*Lea E. Williams*


# Overseas Chinese Nationalism

## THE GENESIS OF THE PAN-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA, 1900-1916



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# Overseas Chinese Nationalism

## THE GENESIS OF THE PAN-CHINESE MOVEMENT IN INDONESIA, 1900-1916

*by Lea E. Williams*

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To my mother

who from earliest memory taught me of
faraway peoples, places, and times.

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# PREFACE

The bulk of the research for this book was conducted in Indonesia and the Netherlands from 1952 to 1954. In Jakarta the facilities of both the Bataviaasch Genootschap (Batavian Society) and the University of Indonesia, particularly its Sinological Department, were of great usefulness. Many individuals in that city, including Raden Mas Utoyo of Kementerian Dalam Negeri (Ministry of the Interior), Mr. Hsü Eng-hua, principal of the Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan high school, and Mr. Inio Beng Goat, editor of Keng Po, furnished invaluable advice and guidance. The writer was especially fortunate in benefiting from the unlimited graciousness of the late Mr. Chin P'in-san, an imperial degree holder under the last Chinese dynasty and for many years the outstanding representative of Confucian scholarship in Java.

Historical reasons led to the removal to Europe of most of the official documents pertaining to the subject under investigation. It was, therefore, necessary for the writer to spend the major portion of his first two years of research in the Netherlands and to return briefly to that country in 1957. The Dutch have a long tradition of scholarly interest in the Far East and, despite their altered political position in Southeast Asia, the interest continues. Miss Johanna Felhoen-Kraal of the Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen (Royal Tropical Institute) in

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all in the Hague, and Baron J. G. F. M. G. van Hoëvell tot Westerflier of the Hulpdepot, Algemeen Rijksarchief (Subdepot, General State Archives) at Schaarsbergen. These expressions of thanks have mentioned the names of only a few of the many kind and helpful persons met by the writer in Indonesia and in Holland.

In England Dr. Victor Purcell, C.M.G., the leading British authority on overseas Chinese, gave generously of his time and advice. In this country there are many to whom the writer is much indebted. Foremost among these are the officers of the Center for International Studies of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, who underwrote the research; Professors John K. Fairbank, Rupert Emerson, and Douglas L. Oliver of Harvard University; Dr. Hedwig Schleiffer, who made available her special knowledge of research methods and bibliography; and my wife, whose encouragement and support were as always without stint. Many people contributed to the writing of this study, but its errors and misinterpretations are solely those of the writer.

The spelling of proper names in this work presents special problems growing out of such factors as recent political changes in Indonesia and, in the case of Chinese names, differences in dialect and systems of romanization. The currently accepted English spellings of purely Indonesian place names will be followed. Thus there may be references to Jogjakarta, Surabaya, Bandung, and so on; but places formerly with Dutch names, such as Batavia, Weltevreden, and Buitenzorg, will be referred to in that manner, as those are the appropriate names for the period under study. Whenever sensible, Chinese names will be romanized according to the modified Wade-Giles system used by the Journal of Asian Studies; in the case of less easily identified names, the use of the Dutch or Malay spellings derived from South China dialects will

be unavoidable. An incomplete list of Chinese surnames common in the East Indies is to be found at the end of this book. The list is based upon scattered references from a number of works which give the Chinese characters for the names of various individuals. As will be seen, the list gives the Wade-Giles romanizations, then the one or more forms a name takes in the area studied, and, finally, the appropriate Chinese characters. In all cases, where it is feasible and likely to clarify the meaning or bring out the significance of the proper names and terms used in the text, alternate forms or translations will be indicated. Chinese characters for names will, when they are known, be given as an aid in identifying persons, organizations, and various terms. Reference notes are at the end of each chapter; certain titles will be abbreviated. A list of these and other abbreviations appears on pp. xiii-xiv. In notes where more than one source is cited, references are given in an order corresponding to that in which data from the sources are employed.

Lea E. Williams

Brown University
Providence, Rhode Island
June 1959

## ABBREVIATIONS

| | |
|---|---|
| Ad. Chin. Aff. | Adviser for Chinese Affairs |
| Ad. Jap. Aff. | Adviser for Japanese Affairs |
| Ad. Jap. Chin. Aff. | Adviser for Japanese and Chinese Affairs |
| arch. Neth. Min. For. Aff. | archives of the Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| arch. Neth. Min. Ov. Parts Realm | archives of the Netherlands Ministry of Overseas Parts of the Realm |
| Asst. Res. | Assistant Resident |
| Atty. Gen. | N.I. Attorney General (Procureur-Generaal bij het Hoog-Gerechtshof) |
| CHHTC | Chung Hwa Hui Tsa Chih (Leiden) |
| Chin. Chargé | Chinese Chargé d'Affaires |
| Chin. Con. Gen. | Chinese Consul General |
| Chin. Min. | Chinese Minister |
| Chin. Min. For. Aff. | Chinese Minister of Foreign Affairs |
| Dir. Civ. Serv. | N.I. Director of the Civil Service (Binnenlandsch Bestuur) |
| Dir. Ed., Relig., Ind. | N.I. Director of Education, Religion, and Industry |
| Dir. Fin. | N.I. Director of Finance |
| Dir. Jus. | N.I. Director of Justice |

| | |
|---|---|
| DL | De Locomotief (Semarang) |
| 1st Gov. Sec. | N.I. First Government Secretary (1ste Gouvernements Secretaris) |
| Gen. Sec. | N.I. General Secretary (Algemeene Secretaris) |
| G.G. | N.I. Governor General |
| G. Sumatra W. Cst. | Governor of Sumatra's West Coast |
| IG | Indische Gids (Amsterdam) |
| KS | Koloniale Studiën (Batavia) |
| Neth. Chargé | Netherlands Chargé d'Affaires |
| Neth. Con. Gen. | Netherlands Consul General |
| Neth. Min. | Netherlands Minister |
| Neth. Min. Col. | Netherlands Ministry of Colonies |
| Neth. Min. For. Aff. | Netherlands Ministry of Foreign Affairs |
| N.I. | Netherlands India (Nederlandsch-Indië) |
| Off. Chin. Aff. | Officer for Chinese Affairs |
| Off. Jap. Aff. | Officer for Japanese Affairs |
| Off. Jus. | Officer for Justice |
| Res. | Resident |
| SPJN | Sin Po Jubileum-Nummer (Drukkerij Sin Po, Batavia, 1935) |
| THHK | Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan |
| Temp. Ad. Chin. Aff. | Temporary Adviser to the N.I. Government on Chinese Affairs |
| WI | Weekblad voor Indië (Batavia) |

# Overseas Chinese Nationalism

# 1

## INTRODUCTION

Exile is the nursery of nationality.

Lord Acton

### The Problem

Perhaps twelve million Chinese today live and, in many cases, prosper in Southeast Asia. Estimates on the division of their loyalties seem almost as numerous as the immigrants themselves. Officials, journalists, and travelers in the area commonly state that the overseas Chinese population can be classified as 10 per cent vociferously pro-Communist, 10 per cent rather forlornly pro-Kuomintang, and 80 per cent cautiously "waiting." Clearly there is no way to evaluate this guess. Only two observations on the problem seem universally acceptable: the political attachments of most overseas Chinese are either concealed or unsettled; and virtually all these people look ultimately to China as their symbol of national prestige and security. Relatively few Chinese in Southeast Asia seem inflexibly committed to a cold war camp; but without significant exception every immigrant is a nationalistic Chinese, a man somehow prepared to give final allegiance to China.

Nationalism is not necessarily rational in economic or political terms. Countless examples can be put forward to demonstrate this fundamental point. The people of one newly independent nation may have been better off economically under colonialism; perhaps the citizens of another

state enjoyed a larger measure of political stability and personal freedom in the days of imperial rule. The philosophy of non-Western nationalism is lucidly set forth in a slogan of Nkrumah's party in Ghana: "We prefer self-government in danger to servitude in tranquility." Vigorous nationalism, like love, is often blind.

Outside observers, including the author, are prone to feel that the Chinese of Southeast Asia sometimes permit nationalism to work against their own best interests. It is simply illogical for a Singapore rubber tycoon to endorse communism. The Indonesian-Chinese student undergoing indoctrination in Peking appears misguided. There is no practical reason for a Manila shopkeeper to contribute hard-earned pesos to Kuomintang causes or Communist enterprises—or even to both. Nationalism can be assumed to motivate all these seemingly irrational actions, and nationalism transcends politics and economics.

The outcome of the present contest for the minds of men in Southeast Asia will not be determined by a cool appraisal of the workings of communism and democracy. Decisions will be made nationalistically; that is, Southeast Asians will support the ideology which appears to offer the greater strength to their nationalist causes. This generalization can be applied with equal validity to any of the nationally conscious peoples of the area, to the Burmans, to the Indonesians, to the overseas Chinese.

The study to follow attempts to increase understanding of the new nationalism of the populations of the non-Western world. The concern here is with but one of the peoples of that majority of mankind; research in a relatively unexplored field cannot be more than preliminary. Yet, while the present investigation is restricted to the Chinese of the Indonesian islands in the early years of our century, the implications

of the story to be told reach beyond that people, those islands, and that period of history.

## The Indonesian Environment

Netherlands India* consisted of those parts of the Southeast Asian archipelago under Dutch sovereignty. From the northern tip of Sumatra to the Dutch-Australian frontier in New Guinea, it stretched along the equator between the Asian mainland and Australia for 3,100 miles, a distance somewhat greater than that across the United States. This colonial empire included Sumatra, most of Borneo, Java, Celebes, the western half of New Guinea, and countless smaller islands. The total land area was in the neighborhood of 735,000 square miles, the equal of that of France, the Low Countries, Germany, Italy, Spain, and Portugal combined—or twelve times the size of New England. Java, overwhelmingly the most populous island, is relatively small, having an area of only 48,766 square miles, about the same as that of New York State.[1]

The population of the Dutch holdings in 1900, the year marking the opening of the period to be investigated, was roughly 35 million, with about 80 per cent of this population concentrated on Java and Madura.[2] Thus, while agricultural Java has long been famous as the most densely populated island of the world, there were and are regions in, say, Borneo or New Guinea inhabited only by scattered hunting and gathering peoples. The Indonesian archipelago, crossed since prehistory by a great number of different ethnic groups, challenges

*The writer feels it is convenient to refer to the colony studied by the direct translation of its Dutch name, Nederlandsch-Indië, or by the abbreviation N.I. rather than by the more common but clumsier name, the Dutch East Indies.

anthropologists with a broad range of human types and cultures. If there is any sense in speaking of levels of civilization, it can be said that the distance—vertical, if you will—between the primitive Papuans of New Guinea and the cultivated Javanese is as great as that to be found between any two peoples living within one state. The anthropological mosaic left by successive migrations has been subjected, with uneven degrees of penetration, to the cultural influences of India, Islam, the West, and China.

The economy in 1900 was based upon the raising of tropical export products, including sugar, coffee, tobacco, spices, tea, and cinchona. The extraction of tin and oil was significant, though oil production in Sumatra and Borneo was then still in its pioneer stages. The Netherlands of the period, in the early phase of its own industrialization, was just beginning to consider the Indonesian colony as a potential market for goods manufactured in the metropolitan country. Holland continued to function primarily as an emporium and to reap the profits of the merchant rather than those of the industrialist. Imports into the colony in 1900 were valued at only f. 195 million; exports totaled f. 259 million. The main import items were textiles, luxury foods, beverages, and metal products. Within the colony there was only the most elementary sort of manufacturing. Certain export items underwent preliminary processing in the islands, and some simple goods for Indies consumption were fabricated locally.[3]

This study is concerned with the years which saw the Dutch celebrate the three hundredth anniversary of their arrival in Southeast Asia. During those three centuries, the Hollanders had gradually extended their authority over the whole archipelago. The last formal Dutch acquisitions of Indonesian territory, in fact, were made only in the

twentieth century in the interiors of Borneo, Celebes, and New Guinea. But most of Java had been under effective Netherlands control since the first half of the eighteenth century.[4] The Dutch had first come to the islands, like the earlier Portuguese, to trade, not to govern. The early merchants had found that possession of a permanent trading post offered advantages over simply anchoring offshore to barter with native* suppliers. The price of spices, the product which first attracted the Westerners to Southeast Asia, was very likely to be pushed up by the arrival of a foreign ship. A fixed trading establishment, often called a factory, could, on the other hand, buy spices at any time the price seemed attractive and not be subject to the hazard of wild price fluctuations occasioned by the irregular coming of Western ships, which, as the natives knew well, had to take on their cargoes of spices without lengthy delay. The establishment of factories led to the laying out of fortified towns, and these in turn demanded the control of their environs. The exercise of political authority over Indonesia in the days before nineteenth century European colonialists began to speak of their "civilizing mission" was forced on the East India Company. The company had been founded as a commercial venture but was pushed evermore deeply into the sphere of colonial government. In 1800, after years of inefficient and corrupt management, the company collapsed and its governing functions were taken over by a colonial administration.

*The term native has become very unfashionable in recent years, but, as it is so much more convenient than the substitutes now frequently employed in its place, the writer continues to use it. Readers can be assured that references to the autochthonous peoples of the Indonesian archipelago as natives are not intended to carry any derogatory connotations. If one can speak of natives of France or England, there is no sound reason to avoid referring to natives of Java or Sumatra.

The N.I. government's administrative policies, though shifting, lay between direct and indirect rule. Native rulers and native officials existed throughout the colonial period, but the Dutch were the initiators of basic policy and kept a close watch on the operations of the machinery of government. Native bureaucrats appeared to act with considerable autonomy, but, like junior officers walking with their superiors, they were always slightly to the rear and in step with the Dutch. One of the earliest principles of Dutch colonial government was that later expressed in the phrase: "Like over like is humane." *

This semi-official slogan originated from the maintenance of separate officials and different politico-legal systems for the various ethnic groups within the colony. Thus, in theory and within restricted limits in practice, natives were under their own regents, Europeans lived under the jurisdiction of Dutch civil servants, and Chinese and other foreign Orientals † were accountable to their headmen or officers. Final and absolute authority was, it must not be forgotten, always in the hands of a Dutch governor general who acted in accordance with directives from the Hague.

*"Soort over soort genade is." J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1944, p. 89, discusses this principle further but translates the Dutch sentence above: "Like over like is welcome." As genade properly means either God's grace or human mercy, the word humane seems to be more accurate than welcome. Miss Johanna Felhoen-Kraal of the Koninklijk Instituut voor de Tropen in Amsterdam reports that the slogan was originally introduced into the vocabulary of the Indies officialdom by the famous Dutch authority on Islam, Professor Snouck Hurgronje, who translated it from an Arabic aphorism.

†Dutch works on N.I. distinguish, as did Dutch law, between Europeans (Europeanen), natives (Inlanders), and foreign Orientals (Vreemde Oosterlingen, sometimes known earlier as Oostersche Vreemdelingen, Oriental foreigners). The last group was very largely Chinese but included some Arabs, Indians, and other Asians alien to N.I. More discussion of this classificatory system will be necessary later.

It should be observed parenthetically that from an early time the Dutch gave military titles to those Chinese made responsible for the supervision of their compatriots. Thus there was a Chinese major, assisted by subordinates, in large cities such as Batavia. Smaller communities might rate only a captain or a lieutenant. For accuracy and convenience, the terms majoor, kapitein, and luitenant are used here in referring to the Chinese who held such ranks. The Dutch versions of these titles are sufficiently close to the English to preclude any reader difficulty.

This colonial administrative system appears to have been and was in fact complicated. Much of its complexity was inevitable in the Indonesian scene, but a share must be attributed to Dutch bureaucratic zeal and thoroughness. A French observer just before the turn of the century is reported to have spoken of Java as "le paradis des fonctionnaires."[5] And the same critic, in writing of the administration of Java, stated with charming Gallic directness: "Java est trop gouvernée." However, he was sufficiently gracious to add that the Dutch "excès d'intervention" grew out of an "excès de bienveillance."[6]

## The Chinese Position

Within the complex society of Netherlands India the Chinese had carved a niche for themselves. Their position was at times comfortable and at others highly precarious. In 1740 nearly the entire Chinese population of Batavia was massacred. In other, happier years Chinese individuals, such as the late nineteenth century majoor of Semarang, who cleared 18 million guilders as an opium dealer,[7] grew rich. There were in 1900 well over half a million Chinese in the colony. On Java and Madura lived 277,265, and a nearly equal number, 260,051, were

in the so-called Outer Possessions, that is, on the islands other than Java and Madura. The Chinese of Java were mostly Indies-born, while those of the Outer Possessions included a higher percentage of immigrants. Between 1860 and 1900 the Chinese population of Java rose by 128,000; but that of the Outer Possessions climbed by about 190,000. It is thus statistically clear that immigration into the Outer Possessions was in far greater volume than that into Java. It must also be noted that these raw statistics do not reveal the full magnitude of immigration into the Outer Possessions. Many contract laborers for the mines and plantations of those regions returned to China; their numbers accordingly are not included in the net increase of Chinese residents during the latter part of the nineteenth century. Other and more significant statistical evidence that Java's Chinese lived a settled life is provided by figures showing that the sex ratio for the Chinese of Java in 1900 was 85 women to 100 men. Similar calculations for Sumatra, where most of the Chinese of the Outer Possessions were found, show a ratio of only 16 women to 100 men. These figures graphically demonstrate that the Chinese of the Outer Possessions, particularly those of Sumatra's plantations and the mines of Bangka and Billiton, were largely immigrant laborers tied recently and loosely to the society of the country.[8]

The Chinese of Indonesia, in their own eyes and in the eyes of others, have long been divided into two principal groups. Immigrant Chinese are referred to as Singkehs or Sinkehs. The term is derived from the Amoy dialect pronunciation of hsin-k'o ( 新客 ) and thus means new guest. Arrivals from China can also be called Totok, but this designation, from the Indonesian word for genuine, is less commonly used. Chinese born in the archipelago are normally called Peranakans, a term of local origin based upon the Indonesian word for child, anak,

which is also the root, for example, of beranak, to give birth. A Peranakan may or may not be of mixed Chinese-Indonesian ancestry but he is always of Indonesian birth.

While immigrants, Singkehs, were likely to be found in rural areas because of the nature of their employment, Indies-born Chinese, Peranakans, tended to be urbanized. The 1900 population estimate revealed that nearly one fifth of Java's Chinese were concentrated in that island's three chief cities, Batavia, Surabaya, and Semarang; and only one fifth resided outside the other principal cities and towns. In Batavia they accounted for almost a quarter of the population.[9]

It is not yet possible to state when the Chinese first came to the archipelago. They were firmly established there by the time the Europeans came, but much earlier, in the fifth century, the famous Chinese Buddhist pilgrim, Fa Hsien, had described having seen a fan but no immigrants from his native land in Java or Malaya. The Sung dynasty saw a considerable advance in Chinese techniques of shipbuilding and navigation, and the resultant growth of overseas trade very likely took new numbers of Chinese to the Indies. Many Chinese, no doubt, were represented in the Mongol forces which unsuccessfully invaded Java in the late thirteenth century. And during early Ming, the great Chinese explorer Cheng Ho led his seven expeditions to Southeast Asia and beyond. The collapse of the Ming dynasty and the ensuing disturbances on the South China coast appear to have stimulated the emigration to Southeast Asia of Fukien people. Often Southeast Asian Chinese of Fukienese descent boast of ancestors who emigrated when the Manchus came down from the North. Nameless seventeenth century junks are thus roughly analogous to the "Mayflower" of our own history.

One aspect of the impact of the West on China in the second half of the nineteenth century was that, through the introduction of steamships to Eastern waters, it greatly facilitated the travel of Chinese to Southeast Asia. Further, the same years were a period of extensive economic development in the colonies of that part of the world. Labor was needed to work the mines and plantations of the Europeans, and a fruitful source of supply was found in the crowded villages of Southeast China. This was a phase of the infamous coolie trade and the primary reason for the rapid growth of the Chinese population of Netherlands India, particularly in the Outer Possessions, during those years. The later Chinese immigrants, while some Fukienese were represented, included many of Hakka, Swatownese, and Cantonese birth. Thus the Peranakans of 1900 were largely of Fukienese descent, while most Singkehs had come from from Kwangtung.[10]

The various groups of fresh immigrants usually had little in common but their poverty. They were sharply divided by differences in dialect, and, in turn, Singkeh speakers of Chinese were unable to converse easily with Malay-speaking Peranakans. Occupational roles also tended to differ on the basis of men's origins. Peranakans were likely to be self-employed, principally as merchants; Singkehs, lacking capital or credit, were obliged to work as wage earners. Thus, at the beginning of this century in Java, where the great majority of Chinese were Peranakans, of some 75,000 Chinese men with occupations, 33,000 were engaged in trade, nearly 10,000 were manufacturers, and 20,000 worked at other nonagricultural jobs, presumably as moneylenders, restaurant operators, and the like. In the Outer Possessions over half of the 207,000 employed Chinese were engaged in agriculture, which meant that they worked as hired hands on plantations.[11] Finally, if,

as is commonly stated in Java, two-thirds of the Peranakans were of mixed Chinese and Indonesian ancestry, even physical characteristics set the new residents apart from many of the old. It was even possible, imprudent though it now seems, for an astute Dutch observer to say in 1900: "The Peranakans are not Chinese and do not want to be so."[12]

## Chinese Separateness

While it is true that Singkehs and Peranakans were far from forming a unified Chinese community in 1900, virtually all Chinese in the Indies were readily recognizable as distinct from the native Indonesian population. The centuries of residence in Southeast Asia had caused the Peranakans to lose many of the features usually attributed to the Chinese, but they had never been fully assimilated into the native population nor had most undergone more than superficial Westernization from the European side. Or, to employ the words of a Dutch missionary observer: ". . . while the Netherlands have been enriched by the Chinese, the Chinese have, through their contact with the Netherlands, gained little or nothing in religious or spiritual respects. . . ."[13] The language, dress, cuisine, architecture, religions, and habits, that is, the cultural background, of the ancestral homeland had been lost or corrupted in the Indonesian environment. Nevertheless, the Chinese continued to consider themselves a separate people and were so viewed by others.

The Chinese can be said to have been "marked off by communicative barriers"* and thereby to have formed a distinct people within the archipelago. In the case of the Singkehs, it is easy to see how their

*This phrase and many of the concepts to be used as analytical tools in the discussion of nationalism to follow are taken from Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, Technology Press of MIT, Cambridge, 1953. This

ignorance of an Indonesian language was an obstacle to communication with the indigenous people. But, to rule out language as the principal factor in the remaining apart of the Chinese, it must be remembered that virtually all Peranakans knew one or more of the native tongues. The failure of the Chinese to become assimilated, that is, to be linked to the Indonesians by common channels of communication, must be attributed to other causes. Religion was partly responsible for the isolation of the Chinese, few Chinese having embraced Islam, the religion of the majority of Indonesians. Furthermore, in a colonial situation, an alien minority unable to achieve political or social equality with the equally alien rulers is understandably likely to seek to separate itself from the ruled natives. This was indeed true of the Chinese in Netherlands India, who were, as will be demonstrated later, galled by Dutch efforts to identify them with the native masses. Throughout their history the people of China have, perhaps to a unique degree, felt themselves culturally superior to other peoples. The term culturalism has come into limited use to describe the attitude of the Chinese in

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book, probably more than any other, has shaped the thinking of the present writer on the problems of nationalism.

In the great mass of literature on nationalism, several other titles stand out as examples of solid scholarship. Readers may wish to consult the following works: Carleton J. H. Hayes, Essays on Nationalism, Macmillan, New York, 1926; Friedrich O. Hertz, Nationality in History and Politics: A Study of the Psychology and Sociology of National Sentiment and Character, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1944; Hans Kohn, The Idea of Nationalism: A Study of Its Origins and Background, Macmillan, New York, 1944, Nationalism: Its Meaning and History, Van Nostrand, Princeton, 1955, Prophets and Peoples: Studies in Nineteenth Century Nationalism, Macmillan, New York, 1946; Royal Institute of International Affairs, Nationalism, Oxford University Press, London, 1939; Boyd C. Shafer, Nationalism: Myth and Reality, Harcourt, Brace, New York, 1955; Louis L. Snyder, The Meaning of Nationalism, Rutgers University Press, New Brunswick, 1954.

their prenationalist relationships with foreigners. This attitude contains a strong sense of cultural superiority together with an extreme reluctance to accept or to acknowledge having accepted innovations from abroad. Overseas Chinese appear, no less than the people of China proper, to have been deeply imbued with culturalism; their view of the native populations of their adopted countries was on the whole disdainful. It is not possible here to do more than offer the conjecture that the Chinese belief in the supremacy of their civilization was possibly the chief barrier to social communication with Indonesians.

Finally, one of the most important reasons for the maintenance of a separate Chinese system of social communication is to be seen in the economic position of that people. The Indonesians were for the most part peasants. They lived in countless villages, and few ever sought to break away from the poverty—but also the security—of their native homes. The Chinese by contrast were a trading people, tending to be urbanized and, if not yet financially successful, ordinarily strongly attracted by the lure of commercial profits. Western history also provides an example of a trading people isolated in part because of their economic role, the Jews; and the overseas Chinese have very frequently been referred to as the Jews of the Far East. The barriers to communication, established initially by linguistic, religious, ethnocentric, and economic factors, naturally tended to be self-perpetuating. Long after many Indies Chinese spoke only the language of their adopted country, they still failed to communicate effectively with the native majority. There was no real basis for communication between a Chinese trader in the city and an Indonesian peasant in the hinterland. Often both could speak the same language or mutually intelligible dialects; but their experiences, habits, and aspirations were too dissimilar to permit

any significant exchange of ideas. But a Peranakan, who was probably in commerce, and a Singkeh, who might merely be hopeful of attaining that position, would be better able to communicate with each other and, accordingly, more likely to do so. The Peranakan and the Singkeh might experience difficulty in finding a common language, but shared thoughts would make up for much of the linguistic deficiency. However, much greater complementarity of social communication, of course, would have served two Peranakans, whose backgrounds, thoughts, and language were even closer. The possession of common channels of communication, then, is in a sense like what is meant when two persons are said to have something in common.

## The Chinese as a Minority

Under pressure, real or imagined, a minority may feel threatened and seek security by further isolating itself from those who are outside its system of social communication. A religious minority may seek solace in a withdrawal from the hostile world around it and a growing dependence upon the comforts of its church. A racial minority may feel its only chance of survival is in the acceptance of its hard lot for fear of worse to come. Thus Jews, who in modern times have been freed physically from the ghetto, still often are loath to break away in spirit—for, as they say, faith in their religion and the practice of the ways of their ancients were all that held them together and prevented their destruction during the long centuries of persecution. Only recently have any appreciable number of our largest racial minority, the Negroes, been willing to risk struggling for final acceptance into American society; but, even today, many Negroes are still fearful of "making trouble."

Here the concern is the emergence of nationalism as a solution to the problems of a minority. A recent United Nations publication neatly lists the customary demands of a minority "whose members desire equality with dominant groups in the sense of nondiscrimination plus recognition of certain special rights and the rendering of certain positive services." Since the Chinese to be studied in this book came to form such a minority, it is useful to read over the following United Nations inventory of the "positive services" and "special rights" normally included in a program of minority nationalism:

> (a) Provision of adequate primary and secondary education for the minority in its own language and its cultural traditions;
>
> (b) Provision for maintenance of the culture of the minority through the establishment and operation of schools, libraries, museums, media of information, and other cultural and educational institutions;
>
> (c) Provision of adequate facilities to the minority for the use of its language, either orally or in writing, in the legislature, before the courts, and in administration and the granting of the right to use that language in private intercourse;
>
> (d) Provision for respect of the family law and personal status of the minority and their religious practices and interests; and,
>
> (e) Provision of a certain degree of autonomy.[14]

A people such as the overseas Chinese must command certain economic, social, and intellectual resources to be able to turn to nationalism. They must, obviously, be in large enough numbers to make their efforts meaningful. A handful of separate people is not likely to be taken seriously by themselves or by the majority population of their adopted country. However, as the history of the German minorities of Poland and Czechoslovakia between the world wars unhappily shows, a special situation can arise when a minority is native to a powerful

aggressor state on the borders of its country of residence. The Chinese of Indonesia fifty years ago were definitely not in such a situation. Although their present and future positions could conceivably make them the Sudetenlanders of the Orient, this is not an appropriate problem for discussion here.

A people will, as already indicated, be much better prepared for a nationalistic campaign if it is in possession of the equipment for its task—the symbols and consciousness of nationality. In the case of an expatriate people long isolated from its national homeland, such as the Peranakans of Java, the acquisition of this equipment may demand skillful organization and, since formal education in nationalism is likely to be required, considerable expenditures of energy and money. Without these resources, rather than a constructive social effort, a movement born of desperation and with negative goals may be the result of nationalistic stirrings, as in the terrible example of Kenya's Mau Mau.

Many of the problems to be investigated here are suggested by the following passage:

> Once men formed a people, once they acquired many objective characteristics of nationality, they would become aware of what had happened. If this new awareness should come to them in the midst of cultural and spiritual change, a change in the fundamental strategy of values, teaching them a new pride and a new confidence in what they were and in their own kind—or teaching them a hunger for this kind of pride and confidence not yet attained—then this new consciousness of nationality would become a potential center for new patterns of individual and social behavior, and of political action. If all this should happen in ages of widening social mobilization and sharpening social conflicts, nationalism would easily turn into a political weapon, a powerful pattern to organize men in the course of their social conflicts, bidding them to abate or defer some of

> these conflicts in order to concentrate all their strength on winning victories in others. And if these trends to nationalism should become reinforced by the deliberate actions of governments, public education systems, newspapers and other media of mass communication, economic interest groups, and hosts of other private or public agencies—then indeed, nationalism might appear on the stage as a dominant political force. . . . Nationalism has in fact appeared as such a dominant power, a power not so much in its own right but, like a whirlpool, the visible expression of the meeting of other forces which created it.[15]

The central problems to be studied, then, are how, why, by whom, and with what result the passive feeling of separateness of the Indies Chinese was transformed into vigorous nationalism in the space of a decade and a half. At the opening of this century the Chinese of Netherlands India lacked cohesion and were politically inarticulate; fifteen years later they controlled the most active political force within the colony and made their wishes felt both there and in China. This achievement is to be credited primarily to the organizational skill of the leadership of the movement. For this reason a large share of this study will be devoted to an investigation of the efforts of the leaders of the overseas Chinese community of Netherlands India to mobilize their people for nationalism. Schools, pan-Chinese associations, and the press were all contributors to the success of the movement and will be studied as sources of national consciousness. A discussion of the consequences of this nationalistic awakening may prove useful as a means of explaining the course and goals of the movement. In these efforts the writer hopes to develop a case study of overseas Chinese nationalism. The islands of Indonesia, particularly Java, the most populous and in the history of this nationalistic movement the most important, will be the scene of the account to follow.

## Notes to Chapter 1

1. These statistics are taken in part from: Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek (Central Statistical Bureau), Jaarcijfers voor het Koninkrijk der Nederlanden, Koloniën, 1900 (Annual Figures for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, Colonies, 1900), Gebr. Belinfante, the Hague, 1902 (hereafter referred to as Jaarcijfers, plus year of edition), p. 1; and J. S. Furnivall, Netherlands India, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1944, p. 1, which, along with Bernard H. M. Vlekke, Nusantara: a History of the East Indian Archipelago, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, 1943, is an excellent general work in English on N.I. Many of the remarks in this introductory chapter are expanded in these two books.

2. Jaarcijfers, 1900 gives no population figures for islands other than Java and Madura, which then had 28,746,638 inhabitants. However, the 1905 statistics in Jaarcijfers, 1905, p. 3, show the total for all N.I. at the time to have been 37,717,377. Thus a rough estimate of 35 million for 1900 seems not unreasonable.

It is to be noted that the proximity of Madura to Java caused the Dutch to link the two islands for purposes of administration and the compilation of statistics. Therefore, references to Java often imply the inclusion of Madura.

3. Jaarcijfers, 1900, pp. 49, 64-66, 69.

4. Two maps in Vlekke, op. cit., pp. 153 and 304, are useful in presenting a clear, concise picture of this Dutch expansion.

5. H. J. de Graaf, Geschiedenis van Indonesië (History of Indonesia), W. van Hoeve, the Hague, 1949, p. 428.

6. Joseph Chailley-Bert, Java et Ses Habitants (Java and Its Inhabitants), Armand Colin et Cie., Paris, 1900, p. 323.

7. Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Semarang, 1416-1931 (History of Semarang, 1416-1931), Drukkerij Misset, printers, Ho Kim Yoe, publishers, Semarang, [1933?], p. 181.

