
VICTORIA UNIVERSITY
MELBOURNE AUSTRALIA

Tapol bulletin no, 148, September 1998

This is the Published version of the following publication

UNSPECIFIED (1998) Tapol bulletin no, 148, September 1998. Tapol bulletin (148). pp. 1-32. ISSN 1356-1154

The publisher's official version can be found at

Note that access to this version may require subscription.

Downloaded from VU Research Repository https://vuir.vu.edu.au/25992/

tapol
The Indonesia Human Rights Campaign

ISSN 1356-1154

TAPOL Bulletin No. 148 September 1998

Aceh emerges from years of state terror

After nearly a decade of brutality, massacres, disappearances and rape, the people of Aceh have spoken out about their sufferings at the hands of Indonesian troops, forcing the ABRI commander to make a public apology. Although military operational status will now end, the people want thousands of disappearances and mass graves to be investigated, prosecution of the guilty men and compensation for the victims or their families.

The downfall of the Indonesian dictator, Suharto, on 21 May opened the way for people in Aceh to give vent to their anger at the murderous campaign of terror to which they have been subjected since the late 1980s and the decision by the Indonesian army in 1991 to treat Aceh as a military operational region or DOM. [See *TAPOL Bulletin*, No 147, July 1998 for an account of the opposition to DOM.]

On 8 August, armed forces (ABRI) commander-in-chief General Wiranto, made a hurried visit to Aceh to issue a public apology to the people of the region. For weeks, local and national newspapers had been awash with the horrific testimony of hundreds of Acehnese to members of a parliamentary fact-finding mission to the province. It was clear that, with ABRI's reputation under severe strain over abductions of human rights activists (see separate item), speedy action was needed to salvage its reputation in the country's most northerly province.

Wiranto announced that DOM would be lifted and that all 'non-organic' troops would be withdrawn from Aceh within a month. These are mainly elite corps *KOPASSUS* troops. He also said that Acehnese who had fled abroad during the reign of terror could return, promising that unless they were involved in 'criminal activities', they would not be prosecuted. He also said that the term GPK, *Gerakan Pengacau Keamanan* or 'security disruptor gangs', would be scrapped and replaced by GPL, for *Gerakan Pengacau Liar* or 'wild disruptor gangs', as the way to refer to the Free Aceh Movement, which has been struggling since the mid 1970s for liberation from Indonesia. The GPK initials are used to brand liberation struggles in Aceh, West Papua and East Timor as terrorist groupings. Replacing one of the letters makes not a scrap of difference.

Background to state terror in Aceh

The story of Aceh in post-colonial Indonesia is one of rebellious opposition to Jakarta. In the early 1950s, when the position of the *ulama* or religious teachers was very strong, a rebellion broke out under the banner of D*arul Islam*. After years of conflict, the rebellion was finally subdued in 1959 with the granting of 'special status'. Two years earlier, Aceh had became a separate province. Special status accorded it autonomy in religion, customary law and education. According to Tim Kell, this left Aceh insulated from external influences for nearly a decade until the

WEST PAPUA
Calls for independence reverberate in West Papua p6

POLITICS
Stubborn *Orde Baru* remnants p9
European Parliament resolution p20

HUMAN RIGHTS
Who gave the orders to Prabowo? p12
TAPOL activist stopped from entering Indonesia p14
Prisoner releases: a slow business p15

SOCIAL ISSUES
International outcry against gang-rapes p17

ECONOMY
CGI aid not the answer p19

EAST TIMOR
Gestures are not enough p21
An encounter with Gus Dur p23

BOOK REVIEW p24

dramatic political changes in Indonesia after Suharto took power in 1965. [See *The Roots of Acehnese Rebellion, 1989-1992*, Cornell, 1995, page 12.]

