

INDONESIA ABANDONS CONFRONTATION

An Inquiry Into the Functions of
Indonesian Foreign Policy

by

FRANKLIN B. WEINSTEIN

INTERIM REPORTS SERIES

MODERN INDONESIA PROJECT

Southeast Asia Program
Department of Asian Studies
Cornell University
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A Note Concerning the *Interim Reports Series*

One of the distressing aspects of contemporary scholarship is the substantial interval that often intervenes between the completion of field research and the first appearance of writings descriptive of its findings. American scholarship relating to Indonesia has been no exception, and here this delay has been particularly regrettable inasmuch as the extent of research being undertaken is so limited. With respect to much of the research carried out in post-revolutionary Indonesia there has been a lag of two to three or more years between the termination of research and the first publication describing its results. From this situation stem a number of unfortunate consequences. Scholars and others having a serious interest in the country, Indonesians as well as Americans, are sometimes required to wait so long before seeing the results of such research that when finally available its importance to them has appreciably diminished. Moreover, because they are kept for so long in the dark as to the course and character of this earlier but as yet unreported work, they frequently are obliged to spend time in unnecessarily laying foundations their predecessors have laid but not yet divulged and in undertaking analysis of data similar to that already collected and analyzed or largely analyzed. Thus all too often contemporary students of Indonesia waste much precious time and effort in duplicating or roughly duplicating what has already been done or is in the process of being completed, instead of utilizing such materials, building on them, and possibly refining them. Parenthetically it might be observed that some of those perfectionists who insist that their name appear in print only when attached to a body of material wherein each word has been given its final polish are deprived of what might well have been healthy and useful criticism by those who would have been interested in reading their work at some earlier stage of its processing. Also this reluctance to publish findings sooner sometimes puzzles Indonesians, because frequently for several years they look in vain for some published account of research for which they smoothed the way or in which they actually participated. Consequently some of them tend to doubt the usefulness of American scholars undertaking research in their country.

The object of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project's *Interim Reports Series* is to avoid insofar as possible the situation described above. Wherever feasible those undertaking research in connection with our project will prepare preliminary reports concerning salient aspects of their study well before publication of their relatively finished monographs or articles. Our object, then, is to make available in provisional form what we believe to be some of the more important of our findings soon enough to be of maximum usefulness to others engaging in studies relating to Indonesia or having a serious interest in the topics with which our work is concerned. It is our hope that by doing so we will be of help both to interested Indonesians and to students of Indonesia in the United States and other countries. In thus submitting *Interim Reports* for early publication the members of our group will generally be doing so prior to command of all relevant data or before this data has been completely analyzed. Certainly they will be submitting them without having had an opportunity to cast them in finished written form. It should therefore be emphasized that these preliminary reports are to be considered as explicitly tentative and provisional in character. It is our expectation that most of them will be followed by later publications bearing on the same subject of a less tentative and more solid character. We hope that our *Interim Reports* will elicit candid and open criticism from interested persons reading them. For we believe that thereby we will benefit, and that in many cases such criticisms will point the way to better analysis of the data in hand and/or further research on facets of the subject so far not adequately covered. Thus we cordially invite and welcome such criticism. We would appreciate it if those inclined to offer it would write to the author in question, c/o Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

George McT. Kahin
Director

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PREFACE

Indonesia's foreign policy has been the topic of all too few scholarly works. This condition is, however, rapidly changing, and we can now look forward during the next few years to the publication of several important studies. Among the highly qualified authors presently engaged in completing books on various aspects of this subject are: Indonesia's former Vice-President, Mohammad Hatta; a former Foreign Minister and Deputy Prime Minister, Mohamad Roem, and a former Foreign Minister, Anak Agung Gde Agung. Currently major studies are also well under way by Ambassador Howard Jones, Professor Frederick Bunnell, and Professor David Mozingo.

None of these ongoing studies, however, focuses on the very recent period described by Mr. Franklin Weinstein in the Interim Report which the Indonesia Project is here publishing. His report is concerned with one of the most significant, but at the same time one of the most confusing, watersheds of Indonesian foreign policy. This is the process whereby Indonesia's confrontation against Malaysia was brought to an end. A development of this significance, we feel, merits careful study now, even though the relevant data are as yet only partially available. It is our belief that a sufficient amount of pertinent material is on hand at this point to warrant the avowedly provisional account which Mr. Weinstein has undertaken with the encouragement of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project. He, himself, wishes to emphasize the tentative character of his report and would appreciate it if those who read it, Indonesians in particular, would be kind enough to send him their criticisms and suggestions for the study's improvement. It is his hope, and ours, that a substantial amount of such commentary will be sent him so that following his current sojourn and research in Indonesia, he will be in a position to publish a study of recent Indonesian foreign policy which will be more comprehensive and definitive in character.

Ithaca, New York
October 1968

George McT. Kahin
Director

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INTRODUCTION

Among close observers of Indonesian politics, there is a consensus that, at its inception in 1963, the policy of confrontation against Malaysia found wide support in Indonesia.¹ As Robert Curtis put it: "[Confrontation] reflects pressures from almost every section, whether Right or Left, of the political spectrum in Djakarta . . . there is practically no important group in Indonesia which, for reasons of its own, does not support the anti-Malaysian campaign."² Although the aftermath of the events of September 30, 1965 brought a dramatic change in the power balance within Indonesia, many of the new wielders of power had been prominent, if not dominant, in the politics of the Guided Democracy years. Almost all of them had given strong public support to confrontation. How is it, then, that by the middle of 1966 confrontation had ended? Who brought about the termination of confrontation, and what were the motive forces impelling the reversal of a policy which had commanded such nearly universal obeisance?

Those questions about the end of confrontation are of more than historical interest. For the study of such a critical period of policy adjustment holds special promise of bringing to light some of the functions which foreign

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1. On the breadth of support for confrontation during the Guided Democracy period and the multiplicity of motives underlying that support, see George McT. Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia," *Pacific Affairs*, 37 (Fall 1964), pp. 253-270; Donald Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia: A Search for Motives," *Asian Survey*, 4 (June 1964), pp. 904-913; Frederick P. Bunnell, "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy, 1960-1965: President Sukarno Moves from Non-Alignment to Confrontation," *Indonesia*, No. 2 (October 1966), pp. 37-76; Robert Curtis, "Malaysia and Indonesia," *New Left Review*, 28 (November-December 1964), pp. 5-32; Bernard K. Gordon, *The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia* (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1966); and Arnold C. Brackman, *Southeast Asia's Second Front: The Power Struggle in the Malay Archipelago* (New York: Praeger, 1966).
 2. Curtis, "Malaysia and Indonesia," p. 32.

policy can play in Indonesia and, perhaps, in other developing countries as well. And it may not be too much to expect that an understanding of the functions of foreign policy will help us to define more concretely the manner in which the pressures of domestic political competition may intrude on the determination of foreign policy.

Before the Coup: The Functions of Confrontation

To understand the full meaning of confrontation's demise, it is necessary to know something about the character of the support which the Crush Malaysia campaign had received during the Guided Democracy years. The breadth of this support should not be permitted to obscure the existence of potentially significant currents of dissent. Despite the wide consensus which apparently existed in favor of confrontation, the depth of that consensus was subject to at least three important limiting conditions: the continued existence of some important, if alienated, leaders who rejected Sukarno's entire set of priorities and thus found confrontation reprehensible; the occurrence of a fundamental change in the nature of Malaysia itself; and, most important, the declining capacity of confrontation to perform some of the important domestic political functions which underlay the consensus. It is no exaggeration to say that the foundations of support for confrontation had begun to weaken even before the attempted coup of September 30, 1965.

Among men far removed from positions of political power, there seems to have been considerable outright, if private, opposition to the confrontation policy.³ Many intellectuals had found Sukarno's rationale for confrontation "puzzling." One can readily believe that the economists now serving as advisers at the top echelons of the Indonesian government were among those who found confrontation wasteful of the country's resources. Undoubtedly, among the leaders and supporters of the banned political parties, notably the Masjumi (Madjelis Sjiuro Muslimin Indonesia, Council of Indonesian Moslem Associations) and the PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia, Indonesian Socialist Party), criticism of confrontation was sharp. Also the leaders of HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam, Islamic Students Association) reportedly never saw merit in the Crush Malaysia campaign. While it is often impossible to separate criticism of confrontation from a more

3. This paragraph is based on conversations with prominent Indonesians who counted themselves among those who had opposed confrontation from its earliest days.

generalized antipathy towards Sukarno's policies, it does appear that, for his opponents, confrontation came to symbolize what they regarded as his obsession with the anti-imperialist revolution and his neglect of Indonesia's economic problems.

Even more significant than the criticism of those outside the mainstream of Guided Democracy politics were the reservations about confrontation evinced by some leading backers of the Crush Malaysia campaign. For confrontation's principal supporters--President Sukarno, the PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), and the armed forces--the Crush Malaysia campaign served a variety of ideological, strategic, and political purposes; in their doubts about confrontation can be seen some indication of the limits of confrontation's ability to fulfill the functions which underlay its support.

Though President Sukarno was the chief architect of the Crush Malaysia campaign, there is some reason to believe that his enthusiasm for confrontation was not unlimited. Some observers in Djakarta have emphasized Sukarno's own ambivalence about confrontation, picturing him as torn between an awareness of confrontation's congruence with his ideological predispositions and political needs and a recognition that confronting the British was unrealistic and would ultimately prove futile.

Confrontation naturally appealed to Sukarno's ideological preoccupation with the struggle against *nekolim* (neo-colonialism, colonialism, imperialism), and Britain's failure to consult Indonesia with regard to the formation of the new federation only served to reaffirm Sukarno's suspicions about the West's motives in Southeast Asia. He saw Malaysia as a strategic threat as well, for it seemed to guarantee the perpetuation of British influence close to Indonesia's borders. As Sukarno well remembered, Britain had indirectly supported the regionalist rebels in 1958; might not London again seek to exploit Indonesia's internal divisions in order to drive Djakarta toward the West? For Sukarno himself confrontation focused political attention in Indonesia on the kind of emotional, anti-*nekolim*, nationalist campaign which would place highest priority on the exhortative, "solidarity-making" political skills he possessed in abundance. Such an issue not only strengthened Sukarno's position vis-a-vis his rivals. By drawing attention toward the "external threat," confrontation also supported Sukarno's appeal for solidarity and thus helped him deal with what he, like many a Javanese ruler before him, saw as Indonesia's overriding problem--the maintenance of unity within the realm.

But, despite confrontation's uses, some close-range observers of Sukarno have said that he realized Indonesia could not hope to defeat the British and feared that the

campaign to crush Malaysia would drag on endlessly with an embarrassing lack of success. Whatever Sukarno's reasons, there is evidence that he sought a graceful retreat from confrontation. Several observers believed that Sukarno wanted to settle the dispute peacefully at various early stages, but was prevented from doing so either by the high-handedness of the British or by pressures from the PKI.⁴ Even later in the Crush Malaysia campaign, there were reports of Sukarno's interest in ending it. Several Western sources reportedly believed that a genuine initiative for a settlement had emanated from President Sukarno in late February of 1965 and possibly again in May.⁵ Reliable sources also report that in early 1965, or possibly late 1964, Brigadier General Sukendro was in Kuala Lumpur on Sukarno's orders to explore the possibility of settling confrontation.

Even the PKI apparently had some qualms about confrontation. To be sure, there is nothing to suggest that the PKI ever wanted to end confrontation, for the PKI was a principal beneficiary of the policy. Not only did confrontation give the PKI an issue it could exploit to demonstrate the party's militant nationalism. It was an outlet for the energies of PKI members whose frustration at the slowness of Indonesia's progress toward communism was creating a major morale problem for the party leadership. Perhaps more important, confrontation provided a cloak of legitimacy for some of the PKI's most vital goals in its effort to build a strong political position. Confrontation provided the rationale for Indonesia's growing isolation from the West, capped by Jakarta's withdrawal from the United Nations in January 1965 because Malaysia had assumed a Security Council seat. Similarly, the PKI's call for a Fifth Force, a people's militia which would be highly susceptible to Communist influence and might well constitute the rudiments of a PKI military arm, drew its justification from the need for a massive mobilization in order to implement confrontation.⁶ Nevertheless, in the early stages of confron-

4. On the view that Sukarno sought, but was denied, a graceful exit from confrontation, see also Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia," pp. 269-270, and Gordon, The Dimensions of Conflict in Southeast Asia, pp. 98-119.

5. See Bunnell, "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy," pp. 65-66. Bunnell, who was in Indonesia at the time, recognizes the uncertain veracity of those reports. Moreover, for reasons which are the subject of some controversy, Sukarno ultimately proved unwilling to negotiate. See ibid.

6. On the benefits which confrontation held for the PKI, see Curtis, "Malaysia and Indonesia," p. 26, and Hindley, "Indonesia's Confrontation with Malaysia."

tation, the PKI appeared fearful that the Crush Malaysia campaign might develop in ways contrary to party interests.

In a speech delivered in October 1963, PKI Chairman D. N. Aidit seemed worried that confrontation might grow into a full-scale war, and warned Indonesians against taking the "adventurist road." There were elements in Indonesia, he contended, that looked as if they opposed Malaysia and the British, but, in reality, they were "*agents provocateurs*" who wanted to provoke a British invasion of Indonesia, whereupon they would collaborate with the British and seize power. Aidit placed the PKI in support of the "revolutionary road," which demanded seizure of British economic enterprises by the state, rejection of the Malaysia concept and recognition of an independent North Kalimantan state, implementation of *NASAKOM* (nationalism, religion, communism), strengthening of national unity, and maintenance of the fight against "Communistophobia." Conspicuously absent from Aidit's version of the "revolutionary road" was mention of Indonesian military action against Malaysia. On the contrary, he claimed that the "revolutionary road" would not lead to war, because the British, having contrived Malaysia in order to preserve their influence in Southeast Asia, realized that war would end by costing them their remaining influence in the area.⁷ While the PKI's professed fear that "adventurists" (a scarcely concealed reference to the army leadership) actually sought to provoke a British invasion strains credulity, it is less difficult to believe that, at least in the early stages of confrontation, the PKI was worried lest an emphasis on the military aspects of the Crush Malaysia campaign result in strengthening the army at the Communists' expense.

The most important reservations about confrontation came from the army itself. Initially, the army's opposition to Malaysia appeared wholehearted. Army leaders presumably were partly moved by the expectation that confrontation would facilitate a larger military budget and an expanded national role; it might even cause a full resumption of martial law. By taking a vocal, militant stand against Malaysia the army hoped to keep the PKI from usurping the forefront on an issue of national pride, as had happened with respect to the West Irian campaign. Like Sukarno, the army leaders probably were genuinely worried about the possible use of British bases in the vicinity to support future anti-Djakarta rebel movements, as had been the case in 1958. Again like the President, army leaders undoubtedly saw Indonesian nationalism at stake; they objected to having Southeast Asian affairs determined in London, and strongly believed that Indonesia

7. Harian Rakjat (Djakarta), October 14, 1963.

deserved to be consulted and taken seriously on matters of importance in the region. Finally, army leaders, especially in private, stressed their fear that ultimately Malaysia might fall under the domination of its Chinese population. They were undoubtedly aware that the inclusion of the North Borneo territories in the federation stemmed largely from a desire to enable Singapore and Malaya to unite without leaving their Chinese population predominant, but Indonesian army leaders feared the result might be merely to extend the "Singapore problem" to Indonesia's borders.⁸

But, by 1965, the army had cause to reconsider its position with respect to Malaysia. The army leaders recognized the military futility of confrontation and resented the PKI's ability to use confrontation as a means of isolating Indonesia from all major powers except China.⁹ Indonesia's withdrawal from the United Nations, followed in August 1965 by Sukarno's promulgation of a Djakarta-Peking axis,¹⁰ dramatized Indonesia's growing estrangement from both Moscow and Washington. The army leadership was alarmed, not least because the Americans and the Soviets were the army's principal sources of new equipment and spare parts. Although it was true that confrontation gave the army budgetary advantages, a justification for the maintenance of army people in key administrative positions, and an opportunity to express its nationalism, at the same time, it was necessary to weigh these considerations against the Communists' apparent success in using confrontation to protect their own position and, especially, to help move Indonesia into an alignment with China. Moreover, Singapore's separation from Malaysia in August changed the army's perception of the new federation in a fundamental respect; it removed, or at least greatly lessened, whatever fear had existed that the Chinese might come to dominate Malaysia.

8. On the army's fear that Malaysia might bring Chinese domination to Indonesia's Kalimantan border, see Kahin, "Malaysia and Indonesia," p. 264. One cannot rule out the possibility that this argument was made for American consumption. But it is noteworthy, if ironic, that observers who have found Indonesia's concern about the Chinese "not entirely without sophistry" saw "genuine alarm" in the Philippines over the possibility that Malaysia would provide the Chinese Communists a path to the Philippines' southern frontier. See Brackman, Southeast Asia's Second Front, pp. 187, 163, and 171-172.

9. See Bunnell, "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy," p. 65.

10. The "axis" also included Hanoi, Phnom Penh, and Pyongyang.

The army's doubts about confrontation found expression in several forms. The army had never played a paramount role in the execution of the Crush Malaysia campaign.¹¹ The principal military role was given to the Indonesian Air Force (AURI). AURI was susceptible to PKI influence and had a stronger ideological commitment to confrontation than had the army, and in late 1963 or early 1964, favored the initiation of bombing raids against Malaysia. Such raids, among other things, would have enhanced AURI's prestige as compared to that of the other armed services. Army leaders, on the other hand, were more concerned about British contingency plans for the bombing of key targets in Java, and strongly opposed to any AURI bombing raids. Nor was the army inclined to contemplate any significant military action of its own in support of confrontation. Partly because of their appreciation of Britain's strength and partly because they feared that any plan involving the diversion of the army's best units to Kalimantan would leave Java perilously vulnerable to the PKI, the army leadership appeared content to allow AURI to take the leading role in confrontation. At no time, according to one Indonesian source, did the army seriously consider committing its main forces to a major operation against Malaysia.¹² Evidence is difficult to obtain, but it seems that assertions of army hesitation in carrying out even the limited operations in Kalimantan are not entirely without foundation.

Increasing army uneasiness about confrontation was most vividly reflected in the army's key role in exploratory peace negotiations with Malaysia. Sukarno's apparent attempt to investigate possibilities for a settlement in early March and again in May reportedly had army support.¹³ Sukendro's reported role as Sukarno's emissary has already been mentioned. But the army undertook other more significant

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11. One possible indication of the army's relatively small role in confrontation as compared to the other services is a breakdown by service of prisoners returned by Malaysia in October 1966. Of the armed forces prisoners, 21 were from the army, 34 from the navy, 117 air force, and 72 police. There were also 4 customs officials, 189 "volunteers," and 109 "fighters for various agencies." The figures are from Antara (Cologne), October 28, 1966, citing Antara, October 24, 1966.
 12. Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia and the World," The Dyason Memorial Lectures, II (Canberra: unpublished typescript, 1967), p. 4a.
 13. Bunnell, "Guided Democracy Foreign Policy," p. 65.

negotiations without Sukarno's knowledge. The first independent army contacts with Malaysian representatives may have been made as early as the beginning of 1965, with Sukarno's abrupt pullout from the United Nations and the PKI's call for a fifth force acting as the immediate stimulants.

In any case, according to reliable Malaysian, Indonesian, and American sources, officers of the KOSTRAD (Strategic Army Command), then under the command of Suharto, had made contact with Malaysia by the summer of 1965. The army commander-in-chief, General Yani, is said to have been cognizant of those contacts. It is generally agreed that the army emissaries were Lieutenant Colonel Ali Moertopo, then in charge of intelligence for KOSTRAD, and Lieutenant Colonel Benny Moerdani, also a KOSTRAD officer. Though the substance of the meeting is unclear, it seems likely that the two KOSTRAD officers met in Hong Kong with Des Alwi, an adopted son of Sjahrir who had left Indonesia after the 1958 rebellions, had lived in Hong Kong, and eventually had come to work for the Malayan Foreign Ministry.¹⁴ In view of Ali Moertopo's later role in the negotiations with Malaysia and his close personal friendship with Tan Sri Ghazali bin Shafie, Permanent Secretary of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, reports that he played such a role are plausible. Moerdani too was a key figure in the 1966 negotiations. There are also unconfirmed reports that Brigadier General Sugiharto, as Ambassador in Rangoon, was involved in the extension of peace feelers to Kuala Lumpur. Whether or not those officers were in fact the negotiators, Suharto confirmed a year later that negotiations directed toward a settlement with Malaysia were in fact underway in August 1965.¹⁵

The existence of pre-coup doubts about confrontation does not, of course, mean that the Crush Malaysia campaign necessarily would have ended as rapidly as it did, had there been no September 30th Movement and no subsequent political upheaval in Indonesia. The army, like practically everyone in or near power in Djakarta, retained a vocal public commitment to confrontation throughout the pre-coup period. Nevertheless, that there were objections to and reservations about

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14. It is also noteworthy that Des Alwi had been Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Tun Abdul Razak's roommate in London. For the background on Des Alwi, see Sinar Harapan (Djakarta), August 14, 1966.
 15. Antara (Djakarta), August 2, 1966. Hereafter, all Antara citations are from the Djakarta edition unless otherwise specified.

confrontation, and even efforts to explore the possibilities of a settlement, before September 1965 is important for two reasons. First, it indicates that potential existed for an end to confrontation even under Guided Democracy. Sukarno's successors in power did not approach a political arena which was entirely devoid of desire for a settlement of the Malaysia issue. Second, the existence of pre-coup doubts about confrontation suggests that the wide political support accorded the Crush Malaysia campaign was to a significant extent dependent on confrontation's ability to perform important political functions for the principal actors and for the system as a whole. The doubts did not signify any questioning of Sukarno's analysis of the unjust manner in which Malaysia was formed; rather, they were indicative of apprehension about the viability of confrontation as a means of advancing Indonesia's foreign policy goals and, most important, about the impact of confrontation on the development of the political situation in Djakarta.

The foregoing analysis of why Sukarno, the PKI, and the army supported the Crush Malaysia campaign and of why some of them began to have reservations about it suggests that one of confrontation's principal political functions was its exploitation by all three of the chief political elements as a source of legitimacy for policies which each felt would enhance its political position. In the name of confrontation, the army could hope to maintain both a strong military establishment and a strong political position, while at the same time the PKI could use confrontation to legitimize its own hopes for a Fifth Force and for an anti-Western trend in foreign policy that would weaken the army's political position. And at the very same time, confrontation lent legitimacy to Sukarno's contention that national unity under his revolutionary leadership was indispensable to Indonesia's survival. Each of the three groups, then, sought to use confrontation's legitimizing capacity to alter the domestic political environment and enable maximum use of its own particular political skills or instruments of power.

But if confrontation's flexibility in serving as a source of legitimacy for such conflicting goals helps to explain the breadth of its appeal, it also serves as a reminder of the limitations inherent in any support based on such contradictory expectations. In any case, it was evident that the most serious doubts about confrontation, those of army leaders, came in large part because the Crush Malaysia campaign had failed to bring into being those measures which would have enhanced the army's position. On the contrary, it had been used to justify policies which could only be inimical to the army's interests. Army leaders were also sensitive to the embarrassing military futility of confronta-

tion, the failure of the peoples of North Kalimantan to rise against Malaysia, and the deteriorating economic situation in Indonesia, but confrontation's failure to advance the army's vital political interests ought not to be underestimated in assessing the sources of the rising doubts.

