

THE FOUNDATION OF THE PARTAI MUSLIMIN INDONESIA

by
K. E. WARD

INTERIM REPORT SERIES

Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1970

THE FOUNDATION OF THE PARTAI MUSLIMIN INDONESIA

by

K. E. Ward

INTERIM REPORT SERIES

Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
Cornell University
Ithaca, New York
1970

© 1970 Cornell Modern Indonesia Project

PREFACE

Cornell's interest in Indonesian Islam goes back many years and was given an early stimulus by the lectures of the late Hadji Agus Salim, who served as visiting professor at the university in 1953. One of the points which he made in his lectures was that, as a political force in his country, Islam had not assumed an importance at all commensurate with the fact that Indonesia was the largest predominantly Islamic country in the world. Hadji Salim was speaking at a time when Indonesia's principal Islamic party, the Masjumi, was yielding cabinet leadership to the first of many cabinets dominated by secular nationalists. Today, seventeen years later, Islamic political power in Indonesia has become considerably weaker, and the influential Modernist Islamic elements who previously led the Masjumi are without political focus and organization.

Despite the fact that Modernist Islamic thinking is still inchoate and insufficiently articulated for political effectiveness, in the judgment of the present army leadership (as was the case with Sukarno) it is perceived as having latent power which if effectively channeled might threaten the present political balance. Attempts in 1966 to revive the Masjumi, which had been outlawed by President Sukarno in 1960, were thus banned by the army-dominated government of President Suharto; for it too regarded a Modernist-led Islamic party as a potential danger, and its prospects something to be circumscribed and undercut. Finally, in 1968, the Suharto government permitted the establishment of a Modernist-oriented party, the Partai Muslimin Indonesia, but it forbade the men of stature, who had earlier guided Masjumi thinking, to assume leadership of the new party.

In describing and analyzing these developments, Mr. K. E. Ward of Monash University has made a significant contribution to our understanding of Modernist Islam's political failure in Indonesia. He has helped clarify why it has been impossible to build a consensus among Indonesia's Islamic leaders as to how Islamic doctrine is to be applied to Indonesia's political and socio-economic development. Mr. Ward's study thus helps one understand why Islam has not become a political force commensurate with the size of Indonesia's Muslim population.

George McT. Kahin

Ithaca, New York
September 15, 1970

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page
Introduction	1
Chapter	
I. Masjumi, 1945-1960	9
II. The Struggle for Rehabilitation	17
III. The Movement Towards a New Party	29
IV. The Party's Development Since Foundation	40
V. The Government and the Party	57
Appendix	
I. Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin	69
II. Political Parties and Miscellaneous Organizations	71
Bibliography	73

INTRODUCTION

Harry Benda remarked several years ago that Javanese Islam ". . . has usually been studied in the elite context, with the peasantry relegated to a more or less stereotyped background. The result has been that most have tended to take a basically Muslim orientation of the Javanese peasantry for granted."¹ Although the following discussion of the foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia is largely restricted to an examination of events taking place within this elite context, some preliminary comments are necessary on the nature of Indonesian Islam, particularly as it exists in Central and East Java.

The pioneering research of the Harvard group of anthropologists introduced, or at least emphasized, the distinction in Javanese Islam between *abangan* (nominal Muslims) and *santri* (devout Muslims). Describing the inhabitants of Modjokuto, the town where his research was centered, Clifford Geertz wrote: "The great majority . . . pronounce themselves to be Muslims. Within this more general category, however, they make a clear distinction between the santri, the pious Muslim who takes his Islam seriously and attempts to keep it free of local adulterations, and the abangan, whose main adherence is to . . . the 'Javanese religion'."² This latter abangan matrix of religious beliefs is an integration of the three major sources of spiritual tradition, animism, Hindu-Buddhism and Islam. Abangans show a lack of concern for correctness of religious doctrine, and consequently an unwillingness to condemn the religious beliefs of others. The abangans have a detached, relativistic attitude towards their own which has been likened to that of the "dilettante ethnologist collecting quaint customs among the heathen."³ The abangan religious outlook is a syncretistic, accommodating one which seeks "'truth' but not 'the truth' in all religions."⁴

1. See his introduction to R. R. Jay, Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java (New Haven: Yale University, Cultural Report Series No. 12, 1963), p. iv.
2. Clifford Geertz, "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town: Some Preliminary Observations," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 4, No. 2 (January 1956), p. 138.
3. Clifford Geertz, The Religion of Java (New York: Free Press of Glencoe, 1960), p. 127.
4. Benedict Anderson, Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1965), p. 3.

Among the santris (which originally meant students of religion), there is overwhelming conviction of "the truth" of Islam, of its unique superiority as the religion chosen by God. There is general belief among the santris that, however necessary are the prescribed ritual acts such as performance of the daily prayers, it is doctrine that is crucial in Islam: "It is not the knowledge of ritual detail or spiritual discipline which is important, but the application of Islamic doctrine to life."⁵ Santri attitudes towards the abangans are a mixture of exasperation at their failure to follow the simple path necessary to obtain salvation and at their apparent inability to understand the simple, logical truths of Islam which show the error of abangan heterodoxy. This is combined with openly-expressed contempt for abangan laxity and ignorance. At the same time, however, there persists the conviction that there is not much that divides abangans from santris. Thus several decades ago, "It was the naive belief of the orthodox Muslim leaders that all Indonesians, other than those under the deep influence of the *kaum feodal* (feudal elements) or of the West, were as a matter of course basically loyal to Islam and needed only sound instruction, for which they would be duly grateful, to become good orthodox Muslims."⁶ There has long existed an over-riding confidence in the ability of the santris to convert abangans, that is, to induce abangans to discard heterodox practices; yet little has been achieved so far to justify such self-confidence.

The abangan population of Java is scarcely fond of the santri community with its contempt for their beliefs, its intolerance of syncretistic tendencies and insistence that abangans will end up in hell if the santri example is not followed.⁷ Nevertheless, the extent of the Islamness of the abangans is important in considering the size of the Islamic community, the *ummat Islam*, in Indonesia. Abangans still regard themselves as Muslims, and, until recently, there was no tendency for large numbers of them to abandon their, if only nominal, adherence to Islam and embrace another religion, such as Christianity.⁸

5. Geertz, *Religion of Java*, p. 127. This discussion of the abangan/santri dichotomy has been deliberately kept very brief. For a full analysis, see Geertz, *Religion of Java*.

6. Jay, *Religion and Politics*, p. 22.

7. "Fanaticism" is an accusation frequently made of the santris, and an abangan asked what his religion is will often reply "Islam," followed by the quick, almost apologetic reassurance, "but not fanatic."

8. Anderson noted, "There has been an inescapable loss of caste involved in a Javanese becoming a Christian. . . . Like strongly Islamic santris, Christians are felt to threaten

Before considering the ummat Islam question, attention must be paid to an important dichotomy within the santri community itself, that between conservatives and modernists.

The conflict between these two groups originated in the trends toward Islamic renewal apparent in Indonesia from the middle of the nineteenth century. Closer contact with the Middle East and its centers of Muslim civilization produced an awareness of the extent of the compromise Islam had made in adapting itself to local conditions in Indonesia where, especially in areas that had been more thoroughly exposed to Hindu civilization, pre-Islamic practices and superstitions survived, virtually unchallenged. But it was especially after the teachings of Middle Eastern reformers such as Muhammad Abduh and Al Afghani spread to Indonesia that a clear split could be observed between those content with the somewhat diluted Islam of East and Central Java in particular, and those who wished to purify the religion of heterodox elements.⁹ Abduh wished to strip contemporary Islam of alien influences and return to the pristine correctness of the Quran and the Hadiths, which were to become the sole authorities for thought and action. But he also wanted to modernize Islamic education by introducing Western subjects such as science and European history to make Islam better able to accept the challenges of the modern world. However, the fundamentalist, purist approach tended to act in a restrictive capacity on Islam's ability to modernize and made Islamic modernism seem unattractively intolerant. Geertz remarked, "This tense intermixture of radical fundamentalism and determined modernism

the stability of the traditional order by making claims to social honor which cannot be justified within that order." Mythology and Tolerance, p. 3.

9. See Hamka, Pengaruh Muhammad Abduh di Indonesia (Djakarta: Tintamas, 1958), for a description by a modernist of Islamic conservatism in Indonesia at the end of the last century. Paradoxically, a more tolerant attitude to syncretistic practices such as the communal feast (slametan) is coupled, among the conservatives, with a view on religion and its role in human life generally termed "totalistic," which contrasts with the modernists' willingness to grant secular institutions a more considerable significance. Moreover, in contrast with the modernists' attempt to infuse a pragmatic rationalism into their attitude towards Islam, conservatives have in general a scholastic approach, an approach that emphasizes the role played in life by fate (takdir), rather than human will. For a full analysis of such ideological differences, see Geertz, Religion of Java, pp. 150-159; also Howard Federspiel, Persatuan Islam: Islamic Reform in Twentieth Century Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1970), pp. 46-68, et passim.

is what has made the culminating phases of the scripturalist movement so puzzling to Western observers. . . . Stepping backward in order better to leap is an established principle in cultural change. But in the Islamic case the stepping backward seems often to have been taken for the leap itself, and what began as a rediscovery of the scriptures ended as a kind of deification of them. 'The Declaration of the Rights of Man, the secret of atomic power, and the principles of scientific medicine', an advanced *kijaji* (Islamic teacher) once informed me, 'are all to be found in the Koran'. . . . Islam, in this way, becomes a justification for modernity, without itself actually becoming modern."¹⁰

Nevertheless, attacks made by the Indonesian followers of Abduh, anxious both to purify Islamic practice and thought and disseminate secular knowledge as well, were sharp enough to rouse the opposition of the conservatives who, a decade or so after the formation of the modernist socio-educational organization Muhammadiyah, made sufficient compromise with modernist ideas of organization to found their own, the Nahdatul Ulama (NU), to combat modernism. The two major divisions in the body of Indonesians embracing Islam should not be seen as nation-wide dichotomies (the santri-abangan dichotomy, for example, has been thoroughly investigated only in Java). However, consciousness of such divisions has caused, among the santris, a persisting search for unity, for a unified ummat Islam.

An ummat is a community of adherents of a certain religion. Thus in Indonesian there is an *ummat Kristen* (Christian community) and an *ummat Hindu* (Hindu community) as well as the ummat Islam. If contemporary Muslim politicians and the Muslim press are heeded, the impression arises that the ummat Islam has played a most significant role in Indonesia's history. Yet rarely is a definition given of what the ummat Islam comprises. The common claim that the Islamic community constitutes over 90% of the Indonesian people suggests that all Muslims, santri and abangan, are included in the concept of an ummat Islam.¹¹ In another context, however, the assertion is made that the Islamic community made the greatest contribution to the struggle against the Dutch, which implies a comparison not with the tiny 8-9% of non-Muslims in Indonesia but with, for instance, the secularist parties such as the PNI (Nationalist Party). If it is more realistic to restrict the term ummat Islam to the supporters of the Muslim parties and mass organizations (which

10. Geertz, Islam Observed (New Haven: Yale University, 1968), p. 69.

11. For a criticism of this claim, see the statement by Mohammad Hatta in Sinar Harapan, November 19, 1968.

received 45% of the vote in the 1955 general elections), it is clear that much dissatisfaction exists over the position accorded to Islam in post-independence Indonesia.¹²

A village santri may feel himself to be part of an Islamic community which ". . . is seen as a set of concentric circles, wider and wider communities . . . spreading away from the individual santri where he stands: a great society of equal believers constantly repeating the name of the Prophet, going through the prayers, chanting the Koran."¹³ But it was long thought that the desire to have the ummat Islam seen as co-terminous with the nation would be achieved by the establishment of an Islamic State in independent Indonesia. There have been two principal arguments presented since 1945 to justify the conversion of the Pantjasila-based Indonesia to one founded on Islam. The first emphasizes that Islam is the religion of the majority of Indonesians. Thus Mohammad Natsir reasoned that, "The constitution of our country must place the state in the closest possible relationship to the living society within our state. That is, the state constitution must be deeply-rooted in the heart, the thought patterns . . . the feelings, beliefs and philosophy of the people." A democratic country should, Natsir continued, ". . . Above all reflect what is genuinely vital among the people, especially the philosophy of the . . . majority of its people."¹⁴ And Islam was, according to Natsir, obviously the philosophy of life of the majority of Indonesians. He continued that if it was true that Indonesia's religious minorities should not have to accept Islam, as this was alien to them (which was an argument offered by the opponents of an Islamic State), it was also true that the Islamic majority should not have to accept the alternative, a state founded on the secular Pantjasila, for this was alien to them. Closely allied to the belief in the Islamic identity of the mass of Indonesians was the wish to have this identity institutionalized

-
12. It is not feasible to include all the santri population of Indonesia within the ummat Islam, although this would be the most accurate definition for the village level Islamic community. Examination of Muslim sources reveals that the two commonest connotations of ummat Islam are religious, which includes all adherents of Islam even if only nominal, and political, which excludes, for example, santri members of the army.
 13. Geertz, The Religion of Java, p. 128.
 14. Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante (Djakarta: np, 1958), Vol. 1, pp. 113-114. Natsir was speaking in the Constituent Assembly debates on a new constitution for Indonesia.

in the state. A Dutch Islamologist wrote that, in Muslim eyes, "The state cannot be merely an administrative apparatus that has little connection with spiritual, cultural and religious life. It retains its characteristic of comprehensive unity. Thus, in the general Indonesian view, the state . . . has not achieved its proper status, nor can it do so, until it becomes the focus, not only of political administration and activity, but of cultural, spiritual and even religious life as well."¹⁵

The second argument for an Islamic State was based on a conviction of Islam's supremacy as a foundation for a democratic state. It was asserted that Islam provided for "a system of democracy and the rule of law in national life, freedom of the judiciary and the sovereignty of law in the courts. . . . Islam has regulations on all problems concerning art and science, even on the status of non-Muslims."¹⁶ What was considered the spiritual emptiness of the Pantjasila would offer no protection against the mounting waves of secularism reaching Indonesia from the West and of communism from the East. Neither of these two arguments, however, has given any indication of what an Islamic Indonesia would be like.

Geertz discovered two major interpretations on this question. The first was one that envisaged a theocratic state, a state where *kijajis* would dominate. But there was much divergence of opinion on how such a theocratic state would operate, for, as he noted, "Even here the exact methods which can bring about such a domination in the absence of a church organization within Islam is not clear, although people suggest such notions as having a special parliament of *kijajis* to check on secular legislation passed by the regular parliament to make sure it is orthodox, placing *kijajis* in high government positions or appointing the most learned one as Head of State. . . ."¹⁷ The alternative was a kind of general proclamation of an Islamic State, with provisions that the Head of State had to be a Muslim, that no laws could be passed that were in conflict with the Islamic Law (*sjari'at Islam*) and with an emphasis on the teaching of religion in government schools.¹⁸ Since independence, there

-
15. C. A. O. van Nieuwenhuize, Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia (The Hague and Bandung: van Hoeve, 1958), p. 163.
 16. Abadi, February 26, 1969. No hesitation need be shown in quoting sources very recent, as ideas on this problem have a timeless constancy about them.
 17. Geertz, Religion of Java, p. 211.
 18. Ibid., p. 212.

have been both legitimate and constitutional as well as illegal and violent attempts to establish an Islamic State, which have served to discredit the ummat Islam in the eyes of the supporters of a Pantjasila-based state.

The Darul Islam (House of Islam) movement in West Java conformed to the theocratic state ideal, and its support derived largely from traditional leaders and religious teachers. Early in 1948, an Islamic State was set up in West Java with Kartosuwirjo as Imam and President of a Madjelis Ummat Islam (Islamic Community Council), with an army, a parliament, a council on *fatwa* (decisions on canon law) and a loosely-disciplined armed organization called Pahlawan Darul Islam (Heroes of the House of Islam).¹⁹ The movement was characterized by its willingness to resort to brutal terrorism, by declarations of Holy War against the Dutch and an attitude of contempt for the Republican Government which was considered both too compromising toward the Dutch and toward Islam. Terrorism became almost synonymous with the Darul Islam, and, "So great was the fear of the Darul Islam movement in West Java that whatever violence occurred was automatically ascribed to its supporters."²⁰ Darul Islam activities persisted throughout the fifties, and Daud Beureueh in Atjeh and Kahar Muzakkar in Makassar extended the movement to those traditional areas of Islamic strength.

The Constituent Assembly (Konstituante), formed after elections in December 1955, had been established to promulgate a new constitution for the Republic of Indonesia. It was impossible for either Islamic organizations or secular ones to obtain the two-thirds majority that was necessary for their respective proposals to be accepted; deadlock was inevitable if no compromise solution were found. However, the Konstituante gave advocates of an Islamic State a legal forum from which to propound their unchanging ideas on the perfection of Islam, on the unique position of Islam as the religion of the vast majority of Indonesians, and on the guarantee of religious freedom which would be given to minorities. Yet these arguments were no more compelling to proponents of Pantjasila in the mid-fifties than they had been two decades earlier, at the time of the famous dialogue between Sukarno and Natsir, or when discussions took place in 1945 over the constitution for independent Indonesia, or indeed today.²¹ Coupled with the fear of fanatic Islam that

19. van Nieuwenhuize, Aspects of Islam, p. 173.

20. Ibid., p. 174. For a view emphasizing the traditionalist, anti-modern nature of the Darul Islam, see W. F. Wertheim, Indonesian Society in Transition (The Hague: van Hoeve, 1964), p. 228.

21. For Natsir's case in the 1930's disagreement on the role to be played by Islam in Indonesia, see M. Natsir versus Soekarno (Padang: Jajasan Pendidikan Islam, 1968).

was widespread in Central and East Java among the abangan population was the belief that "Islam did not have anything to contribute to a modern Indonesian state."²² When Sukarno dissolved the Konstituante in 1959 it ". . . symbolized the last stand of Islam as an organized political force in independent Indonesia against the triumphant forces of nationalist secularism."²³ But it did not mean that those who had advocated an Islamic State now realized the advantages of having Pantjasila as the state ideology. Rather it has become necessary to institute features of an Islamic State within the framework of a Pantjasila-based Indonesia. It is still necessary for Islam, the religion of the majority, to be given some form of official recognition. Any attempt to achieve a more significant role for Islam, however, is generally seen by the self-named Pantjasilaists as an effort to establish an Islamic State. It is apparent that many feel that the Partai Muslimin Indonesia may try to achieve this.

-
22. Daniel Lev, The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966), p. 125. For a discussion of nationalists' views on Islam and the Pantjasila, see Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1962), p. 356.
23. Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 234.

