

ONE SOUL ONE STRUGGLE

REGION AND REVOLUTION
IN INDONESIA

ANTON LUCAS



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ONE SOUL ONE STRUGGLE

Region and Revolution in Indonesia

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For Kadar, Trina and Darma

Contents

Maps	ix
Glossary	x
Abbreviations	xiii
Preface	xxii
1 The Nationalists and the Bureaucratic Elite in Pre-War Pekalongan	1
2 The Japanese Experience: Self-sufficiency as Economic Distress	27
3 Opposition and Resistance	55
4 The Proclamation of Independence: Responses and Reactions to the End of Japanese Rule	66
5 Social Revolution	103
6 Order and Disorder	133
7 Revolutionary Consciousness	145
8 Revolution Reaches the Regency Towns	166
9 The Popular Front	190
10 The Army Intervenes	218
11 The Tiga Daerah on Trial	234

12 Conclusion: The Tiga Daerah in the Indonesian Revolution	250
Appendix Time Chart of Events in the Residency of Pekalongan August-December 1945	262
Biographical Appendix	270
Bibliography	282
Index	293

Maps

The Residency of Pekalongan	xviii
Brcbes Kabupaten	xix
Tegal Kabupaten	xx
Pemalang Kabupaten	xxi

Glossary

<i>aliran</i>	lit., a stream or current; a world-view and the social community that adheres to it.
<i>badan</i>	struggle groups
<i>bapak</i>	father
<i>bau</i>	0.71 hectares
<i>bebas, kebebasan</i>	personal liberty, freedom
<i>bung</i>	brother
<i>bupati</i>	regent—administrative head of <i>kabupaten</i> or regency
<i>camat</i>	subdistrict head, below <i>wedana</i>
<i>candi</i>	sacred grave, holy place
<i>corvee</i>	unpaid labour
<i>darah</i>	blood
<i>dombreng</i>	a ritual of public unmasking of corrupt officials
<i>f</i>	guilder, Dutch unit of currency
<i>gamelan</i>	Javanese percussion orchestra
<i>gunseikan</i>	Japanese military administration
<i>guru</i>	teacher

<i>haj</i>	pilgrimage to Mecca
<i>Haji (H.)</i>	title used by one who has made the pilgrimage to Mecca
<i>hormat</i>	expression of respect
<i>janur kuning</i>	young yellow leaf of coconut palm, used symbolically
<i>kabupaten</i>	regency, administrative division above district, under a <i>bupati</i>
<i>kampung</i>	village, or town neighbourhood
<i>kecamatan</i>	subdistrict, administrative division, under a <i>camat</i>
<i>kenpeitai</i>	Japanese military police
<i>kentongan</i>	village signal drum
<i>kermerdekaan</i>	independence
<i>kewedanaan</i>	district, administrative division, under a <i>wedana</i>
<i>kinro hoshi</i>	voluntary labourers under Japanese
<i>kris</i>	Javanese ceremonial dagger
<i>kromo</i>	high Javanese
<i>kyai (K.)</i>	Muslim teacher (also title)
<i>lenggaong</i>	magically powerful village strongman (Tiga Daerah)
<i>lurah</i>	village headman
<i>makloemat</i>	proclamation
<i>Mas</i>	low priyayi title
<i>Merah Putih</i>	the Red and White, the Indonesian flag
<i>merdeka</i>	freedom
<i>Mr.</i>	Meester (academic title of the holder of a Dutch law degree)
<i>nasi ponggol</i>	rice meal wrapped in banana leaf
<i>ngoko</i>	low Javanese

<i>noji padi</i>	official in charge of village rice deliveries under Japanese
<i>pangreh praja</i>	Dutch-trained bureaucratic elite
<i>patih</i>	deputy regent
<i>pemuda rakyat</i>	poor, non-elite youth
<i>pemuda</i>	youth, young activists
<i>pendopo</i>	open pavilion
<i>perjuangan</i>	revolutionary movement
<i>pesantren</i>	traditional rural Muslim School
<i>pokrol bambu</i>	'bush lawyer'
<i>priyayi</i>	Javanese bureaucratic elite
<i>Raden Mas (R. M.)</i>	priyayi title
<i>razia</i>	police search
<i>romusha</i>	conscripted labourer under Japanese
<i>santri</i>	devout Muslim
<i>satay</i>	Indonesian kebabs
<i>sawah</i>	wet rice fields
<i>semangat</i>	revolutionary spirit
<i>S. H.</i>	Sarjana Hukum, holder of an Indonesian law degree
<i>silat</i>	martial self-defence arts
<i>tanah bengkok</i>	ricefields assigned to officials in lieu of salary
<i>wedana</i>	district head

Abbreviations

<i>AMRI</i>	Angkatan Muda Republik Indonesia (Younger Generation of the Republic of Indonesia)
<i>AMRI-I</i>	AMRI-Islam
<i>API</i>	Angkatan Pemuda Indonesia (Younger Generation of Indonesia)
<i>BARISAN PELOPOR</i>	Pioneer Corps under Japanese
<i>BKR</i>	Badan Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Force)
<i>BP2</i>	Badan Pembantu Prajurit (Soldiers' Relief Organisation)
<i>BP3</i>	Badan Pembantu Prajurit Pekerja (Working Soldiers' Relief Organisation)
<i>BPKKP</i>	Badan Penolong Keluarga Korban Perang (Organisation for Aid to Families of War Victims)
<i>BP-KNIP</i>	Badan Pekerja Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat (Working Committee of the Central Indonesian National Committee)


<i>BPM</i>	Bataviasche Petroleum Maatschapij (Batavian Oil Company)
<i>BPRI</i>	Barisan Pemberontak Republik Indonesia (Insurgent Corps of the Republic of Indonesia)
<i>BUDI UTOMO</i>	'High Endeavour' (early nationalist association in Java)
<i>FUJINKAI</i>	Japanese-sponsored women's organisation
<i>GBP3D</i>	Gabungan Badan Perjuangan Tiga Daerah (Federation of Resistance Organisations of the Tiga Daerah)
<i>GERINDO</i>	Gerakan Rakyat Indonesian (Prewar Indonesian People's Movement)
<i>GPII</i>	Gerakan Pemuda Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Youth Movement)
<i>HEIHO</i>	Indonesian auxiliary forces under Japanese
<i>HIS</i>	Hollandsch-Inlandsche School (Dutch-language primary school)
<i>HIZBULLAH</i>	Army of Allah (militia attached to Masyumi party)
<i>HOKOKAI</i>	Java Service Association under Japanese
<i>INDONESIA MUDA</i>	Prewar 'Young Indonesia'
<i>JAWA HOKOKAI</i>	Java Service Association under Japanese
<i>KBI</i>	Kepanduan Bangsa Indonesia (Indonesian Scouts)
<i>KEIBODAN</i>	Japanese-sponsored Vigilance Corps
<i>KNI, KNIP</i>	Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat

	(Indonesian National Committee)
<i>KNIL</i>	Koninklijk Nederlandsch Indisch Leger (Royal Netherlands Indies Army)
<i>KOPI</i>	Koperasi Indonesia (Co-operative under Japanese)
<i>KRI</i>	Koperasi Rakyat Indonesia (Indonesian People's Cooperative)
<i>KRIS</i>	Kebaktian Rakyat Indonesia Sulawesi (Loyalty of the Indonesian People of Sulawesi)
<i>LPT</i>	Laskar Pemuda Tionghoa (Chinese Youth Irregulars)
<i>MARDI UTOMO</i>	Prewar 'Excellent Community'
<i>MASJUMI</i>	Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia (Consultative Council of Indonesian Muslims—a modernist Muslim political party)
<i>MOSVIA</i>	See OSVIA
<i>MUHAMMADIAH</i>	modernist Islamic—social and educational association
<i>MULO</i>	Meer Uitgebreid Lager Onderwijs (Dutch-language intermediate School)
<i>NICA</i>	Netherlands Indies Civil Administration
<i>NEGEN BROEDERS</i>	Nine Brothers
<i>NU</i>	Nahdatul Ulama (Council of Muslim Scholars)
<i>OSVIA</i>	Opleidings-School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren (Training School for native officials, later known as MOSVIA)


<i>P4</i>	Panitia Pembereasan Penahanan Politik (Committee for the Management of Political Prisoners)
<i>PARINDRA</i>	Partij Indonesia Raja (Greater Indonesia Party, prewar)
<i>PARSI</i>	Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party)
<i>PARTINDO</i>	Partij Indonesia (Indonesian Party, prewar)
<i>PBI</i>	Partai Buruh Indonesia (Indonesia Workers' Party)
<i>PEKOPE</i>	Penolong Korban Perang ('War Victims' Helpers' under Japanese)
<i>PEMUDA ISTIMEWA</i>	Special Youth
<i>PEMUDA PERMI</i>	Permi Youth
<i>PERHIMPUNAN INDONESIA</i>	Prewar Indonesian leftist student association in Holland
<i>PERINTIS KEMERDEKAAN</i>	Pioneers of Freedom
<i>PERPRI</i>	Persatuan Pemuda Rakyat Indonesia (Union of the Youth of the Indonesian People—Partindo youth group)
<i>PERSI</i>	Persatuan Sopir Indonesia (Indonesia Drivers' Union, prewar)
<i>PESINDO</i>	Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Youth)
<i>PETA</i>	Pembela Tanah Air (Defenders of the Fatherland—volunteer army on Java under the Japanese)
<i>PKI</i>	Partai Komunis Indonesia (Indonesian Communist Party)
<i>PKN</i>	Polisi Keamanan Negara (State Security Guard)

<i>PNI</i>	Partai Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian Nationalist Party)
<i>PNI BARU</i>	Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (New PNI, Indonesian National Education [Movement], prewar cadre party of Hatta and Sjahrir)
<i>PRI</i>	Pemuda Republik Indonesia (Youth of the Republic of Indonesia)
<i>PSII</i>	Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia (Indonesian Islamic Union Party)
<i>PUTERA</i>	Pusat Tenaga, Rakyat (Centre of People's Strength under Japanese)
<i>SAREKAT ISLAM</i>	Islamic Union
<i>SAREKAT RAKYAT</i>	People's Unions set up by early PKI
<i>SEINENDAN</i>	Japanese-sponsored Youth Corps
<i>TAMAN SISWA</i>	'Garden of Pupils': nationalist school system founded by Ki Hadjar Dewantoro
<i>THHK</i>	Tiong Hoa Hwce Kwan (Chinese School)
<i>TKR</i>	Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (People's Security Force)
<i>TNI</i>	Tentara Nasional Indonesia—(Indonesian National Army—name of official Republican armed forces after May 1947)
<i>VSTP</i>	Vereeniging van Sporen Tramweg personcel (Indonesian Railway Workers' Union)
<i>VVV</i>	Vak voor Victorie (Dutch Victory Movement)


THE RESIDENCY OF PEKALONGAN




BREBES KABUPATEN



TEGAL KABUPATEN





Preface

The proclamation of Indonesian independence on 17 August 1945 unleashed five years of struggle that culminated in diplomatic recognition of Indonesia's sovereignty in December 1949. It was a time of extraordinary political turbulence as well as personal excitement and tragedy in the lives of the many thousands of Indonesians who took part in the struggle. Many of those deeply moved by their own first hand experiences have written about events which occurred during these memorable times, particularly in the first year of the revolution. There was the kidnapping of Sukarno and Hatta on the eve of the proclamation itself, then the great rally in the main square in Jakarta on 19 September when despite a Japanese prohibition, Sukarno spoke publicly at a mass meeting for the first time. The battle of Surabaya in early November saw thousands of young Indonesians throw themselves to their deaths under advancing British tanks, and the burning of Bandung by retreating Republican forces on 24 March 1946, was later immortalised for Indonesians in the song 'Halo, Halo Bandung'. North Sumatra experienced the 'night of blood' in March 1946 when hundreds of the ruling elite were murdered; in South Sulawesi, the terror of Raymond 'Turk' Westerling and his summary execution of more than 2000 pro-Republican villagers in late 1946 is still strong in popular memory.

Westerners writing about the revolution have tried to make sense of these events in various ways and from different perspectives. Early histories made use of first hand Indonesian accounts; later, there were attempts at detailed analyses of the complex revolutionary processes which occurred. All recent writers on the revolution have used a wide range of source material, from the Dutch archives to contemporary newspapers and interviews with former participants.

In this study of revolution in the Pekalongan region of Java's north coast, interviews with former participants play a crucial part in gaining access to a view of local events. As such, the scope of the fieldwork for this book reflects a host of factors related to the practice of oral history research in modern Indonesia. For example, factors such as who was still living at the time of the research, the educational or occupational backgrounds of informants, and their current status, have all played a part in the reconstruction of the times with which this study is concerned. The common denominator among the range of informants who were interviewed was their experiences in the revolution, as all were deeply affected by this struggle. In general they were more than willing to talk about these experiences, particularly as there was the strong feeling among many of them that 'their' region was always the one most neglected in the national histories.

This study began in a small way while I was in Yogyakarta on language field study in 1971. After a chance meeting on the night train from Jakarta with Sarimin Reksodihardjo, Bupati (or Regent) of Brebes on Java's north coast in 1945, the Indonesian historian Sartono Kartodirdjo suggested to me that Sarimin's experiences were worth researching further. Brebes was one of 'three regions' or 'Tiga Daerah' which included the regencies (*kabupaten*) of Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang in Pekalongan residency on Java's north coast. What happened there has become known, in Indonesian history, as the Three Regions Affair or 'Peristiwa Tiga Daerah'.

Given the changes which have occurred in political situation and ideological climate since 1945, interviewing the vanquished and the victors in the Affair was not easy. My first group of informants, members of the *pangreh praja* (the Dutch-trained Javanese bureaucratic elite) were the most accessible. Most of these men had retired to the larger towns of central Java (e.g. Pekalongan, Tegal, Semarang, Salatiga) and could be readily traced through their own organisation of ex-students of the former Dutch civil servants' training school Mosvia, or through the personal networks they maintained. They had a common view of the Tiga Daerah Affair, one of them recalling it as 'a movement whose leaders included an executioner called Kutil, a mysterious communist called K. Midjaja and a medical orderly called Soepangat who became Bupati of Pemalang'.

It was more difficult to locate leaders of revolutionary groups who had played important roles in 1945. Many had moved to other areas of Java, and their whereabouts were unknown except to close friends. I was very fortunate to have the Indonesian Institute of Sciences generously grant me extensions of time for fieldwork which made it possible to locate informants and to complete the interviewing.

It was seldom possible to complete an interview in a single meeting. In fact as the study grew, I found the quality of the oral material depended upon the number of meetings possible with each informant. Frequent return visits to key informants over a number of years enabled me to check new material, and elicit hitherto forgotten information, or facts which had not been told me earlier. The length of time the study took also meant that I was able to visit all districts throughout the Tiga Daerah to find out what had happened to local officials, by whom and by what processes they were replaced, and what the new leaders' political ideas and perceptions of revolution were.

The book is essentially a narrative set in a broad analytical framework. After an analysis of economic conditions, the role of the bureaucratic elite and the emergence of nationalist feeling in the pre-war Pekalongan Residency, I examine the deprivation brought about by the Japanese occupation and the difficulties which emerged between the administrative elite and the people, who were suffering from Japanese wartime compulsory rice requisitioning, forced labour, and rationing of basic commodities. Chapter 3 sets the political leadership of the Tiga Daerah Affair within the context of the underground PKI (Indonesian Communist Party), a loosely knit group of survivors of the pre-war Illegal PKI and other locally based opposition groups. Responses to the proclamation of independence, the nature of the rural social revolution and revolutionary violence itself are dealt with in subsequent chapters, as is the role of the military in Pekalongan politics and the legal and political fate of the movement. The various conflicts which made up the Tiga Daerah Affair, between pangreh praja and peasantry, between centre and region, between authority and anarchy, between generations, between officials accused of siding with the Dutch and those claiming to represent the Republic, are then set in a broader context of conflicting traditions within Javanese society. A Javanese 'counter-culture', a strange alliance of communists, village strong-men called *lenggaong* and radical Muslims, clearly occurred in the Tiga Daerah in 1945 along with the social revolution, which saw the entire removal of both pangreh praja and village officials.

A Tegal informant revealed his cultural perceptions of the Tiga Daerah in a set of analogies. Pekalongan, the rich Residency capital, which has long been a flourishing batik textile centre, is perceived by Tegal people as a 'peacock which dances decoratively' (*merak ngigel sinonderan*), or one that is by implication unwilling to fight. Brebes, bordering Sundanese-speaking West Java and the Southern Banyumas region, is pulled in several cultural directions, and is likened to a large, freely hanging *kenong* gong of the gamelan orchestra which has

become cracked. Like the *kenong* gong, it is difficult to 'mend' (unite) because 'it is hanging' (*kenong sigar ing gantungan*) between Sundanese-speaking West Java and Central Java. Tegal, a much larger town than either of its neighbours, is proudly likened to a wild bison which can only be mounted and ridden by someone (usually symbolised by the cattle boy, a legendary figure in Javanese folklore) who understands its character (*banteng loreng binoncengan*).

Pemalang, a rich rice growing area (at least in its coastal plain) is compared to a sleek *perahu* (small sailing boat) which, if the long steering oar snaps, is easily thrown about by the waves (*watang putung ing ayunan*). The people of Pemalang say they can sometimes then be influenced by one side or the other, by Pekalongan or Tegal. If, however, the oar of the Pemalang *perahu* is steered with a firm hand, as it was during the Tiga Daerah Affair, the boat will chart its own course, and 'the small gong will echo in the heavens'—*bende munggeng tawang*. The voice of little Pemalang will be heard everywhere.

In a study that relies heavily on oral sources which in some cases span several years, my first debt must be to my informants. All of these, after expressing surprise or even astonishment at my tracking them down, gave generously of their time and hospitality, lent me documents or their own personal memoirs to copy, wrote down answers to written questions, completed their own unfinished memoirs, wrote down their own accounts for the first time, and gave me invaluable introductions to their friends. In most cases, and this was of crucial importance, they could help locate them as well. To all my informants, many of whom do not want to be mentioned by name, I owe a tremendous debt of gratitude.

However I am able to record my thanks to the following informants and their families: Soemarno and Kadarisman Soerodiwiryo in Tegal, Samhuri in Pemalang, the late A. Djunaid in Pekalongan, Wadyono and Soesmono in Semarang and the late Major General Soedharmo Djayadiwangsa, the late Sarino Mangunpranoto, Soenarto, Soewignjo, the late Marsum, the late Mr. Besar Martokoesoemo and Sarimin Reksodihardjo.

Among many Indonesian colleagues I should thank in particular two Indonesian historians, Sartono Kartodirdjo, who originally suggested the topic, and Abdurrachman Surjomihardjo who, being from Tegal, would have liked, I suspect, to do the study himself. Of the many at the Australian National University (where a scholarship made possible the writing of the dissertation on which this book is based) I must thank in particular Anthony Reid to whom I owe a great intellectual and personal debt. Benedict Anderson also provided much help at various stages of this project, for which I am most

grateful. The Indonesian Institute of Sciences sponsored the research in Indonesia and the Dutch Public Archives assisted in many ways.

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Lastly, I must thank my wife, Kadar, whose interest and knowledge of Java helped to make this book a reality.

* * * * *

A Note on Conventions

Spelling of Indonesian place names has been standardised, except for titles of published works, newspapers, and personal names. A number of Indonesian words in common use throughout the thesis are not italicised. All the Indonesian words, names, initials and abbreviations appear in the glossary. All quotations (whether from transcripts of taped interviews, interview notes, or written answers to my questions to informants) are my translations from Indonesian unless otherwise indicated. The original Indonesian interview quotations can be consulted in my *Peristiwa Tiga Daerah: Revolusi dalam Revolusi* (Jakarta, Pustaka Utama Grafiti, 1989). In interviews cited as 'Transcript of taped interview 1/27' the Roman numeral refers to the side of the cassette, the Arabic numeral to the page number of the typed transcript. Proc.Gen refers to the archive of the Attorney General (Procureur-Generaal bij het Hoogerrechtshof van Nederlandsch Indie) located in the General State Archive (Algemeene Rijksarchief, A.R.A) in The Hague.

To set the narrative of local events in Pekalongan Residency in its national and regional context, the reader should refer to the Time Chart in the appendix, where biographical notes on the main actors in the story can also be found.

The Nationalists and the Bureaucratic Elite in Pre-War Pekalongan

Pekalongan has long been associated with the bright colours and designs of its unique batik, produced in the Residency capital, a contrast to the sombre tones and the traditional motifs of the hinterland cities of Yogyakarta and Solo. These contrasts in batik styles and designs are paralleled by geographic, social and political differences between Pekalongan Residency, located on the western coastal region, and other parts of Java.

The Residency consisted of four regencies: Pekalongan itself (including the administrative capital of the same name) and, moving to the west, the regencies of Pemalang, Tegal and Brebes.¹ In the nineteenth century these regions formed a separate Residency of Tegal, but in 1931 the boundary was changed to include Pekalongan, and became known as the Residency of Pekalongan, as it had been between 1900 and 1928. The regencies of Pemalang, Tegal and Brebes were the Three Regions or 'Tiga Daerah' in 1945.

The Residency of Pekalongan, with a population of just over two and a half million in 1930 when the last pre-war census was taken, fell into three distinct geographical regions which roughly coincided with administrative boundaries. The Batang area, the most prosperous in the Residency, had remained a separate regency until the early 1930s when economy measures and a low population forced its amalgamation with Pekalongan. An area of low hills, extending from the mountain range running the length of Java to the coastal plain in the north, Batang grew most of the Residency's cash crops in the 1920s—sugar, tea, coffee, cinchona, rubber and 37 per cent of Java's cocoa. It was also virtually the only place where indigenous small holders grew any crops for export.

The second region consisted of a densely populated coastal plain

stretching from Batang to Losari, on the border of West Java. Fed by strong easterly monsoons and regular alluvial flooding, this plain became one of the best irrigated and fertile regions in Central Java. The Comal and Pemali Rivers irrigation network, constructed and maintained by the European sugar plantations in Pemalang regency, allowed the region to achieve self sufficiency in rice. The coastal region of Brebes regency produced a surplus of rice. Until the Depression, sugar yields along the coastal plain were among the highest in Java, supporting seventeen sugar mills. Pemalang regency also had one of the highest pre-war birth rates in Central Java, while Adiwerna district south of Tegal had the highest population density in all of Java—1,764 people per square kilometre of cultivated land in 1930.²

The third region lay behind the other two, a hinterland with poor soil but large teak forests creeping up the lower slopes of Mt. Slamet. In these southern regions of Brebes and Pemalang were among the most sparsely populated in Java. Even so these areas had 400 people per square kilometre.³ Many of the Residency's Muslim schools (*pesantren*) were located in this region, where orthodox Islam was strong.

Income from commercial activity was of considerable importance, and was mainly in the hands of the Chinese and Arab minorities in the larger towns. However, Tanjung district on the Brebes coastal plain supported a thriving clove cigarette industry the majority of factories being indigenously owned. Further inland Banjarharjo district had its own cotton growing and weaving industry. Textiles were produced in the regency towns of Tegal and Pemalang, and in the reformist Muslim village stronghold of Pekajangan to the south of the Residency capital, which the Chinese and Arabs had never been able to penetrate.⁴ In fact Pekajangan village, Bumiayu and Tanjung district towns were remarkable as centres of successful indigenous commercial activity in a part of Java where economic life was dominated by Dutch and Chinese capital (see the maps of Brebes, Tegal and Pemalang on pp. xiv–xvi).

This mosaic of geographic and economic contrasts enveloped social divisions. At the top was a wealthy class consisting of *priyayi* (higher officialdom), *lurah* (village headmen) and rich traders, who had some Dutch education and western habits. In Pemalang this class tended to identify with Muhammadiyah, the reformist Muslim movement. The rural counterpart of this elite frequently had the title of *haji* from the pilgrimage to Mecca, and were usually landlords, having acquired wet rice fields (*sawah*) by money lending. Sarino Mangunpranoto, head of the nationalist Taman Siswa school in Pemalang from 1929 to 1943 (also a member of the original Indone-

sian Nationalist Party, the PNI) recalls that his father-in-law became a landlord with 12 hectares of wet rice fields by deliberately lending money to peasants who owned land further up the irrigation channels, and then taking the wet rice fields when loans could not be repaid. In other areas, *haji* controlled the water distribution in the village by bribing the irrigation officials.⁵ Members of this class owned three of the Residency's rice mills, and lurahs became wealthy by leasing village communal land as well as *tanah bengkok* (rice fields assigned to officials in lieu of salary) to the sugar mills. The 'foreigners'—the Chinese, Arabs and Eurasians—were part of this class in the popular mind. The Arabs, notorious as money-lenders, also controlled and, in practice, owned large areas of land through buying it in the name of their Javanese wives.⁶ Ethnic hostility thus reinforced economic cleavages.

The Muslim elite in the Residency consisted of three elements. First there was the large orthodox group, the Muslim teachers (*kyai*) who with their rural following were often members of the orthodox Muslim Scholars' Union or NU. Second were the reformists, who were strongest in and around the regency towns, and in Bumiayu district and Pekajangan village. A much smaller third element in local Islam were a handful of Muslim leftists, active until the 1926 communist-led rebellion (discussed below) when they were jailed or exiled along with other radicals.

Last, there was an urban-rural division. While some of the larger district towns such as Comal on the main east-west road, where sugar factories had been established since the mid-nineteenth century, had Chinese *kampungs* (village or town neighbourhoods), most 'foreigners' and the bulk of the Residency's Western-educated people lived in the urban areas. The regency towns had running water, paved streets with electric lamps to light them (at least in the priyayi quarter), hospitals and Dutch-language schools.

Economic Origins of Political Discontent

The socio-economic and racial divisions in the Tiga Daerah had their origins in the expansion of colonial capitalist administration in the region. By the 18th century the Dutch East Indies Company had ensured its own financial success by incorporating the political and social power of the Javanese elite and court officials. The Company ensured loyalty in its time with promises of de facto hereditary rule for loyal vassals, that is bupatis whom they called regents. Under the Cultivation System from 1830–1870, forced cultivation of export crops, such as coffee, tea, tobacco, indigo and sugar, was administered

by the Javanese elite on behalf of the Dutch. This affected the Tiga Daerah very seriously.⁷ In Tegal the entire population had to supply land and labour for planting, harvesting, processing and transportation of these crops. These new forms of labour service were in addition to the traditional claims on peasant labour for public works and personal services at the regency, district and village level. At the same time money taxes increased (because of the introduction of wage labour by the government) and the lurahs, as 'caretakers of the government', were made responsible for their collection. This led, in 1864, to a peasant revolt in Tegal when a sugar mill was attacked and a number of Dutch officials were killed.⁸

However bupatis were not able to have everything their own way at the expense of the peasantry. To ensure that their private rice requirements were met, bupatis had to treat the peasants relatively generously in times of labour shortages. They gave loans, and often annulled debts to prevent peasants moving off to other areas. For example, the Bupati of Brebes, one of the richest in Java, had, in addition to personal land holdings, 2,440 hectares of so-called 'private lands' which he put under sugar and which earned him f37,000 in 1856. In effect a rice merchant, because of his position he needed 200 tons of rice each year for entertaining large numbers of visiting officials about whom he constantly complained. The Bupati of Tegal had 8,179 hectares of which less than half was cultivated because of the shortage of labour.⁹

The aim of the Ethical Policy introduced in 1901 to improve 'native' welfare through irrigation, emigration and education brought little relief to the peasantry; peasantry/officialdom relations continued to decline. One source of social security, communally-owned rice fields which were periodically redistributed to villagers, was lost by its alienation into private hands or as *tanah bengkok*. As lurahs were elected for life, and the office usually passed on to sons or other relatives, the *tanah bengkok* could remain in the one family for generations. In Pekalongan Residency this conversion of large amounts of communal rice fields to *tanah bengkok* was more burdensome than in other Residencies because the amount of communal village rice fields alienated was greater than elsewhere. Also village labour was obliged to work official land.¹⁰ The lurahs leased their *tanah bengkok*, as well as rice fields rented from fellow villagers, to the sugar mills. Where communal land was once a resource for the poor, its alienation by lurahs resulted in further economic inequality within villages.

Although with Dutch economic rationalisation the number of villages had dropped by 20 per cent by 1927, the amount of *tanah bengkok* fell by only 5 per cent, thus increasing the official land in each village. Lurahs' incomes also increased dramatically over the

same period as did the gap between their earnings and the average income per head.¹¹ Per capita peasant incomes continued to decline in relation to those of village officials and the pangreh praja until the Japanese occupation. Such income discrepancies served to alienate the lurahs from the peasants, and make them the functionaries of the Dutch merchant class and government rather than active participants in village economic life, which had been their traditional role.

In contrast to village officials, district and subdistrict heads did not usually own property. A former *camat* (subdistrict officer) in Brebes regency before the war recalls:

My own father, a *wedana* [district officer], did not own a house when he was pensioned. I was bred with the ethic that it would be a disgrace if a member of the Pangreh Praja during his career made himself rich by owning lands and houses. Of course at that time we lived far above the standard of the common people.¹²

This was because salaries were so high. A *wedana* earned f500 a month. With the stable rice price of five cents a kilogram, this was the equivalent of ten tons of rice. On his retirement a *wedana* was paid a pension of f237, still the equivalent of five tons of rice. A *bupati* earned f1,250 per month—more than twice a *wedana*'s earnings.¹³

The Burden of Taxation

'Nothing about the colonial order seemed to infuriate the peasantry more than its taxes', writes Scott.¹⁴ In Java the lurahs and their officials were given the role of tax collectors by the colonial government. The abolition of taxes was the goal of the twentieth century 'folk anarchism' of the messianic Saminist movement in Central Java, Islamic brotherhoods in Banten, and the PKI's rural offshoot, the *Sarekat Rakyat* (People's Unions) in the 1920s. The particularly onerous village compulsory labour obligations were an underlying cause of the uprising in Karangcegak hamlet south of Tegal in March 1926.

Often the magnitude of the tax was less important than the ability of people to pay. For the peasants what was left over to meet subsistence needs was the important thing. The land revenue tax was the most hated because it was determined as a fixed charge based on the estimated average yield of graded rice fields, and bore no relation to actual yields, ability to pay or to subsistence needs. The rate of tax was determined by the lurahs, who administered its collection.

The impact of various taxes levied throughout Java on different classes in Pekalongan Residency show how the taxation burden was distributed. Local peasants had to pay an extraordinarily high irrigation

tax levy,¹⁵ while the burden of village taxes fell much more heavily on poor landowners. This latter group was in fact paying more tax per head and per family in the Pekalongan region than in any other area in Java. There was no sliding scale of taxation, rich peasants were paying the same percentage of tax as the poor, although their disposable incomes were different. The percentage of net income paid in total land, local and village taxes by various classes in Pekalongan Residency was as follows:

Village officials	5.4
Rich landowners	12.5
Middle landowners	10.7
Poor landowners and occupants	12.5
Casual labourers	1.2

The area where taxes were most burdensome in Pekalongan Residency was Adiwerna district which, as we have seen, had the highest population density per square kilometre of cultivated land in all Java. Here, 17 per cent of rent paid by the sugar mills to the peasants went in tax, although average rent payment per harvest year by the mills was the lowest in the Residency.¹⁶

Misappropriation in the collection of village taxes and the land revenue tax, the responsibility of the lurahs, occurred frequently. An Indonesian nationalist in the mid-1920s, writing about land revenue, said that 'the tax imposed is everywhere considerably in excess of the established rates, owing to the selfish interests of the village elders, who get eight per cent of the tax collection in their respective villages.'¹⁷ Taxes assessed and collected by lurahs had to be paid to the subdistrict office where collections from each village in the subdistrict were recorded. The pre-war camat quoted earlier again recalls:

I made a graph from statistics over ten years. I knew that whenever payment of taxes was down, the money was certain to have been used by the lurahs. If a lurah couldn't pay his village taxes to the subdistrict office it was an open secret that he robbed other areas using hired semi-bandits to find the money.¹⁸

Rapid promotion of members of the pangreh praja depended on conduct reports, which always commented on the ability of officials to collect taxes. 'My father reached a high position as a camat because he was clever at entering the taxes', recalls a Pemalang teacher.¹⁹

In the last decades of colonial rule the Pekalongan Residency was becoming more socially differentiated. On the one hand there was a class of rich peasant smallholders located in Pekalongan regency, including a large number of landowners with subsidiary incomes,

particularly in Batang region. At this extreme, growing numbers of people in the Residency had incomes over f1,000 in 1924. On the other hand, the numbers of landless peasants, who owned a house which stood on the garden land of others, or who lived in others' houses owning nothing, were the highest of any Residency in Java in 1925. Peasant allotments were also very small.

Indebtedness

The amount the peasant was left with to meet subsistence needs in the Tiga Daerah was smaller than the percentages of net income paid in taxes would indicate. According to a local Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union) leader, in Tegal in 1918 a peasant with one *bau* (0.71 hectares) of wet rice had to pay 30 per cent of his net income in six different taxes.²⁰ In order to get enough food or enough cash to pay taxes, peasants often slid into debt. They either rented the land out at very low rates and worked as seasonal labourers in sugar mills or embarked on an endless and vicious cycle of pawning expected crops. Rural debt and landlessness fed the growing usury industry controlled by Arabs and Chinese, further entrenching racial divisions. Not only Arabs and Chinese but Javanese haji usurers became inordinately rich, owning many houses and ricelands from lending money on prospective harvests. One of these men became so rich that he was appointed a member of the local People's Court.²¹ On pay days, Arab usurers waiting outside factories for people who owed money were seen accosting women debtors in the streets for items of value, including clothing, or searching houses for anything to get their money back.²²

Even before 1930 People's Bank loans in arrears in the Tiga Daerah were larger than in any area in Java, except Kediri. While these banks were set up to reduce dependence of the poor on money lenders, during the Depression banks refused to lend money and this dependence increased. Between 1930 and 1938 the individual amount loaned fell 68 per cent while the number of borrowers in those eight years increased by only 25 per cent.²³ Peasants resorted to pawning their possessions at their local government pawnshop. The number of unredeemed pawns increased and the average amount received for pawned goods was the lowest in all Java.²⁴ A consequence of pawning was an increase in the outward flow of gold assets from the Netherlands East Indies between 1931 and 1936.²⁵ Money was therefore not circulating within Java to repay accumulated debts, let alone re-invest in any return to prosperity after the Depression.

The Impact of Sugar

In the colonial era, Java was the world's second largest exporter of sugar, after Cuba, and until the 1920s sugar was the lifeblood of the Dutch colonial economy. But sugar was also at the heart of rural poverty. Demands the industry made on the precious resources of land, water and labour had destructive effects on the livelihood of peasants, ranging from the actual alienation of land to disruption of irrigation for domestic subsistence crops.²⁶

Since mills were not allowed to own land, sugar's comparative advantage depended on low ground rents. Rent was based on 'normal' yields of rice and secondary crops as net proceeds rather than returns when planted with sugar. Thus the value the land acquired through change in use benefited the European commercial sugar interests and not the peasantry.²⁷

The sugar mills also depended on the peasants to ensure a source of cheap labour for the time when cultivation and milling processes occurred. This was only for a few months of the year and though wages paid to sugar mill workers may not have been extraordinarily low on a daily basis, worked out over a year they were a mere pittance. The casual workers, being landless, had no other form of sustenance left to them and no land to grow subsistence crops.

In order to ensure that the mills got the amount of rice land they needed for growing cane, quotas were given to each village. To obtain enough land, the system depended on coercion of the peasantry by the local bureaucratic elite, both the lurahs and the pangreh praja. Lurahs were given a percentage of the crop as an incentive to find enough peasant land for the mills. Peasants had no way of escaping the 'gentle command' of the lurahs, still less of higher officialdom. As the same Pangkah nationalist put it, 'peasants were robbed of their rights' by the lurahs and the mills.²⁸ Furthermore, sugar mills in Pekalongan Residency had a policy of buying off the traditional religious elite, the kyai, by building mosques and prayer houses in regions where the mill wanted to rent wet rice fields.

By the mid-1920s Pekalongan Residency's seventeen mills had squeezed rice farmers onto even less land or off it altogether. Slawi district had 31 per cent of its rice land under sugar²⁹ and Adiwerna district with its three mills is a classic case of what had happened by 1930 to the peasantry in these sugar districts. With the highest population density in all Java, less than a quarter of Adiwerna's work force were engaged in 'native agriculture'; 25.5 per cent were in 'industry' (in Tegal) while another 28.9 per cent were 'unskilled labourers' who worked wherever they could find employment.³⁰ Until the Depression, many found casual work on the European

sugar estates. Smallholder sugar, an alternative commercial activity for peasant farmers who still had access to land, was still considered a threat to control of the industry by large European interests, who had it banned in the region. A local nationalist recalls that a lurah in Pangkah district once planted sugar and milled it himself. The assistant Resident of Tegal ordered him to stop, but the lurah disregarded the order and grew sugar for one season. Continued intimidation and threats by the armed field-police that he would be dismissed and brought to court finally forced the lurah to abandon the project.³¹

Until Sarekat Islam took up the villagers' cause after 1918, a common form of social protest against the mills was setting fire to the canefields. Arson had become as common in Pekalongan by 1910 as in other parts of Java.³² One of the main complaints of villagers was that the mill waited until the cane had reached the required sugar content before harvesting. The fields were then returned to the villagers too late for paddy planting before the next monsoon was due. In 1910 the Resident of Pekalongan imposed levies on the mills to finance a canefield guard to be recruited from villagers by local officials, but there was no way of controlling the disbursement of the money. Villagers called out for plantation guard duty were sometimes unpaid, and local criminals and village toughs were often recruited as spies to catch the cane burners.³³ Not surprisingly the peasantry resisted this additional labour obligation. If there was a cane fire the whole village, not just those who rented their rice fields to the mill, had to help put it out. The people were being turned into 'guards of the mill owners', recalled the national Sarekat Islam leader, Haji Agus Salim.³⁴ The sugar mills also had special police who had the same authority as regular police to arrest and detain people. Village police often spent more time defending mill interests than those of the village.

Another source of peasant resentment in colonial times was the failure of the mills in Pekalongan Residency to pay compensation to villages for land used for railways. While the mill demanded an eight-metre strip of land to lay the narrow gauge railway which took the harvested cane into the mill, in practice canefield foremen would often use half the land to plant paddy for themselves. Furthermore, although the government allowed peasants to build irrigation channels under the rails, sugar mills often refused them permission to do this.³⁵

From about 1918 Sarekat Islam leaders began to champion the cause of the peasants against the mills. In one area Sarekat Islam successfully put pressure on the mill to raise wages for casual labour and to increase rents. In another the sugar factory administrator had

the Sarekat Islam leader moved because, by always defending the poor peasants, he 'damaged the interests of the plantation'.³⁶ On rare occasions the pangreh praja tried to defend the people's interests but they were treated in the same way. One wedana, supported by his Dutch superior, told the mill administrator that rents on peasant land should be raised at least to the level peasants paid each other when renting the same land. The reply from the mill administrator was: 'I determine the rent with the agreement of the Resident'.³⁷ Not surprisingly people recall today that the mill administrator was more powerful in his area than the Resident himself.³⁸

While the payment of low rents affected those whose land was rented by the mills, the distribution of irrigation water between sugar and wet rice affected all cultivators. Sugar needs almost three times as much water as wet rice, and a Sarekat Islam spokesman complained about the difficulty of irrigating the rice fields, which was only possible at night during the cane growing season. Where cane was grown, the European-manned irrigation service regulated the division of water. The mill was much more likely to have its needs met and '... the competing demands for water from the sugar and the food crops led to endless quarrels and frauds'.³⁹ Where cane was not planted the village level irrigation systems were controlled by the lurah through his irrigation official. In 1921 farmers complained that the latter frequently spent more time getting water for his patron, the lurah, than looking after villagers' needs. Hostility between villages about the water ran so high that violence was quite common, and fields had to be guarded day and night to prevent water from being stolen. The peasants' dependence on rich Muslim landlords for loans of money and paddy, especially during the dry season, prevented them from agitating for a better deal with water. As one peasant interviewed said, 'the rich landowner can make us suffer by not lending us any money or paddy'.⁴⁰

The Great Depression

The dramatic collapse of the colonial sugar industry during the Great Depression was a major crisis for Pekalongan Residency—thirteen of Pekalongan's seventeen sugar mills closed. Dutch investment in maintenance and new irrigation works stopped, wages fell, seasonal employment in the mills disappeared, and a subsistence economy reappeared. Peasants 'saw their money earnings disappear or shrink to a fraction of their former size', while income from the sale of plantation products also declined, often as much as 70 per cent.⁴¹ On the other hand, the cost of living declined much less, while interest on

loans and taxes still had to be paid. As part of the People's Credit Bank investigations into land usury in 1935, a detailed survey was done in two villages in the south Pemalang region. It was found that while the price of paddy had fallen by more than half between 1928 and 1931, the land tax almost doubled.⁴²

The recovery in the Pekalongan sugar industry and the re-opening of many mills in 1937 was not reflected in wages which, in Tegal, remained low. The more rapid revival of sugar-cultivation in Pekalongan than elsewhere (and its bigger share of Java's production) was due in part to the low wage rates there, making it attractive for the mills, but it was also due to little new investment being needed on the existing Pemali-Comal irrigation network.

The Role of the Pangreh Praja

The memory of the long process of pauperization over three or four generations was overtaken in the increasing misery of the 1930s. If future revolutionaries had the sense of having lost the 'good life' at any particular point it was in this decade. For this they blamed colonial taxes and the sugar mills, and the elite on whom the Dutch relied. The pangreh praja's role was crucial. As 'security and crop overseers' for the Dutch their role was accentuated in Pekalongan Residency because of the importance of the sugar. The taxation burden, the tremendous population pressure on land, especially in Tegal, and the extent of rural indebtedness made it difficult for the officials to represent the people to the government (even if they had wanted to). While acting as tax collectors and being responsible for security and surveillance, they hounded the nationalist leaders often with even greater ferocity than the Dutch. For the pangreh praja were central to the anti-nationalist strategy of the Dutch, just as they were central to maintaining law and order through their own network of spies and informants. Camats were judged for promotion on three criteria: their general administrative skills, control of criminality, and (as we have seen) their success in tax collection. For the second function the Pekalongan Residency pangreh praja were given secret police funds of f15 per month to pay spies and informers. Officials who were anxious to demonstrate that they could always 'catch the culprit' and keep down 'criminality' and dissent in their subdistricts freely admitted using their own salary to supplement the fund, as this expenditure did not have to be accounted for to the colonial authorities.⁴³

The pangreh praja did not always limit their activities to political surveillance and tax gathering. In an effort to combat the popularity

of the Sarekat Islam, Pekalongan's priyayis set up their own organisation called Pirockoenen (Harmony) in opposition to the Sarekat Islam.⁴⁴ Then, following the success of similar anti-nationalist pangreh praja organisations elsewhere in Java, officials formed a branch of an organisation called Mardi Oetomo (Excellent Community) in the late 1930s in South Pemalang. It was 'a movement of less well-born low ranking officials . . . most of its leaders and the majority of its members bore the low priyayi title *mas* and were clerks or assistant clerks'.⁴⁵ With the Camat of Pulosari as chairman, the executive committee consisting of priyayi officials, and most of the membership consisting of lurahs, the Mardi Oetomo became active in the areas of health, sports, handicrafts, agriculture and the arts. Its program included planting bamboo and tea to stop soil erosion, eradication of rats, building lavatories in villages, and distributing government medicines to combat dysentery and plague. It also distributed brown rice to those with malnourishment or hunger oedema.⁴⁶ Through access to government funds the pangreh praja worked to maintain their power and influence against that of local nationalists by apparently relieving the people's sufferings. However these efforts were inadequate to meet the calamity which developed in South Pemalang in mid-1939. By June of that year 1,436 cases of hunger oedema were reported,⁴⁷ while the local hospital in Moga was strained to the limits treating two hundred victims (including fifty-three children) of the famine.⁴⁸ Despite increased levels of aid due to publicity, a subsequent survey confirmed the endemic malnutrition in Pulosari and Belik subdistricts.⁴⁹

In the days of East Indies Company administration during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, priyayi families had co-operated with the Company to safeguard their economic and political status and Pekalongan Residency was no exception to this. One of the Company's most loyal vassals, the Reksonegoro family, had ruled Tegal since 1678 thus becoming the longest ruling regent family in Java, claiming descent from the Demak sultans.⁵⁰ R.M.A.A. Reksonegoro X (bupati from 1908-1929) married Kardinah, sister of Raden Ajeng Kartini, pioneer of women's emancipation in Java.⁵¹ Kardinah founded a hospital, a girls' school and orphanage in Tegal, and, being herself childless, reared three of her husband's children by a junior wife. One of these was R.M.T. Soesmono Reksoharsono who, on the death of his father in 1929, became the popular Reksonegoro XI. However in 1936 he was removed by the Dutch, an almost unheard of occurrence, because he had become involved with a Dutch woman to the extent of eventually marrying her. Sutherland writes that the government accused him of 'grievously offending European colonial mores by becoming involved with a Dutch

woman⁵² and his current wife, the daughter of another regent, demanded a divorce. Reksonegoro XI tried to ride out the storm, in his defiance of colonial rules relying on the promise given to his forebears that Tegal Regency would remain in Reksonegoro hands for twelve generations,⁵³ as well as on support from the people of Tegal who petitioned the Dutch in his favour.⁵⁴

The Dutch were loath to break with past practice—both indigenous and colonial—in their relationships and management of the bupatis and their families. It was fundamental to early Dutch administration that native rulers as officials would retain their privileges and, more importantly, their customary status relative to the community. The bupatis must not be publicly disciplined or humiliated since they had a unique ceremonial role as agents strengthening Dutch authority by indigenous means. However, over the years Dutch commercial needs and a modernising of the bureaucratic structure combined to undermine the authority of bupatis without interfering with their formal status. Excessive expenditure, corrupt use of funds and more exuberant antics were tolerated by the Dutch who believed that sustaining the bupatis' ceremonial function bolstered their authority in the people's eyes.

But in the 1920s changes were occurring within the indigenous population as well as in the Dutch colonial administrative thinking. Bupatis gradually became alienated from the intelligentsia of their own people and the Dutch administration became more concerned with probity and professional propriety. There was also a liberating influence at large in social matters and contacts between bupatis and colonial rulers grew more informal and democratic.

Although the bupatis still retained considerable privilege despite encroachments on their traditional power base, by the 1930s they were much more vulnerable and Reksonegoro XI was forced to resign because the Dutch regarded him as a social hazard at best and a political one at worst. He was replaced by a non-local man with little of his predecessor's authority. Tegal regency had been made safe against Dutch women but not, as we shall see, against revolutionary mobs.

Political Action

Prior to the communist rebellion of 1926 there were expressions of popular discontent about wages and conditions on European plantations, and lack of educational opportunities. In the 1920s such local grievances had been aired by the active Pekalongan leadership of Sarekat Islam whose speakers thundered against the discrimination

between the priyayis and the common people in the Residency capital.

Members of the pre-war nationalist movement felt very strongly about educational discrimination in favour of priyayi children for the small number of places available each year in the Dutch-language primary schools or HIS. In rural areas only those 'on good terms with the camat' had a chance of even applying for the HIS schools.⁵⁵ In Pekalongan itself grievances about high market rents and undemocratic elections for the Pekalongan municipal council were also expressed. Priyayis who dominated the council 'do not understand the situation in the kampung as they seldom mix with the inhabitants'.⁵⁶

Following the widespread failure of the Java-wide rice harvest in 1918 the backlash against the Ethical Policy saw the mobilisation of the peasantry by the left-wing of Sarekat Islam in Pekalongan Residency, particularly in the coastal plain. Disturbances on the rubber plantations were followed by industrial strikes and European-Indonesian relations worsened, particularly in the Pemalang Forestry Service.⁵⁷

Strikes increased in number and variety and sugar worker union leaders complained to the governor-general about police intimidation and false reports circulated by the Dutch officials and the pangreh praja.⁵⁸ In 1923, when Sarekat Islam no longer allowed members of other political parties to remain within their ranks, many members and local branches went with the Sarekat Rakyat—which the PKI had set up for peasant sympathisers of the party outside the urban centres. By January 1926 the Tegal branch of the Sarekat Rakyat had 3,500 members on its books and the Pekalongan branch 3,230 (including 160 Chinese).⁵⁹ In 1923 the strike by the Indonesian Railway Workers' Union (VSTP) initiated a period of rapid growth for the PKI, with many Sarekat Islam and railway workers joining it,⁶⁰ although the Pekalongan branch of the Railway Workers' Union had its right of assembly restricted by the colonial government after the strike.⁶¹

By early 1926 membership of the PKI had developed to a point where Tegal was one of the most fiery radical centres in Java, with groups opposing burdensome taxes supported strongly by local Muslim leaders. In the middle of 1925 the Tegal internal revenue inspection discovered that because of poor supervision a great backlog in tax payments had built up since 1921. Payment was then demanded but not received, so forcible collections of all unpaid taxes were begun in 1926, as a result of which '... the population as a whole was in a desperate and angry mood'.⁶² The Sarekat Rakyat also supported villagers in their opposition to oppressive corvée (compulsory unpaid labour).

The upsurge of political activity brought about increased surveillance by the Dutch of Communist Party branches in Tegal, Cirebon and Pekalongan. This increased police surveillance in turn forced the PKI in Tegal to form an illegal organisation to train members as 'fervent revolutionaries' as well as keeping the ordinary Party structure.⁶³ Before the party was ready premature revolts broke out in some localities, often triggered by police actions which fuelled resentment about tax collections, guard-duty imposts which peasants had been resisting, and prohibitions on protest meetings.

Karangcegak in Tarub subdistrict south of Tegal was the scene of such an eruption. Apart from the tax collections, corvec in this subdistrict was very onerous.⁶⁴ Since 24 February 1926, a new village guard duty and nightwatch duty had been made compulsory. This duty was opposed by a group calling itself the Faithful Hearts Fellowship led by a Tegal PKI committee member and a dismissed village rice-barn official who also led the local Sarekat Rakyat. On 26 February a police detachment under the *Patih* (deputy regent) of Tegal had gone to the area to enforce the new regulations about village guard duty, and several PKI leaders were arrested. Because opposition to the guard duty continued, on 2 March the Wedana of Adiwerna and the Camat of Tarub went in person to Karangcegak to assess the situation. Despite the fact that the only 'resistance' that could be found was 'an audacious attitude' on the part of a group of peasants returning home from their fields, it was considered such a serious situation that next morning six policemen were called in to settle the disturbance. The police in fact set about breaking into the houses of Sarekat Rakyat leaders thought to be active in resistance against guard duty. An angry crowd collected and besieged the wedana, who called in further police reinforcements the following day, by which time the crowd, grown to over two hundred people, had armed itself with cudgels, bamboo spears and knives. Chanting the Islamic Holy War cry, 'Sabilillah', they stormed a local haji's house, in which various police and political intelligence service agents were hiding, lightly wounding some of them and wrecking furniture. The Resident of Pekalongan panicked and sent an urgent telegram to the governor-general in Bogor and police reinforcements from as far away as Sukabumi in West Java, Semarang and Kudus to the east were sent to Karangcegak to put down the 'rebellion'. In a mass roundup which followed, a total of 5,326 members of the Sarekat Rakyat were questioned or detained in nine subdistricts and 3,510 membership cards were collected by the police. At least eight people were exiled to Boven Digul prison camp in West New Guinea and sixty more imprisoned elsewhere in Java.⁶⁵

The situation in Tegal became further embittered by another

incident in Bangle village, also in Adiwerna district, in September 1926. This was caused by the Pagongan sugar mill's refusal to give back rented rice fields in time for the peasants to plant their paddy. The canefield inspector would not cut the cane, although the leases had expired, because the sugar content was too low. There was a quarrel, a labour foreman fled and reported the case to the Wedana of Adiwerna. Six people, supposedly the ringleaders, who were merely 'standing around with grass knives', were shot down in subsequent reprisals by a force led by the assistant Resident of Tegal.⁶⁶

Another important radical centre in Tegal region was the sugar-mill town of Ujungrusi in Adiwerna district which, as we have seen, had the highest population density in Java. Ujungrusi was the home of well known unionist and PKI vice-chairman Sugono Reksoputro who played a leading role in planning the abortive rebellion of 1926, and was alleged by the Dutch to have committed suicide in prison. This information was treated with anger and scorn by the family and aroused such local hostility that the Dutch had to guard the grave during the customary forty days of mourning. A martyr was thus created for Ujungrusi keeping the revolutionary spirit alive there so that the people never lost its active commitment to redressing their wrongs.⁶⁷

The early outbreaks of rebellion in August and September 1926 suffered from too much enthusiasm and too little organisation. These tragically ill-prepared, premature outbursts allowed the Dutch to 'clear the undergrowth' of the revolutionary movement, while their spies and informers later supplied them with the necessary information to arrest the entire Tegal-Pekalongan leadership before 12 November 1926, the date set for the uprising.⁶⁸ This meant that many of the places which had worked hardest for rebellion were silent on 12 November.

The PKI revolutionary wave which broke prematurely was nonetheless the high point of 1926. Despite the failures and arrests which followed, it established the PKI's image as the revolutionary vanguard in Tegal, symbolising successful action against taxation, onerous corvée and the sugar mills.

While Pekalongan was considered by the Dutch to be still one of the two most 'politically active' Residencies in Central Java in 1930,⁶⁹ such nationalist activity was fragmented, being confined to a few small groups in the regency capitals. Their success depended on the extent of surveillance of the political intelligence service as well as on the calibre of those who had escaped imprisonment: a handful of Sukarnoists, the new PNI (PNI Baru), and Islamic nationalists.

The first PNI, founded by Sukarno in 1927, enjoyed a brief period

of activity in Pekalongan city in late 1929 under the leadership of Kromo Lawi, a seaman dismissed from the navy for alleged communist leanings. By December of that year there were over five hundred members, a regular programme of courses and 'very large finances'. The arrest and detention of Kromo Lawi at the end of December 1929 caused many Minangkabau traders, who had supported the PNI in Pekalongan, to return to Padang. The movement then declined, although a small kernel of traders remained to support it throughout 1930. In May of 1930 Kromo Lawi was released from detention, but the PNI was disbanded in April 1931.⁷⁰

During this period Tegal had no popular follower of Sukarno like Kromo Lawi around whom nationalist remnants could rally after the disasters of 1926. A branch of the early nationalist organisation, Budi Oetomo, (High Endeavour) led by a 'leftist' lawyer Mr. Sastromoljono, and the Muhammadiyah were the only signs of political life there in the late 1920s.⁷¹ The two nationalist parties of the 1930s, Gerindo and Partindo had ineffective leadership. Indeed if anything the more conservative Parindra was more active. The weak state of the nationalists in Tegal was partly the result of harassment by the political intelligence service and the police, much more severe than in Pematang because of the earlier communist led uprisings. Even the most active group in Tegal at that time, Indonesia Muda (Young Indonesia), founded and led by a young student, Supeno, was finally forced into demise when the police demanded that its members sign a witnessed declaration that they had left the organisation. Some then formed an Islamic Study Club while others joined the Muhammadiyah. Although Supeno left Tegal, he maintained close contact with his friends from the Indonesia Muda group throughout the 'thirties and the Japanese occupation.⁷²

Of the two Muslim groups, the Islamic nationalists (the PSII or Indonesian Islamic Union Party), although not harassed as much, suffered the same decline as the PNI after a similar brief time of popular success in Pekalongan in 1929. It was more active after 1931, when the Residency branch headquarters moved to Batang, the home of its leader.⁷³ The PSII, grew out of the Islamic Union of the 1920s and was the major pre-war Muslim party, emphasising all-Indonesian nationalism and non-cooperation. It had an effective cadre building program in Tegal.⁷⁴ In the rural areas local PSII leaders deliberately broke the state salt monopoly, and, for religious reasons, openly opposed the taking of blood samples from corpses which was part of the government plague eradication program. By 1932, this opposition became a popular movement in some places, with leaders going to jail after violent clashes with government health workers.

Apart from its support in the regency capitals, the Muhammadiyah had two strongholds in Pekalongan Residency: the prosperous district town of Bumiayu (in southern Brebes regency) and at Pekajangan, the textile weaving village just south of Pekalongan. The main impact of Muhammadiyah was in education, providing the opportunity of Dutch-language primary schooling for many who could not get into a government school. The conflict between this group and the PSII was quite strong, particularly in Tegal. Apart from religious differences, the most well known PSII leader, Kyai Haji (K.H.) Abu Sudja'i (who led the campaign against taking blood samples from corpses), would not associate with the Muhammadiyah because he considered their members 'very moderate and pro the colonial government'.⁷⁵ The Islamic nationalists on the other hand, would not let their children 'sit at the desk of a Dutch school'.⁷⁶

In Brebes regency the pre-war nationalists faced different problems, being physically divided between Brebes and the more active subdistrict of Ketanggungan on the main railway from Jakarta. In Ketanggungan, the Taman Siswa school was led by nationalists while in Brebes it was not. It was the centre of both the reformist Muslims and the orthodox NU and also had one of Tiga Daerah's two non-government intermediate schools or MULO.

In political terms Pemalang was different from other regencies during the pre-war period. Perhaps this was because of the presence of Sarino Mangupranoto, head of the local Taman Siswa and the most influential political figure in Pemalang during the 1930s. Sarino Mangupranoto encouraged Partindo and other sympathetic parties to hold their meetings in the Taman Siswa buildings, although he was not a party member himself because of Taman Siswa rules. Sarino had close personal ties with Pemalang's assistant Resident and his wife (both Theosophists and admirers of Taman Siswa founder Ki Hajar Dewantara), and the Dutch police chief, both of whom were involved with the local scouts (the KBI) which Sarino ran. Because of this Pemalang's moderate nationalists were not harassed by the pangreh praja as in other areas. Taman Siswa was never reprimanded for allowing Indonesia Muda to use its premises for political meetings, nor for deliberate failure to fly the Dutch flag on Queen Wilhelmina's birthday; nor were any teachers dismissed under the 'Wild School' Ordinance of 1933, a source of pangreh praja — nationalist conflict elsewhere.⁷⁷

The Residency's radical nationalists were rendered inert after the attempted rebellion of November 1926 because most of their leaders were exiled to Boven Digul in West New Guinea or imprisoned elsewhere in Java. The remaining radicals transferred their cells to the cover of the Cirebon-based Indonesia Driver's Union (Persi),

then under the leadership of Dutch-educated leftist Muhammad Jusuf.⁷⁸

Two other groups which participated in the development of political consciousness and were later to play an important part in the events of October-November 1945 were the lenggaongs and the *pokrol bambu* or local 'bush lawyers'.⁷⁹ Both groups served the underprivileged and their own best interests at the same time.

Lenggaongs in Pekalongan Residency had other local names with a variety of nuances all reflecting the importance of invulnerability and the mixture of awe, fear and admiration in which local peasant communities held them. These people were 'graded' in the minds of local people according to their spiritual power, reflected in the degree of knowledge of esoteric or magical arts, and the magical power this knowledge gave. In this way these village strong men acquired various degrees of invulnerability and spiritual power.⁸⁰

At one end of the scale were pickpockets and petty thieves (*ba-jingan* and *pencuri*) while urban areas produced vagabonds (*pen-coleng*) who had a higher esoteric knowledge than petty thieves. Others with fighting skills were known as *wong julig*, *tukang gelut*, and *tokdeng* while group leaders were known as *blantongan*. Such fighters and organisers were thought to have greater invulnerability derived from their stronger protective amulets, their daring and their better contacts. In Indonesian they were also called *jago* or fighting cock, a brave, daring and often intimidating figure in the eyes of villagers.

In times of scarcity, at least one local Robin Hood called *mbah pandung aguna*, or magically skilful thief, whose grave in southern Pemalang is still a place of pilgrimage today, allegedly stole food from the rich and gave to those 'whose cries of hunger he heard'.⁸¹ Gentoloto Nayo Genggong, from Pacul village (Tegal), one of three famous lenggaongs on this part of the north coast in the latter part of the nineteenth century, stole water buffalo, changed the shape of their horns so their rich owners could not identify them and then slaughtered them for distribution to the poor.⁸² In 1919, a bad harvest year, social unrest was rife in the Pekalongan coastal area where the population, on the brink of famine, were mixing chicken feed with the rice. Bands roamed the area, armed with a unique local weapon, a type of sawn-off shotgun, and rich people were robbed of their gold and clothes.⁸³

In colonial times, these lenggaong figures then acted as power brokers between the village and the outside world, and within the village between the lurahs and the people.⁸⁴ They often had a reciprocal relationship with the lurah, safeguarding the security of the village and acting as bodyguards at weddings and circumcisions.

Local lenggaongs used to gather for mutual protection and solidarity in certain villages and almost every subdistrict had at least one such village. The colonial authorities did not try to 'clean them out', probably because they were recognised by the Dutch as a rough but necessary part of local pangreh praja control techniques and were used by the Dutch in the field police also for that purpose.

Villages where lenggaongs lived were known to be difficult to control. Cheap land could not be obtained easily, and the mill was careful to return land no later than the lease stipulated. The pangreh praja considered the sugar mill subdistricts difficult postings where officials were sent to be 'tested'. Here the people had more money to spend and prostitution, gambling, drinking a brew made from waste sugar, and banditry were the common pastimes of an 'unruly' population.

A nationalist from Comal, which had a strong lenggaong tradition, describes them thus:

A lenggaong does not necessarily steal in the way an ordinary thief does. A lenggaong is a person who has physical strength, and deep spiritual knowledge. It takes a long time to become a lenggaong, studying self-defence arts and obtaining knowledge of inner things. If a person has the title lenggaong, his livelihood does not come from stealing, but from other people who need the security of the protection that he can give. . . . In colonial times the lenggaong were in general looked up to by the People. Their actions did not bother the People. It was the colonial administration and the *landlords* who were obstructed.⁸⁵

A lenggaong had learnt *silat* (martial arts), perhaps during time spent in a pesantren, and returned to the village knowing a few Arabic words which, in villagers' eyes, gave him a superior knowledge of religion as well as a supernatural protection from weapons, and the power to enter and leave houses unseen.⁸⁶ There was a strong magico-religious element in rural Islam and many kyais in the rural areas of Pekalongan Residency were revered for similar reasons.

During the 1920s it had been part of PKI strategy to recruit elements 'outside the law' into the party. They would be attracted to the party '... partly by defiance of authority and not by class interests or by doctrine'.⁸⁷ In March 1925 Alimin had urged local party leaders to search the kampungs for criminals who would lead their fellows in robberies, two-thirds of the booty being for the PKI.⁸⁸ Many Sarekat Rakyat leaders formed alliances with lenggaongs in the same village as themselves during this period.

The activity of the *pokrol bambu* was an important barometer with which to measure the amount of ill-feeling or unrest towards the

bureaucratic elite in the Tiga Daerah. If the lenggaongs were power brokers acting on behalf of a growing dispossessed rural proletariat, so the *pokrol bambu* were law brokers defending the latter, both in and out of court, from rapacious Arab money-lenders and overzealous officials. While there were many kinds of *pokrol bambu* throughout Java, all shared some knowledge of how the legal system worked without any formal law degree⁸⁹ and were granted a grudging recognition by the Dutch as part of the local legal system. In the Tiga Daerah nearly every village had at least one. They often earned sizeable fees defending or litigating in cases involving loans, the pawning of rice fields, village inheritance, and complaints against both lurahs and higher officials. If the litigant had no money the *pokrol bambu* might be treated to satay in town. They were hated by the *pangreh praja* who considered them quick, skilful writers, talkers and debaters; *pokrol bambu* after all often wrote letters to *wedanas* about corrupt village heads and *camats*. Their role was all the more significant in a culture in which to oppose the ruler was to invite personal disaster or misfortune. In Pemalang their ranks swelled during the 1930s and, at village level, they helped to defend the weak against official corruption.⁹⁰ In Brebes the most famous *pokrol bambu* was a Eurasian who would write letters in Dutch to the *bupati* about overbearing *wedanas* and would liven court proceedings with his biting wit.⁹¹

1. Each regency or *kabupaten* with its regional head or *bupati*, was divided administratively into districts (*kewedanaan*) each with its district head (*wedana*). Below them were the sub-districts (*kecamatan*) headed by a *camat*. Together with the village headman (*lurah*), these higher officials, the Dutch-trained *pangreh praja*, made up Pekalongan's bureaucratic elite. See the maps on pp. xiii-xvi.
2. For agricultural production in Pekalongan residency see: Netherlands Indies Centraal Kantoor Voor de Statistiek *Landbouwatlas van Java en Madoera* (Weltevreden, 1926), Part II, Table VI; for irrigation, soil fertility and demography of the region see *Volkstelling*, 1930, Vol. 11, pp. 10, 11 and *Indisch Verslag*, 1939, p. 377. The population density of Adiwerna district is quoted in Karl J. Pelzer, *Pioneer Settlement in the Asiatic Tropics* (New York, 1948), p. 167. Charles A. Fisher, *South-East Asia: A Social Economic and Political Geography* (London, 1969), p. 291, Table 22, shows Adiwerna as having 4,242 people per square mile, the highest population density in Java in 1930.
3. *Volkstelling*; Table 9, p. 167.
4. See Suzannah Price, 'Religion, Social Organisation and Textile Pro-

- duction in a Javanese Village' (M.A. thesis, Australian National University, 1978).
5. Interview with Sarino Mangunpranoto, Ungaran, 21 July 1976. After the war an important PNI figure, Sarino Mangunpranoto was twice Minister of Education (1956-57 and 1967), and a leading Indonesian educator until his death in 1983. See Anton Lucas 'In Memoriam: Ki Sarino Mangunpranoto', *Indonesia* 35 (April, 1983), pp. 133-137.
 6. Under the Agrarian law of 1870 only 'natives' could own land.
 7. See the report by L. Vitalis, who was Inspector of Forced Cultivation in Tegal Residency in 1834, in Chr. L. M. Penders, *Indonesia: Selected Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism 1830-1942* (Brisbane, 1977), p. 27. For the import of forced sugar cultivation see R. E. Elson, *Javanese Peasants and the Colonial Sugar Industry: Impact and Change in an East Java Residency, 1830-1940* (Singapore, 1984); also C. Fasseur, *Kultuurstelsel en Koloniale Baten* (Leiden, 1975).
 8. Tine Ruiter, 'The Tegal Revolt in 1864', in Dick Kooiman, Otto van den Muizenberg and Peter van der Veer, *Conversion, Competition and Conflict: Essays on the Role of Religion in Asia* (Amsterdam, 1984), pp. 83-6.
 9. See Onghokham, 'The Residency of Madiun: Priyayi and Peasant in the Nineteenth Century' (Ph.D. Thesis, Yale University, 1975), p. 139, fn. 69.
 10. Hiroyoshi Kano, *Land Tenure System and the 'Desa' community in Nineteenth Century Java* (Tokyo, 1977), p. 8. Kano sees the development of a class relation in parts of Java originating not in the classical landlord-tenant relations but derived from official position between lurahs, their officials and the people. See also *Onderzoek naar de Mindere Welvaart der Inlandsche Bevolking op Java en Madoera*, Vol. IXc, Part III, (1904-1906), p. 132.
 11. Forty per cent of lurahs in Pekalongan Residency were earning between f600-f1200 per annum compared to the average population's wage of f25.79. J. W. Meijer Ranneft and W. Iluender, *Onderzoek naar den Belastingdruk op de Inlandsche Bevolking*. (Weltevreden, 1926), p. 122. Penders, *Selected Documents*, pp. 101-6.
 12. Personal communication from Wadyono, a pre-war Camat of Tonjong, 21 June 1979. For his biography see p. 280.
 13. *Ibid.*
 14. James C. Scott, *The Moral Economy of the Peasant: Rebellion and Subsistence in South East Asia* (New Haven, 1976), p. 91.
 15. According to Meijer Ranneft et al., Pekalongan Residency contributed 96 per cent of Java's total irrigation levy, *Onderzoek*, p. 139.
 16. *Ibid.*, p. 39.
 17. S. Dingley [Iwa Kusuma Sumantri], *The Peasants' Movement in Indonesia* (Moscow, 1926), p. 20.
 18. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 15 October 1976.
 19. Transcript of taped interview with Pemalang schoolteacher (Subechi), II/16, Pekalongan, 3 May 1975.
 20. 'Tani dan Sawah', *Neratja*, 23 November 1918.

21. 'Over den Woeker in de Regentschappen Tegal, Brebes en Pemalang', *Blaadje voor het Volkscredietwezen*, 15 August 1925, pp. 139, 144.
22. *Ibid.* The Arabs, addressed as *ndoro tuan* (your honour) even by the village officials, were mainly renowned as usurers.
23. *Indisch Verslag*, 1930, Table 136; 1938, Table 135.
24. *Ibid.*, 1938, Table 128. See also J. S. Furnivall, *Netherlands India: a Study of Plural Economy* (reprinted, Amsterdam, 1967), pp. 357-61.
25. 158 million guilders left the Indies 'mainly via government run pawn-shops'. See W. F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society in Transition: A Study of Social Change* (Bandung, 1956), p. 94.
26. Elson, *Javanese Peasants*, pp. 141-8; Alec Gordon, 'The collapse of Java's Colonial Sugar System and the Breakdown of Independent Indonesia's Economy', in Francien van Anrooij et al. (eds.), *Between People and Statistics: Essays on Modern Indonesian History* (Amsterdam, 1979), pp. 253-56.
27. J. van Gelderen, 'The Economics of the Tropical Colony', *Indonesian Economics* (The Hague, 1961), p. 154.
28. The Indonesian is *hak asasinya di rampas*. Transcript of taped interview with Sugiono, 1/5, 27 November 1975.
29. *Landbouwatlas van Java en Madoera*, Part II, Table IV. This meant that Slawi had more than 25 per cent of its rice field acreage rented to sugar mills for cane-growing in a single year. For Java as a whole only 8 per cent of rice fields was in cane in 1920. See C. Geertz, *Agricultural Involvement* (Berkeley, 1963), pp. 70-8.
30. Peizer, *Pioneer Settlement*, p. 167. 'Industry' here meant light engineering and metal workshops which formed the backbone of the local economy after the collapse of the sugar industry in the early 1930s.
31. Transcript of taped interview with Pangkah nationalist leader (Sugiono), 1/5-7, Tegal, 27 November 1975. See also Elson, *Javanese Peasants*, p. 217.
32. Between June 1910 and September 1911, 205 cases of arson were reported in Pekalongan Residency. M. van Geuns 'Het Rietbrandenvraagstuk in Pekalongan', reprinted from *Soerabajasch Handelsblad*, 1911, pp. 4-5. In Madiun in 1913 between 3-8 per cent of canefields were subject to arson. Onghokham, 'Madiun', p. 226. See also R. E. Elson, 'Cane burning in the Pasuruan area: an expression of social discord', in van Anrooij et al., *Between People and Statistics*, pp. 251-266, and Elson, *Javanese Peasants*, pp. 148-54, and 187-89.
33. van Geuns, 'Het Rietbrandenvraagstuk . . .', pp. 15, 17.
34. *Neratja*, 23 December 1918.
35. Interview with Comal nationalist leader (Panji Soewarso), Comal, 15 December 1975.
36. Transcript of taped interview with Sugiono, 1/3, Tegal, 27 November 1975; *Neratja*, 12 April 1919. See also Elson, *Javanese Peasants*, pp. 195-209.
37. Sarimin Reksodihardjo, 'Kenang-Kenangan dari Masa yang Silam' *Memoir*, 1 January 1965, pp. 85-86.
38. The expression *besar pabrik* (mill big-shot) for the mill administrator is

- still common in villages. Grander than the bupati's official residence, the huge mansions where the sugar mill administrators lived were referred to as *besaran*.
39. J. J. van Klavren, *The Dutch Colonial System in the West Indies* (The Hague, 1953), p. 172; see also Elson, *Javanese Peasants*, pp. 145-8, 185-6.
 40. Hoengoesia, 'Verslag omtrent de Oeloe-Oeloe regeling in het Pemali Tjomal', *Indisch Bouwkundig Tijdschrift* (1921), p. 225.
 41. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society*, p. 97. See also the discussion of the impact of the Great Depression on the sugar industry in East Java in Elson, *Javanese Peasants*, pp. 233-249.
 42. Soekasno, 'Grondwoeker als gevolg van Crediettransacties in het Pema-langsche', *Volkscredietwezen*, 24 (1936), p. 191.
 43. This was unusual considering the usual Dutch fastidiousness over money matters. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 7 October 1976.
 44. *Neratja*, 29 August 1918.
 45. Heather Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite*, (Singapore, 1979), pp. 75, 123.
 46. Interview with Pulosari leader (Soegirwo Poedjoetomo), Pulosari, 29 November 1974.
 47. *Algemeene Landbouweekblad voor Ned. Indie*, 30 September 1939, p. 186.
 48. *De Indischman*, 17 May 1939; *Soerabajasch Handelsblad*, 15, 16 May 1939.
 49. *Poelosari Rapport: Onderzoek naar de voeding en voedings toestand der bevolking in zuid-Pemalang in 1939-41*, Mededeeling No. 6 (Batavia, 1941).
 50. Heather Sutherland, 'Notes on Java's Regent Families': Part I, *Indonesian*, 16 October 1973, p. 136 fn. 70; Part II, *Indonesia*, 17 April 1974, Appendix I, pp. 37-8.
 51. Kardinah was to suffer public humiliation at the hands of Tegal revolutionaries during the social revolution in 1945. See below p. 175.
 52. Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite*, p. 136.
 53. Interview with Mr. Besar Martokoesoemo, Jakarta, 24 July 1973.
 54. Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite*, p. 136.
 55. Interview with Comal primary school teacher and veteran nationalist (Soenarjo), Pemalang, 16 December 1975.
 56. *Neratja*, 29 August 1918.
 57. *Neratja*, 14 December 1918, 26 May 1919.
 58. *Neratja*, 5 August 1920, 18, 22 and 25 September 1920. The demands also included time off for the Friday prayers.
 59. 'De Communistische Beweging in de Residentie Pekalongan voor en na de Beperking van het Vergaderrecht', enclosed in J. E. Jasper (Resident Pekalongan) to Governor-General of the Netherlands Indies, 24 January 1926, Secret Mail Report 1926/151, Algemeene Rijksarchief (Dutch State Archives), The Hague (hereafter A.R.A.).
 60. Resident Pekalongan (Schilling) to Governor-General, 28 February 1927, Secret Mail Report 1927/354, A.R.A.

61. Ruth T. McVey, *The Rise of Indonesian Communism* (Ithaca, 1965), p. 151. Other areas where the ban on meetings was applied to the VSTP were Semarang, Kediri, Madiun, Priangan and Surabaya.
62. McVey, *Communism*, p. 331.
63. *Ibid.*; Secret Mail Report 1927/354, A.R.A.
64. 'De Ongerelgheden in Tegal', *Overzicht van de Inlandsche en Maleische-Chineesche Pers (IPO)*, 16, 17 April 1926.
65. *Ibid.* Report by Pekalongan Bupati, 28 March 1926, Secret Mail Reports 1926/261, 1926/397, A.R.A. The names of the Karangcegak people arrested and jailed are recorded in the membership book of the Tegal Branch of the Pioneers of Freedom (Perintis Kemerdekaan).
66. Secret Mail Report 1927/354 A.R.A.; *IPO*, 4 September 1926.
67. See McVey, *Communism*, pp. 340, 478, fn. 7; Secret Mail Report 1927/354. Sugono Reksoputro's brother Soelciman, on his return from Australia in 1946 with other former political exiles from Boven Digul, became the first secretary of the reconstituted PKI under Sardjono.
68. McVey, *Communism*, pp. 341-4.
69. *Memorie van Overgave (M.v.O.)*, P. J. van Gulik, Governor of Central Java, 1930, A.R.A. The other area was Semarang. If Pekalongan was still considered an 'active area' in 1930, then the rest of Central Java must have been very quiet indeed.
70. *M.v.O.*, J. J. M. A. Popelier, Resident of Pekalongan, A.R.A. Bijlage Politiek Toestand. For a biography of Kromo Lawi, see pp. 273-274.
71. The Resident of Tegal noted that everything was 'very satisfactory' and that the searching of houses of PNI members which had been carried out in Pekalongan in December 1929 did not need to be undertaken since there was no branch in Tegal. *M.v.O.*, J. C. Brinks, Resident of Tegal 1930, A.R.A.
72. During the 1930s Supeno studied at the Technical Faculty in Bandung then for four years at the Law Faculty in Batavia, and was active in pre-war student politics. B. R. O. 'G. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution* (Ithaca, 1972), p. 449. He became Minister for Youth and Development in the first Hatta Cabinet (1948-1949) and died in the second Dutch military action. Supeno was to play a crucial role in defending these revolutionaries who were imprisoned then brought to trial by the Republican government in the aftermath of the Tiga Daerah Affair. See below pp. 243, 244-5.
73. Secret Mail Report 1932/399, A.R.A.
74. This program was led by Wondoamiseno who was later Minister for Internal Affairs in the first Amir Sjarifuddin cabinet in 1947, and second deputy Prime Minister in the second Amir cabinet, representing the PSII.
75. Tegal nationalist leader (Soesmono), written answers to questions, November 1972, p. 6.
76. Interview with K. H. Abu Sudja'i, Pacul, 20 November 1975.
77. Interview with Sarino Mangunpranoto, Ungaran, 9 July 1976. See also footnote 5 above. For the Wild Schools see Bernard H. M. Vlekke,

- Nusantara: History of Indonesia*, (The Hague and Bandung, 1959), p. 384. 'Wildc Schoelen' were regarded by the Dutch as 'uncultivated' schools because the teachers were unqualified.
78. As a member of Perhimpunan Indonesia, the Indonesian leftist student association in Holland, Muhammad Jusuf was to found the new PKI in Cirebon in 1945. See also Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, p. 423.
 79. Ideas about the origins of the term abound; a *pokrul* or *juru mbombong* is someone who makes a person feel braver or bigger against the oppressive officials. W. J. S. Poerwadarminta, *Baoesastra Djawa* (Batavia, 1939), p. 56.
 80. See Onghokham, 'Madiun', p. 64; and Sartono Kartodirdjo and Anton Lucas, 'Banditry and Political Change in Java' in S. Kartodirdjo, *Modern Indonesia: Tradition and Transformation* (Yogyakarta, 1984). See also A. J. Stockwell, *British Policy and Malay Politics during the Malayan Union Experiment, 1942-1948* (Kuala Lumpur, 1978), Chapter 8, on the political and magico-spiritual power of cults in village life in immediate post-war Malaya.
 81. Interview with Lurah of Kreyo (South Pemalang), Kreyo, 8 February 1975. These robbers were known elsewhere in Java as *maling aguna* or skilful thieves.
 82. Interview with K. H. Abu Sudja'i, Pacul, 20 November 1975. Gentoloto Nayo Genggong was the grandfather of K. H. Abu Sudja'i the PSII leader, who became Bupati of Tegal during the Tiga Daerah affair (see pp. 180-1). For his biography, see p. 270. 'Gento' in Tegal dialect of Javanese also means 'skilful' or 'useful' thief.
 83. *Neratja*, 3 September 1918, 11 January 1919.
 84. For similar village strongmen or *jago* in early Java, see Onghokham, 'Madiun', pp. 63-9.
 85. Comal nationalist leader (Panji Soewarso), written answers to author, 15 June 1976. Italics and capitals in original.
 86. For some examples of these arts see George Quinn, 'The Javanese Science of Burglary', *Review of Indonesian and Malayan Affairs* 9, 1 (1975), pp. 33-54.
 87. McVey, *Communism*, p. 299.
 88. Harry J. Benda and Ruth T. McVey (eds.), *The Communist Uprisings of 1926-1927 in Indonesia: Key Documents* (Ithaca, 1960), pp. 3, 10.
 89. Daniel S. Lev, 'Judicial Institutions and Legal Culture in Indonesia' in Claire Holt (ed.), *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, 1972), pp. 293-6, fn. 61. See also his 'Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian State', *Indonesia* 40 (October 1985), p. 68.
 90. Interview with Sarino Mangunpranoto, Ungaran, 21 January 1976.
 91. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 7 October 1976.

The Japanese Experience: Self Sufficiency as Economic Distress

The pre-existent conditions of the Tiga Daerah affair were established during the period of the Japanese interregnum. The harsh economic realities of the Japanese occupation increased corruption and oppression of the ordinary people by the traditional elite. A climate was created in which people learned to resist or circumvent these impositions as much as possible. Some of the responses grew from disillusionment with the Japanese in their role of saviours of the people, freeing them from colonial rule.

Increasingly people found Japanese rule economically more onerous than Dutch colonial rule. The bureaucratic elite found Japanese rule humiliating but there were other more dangerous consequences for them than that. The Japanese used the elite and community leaders to manage their burdensome policy at 'grass roots' level. The divisions between the people and their local leaders widened critically, creating some of the resentments which were to be released after August 1945.

The Dutch had surrendered their beloved East Indies to the Japanese on 8 March 1942, and on 17 March the new political masters arrived at the Pekalongan Residency to find the region barely recovering from widespread social upheaval which had followed the breakdown of colonial administration. Following the Japanese landings elsewhere in Java, Dutch authorities tried to implement a hastily prepared plan of sabotage involving warehouses, bridges and harbour installations around Tegal, including the destruction of the Batavian Oil Company refinery. In Pekalongan itself, the Dutch ordered that machinery in local spinning and weaving factories, as well as the local sugar mills, be stripped. They blew up bridges and ordered people to throw their bicycle chains in the river 'so the

bicycles could not be used by the enemy'.¹ The Wedana of Wiradesa (on Pekalongan's coastal plain) received orders to supervise the scuttling of the small fishing boats upon which the people in this densely populated coastal area depended for a livelihood. However he told the fishermen to hide their boats for the time being.²

The sugar mills, because they could not be camouflaged, seemed prime targets for Japanese bombing attacks which never came. People realised that the colonial masters were so uninformed that they had no idea what to do or where to go. The people were ordered by the newly-created Civil Air Defence Corps to dig trenches around the sugar mills big enough for one family to shelter in—three metres deep and three metres wide. They made fun of the preparations saying, 'When the bombs are falling, they won't need to dig another grave for us, we already have a hole to die in'.³

With the departure of the Dutch, the Residency pangreh praja lost their authority. With no means of enforcing law and order while the Dutch-created militias quickly disbanded themselves, they watched helplessly as 'plunder fever' (*demam merampok*) spread over the countryside. In most areas it was the local Chinese stores, the pawnshop or the rice mill—and often all three—which were the main targets. The pangreh praja themselves sometimes barely escaped attack and were often the subjects of intimidation by excited crowds. The Dutch police and administrators seemed too confused to assert authority.⁴

There were extraordinary scenes everywhere. It was the time of the first paddy harvest. Women streaming along the roads bringing in their paddy still on the stalks would, upon seeing a group plundering a shop, throw away their paddy and follow suit. The Chinese population fled their shops seeking refuge in local government offices. Hearing rumours that the government pawnshop would be returning all unredeemed pawns free, hundreds of peasants poured into the town of Pemalang with receipts to claim their goods. On finding the pawnshop still guarded by a few loyal militia, the crowd began chanting 'Distribute the rice! Distribute the rice!' and the town's three Chinese-owned rice mills were ransacked and the machinery carried off. A number of people were reported killed when a large paddy stack collapsed, after which the crowd, ignoring the Wedana of Pemalang who was seen firing shots into the air, ransacked Chinese shops and carried the contents back to villages.⁵ Without Dutch guards the prisoners in Pekalongan's two jails broke out and joined in the general uprising.