Confrontation nevertheless still evoked wide support in Indonesia during the pre-coup period, and the explanation lies in large part in the fact that despite the army's dissatisfaction, confrontation did retain a capacity to perform some important political functions. Sukarno and the PKI found confrontation effective in maximizing the usefulness of the political tools at their disposal. From Sukarno's standpoint, confrontation facilitated the task of conflict management, insofar as it strengthened his appeal for solidarity and, at least for a time, appeared to absorb the conflicting demands of the army and the PKI in such a manner as to reduce the likelihood of domestic strife. There is a close relationship between the legitimization function and conflict management, for so long as each group felt that confrontation could still be used to legitimize its demands and might lead to their acceptance, it could accept a stabilization of conflict in the hope of future success. Similarly, confrontation helped to obscure the inherent contradictions among the conceptions of Indonesia's future held by Sukarno, the PKI, and the left-wing of the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party), not to mention the army and the NU (Nahdatul Ulama, the leading Islamic party), by providing a pretext for postponing the day when those hard issues would have to be faced. In the absence of any mechanism for resolving such basic conflicts as those, the political system required a means of keeping conflict under control, and confrontation contributed to that process of submerging, if not solving, conflict.

For all the principal actors, confrontation provided a standard against which nationalist and revolutionary credentials could easily be measured. To be sure, confrontation continued to express the widely held belief that the manner of Malaysia's formation was an affront to Indonesia and the suspicion that the Malaysians were less than fully independent. But at a time when demonstrated nationalist ardor and loyalty to the revolution were not only a matter of ideological conviction but a prerequisite for political survival, declarations of adherence to the Crush Malaysia policy undoubtedly were employed by many to avoid the pejorative label "rightist."

Confrontation may also have served certain psychological functions of some import. Perhaps it helped to compensate for Indonesia's economic difficulties by giving Indonesians a sense that they were playing a leading role in the struggle

of the world's new emerging forces against the imperialist Goliath. For some people, confrontation probably succeeded in dramatizing the reality of the *nekolim* threat and thus helped to make credible the explanation that the hardships of life in Indonesia resulted more from the malevolent activities of *nekolim* than from government shortcomings.

If the pre-coup consensus in support of confrontation owed much to the Crush Malaysia campaign's capacity to serve as a source of political legitimacy, a means of maximizing the usefulness of one's political tools, a standard of revolutionary nationalism, and possibly a source of psychological reassurance, the doubts about confrontation were in some measure indicative of the limits of confrontation's ability to fulfill those functions. The course of confrontation after September 30, 1965 continued to reflect the policy's relative capacity to contribute to the fulfillment of important political functions. Confrontation ultimately was abandoned for several reasons, but the most important was that it had lost most of its capacity to fulfill a meaningful political function for any major group or for the system as a whole.

THE ABANDONMENT OF CONFRONTATION:

ITS FIVE STAGES

The actual process of ending confrontation passed through five stages. The first, from October 1, 1965 to December 9, 1965, was marked, on the one hand, by a repeated insistence that confrontation was continuing unabated, and, on the other hand, by a slowdown of military activities in Kalimantan accompanied by an extension of peace feelers to Kuala Lumpur. The second stage lasted from December 9, 1965 to March 11, 1966. During that three-month period, there was frequent talk of negotiations, but in each case it proved futile, and, at the end of the period, Sukarno issued his most violent declaration of unwillingness to negotiate anything but a Malaysian surrender. The third stage, from March 11, 1966 to April 30, 1966, was a time of rapid movement in Indonesian policy from a belligerent stance to an espousal of "peaceful confrontation." The fourth stage, ushered in by the meeting in Bangkok between the Indonesian and Filipino foreign ministers, lasted from April 30, 1966 to June 1, 1966. Djakarta's policy moved from "peaceful confrontation" to a commitment to the termination of confrontation on the best possible terms. During those weeks, as the Dwikora cabinet's top leadership began to outline a position in support of terminating confrontation without asking major concessions from Kuala Lumpur, a subtle but significant opposition to this complete reversal of policy started to emerge. During the final stage, from the conclusion of the Bangkok Agreement between Indonesia and Malaysia on June 1 to its signature in Djakarta on August 11, controversy centered on how closely the settlement should conform to the terms of the 1963 Manila Agreement. A resurgence of sentiment against any rush to capitulate to the Malaysians resulted in an unexpectedly long delay in ratification of the Bangkok Agreement and in the apparent addition of what amounted to an unwritten annex to the agreement.

Attitudes toward confrontation in each of the five stages can best be understood in relation to the particular political climate of that stage. The months from October 1965 to August 1966 constitute a period in which the needs of the protagonists in the political power struggle changed drastically. Close to the heart of the matter was a change in the manner of measuring the intensity of one's progressive-revolutionary-mindedness. With the imposition of new standards,

the slogans and rhetoric of confrontation gradually lost their capacity to fulfill their former political functions. The principal conflict which confrontation had served to muffle had been largely resolved by the elimination of the PKI and the downgrading of Sukarno's role. Adherence to the slogans of confrontation no longer served as protection against allegations of "rightism." Nor could confrontation convey the psychological reassurance it once may have yielded. New political pressures were building up, and the confrontation policy was in part a casualty of the growing predominance of those newer forces. There were external pressures as well, namely an understanding that without an end to confrontation, there would be very little foreign aid or political support for Indonesia from the West. As all those forces combined to alter the needs of actors in the political power struggle, perceptions changed with regard to the functions confrontation could fulfill, and so did attitudes about confrontation. But the process was hardly a single-minded flight from confrontation. In the months immediately after the attempted coup, confrontation became in some respects even more important than it had been before. The progression through the five stages of confrontation's abandonment was an uneven one; confrontation served various purposes dictated by the political situation of the moment, until finally, the power struggle virtually over, confrontation lost its capacity to serve an important political function and was abandoned.

October 1, 1965 to December 9, 1965:
The "No Change" Theme and the
Relaxation of Confrontation

The period from October 1, 1965 to December 9, 1965 was marked by a succession of denials that confrontation would slacken. There was no public suggestion whatsoever that confrontation might be slowed, let alone terminated. In fact, nearly every important segment of the political spectrum asserted that confrontation actually was being stepped up. In October, Major General Sugandhi, a spokesman for General Nasution, declared that a Malaysian minister who had predicted an early end to confrontation either was "not in his right mind" or did not know what was "really happening along the front lines." Sugandhi claimed Indonesia was "continuously stepping up" confrontation, and, in fact, armed confrontation persisted all along the border areas. "There will be no compromise with neo-colonialist 'Malaysia,'" concluded Sugandhi.¹⁶

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16. Antara, October 12, 1965. For additional examples of the army's contention that confrontation was being or was about to be stepped up, see the statements by

Sukarno and Subandrio, of course, consistently predicted that confrontation would not abate. Sukarno warned that Indonesia would not forget to destroy Malaysia merely because the attempted coup had taken place.¹⁷ He rejected even the slightest change in the confrontation policy, because Indonesia still believed that Malaysia constituted a threat to Indonesia's sovereignty. Confrontation, he pledged, would be intensified.¹⁸ Subandrio offered similar reassurances that Indonesia would not neglect to crush Malaysia, a "task determined by history."¹⁹ At mass rallies assembled to express loyalty to Sukarno and condemnation of the PKI, virtually all important political parties and their affiliated mass organizations rededicated themselves to confrontation and called for its intensification.²⁰ Even a rally organized by KAMI, the militant student action command later to take a leading role in Subandrio's downfall, joined in the clamor to intensify confrontation.²¹

The plethora of reaffirmations partly reflected an awareness in Indonesia that the PKI's elimination from the power balance and the overwhelming stress placed on the obliteration of 'Gestapu' (September 30th Movement, perpetrator of the attempted coup) might be regarded in many quarters as inconsistent with a continued confrontation of Malaysia.

Brigadier General Sunandar Prijo Sudarmo, commander of the XIIIth Military Command (North and Southeast Sulawesi), Antara, November 6, 1965; and Suharto's statement, Antara, December 2, 1965.

17. Antara (New York), October 25, 1965.
18. Antara, December 6, 1965.
19. Antara, November 5, 1965. Subandrio was also reported as having assured foreign diplomats on October 29 that Indonesia's foreign policy would not undergo any changes as a result of recent internal developments. Antara (New York), November 5, 1965.
20. For example, at a mass rally in Banteng Square on November 9, with a very broad spectrum of political parties and mass organizations represented, speakers supported a petition which included a pledge that the Indonesian people would continue their efforts to crush Malaysia. See Antara, November 9, 1965.
21. See Antara, November 4, 1965. In December the Bandung branch of KAMI reiterated the students' determination to crush Malaysia. Antara, December 8, 1965.

Malaysian and Filipino officials, among others, expressed the view that the political changes in Indonesia gave cause to hope that confrontation would end.²² The new leaders thus took pains to make sure that their anti-Communist exhortations were accompanied by expressions of continued fidelity to the revolutionary foreign policy of which confrontation was the focal point. Repeated warnings were sounded lest preoccupation with crushing the September 30th Movement cause Indonesians to neglect their previous commitment to crush Malaysia.²³ This determination to sustain a dual crusade was symbolized by the joint burning in effigy of Aidit and Tunku Abdul Rahman, Prime Minister of Malaysia.²⁴ Indonesians were exhorted to crush 'Gestapu' and Malaysia simultaneously, without giving priority to either one of them.²⁵ Shouts of "Crush Aidit" frequently accompanied reminders to "Crush Malaysia."²⁶ The Indonesian Journalists Association (PWI) suggested that the government review its foreign relations with countries believed to have been involved with 'Gestapu,' an obvious reference to China, but at the same time, it also called for an intensification of the drive to crush Malaysia.²⁷

Indonesian leaders sought to give the dual campaign against 'Gestapu' and Malaysia coherence by describing a link

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22. See Antara, November 4, 1965, for the statement by Foreign Secretary Mendez of the Philippines. British Ambassador Gilchrist's reported statement to the effect that present conditions in Indonesia would ultimately lead to an improvement of Indonesian-British relations and that confrontation could not continue indefinitely was rejected as "wishful thinking" by Indonesian officials. Antara (New York), December 1, 1965.
 23. For examples of the admonition to Indonesians not to forget that the task of the revolution was to destroy Malaysia, see the statements by Sukarno and Subandrio in Antara (New York), October 25, 1965, and Antara, November 5, 1965.
 24. Antara, November 2, 1965.
 25. For this formulation, see the statement by Brigadier General Sobiran, Commander of the Second Military Command (North Sumatra), reported in Antara, December 4, 1965. The statement by Brigadier General Sunandar Prijo Sudarmo, in Antara, November 6, 1965, is similar.
 26. For examples, see Antara, November 4, 1965 and November 9, 1965.
 27. Antara, November 8, 1965.

between the two facets of the drive to eliminate Indonesia's internal and external enemies. Foreign Minister Subandrio contended that with the PKI out of the way, it would be possible to carry out confrontation more effectively. He claimed that previously the ideological struggle between Peking and Moscow had hampered Indonesia's foreign policy but now she no longer need consider the feelings of the Communist giants and could pursue confrontation unhindered. Indonesia could widen the anti-*nekolim* front without concern about the acceptability of potential allies to either Moscow or Peking.²⁸ Undoubtedly, this purported link was intended chiefly to discredit the PKI by accusing it of sabotaging confrontation. A KAMI letter sent to Sukarno in early November alluded to "strong indications" that the PKI and its affiliates had carried out acts of economic sabotage and destruction of progressive revolutionary unity, which had weakened Indonesia in her struggle against *nekolim*. If the PKI were banned, argued KAMI, confrontation could be intensified.²⁹ Similarly, at a mass rally at which practically all important Indonesian political parties and their affiliated mass organizations were represented, speakers supported demands for a ban of the PKI by invoking the argument that the removal of the PKI would facilitate the intensification of confrontation.³⁰ Others argued simply that the Malaysia confrontation and the restoration of Indonesian security and order were inseparable parts of the same problem.³¹ If British military bases made Malaysia a *nekolim* outpost, then 'Gestapu's "foreign mental base" made it equally a manifestation of *nekolim*.³²

Rather than suggesting that a curtailment of confrontation would probably facilitate a renewal of Western economic aid, some Indonesians emphasized the economic benefits they saw arising from confrontation.³³ It was argued that con-

28. Antara, December 3, 1965.

29. Antara, November 4, 1965.

30. Antara, November 9, 1965.

31. This argument was made by Air Force Minister Sri Muljono Herlambang, Antara (New York), November 2, 1965.

32. Deputy Minister for Health Brigadier General Dr. Azil Widjajakusumah, Antara, December 3, 1965.

33. The Indonesian Herald editorially advised the United States not to seek friendship by giving foreign aid and claimed that denunciation by American newspapers proved the Indonesians criticized were on the right track. Antara (New York), November 8, 1965.

frontation had proved economically beneficial because it had eliminated Indonesia's dependence on Singapore and had obliged Indonesian merchants to find new markets.³⁴ According to this argument, the direct export of Indonesia's natural rubber to the United States, Western Europe and Japan following the start of confrontation had greatly jeopardized the position of Indonesia's competitors in Malaysia.³⁵ Indonesia refused Singapore's request for a resumption of barter trade relations partly no doubt to demonstrate that confrontation had been more damaging to Singapore's economy than to Indonesia's.³⁶

In early December, a statement by British Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart expressing London's willingness to exchange views with Indonesia on the subject of ending confrontation led to some open speculation about possible negotiations. Subandrio declared that Indonesia would not refuse to participate in such discussions.³⁷ The Malaysians appear to have been somewhat alarmed by Stewart's suggestion, and they asked for a clarification of Britain's position. London assured Kuala Lumpur that British support for Malaysia would not diminish;³⁸ whereupon, Tunku Abdul Rahman took the initiative in voicing his willingness to meet with Indonesia.³⁹ Suwito Kusumowidagdo, the second-ranking official in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry, rejected the Tunku's offer on the ground that the Tunku obviously misunderstood the issues at stake because he insisted that negotiations be made contingent on a prior cessation of hostilities by Indonesia.⁴⁰ Sukarno had made it clear enough several days earlier that negotiations should not be expected when he warned Kuala Lumpur, London, and Washington not to hope for any slackening of confrontation. Declaring that a recent meeting of KOTI (Supreme Operations Command) had unanimously voted to increase

34. See Antara, November 16, 1965 and November 22, 1965. The first reference is to an analysis by an Antara correspondent; the second is to a statement by Minister for Plantation Affairs Drs. Frans Seda.

35. Antara, November 22, 1965.

36. Antara (New York), November 12, 1965.

37. The Times (London), December 2, 1965.

38. Antara, December 4, 1965.

39. Antara, December 7, 1965.

40. Antara, December 8, 1965.

confrontation, Sukarno affirmed that Indonesia would continue to intensify confrontation until Malaya, Singapore, Sarawak, Sabah, and Brunei became fully independent.⁴¹

Sukarno's militant statement concluded the period during which Indonesian leaders consistently emphasized that, despite the political changes in Indonesia, the confrontation policy would continue unabated and would even be intensified. Although Indonesian foreign policy had in fact already begun to change, notably in the rapid retreat from the relationship with China, no one had dared question confrontation. There was, nevertheless, other evidence which indicated that confrontation was in fact slowing down. In late December, Tunku Abdul Rahman observed that confrontation apparently had eased considerably.⁴² A week later, Malaysian Deputy Premier Razak voiced his uncertainty about the political situation in Jakarta, but noted: "All we know is confrontation has been slowed down."⁴³ A *New York Times* reporter based in Hong Kong also reported that confrontation had slackened since October.⁴⁴ Indeed, few military encounters were reported in the press. On one occasion, Subandrio made a sort of admission that confrontation had slackened. In an interview with *Berita Yudha* at the beginning of December, Subandrio said it had been necessary for the Indonesian people to focus their attention on settling the 'Gestapu' affair. It was not surprising, Subandrio observed, that "we seemed to have no attention for the crush-*nekolim* struggle." While claiming that confrontation in the military, economic, and diplomatic spheres was being conducted as intensively as ever, he conceded that it was possible that the impression had been given of a relaxation of the struggle against Malaysia. If so, said Subandrio, it was "only temporary," and he looked forward to a resumption of the struggle "in the most all-out way possible."⁴⁵

It was probably inevitable that military activities in Kalimantan would decline anyway because throughout most of late 1965 units with questionable loyalty to the top military leadership were being transferred from Central Java to Kalimantan, and units from there back to Java. Moreover, Brigadier

41. Antara, December 6, 1965.

42. Antara, December 31, 1965.

43. Antara, January 7, 1966.

44. Seymour Topping in New York Times, January 14, 1966.

45. Antara, December 3, 1965.

General Supardjo, the commander of the Indonesian forces involved in confrontation activities on Kalimantan, had been dismissed because of his involvement in the September 30th Movement. With a change of leadership under such circumstances, it would have been surprising if confrontation had flowed smoothly.

In addition to this evidence of a decline in confrontation, reports circulated that Indonesian leaders were unofficially exploring possibilities for a settlement with Malaysia. Malaysian Deputy Prime Minister Razak disclosed in June 1966 that there had been direct contact between Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur since the abortive coup.⁴⁶ According to the Tunku himself, beginning in October, Indonesian politicians and army leaders had sent separate "peace feelers" to Kuala Lumpur seeking a rapprochement.⁴⁷ Moreover, subordinates of the Tunku were said to be convinced that there was a real desire among influential groups in Djakarta for an end to hostilities.⁴⁸ Subandrio denied that such feelers had been extended,⁴⁹ as did Sukarno, though the latter admitted that it was possible that "middlemen," hoping to profit from a resumption of trade relations,⁵⁰ had made unauthorized contacts. Indonesian sources have since confirmed that contacts did take place, probably without Sukarno's knowledge.

The inconsistency between public statements about intensifying confrontation and the actual slowdown is not hard to understand. The campaign against the PKI was of such overwhelming concern that it was hardly possible to devote full attention to confrontation. Yet even if the Crush Malaysia campaign had not in reality been intensified, it still would be fair to say that confrontation in certain respects had become more important than before. The months immediately after the attempted coup were marked by a sense of shock at the radical change being wrought in the power balance. There was great uncertainty as to who would hold predominant power in the future. Many believed that Sukarno would retain much

46. Indonesian Herald, June 14, 1966.

47. Antara, January 10, 1966. The Tunku added that Malaysia did not take those approaches seriously because of the internal confusion in Indonesia.

48. Christian Science Monitor, January 19, 1966.

49. Antara, January 11, 1966.

50. Antara, February 2, 1966 and New York Times, February 3, 1966.

of his power. Had he not survived other challenges?

In such a political climate of shock and uncertainty, confrontation could fulfill important functions. Amid bewildering change, confrontation stood as a reassuringly familiar source of political legitimacy. Perhaps it was natural at such a time to maintain that, except for the need to punish the perpetrators of the attempted coup, nothing had changed. Perhaps it was also natural that the momentum confrontation had acquired should keep it moving forward after the attempted coup. In the turmoil of the immediate post-coup period, a continued public commitment to confrontation probably came to many almost as a reflex. In any case, voicing a continued commitment to the widely accepted goals of the past was an excellent hedge against an uncertain future. Even for those who contemplated an end of confrontation and had initiated peace feelers toward that objective, an unflagging public devotion to the crushing of Malaysia must have appeared as a necessary form of political insurance. Moreover, both for their political security and their own peace of mind, it was undoubtedly important to many Indonesians to prove that being anti-PKI did not make them deserving of the appellation "rightist." A vocal commitment to confrontation was seen as evidence that an individual was indeed a progressive-revolutionary person. In this connection, the attacks on the PKI for having sabotaged confrontation indicated how important it was to show that it had been the Communists who had turned their backs on the goals of the Indonesian revolution. If killing Communists could be justified as aiding confrontation, then it could be regarded as conforming to the demands of Indonesia's "leftist" revolution.⁵¹ Thus, in the months just after the attempted coup, confrontation served as justification for the moves against the PKI, as a basis for demonstrating loyalty to Indonesia's revolution, and as a much-needed shelter offering security at a time of great uncertainty.

December 9, 1965 to March 11, 1966:
Negotiation Offers, Rejections, and
Intensified (Verbal) Confrontation

The second stage began with Subandrio's offer on December 9 to negotiate with the leaders of Malaya, Singapore,

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51. For a strong reaffirmation of both the "leftist" nature of Indonesia's revolution and the need to step up confrontation in the face of an increasing *nekolim* threat, see Suharto's speech reported in Antara, December 2, 1965.

Sabah, Sarawak, and Brunei. He claimed that the time was appropriate for negotiations because conditions had changed. Subandrio meant, however, changes not in Indonesia but in Malaysia. Singapore's withdrawal from the federation the previous August and continuing reports of unrest in Sabah and Sarawak were, according to Subandrio, evidence that Malaysia was not viable. Thus, he reasoned, the Malaysian leaders should realize the need to negotiate.⁵² Subandrio's proposal was greeted favorably in some quarters. Singapore's Foreign Minister Rاجaratnam said his government would be willing to hold talks with Indonesia at any time to find a peaceful solution to confrontation.⁵³ A Foreign Office spokesman in the Philippines said that the talks proposed by Subandrio would be "a welcome development."⁵⁴ The Malaysian leadership, however, quickly rejected Subandrio's proposal, asserting that only the leaders of the central government of Malaysia could speak for the Borneo territories. Kuala Lumpur likened Subandrio's offer to a request they might make for negotiations with the leaders of Sumatra, Java, Sulawesi, etc. Razak claimed that Indonesia's proposal to negotiate with the component parts of Malaysia amounted to a demand for the break-up of the federation.⁵⁵

Djakarta, nevertheless, persisted in promoting Subandrio's proposal. On December 16, Subandrio reiterated Indonesia's willingness to meet with the leaders of the five territories he had previously mentioned, but he relented a bit asserting that he did not care whether talks were held separately or among all the leaders at once.⁵⁶ On December 17, the

52. Antara, December 9, 1965.

53. Antara, December 10, 1965. That acceptance was subsequently qualified by a Singapore government communique declaring that Indonesian recognition of Singapore as a sovereign and independent state should be the first step toward normalization of relations. The communique is reported in another Antara dispatch of December 10, 1965. But three days later Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew removed the previous condition he had set by announcing that it was no longer necessary for Djakarta to recognize Singapore's sovereignty since Singapore was already accepted by many Asian and African countries. Singapore was ready to talk. Antara, December 13, 1965.

54. Antara, December 11, 1965.

55. For the Malaysian position, see Antara, December 11, 1965, and Antara (New York), December 16, 1965.

56. New York Times, December 18, 1965.

Indonesian Herald noted that Indonesia had "acquired a position of flexibility" with respect to confrontation. Indonesia's "new position," said the paper's leading editorial, had "undoubtedly caused repercussions," particularly in countries with which "Indonesia had consistently made a joint stand." The reference, obviously, was to China. The *Herald* cited Indonesia's presentation of "alternatives" to Kuala Lumpur and London as an example of the present flexibility. Subandrio, however, stressed that Indonesia would continue to maintain the principle of confrontation.⁵⁷

Despite the Indonesian leaders' contention that they had adopted a new position of flexibility, it is hard to see any significant change in their position on issues of importance to Kuala Lumpur. Australia's Foreign Minister described Subandrio's proposal as "quite unacceptable," and no more favorable a response was forthcoming from Kuala Lumpur.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the *Herald's* stress on flexibility and Subandrio's reference to the maintenance of the "principle" of confrontation suggest that it may be a mistake to rule out the possibility of Indonesia's willingness to make some concessions. In any case, the Malaysian government's clear lack of interest in negotiations under the conditions proposed by Subandrio made it impossible for Indonesia's new "flexibility" to be put to the test.

