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Students shot dead on Black Friday

Calls for ABRI to get out of politics and for Suharto to be put on trial reverberated on the streets of Jakarta for a whole week as tens of thousands of students and hundreds of thousands of citizens protested against the Supreme Consultative Assembly (MPR) special session. On Black Friday, 13 November, eight students were slain as troops opened fire on peaceful demonstrators, almost six months to the day after student demonstrators forced the dictator, Suharto, to step down.

The mass campaign against the MPR's special session began on 28 October, when tens of thousands of students demonstrated peacefully in Jakarta, protesting against the meeting scheduled for 10-13 November and denouncing the *dwifungsi* which gives ABRI, the armed forces unrestricted powers in all the affairs of state.

The demonstrations that began on 10 November grew in size as the week progressed. The students raised three main demands:

- reject the Special Session of the Supreme Consultative Assembly, the MPR,
- abolish the army's *dwifungsi* (the dual function) which allows ABRI to play a dominant role in political affairs, and
- put Suharto on trial for corruption and human rights violations.

By Thursday, hundreds of thousands were out on the streets, clamouring to get near to the MPR building where the one thousand members were cloistered behind a huge wall of troops.

The tens of thousands of students came from universities in Jakarta and West Java. The groups included *Forkot,* or City Forum, *FKSMJ* or Communications Forum of Greater Jakarta Student Senates, *HMI* or Muslim Students Association, *Kobar* or Workers' Action Reform Committee, *Komrad* or Committee of Students and People for Democracy, *Famred* or Students Action Front for Reform and Democracy, *Forbes* or Collective Forum, *KPM* or Youth Committee to Support Megawati, the Students' Family of the Bandung Institute of Technology, and many others.

With students trying to approach the MPR building from different directions, some succeeded in breaching the blockade and were set upon by troops. Pitch battles ensued between soldiers wielding rifles butts, truncheons and sticks and unarmed students who resorted to throwing stones. Throughout the week, armoured vehicles and water cannon supplied to the Indonesian armed forces by British companies, were used to quell the protesters.

In addition to the troops, the armed forces had hired gangs of men to join a vigilante brigade called *PAM Swakarsa* armed with sharpened bamboo sticks (*bambu runcing*), to set upon the demonstrators. In many incidents, these gangs were the first to start throwing missiles from behind the lines of troops. These gangs played such a dis-

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ruptive role that the Jakarta police chief tried to have them disarmed and removed from the streets. In several parts of the city, inhabitants repulsed vigilantes who tried to enter their kampungs. In the clashes that ensued, several of the vigilantes were killed.

The first student casualties fell on 12 November when a 20-year old man named Lukman Firdaus was fatally injured by gunfire and scores of people were wounded. Thousands of students intent on encircling the MPR building confronted the troops and the vigilantes in four different parts of the city. After being assailed with truncheons and *bambu runcing*, the demonstrators were attacked with water cannon, teargas and gunfire.

The Semanggi Tragedy

On the next day, which was to become known as Black Friday, even larger crowds filled the streets. The worst clashes occurred around the Semanggi cloverleaf bridge near Atma Jaya University, which is about a kilometre from the MPR building. By early afternoon, according to *Waspada* [14 November], tens of thousands of students joined by workers and other Jakarta citizens, had gathered near the cloverleaf. Their intention was to march to the MPR building but they were prevented from doing so by large numbers of troops and vigilantes, many on armoured vehicles below. They were attacked with water cannon and tear gas, and when this failed to disperse the crowds, shots were fired. The *Waspada* account describes troops on armoured vehicles careering from place to place in an attempt to disperse the demonstrators, and prevent them from approaching the MPR. Most of the troops were from KOSTRAD, the army's strategic command, and BRIMOB, the police anti-riot corps.

According to other reports, the sound of gunfire rang out for seven hours and by the end of the day, it was clear that at least seven students had been killed in the vicinity of Semanggi and hundreds injured, many from gunfire.

Richard Lloyd Parry of *The Independent* who was in the thick of it wrote:

'... a few thousand students began to gather in front of Atma Jaya university, to be joined by several thousand... young men from poor neighbourhoods nearby. They were unarmed, they were 20 minutes' walk from the parliament and the worst offence being committed was obstructing the traffic. The soldiers I saw ... were energetic combat troops. They began firing at 3.40pm as armoured cars and water cannon advanced down the road. The legitimate job of clearing the road was achieved in five minutes. But the barrage of shooting continued unabated for a full 15 minutes. At least four people were fatally wounded during that first round of firing...' [*The Independent,* 19 November]

Police chief Rusmanhadi later denied that the troops had been equipped with live ammunition. However, doctors who carried out autopsies on the dead students told the press that they had found metal fragments from 'high-velocity type' bullets in the bodies of the seven students. The head of the forensic department of the Cipto Mangunkusumo Hospital, Dr Mu'nim Indris said the fragments had been handed over to the military. [*AP,* 20 November]

Several injured students have described how they were shot by soldiers after they had fallen to the ground. Ferkin Susanto, a history student, said he fell to the ground in the lobby of a bank where he had fled to take cover when a soldier aimed his gun and fired a rubber bullet into his chest. 'I tried to get up but the soldiers kicked me again and I knew I had to run, even if I couldn't breathe.' [*Sydney Morning Herald,* 21 November]

Hired to inform on the students

Wiwid Prawito, 21, who is a student at Trisakti University, Jakarta, was recruited as an informer for the intelligence operation to protect the MPR against the students. Full of remorse for having betrayed his fellow students, he decided to tell the National Human Rights Commission of his experiences and seek its protection for himself and his family.

He was hired back in August by a soldier, a second-class private from a military police unit attached to the presidential guard, whom he knew only by the initials BL. They had met at a bus stop. The soldier made several visits to the family home to win their confidence.

Then one day, BL took Wiwik to a place in Tanahabang, Jakarta, where he was introduced to an ABRI officer and asked to sign a contract agreeing to help safeguard the MPR. When he refused, he was warned that they knew all about his parents and sister who might suffer the consequences.

He was assigned to recruit civilian guards and monitor universities for information about the student movement. One of his assignments was to transport people from a number of locations to Cijantung, (headquarters of *Kopassus*, the army's elite corps). He made trips to Pandeglang, Banten, Solo, Yogyakarta, Semarang and Surabaya, by army truck. At each place, he handed over an envelope to a local government official who then supplied several dozen men. In all, he transported about 160 men to Cijantung.

He was instructed to mingle with students at Atma Jaya University during the MPR session. On 13 November, he received a message from BL through his pager warning him to move out as there would be a 'shooting spree' from 1 to 4 pm.

'I was promised Rp 10,000 for each piece of information I supplied but I haven't received anything.' he told the Commission members.

Munir, the director of Kontras, the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence, who accompanied Wiwid, said: 'This is part of the political terror, taking advantage of people's economic plight to recruit them for military operations.' [*Kompas* and *Jakarta Post,* 22 November]

Many of those recruited were unemployed men from across Java. Several interviewed by *Jakarta Post* while the MPR session was still in progress said they were paid Rp 10,000 ($1.25) a day plus food,. which, in these difficult times, 'was better than sitting at home doing nothing'. [*Jakarta Post,* 12 November]


Seventeen dead, 456 injured

In a statement issued on 14 November, Father I. Sandyawan Sumardi SJ, the secretary of *Tim Relawan Kemanusiaan* [Volunteers' Team for Humanity], said that the bloody events had shown 'how difficult it is for the major-

ity of people in this country to articulate their choices, even though this is supposed to be the Era of Reformasi'. He said it was the *Tim Relawan's* policy to be present at such events to provide medical assistance to those in need. A Team member named Bernardinus Realino Norma Irmawan, 'Wawan', an Atma Jaya student, was on duty at the time of the Semanggi Tragedy. While attending to a wounded person who was waiting for an ambulance, he was shot in the chest. He was rushed to hospital but died at 6pm on 13 November. 'The bullet which killed him was a live bullet, not a rubber bullet,' the priest said.

According to the *Tim Relawan's* on-the-spot investigations, seventeen people were killed, of whom six were university students and two high-school pupils. Two police officers were among the dead as well as four members of the *PAM Swakarsa* brigade and one member of another vigilante unit. Two local inhabitants who also died had not yet been identified.

Altogether 456 people were injured, in most cases by gunshot wounds or from being struck with hard, sharp im



A student hit by gunfire

plements. They include students, journalists, members of the security forces and ordinary people of all ages. Among the wounded is a six-year old child who was hit by a stray bullet.

The MPR, a New Order relic

The decision by the Habibie government to convene a Special Session of the Supreme Consultative Assembly, the MPR, had been widely condemned by the pro-democracy forces for months. President Habibie, whose mainstay in office is the Indonesian Armed Forces, ABRI, under commander-in-chief General Wiranto, knew very well that the Special Session would trigger mass opposition yet pressed ahead regardless. When Wiranto announced that 30,000 troops would be deployed in the capital to 'secure' the meeting and tens of thousands of civilian vigilantes would be recruited as part of a massive operation to prevent anyone from disrupting the event, it was clear that the ABRI chief was determined to protect the MPR at all costs.

The MPR which was convened to adopt decrees regarding forthcoming elections was the very same body which rubber-stamped Suharto's appointment for a seventh term in March this year, two months before his overthrow in May, and adopted a decree granting him yet more special powers. Well over half the members are Suharto appointees, with GOLKAR controlling the lion's share. The remaining seats are held by the two parties that were allowed to exist under Suharto's New Order, plus 75 ABRI appointees. Several dozen MPR members from GOLKAR were replaced before the special session to bolster the position of the party's new chairman, Akbar Tandjung, who as Secretary of State is Habibie's right-hand man. These manoeuvres meant that forces within the Habibie government were bent on ensuring decisions that would promote their own chances of clinging on to power in next year's general elections and the presidential election six months later.

Nothing could be farther removed from the spirit of *reformasi* which is supposed to inspire Indonesia's transition from dictatorship to democracy. In the past six months, scores of new political parties have been born, representing a wide range of political and social interests. The removal of Suharto has given birth to a totally new political situation. These are the forces whose rights have to be safeguarded in new laws that will determine the way in which the forthcoming elections are conducted. No genuine democrat could be expected to entrust this to a New Order relic like the MPR.

These new laws will be enacted by the DPR, the Parliament, whose 500 members also sit in the MPR. This DPR is the result of the fraudulent elections held in 1997; 75 seats are occupied by ABRI appointees. In the wake of the campaign against the MPR special session, meetings of the DPR are becoming the target of new protests.

Abolish the *dwifungsi!*

But the main obstacle to democracy in Indonesia is ABRI's *dwifungsi* or dual function. Since the downfall of Suharto, a Pandora's Box of atrocities by members of the armed forces has been opened up. Revelations of killings, disappearances and rapes in Aceh have filled the columns of national and local newspapers. Massive human rights abuses in West Papua have been exposed and diverse groups have demanded inquiries into the numerous massacres perpetrated by troops in Tanjung Priok (1984), Lampung (1989), East Timor (1991), all of which are laid at the door of ABRI. Investigations into the mass rape of Chinese women during the riots in Jakarta on 13-14 May this year when at least 1,200 people died have highlighted the role of members of the security forces (see separate item).

The reputation of the Indonesian armed forces, which claims to base its special role on being a 'people's army' has never been so low. Commander-in-chief Wiranto, who

was seen by many Western governments as a moderate and reasonable officer, has gone out of his way to project a more friendly image. He has apologised for the atrocities in Aceh, announced the withdrawal of special forces from the region as well as from West Papua and East Timor, and set up an Honour Council within ABRI which led to the expulsion of Lieutenant-General Prabowo and two other senior officers of the elite corps, *Kopassus* for their involvement in the abduction of pro-democracy activists in the months preceding Suharto's downfall.

In a further attempt to salvage the *dwifungsi,* he announced just before the MPR session began that the *sos-pol* directorate within the armed forces was being disbanded. This is the sector which appoints serving and retired officers to non-military posts, the so-called *karyawan* appointments through which ABRI permeates the national, regional and local administrations. Lt-General Bambang Susilo Yudhoyono, who was *sos-pol* chief of staff in ABRI, was shifted to a newly created post as ABRI chief-of-staff for territorial affairs. Most people see this as nothing more than a tactical move to make ABRI more acceptable to civil society.

The true face of ABRI

However, the massive deployment of troops during the MPR session showed that ABRI's true colours have not changed. With bullets flying in all directions and the dead and wounded being rushed to hospital with bullet wounds, stab wounds or stunned by water cannon and tear gas, Wiranto's mask fell to the ground.

As the tragedy of Black Friday unfolded, with continuous coverage on television while other programmes were taken off the air for most of the day, the students' demand for an end to the *dwifungsi* found resonance across the political spectrum with demands for the 'amiable' Wiranto to be sacked and tried.

The hapless Habibie, who according to his chief spokesperson, Dewi Fortuna Anwar, had little idea of what was going on [*The Independent,* 17 November], could only respond to the tragedy by announcing, with Wiranto at his side, that he had ordered the armed forces to 'take stern measures' against 'subversives' who were allegedly seeking to overthrow the government.

Thus far, the people who have been netted are a group of retired armed forces officers, members of a ginger group called *Barisan Nasional* or National Front who signed a statement shortly before the MPR session, calling for a presidium to be set up in place of the present government. The leading light is Kemal Idris, a former elite force general, and Ali Sadikin, a retired Marines officer; they were taken in for questioning and are likely to be charged for rebellion for 'inciting the students to disrupt the MPR session. Sri-Bintang Pamungkas, a former MP who has had repeated brushes with the law in the past few years and who heads PUDI, one of the earliest of the new political parties to be set up, has also been questioned. Another is Permadi, a well-known soothsayer who was also held and charged while Suharto was still in power.

According to official sources, they will face charges for rebellion and conspiring to overthrow the government which carry a maximum penalty of life imprisonment.

Wiranto's strategy seems to be to blame the events during the MPR session on a sinister conspiracy between disloyal retired officers and students as their puppets, to topple the 'constitutional ' government. Besides trivialising the student movement which has played such a decisive role in pushing Indonesia towards democracy, this ploy is intended to conceal the illegitimacy of the appointment of Suharto's protégé Habibie as president, brokered by Wiranto when Suharto resigned. While Habibie still harbours dreams of winning a second term as president, Wiranto is using his commanding political role in the weak Habibie government to preserve what he can of the *dwifungsi.*

More student demonstrations follow

While these events were taking place in Jakarta, students were out on the streets protesting in many parts of the country. They included an action to commandeer a plane in Medan, North Sumatra, to go to Jakarta and the occupation of Hasanuddin Airport in Ujung Pandang, South Sulawesi. Students also occupied the regional parliament building and used the assembly hall to air their demands. There was a day of demonstrations by students in Ambon, Maluku during which at least two dozen students were injured in clashes with the security forces.

In Yogyakarta, hundreds of students staged a rally to support the same demands as their colleagues in Jakarta. In Malang, East Java, students were prevented from occupying the local radio station to broadcast their demands. In Surabaya, also in East Java, dozens of students scaled the walls of the Mandarin Majapahit Hotel and waved flags and banners from the roof. Other actions took place in Bandung, West Java and Salatiga, Central Java.

After the events during the MPR session, more rallies were held. On 19 November, thousands of students gathered in Menteng, Jakarta, hoping to surround the residence of former dictator, Suharto, to highlight their demand that he be tried in a court of law for accumulating wealth unlawfully while head of state. They were prevented from reaching their objective by hundreds of troops and eventually dispersed peacefully. A few days later, they marched to the Attorney General's Office with their demands for Suharto to be put on trial.

Attempts to derail the movement

Following Black Friday, there was a day of rioting and looting in some commercial centres where ethnic Chinese businesses are located. This was quite unconnected with the student actions and there were fears that this would be a repeat of the riots in May following the killing of four Trisakti University students, when 1,200 people died and scores of Chinese women were raped. However, the rioting ended after a few hours.

Many observers have commented on the orderliness and discipline of the student demonstrators who refrained throughout from inflicting damage on property and vehicles. ✸

TAPOL 25 years, and still going strong

TAPOL's 25th anniversary comes just months after the downfall of the Indonesian dictator, Suharto. A glance back at what we have tried to do provides an insight into the depth and persistence of gross human rights violations suffered by people living under Indonesian rule. It will help identify the tasks which lie ahead as Indonesia struggles to create a democratic country

It was in June 1973 that, for the first time, a small group of people demonstrated outside the Indonesian embassy in London's Grosvenor Square, to protest against the continued detention without trial of tens of thousands of Indonesian political prisoners held since Suharto seized power in 1965. In the late sixties, several MPs and left-wing activists, among them the late Arthur Clegg and Stan Newens MP (now a member of the European Parliament), had been to the embassy, spoken out in Parliament and written to the press condemning the massacres instigated by Suharto, which left up to a million people dead, but no one was listening. Eight years after Suharto came to power, a campaign to expose the brutalities of Indonesia's *Orde Baru* (New Order) rulers was clearly long overdue.

The occasion of our first demonstration was the meeting of the international aid consortium, the IGGI. We urged Indonesia's western financiers to stop propping up a regime whose hands were steeped in blood. They have been at it ever since, and so have we.