CHAPTER I

MASJUMI, 1945-1960

It is the proud claim of leaders of Indonesia's Islamic community that the banner of Islam provided the inspiration for the Indonesian struggle for independence. In the nineteenth century, for example, the Padri and Bone Wars, the war led by Diponegoro and the thirty-year long Atjeh War are referred to in support of the assertion of the prime importance of Islam in awakening the desire among Indonesians for freedom from foreign rule. In the twentieth century, the conventional practice of regarding the Budi Utomo as the precursor of the nationalist movement is condemned by Muslim writers who see the Sarekat Islam as the first nationalist organization.¹ After the decline of the Sarekat Islam in the 1920's, however, not only did leadership of the nationalist movement definitely lie with non-Islamic organizations such as the Partai Nasional Indonesia of Sukarno, but also the forces of Islam lost the unity that had been indicated, if only superficially, by the Sarekat Islam's existence. Thus in 1933 the Partai Sarekat Islam (PSII), the successor to the Sarekat Islam, was rent by internal dissension which resulted in the formation by former PSII members of the Partai Islam Indonesia. The two rival social organizations Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah were united in a body called Madjelis Islam A'la Indonesia (MIAI), which was later dominated by the PSII. It was later reorganized by the Japanese during their occupation of Indonesia and replaced in 1943 by yet another federation, the Masjumi.

In November 1945, a new political party was founded to represent the interests of the Islamic community in independent Indonesia, and all the organizations that had joined the Japanese-sponsored Masjumi, such as Muhammadiyah and NU, took part. The Masjumi, as it was called, did not survive long as the sole representative of a seemingly-united Islamic community. It was unique among Indonesian political parties in having both individual and corporate extraordinary members, the latter being considered necessary to attract and retain the support of the mass organizations without compelling them to sacrifice their interests in social or educational activities.² The first major

1. For the most recent instance of this, see the article, "The Islamic Community and the Oath of Youth," Abadi, October 27, 1969.
2. Deliar Noer, "Masjumi, Its Organization, Ideology and Political Role in Indonesia" (M.A. Thesis, Cornell University, 1960), p. 54.

split in Masjumi was the exit of the PSII in 1948, which was followed by the NU in 1952. A recent analysis explaining this disintegration has been offered by a Muhammadiyah leader, Mintaredja. After recalling that the left-wing cabinet of Amir Sjarifuddin had proffered seats to the leaders of the PSII in an attempt to sow disunity in the Islamic community, Mintaredja referred to the "arrogant attitude of several leaders of the ruling-class, namely those who because of their knowledge or university degrees feel that they have a monopoly over general knowledge (secular) and political knowledge, and therefore maintained that the santri and kijajis who by chance came mostly from the NU or PSII should only operate in *suraus* [religious training center] . . . and confine themselves to religious duties."³ What he was criticizing was the apparent unwillingness of the mainly intellectual-led modernists within Masjumi to give positions of power to the kijaji-led NU, or to the PSII, whose leaders felt their ambitions sooner achieved if they constituted their own party in its own right. Several years after its foundation, it was clear that Masjumi was coming under the domination of its modernist wing. Kahin suggested that the modernist followers of Dr. Sukiman and Mohammad Natsir had by the end of 1948 ". . . come to exercise more influence over Masjumi's policy than the remainder of the [leadership] Council's members combined."⁴

After the defection of the PSII, there were three main groups within the Masjumi: the Religious Socialists, that is, the generally Western-educated intellectuals such as Sukiman, Natsir, Rum and Jusuf Wibisono, who were often connected with one of the modernist social or educational organizations, such as Muhammadiyah or the Djamiatul Al-Washlijah; the NU group, consisting mainly of kijajis, led by Wachid Hasjim; a smaller group of "radical fundamentalists" which has been described as ". . . having its origins in the antitraditionalist 'Protestant' movement of which the Muhammadiyah was the main channel, [and which] represented another more militant, illiberal, and anti-secularist current."⁵ The last group was marked by its most outspoken advocacy of an Islamic State, as well as by a tendency to instantly label any opposition to Islamic aspirations as communist. In the two or three years before the formation of the Wilopo Cabinet in April 1952, cabinet seats offered to Masjumi were generally given to Masjumi members from the first

-
3. Mintaredja, Perjuangan Ummat Islam Mengalami Setback 25 Tahun (Jakarta: n.p., 1968), p. 6.
 4. George McT. Kahin, Nationalist and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca: Cornell University, 1952), p. 306.
 5. Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 136.

of these three groups alone, who received three seats to the NU's one in the Hatta Cabinet, three to one in the Natsir Cabinet and four to one in the Sukiman Cabinet.⁶ In each case, the NU held only the portfolio of Religious Affairs. The NU's main source of influence in Masjumi derived from its domination of the Religious Council, but, in 1949, this had become a purely advisory body, thus subordinating religion to politics, as NU leaders alleged. When the Wilopo Cabinet's choice of Religious Affairs Minister was the Muhammadiyah figure Faqih Usman, it seemed to the NU that nothing was to be gained from remaining within Masjumi, and, in 1952, the NU was reconstituted as an independent political party. The unity of the ummat Islam which had been achieved during the revolution was finally destroyed.⁷

The attitude that Mintaredja condemned seems to reveal a tendency among many party leaders from one particular group to regard themselves as being the most representative, and the most capable, leaders of the ummat Islam. This may be, too, a reflection of the attitude which Geertz found in Modjokuto where, "... Each group--abangan, santri and prijaji--sees the political struggle not so much as a process of mutual adjustment between separate interests as parts of a larger society but as a naked struggle for power in which one group wins and the others lose."⁸ Masjumi was not free from this attitude after NU's departure, for, faction-ridden until 1960, the party saw the eventual unhappy triumph of one faction, and the defection to the PSII of the leaders of another. The chief differences between the principal factions, followers of Natsir and Sukiman respectively, were, according to Feith, closer relations enjoyed by Sukiman with the President, and the PNI and NU, contrasted with the links that Natsir had with the radical fundamentalists such as Isa Ansjary, as well as a greater community of interest with the PSI (Socialist Party). Furthermore, the Sukiman wing was more commonly identified with Javanese interests; whereas Natsir's group was thought to be more representative of the Outer Islands, and in greater sympathy with regionalist demands. However, there were many Javanese leaders of Masjumi usually associated with Natsir, such as Prawoto Mangkusasmito and Mohamad Rum, while there were some Sumatrans, for example Firdaus, who were at times highly critical of Natsir.⁹

6. Ibid., p. 234.

7. Ibid., pp. 233-237, for a full analysis of the reasons for NU's withdrawal.

8. Geertz, Religion of Java, p. 213.

9. See Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 234 ff. for an analysis of the factions within Masjumi. During the early fifties, the Sukiman faction was disturbed at the

The Masjumi declined from its position as the largest party in 1950 through one of second-largest in the 1955 general elections, when Masjumi triumph had been predicted, to a situation in the late fifties when, "The dominant mood in Masjumi approached defeatism. Government action to abolish the party . . . would not have been a surprise. . . ." ¹⁰ There has so far been no full explanation offered to account for the startling decline of this party, except within the framework of the decline in the party system in general. However, it is clear that, apart from the lack of unanimity in Masjumi over the question of how to face the growing power of Sukarno and how to avert a semi-alliance between the PNI and PKI (Communist Party), Masjumi was considerably weakened by its inability to control the radical utterances of its fundamentalist wing. ¹¹ Lev observed, "Although many of Masjumi's national leaders were intellectual moderates who questioned the utility of Islamic doctrine in the modern state, yet in the heat of ideological debate they were often drawn towards the extreme positions of the party's religious fanatics." ¹² More particularly, after the famous Amuntai speech of Sukarno, when he warned against the dangers of setting up an Islamic State, the ideological battle was fought in Indonesia, and charges of heathen and communist were hurled at Masjumi's opponents.

However, the fall of Masjumi was more directly caused by its growing identification with the regionalist demands that were voiced loudly in the middle of the decade. Although Masjumi derived some 25% of its support from Central and East Java, half

possibility of the PNI's seeking communist support, or vice-versa, and at the dangers of alienating the NU and losing its support. Thus whereas Natsir had formed a cabinet without the PNI in 1950, Sukiman restored a PNI-Masjumi coalition the following year. Similarly, Sukiman protested at the way the NU was almost driven from Masjumi.

10. Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 136.
11. Herbert Feith, The Indonesian Elections of 1955 (Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957), p. 72. Naturally Masjumi's strong emphasis on Islam, by no means restricted to the fundamentalists, repelled what Castles called "the vitally important class of Western-educated officials and white-collar workers." See Lance Castles, Religion, Politics, and Economic Behavior in Java: The Kudus Cigarette Industry (New Haven: Yale University Cultural Report Series, No. 15, 1967), p. 13.
12. Daniel Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia," Journal of Southeast Asian History, 8, No. 1 (March 1967), p. 57.

of its support came from the Outer Islands, which meant that on the one hand Masjumi was the only truly national party, but on the other: "The distribution of Masjumi's support was unfavorably out of proportion to the distribution of Indonesia's population, and when the conflict between Java and the Outer Islands came to a head . . . , Masjumi suffered the same decline as the regions."¹³ The regional crisis of 1957-1959 was caused by the anomalous economic position of the Outer Islands vis-a-vis Java. Through an unreal exchange rate, the importers of Java were treated favorably and the exporters, mainly from the Outer Islands, were discriminated against; moreover, the foreign exchange earnings of the Outer Islands seemed to be used chiefly on Java, where, for example, the nation's principal educational institutions were located. In parts of Sumatra and Sulawesi, there was widespread dislike and distrust of President Sukarno and his toleration of the communists, and, in areas of Islamic "fanaticism," such as Atjeh, there was distrust of and contempt for the attitude of the Javanese towards Islam. But there was a more profound aspect to center-region relations, for, as Lev perceived, "The Javanese elite saw in independence an opportunity . . . to fulfill the ambitions and promises of Javanese civilization in the new national state, while the smaller and more particularistic societies of the rest of Indonesia recoiled before the vision of their eventual subordination or assimilation in a Javanese-dominated nation."¹⁴

That Masjumi was sympathetic to regional demands for greater autonomy was understandable given the base of non-Javanese support on which Masjumi's strength lay, but other issues were involved in the decision of three national leaders of Masjumi to join the Sumatran army officers who threatened to rebel against the central government. First was the fear that Sukarno's idea of Guided Democracy was inimical to constitutional democracy, and, more seriously, constituted an open invitation to the PKI to increase its strength and influence. Among the Sumatrans were men like Simbolon, whose participation in the October 17 Affair of 1952 had indicated his, to put it mildly, ambivalence to democracy.¹⁵ The ideal of an Islamic-inspired resistance to communist-dominated Java, of a holy war against atheism, may have been of considerable importance, and once they had joined the rebellion (in December 1957 Natsir, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Burhanuddin Harahap left Djakarta for Padang), they tended to cooperate with the Atjeh-based Darul Islam movement in North

13. Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 136.

14. Ibid., p. 3.

15. On the October 17 Affair, see Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, pp. 246 ff.

Sumatra. The hope of achieving a federal system of states which were free to proclaim themselves Islamic was realized during the PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia) rebellion, when a Republik Persatuan government was set up in 1960, with ten constituent states, including the Islamic State of Atjeh.¹⁶

It may well be, however, that the action of Natsir and his colleagues in fleeing to Padang was more a response to unbearable conditions in Djakarta than a long-planned decision which took into consideration the direct political interests of Masjumi. There seems to have been no prior consultation with other Masjumi leaders in Djakarta before Natsir left. Furthermore, these three Masjumi leaders had been for some time subjected to harassment by youths connected with the pro-Sukarno newspaper, *Pemuda*, partly as a reaction to the condemnation made by Natsir of the takeovers of Dutch enterprises in December 1957.¹⁷

Whatever the factors motivating the participation of the three senior Masjumi leaders, Natsir, Sjafruddin and Burhanuddin Harahap, in the PRRI rebellion, the consequences were very serious for Masjumi. On this issue as on others, the Sukiman wing clashed with the supporters of Mohammad Natsir. Jusuf Wibisono, for example, although he desired a compromise between the central government and the rebels, nevertheless demanded that Masjumi condemn Natsir for his extreme action, and he argued, "Any other posture was inconsistent; to refuse to denounce the rebellion and yet to continue to participate in legal politics was two-faced and debilitating. The inevitable outcome of such a course would be that Masjumi's power would disappear altogether, imperilling the entire Islamic cause in Indonesia."¹⁸ A further source of dissension within Masjumi was the refusal of the Natsir group, now led by Prawoto, to replace Natsir as General Chairman of the party, which tended to heighten Masjumi's embarrassment in Djakarta politics. It was not until April 1959 that Prawoto was elected to succeed Natsir, but even then no decision was taken to condemn the leaders involved in the rebellion. Prawoto and his supporters preferred to compete in the Djakarta political arena shackled by the Masjumi's connection with the PRRI, and the party was dubbed "the party of separation and rebellion."¹⁹

-
16. Herbert Feith and Daniel Lev, "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion," Pacific Affairs, 34, No. 1 (Spring 1963), p. 38.
 17. Interview with Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Djakarta, May 1968.
 18. Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 136.
 19. Allan Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," Asian Survey, 8, No. 13 (December 1968), p. 1001.

Prawoto's unwillingness to criticize the participation of Natsir and the others in the rebellion was caused first by loyalty to his comrade, and by a hope that the rebellion might just succeed.²⁰ Prawoto, Rum, Kasman Singodimedjo and others were convinced that the present trends in political life in Indonesia were completely opposed to Masjumi's interests as they saw them, interests which could only be furthered by a thorough reversal of Sukarno's actions. Moreover, Prawoto thought that Masjumi's future strength lay outside Java, and that condemnation of the spirations of Masjumi supporters in Atjeh and other areas would alienate Masjumi's sources of support.²¹ A third factor was suggested by Mohammad Rum, who maintained that by refusing to condemn the role played by Natsir and the Masjumi branches in the regions involved in the PRRI, "The unity of the ummat Islam was preserved intact."²² At the conclusion of the rebellion, the return of Natsir and his colleagues would not signify a split within the Islamic community, but a joyful restoration of unity.

However, the result of the rebellion and the other issues pressing in the last years of the decade was precisely the disintegration of Masjumi, which owed as much to a deep conflict within the party over how to confront these problems as to the actions of Masjumi's opponents. The return to the 1945 Constitution provided the final test of the party's ability to face Djakarta's political demands on a united stand, and Masjumi failed. In February 1959, Sukiman was reported to have said that the 1945 Constitution was consistent with what Masjumi had sought during the post-independence era and that a return to that constitution was the only way out of the deadlock in the Constituent Assembly. He added that he could not express his party's opinion on Guided Democracy, "because he had to seek further explanations from Sukarno and Djuanda."²³ Such an attitude towards Guided Democracy was wholly unthinkable to Prawoto, who found abhorrent Sukarno's violation of the constitution.²⁴

20. For a full discussion of Prawoto's position, see Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 136, and Feith and Lev, "End of the Indonesian Rebellion," p. 37.

21. Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 252-253.

22. Interview with Mohammad Rum, Djakarta, February 1969.

23. Merdeka, February 25, 1959.

24. The best statement of Prawoto's views may be found in his pamphlet, Tempat Hukum dalam Alam Revolusi (Djakarta: Abadi, 1960). It is a moot point, of course, how concerned Masjumi's leadership was at the prospect of constitutional democracy being overthrown, and how alarmed at the likely concomitant decline in Masjumi's influence.

Realizing the futility of the ideological conflict with the secularists, Jusuf Wibisono proposed that a democratic front be formed with the secular and Christian parties to combat communism on the basis of the Pantjasila. "Meanwhile," he argued, "Islamic groups should study the conditions of society and adjust themselves to the national stage of development."²⁵ This highly pragmatic approach was, however, unacceptable to much of Masjumi's leadership, and might have conceivably alienated large sections of the party's regional supporters. Early in 1960, Jusuf Wibisono left Masjumi and joined the PSII, to be followed several months later by Sukiman. At the same time, Masjumi's constituent organizations were restless and anxious lest their interests be sacrificed to those of the party. Before the dissolution of Masjumi in August, the Muhammadiyah declared itself no longer a special member of the party, and so it survived Masjumi's demise.²⁶

Sukarno introduced in January 1960 a resolution on party life which gave him authority to ban and dissolve parties whose bases conflicted with that of the state, whose members were carrying out rebellion or which refused to condemn those party members participating in rebellion. A party violating the conditions of Presidential Decision No. 7 would have to be dissolved by the party leadership within thirty days of issuance of a dissolution decree.²⁷ Although the other main party of rebellion, the PSI, attempted to ban its members from participation in rebellion and announced that such involvement meant automatic expulsion from the PSI,²⁸ on August 17, 1960, Sukarno was able to reveal that his earlier demand that the PSI and Masjumi denounce their rebel members had not been satisfactorily executed, and that consequently both parties had been dissolved. With the Masjumi and PSI effectively removed from the arena of legitimate politics, the remaining Islamic parties no longer rested in the center of the Indonesian political spectrum, but rather constituted the most right wing parties and thus were forced to play cautious roles in a nation that seemed to have swung markedly to the left.²⁹ Islam, it appeared, was destined to enjoy a muted share in the political future of Indonesia.

25. Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 229.

26. Mintaredja, Perdjuangan Ummat Islam, p. 3.

27. Merdeka, January 13, 1960.

28. Interview with Subadio Sastrosatomo, Djakarta, May 1968.

29. The Muslim parties surviving the introduction of Guided Democracy were the NU, PSII and the small, Sumatra-based Perti (Partai Tarbijah Islamijah).