8. Departement van Economische Zaken (Department of Economic Affairs), Volkstelling 1930, Deel VII, Chineezen en Andere Vreemde Oosterlingen in Nederlandsch-Indië (1930 Census, Part VII, Chinese and Other Foreign Orientals in Netherlands India), Landsdrukkerij, Batavia, 1935, pp. 39-48.

9. Jaarcijfers, 1900, p. 5; L. H. W. van Sandick, Chineezen buiten China, Hunne Beteekenis voor de Ontwikkeling van Zuid-Oost Azië, Speciaal van Nederlandsch-Indië (Chinese outside China, Their Significance in the Development of Southeast Asia, Especially Netherlands India), M. van der Beek's Hofboekhandel, the Hague, 1909, p. 184.

10. Victor Purcell, The Chinese in Southeast Asia, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1951, pp. 11-39; J. J. M. de Groot, Het Kongsiwezen van Borneo, eene Verhandeling over den Grondslag en den Aard der Chineesche

Politieke Vereenigingen in de Koloniën, met eene Chineesche Geschiedenis van de Kongsi Lanpong (The Kongsi System of Borneo, a Discourse on the Foundations and the Nature of the Chinese Political Associations in the Colonies, with a Chinese History of the Kongsi Lanpong), Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 1885, p. 66; A. G. de Bruin, De Chineezen ter Oostkust van Sumatra (The Chinese on the East Coast of Sumatra), E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1918, p. 125.

11. Jaarcijfers, 1900, pp. 8-9.

12. Henri Borel, De Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indië (The Chinese in Netherlands India), L. J. Veen, Amsterdam, 1900, p. 37.

13. H. C. Millies, De Chineezen in Nederlandsch Oost-Indië en het Christendom (The Chinese in the Netherlands East Indies and Christianity), Koninklijke Bibliotheek, the Hague, c. 1850, p. 61.

14. United Nations, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Definition and Classification of Minorities, United Nations, Lake Success, New York, 1950, pp. 2-3.

15. Karl W. Deutsch, Nationalism and Social Communication, Technology Press of MIT, Cambridge, 1953, p. 155.

# 2

## THE BACKGROUND OF THE NATIONALIST AWAKENING

> La souffrance en commun unit plus que la joie. En fait des souvenirs nationaux, les deuils valent mieux que les triomphes; car ils imposent des dévoirs; ils commandent l'effort en commun.
>
> Renan

### The Need for Nationalism

We have noted that the Chinese of Netherlands India were always quite distinct from the other inhabitants of that colony but that until this century they were far from united as one community. The achievement of unity demanded the awakening among all Chinese of the archipelago of a feeling of membership in a greater Chinese nation. The split between Peranakans and Singkehs required closing; the divisions separating Cantonese, Hakkas, Swatownese, and Fukienese had to be abolished. Loyalty to Thian Tee Hwee (t'ien-ti hui, 天地會) and to other secret societies, long sources of hostility and even bloodshed, could no longer be tolerated.[1] These bodies, maintained to provide mutual help to the members, were clearly "one-sided and served only to protect the interests of the membership."[2] Finally, friction between the various economic classes of the Chinese had to be lessened. But why did 1900 and not some other year mark the beginning of intense efforts to unify the Chinese? It has been said that they were subjected to new pressures around the turn of the century. This is so, but pressure and worse had been felt many times before without causing any

significant change in the tactics by which the Chinese sought to safeguard their position.

To answer the question of why nationalism or, more correctly, efforts to lay a foundation for nationalism emerged in 1900, it is necessary to consider the events and circumstances of half a century ago in the Indies and, briefly, in other parts of Southeast Asia, in China, and, if it is not too daring, in the world as a whole.

## Dutch Rule

The periods of Netherlands Indian history usually recognized are: 1600-1800, the time of the East India Company; 1800-1811, the years of confusion arising out of the Napoleonic wars; 1811-1816, the British interregnum under Sir Thomas Stamford Raffles; 1816-1830, the restoration of Dutch authority and the search for a profitable, sound colonial policy; 1830-1870, the period of the culture system (cultuurstelsel), when forced labor was employed by the colonial government in the production of export crops; 1870-1900, the era of liberalism, the time of the emergence of large-scale private enterprises; and, 1900-1942, the years of the ethical program (ethische koers) or, to use a chapter title borrowed from a work dealing with the subject, the period of "efficiency, welfare, and autonomy."[3]

Two factors in the late nineteenth-century creation of a new official morality calling for the protection and elevation of the depressed natives must be considered—the rather vague notion that colonies were held as a trust and the expanding role of private European business interests in Netherlands India.

> . . . The crisis of 1885, bringing to a close a period of enormous economic development, brought general bankruptcy in Indonesia.

> The results of that crisis led to: intensive rationalization, particularly in European enterprises; plantation agriculture on a scientific basis; the replacement of individual enterprise by corporation enterprise; more prudent finance; control by the banks over borrowing enterprises; a common marketing policy; the displacement of the center of economic life from Java to Holland; an increase in racial discrimination. . . .*
>
> Increased production necessitated the construction of railways, ports, etc., which constituted a considerable cost for the government, especially since the Achinese war had not been ended and cost huge sums. . . .
>
> The capitalists were the masters during this period over all administration in Indonesia; they demanded a certain autonomy from the mother country. . . . They wanted a more powerful government capable of opening up the outlying possessions and of improving justice, the police, irrigation, and education. . . .[4]

In other words, the Dutch colony was undergoing extensive development and the government was obliged to seek funds to finance its construction programs, its efforts to modernize the administration, and its wars. The financial burden for all this had to be borne in no small measure by the Chinese; and the ethical program's efforts to improve the position of the Indonesians seemed, in Chinese eyes, to call for native betterment at Chinese expense.

## Chinese Revenue Farming

From the time of the East India Company, Chinese had held licenses granted by the authorities to engage in certain profitable activities, such as the selling of opium, the operation of gambling establishments, ferries, pawnshops, and abattoirs, and the gathering of birds' nests for export to the gourmets of China. This system of bestowing monopoly privileges on Chinese who paid the company or, later, the government

*Italics added.

the required license fees had proved itself an inexpensive and simple means of raising official revenues. Once a Chinese was established as a license holder or monopolist, that is, as a revenue farmer, the Dutch had only to collect the sums annually due the authorities. There was no need to appoint, supervise, and pay costly European or Europeanized officials to operate the monopolies, and, accordingly, most money taken in by Batavia represented net profit.

The whole system of using Chinese revenue farmers came under attack from philanthropic quarters near the end of the nineteenth century. The opium farmers, because of the deleterious nature of the product they distributed, were viewed as the arch villains, but all farmers appeared to be the enemies of native elevation.

> The farming system is the key with which the government opens the interior to the Chinese. . . . The Chinese penetrate evermore deeply into our India. Moreover, the Javanese, endowed by Nature with much less cunning than the Chinese, is in his contacts with them the loser.[5]

It was also argued that, while farmers enjoyed, at the expense of the Dutch, "great prestige . . . in the eyes of the natives,"[6] the abolition of the farming system would immediately restore the Chinese to their proper economic, social, and political positions.[7] The hostility of private Dutch humanitarians, shared by the government and translated into measures to end revenue farming, brought forth the typical indictment of Chinese contained in the following official statement:

> . . . Regardless of how much respect one has for the energy and the great industriousness of the foreign Orientals, it cannot be denied that these qualities in large measure are employed to the injury of native society. . . . Because it is now the sincere aim of the government to further native industry, it cannot shrink from [the introduction of] regulations which will end the present privileged position of the foreign Orientals. . . .[8]

Concrete evidence that the government intended to act in accordance with its new-found desire "to further native industry" by protecting it from the Chinese can be seen in official efforts to break Chinese economic power. Chinese revenue farmers were the first victims of these efforts.

As an experiment, opium farms were replaced by a government opium monopoly on Madura in 1894 and in East Java in 1896. The success of the government monopoly led to the announcement in 1898 that opium farming would soon be ended in all of Netherlands India. The Chinese monopoly over licensed abattoirs was broken at about the same time, and there soon was talk among the Chinese that all their other monopolies would likewise be ended. Added to this, rumors were soon heard that the government planned to establish banks for the extension of agricultural credit to the peasantry and thus ruin the position of rural Chinese moneylenders.[9]

It is not possible to calculate the size of the profits denied the Chinese by the abolition of revenue farming, partly because official statistics do not accurately reveal the prices farmers charged for the goods and services they dispensed and partly because farmers were able to realize substantial indirect profits. A Chinese monopolist was likely to be willing to sell on credit and thereby gain the interest on a short-term loan. More significant, farmers, unlike ordinary Chinese under the pass system, to be discussed later, were able to travel into the interior and carry on trade in addition to that licensed. Nothing prevented a farmer of opium, say, from selling textiles as a side line; and the Chinese operator of a ferry service might easily become a local moneylender. All these indirect profits, as well as the direct, were lost or threatened with loss by 1900.[10]

The wealthiest Chinese had invested heavily in opium farms, pawnshops, and other licensed enterprises; but around 1900, as a result of the termination of revenue farming, "a great deal of [their] capital was freed. . . ."[11] Or, from the Chinese viewpoint, many well-established businesses were forced to close and Chinese financial losses were heavy. Many hundreds of Chinese, the employees of the farmers, were made jobless. On the political side, the Chinese farmers had been divested of their semi-official status and came to be merely "subjects without any legal or extralegal privileges."[12]

## Major Chinese Grievances

An estimate of the amount the Chinese of the colony paid in taxes in 1900 is presumably impossible to find. The available statistics do not adequately reveal the distribution of the tax burden among the various population groups. There are on record Chinese complaints to the effect that their tax contributions to the government were unreasonably large.[13] On the other side, a spokesman for the N.I. government stated that the Chinese paid "extremely little" in taxes.[14] The truth seems to be that the Chinese, like any other people, disliked paying taxes and resented receiving what seemed a small reward for their expenditures. The Chinese were resentful, not because the taxation was without representation but because it was without compensation.

It does appear that the Chinese suffered under a curious Dutch scheme whereby foreign Asians were joined with Europeans in paying the personal property tax (personeele belasting), which natives are not listed as having paid, and linked with natives in paying the business tax (bedrijfsbelasting), which Europeans paid on a different basis. These revenue sources took in approximately f. 2 million from the Chinese

and f. 1.5 million from the Europeans in 1900; but it must be remembered that the Chinese population of N.I. was then about seven and a half times the size of the European community. Those few Indies Chinese who had, through a process not worth lengthy treatment here, acquired the legal status of Europeans were reportedly taxed less heavily than the mass of their compatriots. Because of their numbers and economic position, the Chinese must have paid a sizable share of the customs duties and the vehicle, excise, and stamp taxes; but there is no way of determining even the approximate sums involved. Here it is important simply to note that unfair taxation was ordinarily included among the grievances listed by the Chinese against the colonial government, and full equality with European taxpayers did not come until 1920.[15]

Several other grievances were recounted by the Chinese early in this century. Foremost among these were the pass system (passenstelsel), the maintenance of separate residential areas for Chinese (wijkenstelsel), and the placing of Chinese under the jurisdiction of the courts for natives (politierol).

There is abundant documentation of the Chinese dislike for the pass system and no need to present here the many expressions of resentment it brought forth. The system in operation in 1900 had been authorized by a government decree of 1863, which required that foreign Orientals traveling in Java and Madura be equipped with passes valid for one year. Such passes were to be issued at the discretion of local officials in "the interest of commerce and industry or other worthy endeavors" but could be summarily revoked "in the interest of public peace." A visa was to be affixed by local officials for each individual trip, except when the foreign Oriental concerned was known to be "of good name,"

such persons being exempt from the visa requirements. The system seemed to imply that the great majority of Chinese, forced to arm themselves with visaed passes, were of bad name. It is improbable that the Dutch government deliberately sought to insult the Chinese under its flag, yet the victims of the passenstelsel regarded the system as a disparaging slur.[16]

The great latitude granted officials in the determination of the qualifications of applicants for passes was an invitation to bureaucratic arbitrariness and petty corruption, and, indeed, these evils did result. Even if it is assumed, as in fairness it must be, that the majority of pass applications received conscientious and honest treatment, obtaining a pass was still both "troublesome and expensive." Applicants were obliged to present themselves at a specified time outside a government office, where long queues of Chinese often formed and where a day might be lost in waiting. Tax stamps had to be placed on passes, and thus the pass system was a source of government revenue gained exclusively from foreign Asians.[17]

The irritations of the pass system were sharply intensified with the abolition of revenue farming at the close of the last century. When it was necessary, under the revenue farming system, for the government to permit large numbers of Chinese to travel in the interior for the purpose of operating their licensed concessions, passes were not difficult to obtain. However, when revenue farming was ended, there was no longer any officially endorsed legitimate reason for the travel of many Chinese. Furthermore, the ethical program's concern with the protection of the natives made the restriction of Chinese travel appear morally justified. In 1897 the government announced its intention to supervise more closely Chinese travel, and, in the words of a highly

placed critic of this policy, "stricter supervision meant making it difficult to obtain passes."[18]

When rigid enforcement of the 1863 regulations began in the late nineties, it became necessary for Chinese to get new visas for every four days spent away from home. A pass was required for short trips, such as the one from Batavia to Meester Cornelis, only an hour's journey even in 1900. In an emergency, such as illness, a Chinese might, because he held no pass, be unable to reach his destination as quickly as circumstances required. In order to visit a cool mountain resort or a spa, where it was thought a variety of complaints could be cured, a Chinese was forced to present, as part of his application for a pass, a physician's statement declaring the proposed trip necessary for reasons of health. A Chinese apprehended traveling without a pass was subject to a fine of f. 25 or one month's imprisonment at hard labor; those who made use of falsified passes were liable to prison sentences of up to five years. It is no wonder that "many heathen Chinese" expressed themselves ready for conversion to Christianity on the condition that the pass system be revised to exempt converts.[19]

It is not possible to calculate the financial losses suffered by the Chinese through the sharpened supervision of their travel. European firms became reluctant to employ Chinese unable to travel on business, and, more important, Chinese merchants long free to trade in the interior were confined to the cities. As early as 1897, when the new official ethic was only beginning to limit Chinese commercial activity, the Dutch importers of Surabaya sought to persuade the government to ease its restrictions on Chinese entry into the interior. The end of revenue farming and the accompanying limitations on Chinese travel threatened the importers with the loss of village markets, markets

penetrated almost exclusively by Chinese. Dutch import houses in Surabaya were reported to have lost f. 1,140,000 in 1896 as a result of the bankruptcies of their Chinese retail dealers; and imports into that East Java port showed a 10 per cent decline between 1895 and 1897. A few years later the Dutch planters' association at Sukabumi also sought to win from the government the right to travel for those Chinese who served its interests. Dutch businessmen, along with the Chinese, were understandably alarmed at the stagnation of trade which seemed to threaten.[20]

Not only were most Chinese confined to urban centers; also they were permitted to reside only within restricted areas. This discrimination was in accordance with the provisions of other regulations included among the list of Chinese grievances in 1900. These regulations were known collectively, in Dutch, as the wijkenstelsel, the district system, a term too weak to convey the real meaning. It would be proper, but also very clumsy, to speak of this institution as the system for the maintenance of separate residential areas for Chinese. It seems that the wijkenstelsel can best be referred to here simply as the zoning system, a term which makes up for its lack of strength by its brevity.

The zoning system of course had its basis in the natural desire of early Chinese settlers to congregate in their own neighborhoods to seek congeniality and convenience and in the Dutch belief that the Chinese of their colony could best be controlled if found only in a limited number of places. The Chinese of 1900 were living under zoning system provisions which read in part:

> Foreign Orientals, resident in Netherlands India, will, so far as possible, be concentrated in separate districts, under the leadership of their own chiefs.[21]

This regulation was softened considerably by an article of the 1866 law on the zoning system, the law still in operation in 1900, which stated:

> In the interests of agriculture and industry or of revenue farming and public works, local officials are empowered to grant permission to foreign Orientals to reside until further notice in places where no districts [for them] are located.

The modification of the zoning system contained in the article just cited made it possible that there were in the early nineties "more than 30,000 [sic] villages on Java where Chinese could reside as employees of the revenue farming system in order to guard against violation of the . . . system."[22]

As with the pass system, the end of revenue farming brought rigid enforcement of the zoning regulations. In 1900 the Governor General proclaimed new and more stringent enforcement of the 1866 zoning laws for Java and Madura and soon made a similar proclamation concerning the Outer Possessions. Violators of the zoning system were liable to fines of from f. 25 to f. 100 and were to be removed, forcibly if necessary, to Chinese districts. Again Dutch eagerness to help the natives had struck the Chinese a severe blow.[23]

Chinese of the period complained bitterly over the new vigor of the zoning system. In the early years of this century, when some knowledge of the value of preventive medicine in the tropics had filtered down to the Chinese, the districts were seen by their residents to be unhealthy. The writer can, from his own observations of some Chinese quarters in Java, testify that the areas formerly set aside for the Chinese are crowded, filthy, and brutally hot. Tortuous alleys reek of generations of refuse. Walls appear to be covered with a patina of moldy slime.

In a tropical land of gleaming sunshine, Indonesia's old Chinese quarters seem oddly dark and are enveloped in dankness. The former European neighborhoods are, when possible, on elevated ground and have wide clean streets; the Chinese districts are down by the malarial harbor or river. Once a Chinese district was established, it was difficult for the Chinese to expand territorially, as their district was surrounded by non-Chinese areas from which the native or European inhabitants could not readily be expelled. As a result, the Chinese districts grew increasingly unpleasant as the population increased. Forced residence in a Chinese district often spelled financial loss or great inconvenience, as in the example of a Chinese sugar mill owner who was obliged to travel daily ten kilometers each way between his mill and the district in which he was required to live. To compound this injury, the Chinese in question was also forced to have a travel pass to make his twenty-kilometer journey.[24]

The enforcement of the pass and zoning systems, as well as that of the criminal code of Netherlands India, was under the jurisdiction of the police courts, often referred to collectively and somewhat inaccurately as the politierol or police docket. These courts tried the less serious criminal cases in which natives or "those assimilated to them," i.e., the Chinese and other foreign Asians, were the defendants. Europeans were of course brought before "European courts." The Chinese long viewed the police courts as the keystone of their grievances. The evil of the system lay ultimately in the fact that the courts were not instruments for dispensing justice but tools of the administrators.[25]

> . . . it was necessary to maintain an old Asian form of administration, consisting of absolute power for the Governor General and his lieutenants in the residencies, and on the opposite side,

> from the side of the populace, blind obedience to the authorities. So that there would be no danger of disobedience, it was thought that in the trials of ordinary offenses, where judgment often can have an effect on the obedience of the people, the administrative power must not be exposed to the ever uncertain directions which the statements of judges can take. On the contrary, the administration must be empowered to reserve the rights of investigation and decision to its officers, to the exclusion of the courts. Only thus was the civil officer assured of the cooperation of the judge.
>
> From this there resulted the . . . police court, where a government official, the chief of police, administers justice according to his own feelings, without the obligation to hear testimony, and, if he hears it, without the obligation to administer oaths. [There was] no provision for appeals to higher courts and . . . sentences were not intended to be suspended by the issuance of pardons.
>
> A system of justice . . . notorious because of the fatal combination of the administration and the courts, which as a matter of course aim as a team at the same goal, becomes the worst possible system.[26]

Above the police courts, but part of the same judicial system, were the district courts, where the more serious felonies were tried. These courts were headed by a European official who might or might not be a trained jurist. As late as 1916 it could only be officially claimed that the typical district native court was presided over by "a European, often a judicial, official." Assisting the Hollander were two native administrative officials, a native police officer, and, when Chinese were tried, a Chinese adviser. Even when the European head of the court was trained in the law, he could conceivably be outvoted by his native colleagues on the bench. If, as is not at all unlikely, the native officials were hostile to Chinese in general, the foreign Asian defendant was in an extremely unenviable position. By 1900 there was the further danger to Chinese before the district bench that the European court president might be loyal to the new principle of native elevation

and thus be unsympathetic to "outsiders." The mildest observation on the courts is that their operation was not in accordance with the Indies bureaucratic belief that "like over like is humane."[27]

Unlike Europeans, natives and others under the law applicable to natives were, when suspected of crimes, subject to arbitrary "preventive detention," and their houses could be searched almost at will by the police. The jails of Netherlands India in the early years of this century were said to be overflowing with natives and foreign Asians awaiting trial and held in "preventive detention," a wait of one year being not uncommon.[28]

The sentences imposed by the courts for natives were considerably harsher than those meted out to Europeans. A Dutch felon might be obliged to serve his sentence in a reformatory; his Asian colleague in crime would find himself on a chain gang. Conviction for similar crimes might result in a European's expulsion from the colony and the sentencing of an Asian to as much as five years at hard labor. The European convict's punishment was not only generally less severe; it was also less degrading than exposure to public view on a road gang and less hazardous than being assigned as a pack coolie to a military expedition. When it is considered that in the decade before 1900, 24,000 to 30,000 foreign Asians appeared annually before the police courts and about 5,000 before the district courts, it is not surprising that the Chinese were very much concerned with the question of their treatment before the law. After all, these statistics indicate that in the neighborhood of one out of every fifteen Chinese in the Indies at that time was likely to find himself in front of a judge each year.[29]

Up to this point the discussion has centered on what the government of N.I. did to the Chinese and has neglected to mention what it did

for them. In considering the latter question, it can only be said that constructively little was done and that the omissions of the government, though less easily publicized than its commissions, were keenly felt by the Chinese. Colonial Indonesia was of course not a "welfare state" in which the populace expected to receive a wide range of services provided by the authorities; it was a state where the few services supplied by the government for the most part benefited only a limited minority. The minority, as can be anticipated, was composed almost exclusively of the European and Europeanized elements of the population. The maintenance of law and order, the great contribution of most imperial powers to their colonies, served Chinese enterprise; but, since the police appeared to be concerned with providing protection from and not for the foreign Asians, this blessing of Dutch colonialism was not properly appreciated by the Chinese. Even such an elementary service as the provision of facilities for the collection of mail in the Chinese district of Batavia was lacking. Only in 1902 were the postal authorities finally persuaded to install three mail boxes in that quarter—to serve a bustling business and residential neighborhood containing about 20,000 inhabitants. But it was the refusal of the government to make any significant arrangements for the education of their children which caused the Chinese the greatest concern.[30]

## Government Education for Chinese

The fairly common accusation that "nothing was done for the education of Chinese children" is too strong; but it is not inaccurate to observe that woefully little was provided by the government in this respect. No separate schools for Chinese were supported by official funds in 1900. Direct government subsidization of private Chinese schools

was not known. There was provision in the regulations of the Chinese Council or Raad at Batavia, a semi-official body headed by the Majoor, for the free education of "the children of Chinese paupers"; but presumably few parents were willing or able to have their children qualify for this charity. Government-sponsored Malay-language schools all but excluded Chinese; only 39 Chinese pupils attended them in Batavia in 1897. So far as Dutch-language education was concerned, the Chinese were in an equally unfavorable position. In 1900 there were 19 "non-European" students in the government middle schools of N.I., and most of these appear to have been sons of the tiny Indonesian elite. The same year saw a mere 1,870 foreign Asian and native pupils in a total government primary school population of 15,562 and only 97 in all the private European primary schools. There were, on the other hand, 8,085 pupils in the private schools for foreign Asians, which, as noted above, did not benefit from government support.[31]

The laws of the colony did not specifically exclude Chinese from Dutch-language schools; such a formal arrangement was unnecessary. If parents wished to have their child attend a government Dutch-language school but were not "close friends of the Resident or Assistant Resident, who was ordinarily the head of the school board, there was no hope of the child's being accepted." Even if the local Dutch authorities supported a child's application for admission to a school, the principal could and often did claim "there was no room" for him.[32]

Despite these obstacles, there were, as the statistics reveal, some Chinese children in the Dutch schools; their parents paid dearly for this distinction. Tuition for Chinese was higher than for others, f. 10 to f. 15 per month being the usual fee in "free" government schools. Furthermore, a Chinese child was required before admission to understand

enough Dutch to follow instruction. In most cases this requirement forced parents to engage a private Dutch tutor, usually at a salary of f. 100 per month, to instruct their child in the language and etiquette of the Netherlands. The Chinese pupil was apparently expected to master not only Dutch but also such curious Dutch customs as the eating of a slice of bread with a knife and fork.[33] Readers will probably not be surprised to discover later that education was one of the primary concerns of the leadership of the overseas Chinese nationalist movement of Netherlands India.

## The Chinese and the Officialdom

The machinery of the colonial government was for the most part controlled by men frankly unsympathetic or even hostile to Chinese. It is difficult to document this statement, but there is some supporting evidence; and, despite the risks, it is necessary to discuss this bureaucratic view of the Chinese, a formless thing to handle, in order to appreciate more completely that Chinese feeling of insecurity which helped spark the nationalist effort.

The bureaucracy had no Chinese members. The Chinese officers were not properly in the officialdom but merely servants of it—and servants without pay at that. Natives, on the other hand, could and did enter government service. It was only in 1911 that the examinations providing entry into the lower echelons of the bureaucracy were opened to Chinese candidates.[34]

The Dutchmen who held and exercised the governing power in N.I. appear, on the basis of scattered references, to have been immersed in the racialism so prevalent among colonial administrators in the late nineteenth century golden age of imperialism. It has already been

suggested that there was an increase of racial discrimination with the opening of the period of the ethical program. The building of the Suez Canal and the development of speedy, safe steam navigation had facilitated the travel of new numbers of Hollanders to the East. The growth of the colonial economy and the amelioration of tropical living conditions had attracted an increased flow of Dutchmen, the European population of the colony more than doubling between 1880 and 1900.[35] Included among the new arrivals were, it appears, a larger proportion of Dutch women; and an often repeated commonplace is that the importation of white women into a colonial setting tends to diminish chances for interracial harmony. In any event, the significantly enlarged areas of contact between Dutch bureaucrats and businessmen and the Chinese community proved to be sources of friction rather than bases of mutual respect and understanding.

The introduction of new legislation and the reinforcement of older regulations to control Chinese activities were formal expressions of the new hostility. Informally, acting on his own initiative, the Dutch official was able to demonstrate his attitude toward Chinese with considerable freedom. As one official put it: "One cannot think of a civil servant who is powerless to act against natives [and, of course, those treated under the law as natives] by means of his authority." Chinese could be arbitrarily classified as "dangerous to the economic interests of the native people," and thereby the way was opened for the refusal of travel passes or residence permits.[36]

The officialdom has been described, probably with reasonable accuracy, as "haughty" in its relations with non-Europeans. Unlike the British in their colonies, the Dutch long sought to reserve their own language to themselves. Non-Europeans who addressed Hollanders in

Dutch were, until about fifty years ago, thought to be disrespectful and unacceptably familiar. The languages of the Indonesian archipelago, particularly Javanese, are rich in terms, styles of speech, and special vocabularies designed to insure that a speaker always expresses recognition of his own status and that of the person addressed. The languages of Europe do not have any comparable system. Accordingly, the European officialdom of N.I. was reluctant to permit itself to be addressed in Dutch with its polite but not servile second person pronoun. As late as 1909 it was necessary for the colonial government to reprimand officials who insisted that educated, Dutch-speaking Asians address them in Javanese or some other Indonesian language.[37]

Petty discrimination against the Chinese was often of a shockingly childish character. Officials unnecessarily but deliberately kept Chinese waiting outside their offices for long periods. The lowliest bureaucrat was able to cause Chinese inconvenience and delay; even the purchase of postage stamps was at times made a small ordeal. It was reported that a Dutch official in one area required that the Kapitein remove his shoes before entering the Hollander's office. Young officials, obviously with little work to do, are said to have somehow derived a feeling of power from stopping Chinese on the roads to inspect their travel passes, such activity being a sport rather than a duty. Until the early years of this century, the Indies government addressed its letters sent non-Europeans "to the native" or "to the Chinese John Doe," rather than "to Mr. John Doe." Presumably in an effort to humiliate and make conspicuous the Chinese, the bureaucracy, until after the 1911 revolution in China, refused to permit Chinese to wear Western dress or cut off their queues. It was a simple matter to enforce restrictions on the clothing and hairdress of Chinese by, for example,

withholding travel passes from any Chinese who might be queueless and clothed in the European fashion.[38]

While the bureaucrat in his office could and unhappily often did treat the Chinese shamefully, the police were on occasion even brutal. The police were largely recruited from the native population and had little reason to like and no way to understand the Chinese. Native policemen were said to be fearful of Europeans and to avoid interfering with their activities. The frustrations thus developed were in part eased through the harsh treatment of Chinese. An orgy of police brutality occurred in 1912 when the arrest of all Cantonese in Surabaya was ordered in an effort to stamp out Chinese unrest in that city.[39]

The Dutch press of Indonesia half a century ago, presumably a molder of public and official opinion, did little to counteract the anti-Chinese attitudes of the bureaucracy. In 1896 it was stated that, with one notable exception, all the newspapers had "begun a crusade against the Chinese." These journalistic efforts to stir up feeling against the Chinese continued for many years.[40]

Thus the new losses suffered by the Chinese through legislative measures adopted to implement the ethical program, together with the old grievances, were magnified by the feeling of insecurity engendered by the heightened tempo of the Dutch attack. In any event, the following statement is a succinct summary of the general situation obtaining at the time under study:

> . . . Europeans are irritated to see the Chinese enriching themselves on Java; they translate this sentiment into noble terms: they are indignant to see the Chinese exploit and demoralize the Javanese; they come spontaneously to the rescue of the Javanese . . . ; they demand measures to protect the Javanese from the Chinese. Thus, Europeans and Chinese are on the stage, the Javanese are in the wings. . . .[41]

## The Chinese and the Outside World

While it could no doubt be argued that the Chinese of Netherlands India in 1900 lived in an atmosphere in itself sufficiently hostile and insecure to bring forth a reaction in the form of nationalism, it is also true that overseas Chinese nationalism was not a local phenomenon. There were forces in the world as a whole favoring the rise of nationalism.

To the Chinese of Indonesia, the outside world begins at Singapore. Ties between the Chinese in the archipelago and Singapore have been close ever since that port's establishment in 1819. The British city off the tip of the Malay Peninsula has always owed its existence to its function as an entrepôt; goods and persons destined for or coming from the islands of Southeast Asia often pass through Singapore. Ideas, as well as people and freight, have also been filtered through the port. Elements of overseas Chinese nationalism are no exception to this rule.

It is not extravagant to speak of Singapore as the capital of the overseas Chinese communities of Southeast Asia. A tremendous amount of research has yet to be done on Singapore's role as an overseas Chinese commercial, political, and intellectual center.* In the following chapters numerous references to Singapore and to Chinese of that colony, such as the outstanding nationalist leader, Lim Boen Keng (Lim Boon Keng, Lin Wen-ch'ing, 林文慶) will be made. Here it is

*Dr. Victor Purcell has long been a student of these questions and has published a number of works. An earlier and unique book on the Chinese of Singapore is Song Ong Siang, One Hundred Years' History of the Chinese in Singapore, John Murray, London, 1923.

The foremost Chinese writer on the role of the overseas Chinese in the 1911 revolution, states: "Singapore was the communications center for the British and the Dutch Southeast Asian colonies and for Burma, India, Indochina, and Australia." Feng Tzu-yu 馮自由, Ko-ming i-shih 革命逸史 (Reminiscences of the Revolution), The Commercial Press, Shanghai, 1946, Vol. 4, p. 145.

necessary simply to note that events and circumstances in Singapore contributed, as did the local grievances described above, to the nationalistic awakening of the Indies Chinese.

Commercial relations between N.I. and Singapore began in the days of Raffles. By the close of the nineteenth century it was not uncommon for Chinese merchants in one colony to have business interests in the other. Businessmen traveling between Singapore and N.I. naturally were carriers of information, much of it on contemporary world developments, including the rise of nationalism.[42]

Until the establishment of Chinese consular representation in Netherlands India in 1912, the Chinese Consul General at Singapore was informally charged with the responsibility for observation of the Chinese population in the Indonesian archipelago. Although the Singapore Consulate General was unable to extend official protection to Chinese living outside its consular district, the existence of an official of the dynasty in the British colony was another reason to regard Singapore as a communications center for the Chinese of Southeast Asia.[43]

Singapore's politico-legal institutions came to play a role in the nationalist awakening of the Indies Chinese by serving as the basis for comparisons drawn between the positions of overseas Chinese under the Dutch and under the British. Many Chinese in Netherlands areas strongly felt that their lot would have been better under British rule. It was often pointed out that a fundamental principle of British colonialism, universal equality before the law, was conspicuously absent in the Dutch system. Singapore Chinese were not burdened with hated pass and zoning systems. The example of Singapore taught that discrimination and insecurity were not the inevitable fate of overseas Chinese.[44]

Finally, it can be mentioned that the Chinese press of Singapore was influential in Netherlands India, that the Singapore Chinese Chamber of Commerce* came to function as a clearing house for information flowing south from China, that a number of teachers in the Chinese schools of the Indies were recruited in Singapore, and, as will be discussed in the opening part of the next chapter, that the rebirth of Confucianism in Singapore in the late nineties was one direct cause of the nationalist upsurge in the archipelago a few years later. An interesting historical side light, in view of the recent miscarriage of very similar plans, is that half a century ago there was talk of creating "a great Chinese university at Singapore." The university was to be staffed by European, Chinese, and Japanese professors, to be financed by both private contributions and Chinese government subsidization, and to be "entirely Chinese in its architecture and furnishings."[45]

Because the Chinese of Indonesia were made aware, largely through their Singapore window on the outside world, of events outside the area known personally to them, it is possibly convenient here to consider briefly certain late nineteenth century forces of nationalism and imperialism.