Relations between the people and the pangreh praja were reflected in events which occurred at the Pekalongan regency offices. After the Municipal Defence Unit and the police had disbanded themselves, an

angry crowd, described as rebels by an official, entered the regency compound and took down the weapons that the police had left hanging in the guardhouse. The bupati's wife could be heard crying for help, while the bupati, R.A.A. Soerjo, fainted with shock. Automatically, the regency secretary rang the Dutch Resident, who was still in the city, to report that the Bupati of Pekalongan had collapsed upon the arrival of robber bands in his office precincts. For the first time in several hundred years of colonial rule, the Dutch found themselves powerless to do anything about 'lawlessness'. The Peace and Tranquility (*Rust en Orde*) of the colonial order had gone for good.

Japanese Economic Policies

The Japanese 16th Army's invasion of Java was intended to secure the supply of strategic raw material for Japan under the slogan of the construction of the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere. Whatever political or cultural aims the Japanese might have had initially for their occupied territories, these were soon subordinated to the all-important task of the acquisition of resources, including food-stuffs, to meet the requirements of Japan's military operations. As the war went on, Java became increasingly important as a supply base for the Japanese, whose programme of 'Mutual Exchange of Non-Military Commodities' made Java the only source of sugar and cereals for Malaya, which it also supplied with rice and salt. Cigarettes, quinine and base metals were also essential exports.⁶

In the latter part of the war the Japanese adopted a policy of what they called self-maintenance for all occupied regions. Transport, particularly shipping, between Japan and the occupied areas of Southeast Asia had become difficult or impossible by the end of 1943. Many areas still relied on supplies from Japan or surpluses from other regions. As the Japanese war position deteriorated, the authorities ordered all forces in occupied regions to become self-sufficient. The policy was based on the compulsory acquisition of all plantations by the state, the appropriation and rationing of the surplus product of peasant agriculture, particularly rice and other increasingly scarce commodities (such as kerosene), and the forced recruitment of labour for various projects within each region, as well as outside Java. Because of a continued fear of invasion from the south, late in the war the Japanese began stockpiling munitions and foodstuffs in selected places in Java.⁷ With no export markets, the Java sugar industry collapsed for the second time in a decade, the number of mills in operation dropping from eighty-five in 1942, to thirteen in

1945.⁸ Two of the thirteen (Pangkajene and Banjaratma) still operating were in Pekalongan Residency.

On his arrival in the Residency of Pekalongan, the new Japanese Assistant Resident, Toshio Ota

... sensed a strong cleavage between the rich and the poor ... only a handful of high ranking officials—western educated—versus the bulk of poor Indonesians. In addition the economy was in the hands of the Chinese, and the population had little opportunity to earn cash, except for manual labour which gave them daily food alone ... Dutch plantations owned too much land at the expense of the peasants, thus many inhabitants had to leave their villages to work. It seemed that there were many poor peasants ... I felt our duty was to reduce the difference in wealth as much as possible.⁹

In order to implement their self-maintenance policy, the Japanese relied entirely on the *pangreh praja*, whose main economic role under the Dutch had been that of tax collectors. Now they had to supervise compulsory rice deliveries, and be responsible for organising the rationing of cloth and other basic raw materials from the subdistrict level down. They were now also responsible for the raising of *romusha* or forced labour quotas for work on projects within the Residency. As one *camat* put it: 'The Japanese would come around every few days to see us. We were their economic inspectors'.

The initial goodwill towards the Japanese quickly changed to antipathy because of their violent methods. No group in Pekalongan society, not even the *priyayi* officials, was immune to Japanese insults and violence. People, particularly officials, resented being called *kowe*¹⁰ or *bakero* (fool, in Japanese) or being slapped about the head for not bowing from the waist while passing Japanese military guard posts. This was common, especially during the first six months of the occupation when the Residency came under direct military administration.¹¹ The whole of Javanese society suffered and relations between the *pangreh praja* and the peasantry deteriorated further than under the Dutch. In a climate of shortages, inequities, greed and brutality, corruption and an underground opposition was the inevitable result.

Rice Requisitioning

For the majority of the population the forced delivery of rice was the most onerous of all the Japanese war-time impositions. Under the Dutch, the pre-war food fund (*Voedingsmiddelen Fonds*) provided credit for the Chinese to buy rice for a government buffer stock, and

Table 2:1 Rice Requisitioned for Military and Support Purposes in Java, 1944.

Categories	
Japanese living in Java	17,000 ¹
16th Army (including stockpiles)	380,000 ²
Semi-military purposes (romusha)	239,440 ³
Total	636,440 ⁴

Notes:

1. Miyamoto calculates the average rice consumption of the 74,000 Japanese in Java at the end of the war at 640 grams per capita per day. Miyamoto in Reid and Oki (eds), *The Japanese Experience*, p. 246.
2. *Ibid.*, p. 244, Table 9.
3. Miyamoto gives the different categories receiving rice rations (Peta, Heiho, regular romusha, occasional romusha, skilled workers, voluntary labourers) as 2,623,691 people (*ibid.*, Table 11, p. 247). Assuming a ration of between 200–300 grams per person per day (well below the 400 grams Javanese consider adequate), say 250 grams, total rice requisitioned for semi-military purposes is the amount given above.
4. This total amount requisitioned is 14 per cent of 4,630,000 tons which was the polished rice production for 1944 (*ibid.*, Table 9, p. 244).

people brought their surplus rice voluntarily to the Chinese-owned rice mills. Dutch regulations prevented the Chinese from stockpiling more than one ton of rice without permission and a maximum ceiling price was fixed.

In order to increase the rice supply for their war effort, the system changed drastically under the Japanese. Peasants were compelled to deliver their rice to the state. After the needs of the Japanese civilians and military had been satisfied, rice was requisitioned for what was called semi-military purposes and rationed out to various groups whose support for the war was considered important, namely the Peta (Defenders of the Fatherland), Heiho (the Indonesian auxiliary forces), romushas, government officials, voluntary labourers (*kinro hoshi*) and skilled workers such as typists and nurses.¹²

Of the military policy begun in 1943 to create rice stockpiles in the event of the expected invasion from the south, Miyamoto writes: 'Apparently both the army and civilians attached to the army misinterpreted this order and tried to accumulate excessive quantities of foodstuffs . . .'.¹³ Rice was bought at prices so low that it amounted to confiscation.

Table 2:1 indicates that the total military and semi-military requisitions were something like 14 per cent of Java's 1944 production of hulled rice. Table 2:2 shows that in many areas of the Tiga Daerah half the harvest was requisitioned. This situation was made worse because Pekalongan Residency added to the delivery quotas set by

Table 2:2 Paddy Requisitioning in the Tiga Daerah during the Japanese Occupation.

Location	Av. yield of paddy (tons per ha.)	Av. amount requisitioned (tons per ha.)	% of crop yield	Interview Source
<i>Brebes regency</i>			50-55	Bupati of Brebes
Brebes subdistrict	2.0-2.5	1.0	50	Camat
Losari subdistrict	2.5	1.0	50	Camat
Ketanggungan village	2.0-3.0	0.6 ^a	14-25	Village secretary
		0.4		
<i>Tegal regency</i>				
Bumijawa subdistrict	2.1	0.3	14	<i>noji padi</i>
Talang subdistrict	2.0-4.0	1.0	25-50	Camat
<i>Pekalongan regency</i>				
Belik district	1.4	1.5	150 ^b	Wedana
Cibuyur village	2.1-2.8	0.5	14-16	Lurah
Taman subdistrict	2.1-3.5	0.8-1.8	40-50	Camat
Ambowetan village	2.8-4.2	2.6-3.9 ^c	95 ^c	<i>noji padi</i>
Ampelgading subdistrict	2.8	1.4 ^d	50 ^d	Seinendan (Youth Corps Leader)

Source: Data from interviews

a. 0.6 tons from 'good' rice fields, 0.4 tons from 'average' rice fields.

b. See page 33 for an explanation of how this could occur.

c. In theory farmers were allowed to keep only 5 per cent yield of the harvest.

d. In practice, at the subdistrict level about 50 per cent of the crop was requisitioned.

the central government, to 'make sure of their estimates'. Subdistrict quota levels were fixed by local officials. By January 1945 corruption in the delivery system was so widespread that rice delivery quotas fixed by the centre had to be increased by 18 per cent, rising from 88,000 to 100,000 tons (see Table 2:4).¹⁴

The impact of forced deliveries varied throughout the Tiga Daerah according to the area and quality of land under wet rice, yields, and attitudes of the subdistrict and village heads (Table 2:2). Under the new marketing system peasants could no longer take their harvested paddy home to hull it themselves. They were allowed to keep only enough rice for seed and some food: the rest had to be delivered to the lurah or his representative. As in other areas, rice delivery quotas were based on grades, or classes, of rice fields, derived from the pre-war Dutch classification used in determining tax.¹⁵ While the fixed price in Pekalongan in January 1944 was f4.00 per kilogram, because of various 'deductions' at collection centres the farmer received only f1.88, or less than half the market price. Profiteering in

rice became widespread as the blackmarket price soared later in the occupation.¹⁶

The harsh impact of the forced delivery system was somewhat softened in 1945 by an arrangement, in Brebes at any rate, between the bupati and the Japanese, in which part of the regency's rice quota could be delivered as husked rice rather than paddy.¹⁷ Before 1945, here as in other parts of the Residency, all the requisitioned rice had to be delivered as paddy to the mills where it was hulled, and what remained after Japanese military and civilian requirements had been met was distributed through agricultural co-operatives. Hulling of requisitioned rice by Chinese-owned mills meant that farmers lost valuable by-products of their crop. As well as the nutritious rice bran and broken pieces being no longer available to him, the farmer had to buy husks back from the mill to feed his poultry and livestock. Under the new arrangements agreed to by the Residency Economic Affairs Department which controlled rice-hulling throughout the Residency, the paddy was hulled by hand in each village. The pounders, removing the husks, were employed at a 'wage' of hulled rice, plus husks, bran and broken pieces. Traders then collected the rice for delivery to central collection points.¹⁸

In Taman and Ulujami, two small, densely-populated subdistricts east of Pemalang, the Economic Affairs Department also allowed *noji padi*, local officials responsible for paddy collection, to hull some of the crop by hand. This meant they could keep the rice bran, broken pieces and rice-straw. In Taman subdistrict, where about forty per cent of the rice harvest was requisitioned (see Table 2:2), instead of delivering the quotas to the mills in Pemalang (the collection centre) where it would have lain rotting while waiting to be hulled, the camat began milling the entire crop on the spot. The pounders were paid about two and a half kilograms for this work.¹⁹

In the southern region of Pemalang, the Japanese assessed rice delivery quotas on the Dutch rate of tax-payment, a method which took no account of the variations in productivity of the land. Thus Belik district was an area of poor soils where paddy yields of one ton per hectare were considered good. For every guilder of tax (paid on one-tenth of a hectare of land), the peasants had to deliver 150 kilograms of rice. In Belik, this was equivalent to one and a half tons of paddy per hectare, or 150 per cent of the average yield in a good season.²⁰ The wedana promptly told the Japanese that it was impossible to deliver more paddy than was grown in his district. The reply was to do the best he could.²¹

Across the regency border with Tegal, in the neighbouring hill district of Bumi Jawa, quotas were not as high as in some coastal areas. However, because rice yields were completely dependent on rainfall (in the absence of irrigation), and soil fertility was poor, the

burden of the rice delivery quotas was very onerous. The total area of rice fields was small and only those who delivered paddy had the right to buy their quota of cloth (one two-meter length of unbleached cotton for 100 kilograms of paddy). In order to enforce the compulsory deliveries, the *noji padi* had a team of six assistants who were each responsible for three villages.²² Perhaps because of the actions of these assistants, the forced deliveries were openly resisted in one village, about which more will be said later.

Rice Rationing

Even in the last year of the occupation when rice rations to ordinary townspeople were diminishing in quantity and frequency, the towns still had electricity, schools and cars. Rural people, dependent for transport on the bicycle, had a long, uncomfortable ride to market on solid rubber tyres. A majority of the Western-educated elite lived in the towns and it was this group whose support the Japanese considered important, while the pejorative term *genjumin*, or 'native', reflected their view of villagers as people who did not really matter.

In its discussions on Japanese rice policy in Java in January 1944, a committee advising the Japanese in Jakarta pointed out that outside the Residency capitals and regency towns, regular rice distribution was limited to pangreh praja, while the common people's supply was not only irregular but far from sufficient. Table 2:3, showing the amount of the rice ration in various parts of Pekalongan Residency compared to other areas as remembered some thirty years later, supports this contention.

The Japanese divided up most larger towns into a number of hamlets, each with its own hamlet head to manage the rationing system of rice and other commodities. Deciding who qualified for a ration of rice and who did not was often done in an arbitrary way, as a Pemalang schoolteacher recalls:

The townspeople were given a distribution of rice, but the people outside the town were not. Because it was the villages which produced the rice, the Japanese government considered that village people didn't need to have any ration . . . Some funny things happened; for example, the people in this hamlet would be considered townspeople, while the people in that hamlet were not, while in fact it was the one kampung. I became a victim of this. My house was exactly on the border of the town, the house in front of me got a distribution of rice, but I did not . . . but because I was an official, I could contact the rice mill direct.²³

Table 2:3 A Comparison of Polished Rice Rations during the Occupation between Pekalongan and other areas in Java.

Area	Ration: grams per person per day
Average Japanese rice consumption: (basis of requisition)	640 ^a
Pekalongan	230 ^b
Pekalongan municipality	100
Pemalang town (officials)	200
Pemalang town (kampung)	30-50
Bojongbata (Pemalang)	100
Tegal municipality	100
Slawi subdistrict	200
Adiwerna subdistrict	200 ^c
Talang subdistrict	30
Margasari subdistrict	005
Brebes subdistrict	100
Brebes romusha	300
Sukowati romusha	200 ^d
Standard romusha	50 ^e
Banten coal-mine romusha	250 ^f
British POW & internees in Bandung	500 ^g

Source: Data from interviews

Notes:

- a. Miyamoto, in Reid and Oki, *The Japanese Experience*, p. 246.
- b. Although not clear this ration must refer to officials in the municipality of Pekalongan. The ration reported for Pekalongan (according to 'The Problem of Rice', p. 99) can be explained by the fact that the Residency Economic Affairs Department added another 18 per cent to the delivery quota set by the centre.
- c. This figure refers to an issue for the whole family.
- d. This is the official ration, later doubled to 400 gms.
- e. Sidik Kertapati, *Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945* (Jakarta, 1964), p. 18.
- f. This figure was reduced to 200 in 1945. See Tan Malaka, *Dari Penjara ke Penjara* (Jakarta, n.d.), Part II, pp. 155, 157, 179. Those actually working in the mine got 400 gms. and f1.50 per day, the other 250 gms and f0.40 per day, according to Tan Malaka.
- g. Laurens van der Post, *The Night of the New Moon*, (London, 1970) p. 38.

The widespread practice of officials obtaining rice from the mills direct may have been one of many reasons for the large discrepancies in the amount reported delivered by the pangreh praja and the amount reported by the mills.

Apart from deciding who would qualify for rice rations, there was the problem of the quality of the ration itself. Often to make the ration 'go further' gravel and sand were mixed with it. 'In 100 kilograms of rice', recalls a doctor who worked in the Pekalongan Residency, 'there was maybe 25 kilograms of gravel. Many people's teeth were ruined'.²⁴

The magnitude of rice requisitioning and the amount left for local

Table 2:4 Estimated Production, Requisitioning and Consumption of Rice, Pekalongan Residency 1944

Estimated Production	Estimated Population	Amount Requisitioned (tons polished rice)	Rice Remaining (tons)	Per Capita Consumption (grams/person/day)
tons 158,600 ^a	180,557 ^b	88,000 (central govt.) increased to 100,000 (by Residency)	58,600 + 30,000 withheld Total: 88,300	76

Notes:

- a. This is calculated by assuming that the Residency's rice production between 1938-1944 increased at the same rate as the all-Java production for the seven-year period, from 3,933,050 tons (Netherlands Indies Central Bureau of Statistics, *Statistical pocket Book of Indonesia, 1941*, Table 55, p. 37) to 4,630,000 tons (Miyamoto, in Reid and Oki, *The Japanese Experience*, Table 9, p. 244.)
- b. Pekalongan's population figure for 1944 is calculated from the 1930 census, the last held before the Japanese occupation. The figure assumes the all-Java exponential growth rate between 1930 and 1961 (the date of the next census) of 1.33 percent can be applied to Pekalongan for the years 1930-1944 when no censuses were taken.

consumption can be seen from Table 2:4 which shows the food situation towards the end of the occupation: 88,000 tons of rice for three million people or an average of 76 grams per person per day. This assumes that peasants were able to withhold 30,000 tons of rice from requisitioning, a formidable task given the difficulties of hiding large quantities of rice successfully in the face of extreme punishments if detected. Pekalongan Residency's population in 1944 would have needed 464,361 tons of rice, for the consumption of 400 grams per person per day which is considered adequate by Javanese. The magnitude of the deprivation is critical enough in itself, but the Japanese policy of economic self-sufficiency for each region tipped the balance of undernourishment into famine conditions. In order to meet the Javanese civilian and military needs, trade in rice between Residencies was prohibited, a move which 'appeared extremely oppressive' to the population because rice deficit areas could not get supplies.²⁵ The 1944 situation was made even worse by the extremely long, dry season, the late arrival of the rains and the subsequent poor harvest with yields far below average.

It is important to emphasise again that, in general, the lot of villagers in Pekalongan Residency was worse than that of townspeople, at least until the last year of the occupation. This may seem paradoxical, for the received wisdom would suggest that the wet rice system was still a buffer for those who controlled land and harvest

and were in a position to withhold rice from requisitioning. While this may have been so for a tiny minority of rich peasants, for the smaller middle peasants owning one *bau* or less, the amount of rice that could have been withheld and hidden could not have lasted more than a couple of months after the harvest.²⁶ Conditions in the villages during the second half of the occupation were so bad that people had to fall back on rice substitutes, traditionally only eaten in times of famine. Cassava was made into a porridge called *bubur bolit* and many people ate the root of *badur*, a kind of taro plant which first had to be sliced and soaked in brine to remove the poisonous sap.²⁷ Banana root nodules were also boiled up for food, as were the leaves of a tree palm that were normally used for roof thatching or fed to ducks.

The Japanese-sponsored women's organisation, Fujinkai, frequently held demonstrations to encourage the spread of new recipes, using ingredients considered by the Japanese to have some nutritional value. Fujinkai members demonstrated how to cook snails, and *roti Asia* or 'Asia' bread, a black concoction made from palm sugar and *katul*, the brown skin of unpolished rice rich in vitamin B1. *bubur perjuangan*, 'struggle' porridge, consisting of sweet potato, cassava and *katul* was another recipe the Fujinkai tried to make popular. 'It was like eating chicken feed', recalled a Pematang nationalist leader, 'I wanted to vomit'. 'The people were amazed if they saw rice', recalled a former Seinendan (Youth Corps) leader, 'hunger oedema and lice were everywhere'. Hunger oedema was so bad in Margasari subdistrict, the wife of the camat recalled, that 'there were flies settling on the people's bones, which were no longer covered with skin'.²⁸ The chronic malnutrition in the rural areas also produced trachoma and scabies, while even the plague, eradicated by the Dutch, reappeared in Pangkah district. In Ampelgading subdistrict people were dying of hunger on rubbish heaps while looking for food, and were buried unidentified in the village nearest to where they died. A Tegal Barisan Pelopor (Pioneer Corps) leader, writing about similar conditions in the middle of 1945, recalled some thirty years later that:

Every day living corpses could be seen walking about. Living corpses laden with lice which decorated their clothes that were in rags, or made from sacking, plant or bark gum. Human corpses were everywhere, in the shelter pits, under bridges, in the Chinese graveyards; there were corpses lying full length where rubbish was thrown away.²⁹

Other Requisitions

As well as rice deliveries, other impositions doubtless gave opportunities for corruption, and certainly added to the people's crippling burdens. The Japanese self-maintenance policy enforced, for example, the cultivation of castor oil plants throughout the Residency. Cultivation was supervised in each regency by a manager appointed by the local pangreh praja. In one area of Brebes the castor oil plants were grown on land belonging to peasants, beside rice fields, along the banks of streams and in house gardens, under the supervision of the lurahs. If peasants did not want to grow castor oil plants, the Japanese would get angry with the lurah. Afterwards the lurah, who was afraid of the Japanese, would get angry with the farmers.³⁰ After a crop failure of over 100 hectares in one village on Pemalang's coastal plain the lurah committed suicide by jumping from a coconut tree.

In the rural areas the Japanese tied castor oil plant deliveries to the rationing of kerosene. A peasant who delivered his castor oil plants could buy kerosene at the regency office for a 'low' price. There were also other, seemingly trivial, requisitions which consumed the hungry peasant's time and energy. Peasants were told to collect a plant known locally as *iles-iles* with leaves like small taro plants, while sunflowers were collected for their oil seeds, as was a sea-fungus (*cuwur-cuwur*) which 'made your hands itch'. None of these minor impositions weighed as heavily as the rice and castor oil requisitions, but they added to the ill-feeling directed at the lurahs who compelled peasants to carry out these tasks.

Rationing

As part of the self-maintenance policy, the Japanese also instituted rationing for cloth and other basic commodities. Like rice requisitioning and corvee it was the pangreh praja who were responsible for making the system work. While there was little chance of benefiting from illegal dealings in rice (except by taking from what was found in searches), officials and their wives could directly manipulate the rationing system to their advantage. Although the impact of rationing varied between areas within the Residency, a Pemalang government medical officer, writing early in 1946, recalled that:

... rationing, labour service, and the requisitioning of foodstuffs were felt really deeply by the people. The feelings of resentment were harboured against the Pangreh Praja who were carrying

out orders of their Japanese superiors. The people felt that the rationing, especially, was not carried out in the way that it should have been. The people did not think about the difficulties of rationing such small supplies; they only saw, and heard, how rationing was implemented. The dishonesty was a public secret. The people were in a discontented mood and this created a state of tension.³¹

At the beginning of the occupation, the Japanese military administration took over Java's four textile mills, including the biggest, the Java Textile Company's mill in Tegal, which had been enlarged in 1940 to spin 15 million guilders' worth of raw cotton annually to give employment to 12,000 native workers.³² In January 1944, after it became impossible to transport supplies from Japan, total stockpiles of 50 million yards 'most of which had been confiscated during the initial stages of the war' were released, but 'because of the requirements of the military, it was necessary to commandeer the civilian textile allowance'.³³ The military further tried to increase local production by encouraging cultivation of cotton as a state monopoly. Again because 'military requirements were to be met first' local weavers were not allowed to use the cotton themselves. This destroyed the thriving Banjarharjo textile industry south-west of Brebes, as people turned instead to weaving a kind of fabric from kapok, which wore out after a couple of months.³⁴

In Pekalongan Residency, cloth rationing was tied to the delivery of rice requisitions. Early in the occupation there had been a separate ration for those who had no rice to sell, but the Japanese stopped this in most areas later during the occupation because of the shortage of supply. The Wedana of Belik, which comprised three subdistricts, had this to say about the rationing policy:

The distribution of cloth was indeed difficult. I think this was one of the reasons behind the protest which occurred later in the Tiga Daerah. The instruction from Pekalongan only mentioned that 'this is for clothing for those people in real need'. That is very relative isn't it? When I got a lot of cloth there were so many people who wanted to make trousers that I made a 'one and a quarter yard' rule. People had to make do with one and a quarter yards even though it probably wasn't enough. Even my wife didn't get any. It was given to those badly in need, such as servants. I didn't get any either, I held firmly to the principle 'for the people in real need'. In this way I was able to make do.³⁵

The wedana also tried to take measures to allay the widespread suspicion that officials were enriching themselves by using the *pen-dopo* (open pavilion) of the Belik district office as a warehouse. This

was glassed in so people could see exactly when rations of cloth and kerosene arrived and how much there was. Cloth rationing was not tied to deliveries of rice in Belik, but was the direct responsibility of the three camats whose wives organised cloth distribution. Although the wedana reminded the Camat of Belik of the political dangers of this and told him to form a distribution committee, 'he agreed but in practice it never happened'. People were naked with no clothes to wear, while according to the wedana, 'it was the lurahs and their families who got cloth'.³⁶ In Belik district cloth was even used as a medium of exchange, the camats' wives exchanging the cloth they should have been distributing for foodstuffs (mainly corn) and even rice.

An official appointed by the Japanese to oversee the rationing system and paddy collection at the Pemalang regency level in 1944 recalled the situation in some districts:

I saw clothing material stacked undistributed in the *pendopo* of three districts of Comal, Randudongkal and Pemalang, which were full of cloth. In Randudongkal where my brother-in-law was camat, I saw his mattresses were stuffed with cloth instead of kapok; his pillows were also full of yarn.³⁷

Yarn became so valuable that people living in kampungs around the textile mill in Tegal were able to make a living by stealing it. The yarn was thrown over the mill walls at night, and sold on the black market.³⁸

In the last months of the occupation even in the towns cloth was so scarce that head scarves were made into shorts, mattress covers into women's sarongs and white burial cloth appropriated for apparel. In the rural area clothes made from gunny sacks were full of lice, and sarongs made of sheets of coarse latex painted to look like cloth stuck to one's body in the heat and tore easily. When these ran out, people made their own cloth substitutes from yarn extracted from fibrous leaves and bark. Gunny sacking shorts became prizes in a campaign to exterminate rats in one subdistrict: fifteen rats' tails in exchange for a pair of gunny sacking shorts donated by the camat.³⁹

In the towns the population also obtained rations through the hamlet heads and neighbourhood heads, officials newly created by the Japanese. These characters were little more than the henchmen of the lurah, being appointed by him and thus an inseparable part of the Japanese oppressive apparatus. While sometimes having to organise corvee and youth training, their main function was to organise distribution of what basic necessities were available such as kerosene, soap, sugar, cigarettes and, occasionally, cloth. There was never enough to go around and hamlet heads were always being compromised.

Table 2:5 Romusha Levies from some areas of Pekalongan Residency

Location	Number of People
<i>A: Sent outside the Residency</i>	
Pangkajene (d)	20-40 per week ¹
Brebes (s)	100 per week ²
Losari (s)	25-50 per week ³
Tegal (r)	100 per week ⁴
<i>B: Deployed within the Residency</i>	
Brebes and	860 from 43 villages
Wanasari (s)	daily ⁵
Ampelgading (s)	300 from 15 villages
	daily ⁶

s = subdistrict; d = district; r = regency

Source: Data from interviews

Notes:

1. Figure for each village.

2. Figure for the whole subdistrict.

3. Increased to 250 by end of occupation.

4. Figure for the whole regency.

5. Twenty from each village for the Pemali River irrigation canal.

6. Twenty from each village for the Comal Baru butanol project.

Forced Labour

To add to the misery, the Japanese romusha projects turned the Residency of Pekalongan into a giant labour camp (see Table 2:5). While the rationale for the romushas within Java was to promote the policy of self-sufficiency in the respective regions, the Japanese army assigned a total of 228,000 to work outside Java, but claimed that transport difficulties, that is, the scarcity of ships, prevented the programme from being fully implemented.⁴⁰ While the extreme undernourishment and inhumane treatment of the romushas sent outside Java is well known, the actual implementation of the romusha projects within Pekalongan Residency, as well as the attitudes of nationalist leaders involved, is more complicated. As with the rice requisition and the rationing systems, the impact of corvée varied according to the attitudes of the local pangreh praja. However, as the recruiting of romushas involved local nationalist leaders who were put in charge of projects by the Japanese, this made the romusha system different from the rationing and requisitioning burdens. The nationalist leaders as well as the bureaucratic elite were now manipulated

into imposing Japanese policy. The leaders, in turn, tried to protect people by manipulating the romusha system in order to offset the harsh effects.

The Japanese, in theory, distinguished between two kinds of labour service, first *kinro hoshi*, which was organised at regency level and below, and second those engaged in manual labour, the romushas, who were organised directly by the central military administration. Recruitment and transportation was the responsibility of the local Institute of Labour Affairs, run by a leading member of the local pangreh praja, who in one case was also head of the local Labouring Soldier's Organisation, the BP3, which had been set up by the Japanese to provide money for the families of romushas. The Institute of Labour Affairs allocated romusha quotas at regency and district levels. *Kinro hoshi* worked on military defence projects which were, in fact, compulsory tasks despite the theoretical 'voluntary' classification. Because of this the word 'romusha' became generally used for all corvee. In Pemalang the Japanese used the local Arab community as *kinro hoshi* to construct shore defences. These workers were also sent, once or twice a month, to stack logs on the forestry plantations, along with Keibodan (Vigilance Corps) members. While they got rations of rice wrapped in banana leaves (*nasi ponggol*) it was so inadequate that the Arabs supplemented it with their own food.⁴¹

Table 2:5 compares romusha levies from some areas of Pekalongan Residency as recalled by pangreh praja, *kinro hoshi* project leaders and those local nationalists who were directly involved. Allowing for some unreliability in the informants' memories, it shows that many more romushas were deployed within the Residency on village level projects, usually under the control of lurahs, than were recruited by pangreh praja for work outside the region.

The difference in bureaucratic elite and nationalist involvement lay first in the classes of recruited labour for which they were responsible. Pangreh praja had to find romushas to work both inside and outside the Residency, while pre-war nationalists were co-opted by the Japanese to try and create enthusiasm for romusha projects and to achieve this by leading projects themselves to places outside the Residency. Probably because of this participation, these leaders did not collect such odium from the people as the bureaucratic elite who often recruited by making empty promises in order to fill quotas, or sent the destitute of those least able to resist. Nationalist leaders tried to use romusha projects to provide food for the conscripts (a major problem given the shortage), although when they were sent outside the Residency it was not so easy to supervise or manipulate daily rations.

Some of these experiences and the ambiguous reactions to them can be seen from the recollections of two of the Residency's leading pre-war Sukarnoist nationalists of the time. Despite their experiences they saw their actions as protective to some extent. Kartohargo, the Brebes leader, took three hundred 'voluntary' romushas to work in a coal mine in South Banten for six months. 'I was following Bung Karno's example without pride or shame', he said, 'one romusha got sick and died at Bayah, and one died in the train. The Japanese gave us enough food while we were there'.⁴²

Kromo Lawi, the veteran Pekalongan Sukarnoist and head of the Pekalongan Residency Putera (Concentration of People's Power), was involved early in the occupation in sending romushas outside the Residency. On visits to the Pekalongan romushas in the Banten coal mines he used what authority he had as head of Putera to try to ensure reasonable treatment of his romushas, who were rotated every fortnight with new arrivals from Pekalongan.⁴³

Sukarno's role in the Japanese propaganda machine forced him into publicly supporting projects which involved romushas. He even led a group to the coal mines in South Banten. This put local nationalists, such as Kartohargo and Kromo Lawi, in the position of having to cover their tracks when recalling their role twenty years later. Perhaps these leaders had learned in the meantime that tens of thousands from elsewhere in Java did not return safely. Tan Malaka gives a very different account of the welfare of the Banten coal mine romushas. He says that the 'voluntary romushas' from Pekalongan and Kedu were Seinendan members. Of over 15,000 romushas working in the coal mine, 400 to 500 died each month from disease and malnutrition.⁴⁴

Certainly, in the mind of one local nationalist leader, there was a world of difference between being sent away 'to die' in Banten and working as a romusha on logging the teak forests in south Pemalang. This project provided fuel for the Comal factory, piles for a Pemalang shore defences project, and, most importantly, wood for the Japanese boat building projects in Tegal, Pekalongan and elsewhere on the north coast.

The next Japanese priority after the requisitioning of rice was the building of wooden ships, with which the Japanese wanted to send medicinal supplies to New Guinea, and launch an attack on the island of Morotai.⁴⁵ In Java, 44,455 Indonesians supervised by 215 Japanese engineers were employed building 150 wooden ships, mostly diesel-powered. In 1943, 127 were launched, but the target for 1944, an ambitious seven hundred, was later modified to 343. 'To this end great numbers of beautiful teak trees were felled without compunction' recalls Miyamoto.⁴⁶ Hence the importance of the Pemalang teak

forest romusha project in supplying wood for these ships. The Ambonese forester in charge of the project, Holle, recalled:

... I explained to the camats that, rather than be sent as romushas to die in Banten, it was better to send them to Sukowati where I was organising wood cutting. I guaranteed that they could eat as much as they wanted in one day, this was the principle ... as the rations were sent by *kenpeitai* [Japanese military police].⁴⁷

Being an Ambonese, the Japanese initially treated Holle warily, suspecting him of pro-Dutch sympathies.⁴⁸ However, because of his popularity and his apparent zeal in successfully organising the large romusha teams, the project was widely praised, and the Japanese forgot their misgivings. Extra supplies of cloth, rice and salted fish arrived for romushas at Sukowati and the *kenpeitai*, in a rather unusual role, delivered an entire gamelan set for the romushas' entertainment.

A central issue concerning the romushas in local projects in Java was their nutrition. While the Japanese requisitioned rice for 'semi-military purposes' which included romushas (see Table 2:1), rations were appallingly inadequate. Miyamoto, staff officer in charge of supply for the 16th Army, later admitted that the Japanese came to realise the extent of romusha undernourishment and that the low nutritional value of the romusha diet was the reason they were unable to work 'as efficiently as the Japanese'.⁴⁹

In Pekalongan Residency other leaders tried to manipulate the system to get a better deal for their romushas. This was important, as apart from trouble makers and petty thieves, villages often sent the very poor and hungry on projects so they would get food.⁵⁰ In Brebes, as a result of pressure from the bupati, there was a public kitchen. However, the lurah who was supervising the cooking was sometimes dishonest and would give only half rations to the romushas. As a result, during the social revolution period he was attacked by former romushas.

Conditions under which romushas worked in the converted sugar mills were typically harsh. In Dukulhwringin near Slawi, romushas who wore clothes made from gunny sacks worked for ten hours a day making soy sauce, waterproof food containers and midget submarines. These were submarines with petrol engines which could submerge for short periods only and were just high enough for the suicide 'pilot' to stand up in.⁵¹ The romusha's daily ration on this project was rice, cassava, and corn wrapped in a banana leaf.

By contrast, skilled workers brought in from outside the Residency to work on the submarine project were privileged. The Japanese held

a competition on one occasion to see who could build a submarine the fastest:

There was a prize for any 14-man team which could finish a submarine in seven days. We, a winning team, got a 20 litre tin of dried shrimps, one kilogram of dried meat and three kilograms of peanuts. These submarines usually took a team ten days to build.⁵²

The Comal Baru sugar mill, like the Slawi mill, was used to make butanol from ground nut roughage, which the Japanese said they were going to use as fuel for aeroplanes.⁵³ The romushas were paid 31 cents a day and occasionally given a packet of Japanese Kooa cigarettes which cost 12.5 cents early in the occupation, more than a third of their daily wage, although by the end such cigarettes were a luxury available only to the Japanese.

Cooperatives

In Pemalang some attempts were made, both by honest priyayi officials and leaders of the pre-war nationalist movement, to alleviate the shortages in rural areas by forming cooperatives. One of these was Kopi founded by Sarino Mangunpranoto, Pemalang's most prominent pre-war nationalist, and it included the town's top priyayi officials, with the bupati as patron, the public prosecutor as honorary head, and Abdul Mutholib, head of the local Muhammadiyah, as business manager. Using the authority of the bupati, Sarino Mangunpranoto was able to raise enough capital from selling shares in Kopi to various lurahs to buy supplies of soap, sugar, cloth and cooking oil. The cooperative then distributed these to each lurah according to local needs. Kopi worked smoothly until 1943 when Sarino Mangunpranoto moved to Pati, and Abdul Mutholib took over the running of the cooperative. After that its usefulness declined as the Muhammadiyah leader rapidly acquired the reputation of being Pemalang's biggest swindler.

Kopi's main competitor was Pekkope (War Victims' Helpers), a cooperative set up by some pre-war nationalists, led by Pemalang's senior medical orderly Soepangat, and several orthodox Muslim leaders. It ran the Fuji Restaurant which became a favourite meeting place for all sections of the local nationalist movement, including underground PKI cadres who had escaped *kenpeitai* sweeps in Jakarta, Solo and East Java. Its food was apparently a great attraction. One prominent Pemalang *santri* (devout Muslim) said he had never eaten satay like it: 'the spices were unrivalled'.

The Camat of Taman was well known for his efforts in trying to ease the burden of the oppressive Japanese policies. He appointed a five-man committee to be responsible for the distribution of cloth received from the local cooperative. It was general practice at that time for cooperative officials to take twenty per cent of the cloth, and the camat or his wife the same amount. To avoid this in Taman the camat, an exceptionally innovative official, had the cloth received from the cooperative made up into pairs of shorts and sarongs for those who had not received any cloth, because they had no rice to deliver. The left over scraps, known as 'self-help pieces' (*potongan gotong royong*), were made into shorts for children who could not go to school because they had no clothes, for Seinendan members and for the local football team.⁵⁴ The remaining unusable pieces were sent to the Pemalang hospital to be made into bandages.

Corruption

Because of shortages created by war-time economic chaos, fiddling of rice delivery quotas was practised on a large scale in response to skyrocketing black market prices for rice. In one month, in Pemalang alone, almost three hundred tons went 'astray'. The amount reported as sold to the mill by the pangreh praja was 1,064 tons, but the government figure for purchases by rice mills was only 786 tons. While admitting a deficiency, the Pemalang rice mills claimed that only 140 tons had gone astray. Over the whole Pekalongan Residency in one year as many as 1200 tons were 'lost'.⁵⁵

Throughout Java the Japanese substituted the lurahs for the Chinese rice-millers as the middlemen in the rice delivery system; the village became the collection centre for harvested rice. The lurahs became the lynchpins in the harsh Japanese extractive process with new opportunities to swindle and cheat peasants. Corruption was so widespread that *tanggem*, an old word meaning 'vice-grips', was now popularly used to refer to corruption.

The key role played by the lurahs in rice requisitioning can be seen from their new ways of swindling. A typical example of this comes from the village of Ambowetan on Pemalang's north-eastern border, where the rice delivery system was most onerous. Farmers, so it is said, were allowed to keep about five per cent of their average yield for food. The rest had to go to the village collection centre, a large yard in front of the lurah's house. And there the corruption began by short-changing each farmer's delivery in various ways: by over-estimating the amount deducted for moisture content which gave the lurah an extra three per cent of the farmer's crop; by keeping the

unhusked rice which fell off the sheaves in the lurah's yard for himself; by under-estimating his, the lurah's, harvest, and therefore delivery quota, and making up the deficiency from peasants' deliveries; and lastly by under-weighing the farmer's paddy by manipulating the old Dutch scales (which could only weigh up to 60 kilograms of paddy at a time). If the farmer complained, he was told that the under-weighing was to compensate for losses in paddy which occurred in transport from the village to the rice mill.⁵⁶

Noji padi responsible for the collection of Japanese rice requisitions also had opportunities to defraud the peasants and to secure illicit supplies for their families by understating the amount of hulled rice obtained from paddy. These officials sometimes helped the mill by hulling the rice on the spot, creating ideal conditions for fiddling the quantities. They could claim that the heads of rice were empty because of disease or immaturity. There seem to have been limits set on the extent to which this sort of cheating could go, however. According to one official: 'I took a small amount illegally [*saya juga tanggem kecil-kecilan*] but I never sold any to the middleman as my assistants would have known; what the *noji padi* could do depended on "having an understanding" [*tahu sama tahu*] with his assistants'.⁵⁷

Apart from this inbuilt deterrent, some officials took positive action to control corruption. For example, in Tonjong there was no distribution from the Japanese agricultural cooperative through the hamlet head and neighbourhood associations which may have made control easier. Here the camat rotated the appointment of the person in charge of distribution so that it was not always the lurah. The camat replaced any man reported to be corrupt by the man who had reported the dishonesty. If corruption occurred in one village in the subdistrict he would change all the officials in that village. 'You could call it the "rotating spoils" system', he said. 'At least no-one could swindle or cheat for long.'⁵⁸

Evasion

Because of these harsh conditions more than half the farmers were forced to steal their own rice, usually by harvesting it secretly at night, then burying it or hiding it in rafters. They thus ran the dire risk of being found out, reported to the lurah, or more terrifyingly, to the local *kenpeitai*. Searches for hidden paddy by the local official and Japanese police took place every few months, and the people came to believe they had supernatural ways of finding out where the paddy was hidden.

In a few places evasion could be fairly successful, depending on the

zeal or probity of officials. Sometimes as much as thirty per cent of the requisition could be retained. However, in these circumstances the officials were as vulnerable to Japanese retribution as the peasants.

One occasion in Ambowetan illustrates the vulnerability of everyone in a village where hidden paddy had been discovered by the Japanese. Four sheaves of paddy (about 24 kilograms of husked rice) were found in a house occupied by a lenggaong, and claimed by a local widow. The paddy was taken to the lurah's house as proof for the accusation of theft, but unfortunately for him, the Japanese on a routine search found the paddy, accused the lurah of illegally hoarding rice and beat him so severely that he was ill for the following eight days.⁵⁹ In another area a village official tried to prevent the local police confiscating ten sheaves saved for a traditional ritual by a poor farmer. The police searched the official's own house and confiscated ninety per cent of his paddy although he had already delivered the quota and had a receipt to prove it. Not surprisingly a fight broke out in which the local senior policeman came off the loser and needed hospitalisation. The kenpeitai then appeared on the scene, accused the official of hampering paddy collection, and kept him at the Pekalongan kenpeitai headquarters for seven days.⁶⁰ Two months later the unfortunate official was sentenced to six months' imprisonment for hampering paddy searches.

The cost of honesty was terrible, and if village officials got such treatment from their own superiors and the Japanese, the peasants were at the mercy of everyone—the kenpeitai, the camat, their own village officials, and even in one area, the Seinendan. Soesmono, a Tegal nationalist recalled:

It was not only the Japanese harshness which made the people afraid, but we ourselves were to blame. For example, when farmers from Brebes subdistrict went to Ketanggungan to join in the harvest, they would be paid maybe one-fifth or one-sixth of what they harvested there. They would return home once a week bringing their rice—they preferred to save rice rather than money. Seinendan youths would stop these peasants and order them to sell their rice to the government, to meet the lurah's quota.⁶¹

Whether or not they accepted the Japanese need for rice requisitioning, for the Seinendan members it was a new experience to be able to wield this kind of authority. But for the already overburdened peasantry it was yet another humiliation.

Corruption was so widespread in Pekalongan Residency that rice delivery quotas had to be increased—the only place in Java where this practice was reported. Officials as a result got extra rice, the

highest ration in Java. While the Japanese Resident and assistant Resident were more flexible men, the Japanese head of Economic Affairs was a tyrant whose strict enforcement of prohibition of trade in rice and cloth between subdistricts and regions caused great hardship. The Brebes' rice surplus which normally fed Tegal was expropriated and Tegal regency, where only two out of nine subdistricts had surplus paddy, could not meet its rice deficit.

Violent Resistance

Peasant evasion of Japanese forced deliveries of rice was followed by more violent resistance, directed primarily at corrupt officials in the final stages of the occupation. The hatred was directed more against the pangreh praja than towards the Japanese 'overlords' because members of the traditional elite were more visibly involved in implementing Japanese policies. The pangreh praja were perceived to be responsible for the threatening subsistence crisis.

The killing of Raden Bambang Basiroen, the over-zealous Camat of Ampelgading, resulted from months of predatory intimidation of peasants by the camat with assistance from his village officials. Basiroen would enter houses and climb rafters himself in search of hidden grain and to this he added the reputation of emulating his Japanese superiors in the free use of violence and slaps in the face.

In mid 1943 a peasant who had not delivered his paddy quota returned from his rice field to find Basiroen together with the lurah and two other village officials searching his house for paddy. An argument broke out; someone hit the peasant, upon which the latter ran and called for help. A large crowd shouting in Japanese '*Atsumare! Atsumare!*' (Gather! Assemble!) quickly formed. Not long afterwards Basiroen was mobbed and killed with bamboo spears, while his three assistants were chased by the crowd, but escaped. Some time later the Wedana of Comal arrived at the scene, and told the Seinendan leader who was accompanying him to give out Kooa cigarettes to the crowd who were still shouting '*Atsumare!*'. The crowd was still agitated so the wedana got up and said 'Don't be afraid, I will see that everything is taken care of'. What this meant was not clear until about half an hour later when several truckloads of Japanese military arrived and began taking people back to Pekalongan. Over the next fortnight hundreds more arrests were made throughout the subdistrict, but the Japanese never found 'the leaders'. Everyone 'confessed' to the killing of the camat, even those who had nothing to do with the incident.⁶²

About a year and a half later in neighbouring Petarukan village

Haji Dulgani, a prominent religious leader, began a protest against compulsory rice deliveries by refusing to deliver paddy to the lurah, urging the people to take their harvested paddy home rather than to the collection centre. The haji further urged the people to defy another principle of requisitioning policy, and to harvest their paddy without permission from the lurah. This they proceeded to do. The lurah, hearing of this, sent a village policeman to the rice fields to prevent harvesting. The policeman failed and the lurah went himself to find that some paddy had already been removed and other people were still harvesting. Haji Dulgani challenged the lurah, who was beaten and thrown into the rice fields emerging covered in mud and soaking wet. Although the kenpeitai searched for the religious leader, he remained safely hidden by various villages for the rest of the occupation.

Other leaders of defiance against Japanese requisitioning policy were not always so lucky. Some came to tragic ends like a school teacher who led resistance to paddy deliveries in Bumijawa in Southern Tegal and was later tortured to death by the kenpeitai in a Tegal jail.⁶³

The conflict with the pangreh praja worsened as the occupation progressed, because of the magnitude of rice rationing and of corruption, of which the pangreh praja were seen as the prime movers. People resented most strongly their role as rice requisitioners, and their personal enrichment from corruption, particularly over cloth rations. The deteriorating relations between the people and lower level officials can be seen from the complaints of hardship received by Putera, one of the Japanese sponsored organisations aimed at mobilizing popular support for the war. Mohammad Hatta, in his first report, suggested that these complaints '... can be likened to a barometer for measuring the conditions among the people and their general circumstances'. As well as complaints about the burdensome regulations concerning the sale and harvest of rice, and harsh methods of taxation, there were pointed complaints about '... the attitude of the lower-ranking pangreh praja towards the people, which is now as bad or worse than it was under the Dutch'.⁶⁴ In a second report in March 1944, Hatta devoted a whole section to problems concerning the pangreh praja and the police. These included difficulties with the transportation and marketing of rice, unheeded requests for irrigation water and 'problems of detention, looting and arrest or beating by the police and pangreh praja'. He also mentioned the gathering of village dues and contributions by lower-ranking pangreh praja in various districts, 'and ... requests for protection from constant harassment by lower-ranking pangreh praja'.⁶⁵

The Muslim and nationalist counter-elites were not seen to be involved in making harsh policies and were free from the taint of corruption, a distinguishing mark in the people's eyes. The fact that both were involved in co-opting people for romusha projects did not seem to make the people feel betrayed in the same way that oppression and corruption at the hands of pangreh praja antagonised them. For the villagers the burden of compulsory rice deliveries was exacerbated by officials—lurahs, camats and wedanas—making house searches.

By the end of the occupation relations between the pangreh praja and the people had been damaged irreparably. In 1946 Dr. Moerjawan, Pemalang regency's medical officer, wrote that the dishonesty of officials in the distribution system was a 'public secret' at the time and that the people had strong feelings of revenge towards the pangreh praja. He remembered a conversation with one of his patients, who drove a horse and cart, about the injustices: 'The driver and the other little people felt that they were being exploited by the upper classes and would surely take revenge in the future'.⁶⁶

1. Transcript of taped interview with Soedjono, I/4, Cipanas, 29 July 1973. Soedjono, who at the time was Pekalongan Regency secretary, moved soon afterwards to the Residency Economic Affairs Department. During the early revolution he was Residency secretary, and later Resident during the guerilla period after the first Dutch police action against the Republic. See *Republik Indonesia Propinsi Djawa Tengah* (Djakarta, 1953-54), p. 76.
2. Sarimin, memoir, p. 87.
3. Transcript of taped interview with Sugiono, Tegal, I/11, 27 November 1975.
4. Sarimin, memoir, p. 88.
5. Interview with Pemalang market tailor (Achmad Toyib), Pemalang 4 December 1974.
6. Miyamoto Shizuo, 'Economic and Military mobilisation of Java, 1944-1945' in Anthony Reid and Oki Akira (eds), *The Japanese Experience in Indonesia: Selected Memoirs of 1942-45* (Ohio, 1986), Tables 3 and 4, pp. 238-239.
7. *Ibid.*
8. Production fell drastically from 1,326,000 tons in 1942 to 84,000 in 1945. Benedict Anderson, 'Japan: "The Light of Asia"', in J. Silverstein (ed.), *Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays* (New Haven, 1966), pp. 48, 68.
9. Toshio Ota, written answers to author, 10 February 1978. (I am grateful

- to Oki Akira for the English translation of all correspondence with Toshio Ota.) Some Japanese administrators such as the new Resident of Pekalongan, Tokonami Tokogi, tried to offset the harsh effects of the requisitionary, rationing and labour policies by trying to improve, as they saw it, the distribution of wealth and level of productivity in their areas by setting up cooperatives and schools to promote the latest Japanese agriculture and fisheries technology.
10. *Kowe*, the low Javanese (*ngoko*) form of the pronoun 'you', is insulting if used to people of higher status.
 11. Assistant Resident Toshio Ota writes that 'we tried to persuade Japanese not to touch the body above the neck', which was a common prohibition in Java. Written answers, 10 February 1978.
 12. Miyamoto, in Reid and Oki (eds), *The Japanese Experience*, Table 11, p. 247.
 13. *Ibid.*
 14. 'The Problem of Rice', trans. from the Japanese with an introduction by Ben Anderson, *Indonesia* 2 (October 1966), p. 99.
 15. Anderson, 'The Problem of Rice', p. 87.
 16. *Ibid.*, p. 94.
 17. Sarimin, memoir, p. 99.
 18. *Ibid.*
 19. Interview with the Camat of Taman (Gunodo Surio), Jakarta, 9 November 1971. A son of the Bupati of Pekalongan, and one of the few pangreh praja with a reputation for honesty, the Camat of Taman was the only subdistrict head who remained in office during the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah. See Chapter 5.
 20. See Anderson, 'The Problem of Rice', p. 87, fn. 29, for a comparison with the situation in Belik. See also Table 2:2.
 21. Transcript of taped interview with the Wedana of Belik (Hardjowinoto), I/10, Temanggung, 22 May 1973.
 22. Interview with Bumijawa *noji padi*, Bumijawa, 16 February 1973.
 23. Transcript of taped interview with Subechi, I/14, Pekalongan, 3 May 1975.
 24. Interview with Dr. Sumario, Semarang, 8 September 1971. Other informants, confirming this practice, give lower estimates, e.g. that 10 per cent of any ration was adulterated in this way.
 25. Miyamoto, in Reid and Oki (eds), *The Japanese Experience*, p. 248.
 26. Charles van der Plas, in his intelligence reports on the situation in Java in early 1944, wrote 'the Japanese are buying up the rice crops leaving three months' food for the farmers' and that outside of the rationing system, 'no other rice is available'. 'Situation in the Netherlands Indies', 19 February 1944. N. I. Intelligence Report, Australian Archives, CRS A1067 P1/46/2/7/1.
 27. In Moga there was an official appointed by the Japanese to supervise the planting of *badur*, also known as *walur* or *walui*. See Poerwadarminta, *Baoesastra Djawa*, pp. 24, 654.
 28. Interview with Mrs. Soclainan, Yogyakarta, 22 February 1973.
 29. Marsum, 'Ceritaku: Percikan Peristiwa Bersejarah Disekitar Hari Prok-

- lamasi Komerdekaan Indonesia di Daerah Tegal dan Sekitarnya', unpublished memoir, November 1974. On this source see Anton Lucas, "'My Story'" and other sources: an oral approach to the Indonesian revolution', *Masyarakat Indonesia*, 1, 2 (December 1974).
30. Transcript of a taped interview with castor oil plant supervisor (*mantri jarak*), the West Ketanggungan Pesindo leader (Dusman), I/4, Ketanggungan, 13 April 1973.
 31. Moerjawan, 'Ichtisar' [1946], in Inventory 201, 'Omwentelingzaak to Pekalongan' [The Revolutionary Affair in Pekalongan], A. R. A. [hereafter *Proc. Gen.*].
 32. J. H. Boeke, *The Evolution of the Netherlands Indies Economy* (New York, 1946), pp. 119, 122.
 33. Miyamoto, in Reid and Oki (eds), *The Japanese Experience*, p. 248.
 34. Interview with Banjarharjo Muslim leader (Haji Mukhsan), Brebes, 12 December 1975.
 35. Transcript of taped interview with Hardjowintoto, I/6, Temanggung, 22 May 1973.
 36. *Ibid.*, I/7.
 37. Interview with Tegal KNI Vice-Chairman (Soesmono), Semarang, 19 October 1975.
 38. Transcript of taped interview with Subechi, I/10, Pekalongan, 3 May 1975.
 39. Interview with the Camat of Taman, Jakarta, 9 November 1971. Miyamoto notes that since virtually none of the existing textile stock remained in the hands of the indigenous population, the textile shortage reached the point where people had to use gunny sacks for clothes'. Reid and Oki (eds), *The Japanese Experience*, pp. 248-249.
 40. *Ibid.*, p. 249. Compare Wertheim's claim that 300,000 were sent overseas of which only 70,000 returned alive. *Indonesian Society in Transition*, p. 262.
 41. Interview with Arab leader (Mubarak), Pemalang, 5-6 February 1975.
 42. Interview with nationalist leader Kartohargo, Brebes, 16 December 1972. My notes do not indicate whether the romusha in Kartohargo's group died while going to Banten or returning.
 43. Transcript of taped interview with Kromo Lawi, I/7-8, Pekalongan, 29 May 1973.
 44. Tan Malaka, *Dari Pendjara ke Pendjara*, Part II (Jogjakarta n. d.), pp. 157, 159-60.
 45. Morotai, taken from the Japanese on 15 September 1944, became an important base from where Australians began bombing the oil centre of Balikpapan in late 1944.
 46. Miyamoto, in Reid and Oki (eds), *The Japanese Experience*, pp. 242, 243-244.
 47. Transcript of taped interview with Holle, I/3, Kaliurang, 24 June 1976. See below p. 57, and Anton Lucas (ed.), *Local Opposition and Underground Resistance to the Japanese in Java 1942-1945*, Melbourne, 1986), pp. 38, 41.
 48. The Christian Ambonese, with their loyalist elite, had a privileged

relationship with the Dutch, and were recruited in large numbers into the colonial army and lower levels of the bureaucracy.

49. Miyamoto, in Reid and Oki (eds), *The Japanese Experience*, p. 24.
50. Interview with Sugiono, Tegal, 10 October 1972.
51. These were most likely the 17 metre-long *Kairyu* suicide submarines, which carried two eighteen-inch torpedoes. The only Japanese submarine to be fitted with a petrol engine, from February 1945 several varieties were built and assembled at their place of launching. Anthony Watts and Brian Gordon, *The Imperial Japanese Navy* (London, 1971), pp. 362-70.
52. Interview with skilled team member (Tangwin), Balapulang, 26 November 1975.
53. Japanese assistant Resident Ota says the ship which was bringing the necessary machinery to be installed in the Comal factory was sunk on its way to Java, 'making the production of butanol impossible'. Written answer to author, 1977-78.
54. Interview with the Camat of Taman, Jakarta, 9 November 1971.
55. Anderson, 'The Problem of Rice', pp. 95, 99.
56. Interview with *noji padi* (Warbo), Ambowetan, 28 October 1975. For a full account of what went on in Ambowetan see Anton Lucas, 'The Bamboo Spear Pierces the Payung: The Revolution against the Bureaucratic Elite in North Central Java in 1945'. (Ph. D. thesis, Australian National University, 1980), pp. 55-57.
57. Interview with *noji padi* (Warbo), Ambowetan, 28 October 1975.
58. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 19 October 1976.
59. Interview with Warbo, Ambowetan, 28 October 1975.
60. Interview with the village secretary of Pamutih (Mulyorahardjo), Comal, 4 November 1975.
61. Interview with Soesmono, Semarang, 20 October 1976.
62. There was a loophole in Dutch law which enabled participants of a group killing to escape almost without punishment (personal communication with David Bourchier). The above account is from interviews with Mochtar, later a Governor of Central Java, who became the Wedana of Comal after the 'uprising', Soedjono who was then Pekalongan Regency secretary, and Soepardjo an Ampelgading Seinendan leader.
63. Muhamad Nuh, written answers to Semdam Questionnaire, 1959, Kodam VII Archive, Semarang.
64. Mohammad Hatta, *The Putera Reports: Problems in Indonesian-Japanese Wartime Cooperation*, translated by W. H. Frederick (Ithaca, 1971), pp. 55, 56.
65. *Ibid.*, pp. 102, 104. Thirty-nine complaints involving police or pangreh praja are listed.
66. Mocrjawan, 'Ichtisar', Proc.Gen.

Opposition and Resistance

By 1944 considerable support had developed for local action against both the Japanese and, more importantly, against the elite who were the factotums of Japanese repression. While the policies of resistance pursued by local opposition during the period of the Japanese occupation did not end with the defeat of the Japanese, the emergence of revolutionary leadership in the Tiga Daerah in 1945 had its origins in various groups engaged in underground activities. The most significant of these had direct links with, and considered itself the legitimate successor to, the 'Illegal' PKI, whose establishment was inspired by a visit by from the veteran PKI figure, Musso, to Surabaya in mid 1935.¹ Musso's allegiance to the Communist International meant that he brought with him the Dimitrov line which was to build a united democratic front to fight fascism. While in Surabaya Musso wrote articles for the nationalist daily, *Indonesia Berdjoang*, on the struggle against imperialism and capitalism,² and formed the nucleus of leadership of the new Illegal PKI before his departure. Circulation of communist literature, including a translation of the Dutch Communist Party program, alerted the authorities and all his inner circle were arrested except the editor of *Indonesia Berdjoang*, Pamoedji. A Dutch-educated teacher and journalist, Pamoedji was left with the task of building some kind of power base using his position as a committee member of the Surabaya branch of the radical nationalist movement, Gerindo.³ Propaganda was circulated via a pocket-sized pamphlet called *Menara Merah* (Red Tower) with articles on the international situation, the progress of the war and anti-facist propaganda.⁴

Cells were working in the East Javanese towns of Madiun, Blitar, Nganjuk, Pasuruan, Jember, and Banyuwangi as well as in Semar-

ang, Bandung and Jakarta, and some cadre forming activities were carried out among workers in the BPM (Batavian Oil Company) refineries in Cepu and on the railways.⁵ One issue of *Menara Merah* contained an analysis of the 'critical' international situation and urged the colonial government to arm the people against Japanese fascism. However a manifesto urging a boycott of trade with the Japanese caused a split between the Surabaya leadership and the Semarang cell, whose members included S. K. Trimurti and her husband Sayuti Melik. With the fall of Singapore, it was argued that the nationalist movement did not have the strength to confront the Japanese openly.⁶

The Dutch had given Amir Sjarifuddin PKI money to start an underground movement, unfortunately in the form of a cheque which the Japanese traced.⁷ In April 1942, with their rapidly expanding network of spies and informers, the Japanese began arresting party members and other suspected anti-fascists in Solo, Surabaya and East Java, including Pamoedji, who died in a Surabaya prison in December 1942 as a result of torture.⁸ Other leaders were hanged early in 1944 with the exception of Amir Sjarifuddin whose sentence had been commuted to life imprisonment only on the intervention of Sukarno.

The critical situation and the response of the underground was described in 1948:

Nearly all the party or PKI cells in East Java were destroyed, cadres were caught and the cruelty continued until it reached Central Java and parts of West Java. The revolutionaries had lost almost all their cadres. However, working efficiently, the second generation quickly took the place of those who had been crushed. The movement of cadres from place to place was begun so quickly that the underground movement was able to build up its strength again.⁹

The rebuilding of the underground was left to the so-called 'second generation' of PKI activists. These included Widarta and Bung Kecil, selected in the 1930s as cadres to work in the labour movement outside Java. They chose Sumatra where in 1936 they found work in BPM's Plaju refinery near Palembang. There Widarta founded a union and organised a strike over appalling working conditions. As a result he was placed under house arrest until he escaped to Sambu Island, where the Dutch nearly caught him again. Widarta returned to Java and wrote for a Semarang newspaper edited by Sayuti Melik, until he assumed leadership of those PKI cadres who had escaped arrest by the Japanese.¹⁰ He was thus a cadre who had experienced the necessary baptism of fire, and was to play a key role in the leadership of the popular front in the Tiga Daerah in 1945.

In reorganising PKI remnants in early 1943 under the leadership of Vidarta those remaining tried to continue the united front strategy via *Menara Merah*. Sporadic acts of sabotage were attempted, but their main activities were sheltering cadres on the run and spreading anti-Japanese propaganda. Cadres who survived kenpeitai forays and the Japanese occupation, in recalling their experiences in the 1970s, told of elaborate codes, schemes to pass on information, covers for fugitive cadres, attempts at sabotage and the filching of Japanese equipment to finance endeavours. In some areas couriers were said to have regularly approached people for donations of money.¹¹

By the middle of 1944 the kenpeitai in East and Central Java had destroyed the weak underground network. One cell remaining in Central Java was located in the teak plantation at Sukowati in southern Pemalang¹² and was led by Holle¹³. Born in 1914 in the Moluccas, Holle was the son of a Christian minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, and was expected to follow that profession. However, his Dutch was not good enough so he entered the Forestry school at Bogor, and from there went to the teak plantation in southern Pemalang. Approached by the Pemalang leaders Amir and M. Mustapha who needed secure hideouts, Holle told the families of his four forestry assistants to hide fugitives.¹⁴

Apart from the security of the Sukowati teak plantation there were a number of inter-connected reasons why Pemalang became a meeting place for radical leaders and a refuge for fugitives. The simplest reason was that the Japanese presence in Pekalongan regency was minimal. It consisted of the police chief, the jailer and a training officer attached to the Peta company. By contrast, in Pekalongan there was a municipal garrison along with kenpeitai detachments, which were also present in Tegal to the west.

Another important reason for Pemalang's prominence in the underground PKI scheme was that an active cell already existed here. This was led by the able and experienced Amir, a veteran of the 1926 PKI. Imprisoned for six years in the wake of the 1926 attempted communist rebellion, he had earned a living as a goldsmith after his release and was a key figure in a small radical nationalist group in pre-war Pemalang. Arrested again by the Dutch in late 1941 for suspected illegal activities, he was later released by the Japanese, and became a key figure in local underground activities and later in the Tiga Daerah movement itself.

Organisation

Using his position as senior forester at Sukowati, Holle was able to hide the underground PKI fugitives with the foresters under his authority. The fugitives helped with the forestry work in supervising the cutting down of teak trees by the *romushas*, and in distributing the rations of food and cloth. A courier from Lasem living in Pemalang during this time recalls:

The people were sent to cut down trees. . . . Every day the kitchen near Holle's house would be told how many *romushas* there were to be fed. If there were thirty people, we made a coupon for sixty. The 'official' ration of rice was 200 grams per person per day but we doubled that. The *kenpeitai* never came. If Holle hadn't been in charge no-one would have dared double the rice rations. He controlled everything.¹⁵

There was a carefully worked out system to take fugitives arriving by train south to Sukowati from the siding servicing the sugar mill of Comal Baru, with the help of the stationmaster, a member of the pre-war nationalist movement since 1926. Ibu Pri, Amir's wife, kept the fugitives in touch with Pemalang by riding a bicycle the twenty-odd kilometres between the teak forests and another underground meeting place, the Fuji restaurant in Pemalang.¹⁶

At that time, a loose hierarchy existed among the underground leaders. An inner group, which included Widarta, Bung Kecil, Djono 'Bungkuk' and K. Midjaja among others, used to come to the plantation at Sukowati for regular meetings,¹⁷ while K. Midjaja coordinated underground activities on Java's north coast. A veteran activist of the pre-war labour movement, by 1938 K. Midjaja had joined the Illegal PKI and in his own words was 'actively opposing Japanese fascism'. In April 1942 he was forced to flee Solo after the first *kenpeitai* razzias (because of a newspaper article considered anti-Japanese) and he spent the rest of the occupation 'being hunted and chased by Japanese fascists'. His contacts in the Tegal area included an ex-leader of the Union of Native Pawnshop officials in Talang, whom he visited as a salesman using a Sundanese name. K. Midjaja's role in determining the outcome of the Tiga Daerah movement in December 1945 was crucial and it is important to note his underground political presence at this point in our story.¹⁸

The Pemalang underground had two sources of income besides soliciting directly from sympathisers. The first was the Japanese themselves. The Japanese were sending large amounts of money and cloth to Sukowati for the *romushas*, who were paid by the Forestry

Department according to the number of teak stacks they cut each day. As an additional incentive for this work, every three months the kenpeitai sent 'presents', consisting of one month's extra wages, as well as clothes. Kubota, a member of the Pekalongan kenpeitai, used to come himself bringing extra rolls of cloth. It was these 'presents' that went directly to the underground through Holle's foresters, instead of to the romushas. The PKI argued that the romushas got enough rations as it was and were well cared for, although Holle later claimed that he had not really agreed with this 'corrupt' diversion of the kenpeitai presents to the underground.

A second source of funds came towards the end of the occupation when a Swiss planter named Victor Stober gave the partisans a sum of Dutch money, which was changed into Japanese currency. Holle contended that Stober had buried the money after the Dutch collapse when he was threatened by angry villagers who had invaded his rubber and tea plantation because they saw it as a symbol of European wealth. Grateful for Holle's intervention and protection Stober also gave Holle a double-barrelled shotgun with which he used to hunt wild pig, and made available to the Pemalang group, through Holle, the use of a radio set. Stober assisted the Japanese in the matter of produce from his 200 hectare estate; perhaps for this reason he was left alone by them and therefore invaluable to Holle and his underground PKI friends in Pemalang.

Great caution had to be exercised by the Pemalang underground in moving and protecting couriers and cadres, since discovery and arrest by the kenpeitai involved death as the easiest option. For example, after a cell in Central Java had been broken and its leader tortured and killed, a surviving courier and his wife were sent to Pemalang, where on arrival they were taken to separate places and did not meet again for a month. The courier asked no questions, for to do so was to invite immediate suspicion and perhaps worse. It was also necessary for fugitive couriers to identify themselves on arrival at a refuge and to quickly assume a cover activity. Ibu Pri recalled the atmosphere of her sister's house in Comal which had been the underground base before the forestry station was used:

. . . the house was always full of people . . . During the Japanese time they would bring samples—buttons, metal, nameplates, which were much sought after—to sell to other guests who might be already there. If there was a card game they would join in until everyone was involved in it, then slip out the back. On the other hand if guests came while they, the fugitives, were there they would start to do something—grab a bucket and get water from the well—grab a broom and sweep

the floor . . . it was extremely dangerous to hide anyone, people were being caught and killed—caught and killed (*ketangkap mati, ketangkap mati*) all the time . . .¹⁹

Throughout the occupation the Pemalang group was able to follow the progress of the war through the illegal radio owned by the Swiss planter. All radio receivers had been sealed after being altered by the Japanese so as to pick up only local bands. Seals were inspected regularly. Holle, however, devised a way of shifting this seal temporarily, removing the back plate and re-adjusting the receiver so that it could be tuned to broadcasts from outside Java, and the Japanese never discovered that the seal had been tampered with.²⁰

Unlike groups elsewhere in Java earlier in the occupation, the Pemalang group did not attempt sabotage of installations. Rather their work involved building up moral support through regular contacts by courier, and disseminating anti-Japanese propaganda and news of the war through *Menara Merah* and by word of mouth. After the Pemalang base was established, local activists produced *Menara Merah* in the forestry stations. Paper, roneo ink and carbons were supplied by Holle from the Swiss planter's office. Coming out every three or four months, and stamped with the hammer and sickle, contents included summaries of local news and information about Japanese oppression in other parts of Java and articles about the nature of imperialism.²¹

Locally Based Opposition Groups

The PKI was not the only group organising opposition to the Japanese, striving to be 'in the forefront' and to win influence. Among locally based opposition groups were the Nine Brothers. In mid March 1945, a group of nine men all in their early thirties held a secret meeting in a house at Jalan Kejambon in Tegal. One of the group outlined recent discussions with Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo, the PNI Baru leader, who had been living in Tegal since 1938 in a kind of voluntary 'exile' from Bandung. An intellectual, he earned his living running a freshwater fisheries enterprise but spent a lot of his spare time discussing political philosophy with local activists. Soebagio's analysis of the political situation was that the Japanese would surrender to the Allies before much longer. He argued that preparations should be made for this. Most of the Nine Brothers group had been close associates since the early 1930s. As the sons of lower-level government officials, all had completed HIS and most some years of MULO, and they spoke Dutch. They had been involved in the founding of the Tegal Branch of Indonesia Muda, the local branch of

the KBI and the Muslim Youth Group, JIB. They were close associates of Supeno, having been at school with him in Tegal and Pekalongan,²² and many joined Sjahrir's Socialist Party as a result of their friendship with Supeno.

After Indonesia Muda had been harassed to a standstill by the Political Intelligence Service a new group calling itself the Islam Study Club had been formed, more to ease police surveillance than from any commitment to Islam (only three of the group were devout Muslims, one of whom had taught in modernist Muslim schools in the 1930s). Having completed a first aid course set up by the Dutch in Pekalongan in 1941, several of the Nine Brothers were co-opted into the Red Cross section of the Dutch Army and sent to Cilacap to assist in the last minute evacuations in flying boats to Australia. Interned as a result by the Japanese for several months, on their release and return to Tegal the group had maintained loose contact, occasionally meeting informally at courses run by the Medical Rescue Team, a Japanese equivalent of the Red Cross. They had decided among themselves that the best way of opposing Japanese authority was to 'infiltrate' local organisations such as the Seinendan, Barisan Pclopor, and the BP3, the Soldiers' Relief Organisation set up to help families of the Indonesian battalions of Peta, and to influence their members. Two of the group even took the dangerous job of being double agents for the kenpeitai based in the Tegal docks. One of these recalls:

I joined the kenpeitai as a double agent. There were several of us involved. We used to go around a lot, listening and talking informally in trains, markets and cinemas. We used to tell people that the Japanese spoiled the morals of our young girls, and about taking all the paddy and the romusha . . . We didn't blow up bridges, but tried to influence people's minds . . .²³

It should be clearly pointed out that the person involved as a 'double agent' here did not claim to be part of a resistance with a consistent cause in view like the underground PKI. There is an obvious distinction between those few who were highly motivated and many cases (like the above) where motives were uncertain.

Urged on by Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo's prediction that the Japanese faced certain defeat, the Nine Brothers drew up a plan of action at a secret meeting in Kejambon quarter in Tegal. Four of the group were to make contacts within the Tegal Peta battalion and Heiho. According to one of the group, Peta and Heiho did not know much about military matters and 'we told them not to oppress (*mengingjak*) the people and to be patient. We hadn't really got going when the Japanese surrendered'.²⁴ Two others assigned them-

selves the task of finding out which *pangreh praja* were most disliked as a result of the Japanese economic policies. Another approached well-known veterans of the 1920s as well as Tegal *pemuda* (youth) figures. The group aimed to pass on their own analysis of the war situation and to prepare the ground for action after what was now thought to be the inevitable defeat of the Japanese.²⁵

About the same time a group was holding secret meetings within the Barisan Pelopor in Tegal. It included three nationalists exiled to Boven Digul prison camp in West New Guinea after the attempted rebellion of 1926, a Gerindo leader, and a *pemuda* activist. The acknowledged leader of the group was the Marxist Muhamad Nuh.²⁶ The group was not in agreement in its analysis of the war situation, attitudes to the national leadership, or the strategy to be adopted against the Japanese. The Marxists in the group were critical of the Jakarta Republican leadership, many of whom they considered were still 'feudalistic' and 'tools of Japanese military fascism'. It was essential to establish local priorities in the coming struggle. Because the economic situation had reached a crisis point, people could be easily mobilised against the Japanese.

The non-Marxists in the Barisan Pelopor were less quick to criticise the national leadership as collaborators, and placed priority in the coming struggle on seizing power from the foreigners before social revolution. There was disagreement over comparisons which Muhamad Nuh and the other Marxists made between the Indonesian, Russian and French revolutions. Because Russia and France were free nations not colonies, they did not have to throw out the foreign ruler, the main task of Indonesia's revolution.

Despite these differences the group agreed that cadre building should start immediately, so that people would be ready to oppose Japanese authority and 'hit the enemy from behind' as soon as the opportunity arose. They decided to begin a propaganda campaign amongst the workers of the shipbuilding yards, many of whom were already members of the Barisan Pelopor.

Another underground which operated in Brebes regency was more directly influenced by recent PNI Baru models than were the Ninc Brothers. Soenarto, the leader of the group, had taught in a school run by Soegra near Cirebon before the war and had helped found the Indonesian People's Cooperative, the KRI, with Soegra, who headed the Cirebon branch of PNI Baru.²⁷ On moving back to Brebes he set up branches throughout the regency. Under the leadership of Soenarto these cooperatives, sanctioned by the Japanese, changed their function. They soon became a loosely integrated network of informal groups which met irregularly to discuss the progress of the war, and what local initiatives could be taken when the inevitable defeat of the

Japanese came. KRI members in Brebes included three village school teachers, a seller of steamed rice cakes, a carpenter and a Chinese. While the majority were agricultural labourers there were several *lenggaongs* involved also. An adviser to the KRI was able to travel freely throughout Brebes regency (as far south as Salem) making contacts and holding meetings. In all there were about eight branches. If local officials wanted to know what went on in meetings the answer was simply 'co-op business'. Inevitably the Japanese, who kept a close watch on all such organisations, began to suspect the Brebes KRI of other aims. A peasant named Karta was arrested after being reported by village police for making certain charm amulets, which were going to be used to oppose the Japanese. Along with two others, Karta was beaten and imprisoned in Brebes jail. All three refused to talk or acknowledge that they knew Soenarto, and Karta was released.

In wartime, local resistance groups such as existed in the Tiga Daerah are always feared. Certainly the Japanese went to great lengths to try to root them out. The Japanese probably feared that if the Allies were to launch the expected invasion of Java from the south, the role of these undergrounds would have become much more important.

The hardships caused by the implementation of Japanese wartime economic policies sharply reduced the ability of the *pangreh praja* to lead the people. By the end of the occupation, with a few exceptions, *pangreh praja* in Pekalongan Residency in the Tiga Daerah were discredited. On the other hand, the underground leftists based in Pemalang and Tegal emerged free from the taint of corruption as the natural popular leaders after the Japanese collapse.

Unlike the PKI the other 'opposition' groups, such as the Nine Brothers, the Tegal Barisan Pelopor group and the Brebes based KRI, were not so concerned with working full time against Japanese fascism. Anderson's comment on the Jakarta situation can apply equally to these local groups: their importance '... is that they were germs of political cliques and groups which were to bud only in the spring-time of independence, not that they undertook any effective opposition to the military government'.²⁸ The western-educated Nine Brothers with their *priyayi* ties also remind one of the pro-Sjahrir resistance group in Jakarta. However, the Barisan Pelopor leadership stood out in one crucial way, and that was the dominant leadership of a group of older generation nationalists, all of whom were Marxists who had returned from exile in Boven Digul during the 1930s. These ex-Digulists were to play a key role in setting up a new revolutionary government during the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah.

In the people's judgment both the Barisan Pelopor leadership and the Nine Brothers in Tegal, and the Pemalang based underground PKI emerged from the occupation free of the odium which attached to the pangreh praja for having unfairly distributed scarce commodities in a time of great hardship and for participating in the cruel extraction of rice for the Japanese. Also, they were ready to act in August 1945. It remains for us to see in the following chapters how, after the proclamation of independence, these groups seized power and held on to it for four months until mid December.

1. Harry A. Poeze, 'The PKI Muda 1936-1942', *Kabar Sebarang*, 13/14, 1984, p. 159. For a general overview see the four essays by Anton Lucas, Sintha Melati, Soeryana and Jaques Leclerc in Anton Lucas (ed.), *Local Opposition and Underground Resistance to the Japanese in Java 1942-1945* (Monash University, 1986); Sidik Kertapati, *Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945* (Jakarta, 1964); Pusat SBPI, *Dokumentasi Pemuda; Sekitar Proklamasi Indonesia Merdeka* (Yogyakarta, 1948), based on notes left by D. N. Aidit, S. W. Lagiono and Mustapha.
2. Poeze, 'The PKI Muda', p. 161.
3. On Pamoedji's activities see Lucas, *Local Opposition*, pp. 4-5, 21; for his biography, *ibid.*, p. 90 fn 14.
4. Kertapati, *Sekitar Proklamasi*, p. 5; Lucas, *Local Opposition*, pp. 7-9, 42-43, 349-351.
5. Lucas, *Local Opposition*, p. 7.
6. Later Sayuti Melik, in a printed interview (*Berita Buana*, 13 January 1977), said he could not agree with underground PKI propaganda which urged people 'to kill the Japanese'. Later in the war, Sayuti Melik was arrested with other leftists by the Japanese.
7. See evidence of van der Plas in Netherlands Staten-Generaal, *Enquete-commissie Regeringsbeleid 1940-1945* ('s-Gravenhage, 1956), Vol. II, p. 1353.
8. *Penghela Rakjat*, 8 February 1946. Kertapati, *Sekitar Proklamasi*, p. 29, and *Dokumentasi Pemuda*, p. 45, list those arrested, tortured and executed.
9. *Dokumentasi Pemuda*, p. 45.
10. Interviews in Jakarta on 7 June 1978 and 4 July 1978.
11. Information culled from interviews by the author with surviving couriers and cadres. For further details see Lucas, *Local Opposition*, pp. 59-60.
12. For an account of the Pemalang underground in the context of the Java-wide network, see Lucas, *Local Opposition*, pp. 27-50, 51-62.
13. For Holle's biography, see pp. 271-2.
14. For Amir's biography, see pp. 270-1. For S. Mustapha, see Lucas, *Local Opposition*, p. 103 fn 32.
15. Interview with Lasem courier, Yogyakarta, 27 July 1976.

16. On the role of women in local underground work since the 1930s, see Lucas, *Local Opposition*, pp. 43-49. For Ibu Pri's biography see pp. 276-7.
17. For Widarta's biography see p. 281; on Djono Bungkok's (Suhardjo) activities see Lucas, *Local Opposition*, pp. 174-5.
18. For K. Midjaja's biography, see p. 275.
19. Interview at Comal, 2 September 1975.
20. Transcript of taped interview, with Holle, V/7, Kaliurang, 24 June 1976. Use of radios and techniques for removing seals were not confined to Pemalang. At least three other illegal radios operated in Tegal and Pekalongan at this time.
21. Transcript of taped interview with Holle, V/7, Kaliurang, 26 June 1976.
22. Interview with Tegal KNI Vice-Chairman (Soesmono), 16 October 1975.
23. Interview with a member of Nine Brothers (Marnomo), Bogor, 2 August 1976.
24. Interview with Soesmono, Semarang, 11 October 1972.
25. Soesmono, written answers to questions from author, November 1972. Slamet Soenarjo, 'Catatan Singkat Slamet Soenarjo dalam Perjuangan Kemerdekaan Pemuda Tegal dalam Enam Bulan Sebelum dan Sesudah Hari Proklamasi R. I.', memoir, undated.
26. For Muhamad Nuh's biography see p. 276.
27. For Soenarto's biography see p. 278. For Soegra's biography see Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, p. 445.
28. Benedict Anderson, *The Pemuda Revolution: Indonesian Politics 1945-1946*, (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1967), p. 37.

The Proclamation of Independence: Responses and Reactions to the End of Japanese Rule

On the evening of 14 August 1945, some time after 9 o'clock at night, a member of the group within the Barisan Pelopor that had been meeting secretly in Tegal for the past month, arrived at a friend's house in Jalan Gilitugel. Peering through the window he saw his friend, also a member of the group, trying to tune in to the illegal short wave radio that had been the Barisan Pelopor's source of information about the war. Deciding to teach his friend a lesson for being careless about such a dangerous occupation, in full view of anyone coming to the back of the house, he called out '*Moshi Moshi*' ('hello' in Japanese) in a loud voice. This was followed by 'Is the owner at home?', imitating a Japanese Indonesian accent. Hearing the greeting the startled man jumped up and raced to the back door. He was relieved to find, not a member of the *kenpeitai*, but his old friend Marsum. The two sat down in front of the radio and continued attempts to get the latest news of the war.

A voice could be heard talking. 'What band is that?', . . . I asked. 'Saigon or Hanoi', he replied. 'It's English with a Chinese accent, I'll change to Australia'. He began tuning . . . and someone was speaking slowly in English, the voice on the station was clearer. 'What band is that, Bung [Brother]?' I asked again. 'Australia', he replied, 'probably Melbourne'. I complained to myself 'What a pity . . . why can't I speak English . . . my own fault . . .' Suddenly my friend sat up agitated and moved closer to the radio, straining every muscle, trying to catch the voice speaking in English. . . . Then I was shocked to hear my friend say 'No! What? Hey! Bung! The Japanese . . . they've surr . . . surrendered!'¹

This unexpected news, and the Proclamation of Independence which followed three days later, galvanised into action various groups within the revolutionary movement (*perjuangan*) in Pekalongan Residency. Their knowledge of events in Jakarta was helped by the fact that the capital was accessible within eight hours by road and all the Pekalongan regency towns were located along the Jakarta-Semarang railway line. Many of the trains coming from Jakarta were scrawled with slogans such as *Merdeka atau Mati* (Freedom or Death). Activist railway workers were thus often the first to hear the news from the capital, and played a leading role in spreading it around the regency towns, and into the countryside.

The first response from local groups to the news of the Japanese surrender and the proclamation was to send couriers to Jakarta to seek confirmation. When early on the evening of 14 August, underground PKI in Pemalang heard via the Swiss planter's radio that the Japanese had surrendered, their leader Widarta was already in the capital. The Nine Brothers, on hearing the news on their radio in Tegal, dispatched two of their group to Jakarta on 19 August, where they spent the night with Supeno at his home in Jalan Lawu 'being lectured on the meaning of the proclamation'.² In a similar way the Tegal Barisan Pelopor group, after confirming the accuracy of the radio broadcast they had heard the previous night, sent a courier to Jakarta. He returned saying he had been unable to meet with Menteng 31 leaders as they were all out of the city.³ However, on 20 August another courier returned bringing hundreds of printed texts of the Proclamation, as well as other slogans printed on fragile yellow rice paper, all that was available at the time. With confirmation from Jakarta of the Japanese surrender older nationalists in the revolutionary movement were in a strong position. They quickly took the initiative, first with a flag-raising and propaganda campaign and then with the formation of local national committees, or KNIs, on instructions from Jakarta.

In contrast, the *pangreh praja* had no access to sources of information other than the Japanese, whose continued attitude of authority reinforced the natural confusion and doubts that the bureaucratic elite had about the proclamation. In any case the Japanese in Pekalongan Residency kept silent about the surrender after the proclamation, refusing to confirm it in public and often denying it privately.

Sarimin Reksodihardjo, the Bupati of Brebes and a leading *pangreh praja* spokesman in the region, believed at the end of August 1945 that Indonesia would be returned to the Dutch under the terms of the agreement reached by Stalin, Roosevelt and Churchill at

Potsdam outside Berlin in mid July.⁴ By accepting the Potsdam Declaration the Japanese were forced to maintain the status quo until the Allies arrived.