Under the New Order, Aceh's natural resources, in particular its liquefied natural gas, were exploited on a massive scale. LNG produced by the Arun liquefied gas plant, became a major foreign exchange earner; by the 1980s Indonesia was supplying 40 per cent of the world's supplies. A large fertiliser plant was built, almost entirely for export, alongside the Kertas Kraft Aceh factory producing sacks for the country's rapidly growing cement industry.

Virtually all the proceeds from these and other huge investments went to the centre, not to speak of jobs which were taken by people from outside the region. Aceh contributes eleven per cent to the national budget, but receives hardly one per cent in return. Observers speak of 'rich ghettos of migrants' and the emergence of glaring social and cultural disparities between those employed by the big industries and the surrounding population, (Kell, page 17-18). Moreover, as centralisation intensified under Suharto, Aceh's special status, limited as it was, became meaningless.



ABRI soldiers posing by the body of a murdered GAM warrior

In 1976, the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) under Hasan di Tiro, the descendant of one of Aceh's leading noble families, proclaimed independence and initiated an armed struggle. The movement, also known as the Acheh/Sumatra National Liberation Front, sustained the struggle for several years but was effectively quelled, only to resume its struggle in 1989, with far wider support from the local population, and better trained and equipped forces.

The army was forced onto the defensive with many army and police posts being taken out by GAM forces. Senior army officers made no secret of their isolation in many parts of the province, with officers and soldiers preferring to wear civilian clothing to conceal their identity from a largely hostile population. In May 1990, the Aceh district military commander, Colonel Sofian, while denying 'groundless reports' in the Indonesian press that civilians had been killed, said that security was vital because there were five major industries in the region. '*We don't want to take any risks since there are many vital projects and many foreign nationals work here.*' [*Jakarta Post,* 14 May 1990 quoted in *TAPOL Bulletin* No 99, June 1990] According to *Kompas* [9 July 1990] an estimated fifty military and civilians had been killed in the previous weeks.

Local support for GAM was clearly widespread, according to reports from many sources. In mid-1991, Major-General Pramono was lamenting the fact that the guerrillas were 'everywhere among the people' and 'had a concept, had guns and on the ground, had the masses' (see Kell page 66-67). The army also were worried that the insurgents enjoyed support among the educated elite; a number of academics were later put on trial for supporting the armed struggle and given particularly harsh sentences. These men are still in prison today.

In 1991, as the pressure on GAM intensified, it appears that some of their leading figures succeeded in escaping to Malaysia, along with hundreds of civilians fleeing the terror in the countryside. Although by 1992, GAM forces were probably greatly reduced in number, the reign of terror continued unabated.

After years without news of conditions in Aceh, TAPOL received a detailed report from the region, describing Aceh as a virtual war zone, with a huge influx of troops into Pidie district and villagers again being forced to take part in 'fence of legs' operations to flush out the guerrillas. [See *TAPOL Bulletin,* No 143, October 1997.]

Killer *KOPASSUS* troops sent in

Back in June 1990, the army's special elite strike force, *KOPASSUS*, was sent to the area 'to hunt down Free Aceh forces'. [*TAPOL Bulletin* No 99, July 1990.] This is the force which, according to all the evidence now coming to light, has spearheaded the wave of terror against the population.

In an interview with *Tempo,* the North Sumatra military commander, Major-General H.R Pramono, himself from the elite force, admitted that people were being killed every day in Aceh. He urged people to kill anyone suspected of being a GPK supporter:

'I have told people the important thing, if you see a GPK, you should kill him. There's no need to investigate, just shoot him or knife him.... I have instructed people to carry weapons, machetes or whatever. If you see a GPK, just kill him! [*Tempo,* 17 November, 1990, quoted in *TAPOL Bulletin,* No 103, February 1991.]

These murderous instructions were to set the tone for Aceh's experience for the next decade.