In China some elements among the Taiping rebels of the middle of the century may have been at least protonationalists. Later, the officials, notably Li Hung-chang, responsible for the conduct of foreign affairs had come to think in terms of nations and national interests, although the application of the term nationalist may be inappropriate in their case. True nationalists emerged only in the last years of the

*Tiong Hwa Siang Boe Tjong Hwe, Chung-hua shang-wu tsung-hui, 中華商務總會.

century to defend the Chinese nation, not merely her institutions and dynasty. Famous names are included in the list of these nationalists—Liang Ch'i-ch'ao, K'ang Yu-wei, and Sun Yat-sen being the most widely known. By 1898 an imperialist scramble had led to talk of "splitting the Chinese melon"; that is, foreign powers were reshaping their China policies in a shift from commercial penetration to the parceling out of the Chinese empire in semicolonial spheres of influence. Japan's 1895 victory over China demonstrated to the world the weakness of the Ch'ing empire and gave rise to the melon-splitting fever. Because the Anglo-American response to the proposed dismemberment of China, the open-door policy, is so much a part of our own history, there is no need to dwell on the imperialist onslaught on China in the late nineties. For the purposes of this study, the significance of this phase of Chinese history is in the fact that the threat to China did not go unnoticed in the overseas Chinese communities of Southeast Asia. The imperialist attack on China caused articulate Chinese everywhere to reflect on their country's and their own places in the world. Overseas Chinese soon reached the conclusion that their fate as alien residents abroad was somehow tied to the future of the ancestral homeland. A strong, independent China might afford protection or at least prestige to her expatriates; a colonized and, thus, internationally despised China could only make the position of overseas Chinese more insecure. The dream of a Chinese state, united, powerful, and internationally respected, came to be that of all Chinese emigrants; and this theme will underlie much of the material to be presented here. There was disagreement over how China was to elevate herself among the states of the world, but the vision of the Chinese as a great nation in the future was universally held.

Since this investigation employs the Dutch colony of Southeast Asia as its setting, it is not inappropriate to mention that even in tiny Holland there were highly placed men eager to draw their country into the grabbing of concessions in China. As something of a footnote to the history of international rivalry in China at the end of the last century, it is interesting to consider that early in 1898 the Netherlands Minister in Peking recommended to his government that a Dutch concession be obtained "in the Amoy area" when China was divided up by the powers.[46] The Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs replied negatively:

> The Netherlands already have very extensive colonial territories, for the preservation and protection of which we must severely strain our powers. The expansion of those territories in a part of Asia, where until now no Netherlands possessions have been, appears inadvisable because the sacrifices to be demanded would be beyond our means. . . .[47]

The passage above is important because it demonstrates that Dutch officials were not concerned with any moral considerations possibly involved in the annexation of Chinese territory; they had been carried into the new imperialist tide, a fact doubtless reflected in their treatment of overseas Chinese. It is also interesting to consider that the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs, in his refusal to commit his country to a new adventure in Asia, did not so much as mention the possible overseas Chinese reaction to a Dutch seizure of a concession in China. Ten years later, no maker of high-level Dutch policy in Asia was able to ignore the feelings of the Chinese population under Netherlands rule. The Chinese minority had by then created, through nationalist mobilization, effective means for the expression of its wishes. The manner in which this creation came about and the use made of the new power of the Indies Chinese will be studied in subsequent chapters.

Before leaving these essentially introductory sections, the presentation of a hasty survey of the late nineteenth century climate of imperialism beyond China proper and Southeast Asia may prove useful by recalling to the reader the nationalist and imperialist ferment of the era. In the West, Englishmen spoke of the "white man's burden"; Americans talked of "manifest destiny"; and the Kaiser originated the term "yellow peril" when he expressed alarm over die gelbe Gefahr.

Although it has often and uncharitably been held up to ridicule, President McKinley's justification of the American annexation of the Philippines too neatly expresses the patronizing humanitarianism of a late nineteenth century imperialist to be overlooked here. It is hoped that the writer will be forgiven for presenting once again the following:

> The truth is I didn't want the Philippines and when they came to us as a gift from the gods, I did not know what to do about them. . . . I walked the floor of the White House night after night until midnight; and I am not ashamed to tell you, gentlemen, that I went down on my knees and prayed Almighty God for light and guidance more than one night.
>
> And one night late it came to me this way—I don't know how it was, but it came: (1) that we could not give them back to Spain—that would be cowardly and dishonorable; (2) that we could not turn them over to France or Germany—our commercial rivals in the Orient—that would be bad business and discreditable; (3) that we could not leave them to themselves—they were unfit for self-government—and they would soon have anarchy and misrule over there worse than Spain's was; and (4) that there was nothing left for us to do but to take them all, and to educate the Filipinos, and uplift and civilize and Christianize them, and by God's grace do the very best we could by them, as our fellow-men for whom Christ also died. . . .[48]

In these same years Africa was finally divided. The British were subduing the fanatics in the Sudan and crushing the Boers in the Transvaal; the French were expanding in the North; the Germans ruthlessly

punished native recalcitrance; and the Italians blundered into Ethiopia. The first nationalist stirrings could be detected in the Near East, especially in Turkey and Egypt.

In Asia, Russian empire builders were pushing down through Manchuria and Korea, while the Japanese moved up to meet them. India's nationalism is usually dated from the 1905 response of the Bengalis to the partition of their home province; but the Indian National Congress, admittedly a conservative body at the time, had functioned for twenty years before that date. Japan alone in the non-Western world had achieved nationalism; other Asian peoples were on the verge of following, often painfully, her example.

In the years to be covered in this study, the forces, nationalism no less than imperialism, leading to the misnamed Great War had been set in motion. Western imperialism had reached spring tide and was to foster its own destruction through Asian nationalism.

## Notes to Chapter 2

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25. Fromberg, De Chineesche Beweging op Java, op. cit., p. 16; Henri Borel, "Dr. Lim Boen Keng over de Chineesche Beweging" (Dr. Lim Boen Keng on the Chinese Movement), DL, Vol. 55, No. 123 (May 28, 1906); Han Boen Sin Po (Surabaya), January 19, 1911, article in translation in arch. Neth. Min. Ov. Parts Realm; Hoa Tok Po (Batavia), October 15, 1912, article in translation in arch. Neth. Min. Ov. Parts Realm; Off. Chin. Aff., Semarang to Res., Semarang, January 21, 1907; Chin. Min. For. Aff. to Neth. Min., Peking, December 30, 1909; Off. Chin. Aff., Batavia to Gen. Sec., August 26, 1910; Acting Ad. Chin. Aff., Batavia to Dir. Civ. Serv., February 13, 1914.

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28. Ibid., pp. 10-12.

29. Margadant, Verklaring, op. cit., pp. 80-81; Fromberg, De Chineesche Beweging op Java, op. cit., p. 15; Jaarcijfers, 1902, p. 47.

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October 19, 1910; Res., Bandung to G.G., February 26, 1912; Off. Chin. Aff., Surabaya to Dir. Jus., March 22, 1912; Chin. Min. For. Aff. to Neth. Min., Peking, August 2, 1912; Fromberg, De Chineesche Beweging op Java, op. cit., p. 31; "Onderwijs Tionghoa di Indonesia" (Chinese Education in Indonesia), SPJN; Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat, op. cit., p. 16; L. Tiemersma, "Onze Roeping Tegenover het Huidige Streven der Chineezen in Nederlandsch-Indië tot Herstel van het Confucianisme" (Our Call to Oppose the Present Efforts of the Chinese in Netherlands India to Restore Confucianism), Overzicht van de Elfde Zending-Conferentie, Gehouden te Buitenzorg en te Depok, van 22 tot 30 Augustus 1903 (Survey of the Eleventh Mission Conference, Held at Buitenzorg and at Depok, from the 22nd through the 30th of August 1903), Albrecht en Co., Batavia, 1903, pp. 139-140, 148; Borel, "Dr. Lim Boen Keng over de Chineesche Beweging," op. cit., DL, Vol. 55, No. 124 (May 30, 1906).

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# 3

## THE MOBILIZATION FOR NATIONALISM

Individualities may form communities, but it is institutions alone that can create a nation.

Disraeli

### The Confucianist Revival

To dignify their nationalism with a cover of antiquity, to conceal its Western inspiration, and to put forward a respected and familiar symbol, the Chinese of Netherlands India, though not fully conscious of their motivations, resurrected Confucius. The men who led the Confucianist revival of the early years of this century sought not a national but a spiritual awakening; their initial efforts were religious rather than political in nature. This is not to deny, however, that the Confucianist leaders were soon able to ride and in large measure guide the nationalist movement stimulated by their preaching of the ancient morality of China. Reborn Confucianism was a stone dropped into the overseas Chinese pond; the ripples it generated spread and, under the force of breezes and gales from every quarter, grew to be waves of great size and power.

As partial evidence in support of the view that Singapore served the Indies Chinese as an intellectual center, it can be noted that a small-scale Confucianist revival, the starting gun of nationalism among the Chinese of the archipelago, began in 1898 in Singapore. It is true that one year earlier a life of Confucius[1] had appeared in Batavia, but the book seems to have stirred little interest among the Malay-speaking

Chinese to whom it was directed. An earlier study of certain Chinese customs, also prepared for Peranakan consumption,[2] was of even less significance. The random publication of books aimed at an expatriate Chinese audience doubtless helped pave the way for a Confucianist rebirth, but real credit for a limited acceptance of or, rather, an interest in traditional Chinese morality must go to the men who launched and organized the campaign to lead their compatriots into what they considered the paths of Confucianism.

The return to Confucianism, a movement known to Dutch writers as neo-Confucianisme, a term inaccurately suggesting a relation between the syncretic but orthodox Confucianism developed in Sung dynasty China and the Confucianist phase of overseas Chinese nationalism, was led not by elderly scholars in long gowns but by youthful Westernized Chinese. The establishment in 1898* in Singapore of a Khong Kauw Hwe (K'ung-chiao hui, 孔教會), or Confucian religious society, was the work of two Christian Chinese — Lim Boen Keng (Lin Wen-ch'ing, 林文慶), a British-trained physician, and Song Ong Siang (Sung Wang-hsiang, 宋旺相), a member of the Singapore bar. Both these men seem to have been quite thoroughly Westernized. A book by Mr. Song contains a variety of statements and photographs symptomatic of his Anglomania. Song Ong Siang was, for example, especially proud of holding a reserve commission in a Singapore unit of the British army. The record establishes that Dr. Lim

*The year 1898 has of course special significance for the student of Chinese history, for that was when K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao won brief imperial support for their Confucianist reform program. Lim Boen Keng, unquestionably a widely read man, must have been inspired by the reformers' interpretation of Confucianism. Mention of K'ang Yu-wei's direct contacts with overseas Chinese will come later in this study; his influence before his 1898 flight from China is a matter yet to be investigated in research on Singapore as the Southeast Asian Chinese intellectual center.

was by far the more active of the two men in the Confucianist and later nationalist movements. Lim was to become one of the founders in 1905 of the Singapore branch of Sun Yat-sen's revolutionary T'ung-meng hui.

In 1899, one year after the founding of the Singapore Confucianist society, Yoe Tjai Siang, a Christian from Java, went to the British city to meet Lim Boen Keng. It has been asserted by a Dutch missionary writer that Yoe Tjai Siang was both mentally ill and an opium addict. In any case, he was regarded as something less than a faithful member of the Dutch Protestant flock. Following his Singapore visit with Lim, Yoe Tjai Siang returned to Java to launch a new series of Confucianist publications.[3]

In 1900, together with a colleague of whom little is known, he published a Malay translation of certain Confucian texts under the title Thay Hak Tiong Jong (Ta-hsüeh chung-yung, 大學中庸). Some insight into the background of the two Confucianists can be gained from the fact that their translations were based in part on books in the Dutch language. The hospitable public response to the translation of parts of the Confucian canon soon encouraged Yoe and his colleague to found a weekly newspaper, Li Po (Li-pao, 理報), published in Malay at Sukabumi and dedicated to the presentation of the teachings of Confucius and Mencius.* The example of this periodical led to the establishment by Tjoa Tjoe Koan in 1905 of Ik Po (I-pao, 譯報), published at Surakarta in both the Chinese and Malay languages. Tjoa Tjoe Koan in 1887 had written the book on Chinese customs to which

*It can be noted in passing that the names of the Chinese sages are often hard to identify in Indonesia's publications. Confucius was ordinarily known as Khong Hoe Tjoe (K'ung-fu-tzu, 孔夫子) or as Khong Tjoe (K'ung-tzu, 孔子), with the title Nabi (prophet) occasionally employed. Mencius is often called Bing Tjoe (Meng-tzu, 孟子).

reference has already been made. Two other weeklies of Confucianist orientation but seemingly little significance were Loen Boen of Surabaya and Ho Po of Buitenzorg.[4]

Desirous of channeling this newly awakened interest in Confucianism into constructive efforts, a group of Batavia Chinese established a society for the promotion of Confucianist thought and conduct. The society, Tiong Hoa Hwe Koan (Chung-hua hui-kuan, 中華會館), will figure prominently in this study, its name usually abbreviated as THHK. If any date can be selected as that of the establishment of overseas Chinese nationalism as an organized movement in Indonesia, it is March 17, 1900, the day THHK was founded. The initial planning for THHK seems to have been the work of Lie Kim Hok, a Peranakan who had received his education and served as an assistant teacher in mission schools. Lie was also the author of the 1897 biography of Confucius mentioned above. Included among Lie's principal colleagues in the establishment of THHK was Phoa Keng Hek, also a Peranakan educated by missionaries, who became the first president of the association and served for many years in that capacity.[5]

Directing a Confucianist revival proved to the leaders of THHK to be a difficult task. Their initial efforts were designed to encourage reform among the Chinese, "to spread the study of Confucian doctrines in order to erase many superstitions and harmful practices. . . ." The Confucianist reformers believed that "superstitious acts at funerals, weddings, and similar ceremonies . . . were not useful or meaningful, wasted money, and caused people of other races to laugh [at the Chinese]." THHK later stated that its establishment was "for the purpose of furthering knowledge and correctness among the Chinese in order that people might not remain ignorant or in an inferior position."[6] This

concern for the position of the Chinese in the eyes of the other residents of the colony, especially the Europeans, is shown in these statements to have been of paramount importance in the attempt to restore Confucianism. Documentation of this fact is scarce because men seldom acknowledge that their actions are prompted by the scorn of others. It is worth noting, however, that the Confucianist leaders were members of that group of Chinese most likely to be aware of European ridicule. As during the ascendancy of the ideas of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao in China, a brand of Confucianism was to be encouraged not solely because it was intrinsically good but also because it appeared to offer the means for raising the power and prestige of the Chinese nation without demanding the acceptance of more than the superficialities of Westernization and without forcing the abandonment of China's ancient enthnocentrism.

The leaders of this Confucianist rebirth, for the most part businessmen of little or no classical Chinese education, had no deep knowledge of the Confucian way of life. Their backgrounds and the demands of their commercial enterprises made the dedicated pursuit of Confucian scholarship impossible. No rewards would have come to them through such effort in any case, as the colony provided no entry to the officialdom by way of Confucianist examinations. These men had picked up a few Confucian clichés and often spoke of other persons as being filial or unfilial*; but the extent of their knowledge of the Confucian canon

*In N.I. these terms were rendered hauw and poet hauw, i.e., hsiao 孝 and pu-hsiao 不孝. The most popular cliché was: Ko tjet poet tan kai, derived from kuo tse wu tan kai 過則勿憚改, apparently quoted on every possible occasion and used on the masthead of Li Po. The quotation is from Lun-yü, Book I, Chapter VIII: "The Master said: 'If the scholar be not grave, he will not call forth any veneration, and his learning will not be solid. Hold faithfulness and sincerity as first principles. Have no friends not equal to

can be gauged by the fact that the early directors of THHK were obliged to vote funds for the purchase of the work of a Dutch sinologist on Chinese religion.[7]

Not intellectually equipped to interpret Confucianism to their fellow overseas Chinese, and working in a political and economic environment sure to frustrate a genuine effort to create a Confucianist society, the leaders of THHK concerned themselves, as their sage himself might have done, with the purification of the ceremonies of their people rather than with the reconstruction of their social order. THHK at first gently scratched the surface of the overseas Chinese cultural complex by proposing seemingly meaningless reforms in etiquette and ceremonials. The true contribution of these efforts was in its causing the Chinese to think in terms of their status as a minority people.

To educate men in the ways of Confucianism, THHK soon after its establishment opened a reading room where publications, including the periodicals already discussed, were available to the public. It is not now known how extensively Batavia's Chinese utilized this facility; but the record does reveal that another attempt at adult education in Confucianism ended in complete failure. When the Batavia association opened its first school, an event to be handled at considerable length later, the teacher was required under the terms of his contract to give weekly lectures on the teachings of Confucius. Although public attendance at the first session was invited, not a single person took advantage of THHK hospitality. No further attempt was made to conduct

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yourself. When you have faults, do not fear to abandon them.'"子曰：君子不重則不威。學則不固。主忠信。無友不如己者。過則勿憚改.
James Legge, The Chinese Classics, The Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1893, Vol. I, p. 141.

public lectures. Monthly meetings, where Malay translations of classical texts were presented by the teacher, were held for a time, but only THHK members were welcomed. The fruits of the closed meetings did reach the public through the pages of Malay-language newspapers, but little seems to have been understood or accepted.[8]

More specific but of equally limited value were THHK efforts to persuade people to rid themselves of a number of customs practiced at weddings and funerals but seen to be of local origin. To guide families planning weddings, THHK published a pamphlet setting forth in detail the correct procedures, including a caution to prospective brides that it was not Confucian to file the teeth.* Chinese or, curiously, Western music was permissible at wedding parties but native music was not.[9]

Funerals were to be similarly reformed. In November 1900 a Sukabumi member of THHK requested the directors of the association to furnish him with instructions for the Confucian burial of his father. In response to his inquiry, the bereaved son was sent a list of twenty-five steps to be taken in arranging for his father's funeral. Included among the twenty-five points were warnings that the teachings of Confucius did not prescribe that a person in extremis be given a watermelon to hold or that a pillow be placed on the roof of the deceased's house. These were branded corrupt Peranakan customs. The son in this case carried out the suggestions of THHK and was immediately denounced as unfilial by many of his neighbors. The son was prompted to publish an apologia for his actions; and THHK itself, presumably to defend its

*The Malay phrase used for this operation was gosok gigi, which in modern Indonesian ordinarily means to brush the teeth. Evidence indicates, however, that the reformers were not hostile to dental hygiene but to a more severe treatment. The THHK admonition on gosok gigi was amplified by the statement: "This custom is derived from the natives. If the teeth are good and it is not necessary to shorten them, it is better that they not be filed."

position, put out a booklet on filial piety, unfortunately not now extant, entitled simply Hauw (hsiao 孝 ).[10]

THHK did not achieve revision of funeral and marriage customs. In the matter of funerals, only the daring son at Sukabumi seems to have been willing to risk condemnation by abandoning the peculiar customs of the Indies Chinese. As for weddings, "only about half a dozen" reformed ceremonies were carried out under THHK guidance; others were celebrated in the traditional manner or, somewhat later, conducted as civil ceremonies of the European type. After three years, THHK gave up its attempts to reform these ceremonies, "no more mention of the problem" being made at association meetings after 1903.[11]

THHK did win a victory significant in terms of the creation of nationalist symbols through the introduction of a number of new terms into the language of the Chinese and many Indonesians. This success came more or less as an unexpected gain, no concerted effort apparently having been made to achieve it. Until THHK began its operations, everybody in the colony when speaking Malay used the term Tjina to designate the land of China. Even THHK followed this usage in its first year or so, writing, for example, of its sekola Tjina or Chinese school. Soon, however, largely because THHK used the words Tiong Hoa (Chung-hua, 中華 ) in its name, Tjina came to seem "old fashioned." Proper Chinese terms, Tionghoa for Chinese and Tiongkok (Chung-kuo, 中國 ) for China, came into general use among the Chinese and were eventually accepted by virtually all literate inhabitants of the archipelago.[12] Today the use of the term Tjina is likely to be considered insulting by many Indonesian Chinese.*

*In 1928 the N.I. Governor General formally recognized the use of the new terms for official purposes. Strangely enough, in Malaya, where the percentage of Chinese is vastly greater, Tionghoa and Tiongkok are not generally used.

Although the shift from Tjina to Tionghoa appears to have been an unearned dividend of THHK operations, there were conscious efforts made to revise some of the terms of address and the system of dates used by Chinese. The Malay Toean was, in THHK correspondence addressed to men, replaced by the Chinese Siansing (Hsien-sheng, 先生); Joedjin (Fu-jen, 夫人) came to be used in addressing married women. Years were counted from the birth of Confucius, while months and days were reckoned according to the Chinese lunar calendar. No longer were Chinese to write, for example, 16 Januari 1901; 26 Tjap-it-goeé (Shih-i yüeh, 十一月) 2451 was to be the acceptable form. The clumsiness in the Indonesian setting of the revised dating system and the growing preference for Dutch, not Chinese, styles of address defeated these efforts.[13]

Contributing to the partial collapse of attempts to awaken an interest in what was viewed as Confucianism were the attacks of some conservative Peranakans, known to the membership of THHK as the "old fashioned clique." THHK members appeared unduly puritanical to many of their compatriots. We are told: ". . . members were strictly forbidden to gamble, in public places as well as at gambling halls. At parties a big difference between those pro- and those anti-THHK was evident. The THHK people at parties kept far away from the gambling tables and . . . separated themselves from the others."[14] Among a people for whom games of chance form the nuclei of most parties, the THHK guests must have seemed more than a little prim.

More serious than the charges of puritanism were the accusations that THHK members who followed the reformed ceremonial in funerals were "unfilial" and, worse, "Christian." It seemed, not without apparent reason, to the conservative group that a movement largely led

by Chinese Christians and striving to take some color out of ceremonies and some joy out of life, must represent an attempt of the missionaries to cloak their proselytism in the gown of the Confucian scholar. It was indeed the hope of some early THHK leaders that Confucianism and Christianity might serve one another. Yoe Tjai Siang, an early leader if not the founder of the Confucianist revival, is said to have told a Dutch missionary that his goal was "to lead the Chinese, through Confucius, to Christ." The missionaries were not friendly to Yoe's endeavor. They stated: "There is no place in the [Christian] community for followers [of Confucianism]"; "neo-Confucianism [sic] is a weapon of Satan." The hostility of the Dutch preachers does not, however, seem to have shielded THHK members from denunciation by their conservative opponents.[15]

More significant than the attacks on THHK was the fact that the early efforts at reform generated relatively little interest among the Chinese. It seems that the Indies Chinese were not disturbed by their observance of corrupt ceremonials or their ignorance of the niceties of Confucian life. They required solutions to their immediate problems, the two chief ones being the unification of the various groups of Chinese and the provision of educational facilities for Chinese children. When THHK shifted its attention from idealistic unreality to practical necessity, the movement gained momentum and eventually achieved success.

## Internal Divisions

The hostility and suspicion with which various groups of Chinese regarded each other half a century ago is now difficult to appreciate. Not only were Peranakans and Singkehs liable to come to blows; within

those two major groups lines were drawn to separate Fukienese from Cantonese and Hakkas from Swatownese. Ridiculous though it seems, a Peranakan of, say, Fukienese ancestry might be known not simply as a Hokkien-Peranakan but also as an anak Senen or a native of the Pasar Senen district of Batavia, distinguishable from a native of that city's main Chinese area, Gelodok. The secret societies, the most influential of the prenationalist organizations, were divided into two types: those for Peranakans and those for Singkehs. The obvious course of action to end the fragmentation of the Chinese community was to establish pan-Chinese associations; the THHK was the first of these.[16]

> At the close of the last century, several perceptive Chinese of Batavia rightly saw that animosity and fighting between people of the same race who belonged to [different] secret societies was not only injurious to security and peace but also caused overseas Chinese to be regarded as inferior by people of other races . . . as a positive measure, they formed the THHK, which was based on the principle of ending differences between overseas Chinese. . . . The name THHK means no more and no less than "The Association of the Chinese."[17]

In its initial effort to enlist wide support, in a letter addressed to "all those of Chinese race," THHK stated that its 100 charter members included men from both the Peranakan and Singkeh groups and from Hakka, Fukienese, and Cantonese backgrounds. Batavia's THHK seems to have served in this and many other respects as the model for THHK organizations in other places. For example, the Bantam association tried to end Cantonese-Fukienese enmity in its area; in Bandung the local THHK sought to halt the bloody feuding of the Hakkas and Fukienese.[18]

The success of the efforts of the pan-Chinese associations to unify the various Chinese groups was marked but not complete. Friction among the groups was not entirely abolished in the first fifteen years of

the operation of the pan-Chinese associations; it exists in fact even today. There has been a certain amount of backsliding into the old paths of provincialism from time to time. The Batavia Chinese Chamber of Commerce, Hoa Siong Tjong Hwe (Hua-shang tsung-hui, 華商總會), to be discussed later at greater length, upon its establishment in 1908 specified in its charter that of the Chamber's 28 directors "20 must always be Singkehs, 8 from Fukien, 8 Hakkas, and 4 from Kwangtung, while the remaining 8 directors must be N.I. Peranakans."[19] In 1911 a reporter from China observed that the Peranakans and Singkehs despised each other and that the latter loved the ancestral land more than did the former. In 1912, a year of excitement following the Revolution in China, Fukienese and Cantonese in Jogjakarta scuffled after an altercation over the wearing of queues; and in the same year a "Peranakan leader of Batavia's THHK" placed the blame for unrest among the Chinese on the Hakkas and Cantonese.[20]

Despite this continuation of internal hostility, the Chinese were moving toward unity. The rash suggestion of the Luitenant at Buitenzorg in 1905 that Singkeh immigration be halted brought an immediate reaction in the form of a boycott of that officer by Singkeh and Peranakan groups alike. It appears from the record that many Dutch observers tended to overemphasize the divisive forces at work among the Chinese, an understandable sort of wishful thinking on the part of harassed colonial administrators. The evidence, however, supports the notion that one of the great accomplishments of THHK and its fellow pan-Chinese bodies was the establishment of a new measure of Chinese solidarity. After a few years of effort by the pan-Chinese associations, on matters of major importance, on "questions of race or nationality, there existed no difference between Singkehs and Peranakans."[21] The

desire for Chinese cohesiveness underlay many of the actions to be analyzed in this chapter and must be viewed as one of the basic motivations of the men and organizations discussed here.

## The Movement for Reform in Education

Foremost among the weapons of the associations in the struggle for the unification of the Chinese was education. If schools were to serve as forces for unity, a new approach to education had to be tried. The traditional Chinese schools were practically useless for purposes of either nationalism or education. The old schools were beyond saving by the addition of a few new courses or the recruitment of extra teachers; they had to be scrapped and replaced.

In 1900 there were 439 Chinese schools in Netherlands India, 257 of them on Java, including 28 in Batavia. These traditional schools served a total of 7,835 children, few indeed in a Chinese community of over half a million.[22] A brief account of the near absence of European- or Malay-language educational facilities for Chinese children has already been given.

Most of the old schools fell into two categories—those operated as family affairs and those maintained as business ventures by their teachers.[23] It is not now known which type was the more common, but it can safely be assumed that attendance at either was primarily dependent upon the ability of parents to pay the costs.

The teaching staffs of the traditional schools were of very low caliber. It was said that most teachers had received only limited educations and, while they had memorized some classical texts, were unable to carry out the duties now generally recognized as those of the teacher—the tasks of interpretation and instruction. It was said that

the teachers did not explain the classics simply because they themselves did not understand the texts they could parrot. If this cruel accusation is justified, it may help to explain why countless generations of children were forced to know the classics by rote but were denied any elucidation of their lessons. As can well be imagined, only the inferior scholars of China, men unsuccessful in the usual bureaucratic or academic careers, were willing to make the trip to Southeast Asia. Unless a few scattered idealists came their way, the Indies schools had to content themselves with the services of the dregs of China's literate class. Some very wealthy families may have been able, with the offer of high salaries, to lure an occasional able teacher to tropical exile, but that did nothing for the Chinese community as a whole. As a final observation on the quality of the traditional schools' staffs, it may be noted that teachers with any degree of ambition seem to have been drawn out of education and into the more lucrative field of commerce.[24]

Even had the teachers of the old schools been superb instructors, their efforts would have been doomed to failure. The classical education of China was simply not suited to Indonesian conditions; accordingly, overseas Chinese did little more than go through the motions of acquiring some learning. In China the ability to call up classical quotations was a prerequisite to an official career; overseas that accomplishment was of no measurable value. Success in the Indies, the accumulation of wealth, was not related to a mastery of the classics. Had an elementary classical education been viewed as preliminary to further study in China, the traditional schools might have enjoyed more success; however, "few, if any, [N.I.] Chinese children could continue their studies in the motherland." It ought, therefore, to come as

no surprise that absenteeism was chronic in the traditional schools and that children were often withdrawn from school before they had covered even the restricted courses offered. Girls were ordinarily given no formal education of any kind. Their educated brothers, on the other hand, had command over a few characters but were said to be unable to read or write a simple Chinese letter.[25]

At the beginning of the educational reform the great shortcomings of the traditional schools appear to have been recognized by all interested Chinese, with the understandable exception of the teachers in the old schools. The debate over which type of school, old or new, taught its pupils more effectively was settled in a sensible and final manner. A contest was held between the pupils of the major old school and those of the first modern school in Batavia. The results of these competitive examinations in the reading and writing of Chinese were decisive. The pupils of the modern school, although they had studied for only a year, easily outdistanced their older opponents. The traditional schools' struggle to survive was quietly abandoned in the years following this victory of modernized education.[26]

Because of the significance of the modern schools both in their own right and as sources of national consciousness, it is necessary that an effort be made here to describe their organization, the recruitment of their teachers, and their curricula.

The THHK at Batavia, as it had done with mixed success in the Confucianist revival, took the lead in educational reform and served as the model for sister groups throughout the archipelago. The first modern school was opened on March 17, 1901 by THHK in Batavia—exactly one year after the organization's founding. This is another meaningful date in the history of N.I. overseas Chinese nationalism.[27]

The idea for the establishment of a school was first discussed by THHK leaders in Batavia less than three months after the establishment of their organization. It had apparently already been realized that a reform movement demanded more than the publication of pamphlets and the discussion of Confucian virtues. The main objective in the minds of the founders of the first modern school was still a Confucianist revival. Confucianism was to be furthered in the modern school "just as Christianity is promoted in the mission schools." A secondary motivation in the establishment of the school lay in the hope of some THHK members that their endeavor in the field of education might spur the colonial government to provide more opportunities for Chinese children.[28]

The model for the new education was found in the modern schools of China and Japan, the latter country having pioneered in educational reform in Asia. Like the new primary schools of China, the Batavia school was to be divided into six classes. Pupils were to be promoted from lower to higher classes upon the completion of stipulated courses of study. Education beyond the primary level was not given real consideration until a few years later.[29]

Primary emphasis in the modern schools was put upon the teaching of the Chinese language. The traditional schools had also taught Chinese but not the Northern dialect of that language. The old institutions had given instruction in the dialects of the families or groups supporting them, Amoy, Canton, and Hakka dialects being the most commonly taught. The great distinction of the new schools lay in their teaching of the Northern or Mandarin dialect, now significantly known as Kuo-yü, the national language.