CHAPTER II

THE STRUGGLE FOR REHABILITATION

There has so far been, unfortunately, no analysis of the role played by Islamic organizations during the years of Guided Democracy. This is scarcely surprising, however, as attention was focused on the three main participants in Djakarta politics in that period, the President, the Army, and the PKI. After the dissolution of Masjumi, the constituent organizations that survived independently restricted their activities to non-political fields, although the Muhammadiyah, for example, at times held cabinet portfolios.¹ In 1963, the Masjumi youth movement, GPII (Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia), was banned because of its opposition to *Manipol-Usdek* and its suspected involvement in the 1957 attempt on Sukarno's life. But other Islamic student or youth organizations, notably the NU-affiliated Pemuda Ansor and the independent HMI (Himpunan Mahasiswa Islam), survived, although the latter movement was subjected to a long campaign waged by the PKI which tried to link HMI with Masjumi and have it banned also. The HMI was supported by NU and other religious parties, as well as by elements within the Armed Forces. By April 1965, Sukarno had announced that the HMI was not in danger of dissolution.² Generally, however, Islamic organizations were compelled to adopt passive postures, in the period 1963-1965 especially, when the PKI ". . . had come to monopolize the interpretation and marketing of symbols, acronyms and national objectives expounded by President Sukarno. . . . No group objected to the wholesale expulsion by the Nationalist Party of

1. Even as late as October 1965, the Muhammadiyah held the post of People's Welfare (Coordinating Minister) which was in the hands of Muljadi Djojomartono (who had defected from Masjumi when he accepted a seat in the Kabinet Karya, appointed by Sukarno in April 1957), and the post of Hadj Affairs.
2. See K. D. Thomas, "Political and Economic Instability: The Gestapu and Its Aftermath," in T. K. Tan, ed., Sukarno's Guided Democracy (Brisbane: Jacaranda, 1967), p. 117. Thomas (p. 126, n. 5) erroneously suggests that the HMI was not banned in 1960 along with Masjumi because it traditionally contained both Masjumi and NU sympathizers. It is not clear why the HMI should (or should not) have been banned in 1960, but the fact that GPII, which was much more closely identified with Masjumi, lasted until 1963 is ignored by the explanation Thomas offers.

the liberal half of its leadership or protested the banning of the Murba Party. . . . Every group, however modestly, picked up the clamorous PKI campaign for the ouster of capitalist-bureaucrat . . . officials from the highest levels of government."³

In the regions, particularly Central and East Java, the agitation launched by the communist peasant front, BTI (Barisan Tani Indonesia), to have the land reform legislation of 1960 implemented through the so-called *aksi sepihak* (unilateral action) movement provoked violent reaction from the NU and PNI land-owning class. Clashes occurred throughout 1964 and 1965 and formed a prelude to the later massacres. "Islamic schools," one commentator noted, "not only were hotbeds of agitation against 'communism' and 'atheism' but were also strongly influenced by the richer peasants as an interest-group."⁴ In Java there developed what Castles described as a "new tendency among young Muslims which rejects both the NU (on account of its opportunism and religious traditionalism) and the Masjumi (on account of its excessively Westernized leadership). Their main concern is not politics, but *da'wah* (propagation of the faith). They eschew formal organization which . . . means submitting to government surveillance and leadership. . . . These intense young men . . . probably stand behind some at least of the various outbreaks . . . of united Islamic sentiment against the left in the past two years."⁵

Despite what seemed to be substantial increases in communist strength in the last years of Guided Democracy, the PKI was comparatively easily routed when the murders of six generals, on October 1, 1965, were used by the army to make the communists the chief target in its counter-offensive against the Untung forces. Onto the anti-communist bandwagon set careering forth by the army, clambered many elements of the Djakarta political scene, with demands for the PKI's dissolution and promises of support to army leaders. Until January, however, the initiative in political maneuvering lay with Suharto and his allies, or with the President, and the parties were compelled to proceed cautiously, partly owing to old and feeble leadership, as in the PNI, or perennial disunity, so that: "The army could not depend on public party affirmations to reflect the strength of

-
3. Roger Paget, "The Military in Politics in Indonesia: The Burden of Power," Pacific Affairs, 34, Nos. 1-2 (Spring 1966), p. 121.
 4. W. F. Wertheim, "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup," Pacific Affairs, 40, Nos. 3-4 (Fall 1967-1968), p. 296.
 5. Lance Castles, "Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor," Indonesia, 1 (April 1966), p. 44.

party leadership."⁶ Nevertheless, the NU did at least continue to function as a party. The former supporters of Masjumi were forced to operate through a variety of organizations, until a front was set up in December called the Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin. But the principal role played by Islam was increasingly dominated by youth and student movements such as Pemuda Ansor and HMI, which were involved throughout most of Central and East Java in the systematic massacre of communists and their alleged sympathizers.

During this period, and well into the new year, most national leaders of Masjumi were ensconced in prison. The arrests of "opposition" politicians in 1962 had been preceded by the placing of the PRRI rebels in "political quarantine."⁷ At the time of the attempted coup, Natsir, Prawoto and other detainees were in a Madiun jail. It was perhaps a special misfortune to these Masjumi figures, and a circumstance of considerable irony, that initial steps taken against their old opponents, the communists and Sukarno, were made while they were still in prison. Thus they were not comparable to men like Suharto, Sarwo Edhie and the students, who unquestionably enjoyed the distinction of belonging to the New Order by physical participation in its struggles. It is indeed possible that the political detainees of the *ancien regime* provided inspiration to the demonstrating youths of the Action Fronts. The remarkable public display of emotion at the funeral of former PSI leader Sjahrir in April may be a gauge of the respect with which Masjumi leaders also were held.⁸ Nevertheless it is still true that the old Masjumi leadership was unable to play an active part in the hectic events of the transition from the Old Order to the New. This may have increased a tendency among HMI leaders, for example, to feel independent of their Masjumi elders and, at times, even skeptical of the latter's grasp of political realities. At the same time, the absence of Masjumi leaders from the battlefield, however undesired by themselves, may have strengthened an inclination among elements within the army, to whom Masjumi aspirations were either irrelevant or dangerous, to consider Natsir and

6. Paget, "Military in Politics," p. 300.

7. Masjumi leaders jailed during 1962-1964 included Mohammad Natsir, Prawoto Mangkusasmito, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Burhanuddin Harahap, Mohammad Rum, Yunan Nasution, Kasman Singodimedjo, Anwar Harjono, Hamka and Isa Ansary. There were also a number of GPII figures arrested, including E. Z. Muttaqien, Soemarsono and Achmad Buchori (or Buchari).

8. See the detailed account of Sjahrir's funeral in Rosihan Anwar, Perjalanan Terakhir Pahlawan Nasional Sutan Sjahrir (Jakarta: Pembangunan, 1966).

other detainees as the jetsam of the old government rather than as heroes who deserved a place in the new one.⁹ Anyway, it was not until May or June 1966, that Natsir and the other, largely PSI and Masjumi, detainees were released from their confinement in Djakarta.¹⁰ The long delay in releasing these men seems to have been caused by two closely interconnected factors. First, the preoccupation of Suharto and the central leadership of the army with eliminating the PKI and then cautiously edging the compromised Sukarno out of real power probably prevented serious consideration of what to do with the political prisoners of Sukarno's government. Second, the concomitant desire for a state of *aman* (peace, security), for public security was needed while the latter objective of confronting Sukarno was being canvassed. The Action Fronts, which after January 1966 became increasingly independent of, and often in conflict with, the immediate objectives of Suharto, were a sufficient nuisance for the army to contend with.¹¹

It should be recalled that the Masjumi which emerged from the prisons of Java and Djakarta comprised a leadership that came mainly from the Natsir group, with the fundamentalists such as Isa Ansjary. Sukiman and Jusuf Wibisono had remained in the PSII, so that for some time it seemed that Masjumi, though still lacking the right to exist as a party, was rid of the chronic disunity that had led to its downfall. However, the endeavors launched throughout 1966 to achieve restoration of the party's right to participate in Indonesian politics were not fully concerted. Two committees, or fronts, were formed to struggle for the rehabilitation of Masjumi neither of which was destined to receive an official reply from the government.

-
9. For a discussion of conflicting attitudes within the army towards the Masjumi and PSI, which found sympathy with various regionally-based officers and hostility from others who disapproved of their pro-Western orientation or role in the PRRI, see Herbert Feith, "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy," in Ruth T. McVey, ed., Indonesia (New Haven: HRAF, 1963), p. 343. It seems unobjectionable to assume that four years afterwards the same differences were to be found, in a greater or lesser degree.
 10. The funeral of Sutan Sjahrir saw most of his fellow prisoners let out during the ceremony and then rather pathetically returned to their place of detention. Several days later, the Catholic newspaper, Kompas (April 12, 1966) asked: "What is the fate of the political prisoners still in jail, who like Sjahrir once served their country as ministers? Are they to suffer further?"
 11. See Paget, "Military in Politics," for the best account of this period.

Apparently, senior officers in Djakarta suspected that student demonstrations launched in early 1966 were being manipulated by GPII and Masjumi figures. At a meeting between Major-General Amir Machmud, Commander of the Greater Djakarta Area, and a delegation of nine Masjumi or GPII representatives led by Faqih Usman held on May 9, Amir suggested that those two organizations had been behind current student demonstrations.¹² From the Masjumi/GPII side, this encounter with Amir Machmud had taken some time to arrange, and it constituted the first effort to get off the ground the campaign for the rehabilitation of both organizations. Two GPII leaders, Buchori and Hasan Suraatmadja, began in February to contact Amir's younger brother, an old school friend of the latter, and it took three months for Amir himself to agree to meet representatives of the GPII and Masjumi. During the following years, attempts to achieve first rehabilitation of Masjumi and then legalization of a new party were continuously made through a pattern of informal contacts with friends or acquaintances of Masjumi men within the army.

The May meeting was significant in so far as it revealed the first presentation of the Masjumi's case for rehabilitation. Both the GPII and Masjumi, in fact, surrendered documents to Amir expounding the reasons why rehabilitation was justified.¹³ Encouraged, perhaps, by the current slogans of upholding justice and democracy then popular among the Action Fronts, the first outline of the Masjumi case was based on historical arguments and legal questions surrounding the role of the party in the 1958 rebellion. The main defense against the charge of not having condemned their leaders involved in the PRRI was a speech made by Prime Minister Djuanda in parliament late in February 1958. Djuanda had declared: "The government is of the opinion that although men involved in the rebellion may be leaders of a political party, nevertheless it is not the party but its members who have broken the law."¹⁴ Moreover, ran the Masjumi

-
12. Interview with Achmad Buchori, Djakarta, March 1969. Buchori denied the general's charge, and said that the student outbreaks had been "spontaneous."
 13. See S. U. Bajasut, Fakta Documenta (n.p., n.d.), Vol. VI, p. 14. This is the last volume in a series of six booklets on Masjumi and the development of the new party. The other main account of the Partai Muslimin in Indonesian is Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Djakarta: Jajasan Kesedjahteraan dan Perbendaharaan Islam, 1968).
 14. Bajasut, Fakta Documenta, p. 36. It may be noted that this was not Djuanda's final statement on this issue. In August of the same year, he admonished all groups in parliament to take a firm stand in condemning their members who had joined the PRRI. See Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 139, n. 13.

argument, since 1962, those who had rebelled had received amnesty, and so should Masjumi. The dissolution of that party could not be divorced from the maneuvering of the PKI, and reference was made to the attempt of Prawoto to sue the government in 1960 for the dissolution of Masjumi. Finally, while it was admitted that there would always be slander, the document given to Amir refuted the common slander against Masjumi, that it opposed Pantjasila.¹⁵

It may be useful to compare the Masjumi's posture on its rehabilitation in 1966 with the tactics adopted by the PKI in a not dissimilar situation fifteen years earlier. Hindley recorded that, after 1951: "The Aidit leadership directed much of the party's propaganda and activities to building a favorable image of the PKI as a nationalist, anti-colonial party, as a party sympathetic to religion, as a responsible party opposed to the use of violence in the pursuit of political objectives, and as a resolute defender of democracy. That the PKI lacked this image at the beginning of 1951 was partly the result of the Madiun rebellion, in which the communists had attacked the central government during the war against the Dutch, and in which they had murdered many santri. In short, without this favorable image, it would have been very difficult, probably impossible, to win mass support."¹⁶ Masjumi in 1966 did not have the problem of winning mass support, at least its leaders were confident their policies would invariably be endorsed by their supporters, should they be given the opportunity to demonstrate approval. But Masjumi was still on the periphery of the Indonesian political scene, in the sense that it lacked legitimacy and until it gained rehabilitation it could not play a satisfying role in national politics, a role that offered the party a future.

Unlike the PKI, however, Masjumi saw no need, apparently, to change its justification for past errors, denying that any errors had been committed. Quite the contrary, following the

15. Bajasut, Fakta Documenta, p. 36.

16. Donald Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1963 (Berkeley: University of California, 1964), p. 121. This comparison with the PKI would of course be highly offensive to any Masjumi member (or to any communist, for that matter) and it should not be taken too far. But the distinction is not always kept in mind by elements of the army; for example, a local military command in South Djakarta recently instructed all lurahs (village headmen) to provide lists of all inhabitants who were former members of either PKI or Masjumi. See Mertju Suar, June 10, 1968

course of Guided Democracy and the 1965 coup d'etat, Masjumi leaders felt their previous actions of opposition to Sukarno and even rebellion against his government had been justified by history. They argued that if the PRRI had won wider support (presumably from those who now attacked Sukarno willingly), the authoritarian Sukarno and the PKI would have been restrained, and the tragedy of Crocodile Hole averted.¹⁷ Now that the PKI had been so conclusively discredited as treacherous and unpatriotic, it was up to the rest of the political elite and the government to accord Masjumi the recognition it so singularly deserved as the earliest champion of anti-communism and anti-Guided Democracy.¹⁸

Masjumi's opponents, however, saw no need to grant recognition to that party, a former rebel party whose leaders had "revolted against the state."¹⁹ It was widely considered that the government of 1958 was not yet the evil government later dubbed the Old Order, and at that time, Sukarno was quite different from the dictatorial leader he later became. Thus there could be no justification for rebellion. The PRRI's motives were seen in terms of Islamic ideals and federalist intentions, and the men who had in 1958 been stamped "anti-nationalist, pro-Western and accomplices of colonialism and imperialism,"²⁰ found that these and other labels, such as "fanatical Muslims," stuck even after the fall of Sukarno. It has been stressed sufficiently by Western observers that it was the army under General Nasution that was instrumental in the introduction of Guided Democracy.²¹ The army leadership in 1966 was unlikely to make

-
17. It is common to see the murders of the six generals (whose bodies were found at Crocodile Hole) as the logical outcome of Guided Democracy, which views seems to ignore the army's role in the introduction of Guided Democracy. See, e.g., Amura's article in Operasi, October 24, 1968.
 18. Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1005.
 19. That they had rebelled not only against the central government but also against the unitary state of Indonesia would probably be denied by the PRRI rebels, yet the Federal Republic of Indonesia government they set up in 1960 was enough to convince Djakarta of the federalist threat.
 20. Jan Pluvier, Confrontations (Kuala Lumpur: Oxford University, 1965), p. 53.
 21. For the best account of the army's role in Guided Democracy's introduction, see Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy.

public admission of Masjumi's correctness in opposing Guided Democracy, but this notwithstanding, old Masjumi leaders such as Prawoto almost inevitably adopted a position, at times bordering on self-righteousness, which others found either completely unjustified or containing an inherent threat to their own positions or reputations. The NU, for example, would have been seriously embarrassed had Masjumi's right to rebel against Guided Democracy been conceded.²² To put it bluntly, large sections of the modernists entered the New Order with a chip on their shoulder, and the refusal of most other political forces to acknowledge their martyrdom increased the frustration they felt.²³ Some observers who considered Natsir and Sjafruddin rash in joining the PRRI even believed that after their surrender and imprisonment these Masjumi leaders became more fanatic than ever before.²⁴

After the release of Prawoto, Natsir, Rum and other leaders in May, a committee was set up to seek formally the restoration of Masjumi's legitimacy. Named the Committee for the Rehabilitation of Masjumi, this was chaired by a former Sumatran leader of Masjumi, Sjarif Usman, who had participated in the PRRI in Padang. There is unfortunately little record of this committee's activities, and its membership has not been published. But it is safe to assume that it was largely under the guidance of Faqih Usman, and through him, of Prawoto.²⁵ Throughout the latter half of 1966, representatives of this committee continued the informal contact established with Amir Machmud and other key generals, such as Kemal Idris, Sutjipto and Alamsjah, as well as with Colonel Ali Murtopo.²⁶ During this period, which lasted until December, a variety of organizations came out in support

-
22. See Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1004. This section is almost wholly based on interviews with senior officers (Colonels and Brigadier-Generals) in Djakarta, but very similar opinions have been expressed by a variety of civilian politicians, from the Christian parties, the PNI, NU and PSII.
 23. The term "modernist" is admittedly very vague. The organizations most conscious of the injustice done to Masjumi seemed to have been the PII and the GPII.
 24. General Simatupang was particularly emphatic on this point in an interview in Djakarta in March 1969.
 25. Faqih Usman's prominence seems to have come largely from his position as the most senior Masjumi leader not imprisoned during Guided Democracy.
 26. Interview, Muttaqien, Djakarta, February 1969.

of Masjumi's demand for rehabilitation. Although, not surprisingly, most declarations of support were from former constituent member organizations, such as Muhammadiyah, or ones closely identified with Masjumi, such as Peladjar Islam Indonesia (PII), there were also several independent associations that issued statements favorable to the party or called for justice to be done to banned parties. In August, for instance, a symposium held in Djakarta to discuss the forthcoming general elections issued a declaration endorsing rehabilitation of Masjumi and the PSI in order to "guarantee that democracy is not merely accorded lip-service," and it was hoped that all formerly-banned organizations such as Murba might be able to participate in the elections.²⁷

Seemingly of greater significance, the Second Army Seminar in Bandung, while not espousing the cause of Masjumi's rehabilitation, nevertheless recommended that members of disbanded political parties such as Masjumi should be allowed to take an active part in political life. Several months later, a national conference of the Lawyers' Association (Persahi) declared in Djakarta that the dissolution of Masjumi and the PSI had been illegal and unconstitutional. Furthermore, the rehabilitation of the two parties would serve to consolidate the New Order.²⁸ Thus it was that supporters of Masjumi were optimistic about their party's rehabilitation: "By December 1966, it was anticipated that Masjumi's rehabilitation would occur very shortly."²⁹ But in this atmosphere of hopeful expectation, the regional commanders of the Armed Forces issued a statement on December 21 in which Masjumi was coupled with the PKI in having once deviated from the 1945 Constitution. This offensive reference induced the former General Chairman of Masjumi, Prawoto, to publish an immediate denial, and, in a press-release, he noted that it was "a great irony that Masjumi, which always invoked us to remain loyal to the Constitution, has now been grouped with those who have deviated from it."³⁰

Prawoto was sufficiently jolted by the December statement to write to Suharto and request a meeting with him to discuss Masjumi's rehabilitation. In his quite brief letter, Prawoto argued that for him, "As the first man responsible in Masjumi

-
27. Bajasut, Fakta Documenta, p. 15. The symposium was sponsored by the University of Indonesia, the Graduates' Front and the National Cultural Research Institute.
 28. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
 29. Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1004.
 30. Karya Bhakti, December 28, 1966.

when it was dissolved, the Ampera Cabinet constitutes the only hope of a return to a democratic legal system in our country. . . . I am fearful [he continued] lest the Armed Forces' December statement be misused by elements who wish to fish in troubled waters and thereby seriously endanger the consolidation of the New Order."³¹ Although the contents of Prawoto's letter mainly comprised a reiteration of the case earlier presented by Faqih Usman at the May meeting, it was significant in that it elicited a succinct exposition of Suharto's stand on this issue.³² In his reply of January 6, Suharto made it clear that he would not countenance rehabilitation of Masjumi. He said that he still had to observe Presidential Decision No. 7/1959, and he reminded Prawoto that Masjumi had in fact failed to castigate those of its members who joined the PRRI. Suharto trusted that Prawoto would understand his position, for a rebellion could not be tolerated, and action had to be taken against it. He explained that the Armed Forces as a whole, and soldiers' families in particular, who had suffered greatly in the campaign to quell the PRRI and the Darul Islam, were completely unprepared to accept restoration of Masjumi. "Juridical, constitutional and psychological considerations have brought the Armed Forces to one view-point, that is, that the party cannot be rehabilitated." Suharto finally added insult to injury by disclaiming that the special mention of Masjumi in the December statement had any significance, for what was meant was merely that the Armed Forces were resolved to put down any attempt at deviation from Pantjasila and the 1945 Constitution. Suharto hoped that Prawoto could see the problem in the right perspective and thus avoid any abuse of the December statement.³³

It appears that Suharto was quite unimpressed with the case for Masjumi's rehabilitation, and we may surmise that any further attempts to open the door that he had thus slammed shut would not be appreciated. Nevertheless, after waiting two months Prawoto wrote again and elaborated in some detail the reasons for his party's revival. In this second and much longer

31. Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, p. 55.

32. At the time, General Suharto was chairman of the ruling Presidium. It seems that Prawoto was unwilling to publicly lead the rehabilitation campaign owing to his belief that Suharto was too preoccupied to give serious thought to the problem. Interview with Prawoto, Djakarta, May 1968.

33. Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, pp. 53-55. Although marked urgent, Suharto's letter took over two weeks to reach Prawoto's house, by which time copies had been distributed to regional military commanders. Prawoto interview, May 1968.

letter, Prawoto capitalized on the prevailing anti-Sukarno atmosphere by reminding Suharto of Masjumi's strong opposition to the President ten years earlier. He suggested that the Presidential Decision quoted by Suharto was unconstitutional, as it contravened Article 28 of the 1945 Constitution, which guaranteed freedom of association. Masjumi had in fact, maintained Prawoto, declared the PRRI to be unconstitutional, and he asked how the party could have condemned those members who had participated in the rebellion, since in the regions such as West Sumatra where rebellion occurred, the party had been banned, so that local Masjumi men were no longer party members. Just as Suharto believed any form of revolt intolerable, so Masjumi had opposed the revolt (i.e., the unconstitutional actions) of President Sukarno. Prawoto ended with a bold challenge: "Would it not be more responsible of the Armed Forces which are resolved on holding high law and constitution if they changed their standpoint and . . . declared that Masjumi must be rehabilitated?"³⁴

Suharto's reaction to this second appeal is not known. He neither replied nor granted Prawoto's request for an interview. It may be appropriate at this time to observe that Prawoto's apologia for Masjumi was just as much a justification of its opposition to Guided Democracy as a claim to rehabilitation. But the party never seems to have rebutted the accusation for which it was, at least ostensibly, banned, that it refused to denounce its rebel members. In recounting his party's opposition to the authoritarianism of Sukarno, Prawoto apparently attributes to the army and Suharto a love of constitutional democracy and even a love of political parties which is scarcely indicated by Indonesian history of the last decade. It is possible that Prawoto was deceived by the reverberating calls for the rule of law and democracy which replaced the slogans of the immediate past. Yet it is difficult to see how any of Prawoto's eloquently-argued reasons could have had much weight with Suharto who was at that time finishing his long endeavor to remove Sukarno from office and contemporaneously prevent disturbances in Central and East Java.

The last attempt to secure Masjumi's rehabilitation was at once a more clandestine and more unorthodox one. Indeed, it is not completely certain that Masjumi's rehabilitation was the immediate aim of the movement that now warrants discussion, the Holy War Command (Komando Djihad). This was officially founded

34. *Ibid.*, pp. 55, 58. The audacity of Prawoto probably angered Suharto, for in mid-1968 a rumor was circulating among Masjumi sympathizers that Suharto had once threatened to return Prawoto and other leaders to their former place of detention, if they were determined to press for rehabilitation against his stated policy.

early in 1967 to provide additional strength to the forces of the New Order in their anti-communist struggle. It was asserted, actually, that the Holy War Command and the New Order were inseparable. The strength of the Indonesian people was held to lie in the Islamic community, which could not be suppressed by either the Dutch or the PKI. The Command had two purposes, safeguarding the nation from total, economic, political and moral destruction and ending the continual slander of the Islamic community by the communists and secret supporters of Sukarno.³⁵

Essentially, the Command was a front of Islamic youth organizations whose aim was to restore the name of the Islamic community, constantly under attack during Guided Democracy, and thus, apparently, to lay the ground for the rehabilitation of Masjumi, perhaps thought of initially more in terms of Islam's rightful resumption of its role as the major force in Indonesian politics.³⁶ After several months of issuing fiery declarations, with Sukarno as a principal target, the Command's activities were banned in Djakarta by Amir Machmud. The chairman of the Command, Abdul Qadir Djaelani, appealed against the ban in an encounter with Brigadier General Sutopo Juwono, Chief of Staff of the Djakarta Military Command. Sutopo Juwono advised the delegation from the Command that: "We must ensure that fighting does not break out between fellow New Order forces. To prevent this, the Armed Forces take steps to control the masses. If society has become a mass inflamed by 'issues,' it will become a snowball that grows bigger and bigger." The Armed Forces, he emphasized, had "the right to level a ban on the basis of security."³⁷ The ban on the Command's activities was not lifted, and subsequently the Command was dissolved. What was of special significance in this short-lived movement, which suggests nothing so much as a youthful attempt to carry on the tradition of the radical fundamentalists such as Isa Ansary, was that its dissolution was ordered on much the same grounds as the government was to invoke in support of its policy towards the Partai Muslimin Indonesia. It may be unwise to stress the Command's interest in Masjumi's rehabilitation, but by the time of the Command's dissolution in April 1967, it had become obvious that Suharto was resolute in his decision not to sanction rehabilitation. Thereafter the energies of many former Masjumi supporters were channelled into a long campaign aimed at founding a new Muslim party.

35. This account is based on Documenta Selecta Komando Jihad (Djakarta: n.p., 1967).

36. Soemarsono (Interview, Djakarta, March 1969) suggested that the Command failed to consult the Masjumi leaders before organizing a program of objectives.

37. Documenta Selecta Komando Jihad, p. 7.

CHAPTER III

THE MOVEMENT TOWARDS A NEW PARTY

To trace the foundation of the Partai Muslimin, it will be necessary to turn back to the formation of the Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin, set up in December 1965 to unite a variety of Islamic social and educational groups, of which many had formerly been constituent members of Masjumi.¹ This front originally had both socio-cultural and political aims, but, by early 1966, it was increasingly interested in the rehabilitation of Masjumi.² During that year, discussions were held between representatives of the Badan Koordinasi and Sjarif Usman's Rehabilitation Committee. At the same time, however, alternatives to rehabilitation were considered and contact was made with ex-Vice President Mohammad Hatta, who was known to be planning a new Muslim party. By October 1966, however, no cooperation had been agreed upon with Hatta, and two months later, the December Armed Forces' statement followed by Suharto's enunciation of government policy on rehabilitation indicated the need for Badan Koordinasi organizations to set up their own party to act as a *wadah* for their political interests.³ At the end of March 1967, Prawoto spoke of much misunderstanding as the cause of the failure of the rehabilitation campaign, and he asserted that if the struggle was continued with patience and wisdom, success would inevitably come.⁴ But in April, representatives of the Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin fixed a dead-line for rehabilitation, after which energies would be turned towards the formation of a new political party.

1. For a list of the organizations represented in the front, see appendix.
2. Samson suggested that the front was set up solely as a transitional step toward Masjumi's rehabilitation ("Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1004).
3. For a discussion of the term wadah (which literally means "receptacle"), see Samson, ibid.
4. Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, p. 4. For an outline of the program and structure of Hatta's projected party, see Rentjana Dasar, Program, dan Struktur Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia (Bandung: Angkasa, 1967). This party failed to gain Suharto's approval in April 1967, and Hatta discontinued his efforts.

The outcome of final deliberations with Masjumi leaders held in April was the historic meeting of May 7, 1967, where Masjumi supporters and delegates from the Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin decided to set up a committee to prepare for the birth of a party that was "to form a political wadah for that section of the Islamic community whose political aspirations are not yet channelled into an existing wadah."⁵ The committee comprised seven members and was referred to simply as the Committee of Seven. Its chairman was the Masjumi figure Faqih Usman, vice-chairman Anwar Harjono, secretary Agus Sudono and the other members were Mrs. Sjamsuridzal, Hasan Basri, Muttaqien and Marzuki Jatim. So began the long process leading to the formation of the Partai Muslimin.⁶ On May 11, the committee met to discuss the problems concerning the party's leadership, its constitution and program. On June 20, Faqih Usman and Agus Sudono sent a communication to Suharto informing him of the formation of the Committee of Seven, of the organizations that it represented, and of their ambition to found a political party.⁷

In his January letter to Prawoto, Suharto had moderated his rejection of rehabilitation by affirming that former members of Masjumi has full rights as citizens according to the law. This was taken by Masjumi supporters to mean that Masjumi leaders would be free to lead the new party. However, by mid-1967, Rosihan Anwar had noted in his *Kompas* column that army circles objected to the election of either Mohammad Rum or Faqih Usman to the party's leadership council. He commented that objections based on personal reasons if not backed by legal arguments would constitute a return to the days of Guided Democracy, where "like" and "dislike" policies were supreme.⁸ The opposition of senior army officers, and of Suharto himself, was one of the main obstacles faced by the founders of the Partai Muslimin, and

-
5. Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, p. 6.
 6. The meeting of May 7 unanimously adopted a resolution that the new party should be called Partai Muslimin Indonesia.
 7. No reply was received from Suharto, and another letter was sent on July 20. On July 25, a meeting was held between the Committee of Seven and three representatives of the government, Lieutenant General Basuki Rachmat, Major General Alam-sjah and Brigadier General Sunarso. A series of such meetings, where the committee reported on progress towards the party's formation, occurred throughout the whole of 1967. See Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, pp. 7-8.
 8. Kompas, July 11, 1967, quoted in Bajasut, Fakta Documenta, p. 23.

they were not united on how to face it or on what attitude to adopt toward the demands of the government.⁹

Samson has described this lack of unity as a "split between Muhammadiyah and those supporting Masjumi figures," but he observed that: "In a way this dichotomy is misleading, for everyone supported the Masjumi figures and wanted to see them in positions of leadership; rather, a matter of emphasis was involved. Muhammadiyah was less inclined to struggle against ABRI [Armed Forces]-imposed limitations on party composition because its own leadership would be relatively unaffected by limitations in Masjumi's participation. What Muhammadiyah wanted was to play the most important role in party formation, reasoning that this role was merited by its strength. Masjumi loyalists were more intense in their determination to guard against an ABRI attempt to limit or exclude Masjumi figures from active roles. No *strict* split was involved. Many supporters of the Masjumi faction were members of Muhammadiyah, many members of mass organizations other than Muhammadiyah supported its position and many lower-level Muhammadiyah members were bitter at their leaders' actions."¹⁰ It might be more accurate to separate the two issues involved in this disagreement, that is the question of attitude towards the imposition of conditions on the party's birth, and the role to be played by Muhammadiyah in the party. The former of these in particular has plagued the party even after its formation.¹¹

Samson has himself offered a useful distinction between "realists" and "idealists" within the body of PMI supporters confronted by army determination not to permit Masjumi leadership of the future party. The idealists were those who empha-

-
9. It is not clear whether this opposition to leadership by Masjumi men constituted a change in policy by Suharto, or elaboration of a policy which Suharto had been unwilling to clarify fully lest Masjumi supporters become completely alienated from his government. The history of the Partai Muslimin shows a series of government demands or refusals gradually more "hardline" in nature.
 10. Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1008.
 11. It is interesting to note a divergence between the two chroniclers of the Partai Muslimin, Bajasut and Solichin Salam, of whom the latter restricts his discussion generally to the lack of unanimity on the problem of how to confront officially-imposed limitations (see Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, p. 13), whereas Bajasut (Fakta Documenta, pp. 26-27) evinces more concern with the ambitions of Muhammadiyah.

sized the principle involved in the demand for rehabilitation of Masjumi, that is that justice had to be done to the former leaders, and the party whose dissolution had been illegal. The advocates of rehabilitation who were reconciled to the idea of a new party were adamant that anti-Masjumi prejudices were not to prevent Masjumi leaders from ruling the party, which would thus be able to "carry on the spirit of Masjumi's struggle," or in other words become a neo-Masjumi.¹² The idealists counselled opposition to army demands and maintained that it would be better to have no party at all rather than support a policy of appeasement towards the government.¹³ The realists held that the most important requirement was for the interests of Masjumi and mass organizations of the Amal Muslimin to be represented in the New Order, and that a political wadah had to be found as soon as possible, whether or not it satisfied all the hopes of former members of Masjumi. Later, it was thought, reconstruction of the party could take place, after legitimacy had been obtained, and then Masjumi leaders could take their rightful place.¹⁴

By August 1967, the Committee of Seven had drawn up a draft charter for membership in the Partai Muslimin, one clause of

12. A clear exposition of the "idealist" outlook was provided by the PII in a statement read at the May 7 meeting. Entitled "The Islamic Community Answers the Challenge," the declaration defended that movement's refusal to support the PMI. It was asserted that: "Masjumi is willing to be martyred rather than parrot the government; this is the quality that has not disappeared from the fathers of Masjumi, and indeed has been inherited by its younger generation. It would be truly amazing if the witness of history which has valued highly Masjumi's character should be obliterated by the leaders of Masjumi itself and not bequeathed to its younger generation."
13. Among the idealists can be grouped the leaders of the GPII (who had failed in their efforts to gain permission to restore their movement), the PII, the peasants' front, STII (Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia) and the senior leaders of Masjumi, of whom the most notable was Prawoto.
14. Such a view was given by Agus Sudono (interview in Djakarta, May 1968). The realists included the leaders of Gasbiindo, HMI, Muhammadiyah and in general the mass organizations of the Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin, but Muhammadiyah, for example, included idealists such as Hamka. On the other hand, among the Masjumi leaders there were some, such as Kasman, who were closer to a realist position, so that the above classifications should not be considered to be without exceptions.

which read: "We in the name of the Islamic organizations signing hereunder without releasing our functions in our respective fields, declare that we support and affiliate [our organizations] within the Partai Muslimin Indonesia."¹⁵ This wording was considered to be objectionable by the Muhammadiyah leadership because insufficient emphasis was placed on the independence of the mass organizations in their own particular fields. Consequently the Muhammadiyah refused to sign the charter. In September, however, Muhammadiyah did sign, after the clause had been rewritten as follows: "We declare we support and affiliate the political activities [of our organizations] with the Partai Muslimin," which implied that in non-political fields, the organizations would be autonomous.¹⁶ The eventual signing of the charter did not assuage feelings outside Muhammadiyah that its ambition to dominate the Partai Muslimin would endanger intra-party unity. Mintaredja indicated frankly that Muhammadiyah, "together with the other supporting organizations, wants to draw up the leadership [of the party] on the basis of *musjawarah* [consultation] and *mufakat* [consensus] according to religious teachings and democratic values in force, *without any external interference*." Warming to his subject, he continued: "According to certain members of the Amal Muslimin Presidium, interference has indeed been felt from outside the Committee of Seven, and, if this has really happened, Muhammadiyah strongly resents it."¹⁷ What Mintaredja meant was that Masjumi leaders such as Prawoto were overly influential in the committee. Mintaredja also maintained that the Committee of Seven itself was unrepresentative in that a majority of its members were Masjumi figures rather than leaders of the Amal Muslimin organizations.¹⁸ The various conflicts within the PMI circles were

15. Bajasut, Fakta Documenta, p. 26.

16. Ibid., p. 27.

17. Ibid., p. 29. The italics are Bajasut's. Mintaredja concluded these remarks by calling for a perfecting of the committee, "so that it would truly reflect the vital constellations of the supporting organizations." This implied that only those Masjumi leaders connected with a mass organization would be eligible: "Those sitting on the Committee of Seven must be selected by the supporting organizations." An alternative interpretation would be that he simply meant that the organizations would have the right to elect the committee members, although the nominees need not be from the supporting organizations. However, no change was made in the composition of the Committee of Seven.

18. Both the chairman and vice-chairman were from Masjumi, but three of the members (Sjamsuridzal, Marzuki Jatim and Sudono) came from Amal Muslimin organizations.

highlighted on October 24, when, at a meeting at his house, Mohammad Natsir told Muhammadijah and Masjumi supporters that they should submerge their differences for the sake of party unity.¹⁹

Negotiations continued between the Committee of Seven and the representatives of Suharto. On September 15, a draft list of members of the party leadership council was sent to Suharto, but did not meet government approval, and a revised list was drawn up on October 31. The two lists are as follows:²⁰

<u>September 15</u>	<u>October 31</u>
<u>General Chairman</u>	
Faqih Usman (Masjumi)	Faqih Usman (Muhammadijah)
<u>Chairmen</u>	
A. D. Sjahruddin (Masjumi)	Anwar Harjono (Masjumi)
Anwar Harjono (Masjumi)	H. M. Sanusi (Muhammadijah)
Djarnawi Hadikusuma (Muhammadijah)	A. D. Sjahruddin (Masjumi)
Hasan Basri (Masjumi)	Hasan Basri (Masjumi)
E. Z. Muttaqien (Masjumi)	Agus Sudono (Gasbiindo)
	Djarnawi Hadikusuma (Muhammadijah)
	E. Z. Muttaqien (Masjumi)
<u>Secretary-General</u>	
M. Sulaiman (Muhammadijah)	M. Sulaiman (Muhammadijah)
<u>Secretaries</u>	
Chadidjah Razak (Wanita Islam)	Umaruddin (?)
Hasbullah (Muhammadijah)	Chadidjah Razak (Wanita Islam)
Lukman Harun (Muhammadijah)	Lukman Harun (Muhammadijah)
Umaruddin (?)	Hasbullah (Muhammadijah)
	Maizir Achmadyns (KBIM)

19. Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1008.

20. Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, pp. 71 and 73. In comparing the two lists, several impressions are felt. Although there are thirty names in each, they are not distributed in the same way; the second has a larger number of chairmen and secretaries, suggesting that the government wanted to give prominence to certain favored ones. The two obvious examples are Sanusi and Agus Sudono who shot up from ordinary membership positions to join the chairmen. The fact that this was an attempt at compromise is clear from the larger number of chairmen in the October list. Even in the second list, however, in the upper level of the leadership council, Masjumi domination is evident, and this is the probable explanation for official disapproval.