The action was supported by people from various political parties, from the trade unions, churches and the film world; it prompted a group of MPs to table a motion in the Commons. Encouraged by this and armed with a striking emblem designed by an Indonesian living in London, Taunus Kemasang, we decided to turn ourselves into a permanent campaigning body, then called the *British Campaign for the Release of Indonesian Political Prisoners.* The choice of 'tapol', a contraction of *tahanan politik* or 'political prisoner', as our name was intended to popularise a new word that entered the Indonesian vocabulary after 1965.

Under attack

Despite our modest beginnings and a scruffy-looking newsletter, it was not long before the Jakarta regime began to vilify us. In June 1974, the Indonesian Defence Department refuted TAPOL's condemnation of the use of *tapols* as forced labour, working for private companies and public works projects; they admitted that such practices had occurred but they had now been ended. In August 1974, the Department again held a press conference, this time to denounce TAPOL and one of its founders, Carmel Budiardjo, herself a recently released *tapol,* for 'creating misunderstandings' about the treatment of *tapols* and for seeking to discredit the Indonesian government. A month later they were at it again, to announce that the word *tapol* was now banned because Indonesia 'does not hold any political prisoners', only persons who have broken the law (even though there was not enough evidence to prove it!).

At the time, it was estimated that there were still 70,000 to 100,000 political prisoners in prisons, detention centres and labour camps across the length and breadth of the country. The vast majority were classified as 'B' category, who would not be brought to trial for lack of evidence but who could not be released because they were 'known to have been directly or indirectly involved' in the events of 30 September 1965. The armed forces were in charge, with special powers vested in *KOPKAMTIB,* the Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order headed by Suharto. There was no serious attempt by *KOPKAMTIB* or anyone else in the regime to quantify the number of prisoners. The facts were shrouded in cynicism and mystery. Attorney General Major-General Sugih Arto airily dismissed journalists' queries: 'The figure fluctuates like the rate of the yen against the dollar.'

Pressure begins to bear fruit

By late 1975 however, the pressure on Jakarta was beginning to bear fruit. For the first time, a release plan was announced. It was a slippery beast, changing shape and substance from day to day. However, after 'ten long years' - to borrow the title of a drama written and produced by Roger Hibbitt and others in the TAPOL collective and shown at a London theatre for three nights running to packed houses - the military now realised that Indonesia desperately needed financial support which could be jeopardised by its notoriety as the world's worst violator of human rights and identified as such by Amnesty International.

While TAPOL can claim part of the credit, there were many factors forcing the U-turn. The dictatorship was facing its first serious financial crisis when the state oil company, *Pertamina,* needed a bail-out for indebtedness resulting from corrupt deals amounting to $10 billion (in the middle of an oil boom!). Indonesia faced annual condemnation at the International Labour Organisation for its contravention of ILO Convention 29 on Forced Labour, in particular because of the horrific revelations about conditions at the forced-labour camp on Buru Island where tens of thousands of 'B' category *tapols* were now living and dying. The IGGI's bankrolling had by now reached $2,400 million a year and some member states, notably Holland which chaired the consortium, were under pressure from domestic public opinion. In London, TAPOL held a rally at

St Martin's-in-the-Fields, Trafalgar Square to protest against the Queen's visit to Indonesia in March 1974.

After a slow start and much foot-dragging, the release of 'B' category prisoners was more or less completed by the end of 1979, though the conditions of release rendered the ex-*tapols* second-class citizens, with few civil rights to speak of, hostage to a regime which needed to keep alive the spectre of the 'communist menace'.

Broadening the campaign

But TAPOL had moved with the times. Already in 1974, it started campaigning on behalf of students arrested for demonstrating against the visiting Japanese Prime Minister. In June 1975, it turned its attention to massacres in West Papua, and in October that year, warned in its Bulletin of the impending aggression against East Timor and the bloodshed and terror this would entail.

While continuing to report the trials of dozens of 'A' category prisoners charged in connection with the 1965 events or for trying to re-establish the unlawfully banned communist party, there was also extensive coverage in our *Bulletin* of the student trials.

The campaign also turned its attention to atrocities in West Papua. The first report we published came from a Dutch newspaper account of massacres in Biak that had occurred in June 1970. Following the invasion of East Timor, TAPOL provided regular reports of news that managed to breach the almost total information blackout.

A constant theme was condemnation of British arms sales to Indonesia. In April 1978, British Aerospace announced its first contract to supply Indonesia with eight Hawk ground-attack aircraft. TAPOL launched a major campaign, writing to all Labour Party branches throughout the country - the contract had been licensed by the Labour Government then in power - and initiated questions and motions in both houses of Parliament. Since then, we have campaigned ceaselessly against British arms sales to Indonesia, building alliances with other UK organisations such as Campaign Against Arms Trade and the World Development Movement. In the past few years, with the help of documentation from activists in Indonesia, we have be the source for several major TV documentaries exposing Britain's arming of the Indonesian armed forces.

At the beginning of 1980 we decided to change the name of our campaign to the *British Campaign for the Defence of Political Prisoners and Human Rights in Indonesia,* to reflect the broader remit we had already assumed for several years.

TAPOL under attack from the FEER

While TAPOL saw itself as a small ginger-group working with limited resources and for the first five years with no full-time staff, the Indonesian regime clearly saw us as a dangerous menace. As the release programme gathered pace, there was pressure on us to abandon our campaign, the assertion being that since we had been set up to campaign for the release of the 1965 prisoners, there was no justification for us to continue. The pressure came from an unexpected quarter, the Hong Kong-based *Far Eastern Economic Review*, read widely throughout the region in business, academic and government circles.

During 1979, the weekly had published several letters from TAPOL but never without an editorial rejoinder or response from Yusuf Wanandi, Deputy-Director of Jakarta's Centre for Strategic and International Studies, the regime's think-tank. Then in April 1980, the editor, Derek Davies, wrote to all the sponsors whose names appeared on our letter-head, suggesting that, now that the mass release of prisoners had taken place, it was time 'for the Society to wind itself up' and asking whether they were willing to 'go on sponsoring the political activities of Mrs Budiardjo'.

This shameless attempt by an influential mainstream publication to shut us down had the finger-prints of Jakarta all over it. When, in response to defamatory articles published by the journal, two responses were sent, one a personal letter on plain paper from Carmel answering slurs on her and her husband and the other from TAPOL and signed by all the members of the collective, which dealt at length with the journal's charges against the organisation, Carmel's letter was published as if it had been written on our headed notepaper and TAPOL - whose letter was not published - was accused by the editor of failing to respond to the charges made! Since the editor reigns supreme in any publication, we were left with no way to expose this blatant deception. Many supporters wrote letters in our defence which were not published.

We could hardly have needed further evidence that our work *was* upsetting the regime, which gave us every encouragement to continue.

In November 1979, Suharto made a state visit to London. TAPOL mounted several protests, the largest being outside the Guildhall where the Indonesian dictator addressed a state banquet. A TAPOL poster produced for the occasion and pasted in many places throughout the capital showed Suharto, surrounded by skulls, wielding a knife. The text read:

The Butcher of Jakarta:
Suharto's Slaughterhouse,
Indonesia: One million dead, 600,000 arrested.
East Timor, 100,000 dead
West Papua/New Guinea, 90,000 dead

No one in Indonesia was using such strong language in those days but today it is on many people's lips.

The 1980s nadir

Once the regime had extricated itself from the *Pertamina* crisis, Suharto set about consolidating his grip on Indonesian society. The students had been rendered voiceless with the banning of student councils and the 'normalisation of campus life' in 1978. In 1983 and 1984, army and police death-squads killed at least 5,000 'criminal suspects' and left most of the bodies lying in the streets. Although this became known at the time as *petrus* or 'mysterious killings', Suharto acknowledged some years later in his autobiography that he had personally given the order for the campaign as a 'shock therapy'. Our attempts to persuade the British government to condemn Indonesia's head of state for having ordered this bloodthirsty campaign were fobbed off with casuistic arguments about reading his words too literally.

By this time, Britain was so steeped in the business of selling arms to Indonesia that the Thatcher Government was not about to say anything that might upset the dictator. At a state banquet during a visit to Indonesia in April 1985,

Margaret Thatcher enthused about her host, the dictator, whose troops had by then slaughtered 200,000 East Timorese:: 'Our cultures are different but when it comes to defending independence and freedom, we are at one with you,' she said.

In 1985, the five political laws on political parties, the elections and social organisations were enacted, casting the New Order political system into a mould that was intended to keep Suharto in power for ever. The state dogma, *Pancasila,* was now enforced as the 'sole principle' for all organisations.

The most vociferous opposition to these laws came from Muslims who used the mosques to snipe at the policy. As a way of teaching them a lesson, an incident was provoked at a mosque in Jakarta's harbour district, Tanjung Priok, in September 1984 resulting in a mass demonstration calling for the release of four mosque officials who were being held by the police. Army units opened fire killing hundreds of people. Despite calls from the dissident group, *Petisi 50,* for an inquiry, the massacre was quickly swept under the carpet at home and by the international community.

There were scores of trials of Muslims during the following two years, many of whose victims are still in gaol today. Given the scale of these human rights violations, TAPOL undertook a major investigation of its own which was published by TAPOL in 1986 in a book titled: *Indonesia: Muslims on Trial.* Two years later, the book was banned from circulation in Indonesia by the Attorney General's office, by which time however, it had been translated into Indonesian and given much wider circulation. We recently decided to re-issue the Indonesian version, now that many human rights groups and Muslim groups in Indonesia are calling for a thorough investigation of the Tanjung Priok massacre and the release of all the Muslim political prisoners.

Executions resumed

Along with the many other issues it was dealing with, TAPOL continued to focus on the scores of *tapols* held for alleged involvement in the 1965 events. These were people who had been tried in kangaroo trials bent on reinforcing the Suharto version that those events were masterminded by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). The January 1980 issue of *TAPOL Bulletin* was devoted to an analysis of the trials and the political background, the events of 1965 which had brought Suharto to power.

Analysing the 1965 affair has been a common theme in *TAPOL Bulletins* throughout the 25 years of our existence. In 1995, we published *Tragedi Manusia dan Kemanusiaan* (A Human Tragedy) by M.R. Siregar, a PKI functionary for many years in North Sumatra, on the 1965 events and the political events leading up to it.

Dozens of convicted *tapols* had been sentenced to death, but there had been no executions since around 1970, leading some to think that the regime had relented and would 'forgive and forget'. The Dutch Government had even been given an assurance that there would be no more executions, although human rights lawyer Buyung Nasution told TAPOL that as long as the sentences had not been commuted, such assurances were meaningless. In May 1985 he was proved correct when the trade union leader Munir was executed after being in prison for nearly 20 years. More executions followed during the remainder of the 1980s, despite worldwide condemnation, including a resolution adopted by the European Parliament, the first of many adopted by that body.

At the end of 1987, we decided to change our name once again to *The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign.* Although much of our energies were, and still are, spent campaigning in the UK, our contacts, the reach of our information and many of our campaigns had by then become much more worldwide.

East Timor

From the start, East Timor's struggle for independence attracted support from pro-independence solidarity groups in many countries. But after what appeared at the time to be the virtual elimination of armed resistance in 1979, international solidarity waned and many groups disbanded. TAPOL continued to pursue the issue, and filled the pages of many issues of the *Bulletin* with information on the human rights situation in East Timor. It is no exaggeration to say that in those bleak years, TAPOL, along with dedicated activists in Australia, shouldered the burden of keeping the issue alive as far as international solidarity was concerned.

In 1979, we published *An Act of Genocide: Indonesia's Invasion of East Timor* by Arnie Kohen and John Taylor. A staff member went to Australia in 1982 to testify before Senate hearings on East Timor. We regularly testified at the UN Decolonisation Committee in New York and published a number of supplements to *TAPOL Bulletin* on human rights and the military operations in East Timor. It was then that we established our reputation for broadening our coverage on East Timor by analysing Indonesian military strategy in the illegally occupied territory.

In 1988, we supported the efforts of one of our most committed supporters, Eric Avebury, member of the House of Lords, to set up *Parliamentarians for East Timor.* The following year a Labour MP, Ann Clwyd, visited East Timor and became one of the most fervent advocates of the rights of the people of East Timor.

The Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991 and the dramatic footage taken by British cameraman Max Stahl, thrust East Timor onto TV screens around the world, making it for the first time a major issue which western powers could no longer afford to ignore. For months, we found ourselves in a swirl of activity, receiving, translating, analysing information on a scale that stretched our resources to the limits. We helped organise a very successful hearing in Parliament at which several foreign witnesses of the massacre testified. The massacre inspired groups in many countries to campaign for East Timor, joining ranks with groups in Canada, Japan and Australia that had emerged a few years earlier. The international solidarity movement for East Timor was now a living force.

During the Falklands (Malvinas) War in 1982 and the Gulf War in 1991, TAPOL argued repeatedly with the British Government about the hypocrisy of its response to these crises as compared to its muted concern about Indonesia's far graver act of aggression against East Timor, as compared with Argentina or Iraq.

West Papua and Aceh

Throughout its many years of campaigning, the massive abuses in these territories have always been uppermost in TAPOL's mind. To the regime these were 'zones of trou-

trouble' where 'security disrupter gangs' (GPK) operated. To us, they were regions with deep-rooted grievances against Indonesian rule and massive human rights violations. Given their different histories, their struggles against Indonesian rule have enjoyed very different levels of international solidarity.

In 1984, a flare-up of discontent in Jayapura led to thousands of West Papuans fleeing across the border to Papua New Guinea where many of them still live as refugees. The arrest and murder in custody of Arnold Ap, anthropologist and promoter of West Papuan culture, also drew attention to the simmering discontent in West Papua. TAPOL became a voice for the West Papuan refugees in PNG and lobbied hard for them with the UN High Commission for Refugees. A book published by TAPOL in May 1983, *West Papua: The Obliteration of a People* was so popular that it went into three editions. For a decade or more, information from West Papua was hard to find until the mid 1990s when resistance to the US-UK copper and gold mine, Freeport re-emerged and with it, massive abuses that were documented and disseminated in Indonesia and abroad by the Catholic Church and local NGOs.

When members of a scientific exhibition were kidnapped by the OPM (*Organisasi Papua Merdeka*) in Mapnduma, east of the Freeport mine, in 1996, TAPOL did what it could to persuade the OPM to release the hostages, whilst using the event to increase public awareness about the injustices of West Papua's annexation by Indonesia. Our contact with activists in Jayapura has grown by leaps and bounds since then. With the resurgence of demands for independence for West Papua since the downfall of Suharto, more and more people are being arrested and tried for rebellion. The number of *tapols* in West Papua is now increasing faster than anywhere excepting East Timor.

At the other end of the archipelago, Aceh on the northern tip of Sumatra (devoutly Muslim, unlike the Christian populations of East Timor and West Papua) was also an arena for resistance to rule from Jakarta. Whilst East Timor and West Papua have enjoyed varying degrees of attention from the international community, Aceh has been virtually ignored in spite of a veritable tidal wave of information about massive human rights abuses during the eighties and especially from 1989 until 1992. Much of what TAPOL reported in those years has come back to haunt us, now that the veil of silence and fear has been lifted with the downfall of Suharto, and the Acehnese are coming forward in their thousands to testify about what happened during those years of unmitigated terror.

While all these ghastly abuses were going on which TAPOL regularly reported to the Foreign Office, there was no let-up in British support for the Suharto regime, manifested first and foremost by the constant flow of military equipment - combat aircraft, naval vessels, rapier missiles, electronic - to bolster the Indonesian armed forces in the pursuit of its internal security operations.

TAPOL has campaigned hard to protect the many hundreds of Acehnese who fled to Malaysia to seek political asylum. The Mahathir government has remained deaf to pleas for the UN High Commission for Refugees to be allowed to assess their claims for political asylum. In violation of international law hundreds of been forcibly repatriated. We now work closely with *Suaram* in Kuala Lumpur, to publicise the plight of these refugees.

Offering a broader analysis

It was also during the 1980s that TAPOL began to provide a broader analysis of the political and economic situation in Indonesia, while maintaining its focus on human rights. We felt that the abuses of the regime could not be properly understood without an analysis of the workings of the Suharto regime, its shifts in political alliances, its economic policies and its burgeoning dependence on foreign aid. We have also published profiles of the figures who Suharto has relied on, and discarded, in pursuit of lasting power and to satisfy the greed of his coterie of offspring and cronies. Some of those we profiled are now yesterday's men, hardly worth a footnote in history, while others, notably B.J. Habibie, a Suharto protegé, now has the unenviable task of trying to extricate Indonesia from its ever-worsening economic crisis.

We also have devoted much space to interviewing East Timorese and West Papuans whose accounts have added flesh and blood to the reports that have filled the pages of our periodical publication.

In 1986, we produced jointly with Survival International a special issue of *The Ecologist* devoted to Indonesia's transmigration programme and it deleterious impact on the land rights and livelihoods of the native people at the receiving end of this programme. This led in the following year to the establishment of *Down-to-Earth,* a campaign to promote ecological justice in Indonesia. *Down-to-Earth* is now a flourishing campaign with a newsletter of its own focusing on tribal peoples, mining, pollution and forestry.

