

AGRARIAN REFORM CONSORTIUM (KPA)
2025 YEAR-END REPORT

FULL SPEED ON THE WRONG TRACK

THE PARADOX OF PRABOWO–GIBRAN'S AGRARIAN POLICY IN 2025: REJECTING CORRECTION, REPRODUCING CRISIS

KONSORSIUM PEMBARUAN AGRARIA
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Rows of demonstrators and a list of demands during the 2025 National Peasants' Day Action in front of the MPR–DPR RI Building on 24 September 2025.



FOREWORD

How has the Prabowo–Gibran administration implemented agrarian reform in its first year in office? We describe it as a year of paradox. This term reflects a profound deviation in the implementation of agrarian reform over the past year.

At the outset, the administration gave rise to a sense of optimism. Reading the direction and design of national development through the *Asta Cita* agenda, it did not seem excessive to harbor hopes for improvement. President Prabowo's stated ambitions—to achieve food and energy self-sufficiency, eradicate poverty, reduce social inequality, and improve public welfare - should have provided momentum for the realization of genuine agrarian reform.

However, as time passed, expectations drifted further from reality. The grand Vision and Mission articulated by President Prabowo in *Asta Cita* have, in practice, moved in the opposite direction of the Constitution and the agrarian reform. Rather than placing the people at the center, these programs have been implemented through an approach marked by the centralization of power and the massive involvement of the military.

In practical terms, military involvement has indeed accelerated the execution of strategic programs. Yet this acceleration has come at a significant cost. The participatory and democratic principles that should animate so-called "people-centered" programs have gradually disappeared. A culture of dialogue and deliberation in shaping development agendas has been replaced by a one-way command system.

As a result, these strategic programs have brought disaster upon the people. Agrarian conflicts arising from land grabbing and forced evictions have intensified and expanded. Communities are increasingly displaced from their lands to satisfy the state's

appetite for land acquisition in support of ambitious development projects. The interests of the people are pitted against so-called national interests, producing repression in many regions.

Throughout 2025, the Indonesian people have demonstrated resistance to this situation. We have witnessed consecutive waves of popular struggle across the country. These demonstrations that took place were an accumulation of public anger toward the policies and performance of state officials, which have never been on the side of the people.

The wave of popular resistance - particularly from rural areas - stems from a fundamental issue: extreme inequality in the control of land and the means of production, concentrated in the hands of a small elite of economic and political actors. This inequality has generated widening socio-economic gaps between poor peasants and communities on one hand, and a small group of ultra-wealthy individuals - many of whom also wield political power - on the other.



As 2025 drew to a close, Indonesia was once again struck by tragedy. Three provinces in Sumatra - Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra - were simultaneously hit by flash floods and landslides. Thousands lost their lives, tens of thousands of homes and buildings were swept away, and millions were displaced. This catastrophe constitutes a stark warning to the government: a structured and systematic crime has taken place, giving rise to a prolonged agrarian crisis. Without immediate and serious corrective action, even more people will become victims.

The Special Committee on the Resolution of Agrarian Conflicts (*Panitia Khusus Penyelesaian Konflik Agraria* – Pansus PKA), established by the DPR RI in October, can serve as an entry point to unravel Indonesia's deeply rooted agrarian problems. This committee must act swiftly to produce political and legal breakthroughs to overcome the stagnation of agrarian reform - addressing overlapping policies, institutional failures, budgetary constraints, and flawed implementation on the ground. Through its oversight and evaluation functions, the committee should act as a catalyst for genuine agrarian reform, in accordance with the mandate of MPR Decree No. IX/2001 on Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource Management and the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law.

This 2025 Year-End Report of the Agrarian Reform Consortium presents an account of agrarian conflicts, policies, and the implementation of agrarian reform over the past year. It is offered as an effort to support collective reflection and evaluation - particularly as a corrective intervention against national agrarian policies that have yet to deliver justice for the people.

We hope this report will be useful, opening our eyes further to the structural agrarian problems confronting this nation, and inspiring all stakeholders to drive a broad-based transformation of national agrarian policy - one that truly prioritizes the interests of the people.

Happy New Year 2026.
Jakarta, January 10, 2026

Respectfully,
Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA)

Dewi Kartika
Secretary General



One member of the Sihaporas Indigenous community who was assaulted by a group of PT TPL security forces. Photo source: AMAN documentation

CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION



A. Looking Back at 2025

> It is like a driver who realizes he is on the wrong road yet presses the accelerator even harder; this is how the Prabowo–Gibran administration has pursued agrarian policy in its first year.

The slogan "let's hit the gas" has frequently been used as a symbol of acceleration. Yet what has been accelerated is not the correction of unequal land control, but rather the repetition of old schemes: large-scale concessions, forest clearing for oil palm plantations, the opening of forest areas for food estate projects, and the relaxation of licensing requirements in the name of investment. The accelerator has been pressed harder, while the direction of policy has remained unchanged.

In its first year, agrarian policy has instead revealed the face of a paradox of power. Ironically, before becoming President, General Prabowo Subianto once authored a book titled *Indonesia's Paradox and Its Solutions*. However, rather than dismantling that paradox, the administration he leads has consciously preserved it. Thus, 2025 must be read as the year in which this paradox was institutionalized.

This report serves as both an expression of concern and an evaluation of the implementation of President Prabowo's Asta Cita program, which was presented as a set of political promises prior to his election. Over the past year, many of the policies implemented have in fact diverged from those promises, and even run counter to the

spirit of the Constitution and agrarian reform. Yet these principles should constitute the foundation and soul of any development agenda that claims to serve the people.

In his policy design, President Prabowo advances an ambitious vision of realizing "Golden Indonesia 2045." This vision imagines a strong and advanced Indonesia with high per capita income, zero poverty, reduced social inequality, and enhanced human resource competitiveness.

This ambition is reflected in the Second Asta Cita, which emphasizes strengthening national defense and security while simultaneously promoting national self-reliance through food, energy, water self-sufficiency, as well as the development of the creative economy, green economy, and blue economy. A similar spirit is found in the Sixth Asta Cita, which places development originating from villages and grassroots communities at the center of economic equity and poverty alleviation. In principle, these two Asta Cita agendas provide vast space for agrarian reform to serve as their foundation. However, that expectation was not realized in 2025.



The shooting of a peasant woman in Pasinan Village, Lekok Subdistrict, Pasuruan Regency, East Java, by a member of the Indonesian Navy's 15th Battalion.

> President Prabowo has governed through three primary approaches: the centralization of power through command-oriented and centralized policies; state capitalism; and militarism.

Over the past year, the Prabowo–Gibran administration has moved through three main approaches. *First,* power has been centralized through command-driven policies. *Second,* the economic system has been managed according to the logic of state capitalism. *Third,* political stability has been maintained and administered through a militaristic approach, with the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) and the National Police (Polri) as key actors.

These three approaches are clearly visible in political-legal dynamics, policy formulation, and the implementation of priority programs throughout the administration's first year, including:

First, in food self-sufficiency, energy downstreaming, the Free Nutritious Meals (MBG) program, cooperatives, large-scale investment, and National Strategic Projects, the government established Daya Agata Nusantara (Danantara) to consolidate the control of the central government, the national elite and the militer over these projects and investments. This institution functions as a strategic state-owned investment management body, similar to a sovereign wealth fund, tasked with consolidating and optimizing state-owned enterprise assets through investment in strategic and so-called sustainable projects to stimulate national economic growth.

Second, executive power has become increasingly concentrated. The Prabowo–Gibran administration operates with minimal opposition, as it is supported by a dominant parliamentary coalition. As a result, government policies and programs have proceeded with little substantive oversight or criticism.

Third, a command-based approach and the massive involvement of the military in civilian affairs have intensified. President Prabowo has governed with an emphasis on order and national stability. This logic has been translated into widespread military involvement across various sectors and civilian domains, resulting in a shrinking of civic space and democratic practice.

Fourth, narratives of nationalism and unity have been manipulated to legitimize the centralization of power, framing public participation and community interests as being in opposition to national unity, security, and national interest.

Fifth, democratic processes have gradually been undermined in the name of efficiency. Public participation and the role of local governments in policymaking, budgetary politics, strategic program design, and the issuance of permits and concessions have been steadily curtailed under the pretext of efficiency.

These approaches have deepened Indonesia's economic, social, and political crises. The path toward Golden Indonesia promoted by President Prabowo is drifting further away from the ideals enshrined in the Constitution. Indonesia continues to grapple with chronic agrarian problems and structural land injustices that have plagued the nation for decades, with no meaningful signs of improvement.

Land grabbing and the forced displacement of communities from their territories persist across the country. The monopolization of land, plantations, forests, and mines; the parceling of seas and small islands; the reckless exploitation of natural wealth; and environmental destruction by a small group of conglomerates continue unabated. Worse still, amid these agrarian crimes, people face threats to their freedom of association, criminalization, violence, and even loss of life due to the reckless actions of state security forces. Such violence has not only persisted but increased, in parallel with the expanded involvement of the TNI and Polri across agrarian development sectors.

In mid-August, waves of resistance erupted simultaneously across various regions of Indonesia. These were not merely expressions of anger toward officials who lacked empathy amid public hardship. More deeply, they represented the culmination of popular exhaustion with increasingly acute structural problems. The President and the DPR RI have failed to address the root causes driving people toward despair and rage.

During National Peasants' Day on September 24, 2025, the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA), together with 24,000 peasants, fishers, Indigenous Peoples, women, students, and workers, organized coordinated national actions in Jakarta and across multiple regions. On this occasion, KPA presented 24 structural agrarian problems and nine demands for reform. These demands were not merely annual ceremonial appeals, but reminders to state authorities of the daily reality in which people's land and natural wealth continue to be seized and plundered.

The flash floods and landslides that struck Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra toward the end of the year constitute a severe warning to the government. These disasters reflect structured and systematic agrarian crimes that have produced a prolonged crisis. They are not merely natural disasters, but ecological disasters resulting from the expanding agrarian crisis in Indonesia.

This agrarian crisis and ecological catastrophe in Sumatra should serve as a moment of reckoning for the Prabowo–Gibran administration. Immediate action is required before the crisis expands further. The Special Committee on the Resolution of Agrarian Conflicts (Pansus PKA), formed by the DPR RI in response to pressure from KPA and the National Peasants' Day mobilizations, must begin its work without delay.

The committee must summon all relevant parties to conduct comprehensive monitoring and evaluation of agrarian policies across sectors, including land, plantations, forestry, mining, agriculture, and food systems. It must also urge President Prabowo to establish a National Agrarian Reform Implementing Body (BP-RAN) as an authoritative institution dedicated to executing national agrarian reform.

In parallel, the government must impose a moratorium on the issuance of permits and concession rights in the plantation, forestry, and mining sectors, including HGU, HPL, HGB, HTI, location permits, and mining licenses. Land acquisition processes for National Strategic Projects, Special Economic Zones, the Land Bank, food estates, National Tourism Strategic Areas, and the new capital city have generated thousands of agrarian conflicts and widespread environmental destruction. Projects that overlap with people's land must be returned to the framework of Agrarian Reform.

This is the trajectory of agrarian reform and national agrarian political-legal dynamics throughout 2025, marking the first year of the Prabowo–Gibran administration. To examine and analyze these developments in greater depth, KPA once again presents its annual report, the 2025 Year-End Report, which contains data and analysis on agrarian conflicts and policies over the past year.



Various demands of peasants during the 2025 National Peasants' Day protest in front of the DPR RI building.

B. Scope and Limitations of Agrarian Conflicts

> This Year-End Report is the result of monitoring, data collection, and analysis of Indonesia's national agrarian situation throughout 2025, encompassing agrarian conflicts on the ground, regulatory developments, and the implementation of agrarian reform during the year.

This annual monitoring report aims to present: 1) a national portrait of current agrarian conditions based on field-level events throughout the year; 2) comprehensive data and analysis of agrarian conflicts grounded in KPA's field findings and advocacy experience; 3) policy analysis derived from desk studies and practical experience in agrarian reform advocacy; 4) alternative data to build public awareness of the ongoing agrarian crisis and human rights violations related to land rights in Indonesia; 5) strengthened emergency response mechanisms to address agrarian violence; 6) and policy recommendations emphasizing the urgency of agrarian reform and effective conflict resolution mechanisms, including improvements in government and security force practices.



Ranks of demonstrators during the 2025 National Peasants' Day action in front of the MPR–DPR RI building on September 24, 2025

In this report, agrarian conflict refers to structural agrarian conflicts resulting from policies or decisions issued by public officials and/or state authorities. These policies or decisions have wide-ranging impacts in terms of scale, number of affected communities, and the extent of impacted areas.

Such agrarian conflicts generate multidimensional consequences, including social, economic, cultural, ecological, and political impacts. The concept of structural agrarian conflict used here refers to practices of land grabbing or unilateral claims by the state and/or corporations over community land, facilitated by legal frameworks and driven by elite political and business interests. Accordingly, the primary actors responsible for agrarian conflicts include large-scale business entities (state-owned or private), government institutions, and security forces. The victims are mass social groups, including peasants, Indigenous Peoples, fisherfolks, rural and coastal communities, and the urban poor.

The term agrarian in this report does not refer solely to land issues. It is grounded in Article 33(3) of the 1945 Constitution and Law No. 5 of 1960 on Basic Agrarian Principles, which define agrarian matters as encompassing land, water, airspace, and the natural resources contained therein. This includes surface land, subsurface resources, and resources above ground.

Due to this broad conception, the sectors monitored and analyzed in this report extend beyond land alone and encompass the full agrarian domain. Policy analysis therefore addresses development policies and government programs across sectors that generate conflicts between communities and the state, security forces, and/or business actors. Sectorally, this report covers 1) plantation and agribusiness, 2) forestry, 3) mining, 4) infrastructure development, 5) property and real estate, and 6) military facilities. From a landscape perspective, it includes 1) agriculture and aquaculture, 2) settlements and housing, 3) customary territories, and 4) coastal and fishing grounds.

Based on this framework, the report excludes individual land disputes, inheritance disputes, corporate disputes, or conflicts between government agencies that do not constitute structural agrarian conflicts.

C. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis

The monitoring and data collection methods employed in this report are based on the number of agrarian conflict incidents occurring within a given area over the course of the year. Conflicts that emerged in previous years may be recorded again if new incidents occurred, such as continued evictions, criminalization, or acts of violence that triggered protests by affected communities and often resulted in physical confrontation. As such, a single conflict area may experience multiple incidents within a single reporting year.

Dalam hal The reporting period for this report covers January 1 to December 25, 2025. Incidents occurring outside this timeframe are not included.

The data presented in this report are derived from multiple sources, including:
1) direct complaints from communities affected by agrarian conflicts submitted to KPA at the national and regional levels;
2) reports received through the agrarian emergency response and monitoring system of the Agrarian Reform National Committee (KNPA);
3) field investigations and studies conducted in cases directly accompanied or advocated by KPA;
4) monitoring of national and local mass media across print, digital, and audiovisual platforms; verified social media monitoring;
5) and, specifically for Papua, collaboration with the Pusaka Bentala Rakyat Foundation in data collection.



Tarsisius Fendy Sesupi, the customary leader of Lelayang Hamlet, Ketapang Regency, West Kalimantan, was criminalized for defending his customary territory, which was slated to be seized by PT Mayawana Persada.

Prior to analysis, all data underwent a validation process through cross-checking across sources and the use of comparative data to prevent errors and double counting, and to enhance data validity, reliability, and quality. In several cases, further field investigations and interviews were conducted to verify information and minimize analytical errors.

Despite these efforts, the data and analysis presented may not capture all agrarian conflicts and acts of violence that occurred in 2025. Limitations remain due to organizational capacity and resource constraints in monitoring and documenting incidents nationwide. In several cases, there are also limitations in terms of the completeness and types of information/data required, such as case chronologies, victim data, gender-based data, problem typologies, and other details related to the conflicts we analyzed - one of these limitations being that the case data and information we obtained came from mass media sources. *



The planned construction of a People's School and an MBG building displaced residents of Flamboyan, Tanjung Selamat Subdistrict, Medan City, North Sumatra.

CHAPTER II
AGRARIAN CONFLICTS IN 2025



A. General Overview of Agrarian Conflicts

President Prabowo's command authority has never been used to prevent the escalation of agrarian conflicts across Indonesia. On the contrary, this authority has been exercised to encourage the active involvement of the TNI and the National Police (Polri) in handling agrarian conflicts. The Prabowo–Gibran administration has made no meaningful breakthroughs in addressing either newly emerging agrarian conflicts or long-standing agrarian conflicts that have persisted for decades in Indonesia.

Throughout 2025, agrarian conflicts continued to escalate sharply. KPA recorded at least 341 outbreaks of agrarian conflict, covering an area of 914,574.96 hectares and affecting 123,612 peasant households across 428 villages nationwide. This figure represents a 15 percent increase compared to 2024. Not only did the number of agrarian conflict incidents increase, but the geographic spread of affected villages also expanded significantly. In the previous year (2024), agrarian conflicts occurred in 349 villages, which is lower than the number recorded this year.

> "At least 341 outbreaks of agrarian conflict occurred, covering an area of 914,574.963 hectares and affecting 123,612 households across 428 villages in Indonesia. This figure represents a 15 percent increase compared to 2024.




Figure 1: Outbreaks of Agrarian Conflicts in 2025



PT Tanjung Piayu Makmur (TPM) evicted residents of Kampung Tembesi Tower, Sagulung, Riau Islands, on Wednesday, January 8, 2025. Photo source: Irwan Hirzal_BTD

Over the past five years, the trend of agrarian conflict outbreaks has shown a consistent upward trajectory. This escalation is the result of unresolved long-standing agrarian conflicts intersecting with new conflicts generated by development and investment policies that continue to be imposed by the state.

> **President Prabowo's policy of strengthening and expanding military dominance in food development projects, energy projects, and forest area enforcement has also been a major factor behind the significant increase in agrarian conflict outbreaks in 2025.**




Figure 2: Trends in Agrarian Conflict Outbreaks, 2021–2025

The transition of government from Jokowi to Prabowo initially gave rise to hope for improvements in agrarian conflict resolution. However, this expectation was not realized. Instead, President Prabowo's policies to strengthen and expand military dominance in food production projects, energy development, and forest area enforcement have significantly contributed to the surge in agrarian conflicts in 2025.