THHK wisely saw that if its school was to receive broad support and serve a large number of children, the language of instruction would

have to be one not likely to stir up old hostilities. A school determined to instill Confucianism was practically obliged to employ some Chinese dialect; in any event, Malay or Dutch would have been unacceptable to most Singkeh parents. Cantonese, Hakka, and Amoy dialects were the dominant tongues of the Singkehs, but the selection of one would automatically deprive THHK of the backing of those Chinese attached to the others. The use of a neutral Chinese dialect was called for, and Kuo-yü was selected.[30]

The reasons for the selection of Kuo-yü were not all negative. It was believed that this dialect could serve as "national cement" to unite Chinese at home and abroad. Command of Kuo-yü would establish communications with Chinese intellectuals everywhere. There was even a vague feeling that Kuo-yü was the sacred language for all Chinese: ". . . in our own language, our innermost feelings can be expressed"; and, ". . . the study of Chinese is strongly advised . . . to enrich the soul."[31]

The teaching of Kuo-yü was thus the fundamental concern of THHK. Other subjects were added to the modern school curricula when possible, but Chinese was given first priority. Proof that the enthusiasm for Kuo-yü was not limited to the leaders of THHK is seen in the response of the general Chinese public to the opening of the new schools. Further evidence of the popularity of Chinese was provided by a Dutch missionary, who wrote that the number of Chinese pupils in his school was halved by the opening of a nearby competing modern Chinese school and that there was talk among the missionaries of opening their own Chinese-language school to meet the challenge.[32]

THHK planned to supplement the teaching of the Chinese language with instruction in "Chinese customs, mathematics, geography, and

other useful subjects."[33] It can be assumed that the "customs" were those thought to be Confucian. The THHK leaders no doubt hoped that it was not yet too late to save the children.

It may seem odd that, in a school designed to Sinicize, the teaching of English came to be given a prominent place; but there is really nothing at all strange in this. English was coming to be necessary for those who might seek a modern education in China. It was essential for any student planning to study in Singapore and in most Western schools. English was also firmly established as the commercial language of the East, a fact no doubt impressive to the businessmen founders of THHK. Finally, English may have been made more attractive by the fact that its choice irritated the Dutch. It has been earlier stated that until about fifty years ago non-Europeans were not encouraged to speak to Hollanders in the European language. THHK may have decided to boycott Dutch as an indication of its dissatisfaction with the political position of the Indies Chinese. The organization later made use of the fact that Dutch was not in the curriculum to negotiate with the colonial government for an official subsidy for its schools. After many years, the Dutch are reported to have been finally driven to offer government subsidization to the Batavia body in exchange for the replacement of English by Dutch in the THHK schools.[34]

The importance attached to the study of English is demonstrated by the fact that the Batavia THHK opened an English-language school within a few months of the establishment of its modern Chinese school. The English school, known mysteriously as the Yale Institute, was under the direction of T. H. Lee (Li Teng-hui, 李登輝), who years later became the president of Fuhtan University in Shanghai. Children in the Yale Institute, like those in the Chinese-language school, were

expected to be indoctrinated in Confucianism. It is not known what happened in the field of Confucianist instruction after Lee's departure in 1903 from the Yale Institute. At that time English training was taken over by Westerners, including workers of the American Methodist Episcopal Malaysia Mission.[35]

The textbooks used by the modern schools represented another innovation. The new textbooks were patterned after Western models, being profusely illustrated and, unlike the classics used in the traditional schools, geared to the level of understanding of primary school children. The new books were the same as those in use by overseas Chinese children in Japan and were imported from that country until the Commercial Press at Shanghai began to publish their equivalents. It is not known when the shift from books of Japanese manufacture to those from China took place; in 1903 the Batavia association spent f. 300 in Japan for equipment, and two years later the modern school in Bandung was still using books of Japanese origin. The effort made to foster national consciousness in the texts was reinforced by the use of wall maps graphically showing China's great size in comparison with other countries. A pupil needed little imagination to discover that his ancestral land was tremendous while the homeland of the colonial regime was puny. Pictures of outstanding historical or semihistorical figures also decorated classrooms. The selection of these heroes seems to have been highly eclectic; Confucius, Buddha, Lao-tzu, Jesus, Napoleon, Bismarck, Franklin, and Shakespeare were the most commonly honored. It has been suggested that the reasons for this presentation of a cosmopolitan array of great men lay in the fact that overseas Chinese lack comparable leaders of their own and that the display of Queen Wilhelmina's picture could be successfully avoided through this device.[36]

But if it is true that the modern schools "were permeated with the spirit of Chinese nationalism," the major credit for that innovation must go to the teachers of those schools. The recruitment of teachers posed great difficulties. In Batavia at the time of the opening of the first modern school there was not one man qualified to teach Kuo-yü. THHK called for the aid of their Singapore patron, Dr. Lim Boen Keng, who sent a man originally slated to teach in Singapore but generously allowed to go on to Batavia to further educational reform there. Little is known of this pioneer teacher's background other than that he was supposed to have been trained in modern educational techniques. He worked in Batavia for only three years, after which he was transferred to THHK in Malang. It is impossible to say whether this import was something of a failure; it can only be noted that no references have been found relating to his career after leaving Batavia. His successor as head teacher in the THHK school at Batavia was recommended by no less a personage than K'ang Yu-wei. This second teacher was a graduate of a Yokahama school and represented the new generation of Chinese scholars.[37]

The importation of teachers continued at a rapid rate despite the cost and the distance separating Netherlands India from the source of supply. By 1904 THHK Batavia employed 15 Chinese teachers, 11 of them China-born. In Semarang, at about the same time, only one of seven teachers was not from China. Bandung boasted of three China-born teachers in 1906, while, of all the modern schools, the one at Surabaya was unique in being unable to offer instruction in Kuo-yü. The total number of new teachers brought to the colony in those years is not known. It is safe to note, however, that the flow of new personnel was steady and reached virtually all Indies centers of Chinese population.[38]

Many of the new teachers came by way of Japan, where a large number of young Chinese were drinking in Westernized learning. The majority of these teachers were of Cantonese origin, although some men from the Shanghai region were also recruited. The reasons for the influx of Southern Chinese teachers are probably to be found in the traditional willingness of men from the South to emigrate and in the fact that the pre-1911 revolutionary spirit had penetrated deeply in that region. Another, more concrete reason was simply that Cantonese teachers were not as costly as Northerners.[39]

It can be noted in passing that the early years of this century were a time of intellectual ferment among the Chinese student population of Japan from whom many of the teachers were obtained. Chinese revolutionaries and reformers were hard at work to enlist the support of the young men seeking Westernized learning in Japan:

> . . . among [the teachers brought from Japan] were men with revolutionary ideas [derived from] Dr. Sun Yat-sen and the T'ung-meng hui [and] there were those who were moderate monarchists and agreed with the thinking of K'ang Yu-wei and Liang Ch'i-ch'ao; but they all equally loved their country and wanted China to be truly free and the Chinese people to be improved.[40]

That many of the new teachers inclined toward a brand of nationalism hostile to the continuation of the moribund absolutism of the Manchus is substantiated in the repeated warnings sent by dynastic officials to THHK organizations.[41]

Aside from the new teachers' political views, there was the question of their qualifications. It is reported that, despite their new educations, the fresh teachers were able to handle classical Chinese texts as easily as had their traditional predecessors. Even modernized Chinese of that era had received an extensive education in the Confucian canon.[42]

The language problems faced by the new teachers were formidable. In the early days of the THHK schools it was often necessary for a teacher to rely on the constant assistance of an interpreter who knew Malay or, less commonly, Amoy dialect. Even when the teachers could operate alone and in Kuo-yü, their command of that dialect was likely to be weak. The writer has been told that many of the overseas Chinese schools turned out graduates able to communicate in Kuo-yü only among themselves, no Chinese brought up in that dialect being able to understand them. One can imagine the chaotic results achieved by a Cantonese teacher leading a class of children of Fukienese descent in a Malay-language area.[43] It is appropriate, though perhaps slightly unkind, to recall that Northern Chinese have long enjoyed a little poem expressing their horror of the Cantonese variety of Kuo-yü:

I fear not heaven
  I fear not earth;
I only fear a Cantonese
  speaking Mandarin.

Finally, there is evidence that a number of the imported teachers were immature and inexperienced. Their "new" education had in many cases been hastily acquired, and some men lacked the perseverance and skill demanded of them. The Batavia THHK organization is reported to have early made efforts to replace its younger teachers with older men.[44]

The education of girls, so long neglected, was one of the initial concerns of THHK. Yet the decision to offer schooling to girls was obviously not reached without argument. It was first decided that girls would be provided with separate but unequal facilities. The curriculum of the school for girls would include very little Chinese language and emphasize romanized Malay. Apparently it was felt that girls ought to be literate only in a language regarded as second rate. The plan to

build a separate school was defeated by the lack of financial resources. The leadership of THHK finally agreed that girls could be admitted to school along with boys until their own building was put up, but the sexes were to be seated separately. Despite this lack of gallantry on the part of THHK, 80 girls were enrolled in its Batavia school by 1904.[45]

This great expansion in education cost a great deal of money, and it is in the field of economic organization that the talents of the Indies Chinese shone most brilliantly. The leasing or purchase of school buildings, the importation of textbooks, and the employment of teachers from abroad required large sums. The Batavia THHK in 1901 contracted for the purchase at f. 19,000 of buildings to house their schools. Teachers brought from outside the colony were able to demand salaries high for the time and place. Ordinary teachers at the school were paid f. 600 per annum; the head teacher or principal received f. 1,500. Salaries were ordinarily considerably augmented by allowances for travel, housing, and food. For example, the Semarang THHK spent f. 11,125 on salaries and allowances for seven teachers in 1905. The figures show that the average cost per teacher to the association was nearly f. 1,500 per year. Another source indicates that the average annual cost of a Kuo-yü teacher was f. 1,200. Teachers of European languages were even more expensive. Dr. T. H. Lee during his years at the Batavia school was paid a salary of f. 2,400 per annum; his assistant received f. 1,680. Lee's successor, apparently an American or Briton fired with missionary zeal, was more of a bargain, his salary being only f. 1,800. Teachers' salaries made up the major item in the expenditures of the modern schools. For example, the association at Semarang spent about 75 per cent of its budget to pay its teachers.[46]

The amount of money required to finance the educational reform is indicated by the fact that by the end of 1906 there were roughly 12,000 pupils in new schools throughout the archipelago. The Batavia THHK had originally planned to have one teacher for every 25 pupils, but that ratio was probably never maintained. It is perhaps not overly daring to assume that there was an average of 3 teachers for every 100 pupils or in the neighborhood of 360 teachers to serve the 12,000 pupils in 1906. At an average cost per teacher of f. 1,200 each year, the modern schools at the time annually spent f. 432,000 on salaries and perhaps another f. 100,000 on buildings and equipment. One of the most fascinating sides of the story of the educational reform relates to the raising of such great sums.[47]

As throughout this discussion of the modern schools, the Batavia THHK can continue to serve as a model, here to illustrate the manner in which funds were accumulated. As can be expected, members of the association paid dues, the amount being f. 6 per annum. It was originally planned that 700 members would contribute in this way. THHK expectations had been modest; by 1908 the Batavia association was receiving f. 6 each year from over 5,000 members. A similar story was repeated wherever organizations of the THHK type were established. Tuition charges also contributed to the support of the new schools. Tuition rates were reasonable; most THHK Batavia pupils paid between f. 1 and f. 2.50 per month, depending on their parents' resources. Many paid nothing at all, having won scholarships, granted on the basis of need, which furnished tuition, books, and clothing. Semarang's school seems to have had somewhat higher tuition rates—an average of about f. 3 per month.[48]

Official subsidization of the new schools was not important. So far as can be determined, the only subsidy received was one of f. 225 per month paid to the Batavia association by the Chinese Raad or council in that city. The subsidy was granted THHK following the victory of its pupils in the contest with the children of the traditional school, which until that time had been partly supported by the semiofficial Raad.[49]

At the time of its establishment, the Batavia association floated a loan for f. 40,000. Eight thousand f. 5 bonds, bearing interest, were issued. The loan was soon subscribed, surely another example of the broad popular base of the new schools. The association also sought to solicit support through the holding of a lottery. It was proposed in 1902 and several times afterwards that a lottery with prizes totaling f. 200,000 be organized; however, the required government licenses for this and similar projects were repeatedly refused.[50]

THHK associations gathered funds in numerous other ways, including the presentation of theatrical performances and the organization of bazaars. In 1904 a bazaar netted the Batavia THHK a profit of over f. 12,000. Members of the Batavia association paid fines imposed for infractions of the association's regulations. The sums gained from this source were small but significant as an indication of the association's power to maintain discipline. Fines ranged from f. 1 to f. 25 and could be demanded for seemingly trivial offenses, as in the case of a fine of f. 2.50 levied on the vice president of the association who arrived at a meeting carelessly dressed in a white rather than in the required black jacket. Other miscellaneous sources of income were found. For example, the Semarang association was able to realize a profit through the operation in 1907 of launches to take "nearly all the Chinese of the area" out to see two Chinese naval vessels anchored in the harbor.[51]

Gifts were important in THHK finances. In 1905 the Semarang association received nearly f. 2,000 in "special gifts" or contributions other than those paid as membership dues. A few years later, a wealthy member of the Batavia association contributed f. 5,000 and promised to give a like contribution when a fund raised from gifts reached f. 100,000. Although this generous move prompted another member to make a sizable individual donation, the f. 100,000 goal was never reached.[52]

Legacies appear to have played a less significant role in the finances of the THHK associations. This is not unexpected when it is remembered that the Chinese inheritance system traditionally makes no provision for the type of posthumous charity so common in our society. The semiofficial historian of the Batavia association mentions only one legacy in the early years of THHK. A clause in the will of a Peranakan director of the association provided for a gift of f. 3,000. In appreciation of this apparently unusual gift, THHK hung a commemorative portrait of the testator in its meeting place.[53]

Regular subsidization of the modern schools by the Dutch colonial authorities was, as already noted, not carried out. The Chinese government was more generous, at least in promises; but subsidies from imperial China, if they existed at all, never formed a very significant source of THHK income. An official of the dynasty is supposed, according to one report of questionable reliability, in 1907 to have given the Batavia association f. 1,000 for the operation of its schools. A year later another official stated that the Peking government was prepared to give the Indies Chinese f. 28,000 for the construction of a high school and annual subsidies of f. 9,000 for its maintenance. Plans for the high school, which incidentally never reached fulfillment in the

period under study, brought forth other pledges of Chinese government aid. In 1910 the imperial regime was reported, probably without basis in fact, to have deposited 20,000 taels in a Batavia bank for the establishment of a high school. Annual subsidies of 6,000 taels, to be taken from the customs receipts of Kwangtung, Fukien, and Kiangsu provinces, were to be available to the school after its opening.[54] The 1911 Revolution came before Peking's sincerity could be put to the test. Moreover, the historical record indicates for the period an opposite, a Batavia to Peking flow of funds. The tottering dynasty, as will be shown later, was ordinarily concerned with the soliciting rather than the distribution of monetary gifts.

The most dramatic illustration of the power of the THHK associations in the realm of finance is seen in their ability to tax certain business transactions to raise revenue for the support of their operations. The THHK power to tax not only Chinese consumers but also those of the European and Indonesian communities goes far to justify speaking of the Chinese in the archipelago as forming a state within a state. It was of course the position of the Indies Chinese as the virtual monopolists of retail trade which made possible the levying of these taxes.*

The Bandung association was reported to have partially met its operating costs of f. 1,000 monthly through the collection of taxes on each can of kerosene and every picul of rice sold in its district. In

*W. J. Cator, The Economic Position of the Chinese in the Netherlands Indies, Basil Blackwell, Oxford, 1936, is probably the best account in English of the Chinese economic role in the islands. Some outstanding works on this subject in the Dutch language are: J. L. Vleming, ed., Het Chineesche Zakenleven in Nederlandsch-Indië (Chinese Business Life in Netherlands India), Landsdrukkerij, Batavia, 1926; Liem Twan Djie, De Distribueerende Tusschenhandel der Chineezen op Java (The Distributive Intermediary Trade of the Chinese on Java), Martinus Nijhoff, the Hague, 1952; and a number of studies by Professor J. H. Boeke.

Batavia, until the First World War disrupted commerce, THHK was able to collect a levy on each bag of copra traded in the city. The record indicates that as much as f. 1,500 per month may have been gained in this way. The same association also put a sales tax on kerosene, rice and other cereals, and on several delicacies popular among the Indonesians. Other sources of revenue included taxes on Chinese commercial shipments by land and sea, on the sale of cotton, tobacco, and hogs, and on mining operations. It is unfortunate for the purposes of this study that, sensibly enough, the associations did not publicize their tax collecting roles. The extent and success of these operations can only be guessed at on the basis of what is known of the commercial position of the Indies Chinese.[55]

Before leaving the ordinarily drab subject of finance, it ought to be mentioned that the various THHK associations supported a number of endeavors other than the direct operation of schools. In 1905 the Batavia body established a fund to cover the expenses of education in "Europe or elsewhere" of deserving graduates of its schools. Similar arrangements were later made for students who went to China for schooling. In its early years the Batavia THHK operated a clinic where a Chinese physician treated charity cases. Associations were obliged from time to time to appropriate considerable sums to entertain important Chinese visitors to their cities. K'ang Yu-wei's 1903 visit to Batavia, for example, cost the local association a thousand guilders. Official guests from China were similarly expensive. The THHK directors were not improvident in matters of money, however. A Chinese pilot who sought f. 10,000 from the Batavia body to underwrite providing his compatriots with the unusual spectacle of a flying machine operated by a Chinese was quickly discouraged.[56]

Throughout this discussion, as must be apparent, the emphasis has been on the THHK of Batavia. The reasons for this are four-fold: the Batavia association was the pioneer; it was the largest; it documented its work the most extensively; and it was the model after which most other Chinese educational associations patterned themselves. The relationship between Batavia and the THHK associations in the rest of the archipelago is not always clear. Within a few years of the establishment of the Batavia body some 35 THHK associations had been founded elsewhere. Often the ties between these groups were informal, if not tenuous; yet there seems to have been a considerable measure of unanimity among them. One is forced to the conclusion that a much higher degree of uniformity and interdependence bound the various THHK associations together than is apparent from the record. The reasons for the paucity of documents to corroborate this assertion are not hard to find. It is more than likely that the Chinese, on insecure ground politically, were interested in concealing their growing cohesiveness. Dutch officialdom would quickly have sought to hamper the movement toward educational reform had it appeared that Chinese unification would result. Divide et impera was of necessity more than a fancy cliché to the thinly scattered colonial administrators.

As the initiator of the modern school movement, the Batavia THHK was copied on an informal basis by most, if not all, of the other school associations, although many of them never properly acknowledged their debt to Batavia. There were also several associations which frankly recognized their tie to Batavia by calling themselves branches of the pioneer body.* Six other THHK associations had been established by

*In THHK publications, branches were known by the Malay term tjabang-tjabang or as hoen kiok, presumably the Amoy form of fen-chü 分局.

1903 under Batavia's influence; these were at Tanah Abang, a Batavia suburb, Buitenzorg, Semarang, Malang, Cheribon, and Kedu. "But not all were subordinate to the THHK of Batavia . . . although they ordinarily followed [its] policies. . . ." Batavia's example soon inspired the establishment of many similar bodies, fifteen of which in 1914 still referred to themselves as branches of the Batavia THHK.[57]

Those school associations not formally connected with Batavia still cooperated with the parent body in a variety of ways. K'ang Yu-wei's 1903 visit to Java required that fairly extensive arrangements be made to receive the famous visitor in a number of cities. The Batavia association accepted responsibility for the arrangements and secured the cooperation of both its branches and the independent school associations in all of the places to be visited by K'ang. When, in 1906, the school associations were asked by the government to express their views on the founding of Dutch-language schools for Chinese children, the Batavia group took the lead in soliciting and interpreting the reactions of the various associations. When the first groups of Chinese students were sent to Nanking for higher education, the Batavia association, along with the independent groups at Semarang and Surabaya, was responsible for the selection and sending of boys from a number of schools. With mixed success, the Batavia THHK later sought to dominate and control efforts to build a Chinese high school.[58]

The casual cooperation of the school associations was soon seen to be inadequate; an attempt was made to establish a union of all these groups. A meeting of the representatives of 20 associations was held in Semarang in July 1906, the result being the establishment of Tiong Hoa Tjong Hwee (Chung-hua tsung-hui, 中華總會),

or General Chinese Association. The new body "may very easily have been the first . . . union of Chinese associations in the country."[59]

The primary aim of Tiong Hoa Tjong Hwee was the improvement and standardization of instruction in the modern schools operated by its member associations. The achievement of this aim called for the introduction of a system of school inspection and for better selection and control of teachers. The Semarang meeting approved sending a request to the Canton governor general for "a Peking teacher with a thorough command of Kuo-yü and English" to serve as school inspector. Should the Canton official fail to act on this request, Dr. Lim Boen Keng of Singapore, who had "influential contacts in Peking," would be asked to help. As will be discussed in detail later, the Chinese government did respond to the new union's request and sent an inspector to Indonesia.[60]

The difficulties in recruiting and supervising teachers were chronic and required solution. The measures considered by Tiong Hoa Tjong Hwee indicate that some teachers were incompetent and that some had attempted to exploit the overseas teacher shortage by encouraging various school associations to engage in competitive bidding for their services. To counteract the efforts of the teachers to reap the benefits of a sellers' market in their talents, the school associations planned to unite to end labor piracy among themselves. The proposals made to the first Tiong Hoa Tjong Hwee meeting to achieve this and related goals included suggestions that teachers be required to sign standard contracts of employment, that teachers discharged on grounds of unsatisfactory service by one school be considered ineligible for employment by another, that the names of unsatisfactory teachers be published in the press, and that schools clear the hiring of all new teachers and their terms of employment with the union of school associations.[61]

At the second meeting of Tiong Hoa Tjong Hwee, in 1907, it was decided that the union's name ought to be changed to Djawa Hak Boe Tjong Hwee (Chua-wa hsüeh-wu tsung-hui, 爪哇學務總會), or General Educational Association of Java. The headquarters of the union, in Batavia for a year, were moved to Semarang at the same time. It was then planned to shift the location of the union's office at regular intervals, presumably so that no one Chinese urban center could dominate it. The change in the name did not alter the objectives of the union but merely emphasized its primarily educational role. The adoption of the new name does, however, appear to have been accompanied by an increase in the power of the union. After 1907 any school engaging a teacher without permission from the union was subject to a fine of f. 100; disagreements among member associations were to be settled by the union's leadership; and member associations could be expelled for violation of the union's rules. The union was supported by a fixed monthly payment from its member associations for each teacher employed. A plan to establish scholarships for deserving children was put into operation, how successfully is unclear. For a time the union served as the channel through which the associations in Java could communicate with officials in China; and much of the organizational effort involved in sending pupils to China was the responsibility of the union.[62]

It was not long, however, before harmonious working toward common goals within the union gave way to friction. Although the record is not clear whether the Batavia association was the victim or the instigator of these troubles, that body was certainly deeply involved in them.

In 1909 the Batavia association sponsored a competitive examination for pupils from several West Java schools, the union school inspector

serving as examiner. Because the union's permission for the examination had not been obtained by Batavia, it was necessary that an apology be sent to the union's headquarters. A few months later, Batavia and Semarang quarreled over the question of the school inspector's qualifications; Semarang wanted him sent back to China and Batavia disagreed. The inspector had been a source of friction earlier; at the time of his arrival in 1906 Semarang's THHK had protested that he stayed too long in Batavia. By 1910 Batavia withdrew from Djawa Hak Boe Tjong Hwee because it felt "the union did nothing to help the Chinese schools." The following year a fruitless effort to entice Batavia back into the union was made. At the request of the association of the second city, the Semarang association sent a representative to Batavia to apologize and ask that Batavia re-enter the union. Although the union boasted a total membership of 93 associations after Batavia's withdrawal, the absence of the oldest, largest, and most influential school association seems ultimately to have proven fatal to the union. It soon collapsed as an effective organization, although the name endured for some years longer.[63]

One can only speculate on whether the recorded explanation for Batavia's withdrawal from Djawa Hak Boe Tjong Hwee and that union's subsequent decline is adequate. It would seem that the resentments were deeper than has been revealed. It is possible that the Batavia group, quite a conservative body, felt it might endanger itself by association with potentially radical elements in the union. Such a tie could cause Batavia to lose favor with the imperial regime in China and to come under greater suspicion with the N.I. authorities. It is perhaps more likely that the Batavia THHK, aware of its prestige as the founder of the modern educational movement, was unwilling to

surrender its respected position to another group. Finally, money may have been the basic difficulty. The Batavia association was relatively rich and powerful and no doubt disinclined to give less fortunate sister associations a voice in its operations. In any event, the failure of the attempt to bring the educational reform under unified leadership must be counted as a contributing factor to a slackening of the nationalist movement in subsequent years.

Before leaving the key problem of education as a force in the mobilization for nationalism of the Indies Chinese, two developments require further discussion. Both reveal the extent of the cooperation between the overseas educational bodies and the officialdom of China. The two developments are the assignment of dynastic officials to posts as school inspectors in the archipelago and the sending of Indies pupils to schools in the ancestral homeland.

Mention of the school inspectors has already been made in a number of places, but nothing specific has been reported on who they were and what they did. These matters are important because the inspectors were the earliest direct permanent link between China's bureaucracy and the Indies Chinese. The willingness of the overseas school associations to request and accept advice from outsiders is noteworthy in itself. When it is remembered that the advice came from supporters of the dynasty, the inspectors can be seen to have played a conservative role in the pre-Revolutionary nationalist activity of the overseas Chinese.

For a few years a number of school inspectors visited or resided more or less permanently in the archipelago. Several of these men used their inspector's title to cloak their main activities and will be discussed in some detail in those later paragraphs dealing with official

Chinese missions. Only two inspectors seem to have been sincerely and consistently concerned with the problems of overseas Chinese education, and only one is significant for the purposes of this study.

The motivation for the employment of school inspectors lay in the desire of the school associations that the curricula be standardized and the quality of instruction improved. The plan to engage an inspector was first proposed to the Batavia THHK by the Kediri school association in 1905. In March of the following year the viceroy at Canton sent an official, Liu Shih-chi (known in Indonesia as Lau Soe Kie), to Java to make an inspection tour of the schools. This dignitary arrived, resplendent in the uniform of a Chinese admiral, and was received by the N.I. governor general and other high officials. Liu unfortunately became ill before he could complete his tour and was obliged to return to China. Before leaving, however, Liu offered the Batavia THHK some advice of mixed usefulness on the operation of its school. He stated that the school ought to close on Sundays, remain open on the first and fifteenth days of the Chinese month, have more windows, provide free housing for its teachers, and set up adequate scholarship funds. It appears that Liu was in general favorably impressed with what he saw in Batavia; an official Chinese announcement declared that Liu Shih-chi had completed an inspection tour in Netherlands India and found that "the study programs of the schools were in complete conformity with imperial regulations" and that "the teachers employed good methods of instruction."[64]

The first permanent and the most important school inspector, Wang Fung Cheang,* arrived a few months after Liu Shih-chi's departure.

*This man's name has been rendered in a startling variety of ways. As an aid to future students and as an example of how Chinese names can be corrupted in publications and documents relating to N.I. Chinese, all the forms of Wang

At the first Tiong Hoa Tjong Hwee meeting at Semarang in the summer of 1906, it had been decided to ask the governor general at Canton to send a school inspector to Indonesia. Wang's seal of office, an important symbol in imperial times, stated that he was appointed "Inspector of Education and Teachers in Java and the Islands of the Southern Seas." This title upset the Dutch by its failure to indicate that Java was a Netherlands rather than a Chinese colony. His exact position in the Chinese bureaucracy is unknown, but Wang certainly held official rank under the dynasty. As the Chinese government protested to the Dutch: "Mr. Wang is an official of rank and cannot, consequently, be placed on the same footing as the Chinese merchants." The background of the school inspector was not unlike that of many of the younger intellectuals of the last years of the Ch'ing dynasty. He was born about 1876 and graduated in 1903 from a medical school in Canton. In Java he ordinarily wore Western clothing and was said to speak "very unclear English."[65]

Wang's duties were twofold: he was expected to advise the various school associations and to correlate their activities, and he was one of the principal links between the Chinese government and its overseas subjects. In addition to the routine duties of traveling from one school to another to check on the quality and uniformity of instruction, Wang played a large part in selecting boys to be sent to China for higher education. He also supervised special examinations and passed out prizes to superior students. The school inspector was further charged by the Chinese government with the responsibility for distributing any

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Fung Cheang's name so far encountered are listed here. They are: Wang Fung Cheang, Wung Tong Cheang, Wang Tung Chiang, Wang Ong Siong, Ong Honh-siang, Ong Hong Siang, Wong Fong Cheang, Wang Voong Siang, and Wang Feng-hsiang; all derived from 汪鳳翔.

funds sent by Peking to N.I. for subsidizing education. He is reported to have promised funds to the Semarang association for the construction of a high school in that city.[66]

As an official representative of the dynasty, Wang enjoyed considerable prestige among the Indies Chinese. Originally his salary and expenses were met by Tiong Hoa Tjong Hwee, but possibly in part in an effort to insure Wang's loyalty to Peking, the Chinese government took over this obligation in 1907. As an official, Wang reported according to circumstances to the governor general at Canton, to the Chinese minister at the Hague, and to appropriate offices in Peking. His reports covered not only the state of Chinese primary education but also included the names, occupations, and incomes of the leaders of the school associations. The interest of the Chinese authorities in the second category of information gathered by Wang will, if it has not already done so, make itself understood in subsequent sections of this study.[67]

Wang Fung Cheang worked in Indonesia until the 1911 Revolution. The exact date of his departure from the islands is not recorded. In 1911 Wang was still offering advice to the Batavia THHK; but the new Chinese government of 1912 was asked to furnish a replacement for him. It can be noted parenthetically that during his tenure Wang continued to serve both the Batavia association and Djawa Hak Boe Tjong Hwee, successor to Tiong Hoa Tjong Hwee, despite the former's withdrawal from the general association.[68]

In addition to Wang Fung Cheang, there was another semipermanent school inspector operating in Netherlands India in the years before the Chinese Revolution. The second man, Tan Hoa (also known as Tan Hwa and Ch'en Hoa), had served as one of the first teachers of the

school at Kediri. He was a Cantonese by origin and had been trained, like so many other Chinese of his generation, in Japan. His appointment as inspector of education was issued by the governor general of Fukien and Chekiang provinces. Early in 1907, at about the time of Wang Fung Cheang's arrival, Tan reached Surabaya, where he planned to establish himself more or less permanently. For reasons presumably known to himself, probably a desire to enhance his prestige, Tan appeared dressed in the uniform of an officer of the imperial Chinese army.[69]

Tan Hoa was immediately a cause for disagreement among the school associations. The record indicates that most of the member associations in Tiong Hoa Tjong Hwee refused to submit to Tan's inspection, having already accepted Wang Fung Cheang as their inspector. The controversy was finally settled by placing Tan in exclusive charge of the inspection of schools in East Java and the outlying islands of eastern Indonesia. He made his headquarters, apparently in accordance with his own wishes, at Surabaya.[70] Tan, by being assigned to areas of relative unimportance in the affairs of the Indies Chinese, never was as significant a figure in the history of overseas Chinese nationalism as his colleague, Wang Fung Cheang.

The role of the school inspectors as representatives of the Peking government soon brought forth official Dutch expressions of resentment over Chinese interference in the internal affairs of a Netherlands colony. In January 1907 the colonial government stated that it had "no objection" to tours by education inspectors—although an officer of the government, specializing in Chinese affairs, had declared: "The residence in N.I. of Chinese inspectors of education appears to me neither necessary nor desirable." The change in the initially tolerant

official Dutch attitude was speedy and complete. By February 1907 the Netherlands Minister of Foreign Affairs wrote the Chinese minister in the Hague stating: "In fact all interference on the part of the Chinese government in the internal affairs of the Netherlands colonies would be in opposition to the most elementary principles of international law and, as a consequence, will not be tolerated." Within a few years it was even proposed that school inspectors be required to know the Dutch language before being admitted to Netherlands India. This measure would surely have reduced to zero the number of Chinese officials able to operate in the archipelago.[71]

Through the provision of facilities to boys from the archipelago for studying in China, the Chinese government found another means of drawing the overseas Chinese more closely into the affairs of the homeland. The plan for this program was first announced by the leader of a Chinese mission to Netherlands India late in 1906. The first group, numbering 21 students, left for China in February 1907. It had been expected by the Chinese authorities that 30 boys would make up the initial group, but parental enthusiasm was not sufficient to make that number possible. Actually, the fact that 21 boys were assembled on such short notice and that other groups were soon sent out indicates that the reluctance of parents to have their sons leave home was soon overcome. Over 100 boys were studying in China in 1908; two years later the total was reported to be 148. In all, about 200 Indies students are supposed to have benefited from this plan before the 1911 Revolution ended it.[72]

The students were sent to a school at Nanking designed to serve the needs of overseas Chinese from all Southeast Asia, not only those from Netherlands India. The school was called, in Kuo-yü, Chi-nan

hsüeh-t'ang.* The patron of the school was the Nanking viceroy, who seems to have taken a special interest in his overseas charges. The viceroy is supposed to have often taken students for rides through the city in his carriage; and during his visits to the school he reportedly asked the boys to criticize their teachers.[73]

There were 19 teachers at Chi-nan hsüeh-t'ang in Nanking giving instruction in Kuo-yü, European languages, mathematics, geography, history, military science, and music. Students "were promised, upon graduation, an opportunity to go abroad . . . , to Japan, America or Europe, to broaden their learning." All, or almost all, of the funds required for the maintenance of the Nanking school and its students were furnished by the Chinese authorities; students were obliged to provide only their own clothes, pocket money, and transportation. There is some evidence that the Chinese government considered this educational burden too heavy. A letter from the Nanking pupils to their parents in 1909 suggested that money be sent to China to build a new school, and in 1910 a request for overseas funds was sent out by the school authorities themselves. No money was donated, yet the Nanking school operated until forced to close during the Revolution.[74]

The Chinese government apparently saw in the overseas pupils a source of personnel to occupy official posts, especially in the diplomatic and consular services. After a period of study of up to six years at Nanking and further training elsewhere, the students were to be given a chance to participate in special civil service examinations.