Since 1995, we have carried out research on key aspects of Britain's relationship with Indonesia. This resulted in a pamphlet, *Partners in Repression: The Reality of British Aid to Indonesia.* The next project focused on British investments in Indonesia which was published in a briefing titled: *Ethics, Investments and Repression: Britain and Indonesia - the Test for Government and Business,* at the time of the Second ASEM conference in London in April 1997. We have also worked closely with Ann Clwyd MP who has pursued British governments, Conservative and Labour, relentlessly on their aid programme, their training of the Indonesian police and the continuing flow of military equipment to the Indonesian armed forces. In alliance with academics and students at Kings College in London, we succeeded in preventing a training course for *Kopassus* officers from going ahead in 1996.

We have submitted comments to several parliamentary Select Committees and keep a number of MPs from all parties informed about developments in Indonesia.

Keeping going

As a campaign without a membership structure or local branches, TAPOL has depended primarily on networking with organisations and groups in Indonesia, with NGOs in the UK and with solidarity groups around the world.

For the first two decades, networking in Indonesia was virtually impossible because TAPOL was branded as 'PKI' and few groups wanted to risk being associated with us. While PKI prisoners and released prisoners were no doubt grateful for our efforts, few were prepared to say so, for fear of adding to their problems in a society where the

'communist menace' was (and still is) a constant theme of regime propaganda.

Since the mid the 1990s however, things have changed dramatically. During the past decade, our links with many groups in Indonesia have flourished as 'PKI' scaremongering has ceased to impress a new generation of activists untrammelled by the fears that haunted their predecessors and who can see for themselves that TAPOL is not, and indeed never was, an offshoot of the PKI. Our links with the new generation of NGOs and political groupings have been enhanced by several visits to Indonesia by staff-member Liem Soei Liong, who managed to enter the country despite being blacklisted. (His most recent attempt was foiled by none other than the ABRI commander himself.)

Our links with pro-democracy NGOs and political groups which had been well established in the final years of the New Order have flourished in the post-Suharto period. We are working with them on activities to broaden understanding in Indonesia about the situation in occupied East Timor, on pressing for the re-writing of the history (*pelurusan sejarah*) of 1965 and Suharto's seizure of power as well as campaigns to press for the release of all political prisoners, without discrimination.

In the UK, we have for many years worked closely with a number of organisations such as Campaign Against Arms Trade, the Parliamentary Human Rights Group, World Development Movement, Survival International, Partizans, to mention but a few. This has been the most effective way of reaching out to the British public.

Internationally, we are part of the worldwide solidarity movement for East Timor, with groups supporting the struggle of the people of West Papua and, most recently, with groups supporting the democracy struggle in Indonesia.

Finally, a word about funding. In the early days, our founding member had to make do with a kitchen table and support from her late sister, Miriam, and other members of her family. In 1977, the organisation received a handsome shot-in-the-arm when an anonymous supporter, whose identity we have never been able to discover, made over to us $15,000 from a legacy. Able at last to employ a part-time worker supported by several volunteers, the organisation turned to overseas funding agencies in Denmark, Ireland and The Netherlands. Its chances of raising cash in the UK have always been circumscribed by the Charities' Law which prohibits British funding agencies with charitable status from supporting organisations whose activities are deemed to be 'political'.

We were also helped by the sizeable award to our founding member when she received the Right Livelihood Award in 1995.

We have gone through difficult times but in the end, with the support of agencies in a number of countries, we have always managed to pull through. Even in our darkest days, there has always been a fund of goodwill for our work and an appreciation of the need to campaign worldwide to expose the human rights violations perpetrated by Indonesia's rulers against their own people and against those living under its rule in East Timor, West Papua and Aceh.

The downfall of Suharto has left the country in a state of great confusion. The country is mired in a grave economic crisis as a result of the cronyism fostered under Suharto. Tens of millions have lost their jobs and been pauperised, with the result that social unrest is rife.

While some democratic rights have been restored, the Habibie Government still retains many of the trappings of Suharto's New Order regime. The armed forces have been comprehensively exposed and condemned in Indonesia for their many atrocities and are on the defensive. Their reputation has never fallen so low as it is today, yet they clearly have no intention of relinquishing their 'special role' in political and social affairs, known as the *dwifungsi*, or dual function.

Hundreds of political prisoners are still being held. The releases so far have been aimed more at impressing the country's foreign financiers than ending the blight of political imprisonment once and for all. The East Timorese people are still far from their aspiration for an act of self-determination. The people of West Papua are raising their voices in favour of independence, and are being treated like traitors for daring to do so.

The truth about the many atrocities perpetrated during the 32 years of Suharto rule is now coming to light, in Aceh, West Papua, East Timor and in Indonesia, going back to the massacres of 1965/65 and the massacre of Muslims in 1984. For far too long, members of the armed forces have acted with impunity and demands for the killers to be called to account are growing.

The truth about how Suharto came to power in 1965 is now under public scrutiny, the focus of attention for historians and activists, and is being discussed in the press almost daily and at public meetings in Jakarta. Hundreds of thousands were killed and hundreds of thousands more were imprisoned and are still being stigmatised for 'crimes' they never committed and should have their names rehabilitated.

All these are issues that will occupy TAPOL in the months and years to come. ✸

TAPOL's anniversary celebrated in Jakarta

A public meeting was held in Jakarta on 20 October to celebrate TAPOL's 25th anniversary. The meeting, which was convened by *MIK*, the Indonesian Society for Humanitarianism, was addressed among others by Poncke Princen, a leading human rights activist, and Joesoef Ishak, a long-term, untried political prisoner during the early years of the New Order regime. Helmy Fauzi, a leading human rights activist, gave an account on TAPOL's work based on his own experience when he visited London last year. The event was reported in the Indonesian press, including the leading daily *Merdeka*, that also made a long report about TAPOL's activities over the past 25 years.

TAPOL's anniversary celebration

On 20 October, about 200 supporters attended a public meeting in London to celebrate TAPOL's 25th anniversary and to hear the views of distinguished speakers on the past, present and future for the people of Indonesia and East Timor at this critical time of transition.

The meeting was addressed by José Ramos Horta, the 1996 Nobel Peace Prize winner, Wilson, a People's Democratic Party (PRD) activist released from Cipinang prison, Jakarta in July this year, Ann Clwyd, British Labour MP, and Carmel Budiardjo, the director of TAPOL.

The film *More Than A Million Years*, made by TAPOL in 1976, was shown and a TAPOL supporter, Tim Mottershead, played his own piano composition dedicated to East Timor's leader, Xanana Gusmao, *Heroic Song For Xanana*. Lord Avebury TAPOL's Honorary President, chaired the meeting.

José Ramos-Horta

Against the background of the downfall of Suharto and the continuing struggle for democracy in Indonesia, East Timor's external representative praised the 'extraordinary dedication' of TAPOL founder, Carmel Budiardjo, and the many members of the international solidarity movement 'who year after year helped the cause of East Timor'. He looked forward to the day on which Carmel would be able to join him in East Timor, met at the airport by Xanana Gusmao in his capacity as President of the new Republic of East Timor.

At the same time he had strong words for Western governments complicit in the tragedy of East Timor. He paid tribute to the extraordinary role the East Timor resistance and people have played in overcoming their treatment as a footnote of the Cold War and their sacrifice on the altar of pragmatism and realpoltik.

As the East Timorese were being slaughtered, those in London and elsewhere, who preach human rights and democracy, did more than turn a blind eye. If that was their only crime, 'it would have been a blessing', he said. Instead they provided weapons which contributed to the killings. But, he went on, 'We survived them all', including five US Presidents and several British Prime Ministers, among them Margaret Thatcher whom 'it is not easy to survive!'.

The one thing that Horta said disgusted him most was seeing how the British and Australian authorities 'went to great lengths to cover up what they knew to be a cold blooded assassination of their own subjects'.

'Two young British subjects, journalists were murdered [at Balibo, East Timor, in October 1975]. They knew about it. They deliberately covered it up. They lie about it year after year. To preserve the arms deals, to preserve the trade relations. Again I hope that all of this will serve as a lesson to change these policies,' he pleaded.



Wilson ***photo: Paul Slattery***

With Suharto gone and changes taking place in Indonesia, Horta said 'we are winning the battle'. Despite the way the East Timorese have been treated by the West he has no hard feelings or resentment. An independent East Timor will be in the best interests of Australia, New Zealand, European countries and the US, who will all benefit.

'In the 23 years, after failed policies, we appeal to them to support the independence of East Timor. Indonesia does not need East Timor. The Indonesian people do not need East Timor. An independent East Timor would be a close friend of Indonesia. Thousands of Indonesian soldiers lost their lives in East Timor. There are still many thousands of Indonesian soldiers in East Timor and many are still being killed right now. What is the purpose of it all?...It is time for the UK, Robin Cook, Tony Blair to take the lead...'

Wilson: 'Reconciliation and Democracy without ABRI's *Dwifungsi*'

In a powerful analysis of the progress of *reformasi*, the former political prisoner stressed that the changes since the downfall of Suharto will be meaningless unless the fundamental issue of military power is addressed. The armed forces, ABRI, must return to barracks and give up their social and political role [this role and ABRI's security and defence role are together known as *dwifungsi*, 'dual function'], which they have clung onto for more than 30 years. Reconciliation and democracy can only be meaningful if civil society is dominant, he said.

On 21 May, Wilson and his fellow political prisoners in Cipinang prison celebrated the demise of 'one of the 20th

century's most brutal dictators' with four ducks supplied by Xanana Gusmao. However, initial optimism that the new regime would grant amnesties for all political prisoners was dispelled by the realisation that the amnesties were being used as 'diplomatic trade-offs in exchange for financial assistance from the IMF and World Bank'. Many PKI, Timorese, West Papuan, Acehnese, Muslim and PRD prisoners were not included.

The problem, said Wilson, lies in the enduring political structures of the old regime, which have put in place 'the Suharto regime without Suharto'. As ABRI continue to play a leading role, they are able to vet the release of prisoners and thwart real *reformasi*. There were some openings during the first five months of the Habibie regime, but they resulted from mass pressure which the regime was unable to resist. Although it embraced *reformasi*, it did so only to survive and consolidate its position of power.

ABRI is, however, under intense pressure to answer for the military violence of the Suharto era. *Kontras*, the Committee for the Disappeared and the Victims of Violence, has forced ABRI onto the defensive and the political space created by *Kontras* has given the victims of army violence the opportunity to call the army to account. The press has helped by reporting atrocities and conducing investigations. As a result, ABRI was forced to dismiss Lt. General Prabowo for involvement in the abduction of pro-democracy activists, but that was a small victory used by ABRI to stop people calling for an end to its special role.

The army violence cannot be blamed on procedural errors or a lack of discipline. It is systematic and deliberate and aimed at protecting ABRI's *dwifungsi*, said Wilson.

He warned that ABRI have not stopped doing what they can to preserve their political position. 'Together with some Muslim groups that are very close to the military and the Suharto regime, they are now spreading anti-communist hysteria and trying to sow the seeds of ethnic, racial and religious hatred.'

'They are deliberately creating situations to justify the army's assertion that political freedoms lead to anarchy and disorder and in this way legitimise ABRI's role as the defender of stability,' he said.

To counter this, the PRD has called for a joint political platform to end *dwifungsi*, which would bring together people from all walks of life all over the country. 'All our energies, efforts, propaganda and actions must be devoted to ending ABRI's social and political role now.'

Wilson then set out the preconditions for reconciliation: the release of all political prisoners; the trial of everyone responsible for the brutalities of the former regime; and the ending of ABRI's dominant political position in society. He warned against ABRI's own version of reconciliation, which involved an end to demands for them to answer for their crimes under Suharto.

TAPOL - a trustworthy friend of the victims of military violence and the brutalities of the Suharto and Habibie regimes, 'like a small umbrella, helping to protect the victims of [the] massacres' - must confront militarist power which has shown no sign of weakening, he concluded:

'Political opportunities created by civil society are the decisive factor but international pressure can help to undermine militarism, which is the enemy of humankind in Indonesia, my beloved homeland.'

HUMAN RIGHTS

Ann Clwyd MP

A tireless parliamentary campaigner for the people of Indonesia and East Timor since Carmel 'first got hold of me' in 1989, Ann Clwyd recalled her first visit to East Tmior that year. She was able to visit some of the badly tortured prisoners in Dili prison and was struck by the real commitment of the young men who vowed to rejoin the fight whatever happened to them.

That is why, she said, she is full of admiration for those people and others who have endured imprisonment, but not given up. 'People like Carmel who know what being in prison in Indonesia is all about. People like José Ramos-Horta who have ceaselessly continued the struggle outside the country. All those brave people who have been killed in the struggle and people who we don't know what happened to them but we know they are no longer alive.'

A well-known and hard-hitting critic of her own party's policy on arm sales to Indonesia, Ann Clwyd launched a stinging attack on the Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook. She recalled the shock and disappointment she felt when he informed her that the Government would not be revoking export licences for the sale of Hawk aircraft. We have continued to give licences for arms exports and '(E)ven the previous administration admitted that once you sell the arms you have absolutely no idea what they are going to be used for', she pointed out.

She condemned previous policy on aid to Indonesia, which had resulted in aid being linked to arms sales, transmigration and the training of police officers subsequently implicated in human rights abuses.

There must be no compromise for the sake of the people who have died in Indonesia and East Timor in the struggle for human rights, she insisted. In particular, the people of East Timor must be given the referendum to which they are entitled.

Ann Clwyd ended by welcoming the news that General Pinochet of Chile is under arrest in London, enabling us to look forward to the day on which other evil dictators, such as Suharto, are arrested and made to account for their crimes against humanity.

Carmel Budiardjo

In a brief address, Carmel said she was optimistic about the future for the people of Indonesia and East Timor, despite the continuing power of the military. There were two things signifying a new atmosphere.

In Jakarta, a public meeting to celebrate TAPOL's 25th anniversary was being held by a number of organisations. Such an event, with participants stretching across the generations, would have been unthinkable under Suharto.

At the same time, moves are being made through conferences, seminars and newspaper articles to rewrite history, which has indoctrinated people with the belief that what happened in 1965 was a PKI coup and Suharto was the saviour of the people. Now is the opportunity to learn the truth about what really happened, she said.

Carmel expressed her delight at having so many friends from the early days of TAPOL in 1973 and others who have worked over the years to share the precious evening with all staff members of TAPOL. ✸

25th anniversary tributes

14 political prisoners in Cipinang Prison

On this happy occasion, we fourteen political prisoners in Cipinang Prison warmly greet TAPOL on its anniversary. We are not saying this just to be polite. Our incarceration as political prisoners will help people understand why we speak so frankly. We want to express our gratitude to TAPOL, an organisation that for decades has been a faithful friend from afar.

We are sure that TAPOL as an organisation set up to campaign for Indonesian political prisoners will remain faithful to the fundamental issue for which it came into existence. All the more so today because, although power has passed on from Suharto to Habibie, there is no end in sight for the political prisoner problem. This only goes to show that the Habibie government treats the political enemies of the Suharto regime as its own political enemies. And it is absolutely clear that Habibie treats his political enemies as dangerous 'criminals'.

This is why we hope that TAPOL will remain faithful to us, a partner for those who are silenced in their own country.

Budiman Sudjatmiko, Petrus H. Hariyanto, Jacobus Eko Kurniawan, Ignatius Damianus Pranowo, I Gusti Agung Anom Astika, Bartholomeus Garda Sembiring, Suroso, Fauzi Isman, Xanana Gusmao, Joao Freitas, Asep Suryaman, Abdul Latief, Bungkus, Nathaniel Marsudi.

Xanana Gusmao, CNRT President, Commander-in-Chief of FALINTIL

It is with much emotion that, on behalf of the Maubere People, I wish to associate myself with your celebration of the 25th anniversary of TAPOL and only regret that I am not able to be there in person.

When no one else would bother, when the world was looking the other way as the Indonesian military perpetrated one of the worst massacres of the twentieth century against its own people, Carmel you created a voice for the Indonesian political prisoners, and later in defence of the growing democracy movement in Indonesia. In the midst of the Cold War, TAPOL was not afraid to confront the indifference of the international community and their governments.

TAPOL was able to establish itself as a committed, credible and tenacious group that always maintained very close contact with the people whose suffering and struggle it claimed to represent.

To know that TAPOL was out there to make sure they would not fall into complete oblivion has been of great comfort to the Indonesian political prisoners in Cipinang and other jails... I can say that in the name of my Timorese companions and myself, who are experiencing this solidarity. The knowledge that one's case would appear in the pages of TAPOL's bi-monthly bulletin brought a glimmer of hope to people fighting desperation.

I find it remarkable that TAPOL should extend its solidarity to the East Timorese people from the first day of the Indonesian invasion in 1975. Its selflessness enabled TAPOL to evolve with the situation in Indonesia and East Timor to best serve the interests of those it defended. This generosity touches us profoundly and I wish to...express the deepest gratitude of the Maubere people and our respect before your admirable work.

Pramoedya Ananta Toer, leading novelist and former political prisoner

I wish TAPOL the strength to continue to defend the oppressed people of Indonesia who have been robbed of their basic human rights. I hope that TAPOL will be a source of inspiration for all those with the energy to follow your example in defending people everywhere who have never or not yet been able to live decent lives as human beings.

TAPOL's very informative bulletin...has helped the world to understand Indonesia, free from the distortions coming from official Indonesian sources. ...I personally, along with many other readers..., am truly grateful.