B. Trends in Military Involvement in Agrarian Conflicts

Camouflaged military uniforms were a common sight across many agrarian conflicts in 2025. Some key triggers led to the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) direct involvement in agrarian conflicts, with TNI personnel visibly and actively involved as perpetrators on the ground.

The first trigger was the issuance of Presidential Regulation No. 5 of 2025 on Forest Area Enforcement (Penertiban Kawasan Hutan, PKH), which positioned the Minister of Defense as the central driving force of enforcement operations. *The second trigger* was the territorial expansion of the TNI through new Regional Military Commands (Kodam) and battalions, requiring military facilities and infrastructure expansion.


The establishment of the PKH Task Force, which directly involves the military, has transformed agrarian issues from matters of structural injustice, governance failures, and historical land and forest claims into issues framed narrowly as "order" and "security." Once the logic of enforcement is applied, the TNI is viewed as the institution most prepared to act quickly.

When the PKH Task Force targeted companies operating plantations within forest areas and transferred seized land to Agrinas, public resistance was relatively limited. However, when the task force began targeting community-managed lands and forcibly transferring them to Agrinas, the impacts became far more complex. Unlike companies whose land was confiscated following court rulings, communities were dispossessed based on unilateral state claims rooted in past decisions.

This presidential regulation on forest area enforcement operates on the assumption that forest boundaries are clear and legally settled. In reality, overlapping claims persist due to arbitrary state actions in designating forest areas over community lands, villages, long-established settlements, customary territories, and problematic concessions. These unresolved overlaps constitute the very core of Indonesia's agrarian conflicts. Unresolved forestry-related agrarian conflicts have been further exacerbated by the operations of the PKH Task Force, akin to pouring gasoline onto the smoldering embers of agrarian conflict.

The second trigger is the militarization of agrarian conflicts themselves. The presence of soldiers has fundamentally altered power relations on the ground, both psychologically and politically. Communities now confront an armed state rather than a space for dialogue, not a negotiation table, not ministries or local governments.

The third trigger is the severing of dialogue channels. When agrarian conflicts are handled through enforcement operations and asset security measures, mechanisms such as field-based claim verification, land redistribution, or agrarian conflict mediation are sidelined. Ironically, this approach is often justified in the name of legal certainty and investment protection. In practice, however, it produces long-term social uncertainty: trauma, criminalization, erosion of public trust, and new cycles of conflict that are far more difficult to resolve.



Peasant participants in the 2025 National Peasants' Day Action carried posters demanding the rejection of the state's unilateral claims over forest areas

C. Victims of Agrarian Conflict Bear the Burden of Ecological Disaster

The year 2025 marked a moment when nature finally pushed back against the privileged investment concessions granted by the government to business elites and large-scale corporations. Much like agrarian conflict, ecological disaster is a form of resistance. Agrarian conflict represents citizens' resistance to decisions by state authorities that allocate their land and territories to capital interests. Ecological disasters, meanwhile, are nature's angry response to land, forests, and seas being seized and exploited mercilessly by those in power and by business actors.

It is therefore unsurprising that the state's response to ecological disasters follows the same pattern as its response to agrarian conflict. The state consistently defends its policies that favor business interests in controlling agrarian resources.

In agrarian conflicts, structural problems are deflected into criminalization of citizens. People are labeled illegal, accused of having no legitimate claims, or branded as encroachers, rather than the state evaluating concessions that have been issued on top of community land. In ecological disasters, the issue is similarly deflected through denial, by blaming rainfall and extreme weather, while concealing the environmental destruction and ecological crimes that have taken place.

Through this approach, the state avoids addressing the root causes of the problem, namely the unequal structure of ownership and control over agrarian resources. Meaning conflicts are never resolved, and disasters will continue to recur because flawed spatial planning and land allocation patterns are never corrected.

Ironically, areas affected by ecological disasters are often the same areas where agrarian conflicts occur—places where people have long demanded that their land and customary forests be returned to them. Flood-affected areas in North Sumatra, for example, include customary lands that were unilaterally allocated by the government as concession areas controlled by PT Toba Pulp Lestari (formerly PT Indorayon). Communities that have already suffered through prolonged agrarian conflicts are once again victimized by ecological disasters.

Similar conditions can also be found in Aceh. One example is the agrarian conflict between PTPN I Cot Girek and residents of Langkahan, North Aceh, resulting from the seizure of community land by the state-owned plantation company. This also includes PT Tusam Hutani Lestari, owned by President Prabowo, which holds a concession covering 97,000 hectares in Central Aceh, Bener Meriah, Bireuen, and North Aceh.

In this context, agrarian conflict and ecological disaster cannot be treated as separate phenomena. They must be understood as interlinked outcomes of the same political-economic framework governing land and spatial planning. This framework systematically prioritizes business and investment interests while marginalizing affected communities and undermining the ecological carrying capacity of land, forests, and coastal ecosystems

The BPRPI House of Struggle in Kampung Tanjung Gusta, Deli Serdang, North Sumatra. The secretariat of the Badan Perjuangan Rakyat Penunggu Indonesia (BPRPI), which functioned as a flood shelter and emergency response post, was itself inundated by flooding.



D. Sectors Contributing to Agrarian Conflict

Agrarian conflicts recorded throughout 2025 were predominantly concentrated in the plantation and agribusiness sector. Operations by large-scale plantation corporations, both state-owned and private, accounted for 135 recorded agrarian conflict incidents, covering an area of approximately 352,156.41 hectares and affecting 8,734 peasant households. The infrastructure sector followed, with 69 agrarian conflict incidents occurring on 59,809.42 hectares of land and affecting 12,786 households.

The mining sector contributed 46 agrarian conflict incidents, affecting an area of 58,904.68 hectares and impacting 11,020 households. The property and real estate sector generated 36 agrarian conflict incidents, covering 2,370.17 hectares and affecting 10,807 households. The forestry sector recorded 31 agrarian conflict incidents, involving a total area of 435,439.80 hectares and affecting 11,331 households. Finally, the military facilities sector accounted for 24 agrarian conflict incidents, covering 5,894.48 hectares and affecting 68,934 households.



On September 22, security forces and employees of PT Toba Pulp Lestari (TPL) carried out a violent attack against the indigenous community of Ompu Mamontang Laut Ambarita in Sihaporas, North Sumatra.
Photo source: Private documentation




Figure 3: Sectors Contributing to Agrarian Conflicts in 2025

1. Plantation Sector

Overall, agrarian conflicts in the plantation sector increased by 21 percent compared to 2024. This trend demonstrates that the plantation concession (HGU) moratorium announced and implemented by the Minister of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency has been insufficient, as it was not accompanied by the revocation of problematic HGUs that violate the law and overlap with community land, which had previously been issued by the state.

Agrarian conflicts in the plantation sector were largely driven by oil palm plantation operations, which accounted for 74 conflict incidents (45 percent of total plantation-related conflicts), covering an area of 111,458.96 hectares and affecting 7,477 peasant households. This was followed by sugarcane plantation operations, which generated 25

> Conflicts related to sugarcane plantations merit particular attention, as most incidents stemmed from land acquisition processes for large-scale sugarcane plantation projects under the government's energy security agenda.



Customary (Indigenous) territory belonging to the Yei Tribe in Merauke was destroyed to make way for a food and energy estate project initiated under President Jokowi and later continued under President Prabowo.
Photo source: Pusaka Bentala Rakyat





Figure 4: Agrarian Conflicts in the Plantation Sector

One example of plantation-related agrarian conflict in 2025 occurred in Central Sulawesi, involving peasants from five villages in East Petasia Subdistrict and PT Agro Nusa Abadi (ANA), a subsidiary of PT Astra Agro Lestari (AAL). In March 2025, eight community members were once again summoned by the North Morowali Police on allegations of pluder or theft of oil palm fruit on land claimed by PT ANA. The community viewed these actions as a form of criminalization against peasants defending their land from corporate expansion. In addition to operating on community land, the company reportedly does not possess a valid HGU. The company has also been accused of deliberately fostering divisions within the community, resulting in horizontal conflict.

Another case occurred in South Bengkulu, involving residents of Pino Raya and the oil palm company PT Agro Bengkulu Selatan (ABS). This long-standing conflict escalated into the shooting of five peasants in late November 2025. The conflict originated from the issuance of South Bengkulu Regent Decree No. 503/425 of 2012, which granted PT ABS a plantation location permit covering 2,950 hectares overlapping with community land. Despite holding the permit, the company failed to cultivate the land, and local residents continued to use it for their livelihoods. Multiple parties have alleged that the company does not hold a valid HGU. Between 2023 and 2025, the conflict intensified as the company continued to intimidate residents.

In Labuhan Batu, North Sumatra, agrarian conflict between PT Sinar Mas Agro Resources and Technology (PT SMART) and residents of six villages in Padang Halaban escalated once again following attempts by the company to evict communities. This conflict dates back to 1967, when community land in the six villages was forcibly taken during the New Order regime. Since 1970, residents have pursued various avenues to reclaim their land, but without success. After prolonged deadlock, in 2009 residents collectively reclaimed 83.5 hectares of their former village land from a total of 3,000 hectares held under PT SMART's HGU.



Conflicts related to sugarcane plantations also occurred in South Papua, involving the Indigenous Yei People in Merauke and PT Murni Nusantara Mandiri (MNM). This sugarcane plantation forms part of a National Strategic Project for food and energy security. The majority of the Yei community, particularly members of the Kwipalo and Noya clans, have strongly rejected the project, which they consider a large-scale seizure of Indigenous land and forests. PT MNM holds a concession covering 52,700 hectares - an area comparable to the size of Jakarta Province. As of August 2025, the company had cleared 4,912 hectares of Indigenous land and forest. This land seizure has been accompanied by violence and criminalization of community members, including Vincent Kwipalo, who was criminalized after stopping company excavators and bulldozers on 15 September 2025 during road construction activities in Indigenous territory.



A peasant from Polongbangkeng, Takalar Regency, South Sulawesi, was assaulted for defending his land from seizure by PTPN XIV.

Sugarcane plantation projects under the energy security agenda are not only operated by private companies but also by state-owned enterprises. In Takalar Regency, South Sulawesi, PT Perkebunan Nusantara XIV (PTPN XIV) carried out forced evictions against local communities, with the conflict escalating throughout the year. The company repeatedly destroyed community crops and farmland, accompanied by intimidation and violence. This conflict dates back to 1978, when PTPN seized 6,650 hectares of community land across 11 villages in Polongbangkeng and North Polongbangkeng Subdistricts to establish sugarcane plantations. Although PTPN's HGU expired in 2024, the company attempted to reassert control over land that had since been cultivated by residents. This conflict is closely linked to the government's sugar self-sufficiency program.


Agrarian conflict related to sugarcane plantation operations occurred in Pati Regency, Central Java, involving residents of Pundenrejo Village and PT Laju Perdana Indah (LPI) over 7.3 hectares of land. Between March and April 2025, peasant communities faced ongoing intimidation and alleged acts of thuggery linked to the company, culminating in the destruction of a resident's house by unidentified individuals suspected of acting on its behalf. Historically, the land was controlled by the Dutch and later claimed in 1973 by PT Bapipundip under Kodam IV Diponegoro, which converted it into Building Use Rights (HGB) valid until 2024. After PT Bapipundip went bankrupt in 1999, the land was abandoned and later used by local residents before being transferred to PT LPI. Although the HGB permit was designated for employee housing, it was never used for that purpose and instead the land was converted into a sugarcane plantation.



The Pundenrejo agrarian conflict: two peasants' houses were demolished by a group of masked thugs in Pati, Central Java, on May 7, 2025.
Photo source: Documentation by Pundenrejo residents, Pati

2. Infrastructure Sector

In 2025, the infrastructure sector accounted for 69 recorded agrarian conflict incidents, covering a total area of 59,809.42 hectares and affecting 12,786 households. Conflicts in this sector were primarily associated with tourism infrastructure development (18 incidents), the construction of industrial estates (14 incidents), and the development of public facilities (11 incidents).



Lights of the IKN project at night; the project was built by dispossessing the customary territory of the Balik Tribe. Photo source: AMAN documentation




Figure 5: Agrarian Conflicts in the Infrastructure Sector

One of the most prominent cases in 2025 occurred in Kampung Tembesi Tower, Sagulung Subdistrict, Batam City, Riau Islands Province. On 8 January 2025, residents faced forced eviction by PT Tanjung Piayu Makmur (TPM), supported by a joint task force involving the military, police, municipal public order officers, internal security units, and the Batam Free Trade Zone Authority. The eviction affected approximately 12 hectares of land and displaced at least 800 households who had lived in the area for around 25 years. Residents strongly criticized the eviction process, which treated long-term residents as illegal occupants despite the fact that they had paid local taxes for years and had access to public services such as electricity, water, and paved roads provided by the Batam City Government.

Another significant conflict occurred in Penajam Paser Utara (PPU), East Kalimantan, involving residents of Telemow Village, Sepaku Subdistrict, and PT International Timber Corporation Indonesia Kartika Utama (ITCI-KU). While legal proceedings were ongoing against four villagers accused of land grabbing and threats, the company proceeded with additional land clearance, triggering renewed community protests. This conflict has persisted since 2017. Residents asserted ownership through land certificates (SHM) and sealed land documents held for more than two decades. However, PT ITCI-KU later obtained Building Use Rights (HGB) certificates from the National Land Agency, resulting in overlapping claims. Communities raised concerns about potential conflicts of interest in the issuance of these certificates. The disputed area, covering approximately 83.55 hectares, is designated for industrial estate and port development within the Nusantara Capital City (IKN) project. PT ITCI-KU is reportedly affiliated with the family of President Prabowo Subianto.

In Bekasi City, West Java, dozens of households in Kampung Pangkalan Bambu, Margajaya Subdistrict, opposed planned evictions by the Bekasi City Government as part of a riverbank normalization and spatial reorganization project. Residents rejected the plan due to its unilateral nature, lack of meaningful consultation, and failure to guarantee basic rights. According to residents, their settlements were not originally located on the riverbank. However, repeated flooding and riverbank erosion caused by water overflow gradually reduced the distance between their homes and the river. Most residents had lived in the area for more than 20 years. Protests included road blockades and demonstrations in front of the Bekasi City Government office on 3 July 2025.

3. Mining Sector

Investment and operational activities of mining corporations throughout 2025 generated 46 recorded agrarian conflict incidents, covering a total area of 58,904.68 hectares and affecting 11,020 households. Conflicts in the mining sector were predominantly linked to nickel mining operations, which accounted for 16 conflict incidents, followed by coal mining with 12 incidents. Geothermal projects and sand mining operations each contributed four conflict incidents.

> **The pattern of agrarian conflict in the mining sector throughout 2025 exposes the structural contradictions of the government's energy transition agenda. Commodities framed as solutions for sustainable energy development are, in practice, not free from land grabbing, violence, criminalization, and environmental harm.**

Although mining - particularly nickel - is frequently promoted as part of Indonesia's clean energy transition, conditions on the ground demonstrate that extractive practices remain largely unchanged. Behind the narrative of renewable and transition energy, mining operations continue to rely on land acquisition, displacement, and environmentally destructive practices that reproduce agrarian conflict, social tension, and ecological degradation.



The Wayamli Indigenous community in Maba, East Halmahera, North Maluku, was subjected to violence and criminalization for defending its customary territory from seizure by the nickel mining company PT Sambaki Tambang Sentosa (STS).




Figure 6: Agrarian Conflicts in the Mining Sector

One prominent case involved PT Bukit Asam (PTBA), which forcibly cleared land belonging to 262 residents of Darmo Village, Muara Enim Regency, South Sumatra, for the construction of a Coal Handling Facility (CHF) TLS 6 and 7. This conflict has persisted since 2022, without a fair resolution. The affected land had been cultivated for generations and served as the primary source of livelihood for peasant households through rubber farming. Initially, PTBA agreed to provide compensation based on South Sumatra Governor Regulation No. 40 of 2017, which regulates compensation rates for land and crops. However, the company later shifted to using Presidential Regulation No. 78 of 2023 (amending Presidential Regulation No. 62 of 2018), which focuses on social assistance rather than fair compensation. This policy shift significantly reduced the value of restitution offered to affected communities.

In Paser Regency, East Kalimantan, conflict between local residents and PT Mantimin Coal Mining (MCM) escalated following the arrest of a community member, Misran Toni, who opposed the company's alleged illegal coal hauling activities. Residents viewed the arrest as an attempt to silence community resistance. Since 2023, PT MCM's coal hauling operations on public roads have caused repeated social conflict and have reportedly resulted in at least seven serious injuries and fatalities.

Another case occurred in Pekaulang Village, Maba Subdistrict, East Halmahera, North Maluku, involving PT Sambaki Tambang Sentosa. On 14 April 2025, the company cleared peasant plantations, destroying hundreds of coconut trees across 3.6 hectares of land. In addition to land clearing, the company was found to be operating without a valid Environmental Impact Assessment (AMDAL), a violation later confirmed by the East Halmahera Environmental Agency.



4. Property and Real Estate Sector

Throughout this year, there were 36 outbreaks of agrarian conflict in the property sector, covering a total area of 2,370.17 hectares and affecting 10,807 households. Most conflicts in this sector were caused by housing development (including the government's three-million-housing program) and real estate projects, accounting for 23 cases. This was followed by unilateral claims over community-managed land and agricultural areas by government asset holders in 10 cases, with the remaining conflicts arising from the construction of office complexes (2 cases) and shopping centers (1 case).




Figure 7: Agrarian Conflicts in the Property and Real Estate Sector

One significant case occurred in Sabah Balau Village, Tanjung Bintang Subdistrict, South Lampung, where residents were forcibly evicted by the Provincial Government of Lampung under the pretext of state asset enforcement. The affected communities rejected the eviction, questioning its legal basis, as the land remained under dispute and no final court ruling had authorized execution. The eviction escalated into violent confrontation, with several residents choosing to remain on-site as excavators demolished their homes. Security forces responded with coercive measures, forcibly removing residents, resulting in injuries.