*In N.I. documents and publications this name is given as Ki Lam Hak Tong, Kay Lam Hak Tong, or Kie Lam Hak Tong, from 暨南學堂. When the school was moved to Shanghai in 1912, the name was changed to Chi-nan hsüeh-hsiao 暨南學校, and later, when the school was expanded to offer college training, to Chi-nan ta-hsüeh 暨南大學.

The Chinese authorities probably intended to make use of the language qualifications and foreign experience of these overseas graduates. Even under the changed conditions of the last decade of the dynasty, no higher honor than promotion to the ranks of the scholar-bureaucracy could have been offered a student in the traditional Chinese scene. The sincerity of the imperial regime in this respect was never put to the test because of the Revolution. The products of the Nanking school returned to their homes, where they quickly earned reputations as nationalist firebrands.[75]

The process of selection of pupils to study in Nanking is of significance here. The total number of boys sent to China was not large, but these students were drawn from many places. Almost every center of Chinese population was able to have its own nationalist hero at school in China. Most of the boys were from Java; but Sumatra and Borneo were also represented. The boys from East Java were primarily of poorer Peranakan origin; and the student group as a whole is described as definitely Peranakan in appearance, "looking more like the Javanese than like their 'yellow brothers.'" The students were between 12 and 18 years of age, and most had completed primary school in Netherlands India. Only the best students were sent, the selection being made in part on the basis of competitive examinations. For most of the years of the program, Djawa Hak Boe Tjong Hwee, working with local THHK associations, was responsible for these arrangements. The cost of a student's passage to China was often borne by his local school.[76]

The establishment of the Republic broke this link between China and its overseas populations. After 1912, students from Southeast Asia who went to China were scattered through many schools and universities. In the early Republican period, Chinese students, at least

those from Batavia, "only received [from THHK] the necessary school certificates and had to arrange other matters themselves."[77] In other words, scholarships from both the Chinese government and the Indies school associations no longer existed.

## Chambers of Commerce

The various Chinese chambers of commerce, usually known as Siang Hwee,* furthered, as did the pan-Chinese educational system, the nationalist mobilization of the Indies Chinese. Whether the THHK or the Siang Hwee movement was the more important in the rise of nationalism is perhaps a matter of personal interpretation. The school associations, through the necessarily lengthy process of education, laid the foundation for a continuing national awareness in successive generations. The Siang Hwee tended to be most active in times of stress. THHK operated with its sights on long-range developments; Siang Hwee met specific challenges.

Informal ties among the Chinese merchants of the Indies had of course existed from an early time. Siang Hwee were established as a means of making permanent and more effective arrangements for cooperation. The inspiration for the founding of Siang Hwee reached Netherlands India in the person of an official representative of the dynasty, the same man who promoted the sending of students to Nanking.

Late in 1906 and early in 1907, Chinese merchants were advised to band together in chambers of commerce modeled after those already

*Shang-hui 商會, derived from hua-shang hui-kuan, 華商會館 or hua-shang tsung-hui 華商總會. Siang Hwee were sometimes inaccurately known as Siang Boe, shang-wu 商務, which came from the name of the general association of Siang Hwee, Siang Boe Tjong Hwe, shang-wu tsung-hui 商務總會.

operating in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Shanghai. The newly established Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade in Peking (Nung-kung-shang pu 農工商部) was prepared to examine the draft regulations of the new Siang Hwee and give them official endorsement. It has been suggested that this fresh interest on Peking's part in the affairs of overseas Chinese merchants reflected the improved socio-political position of the Chinese commercial class during the late Ch'ing period of reform. In any case, the Chinese government did at the time begin to take cognizance of the activities of the Southeast Asian Chinese traders, who were said to enjoy "the Imperial appreciation and sympathy." The promotion of Sino-Indies trade was an announced but unrealistic objective of Siang Hwee. In the first decade of this century, Indies exports to China and Hong Kong equaled only about 6 per cent of total exports. Imports from China coast ports totaled an insignificant 2 per cent. Commercially, Netherlands India faced west rather than north.[78]

To discover the true significance of Siang Hwee, it is necessary to look beyond the economic sphere into the political. Siang Hwee were designed primarily to serve as agencies of the Chinese government. In a sense they functioned as Chinese consulates until normal consular representation was established in 1912. The dynastic official who visited the islands to take the lead in the establishment of Siang Hwee reported to his government that the new associations could effectively function as consulates. Further, this arrangement would make it unnecessary to engage in troublesome diplomatic negotiations with the Dutch. Each Siang Hwee was presented by the Chinese government with an official seal necessary in signing correspondence. The right to communicate directly with the Peking bureaucracy accompanied the

granting of these seals. The officers of the various Siang Hwee held official rank; the president of an important association reportedly was expected to purchase a rank equal to that of a district magistrate in China.[79]

The consular role of Siang Hwee can be seen in a number of their actions. Stranded Chinese workers in at least two instances had their passages back to China paid by Siang Hwee. Crimes against Indies Chinese were at times investigated by Siang Hwee, which then forwarded reports to Peking. Siang Hwee enjoyed considerable prestige due to their position as semiofficial intermediaries with the local Dutch authorities. Even after the opening of the Chinese Consulate General at Batavia, Siang Hwee in other cities continued to carry on consular functions.[80]

When the matter of the citizenship of Chinese in the colony came to be discussed by Netherlands and Chinese authorities, Siang Hwee waged a campaign to have Chinese, both Singkehs and Peranakans, register as subjects of China. Such registration facilities are of course ordinarily provided only by consulates. The Indies Chinese seem to have responded in a negative manner to this opportunity to declare themselves Chinese subjects. Only Siang Hwee Batavia appears to have succeeded in enrolling an appreciable number of names on its register.[81]

When plans to hold elections in China were first formulated, Siang Hwee were given the responsibility for the organization of polling among overseas Chinese in Netherlands India. In 1910 all Siang Hwee were notified by the Chinese minister at the Hague that elections were to be held to select "advisers for the provincial assemblies in Fukien and Kwangtung." The franchise was to be quite narrow; voters were required to be men, Peranakan or Singkeh, 25 years of age who "had

served three years or longer as leaders in education or other fields," had finished high school in China or elsewhere, had passed an imperial literary examination, had held military or civil rank, or who possessed commercial capital of at least 5,000 dollars. Needless to say, the last requirement was the one most easily met by overseas Chinese. In December 1910, under Siang Hwee auspices, enfranchised Chinese in Surabaya participated in primary elections. The Chinese of Batavia and a number of other places for obscure reasons failed to vote. And final elections were never held in the colony under Ch'ing dynasty direction. Many overseas Chinese stated that there was no point in sending elected representatives to a country without a democratic constitution. This lack of confidence in the effectiveness of their own overseas representatives may well have been increased by the fact that the men elected were not obliged to leave the Indies to take their seats in Canton or Foochow.[82] The interests of an overseas constituency were not likely to be served by a representative who, because he remained at home, never made a speech or cast a vote.

Elections after the 1911 Revolution were of more significance to overseas Chinese. In 1912, Siang Hwee were again asked to organize polling, this time to choose certain members of an electoral college to meet in Peking to select the Senate of the new Chinese Republic. Siang Hwee in Batavia, Surabaya, and Semarang each sent a delegate to the electoral college; however, at least in the case of the Semarang delegate, the choice was based on appointment rather than on election. And it appears, in fact, that appointment was the method of selection favored by the Peking authorities.[83]

In February 1913, overseas representatives met in Peking under the auspices of the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Commerce and selected

6 Senators to sit in the upper house of the Republican legislature. Two Indies Chinese were elected along with 2 men from Malaya, 1 from the United States, and 1 of unannounced origin. The 6 overseas Senators were to sit with 10 colleagues from each Chinese province, 27 from Mongolia, 10 from Tibet, 3 from Sinkiang, and 8 selected by the "Central Educational Conference."[84] The representation of overseas Chinese in the Senate was certainly not proportional to population.

This failure of the Chinese government to provide overseas Chinese with their proper share of seats in the first Republican Senate was, because of the political chaos of Yuan Shih-k'ai's presidency, not taken seriously in the Indies. Overseas Chinese apparently soon realized that sending representatives to Peking was an empty privilege. The lack of interest in elections proposed in 1916 reflects that realization.[85]

But, while Siang Hwee's electoral functions were of symbolic rather than practical importance in the effort to tie overseas Chinese to their motherland, other efforts were more successful. Specifically, Siang Hwee were frequently charged with responsibility for raising funds to further various endeavors in China.

> ". . . [To] protect its good name and influence in the motherland, a Siang Hwee must be willing to accept interference from the authorities and organizations [there]. Thus, if compatriots in China need the help of overseas Chinese . . . when there is a great flood . . . or the threat of a severe famine, the compatriots there will make an appeal for help to a Siang Hwee and that association usually feels obliged to do this charitable work."[86]

It must not be concluded from the passage above that Siang Hwee fund raising was always inspired by charity; political motives often caused members to contribute money to be sent to China. Plans to construct a railway in Fukien, at a time when domestic Chinese railroad

construction was considered a means of checking foreign imperialism, led to the reported sale of 10,000 shares of stock by Siang Hwee in Surabaya. In 1909, however, the same organization sought with little success to raise f. 5 million to be used for the purchase of a warship for the Chinese navy. After the establishment of the Chinese Republic the enthusiasm of Siang Hwee in these matters was briefly increased. Subscriptions to a post-Revolution Chinese national loan were rapidly obtained. The Batavia Siang Hwee alone pledged itself to furnish over f. 200,000. In at least one case a local Chinese official sought to get his share of the money so eagerly sent to China in the early Republican period. In November 1912 Hu Han-min, then the governor at Canton, wrote Siang Hwee Batavia asking that a fund be raised to equip an army to march against the Russians, then making incursions in Outer Mongolia. Siang Hwee reacted by observing that it was up to President Yuan Shih-k'ai to organize anything as ambitious as a campaign against the Tsar's army. And by 1912 internal conditions in China had so disillusioned the Indies Chinese that only the Singkeh members of Siang Hwee were said to be willing to send money to the motherland.[87]

Yuan Shih-k'ai's 1916 attempt to ascend the imperial throne brought forth one final Siang Hwee drive in the early Republican period to raise funds for political ends. Under the leadership of the Surabaya body, money was collected to finance opposition to Yuan. Various school associations and other pan-Chinese organizations cooperated with Siang Hwee Surabaya. Even the Chinese consul general at Batavia, in theory a servant of Yuan's government, seems to have supported this movement. To disguise the operation, it was originally announced, for Dutch consumption, that the money was destined for the Chinese Red Cross; this sham was soon abandoned. The rapid collapse of Yuan's

imperial dream was immediately reflected in the halting of this fund-raising effort. It is not known how much, if any, money ever reached the anti-Yuan groups in China. In the fall of 1917, however, it was reported that Indies Chinese had sent a large sum to be used by revolutionaries at Canton.[88]

Siang Hwee associations also were concerned with the most immediate general problem of the Indies Chinese and demonstrated that concern by actively supporting the THHK educational movement. When the first school inspectors arrived, they were given assistance, no doubt including financial aid, by various Siang Hwee. A number of boys sent to Nanking had their travel expenses covered by Siang Hwee associations. Financial aid to THHK schools came to be a regular obligation of Siang Hwee members. In fact, schools often later became "permanent appendages of Chinese business life," many firms regularly entering debits in their books for "contributions to the school."[89]

One of the most important Siang Hwee services was the provision of a meeting place, a club, for members. One can only speculate on the political and social consequences of the informal discussions and exchange of information which took place in the Siang Hwee buildings. In at least the Batavia Siang Hwee, the regulations specified that the association would maintain for its members "an appropriate room to serve as a daily meeting place."[90]

Up to this point, nothing has been said on the membership and formal organization of the Siang Hwee associations. The following chapter deals with the problem of leadership in the overseas Chinese population of Netherlands India and considers Siang Hwee heads in further detail. Before leaving the subject of Siang Hwee, however, some preliminary remarks on these matters ought to be made.

Indications are that, while Peranakans formed a majority in the membership of Siang Hwee, Singkeh elements were the more active members of the associations. It is not surprising that Peranakan members outnumbered Singkehs. The new immigrants often had not yet risen to owning and managing their own businesses, and Siang Hwee membership rolls included the names of "the most solid and outstanding merchants." It is also not unreasonable to assume that, because of the political nature of many Siang Hwee activities, most Peranakan members preferred to stay in the background while their Singkeh colleagues took the lead. It has already been noted that the regulations of the Batavia body insisted that its officers be predominantly of Singkeh origin. In 1912 the Batavia, Surabaya, and Semarang organizations sent only Singkehs to the senatorial electoral college at Peking. This action must in part have been born of the necessity to select overseas delegates who knew the Chinese language.[91]

While Singkeh influence can be seen in such developments as the 1910 effort of the Surabaya association to require that all its correspondence be conducted in Chinese instead of Malay, the most powerful leader of the Siang Hwee movement as a whole was a Peranakan. This was Oei Tiong Ham, Majoor at Semarang and head of Kian Gwan (Chien-yuan kung-szu 建源公司), the largest Chinese trading company in the archipelago. Oei was undoubtedly the richest and most powerful Chinese in the Indies. He once simultaneously entertained the crown princes of Denmark and Greece as his house guests, and reportedly he was in close touch with Japan's Marquis Ito. The prestige and power of Siang Hwee were greatly augmented by the tie with Oei, who made use of his position in Siang Hwee to further the aims of his business. For example, some Siang Hwee members in 1912

attempted to organize a boycott of Japanese goods to protest a Japanese threat to Manchuria. Oei Tiong Ham, whose Kian Gwan traded actively with Japan, opposed the boycott and none was carried out. On the other hand, Siang Hwee at Semarang, Oei's headquarters, had in 1908 been easily able to persuade reluctant sister associations to join a boycott against a Dutch competitor of Kian Gwan. Oei preferred to pull strings from above the stage, though he did arrange to have Kian Gwan officers in power in some local Siang Hwee, including the Batavia organization.[92]

Like the THHK associations, the various Siang Hwee normally functioned with a marked degree of unanimity. The Surabaya body, almost from the beginning, functioned as the publicly recognized leader. Possibly this was in part to compensate for the open leadership of Semarang and Batavia in the educational movement. In 1909 the Surabaya Siang Hwee was elected to head a general association of Siang Hwee, known as Siang Boe Tjong Hwee (Shang-wu tsung-hui 商務總會). The record reveals that most correspondence between China's officialdom and Siang Hwee went through the Surabaya body. But, presumably in an effort to conceal from the suspicious Dutch the extent of cooperation among the various Siang Hwee, the formal unification under Surabaya was allowed to dissolve. In a few years a careful observer of events in the Chinese community could only state that the Siang Hwee associations "seemed to work together closely."[93]

## Soe Po Sia

Of the two types of pan-Chinese associations discussed up to this point, one was primarily concerned with education and the other was most important for its provision of those services usually considered

governmental. A third group of associations, designed to function as a political party, also existed; such associations were ordinarily known as Soe Po Sia (Shu-pao she 書報社). The model for these bodies had, although it may seem odd, been found in the reading room of a Singapore Christian missionary establishment, where lectures were held and where books and periodicals were available to the public.[94] Similar reading rooms or Soe Po Sia began to be opened in the other Chinese population centers of Southeast Asia in the first decade of this century; but, instead of Christian doctrine, revolution was preached.

The first Soe Po Sia in Netherlands India were established in 1909. As with many other matters regarding these associations, the exact date was, presumably because of the somewhat subversive nature of Soe Po Sia, not publicized. Each association was given a charter by Sun Yat-sen, and all functioned as fronts for Sun's revolutionary activities. Within a few years there were 52 Soe Po Sia in the archipelago. All Soe Po Sia were reported to work closely with each other; but, unlike THHK and Siang Hwee, they did not band together in a formal general association. Throughout Southeast Asia, Soe Po Sia looked to the Singapore association as their communications center. They also were able, however, to communicate directly with leaders in China and elsewhere.[95]

Ties of cooperation and communication between Soe Po Sia and other pan-Chinese associations were at times tenuous but never wholly absent. Most THHK teachers were affiliated with Soe Po Sia; and the political associations are said to have contributed to the support of the modern schools. Soe Po Sia frequently instituted adult education programs where instruction in Kuo-yü was offered in the evenings, presumably by THHK personnel. Immediately after the 1911 Revolution

cooperation between THHK and Soe Po Sia became even closer, no doubt because the rather conservative leadership of the educational movement by then recognized the former revolutionaries as legitimate governmental agents.[96]

Links between Siang Hwee and Soe Po Sia are perhaps even easier to trace. Before the Revolution some believed that animosity existed between the two types of associations because Siang Hwee were founded with imperial blessings while Soe Po Sia were dedicated to revolution. It now appears that this evaluation was based primarily on Dutch wishful thinking. The Surabaya Soe Po Sia was established in 1909 by a revolutionary former THHK teacher "and several other party comrades, including officials of . . . Siang Hwee [Surabaya]." The Semarang Soe Po Sia's president was a relative of Majoor Oei Tiong Ham and a high officer of Oei's trading firm, Kian Gwan. It will be remembered that Kian Gwan dominated the Siang Hwee effort. In Batavia, Siang Hwee and Soe Po Sia were joined together through the efforts of Luitenant Khoe A Fan, an officer of both associations and a "firey Republican." Friction and jealousy between Siang Hwee and Soe Po Sia did break out from time to time, as in 1912 when Siang Hwee initially were given sole responsibility for organizing the election of overseas members of the Chinese electoral college and, in the same year, when Soe Po Sia's impetuous elements argued for an anti-Japanese boycott opposed by the Kian Gwan faction in Siang Hwee.[97] But in a broad sense it can be stated that Soe Po Sia and Siang Hwee worked toward the same goals, assisted by their politically less vocal THHK partner.

The educational movement was largely inspired and led by Peranakans; the chambers of commerce were dominated in membership by Peranakans and operated under joint Peranakan-Singkeh leadership.

Soe Po Sia organization and activities were primarily designed to serve Singkehs. Immigrants from China were almost bound to have a more active interest than the Indies-born Chinese in the political future of the homeland. Peranakans also tended, because of their greater investment and their anomalous political position in the Dutch colony, to be the more conservative group in the Chinese community. Therefore Singkehs formed the majority in Soe Po Sia membership. Most of the Singkeh members were Hakkas, a traditionally rebellious Chinese people, who have been described as "lower class" and "coolies." As Singkehs tended to be concentrated in the cities and in the plantation and mining areas, Soe Po Sia establishments were confined for the most part to major urban centers and to regions where imported Chinese coolie labor was extensively used. Over one-fifth of the Soe Po Sia in Netherlands India were in the Deli district of Sumatra, an area of great plantations worked by immigrant labor.[98]

The strong Hakka influence in Soe Po Sia did not mean that other Singkehs were excluded; and some Peranakans also had a voice in the affairs of these bodies. Luitenant Khoe A Fan of the Batavia organization was a Cantonese Singkeh; many other Cantonese were important in sister associations.[99] The Kian Gwan leadership of Siang Hwee who supported Soe Po Sia was Peranakan. Finally a special effort was made to enlist the support of other Peranakan Chinese through the Soe Po Sia press.

Soe Po Sia political activity was primarily oriented toward China and the Chinese Revolution. Before 1911 the major work of Soe Po Sia was the collection of funds to support Sun Yat-sen's numerous revolutionary attempts; money was usually earmarked for use by the Kok Bin Koen (Kuo-min chün 國民軍), or Peoples National Army.

Other efforts were directed at spoiling the enthusiastic welcome shown by Indies Chinese to dynastic official visitors. Soe Po Sia leaders in the last days of the Manchus also conducted "ceremonies honoring the Ming emperors," an action which suggests a relationship between Soe Po Sia groups and the traditionally pro-Ming secret societies.[100] In this regard, it will be remembered that one of Sun Yat-sen's first acts after the Revolution was the performance of a similar ceremony at the Ming tombs near Nanking.

After 1911, Soe Po Sia continued to support Sun Yat-sen, a stand which inevitably created hostility toward Yuan Shih-k'ai. Until Yuan revealed his dictatorial, later imperial, ambitions, under Sun's leadership, Soe Po Sia supported the Peking government. In 1913, Soe Po Sia organizations were represented in the Republican legislature, a Surabaya member being elected to the Senate. Siang Hwee bodies were given the main responsibility for the election of overseas delegates to the Peking electoral college; but Batavia, Semarang, and Surabaya all sent Soe Po Sia officers.[101]

Once open conflict between Yuan and Sun broke out, Soe Po Sia were quick to reaffirm their devotion to revolutionary principles. Money was industriously collected to finance Yuan's overthrow. Beginning in 1914, Soe Po Sia propagandized their members with a view to getting their purses open; and 1915 and 1916 saw a continuation of these efforts.[102] As in the case of the money sent to Sun Yat-sen before 1911, it is not possible to estimate the size of these financial contributions. Revolutionaries seldom publish balance sheets.

Yuan's death made it possible for Soe Po Sia again to plan an open political role in the Chinese government. In 1917, Soe Po Sia representatives were once more in Peking to help organize a new legislature.

As in the 1912-1913 attempt to establish parliamentary government, Siang Hwee took the lead in organizing polling among Indies Chinese while Soe Po Sia supplied most of the candidates.[103]

In addition to their political activity in or directly related to China, Soe Po Sia were involved to some extent in the local struggles of the Indies Chinese. It is difficult to say whether Soe Po Sia interest in the political position of overseas Chinese in the Dutch colony grew out of an opportunistic attempt to win prestige as anti-Dutch spokesmen or out of the fact that revolutionary zeal, once generated, spreads in all directions. In any case, Soe Po Sia soon won a reputation for sharp criticism of the Dutch authorities and of many of their allied Chinese officers.[104] These activities had, no doubt, special appeal for Peranakans, who were likely to be more concerned with the improvement of overseas conditions than with the democratization of China.

One of the chief media employed by Soe Po Sia for the achievement of their objectives was the press. Four major Soe Po Sia newspapers appeared in Netherlands India during these years, one each at Batavia, Semarang, Surabaya, and Medan.

Hoa Tok Po (Hua-to pao 華鐸報) of Batavia was founded in 1909 to serve the interests of the revolutionaries, and it remained faithful to Sun's cause throughout the period studied. This newspaper appeared weekly both in Chinese and, for Peranakan consumption, Malay editions. Its original editor was a Hakka and a director of the Batavia Soe Po Sia.[105]

In Semarang, Djawa Kong Po (Chua-wa kung-pao 爪哇公報) represented Soe Po Sia interests. It was published in Chinese from 1909 until its demise a few years later, when it had lost f. 10,000 because of the local absence of a public literate in its language of

publication. The owner of Djawa Kong Po was a wealthy Peranakan officer of Semarang's Siang Hwee. Once more the close ties between the commercial and the political associations are illustrated.[106]

The Surabaya Soe Po Sia paper was Han Boen Sin Po (Han-wen hsin-pao 漢文新報), also established in 1909 and, like Hoa Tok Po, published both in Chinese and Malay editions. Like the Semarang Soe Po Sia publication, Surabaya's Han Boen Sin Po cooperated closely with the local Siang Hwee. The early editor of this paper was a former THHK teacher who displayed such violent revolutionary ardor that he was ultimately deported by the Netherlands authorities.[107]

It has already been mentioned that the Deli district of Sumatra was a fruitful source of Soe Po Sia support. A newspaper in Medan, the major city of the area, furthered revolutionary efforts. The paper, Sumatra Po or So Mun Tap Lap Po (Su-men-ta-la pao 蘇門達臘報), was established at about the same time as its Java fellows and for the same purpose. It enjoyed wide circulation in the heavily Singkeh region around Medan, and some of its issues reached other parts of the Indies and Malaya. Its first editor, like his Surabaya colleague, was unceremoniously expelled by the Dutch because of his extremism.[108]

## Other Pan-Chinese Associations

In addition to the schools of THHK, the chambers of commerce of Siang Hwee, and the reading rooms and publishing enterprises of Soe Po Sia, there were several other associational efforts initiated during the years of overseas Chinese nationalist mobilization in Netherlands India. None of the other organizations was of importance comparable to that of the three described at some length above; it is, however, of

possible usefulness to mention some of them to indicate the various interests of the people under study.

Two principal types of organizations antedated the nationalist awakening of the Indies Chinese: the secret societies and the burial associations. Brief mention of the former has been made earlier in this volume, pointing out that the role of the secret societies lost its importance as nationalist mobilization went forward. The burial associations continued to operate during the years under investigation but are to be viewed as apolitical bodies. They functioned essentially as insurance groups. Members contributed periodically to a fund from which families could draw funeral expenses at the time of a member's death. Mutual help among members was the sole objective of these bodies. Batavia's THHK provided the facilities of a burial association for its members, an arrangement which no doubt served to attract many supporters. The secret societies, losing their political power to nationalist organizations, are said to have degenerated into burial associations in fact if not in name.[109]

A Chinese effort at labor organization also was made during this period. In 1909 the Chinese Employees Bond was established in Batavia with a membership composed primarily of Peranakan clerks in offices and shops. The Bond maintained a business school, where members could learn new skills, and was designed to insure members against unemployment. The example of the Batavia Bond inspired Chinese white-collar workers in other cities to establish similar associations, many with the same name as that of the Batavia pioneer.[110]

Operating alongside Batavia's Soe Po Sia was an association with similar aims but less notoriety, which called itself Tie Yok Hwee or Hoa Kiauw Tie Yok Hwee. The group was a revolutionary movement

of the Amoy people of Batavia. Soe Po Sia, it will be remembered, was dominated by Hakka and Cantonese elements. The ties between Tie Yok Hwee and the three major Chinese associations of Batavia were represented in the person of Tan Kim Say, a man of Fukienese origin, who in Batavia was simultaneously the manager of Kian Gwan, the vice president of THHK, and the president of both Siang Hwee and Tie Yok Hwee. The relationship between the Kian Gwan firm and Soe Po Sia has already been pointed out. Tan's link to the giant trading empire undoubtedly gave him a close connection with the revolutionary body. Like its sister organization, Soe Po Sia, Tie Yok Hwee was active in making arrangements for the 1912 elections to the Peking electoral college. After a brief period, however, Tie Yok Hwee appears to have ceased its operations. In 1913 it cooperated with Batavia's THHK in raising funds through levies on copra sales, but after that year only one further reference to Tie Yok Hwee appears in the documents.[111]

Although isolated references to at least a dozen more Chinese associations are to be found,[112] it seems that these other bodies were small, local, or of brief existence. The important organizations to consider for the purposes of this study are THHK, Siang Hwee, Soe Po Sia and, to much less a degree, the few just discussed.

## Summary

The history of the Indies Chinese nationalist awakening is largely a matter of the establishment and operation of organizations able to unify the Chinese and express their wishes. A considerable amount of space has been devoted to a description of this organizational effort. It is now necessary to make a preliminary analysis of some of the data.

The models upon which the associations were based were Western, not Chinese; the Confucian revivalists had learned their tactics as Christians; the nationalist schools were patterned after examples coming from Europe via Japan. The chambers of commerce, in their announced role, were copies of Western counterparts; in their less publicized work they served as consulates, an institution wholly alien to traditional China. Even rebellious Soe Po Sia members owed, but never expressed, gratitude to Western missionaries for having set up prototypes of their organizations. Nationalism is usually recognized as a Western contribution to Asia. The operation of these Indies Chinese associations is evidence of the truth of this view.

The pan-Chinese associations owed their success in part to the great financial strength of the people they served. The rapid growth of a private school system demonstrates the economic power of the Chinese; perhaps more important as a cause of the flourishing of the associations was the pressure, political and social, under which the Chinese lived. Dutch policy was a constant reminder to the mass of Chinese that there was no direction in which to turn their energies but inward. Once the Chinese learned through their associations the power of group effort, their support of the associations was maintained with steady enthusiasm. No single association, supreme over all others, was formally constituted. Informally, however, the various groups were so linked together that within a few years the Chinese public was unified.

The interest of the associations in events in China was not constant. While it is reasonably safe to remark that a kind of devotion to democracy permeated most of the Indies Chinese community, the record does not establish that revolution and republicanism were the ideals of all the associations. Clearly the primary concern was the improvement

of the lot of the local Chinese. And it was not always possible to identify the welfare of the overseas people with that of the Chinese state. The result was an emotional attachment rather than a political tie to China. China was an honored symbol, not the master, of the nationalist movement of the overseas Chinese.

The main innovation brought to the Chinese of Netherlands India through their associations was a new pattern of allegiance. Old loyalties to family, clan, ancestral province, and secret societies were to a significant extent replaced by obedience to pan-Chinese associations working for the community as a whole. To borrow terms from sociology, it can be stated that traditional particularism was abandoned for practical universalism—for nationalism. The chief achievement of the associations, then, was the nationalist mobilization of the Indies Chinese.

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# 4

## DEVELOPMENTS IN LEADERSHIP

Every Country hath its Machiavel.

Sir Thomas Browne

### The Collapse of the Officer Institution

Leaders are significant both as the agents for nationalist mobilization and as nationalist symbols. In their pan-Chinese movement the Indies Chinese abandoned the traditional leaders of their communities and followed a new group of men. There is no more graphic demonstration of the speed and thoroughness with which nationalism conquered than that brought out by an account of the total downfall of the old, prenationalist leadership—the Chinese officers.

The Chinese officer system was as old as Dutch rule itself. Jan Pieterzoon Coen, the founder of Batavia, felt it convenient in 1620 to appoint "the current head of the Chinese" to his council. Soon military titles were conferred on such Chinese, presumably to fit them more easily into the European pattern. The institution was codified in successive enactments and became firmly established. The officers came to be expected to maintain peace and order in the Chinese districts; to transmit the orders of the colonial government to the persons concerned; to keep the European administration informed of events in the Chinese quarters; and, finally, to serve as advisers, guarantors, and spokesmen for their compatriots.[1] They were not, then, officials empowered with the right to make administrative decisions. The officers

were entrusted merely with the obligation to function as the communications link between the Dutch and the Chinese. They barely deserve consideration as instruments of indirect rule.

Officers in some cities had further duties, but in general their role was the same throughout the islands. In Batavia and a few other places the officers managed the finances of Chinese cemeteries, temples, and schools. The registration of alien Chinese was another duty of the officers. More in theory than in practice, officers had a juridical function. An officer sat, in the full sense of the word, at trials of Chinese. In some cities Chinese divorce cases were judged by the Chinese Council, headed by an officer; but, for example, the Batavia Council handled only seven such cases in one representative year.[2]

The recruitment of the officers was not based upon a desire to install true representatives of the Chinese community. Wealthy men ordinarily were selected because they appeared to command the respect of their compatriots and because they were thought likely, having a personal stake in the colony, to be loyal to the Dutch. The Netherlands authorities believed, with justification in the prenationalist era, that the richest Chinese of a city was likely to be the most highly respected man in his community. He was certain to be a staunch advocate of law and order. As observed earlier, the rich were ordinarily Peranakans; accordingly few Singkeh officers were appointed. And, ". . . in some cities, for example in Surabaya, the officership [had] been made hereditary or at least [had] come to be considered the prerogative of certain families."[3] This latter, almost feudal, arrangement must have enabled the authorities to trust with even greater confidence in the loyalty of the Chinese servants of the regime.