Now that the winds of *reformasi* are blowing in Indonesia thanks to the victory that was won by Indonesia's youth and students, others in Indonesia are beginning to follow in TAPOL' s footsteps. Nevertheless, TAPOL continues to occupy a place that is unique.'

Joesoef Ishak, publisher Hasta Mitra

On behalf of Hasta Mitra and on my own behalf, I would like to congratulate you on your 25th anniversary. My best wishes to all the staff of TAPOL and especially to you personally as the motivator and inspiration in shouldering the burden of this heavy but noble task humanitarian work. Your movement and your publication is worthy of the name that you bear in the work you have undertaken to uphold justice, freedom and human dignity.

TAPOL has been a thorn in the flesh for the barbaric rulers of Indonesia and deprived them of many night's sleep, but TAPOL has a place in the hearts of Indonesian people who are struggling for democracy.

Sumatra Human Rights Network

We congratulate TAPOL on its 25th anniversary. ...you have proven to everyone how consistent you have been in the struggle to uphold and respect the human rights and the political rights of the Indonesian people which were trampled on by the New Order regime for 32 years.

Although a *reformasi* breeze has begun to blow across our beloved country, a member of your staff, Liem Soei Liong, was recently refused entry into this country, a

country whose wealth has been plundered by Suharto and his cronies. We are sure that TAPOL will continue to struggle in accordance with its mission and its vision. Please accept our warmest greetings.

Stan Newens, MEP

I have at home a complete collection of TAPOL's newsletters from the first issue, which is an invaluable source of information on human rights issues in Indonesia and East Timor. TAPOL has played an outstanding role over the last quarter century and I...salute its work.

Noam Chomsky, professor of linguistics

It is a great personal pleasure to have an opportunity to congratulate TAPOL on its 25th anniversary... The information and analysis they have provided, and their inspiring leadership, have been indispensable for those of us who have sought to join them in the struggle for democracy, justice and human rights in Indonesia and the territories it occupies... Thanks in no small measure to their work, dramatic changes are underway, with uncertain outcomes. I am confident that TAPOL will be in the forefront of the difficult struggles that lie ahead.

Ben Anderson, specialist in Indonesian political affairs

Almost alone at the start, TAPOL has worked for 25 years to unmask the crimes of the [Suharto] regime... Indeed, it is safe to say that none of the "new" revelations of the past months were not long ago signalled by TAPOL. One might think that with Suharto's fall, TAPOL could sit back on its well-deserved laurels - mission achieved. But no one who knows its Director Carmel Budiardjo, or those who have worked closely with her, will expect any such thing. The end of Suharto does not mean that the vices of his regime are not continuing... Sadly one could say that TAPOL's "work is never done". ... I would like to convey my feelings of admiration and gratitude for all that it has wonderfully accomplished.

John Taylor, professor of sociology

'Congratulations and thanks to Carmel and TAPOL for all their support for the people of East Timor.'

Dr Peter Carey, historian

Tyrannies are not eternal. When the wheel of history turns what had once seemed fixed and inevitable, suddenly becomes part of the tragic history of the past. Just so with Indonesia: in the past few months, since the fall of President Suharto, mass graves are being dug up, torturers and rapists put on trial, human rights and political reform everywhere talked about. Yet we must remember the time when the voices who spoke out against tyranny were few...

It was at that darkest time when thousands languished in jail and whole communities were buried alive in Irian, Aceh and Timor, that a voice was heard in distant London, a voice which spoke for those who could not speak... *Tahanan politik*, TAPOL, and its founder Carmel Budiardjo was that voice. ... Having helped bury the 'New Order', may its next quarter century see it help to build a just and democratic Indonesia. With history as its witness, may its name be written in letters of light.

HUMAN RIGHTS

John Pilger, writer and film-maker

When the people of Indonesia and East Timor are finally free, they will owe much to the unflagging work of Tapol, and especially to Carmel Budiardjo, whose brilliant determination and courage have lit up the past 25 years.

Jakob von Uexkull, Right Livelihood Award Foundation

..TAPOL has been a beacon of light for many, many people. And Carmel Budiardjo herself has been a shining example of right livelihood in having dedicated herself...to upholding fundamental human values in a part of the world where they have been so savagely flouted. TAPOL deserves the admiration and support of all right-thinking Indonesians - and of everyone concerned for human rights.

Sulak Sivaraksa, social affairs activist and Buddhist thinker

...we can reflect on the work of TAPOL and other human rights groups who have vigilantly and bravely held the flag of social justice throughout the dark years of oppression under the Suharto regime.

It is these voices which not only kept hope alive but helped to remind Indonesians...of the higher ideals of humankind: fundamental human rights for all and a vision of the future in which diverse peoples can live in peace and prosperity as one nation. This is an emerging vision in Indonesia today and one we hope will find form root in the new soil of this new era. And so we look forward to the further work of TAPOL in years to come as this voice of conscience calling Indonesians and people all over the world to enact a vision of humanity in which individuals and societies may retain their distinctiveness while living side by side in harmony and mutual respect.'

Hugh O'Shaughnessy, journalist

'On the five occasions I have visited Indonesian-occupied East Timor since I first went there in 1991 to report, I have found the East Timorese desperate to have their tragedy told to the outside world. TAPOL, to its great credit has helped with splendid effectiveness in that task.'

The messages were also received from two of TAPOL's original sponsors in 1973:

Lord Archer of Sandwell, Labour peer: '... we can be sure that many hundreds of former political prisoners owe their freedom, and even their lives, to TAPOL. The Campaign may well be proud of the past 25 years. But unhappily, its work is not complete....'

The Rev. The Lord Soper, Methodist preacher and socialist: '...(Your) publicity on behalf of the victims of oppression in Indonesia and East Timor has ensured a wider awareness of their plight and of the evils of the regime under which they suffer. I hope that sufficient pressure can be put on the new Indonesian Government to establish a just, democratic society in Indonesia where the human rights of all are safeguarded; and that before long TAPOL will have achieved its goal.' ✸

Witch-hunt in Java and Madura

At least 200 people died in Java and Madura in a wave of killings this year. In November mobs attacked Ambonese/Christian communities in Jakarta, killing more than a dozen people and destroying twenty churches and many Christian schools. These brutal actions are part of a campaign to spread instability and instil fear in the population when the need to create civil society is so critical to democracy in Indonesia.

The wave of killings, which started in East Java in January, were perpetrated by machete-wielding gangs who always struck at night. The first killings occurred in the surroundings of Banyuwangi and Jember. After some weeks, villagers started to organise themselves, often taking the law into their own hands. By October, the killings had spread to Central and West Java. The *ninja killings*, as they became known, succeeded in creating an atmosphere of fear and terror.

There have been many attempts to explain the background to these atrocities, but most people believe that members of the armed forces, ABRI, are behind the slaughter. The killer gangs were masked and dressed in black and called ninjas, after the ferocious Japanese martial art practitioners. Eyewitnesses insist that the ninja gangs are professionals because, especially during the later stages, they acted so systematically.

The victims were carefully selected and their homes surrounded and invaded by gangs of up to 20 people after the electricity in the village had been cut off. In most cases, the victims had their throats slashed. The murderers then urged the villagers to join them, creating the impression that the targeted person had been the victim of a mass execution.

The victims: *dukun santet* and *kyais*

The majority of the victims have been *dukun santet* (traditional healers who practise black magic) and *kiyais*, traditional Muslim leaders, although there are reports of local labour activists and people leading land disputes having been killed.

It started with the killing of a number of practitioners of black magic. After some time, it was the turn of the kyais. These two types stand at opposite poles in Javanese society. *Dukun santet* or witches (mostly men) are part of an old Javanese tradition and live among the Javanese *abangan*, or syncretic Muslims who identify themselves as Muslims while adhering to Javanese beliefs; *kyais* are *santris* or pious Muslims untainted by other beliefs.

East Java is the heartland of *Nahdlatul Ulama (NU)*, arguably the world's largest Muslim social organisation, which is based predominantly in rural areas. Although *kyais* nurture a deep distrust of *dukun santet* practices, these contrasting social forces have lived side-by-side peacefully for generations.

As the second wave of killings got underway, fourteen local Muslim leaders were found slain within a few days. In the absence of attempts by the security forces to apprehend the killers, terrified villagers decided to organise themselves and vigilante groups were formed armed with pitchforks and scythes. Curfews were declared, checkpoints set up and house-to-house searches were organised to try to find the *ninja*-killers.



Tit-for-tat killings have also been used to settle old scores. In some cases, local thugs were hired as hit-men to exterminate local people who had been identified as evil practitioners of black magic and disrupters of the community. With inflation now running at nearly 100 per cent, hit-men have been hired for next to nothing. In Jember, two killers were apprehended by the police after killing Mat Gundul, a villager of Glundengan who was neither a *dukun* nor a *kyai*. Under interrogation, the men said they had been hired by 'HW' for the princely sum of Rp 100,000 (about US$12).

In recent months, the killings have taken a new turn, targeting mentally-retarded people and outsiders. In one instance, scores of people under treatment in a psychiatric hospital were given free rides by strangers, driven hundreds of kilometres away and abandoned. They were then assailed as *ninjas* by the locals and often brutally executed in public, because they had no ID.

Who are the ninja killers?

The tabloid press have made some absurd claims. The black-hooded black-clad assassins are said to have supernatural powers, capable of prowling like cats on rooftops, and able to move swiftly and silently. These stories have probably been planted by intelligence agents, intent on sowing fear and confusion in the general public.

The first killings went on for several months till just before Suharto's downfall. After a few months when no killings occurred, they started again in September, this time targeting local Muslim leaders. The second wave of killings had a much clearer political agenda. The killer squads were much more professional, and soon analysts were trying to fathom what the background might be.

At first, local military leaders claimed that they were the offspring of communists, in retaliation for the mass murders in 1965 when members of the NU took part in a red drive against members of the PKI, the Communist Party. The Indonesian military are always ready to blame everything on the communist menace, but this time their ploy failed. NU leaders said it was ludicrous to speak about acts of revenge for events more than thirty years ago. The NU leader in East Java, Kyai Hasyim Muzadi, said he was convinced that hardliners in the military and officials with a strong Islamic agenda were out to create an atmosphere of social conflict and chaos. Muhammad Munir, coordinator of Kontras, the organisation that campaigns against political kidnappings, expressed the opinion that military elements are involved.

It gradually became clear that there was a distinction between the killers in the first and second waves. In the first wave, when *dukun santets* were the target, the killers were often recruited from local bandits and the unemployed who were given a list of names of people to be exterminated. Not being professional killers, their operations were rather crude. The second wave of killings appear to have been carried out more professionally.

However, none of the trained operators have been taken into custody by the police. The majority of people arrested are locals who were incited into joining in the frenzy. Local soldiers are also believed to have been involved but the ring-leaders have so far not been apprehended.

The real motive, instability

Generally speaking, people see the *ninja*-killings as a logical sequence to the overthrow of Suharto in May. Marzuki Darusman the vice-chair of *Komnas Ham,* the National Commission of Human Rights, sees the *ninja* killings as a consequence of the culture of violence that was the hallmark of the New Order. In this transitional period, the old forces are still struggling against the new forces, he says.

Many people also believe that this campaign is the brain-child of Suharto loyalists who have recruited the *ninja* killers, in order to destabilise the fragile political situation. The Habibie government is not able to wield the iron fist in the way Suharto could.

ABRI has been widely exposed for its involvement in killings, kidnappings and rapes. One of the major demands of the *reformasi* era is for the military to go back to the barracks. The sacking of Lt.General Prabowo for involvement in the kidnapping of activists earlier this year was certainly a blow, but it did not signal the end of the hard-line wing in ABRI. While he was commander of the elite corps *Kopassus,* Prabowo increased the corps from 4,000 to 6,000 men. The new units were given special training in counter-insurgency. He also organised para-military gangs in several regions, including East Timor. These anti-*reformasi* elements can easily be put to use as killers or to destabilise the community. Prabowo also recruited people from traditional martial art (*pencak-silat*) schools and organised them in para-military groups. All this has only reinforced the ingrained tradition of violence.

Many people in ABRI are unwilling to forego the political dominance they have enjoyed for more than thirty years. The message for the general public is clear: without ABRI no one is safe from the likes of *ninja* killers, only ABRI can safeguard law and order. There have been persistent reports about the defection and disappearance of several *Kopassus* platoons and as yet unsubstantiated claims that they were involved in the killings.

One suggestion is that the campaign is aimed at causing conflict within the Muslim community, in particular between ICMI, the Muslim Association of Intellectuals and NU. ICMI is very close to Habibie while NU sees Habibie as a transitional figure.

For a while it looked as if the ploy to create instability had worked. Local people together with local NU chapters started organising themselves to hunt down the ninja killers. Frustrated at the ineffectiveness of the security forces, local people took matters into their own hands. Strangers visiting a village became victims of the mob. In extreme cases, strangers who could not produce an ID card were butchered by angry mobs. In one case in Malang, a mentally retarded man was hacked to death, decapitated and his body paraded in the streets. But in the last weeks big public rallys in many different places has heightened people's awareness and understanding of this issue. The *ninja*-killings is gradually fading away.

As many political analysts argue, all these gruesome events distract attention from the real issues, investigating the wealth of the Suharto family (or more precise the misuse of Suharto's money for sinister practices) and abolishing the dual function of ABRI.

Religion in the service of terror

The mass actions by the students during the MPR Special Session pushed the issue of the *ninja*-killings into the background but a week later, on Sunday 22 November, a district in northern Jakarta was plunged into chaos when people claiming to be members of the Front for the Defence of Islam attacked Ambonese Christians employed as bouncers to guard a local gambling-hall, on the pretext that its activities disrupted Muslim worship. Stones were thrown at a local mosque giving credence to rumours that the mosque had been burnt down. This had the desired effect of inflaming local passions. Five Ambonese were seized and hacked to death and their badly mutilated bodies displayed in public. Some imams were seen egging on the mobs with shouts of 'death to the infidels'. A local Catholic church was targeted and the incident quickly took on the character of a conflict between Muslims and Christians and between Javanese and Ambonese.

Mayhem reigned for hours with mobs attacking churches in several localities and threatening congregations. In one church, they interrupted a wedding in progress, causing everyone to flee. Altogether twenty churches and many schools run by Christian organisations were burnt down or badly damaged.

On-the-spot investigations by human rights activists suggest that the incident was deliberately provoked. Men who had stoned the mosque later turned out to have false identity cards identifying them as Christians.

Fortunately, the frenzy of killing did not develop into an inter-ethnic clash in the capital. The incident bore similarities with the killings in East Java, part of the destabilisation practices that have plagued Indonesia in the past few months. According to *The Independent* [23 November], 'vested interests are hiring thugs to slow down reform by stirring up racial and religious tensions' ✸

Wim Wertheim, a man against the stream

Wim Wertheim, 90, died on 3 November 1998 after a brief illness. Few people have witnessed all the important events of the twentieth century as he did. It shaped his world view and Wim Wertheim became known as somebody who always stood up for the oppressed. His support for the Indonesian independence struggle and his relentless campaign against the Suharto regime is deeply enshrined in the hearts and minds of many Indonesians who see his death as an unbearable loss.

Willem Frederik Wertheim was born in 1907 in St. Petersburg in Tsarist Russia where his father worked for an insurance company. Although they were Jewish, his parents brought up him and his brother as Christians. Only after leaving Russia did they find out about their Jewish heritage though Judaism never played an important role in his life.

An above-average student, Wim Wertheim graduated in law at 22 and took his PhD in legal philosophy a year later. At the start of the global crisis in 1930, he and his wife Hetty moved to the Netherlands East Indies where he worked as a judge in Surabaya, bringing him face to face for the first time with the injustices of the colonial system. He had to contend with different criminal codes which treated Europeans as first class citizens.

In 1936, he became the youngest ever professor at the Law Faculty in Batavia (now Jakarta). Through close friendships with his Indonesian students, Hetty and Wim developed a deep understanding of the national aspirations of the pro-independence movement.

The Second World War brought tragedy to the Wertheim family. Unable to cope with Hitler's fascism and anti-Semitism, his parents committed suicide in 1940 but Wim heard of the tragedy only after the end of the war. In 1942, Japan invaded Indonesia and both Hetty and Wim were interned and held in prison camps with thousands of other Dutch citizens. By the time they were released, Sukarno and Hatta had proclaimed Indonesia's independence.

During his three years of Japanese internment, Wertheim engaged in profound discussions with other Dutch intellectuals, notably Theo van Tijn and Jaap de Haas. As a result, Wertheim's political views moved sharply to the left and the Wertheims joined the ranks of a small minority of Dutch who sided with the Indonesian nationalists.

Sixty years of solidarity with Indonesia

Back in Holland, he became actively involved in a pressure group called *Vereniging Nederland-Indonesië,* an association that opposed the Dutch colonial wars in 1947 and 1949 in Indonesia and actively supported the young Indonesian republic. The association had many prominent Dutch and Indonesians members.

In the fifties and sixties Wertheim's academic achievements soared and he became a sociologist of world renown. Under his guidance, Asian studies in the Netherlands were transformed from a discipline dominated by colonial-minded academics to a forward-looking discipline. He was directly responsible for promoting a variety of disciplines in Asian studies like history, sociology and political science. He helped to found the radical Social and Political Science Faculty in 1948 and in the early sixties he established a new discipline called Non-Western Sociology. He became the first professor in this discipline and many of his students saw themselves as Wertheimites. His specialisms were Indonesia and China and he wrote several books and numerous articles on both countries. A topic that was close to his heart was peasant revolts in Asia. Combined with his greatly admired teaching skills, Wertheim won recognition as one of the country's leading social scientists.