Instead of MacArthur's Southwest Pacific Command arriving to 'free' the Indonesians from Japanese rule, Mountbatten's Southeast Asia Command was in charge of repatriating the Japanese and their prisoners of war from Indonesia while the Americans concentrated on the Pacific. There were also moves within the delegations at Potsdam to deter any independent French and Dutch moves to return in force to their Southeast Asian colonies, but in the end some Dutch and French troops were included in Mountbatten's forces.⁵ The Japanese military commander's statement to Sukarno and Hatta on 18 August, that 'Japan has accepted the Potsdam Declaration and accordingly assistance towards independence is impossible', showed that the Japanese were not going to help either. Peace and order would be maintained under the command of the Japanese army 'until the day when the transfer of everything to the Allies is completed'.⁶

Pangreh praja, like Sarimin, were confident that according to the terms of the Potsdam agreement as stated by the Japanese commander, the Allies would arrive immediately to return the Indies to the Dutch. They were also influenced by the speech of Queen Wilhelmina in December 1942 (which the Dutch re-broadcast in September 1945) which led them to believe Indonesians would have some self-government within a Dutch Commonwealth which consisted of the Netherlands, Indonesia, Surinam and Curacao. During June and July 1945 Soetardjo, a well-known priyayi spokesman who had been travelling around Java, told a meeting of pangreh praja in Tegal to be prepared for independence which the Japanese would give out 'in stages'. 'As a result of Queen Wilhelmina's promise and Soetardjo's speeches we thought that independence (*kemerdekaan*) was logical; it was the proclamation that we could not imagine. We had no idea that a country could simply make a proclamation of independence.'⁷ The pangreh praja were confused, according to Sarimin, by the fact that there had been no 'formal announcement' of the Japanese surrender either over the radio or from the Japanese Resident of Pekalongan. Pangreh praja doubts about the proclamation were further reinforced by the attitude of local Japanese officials, such as the one encountered by Sarimin:

Japanese officials in the regions kept completely silent (*membungkam seribu bahasa*) . . . at the time the news was spreading. I had been on a tour of duty to the inland areas and met a kenpeitai officer who must have known [about the surrender] but he strongly denied the news. Automatically,

anxieties arose especially amongst the officials who were in positions of responsibility. They were caught [not knowing how] to follow the wave of unrest, while under the pressure and threat of the still real [Japanese] power.⁸

A critical factor in explaining the 'wait and see' attitude of the *pangreh praja* was their expectation that the allied force would arrive immediately, and not, as happened, six weeks later. This unexpected delay explained a lot of *pangreh praja* caution and created a climate in which a power struggle between all groups could have free play.

Revolutionary Groups

The revolutionary movement during the months after the proclamation was characterised by the springing up of so-called struggle organisations (*badan perjuangan*). Most of these were very loosely-structured bands of youthful activists, centered around an older, sometimes charismatic nationalist figure. A further look at some of these leaders is necessary, before describing their activities. The leadership of the struggle organisations consisted of three groups. First, there were veterans of the early nationalist movement, usually former members of the early PKI, the VSTP (Railway Workers' Union), and the PKI-affiliated *Sarekat Rakyat*. These included radicals who, after the 1926 communist rebellion, had been imprisoned in Java or exiled to Boven Digul, such as Muhamad Nuh, Soewignjo, Soelaiman Soetopratiwo and Wachtoem from Tegal, and Brebes veteran Slamet.⁹ Several Islamic leftists such as Haji Moeklas and Kyai Misbah were in this group as well.¹⁰ Surveillance by the political intelligence service along with promises made to the Dutch to secure their return from Digul meant that most had not been active in politics again. This first group also included such older Sukarno supporters of the first PNI (1927) as Kartohargo and Kromo Lawi, who were harassed and occasionally detained for their political activities in the late 1920s and early 1930s.¹¹

The second group were the 1930s generation. They included activists of various pre-war pemuda groups: Indonesia Muda, the Indonesian Scouts (KBI), the Solo-based Partindo youth group *Perpri*, and the PNI Baru youth group, the SPI. Among them were Sugeng Hargono (from Brebes), most of the Tegal-based Nine Brothers and Sarli, the Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor leader.¹² The 1930s generation also included ex-members of the political parties of that period, the PNI Baru, Gerindo, Partindo and the PSII, such as Soenarto (Brebes), Ismono, Marsum and K. H. Abu Sudja'i.¹³

Finally, there was the '1945 generation', whose first political experience was in a Japanese youth organisation and whose outlook was moulded by this and other experiences of the Japanese occupation. This group included the younger Pemalang API leaders Oerip and Karso, and the West Ketanggungan (Brebes) Pesindo leaders.¹⁴ This group had less, if any, Dutch education and were often sons of lower-level government officials or sugar mill employees. They were not usually in leadership positions in the struggle organisation but they made up the bulk of the active membership of these groups. The vast majority were referred to as *pemuda rakyat*, the poor non-elite youth from the semi-urban kampungs who made up the bulk of the Tegal Barisan Pelopor and Pemalang API. In contrast, the Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor activists were described by their leader as *pemudas* with some Western education, *pemuda sekolah*.

The leadership pattern in groups outside the regency capitals was the same: older activists dominated, while the religious strength varied from group to group. For example, in Randudongkal in Southern Pemalang because of the leadership of H. Zaini and the location of several *pesantrens* in the area, most AMRI (Younger Generation of the Republic of Indonesia) members were *santris*. In other small centres such as Slawi and Tanjung there were no *pesantrens*, and the modernist *santris* had been to the pre-war Continuation School.

The organisation of these groups also varied, from the structured Tegal Barisan Pelopor, to more usual loosely-knit unnamed groups such as the Tanjung *Pemudas*. Even groups with the same name had no organisational links with their namesakes in the same regency, let alone at the provincial or national level. For example, API groups in Tegal and Pemalang had no connection with each other, although both claimed to be part of their Jakarta namesake, while the various AMRI groups in Pekalongan Residency had no links with each other or with their counterparts at the provincial or national level. Local groups easily changed their names, reflecting national level developments, such as the founding of the socialist youth Pesindo in early November, and later, the socialist party Parsi. 'Membership' in these groups was informal, and not mutually exclusive. Many Tegal activists such as the leader of the local South Sulawesi youth KRIS (Service of the Indonesian People of Sulawesi) were members of both the Barisan Pelopor and their own group. While the Barisan Pelopor apparently kept a membership book, as did one AMRI group, this was unusual. Names were frequently borrowed from more glamorous groups in Jakarta, Semarang or Surabaya without there being any organisational link. Because of the abundance of struggle organis-

ations and differences in the impacts of the occupation, there were also different responses to the aftermath of the proclamation in Tegal, Brebes and Pemalang.

The pangreh praja reaction was crucial to the freedom struggle and the way it developed after 17 August. The first reactions by the pangreh praja and the revolutionary movement in each of the three regions shows the widely differing role of the local national committees, the KNIs, whether chosen by members of the struggle organisations or appointed by members of the pangreh praja. In Pemalang the KNIs were predominantly pangreh praja choices; in Tegal and Brebes they were mainly nationalists. Whether KNIs were organised from 'below' or from 'above' depended on local power struggles as we shall see. In September 1945, at the height of the revolutionary violence, the KNIs acted as a focus, unifying nationalist struggle aspirations, but they proved ineffectual in restraining or controlling revolutionary outrage against the Japanese (particularly the *kenpeitai*), against the Indo-European population, and finally against the pangreh praja themselves.

Pangreh praja responses to the proclamation were critical—for them, for the Tiga Daerah and for the revolutionary struggle in the Residency, and these deserve close examination.

Pangreh Praja Reactions

The initial response of the traditional elite to the flag raising of the Red and White, the Indonesian flag, throughout the Residency seemed to be the same. 'Take it down', the pangreh praja told revolutionary leaders, 'we have no official orders from the Japanese'. The fear of Japanese reactions if the revolutionary movement continued the campaign to take down the Japanese flag and replace it with the Red and White was widespread among the pangreh praja. Underlying doubts about the proclamation were not limited to this group but were held by the great majority of older Indonesians who were not part of the revolutionary movement. Those officials who made their doubts known greatly weakened their own subsequent authority.

Sarimin Reksodihardjo, who in August 1945 had been Bupati of Brebes for only three months, had achieved what rarely happened under the Dutch. A village boy from a family of tobacco farmers near Dieng plateau, his father's great ambition was that one of his sons would become a priyayi with high status in the colonial civil service. Sarimin topped his class in the government training school Osvia in 1924, and was a *camat* by the age of twenty-eight. One of only

thirteen who graduated from the prestigious *Bestuursacademie* before the war (attendance was previously reserved for the sons of regents), Sarimin was known in his village as 'the one who has been privileged by the gods'. The kind of able and modern priyayi who ruffled feathers in the colonial world, he made extraordinarily rapid progress under the Japanese, being promoted from *wedana* to *patih* and then *bupati* in three years. Yet the gods withheld their favour from Sarimin during his six months as *Bupati* of Brebes, which turned out to be what he later called the 'calamity' of his long and distinguished career.

Pangreh praja relations with the revolutionary movement in Pekalongan Residency in the first month after the proclamation were worsened by the suspected existence of a fifth column to welcome the Dutch return to Indonesia. In the minds of the Nine Brothers this began with the last Dutch assistant Resident of Tegal, A. R. Coert, who set up a branch of the VVV or Victory Movement. This group, which began activities in Indonesia after Germany had invaded Holland in May 1940, used the slogan of the free Dutch movement 'Holland shall rise again' and included members of the Dutch freemasons. Resident Besar and *Bupati* Sarimin were said to have been freemasons at one time, though Sarimin later denied it.¹⁵ His name however became linked with the wartime VVV movement, which was not at all to his advantage. His reputation was further impaired by his alleged association with the *Wedana* of Pangkah, an alleged VVV member who reportedly was using Dutch money to subvert the new Republic.¹⁶

In Pekalongan there were similar rumours of a secret committee of top pangreh praja, including the *bupati* (who had held office since 1924), preparing to welcome back the Dutch. Pekalongan pangreh praja hated Kromo Lawi, Pekalongan's veteran nationalist leader, most of all. Relations between Pekalongan officials and Kromo Lawi, and the small group of radical nationalists in the Residency capital had deteriorated during the occupation. Kromo Lawi, it will be recalled, had been given high status by the Japanese, rising to become first chairman of *Putera*, then head of the business section of the Jawa Hokokai (the Java Service Association) and leader of the *Barisan Pelopor* in Pekalongan. The pangreh praja disliked his frequent visits to their areas to make speeches about independence at the courses conducted by the *Putera*, and later the Jawa Hokokai. They resented the way he was able to take over the house of the *Wedana* of Pekalongan as an office of *Putera*. They suspected as well that certain derogatory reports the Japanese had been receiving about the pangreh praja resulting in reprimands or dismissals, orig-

inated with Kromo Lawi. So the priyayi had tried without success to remove him from positions of influence.¹⁷

In response Kromo Lawi sought to protect himself by drawing close to the *kenpeitai*. This was itself to have repercussions at the time of the *kenpeitai* clash in Pekalongan in early October when Kromo Lawi was arrested and accused of being a fifth-column agent of the *kenpeitai*.

In the light of the tension that existed between Kromo Lawi and Pekalongan's *pangreh praja*, their reaction to the news he brought from Jakarta was not surprising. Kromo Lawi, by his own account, had been in Jakarta at the house of the Japanese Admiral Maeda on the night the proclamation was being debated.¹⁸ Leaving early to carry the news that a proclamation would be made, the news had reached Pekalongan before Kromo Lawi arrived. On 21 August the Residency's *pangreh praja* (including all the *bupatis*) assembled in Pekalongan for a meeting of the Jawa Hokokai and the Residency Advisory Council. Thirty years later, Kromo Lawi recalled the meeting which he attended as a member of the Council:

I was laughed at by Sarimin . . . because they held the view that the only people who could give us independence were those who won the war . . . They could not believe that we could become independent by a proclamation. The winners of the war had to give us our freedom. America had won, the Japanese had been defeated and could not grant us independence. They could not understand that the proclamation came from the innermost feelings of the Indonesian people themselves.¹⁹

Sarimin, in his account of this meeting five months after the event, wrote:

Not a single person at the meeting really knew all the implications of the Proclamation. Mr. Kromo Lawi who had just come from Jakarta explained that it was not yet a reality. It was an ideological statement without a concrete manifestation.²⁰

Until the Japanese had formally transferred power to the new Indonesian administration in Pekalongan residency, Sarimin felt unable to act in the name of the Republic. Moreover, the *bupati* was not one of those *pangreh praja* who remained passive. He considered it his duty to make his views known everywhere, as he had done before the war, when he had been banished to a poverty-stricken subdistrict for offering unsolicited opinions to a visiting Dutch Resident from the lowly office of assistant *wedana*. As a *bupati* Sarimin was more self-confident.

In Brebes, it was inevitable that Sarimin would clash with the town's leading pre-war nationalist Kartohargo whom he accused of being a tool of Japanese imperialism during the occupation, and who now claimed 'to have the support of the people'.²¹ Implications of what Sarimin was saying in public appear from Kartohargo's contemporary account of a meeting with the bupati in the Brebes regency *pendopo*:

The kabupaten [regency] meeting was attended by all the Pangreh Praja from the lurahs on up to the wedanas, office officials, members of the Chinese and Arab communities, and representatives of revolutionary groups. The meeting was led by the Bupati himself. He said that he had just got information about the Japanese surrender to the Allies at a conference with the vice-Resident Mr. Besar. The Bupati then analysed the War and also the problem of the proclamation. In his analysis of the proclamation, the Bupati implied that he did not want to confirm it, and as regional head he did not want to announce it. This was clear by his question 'What is the meaning of a proclamation that has only been signed by two people [Sukarno and Hatta]?'²²

Afterwards the Muslim leader again asked Sarimin if, as bupati, he did not have the confidence to announce the proclamation. The bupati replied that he did not. A Barisan Pelopor leader said that the Brebes revolutionary movement would only support the bupati if he announced the proclamation officially. After the meeting tensions mounted in Brebes. Local Chinese merchants derided the pemuda saying 'independence isn't going to happen', while Arab money-lenders and traders, apparently pleased by the bupati's speech, openly went around saying that if the Javanese were independent 'there would be disturbances because of the plundering'.²³

Nonetheless, the bupati continued to make his views known on tours around the regency. On one occasion sometime after the proclamation, he arrived at Banjarharjo district office (southwest of Brebes) where the local dignitaries had gathered to hear the bupati speak. A local Muslim revolutionary remembered him saying:

Independence depends on the attitude of the Allies; we didn't win the war, the Allies did. You must just wait and see what their attitude is when they land. If they wish us to be independent so we will be. Independence or no independence, what is necessary now is security and order.²⁴

Before the end of Sarimin's speech, many had got up to leave saying 'what kind of speech is this?' and 'colonial stooge'. Then a pemuda leader from nearby West Ketanggungan sugar mill finally interrupted

saying, 'Excuse me sir, it is better for public order if you finish now'. The meeting disbanded with the mainly santri pemuda of Banjarharjo furious about the speech and the bupati's wounding words. A botched attempt to kidnap the bupati, made some time later as he left the district, indicated the degree of animosity he had aroused, and was a foretaste of events to come.²⁵

Five months later in a written statement to the Pekalongan public prosecutor investigating the Tiga Daerah affair, Sarimin freely admitted that 'my views and attitudes offended the nationalist feelings of some people'. Furthermore 'these attitudes and opinions, if evaluated now, were indeed completely wrong, but ought to be seen in the light of our understanding at that time also'.²⁶ Consistent with his views, it was not until 27 September, when the Japanese formally transferred power to Mr. Besar (who had officially become Resident only six days earlier), that Sarimin finally agreed to Indonesian flag raisings. After this date, 'the difficulties being suffered by the regional heads having to submit to two different governments, were removed'.²⁷

Sarimin's sense of having to serve two governments illustrates the great disjunction between national moves and local reality during the early days of the revolution. At the national level it appeared this problem had been resolved. On 30 August an all-Java and Madura conference of pangreh praja was held in Jakarta. This reflected one of the priorities of the older nationalists in the first Republican Cabinet. In order to present the Republic as a *fait accompli* to the Allies they had to demonstrate their popular support from, as well as authority over, the population. To this end Sukarno and Hatta were trying to avoid having a system of dual administration and responsibility, Japanese and Republican, side by side. As Hatta put it, 'Orders were issued to every government official to acknowledge himself as an official of the Republic of Indonesia and be ready to accept only orders given him by superiors of Indonesian nationality'.²⁸ Sukarno for his part reassured the pangreh praja that they would get 'the proper place they deserved' in the new Republic, reflecting a so-called 'deal' worked out between the pangreh praja and the nationalist leadership, in which the former would stand behind the Republic provided their positions and status were guaranteed.²⁹

However, there was a big gap between these aspirations and their actual implementation at local levels. There the real problem was how officials like Sarimin and their Japanese superiors were going to react. Some waited for Japanese orders authorising independence, others believed the Allies would restore Dutch power. The role of the Resident was critical. In neighbouring Banyumas Residency to

the south, for example, the proclamation of the new Republic was much quicker due to the action of the Resident, Mr. Iskaq Tjokroadisoerjo. A member of the pre-war nationalist movement, he announced that Banyumas was part of the new Republic on 5 September. Mr. Besar made the official announcement of Indonesian independence in Pekalongan Residency on 23 September, two days after Jakarta finally ratified his appointment as Resident. Four days later the Japanese formally transferred power to him as the official Republican Resident. Only then was the dilemma of working for 'two governments' resolved in the minds of officials like Sarimin.

The deal between nationalists and the pangreh praja in Jakarta was only possible because of the position of the older moderate nationalists who had worked for the Japanese and who were a majority in the new Republican cabinet. In the Tiga Daerah the older nationalists were the radicals and they did not hold power. While some did join Japanese organisations, they were not involved in implementing Japanese wartime economic policies. They were all aware of the extreme resentment felt by the people because of these policies. So the Japanese transfer of power at the end of September would not have prevented the growing polarisation between the revolutionary movement and the pangreh praja. This polarisation reflected local realities, the position of the older nationalists, who were not in power like their Jakarta counterparts, denials of the surrender by the Japanese, and the expressed doubts about the proclamation. The growing communication breakdown between Jakarta and the Residency was felt by all groups. Feeling left on their own without instructions from superiors the pangreh praja, super-cautious and bureaucratic as always, kept waiting for non-existent orders.

Officials like Sarimin were later to blame the Japanese at Residency level for denying the news of surrender and refusing to hand over power. Yet there is no evidence that the Japanese Residency authorities were in any way prepared to fight for the status quo. Apart from anger, as a matter of honour, over their flag being taken down by the pemuda, it was only the kenpeitai who clung to their arms; after all their cruelties they knew how much they were hated. Without arms, they would be murdered immediately. Captain Oka, in charge of the regular military garrison in the Residency capital was typical of those Japanese who had come to regard Indonesia as a 'second homeland'. He was sympathetic to the newly formed army (the TKR) and the revolutionaries' demands for arms.³⁰ It was not the Japanese, but Jakarta's delay in appointing Besar as Resident which prevented formal transfer of power and an early proclamation of the Residency as part of the new Republic.

No reason was given for the fact that the Residency of Pekalongan

(together with Banten) was the last to have its assistant Resident appointed as Resident as a part of the 'deal' worked out at the national pangreh praja conference.³¹ The Jakarta Republicans may well have wanted the new Residents to be either administrators experienced under the Dutch, or nationalist leaders of status like Mr. Iskaq Tjokroadisoerjo in Banyumas. Mr. Besar's credentials as a suitable Resident seem to have been called into question in Jakarta as well as in the Residency. Despite a motion of support from the Pekalongan KNI on 12 September, it took Jakarta nine days to ratify Besar's appointment.³² At the Residency level this delay was interpreted by revolutionary leaders as Jakarta having doubts about Besar's Republican credentials, suspicions which were reinforced by Besar's desire to seek a compromise with the Japanese Resident about the flying of the Indonesian flag. At a time when suspicion, rumours and anti-Dutch feelings were rife, his rather western life style and aloof bearing were also misinterpreted. Indeed Besar, like many moderate older nationalists, was a little sceptical at first about the proclamation. As his daughter recalls:

Father was being cautious about the Proclamation. He was cautious about everything new. He was never immediately enthusiastic and always waited a while before deciding what to do. I remember saying to father 'You've got to support it [the Proclamation], there's no other way, it's happened'. He said 'You young people are not going about things in the right way. You're doing things too quickly'. But once he was with you he was always with you no matter what you did or thought.³³

However, it was a commonly held view amongst the Nine Brothers in Tegal at least, that Besar had not been appointed by the Central Government earlier 'because they doubted he could lead the Independence movement in the Residency'.³⁴

Revolution in Pekalongan

In Pekalongan municipality as elsewhere the pangreh praja strongly opposed raising the Indonesian flag, the Red and White (*Merah Putih*). The Barisan Pelopor leader Sarli had heard the news of the proclamation from Jakarta radio late on 17 August. Very early the next morning he recalled:

I urged two other Barisan Pelopor leaders to come with me to the Town Hall. At 6.30 a.m. no one was there. I changed the Japanese flag for the Merah Putih. After that we went home and told Kromo Lawi and Bung Bagio. Then the row began. At

about 7 a.m. I arrived at the municipal offices then suddenly I was called in by Soempeno the Mayor of Pekalongan. With him were Harso (or van de Wil), secretary of Pekalongan municipality, and one other. 'Who did this?' they asked. 'I did' I replied. They were very scared and very pale. I was told that as I put the Red and White up, I had to take it down. What if the Japanese got to hear about it? I said that I had put it up and couldn't take it down again, because the Japanese power had ended with the proclamation. 'We as the Indonesian nation acknowledge the flag. We acknowledge Bung Karno as leader. We are obedient', I told them. Then things became heated. I still wouldn't go and take the flag down. 'Who *ordered* you to put that flag up?' they kept asking. 'I didn't get an order', I replied, 'it is the Proclamation itself that orders us to act . . .' Soempeno said he had heard about a proclamation but had no orders to fly the flag.³⁵

Barisan Pelopor leaders in Pekalongan were not able to mobilise grass roots support so widely as in Tegal where the organisation reached down into the urban kampungs. The Barisan Pelopor in Pekalongan municipality began modestly to implement the revolutionary struggle and to encourage the flying of the Red and White. At this stage relative cooperation existed between the various nationalist groups. The railway activists saw to it that everyone boarding trains wore red and white badges, and flew the Indonesian flag from an enormous tower they built in front of the station, still standing today. Pekalongan AMRI leaders, despite the fact that they were scornfully derided as 'picnic and ball games' activists by the pemudas because of their middle class batik-entrepreneur origins, joined with the Barisan Pelopor in taking over a rice mill and selling the rice to the KNI for distribution. Local AMRI leaders were also active in flag raisings outside government buildings. Not that it flew long in front of the city's court, for Soeprapto, a leading member of the priyayi and the city's judge, had it pulled down again.³⁶

Loyalty to one's social origins seemed a thing of the past for a group of youthful priyayi pemudas who were active in circulating posters which read 'Freedom or Death', removing the Japanese flag and whipping up the Red and White in short order, sometimes assisting the process with threats of violence. Their activities were uninterrupted until they reached the Residency office and hauled the Japanese flag down before an outraged collection of Japanese officials and the furious Japanese Resident, who demanded an explanation from Besar, then still functioning under his Japanese status of assistant Resident. Realising the explosiveness of the situation Besar called an urgent meeting of the KNI to say the Japanese were extremely angry about the incident. Even if the officials backed the

pemuda action, the Japanese had the arms. The Japanese were still in a state of shock from the surrender and were in no mood to suffer any more loss of face by seeing their flag taken down.

The situation became very tense in front of the Residency office. Other Indonesian officials gathered, as well as the KNI leaders summoned by Mr. Besar. Pemuda leaders were asked by the KNI to take down the Red and White and put the Japanese flag back up, but they refused, confusing the KNI leaders further. Eventually some youths from the Residency office were persuaded to take down the Indonesian flag in order to avoid more serious confrontation.³⁷

Following this incident another meeting between Mr. Besar, the KNI and the Japanese Resident took place. To prevent further trouble it was agreed that neither the Japanese flag nor the Red and White would be flown outside the Residency office. This situation lasted for another week, when the Japanese finally gave way and agreed to allow the Indonesian flag to be flown in front of all buildings.

Revolution in Tegal

On 20 August, Tegal Barisan Pelopor couriers had returned from Jakarta with the message that the Japanese still had the responsibility (as well as the arms) for preserving order until the Allies arrived.

However, enthusiasm overrode caution, and slogans and handbills saying '*Indonesia Merdeka!*' (Freedom for Indonesia!) and '*Jagalah Kemerdekaanmu!*' (Guard your Freedom!) were posted up. They were quickly removed or defaced but whether by the Japanese or others was not known. The Barisan Pelopor soon became the centre of the city's revolutionary activity and had to find a larger office, moving its headquarters to the city square.

The confused situation and raised emotions brought out latent communal tensions, resulting in outbursts of violence against the Chinese in Tegal who were accused of being unwilling to fly the Red and White and of using makeshift flag-poles for disrespectful purposes. Originally used to knock ripe mangoes from high branches, the poles had been sequestered for flag flying: the Chinese were not always careful to remove the flags when putting the poles to their original use, which upset kampung youth. On one occasion someone was beaten unconscious for failing to reply to the greeting '*Merdeka!*' when passing a guard post.³⁸

An unpleasant sign for the Barisan Pelopor was the reappearance of the Japanese flag on government buildings, so a new drive to mobilise the different revolutionary groups in Tegal city began.

... the Barisan Pelopor forces, together with the *becak* [pedicab drivers], *pemudas* from the railways and textile factory, activists from the shipbuilding yards, the Health Department, the People's Bank, and everyone else who was part of the younger generation ... carried out a mass action together to put up the newly-printed flags and posters. On each house, on walls, in markets and on buildings, in all the busy places, on vehicles, horse drawn carts, *becaks*, buses, bullock waggons going ... southwards, west and east out of the city. The people helped not because they were ordered to help ... no one dared to stop the action.³⁹

Thus the situation in Tegal became polarised but with more ominous implications; it was not a simple struggle of the mayor against a handful of revolutionaries as in Pekalongan. In Tegal it was a united group of nearly all revolutionary urban-based groups, the Barisan Pelopor, the Nine Brothers and the KNI, confronting the bupati, the mayor and the police chief who refused to support the proclamation.

The Indonesian mayor of Tegal, still called by his Japanese title of *sicho*, had been approached by several of the Nine Brothers in the week following the proclamation. Their various questions about the flag, about arms and about the proclamation all met with the same reply, that 'government problems are the responsibility of the *pan-greh praja*' and that 'you do not need to interfere'.⁴⁰

Three members of the Barisan Pelopor leadership council also went to see the mayor shortly after the printed texts of the proclamation and the slogans had begun to be torn down. The leaders asked the mayor to print more copies of the proclamation text and the flag. The mayor (who was also the chairman of the Tegal Hokokai branch) rejected the request saying that 'there was no order to do this from Jakarta'. The Barisan Pelopor then suggested to the mayor that he use his own authority to distribute the proclamation text and order the town's ten *lurahs* to fly the flag. An argument started which was interrupted by a police official and former member of the pre-war political intelligence service who was also present. He told the Barisan Pelopor leaders:

You are activists for the ideology of independence; why must you ask agreement and help from the *Pangreh Praja*? Of course no agreement can be reached. We certainly cannot be any different from the rest of the *Pangreh Praja*, who are still tied to orders from the *gunseikan* [chief of Japanese military administration]. We ourselves (pointing in the direction of police barracks), are still being forced to fly the Japanese flag.⁴¹

Far from 'seizing power from within', the Republican cause in Pekalongan was forced into confrontation with a government hierarchy still in the colonial habit of waiting for orders from the top. Nowhere did Pekalongan Residency officials indicate (publicly or otherwise) to the Japanese authorities that they, the pangreh praja, were in charge under the new Republic, as happened in Kendal regency which lay between Pekalongan and Semarang Residencies. In Kendal pangreh praja resigned publicly from the Japanese military administration following the presidential decision of 25 September appointing all pangreh praja as officials of the new Republic.⁴²

In Tegal the flag incidents continued. The mayor would only agree to allow the Red and White to be flown, 'according to the regulations that are in force', to the left of the Japanese flag. Obviously conflicts occurred in government offices between Japanese heads, the pangreh praja and revolutionaries who worked there. The result was that 'sometimes the Red and White was flown on its own, sometimes with the Japanese flag, sometimes the latter was flown by itself and sometimes neither flag was flown'.⁴³ The Republican flags that were torn down were continually replaced by the Barisan Pelopor. After the Tegal municipal KNI had received the same answers about the proclamation from both the mayor and the bupati, the local revolutionaries decided to call a meeting on 11 September, at which the mayor and the other officials would be invited to give a full explanation of the government's policy.

The Roman Catholic Church hall in Kraton Lor, where the meeting was due to start at 8 p.m., was packed. All the officials took their seats in the front rows. Behind them sat the city's traders, and at the back of the hall were revolutionaries. Nothing happened for over half an hour and rumours were flying that at the last minute the meeting had been cancelled, but finally the mayor, Tuan 'sicho' Soengeb, accompanied by his attractive young second wife, appeared wearing the formal Javanese dress of the traditional priyayi elite: a courtly batik headscarf (*blangkon*) with a long batik worn as a sarong and folded in pleats down the front, and sandals.

His arrival was studiously ignored by the revolutionaries at the back of the hall. His appointment as mayor was out of the usual run of things in Japanese policy for the rest of Java, where they had preferred to appoint intellectuals or members of the nationalist movement to the position, since there was no traditional pangreh praja stake in city government. But occasionally, as in Pekalongan Residency, the Japanese appear to have just extended or transferred local priyayi influence to municipal administration as well.

Undeterred by this lack of proper deference, the mayor opened the

meeting, welcoming those present and thanking the church for making the hall available; questions were then invited from the audience. Several people asked what was Tuan 'sicho' Soengeb's opinion about independence. In reply the mayor told the meeting that as an official under the authority of the Japanese military administration he had not received any 'official instructions' about independence from his superiors. Not even in the latest edition of *Kan Po*, the Japanese government gazette, was the Proclamation of Independence mentioned. The mayor then produced a copy and held it up before the stunned and disbelieving audience, going on to say that it was dangerous to believe all outside news. Before he had finished, or the other officials had had their chance to speak, those at the back of the hall had risen to their feet. Kadarisman, a member of the Nine Brothers, interrupted the mayor in a clearly annoyed voice:

Your attitude, sir, as a person in authority is clearly contradicted by the facts. Because of this the pemudas can no longer believe in you, Sir, and you will feel the result of this yourself. It is quite clear that the Japanese have surrendered to the Allies [but] you are waiting for an official order about this. Does such an enormous defeat have to be confirmed officially? Independence did not come by an official order from the Military administration. Independence was not handed out, like giving sugar lumps to bothersome children. . . .

Kadarisman's voice was drowned by the noise of clapping from the pemudas, and cries of 'That's true! that's right!' and 'Don't act like a slave!'. He continued:

Our freedom comes from our nationhood, not from Tuan 'Gunseikan'. Are you not an Indonesian, Sir? Are your attitudes and opinions those of a son of Indonesia, or of a faithful servant of the Japanese?⁴⁴

The clapping was now so deafening that Kadarisman could not continue. Then he apologised saying that he was leaving before the meeting had ended. Soengeb looked as if he had been struck by lightning on a clear day; his potency as mayor no longer worked. He tried to speak but it was not easy to understand what he was saying. At this moment Soemarno, another Nine Brother, stepped in with a compromise. If the mayor would withdraw his previous statement about waiting for orders from the *gunseikan*, then the revolutionary movement would still be willing to cooperate with him and work towards the implementation of the Proclamation. More shouts from the back of the hall: 'We've had enough!', 'A waste of time!', 'Once a slave always a slave!' could be heard. Then came the finale:

The Mayor stood up, his hand holding up the wooden mallet. His face went pale then red, sweat began to pour from his brow. Apparently he was going to say something, but did not have the chance to open his mouth, when the voices from the back of the hall continued: 'What more does he want?' 'Let's go home' . . . 'It's already clear'. The pemudas began to move, one, two, three. In the end many left the hall making a great noise as they went. Suddenly there was nobody left at all except those officials in the front rows—the meeting had disintegrated.⁴⁵

From that day Mayor Soengeb had a new name amongst the local revolutionaries—'Tan Sung Eb'. The final humiliation which could be bestowed on him was a Chinese nickname, exposing his notorious business connections with the Tan family, a leading Chinese business clan in Tegal.

Revolution in Brebes

Tanjung, a district town of about five thousand people on the coastal plain to the west of Brebes, had a small revolutionary movement of about fifty activists, led by a member of the pre-war PNI Baru, Soenarto. His main job was dividing up the guard duty amongst members, who included a well-known lenggaong. One group manned road blocks to stop any Japanese who passed, others organised themselves to look after local kampung security, checking all vehicles entering and leaving the area, and keeping 'suspicious' people under surveillance. Another group was responsible for security at the railway station. Each night ten pemudas guarded the headquarters, as well as a two-kilometre stretch of main road through the middle of the town. For transport the pemudas had twenty bicycles that had been 'donated' by the local Chinese at Soenarto's request.

As in other areas the attitude of the wedana, quickly became a major issue. In the fortnight after the proclamation Soenarto recalls a meeting at the government office:

The essence [of what the Wedana said] was that he would not allow us to proclaim Indonesian independence. He explained that there had been a broadcast from the Japanese news agency that no decision had been made about this. His intention was to hamper the flying of the Red and White as long as Nippon was still there. He talked [like this] for about half an hour to one hundred people at the office. I went home feeling disappointed. I had already learnt from a friend who had a radio that Japan had fallen. *Indonesia Raya* [the national anthem] had already been heard. I pondered over the problem. Why was there a

prohibition on flying the Red and White? Some time later a truckload of *pemudas* arrived from Tegal. They said 'now we will start flying the flag'. One of the Brebes activists said later 'this *wedana* needs to be removed'. I said if it was necessary then go ahead . . .⁴⁶

Despite the *wedana*'s attitude, a strategy was worked out for taking over the Banjaratma sugar mill:

At 9 a.m. five *pemudas* with bamboo spears surrounded the office of the mill administrator. Others guarded the mill's three telephones. I was able to make contact with the mill workers. I told them that today our intention was to hand over the mill to the Republic of Indonesia, and the workers should go and demonstrate at the office. After talking to the Japanese mill management, they handed over fifteen Browning rifles. Then I took the radio from the administrator's house. He had also left clothes . . . I got a shirt and a pair of pants . . . the clothes in the mill store were also taken, by the police. There were five Japanese at the mill . . . Later that day we heard that Eurasian men had been killed and the women interned and taken to Pekalongan. A Batak, Sihombing, was appointed new administrator and another Batak was put in charge of technical matters.⁴⁷

About six weeks after the proclamation this was the scene on an afternoon in Tanjung:

My headquarters was in the auction yard of the pawnshop (at the same time we were guarding the pawned goods) . . . As long as it was for the revolution, buildings were handed over . . . With no walls or roof, it was like a water buffalo pen. I had a way of attracting the masses, namely a radio, a Phillips which had belonged to the Banjaratma sugar mill administrator. By five o'clock in the afternoon everyone began gathering to listen to Bung Tomo. About five hundred people came, about fifty of whom were *pemudas*, including two former Peta, one Heiho auxiliary and about twenty *santris* . . . I slept there night and day on a chair; I never went home. We even had a telephone, which was rare.⁴⁸

Here as in Tegal, communal animosity became part of nationalist or independence fervour. Local leaders were faced with strong local Muslim antagonism to the Chinese. This expressed itself in attacks on pig owners, as pig meat was a Muslim prohibition. The pig problem in fact had been an issue in Tanjung since the 1920s.⁴⁹ Muslim youths, after attacking and beating up a pig owner who was taking his animal to the slaughtering yard, began a general pig hunt. Some animals were let out, others killed. The *gundik* system, through which many

Chinese who could not afford wives from their own community took Javanese girls as mistresses, was also a source of tension. The Muslims demanded that the system be abolished. The failure of the Chinese to fly the Red and White increased mistrust between them and the local revolutionary movement, adding political to religious animosity.

Revolution in Pemalang

In contrast to Tanjung, Chinese nationalists in Pemalang were an integral part of the town's revolutionary movement, while at the same time having their own struggle organisations. Indeed this made Pemalang's revolutionary movement quite special in the Tiga Daerah, and possibly elsewhere in Java.

The Chinese pemuda in Pemalang were possibly unique in their integration with the broader nationalist struggle. Like other overseas Chinese communities in Java, pre-war Pemalang had its own overseas Chinese association, and a Chinese language school. What was different in Pemalang was Chinese support for Indonesian nationalism. Thus it is said that the office of Sarekat Islam in Pemalang was located in a big Chinese shop whose owner bequeathed his wealth to the movement after his death. The local Chinese school, the Tiong Hwa Hwee Kwan or THHK, founded in 1921, was a breeding ground for Pemalang Chinese nationalist sentiment, and several activists in the social revolution in Pemalang in 1945 were former THHK students. On one occasion during the 1930s Sukarno, wearing black clothes, visited the school and made a speech to the Chinese community. The Dutch political intelligence agent present warned him about the tenor of the speech, which made a strong impression on the THHK students, and is still remembered today. Twelve Chinese were also students at the Pemalang Taman Siswa school, a centre of Indonesian nationalism in the 1930s under Sarino Mangunpranoto's leadership. Although elsewhere in Java the Chinese generally regarded these schools as 'communist', in Pemalang several Chinese rice mill owners contributed to Taman Siswa funds.

Significantly, in Pemalang the division between rich Chinese merchants or traders and an impoverished Javanese population seemed less marked than in the larger, more prosperous towns of Tegal and Pekalongan. In Pemalang many Chinese were either poor or only marginally well-off and worked with the Javanese population in agricultural enterprises, keeping money and product circulating within the population rather than removing it from the district through commercial ventures. For example, during the three month

dry season, or time of scarcity between the time the sugar mills returned leased wet rice fields to the village and when rice could be planted, both Chinese businessmen and Javanese hajis provided soya bean seeds and labour to produce a crop which could be marketed, to see villagers through the scanty period. Chinese rice mill owners also made it a policy to contribute to traditional festivals, weddings and funerals, thus maintaining local contacts and goodwill as well as their own financial success.⁵⁰

The political implications of this social cohesiveness were clear in the revolutionary struggle of 1945 when Javanese and Chinese worked for a new political and social order in Pemalang, whereas in other areas of Pekalongan Residency (and indeed of Java) the Chinese were aligned with the priyayi on the side of socio-economic privilege, and law and order to maintain it.

Tju Liep Goan was a member of this nationalist-minded Chinese activist group. The son of a small rice farmer who rented one *bau* of rice fields, he was born in 1921, the year the THHK was founded in Pemalang. Later he was a pupil there and in the 1930s he was active in organising labour for the nationalist cause. He worked for the Moga bus company, from whom he extracted money in support of the struggle, following the same course when he later worked in a Chinese-owned rice mill. During the occupation he helped run a cooperative to distribute rationed goods to Chinese families and joined the Pemalang Keibodan, as well as a nationalist minded group which met regularly in the house of regency medical officer Dr. Moerjawan to discuss Indonesia's political future after the Japanese left. This group were also active in propagating messianic beliefs about the coming of the Just King (*Ratu Adil*) among the villages in preparation for the overthrow of Dutch and Japanese rule.⁵¹

Pemalang's best known Chinese nationalist was Tan Djiem Kwan usually known as Djing Kwan. Born in 1918 in Pemalang and schooled in a THHK in Tegal, his father owned a rice mill and a picture theatre in Pemalang, which Djing Kwan later lent free of charge to Pemalang's pemudas for money-raising shows during the social revolution in November 1945. He was a member of the local underground cell during the Japanese interregnum while at the same time working as head of the Japanese-organised Overseas Chinese Association, the Kai Kuo Sho Kai.

In 1945 the Chinese had their own struggle association, the Chinese Youth Irregulars (Laskar Pemuda Tionghoa or LPT). Djing Kwan gave courses to Chinese activists advocating freedom from both Dutch and Japanese control, indoctrinating people to be prepared for the collapse of the Dutch and Japanese, and exhorting people, often violently, to be ready to fly the Red and White. Immediately after the

news of the Japanese surrender no one in the Chinese community was game enough to defy Djing Kwan's orders to fly the Red and White. The Chinese Youth Irregulars played a prominent part in dislodging the Japanese administration in Pemalang, overthrowing the incumbents and capturing arms which included two carbines, two colt revolvers and hand grenades.⁵²

Like the Barisan Pelopor in Tegal, Pemalang's largest struggle group, API, coordinated the majority of the town's pemudas. API's organisation was divided into four headquarters. Headquarters I had essentially political functions. It was initially located at the house of Soepangat who, by the end of the occupation, had emerged as the town's leading nationalist figure, backed by the poor *santris* (*santri rakyat*), the PKI underground, and most pemuda elements in the struggle, including the Chinese Youth Irregulars.⁵³ Headquarters I was composed of representatives of the three groups in the revolutionary movement: the older veterans of the 1920s such as Amir, the activists of the 1930s, and the younger pemudas led by Oerip and Karso. During the social revolution period of October 1945, Headquarters I was to move from Soepangat's house into the old Dutch assistant Resident's office on the east side of the town square. Under veteran communist Amir's tutelage, a training centre was started there, and pemudas were given military-style training and political indoctrination. Headquarters II, located near the market, was responsible for security of the town in general, and of the market in particular. Headquarters III handled API's finances.

Like the other Pemalang struggle groups, API relied heavily on contributions from the town's business community which was dominated by Arabs, Chinese and *santris*, whose own struggle groups obviously had the advantage in raising money from this source. Accordingly, Headquarters III tried to raise funds by putting on plays (which will be discussed in Chapter 7). Lastly, Headquarters IV acted as a kind of social welfare office.

The pemudas would bring in poor people from the kampungs to receive a quota of cloth. They had to come in person, as the cloth would not be distributed elsewhere by the pemudas. The people who came were asked their name and work and their kampung, and we told them that the cloth had to be used by them and was not to be sold. I had to guard the distribution and no one was dishonest; if two metres per person was being given out, then it was exactly two metres, no more and no less.⁵⁴

In addition to distributing cloth bought from the Tegal textile factory with regency funds, Headquarters IV also attempted to control all economic activity within the regency:

Any goods sent into the regency capital were detained. Headquarters IV was informed and it reported to Headquarters I. Headquarters I then decided whether the goods were needed for the revolutionary struggle or not. If they were needed, they were bought at two-thirds their value; there was no extortion.⁵⁵

Similarly, goods could not leave the regency without permission from the leader of Headquarters IV.

Common to other struggle groups, one of API's main tasks was to organise the town security, and as compensation for turning up for guard duty the poor pemuda received *nasi ponggol*, a rice meal wrapped in banana leaves. *Nasi ponggol* varied in quality from place to place. In Pemalang and Slawi it was no better or worse than everyday food; in Tanjung it was quite special. Not all pemuda groups provided *nasi ponggol* for their members. It seems that while AMRI Slawi gave out a distribution of rice which had been donated by people grateful for the guard duty, smaller urban-based elite groups who were better off socially had no need of the handout.

In Pemalang there were no flag incidents or clashes between the pangreh praja and the struggle organisations. Instead, after the proclamation, a group of moderate nationalist politicians and officials, calling themselves the Committee for the Preparation of Independence in the Region of Pemalang, suggested flying the Red and White. Because this group included corrupt cooperative leader Abdul Mutholib who (as we saw in Chapter 2) had run the pangreh praja cooperative after Sarino Mangunpranoto left Pemalang, there was no opposition from officials. Undoubtedly the minimal Japanese presence also helped, and the Japanese flag near the regency office was hauled down for good on 10 September.⁵⁶ Pemalang was unique too in that the pangreh praja set up their own struggle organisation, the Office Youth, as the Pemalang bupati called them. A local official and policeman were made the leaders by the pangreh praja and its membership came exclusively from local government offices.⁵⁷ When Pemalang's pangreh praja attempted to go even further and control the town's revolutionary movement by setting up a United Indonesian Younger Generation, it was ridiculed by API and never functioned effectively.

Soepangat's kidnapping reflected a growing antagonism between himself and the pangreh praja KNI group, because of this leading pre-war activist's influence on the revolutionary movement. While it is not exactly certain who was responsible for the planning of this action, several former Peta members were involved in its execution, including Soentoro, a platoon commander of the third company of the Pekalongan Peta battalion who had joined the TKR stationed in Comal. Ironically Soentoro was later to join the Tiga Daerah move-

ment in Pekalongan. The kidnapping, insignificant in itself, further polarised the political situation. Soepangat was a popular figure in Pemalang with a reputation for honesty and fairness in running the Pekope cooperative which had helped to alleviate wartime deprivations. He was well liked by everybody for his tactful flexibility. Like the other Tiga Daerah nationalist leaders Kartohargo and Muhamad Nuh he was in his forties, and like them he was close to the younger poor youth in the revolutionary struggle. Unlike them however, he was seen as an effective unifier of the local revolutionary movement.

Apparently Soepangat was taken to a village near the old Sumberharjo sugar mill (the former Peta Company's barracks) for a day and a night. This provoked an ultimatum from Soepangat's supporters that if the 'father of the people' was not immediately returned to Pemalang, the pangreh praja and the police 'with all their assistants would be destroyed to the last man'.⁵⁸ Shortly afterwards Soepangat was returned to Pemalang unharmed. The intensity of local feeling against the pangreh praja after the affair was probably stronger than in Brebes or Tegal, where the older santris were not such an integral part of the revolutionary movement. Although less dramatic than the public confrontations in Tegal and Brebes, the kidnapping of Soepangat was a similar turning point in relations between the two groups. From then on, the Pemalang revolutionaries gave up their attempts to negotiate or cooperate with the pangreh praja.

The Bupati of Pemalang, writing in 1946 in response to a request from the Pekalongan public prosecutor (who was seeking evidence of what he believed had been the 'rebellion' in the Tiga Daerah), blamed those who kidnapped Soepangat for 'creating the subsequent movement by the people to change the entire pangreh praja and those in authority'.⁵⁹ No doubt he spoke with some bitterness since he and the other top echelon of Pemalang's pangreh praja were themselves to become the first victims of the social revolution which was to sweep through Pemalang within several weeks.

The National Committees

On 22 August 1945, Sukarno announced the decision of the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence, now calling itself the Komite Nasional Indonesia or KNI, to set up the PNI State Party, the BKR or People's Security Force, and local national committees. With the suspension of the State Party at the end of August, the KNIs in each region were left 'as the representative body linking the Republican administration and popular forces at each level' of

government. Anthony Reid argues that the KNIs were extensions of the wartime Jawa Hokokai branches and as such very much the organs of the older nationalist elite.⁶⁰

In Pekalongan Residency however, the roles of the KNI reflected Residency rather than national or even provincial level realities. There, with the passive attitude of the *pangreh praja* towards the proclamation, a power vacuum was developing. Older revolutionaries saw the KNIs as a method of replacing the colonial administrative apparatus whose weakness and inability to act decisively was threatening the foundations of the new Republic. The KNIs provided a legitimate new power base from which the older leaders could negotiate with the Japanese for arms and offer a focus for the *pemudas*. They also performed economic functions in many areas.

The effectiveness of local KNIs depended to a large extent on whether they were appointed from 'above' by the *pangreh praja* or chosen from 'below' by and from revolutionary groups. Of six KNIs at the regency and the Residency level in Pekalongan four were elected and two appointed.⁶¹ Among these only the Tegal municipality KNI played an effective role, successfully negotiating the withdrawal of the *kenpeitai*. This was because in the month before the social revolution began on 7 October the KNI chairman, Taman Siswa schoolteacher Ki Tjitrasmaka, had the support of the older radicals in the Tegal Barisan Pelopor, the Nine Brothers and the Islamic nationalists. In the opinion of a member of the Nine Brothers, 'it was the KNI which represented the Indonesian Republican government in Tegal municipality because the *pangreh praja* and the police were not strong and doubted the proclamation'.⁶² Another Barisan Pelopor view was that the KNI was a place where local revolutionaries would gather, a body through which the voices of the people could be heard and directed. Ki Tjitrasmaka's view was that while the municipal KNI's main task was security, the United KNI which replaced it later in October had the more difficult job of filling the vacuum of authority left as a result of the social revolution in the countryside.

Were the KNIs, then, unique in the political history of the revolution? Unlike Pemalang, Tegal did not have a political figure like Soepangat, with charisma and the authority to unite all revolutionary groups. In Tegal it was the KNI (and later the working committee) which played this role, forging a unity of all groups. As Soesmono recalled:

At the beginning, after the Proclamation, it was as if the pre-war nationalists gave up their ideological and organisational ties and accepted fully the KNI as the centre of the revolutionary struggle in the region. The KNI was like a kitchen that

'processed' all the social and administrative problems that the revolutionary movement faced. It seemed as if the business of the government departments had moved to the KNI offices. People felt proud, indeed preferred, to enter the KNI, rather than a government office, so the KNI had to be open day and night.⁶³

This role for the Tegal KNIs was not repeated in other parts of Pekalongan Residency. In Pemalang as we have seen, the KNI was a *pangreh praja* creation, composed of high officials, moderate older nationalists and conservative Muslims chosen at a meeting of regency officials. This meeting was attended by a member of the Pekalongan KNI as a 'representative from the Resident's office' but no revolutionaries were there. Soepangat, in his absence, was chosen 'to lead the information section' of the KNI, but he refused to have anything to do with it.⁶⁴

One reason for the revolutionaries' antagonism in Pemalang towards the KNI was that with the possible exception of Ulujami, all the local KNIs were dominated by *pangreh praja*. This reflected the attitude of the Bupati of Pemalang, R.T.A. Rahardjo Sosro Adikoesoemo, who believed that the task of these local KNIs was 'to cooperate with the local government and to comply with the wishes of the people to live in freedom'. Their main task was to 'guard the safety and orderliness of the people' and to assist local *pangreh praja* whose job it was to 'improve the welfare of the people'. According to the bupati, it was logical that those chosen as chairmen of local KNIs should all be *pangreh praja*, 'so the actions of the KNIs would be in line with government departments'. The KNI's main function should be to 'calm the people'.⁶⁵

Soepangat and the nationalists in Pemalang (and indeed throughout the Residency) held the opposite view. They believed the KNI should be in the forefront of the revolution, to awaken the people to the call of the proclamation and independence. But the KNIs could hardly link the old administration and popular forces when the former seemed unwilling to allow the symbol of independence, the Red and White, to be flown.

There were more elected KNI members in Tegal regency than in Pemalang or Brebes. Pangkah, a sugar mill settlement, provides a good example of the election of a KNI chairman which took place at a meeting of the district office. Each lurah from the district's fifty-three villages had to come, bringing with him five 'well known people'. The large meeting was chaired by the Japanese appointed *camat*. After each of the seven candidates had been assigned a number, the voters wrote the number of their chosen candidate on a slip of paper and put it in a makeshift ballot box. An assistant teacher

and the youngest of the seven candidates, Sugiono was elected, beating his boss, the local head teacher, and three sugar mill employees, who were also API members. Conscious of his youthfulness (he was only twenty-seven), Sugiono got up and made what was in his own view a very unrevolutionary speech, trying to make fun of himself by 'thanking everyone for putting their trust in me, especially the honourable Wedana, the honourable Camat, and the honourable everyone else'.⁶⁶

Election of the KNI in Pangkah symbolised the decline in authority of the wedana who was thought to have been a member of the pro-Dutch Victory movement and to have received money to subvert the new Republic. Local people began to call the new chairman, Sugiono, 'Pak [Father] Wedana'—quite a radical move in the Javanese context where use of proper titles was part of priyayi etiquette.⁶⁷ Certainly Sugiono's doubts about the wedana's loyalties were increased at a post-election celebration with the three camats of Pangkah, Kedungbanteng and Jatinegara. In the middle of lunch the wedana remarked that yes, indeed, this was independence, but he was waiting for his old master (*majikan yang lama*) to return. Sugiono, reflecting later on this remark, decided that the arrival of the 'new master', namely the KNI, was not to the wedana's liking.

The activities of the Pangkah KNI reflect the economic role some KNIs played during this time. After the election of a new bupati in Tegal, Sugiono went to the local textile factory and bought cloth with KNI funds 'at a fair price' for free distribution to the people. Apart from an information section, which Sugiono appointed an influential local kyai to organise, the KNI included a BKR member (who was also in API) to coordinate the pemudas, and as liaison officer, a former inspector with the pre-war Plague Eradication Program who had travelled widely throughout the area.

In Bumijawa district further to the south, one of the tasks of the local KNI was also to meet the people's demand for cloth. Its economic role went further than this, however, and included the collection and marketing of the local maize crop. By borrowing funds through issuing shares, a simple marketing cooperative was set up. After the corn was sold the people were repaid, a critical contrast, in the people's eyes, to the behaviour of the pangreh praja who let stored supplies rot rather than take responsibility.⁶⁸

The effectiveness of local KNIs during the first two months after the proclamation thus depended on several factors: first, who the chairman was, and how he was appointed; second, to what extent the KNIs, which all had some economic functions, took the initiative in trying to alleviate the continued economic distress; and third, the attitude of pangreh praja. For example, the views of the Bupati of Pemalang about the role of the KNI effectively excluded any revol-

utionaries from joining it. In this respect the Belik KNI was an exception in Pemalang because it was elected, but the elected chairman was none other than the somewhat nationalist-minded wedana. This can be explained partly by the lack of strong revolutionary leadership in this area. Not surprisingly the wedana quickly sought to legitimise his appointment by seeing to a local cloth distribution.

Another exception was Talang, south of Tegal, where the camat appointed a local nationalist from the 1930s as KNI Chairman. A number of prominent Muslims were also members, reflecting the strength of the local santri community in this subdistrict. More typically, local pangreh praja chose moderate members of the pre-war nationalist movement. Thus in Slawi, the KNI had no authority because it had no ties with either the radicals of the 1920s or the local pemuda, and after a time it ceased to function.

The End of Japanese Rule

The last supports holding the crumbling edifice of pangreh praja authority in Pekalongan Residency were the kenpeitai units in Tegal and Pekalongan and the Pekalongan municipal garrison, civilian Japanese who ran the local government and the few sugar mills remaining open. Little by little more supports were removed.

In Tegal the initial confrontation occurred when railway workers started hauling down Japanese flags after the Red and White had been successfully raised at the station despite the appearance of a kenpeitai officer. In the excitement of this psychological victory the group climbed into two trucks and went around the town, hauling down Japanese flags whenever they found them, until they reached the municipal offices, across the street from the kenpeitai barracks. The trucks were stopped by a kenpeitai officer on a motor bike, who told the activists to get down and go into the barracks. The pemuas refused and an argument started. The kenpeitai officer probably tried to force the issue with a pistol. The pemuas then said they could not agree to the request without getting permission from the KNI chairman. The kenpeitai officer apparently agreed to this, and the pemuas were allowed to leave.⁶⁹ There was barely time for hurried explanations to the startled KNI chairman when about ten armed kenpeitai arrived at his office. Ki Tjitrasatmaka recalled in 1961:

A kenpeitai guard was posted outside the KNI office with their guns pointed at the building. Their leaders came in extremely angry and wanted us to hand over the pemuas involved in the flag incident, who had said that the kenpeitai was no longer in power.⁷⁰

News of the incident spread and, according to one report, over a hundred demonstrators gathered outside the KNI office. Messages were passed out that rash action would only lead to bloodshed, as the *kenpeitai* were heavily armed. The situation became very tense as those outside the KNI office waited for the outcome of negotiations. Finally the diplomacy of the KNI chairman calmed the situation, and whatever was said inside, when they left the KNI office some of the Japanese returned the salute of 'Merdeka' from the *pemudas* waiting there.⁷¹

Anti-Japanese feeling in the town continued to run very high, with news of Japanese being captured, paraded, and then killed on the outskirts.⁷² It became very dangerous for the Japanese to move outside their own homes, let alone outside the towns. An eyewitness describes one such incident in Ketanggungan, south of Brebes:

The subdistrict office received a telephone call from Purwokerto to say that a car with six Japanese passengers, and a truck carrying food and clothing would be coming through and could we try and stop it at the railway crossing. I was waiting there myself, armed only with a short sword. A large crowd had soon gathered. Around five o'clock in the afternoon the Japanese car arrived, they had the Red and White flying on the car. . . . We had closed the railway gates, so they had to stop, thinking there was a train. We asked the Japanese to get out, and we took them along to the local BKR. Some of them started crying, maybe they were afraid. The regency office was informed and soon a truckload of *pemudas* arrived carrying flares and wearing red headbands . . .⁷³

The fate of these Japanese is unknown. Another account of the Ketanggungan incident by the leaders of the BKR in Brebes emphasises an important aspect of revolutionary confidence. On the arrival of the *pemudas* to escort the Japanese, the people were shouting 'Jepang! Jepang!' (the Japanese! the Japanese!) for the first time—during the occupation they were forced to use only the word 'Nippon'. The psychological effect of incidents such as these on ordinary people was enormous, especially in view of the appalling economic conditions that still existed in the rural areas of the Residency. The rice the Japanese had collected was still stacked—and rotting—outside the cooperatives, because *pangreh praja* officials would not distribute it without an 'order' from above. But here were the Japanese, whom the *pangreh praja* still feared, surrendering before them.

The sugar mills, well away from *kenpeitai* protection, then became the target of a series of actions planned and implemented by local revolutionaries. The Japanese civilians manning the mills had sup-

plies of small arms which local revolutionaries wanted to obtain. As the mills were not closely guarded the Japanese could easily be overpowered. Surprise was the key element, and the Japanese never resisted at this stage. A midnight raid on the West Ketanggungan sugar mill in Brebes resulted in the 'disappearance' of the seven Japanese guarding it and some of the weapons—four carbines, ten pistols and a samurai sword.⁷⁴

Efforts by local KNI chairmen to secure peaceful handovers of weapons and Japanese personnel weakened when news reached Pekalongan of Allied landings in Jakarta on 30 September, together with representatives of NICA, the Netherlands Indies Civil Administration. News of Dutch and Ambonese soldiers terrorising the Jakarta population brought the *pemudas* up short and set them questioning their role:

Because of the news of NICA's activities, the 'games' the *pemudas* had been playing—hauling flags up and down, putting up posters—suddenly seemed irrelevant. The enemy in front of our noses, the Japanese, had to be disarmed immediately—what were we sitting back waiting for? The arrival of NICA? This was heard everywhere among the *pemudas*.⁷⁵

The KNI in Tegal was thus caught between increasingly militant *pemudas* demanding Japanese arms, and *kenpeitai* insistence that they could not hand over weapons (which was tantamount to surrender) without orders from superiors. Negotiations broke down, the *kenpeitai* barracks were surrounded and a siege, which lasted a week and during which at least one Indonesian was killed, was laid to the building. Finally the stalemate was broken by the arrival of Banyumas Resident, Iskaq Tjokroadisoerjo, together with the regional *kenpeitai* commander from Purwokerto, who gave the Tegal garrison the official order to surrender. After handing over arms, ammunition and supplies, the Japanese left by train for Purwokerto without further incident.⁷⁶

Whereas in Pemalang the smaller contingent of Japanese was easily disarmed,⁷⁷ in Pekalongan the outcome was very different. Negotiations for the transfer of arms from the Japanese to the *pemudas* had already yielded some weapons held by civilians. But as in Tegal, the *kenpeitai* had refused to surrender their weapons (which included sub-machine guns) without specific orders from their headquarters in Purwokerto.

By early October all the Japanese except the *kenpeitai* had agreed to hand over their weapons and these were now stored in the former Dutch social club, the *Societeit*. The *pemudas* had apparently already obtained some weapons from raids on the homes of Japanese, and

this had not helped negotiations. The railway activists were now demanding that the kenpeitai also hand over their heavy weapons, namely the machine guns. The continued show of force by the kenpeitai around the town was causing tensions as well.

About midday on 4 October, a call spread around Pekalongan for people to rally for an action against the kenpeitai. A crowd soon gathered outside the building, where Resident Besar was negotiating with the kenpeitai commander. After about two hours they began demanding impatiently that the kenpeitai agree to hand over all their weapons. Besar was forced to leave the negotiations, and went out to speak to the crowd.⁷⁸ An arrangement had been worked out whereby the Japanese agreed to stop their provocative demonstrations around the town, and would surrender enough guns so that there was parity with the municipal police.⁷⁹ The guns would be stored in the Societeit to which both Besar and the Japanese kenpeitai chief would have keys. No weapons could be removed without the knowledge of the other side. The militant railway *pemudas* were not satisfied with the arms agreement, for they wanted total control of the weapons.⁸⁰ Just as Resident Besar was about to re-enter the building to continue negotiations, the crowd surged forward into the neighbouring Residency office compound, right up to the low wall separating it from the kenpeitai barracks.

What exactly happened next is uncertain. The kenpeitai probably feared the pressing crowd was about to break through and into their own headquarters as well. At this moment a railways activist climbed onto the roof of the kenpeitai building and began hauling down the Japanese flag.

Suddenly there was the sound of rapid machine gun fire into the crowd . . . A sharpened bamboo spear was no use against machine guns so I threw mine away, and crawled into the Residency yard. There was pandemonium amongst the Japanese. I saw three Japanese had been stabbed and killed with bamboo spears . . . Sheltering under a window of the Residency offices I saw Mr Besar jump over the wall . . . bullets were flying everywhere, he could easily have been killed . . . I saw someone on the roof of the kenpeitai building with kerosene trying to set it alight, blood was streaming from a wound in his head, I remember it clearly . . . The Japanese were shooting aimlessly at everyone, we had to get away as quickly as possible. I crawled around the back of the Residency, got hold of a boat and crossed the river. I went straight to the Public Works Department, and I rang Semarang and Purwokerto to get help.⁸¹

Some time later *pemuda* reinforcements arrived from Semarang

bringing dynamite. They laid siege to the kenpeitai building and were soon joined by the local BKR.

No one dared move openly in front of Japanese guns which were still trained on the dead and dying. Later a truce was called and the four daughters of Residency medical officer Dr Soemakno (who was Besar's brother), together with the Wedana of Pekalongan's two daughters, were allowed to enter the compound with an Ambonese doctor to help the wounded as best they could. One of the girls, recalling the scene in 1973, graphically described what happened:

Eventually we persuaded father to let us go—we left from in front of the district office. Dr. Tupamahu was carrying a small Red Cross flag, actually meant for a car. The six of us were walking behind. We went slowly across Queens Park towards the kenpeitai, hoping their binoculars would pick up our flag. When we got to the barricade, Dr. Tupamahu explained that we were from the Red Cross, and wanted to pick up any wounded. We then started work. I remember none of the *pemudas* had weapons, only bamboo spears. Those still alive after the fighting had obviously been speared in the stomach, sometimes two with the one spear, like *satay* . . . it was ghastly. They had all been shot at chest level by machine gun fire. Suddenly one of the 'corpses' said 'Help me'. He had been shot in the leg, and had been lying in the heat for a whole day. He said, 'I would have died if it hadn't rained last night.' We took him to the hospital immediately and were allowed to take all the bodies as well, for identification. One of my sisters fainted at the hospital.⁸²

The following afternoon Pekalongan buried thirty-two of its dead as a result of the fighting, and a number of Japanese as well.⁸³ Later in the evening Iskaq, the Banyumas Resident, arrived, accompanied by a Japanese interpreter, Saburo Tamuro, and Captain Nonaka from the Banyumas kenpeitai garrison, to conduct negotiations with the BKR, led by Iskander Idris.⁸⁴ The BKR demands were that a ceasefire should begin immediately, all Japanese in Pekalongan region should hand over their weapons to the BKR, and that the Japanese should leave the region as soon as possible. The two Japanese accompanying Mr. Iskaq agreed to the conditions, and said they would try to make contact with the besieged kenpeitai officers. This was done by about 9 p.m. After two anxious hours, a Japanese representative from the former Resident's staff arrived back at the Pekalongan district office to say that the kenpeitai had agreed to the conditions. Direct negotiations between the kenpeitai, Iskander Idris, Pekalongan municipal garrison commander Captain Oka, and others, were successfully concluded about midnight on 6 October.⁸⁵

On the following day the Residency's remaining Japanese military personnel were taken to Banyumas in trucks provided by the BKR.⁸⁶ Part of the agreement was that Japanese civilians were put under the authority of the Republican Resident of Pekalongan until transport could be found for them to leave for Banyumas.

The initial reaction to the departure of the Japanese is well expressed by one government official:

After this all the Japanese were taken away, leaving only their old unusable weapons. We were the first place in Java to get rid of the Japanese. I was amazed, we were so used to having colonial masters, but now they were no more.⁸⁷

Not only was Pekalongan the first region in Java to be free of Japanese, it was also well ahead of any Residency in the outer islands. It was the first in Indonesia.

1. Marsum, 'Ceritaku' memoir, p. 46. For Marsum's biography, see p. 274.
2. Interview with a member of the the Nine Brothers (Marnomo), Bogor, 2 August 1976. Discussions and negotiations about the leadership of the new Republic among the various factions can be found in Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, p. 70; Anthony Reid, *The Indonesian National Revolution, 1945-1950* (Melbourne, 1974), pp. 142-144.
3. Menteng 31 was a political training centre in Jakarta under Japanese auspices. See Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, pp. 41-43.
4. For Sarimin's biography, see p. 278.
5. The text and proceedings of the Potsdam agreements are to be found in United States of America, *Foreign Relations of the United States, Diplomatic Papers. The Conference of Berlin 1945*, vols. I & II (Washington, 1960).
6. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, p. 85.
7. Interview with Sarimin, Purwokerto, 23 January 1973.
8. Sarimin, 'Kenang-Kenangan' memoir, p. 101.
9. For Soewignjo's biography, see pp. 279-80. Soelaiman Soetopratiwgo (1904-1972) was a Barisan Pelopar leader in Tegal who worked in the Department of Labour after the revolution. Watchtoem was a VSTP leader and a PKI Committee member in Cirebon before his arrest in 1926. Released from Boven Digul in 1931 he became an English teacher. During the Japanese occupation he was a Keibodan leader and after the proclamation became chairman of Balapulang district KNI and Wedana of Balapulang during the social revolution. Slamet was a PKI committee member in Semarang before 1926. After his release from Digul in 1939, he taught in the Sriwidodo private school at

- Ketanggungan. After the proclamation he became chairman of Ketanggungan district KNI, and was a member of the Brebes working committee during the Tiga Daerah movement. He died in 1953.
10. Kyai Misbah was a member of the Sarekat Islam and the early PKI. Jailed after the 1926 communist rebellion, he later joined Muhammadiyah. During the Tiga Daerah he was a close ally of AMRI Slawi leader Sakirman (see below p. 277). Later in the revolution he led Masyumi (the modernist Muslim party) and Hizbullah (Army of God). He was shot by the Dutch in 1947. Haji Moeklas from Jatinegara subdistrict was a Sarekat Rakyat leader exiled to Boven Digul, and taken by the Dutch to Australia in 1942. His son M. H. Lukman was a member of the PKI's politbureau, before 1965.
 11. For Kartohargo's biography see p. 273.
 12. Sugeng Hargono (1916-1973) was a leader of the Tegal branch of the pre-war Indonesia Muda. A member of the Brebes KNI, and the Brebes working committee during the Tiga Daerah Affair, he was involved, by his own account, in the kidnapping of the Wedana of Tanjung, and the Demang (headman) of Kersana (West Ketanggungan). Arrested after the Tiga Daerah by the TKR, he later joined the guerilla movement in Wonsobo. After the revolution he was an official of the Department of Agriculture.
 13. Ismono Sosrohadi-soerjo was born in 1912 in Madiun. After attending the European Primary School and MULO, he opened a business school in Madiun in 1937 and was chairman of the local Madiun branch of Partindo. He came to Tegal in 1940, opened an auction business and was chairman of the local branch of Gerindo. After his release from Wirogunan prison in 1947 as a Tiga Daerah detainee he was head of the Bureau for Development for Madiun and Kediri in the TNI Masyarakat (People's TNI).
 14. Oerip was the son of an official of the Peralang regency public works department. Both he and Karso attended the Muhammadiyah HIS in pre-war Peralang.
 15. Sarimin, Question 15, 'Keterangan', 31 January 1946, Proc. Gen. Under the Japanese, the Dutch-trained lawyer Mr. Besar Martokoesoemo became mayor, then Bupati of Tegal before being appointed assistant Resident of Pekalongan, then Resident in September 1945. He arranged the divorce for Reksonegoro XI's first wife (see p. 12). For further biographical details, see p. 271.
 16. Interview with a Nine Brother (Soemarno), Tegal, 27 February 1973. Muhamad Nuh, written answers, p. 5. The Wedana of Pangkah had an unsavoury reputation for involvement in *agent provocateur* activities said to be aimed at discrediting the new Republic.
 17. Interview with Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor leader (Sarli), Jakarta, 27 August 1976.
 18. Admiral Maeda was sympathetic to the nationalist movement. The text of the Proclamation of Independence was worked out in his house on 16 August 1945, and proclaimed at 10 a.m. on 17 August. See Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, pp. 75-82.

19. Transcript of taped interview with Kromo Lawi, III/6, Pekalongan, 7 June 1973.
20. Sarimin, Question 1, 'Keterangan', 31 January 1946, Proc. Gen.
21. Interview with Sarimin, Purwokerto, 23 January 1973. Kartohargo ran the Brebes branch of Putera, Barisan Pelopor and Jawa Hokokai during the occupation.
22. Kartohargo, Question 14, Proses-verbaal, 23 October 1946, Proc. Gen.
23. *Ibid.*, Question 11, 19 October 1946.
24. Interview with Islamic nationalist (Haji Mukhsan), Brebes, 6 December 1975.
25. *Ibid.* The most radical of the Brebes rural revolutionary groups, later calling itself Pesindo, came from the Ketanggungan West sugar mill settlement, which was formerly part of the private lands owned by the Bupati of Brebes (see p. 4).
26. Sarimin, Question 1, 2, 'Keterangan', Proc. Gen.
27. *Ibid.*, Question 15. For a chronology of these events see the Time Chart on pp. 262-264.
28. Quoted in Anderson, 'The Pemuda Revolution', p. 116.
29. *Ibid.*, p. 167.
30. Wadyono, transcript of Semdam interview, 'PETA di Daerah Pekalongan', 23 September 1967.
31. Koesnodiprodjo (ed.), *Himpunan Undang-Undang, Peraturan-Peraturan, Penetapan-Penetapan Pemerintah Republik Indonesia*, 1945 (Jakarta, 1951), p. 88.
32. 'Mosi Komite Nasional Daerah Pekalongan'. Letter from Secretary of State, A. G. Pringgodigdo, to Dr. Soembadji, Pekalongan KNI chairman, 21 September 1945. I am grateful to Mr. Besar for making this and other Pekalongan KNI documents available.
33. Interview with Mrs. Wibowo, Jakarta, 16 October 1976.
34. Interview with Nine Brothers member (Soemarno), 8 November 1975.
35. Interview with Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor leader (Sarli), Jakarta, 28 August 1976. Bung Bagio is Soebagio Mangoenraharjo, at that time head of the Pekalongan BP3 office. For a biography see Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, pp. 441-442. Harso was granted European status and a Dutch name as a reward for loyal service.
36. Interview with Pekalongan Pesindo leader, Djunaid, later chairman of the Federation of Indonesian Batik Cooperatives (GKBI), and Pekalongan's most prominent businessman, Pekalongan, September 1972. Soeprapto was the judge at the trial of the Tiga Daerah leaders. In the 1947 trials, discussed in Chapter 11, he ruled a question from the defence about this incident 'out of order'.
37. Transcript of taped interview with Soedjono, V/1-2, Cipanas, 30 July 1973.
38. Marsum, 'Ceritaku' memoir, p. 55.
39. *Ibid.*, pp. 56-57.
40. Interview with a member of the Nine Brothers (Soermarno), Tegal, 8 November 1975.
41. Muhamad Nuh, written answers to Semdam questionnaire, February 1959, p. 5.

42. *Penghela Rakjat*, 1 March 1946.
43. Muhamad Nuh, written answers, p. 6.
44. Marsum, 'Ceritaku' memoir, p. 75. For Kadarisman's biography, see p. 272.
45. *Ibid.*, pp. 74-75.
46. Interview with Soenarto, Jakarta, 29 July 1976.
47. *Ibid.*
48. *Ibid.*
49. *Neratja*, 29 September 1920.
50. Interview with Tju Liep Goan, Semarang, 6 October 1976.
51. *Ibid.*
52. *Ibid.*
53. For Soepangar's biography see p. 279.
54. Interview with API leader (Mohamad Tibi), Pemalang, 10 February 1975.
55. *Ibid.*
56. Soegirwo Poerdjoetomo, 'Ikhtisar Perjuangan Politik dari tahun 1940 sampai akhir 1949 di Daerah Pemalang Selatan', memoir, 1974.
57. Bupati of Pemalang [R.T.A. Rahardjo Sosro Adikoesoemo], Question 2, 'Jawaban atas pertanyaanya Paduka Tuan Kepala Pusat Kejaksaan Pengadilan Negeri Pekalongan', 3 June 1946. Proc. Gen.
58. Bupati of Pemalang, Question 9, 'Jawaban', Proc. Gen.
59. *Ibid.*
60. Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, p. 34.
61. For details of the composition of the KNIs at the residency/regency levels in 1945 see Lucas, *Bamboo Spear*, pp. 417-420.
62. Kadarisman Socrodiwiry, 'Riwayat Perjuangan', memoir, 1978.
63. Tegal KNI Vice-Chairman (Soesmono), written answers to author, November 1972, p. 6.
64. The Bupati of Pemalang, gives a good description of the meeting to appoint the KNI in Question 6, Proc. Gen.
65. *Ibid.*
66. Transcript of taped interview with Pangkah KNI chairman (Sugiono), II/25, Tegal, 27 November 1975.
67. For a discussion of attempts to abolish this formal style in the context of the social revolution, see pp. 152-54.
68. Interview with Bumijawa KNI leader (Radan), Bumijawa, 15 February 1973.
69. 'Tegal pada Zaman Kemerdekaan', compiled in 1969 by Ki Tjitrasatmaka and others (part of an unpublished history of Tegal). Also interview with K. Tjitrasatmaka, Tegal, 8 December 1972.
70. Ki Tjitrasatmaka, 'Bahan Research', written answers to Semdam questionnaire, 18 November 1961, p. 5.
71. *Ibid.*, also 'Tegal pada Zaman Kemerdekaan'.
72. According to a report received by the Barisan Pelopor, the Japanese included a civilian from the shipbuilding yards, while the other was the assistant Resident of Tegal. Marsum, 'Ceritaku' memoir, p. 75.
73. Transcript of taped interview with BKR leader (Al Masih), Pekalongan, 12 April 1973.

74. The planning and execution of this raid is described in detail in Marsum, 'Ceritaku' memoir, pp. 67-68.
75. *Ibid.*, p. 86.
76. For more details of the disarming of the Japanese in Tegal, see Lucas, *Bamboo Spear*, pp. 149-155.
77. For details see Anton Lucas, 'Social Revolution in Pemalang, Central Java, 1945', *Indonesia* 24 (October 1977), pp. 105-106.
78. Transcript of taped interview with Mr. Besar II 3, 8, Jakarta, 24 March 1973.
79. *Antara*, 6 October 1945. According to a Japanese version, 'the kenpeitai lent part of the arms in its possession to the Indonesian Resident under the pretext that he needed them for extra guard duties'. Miyamoto, 'Army problems in Java after the Surrender' in Reid and Oki (eds), *The Japanese Experience*, pp. 335-336.
80. Transcript of taped interview with Soedjono, VI/9, 29 July 1973.
81. *Ibid.*
82. Interview with Mrs. Hugeng (wife of Indonesia's former police chief), Jakarta, 1 August 1973. One of the wedana's daughters is the widow of Hertasning, a former Indonesian ambassador to Australia.
83. *Warta Berita*, 8 October 1945.
84. For a biography of K. H. Iskandar Idris see p. 272. The Japanese interpreter on this trip, Saburo Tamura, later wrote a memoir of the mission in Indonesian. I am grateful to Mr. Iskaq Tjokroadisoerjo for providing a copy of this account, dated 26 September 1971. The following is largely based on Tamura's version. For a further discussion of the military in Pekalongan politics, see Chapter 8.
85. Oka, senior Peta trainer (*shidokan*) in Pekalongan, played an important role in bringing negotiations to a quick conclusion. During the siege of the kenpeitai Oka had kept the Pekalongan garrison confined to their barracks, while advising his ex-Peta men on what to do (Wadyono, personal communication). According to a kenpeitai version, in Pekalongan 'Chief Warrant Officer Hostino Katushige's pacification efforts and management at the end of the war had been most appropriate. The natives had not even caused the slightest disruption and had good feelings towards the kenpeitai. When we left they gave us a farewell party' [sic]. *The Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra* (Selections from *Nihon Kenpei Seishi*), translation by Barbara Gifford Shimer and Guy Hobbs (Ithaca, 1986), p. 63.
86. This was unusual, according to the kenpeitai memoir, 'they even provided a guarded train for us to travel to our assembly area in, this was very rare'. Shimer and Hobbs, *The Kenpeitai in Java and Sumatra*, p. 63.
87. Transcript of taped interview with Soedjono, VI/12, Cipanas, 30 July 1973.

Social Revolution

The month following the proclamation provided little relief from the near famine conditions and shortages which people had experienced during the occupation. In village rice barns throughout the Tiga Daerah tons of paddy delivered after the last harvest (May-June) lay unused. Demands from hungry villagers that this paddy be distributed went unheeded by village as well as subdistrict officials throughout the Tiga Daerah.

Rural violence in Pekalongan lasted until mid November 1945. Generally known as the social revolution¹ this violence swept away the old order—the lurahs and their officials, the camats and wedanas and eventually the entire regency administrations.

This chapter examines the dynamics of the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah. In particular we will focus on how officials were removed from their positions in rural areas, who replaced them and how the new incumbents were chosen.²

The social revolution in the Tiga Daerah began in Moga subdistrict in southern Pemalang during the first week in October 1945. The people called a meeting while the camat was away in the regency capital and asked officials to distribute the paddy. They were told nothing could be done until the camat returned. The secretary of the Moga branch of the Soldiers' Relief Organisation (BP2) recalls:

A large crowd had gathered in front of the agricultural cooperative storehouse demanding the distribution of the paddy. The Deputy Camat (*Fuku Soncho*), a younger brother of the Bupati of Pemalang, got up to speak to the crowd. He was very scared. He said in Javanese, 'Brothers! Brothers! Be aware of what you are doing'. The crowd got angry and began throwing big rocks which missed the Deputy Camat but fell on the tiled

roof which was soon full of holes, though the walls were undamaged. The rocks also hit the tin roof of the shelter in front of the storehouse, then bounced off and rolled down the hill, making a terrific noise. The Deputy Camat fled. By twelve midnight the sound of the *kentongan* (wooden signal-drum) was far away.³

The next morning the camat returned and held a meeting to hear what had happened. The local teacher said 'arrest the trouble-makers', but instead the camat sent his spokesmen to tell villagers: 'Be calm; the government will arrange things, don't take action on your own'.⁴ Similar incidents occurring elsewhere in the Tiga Daerah showed that local officials had no time to lose if they were to 'arrange things'. Ten days later it was already too late for officials to distribute the surplus paddy.

The Social Revolution Begins

The first popular action against a local official in the Tiga Daerah occurred in the village of Cerih in Tegal, a poor cassava-growing area typical of much of the hill country in the south, and a well-known radical centre.⁵ On the night of 7 October 1945, the day after Pekalongan had buried the victims of the *kenpeitai* massacre, an angry crowd surrounded the house of the Lurah of Cerih, Raden Mas Hardjowijono, one of the few lurahs bearing this title in the Tiga Daerah.⁶ When the lurah and his family refused to come out despite angry threats from the crowd, they were locked inside. At 1 a.m. the crowd threatened to burn the house down if the lurah did not appear. Later that morning 'Den Mas' Hardjowijono finally appeared in his full lurah's uniform, faced the crowd who were threatening to kill him, and asked what he had done wrong. The crowd disarmed him and dressed him in sackcloth, while his wife was made to wear a necklace of paddy. To the accompaniment of the lurah's own gamelan orchestra, a symbol of status and wealth on the north coast of Java, both were then paraded along the five kilometres to the subdistrict town where they were further humiliated by being treated 'like fowl'—made to drink unboiled water from a half-coconut shell and to eat rice bran. Local revolutionaries then locked up the lurah and his family in the subdistrict office where the new camat (the former official had fled) could keep an eye on them.⁷

The action of the people in Cerih in parading their lurah set a pattern which was to be repeated with many officials all over Tegal and Pemalang regencies in the following fortnight. Such actions went under the local name *dombreng*, a word derived from *tong* and *breng*,

two onomatopaeic Javanese words for the sounds of banging on wood or metal, meaning that the accused were paraded around to the accompaniment of clanging tin pots and wooden clappers. 'Tong' also refers to the sound of the *kentongan*, the signal-drum which is sounded in a different way for calling meetings, giving the time or warning of fire, theft and other emergencies. So it is quite possible that in some cases the corrupt official was paraded to the sound of the 'thief *kentongan*'. The *dombreng* rituals are discussed further in Chapter 7 in the context of the social revolution.

The Lenggaongs

Usually it was the lenggaongs in the Tiga Daerah who led the *dombreng* actions during the rural social upheaval in October 1945. During the power vacuum of the social revolution they reacted quickly against corrupt officials particularly at the village level. The role of the lenggaongs was not unique to Pekalongan. In Banten during the early revolution similar figures called *jawara*, were used by both Muslim leaders and local communists against the old bureaucratic order. As in the Tiga Daerah these social forces were later suppressed by the army.⁸

The prominent role of the lenggaongs in the Tiga Daerah was already a feature of the rural revolution in October 1945, two months before the old order was overturned and the *pangreh praja* was thrown out in Banten. The lenggaongs in Pekalongan Residency as in Banten, had ties with Islam as well as with the whole magico-mystical religious world of rural Java in which power is assumed to have its source.⁹ As formal power structures disintegrated, the outlaw world of the lenggaongs with its bravado, magical charms, secret graveside oaths and violence came into its own.

Lenggaongs in rural areas spearheaded the resistance against hated and corrupt Javanese officials and the takeover of the state-owned sugar mills. The Barisan Cengkrong (or Sickie Corps) consisted of a band of about fifty lenggaongs, organised into four groups which rode around the countryside on bicycles armed with sickles. Idris, their leader, was famous in the Petarukan area and his deputy, Tarbu, was a landless peasant. The group ate at roadside stalls without paying. Its 'political adviser' was a school teacher and former Sarekat Rakyat member. This reflected another important element in the lenggaong phenomenon: the relationship many groups had with older left wing radicals from the early nationalist movement, mostly village school teachers, and former members of the Sarekat Rakyat. Members of

the Barisan Cengkong locked up one lurah, removed another, and distributed the textiles found stuffed in his mattresses. With the help of an executioner the Barisan Cengkong took over the Petarukan sugar factory, while the former camat went into hiding and was later smuggled to safety in Pemalang.¹⁰

Anti Chinese Actions

Lenggaongs also spearheaded actions against local Chinese traders and rice merchants. In Adiwerna district a group of lenggaongs calling itself Rukun Tani, the Peasants' Association, arrived at the subdistrict office on the morning of 7 October 1945. They demanded to see the camat, who, when he finally emerged, was escorted by angry Peasants' Association members to the Adiwerna district office. The owners of the local rice mill—Hok Lian, Liem Hoan Tien and Kwee Tjoan An—were called and forced to sign an agreement, witnessed by the wedana, the camat and the KNI chairman, handing over the mills to the Peasants' Association committee.¹¹ In Tanjung district, as we have seen, the hostility was directed against the raising of pigs and the practice of the poorer Chinese taking Javanese mistresses. While there was no attempt to take over the Chinese-owned clove cigarette factories in Tanjung, in other areas ethnic resentment towards the Chinese was reinforced by hostility towards their class position.