Wealthy and conservative though the officers were, the other qualifications of those dignitaries were generally not of the highest sort. The Dutch thought of the officers as experts on Chinese institutions. The truth was that the typical Majoor, Kapitein, or Luitenant knew little of the culture of his ancestral home; current commodity prices and interest rates, not the Chinese classics, were his concerns. Literacy in the Chinese language was almost unknown among the officers.[4]

For nearly three centuries the officer institution was all but unchallenged. It made no real difference that the Chinese community was led by men who, for reasons of self-interest, identified themselves with the European rulers rather than with their own people. The Chinese populations of those centuries were not organized for the determination and expression of their group will. Nationalist mobilization was yet to come. When the national consciousness of the Chinese was stirred, the officer system was soon seen to be anachronistic and an obstacle to the realization of popular aspirations. Individual officers of unusual perception were able to move with the nationalist tide. The officer institution as a whole was submerged and destroyed.

The Dutch, no doubt unwittingly, began the destruction of the officer system when the measures to end Chinese revenue farming were promulgated at the turn of the century. In the days of revenue farming most officers had held government licenses as opium farmers. The establishment of the official opium monopoly deprived the officers of that source of income and power.[5] No longer economically closely allied to the regime, many officers must have grown slack in the performance of their official duties. More important, their prestige in the eyes of their countrymen was diminished when they were seen to be not partners but mere lackeys of the Dutch.

To check the decline of the officer institution, the Dutch tried a number of measures, some laughable and all, it appears, injudicious. During their centuries of ascendancy the officers had received no salaries; the accessory rewards of the office made direct remuneration unnecessary. As it grew difficult to recruit men to serve as officers, the government considered paying its Chinese servants. Opponents of this plan pointed out that, while salaries would attract men, the right men were not certain to respond. To make holding rank more attractive, the authorities were obliged to exempt officers from the provisions of the hated pass and zoning systems. After prolonged discussion of this step, the government in 1908 announced its decision to grant special rights of travel and residence to Chinese officers. The colonial government, again motivated by the desire to enhance the desirability of these posts, granted the officers immunity to trial by the courts for natives. The government proclaimed in 1908 that its Chinese agents were to be tried "by the courts and judges for Europeans and those assimilated to them." And it will be recalled that, almost unique among the Chinese, the children of officers were normally permitted to attend the European primary schools.[6]

The Dutch had, in short, extended to the officers those privileges demanded by the entire Chinese community. It was as if the regime had taken the list of the major grievances of the Chinese, the disabilities of the pass and zoning systems, the discriminatory administration of justice, and the virtual barring of Chinese from government schools, and employed it as a guide for the extension of special rights to the officers. A more indiscreet plan is difficult to imagine. At a time when efforts ought to have been made to demonstrate to the Chinese that the officers could serve as the spokesmen of their people,

the Dutch authorities took steps further divorcing the officers from the general Chinese population.

As part of the incredibly misguided campaign to raise the prestige of the officers, the Dutch hit upon another rather foolish scheme. An official uniform was authorized for the officers. Many officers had taken to wearing their own versions of the robes of the officialdom of China. This habit naturally caused the Dutch to fear that the position of the officers as servants of the colonial regime might be obscured. Under the new system, the uniform of a Majoor consisted of "a black jacket with a high collar, to be worn with white linen collar and cuffs, adorned with embroidery of orange oak leaves, and with six large gold buttons with crowned W's; black linen trousers with gold piping; and a cap of black linen also with a gold piping." The cap sometimes bore an emblem made up of another crowned W, the letter standing of course for Wilhelmina. The color orange is that of the Netherlands royal House of Orange. Although these splendid outfits were modeled after the uniforms of the European rulers, there is no evidence that the Chinese were much impressed by their officers' new radiance.[7]

The Dutch efforts to save the officer institution were futile. Attacks from the Chinese community continued to grow in volume. As early as 1904 a protest had been raised by the Chinese against the appointment of a Kapitein at Buitenzorg who was said to be "uncultivated." A short time earlier it had been the custom of the Chinese of Buitenzorg to remove their hats as a sign of respect when they walked past the house of their Kapitein. In 1905 Buitenzorg was the scene of the boycott of a Luitenant mentioned earlier. The next year saw officers collectively branded "absurd" by Dr. Lim Boen Keng, the Singapore patron of Indies Chinese nationalism. Lim especially condemned the officers' ignorance

of the Chinese language. The lack of literacy in Chinese was to become the focus of the attacks against the officers.[8]

The 1911 Revolution in China caused the Indies Chinese to attack their officers with growing determination. In early March 1912 a poster appeared on a number of walls in Batavia's Chinese quarter to ask:

> . . . of what nationality is the Majoor? Answer: Chinese and still not Chinese; native and still not native; in reality [he is] of mixed race! This bastard cannot return to China and cannot be named a European. He has no land to turn to—only the Land of the Hereafter.[9]

A few days after the Majoor's antecedents had been publicly maligned, that officer was denied a part in the planning of festivities to celebrate the establishment of the Chinese Republic. He was considered too close to the colonial regime to be an acceptable participant in a nationalist activity. Some persons were reportedly opposed to him as a Peranakan.[10] One suspects, however, that the Majoor's ancestry had less to do with his rejection than did his inability to fill a nationalist role. In the eyes of some Singkehs, of course, the two handicaps could have been closely related, even causally.

Violence against the officers and their property, absent in Batavia, occurred in other places. In June 1912 a group of "Cantonese" tore the Dutch flag from the house of a Luitenant in Semarang and trampled on it.[11] This act presumably illustrates the fact that officers had come to be considered puppets of the Europeans. In Surabaya the greatest outbreak against the officers took place during a wildly confused week when the celebrations accompanying the Chinese New Year and the downfall of the Manchus coincided. An official report on that hectic time re-creates the tension and lawlessness:

> . . . in front of the [Soe Po Sia] building a proclamation was posted in which men were advised to go to the Majoor to compel him to hoist the Republican flag and cut off his queue. A Chinese zone chief with a queue who passed by and sought to read the proclamation was mistreated by a mob and forced to let his queue be cut off; he was freed by several members of Soe Po Sia and protected in a room of the building of that association. . . . [In the afternoon of February 19, 1912] a band estimated at 200 or 300 Cantonese stormed the house of the Kapitein and broke everything in it. . . . Nothing was stolen . . . and the drama was played out in ten minutes.[12]

The attack on the Kapitein's house can no doubt be explained in part by the fact that when the "200 or 300 Cantonese" arrived at his address they were greeted by that officer, who made the grave mistake of calling them "stinking immigrants." The house of the Majoor was spared a similar fate only when the police fired at the crowd, killing one and wounding several. It is perhaps noteworthy that all Surabaya officers were Peranakans at the time.[13]

The campaign against the officers continued in subsequent years; however, the uproar of 1912 was replaced by verbal and written denunciations. The appointment in 1914 of a new Majoor at Surabaya brought forth criticism from that city's Soe Po Sia. At about the same time a Malay-language newspaper in Semarang berated a Luitenant; in Sumatra a nationalist daily ran a series of articles censuring all the officers of the Deli district, a region rich both in Soe Po Sia establishments and in nationalist enthusiasm. Finally, it should be noted, the hostility of the Chinese community to the officer institution caused the Majoor and the other officers at Batavia to submit their resignations in a body.[14]

During these years the officers had two courses of action open to them: they could serve the Netherlands authorities, or they could

act in accordance with the wishes of the majority of their countrymen. The choice lay between the traditional and the nationalist paths.

Those who were unable to accept nationalism merit attention, not because they weathered the storm but because their activities reveal some of the less publicized duties of the officers and because it is probably useful to point out that the course of nationalism was not unopposed in the Chinese community. The chief weapon of the anti-nationalist officer was the confidential report to the Dutch. Such reports were apparently thought by their authors to offer double benefits: the disclosure to the regime of the nationalists' operations might bring action against those opposed to the officer institution; and officers believed that their loyalty to the Dutch could be reaffirmed through their service as informers.

When dynastic officials began traveling to Netherlands India on various missions, a number of officers felt obliged to warn the authorities that the representatives of China did not always limit their work to the comparatively innocent inspection of schools. It was frequently reported by the officers that the dignitaries from China were primarily motivated by the lure of overseas Chinese wealth and used their official missions to stimulate the flow of money into imperial or personal coffers.[15] But, while some officers were hostile, not always unjustifiably, to the dynastic officials, the growth of republicanism brought forth their most energetic efforts to expose to the Dutch the work of their enemies.

In 1910 the Batavia Soe Po Sia sought to identify itself more closely with the Chinese community as a whole by sponsoring a petition against the pass system and other grievances. The Majoor reacted obediently and supplied his Dutch superiors with certain secret Soe Po Sia

documents and the names of the instigators of the movement. The following year, at the time of the final military campaign in China against the Manchus, the Majoor at Batavia was asked in a telegram from the revolutionary governor of Fukien province to solicit the assistance of the leaders of Batavia's THHK, Siang Hwee, and Soe Po Sia in efforts to raise funds for the support of the Fukien army. The Majoor, remembering his allegiance to the Dutch, immediately sent the telegram to the assistant resident, stating: "I respectfully request you, Honored Sir, to inform me whether the contents of this telegram may be reported to the persons named." Even after the Ch'ing dynasty had been completely overthrown, the Majoor at Batavia was suspicious of the Republicans; he denied a request for authorization to fly the new Chinese flag, ordering his "officers and zone chiefs to advise the people that they might not display the Republican flag until the Republic was recognized by the honorable Dutch government." The Batavia Majoor obviously did not march with the times, and his colleague at Surabaya seems to have been of the same ilk.[16]

Those officers who had tended to support the Dutch over the Chinese imperial government and, subsequently, the dynasty over the revolutionaries came naturally to a later position backing Yuan Shih-k'ai in opposition to Sun Yat-sen. It appears, in fact, that the counter-revolutionary sentiment of the officers was crystallized by the prospect of ceaseless plotting against the head of the then recognized government of China. Yuan Shih-k'ai was seemingly a man, like the officers themselves, devoted to the preservation of law and order. From 1914 until Yuan's death two years later, many Chinese officers vigorously sought to expose the work of the followers of Sun Yat-sen. The Majoor at Medan is credited with preventing any open display of anti-Yuan

feelings in his district. In Jogjakarta the Kapitein and the Luitenant furnished the resident with the names of local Chinese who contributed to the support of Sun Yat-sen's endeavors. In Semarang, at the same time, the Majoor and the Kapitein were equally eager to inform the Dutch of the activities of certain Kok Bin Tong or Kuomintang representatives. The Semarang Majoor continued these efforts the following year, as did his colleague, the Luitenant in Temanggung. The Batavia Majoor carried on similar operations, employing "spies" and "searching houses" where revolutionary activity was suspected.[17]

While some officers sought to obstruct the nationalist movement, others furthered it. A few delicately balanced officers attempted to appear to do both. At the time of the founding of Batavia's THHK, the Majoor, not the officer just discussed, was made a patron of the organization but never seems to have been active in its affairs. His successor as Majoor and as a THHK patron was not only inactive but tended, as already noted, to be hostile to the association. In Surakarta the local Majoor, at least in 1905, participated in THHK activities there by helping to organize festivities on the occasion of the Chinese emperor's birthday.[18]

Other officers were more closely identified with THHK work. Two men, each holding the rank of Luitenant, served in two successive years as vice presidents in the Batavia association. One unavoidably jumps to a conclusion of sorts when finding a subsequent official Dutch reference to the second Luitenant-vice president in which he is called a "former Luitenant." Unfortunately it has not been ascertained that the man's official rank was jeopardized by his holding office in THHK; there is only room for speculation on the matter. In 1913 a third Luitenant was serving as a vice president of THHK Batavia.[19] His later

fate is unknown, but by that time the school association was growing respectable in Dutch eyes. Soe Po Sia and other revolutionary groups had by then come to bear the brunt of official hostility.

The Siang Hwee effort, as observed earlier, profited enormously from the support of the Majoor at Semarang, and other officers also had parts in the work of Siang Hwee associations. The Semarang group in 1912 was headed by a Kapitein, an associate in both his official and business careers of the noteworthy Majoor. Siang Hwee Batavia put forward the name of a Luitenant as a candidate in the 1912 elections to the electoral college at Peking, a sure indication of a close relationship between the association and the officer.[20]

There is only one reference in the records to an officer taking a leading role in a Soe Po Sia association. The Luitenant of a small Sumatra community served as a director of the local Soe Po Sia and took part in the elections to the Peking electoral college following the death of Yuan Shih-k'ai. As a consequence, "the Governor General felt it necessary to take the question of his punishment into consideration."[21] While there may well have been more officers connected with Soe Po Sia, they kept this side of their lives to themselves for easily understood reasons.

A number of officers fostered nationalism in ways other than through direct and open participation in the pan-Chinese associations. In 1904 the unconventional Semarang Majoor took the then shocking and highly symbolic step of cutting off his queue and dressing in Western clothes. His subordinates soon followed suit. "From that time the movement against queues gradually spread among younger groups. . . ." A few years later the Luitenant at Jogjakarta privately gave a visiting Dutch jurist, a man of high rank and known liberal views, a lengthy statement

protesting against the legal disabilities under which the Chinese then lived.[22] That officer was one of the few of his group who seems to have felt a genuine obligation to serve as the spokesman for his community.

Perhaps the officers rendered aid to the nationalist movement to a much greater degree than is revealed in the documents. It is impossible to know how many officers protected their nationalist compatriots by failing to report fully to the Dutch on events in their districts. At least in Padang the Chinese officers rebelled effectively against their intelligence role. The Kapitein and the Luitenant of that Sumatra city in 1909 simply ceased enlightening the Dutch officials on nationalist efforts. When the latter officer was finally forced to submit a report, he was "so frightened" that he sent it in "typed and unsigned." And the Kapitein had to be replaced after having "failed repeatedly to report." For Netherlands India as a whole, "officers gradually came to be put by the [pan-Chinese] associations in a very difficult position. On the one side, it was their duty to inform the heads of the district and local administrations of the operations of these associations; and on the other side, they feared the vengeance of those associations and were indeed secretly in sympathy with them."[23]

The response of the officers to the efforts of mainland Chinese individuals and organizations to establish ties with the Indies is another indication of their reaction to the nationalist awakening. Their attitudes toward the dynasty are of particular interest. The officers seem to have tended to think of themselves as overseas carriers of China's bureaucratic tradition. It was, therefore, difficult for them to decide whether to greet visiting Chinese dignitaries in the respectful manner expected of lower officials dealing with superiors or in the overtly suspicious and antagonistic way that was likely to be born of their

resentment of uninvited outside interference. The problem was never fully resolved for all officers.

In 1907 a group of Chinese dynastic officials were the guests of the Luitenant at Buitenzorg, the Kapitein at Pekalongan, and the Kapitein at Cheribon. But another distinguished visitor from China was extended a more mixed welcome the following year. In Surakarta he was entertained by the Majoor, and at Padang he was made welcome by the Chinese officers of that city, all of whom were reported to be inclined to nationalism. In Batavia, on the other hand, this official "sought no contact with the various Chinese officers; the acting Majoor did not even meet him." The Majoor at Surabaya was apparently considered untrustworthy by this visitor, who reportedly spoke to that officer with marked caution. A final important representative of the dynasty was in the colony in 1909 and enjoyed polite treatment by the Kapitein at Batavia, the Majoor at Surakarta, and the Majoor in Medan. The last-named officer even went to the extent of performing a kowtow to honor the guest from China.[24] The officers as a group were obviously more than a little puzzled over the problem presented by the appearance of missions from China. The growth of republican sentiment among the Chinese further confused the issue. The visitors from abroad represented one more challenge to the authority and security of the Chinese officers and may indeed have hastened their collective political demise.

## Local Leaders

By this point it is doubtless obvious that the leadership of the Chinese, after the officer institution had been subjected to incessant and eventually successful attacks, was assumed by men not discredited as

instruments of Netherlands rule. The new leaders were drawn from two sources: from those members of the Chinese population who formed, largely because of their acquisition of a number of techniques and skills usually considered Western, a new elite capable of inspiring and guiding a nationalist movement; and from those mainland Chinese who came to be involved in the affairs of Indies Chinese.

In the preceding chapter some consideration has been given to the leaders of the pan-Chinese associations; some fairly extended supplementary remarks are required here. The most convenient and perhaps the most satisfactory method for presenting these men is to record some biographical facts concerning them. The men to be discussed seem appropriately representative of their group. Because of the limits imposed by the available research sources, however, only upper-echelon leaders can be investigated in any meaningful detail.

> It was fortunate that in the leadership of the [Batavia THHK] association there were a number of men who, although their learning was not as great as that of present day Chinese intellectuals, possessed the skills and ambition needed to enable them to carry out difficult duties successfully. Among these men must be mentioned: Phoa Keng Hek, who because of extensive contact with Europeans was easily able to obtain the knowledge necessary to a modern movement; Lie Hin Liam, who was considered liberal and known as industrious [and] was counted on to expend his energy and also his money; Lie Kim Hok, a learned man who drafted and clarified all [the association's] regulations, pamphlets, circulars and public announcements in the Malay language in a beautiful and concise style so that everybody who read them was made interested; Khoe Siauw Eng, who, knowing Chinese characters, was versed in the classics and translated them into Malay [and] in his capacity as adviser assumed responsibility for answering all sorts of questions and furnishing information on matters related to Confucianism and Chinese cultural institutions; Khoe A Fan, a Hakka Singkeh, who was widely known in the modern movement; Tan Kim San, who

> for those times was highly educated in English and Chinese and held a strong ambition to improve the position of his people; Tan Tjong Long, who, like Mr. Tan Kim San, was trained in English and Chinese and who also was able to express himself well in Malay; Tan Kim Bo, who in his position as First Secretary bore an extremely heavy work load but handled all the correspondence, minutes, archives, and the like with such speed and neatness that people were amazed, especially when it was remembered that the gentleman's regular work at K.P.M. [Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij, the Dutch steamship company serving the archipelago] was very taxing. Mr. Tan Kim Bo had mastered Dutch and could write correctly in Malay. . . .[25]

The statement above, though tiresomely verbose, demonstrates effectively that the leaders of the Batavia THHK were to a great extent men who had been brought to nationalism by a type of experience new to many of their countrymen. All had undergone considerable exposure to Westerners and their values. As it is likely that expansion on parts of the paragraph quoted will be of some value, brief biographies of a number of the leaders mentioned and of certain of their colleagues in nationalism follow.

Phoa Keng Hek, for nearly forty years the president of Batavia's THHK, was among the most influential and best documented leaders of the nationalist movement. He was a Peranakan, born about 1857, who made his fortune from extensive real estate holdings in the Batavia area. Phoa's education was completed not in the traditional Chinese schools of his childhood but under Christian missionary teachers, who equipped him with a mastery of the Dutch language and a knowledge of Western institutions. His social position in the Chinese community is indicated by the fact that he was the father-in-law of a Batavia Majoor, an officer who incidentally did not share Phoa's nationalist enthusiasm.[26]

Phoa Keng Hek's great contribution to the nationalist movement came from his talent for organization and from his ability to operate effectively in dealings both with the Dutch and with fellow Chinese. The inspiration for the Confucianist revival first came to men other than Phoa; his task lay in making Confucianism meet the needs of his people. In 1900 Phoa was one of the founders of THHK Batavia and became its first president. He is credited with having originated the idea of employing Kuo-yü as the language of instruction in the THHK school. It ought to be noted, however, that the use of the national language of China in education had come to enjoy increasing favor in many schools in the Chinese world. There is evidence that Phoa became interested in the establishment of a modernized Chinese school system largely because he hoped that the Dutch authorities, fearing the power of private schools independent of government supervision, would be forced to open government schools to Chinese children.[27] If this was the case, Phoa originally sought to elevate his people to the level of the Europeans, not to isolate them through nationalism.

It has already been observed that the Batavia THHK was on some matters, especially gambling, rather puritanical. This hostility to games of chance may in large part have been the result of Phoa's influence. In 1904, for example, he proposed that the licenses of the gambling houses in the part of Batavia where he held most of his property be canceled in order that public order might be restored.[28]

As president of Batavia's THHK, Phoa was widely known by the Chinese of Netherlands India and became involved in most of the nationalist activities of his time. He was host to the leader of an imperial mission in 1907; he communicated directly with the Chinese minister at the Hague; and he was in touch with the revolutionaries

in 1911. He was elected the first president of Djawa Hak Boe Tjong Hwee in 1907 but held that post only briefly. Phoa supported the new Chinese Republic of 1912, sending a telegram to the Dutch governor general to request permission for the display of the Republican flag. Possibly because of his being a Peranakan and related by marriage to the Majoor, Phoa was rejected as a candidate for the chairmanship of a Batavia committee established in early 1912 to organize the celebration of the overthrow of the Manchus. The culmination of Phoa's career came in 1937, when, on his eightieth birthday, he was knighted by the Netherlands crown.[29] He lived in two worlds till the end.

Tan Kim San was another of the founders of the Batavia THHK and was active in the organization throughout the period under study. In 1905 Tan was the master of ceremonies of the association, an important office on ritual occasions. His concern for ceremonials seems to have kept him loyal to the idea of a Confucianist revival. In 1914 he characteristically proposed that THHK request the Chinese Council of Batavia to ban marriage celebrations on the anniversary of Confucius' death. Tan was, at least on one occasion, in close contact with the Christian missionaries. In 1911 he was sent by THHK to a conference of the Malaysia Mission of the Methodist Episcopal Church at Singapore. He was ordered to "ask for help in finding a teacher from America for the high school THHK planned to build and to invite Bishop Oldham of the Malaysia Mission to come to Java to participate in the organization of the high school." The journey to Singapore proved fruitless according to the record. In 1915 Tan was made director of the schools operated by the Batavia association.[30]

A third founder was Lie Kim Hok, a Peranakan, who, like Phoa Keng Hek, had been educated by missionaries. He was one of the

first Indies Chinese journalists and in 1897 published a biography of Confucius. His interest in Confucianism, almost certainly born of his experience with Christianity, prompted Lie to help establish and for many years participate in the Batavia association.[31]

The fourth Batavia THHK pioneer to be considered is Lie Hin Liam, the only Singkeh in the founding group. Lie had originally come from Fukien province but appears to have been financially much more successful than most immigrants. He was an important officer in THHK for many years. One of his most appreciated qualities in the association must have been his willingness to loan money; there is one record of his advancing THHK well over a thousand guilders in its early years. Lie Hin Liam was not educated in mission schools but was familiar with the work of the missionaries. He was the originator in 1910 of the plan to enlist the cooperation of American Methodist Episcopal missionaries in the establishment of a Chinese high school at Batavia. Of all the founders of THHK Batavia, Lie Hin Liam led the most active public career. In 1904 he was K'ang Yu-wei's host on the occasion of the fugitive reformer's visit to Batavia. For a brief two-year period he was a Luitenant in Batavia. His rather speedy falling out of Dutch favor may have been the result of his prominence in nationalist circles. In 1908 he was one of the leaders in the establishment of the Batavia Siang Hwee and served briefly as president of that organization. And by 1911 Lie Hin Liam was in communication with Chinese revolutionary forces.[32]

Another Singkeh in the early leadership, but not in the founding group, was Khoe A Fan, a Hakka. Like his colleague, Lie Hin Liam, Khoe served in Batavia as a Luitenant, holding that rank for at least twelve years. His period of activity in THHK affairs seems to have

lasted only for the relatively short period up to 1908, although he was vice president of the association for much of that time. Perhaps his disappearance, at least officially, from the leadership of the Batavia association is to be attributed to the fact that Khoe swung evermore sharply toward the revolutionary end of the Chinese political spectrum. The school association tended to grow more conservative as it prospered and could hardly afford to risk unnecessary official hostility. By 1912 Khoe A Fan was cooperating with Batavia's Soe Po Sia and was the only officer to participate in the organization of festivities accompanying the establishment of the Chinese Republic. He came to be known as a "fiery Republican" and was accused of stirring up disorder by selling Chinese Republican flags at his Batavia shop, where the first of those banners to be seen in the city was flown.[33]

The final early leader of the Batavia THHK to be discussed here is Khoe Siauw Eng, a Fukienese Peranakan, long significant in the association. Literate in Chinese, he was called upon to compile accounts of the practices observed at Chinese weddings and funerals. There is no indication that Khoe Siauw Eng became involved in the revolutionary movement. In 1909 he was one of the organizers of Tiong Hoa Keng Kie Hwee, or the Chinese Employees Bond of Batavia, and from 1915 to 1921 he was its chairman. He also served for several years as a secretary of the Majoor's Chinese Council in Batavia.[34]

The last Batavia Chinese for consideration here is Tan Kim Say, probably a Peranakan and known to be of Fukienese descent. In 1908 Tan was made one of the commissioners of the newly established Siang Hwee of Batavia; two years later he was president of the organization. In 1910 and 1911 Tan Kim Say participated in the work of the Batavia THHK. During the period of excitement following the Chinese

Revolution he was in communication with the Republicans and received from them a request for financial support. As the Batavia manager of Kian Gwan, the giant trading firm with a considerable voice in the affairs of the Siang Hwee and Soe Po Sia associations, Tan must have been an influential force in the nationalist movement of the colonial capital. He was president of Tie Yok Hwee, the sister revolutionary association of Soe Po Sia in Batavia, and in 1912 was elected chairman of a committee set up to organize the celebration of the establishment of the Chinese Republic.[35]

Next to the powerful but ordinarily backstage Majoor Oei Tiong Ham of Semarang, the outstanding nationalist leader in that city was probably Be Kwat Ioe. This man's nationalist career began in 1903, when he was the Semarang host of K'ang Yu-wei and one of the original commissioners of the local THHK. His interest in education led him in 1909 to employ the facilities of his firm to print textbooks for THHK use. The following year he was elected vice chairman of Djawa Hak Boe Tjong Hwee. He also took an active interest in the problem of China's economic development. His Semarang firm was "established primarily for the purpose of distributing Chinese [export] goods." In 1906 and 1907 Be Kwat Ioe energetically promoted the sale in Semarang of shares in a Chinese corporation established to build a railway in Fukien. He was a leading member of the Semarang Siang Hwee. His association with the Soe Po Sia effort is revealed by the fact that he was the owner and publisher of Djawa Kong Po, the revolutionary newspaper of Central Java. This provokes thought when it is contrasted with the display of loyalty to the dynasty made by Be Kwat Ioe as late as 1909, when he was a gracious host to the leader and members of an imperial Chinese mission.[36]

The last in this series of biographies of Indies Chinese nationalist leaders is that of Lie Siong Hwie, a Peranakan, who was the president of Siang Hwee at Surabaya from the time of its establishment. In his presidency of the Surabaya association Lie was considered by the Chinese imperial government to have a rank corresponding to that of a district magistrate. He served the dynasty in 1909 by proposing to lead a campaign "to collect funds for the purchase of a warship to be sent as a gift to the Chinese government." The next year he was active in organizing elections for the provincial assemblies to be convened as the dynasty's desperate concession to democracy. Despite his connection with the imperial regime, Lie also worked for revolution in China. While president of Siang Hwee and thus a mandarin, he was vice president of the Soe Po Sia of Surabaya and thereby a revolutionary. By 1916 Lie Siong Hwie was a vigorous opponent of Yuan Shih-k'ai and strove to raise money to back the revolutionaries of South China.[37]

On the basis of the data contained in these short biographies of admittedly selected but reasonably typical nationalists, it is possible to construct a composite picture of a representative overseas Chinese leader of the movement under investigation.

The man probably was engaged in commerce and had attained a considerable measure of financial success. Nationalism may have been his tired businessman's hobby; in any case leadership demanded time and financial resources. The leader was likely to be of Peranakan origin but could be a Singkeh. He was certain to be a man well and long established in Southeast Asia. It can be noted here that of 128 Indies Chinese decorated by the imperial government in 1908 for their services "in education and public worship," in other words in the laying of a foundation for nationalism, 104 were Peranakans.[38]

Holding rank as a Chinese officer in the colonial bureaucratic structure did not prevent a man from working in the movement. But it ought to be pointed out that, with the notable exception of the Semarang Majoor, none of the higher ranking officers was a nationalist leader. This is easily understood when it is remembered that the junior officers were likely to be younger and more daring than their conservative superiors.

The typical nationalist leader was not a learned man in the classical Chinese tradition, but he saw the value of education. He had been stimulated to nationalism by his knowledge of the West. He had come to think in terms of nations and of the position of his own people in a world structured on a nationalistic pattern. His awareness of developments in the West came either from study under missionary teachers or from his association with European businessmen.

The most remarkable talent of this composite man was his ability to cooperate, at least on the surface, with men of all political shades. He could simultaneously pay homage to the Chinese emperor, be respectful toward the Dutch, and work for revolution. The most significant point brought out by a study of these leaders is that the nationalist movement was controlled by an interlocking directorate. It was rare for a man to be active in only one pan-Chinese association. Ordinarily a leadership role in two or more organizations was possible for these men, regardless of the divergence of the announced aims of the associations concerned.

The outstanding and only essential qualification of the typical leader was acceptance by significant elements in the various Chinese communities as a spokesman and leader in a movement promising social and political progress through minority nationalism.

## Dynastic Officials

Aiding, abetting, and, on occasion, exploiting the nationalist leadership in Netherlands India were various emissaries from China. Although these men went to Southeast Asia for a multiplicity of purposes, all shared one central common goal—they sought to arouse the interest of overseas Chinese in the welfare of the ancestral homeland. The work of Chinese revolutionaries in expatriate Chinese communities is widely known; less often remembered is the fact that the imperial government made similar efforts to win the support of overseas Chinese.

The attitude of successive Chinese dynasties toward emigration had, until the second half of the nineteenth century, been characterized either by a lack of interest or by frank hostility. To the majority of the traditional Chinese it was inconceivable that any but the unfilial and treacherous could abandon their ancestral homes. The criminal code of the Manchu period contained a stern warning against seeking fortunes overseas:

> . . . All officers of government, soldiers, and private citizens, who clandestinely proceed to sea to trade, or who remove to foreign islands for the purpose of inhabiting and cultivating same, shall be punished according to the law against communicating with rebels and enemies, and consequently suffer death by being beheaded.[39]

The great numbers of Chinese established in Southeast Asia during the long period when this ominous clause was on the statute books were evidence that the ban on emigration deterred only the fainthearted from migration southward. The law was, nevertheless, injurious to overseas Chinese interests. It made possible the extortion by local officials of the wealth of returning emigrants. It was also a declaration

of government policy which made abundantly clear the fact that the extension of official Chinese protection to emigrant communities was not to be expected.

The swing away from this official ban was, as were so many of the innovations of the late Ch'ing period, born of Western pressure on the dynasty. Article V of the 1860 Anglo-Chinese treaty stated:

> As soon as the ratifications of the Treaty of 1858 shall have been exchanged, His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of China will, by Decree, command the high authorities of every province to proclaim throughout their jurisdictions, that Chinese choosing to take service in British Colonies or other parts beyond the sea, are at perfect liberty to enter into engagements with British subjects for that purpose, and to ship themselves and their families on board any British vessel at any of the open ports of China. . . .[40]

Article IX of the treaty France forced upon China at the same time provided for even greater freedom in the matter of emigration:

> It is agreed between the high contracting parties that, when the ratifications of the Treaty of Tientsin have been exchanged, an imperial edict will command that the high officials of all the provinces of the Empire permit each Chinese, who wishes to go to countries beyond the seas to establish himself or to seek his fortune, to embark together with his family. . . .[41]

Eight years later China and the United States made a treaty guaranteeing, in phrases somewhat reminiscent of our Declaration of Independence, individual freedom of choice in the matter of emigration:

> The United States of America and the Emperor of China cordially recognize the inherent and inalienable right of man to change his home and allegiance, and also the mutual advantage of the free migration and emigration of their citizens and subjects respectively from the one country to the other for purposes of curiosity, of trade, or as permanent residents.[42]

The Western powers had compelled China to grant concessions to emigrants so that the coolie trade could operate unimpeded. The sources of labor for the railroads and mines of America's West, as well as for the enterprises of Southeast Asia, were not to be allowed to dry up. It was only some years later, however, that the Manchu government began to take an active interest in its overseas subjects.