September 15October 31Members

Affandi Ridwan (PUI)
 Agus Sudono (Gasbiindo)
 Aisjah Aminy (HSBI)
 A. Djuwaeni (Masjumi)
 Amelz (Masjumi)
 A. W. Sujoso (Masjumi)
 Daris Tamin (Muhammadiyah)
 Djamaluddin (Masjumi)
 E. Sar'an (Persatuan Islam)
 Faisal (Al Irsjad)
 Ismail Hasan Metareum
 (HMI Alumni)
 Maftuch Jusuf (Muhammadiyah)
 Maizir Achmadyns (KBIM)
 O. K. Azis (Djamiatul
 Al-Washlijah)
 H. M. Sanusi (Muhammadiyah)
 S. Buchari (?)
 Sjarif Usman (Porbisi)
 Omar Tusin (SNII)
 Uwes Abubakar (Mathl'aul Anwar)

Affandi Ridwan (PUI)
 Aisjah Aminy (HSBI)
 A. Djuwaeni (Masjumi)
 Amelz (Masjumi)
 A. W. Sujoso (Masjumi)
 Djamaluddin (Masjumi)
 Djazman (Muhammadiyah)
 E. Sar'an (Persatuan Islam)
 Faisal (Al Irsjad)
 Ismail Hasan Metareum (HMI
 Alumni)
 O. K. Azis (Djamiatul
 Al-Washlijah)
 Omar Tusin (SNII)
 Rohana Ahmad (Muhammadiyah)
 Buchari (?)
 Sjarif Usman (Porbisi)
 Uwes Abubakar (Mathl'aul Anwar)

The rejection of what had been considered the maximum result of the Committee of Seven's efforts to balance Masjumi interests with the aspirations of the supporting organizations, or at least the demands of the army to have fullest possible representation of Amal Muslimin elements,²¹ caused widespread disenchantment with the circle of PMI supporters. Deep concern was felt whether the party would ever be able to get off the ground. At the beginning of February, however, Anwar Harjono and Agus Sudono of the Committee of Seven were summoned to the house of General Alamsjah, Coordinator of Suharto's Personal Staff, and told that on the evening of February 5, 1968, they would be received by Suharto to discuss the formation of the party. The agenda might consist of mere checking, Alamsjah said, but that would be wholly up to Suharto.²² It has been known for some time that legalization of the Partai Muslimin would follow such an encounter with Suharto, to whom, it was thought, would be introduced the Committee of Seven, representatives of the Amal Muslimin, and the prospective leaders of the new party. But official invitations received the next day were restricted to all but representatives of the mass organizations. It was only

21. Ibid., p. 8.

22. Ibid. Previously, negotiations had been carried on with Alamsjah, Sunarso and Basuki Rachmat, and this was to be the first official meeting with Suharto.

through the endeavors of Agus Sudono, who had better relations with Suharto's staff than had other committee members, that the Committee of Seven was actually invited.²³ Just before the meeting, Agus Sudono was given a warning by Alamsjah that Suharto had been persuaded by opponents of the Partai Muslimin to review his policy and consequently might wish to discuss the leadership of the party with the February 5 delegation. It could amount to a request to put Sanusi's name directly below that of Faqih Usman, according to Alamsjah.²⁴

At the February 5 meeting, the PMI delegates, consisting of the Committee of Seven and of leaders of supporting organizations, were divided into two groups. The first to see Suharto were the four supporter organizations represented in parliament, Muhammadiyah, KBIM, Gasbiindo and Djamiatul Al-Washlijah.²⁵ Suharto told them that the matter of the rehabilitation of Masjumi was closed, but "some people" were complaining that the Partai Muslimin was simply Masjumi "in a new coat."²⁶ Therefore, as Suharto still endorsed the idea of a new Islamic party, the PMI leadership should truly show that it was made up of a multitude of organizations. This was to ensure that the MPRS Decision No. XXII, of the Fourth General Session in 1966, which called for simplification of party life or the party system, would not be violated. So that the PMI could be seen as implementation of that Decision rather than violation, and so that the party would not be seen to be a neo-Masjumi, Suharto said that for the time being no Masjumi leaders who had been prominent either in Djakarta or in regional branches at the time of Masjumi's dissolution could assume leadership of the Partai Muslimin. He continued: "They can lead from behind. In the future, when you hold a congress and all the Masjumi leaders are returned, that is an internal matter. That is a matter of the sovereignty of the people. I would not be able to intervene again. But now I am responsible."²⁷

-
23. Interview with Anwar Harjono, Djakarta, May 1968.
 24. It is not clear whether rejection of the October list led to any change being made by the Committee of Seven, before preparing to meet Suharto. Neither is it clear whether any suggestions were made by Alamsjah in November on changes that should be made, which would surely have included further promotion of Sanusi.
 25. This first group comprised ten delegates, and the second was addressed by Suharto together with these ten.
 26. Bajasut, Fakta Documenta, introduction, p. i.
 27. Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, p. 8.

On being asked which Masjumi leaders were considered prominent, Suharto replied, somewhat unwillingly, people like Faqih Usman and Anwar Harjono. Then this first group rejoined the others, and Suharto repeated his "advice" that prominent Masjumi figures should not lead the party at its birth. When Anwar Harjono remonstrated that Suharto's assistants had not laid down such a condition during their discussions since mid-1967, Suharto remarked that no matter what agreements had been reached with his staff he alone was responsible for the nation's welfare and political stability.²⁸

Two days later, Sudono was again summoned by Alamsjah and told that the cabinet had been informed of Suharto's decision to recognize the Partai Muslimin, and Alamsjah hoped that the supporter organizations would soon give their reactions to Suharto's "suggestions." Sudono asked who was still objected to by the government, and Alamsjah answered Faqih Usman.²⁹ On February 8, the Committee of Seven met leaders of supporting organizations and offered to resign its mandate to form the party in view of its apparent failure to unite Masjumi elements and mass organizations in one wadah. But instead of disbanding entirely, the committee was revamped, with Faqih Usman and Udin Sjamsuddin as advisers, and Anwar Harjono, Sudono, Djarnawi, Hasan Basri and Maizir Achmadyns as members. It was decided by this committee (now chaired by Anwar Harjono) that Suharto's requirements would have to be met, and a revised list of the party leadership was sent to Alamsjah. But the only change was the removal of Faqih Usman's name, and the consequent promotion of everyone else by one position.³⁰ On February 10, Alamsjah expressed dissatisfaction with this step, and recommended that only representatives of mass organizations be appointed to positions within the central leadership, and Masjumi men be listed only if they were also members of one of the Amal Muslimin organizations.³¹ Thus it was no longer a question of the prominent Masjumi leaders being withdrawn, but all.

28. Ibid., p. 10.

29. Ibid. Why Sudono felt it necessary to ask again which leader had to be removed is not plain, given Suharto's reference to both Faqih Usman and Anwar Harjono.

30. Ibid., pp. 10-11. It is difficult to understand why it was necessary to revamp the Committee of Seven, when only this change was intended.

31. Again it appeared that the substance of official objections was only revealed gradually, so that PMI supporters had to keep on retreating in the face of new demands.

Before taking the next step, the committee elicited a list of some ten men who were unwanted by the government, and on February 14, in yet another meeting, it was recommended by the committee that the following names be removed: Faqih Usman, Anwar Harjono, A. D. Sjahrudin, Hasan Basri, Muttaqien, Sulaiman, Djamaluddin, Sujoso, Sjarif Usman and Amelz. Before finally returning the mandate of the committee, Faqih Usman reminded those present (once again Amal Muslimin organization leaders) that they must obtain legality from the government, that the party leadership would operate until the holding of the first party congress. In any circumstances, he said, party unity should be maintained. At this juncture, however, it was obvious that no such unity existed. The STII walked out of the meeting in protest, the PII was against any effort to found a compromise party, and PUI thought the whole affair might as well be called off.³²

The final composition of the central leadership was presented to the government on February 16, and read as follows:

<u>General Chairman</u>	Djarnawi Hadikusuma (Muhammadiyah)
<u>Chairmen</u>	Agus Sudono (Gasbiindo) H. M. Sanusi (Muhammadiyah) J. Naro (Djamiatul Al-Washlijah) Daud Badaruddin (KBIM) Chadidjah Razak (Wanita Islam) Omar Tusin (SNII)
<u>Secretary-General</u>	Lukman Harun (Muhammadiyah)
<u>Secretaries</u>	Amura (HSBI) Imran Kadir (Al-Ittihadijah) Siregar Pahu (Djamiatul Al-Washlijah) Anwar Bey (PUI) Said Suncar (Mathl'aul Anwar) M. Sjariki (Nadlatul Wathan) Rafilus Ishak (Porbisi) Darussamin (PGAIRI)
<u>Members</u>	Daris Tamin (Muhammadiyah) Djazman (Muhammadiyah) Rohana Ahmad (Muhammadiyah) O. K. Azis (Djamiatul Al-Washlijah) Ibrahim Usman (Gasbiindo) Maizir Achmadyns (KBIM) Mrs. Latjuba (Wanita Islam) Affandi Ridwan (PUI)

32. Solichin Salam, Sedjarah Partai Muslimin, pp. 13-14.

Aisjah Aminy (HSBI)
 Faisal (Al Irsjad)
 Uwes Abubakar (Mathl'aul Anwar)
 Ichsanuddin Iljas (Porbisi)
 Abdul Karim (PITI)
 Saleh Suaidy (Masbi)
 Mohammad Said (Nadlatul Wathan)
 Hasbullah (Muhammadijah)
 Gazal (Al-Ittihadijah)
 Ismail Hasan Metareum (HMI Alumni)
 Alala (HMI Alumni)³³

This was accepted by the government, and on February 19, Mrs. Sjamsuridzal led a delegation consisting solely of representatives from Amal Muslimin organizations to be received by Acting President Suharto. The Partai Muslimin was legalized by Presidential Decision No. 70, February 20, 1968, which stated that the party constituted a uniting of Islamic social organizations not yet affiliated with a political party.³⁴ Thus the Partai Muslimin was not, according to the government, "Masjumi in a new coat."

33. Ibid., p. 15. That this final composition was radically different from preceding ones is indicated by the number of new names in the list. Djarnawi was the only chairman of the original September list, when he was placed fourth in rank under Faqih Usman, Sjahrudin and Anwar (before government demands became more explicit), to survive; he was now promoted to the chief position. Two chairmen, Naro and Badaruddin, were completely new to the leadership council, as were all the secretaries. Eight of the nineteen ordinary members were also new, and the council's total membership was now thirty-five, an increase of five.

34. Ibid., p. 16.

CHAPTER IV

THE PARTY'S DEVELOPMENT SINCE FOUNDATION

The emergence of a legal Partai Muslimin was announced to the public in the following terms: "The birth of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia, which has indeed long been awaited by the Islamic community, is a concrete step in the creation of political stability. . . . In a short time, the first congress will be held and it is this congress that has the highest authority to fulfill all the wishes of its supporters."¹ It was perhaps felt necessary to add this reassurance on the sovereignty of the party congress, for although in general the announcement of the party's formation had little impact in the Djakarta press, it was soon obvious that many misgivings were held publicly about the new party.²

The Bandung student weekly, *Mimbar Demokrasi*, published a series of articles in the two months following PMI's birth commenting on the party's "independence." A West Java HMI leader, Ahmaddan Martha, lamented the fact that the formation of a political party had required promulgation of a Presidential Decision, which he felt would produce a moral commitment between the party and the government.³ Ajip Rosidi argued that the party had been set up to serve the interests of the government rather than fulfill the needs of the Islamic community. Instead of forging unity, a new split had been perpetrated between representatives of mass organizations and the Masjumi elements, both of whom had originally supported the foundation of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia.⁴ Muttaqien used the occasion of the Partai Muslimin's birth to attack the anti-Masjumi policy of the government, from which he, as a potential leader of the party, had suffered directly. He maintained that ex-members of Masjumi should be

1. This statement was issued as a press-release by Mrs. Sjam-suridzal.
2. Most Djakarta newspapers reported the formation of the party by quoting sections of the above press-release. At least four referred to the fact that the party would hold a congress at which the party leadership would be elected. See Pelopor Baru, February 19; Operasi, February 20; Kompas, February 20; Berita Yudha, February 20, 1968.
3. Mimbar Demokrasi, No. 23, March (1st week), 1968.
4. Ibid., No. 24, March (2nd week), 1968.

accorded full democratic rights and asserted that the party's progress would serve as a gauge of the intentions of the New Order regime to act democratically. Democratic life would best be promoted, he reasoned, if pressure groups like KAMI and KAPPI were replaced by strong political parties.⁵

A major source of dissatisfaction among critics of the Partai Muslimin was its dearth of genuine leadership. The seven chairmen of the party's central leadership were virtually unknown outside their respective mass organizations. Although Sanusi, for example, was a minor cabinet minister, he was in no sense a national figure. The contrast apparent to all observers was that between the Partai Muslimin's lackluster men and the respected Masjumi leadership of Natsir, Sjafruddin and Rum, who had played distinguished roles in the revolution and the liberal democracy era. What the Partai Muslimin lacked was "*orang-orang jang berwibawa*," men of great personal authority. The PMI presented another contrast related to its leadership. The PNI or NU were parties whose older generation of leaders had "collaborated" with Sukarno, men such as Ali Sastroamidjojo and Wahib Wahab, who had to be removed gradually, if the parties were to be "New Ordered." Thus Subchan rose in the NU, and the Osa Maliki faction re-emerged in the PNI. But Masjumi and the PMI were different in that the former's older generation had not collaborated with the Old Order and had indeed suffered imprisonment for their opposition to Sukarno. It was among younger Masjumi figures that were found men who took what were considered compromising stands towards Guided Democracy. Coming particularly from the mass organizations that had been constituent members of Masjumi before its dissolution, men such as Faried Mar'uf and Muljadi Djojomartono even held cabinet posts during the early sixties.

An analysis popular among present-day HMI and PII leaders is to see the Masjumi/Partai Muslimin figures as representatives of three generations. The first generation comprises the senior Masjumi leaders, Natsir, Prawoto, Rum and others of the Natsir faction, and is seen as a principled group able to struggle with intrepidity for the promotion of the "interests of the Islamic community." The second generation is harder to identify, but is represented by former HMI leaders of the late forties and early fifties, like Mintaredja, Deliar Noer and Sanusi, by leaders of Islamic organizations who had been anxious to survive the Guided Democracy period, such as Maizir Achmadyns and Marzuki Jatim, and by lower echelon Masjumi figures, such as Anwar Harjono. This group, ill-defined as it is, is considered incapable of continuing the noble Masjumi tradition, perhaps because it matured during the fifties when Masjumi was a highly

5. Ibid., No. 25, March (3rd week), 1968.

significant and influential party. The third generation in this analysis is that of the PII and present-day HMI which gained its first major political experience in the hard years of Guided Democracy when the HMI and PII were subjected to attack by the PKI. Consequently, this last group is closer to the principled outlook of the senior Masjumi leaders. The PII, for example, has become well known for its outspoken defense of Muslim interests and its idealist posture on Masjumi's rehabilitation.⁶

Whether or not three such generations did exist is not clear, but it is true that many of the old Masjumi leaders had immense influence within the Partai Muslimin, even though they were not officially connected with it. This Masjumi family provided a legion of *tokohs* (leaders or figures) who were called upon throughout 1968 to address meetings of the Partai Muslimin in the regions. After the party's foundation, Natsir, Rum, Kasman Singodimedjo, Burhanuddin Harahap, Yunan Nasution, Isa Ansary and other Masjumi leaders visited new PMI branches and gave their public support to the new, unknown Partai Muslimin leaders from Djakarta. One tokoh from Masjumi even suggested that the PMI men only gained respect among erstwhile Masjumi supporters if they were accompanied by one or two Masjumi leaders.⁷ Even then disappointment was apparently widespread among Masjumi sympathizers, one of whom Samson reported as saying: "They [Masjumi supporters] look at the current leaders and then they remember Natsir and Prawoto. How can they help but feel cheated?"⁸

That the Partai Muslimin's appearance on the Djakarta political scene did not attract much interest may have been owing to the presence of other issues of major consequence, particularly the prospect of the imminent Fifth General Session of the MPRS. Indeed it was principally in reference to the MPRS that the Partai Muslimin's first political statement was issued. In a declaration published in the last week of February, the party endorsed early convocation of the MPRS so that the Acting President could be promoted to full President and the decisions of the Working Body of the MPRS be ratified. Furthermore, PMI wanted general elections to be held within eighteen months of

-
6. This analysis was suggested to me by several HMI and PII leaders, including Ekki Sjahruddin, Nurcholish Madjid and Hoesnie Thamrin, during interviews in Djakarta, January 1969. One exception to the generalization on the more compromising nature of the second group is the GPII, many of whose leaders were jailed for opposition to Sukarno.
 7. Interview with Kasman Singodimedjo, Djakarta, March 1969.
 8. Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1009.

the ratification of electoral legislation, which comprised bills on the elections, on the composition of national parliament and the regional assemblies, and on mass organizations and party life.⁹ The strong interest of the Partai Muslimin in the early holding of elections is understandable if the party's strength in parliament is considered. Throughout Guided Democracy, several mass organizations were represented in the appointed parliament, the DPR-GR, as functional group elements. At the beginning of 1968, Muhammadiyah, Gasbiindo, KBIM and Djamiatul Al-Washlijah had a combined total of eighteen representatives in parliament, and in February these joined forces as the PMI faction. Thus the Partai Muslimin, which often tended to see itself as the successor to Masjumi, one of the two biggest pre-Guided Democracy parties, had to content itself with a smaller representation than the insignificant PSII, and with fifty less seats than NU. Not surprisingly, the Partai Muslimin considered itself grossly under-represented.¹⁰

But the Partai Muslimin's desire for early elections was not simply motivated by the wish to achieve a more just representation of the party. In discussing the 1955 general elections, Feith wrote that: "Two main arguments had long been put forward in favor of holding elections. The first was that of democratic ideology: Because Indonesia was now a democratic country elections must be held. . . . A second major argument was the more pragmatic one that elections were necessary for the attainment of political stability. . . . Elections would create a representative parliament and one with moral authority and at the same time lessen the number of political parties. They would put an end to political instability and thereby undo most of the current political wrongs."¹¹ The 1955 elections failed to fulfill many of the hopes attached to them; most notably, political stability was no closer to realization after the elections--if anything, political dissension became more rife and its effects more deleterious. But as Prawoto warned recently: "Does this mean that therefore it is not necessary to hold elections? Of course the answer is that elections are still necessary."¹² The arguments quoted above are apparently just as convincing today, although to a narrower group of people.

9. Kompas, February 29, 1968.

10. As of March 1, the PNI had 78 seats, NU had 75, PSII 20 and the non-party groups had a total of approximately 165 representatives in the DPR-GR. See Daftar Nama dan Alamat Anggota-Anggota DPR-GR (Jakarta: n.p., 1968).

11. Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, pp. 430-431.

12. Mertju Suar (Jogjakarta), April 22, 1968.

If there is perhaps greater wariness about the chances of political stability emerging from the elections, there are few doubts that the democratic nature of the New Order regime must be tested by general elections.¹³ As countless editorials in *Abadi*, *Mertju Suar* (organ of Muhammadiyah) and *Duta Masyarakat* (NU) aver, without elections, the condition essential for democracy has not yet been fulfilled. In fact, to some democracy means elections.