In the southern Pemalang town of Randudongkal early in October, a lenggaong leader arrived with a group of followers to demand that prisoners in the local jail be released and that Chinese shops be closed. The Japanese-appointed wedana was still in office, but the head of police who had disappeared had been replaced by a local nationalist. The wedana called for reinforcements and two truckloads of regency police arrived from Pemalang armed with bren guns and the situation became very tense. Suleman, a local revolutionary leader, recalled:

I asked what Nasro [the lenggaong] wanted. He said he wanted to take his friends from the jail and destroy the Chinese shop. I said 'this is not what Bung Karno wants. He wants to have good relations between everyone. So it is better to ask the Chinese to fly the Red and White using big flags and many of them'. I told him not to destroy the shops, but to ask the Chinese not to raise prices.¹²

By this stage the Chinese shopkeepers, wearing white clothes and ready to be killed, were called together. They immediately agreed not to raise prices and the lenggaong group dispersed.

Kutil's Movement

Talang became a popular prototype during the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah, and it was this subdistrict which even AMRI Slawi leader Soewignjo said he made wide detours to avoid when travelling from Slawi north to Tegal. Anyone who went through Talang in November 1945 risked his life, people believed. Sukarno, speaking on a stopover in Tegal on his return to Jakarta after a presidential tour of Java in mid December, referred to the Tiga Daerah movement as the '*negara Talang*', or Talang state.

Talang's notoriety was largely due to Kutil, the hero of the people whose life and death are still surrounded by myth and controversy. For some he was an executioner who had 'killed many people', a cruel, fierce person, an anarchist, a tool of communists, while still others claimed at the time that he was an agent of NICA. At his trial Kutil 'confessed' to many killings, according to his supporters to protect his friends in Talang. For this he earned the honour of being the first person in the infant Indonesian Republic to be sentenced to death by formal judicial process. The Tiga Daerah Affair is still referred to by people elsewhere in Java as 'Kutil's movement'. Yet in Talang, Kutil was admired and respected, as well as feared, by many. After the old order had collapsed and a new Muslim *camat* had been elected the area became free of the factionalism and unrest which continued in other places.

Kutil (whose real name was Sachjani) means both 'wart' and 'pickpocket' in Javanese. His name derives from the first meaning—when he was young he had tiny black warts on his face, which later disappeared, though the name stuck. The second son of a gold trader from Taman near Pemalang, Kutil is often said even today to have come from Madura. This was because he lived not in Talang itself, but across the Gung river in the neighbouring hamlet of Pesayangan, and the people of Talang jokingly referred to him as a person from 'across the water', an *orang seberang*. This was apparently how the confusion with Madura arose, for in Java the Madurese, and indeed all those who come from the other islands, are known as *orang seberang*. Also Madurese have a reputation in Java for fierceness which fitted the stories about Kutil's character.

A troublesome child (*anak bangor* in Tegal dialect), Kutil seldom followed his parents' wishes. He arrived in Talang with his eldest son to take over a house which his father had bought for his grandchildren in a goldsmithing village, disregarding the claims of other members of his family to the house. Later he opened a barber's shop in nearby Kajen village on the main road south from Tegal, while carrying on his father's trade as a goldsmith in a small way at the back

of the shop. According to his lurah, a long sword hung on the wall beside the shop mirror, and, rather than fight with Kutil, the only other barber in the village soon left. Kutil's other business was buying secondhand goods for resale.

In 1937 Kutil had been a candidate in the election of the new Lurah of Kajen but lost, according to his son, by a narrow margin. The successful candidate of that election remembers:

Kutil had maybe finished second grade of village primary school. He could read and write a little but not much. His handwriting was almost totally illegible. There was a story he had gone to Deli on the east coast of Sumatra to work clearing land for plantations, had killed the Dutch foreman and returned to Java.¹³

This story was not confirmed by Kutil's son, who recalls that his father used to travel long distances by bicycle to lead the chanting of the Koran, often returning in the early hours of the morning undisturbed by robbers who roamed the area.¹⁴ He always wore the black *pici* (the velvet cap worn by Indonesian nationalists, particularly Muslims) even inside the house. Kutil's group which met to chant the Koran was the biggest in the area, with about thirty members. He also used the Muslim greeting *assalam walaikum* (peace be unto you) when entering houses, although he did not keep the Five Daily Prayers regularly, being 'half a santri, sometimes praying, sometimes not'.¹⁵ Local people who referred to Kutil as a santri were using the term with its older Javanese meaning of a powerful holy man.

In September 1945, when the struggle organisations were springing up, Kutil formed his own AMRI which took over the Talang branch of the People's Bank for its headquarters. All of his closest followers were AMRI members. These included a trader, a food seller, a tailor, a poor peasant, a blacksmith, and a haji circumciser and medicine seller. Like other struggle groups which sprang up during this time, its self-appointed task was to search for remaining Japanese to disarm them. This later became a hunt for so-called 'NICA agents'. In fact the 'anti-NICA' phobia which we will discuss later was very strong in Talang.

The social revolution began earlier in Talang than elsewhere. During the first week in October a local policeman was killed by an angry crowd because, according to one account, he had unfairly detained some people for selling cloth.¹⁶ The Talang KNI Chairman recalled:

During the Japanese time the policeman had, apart from his other duties, apparently been an intelligence agent for the *kenpeitai*. The *kenpeitai* often used to come and take people

accused of illegally selling melted-down brass. Talang had a brass industry, since the people were driven off their land by the sugar factories. Brass commanded a high price in Jakarta, and the Japanese were buying it. Some kyais here trading in melted brass were often caught, including a close friend of Kutil. If you bribed the policeman you would not be arrested. He also arrested or detained people for all kinds of reasons and confiscated whatever they were selling illegally.¹⁷

Kutil's desire for power and prestige made it necessary to have a large following, and his actions during the social revolution reflect his attempts to achieve this through patronage. It was not difficult to obtain booty in the name of the Republic, as eliminating suspected 'NICA agents' called for ransacking the houses of former Dutch and Eurasian employees of the local Pagongan sugar mill and seizing their contents. On another occasion, Kutil took over the house of a wealthy trader, who lived most of the time in Jakarta, as a pemuda headquarters. The trader had to move out but on this occasion he was reputedly allowed to take some belongings with him.

Kutil also appropriated the four hectares of *bengkak* land belonging to the Lurah of Kajen which was later returned to the lurah after the TKR counter-revolution. Kutil's relationship with this lurah was difficult. Originally he had incurred Kutil's wrath by opposing the ransacking of the house of an official who ran the People's Credit Bank during the Japanese occupation. As a consequence the lurah went into hiding, but was discovered by Kutil and *dombreng*-ed around the Chinese quarter of Kajen. Kutil told the people: 'Let this serve as an example to you all. This person was my ally but has now proved he is my enemy, he would not help me but instead went into hiding!'. The lurah subsequently escaped from detention in AMRI headquarters and fled the district. He was not implicated in corruption like many of his colleagues, and Kutil's followers later fetched him back. After this, relations improved and the lurah used to accompany Kutil on visits to various parts of the regency.

Cloth distribution both in Talang and throughout the regency illustrates again Kutil's need to distribute patronage and, perhaps, to redistribute wealth as well. As we noted, early during the occupation people were reduced to wearing clothes made out of gunny sacks and bark fibre. On one occasion the Camat of Talang received fourteen rolls of textiles which he asked the KNI camat to distribute. The KNI chairman said he wanted to distribute it to those who were suffering most, according to the principle 'to each according to need'. Kutil disagreed with the KNI view, realising that the usual abuses would creep in, or doubting the ability of the KNI to ascertain who were in real need, and wanting no doubt to ensure his many sympathisers all

got something out of the distribution. So he demanded that the textiles be distributed according to the principle of 'equality and fraternity' (*sama rata sama rasa*), implying 'we must be fair'. This meant that each person got a piece of cloth ten centimeters in length. The Talang KNI chairman said it was a ridiculous amount, and indeed it was, but that was not the point.¹⁸

In November after Kutil became regency police chief he was able to be more munificent. The committee he headed organised trucks to distribute white unbleached cloth stockpiled by the Japanese at the large mill outside the city. A special delivery was sent to Balamoa, near the place of the 1926 Karangcegak uprising, to gain support for the new order. Nobody paid any money for the cloth, and there were no records kept.¹⁹ The explanation was that they were 'finishing up the stocks at the mill, so the people will be satisfied'. A member of Kutil's distribution team said 'it was done on orders from Talang'.

Perhaps because he had never owned property, Kutil's interest in opportunities for power and consumption provided by the social revolution explain why he expropriated the Kajen village *bengkak*, and was seen driving everywhere in the best known and most admired automobile in Tegal regency, a yellow eight-cylinder Ford Mercury which had belonged first to the *kenpeitai*, then to the KNI deputy chairman Mardjono who was killed near Talang on 4 November. He never paid his Chinese chauffeur any wages. 'If we ate anywhere I always paid', recalls his chauffeur. 'Kutil always travelled without companions, sitting beside me in the front seat wearing a colt revolver'.²⁰

Kutil was an intermediary between the religious elite and the *lenggaong* groups, as well as having contacts with Dutch-educated nationalists. In keeping with the tradition to which he belonged, Kutil had acquired his magical power through a well-known local *kyai*, from whom his group, who often met at the *kyai*'s house, sought advice and obtained various amulets and charms. *Kyai Makdum*, who possessed 'special powers' and could 'cure' people, was Kutil's closest friend in Kajen. AMRI *pemudas* came to *Kyai Makdum* for special drinks containing magic charms, and bamboo spears were also blessed. The *Kyai* would take the spear and blow on it, saying in Arabic: 'In the name of Allah, the Merciful, the Compassionate'. Many of Kutil's AMRI *pemuda* also wore slings made of yellow leaves from the young coconut palm called *janur kuning*. Traditionally the *janur kuning* were supposed to give the wearer courage and frighten away evil spirits, but during the social revolution they came to symbolise opposition to the old order as well. Because of the scarcity of firearms (only two AMRI leaders beside Kutil had weapons) these forms of protection were especially important to the *lenggaongs* turned revolutionaries.

Kutil was also close to the older nationalist leaders of AMRI Slawi, the largest struggle group in the region, often journeying to their headquarters in the mansion of a former Dutch sugar mill manager. Kutil's patronage was important for K. H. Abu Sudja'i, who became Bupati of Tegal on 6 November. Members of Kutil's AMRI Talang group, including Kutil himself, went to meet Abu Sudja'i at his home in Pacul village and escorted him to the capital to be installed as bupati. The high point in Kutil's career came when the Tegal working committee, which governed the regency in November, appointed him as regency police chief, about which we will have more to say in chapter 9.

The Old Order Destroyed

The collapse of the old order in the Tiga Dacrah began with demands that paddy be re-distributed, followed by *dombreng* actions which began, as we have seen, in Cerih village and which spread to the north-east. On 10 October, across the border in Pemalang, peasants burned down the house and store of a Chinese trader and chased off the official who ran the local market. Symbolic authenticity and legality were given to many of these retributive actions. For example, in neighbouring Moga subdistrict, Kyai Said led a crowd parading a so-called 'thief', and carried the symbol of local opposition to the Dutch, the sacred kris of Mandireja sheltered by a ceremonial umbrella, as they entered the yard of the subdistrict office.²¹ The camat, Singgih Harsojo, hearing that a man had been brought to his office accused of 'stealing corn', rebuked the crowd and said 'You should have handed him over to the lurah'. The crowd surged forward and someone struck the camat in the face with an axe. While running from the subdistrict, covered with blood, he was knocked down by a stone but finally managed to get away. Thirty years later he recalled his escape:

Someone hid me behind a rice mortar. After I had been lying there for a couple of hours, a neighbour came and smuggled me into a nearby rice barn . . . I must have passed out altogether until about 6 a.m. the next morning. Then I crept out and walked along the road towards Pemalang, but after a while I fainted again. Luckily, someone took me to the local hospital and later to Pemalang.²²

It was widely believed that Kyai Said had used the deception of *dombreng*-ing a thief caught in the act to lure the camat out to meet the crowd. During the rest of the day eleven houses in Moga were ransacked. These were owned by people who were prominently involved in the distribution system during the Japanese occupation,

including a Menadonese who was responsible for hulling the paddy delivered to the agricultural cooperative, the Roman Catholic head teacher, the head of the market, the two Chinese who organised rationing and the castor oil cultivation programme, an official who supervised the distribution of kerosene in exchange for castor oil plants, the medical orderly of Moga, the lurah, the hamlet head of Banyumodal (the village where the subdistrict office was located) and Kyai Tartib, who sat on all the Japanese rationing committees. The subdistrict office was also ransacked.

From Moga, the chain of popular actions against hated officials spread as people demanded that paddy be distributed. The Wedana of Belik described how, on entering a village on horseback, he saw sharpened bamboo spears hidden in a fence. Frightened, he went on and met the people, who were asking for the paddy which they had been forced to sell to the government. He told them:

'It doesn't belong to me. I cannot give you the paddy without an order from my superiors. I am only an ordinary official.' I told them, if they didn't want to wait for an order, to go ahead and distribute the paddy, but that it was their decision not mine. They formed a committee and I advised them not to have any village official on it.²³

The attitude of officials to 'wait for orders' from above was common to all pangreh praja of Pekalongan Residency during September and October 1945 and reflected the timidity, lack of initiative and obsequiousness fostered by their Dutch-bureaucratic backgrounds. Partly, of course, it was the failure of the central and provincial governments to inform local pangreh praja about the policies of Jakarta or about the guarantees of cooperation their own spokesmen had given to Sukarno in September. Not knowing what the government wanted them to do about rice distribution, they reacted in the way they had been trained as career bureaucrats, by waiting for orders from their superiors.

In other areas the impetus for the popular uprising came from outside. Peasants bitter about treatment received from the pangreh praja during the Japanese occupation moved between villages to stir up local action. En route the crowds destroyed houses and property of officials who worked for the Japanese, including police and anyone who 'looked well off' (*kelihatan mewah*) and *dombreng*-ed those held to be responsible. Some camats and wedanas were rescued, hidden and sent to places of safety, while others were not so lucky.²⁴

R. M. Soehodo Gondosamito, the Camat of Lebaksiu in Tegal, was still uncertain about what to do with the paddy collected by the Japanese. Urgently advised by local KNI leaders to distribute it

immediately, as a temporary 'loan' if necessary, on Friday 12 October he decided to discuss the matter with his superior, the Wedana of Slawi. His widow recalls:

He wanted to go to Slawi to discuss how to make the people less troublesome (*muluk*) by distributing the rice. We left at 9 a.m. after breakfast. I wanted to see the doctor as I was seven months pregnant. I took along the three youngest of my six children, aged 4, 3 and 2 years. Just outside of Lebaksiu we were stopped. He was killed with bamboo spears. Someone helped us to the house of a haji nearby, where we stayed for the rest of the day. Later we were met by the BKR chief and taken to Tegal. Our belongings were all seized by the people and we never went back to the subdistrict.²⁵

The band which had ambushed the camat and his family was led by lenggaongs who then went to Haji Toha, who was distributing rice to kampung heads in Lebaksiu, on behalf of the KNI.

Along came Suhar with his band . . . with a sword shouting 'Be prepared to fight!' The distribution was not finished, but we put the paddy in the storage barn. The atmosphere was panic-stricken, because Suhar held a drawn sword. He wanted to go on to the camat's house . . .²⁶

Haji Toha had to act quickly. In an effort to prevent plundering of the camat's house and using his authority as head of KNI security, he worked out an agreement with the lenggaongs. The camat's personal belongings would be locked up in the local primary school until the situation had calmed down, and the goods would then be divided up, probably the next day. After this guarantee from the KNI leader, the lenggaongs left. The camat's house contained five kilograms of silver cutlery and half a kilo of gold, according to Toha.

KNI leaders visiting the area learned that Haji Toha had been chosen as the new camat. One of them, Tegal regency KNI vice-chairman Soesmono, recalled that 'After formally installing Haji Toha as Camat I told him his main task was to look after law and order as best he could'.²⁷ The KNI leaders then returned to Tegal. But the lenggaongs in Lebaksiu, as elsewhere, had not finished their work of settling old scores, this time with the Chinese.

Anti-Chinese feeling in Lebaksiu was expressed in Tanjung, Randudongkal and Adiwerna by the lenggaongs leading the plundering of fourteen Chinese shops in the local market. Soon Kyai Fachruri, Commander of the Barisan Pelopor, arrived from Slawi and fired shots into the air with a pistol. This seemed to disperse the demonstrators for a time. Later in the morning a detachment of the BKR arrived with instructions to arrest the 'troublemakers'. Eleven arrests

were made, including Suhar and Bugcl, but five of the men were later released.

In the meanwhile, Haji Toha set to work re-distributing four tons of soya beans and over three hundred tons of rice stock-piled during the occupation. Again Haji Toha recalls:

I called all the lurahs and obtained lists of paddy stored in each village. I went around the fifteen villages [in the subdistrict] on horseback with two BKR members and a local policeman. The rice was distributed equally and some was given to the pemudas who were responsible for security. Not one of the fifteen villages was short of rice. Everyone was calm because their stomachs were filled. If Soehodo [the former camat] had given out the rice there wouldn't have been any plundering (*penggarongan*).²⁸

The unrestrained violence continued. On 10 October 1945 the young and inexperienced Camat of Adiwerna addressed a large crowd at Lemahduwur, in front of the ancient graves of Tegalarum where Sultan Amangkurat II of Mataram is buried, as well as all of Tegal's ruling bupati family, the Reksonogoros.²⁹ Accounts vary about exactly what he told the crowd. According to a local teacher he simply said that Sukarno had been arrested by NICA that had just landed with the British in Jakarta on 29 September. However, a KNI leader in Tegal thought he had said that Sukarno had been killed by a NICA hand grenade, and such reports had indeed been broadcast about this time from Jakarta. Whatever his exact words, the camat never left the meeting. He was murdered immediately after it ended. Writing about it eleven years later a local teacher recalled:

His body was lying on the road in front of the house of the Lurah of Lemahduwur. When I arrived there, it was packed with a crowd of people, who had come and were swarming around the body, lying on the ground bathed in a pool of blood. Nearly everyone had brought sharpened bamboo spears, but others had swords and other weapons as well . . . People showed how angry they were by kicking and spitting on the body, and it was dirtied with dust . . . the face was unrecognisable.³⁰

The camat's murder signalled more than the collapse of the old administration in the entire district of Adiwerna. People were so enraged that they were willing to take it out on any symbol of the old authority. The young camat of Adiwerna was supposed to have naively relayed what was a politically explosive message. While this and other motives for the camat's murder were suggested after the event (letters were found supposedly pointing to a recent affair with a local girl) such *post hoc* explanations should not obscure the outburst

of spontaneous, unpunishable violence, a hallmark of the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah.

The Wedana of Adiwerna, too afraid to give any orders at all, left for Tegal, his belongings piled high in a bullock cart. However, half-way to Tegal the cart was stopped and the 'Japanese goods', meaning clothing, were taken, as well as furniture and other belongings. The rest of his administration promptly followed the wedana's example: '... all government officials, pangreh praja, teachers, police and village heads were running away in confusion, and nobody knew where they were going'.³¹ The wedana's eldest son, Slamet, was told that the family belongings could be collected from the API headquarters, so he set off to get them. He never returned.³² Road blocks had been set up along the main road leading through Adiwerna at that time and there were no vehicles on the roads, because nearly every twenty-five metres wood or bamboo road blocks had been set up. On the roadsides there were people, even children, carrying bamboo spears, and everyone who went past gave them the greeting 'Merdeka!'. At each guard post there were radios, tables and chairs and other goods which had found their way there from Chinese homes.³³

In Brebes the social revolution which saw the removal of the old pangreh praja, took place with less violence than occurred in Tegal and Pemalang. No camats or lurahs were killed there. As elsewhere, if the new official had been connected in any way with the oppressive Japanese economic policies, or had little popular support, he was soon replaced, but usually in a non-violent way. Radical groups, such as Pesindo, quickly acted to take over assets of the sugar mills and put up notices reading 'Owned By The State' on land previously used for growing sugar cane.³⁴ Only one camat fled for his life, others were stripped of their old privileges and status and placed in local jails where at least they were safe from further revolutionary violence.

New Elites

By the third week in October 1945 the entire bureaucratic elite outside the three regency towns in the Tiga Daerah had either been *dombreng*-ed or had fled, perhaps both in some cases. Revolutionary leaders in each area were faced with the problem of how to replace the old pangreh praja, as there were no instructions from any level of government about how, for example, to choose a new camat. During the social revolution Resident Besar immediately approved local choices by formal letters of appointment.

The changes in the elite at the subdistrict and district levels and

patterns in the transfer of power to 'new elites' emerge from Table 5.1. In Brebes the largest number of new incumbents were former officials, usually at the village level. There were several ex-regency officials from the old regency administration as well as two deputy *wedanas* and one deputy *camat*. In Pemalang and Tegal, where the radical nationalists were stronger and the conflict with the regency *pangreh praja* sharper, this type of transfer did not occur. While the absence of new *santri camats* in Pemalang reflected both the strength of the radicals and the support of Islamic nationalists—particularly for the new *bupati*, Soepangat—in Tegal radical nationalists (the school teachers and KNI members) had to share power with the religious leaders.

For many participants the social revolution was against the privileged class *per se*. However in Taman, a subdistrict between radical Petarukan and Pemalang, honesty was an issue which in one case overrode class. There the *camat*, Gunodo Surio, not only managed to 'escape' the social revolution, but also has the distinction of being the only *camat* in the entire Tiga Daerah to remain in office during the said period. As the son of R. A. A. Soerjo, the *Bupati* of Pekalongan since 1924, his elite credentials were impeccable. Along with his brother, Surjono Surio, the *Camat* of Margasari (Tegal), he was in fact the most 'well-born' of all the *camats* in the Residency. He survived the revolutionary movement against the bureaucratic elite for two reasons. The first was because he was honest, and worked to alleviate the sufferings of the people in Taman during the Japanese occupation by appointing a committee to organise the rationing, and by using the subdistrict cloth quota to make pairs of shorts and sarongs to be distributed to those too poor to get cloth by delivering paddy. Second, Gunodo Surio had enough political acumen to realise that distribution of rice was the way to stave off the revolutionary wave. In this he was able to exploit his close relationships with two *santri* landlord families in Taman who owned more than 100 *bau* of rice land and who had 200 tons of paddy in their rice barn, left over from the occupation. At the *camat's* request, they agreed to give out rice to the local people and the *pemudas* after the proclamation, probably expecting the *camat* to protect their property in return.³⁵

Within the religious groups who came to power, there was a range of political views as well as class backgrounds. Haji Tobari, for example, the new *camat* of Losari in Brebes, owned over 100 *bau* of rice land and was one of the richest landowners in the region. He had studied in Termas *pesantren* (near Pajitan) and for a time joined the pre-war PSII. Later on he returned to his home in Larangan subdistrict but, influenced by the *kyais* in the nearby Nahdatul Ulama stronghold of Ketanggungan, he joined NU. Unable to exercise

Table 5:1 Composition of New Ruling Elite at the District and Subdistrict Levels in the Tiga Daerah after the Social Revolution

Regency	No. of districts and subdistricts	Number Changed	'Former Elite'	NEW OFFICIAL 'New Elite'			
			Village/ other officials	Religious ¹ elite	School teachers	KNI/other revolutionary leaders	Other
Pemalang	17	16	3		3	1	3 wedanas not replaced 1 camat stayed in office 1 wedana returned 4 uncertain
Tegal	25	25	4	11	7	2	1 uncertain
Brebes	21	20 (?)	10	3	4	1	2 uncertain
TOTALS	63	61/97%	17/27% ²	14/22% ³	14/22% ⁴	4/6%	12/20%

Source: Lucas, 'Bamboo Spear,' pp. 421-424.

Notes:

1 No member of the religious elite held office at this level under the Dutch.

2 4 officials also KNI leaders.

3 1 religious leader also a KNI leader, 3 were subdistrict-level Barisan Pelopor leaders (*chutaicho*).

4 7 teachers also local KNI leaders, including 2 Chairmen, 1 Vice-Chairman.

authority over the population who were 'acting how they liked' (*herbuat bebas*), the old incumbent appointed Haji Tobari as his successor before leaving, an action unthinkable in the rural areas of Tegal or Pemalang.³⁶

At the other end of the santri political class spectrum were the radical kyais in Tegal who were not landowners, and who had ties with the Sarekat Rakyat which was strong in the rural areas of Tegal until 1926. The new Camat of Tarub, for example, came from the hamlet of Karangjegak, a Sarekat Rakyat-early PKI stronghold, where the uprising of May 1926 had occurred. A number of new santri camats ran pesantrens. Four local level santri Barisan Pelopor leaders also became camats during this period.

Table 5.1 shows that the teachers and KNI members together make up 28 per cent, the largest group of new officials. The category of 'teachers' however includes Islamic nationalists in modernist Muslim schools as well as Dutch-educated nationalists such as the new Wedana of Pangkah who was also the local KNI chairman. This reflects the general trend for village primary school teachers or active members of the local KNIs to be chosen as new officials replacing *pangreh praja*.³⁷

There was enormous variation in the way wedanas and camats were chosen. Sometimes elections were arranged to make an appointment from above seem like a popular choice; sometimes villagers were genuinely involved; sometimes the KNI played an active role in the choice of the 'best' candidate, which was then ratified by an 'election'; while in other areas people wanted to keep their old officials. What happened in each district and subdistrict reflected the degree of violence, attitudes of previous incumbents and the strength of local older nationalists vis-à-vis Muslim groups. In Brebes the largest number of new incumbents to office were village officials from the old administration, while in Pemalang there were very few former officials in the new administration. Amongst the Islamic groups that gained power, there were santri landowners (Brebes) and radical kyais sympathetic to the early PKI and the attempted communist rebellion of 1926 (Tegal). How local revolutionaries solved the problem of choosing new officials was left largely up to them. As we have seen, the only camat in the Tiga Daerah able to stave off the revolutionary wave did so partly by an alliance with local santri landowners which gave mutual protection.

In Talang, to the north of Adiwerna, an open 'election' for a new camat was held. There were several reasons for this. Older nationalists ran the local Talang KNI—both the chairman and the vice-chairman were leaders of the local Pawnshop Employees' Union before the war, and the latter had had contact with underground PKI

leader K. Midjaja during the occupation. Then there was the strength of the Islamic nationalists. In Talang it was the Muslim voices from the santri village of Kebasen (which had its own Hizbullah pemuda group from the occupation), together with Kutil's own AMRI, which demanded that the KNI act immediately to replace the former Camat of Talang, who had fled the area after the killing of a local policeman. The KNI chairman takes up the story:

I held a meeting in the Talang square near the mosque. There were three candidates for camat: Abdul Latip (a Muslim candidate); the vice-chairman of the KNI, Partosoetikno; and a kyai, not well-known, I forget his name. I did not want to be a candidate. About two hundred gathered at the oval. The system of election was quite simple, the people went and sat down behind the candidate of their choice. It was clear that Abdul Latip had a majority behind him. Most of the two hundred-odd people in the oval were from Kebasen (Abdul Latip's hamlet), it was a *fait accompli* for the Muslim group. The radical nationalist, Partosoetikno, had made no preparations with his main support, that is Sachyani (Kutil) and his offsider Tanggun. I asked the crowd 'Who has the biggest support?': 'Abdul Latip', they replied. So it was he that became camat. Then I reported to the chairman of the Tegal regency KNI branch what had happened.³⁸

At the subdistrict and district levels in other areas the installation of new officials was not as dramatic as the expressions of popular sovereignty in Talang. In areas where there were few, if any, *dombreng* actions, the new leadership (particularly in Pemalang) was still anxious that the people be given the chance to choose new local officials if they wished. In 1973 the former Wedana of Belik gave a lively account of such an election:

Soepangat told me that he had been chosen as bupati. Ha, good luck to him! He said that perhaps the District of Belik wanted an election, and could I call a meeting? I said yes, certainly I could. . . . Then Soepangat came and told the meeting that he had been chosen as the new Bupati of Pemalang. 'I am now the Bupati of Pemalang, and I was chosen by the people. I have come here because I want to give all the people the same chance. If you don't like your present wedana, you can choose a new one, I will organise it'. But the people said: 'No, we will keep our present wedana'. Then I told the meeting that this was a great chance for them, that there had never been a wedana elected by popular choice since the early times. I told them this was their chance to choose someone they wanted. They should not be shy (*jangan malu*); if they didn't want to choose me because I wasn't a local person, I would return home. The

camat, trying to encourage the people, said the old wedana had had to be called master (*ndoro*) but a wedana who was chosen by the people should be called father (*bapak*).³⁹

Nevertheless the people insisted on keeping their former wedana, who declined the protection of a revolver saying: 'If I was given a revolver my behaviour might change. Then people who didn't like me might say, "what is the use of one revolver against all of us?" So I wouldn't take it'.⁴⁰

It is clear that during the social revolution period there was great ambiguity as to whether officials were appointed or elected since there was no revolutionary 'consensus' on how new leaders were to be chosen or what kind of leaders to select. What happened in each subdistrict reflected the attitude of the pangreh praja, and the strength of the Muslim group vis-à-vis the KNI, which sometimes represented the radical nationalists, but more often the old establishment.

Village Level Social Change

John Smail has written that the replacement of incumbent pangreh praja during October and November 1945 'reflected the general breakdown of the old rural administration into a tangle of local power struggles'.⁴¹ While on the surface it was indeed a tangle of local power struggles, as Table 5.2 shows these power struggles at village level in seven subdistricts in the Tiga Daerah produced a pattern whereby, after the old lurahs were thrown out, local groups jockeyed for power. In some the power struggle led to villages splitting up to form two separate administrations. A distinguishing feature of these actions was how orderly or violent they were.

In the second week of October 1945 an orderly demonstration of about two hundred unarmed people arrived at the (absent) lurah's office in Bumirejo in Ulujami subdistrict, Pemalang regency and demanded that the lurah and his staff be dismissed because they had 'helped the Japanese'. A set of new officials was then appointed, headed by the new lurah, a former school teacher and member of the Sarekat Rakyat. The new village administration did not last long, however, since it did not reflect the strength of the lenggaong element in Bumirejo. Two days later, the list of officials was changed again to include the son of the lenggaong leader, Siwad, as village secretary.⁴² This second peaceful reshuffle, presided over by the chairman of the Ulujami subdistrict KNI, reflected the ambitions of Siwad and the other lenggaongs.

There were several factors contributing to the orderliness of the social revolution in Bumirejo. First, during the occupation, there had

Table 5:2 Changes in Lurahs in the Tigah Derah during the Social Revolution

	No. of villages	No. of lurah changed	Religious elite	Family of former lurah	Former village officials	Lenggaong KNI leader*	School teacher/ (tani)	Peasant	other
Pemalang (Ulujami, Comal and Moga subdistricts)	53	45	12	8	7	6	6		6
Tegal (Warureja and Balapulang subdistricts)	25	20	6	4	2	3	1		4
Brebes (Brebes and Bumiayu subdistricts)	37	29	8		2	2	1	8	8
TOTALS	115	94/82%	26/28%	12/13%	11/12%	11/14%	8/9%	8/9%	18/16%

Source: Lucas, 'Bamboo Spear,' pp. 425.

* usually a veteran from the pre-war nationalist movement

apparently been no paddy searches, so popular anger was not as high as in other places. Second, there was a strong pre-war nationalist core leadership which could quickly respond to local demands. Thus the crowds which assembled came without bamboo spears, carried out no *dombreng* actions, and did not burn or ransack officials' houses. Siwad was unable to oust the new lurah, Rasid, partly because the secretary of the Ulujami KNI was a veteran of 1926 and the Sarekat Rakyat, and was Rasid's brother.

Events followed a very different course in Ambowetan in Comal subdistrict, where santris comprised one-third of the village, and there were no members of the pre-war nationalist movement. The village had suffered harshly during the Japanese times. As a result, a large crowd ransacked the lurah's house repeatedly shouting: 'Where is the lurah Sayan?' The people took his clothes and burnt them, then proceeded to chop in half one of the four wooden pillars holding up the roof in the inner part of his house. Villagers then organised the distribution of twenty tons of paddy, of which about two tons had been compulsorily requisitioned during the occupation. The rest belonged to the lurah himself. Each household received between forty and seventy kilograms. The crowd was led by two prominent Muslims—Bunjamin, who had the largest popular following in the village, and Kastam, a lenggaong. The village policeman, who had been an official under the Japanese, was chased out and he fled to the Dieng plateau. A village official was wounded in the head and *dombreng*-ed in tears around the village. The former village secretary lost a set of tables and chairs, five hundred kilograms of paddy and fifteen kilograms of hulled rice, and the walls of his house were left full of holes from bamboo spears. The *noji padi*, a former lurah of Ambowetan, had supernatural powers and a special kris which enabled him to ward off an attack from Bunjamin wielding a rice-pounder. His supernatural powers did not prevent two and a half tons of his rice from being taken, which he admits today had been embezzled during the occupation. He also lost forty goats, but these were later returned because they had not been obtained by corrupt means.⁴³

In the new village administration, the lenggaong Kastam became lurah and the other seven positions were filled by members of the lenggaong group, with the exception of two santri followers of Bunjamin. In contrast to Bumirejo, there was no meeting in which the subdistrict KNI leaders supervised the installation of the new village government.⁴⁴

In Krasak, in Brebes subdistrict, the situation produced a different scenario. The old lurah had been extremely oppressive during the Japanese time; his ambition was to be promoted to camat, unheard of during Dutch days. On one occasion, together with other officials, he

had taken the small harvest belonging to a poor widow without paying for it. In a second incident, he had confiscated from a poor peasant sharecropper fifteen kilograms of rice kept for seed for the next year's crop. Both these people had been accused of hiding unhulled rice illegally. The lurah had also ordered the arrest of the young son of a poor peasant accused of stealing cassava whom he then *dombreng*-ed around the village, naked, with a container of cassava tied around his neck while someone beat a small gong.

Not only involved with small scale robberies, the lurah had also taken a large quantity of paddy stored in the village barn. He had pulled up villagers' cassava crops without their consent in order to get the next rice crop in early, and sent them away to work as *romushas*, more than fifty of whom did not return. He had ordered the mature village kapok and shade trees along all the roads and paths leading from the village to be cut down for the Japanese, so that there was no shade along the roads at all. He had all brass locks and door handles dismantled and taken from the village, as was the iron on the peasants' hoes; the iron sluice gates on the irrigation channels were also removed and carted off by the Japanese. On top of all this the village quota of cloth had been sold in the Lebaksiu market.⁴⁵ The lurah's position had been strengthened because Krasak was easily accessible to the Tegal kenpeitai by the main north coast road.

By September 1945 the people had had enough of all this. Two-thirds of the entire village of about 3,000 people came to a big meeting called to elect a village KNI chairman. This was supervised by two regency KNI leaders. There were three candidates for the position, two officials of the old village administration—the village messenger and the irrigation official—and Karto Katul, a popular man connected to the village lenggaong element who had supervised a large *romusha* project. Only those who owned land in the village could vote, writing the name of the candidate on a paper which was placed in a rough bamboo ballot box. Karto won. Later during the social revolution the former lurah's house was surrounded by an angry crowd, saying: 'The lurah must resign and give back the paddy, corn and everything else that he gave to the Japanese'. Karto as the newly-elected village KNI leader used his authority to prevent the lurah from being killed, but the latter was ousted from office with several henchmen, including the village school teacher who had organised the rationing system, and left the village. A second village election was then held, this time to choose a new lurah by a different method from that used in the earlier election:

There were three candidates, each candidate had his own *bumbung* [round bamboo cylinder] with his symbol, different roots of leaves, above it. My symbol was *turi* leaves; Satum (who had been a lurah for 17 months during the Dutch time, but

was dismissed for corruption) used *janur* [young yellow leaf of the coconut palm]; and the other candidate used a *kluwih* leaf. People used short sticks [as ballot papers] which they placed in the *bumbung*. Everyone in the village could vote.⁴⁶

Again Karto won becoming both KNI chairman and lurah. The people remembered that during the Japanese occupation Karto had used his position as supervisor of a large romusha project on the coast to the people's advantage. By stealing rations from the Japanese he was able to provide food for the poor and destitute who were sent to the project.⁴⁷

The hated village administrators were thrown out in fewer villages in the hinterland areas of Tegal and Brebes, in Balapulang and Bumiayu. This was partly due to the reduced pressure because of lower population density, and the lesser impact of Japanese wartime economic policies on the people in these southern subdistricts. The situation was the same in the three southern subdistricts of Pemalang regency, Belik, Watukumpul and Pulosari (not shown in Table 5.2), but for different reasons. Although these areas had been very poor since Dutch times, the santri leadership and lenggaong opposition strongholds were missing.

There was relatively little upheaval in Bumiayu subdistrict in 1945. It was a rich santri trading town with a thriving leather industry, in an area known for its agricultural products, tapioca and cloves. Although supporting several Muslim religious schools of its own, there was a strong tradition of students and traders studying and working outside the area. Before the war, Muhammadiyah ran a private Dutch-language primary school (HIS) in Bumiayu. During the occupation there was no hunger oedema in Bumiayu as in many coastal subdistricts or the southern area of Pemalang, in part due to the efforts of the PKO, a Muhammadiyah social welfare group which distributed to the needy a kind of porridge called *wajlam* made from pawpaw, palm sugar, and cassava flour.

In southern Tegal, rationing of basic commodities was in the hands of a separate committee, not the lurahs, and the system of paddy collection was different from that of the coastal areas. Peasants did not need to take their paddy to village collection centres, but could take it home to pound, later delivering their quota to the village office as hulled rice. The role of the *noji* was less intrusive, he only 'reminded' people to deliver their quotas. People knew well in advance about paddy searches, which were infrequent in any case. The cloth distribution—three metres of calico for 200 kilograms of rice—was also much higher and the camat used extra cloth to make shorts.⁴⁸

During the Japanese occupation throughout the Tiga Daerah the link between the religious elite and the village priyayi had not been disturbed, except that while the latter suffered a loss of status and prestige by having to raise *romushas* and enforce paddy collection, the religious elite did not. While some *lenggaongs* had patrons from both the religious elite and the village priyayis, such links did not prevent these patrons from being overthrown by their 'clients' or other *lenggaongs* during the social revolution. In the seizing of power on behalf of poor peasants by the *lenggaongs*, who were mostly from poor and middle peasant backgrounds, we see the signs of emerging class conflict. The *lenggaongs* challenged both the village priyayis and the religious elite. The village priyayis were almost completely overthrown in Ulujami subdistrict where only one of eighteen lurahs, a haji, survived in office, barely resisting a *lenggaong*-led 'coup'. The strength of the religious elite may account for the changes in Moga, for many of the new lurahs there were local Muslim leaders. In both Comal and Moga the changes were less drastic but more extensive than in Bumijawa or Balapulung.

In the tangle of local power struggles and revolutionary factionalism, villages were split between santris and between *lenggaongs* as well as along the *lenggaong*-santri divide. The *lenggaong*-santri clash came about because some *lenggaongs* had santri, that is to say pesantren backgrounds, or had been on the pilgrimage to Mecca, and made their appeal to the people using the same magico-religious symbolism as many of the orthodox rural kyais. Their claim on popular religious sentiment was often as strong as that of the kyais.

Table 5.2 summarises the changes in village leadership after the revolution in seven subdistricts researched. Fifty-three per cent of new lurahs came from the established wealthy class, while thirty-two per cent were from the new groups in the villages and had not held power before the revolution. There were the odd cases in the santri group of a poor santri becoming lurah in which case he would have been closer to the new group than the religious land-owning elite.

Villages Splitting

The phenomenon of villages splitting occurred at least four times in the Tiga Daerah: once in Tegal and three times in Pemalang regency. One reason for this was the unwieldiness of some village units. In one village in Petarukan subdistrict, for example, it was remembered that there had been two villages in earlier times, until the Dutch had combined them. Dutch policy certainly leaned in this direction in the interests of administrative economy, fostering the development of large, artificial village units, in which the 'election' of lurahs was

usually nominal and cultural differences suppressed.

In Petarukan subdistrict, the old administration of Pesucen village fell when the lenggaong Ali Wardo and his followers ransacked and buried the house of five officials: the lurah, two policemen, the village secretary and a hamlet headman. A crowd acclaimed Ali Wardo as the new lurah, but the santri groups would not accept his authority and formed a new village with one of the hamlet heads from the old village. *Tanah bengkok* was divided evenly between the new villages.⁴⁹

In Warureja, a small subdistrict on the Pemalang-Tegal coastal border, the majority of villages split, two of them along a rich santri-lenggaong cleavage. Elsewhere new lurahs were former officials or their relatives. Under strong popular pressure to recognize new villages, delegations of mainly religious leaders went to Pekalongan to seek the approval of Resident Besar. They were unsuccessful, for while Mr. Besar said that although they could have as many village secretaries as they liked, he could not give permission to divide existing villages. 'We got nowhere, and had to go home empty-handed. Meetings were held to explain the Resident's decision to the people. We had no choice but to reunify the villages that had been divided by the people's choice'.⁵⁰

Several factors caused splitting of villages. In some circumstances old rivalries ensured people were not satisfied with the first 'popular' village government. Where there were fewer active local KNI or members of the pre-war nationalist movement supervising the choice of lurahs, and the lenggaong element was much stronger, the village ended up being split in two. This was because new lurahs could not hold the whole village under their authority, due to opposition from either santris or officials who had been ousted during the social revolution. The *tanah bengkok* was divided evenly between the two new villages.

The Issue of 'Tanah Bengkok'

The size of the *tanah bengkok*, the most visible sign of a lurah's wealth, had been an issue since colonial times. During the social revolution, if a village split in two the *tanah bengkok* was divided as we have seen. The *tanah bengkok* issue was important, as it was the most obvious and easily accessible land available for redistribution. In Sukowati in South Pemalang the first demand of the people had been that the paddy in the village barn, requisitioned by the Japanese, be distributed. However, this soon developed into strife over the

lurah's enormous personal wealth. Besides his *tanah bengkok*, this lurah owned three horses, a horse cart and many rice fields. When the people threw out the lurah they wanted to divide up the *tanah bengkok*. According to a former underground member:

The paddy was collected in the village rice barn, and the people held a meeting about how to divide it. It was decided that those ten years old and over would get the same as adults (25 kilograms per person) and those under ten would get half. There was no difference between rich and poor, in principle everyone got a quota. However, the rich were asked to hand over their quotas to add to those of the poor. In general the rich did not dispute this . . . they were afraid that their wet rice fields would be taken over by the people.⁵¹

The people took the lurah's horses, burnt his cart and the paddy from his personal ricefields, and distributed the paddy from his *tanah bengkok*. Led by the lenggaong Sahid, the people demanded that the *tanah bengkok* land be distributed. However Soepangat, the new revolutionary bupati from Pemalang who was asked to come and approve the redistribution of wealth, said that 'the land belongs to the State'. This apparently did not satisfy the people, but to defuse the issue the lenggaong Sahid was appointed as lurah:

He was a daring person with special powers; he could disappear and weapons could not pierce his body. A farmer, he only stole outside his own area, and he had two wives in Mangunsari. You could say he was nominally Muslim (*abunganlah*). He had never killed anyone but had been in jail during the Japanese time. He was clever at *silat* belonging to the Cimandi group. He was appointed lurah on the voices of the people, and a report was made to the bupati. Then a group of six people including Soepangat, Amir, and Dr. Moerjawan came in a car. I just went along with them. Soepangat said, 'Because this person is your own choice, obey all his orders.' Amir backed up what Soepangat said. He said, 'The people and the lurah are one. Everything must be discussed together (at that time there was no term *musyawarah* [mutual discussions]). After Sahid became lurah, security of the village was guaranteed.'⁵²

It was as difficult to obtain land which had been expropriated by santri landlords as it was to obtain the lurah's *tanah bengkok* during the social revolution. In Taman subdistrict two santri landowning families distributed paddy at the request of the camat, to defuse the movement against them. In a neighbouring subdistrict the santri landowners moved quickly to protect their wealth by forming a

branch of Pesindo. They and the *pemudas* who joined Pesindo (all of whom were Dutch-educated) did so, as a local revolutionary leader said, 'simply and solely to save their families from being disturbed as a result of rapid social change'.⁵³

Different 'models' of upheaval emerge from these example villages. Villages with a relatively weak and assimilated *santri* group had little choice but to cooperate with *lenggaong* elements.⁵⁵ The village *priyais* and the weaker religious elite could no longer link up for mutual reinforcement. There were no pre-war nationalists either, as the Sarekat Rakyat had not been strong in these areas and there were no strong local KNIs to supervise the elections of new officials.

In areas where the religious elite controlled the village, the *lenggaongs* were not a challenge and there was little real change. In the hilly hinterland of southern Pemalang the pre-war nationalists represented by the local KNI were weak and the Sarekat Rakyat had no following.

Between these two poles were areas where power in the village passed to a variety, and often a combination, of village *priyais*, religious elite, veterans of the early nationalist movement, and the *lenggaongs*. Whether the upheaval was violent or orderly depended on several factors, such as the strength of the rivalries between the *lenggaongs* and the religious elite, the moderating role of the radical pre-war nationalists, the impact of war-time depredations and the corruption, as opposed to the oppressiveness, of the old administration.

In almost all cases where *lurahs* were thrown out, there was a redistribution of the former incumbents' personal wealth, the paddy being divided and sometimes property sold. However, the land and houses were often taken over by the new *lurah*. Ironically, local leaders at the regency level did not agree to peasants distributing *tanah bengkok*, although control had been taken away from the *lurah*. After the TKR-led counter-revolution, this personal property was often returned to the former owner, although the new incumbent may have stayed in office, in some cases until the 1965 upheaval. The fact that many *lurahs* were able to go into hiding in the village or its environs reflected village patron-client ties, or a powerful group not supportive of the *lenggaong*, or perhaps a level of humanity for someone in trouble. There were still people who were willing to protect the *lurahs*.

At the subdistrict and district levels (see Table 5.1) the proportion of members of the former elite retaining power after the social revolution, 27 per cent, was much lower than at the village level, 53 per cent (see Table 5.2). This radical change at the subdistrict and district levels was a result of the election of men, who had been

religious leaders or nationalists or both during both colonial times and the Japanese occupation to higher positions which formerly had been the jealously guarded domain of the pangreh praja.

1. For a discussion of the social revolutions in Aceh and Banten see Audrey R. Kahin (ed.), *Regional Dynamics of the Indonesian Revolution: Unity From Diversity* (Honolulu, 1985), pp. 55-77, 83-105; for East Sumatra see Anthony Reid, *The Blood of the People* (Kuala Lumpur, 1979), pp. 218-45; for overviews see Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, pp. 332-69 and Reid, *National Revolution*, pp. 59-68.
2. As a bewildering number of events happened in a very short time, it will be helpful for the reader to refer to the 'Time Chart' pp. 264-269, both for the chronology of events being discussed in this chapter, as well as their wider regional and national context.
3. This meant that by midnight the disturbances around Moga had died down, and the *kentongan* signal for emergencies or danger was by then being sounded in villages some distance away. Interview with Moga BP2 secretary (Deradjat), Moga, 4 November 1975.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Cerih was the home of several Islamic communists active in the early PKI and the Sarekat Rakyat, including Haji Moeklas, M.H. Lukman's father.
6. 'Raden Mas', often abbreviated to 'Den Mas', is a high priyayi title, indicating the family claimed descent from one of the princely houses of Yogyakarta or Solo.
7. Interview with the elder son of the Lurah of Cerih (Sakunto), Cerih village, 13 February 1975.
8. Michael C. Williams, 'Banten: "Rice Debts will be Repaid with Rice, Blood Debts with Blood"' in Kahin, *Regional Dynamics*, p. 56.
9. See pp. 19-20 for further discussion of lenggaongs. On this aspect of the Javanese tradition, see B. R. O'G. Anderson, 'The Idea of Power in Javanese Culture' in Clair Holt (ed.), *Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Ithaca, 1972), pp. 9-12.
10. Interview with Kendalsari Pesindo secretary (Djuwahir), Comal, 31 October 1975; also transcript of taped interview with the same informant I/2, March 1975. (I am grateful to Pandji Soewarso for recording this and a number of other interviews for me early in 1975.) For the camat's escape, see Lucas, 'Social Revolution in Pemalang', p. 115.
11. Soekardjo, 'Verslag peristiwa jang telah terdjadi di Adiwerna', 23 January 1946, Proc. Gen., (henceafter 'Adiwerna Verslag').
12. Interview with Suleman in Jakarta, 15 November 1975. Born in 1914, Suleman was educated in HIS, Mulo and Taman Dewasa, the Taman Siswa teacher training college. He taught in Lampung and Sukabumi before the war. He returned to Randudongkal in 1943, where he ran a large plantation for the Japanese. Appointed by Bupati Soepangat as Camat of Comal during the Tiga Daerah Affair, he was jailed by the TKR in Pekalongan. In 1948 he joined the Department of Manpower

- and was a leader of his office trade union until 1965. Sulman's brother, Soetardjo, a close associate of Soepangat, was Camat of Pemalang during the Tiga Daerah Affair.
13. Interview with the Lurah of Kajen (Tauchwid), Kajen village, 9 February 1973.
 14. Interview with Kutil's second son, Pemalang, late November 1974.
 15. Interview with the Lurah of Kajen, Kajen village, 9 February 1973.
 16. Interview with revolutionary Camat of Talang (Abdul Latip), Tegal, 18 December 1972.
 17. Interview with Talang KNI Chairman (Soewachno), Tegal, 7 December 1975. Talang was encircled by four sugar mills—Pagongan, Pangkah, Kemanglen and Ujungrusi which in practice had rented all the available rice lands before the depression. The people, having no land to cultivate, had to find other means of livelihood and the area is still well known for its gold and brass smiths, and metal work, such as bicycle parts.
 18. See below pp. 155–6 for a fuller discussion of *sama rata sama rasa* in the context of the social revolution.
 19. Interview with textile distribution committee member (Gondo), Pekalongan, 13 June 1973.
 20. Interview with Kutil's chauffeur (Kho I Sin), Tegal, 21 February 1973.
 21. The following account of events in Moga is based on an interview with BP2 Chairman (Deradjat), Moga, 4 November 1975. See also p. 147.
 22. Interview with the Camat of Moga (Singgih Harsojo), Jakarta, 2 November 1971. After graduating from Mosvia in 1932 Singgih Harsojo worked with the police in Pekalongan. From 1939–1944 he was Camat of Tarub (Tegal) and had been at Moga for one year before these events took place.
 23. Transcript of taped interview with the Wedana of Belik, (Hardjowintoto), II/18–19, Temanggung, 22 May 1973.
 24. For details of separate incidents in different subdistricts and districts in the Tiga Daerah, see Lucas, *Bamboo Spear*, pp. 169–179, 186–194.
 25. Interview with Mrs. Suhodo Gondosamito, Slawi, 29 January 1973.
 26. Interview with Haji Toha, Ajiwinangun, 10 April 1977. H. Toha was born in Tegal in 1910 and spent two years in Mecca before the war. During the Japanese occupation he worked as a building contractor. In October 1945 he was chosen as Camat of Lebaksu and in 1946 became Camat of Kramat. In July 1947 he evacuated to Wonosobo with the Republican government, and later worked in the local Office of Religious Affairs.
 27. Interview, Semarang, 10 March 1973. For Soesmono's biography see p. 279.
 28. Interview with Haji Toha, Ajiwinangun, 10 April 1973.
 29. See pp. 12–13.
 30. Raden Soengkono Wiryoesanto, *'Riwayat Hidup'* Book I, memoir, [? 1953], pp. 76–77. One person deeply affected by the murder of the Camat was Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo, the PNI Baru leader and a close associate of the Prime Minister Sutan Sjahrir. Soebagio was head of the Pekalongan Soldiers' Relief Office during the Japanese time.

Soesmono, interview, 20 October 1976.

31. Soengkono, 'Riwayat Hidup' memoir, pp. 78-79.
32. The fate of the wedana's son was not known for three months. He was buried between two other victims of the social revolution, Siddik, younger brother of API leader Mansur, and R. M. Abu Bakar's son, Chamzah. Interview with the Wedana of Adiwerna (Ismail), 13 January 1973.
33. Soengkono, 'Riwayat Hidup' memoir, p. 84.
34. Transcript of taped interview with West Ketanggungan Pesindo leader (Dusman), I/7, Ketanggungan, 13 April 1973.
35. Interview with Taman santri landowner (Haji Chambali), Taman, 16 February 1975. Needless to say only about one ton was given out to the pemuda.
36. Interview with Haji Tobari, Losari, 16 December 1975.
37. If those Islamic nationalists who were KNI leaders or teachers were counted as part of the Muslim group, the proportion of new Muslim officials would also be 28 per cent.
38. Interview with Talang KNI Chairman (Soewachno), Tegal, 7 December 1975.
39. Transcript of taped interview with the Wedana of Belik (Hardjowinoto), II/16, 22 May 1973.
40. *Ibid.*
41. John Smail, *Bandung in the Early Revolution 1945-1946* (Ithaca, 1964), p. 126.
42. Siwad himself had been made village secretary during the colonial time, in the hope of inducing him to stop his lenggaong activities.
43. Transcript of taped interview with Ambowetan *noji padi* (Warbo), I/2, Comal, 3 December 1974-March 1975. (I am grateful to Comal nationalist leader Panji Soewarso for recording this interview.)
44. The Ambowetan village administration (typical of Pekalongan Residency villages) consisted of the lurah, village secretary, hamlet head known as *bau desa*, two village policemen, two messengers and a Muslim official. Other villages often had an irrigation official as well. The village policeman stayed on in the new administration, as his older brother was the new hamlet head. The new Muslim official was the younger brother of the previous official. No one was removed by the TKR in the counter-revolution, but the entire administration was changed by the Dutch after the first clash in 1947.
45. Interview with Krasak KNI chairman (Karto Katul), Krasak village, 5 December 1975.
46. *Ibid.* For another example of village elections in Pangkah subdistrict, see Lucas, 'Bamboo Spear', pp. 200-201.
47. See Lucas, 'Bamboo Spear', pp. 74-5 for discussion of this project.
48. The above account is from interviews in Bumijawa, 13-14 December 1975.
49. Interview with the Lurah of Pesucen (Wahadi), Pemalang, 3 September 1975.
50. Interview with the Lurah of Kedungjati (Soemarto), Pemalang, 10 February 1975.

51. Interview with Lasem courier, Yogyakarta, 18 October 1976.
52. *Ibid.*
53. Interview with Kendalsari Pesindo secretary (Djuwahir), Comal, 31 October 1975.

Order and Disorder

The violence that often accompanied the removal of officials during the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah was absent outside of it. In the regency of Pekalongan there were no *dombreng* actions, and the *pangreh praja* remained at their posts. In one district officials left for a few days and then returned when the protest had died away. Stories of officials who had escaped from the social revolution in Tegal and Pemalang amazed the Residency capital, as no violent social upheaval was occurring in Pekalongan regency. There was no NICA-phobia there either.

In response to what now seemed to remaining Residency officials like total anarchy in the Tiga Daerah, Resident Besar issued three proclamations or *makloemat* in mid October. The first, apparently directed at the upheaval in Pemalang, called on the Residency 'to stay calm and orderly' and to stand behind the government of the Indonesian Republic. People were 'strictly forbidden' to take matters into their own hands, as this would quickly lead to 'disorder'. The safety of individuals as well as their personal property had to be guaranteed. Strong action would be taken against anyone who either provoked or carried out 'robbery, arson, murder, damage to buildings, factories or warehouses, bridges and anything else'.¹

The second proclamation, apparently issued from the Residency police headquarters, but signed by Resident Besar, called on anyone with arms or ammunition to hand them in to the local police station on any day 'between the hours of 9 a.m. and 1 p.m.'. These would be used by the TKR which had a 'very heavy responsibility to guarantee the security of the Republic of Indonesia'.²

The third proclamation from Pekalongan on 22 October was virtually a declaration of martial law. From Pekalongan's viewpoint a


further 'deterioration' had occurred in the intervening six days. The language in the third proclamation had hardened: the Resident no longer 'expected' that the people would be orderly. The TKR, or People's Security Force, was now given full power 'to take whatever action is necessary to maintain respect for the government of the Republic of Indonesia, so the government can continue to function in the best way possible, to improve the daily welfare of the people'.³ The entire coastal region, from Petarukan in the east to Wanasari in the west, was put under the authority of the TKR, as well as the subdistricts of Jatibarang, Adiwerna and Talang further inland.

In the growing NICA-phobia in the Tiga Daerah, people either disregarded Resident Besar's proclamations or greeted them with suspicion. Tegal revolutionary leaders in particular still believed that 'Pekalongan had no Resident appointed by the Central Government because there had been no public announcement when Besar's appointment was made official on 21 September'.⁴

Furthermore, the various struggle groups guarded their weapons jealously and any suggestion that they should be handed over to anyone else was unthinkable, particularly as the police were just as unpopular as the pangreh praja.⁵ If anything, the proclamations only served to widen the gulf between Pekalongan and the rest of the Residency. Amidst growing anti-NICA feeling rumours abounded that Resident Besar was 'trying to save Eurasians', or that he was 'pro-NICA', and many people said facetiously that the TKR was nothing more than 'the Resident's Security Force (*tentara keamanan residen*)'.

Officials remaining in the regency towns in the Tiga Daerah, and facing the problem of continuing social unrest, also faced nationalist perceptions that conflicted with their own about what constituted disorder and what was necessary change. Writing some thirteen years later, Tegal Barisan Pelopor leader Muhammad Nuh recalled:


... the Bupati said that there was disorder to the south of Tegal, and it had to be quickly combatted. He asked if the Barisan Pelopor leadership were willing or not to help in combatting the unrest. The Barisan Pelopor leadership replied by saying that it did not see the events south of Tegal as 'disorder'. What was going on was a revolution, which was tearing down everything that was tainted with colonialism and fascism. The solution was to be found in a reorganisation which was not just quantitative but qualitative. The Barisan Pelopor had already made efforts to achieve this end, by contacting the existing organisations, namely the heads of the village KNLs that had only recently been formed. There were two ways of looking at the problem of how to deal with the social unrest and two ways of solving the problem, but during the discussions the



Revolutionaries from the Tiga Daerah in a Yogyakarta prison c. December, 1946. *Back row:*


Maksum, Sosrowidjojo, Muroso, Moh. Saleh, Soewito, Tan Djem Kwan. *Front row:*

Soekirman, Soewignjo, Soekardi, Rustamadji, Chamidun, Soenjoto.




Revolutionaries from the Tiga Daerah in a Yogyakarta prison c. December 1946. *Back row:* Chambali, Sachjani (Kuti), Dr Moerjawan, Kromo Lawi, Mohamad Nuh, Soepangat. *Front row:* Miad, Saleh Jusuf, Sapu, Moh. Salim, ----, S. Widarta.

Ki Tjitrosutmoko, who was
Patih of Tegal in 1945.
(Photograph taken in
1975.)




Sarimin Reksodihardjo,
who was Bupati of Brebes
in 1945. (Photograph taken
in 1975.)






Chung Hwa Chung Hwee building in Pemalang.




The former Hotel Merdeka, 'headquarters' of the Tiga Dacrah in Pekalongan, December 1945. (Photograph taken in 1975.)



Office of the Pemalang Bupati.



Japanese military headquarters in Tegal. This building was formerly the head office of the Semarang-Cirebon Steamtram Company.




Randudongkal Mosque, South Pemalang.



*The following captions describe the functions the buildings served in 1945.
Photos were taken in 1975. Pekalongan Court.*




Tegal Town Hall.



Tegal Mayor's house.



Head Office of the Bank Rakyat Talang, Tegal, at the time of the Tiga Daerah.



Residence of the Pekalongan Resident.

attitude of the officials was stiff and very formal. Then one official—the one from Pekalongan—just got up and left us and walked from the *pendopo* to the inner part of the regency residence while the Bupati wasn't prepared to discuss anything else, and asked us to excuse ourselves.⁶

In this climate of conflicting opinions, police and Eurasians became the first target of popular hatred. At the beginning of the Japanese occupation career police officers, mainly Dutch and Eurasians, had been interned. Their place had been taken by pangreh praja officials, for the greater part graduates of Mosvia, the training school for native officials (formerly Osvia). In Tegal both the regency and municipality police chiefs were Mosvia graduates, and both had, to quote a former Mosvia colleague, 'the priyayi mentality'.⁷

In Tegal in late September 1945, despite the still obvious Japanese presence, API leaders removed some officials to 're-educate' them, an action they said was provoked by the kidnapping of Sukarno and Hatta shortly before the proclamation. After being interrogated, made to 'confess' his mistakes and to swear on penalty of death that he would change his behaviour, one of them was allowed to leave, but the police chief and the mayor were detained. For the next three days and nights, the two were indoctrinated by API and BKR leaders 'so they would be conscious that Indonesia was already free with its own government, with full power in our hands'.⁸ Three days and nights of this was enough to convince the officials of their mistakes, and the police chief promised to try to get back the weapons that he had handed over to the *kenpeitai*.

However violence against the police in Tegal continued. A sub-district policeman was killed early in October, and on 19 October the regency police chief with the 'priyayi mentality' sent a detachment of police to where the Camat of Adiwerna had been killed ten days earlier, to 'settle the disorder'. Those arrested included a popular local Hizbullah leader, an action which provoked angry villagers to ask neighbouring KNI leaders for help to mount an attack on the Tegal regency police barracks and rescue their leader. The KNI informed all villages in the area and asked for volunteers, and on 20 October, barely four days after Resident Besar's proclamation ordering all arms to be handed over to the police, the Tegal regency police barracks were attacked and a quantity of weapons and ammunition taken back to Adiwerna.⁹

Hostility towards the police then spread into neighbouring Brebes where a local KNI leader had been seized and put in jail by police who were said to be 'acting tyrannically'. The Brebes police had been particularly provocative, with a number of actions against local revolutionary leaders. In September the Japanese flag had flown over

the Brebes police barracks long after it had been taken down from other government offices. A large crowd had assembled outside the barracks demanding that the flag be changed, but because they had no weapons their protest came to nothing and the 'police scoundrels', or *polisi bangsat* as the demonstration leader called them, retaliated by throwing the leader of the crowd into jail.¹⁰

The Brebes police continued making arbitrary arrests, forcing the TKR to intervene. The police agreed to hand over its weapons to the TKR, and then disband itself to avoid violence. This failed to prevent a mass demonstration (including Kutil) marching on Brebes to free about eighty detainees, among them a KNI leader from Jatibarang. Upon their arrival the Brebes TKR agreed to the crowd's demand and released the prisoners, who then returned with their supporters to Jatibarang and Talang by the sugar mill railway.¹¹

The TKR which, according to Resident Besar's proclamation, had replaced the *pangreh praja* in keeping law and order, was as powerless as local police or revolutionary leaders to impose any kind of authority outside the regency capitals. In Tegal, for example, they had no support from the remaining police because, according to the municipality police chief, the police had taken off their uniforms, given away their weapons and stopped doing duty in general because 'they were afraid to be police any longer'.¹² A committee of local leaders was formed as soon as possible to reorganise regency security, and in the interim period the Barisan Pelopor would be responsible for security in the municipality, using local funds where available.

The new committee issued an announcement calling on the old police to join the new force. Some former officers rejoined on the condition that they would not be known as police. The former police chief agreed to stay on as a 'technical adviser', but soon after this disappeared from Tegal. The Governor of Central Java then agreed to send a police officer from the provincial capital to help the new head and his deputy in their new tasks. To try to attract former police officers it was decided the new organisation would be known as the PKN, or State Security Guard, and its members simply as 'security guards'.¹³

In Tegal the PKN became a kind of adjunct to the Barisan Pelopor which had in any case successfully organised municipal security since the proclamation. It never developed a separate entity or role of its own. This was in contrast to the situation in Brebes where, early in November, local revolutionaries decided to move the Barisan Pelopor headquarters into the old police barracks where it was renamed the PKN. The Brebes PKN badge was a black bison on a white background, made by the local *pemudas*. PKN groups, synonymous

with the most revolutionary local elements, were formed in nearly all subdistricts, some sending between ten and fifteen *pemudas* to the PKN barracks in the regency capital, where over two hundred were housed and fed. In short, the Brebes PKN was basically a *pemuda* group with rice rations supplied by the local population, its people acting on the basis of revolutionary spirit doing guard duty without orders, when the spirit moved them to do so. The *pemuda* PKN, as they were called, more closely resembled the Tegal Barisan Pelopor or the Pemalang API in their ethos, without the economic functions of these struggle groups but also without their united leadership.¹⁴

The Fate of the Eurasians

Of all the groups in the Indies, Eurasians perhaps suffered most from the violence in the early days of the Indonesian Republic.¹⁵ In the rural areas of Pekalongan Residency especially, Eurasians were seen as aliens occupying a privileged economic position. During the social revolution over one hundred Eurasians, as well as Menadonese and Ambonese (who were considered pro-Dutch) were killed, mainly around the sugar mills in Tegal and Brebes regency. The worst massacres were in Slawi and Balapulang subdistricts.

In 1930 there were 4,200 people with European legal status living in the Pekalongan Residency, 12 per cent of Central Java's European population.¹⁶ About 90 per cent were Eurasian or 'Indos', a term which conventionally included Indies-born Europeans.¹⁷ About half the Residency's Eurasian population lived in Tegal regency, mostly in the Tegal municipality itself, while another one-third (roughly six hundred people in 1930) lived around the regency's six sugar mills. The situation was similar in Pemalang, while Brebes had the smallest group of Eurasians most of whom were living on the coastal plain, with about twenty in Bumiayu to the far south. The privileged economic position of a majority of the Eurasian population depended on the sugar mills which were symbols of the worst and most hated aspects of colonial economic oppression. The mills exploited the Eurasian's familiarity with the Javanese cultural world and their language fluency by giving them the difficult job of obtaining labour. Usually they worked as plantation supervisors, labour foremen and contractors, or in the mill itself as chemical analysts or machinists.

Some of the attitudes held by Eurasians towards Javanese reflected the bitter relations between the two groups. Simply put, many considered the Javanese to be 'stupid', 'lazy' and 'dirty'. Attitudes of superiority in matters relating to health, education and work efficiency were keenly felt, especially by the more educated Javanese

who resented the Eurasians' insistence on being spoken to always in high Javanese, even by Javanese associates with excellent Dutch. In short, racial prejudice worsened the already oppressive labour relations in the sugar mills.

During the 1930s, when many of the mills closed, some Eurasians turned to farming, running guest houses in the hill station of Tuwel near Bumijawa, and managing the tea and rubber plantations around Bumiayu, where the town's dairy and ice factory was run by a German. Tegal's three dairies were also run by Eurasians. From the mid 1930s, as the mills reopened, many returned to their old jobs, reflecting the prosperity of the Eurasian community in the Residency.

With the arrival of the Japanese, the world of the Indo-Europeans was turned upside down. Early in 1942 the Japanese introduced a racial classification system based on paternity and every Eurasian was expected to prove his or her descent.¹⁸ In practice in Pekalongan Residency, however, the Japanese did not apply such distinctions. According to the Japanese Assistant Resident, Toshio Ota, Dutchmen or those 'with more than 50 per cent Dutch blood' who were working in the sugar mills still operating when the Japanese arrived, were ordered to move immediately to Jakarta, leaving Eurasians of 25 per cent 'Dutch blood', Menadonese and Ambonese working in the factories.¹⁹ The Japanese mistrusted all Eurasians because of their suspected European loyalties, and later in the war they had to report to the authorities each month, while many were arrested and interned. People such as these, over whom the Japanese had powerful leverage, were used as informers. Japanese propaganda may have had an impact, but the immediate impetus for the Eurasian killings in the Pekalongan Residency was the generalised fear that the Dutch would try to re-occupy Indonesia. This fear intensified after the landings of the British and NICA in Jakarta.

It is difficult today to reconstruct the phobia aroused in October 1945 by the hated word 'NICA'. The years of hardship before the war, and the appalling suffering brought on by the near famine conditions of the latter part of the Japanese occupation, had built up fierce suspicions and feelings of intense hostility in the population which were stronger in the poor, most densely populated parts of the Tiga Dacrah, especially the Talang-Adiwerna-Slawi areas of Tegal. The first targets for outbursts of hostility were the Japanese. Once the Japanese were gone, attention focussed on the pangreh praja. After the landings of British troops on 29 September and the reports and rumours of NICA atrocities on the population of the capital, the hostility became anti-foreign, and took on a momentum of its own. This is referred to today as the anti-NICA movement. Well into

November, several weeks after the Eurasian killings had ceased, *pemudas* were stopping people in the street, or boarding trains searching the people for any red, white and blue (the Dutch colours) clothing. Finding even a single thread of these colours, in coat linings for example, would mean dragging the person off the train and away for questioning. Anything that was feared as strange or unknown was labelled 'NICA'.

The anti-NICA movement in the Tiga Dacrah was sparked by reports of events following the arrival in Jakarta of a company of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army or KNIL, quickly referred to as the 'NICA army', with the British Indian forces on 29 September. At the time of these landings, Jakarta in particular was filled with rumours about armed Dutch and Eurasian ex-internees out to assassinate Indonesian leaders and suppress the Indonesian independence movement. Unrest was increasing among the population who believed the actions of the ex-internees and the 'NICA army' threatened the Republic.²⁰

On the morning of 11 October, hostility towards Eurasians began when Slawi's entire Indo-European population were taken from their homes to the old Dukuhwringin sugar mill. About 2 p.m. people from surrounding kampungs, armed with bamboo spears, began gathering at the mill to attend 'an important mass meeting'.²¹ Leaders from the API and AMRI *pemuda* groups were also present, and after speeches the crowd demanded that the prisoners be tried by an open people's court as 'the enemies of the people were tried in the October Revolution in Russia'.²² The Eurasians were escorted out one by one to the front of the crowd where their 'errors' were read out—that they had 'betrayed the national revolution'. The crowd was then asked three times for the sentence on each person, and three times the people replied by raising both hands above their heads crying 'kill them!'. Twenty-eight years later Mrs. Tiurlan, wife of one of the Bataks, recalled her narrow escape:

My husband K. M. Sinambela was number eight, his cousin Mahuddin Pane one before him. As each person was taken onto the stage the people shouted '*Bunuh! Bunuh!*' [kill them!] Sister Rizakota (an Ambonese nurse) was still wearing her white uniform. Then they were taken away, blindfolded and killed with bamboo spears. I was at the end with an Indo girl, Meri, who was the wife of the Lurah of Kalisapu. I was already on the stage when someone shouted out that I was not an Indo, I was Javanese. It was a friend of my brother, who was in the TKR. He helped me down and we were taken with Meri to the Lurah's house.²³

While the exact number of people killed will never be known, according to Tiurlan thirty-nine died and three escaped.²⁴ In Slawi, during the height of the NICA-phobia, a 'Dutchman' could be anyone who was known to speak Dutch habitually or whose way of life was 'European'. Trains were going through Slawi with the slogan 'kill all NICA people' painted in Javanese on the sides.²⁵

In Pangkah, east of Slawi, there were no large crowds, and no open 'trials' by people roused to a frenzied anger by cries of '*bunuh!*'. The daughter of Henry Gill recalls the horror of the time. Her father, a Catholic of English descent, worked as a machinist in the Pangkah factory there. Two of Henry Gill's sons, Harry and Bernard, on their release from internment in West Java, returned to Pangkah in late September 1945. They tried to persuade their father to leave for Bandung, but he refused to go. Gill had been a close friend of the well-known local Sarekat Islam leader, Kyai Badrun, whose sons Mansur and Sidik (who had grown up with Gill's children) were leaders of API, so Gill may have thought the API youth would protect him. Some time in September Gill had been taken to a large meeting at the factory and was pushed up on a stage and made to give a speech. Apparently Henry Gill's attitude to the proclamation was ambivalent and this angered local API members.²⁶ Ellen, his oldest child, now living in Tegal, recalled in 1973:

Papa had found out beforehand that he would be killed. He prayed the whole night with his Bible. Then he got up about nine o'clock. My brother Jamie went off to get some rice, as he wanted to eat. Papa told my mother that there would be visitors coming. Then Jamie came running back out of breath. 'Mama, Mama, they are coming to kill Papa' he cried. The *pemudas* came, they shot Father in the head, in front of Mother and Jamie. He staggered to his wife but fell. The children began to cry and the *pemudas* threatened them 'if you cry you will be killed too'. We were told to go inside but from the window looking out could see Father. They hadn't shot him dead so he was rolled over and bayoneted. He was buried by neighbours in the local cemetery. Someone said that he was a Christian so they put a cross on his grave. The *pemuda* leader came back and said that Father was not a human being but a dog, and not fit to be given a decent burial.²⁷

Early in November API leader Sidik himself was killed, for this and for other acts of violence.

The most notorious vengeance killings of Eurasians in Tegal were those of the Wijk children. F. M. Wijk had been a plantation supervisor in the Balapulung sugar mill before it was closed for good as a result of the Depression. He then started a soya bean curd

business and began breeding horses. Living an 'Indies' lifestyle with his Chinese wife, he was remembered for harshness towards Javanese plantation coolies, whom he reputedly ill-treated. He apparently did business with the Japanese who, for this reason, did not intern him until a year and a half after the occupation began. Two of F. M. Wijk's sons, as members of the Dutch military, had been interned in Bandung, but the other eleven children were in Balapulang. These were taken to a well near the centre of the town, where they were beaten. Seven were killed with bamboo spears (including a girl, Anne, aged three and the youngest, Ale, aged two years) and their bodies thrown down the well. Four others managed to escape and joined their mother who was put in a local jail. After the Dutch occupation of the area in late 1947, F. M. Wijk rode into Balapulang on horseback with two colleagues and shot eleven people chosen at random, plus a further four outside the town, then moved the remains of his seven children to a nearby rice field and filled in the well.²⁸

As a result of radio broadcasts describing NICA terrorism in Jakarta, the Tegal Barisan Pelopor held discussions with remaining police which resulted in a decision to place all surviving Eurasians in the municipality in the Barisan Pelopor headquarters, where some protection was possible. Resident Besar's announcement had supported this move, which was strengthened by a phone call which the Barisan Pelopor received at its headquarters at 11.30 p.m. on the night of 11 October (the same day as the killings at Slawi and Pangkah) saying that all Indo-Europeans, Ambonese and Menadonese must be interned 'because of NICA terrorism in Jakarta'.²⁹ The following day, a message came through from Cikampek near Jakarta via the railway telegraph, which said that all Indos, Ambonese and Menadonese in Tegal should be killed in retaliation for their involvement in NICA actions in Jakarta, including the killing of innocent women and children.³⁰

Altogether during the anti-NICA movement in the Tiga Daerah over one hundred Eurasians, Ambonese, Menadonese and others who were considered 'pro-Dutch' were killed. The killings took place over a very short time, from 11-14 October. They were confined to the sugar mill settlements, and the regency towns of Tegal and Brebes. No similar violence was recorded in either Pemalang or Pekalongan regency itself, where the social upheaval had been much milder. In Pekalongan there was one incident involving a Eurasian who was kidnapped but returned to Pekalongan unharmed. This case is revealing because such lenience would have been unthinkable in the NICA-phobic atmosphere of the Tiga Daerah.

In Pemalang regency there are no recorded incidents against

Eurasians. Pemalang's more united revolutionary leadership was better able to direct popular anti-Dutch antagonism towards the town's priyayi officials, all of whom were rounded up and placed in the local jail on 20 October. In Comal W. O. McKenzie, one of the Residency's best known Eurasians and Comal's most influential citizen, still had authority to diffuse potential violence against those who were considered to be pro-NICA. In contrast to other Eurasians in Tegal and Brebes, W. O. McKenzie's authority was partly due to what people perceived as his spiritual potency—he could cure people. Although he was a plantation owner of great personal wealth, he ran a free eye clinic each day for the people of Comal and had been instrumental in building the local distillery, the market and the shops. Indeed, he was considered a founder of the town. When the entire regency, as well as much of neighbouring Pekalongan had been thrown into chaos by the anti-Chinese riots of March 1942 in the vacuum before the Japanese arrived, there had been no ransackings of shops in Comal (one of the few district towns to have a separate Chinese kampung of its own). This, it is said, was because of W. O. McKenzie's restraining influence.³¹

Often during the social revolution the chief 'butcher' became the chief revolutionary. This was part of the pattern at the height of revolutionary or anti-NICA fervour. The man who had the bravado to resort to violence became the leader, partly because, for a time at least, no one dared to oppose him.

The Eurasian killings were part of the phenomenon of the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah. They began on 11 October 1945 almost simultaneously with the outbursts of violence against the pangreh praja and the Chinese, and continued for several days. Such violence was further evidence of the breakdown of elite control in the broadest sense, which also included the pre-war nationalist movement. The leaders of revolutionary groups were powerless to protect officials, Eurasians or Chinese from the violence, and some were involved in the Eurasian killings themselves. Army leaders found themselves unable to maintain order because the TKR, as an urban-based security group, had no authority outside the regency towns. Afraid for their own safety because of the intense NICA-phobia, the TKR and the police simply refused to venture into the rural area. The police also were powerless, without arms and largely discredited for working with the Japanese. Resident Besar had no apparatus with which to enforce security.

1. *Makloemat No. 1*, Pekalongan, 17 October 1945, Besar Papers.
2. *Makloemat No. 2*, Kantor Pusat Kepolisian Karcsidenan Pekalongan, 16 October 1945, Besar Papers. (This second proclamation is actually dated a day before the first.)
3. *Makloemat No. 3*, Pemerintah Republik Indonesia Daerah Karesidenan Pekalongan, 22 October 1945, Besar Papers.
4. Muhamad Nuh, written answers to Semdam questionnaire, p. 8.
5. Marsum, writing about this proclamation calling on the people to hand over their arms, says: '... the word "people" had a wide meaning, if it applied also to the Tegal Barisan Pelopor weapons, I certainly couldn't accept it'. Written answers to author, p. 3, 6 August 1974.
6. Muhamad Nuh, Semdam answers, p. 8.
7. Wadyono, personal communication.
8. Adiwerna Verslag, p. 4, Proc. Gen.
9. These included three M.95 carbines, two pistols, two swords belonging to the *marechaussee*, as well as a bicycle. *Ibid.*
10. Interview with Brebes AMRI/PKN leader (Ramlas), Surodadi, 2 December 1975.
11. Interview with Brebes TKR company leader (Moekasim Ilyas), Yogyakarta, 11 December 1986.
12. Muhamad Nuh, Semdam answers, p. 10.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 11.
14. The Brebes PKN leadership was plagued with the same factionalism as the rest of the Brebes revolutionary movement. See pp. 181-84.
15. W. F. Wertheim, 'The Indo-European Problem in Indonesia', *Pacific Affairs*, XX (1947), p. 297.
16. *Volkstelling*, 1930, Deel 1, pp. 103, 120.
17. J. M. van der Kroef, *Indonesia in the Modern World* (Bandung, 1954), p. 276. By Dutch law, the offspring of mixed marriages take the nationality of the father, so this figure for 'Europeans' excludes Eurasians with 'non-European fathers'.
18. *Ibid.*, p. 286.
19. Ota, written answers.
20. Sukarno, letter to Mountbatten, 30 September 1947. S. L. van der Wal, *Officiële Bescheiden Betreffende de Nederlands-Indonesische Betrekkingen 1945-1950* ('s-Gravenhage, 1971), Vol. 1, pp. 125, 380.
21. The impetus for this revolutionary action came from a certain Mulyadi, about whom little is known. A native of neighbouring Jatibarang, and an ex-Heiho member, he was later involved in the removal of the camat of that subdistrict. Among Eurasians taken to the old mill were the Frederiks and Van Dongen families, who ran the local dairy, the Dychton and Van Ooyens families who had worked in the sugar mills, an Ambonese nurse Rizakota, and three Bataks—K. M. Sinambela, his wife Tiurlan and a cousin Mahuddin Pane. See the time chart appendix for the chronology of the Eurasian killings on p. 265.
22. Tegal KNI Vice-Chairman (Soesmono), written answers to author, p. 8.
23. Interview with Mrs. Tiurlan, Tegal, 22 April 1973.
24. *Ibid.* Estimates of the numbers killed vary from twenty-eight (son of

- AMRI Slawi adviser Kyai Misbah), thirty-two (secretary, Ujungrusi KNT), while another Slawi resident said forty. These included many women and children, grandparents, and at least one other Batak, Hasibuan.
25. Interview with the widow of the Camat of Margasari (Mrs. Suleman), Yogyakarta, 23 February 1973.
 26. His daughter relates that he said '*setuju tetapi anti*', meaning that while he was forced to accept the proclamation, he disagreed with it in principle. Interview with Henry Gill's daughter, Tegal, 22 April 1973.
 27. *Ibid.*
 28. The Balapulung account is from an interview in Tegal with a niece of Wijk's wife on 21 February 1973; interviews in Balapulung on 24–25 November 1975. For further examples of Eurasian killings in Brebes regency see Lucas, 'Bamboo Spear', pp. 228–230.
 29. Diary entry of Andi Penyamin, leader of the Tegal branch of the Sulawesi pemuda group KRIS.
 30. Interview with Kaharuddin Siregar, Tegal, 5 March 1973.
 31. W. O. McKenzic, a theosophist, lived on in Comal until his death in the early 1970s. According to local belief he was over one hundred when he died, a patriarchal Old Testament figure with a flowing white beard, who used to tell stories of large ships sailing up the Comal River to the town from the sea, then only five kilometres away.