So far as the Chinese of Netherlands India are concerned, their first direct contact with the officialdom of China appears to have come in 1887, when the governor general at Canton assigned an official to Southeast Asia to investigate the problem of coolie emigration. It is perhaps significant that this representative was sent out under provincial rather than imperial auspices. The concern within the Chinese government for the overseas people very probably filtered north from the South China home districts of the emigrants. A Netherlands diplomatic dispatch supports this view:

> There is at present in the Chinese official world a dominant current of opinion for linking the remote parts of the empire closer to the motherland and at the same time strengthening the emotional ties with the Chinese communities abroad. . . . So far as I can determine the notion of binding the Chinese of N.I. closer to China has until now come principally from the South China authorities. . . .[43]

The 1887 mission appears to have created little stir either in Chinese bureaucratic circles or in the Chinese communities of the Indies. It can be observed in passing, however, that this imperial delegation was received by the Dutch with considerably more graciousness than was to be extended to subsequent visiting mandarins. In fact, this first group was invited to Sumatra by the tobacco planters' association of the island, a body of Dutch entrepreneurs who later became notoriously

inhospitable toward distinguished guests from China. But in 1887 the planters were not certain that their supply of coolie labor was secure, nor had China undergone the crushing humiliations of the next decade and a half.[44]

Li Hung-chang seems to have been the first official close to the Manchu imperial court to become permanently interested in the emigrants. This is not surprising when it is considered that Li had for many years dealt with foreigners and was thus more aware than most of his colleagues of events and circumstances outside his own country. In 1891 Li, in conversations with the Netherlands minister at Peking on the subject of coolie emigration, expressed the view that he would "be pleased to see as much money as possible brought into China by the emigrants." The interest of the elderly Chinese statesman in the overseas Chinese and, presumably, in their remittances continued for the rest of Li Hung-chang's life. In 1896 he questioned the Dutch consul general at Hong Kong about the alleged mistreatment of Chinese laborers in Sumatra. Later the same year, in a formal speech to the queen of the Netherlands during his famous trip to the West, Li made a pointed reference to the "protection" afforded by the Dutch to the Chinese in the Indies. In 1900 Li again discussed with the Dutch consul general at Hong Kong the treatment of Chinese coolies on Sumatran plantations, indicating that he planned to send out an investigating commission to study the situation. And shortly before that conversation, Chinese diplomatic and consular personnel had been ordered to extend "as much help and support as possible" to overseas Chinese.[45] The Chinese government had come around to an acceptance of its responsibility for the protection of subjects abroad. This shift in official attitude was another manifestation of China's gradual

entry into an international order of Western design. It is quite possible that, in addition to developing an interest in the financial support to be won from loyal emigrant sons, the Chinese government came to view the protection of the emigrants as a means of demonstrating to the foreign powers that China was sovereign and modern. After all, Chinese officials had come to be thoroughly familiar with the sight of foreign consuls serving as the guardians of the interests of foreign nationals in China. China could assert herself through the same techniques in countries where her subjects settled.

The first official Chinese act arising from this new concern for the emigrant Chinese of Netherlands India was negative in nature. The imperial consul general at Singapore was ordered in 1899 to go to the Dutch colonies to warn the Chinese there against K'ang Yu-wei and his recently discredited band of reformers.[46] It is unclear whether the consular officer ever carried out the mission assigned to him. If he did, the impression he made was not great enough to cause any observer, Dutch or Chinese, to record his visit.

The earliest Chinese official to have a direct influence on the overseas nationalist awakening reached Java in 1906. This visitor was Liu Shih-chi ( 劉 士驥 ), sent by the Canton governor general for the purpose of inspecting the new THHK schools. Liu at the time held the rank of district magistrate and was regularly assigned to a hsien in Kwangsi. Possibly because this official of low rank was dressed as an "admiral of the Chinese fleet" during his tour of Netherlands India, he was received with considerable pomp by the Dutch, including the governor general at Buitenzorg. Unlike his more politically oriented successors, Liu limited his work on the trip to the field of education. He helped launch the general educational association,

Djawa Hak Boe Tjong Hwee; he offered advice to THHK associations on means for improving the instruction offered; and he promised to arrange to have a permanent educational inspector sent out from China. Liu was empowered on his trip to confer official rank on overseas Chinese who contributed generously to the educational program. Liu Shih-chi was taken ill during the inspection tour and forced to return to China before the completion of his mission. Dr. Lim Boen Keng, the vigorous Singapore nationalist who had accompanied Liu, appears to have been able to finish only part of the inspection.[47]

The year 1907 was marked by distinguished Chinese visitors to Indonesia; four missions from China, two of them of major significance, toured the Indies in that one year. This was the period of the dynasty's most active campaign to assert itself as the leader of the Chinese in the Dutch colonies. Other missions followed in later years, but none enjoyed the prestige and success of those of 1907, when the novelty of receiving dignitaries still appealed to overseas Chinese and when the revolutionaries had yet to win solid widespread backing.

The first of the 1907 visitors was Ch'ien Hsun ( 錢恂 , known in the Netherlands Indies as Tsien Sun), a member of the diplomatic service on his way to the Netherlands to assume the duties of counselor of the Chinese legation in that country. He sought to impress upon the overseas Chinese the fact that the Peking government was concerned for their welfare, saying that reports had reached China on the "tryannical treatment" inflicted upon them by the Dutch. Needless to say, the Netherlands authorities were hostile to Ch'ien, and he did little to overcome their unfavorable impression of him. He was said to "carry himself clumsily, without the grace high mandarins are supposed to have, and he also did not respond in the customary manner to

certain ceremonies of the so-called 'mandarin decorum'. . . ." Ch'ien refused to talk with the Dutch except through interpreters, but was reported to be thoroughly familiar with English. In Semarang he shocked the Dutch and delighted the Chinese by refusing to pay an official call on the local resident. In Buitenzorg, in an effort to make polite conversation, a Dutch official asked Ch'ien which city, Singapore or Batavia, seemed more beautiful. The Chinese seized upon the occasion, saying that Batavia was far prettier but that the Chinese in Singapore enjoyed much greater freedom than their compatriots in the Indies capital.[48]

Ch'ien busily toured through various parts of the archipelago, demonstrating to his overseas countrymen that they were welcomed back into the Chinese fold. He was accordingly received with great festivity along his route. This visitor furthered the sending of pupils to Nanking, bestowed honors on the leaders of the educational movement, and offered suggestions on the operation of the new Chinese schools. He also took the lead in the organization of the Siang Hwee, or chambers of commerce. Ch'ien urged that the Indies Chinese petition Peking for the establishment of consulates for their permanent protection, advising them to work through the Siang Hwee to achieve their goal. This diplomat was also quite willing to serve as a stock promoter for a Kwangtung railroad project. He was obviously a man of varied interests and great energy. His efforts must have been made more significant in immigrant Chinese eyes by the fact that he was in direct frequent contact, through coded telegrams, with the Chinese government.[49] Ch'ien Hsun's tour set a general pattern for those of his successors.

Ch'ien Hsun was considerably aided during his stay in the Dutch colony by his son-in-law, a former teacher in the THHK schools at

Batavia and Cheribon. The younger man was a native of Chekiang, trained at a Japanese university, who held the scholarly rank of chü-jen. At the time of the 1907 trip the former teacher was being transferred from a Peking assignment in the field of education to a post in the Chinese legation at the Hague. He appears to have subsequently become a direct link between the Batavia THHK and China. As late as 1914 his help was requested by the school association when it sought to find a new teacher in China.[50]

Close on the heels of the Ch'ien Hsun mission came that of Ch'en Pao-ch'en ( 陳寶琛 ), referred to in his official introduction simply as "an official of the Ministry of Public Instruction," but actually a man of long experience and high rank in the officialdom of China. In the 1880's Ch'en had served as educational commissioner for the province of Kiangsi. After the 1911 Revolution he was to become private tutor of the deposed infant emperor in the splendid confinement of the Forbidden City.

Ch'en had been sent to the Indies by the governor general of Fukien and Chekiang ostensibly to inspect the educational facilities of the Fukienese residents in the colony. His real mission, it appears, was the promotion of the sale of shares in a Fukien railroad enterprise. Since Ch'en openly referred to himself as "Director General of the Fukien Railway," he was not embarrassed by the economic motivation behind his journey. His sales campaign, however, met with limited success, only some 150,000 [Straits?] dollars being gained.[51] Ch'en's stay in Netherlands India was brief; he really made little impression on the nationalist movement.

The third visitor from China in 1907 was an official in name only. Lin Lu-ts'un ( 林輅存 ), "a very wealthy and extraordinarily

popular" native of Amoy, who had purchased official rank, went to Indonesia for the announced purpose of inspecting Chinese schools. Lin's real mission was in the interests of his own business operations. He was said to be seeking capital for his glass and china factory in Amoy. There is evidence that Lin chose to travel in the guise of an official for reasons of prestige and convenience. This device spared him the nuisance of carrying passes and other Indies travel documents. Lin, presumably for the sake of appearances, called at some schools but was far from thorough in his inspection. In Semarang, "he visited the Chinese school so fleetingly that the faculty was surprised; and [he] never, for example, took the trouble to go upstairs to see the classrooms there." Yet he did take some interest in the Siang Hwee movement, advising Chinese in places where none existed to establish chambers of commerce.[52]

Toward the end of 1907 the last of that year's official visitors from China appeared. Bearing the title of Imperial Commissioner, Yang Shih-ch'i ( 楊士琦 ), "Junior Vice President of the Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Trade," arrived in Netherlands India. To add to the visitor's prestige, the Chinese government sent two naval vessles to transport and escort Yang, who was welcomed with great enthusiasm by the Chinese and with open antagonism by the Dutch.[53]

Yang represented the Chinese government's most intense effort to bring the Indies Chinese under its control. He was commissioned to inspect and advise the Siang Hwee associations and to reward the deserving:

> Yang Shih-ch'i . . . is hereby commanded to proceed to the islands of the South Pacific to inspect commercial associations and to tell their members of the Imperial solicitude for them and the desire to take care of them. Furthermore, should any-

> one succeed in bringing together large sums of money for the purpose of starting important commercial enterprises for the encouragement of trade in China, such public benefactors will be given noble rank in reward for their services, and the authorities of all cities within the Imperial dominions, in which these emigrants shall reside, are to give them every protection and countenance on their return to their homes in China. [54]

Yang was also interested in the educational movement. He toured a number of schools and specifically warned them against the use of teachers trained in Japan. The Chinese government had come to realize the danger to itself from the young revolutionaries filling faculty posts in Southeast Asia. Yang sought to strengthen the hand of the Chinese government over its expatriate subjects by urging them to combine their commercial and educational associations in one supreme pan-Chinese organization to operate under the tutelage of the Peking regime.[55] But, as noted in the previous chapter, no such super association ever emerged.

In the official Chinese view, Yang Shih-ch'i must have achieved a measure of success during his tour. He came to be regarded as something of an Indies Chinese expert. The imperial government in 1910 considered sending him out a second time. The Republican authorities in 1913 and again in 1916 also gave thought to a second mission for Yang.[56] The success of the man is difficult to estimate. It is clear from the record, however, that no later visitor was as hospitably received in the Chinese community.

The four years before the Chinese Revolution saw four more imperial representatives on tour in Netherlands India. In 1908 another member of the Chinese diplomatic staff in the Hague, Wang Kang Ky, traveled through the archipelago urging the Chinese to consolidate and to maintain their national separateness. Wang visited all THHK and Siang

Hwee establishments in Batavia, Surakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, and Padang. He appears to have been more concerned with Siang Hwee operations than with the educational movement. This was an understandable interest on the part of a diplomat who would make use of the consular activities of the chambers of commerce. In both Batavia and Semarang he was the guest of the local Siang Hwee presidents. The Surabaya Siang Hwee was told to take the lead in the establishment of a centralized association of Chinese merchants for all Indonesia. Wang, like the great majority of the other emissaries from China, also sought to stimulate the flow of overseas capital into mainland Chinese enterprises. His special interests were in plans to develop domestic banking and steam navigation companies.[57]

Wang strove to persuade the Chinese of the East Indies to renounce any close ties with the Dutch and to put their faith in the emperor. He willingly and with seeming sympathy listened to the grievances of his emigrant countrymen. He very pointedly did not associate with the traditionalist Chinese officers; the Batavia Majoor never even met him. Wang vigorously warned against the acceptance of Netherlands citizenship, reportedly declaring: "There is a clear relationship between nationality and a person's personality. When one accepts another nationality, it is as if one takes a foreign father." Wang Kang Ky tried to put teeth in his warning by stating that the property in China of any emigrant who became a Netherlands subject would be confiscated.[58] The views and purposes of this visitor are well presented in a passage from a speech he is supposed to have delivered in Surabaya:

> The Chinese must not accept the Dutch [sic] religion because by so doing they will get a bad name, they will be regarded as seeking to forget their Chinese origins. They can have faith

that the Chinese government will not forget them, that it labors continuously in the interest of the welfare of all the Chinese of Java.[59]

Two Chinese warships reappeared in Indies waters in 1909 bringing that year's inspector from China, Wang Ta-chen (王大貞), a Fukienese chü-jen, who nevertheless reportedly lacked the customary polish of the mandarin. Wang had been ordered by the Chinese Ministry of Agriculture, Industry, and Commerce to visit the Siang Hwee establishments. He combined his investigation of the commercial associations with a tour of a number of THHK schools. In Batavia, Semarang, Surabaya, and Pontianak he was the guest of the Siang Hwee associations, but his public reception in all those cities, especially in the last three named, was cool. By pointing to the steps then under way for the reform of the Chinese criminal code, Wang Ta-chen attempted to prove to the overseas people that the homeland was undergoing modernization. His success appears to have been small; Wang's only noteworthy accomplishment resulted from a presumably unplanned act maddening to the Dutch. At Pontianak, the local sultan, "in official costume and with a large retinue," escorted Wang and a number of resident Chinese to the visiting warships on a Dutch government launch borrowed for the occasion. The Netherlands official reporting the incident stated: "I do not need to say what an enormous impression this demonstration made on the Chinese (and probably also on the native) populations."[60] Native princes were expected to display their pomp and hospitality to European dignitaries, not to visiting Chinese.

Plans to hold an industrial and commercial fair in Nanking brought another 1909 official Chinese visitor, Wang Yi-wai. This man was a representative of the viceroy at Nanking, who was then interested in

the establishment in Southeast Asia of an association for the promotion of industrialization in China. The Dutch governor general feared that Wang Yi-wai's visit might cause an outbreak of anti-Manchu demonstrations among the expatriates. Wang may well have shared the Dutchman's concern. He remained in Java only two weeks, visiting a few Chinese enterprises in Batavia, Bandung, Semarang, and Surabaya.[61] Wang Yi-wai achieved no recorded success during his tour.

The year 1911 brought the last of the Ch'ing dynasty agents to Netherlands India. The Chinese government subsequently stated that: ". . . the trip of Chao Ts'ung-fan ( 趙從藩 ), secretary of the Department of Agruculture, Industry, and Commerce, has taken place and served specifically as an investigation of commercial conditions. This tour had no other aims. . . ." There was a belief among many, however, that Chao was in reality sent to check on the activities of the revolutionaries in Southeast Asia. Chao Ts'ung-fan told the Indies Chinese that he had come to "comfort" them, that is, to assure them of imperial solicitude. This emissary, who arrived on a small naval vessel and wore mandarin robes, was politely received by his Siang Hwee hosts. He was also bitterly attacked by the revolutionary Chinese press and made to feel generally unwelcome by the Chinese public.[62] A pamphlet circulated in Surabaya stated:

> You are informed that the slave of the Manchus, the traitor to the Chinese, Chao Ts'ung-fan, will soon come to Surabaya for the announced purpose of "giving support and comfort to the Chinese colonists" but in reality to cheat them and to take away their money, to set a trap for them so that they will remain slaves through the centuries. . . . Let us, racial brothers, when the time [of Chao's visit] comes, display no flags in order that we not become the laughing stock of the whole world. This is a matter involving the honor or the disgrace of our Han forefathers.[63]

Clearly the overseas public had lost its earlier enthusiasm for touring mandarins. Perhaps the people had grown blasé after seeing an uninterrupted stream of distinguished visitors. Or possibly they had become weary of guests who somehow always cost money but returned little.

## Some Nationalist Symbols

Before leaving the attempts of the imperial regime to assert leadership over the Indies Chinese, it is perhaps sensible to consider some of the nationalist symbols, other than the emissaries themselves, employed by the Ch'ing dynasty to draw the overseas communities under the emperor's wing. Official rank for emigrant Chinese, the visits of Chinese warships to Southeast Asia, and the display of the Chinese flag have already been mentioned in passing. Closer attention to these seems appropriate here.

In old China official rank was highly respected and assiduously sought. Even degrees sold by a government short of funds brought a measure of honor to their holders. The ability to purchase a degree was at least a sign of success in the economic world and an indication of scholarly ambition, if not attainment. The imperial government, in related moves to obtain money for various activities and to bring the upper stratum of the Indies Chinese community into the social framework of traditional China, began bestowing rank on certain deserving men. These rewards are significant here as symbols of the reborn link between China and the emigrants.

The first of a surprisingly large number of recipients of imperial favor in the years under investigation, the Majoor at Medan, was made "an official of the second rank" in 1903. He reportedly began his

career as a coolie, yet had contributed large sums to the imperial treasury during a visit to Peking. A 1906 citation from the Canton viceroy authorized the distribution of medals to 128 THHK leaders. The following year the viceroy ordered the Chinese consul general at Singapore to arrange for the division among the THHK associations of the following items: 25 wooden plaques to be displayed over the doors of the schools, 25 inscribed tablets, 185 silver belts, 250 inscribed emblems for the caps of students, and 185 standards to be displayed by schools deserving special honor.[64] Prestige was being mass produced.

The Chinese government was particularly eager to reward its supporters in the business circles of Southeast Asia. It will be recalled that the officers of the various Siang Hwee were regarded as members of the Chinese officialdom. Siang Hwee leaders who displayed great generosity to the Chinese regime were singled out for special honors. A scale of rewards based on the size of contributions to imperial causes seems to have been developed. For example, the president of the Siang Hwee at Padang in 1907 gave a touring Chinese emissary f. 10,000 and was made a "fourth grade mandarin." A colleague who gave only half that amount was designated "an official of the fifth rank." On at least two occasions, ceremonies reminiscent of the ancient imperial investiture of tributary princes took place when the Susuhunan of Surakarta was sent decorations from Peking.[65]

In the desperation born of its fiscal difficulties, the Manchu dynasty recklessly cheapened the prestige of these honors and weakened the position of the dignitaries sent on missions to the islands. The lack of success suffered by Wang Ta-chen on his 1909 tour of the Indies was to be accounted for in part by the fact that "he was only of the fifth rank and there were many Indies Chinese who had purchased the fifth

and even the fourth ranks." The Chinese Republic was of course unable to offer the traditional honors of dynastic times; it did, however, distribute a number of medals to THHK leaders.[66]

Flags are perhaps the most universal of nationalist symbols. It must be noted, though, that national flags were brought to the Orient from the West. Traditional China had no national flag. Banners were used by Chinese military units in much the same way as our army employs its various regimental colors; but those banners had no symbolic significance to the Chinese people as a whole. The Indies Chinese, doubtless because of their contact with the Dutch, a people especially fond of flags, came to make widespread and enthusiastic use of the flag symbol.

The 1907 arrival of Ch'ien Hsun caused "dragon flags" to blossom out in the Chinese quarters of the Netherlands colony. That this was an innovation is evidenced by the fact that in Semarang "the leaders of the community, a few days before the arrival of the imperial envoy, hastily ordered a Chinese art studio to make dragon flags." In 1909 the Chinese minister at the Hague advised the Siang Hwee that they were to fly only the Chinese flag. The next year the Chinese minister of foreign affairs complained that the Netherlands colonial authorities insisted that the Dutch flag be flown higher than the Chinese. Chinese flags came to be seen in Netherlands India on all Chinese holidays. Flags also served to stir up trouble and to express displeasure. As already noted, Chao Ts'ung-fan, the last and probably the least successful of the imperial emissaries to the East Indies, was greeted by an absence of Chinese flags. This was in part a sign of the growing strength of the revolutionaries.

By what appears from the vantage point of hindsight to have been a needless and stupid blunder on the part of the Dutch, blood was shed

in rioting after the colonial administration refused to permit the display in 1912 of the new flag of the Chinese Republic. In part as a reaction to the Dutch ban on the Republican flag, some Chinese publicly destroyed a Netherlands flag. And in Surabaya, at about the same time, the Chinese quarter, contrary to former practice, flew no Dutch flags on the occasion of a birthday in the Netherlands royal family.[67]

Some decades ago it was the custom of many states to send fleets to foreign ports in order, as the usual phrase put it, to show the flag. Such naval cruises were expected to impress foreign governments and, in the case of empires, to show colonists that the mother country had not forgotten them. The Ch'ing dynasty, having seen the showing of many flags, adopted this technique in a further effort to strengthen the ties between the overseas Chinese and the mainland. In both 1907 and 1909 two ships, then the pride of the imperial Chinese navy,* called at Indies ports during the tours of Yang Shih-ch'i and Wang Ta-chen. The public response to those visits was understandably greater on the earlier occasion.[68]

> [In 1907] several days before the coming of the two cruisers, the news of their future arrival had spread to all parts of Central Java; thus, on the day of their arrival, a great many Chinese had felt it necessary to come to Semarang from many places in order to see the warships. At the time nearly every Chinese felt proud.[69]

In Batavia the ships were extended a similar welcome. The THHK association closed its schools for two days to give the children an opportunity to visit the vessels.[70] Perhaps the excitement among the

*The two vessels were the Hai-ch'i 海圻, 4,300 metric tons, built in Great Britain in 1898, and the Hai-jung 海容, 2,950 metric tons, of 1897 German construction. Jane's Fighting Ships, Sampson, Low, Marston and Co., London, 1917, p. 479.

Indies Chinese when the imperial warships called was increased by a general realization that Chinese government protection in an emergency would require the use of sea power.

## Diplomatic and Consular Leaders

The Republican government of China in its early years did not follow the example set by the Manchus in the matter of commissioning representatives to tour Netherlands India. This fact may possibly be explained by the difficulties facing the new government; it seems more likely, however, that the establishment in 1912 of the Chinese consulate general at Batavia made special missions less necessary.

Prior to the opening of the Batavia consulate general all diplomatic negotiations between the Netherlands and Chinese governments were conducted at the ministerial level in the Hague or Peking. The Chinese minister in the Netherlands, as the nationalist movement of his compatriots in the Indies went forward, found himself evermore deeply involved in the affairs of the overseas Chinese. In accordance with standard practice, it was the duty of the Chinese diplomat to transmit the introductions of officials sent by Peking to the Dutch colony. It will be recalled that two of the emissaries to visit Indonesia were members of the staff of the legation in the Hague. Also in keeping with customary procedure, the Chinese minister was quick to protest to the Netherlands government whenever it appeared that Chinese citizens in Dutch areas had been unjustly treated.[71]

Although the Chinese minister's legitimate functions are of no particular interest, his extralegal operations merit some attention. The Siang Hwee, because of their quasi-consular role, were in close contact with the minister. He was the channel through which the early

Siang Hwee obtained official Chinese approval for their statutes. The minister sought to have Chinese subjects in Netherlands India register their citizenship through facilities set up by the Siang Hwee. Voting by Indies Chinese in the 1910 Chinese provincial elections was carried out through the Siang Hwee under the minister's supervision. A later diplomat was also active in the 1917 elections. A 1912 search by the Dutch police of the Siang Hwee and Soe Po Sia establishments at Surabaya revealed that the minister had long been in direct communication with those two bodies through means of coded messages. Ciphers had to be used because the imperial legation in the Hague well knew that the Netherlands authorities regularly intercepted mail and cables. In fact, the Chinese had unsuccessfully protested against this breach of diplomatic usage. In his communications to Indonesia the minister was quick both to tell the Siang Hwee that he worked tirelessly for the repeal of the colonial laws discriminating against Chinese and to claim credit for any progress.[72]

The Chinese diplomatic representative at the Hague was also interested in other matters. He sought to learn the names and incomes of the leaders of THHK. The minister once presented the association of Chinese students in the Netherlands with f. 2,000 to be used to encourage the study of Kuo-yü. He was vigorous in his efforts to warn Indies Chinese against the acceptance of Dutch nationality. Finally, acting on the orders of his government, the Chinese minister at the Hague on several occasions warned the Dutch against the sinister activities of the revolutionaries; the first warning was made as early as 1906.[73]

The official link between the overseas Chinese and the Chinese government was of course made more secure with the establishment of

the consulate general at Batavia. That event had been preceded by several years of negotiation between the governments of China and the Netherlands. In 1889 the Chinese consul at Singapore reported to Peking that consulates ought to be maintained in the Indies to protect Chinese interests. It was pointed out by the consul that the establishments would probably pay double returns on the investment, presumably by collecting contributions from wealthy emigrants. The Chinese of Manila in 1888, for example, had promised to remit funds to Peking for naval construction in exchange for consular protection. Dutch opposition to the opening of consulates was to be fought by a Peking threat to block the coolie traffic between South China and Sumatra. The minister at the Hague in 1891 began efforts to secure the right to open Chinese consulates in Netherlands India.[74] The Chinese government in 1894 tried to obtain an agreement from the Dutch by again raising the perennial problem of coolie emigration. The Netherlands reaction was curtly negative:

> In exchange for the right of free and direct emigration [of coolies] to the Dutch colonies, the Chinese government demands an important concession, the maintenance of consular establishments on Java and Sumatra, a concession which the royal [Netherlands] government is not prepared to make.[75]

As part of his campaign to muster overseas allegiance to the Manchu dynasty, Ch'ien Hsun during his 1907 mission spoke widely and frequently in favor of opening Chinese consulates in the Indies. And, to fix the issue firmly in the public mind, THHK textbooks informed the children that the maintenance of consular relations among states was fundamental to normal international intercourse.[76]

The issue of the citizenship of overseas Chinese held up a settlement of the consular question until 1911. It is not necessary to go

into the points of international law which underlay the citizenship problem; a generation of Dutch lawyers has written on the subject. The fundamental difference between China and the Netherlands was that the former insisted upon jus sanguinis and the latter on jus soli in the determination of the citizenship of overseas Chinese. A compromise was finally reached between the two governments: Chinese born in the Indies were to be considered Netherlands subjects except during periods of residence or travel in China, when they were to be viewed as citizens of China.[77] In other words, the Dutch claimed full jurisdiction over the Peranakan population of their colony but were unwilling to become involved in the task of extending consular protection to Indies Chinese who went to China.

Ultimately, the right of the Chinese to establish consulates in the Netherlands Indies was grudgingly granted by the Dutch. The treaty between China and the Netherlands that was signed in 1911 contained the following statements:

> The consuls general, consuls, vice consuls and consular agents of China will be considered as commercial agents, protectors of the commerce of their nationals within their consular districts. . . .
>
> The consuls general, consuls, vice consuls and consular agents are not invested with any diplomatic character.
>
> Demands can only be addressed to the Netherlands government through the intercession of the [Chinese] diplomatic agent accredited to the Hague. . . .[78]

The Chinese immediately broke both the spirit and the letter of this agreement. The first Chinese consul general at Batavia, Su Jui-chao (蘇 銳 釗), had served in the same capacity at Singapore. In 1911, after the signing of the Sino-Dutch consular convention, he was ordered to Batavia. The outbreak of the Revolution obliged Su,

obviously a man devoted to Confucian principles, to submit his resignation. The delay resulting from that traditional gesture caused Su's arrival in Batavia to be postponed until August 1912.[79] But once on the job, Su demonstrated that he had no intention of limiting his activities to the protection of Chinese commerce.

Among the new consul general's first acts was an investigation of a report that a Chinese had died of unnatural causes during interrogation by Dutch police. The same year Su was ordered by his government to take the lead in organizing voting by Indies Chinese in the planned senatorial elections; in 1917 roughly the same procedure was repeated. The consul general was soon made responsible by Peking for the general supervision of Chinese education in Netherlands India. He also applied himself to a sales campaign aimed at persuading overseas Chinese to invest in the bonds of the new Chinese Republic.[80] In short, then, he was expected to perform the great range of duties previously carried out by the series of visiting officials from China.

The consul general's efforts seem to have been little appreciated by the Chinese community. The local press acidly complained that "his door was closed to visitors and he kept himself fully occupied with female house guests." It is likely that some of this irritation with the consular head arose from growing hostility to Yuan Shih-k'ai and his agents. The Batavia consul general by 1914 was working with the Dutch to expose revolutionaries. He was later given the unenviable chore of convincing the overseas Chinese that their mainland compatriots longed for a restoration of the monarchy and, in the same connection, he was ordered to inform Peking of the names of those loyal to Yuan Shih-k'ai.[81] Dutch fears that the consul general would, to their detriment, exercise strong leadership over the Chinese community

had proven groundless. Overseas Chinese were perhaps even more suspicious of Yuan and his servants than they had been of the Manchu dynasty.

## Reformer and Revolutionary

In addition to the nationalist leaders drawn from Indies Chinese groups and to those coming as officials from China there were mainland reformers and revolutionaries involved in the movement under investigation. It has long been a matter of course for students of the Chinese Revolution to mention that overseas Chinese support was significant. The present writer does not dispute that view but believes that the revolutionaries were far less important than the local and official leaders in the creation of overseas Chinese nationalism. Perhaps they merely exploited rather than furthered the movement under study. It is also felt by the writer that the immense subject of the political awakening of the Chinese is outside the scope of this effort. The concern here is with the birth of a particular brand of nationalism. The political struggles of China's revolutionary period were an outgrowth of national consciousness, not the sources of that consciousness. It is nevertheless of some limited usefulness to look briefly at the connections between the Chinese of Netherlands India and two dominant figures of the early twentieth century Chinese political scene, K'ang Yu-wei and Sun Yat-sen.

K'ang Yu-wei's influence on the Indies Chinese nationalist movement was slight and of brief duration; but, coming at an early date, it was more significant than Sun's in the initial nationalist awakening. K'ang went to Southeast Asia during his years of political exile; his reputation as a scholar and reformer had preceded him. In 1903 K'ang,

then resident in the Straits Settlements, visited Java. One report states that he was urged to make that journey by Batavia's THHK. Another and probably more credible source maintains that K'ang took the initiative in arranging to visit the Indies. In either case, K'ang was hospitably received by the Batavia association, which made arrangements for a Java tour of about two months' duration.[82]

K'ang really achieved little in the Dutch colony. In Semarang he addressed the leading Chinese of that city and is supposed to have inspired them to establish a THHK school. It must be remembered, however, that educational reform was firmly on its feet by the time K'ang reached Java. Of course a number of teachers in the modern schools were disciples of K'ang Yu-wei. On at least one occasion a Batavia teacher was hired on K'ang's recommendation. It is recorded that, although K'ang's visit was "the first contact THHK had with the intellectual circle of China . . ., there is no evidence that he expressed any kind of opinion [in Batavia]." Another report maintains, however, that K'ang did suggest to THHK Batavia that it place an altar to Confucius in its building.[83] This is the only advice he is definitely known to have offered.

Perhaps K'ang Yu-wei's most lasting contribution to the nationalist movement lay in the fact that he became in official Dutch eyes a mysterious figure on the Southeast Asian scene. Much political mischief was blamed on K'ang, who thus unwittingly led the Netherlands authorities off the trail of the genuine nationalist leaders. He was credited with organizing the 1902 boycott of a great Dutch firm by Surabaya's Chinese merchants. The authorship of a widely circulated 1909 pamphlet telling the Chinese to reject Netherlands citizenship was supposedly his. And K'ang was eventually thought by some Dutch

officials to be influential in the secret societies. There appears to be no basis in fact for these Dutch fears. K'ang seems to have done little more than live among the Southeast Asian Chinese, intellectually remote and politically impotent.[84]

Sun Yat-sen appeared on the Indies scene late and only from a distance. As stated in an earlier chapter, the Soe Po Sia organizations were established to serve Sun; and a number of THHK teachers were his followers. Sun's support was derived primarily from transient or newer Singkeh groups, not from the settled overseas nationalists under investigation here. Those who followed Sun sought goals in China; the Indies Chinese nationalists worked for security and advance in their local environment. Sun Yat-sen's direct contribution to the rise of nationalism, a development distinct from republicanism, was small indeed. He was interested in the Putsch, not in the slow construction of a nationalist base. Sun was not a man concerned with the painstaking work of educational reform and moral revival, the original and major objectives of the Chinese nationalist leadership in Netherlands India.

The first mention of Sun Yat-sen in the archives of the Dutch colonial government appears in a 1906 warning from the Chinese minister at the Hague stating that Sun's agents were trying to sell bonds to finance military adventures against the Manchus. The official reaction to that warning demonstrates how little known Sun was at the time. Although the revolutionary leader had never been in Indonesia, the Dutch governor general was ordered, among other things, "to withdraw [Sun's] residence permit." In 1907 a Batavia chapter of T'ung-meng-hui was established, but its work was undercover and attracted little public or police attention. The following year Sun attempted to visit

Java; the way in which he went about it was characteristic. Sun called on the Netherlands consul general in Singapore to request that an audience for him be arranged with the governor general. He wished to warn the Dutchman against "Japanese intrigues" but was fearful of incorporating his warning in a letter. The audience and permission to enter the colony were refused Sun by the governor general, who could not accept warnings against "agents of a friendly nation." Although Sun never visited Java, reports sometimes circulated that he did travel there under his Japanese alias, Dr. Takano Chōei.[85]

The overthrow of the Manchus naturally enhanced Sun's prestige among the overseas Chinese, but he came to fill a symbolic rather than an active role in the nationalist movement. Many Chinese associations, including all Soe Po Sia, hung pictures of Sun in their meeting places; yet by 1914 it was reported that the public response to the appeals of Sun's agents for funds was meager indeed.[86] To the Indies Chinese, Sun Yat-sen was always a remote figure; he never offered them solutions to their own local problems. Even the Manchu dynasty attempted to do better than that. In these years Sun was nearly always either in exile or on the periphery of power. He was not in a position to extend the help and protection demanded by the overseas Chinese.