According to a dossier full of horrifying atrocities, sent to TAPOL at the time by the Aceh/Sumatra National Liberation Front, 56 prisoners being held at the notorious Rancong detention centre in Lhokseumawe, were stripped naked, shot dead and their bodies thrown down a ravine, where they were found by villagers three days later, most of them unidentifiable. The dossier described prisoners being held in barbed-wire cells with their hands tied behind their backs. One form of torture was to unleash dogs on the prisoners, which resulted in some being savaged to death. [*TAPOL Bulletin,* No 102, December 1990]

A New York-based Asia Watch report on 27 December 1990 quoted an army doctor as estimating a thousand deaths on both sides, with perhaps more killed by summary executions than in actual armed clashes. It spoke of bodies with gunshot or stab wounds 'being found by roads, along rivers or in plantations', while the military were refusing to allow the bodies to be buried in accordance with Islamic practices.

In a statement on 18 December 1990, TAPOL condemned the wave of killings in Aceh and called on governments to exert pressure on the Suharto regime to halt the killings. '*Those responsible for the killings must be brought to justice. Since this cannot be done in Indonesia, an International Tribunal on Crimes against Humanity should be convened to investigate the abuses in Aceh and hold the Suharto regime responsible for its campaign of death and mass intimidation,*' the statement said.

While the Foreign Office later told TAPOL that it was 'deeply concerned at the allegations of widespread killings and torture', it downplayed the words uttered by Pramono, taking comfort in reports that he had been reprimanded. It also complained that it was 'exceedingly difficult to obtain accurate information about events in Aceh'. [Minister of State, the Earl of Caithness, in a letter to TAPOL.]

Although TAPOL continued to publish detailed reports of atrocities, mass killings and mass graves in Aceh throughout 1991 and 1992, and Asia Watch and Amnesty International both issued more reports estimating that thousands of people had been killed, that is pretty much how matters have remained for the past eight years.

When the UN Special Rapporteur on extra-judicial, summary and arbitrary executions, Bacre Waly Ndiaye, sought permission in 1994 to visit East Timor in the aftermath of the Santa Cruz massacre, he also asked to go to Aceh. His visit to East Timor went ahead but permission to visit Aceh was refused and the international community chose to let the matter rest.

Now, with Suharto removed from power and the people of Aceh gradually freeing themselves from the shackles of fear and intimidation, the truth about the regime's murderous policy towards the people of Aceh is coming to light.

DOM status introduced

In 1991, after almost two years of continuous military operations, far exceeding what was happening at the time either in East Timor or in West Papua, Aceh was declared a *daerah operasi militer (DOM)* or 'military operational region'. According to human rights activists and NGOs in Aceh, this was done at the behest of the governor of Aceh, Ibrahim Hasan, under whose rule the military reigned supreme. Hasan had been appointed governor to win the Acehnese over to the government party, GOLKAR, at a time when Aceh was still a stronghold of the Muslim party, the PPP. Until the 1987 election, Aceh was one of the few regions where GOLKAR had been unable to secure a majority.

Many groups in Aceh are now calling for Hasan, a civilian, himself an Acehnese, to be called to account before a court of law for his role in placing Aceh in the grip of military terror.

'Widows villages'

Earlier this year, as Acehnese began to reveal the depth of their sufferings during the past decade, bereaved women were the ones to come forward, the wives of men who have disappeared over the past ten years. So widespread has the slaughter and disappearances of men been that there are villages in Aceh known as 'widows' villages'. Many women also spoke of being raped, often in front of their husbands and children, or after their men-folk had been seized, leaving them more vulnerable in their homes.

→

25 YEARS OF tapol

1973 - 1998

JOIN US TO CELEBRATE

a unique quarter-century of campaigning

All welcome

Speakers: José Ramos-Horta, Carmel Budiardjo, Ann Clwyd MP, and a recently-released political prisoner

Video presentation of a film made in 1975 by TAPOL, *More Than a Million Years* on the 1965 prisoners; visual display of TAPOL's work

Asian buffet supper and drinks

Tuesday, 20 October 1998
6:30 pm to 9:30 pm
Conway Hall, Red Lion Square, London WC1R 4RL (near Holborn tube)


Tickets: £22-50 (£12-50: students, unwaged). Please send cheques to TAPOL, 111 Northwood Road, Thornton Heath, Surrey CR7 8HW, UK. Include the names of all persons attending (tickets will be issued at the door).