Revolutionary Consciousness

'Rituals reveal values at their deepest level . . . men express in ritual what moves them most'. Victor Turner¹

What were the values that lay behind the social revolution? Outside the ethos of the Javanese bureaucratic elite, which emphasised hierarchy and social control, were Javanese traditions of social protest. In Pekalongan Residency, aspects of messianism and the social solidarity of the *lenggaongs* were part of this 'counter culture' protest tradition. The first months of the revolution provided an extraordinary opportunity for the outpouring of social protest. One crucial aspect of the conflict between the revolutionaries and the bureaucratic elite in the Tiga Daerah was the way the struggle was perceived in cultural terms as a conflict in values, which transcended differences in age, marital or economic status. What both groups—the *priyayis* and the revolutionaries—had in common as Javanese was that power was essentially spiritual. As Anderson has shown, it is the means by which that power is obtained, the rituals by which it is furthered and the objects which demonstrate its possession which vary widely.²

The Pangreh Praja Tradition

The Javanese *priyayi* tradition, of which the bureaucratic elite in Pekalongan Residency was an integral part, emphasised hierarchy, control and inner spiritual calm, a belief in privileges and duties and a reluctance to criticise authority. The rules of behaviour upholding the tradition stressed harmony and the avoidance of conflicting views, and ensured anonymity in decision making. In order to achieve the necessary *rasa halus*—refined inner sensitivity, emotional equanimity

and stability—the priyayi had to be patient, detached from the world, and ready to accept whatever happened. In this value system, inner refinement was of great importance. So were such things as posture, gesture and language and the tone in which language was expressed.³ The pangreh praja relied upon the rules of conduct for their success as administrators. Some likened the ideal pangreh praja to a priest-king, 'the ideal Javanese ruler who combines religious authority and wisdom with secular power and majesty',⁴ whose words must fit his actions. He must be of good character and must be able to mix with all groups in society without sacrificing his authority by doing so. He was prohibited from sleeping with women who did not belong to him. The breaking of this prohibition resulted in calamity such as natural disaster, sickness or crop failure.⁵

The Dutch relied on, and reinforced, the authoritarian hierarchical system of the Javanese bureaucratic elite. The camat was the 'lord' assistant, for whom villagers would '... dismount and walk when they passed his house, squat by the roadside and make obeisance with hands held above the face should they pass him by',⁶ and to whom they also gave their labour. The Japanese maintained the strict hierarchy between different ranks of pangreh praja and people. The Camat of Tonjong recalls:

During the Japanese occupation I was still addressed as 'your honour'. The form of address *ibu* [Mrs., mother], I hadn't yet heard during the Japanese occupation. There was no *bapak* [father] bupati then, it was still *ndoro kanjeng* [your lordship]. I could never call my superior 'bapak' wedana, always 'ndoro' wedana, and I was very close to him.⁷

The pangreh praja, like everyone else in Javanese society, selected the qualities they idealised from *wayang kulit* or shadow play puppets. In a poem written alongside a drawing of Kresna, a Javanese official compared the administrative priyayis to the warrior seer, 'constant and still in the centre of battle. Though the world is in flux, the good official does not alter his aims, but is everlasting and steadfast in the midst of tumult'.⁸

The Protest Tradition

Javanese society has also had a long tradition of social protest. Lenggaongs formed an essential part of this tradition and historically Pekalongan Residency has had many famous lenggaong figures. Like the priyayis the lenggaongs were in quest of power. A lenggaong relied on his guru or spiritually powerful teacher who was often head

of the *silat* fraternity of which he was a member.⁹ The ties of a *lenggaong* with his teacher as well as the latter's identity were secret; the teacher was the source of knowledge of esoteric arts, and charms thought to possess magic power. After studying for a time, a *lenggaong* would be initiated into the self-defence fraternity at a local grave or *candi*, which had special symbolic and magical significance to the surrounding population.¹⁰ In the subdistricts throughout the Tiga Dacrah there were many such graves. Each had its own powerful 'key keeper' or guardian, who not only tended the grave but who knew the various magico-religious rituals connected with them.

The sacred graves had special significance for the *lenggaongs*. They were often close to where these village stungmen lived partly for mutual solidarity and support, and partly because local authorities turned a blind eye to their activities outside the village. *Lenggaongs* maintained their spiritual power by frequent visits to the graves, and from the charms obtained from the guardian. Many of the graves of holy men had added political significance, especially in parts of the Pemalang and Tegal regencies, as places where rebels against the Dutch were buried. In southern Pemalang the most famous of these graves was the Candi Mandireja, located in the village of the same name. The revered heirloom from this grave was carried into Moga under a sacred umbrella—a symbol of its spiritual potency—to legitimise the overthrow of the Camat of Moga. The sacred umbrella is a powerful symbol, normally protecting royalty, but also sheltering other objects which have special power. Baurekso was a local folk hero believed to have been a rebel during the Mataram dynasty. Nearly every village in the Comal area of coastal Pemalang had its own Candi Baurekso. Also in Comal is Candi Sigeseng, revered as the grave of a former Pemalang bupati who, according to local legend, fought against the Dutch with Diponegoro, while followers of Diponegoro are believed to be buried in other graves nearby.

The magico-religious formulac learnt from the guardians of these graves incorporated opposition to both the village ruling elite and the pangreh praja. Thus it was believed that if any pangreh praja saw the Mandireja village sacred heirloom, he would be dismissed from his job. Similarly, no one working for the Dutch, 'including village officials', dared to make a pilgrimage to Candi Sigeseng for fear that some great misfortune would happen to themselves. Late in the occupation, after urging the people not to obey the paddy requisitioning order of the Japanese, the Islamic nationalist Haji Dulgani went into hiding at Candi Sigeseng.

The holy men had probably been long revered as dead saints when, in the early 1920s, as increasing anti-Dutch sentiment saw politicisation of the *lenggaongs* and their graves became meeting places for

the Sarekat Rakyat. Several famous *silat* teachers joined the Sarekat Rakyat. Instead of a black cap, today still a strong symbol of Indonesian national identity, they wore a red one like Sarekat Rakyat members, but sideways as a symbol of opposition. Villages that were known for their lenggaongs were often places where Sarekat Rakyat leaders lived. A lenggaong always celebrated a wedding or a circumcision with either a *tayuban* entertainment—in which people took turns with dancing girls (*ronggeng*), rice wine was drunk, and wild scenes often occurred—or a *wayang golek* puppet performance.¹¹ Instead of the traditional cycle of stories associated with this wayang form, the local Baurekso legend was used, or a very popular story called 'Semaun', the name of the PKI leader of the 1920s. This concerned a seller of ices who went about the country tearing up railway tracks—a direct reference to the 1926 rebellion. Although the Semaun story was banned in colonial times, village officials, frightened of lenggaong retribution, thought twice before reporting its performance.¹²

Sarekat Rakyat leaders used other semi-religious thanksgiving rituals for political discussions. Recognising the lenggaongs' fondness for gambling they popularised a Chinese card game which had only three players. During the game Sarekat Rakyat leaders would fill in the time telling anti-Dutch stories.¹³

Traditions of social protest rooted in Indonesian rural history arose out of psychological and economic disruption caused by land alienation, penetration by the Dutch colonial bureaucracy into indigenous rural life, taxation and the destructive effects of plantation economics on traditional systems of production and exchange. When people became aware of oppression, movements developed which promised to cleanse the disorder, reverse the destructive trends and usher in a golden age. These were sometimes, but not always, under the leadership of a messianic figure known as the *Ratu Adil* or Just King. A main thrust of the concept of the Just King was moral regeneration and purification. Some movements relied more on magical or mystical devotion and ritual to achieve the new regime, others relied on redressing the social and economic injustice by political means (for example refusing to pay taxes to the colonial government).

All the movements from the late nineteenth century were syncretic, drawing on the magic from traditional Javanese culture and on the messianic, millenarian traditions of Islam which were sometimes expressed in the concept of the Mahdi, a descendant of Mohammed sent to cleanse the world. Membership of Sarekat Islam included rituals which tied peasant members to the authority of movement leaders.

In Pekalongan Residency these processes occurred frequently

during the last few decades of colonial rule. The Japanese occupation had created even more stress and insecurity among the rural masses and was referred to as the mad age (*zaman edan*), a time of disorder in Javanese eschatological literature. In parts of the Tiga Daerah, however, millenarian predictions had begun to be heard years before the Japanese occupation.

During the 1930s, when political activity was banned by the Dutch, local activists turned to clandestine activities in order to pursue their opposition to Dutch rule. These included singing popular Javanese ballads known as *macapat* at celebrations. This loosely structured art form, like the wayang, gave radicals the chance to make up their own words, criticising the current social and political situation.¹⁴ Between songs, which were usually in old Javanese, the story was explained and, if they felt safe enough to do so, leaders used this convention to talk about future independence and the wickedness of the Dutch.

Local leaders also used the traditional ceremony of *pasang molo*, when the central roof beams of a new house are put in place and the symbolism of the ceremony to keep the new house and its inhabitants secure is explained. This included placing spices wrapped up in a red and white cloth underneath the umbrella, the symbol of power which was raised below the roof pitch. In between *macapat* verses the singer would tell of the evils of colonialism and how 'dogs of the Dutch' (*asune londo*) ate better food than village people. This phrase was often changed to 'Dutch dogs' (*asu londo*). If there were village officials present, the commentary was left out. Other protest songs taught by local nationalists were common in the Tiga Daerah during the Japanese occupation. The local version of one song, attributed to the nineteenth century poet Ronggowarsito and popularised before the war in ballads, ran:

Living in a mad age,
All actions are wrong,
Some don't have the heart to follow the madness,
If they don't follow they will not get anything,
In the end they will be hungry too.
No matter how 'fortunate' are the insane ones who have
forgotten themselves,
Still more fortunate are those who don't forget themselves
And are on their guard.¹⁵

This verse had long been popular in Java in times of economic distress and suffering, when the gap between rich and poor widened or exploitation was rife. One local nationalist, working for the information service set up by the Japanese, who taught the song, told the villagers that 'although the pangreh praja were following the mad

age, by enriching themselves through corruption, the people must not'.¹⁶

According to Anderson, in the mad age at the end of the historical cycle there is a diffusion rather than a concentration of power.¹⁷ In times of disorder such as this, as people expect a new concentration of power to emerge, Joyoboyo prophecies which expressed themselves in messianic and Just King movements are often heard.¹⁸ Such prophecies have been an important part of Javanese social history for at least the last two centuries and, being closely connected with local conditions, reflect regional variations throughout Java.¹⁹

Within the Pekalongan Residency during the Japanese occupation there were several versions of a prophecy generally referred to as 'the life of corn' (*seumur jagung*). One common interpretation went as follows: a great king (or the yellow king) would come and rule in Java for as long as the 'life of corn', then he would be defeated or driven out by the Just King. When the Japanese arrived, many believed that they would only stay for three and a half months, the life of a maize plant. When this proved wrong, the prophecy was reinterpreted to mean the great king would rule for the length of time that a dormant maize could be stored, which people said was three and a half years. The identity of the great king was not explained in the prophecy, although some said he was the Japanese emperor.

Sarekat Islam, founded in 1912, combined many elements of the Javanese protest tradition in a mass movement. Its appeal was based on people's resentment of the Chinese businessmen's monopoly of Javanese trading, and the excessive demands for material expressions of *hormat*, or respect, by the priyayi. Sarekat Islam was anti-priyayi and appealed to the grievances of ordinary people while keeping Islamic precepts to the fore. At the village level it had its corporate quasi-magic, secret symbols and oaths of allegiance, veneration of saints, and attachment to a guru. Its main aim was to redress material wrongs. This was to be achieved by a 'purification' of the civil administration, by ending economic exploitation and social injustice and by the enhancement of human dignity. It professed to be loyal to the Dutch administration if, and only if, these socio-economic imbalances were corrected. It was Islamic in that it aimed at secular and political ends by religious practices and precepts including those drawn from strands of Islamic belief which incorporated mysticism and millenarianism.

The imminent mad age was to be cleansed and followed by a just society. The corrupt ruler, which to Sarekat Islam was both the corrupt Dutch colonial and Javanese priyayi rule, would be overthrown. The willing servants of this corrupt ruler, who included those as far down the hierarchy as the lurahs, would also be overthrown.

Sarekat Islam is significant not only because of its place in the millenarian tradition of Javanese protest, but because its ideas often prefigured the 'cleansing' of local officials in the Tiga Daerah in 1945. Sarekat Islam had its own symbol of spiritual solidarity, a secret oath for mutual protection. The oath included faithfulness, fraternal love between members, helpfulness in advice and action, and loyalty to the secret symbols of Sarekat Islam. The oath and the symbols added prestige and a sense of unity and cohesion to the group, and 'bound the members in a pledge of non-betrayal and enforced solidarity against outsiders', particularly the colonial government and the priyais.²⁰

The social revolution provided an extraordinary opportunity for the outpouring of social protest. However, the overthrow of a powerful social hierarchy headed by the pangreh praja was difficult indeed. It called for a total rejection and humiliation of the 'master' and his killing or ritual humiliation in the form of the *dombreng*. In plays put on by the revolutionary movement during this period, in the *dombreng* rituals, in the campaign for more democratic speech levels, in the Islamic preference for complete equality and in the pemuda ethos, we can see a total rejection of powerful social hierarchy and an inversion of the old values. According to the pangreh praja, of course, people's actions during the social revolution simply showed they were 'confused' (*semrawut*), 'disorganised' (*morat-marit*), 'greedy' (*srakah*) and 'not acting properly' (*pating jlenting*).

The 'Revolutionary' Plays

As in other areas the plays put on in the Tiga Daerah during the social revolution rejected the old, 'normal' hierarchical values. In Pemalang, where the plays were put on by API, the star sang songs of the revolution reminding the revolutionaries of their responsibilities. Three of the plays performed reflected aspects of revolutionary consciousness and echoes of past social protest and rebellion as well as present revolution. *Untung Suropati* told the story of a seventeenth century Balinese hero, who had fought against the Dutch East India Company in Java. 'Oath of Youth' recalled the famous Oath of Youth in 1928, a landmark in the nationalist movement's quest for spiritual solidarity. 'At the End of the Bamboo Spear' was about the unity of the common people and youth, whose only weapons were bamboo spears, while a later play actually composed in November 1945, 'In Front of the Barbed Wire', told the story of the heroic resistance of the people against the British assault on Surabaya earlier that month.²¹

A play performed during the social revolution in Brebes even more pointedly symbolised what the revolution was about in the popular mind: the overthrowing of authority, be it that of the lurah, the pangreh praja or the Dutch. 'The Servant Confronts his Master' (*Bedinda Berani dengan Majikan*) was about someone working as a servant for a Dutchman managing a rubber plantation. The manager abused his servant and said the Javanese were universally stupid and destined always to be ruled by the Dutch. The servant escaped from him and formed a group called the Underground Brigade which one day ambushed and killed the Dutchman on his plantation. The planter's wife asked the authorities for help and members of the underground were rounded up and imprisoned. While they were in jail the proclamation occurred, the authorities were defeated, but not before the hero of the story, the servant was killed.²²

In many areas of Pekalongan Residency, lurahs were addressed as 'master' or 'chief' (*majikan lurah*) until the end of the Japanese occupation. Thus *majikan* can be applied to Javanese servant-master relations at the village level. The Wedana of Pangkah, for example, said he was waiting for 'the old master' (*majikan yang lama*), to return, meaning the Dutch. The specifically anti-colonial associations are also symbolised by the word *bedinda* taken from the Dutch word *bediende* meaning servant or employee.

Democracy in Language

The role of language in reinforcing the priyayi's authoritarian system of values was crucial in Java. Of the three speech levels in Javanese, the priyayi were most adept at using *kromo* or high Javanese, an essentially honorific language spoken 'up the social hierarchy' by inferiors to their superiors.²³ The pangreh praja, who were clever at using words as weapons, used *kromo* when speaking to villagers as a means of social control. Members of the Saminist movement—a radical peasant movement near Blora on Java's north coast—were known to have rejected high Javanese earlier as part of their rejection of the authority of officials. At Sarekat Islam meetings in Pekalongan in 1919 the speaker would announce that he was going to address the crowd in *Jawa Dipo*, the name of a movement current at the time to speak only in low Javanese.²⁴ This movement was unpopular with both the European Civil Service and the pangreh praja, 'who regarded it as "undermining authority" and dangerously democratic'.²⁵ Tjipto Mangoenkoesomo, a Western-educated Javanese radical, had the same feeling about Javanese, and demanded its abandonment altogether as 'a language of slaves and a barrier to progress'.²⁶

Overthrowing the 'master' during the social revolution meant also rejection of his language. Soepangat, the Pcmalang leader, always spoke in low Javanese at public meetings because, in using it, a person can be more direct, critical and emphatic. Even the most 'high born' revolutionaries such as Raden Sakirman, the AMRI Slawi leader (a priyayi from Yogyakarta), sometimes spoke low Javanese in meetings with local revolutionary leaders and the pemudas.

Tiga Daerah leaders encouraged people to drop the use of aristocratic titles and forms of address. The only announcement that the radical Sardjio issued during his four days in office as Resident of Pekalongan in December was concerned with how to establish a government based on 'democracy and fraternity'. As a first step in this direction he decreed that in both written and verbal communications between the government and the people, the word *bapak* should be used in addressing all officials, from '*Bapak*' Resident downwards; otherwise *bung* or *saudara* (brother), were to be used. Terms of address such as 'your honour', 'servant' and of course 'master' were to be banned forever in the Residency of Pekalongan.²⁷

Popular Front leader K. Midjaja, when visiting the Jatibarang sugar mill, told employees of the mill:

'Beginning now there are no longer any *Raden Mas*, *Kanjeng Gusti* or *Raden Tumenggung* [high priyayi titles]. Everyone is the same now. If you mention the President you don't need to use *Paduka yang Mulia* [Your Excellency], it is enough to say Bung Karno. Likewise other important people should be called *Bung*. You should not be afraid of others, all are the same. *Kromo* is no longer necessary. You should all use just *ngoko* [low Javanese] and Indonesian.²⁸

Equality of language was important to the revolutionaries, but how were they to change traditional ways? Maksum, a pangreh praja turned revolutionary, had this problem when he spoke to the prisoners in Pekalongan jail:

'This is a new government not like the previous one before. In principle, we are socialist'. The prisoners replied in high Javanese 'Yes, your lordship' (*inggi ndoro*). Maksum said, 'Stop! You must speak low Javanese (*ngoko*). Now there are no longer any masters (*ndoro*) just speak in *ngoko*.' Maksum tried to get the prisoners to speak *ngoko*. Pointing to the prisoners in turn he said 'This is *bapak* number one, this is *bapak* number two'. The convicted prisoners didn't agree. They said 'Yes, Your Lordship' again.

The former jailer thought this story was very funny. 'You can't change the attitude of the people in this way.' Besides, said the jailor, Maksum came from a feudal background. The servants in his house

were said to address his wife as *ndoro* and had to bow low to them both.²⁹

The traditional response from generations of peasants burdened with exactions and impositions of various kinds by the colonial power through the *pangreh praja* was 'Yes, your lordship'—'*Inggi ndoro*'. Polite respect was thus automatically given to Maksum, a government *priyayi*, even if he had thrown in his lot with the revolutionaries. Maybe if the jail inmates had been outside holding a gun and not in prison their response might have been different.

A language revolution of the kind implied in the above story was of great importance in Java because the *pangreh praja* used high Javanese not only to maintain social hierarchy, but to restore order and stability in situations which appeared 'insecure'. Thus the *pangreh praja* were told, according to the acting Pekalongan TKR Commander Wadyono (a former *camat*), that if they went to a village where there was a disturbance they had to speak before anyone else and in high Javanese. In this way 'we would win because our language was more refined'. At all costs one had to avoid allowing the people to speak first in the common language in such situations, because they could then express their demands strongly and with anger, while in high Javanese they could not. By using high Javanese first the *pangreh praja* could 'lull the people to sleep' (*menina-bobokkan*) that is, keep them subdued after any trouble by forcing them to speak with 'refined feelings' in high Javanese. Wadyono recalls that Kutil was 'easily beaten' in this way.³⁰

The revolutionary demand for more democratic forms of address can be linked to the preference by one revolutionary for the wayang puppet Bima. A fearsome warrior, who has the 'strength of the wind, and power to destroy mountains', Bima never walks at a slow pace (a hallmark of the *priyayi*) but travels over mountains and seas and through deserts and forests with great strides. 'Merciless to his enemies, gigantic, ungainly, heavily muscled, hairy, with protruding eyes, and thunderous voice . . .', his behaviour is the opposite of the aristocratic refinement of the *priyayis*, epitomised by Bima's elder brother, Judistira.³¹ He always speaks in the common tongue, even to the gods. When speakers began in Indonesian at Sarekat Islam meetings in Pekalongan saying that they would continue in Jawa Dipo, or low Javanese, this was greeted with thunderous applause and shouts of 'we agree with Seno's way!' Seno was the youthful name of Bima.

The 'Dombreng' Phenomenon

The *dombreng* ritual, characteristic of the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah during October 1945, was the servant's means of overthrowing the master. A typical *dombreng* action followed a pattern. A crowd would arrive at the house of the accused person and break into it. If the person was found, he was taken out, presented to the crowd and paraded around, often with a necklace of paddy, to the 'breng dong breng' of empty tins and sticks being beaten. This always occurred during the day so that the maximum number of people could see the corrupt person, and he would be humiliated as much as possible. Thus what had been the traditional village method of exposing thieves who were caught, in October 1945 became a powerful form of political protest aimed at exposing corruption.

At one level the *dombreng* phenomenon exposed the corrupt official in a symbolic public unmasking and shaming rather than through violence. On another level, the *dombreng* was a ritual degradation of the master, or a ritual of status reversal.³² But it was not only officials who were unmasked and ritually degraded. A pemuda caught gambling in one village had to wear a necklace of the cards as he was paraded around the village by Pesindo. In both urban and rural areas *dombreng* rituals had a strong moralistic tone about them. In a Pemalang coastal village a man was *dombreng*-ed for having intercourse with his stepdaughter, while in a Tegal urban kampung an older man discovered to be sleeping with someone else's wife was *dombreng*-ed around naked. Perhaps these types of *dombreng* were part of a millennial expectation that a new 'golden' age of righteousness, a new concentration of power after the mad age, was about to emerge. Such was the fear of being ritually humiliated by *dombreng* that urban thieves in Tegal were known to 'give themselves up', join the local BKR and promise not to steal again, for fear of being *dombreng*-ed.³³

'Equality and Fraternity'

Egalitarian values, which were part of the revolutionary consciousness, were also fundamental to Islam. In Pekalongan municipality in 1919 the Sarekat Islam was demanding equal rights or *hak sama rata* for both priyayis and kampung dwellers. 'If their street has running water so should ours, if ours are dark, theirs should be without proper lighting, equal rights for everyone' was the demand of the active Pekalongan Sarekat Islam.³⁴ Equal rights apparently did not apply to the priyayis. 'The priyayis do not need equal treatment but we the little people (*kromo*) need it.'³⁵

The sentiment expressed in the phrase *sama rata sama rasa* had great meaning for Indonesian nationalists as well. First coined in 1918, the phrase expressed widespread expectations of a golden age coming with a Just King.³⁶ *Rasa* is a Javanese word rich with many connotations, one of which is inner spiritual feeling.³⁷ *Sama rasa* suggests a sharing of soul or inner being between those who are in the same struggle together. One could be *sama rasa*—one soul—at a sacred grave, in a fraternity, in the Sarekat Rakyat, or speaking low Javanese together at Sarekat Islam meetings.

This was expressed during the height of the social revolution when local revolutionaries, who had seized power, redistributed stocks of rice and cloth held by the *pangreh praja* to villagers according to *sama rata sama rasa*. It was probably not possible to distribute the cloth according to need everywhere at that time but, as we have seen, there was an incident in Talang where Kutil's insistence on rigid adherence to equal amounts for everyone meant no one got a big enough piece to use for anything.³⁸

The *sama rata sama rasa* populist ideology was taken up in different ways by all the left-wing groups at the national level, though at a popular level it may have meant quite different things. One aim at the national level, according to Prime Minister Sjahrir's leadership, was 'to struggle towards a society of *sama rata sama rasa* egalitarian collectivism'.³⁹ For Pesindo youth it meant 'collective happiness, collective welfare and collective sovereignty'.⁴⁰

Janur Kuning

The symbolism of the young yellow leaf of the coconut palm, *janur kuning*, is also firmly rooted in Javanese culture, where this versatile tree has always been considered a source of spiritual power. In the Banyumas area, *janur kuning* flags flutter above effigies of the rice goddess, Dewi Sri, with offerings at the edge of the rice fields. Elsewhere in Java, for example, *janur kuning* is traditionally used to decorate the main arched entrance to a wedding reception, whether or not it is Muslim, and is associated with potency to ward off evil spirits.

In the Javanised version of the Ramayana epic when Rama sets out to burn the city of Ngalingka accompanied by the white monkey Hanuman, the monkey decorates his house with *janur kuning* as protection against danger. Nowadays, putting a cross of *janur kuning* above a doorway is thought to ward off illness or prevent evil spirits from entering a Javanese house.

During the revolution in the Tiga Daerah, *janur kuning* was used

by the combatants on both sides of the revolutionary struggle.⁴¹ For some it was a means of obtaining invulnerability, or the spiritual power, a charm which would protect the wearer during the fighting. Kutil's AMRI Talang were known by the *janur kuning* slings, headbands or armbands they wore, especially in the attack on Tegal City on 4 November, and in the takeover of the Residency capital in December. In the clashes which followed imprisonment of Tiga Daerah leaders in Pekalongan, villagers defending themselves in the Tiga Daerah also wore *janur kuning*.

Revolutionary Culture

The revolutionary consciousness was reflected in the use of Indonesian language, greetings and nicknames to unite poor youth with older leaders of struggle groups. Although the Indonesian language press played a part as a national unifier before the war, it was not until the Japanese occupation that Indonesian was spoken widely and taught in schools as the national language. During the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah, such Indonesian words as freedom (*merdeka*), blood (*darah*), personal liberty (*bebas*), and brother (*bung*) became used as greetings, 'the expression of a hopeful new enterprise and solidarity'.⁴² Revolutionary spirit (*semangat*) underlay everything one did.

The ethos of the struggle groups which controlled the regency capitals reflected the new solidarity, and the inversion of old elite values. The very opposite of hierarchical in structure, loosely knit yet close, they made decisions in a non-authoritarian way. People turned up for guard duty when they felt like it, understood what they had to do and where they had to be. Refined feelings, posture, gesture, tone of voice, and all forms of respect were irrelevant. All that mattered now was enthusiasm and being free.

While the younger *pemuda rakyat* or poor youth had to learn to say the word *proklamasi*, the word *merdeka* was not so strange. An Australian war correspondent, travelling with the presidential entourage to East Java in early December 1945, wrote that trains pulled up 'amidst a vast roar of "Merdekas" . . . [People thought it] a fine thing to have the privilege of shouting "Merdeka" . . . [and] speeches always ended with a triple "Merdeka" salute, thunderously returned by the crowd'.⁴³ Merdeka was the universal greeting, the nation-wide salute, the word of acclamation.

But what did 'merdeka' mean to the revolutionaries? For a Tiga Daerah *camat* it was a cry 'which united the old and the young'.⁴⁴ For the *pemuda* leader over fifty at the time of the proclamation, and

manning the road blocks in Brebes, it had both an ideological and a personal meaning. While it meant first and foremost that the Dutch must be destroyed, saying the greeting 'merdeka' also meant that 'with a bold heart I was not afraid to die' (*hati besar tidak takut mati*). In this man's consciousness 'merdeka' and the news of the proclamation were inseparable. Hearing the news of the latter set his blood 'on fire' to defend independence. The cry '*Keluar! Merdeka!*' (Come out! Be Free!) heard everywhere, was a call to locate the enemy by manning the road blocks.⁴⁵

In Surabaya, the slogan 'it is better to bathe in blood, than to be colonized' became popular and in Pemalang the greeting '*darah*' (blood), said with both fists clenched and raised above the head, became as important as '*merdeka*'. It symbolised 'one soul, one struggle,' the essence of the struggle against the Dutch. For others, it meant the blood of the colonialists if they dared to come back, the daring of young heroes defending their country; it could also forebode revenge for the bitterness and suffering of the Japanese period.⁴⁶

Bung as a term of address also expressed the new egalitarian fraternity of the revolution. During October 1945, Wadyono, the acting TKR commander and former camat, went to the Hotel Merdeka in Pekalongan with a guest. Forgetting the times, he called out '*jongos! jongos!* [boy!]', in the way the Dutch used to call their male servants. There was silence, then a voice called out 'there are no *jongos* any more'. The TKR commander felt that deep down 'He was right and I was wrong. I called the servant *bung*'.⁴⁷

Two other catchwords of the revolutionary consciousness at the time were '*semangat*' (revolutionary spirit) and '*bebas*' (personal liberty). According to a contemporary Pemalang observer, 'If a person didn't have spirit he was not considered a pemuda. He just acted the pemuda'. The reply to 'Merdeka!', at least in the Comal area of Pemalang, was '*Bebas!*' (Be free!) with the left hand held up.⁴⁸

During the social revolution period several characteristics came to typify genuine membership of the revolutionary movement. Participation in guard duty was obligatory but no one ever gave orders about this; it was part of the revolutionary consciousness to understand the need to do guard duty. Anyone not active was quickly suspected of being 'the enemy' and even punished. But freedom to come and go existed; nothing should be too organised; each person was seeking his own freedom in the exhilaration of looking for new personal liberty, which in turn formed a new consciousness.

Not all poor youth had this revolutionary consciousness, of course. There were those who used the newly won 'freedom' in anti-social ways; a few turned out for guard duty for the wrong reasons. As

compensation for this duty in the regency towns, the *pemudas* received *nasi ponggol*, rice wrapped up in banana leaves cooked in public kitchens. This is where the activist girls also worked, as well as doing their share of guard duty. For elite *pemudas* who could already afford to eat well, this *nasi ponggol* was no better (or worse) than everyday food but for the poor youth of the *kampungs* and villages who had drifted into the towns, it was an improvement. There were a few *pemudas*, nicknamed '*pemuda ponggol*' by one leader, because they were reluctant to relieve their fellows on guard duty if the rice packets had not arrived—'if guaranteed *ponggol*, he wanted to become a *pemuda*!'.⁴⁹

Being a *pemuda*, then, did not depend on age, education or marital status, although traditionally a *pemuda* was someone unmarried (only single youth could join the pre-war Indonesia Muda). *Pemudas* were simply people with revolutionary spirit. Those *pemudas* who had Western schooling (as had all the leaders of the urban and larger rural groups) were more restrained than the *pemuda rakyat* caught up in the NICA-phobia. 'I also hated the politics of the Dutch', said a Tegal leader, 'but not to the extent of those who were involved in the killings at Slawi'.⁵⁰

Those *pemudas* who shared the revolutionary consciousness of the time, according to a Muslim leader:

wanted personal freedom yet didn't understand the meaning of independence, they were more concerned with military drill and sowing the seeds of dissatisfaction against the Dutch. What did the *pemudas* talk about? Only one thing, defending the country.⁵¹

Only those who could forget about work and family were regarded as part of the movement. A person who shared the revolutionary consciousness 'didn't think about his hoe, or his buffalo, but only thought about war. He didn't think of anything but the struggle'.⁵²

The range of attitudes within *pemuda* ranks is illustrated by Pekalongan's *Pemuda Permi*, whose members—all Dutch educated—were sons of Pekalongan Residency *priyayi* officials who lived in Jalan Permi. *Pemuda Permi* members were most active at the time of the proclamation when they distributed posters which read 'Freedom or Death'. The *Pemuda Permi* also hauled down the Japanese flag in front of the Pekalongan district office, but unlike the militant Pekalongan railway activists, they failed to replace the Japanese flag with the Red and White. Indeed, these *pemudas* spent more of their time being frivolous and daring, by taking lights off cars, valves from radios, and writing 'Freedom or Death' on the Japanese Resident's car.⁵³ A veteran of the early nationalist movement referred to them

as a bunch of adventurers whose behaviour and actions the revolutionary pemudas rather despised.⁵⁴

Another official pemuda group, called the Office Youth (*Angkatan Muda Kantor*), was sponsored by Pemalang's pangreh praja which appointed its leadership. Its membership apparently came exclusively from the various levels of the government bureaucracy.⁵⁵ The pangreh praja tried to use the Office Youth, as well as the KNI, to control the Pemalang revolutionary movement and even set up a United Indonesian Younger Generation, which was ridiculed by the revolutionaries and never functioned.

The revolutionary spirit inspired older people as well as the pemudas. Most of the pemuda leaders in the Tiga Daerah were married, unlike their counterparts in Jakarta, and many were over thirty years of age. In fact Tiga Daerah struggle group leaders were mostly older members of the early nationalist movement, such as Kartohargo and Slamet (Brebes), Soewignjo and Muhammad Nuh (Tegal), Soepangat and Amir (Pemalang), who provided crucial leadership to the younger, inexperienced poor youth. It was not just a question of elders leading quietly from behind; in some cases they were at the front in real pemuda-style actions. The Bupati of Pemalang, for example, was kidnapped by fifteen pemudas, led by two older Pemalang nationalists Soemargo and Rustmadji.⁵⁶ Soemargo was a member of the Sarekat Rakyat who had been dismissed from his job as a village school teacher before the 1926 communist rebellion and appointed as village secretary by the assistant Resident, to try and prevent his radical activities. Now a Pesindo leader at Banjardawa sugar mill, a fiery public speaker and leader of Pemalang's police, he was fifty-one years of age in 1945.

People with enthusiasm, even if they were over fifty years of age, shared in the revolutionary spirit. The Pangkah KNI chairman and newly elected revolutionary wedana was going on a regular tour to villages with the district secretary. As they were passing a village pemuda guard post, an older man stood up and shouted 'Merdeka!':

It was a well known gambler, a *pencoleng*, someone who broke down walls (to enter people's houses). 'Merdeka!' [he greeted me]. I got down from the *dokar* [horse cart]. I asked him 'Who are you?' 'I am pemuda Marto'. I laughed a long time. He was already fifty years old yet he called himself a pemuda. It was funny but true. He had the feelings of a pemuda. I said 'Hey, you've got white hair coming out of your ears, what about that?' He replied, 'Ya, Merdeka!' I understood his lightheartedness how really happy he was. Merdeka meant not being ruled again. Merdeka meant happiness, before there was suffering, but in the future there would be no more poverty.⁵⁷

Ties between the *pemudas* and the older leaders were strengthened by the custom of giving nicknames which referred to physical traits or eccentric behaviour. An old Javanese peasant custom, typical of societies where peasants do not have 'surnames', such names were used as a code for members of the radical pre-war underground, particularly those in prison, for protection against Dutch spies. Often epithets referred to personal habits or physical flaws. Thus in Pemalang where nicknames were most popular, reflecting the cohesiveness of the radical group, K. Midjaja had been known from pre-war days as *cempluk* because he was short like a small lamp (*cemplik*) with a round protruding stomach (*nyempluk*). The Pemalang API leader Sukarso was known as Karso *gebog* because he was short and slightly plump like the *gebog*, the storage place for small farmers' paddy. Amir *codot*, the veteran communist, gained his nickname because, like the *codot* bird, he loved bananas. Partly an inversion of priyayi propriety the nickname style in Pemalang (and to a lesser extent in Tegal or Brebes) reflects the influence of older radicals throughout the Tiga Daerah. One leader said that the *pemudas* were activated initially by the older leaders rather than on their own initiative.⁵⁸

Priyayi Perspectives

Both the revolutionaries and the priyais believed in the importance of spiritual potency in any conflict. The Pekalongan *pangreh praja* saw the conflict during the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah in two ways: first, as a contest between two different kinds of aura or radiance (*wahyu*) which were manifestations of spiritual potency or power: and second, as a contest between the two opposing sides of the *wayang*. Explaining the defeat of the revolutionaries retrospectively, Kutil and Sardjio were said to have received 'black' radiance or power (*wahyu tinangkal*), whereas the TKR leader Wadyono was able to defeat Sardjio because he had received the authentic, divine spiritual power (*wahyu cakraningrat*).⁵⁹ According to the Pekalongan *wedana*, in the beginning all *wahyu* was 'white', but because it had been used for personal ambition it had become black. The priyais believed that the new Resident had obtained his *wahyu* in the wrong way. The fact that the TKR won in Pekalongan priyayi circles legitimised the *wahyu* of its leader Wadyono, and emphasised the perceived deviation of Sardjio's revolutionary supporters from customary order and harmony.

In 1974 the TKR commander claimed that a dream of his, on the night before the counter-revolution started, illustrated this duality of spiritual power. This dream, he said, had changed his mind about

adapting to the new government led by Sardjio, the communist Resident of Pekalongan. In the dream, a black flag appeared with the words 'from outside Java' (*saka jaba Jawa*). This meant, so Wadyono said in 1974, that the PKI was 'an import, not indigenous,' and therefore, presumably, should be resisted, an unlikely perception in 1945.⁶⁰

However the words '*saka jaba Jawa*' also reflect the past use of the pangreh praja as a prop for the colonial state and a weapon against new political groups. Sarekat Islam had been resisted strongly by the pangreh praja as a 'foreign', that is Islamic, cultural and political influence. For the pangreh praja communism was also 'from outside Java', to be resisted even more strongly.

But the revolutionaries too regarded their enemies as 'from outside Java'. The pangreh praja's social and political base had been the colonial power. Their Western lifestyle, their use of Dutch, their suspicion of Islam in an area where Islamic culture was strong, had made them appear just as foreign to the early nationalist movement as modernist Islam and the PKI were to the pangreh praja. Muslim-led opposition to the priyayis had been part of the tradition of Islamic revivalist movements in Java which opposed those whose faith had been corrupted by Javanese mysticism and by working with the colonial government.

The idea of combat between two opposite camps, the Pendawa on the right of the puppeteer and the Kurawa on his left, is a fundamental principle underlying the Javanese wayang stories. Not surprisingly, the conflict which came to a head in Pekalongan in December 1945 between the social revolutionaries and the TKR was seen within this wayang framework, just as a later and much more cataclysmic confrontation in 1965 was also seen in terms of the same Pendawa-Kurawa conflict.⁶¹ Thus, in the conflict with the social revolutionaries, the Wedana of Pekalongan believed that the TKR would win, because in the wayang 'the right side [i.e. the Pendawas] always wins'. Which side in the wayang was identified with the TKR and the pangreh praja, and which with the revolutionaries depended on one's perspective. In any event the outcome of the real Tiga Daerah shadow play was in doubt until the end.

1. *The Ritual Process* (Chicago, 1969), p. 6.

2. See Anderson, 'The Idea of Power', pp. 8-19.

3. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Modern Indonesia*, pp. 187-188.

4. Anderson, *Mythology and Tolerance of the Javanese*, p. 74.

5. Sarimin, 'Kenang-Kenangan' memoir, p. 66.
6. Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite*, p. 25.
7. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 19 October 1976.
8. Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite*, p. 163.
9. As a powerful natural leader outside any government structure, along with the haji, the kyai and *dukun* (healer, seer), the guru is part of '... an unofficial religious elite, ... supported neither by the state nor the village budget, but often (with) large and devoted personal followings'. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, 'Agrarian Radicalism in Java: Its Setting and Development', in Holt, *Culture and Politics*, p. 78.
10. *Ibid.*, p. 80.
11. See Robert W. Hefner, 'The Politics of Popular Art: *Tayuban* dance and culture change in East Java', *Indonesia* 43 (April 1987), pp. 75-6. *Wayang golek*, popular in more devoutly Muslim villages in West Java, uses three dimensional carved wooden puppets with its own Panji cycle of stories.
12. Comal nationalist leader (Panji Suwarso), written answers, September 1975.
13. *Ibid.*
14. Margaret Kartomi notes that 'macapat song ... acted as a form of psychological refuge from the demoralising effect of political and economic control by the colonial power'. See *Matjapat Songs in Central and West Java* (Canberra, 1973), p. 28.
15. For another of the many versions of this song see C. Geertz, *Religion of Java* (New York, 1964), p. 281.
16. Transcript of taped interview with Sugiono, II/16, Talang, 27 November 1975.
17. Anderson, 'The Idea of Power' in Holt, *Culture and Politics*, pp. 21-22.
18. See Penders, *Indonesia: Select Documents on Colonialism and Nationalism*, pp. 183-88; I. J. Brugmans et al. (eds), *Nederlandsch-Indie onder Japane Bezetting 1942-1945* (Franeker, 1960), p. 143; and Sidik Kertapati, *Sekitar Proklamasi 17 Agustus 1945*, p. 15, on how the Japanese used the Joyoboyo prophecy.
19. See Sartono Kartodirdjo, 'Agrarian Radicalism', pp. 92-125.
20. For the oath and secret code, see Sartono Kartodirdjo, *Protest Movements*, pp. 183, 198. fn. 75.
21. In Solo, such plays were also popular. See John Thompson, *Hubbub in Java* (Sydney, 1946), pp. 78-79.
22. Interview with Brebes PKN leader (Ramilas), Surodadi village, 2 December 1975.
23. Anderson writes that 'high Javanese is *par excellence* the language of the priyayi ... developed largely to emphasise and "build into" the larger Javanese language the increasing hierarchisation of Javanese society and the influence of Dutch pressure and later control'. B. R. O. 'G. Anderson, 'The Languages of Indonesian Politics', *Indonesia*, 1 (April 1966), p. 96. For a discussion of language and spiritual potency in Java see Ward Keeler, *Javanese Shadow Plays, Javanese Selves* (Princeton, 1987), pp. 28-32.

24. Nagazumi Akira, *The Dawn of Indonesian Nationalism: The Early Years of the Budi Utomo, 1908-1918* (Tokyo Institute of Developing Economies, 1972), p. 193 fn. 26.
25. Sutherland, *The Making of a Bureaucratic Elite*, p. 91.
26. Ki Hadjar Dewantara, quoted by Anthony Reid, in 'Indonesia: Revolution without Socialism' in Robin Jeffrey (ed.), *Asia: the Winning of Independence* (London, 1981), p. 126.
27. *Pengoemoeman Pemerintah Repoeblik Daerah Karesidenan Pekalongan* No. 1/B signed Bapak Resident Sardjio, Pekalongan, 11 December 1945, Proc. Gen.
28. Interview with Jatibarang sugar mill employee (Soepardi), Tegal, 19 November 1975.
29. Interview with Pekalongan jailer (Sudarso), Jakarta, 15 October 1976. Maksu, the son of a wedana, was born in 1901. He graduated from Mosvia, the training school for 'Javanese' civil servants, in 1930, but was dismissed from his job as public prosecutor in Brebes for corruption by the Dutch, an unprecedented event which sent shock waves through the priyayi corps at the time. Wadyono, personal communication.
30. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 27 August 1971.
31. Anderson, *Mythology and Tolerance of the Javanese*, p. 12; see also Hardjowirogo, *Sedjarah Wayang Purwa* (Jakarta, 1965), p. 133.
32. Such rituals, according to Turner, are a characteristic of transitional periods when society becomes 'unstructured and relatively undifferentiated'. A second feature of such periods is heightened magico-religious activity, such as the use of charms and amulets for protection. Turner, *The Ritual Process*, pp. 102, 106, 109. On the theme of reversal or inversion, see also Rodney Needham (ed.), *Right and Left: Essays on Dual Symbolic Classification* (Chicago, 1973).
33. Interview with Tegal regency KNI vice-chairman (Soesmono), Semarang, 8 October 1976.
34. *Neratja*, 2 September 1918.
35. *Neratja*, 29 August 1918.
36. Takashi Shiraishi, 'Disputes between Tjipto Mangocnkoesomo and Soetatmo Soerio Koesomo: Satria vs. Pandita', *Indonesia*, 32 (October 1981), p. 94.
37. For some examples of what the Javanese mean by *rasa*, see Geertz, *Religion of Java*, pp. 238-39.
38. Interview with Talang KNI leader (Soewachno), Tegal, 7 December 1975. Each person apparently got about thirteen centimetres which the KNI leader called 'a mad decision'. See also pp. 109-10.
39. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, p. 203.
40. The *Pesindo* magazine, *Revolusioner* 4 (26 January 1946), pp. 6-7, gives this interpretation of the phrase.
41. At the beginning of the violent conflict between the aristocrats and their Islamic opponents in Aceh early in 1946, a Japanese captain, who had remained in the area after the main Japanese forces withdrew, noticed that the marching lines of demonstrators '... had palm leaves tied

- around their necks . . . which . . . were also symbols of combat'. See Ushiyama Mitsuo, 'Conflict in Aceh after Independence' in Reid and Oki, *The Japanese Experience*, p. 385.
42. Anderson, 'Languages of Indonesian Politics', *Indonesia* 1 (April 1966), p. 105.
 43. Thompson, *Hubbub in Java*, pp. 72, 73, 76. 'Merdeka' comes from the Sanskrit maharddhika meaning 'free' or 'freedom'. In early colonial Batavia mahardikers were free men i.e. not slaves.
 44. Camat of Randudongkal (Soejatno), memoir, August 1975.
 45. Interview with pemuda leader (Bang Dana), Brebes, 6 December 1975.
 46. Songs and poems using the theme of *darah*, and even a short story with that title, can be found in issues of the magazine *Revolusioner* throughout 1946.
 47. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 19 October 1976. The Dutch word for boy, *jongen*, became *jongos* in Indonesian usage.
 48. Interview with the revolutionary Camat of Comal (Suleman), Jakarta, 1 December 1976.
 49. Interview with Pemalang API leader (Satiman), Pemalang, 9 February 1975.
 50. Interview with Soesmono, Semarang, 8 October 1976.
 51. Interview with Pemalang Hizbullah leader (Nur Effendi), Pemalang, 16 February 1975.
 52. Interview with Brebes pemuda leader (Bang Dana), Brebes, 6 December 1975.
 53. Interview with Pemuda Permi member (Mohamad Anwar), Jakarta, 30 July 1975.
 54. Transcript of taped interview with Pemalang schoolteacher (Subechi), II/19, Pekalongan, 3 May 1975.
 55. Bupati of Pekalongan, 'Jawaban', 20 June 1946, Proc. Gen.
 56. Rustmadji, a graduate of the Prinses Juliana Technical School in Yogyakarta and a second cousin of Soepangat was about 39 at the time. See Chapter 8 for a full description of this incident.
 57. Interview with Soegiono, Tegal, 27 November 1975.
 58. Interview with Soesmono, Semarang, 8 October 1976.
 59. *Tinangkal* means to 'push away or aside', reflecting the pangreh praja perception of how the new Resident came to power. *Cakraningrat* is the real power, *wayhu kekuasaan*. Interview with the Wedana of Pekalongan (Soeprapto), Semarang, 25 August 1971.
 60. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 27 August 1971 and 21 November 1974. For Wadyono, the black flag had associations with the palace in Yogyakarta where a black flag of the *kraton* was taken out at night and paraded around the town whenever the kingdom was threatened by an epidemic or some grave external danger. Reasons for the TKR action against the new Residency regions are discussed on pp. 224-226.
 61. G. J. Resink, 'From the Old Mahabharata to the New Ramayana Order', paper presented to the 6th IAHA Conference, Yogyakarta, 26-30 August 1974.

Revolution Reaches the Regency Towns

In both Pemalang and Tegal social upheaval began in the southern hinterland areas, and spread northwards to the coastal subdistricts. Although in the town of Pemalang word had been received that villagers to the south were gathering for some kind of protest, the main impetus for overthrowing the old order came from groups within the poorer kampungs of the town itself. In Tegal a mass demonstration starting at AMRI headquarters in Slawi marched northwards to take over the regency capital on 4 November. In Brebes ethnic hostility, fuelled by rumours, erupted into revolutionary violence against both Chinese and Eurasian communities.

After the proclamation, communication between the countryside and all the regency towns was difficult. Motor vehicles were scarce; there were no buses and even fewer cars, while there was a shortage of inflatable rubber tyres for bicycles. The railway, the main means of transport, linked the regency capitals along the coastal plain. There was one rail link south, running from Tegal to the main southern line, and only slower trains stopped at smaller stations. Urban leaders had few contacts with their rural counterparts.

The social upheaval which began in the countryside in early October made communications between the regency capitals and the rural hinterland even more difficult. Revolutionary leaders who had a good picture of the rural situation were exceptional. One such leader was Tegal KNI vice-chairman Soesmono, who made frequent visits to BKR posts and also supervised elections of new camats. Most people were afraid to venture out of the towns anywhere for fear of being kidnapped or losing their lives. Travel was slow even along the main north coast road because of continual road blocks. The fate of many officials was unknown.¹ Many sought safety in the regency capitals, but the social upheaval soon caught up with them there.

Pemalang: 'the perahu steering oar is broken.'

In Pemalang the past was wiped out in a night. Acting on rumours of an impending attack on the town from the south, revolutionary leaders decided to put the bupati in jail temporarily for his own safekeeping. At mid afternoon on Friday 19 October, Bupati R.T. Rahardjo Sosro Adikoesoemo was sitting in his *pendopo* with his patih, when a bus belonging to the Comal sugar mill entered the regency compound at high speed and drove up to the front of the *pendopo*. About fifteen pemuda, led by Rustamadji and Sumargo (two well known older nationalists), jumped out and surrounded the *pendopo*. Acting instinctively according to protocol, the surprised bupati asked his 'guests' to be seated. This gesture was not reciprocated. Instead Rustamadji, waving a pistol, said there was no time to waste. The bupati and his patih must remove themselves to a 'place of protection', namely the local jail, as attack on the regency offices was imminent. The bupati felt he had done nothing wrong, nor did he think he was about to be attacked. He would discuss the matter with the patih first. However this, and his request to take leave of his wife, was refused. As Rustamadji was by now holding his pistol 'as if he were about to use it',² the bupati and his deputy decided to go with the group, but left a message with a servant for the bupati's wife, instructing her to take great care of Pemalang's sacred heirloom, a kris called Mbah Tapa.

The climax of the social revolution swiftly followed. In a night of violence the houses of a lurah and the Camat of Pemalang were set on fire, and many others looted. The violence began with the killing of Djoewito, a former agricultural adviser during the Dutch time, who had been responsible for the distribution of cloth during the occupation. He had been having a meal at the market, not knowing that a crowd was waiting for him outside. As he tried to leave the market on his bicycle after his meal, he was killed with a hammer blow on the head by someone in the crowd which had gathered to wait for him.³

That night people with bodies blackened with lamp soot, carrying torches made from old tyres to light up their path, roamed the streets of Pemalang.⁴ Arriving at the regency offices and finding no one in the residence behind, they went on to the house of the regency secretary, which was broken into and ransacked.

Houses of other priyayi officials were also ransacked. These included the home of the Wedana of Pemalang, whose furniture was collected and burnt, and that of the head of the Fisheries Department, Wadri, who was especially disliked. A Pemalang teacher recalled Wadri as:

That rotten stinking thief (*bajingan tengik*)! He married the Bupati's sister-in-law, a widow, so that he could say, 'I'm married into the Bupati's family'. I was riding a bike with solid rubber tyres, while he was hoarding tubes—he had a whole room full.⁵

A Camat from the rural areas, who had earlier been the target of similar action in his own locality, was in Pemalang on that night. He remembered:

We had left our house with all our belongings in Bodeh, had arrived in Pemalang, and were staying in the house of [a teacher named] Umar. We had just finished dinner, about 7 p.m., when a crowd came past the front of the house and stopped. Small children were carrying petromax kerosene pressure lamps and small red and white flags, and beating on cans, 'tong tong tong', the street was packed. Someone in front had a 'black list'. Then I remembered that Umar had been a *kumicho*. My wife and I took a suitcase to the house of the next-door neighbour, Kyai Abdullah. The people surrounded Pak Umar's house yelling 'Burn it down! Burn it down!' 'No! It's not the house but the man that we want' [someone said]. Then Umar's house was ransacked and we lost our bicycle and all the belongings that we had brought from Bodeh. Apparently, Pak Umar knew what was going to happen as he had moved his sewing machine and other belongings to safety beforehand.⁶

Pemalang regency police chief Natsir was among those kidnapped from his house that same night, while he had gone out to relieve himself. The next day about ten pemudas came to the house and took all the Dutch books from the shelves, carried them outside and made a bonfire of them saying this was evidence that Pak Natsir had been a NICA agent.⁷ Mrs Natsir and the wives and families of all the town's top priyayi officials were taken to the former residence of the Japanese military adviser on the north side of the town square where the bupati's wife conducted rituals with the Mbah Tapa to give protection to those who (for her) were the rightful rulers of the regency and guardians of the kris.⁸

The next day all the officials accused of being corrupt were rounded up and taken to the tennis court in the town square. Between sixteen and eighteen of the town's other officials were put in jail, the only place where their physical safety could be guaranteed, according to local leaders.⁹ Some of them had been arrested or captured during the violence in Pemalang. Local revolutionaries had kidnapped the bupati, the police chief and others, for their protection. Abdul Mutholib, discredited leader of the priyayi-sponsored cooperative during the occupation, had made a dramatic but tempor-

ary escape from Pemalang on the back of a bicycle. He was too frightened to pedal, though he was bigger than his rescuer. He had then boarded the train to Tegal, but was recognised by some Arab *pemudas* and ended up in Pemalang on the same tennis court as the other officials.¹⁰

Pemalang Arab *pemudas* from the GPAP, the Indonesian Arab Youth Movement, and Hizbullah played a major role in the early part of the social revolution. For them:

Ideology was not important then, nobody thought about ideology, at least the Islamic group did not. There were no orders, that is why the revolutionary spirit (*semangat*) and spontaneity were so important. At that time, as in no other period during the revolution, we were together, we were one. Most of the leaders of the pemuda brigade were *santris*. We were united then with the one aim of destroying the corrupt cliques.¹¹

The unity between the Muslim and Western-educated revolutionary groups was a feature of Pemalang regency as a whole. In South Pemalang, Islamic nationalists worked closely with two Dutch-educated socialists, both Soepangat's cadres. Suleman, the revolutionary *camat*, had this to say about the nature of the local revolutionary movement in the area:

There was no difference between the religious groups and those who were not religious. The *santris* used to sleep at my place and talk until the early hours of the morning. Were there different concepts about the revolution? There weren't. It was still the time of *merdeka*. What did *merdeka* mean? It meant 'being free from colonialism'. We wanted to become a free country. Its form would be decided later. We already knew that Kromo Lawi, the PKI and the Tegal KNI group were different. In the local areas we followed whoever was progressive.¹²

On 20 October 1945, the day following the social upheaval, a new revolutionary government came to power in Pemalang at a mass meeting in the town square. The first speaker, Pemalang's medical orderly, Soepangat, told the people that there must be no more arson and no one should be killed. His call for order was obeyed, highlighting an important difference between the revolutionary movement in Pemalang and its counterparts in Tegal and Brebes where the movements were fragmented in several ways. In Pemalang, Soepangat was able to forge a remarkable unity between the 1926 generation, his own group of pre-war activists of the 1930s, younger pemuda figures, and the *santri* leaders. He had begun this work in the Pekope wartime co-operative and continued it until the end of the Tiga

Daerah Affair. Soepangat also controlled the town's security: 'My strongest impression about the period of Soepangat's rule in Pematang was that there were literally no thieves, pick-pockets, or trouble-makers operating in the town. They all followed his leadership'.¹³ Soepangat's success was also attributed to his reputation for honesty and fairness in running the Pekope rationing system. He was well liked by everyone because of his tactful flexibility and he was closer to the younger pemuda than many pemuda leaders themselves.

The pragmatic approach of Pematang revolutionaries quickly brought more order to the situation. The new revolutionary government's first priority was rebuilding the local economy after the ravages of the occupation. To this end Dr. Moerjawan, Soepangat's new deputy, formed a group of advisers to help re-open local enterprises, while a man with some pre-war agricultural training was appointed to run the huge kapok and coconut plantation in Randudongkal. This appointment reflected Moerjawan's view, in which he agreed with Soepangat, that in order to keep the wheels of government moving it was necessary to use officials of the old pangreh praja. In reply to the cry of his older radical supporters, the former Digul-Sarekat Rakyat group, who said 'Don't leave a single stooge of the Japanese in office', Soepangat and Moerjawan, out of necessity, urged using the ones who were honest.¹⁴ Not having any formal administrative skills themselves, they were forced to rely on at least two former camats, one of whom seems to have had a reputation for heavy-handedness during the Japanese period. Nonetheless he went with Soepangat and Moerjawan to Pekalongan where they were presented with letters of appointment by Resident Besar on 29 October 1945.¹⁵ This was followed by an official inauguration ceremony in Pematang, which Besar also attended.

Tegal: 'the wild bison becomes unridable.'

In Tegal, the struggle for power and the search for a new leadership during the social revolution were different. For one thing, the leadership in Tegal was divided among three groups: the KNI group dominated by the Nine Brothers and other 1930s activists; the Barisan Pelopor-AMRI Slawi groups led mostly by 1926 veterans; and the youthful Japanese occupation activists who led the API-BKR/TKR group.

By the end of October the KNI group was unable to solve the main problem facing the revolutionary movement—security in the rural area. Both the new police and the TKR were unwilling to move outside the city. KNI leaders keenly felt they were caught in a

dilemma over the problem of order. The respected Ki Tjitrasatmaka, admonished by Resident Besar at the time of the Brebes pangreh praja kidnappings by Tegal KNI associates, told the Resident that he could not even be responsible for his own safety, let alone that of kidnapped government officials. Nevertheless Besar refused to accept his offer of resignation.¹⁶ Instead a Pekalongan KNI delegation including Resident Besar, Pekalongan KNI chairman Dr. Soembadji and K. H. Mohamad Iljas, a leader of the Pekalongan orthodox Muslims, visited Tegal to talk with local KNI leaders who were asked to report on the situation in the rural areas. Soesmono explained that camats had been killed because of corruption, and he could provide witnesses of actions by officials 'which have made the people angry'. The people wanted all pangreh praja from bupati to camat replaced by new leaders who conformed with the national revolution.¹⁷

As a result of these discussions the two KNIs in Tegal united into one committee under Ki Tjitrasatmaka's chairmanship. However with no security force, and no representative from the veterans of 1926, the new United KNI was ineffective for the same reasons as the earlier bodies had been. In late October the KNI members approached AMRI Slawi to discuss revolutionary strategy:

The broad outline was that AMRI Slawi wanted to change the structure of local government completely. They wanted to change the remaining heads of various levels of local government. This included the TKR which had to be made up of the common people and it should not include former fascist Peta and Heiho elements.¹⁸

Disagreement between revolutionary groups centred around the role of the API-BKR. API in Tegal was led by a group of young activists whose only political experience was in Japanese organisations, namely Peta (the self-defence force), Seinendan youth and Heiho auxiliary defence. Even before the Eurasian killings (in which at least one API-BKR leader in Tegal municipality had been involved), AMRI Slawi had passed on complaints to the Tegal Barisan Pelopor that village KNI leaders had been seized and thrown into Tegal jail. Several truckloads of people, including a number of local KNI leaders, escorted by API, had been brought into the city and placed in the jail. After negotiations with a public prosecutor they were released in November.¹⁹ AMRI Slawi claimed that API-BKR leaders were responsible, pointing out that the Tegal revolutionary leadership would suffer a severe blow to its legitimacy if such action continued. The KNI group had received other unconfirmed reports of killings and harassment of lurahs.

API leadership's lack of revolutionary strategy can be seen by the

following incident. After the Ujungrusi-led attack on the Tegal regency police barracks on 20 October, API leaders had gone to the village and made a speech about the need for the revolutionary struggle to oppose colonialism but 'not one's own friends'. The immediate cause of the attack, the arrest of a popular Ujungrusi leader by the regency police, had been received 'in the wrong way'. People in Ujungrusi had over-reacted, said the API leader, who then cautioned people not to take matters into their own hands or act in an arbitrary way. At this point a furious H. Sjamsuri, leader of Ujungrusi's militant Pemuda Istimewa, interrupted and told the people to return home, saying 'This is a phony speech'. This aborted meeting was typical of the way API in Tegal went about things. Brash and full of spirit, they usually failed to see the political impact of their actions.²⁰ This incident symbolised API's declining role in the Tegal revolutionary movement until the withdrawal of the TKR battalion from Tegal on 4 November, when most of its members left the area.

The decline of API's fortunes coincided with a rise in the influence of AMRI Slawi and reflected the beginning of a more radical shift in regency politics. By early November, the older radicals who controlled AMRI Slawi had forged links with the lenggaongs, through Kutil's group in Talang, and with radical santri groups at Ujungrusi and Balamoa near Karangcegak, the centre of the 1926 attempted rebellion in the area. The plan to take over Tegal municipality and to remove all remaining pangreh praja began in Slawi.

On the morning of Saturday 3 November, an invitation reached various revolutionary groups to attend a meeting at AMRI headquarters. By about noon revolutionaries from Talang (including Kutil), Ujungrusi and Balamoa had assembled, many armed with krisses and machetes. They moved into a large room, the doors were locked and guards placed outside. AMRI leader Sakirman, who chaired the meeting, explained in detail the rights of the ordinary people (*kaum Marhaen*), and how the government must be in their hands.²¹ All remaining pangreh praja must be captured, examined, and then handed over to the people. The names of eight API-TKR leaders who were to be eliminated were read out. The TKR must also be disarmed as their only role was to protect Resident Besar and the pangreh praja.²²

AMRI Slawi leader Sakirman then announced a four-part plan for the people to take over the regency government. Beginning the following morning, road blocks were to be set up in order to prevent any pangreh praja from trying to escape. All roads leading out of Tegal were to be barricaded, all cars and horse carts stopped from twelve noon and their drivers and passengers detained. At that time also the people were to disarm all TKR units in Adiwerna, Slawi and Balapulung, detain members and confiscate weapons for the general

attack on Tegal. By four o'clock, the 'people's forces' would assemble on the outskirts of the town with weapons obtained from the TKR, and wait for orders. After Tegal was occupied the weapons would be handed in at the Barisan Pelopor headquarters on the city square. Those mobilised for the attack would come from the subdistricts of Slawi, Adiwerna, Talang, Dukuhuri, Sumurpanggang and Kemantran.²³ The last part of the plan was a simultaneous attack on the Pangkah sugar mill, to remove the API leadership there. The meeting was then thrown open for questions. One person asked about how the officials who were to be captured would be recognised. In reply Sakirman said that on arrival in Tegal the demonstrators would be met by members of the Barisan Pelopor wearing white armbands with the initials 'BP', who would lead the people to those officials and others who were to be removed.

For those with friends in the local Adiwerna TKR unit, a conflict in loyalties arose over the order to disarm the TKR. Eventually the operation was disguised as a training practice for the Pemuda Is-timewa of Ujungrusi, fifty-six of whom, armed with bamboo spears and led by Haji Sjamsuri carrying a pistol, surrounded the TKR leader's home. He explained to the surprised TKR leader that this action was to avoid bloodshed because villagers who did not have weapons were going to get them from the TKR by force. TKR members must change out of their uniforms immediately in order not to be attacked on the streets.²⁴

Tegal Falls to the Revolutionaries

In the city itself, the first warning of what was to happen on 4 November 1945 came when a local KNI leader received an anonymous letter early that day, written in Arabic script, warning that 'an attack on Tegal by "the people" was imminent'. Nearly thirty years later a Barisan Pelopor leader recalled the atmosphere of threat that hung over the place that day:

The stillness and quietness in the city at that time was fitting for a ghost town. The place seemed engulfed in a feeling of apprehensiveness. This was not only my impression, others were feeling the same. The city was covered by thin cloud and was overcast for a while; then the clouds would disappear; then return again and there would be a light shower of rain for a few minutes, enough to wet the roads and settle the dust . . . the leaves on the banyan tree in the city square were not moving at all . . . the banyan tree resembled someone in trouble who was bowing his head towards the soil of the Fatherland, or like someone meditating . . .²⁵

Wild rumours about mysterious unmarked planes being seen added fuel to the rumours that Tegal was a 'NICA lair' which had to be 'cleaned out' immediately, because it was spread about that a plane was trying to make contact with pro-NICA groups within the municipality—the remaining pangreh praja, API or the TKR.

Tegal KNI leaders now aware of what was building up in the south, made a last ditch attempt to avert the attack by diplomacy. All remaining officials in the town agreed to sign a declaration at the KNI office, which said that the pangreh praja stood behind the Proclamation, and would fight together with the people to defend independence. KNI deputy vice-chairman Mardjono, in the company of a santri notable, Haji Iksan, decided to take this declaration to AMRI Slawi leaders immediately.²⁶ If AMRI Slawi still insisted that all remaining officials should resign, Mardjono would guarantee this.

Although the Barisan Pelopor did not agree with the KNI about the usefulness of the visit to AMRI Slawi and were worried about the hazards of the journey, they were unable to offer an alternative solution to avoid the threatened 'attack by the people'. About two o'clock Mardjono and Haji Iksan set off on their own in Mardjono's yellow Ford Mercury. Their chauffeur later said they were stopped and taken to Kutil's headquarters at AMRI Talang where they were both killed. Kutil took the Yellow Ford Mercury for his own use.²⁷ Two other kyais who had set off to the south after Mardjono on a similar self-appointed mission to prevent further violence also went missing. Kutil's group was responsible for their disappearance and subsequent imprisonment in Slawi.²⁸

Advance groups of AMRI Talang pemuda arriving at the Barisan Pelopor headquarters reported that a huge crowd was encircling Tegal with the main group advancing along the road towards the regency office. The main crowd, wearing *janur kuning* and black headbands and waving drawn swords were shouting fiercely in Arabic 'la ilaha illa'llah' ('there is no God but Allah'). 'It raised the hairs on the back of my neck, like seeing a hungry tiger about to fall on its victim'.²⁹

One group of revolutionaries advancing on the TKR headquarters found that the TKR had barricaded themselves (symbolically) behind sacks of rice. With the TKR were also many police who had fled with their families and also the Camat of Kramat and his wife, victims of an attack some time before. In 1975 the battalion commander Djoeweni Wimbohandoko recalled:

The crowd from the West was pressing forward, continuing to chant 'there is no god but Allah' . . . whatever happened we were going to defend ourselves . . . we fired warning shots over

the heads of the crowd which was coming closer. But they shouted in Javanese, 'it doesn't matter' the bullets can't pierce our bodies'. Because there had been no victims as we had fired above their heads they believed they were invulnerable, the Muslim prayer had ensured that bullets could not perforate their bodies.³⁰

Afraid that bloodshed would be inevitable with the continuing approach of the crowd, the TKR now fired towards the ground. Several leaders fell and were dragged behind the barricade, where their wounds were treated. After more machine gun fire into the air, the crowd dispersed.

Meanwhile groups turned their attention to the compound housing the regency government offices. Finding the bupati absent, the crowd began turning out the contents of his residence. Some ceremonial clothes were thrown about, but nothing else was damaged or taken. Sumiyar, the bupati's wife, and her mother, Raden Kardinah (Kartini's sister), were made to dress in sackings and, together with a servant and Kardinah's granddaughter, were paraded round the town, ending, ironically, at the hospital which Kardinah had founded some years before and which bears her name today. From there they were taken by truck to Talang and later to the Adiwerna wedana's house, where they were kept prisoner for a week.³¹

The group in the regency compound began to drift out onto the city square but other people headed for the homes of at least three priyayi officials—the assistant public prosecutor, his cousin the deputy Camat of Kramat, and R. M. Abu Bakar, a local 'bush lawyer'. The latter, a romusha-raiser, was accused of keeping half the romushas' allowance for himself. These officials were taken south to Talang and killed. The mayor's house was attacked by another group, but the mayor had already taken refuge voluntarily in the local jail, which was the only place where the KNI could attempt to protect the city's beleaguered officials. Later, on the advice of the local KNI leaders, the mayor was joined by the patih and wedana of Tegal. The bupati himself made a dramatic escape from Tegal the following evening, dressed as the engine driver of a train.³²

The various groups which had separated on entering Tegal now began to converge on the city square. There were more demands for API leaders who were hiding in the TKR barracks and for the trial of members of the pangreh praja, including the Bupati of Tegal and Resident Besar. After urgent discussions between Tegal KNI leaders and the demonstrators, a two-man KNI delegation left for TKR headquarters to ask the army commander for a written declaration that the TKR was not the Resident's security force and that the TKR

would agree to help the demonstrators seek out the 'NICA agents' remaining in the city. The commander obliged immediately and a Barisan Pelopor leader relayed his message to the people in the square that 'the regional government of the regency of Tegal was now in the hands of the people'.³³ Not everyone was convinced; after more debate the TKR headquarters was rushed again. The TKR held back the attackers by firing over the heads long enough to evacuate the battalion to headquarters in Pekalongan.

The search for a consensus in the wake of the fall of the old order in Tegal and the emergence of a new popularly based government began in the week following 4 November. Attempts to consolidate the new regime illustrate how fragile the concept of a unified revolution was. Attempts to create a consensus by politicians from outside the Residency were resented by some local leaders and regarded with suspicion by the *pangreh praja*. There were also differences of opinion with the local revolutionary movement on how a new government should be formed, and how it should function.

The Role of Sayuti Melik

Sayuti Melik's role in Pekalongan Residency politics had begun early in October. He had come from Semarang as a republican government emissary after the *kenpeitai* massacre, and later returned to the Residency capital as representative of both the Governor of Central Java, Wongsonegoro, and President Sukarno, to whom he was private secretary.³⁴ Sayuti Melik had spent an active pre-war political life in and out of prison and in exile for radical left-wing leanings. Arrested by the Japanese for critical articles in a Semarang newspaper, he was released on Sukarno's intervention in mid 1945. At the time of the proclamation of independence Sayuti Melik had played an important role as mediator between *pemuda* leaders and older nationalists in Jakarta. A leader of the ill-fated PNI-Staatspartij (set up on 21 August to mobilise the population behind the new Republic), and a member of the KNIP, he was closely involved in the constitutional affairs surrounding the setting up of the new Republic. He also became a close associate of Tan Malaka later in the revolution and was a spokesman for the Struggle Union (*Persatuan Perjuangan*). As a national politician of considerable influence, Sayuti Melik's credentials as a mediator in Pekalongan's revolutionary crisis were excellent.

On his arrival in Pekalongan Sayuti Melik made contact with local revolutionary leaders and gave lectures on the meaning of independence, during which he made reference to municipal corruption and

the need to elect a new mayor of Pekalongan. This caused confusion in the minds of Pekalongan's pangreh praja, who already had reservations about one of his tasks in Pekalongan as representative of the governor which was, he said, to ratify the appointment of 'revolutionary' officials. The then Residency secretary asked Sayuti Melik for clarification about what his job was. 'Was he sent by Wongsonegoro or from Bung Karno?' Soedjono asked, 'because people thought he was sent direct from the central government'. Sayuti Melik told the Residency secretary that he had the power to ratify the appointment of new local officials but he failed to produce a formal letter from the Governor confirming this authority.³⁵ Sayuti Melik may have felt that his status in the national movement as a nationally known figure was enough, being the personal secretary of President Sukarno at the time.

While Sayuti Melik's relationship with Resident Besar was apparently cordial, the latter was sceptical about what Sayuti Melik saw as the need for the Resident to have a more strongly republican public image, especially 'if it meant driving around everywhere in a big car with a flag'.³⁶ Sayuti Melik himself said that he canvassed the possibility of becoming Resident to replace the beleaguered Besar, but because he was not a member of the pangreh praja the suggestion was received without enthusiasm in Pekalongan. Older moderate nationalists in Pekalongan's KNI also 'politely rejected' his offer 'because he did not have much authority in Pekalongan'.³⁷

Sayuti Melik's main object was to help establish a genuine republican government to replace the old order in the Tiga Daerah. His first informal visit to Tegal was on the initiative of Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo, the pre-war PNI-Baru leader who took him, as a 'friend from Digul', to meet Tegal regency KNI vice-chairman Soesmono, who answered a series of detailed questions from Sayuti Melik about the social upheaval which had occurred. Sayuti Melik then decided to accept the demands of the people to replace all or most of pangreh praja throughout the Tegal regency and the municipality.³⁸ He proposed a conference, which he would attend as the governor's representative, to formalise 'the people's demands' in a resolution, which would then be presented to the pangreh praja. Following this, he would remain in Pekalongan for three days to await an answer from the Tegal revolutionary leaders.

The response of K. Midjaja, AMRI Slawi and Tegal Barisan Pelopor leaders to the proposition was hostile and blunt:

K. Midjaja said in a rather angry voice that he didn't like Sayuti Melik interfering in this problem because he was from Tan Malaka's group. If Sayuti Melik was a genuine communist,

events in the Tiga Daerah would have attracted his sympathy and he would have tried to contact his revolutionary comrades in Slawi. But this was not the case; he preferred to come as a big shot acting for the Governor to pacify the revolution (*meredakan revolusi*). Indeed he had already betrayed the communist struggle in Central Java during the Dutch colonial period. Therefore he was not a friend but a foe, and from that day he was not allowed to cross the Pemalang-Pekalongan regency boundary.³⁹ K. Midjaja said he would order guards to be placed on the border to enforce this.

This reply surprised Sayuti Melik, especially as it was suggested that he should leave the Residency. He said that the Tegal revolutionaries were lucky that he, as a 'government person', was willing to help. However Sayuti Melik left Tegal to return yet again on 3 November on the same train which took President Sukarno back to Jakarta from the Allied-Republican conference in Magelang.

At this point Sayuti became involved in an episode critical for the future of the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah and for the relationship between the rival factions within the revolutionary movement. In Tegal Sayuti Melik met Colonel K. H. Iskandar Idris, Pekalongan TKR commander, who was en route to a Residency-level Muhammadiyah conference. While at the conference, Iskandar Idris decided to meet Kutil personally and he set off, armed, by car for Talang accompanied by Sayuti Melik and Kyai Bisri, a Muslim notable. Outside Tegal *pemudas* stopped the car and took the occupants, blindfolded and disarmed, to local Pemuda Istimewa leaders in Ujungrusi in the belief that they were *pangreh praja*, caught trying to escape from Tegal. *Pemudas* were acting on AMRI Slawi orders that cars travelling south from Tegal on that morning, 4 November, were to be stopped and the occupants taken prisoner, no matter who they claimed to be. Pemuda Istimewa leaders decided to take the prisoners to AMRI Slawi, where Sayuti Melik was immediately recognised by AMRI leader Socwignjo, an old comrade from Digul.⁴⁰

Sayuti Melik's subsequent discussions with AMRI Slawi leaders on the revolutionary situation in Tegal concerned the future of the TKR in Pekalongan Residency. Sayuti Melik agreed that Resident Besar's position was now completely untenable since allegations that the resident was pro-NICA had intensified.⁴¹ There were two reasons for this: first, Besar's order to intern all Eurasians and safeguard their property; and, second, it was said that he had 'welcomed the British' to Pekalongan. In fact what had happened was that an English major, accompanied by a Dutch officer, had arrived in Pekalongan on 27 October with a small detachment of about fifteen Indian troops in

one truck, to observe the condition of Dutch and Eurasian prisoners of war.⁴² They had met Resident Besar, Iskandar Idris and Residency officials, then returned to Semarang apparently satisfied.

On the question of the army, AMRI Slawi and Sayuti Melik now agreed that the TKR should withdraw from the Tiga Daerah immediately. Sayuti Melik then rang TKR headquarters in Yogyakarta to report this and also recommend that the Resident be removed from office. This saw the end of Mr. Besar's turbulent two and a half months as republican Resident.

General Urip's chief of Intelligence, Dr Sutjipto, sent a telegram to Wongsonegoro, the civil governor, ordering my detention, and this telegram was sent on to the Pekalongan TKR to arrest me. The head of the military police, Soedharmo, came and told me about it and said that he just could not carry out the order. At 11 o'clock that night [5 November] I left Pekalongan with my wife and four children. I wanted to meet the Governor and talk about this.⁴³

Soedharmo's reluctance to arrest Besar stemmed partly from Javanese social and cultural norms. TKR loyalty to the pangreh praja was strong in Pekalongan as its officers all had priyayi backgrounds, and some had themselves served (or had fathers serving) as pangreh praja. Soedharmo's class loyalty reinforced Javanese status distinctions. The TKR office sent to carry out the order to arrest Resident Besar was a young man of twenty-two, the son of a minor government official. For a Javanese pemuda to arrest such a prominent man, a Dutch-trained lawyer old enough to be his father, was difficult. The cultural norms of respect for age and respect for position and authority overrode, in Soedharmo's reckoning, obedience to a military order.⁴⁴

The New Bupati of Tegal

On 6 November, R. M. Soeprapto, a high official in the Semarang governor's office, arrived in Pekalongan with a letter of appointment as the new acting Resident. He found pangreh praja in the regency towns of the Tiga Daerah had either disappeared, taken refuge voluntarily in the local jail or had been put there by local revolutionary leaders for safety reasons. The three TKR battalions stationed in the Tiga Daerah had withdrawn to Pekalongan on orders from Yogyakarta while Iskandar Idris and Sayuti Melik had been last seen heading south from Tegal two days previously, on the morning the city had fallen to revolutionary masses.

Having received conflicting reports and rumours about events in the Tiga Daerah, on his arrival in the Residency capital R. M. Soeprapto decided to proceed immediately to Tegal, in order to see the situation for himself. He found out that 'the police had vanished completely' in Tegal and Brebes, but had since been re-formed with the help of two officials sent from Semarang. In Pemalang the new bupati had re-formed the police himself. Soeprapto observed that the only security forces were under the control of the Tiga Daerah revolutionary leaders who were not responsible to Pekalongan.⁴⁵

In Tegal R. M. Soeprapto found that local AMRI and KNI groups, Kutil, and leaders from Ujungrusi (now renamed New Ujung) had chosen K. H. Abu Sudja'i as the new Bupati of Tegal. Sayuti Melik, back in Tegal from Slawi, explained his presence as the governor's representative 'to try and fill the vacant positions of bupati, mayor and other positions'.⁴⁶ Candidates for bupati included AMRI Slawi leader Sakirman, and two candidates from the Tegal KNI group. It was AMRI Talang—Kutil's group—that put forward the name of K. H. Abu Sudja'i, a progressive Muslim leader from the village of Pacul, about six kilometres south-east of Tegal.

K. H. Abu Sudja'i's candidature symbolised the strong radical Muslim-nationalist alliance in the Tiga Daerah. His grandfather, Gentoloto Naya Genggong, was a famous lenggaong in the Tegal region during the late nineteenth century. K. H. Abu Sudja'i came from a family with a long tradition of opposition to the Dutch and was well known to the revolutionary centres of Slawi, Ujungrusi, Talang, Adiwerna and Pangkah. In 1930 he founded an Islamic Union in Pacul and opened a Muslim private school, one of the first in the district. Pacul, south of Tegal, with its earlier active Sarekat Islam branch, had been successful in standing up to the nearby Pagongan sugar factory on such questions as long-term alienation of land by lease to foreigners, and the distribution of irrigation water between the sugar mill and the village rice lands. Pacul was also well known for its stubborn refusal to accept low rents from the mill.

K. H. Abu Sudja'i was also the focus of strong Muslim resistance, on religious grounds, to the colonial government's practice of taking blood samples from bodies as part of the plague eradication programme. This opposition had become politicised by the PSII which backed local protest against the practice. K. H. Abu Sudja'i, a prominent PSII leader who led the movement in these subdistricts had been jailed in 1937 for refusing to allow a blood sample to be taken.⁴⁷ Abu Sudja'i and the PSII were also involved in trying to reduce the oppressive village corvee obligations. As a result Pacul had a reputation for opposition; it was known for its lenggaongs and as 'a place of disturbances'. In addition to opposing blood samples,

Abu Sudja'i had been imprisoned for breaking the salt monopoly in 1932, for speaking out against the government in 1939, and by the Japanese early in 1944 for publicly supporting a Muslim revolt near Tasikmalaya in West Java.⁴⁸ Released from jail early in October 1945, a sick man barely able to walk from malnutrition, he was appointed bupati only thirty days later. As a suffering hero, K. H. Abu Sudja'i was the perfect revolutionary symbol.

After Abu Sudja'i had been loudly acclaimed by the AMRI delegates as the new bupati, the Tegal Barisan Pelopor put forward KNI chairman Ki Tjitrastanaka as candidate for patih, while a member of the former regency staff was chosen as the new regency secretary to provide some administrative skills for the inexperienced new leaders. Acting Resident R. M. Soeprapto immediately ratified the new appointments, and accepted AMRI Slawi's demand for the abolition of Tegal municipality. Indeed there were grounds for doing this; the colonial government had created a separate municipal administration simply because of the large number of Europeans living in the city in pre-war days.

On 8 November R. M. Soeprapto returned to Tegal to install the new officials formally, while AMRI Talang leaders met K. H. Abu Sudja'i and escorted him to the regency office, and later to the city square. There a large crowd had gathered to see the new bupati. When K. H. Abu Sudja'i came up onto the platform the crowd grew quiet. Tegal nationalist leaders were surprised to see such a tall good-looking person simply dressed in long trousers, a white shirt, and wearing a black cap. He spoke calmly but clearly and fluently, occasionally using a Dutch word which he pronounced correctly and quoting verses from the Koran. Although the people of Tegal had known his name this was the first time they had seen him. The Muslim group in the city seemed obviously satisfied, and the Nine Brothers surprised, that such a sophisticated and urbane 'rural' kyai was the new bupati.⁴⁹

Brebes: 'the cracked gong is difficult to mend.'

The following day, acting Resident R. M. Soeprapto supervised the election of a bupati of the 'people's choice' in Brebes, in a climate of considerable confusion and rivalry. Bupati Sarimin had helped create this atmosphere with his clearly expressed doubts about the proclamation, his refusal to allow the Indonesian flag to be flown in front of the regency offices until the end of September and his announcement that the Allies would shortly be re-occupying Java. This last had led him into several open clashes, in particular with Brebes revolutionary

leader Kartohargo.⁵⁰ Even after the bupati had publicly accepted Indonesian independence the scepticism of pangreh praja towards independence continued. The Patih of Brebes, during a trip to inaugurate the Tanjung KNI, commented that 'at the longest, the Indonesian Proclamation will last for 6 months'.⁵¹

Pangreh praja opposition to the revolutionary movement continued in several ways. After the Brebes BKR/TKR had been formally set up in September, Raden Sudirman Danuwilogo, the Wedana of Brebes, formed a 'clandestine BKR', ostensibly to protect the pangreh praja. The 'clandestine BKR' consisted of persons who were not popular with the people because of their behaviour—the majority were thieves—and whose patronage by the wedana allowed them to act in an arbitrary way.⁵²

Aside from the 'official' Brebes AMRI led by Kartohargo, a group including several lenggaongs formed its own AMRI-I, or Islamic Younger Generation of the Republic of Indonesia, which was in conflict with both the Brebes BKR/TKR and Kartohargo's AMRI. AMRI-I leader Muchsan claimed that his group was a branch of AMRI Slawi, and took control of a local rice mill. AMRI-I considered that the Brebes BKR/TKR was nothing more than 'a bunch of playboys' who were not sufficiently devout. This polarisation of opposites in the town reflected the physical geography of Brebes itself, spread along the main north coast road and railway. For example, the Muslim quarter was separated from an 'unruly' kampung to the north of the railway, where well-known lenggaongs, pick-pockets and so-called 'trouble makers' or *tukang tetek bengek* lived.

The social upheaval in Brebes was sparked off in nearby Pasarbatang by an outbreak of violence against the Chinese and their pigs. The Chinese population kept their pigs in a kampung on the edge of the town. Early one morning the people burnt the pigs in their pigsties later claiming that the animals regularly spoiled neighbouring crops and house gardens. The crowd then looted Chinese shops.⁵³ Later on AMRI-I leaders, spurred on by anti-NICA radio broadcasts, went to the Jatibarang and Banjaratma sugar mills, where they were involved in killings of Eurasians. The group also managed to obtain keys to the cells in the local jail, where some Eurasians had been placed for safety. These people were taken away and killed at Pasarbatang.

In response to the deteriorating social situation, the Patih of Brebes arrived at the KNI office with a letter from the bupati, which said that the Brebes pangreh praja, from the bupati down, were prepared to resign 'if the people didn't want them'.⁵⁴ The bupati requested that someone on the KNI make a public announcement, and explain it to a meeting of the 'leaders of the people' which was

convened by Kartohargo. The meeting of the Brebes KNI was a turbulent one, continually disrupted by AMRI-I leaders. Kartohargo explained the pangreh praja offer of resignation, then warned that although it was a time of revolution the people should not take matters into their own hands. If they want an official to be changed, they should pass this on to a member of the KNI. AMRI-I leader Muchsan argued that he, not Kartohargo, had authority in Brebes, and he left the meeting but was overpowered and detained for questioning by a police guard. Muchsan wielded enough authority among the local population to muster considerable support for the wedana, who was personally unpopular and increasingly isolated.