## Recapitulation

The officer institution was a casualty of nationalism. The Chinese officers lost their leadership position because, in a sense, they never really held it. Officers had served Dutch, not Chinese, interests. They were installed as leaders of the Chinese community by decree of the Netherlands authorities, not by the will of their countrymen. The rise of nationalism demanded genuine leadership for both functional

and symbolic purposes. Individual officers were able to answer the nationalist call; but the officer institution collapsed. Its decay antedated the 1911 Revolution.

The local leaders who sparked and were pushed into prominence by the nationalist awakening are the keys to this study. Through them it is possible to see the origins, the sources of power, and the goals of the overseas Chinese movement. These men formed a new elite, able to use modern, in this case a synonym for Western, techniques. Significantly this elite was free of the Dutch taint which caused the Chinese officers to be discredited. The new local leaders tended to be the products of experiences in European education, formal or informal, and to be men who had achieved considerable success in the commercial world of the Indies Chinese. Whether or not they were Peranakans, they identified themselves with the Chinese community of Netherlands India; as a consequence they were prepared to engage in long-term efforts to elevate their people. Education was soon wisely recognized as the chief means for the attainment of their objective. Because their basic goal was so broad, they were able simultaneously to support and even direct a number of nationalist associations of a variety of political shades. The final objective, not narrow partisan loyalties, determined their actions.

The various emissaries from imperial China who visited the Indies were of course acting in the interests of the Peking government. Either for frankly acknowledged financial reasons or because of a concern for China's prestige in the world, they sought to tie the overseas people to the homeland. The Indies Chinese were able to exploit these dynastic efforts by using the emperor's person, representatives, rewards, flag, and ships as symbols, largely of Western inspiration, around which

nationalist mobilization could be carried forward. It was also not without value that Peking's interest in the emigrants implied a promise of protection against the Dutch. As the revolutionaries enlisted greater support, especially among Singkehs, and as the imperial agents lost their initial glamour, preoccupation with local problems cost the Ch'ing dynasty most of its backing in the archipelago.

Diplomatic and consular representatives of China acted in much the same way as imperial emissaries; the difference lay in the duration of the action. A desire for a share of the wealth of the overseas Chinese and for international prestige seems to have stimulated the Peking government in its efforts to work through this channel to reach the emigrants. The consul general at Batavia, because of personal limitations and because of the overseas Chinese concern with local problems, achieved no position of leadership. Had he arrived ten years earlier, the situation might have developed quite differently.

The reformers and revolutionaries played a far less significant role in the nationalist awakening than the writer once supposed. The Confucianist revival in Southeast Asia obviously is to be credited in part to the inspiration provided by K'ang Yu-wei in the nineties; but it must also be viewed as a reaction to the work of Christian missionaries. When he was in the area, K'ang appears to have done little but innocently activate European rumors of Chinese plots for revolution.

Sun Yat-sen figured not at all in the early nationalist movement of the Indies Chinese, and his later contribution was largely symbolic in nature. Unlike the local leaders or, to a limited degree, the dynastic officials, Sun could not give the overseas Chinese any support in the solution of their problems. In the years studied he was never in a position of power. The immigrants demanded productive leadership and

seem to have been quick to recognize that a political outcast could do little for them. Sun was rewarded for his value as a nationalist symbol; he was not widely accepted as a leader.

There was, then, one quality held in common by all those who filled leadership roles in the movement of the Indies Chinese. All leaders, heads of the pan-Chinese associations as well as certain dynastic officials, appeared to work for the common good of the entire Chinese community. All were nationalists.

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69. Liem Thian Joe, Riwajat Semarang, op. cit., p. 192.

70. Nio Joe Lan, Riwajat, op. cit., p. 127.

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# 5

## AN EVALUATION

Behold how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity.

Psalms, CXXXIII, 1.

### The Accomplishments of Indies Chinese Nationalism

After this prolonged discussion of the nationalist awakening of the Indies Chinese, it is appropriate to consider some of the achievements of the movement and to draw certain general conclusions from the material presented. The record reveals that the nationalist movement was by and large a success. The prime goals of the early nationalists were realized: pride born of national consciousness was instilled in the people; a new degree of unity came to bind the Chinese together; a universal concern for the welfare of the entire community generated a spirit of democracy; and the respect of other peoples was won. These attainments came through carefully planned and executed efforts in education and from the organization of pan-Chinese associations. In the narrative sections of this book the broad outline of this victory has already been presented. Before moving on to a summation and interpretation of the developments studied, it is advisable to look briefly at a few later or, in a sense, peripheral consequences of the nationalist awakening.

A desire to provide their people with the facilities for practical education had guided the planning of the nationalist leaders from an

early time, and it was in the field of education that the Chinese gained one of their greatest triumphs. Not only was a school system established which was operated by the Chinese themselves; the Dutch authorities were obliged to open schools for Chinese children. While the Netherlands authorities may well have been prompted in this direction in part by philanthropy, they were definitely pushed into taking relatively speedy action by the knowledge that the independent schools of the Chinese, outside of close government scrutiny, were producing a generation of nationalists potentially hostile to Dutch rule. This threat to European interests was soon apparent to the Indies colonial administration. In 1908, a bare seven years after the establishment of the pioneer THHK school, the first government schools for Chinese were opened. The Chinese community correctly viewed this official concession as a conquest gained by their new nationalism.[1]

In 1906 the colonial regime had solicited the opinion of Batavia's THHK on the matter of government education for Chinese children. Three plans were to be considered: existing European schools would open their doors to Chinese on a basis of equality with Dutch children; official subsidies would be granted private Chinese schools to enable them to offer instruction in the Dutch language and certain other subjects; or the government would establish, exclusively for the Chinese, schools equal to those for Europeans. After lengthy debate, the members of THHK Batavia and its sister associations informed the government that the first plan, free entry of Chinese to European schools, appeared to be the most satisfactory; official subsidization of private Chinese schools, though not preferred, would also be acceptable. The Netherlands authorities discarded this opinion and put the third plan into effect; separate government schools of the same quality as those

of the Europeans were established for Chinese. These were the so-called Dutch-Chinese schools (Hollandsch-Chineesche scholen), which taught Chinese pupils in the Dutch language; they were not, as the name suggests, schools for both Dutch and Chinese children.[2]

The Indies government must be given credit for having provided the pupils of the Dutch-Chinese schools with excellent educations. These schools, which offered seven years of elementary training, were staffed by Europeans and were fully as good as the primary schools for Dutch children. By 1915 there were 27 Dutch-Chinese schools in the colony; their 165 teachers were serving 4,096 Chinese pupils, 1,318 of them girls.[3]

Batavia's THHK had perhaps initially been motivated to withhold its endorsement of the plan for the establishment of Dutch-Chinese schools by the knowledge that its own schools would suffer from competition. It is true that, after the opening of the new government schools, some children were withdrawn from the THHK institutions. A threat to Chinese nationalist indoctrination was seen by at least one imperial emissary who visited some of the Dutch-Chinese schools. In order that they might both have and eat their cake, some Chinese perennially suggested that the Dutch-Chinese schools offer instruction in both Dutch and Kuo-yü. This scheme was regularly condemned as "unthinkable" by the Batavia government.[4]

In addition to the Dutch-Chinese schools, other facilities were opened up to Chinese children in 1908, when the government ordered that Chinese be admitted to European schools on the same basis as natives, a knowledge of Dutch being the chief requirement. Furthermore, any Chinese parents who wished, after 1908, to send their children to the government Malay-language schools for natives were free

to do so.[5] Within seven years of the start of the campaign to educate their children, the Chinese had achieved tremendous success. A private school system was in operation to provide Chinese language training; new government schools were being established to meet the needs of the Chinese for European education; and the discriminatory restrictions on the admission of Chinese to the older government Dutch- and Malay-language schools were removed.

The other demands of the Chinese were met more slowly by the government. But the pass and zoning systems, trials before the courts for natives, and unfair taxation were all abolished in the years following the period studied. When the Netherlands Indian government later convened its popular assembly (Volksraad), the Chinese were given representation. The Chinese did not achieve full social and political equality with the Dutch, which would have been more than a little remarkable in a colonial environment; but they came to enjoy far greater security and consideration than any 1900 observer would have thought possible.[6]

The victories of Indonesian nationalism in the past few years make it appropriate to add here, as something of an historical footnote, that the Chinese example contributed to the national awakening of the indigenous peoples of the Indies. Every writer on modern Indonesia attributes the 1912 establishment of the first powerful native nationalist organization, Serikat Islam, in part to the competitive pressure of the Chinese on certain Javanese entrepreneurs. There were, in addition to this familiar negative role of the Chinese in the Indonesian nationalist effort, several positive Chinese contributions to the movement. As early as 1904 an Indonesian noble, Raden Moehamad Oemar, who was "a member of the Religious Council in Kendal," wrote THHK

Batavia to ask for information on its activities. In 1910 another member of the local nobility, Radja Sabaroedin, at the time president of the protonationalist Boedi Oetomo and a member of the native officialdom, asked to be allowed to attend a meeting of the Batavia THHK in order to observe the organizational techniques of the Chinese. The 1911 Revolution in China, interpreted to the Indonesians by the Chinese in their midst, is reported to have stimulated great interest in native nationalist circles. Finally, a good part of the financing of the Indonesian nationalist press in the early years was the work of Chinese capitalists.[7]

## The Weapons of the Chinese

Nationalism all too often gives rise to violence; this was ordinarily not the case in the overseas Chinese movement under investigation. The chief weapon of the Indies Chinese in their struggle for social and political elevation was simply their ability to present the Dutch with the unified strength of their pan-Chinese associations. The Netherlands authorities quickly and correctly came to the realization that the Chinese communities under their control were no longer fragmented and inarticulate. Because the threat of force seemed implicit in the growth of the pan-Chinese associations, the colonial regime wisely made concessions to prevent an open display of Chinese might.

Although force was usually not employed by the Chinese, there were a few occasions when vigorous group action by that minority was used to achieve certain ends thought unobtainable through more peaceful means. Such group endeavors commonly took the form of boycotts. A great Dutch trading firm, Handelsvereeniging Amsterdam, was singled out by the Chinese of Surabaya for special attack. The background

of the boycotts against this firm was commercial rather than political. The policy for the extension of credit by the Dutch concern to Chinese retail dealers was the chief source of friction. Two boycotts were waged against this company, one from 1902 to 1904 and another in 1908. The earlier was the more bitter, especially as Handelsvereeniging Amsterdam was obliged to contribute f. 25,000 to the Surabaya THHK to bring the boycott to an end. It is no wonder that European trading houses came to be afraid to fight Chinese boycotts.[8]

Other boycotts were less spectacular. The establishment of Siang Hwee associations throughout the Indies, however, made the threat of boycotts more feared than ever by the Dutch. The only other boycotts to be considered here were the 1905 action against the Luitenant at Buitenzorg who, as already mentioned, proposed a ban on Chinese immigration, and two anti-Japanese efforts. In 1912 various Soe Po Sia urged that Japanese goods be boycotted as a protest against Russo-Japanese penetration in Manchuria and Mongolia. As the Siang Hwee associations did not support this campaign with any enthusiasm, it accomplished little, although the Japanese consul at Batavia was obliged to lodge a formal complaint. In 1915 a more successful boycott of Japanese products was conducted as a consequence of the notorious demands made on China in that year by her aggressive neighbor. The most striking aspect of the 1915 boycott is that twenty years earlier Japan's military defeat of China had passed almost unnoticed in the Indies Chinese communities.[9]

On one occasion the Chinese resorted to an extreme form of the boycott, a cessation of all trade, known in the Indies as pa tsh'i (pa-shih 罷市), or marketing strike. This technique had long been used in China as a means of protest against the government. In

Netherlands India it was employed following the Surabaya riots of 1912. In that year, after the Dutch authorities had prohibited the display of the Chinese Republican flag during the celebration of the establishment of the new mainland government, serious rioting broke out in Surabaya. Batavia had a similar, though smaller, outburst. Casualties were light, but the police were more than zealous in the performance of their duties. To indicate their disapproval of the measures used to restore order, the Chinese shopkeepers of Surabaya closed their doors. A virtually complete stagnation of commerce followed. The situation was particularly hazardous from the official point of view as the Chinese monopolized the retail trade in food supplies. Unable to procure food, the native population began to grow restless; nothing could have been more alarming to the colonial administrators. The shop closure was peacefully brought to an end by negotiations between the Netherlands authorities and the leaders of Surabaya's Chinese. The power demonstrated by the Chinese in this instance deeply impressed the colonial government.[10]

Having mentioned the outbreak of violence at Surabaya, it is necessary to list the surprisingly few other occasions when disorders took place. The year 1912 was the time of all the other recorded cases of group violence. In that turbulent year, at Surabaya, Cheribon, and Bangil, hostility between Chinese and Arab residents flared up in rioting; some tin miners on Bangka staged a strike which led to bloodshed; and there were some brawls between Chinese and natives in Balikpapan in Borneo.[11] When it is considered that 1912 was a time of great excitement for Chinese everywhere, the record of the Indies Chinese is not as black as it might have been. Violence was simply not one of the weapons of organized Chinese nationalism in the Indies.

Isolated explosions occurred; carefully planned demonstrations of brute strength were not a part of the campaign of the nationalist leadership.

## General Conclusions on the Indies Chinese Movement

At this point the reader will quite properly ask for conclusions on the Indies Chinese nationalist awakening as a whole and expect an attempt to relate the story told here to the general problem of minority nationalism. There are a number of tentative generalizations suitable for presentation.

An examination of the motivations behind the movement studied reveals some of the circumstances favorable to the rise of minority nationalism. The Indies Chinese in 1900 had been long established overseas; they were not a migratory people in search of temporary advantages. The Chinese had a legitimate interest and a large investment in the Netherlands colony. Nationalism was a means of protecting that interest through the attainment of greater social, political, and psychological security. The Chinese permanent residents of the Indies were no longer willing to accept an inferior status, regardless of whether that status was imposed by the regime or grew out of an inner sense of intellectual inadequacy and cultural homelessness. The fact that the initiators of nationalist action were those men, mostly Peranakans, who, through contact with Western ideas and methods, were most likely to turn to nationalism to meet an emotional need is evidence of the importance of emotional demands in the turn to an awareness of nationality. The new socio-political pressures on the Chinese which resulted at the turn of the century from the inauguration of the Dutch ethical program doubtless made the need for nationalism

seem more immediate. The rise of nationalism among Chinese outside of the Netherlands area suggests, however, that, as a stimulus to national consciousness, internal emotional pressure must be given at least equal weight with external forces.

The attempt to revive Confucianism was born of experience with Christianity. The Confucianist effort was to serve as a positive reaction to the work of the missionaries; again psychological factors are seen to be of prime significance. Exposure to Christianity led some Chinese to look to the ancient cultural heritage of their homeland for reassurance that morality was not a European innovation in Asia. To many Chinese, after all, the acceptance of Christianity implies a recognition of Western cultural superiority. In addition to fostering a reaction against themselves, the missionaries furthered the Chinese nationalist cause in other ways, especially by their introduction of certain techniques in education and by their formation of associations for the achievement of group goals.

The world climate of nationalism half a century ago is so obvious a factor behind the emergence of the Indies Chinese onto the nationalist stage that it is likely to be overlooked. It seems not unreasonable to assume that in another age, when men did not think in terms of nations, no nationalist awakening would have occurred in the Indies. For several prenationalist centuries, in fact, no such awakening did take place. The often discussed Western impact on Asia, bringing with it highly aggressive nationalism, must be viewed as the basic cause of the nationalist ferment in the twentieth-century East.

Finally, it is appropriate to ask, given the circumstances under which they lived, if a course other than nationalism was open to the Chinese of Netherlands India. Since that people had been unwilling

to continue in the acceptance of an inferior and insecure position, there were only four paths from which to choose: return to China, assimilation to the Dutch community, absorption by the native population, or nationalism. Emigration to China would have been economic suicide for most Indies Chinese. The realities of life in a colonial setting made impossible the achievement of full equality with the Dutch ruling stratum of society, an aristocratic group jealous of its position. The same colonial circumstances obliged the Chinese to fear absorption by the Indonesians, a people then more insecure and despised than themselves. The only chance for the social, political, and psychological emancipation of the entire Chinese community lay in nationalism. Resourceful individuals, such as some Chinese officers, were able to attain a measure of security by clinging to the fringes of the European community. And the security of oblivion was theoretically available to those Peranakans able to disappear into native society. Only one course was open, however, to the whole Chinese people—nationalism.

The success of the Indies Chinese nationalist mobilization reveals that certain resources were available to that people. Most obviously the community was of sufficient size to make its struggle promising. It also formed a distinct population group; Chinese separateness in the Indies was the foundation of the nationalist movement. The Chinese had, because of their feeling of superiority over the natives, their economic role, and their peculiar cultural institutions, remained apart during the centuries in Southeast Asia. Without their separateness as a base on which to build nationalism, no Chinese movement could have been launched. This fact is so self-evident as to be in danger of being ignored. The Chinese community at the beginning of the century was split by internal divisions arising from provincialism and

loyalties to secret societies or other particularistic attachments. The relative speed and completeness of the disappearance of the old, pre-nationalist hostilities seems to indicate that there was a greater degree of cohesiveness in the Chinese community than the surface antagonisms suggested. Pan-Chinese efforts could never have achieved rapid success had the divisive forces been based on deep-seated resentments.

The financial resources of the Indies Chinese, especially of the Peranakan element, were a great source of strength in the nationalist movement. Educational reform is a particularly expensive means of stimulating national consciousness, yet the THHK did not hesitate to institute an ambitious school program. A section of the Chinese press in the early years very probably was operated at a loss, public service rather than profits being the goal of the publishers. Clearly the collection of funds to be used for the benefit of China depended upon the wealth and generosity of the Indies Chinese. The seemingly incessant travel of various nationalist leaders must have entailed not inconsiderable expenditures. The power of the Indies Chinese to raise, even through forms of taxation, the great sums demanded by their movement is to be counted as one of their chief resources.

Skillful organization by the nationalist leadership was another of the sources of strength behind the Indies Chinese movement. A new elite, largely of Peranakan origin, was in possession of the organizational skills required for nationalist mobilization. The leadership had mastered these skills as students or observers of Western, especially missionary, activity in Asia. Associations designed to serve a whole community, not merely a select portion of it, appear to have been another innovation from the West. Universal education, for example, was an ideal alien to traditional China. The nationalist leadership

was further helped toward success by the fact that its members were generally able to operate with clear consciences within associations of varied political orientations. The final goal, rather than narrow loyalties, guided the leaders. Perhaps it was believed that the pressure on the Chinese community was sufficiently heavy to require nonpartisan support of any nationalist effort. Selflessness, not opportunism, indeed seems to have motivated the leaders.

Circumstances making possible a connection with China were beneficial to the rise of overseas Chinese nationalism in Netherlands India. Dynastic officials on tour in Southeast Asia were sometimes able to furnish their emigrant countrymen with some of the techniques necessary in the organization of community endeavors. These contributions were, incidentally, of Western inspiration; chambers of commerce, consulates, and government scholarships were not part of the traditional scene. The symbols attached to the official emissaries from China were of both Asian and Western origins. The national flag and the cruising naval vessels to "show" it were definitely inspired by Occidental example. The personal interest of the emperor in his overseas subjects, symbolized by the tours of dynastic officials, was in keeping with both the Chinese tradition of imperial solicitude for the people and with Western notions calling for the protection of expatriates. The ranks and rewards bestowed on overseas Chinese fit more completely into the traditional Chinese pattern. The demonstration by Peking of its concern for the welfare of the overseas Chinese was a useful tool to the Indies nationalists in their struggle with the Dutch. To the local pressure brought to bear upon the colonial government was added the internationally recognized technique of diplomatic negotiation. Probably the most significant contribution made to the Indies movement by the

visiting Chinese officials grew from the fact that their presence in Southeast Asia was substantial proof that overseas people were welcomed back into the Chinese cultural family. The shift in the Manchu regime's attitude toward the emigrants, from unfriendliness to sympathetic interest, was useful to the overseas nationalists and helped shape the course of their movement. It does not appear, however, that the Ch'ing dynasty is to be credited with a leading role in the nationalist awakening. The Indies Chinese movement was launched well before Peking, to any meaningful extent, turned its attention southward.

The weapons of the nationalist leadership did not include violence. Isolated outbursts of mob action were not planned by the leading group. The threat of force implied by the unification of the Chinese was probably recognized as a valuable bargaining tool to use in dealing with the Dutch, although few seem to have been crude enough to mention this resource. Dutch fear, whether justified or not, was an ally of Chinese nationalism. But it must also be recognized that the Netherlands authorities very likely came to their more tolerant view of the Chinese in part because of their own commitment to humanitarian principles. Dutch rule was despotic, but it came to be tempered by idealism.

The last of the sources of strength for consideration is the system of communications serving the Chinese. Their commercial position had required the development of habits and facilities encouraging the exchange of information within the Indies and abroad. Prenationalist economic activity had, in other words, furthered the social mobilization of the Indies Chinese. It is difficult to imagine how the pan-Chinese effort could have achieved the early realization of its goals without the pre-existence of this communications network. It was, significantly, the commercial class, largely Peranakan in origin, which supported and led the nationalist movement.

Symbols are the indispensable tools of nationalism. Those things, common language, territory, history, religion, and so on, often enumerated as "the building blocks of nationalism," serve a dual function in the creation of national consciousness. As indicated in the introductory section of this study, a people in possession of certain of these assets is likely to be linked together by common channels of social communication. These resources can also serve as symbols in the process of nationalist mobilization. If they do not already exist, they must be fashioned.

At the opening of their movement, the Indies Chinese were not particularly rich in the required symbols; their extensive program in education was needed to overcome this deficiency. The fact of their separateness and the practice of their own customs had symbolic value in the nationalist awakening. Little else was available to meet the demands of nationalism. The culture and historical tradition of China were, in the form of reborn Confucianism, introduced into the Indies. A language useful primarily as a symbol was taught in the new schools. Kuo-yü seems to have been regarded as having some mystical value; its practical usefulness to the great majority of those who studied it is difficult to see.

The local leadership of the movement served their cause not only through their direct efforts; they can be regarded as having also functioned as symbols of Chinese modernity and success. The visiting dynastic officials shared this symbolic role and had the added appeal of representing other symbols, the emperor and the homeland of Chinese culture. The reformers and revolutionaries with whom the Indies Chinese came in contact, through personal experience or hearsay, like the local leaders, symbolized the hope for Chinese progress; they did not, however, achieve firm standing as symbols of success. K'ang Yu-wei,

in addition to his contribution as a symbol, furthered the nationalist movement by stimulating early intellectual activity. Sun Yat-sen was of almost exclusively symbolic usefulness, seeking, in fact, to exploit rather than aid Indies Chinese nationalist mobilization. The 1911 Revolution was for a short period a stirring symbol, but it soon was seen to have brought more chaos than security.

This discussion of symbols highlights, to this writer at least, the importance of education as the foundation and driving force of overseas Chinese nationalism in Netherlands India. The schools provided many of the symbols of the movement; Kuo-yü, a knowledge of China's history, and a respect for Chinese cultural institutions were all encouraged. In addition to these contributions to the sense of national pride, the schools offered pupils practical training. Mathematics, geography, and English were taught to meet needs arising from commercial activity. Thus the reformed schools sought to provide both emotional and economic benefits. The willingness of the Batavia THHK to cooperate with the colonial authorities in the planning of the Dutch-Chinese schools can be taken as evidence of the fact that practicality ranked alongside nationalism in the educational movement. The provision of schooling for girls by the new schools seems to emphasize the significance of the Western example on which the schools were built. Furthermore, THHK leaders obviously recognized the fact that their cause would be well served if both the mothers and fathers of future generations were equipped to instill national consciousness in their children.

The educational effort clearly worked to indoctrinate the children for ongoing nationalism. Parents were also likely to be drawn more closely into the nationalist camp by the schools. It requires little

imagination to see that Indies Chinese parents must have glowed with pride when their children were able to recite passages in Kuo-yü. The present writer can, from personal and exhausting experience, testify that the school play is still an important part of Chinese education in Indonesia and that parental attendance at such performances is heavy.

The THHK movement taught the Indies Chinese to cooperate effectively in community endeavors. Establishing the financial base of the new school system required extensive planning and public generosity. Habits of working together to achieve ends in education later could serve to unite the group for other nationalist efforts. The link with China, particularly through the school inspectors, teachers, and imported books, was made more solid by the activities of the THHK associations. Finally, the successful operation of an independent Chinese system of education compelled the Netherlands colonial regime to meet the demands of the Chinese for admission to government schools. The granting of educational facilities to the Chinese by the government opened the way for an abolition of the discriminatory laws which had given rise to the familiar list of Chinese grievances. Education, then, was the chief means for the nationalist mobilization and the social, political, economic, and psychological elevation of the Indies Chinese.

Certain broader comments on the movement studied can also be presented. The Indies Chinese were definitely not seeking to establish themselves on a national territorial base. According to the record, no statement was ever put forward to suggest setting up a separate nation-state in Netherlands India or elsewhere as a haven for the overseas Chinese. On the contrary, the commercial interests of the Chinese minority in the colony demanded that free residence throughout the

archipelago be won. Cultural, not geographic, separateness was the basis of the Indies Chinese claim for national identity.

Not only were these Chinese free of any territorial ambitions in Southeast Asia; the great majority showed no interest in emigration to China. The ancestral land could serve as a spiritual home, but, with the exception of some contract coolies and a few other migrants, most of them from the Outer Possessions, nobody seems to have given China much thought as a home to reside in physically. Indies Chinese nationalism was not a sort of Far Eastern Zionism.

The subjects of this investigation of course gave thought to using China for the attainment of concrete goals as well as for symbolic purposes. It was vaguely hoped by some Indies Chinese that protection could be received from the Peking government. This threat of outside interference in the affairs of the Dutch possessions did indeed come to be taken into careful consideration by the colonial authorities. The diplomatic pressure China managed to bring on the Dutch was evidence of Peking's interest in the emigrants. The Indies Chinese were willing to pay the homeland government for its services in this respect. But the willingness to contribute financial support to official Chinese enterprises seems to have fluctuated in direct relation to China's apparent power to achieve results. When the homeland seemed capable of winning a political place in the world or of serving the interests of the Indies Chinese, overseas support of Peking was fairly generous. When the Chinese government appeared internationally despised and ineffectual, as at the very end of the dynasty or after the collapse of cooperation between Yuan Shih-k'ai and the dedicated Republicans, the flow of emigrant remittances to China was diminished. Similarly, financial support for Sun Yat-sen seems to have been offered most

liberally when the process of revolution was thought likely to make China strong and respected. In other words, in the matter of the relations between political groups in China and the Indies Chinese, nothing succeeded like success. A natural desire to obtain solutions to their own problems, not a purely idealistic interest in China's future, appears to have been the motivating power behind many of the actions of the Indies Chinese. While loyalty to China as a symbol and as a potential ally developed, the realistic goals of the Indies Chinese were never forgotten.

## Application to the Problem of Minority Nationalism

A minority people desirous of transforming itself into a national minority must possess certain resources to be used in the process of national mobilization. A sufficient number of participants in the movement, nationalist symbols, and financial and intellectual resources come to mind as essential ingredients of minority nationalism. It also appears that a transient minority, with no permanent stake in its country of residence, will be unwilling to make the required investment for a long-term nationalist effort. Obviously, despite having undergone a degree of assimilation to the majority, the minority must consider itself a separate and distinct people and wish to remain so. Although a people so downtrodden as to be denied a minimum of the resources just discussed will be incapable of achieving any rapid nationalist mobilization, a minority is doubtless turned to nationalism by a measure of discrimination against it. Because assimilation to the majority is hopelessly beyond reach or thoroughly distasteful, nationalism must appear to be the only avenue for the betterment of the minority. Finally, if

minority nationalism is to flourish, the majority population or the ruling elements of a society cannot be willing and able to employ measures of extreme harshness, including genocide, to destroy the movement. Mass slaughter or the exodus of refugees, not constructive nationalism, follow under those brutal conditions.

As history demonstrates, the necessary conditions for the rise of minority nationalism have existed and continue to exist in many countries. Nationalism and its subdivision, minority nationalism, can be employed for good or evil purposes. Overseas Chinese nationalism in Netherlands India in its early years brought great benefits to its followers. Now, with the end of colonialism in Indonesia, there is a feeling among many inhabitants and leaders of the country that progress and stability will depend upon the unification of all population groups. Chinese nationalism is an obstacle to the realization of this goal. Yet, in an atmosphere electric with nationalism, the Chinese cannot afford to forget the techniques so effectively mastered in the early years of their nationalist awakening. The Chinese now feel themselves rejected as full members of the independent Indonesian nation-state. Their own minority nationalism has provided security and promise for too long to be abandoned in a time of change and fear.

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# GLOSSARY

| | |
|---|---|
| Batavia | The former name of Jakarta, capital of Indonesia. |
| Buitenzorg | The former name of Bogor in West Java. |
| Cultuurstelsel | Culture system, an arrangement under which Indonesian peasants produced quotas of export crops set by the Dutch colonial government in the middle decades of the nineteenth century. |
| Ethische koers | Ethical program, the progressive policy of the colonial regime in the late nineteenth and in the twentieth centuries. It called for increased Indonesian living standards, native education, and public health measures. |
| Kapitein | Captain, one of the ranks of the Chinese officers who served the colonial administration. |
| Luitenant | Lieutenant, the lowest of the ranks of the Chinese officers. |
| Majoor | Major, the highest of the Chinese officer ranks. Only the largest centers of Chinese settlement were served by men of this rank. |
| Outer Possessions | All the islands of Netherlands India other than Java and Madura, known in Dutch as Buitenbezittingen. |
| Passenstelsel | Pass system. |
| Peranakan | A Chinese, possibly of mixed ancestry, born in the Indies. |
| Politierol | Literally, the police court docket, popularly a name for the court for natives. |
| Raad | Council, more specifically the Chinese Council at Batavia, a semiofficial body advising the Majoor of that city. |

| | |
|---|---|
| Singkeh, Sinkeh | A Chinese immigrant born in China. |
| Totok | Same as Singkeh. |
| Wijkenstelsel | Zoning system, the arrangement which obliged Chinese to live in segregated areas of certain cities in Netherlands India. |

# SOME NETHERLANDS INDIES EQUIVALENTS OF KUO-YÜ SURNAMES

| Kuo-yü | N.I. Equivalents | Chinese Characters |
|---|---|---|
| Chang | Tchang, Thio, Tio, Tjo | 張 |
| Chan | Tjian | 詹 |
| Chao | Chau, Tio, Jouw, Chow | 趙 |
| Ch'ao | Gan | 朝 |
| Ch'en | Tan, Tam, Tjiauw | 陳 |
| Ch'eng | The | 鄭 |
| Chou | Tjioe | 周 |
| Chuang | Tseng | 莊 |
| Fu | Pouw | 傅 |
| Han | Han | 韓 |
| Ho | Ho | 何 |
| Hsü | Tschi, Tsi, Djie, Tjhie | 許徐胥須 |

| Kuo-yü | N.I. Equivalents | Chinese Characters |
|---|---|---|
| Hsü | Khouw | 許 |
| Huang | Oei, Ng | 黃 |
| Jung | Yong | 容 |
| K'ang | Kong, Kheng, Khang | 康 |
| Kuo | Kwee | 郭 |
| Lao | Lau, Lauw | 勞 |
| Li | Lie | 李 |
| Lian | Liau, Liauw | 梁 |
| Lin | Lim, Liem | 林 |
| Liu | Liu | 柳 |
| Lou | Louw | 婁 |
| Ma | Be, Bee, Beh | 馬 |
| Pai | Pe, Peh | 柏白 |
| Sun | Soen | 孫 |
| Sung | Siong | 松 |
| T'ang | Tong | 唐湯 |
| T'ien | Dien | 田 |

| Kuo-yü | N.I. Equivalents | Chinese Characters |
|---|---|---|
| Ts'ai | Tjoa | 蔡 |
| Wang | Ong, Wung, Honh | 王 汪 |
| Wei | Goei | 魏 |
| Wu | Ngo | 伍 |
| Wu | Gouw | 吳 |
| Yang | Njo, Yong, Jo, Yo, Yoe Ioe, Jang | 楊 |
| Yüan | Oan, Hoan | 袁 |

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