That Indonesia was still far from agreeing to a settlement based on an acceptance of Malaysia's existence, was strongly suggested by Subandrio's utterances in January. Stressing that Indonesia was in no hurry to settle the Malaysia question, Subandrio reminded his listeners that Indonesia's new position was based on the belief that Malaysia had changed, "particularly after Singapore's secession and mounting demands for independence by the people on Sabah and Sarawak." Responding perhaps to the Tunku's assertion that it would be impossible to talk with the Indonesians until it was clear just who was in authority, Subandrio emphasized

57. New York Times, December 18, 1965.

58. Antara, December 20, 1965. Statements emanating from Kuala Lumpur in January indicated that the Malaysians were not interested in talks with Indonesia until they could know "who is actually in power in Jakarta." On January 7 Razak said Malaysia was willing to talk with Indonesia "but only with people in authority," and, he added, "no one knows who is in power in Jakarta." Antara, January 7, 1966. Three days later the Tunku said categorically: "We cannot hold any talks with Indonesia until things are clear." Antara, January 10, 1966.

that Indonesia could not hold talks with the Tunku because he was no longer in control of Malaysia and even his authority in Malaya itself was based only on the presence of British troops. Any talks, explained Subandrio, would have to be attended by representatives of Malaya, Sarawak, Brunei, and Sabah.⁵⁹

Despite the swift rejection of Subandrio's proposal, talk of possible negotiations began to spread. On December 13, diplomatic observers in Manila reportedly anticipated a possible request that the Philippines act as a mediator in the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute.⁶⁰ Two days later Thai Foreign Minister Thanat Khoman said he could neither confirm nor deny that his government was undertaking a new attempt to bring Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur together. He asserted that a statement on the subject would serve no purpose, adding that his mission in the dispute was most delicate and "the less we talk about it the better."⁶¹ His statement certainly suggests that a mediation effort of some sort was underway. On December 17, a Reuters dispatch from Kuala Lumpur asserted that although there were no signs that Indonesia intended to stop its confrontation, there had been confirmed reports of moves toward attempted mediation by a third country.⁶² On December 21, British Foreign Secretary Stewart was still reported to be speaking, albeit without optimism, of "possibilities and rumours of possible negotiations."⁶³ It probably is fair to say, however, that the motivating force behind growing anticipation that negotiations might be possible was less Subandrio's proposal than the hope that the changed situation in Indonesia might somehow produce a new attitude toward confrontation.

The previous period's stream of statements affirming the need to maintain and intensify confrontation continued through December and January. Particularly conspicuous was the predominance of such assertions on the part of student and army leaders most strongly opposed to the PKI and therefore

59. For Subandrio's statements, see Antara, January 11, 1966 and January 12, 1966.

60. Antara, December 14, 1965.

61. Antara, December 15, 1965.

62. Antara, December 17, 1965.

63. Antara, December 21, 1965.

most susceptible to allegations of "rightism."⁶⁴ Suharto, who asserted that confrontation should by no means be relaxed, apparently sought to immunize the army against any possible effort by Sukarno to characterize it as "rightist" by stressing that security operations against 'Gestapu' and "followup measures" were essential so that national thoughts and energy could then be devoted to the smashing of Malaysia.⁶⁵ Confrontation was also used by Suharto to buttress his admonition against permitting a division to develop between Sukarno, the armed forces, and the people. Appeals for national unity were of particular importance during a time when national disunity was so profound, and confrontation appears to have been useful to Suharto as a means of reaffirming his commitment to Indonesian unity and the Indonesian revolution.

The end of December saw the beginning of developments in Manila which were later to provide a new focus for Indonesian reassertions of loyalty to confrontation. It became known that the Philippines was considering the recognition of Malaysia.⁶⁶ This move was not entirely unexpected, for the new President of the Philippines, Ferdinand Marcos, was thought to lack his predecessor's keen interest in Manila's North Borneo claim. Initially, Indonesia's attitude was described as "wait and see."⁶⁷ On February 5 it was announced that the Philippines would inform Indonesia a day in advance of its normalization of relations with Kuala Lumpur. Recognition was expected to come very soon.⁶⁸ Then, on February 7,

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64. For examples, see the KAMI warning not to forget or relax confrontation, Antara, December 12, 1965; the statement by Rear Admiral Muljadi, Antara, December 27, 1965; Siliwangi division commander Major General Ibrahim Adjie's declaration that Siliwangi troops would remain at the border until Malaysia had been crushed, Antara, December 29, 1965; General Nasution's statement, Antara, January 5, 1966; Suharto's assertion that confrontation should by no means be relaxed, Antara, January 18, 1966; and Arudji Kartawinata's declaration that confrontation would be intensified until Malaysia had been dissolved, Antara, February 2, 1966.
65. Antara, January 29, 1966 and January 18, 1966.
66. Antara, December 31, 1965.
67. Antara, January 25, 1966. Djakarta's attitude was characterized in this manner by Abdul Karim Rasjid, Indonesian ambassador to the Philippines.
68. Antara, February 5, 1966.

Sukarno announced his displeasure at the anticipated Philippines action, and denounced any such recognition of Malaysia as a violation of the Manila agreement.⁶⁹ Sukarno's speech came as a "shock" to Manila.⁷⁰ Three days later, the Indonesian ambassador in Manila, having been officially informed of the Philippines' intention to proceed with the recognition of Malaysia, formally requested a deferment of Manila's initiative. The Filipinos complied.⁷¹

Sukarno's speech triggered a renewed wave of pledges of support to confrontation. The news that Manila would normalize relations with Kuala Lumpur provided a new issue which the Indonesians could use to demonstrate that their support of confrontation was indeed undiminished. Talk of negotiations faded further, and a new militancy became evident in Indonesia's advocacy of the Crush Malaysia campaign. Confrontation claimed an increasing amount of newspaper space as Indonesian organizations and leaders united in opposition to Manila's plan to recognize Malaysia. KAMI demanded that the Philippines honor the Manila agreement, and added that any possible hopes Manila might have of mediating the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute were incomprehensible.⁷² Catholic Youth and HMI echoed KAMI's sentiments; the Muslim organization added that Filipino recognition of Malaysia would constitute an "unfriendly act" against the 105 million Indonesian people who were firmly against *nekolim* in all its manifestations.⁷³ H. A. Sjaichu, a prominent NU leader, warned that the Philippines' "unsympathetic act" toward Indonesia would create new tension in Southeast Asia.⁷⁴ Sukarno made it

69. Antara, February 8, 1966.

70. Antara, February 11, 1966.

71. Antara, February 10, 1966.

72. Antara, February 11, 1966.

73. Antara, February 11, 1966 and February 12, 1966.

74. Antara, February 12, 1966. Among additional declarations of opposition to the Philippines' move were those of a National Front rally, Antara, February 14, 1966; GASBIINDO (Indonesian Moslem Trade Unions Federation), Antara, February 15, 1966; the DPRGR, Antara, February 19, 1966, and GOBSI, the PSII's trade union affiliate, which claimed that recognition of Malaysia would "pollute" the peaceful atmosphere in Southeast Asia and would encourage American imperialism, Antara, February 19, 1966.

clear that Indonesia would never follow Manila's path: "If Marcos wants to aid Malaysia, that's his business, but we will continue to crush Malaysia, even if we have to fight alone."⁷⁵ Subandrio stressed that the Philippines' recognition of Malaysia would only strengthen the resolve of the Indonesian people to settle this issue by "way of confrontation in the widest sense of the word." Subandrio expressed the conviction that the collapse of Malaysia would be only a matter of time if Indonesia stepped up its confrontation policy.⁷⁶

Renewed militancy with respect to confrontation was reflected in the February 22 conversion of KOTI, the Supreme Operations Command, into KOGAM, the Crush Malaysia Command, heralded as facilitating the intensification of confrontation.⁷⁷ In a similar manifestation of militancy, KAMI members asserted their readiness to go to the front to crush Malaysia. A statement read by the chairman of KAMI's Jakarta Raya chapter reported that the students were ready for physical and mental training for action against Malaysia. KAMI further offered to form a student corps to be converted into a Dwikora Volunteers Combat Brigade. The students also presented parcels for troops assigned to the frontier.⁷⁸

The significance of the KAMI offer and the formation of KOGAM can only be understood within the context of the heightening political struggle in Indonesia. The formation of KOGAM was described by Information Minister Achmadi as part of Sukarno's long-awaited "political solution" to the 'Gestapu' affair. An equally important component of that solution would be the formation of a Barisan Sukarno (Sukarno Legion) to combat any covert attempts to undermine President Sukarno's leadership.⁷⁹

75. Antara, February 14, 1966.

76. Antara, February 19, 1966. Subandrio cited the Tunku's speech calling for foreign aid as new evidence of Malaysia's impending demise. Subandrio also reaffirmed that Indonesia was still willing to meet with the leaders of Singapore, Sabah, Sarawak, Brunei, and "also" Kuala Lumpur.

77. See Antara, February 10, 1966, February 11, 1966, February 16, 1966, and February 23, 1966.

78. Antara, February 19, 1966 and February 22, 1966.

79. Antara, February 10, 1966.

KAMI's professed interest in training its members for front-line duty against Malaysia seems in large measure to have been a response to the announced formation of the Barisan Sukarno. Aware that the Barisan Sukarno could be used as a means of marshalling support against themselves and others who were pressing for a complete ban on the PKI and the elimination of other alleged 'Gestapu' sympathizers from the cabinet, KAMI naturally was unfavorably disposed toward the new organization. KAMI's chapter in Bandung, a stronghold of anti-Sukarno sentiment, pledged support to Siliwangi commander Adjie's decision to ban the formation of a Barisan Sukarno in West Java.⁸⁰ In Djakarta, KAMI's way of rejecting, or at least neutralizing, the Barisan Sukarno was to claim that KAMI already constituted a part of the Barisan Sukarno. It was explicitly as a part of the Barisan Sukarno that KAMI volunteered for confrontation duty.⁸¹ By making such a bold offer in support of confrontation, KAMI presumably sought to avoid giving Sukarno a pretext for accusing it of being counterrevolutionary. KAMI wanted to prove that as a branch of the Barisan Sukarno it was an authentic supporter of the President's leadership. The urgency of demonstrating fidelity to Sukarno must have been heightened by Subandrio's statement of February 18, which the students took as a threat to dissolve their organization.⁸² Strong support of confrontation was probably viewed as one way to help forestall such an eventuality.

As for the formation of KOGAM, its political significance became clear on February 26, when the new command voted to disband KAMI and to ban student demonstrations. These decisions were officially justified by charges that KAMI's actions were detrimental to the Crush Malaysia campaign and to the Indonesian Revolution, and by the assertion that the present stage of the Indonesian Revolution required the maximum of national strength. Any harassment of Sukarno, the Great Leader of the Revolution, would impede efforts to mobilize the nation's power.⁸³ The government probably hoped that anti-student statements from KOGAM, an agency specifically designated as responsible for confrontation, would lend more plausibility to the argument that the success of confrontation required the silencing of the students. In any case, it should be understood that assertions made with

80. Antara, February 22, 1966.

81. Ibid.

82. Ibid.

83. Antara, February 24, 1966.

respect to confrontation by both sides in the domestic political struggle probably were motivated above all by the requirements of the competition for power.

With Sukarno's reshuffle of the Dwikora cabinet on February 23 and the consequent elimination of General Nasution from the cabinet, the President and his supporters took the offensive. Pledges of loyalty to the Crush Malaysia campaign were part of the effort to rally support for Sukarno. As already mentioned, Sukarno's most openly virulent opponent, KAMI, was ordered dissolved on the grounds that it had taken actions harmful to confrontation and to the course of the revolution. A series of loyalty "roll calls" (rallies) declaring support for the Barisan Sukarno were held; calls for the intensification of confrontation were a prominent part of those rallies.⁸⁴ The second session of KOGAM, held on March 2, ordered the continuous stepping up of confrontation and the rendering of the greatest possible aid to the people of North Kalimantan.⁸⁵ On March 3 the University of Indonesia in Djakarta was ordered closed, the official reason being that student disturbances there would undermine the current struggle of the nation, particularly the Crush Malaysia campaign.⁸⁶ SARBUMUSI (Moslem Workers Trade Union Federation) announced five themes for a national congress planned in April. The first two goals concerned making a success of CONEFO (Conference of New Emerging Forces) and Crushing Malaysia; mentioned last was the crushing of 'Gestapu.'⁸⁷ And from the other side, the Jogjakarta branches of eight student organizations asked Sukarno to review the KOGAM decision disbanding KAMI because such a review could enhance and intensify the current campaign to crush Malaysia.⁸⁸

What is interesting about the numerous references to confrontation is that both sides made them to justify their

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- 84. For example, the rally held on March 6 in Bandjarmasin, South Kalimantan, reported in Antara, March 15, 1966.
 - 85. Antara, March 3, 1966. Military operations against Malaysia stayed at the low level of activity maintained during the October to December period. There were no incursions against the Malayan mainland and only infrequent instances of harassment and border penetration in Kalimantan. See Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 1966.
 - 86. Antara, March 3, 1966.
 - 87. Antara, March 10, 1966.
 - 88. Ibid.

own particular actions or requests. During this period confrontation was less a manifestation of any deep concern about the fate of Malaysia than a symbol used by competitors for power to protect and enhance their own positions in the power struggle.

In view of Indonesia's hardening attitude, the Philippines announced, at the beginning of March, that it would delay recognition of Malaysia until a more favorable time.⁸⁹ A brief flurry of speculation about possible peace negotiations arose when Subandrio asserted his belief that Sukarno was ready for a meeting of the Maphilindo countries,⁹⁰ but Malaysia responded that Sukarno first must prove the sincerity of his intentions.⁹¹ On March 8 Sukarno quashed all hope of negotiations, making his strongest statement on confrontation in months. As long as Malaysia existed in its present form, said Sukarno, he would refuse to talk with

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89. Antara, March 21, 1966 and March 2, 1966. Indonesia in mid-February had dispatched Madame Supeni, Third Deputy Foreign Minister, to Manila to press Jakarta's case. Madame Supeni reportedly proposed a four-nation Asian-African commission to consider all problems relating to Malaysia, and also a new Maphilindo conference. She asserted that Indonesia would not seek to block or delay any further Manila's recognition of Malaysia, although she considered such recognition futile and "empty" since Malaysia was disintegrating. Despite Madame Supeni's apparent willingness to acquiesce to Manila's move, the Philippines' decision to postpone recognition indefinitely was said to result from Manila's fear that such a move would lead the Indonesians to break relations with the Philippines. See Antara, February 16, 17, 18, and 20, 1966 and March 1 and 2, 1966.
90. New York Times, March 5, 1966. See also Antara, March 3, 1966, which cites Foreign Office sources in Manila to the effect that Sukarno had extended feelers to Marcos concerning a summit meeting.
91. Antara, March 7, 1966. The Tunku also reportedly suggested that Indonesia and the Philippines confer first, adding that "if I see then there is something worthwhile requiring my presence I may join in." Antara, March 6, 1966.

Kuala Lumpur.⁹² Thus when the power struggle reached its climax on March 11, Indonesia's posture on confrontation was as militant as it had ever been.⁹³

In the atmosphere of continued uncertainty which prevailed during this period, confrontation still served important political functions, and most of the considerations mentioned with respect to the first stage continued to apply. Confrontation provided a sense of unity and continuity in a situation marked by change and instability. Particularly as this period neared its close, the apparent trend in Sukarno's favor sharpened the need to demonstrate the fervor of one's anti-*nekolim* commitment. The students, vocal in their demands for domestic political change, saw confrontation as a way of demonstrating that they nevertheless remained loyal to Indonesia's "leftist" revolution. The army, although less disposed to voice publicly demands as extreme as those of the students, believed itself in sufficient danger of being called "rightist" (one had only to listen to Radio Peking to hear such allegations) to need to identify with the "leftist" revolutionary path as symbolized by confrontation. It is worth remembering also that one of the September 30th Movement's major charges against the "Council of Generals" was the allegation that the army leaders were collaborating with the Malaysians. Presumably the army was still sensitive enough to that accusation to take special pains to demonstrate support for confrontation.

In addition, it became clear, especially in late February and early March, that Sukarno believed he could use the urgency of a militant confrontation against Malaysia as a basis for rallying his supporters and isolating his enemies. The appeal for unity in the face of a serious external threat had been one of Sukarno's most successful political levers in the past, and it is likely he would rely on it in his time of greatest need. In light of this particular importance

92. Antara, March 8, 1966. Sukarno said he did not know anything about a summit meeting. Sukarno's extreme position received immediate support in a declaration issued by the general board of PSII. According to PSII, Malaysia had to prove its loyalty to the Manila agreement by dissolving the Malaysian Federation before any Maphilindo summit could be held. Antara, March 10, 1966.

93. Worthy of note is a report in Sinar Harapan, August 14, 1966, claiming that approaches to Malaysia were carried out some five or six months earlier, without the knowledge of Subandrio.

of confrontation to Sukarno, Subandrio's earlier negotiation suggestion probably did not signify a real intent to reach a compromise settlement. It was actually an offensive move, which stressed Malaysia's weakness and Indonesia's hope for a complete victory. Negotiations under the conditions set by Subandrio, as the Malaysians quickly recognized, would have been an automatic admission of defeat by Kuala Lumpur, since it would have conceded that Malaysia was not a single entity. The continued discussion about possible negotiations owed more to the expectations of others about the effect of the changes in Indonesia than to any real move toward peace on the part of Djakarta.

Viewing the first two stages, from October 1, 1965 to March 11, 1966, one is struck by the manner in which both sides in the Indonesian internal power struggle sought to use the Crush Malaysia campaign to legitimize their position and to justify actions against their rivals for power. If, as Soedjatmoko has written, confrontation before the coup had been directed more inwardly than outwardly,⁹⁴ this was equally true of the post-coup period. Confrontation was not an issue during this period; it was an instrument, a symbol invoked to achieve political goals within Indonesia.

March 11, 1966 to April 30, 1966: From
Belligerence to Peaceful Confrontation

Sukarno's March 11 order to Suharto to take, in the President's name, all steps necessary to ensure security, tranquillity, and the stability of the machinery of government marked a decisive shift in the power balance. Even so, in the days immediately following the March 11 order, there was a flurry of assertions that confrontation would not be abandoned just as had occurred after the September 30th Movement's collapse.⁹⁵ The declaration of March 12 banning the PKI stated that that action had been necessitated by clandestine PKI activities which endangered the progress of

94. Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia and the World," p. 4a.

95. A London Times correspondent in Indonesia reported that military leaders sounded "almost desperate lest anyone get the wrong idea." Day after day, "commanders and information officers let forth a torrent of speeches and clarifications to the effect that the most important tasks facing the country were to step up confrontation and make a success of the almost forgotten Conefo." The Times (London), April 15, 1966.

the Indonesian Revolution, particularly with regard to overcoming economic difficulties and crushing Malaysia.⁹⁶ On March 13 Suharto announced formally that confrontation would continue.⁹⁷ On March 15 Col. Soenarjo, chief of KOGAM's information section, issued a statement that confrontation would persevere until Malaysia had been crushed. The Malaysian leaders were deluding themselves, he said, if they thought that recent developments in Indonesia meant confrontation would be halted.⁹⁸

As before, a rightward swing in the political balance had to be countered by proof that Indonesians were still leftists, true to their revolution. In an unusually explicit assertion of that feeling, the NU's Subchan, chairman of the Action Front for the Crushing of Gestapu/PKI, declared that Indonesians could disprove the accusation that they were counter-revolutionary by continuing the struggle to crush Malaysia and to hold CONEFO.⁹⁹ Supporting confrontation continued to validate one's credentials as a progressive-revolutionary person. Ending confrontation, said the *Indonesian Herald*, would be "political suicide." According to the *Herald*, to suggest that the army leadership would advocate dropping the Crush Malaysia campaign was the same as saying that the army was not motivated by genuine nationalist aspirations.¹⁰⁰ The *Herald's* assertion that "everything must be done to keep confrontation at full momentum"¹⁰¹ was matched by similar

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96. Antara, March 12, 1966.
 97. New York Times, March 14, 1966.
 98. According to Col. Soenarjo, Razak had said on March 13 that with the banning of the PKI, confrontation would end. Soenarjo insisted that confrontation would be maintained until it succeeded because it was the absolute demand of the Indonesian people and of the Indonesian Revolution, both of which remained consistently anti-*nekolim*. Antara, March 15, 1966.
 99. Antara, March 15, 1966. Subchan was speaking to a rally in Banteng Square supporting Suharto, demanding the dismissal of the "Gestapu Cabinet," and urging that Subandrio be delivered to a "People's Court."
 100. Indonesian Herald, March 15, 1966.
 101. Indonesian Herald, March 19, 1966. In this editorial, the Herald did hold out the vague prospect of "eventual talks" to tackle the political principles underlying differences about Malaysia after "basic political problems" at home had been overcome.

appeals from a number of military commanders.¹⁰² Political leaders likewise joined in the reaffirmation of loyalty to confrontation.¹⁰³

To these renewed pledges to confrontation was added a lengthy defense of the policy itself by Col. Soenarjo, KOGAM's information chief. In a press release distributed on March 22, Soenarjo cited a variety of political, economic, and military accomplishments attributable to the Crush Malaysia policy. Political gains included the concept of Maphilindo, expected in the "near future to become a living reality"; the continued development of the Sukarno-Macapagal doctrine of Asian solutions for Asian problems; and the emergence of national consciousness in Malaysia as a direct consequence of confrontation. This latter was viewed as an advantage because it could lead to a Malaysian decision to join Indonesia in the struggle against British neo-colonialism. With respect to the economic field, Soenarjo saw a "blessing in disguise" in the ending of Indonesia's dependence on Singapore. Malaysia's economic development was said to have been "dislocated" as a result of Singapore's secession. Moreover, Soenarjo predicted, the diminishing prospect of trade and industrial development in Singapore and Malaysia as a consequence of Indonesia's confrontation would result in the

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102. See the statement by Brigadier General Ryacudu, Commander of the XIIth Regional Military Command (West Kalimantan), Antara, March 16, 1966; the message of Djakarta Raya Commander Brigadier General Amir Machmud, Antara, March 18, 1966; the Central Java Military Commander Brigadier General Soerjosumpeno's exhortation that Malaysia, a "direct threat to the life and security" of Indonesia, should be opposed with "all-out fierceness," Antara, March 21, 1966; the statement of Major General Mokoginta, Sumatra Interregional military commander, stressing that the two issues of top importance in Indonesia were the intensification of the campaign to crush *nekolim* and the successful holding of CONEFO, Antara, March 21, 1966; and Navy Chief Rear Admiral Muljadi's warning that the need to crush Malaysia, the "lifeline of imperialism" threatening the security and sovereignty of Indonesia, was "absolute," Antara, March 23, 1966.
103. See the statements of the NU's Sjaichu, Antara, March 16, 1966; Partindo, Antara, March 22, 1966; NU mass organizations, Antara March 23, 1966; KAMI, Antara, March 25, 1966; and DPRGR Speaker Subamia, a PNT member, Antara, March 25, 1966.

instability of their industries and their markets. According to Soenarjo, confrontation's rewards in the military field were two: the tying down of British forces East of Suez making it impossible for London to aid the United States in Vietnam; and indications that, as a result of the Maphilindo idea, Britain would establish new bases in Australia and leave Singapore. Finally, Soenarjo concluded, the secession of Singapore was part of "confrontation's victory" and proof that the artificially created Malaysian Federation would ultimately collapse.¹⁰⁴

It is unlikely that many foreign observers found Soenarjo's arguments persuasive, but there was nevertheless widespread doubt that Indonesia's new leaders would abandon confrontation. Tunku Abdul Rahman himself appeared to see little hope that Indonesia would end confrontation soon. He reportedly told a Filipino correspondent that the Indonesian people had been "so poisoned about Malaysia being a neo-colonialist plot" that no one in Indonesia could directly end confrontation.¹⁰⁵ *Le Monde* concurred in that assessment, writing that it was "impossible" for Indonesia to end confrontation.¹⁰⁶ The *Christian Science Monitor*'s John Hughes reported from Hong Kong that "experts" believed that even if Suharto succeeded in reducing Sukarno to a ceremonial role, he would feel obliged to continue confrontation. Because "Communists and leftists" would be quick to label the generals and students collaborators with *nekolim*, it would be impossible in the short run for the army to order a halt to confrontation.¹⁰⁷

Despite the outwardly unchanged commitment to confrontation, one could perceive within Indonesia the rise of new pressures which would eventually discredit the existing standards of fidelity to the revolution. On March 10, in a final attempt to retain power, Sukarno had brought the leaders of nine political parties together and extracted a joint statement from them criticizing the student demonstrations which had demanded lowering prices, banning the PKI, and retooling the cabinet.¹⁰⁸ But on March 11, after the publication of Sukarno's mandate to Suharto to restore order, the

104. Indonesian Herald, March 23, 1966.

105. Antara, March 20, 1966.

106. Antara, March 18, 1966.

107. Christian Science Monitor, March 21, 1966.

108. Antara, March 11, 1966.

party leaders claimed that their earlier declaration had been prepared in haste and they released a new statement clarifying the previous one. The party leaders now asserted that it was necessary to understand the causes underlying the student demonstrations, and they expressed their belief that the demonstrators' demands were based on an understanding of the common people's plight.¹⁰⁹ This acceptance of the students' contention that economic privation constituted the most urgent political matter signified the adoption of a new standard for measuring political virtue, and one which could replace the anti-*nekolim* struggle as a legitimizer of political action.