During the roaring sixties and seventies, he became a political activist. During the anti-Vietnam war demonstrations in Holland, Wertheim was a familiar figure in the many teach-ins. The activist student generation of the day in Holland cut their teeth politically inspired by the wisdom of Wertheim.

Suharto's seizure of power in Jakarta was greeted with great enthusiasm by the West but from the very start, Wim Wertheim took a principled stand against the *Orde Baru.* In 1968, he became a founder-member of the Dutch Indonesia Committee and for many years he was one of its foremost activists.

The fact that he outlived the *Orde Baru* and lived to see Suharto's downfall was one of the greatest pleasures in his old age.

Tracing Suharto's complicity

Beyond doubt, Wim Wertheim deserves recognition as one of the most prominent anti-Suharto campaigners. Relentlessly over the years he campaigned against the *Orde Baru,* demanded the release of the political prisoners, called for an end to aid for the Suharto regime and campaigned for the right of self-determination for East Timor.

But Wertheim also became known as one of the first who doggedly tried to piece together the facts about the events in October 1965: the so-called Untung Coup, the killing of six generals and the takeover by Suharto. In 1968, in an lengthy interview with *Le Monde,* Wertheim produced the first evidence of the close relationship between Suharto and the Untung plotters. The 1965 tragedy, later known as the G30S affair, became a heated issue among many Indonesianists. It became part of Wertheim's life works to prove Suharto's involvement in the 1965 events and over the years, he produced many articles on

the topic. In 1995 he gave enthusiastic encouragement to the production and publication of *Tragedi Kemanusiaan,* a 600-page book by M.R.Siregar, the first comprehensive account in Bahasa Indonesia of the events in 1965. *TAPOL* published the book.

Campaigning on Indonesia in the seventies and eighties was a lonely quest, especially as compared with issues like South Africa and Chile. Suharto was hailed as a beacon of stability for western investors and western governments applauded his staunch anti-communism credentials. Campaigners in the Indonesia Committee were seen by mainstream politicians as part of the world Communist movement. The mainstream press generally lumped Wim Wertheim in this basket as well, although he never joined any political party. The press were in two minds about how to treat this stubborn, elderly Dutchman: on one hand he was a left-winger with contemptible ideas but on the other, he had impeccable academic credentials.

Wertheim's consistent views on the Suharto dictatorship have proven to be correct but more often than not, the mainstream press in Holland, nurturing their deeply-held prejudices, refused to give him the space to air his views.

We in *TAPOL* cherish a long and fruitful working relationship with Wim Wertheim. He wrote a number of articles for *TAPOL Bulletin* and frequently shared his thoughts and resources with us.

Wertheim's message to TAPOL

Since its establishment in 1973, I have been closely involved in the highly significant work accomplished by TAPOL. From the early 1980s, in spite of the fact that most *tapols* had been released, its continuation was as important as hitherto since nothing had basically changed as far as the lack of human rights under the Suharto New Order regime was concerned.

'Has the situation changed basically since Suharto's fall...? There are still are a good many political prisoners still in jail, some of whom have been imprisoned for 30 years. But what counts most of all is that the central role of ABRI...is still unchanged.

'As long as Suharto's role in the successive coups in October 1965 and March 1966 has not been cleared up and the massacres...in that period have not become a main issue of the *reformasi* movement, the temporary victory of that movement through greater *keterbukaan* (openness) in the Indonesian media, cannot be viewed as guaranteed.

'The continuation of TAPOL's activity is therefore still very necessary.' ✸

Active to the end

Wim Wertheim retired from the University of Amsterdam in 1972 but remained active both in academia and in political affairs. He followed global events closely and kept in close contact with the many friends in Indonesia. His contacts in Indonesia were not only limited to the older generation; many people from the younger generation of activists made their way to his day-care home in Wageningen.

OBITUARY

In 1997, his last book, *Third World, Whence and Whither?* was published, taking a strong position against the globalisation of the market. Long before the Asian economic crisis, Wertheim had already predicted the economic meltdown. A few weeks before he fell ill, we told him about an important project being prepared in Jakarta: the first serious effort to cope with the 1965 tragedy and to rewrite history according to the facts. Wertheim was brimming with enthusiasm and said he would go to Jakarta to give a lecture on the topic. Alas, that was not to be.

Wim Wertheim is no longer with us. We have lost a personal friend and a political mentor. We will have to get used to the fact that he is no longer there to answer the phone and advise us on many different matters.

We remember him as a man of grand ideas, a strategic thinker. We can best serve his memory by continuing to work on his visionary ideas. ✸

Liem Soei Liong

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and home to Mobil Oil Indonesia.

In the afternoon ABRI arrived with reinforcements and sealed Lhokseumawe off for three hours. Incidents like this are being used by ABRI to justify increasing the number of troops in the region.

Shoot-out at Kandang

Two weeks later, on 15 November, there was a shoot-out in Kandang. The anti-riot police *Brimob* were allegedly seeking to arrest a GAM leader who recently returned from Malaysia. The shoot-out which took place very early in the morning resulted in two deaths - one *Brimob* and one member of GAM. A number of villagers were taken to hospital with bullet wounds. ✸

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Indonesian troops should be withdrawn from East Timor and called on the United Nations to place a peace-keeping force in the country to monitor the repressive actions of the Indonesian army against the civilian population.

After 24 hours, the students marched to the governor's residence to demand permission to enter the area. They succeeded in holding face-to-face talks with the governor and the military commander who agreed to allow student representatives to take part in a joint investigation into the reported killings in Alas, along with human rights groups. Although this was hailed as a victory for the students, many of their supporters were sceptical about the chances of this happening. [*The Irish Times,* 25 November]

Meanwhile, under pressure from foreign governments who were pressing for information through their embassies in Jakarta, the military commander Colonel Suratman announced on 21 November that military operations in Alas were to end. A spokesperson for the Peace and Justice Commission told *The Irish Times* he feared that even if they did end, they would only shift to other areas. 'There is no substantial change in how the military arrest, interrogate and torture people.' he said. ✸

The findings of the *TGPF*

After being twice postponed, the findings of the TGPF (Joint Fact-Finding Team) were eventually made public in early November. Its task was daunting: to explain what happened during the hectic days in May just prior to Suharto's removal from power, days which were marred by riots, large-scale looting and the mass raping of mostly Chinese women. Its findings had been eagerly awaited.

Initially, human rights organisations had serious misgivings about the *TGPF*, the Joint Fact-Finding Team, primarily because it had been set up by five government departments. The outrage at home and abroad as news of the riots and rapes began to emerge forced the government to initiate an inquiry. This is how the *TGPF* was born. Its brief was to undertake an investigation and make recommendations, though it would be up to the government to decide whether or not to act on the recommendations.

The Team started its work on 23 July. The members included three army officers and two police officers as well as representatives from the justice and home affairs departments, the foreign ministry, the department for women's affairs and the attorney-general's office. Non-governmental organisations were also represented including the NU, the main Muslim organisation, and several civil society organisations such as the Legal Aid Institute *YLBHI, Elsam, APIK* and the Volunteers Team for Humanity. Marzuki Darusman of the *Komnas Ham*, the National Commission of Human Rights, was chosen to chair the Team.

When the *TGPF* called a press conference on 3 November to announce its findings, hundreds of people from the press and the public were present but the four cabinet ministers and the Attorney-General who should have been there to receive the report were conspicuous by their absence. It was not difficult to conclude that they already knew that the findings would be very damaging to the government and ABRI.

One of the fundamental flaws of the Team was the inclusion of several people from ABRI. The most critical question for the Team was to examine the involvement of sections of the security apparatus in those horrific events in May. Some human rights organisations refused to participate on the grounds that the *TGPF* lacked independence while others decided to participate, arguing that the investigations should not be left to the authorities. *Tim Relawan,* the NGO which had done so much to monitor the acts of violence, hesitated but in the end was persuaded to join after a special plea was made to Father Sandyawan, the group's coordinator, known widely as Romo Sandy.

State violence

Not long after the May events and long before the *TGPF* was set up, *Tim Relawan* had announced its own findings which were widely reported in the press. [See *TAPOL Bulletin,* No 148, September 1998] *Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan* (Team of Volunteers for Humanitarian Causes) is widely respected and has a large network of volunteers. It has won esteem for its reliability in monitoring many human rights abuses especially at the time of the assault on the headquarters of the PDI in July 1996.

The *Tim Relawan's* conclusions were that the violence in May was systematic and well organised. Witnesses had testified that there were men inciting people to loot and burn property and participate in gang-rapes. They were described as muscular men wearing military boots who looked very much like hit-men.

In a statement to members of the US Congress during a visit to Washington earlier this year, Romo Sandy said that the May tragedy was part of a series of events having their roots in the elite politics of the *Orde Baru.* The *Tim Relawan's* investigations had led them to conclude that a fierce power struggle was underway at the time of the riots. Romo Sandy said that bloodbaths and riots were part of a pattern of bloodshed that characterised politics during the *Orde Baru.* Many political observers in Indonesia had concluded that Suharto loyalists and Suharto himself were worried about the growing ferment of protest which had spilled onto the streets. They believed that by provoking violence and mayhem, it would be possible to justify the imposition of martial law. But internal ABRI conflicts and the strength of opposition in civil society put paid to these intentions.

The death of Ita Marthadinata

By adopting such a strong position against the security apparatus, *Tim Relawan* became one of the spearheads challenging militarism, making it the target of dark forces. During the course of their investigations, several leading members of the *Tim Relewan* had received mysterious phone-calls and other forms of harassment warning them not to continue.

The intimidation continued after the *TGPF* started its own investigations and came to a head with the murder (date???) of Ita Marthadinata, an 18-year old high school student and active member of *Tim Relawan* just as the *TGPF* investigations had reached a critical point. Ita's mother helped run a Buddhist centre that was providing counselling for the rape victims and she and her daughter were planning to escort four rape victims to the US to testify.

Ita was found dead in her room with multiple stab wounds and a slashed throat. Her death inevitably spread fear among *Tim Relawan* volunteers many of whom refused to continue with their work.

Ita had hardly been laid to rest before the authorities started a smear campaign. In clear violation of professional

ethics, Sarlito, a senior psychologist close to the military, alleged in a statement to the press that a post-mortem had shown that Ita had been sexually active and was probably a drug addict. Acting with a speed that rarely distinguishes police investigations, a young man living next door was taken into custody and charged with Ita's murder. It was clear that the authorities were bent on creating the impression that Ita 's murder was just a straight-forward crime.

The impact of Ita's tragic death was devastating for the *TGPF*, making the task of cross-checking the *Tim Relawan*'s findings almost impossible. Some rape victims changed their minds about testifying or simply disappeared and several doctors who were treating rape victims now denied that this was so.

TGPF's impossible task

In a way *TGPF* was replicating the investigations that had already been carried out by the *Tim Relawan.* The conclusions by the *Tim Relawan* had been widely acclaimed and had further eroded ABRI's image. During the Suharto era, independent fact-finding teams had been set up by NGOs but their conclusions had been largely ignored. On the few occasions when ABRI had been compelled to carry out investigations, the findings were nothing more than a whitewash with a few low-ranking soldiers taking the blame for horrific bloodbaths such as the Santa Cruz Massacre in November 1991.

The composition of the *TGPF* did little to inspire confidence that now, things would be different. In theory the Team's investigations were supposed to be confidential but there were a number of leaks, highlighting conflicts between members of the Team about practically everything, in particular the political thrust and the conclusions of its report. The ABRI members refused to accept that the riots and mass rapes had been systematic, a clear example of violence perpetrated by the state apparatus. Although the contradictions were deeply entrenched, the *TGPF* eventually reached a compromise. After three months' work and two postponements, the findings were made public on 3 November.

The Team concluded that the riots had been provoked by provocateurs who were not local people and who identified the targets, were trained in the use of instruments of torture, had the means to communicate with each other. It said that there was evidence that implicated members of the security forces.

Prabowo and Sjafrie to go on trial?

However, at his press conference, the *TGPF* chair Marzuki Darusman went much farther. He made it clear that members of the military and political elite were directly involved in the riots and had instigated the atrocities in the hope that by provoking chaos, they could justify the imposition of martial law. Marzuki mentioned the name of Lt General Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-law, suggesting that he might have been the brains behind the operation. Another name mentioned who also, like Prabowo, was a senior member of *Kopassus*, the notorious red berets elite troops, was Major-General Sjafrie Sjamsoeddin who was the military commander of Jakarta at the time of the riots. He said that these officers should be held responsible for the riots. Regarding Sjafrie in particular, Marzuki said that he should take responsibility for the fact that the security forces under his command had done nothing to contain the spread of violence. With such strong accusations levelled against him, the chances are that Major-General Sjafrie could soon face prosecution. The chances of Prabowo facing court-martial following his expulsion from the army appear to have diminished as he is now reported to be in Germany 'for reasons of health'.



Another burning issue raised by Marzuki was a mysterious meeting or series of meetings that took place at the headquarters of *Kostrad,* the army's strategic command, on 14 May, while the rioting and rapes were at their height. Several top-ranking army officers including Prabowo and Sjafrie and a number of civilians including the lawyer Buyung Nasution, Hashim Djojohadikusumo, Prabowo's brother, and others were present the meeting. Analysts suggest that other, more strategic meetings took place on the same day in *Kostrad.* The discussions which took place still remain a mystery.

Mass rapes

The *TGPF* came to the conclusion that 85 persons had been victims of sexual violence, of whom 52 had been raped. Fifteen of the 52 victims of rape had given personal testimony or their cases had been verified by the Indonesian Medical Association. The other 37 cases were based on evidence from family members, witnesses or medical counsellors. Given the pressure under which it had operated, it is a wonder that the *TGPF* was able record so many cases. Members of the Assistance Team which had undertaken the investigations on behalf of the *TGPF* later commented that if they had been given more time, they would have been able to track down many more victims. Considering its limitations, the *TGPF* is to congratulated for achieving these results. This is a victory for civil society and a defeat for the military. ✸

Suharto's role in the 1965 coup

'Pelurusan sejarah' or 're-writing history' is very much in the air in post-Suharto Indonesia. And what people mean by this is re-writing the history of the events in October 1965 which brought Suharto to power. Among those now accusing Suharto of direct involvement are even people who served in his government for years.

For 32 years, the New Order régime has kept a tight lid on the history of Suharto's seizure of power. The official version asserts that the kidnap and murder of six army generals on the night of 30 September - 1 October 1965 was masterminded by the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI, that Major-General Suharto speedily mobilised his *KOSTRAD* and *RPKAD* troops to foil troops under the command of the 'G30S' (30 September Movement) rebellion, and that three months later, on 11 March 1966, the then president, Sukarno, handed over full powers to him in a letter, on the basis of which he proceeded to ban the PKI and its associated mass organisations and to arrest a number of ministers appointed by Sukarno.

Nothing is written in Indonesian history books about the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of alleged communists and the arrest and persecution of hundreds of thousands more, or the conviction of hundreds of people by kangaroo courts that have led to dozens of people being judicially executed or held in prison for decades. (Ten 1965 convicted prisoners still remain in prison of whom four are under sentence of death; all ten were arrested in the late 1960s.)

The G30S/PKI spectre

The spectre of the G30S/PKI and the PKI's alleged murderous conspiracy has been used to terrorise the entire population and prevent discussion about what really happened. School history books are all based on Suharto's version, there are museums and monuments dedicated to driving home the same message. School children have been taken to these 'sacred' places to din the message in, and for more than fifteen years, all TV companies have been required to show a four-and-a-half hour film on 1 October, giving a grotesque depiction of the heinous deeds of Indonesian communists and their allies.

As a former political prisoner once wrote in *TAPOL Bulletin:*

Here in Indonesia, people are still misled by symbols, primarily the G30S/PKI symbol.... It is a matter of life and death for the Suharto military regime which now rules the country to prevent their lies surrounding the symbols from being exposed for what they are. The patriotic forces of the people will not be able to restore democracy in Indonesia as long as the G30S/PKI symbol still clouds their vision, as long as we regard the symbols created by the regime as sacrosanct. [*TAPOL Bulletin,* No 71, September 1985]

Autopsy cover-up

One member of the team of forensic experts which examined the bodies of the generals murdered by the G30S conspirators has now spoken publicly about the results of the autopsies which were never made public in Indonesia.

To understand the significance of his testimony, it should be recalled that immediately after 1 October 1965, the armed forces fuelled the flames of anti-communist hysteria by alleging that the bodies of the murdered generals had been mutilated, that their eyes had been gouged and the penises slashed. Women from the left-wing women's organisation, *Gerwani* were alleged to have perpetrated these atrocities, setting the stage for a fanatical wave of killings against a movement whose women affiliates had supposedly engaged in such horrific practices. These claims which were published widely in the army-controlled press helped whip up the frenzy that led to the wave of killings in 1965/1966 which left up to a million communist suspects dead.