Aware that Muchsan's detention was threatening the town's security (as his son, a member of the BKR, was going to run amok with his friends if his father was not released), the wedana asked Kartohargo to use his influence in arranging the release. He also went with the patih to the regency police chief with the same request. However, the police decided to arrest other AMRI-I people as well. Muchsan remained in jail until he was released by the TKR during the attack on the Brebes police by groups from Ujungrusi and Pangkah. He was recaptured by the PKN, which had been formed to replace the police in the second week of November, and with several of his followers he was *dombreg*-ed to the PKN barracks headquarters and sent off to the Tegal jail.⁵⁵

The bupati's offer that the Brebes pangreh praja would resign had come too late. Maksum, a former public prosecutor who had joined the revolutionaries, contacted the Tegal KNI group suggesting removal of the officials from the town altogether. Tegal KNI leaders organised this on the evening of 18 October, when the Wedana of Brebes, the patih and his brother, the Wedana of Tanjung, were picked up and imprisoned. Raden Sudirman, using a diary he had kept at the time, wrote in 1972:

Two pemudas got out of a car and met me in the *pendopo* and said: 'Tuan Wedana is asked to come to Tegal to attend a meeting of all the representatives of the people from Tegal and Brebes', adding even more politely 'when the meeting is over, we will accompany Tuan Wedana home'. But I had the feeling that no good was going to happen to me. I thought about it for a while, then decided to go with them. I got dressed formally with a coat and tie . . . I first thought that I could refuse the pemudas' request and escape to the TKR guard headquarters but realised this would start a dispute between the pemudas and the TKR . . .⁵⁶

Relying on the protection of the local TKR, the wedana was surprised to find himself taken first to the Tegal TKR headquarters,

where he was handed over to API. After spending several nights at various API headquarters in Tegal he was taken to the estate of an Eurasian who had been killed. On 29 October 1945, a group of Tegal Barisan Pelopor leaders conducted an examination of the 'prisoners'. One by one they were taken from their rooms blindfolded and faced a tribunal which asked such questions as 'Do you still want to work?', 'Are you prepared to get rid of your feudal ways?', 'What is your attitude towards independence?', 'Would you cooperate?'. The questions were accompanied by the noise of pemuda guards sharpening their swords to scare the prisoners.⁵⁷

On 10 November, the pangreh praja prisoners were taken back to Tegal, where they were placed in the city jail. On the advice of the KNI leaders, the Patih and the Wedana of Tegal, the regency secretary and two other officials had hidden in the jail, the only safe place in the town. Later Residency officials and Pekalongan TKR leaders accused the revolutionaries of 'imprisoning' these officials, possibly because they were together with the kidnapped Brebes pangreh praja. However, a Barisan Pelopor leader later said that the officials were in jail not as detainees, prisoners or criminals. They had not been put there for safe keeping by any pemuda group, but were staying because they did not feel safe elsewhere.⁵⁸

The jail turned out to be a fairly tolerable place. To pass the time Sarimin and Sudirman re-wrote the famous song '*Bengawan Solo*', which had become popular throughout Indonesia under the Japanese. The new pangreh praja version reflected on how these officials felt being in prison for the first time, away from family and friends:

So this is how it feels to be jailed,
For the first time in our lives we know what it's like.
In a time of great change,
Though we be sons of the State,
We too must undergo experiences like this.

Refrain

As the Joyoboyo prophecy tells,
We have to suffer.
May the blessing of God
Saves us from disaster.
We bear this trial willingly
Answering the call of our Motherland.

In our hearts we think always,
Of our wives, our children and our families.
Here we are alone,
Bereft of friend and family.

Refrain

We trust that God will now watch over
Our wives and children, the families we love.
Still we always do believe
That the Almighty does not forget
His servants in their suffering.

No one expected to work again in a job 'with nice status' (*kedudukan yang enak*). The Patih of Brebes decided he would ask his wife to open a roadside stall and he would become a barber and have a shop next to it. These poetic expectations were actually too pessimistic. The Patih of Brebes ended his career as Bupati of Grobogan, his brother the Wedana of Tanjung died as Bupati of Brebes, Sarimin became Governor of the Lesser Sundas, and Sudirman himself ended up as acting Mayor of Magelang. The reappointments were indicative of what happened to the Pekalongan Residency pangreh praja thrown out during the social revolution period. Most were reappointed to posts either in the civil service, the police, or the army in other parts of Java.

The social revolution that swept from the south and engulfed the three regency capitals left the entire Tiga Daerah without an administrative apparatus and effectively sealed off the area from the Residency capital and from other parts of Java. After 19 October communications between the Tiga Daerah and the Residency capital were cut. No one remembers receiving mail from outside the Tiga Daerah, although post offices remained open, and people feared travelling on the roads because of the unrest in the rural areas. From that day no official instructions or information arrived from the central government and the Tiga Daerah became geographically and ideologically isolated from the national struggle, a condition aggravated by the fact that there were no Dutch or allied landings or military engagements in the Tiga Daerah. The Residency's two local newspapers, *Pelita Rakjat* in Tegal and *Pantjaran Nasional* in Pekalongan, must have been the only source of outside news for those without radios.

Moreover, there were no linkages with the central government, at least until November when political parties began to be formed. The KNI group had links with Supeno, but even he seems to have had little contact with his Tegal friends after their initial visit to Jakarta to see him at the time of the proclamation. The only effective way of communicating with the centre at this time seemed to be to go in person to Jakarta. This was done some time towards the end of October because the KNI could no longer deal effectively with the

social unrest. Kartohargo left Brebes with Maksum to visit the Ministry of Social Affairs, which they felt could help and give some explanation on 'how to stop the chaos in Brebes'. There they were told to go to the Ministry of Home Affairs, where they were advised that the Brebes situation could only be solved by the local KNI, 'because the centre was not yet able to manage the regional situation'. After meeting Ministry of Information officials who asked about the situation in Brebes, the local leaders were then given a letter and told to see the Governor of Central Java in the provincial capital of Semarang who told Kartohargo to wait for instructions 'from above'. It was explained that as soon as the situation in Ambarawa—where Republican forces were fighting the British troops—was resolved, 'Brebes would receive its turn for attention'. Because there was no anti-Dutch or anti-Allied fighting going on in the Tiga Daerah, the region was not under threat in this way and could not command priority for its local affairs. Kartohargo returned to Brebes to try and maintain the KNI's role while waiting for instructions from the central government.⁵⁹

One answer for the Brebes leader would have been the 'Political Announcement' from the Jakarta government, had he known about it. Dated 27 October and signed by both Sukarno and Hatta, it warned against 'the people acting by themselves', which would result in anarchy and perhaps the collapse of the Republic. The appropriate 'punishment' for officials and authorities who had done wrong was to deprive them of their jobs. Demands should be made 'via the Government' or 'with the mediation of the National Committee as the temporary representative of the people'.⁶⁰ The problem in the Tiga Daerah was that the regional government apparatus was discredited and local KNIs were powerless in October to play the role envisaged for them by the centre. The reasons for this throughout the Tiga Daerah varied. In Pemalang, it was because the KNI was stacked with discredited pangreh praja; in Tegal it was because although the KNI was popularly chosen or consisted of revolutionary leaders (as in Brebes), they had no security force effective outside the urban area. All the Tegal KNI leaders could or would do prior to 4 November was to direct pangreh praja to the local jail as the only place where their safety could be guaranteed.

However, there were other reasons why the central government lacked even tenuous authority in the Tiga Daerah. In the eyes of the more radical Tegal and Pemalang leaders, Jakarta was suspect for backing (after some hesitation) the Residency priyayi-dominated KNI in its support for the ratification of Besar's appointment as Resident. Communication with higher governmental levels was not improved when Sayuti Melik arrived as the governor's representa-

tive, his task hampered by the fact that the local revolutionaries, with whom he had to negotiate, mistrusted him for political reasons.

The complete breakdown in communications between the Tiga Dacrah and the revolutionary struggle in the rest of Java meant that the arrival of Widarta and K. Midjaja, two personal envoys from Amir Sjarifuddin (the Minister of Information till mid November 1945), was critical. Their impact was great on those leaders such as Kartohargo who were struggling with intractable local groups without any advice from Jakarta. With the authority of the central government, which at last seemed to be providing 'instructions from above', Widarta and K. Midjaja advised the local leaders to set up working committees to replace the old unworkable KNIs.

1. For one dramatic escape, that of the Camat of Petarukan, see Anton Lucas, 'Social Revolution in Pemalang', p. 115.
2. Bupati Rahardjo, 'Jawaban', Proc. Gen.
3. From secondhand accounts during interviews in Pemalang in February and November 1975. No eyewitness accounts of Djoewito's death were available.
4. Interview with API leader (Mohamad Tibi), Pemalang, 9 February 1975.
5. Interview with Pemalang teacher (Subechi), Pekalongan, 3 May 1975.
6. Interview with Camat of Bodeh (Sadeli), 23 September 1971.
7. Interview with Mrs Natsir, Semarang, 23 September 1972.
8. Interview with Mrs Rahardjo Sosro Adikoesoemo, Jakarta, 12 December 1971.
9. They included the bupati, the deputy bupati, the police chief, the Wedana of Pemalang, the head of the Public Works Department, the head of the Fisheries Department, and Raden Soewignjo, the regency secretary.
10. Interview with API member (Ali Zainal), Pemalang, 17 February 1975.
11. Interview with Hizbullah leader (Nur Effendi), Pemalang, 16 February 1975.
12. Interview with revolutionary Camat of Comal (Suleman), Jakarta, 1 December 1976.
13. Interview with Pemalang API leader (Mohamad Tibi), Pemalang, 9 February 1975.
14. Interview with Kendalsari Pesindo leader (Djuwahir), 31 October 1975.
15. Soepangat's letter was No. 46/P.P.D., Letter of Attorney-General Tirtawinata, 26 March 1947, Letters from the Attorney-General to the Pekalongan Public Prosecutor, Proc. Gen. Dr. Moerjawan's letter of appointment was lost during the TKR counter-revolution.
16. Interview with Tegal KNI chairman (Ki Tjitrasatmaka), Tegal, 30 January 1973.

17. Tegal KNI vice-chairman (Soesmono), written answers to author, p. 7; Interview, Semarang, 8 October 1976.
18. *Ibid.*, 8 January and 8 October 1976.
19. Mohamad Nuh, written answers to Semdam questionnaire, p. 9.
20. Adiwerna Verslag, pp. 4-5, Proc. Gen.
21. Sukarno coined the term Marhaen in the late 1920s to mean 'little people'. It was derived from Pak Marhaen, a peasant farmer, whose land was insufficient to support his family, though he owned the means of production, i.e. his own land and his own tools. He was not proletarian since he was not selling his labour. For Sakirman's biography see p. 277.
22. Adiwerna Verslag, pp. 4-5, Proc. Gen.
23. Adiwerna Verslag, p. 7. Kemantran was the former name of Tarub subdistrict.
24. *Ibid.*, p. 8.
25. Marsum, 'Ceritaku' memoir, p. 96.
26. Haji Iksan was a former vice-consul in Jiddah and had just been appointed Wedana Co-ordinator of Adiwerna by Resident Besar, to replace the former official who had fled.
27. Marsum, 'Ceritaku' memoir, p. 97. Kadarisman Soerodiwiryo, 'Catatan mengenai isi tulisan Saudara Marsum berjudul "Ceritaku"', memoir, 5 December 1975.
28. Interviews with the two Islamic leaders involved, K. Mochidin, Tegal, 31 January 1973 and K. H. Mohamad Mochtar, Tegal, 2 February 1972.
29. Marsum, 'Ceritaku' memoir, p. 100.
30. Transcript of taped interview with Tegal TKR battalion commander (R. Djoeweni Wimbohandoko), IV/31, Yogyakarta, 17 April 1975.
31. Interview with Mrs. Soenarjio Reksonegoro, Salatiga, 25 September 1971.
32. Interview with Tegal API leader (Mohamad Junus), Tegal, 10 December 1972.
33. Marsum, 'Ceritaku' memoir, p. 106.
34. Interview with Sayuti Melik, Jakarta, 30 October 1971.
35. Transcript of taped interview with Soedjono, VII/5, Cipanas, 30 July 1973.
36. Transcript of taped interview with Mr. Besar, Jakarta, IV/16, 24 July 1973.
37. Interviews with Sayuti Melik, Jakarta, 30 October 1971 and Pekalongan KNI leader (Soetedjo), Jakarta, 24 March 1973.
38. Soesmono, written answers to author, p. 9.
39. *Ibid.*
40. Sayuti Melik says that he was taken to Slawi after local leaders in Adiwerna had 'recognised' his name. Interview, 30 October 1971. Soewignjo's version is that hearing who had been arrested, he sent a group of AMRI pemudas to Ujungrusi to free them, and bring them to Slawi. See also a printed interview with Soewignjo, 'Penyelamat jiwa Sayuti Melik', *Berita Buana*, 28 April 1977.

41. Interview with Sayuti Melik, Jakarta, 30 October 1971.
42. *Keduaelatan Rakjat*, 1 November 1945. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 20 November 1974.
43. Transcript of taped interview with Mr. Besar, Jakarta, 24 July 1973; *Bylage NEFIS Periodiek* No. 2, 4 March 1946, Proc. Gen. In Semarang the governor told Besar that he had no choice but to carry out the orders of the Yogya military. Besar was then taken to Yogya and put under house arrest for several months.
44. Soedharmo Djajadiwangsa was born on 29 March 1923 in Paree, East Java, the son of an assistant manager of the local People's Credit Bank. After HIS, MULO and two years of Intermediate Trade School, he joined the Peta and became a company commander. While visiting relatives in Pemalang in October 1945 he joined the Pekalongan TKR. An inspector-general of development in the Ministry of Home Affairs, he was appointed Indonesian Ambassador to Sri Lanka in 1980. He died in 1984.
45. Questions 1 and 2 of seven answers to questions from S. Karioatmodjo, head of Pekalongan Department of Justice, dated 15 July 1946, Proc. Gen.
46. Marsum, 'Ceritaku' memoir, p. 113.
47. Interview with K. H. Abu Sudja'i, Pacul, 20 November 1975. Abu Sudja'i's influence was weaker in the subdistricts that had not been part of the plague eradication programme.
48. For details of this report see Anderson, *Java In a Time of Revolution*, p. 35.
49. Soesmono, written answers to author, p. 7.
50. See pp. 73-4.
51. Interview with Brebes pemuda leader (Sugeng Hargono), Brebes, 16 December 1972.
52. In his diary Raden Sudirman Danuwilogo wrote that after his kidnapping by the Tegal KNI group, he was asked if he had formed a Barisan Gobed or 'Knife Brigade', referring to the clandestine BKR. See also his 'Peristiwa Tiga Daerah Di Daerah Karesidenan Pekalongan, Jawa Tengah, Taun 1946', memoir, 1972; Kartohargo, Question 14, proces-verbaal, 23 October 1946, Proc. Gen.
53. Interview with santri leader of Pasarbatang (K. H. Achmad), Brebes, 3 December 1975.
54. Kartohargo, Question 15, proces-verbaal, 23 October 1946, Proc. Gen.
55. Interview with AMRI/PKN leader (Ramlas), Surodadi, 2 December 1975.
56. Raden Sudirman, memoir, p. 2.
57. Interview with a pemuda interrogator (Andi Penjamin), Semarang, 28 August 1971; Raden Sudirman, memoir, p. 2.
58. Marsum, 'Ceritaku' memoir, p. 86.
59. Kartohargo, Question 5, proces-verbaal, 14 January 1947; Questions 21, 22, proces-verbaal, 15 January 1947, Proc. Gen.
60. Koesnodiprodjo, *Himpunan*, p. 68.

The Popular Front

In August 1945 after news that the atomic bomb had been dropped on Hiroshima and then that the proclamation of independence had reached the Tiga Daerah, the underground PKI in Pemalang was faced with the question of whether to declare themselves openly or continue as an underground. A leaflet, printed in the Sukowati forestry plantation urging people to rise against the Japanese, made no mention of the PKI. Bung Kecil, a leader of the underground movement interviewed in 1978, considered the decision to remain clandestine to be a mistake.

With hindsight he said that there were several reasons for the decision. One was that the underground had no national level leader of its own, except Amir Sjarifuddin who was still in jail in Malang. Tan Malaka was not visible publicly (his whereabouts was unknown), and he was unacceptable on ideological grounds for criticising the 1926 uprising. Three other prominent veteran communists, such as Musso, Alimin and Sardjono, were still overseas in Holland or Australia.

A second reason was that if the PKI had an open role in the Tiga Daerah, the pangreh praja would be even more suspicious. After all the most prominent local nationalists were ex-Digulists. It was clear that the pangreh praja would be as hostile to communists in an independent Indonesia as they were under the Dutch.

A third reason was that in August 1945 the underground was uncertain about the international situation. The Anti-Fascist Front had recognised the Dutch as one of the Allies. All Allied countries except the Soviet Union were capitalist and might well be unsympathetic to an independent Indonesia with a strong communist party. What was the aim of the united front to be? At the Sukowati

meeting, local underground leaders decided to continue their tactical alliance with 'bourgeois nationalism', shifting the target from 'fascism' to 'feudalism and capitalism'.¹

On his return to Indonesia in 1948 veteran communist leader Musso, exiled after the attempted uprising of 1926 which he had planned and led, is said to have described the decision to remain clandestine as 'a mistake of tactics not of principle'. With the defeat of fascism, the rationale for an underground was removed. If the PKI was a party of the lower classes, how were these classes to know about the party which represented their interests if it continued to be organised as an underground? 'Its advice was heard, its writings were heard, but its members did not exist', Musso reportedly said. Again with hindsight, Bung Kecil recalled:

We were not sure of our own strength, we followed every voice. The party was dependent on whom? On the masses! Yet when the masses rose up unafraid in 1945, the party itself became afraid! We dared to take up arms against the Dutch, yet we hesitated about the Dutch-trained officials and police and the colonial apparatus that remained. This was a mistake'.²

In any case, in August 1945 political parties were not yet legal and the Japanese still seemed powerful in many places. The Republic declared itself on 21 August for a single state party (the PNI Staats-partij), and habits of caution generated during the occupation, as well as the memory of the crushing blows received after 1926, help to explain the underground PKI's decision.

Also the PKI in Pekalongan Residency was weak, like other pre-war parties. The entire Residency of Pekalongan had only eight members of the underground PKI network—one in Pekalongan, three in Pemalang, two each in Tegal and Brebes. One of the Pemalang cadres, S. Mustapha, arrested early in the occupation for illegal activities, escaped to Surabaya where he remained underground; he returned once to Pemalang with Widarta after the proclamation, and late in the revolution became a top Pesindo figure.³ Of the seven others, K. Midjaja in Tegal and Amir (not to be confused with Amir Sjarifuddin) were the most active. The strength of the underground PKI did not reflect communist strength, which comprised the more visible group of older veterans of the early PKI, including the ex-Digulists and many former Sarekat Rakyat people. A rule was adopted by the Illegal PKI in 1938 for protection against Dutch infiltration to the effect that whoever was arrested by the Dutch automatically lost their underground status and when released could not be contacted or used by the party again. This also prevented cadre building at the time.

The underground PKI's strategy in the Tiga Daerah was to create a popular front with other progressive elements. A 'Progressive' in the August-November 1945 context meant simply someone who 'agreed with Independence'. The opportunity for the underground PKI arose in early November when the KNIs in Pemalang and Tegal ceased to function effectively. It was then that Midjaja and Widarta, the two personal envoys of Amir Sjarifuddin who was now Minister for Information, began implementing their strategy in the Tiga Daerah.

In mid October veteran Pemalang nationalist Amir, then in Jakarta with Widarta, received an urgent telegram from Tan Djiem Kwan asking him to return to Pemalang immediately to coordinate the revolutionary movement. By kidnapping the popular leader Soepangat, pangreh praja and TKR elements had polarised the situation in Pemalang and feeling against them was running high. Amir and Widarta arrived in Pemalang on 15 October and Widarta went straight to the Padurekso forestry plantation. There he found that his house had been ransacked and his family had moved to the comparative safety of neighbouring Sukowati. Widarta's arrival in Sukowati aroused local suspicions that he was a runaway government official and threats were made that houses of other foresters would be attacked on the assumption that they too were hiding officials. Widarta asked Amir, then in Pemalang, for protection and the next day Amir, Tan Djiem Kwan and Soepangat arrived with about ten pemudas, four of them armed with carbines.⁴ After talking to local villagers about keeping order, Soepangat took several lenggaongs back to Pemalang for a course in revolutionary ideology at the API-PRI headquarters.

On 20 October in the town square Soepangat spoke to the people of Pemalang for the first time as their new bupati. Widarta and S. Mustapha also addressed the meeting. Mustapha spoke about 'strengthening and consolidating the power of the pemudas and the people to face the Dutch'. Widarta then counselled people to refrain from robbery, murder or arson. He explained the political, economic and social meaning of 'popular sovereignty' which if correctly implemented would lead to happiness for the people. It was also announced that API had changed its name to become the Pemalang branch of the Surabaya-based PRI or Youth of the Republic of Indonesia. Later that night both Widarta and S. Mustapha attended a meeting of API/PRI in Pemalang jail to discuss policy in regard to the pangreh praja. Widarta advised Soepangat to treat the detained officials well. Soepangat replied that they had been put in jail 'at the people's request' and would be released as soon as the situation was calm.⁵

The next day Widarta accompanied Soepangat on a tour of villages

near the forestry plantations to observe the election of new lurahs. On 7 November Widarta returned to Pemalang again, to find the problem of the pangreh praja unresolved. Pekalongan had requested that the officials be moved to the Residency capital, but the new bupati was afraid for their safety because of threats from the people. Soepangat therefore asked Widarta to take up the matter with authorities in Jakarta. He also requested a letter of support from Widarta with his authority as assistant to the Minister of Information, and this Widarta provided.⁶ After visiting his family in Sukowati for two days, Widarta returned to find that Republican Attorney-General Kasman Singodimejo had visited Pemalang to find out why the bupati and the rest of the town's pangreh praja had been placed in the local jail, and what was to be done with them. Soepangat again argued that they were there not as prisoners but as temporary internees because of pressure from the people.⁷

Meanwhile Midjaja began building a movement in other parts of the Tiga Daerah. Midjaja had a depth of experience in the radical pre-war nationalist movement elsewhere in Java that was unique in Pekalongan Residency politics. Passive resistance leader, journalist, newspaper editor, pemuda leader and labour unionist par excellence from 1939 when he joined the Illegal PKI, he actively opposed the Japanese fascists. In April 1942 he was forced to flee Solo after the first kenpeitai razzias began, and spent the rest of the occupation 'being hunted or chased after by the Japanese fascists'.⁸

Midjaja's first move in Brebes and Tegal created a link between the radicals in Pemalang and AMRI Slawi which was led by Soewignjo, a veteran of the 1926 rebellion in Comal, and Sakirman. Midjaja used the old friendship between Amir and Soewignjo to introduce other Pemalang radicals—Tan Djiem Kwan, Widarta and Bung Kecil. Midjaja and Bung Kecil both carried letters signed by Amir Sjarifuddin which gave them authority to take whatever steps were necessary to restore order and establish genuine Republican government in the region. Midjaja then explained that AMRI Slawi should recognise Pemalang's leadership of the revolutionary struggle in the Tiga Daerah, and Soewignjo agreed. Subsequently Midjaja made frequent visits to Slawi to lead political courses conducted by AMRI.⁹

The Working Committees in Tegal and Brebes.

Under the 1945 constitution hammered out by the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence (the PPKI) in the last weeks of Japanese rule, a cabinet of twelve ministers responsible to

the president, the national armed forces (the BKR), the short-lived PNI Staatspartij and the Central Indonesian National Committee (the KNIP) were set up. Membership of the KNIP, the provisional representative advisory body of the new republic was dominated (like its predecessor, the PPKI) by older nationalist politicians and *pangreh praja*. After the Allied landings on Java at the end of September, the Republic needed a more democratic image in line with the western concept of a parliamentary democracy. Sjahrir moved quickly to give the KNIP the status of a quasi-parliamentary body by giving it legislative powers, to be exercised between full sessions of the KNIP by a working committee or the Badan Pekerja, the BP-KNIP. As part of the same democratic reforms, Sjahrir and Amir Sjarifuddin also proposed the free establishment of political parties, that cabinet ministers be responsible to the KNIP acting as a parliament, and that free elections be held within six months. In Jakarta the BP-KNIP was really a manoeuvre to enable the 'anti-fascist' Sjahrir-type leftists to take political power from collaborating nationalists who had inherited the Japanese administration.

The BP-KNIP also announced plans for the democratisation of regional government via newly constituted local KNIs, each with its own five-man working committee, which would 'join the appointed head of a region in daily government'.¹⁰ This proposal, drafted on 30 October 1945, suited the strategy of Midjaja and Widarta in the Tiga Daerah, where they promoted local working committees without the revamped KNIs provided for in the BP-KNIP model proposed by Sjahrir.

The two regency working committees set up by Midjaja in Tegal and Brebes were not responsible to enlarged KNI assemblies. In Brebes, where working committees were also set up at district and subdistrict levels, they simply replaced all earlier KNIs. The working committees in Tegal and Brebes combined legislative and executive powers in a kind of presidium of nine men at the regency level or five men at the district and subdistrict levels. AMRI Slawi was to be the representative council in the region. Thus in the Tiga Daerah Midjaja rejected Sjahrir's model as 'recking of parliamentary democracy' (*baoe parlementerisme*).¹¹

The Brebes working committee was formed by Midjaja at Ketanggungan, the centre of the regency's pre-war nationalist movement and base of Brebes' best-known ex-Digulist Slamet. Midjaja told the meeting, 'We need to take full control of the government as the Japanese are on their knees'.¹² He said that the revolutionary struggle should be strengthened by uniting Brebes and Ketanggungan under a single leadership. At a second meeting in Brebes shortly

afterwards, Kartohargo met Midjaja for the first time and was impressed by his behind-the-scenes organisational skills.

K. Midjaja said that he had met with KNI members from all over Brebes at Ketanggungan where it had been decided to dissolve the KNIs and replace them with working committees. Meetings to establish these committees throughout the Residency were being held at 4 p.m. that afternoon. K. Midjaja decided that I should lead the Brebes meeting. I said that I did not yet have a clear idea of the status of the working committee. I was not prepared to lead the meeting, as I did not know what I had to say. I was told that as the leader of the meeting I only needed to open and close it. I was amazed at the number that attended as I had not heard any announcement beforehand.¹³

Kartohargo, Brebes' leading nationalist, was chosen as chairman of the nine-man working committee set up on Midjaja's initiative. The other members included a member of the local religious elite, a pemuda figure, three radicals from Ketanggungan, and two 'renegade' members of the priyayi corps from Brebes, regency secretary Mohamad Saleh, and public prosecutor Maksum. Because of the wide range of representation on the working committee, as well as its imaginative policies, it was seen at the time as a model of administration to be emulated in other areas.¹⁴

A second meeting took place several days later, attended this time by Tegal Barisan Pelopor leader Muhamad Nuh, Pemalang leader Amir and Widarta. The question of the Pekalongan Resident was first on the agenda. Mr. Besar had left the Residency several days before and his temporary replacement, R. M. Soeprapto, was not from the pre-war nationalist movement. Budisutjitro, the secretary of the PKI in 1924, was suggested but Midjaja recommended Sis-madi, a journalist from Solo.¹⁵ The meeting agreed, and Mohamad Saleh, Brebes working committee secretary, was asked to notify the central government by telegram. After introducing Midjaja to the meeting, Widarta gave his views about 'society in a time of revolution' and described in detail what had been happening in other areas.¹⁶

On 8 November Kartohargo received an invitation from the newly formed Tegal working committee to attend the installation of K. H. Abu Sudja'i as the new Bupati of Tegal. Kartohargo recalls:

I was able to meet the acting Resident [R. M. Soeprapto] and the Governor's representative [Sayuti Melik] for the first time. They asked when the new Bupati of Brebes was going to be installed. I replied that Brebes had not chosen a new bupati.

Then I was pressed by the acting Resident to carry out elections as quickly as possible for the prangreh praja positions that were empty, because the governmental functions could not be carried out properly if there weren't any local heads.¹⁷

The following day Kartohargo discussed the problem with the Brebes working committee, which was of the opinion that 'only the government has the right' to appoint new prangreh praja. Nevertheless, Sayuti Melik urged the working committee to agree to ask local revolutionary groups and bodies to submit a candidate for bupati. Five days later, after the voting papers had been counted, K. H. Syatori was elected. He was vice-chairman of Masjumi and a local mosque functionary (*naib*). The other pangreh praja vacancies were filled by the working committee. Acting Resident R. M. Soeprapto and Sayuti Melik arrived in Brebes for the official inauguration, together with members of the Tegal working committee, and all the new regency officials. After the installation Sayuti Melik gave a speech about the international situation, and later in the evening Soeprapto prepared and signed all the letters of appointment of new officials chosen by the working committee.

After the replacing of the pangreh praja, the most pressing problem facing the Brebes working committee was the economy. Brebes' most important and lucrative cash crops—onions, chillies, ground nuts and soya beans—had to be sold. With the bupati's permission, the working committee sent small shipments to Jakarta to get higher prices. Dried fish, salted eggs and a fish preserve, *terasi*, were also traded in Jakarta. At the same time, an economic affairs section distributed basic commodities throughout the regency. As the head of the regency Fisheries Department had been removed from his position, his department was replaced by a fisheries cooperative.¹⁸

The Brebes working committee was also active in social affairs, holding various women's courses two afternoons a week in the local primary school. These in part aimed to explain the wider implications of the revolutionary struggle, as well as what the working committee was doing, so that women 'would know about how to defend their country'.¹⁹ Brebes was the only place in the Tiga Daerah which had a special programme to bring women into the revolutionary movement. Working committees also had economic and political functions at lower levels. In nearby Klampok, local farmers had taken over the Chinese-owned rice mill, and the five-man Wanasari subdistrict working committee formalised this 'takeover' on behalf of the farmers who had occupied the mill premises in an orderly manner.²⁰

The composition of the subdistrict as well as the district working committees reflect the grassroots involvement in the revolutionary

movement. The Wanasari working committee was led by the local stationmaster (representing pre-war veterans), and its members included the leading orthodox kyai, and a modernist Muslim teacher, while the Brebes district working committee consisted of an official of the pre-war pest eradication programme from Jatibarang, a Brebes schoolteacher, a pemuda leader, and the former lurah who became the new Brebes camat.²¹ Whether a new wedana was appointed or not depended on local opinion.

The question of the rule of political parties divided local revolutionary opinion. On 3 November Vice-President Hatta issued a government decree permitting political parties to operate. Indeed the PKI, Masjumi and Parsi were already being formed nationally. Brebes regency working committee chairman Kartohargo believed that political parties would facilitate cadre-forming, while others believed that taking power from the old administration should be the first priority.²² Working committees, it was felt, would do this more effectively than political parties.

In Tegal, Midjaja also played a crucial role in determining the membership of the nine-man working committee. The Tegal committee was chosen privately by Midjaja and his group, not, as in Brebes, at a public meeting of revolutionaries. A Tegal KNI leader after visiting AMRI Slawi for discussions about revolutionary strategy received a visit from Midjaja at his house in Tegal:

He introduced himself as a member of the PNI-Baru who knew Bagio [Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo] very well. He asked me what my political leaning [*aliran*] was. I said PNI-Baru. Then he repeated what Wignjo [AMRI Slawi leader Soewignjo] had said several days before in Slawi. This was that radical changes had to be made, and all remaining officials from the colonial period and the tools of the fascists must be swept aside. That should be our purpose.²³

Reflecting on the discussion with Midjaja, the Tegal KNI leader recalls:

I didn't agree wholeheartedly with this for two reasons. Firstly, I saw their lack of preparations in Slawi; they did not really have any trained cadres. Also I did not accept the principle of radically changing the local government without any guide from the centre. Changing officials was easy. Everyone wanted to become a camat, wedana or whatever. But what was their revolutionary leadership ability? It was clear that K. Midjaja did not have any followers.²⁴

In the week following the mass demonstration from the south, the

Tegal working committee held its first meeting. Its secretary, also a member of the KNI group, recalls this occasion:

As well as the nine members of the working committee there was a tenth person present. As a point of order I said 'before the meeting starts I would like an explanation as to who is the tenth person'. The tenth person himself, not the chairman of the meeting, replied. 'You don't need to know who I am or what my status is on this working committee' he said. If at the first meeting the rules are broken I thought they would go on being broken. Only after I left did I find out that the tenth person was K. Midjaja. He wore Japanese drill shorts, a grey long-sleeved shirt, and had short hair.²⁵

How often Midjaja sat in on the meetings is not known. The chairman could not remember his coming at all after it was set up. Apart from the three ex-Digulists (Soewignjo, Soelaiman and Muhammad Nuh), the working committee membership included two of the KNI group, AMRI Slawi leader Sakirman, and the younger Barisan Pelopor pemuda figure, Marsum. It was more representative of local revolutionary groups in the Tegal revolutionary movement than the three previous Tegal KNIs had been.

Despite the Tegal KNI group's reservations about Midjaja's strategy, two of its members decided to join the radicals on the working committee. One replaced Soemarno as secretary, while Soesmono was in charge of government affairs. The KNI group realised they were in the same position as they saw Midjaja to be in—neither had a mass following, unlike the Barisan Pelopor leaders in Tegal:

We were impotent by ourselves, we didn't have any power. K. Midjaja received us well, I was given the task of looking after government matters. At several meetings in Slawi I made them change a lot of their plans. For example, I disagreed with the division of tasks on the new working committee. The people who were being given the tasks were not up to the job. Because there was never any agenda given out beforehand, one could not bring along any draft proposals.²⁶

The problem of lack of administrative skills or experience with money matters was felt by all revolutionaries who were now in government positions. In Pemalang this was solved by using officials from the old regime including two camats from the Japanese occupation, one of whom now became regency secretary. In Brebes the old regency secretary, Mohamad Saleh, joined the revolutionaries and was himself a member of the working committee, while one camat from the Japanese time was employed in the regency. In Pemalang,

however, the older radicals in the Tiga Daerah advised, 'Don't leave a single Japanese stooge in office', and that had more influence.²⁷ In Tegal, only one member of the working committee had any administrative experience and he was a clerk in the regency office. None had any knowledge of money matters, including Soelaiman, the treasurer of the working committee, who at the first meeting proceeded to close the accounts of all government offices. This was probably in order to make an assessment of the regency financial situation as part of the business of combining the regency and the now abolished municipal administrations. Closing accounts caused difficulties. The doctor at Kardinah Hospital, for example, soon complained that he could no longer get medical supplies because money had run out, and asked the working committee for assistance.

Next, the Tegal working committee made an inventory of the sugar and rice stocks in the regency. This led to the discovery that one rice mill on the road to Pemalang was still hoarding rice that was meant to have been distributed during the occupation. The hoard was confiscated and distributed to people in the city.²⁸

Apart from ensuring adequate supplies of food, the working committees worked out a cloth distribution program. During the occupation, as we have seen, cloth had been even scarcer than rice; the proclamation did not change the situation. Nevertheless, the textile mill in Tegal—the biggest in Java—held stockpiles of cloth which were still undistributed in November when Kutil was asked to help in this distribution.²⁹ Pemalang regency also obtained supplies from the Tegal factory early in October but the local KNI, dominated by pangreh praja, could not think of a way to pay for it until the Wedana of Belik, who was a KNI vice-chairman, suggested using village funds. When the old administration in Pemalang fell, revolutionary leaders found the cloth undistributed as the KNI did not know how. The Wedana of Belik helped Bupati Soepangat in this task:

This distribution strengthened the Tiga Daerah movement. People were saying 'You see, where there is an uprising there is a distribution of cloth; in other areas where there is no uprising there is no distribution . . .' The money from the distribution was used for the pemuda doing guard, to buy good food. Each meal they got at least one egg. Just imagine, in those times!

The people in Belik had to pay for their cloth allocation in contrast to Kutil's free (but virtually useless) distribution in Talang. The Wedana of Belik was allocated fourteen metres for himself and his family, only part of which was payment for organising the distribution.³⁰ In fact, as a former official of the Japanese, the Wedana of Belik's authority was insecure and he needed Bupati

Soepangat's protection as well as a commitment to the new revolutionary ideology of equality.

The Tegal working committee, like its Brebes counterpart and also the API/PRI in Pemalang, had social welfare functions. The working committee began a campaign to 're-educate' the city's prostitutes with the help of the *pemudas* who gave the prostitutes a rice ration and sent them to join their compatriots from Slawi working in the textile factory.³¹ The committee filled vacant administrative positions, appointing two new *camats* (in Slawi and Kedungbanteng) which acting Resident Soeprapto later ratified. As the railway workers in the Tegal repair shops had no union, a unionist was brought from Bandung to set up a local Railway Workers' Union.

The working committee also supported the navy in its plan to set up a unit in Tegal. This unit, known as Base IV, was officially inaugurated on 7 November after the withdrawal of the TKR and set up headquarters in the former *kenpeitai* barracks.³² The working committee helped in recruitment and sold some of the regency sugar stockpiles to buy weapons and other supplies, including food for the navy base.

Other autonomous groups outside Tegal, including the fiercely independent Pemuda Istimewa at Ujungrusi, accepted the authority of the working committee, but Kutil still remained outside all authority. In an effort to control him, the working committee appointed Kutil as regency police chief, and devised a plan to detain him when he moved into the police barracks. Shrewdly, Kutil accepted the new position but refused to move permanently into the barracks with his followers. The working committee's difficulties in this regard were not made any easier when its chairman, AMRI Slawi leader Socwignjo, fell out with the man on whom he was relying to capture Kutil.³³ In the end Kutil remained as regency police chief but stayed in Talang.

The relationship between the Muslim *bupatis* and the working committees was critical to the continuing success of the revolution and to communist strategy. K. Midjaja set up working committees only in Tegal and Brebes where the *bupatis* were Muslims. While at the national level it was envisaged that working committees would assist the appointed heads in daily government in the Tiga Daerah, the role of the two *bupatis* was merely to agree to policies originating with the working committees, which had the actual power. As Bupati of Tegal, K. H. Abu Sudja'i felt in 1975 he had been a puppet with no real authority.³⁴ In reality the working committee's decisions were in response to the needs and challenges of local administrative and political problems, and their priorities reflected the political realities of November 1945. The Tegal working committee controlled by

Midjaja knew it had to work to cooperate with Muslim nationalists but it was clumsy in making the arrangements. It was essential political realism to try and forge a working coalition between the two groups if the radicals were to survive in office, but political realism needed sensitivity to social realities if it was to work successfully.

Some radicals believed that by having santri bupatis the Islamic group would be satisfied and the latent Marxist-Muslim social and intellectual antagonisms could be largely overcome. However no santri members were appointed to the Tegal working committee or the Federation of Resistance Organisations of the Tiga Daerah, the GBP3D. Islamic communists who could bridge the gap between Muslims and Marxists in the Tiga Daerah were few in number despite the Muslim support for the Sarekat Rakyat in the 1920s.³⁵ While the bigger group of Islamic nationalists in the Tiga Daerah supported replacing the *pangreh praja*, by working committees if necessary, they had little in common with the committed Marxists of the Tegal Working Committee.

Thus the radicals too easily assumed that the appointment of two popularly chosen santri bupatis solved the problems between Islam and communism. Furthermore, detaining in Slawi two well-known figures—the TKR Commander Iskandar Idris and the Wedana of Adiwerna—as well as two leading orthodox kyais from Tegal, was not helping their cause. Eventually AMRI Slawi decided that Iskandar Idris and the Wedana of Adiwerna should stay in Slawi until the social situation was calmer. This antagonised the Pekalongan TKR who now believed that their commander had been ‘imprisoned’. In fact AMRI allowed him to live outside their headquarters in an unguarded house provided that he stayed in Slawi, and he brought his family from Pekalongan. Thus Iskandar Idris chose to stay in Slawi rather than risk travelling back through Adiwerna and Talang to Pekalongan. He attended several pemuda training sessions, visited the textile factory and was treated well. However, it was a politically naive move, and santri pemudas who believed he was being detained began to doubt AMRI’s intentions.³⁶

AMRI Slawi fell out with Muslim groups in other ways as well. Adiwerna pemudas, training in Slawi, resented having to do marching practice ‘as if they had never done it before’ and by early December AMRI Slawi no longer held authority in Adiwerna. In mid December 1945, the Adiwerna working committee changed its name to Masjumi, and AMRI Adiwerna became the GPII or Islamic Youth Movement of Indonesia.³⁷

In short, the radicals seem to have assumed that no special strategy was needed to gain the support of the faithful. Perhaps the memory of the extraordinary success of the Sarekat Rakyat in Tegal before

1926 made them think this was unnecessary. But conservative social values in themselves were an ever present danger. Midjaja could not achieve the unity he wanted merely by introducing himself to the new *santri* Bupati of Tegal under the name of Abdul Hamid 'as though he was from a *pesantren*'.³⁸ Many *kyais* had been local KNI leaders and four were now *camats*. The intellectual and socio-religious conflict between Islam and communism had already been expressed once in the bitter split in the *Sarekat Islam* in 1919. The radicals needed all the support they could muster, including that of the Muslims.

The Popular Front

The GBP3D was set up in the headquarters of the Tegal Barisan Pelopor on 16 November 1945. It was an attempt to create a popular front in the Tiga Daerah which would choose a new Resident, and to bring the Residency capital and the regency of Pekalongan into line politically with the Tiga Daerah. The minutes of the GBP3D meeting held a week afterwards in Brebes are a clear indication of the aims and priorities of the popular front.³⁹ The problems and strategies devised to solve them were discussed under three categories—the economy, information and security, all considered to be matters of civil rather than military authority. There was to be one ideology, and a strong regional autonomy on local matters would be encouraged.

Of the front's members, three were from the underground PKI (two were veterans of the 1926 rebellion), two were ex-Digul activists and four were non-communists (two from the PNI Baru and one a Sukarnoist). It was significant that no Islamic nationalists were represented on the GBP3D. Midjaja, as chairman, identified the goals of GBP3D with those of Amir Sjarifuddin's Indonesian Socialist Party (Parsi), namely, to lead peasants, workers, soldiers and *pemudas* towards a socialist society.⁴⁰ The GBP3D was sympathetic to Parsi because of its 'orientation to Moscow,' according to Midjaja.⁴¹

The immediate concern of the GBP3D, however, was finding a Resident to replace R. M. Soeprapto, the government official appointed acting Resident after the sudden departure of Besar on 5 November. Sismadi, the candidate selected at an earlier meeting, had withdrawn saying he would be unacceptable to the majority of the Residency's population on religious grounds as he was a Christian. Midjaja then suggested that Sardjio from Purworejo be approached. Initially a member of the PNI Baru, during the Japanese occupation he had been an elected member of the Kedu Residency council and later represented the Residency on the Java Advisory Council. He was arrested with his brother as a suspected member of the under-

ground PKI and sentenced to thirteen years' jail in 1944. He had been serving this sentence in the same Ambarawa prison as Sayuti Melik at the time of the proclamation, and was released in late September 1945.⁴²

A second meeting of the GBP3D was held in Brebes on 25 November, attended as well by Widarta and a Chinese representative from Tegal. The first problem was how to organise the local economy. The new Republic was locked in a struggle for independence, the 'enemy' was now the Allies in Surabaya and NICA in Jakarta. Against this background the Japanese wartime economic policies had to be replaced by an economy run on cooperative lines. While exports of foodstuffs in theory should have been limited in case NICA got hold of them, Brebes needed to find markets for its traditional cash crops of chillies and onions.

The meeting also discussed the distribution of food between rural and urban areas as there were 5,000 tons of hulled rice left over from the occupation to be distributed. A related issue was how to provide enough rice during the traditional scarcity or *paceklik* period before the next harvest. Widarta suggested cooperatives at the village level, and the meeting agreed that cooperatives could stockpile rice for the period.

Widarta pointed out that while cooperatives should be run by the state, private traders still existed in Soviet Russia and Yenan. The meeting then agreed that trade should be left in the hands of the people while businesses in private hands should be leased to the Tiga Daerah movement. Widarta suggested that Tegal and Brebes should follow the example of Pemalang where the struggle group API/PRI was reorganising the local economy assisted by the State.

The style of democratic centralism of the new government was reflected in the decisions of the GBP3D's economic affairs committee. A central body would coordinate the purchase and distribution of food, supervise establishment of village cooperatives run by 'lower classes', control prices, supervise trade with other regions, take over responsibility for the transport system, increase agricultural production, promote home industry based on house gardens, and hire plant and equipment from private businesses.

Other economic issues such as how to run the sugar estates or how to use the sugar stockpiles were not discussed. Neither was there discussion on the question of the distribution of *tanah bengkok* which became an issue later in the revolution. This was a time when there was a supreme opportunity to redistribute land, or at least reduce inequalities of distribution and cut down the huge amounts of land that some lurahs had held in lieu of salary. If these matters were in the minds of PKI leaders, they were not discussed at the time. Indeed

it was Bupati Soepangat's view that *tanah bengkok* belonged to the State and could not be distributed to the people.

The second issue was the role of the TKR in the Tiga Daerah. The meeting considered the view of Brebes leader Kartohargo that the Pekalongan TKR should simply be asked to return to the Tiga Daerah, but this was rejected. A second alternative was to establish a new army presence in Tegal, with Pekalongan TKR providing half the weapons and some manpower, but Tegal having a voice in the selection of the corps. Believing that the TKR was fundamentally a conservative force, the GBP3D decided to create a new armed force or standing army, with headquarters in Slawi. The Defence Committee also saw the need to form an Executioners Brigade (*Barisan Algojo*) from each region to oppose obstructionists such as NICA and its agents.

The example of Mao Zhe-dung's revolutionary government in Yen-an was known to the PKI underground leader Widarta, for he suggested that government in the Tiga Daerah should be based on the Chinese model of bureaus under a council of party leaders divided into four executive groups.⁴³ These were to be the council of justice, the general secretariat, the executive committee and the congress, in charge of bureaus for regency councils, economics, defence and information.

This plan of government was part of the ideological and theoretical discussion at the meeting, reflecting perceptions of local communist revolutionary strategy in 1945. These were couched in phrases such as 'our struggle strategy is to defend the Republic of Indonesia, and we shouldn't act openly too quickly', that is, 'reveal communist plans', and 'our stance is to create a local block against particularism' or 'we take a hard line against obstructionists'.

Behind such rhetoric, together with more realistic concerns and pragmatic solutions, lay the concern to defend the revolution against its opponents. These were diverse and were identified as NICA and its agents, the Japanese, rival PKI factions from other areas headed by Tan Malaka or Mohamad Jusuf, socialists and various fragmented pemuda organisations.

AMRI Slawi was to be the headquarters of the Tiga Daerah popular front and a new Tiga Daerah-based revolutionary army was to be formed. The following regulations were to be introduced: vehicles were to be kept in one place, reserves of benzine were to be stored in Pemalang and if threatened were to be destroyed, communication lines were to be manned by *pemudas*, and soldiers were to be educated through a propaganda programme—because 'the army's actions must be in accord with propaganda principles as must be the government's'.

The TKR was seen as a threat to the revolution in the Tiga Daerah. The GBP3D considered that the TKR was instrumental in strengthening feudalism elsewhere in Java. Distrust of the TKR led the GBP3D to reject the Yogyakarta TKR offer to help establish an army in Tegal. Ironically the minutes record that attempts to have discussions with the Yogya TKR were considered by the GBP3D to be a mistake, whereas perhaps the real mistake was for the radicals to cut the TKR out of the revolutionary process. This move would cost the revolutionaries dearly in the immediate and long-term future.

Although the strategy of the PKI at this time was supposedly to work 'invisibly' within existing bodies and remain in the background of a broad popular front, Widarta and Midjaja did not seem concerned with concealing the overt PKI leadership of GBP3D. Widarta talked about 'not acting openly too quickly' and about Parsi being '100 per cent pro-Moscow'. In retrospect Widarta and Midjaja assumed too readily that the non-communist members of the popular front were basically sympathetic to their own views. There was also the problem of 'internal' animosities, indicated in the GBP3D minutes, which weakened the popular front strategy. This revolved around the antagonism of Midjaja towards Sayuti Melik, who had disagreed with the anti-fascist propaganda put out when the Japanese landed. Widarta also accused Sayuti Melik of 'causing many victims' in Semarang, that is, of being a Japanese informer. Ironically this was the man sent by both the President and the provincial-level government to help establish a genuine revolutionary government in Pekalongan.

The main priority of the popular front at this point was to gain power in Pekalongan as quickly as possible. On 28 November the GBP3D issued a letter to all struggle organisations in the Tegal region urging them to prepare to support a move to Pekalongan. On 5 December a leaflet distributed throughout the Residency set out three demands, namely, that Sardjio be appointed as Resident, that remaining *pangreh praja* who were heads of government departments should be replaced, and that all those who supported NICA should be purged. The leaflet ended with an ultimatum that if Pekalongan did not reply within three days, the GBP3D would be forced to take 'definite action'.⁴⁴

Midjaja's later justification for ending on this note was that the GBP3D had been receiving disturbing reports about unrest in Sragi (on the Pemalang-Pekalongan regency border) and in Batang to the east of the Residency capital, indicating that social upheaval of the kind the Tiga Daerah had experienced in October was about to occur.⁴⁵ GBP3D therefore urged Pekalongan to democratise the administration of remaining districts by creating working committees, thus preventing

the sort of uncontrolled, spontaneous social upheaval which had occurred throughout the Tiga Daerah. Midjaja had said that the passivity of the Residency capital was endangering external security in the face of rumours that enemy ships had been sighted off the coast, that landings were imminent, and that before it had withdrawn, the TKR battalion had caught a spy distributing Dutch money.⁴⁶ However, an appeal to either the Minister of Information and Defence or to Sjahrir would not have been noticed, as the central government was involved in the fighting between Allies and Indonesians in areas such as Surabaya and Ambarawa. Their priority was fighting the foreigners, not rebuilding local government along radical lines. It was better, therefore, to await Pekalongan's reaction to the Tiga Daerah demands of 5 December before appealing to the centre.⁴⁷

The Conference in Pematang

The leaflet directed to the struggle organisations of Pekalongan regency reached acting Resident Soeprapto in Pekalongan on 6 December. He convened a meeting of the Pekalongan Struggle Council, which represented local groups, the next day.⁴⁸ The Council accepted Sayuti Melik's advice that they should meet with the GBP3D to discuss the demands, and arrangements were made with GBP3D for Sayuti Melik and Soeprapto to attend. However Sayuti Melik left the Residency and Soeprapto judged it better for the negotiations if government officials like himself stayed away to allow 'the people to meet with the people'.⁴⁹

On Sunday, 9 December, a delegation set out for Pematang from the Hotel Merdeka in Pekalongan. It included K. H. Sjirat, a leader of the orthodox Muslim Teachers' Insurgency Corps (Badan Pemberontakan Alim Ulama), K. H. Syafi'i, a leader from the Muhammadiyah stronghold of Pekajangan representing the local BPRI, the Pekalongan Residency police chief, a local KNI leader, and a representative from the local Indonesian Workers' League.

On the Pekalongan-Pematang border, the group was stopped by people armed with bamboo spears, and told to get out of their cars. This happened 'about fifteen times' during the twenty-kilometre journey to Pematang. The Brebes delegation to the Pematang Conference was also stopped after crossing the Pematang regency border and searched in exactly the same way as the Pekalongan party. Brebes leader Kartohargo was in fact struck by the complete contrast between Pematang and the rest of the Tiga Daerah, both in the number of road blocks and the fierceness of the pemuda manning

them.⁵⁰ GBP3D leaders, waiting in the regency compound to welcome the Pekalongan delegation, had already made their own preparations for the meeting. These included a pemuda escort company for the new Resident and his takeover staff, consisting of twenty-five pemudas from Tegal and Brebes, who had also gathered in Pemalang. Another twenty-five local pemudas guarding the regency later joined the escort company. Apart from the two delegations, about ten other participants took part in the meeting. Pemudas carrying weapons remained outside the regency *pendopo* and did not participate in the discussion.

The Brebes nationalist leader Kartohargo, writing in 1947, said of the conference:

It was opened by K. Midjaja in a welcoming way, using mild-tempered words. Before the opening proceedings, K. Midjaja had issued a friendly reprimand to Pekalongan for the absence of Acting Resident Soeprapto, who had been asked to come. K. Midjaja went on to explain the revolutionary struggle in the Tiga Daerah and events leading up to the present Tiga Daerah demands which were supported by the majority of the people of the entire Residency of Pekalongan. Therefore it was proper that Pekalongan [regency] agree to them. The representatives from Pekalongan were asked to reply to K. Midjaja's address one by one. Everyone agreed, except the Pekalongan Pesindo delegate seemed rather dissatisfied. In short, Pekalongan accepted the demand, and later during the rest for prayers, a written agreement would be made. Then the meeting adjourned and the Pekalongan representatives who wanted to pray went off to the mosque.⁵¹

A contemporary Pekalongan source asserts that the Pekalongan struggle council agreed in general with the proposals of the Tiga Daerah, provided that the changes that were going to be carried out would mean 'an improvement for progress of the nation', that they would help Pekalongan's contribution to the fighting on the Semarang front, and were 'in line with the wishes of the central government'.

Acting Resident Soeprapto had also had difficulty in reaching Pemalang after receiving a telephone call from a KNI leader in the Pekalongan delegation requesting his immediate presence in Pemalang. He was stopped frequently by pemuda road blocks and reached Pemalang only after the meeting had chosen Sardjio as Resident, but in time for the five o'clock prayers which he attended with the Pekalongan delegation.⁵²

After the meeting reconvened, Midjaja gave the acting Resident a friendly rebuke for not coming with the Pekalongan delegation and

summarised the earlier discussions for him. The GBP3D circulated a 'letter of agreement' signed by representatives of both the GBP3D and the Pekalongan struggle council and witnessed by Soeprapto. The letter said that the government of Pekalongan Residency was to be handed over to the people immediately, that Sardjio be appointed as Resident, that those officials 'who were not able to follow the way of revolution' should resign, and those who had already done so would not be allowed to leave their homes until the situation was under control.⁵³ The handing over of all government affairs to the GBP3D takeover staff was to be completed at 2 p.m. the next day, 10 December. Before the staff had got things running smoothly, the acting Resident would guarantee the safety of the takeover staff and the security of the region.

Informally it was also decided, with the Pekalongan delegates' approval, that the new Resident and his takeover staff would be accompanied by an escort company of about fifty armed *pemudas* as a propaganda device to inspire enthusiasm for the war of independence. Midjaja did not realise that a band of armed *pemudas* might be seen as threatening. He also asked Soeprapto to continue working in Pekalongan until the transfer of power was complete.

The popular front had reason to be satisfied with the meeting with the Pekalongan struggle council since Midjaja's authority seemed obvious from the way he had conducted it. The Pekalongan delegation later claimed that, because of the atmosphere of the meeting they had not been free to give their views. The tense revolutionary atmosphere in Pemalang, heightened by the armed *pemuda* guards and road blocks everywhere, made both delegations uneasy, but as Brebes leader Kartohargo pointed out in 1947, it was the Pekalongan side which had chosen Pemalang as the venue; if they were put off by the revolutionary atmosphere there they could hardly blame the GBP3D.⁵⁴

As far as Midjaja and the GBP3D were concerned the Residency was now united. Accompanied by a sixty-strong escort company from the Tiga Daerah led by Soentoro, the takeover staff left Pemalang for Pekalongan on Monday 10 December.⁵⁵ The group went first to the Hotel Merdeka where they set up their headquarters, then made for the Residency offices where Soeprapto received them. Contemporary sources differ about the behaviour of the escort company. The acting Resident saw them positioned at entrances to the Residency office building and along certain main roads leading out of the city. The public prosecutor held that they took up positions around the Residency like an 'occupying army'. According to the same source, the group also had its own red flag with a white star in the centre.⁵⁶

The heads of all municipal and Residency government depart-

ments were gathered at the Residency office and Soeprapto handed over the Residency administration to Sardjio, in a brief ceremony. The public prosecutor's office and the court did not send representatives. Members of the Tiga Daerah takeover staff moved into the various government departments and all funds were placed under seal. That evening the GBP3D invited Residency officials to a goodwill gathering at the Hotel Merdeka to meet the new leaders and hear the aims of the GBP3D for the democratisation of all levels of Residency government. According to the Pekalongan public prosecutor the officials, who had been feeling 'very threatened' by the takeover of the Residency government by the Tiga Daerah, were reassured by the meeting. Other local observers also felt that there was a 'good atmosphere' there.⁵⁷

Throughout Tuesday 11 December the takeover staff continued the work of transferring the administration to the new revolutionary government. An investigation of the financial situation of the various government departments was begun under the direction of Tegal working committee treasurer Soelaiman Soetopratiwo. The GBP3D planned to make an inventory of the contents of the government warehouses, which would also be closed if any irregularities were found.

The takeover staff then began a review of the administration of the various Residency offices and provided information to local revolutionary groups about why the GBP3D had arrived in Pekalongan.⁵⁸ The Tiga Daerah escort company took control of the telephone exchange, post office, electricity and water supplies, the administration of the jail and the police, and organised guard duty. Vehicles leaving and entering the capital were stopped for questioning and prisoners held since the Japanese occupation were released. Former acting Resident Soeprapto handed over the contents of the Resident's office, including all secret files, to Sardjio. Apparently nothing had been destroyed.

After closing the government offices the takeover staff returned to the Hotel Merdeka to hear reports of what had been achieved in the first two days of the new administration, and to plan further moves in their 'democratisation' strategy. The creation of working committees, now called *dewan pekerja*, at the district, subdistrict and village levels as in the Tiga Daerah, was to begin in Pekalongan.⁵⁹ Midjaja had advised a delegation led by the chairman of the Batang working committee that if the people did not like their *camat* they should form a working committee 'to replace the *camat*' and carry on the administration. A plan was also being formulated to divide the huge Pekalongan regency into two, with a new regency capital at Batang.⁶⁰ Aware of the importance of cadre-forming in the rural

areas the GBP3D also tried, with the few cadres it had in Pekalongan, to form Pesindo branches in the Pekalongan coastal subdistricts. The responsibility for this was given to Ibu Pri, an experienced underground PKI courier, who knew the area well.

On Wednesday 11 December, Sardjio issued his first, and last, public announcement. This explained that on 9 December the Pekalongan Residency government had 'surrendered' and fallen into the hands of the people and urged the people to use more democratic forms of address instead of old *priyayi* titles when addressing officials.⁶¹ On the same day Midjaja and Sardjio discussed with Soeprapto the question of the official ratification of the new Resident. Midjaja had sent a telegram to the central government asking for Sardjio to be formally appointed.⁶² It was decided that Soeprapto should do the same, and he agreed to stay on in the new Residency administration because Sardjio would have to spend a lot of time away from Pekalongan. Soeprapto also wished to make a report to the Governor of Central Java about what had happened in Pekalongan.⁶³

A list supplied by the public prosecutor gives an indication of the social backgrounds of the movement's supporters who came to Pekalongan from the Tiga Daerah. The biggest single group was classified by the Pekalongan authorities as 'peasants' (*tani*), and most of these (thirty-seven out of fifty-two) were from Tegal and Pemalang, with only five from Brebes. Another eight were from the sugar mill town of Sragi on the Pekalongan-Pemalang border. The second largest group were petty traders, including a rice merchant. There were also government officials from the regency office, the railways and the post office; village officials, including the Lurah of Slawi; five former Heiho members (also from Slawi); a plantation foreman, two medical orderlies (from Pemalang), and five policemen. In addition there was a sprinkling of urban workers: tailors, weavers, mechanics (including a bicycle repair man), peddlers, drivers, a shoemaker and a goldsmith. The majority of the supporters of the Tiga Daerah movement were under twenty-five, and either from Tegal or Pemalang.⁶⁴

On Thursday afternoon, 12 December, Midjaja held a well-attended public meeting in the Pekalongan municipal square to introduce the new Resident and the GBP3D policy on the democratisation of local government to the people of Pekalongan. The atmosphere at the meeting was peaceful; there were no incidents of any kind. Copies of Sardjio's printed announcement of 9 December were handed out. While the meeting may have been satisfied with Sardjio, Midjaja made a serious tactical error with Islam, saying in his speech that the Pekalongan Muslim *pemudas* were not as revolutionary as those in other areas such as Surabaya and West Java. In fact this was

not justified, as Pekalongan pemuda had gone to the Semarang front to fight the British along with other groups and the TKR. Midjaja also reportedly said that in view of the importance of revolutionary struggle, 'religion could be put aside' at this time.⁶⁵

At the routine meeting between members of the Tiga Daerah takeover staff in the Hotel Merdeka later that evening, complaints from Pekalongan pemuda, officials and others were discussed. Pekalongan officials were concerned that freezing office funds had curtailed day-to-day government business, and officials from outlying areas in the regency coming in to collect payrolls and returning home empty-handed were worried that they might be held legally responsible if employees were not paid. Similarly, government departments, especially the Department of Health, were worried that essential supplies of medicine to hospitals and health clinics were not being provided. Behaviour of Tiga Daerah pemuda was another problem, as they 'were behaving like drunken Japanese soldiers'. Those who walked past the guardposts had to show respect or *hormat*. Those who did not, people said, were slapped, in exactly the same way as the Japanese had done.⁶⁶

Of fundamental concern for the success of the revolution was the attitude of two groups in Pekalongan, the TKR and the Muslims. The TKR took a serious view of the searches made of all vehicles leaving the city for runaway officials and forbidden equipment, such as typewriters and adding machines. Many of the vehicles were on their way to the Semarang front, set up by the Republic to prevent any British move towards Pekalongan. In reply to a TKR request for assistance at the front in Semarang the GBP3D told the army that 'the foreign threat was not in Semarang but in Surabaya'.⁶⁷

Santri groups, moreover, were understandably angered by remarks made by Midjaja about the Pekalongan Muslim pemuda. Midjaja, they said, had 'ridiculed' Islam, had stated that the Koranic oath was no longer any use, and worse.⁶⁸ A counter-movement was beginning to mobilise dissent.

Because the reports of growing dissent originated with Pekalongan people, Midjaja asked GBP3D leaders to check their validity. The meeting closed without any positive action being taken. This concerned one of the Tiga Daerah leaders considerably:

I approached Muhamad Nuh and Soehardjo to get them to re-evaluate my report seriously, to try to ensure that the members of our militia did not act as if they were an occupying army. I impressed on them that the strength of our militia was not much compared with the army and the Pekalongan pemuda paramilitary groups (*barisan*). Especially if the army branded us as obstructing and hampering their effort at the Semarang front,

this would not help us psychologically, and we could be suspected of being a tool of NICA or at least a movement opposed to the national revolution.⁶⁹

Muhamad Nuh finally agreed also to meet the following day with officials who were worried about the scaling of warehouses and government funds. The situation was not going well for the GBP3D and there were good grounds for the concern expressed by some members. With the TKR disaffected by interference with their military activity, it was particularly important to have the support of the Muslim leaders. With such support the difficulties with the TKR could perhaps have been ironed out. Pekalongan Muslims should have been reassured by the strong Islamic nationalist element in the revolution in the Tiga Daerah; there were santri bupatis in Tegal and Brebes and many kyais had been chosen as camats.

While Muslim groups in Pekalongan municipality were not initially antagonistic, it was a different matter with the Muhammadiyah batik-making community of Pekajangan, the home of many small batik and textile entrepreneurs, some kilometres to the south of the city. Their economic status and conservative religious outlook made them suspicious of outsiders generally, and of radical revolutionaries especially.⁷⁰ K. H. Iskandar Idris, chosen by the Japanese as Commander of the Pekalongan Peta battalion, came from Pekajangan. As we have seen Idris had been captured while attending a Muhammadiyah conference near Tegal and was now, so his Muslim supporters believed, 'imprisoned' in Slawi. His brother, Ismail Hassan, another leader of the Pekajangan Muhammadiyah community and head of the local school, paid a visit to the Pekalongan Police Chief on the morning of Thursday 13 December, complaining that 'Islam had been ridiculed (*diperolok*)' by Sardjio, and requesting permission to hold a meeting of the Muhammadiyah community. The police chief agreed, providing that Hassan Ismail could guarantee security.⁷¹

The meeting went ahead later in the day and was followed by a parade which marched past the Tiga Daerah headquarters in the Hotel Merdeka to 'honour' the new Resident, it was said. The crowd were chanting 'There is no god but Allah' (*la ilaha illa 'ilah*) and 'God is great' (*Allahu Akbar*).⁷²

The following morning, Friday 14 December, Sardjio, accompanied by a small staff, set out in three cars to visit several southern subdistricts. Sardjio, his secretary Muroso,⁷³ the Brebes leader Maksu and two pemuda bodyguards were in the first car. The second one carried Midjaja, Socyono the government veterinarian (sent as an observer by the Bupati of Pekalongan) and three bodyguards, and

the last vehicle contained Pekalongan police.⁷⁴ Pekajangan santri leaders got word of the fact that the Resident and staff would be passing and made plans to intercept the car and capture the 'communist' Resident under the guidance of Hassan Ismail, who called in several ex-Peta and Heiho people to help organise the ambush. A pupil at Hassan's school at the time said in 1973:

At 9 p.m. we were told by Pak Ismail [Iskandar Idris' younger brother] that the Resident of Pekalongan would be passing through the next morning. Just imagine our teacher Pak Ismail, *Ustad* Ismail, with a pistol!⁷⁵ There was also a former Heiho whose head still looked clean shaven. At that time there were few cars passing by, perhaps only three a day. The road was blocked with a bullock cart to sabotage the meeting to form a new administration at Kedungwungi [south of Pekajangan]. It was not a coordinated action, Ismail was just being brave. He hid behind a tamarind tree. He had no military training or firing practice. A red Fiat came into sight. Ismail Hassan and the others started shooting. The driver (they said K. Midjaja) swung the car around with great skill and drove back towards Pekalongan.⁷⁶

Accounts differ as to exactly what happened next, but the only casualty in the shooting seems to have been Midjaja who was wounded in the knee. Sardjio, shaken, got out of his car and managed to telephone to Pekalongan for someone to pick up the group.

News of the shooting incident reached Pekalongan and rumours quickly spread. The TKR Regiment staff, meeting with their Commander Wadyono who had just returned from the Semarang front and Division headquarters the night before, set off for the Hotel Merdeka and ordered the revolutionaries to surrender.⁷⁷ The four-day-old revolutionary government had come to an end.

1. Interview with Bung Kecil, Jakarta, 6 July 1978. On Bung Kecil's role in the underground during the occupation, see p. 56, 58; also Lucas, *Local Opposition*, pp. 5-7, 266-267.
2. *Ibid.*
3. For S. Mustapha's biography, see Lucas, *Local Opposition*, p. 103 fn. 32.
4. Question 3, 'Surat Pemeriksaan S. Widarta', proces-verbaal, Pekalongan, 16 February 1946, Proc. Gen. See pp. 280-81 for Widarta's biography, and Lucas, *Local Opposition*, pp. 331-339 for an interpretation of his role in the underground.
5. Widarta, Question 4, proces-verbaal, Proc. Gen.

6. *Ibid.*, Question 5.
7. *Ibid.*, Question 7.
8. K. Midjaja, 'Sejarah Keluarga' diary, unpublished history of the Djasmadi-Sardjono family.
9. Transcript of taped interviews with Soewignjo, I/4, Jakarta, 26 March 1973, 25 August 1976.
10. Reid, *Indonesian National Revolution*, p. 71.
11. Minutes of the GBP3D meeting of 25 November 1945. Proc. Gen. For the full Indonesian text of these minutes see Anton E. Lucas, *Peristiwa Tiga Daerah: Revolusi dalam Revolusi*. (Jakarta, 1959), pp. 306-315.
12. Interview with Tanjung revolutionary leader (Soenarto), Jakarta, 29 July 1976.
13. Interview with Kartohargo, Brebes, 16 December 1972; Question 3, proces-verbaal, 19 October 1946, Proc. Gen.
14. Letter of the Tegal Branch of the Indonesian Workers' Party (PBI) to the Attorney-General, Mr. Kasman Singodimedjo, about the political situation in Brebes, dated 12 December 1945. Proc. Gen.
15. On Budisutjitro, see Lucas, *Peristiwa Tiga Daerah*, p. 310, fn. 10. Sismadi Sastrosiswoyo, an ex-Digulist, had also been a teacher.
16. Kartohargo, Question 4, proces-verbaal, 14 January 1947, Proc. Gen.
17. Kartohargo, Question 15, proces-verbaal, 23 October 1946, Proc. Gen.
18. The cooperative at Sawojajar was still running in 1976. Interview with Tanjung revolutionary leader (Soenarto), Jakarta, 29 July 1976.
19. *Ibid.*
20. Interview with Muslim teacher (Mardjuki), Brebes, 6 November 1975. Wanasari subdistrict office is situated at Klampok.
21. Letter of the Tegal Branch of the Indonesian Workers' Party, Proc. Gen. Interview with Brebes teacher (Mardjono), Brebes, 10 December 1975.
22. Interview with Soenarto, Jakarta, 29 July 1976.
23. Interview with Soesmono, Semarang, 8 October 1976.
24. *Ibid.*
25. Interview with Tegal KNI leader (Soemarno), Tegal, 18 December 1972.
26. Interview with Soesmono, Semarang, 8 October 1976.
27. Interview with Kendalsari Pesindo leader (Djuwahir), Comal, 31 October 1975.
28. Transcript of taped interview with Tegal working committee chairman (Soewignjo), I/8, Jakarta, 26 March 1973.
29. See p. 110.
30. Transcript of taped interview with Hardjowinoto, II/23, Temanggung, 22 May 1973.
31. Interview with Tegal working committee chairman (Soewignjo), Jakarta, 16 November 1971.
32. For a full discussion of the military and the navy presence in the Tiga Daerah, see Chapter 10.
33. Transcript of taped interview with Soewignjo, I/8, Jakarta, 26 March 1973.
34. Tegal Branch of the Indonesian Workers' Party, letter of 18 December

- 1945, Proc. Gen. Interview with K. H. Abu Sudja'i, Pacul, 20 November 1975.
35. The most well-known were H. Moeklas interned in Boven Digul and still in Australia, and Kyai Misbah adviser to AMRI Slawi.
 36. Interview with Wedana of Adiwerna (K. H. Fachruri), Slawi, 15 December 1972; Iskandar Idris, 'Sedikit Catatan Sekedar Yang Saya Alami dan Ketahui', notes of interview with the Armed Forces Museum team, 26 July 1972. This was one of several interviews during research for the creation of a series of dioramas depicting various events during the 1945-49 revolution in the Armed Forces Museum in Jakarta. (I am grateful to Maj. Gen. Soedharmo for making copies of these interview transcripts available to me.)
 37. Adiwerna Verslag, Proc. Gen.
 38. Interview with K. H. Abu Sudja'i, Pacul, 20 November 1975.
 39. See note 11. The following discussion on policies and direction of the GBP3D is derived from this document.
 40. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, p. 177.
 41. K. Midjaja, Question 3, 25 April 1946, proces-verbaal, Proc. Gen.
 42. Sardjio's brother-in-law, written answers to author, 20 June 1973. For Sardjio's biography see pp. 227-28.
 43. Before the war Chinese Malay-language newspapers frequently reported Mao's work in Yenan, and after 1945 the Chinese Civil War was an important news item in nationalist as well as the Chinese press. Personal communication from Benedict Anderson.
 44. See Lucas, *Peristiwa Tiga Daerah*, pp. 317-18.
 45. Batang working committee and Pekalongan PSII chairman (Suwito), Question 12, proces-verbaal, November 1946, Proc. Gen.
 46. K. Midjaja, Question 13, 25 April 1946, proces-verbaal, Proc. Gen.
 47. *Ibid.* Question 19.
 48. According to the Pekalongan public prosecutor, S. Kariotomodjo, in 'Laporan Tentang Keadaan Dewasa Ini Didalam Karesidenan Pekalongan', 19 December 1945, Proc. Gen., the Pekalongan Struggle Council was in fact set up in response to the 5 December GBP3D leaflet. Groups represented by the Council included branches of Pesindo in Batang, Pekalongan and Sragi, the Pekalongan police, the Sragi and Pekalongan Hizbullah, the Barisan Banteng, BPRI, and Badan Pemberontakan Alim Ulama (or Muslim Teachers' Insurgency Corps), all from Pekalongan.
 49. Acting Resident Soeprapto, Question 6, written answers to Pekalongan Public Prosecutor, 15 July 1946, Proc. Gen.
 50. Kartohargo, Question 12, proces-verbaal, June 1947, Proc. Gen. The account of the Penalang conference is based on this source, which as well as being the most detailed and contemporary source available is also perhaps more detached. A non-communist member of the GBP3D, Kartohargo was by no means in agreement with the way things were going. He was uneasy about Midjaja's dominance of the popular front and felt the takeover of Pekalongan was premature.
 51. Kartohargo, Question 9, proces-verbaal, 14 June 1947, Proc. Gen.

52. See Lucas, *Peristiwa Tiga Daerah*, pp. 318–19.
53. The journey from Pekalongan to Pemalang usually takes half an hour at the most. Although Soeprapto asked for an escort from Petarukan to Pemalang, they were stopped a further two times. Question 6, Proc. Gen.
54. Kartohargo, Question 17, proces-verbaal, January 1947. Proc. Gen.
55. Soentoro was a member of the Pekalongan Peta battalion who had joined the TKR's second battalion stationed in Comal. One version has it that he was on leave in Pemalang when he joined the new Resident's escort company as its commander. Earlier he was said to have been involved in Soepangat's kidnapping.
56. This is similar to the Pesindo flag except that the latter was red and white (that is the colour of the national flag) with the star in the middle. S. Karioatmodjo, Report, Proc. Gen. No other accounts mention this flag.
57. Soeprapto, Question 6, proces-verbaal Proc. Gen. TKR Divisi Istimewa, Yogyakarta, Bagian Penerangan, 'Peristiwa Pekalongan Pemalang/Tegal/Brebes', 18 December 1945. This report was made to TKR headquarters by two Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor leaders, and the Indonesian Workers' Party representative on the Pekalongan Struggle Council. The report is initiated by the division commander, Maj. Gen. Soedarsono. Proc. Gen. (subsequently cited as 'Yogyakarta TKR report').
58. Tegal KNI vice-chairman Soesmono, as head of information and government affairs on the GBP3D, organised the propaganda campaign. Muhammad Nuh was responsible for the escort company, and Amir and K. Midjaja planned meetings to explain the aims of the Tiga Daerah throughout Pekalongan regency.
59. *Kedaoelatan Rakjat*, 15 December 1945.
60. Soewito, Question 12, proces-verbaal, Proc. Gen.
61. See Lucas, *Peristiwa Tiga Daerah*, p. 320, for the text of this announcement.
62. This telegram had been sent after the meeting between the GBP3D and the Pekalongan struggle council on Sunday 9 December. K. Midjaja, Question 22, proces-verbaal; Kartohargo, Question 19, proces-verbaal, 15 January 1947, Proc. Gen.
63. Acting Resident Soeprapto, Question 6, Proc. Gen. Soeprapto also asked Midjaja for confirmation of Sardjio's request that he stay on from the GBP3D. Midjaja at first agreed but then said Soeprapto should leave.
64. S. Karioatmodjo, 'Daftar nama-namanya orang tahanan jang ditahan menurut perintahnya tuan pemimpin TKR di Pekalongan pada 14, Desember 1945', 14 December 1945, Proc. Gen.
65. Unsigned letter from the Tegal branch of the Indonesian Workers' Party, entitled 'The crisis in the region of Pekalongan Residency' dated 20 December 1945, Proc. Gen. According to the Yogyakarta TKR report the speeches were 'very extreme'.
66. Soesmono, written answers to author, p. 12. S. Karioatmodjo, 'Laporan', Proc. Gen.

67. S. Karioatmodjo, 'Laporan', Proc. Gen.
68. According to Pekalongan Residency police chief Suwarno in 1971, K. Midjaja told the meeting Islam was the 'poison of society' which 'hinders progress'. This reflects the distortion of Midjaja's remarks by the GBP3D's political enemies after the TKR intervention. Interview with Suwarno, Semarang, 22 September 1971.
69. Soesmono, written answers to author, p. 12. Before the war Soehardjo was chairman of the Tegal branch of Gerindo and had founded a Union of Railway Workshop Employees in 1940. He was a leader of the Tegal municipality Barisan Pelopor, and a member of the Tegal working committee. Interview, Pekalongan, 12 December 1972.
70. See Suzannah Price, 'Religion, Social Organisation and Textile Production in a Javanese Village', for a study of this closely knit, socio-economically self-contained Muhammadiyah community.
71. Interview with Soewarno, Semarang, 22 September 1971.
72. According to a priyayi account, S. M. Kartosuwirjo, a leading protagonist of the Islamic state ideal in Java, who was 'passing through' Pekalongan, spoke at the mass meeting which began the counter-movement against the Tiga Daerah. Transcript of taped interview with regency veterinarian (Soeyono), I/5, Semarang, 27 August 1971. S. M. Kartosuwirjo had also met PSII leaders Suwito (from Batang) and K. H. Abu Sudja'i in Tegal and discussed with them the contents of the GBP3D leaflet of 5 December. The former Muhammadiyah Wedana of Adiwerna also recorded in his diary meeting S. M. Kartosuwirjo in the main Pekalongan mosque on 22 December.
73. For a biography of Muroso, see Lucas, *Local Opposition*, p. 113, fn. 14.
74. Transcript of taped interview with Soeyono, I/6, Semarang, 27 August 1971.
75. *Ustad* is a muslim religious teacher.
76. Interview with a pupil of Ismail Hassan (Ibrahim Kadir), Pekajangan, 24 June 1973.
77. Interview with Tegal KRIS leader (Andi Penyamin), 28 August 1971. This man was Buginese and according to custom it was dishonourable to surrender and proper to die; but he thought it useless to die needlessly.

The Army Intervenes

The class loyalties of TKR officers offer one explanation for the army's decision to launch a counter-revolution against the Tiga Daerah government in Pekalongan. Class loyalties and privileged economic status under the Japanese also explain the animosity of much of the population towards the TKR during the Tiga Daerah Affair. The military quickly came to be disliked on two counts—its privilege during the Japanese interregnum, and its connections through its officers with the *pangreh praja*. Hence its nickname 'the Resident's Security Force'.

Wadyono, the acting TKR regiment commander, said that the decision to arrest Sardjio was made by all members of the regiment general staff, 'at least all the section heads, especially those officers whose parents had been detained'. He noted that all the *pangreh praja* who had been put in prison in the Tiga Daerah were known to him and highly respected. He personally knew Pemalang police chief Natsir, Brebes Wedana Sudirman and others, and in his judgement their detention was not just.¹

Social Origins of the Pekalongan TKR

The choice of Residency commanders for the two Pekalongan Peta battalions followed the Java-wide pattern set by the Japanese in choosing Peta company commanders from prominent *santris* or teachers in the modernist Muhammadiyah movement. Pekalongan Peta battalion commander Iskandar Idris was a Muhammadiyah leader from Pekajangan region. The Tegal Peta battalion commander Kyai Haji Doerjatman was a mosque official from Brebes

appointed by the Japanese after their first choice, K. H. Abdul Gafi who was a Muhammadiyah leader from Bumiayu, refused to take on the job.²

However in the appointment of other members of the officer corps the Japanese followed a policy of using pangreh praja officers or their children. In Pekalongan Peta battalion three company commanders had been camats or officials in the pre-war colonial administration, while the Tegal battalion commanders whose backgrounds are known were sons of a police sergeant, a wedana and an irrigation official.³ None of the seven company commanders known seem to have had any strong Islamic affiliations although one had been a teacher at a Muhammadiyah school. The Japanese also tended to recruit platoon commanders from the priyayi class.⁴

Contrasting Living Conditions

Special economic opportunities existed during the occupation which contributed to resentment of the TKR. While living conditions in Peta for the officer corps were probably not very different from those to which they had been accustomed as government officials, they were far better than those of the common people. Although a camat entering Peta as a company commander would have suffered a drop in salary, a school teacher's salary more than doubled. After the first week of training, a month's salary was paid and this was sent to family or parents by special mail transfer bearing the seal of the Japanese military headquarters. There were no expenses during the six months' training as food and uniforms were provided free.⁵

For the ordinary soldier, living conditions in a Peta company were very attractive compared with those of the rest of the population. Each battalion had a logistics section with officers of the rank of platoon commander separately responsible for weapons, finances, food, clothing and health. In addition to routine rations for training, under the self-maintenance policy Peta companies managed various economic assets and thereby succeeded in producing food for their battalions. How this worked in practice depended on where the company happened to be stationed, as well as the entrepreneurship of its officers. The Pekalongan battalion had two milking cows, which meant fresh milk (but only for the sick), a fish pond, cassava fields and ducks. They slaughtered a bullock each week for meat and a Pekalongan bakery supplied the battalion with bread baked from Peta tapioca flour rations.⁶

Among the companies of the Tegal battalion a flourishing barter system operated. The first company, stationed at Kemantran sugar

mill battalion headquarters, had half a hectare of fish ponds, the produce from which was bartered with other companies.

Two of the second company's three sections living at Sumberharjo mill in Pemalang were employed full-time in implementing the self-maintenance policy. Only one was trained for combat. The agriculture section with forty men was given the job of cultivating one hectare of wet rice fields and a second hectare of ground nuts, chillies and other vegetables. The economic affairs section was in charge of looking after the company's flock of one hundred goats and one hundred and twenty ducks, which enabled the company to eat meat nearly every second day. Villages in this area of Pekalongan Residency specialised in intensive duck husbandry involving the shepherding of ducks along the irrigation channels and waterways of Pemalang's coastal plain. The company also ran productive fishponds which with the barter system ensured that other needs were supplied. The Japanese also supplied free electricity, cigarettes, clothes and condoms, as well as sugar, rice and vegetables.⁷

Added to this, the Japanese-sponsored women's organisation, the Fujinkai, occasionally sent food parcels and the Soldiers' Aid Organisation (BP2), chaired by Abdul Mutholib, who had been heavily involved in the corruption of the Pemalang-based pangreh praja cooperative Kopi, provided free evening entertainment as well. As a company commander of the Pekalongan company recalls: 'During the Japanese time everyone suffered, but we in the Peta didn't. Communications with the people were limited because the Peta lived together in training centres'.⁸ Peta were indeed well off.

The gulf between Peta affluence and popular misery was not peculiar to Pekalongan, although the gulf there may have been especially wide because of the impact of rice requisitioning throughout the Residency. The attempt to do something about it by identifying more with the people was one reason behind a Peta revolt in Blitar when plantation warehouses and storerooms were opened to let the people take much-needed food and clothing.⁹ The nature of Pekalongan priyayi relations with society meant that Pekalongan Peta battalion officers were more accustomed to the division in wealth between priyais and the masses than were Peta leaders in Blitar, and more used to the people's deprived circumstances.

After the proclamation the Japanese acted quickly, instructing commanders to disband their companies. However, after the Pemalang company handed over their weapons to the Japanese in a brief ceremony at Widuri beach, villagers attacked the battalion barracks in the old Sumberharjo sugar mills, eight kilometres south of the town, carrying off rice, ducks and goats and anything else they could carry back to the kampungs.¹⁰

The BKR

On 20 August the Committee for the Preparation of Indonesian Independence in Jakarta announced that a voluntary BKR or People's Security Organisation would be formed under the authority of local KNIs.¹¹ However, it was not until early September that former Peta members, disarmed and sent home after their battalions had been disbanded by the Japanese, began to meet to form local BKR units.