Criticism of Indonesian foreign policy had been confined largely to condemnation of the Guided Democracy regime's close relationship with Peking, responsibility for which was placed on the PKI. But, beginning on March 21, three days after the arrest of Foreign Minister Subandrio, more general criticism of Indonesian foreign policy was publicly voiced. Adam Malik, the new foreign minister, charged that Subandrio's foreign policy had brought the country's international prestige to a new low.¹¹⁰ The next day the Catholic Party called for a "re-orientation" in foreign policy, including expansion of economic relations with other countries.¹¹¹ On March 23 PSII (Indonesian Islamic Union Party) and KAMI statements urged that Indonesia's domestic needs should no longer be sacrificed for the sake of foreign policy. PSII President H. Anwar Tjokroaminoto, deploring the "total failure" of Indonesia's foreign policy and the loss of the country's friends, appealed to Sukarno to forget about considerations of international prestige and to "return to his people."¹¹² KAMI maintained that Indonesian foreign policy should accurately reflect the nation's interests.¹¹³

It is significant, however, that despite this generalized attack on Subandrio's foreign policy, there was no criticism

109. Antara, March 12, 1966.

110. Antara, March 22, 1966.

111. Antara, March 23, 1966. The same day, Api Pantjasila, a newspaper run by army members of the IPKI political party, called for steps to restore foreign confidence in Indonesia, so that "economic relations" could be revived.

112. Antara, March 25, 1966.

113. Ibid.

of confrontation. On the contrary, KAMI, in its March 23 statement urging that domestic needs be given priority over foreign policy, specifically exempted confrontation from its criticism. The government, said KAMI, should aim at overcoming Indonesia's economic and monetary problems without relaxing confrontation.¹¹⁴ Suharto, on March 27, told the Indonesian people that the new cabinet would have three goals: realization of the people's welfare in the shortest possible time, crushing of all deviators from the revolution, and continuing to the utmost the confrontation against Malaysia and the drive to hold CONEFO.¹¹⁵

The first real signs of a possible change in Indonesia's confrontation policy appeared at the very end of March. While reiterating that confrontation would continue unaltered, Suharto in statements on March 30 and 31 indicated that the door to peace talks was open. Nevertheless, his assertion that confrontation must be maintained so long as British bases remained in Malaysia made it questionable whether his statements represented any new move toward a settlement.¹¹⁶ Somewhat more promising was Malik's announcement on March 30 that although no new contacts had yet been made with Malaysia, attempts had been initiated to arrange a meeting between the foreign ministers of Indonesia and the Philippines.¹¹⁷ That Indonesia was in fact starting to move toward a settlement of the Malaysia dispute seems evident from reports that the Philippines ambassador to Indonesia left Djakarta "hurriedly" on April 2, carrying a message from the Indonesian leadership asking Manila's assistance in a new search for a peaceful solution to the dispute.¹¹⁸ President Marcos was quoted as saying that the Philippines would soon reopen its mediation efforts.¹¹⁹ On April 3 Sukarno himself, although calling for an intensification of confrontation, said that the door was open for a peaceful settlement.¹²⁰

114. Ibid.

115. Antara, March 28, 1966.

116. See Antara, March 31, 1966, and Indonesian Herald, March 31, 1966.

117. Antara, March 31, 1966.

118. Antara, April 4, 1966.

119. Antara, April 6, 1966.

120. Antara, April 4, 1966.

On April 4 Malik indicated clearly for the first time the direction in which Indonesian foreign policy would move. In his first major press conference as Foreign Minister, Malik spelled out a series of foreign policy goals and perspectives which strongly suggested a reassessment of Indonesia's position on confrontation. He said that the government would reevaluate the foreign policies of the previous administration and would seek to bring them into conformity with "the realities existing in the outside world, which, whether we like it or not, will have to be faced by Indonesia, irrespective of the desires and ideas of the Indonesian people." Deploring Indonesia's isolation, he announced that Djakarta would seek the broadest possible range of international cooperation. Relations with the United States would be improved, participation in the United Nations would be considered, and economic cooperation with other nations would be sought. He added that confrontation would continue, but he stressed that Indonesia was by nature a peace-loving nation and would always be open to a peaceful settlement.¹²¹ On the same date, Sultan Hamengku Buwono IX, Deputy Prime Minister for financial, economic, and developmental affairs, held a press conference in which he emphasized that economic stabilization would be Indonesia's primary goal and that Indonesia would welcome foreign aid in that endeavor.¹²²

The Indonesian leaders clearly were showing a new interest in settling the Malaysia question; nevertheless it was not at all clear what terms they might accept. On April 7 *Trisakti*, a tabloid believed to represent the view of certain army elements, made the first public criticism of confrontation, terming the "physical confrontation or war" something "inspired by the Indonesian Communist party for the interests of China." *Trisakti* suggested "peaceful confrontation" as an alternative to war.

On April 9 Suharto issued a three-page statement outlining Indonesia's objectives in confronting Malaysia and apparently designed to introduce a new strategy of "peaceful confrontation." He declared that the Tunku's consistent unwillingness to agree to a negotiated settlement had obliged Indonesia to continue confrontation. Suharto also asserted that Indonesia opposed the British bases in Malaysia and Singapore not only because they were anachronistic but also because they had been used in the past to aid anti-Djakarta rebels. He insisted, however, that Indonesia's main objective was to ensure self-determination for the North Borneo peoples;

121. Antara, April 4, 1966.

122. Ibid.

the methods used would depend on the situation at any particular time. Peaceful methods were not to be ruled out.¹²³ On the same day, Malik announced that Indonesia was considering the establishment of diplomatic relations with Singapore, but he characterized the move as an intensification of confrontation.¹²⁴ In an interview on April 20, Malik clarified Indonesia's new approach when he explained that confrontation "need not necessarily mean the use of physical force."¹²⁵

The Tunku did in fact appear to view Indonesia's plan to recognize Singapore as an intensification of confrontation by peaceful means. He had long regarded moves by Singapore to re-establish trade relations with Indonesia as "hostile" to Malaysia.¹²⁶ Thus it was not surprising when on April 13 the Tunku complained that Djakarta's recognition of Singapore would bring confrontation right up to Malaysia's door-step.¹²⁷ He manifested considerable displeasure when Singapore indicated that it might consent to the normalization of relations with Indonesia, despite the fact that Djakarta would not cease its confrontation against Malaysia. Singapore, said the Tunku, would have to choose between Indonesia and Malaysia.¹²⁸

123. Antara, April 10, 1966.

124. Antara, April 11, 1966. A KOGAM statement issued on April 12 strongly emphasized the argument that Indonesia's recognition of Singapore would represent an intensification of confrontation. Antara, April 13, 1966. The New York Times reported on April 12 that a "high source" in the Indonesian Foreign Ministry said on April 11 that recognition of Singapore would be the first step toward ending confrontation.

125. Antara, April 20, 1966.

126. See, for example, Antara, January 10, 1966.

127. Antara, April 14, 1966.

128. On Singapore's "welcome" of the Indonesian initiative, see Antara, April 12, 1966. The Singapore government announced at the same time that it would consult Malaysia wherever the latter's defense interests were involved. For the Tunku's reaction, see Antara, April 13, 1966. Malik described the Tunku's displeasure at the prospect of ties between Indonesia and Singapore as "good news." Antara, April 13, 1966.

In light of Indonesia's talk of continuing confrontation peacefully and Djakarta's apparent determination to embarrass Malaysia by normalizing relations with Singapore, the Tunku seriously questioned the credibility of Indonesia's alleged interest in a settlement. Despite the evidence of changing policies in Djakarta, the Tunku did not seem inclined to make any positive assumptions about the good faith of the new leaders or about their ability to keep Sukarno from sabotaging any potential agreement. "All this talk of Indonesia wanting to make peace with Malaysia is sheer hypocrisy," he said on April 13 when he rejected President Marcos' bid to mediate the dispute. He insisted that Indonesia had to call off its Crush Malaysia campaign before any talks could be held.¹²⁹

Toward the end of the month, however, Prime Minister Lee formally pledged that Singapore would never condone any move contrary to Malaysia's interests, whereupon the Tunku abandoned his opposition to the establishment of relations between Indonesia and Singapore.¹³⁰ He also moderated his conditions for meeting with Indonesia to require only that confrontation be suspended while talks were in progress.¹³¹ In an effort to convince the Tunku of Indonesia's real interest in a settlement, Malik left on April 29 to meet with Philippines Foreign Minister Ramos in Bangkok.

During this period of transition to peaceful confrontation, almost no criticism of confrontation itself was heard. *Trisakti* alone spoke disparagingly of confrontation, and it criticized not the principles involved but the military aspects of the Crush Malaysia campaign. *Trisakti* asked rather for a switch to peaceful confrontation, not for an end to confrontation altogether. Amid numerous statements by Indonesian leaders that confrontation would continue in some form, only one call for a rapid end to confrontation stands out. On April 14 the Bandung chapter of KAMI expressed the view that the best possible solution of the dispute with Malaysia in accordance with Indonesia's active and independent foreign policy should be found quickly.¹³² Clearly, the movement to end confrontation did not come in response to any direct public criticism of confrontation.

129. Antara, April 13, 1966.

130. Antara, April 27, 1966.

131. Antara, April 28, 1966.

132. Antara, April 14, 1966.

Despite the absence of significant public criticism of confrontation, evidence exists that the Crush Malaysia campaign was being severely attacked in private. Sukarno reportedly had been told by "powerful members of his new cabinet" that the campaign to Crush Malaysia had failed and could not be intensified without an all-out war, which Indonesia could not afford. Notwithstanding their public support of confrontation, "leading members of the government" were said to have privately expressed the view that a way must be found to end it. "The generals," according to one "highly placed" Indonesian official, "have grown tired of it and the people are indifferent toward it."¹³³ A London *Times* correspondent wrote that military officers had asked him not to pay too much attention to their public reaffirmations of confrontation; it was, the reporter was told, "for internal consumption."¹³⁴ It does not seem at all unlikely that the shift to "peaceful confrontation" masked a significant degree of feeling within the government that confrontation should be ended as quickly as possible.

The month and a half during which Indonesia's confrontation policy moved from belligerence to peaceful confrontation was a time of the most significant change in the political climate in Indonesia. Whereas adherence to confrontation earlier had appeared to many as a hedge against an uncertain future, it now seemed less important as the pattern of the future power distribution became discernible. Moreover, while vehement denunciations of *nekolim* still served as evidence of devotion to the Indonesian revolution, a competing standard of political virtue was arising--a willingness to express support for measures designed to improve the living conditions of the people. The most vital acronym was no longer *nekolim*--the incarnation of all political evil. Now *Ampera*, the "message of the people's suffering," was the focus of political rhetoric. Pressures to maintain the consistency of one's anti-*nekolim* position were now directly countered by new pressures to cast off the vestiges of an "old order" rapidly coming to be regarded as a time when unrealistic policies were pursued to their failure, while the needs of the people were ignored. Furthermore, despite

133. Seth King in New York Times, April 11, 1966.

134. The Times (London), April 15, 1966. He noted, however, that a belief that Britain sought to humiliate Indonesia through the "provocative existence of Malaysia and the retention of bases in Singapore" was widespread. This "indoctrination" was said to have run deep, especially among the military and students.

a futile effort by Sukarno to link confrontation to Ampera,¹³⁵ the new commitment to relieve the "people's suffering" clearly was producing a pattern of policies into which confrontation did not fit. The new policies enunciated by Malik and the Sultan of Jogjakarta were perhaps the most persuasive evidence that confrontation would have to end soon. For it was not hard to see that any effort to carry out economic stabilization, especially in cooperation with the West, would be incompatible with a continued policy of confrontation.

The new political climate and the new policies meant that confrontation was losing its capacity to legitimize political action. To be sure, the rightward swing indicated by Sukarno's March 11 delegation of authority to Suharto was accompanied by a massive effort to demonstrate fidelity to Indonesia's leftist revolution; the torrent of statements reaffirming adherence to confrontation showed that the Crush Malaysia campaign still served as a source of legitimacy. But as the period progressed, confrontation grew increasingly irrelevant to the principal matters of political concern and was less frequently invoked as a justification for other policies.

With the army clearly predominant over those who had hoped to restore Sukarno's strength and to maintain the fundamental patterns and perspectives of the Guided Democracy years, the relevance of confrontation to the army's political needs had changed drastically. In 1964, the army could use confrontation to avoid a post-West Irian campaign demobilization and the restoration to civilian control of key administrative positions held by army officers. By March 1966, however, the army no longer needed a foreign crisis to justify its retention of administrative posts. Confrontation had originally enabled the army to demonstrate that its revolutionary nationalism was just as fervent as that of Sukarno and the PKI. But now there was no PKI to compete for power. And, with the decisive power shift culminating on March 11, the army leadership no longer needed to be seriously concerned that Sukarno might rally his supporters against the army under the anti-*nekolim* banner. Moreover, the presence in Kalimantan of Central Javanese troops who had been sent there

135. Although Sukarno had created the word, Ampera was in April 1966 essentially an anti-Sukarno acronym. Sukarno nevertheless sought to turn Ampera to his advantage by linking it with the anti-*nekolim* struggle, of which he was the unrivalled leader. Sukarno said that the Crush Malaysia campaign should be stepped up because confrontation was a manifestation of Ampera. See Antara, April 4, 1966.

because of their uncertain loyalty to the central army leadership made the notion of a stepped up military confrontation especially unappealing. Even if the army had for some reason wanted to step up military activities against Malaysia, the unreliability of the Indonesian troops in Kalimantan and of the local recruits (many of whom were Communists) probably would have ruled out such a course as a realistic alternative. The army, then, had little to gain by continuing confrontation, but its continuing sensitivity to allegations of rightism made it hard for Suharto to end confrontation outright. Affirmations of loyalty to a strategy of peaceful confrontation reflected the leadership's understanding of the need to proceed with caution in moving away from confrontation.

Sukarno's position was rather more complex. Much as he might have wished to use his leadership of the anti-*nekolim* crusade as a vehicle to restore his position, he was without sufficient power to do so. Under the prevailing political circumstances, an effort by Sukarno to insist on the need for a belligerent confrontation would probably have exacerbated divisions, instead of bringing about unity under his leadership. But neither was Sukarno in a position to end confrontation, since to do so would have been to raise embarrassing questions about his earlier claims and predictions, on which he had staked much prestige. In view of his subordinate position, a settlement of confrontation on terms he had earlier deemed unsatisfactory (a settlement on his own terms was, of course, inconceivable) would almost certainly have been interpreted as a repudiation of his past leadership. Sukarno thus could neither sustain confrontation as before nor end it. For him, peaceful confrontation was the only alternative.

By the end of April 1966, then, confrontation had lost much of its capacity to legitimize political action or to serve as a basis for rallying allies in the competition for power. Confrontation was no longer an unchallenged standard of political virtue. Adherence to confrontation was increasingly less effective in conveying psychological reassurance or guaranteeing security. But confrontation had been so important in defining Indonesia's leftist revolutionary identity that the consequences of abandoning it could not immediately be assessed. Although confrontation was clearly losing its ability to fulfill a meaningful function, almost no one dared attack it directly. Nevertheless, confrontation's growing irrelevance, along with the preliminary negotiations leading up to Malik's first Bangkok meeting, left little doubt that peaceful confrontation was really but a transitional form to soften the way toward a full abandonment of confrontation.

April 30, 1966 to June 1, 1966:
From Peaceful Confrontation to
Negotiations for an End of Confrontation

In the month between Malik's two Bangkok meetings--on April 30 with Ramos of the Philippines and on May 30 with Razak of Malaysia--Indonesia appeared to move from peaceful confrontation to a clear commitment to the rapid ending of the dispute. In his talks with Ramos, Malik succeeded in convincing him that Indonesia was determined to bring about a peaceful settlement of confrontation as quickly as possible.¹³⁶ According to one newspaper Malik said that he personally would have preferred to see a settlement of the dispute with Malaysia "tomorrow if possible."¹³⁷ On his return from Bangkok, Malik asserted with respect to a settlement: "We do not want to delay it, we want to settle as quickly as possible." He indicated that Indonesia no longer objected to the Philippines' recognition of Malaysia. Nor would Indonesia raise the issue of British bases in Malaysia, though in principle the Indonesians would continue to oppose them. When asked to comment on the Tunku's reported demand that Indonesia recognize Malaysia before beginning talks, Malik calmly replied: "Let the Tunku talk. The important thing is to settle the confrontation issue."¹³⁸

In the ensuing days, Malik continued to issue conciliatory statements. In a speech on May 5, he described Indonesia's planned recognition of Singapore as lying within the

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136. After the signing of a joint communiqué, Ramos said that a favorable climate for harmony in the region had been achieved and that "success" had come because Malik was a "man of understanding." Several days later Ramos predicted an end to confrontation within two to five months. A settlement, said Ramos, was "in the books." See Antara, May 2 and 5, 1966. Malik also convinced the Japanese ambassador to Malaysia, who was in Bangkok, of Indonesia's sincere interest in a settlement. The ambassador later informed Razak of Djakarta's conciliatory mood. Antara, May 20, 1966.
137. Antara, May 2, 1966.
138. Antara, May 4, 1966. With respect to the British bases, Malik was asked whether Indonesia would still demand their abolition. He answered: "This remains Indonesia's principle, even if it is not being demanded."

framework of finding a solution to confrontation.¹³⁹ In an interview on May 12 he declared that the possible loss of face as a result of new moves in Indonesian foreign policy should not be allowed to obstruct efforts to meet the country's needs.¹⁴⁰ On May 19 he was more specific when he told a student rally that "the confrontation of the people's stomachs is more important than any other confrontation." Malik said that the Crush Malaysia policy had drained the economy and created inflation.¹⁴¹ Two days earlier he had made perhaps the most important concession of all. In an interview with the Australian Broadcasting System he had declared that Indonesia would not insist on a referendum in the North Borneo territories.¹⁴² On May 23, discussing Indonesia's efforts to acquire economic assistance from the West, Malik reiterated that he was trying to find a way to end confrontation.¹⁴³

Apart from Malik's periodic statements, the only other significant public expression of eagerness to end confrontation came at a University of Indonesia symposium on the rise of the "spirit of '66." The symposium's foreign policy discussion¹⁴⁴ on May 7 produced general agreement that Indonesian foreign policy should be pragmatic and realistic, and that confrontation should be peacefully resolved without delay. Sukarno's conception of a confrontation between New Emerging Forces and Old Established Forces was denounced as having Marxist roots which placed it in conflict with Pantjasila. A particularly interesting, if rather contrived, argument against confrontation was made by Drs. Sumiskum, a

139. Antara, May 6, 1966. It had previously been described as an intensification of confrontation. See p. 38 above.

140. Antara, May 12, 1966.

141. New York Times, May 21, 1966.

142. Antara, May 18, 1966. Only three days later, however, Malik was reported to have insisted that another plebiscite be held. New York Times, May 20, 1966.

143. Antara, May 25, 1966. It is noteworthy that Malik's harshest criticism of confrontation was delivered before a rally of students, his most receptive audience.

144. Moderator of the foreign policy discussion was the economist Mohammad Sadli; rapporteur was Bintoro Tjokroamidjojo; and the speakers were Nugroho, Major General Suwanto, Cosmas Batubara of KAMI, and Drs. Sumiskum of KASI.

KASI (Action Command of Indonesian Scholars) leader, who contended that in launching confrontation Indonesia had fallen into a British trap.¹⁴⁵

Malik's conciliatory statements were amply balanced by numerous assertions that peaceful confrontation would continue. Malik himself was the source of some of them. If on May 5 he had described the proposed recognition of Singapore as a step toward ending confrontation, several weeks later he characterized that move as an integral part of the government's efforts to obtain the political objectives of confrontation in a peaceful manner. According to Malik, recognition of Singapore would be "in conformity" with continued confrontation.¹⁴⁶ The same type of reasoning was advanced by the

145. According to Sumiskum, the British, fearful that the combined force of Indonesian and Malayan nationalism would endanger their interests in the area, sought to lure Indonesia into a campaign against Malaysia so that the British could maintain their domination of Malaya under the pretext of defending it from Indonesia. As evidence that the British intentionally tried to provoke Indonesian opposition to Malaysia, he cited Britain's failure to consult Indonesia in advance and London's premature announcement of the federation's formation before the results of the UN commission's investigation were in. Indonesia, prone to "living beyond its means" in its struggle against imperialism, was further prodded into the path of confrontation by the PKI and China, whose interests were served by the Crush Malaysia campaign. As a speculative final conclusion, Sumiskum suggested that the British were aware that the PKI would benefit from confrontation, but that this too was part of London's plan. For when the threat of communism in Indonesia became imminent, then Britain would invade Indonesia under the pretext that such an invasion was necessary in order to crush communism. See Kebangkitan Semangat '66: Mendjeladjah Tracee Baru, simposium diselenggarakan oleh Universitas Indonesia, 6 Mei 1966-9 Mei 1966 dengan kerdjasama KAMI dan KASI (Djakarta: Departemen Perguruan Tinggi, 1966). A KOGAM statement of April 12 had also suggested that confrontation had been intentionally provoked by the British so that the Malaysians would denounce Indonesia as an aggressor and rely on British "protection." But the KOGAM statement did not seem to suggest that Indonesia's launching of confrontation had been a mistake. See Antara, April 12, 1966.

146. Antara, May 25, 1966. KOGAM had already taken the same position. See New York Times, May 16, 1966. Col.

Indonesian Herald, which generally represented the Foreign Ministry's viewpoint. The *Herald* contended that a diplomatic offensive was more likely to succeed in bringing about self-determination for North Borneo and the liquidation of British bases than was military action.¹⁴⁷

From a variety of army sources came statements of continued adherence to confrontation. Although Suharto agreed with Malik that Indonesian foreign policy must be adjusted so that it would conform to international realities and to the needs of domestic policy, he said nothing of the need for a quick end to confrontation. Suharto would go no further than to restate his April 9 position that while "not closing the door" to a settlement based on the Manila agreement, Indonesia would continue to support the North Borneo peoples' right to self-determination.¹⁴⁸ Among the more explicit declarations was General Mokoginta's reminder that it was the manner of confrontation, not confrontation itself, that was under review.¹⁴⁹ Similarly, the armed forces newspaper *Angkatan Bersendjata* stressed that while the holding of peace talks with Malaysia would represent a shift in tactics, confrontation would unquestionably continue.¹⁵⁰ Even KAMI showed signs of a continuing commitment to confrontation. Cosmas Batubara, chairman of the central KAMI presidium, said that KAMI's struggles were based on three central principles: propagation of Bung Karno's teachings, continuation of the campaign against British Malaysia, and the uprooting of Gestapu/PKI elements.¹⁵¹

Soenarjo explicitly recalled Suharto's April 9 statement which emphasized that the method of pursuing confrontation was dependent on the needs of the situation.