The March 1968 session of the MPRS had to consider, *inter alia*, the following issues: Suharto's promotion to full President, postponement of elections, endorsement of the Five-Year Development Plan (Repelita), promulgation of Broad Outlines of State Policy and framing a Charter of Basic Human Rights. The supporters of the government focused their attention on Suharto's promotion (with retention of the emergency powers provided for in Sukarno's March 1966 delegation of power to him), maximum postponement of elections for five years, and endorsement of Repelita. Scant heed was taken of the Broad Outlines and the Human Rights Charter. The aspirations of the Partai Muslimin, and of the other Islamic parties, were in general opposed to the government's aims. The Partai Muslimin wanted elections to be held as soon as possible; it discounted the need for emergency powers; and, in contrast to the government though not yet in opposition to it, the Partai Muslimin wanted immediate ratification of the draft Broad Outlines of State Policy and the Human Rights Charter.¹⁴

During the MPRS session, the Islamic parties (PMI, NU and PSII) achieved something of a united front and managed to elicit some concessions from the government, so that although Suharto became full President: "His emergency powers had been specified and thus narrowed somewhat. And elections would have to be held by July 1971, before the end of Suharto's five-year term."¹⁵ However, the two issues of Broad Outlines and Human Rights Charter produced a deadlock in the Second and Third Committees of the MPRS, a deadlock which all the Islamic parties blamed on

-
13. This statement applies largely to the PNI, NU, Partai Muslimin and PSII. There is little enthusiasm for elections among the Christian parties, the Armed Forces or the Development Factions in parliament. That the political parties now desirous of elections do not have a disinterested and genuine love of democracy is demonstrated by the opposition of Masjumi, PNI and NU to the holding of elections in 1959, when they feared a victory by the PKI.
 14. See Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format," p. 4.
 15. Ibid., p. 5.

the Christians. The introduction to the draft decision on Broad Outlines of State Policy reached by the Working Body's Second Committee referred to the fact that the constitution was based on the Pantjasila and inspired by the Djakarta Charter. It recommended that religion be compulsory in all schools, from primary level to tertiary. Emphasis was generally placed on the strengthening of religious belief and on the intensification of religious instruction. In the Charter of Basic Human Rights, the right to change one's religion was not included, although this is one of the basic rights mentioned in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.¹⁶ All this is anathema to both Christians and secularists in Indonesia (the Pantjasilaists of the Konstituante debates). The Christians in particular believe that since the successful quelling of the 1965 coup, Indonesia's Muslims have launched a gradual campaign to change Pantjasila-based Indonesia into an Islamic State.¹⁷

The uncertainty on what an Islamic State would be like has produced a tendency among those opposed to it to see any example of Islamic fanaticism as evidence of a plan to convert Indonesia into an Islamic State. Thus the Djakarta Charter is seen by many as highly threatening to the Pantjasila-based state. This charter was drawn up in June 1945 as a draft preamble for Indonesia's constitution. Its most significant discrepancy with the preamble to the 1945 Constitution later adopted was its clause making obligatory for Muslims adherence to the Islamic law (*syari'at Islam*). This clause was rejected by Sukarno and others because it was thought that unity would be impaired if one religious community was given special consideration in the constitution. In July 1959, however, Sukarno mentioned the Djakarta Charter in his decree reintroducing the 1945 Constitution with the words, "We are convinced that the Djakarta Charter of June 6, 1945 inspires the 1945 Constitution and is an integral link with it."¹⁸ The Muslim parties argue that the Djakarta Charter is now a source of law, and must be implemented.¹⁹

-
16. This is an objection raised by Christians who wish to see that right included in the Indonesian charter. The Muslim answer is that Indonesia is not bound to accept all the rights listed in the Universal Declaration, such as the right to strike.
 17. Much of this section is based on private information and comment, from Christians of both the Partai Kristen (Protestant) and the Partai Katolik.
 18. See Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, pp. 128 ff., for an account of the significance of the Djakarta Charter.
 19. There is a complicated argument, which need not concern us here, on whether the Djakarta Charter does constitute a

But there is no unanimity on what implementation of the Djakarta Charter would entail.

It is conceivable that as performance of daily prayers and the other pillars of Islam is prescribed by Islamic law, all Indonesian Muslims, santri or abangan, would be obliged by law to carry out their daily prayers, to observe the fast strictly and so on. Here Pantjasilaists envisage fanatical Muslim religious officials forcing unwilling abangan villagers to attend mosque services and to refrain from eating during the fasting hours. Yet Muslim leaders are quite divided on such a use of force in Islamic matters, some suggesting that there is no justification for force at all in religion, while others maintain that the "no force principle" only applies to conversion to Islam. Once a man has converted, he may indeed be forced to observe its requirements.²⁰ In a sense, Muslim aspirations concerning the Djakarta Charter are not dissimilar to the "Islamic State by proclamation" referred to by Geertz. If the Djakarta Charter were implemented, it is generally agreed that there could be no legislation that contravened the sjari'at Islam, and probably the charter would be used to justify intensified religious instruction in government schools.

The controversy surrounding the Djakarta Charter made it inevitable that its mention in the Broad Outlines of State Policy would create something of an uproar.²¹ Unable to understand Christian fears of efforts to implement the Djakarta Charter, Muslim representatives in the MPRS were furious at the deadlock that occurred in the Second and Third Committees. Immediately after the abandonment of committee discussions, all the Islamic parties issued a joint statement blaming particularly the Christians for the failure to ratify the decisions of the

source of law. For an exposition of the secularist case, see Mahasiswa Indonesia, No. 98, April 1968.

20. This discussion is based on interviews with a number of Muslim leaders, including Natsir, Kasman, Soemarsono and Nurcholish Madjid. It seems that secularist opposition to the Djakarta Charter tends to ignore the purely emotive aspect of Muslims' advocacy of its implementation. The Djakarta Charter is widely seen as the greatest symbolic achievement of the Islamic parties, and this may explain why there is little consensus on how it should be implemented.
21. That it was not objected to earlier may have been owing to a preoccupation of government supporters with what were considered more immediately important issues, such as retention of Suharto's emergency powers.

two committees.²² The Partai Muslimin itself issued another political statement in April 1968 that indicated an overriding concern with religion and what was considered to be a Christian threat. Among demands made by the Partai Muslimin were: that foreign aid for missionary activity in Indonesia should be carefully supervised by the government; that the dissemination of one religion should not be directed towards adherents of another; that religion be made a compulsory subject at all levels of education; and that the Department of Religion should be reorganized by restoring the Directorates-General of the various non-Islamic religions to their earlier status of Directorates.²³

These demands were a result of successful Christian missionary exploitation of Indonesia, especially marked in the three years since the Untung coup. There have been claims that over two million Muslims entered Christianity in the years 1965-1968.²⁴ There are several explanations for Christian successes, whether or not such a large number of conversions has taken place. One writer suggested: "Some come out of disillusionment with their faiths . . . , some out of fear of being branded atheist (communist), some out of an awareness that in a time of revolutionary change some firm direction and lasting values are essential, some out of recognition that for man on his own (secularist or communist) there is no salvation, no hope, no joy, no strength to go on in suffering and frustration; some because of what they see in Christians. . . ." ²⁵ The Partai Muslimin, however, is more inclined to see the startling success of Christian missionaries as the direct result of material aid that has flowed to Indonesia for use by Christian churches and

-
22. Unable to realize Christians' concern for abangans whom they place in a different group to the santris, Muslim politicians fail to understand the motives of Christian opposition to the Djakarta Charter, and they assert that as the charter says nothing about non-Muslims, the freedom of religious minorities will be protected. In June 1968, the first attempt was made to celebrate the signing of the Djakarta Charter, intensifying both Muslim advocacy of its implementation and Christian opposition to it.
 23. I am indebted to the Partai Muslimin secretariat for a copy of this political statement, which was not, as far as I know, published.
 24. Angkatan Baru, January 23, 1968, published a report that two and a half million Muslims had entered Christianity during the three-year period.
 25. Frank Cooley, Indonesia: Church and Society (New York: Friendship Press, 1968), p. 113.

missionaries. This vast amount of food, clothing, books and money is used, according to Muslim critics: to build churches in the midst of strongly Muslim areas; to purchase land at enormous prices to be set aside for church construction; to distribute rice and grant loans to the poor on condition that the debtor becomes Christian; to give help to the families of alleged communist prisoners, with the same condition; to take the children of unmarried servants and bring them up as Christians; and to use young Christian men and women to attract Muslims of the opposite sex.²⁶

It would be no exaggeration to say that the problem of how to face the Christian challenge was (and still is) one of the most pressing issues confronting the Partai Muslimin.²⁷ Significantly, Christian missionary activity, seen as Christianization, was an issue on which all potential supporters of the party were united. There appeared to be no marked distinction between idealists and realists on the need to stop Christianization, but little success has been achieved. In mid-1968, the government made an unsatisfactory response to an interpellation initiated by the PMI's Secretary-General, Lukman Harun, who hoped to bring about government supervision of foreign aid to

-
26. H. M. Rasjidi, Mengapa Aku Tetap Memeluk Agama Islam (Jakarta: Budaja, 1968), pp. 15 ff. Perusal of Muslim newspapers such as Mertju Suar and Abadi establishes that these and other allegations on Christian methods are widely held to be true.
 27. Even the catalogue of alleged Christian misdemeanors provided by Rasjidi fails to depict fully the disgust felt by santris at Christian conversion of Muslims. To a santri, to leave Islam, the chosen religion of God, for any other religion or ideology is to be murtad, to be a renegade or apostate, and the Christians are accused of memurtadkan Indonesia's Muslims. The various similarities between Christian and Islamic theology should not conceal the fact that Muslims have a deep feeling of superiority towards what is considered the illogical religion of Christianity. The Muslim press has become increasingly willing to attack Christianity. For one example, see the letter published in the magazine Kiblat by its editor, Musaffa Basjyr, who congratulates a newly-converted Muslim: "God has rescued you from the teachings of Catholicism, which are unacceptable to a rational mind. . . . You are not in the hands of a Pope or priest whose duties are only to order men to commit sin, which need not be feared because there has been one to redeem them." Kiblat, 16, No. 12 (November 1968).

Christians.²⁸ In the PMI's party council in August, its demands on government supervision and the restoration of the Christian religion's lower status within the Department of Religion were repeated. Response to Christian aggression did create a unifying sentiment, both within the Partai Muslimin and among all the Islamic parties, a sentiment sorely needed.

The achievement of party unity was the greatest internal problem for the Partai Muslimin in 1968. In a sense, however, this was not strictly an internal problem, for the disunity was rather between those hitherto called realists, who supported the Partai Muslimin, and the idealists, who withheld their support. After the party's birth in February, the realists' position was that despite all the concessions that had to be made the party was at least in existence. Moreover, in the party congress to be held as soon as possible the Masjumi leaders could assume positions of leadership in the Partai Muslimin.²⁹ The standpoint of the idealists, of whom the most important was Prawoto, was that public support could not be given to the party as long as it showed discrimination between Masjumi and non-Masjumi figures. The first successful attempt at forging unity between the two groups was a large meeting of ex-Masjumi leaders with the leadership of the Partai Muslimin, held in August at Tjibulan. Among Masjumi men present were Natsir, Prawoto, Burhanuddin Harahap, Djerman Prawiranegara, Anwar Harjono and Achmad Buchori. At this meeting, it seems that the majority of the idealists were reassured that the Partai Muslimin could become a suitable vehicle for the preservation of the Masjumi tradition. So cordial was this meeting that it was suggested that the site be renamed Tji Bulan Bintang (after the emblem of Masjumi).³⁰ The most rigid idealist, Prawoto, explained in the party council convened later in August that he was still unable to accept Suharto's concept, that is, the latter's refusal to tolerate Masjumi leadership of the Partai Muslimin, unless the Masjumi figures were also connected with one of the supporter organizations. His speech at the council, in which he declined

-
28. See my "Some Comments on Islamic Reactions to Recent Developments in Indonesia," Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, 2, No. 2 (April-June 1968), p. 46. One can only assume that the Religious Affairs Minister Dachlan was subjected to pressure from other government officials in not taking a stronger line against Christian missionaries, for he is not known for his moderation on this issue.
29. This is based largely on interviews with Agus Sudono and Djarnawi Hadikusuma, Djakarta, May 1968.
30. See Bulletin Partai Muslimin Indonesia, Year I, No. 4, pp. 1-2.

to actively support the Partai Muslimin, was highly distressing to those who had hoped that the Tjibulan meeting would lead to full unity within the party, and Kasman Singodimedjo immediately followed Prawoto with an appeal for support for the Partai Muslimin.³¹ But the fact remained that the idealists would only be completely satisfied when the party congress returned at least some senior Masjumi leaders to the party's central leadership.³²

The party council decided to hold the congress (*muktamar*) in Malang in the first week of November. To gain some idea of Suharto's reaction to the planned congress of the party, soon after the party council, its proceedings were reported to the President by a PMI delegation led by Djarnawi. At that time, the last week in August, Suharto voiced no objection to the holding of the congress, and Djarnawi was delighted.³³ During the following two months before November, it became increasingly clear that the congress in Malang would see election of several Masjumi leaders. One proof of this was the Muhammadiyah congress

-
31. Interview with Kasman Singodimedjo, Djakarta, March 1969. That the idealist-realist dichotomy, admittedly difficult to define precisely, is not necessarily related to attitudes on other issues is indicated by the presence of Kasman, formerly considered a firebrand of Masjumi, in the camp of supporters of the Partai Muslimin.
 32. The PMI's General Chairman, Djarnawi Hadikusuma, expressed his awareness of the idealists' persisting dissatisfaction when he said at the party council: "Although the task of consolidation of the Masjumi family within the Partai Muslimin is felt to be rather difficult, yet with the promise of President Suharto enunciated in front of the leaders of the supporting organizations and the Committee of Seven (about forty people) at the Independence Palace on February 5, . . . the party feels optimistic and certain that after the congress the task of consolidation will be carried out as we hope." In the same report, Djarnawi said that the four tasks to be performed by the party leadership were: to lead the party until the congress, to hold the congress as soon as possible, to "receive and develop" the party's legality and spread the party throughout Indonesia. I am indebted to Djarnawi for a copy of his speech.
 33. Interview with Djarnawi Hadikusuma, Djakarta, January 1969. There is admittedly no public record of this meeting with Suharto, and it is not clear that Suharto had no objections to the principal purpose of the Partai Muslimin's congress, that of electing some Masjumi figures to the leadership council.

at the end of September, at which Faqih Usman was appointed General Chairman, and other chairmen were Rasjidi and Hamka, both of Masjumi. If such endorsement of Masjumi figures could occur in Muhammadiyah, it was probable that Masjumi would have even greater success in the Partai Muslimin. In September, however, Suharto conferred with the Minister for Government-Legislature Liaison, Mintaredja, one week after the President had seen a Muhammadiyah delegation.³⁴ He told Mintaredja that he had "forgotten" to convey to Muhammadiyah leaders a message which he wanted them to carry to the Partai Muslimin, that is that the PMI should hold elections for a new leadership council only after Indonesia's general elections. After discussions with several Muhammadiyah leaders, including Hasjim, Daris Tamin and Sanusi, Mintaredja sent a letter to the Muhammadiyah in Jogjakarta.³⁵ But Muhammadiyah leaders were unwilling to give Suharto's message to the PMI, perhaps because this would be seen as an attempt by Muhammadiyah to increase its strength within the party.³⁶ The Partai Muslimin leaders eventually met Suharto on October 28, and then he shocked them by saying that it would be better not to have any change in the party leadership.

Throughout October, however, speculation was rife in sections of the Djakarta press on what would take place in the Partai Muslimin's congress. *Operasi*, for example, asked Kasman the following questions in an interview: Would the name of the Partai Muslimin be changed to Masjumi in the congress? Would all the ex-Masjumi supporters enter the Partai Muslimin at the congress? Would the *bapaks* (lit. fathers) from Masjumi return to lead their followers? Would the party adopt a firm stand in relation to the government, which had failed to satisfy the aspirations of the people?³⁷ The same newspaper published criticisms of the present PMI leadership, which was compared unfavorably with Masjumi leaders.³⁸

-
34. Mintaredja was appointed to this portfolio in June 1968. The Partai Muslimin gave some indication of feeling toward Mintaredja in its circles when it stated in a declaration issued after the formation of the new Development Cabinet that the party did not consider itself represented.
35. Operasi, November 15, 1968.
36. This section is largely based on information provided by Allan Samson.
37. Operasi, November 2, 1968.
38. See, e.g., the article "Is the Present Leadership Disappointing?" in Operasi, October 12, 1968.

Meanwhile the Partai Muslimin faced the problem of whether to yield on the eve of the long-awaited congress to Suharto's latest demands, and thus risk an uproar within the party, or to satisfy their supporters' wishes and court the disapproval of the government. A small group of Masjumi men, including Natsir, Prawoto, Rum and Faqih Usman, decided in meetings during September and October that either of the latter two should lead the Partai Muslimin, and as Faqih Usman was both seriously ill (in fact he died in the first week of October) and closely involved with Muhammadiyah, Mohammad Rum became the choice for General Chairman.³⁹ Suharto's warning was highly distressing to Prawoto and Rum who were aware of the intention of regional delegates to the congress to have Masjumi represented in the central leadership of the Partai Muslimin, and these delegates had already left Djakarta for Malang. Before the congress began on November 2, Agus Sudono, well-known among the party leaders to have the most cordial relations with key army officers such as Ali Murtopo, Alamsjah and Sudjono Humardhani, was deputed to try to soften the government's attitude towards the Partai Muslimin, and he obtained a letter from Ali Murtopo stating that an acceptable new list of chairmen would be: Djarnawi as General Chairman; a Gasbiindo representative and Djamiatul Al-Washlijah representative as first and second chairmen respectively; Anwar Harjono and Hasan Basri as third and fourth; and Omar Tusin as fifth chairman.⁴⁰ In fact, however, the offer of these concessions had little effect on the election at Malang. In Malang, the election of a new General Chairman produced seven nominees: Djarnawi, Kasman, Natsir, Prawoto, Sanusi, Sjarif Usman and Rum. Five announced their withdrawal from the election, and a sixth, Natsir, was overseas and had not authorized anyone to nominate him. The seventh, Mohammad Rum, was elected by acclamation. The new leadership council was as follows:

<u>General Chairman</u>	Mohammad Rum (Masjumi)
<u>Chairmen</u>	Anwar Harjono (Masjumi)
	Hasan Basri (Masjumi)
	Djarnawi Hadikusuma (Muhammadiyah)
	Omar Tusin (SNII)

39. Interview with Rum, Djakarta, February 1969. It had been considered, apparently, inadvisable to nominate Natsir or Prawoto, to whom the government was thought to object strongly. Other Masjumi leaders were involved in non-political activities, and had not evinced interest in playing active roles in the Partai Muslimin. Sjafruddin, for instance, was the General Chairman of Husami (Himpunan Usahawan Islam) and Burhanuddin Harahap was active in obtaining the license to republish the daily Abadi.

40. This again is based on information provided by Allan Samson.

<u>Secretary-General</u>	Hasbullah (Muhammadiyah)
<u>Secretaries</u>	Lukman Harun (Muhammadiyah) M. Sulaiman (Muhammadiyah)
<u>Members</u>	Aisjah Aminy (HSBI) Abdul Mukti (Muhammadiyah) Alala (HMI Alumni) A. R. Baswedan (Masjumi) Chadidjah Razak (Wanita Islam) Djamaluddin (Masjumi) Gusti Abdul Muis (Masjumi) Ismail Hasan Metareum (HMI Alumni) Mrs. Latjuba (Wanita Islam) Maizir Achmadyns (KBIM) Misbach (Masjumi) Andi Mapasala (Gasbiindo) Sanusi (Muhammadiyah) Rohana Ahmad (Muhammadiyah) Siregar Pahu (Djamiatul Al-Washlijah) Sjarif Usman (Masjumi/Porbisi) Mrs. Sunarjo Mangunpuspito (Masjumi) ⁴¹

The new leadership council was different in two ways from the central leadership that had led the party from February 20, 1968. First, Masjumi figures were obviously a predominant element, with the three top positions and half a dozen members; notably absent were Agus Sudono, Naro and Sanusi who was returned as an ordinary member. Second, there were ten less in the total, which suggests that little need for compromise had been felt. It is not clear why the party decided to completely ignore the government's advice, although admittedly either way out of the party's dilemma entailed on the one hand sacrifice of the support of many of the ex-members of Masjumi, and on the other, possible action by the government to enforce its wishes.⁴²

-
41. Abadi, December 7, 1968, and Sinar Harapan, November 25, 1968. It is not clear why Sanusi was not placed strictly in alphabetical order as the others. Sjarif Usman, who had chaired the Masjumi Rehabilitation Committee and was a former PRRI rebel was an interesting case of apparent government inconsistency. He was a Masjumi leader of some distinction, and yet he had appeared in the February leadership, perhaps acceptable as a Porbisi figure.
42. There is no published record of the way voting was carried out at the congress, but according to Prawoto (interview, Djakarta, January 1969), the chairmen were nominated and elected by the delegates, and the remainder appointed by the General Chairmen and chairmen.