Another major incident took place in Pulo Gebang Subdistrict, Cakung, East Jakarta, on 12 February 2025. Hundreds of homes were demolished following an eviction operation led by the Jakarta District Court, supported by joint security forces consisting of the military, police, and municipal public order officers. The eviction affected residential areas covering approximately 3.8 hectares. Residents protested the operation, citing the absence of clear procedures, meaningful consultation, and adequate legal safeguards prior to demolition.

> “Ironically, the eviction of residents in the Perumnas Pulo Gebang area formed part of the government’s three-million-homes housing development program.

Additional conflicts were recorded in the Kebon Sayur area of Kapuk, Cengkareng, West Jakarta, where hundreds of households occupying approximately 22 hectares of land were evicted following a unilateral ownership claim by a private individual, Sri Herawati Arifin. The claimant relied on a historical land title (Erfpacht Verponding No. 10) allegedly transferred in 1960. However, residents uncovered multiple administrative irregularities, including evidence that the official who authorized the transfer did not hold the relevant public office at the time. Furthermore, residents identified a Supreme Court ruling (No. 55 K/PID/2015) that found the claimant guilty of document falsification related to land ownership.

5. Forestry Sector

In 2025, the forestry sector recorded 31 agrarian conflict incidents, involving a total area of 435,439.80 hectares and affecting 11,331 households. Agrarian conflicts in this sector were once again dominated by the control of Industrial Timber Plantations (HTI) by forestry corporations, with 22 cases covering an area of 360,491.80 hectares (84 percent). This was followed by conflicts related to forest concession rights (HPH), accounting for six cases, while production forests and national parks each recorded one case.

Overall, agrarian conflicts in the forestry sector increased this year compared to the previous year, rising to 25 recorded cases. The sharp increase in forestry-related agrarian conflict was primarily driven by the expansion and control of Industrial Timber Plantations (HTI) operated by forestry corporations. While only 14 HTI-related conflict cases were recorded in the previous year, this figure rose to 22 cases in the current reporting period. This increase was partly attributable to the implementation of the Forest Area Enforcement Policy (Penertiban Kawasan Hutan/PKH), which has generated heightened tensions with communities already in conflict with corporate HTI control. A more detailed analysis of PKH-related cases is presented in Chapter III.



The Dayak Indigenous community in Nunukan Regency, East Kalimantan, is urging PT Adindi Hutani Lestari (AHL) to immediately halt its operations on their customary territory




Figure 8: Agrarian Conflicts in the Forestry Sector

One agrarian conflict in the forestry sector occurred between the Dayak Kualan Indigenous community and PT Mayawana Persada in Ketapang Regency, West Kalimantan. The company holds an Industrial Timber Plantation (IUPHHK-HTI) concession of 136,710 hectares across Ketapang and Kayong Utara Regencies, which the Kualan Hilir community has opposed from the outset. Between 2021 and 2022, the conflict escalated into the seizure of Indigenous land and threats of criminalization. In 2023, community representatives sought customary sanctions (batang adat) or compensation for land clearing and economic losses, an action that later led to the criminalization of Tarsisius Fendy Sesupi, the customary leader of Lelayang Hamlet, who was charged in December 2025 with alleged extortion.

In North Kalimantan, agrarian conflict between the Dayak Indigenous communities of the Murut Agabag, Okolod, Yahoo, Tenggalan, and Tidung groups and PT Adindo Hutani Lestari (AHL) in Nunukan Regency escalated once again. Communities protested the company's actions in poisoning cassava (ubi singkong or iluy) crops belonging to residents, as well as prohibiting community members from cultivating their gardens. The communities also demanded that PT AHL comply with a 2007 agreement, including the release of land within a 500-meter buffer on both sides of the Trans-Kalimantan Road and a 250-meter buffer on both sides of roads under the authority of the Nunukan Regency Government.



A peasant holds a poster demanding the closure of PT TPL for harming Indigenous communities in the Tano Batak region

Another long-standing agrarian conflict in the forestry sector involves the Sihaporas Indigenous community and PT Toba Pulp Paper (TPL). This conflict, which has persisted for more than three decades, escalated again following an attack on community members on 22 September 2025. Thousands of individuals, allegedly acting on behalf of the company, suddenly attacked residents in Buttu Pangaturan, Simalungun Regency. The violent assault resulted in injuries to 33 people, 18 of whom were women. The attack also led to the destruction of the community's struggle post, farming shelters, homes, and vehicles. Throughout the year, PT TPL reportedly carried out repeated attacks and unilateral evictions of community farmland. These actions occurred in the absence of firm or effective responses from government authorities.

6. Military Facilities Sector

Throughout 2025, agrarian conflicts resulting from unilateral military land claims and military involvement in advancing government programs led to 24 recorded conflicts, covering an area of 5,894.48 hectares and affecting 68,934 households. These conflicts were primarily driven by unilateral military claims over community land and settlements, accounting for 17 cases, and forced evictions for the development of Combat Training Centers (Puslatpur), which accounted for 4 cases.

In aggregate, agrarian conflicts linked to military land claims increased by up to 300 percent compared to 2024, when only six agrarian conflict cases were recorded. This sharp increase was due to the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) involvement in several government priority programs, including the food security program, the Forest Area Enforcement Task Force (Satgas PKH), the establishment of new military regional commands, and the deployment of Territorial Development Battalions (BTP) across multiple regions. These initiatives have generated widespread friction with local communities (see Chapter III).



Figure 9: Agrarian Conflicts in the Military Facilities Sector



TNI boundary markers on agricultural land belonging to residents of Balung Kulon Village, Jember Regency, East Java.

One case recorded this year involved a conflict between residents of Tongkol Dalam, Ancol Urban Village, North Jakarta, and Kodam Jaya, triggered by arbitrary evictions by security personnel. Although residents were willing in principle to relocate, they rejected the inhumane eviction process. In late 2024, residents were offered IDR 10 million per household, accompanied by threats that eviction would proceed regardless of acceptance.

Another conflict in Jakarta occurred between residents of Srengseng Sawah, South Jakarta, and the Army Strategic Reserve Engineering Corps (Zeni Kostrad) over the enforcement of Indonesian Army asset claims. The conflict arose after residents rejected what they viewed as a unilateral eviction lacking a clear legal basis.

E. Distribution of Agrarian Conflicts

> Throughout the year, agrarian conflicts erupted in 33 of Indonesia's 38 provinces, indicating that agrarian conflict has become a near-nationwide phenomenon.

However, due to the limitations of the methods we employed, the actual distribution of agrarian conflicts may be broader than reflected in this data. In this report, we present and analyze only the five provinces with the highest incidence of agrarian conflicts in Indonesia in 2025 (see Figure 10).



Former East Timor refugees residing in Naibonat Village, Kupang Regency, East Nusa Tenggara, rejected eviction by the Indonesian Army (TNI AD) for the construction of military facilities.


ACEH
6 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 5.000,00 HA resulted in 1.000 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
RIAU
14 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 220.856,40 HA resulted in 9.378 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
KEPULAUAN RIAU
11 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 16.693,60 HA resulted in 10.151 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
BANGKA BELITUNG
1 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 5.039,11 HA resulted in 588 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
KALIMANTAN BARAT
9 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 139.634,43 HA resulted in 161 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
KALIMANTAN TENGAH
6 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 1.183,60 HA resulted in 16 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
KALIMANTAN SELATAN
2 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 0 HA resulted in 0 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
SUMATERA UTARA
36 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 52.065,09 HA resulted in 2.613 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
SUMATERA BARAT
4 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 47.706,00 HA resulted in 796 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
JAMBI
13 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 3.197,00 HA resulted in 1.389 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
BENGKULU
3 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 600,00 HA resulted in 414 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
LAMPUNG
7 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 35.400,23 HA resulted in 3.871 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
SUMATERA SELATAN
3 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 1.000,00 HA resulted in 280 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
BANTEN
9 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 6.378,00 HA resulted in 1.316 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
DKJ JAKARTA
21 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 1.021,78 HA resulted in 4.746 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
JAWA BARAT
39 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 2.894,90 HA resulted in 6.891,00 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
JAWA TENGAH
15 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 621,20 HA resulted in 32 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
YOGYAKARTA
6 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 6,00 HA resulted in 64 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
JAWA TIMUR
6 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 4.181,18 HA resulted in 67.000 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims
BALI
1 ESCALATION OF AGRARIAN CONFLICT
covering 0,00 HA resulted in 13 HOUSEHOLDS becoming victims




Figure 10: Distribution of Agrarian Conflicts by Province

West Java recorded the highest number of conflicts, with 39 cases covering 2,894.90 hectares and affecting 6,891 families. This was followed by North Sumatra with 36 cases covering 52,065.09 hectares and affecting 2,613 families. South Papua recorded 23 cases covering 239,262.90 hectares. Jakarta experienced 21 conflicts affecting 4,746 families across 1,021.78 hectares, while South Sulawesi recorded 20 cases covering 33,289.93 hectares.

In West Java, agrarian conflicts were dominated by the property and real estate sector (17 cases), followed by infrastructure development (10 cases), plantations (6 cases), mining (4 cases), and one case each in the forestry sector and military facilities.

One of the recorded cases involved a conflict between residents of Sukahaji, Babakan Ciparay Subdistrict, Bandung City, and PT Xressi Jaga Nusantara (PT XJN). The conflict was triggered by the company's claim over approximately 7 hectares of land, which prompted resistance from local residents. Community resistance was met with widespread intimidation by the company, reportedly involving mass organizations (ormas). In Cianjur Regency, hundreds of residents rejected plans for the development of a geothermal power plant (Pembangkit Listrik Panas Bumi/PLTP) by PT Dayamas Geopatra Pangrango. Community opposition was driven by concerns that the geothermal project would result in the loss of agricultural land and community-managed areas, as well as increased risks of disaster, including micro-earthquakes, land subsidence, and broader ecological disruption. Residents also raised concerns about the potential degradation of the protected forest ecosystem of Mount Gede.

Meanwhile, agrarian conflicts in North Sumatra were dominated by the plantation sector, which accounted for 13 conflict incidents, followed by the forestry sector with 11 incidents. Infrastructure development contributed four conflict incidents, while military facilities and property development each accounted for two cases.

One of the conflicts in North Sumatra involved residents of Parbuluan VI Village, Parbuluan Subdistrict, and PT Gunung Raya Timber (PT Gruti) in Dairi Regency. Residents opposed the company's operations due to concerns over forest destruction in areas that had long functioned as ecological buffer zones for the community. The conflict escalated on 12 November 2025 when Pangihutan Sijabat, Chair of Pejuang Tani Bersama Alam (Petabal), was arbitrarily arrested by police. This arrest triggered

public protests in front of the Dairi District Police headquarters, which escalated into clashes resulting in the detention of 35 community members by law enforcement authorities.

An agrarian conflict then arose between the Malay Indigenous community of Petumbukan Village, Langkat Regency, and PTPN II when hundreds of residents sought to install boundary markers and set up a community post on about 302 hectares of former PTPN plantation land. The attempt was blocked by PTPN II employees, leading to confrontation and escalating tensions. PTPN II claimed it still held valid legal rights over the land, while the community argued that the HGU had expired on 9 June 2025 and that the land had reverted to customary (ulayat) territory.

In South Papua Province, 23 agrarian conflicts recorded throughout the year were largely driven by the implementation of food estate programs and national food and energy self-sufficiency initiatives. One notable case involved the arbitrary arrest (criminalization) of Stenly Dambujai, coordinator of Suara Kaum Awam Katolik Papua (Voice of the Catholic Laity of Papua). The arrest was linked to a silent protest he conducted on Sunday morning, 7 December 2025, in front of the Catholic Church of the Divine Mercy Parish in Kelapa Lima, Merauke. During the protest, he displayed posters that were deemed to disrupt church activities. The silent action was an expression of disappointment with the church's perceived lack of a firm stance against the seizure of Indigenous land and territories in Merauke for food estate development.

Another case involved an agrarian conflict between residents of Soa Village, Tanah Miring District, Merauke Regency, and PT Global Papua Abadi (GPA). The company was accused of seizing community land and Indigenous territory for the implementation of national food self-sufficiency programs.



Fully armed TNI troops accompanied the land-clearing process for the food estate project in Merauke.
Photo source: Pusaka Bentala Rakyat

In Jakarta, of the 21 agrarian conflict incidents recorded throughout the year, infrastructure development accounted for eight cases, military facility claims for seven cases, and property and real estate development for six cases. Notable incidents included the eviction of traders at Cikini Flower Market, the eviction of residents in Kebon Sayur, the eviction of traders at Barito Bird Market, the conflict between residents of Sunter Jaya and Kodam Jaya, the eviction of residents in Menteng Pulo, and the conflict between residents of North Manggarai and PT Kereta Api Indonesia (PT KAI) resulting from unilateral land claims by the state-owned enterprise.

In South Sulawesi Province, at least 20 agrarian conflict incidents were recorded during the year, affecting 33,289.93 hectares. These conflicts were mainly driven by state-owned and private plantation operations (11 cases), followed by mining (4 cases), infrastructure development (3 cases), and property development and military facilities (one case each). Notable conflicts involved residents of Takalar Regency and Mantadulu, East Luwu, with PTPN XIV; residents of Luwu Regency with PT Masmindo Dwi Area; the Rampi Indigenous community with PT Kalla Arebama; the To Cerekan Indigenous community with PT Prima Utama Lestari; and residents of Banteng Village with PT Hangseng in the Bantaeng Industrial Estate (KIBA).



Peasants participating in the 2025 National Peasants' Day demonstration carried posters rejecting the seizure of people's land by the Forest Area Enforcement Task Force (Satgas PKH).

F. Actors, Victims, and Areas Affected by Agrarian Conflicts

1. Actors Causing Agrarian Conflicts

> Throughout 2025, we observed the involvement of multiple actors, ranging from business entities, state-owned enterprises, central and regional government programs, to specialized agencies established to implement various strategic and national priority projects.

Private corporations at regional, national, and international levels triggered 217 agrarian conflict incidents, affecting a total area of 817,490.86 hectares and impacting 37,910 families. Meanwhile, unilateral operations and land claims by state-owned enterprises (SOEs) on community land resulted in 51 conflict incidents, covering 20,469.43 hectares and affecting 2,717 families. Agrarian conflicts between government authorities (central and regional) and local communities occurred in 34 cases, spanning 46,161.72 hectares and impacting 3,923 families. Conflicts between communities and the military amounted to 24 incidents, affecting 5,894.48 hectares and 68,934 families. Conflicts between special authorities (such as development or infrastructure agencies) and communities were recorded in 14 incidents, covering 16,818.47 hectares and affecting 10,048 families. Finally, a conflict between the Land Bank and local communities involved one case, covering 7,740 hectares and impacting 80 families.



Figure 11: Actors Causing Agrarian Conflicts

One of the agrarian conflicts caused by unilateral claims and operations of private corporations involved the Dayak Indigenous Community in Nunukan, North Kalimantan, and PT Adindo Hutani Lestari (AHL), a subsidiary of the APRIL Group, which is part of Sukanto Tanoto's Royal Golden Eagle. PT Adindo Hutani Lestari seized community land and customary territories while criminalizing five community members, including the village head, on charges of encroaching on company land.

Meanwhile, an agrarian conflict involving a state-owned enterprise occurred between the residents of Peleru Village in North Morowali Regency and PT Sinergi Perkebunan Nusantara (SPN). This conflict between the PTPN subsidiary and the community was triggered by the company's claim of ownership over community land. In the latest case, PT SPN criminalized a resident named Adhar Ompo, accusing him of harvesting the company's oil palm. In fact, Adhar Ompo had been cultivating the land since the 1990s, supported by a certificate of business ownership (SKUK).


Another conflict between residents and the government involved the Padang City Government in West Sumatra and street vendors. This conflict arose from efforts to evict street vendors in the Permindo area near Pasar Raya Padang, following the revocation of regulations that previously allowed vendors to operate there. During the clash, two vendors were injured while confronting the Public Order Agency (Satpol PP).

An agrarian conflict between the military and residents occurred, among others, between the Kostrad Engineering Unit and residents of Srengseng Sawah, Jagakarsa, South Jakarta. The conflict was triggered by the demolition of residents' homes, many of whom are veterans, carried out by the military unit. Residents rejected the demolition, claiming it was a unilateral decision without mediation and lacking clear legal basis.

A conflict between a special authority and residents occurred, for example, between thousands of street vendors in the Borobudur Tourism Area and PT Taman Wisata Candi (TWC). PT TWC is the company managing the Borobudur Tourism Area under In Journey, a special authority established to develop the National Strategic Tourism Area (KSPN). PT TWC relocated nearly 2,000 vendors from Zone 2 of Borobudur to Kampung Seni Borobudur, located in Dusun Kujon, Zone 3 on the west side of the temple. The clearance of stalls and relocation of Borobudur vendors was reported to the Central Java

Ombudsman in November 2024. The Ombudsman recorded that 324 vendors had not yet received stall rights at Kampung Seni Borobudur.

Finally, a conflict occurred between the Land Bank and residents of Watutau Village, Poso Regency, Central Sulawesi. This conflict has actually been ongoing for several years, triggered by the Land Bank's unilateral claims over community land. The residents' rejection of these unilateral claims and the installation of markers by the Land Bank resulted in the criminalization of 12 community members. Most recently, one of them, Christian Toibo, has been formally named a suspect.



Boundary marker installed by the Land Bank in Watutau Village, Poso Regency, Central Sulawesi.


2. Victims and Areas Affected by Agrarian Conflicts

> Throughout 2025, the escalation of agrarian conflicts has become increasingly concerning, particularly due to threats to peasants (food producers) and agricultural areas in Indonesia.

At least 107,099 farming families were affected by agrarian conflicts, involving 398,646.45 hectares of agricultural land.

Meanwhile, agrarian conflicts occurring in indigenous territories covered an area of 500,637.31 hectares. Conflicts also affected fishing and aquaculture areas, totaling 12,960.26 hectares, which are the livelihoods of 1,123 fishing families. Finally, agrarian conflicts in residential areas impacted 2,430.82 hectares, affecting 13,920 families.