Professor Arif Budianto was the youngest member of the seven-man team that carried out the autopsies, the only surviving member still living in Indonesia. He was collected from his home on the evening of 4 October 1965 by a company of troops from *KOSTRAD* - then under the command of Suharto - driven to the military hospital, and taken to the autopsy room to examine the bodies of the six generals and one sentry killed on 1 October. They worked through the night in order to complete their work by the morning. He said that Major-General Suharto was present in the room for much of the time.

His own examination of the body of General Yani showed that the eye-balls had come loose from the sockets but this was because the body had been submerged in water for several days, not because they had been gouged out.

Because they had read reports in the press that the penises had been slashed, they examined the penises very carefully but found no evidence of incisions or cuts. All the sexual organs were intact and they were able to confirm that one of the victims had not been circumcised.

The bodies bore many bullet wounds which were clearly the cause of death. Some were badly bruised but this was probably because they had been thrown down the well in Lubang Buaya where the conspirators had their headquarters.

'When it came to writing up our findings, we were all very frightened about the consequences of our findings. The reports circulating about the bodies were clearly untrue and greatly exaggerated. As the youngest member of the team, my turn to speak came last. I said that our duty was to the state and the Almighty so we would have to tell the truth. I stressed this and said that if we were later accused of doing something wrong and landed up in prison, so be it. But I felt convinced that if we told the truth, this would not

happen. However, the truth about our findings was never made public here in Indonesia although our findings were later published in the US.' [*Forum Keadilan,* 3 October 1998]

The reference here is to the publication in the Cornell University publication, *Indonesia* of the seven autopsies translated by Ben Anderson who discovered the documents while browsing through some trial records. The details tally with what Professor Budianto has said, though the fear and anguish experienced by the forensic experts has only now been described. His account also reveals that Suharto closely monitored the work of the autopsy team and knew about their findings but decided to conceal them from the public so that he could go on lying about the 'depravities of the Gerwani women'.

Dewi Sukarno on Suharto's two coups

One of the many people with a different explanation of what happened is Dewi Sukarno, the Japanese-born widow of President Sukarno, who spent the days leading up to 1 October with her husband. In a well-attended press conference in Jakarta, she described how stories were circulating at the time about a 'Council of Generals' which was about to launch a coup against the President. On hearing this, some hot-headed middle-ranking officers, including Lt-Colonel Untung from the Cakrabirawa palace guard, decided to capture several generals and bring them to the head of state to answer for these plans. 'I'm absolutely certain they wanted to protect Sukarno though their way of doing it was very wrong. I am quite sure they never told the soldiers who captured the generals to murder them.'

In those early days, it was immediately alleged that the PKI was responsible although there was no proof at all. Suharto then sent out his men to carry out massacres which led to the slaughter of 1.2 million people during the next four years.

'It was Suharto who committed the major betrayal because he refused to carry out the instructions of his superior (Sukarno). 1 October is the day on which Suharto carried out his first coup against Sukarno.' This refers to Sukarno's instruction to General Pranoto .... to head the army which Suharto refused to recognise, instead taking over command of the army himself.

The second Suharto coup, she said, took place on 11 March 1966 when a cabinet meeting was underway at the palace in Jakarta. The palace was surrounded by unidentified troops, forcing Sukarno to escape by helicopter. 'When he arrived at the Bogor Palace, that too was in the hands of the army and three generals were there waiting for him. The two presidential palaces were occupied by troops. If that's not a coup, then what is?'

Suharto has been unable to produce the letter signed by Sukarno in Bogor on 11 March, allegedly giving him full powers. One of the mysteries much talked about over the past few years is that the original of this document, Sukarno's 11 March 1966 Instruction to Suharto, has been 'lost'.

Dewi Sukarno also accused Suharto of plotting the slow death of her husband. She herself was forced to leave the country while Sukarno was kept under close guard while his health deteriorated. 'I was not allowed to return until 18 June 1970, by which time he was in a deep coma. I pleaded with his five doctors to treat him but they said they were unable to do anything without Suharto's permission. [*Waspada,* 8 October 1998]

Ex-minister on Suharto's involvement

A former minister who served in several of Suharto's cabinets after 1965 and was also deputy speaker of the Supreme Consultative Assembly, the MPR, told a public meeting in Jakarta that he had evidence to show that Suharto in 1965 was acting in collaboration with the US and UK secret services, the CIA and MI6.

Mashuri, who was minister of information and later minister of education in two post-1965 cabinets, told a seminar held to discuss 'Suharto's Role in Indonesian History' that Suharto maintained links with the US and UK secret services through Dr Budiono Kertapati, an operative of the Dutch secret service. Mashuri also spoke at length about Suharto's links with one of the G30S conspirators, Colonel Latief, who informed him two hours in advance of their intention to kidnap seven generals (one of whom, Nasution, escaped).

Mashuri, who was a neighbour of Suharto at the time, said that Suharto was not at home when the kidnappings occurred but only appeared afterwards. He later claimed that he knew nothing about what was going to happen.[*Republika,* 10 November] ✸

NEW PUBLICATION

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Under the Indonesian jackboot

Leaked army documents confirm that East Timor remains heavily militarised despite persistent Indonesian claims that troop levels have been reduced. They also provide, for the first time, a comprehensive picture of the army's structure and the depth of its penetration of East Timorese political, economic and social life.

The 100 pages of documents found their way from East Timor to a solidarity activist in Australia in October. They originated from the Territorial Military Command in Den Pasar, Bali, which commands the Regional Military Command in East Timor, Korem 164. No one has denied the documents' authenticity, including 'diplomatic sources' quoted in the press.

In general, the documents confirm what we have known for many years, that East Timor is a heavily militarised country where the armed forces (ABRI) exercise a tight grip on everyday life. They prove that ABRI regard East Timor as a place where they must maintain a pervasive presence to suppress those opposed to the occupation.

The documents also prove, contrary to official claims, that overall troop levels in the territory have increased this year and that combat troops, far from being phased out, have increased and amount to nearly 40 per cent. of the total troop strength.

They show that the para-military forces are under the direct command of ABRI and are not independent vigilantes outside the command structure as is usually claimed. Furthermore, all the key posts within the civilian administration are occupied by army personnel.

The civil defence units, which are also a key element in the control of Timorese society, trained and armed by ABRI, are barely mentioned.


The number of troops

In August this year, regular soldiers totalled 17,941. With the addition of the military personnel from the civil service and the so-called *wanra* or 'people's resistance' units, the total was 21, 620.

Since the beginning of Suharto's New Order, the Indonesian state has been heavily militarised. However, the figures show that the militarisation of East Timor far exceeds Indonesia as a whole. In 1995, ABRI had 507,137 troops for around 200 million Indonesians (1:400). In East Timor, it now has nearly 18,000 regular soldiers for no more than 700,000 people (1:56), proportionately seven times the number.

The composition of the troops

The key tables in the documents divide the troops into two categories: *organik* or territorial troops, who are stationed in the territory on a semi-permanent (usually three months or longer) basis; and *penugasan* or combat



troops deployed from outside to fight the guerrillas and quell rebellion in the towns and villages.

The tables are for November and December 1997 and for July, early August and August this year.

Between November 1997 and August 1998, there was an increase of 2,029 troops from 15,912 to 17,941 (11.3 per cent.), which consisted almost entirely of combat troops. These figures give the lie to the much-publicised Indonesian claim that troops were reduced in July and August and that those remaining were almost all territorial.

The same tables also include figures for 'non-ABRI' civil service and 'people's resistance' forces. While almost all the civil service forces were attached to the territorial troops, more than 60 per cent of the 'people's resistance troops served with the combat troops. These 'non-ABRI' forces numbered just under 4,000 and remained virtually unchanged over the nine-month period.

Medical corps personnel, scores of whom were alleged to have been brought in to replace the departing combat troops in August, amounted to no more than 84 persons.

In August 1998, just under half the territorial troops were attached to the 13 district military commands (*Kodims)*, the largest of which were at Baucau, Lospalos and Manatuto. A further contingent was spread between the 13 police districts, notably at Dili, Baucau and Bobonaro

Most of the remaining territorial troops were serving in Battalions 744 and 745. Although these battalions include a sizeable number of East Timorese, all the command positions are occupied by Indonesian officers. This pattern

was introduced following desertions by many East Timorese officers holding positions of command in the 1980s (see below).

The combat troops in August included five infantry battalions, each of around 985 men, from various parts of Indonesia, 'special duty land forces' (*Satgas Darat*), *Kopassus* commandos (*Satgas Tribuana*), and 'special duty engineers' (*Satgas Zipur*).

The *Kopassus* units listed are known to be trainee units, confirming that East Timor is used as a training ground for the army's elite troops. The documents show that there was a switch round in *Kopassus* units between July and August, evidence that the troops which departed on 28 July in a blaze of publicity were replaced by other elite troops a few days later.

By far the largest number of 'people's resistance forces' are attached to the *Kopassus* units, making them the largest single contingent of combat troops.

There is no mention in any of the documents of *Menwa* the student regiments that exist in all Indonesian universities. These units, which are directed and trained by the local military commands, have the task of keeping a close watch on their fellow students. We know for certain that there is a *Menwa* with about 300 members in the University of East Timor in Dili.

Brimob, the riot police

The role of the police - and in particular *Brimob* (*Brigade Mobil*, Mobile Brigade), a special police task force in charge of riot control - in maintaining public order has increased recently in an unsuccessful attempt to bolster the image of the security forces. *Brimob* personnel are equipped with weaponry such as water cannon and armoured personal carriers and in major Indonesian cities they have been responsible for much of the brutality against peaceful protesters. They have replicated this role in East Timor.

The documents show that more than 1,000 *Brimob* personnel are stationed in East Timor. In August, 633 men served in territorial units and 380 were attached to combat units.

Brimob companies continue to arrive in East Timor. At the end of October, three companies arrived from Bali and Kalimantan 'to help maintain civil order' [AFP, 28 October 1998]. We do not know if they were replacing other Brimob troops, but it is clear that East Timor has a higher concentration of riot police per head of population than anywhere else in Indonesia.

The army's presence in every village

A total of 464 non-commissioned officers (*babinsa*) are stationed in the villages of East Timor. With a *babinsa* post in every village, grassroots surveillance is far more intense than in Indonesia where as a rule each *babinsa* post covers a group of villages. More than 400 of the *babinsa* appear to be Timorese, though some names suggest that they are from West not East Timor.

Babinsa officers are the 'eyes and ears' of the occupation forces, collecting intelligence on a regular basis. By using Timorese, ABRI aim to set Timorese against Timorese in line with the classic colonial policy of 'divide and rule'. However, many Timorese *babinsas* may share the sentiments of the villagers they supervise.

East Timorese members of ABRI

The armed forces have sought to emphasise their success in recruiting East Timorese, but their policy has not been a notable success.

It is clear for a start that Timorese soldiers are in the lower ranks only. There is not a single East Timorese above the rank of major. Even the three majors are all 'ex-Tropas', former members of the Portuguese army disbanded in 1975, likely to be well above active-service age.

More than 90 per cent. (5,505 out of 6,095) of the Timorese are corporals or privates. This is hardly a record to be proud of after 23 years of recruitment efforts. Many East Timorese who trained as officers are known to have deserted over the years, in most cases joining the ranks of the armed resistance.

Battalions 744 (based in Los Palos) and 745 (Baucau) are always referred to as 'East Timorese battalions', but the August tables reveal that fewer than one-third of the men are East Timorese. The two battalions are also much smaller than normal, indicating a failure to recruit Timorese in sufficient numbers. The battalions were set up in the early 1980s with members mostly recruited from East Timorese civil defence units known as *hansips*. Many officers later deserted, after turning on their 'battalion comrades'.

It appears that the Indonesians regard the Timorese under arms as a security risk, hence the majority of Timorese soldiers are spread out among the territorial troops stationed in the 13 military command districts.

Para-military teams

The para-military teams, which figure so aggressively in intelligence operations, spying on and helping to capture suspects and creating an atmosphere of fear, are likely to include a large number of Timorese. They work closely with the intelligence units of *Kopassus*, known as the SGI, whose brutal methods of interrogation and torture are widely feared in East Timor.

It is an integral part of the army's doctrine to recruit members of the community to serve the interests of the armed forces in so-called 'people's defence' and to undermine the resistance of the people by pitting Timorese against Timorese. This explains the use of the term 'resistance forces' for these insidious units.

The listing of 12 teams (one for almost every military command) in these official army documents nails the lie that these para-military forces are not incorporated as a part of ABRI but are 'independently managed' vigilante units.

There is no mention of what is thought to be the largest and most infamous para-military group, *Gadapaksi*. *Gadapaksi* is the brain-child of former *Kopassus* commander Lt.General Prabowo. Prabowo's recent fall from grace may explain why loyalties are shifting. Recently, some Gadapaksi hirelings were reported to have joined in calls for the resignation of the governor, Osorio Soares, one of Prabowo closest cronies.

The 13th item on the list of 'resistance forces' consists of 54 'respected citizens and local leaders'. These are the traditional or informal leaders, possibly including some pro-Indonesian priests, which the Indonesians use to

bolster their control over the community at large. These traditional leaders are also relied on to 'nurture' members of the para-military teams.

Altogether there are 1,188 para-militaries. During the period covered by the documents, 11 men were killed in action (*gugur*), which suggests that they are also used in armed conflict with the guerrillas.

ABRI dominates the civil administration

An August 1998 document lists 83 ABRI officers occupying top executive posts and 57 officers who are members of the first and second-level assemblies (*DPRD-I* and 13 *DPRD-II* assemblies). These are the so-called *karyawan* appointments, which reflect the implementation of ABRI's *dwifungsi* or dual function doctrine.

The army assembly members are not elected but appointed to hold seats set aside for the armed forces, four in each of the *DPRD-II* assemblies and nine in the *DPRD-I* assembly. As in all regional and district assemblies throughout Indonesia and in the national Parliament, the army officers are there to control the activities and decisions of these rubber-stamp legislatures.

As for the executive posts, 19 key positions - including the Deputy-governor and two assistant governors - are held by *karyawan* appointees in the first-level regional administration (*Dati-I*), and 64 in the second-level or district (*Dati-II*) administrations.

Army executives

The array of officers holding key strategic administration posts is part and parcel of the way in which the forces of occupation control the population, resources and economy. Rui Gomes, who until his defection in 1997 was Head of Research at East Timor Regional Planning Board, told TAPOL, 'the kitchen must be rigorously controlled by means of a system which manages all the colony's physical and human resources'.

The deputy governor shadows the governor, a post which for political reasons has always been occupied by an East Timorese. Just as the governor has always been Timorese, so his deputy has always been a senior-ranking military man. The assistant governors are on hand to ensure the smooth running of the governor's office to safeguard the vested interests of military and non-military Indonesians.

Ten officers head a range of offices which penetrate down to the lowest levels of society (for example, the Social-Political Directorate, the State Ideology Directorate and its Education Department and the Communications Office). Officials have powers to exercise strategic control over the people in the conduct of their everyday lives and to oversee indoctrination. For example, according to Rui Gomes, the Communications Office keeps tabs on all official correspondence between the province and Jakarta, it handles the affairs of East Timorese given scholarships at Indonesian universities and handles the trips to Indonesia or overseas of all local government officials.

Other posts include the chiefs of trade and industry, co-operatives, and the logistics agency and the director of the Regional Development Bank, which together control all the colony's economic and commercial activities and safeguard the financial resources of army-related business activities.

The head and secretary of the Regional Planning Board - *Bappeda* - control the use of resources and ensure that the proceeds of projects are distributed 'fairly' among officers, officials and business enterprises in East Timor and Jakarta. As a rule, all projects requiring more than Rp. 500 million are assigned to businesses in Java as businesses in East Timor are unable to provide the necessary capital. The *Bappeda* executives determine the funding agencies which may operate in East Timor, the types of building projects, and the listing of 'poor villages' which is a way of acquiring additional funds from Jakarta.

Local-based executives

The 64 *Dati-II karyawan* appointees include three district heads (*bupati*), three district secretaries, 13 heads of social-political departments (one for each district), two staff members of social-political departments, 11 heads of district civil defence offices, 31 village heads, and one head of a district co-operative department.

Since ten of the thirteen district head posts are occupied by non-military East Timorese, visiting journalists and diplomats are expected to be impressed. Social and political ('sos-pol') control is, however, in the hands of *karyawan* officers through sos-pol offices in every district. Sos-pol heads at all levels of the civil administration in Indonesia, from departmental ministries down, are invariably occupied by active-service or retired ABRI officers.

Surprisingly, there are 31 *karyawan* village heads, positions which, one would have thought, would always be held by East Timorese. The 31 villages are not identified, but it is safe to assume that they are in highly sensitive regions where the security situation is unstable.

All the *karyawan* executives function as an extension of the military establishment and remain firmly under military discipline. Although they wear civilian dress, they do not treat their co-workers as equals and expect, and receive, the deference due to army personnel. Their presence is a constant source of friction and fear in the civilian offices which they oversee.

ABRI could lose most of their *karyawan* positions in East Timor if the Habibie/Alatas duo go ahead with their offer of autonomy for East Timor. In the Indonesian version of autonomy, all the key positions in the administration should logically be filled by East Timorese which means ABRI will lose much of the iron grip they hold over the territory.