147. *Indonesian Herald*, May 6, 1966. See also *The Times* (London), May 7, 1966, and *Antara*, May 6, 1966.
148. See Suharto's May 4 speech to the DPRGR (Parliament) and his interview in *Asahi Shimbun*, both reported in *Antara* bulletins of May 5, 1966.
149. *Antara*, May 10, 1966. For additional assertions by army officers that confrontation would not be relaxed, see the statements by Brigadier General Ibnu Subroto, *The Times* (London), May 14, 1966, and Kalimantan Inter-regional Commander Major General Soemartono, *Antara*, May 3, 1966.
150. *Angkatan Bersendjata* (Djakarta), May 23, 1966.
151. *Antara*, May 11, 1966.

By mid-May it was possible to identify several focal points of opposition to Malik's apparent eagerness to facilitate an early settlement by making concessions. General Nasution, judging from his public statements, had become one such center of resistance to concessions on the Malaysia issue. He consistently warned against compromising Indonesia's principles. In an interview with *Yomiuri Shimbun*, he warned that while a peaceful approach to the Malaysia issue might be seriously considered, the Maphilindo spirit must not be sacrificed.¹⁵² On May 15 he agreed with Malik that the Malaysia issue should be settled instead of letting it hang indefinitely. But he urged that the Manila agreement be consistently and honestly implemented by those concerned, and he made it plain that Indonesia would seek a peaceful settlement without sacrificing its principles.¹⁵³ On May 21 he noted that peace talks might be held, but he argued that this would not lessen Indonesia's adherence to the principle of crushing British Malaysia. Denying that confrontation was solely responsible for Indonesia's economic problems, Nasution said that the Crush Malaysia campaign would be adapted--physically, economically, and diplomatically--to present conditions; confrontation would continue because Indonesia was sticking to her anti-*nekolim* principles.¹⁵⁴ In Medan on May 26, Nasution stressed again that Indonesia was not going to violate her own principles in order to have peace with Malaysia. Much as they desired peace, Indonesians would hold to the Manila agreement. Nasution suggested that the efforts underway to contact Malaysia were intended merely to "ask" Kuala Lumpur if it really wanted to implement the points stipulated in the Manila agreement. Thus far, he added, Kuala Lumpur had not given a positive reply.¹⁵⁵

152. Antara, May 13, 1966.

153. Antara, May 17, 1966. It should be noted that this statement, which represents the closest Nasution came to emphasizing the need for a settlement, was made to an "Angkatan '66" student group in Bogor.

154. Antara, May 23, 1966. Nasution said that a share of the responsibility for Indonesia's economic troubles had to go to such factors as the huge manipulations of state funds by now discredited leaders like Jusuf Muda Dalam. Nasution appeared to be responding to Malik's allegation on May 19 that confrontation had "drained the country's finances" and indirectly caused the skyrocketing inflation. New York Times, May 22, 1966.

155. Antara, May 30, 1966. For additional evidence, see Antara, May 31, 1966.

Some have asserted that Nasution was in fact a leading advocate of ending confrontation. John O. Sutter writes that Malik and Nasution in April led the movement within the government to normalize relations with Malaysia. But Sutter offers neither explanation nor specific evidence to support his assertion, so it is hard to evaluate.¹⁵⁶ Apparently in agreement with Sutter is a report by Donald Kirk of the *New York Times*. Kirk writes that at the KOGAM session of May 15 Sukarno and Nasution "quarreled bitterly" over whether or not Indonesia should continue to pursue its policy of military and diplomatic confrontation against Malaysia.¹⁵⁷ But the precise content and, thus, the significance of that "quarrel" are still unclear. Kirk's article is ambiguous, but he appears to be saying that the violent argument between Sukarno and Nasution concerned the specific question of whether meetings with Malaysia should be at the summit or at the ministerial level. Nasution and Malik were said to favor ministerial meetings, on the grounds that a heads-of-state meeting would accomplish nothing. Malik's sincere interest in a settlement presumably would have led him to fear a summit meeting which Sukarno might sabotage, but Nasution's opposition to such a meeting does not necessarily signify that he was as eager as Malik for a settlement. Nasution was bitterly anti-Sukarno and would almost certainly have been opposed to any move which would give Sukarno additional prestige and political leverage.

Nasution's reluctance publicly to endorse a policy of ending confrontation as rapidly as possible is certainly understandable in view of the demands of his political position. Once regarded as the most likely head of a military-dominated government were one to succeed Sukarno, Nasution almost certainly still believed he had a claim to the top

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156. John O. Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi: 'Crush Malaysia' and the Gestapu," Asian Survey, VI, no. 10 (October 1966), p. 544.
157. New York Times, May 22, 1966. Kirk also writes that Nasution, Malik, Suharto, and the Sultan met several times during the following week, "reportedly" to discuss how to bring about an end to confrontation. Nasution's participation in those meetings, of course, does not necessarily make him a supporter of the initiative to end confrontation, as Kirk implies. It is noteworthy that the Indonesian Herald wrote editorially on July 29, 1966 that it was "a fact" that Suharto, Malik, and the Sultan were the initiators of the move to end confrontation. Nasution's name was not mentioned.

leadership or, at the very least, the Vice Presidency. Given these circumstances, it would have been surprising if Nasution had not felt some resentment towards Suharto. His other stands during this period, including a call for early elections and a suggestion that the military budget could be cut, seem to reflect his desire to win political support outside the military. As will become clear, Nasution's public position on confrontation was one which had appeal for the NU. Moreover, Nasution had been much more openly identified with confrontation before September 30, 1965 than Suharto. He certainly was on record with some very strong statements against Malaysia. Nasution was the only survivor of the alleged "Council of Generals," that is to say, of the top army leadership against which the September 30th Movement had made accusations of softness on confrontation. The firm position on confrontation suggested by Nasution's public statements is consistent with the pattern dictated by the above mentioned factors.

A second focal point of resistance to concessions on the Malaysia issue was the NU and its outspoken youth organization, Ansor. The chairman of the central executive board of Ansor told a mass rally on May 15 that whether confrontation was "peaceful or any other way, the target must not change, namely to crush the Nekolim project of Malaysia, while sticking firmly to the Manila agreements."¹⁵⁸ Drs. Chalik Ali, an East Java NU leader, stated that peace talks with Malaysia should not be interpreted as capitulation, but merely as a change in tactics. Any attempt at shifting the confrontation policy towards a "capitulation policy" would be opposed, he warned, because a policy of capitulation, would benefit only Britain and the "PKI guerrillas."¹⁵⁹

The NU's attitude, like Nasution's, is understandable in terms of the party's perspective on the political struggle and on the personalities involved in it. The NU had a history of strong ties to Sukarno, and its principal bastions were in areas believed to represent the President's widest support. Furthermore, the NU had little affection for Malik, whom it distrusted not only because of his "Marxist" background in the Murba Party (national communist) but also because of his willingness to associate with individuals of the Masjumi and PSI type.¹⁶⁰ There were even reports that

158. Antara, May 15, 1966.

159. Antara, May 25, 1966.

160. It is noteworthy that after Malik's later differences with the Murba on the question of foreign aid,

some NU leaders suspected Malik of working with Subchan to undermine their position within the party. The NU clearly had a strong interest in reducing the prestige and influence of Malik and his allies, and in sustaining countervailing sources of power. Besides, the NU, with its relatively parochial outlook, was probably unimpressed by the desire of Malik, the Sultan, and the military to take steps that would end Indonesia's international isolation and facilitate the renewal of foreign aid. It is hard to find statements indicating any strong NU acceptance of a need for such measures. Thus, the requirements of the NU's political position, in conjunction with what appears to have been a relative disinterest in improving Indonesia's international position and attracting Western economic aid, made it logical for the NU to oppose the government's initiatives to end confrontation.

Sukarno is presumed to have been a third source of opposition to a quick settlement of confrontation. He said very little about confrontation during May. Kirk reported that at the KOGAM session of May 15 Sukarno had fought hard for his view that Indonesia should not "yield an inch" against Malaysia, unless the Malaysians approved self-determination through new elections in the North Borneo territories. Sukarno's only public statement, made after the KOGAM session, was an assertion of his willingness to talk to the Tunku and a reminder that "the political line is still the same."¹⁶¹ Sukarno's opposition to an end of confrontation seems to have been one of the "givens" of this period, and, in light of the reasons suggested in the analysis of Sukarno's position during April, there is no reason to doubt his continuing resistance to the abandonment of confrontation. For the NU, Nasution, and Sukarno, an appeal based on the principles underlying confrontation was seen as a way of gaining the support of those who, for one reason or another, were alarmed at the growing concentration of control in the hands of the factions led by Suharto and Malik.

Situated somewhere between the supporters and critics of a rapid end to confrontation was the PNI. The ambiguity surrounding the PNI's position became evident during an extraordinary party congress held in Bandung during the middle of May. On the one hand, the congress took the

former Masjumi leaders working to form a new Islamic party representing the modernist viewpoint said that Malik could count on support from their party.

161. See New York Times, May 16 and 22, 1966. The KOGAM meeting had, however, decided against a summit, so Sukarno's invitation was meaningless.

position that the struggle to crush Malaysia should be carried on in order to free the peoples of Malaya and North Kalimantan from oppression. On the other hand, the PNI congress suggested that for the sake of realism the anti-*nekolim* struggle should pursue a strategy that would take into account the actual distribution of power in the world. The congress called for a reversal of past policies which had shown too little regard for national interests.¹⁶² Near the end of May, PNI First General Board Chairman Hardi declared that the PNI did not oppose preliminary talks with Malaysia as long as anti-imperialist principles and Indonesian national interests were maintained.¹⁶³

Judging from the PNI's May statements, from the comments of informed Indonesians on the party's June position, and from Third Party Chairman Mohamad Isnaeni's August advocacy of Sukarno's viewpoint on the confrontation settlement, it seems likely that the PNI's ambiguity masked a split within the party on the confrontation issue. If the leadership of the party under Hardi seemed sympathetic to Malik's desire for an early settlement, there appear also to have been Isnaeni-led elements that were much less eager to have Indonesia make concessions in order to terminate confrontation. It is noteworthy that like Sukarno, the NU, and Nasution, the Isnaeni faction had some reason to be unhappy about the direction and speed of political change in Djakarta. The recent reapportionment of influence within the PNI, at the behest of Suharto, had left elements led by Isnaeni in a weaker position than they had desired. A continued commitment to the liberation of the North Borneo peoples in the face of Malik's obvious eagerness for a settlement was one way in which the Isnaeni group within the PNI could express its dissent from a disadvantageous political trend.

The stream of assertions that peaceful confrontation would continue annoyed the Malaysians. Tunku Abdul Rahman noted the "contradictory statements" of Indonesia's leaders on confrontation, and he voiced his objection to the numerous assertions that armed confrontation could cease while "political confrontation" continued. In the second week of May, he reported that Indonesia had yet to make a direct approach to Kuala Lumpur with respect to a settlement. The Tunku further showed his suspicion when he reverted to his previous hostility toward the possibility of relations between Indonesia and Singapore. The Tunku revealed his exasperation when he said on May 11: "Only God knows what are the real

162. Antara, May 17, 1966.

163. Antara, May 28, 1966.

intentions and aims of the Indonesian leaders."¹⁶⁴

Indonesia's intentions became clearer to the Tunku after the KOGAM meeting of May 15. The exact decision is unknown, but, according to Kirk of the *New York Times*, Sukarno found himself powerless to combat an overwhelming sentiment in favor of ending confrontation.¹⁶⁵ Sutter also reports that Sukarno was overruled by the cabinet presidium at the KOGAM meeting of May 15.¹⁶⁶ Whatever else may have been decided, it seems clear that one major advance was Col. Soenarjo's announcement that Indonesia would seek a direct approach to Malaysia at the ministerial level.¹⁶⁷ On May 17, during an interview with the Australian Broadcasting System, Malik declared Indonesia's willingness to meet Malaysia without preconditions, and specifically that Indonesia would not insist on a referendum. The next day, the Malaysian cabinet met and, citing Malik's interview, directed Razak to meet Malik for immediate peace talks.¹⁶⁸ On May 19 Malik said that Indonesia had established direct contact with Kuala Lumpur

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164. On the Tunku's doubts about Indonesia's sincere interest in a settlement, see Antara, May 2, 7, 10, and 12, 1966. The Tunku, having found his previous encounters with Sukarno distasteful, was somewhat more skeptical than Razak. While the Tunku called for proof of Indonesia's good intentions, and reiterated conditions for peace talks (Indonesia must call off confrontation, show desire for peace by deeds, and recognize Singapore and Malaysia together), Razak tended to stress the need to trust Djakarta and to avoid imposing conditions that would upset the present favorable atmosphere. On Razak's view, see Antara, May 2, 5, and 17. Even Razak, however, was disturbed by Indonesia's talk of "political confrontation." See Antara, May 8, 1966.
165. New York Times, May 22, 1966.
166. Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi," p. 544. Again Sutter cites no sources.
167. Indonesian Herald, May 16, 1966. In announcing plans for ministerial level talks several days later, however, Malik said that if the ministerial talks succeeded, the two sides would strive toward a summit meeting. Antara, May 20, 1966.
168. Indonesian Herald, May 19, 1966. The article is an Antara/Reuters dispatch.

to arrange peace talks,¹⁶⁹ but a day later, Malik declared that Sukarno had forbidden him to go abroad.¹⁷⁰ On May 23 Sukarno retreated and agreed to let Malik participate in peace talks.¹⁷¹ Razak declared on May 25 that he was now convinced of Indonesia's sincerity, and he claimed that both Indonesia and Malaysia had decided to end confrontation.¹⁷²

The prospects that an agreement would be reached brightened considerably three days before the talks were set to begin in Bangkok. On May 27 a delegation of eight high-ranking Indonesian officers, led by Vice Admiral Omar Basri Sjaaf, made a one-day trip to Kuala Lumpur where they told Razak and the Tunku of Suharto's desire to end confrontation and to live in peace with Malaysia. In its enthusiastic optimism about a settlement, the delegation, officially described as representing KOGAM, went well beyond anything Malik had said previously. Sjaaf expressed Indonesia's desire for a speedy settlement, and one member of the delegation, Herlina, a female officer of KOSTRAD, declared: "Our confrontation is over. We are here to pave the way to restore relations between our two countries."¹⁷³ The visit was intended to convince the Malaysians of Indonesia's sincerity with respect to the impending negotiations, and it apparently had that effect. Following the departure of the military delegation, Razak declared that Indonesia's war against Malaysia had unofficially ended. "I am fully confident the formal peace talks with Indonesia will now succeed," said Razak. "You could even say that after today's visit there is nothing much left to talk about."¹⁷⁴

169. New York Times, May 21, 1966.

170. Ibid.

171. New York Times, May 24, 1966.

172. Antara, May 26, 1966.

173. Antara, May 28, 1966 and May 30, 1966. The members of the delegation were Sjaaf, chief of Naval Training; Brigadier General Kemal Idris, KOSTRAD; Air Commodore Susanto, Air Force; Colonel Tjokropranoto, Navy; Colonel Yoga Soegomo, KOGAM; Lieut. Col. Soegeng Djarot, military attache in Bangkok; Herlina, KOSTRAD; and Trisula, secretary to the mission. Another Antara dispatch of May 30, 1966 indicated that Lieut. Col. Ali Moertopo had been a member of the mission. He stayed in Kuala Lumpur after the others returned to Djakarta.

174. New York Times, May 28, 1966.

The military mission was particularly important because it suggested that Suharto's interest in a settlement was as great as Malik's. Among the group that journeyed to Kuala Lumpur were two officers particularly close to Suharto, Brigadier General Kemal Idris and Lieut. Col. Ali Moertopo. Ali Moertopo actually stayed on in Kuala Lumpur after the others had left, and he flew to Bangkok with the Malaysian delegation.¹⁷⁵ According to one account, Ali Moertopo had for some time been secretly coordinating the efforts of four "mysterious" Indonesians who were maintaining contacts with Kuala Lumpur.¹⁷⁶ It is probable that any activities of this nature were undertaken by Ali Moertopo with the knowledge and approval of Suharto. Suharto himself later acknowledged that contacts with Malaysia had started long before Bangkok--as far back as August 1965.¹⁷⁷ Furthermore, Herlina, who declared that confrontation was already over, had served under Suharto in KOSTRAD; it is unlikely that she would have made a statement which, in her estimate, would have been unacceptable to Suharto. Thus, despite his reluctance to take a public position approaching Malik's, it is altogether likely that Suharto was in sympathy with his foreign minister's views on the need for an early end to confrontation.

The Bangkok meeting was conducted in an atmosphere of extreme cordiality and optimism, and, by the end of the conference, there could be little doubt that confrontation soon would end.¹⁷⁸ There were, nevertheless, some tense moments.

175. Antara, May 30, 1966.

176. Sinar Harapan, August 14, 1966. According to this article, the four were: Des Alwi, Jan Walandouw, Jerry Sumendap, and Daan Mogot. Their efforts reportedly began when Subandrio was still foreign minister. It is noteworthy that of the four, all but Sumendap are known to have been involved in the PRRI/Permesta revolts. It should also be mentioned that Malik's brother-in-law, a Malaysian, was involved in the Bangkok negotiations. Des Alwi's friendship with Razak has already been mentioned (p. 8 above), and Ali Moertopo himself was known to be a close friend of the Permanent Secretary of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, Ghazali bin Shafie (Antara, May 30, 1966). The web of personal relationships is interesting, for it suggests that the great importance of personal relationships in domestic politics may have some relevance to international diplomacy as well.

177. Antara, August 2, 1966. See p. 8 above.

178. Indonesian officials were said to have made clear that they would not let any differences about self-determination in North Borneo alter their basic plan of ending confrontation. New York Times, June 5, 1966.

Malik and Razak were able to agree on three principles that would form the basis of a settlement. Although it was not announced at the time, they had agreed to end hostilities, to establish diplomatic relations immediately on signature of the agreement, and to provide an opportunity as soon as practicable for the North Borneo peoples to express their views as to whether they wished to remain in Malaysia.¹⁷⁹ Controversy centered on the practical steps to implement the third of these principles. The dominant issue in the talks was the question of what method would be used to determine the desires of the people of Sabah and Sarawak. It had been clear from the outset that the Malaysians would not accept another referendum, and Malik was willing to waive the demand for one.¹⁸⁰ The question, then, was one of finding an

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179. New York Times, June 3, 1966. These three principles constituted the formal agreement which was signed in Djakarta on August 11, at which time they were made public.
180. Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1966. Peter Braestrup, writing in New York Times, June 2, 1966, reported that, according to "informed sources," there had been a disagreement within the Indonesian delegation with regard to the concessions Indonesia should make in order to speed the end of confrontation. While Malik was said to have told Western diplomats that Indonesia could not afford a delay in normalizing its trade and diplomatic ties with Malaysia, military members of the delegation were said to want stronger assurances that Sabah and Sarawak would be given the opportunity to say whether they wished to stay in Malaysia. Braestrup's report is hard to evaluate. The military members of the delegation were Brigadier General Sjarif Thayeb, Rear Admiral Sjaaf, Brigadier General Sunarso, Colonel Supardjo, and Air Force Commodore Susanto. Among them, Sunarso had close ties with Suharto, while Thayeb's relations with Nasution were close. It is possible that Thayeb or even Sunarso indicated a desire for stronger guarantees of self-determination in North Borneo. It should also be noted that a report appeared in the New York Times, June 3, 1966, asserting that "contrary to earlier reports," Malik had taken a noticeably hard line in the negotiations. This suggests that the alleged differences within the Indonesian delegation may simply have represented a misunderstanding of Malik's position by Braestrup. It may be that Malik, in his eagerness to impress foreign diplomats with Indonesia's desire to end confrontation, gave them the erroneous impression that Indonesia was willing to forego completely any sort of reassessment of the feelings of the North Borneo peoples.

acceptable substitute. Debate on that subject was particularly troublesome, and, according to one report, it delayed the meeting's conclusion a day.¹⁸¹ At length, the two sides consented to propose to their governments that a vote be held in Sarawak and Sabah in 1967.¹⁸² The Malaysians thus made at least a token concession to Djakarta's demand for self-determination in North Borneo. But the major concession was Malik's, for the agreement provided that Indonesia normalize relations with Malaysia without waiting for the results of the voting in Sabah and Sarawak. All that remained was the ratification by each government of the points agreed on at Bangkok and the formula suggested for their implementation.

In the month between the two Bangkok conferences, then, it had become abundantly clear that Malik and Suharto were committed to the rapid ending of confrontation. The Crush Malaysia campaign's capacity to function as a source of legitimacy had continued to erode. Rarely was confrontation invoked to justify other policies. If KAMI leaders, army officers, and even Malik occasionally seemed to be repledging themselves to a continuation of confrontation, those statements probably were but a reflection of a still existing, though diminishing, need to protect themselves against allegations of rightism. The breakdown of confrontation as a standard of political virtue was considerably accelerated when Malik explicitly ascribed Indonesia's economic ills to the costs of the Crush Malaysia campaign. The concessions Malik ultimately made at Bangkok serve to confirm how strong indeed was his desire to extricate Indonesia from confrontation.

Malik's obvious eagerness to abandon confrontation provided a convenient target for those who were not entirely pleased with the evolving distribution of political influence and the resultant policies. The Foreign Minister's apparent willingness to make substantial concessions in order to end confrontation left him vulnerable to the charge that he was

181. Christian Science Monitor, June 3, 1966. See also New York Times, June 2, 1966 and June 5, 1966. The report of the day's delay is from Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), June 2, 1966.

182. New York Times, June 3, 1966, citing "authoritative sources." Similarly, it is reported in Kompas (Djakarta), June 4, 1966, that Razak was prepared to arrange general elections in North Borneo. Razak himself indicated that he and Malik had worked out a formula to solve the North Borneo problem. Antara, June 4, 1966 and August 7, 1966.

ignoring Indonesia's principles. To Sukarno, Nasution, Isnaeni, and the NU, each of whom was in one degree or another searching for allies who shared his hopes of altering the prevailing political trend, the prospect of an embarrassing capitulation on confrontation seemed to offer an issue which might enable him to rally support. Confrontation still retained enough of its legitimizing capability to lend respectability to what amounted to attacks on Malik and Suharto. It was impossible to criticize the leadership directly; nor was it feasible to deny that peaceful confrontation was preferable to belligerence. But Malik's alleged "peace-at-any-price" posture provided his adversaries with a ready issue--peace was important, but it should not be bought at the sacrifice of Indonesia's honor. It may well be the case that those who warned against rushing into a capitulation on confrontation honestly believed that principles were at stake which had to be defended; but the fact remains that the confrontation issue did serve to legitimize criticism which they probably wanted to make for reasons unrelated to confrontation.

Thus, when Malik met with the Malaysians in Bangkok at the start of June 1966, confrontation was important mainly to those who had found themselves on the short end of the distribution of political influence. Confrontation was still seen as a legitimizer of political action. But in February confrontation had been used to legitimize the actions of all the major competitors; now it was essentially a legitimizer of dissent. Confrontation was still seen as an instrument which could be used to isolate one's enemies and rally one's allies. But in February both the army and Sukarno had sought to justify moves that would strengthen their political position by linking them to confrontation; now the balance had been broken, and only the weaker parties were relying on confrontation to enhance their political position. Confrontation now served important functions only for those who lacked the power to determine the fate of the Crush Malaysia campaign. And given the obvious interest of Malik and Suharto in terminating the Crush Malaysia campaign, there could be little doubt that confrontation would soon be over.