In sum, agrarian conflicts throughout 2025 increasingly threaten agricultural and food security, assuming that indigenous territories also function as local food production centers that have historically supported national food sufficiency.



Excavator clearing land for a food estate project in Merauke, South Papua.
Photo source: Pusaka Bentala Rakyat



Figure 12: Victims and Areas Affected by Agrarian Conflicts

One of the agrarian conflicts occurring on community food and agricultural land involved the unilateral operation of PT Setia Agro Abadi (SAA) in Mahakam Ulu Regency, East Kalimantan. The palm oil company seized 6,101 hectares of community farmland in Tri Pariq Makmur Village, much of which had certified ownership titles. Potential conflicts due to PT SAA's operations were also identified in five other villages - Long Hubung Ulu, Matalibaq, Memahak Teboq, and Wana Pariq - totaling nearly 20,000 hectares of disputed land.

In Labuhan Batu Regency, North Sumatra, two peasants' groups - Mekar Tani and Serbaguna D in Kuala Bangka Village, Kualuh Hilir Subdistrict - were in conflict with PT Torganda. The company took over 3,423 hectares of indigenous territories and productive community farmland to develop oil palm plantations. This conflict has prevented hundreds of families from continuing their farming activities.

These agrarian conflicts in indigenous territories, agricultural areas, and fishing grounds demonstrate the lack of strong political commitment from the government to protect community farmland and food systems. Amid President Prabowo's rhetoric and ambition for national food self-sufficiency, the government continues to allow community agricultural land and food sources to be threatened by investment interests and national strategic projects.

The government is gradually moving away from people-centered agricultural and food systems. At the policy level, through the Job Creation Law (UU Cipta Kerja), the government has opened opportunities for the conversion of sustainable farmland in the name of National Strategic Projects (PSN). To address the ongoing food crisis, the government has instead opened indigenous territories and forests and confiscated community farmland to develop large-scale, corporate-operated agriculture (food estate).

A protester displays one of the demands of the 2025 National Peasants' Day action, calling for the repeal of the Job Creation Law, in front of the MPR-DPR RI Building on September 24 2025.



G. Patterns of Violence, Criminalization, and Human Rights Violations in Agrarian Conflicts

Year after year, the patterns and approaches to handling agrarian conflict areas have remained unchanged, still discriminatory and repressive. Cases of violence and legal discrimination (criminalization) in agrarian conflict zones continue to increase.

> **The growing involvement of the military in land acquisition programs and government strategic projects is also a key factor driving the rising trend of violence and criminalization in handling agrarian conflicts.**



Residents of Sukahaji, Bandung City, repeatedly faced violence for defending their land against PT Xressi Jaga Nusantara (PT XJN).
Photo source: Yogi Muharam / BandungBergerak

Throughout 2025, at least 736 people were victims of violence and criminalization in agrarian conflict areas, including 135 women and 601 men. Among them, 404 people were criminalized (19 women and 385 men), 312 people were physically assaulted (114 women and 198 men), 19 were shot, and 1 person died.



Figure 13: Victims of Violence and Criminalization in Agrarian Conflict Areas

Compared to 2024, cases of criminalization and violence in agrarian conflict areas rose significantly, increasing by 32 percent. This situation calls for a fundamental evaluation of agrarian conflict management in Indonesia, which annually results in civilian casualties.

The government's approach, which frames community protests in the field as a security issue rather than addressing the structural problems arising from public officials issuing permits and concessions on community land, is a root cause of the problem. Rather than holding ministers or officials accountable, the government typically deploys thousands of security personnel, often fully armed.




Figure 14: Increase in Cases of Violence and Criminalization in Agrarian Conflict Areas

The cases of criminalization and violence throughout 2025 still involved traditional actors in agrarian conflict management, such as the Police, TNI (Indonesian military), Satpol PP (Public Order Agency), and company security forces. According to data collected by KPA, company security forces were responsible for the most violence, with 233 cases, followed by police (114 cases), TNI (70 cases), and Satpol PP (36 cases).



Figure 15: Actors of Violence and Criminalization in the Handling of Agrarian Conflicts

One of the shooting incidents this year involved a female peasant in Pasinan Village, Lekok Subdistrict, Pasuruan Regency, East Java, shot by members of the 15th Battalion of the Indonesian Navy (TNI AL). The case began as a land dispute between residents of 10 villages and the TNI AL, which planned to build a battalion and a school. Residents rejected the plan because only 379 hectares were allocated for the relocation of 67,000 families.



Rahmad Dani (42), a resident of Amplas Village, Percut Sei Tuan Subdistrict, Deli Serdang, North Sumatra, was shot dead while defending his land in conflict with PTPN II. Photo source: Medan Pos

In North Luwu Regency, 17 Rampi Indigenous people were criminalized for rejecting mining by PT Kalla Arebama. The community's resistance arose because the company's operations had destroyed rice fields, gardens, sacred sites, and cemeteries that are the sources of livelihood and identity for the Rampi Indigenous people.

Rampi Indigenous people in South Sulawesi defending their customary territories from seizure by PT Kalla Arebama for gold mining. Seventeen Indigenous people were criminalized for defending their rights.



In South Konawe, three peasants from the Angata Peasants' Group suffered serious injuries after being assaulted by employees of PT Marketindo Selaras. The conflict originated from the operation of a 1,300-hectare palm oil plantation owned by a subsidiary of the Artha Graha Group, which seized community land.

In Deli Serdang, Rahmad Dani (42) was shot dead, an incident linked to an escalating agrarian conflict between residents and PTPN II that culminated in clashes. His death highlights the prolonged nature of agrarian conflicts between communities and state-owned plantations. Last year, two other residents were killed by PTPN.



Lines of protesters and demands during the 2025 National Peasants' Day action in front of the MPR-DPR RI Building on September 24, 2025.



Prayers and tribute to Agrarian Reform Defenders who became victims of repression while defending their land rights. This moment concluded the National Peasants' Day 2025 action.

CHAPTER III
THE POWER BEHIND AGRARIAN CONFLICTS IN 2025



A. Agrarian Conflicts as a Mechanism for Business Accumulation

In 2025, giant business networks dominated agrarian conflicts, most of which involved private corporations and state-owned enterprises operating across multiple agrarian sectors. These business groups, both private and state-owned, are among the largest landholders in Indonesia, active in plantations, mining, forestry, infrastructure development, as well as tourism, property, and real estate.

This chapter focuses on the networks and connections of the corporations responsible for agrarian conflicts in 2025, specifically within three key sectors: plantations, forestry, and mining.



Solidaritas Merauke urging the government to halt the PSN Food Estate project on indigenous and peasant lands.

> In the plantation sector, 64 percent of corporations causing agrarian conflicts were part of or affiliated with giant business groups, including state-owned plantation companies (PTPN).

Notable business groups include Royal Golden Eagle (RGE), Wilmar, Sinar Mas, Salim, Sampoerna Agro, Jardine Matheson, Jhonlin Group, and Artha Graha.



Children of peasant families from the Pasundan Peasant Union (SPP), attending a community school built by their parents, perform a theatrical reenactment showing the repression peasants face in defending their land from PTPN and Perhutani. This performance was part of the 2025 National Peasants' Day action.





Figure 16: Plantation Corporations Affiliated with Giant Business Groups

> In the mining sector, 72 percent of corporations causing agrarian conflicts were affiliated with major business groups such as Bakrie Group, Sinar Mas, Harita Group, Barito Pacific, Harum Energy, Indika Energy, Bayan Resources, and several state-owned enterprises including PT Timah, Pertamina, PT Antam, and PT Mineral Industri Indonesia.




Gaga Island in Raja Ampat, Southwest Papua, opened for nickel mining by PT Gag Nickel, a subsidiary of state-owned PT Aneka Tambang. Photo Source: Jubi



Figure 17: Mining Corporations Affiliated with Giant Business Groups

> In the forestry sector, 80 percent of corporations causing agrarian conflicts this year were affiliated with major groups such as Royal Golden Eagle, Sinar Mas, Parna Raya, Mujur Group, and the state forestry company Perum Perhutani.



Marker installed by the PKH Task Force in the Priority Location for Agrarian Reform (LPRA) of the Tebo Peasant Union, Jambi, still in conflict with Sinar Mas subsidiary PT Wira Karya Sakti.




Figure 18: Forestry Corporations Affiliated with Giant Business Groups

Agrarian conflicts involving large corporations are not simply a side effect; they function as a mechanism for accumulation itself. Through large-scale land control - preceded by permits, administrative coercion, and violence - peasant land is converted from living space into capital production assets. At this point, the conflict begins as a way for corporations to gain cheap access to land, natural resources, and labor.

Within this framework, the state often acts as a facilitator of accumulation rather than a neutral conflict mediator. Legal and spatial planning apparatuses are used to legitimize dispossession, while conflict resolution is reduced to compensation or technical mediation rather than structural justice. As a result, agrarian conflicts are never truly resolved fairly. Conflicts become instruments to expand concessions, normalize inequality, and secure long-term accumulation, while the social and ecological costs fall on local communities and future generations.



Protesters during the 2025 National Peasants' Day action carry posters rejecting the PSN Food Estate project in Merauke, South Papua.

B. Agrarian Conflicts as a Means of Consolidation and Strengthening the Military's Economic-Political Role

> The massive involvement of the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) in civilian affairs - ranging from food programs, security for plantation investments, food estate development, to forest area enforcement - has been highly dominant during the first year of the Prabowo–Gibran administration.

In agrarian issues, the military no longer acts merely as a supporting policy actor, but is directly involved in the agenda of food–energy self-sufficiency and in the handling of agrarian conflicts.

Over the past year, KPA data for 2025 show that military involvement is associated with an increase in agrarian conflicts, intertwined with violence, friction during forest area enforcement operations, and other coercive approaches to conflict resolution.



Residents of Srengseng Sawah, Jagakarsa, South Jakarta, reject forced eviction carried out by the Kostrad Engineering Battalion

The escalation of military involvement reflects a worrying trend. Agrarian conflicts involving the military sector surged by 300 percent, from six cases in 2024 to twenty-four cases in 2025. Military operations claimed as support for food and energy self-sufficiency triggered ten conflict outbreaks, accounting for approximately 41 percent of total conflicts in this sector. Forest enforcement operations resulted in at least twenty-one cases of forced eviction and violence.

Throughout 2025, the TNI was recorded as committing seventy acts of violence in the handling of agrarian conflicts - an increase of 89 percent compared to the previous year and part of a consistent upward trend over the past five years. This pattern reinforces the perception that agrarian conflict is increasingly treated as a security issue rather than as a structural problem rooted in unequal land control. This situation has intensified since the establishment of the Forest Area Enforcement Task Force (Satgas PKH) through Presidential Regulation No. 5 of 2025. Normatively, the task force is claimed to aim at disciplining corporations that damage forests and restoring forest areas to state control. In practice, however, task force operations have disproportionately targeted local communities and peasants.

Meanwhile, the involvement of military personnel in forest enforcement efforts has resulted in 21 cases of violence and forced evictions across several provinces, including North Sumatra, Riau, Jambi, and West Kalimantan. Overall, cases of violence involving the TNI in the handling of agrarian conflicts across various regions reached a total of 70 cases.



Residents of Pelalawan Regency, Riau, reject the seizure of their agricultural land by the Forest Area Enforcement Task Force (Satgas PKH), which claims the area as part of Tesso Nilo National Park. For years, the community has defended their land from eviction attempts by PT Riau Andalan Pulp and Paper.

1. Militarization of Forest Area Enforcement

In January 2025, President Prabowo established the Forest Area Enforcement Task Force (Satgas PKH) through Presidential Regulation No. 5 of 2025 on Forest Area Enforcement (PKH). Article 2 paragraph (1) of the regulation states: *"For the handling and improvement of governance of mining, plantation, and/or other activities within Forest Areas, as well as the optimization of state revenue, the Central Government shall undertake government actions in the form of forest area enforcement."*

Operating under the direct command of President Prabowo, the task force is mandated to carry out forest area enforcement through administrative fines, the repossession of forest areas, and/or asset recovery. From the government's perspective, the establishment of this task force is expected to serve as a strategic step to take action against rogue corporations that have long operated within forest areas.



According to data from the Attorney General's Office, as of December 2025, Satgas PKH has succeeded in repossessing forest areas to state control covering a total area of 4,081,560.58 hectares. This achievement reflects one year of operations since the task force was formed in January.

While Satgas PKH is considered successful in reclaiming forest areas from corporations for the state, its operations in various regions have also triggered tensions with local communities. Since its establishment, Satgas PKH operations have resulted in 21 agrarian conflict cases involving forced evictions and violence against communities, affecting a total area of 48,183.37 hectares and 480 families. These conflict outbreaks are spread across several provinces, including North Sumatra, Jambi, Riau, and West Kalimantan.




Figure 19: Number, Area, and Location of Forced Evictions and Violence Resulting from Forest Area Enforcement

One prominent case involves an agrarian conflict between the Indigenous Anak Kemenakan community of the Melayu Rantau Kasai people and TNI personnel in North Tambusai Sub-district, Rokan Hulu Regency, Riau Province. The conflict was triggered by the unilateral action of Satgas PKH in sealing land located in the former plasma plantation area of PT Torganda. The community stated that they never received any coordination or communication from PT Agrinas.

Another case concerns the unilateral installation of boundary markers by Satgas PKH on Indigenous land in Nanga Nuar Village, Silat Hilir Sub-district, Kapuas Hulu Regency, West Kalimantan. Satgas PKH justified the installation of prohibition signs as an effort to discipline PT Riau Agrotama Plantation (RAP), which was claimed to still be managing the land. However, according to a joint official report by the Kapuas Hulu District TP3K and PT RAP, the 330.10-hectare land located in Nanga Nuar Village had already been returned to the community.

In Tebo Regency, Jambi Province, Satgas PKH seized 20,660 hectares of peasant land that had long been in conflict with PT Wira Karya Sakti, a subsidiary of the Sinar Mas

Group. Beyond Tebo, Satgas PKH also installed boundary stakes or signage at 16 locations across Batanghari, West Tanjung Jabung, Muaro Jambi, and Sarolangun regencies. Rather than disciplining illegal control by oil palm, timber, and mining corporations, Satgas PKH instead appropriated community agricultural land and gardens.

During meetings between the Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA) and the leadership of the House of Representatives, the Minister of Forestry, and the Minister of Agrarian Affairs/Head of the National Land Agency (ATR/BPN), the government had been warned from the outset about the on-the-ground implementation of the task force. If forest area enforcement through Satgas PKH is not carried out within the framework of agrarian conflict resolution and agrarian and forestry reform, its operations will inevitably generate friction with communities and lead to renewed agrarian conflicts. Below are KPA critical notes regarding the implementation of forest area enforcement.

First, the phrase "every person" used in the Presidential Regulation equates the legal standing of local communities with that of corporations, despite corporations being the primary actors responsible for forest destruction. As a result, these operations are highly likely to target peasants, Indigenous Peoples, and rural communities that have long been in conflict with claims over "State Forest Areas."

Second, the enforcement procedures carried out by Satgas PKH have strong potential to revive the forestry *domein verklaring* doctrine and trigger the expansion of agrarian conflicts. This is because their implementation lacks transparency, discriminates against communities, and disregards the historical context of land tenure by peasants and local populations.

Third, many areas (villages and hamlets) across Indonesia have been unilaterally designated as "state forest areas" without proper boundary harmonization with community territories. In reality, many of these areas have long functioned as agricultural land, settlements, villages, and Indigenous territories inhabited for generations. Many of these locations possess administrative evidence such as village decrees, land and building tax documents (SPPT), and customary or communal land letters. As a result of these unilateral designations, many villages fall within claims of "state forest areas." Data from the Ministry of Villages and Development of

Disadvantaged Regions (Kemendes PDT) in 2024 show that 2,966 villages are located within forest areas.

Fourth, the overly formalistic and militaristic approach fails to apply the principle of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC). Enforcement is based solely on industrial plantation forest permits (SK HTI) and forest area release permits (SK IPPKH) for plantations and mining. This approach ignores the socio-historical context of territories and overlooks the historical existence of customary land rights and community land tenure. Communities that have lived in these areas for generations are viewed as illegal occupants on "state land," rather than as the parties with the strongest legitimate claims.

Fifth, the involvement of security forces shifts the core issue from agrarian justice to security, creating a binary logic of orderly versus illegal, state versus encroacher, or worse, framing communities living in areas "claimed" as forest areas as threats to the state. This results in a repressive "object enforcement" approach rather than dialogue-based engagement with communities.



The Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA), together with hundreds of peasants from the Pasundan Peasant Union (SPP) from five regencies (Pangandaran, Ciamis, Tasikmalaya, Garut, and Banjar), the Cianjur Peasant Alliance (PPC), and the Banten Peasant Movement, stage a mass action demanding the implementation of genuine Agrarian Reform.

Sixth, the large-scale deployment of security forces has generated collective and historical trauma among communities, potentially escalating tensions on the ground. Based on past experience, military involvement in handling agrarian conflicts has frequently resulted in violence and even loss of life.

Seventh, the spirit of forest area enforcement is disconnected from the agenda of resolving agrarian conflicts within the framework of agrarian reform. Rather than restoring, protecting, and recognizing the land rights of the people that have long been dispossessed by unilateral "state forest area" claims and by forestry, mining, and plantation corporations, the policy instead reflects the state's effort to reassert monopoly control over land under the pretext of the state's right to control. This situation degrades the people's rights to land.

2. Food-Energy Self-Sufficiency and Militarization

President Prabowo's ambition to expand military involvement in civilian affairs appears far from rhetorical, particularly in support of the food, water, and energy self-sufficiency programs that are positioned as priority and strategic pillars of the Asta Cita administration. Military involvement in food programs is not new; it has been ongoing since 2020, when Prabowo was still serving as Minister of Defense under President Jokowi. At that time, President Jokowi appointed the Minister of Defense as the leading sector for the development of the national food estate. Jokowi justified this decision by framing food reserves as a strategic component of national defense.