The documents show conclusively that army penetration of the provincial and local administration in East Timor is overwhelming. The military's *dwifungsi* doctrine is enforced with particular vigour. It is not enough, therefore, to call for the withdrawal of all Indonesian troops from East Timor. We must also call for the demilitarisation of the civil administration and the removal of all army appointees holding executive and legislative positions. ✸

TAPOL is indebted to George Aditjondro for comments on the documents, to Andrew McNaughtan for transcribing these comments, and to Rui Gomes and John Roosa for their comments. This is a shortened version of TAPOL's analysis. The full version is available on request, published as ***TAPOL Occasional Reports No. 26,*** *£ 1.00 incl. postage.* ✸

Are the forces of occupation losing control?

In a sudden reversal of strategy, the forces of occupation in East Timor have lashed out against the population in the remote region of Alas while more troops flood in amid reports of new military operations against Falintil. This is in response to the many public meetings held in the occupied country, calling for a referendum and the release of Xanana Gusmao.

Already in June, students from the University of East Timor and from a number of academies, meeting under the umbrella of the *Dewan Solidaritas Mahasiswa Lorosae* (East Timor Students' Solidarity Council), decided to initiate discussions on the question of East Timor's future. According to the Council's leader Antero Bendito da Silva, during a brief visit to London, the aim was to build an awareness among the East Timorese of their existence as a nation and to strengthen people's knowledge about the principles of democracy and differences of opinion.

Teams were dispatched to many parts of the country where meetings were held to discuss these issues and East Timor's right to a referendum. In many places the meetings were held without too much interference, but elsewhere, the military stepped in, blocking students on their journeys or preventing meetings from taking place.

Jakarta offers autonomy

In June, Indonesia's president announced that 'special status' was on offer and Foreign Minister Ali Alatas started talking about 'wide-ranging autonomy' for East Timor. Although the proposal is now under discussion at the UN talks between Indonesia and Portugal, it has aroused widespread opposition in East Timor where it is seen as a move by Jakarta to maintain control over the territory. The Indonesians also allege that a referendum would only provoke conflict and even civil war because the East Timorese are so divided on the issue.

Recognising the need to bring together all sides in the argument over autonomy or referendum, the two Catholic bishops, Carlos Filipe Belo in Dili and Basilio Nascimento in Baucau convened a two-day dialogue in Dare on 10-11 September attended by many parties and groups. An 11-point statement was adopted, acknowledging the right to differences of opinion and the need for 'further efforts to realise a common platform to unite the people of Lorosae, leading to the establishment of a representative forum for all East Timorese'. [*Jakarta Post,* 14 September]

Meanwhile, more than seven hundred East Timorese graduates from universities in Indonesia and overseas have set up a Graduates' Forum for a Referendum and the Development of East Timor called *Forsarepetil.* In its very first communiqué it called for the release of Xanana and all East Timorese political prisoners, an end to all forms of violence and the disarming of Indonesia's para-military units.

Soon afterwards, fourteen political prisoners being held in Becora Prison, Dili, began a hunger strike calling for the release of all East Timorese political prisoners, especially Xanana Gusmao. As the strike wore on and some of the strikers were being given intravenous feeding, others joined in, bringing the number to 35. Fearing for the lives of the prisoners, Xanana Gusmao called on the men to abandon their action, saying he did not want yet more sacrifices when so many lives had already been lost.

Calls for the governor to resign

Fearful of the mounting support for a referendum among government employees, Governor Abilio Orosio Soares announced on 6 October that all government employees who did not support East Timor's integration into Indonesia should 'voluntarily' resign or else face the sack. This provoked an immediate response from the newly-established *Forsarepetil,* most of whose members are government employees. They condemned it as being in breach of the spirit of *reformasi* and the reconciliation agreement so painstakingly drafted at the September Dare meeting.

On 10 October, a huge protest strike brought public transport and commerce in Dili to a virtual standstill. On the following day, Sunday, thirty thousand people rallied on the streets of Dili condemning the governor and calling for his resignation. People arrived in the capital on scores of trucks and motorbikes to join in the protest. An attempt to gather in the forecourt of the Governor's residence was prevented by anti-riot police so the crowds marched round the city and ended the rally with a free-speech forum in a square near the residence. Even larger numbers rallied in Dili two days later as thousands converged on the city from Liquica and Ermera. [*Suara Timor Timur,* and Report by the Peace and Justice Commission, Dili, 12 October]

The next day, thousands of Timorese returning to Becora were confronted by 600 riot police bristling with semi-automatic and automatic rifles, blocking their way home. The danger of open confrontation which could have led to bloodshed was averted by the intervention of representatives of the Dili office of the CNRT, the National Council for Timorese Resistance, who stood between the security forces and the demonstrators and negotiated a way out of the conflict. [*Canberra Times,* 19 October]

Renewed military operations

While these public manifestations of support for a referendum were underway in many parts of the territory, things were definitely far from quiet on the military front.

Claims that the army was in the process of cutting back the number of troops in the territory were hotly disputed by local reports of thousands of troops arriving. On 12 October, ten thousand people from the sub-districts of Baguia, Laga, Quelicai, Venilale and Vemasse rallied in Baucau to protest against the arrival of more troops in the area as wit-

nessed by the populace. [See also separate article analysing leaked military documents.]

For months, the military commander of Korem 164/Wira Dharma, Colonel Tono Suratman, had been claiming that the army was no longer engaged in operations against the armed guerrillas in *Falintil.* He even suggesting that guerrillas were welcome to take part in meetings provided that they first reported to the local authorities. However, behind this facade of camaraderie, a very different situation was developing.

On 3 October, the deputy-commander of Falintil, Taur Matan Ruak sent a message to the outside world saying that he and his company of guerrillas had been encircled by two battalions dispatched from Baucau, numbering around two thousand troops. The guerrillas managed to escape due to their superior knowledge of the terrain but small detachments were still trying to discover the guerrillas' whereabouts.

The military commander later hinted that the army's strategy was about to change when he told Andrew Perrin, a journalist from Australia that 'there is a limit to the new era of openness..., a limit to our tolerance'. At the same time, a guerrilla leader in the Los Palos region was quoted as saying that military operations were taking place in his region which might lead to the guerrillas being forced to retaliate, to secure their position. [*Canberra Times,* 24-25 October]

At the time, the armed wing of the resistance showed no signs of engaging in military operations. When Richard Lloyd Parry of *The Independent* went into the bush to meet Lere Anak Timor, the second man in *Falintil*, in late October, he was told in no uncertain terms: 'The only solution is a peaceful solution based on international law and based on the support of the international community and the United Nations.' [*The Independent,* 4 November]

But a relentless build-up of Indonesian troops was underway, presaging new military operations which might force the guerrillas to respond. According to a report from the Third Military Zone of *Falintil* on 27 October, the Indonesian army was bringing in reinforcements for a surprise attack on all guerrilla positions in November. The reinforcements included more *Brimob* (the elite police corps) units and more East Timorese soldiers for incorporation into Battalions 744 and 745 which are permanently based in East Timor. The report also monitored the arrival in Kupang, West Timor of more combat troops, including air-borne army units, marines and *Kostrad* troops, for immediate dispatch to East Timor.

This reversal in the army's strategy was triggered not by the threat of an offensive by *Falintil* but by the recognition that the forces of occupation had lost the battle for the hearts and minds of the population. They thought that greater openness would make the Timorese more kindly disposed towards their oppressors, but the contrary was happening: the openness was giving people the opportunity to voice their true feelings and organise themselves for an independent future.

Killings and terror in Alas

As the storm clouds gathered, it was in the sub-district of Alas, about 175 kms due south of Dili, that the army launched a campaign of terror against the civilian population in November.

Alas sub-district in the district of Manufahi is not easily accessible by road especially during the rainy season because of thick forest and poor communications. First reports that something was amiss came when a small detachment of Indonesian soldiers was attacked in the village of Weberek which is the site of a transmigration site for Indonesian farmers. The army claimed the men had gone out on patrol unarmed and were later found dead from stab wounds. It appears that the patrol infiltrated a public meeting of Timorese discussing their own problems. Their presence aroused suspicion and they were hounded out. According to Major Wisnumurti, intelligence chief of staff of the Dili military command, the soldiers had been set upon by about three hundred local people. [*Jawa Pos,* 1 November] Intentionally or not, their presence had acted as a provocation.

The killings prompted the security forces to initiate a campaign of terror to hunt down the perpetrators and terrorise the population. Hundreds of extra troops were sent to Alas and young people were warned that they were at risk of arrest. As tensions mounted, there was an attack on the Alas *Koramil* (military command) on 9 November. Three soldiers were killed, thirteen soldiers were taken captive and 36 firearms and ammunition were seized. Eleven of the captives were released immediately while two East Timorese are reportedly being held by a local *Falintil* unit. It was suggested at the time that *Falintil* was responsible for the *Koramil* attack, but other sources say that villagers from Taitudah were the ones who carried out the attack in response to the terror.

More Battalion 744 and 745 troops descended on the region in retaliation for the attack. While many young people fled, women, children and elderly people took refuge in a local church.

On 20 November, high-level bilateral talks at the UN in New York were suspended by the Portuguese government. UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan expressed concern about reports coming from East Timor and called for restraint on all sides.

Meanwhile, reports were emerging of summary killings. The village chief of Taitudah, Vicente de Andrade, was shot dead, two of his nieces were arrested and a group of youths seized by the army disappeared without trace. The names of eleven people killed during the crackdown were confirmed by the Peace and Justice Commission in Dili while former governor of East Timor, Mario Carrascalao, told the press in Jakarta that he had been informed that 44 people had been killed in Alas.

Since the whole area had been sealed off, on-the-spot verification of the killings proved impossible. Human rights activists were prevented from entering the area. Water supplies and electricity had been cut and food was scarce, prompting Bishop Belo to demand that relief teams be allowed to enter. He also urged the military commander to withdraw his troops from Alas.

Students occupy parliament building

On 23 November, four thousand students from the Students Solidarity Council occupied the building of the provincial assembly, the DPRD, to demand the cessation of military operations in Manufahi. They also said that

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Independence calls reverberate in West Papua

Another flag-raising, more arrests and trials. The political atmosphere in West Papua, known to Indonesia as its province of Irian Jaya, has been transformed since the downfall of Suharto in May this year. Calls for independence or dialogue on the status of the territory continue to reverberate despite the murderous attack on people who raised the West Papuan flag in Biak in July and the army's threat to treat all actions in support of independence as treachery.

The flag-raising incident in Biak to mark the anniversary of the declaration of West Papuan independence on 1 July 1971 (check date) led to many deaths and disappearances. Unfurling *kejora*, the Morning Star flag, has been a traditional act of defiance for many years but it has occurred with greater frequency in the past few months.

West Papua was surrendered to Indonesia following a UN-endorsed treaty between the Netherlands and Indonesia in 1962. The 1969 'act of free choice' gave West Papua no choice but to integrate with Indonesia. Resistance to Indonesian rule was more muted under Suharto. While *reformasi* in Indonesia means democratisation, in West Papua it means independence for many people.

Carrot and stick

The armed forces, ABRI, have faced a barrage of criticism for the atrocities committed during the Suharto regime, especially in West Papua, Aceh and East Timor which are all known as *daerah rawan* or 'areas of unrest'. In an attempt to clean up their disreputable image, ABRI announced a 'gradual' reduction in the number of troops in West Papua and an end to the territory's status as a *daerah operasi militer,* 'military operations zone' or DOM. But there is no way of monitoring the troop reductions. (It is well established that in East Timor it has meant quite the opposite, see separate item.) As for DOM, all that has happened is that it has been replaced by a new classification, *pengawalan daerah rawan* or 'supervised region of unrest'.

The ABRI regional commander, Major-General Amir Sembiring, also took everyone by surprise with an announcement at the end of September that the army had agreed to a ceasefire with the *Organisasi Papua Merdeka* (OPM). ABRI have never before entered into negotiations with the armed wing of the independence movement in West Papua. The ceasefire was reached following talks between the army and representatives of OPM commander Mathias Wenda who commands the north-eastern sector of the country. Wenda's objectives in agreeing a ceasefire have not been divulged, nor is it clear whether Wenda represents the other sectors of the OPM in this far-flung territory.

The Indonesian parliament also been part of this softly-softly approach by dispatching a 'fact-finding team' to Jayapura, talking to local leaders and NGOs and promoting the idea of peaceful dialogue on the territory's status.

Four on trial in Biak

Meanwhile, four men went on trial in Biak on 5 October for their part in the July flag-raising, six were arrested in Jayapura for conspiring to conduct a meeting to discuss West Papua's status, and at least ten were arrested for raising the *kejora* in Manokwari, on the north coast.

The men on trial at the district court in Biak-Numfor are: **Philipe Karma (40 years), Nelles Sroyer, Agustinus Sada** and **Clemens Rumsarwir.** They are among the scores of people taken into custody after army units opened fire on hundreds of people in the vicinity of the flag-pole in Biak harbour on 6 July. The flag had been kept aloft for five days. An unknown number of people were killed during the attack and many people are still unaccounted for. Philipe Karma was serious wounded in the leg but his would was left to fester unattended during his first days in custody.

The men have been charged under Article 106 of the Criminal Code with rebellion or secession for which the maximum penalty is life. They are being defended by a team of lawyers from Jayapura and Jakarta. Their attitude in court was one of defiance; when asked their citizenship, they all replied: 'West Papuan!' The broach pinned to Karma's tie was decorated with the West Papuan flag.

Hundreds of people came to the courtroom to express their sympathy with the accused men. The area surrounding the courthouse was heavily guarded by security forces. The trial is likely to continue for several months.


Altogether 32 lawyers from Jayapura and Jakarta have agreed to be part of a Team for Human Rights Protection in Irian Jaya to handle the cases of 20 people being held as suspects. Team member Albert Rumbekwan told the press in Jakarta of their determination to undertake this mission even though they had been terrorised by unidentified men for doing so. [*Jakarta Post,* 15 September]

Eight arrested in Jayapura

In early October, the security forces arrested eight people in Jayapura for their involvement in planning a two-day meeting that was to have discussed the status of West Papua. The initiative had been taken under the umbrella of a newly-formed Committee for the Independence of West Papua and was scheduled to take place at the Arts and Culture Centre in the city on 1-2 October. Many people had been invited to participate, including members of the local assembly and people from the governor's office.

WEST PAPUA

The first to be arrested was **Drs Don Flassy**, secretary of the Regional Planning and Development Board, Bappeda, followed by a Protestant clergyman, the **Rev. Agustinus Ansanai**, and two more government officials, **Barnabas Yufuwai** and **Laurens Mehuwe**. A fifth person was **Sem Yaru**, a former political prisoner who appears to have handed himself in after being intimidated by the security forces. Two students were also arrested but they were released after being held for questioning for a couple of days.



But the arrest which stunned local opinion most of all occurred on 6 October, when **Theys Eluay,** the revered traditional leader of the Santani tribe, the *ondofolo,* was taken from his home at crack of dawn by a unit of the special police force, Brimob. The tribal chief had made it known that, in his position as leader of the people, he felt duty bound to stand up for his people who had been arrested since the flag-raising incidents at the beginning of July. In saying that he 'took responsibility' for everything they had done, this was interpreted by the authorities as meaning that he had been in charge of everything.

Theys Uluay has made no secret of his support for independence for West Papua. Back in 1969, he was a member of the council of over one thousand tribal chieftains who had been hand-picked by the Indonesian military authorities to vote on the 'act of free choice' which sealed West Papua's fate as part of Indonesia. He has long since abandoned support for integration with Indonesia.

At the time of his arrest, members of his tribe had been preparing to bind him physically, according to custom, and hand him over to the authorities. His intention was that, in taking responsibility for all that had happen, he would offer himself as a prisoner in exchange for the release of all the others. Much to the chagrin of the tribal elders, the security forces refused to allow this to happen. According to his lawyers who were allowed to be present at his interrogation, Theys Uluay challenged his interrogators throughout the session.

All the six men still in custody are likely to be charged under Article 110 of the Criminal Code, for conspiracy to engage in a rebellion, for which the maximum sentence is life imprisonment.

The sole aim of the Committee for the Independence of West Papua was to enter into dialogue. This was in line with the proposal of the parliamentarians who had visited Jayapura in August. One of the lawyers working on the case, Abdul Rachman Uapara, intends to consult experts in political science on whether plans to hold dialogue about independence without any resort to violence can be classified as an act of rebellion. As one of the detainees has said, 'these will be cases in which thoughts are put on trial'.

Should these cases reach the courts, as seems likely, the trials will become the focus of popular support for the ideas advocated by these men, causing yet more 'security problems' for the army and the police.

[Sources: *Cendrawasih Pos*, 3, 7 and 9 October, and reports received via the Internet from IHRSTAD, the Institute for Human Rights Studies and Advocacy.]

Flag-raising in Manokwari

Undeterred by the harsh handling of flag-raisers in Biak and Sorong in July, a group of people went ahead with a similar action in Manokwari, a town on the north coast of West Papua.

Early in the morning of 2 October, a group of people approached the flag-pole in the forecourt of local assembly, paid their respects to the Indonesian flag, pulled it down and unfurled the *kejora* in its place. After making speeches to the crowd that had gathered, they asked to meet the district chief for a dialogue but he refused, saying he was no authorised to discuss independence with anyone. Within minutes, a police unit headed by the local police chief arrived on the scene and set up barricades around the area. The people watching quickly grew in number. Soon after prayers were said, some policemen tried to pull the flag down but were held back by the flag-raisers. In the scuffle that followed, the flag fell to the ground. The police opened fire, shooting rubber bullets into the air; according to some witnesses, they also directed their fire into the crowd. Some people in the crowd responded by throwing stones and one policeman was hit on the head.

