, interconnect, and strengthen national industrialization that uplifts workers. This approach ensures a mutually reinforcing urban-rural relationship, rather than an exploitative one.

This report presents the annual monitoring results of agrarian conflicts and issues throughout 2024.


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