Upon assuming the presidency, Prabowo appears increasingly committed to embedding the military in national food governance. The Indonesian government, through the Ministry of Defense and the Indonesian Army (TNI AD), is currently establishing several new Regional Military Commands (Kodam) across various regions. In parallel, the government has also designed the establishment of 100 Territorial Development Battalions (BTP), out of a target of 500 within five years. These Kodam and BTP units are intended to support programs on food, water, and energy security.

In August 2025, the TNI inaugurated six new Kodam covering regions including Riau–Riau Islands, West Sumatra–Jambi, Lampung–Bengkulu, Central Kalimantan–South Kalimantan, Central Sulawesi–West Sulawesi, and South Papua. The plan also includes the establishment of five additional Kodam in 2026, covering East Nusa Tenggara,

Central Papua, Southwest Papua, the Special Region of Yogyakarta, and North Maluku, with a long-term target of 22 new Kodam.

> Instructions to support food, water, and energy security programs have prompted the TNI to employ various measures, particularly in land acquisition, to facilitate these priority programs.

Unilateral "claims" by the TNI over land used for peasant farming and community settlements have increased alongside military involvement in food and energy self-sufficiency initiatives. Agrarian conflicts between the TNI and communities related to these programs have triggered at least ten conflict outbreaks in various regions, including:

1. An agrarian conflict between Kodam XII/Tanjungpura in Kubu Raya Regency, Central Kalimantan, and residents of Sungai Raya Village. The eviction was carried out to expand Kodam territory in connection with planned food self-sufficiency programs.



Seizure of land belonging to residents of Tanalili by TNI forces for the construction of the Territorial Development Battalion (Yon TP) 872 headquarters in North Luwu Regency, South Sulawesi.

2. The construction of a new Kodam in East Nusa Tenggara to support food self-sufficiency has caused an agrarian conflict between the TNI and former East Timor communities in Naibobat. The TNI unilaterally claimed land that has been occupied by the community since 1999.

3. An agrarian conflict between Kodam XVIII/Cenderawasih and the Indigenous Kwipalo clan community in Jagebob District, Merauke, South Papua. Kodam XVIII/Cenderawasih provided security for the development of a sugarcane plantation owned by PT Murni Nusantara Mandiri (MNM), part of a National Strategic Food Project (PSN). The plantation development encroached on Kwipalo customary land without consent. During 2025, two conflict outbreaks occurred due to this project.

4. An agrarian conflict between residents of Sumberanyar Village, Pasuruan Regency, East Java, and the TNI related to plans to construct the Indonesian Navy's 15th Battalion. Residents rejected the plan due to the potential eviction of their agricultural land. The construction of Battalion 15 is linked to TNI support for food self-sufficiency programs. At least two conflict outbreaks occurred during 2025.

5. An agrarian conflict between residents of Punti Kalo Village, Sumay Sub-district, Tebo Regency, Jambi, and the Indonesian Army related to the construction of Territorial Development Battalion 844 BT. The conflict was triggered by the TNI's unilateral installation of boundary markers on community land.

6. An agrarian conflict between residents of Rancapinang Village, Cimanggu Sub-district, Pandeglang Regency, Banten, and the Indonesian Army related to plans to build Territorial Infantry Battalion (Yonif TP) 842/Badak Sakti. The conflict was triggered by the TNI's unilateral claim over 376 hectares of community land that had been cultivated by residents for decades.

7. An agrarian conflict between residents of Kaibobo Village, West Seram Sub-district, West Seram Regency, Maluku, and Kodam XVI/Pattimura related to the construction of the West Seram Territorial Development Battalion (Yonif TP SBB). The conflict was triggered by unilateral land acquisition.

8. An agrarian conflict between residents of Rampoang Village, North Luwu Regency, South Sulawesi, and Kodam XIV/Hasanuddin emerged over the construction of Combat Infantry Battalion 872, after the TNI unilaterally claimed community land. Although the provincial government stated that 75 hectares had been allocated, residents rejected the claim, asserting that 60 hectares are customary land.

From the outset, military involvement in food and energy self-sufficiency programs has been fundamentally misguided. Nevertheless, it continues to be normalized, as if military presence in fields or participation in planting activities could resolve national food problems. The romanticized narrative of food self-sufficiency during the New Order era - also involving the military - continues to be repeatedly invoked. In geopolitical studies, food is indeed recognized as a security issue; however, it constitutes a non-military security concern. As such, military involvement in food governance fails to address the root causes of Indonesia's food problems.

First, the state has misdiagnosed the food problem. Indonesia's food crisis is not a technical issue nor a failure of the people to produce food. Rather, it is rooted in a prolonged agrarian crisis marked by decades of agricultural land conversion and uncontrolled land grabbing, resulting in unequal land control, agrarian conflicts, environmental degradation, and corporate domination of food supply chains that increasingly impoverish peasants. Food militarization reduces a structural problem to a technocratic one.



Boundary markers installed by Kodam XVII/Cenderawasih appropriating 100 hectares of Indigenous territory. The land seizure is intended for the development of facilities and infrastructure for Territorial Development Infantry Battalion (YTP) 817 in Jagebob, Merauke, which provides security for the National Strategic Food Estate Project.

Second, militarization allows the state to evade its obligation to implement agrarian reform as a pathway to food sovereignty. Food self-sufficiency should align with efforts to dismantle unequal land control, restore peasant land rights, and provide comprehensive support for production and markets - outcomes that can only be achieved through genuine agrarian reform. Under a military approach, food self-sufficiency prioritizes rapid production, large-scale land clearing through food estates, and the marginalization of peasants, fisherfolks, and Indigenous Peoples as the frontline actors of national food systems.

Third, food militarization normalizes violence and coercive approaches. Militarized food governance operates through top-down command structures, excluding peasants, fisherfolks, and Indigenous Peoples from planning processes and depriving them of bargaining power. This mindset also fosters repressive actions against peasant organizations that do not conform, which are seen as obstacles, delegitimized, or treated with suspicion when they are critical or protest. This situation height ens the risk of land grabbing and criminalization of the people.



Peasants safeguard the commitments made on National Peasants' Day 2025 through actions demanding the establishment of a parliamentary special committee on agrarian conflict resolution and a National Agrarian Reform Implementing Body by the House of Representatives and the President of Indonesia.

Fourth, militarization strengthens state control over land. Military involvement in food self-sufficiency programs leads to policy centralization and reinforces state land control and ownership. Peasants are viewed merely as laborers or contract partners, while the state or corporations are positioned as land controllers and owners. This approach directly contradicts the Constitution and the Basic Agrarian Law of 1960.

Fifth, food militarization weakens democracy and civilian supremacy. Food issues should be treated as public matters that are transparent, accountable, and participatory. Military involvement closes spaces for public participation, centralizes decision-making, and obscures accountability. As a result, food policy is removed from public control.

Sixth, militarization marginalizes local food knowledge and erodes the sovereignty of peasants, fisherfolks, and Indigenous Peoples. A military approach to food policy promotes uniform, command-based production systems oriented toward market demand while neglecting the basic needs of the people. Over time, this process erodes peasant knowledge systems and undermines Indonesia's rich diversity of local food practices.

3. TNI Violence in Areas of Agrarian Conflict

KPA findings throughout 2025 indicate that the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) committed 70 acts of violence in the handling of agrarian conflicts. In aggregate, the number of violent incidents involving the TNI increased very significantly - by 89 percent - compared to the previous year. Over the past five years, cases of violence committed by the TNI in agrarian conflict areas have consistently increased each year.




Figure 20: Escalation of TNI Violence Cases Over the past 5 Years (2021–2025)

These data reinforce the concerns of many observers regarding the increasingly pronounced militaristic approach adopted by the government in recent years, particularly under the Prabowo administration. The TNI has been increasingly involved in the handling of agrarian conflicts under the pretext of maintaining national stability and security.

> In recent years, particularly under the Prabowo administration, the TNI has been increasingly involved in the handling of agrarian conflicts under the pretext of maintaining national stability and security.

The surge in violent incidents is not without cause. In late 2024, President Prabowo instructed regional governments and the TNI-Police to safeguard large-scale oil palm plantations under the pretext of protecting state assets. In reality, oil palm plantations are major epicenters of agrarian conflict, making the use of force highly likely. In practice, military involvement extends beyond plantations to include mining operations,

National Strategic Projects (PSN), and state forest areas, often justified through narratives of protecting national vital objects and stability.

The problem is that the involvement of the TNI-Police in agrarian conflict areas is frequently unjust and biased toward corporate interests rather than affected communities. This bias stems from a legal-formalistic perspective and discriminatory law enforcement practices toward peasants and local communities. The use of a military approach in handling agrarian conflicts demonstrates the state's failure to recognize and address the root causes of these conflicts.

The state tends to frame agrarian conflicts as security disturbances rather than as issues of land grabbing and structural inequality in agrarian relations. The historical land tenure of communities whose land has been seized is reduced to mere administrative or legal violations. As a result, the response centers on security operations and enforcement rather than resolution through agrarian reform.



Lines of demonstrators present their demands during the National Peasants' Day Action 2025 in front of the MPR–DPR RI building on 24 September 2025.

C. Agrarian Conflicts as an Entry Point for the Institutionalization of Food–Energy Corporations

Prabowo is one of Indonesia's presidents who has strongly employed food and energy narratives within the framework of national sovereignty. This emphasis was already evident in his inaugural address, where President Prabowo underscored the centrality of food and energy issues.

This attention is reflected in four commitments: a food security vision, food development programs, budgetary support, and the prioritization of self-sufficiency zones. The food security and self-reliance agenda is outlined as the second priority of the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2025–2029 under Presidential Regulation No. 12 of 2015, and has been positioned by the Prabowo–Gibran administration as a top priority in advancing the Indonesia Emas 2045 vision.

Unfortunately, this grand vision has not been accompanied by efforts to strengthen people-centered agriculture and food systems, nor to reinforce the position of peasants, fisherfolks, and Indigenous Peoples as the primary providers of national food. Instead, President Prabowo has steered Indonesia's food policy increasingly toward corporate interests, no longer anchored in peasants and fisherfolks.

> Unfortunately, this grand vision has not been accompanied by efforts to strengthen people-centered agriculture and food systems or to reinforce the position of peasants, fisherfolks, and Indigenous Peoples as providers of the national food supply. Instead, President Prabowo has steered Indonesia's food politics increasingly toward corporate interests, no longer grounded in peasants and fisherfolks.

Ambitions for food and energy self-sufficiency that are oriented toward corporations - through the provision of large-scale land and enforced by militaristic approaches - have in fact deepened the agrarian crisis. Large-scale land allocation to support these

projects has resulted in widespread land grabbing, further consolidating land control in the hands of a small number of corporations and exacerbating Indonesia's already severe land inequality.

> KPA's findings and analysis throughout 2025 recorded 43 outbreaks of agrarian conflict covering an area of 265,969.8 hectares. These conflicts are linked to food estate development and food–energy security programs involving state-owned enterprises, the TNI, and private corporations.

One case that occurred this year involved the seizure of land and Indigenous territory belonging to the community of Kampung Soa, Tanah Miring District, Merauke Regency. Their land was appropriated by PT Global Papua Abadi (GPA), a company included in the National Strategic Project (PSN) for energy self-sufficiency, as designated under Presidential Regulation No. 40 of 2023 on the Acceleration of National Sugar Self-Sufficiency and the Provision of Bioethanol as Biofuel.

Another case involved the seizure of land belonging to residents of Ujung Alang Village, Kampung Laut Sub-district, Cilacap Regency, Central Java, by the Nusakambangan Correctional Facility. The facility cleared 34.2 hectares of land using heavy machinery to establish a food estate. In fact, this land consisted of accreted land that had been cultivated for decades and served as the primary livelihood source for hundreds of village families.

In Kedaton Timur Village, Kedaton Peninjauan Raya Sub-district, Ogan Komering Ulu (OKU) Regency, South Sumatra, conflict erupted between residents and PT Gula Nusantara Sukses (GNS). The conflict was triggered by the company's seizure of community land that had already been formally certified and transformed by residents

from peat swamp into productive farmland. This land grabbing is linked to the company's project to support the food self-sufficiency program.


In several cases, food and energy self-sufficiency programs have also been used by state-owned plantation companies (PTPN) to reactivate long-expired cultivation rights (HGU). In some instances, PTPN has even partnered with the TNI to obscure these motives.



Boundary markers installed by PT Sinergi Gula Nusantara on peasant land in Polobangkeng, Takalar, South Sulawesi.
Photo source: Private documentation

One such case is the renewed agrarian conflict between peasants in Polobangkeng, Takalar Regency, South Sulawesi, and PTPN. PTPN XIV unilaterally occupied former HGU land that had long been cultivated by residents. This conflict dates back to 1978, when thousands of Polobangkeng peasants were forced to relinquish their land to establish a sugar plantation without compensation. Over time, much of the land was abandoned by PTPN and later reclaimed and cultivated by residents, until the company's HGU expired on 9 July 2024. However, in 2025, PTPN once again forcibly entered the land, intimidated residents, and attempted renewed evictions. The company leveraged the food self-sufficiency program as a pretext to re-appropriate community land.

In Garut Regency, West Java, PTPN VIII seized peasant land in three villages - Sukamukti, Dangiang, and Mekarmukti. Using the justification of a memorandum of understanding between PTPN and TNI Headquarters to support the government's food self-sufficiency program, the state-owned company claimed land that had been cultivated by residents for decades. PTPN argued that the land fell within its HGU area, despite the fact that the HGU had expired in 1997. Peasants suspect that this cooperation was a strategy by PTPN to reclaim land long controlled and cultivated by peasants by exploiting the food security program and using the TNI to displace local communities.



Land markers belonging to PT Tanah Pertanian, a member of the Serikat Petani Pasundan (SPP) in Sukamukti Village, Cilawu District, Garut Regency, were seized by PTPN in collaboration with the Indonesian National Armed Forces (TNI) in the name of food security. Sinergi Gula Nusantara on peasants' land in Polongbangkeng, Takalar, South Sulawesi.
Photo source: KPA.

D. Free Nutritious Meals Program Reinforcing Agrarian Inequality

The idea of the Free Nutritious Meals program (Makan Bergizi Gratis/MBG) has deep historical roots. The program was first introduced by Prabowo Subianto in 2006 through the concept of the White Revolution, which promoted the distribution of free milk to schoolchildren to improve nutritional quality among the younger generation and reduce stunting. Various public records indicate that this idea emerged even before the establishment of the Gerindra Party in 2008, making the MBG concept politically older than the party itself.

Long before the MBG program was implemented in Indonesia, many countries had already introduced school meal programs. Finland, Sweden, Estonia, and South Korea are prominent examples of countries that provide free lunches for all students. Other countries such as Japan, India, Brazil, France, and the United States also run similar programs with varying coverage and models, often targeting elementary and junior secondary schools or low-income families.

In Indonesia, the MBG policy is implemented as part of the national agenda to improve the quality of human resources. MBG is understood as a policy designed to address nutritional problems and inequalities in food consumption. However, within Indonesia's unequal agrarian structure, this policy cannot be viewed in isolation. The MBG program operates within existing relations of land control, food production, and value distribution that have long been sources of agrarian inequality and conflict.

The MBG program functions by creating large-scale national food demand under standardized requirements. The state positions itself as the primary buyer, determining commodities, volumes, and production specifications through the Nutrition Fulfillment Service Stations (SPPG). In this context, access to the MBG supply chain is structurally more open to business actors who already control large areas of land, substantial capital, and established production and distribution infrastructure. Conversely, peasants, fisherfolks, small-scale aquaculture farmers, and people's food producers - most of whom operate on a small scale and face limitations in land control - are placed in a disadvantaged position and struggle to participate on equal terms.

In addition, the groups capable of establishing and operating SPPG facilities are those with significant capital and strong political networks. As a result, most SPPG owners are business actors, politicians, and networks linked to the TNI and the police.

KPA's findings show that agrarian conflicts do not only result in the loss of land and living space for communities, but also in the collapse of local food production bases. In many conflict-affected areas, peasants lose cultivated land, access to water sources, and security of livelihoods. Regions with high levels of agrarian conflict are also recorded as having high levels of rural poverty and economic vulnerability. In this context, large-scale national food policies that are not accompanied by reforms in land tenure structures risk further widening the gap between people's food producers and large business actors.

The absence of agrarian reform as the foundation of food policy causes MBG to operate within an unequal agrarian structure. The state does not intervene to reorganize who produces food, how food is produced, where production takes place, the status of the land, or the nature of production relations. Instead, the state once again relies on market mechanisms and procurement systems already dominated by food corporations and processing industries. In this way, MBG does not correct agrarian inequality but rather adapts to and functions within it.

Under these conditions, MBG has the potential to reinforce agrarian inequality through its current mechanisms. There may be no overt evictions or physical clashes as seen in classic agrarian conflicts, but there is systemic exclusion of small peasants from national food production and distribution chains. The economic value of state food expenditure accumulates among large actors controlling both upstream and downstream segments of production, while small peasants remain trapped as subsistence producers or agricultural laborers with limited market access.

KPA notes that in many agrarian conflicts, communities whose land is threatened or seized lose not only their land but also long-term economic opportunities. When national food policies such as MBG are not linked to land redistribution, agrarian conflict resolution, and guaranteed agricultural markets, these policies risk further marginalizing small peasants from the national food production system.

Moreover, procurement standards and menu requirements under MBG encourage the homogenization of food commodities and production patterns. This has implications for the displacement of local food production systems that have long sustained peasant households and Indigenous communities. In the long term, such policy directions risk increasing dependence on large-scale production while weakening people-based food production systems - precisely those most affected by agrarian conflicts.

In fact, the MBG program could become a momentum to demonstrate genuine commitment to agrarian reform if it were managed to prioritize food-producing communities - peasants, livestock farmers, and fishers. With this orientation, MBG could open broad market opportunities for people's agriculture, livestock, and fisheries, while revitalizing diverse local food systems as key components of Indonesian diets. Such an approach would strengthen rural, people-centered industrialization rather than promote extractive industries like oil palm plantations and mining that seize land and damage the environment.

However, agrarian reform also faces challenges from the MBG program itself, particularly in relation to food security strategies. President Prabowo seeks to achieve food self-sufficiency through the development of large-scale food estates, corporate-oriented projects, militarized food approaches, and the provision of land for industrial-scale livestock production.