The congress was attended by over 1,000 delegates from every part of Indonesia with the exception of West Irian, and the atmosphere was a very mixed one, particularly the final reception at which the composition of the new leadership council was read out.⁴³ Decisions announced during the congress included: strong criticism of Israeli aggression and an appeal to the government to aid in the liberation of Palestine; expression of gratitude to Major General Jasin of East Java for his declaration that gambling was equivalent to PKI activities; repetition of demands in regard to religion and Christianization; an appeal to the government to draft a new land-reform bill "that really guarantees the interests of the people."⁴⁴ But it was undoubtedly the new leadership that was the focus of interest. On November 7, the chairman of the congress preparatory committee, Omar Tusin, announced to all the delegates the result of the congress election; the election of Rum was apparently greeted with great enthusiasm.⁴⁵ It had been intended that at the final reception on the night of November 7, speeches would be made by (or read out from) Suharto, Nasution (MPRS Chairman), a representative from the Brawidjaja (East Java) Military Command and the new party General Chairman. However, on the last day of the congress, Alamsjah sent a radiogram to Omar Tusin notifying the Partai Muslimin that the government did not feel that it was time to change the party leadership, and that such a change would be considered a violation of Presidential Decision No. 70, which had legalized the party, and would be unacceptable.⁴⁶ At the reception for the delegates, Omar Tusin announced the new leadership, but said that the transfer of office from the old to the new central leadership

-
43. Sinar Harapan, November 25, 1968.
44. Bulletin Partai Muslimin Indonesia, First Year, No. 6, January 1969, p. 4. In contrast with the new central leadership, these decisions attracted little attention in the Djakarta press. Certainly there seemed to be nothing new in this list, and the only resolution which distinguished the Partai Muslimin from other Islamic parties (also calling for Palestinian liberation and an end to gambling) was the repeated demand for fairer representation of the party in the state legislature.
45. Sinar Harapan, November 25, 1968. Perhaps the belief that Rum, generally considered a moderate and not involved in PRRI, would be acceptable even after the October 28 meeting prompted the decision to have him elected.
46. This radiogram was a reply to one sent by Omar Tusin as chairman of the congress preparatory committee, in which he disclosed the composition of the new central leadership.

would take place in Djakarta, where the party would await clearance from the government. There was no message from either Suharto or Nasution, MPRS Vice-Chairman Subchan spoke only in his capacity as a leader of NU and there was no Brawidjaja representative.

As the Partai Muslimin was unwilling to announce nullification of the results of the election held by its sovereign congress, ever since November 1968 the party has lacked clearance from the government.⁴⁷ Initially, press reactions were generally unfavorable to the government (except for the army newspapers *Berita Yudha* and *Angkatan Bersendjata*), and the government's attempt to limit the independence of the Partai Muslimin was condemned as undemocratic intervention in a political party's internal affairs.⁴⁸ However, on November 10, 1968, Mintaredja provided the rationale for the government's action. In a pamphlet he issued on that date, Mintaredja maintained that the government had in fact made no change in policy towards the Partai Muslimin. He said that in the February 5, 1968 meeting with the Partai Muslimin delegation, Suharto had told representatives of Muhammadiyah, KBIM, Djamiatul Al-Washlijah and Gasbiindo that the party would be free to elect its own leaders after Indonesian general elections, for democracy would have been reflected in general elections and no group (*golongan*) in Indonesia would have the right to hinder the progress of another.⁴⁹ Thus instead of Masjumi leaders being allowed to assume leader-

-
47. Before accepting his position, Rum himself declared that his acceptance was conditional on clearance being obtained from the government. It is difficult to define what this would constitute, for the party has not been appreciably restricted in its activities since November. It was customary for some eleven months after the congress for Islamic newspapers to refer to Djarnawi, for example, as "General Chairman (old leadership)" or to Hasbullah as "Secretary-General (elected)." But, more recently, Djarnawi has been called simply "General Chairman" and a recent Partai Muslimin delegation to the palace included Agus Sudono who lost his position in the central leadership. Abadi, October 17, 1969.
48. See, e.g., Nusantara, November 12, 1968.
49. Mintaredja, Pemerintah dan Pembentukan Partai Muslimin Indonesia (Djakarta: n.p., 1968), p. 2. Those who were present when Suharto gave these conditions on the party's birth were, according to Mintaredja, Djarnawi, Daris Tamin, Hasjim and Mintaredja (Muhammadiyah), Agus Sudono and Usman Ibrahim (Gasbiindo), Maizir Achmadyns and Daud Badaruddin (KBIM) and Udin Sjamsuddin (Djamiatul Al-Washlijah).

ship after the party congress, in fact only after general elections could the Partai Muslimin choose its own leaders. Mintaredja suggested that perhaps the leaders of the party had been so disappointed when they heard Suharto say this that they did not pay close attention to the words "after the general elections," and consequently perhaps forgot.⁵⁰

Mintaredja's apologia for the government has made it almost impossible to get from official sources acknowledgment of other motivating factors for the government's decision not to recognize the new Partai Muslimin leadership, for it need only be stated that such had been government policy since the party's foundation in order to shift responsibility onto the Partai Muslimin itself. But it is very hard to give credence to Mintaredja's account. In February 1968, it had already been apparent that general elections would have to be postponed beyond the original July 5 deadline, as no preparations had been made and the electoral bills were still to be ratified. Thus if the party leaders had agreed to wait until general elections, this would have made the Partai Muslimin seemingly indefinitely subordinate to the government, which would surely have been unacceptable even to the most pragmatic of the party's realists. Also, it is hard to understand how Suharto could have forgotten such a matter as reminding the party leaders of their commitment, and why Mintaredja and the Muhammadiyah leaders should have hesitated in passing on to the Partai Muslimin Suharto's advice in September, if the latter's instruction was simply a reiteration of what Suharto had long ago made clear. The reasons for the government's long-standing opposition to the aspirations of the Partai Muslimin, and earlier to the rehabilitation, must now be considered in some detail.⁵¹

50. Ibid., p. 3.

51. That Rum had insisted that government clearance be obtained before he accepted the position as General Chairman does not establish the truth of Mintaredja's case, for Suharto's attitude, new or otherwise, was revealed to the Partai Muslimin on October 28. Nor does the fact that some Partai Muslimin supporters may have sensed the possibility of collision with the government before that date, perhaps through information from Suharto's assistants, establish that Suharto's conditions had been identical in February 1968. The press-release issued on February 20 (see above) which indicated that the party congress was free to do as it liked was not challenged by the government or the army newspapers.

CHAPTER V

THE GOVERNMENT AND THE PARTY

The policy of the Suharto Government towards Masjumi and then the Partai Muslimin has been one of consistent opposition, the extent of which, however, has been revealed only gradually. Thus in January 1967, at the same time he was refusing to countenance the rehabilitation of Masjumi, he affirmed the rights of leaders of banned parties to take part in political life.¹ Similarly, when in February 1968, Suharto insisted that the Partai Muslimin leadership should not include leaders of Masjumi, he was willing for Masjumi figures to "lead from behind." Even after the Malang congress, Suharto said that although no change in the central leadership would be tolerated before general elections, thereafter the party would be free to choose its own leaders. This slowly-evolving policy, that gradually became more hard-line, may have been the result merely of tact, of Suharto's wish not to alienate the mass of Masjumi supporters by denying them from the outset any prospect of having a virtual neo-Masjumi. But this may have been influenced by changing political circumstances during the years 1966-1968, and a lack of sound advice received by Suharto on developments within the Partai Muslimin. One can only assume, for instance, that Suharto thought before the Malang congress that young leaders would be elected to the central leadership and the Masjumi figures not returned.² But why was Suharto so opposed to the aims of Masjumi supporters?

It is undeniable that much bitterness remains within the Indonesian army against those suspected of involvement in both the Darul Islam and PRRI rebellions. Although Masjumi disapproved of the Darul Islam's violent methods, as Feith noted, there was a conflict between Muslim leaders and the army over how to deal with Darul Islam: "The issue was that the army

1. At least this was the interpretation placed by Masjumi supporters on Suharto's guarantee of "full rights as citizens" to their leaders. In May 1967, Attorney-General Sugih Arto reinforced this impression when he remarked in North Sumatra that former rebels and PSI/Masjumi members were free to join political parties and even assume senior positions in the central leadership of a party. See *Bajasut, Fakta Documenta*, p. 22.
2. This was the assumption of several independent observers interviewed in Djakarta.

insisted that it should have a free hand in pressing a military solution, whereas the political party leaders, and especially the Masjumi leaders, argued that a political and religious approach was necessary to win away the rebels' popular support. . . . Army leaders resented every attempt of political leaders to intervene and particularly all attempts to negotiate with the Darul Islam."³ In areas of West Java, some local Masjumi leaders were arrested and jailed for alleged connections with Darul Islam.⁴ There is no record of Suharto's involvement in the quelling of Darul Islam, but when he was commander of Central Java's Diponegoro Division in 1957, Suharto ". . . made it clear that he regarded appeasement of the dissidents in Sumatra and Sulawesi as perverse partiality. He pointed out that the 54 million people of Java would feel unjustly treated should the Government relax its development efforts there in order to permit the obstreperous regions to catch up."⁵ The PRRI was seen by supporters of the central government as a challenge to the unity of the state and by Javanese, especially, within the army, from the Diponegoro Division, as a rejection of the attempt "to fulfill the ambitions and promises of Javanese civilization in the new national state."⁶

It seems reasonable to assume that bitterness still exists against both former rebels, which includes men like Natsir and Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, and the political parties (largely the Masjumi in the case of Darul Islam and PSI and Masjumi in the PRRI) suspected of being in sympathy with the aims of the revolts. This motive, however, is sometimes pushed too far. One general in Djakarta said that even the people in the regions affected by the PRRI were still resentful against former rebels, but although they would not put up with the rehabilitation of an ex-rebel party, the same perspicacious people did not object to the appointment of a senior PRRI leader, Sumitro, to the Ministry of Trade.⁷ It seems, however, of much greater significance that Masjumi has long been associated with Islamic fanaticism and opposition to Pantjasila, in a way that the essentially

-
3. Feith, Decline of Constitutional Democracy, p. 211.
 4. Among those arrested were Isa Ansjar, Ridwan Affandi and Buchori.
 5. Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 29.
 6. Ibid., p. 3.
 7. Interview with a senior officer from Kosgoro, Djakarta, March 1969.

Javanese Islamic party NU has not been.⁸

That Masjumi, along with all other Islamic parties, fought in the Konstituante for the establishment of an Islamic State should not, in fairness, be held against Masjumi leaders today, but their dissatisfaction with Pantjasila is still openly shown. Sjafruddin, for example, recently confessed: "I do not understand Pantjasila, although I see everywhere boards on which the five principles of the Pantjasila are inscribed. I must admit that I understand Islam better."⁹ Kasman Singodimedjo complained in a speech that although the English, Dutch and Italians were not slow in proclaiming their nations Christian, Indonesia, whose population was 90% Muslim, was reluctant to call itself Islamic.¹⁰ If skepticism about Pantjasila is more often expressed by Masjumi leaders in private, assertions of Islam's superiority to Pantjasila are frequently made publicly. Kasman, in a book of prison reminiscences, wrote that he was confident that no one would object to his belief that, whereas Pantjasila was the five principles, Islam was the All Principles. He added that Muslims should remember that: "To attain something more perfect than the Pantjasila is a matter for further struggle, and this is, moreover, not forbidden by the Pantjasila itself."¹¹

Although the Muslims' *casus belli* is no longer the Islamic State but rather the Djakarta Charter, it is undeniable that ideological conflict has been revived since the coup. Although the most obvious evidence of this was perhaps the Second and Third Committees' deadlock in March 1968, it has become entangled with Christian missionary activity to produce continuing religious bitterness erupting from time to time in the destruction of churches on the one side and the persistent behind-the-scenes campaigning by Christians against the dangers of an Islamic State, on the other. The NU and PSII have also declared support for implementation of the Djakarta Charter and have moved

-
8. Lev (Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 77) wrote: "The NU kijaji . . . the PNI prijaji and the PKI peasant spoke the same language and shared the same stereotypes of the non-Javanese for whom Masjumi spoke. Social communications between the three groups in Java flowed with more or less traditional ease. . . ."
 9. Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, Merombak Pandangan Hidup dan Struktur Politik (Jakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1968), p. 6.
 10. Abadi, August 30, 1969.
 11. Kasman Singodimedjo, Renungan dari Tahanan (Jakarta: Tintamas, 1968), p. 54.

towards Islamic unity, but it is with Masjumi, and a potential neo-Masjumi, that Darul Islam and Atjehnese or Makassarese fanaticism tend to be linked. The other two parties and the insignificant Perti are considered *ringan*, or easy to control, which judgment has been confirmed by, or derived from, the opportunistic record of those parties during Guided Democracy. The outbreaks of religious intolerance such as the Makassar incident, the Meulaboh affair and the alleged evacuation of Christians from Atjeh cannot fail to be a source of profound embarrassment to Suharto. He attempted to mediate personally between Muslims and Christians by promoting an (unsuccessful) Inter-Religions Conference.¹²

Against such a background of religious conflict, with the threat of a renewal of the ideological conflict between a basically secular Pantjasila and greater stress on religion inherent in the Djakarta Charter, it is not surprising that serious objections were raised first against rehabilitation of Masjumi and then against the creation of a neo-Masjumi. In some army circles, it was thought sufficient that Masjumi leaders be accorded liberty of movement and freedom to participate in *dakwah* ("missionizing") activities. In particular, it was held to be both unnecessary and unwise for Masjumi leaders to be given the opportunity to lead a mass party.¹³ There seems to be little sympathy for the understandable wish of Masjumi leaders to be completely absolved of any misdeeds justifying their imprisonment. In an alarmed tone, an editorial in *Angkatan Bersendjata* asked, following the Malang congress, "Why are we not patient until general elections are held? Isn't it necessary for us to absorb the teachings of Abu Thalib, who said that 'patience is of two varieties: patience in averting what you do not like, and patience in seeking what you want'?"¹⁴ Similarly, a "certain General Staff officer" interviewed in the same month, observed that whereas Sumitro's appointment was understandable because he had something to contribute to the improvement of the economy, Rum and the other Masjumi leaders intended to organize mass force. Masjumi leadership of the

-
12. Although the failure of this conference (held in Makassar in November 1967) was at least partly owing to Christian refusal to limit their missionary activity, it is the Muslims that generally receive the lion's share of the blame for religious disturbances, perhaps because of the dramatic acts of destroying churches.
 13. The comments made by General Sutopo Juwono (see above) concerning the Holy War Command seem to apply equally to the possibility of a revived Masjumi.
 14. Angkatan Bersendjata, November 15, 1968.

Partai Muslimin would, he implied, hinder the attainment of political stability.¹⁵

The achievement of political stability has been the keynote of Suharto's domestic policy since he assumed power, and his obsession with stability combined with his own caution produced the successful policy he adopted of removing Sukarno from power without causing a virtual civil war. He also refused to eliminate the PNI from national politics and was opposed to the New Order radicals who wished to have Indonesia's party system overthrown.¹⁶ The fact that Suharto was unwilling to ban the PNI, despite the identification of its Ali-Surachman wing with Sukarno's regime, helps in part to explain his opposition to the Partai Muslimin. Whereas the PNI was a party "whose history, social composition and ideology give it something of the flavor of a state party," the Partai Muslimin, at least to the Javanese, remains Outer Island-dominated and to some extent iconoclastic.¹⁷ The PNI's acceptance of Pantjasila was unquestioned, but not so that of a Masjumi-led Partai Muslimin, and Masjumi leaders were thought to be less malleable than those of the PNI.

It was mentioned above that the NU and PSII were considered ringan, or easily manipulable by successive governments. The Masjumi leaders, however, had a reputation for firm resolve (or alternatively for trouble-making), which has several times been demonstrated in the life of the Suharto Government, especially over the question of democracy and elections. Whereas Achmad Sjaichu, the NU leader and parliamentary speaker, declared in January 1969, that elections could not be held in a situation where economic conditions were still bad, Masjumi figures have made strong attacks on the New Order's methods of operating democracy. In June, for example, Prawoto Mangkusasmito criticized the domination of the government by a minority that attempts to impose its will by refusing to permit voting in the sessions of the MPRS and threatens war if its opponents become adamant, or alternatively carries out redressing of the legislative bodies to replace old representatives with ones more submissive.¹⁸ This is not to say that Suharto fears a challenge to his government from democratic-minded Masjumi leaders intent on restoring genuine democracy. Rather there seems to be a fear

15. Sinar Harapan, November 14, 1968.

16. See Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format."

17. Lev, "Political Parties in Indonesia," p. 65.

18. Abadi, June 18, 1969.

of Masjumi hard-headedness combined with Islamic fanaticism.¹⁹

Suharto may have been reinforced in his opposition to a revived Masjumi by the opposition of other sections of the political elite in Djakarta, which may be divided into three groups--the Islamic parties, the secular parties and finally the army. The NU felt threatened by a strong Partai Muslimin in two ways. Since the introduction of Guided Democracy, the NU has held the position of the major Islamic party, but its supremacy was gained at the price of submission to Sukarno and his Nasakom regime. Consequently, after the fall of Guided Democracy, the NU became open to accusations of opportunism and of neglecting Islam to the extent of cooperating with the PKI. The most natural source of such charges is the Masjumi.²⁰ If Masjumi were rehabilitated, NU stands to lose its position as the leading Islamic party, with its stronghold in the Department of Religious Affairs possibly slowly undermined, and to be subjected to full-scale attack as the Islamic party that collaborated with Sukarno and the communists. The existence of either a rehabilitated Masjumi or a Masjumi-led Partai Muslimin would probably attract to its banner many NU supporters, both those who had joined NU on the dissolution of Masjumi in 1960 and, more importantly, the younger generation, such as the Pemuda Ansor, whose leaders have showed increasing disgust at the alleged opportunism of NU leaders like Idham Chalid and Achmad Sjaichu.²¹ Thus there are good reasons for the NU leadership to oppose restoration of its former strong rival, Masjumi.²² It has been reported that, during 1966 and 1967, NU was active in attempting to persuade the government not to tolerate revival

-
19. The resurgence of Islamic fanaticism is also apparent in the efforts in the last two years for strongly Islamic areas to legislate for compulsory observation of Islamic law. For an editorial giving support to such a move in Bima, Sumbawa, see, Abadi, April 14, 1969.
 20. Thinly-veiled attacks on NU leaders such as Idham Chalid regularly appear in Abadi. See, e.g., the March 6, 1969 editorial.
 21. In January 1969, Pemuda Ansor leaders Zamroni, Asnawi Latief and Jahja Ubed attacked the statement by Achmad Sjaichu on elections, which they said should be held as soon as possible, regardless of economic conditions. See Abadi, January 24, 1969. It is conceivable that the dissatisfaction expressed by young NU students in 1964 noted by Castles ("Notes") may become more apparent as the Partai Muslimin develops further.
 22. The PSII would also stand to lose Masjumi members who joined it after 1960.

of Masjumi; in August and September 1968, Idham Chalid and Subchan allegedly approached Ali Murtopo, Alamsjah, Basuki Rachmat and others entreating them not to accept the election of Masjumi figures in the November Partai Muslimin congress.²³

It has not been established that the two Christian parties campaigned against the Partai Muslimin possibly under Masjumi leadership. Fears of Islamic fanaticism being strengthened by Masjumi's re-emergence may have been balanced by the consideration, or the hope, that the Partai Muslimin would be more concerned with modernization than the NU.²⁴ But Christians within the army have reputedly urged Suharto not to countenance a strong modernist revival. Samson reported that: "It was the conjecture of several PMI figures that a conference of regional military commanders led by General Panggabean [a Batak Christian] . . . had strongly urged Suharto not to legalize PMI."²⁵ The attitude of the Armed Forces, principally the army, has been admitted by Suharto himself to have had great influence on his policy towards Masjumi, but it is necessary to distinguish groups within the army with differing opinions on this issue.