June 1, 1966 to August 11, 1966: The Ratification Debate

In general Malik's statements after the Bangkok conference seemed to reflect his satisfaction with the agreement and his optimism about the prospects for early ratification. He indicated that the agreement embodied the maximum that

the Indonesian government had hoped to accomplish.¹⁸³ He minimized the difficulties encountered at Bangkok. "There were no problems at all," said Malik. Such difficulties as had arisen he compared to a mosquito bite, which required only a little lotion to make the itching vanish.¹⁸⁴ When asked whether he expected the government to ratify the fruits of his work at Bangkok, he replied affirmatively, pointing out that he was himself a representative of the government, and he had acted at Bangkok in accordance with the instructions given him by the President.¹⁸⁵ Malik expressed the hope that ratification would be forthcoming before the convening of the MPRS (People's Consultative Congress) session later in June.¹⁸⁶ Asked whether it was true that Indonesia would recognize Malaysia by August, he replied: "Very soon."¹⁸⁷ From those optimistic statements issued by Malik, one would be inclined to accept Razak's estimate that confrontation was over.¹⁸⁸

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183. Antara, June 3, 1966. Asked whether the conference had been a success, Malik replied: "I should say so!" If it were not a success, said Malik, he would not have returned to Djakarta. Merdeka (Djakarta), June 3, 1966.
184. Berita Indonesia (Djakarta), June 4, 1966.
185. Merdeka, June 3, 1966, and Berdikari (Djakarta), June 3, 1966.
186. Kompas (Djakarta), June 7, 1966. This fits with an earlier statement Malik made when asked about the anticipated schedule for restoration of diplomatic relations. He said: "After our parliaments have approved the Bangkok agreements recognition of Malaysia is automatic. Our parliament meets on June 17. About one month after this, if not sooner, relations may be normalized." Bangkok Post, June 3, 1966.
187. Bangkok Post, June 2, 1966.
188. Antara, June 3, 1966. Malik himself was reported by Merdeka, June 3, 1966, to have said confrontation was over, but according to numerous other sources, Malik felt that confrontation would end when the agreement had been ratified. See Sinar Harapan, June 3, 1966; Djihad (Djakarta), June 2, 1966; and Pelopor Baru (Djakarta), June 2, 1966, for examples. It may be that in the statement quoted by Merdeka, Malik was referring only to the military aspects of confrontation.

To be sure, there were discordant notes. Malik said he was "happy" but not "satisfied" with the results of the conference.¹⁸⁹ He was quoted as having said that there were still many problems to settle before confrontation would be over.¹⁹⁰ The Bangkok meeting had only provided the basis for a settlement, which the two sides hoped would be followed by complete agreement.¹⁹¹ According to *Asahi Shimbun*, none of the concrete issues in the dispute had been solved yet, and everything would depend on future negotiations.¹⁹² An official of the Indonesian Foreign Ministry was quoted to the effect that another series of conferences would be necessary to reach an understanding.¹⁹³ While the door to peace was open, the road ahead was "still rather rough," according to "political observers" in Indonesia.¹⁹⁴ On one occasion when he was asked how long it would take to reach a settlement, Malik replied that it could not be predicted: "Only God knows."¹⁹⁵

Notwithstanding Malik's talk of problems remaining to be solved, there is good reason to believe that he foresaw no difficulties with Malaysia. In early August Razak recounted that he and Malik had agreed on the Borneo question at Bangkok but that Malik had told him it would take some time to settle the question.¹⁹⁶ Malik's estimate that he might need some time seemed to reflect a concern about problems in Djakarta, not in Kuala Lumpur.

Given the concessions he had made, especially the agreement to normalize relations with Malaysia before elections in North Borneo, Malik must have expected resistance from Sukarno, and on June 3 he got it. The official announcement following their meeting said simply that the results of the Bangkok conference as a basis for the settlement of the

189. Suluh Marhaen (Djakarta), June 3, 1966, and Sinar Harapan, June 3, 1966.

190. Pelopor Baru, June 2, 1966.

191. Djihad, June 2, 1966.

192. Antara, June 3, 1966.

193. New York Times, June 5, 1966.

194. Pelopor Baru, June 3, 1966.

195. Duta Masjarakat (Djakarta), June 3, 1966.

196. Antara, August 7, 1966.

Malaysia issue needed further discussion.¹⁹⁷ A later account adds some vivid details. According to that version, Malik's report that "confrontation was over" enraged Sukarno. The President shouted: "You are a coward, and Suharto is a coward, too. You are scared of war with Malaysia." Malik then asked Sukarno if he really wanted to continue the conflict, and Sukarno insisted that he did. "Then you will have to fight it by yourself," said Malik. "You are all alone."¹⁹⁸ The next day Malik and the Sultan, who had just returned from a mission to Japan and the Philippines, briefed Nasution on their trips. When asked for his opinion on the results of the Bangkok meeting, Nasution declined to make a statement.¹⁹⁹

On June 6, nevertheless, Malik announced that the Bangkok proposals were being considered by the government, and that, "basically, no difficulties" were being experienced.²⁰⁰ He was still hopeful of ratification before the opening of the MPRS on June 20.²⁰¹ On June 7, Malik reported on the Bangkok meeting to a closed session of the DPRGR (Parliament). The House members, according to *Antara*, generally voiced understanding and approval of Malik's policy.²⁰² On June 8, Malik

197. *Antara*, June 3, 1966.

198. This story appears in a "Man in the News Sketch" of Malik in *New York Times*, October 17, 1966. Sukarno may have been "all alone" in wanting to fight Malaysia, but, as will be seen, he was not alone in demanding greater concessions from Kuala Lumpur. Malik probably exaggerated his case in his eagerness to persuade the President of the futility of opposing the Bangkok agreement.

199. *Sinar Harapan*, June 4, 1966. According to Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi," p. 544, Nasution "spoke approvingly" of the agreement. Sutter's source is a Malik interview in *Asahi*, June 8, 1966. In *Antara*'s report on the *Asahi* interview, there is no mention of Nasution's feelings about Malaysia.

200. *Antara*, June 6, 1966.

201. *Kompas*, June 7, 1966.

202. *Antara*, June 7, 1966. Malik had decided, however, that the agreement did not need ratification by the DPRGR, because confrontation had been carried out without any authorization from the DPRGR. *Angkatan Bersendjata*, June 7, 1966.

reportedly predicted that relations with Malaysia would "probably" be established after the MPRS meeting at the end of June.²⁰³

By this time, Malaysia had already ratified the Bangkok agreement.²⁰⁴ But it now became clear that those who were wary of the concessions Malik had made at Bangkok were not without influence. On June 8, following a meeting of KOGAM, it was announced that Malik's work on the negotiation of a settlement was finished and that Suharto would take up the task of bringing about final agreement with Malaysia on certain issues "still needing clarification and settlement." Suharto would also settle "the military side" of the dispute.²⁰⁵

It is not entirely clear on whose initiative the June 8 decisions were taken. Sukarno, in his August 17 speech, claimed that he had regarded the agreement Malik brought back from Bangkok as a capitulation, and had succeeded in convincing KOGAM that Malik should be deprived of any further role in the bargaining with Kuala Lumpur. The President had objected to Malik's agreement at Bangkok that diplomatic relations with Malaysia could be resumed before the elections in Sabah and Sarawak. An expression of the popular will, said Sukarno, had to precede recognition. Sukarno's account is partially verified by a June report based on "sources close to the Presidential Palace," which asserted that he had refused to endorse the agreement to normalize relations with Malaysia until after the holding of elections. Both Suharto and Malik, on the other hand, were reported to favor having the Indonesian government approve the agreement before the elections.²⁰⁶

Despite the report that he supported Malik, Suharto acknowledged on June 10 that Indonesia did have reservations

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- 203. Interview with Asahi reported by Antara, June 9, 1966.
 - 204. Antara, June 8, 1966. The Malaysian cabinet approved the proposals on June 7. Razak said a formal agreement would be signed as soon as Indonesia concurred.
 - 205. Antara, June 9, 1966.
 - 206. New York Times, June 11, 1966. It should be noted that to "endorse the agreement" before elections meant to establish diplomatic relations before elections, inasmuch as the agreement provided for the establishment of diplomatic relations immediately following signature of the document.

about Malaysia's attitude toward the North Borneo states. "Informed sources" in Djakarta said that Suharto would insist that Malaysia guarantee a "referendum" (this presumably meant elections, which could broadly be interpreted as a referendum) before Indonesia agreed to open diplomatic relations.²⁰⁷ If the report of Suharto's position is accurate, it would suggest that he was being assigned to bargain for a concession he did not regard as essential. It is possible that Suharto undertook to do this in order to keep Sukarno from publicly castigating the agreement, which would have been embarrassing for a regime still sensitive to allegations of rightism. It should also be considered, however, that Nasution may well have agreed with Sukarno on the point that elections should precede recognition. Such a position is suggested by his previous and subsequent statements on ending confrontation. Similarly, Sukarno presumably had support from the NU and from within the PNI. In delaying ratification and seeking "clarification," Suharto and Malik may have been yielding not only to Sukarno but to others as well.

Why was responsibility for further negotiations shifted from Malik to Suharto? Malik was clearly a weaker opponent than Suharto, and therefore critics of the government would undoubtedly concentrate their attacks on Malik. Moreover, the Foreign Minister had for some time taken a more forceful position than almost anyone else in publicly urging an end to confrontation, and by so doing he had increased his vulnerability to attack. Sukarno's strong dislike of Malik may also have been a factor. Malik's outspoken criticism of Sukarno's policies, not to mention the reports of their arguments in private, make it plausible that Sukarno would have insisted that Malik be replaced. Such a concession would cost Suharto little.

Also to be considered is the possibility that, though he agreed with Malik on the need for a rapid settlement of confrontation, Suharto may have been more amenable to the criticism directed against the Bangkok agreement. This is suggested by a report that when a KAMI delegation expressed its concern to Suharto about the delay in ratification of

207. Ibid. One might interpret this statement to mean that Indonesia sought merely a promise of elections, not the elections themselves, before agreeing to establish relations, but this is what the Bangkok agreement already provided. Razak had, according to the New York Times, June 3, 1966, already accepted the idea of elections in 1967. What clearly seems to have been at issue was the date of the actual elections.

the Bangkok agreement, Suharto countered: "What do you want us to do, sell out our national honor?" Suharto appeared to show rather more sensitivity about the prospect of an embarrassing capitulation than did Malik. On the other hand, it is possible that Suharto took a less extreme position than did Malik for tactical reasons, vis-à-vis either the Malaysians or his domestic rivals. One cannot rule out even the possibility that Suharto encouraged Malik to take an extreme position, so that the foreign minister might absorb whatever criticism was leveled. In any case, the Djakarta rumor mills tended to regard Suharto's new responsibility for the negotiations as a sign that Malik and the Bangkok agreement had suffered a rebuff. Since Malik and Razak apparently felt the Borneo issue had already been resolved at Bangkok,²⁰⁸ it is likely that the decision to entrust Suharto with responsibility for improving on the Bangkok agreement was viewed by Malik as a setback. In any case, it seems fair to regard the June 8 KOGAM decisions as evidence that the leadership felt it necessary to make at least some concession to those who expressed opposition to the formula Malik had brought back from Bangkok.

Malik's critics, among whom Sukarno, Nasution, and the NU remained the most prominent, insisted that strict compliance with the Manila agreement demanded that the North Borneo peoples be permitted to speak their opinion before the recognition of Malaysia. Most outspoken was the NU which, through its officials and its newspaper, *Duta Masjarakat*, repeatedly expressed its belief that the full implementation of the Manila agreement would have to precede any final settlement of the Malaysia issue. The deputy secretary of the East Java NU board reiterated his earlier warning against "capitulation." "We must not allow the level of the Bangkok talks to decline lower than that of the Manila Agreements," he said. Any settlement must "be able to give a formulation on the withdrawal of foreign military bases" from Malaysia. Most important, the settlement should guarantee self-determination in North Borneo.²⁰⁹ *Duta Masjarakat* stressed that the British and the Tunku had caused confrontation by their violation of the Manila agreement, specifically its provision concerning self-determination in North Borneo. In the newspaper's words: "Throughout we have felt we are on the right side. Kuala Lumpur and London are wrong. Not the reverse." It was in defense of the right of self-determination that confrontation had been carried out, said *Duta Masjarakat*, and it was only in recognition of a guarantee of self-deter-

208. See Razak's statement, Antara, August 7, 1966.

209. Indonesian Herald, June 17, 1966.

mination that confrontation could be ended. According to the NU newspaper, it was the government's obligation to convince the Indonesian people that the Manila agreements were being honored, for it was not until they had been "fully adhered to" that the Malaysia issue could be regarded as solved. On June 15 *Duta Masyarakat* said that it saw no indication that Kuala Lumpur was prepared to carry out the Manila agreements.²¹⁰

Nasution was less hostile to the Bangkok agreement than was the NU, but his effort to appeal to Indonesia's anti-*nekolim* principles was unmistakable. In mid-June he made a week's tour of East Java, Sulawesi, and Kalimantan, after which he observed that although Indonesia was settling confrontation peacefully, it would be necessary to carry on the struggle against *nekolim* in North Kalimantan and throughout Southeast Asia although in another form. The denial of the right of the North Kalimantan peoples to self-determination through general elections should be "rejected and crushed." He warned that a settlement of the Malaysia issue must not be made at the expense of the Manila agreement.²¹¹ On June 18 Nasution told a Japanese interviewer that the Bangkok results had "actually been attained by means of evoking the Manila Principles," but, he added, "there is still a certain issue which has yet to be settled."²¹² On July 23 Nasution said that the government was resolving the confrontation issue, but the most important thing was Indonesia's determination to fight imperialism and colonialism in all their manifestations while upholding the principle of a free and active foreign policy.²¹³ And in an interview with a Manila newspaper, Nasution made his most explicit statement on the subject: "We are giving priority to peaceful solutions without sacrificing principle, that is the Manila Agreement. The people of Kalimantan should be given the opportunity for determining their own fate in a free manner. . . . If we adhere strictly to the [Manila Agreement], the recognition of Malaysia will have to come after the wishes of the people of Kalimantan are known."²¹⁴

210. The above paragraph is a composite drawn from *Duta Masyarakat* editorials of June 3, 6, 12, and 15, 1966.

211. *Antara*, June 17, 1966.

212. *Antara*, June 18, 1966.

213. *Antara*, July 26, 1966.

214. *Antara*, July 28, 1966.

It has already been suggested that Nasution's emphasis on maintaining the principles of the Manila agreement might have reflected his desire to win political support, in particular from such elements as those represented by the NU. In this connection, it is interesting to note that Nasution seems to have gone out of his way to speak favorably of the NU. Speaking in Surabaya, Nasution said that back in October, when "several groups were still wavering as to which attitude they should take," the NU was the first to voice demands for the dissolution of the PKI and for the holding of general elections.²¹⁵ The next day the NU announced that it would nominate Nasution for the vice-presidency, if the MPRS decided to fill that post.²¹⁶ Nasution's anti-*nekolim* emphasis and his insistence on the fulfillment of the Manila agreements put him close to the NU's position and would seem appropriate as part of his search for political support. Probably Nasution believed his expressed concern about the Manila principles would contribute to the development of his relationship with the NU.

Sukarno made few public statements, and he probably did not need to say much, for his position was clear. He reaffirmed it on June 25 when he told newsmen: "We want to settle the dispute with Malaysia peacefully, but we want it done on the basis of the Manila Agreement."²¹⁷ And on July 28 Sukarno caused a stir when he asserted that confrontation "will go on." He was opposed to Malaysia "as it is today," but, he added, the issue could be solved peacefully according to the Manila agreement. If the peoples of North Borneo agreed to join Malaysia, then he would recognize Malaysia. "Let us first realize the Manila agreement," he concluded.²¹⁸

Besides the NU, Nasution, and Sukarno, several other voices were raised urging caution on those who would abandon Indonesia's anti-*nekolim* principles in order to bring peace with Malaysia. Well-informed sources report that some PNI leaders, among them Isnaeni, joined in criticizing the Bangkok agreement's failure to provide for elections in North Borneo before recognition. The Parkindo (Indonesian Christian Party) newspaper, *Sinar Harapan*, pointed out that Malaysia had been opposed because Indonesians regarded the new federation as a neo-colonialist project. *Sinar Harapan's*

215. Antara, June 19, 1966.

216. Indonesian Herald, June 25, 1966.

217. Antara, June 26, 1966.

218. Antara, July 28, 1966.

editorial writer noted that "norms which previously were considered a 'matter of principle' now are being reconsidered." People were said to be "nervously asking" what would be the consequences of all this.²¹⁹ The newspaper further suggested that the widespread foreign interest in the Bangkok agreement should serve as a warning that "amid all the optimistic voices," it was necessary for Indonesians to be "cautious" and not to let the hope of improving relations with Malaysia made them "careless even for a moment." The struggle for peace with Malaysia should not result in the abandoning of Indonesia's principles, concluded *Sinar Harapan*.²²⁰ Another newspaper that was cool toward the Bangkok results was *Genta*, which had been established on Subandrio's initiative and retained a general sympathy toward the "old order" until it was banned in September 1966. According to *Genta*, much as the Indonesians wanted peace, a continuation of confrontation was being forced on them by the "rifle muzzles of *nekolim*" aimed at Indonesia. Indonesia's economic problems were not a product of confrontation but a legacy of colonialism. The history of the world had proved, in *Genta*'s view, that no country could overcome its economic difficulties by making itself dependent on foreign aid. The possibility of ending confrontation depended primarily on Malaysia itself--that is, on Malaysia's willingness to implement the Manila agreement.²²¹

There were other indications as well that opposition to Malik's proposals was significant. The MPRS, of which Nasution had been elected chairman, did not make a recommendation that the Bangkok agreement be endorsed. It merely issued a "political note" to the DPRGR stating that the dispute should be settled in accord with the Manila agreement and that confrontation should end. According to "an informed source," the MPRS committee assigned to consider foreign policy matters had been divided over whether to recommend that Indonesia insist that Malaysia first hold referendums for national self-determination in Sarawak and Sabah.²²² The *Indonesian Herald*, while expressing optimism about the agreement reached at Bangkok, warned that "some sections" of the "political machinery" might not approve and might even try to "sabotage" the Bangkok results.²²³ *Ampera* warned that "Gestapu-PKI

219. Sinar Harapan, June 5, 1966.

220. Sinar Harapan, June 3, 1966.

221. Genta (Djakarta), June 3, 1966.

222. New York Times, July 6, 1966.

223. Indonesian Herald, June 3, 1966.

remnants" were hindering the settlement of confrontation in order to thwart the activities of the MPRS.²²⁴ The IPKI (League of the Upholders of Indonesian Independence) paper, *Api Pantjasila*, noted the difficulty of Malik's task, inasmuch as he confronted "serious challenges" from the counter-revolutionary "political guerrillas."²²⁵ Finally, Malik's abandonment of his plan to seek ratification of the Bangkok agreement by the DPRGR may have reflected his estimate that he might encounter some opposition there.²²⁶

There is thus little doubt that there was significant opposition to the Bangkok agreement. Nor can it be denied that this opposition was far more than an expression of Sukarno's personal view. While the stand of those who criticized the Bangkok agreement was made in terms of the need to maintain Indonesia's anti-*nekolim* principles, that does not obscure the fact that practically all of those who expressed doubts about Malik's policies were people who had some reason to feel themselves denied the measure of political influence they felt they deserved. For them, confrontation continued to function as a legitimate channel for expressing a variety of discontents.

Those who shared Malik's eagerness to end confrontation stressed the need for a quick settlement based on a "flexible" interpretation of the Manila agreement. While the government certainly had strong support for its initiative to end confrontation, it is noteworthy that there were few who exceeded the government's own enthusiasm for ending confrontation. The abandonment of confrontation seemed to be a deliberate move taken by the government on its own initiative, rather than a response to popular pressures. Even the action fronts, which had taken the lead on so many of the "new order" changes, appeared to lack some of the vigor that might have been expected. To be sure, the action fronts did provide what was perhaps the most striking manifestation of sentiment in support of Malik's view. Several days after Malik's return from Bangkok, the leaders of eight of the action fronts visited the Foreign Minister to declare their full support of his desire to settle the Malaysia issue as

224. Ampera, June 10, 1966.

225. Api Pantjasila, June 12, 1966. Similar remarks concerning the existence of elements desirous of negating the results of the Bangkok conference can be found in Pelopor Baru, June 3, 1966, and Harian Operasi, June 4, 1966.

226. Antara, June 6, 1966.

soon as possible. After the meeting they disclosed that they would soon undertake actions aimed at speeding up the end of confrontation.²²⁷ On June 14 the action fronts sponsored a large rally in Djakarta's Banteng Square, and Darius Marpaung, chairman of the group, leveled a heavy attack on confrontation. He declared it undeniable that poverty and economic disaster in Indonesia had been caused by confrontation, which, he claimed, had consumed 70% of the national budget. For that reason, he was in agreement with Malik that the immediate end of confrontation was the only way to facilitate the building of a just and prosperous society. Marpaung urged the government to ratify the Bangkok accord as soon as possible.²²⁸

That demonstration was apparently the only major rally devoted to the issue of ending confrontation, and it was probably planned with Malik's cognizance, if not his collaboration. It is entirely plausible that the mass meeting represented an effort by Malik to use the action fronts to build support for his position against Sukarno, Nasution, the NU, and his other critics. Though the action fronts undoubtedly believed that confrontation should be ended quickly, they were not pressuring the government itself so much as they were acting against those who would slow the movement toward a settlement. Apart from the June 14 rally, the militant action fronts made relatively few public efforts on behalf of the drive to end confrontation. There was a memorandum to the MPRS in which the action fronts called for an end to confrontation in conformity with the Manila agreement.²²⁹ A KASI leader contended that Indonesia should not dwell on the problem of elections in North Borneo, for to do so would invite an endless delay in the settlement of the Malaysia dispute.²³⁰ Bandung KAMI staged an "Alertness Roll Call for Peace," which produced a statement expressing full

227. Ibid.

228. All 12 action fronts, including KAMI and KAPPI (Action Command of Indonesian Youth and High School Students) participated. Indonesian Herald, June 15, 1966.

229. Antara, June 30, 1966.

230. See the statement of Harjono Tirtosugondo as reported in Merdeka, June 7, 1966, and Kompas, June 7, 1966. See also the KASI and KAGI (Action Command of Indonesia Teachers) statements on June 12. The KAGI representative expressed the hope that the end of confrontation would facilitate an increased educational budget. Indonesian Herald, June 14, 1966.

support of the Bangkok agreement.²³¹ When Sukarno made his July 28 declaration that confrontation would continue, Bandung KAMI and the Movement for the Implementation of *Ampera* headed by the outspoken Bujung Nasution, rejected the President's view and argued that confrontation had been the main cause of Indonesia's economic downfall.²³²

The relative quiescence of the action fronts on this issue stands in contrast to their repeated statements and demonstrations on the demand to break relations with China, to lower prices, and to institute an *Ampera* cabinet. When the MPRS convened in late June, KAMI students were reported to be scribbling on walls, pasting leaflets on passing cars, and holding mass rallies which, "in the main, voiced their demands for the implementation of the hottest topics now being debated in the MPRS [Provisional People's Consultative Congress], the ban of Marxism, formation of a new cabinet, and reevaluation of Sukarno's teachings." KAMI's demands apparently did not include the termination of confrontation.²³³ Similarly, the resolutions taken at the Central KAMI conference beginning in Djakarta on July 12 endorsed a free and active foreign policy but said nothing of ending confrontation or of ratifying the Bangkok agreement.²³⁴ Probably, the action fronts were preoccupied with other concerns, notably the formation of the *Ampera* cabinet, and thus were unable to generate enthusiasm for a campaign directed at ending confrontation. Whatever the cause, the fact remains that with regard to confrontation the action fronts failed to sustain the sort of pressure campaign they had mounted on behalf of a number of other issues.