Book early to avoid disappointment

ACEH

Following a visit to Jakarta in June by two Acehnese widows who took their complaints to Parliament, one of the commissions decided to send a fact-finding mission to Aceh. During a tour through the province in July, their meetings were attended by hundreds of people eager to testify, even though the mission was headed by a retired officer and one of the members, Major-General Sedaryanto, was until recently military commander of North Sumatra.

In Sigli, around one thousand people turned out to meet the mission, most of them widows and orphans. Space does not permit us to reproduce all the horrifying testimonies published in the press during the DPR mission's many encounters with victims. One woman said she had been raped by three men when she and her husband were arrested and taken to a security post. Three other women had been stripped naked, burnt, given electric shocks and one had



Some of the mass graves recently revealed to the public

her hand smashed and is permanently disabled.

Another woman who had been arrested in 1992 with her husband, M Yusuf, was raped in a cell next to his and thrown into the river the next day. She was later allowed home but never saw her husband again. Villagers from Desa Cibrek told her he had been publicly executed in their village. Ramlah from Simpang Jurong, Geumpang, the woman whose hand had been smashed, told the mission that she had been taken to a security post *(Pos Sattis)* and held by soldiers who were looking for her husband and children. When they found them, she was freed but the rest of her family were killed and buried in a mass grave in Geumpang. [*Serambi Indonesia,* 29 July 1998]

In the same issue, *Serambi Indonesia* reported that going from village to village, local NGOs had collected information about 1,679 cases, including rapes, torture and disappearances. In some places they had been told about scores, even hundreds of abuses.

Several papers report the execution of two members of a local football team who were hanged from the goal-post and shot. The father of one of the men, forced to witness the execution, was later killed as well. One man was killed, then decapitated and his head taken back to his village where it was put on display.

In many instances, the victims said that they or their loved ones had been taken to army posts known as *Pos Sattis,* which stands for *Satuan Tugas Strategis dan Taktis* or 'Strategic and Tactical Taskforce'. Almost invariably the soldiers were identified as coming from the elite corps, *KOPASSUS.* One member of the mission, Dr Muchtar Azis, an MP from Aceh, said that all the data he had compiled pointed to *KOPASSUS* officers as the abusers. On several occasions, members of the DPR mission asked people how they knew their abusers were from the elite corps, only to be told: 'We know them all very well and can easily recognise them.'

'Skulls Hill' and mass graves

Aceh is also home to a place called *Bukit Tengkorak,* Skulls Hill, the origins of which go back to 1965 when victims of the slaughter of thousands of suspected communists and sympathisers by troops acting on the orders of Suharto, were disposed of there.

According to Abdurrahman Yacob, director of the Legal Aid Institute in Aceh, ten mass graves have been discovered in three sites; one is near the town of Pidie, 75 kms south-east of the capital Banda Aceh, and the other two in east and north Aceh. A Jakarta weekly, *Ummat,* reported that there were between 1,000 and 1,420 bodies buried in these mass graves [*Reuters,* 6 August 1998], while the Jakarta daily, *Suara Karya,* quoted the parliamentary fact-finding mission as saying they had seen 'thousands' of skeletons in mass graves. [*Financial Times,* 1 August 1998] The flood of Indonesian press reports about mass slaughter in Aceh prompted *The Jakarta Post* to publish an editorial on 6 August (two days before Wiranto's hasty visit to Aceh). The editorial, entitled 'The Aceh Killing Fields', quotes the Jakarta weekly, *Gatra:*

'Teuku Ayah could hardly believe his eyes. His knees trembled when he saw hundreds of corpses piled up in a hole in front of him like dead rats. No sooner had he recovered his composure than an officer ordered him and his companions to bury the bodies and level the ground over the mass grave. Ayah's fear heightened when an officer tied another man to a tree and shot him dead. The body was simply left their to decompose'.