Incensed by the police actions, some people left the scene and went along the main streets where they set about attacking shops and buildings. Government buildings were a prime target as well as the homes of non-Papuan residents. The amount of damage was later estimated at over Rp1,500 million. An investigation team from several churches sent to Manokwari later was unable to verify how these attacks on property began and whether they had been instigated by organised groups.

It was several days before commercial life got back to normal.

Ten people have since been arrested and held for questioning. They include four college students, four primary school teachers and two government employees. If charged, they too are likely to be accused of rebellion.

Independence the only way

A report published by PGI, the Indonesian Communion of Churches, which includes all Protestant churches in Indonesia, concluded that the people of Irian Jaya were now calling for independence as the only way. The report was written following a pastoral visit by religious leaders to West Papua. The report said that 'military atrocities and the unfairness with which the government treated the province had resulted in the people losing patience'. Rev. Karel Erari said the Irianese had suffered too much at the hands of an authoritarian government, a repressive military and an unfair development policy. 'Their aspirations have been heard and ignored. Now their only demand is independence,' he said. [*Jakarta Post,* 15 September] ✸

Forcibly deported refugee goes on trial

An Acehnese who was forcibly repatriated back to Aceh from Malaysia has gone on trial on charges connected with his activities in support of the Free Aceh Movement. His prosecution gives the lie to the Malaysian government's assertions that he and other Acehnese who have sought asylum in Malaysia should not be regarded as political refugees.

Ishak Daud, 36, went on trial in Lhokseumawe district court at the end of August. He was forcibly repatriated from Malaysia in March this year despite the fact that he had been granted permanent residence. His repatriation was in flagrant violation of the UN Convention on Refugees. The government of Mahathir Muhamad has refused to acknowledge that any of the Acehnese who fled from their country in the past decade are refugees entitled to political asylum.

Daud was a member of the Acehnese Refugeee Committee in Malaysia at the time of his abduction. His wife, who was pregnant at the time, was kept in the dark about his whereabouts for many months.

According to the indictment, he is charged for conspiring along with others not yet arrested to murder soldiers at a military post in the district of Lhokseumawe on 20 May 1990 and of seizing weapons and ammunition from the post. The maximum penalty is death. The indictment makes no mention of Daud's political motivation as a member of the Free-Aceh Movement but says only that the motive for the attack was 'hatred for the armed forces or out of a sense of revenge'.

In a demurrer challenging the indictment, his team of lawyers said that the prosecutor had completely failed to take account of the defendant's political views which are central to the case.. It also questioned the prosecutor's use of no fewer than six alternative charges and articles for the court to choose from.

The defence lawyers described how the defendant had been kidnapped in Malaysia on 25 March this year, in flagrant violation of the human rights Malaysia is reputed to uphold, and transported to Indonesia in extraordinary circumstances (see below). They said the government of Mahathir Muhamad should be held responsible for his kidnap and deportation.

Dragged behind a speedboat

Ishak was kidnapped by unidentified men in Kuala Lumpur on 27 March along with two colleagues, and handed over to the Malaysian police, handcuffed and hooded, and bundled onto a speedboat manned by members of the Indonesian security forces for the trip across the strait to Riau. They were nearly drowned on the perilous journey during which they were tied to inflated rubber tubes, pushed off the boat and dragged from behind as the vessel sped its way to Riau. One of the three, Burhan Sjamaun, 40, has subsequently disappeared and is thought to have died as a result of torture.

Ishak Daud and Syahrul Syamaun who survived the horrific ordeal were flown by military helicopter from Riau to Banda Aceh. After three weeks they were removed to prisons in Lhokseumawe and Langsa.

Trial a 'time bomb' for local security

The trial of Ishak Daud has come at a time when Aceh is traumatised by daily revelations of the discovery of mass graves and of killings, disappearances and torture perpetrated by members of the Indonesian armed forces during a decade of unmitigated terror. It will not be lost of the tens of thousands of victims that while Ishak Daud, a declared member of the Free Aceh Movement, is being charged for killing two Indonesian soldiers at a military post, not a single Indonesian soldier has been taken into custody, let alone charged and tried for the thousands of crimes committed against civilians in Aceh since 1989. A school-boy was also killed in the attack; it would be interesting to know why he was at the army post - in custody perhaps?

Initially, Daud refused to recognise the legitimacy of the court, declaring that he was not an Indonesian citizen and demanding to the defended by a Malaysian lawyer. He later agreed to be assisted by a team of Indonesian lawyers, arranged through the intermediary of *Suaram,* a human rights organisation based in Penang.

During the early stages of the trial, security forces entered the prison in Lhokseumawe where he was being held and opened fire on the inmates. Daud was wounded in the arm and from then has lived in fear for his safety.

By the time it entered its fourth session, the trial was being described in the local press as a 'time bomb', threatening to cause major security problems. The crowds who gathered for each hearing grew in number, with thousands unable to gain entry to the courtroom. The crowds expressed sympathy for the defendant and contempt for the court and its proceedings.

Serambi Indonesia [19 September] reported that local officials were afraid the trial might lead to disruptions in Lhokseumawe, a key industrial centre, where riots erupted a week before the trial commenced. They took the unusual step of making a request to the judicial authorities for the trial to be transferred to Sabang, 437 kms north of Lhokseumawe. (Trials are supposed to be held in the district where the crime was committed.) There was also concern that Daud did not deport himself with the deference expected of a man facing serious charges. He was behaving 'like a film star', said one observer, using the courtroom as

a 'free-speech forum' to expound on his views about the conflict in Aceh.

Although the presiding judge regarded Daud's rebuttal of the prosecution charges as being 'irrelevant', he did not dare stop him for fear of causing uproar in court. His rebuttal was said to be full of 'separatist propaganda', capable of arousing the passions of his supporters inside and outside the court.

The local authorities also alleged that Daud had 'contaminated' his fellow prisoners with his political ideas. [*Serambi Indonesia*, 19 September]

Defendant goes on the attack

After the prisoner was transferred to Sabang Prison, he was placed under heavy guard. [*Serambi Indonesia*, 8 October]

Following the transfer of the trial to Sabang, the hearings appear to have been dragged out even though it was said initially that 'marathon' sessions would be held to complete the trial within a couple of weeks.

In a statement to the court on 27 October, the defendant rebuked the local press for misrepresenting his case and even alleging that he and his movement, the Free Aceh Movement had instigating the riots that erupted in the city of Lhokseumawe on 31 August this year. The riots had been provoked in order to give the army justification for maintaining its troops in Aceh, he said. Such lies were a danger to him as the defendant and to his movement striving to liberate Aceh from the Javanese yoke. He also strongly objected to the press referring to his movement as *Gerombolan Pengacau Liar* or 'wild disrupter gang'.

'Since we proclaimed an Independent Aceh on 4 December 1976, tens of thousands of Acehnese have been killed, thousands of women have been raped and thousands of children have lost their parents while the wealth of the region had been plundered by the colonisers. Scores of Acehnese are languishing in prisons in Banda Aceh, Bireuen, Lhokseumawe, Lhoksukon, Langsa and Medan.'

He said that the fact-finding team that recently visited North Aceh had concluded that 93 per cent of the killings and disappearances during the military operations era had been perpetrated by the Indonesian army, another 2.7 pecent by their lackeys while the Free Aceh Movement were responsible for only 4.3 per cent with the killing of members of the armed forces. Yet, not a single member of the army had been charged court for their crimes.

Unfair procedures in court

Ishak Daud also complained that defence witnesses had been prevented from testifying in his trial on a variety of pretexts. A co-prisoner named Syahrul Syamaun, who was deported together with him from Malaysia and is now being held in Langsa Prison, had written to tell him that the authorities would not permit him, Ishak Daud, to appear as a witness in his trial. These and other injustices made a mockery of the principle of a fair trial, he said, and should be exposed before the international community.

He complained that he was being denied facilities to care for his health and was even being refused medicines unless he paid for them himself.

During a court hearing on 5 November, the defendant defiantly refused to collaborate with the court because he insisted that a police officer be summoned to testify. The conflict remained unresolved until the judge finally ordered the defendant to leave the court.

At the following hearing, the prosecutor Summed up his case against Daud and asked the court to sentence him to life imprisonment. The session was again disrupted by the defendant who again insisted on not collaborating with the proceedings unless the police officer was called.

The defence lawyers also complained that the decision to shift the trial hearings to Sabang had made their work much more difficult.

The verdict in the case will be reported in our next issue. ✸

Conflict with ABRI intensifies

In November several incidents occurred in North Aceh between ABRI and the local population. The nature of the incidents points to a similarity with recent incidents in East Timor [see separate article]. A diplomat told *The Age* [19 November]: 'The view is that Aceh is exactly the same as East Timor - there was a staged withdrawal of special forces and then they were sent in again through the back door.'

The downfall of Suharto has been used effectively by the population of Aceh. Taking advantage of the openness and political transparency, there has been an upsurge of social and political activities which would have been unthinkable in the Suharto era. The armed forces have been the main target for they were the cause of all the sufferings and misery in Aceh.

These actions forced ABRI to promise to end DOM, the special military status [see *TAPOL* Bulletin No. 148] and with it the withdrawal of all troops that had been brought in from outside including special units and non-organic units from elsewhere.

Lhokseumawe explodes on 2 November

An unprecedented show of force occurred early in the morning of 2 November in Lhokseumawe. A convoy of about 100 motorcycles, 35 minibuses and many trucks drove into town. Many of the people in the convoy were heavily armed. They first went to the grave of an Acehnese hero named Malikul Saleh near Kota Geudong and then continued their journey to Lhokseumawe.

They were flying Free Aceh (GAM) flags and shouting slogans in support of Aceh Merdeka. Red-and-white Indonesian flags flying on official buildings were torn down. The action ended after midday at Desa Kandang, a village regarded by the security forces as a GAM stronghold. Kandang is very close to the oil and gas capital of Aceh

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Arms sales intensify debt crisis

TAPOL has repeated its call for a complete ban on arms sales following the revelation that Indonesia has been forced to reschedule part of its public sector debt relating to military contracts.

The poverty-stricken Indonesian people will still have to pay for military equipment which has no conceivable connection with efforts to rescue them from their desperate economic plight, despite the rescheduling agreement, which allows only for a three-year moratorium on the repayment of principal.

The rescheduled debt is thought to include the amount owed for 16 Hawk aircraft worth £300 million, licensed for export in November 1996 and due for delivery in 1999.

The United Nations estimates that two-thirds of Indonesians will be living in poverty by next year and debt servicing is bound to impact primarily on the poor. In October, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas, pointed out that it would be the height of irresponsibility for Indonesia to continue with its arms purchases given the state of the economy. The only exception would be for the Hawk aircraft, he said [Inter Press Service, 19 October].

TAPOL has written to Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, urging him to cancel the delivery of the Hawks. The Government previously said that it would not be 'realistic or practical' to revoke existing licences, but whatever the contractual obligations to the manufacturers, there is a higher moral imperative for the Government to take action to reduce the debt burden which adds to the suffering of so many people.

There is still uncertainty surrounding the nature of the Hawks licence. Export licences normally last for two years, but for some unexplained reason, this licence is a 'contract' licence valid for four years. Enquiries are being made as to the meaning of this.

Favouring the defence industry

Meanwhile, it is unlikely that proposals for new legislation on export controls and changes in licensing procedures, contained in a Department of Trade and Industry White Paper, will result in fewer licences being granted.

The Government has failed to respond to the urgent need for greater transparency and accountability identified by the Scott Report on exports to Iraq. In particular it rules out parliamentary and public scrutiny of individual licensing applications and will not allow a right of appeal against a decision to grant a licence.

The publication of a retrospective annual report on arms exports (the first of which has been due for some time) does not address the need to ensure that licences are not granted for equipment which might contribute to the abuse of human rights and other abuses.

Essentially the changes proposed by the White Paper amount to little more than window-dressing and fail to challenge the overweening influence of the defence industry over government policy and decision-making. [A copy of TAPOL's response to the White Paper is available on request.]

A letter from the Defence Secretary, George Robertson, to Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, published in the *Independent on Sunday* on 26 July, revealed the extraordinary lengths to which the defence industry and ministry officials will go to undermine the Government's so-called ethical foreign policy. One of six licences refused by the Government since it came to power was for the export of Courtaulds Aerospace armoured Land Rovers to the disgraced General Prabowo and his *Kopassus* special forces. Secretary Robertson was persuaded to write of a man responsible for the abduction and torture of activists in Indonesia and numerous killings in East Timor: 'The General is recognised as an enlightened officer, keen to increase professionalism within the armed forces and to educate them in areas such as human rights.'

At the time the licence was blocked by Robin Cook, in September 1997, it was reported that the Prime Minister's office reacted angrily to Mr Cook's decision and urged him to moderate his policy. He did not need much persuading as he has since approved almost all licence applications.

According to the latest available figures up to 10 May 67 export licences had been granted for Indonesia under Labour and only the six had been refused.

Other developments: Alvis and GKN

Two well-known names in the Anglo-Indonesian arms trade, Alvis and GKN, have recently merged their armoured vehicles manufacturing businesses. The companies' vehicles and water cannon are familiar sights on the streets of Jakarta and other cities at times of popular protest. Most recently, they were part of the armoury used to attack unarmed students on Black Friday [see separate item].

Alvis had earlier indicated that they will not be exporting any more tanks to Indonesia after September as they expect no more licences. However, reports indicate that they still have a large number of Indonesian orders on their books.

The Peace Camp outside the Alvis factory in Coventry has now closed down, but the group's presence will continue to be felt at a new Peace House in the city.

Hull University

On a positive note, no Indonesian army officers have been admitted to Hull University this academic year. The University claims that this is due solely to the situation in Indonesia, but there is no doubt that the campaign against the Indonesian officers proved hugely embarrassing for the University authorities and may have played a part. ✸

Yunus Yosfiah's role in the Balibo killings

A film shown on Australian television has thrown the spotlight on the role of Yunus Yosfiah, who is now Indonesia's Minister of Information, in the killing of five television journalists in Balibo, East Timor on 16 October 1975. The British government has also taken the first tentative steps towards seeking an inquiry into the murders.

The appointment of Lieutenant-General (ret'd) Yunus Yosfiah as Minister of Information in the government of President Habibie could draw greater attention in Indonesia to the killing on 16 October 1976 of five television journalists as they were trying to cover the early stages of Indonesia's invasion of East Timor.

On 20 October this year, the Australian Broadcasting Corporation broadcast a film which identified Yosfiah as the officer who led the troops who killed the men and supervised their murders. The documentary included testimony from a crucially important new witness and other witnesses who were interviewed by Tom Sherman who undertook an investigation for the Australian government two years but who were unwilling to tell him all they knew because they had no confidence in him.

The new witness is Olandino Guterres who told journalist Jill Jolliffe during a recent visit to East Timor that he was present when Yosfiah, then in command of a *Kopassandha* (now called *Kopassus*) unit, ordered his men to shoot the journalists. Four were shot dead and the fifth was knifed. Guterres who was a 15-year old UDT fighter with the Indonesians at the time, has since left East Timor.

Yosfiah strongly denied the report though he did not deny that he was in Balibo at the time of the murders. He had refused to collaborate in the making of the documentary.

Shortly before the film was shown, British Minister of State Derek Fatchett met President Habibie and sought an assurance that Indonesia would investigate the Balibo killings. He was assured by Habibie that he would 'look into it'. [*The Independent,* 19 October]. However, the new accusations against Yosfiah led to a categorical refusal by the Indonesian armed forces to countenance any investigation into the matter. ✸

From the editors

Developments in Indonesia since the downfall of Suharto have occurred with breathtaking rapidity. We have tried to portray the changing face of the country now ruled by a transitional government headed by an enfeebled president and a discredited army. While students take to the streets in Jakarta and other cities pressing for an end to the army's *dwifungsi* and the trial of Suharto, dark forces within the army and loyal to the former dictator are taking every opportunity to destabilise society in the hope of undermining the creation of a democratic Indonesia. The six months between now next year's elections are likely to remain volatile and unstable as the forces for democracy seek to foil the disruptive forces.

In East Timor, West Papua and Aceh, the armed forces are bent on using their might to destroy movements pressing for independence. Their determination to retain a strongly centralised state can only reinforce feelings of resentment among people in the outer regions who see their resources being plundered to finance projects in Java and repay the country's crippling foreign debt.

There is little prospect of the grave economic crisis being resolved as long as Indonesia's future continues to be uncertain and the country continues to be ruled by a government lacking legitimacy. The IMF continues to dictate the terms of the country's recovery which can only exacerbate the impoverishment of tens of millions of Indonesians.

The political challenges are formidable while human rights abuses continue unabated especially in East Timor and West Papua.

We in TAPOL are doing our best to cover the events which have borne down heavily on our limited resources. We apologise for the unfortunate delay in producing the present *Bulletin* which we decided to publish as a double issue in order to catch up.

We wish all our readers a Happy New Year with a pledge to do our best to keep the *Bulletin* rolling on time during the coming critical year for the people of East Timor, West Papua, Aceh and Indonesia. ✸

Note: new subscription rates starting next year

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