The fact that it was the government, not the action fronts, that led the way in pressing for an end to confrontation should not, however, be construed to mean that there was not widespread support for the Bangkok agreement. Malik had clear backing not only from the action fronts but also from the army, civilian elements associated with the government, Islamic groups, and others. To the support expressed in rallies and in newspapers representing the views of the above groups must be added scattered miscellaneous endorsements of varying enthusiasm. The MPRS did not render the specific endorsement of the Bangkok agreement which had been

231. Antara, June 22, 1966.

232. See Antara, July 30, 1966 and August 4, 1966.

233. Antara, July 1, 1966.

234. Antara, July 23, 1966.

hoped for, but it did issue a note to the DPRGR (Parliament) advising that the Malaysia dispute should be settled peacefully on the basis of the Manila agreement and confrontation terminated.²³⁵ Although the note paid its respects to the Manila agreement, it is probably more significant that mention of Manila was followed by what appeared to be an unqualified call for the end of confrontation. Thus the note was taken in many quarters as evidence of concrete MPRS support for the government's efforts.²³⁶ For its part, the DPRGR, speaking through its commission on defense-security and foreign affairs, offered Malik a lukewarm endorsement, supporting efforts to bring about a negotiated settlement of the dispute and voicing the hope that those efforts would succeed.²³⁷ More enthusiastic support came from such groups as GASBIINDO (Indonesian Federation of Moslem Trade Unions) and KESPEKRI (Indonesian Christian Workers Federation).²³⁸

The arguments advanced in support of a rapid end of confrontation deserve elaboration for two reasons. First, cast against the dissenting views already presented, they make it easier to appreciate the real range of views on confrontation. Second, and more important, they reveal how the domestic imperatives which had become the focus of political rhetoric were undermining the legitimacy of confrontation itself. The arguments of Malik's backers destroyed the last of confrontation's ability to serve a meaningful function.

Confrontation was criticized for its association with discredited political elements, its deleterious effects on the economy, and its lack of realism. The Crush Malaysia campaign was widely portrayed as a policy which had been exploited by Subandrio and the communists. The armed forces newspaper *Angkatan Bersendjata* claimed that the line of "unceasing confrontation" reflected a "*Peking Diktat*," a secret agreement negotiated by Subandrio with Peking.²³⁹ *Merdeka*,

235. Antara, July 6 and 9, 1966.

236. See, for example, the Tunku's remarks, reported in Antara, July 7, 1966. It is noteworthy, however, that Razak had indicated previously that he expected the MPRS to "ratify" the Bangkok agreement. Antara, June 23, 1966.

237. Indonesian Herald, June 14, 1966.

238. On GASBIINDO, see Mertju Suar (Djakarta), June 3, 1966, and Antara, June 16, 1966. On KESPEKRI, see Antara, July 23, 1966.

239. Angkatan Bersendjata, June 5, 1966.

owned by B. M. Diah, who had been ambassador to Thailand at the time of the Bangkok conference and was to become Information Minister in the *Ampera* cabinet formed at the end of July, was even more explicit in linking confrontation to the PKI's ambitions. It was impossible, said *Merdeka*, to banish the impression that Subandrio had used confrontation to help cause a situation which would enable the PKI to snatch power.²⁴⁰ *Kompas*, the Catholic Party newspaper, which had many close ties to the government during this period, laid similar emphasis on the allegation that confrontation had been used by the PKI to abet its drive for power.²⁴¹

Confrontation's harmful effects on the Indonesian economy were heavily stressed. The army newspaper *Berita Yudha* noted that Malik's real purpose in going to Bangkok had been to facilitate Indonesia's economic recovery by ending confrontation.²⁴² The Foreign Ministry-sponsored *Indonesian Herald* argued that Indonesia's "costly confrontation" had drained the country's resources and delayed economic reconstruction. Persistence in confrontation would further jeopardize Indonesia's development.²⁴³

The most widespread criticism of confrontation was that it had been unrealistic. It had harmed Indonesia and shown no prospect of achieving its stated goals. It was necessary, argued the army newspaper *Pelopor Djaya*, to view the Bangkok agreement from the standpoint of "*rieel-politik*," not "prestige politics."²⁴⁴ Whether Indonesia liked it or not, wrote *Angkatan Bersendjata*, "Malaysia has been a sovereign state for three years now and has gained international recognition."²⁴⁵ *Merdeka* added that Indonesians had "long been suspicious" of the anti-Malaysia policy. "A confrontation that was endless from its inception had become increasingly hard to understand as time passed," said *Merdeka*.²⁴⁶ In

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- 240. *Merdeka*, June 2, 1966. *Merdeka* further objected to Peking's enflaming the dispute while "secretly trading" with Malaysia.
 - 241. *Kompas*, June 4, 1966.
 - 242. *Berita Yudha* (Djakarta), June 3, 1966.
 - 243. *Indonesian Herald* (weekly), June 8, 1966.
 - 244. *Pelopor Djaya* (Djakarta), June 3, 1966.
 - 245. Quoted in *Bangkok Post*, August 10, 1966.
 - 246. *Merdeka*, June 2, 1966.

Diah's words, confrontation had to be abandoned because it was "wrong."²⁴⁷ It had, as the PSII's Arudji Kartawinata told the MPRS, brought Indonesia "nothing but harm."²⁴⁸ The only beneficiaries of a continued confrontation, according to the Islamic newspaper *Harian Operasi*, would be "*Nekolim* in Downing Street and *Nekolim* in Peking, none other."²⁴⁹ The *Indonesian Herald* contended that the previous regime's "biggest mistake in launching confrontation" lay in its "a prioristically" putting Indonesia in an antagonistic position vis-à-vis Malaysia with no prospect of attaining the goals of that antagonistic policy. The old order had unrealistically "overemphasized" the negative aspects of Malaysia, and the present government was to be commended for recognizing the strong affinity existing between the two countries.²⁵⁰ *Berita Indonesia* found the Indonesian people "fed-up" with "empty lofty promises," and, with the exception of "reactionaries," fully in support of the government's efforts to end confrontation as rapidly as possible.²⁵¹

Concern continued for the principles identified with confrontation, but those principles were seen in a new light. Indonesia's eagerness to end confrontation and right the economy did not mean that the armed forces had lost spirit or that Indonesia was capitulating, contended *Berita Yudha*.²⁵² The *Indonesian Herald*, similarly, took pains to stress that peace with Malaysia was "by no means a capitulation" and would not signify betrayal of Indonesia's principles. Ending confrontation was "rather the correction of a mistake committed by the previous regime."²⁵³ Indonesia's principles had to be viewed more pragmatically. Self-determination was a praiseworthy principle, all agreed, but, as Malik pointed out on one occasion and many others probably admitted quietly,

247. Antara, July 7, 1966.

248. Antara, June 25, 1966.

249. Harian Operasi (Djakarta), June 4, 1966. The IPKI newspaper Api Pantjasila similarly contended that only "counter-revolutionaries and economic adventurers" would suffer from the ending of confrontation. Api Pantjasila, July 1, 1966.

250. Indonesian Herald (weekly), June 8, 1966.

251. Berita Indonesia, June 2, 1966 and July 9, 1966.

252. Berita Yudha, June 3, 1966.

253. Indonesian Herald (weekly), June 8, 1966.

confrontation had failed to evoke much response from the people of Sabah and Sarawak.²⁵⁴ The key problem of whether elections had to precede recognition required flexibility. *Kompas* acknowledged that the Manila agreement required that the elections come first, but the newspaper dismissed the distinction between putting elections first or recognition first as merely "a slight difference on procedural matters."²⁵⁵ The PSII newspaper, *Nusa Putera*, condemned the idea of "peaceful confrontation," and argued that the Manila agreement should be made "flexible and amendable in accordance with the situation faced."²⁵⁶ *Angkatan Bersendjata* asserted that literal adherence to the Manila agreement would create trouble "because this would mean a request for United Nations assistance in supervising the referendum in the North Borneo states."²⁵⁷ *Nusa Putera* called on the government to avoid letting the Bangkok agreement remain indefinitely neither ratified nor rejected.²⁵⁸ KOGAM's failure to give immediate endorsement to the Bangkok agreement led the Islamic newspaper *Djihad* to ask: "What's going on?" The desire of the people for an end to confrontation was clear, suggested *Djihad*.²⁵⁹ Army newspapers such as *Berdikari*²⁶⁰ and *Pelopor Baru*²⁶¹ joined in calling for immediate ratification of the Bangkok agreement.

In recounting the arguments advanced in support of the Bangkok agreement, it would be misleading to omit mention of the manner in which external pressures were brought to bear. The focus of political rhetoric was indeed on the need for measures to improve the economic situation, and confrontation was assailed for its failure to contribute to the achievement of domestic needs. But the domestic imperative now given top priority implied a definite pattern of foreign policy--namely, an orientation that would facilitate the acquisition of substantial foreign aid. It is unlikely that there were

254. Antara, June 30, 1966.

255. Kompas, July 17, 1966.

256. Nusa Putera (Djakarta), June 17, 1966.

257. Quoted in Bangkok Post, August 10, 1966.

258. Nusa Putera, June 17, 1966.

259. Djihad, June 10, 1966.

260. Berdikari (Djakarta), June 4, 1966.

261. Pelopor Baru (Djakarta), June 3, 1966.

widespread expectations that the alleged 70% of the budget usurped by confrontation would suddenly be made available for developmental projects. If anyone had illusions that confrontation's end would facilitate a major shift from military to civilian expenditures, he should have been disabused of those notions by Suharto's candid statement on the subject in late July. Suharto told a Filipino journalist that Indonesia had no intention of reducing the size of its armed forces, despite the impending end of confrontation. He declared that the build-up of the Indonesian armed forces had not been aimed solely at confrontation but was geared toward the creation of a defensive capacity in conformity with Indonesia's geographical situation and military strategy. In fact, added Suharto, the strength of the Indonesian armed forces still had not been "brought to a proper balance with the size of our population and the large extent of our territory."²⁶²

When Malik and Suharto argued that the abandonment of confrontation would make possible the stabilization of Indonesia's economy, they were understood to mean that Indonesia could expect to receive substantial foreign aid as a reward for terminating confrontation. The hope that an end of confrontation would bring Western economic assistance to Indonesia was certainly implicit in the commonly heard criticism of Indonesia's international isolation. On a number of occasions the view that ending confrontation was a *quid pro quo* for Western aid emerged quite explicitly. For example, the *Indonesian Herald* wrote:

If peaceful conditions develop from the present situation in Southeast Asia this will suit the Commonwealth British and the United States quite well. What we expect from the West is that they assume a proper longterm role in this region in terms of economic assistance, political non-intervention and military withdrawal with the aim of strengthening the independence of the Southeast Asian countries in particular and of Asian nations in general.²⁶³

According to a Dutch correspondent in Indonesia, Malik had made it clear to him that he was working for a policy aimed at gaining the confidence of the West in order to get credits he regarded as a matter of life or death for Indonesia.²⁶⁴

262. Antara, July 26, 1966.

263. Indonesian Herald, June 10, 1966.

264. Antara, August 4, 1966.

The prospect of foreign aid was used directly as an argument in support of ratification of the Bangkok agreement. Malik reportedly made a statement implying that Indonesia could expect a \$30 million emergency loan from Japan only after the Bangkok agreement had been ratified.²⁶⁵ Hatta remarked that Indonesia needed a minimum of \$10 billion to rehabilitate its economy, and that amount could only be obtained in the form of credits from abroad. The ending of confrontation, he said, would have a psychological effect that would restore the confidence of foreign countries in Indonesia.²⁶⁶ *Merdeka* and *Djihad*, among others, noted that the success of Malik's efforts in Bangkok would smooth the way for foreign aid.²⁶⁷ The Indonesian ambassador to West Germany indicated Indonesia's need for foreign aid and emphasized the salutary effect that a settlement of the Malaysia dispute would have on Indonesia's chances of acquiring the required assistance.²⁶⁸ Probably the most explicit argument of this nature was made by *Pelopor Baru*, which asserted that ratification of the Bangkok agreement would "directly or indirectly influence the efforts of the diplomatic mission in the field of economics, finance, and development." It was "natural" for creditor nations to want a guarantee of the future of their capital, and this guarantee, essentially, was "confidence." The restoration of confidence in Indonesia would only be possible if Indonesia ceased to be involved in disputes with its neighbors, concluded *Pelopor Baru*.²⁶⁹

That there was considerable validity in the argument that Western aid would be impossible without an end of confrontation is manifest. David Bell, head of the Agency for International Development (AID), left little doubt on that point:

If the trend of recent months in Indonesia continues, that is if there is a government continuing in authority which is interested in peace in the area and in the development of the country and can begin [to attack] the terrible economic problems of the country,

265. Ibid.

266. Ibid.

267. Merdeka, June 3, 1966, and Djihad, June 3, 1966.

268. Antara, June 7, 1966.

269. Pelopor Baru, June 4, 1966.

we might be very willing to entertain such requests [for aid] but there have been no requests of that nature.²⁷⁰

Thus it was that confrontation was coming to lose the last of its capacity to play an important political function. As the most powerful elements of the new order asserted that only reactionaries, counter-revolutionaries, and *nekolim* would benefit from a continuation of confrontation, the Crush Malaysia campaign's ability even to legitimize dissent was drastically reduced. The insistence that confrontation was not only irrelevant to the task of improving the economic situation but also the principal obstacle to the achievement of that goal made the abandonment of confrontation a matter of some urgency. And as even those aspects of confrontation still presumably considered laudable (e.g., standing up for the right of self-determination, protesting Britain's high-handedness) were downgraded while the need for a realistic understanding of the limits of Indonesia's power was stressed, confrontation's consignment to the past was sealed.

Confrontation was not, of course, abandoned as soon as the arguments described above were made. Suharto undoubtedly sought a compromise which would enable the Bangkok agreement's critics to save face and would permit the formation of a consensus with himself as its focal point. So the conflict over the terms on which confrontation would be ended persisted. As the ratification debate progressed in Djakarta, diplomatic efforts continued on several levels. In the days immediately following the Bangkok meeting, contact with Kuala Lumpur was maintained through couriers.²⁷¹ The announcement on June 5 that Indonesia had recognized Singapore evoked no hostility in Kuala Lumpur.²⁷² On June 10 the Permanent

270. Antara, July 15, 1966.

271. Antara, June 8, 1966.

272. Indonesia had sent a note conveying recognition to Singapore in April, but it was not made public until June 5. On June 8 Lee and the Tunku announced that Malaysia and Singapore would establish diplomatic relations with Indonesia simultaneously. But with Ali Moertopo assisting, a liaison team had already been set up in Singapore on June 3. Lt. Col. Abdul Rachman and Jerry Sumendap were with Moertopo. Discussions about resumption of trade relations and communications services went on through the summer. See Antara, June 4, 6, 9, and 25, 1966 and July 23, 1966.

Secretary of the Malaysian Foreign Ministry, Ghazali Shafie, arrived in Djakarta to meet with Suharto. Reportedly, they disagreed on the question of elections in North Borneo, but Suharto observed that there were "no fundamental differences."²⁷³ Returning to Kuala Lumpur with Shafie on June 14 was Lt. Col. Benny Moerdani of KOSTRAD, who headed a five-man liaison team which set up headquarters in a Kuala Lumpur hotel. Moerdani said that Indonesia and Malaysia had started negotiations on the procedure for the reestablishment of diplomatic relations.²⁷⁴ On June 18 a four-man mission led by Col. Supardjo and Ali Moertopo arrived in Kuala Lumpur, where they met with Razak.²⁷⁵ It was announced on June 20 that Razak would probably come to Djakarta at the end of July to sign a peace treaty.²⁷⁶

On July 8 Malik indicated that Indonesia would not sign an agreement with Malaysia until after the formation of the *Ampera* cabinet.²⁷⁷ It is altogether likely that with the great attention being given to the formation of the new cabinet, the Indonesian leaders felt that any major step to resolve confrontation should wait until the composition of the cabinet had been determined. In addition, the leadership probably wanted to wait for the *Ampera* cabinet in order to identify the end of confrontation as the first accomplishment of the new cabinet.²⁷⁸ Suharto and Malik may also have

273. See New York Times, June 14, 1966, and Indonesian Herald, June 17, 1966.

274. The other members, who arrived a day earlier, were B. Trisullo of the Indonesian Trade Ministry, Lieut. Roestan Rasjid, Sergeant Sadili, and Corporal Kastimo. Antara, June 21, 1966. The exchange of prisoners was one item to be worked out by the liaison team. Antara, June 8, 1966.

275. The other two members were Jerry Sumendap and Daan Mogot. Antara, June 20, 1966.

276. The Times (London), June 22, 1966. Malik made the announcement.

277. New York Times, July 9, 1966. According to an Antara report of July 11, Malik described the reasons for the delay as "practical."

278. This is suggested by Malik's remark after the signing of the agreement on August 11. Malik then recalled that with the installation of a new cabinet two weeks earlier, a new movement had been started by the

believed that they would encounter fewer difficulties in gaining final acceptance for the Bangkok agreement from the new *Ampera* cabinet in which elements with lingering ties to Sukarno were largely absent.²⁷⁹ In any case, it was immediately after the installation of the *Ampera* cabinet on July 28 that Suharto told newsmen they could expect a final settlement of the confrontation problem within two weeks.²⁸⁰

It was also on July 28 that Sukarno made what appeared at the time to be a dramatic last effort to prevent the ending of confrontation. Sukarno asserted then that he was still opposed to Malaysia as it existed, and thus, he added, confrontation would go on. Sukarno was said still to be insisting that Malaysia hold referendums in North Borneo before he would sign the Bangkok agreement.²⁸¹ But Indonesian officials quickly let it be known that Sukarno's statement did not represent the views of the Indonesian government,²⁸² and the Malaysians chose to regard the President's remarks as the last gasps of an old man who was losing what little power remained to him.²⁸³ Sukarno himself later asserted that he had intentionally taken a hard line in his July 28 statement as a tactic designed to give Suharto "more backbone" and to improve his bargaining position with Kuala Lumpur.²⁸⁴

Indonesian Republic, because the new cabinet had been pledged to carry out a genuine free and active foreign policy, devoted to friendship with other nations.
Antara, August 11, 1966.

- 279. According to New York Times, July 9, 1966, it was the "opinion of observers in Djakarta" that Malik hoped the new cabinet would be strong enough to override Sukarno's protests.
- 280. Antara, July 28, 1966.
- 281. New York Times, July 29, 1966.
- 282. New York Times, July 30, 1966. The Times reiterated that it was Sukarno's refusal to agree that was still preventing ratification.
- 283. The Tunku asked the Malaysian people to ignore Sukarno's outburst. Antara, July 31, 1966. It was Thanat Khoman who described Sukarno as "an old man who is losing power." Indonesian Herald, August 2, 1966.
- 284. See Sukarno's August 17 speech, published by Antara.

Whatever Sukarno's motive may have been, it appears that the final decision to ratify the Bangkok agreement was formally made at the KOGAM session of July 30. A Dutch correspondent reports that the meeting decided on a compromise that deprived Sukarno of victory but on the other hand introduced some ambiguity into the settlement.²⁸⁵ The only announcement made after the meeting stated that KOGAM had decided that Suharto would send a last contact man to Kuala Lumpur shortly.²⁸⁶ On August 3, after a meeting with Sukarno, Suharto announced that confrontation would be settled immediately.²⁸⁷ The next day Ali Moertopo, who had been regularly shuttling between Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur, escorted a Malaysian liaison team to Djakarta to make preparations for the signing of the agreement.²⁸⁸ Suharto announced on August 9 that Razak would be coming to Djakarta in two days.²⁸⁹ On August 11 Malik and Razak signed an agreement to normalize relations between Indonesia and Malaysia.

Aftermath of the Agreement: The
"Secret Annex" and Renewed Relations

Considerable controversy surrounded the actual substance of the agreement signed in Djakarta. According to the published agreement, which coincided with what had been negotiated at Bangkok, Malaysia would give the people of Sabah and Sarawak "an opportunity to reaffirm, as soon as practicable, in a free and democratic manner through general elections, their previous decision about their status in Malaysia"; diplomatic relations would be "established immediately" and the two countries would "exchange diplomatic representation as soon as possible"; and hostilities would cease forthwith.²⁹⁰ Razak announced that elections would be held in Sabah and

285. Antara, August 4, 1966. The correspondent was Sal Tas, roving correspondent of the Amsterdam daily Het Parool.

286. Antara, July 30, 1966.

287. Antara, August 3, 1966.

288. Antara, August 5, 1966.

289. Antara, August 9, 1966.

290. For the text of the agreement, see Appendix.

Sarawak in 1967.²⁹¹ In accordance with the provision for immediate diplomatic relations, Malik declared that Malaysia and Indonesia would exchange diplomatic representation in the near future--"a question of a few days or weeks."²⁹² In Djakarta voices were raised calling for the immediate restoration of diplomatic relations.²⁹³

But the question of diplomatic relations quickly became a controversial one, and a debate erupted as to whether the full agreement had been made public. It was Sukarno who originated the claim that there was more to the agreement signed in Djakarta than had been publicly revealed. Sukarno insisted that he had vetoed the Bangkok agreement, and that the agreement signed in Djakarta had been made acceptable by the addition of a secret provision that Indonesia would not recognize Malaysia until elections in the North Borneo territories had confirmed the will of those peoples to join Malaysia. In his August 17 speech Sukarno declared that the agreement signed in Djakarta was the "Bangkok agreement-as-improved," that is, the "original Bangkok plus an annex of our making." The annex was important, said the President, for there it was written²⁹⁴ that Indonesia would recognize Malaysia only after the elections. Sukarno appealed to the people of Sabah and Sarawak to "make the best use you can" of the elections afforded by the "Bangkok-as-improved," if they really wanted independence, as he was sure they did.²⁹⁵

Sukarno's view with respect to the annex was initially publicized and advanced by PNI and NU leaders. On August 12, Sukarno had summoned the PNI leadership council to the palace and informed them that he had approved the signing of the

291. Ibid.

292. Antara, August 13 and 14, 1966.

293. See the statements by Darius Marpaung, Antara, August 13, 1966; KAMI, Antara, August 15 and 19, 1966; KASI, Antara, August 16, 1966; and KAPPI, Antara, August 19, 1966. HMI expressed the hope that mutual relations would shortly be restored to normalcy. Antara, August 16, 1966. Berita Yudha called on both parties not to delay implementation of the agreement. Cited in Bangkok Post, August 17, 1966.

294. It is worth noting that the President described the annex as written.

295. The August 17 speech was published by Antara.

Djakarta agreement because it was different in content and spirit from the Bangkok accord.²⁹⁶ Mohamad Isnaeni, third chairman of the PNI and vice-chairman of the DPRGR, reported what Sukarno had said and issued a statement welcoming peace with Malaysia, but emphasizing the necessity for elections in Sabah and Sarawak. He said that the agreement signed in Djakarta, "with the additional clarification of article 2 [concerning the establishment of diplomatic relations]," conformed to the Manila agreement.²⁹⁷ On August 13, GMNI, the student movement affiliated with the PNI, hailed the Djakarta agreement with the additional clarification of article 2 as "a concrete step towards the final peaceful settlement of the Malaysia issue."²⁹⁸ Mohammad Dahlan, chairman of the central committee of NU, issued a similar statement advancing the interpretation that diplomatic relations should be restored only after elections in Sabah and Sarawak.²⁹⁹ Dahlan, who had been seriously considered several weeks earlier for a cabinet seat, was believed to be giving the official position of the NU leadership.³⁰⁰ *Duta Masjarakat*, continuing to stress that the British were the guilty parties in the Indonesia-Malaysia dispute, reiterated the NU's belief that diplomatic relations should be implemented only after the elections, so that the spirit of the Manila agreement could be fulfilled.³⁰¹ The NU's youth organization, Ansor, also based its approval of the Djakarta agreement on the annex and criticized the government for failing to maintain "open diplomacy."³⁰²

296. Suluh Marhaen (Djakarta), August 13, 1966.

297. See Antara, August 12, 1966, and New York Times, August 14, 1966. Sukarno's choice of Isnaeni to reveal the annex and Isnaeni's support of Sukarno's view certainly confirms that Sukarno saw Isnaeni, if not the PNI, as an ally.