Earlier the Tegal Barisan Pelopor had sent a delegation to meet Tegal battalion commander Kyai Doerjatman who was stationed in the Kemantran sugar mill, suggesting that the Peta battalion should keep its weapons and form a new BKR group. They were too late. Most members of the battalion had already returned to their villages and the Japanese had taken the weapons to Bandung, saying that 'they were to be replaced with new ones'.¹²

About eighty per cent of the two former Pekalongan Residency battalions subsequently joined local BKR groups in the regency capitals and in district towns. At this level the BKR was led by former section commanders. The groups were similar in some respects to the other struggle groups—they were loosely knit, without ranks or formal structure, and they perceived their basic task as organising local security. Membership of the BKR and other struggle groups often overlapped. At Balapulang, for example, the local API group and the BKR had almost identical membership.

However like Peta before it, the BKR enjoyed special facilities that other groups did not have. Local BKR units took over the offices and finances of the Organisation for Aid to Families of War Victims or BPKKP,¹³ whose funds consisted of voluntary donations from Chinese and pangreh praja for families of Peta and Heiho. These funds were now used to provide food and uniforms.¹⁴ The first priority of the BKR was to contact various leaders or well known people to organise the local security for their own districts. The local BKR usually consisted of a guard post from which village security could be organised and to which people could come for advice.¹⁵

The TKR

The siege of the kenpeitai in Pekalongan which began on 4 October brought BKR leaders together for the first time since the disbanding of Peta. Sukarno had announced the setting up of the TKR in Jakarta on 5 October but it was not until some days later, when BKR units had returned from taking Japanese soldiers and civilians to Purwokerto, that the Pekalongan TKR was formed. The TKR 17th

Regiment, along with regiments in other north coast towns (Kendal, Purwodadi and Pati), was part of the 4th Division with headquarters in Salatiga under Colonel Djatikusumo. It consisted of four battalions in each of the regencies of the Residency. This organisational structure thus marked a clear departure from Peta, in that there was now one centre (in Pekalongan, the government capital) instead of two. On paper this looked organised but in fact the TKR was more like other struggle groups than a disciplined regular army.

Of the two ex-Peta battalion commanders and eight company commanders in Pekalongan Residency, only two did not join the TKR 17th Regiment. These were K. H. Doerjatman and Rasimin, both from the Tegal battalion. Following the capture of the commander, Iskandar Idris, and the withdrawal of the battalions from the Tiga Daerah, the Pekalongan TKR was reorganised.¹⁶ Two results of this reorganisation in early November need to be mentioned. Pekalongan Peta battalion officers now dominated the leadership of the TKR so that Tegal had no 'voice' at army headquarters.¹⁷ Second, two new members of the TKR command had fathers in the pangreh praja 'imprisoned' in the Tiga Daerah. These officers were Wilujo Puspojudo, whose father, the Wedana of Pemalang, was in Pemalang jail,¹⁸ and Sugito, whose father, the Bupati of Brebes, had not been heard of since 18 October. Pangreh praja ties with the TKR were further strengthened when the deposed Camat of Brebes, Soebagio, who had fled to safety in the Residency capital during the social revolution, was appointed head of the regiment staff secretariat.

The reasons for the withdrawal of the three TKR battalions from the Tiga Daerah are clear. The order 'not to fire on the people' and to withdraw came as a telegram from army headquarters in Yogyakarta, signed by General Oerip Sumohardjo, the TKR commander-in-chief. It was relayed to the three battalions in the Tiga Daerah. The leftist General Djokosoejono, who had visited Pemalang with Sayuti Melik and stayed with Soepangat, influenced the attitude of Yogya headquarters at the time.¹⁹ Sayuti Melik's role was also important. After discussing the critical situation in Tegal with Slawi AMRI leaders after his capture at Adiwerna, he telephoned TKR Yogya headquarters to request that the army leave the Tiga Daerah. The order to withdraw was made by Yogyakarta 'to prevent further armed clashes' between the TKR and the people.²⁰ An early attempt by the 17th Regiment to obtain reinforcements of one more battalion from Gatot Subroto, Commander of the Banyumas Regiment, failed.²¹ The 17th Regiment was ordered to withdraw, not reinforce itself.

The TKR withdrawal from Brebes was orderly after Brebes revolutionaries tried unsuccessfully to persuade the fourth battalion to stay. Even when the train carrying the Brebes battalion stopped in

Tegal and Pemalang, the revolutionaries there did not interfere with the departure of the last TKR battalion.

The situation in Tegal was more confused. On 4 November the demonstrators had marched on the city and attacked the TKR third battalion headquarters in the mistaken belief that API leaders were hiding there. The TKR barricaded itself in and fired shots over the heads of the demonstrators until well into the night while deciding what to do. TKR reinforcements trying to relieve the 3rd battalion were stopped in Pemalang and had to turn back.²² Meanwhile the beleaguered battalion, having received telephone orders from regimental headquarters to withdraw immediately to Pekalongan, found a boat with enough petrol and sent one company off, without food or water. They arrived in the Residency capital on the evening of 5 November. The remainder of the battalion waited to see if the demonstrators would disperse, and finding all quiet in the early hours of the morning, marched in formation to the station where they boarded their special train for Pekalongan.²³

Military Elements Remaining in the Tiga Daerah

While couriers had been negotiating with the railways for a special train to take the battalion to Pekalongan, an urgent meeting was held to decide who would go and who would stay. A group within the battalion, which had recently been formed into a sea company under the command of Lieutenant Jusuf, decided to stay. There were several reasons for this decision. Most of the members of the sea company were former students from one of the Schools For Seamen which the Japanese had set up along the north coast, including Tegal and Pekalongan and had homes in Tegal itself. As they were not from either of the Residency Peta battalions, they did not feel the same loyalty to their former Peta officers now in the 17th Regiment. Several section commanders from Peta units outside the Residency also stayed behind in the sea company.

The Naval TKR (TKR Laut) was quite separate from the sea company of the TKR's Tegal battalion. It had begun as the Naval BKR soon after the BKR was founded in September and was led by former students of the Intermediate Navigation School (Sekolah Pelayaran Tinggi) in Semarang. When the fighting between Japanese and Republican forces in Semarang ended on 19 October, the British had occupied the Semarang harbour and forced the newly formed Naval TKR to move to Tegal under the leadership of one Darwis Djarmin from Sulawesi. Like many other struggle groups the thirty-strong Naval TKR 'had no plan of action' at that time except to

obtain weapons. These were obtained from Demak (east of Semarang) via Solo since boats which had been moved from Semarang harbour to Jepara during fighting with the Japanese had not returned. On 26 October the Naval TKR received a grant of 10,000 rupiah from the Governor of Central Java, to provide food and equipment for the unit. After the attack on Tegal on 4 November 'the TKR name was not popular in Tegal municipality', so the navy quickly decided to drop the letters TKR in front of their name. On 7 November Jakarta agreed that the name should be changed to Base IV. Strengthened by the arrival of students from the School for Seamen, the base took over the by now empty TKR third battalion headquarters.²⁴

In their efforts to re-establish a military presence in the Tiga Daerah, revolutionary leaders worked with both the sea company and the naval base.²⁵ To obtain funds, Darwis Djarmin approached the Tegal working committee with a proposal to sell off some of the sugar stocks to buy weapons and food. Base IV was reorganised and enlarged to include shipping, accommodation, administration, recruitment, transport, intelligence and personnel sections. Military training was also carried out at the hill station of Tuwel, and to the south of the city the Tegal working committee used the sea company to train *pemudas* and to help maintain law and order.²⁶

Since early November, Wadyono had been at the Semarang front set up by Republican military authorities to prevent any Allied move westwards from Semarang, returning only briefly with the rotation of the TKR battalions. Hearing about the GBP3D leaflet of 5 December setting out the Tiga Daerah demands, Wadyono had sent a telegram on 7 December to AMRI in Tegal, stating that the army was not going to become involved in matters concerning the Residency civilian government.²⁷ On 13 December Wadyono reported to division headquarters in Salatiga, where he discussed 'the new Resident appointed by Bung Karno' and the latest political developments in Pekalongan with Division Commander General Djatikusumo. In relation to the new government in Pekalongan, Wadyono said the army should recognise Sardjio as the new Resident. Djatikusumo's response was non-committal.²⁸

Wadyono returned to Pekalongan and that night had a dream in which the Tiga Daerah revolutionaries were depicted as being 'from outside Java'.²⁹ Next morning he discussed the dream with fellow TKR officers who were irked by the posting of guards from the Tiga Daerah around the Residency capital. It showed, they said, 'that the TKR was not trusted and was considered as a hostile movement' by the new Resident. The animosity against the revolutionaries began to build up. The TKR was annoyed that the GBP3D had sealed supplies

of rice in warehouses, that vehicles could not leave Pekalongan without permission from the GBP3D and, most serious of all, that the GBP3D had stopped a train leaving with supplies for the Semarang front. The TKR had been refused permission to try out newly repaired machine guns and there were rumours amongst Pekalongan priyayi that the new Pekalongan government was going to disarm the TKR and the Pekalongan police force on 17 December.³⁰

Reflecting on the TKR intervention much later in his life, Wadyono recalled:

We only acted because Sardjio stopped the train going to the [Semarang] front, with supplies for part of the regiment there. We were stopped and searched in Pekalongan! Because of our 'inheritance' from the Japanese we thought we had high status and couldn't be pushed around by anyone. We were at war with the British in Semarang and thus stopping our supplies was even more serious. It was really this factor, more than the political question, that worried us. We weren't bothered by Sardjio's politics. All the key Tiga Daerah people [such as] Muhammad Nuh, Sardjio and K. Midjaja were a lot older than us. We wouldn't have acted if Sardjio had not stopped the train.³¹

Other factors helped the TKR to decide on action at this time. The demonstration against the population in Pekalongan on 13 December started a Muslim counter-move led by Pekajangan leader Ismail Hassan who of course knew that his brother, Iskandar Idris, was being held in Slawi. After Ismail Hassan's attempt to ambush the Resident's entourage had failed, he arrived at the TKR headquarters demanding to be armed. Not wishing to appear dependent on Pekajangan support, Wadyono refused the request.³²

Pekalongan's two police leaders, both former pangreh praja, and one a colleague of Wadyono also supported the growing movement against the Tiga Daerah. These pangreh praja and the TKR officers with priyayi backgrounds were also shocked by Adiwerna revolutionaries parading Raden Kartini's sister, Kardinah, and her daughter around the city, dressed in sacking, on 4 November. 'This had shocked TKR people who had been in the Peta because those who *dombreng*-ed the bupati's wife were not acting according to the norms of Javanese culture'.³³

At a meeting of TKR staff on 13 December the younger men, in particular Wadyono's adjutant Sumanoro, chief of the command staff Soedharmo, and head of intelligence Wilujo Puspojudo, urged prompt action against the revolutionaries. Strength was added to Wilujo Puspojudo's push for action by news of the shooting incident involving Resident Sardjio's entourage near Pekajangan. This decided

the matter in favour of immediate action and Wilujo Puspojudo led the force to arrest Sardjio and the Tiga Daerah entourage at the Hotel Merdeka.

Military Intervention

Disarming about fifty Tiga Daerah guards and arresting the Resident and his staff at the Hotel Merdeka on 14 December 1945 committed the TKR to further action, as it became clear that the military intervention had wider ramifications than at first realised when the extent of the arrests was known. By the end of the day, the TKR had arrested and jailed one hundred and seventy-eight people including all the members of Sardjio's takeover staff who had come to Pekalongan from the Tiga Daerah.³⁴

Shortly after the TKR coup, Pekalongan Pesindo called on the people to 'remain calm' as the Tiga Daerah guards 'had been arrested by the TKR', but the printed announcement made no mention of the Resident having been arrested as well. A more formal announcement quickly followed, saying that the TKR had ended the new Tiga Daerah government and would replace it by a People's Representative Council for the Pekalongan region.³⁵

However, this Pesindo attempt at local democracy was thwarted by further army and Muslim action. GBP3D members still free in the Tiga Daerah held an emergency meeting in Pemalang, where AMRI Slawi leader Soewignjo reported that he had tried without success to negotiate by telephone with Wadyono for the release of Sardjio and his staff. Wadyono refused to release any of the prisoners. The meeting then decided to send a force from Tegal and Pemalang to mount a demonstration in Pekalongan.³⁶

The Pekalongan TKR attitude was hardening for several reasons. Rumours about an attack from the Tiga Daerah to free the Resident and the other prisoners were strengthening. The presidential entourage, which included Sukarno, Vice-President Hatta, Prime Minister Sjahrir and Minister of Defence Amir Sjarifuddin, was due to arrive in Pekalongan on 23-24 December at the end of a whistle-stop tour through Java. The TKR felt action to pre-empt the rumoured Tiga Daerah attack on the eve of the Presidential visit was necessary. After Pekajangan offered to take responsibility for financing the logistics of further action against the Tiga Daerah,³⁷ the TKR formed a joint force with Muslim groups under the leadership of two former Peta-TKR men, Soegijono and Moechlis. Moechlis, regarded as eccentric by fellow officers, was a lurah before joining the Pekalongan Peta battalion as a platoon commander and was believed to have

magic powers.³⁸ Soegijono held the same rank in Tegal Peta battalion

The late Lieutenant General Ali Murtopo, one-time head of the national internal security organisation Opsus and a former personal assistant to President Suharto, claimed in 1979 that as a member of the Pekalongan Hizbullah he played his own role in the first counter-revolutionary force.³⁹ Another large force went along the main north coast road to Tegal and Brebes as far as Tanjung and then part of this group went by sea to Tegal.⁴⁰ A third force was to turn inland at Pemalang and proceed to the southern areas of Tegal to complete the pincer movement. Implementation of the original plan with a co-ordinated command was difficult because so many groups joined in. Rendezvous times were not kept and fighting broke out between a Hizbullah unit to the west of Pekalongan and an unrecognised force from the east which turned out to be a group from Pekajangan. As a result two Hizbullah youths were killed.⁴¹

A force led by the TKR encountered opposition at Sragi, the sugar mill subdistrict on the Pemalang-Pekalongan border where fighting broke out and seven people were wounded. Hizbullah took fifteen weapons found stored in the Sragi sugar mill, but there was no ammunition.⁴²

Meanwhile Ismail Hassan led a force along the north west road to free his brother, Iskandar Idris, in Slawi. Evoking militant Javanese folk-Islam, a well-known Pekajangan haji dressed in a white robe stood in the back of a truck waving a sword.

Further clashes occurred at Comal where people armed with swords and home-made grenades and wearing *janur kuning*, symbols of opposition and invulnerability, chanted 'Aliah is Great! Allah is Great!'.⁴³ This time Islamic ideology was used to support the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah. After warnings the TKR opened fire with machine guns, scattering opposition into nearby rice fields and leaving a number of dead and wounded. The rest, mostly armed with *keris*, were disarmed. After their leaders had been questioned, they were taken to Pekalongan, told not to follow the Tiga Daerah movement, hosed down as 'punishment' and released.⁴⁴

Like every local authority before them, the TKR enlisted the help of a local lenggaong, Talib by name, as their hatchet man and a counter-Kutil figure. The TKR released Talib, who had been imprisoned by the Japanese, made him swear an oath of allegiance to fight the Tiga Daerah, and sent him off to guard the two hundred prisoners taken by the TKR in Slawi.⁴⁵ In Pemalang the fate of Tiga Daerah supporters was not a happy one. Everywhere the TKR rounded up local leaders, tied them up, and beat and abused them in public to teach them a lesson.⁴⁶

On 22 December, TKR leader Sugito released the pangreh praja being kept in Tegal jail, including his father Bupati Sarimin.⁴⁷ When the TKR arrived in Tegal, the revolutionary Bupati K.H. Abu Sudja'i, the Patih, Ki Tjitrasatmaka, and the regency secretary were reported to be on their way to Purwokerto via Cirebon to meet Banyumas Resident Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo. The TKR called them back to Tegal,⁴⁸ where a public meeting was in progress in the municipal square. While Pekalongan KNI leader and Muslim notable, K.H. Mohamad Iljas, wearing military uniform, was making a speech saying that he had been appointed to replace the Bupati of Tegal who had run away, the incumbent Bupati K.H. Abu Sudja'i arrived at the meeting and rejected the rumours.

The round-up of Tiga Daerah leaders continued in Brebes. To settle old scores, a TKR leader treated the Brebes working committee chairman with great brutality. First he kicked Kartohango, then burnt his body with cigarettes, hit him in the face with a rifle butt which permanently damaged his eyesight, and marched him around to the town of Brebes. Later that day, without food or water, the senior leader of the Brebes nationalist movement was flung into jail.⁴⁹ Kartohango languished in various prisons before being released in July 1947, an ignominious fate for a man who had served the nationalist movement for twenty-five years.

The fate of other revolutionary leaders in Brebes was much the same. Ramlas, secretary of the Brebes working committee and leader of the local PKN, was beaten up with rifle butts by the TKR. The TKR soldiers then left but the brutal interrogation was continued by TKR intelligence officers until Ramlas lost consciousness. Kromo Lawi said at the time the TKR was 'like an occupying army'.⁵⁰

Kromo Lawi's imprisonment in Tegal by the TKR reflects another bizarre aspect of local politics during the Tiga Daerah affair. Kromo Lawi, as the Residency's most prominent Sukarnoist, had held high positions as leader of Putera and the Jawa Hokokai during the occupation. He had been accused of being a Japanese agent during the kenpeitai clash in early October and had been imprisoned by pemuda supporters of Resident Besar although he was a member of the Pekalongan KNI. When Besar left the Residency, Kromo Lawi was released by acting Resident Soeprapto at Sayuti Melik's instigation. On a visit to Pemalang in early December, local leaders arrested him and took him to Slawi where AMRI leaders hoped to win him over to the Tiga Daerah side. In 1973 however, Kromo Lawi, although not unsympathetic to some of the Tiga Daerah leaders' aims, believed that they moved too quickly against Pekalongan and that the national political revolution must take precedence over the social revolution. In Kromo Lawi's view the wording in the procla-

mation about the transfer of power being executed in 'an orderly manner' precluded a social revolution for the time being. His analysis reflects events of the Revolution since 1945.⁵¹ It reflects the kind of argument a nationalist like Sayuti Melik would make. Sukarno himself made much of the argument for national, not social, revolution after the Madiun Affair of 1948, although in 1945 he had talked of combining both.

When the TKR arrived in Slawi to free Iskandar Idris and found Kromo Lawi, they chose to believe that he had joined the Tiga Daerah and was being held in detention only as a cover. He spent the next thirteen months in Pekalongan and Yogyakarta prisons, without trial or examination of any kind.

Iskandar Idris, who wanted to resume command of the army immediately, caused the TKR some embarrassment in the middle of its 'clean up' operation. The Japanese had appointed Idris because of his religious affiliations. This, his age and lack of understanding of 'army matters', made him incompatible with the young Western-educated priyayis who made up the regiment general staff and who had appointed him regiment commander as a 'father figure' out of loyalty to their former Peta commanding officer. They were critical of his allowing the Japanese to disarm the former Peta battalion (after Kromo Lawi had warned them it was a trick) and of his indecisive leadership in the *kenpeitai* fighting in early October. They also resented his attempt to get the TKR to take holidays on Fridays, the Muslim day of prayers, and to work on Sundays. Not an army man, Iskandar Idris became commander of the Peta battalion only because he was a *kyai*. 'He didn't understand organisation regulations and mixed up his own interests with those of his organisation'. The anti-santri caste of the army thus appears very early in its history. After the Tiga Daerah affair was over, Iskandar Idris was not reinstated and Wadyono was officially installed as commander of the Pekalongan TKR Regiment at a ceremony at army headquarters in Yogyakarta.⁵²

Army strategy concerning Muslim revolutionaries was clear cut. The Bupatis of Tegal and Brebes, both santris, were left in power. The leftist Bupati of Pemalang, Soepangat, who had escaped to the Residency of Banyumas before the TKR arrived, was replaced by a leading local Islamic nationalist, K. H. Makmur, at a mass meeting held in the town square on 30 December 1945.⁵³ Those conservative Muslims whom the TKR felt had supported the counter-revolution remained in office, as did all the santri officials.⁵⁴ However *kyais* from south Pemalang were among the 1,600 people jailed in Pekalongan by the end of the third week in December.⁵⁵

The army acted against the Tiga Daerah from a combination of

personal, practical and ideological motives. First there were the personal ties of family and friendships with pangreh praja now in jail in Pemalang and Pekalongan whose 'detention' the TKR thought was wrong. If Tiga Daerah popular front leaders were keeping them there because it was not safe to be outside during the violence of the social revolution, that time was now past.

Second there were the problems of moving heavy weapons and ammunition to the Pekalongan TKR battalion which was stationed on the western perimeter of Semarang to prevent any British move westward out of the town. The Pekalongan TKR considered that the Tiga Daerah popular front was hampering this task by searching vehicles leaving Pekalongan.

Finally, there was the Muslim support for the TKR action. TKR commander Iskandar Idris' continued detention in Slawi angered his supporters in Pekajangan who urged the TKR to move against the new Resident and his supporters. Having arrested Sardjio, the TKR was forced to move against the new government in the Tiga Daerah for fear of an attack to release Resident Sardjio and his staff on the eve of the Presidential visit to Pekalongan.

1. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 26 August 1971.
2. Interview with K. H. Abdul Gafi, Bumiayu, 13 December 1975.
3. See Lucas, 'Bamboo Spear', pp. 442-443, for the social origins of the officer corps of Pekalongan and Tegal Peta battalions.
4. *Ibid.*, p. 352, fn. 8.
5. Interview with Tegal Peta battalion company commander (Isnaeni), Semarang, 18 October 1975.
6. Interview with Pekalongan Peta platoon commander in charge of logistics (Brig. Gen. Suhadi), Jakarta, 29 December 1986.
7. Transcript of taped interview with Tegal TKR company commander (Djuweni), II/15, Yogyakarta, 17 April 1975.
8. Interviews with Wadyono, Semarang, 20 November 1975 and 15 October 1976.
9. Idris Adrianatakesuma, *Pemberontakan Peta di Blitar* (Yogyakarta, 1973), p. 9.
10. Transcript of taped interview with Djuweni, III/21, Yogyakarta, 17 April 1975.
11. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, pp. 103-104.
12. Muhamad Nuh, written answers to Semdam questionnaire, p. 6; Marsum, 'Ceritaku' memoir, pp. 70-73.
13. The BPKKP was formed on 20 August, as a reconstituted version of the BP2. The chairman in Pekalongan Residency was Dr. Maas, the Pekalongan representative on the Central Advisory Council and a local KNI member.

14. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 10 October 1971.
15. Transcript of taped interview with Slawi BKR leader (Ali Masih), I/9, Pekalongan, 29 May 1973.
16. Wadyono then appointed Wilujo Puspojudo head of intelligence (see fn. 18). Wadyono himself became acting commander and Soedharmo chief of staff, replacing Boestomi who had left Pekalongan. Pekalongan TKR's officer establishment increased from four to eight with several new sections. See Lucas, 'Bamboo Spear', pp. 444-445.
17. Isnaeni, the only Tegal Peta officer on the TKR Pekalongan headquarters staff, was moved to a battalion after this reorganisation.
18. Wilujo Puspojudo, head of TKR Intelligence, became a well known deputy speaker of the MPRS, the Provisional People's Consultative Assembly, and a member of the Dwikora cabinet in 1964.
19. Djokosoejono later became head of the Army's Struggle Bureau (*Biro Perjuangan*) under Amir Sjarifuddin. For his biography, see Lucas, *Local Opposition*, p. 109, fn. 22.
20. The first official Diponegoro Division history entitled *Sedjarah Tentara Nasional Indonesia Komando Daerah Militer VII Diponegoro* (Semarang, 1964), which was never released, does not mention the withdrawal of the battalions in its discussion of the Tiga Daerah Affair. A later revised version of this history says the reason for the instruction via radiogram from Yogyakarta headquarters was to avoid further armed clashes with the people. *Sedjarah Militer Kodam VII Diponegoro, Sirganing Yakso Katon Gapuruning Ratu* (Semarang, 1968), p. 59; Nasution says that the withdrawal was a direct result of the clash between the third battalion and the people in Tegal on 4 November, and it was to prevent a continuation of these incidents. A. H. Nasution, *Sekitar Perang Kemerdekaan*, Vol. 2, *Diplomasi atau Bertempur* (Bandung, 1977), p. 548.
21. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 27 August 1971.
22. Transcript of taped interview with Maj. Gen. Soedharmo, I/2, Jakarta, 26 March 1973.
23. Transcript of taped interview with Djoeweni Wimbohandoko, IV/32, 35, Yogyakarta, 17 April 1975.
24. A full account of the formation of the Naval BKR/TKR in Tegal is given in the weekly newspaper *Djangkar*, published by the information section of the navy in Tegal, nos. 19-20, 31 October-7 November 1946.
25. See p. 200.
26. Interview with Slawi BKR leader (Sajidiman), Semarang, 27 April 1973. Kutil, as new regency police chief, also asked the sea company to arrest 'robbers' in one subdistrict.
27. Report made to the Yogyakarta TKR Headquarters by Pekalongan Barisan Pelopor leader Sarli, 18 December 1945, Proc. Gen.
28. Interviews with Wadyono, Semarang, 27 August 1971, 10 October 1971.
29. See pp. 161-162 for discussion of Wadyono's dream.
30. Handwritten note by former acting Resident Soeprapto, dated 25 December 1945, Proc. Gen., giving reasons for arrests made by the army, Hizbullah and Sabilillah in the previous week.

31. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 10 March 1973.
32. *Ibid.*, 10 October 1971.
33. *Ibid.*, 20 November 1974. See p. 175.
34. Karioatmodjo, 'Daftar Nama-namanya orang Tahanan jang ditahan menurut Perintahnya Tuan Pemimpin TKR di Pekalongan pada tanggal 14 Desember 1945', Proc. Gen.
35. Pesindo printed announcements in Proc. Gen.
36. Kartohargo, Question 18, proces-verbaal, 14 January 1947. Proc. Gen.
37. Interview with Pekajangan santri (Suharto), Pekajangan, 19 December 1972.
38. Sedjarah Militer Kodam VII, *Sedjarah Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, p. 33. As leftist commander of the Pekalongan military region in 1965, Moechlis was imprisoned in Nusakambangan for publicly supporting the attempted coup.
39. Ali Murtopo, originally from Blora and an official of a foodstuffs distribution committee in 1945, claimed in a speech at a TKR 17th Regiment reunion in September 1979 that he held two roles, one as an ordinary TKR soldier and another as a leader of Hizbullah (Wadyono, personal communication, 4 September 1979.) At the height of the Malari protests in early 1974, a Jakarta newspaper in its corner column referred enigmatically to 'the prominent personality' who had played an important role in the Tiga Daerah Affair and who was an expert in psychological warfare, a direct reference to rumours circulating that Ali Murtopo had started the anti-Japanese riots to discredit opposition movements against the Suharto government (*Indonesia Raya*, 16 January 1974). Ali Murtopo's claim to have been part of the action against the Tiga Daerah is not supported by a single TKR source and is probably a fabrication for his own political purposes at the time. He was not known in Pekalongan circles until the second Dutch military action when as company commander in Wonopringgo in southern Pekalongan, he fought against both the Dutch and Muslim Darul Islam separatists.
40. Sedjarah Militer Kodam VII, *Sedjarah Tentara Nasional Indonesia*, p. 33.
41. Interview with Pekalongan TKR battalion staff member, 18 October 1975.
42. This was said to be the first opposition to the TKR. The figure for weapons is contained in an unsigned copy of a letter from the Tegal branch of the Indonesian Workers' Party, the PBI, giving an account of recent events in Pekalongan Residency, dated Purwokerto, 20 December 1945. Proc. Gen. Interview with Pekajangan santri leader (Suharto), a close friend of Ismail Hassan, Pekajangan, 19 December 1972.
43. Interviews with TKR leaders (Tjiptono), Semarang, 14 October 1971, and Masduki, Semarang, 5 October 1971.
44. Interviews with Pekajangan santri leader (Suharto), Pekajangan, 19 December 1972; Wadyono, Semarang, 27 August 1971; TKR officer (Masduki), Semarang, 5 October 1971.

45. Interview with Talib, Kedungwungi, 13 December 1972.
46. Interviews with Sudaryo, Pemalang, 17 February 1975; Pemalang jailor (Sjirad), 17 February 1975. For further details see Lucas, 'Bamboo Spear', pp. 372-375.
47. Wedana of Brebes (Sudirman), diary entry.
48. On his way to Tegal to help the bupati make preparations for the presidential visit, Resident Iskaq was stopped by activists at Balapulang and had to turn back. The Tegal leaders were on their way to Purwokerto to apologise for this embarrassing incident. Interview with Patih of Tegal Patih (Ki Tjitrasatmaka), 30 January 1973.
49. Interview with Kartohargo, Brebes, 16 December 1972.
50. Interview with Ramias, Surodadi, 2 December 1972.
51. Transcript of taped interview with Kromo Lawi, VII/3-6, Pekalongan, 7 July 1973.
52. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 27 August 1971.
53. Diary of Salim Bassiyul, a Pemalang Arab trader.
54. These were the Camats of Lebaksiu, Margasari, Tarub, the Wedana of Slawi and the Bupatis of Tegal and Brebes, and the Camat of Larangan in Brebes. There were no new santri camats or wedanas in Pemalang.
55. *Lasjkar*, 2-3 January 1947.

The Tiga Daerah on Trial

The legality of revolutionary action was an issue which, in the context of the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah, the Republican government never resolved. The detention of hundreds of political prisoners in Pekalongan in December 1945 set in motion a colonial legal system which used the colonial criminal code and was entirely inadequate for trying revolutionaries. Furthermore, the judiciary and the public prosecutor's department were staffed by officials with the same pre-war priyayi social background and training as the *pangreh praja* which had been overthrown and replaced by the revolutionaries who were now being brought to trial. The subsequent debate on the rights and wrongs of revolutionary action reflected the way the local judiciary found itself administering a legal system whose main task had been to keep intact 'law and order' in the Netherlands East Indies.¹ Not surprisingly, the Pekalongan public prosecutor treated revolutionaries as he was trained to treat law breakers and trouble makers in colonial times.

The Centre View

During the most dramatic events of the Tiga Daerah revolution and counter-revolution, the central government had been preoccupied with conflicts between Allied and Republican forces in Java. During the four days that Sardjio and the GBP3D held power in Pekalongan, the national press and the leaders of the new nation were preoccupied with the fierce fighting with the British around Ambarawa on the southern perimeter of Semarang, Central Java's provincial capital. Ambarawa was finally retaken by Republican forces. Of the quite

large Republican daily press, only *Kedaoelatan Rakjat* in Yogyakarta reported on Sardjio's appointment as Resident of Pekalongan. However the news item was not published until 15 December, after the TKR had arrested the Resident and his staff. Because of the communications problem for the national press and the government, the bigger dailies in the larger urban centres only sent their correspondents to report on the fighting with the foreigner, since Surabaya became the focus of the nation's struggle for survival in early November.

On 18 December a new Socialist Party or Partai Sosialis was formed by merging two leftist parties at a congress held in Cirebon, the capital of the neighbouring Residency to the west, which the Prime Minister Sjahrir and many of his cabinet attended.² After members of the government were alerted to what was happening in Pekalongan Residency, they immediately dispatched a high-powered delegation to mediate between the Tiga Daerah and the TKR. Dr. Sudarsono, the Minister for Social Affairs, and Soebadio Sastrosatomo, an influential member of the working committee of the KNIP, were to impress on pangreh praja leaders that as a 'people's movement' the Tiga Daerah had the central government's support. Djohan Sjahroczah, a nephew of Sjahrir who had had his own underground group and contacts with local communists during the Japanese occupation in Surabaya,³ and Murad, deputy minister for security, went to Pemalang to explain to Tiga Daerah leaders the government's view that Sjahrir 'wasn't supporting feudalism' but 'he could not tolerate the lawlessness of the social revolution'.⁴

The delegations were unsuccessful mainly because they arrived after the TKR had already arrested Sardjio, launched its counter-revolution and removed Soepangat as Bupati of Pemalang. Had the four Socialist Party leaders gone to Pekalongan a week earlier, Sardjio's appointment as Resident would have been more secure. However, faced with a military fait accompli, the mission was a failure. In an atmosphere of mistrust Pekalongan Pesindo arrested the bearded Minister of Information Dr. Sudarsono as a NICA spy. His angry retort, 'What sort of revolutionary struggle is this?' highlights the powerlessness of national level politicians in local politics at this time.⁵

On 23 December the presidential mission arrived in Pekalongan at the end of their tour of the major towns and cities of Java.⁶ Also in the entourage were the deposed Bupati of Pemalang, Soepangat, underground PKI leader Widarta, and Sardjio's secretary, Muroso. Having escaped arrest by the TKR, these three had gone to Madiun to seek help from Pesindo. There they boarded the presidential train on 21 December on its return from Malang.⁷

In Pekalongan, Sjahrir called the TKR Commander Wadyono to the regency office to demand on whose authority the TKR's actions were taken.⁸ Addressing a public meeting, Sjahrir remarked he had had many difficulties in dealings with the international world but those problems were nothing compared with Pekalongan.⁹ The revolutionary struggle in Pekalongan, he said, was analogous to two kinds of building materials, one of which passed the quality test and one of which did not. Pekalongan, by implication, did not. Sukarno in his speech reduced the tension by referring humorously to Sjahrir as 'a small hot green chilli' (*cabai rawit*).¹⁰

An incident during the public meeting reveals Jakarta's attitude to local events. Soepangat, sitting—no doubt safely, he thought—in the audience, was recognised by a TKR officer and member of Pekalongan Pesindo. Together with Widarta and Muroso he was dragged out of the meeting in front of the presidential party, creating great embarrassment. They were put into jail with the rest of the Tiga Daerah prisoners taken during the TKR-led coup. This was a direct challenge to central leadership and was not completely ignored. The Pesindo leader involved earned a strong reprimand from Sukarno over the incident¹¹ but the government made no attempt to intervene on behalf of Sardjio, the GBP3D and their supporters imprisoned in Pekalongan.

Part of the reason for Sjahrir's inaction lies in the conflict between his international moderation and his domestic reformism. GBP3D strategy concerning the *pangreh praja* was in broad agreement with the ideas expressed a month earlier in Sjahrir's historic pamphlet, *Our Struggle*, where he had urged the development of a democratic Indonesian revolution, a social revolution led by 'revolutionary democrats not by nationalist groups who have kowtowed to fascists, whether Dutch colonial or Japanese military fascists'.¹² But now these 'revolutionary democrats' who had led the revolution in the Tiga Daerah were in jail in Pekalongan, and they had been imprisoned by the group on which the legacy of fascism had left its mark most deeply according to Sjahrir—the military. In *Our Struggle* he had attacked the remaining colonial apparatus—the *pangreh praja* and the police. Sjahrir used strong words about the *pangreh praja*, writing that they were '... nothing more or less than an instrument fashioned by Dutch colonialism from the feudal heritage of our society',¹³ a view no doubt shared by Midjaja, Sardjio and other Tiga Daerah leaders. But this domestic reformism was always tempered in Sjahrir's mind by what he saw as the need to attract the sympathy of the Western powers for Indonesia's struggle. Sjahrir wanted to show the world he was in control of Indonesia's domestic situation. To do this he needed a strong hand against internal disturbances, such as social revolutions in the regions.¹⁴

Apparently Sukarno made no reference to the turbulent political events of the previous fortnight in any speeches in Pekalongan. In a short stopover in Tegal on his return journey to Jakarta he referred to the Tiga Daerah as the 'Talang State' (*negara Talang*), a direct reference to Kutil's power-base south of Tegal and what others considered to be the separatist nature of the Tiga Daerah movement.

However, Amir Sjarifuddin, rather than Sjahrir or Sukarno, was the crucial central government figure in the Tiga Daerah Affair. The Republican Minister of Information and Defence had avoided visiting Pekalongan altogether by returning to Jakarta direct from Cirebon. His absence from the presidential entourage needs explanation.

One reason involves internal leadership rivalries within the underground PKI and the question of who had the 'mandate' to carry on the leadership of the PKI following the arrest of Illegal PKI leader, Pamoedji, at the end of 1942. Claims centered around those who escaped arrest (Widarta's group) and the other leftists jailed by the Japanese. Internal rivalry was also influenced by former members of the Perhimpunan Indonesia, a small but influential communist group in exile in Holland led by Abdulmadjid who had been flown back to Indonesia at Dutch expense.¹⁵ Ironically, in adhering to the Netherlands Communist Party's interpretation of the Moscow line, they held the view that the Republic was a Japanese creation. Returning from long exile in Holland, they hoped for a continuation of the 'shared ideological struggle' and the 'warm egalitarian relationship' that they had had with Dutch comrades in the wartime resistance against the Nazis.¹⁶ Widarta rejected the international line they brought from Holland. Although both groups had been engaged in essentially the same fight during the war—the struggle against fascism—there was no other similarity between them. Rather than cooperation with the Dutch, local communists saw the struggle against Japanese fascism replaced by the struggle against Dutch colonialism and imperialism. 'The masses are ready and want to resist the return of the Dutch. Why should they be asked to compromise?'¹⁷

Furthermore, Amir Sjarifuddin and Sjahrir showed the same uneasiness about the issue of domestic political violence. They thought that matters had to be settled peacefully, not only because of the prospect of an adverse international reaction to internal upheaval but because, as Dutch-educated elite intellectuals, they distrusted mass violence of the type which occurred in the social revolutions in the Tiga Daerah and North Sumatra. Despite the bold theory, Sjahrir's *Our Struggle* comes down extremely hard on undisciplined violence.

Feeling betrayed by their comrades, Widarta's group sought help from Pesindo. In Yogyakarta, on 10 November, Widarta had been elected to one of Pesindo's working committees, the Working Committee for Struggle (*Dewan Pekerja Perjuangan*), which was headed

by Surabaya PRI leader Sumarsono. The Working Committee for Struggle was responsible for the organisation of all popular military units outside the regular army including their mobilisation, supply and training.¹⁸ Widarta headed the information section while the committee's liaison officer was S. Mustapha from Pemalang. It was the one group outside the regular army which, in a short time, could muster a force large and well equipped enough to mount an offensive against the Pekalongan TKR to free the leaders of the Tiga Daerah movement.

After Widarta had been arrested on 23 December and imprisoned with Sardjio and the other Tiga Daerah leaders, Mustapha sent an urgent call to Sumarsono 'to attack the Pekalongan TKR'.¹⁹ Sumarsono contacted the Surabaya Defence Command which organised a large pemuda group under the command of Sidik Arselan. Seventy kilometres east of Semarang the special train taking the relief battalions to Pekalongan was stopped after the direct intervention of Amir Sjarifuddin, who summoned Sumarsono to Yogyakarta and persuaded him not to solve the problem with force. Amir then assured Sumarsono that the government intended to move all the prisoners from Pekalongan to Yogyakarta, bringing the matter under the direct jurisdiction and responsibility of the central government.

Six months later a second rescue attempt occurred after legal processes had made no progress and the prisoners were still in Pekalongan. The second 'rescue' force of four hundred Pesindo pemuda was mobilised in Surabaya. It was stopped in Solo and also told that the matter of the Pekalongan prisoners could not be solved by force.²⁰ The Government offered to form a Committee for the Management of Political Prisoners (known as the P4), members of which would be allowed to visit prisoners in Pekalongan and would also be able to appear as witnesses in the preliminary legal proceedings.²¹ The committee was chaired by Tan Ling Djic (secretary of the Socialist Party), with Bung Kecil, Sudoyo, and Supeno who played a leading role as spokesman for the prisoners in the political debates and legal manoeuvres that went on until the trial finally began in Pekalongan in March 1947.

Legal and Political Battles

On 16 April 1946, Wali al-Fatah, Pekalongan's fourth Resident appointed by the centre in as many months, arrived to take up his position. His predecessor, Soemitro Kolopakings, a former Bupati of Banjarnegara who came from an old Banyumas priyayi family, had taken over from R. M. Soeprapto on 23 January 1946.²² He had

alienated the Pekalongan Muslim community by attempts to replace santri bupatis and kyais with his preferred appointees from the pangreh praja, all old Mosvia graduates. Both Kolopaking and al-Fatah were substantial figures nationally, indicating that the government belatedly recognised the importance of the position of Resident of Pekalongan.²³

In January 1946 the Pekalongan public prosecutor's department began releasing people detained by the TKR.²⁴ On 30 April 1946 the public prosecutor publicly refuted rumours that Tiga Daerah leaders were 'NICA agents', announcing that detainees would instead be charged according to sections of the criminal code relating to seizing power by force, confiscating state monies, burning warehouses and homes and 'indiscriminate killing'.²⁵

Within the Pekalongan public prosecutor's department there were conflicting views between officials on how investigations should be conducted. The public prosecutor, S. Karioatmodjo, insisted upon an internal investigation team cross-examining each detainee, a process taking many months. S. Karioatmojo used pangreh praja thrown out of the Tiga Daerah during the social revolution to cross-examine the prisoners, towards whom the pangreh praja showed, not surprisingly, much ill feeling. The Dutch colonial practice of using subdistrict officers as assistant prosecutors left many prisoners doubtful of getting a fair trial.²⁶ Moertolo, then a younger member of the public prosecutor's department in Pekalongan later said:

Because the head of the public prosecutor's department was from the older generation he could not follow our argument that it was best to free the followers, while detaining those who were responsible . . . He could not see that you had to look at the matter from the perspective of the nationalist movement. His view was a relic of Dutch times, when the public prosecutor was an underling of the assistant resident.²⁷

Karioatmodjo saw Moertolo's view as a defence of the prisoners and excluded him from the investigations. The dispute was then reported to the attorney-general who upheld the younger prosecutor's right to hold a different view on how to treat political prisoners.

At the end of September 1946, the Republic's Attorney-General took responsibility for the remaining thirty-two prisoners against whom the Pekalongan public prosecutor wished to lay charges and they were moved to the Wirogunan prison in Yogyakarta, where a new series of investigations began.²⁸ AMRI Slawi leader Raden Sakirman, and the former Bupati of Pemalang, Soepangat, were charged and sent back to Pekalongan on 23 October 1946 to face trial. On 11 November the court sentenced Sakirman to four years' imprisonment

(less the eleven months already spent in jail), the maximum penalty under Article 60 of the criminal code for 'inciting revolt'. Sakirman appealed against the sentence.²⁹ Responding to new pressure, the government speeded up the Yogya examinations and twenty-one of the thirty-two detainees were released on 30 December 1946,³⁰ while the remaining eleven were moved to the Benteng prison.

After a further delay of three months the government decided to try six of the Tiga Daerah revolutionaries who were sent back to Pekalongan. Those who were brought to trial were K. Midjaja, Socwignjo, Kartohargo, Amir, Tan Djiem Kwan and Muhamad Nuh.³¹ They were charged under Section 107 of the criminal code for attempting to change the structure of the government by force for which the maximum penalty was life imprisonment.³² Sardjio was released on 26 March 1947,³³ but Soepangat and Widarta continued to be held in preventive detention.³⁴ On 4 April the defence counsel for the revolutionaries was announced. All three were well-known Socialist Party lawyers, Tandiono Manu, Usman Sastroamidjojo (a brother of the PNI leader Ali Sastroamidjojo), and Supeno.³⁵ Supeno and Tandiono Manu arrived in Pekalongan on 11 April.

The trial finally began two weeks late, attracting local and much national attention in the press. The presiding judge and chairman of the court, Soeprapto, a member of the Pekalongan KNI in 1945, was an experienced legal man who later served for many years as Indonesia's Attorney-General.³⁶ He had already presided over the trials of Kutil, Sakirman and Rustamadji in the previous September. The TKR considered Soeprapto to be 'on their side'.³⁷ A nationalist preparing briefs on the revolutionaries for the defence considered Soeprapto to be disinterested in ideology, a strict interpreter of laws, dedicated to his superiors, and 'a 100 per cent government official in spirit' who saw the Tiga Daerah simply as a rebellion against the legal government.³⁸

Argument on the first day between opposing counsel about the relevance of the colonial criminal code for a political case was reported to have unsettled the judge and the public prosecutor. On the second day Supeno was able to question Midjaja in such a way about his revolutionary record as to evoke popular sympathy for such an unyielding fighter for the nationalist cause from its beginnings. Outside the courtroom militant Muslim groups were generating active hostility and the Resident Wali al-Fatah, asked both counsels to agree to a postponement of the trial.³⁹ Instead Judge Soeprapto tried to speed up proceedings and on 25 and 26 April the other five accused, including Kartohargo, were cross-examined. But proceedings halted yet again when defence asked for two days' adjournment

to study the new evidence produced by the prosecution in the form of thirteen more witnesses called in addition to those already summoned.⁴⁰

Wadyono, the first witness on 28 April, created consternation by saying that the TKR had arrested Resident Sardjio and the Tiga Daerah leaders on its own initiative, causing defence counsel to demand the immediate release of the prisoners. The court rejected the request.⁴¹ Hearings ended on 5 May 1947 with the court initially agreeing to Supeno's request that prisoners should be detained outside jail, but on 17 May 1947 Tandiono Manu was told that the government had taken the case out of the hands of Pekalongan's Justice Department. A decision was promised on 6 June. Unable to find out when the trial would resume, Supeno saw President Sukarno about the matter 'but the President was unable to make a decision'.⁴² On 15 July 1947 the court finished hearing evidence while Supeno's summing up for the defence was heard on 18 July. On 21 July five of the six accused were released⁴³ following an amnesty announced by President Sukarno.⁴⁴ Because of the Dutch attack on the Republic, the verdict on Midjaja, due to be handed down on 1 September 1947, was never given, but he was released soon afterwards.

The Political Debate

The debate about the imprisonment of the Resident of Pekalongan and the other Tiga Daerah revolutionaries by the TKR promoted an extensive and public discussion about the legality of revolutionary action, and it is important for the attitudes it expressed about the whole Indonesian revolution. The way in which the protagonists, including the government, lined up for and against the Tiga Daerah movement and their reasons for their stands, are revealing.

Pekalongan public prosecutor S. Karioatmodjo represented the conservative legal view held by Pekalongan pangreh praja, a view reflected by the journalist Rosihan Anwar in the newspaper *Merdeka*. In late December 1945 he wrote that the TKR had 'cleaned up the disturbances' in the Pekalongan area.⁴⁵ This was followed early in January by a long article in which he condemned the 'brutal and atrocious fascist actions' of self-appointed leaders in the Brebes-Tegal-Pemalang area, aligning himself with the TKR counter revolution.⁴⁶

Initially those opposed to the Tiga Daerah movement claimed that Sardjio and the other leaders were part of a NICA plot by van der Plas and others to subvert the Republic.⁴⁷ From April 1946 the public prosecutor in Pekalongan concentrated on narrow legal

interpretations indicating that the leaders would be charged under nine sections of the criminal code including confiscation of government funds, murder and arson.⁴⁸

Nor did the national leadership show any sign of clemency. Sjahrir, as noted, kept silent when he went to Pekalongan and Hatta was quoted as saying that there was 'too much popular sovereignty' in Pekalongan, and that the government, not the people, had the right to remove the pangreh praja.⁴⁹ This was a key argument in the government's case against Tiga Daerah leaders as well.

Kasman Singodimejo, a former attorney-general who had served at the time of the Tiga Daerah Affair, prepared a highly revealing report making quite clear the government's views on social revolution. The report said that during October and November 1945 officials appeared 'weak and confused' in many areas and that the government had never bothered to explain the meaning of 'popular sovereignty' to the people. Consequently no one took any notice of officials and the government was unable to stop the growing anarchy, the unlawful appropriation of property, and the kidnappings. The 'pure spirit of the pemuda and the People', the real 'motor' of the revolution, had to be distinguished from the egotistical troublemakers who were exploiting the state of unrest at the time.⁵⁰

Amir Sjarifuddin's views on the social revolution are of significance for the Tiga Daerah Affair because of his links with the underground PKI. Although he never made any public comments on the Tiga Daerah Affair itself, he was the crucial figure. In April 1946 in Medan, Amir said that as a Marxist he wanted 'an egalitarian society with fair distribution'. He added, quoting Mao Zhe-tung: 'Our struggle now must be directed to the first phase, with the second phase delayed for the time being'. Amir also believed that social revolutionaries in East Sumatra were guilty of Lenin's 'infantile disorder' of Leftism, and that 'unity, discipline and the power of the state were all important'.⁵¹ The Tiga Daerah Affair four months earlier influenced his thinking about the social revolution.

The views of the government on how to deal with social revolutionaries were further influenced by the so-called 3 July Affair in 1946. The attempted coup by dissident army and radical elements which aimed to bring down the socialist cabinet under Sjahrir with its commitment to negotiations with the Dutch, failed largely because Sukarno refused to give his support and led to over one hundred arrests including leading opposition politicians, Sayuti Melik and Tan Malaka. Prisoners from the affair found themselves in the same Wirogunan prison in Yogya as revolutionaries from the Tiga Daerah. Although the Attorney-General agreed that the two affairs had quite different political backgrounds, he argued that legally both groups of

revolutionaries had to be treated in the same way as both were being charged with changing the structure of government by force.

The views of those who supported the Tiga Daerah affair were represented by the Magelang-based Pesindo paper *Penghela Rakjat* which enthusiastically took up the cause of the revolutionaries. On 8 February it refuted earlier government newsagency allegations that Sardjio was a 'NICA stooge' by giving a full account of the pre-war nationalist movement record of the Resident and Midjaja.⁵² This drew an apology from Antara newsagency which reproduced in full the earlier *Penghela Rakjat* account of the two men's careers.⁵³ Throughout 1946 *Penghela Rakjat* continued its campaign against what it considered the unjust detention of revolutionaries for political reasons. The secretary of the P4 entered the debate in September, stating that when the earlier charges of being NICA agents had been proved wrong, the charges were changed, and the Pekalongan revolutionary leaders were now accused of being 'criminals and robbers'. The replacement of corrupt government officials, which was what the Tiga Daerah Affair was all about, was a political not a criminal matter. The committee went on to say that even if the government did not view it in this way, then at least it should do its utmost to ensure that investigations should not be based 'on revenge' and that members of struggle groups involved should be allowed to attend the examinations of political prisoners.⁵⁴

Responding to the government's announcement that thirty-two prisoners would be moved to Yogyakarta from Pekalongan, the P4 again entered the debate with results of its own investigations. They showed that at the height of the social revolution in October 1945, the GBP3D did not exist. Sardjio did not arrive in the Residency until December 1945 and yet he and the other popular front leaders were being accused of inciting the people to commit criminal acts. It was the nationalists now in jail, not the pangreh praja, who had tried to establish a rapport with the people at the time. The government should look further at the economic, social and psychological reasons behind the violence which took place. The P4 also mentioned allegations of torture in the two Pekalongan jails where the prisoners were being held, and complained that the Pekalongan public prosecutor's investigation team was stacked with the very officials who had been thrown out of office in the Tiga Daerah nearly a year before.⁵⁵

Supeno, a member of the P4, now pushed strongly to have the detainees released or tried quickly. At the BP-KNIP meeting on 4 January in Purworejo he bitterly attacked the Attorney-General's report saying it 'bore no resemblance to reality' and was nothing better than a piece of 'journalistic propaganda'.⁵⁶ The officials described as 'passive' towards the proclamation had in fact opposed it

by refusing to allow the Red and White to be flown and the Minister of Justice could not say on whose orders Sardjio had been arrested.⁵⁷ The debate opened up wider issues. Were popular actions against the pangreh praja a result of oppression during the Japanese occupation? In the people's eyes in November 1945, throwing out the Japanese had meant throwing out their henchmen, the pangreh praja. Were not the actions during the social revolution a legitimate part of the national revolution? What did the concept of 'people's sovereignty' mean in fact? The Minister of Justice replied that the actions of the people against 'cruel officials' in 1945 would be considered 'pure' and would be pardoned.⁵⁸ However, the government's fine distinction between revolutionary and criminal action was a weak basis on which to build a legal case.

A further problem was the widening split between Widarta and Amir which had begun in late 1945 and which did not help the cause of the Tiga Daerah revolutionaries. After May 1946 the leadership of the PKI was in the hands of Sardjono, one of the group of ex-Digul communists exiled to Australia who returned to Java in March 1946. The Digul group had the same perspective as the Marxists from Holland. The PKI, whose principal orientation was now international and who supported Republican negotiations with the Dutch, was happy to have dissident leftists, 'whose experience and sentiments', in Reid's phrase, 'were primarily or entirely Indonesian',⁵⁹ in jail where they could not oppose such negotiations. After his release Widarta became embroiled in the extreme factionalism of the left. An intra-party committee put him on trial for political and ideological failures, namely common hostility with Tan Malaka to the Linggajati agreement, creating a faction of his own, and failing to establish a genuine popular front in Pekalongan. Widarta, now a discarded leader, was executed late in 1947 on a beach south of Yogyakarta.⁶⁰

If the PKI washed its hands of responsibility for those in jail who had led the resistance against Japanese fascism, some Socialist Party members, including the team of three defence trial lawyers, did not. Supeno had close connections with the KNI group from his home town of Tegal, but he was careful to distance himself from charges that he was leading the defence for ideological or party political reasons. He told a local Barisan Pelopor leader:

... whether or not they [the six defendants] are socialists or communists doesn't concern me. I am not trying to get them to join my party by defending them ... whether they are members of a political party is entirely their own affair. The most important thing is to assure the outside world that those responsible for justice in the Pekalongan Residency are really doing their job properly ...⁶¹

Supeno and the two other Socialist Party members of the Tiga Daerah defence team went with Sjahrir, not the PKI, in the Socialist Party split of 1948. The cruellest cut for Midjaja and those who joined his Tiga Daerah movement was that fellow communists completely failed to support them.

Kutil's End

Kutil's fate reflects both the national disinterest in and central government's opinion about social revolution in the Tiga Daerah affair, and also the implacability of those opposed to it who sought revenge.

While debate raged around the political and legal issues outside the Residency for more than a year, no one questioned the death sentence which had been passed on Kutil in September 1946. The press ignored it. Yet Kutil had been maltreated more than any other prisoner. During the trial his son, then aged fifteen and sentenced by Soeprapto to fifteen years' jail, swore on oath that his father had never hurt anyone let alone those killed during the October social revolution in Tegal, and had admitted to killings only to lighten the sentences of others.⁶² While this may be true, it is probable that Kutil gave the nod to several killings in Talang in early November 1945.

The death sentence passed on Kutil by Soeprapto at a separate session of the Pekalongan court on 21 October 1946⁶³ had not been carried out by the time of the First Clash in July 1947. Prisoners were evacuated with the Residency Republican government to the mountains south of Pekalongan.⁶⁴ Kutil, ever resourceful, made his way to Jakarta, where he went back to his old trade as a barber in Kebun Kacang Gang II. Towards the middle of 1949 he was recognised by a man from Slawi and arrested by the Dutch police (Jakarta then being under Dutch administration).⁶⁵ He was handed over to the Republican police on the transfer of sovereignty in January 1950, sent back to Semarang and from there to Pekalongan, arriving on 13 February 1950. Soeprapto, now Attorney-General, was called from Jakarta, being the only witness able to confirm Kutil's earlier sentence. On 8 April a *Declarator*, or reaffirmation of the Pekalongan's court's sentence passed on 21 October 1946, was made.⁶⁶ On 1 August Kutil appealed directly to President Sukarno for an amnesty, which was rejected on 21 April 1951.⁶⁷ A fortnight later he was taken to the beach near Pekalongan, the place chosen for the execution by the local army garrison commander. Soedharmo, chief of staff of the TKR 17th Regiment in Pekalongan during the Tiga Daerah Affair and who had played a leading role in the intervention which ended it,

was commander of both the Pekalongan garrison and the firing squad in 1951. Asked for his last wish, Kutil replied 'nothing'.⁶⁸ Refusing a blindfold he squatted down on his sandals and died before a firing squad on 5 May 1951.

The Revolution could not come to a decision as to how it viewed the Tiga Daerah. Its response, in the end, was to make a scapegoat of a lenggaong, a representative of the peasant tradition of revolutionary violence.

1. On the political ramifications of inheriting intact the colonial legal system see Daniel S. Lev, 'Colonial Law and the Genesis of the Indonesian State', *Indonesia* 40 (October 1985) pp. 69-70.
2. For a full account of the formation of the Socialist Party, see Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, pp. 202-212.
3. Interview with Sumarsono, Jakarta, 5 June 1978.
4. Interview with Soebadio Sastrosatomo, Jakarta, 7 August 1972.
5. Interview with Pesindo leader (Djunaid), Pekalongan, 31 May 1973.
6. For a vivid first-hand account of the trip by the Australian Broadcasting Commission's war correspondent in Java, see John Thompson, *Hubbub in Java* (Sydney, 1946), pp. 71-91.
7. Interview with Bung Kecil, Jakarta, 4 July 1978.
8. Interview with Soebadio Sastrosatomo, Jakarta, 7 August 1972.
9. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 10 October 1971.
10. Transcript of taped interview with Soedjono, VIII/10, Cipanas, 30 July 1973.
11. Interview with Pekalongan Pesindo leader (Djunaid), Pekalongan, 31 May 1973.
12. *Our Struggle*, trans. by B. R. O'G. Anderson (Ithaca, 1968), p. 28.
13. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
14. Interview with Soebadio Sastrosatomo, Jakarta, 7 August 1972.
15. Abdulmadjid arrived back in Jakarta with two other leaders of Perhimpunan Indonesia, Tamzil and Mulwaladi, in early October, 1945. Personal communication from Jacques Leclerc.
16. Anderson, 'Pemuda Revolution', p. 309.
17. Interview with Sumarsono, Jakarta, 5 June 1978.
18. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, p. 257.
19. Interview with Sumarsono, Jakarta, 5 June 1978.
20. Interview with Bung Kecil, Jakarta, 4 July 1978.
21. *Boeroeh*, 2 October 1946, and *Penghela Rakjat*, 11 October 1946, mentioned the P4. Muhamad Nuh, 'Peristiwa Tiga Daerah', *Penelitian Sedjarah*, 3, 1 (March, 1962) p. 29, calls it the *Panitya Pembela Perkara Politik Pekalongan* (The Committee for the Pekalongan Political Affair), but the P4 was probably meant to investigate the Third July Affair political prisoners as well.

22. *Antara*, 25 January 1946; R. M. Soeprapto had been called back to Pekalongan by the right-wing Pesindo there, and had taken up his duties again on 17 December. Question 6, proses-verbaal, Proc. Gen.
23. Wali al-Fatah was the most prominent radical national Muslim leader, as Masjumi vice-president and leader of Tan Malaka's Persatuan Perjuangan. For his biography see Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*, p. 455. Soemitro Kolopaking was later a Minister of Defence.
24. One of the first to be released was the Tiga Daerah Camat of Randudongkal, Soejatno. Letter from the Pekalongan public prosecutor's department signed by S. Karioatmodjo 'No. 1/PmP' [Pamong Praja] dated 4 January, 1946.
25. *Penghela Rakjat*, 9 May 1946.
26. Interview with Soesmono, 8 October 1976 and 30 November 1975. The assistant prosecutors included the former Camats of Moga and Jatinegara, the latter having old scores to settle with a local revolutionary who had been involved in removing him from office. This man's imprisonment was prolonged by the former camat, who was also responsible for maltreating a santri follower of Kutil from Talang.
27. Transcript of taped interview with Moertolo S.H., I/6, Jakarta, 23 March 1973.
28. For a complete list of the prisoners moved to Yogya, see Letter from Attorney-General (Tirtawinata) to Pekalongan Public Prosecutor, No. 218KA 17 December 1945, Proc. Gen.
29. 'Surat Penetapan Jaksa Agung', 26 March 1947, Proc. Gen.
30. For those who were released see *Penghela Rakjat*, 31 December 1946; *Laskjar*, 3 January 1947.
31. *Boeroeh*, 16 April 1947.
32. Yap Sin Fong, *Kitab-Undang Undang Hukum Pidana Indonesia* (Jakarta, 1954), p. 50.
33. *Boeroeh*, 27 March 1947.
34. Letter of Attorney-General to President Sukarno, 31 March 1947, Proc. Gen.
35. *Penghela Rakjat*, 17 April 1947. Tandiono Manu S.H. was born in Jember on 2 July 1913, the son of an irrigation official. After MULO and AMS (Upper Secondary School) he entered the Jakarta Law School in 1936. During the Japanese occupation he worked in courts in Semarang. Active in Jong Java Bond and Indonesia Muda before the war, during the revolution he was on the Yogyakarta KNI and was for one year its chairman. He was on the executive committee of the BTI (Indonesian Peasants League) until 1947, when he was appointed Resident of Bojonegoro. In 1950 he became Minister of Agriculture in Natsir's cabinet, and from 1952 a member of the PSI's central committee. Mr. Usman Sastroamidjojo, who was born near Magelang on 11 May 1910, had an LL.B. from Leiden, was Indonesia's first envoy to Australia (from 1946 until 1950), and later Ambassador to Canada and Brazil.
36. R. Soeprapto (not to be confused with the former Pekalongan acting Resident) was born at Trenggalek in East Java on 27 March 1897.

After finishing Law School in Jakarta in 1917 he worked in courts in East Java, as well as the *Raad van Justitie* in Semarang. Before the war he had been chairman of the courts in Pati, Banyuwangi, Singaradja, Denpasar, Negara and Mataram, and extraordinary chairman in Cirebon, Kuningan, Salatiga and Boyolali. During the revolution he was chairman of the military high court in Cirebon and Yogyakarta, and was Chief Judge of the Indonesian High Court before being appointed Attorney-General in 1950, a post he held for ten years.

37. Interview with Wadyono, Semarang, 10 October 1971.
38. Interview with Pekalongan Barisan Pclopor leader (Sarli), Jakarta, 28 August 1976.
39. Interview with Tandiono Manu, Jakarta, 22 August 1973.
40. *Boeroeh*, 5 May 1947, gives a full account of the trial proceedings.
41. *Antara*, 5 May 1947.
42. *Penghela Rakjat*, 20 June 1947.
43. *Ibid.*, 23 July 1947.
44. Iwa Kusumasumantri, *Sedjarah Revolusi Indonesia* (Jakarta, 1965?), p. 68. See also the biography of Pemalang leader Amir in 'Daftar Nama-Nama Perintis Kemerdekaan dalam Periode 1908-1945 dengan Sedjarah Perjuangan Singkatnya', unpublished typescript.
45. *Merdeka*, 29 December 1945.
46. *Merdeka*, 9 January 1946.
47. These allegations seem to have begun in a long *Antara* report of 5 January, printed verbatim in Nasution, *Sekitar Perang*, p. 549-52. This *Antara* report was also the basis of long articles in *Merdeka* on 7 and 10 January 1946.
48. *Penghela Rakjat*, 9 May 1945 and *Antara*, 10 October 1945, list the charges.
49. Quoted by Rosihan Anwar in *Merdeka*, 29 December 1946.
50. *Antara*, 6 January 1947.
51. Amir's speech and comments are quoted in Reid, *National Revolution*, p. 75.
52. *Penghela Rakjat*, 8 February 1946.
53. *Antara*, 12 February 1946.
54. Cilik [Bung Kecil?], 'Mempertegak Republik Indonesia', a series of six articles in *Penghela Rakjat*, 23-28 September 1946.
55. *Ibid.*, 24 September 1946.
56. *Antara*, 7 January 1947.
57. *Ibid.* The government never denied that Sardjio's appointment was formally ratified by telegram from Jakarta. Opinions differ as to who actually signed it. The TKR Commander Wadyono believed it was from President Sukarno, others said Hatta, while Tiga Daerah leaders say it was from Amir Sjarifuddin.
58. These wider issues were brought up during the BP-KNIP meeting by Tan Ling Djie, secretary of the Socialist Party. *Ibid.*, 4 January 1947.
59. Reid, *National Revolution*, p. 81.
60. Lucas, *Local Opposition*, pp. 76-80, 331-339.
61. Marsum, 'Ceritaku' memoir, p. 67.

62. Soesmono, written answers, p. 15.
63. *Declarator* of Pekalongan Court No. 1 1950, in a private collection of documents relating to Kutil kindly made available by a former member of the Sejarah Militer Kodam VII, Diponegoro Division's military history section in Semarang.
64. Soeprapto (the judge) left his personal belongings behind in his hurry to leave Pekalongan before the Dutch arrived, and took only the transcripts of the pre-trial interviews and the court proceedings. Interview with Soeprapto's widow, Jakarta, 28 July 1973.
65. Dutch police report, Sejarah Militer Kodam VII collection.
66. *Ibid.*
67. *Ibid.*, 'Keputusan President Republik Indonesia No. 336/G, 1951'.
68. Interview with Maj. Gen. Soedharmo, Jakarta, 23 October 1971.

Conclusion :

The Tiga Daerah in the Indonesian Revolution

Was the Tiga Daerah revolutionary experience unique in the Indonesian revolution? The deep impact of the colonial capitalist economy and the changes it brought in the lives of the people in pre-war Pekalongan, the sufferings of the people under Japanese economic policies administered by the pangreh praja, and the expression of social revolution in cultural as well as economic and political terms, all combined to make the Tiga Daerah revolutionary experience special in many ways.

Yet similar revolutionary processes were occurring in other areas of the Republic, namely in Banten in West Java, the Surakarta region of Central Java and in Aceh and East Sumatra. A consideration of the degree to which events in these areas paralleled the experience of the Tiga Daerah helps to illustrate the special character of the Tiga Daerah itself.

Economic change in pre-war colonial society was important in the social revolutions in other regions. In Surakarta the combination of high taxation and compulsory labour service on plantation estates run by the two dynastic courts (the Susuhunan and the Mangkunegaran) was greatly resented. So too was the gradual alienation of peasant lands by the courts.¹

In Aceh, colonial policy transformed the economic position of the indigenous elite. Here the territorial chiefs (*uleebalang*) were reduced to taking over ownership and control of ricelands in order to supplement their official salaries.² In Pekalongan, by contrast, where there were no territorial chiefs or traditional court dynasties, the pangreh praja were able to maintain a style of life far above that of the common people on the salaries they received from the colonial state, without having to accumulate rice lands. At the same time, at

the village level, rice lands were being alienated to rich peasants by those unable to repay loans.

The intrusion of western capitalism in the form of the plantation economy on the north coast of Java had profound and far-reaching effects on relations between the *pangreh praja* and the people. In particular the existence of seventeen sugar mills by the second decade of this century in Pekalongan Residency irrevocably changed social and economic relationships within villages where sugar cane was grown. On the coastal plain where the mills were located, the bureaucratic elite acted as functionaries of European capitalism. This, together with their role as tax gatherers and law enforcers gradually isolated them from the general populace, as they continued to enjoy the increased power and wealth which flowed from their participation in the colonial state.

What stands out in the Tiga Daerah compared with other regions is the extent of indebtedness in both the rural areas and the towns in the 1930s. This was a result of the great depression when the closure of the sugar mills meant the loss of the only source of cash income. As we saw in chapter one, this resulted in the widespread increase in usury in Tegal, with Arab moneylenders becoming notorious for lending money at high rates of interest.

The Japanese occupation saw the further erosion of patron-client ties between the *pangreh praja* and the people. While the impact of the compulsory rice system and the corvée obligations varied between regions of Java and Northern Sumatra according to the attitude of local officials and nationalist leaders, rice requisitioning proved the most oppressive burden on local populations. Village headmen and subdistrict officers were forced into new roles as landlords extracting rice from the peasantry. Meanwhile corruption at all levels forced local administrations to raise rice delivery quotas even higher. In all regions the price of rice skyrocketed in the last year of the occupation.

By 1944 famine conditions existed in parts of the Tiga Daerah, as was also the case in Banten and in Surakarta. In Banten peasants refused to make deliveries of rice and refused permission for officials to inspect villages. Allegations of corruption 'increased the resentment and bitterness of the peasantry towards the *priyayi*'.³ In Solo, food production declined because compulsory labour service took people away from cultivation of their ricelands, and the land itself was taken out of food production and used for growing cotton and castor oil plants.⁴ Forced deliveries of rice in both Surakarta and Pekalongan began to affect both regions seriously by 1944. Shortages in Pekalongan region were compounded by a distribution problem, arising from the Japanese policy of self-sufficiency which prohibited

the movement of rice from surplus to deficit areas even within the Residency. People were dying of hunger in both towns and rural areas. In Surakarta peasants sold their land, cattle and even gold to rich peasants in order to obtain food,⁵ while in the Tiga Daerah people ate snails and fibrous roots which traditionally were a last resort in times of severe shortages. The peasants and the urban proletariat accused the bureaucratic elite of being henchmen of the Japanese because of the harsh and arbitrary way in which they implemented Japanese policies. This was particularly the case with the large projects which used *romushas* to build irrigation canals and exploit the teak forests within the Tiga Daerah. Anger was focused on local officials who had implemented these projects within the region, rather than on nationalist leaders who took *romushas* to the coal mines of south Banten.

Compared to other regions in Java, although not in Sumatra, the social revolution in the Tiga Daerah was more violent and produced more village and subdistrict level administrative change. What the peasants felt about their village headmen and other corrupt officials was symbolically and graphically expressed in *dombrenng* actions, the ritual by which officials were publicly unmasked and humiliated. In the Tiga Daerah the police were also a prime target for local revolutionaries. For three months the region was without a formal police force, its leaders disappeared and its members disbanded. The police then changed their name to the national security guard. Part of the problem with the police in the Tiga Daerah was that the leaders were from the same *pangreh praja* background and training as the district and subdistrict officers.

In Surakarta and Banten officials were removed in less violent actions. In Surakarta region there is no record of physical violence towards *pangreh praja* who simply changed their allegiance from the courts to the local subdistrict national committees (KNIs). There the social revolution in the rural areas was marked by little of the violence against *pangreh praja* or village headmen. Authority of the courts in the self governing principalities was still strong. Thus in the Sragen area of Surakarta 80 out of 100 *lurahs* were re-elected in late 1945. However if they placed their villages under the authority of subdistrict level KNIs, they were known as freedom *lurahs* (*lurah kemerdekaan*) responsible to the Republic and not to the *raja*, that is, the *Susuhunan* or the *Mangkunegaran*.⁶ In the Tiga Daerah, where the social revolution was initiated in the rural areas and not from urban-based groups, 94 *lurahs* out of 115 villages were changed, with about 40 per cent of new officials coming from groups who had not previously held power—*lenggaongs*, school teachers and KNI leaders. They were responsible also to the Republic through the new

administrations which came to power in the regency towns, the most united of which was in Pemalang under the progressive medical orderly Soepangat.

Of the local men of violence produced by the Indonesian revolution, perhaps Kutil, the barber turned revolutionary from Talang south of Tegal, is the most famous. President Sukarno, who spoke in Tegal at the end of a whistle-stop tour of Java with other government leaders in mid December 1945, called the Tiga Daerah the 'Talang state', a reference to the notoriety of Kutil's region. In the eyes of Jakarta, Kutil symbolised the contradictory currents of national revolution and social revolution, which had to be subordinated to winning the struggle against the Dutch. If the pendulum swung too far towards social revolution, as it did in the Tiga Daerah, the centre labelled social revolution as separatist.

For local revolutionaries, on the other hand, Kutil and Talang symbolised the contradictory elements of social revolution; the violence, the anarchy, the *dombong* actions; charms, amulets and invulnerability; expropriation of *tanah bengkok*, and other wealth, for one's own power and prestige; the alliances with local officials. Muslim teachers and Dutch educated radical nationalists, none of whom could control Kutil, needed him for their revolutionary cause. Where else in the Republic except in the Tiga Daerah did a man like Kutil become regency police chief, a position previously held by a Dutch trained member of the bureaucratic elite? Kutil's role, which ended with, or perhaps was glorified by, his death sentence, also has no parallel in other regions. He was a true product of the social revolution, as well as the first judicial victim of Indonesia's national revolution.

The night of blood on 3 March 1946 which wiped out the entire elite in East Sumatra, and the earlier violence against the territorial chiefs in Aceh, had close parallels with events five months earlier between 10 and 13 October 1945 in the Tiga Daerah. Here, however, it was not the traditional bureaucratic elite and their families who were killed in the mass violence, but Eurasians and also Ambonese and Menadonese who had, so it was claimed, betrayed the revolution. As the majority of these massacres occurred near sugar mills, which in the Tiga Daerah symbolised some of the worst aspects of the colonial economic repression, it can be assumed the Eurasians were associated in the minds of the revolutionaries with that exploitation. The Menadonese and the Ambonese civilians on the other hand were killed for being 'pro Nica', referring to their supposed loyalty to the returning Dutch authorities. There are some parallels here with East Sumatra, where Ambonese soldiers (part of the Royal Netherlands Indies Army, stationed in that region) as well as Menadonese were

also the target of *pemuda*, not peasant, violence in the towns.⁷

The Chinese, too, were the targets of violence in the social revolution. In the Tiga Daerah their shops were burnt, shopkeepers were told to keep prices down, and Chinese rice mills were appropriated by Javanese peasants. Surprisingly in that other violent region Banten there is no record of attacks on Chinese,⁸ but in East Sumatra the Chinese, who were the third largest ethnic community, were frequent victims of *pemuda* rather than peasant violence. Here, revolutionary groups raided shops and warehouses in the towns to seize hoarded goods.⁹ Similarly, in Surakarta in December 1945 bands of radical *pemudas* attacked Chinese textile shops and confiscated cloth for uniforms and for making the Red and White, the national flag.¹⁰ In the Tiga Daerah, ethnic antagonism to the Chinese surfaced on religious grounds when the practice of taking Javanese mistresses and keeping pigs (pigmeat was proscribed under Islam) became an issue in the town of Brebes in October 1945.

The composition of revolutionary forces varied between Pekalongan and other regions. In the Tiga Daerah the *lenggaongs* or semi-bandits spearheaded popular actions against corrupt officials, together with the Muslim teachers. In Banten it was a similar group, the *jawara*, 'regional men of violence who traditionally exploited the power gap between the peasantry and the *pangreh praja*', who together with local communists and Muslim teachers became a radical force which could not be resisted.¹¹ In Solo banditry elements were strong in the various bands of revolutionary *pemudas*, their leaders concerned with mystical teachings and obtaining powers of invulnerability to fight the foreigner. Furthermore in Surakarta, village level change was initiated by leaders of city based struggle groups, who had attributes similar to those of the robber bands of colonial times, such as possession of invulnerability and knowledge of mystical teachings.¹² In Pekalongan in 1947, after the first military action when the revolutionary struggle focused on preventing the reestablishment of Dutch power, local *lenggaongs* were directly involved in the guerilla struggle.¹³

A unique feature of the composition of revolutionary forces in the Tiga Daerah was the involvement of Chinese *pemudas* in Pemalang under their leader Tan Djiem Kwan. Djiem Kwan joined the older nationalist radicals in Pemalang and was one of the six revolutionaries eventually tried by the central government in Pekalongan 'for attempting to change the structure of government by force' in 1947. Pemalang was in fact the only regency town in the new Republic (including Republican held territory outside Java) where Chinese *pemudas* formed their own struggle group as part of the local revolutionary movement. In East Sumatra, by contrast, the Chinese

supported the restoration of Dutch colonial rule, and turned to the British occupation forces and later to the Dutch for protection, because 'the political sympathies of the great majority of the Chinese leaders were against the Republic'.¹⁴

Islam was an important force in the radical change which occurred in the social revolutions in the different regions of Indonesia. As Audrey Kahin has noted, it was the role of Islamic religious teachers elected to positions of local authority, replacing the *pangreh praja* or bureaucratic elite at all levels of local administration, that was a common characteristic of the new order in regions where social revolution occurred.¹⁵ In the Tiga Daerah the *kyais* or religious teachers replaced officials at all levels of local administration. In Tegal and Brebes Islamic nationalists were chosen as *bupatis* and in the rural areas Muslim teachers, filling the local power vacuum, took over the administration at district and subdistrict levels.

Local Marxists played a leading role in the organisation of revolutionary forces in areas where social revolutions occurred. Commenting on their role in East Sumatra, Reid noted 'the great advantage they had was a theory, a tradition and a vocabulary of revolution in no way derived from the now discredited Japanese'.¹⁶ While this was certainly also the case in the Tiga Daerah and Banten, the other factor in favour of local communists was their ties with the communist rebellion of 1926 in their own regions. This was of great importance in Banten where both the leaders of the People's Council (the equivalent in Banten to the GBP3D) and the new Resident were local Islamic radicals. Significantly, the revolutionary Resident of Banten, Kyai Chatib, was 'the most important local *ulama* to have adhered to the Communist cause in Banten in 1926'.¹⁷ Exploiting their local reputation as revolutionary leaders of the 1926 rebellion against the Dutch, the popular forces they mobilised kept the People's Council in power in Banten for three months. By contrast the position of Tiga Daerah communist leaders Widarta and Midjaja, as non-local men who had no ties with the rebellion of 1926 within the Tiga Daerah region, was much weaker. Sardjio, the man they chose as Resident of Pekalongan, was also a communist outsider with no Islamic affiliations within the Residency of Pekalongan or anywhere else. He had been Resident for only three and a half days before the army supported by conservative Muslims ousted him and the GBP3D from power.

In the areas of social revolution in the new Republic we find a strong push for democratising local government. In East Sumatra before the bloody overthrow of the traditional sultans and their administrations, Republican leaders had tried unsuccessfully to persuade the sultans to subordinate their regions to the authority of the

republican residents and the Governor, and to create representative councils in their own statelets. The rajas however wanted special region status similar to that of the principality of Yogyakarta.¹⁸ In Solo, the culmination of a long struggle finally saw the dismantling of the self governing regions, or *swapraja*, ruled by the two traditional dynasties of the Susuhunan and Mangkunegaran in July 1946.¹⁹ In the Tiga Daerah local administrative functions were no longer monopolised by pangreh praja, while in Brebes the administrative position of wedana or district officer was abolished and replaced by five-man working committees.

The role of Tan Malaka's Struggle Union was of crucial importance in the dismantling of these traditional ruling dynasties in both East Sumatra and Surakarta.²⁰ Tan Malaka had no visible political presence in Pekalongan Residency, partly because his Struggle Union was not set up until 1946, after the Tiga Daerah Affair had ended. The only possible but unproven link between the Tiga Daerah and Tan Malaka was through Sayuti Melik, who came to Pekalongan as envoy of the Governor of Central Java and emissary of President Sukarno. Considered to be a Tan Malaka supporter since the late 1930s, he later played a key role in the leadership of the Struggle Union. It was Sayuti Melik's connections with Tan Malaka which hindered any kind of alliance between himself and the Tiga Daerah popular front leaders, Midjaja and Widarta. As supporters of prominent pre-war communist leader Musso and his Illegal PKI, Midjaja and Widarta were ideologically opposed to Tan Malaka because he criticised the leadership of the early PKI, including Musso, for attempting an ill-timed and poorly prepared revolt in 1926. For reasons to do with leadership rivalries within the underground PKI during the occupation, as well as preoccupation with events in Pekalongan, Tiga Daerah communist supporters of Musso did not forge alliances with radical groups elsewhere. Ironically no relations were established with the new legal PKI barely two hours drive away in neighbouring Cirebon. It had been refounded under the leadership of Dutch educated radical lawyer Mohamad Jusuf (who had no connections with Musso or the Illegal PKI) in early November 1945.

The issue of how to reorganise the local economy faced all local leaders who were involved in regional social revolutions. In East Sumatra a communist group, the ERRI or People's Economy of the Republic of Indonesia, directed economic activity towards the purposes of the anti-Dutch struggle. At first ERRI was active in organising hawkers, cloth merchants, and medicine sellers into associations with a cooperative basis. Later given official recognition ERRI was a remarkable but short lived Marxist experiment 'to organise the structure of the economy in every sector for the whole of Sumatra'.²¹

A less ambitious economic programme in the Tiga Daerah which was to be implemented by the popular front never got off the ground. Under their plans regional industries such as fisheries were to be organised on cooperative lines and managed by 'the lower classes' under a central body which would control purchase and distribution of foodstuffs. House gardens were to be used for the production of cash crops such as cotton, while the government was to rent out production tools.

The question of village ricelands used by officials in lieu of salary, the *tanah bengkok*, was an issue on which early in the revolution communist leaders of the popular front in the Tiga Daerah had no policy. Peasant demands for the distribution of *tanah bengkok* seem to have taken local revolutionaries in Pemalang by surprise. They actively prevented redistribution, saying that *tanah bengkok* belonged to the state. This Marxist 'conservatism' did not change until 1948, when Musso, shortly after his return to Indonesia, told the Indonesian Peasants Front (the BTI), that '*bengkok* lands must be returned to the peasants to be worked by themselves'.²²

The Indonesian Republican armed forces were fundamentally opposed to social revolution. In the Tiga Daerah the majority of Peta company commanders who subsequently led the Pekalongan TKR regiment were recruited from bureaucratic elite families. The TKR saw its immediate priority as the prevention of British forces from moving westward out of Semarang towards Pekalongan. They believed that the popular front was hindering supplies being sent to the front.

In the Surakarta region military leaders, although from the same social background and Peta training as those in Pekalongan, played a more active role as part of the mainstream revolutionary movement. The first struggle organisation in Solo, the Younger Generation of the Army (AMT), was established by a former Peta officer, with the aim of disarming the Japanese. Likewise the Surakarta KNI, or national committee, was chaired by a former Peta officer on the insistence of the Republican government in Jakarta 'because the KNI would take over from the Japanese military forces'. In the rural areas of Surakarta local Peta leaders set up village KNIs also.²³ In Pekalongan, former Peta leaders played no role in the committees set up by local nationalists to establish the new republican government in the region. On 4 November the TKR withdrew its remaining battalions from the Tiga Daerah, and the popular front leaders subsequently broke off negotiations about the TKR returning to the region, partly because of their view that the TKR was being used to strengthen feudalism in the Republic.

In both Banten and the Tiga Daerah local TKR officers launched

actions against the People's Council and the popular front (the GBP3D). TKR leadership loyalties to the pangreh praja as well as the priority of fighting the foreigner in the Semarang front explain what happened in Pekalongan. In an identical military action, but without the support of conservative Muslims, the TKR also moved against the People's Council in Banten on 8 January 1946, although the action there was more violent, with at least fifteen being killed.²⁴ In Pekalongan the TKR jailed 178 members and supporters of the popular front on 14 December.

The Tiga Daerah Affair also adds another dimension to the nature of the interface between region and region, and region and centre in the Indonesian revolution.²⁵ Political patron-client networks, either across Residency boundaries or between centre and region, were crucial in establishing the outcome of many events in the region. The personal ties between the Nine Brothers in Tegal and Soepeno (a Socialist party member of the working committee of the Central Indonesian National Committee, the KNIP, and later Minister for Youth and Development in Amir Sjarifuddin's cabinet) and Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo (the last PNI Baru leader and a close associate of Sjahrir) gave prestige to the group's actions. As a result of these ties it was Soepeno who defended the revolutionaries publicly and at the trials staged by the Republican government in Pekalongan in early 1947. When the central government decided to intervene and make its views known to both sides in Pekalongan it was too late, as the army had already arrested the popular front leaders. The centre lacked strong political will, despite Prime Minister Sjahrir's rhetoric about the need to eliminate collaborating elements from the Republican government and to remove those pangreh praja who were the 'henchmen of the colonialists'.

For the locally unknown communist leaders of the popular front, Midjaja and Widarta, backing from the centre was particularly crucial to the success of their political movement. As has been pointed out earlier, one of the weaknesses of the political leadership of the GBP3D was that Midjaja, Widarta and the new Resident of Pekalongan, Sardjio, were all from outside the Residency. They came to Pekalongan officially with the authority of the Minister of Information and Defence, Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin. Unlike the Nine Brothers, Widarta's ties with Amir through underground activities during the occupation did not gain him support from the centre when he needed it most. Prominent pre-war communist leaders anxious to reestablish their authority within the refounded PKI found it useful to have Widarta and other local underground leaders out of political action where they could not challenge the PKI support for the Sjahrir policy of negotiating with the Dutch. When sympathetic military

units from East Java tried to force the issue of Tiga Daerah detainees who were considered to be political prisoners in Pekalongan, the centre again intervened on the side of law and order and stopped the rescue attempt.