Thus, MBG must be understood as part of an integrated configuration of national agrarian and food policies. Without agrarian reform, MBG risks becoming a new instrument for reproducing agrarian inequality by strengthening unequal structures of food production and distribution.



E. Ecological Disasters as the Peak of Agrarian Conflicts

The flash floods and landslides that struck the provinces of Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra on 27–28 November 2025 caused extensive casualties and paralyzed daily life across the three provinces. As of 31 December 2025, the National Disaster Management Agency (BNPB) reported 1,154 fatalities and 165 people missing.

In addition, a total of 186,488 houses were damaged, along with 1,600 public facilities, 219 health facilities, 967 educational facilities, 4,343 places of worship, 290 office buildings, and 145 bridges. These flash floods and landslides have opened a Pandora's box of policies and governance failures in the management of agrarian resources on the island of Sumatra, particularly in the three affected provinces.

> "This event was not an ordinary natural disaster, but rather an ecological disaster arising from a prolonged agrarian crisis. Put simply, an agrarian crisis occurs when land and natural resources are not managed in a just and sustainable manner.



Flash floods sweeping away logs in Padang, West Sumatra, Saturday, 29 November 2025.
Photo source: Willy Kurniawan / Reuters

The agrarian crisis is marked by several interrelated problems in land and natural resource governance, including:

First, increasingly acute inequality in land control resulting from policy orientations that prioritize land monopolization by state-owned enterprises, private corporations, and various investment projects;

Second, escalating agrarian conflicts due to the massive dispossession of peasant land and Indigenous territories by plantation, mining, forestry, property, and infrastructure corporations facilitated by state policies;

Third, large-scale land conversion to support industrial estates, new city development, housing, mining, and plantations, which increasingly reduces people's living space and agricultural land;

Fourth, deepening poverty and social inequality as peasants, fisherfolks, and communities lose their livelihoods due to the loss of land rights and access to other agrarian resources, along with the erosion of guarantees for a decent life;

Fifth, worsening environmental degradation caused by land clearing and the destruction of customary forests, resulting in declining land carrying capacity, water pollution, and ecosystem damage.



Aerial view of residential damage after flash floods in Kota Lintang Village, Kuala Simpang City, Aceh Tamiang Regency, Aceh, Wednesday, 3 December 2025.
Photo source: ANTARA FOTO

> The ecological disasters in Sumatra are closely linked to concession politics that have produced land monopolies by a small number of state-owned and private corporations. Land acquisition processes have frequently generated agrarian conflicts between communities and corporations, as much of the land under these monopolies originates from customary territories and peasant-managed land.
>
> Overlay analysis and data processing from multiple sources show that 673 plantation, mining, and forestry corporations control more than 2 million hectares across Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra.

Such extensive concession control has triggered numerous agrarian conflicts due to land grabbing and encroachment on community land and Indigenous territories.



Figure 21: Number and Area of Plantation, Mining, and Forestry Concessions in Aceh Province, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra

Data sources: Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (ATR/BPN), Ministry of Forestry, and Ministry of Energy and Mineral Resources.

Over the past five years (2021–2025), data processed by KPA show that several concession-holding companies in plantation, mining, and forestry sectors have records of involvement in agrarian conflicts with communities due to land grabbing.



Figure 22: Concession-Holding Companies in Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra with a Record of Agrarian Conflicts, 2021–2025

Following the flash floods and landslides in Sumatra, the Ministry of Environment imposed administrative sanctions in the form of activity suspensions on eight companies suspected of contributing to the disasters. These include PT Agincourt Resources, PT Toba Pulp Lestari, Sarulla Operations Ltd, PT Sumatera Pembangkit Mandiri, PT Teluk Nauli, PT North Sumatra Hydro Energy, PT Multi Sibolga Timber, and PTPN III Batang Toru Plantation.

KPA data indicate that seven of these eight companies are also involved in conflicts with local communities due to land grabbing practices (see Figure 23). These companies include:

1) PT Agincourt Resources, which is in conflict with the Indigenous community of Parsadaan Marga Siregar Siagian Boru dohot Bere. The company has failed to provide compensation for 190 hectares of community land for more than ten years.
2) PT SOL Geothermal, which is in conflict with communities in Pahae Jae Subdistrict, North Tapanuli. Explosions from company operations have threatened residents living nearby.
3) PT Teluk Nauli, which seized community land in Batu Mundom Village, Muara Batang Gadis Subdistrict, Mandailing Natal Regency.
4) PT North Sumatra Hydro Energy (NSHE), the developer of the Batang Toru Hydropower Plant, which is involved in compensation disputes with residents of Luat Lombang Village, South Tapanuli. The company undervalued community land for the project and promised employment to ease land acquisition, a promise that was never fulfilled.
5) PT Toba Pulp Lestari (TPL), which has been in conflict for decades with Indigenous communities in Toba and South Tapanuli Regencies. Throughout 2025, TPL was recorded as repeatedly evicting community land accompanied by intimidation and violence.
6) PT Multi Sibolga Timber, which is in conflict with residents of Manduamas Subdistrict, Central Tapanuli. Communities reject the company's ongoing logging activities that threaten their territory.

7) PTPN Batang Toru, which is in conflict with residents of Hapesong Village, Muara Opu and Muara Upu. This state-owned plantation company unilaterally seized cultivated land and customary territories. Another unresolved issue concerns plasma land that has never been distributed to the community.

In addition to the Ministry of Environment, the Forest Area Enforcement Task Force (Satgas PKH), the Ministry of Forestry, and the National Police will identify and verify approximately 27 corporations in Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra suspected of contributing to massive land-use change and the disasters in these provinces. In the context of disasters and their links to agrarian crisis and inequality, government efforts to expose concession-holding companies responsible for disasters should be appreciated, as they demonstrate a direct connection between environmental and agrarian crimes - particularly in the forestry sector - and ecological disasters.

However, such actions should not become mere "firefighting" - temporary, reactive measures that fade as public attention declines. Too often, these steps fail to address root causes. Therefore, investigations by Satgas PKH, the Ministry of Forestry, and the Ministry of Environment must consider the following KPA notes:

1) Massive and destructive logging and land-use change, evident from timber flows in Aceh, North Sumatra, and West Sumatra, should have been detected long before the floods and landslides occurred.

2) Satgas PKH is tasked with regulating overlapping corporate plantations in forest areas, confiscating them, and transferring them to Agrinas. Will disaster-affected locations also be handed over to Agrinas? Would this not merely replace one actor with another, fail to resolve root problems, produce no deterrent effect, and amount to a simple "change of players"?

3) Identification, investigation, and enforcement against concessions must not become a mode of land grabbing and criminalization of communities. There is a risk that while corporations are named as offenders, community land overlapping with concessions is also seized under the pretext of legal violations. Enforcement must align with efforts to restore people's rights to land, customary forests, villages, and agriculture previously taken by corporations or unilaterally claimed by the state in the name of forest zones.

4) Enforcement should not focus solely on plantations in forest areas, as logging corporations are also major culprits. Whether such companies operate legally or illegally must be thoroughly investigated by the government and law enforcement.

5) This process must go beyond criminal prosecution - especially if decision-makers are not held accountable. It should culminate in the evaluation and revocation of permits and land rights held by corporations that undermine ecological carrying capacity, to prevent the recurrence of disasters in the future. *

CHAPTER IV
AGRARIAN REFORM AUDIT 2025 UNDER THE PRABOWO-GIBRAN ADMINISTRATION



A. Paradoxes and Hollow Agrarian Reform Policies

In the first year of his administration, President Prabowo formally positioned Agrarian Reform (AR) as part of the national development agenda. Agrarian Reform appears across various presidential vision and mission documents, the 2025–2029 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN), the 2025 Government Work Plan (RKP), and a number of Presidential Instructions that link AR to poverty alleviation, rural development, and food–energy self-sufficiency. Normatively, this reflects a continuity of agrarian reform discourse across post-Reformasi regimes.

> However, despite successive changes in government since the Reformasi era, Indonesia's core agrarian problems - particularly land issues - remain fundamentally unchanged. KPA has identified at least 24 (twenty-four) agrarian crises that have yet to be addressed by political action or government policy.

KPA has identified at least 24 (twenty-four) agrarian crises that have yet to be addressed by political action or government policy. These range from land tenure inequality, agrarian conflicts, criminalization, land fragmentation (guremisasi), food import dependence, to restrictions on freedom of association for peasants, fisherfolks, Indigenous Peoples, and youth across the republic. As a result, over the past ten years (2015–2025), there have been 3,575 agrarian conflicts covering an area of 8.33 million hectares. *

The language of agrarian reform that appears in policy documents functions more as policy rhetoric than as genuine political will. Agrarian reform is treated as a narrative tool to gain legitimacy, rather than as a decision-making framework implemented in full. In practice, the agrarian reform agenda has largely become cosmetic, consistently subordinated to investment acceleration, National Strategic Projects, and other economic development priorities.

* *See the appendix for a complete explanation of the 24 structural agrarian problems in KPA's Position Statement commemorating National Peasants' Day 2025.*

Such paradoxes also characterize the core nature of agrarian politics under the Prabowo–Gibran administration in its first year: recognition of agrarian reform proceeds in parallel with policies that, in reality, move away from the goals of correcting land tenure inequality and restoring people's rights over agrarian resources.

In fact, Indonesia does not lack a legal foundation to implement agrarian reform in accordance with the mandates of the Constitution and the Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA). Success or failure ultimately depends on the extent of political commitment and presidential leadership in realizing it. The slogan "for the greatest possible prosperity of the people," frequently invoked in presidential speeches, must be accompanied by concrete actions within the bureaucracy and on the ground.



Children of peasants joining demands for land rights and sovereignty over agrarian resources during the National Peasants' Day Action 2025, 24 September 2025, in front of the Indonesian Parliament (MPR/DPR) Building. They studied and played at the Agrarian Justice Booth while their parents demonstrated to demand agrarian justice for all Indonesians.

1. Policies and Programs Implemented in the Name of Agrarian Reform

> Various policies and programs under the Red and White Cabinet (Kabinet Merah Putih/KMP) indicate that ministers once again interpret Agrarian Reform in a mistaken and sectoral manner, continuing business as usual according to the interests of their respective ministries.

As a result, the agrarian reform agenda is fragmented into multiple cross-ministerial programs without a single, coherent framework for achievement. This condition makes it difficult for Agrarian Reform to materialize as an integrated structural policy.

Land redistribution policies, for example, fall under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (ATR/BPN) and the Ministry of Forestry. However, most of the achievements claimed by the government consist of land certification issued outside agrarian conflict areas, on the grounds that conflicts are considered too complex to resolve. In fact, existing regulations allow for the correction or revocation of permits and land rights that overlap with community land. Unfortunately, these corrective mechanisms have never been pursued seriously. The Prabowo administration once again is trapped in routine administrative work through land certification programs, treating this as Agrarian Reform, without any intention of addressing the roots of land tenure inequality nor resolving agrarian conflicts.

A similar pattern is evident in food self-sufficiency policies spread across the Coordinating Ministry for Food Affairs, the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of Public Works and Housing (PUPR), the Ministry of Villages and Disadvantaged Regions Development, the Ministry of ATR/BPN, the Ministry of Forestry, the National Food Agency, and even the TNI and National Police. These policies are implemented through land acquisition for food zones or food estates, reinforcing land grabbing and land monopolization. In 2025, 26 agrarian conflicts were recorded due to food estate

expansion, showing that policies promoted as solutions to the food crisis instead generated poverty and hunger for peasants, fisherfolk, and Indigenous Peoples, while replacing them with corporations as landowners and primary food producers.

In poverty alleviation policies coordinated by the Coordinating Ministry for Community Empowerment, the Ministry of Cooperatives, the Ministry of Small and Medium Enterprises, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the Ministry of PUPR, and the Poverty Alleviation Task Force (BP Taskin), structural agrarian issues are once again ignored. Rural poverty reduction fundamentally requires expanding peasants' access to land and strengthening their productive capacity, which remains impossible as land continues to be seized for plantations, forestry, mining, and National Strategic Projects, including the National Police's one-million-hectare corn program. Land redistribution should therefore prioritize granting ownership rights to peasants, rather than relying on charitable schemes or use-rights over state-controlled land (HPL).

This policy fragmentation demonstrates that President Prabowo and his ministers lack a unified, clear, and measurable Agrarian Reform strategy and targets. The absence of leadership and a single operational concept - one that clearly defines the division of roles, stages of implementation, and policy integration - results in agrarian reform being carried out only partially. Agrarian Reform often becomes mere lip service, little more than empty rhetoric, and is consistently defeated by other programs deemed more "economically productive," such as large-scale investment, plantation expansion, and infrastructure projects. Agrarian Reform is not positioned as a national development framework, but rather as a residual policy that is easily negotiated or postponed. Each ministry implements fragments of programs related to Agrarian Reform, yet none is accountable for the overall success of Agrarian Reform.



Forced eviction of homes and agricultural land belonging to the Tana Ai Indigenous Community in Sikka Regency, East Nusa Tenggara, by PT Kristus Raja Maumere (KRISRAMA).

The failure of agrarian reform becomes a collective failure for which accountability is difficult to establish. It is therefore unsurprising that the public increasingly perceives President Prabowo as merely repeating the failures of the Joko Widodo administration, or at best limiting agrarian reform to administrative land certification in non-conflict areas, without dismantling structural agrarian inequality through land redistribution and the resolution of agrarian conflicts arising from concessions.

2. The Position of Ministers

The demands for agrarian reform raised by peasants, fisherfolks, Indigenous Peoples, and women toward the government are by no means excessive. In reality, there are still around 17 million poor peasants who lack sufficient land to produce and free themselves from poverty. The longer agrarian reform is avoided, the more peasants lose their land. Statistics Indonesia (BPS) data show that from 2013 to 2023, the number of land-poor peasants (petani gurem) continued to increase.




Figure 23: Increase in the Number of Land-Poor Peasants 1980–2025
Source: BPS Agricultural Census, processed by KPA, 2025

During a meeting between KPA and the leadership of the Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR RI), the Minister of ATR/BPN, the Minister of Forestry, the Minister of Villages, the Acting Minister of State-Owned Enterprises (BUMN), the Head of the Executive Office of the President (KSP), and others, held during the commemoration of National Peasants' Day (HTN) 2025, there was no denial from either the government or the DPR regarding the agrarian crisis presented by KPA. As a result, the meeting agreed on the importance of establishing a special institution to implement agrarian reform with three main tasks: resolving agrarian conflicts, redistributing land,

and developing people's economic livelihoods. This would be followed by monitoring through a Special Committee on Agrarian Conflict Resolution (Pansus PKA) in the DPR with direct community participation.

Unfortunately, after the meeting, ministers - especially those from the Ministry of ATR/BPN and the Ministry of Forestry - have shown no meaningful change in mindset or working methods in resolving agrarian problems and overcoming obstacles to agrarian reform. This is despite the fact that these ministers had acknowledged the problems and barriers presented by KPA in front of DPR leaders.
Following National Peasants' Day on 24 September 2025, KPA again met with the Minister and Vice Minister of Forestry to follow up on the outcomes of the parliamentary hearing. A striking fact emerged regarding the Ministry of Forestry's explanation as to why TORA (Land Objects for Agrarian Reform) originating from forest area releases did not align with grassroots LPRAs (Priority Locations for Agrarian Reform) proposals. According to the Ministry of Forestry, they were merely instructed by the Ministry of ATR to identify "fresh land" (vacant land). As a result of this misunderstanding and lack of policy synchronization between ministries, efforts to correct forest area boundary claims overlapping with villages, settlements, and people's food-producing areas - so that these lands could be freed from concessions and returned to the people - remain entirely absent from their agenda.

Similarly, land redistribution under the Ministry of ATR/BPN does not target land monopolized by business actors that has generated conflicts. To date, not a single people-proposed LPRA (Priority Locations for Agrarian Reform) has been successfully resolved, including LPRAs that fall fully under the authority of the Minister of ATR, such as agrarian conflicts between communities and private plantation concessions (HGU).



Peasants Oversee the Agreement from National Peasants' Day 2025 through Action to Oversee the Formation of a Special Committee for the Resolution of Agrarian Conflicts and the National Agrarian Reform Implementation Agency by the House of Representatives together with the President of the Republic of Indonesia.

Claims of agrarian reform achievements by ministers throughout 2025 are essentially a replay of the same narrative from the Joko Widodo administration. Both ministries also tend to retreat from the constitutional mandate and the Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA), continuing to impose Social Forestry as a so-called win-win solution for resolving forestry-related agrarian conflicts, as well as granting Use Rights (Hak Pakai) on top of State Asset Management Rights (Hak Pengelolaan) for victims of plantation conflicts and Bank Tanah schemes.

On Thursday (6 November 2025), the Minister of ATR/BPN stated: *"Land distributed through the Agrarian Reform program will later be granted Use Rights (Hak Pakai), not Ownership Rights Certificates (SHM)."*

On National Peasants' Day, 24 September 2025, representatives of KPA leadership together with 100 representatives of peasant organizations, fisher organizations, and labor networks were received by DPR RI leadership in a public hearing with the DPR RI, the Ministry of ATR/BPN, and the Ministry of Forestry.



In fact, agrarian reform as mandated in the UUPA, the MPR Decree on Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource Management (TAP MPR PA-PSDA), and Presidential Regulations on Agrarian Reform requires the full restoration and recognition of land rights in the form of ownership rights (individual or collective). It does not mandate the continued imposition of permit-based regimes through Social Forestry or planned Use Rights under Management Rights (HPL). Another inconsistency lies in the Minister of ATR/BPN's frequent assertion that land redistribution from the Land Bank is capped at a maximum of 30 percent. In reality, this figure represents a minimum threshold. This means that if people have been cultivating the entirety of former HGU land, then the entire area should rightfully be granted to those cultivators. An additional irregularity is the requirement that Use Rights obtained through the Land Bank must be controlled for more than ten years before being upgraded to Ownership Rights - clearly complicating the recognition of land rights.