298. Antara, August 13, 1966.

299. Berita Indonesia, August 12, 1966.

300. New York Times, August 14, 1966.

301. Duta Masjarakat, August 13, 1966.

302. Antara, August 28, 1966. General Nasution, the remaining critic of Malik's initiative, did not have a clear position with respect to the annex. He merely commented that it was appropriate to express appreciation to the Ampera cabinet for resolving the Malaysia dispute in a forward-looking way on the basis of the Manila principles. Reiterating that the struggle against *nekolim*

Both the Indonesian and the Malaysian leaders denied that any secret annex existed. Asked to comment on Sukarno's speech, Razak declared that there was nothing secret in the Djakarta agreement. He said there was no clause in the peace agreement which stipulated that Indonesia would only recognize Malaysia after the holding of general elections in Sabah and Sarawak. The agreement signed in Djakarta, insisted Razak, was "the same as the one we agreed to in Bangkok."³⁰³ The Tunku similarly asserted that "as far as we know, there is no difference at all in the Djakarta agreement and the Bangkok accord."³⁰⁴ According to John Hughes, Malik "bluntly and decisively shot down" Sukarno's claims. The Djakarta agreement, said Malik, was "the very same accord, intact," as the one adopted at Bangkok. "There is no difference from or modification to the Bangkok agreement."³⁰⁵ John Sutter also expresses skepticism about the possibility of an annex, describing Sukarno's statements as "a vain attempt to drive a wedge between Malik and Suharto."³⁰⁶

There are, however, strong reasons for believing that there did exist a secret understanding of the sort Sukarno describes. Immediately after the Bangkok conference, it was believed that when the agreement had been ratified, the establishment of diplomatic relations would follow without delay. The Bangkok agreement stipulated this, and statements on both sides confirm that there was an expectation that

must continue, he voiced the hope that, based on the principles of Bandung and Manila, the peoples of Malaya, Singapore and North Borneo would become valued comrades-in-arms in that struggle. See Angkatan Bersenjata, August 13, 1966. Nasution's reference to the North Borneo peoples as separate from Malaya may be a sign of his reluctance to accept the Malaysia concept until after the election. It is hard to say.

303. See Antara, August 18 and 20, 1966. A Malaysian Foreign Ministry spokesman, pointing out that the agreement had called for an exchange of diplomatic representation as soon as possible, stressed that the exchange of diplomatic representatives was the prerogative of a sovereign state, "not subject to any conditions." Antara, August 15, 1966.
304. Antara, August 23, 1966.
305. Malik is quoted in John Hughes, Indonesian Upheaval (New York: David McKay, 1967), p. 261.
306. Sutter, "Two Faces of Konfrontasi," p. 545.

article 2 would be carried out literally. On his return from Bangkok, Malik stated that confrontation would automatically cease with ratification of the accord, while "on that moment also diplomatic relations would be restored."³⁰⁷

Utusan Melayu, a newspaper which reflects the views of the ruling Alliance party in Malaysia, reported that Indonesia would resume diplomatic ties with Malaysia after ratification; the paper anticipated that official recognition and the resumption of diplomatic relations would take place by August 17, 1966.³⁰⁸ The Tunku asserted that the withdrawal of British forces from the Borneo territories would begin "soon"--after the restoration of full diplomatic relations between Indonesia and Malaysia.³⁰⁹

It is evident from the already cited accounts of the debates in KOGAM and in the Indonesian press that the question of the timing of recognition with reference to elections was the principal issue. Lt. Col. Moerdani, the Indonesian liaison officer in Kuala Lumpur, confirmed on June 20 that negotiations with Malaysia did in fact concern the question of the "procedure for the re-establishing of diplomatic relations."³¹⁰ The Dutch correspondent Sal Tas' report that the July 30 KOGAM session reached a compromise which "deprived Sukarno of a victory but on the other hand forced the Suharto group to give up all clearness" becomes more comprehensible if one assumes that an annex was decided on. The decision to sign an agreement pledging immediate diplomatic relations but then to let it be known that restoration of relations would wait until after the elections fits his description perfectly. Moreover, the Dutch reporter indicated that the compromise was in the form of an annex. He cites Malik as having said that, while he believed the work had already been done at Bangkok, if something had to be added, Suharto himself should do it.³¹¹

The evidence of an annex grows even stronger as the period immediately preceding the signature of the Djakarta

307. Antara, June 3, 1966. The view that diplomatic relations would automatically follow ratification of the agreement was reported in most Indonesian newspapers.

308. Antara, June 4, 1966.

309. Antara, June 6, 1966.

310. Antara, June 21, 1966.

311. Antara, August 4, 1966.

agreement is reviewed. A series of reports emanating not from Sukarno but from one of the strongest critics of confrontation, B. M. Diah, clearly suggests the existence of an annex. On August 4, after the first meeting of the Ampera cabinet, Diah declared that before August 17 the Malaysia issue would have reached "a stage of settlement in which *physical* confrontation [could] be ended."³¹² Diah explained that the settlement of the Malaysia issue would take place in phases. The first phase would preserve what had recently been achieved. Later would come rehabilitation in the economic, social, and political fields.³¹³ There had been weak points in the Bangkok agreement, said Diah. "It is the modified Bangkok Accord which we shall ratify."³¹⁴ Several days later, Diah indicated that the process would not be completed until after the elections in North Borneo. Seeking to demonstrate that the Manila agreement was not being discarded, he said that "we shall wait for what they [Sabah and Sarawak] really want. We shall wait for their stand and position in Malaysia and this will be known next year."³¹⁵

Most explicit of all was an article that appeared in the *Bangkok Post* on August 7, some five days before Sukarno began to speak of an annex. At a time when Diah and Razak were in Bangkok, the *Post* cited "authoritative sources" to the effect that confrontation would not end formally until after the elections in Sabah and Sarawak. There would be, said the paper, non-diplomatic missions set up in Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta which would serve as a link to provide "normal" but not "diplomatic" relations while the results of the elections were awaited. A "top Indonesian source," which almost certainly meant Diah, was quoted as having said "we need not start with ambassadors."

After the signature of the Bangkok agreement in Djakarta, signs of an annex continued to appear. A KOGAM

312. New York Times, August 5, 1966. Emphasis added. The Times report is from Reuters. The Antara account omits the reference to "physical" confrontation and cites Diah as saying merely that confrontation would have reached "a stage of settlement" by August 17.

313. Antara, August 5, 1966.

314. Indonesian Herald, August 5, 1966. Diah also made it clear that the purpose of the "final" liaison mission sent by Suharto to Kuala Lumpur was to clear those modifications with the other side.

315. Antara, August 8, 1966.

spokesman on August 11 was said to have emphasized that the agreement did not mean the formal end of confrontation.³¹⁶ When Malik was asked in Kuala Lumpur on August 12 whether elections would precede recognition, he said only: "Everything is being worked out."³¹⁷ He later declared that "in principle" the Bangkok accords and the Djakarta peace accord are the same; the only difference was in the implementation of the accords.³¹⁸ Similarly, Razak, despite his explicit denial of an annex, said on one occasion: "*In principle* today's agreement is no different from the Bangkok peace proposals."³¹⁹ When asked specifically whether recognition would have to wait for the results of elections in North Borneo, Razak refused to answer the question directly.³²⁰ Suharto and Malik both stressed that Sukarno had approved the accord,³²¹ which suggests that something had been added to win his approval. When Suharto asserted that the Djakarta agreement would "pave the way" to the restoration of relations,³²² he seemed to be admitting that, contrary to article 2 of the agreement, other steps remained before renewed diplomatic relations could become a reality. *Angkatan Bersendjata*, citing Diah, also reported that the Bangkok agreement, signed in Djakarta, was "the basis for other agreements"; it was "not a final agreement."³²³

The final piece of evidence of an annex, of course, is the fact that diplomatic relations actually were not restored for more than a year.³²⁴ On August 23 Malik announced that

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- 316. Bangkok Post, August 12, 1966.
 - 317. Straits Echo and Times of Malaya (Penang), August 13, 1966.
 - 318. Antara, August 29, 1966. On another occasion, Malik described the Bangkok and Djakarta accords as "mainly" the same. Antara, August 23, 1966.
 - 319. Straits Echo and Times of Malaya (Penang), August 12, 1966. Emphasis added.
 - 320. Bangkok Post, August 18, 1966.
 - 321. Antara, August 13, 1966.
 - 322. Antara, August 17, 1966.
 - 323. Angkatan Bersendjata (weekly), August 14, 1966.
 - 324. Full diplomatic relations were established on August 31, 1967. New York Times, August 31, 1967. Elections had been held in Sabah, but the Sarawak elections had

Indonesia would have to postpone the opening of a diplomatic mission in Kuala Lumpur for lack of funds.³²⁵ It is unlikely that many people accepted the proposition that Indonesia could not afford an embassy in Malaysia. Even the Tunku conceded on August 22 that the resumption of diplomatic relations might take some time because there were problems still to be ironed out before the formal exchange of envoys could take place. According to the AFP (Agence France Presse) correspondent in Kuala Lumpur, the Tunku was apparently referring to the general elections to be held in Sabah and Sarawak.³²⁶

That there was an understanding between Djakarta and Kuala Lumpur to withhold the establishment of diplomatic relations until after elections had been held in the North Borneo territories seems clear. The most important point to be extracted from the ratification debate is that the positions of individuals and groups, the delays and advances in the negotiating process, and the final compromise all seemed to reflect more than anything else the requirements of politics in Djakarta. The annex was probably more important as a compromise between opposing Indonesians than as one between Kuala Lumpur and Djakarta.³²⁷ The annex reduced the domestic political risks of ending confrontation; it was a concession that Suharto and Malik could yield to their opponents to prevent them from exploiting the issue of capitulation on confrontation. Essentially, it avoided putting Sukarno in a position in which his defeat would have been public and total. For it was far better to have Sukarno insist that he

been postponed. Sabah had been planning to hold general elections in the spring of 1967 even before the agreement was signed in Djakarta. Sarawak, on the other hand, had not planned to hold elections in 1967, expressed displeasure at the prospect of having to do so, and in the event did not do so. See Antara, August 15, 1966.

325. Antara, August 23, 1966.

326. Ibid

327. Suharto and Malik never publicly asserted that they had won agreement from Malaysia to make recognition contingent on the results of elections, as one might have expected. Clearly a major reason for this was consideration for the domestic political position of the Malaysian leaders who naturally were anxious not to give the impression that they were making concessions to Djakarta.

approved the agreement, with its annex, than to leave him no option but to repudiate it. If the arguments leveled against confrontation seriously undercut its ability to function as a source of legitimacy, the annex was a positive inducement to those who might have tried to embarrass the government for its "capitulation" on confrontation to refrain from doing so.

From the standpoint of the issues ostensibly involved in the Malaysia dispute, the final settlement was in fact a rather complete capitulation on Indonesia's part, the annex notwithstanding. Razak had made it clear that the elections in North Borneo would not take the form of a referendum. The question of staying in Malaysia would be put to the people of Sabah and Sarawak only to the extent that it emerged in the platforms of the contending parties.³²⁸ Never did the Malaysian leaders agree to abide by the results if the vote somehow went against them. The Tunku told the Malaysian parliament on August 24 that it was a misinterpretation of the agreement to suggest that the elections to be held in Sabah and Sarawak amounted to an attempt to ascertain the views of the people. Asked what would happen if the people of Sabah and Sarawak failed to reaffirm their intention to stay in Malaysia, the Tunku answered: "We will cross the bridge when we come to it."³²⁹ Of course, the Indonesian leaders were as aware as everyone else that reaffirmation of the North Borneo territories' status in Malaysia was a foregone conclusion.³³⁰ When the elections were held in Sabah in April 1967, not one of the 79 candidates called for a withdrawal from Malaysia.³³¹

Ironically, however, the Indonesians found, to the surprise of some of them, that despite their apparent capitulation on the confrontation issue, they had in fact accomplished some of what they presumably had hoped would ensue from their confrontation policy. The international meetings which ended confrontation also saw the initial moves toward the formation of a new regional association that might serve as a forum for

328. Antara, August 13, 1966.

329. Antara, August 25, 1966.

330. See, for example, an article in the Indonesian Herald, August 16, 1966.

331. New York Times, April 9, 1967. Indonesian observers said they regarded the balloting as an adequate test of Sabah's wishes. Japan, Thailand, India, and Ceylon also sent observers.

the expression of Indonesian leadership in Southeast Asia.³³² Nor did the Indonesians overlook the opportunity to hail the ending of confrontation as a victory for the Sukarno-Macapagal doctrine of Asian solutions for Asian problems, an example for other nations to follow. Most striking of all was the warmth of the reception given by the Malaysians to the Indonesian good-will mission led by Malik after the signing session in Djakarta. The "hysterical and tumultuous"³³³ reception testified to the high esteem in which Indonesia was held by its neighbor. The Indonesians felt that they were being welcomed as "elder brothers"; *Utusan Melayu* said that Malik would be greeted as "a son welcoming a father."³³⁴ The former Secretary-General of UMNO reportedly told the visiting Indonesians: "If you want to colonize us, just go right ahead and do so--but please be strong." A Malaysian journalist actually went so far as to suggest privately that Indonesia consider the possibility of sending a quota of emigrants to Malaysia each year. Feelings of racial community were widely expressed in Indonesia as well. As Malik put it: "No one has won or lost. Victory goes to the Malayan people, the great race in Southeast Asia, to which both Indonesia and Malaysia belong."³³⁵

332. The proposal for a new regional grouping, which came into being in August 1967 as the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), first came under discussion at the Bangkok meeting between Malik and Ramos. See Antara, May 7, 1966 and June 3, 1966.

333. Bangkok Post, August 18, 1966.

334. Antara, August 13, 1966.

335. Antara, August 11, 1966. The outburst of Malay nationalism that accompanied the end of confrontation understandably evoked fears on the part of Malaysia's Chinese community. For two examples of the Malaysian leaders' attempts to counter those fears, see Antara, June 5, 1966 and July 9, 1966.

CONCLUSION

Reviewing the progress toward an end of confrontation, one cannot easily fail to be impressed by how few really seemed to care what became of the crusade begun in 1963. While there were those who had reason to protest a headlong rush toward capitulation, there seemed to be very few indeed who exhibited a deep desire to keep the Crush Malaysia campaign alive. Nor, on the other hand, was there a really vociferous campaign to discredit confrontation; even the leaders of the movement to redirect the course of Indonesian politics seemed reluctant to launch a full-scale attack on confrontation. Why did a policy on which so much emotion had been expended pass so quickly and so quietly from the scene?

It seems clear that the abandonment of confrontation cannot be attributed to a repudiation of the stated goals of the policy. It is hard to find anyone who denied Sukarno's argument that Malaysia had been improperly created, and even that it was a neo-colonialist plot which deserved to be opposed.³³⁶ Though there were disagreements about how closely the Manila agreement should be followed, few denied that the settlement should reflect in some way the Manila provision for an assessment of the North Borneo peoples' feelings about belonging to Malaysia. Nor is it likely that the unstated external goals of the Indonesians with respect to Malaysia changed significantly. There is no reason to believe that the nationalist conception of Indonesia's role in Southeast Asia had lost vitality. Indonesia's desire for influence in the region of which it was the largest component had not declined. And all the historical and cultural factors

336. The Indonesian Herald, as pointed out in the discussion of the arguments advanced by defenders of the Bangkok agreement, asserted that the negative aspects of Malaysia had been "overemphasized," but this was not to dispute the veracity of Sukarno's criticism of Malaysia. And even KAMI saw "positive as well as negative aspects" of confrontation. Though confrontation had drained Indonesia's economic resources, according to a KAMI spokesman, it had also helped to develop a sense of national identity. Bangkok Post, August 17, 1966.

which had led Indonesia to mistrust the British and the Malaysians persisted in August 1966.

Confrontation was abandoned for a variety of reasons. The withdrawal of Singapore from Malaysia presumably had reduced fears that the new federation might open the way to an expansion of Chinese influence in Sarawak and Sabah. Apart from Singapore's withdrawal, for which Indonesia could claim no credit, there was general agreement that confrontation had been a failure and that it showed no signs of succeeding in the future. The feeling was less that confrontation had been wrong than that it had simply been unrealistic and too costly. Moreover, the psychological pressures now were such that one could feel more comfortable casting out confrontation as a failure of the old order than simply holding to it on the basis of principle. Laudable as it was to defend the right to self-determination in North Borneo, it was hard for Indonesians to deny that there were more pressing needs at home. Finally, with the new emphasis on economic stabilization and attention to the "message of the people's suffering," it was perhaps inevitable that confrontation would be ended. Even the mildest pretense at economic stabilization would be impossible when much of the budget was being usurped by a military campaign that seemed capable of continuing interminably. Renewed economic aid from the West was clearly incompatible with continued confrontation. All those things the leadership knew, and perhaps that is why it was from Malik and Suharto that the initiative for ending confrontation came.

But important as those considerations may be, it is impossible to gain any real understanding of confrontation's demise without attempting to see foreign policy from the perspective of the competition for political power in Djakarta. Confrontation derived much of its vitality from its ability to carry out important political functions, and it was only when the changed political situation rendered it incapable of fulfilling those functions any longer that confrontation was abandoned.

Before the attempted coup of September 30, 1965, confrontation served as a source of political legitimacy, a means of maximizing the usefulness of the tools available to the principal political actors, an aid to conflict management, a standard of revolutionary nationalism, and possibly as a source of psychological reassurance. In the uncertain first five-and-a-half months after the attempted coup, confrontation's ability to function as a legitimizer of political action became even more important than it had been. Confrontation provided a means of demonstrating one's fidelity to accepted political norms in a time of great uncertainty

and doubt. And while they were in the process of moving rightwards and eliminating the communists, Indonesians seemed to need a way of convincing themselves that they were not doing violence to their "leftist" revolutionary tradition. Continued fervent support of confrontation may have helped to provide that psychological reassurance. Especially for those who led the movement to the right, confrontation provided a way of avoiding the pejorative "rightist" label. For all, confrontation was a hedge against an uncertain future and thus promised to assure some political security. Each side in the political power struggle used confrontation to strengthen its position.

The critical changes affecting confrontation came in the period immediately following Sukarno's March 11, 1966 order to Suharto. As the balance of political power shifted decisively and the Guided Democracy period's symbols, slogans, and standards of political virtue and legitimacy began to clash with new ones raised by the *Angkatan '66*, confrontation began to lose much of its capacity to fulfill its previous functions. The army no longer had use for confrontation, the PKI was gone, and Sukarno was powerless to exploit it as a basis for rallying his supporters. Confrontation still served as a shield against charges of rightism, however, and the disavowal of confrontation by the new leadership was gradual. By mid-April the Crush Malaysia campaign had been reduced to a policy of "peaceful confrontation," and it was not until May that the leadership made manifest its eagerness to end confrontation at almost any cost.

Subsequently, confrontation remained important mainly as a legitimizer of dissent. By the time Malik had negotiated the Bangkok agreement, confrontation was important only to those who had reason to be displeased with the distribution of political influence. For them, insistence that a capitulation on confrontation would be an unacceptable violation of Indonesia's principles was a relatively safe way of voicing criticism of the government. But even confrontation's ability to legitimize dissent declined as the defenders of the Bangkok agreement hammered away at confrontation's incompatibility with the domestic imperatives coming to serve as the chief source of legitimacy. The formal ending of confrontation on August 11, 1966 was the culmination of a process in which the Crush Malaysia campaign had gradually lost its capacity to serve the functions which had once made it important to a broad spectrum of Indonesians. There was no definitive repudiation of confrontation. The Crush Malaysia campaign merely lost its reasons for existing, and so it was abandoned.

Throughout this analysis of the abandonment of confrontation, the importance of domestic politics as a source of

foreign policy has been manifest. The changing positions of many Indonesians concerning confrontation are incomprehensible unless they are viewed in the light of requirements imposed by the competition for political power. Undeniably, to understand foreign policy it is always necessary to give serious attention to the historical, social, economic, and strategic influences bearing on policymakers, for those factors help define the limits within which policy choices can be made. Nor can the character of pressures exerted on Indonesia from outside be omitted from any balanced analysis of Djakarta's foreign policy. But whether or not external pressures will evoke the desired response clearly depends in large measure on the configuration of domestic political forces. And just as arguments based on historical, social, economic, and strategic considerations once were advanced to defend the necessity of confrontation, so they are now, in a new political atmosphere, invoked to demonstrate that regional cooperation is necessary. Thus, it seems fair to conclude that while a variety of influences may sharply color the environment of Indonesian foreign policy, the foreign policies pursued by Djakarta derive much of their specific direction and real vitality from their domestic political functions.

If domestic politics is an extremely important source of foreign policy, then studying the political functions of foreign policy helps to clarify the nature of that influence. The political functions of foreign policy express in concrete terms the intimate relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy. Each of the functions of confrontation --providing political legitimacy, aiding in conflict management, helping to maximize the usefulness of one's political assets, giving a standard of revolutionary nationalism, and possibly providing psychological reassurance--depicts another of the many channels through which the pressures of domestic political competition may impinge on the making of foreign policy. It does not seem unreasonable to hope that further research on the functions of foreign policy will lead to a clearer definition of the relationship between domestic politics and foreign policy.

APPENDIX

AGREEMENT TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS* between THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA and MALAYSIA

Recognising the need for close and friendly relations between Indonesia and Malaysia and to create a climate conducive to cooperation between the two countries, and in the spirit of the Manila Agreement and of brotherliness between the two peoples bound together by history and culture from time immemorial,

THE REPUBLIC OF INDONESIA and MALAYSIA

have decided to conclude an agreement to normalize relations between the Republic of Indonesia and Malaysia and to this end have appointed as their plenipotentiaries:

for the Government of the Republic of Indonesia:
His Excellency Mr. Adam Malik, Presidium Minister
for Political Affairs/Minister for Foreign Affairs,
Republic of Indonesia,

for the Government of Malaysia:
His Excellency Tun Abdul Razak bin Dato Hussein,
Deputy Prime Minister/Minister for Defence,
Malaysia,

who having examined each other's credentials and having found them good and in due form have agreed as follows:

ARTICLE 1

1. The Government of Malaysia in order to resolve the problems between the two countries arising out of the formation of Malaysia, agree to afford the people of Sabah and Sarawak who are directly involved, an opportunity to reaffirm, as

* Source: Antara, August 11, 1966.

soon as practicable, in a free and democratic manner through General Election, their previous decision about their status in Malaysia.

ARTICLE 2

2. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia in its desire for close cooperation and friendship between Indonesia and Malaysia, agrees, and the Government of Malaysia concurs, that diplomatic relations between the two countries shall be established immediately and that they shall exchange diplomatic representation as soon as possible.

ARTICLE 3

3. The Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Government of Malaysia agree that in view of the above, hostile acts between the two countries shall cease forthwith.

ARTICLE 4

4. This Agreement shall come into force on the date of signature.

This in witness whereof the undersigned, being duly authorised thereto by the respective Governments, have signed this Agreement.

Done at Djakarta in duplicate, this eleventh day of August, 1966.

For the Government of the
Republic of Indonesia

For the Government of
Malaysia