The central government also intervened in a similar way in the social revolution in East Sumatra, which Prime Minister Sjahrir saw as a great threat to the Republic's standing abroad. In April 1946 Amir Sjarifuddin and other leading Socialist Party colleagues arrived in East Sumatra to explain the government's position: support was needed for building a strong government and army. Local communist leaders were told that 'this was the stage for national, not social, revolution and that the Kremlin's "Dimitrov doctrine" still demanded a common front against fascism and imperialism'.²⁶ This viewpoint had partly prevented Amir Sjarifuddin from supporting the communist led popular front four months earlier in the Tiga Daerah.

Because of their organisational structure, the Republican armed forces in the Tiga Daerah (both the TKR and the naval TKR) also had links outside the region. The TKR's line of command went through Division headquarters in Salatiga to the armed forces' supreme command in Yogyakarta, where leftists elements were more influential. Thus the order for the TKR to withdraw from the Tiga Daerah came on the initiative of Sayuti Melik and Major General Djokosoejono, a leftist in Yogyakarta military circles who had visited Pemalang several times during the Tiga Daerah.

What is the significance of the Tiga Daerah affair in the context of the regional social revolutions in Indonesia today? As in Banten, the Muslim teachers elected or chosen as *wedanas* and *camats* continued in their positions until the first Dutch military action against the Republic. By 1950 most had moved to local departments of religious affairs. The two religious leaders who became *Bupatis* of Tegal and Brebes during the Tiga Daerah both remained in office. The *Bupati* of Brebes, together with another Muslim teacher who replaced Soepangat as *Bupati* of Pemalang in December 1945, both died heroes' deaths at the hands of the Dutch during the first military action in 1947. The position of *wedana*, abolished throughout Brebes in 1945, has now been officially downgraded in Central Java to the status of *bupati's* assistant. Many *lurahs*, chosen during the social revolution of 1945, continued in office until 1965.

The army-led counter revolution successfully removed all communist influence in local government until 1950, when the PKI began rebuilding the party in the Tiga Daerah again. The socialists, the Tegal based Nine Brothers, continued to be influential in local politics, several taking positions in the local military. In Tegal, the

navy clashed fiercely with the armed forces in 1946 over control of the lucrative sugar stocks, while the army's 17th Regiment in Pekalongan, logistically ill equipped, traded sugar for guns and supplies with boat trips to Singapore financed by local Chinese businessman until the second Dutch military action.

The revolutionary spirit of *sama rasa sama rata*, or one soul one struggle, which burned so fiercely in 1945 allowed important and previously suppressed elements and values in Javanese society to be given concrete expression although not always permanent political form. Existing power structures were successfully challenged, officials—many of them Islamic nationalists—were popularly chosen for the first time to replace Dutch trained pangreh praja, while new administrations swept away the old order at the village level. Underlying these revolutionary actions in the Tiga Daerah were new values, also symbolised in the word 'merdeka', which, after the revolution was over, became part of mainstream Indonesian political life. Although at times difficult to perceive in Indonesia since 1965, the values of *sama rasa sama rata* and *merdeka* are strongly held by the majority of Indonesians today.

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14. Van Langenberg in Kahin, *Regional Dynamics*, p. 133.
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 23. Soejatno, 'Revolution in Surakarta', pp. 65, 89–91.
 24. Williams in Kahin, *Regional Dynamics*, p. 71.
 25. Heather Sutherland, 'The Indonesian Revolution: a Review', *Indonesia*, 42 (October 1986) pp. 115–118.
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Appendix

Time Chart of Events in the Residency of Pekalongan August–December 1945

The sequence of events in a period as short as the first five months of the Indonesian revolution in one small region of Java can leave the reader quite bewildered as to what was happening when and where. The following Time Chart compiled from newspapers, diaries and personal interviews shows events from mid August until the end of December 1945. It may also help place what was happening in the Pekalongan Residency in the context of events at the regional and national level in other parts of Java.

August

Friday, 17	Proclamation of Independence in Jakarta.
Monday, 20	Japanese flag hauled down, replaced by Red and White in a spontaneous action by Brebes pemuda.
Tuesday, 21	Meeting to discuss the proclamation held in Pekalongan in house of assistant Resident Mr. Besar attended by all bupatis in Pekalongan Residency, the mayors of Tegal and Pekalongan, Judge Soeprapto, Pekalongan public prosecutor S. Karioatmodjo, members of Residency Advisory Council including the Wedana of Pekalongan, Kromo Lawi and others.

- Thursday, 23 Meeting in Brebes to discuss the proclamation.
- Tuesday, 28 Indonesian National Committee (KNI) formed in Pekalongan. Brebes regency secretary Mohamad Saleh attends representing Bupati Sarimin, who has just returned from a meeting in Pekalongan about setting up of KNIs.
- Wednesday, 29 Bandung and Banyumas KNIs formed.
- Thursday, 30 Announcement of formation of the BKR (People's Security Force) in Jakarta. All-Java and Madura Pangreh Praja Conference convened in Jakarta.
- September**
- Sunday, 2 First Cabinet of ten ministers of new Republic sworn in. Five regencies in Priangan Residency hold simultaneous meetings to form KNIs. Meeting in Brebes to form regency KNI.
- Monday, 3 Lord Mountbatten instructs Field Marshal Terauchi in Saigon to dissolve the new Republic.
- Tuesday, 4 Kedu Residency KNI formed.
- Wednesday, 5 All former Japanese appointed assistant Residents promoted to Resident with exception of Jakarta municipality and Residency of Pekalongan. Mr. Iskaq Tjokroadisurjo, as Resident of neighbouring Banyumas, announces his region is now part of Republic. Brebes Hokokai is dissolved.
- Tuesday, 11 At the meeting in Roman Catholic Church hall in Tegal, the Mayor of Tegal and the revolutionary leaders clash about validity of the proclamation.
- Wednesday, 12 The Pekalongan KNI passes a motion asking President Sukarno to appoint Mr. Besar as Resident of Pekalongan.
- Wednesday, 19 In Ikada Square in Jakarta, Sukarno speaks to a huge crowd despite Japanese opposition. First violence erupts in Java with flag incident over Hotel Yamoto in Surabaya.
- Friday, 21 Secretary of State, A. G. Pringgodigdo replies to Pekalongan KNI motion of 12 September that Mr. Besar has now been officially appointed Resident of Pekalongan.
- Sunday, 23 Mr. Besar announces 'Indonesian Independence' in Pekalongan.

- Tuesday, 25 All Japanese-appointed officials formally declared civil servants of the new Republic by the government in Jakarta.
- Thursday, 27 Japanese formally transfer power in Pekalongan.
- Saturday, 29 A parade in Pekalongan welcomes Resident Besar's announcement that Pekalongan Residency is now formally part of Republic. The parade, which began at 7.30 a.m., was 'no less than three kilometres long'.
- First British battalion lands in Jakarta.

October

- Tuesday, 2 Railway Workers' Union (*Sarekat Sekerja Kereta Api*) formed in Pekalongan.
- Wednesday, 3 Fighting in Pekalongan after kenpeitai open fire on people while Resident Besar is negotiating the transfer of arms. 37 Indonesians and about 17 Japanese killed.
- Thursday, 4 The Pekalongan kenpeitai building under siege.
- Friday, 5 Formation of TKR consisting of ten divisions. The 17th Regiment in the Residency of Pekalongan along with Semarang, Pati and Salatiga regiments is part of TKR Fourth Division with headquarters in Salatiga under Colonel Djatikusumo. Siege of the kenpeitai continues in Pekalongan.
- Saturday, 6 4 p.m: 32 of those who died during the fighting with the kenpeitai are buried in Pekalongan. Later in evening kenpeitai finally surrender and hand over all arms 'including several machine guns'.
- Three Chinese-owned rice mills in Adiwerna taken over by Farmers' Association (*Rukun Tani*) leaders from Ujungrusi.
- Sunday, 7 11 p.m: House of lurah of Cerih village, Jatinegara subdistrict in south Tegal, is surrounded by large crowd. Japanese garrison and kenpeitai in Pekalongan city leave Residency for Banyumas accompanied by BKR.
- Monday, 8 Lurah of Cerih *dombreng*-ed five kilometres to Jatinegara Subdistrict. The camat flees. First such action in Residency and signals beginning of social revolution.
- Wednesday, 10 Camat of Adiwerna killed after addressing a meeting at Lemahduwur village. The Wedana of Adiwerna flees.

Oei Tjun Lam's shop and house in Warungpring village (south Pemalang) burnt to ground. Beginning of social revolution in Pemalang regency.

Japanese take back control of Bandung after fierce fighting. AMRI formed in Semarang.

Thursday, 11

5 a.m. Killings at Jatibarang sugar mill. 11 a.m. Henry Gill, Eurasian sugar mill employee, killed at Pangkah. 5 p.m. Slawi massacre in which more than 30 Eurasians, two Bataks and a Menadonese die. 11.30 p.m. Tegal Barisan Pelopor headquarters announce that all Eurasians, Ambonese and Menadonese must be interned because of NICA atrocities in Jakarta.

Friday, 12

Wedana of Slawi leaves his district. The Camat of Moga (Pemalang), attacked and wounded by angry crowd, flees for his life. The Camat of Lebaksiu (Tegal) dragged from his cart and killed while travelling with wife to meet superior, Wedana of Slawi.

3 p.m. Camat of Slawi leaves by bicycle for Tegal. His wife and four children follow, leaving behind all their clothes and belongings. Two Adiwerna revolutionary leaders go to API headquarters at old Trubels dairy at Pagongan and are shown telegram ordering all Eurasians, Menadonese and Ambonese to be killed. Preparations in Brebes for interviewing TKR candidates. Wongsongoro becomes Governor of Central Java.

Saturday, 13

1 a.m. API members take F.V. Bouman from his house in Jalan Kartini, Tegal, along with members of his family. Later killed with son Adolph, aged 7.

Monday, 15

In Brebes, interviews for second TKR intake begin, organised by Brebes KNI (not bupati), supervised by TKR officers from Pekalongan, at request of the KNI. In Semarang bloody five-day battle begins with massacre of hundreds of Japanese.

Tuesday, 16

First proclamation of Pekalongan Resident Besar requesting population to remain calm and orderly, and threatening strong measures to prevent further 'lawlessness'. In Jakarta KNIP is given new legislative powers, and 15-man working committee, Badan Pekerja or BP-KNIP, formed. Mr. Besar's second proclamation, ordering all weapons and ammunition to be handed over to police 'between the hours of 9 a.m. and 1 p.m.' One hundred Arab pemuda members of AMRI Pekalongan will 'defend Indonesia as Indonesians'. British troops occupy Bandung.

- Thursday, 18 Bupati of Brebes Sarimin and his deputy Pranoto go to Banyumas to get arms for Brebes TKR. That night these officials, together with Wedana of Brebes and his brother, Wedana of Tanjung, are kidnapped by Tegal KNI group and taken back to Tegal.
- Friday, 19 3.30 p.m. Bupati of Pemalang 'arrested' and taken to jail for safe keeping, with rest of town's priyayi officials. Night of social upheaval in Pemalang.
- Saturday, 20 Soepangat acclaimed as new Bupati of Pemalang at mass meeting in Pemalang town square. Meeting addressed by underground PKI leaders Widarta and S. Mustapha. Tegal regency police barracks at Kejambon, south of city, are attacked. Police disband. British troops land in Semarang.
- Monday, 22 Resident of Pekalongan's third proclamation, giving wide powers to TKR to take 'whatever action is necessary' in certain parts of Tiga Daerah to control the unrest.
- Wednesday, 24 Reshuffle of Tegal municipal and regency KNIs with new united KNI formed. Letter of appointment No. 35 P.P.D. from Besar, formally appointing Soedaju Wiratmodjo as Camat of Petarukan (Pemalang).
- Thursday, 25 British land in Surabaya.
- Friday, 26 Amir Sjarifuddin's Indonesian Socialist Party, or Parsi 7 formed in Yogyakarta.
- Saturday, 27 English major comes to Pekalongan from Semarang with small unit 'to observe places of detention of foreigners', and is met by Resident Besar and TKR acting commander, Wadyono. Returns to Semarang on same day.
- Monday, 29 Bupati of Brebes and Wedana of Bantarkawung are 'examined' blindfolded at Ketanggungan. Letter No. 44/P.P.D. from Mr. Besar formally appointing Soejatno as Pemalang regency secretary under Soepangat. Letter No. 46/P.P.D. from Besar formally appointing Soepangat Bupati of Pemalang.
- Tuesday, 30 Chinese in Brebes reported to have contributed f10,000 to Freedom Funds. Letter No. 57/P.P.D. from Besar appointing Haji Toha Camat of Lebaksu. Fighting with British in Semarang spreads to Ambarawa.
- Wednesday, 31 Haji Mawardi becomes Wedana of Adiwerna.

November

- Thursday, 1 Sukarno and Amir Sjarifuddin fly to Semarang, then to Magelang and Yogyakarta to discuss military situation.
- Friday, 2 Ceasefire between Allies and Republican forces arranged. Sukarno returns to Jakarta by train via north coast, stops in Tegal to make brief speech at station, is welcomed by Barisan Pelopor leaders. Sayuti Melik travelling with Sukarno's party leaves train in Tegal.
- Saturday, 3 Muhammadiyah regional conference begins in Pagongan south of Tegal.
Iskandar Idris and Sayuti Melik captured near Talang and taken to Slawi.
- Sunday, 4 a.m. Chairman of Tegal united KNI and Wedana coordinator of Adiwerna captured while going south, and killed near Talang. Haji Mawardi, Wedana of Adiwerna, captured near Talang while returning from Muhammadiyah conference.

p.m. Huge crowd marches on Tegal, one group attacks TKR barracks, occupies city square and takes off former public prosecutor Singgih, R. M. Abu Bakar, a romusha raiser, and his son Chamzah. Two leading orthodox Muslims Mochidin and Mochtar also captured while trying to meet local Talang leaders. TKR evacuates three battalions from the Tiga Daerah on orders from Yogyakarta military headquarters.
Brebes working committee formed.
- Monday, 5 Besar leaves the Residency of Pekalongan.
5.30 p.m. Bupati of Tegal Socnarjio leaves Tegal disguised as railway locomotive driver accompanied by API leader, Mansur, from Pangkah.
- Tuesday, 6 Soeprapto appointed acting Resident, arrives in Pekalongan and visits Tegal. Letter No. 326/P.P.D. from acting Resident of Pekalongan formally appointing Suleman Camat of Comal.
- Thursday, 8 Election of new Wedana of Bumijawa. Abu Sudja'i officially installed as Bupati of Tegal by acting Resident Socprapto at ceremony in Tegal. Tegal working committee formed. KRIS formed in Tegal.
- Friday, 9 'Temporary Letter of Appointment' of Ki Tjitrasmaka as Patih of Tegal, signed by new Bupati of Tegal, Abu Sudja'i.
- Saturday, 10 After another examination, Wedana and Bupati of Brebes and others moved blindfolded from Durensawit,

- near Balapulang, to Tegal jail where they are 'reunited' with Tegal pangreh praja.
Fierce fighting between British troops and Indonesians in Surabaya.
- Sunday, 11 Wedana of Pangkah kidnapped.
- Monday, 12 Wedana of Pangkah taken to Pemalang and placed in town jail.
- Wednesday, 14 First parliamentary cabinet under Sjahrir formed.
- Friday, 16 Formation of the GBP3D in former Barisan Pelopor headquarters in Tegal.
- Saturday, 17 Letter No. 462/P.P.D. from acting Resident of Pekalongan formally appointing Ki Tjitrasatmaka Patih of Tegal as from 12 November.
- Wednesday, 21 English withdraw from Magelang to Ambarawa where fighting has been fierce since 15 November.
- Sunday, 25 Second meeting of GBP3D in Brebes.
- Friday, 30 H. Mawardi (Wedana of Adiwerna), Kyai Bisri and Kyai Mohidin (captured on 4 November near Talang) leave AMRI Slawi and return home escorted by Kutil.
- December**
- Sunday, 2 Third meeting of GBP3D in Tegal office to plan strategy for taking power in Pekalongan. Decision to send a printed ultimatum setting out demands of Tiga Daerah to Pekalongan.
- Wednesday, 5 GBP3D ultimatum released. Ambarawa retaken by Indonesian forces.
- Thursday, 6 Sardjio visits Tegal at request of GBP3D.
- Friday, 7 Wedana of Brebes moved from Tegal jail to office of Parsi (Barisan Pelopor).
- Sunday, 9 Conference between GBP3D leaders and Pekalongan struggle council in Pemalang regency *pendopo* attended by acting Resident. Letter of Agreement signed by all groups, appointing Sardjio as Resident.
- Monday, 10 2 p.m. Sardjio accompanied by takeover staff and escort company arrives in Pekalongan. Welcome ceremony held at Residency office. Acting Resident Soeprapto formally hands over his job to Sardjio.
- Wednesday, 12 Mass meeting in Pekalongan city square addressed by Sardjio and Midjaja. Sardjio's appointment ratified by telegram from central government.

- Thursday, 13 Muslim leaders organise a large demonstration march past Hotel Merdeka where Sardjio and staff have headquarters. TKR acting commander returns from Semarang front via Division HQ in Salatiga. Fighting breaks out in Bekasi, British burn town.
- Friday, 14 Sardjio visits southern areas, car ambushed at Pekalongan on return journey, Midjaja wounded slightly in the knee. Later TKR surrounds Hotel Merdeka, and Resident and staff captured and imprisoned.
- (Kliwon)
- Saturday, 15 Ambarawa falls to Republic forces after ten days of fierce fighting.
- Monday, 17 Socialist Party founded in Cirebon. Pekalongan TKR and Muslim groups launch full-scale counter-revolution against Tiga Daerah.
- Thursday, 20 11 a.m. Pekalongan force enters Pemalang. Former bupati and other pangreh praja released from Pemalang jail. Arrests of revolutionary leaders.
- Friday, 21 TKR from Pekalongan arrives in Tegal.
- Saturday, 22 Wedana of Brebes and others freed from Tegal jail. Presidential entourage arrives in Pekalongan at end of tour of Java. S.M. Kartosuwirjo addresses Masjumi meeting in Pekalongan regency *pendopo*, on theme of holy war.
- Sunday, 23 Mass meeting in Pekalongan city square. In evening Soepangat and underground PKI leaders Widarta and Muroso seized in *pendopo* during meeting with presidential entourage and imprisoned. Kartosuwirjo visits main Tegal mosque.
- Sunday, 30 At mass meeting in Pemalang town square Haji Makmur appointed Bupati of Pemalang.

Biographical Appendix

K. H. ABU SUDJA'I was born about 1904 in the village of Pacul, the 13th of 18 children by his father's two wives. In 1912 he was taken on the haj by his father. Because his father would not let any of his children 'sit at a desk in a Dutch school', Abu Sudja'i's education was in various pesantrens in Cirebon, Solo, Jombang and Majalengka until 1920, when he entered a Sarekat Islam school in Tegal. In 1922 he joined the famous pesantren of K. H. Mochlas in Panggung, Tegal, but left it in 1925 to wander between pesantrens in Kaliwungu, Semarang, Solo, Jombang and Tebuireng. In Majalengka he entered a private teachers' training school for two years, and joined the PSII-sponsored Union of Islamic Scholars which had been set up in 1927 in Pekalongan, Tegal and Cirebon. In 1930 he returned to Pacul village and founded a Muslim school. Active in the PSII, in 1932 he was jailed for seven months for breaking the state salt monopoly by making his own, again in 1937 for forty days for opposition to the taking of blood samples from corpses as part of the government campaign to eradicate the plague, and again for three months in 1939 for speaking against the government. He refused to work under the Japanese, who wanted him to work in Tegal in the Department of Religious Affairs. In November 1945, thirty-three days after being released from jail he was taken by AMRI Talang and installed as Bupati of Tegal where he remained until the First Dutch Clash, evacuating from Tegal with the republican government. Unjustly accused of being a Darul Islam supporter he was 'dishonourably' dismissed from the government in 1950, with loss of pension, and served a five year sentence in Nusakambangan island prison until his release in 1955.

AMIR was born at Songgom (Brebes) on 12 August 1907, the son of Noto Atmodjo, a land surveyor who later moved to Pemalang as local inspector of the government's Opium and Salt Monopoly. Amir was educated at HIS Pemalang (with Soewignjo). About 1923, while working as a clerk in the Comal Baru sugar mill, he joined the Comal sub-branch of the PKI which was headed by Soewignjo. Arrested on 12 November 1926, he was sentenced

to six years' jail, which was spent in Pemalang, Glodok, Jakarta, Pemakasan (Madura), Tangerang and Cipinang prisons. After his release he was a key member of a small radical pre-war nationalist group in Pemalang throughout the 1930s when he earned his living as a goldsmith. In late 1941 he was arrested and put in preventive detention by the Dutch assistant Resident for 'illegal activities', but was released by the Japanese. During the occupation he was involved in the underground PKI in Pemalang. Shortly before the war he married Pemalang activist Ibu Pri. In 1945 he gave political courses to Pemalang API/PRI pemuda, and represented Pemalang on the GBP3D's defence and information committees and was the GBP3D secretariat's legal adviser. He joined Resident Sardjio's transfer staff in Pekalongan in early December 1945, was arrested by the TKR, was one of the six brought to trial in Pekalongan in March 1947, and was finally released when the charges were dropped on 18 July 1947. During the first Dutch military action he joined the TNI and fought with the guerillas. After the revolution Amir returned to Comal, began giving courses on Marxism, and helped rebuild the Pemalang branch of the PKI. From 1951-59 he ran a National Secondary School in Comal, and was a PKI candidate for the Provincial Assembly in the 1955 elections. A delegate to the 1957 Constitutional Congress in Bandung, he was also a member of Pemalang's People's Representative Council during this period. From 1959-61 he travelled overseas, visiting Albania and Moscow. On his return he taught at the Aliacham Academy and worked in the Yayasan Pembinaan as a translations adviser. From December 1965 he lived in Cirebon, where he died in May 1978.

MR. MAS BESAR MARTOKOESOEMO was born in Brebes on 8 July 1894. He was given the name 'besar' by his father because he was born in the tenth month of the Muslim calendar, the *bulan besar* or *bulan aji*. From the age of six he was brought up and educated in Tegal by a Dutch woman, who sent him to the Dutch-language primary school in Pekalongan for seven years and then on to the Higher Civil School in Semarang. After completing two years, he entered the newly founded Law School in Batavia in 1913, in the first enrolment. From 1919 until November 1923 he studied Law at the University of Leiden and was the first Indonesian to graduate. Returning to Tegal in 1924, he became the first Indonesian defence lawyer to practise there. During the Japanese occupation he first became Mayor, then Bupati, of Tegal. In May 1945 he was appointed assistant Resident in Pekalongan, then Resident in September 1945. He left the Residency on 5 November 1945 and was later appointed as secretary to the head of the Ministry of Home Affairs (then in Purwokerto) to Mr. Sumarman, where he worked for the rest of the Revolution. After the Revolution he was secretary-general of the Department of Justice for many years.

K. HOLLE was born on 9 September 1914 in Ameth village, on the island of Nusalaut, in Ambon. His father, Jonathan Holle, was a minister in the Dutch Reformed Church and expected that his son would be called to the same profession. After graduating from the Christian intermediate school in Ambon in 1932, he was sent to Malang to repeat Dutch before going on the Protestant Missionary Training Centre at Oestgeest in Holland. However,

because his Dutch did not improve, he entered the Forestry School in Bogor. He was working the teak forest plantations in Pemalang when the Japanese arrived. During the occupation he joined the underground PKI. In 1948 the PKI wanted to make him regional representative from Ambon on the enlarged central committee but he could not forget what had happened to Widarta. Instead of party service like other underground PKI leaders from the occupation who had been involved in the Tiga Daerah Affair he joined the union movement, helping to found a Forestry Workers' Union in 1951. He was active in the leadership representing the Union in SOBSI (the left wing national trade union federation) until 1964, when he resigned.

K. H. ISKANDAR IDRIS was born on 17 February 1901 in Kedunghalang village, Semplak, Bogor regency. He was educated at a Jamiyad Kair school and an Al Irsyad school, and came to Pekalongan in 1921 to teach in the local Al Irsyad school there. In 1925 he set up a batik business in Kedungwungi, and from 1931-36 taught at the Muhammadiyah HIS in Tegal, and then taught Arabic at an Arabic school in Pekalongan. From 1936 he worked as the local agent for the Bumi Putera Insurance Company. During this time he published commentaries on the Koran, and other religious books, in both Indonesian and Javanese. On the committee of the Pekalongan branch of Muhammadiyah from 1924, he was its chairman from 1929 until 1931 and again in 1938. In 1931 he became chairman of Pekajangan Muhammadiyah and founded a business association which taught its members business practice. He was chosen by the Japanese as commander of the Pekalongan Peta battalion. At the time Pekalongan priyayi circles rather disparagingly considered the appointment of a 'bill collector' (*rekening looper*) to this position inappropriate. He was made commander of the TKR 17th Regiment in Pekalongan, a position he held until his capture in Talang on 3 November 1945. He did not return to the military after the TKR-led counter-revolution, but during the guerilla period was a leader of Hizbullah in Wonosobo. He now lives in Jakarta on a lieutenant colonel's pension.

KADARISMAN SOERODIWIRYO, who was born on 5 June 1914 in Pemalang, described his father as 'a playboy in the Dutch navy'. He was educated by an uncle first in HIS then in a private intermediate school in Tegal where he graduated in 1933. He was one of the founders of the Tegal branch of Indonesia Muda in 1932 and was later its chairman. From 1933 to 1937 he taught in the Islamiyah Muslim school in Tegal then in a Muhammadiyah HIS in Slawi. In 1937 he worked as a clerk in the Tegal district office, then in the Tegal municipal offices. During the occupation he was a member of the Seinendan. A member of the Nine Brothers group, after the proclamation he was secretary of the Tegal municipal KNI, and the united Tegal regency KNI which replaced it in October 1945. When the municipal administration was abolished the Tegal working committee appointed Kadarisman Wedana coordinator of Tegal, in effect mayor. In 1946 he joined the secretariat of the Tegal Struggle Bureau. Arrested several times for his Republican sympathies after the first Dutch military action, he was jailed for one year in Nusakambangan island prison for supporting the Plebiscite Movement set up to campaign for plebiscites in Dutch-held territory as part of the Renville

Agreement. Released in 1949, he joined the Tegal military government formed to supervise the transfer of Dutch administration to Republican hands. Until his retirement in 1970 Kadarisman worked in the Tegal municipal administration, and now teaches English at the Iksaniyah junior high school which he helped found in 1954.

KARTOHARGO was born on 14 July 1904 at Bantarpolang (Pemalang), where his father Kartotanoyo was the camat. After completing HIS in Pemalang in 1917, he finished his education at a private teacher's training school at Gunungan, Jakarta, run by the *Associatie van Oost en West*. During his stay in Jakarta (1917-23) he was a member of *Jong Islamieten Bond*, then on the committee of the Jakarta branch of *Jong Java* and knew Mohamad Yamin and Mr. Sartono. In 1924 he returned to Brebes, joined Budi Utomo, and taught in its school there. In 1926, at the request of Pemalang Taman Siswa, he taught in their primary school in Pemalang, before moving to Weleri (Kendal) to teach in a Budi Utomo school. He had to leave Weleri because he disagreed with a parade to celebrate Queen Wilhelmina's birthday, and he became a journalist for a time. After teaching in an Arjuna school in Bantul (Yogyakarta) he opened one in Sidarja (Cilacap). Returning to Brebes he taught in a Muhammadiyah HIS, then founded a Taman Siswa School 'because I liked Ki Hajar's lectures'. Late in 1934 he founded Taman Siswa branches in Ketanggungan and Tanjung, and founded and led a branch of Partindo in Brebes. He left teaching for a time and went into business as a building contractor, then he started a timber firm which went bankrupt. In 1934 he took down the picture of Queen Wilhelmina, which was hanging in a village office where he was giving a course, and tore it up. He was summoned by the wedana and his house was searched. The authorities found an article by Kartohargo on the death (under suspicious circumstances) of a village vaccinator, written for the nationalist newspaper *Pemandangan* at a time when he also wrote articles for the progressive daily *Lokomotif* on improving the education of lurahs. The wedana detained Kartohargo for three months. In 1936 he returned to teaching, first at a private HIS in Randudongkal run by the nationalist PGB (Union of Teachers), then back in a Muhammadiyah HIS and Link School in Brebes, and HIS in Adiwerna. In 1939 he was working as head of the Durensawit (Balapulang) irrigation system, and founded a branch of the Union of Native Irrigation Works Employees. During the Japanese occupation he was Chairman of Putera, head of the Barisan Pelopor and also the Hokokai, was head of the local hamlet and neighbourhood association, and led a party of romushas to South Banten. In 1945 he was chairman of the Brebes KNI, chairman of the Brebes working committee, and on the information committee of the GBP3D. Arrested by the TKR in Brebes and one of six brought to trial in Pekalongan, he was released on 21 July 1947. After the Revolution he went back to schoolteaching and died in January 1973.

KROMO LAWI (Lawi Sumodiharjo) was born in Batang in 1900 and educated in a Second Class 'Native' School in Purworejo and HIS Pekalongan. He subsequently spent a year in the Forestry School in Sukabumi, then left and worked as an employee of the Semarang-Cirebon Railway Company in

Batang and Comal. In 1920 he entered the 'Native' Sailors' School in Makassar, and on graduating in May 1925 formed the 'Native' Sailors' League, one of whose aims was to campaign for increased pay for Indonesian sailors. Arrested with other members in November 1926 and accused of supporting the PKI revolt in Surabaya, Lawi was dismissed from the navy. In 1927 he founded a branch of the first PNI in Pekalongan, and joined the Muhammadiyah youth as a cover for his activities. In August 1929 he tried to set up a workers' union but was frustrated by police. In 1930 he was held in preventive detention. Later he became a troop leader of Hizbul Wathan, the Muhammadiyah scouts, also as a cover for nationalist activities. He disbanded the PNI in April 1931 and gave the party funds to Taman Siswa, but in June became the first chairman of Mr Sartono's new PNI, and was jailed again in 1934. Chairman of Pekalongan Gerindo, during the Japanese occupation he rose to prominence as head of Putera and the business section of the Jawa Hokokai, and was on the Residency advisory council. A member of the Pekalongan KNI, after the kenpeitai massacre he was arrested and accused of being a member of an ultra nationalist Japanese-sponsored Black Fan movement and jailed, but was later released through pressure from Sayuti Melik. Sent by Sayuti Melik to contact Tiga Daerah leaders, he was detained in Pemalang and taken to AMRI Slawi, where the army found him, accused him of joining the Tiga Daerah movement and jailed him until January 1947. In 1947 he was a member of the army's Struggle Bureau, and during the First Dutch Clash led the Barisan Banteng guerillas in Dieng plateau, as part of the TKR 17th Regiment. Accused of being pro-PKI at the time of the Madiun Affair, he was detained in Yogyakarta. After 1950 he returned to Pekalongan and led the PNI until after the 1955 general election.

MARSUM HARDJOPRAJITNO was born on 14 April 1914 in Kebumen, the son of the Lurah of Kedungwinangan. After finishing Schakelschool (Link School) in Jakarta, he went to a commercial school, later working in the government medical laboratory making vitamin tablets for a wage of 3 rupiahs per month. Wanting to be a journalist, he worked for a Jakarta news service and also for the newspaper *Pemandangan*. After a year he gave up the idea as 'too many of my stories were being rejected'. In Jakarta he was in the Indonesian Scouts, the KBI. In 1932 he joined the BPM and went on an oil exploration expedition to West Irian for two years. On his return he got a job as a medical orderly, and had the choice of working in Serang, Garut or Tegal. He chose Tegal because the pay was higher. In 1934 he was secretary of the Tegal branch of Partindo and then Gerindo. During the occupation he was a company leader in the Tegal Barisan Pelopor and, after the leadership reshuffle in September 1945, was a member of the five-man leadership council. For a time he was on the Tegal working committee but evaded capture by the TKR. In 1950 he joined the Tegal Municipal government and was later deputy head of its political section. In 1955 Marsum was secretary of the general election committee for Tegal municipality. He became Camat of Geringing in 1957, then Wedana of Wiradesa and retired in 1970. He died in 1976.

K. MIDJAJA (or Kamidjaja), whose real name was Sardjono, was born on 7 August 1909, the son of Sadiman Kromoredjo, a peasant in the hamlet of Bareng or Kauman, Garak subdistrict, Kartosuro, Solo. After finishing fifth class of village primary school in 1923 he was a train conductor engaged by a railway company in Semarang from 1926 to 1933 and was imprisoned for two years during this time after the 1926 revolt. He was on the executive of the Semarang branch of the PBKA (Railway Workers' Union) under Djoko-soedjono and in 1933 was dismissed by the railway company for engaging in PBKA-sponsored passive resistance against the order banning company employees from joining the PBKA. By 1935 he was on the executive committee of the PPBI (Union of Indonesian Unemployed Workers) also based in Solo. During the 1930s he often visited Comal (Pemalang) to build up contacts with local nationalists there, including Ibu Pri and her husband, the Pemalang Persi leader. From 1935 until 1941 Midjaja edited the newspaper *Mimbar Boeroeh* in Solo and was chairman of the Central Indonesian Labour Organisation. In 1939 he joined the Illegal PKI and was a Solo committee member of the Semarang based GASPI (Federation of Unions of Non-government Employees). From April 1942 until 1945 he was responsible for the activities of the underground PKI on Java's north coast, forming 'City Committees' in Brebes, Tegal, Pemalang and several subdistricts. In 1945 he coordinated the revolutionary struggle in Pekalongan Residency, was founder and chairman of the GBP3D and is generally considered as the mastermind behind the Tiga Daerah movement. Brought to trial in Pekalongan, he was released in October 1947 because of the first Dutch military action. During 1947-48 he was in the Information Bureau of SOBSI, was kidnapped by rival communist factions and imprisoned for three months as a follower of Widarta. In 1948-49 he was back in the Tiga Daerah, actively organising opposition to the Dutch there and in other places in Central and West Java. These groups came under the authority of the Central Committee of the PKI in October 1950. He was a member of the executive of the SBBT (Customs & Excise Employees Union) in 1950. In 1953 he travelled extensively in Sumatra and went to Makassar. In March 1954 he formed a union for government officials in Jakarta, and was also actively involved in setting up union branches within the Ministry of Finance and also, in 1958, the Department of Economic Affairs. He represented these ministries on important trade union bodies. On 10 February 1958 he was appointed a member of the National Front for the Liberation of West Irian. In May 1959 he went to China as a union delegate, visiting Peking, Hangchow, Wuhan, Nanking and Canton amongst other centres, travelling via Manila, Hong Kong, Bangkok and Singapore. In the early 1960s he wrote a thesis about the Tiga Daerah Affair for the Aliarcham Academy. On 24 May 1965 the government made Midjaja a Pioneer of Freedom (*Perintis Kemerdekaan*). After six months' detention in the Manggarai military police camp in the wake of the attempted coup of 30 September 1965, Midjaja died of a heart attack on 6 March 1966, the day of his release.

MUHAMAD NUH was born in Tegal and joined the PKI in 1925. On 17 November 1926 he was sentenced to four years' imprisonment in Pekalongan, Glodog and Pamekasan. In 1931 he was sent to Boven Digul, but

returned in 1935. Until 1942 he was engaged in what he himself described as 'subversive activities'. In 1942 he was arrested by the Japanese in Semarang for being part of the 'anti-fascist movement' and imprisoned in Jurnatan prison. After his release he was a company leader of the Tegal Barisan Pelopor and, as the result of a leadership reshuffle after the proclamation, he became chairman of the leadership council of the Barisan Pelopor, the largest struggle group in Tegal. He played a leading role in reforming the police in that municipality, was a member of the Tegal working committee and the GBP3D, and in charge of the General Affairs Section of the GBP3D secretariat. Arrested by the TKR he was one of the six to be tried in Pekalongan and was released on 18 July 1947. From then until 1949 he lived in Bandung, and in 1950 returned to Tegal where he worked at his trade as an optometrist and opened a teachers' training school, which he ran until 1956. He was not an active member of the PKI. From 1958 until his death he was head of the Tegal Branch of the Perintis Kemerdekaan (Pioneers of Freedom). In 1962 he wrote a series of articles about the Tiga Daerah Affair for the leftist historical journal, *Penelitian Sedjarah*. He was shot by Muslim elements on 9 January 1966 near Tegal, in the aftermath of the attempted coup of 30 September 1965.

IBU PRI, as she was known in Pemalang radical nationalist circles, or Mrs. Amir, does not know when she was born. Her father was a tailor in Comal market, and she had no Western schooling. In 1933, when she thinks she was 'about 15', Ibu Pri was attracted to the local nationalist movement after hearing the song *Indonesia Raya*, and joined the local Partindo although the minimum membership age was nineteen. 'I wanted to learn the song, which meant writing it down, which meant that I had to learn to write', she recalls. Soon after this while leading the singing of the song, she was arrested on the orders of the Wedana of Comal for breaking the prohibition on holding a public meeting. From then on she was harassed by the police and told to take her trade of dressmaking elsewhere. After 1935 Ibu Pri was active in local radical activities, building up revolutionary consciousness using the cover of a funeral association. For a time she was married to an activist in Pemalang's Persi, and later married Pemalang's senior pre-war nationalist Amir. During the Japanese occupation she took a political course organised by Putera, together with four other women and thirty-seven men. For some time she worked in Putera but left because 'she could not bear to see the suffering of the ordinary person in Jakarta'. The underground then put her in the women's section of the Jawa Hokokai with M. H. Lukman's younger sister Rollah. Bored with 'just playing with a telephone' and wanting 'to be in contact with the people', she was trained as a spinner and weaver then was sent by the underground to Indramayu in 1943, shortly after the uprising, to become a leader of the Jawa Hokokai there. After six months she was to be moved to Banten but Widarta wanted her to return to Comal. With Amir she built up contacts in the Pemalang Forestry Service to provide a base where the underground could send its fugitives. She also raised funds. After the proclamation Widarta sent her and Amir to East Java to try to secure the release of Amir Sjarifuddin, but the mission failed because all their belongings, including party mandates, were stolen. She returned to Jakarta then

went to Surabaya and attended an East Java Pesindo congress in Malang on 6 November, and the national Pesindo congress in Yogyakarta shortly afterwards. Later returning to Comal she helped to set up Pesindo women's groups during the Tiga Daerah Affair. Although interrogated by the TKR she was not imprisoned. After the thirty-two prisoners were moved to Yogyakarta in December 1946 she was instrumental in sending food parcels to them. She remained active in local politics until 1965.

SAKIRMAN was born in Prambanan, Yogyakarta, in 1906. After HIS he won a scholarship (of thirty guilders per month) to the Prinses Juliana School (PJS), an intermediate technical school in Yogyakarta. With other graduates of the PJS he worked at the Kebonan sugar mill and became Yogyakarta's first 'native' health inspector there. 'All his friends were Dutch', recalls his wife. After 1932 he moved to Pekalongan, where he worked under the Residency doctor who was Mr. Besar's brother. In 1936 he was appointed a health inspector at Moga (southern Pemalang), then moved to Slawi as Inspector of Housing in the government's plague eradication programme. Sakirman's brother, K. R. T. Prakosodiningrat, had the rank of a bupati in the government offices in Yogyakarta. Sakirman himself had a large *kris* collection and was a strong adherent of Japanese mysticism. From September to December 1945 he was leader of the militant AMRI Slawi, playing a key role in the planning of strategy to take over Tegal on 4 November which forced the remaining pangreh praja to resign. Both Sakirman and his wife were arrested by the army. According to one account his wife had a mental breakdown in prison. Later in the Revolution Sakirman was in the logistics section of the army in Yogyakarta. After the Revolution he worked in the water supply section of the city's public works department. He retired in 1962 and died on 'Hari Pesta Rakyat' (1 May) 1965.

SARDJIO (R. Sardjijo Kartodihardja) was born in the village of Bagelen, in the subdistrict of that name in Purworejo regency, in June 1909. He was one of four children of Raden Tjokrodirodo, an assistant lurah of Bedug, whose genealogy showed him to be a seventh generation descendant of Sultan Amangkurat II's son-in-law, R. Adipati Danuredjo. Sardjio attended HIS in nearby Kutoarjo and finished intermediate school in Purwokerto in 1927. He then studied modern foreign languages (English, German and French) for two years at the nationalist Volks Universiteit at Gang Kenari 15 in Jakarta. For a time he worked in a government travel office, then for Harrison and Crossfield, a British tobacco company. He was an important figure in the Purworejo nationalist movement before the war, and a member of the local PNI Baru. In 1933 he was sentenced to a week's jail for holding a party meeting 'without permission' and later banned from teaching in a local private school. In 1941 he was elected as a member of the Purworejo Regency Council as a non-party member. After the Japanese arrived he was again an elected member of the Kedu Residency Advisory Council and later chosen as Kedu Residency's representative on the Central Advisory Council in Jakarta. Later in the occupation he joined the underground PKI. The combination of cooperation with the Japanese and membership of a united front against fascism did not seem to be a matter of controversy amongst the

PKI faithful at the time. Arrested early in 1945 by the *kenpeitai* he was sentenced to thirteen years' imprisonment. His brother Soekarto, arrested at the same time, died in Magelang jail as a result of *kenpeitai* torture. After his release from Ambarawa prison in mid September 1946, Sardjio was active in Purworejo, forming a branch of Amir Sjarifuddin's *Parsi* there in November. Early in December he went to Pekalongan at the request of the GBP3D and was Resident for four days, from 12-15 December, before being arrested with other Tiga Daerah people. Released in early 1947, he joined the Army's Struggle Bureau with the rank of Lieutenant Colonel and was then a member of the *TNI Masyarakat* (People's TNI) under leftist Djokosoejono. On 21 December 1948 he was accused of being a supporter of the Madiun Affair and, as head of the local People's Democratic Front, was executed near Bagelen.

SARIMIN REKSODIHARDJO was born on 17 July 1905 in Kalidesel village on the Dieng plateau. After HIS in Wonosobo he entered Osvia in Magelang in 1917, graduating with a diploma, and joined the Interior Administration in south Central Java in 1924. In 1930 he moved to the regency of Kendal, west of Semarang, and was surprised to find that the *sembah* (gesture of obeisance to the bupati made with hands held before the face, performed squatting) was 'still the custom' on the north coast. The Dutch Resident of Banyumas had already abolished the practice. In 1931 Sarimin attended the *Bestuurs-school* (Administration School) and was then appointed *camat* in Weluri at the age of 21. In 1938 he went to the *Bestuursacademie* (Administration College), from which he graduated in 1941. During the Japanese occupation he was promoted from *wedana* to bupati in eighteen months. Kidnapped during the Tiga Daerah Movement, he rejoined the civil service in the Ministry of Home Affairs in March 1946, later heading its Agrarian Department. He was Governor of the Province of Nusa Tenggara (or Sunda Kecil as it was then called) from 1952-57.

SOENARTO was born in Ketanggungan West about 1913, the son of a clerk in the local sugar mill. After HIS in Brebes and MULO in Cirebon, the Dutch sugar mill administrator offered him a position at the mill, which he refused because of the long hours. Dismissed from the Jakarta Residency office for passing on classified information to HIPA, a news service run by a former Digul exile, he had various jobs before joining the nationalist movement. For a while he sold the newspaper *Daolat Rakjat* for Mohammad Bondan, and later enrolled in courses in the PNI Baru school, Taman Kemajuan, where he later taught. When the Political Intelligence Service threatened that his father, now a village secretary, would lose his job unless Soenarto left Jakarta, he went to Cirebon and taught in a school run by PNI Baru leader Sugra at Walet. He became a committee member of the Cirebon branch of the PNI Baru, and helped Sugra form the KRI (Indonesian People's Cooperative). During the Japanese occupation Soenarto, like Sugra, used the KRI as a front for underground activities. In 1945 he led the revolutionary movement in Tanjung and was a member of the Brebes working committee and the GBP3D. He evaded arrest by the army, and after the Revolution worked in the Jakarta municipality information office.

SOEPANGAT was born in Banyumas in 1903 and worked in Semarang and Ambarawa before coming to Pemalang after 1936 as a medical orderly. His skills soon became well known in the small town. During the Japanese occupation he earned a reputation for honesty as the leading figure in Pekope, which distributed supplies of scarce basic commodities and which ran the popular Fuji restaurant where good cheap food could be obtained. An excellent public speaker, after the proclamation he was popular with younger pemuda figures and older radicals alike because of his combination of tactful flexibility and revolutionary spirit. A leader of Pemalang's API, he became something of a local hero after his kidnapping by pangreh praja-TKR elements. He was chosen by popular acclaim as Bupati of Pemalang, and was a 'unifier' of the regency's revolutionary movement, including the lenggaongs who all followed his leadership. He escaped from Pemalang when the TKR occupied the town, later arrived in Pekalongan with the Presidential entourage, was seized in front of the official party at a meeting in the Pekalongan regency *pendopo*, and thrown into jail by the army. In 1948 after his release in early 1947, he became an official in Supeno's Ministry of Youth and Development. He was not a member of any political party after the revolution and died from hepatitis in Ambarawa in December 1958.

SOESMONO was born on 3 July 1913 at Subah (Batang), the fifth of eight children of an official of the local People's Credit Bank. In 1929 he finished HHS in Batang, but for financial reasons the family was not able to educate him any further. He worked in a bank in Brebes, then in Cirebon, and in 1938 became a clerk in Tegal regency. It was in this period that he first became interested in nationalism through Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo, the PNI Baru leader who was living in Tegal in this period and whose sister Soesmono married. During the Japanese occupation he travelled widely all over the regency because of his membership of the BP2 and BP3 and became well known. Early in 1945 he was a member of the Nine Brothers. He became deputy Chairman of the Tegal regency KNI, and was on the information committee of the GBP3D. He joined Sardjio's transfer staff in Pekalongan, was arrested by the TKR and released on 15 August 1946. In 1947 he formed a branch of the Plebiscite Movement in Tegal with Dr. R. V. Sudjito, in 1948 was in Jakarta and in 1949 returned to Tegal as a liaison officer between the republicans in Dutch-occupied Tegal and the TNI to the south. In 1950 he moved to the governor's office in Semarang at the request of the Minister of Home Affairs to work on the Darul Islam/Tentara Islam Indonesia movement in Banyumas and Pekalongan Residencies. He retired in December 1969.

SOEWIGNJO was born on 19 March 1906 at Bobotsari, Purbolinggo, the son of M. Wirja Atmadja, who later moved to Comal as head of its Second Class 'Native' School. After completing HIS in Pemalang in 1920 he sat for the petty officials' examination (the qualification for lower levels of government employment), but decided to join the Semarang-Cirebon Railway Company instead and worked as a station clerk in Comal. A local member of the Railways Employees' Union, and leader of the Comal section of the

Pekalongan PKI branch, he disobeyed the order to revolt on 13 November 1926 'because the Pekalongan party leadership had been infiltrated by the Dutch'. Sentenced to four and a half years' imprisonment in Pamekasan and Glodok, he was exiled to Boven Digul in West New Guinea in 1929 but was allowed to return in 1932. Unemployed until 1935, he then got a job in the Residency Finance Department and in 1938 was appointed a tax inspector in Slawi. When the Japanese arrived he left Slawi to live for a time in a village in southern Pemalang, and did not work for the Japanese. In 1945 he founded AMRI in Slawi with Sakirman and in November became Chairman of the Tegal working committee and a member of the GBP3D. Imprisoned by the army, he was one of the six brought to trial in March 1947, but was released on 18 July. He was evacuated with other Republicans, losing all his books when the Dutch occupied Slawi. Later he was a titular major in the Republican Military headquarters in Yogyakarta and after the second Dutch military action in December 1948 moved to a base at Sleman. After 1950 he was not active in politics and worked as an official of the Ministry of Education and Culture in Jakarta, retiring in 1970.

WADYONO was the son of a wedana, and it was intended that he follow in his father's footsteps. He entered Mosvia in Magelang in 1934. A graduate with a diploma he worked as an official of the Interior Administration in Banyumas Residency, also doing a stint as a police officer under Kartini's son, Susalit, who at that time was head of Purwokerto's Political Intelligence Service. By the time the Japanese had arrived, Wadyono was Camat of Tonjong, Brebes. Sensing the growing unpopularity of the pangreh praja he left Tonjong in 1943, and joined Peta as a company commander in the Pekalongan battalion under K. H. Iskandar Idris. After Peta was disbanded he was for a time police detachment commander at Margasari, but decided against a police career and joined the BKR in Brebes. He joined the new TKR 17th Regiment in Pekalongan as head of general affairs, and became acting commander after Iskandar Idris was captured and taken to Slawi on 3 November 1945. He helped plan the TKR counter-revolution against the Tiga Daerah, and soon after became the regiment commander. After the First Dutch Clash he evacuated with the regiment to Wonosobo, and rose to be Chief of Staff of Diponegoro Division based in Wonosobo for several months in late 1948. Leaving the army after the revolution, he nearly returned to the civil service in 1951 as secretary to the Governor of Central Java, Boediono, 'but I wasn't considered PSI-ish enough'. He became a businessman in Semarang and is chairman of the Central Java branch of the Indonesian Red Cross.

WIDARTA, whose full name was Subandi Widarta (known as 'Bandi' to his friends) was born about 1913 in Kediri. He was a member of the Surabaya branch of SPI (Torch of Indonesian Youth) which was led by his older brother Tasmidjan from its foundation in 1933; Widarta was also active in the KBI. After Musso's visit to Surabaya he was selected to be sent out of Java to a place of his choice by the Illegal PKI to gain experience in the labour movement. He chose Sumatra, and left for Palembang in mid 1936. There he worked in the Batavia Oil Company's Plaju refinery at Lubuklinggo,

founded a union and organised a strike over the appalling working conditions. Placed under house arrest for three months, he escaped and went to Sambu Island to the company's distillation plant. The Dutch had censored letters between Widarta and Tasnidjan, who was now active in Gerindo in Surabaya. After the Dutch learned Widarta was in Sambu, they gave him twelve hours to leave the island. He returned to Surabaya via Jakarta and was put directly under the guidance of Pamoedji and in charge of the party's activities in Central Java. He wrote for a Semarang newspaper *Pesat*, edited by Sayuti Melik during this time. After the Japanese had arrested the leaders of the Illegal PKI, including Pamoedji, in mid 1942, Widarta took over the leadership and directed underground activities throughout the occupation. He helped spread the news of the proclamation from Jakarta to the regional areas, was active in Pemalang during the Tiga Daerah Affair as the representative of the Minister of Information, Mr. Amir Sjarifuddin, and was arrested by the TKR on 23 December 1945. While in prison he joined with other radicals in signing a declaration opposing the Republican-Dutch Linggajati Agreement. Released in April 1947 he asked, with other Tiga Daerah leaders, for a party congress to resolve internal disagreements. He was kidnapped with K. Midjaja and others, and accused of causing friction within the party over his opposition to Linggajati, and for not correctly following the United Front line in the Tiga Daerah. This had led to conflict with the army. He and other underground PKI members from the Tiga Daerah were 'tried' by an intra-party committee (set up on the authority of Amir Sjarifuddin) which sentenced Widarta and three others to death, the order being signed by Sudisman. Widarta was taken to Madiun by Fatkur Hadi and Tjugito, and later shot at Parangtritis beach, south of Yogyakarta. Because many of Widarta's judges and executioners later became leaders of the large PKI of 1948, and because Musso condemned the execution on his return to Indonesia, the PKI for many years kept silent about the underground and Widarta's role in the Tiga Daerah Affair, leading people to believe that it never existed.

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proces-verbaal of Tiga Daerah revolutionaries;

minutes of the GBP3D meeting of 25 November 1945;

written answers to Pekalongan Public Prosecutor.

2. *Archive of the former Ministry of Colonies* including:

Secret Mail Reports, 1926-1932, from Dutch Residents;

Memoric van Overgave (hereafter M. v. O.), handover reports by senior Dutch officials including J. E. Jasper, J. J. M. A. Popelier, J. C. Brinks, and P. J. van Gulik.

B. Australia

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dated 1944-46 in CRS A1067 Item P1/46/2/7/1. They include reports from former Dutch colonial official Ch. O. van der Plas.

C. Indonesia

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Index

- Abdul Gafi, K. H., 219
 Abdul Mutholib, 45, 88, 168, 220
 Abdulmadjid, 237
 Abu Bakar, R. M., 175
 Abu Sudja'i, K. H., 18, 69, 111,
 180, 195, 200, 228, 270
 Aceh, 250
 Adiwerna, 2, 6, 8, 15, 16, 35, 106,
 114, 134, 138, 172, 173, 175, 180,
 201, 222; Camat of, 114, 135;
 Wedana of, 15, 16, 115, 201
 agriculture, 1, 3
 Agus Salim, Haji, 9
 Ali Murtopo, Lieut-Gen., 227,
 232n39
 Ali Warto, 125
 Alimin, 20, 190
 allied invasion, 63, 69
 Allies, 68, 74, 75, 79, 95, 181, 190,
 194, 203, 206
 Ambarawa, 206, 234
 Ambonese, 253; violence against,
 137ff.
 Ambowetan, 46, 47, 48, 122
 Amir Sjarifuddin, 56, 187, 190-4,
 202, 226, 237, 242, 258
 Amir, 57, 58, 87, 127, 160, 161,
 191-3, 195, 240, 244, 270-1
 Ampelgading, 37, 41, 49
 AMRI, 70, 78, 107, 139, 182, 224
 AMRI Slawi, 88, 107, 166, 170-2,
 174, 177, 178, 179, 193, 194, 197,
 200, 204
 AMRI-I, 182, 183
 API, 70, 87, 88, 92, 135, 139, 140,
 170, 174, 192, 221; &
 revolutionary plays, 151
 API-BKR, 171
 API-PRI, 193, 203
 API-TKR, 172
 Arabs, 2, 3, 7, 42, 87
 Arab moneylenders, 3, 7, 21, 74,
 251
 Arab pemudas, 169
 Badrun, K., 140
 Balamoa, 110, 172
 Balapulang, 124, 126, 137, 140-1,
 172, 221
 Bandung, 35, 56, 60, 221
 Bangle village, 15
 Banjaratma, sugar mill, 30, 84, 182
 Banjardawa, 160
 Banjarharjo, 2, 39, 74, 75
 Banten, 5, 35, 43, 77, 104, 250-2,
 254-5, 257-8, 259
 Banyumas Residency, 75, 77, 95,
 98
 Barisan Cengkrong (Sickle Corps),
 105-106

- Barison Pelopor, 61-2, 67, 80, 90, 136, 177, 244; Tegal, 37, 61-4, 66, 70, 79, 83ff., 90, 134, 136, 141, 170, 173-4, 177, 221, 244
- Basiroen, Raden Bambang, 49
- Batang, 1, 2, 7, 17, 205
- Batavian Oil Company, 27, 56
- Baurekso, 147, 148
- Belik, 12, 33, 39-40, 124; Wedana of, 39, 112, 119, 199
- Besar, Mr. Martokoesoemo, 72, 74ff., 96, 99n15, 115, 125, 133ff., 141, 142, 170-1, 172, 175, 177, 178-9, 186, 195, 202, 271
- Bisri, K., 178
- BKR (People's Security Force), 89, 92, 97, 98, 113, 135, 166, 170, 194, 221ff.
- BKR, 'clandestine', 182
- BKR-TKR Brebes, 182
- black market, 33, 46
- Boven Digul, 15, 18, 25n67, 62, 63, 69, 98n9, 170, 178, 244; ex-Digulists, 190, 191, 194, 202
- BP-KNIP (Badan Pekerja), 194, 243
- BP2 (Soldier's Relief Organisation), 103, 220
- BP3, 42, 61
- BPKKP, 221
- BPRI, 206
- Brebes, 1, 2, 18, 21, 35, 41, 44, 48, 49, 62, 83-5, 115, 116, 135, 166, 180, 186, 196, 197, 227, 254
- British landings, 138, 139, 211, 186, 234
- Budi Oetomo (High Endeavour), 17
- Budisutjitro, 195
- Bumiayu, 2, 3, 17, 124, 137, 138
- Bumijawa, 33-4, 50, 126, 138
- Bumirejo, 120, 122
- Bung Kecil, 55, 58, 190, 191, 193, 238
- Bunyamin, 122
- bureaucratic elite, see officials, pangreh praja
- Candi Mandireja, 147
- central government, 186, 194, 238, 259; and regions, 112
- Central Java, 16, 56, 57, 59, 137, 186, 210, 234
- Cerih, 104, 111
- Chatib, K., 255
- Chinese community, 7, 28, 79, 83-6, 87, 112, 166, 182, 253, 254; merchants, 2, 3, 28, 30-1, 46, 74, 111, 196; hostility to, 79, 83-4, 106, 113, 142; nationalists, 63, 85-7, 203
- Chinese Youth Irregulars (Laskar Pemuda Tionghoa), 86-7
- Cirebon, 14, 62, 235, 256
- Civil Air Defence Corps, 28
- cloth, distribution, 39-40, 46, 87, 156, 109-110, 125
- cloth, rationing, 30, 38-40
- Coert, A. R., 72
- Comal Baru, 44, 58
- Comal, 1, 3, 20, 40, 43, 59, 88, 125, 142, 227
- commerce, 2
- communications, 166, 185, 235
- Communism, 14, 55ff., 191
- communist rebellion of, 1926, 3, 13, 57, 62, 160, 193, 256
- communists, 191, 237, 245, 255, 258, 259; see also PKI
- cooperatives, see also Pekope
- cooperatives, 45, 46, 62-3, 88, 89, 196, 203
- corvee, 14, 40, 251
- Cultivation System, 3
- Darwis Djarmin, 223, 224
- democratisation, 193ff.
- Depression, 7, 8, 10-11, 140
- Dewantara, Ki Hajar, 18
- Digul, see Boven Digul
- Diponegoro, 147
- Djatikusumo, 222, 224
- Djoeweni Wimbohandoko, 174
- Djoewito, 167
- Djohan Sjahroezah, 235

- Djokosoejono, General, 222,
231n19, 259
Djono 'Bungkuk', 58
Doer jatman, K. H., 218, 221, 222
dombreng, 104-5, 109, 111, 112,
115, 119, 151, 155, 252
Dukuhturi, 173
Dukulwringin, 44, 139
Dulgani, Haji, 50, 147
Dutch East Indies Company, 3,
12-13, 27, 151

East Java, 46, 55, 56, 57
East Sumatra, 253-5
Economic Affairs Department, 33,
49
economic affairs, 196, 203
education, 3, 14, 18, 60; see also
HIS
elite, Javanese, 3-4, 13
ERRI, 256
Ethical Policy, 4, 14
Eurasians, 3, 109, 135, 166, 253;
actions against, 84, 137ff., 159,
171, 179, 182, 184
Executioners Brigade, 204

Fachruri, K., 113
Faithful Hearts Fellowship, 15
famine, 12, 103, 251, 252
flag, actions, 18, 67, 71, 75ff., 93ff.,
135, 159, 181, 244
food distribution, 114, 203
Forestry Department, 57-9;
forestry settlement & revolution,
2, 14, 42-3, 58, 193; Sukowati,
35, 44, 57, 58, 126, 190, 192
Fuji restaurant, 45, 58
Fujinkai, 37, 220

Gatot Subroto, 222
GBP3D, 201, 202ff., 234, 236, 255,
258
Gentoloto Nayo Genggong, 19, 180
Gerindo, 17, 55, 62, 69
Gill, Henry, 140
GPAI (Indonesian Arab Youth
Movement), 169
GPII, 201
graves, sacred, 19, 105, 114, 147
Gunodo Surio, 116

haji, 2, 7
Hardjowijono, R. M., 104
Harso, 78
Hatta, Mohammad, 50, 8, 74, 75,
135, 186, 197, 226, 242
Heiho (Indonesian Auxiliary
Forces), 31, 61, 171, 212, 221
HIS (Dutch-language primary
school), 14, 18, 60, 125
Hizbullah, 99n10, 119, 135, 169,
227
Hok Lian, 106
Hokokai, 80
Holle, K., 44, 57, 58-60, 271-2

Iksan, H., 174, 188n26
Illegal PKI, 55, 58, 191, 193, 237,
256
Indonesia Muda (Young
Indonesia), 17, 18, 60, 61, 69,
159
Indonesian Railway Workers'
Union (VSTP), 14
Indonesian Workers' League, 206
Institute of Labour Affairs, 42
Intermediate Navigation School,
223
irrigation, 2-6, 11
irrigation, tax, 5-6
Iskandar Idris, 102n84, 105, 178,
179, 201, 212-3, 218, 222, 225,
227, 229-30, 272
Iskaq Tjokroadisoerjo, Mr., 76, 77,
95, 97
Islam and communism, 170, 211
Islamic nationalists, 16, 17, 90, 116,
118, 201, 202, 229, 255, 260
Islamic Study Club, 17, 61
Islamic Union, 180
Ismail Hassan, 212-3, 225, 227
Ismono Sosrohadosoerjo, 69, 99n13

- Jakarta, 46, 56, 62, 63, 67, 70, 73, 76, 95, 185, 245
janur kuning, 110, 156-7, 174, 227
 Japanese attitudes to, 49, 58-64; 93ff.; economic policies, 29ff., 41, 63, 76, 115, 125, 203; occupation, 17, 27ff., 244, 251; officials, 48-40, 49, 52n9, 78; 16th Army, 29, 31, 44; surrender, 66ff., 244; police, see *kenpeitai*
 Jatibarang, 136, 153, 182
 Java Textile Company, Tegal mill, 39, 40
 Jawa Hokokai, 72, 73, 90, 228
 JIB (Muslim Youth Group), 61
 Joyoboyo prophecies, 150, 184
 Just King (Ratu Adil), 86, 148-9, 156
 Jusuf, Lieut., 223
- Kadarisman Soerodiwiryo, 82, 272-3
 Kajen, 109-110
 Karangcegak, 5, 15, 110, 172
 Kardinah, 12, 24n51, 175, 225
 Karioatmodjo, S., 239, 241
 Karso, 70, 87
 Karta, 63
 Kartini, Raden Ajeng, 12
 Karto, Katul, 123-4
 Kartohargo, 43, 69, 73, 89, 160, 182-3, 195-7, 206-7, 228, 240, 273
 Kasman Singodimejo, 193, 242
 KBI, 18, 61, 69
 Kebasen, 119
 Kedu, 43
 Keibodan (Vigilance Corps), 42; Pemalang, 86
 Kejambon, 61
 Kemantran, 173, 220, 221
 Kendal regency, 81
 kenpeitai, 44-5, 47-8, 57, 59, 66, 71, 73, 76, 90, 93ff., 109, 221, actions against, 135ff.
 Ketanggungan West, 18, 48, 94, 116, 194, 195; Pesindo, 70; sugar mill, 74, 95
 kinro hoshi, see labour Klampok, 196
 KNI, 67, 71, 77-80, 89ff., 109-110, 113, 118, 123, 124, 128, 160, 221, 244; Brebes, 183; Tegal, 95, 169, 170ff., 197
 KNIL (Royal Netherlands Indies Army), 139
 KNIP, 176, 194, 235, 258
 Kopi, 45, 220
 Kramat, Camat of, 174, 175
 Krasak village, 122-3
 KRI (Indonesian People's Cooperative), 62
 KRIS (Service of the Indonesian People of Slawi), 70
 Kromo Lawi, 16-17, 43, 69, 72, 73, 77, 169, 228-9, 273-4
 Kubota, 59
 Kutil, 107ff., 136, 154, 156, 157, 161, 172, 174, 178, 180, 199-200, 227, 240, 245-6, 253
 kyais, 3, 9, 110, 118, 255, 259; & rituals, 20
- labour service, 4, 5, 9; forced (romusha), 14-15, 38, 41
 labour, voluntary, (kinro hoshi), 31, 41ff.
 language and revolution, 152-4, 157; and social class, 138
 Lasem, 58
 law and order, breakdown, 28-29
 Lebaksiu, 112-13, 123
 Lemahduwur, 114
 lenggaongs, 19-21, 63, 83, 105ff., 120-2, 125-6, 182, 192, 252, 254; and spiritual power, 105-06, 146ff.
 Losari subdistrict, 2, 41, 116
 Lukman, M. H., 99n10
 lurah, 2ff., 40, 46ff., 103, 104; and peasants, 4-5, 9, 44, 123-4, 127-8; see also officials, village
- Madiun Affair, 229
 Maeda, Admiral, 73, 99n18

- magico-religious beliefs, 20, 105,
110, 122, 147, 227
- Makdum, K., 110
- Makmur, K. H., 229
- Maksum, 153-4, 164n29, 183, 186,
195, 212
- malnutrition, 12, 37, 44, 125
- Mandireja, 111, 147; sacred kris of,
111
- Mansur, 140
- Mao Zhe-dung, 204, 242
- Mardi Oetomo (Excellent
Community), 12
- Mardjono, 110, 174
- Margasari, 35, 37
- Marsum, 66, 69, 198, 274
- Marxists, 62, 63, 201, 244, 255,
256, 257
- Masjumi, 99n10, 196, 197, 201
- Mbah Tapa, 167, 168
- McKenzie, W. O., 142, 144n31
- Menadonese, 112, 137ff., 253
- Menteng, 31, 67
- messianism, 148-9
- Midjaja, K., 58, 119, 153, 161, 177,
178, 187, 191-5, 197-8, 200, 202,
205ff., 225, 236, 240-1, 255, 256,
258, 275
- Misbah, Kyai, 69, 99n10
- Miyamoto, 31, 43, 44
- Moechlis, 226
- Moeklas, Haji, 69, 99n10
- Moerjawan, Dr., 51, 86, 127, 170
- Moertolo, 239
- Moga, 12, 86, 103, 111-12, 126.
Camat of, 147
- Mohamad Jusuf, 204, 256
- Mohamad Saleh, 195, 198
- Mohamad Iljas, K. H., 171, 228
- moneylending and usury, 2-3, 10;
see also Arabs
- Mosvia, 135, 239; see also Osvia
- Muchsan, 182, 183
- Muhamad Nuh, 62, 69, 89, 134,
160, 183, 195, 198, 211-2, 225,
240, 276
- Muhammad Jusuf, 18, 26n78
- Muhammadiyah, 2, 17, 18, 45, 124,
206, 212, 218-9
- Municipal Defence Unit Tegal, 28
- Murad, 235
- Muroso, 212, 235, 236
- Muslim (see also Islam); elite, 3,
126, 128; leaders, 14, 50-1, 74,
113-4, 116, 122; leftists, 69, 105;
orthodox, 171, 197; political
activity, 17, 70; post-revolution,
118-9, 201-2; and revolutionary
groups, 168-70, 280-2, 210-13,
229-30, 255; see also
Muhammadiyah, NU.
- Muslim Teachers' Insurgence
Corps, 206
- Muslims and TKR, 225
- Musso, 55, 190, 191, 256, 257
- Mustapha, S., 57, 191, 192, 238
- nasi ponggol*, 42, 88, 159
- national committees, 89ff.
- Natsir, 168, 218
- Naval TKR, 223, 259
- navy, 200, 223-4, 260
- NICA, 95, 107, 108, 115, 138, 203,
204, 205, 235, 241, 253; 'agents',
239, 243; NICA, feelings against,
133ff., 159, 182
- Nine Brothers, 60, 61, 63-4, 67, 69,
72, 77, 80, 82, 90, 170, 181, 259
- noji padi*, 33, 47, 122, 125
- Nonaka, Capt, 97
- NU, 2, 18
- Oerip, 70, 87, 99n14
- Oerip, Sumohardjo, General, 222
- Office Youth (Angkatan Muda
Kantor), Pemalang, 160
- officials, 2, 27, 103, 210; defined,
21n1; interned, 167ff., 179, 193;
Japanese, 68; Japanese
appointed, 27, 40, 106; killed,
114-5; and peasants, 49-51, 55,
72, 76, 81-3; village, 34, 36-7,
121-6, 131n44, 210; selection,
118-9, 181, 193, 196
- Oka, Captain, 76, 97, 100n85
- opposition groups, 55ff.; see also

- PKI, Nine Brothers, Islamic Study Group, Barisan Pelopor Osvia, 71, 135; see also Mosvia Overseas Chinese Association (Kai Kuo Sho Kai), 86
- P4, 238, 243
- Pacul village, 19
- Padang, 17
- Padurekso forestry plantation, 192
- Pagongan sugar mill, 15, 109, 180
- Pamocdji, 55, 237
- Pangkah, 8, 30, 37, 41, 91, 118, 140, 180, 183
- pangreh praja, 4-7, 10, 11-13, 28-30, 67-8, 71ff., 115, 120, 127, 162, 170, 183-4, 205, 228, 260; and army; 219; conference, 75-6; corruption, 46-7; hostility towards, 49, 51, 175ff.; interned, 175, 193; and Japanese, 27-30, 35, 38ff., 76; and lenggaongs, 20; and nationalists, 72ff., 88ff.; and peasants, 3ff., 14, 27, 30, 46-7, 49-51, 112, 251; protests, 9, 14-15, 49-51; response to proclamation, 67-77; struggle group, 88; tax collection, 11; and social revolution, 103ff., 241; see also labour, pangreh praja
- Parindra, 17
- Parsi, 70, 197, 202, 205
- Parti Sosialis, 235
- Partindo, 17, 18, 69
- Pasarbatang, 182
- peasants, 3, 8-10, 48ff., 32, 112, 210
- Pekajangan, 2, 3, 17-18, 95, 124, 141, 206, 227, 230, 237, 238, 245, 254, 258
- Pekalongan 1, 5-6, 14, 15, 27, 28, 35, 43, 133; municipality, 1, 16, 77, 95-7, 208ff.; Bupati of, 29; Resident of, 15, 195ff., 238ff., 202, 234-5, 237 (see also Mr. Besar); Wedana of, 72, 97
- Pekope (War Victims' Helpers), 45, 169-70
- Pemalang, 2, 12, 17, 33, 35, 40, 42, 43, 45-7, 57-60, 71, 85-6, 95, 111, 116, 124, 128, 141-2, 167-70, 167ff., 190-3, 204, 210, 227, 235
- Pemalang regency, 1, 2, 10, 18, 21; Bupati of, 160; popular front conference, 206ff.; revolution in, 85-89; Wedana of, 28, 167; see also PKI underground
- pemuda, 70, 75-9, 83ff., 93, 95ff., 157, 159-61, 167, 192, 207-8
- Pemuda Istimewa, Adiwerna, 172, 173, 178, 200
- Pemuda Permi, Pekalongan, 159
- People's Credit Bank, 7, 10, 109
- Perhimpunan Indonesia, 26n78, 237
- Perpri, 69
- Persi (Indonesia Drivers' Union), 18
- Pesindo, 70, 115, 128, 155, 156, 160, 191, 210, 226, 235, 236, 237, 243
- Peta, 29, 31, 57, 61, 88, 171, 212, 218ff., 257
- Petarukan, 50, 105-106, 125, 134
- Piroekocnan (Harmony), 11
- PKI, 14-15, 16, 45, 55ff., 67, 69, 86, 118, 162, 169, 190, 200, 237, 244, 256; PKI underground, 56-64, 87, 190-2, 256; see also Illegal PKI
- PKN (State Security Guard), 136-7
- PKO, 124
- plague, 12; Eradication Programme, 17, 92, 180
- plays, revolutionary, 87, 151-2
- PNI, 2, 16-17, 69
- PNI Baru, 16, 60, 62, 69, 83, 197, 202, 258
- PNI-Staatspartij, 176, 191, 194
- pokrol bambu*, 19, 20-1, 175
- police, 9, 15, 18, 122, 155, 180, 252; Dutch, 28; feelings against, 135-6; secret funds, 11
- political trials, 239ff., 245
- political detentions, 234ff.
- political intelligence service, 16, 17, 61, 69, 80, 85
- population, of Pekalongan

- Residency, 1ff.; birth rates, 2
 Potsdam Declaration, 67-8
 PPKI, 193, 194
 presidential tour, Dec. 1945, 101,
 178-9, 226, 230, 235ff., 253
 Pri, Ibu, 58, 59, 210, 276-7
 PRI, 192
 priyayi, 2, 14, 45, 145ff., 161-2,
 251; and spiritual power, 137-8;
 violence against, 167; see also
 officials, pangreh praja
 Proclamation of Independence,
 66ff., 135, 174, 182, 190, 220,
 228, 243
 proclamations by Mr. Besar, 133-7
 PSII, 17, 18, 69, 116, 180
 Pulosari, 12, 124
 Purwokerto, 94, 95, 221, 228
 Purworejo, 243
 Putera, 43, 72, 228
- Rahardyo Sosro Adikoesoemo,
 R. T., 91, 167
 railway workers, 67, 93, 96; Union
 (VSTP), 200
 railways, 9, 67, 166, 223
 Ramlas, 228
 Randudongkal, 40, 70, 106, 170
 rationing, 30, 34-41, 112
 Ratu Adil, see Just King
 Red and White (Merah Putih),
 77, 78, 85, 86-7, 91, 93, 94, 106,
 159, 244, 254; see flag incidents
 Reksonegoro family, 12, 114
 Reksonegoro X, R.M.A.A., 12
 Reksonegoro XI, 12-13, 99n15
 revolutionary spirit, 157-161
 rice collection, 30ff., 47, 125, 126,
 251; delivery system, 46-7, 49;
 distribution, 78, 103, 111-3, 116,
 122, 251; policy, 31ff.;
 production, 2-4, 14, 106; see also
 tanah bengkok
 romusha, 30, 31, 41-45, 51, 58-9,
 124, 175, 252; see labour, forced
 Rosihan Anwar, 241
 Rukun Tani (Peasants'
 Association), 106
 Rustmadji, 160, 167, 240
- Saburo Tamuro, 97
 Sachjani, see Kutil
 Sahid, 127
 Said, K., 111
 Sakirman, 99n10, 153, 172, 173,
 193, 239, 240, 277
 Salem, 63
sama rasa sama rata, 156, 260
 Saminist movement, 5, 152
 santris, 87, 70, 75, 108, 122, 125,
 127, 211, 218
 Sardjo, 153, 161, 202, 205, 207-3,
 218, 224-6, 230, 234-5, 236, 238,
 240-4, 277-8
 Sardjono, 190, 244
 Sarekat Islam (Islamic Union), 7,
 9, 11-14, 85, 140, 150, 152,
 154-5, 162, 180, 202; and rituals,
 148
 Sarekat Rakyat, 5, 14, 15, 20, 69,
 105, 118, 120, 122, 128, 148, 156,
 160, 170, 191, 201
 Sarimin Reksodihardjo, Bupati of
 Brebes, 67-8, 71ff., 181, 184-5,
 228, 278
 Sarino Mangunpranoto, 2, 18,
 22n5, 45, 88
 Sarli, 69, 77
 Sayuti Melik, 56, 64n6, 176ff., 187,
 195-6, 203, 205-6, 222, 228-9,
 242, 256, 258
 Seinendan (Youth Corps), 37, 43,
 46, 48, 49, 61, 171
 Semarang, 15, 55, 67, 81, 96, 176,
 180, 186, 205, 211, 223-5, 234,
 245
 ship building under Japanese, 43-5
 Sidik Arselan, 131n32, 140, 238
 Sigesang, Candi, 147
 Sihombing, 84
silat, 20, 147, 148
 Singgih Harsojo, Camat of Moga,
 111, 130n22
 Sismadi, 195, 202
 Siwad, 120, 122
 Sjahrir, 61, 63, 131n30, 156, 194,
 206, 226, 235-7, 242, 245
 Sjamsuri, H., 172, 173
 Sjirrat, K. H., 206

- Slamet, 69, 98n9, 115, 160, 194
 Slawi, 8, 35, 44-5, 70, 107, 113,
 137-140, 173, 180, 200, 210
 Socialist Party, 244, 245
 Soebadio Sastrosatomo, 235
 Soebagio Mangoenrahardjo, 60, 61,
 130n30, 177, 197, 222, 258
 Soedharmo, 179, 189n44, 225,
 231n16, 245
 Soedjono, 50n1, 177
 Soedgijono, 226-7
 Soegra, 62
 Soehardjo, 211
 Sochodo Gondosamito, R. M.,
 112-14
 Soelaiman Soetopratiwo, 69, 98n9,
 198, 199, 209
 Soemakno, Dr., 97
 Soemargo, 160
 Soemarno, 82, 198
 Soembadji, 171
 Soemitro Kolopaking, 238
 Soempeno, 78
 Soenarto, 62, 69, 83, 278
 Soengeb, 81
 Soentoro, 88, 208, 216n55
 Soepangat, 45, 87-91, 116, 127,
 129n12, 153, 160, 169, 170, 192,
 199-200, 229, 235, 236, 239, 240,
 259, 279
 Soepeno, 258
 Soeprapto, R. M., acting Resident
 of Pekalongan, 179-81, 195, 196,
 202, 206-10, 228, 238
 Soeprapto, Judge, 78, 100n36, 245,
 249n64
 Soerjo, R.A.A., 29, 116
 Soesmono Reksoharsono, R.M.T.,
 12, 48, 90, 113, 166, 171, 177,
 198, 279
 Soetardjo, 68
 Soewignjo, 68, 69, 107, 160, 178,
 193, 197, 198, 200, 226, 240,
 279-80
 Soeyono, Dr., 212
 Solo, 1, 46, 56, 224, 238, 251, 254,
 257
 Southeast Asia Command, 68
 spiritual power, 137ff., 161
 Sragi, 205, 210, 227
 Stober, Victor, 59-60, 67
 struggle groups, 69ff., 86, 108, 134,
 203, 221; ethos, 157
 Struggle Union (Persatuan
 Perdujuangan), 176, 256
 Sudarsono, Dr., 235
 Sudirman, Danuwilogo, Wedana of
 Brebes, 182-5, 189n52, 218
 Sudoyo, 238
 sugar industry, 2, 8-11, 28-9; mills,
 27-30, 44-5, 84, 89, 139-40, 153,
 167, 182, 220-1, 253; annexed,
 115; and rice lands, 4, 8-10,
 15-16; and violence, 4, 137
 Sugeng Hargono, 69, 99n12
 Sugiono, 91-2
 Sugito, 222, 228
 Sugono Reksoputro, 16, 25n67
 Sukarno, 16, 17, 43, 56, 68, 69, 74,
 75, 78, 85, 89, 106, 107, 112,
 115, 135, 176-8, 186, 221, 226,
 229, 236, 237, 241, 242, 245, 253
 Sukarnoists, 16, 43, 202, 228
 Sukarso (Karso), 161
 Suleman, 106, 129n12, 169
 Sumanoro, 225
 Sumargo, 167
 Sumarsono, 238
 Sumiyar, 175
 Sumurpanggang, 173
 Supeno, 25n72, 61, 67, 185, 238,
 240, 243-5
 Surabaya, 55, 56, 158, 191, 203,
 206, 235, 238
 Surakarta, 250-2, 254, 257
 Surjono Surio, 116
 Syafi'i, K. H., 206
 Syatori, K. H., 196
 Talang, 35, 58, 93, 107, 109, 118-9,
 134, 136, 138, 172, 173, 175, 180,
 245
 Talib, 227
 Taman Siswa schools, 2, 18, 85, 90
 Taman, 33, 116, 127; Camat of, 46,
 52n19

- Tan Djiem Kwan (Djing Kwan), 86, 87, 192, 193, 2240, 254
 Tan Ling Djie, 238
 Tan Malaka, 43, 176, 177, 190, 204, 242, 244, 256
tanah bengkok, 3, 4, 109, 122-3, 124ff., 203-4, 257
 Tandiono Manu, 240, 241
 Tanjung, 2, 70, 83, 84, 88, 106, 227; Wedana of, 185
 Tarbu, 105
 Tartib, K., 112
 Tarub, 15, 118
 taxation, 4ff., 14-15
 Tegal, 2, 4, 7, 17, 27, 39, 41, 43, 49, 57, 62, 68, 71, 95, 104, 107, 116, 124, 135, 200, 227; attack on, 170ff.; Bupati of, 111; mayor of, 80ff.; regency, 1, 2, 11-14, 16, 17, 33, 35; revolution in, 79-83; textile factory, 87, 99
 Tegalarum, graves, 114
 textile industry, 2, 27, 38-40, 87, 99
 Theosophists, 18
 THHK, (Tiong Hwa Hwee Kwan), 85, 86
 Third July Affair, 242
 Tiurian, Mrs., 139-0
 Tjipto Mangoenkoesomo, 152
 Tjitrasatmaka, Ki, 90, 93, 171, 181, 228
 Tju Liep Goan, 86
 TKR 17th Regiment, 221-2, 245, 260
 TKR, 76, 88, 133ff., 142, 161, 170, 174, 179, 204ff., 235, 259; counter-revolution, 109, 128, 226ff.; Pekalongan, 222, 226
 Tobari, H., 116, 118
 Toha, H., 113-14, 130n26
 Tonjong, 47, 146
 Toshio Ota, 30, 138
 traditions, Javanese, 145ff.; protest, 148ff.
 Trimurti, S. K., 56
 Ujungrusi, 16, 172, 178, 180, 183, 200
 Ulujami, 33, 91, 120, 125
 underground resistance, 55ff., 258; see also PKI
 United Indonesian Younger Generation, 88
 Usman Sastroamidjojo, 240
 villages, social change, 120ff.
 VSTP, 69
 VVV (Victory Movement), 72, 92
 Wachtoem, 69, 98n9
 Wadri, 167
 Wadyono, 154, 158, 161-2, 212, 218, 224-6, 229, 236, 241, 280; dream, 161, 224
 Wali al-Fatah, 238, 240
 Wanasari, 1, 134, 196, 197
 Warureja, 125
 Watukumpul, 124
 wayang performances, 146, 148, 154, 161, 162
 West Java, 15, 56
 Widarta, 56, 57, 58, 67, 187, 191-5, 203, 204, 235, 236, 237, 280-1, 238, 240, 244, 255, 256, 258, 280-1
 Wijk, F. M. and family, 140-41
 Wild School Ordinance, 18
 Wilujo Puspojudo, 222, 225-6, 231n16 & n18
 Wiradesa, Wedana of, 28
 Wongsonegoro, 176, 177
 Working Committee for Struggle, 237-8
 working committees, 194ff., 209; and social welfare, 200
 Yogyakarta, 1, 205, 222, 229, 235, 237-40, 243, 244, 259
 Zarni, H., 70

One Soul One Struggle is an in-depth study of the Indonesian revolution at the grass-roots level. It focuses on the Three Regions Affair (Tiga Daerah) in Pekalongan Residency in northern Central Java in 1945. Combining the use of oral sources, Dutch archives and Indonesian newspapers, it sets the 1945 social revolution in Pekalongan Residency against the background of pre-war economic exploitation and political discontent and the extraordinary harshness of the Japanese occupation.

More than 350 former participants in the Three Regions Affair have been interviewed by the author, including Indonesian officials, army leaders, youth, pre-war nationalists and bandit figures. Their memories contribute to a moving account of an important event in the Indonesian revolution, and give added meaning to the excitement, drama and tragedy of the times.

While there are many national-level studies of the Indonesian revolution, there are few which focus on the revolution at the local level. The view from Pekalongan was not always the same as the view from Jakarta. In analysing the revolution through local eyes, *One Soul One Struggle* provides a more rounded view of the revolutionary years in Indonesia.

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