KPA views this confusion in agrarian reform schemes as inseparable from the government's paradigm that treats land as state-owned, i.e., owned by the government. In fact, the concept of the state's right to control does not equate to ownership. This can be easily understood through Constitutional Court rulings and Article 2 of the UUPA. The phrase "controlled by the state" in Article 33 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution cannot be transferred or substituted to semi-public or semi-private legal entities such as the Land Bank. This is consistent with Constitutional Court decisions, including Decision No. 001-021-022/PUU-I/2003 (Court's Opinion, pages 332 and 334), which states:

*The people collectively mandate the state, under the 1945 Constitution, to formulate policies (beleid) and carry out acts of administration (bestuursdaad), regulation (regelendaad), management (beheersdaad), and supervision (toezicht houden daad) for the greatest possible prosperity of the people**. Administrative functions are exercised through the authority** to issue and revoke permits, licenses, and concessions. **Regulatory functions are exercised through legislative authority** by the DPR together with the Government. **Management functions are exercised through shareholding mechanisms** and/or direct involvement in the management of State-Owned Enterprises or State-Owned Legal Entities as institutional instruments through which the state, c.q. the government, exercises its control over these sources of wealth to be utilized for the greatest possible*

prosperity of the people. ***Supervisory functions are exercised to ensure that state control*** *over vital sectors is truly carried out for the greatest prosperity of all people.*

The persistence of a paradigm that positions the state as the owner of land among bureaucrats represents a serious regression, as it revives the colonial *domein verklaring* principle abolished by the UUPA in 1960. Placing the state as landowner clearly contradicts Article 33 paragraph (3) of the 1945 Constitution, the 1960 UUPA, and Constitutional Court rulings on the State's Right to Control. Under this paradigm, it is unsurprising that the public often hears ministers declare that "it is up to the government to give land to whomever it wants," which ultimately distorts the implementation of agrarian reform itself.



The Agrarian Reform Consortium (KPA), together with hundreds of peasants from Serikat Petani Pasundan (SPP), Pemersatu Petani Cianjur (PPC), and the Banten Peasant Movement, staged an action demanding the resolution of agrarian conflicts on National Peasants' Day 2025.

Referring to the Ministry of ATR/BPN's 2024 report, land redistribution from 2015 to 2024 allegedly reached 3.31 million land parcels, claimed to be equivalent to 1.94 million hectares. Alarmingly, the 2023 Performance Report of the Directorate General of Agrarian Structuring equates one land parcel to 0.8 hectares. If agrarian reform has indeed been so "successful" over a decade, why has the number of land-poor peasants continued to rise? Based on BPS Agricultural Census data from 2013 to 2023, land-poor peasants increased by approximately 2.62 million people, from 14.62 million to 17.24 million.

The next simple questions are: how many agrarian conflicts have been resolved? Where are the lands, and who are the beneficiaries? These basic questions have never been answered or explained in any government reports from ATR/BPN, the Ministry of Forestry, or the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs.



The Indigenous Yei People, Kwipalo Clan, halt operations of PT Murni Nusantara Mandiri, a National Strategic Project supporting food and energy self-sufficiency under the Prabowo–Gibran administration in Merauke Regency, South Papua.
Photo source: Private documentation




Figure 24: Claimed Achievements of Agrarian Reform in Fiscal Year 2024
Source: Ministry of ATR/BPN Report, 2025

In another instance, the Coordinating Ministry for Infrastructure and Regional Development - which oversees the Ministry of ATR/BPN - claimed efforts to resolve agrarian conflicts submitted to its office. However, KPA findings show that dialogue processes were conducted without involving affected communities. For example, in the land-grabbing case by PT Krisrama in Sikka, despite being handled by the Coordinating Ministry, Indigenous Peoples in Nangahale Village were never invited to dialogue or had their aspirations heard. Even when evictions were imminent, the ministry remained silent and took no meaningful steps to mitigate conflict and violence.

Beyond conflict resolution, the same exclusionary approach appears in policymaking. For instance, the revision of Presidential Regulation No. 62/2023 on accelerating agrarian reform was conducted without involving people's organizations or civil society groups focused on agrarian reform. Information suggests that the revision does not aim to accelerate the resolution of thousands of agrarian conflicts, but rather to reposition the Minister of ATR/BPN outside the coordination of the Coordinating Ministry for Economic Affairs. Moving ministerial coordination alone will not address the root causes of agrarian reform failure over the past decade. Revisions should instead introduce legal breakthroughs to resolve substantive obstacles and realign policy with genuine agrarian reform principles - at minimum reflecting the outcomes of the HTN 2025 meeting, which emphasized the need for presidential leadership through a special institution and firm regulations for conflict resolution.

From these examples, ministerial attitudes still reflect a "yes, boss" mindset when performance credibility is threatened - such as when summoned by DPR leadership to meet peasants. As extensions of both the President and the people, the Ministers of ATR/BPN and Forestry should proactively initiate comprehensive agrarian reform steps, beginning with systematic data collection on agrarian conflicts, followed by discussions on rights restoration schemes, land redistribution for peasants and farm laborers from monopolized lands, and collaboration with people's organizations. Unfortunately, these steps have yet to materialize amid worsening agrarian and environmental crises.



Women peasant at National Peasants' Day 2025, DPR–MPR Building, 24 September 2025.

The inclusion of agrarian reform in national development policy deserves appreciation. However, KPA believes it must be strengthened. *First,* the National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN), the 2025 Government Work Plan (RKP) should include indicators such as land redistribution targets, conflict resolution and reduction, reduction in the number of land-poor peasants, increases in agricultural households, and rising per capita farm household income. *Second,* agrarian reform must be led directly by the President through a National Agrarian Reform Implementing Agency. *Third,* this agency must establish a four-year roadmap detailing ministerial responsibilities.

These measures are essential to prevent agrarian reform from failing once again due to ministerial inaction. The concerns of the Agrarian Reform Movement are well-founded, given that reform remains programmatic and sectoral, fragmented across ministries and institutions.




Figure 25: Area of Plantation, Forestry, and Mining Concessions and Abandoned Land

B. The Agrarian Reform Agenda Undermined by the Logic of Accelerated State-Led Development

The primary choice of the Prabowo–Gibran administration in its first year has been to accelerate economic growth through investment, large-scale projects, and increased national production. The state is positioned as the main driver of development acceleration, with an orientation toward speed, scale, and stability.

Within this logic, Agrarian Reform - although formally included in policy frameworks - is consistently viewed as an agenda that could potentially slow down development processes. The restructuring of land control, resolution of conflicts, and recognition of people's rights are considered risks that may disrupt business certainty.

By adopting a perspective that places the state as the leader and accelerator of development, the Prabowo–Gibran administration treats inequality and conflict as legacies of past development that merely constitute disturbances to business activity. Meanwhile, conflicts and disputes arising within ongoing development projects are framed as consequences of communities failing to understand the importance of the development being pursued by the government.

"Implement Genuine Agrarian Reform" as the main demand in the 2025 National Peasants' Day Action in front of the MPR–DPR RI Building.



> The political choice to prioritize acceleration over structural correction is a key reason why Agrarian Reform is not abolished, but sidelined so as not to interfere with the pace of development desired by the state.

considered automatically approved if the government, through the relevant ministry or agency, fails to process or reject the application within a specified time limit.

Amid such policies, the state also positions business actors and state-owned enterprises as its main partners in accelerating the desired development. To accommodate business interests, various facilities are issued proactively. One example is the implementation of the "positive fictitious" mechanism in business licensing (deemed approval), whereby an application for a business permit is considered automatically approved if the government, through the relevant ministry or agency, fails to process or reject the application within a specified time limit.

Another example is the land revitalization and plantation management program through state-owned agribusiness enterprises. The problem is that much of the land claimed as state assets is actually people's land that remains in conflict with private companies. Once labeled as state assets, such land is then handed over to state-owned enterprises (SOEs) or other business actors, as has frequently occurred in the process of forest area enforcement (*Penertiban Kawasan Hutan* / PKH).

Pro-business policies are also evident in the 2025–2029 RPJMN and in the Regulation of the coordinating minister for Economic Affairs No. 16/2025 on Amendments to the List of National Strategic Projects (PSN), in which dozens of private business projects have been forcibly included in the PSN list. The inclusion of these projects grants private actors' various privileges, including facilitated land acquisition processes, in accordance with Government Regulation No. 42/2021 on Facilities for National Strategic Projects (see Figure 26).



Signing of a Joint Agreement between the Government and Civil Society Organizations as a Commitment to Joint Action for the Implementation of Agrarian Reform and Rural Development through People's Economic Enterprises, Cooperatives, and State-Owned Enterprises (SOEs).

A 47,000-hectare nickel mining concession owned by PT Bintang Delapan Mineral, part of the National Strategic Project (PSN) for nickel downstreaming.
Photo source: Private documentation






Meski konstitusi Indonesia telah menjamin hak dan kedaulatan rakyat atas tanahnya. Negara sebagai organisasi kekuasaan rakyat memiliki kedaulatan atas tanahnya yang diatur dalam Pasal 33 ayat (3) Undang-Undang Dasar (UUD) 1945. "Bumi dan air dan kekayaan alam yang terkandung di dalamnya dikuasai oleh Negara dan dipergunakan untuk sebesar-besar kemakmuran rakyat". Namun melalui UU Cipta Kerja penggunaan Sumber-sumber Agraria untuk sebesar-besar kemakmuran rakyat beralih jadi kemakmuran swasta.

No.	Kawasan
1.	Kawasan Industri Kalimantan Industrial Park Indonesia (KIPI).
2.	Kawasan Industri Weda Bay.
3.	Kawasan Industri Bantaeng.
4.	Kawasan Industri Teluk Bintuni.
5.	Kawasan Industri Pulau Ladi
6.	Kawasan Industri Indonesia Dahuaxing Industry Park.
7.	Kawasan Industri Indonesia Huali Industry Park.
8.	Kawasan Industri Wiraraja Green Renewable Energy & Smart Eco Indutrial Park.
9.	Kawasan Industri Indonesia Giga Industry Park.
10.	Kawasan Industri Kolaka Resources Industrial Park.
11.	Kawasan Industri ASPIRE Stargate.
12.	Kawasan Industri Tekno Hijau Konasara.
13.	Kawasan Industri Pulau Penebang.
14.	Kawasan Industri Alumina Toba.
15.	Kawasan Industri Rimau.

Figure 26: Distribution of National Strategic Projects (PSN) owned by Private Actors

Source: Presentation on Priority Areas of the 2025–2029 RPJMN, Directorate General of Highways – Ministry of Public Works, and mass media reports



Pengelola	Investor	Luasan (Ha)
Kalimantan Industrial Park Indonesia.	Adaro Group.	30.000
Indonesia Weda Bay Industrial Park.	Tsingshan, Huayou & Zhensh (Investor Tiongkok).	2.000
Huadi Nickel Alloy Indonesia.	Huadi Group.	3.186
ma KPBU.	Pertamina Power, Samsung C&T, Pelindo IV & Wijaya Karya.	200
Ladi Kawasan Industri.	Jlexi Juta Concrete & Wuhan Yadu.	300
Indonesia Dahuaxing Industry Park.	Dahuxiang Group (Investor Tiongkok).	3.445
Indonesia Huali Industry Park (IHIP).	Huali Group.	978
Galang Bumi Industri.	GreenBank Corporation Jepang.	3.859
Indonesia Giga Industry Park.	Huayu/Huayou Group,	1.118
Kolaka Resources Industrial Park (KRIP).	Huayu/Huayou Group.	1.500
Stargate Pasific Resources.	ASPR & United Tractor.	1.647
Industri Tekno Hijau Konasara.	CNGR Ding Xing New Energy (Investor Tiongkok).	5.000
Dharma Inti Bersama.	Harita Group	1.893
Westerfield Alumina Indonesia.	East Hope Group (Investor Tiongkok)	1.109
Rimau Multi Investama.	Rimau Group & Huang Yeping	3.000

C. Rejecting Correction, Reproducing Crisis

> Rather than using the agrarian crisis - manifested in agrarian conflicts, inequality, poverty, and environmental destruction - as a basis for policy correction, the Prabowo–Gibran administration over the past year has instead chosen to maintain the agrarian development model that had long been protested by the people under previous administrations.

In essence, this reflects a rejection of structural correction to agrarian problems. This is the key to understanding why the agrarian crisis has not only continued, but has been systematically reproduced.

This rejection of correction is first evident in the logic of accelerated economic development in the sectors of food, energy, oil palm plantations, and mining, as discussed earlier. In fact, under the Prabowo–Gibran administration, the state has assumed direct leadership over these agendas.

The second form of rejection is reflected in the hollow implementation of agrarian reform, with its institutional design deliberately left fragmented. The agrarian reform agenda is spread across various ministries and agencies without a single leadership entity vested with the political authority to bind and direct the entire process. Under such conditions, no state institution bears full responsibility for the success or failure of agrarian reform. This fragmentation is not merely a coordination problem; it is a reflection of the absence of political will to make agrarian reform a national priority agenda.

The rejection of correction is also evident in how the state defines agrarian problems. Inequality in land control and structural conflicts are not treated as issues of social justice that require policy change, but rather as disturbances to stability and the smooth execution of development. With such a definition, the agrarian crisis is never read as a

signal of policy failure, but instead as a risk to be managed through security operations involving the TNI and the National Police.

Within this framework, the state tends to choose control over renewal. Agrarian issues are shifted from the realm of politics and structural justice into the realms of administration and security. This approach allows the state to maintain its agenda of accelerated development without correcting unequal structures of land control. Agrarian reform - which fundamentally demands a redistribution of power over land - becomes incompatible with this logic.

By rejecting policy correction, the state simultaneously reproduces the agrarian crisis in the form of persistent inequality, unresolved conflicts, and recurring social–ecological destruction. This reproduction of crisis is the logical consequence of the state's political choice to refuse correction of the flawed agrarian development model that has long been pursued.



Lines of protesters and a list of demands during the 2025 National Peasants' Day Action in front of the MPR–DPR RI Building, 24 September 2025.

The state chooses to maintain the same policy framework despite the very real social and ecological consequences that harm the people. This choice confirms that the failure of agrarian reform is not due to limited capacity, legal vacuums, or a lack of data, but rather to a conscious refusal to correct the direction of development.

Based on the above analysis, it can be concluded that the failure of agrarian reform in the first year of the Prabowo–Gibran administration is not caused by the absence of legal foundations, conceptual frameworks, or historical experience. All of these prerequisites already exist. The failure stems from the absence of a political decision by the President of the Republic of Indonesia to make agrarian reform the framework of national development. As long as agrarian reform is maintained merely as a symbolic and empty policy, while the state's direction remains grounded in the logic of acceleration, stability, and control, the implementation of genuine agrarian reform will continue to disappear from the agenda. *



Indigenous People of the Yei Tribe, Kwipalo Clan, installing protest signs rejecting the PSN Food Estate Merauke on their customary territory, South Papua. Photo source: Private documentation

CHAPTER V
AGRARIAN REFORM: THE MAIN PATH OUT OF THE CRISIS




Throughout 2025, the agrarian crisis - manifested in inequality, agrarian conflicts, poverty, and ecological disasters - has demonstrated that the state can no longer govern using old approaches. The agrarian crisis has become increasingly escalatory and expansive, spreading to new regions, involving a wider range of actors, and exerting deeper impacts on the social, economic, and ecological lives of the people.

The preceding chapters are not merely an accumulation of land dispute cases; they are the result of repeated political choices. The state has responded to agrarian conflicts through approaches of control, regulation, and security enforcement, while unequal structures of land control have remained intact.

> The agrarian crisis does not only affect communities directly involved in conflicts, but has spread into issues of food, rural poverty, and environmental resilience. When land - as the basis of production and living space - is treated as a commodity for economic accumulation, any food or development policy rests on a fragile foundation. This situation shows that the agrarian crisis has transformed into a comprehensive development crisis.

In this context, accelerating along the old path without changing the fundamental direction only prolongs the crisis. Programs implemented on the basis of unequal land control structures not only fail to resolve conflicts, but also risk creating new forms of inequality.



A. Agrarian Reform as the Way Out of the Crisis

Without fundamental changes to the structure of land control, all development policies risk continuing to revolve within the same cycle of crisis. As long as this structure is left intact, agrarian conflicts will persist in various forms - whether as open disputes, violence, criminalization, or as prolonged poverty and ecological vulnerability.

Agrarian Reform is a systematic corrective effort to address this agrarian structure. It must not be positioned as an additional agenda or merely one ideal option among many. The state must place it as the primary - and indeed the only - viable pathway out of the crisis politically, economically, and socially. Moreover, from a legal standpoint, agrarian reform is a constitutional mandate.

In the Indonesian context, the urgency of agrarian reform is becoming increasingly evident as the agrarian crisis has spread into other strategic sectors. Food security cannot be built on unequal agrarian structures in which peasants lose land and access to production. Poverty alleviation will not be effective if the main sources of people's livelihoods remain under constant threat. Likewise, sustainable development agendas will continually confront ecological limits as long as land expansion and resource exploitation continue to be prioritized.

> The experiences of various countries show that agrarian reform often becomes a turning point in escaping development crises. Countries that have succeeded in reducing rural poverty, strengthening food security, and creating long-term social stability generally begin with restructuring land control.

Guaranteeing access to and security of land tenure enables smallholders to become subjects, not merely objects of policy or cheap labor within an extractive economic system.

Without agrarian reform, the state tends to replace structural correction with policies such as aid programs, large-scale food projects, or repressive forms of conflict resolution. Such policies may temporarily suppress symptoms, but they do not alter the structures that generate crisis. In many cases, they even deepen inequality by channeling economic benefits to actors already having access to land and capital.

How can agrarian reform enable a country to escape the trap of inequality and poverty? The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the International Fund for Agricultural Development (IFAD) document several experiences of land reform or agrarian reform programs in various countries (*Land Tenure Security for Food Systems*, 2019), as follows:

1. Vietnam implemented land reform during the 1980s–2000s by redistributing agricultural land from collectives to farming households (a land-to-the-tiller program). As a result, rice production increased by more than 60 percent, transforming Vietnam from a rice importer into one of the world's leading exporters.
2. The Philippines carried out land reform through the redistribution of land to 2.8 million pesants under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program (CARP). This led to a 24 percent increase in rice productivity, alongside greater food diversification.
3. Ethiopia implemented land reform through land certification programs or the legal recognition of peasants' land rights. This policy increased agricultural investment by up to 30 percent and boosted yields by 20-25 percent.
4. Bolivia and Peru, with support from IFAD, implemented agrarian reform programs that successfully reduced inequality in land control and increased local food production by up to 35 percent.