Feith recently used a "centrists" versus "military radicals" dichotomy. Of the former, Feith wrote that they "contended that Islamic militancy was better crushed than conciliated, and opposed any tendency to remove the stigma which still attached to those who had been involved in the rebellion of 1958. . . ."²⁶ Among the centrists, Feith counted Suharto himself, Alamsjah and General Panggabean. Military radicals such as Major General Dharsono hoped to replace the present multi-party system with a system of program-oriented parties, which they thought would help eradicate ideological conflict in Indonesia's development era. Dharsono's two-party system has been strongly opposed by all Muslim parties, and conversely, Feith hinted that although Suharto was quite wary of giving support to a policy of radical transformation of the political system, he may have been influenced by the opposition to a strong Partai Muslimin of the military radicals, who favored weakening of present parties rather than a strengthening of ideology-based

-
- 23. Interview with Hoesnie Thamrin, Djakarta, January 1969. PNI leaders Osa Maliki and Hardi are also alleged to have acted to dissuade military officers against return of Masjumi leaders at Malang.
 - 24. See Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format," p. 3. Such a hope was not restricted to Christians.
 - 25. Samson, "Islam in Indonesian Politics," p. 1008.
 - 26. Feith, "Suharto's Search for a Political Format," p. 3.

ones such as the Partai Muslimin. In contradistinction to both these groups we should perhaps see a difficultly-defined group of officers, either from the Outer Islands, such as Nasution, or from Brawidjaja Division, such as Muallim Effendi, Sarbini, Sudirman and Muchlas Rowi. These officers have become connected with Islamic social organizations (Sudirman played a not insignificant role in the Presidium of the Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin) or are generally considered sympathetic to Islamic aspirations (Nasution spoke at the controversial celebration of the Djakarta Charter anniversary in June 1968). Therefore, it would not be surprising if this group was the one least opposed to a strong Partai Muslimin. Yet in Nasution's position as a potential rival to Suharto, any attempt from him to give succor to the PMI would probably be seen as an effort to spread his own power base.²⁷ The Partai Muslimin seems to have stronger foes in the army than friends.

Hence many elements operated against the Partai Muslimin. Perhaps the only factors favorable to the party were the obvious need to satisfy in some way the desire of Islamic mass organizations to possess their own party and the belief that Masjumi's tradition had been one of working toward modernization and economic development. Yet the circumstances of the post-coup era have been detrimental to Masjumi's image (whether or not this image was widely accepted) of iconoclastic modernization. The imagined threat to Islam from efforts to Christianize the Indonesian people, and the unconventional means used by Djakarta Governor Ali Sadikin in accumulating finance for that city's development have tended to force modernist leaders to adopt reactionary and fundamentalist positions. Soedjatmoko remarked that: "Under pressure, or in times of danger, Islam tends to respond in fundamentalist terms, falling back on the inseparability of the State from the Faith, and the need for Islamic forces to score a political victory before the ills of society and the State can be cured."²⁸ One senior officer believed that Masjumi leaders had nothing to contribute to the development of the economy, and would concern themselves, if given some degree of power, mainly with irrelevant issues of Islamic faith, with the danger, once again, of ideological conflict.²⁹

Suharto realized that some form of concession would have to be made to content the supporters of the mass organizations

-
27. Suharto's supporters tend to attribute any move by Nasution to his ambition to become President.
 28. Soedjatmoko, "Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities," Australian Outlook, 21, No. 3 (December 1967), p. 270.
 29. Interview with Brigadier General Sugandhi, Djakarta, March 1969.

which had formerly been constituent members of Masjumi and consented to the formation of a political party as long as it represented a union of the supporting organizations involved and not a neo-Masjumi. Apparently, only by February 1968 was it clear that his method of preventing the Partai Muslimin from becoming a neo-Masjumi was to ensure that all members of the central leadership would be easily recognizable as representatives of mass organizations. Consequently, the results of the November congress, no matter how predictable they should have been, were unacceptable to him. For Malang was a round rejection of his concept, as no less than eight elected out of twenty-five were Masjumi figures who were not also members of supporter organizations.³⁰ The conditions under which the Partai Muslimin was born in February were conducive to the continuation of disunity, and this was possibly one of Suharto's objectives. The Malang congress, however, by removing men suspect to the majority of PMI supporters, such as Naro and Imran Kadir,³¹ resulted in a blurring of the dividing-line between realists and idealists. The latter, though rejoicing in victory, decided against adopting a confrontative attitude towards the government, and the only alternative for the realists would involve some kind of surrender to government terms, obviously unacceptable to PMI supporters.³²

What is the future of the Partai Muslimin? In a sense, the past of the Partai Muslimin is more attractive than its future. It has been suggested already that the potential successors to Masjumi are not comparable to its leaders. Partly because of their youth during the revolution, the Natsir generation has remained the indisputable leaders of the Masjumi family

-
30. The eight were: Rum, Anwar Harjono, Hasan Basri, Baswedan, Djamaluddin, Gusti Abdul Muis, Misbach and Mrs. Sunarjo Mangunpuspito. The party congress also saw the demotion of Agus Sudono and Sanusi who were, presumably, favored by the government because of their moderate attitudes.
 31. Naro was unpopular because he was originally a Murba member, and in 1968 adopted what was considered a tolerant view of pornography, which led Hamka to comment that Naro had "entered the wrong party," i.e., had acted against the Islamic spirit of the Partai Muslimin. Operasi, October 12, 1968. Imran Kadir declared in January 1969 that the party had obtained clearance by agreeing to government conditions, which was promptly denied by Djarnawi Hadikusuma. See Abadi, February 1, 1969.
 32. But see above, page 55, footnote 47, for the tendency recently to refer to Djarnawi and others in their pre-congress positions, suggesting tacit acceptance of government conditions, though no public admission was made.

until the present-day; whereas other parties, such as the PNI and NU, have had complete leadership changes.³³ Despite the claim of the Partai Muslimin to be a New Order party, its leaders, or rather the Masjumi leaders, often give the impression of desiring nothing so much as a return to the liberal democracy of the fifties, when Masjumi was, of course, one of the two main political parties, the rules of parliamentary democracy were generally observed, and when the Armed Forces played a far less significant role in politics.³⁴ But the Partai Muslimin also looks back to the period when Masjumi was the only Islamic party in Indonesia, before the exit of the NU and PSII, and even to the time of the pre-war Islamic federation, MIAI (Madjelis Islam A'la Indonesia). In September 1968, for example, Isa Ansary called on the Islamic community to "reactivate the Madjelis Islam A'la Indonesia" and argued that the weakness of Islamic political movements in Indonesia was due to chronic disunity.³⁵ The call for unity within the Islamic community has been made more urgent by the project of an Islamic Community Congress, which, it is hoped, will pave the way towards the recreation of unity. Although the postponement of the Congress from January to June 1969, and then its apparently indefinite postponement, seem to have been caused more by government apprehension than disagreements within the Islamic parties on what such a congress would attempt, there are important differences between the Partai Muslimin and other Islamic ones. Whereas the NU and PSII gained their independence and greater opportunity to obtain power through leaving Masjumi, the latter was decidedly the loser, as it was deprived of the right to speak as the only mouthpiece of the Islamic community. Not surprisingly, the Partai Muslimin's domination of such an Islamic Congress, not unlikely if Masjumi leaders were to lead the Partai Muslimin, would deter NU or PSII leaders such as Idham Chalid or Anwar Tjokroaminoto from seeking further Islamic unity.

Throughout its eighteen months' existence, the Partai Muslimin has emphasized its similarity to the other Muslim parties rather than its differences. Thus in the MPRS, in joint attacks on secularism and Christianization, in united stands against Israeli aggression and in criticism of pornography and gambling, the party, and the other Muslim parties, stressed its Islamness and not its capacity to modernize.³⁶ The preoccupation with

33. The major change in Masjumi leadership was the exit of Sukiman and Jusuf.

34. See, e.g., Prawoto's articles in Mertju Suar, April 22-24, 1968.

35. Kiblat, 16, No. 9 (September 1968), p. 32.

36. The main exceptions to the statement that identity of interests with other Muslim parties has been stressed are:

setting up party branches throughout Indonesia and the concentration on electing a new leadership and then obtaining clearance for it perhaps prevented any attempt at a detailed analysis of Indonesia's problems.³⁷ When Jusuf Wibisono proposed ten years ago that the Islamic parties should "study the conditions of society and adjust themselves to the national stage of development," his advice fell on deaf ears.³⁸ Clifford Geertz has written of Islam that: "Nothing has been done since Abduh, nothing seems likely to be done, and scripturalism seems likely to remain in the position of cheering on a modernism whose every advance undermines its own position. Perhaps a reaction will set in, and the powerful anti-modern forces which are also contained in scripturalism, the fundamentalist side of it, come to the fore." He continued, "For scripturalism to become a living religious tradition rather than merely a collection of strained apologies, its adherents would have to undertake a serious theological rethinking of the scholastic tradition they can, apparently, neither live with nor live without."³⁹ The Partai Muslimin, with or without Masjumi leaders, has inherited the right to speak for Indonesian modernists. One is tempted to say that, if the Partai Muslimin is to make a distinctive contribution to Indonesian history, it also would have to undertake serious rethinking, if not of the scholastic tradition, certainly of the probably diminishing role that Islam will play in the future of Indonesia.

first, the freedom with which PMI-linked figures attack the Muslim leaders who were "soft" on Sukarno and the PKI; second, the frankness with which men such as Prawoto criticize current authoritarianism in Indonesia; and third, the demands for increased representation of the Partai Muslimin in legislative bodies. However, only the last emanates from official Partai Muslimin sources.

37. By the time of the Malang congress, branches of the Partai Muslimin had been established in every province of Indonesia (the West Irian one was formed on November 4, 1968). The development of the Partai Muslimin in the regions has been very scantily documented, and is not within the scope of the present work.
38. Lev, Transition to Guided Democracy, p. 229.
39. Geertz, Islam Observed, pp. 88, 115.

APPENDIX I

BADAN KOORDINASI AMAL MUSLIMIN

The following organizations of the Badan Koordinasi Amal Muslimin were supporter organizations of the Partai Muslimin Indonesia:

Muhammadijah	socio-educational
Djamiatul Al-Washlijah	socio-educational
Gasbiindo (Gabungan Serikan ² Buruh Islam Indonesia--Association of Indonesian Islamic Trade Unions)	trade union
Persatuan Islam (Islamic Union)	educational
Nahdatul Wathan	socio-educational
Mathl'aul Anwar	socio-educational
SNII (Serikat Nelajan Islam Indonesia--Indonesian Islamic Fishermen's Union)	trade union
KBIM (Kongres Buruh Islam Merdeka--Congress of Independent Islamic Laborers)	trade union
PUI (Persatuan Ummat Islam--Islamic Community Union)	socio-educational
Al-Ittihadijah	educational
Porbisi (Persatuan Organisasi ² Buruh se-Indonesia--All-Indonesian Union of Islamic Labor Organizations)	trade union
PGAIRI (Persatuan Guru Agama Islam Republik Indonesia--Union of Islamic Teachers of the Republic of Indonesia)	trade union
HSBI (Himpunan Seni Budaja Islam--Islamic Art and Culture Association)	cultural
PITI (Persatuan Islam Tionghoa Indonesia--Indonesian Chinese Islamic Union)	
Al-Irsjad	educational
Wanita Islam (Islamic Women)	socio-educational

The above sixteen organizations all signed the charter of 1967 pledging support to the Partai Muslimin. Two other organizations that supported the Partai Muslimin, but whose names were not mentioned as signatories of the charter were HMI (Himpunan

Mahasiswa Islam--Islamic Students' Association) and MASBI
(Madjelis [?] Seni Budaja Islam--Islamic Council of Art and
Culture).

APPENDIX II

POLITICAL PARTIES AND MISCELLANEOUS ORGANIZATIONS

DPR-GR (Dewan Perwakilan Rakjat-Gotong Rojong)	Gotong Rojong Parliament
Kabinet Karya	Working Cabinet
KAMI (Kesatuan Aksi Mahasiswa Indonesia)	University Students' Action Front of Indonesia
KAPPI (Kesatuan Aksi Pemuda Peladjar Indonesia)	High School Students' Action Front of Indonesia
Madjelis Ummat Islam	Council of the Islamic Community
MAIA (Madjelis Islam A'la Indonesia)	Great Islamic Council of Indonesia
Masjumi (Madjelis Sjuro Muslimin Indonesia)	Consultative Council of Indonesian Moslems
MPRS (Madjelis Permusjawaratan Rakjat Sementara)	Provisional People's Consultative Assembly
NU (Nahdatul Ulama)	Islamic Scholars' (Party)
Pahlawan Darul Islam	Heroes of the House of Islam
Partai Katolik	Catholic Party
Parkindo (Partai Kristen Indonesia)	Indonesian Christian Party
PKI (Partai Komunis Indonesia)	Indonesian Communist Party
Partai Murba	Proletarian Party
PNI (Partai Nasional Indonesia)	Indonesian Nationalist Party
PSI (Partai Sosialis Indonesia)	Indonesian Socialist Party
PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia)	Indonesian Islamic Union Party
PII (Peladjar Islam Indonesia)	Muslim Students of Indonesia
Perti (Pergerakan Tarbijah Islamijah)	Islamic Educational Movement
PRRI (Pemerintah Revolusioner Republik Indonesia)	Revolutionary Government of the Republic of Indonesia
RPI (Republik Persatuan Indonesia)	Unitary Republic of Indonesia

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- Anderson, Benedict. Mythology and the Tolerance of the Javanese. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1965.
- Anwar, R. Perjalanan Terahir Pahlawan Nasional Sutan Sjahrir. Djakarta: Pembangunan, 1966.
- Bajasut, S. U. Fakta Documenta. Six Volumes. Surabaya [?]: n.p., 1968.
- Castles, Lance. "Notes on the Islamic School at Gontor," Indonesia, 1 (April 1966).
- . Religion, Politics and Economic Behavior in Java: The Kudus Cigarette Industry. New Haven: Yale University Cultural Report Series No. 15, 1967.
- Cooley, Frank. Indonesia: Church and Society. New York: Friendship Press, 1968.
- Daftar Nama dan Alamat Anggota2 DPR-GR. Djakarta: n.p., 1968.
- Documenta Selecta Komando Djihad Ummat Islam. Djakarta: n.p., 1967.
- Feith, Herbert. "Suharto's Search for a Political Format," Australia's Neighbours, Fourth Series, Nos. 56-57 (May-June 1968).
- . The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1962.
- . "The Dynamics of Guided Democracy" in Ruth T. McVey (ed.), Indonesia. New Haven: HRAF, 1963.
- . The Indonesian Elections of 1955. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1957.
- Feith, Herbert, and Daniel Lev. "The End of the Indonesian Rebellion," Pacific Affairs, 36, No. 1 (Spring 1963).
- Geertz, Clifford. Islam Observed. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1968.
- . "Religious Belief and Economic Behavior in a Central Javanese Town: Some Preliminary Observations," Economic Development and Cultural Change, 4, No. 2 (January 1956).

- . The Religion of Java. New York: Glencoe Press, 1960.
- Hamka. Pengaruh Muhammad Abduh di Indonesia. Djakarta: Tintamas, 1958.
- Hindley, Donald. The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1963. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964.
- Jay, Robert. Religion and Politics in Rural Central Java. New Haven: Yale University Cultural Report Series No. 12, 1963.
- Kahin, George McT. Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia. Ithaca: Cornell University, 1964.
- Kasman Singodimedjo. Renungan dari Tahanan. Djakarta: Tintamas, 1968.
- Lev, Daniel. "Political Parties in Indonesia," Journal of Southeast Asian History, 8, No. 1 (March 1967).
- . The Transition to Guided Democracy: Indonesian Politics, 1957-1959. Ithaca: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1966.
- Mintaredja, H. M. S. Pemerintah dan Pembentukan Partai Muslimin Indonesia. Djakarta: n.p., 1968.
- . Perdjuangan Ummat Islam Mengalami Setback 25 Tahun. Djakarta: n.p., 1968.
- M. Natsir versus Soekarno. Padang: Jajasan Pendidikan Islam, 1968.
- Noer, Deliar. "Masjumi, Its Organizations, Ideology and Political Role in Indonesia." M.A. Thesis, Cornell University, 1960.
- Paget, Roger. "The Military in Politics in Indonesia: The Burden of Power," Pacific Affairs, 40, Nos. 3-4 (Fall 1967-1968).
- Pluvier, Jan. Confrontations. Kuala Lumpur: Oxford U.P., 1965.
- Prawoto Mangkusasmito. Tempat Hukum dalam Alam Indonesia. Djakarta: Abadi, 1960.
- Pringgodigdo, A. K. Sedjarah Pergerakan Rakjat Indonesia. Djakarta: Dian Rakjat, 1967.
- Rasjidi, H. M. Mengapa Aku Tetap Memeluk Agama Islam. Djakarta: Budaja, 1967.

- Rentjana Dasar, Program dan Struktur Partai Demokrasi Islam Indonesia. Bandung: Angkasa, 1967.
- Samson, Allan. "Islam in Indonesian Politics," Asian Survey, 8, No. 13 (December 1968).
- Sjafruddin Prawiranegara. Merombak Pandangan Hidup dan Struktur Politik. Djakarta: Bulan Bintang, 1967.
- Soedjatmoko. "Indonesia: Problems and Opportunities," Australian Outlook, 21, No. 3 (December 1967).
- Solichin Salam. Sedjarah Partai Muslimin Indonesia. Djakarta: Jajasan Kesedjahteraan dan Perbendaharaan Buruh Islam, 1968.
- Tentang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia dalam Konstituante. 2 vols. Djakarta: n.p., 1958.
- Thomas, K. D. "Political and Economic Instability: The Gestapu and Its Aftermath," in T. K. Tan (ed.). Sukarno's Guided Indonesia. Brisbane: Jacaranda Press, 1967.
- Van Nieuwenhuize, C. A. O. Aspects of Islam in Post-Colonial Indonesia. The Hague and Bandung: van Hoeve, 1958.
- Ward, K. E. "Some Comments on Islamic Reactions to Recent Developments in Indonesia," Review of Indonesian and Malaysian Affairs, 2, No. 2 (April-June 1968).
- Wertheim, W. F. "Indonesia Before and After the Untung Coup," Pacific Affairs, 39, Nos. 1-2 (Spring 1966).
- . Indonesian Society in Transition. The Hague: van Hoeve, 1964.