National Peasants' Day Action 2025 in front of the MPR–DPR–RI Building.

These successes are inseparable from multidimensional changes that occur when a country undertakes agrarian reform, namely:

First, secure land rights give peasants the confidence to cultivate long-term, higher-value crops, rehabilitate land, and pursue innovation in agriculture and food systems.

Second, productive investment in agriculture increases as peasants gain improved access to agricultural credit or direct government support.

Third, production efficiency improves because smallholders rely on family labor, resulting in a higher output-to-cost ratio.

Fourth, local food diversification emerges as peasants choose to grow crops for household consumption and local markets, thereby strengthening food supply.

Fifth, ecological restoration and conservation areas improve, as secure land tenure encourages peasants to preserve soil fertility over the long term.



Residents of Muara Kate, Paser Regency, East Kalimantan, stage an action to halt the operations of PT Mantimin Coal Mining.
Photo source: Antara Photo

B. Agrarian Reform as a Constitutional Mandate

> The core agrarian problem in Indonesia does not lie in the absence of policies, but in the deviation of state governance from its constitutional mandate.

The state is not operating in a normative vacuum; rather, it has moved away from the fundamental principles originally intended to regulate the relationship between the people, land, and agrarian resources.

Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution places state control over land, water, and natural resources not as an end in itself, but as an instrument to achieve the greatest possible prosperity of the people. The 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA) translated this mandate into a clear operational framework, namely the limitation of land ownership, the abolition of monopolies, the redistribution of land to the people, and the recognition of Indigenous Peoples' rights. Within this construction, agrarian reform is not an additional program, but the very foundation of national development.

However, in decades of state administration - including in 2025 - this mandate has not been implemented. Instead, national development has reinforced land concentration, expanded large-scale concessions, and placed peasants, fisherfolk, and Indigenous Peoples in increasingly vulnerable positions, threatened with the loss of their living space. The failure to carry out agrarian reform over the past 65 years has produced at least 24 structural agrarian problems, deepening poverty and widening socio-economic inequality. This crisis demands swift and appropriate action by the state, with active public participation.

Before the crisis deepens further, the Prabowo–Gibran administration must immediately return to the constitutional mandate and the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA) by placing agrarian reform at the foundation of national development,

particularly in agrarian, agricultural, and people-centered economic sectors. The government must also recognize that only by strengthening these three sectors can the national economy rest on a solid foundation.

Genuine agrarian reform is the only path that President Prabowo must take if Indonesia is to escape the agrarian crisis and move toward a just society, free from poverty, capable of achieving food self-sufficiency and food sovereignty, and realizing a surge in equitable, inclusive economic growth.

KPA data from 2024 shows that 15 provinces identified as epicenters of agrarian conflict are also epicenters of poverty. This is because agrarian conflicts resulting from land grabbing and forced evictions have stripped communities of their sources of livelihood. This situation can only change if the Government of Indonesia genuinely commits to implementing agrarian reform.



The paradox of agrarian policy under the Prabowo–Gibran regime: the forced eviction of residents in Pulo Gebang, East Jakarta, to serve the ambition of the 3 Million Housing Program.

C. The House of Representatives' Special Committee on Agrarian Conflict Resolution as an Entry Point for Agrarian Reform

> If agrarian reform is the way out, where should it begin? In the context of a long-standing and widespread crisis, the most concrete and urgent entry point is the resolution of agrarian conflicts that have directly affected the lives of millions of people.

For this reason, resolving agrarian conflicts is a strategic entry point for undertaking structural corrections to land control.

Making agrarian conflict resolution the entry point of agrarian reform requires correcting permits and concessions, restoring community rights, and undertaking ecological restoration. By treating conflict areas as objects of agrarian reform and conflict victims as its subjects, the Special Committee on Agrarian Conflict Resolution (Pansus PKA) can produce tangible impacts on socio-economic recovery.

Restoring access to land for peasants, fisherfolks, and Indigenous Peoples in conflict areas can directly strengthen the people's productive base, reduce poverty, and lower the potential for violence. This step also sends a political signal that the state is willing to shift its orientation from administratively and legally driven conflict management toward justice-based resolution.

The establishment of the Special Committee on Agrarian Conflict Resolution (Pansus PKA) by the House of Representatives is expected to become a political–legal breakthrough to dismantle obstacles to the implementation of agrarian reform. Amid the mounting number of agrarian conflicts, the performance and innovations of the Pansus PKA are crucial.

The existence of the Pansus PKA is important as a short-term political instrument. Through its oversight and evaluation functions, the Pansus PKA can break through deadlocks caused by overlapping policies, sectoral egos among ministries, and the use of technocratic justifications to delay conflict resolution.
As a temporary body, the Pansus alone is insufficient to ensure sustainable agrarian reform. It must therefore strongly push for the establishment of a National Agrarian Reform Implementing Agency with executive authority under the President.

Accordingly, the Pansus PKA must begin work immediately and produce political and legal breakthroughs to address the long-standing stagnation in agrarian reform implementation - whether stemming from overlapping policies, institutional arrangements, budgetary constraints, or on-the-ground execution. The Pansus must act as a catalyst for the implementation of genuine agrarian reform in accordance with the mandate of MPR Decree No. IX/2001 on Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource Management and the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA), through its oversight and evaluation functions.

The Pansus PKA must also create legal discretion to address obstacles involving state-owned enterprises such as PTPN and Perhutani, and to counter recurring justifications - sectoral ego, forest claims, budget limits, and technocratic "clear and clean" arguments - that have long been used to block agrarian reform.



Lines of demonstrators and their demands during the National Peasants' Day Action 2025 in front of the MPR–DPR–RI Building on 24 September 2025.

In parallel, the Pansus PKA urges ministers and institutional leaders to refrain from issuing decisions that could deepen the agrarian crisis. This includes freezing the Land Bank; imposing moratoriums on permits and concessions in the plantation, forestry, and mining sectors; and suspending land acquisition for National Strategic Projects (PSN), Special Economic Zones (KEK), Food Estates, National Tourism Strategic Areas (KSPN), and the new capital city (IKN). These projects have generated widespread agrarian conflicts, forced evictions, and environmental damage. Any concessions or land acquisitions overlapping with community land must be returned within the framework of agrarian reform.

Furthermore, the Pansus PKA calls on the National Police (POLRI) and the Armed Forces (TNI) to end repressive actions in agrarian conflict areas, release criminalized peasants, Indigenous Peoples, women, activists, and students, withdraw TNI–POLRI involvement from national food programs, and return agricultural, food, livestock, and aquaculture development to peasants, fisherfolks, and Indigenous Peoples.

Finally, the Pansus PKA must urgently encourage President Prabowo to establish the National Agrarian Reform Implementing Agency (BPRAN), given the urgency of such an institution. To date, various agrarian reform implementation bodies formed by the government have failed to break the deadlock caused by overlapping regulations and sectoral egos among ministries/agencies, largely because they have been led only at the ministerial level.

The BPRAN represents the only viable path to overcoming the deadlock in implementing national agrarian reform, as it would be authoritative and executive in nature, operate directly under the President's leadership, and carry a specific and concentrated mandate to implement agrarian reform.



Residents of Margajaya demanding the restoration of their land rights claimed by the Bekasi City Government.

D. The Urgency of Establishing the National Agrarian Reform Implementing Agency (BP-RAN)

The National Agrarian Reform Implementing Agency (BP-RAN) is an institution whose immediate establishment by the government is highly urgent. The existence of this body would reaffirm that agrarian reform is a cross-sectoral national agenda. With a clear mandate, this agency would be able to lead land redistribution, resolve agrarian conflicts, restore the rights of Indigenous Peoples, and integrate agrarian reform with food sovereignty, rural economic development, and ecological restoration agendas. Without the establishment of such an institution, commitments to agrarian reform will continue to end as mere promises. Moreover, the absence of such a body results in the lack of a comprehensive, consistent, and binding implementation framework across sectors.

> **“The establishment of this institution is not merely the addition of a new body, but a strategic reconfiguration that will serve as a game changer - transforming Agrarian Reform from a slow and fragmented program into an integrated, effective, and impactful national priority program.**



Peasants demanding the establishment of an Agrarian Reform Implementing Agency during the National Peasants’ Day Action 2025.
Photo source: Private documentation

Below are the arguments explaining why BP-RAN must be established immediately:

1. **Vertical and Horizontal Institutional Integration**
   An implementing agency functioning as a single commanding and coordinating body would centralize strategic and operational command. This would shorten bureaucratic chains, simplify procedures, and accelerate decision-making on the ground. Such an agency could act as an agile executor for the government in achieving its targets.

2. **Accelerated Strengthening of Agrarian Reform Human Resources Capacity**
   An agency formed with a special mandate would create strong institutional linkages in the agrarian and natural resource sectors - particularly in land redistribution, conflict resolution, and rural economic empowerment within the framework of sustainable national economic development. This would accelerate the growth and expansion of knowledge and practice of agrarian reform on a national scale.

3. **Institutional Acceleration of Conflict Resolution**
   Equipped with a dedicated conflict resolution unit possessing sufficient authority and resources, this agency could conduct mediation and facilitate the systematic and sustainable resolution of agrarian conflicts through participatory approaches involving affected communities.

4. **Holistic and Impact-Oriented Policy Synergy**
   Agrarian reform is closely linked to issues of rural–urban inequality, food security, and natural resource governance. An implementing agency could design integrated programs, ensuring that asset redistribution is accompanied by local economic strengthening, access to capital, and the development of supporting infrastructure.

In addition, numerous academic studies have examined the challenges and achievements of agrarian reform implementation in various countries. One common feature across these experiences is the presence of strong political commitment from national leaders, manifested through the establishment of dedicated institutions and specific agrarian reform laws.

Negara	Kelembagaan Pelaksana	Mandat dan Karakter Kelembagaan	Periode Utama
 Korea Selatan	*Land Reform Committee* (nasional & lokal)	Komite lintas level dengan kewenangan ekspropriasi dan redistribusi	1949–1953
 Taiwan	*Joint Commission on Rural Reconstruction (JCRR)*	Badan semi-otonom lintas kementerian dengan dukungan teknis & kredit	1953–1960
 Meksiko	*Secretaría de la Reforma Agraria*	Kementerian khusus reforma agraria, mengelola tanah komunal	1917–1992
 Jepang	*Land Reform Bureau* (di bawah Kementerian Pertanian)	Lembaga negara kuat dengan mandat tunggal untuk perombakan ketimpangan tanah/tanah absentee melalui redistribusi tanah	1946–1950
 Brasil	*INCRA* (Instituto Nacional de Colonização e Reforma Agrária)	Badan nasional khusus RA dan pemukiman bagi petani	1964–sekarang
 Bolivia	*INRA* (Instituto Nacional de Reforma Agraria)	Lembaga nasional dengan mandat legalisasi, redistribusi, dan pengakuan tanah adat	1996–sekarang
 Venezuela	*INTI* (Instituto Nacional de Tierras)	Lembaga eksekutif kuat, terintegrasi dengan kebijakan pangan	2001–2013
 Filipina	*Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR)*	Kementerian khusus reforma agraria yang menyelesaiakn konflik dan memberikan pengakuan hak atas tanah.	1988–sekarang
 Tiongkok	*Ministry of Natural Resources + Komite Partai*	Negara/partai mengontrol penuh tanah, kolektivisasi & de-kolektivisasi	1950–sekarang

Figure 27: Experiences of Agrarian Reform Implementation and Institutional Models in Several Countries

A closer look at the above table shows that agrarian reform is most effective when implemented by a specialized institution with strong authority—moving beyond coordination to legally binding execution grounded in the constitution, laws, and the Head of State's political mandate. Such an institution can address the long-cited problem of overlapping authorities and regulations.

The call for establishing an authoritative agrarian reform body is not new in Indonesia; it has been raised since 2003 but continues to face persistent obstacles.




Figure 28: The Trajectory of Advocacy for the Establishment of an Agrarian Reform Implementing Agency in the Reform Era

Although proposed under different names, the authority and stages of implementation of this body remain essentially the same - fully aligned with Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution, the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA), and the MPR Decree on Agrarian Reform and Natural Resource Management - namely:

1. Leading the implementation of agrarian reform;
2. Formulating policies and work plans for agrarian reform implementation;
3. Coordinating efforts and resolving obstacles in agrarian reform implementation;
4. Receiving proposals for agrarian reform subjects and objects from the public;
5. Deciding on agrarian conflict resolution, land redistribution, and post-redistribution empowerment;
6. Monitoring and evaluating the implementation of agrarian reform;
7. Providing recommendations from monitoring and evaluation results to the President.

Based on these strategic functions, the establishment of the National Agrarian Reform Implementing Agency is, in simple terms, not merely an institutional addition, but a strategic reconfiguration that will act as a game changer - transforming agrarian reform from a slow and fragmented program into an integrated, effective, and impactful national priority program. This step represents the highest level of political commitment to realizing agrarian justice as the foundation of equitable and sustainable development in Indonesia.

Posters paying tribute to Agrarian Reform Defenders who became victims of repression while defending their land rights. This moment marked the closing of the National Peasants' Day Action 2025.



E. Other Recommended Improvements

Based on the structural political, economic, legal, social, and agrarian crises unfolding throughout 2025, Agrarian Reform (RA) is no longer negotiable. Beyond the establishment of the DPR RI Special Committee on Agrarian Conflict Resolution (Pansus PKA) and the formation of the National Agrarian Reform Implementing Agency (BP-RAN), the government must immediately fulfill seven (7) additional demands - out of the nine (9) demands raised during the 2025 National Peasants' Day (HTN) - as follows:

1. The President must accelerate agrarian conflict resolution and land redistribution, covering at least 1.76 million hectares of KPA Priority Locations for Agrarian Reform (LPRA); regulate and redistribute 7.35 million hectares of abandoned land and 26.8 million hectares monopolized by conglomerates, including community lands unilaterally claimed by PTPN, Perhutani/Inhutani, and state forest designations over 25,000 villages - returning them to peasants, farm laborers, fisherfolks, women, and restoring Indigenous Peoples' rights.

2. The DPR and the President, together with civil society, must immediately draft and enact an Agrarian Reform Bill (RUU Reforma Agraria); revoke the Job Creation Omnibus Law (UU Cipta Kerja) that legalizes land grabbing and food liberalization; and restore agrarian governance in line with Article 33 of the 1945 Constitution.

3. The President must fulfill the right to adequate housing for peasants, fisherfolks, workers, and the urban poor, while guaranteeing women's land rights as mandated by the 1960 Basic Agrarian Law (UUPA).

4. The President must order the National Police and Armed Forces (POLRI–TNI) to halt repressive actions in agrarian conflict areas, release criminalized peasants, Indigenous Peoples, women, activists, and students; withdraw POLRI–TNI from food programs; and return control of agriculture, food systems, livestock, aquaculture, and fisheries to peasants, fisherfolks, and Indigenous Peoples.

5. The President must freeze the Land Bank and impose moratoriums on plantation, forestry, and mining permits (HGU, HPL, HGB, HTI, location permits, mining

permits/IUP), as well as land acquisition for National Strategic Projects (PSN), Special Economic Zones (KEK), Food Estates, National Tourism Strategic Areas (KSPN), and the new capital (IKN), all of which have fueled agrarian conflicts, forced evictions, and environmental destruction. Concessions overlapping with community lands must be immediately returned under Agrarian Reform.

6. The President and the House of Representatives must prioritize state and regional budgets (APBN/APBD) for land redistribution, agrarian conflict resolution, infrastructure development, agricultural technology, access to capital, fertilizer subsidies, fuel (diesel) subsidies, seed provision, and the strengthening of peasant-, fisher-, and Indigenous People–owned enterprises in the context of Agrarian Reform and rural development; and

7. The President must immediately develop and support the industrialization of agriculture, plantations, fisheries, livestock, aquaculture, and marine resources in ways that strengthen people's production centers, are collectively owned (gotong royong) by peasants, fisherfolks, and laborers, and are based on the People's Economy Model Rooted in Agrarian Reform (EKORA), in order to realize social justice, poverty eradication, food sovereignty, and rural social transformation.



Police brutality against residents of Muara Badak, Kutai, East Kalimantan, who were defending their cultivation areas and fishing grounds from the operations of PT Pertamina Hulu Sanga-Sanga (PHSS).

F. Conclusion

The ten-year trajectory of the Jokowi administration has provided important lessons for Indonesia regarding the gap between political promises and their implementation. It demonstrates that political promises on agrarian reform must be consistent and concrete in their execution on the ground. This means that the Prabowo–Gibran administration must take a firm stance and demonstrate strong political will in advancing agrarian reform.

It can be observed that Agrarian Reform in the *Asta Cita* is positioned as a fundamental foundation for agricultural development. However, in its practical interpretation, agrarian reform has once again been reduced and narrowly translated into a land certification program. Even in the 2025–2029 National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN), only the Ministry of Agrarian Affairs and Spatial Planning/National Land Agency (ATR/BPN) is assigned responsibility for implementing Agrarian Reform. In reality, the scope of Agrarian Reform is far broader, encompassing forestry, maritime affairs, villages, agriculture, public works and housing (PUPR), and many other institutions.

It is therefore crucial for President Prabowo to return to the core readings and principles of agrarian reform and to correct policies that have already been implemented. This is essential so that President Prabowo does not become trapped in continuing the mistakes in Agrarian Reform implementation that occurred over the ten years of President Joko Widodo's administration.

In his capacity as both Head of State and Head of Government, the President must understand genuine Agrarian Reform and then lead its implementation in a systemic manner from Aceh to Papua. Agrarian reform is, at its core, an agenda to liberate the Indonesian people from an unequal, exploitative, and dispossessive agrarian system. It is intended to ensure that land and agrarian resources are used to the greatest possible extent for the prosperity and welfare of the people, in accordance with Pancasila and the mandate of the 1945 Constitution.

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