Such is the extent of the slaughter that went virtually unnoticed at the time, that new mass graves are being discovered all the time. Maimul Fidar of the NGO Forum Aceh, announced that they had found many mass graves and had been able only roughly to assess the number of bodies in each. One at a cross-roads near Plantation V in Lhokseumawe, is thought to contain between 100 and 200 bodies, while one at Skull Hill, Suerake, probably contains between 200 and 300 bodies.

Plans by local NGOs to exhume the bodies could encounter difficulties because of the extreme sensitivity of such an operation, which would require the supervision of experienced forensic experts. In addition, investigations of the mass graves are being hampered by intimidation from unidentified groups. Local residents, who are the source of information regarding the whereabouts of mass graves, have been visited by unknown men and warned not to speak to reporters or NGOs. [*Reuters,* 15 August 1998]

But as *The Jakarta Post* rightly points out in its editorial quoted above, the legacy of mass graves left by the murderous Suharto regime is by no means confined to Aceh, recalling killings in East Timor and in Tanjung Priok in 1984. (However, the paper fails to mention the even greater killing fields of 1965/1966, the legacy of the mass slaughter of hundreds of thousands of alleged communists.)

The disappeared

Estimates of the number of disappeared in Aceh vary from around 1,000, or 5,000, a figure used by the Aceh regional assembly [*Waspada,* 29 July 1998], to 39,000, the figure mentioned several times by Maimul Fidar of the NGO Forum Aceh, based on research undertaken by the Forum and a journalist from the Jakarta weekly, *Gatra.*

This figure was arrived at from spot-checks of the number of disappeared in the worst affected and the least affected villages in the three most militarised sub-districts, north and east Aceh, and Pidie. They cross-checked their findings by looking at official statistics of the size of the population of Aceh and the number of widows and reached a figure of 30,000 people unaccounted for according to the first method and 39,000 according to the second. These investigations were undertaken well before the fall of Suharto and the activists are now busily collecting individual testimonies to back up their findings, which would have been impossible formerly.

The worst period by far was during 1990 and 1991 but the abuses have continued up to the present day.

On 13 August 1998, a group of NGOs in Aceh made public a list of thirty-four men who disappeared from their homes from January until May this year. The list includes the names of the victims, their age, place of residence, the *pos sattis* to which they were taken and the names of their wives.

The announcement by General Wiranto on 8 August that all combat (that is to say, *KOPASSUS*) troops would be withdrawn from the region within a month has confronted the NGOs and the relatives of victims with a dilemma as this will mean removing abductors who should be identified, taken into custody and forced to reveal the whereabouts of people who have recently disappeared.

Serambi Indonesia [11 August 1998] highlighted the plight of two sisters, Rosmiati and Rasyidah, whose mother, Nyak Maneh, disappeared after troops took her to the notorious torture centre, Rancong in Lhokseumawe. The husband of one of the sisters had returned home earlier this year, ill and with a severe limp, after having been thrown down a ravine with two other men. Fortunately, his fall was broken by a tree but the other two were killed and it was left to him to inform their wives. Since returning home, he has left again in fear of his life, apparently after being spotted by an army spy.

In March this year, two of the daughters and their mother were taken from their home by elite corps soldiers and tortured. Rasy, aged 21, who had already previously been raped, was stripped naked, her hands and feet tied; electric wires were attached to her vagina and breasts and she was given shocks throughout the night. Her older sister and mother were tortured even more severely for fifteen days before the mother was transferred to Rancong while the sisters were allowed to go home.

After hearing that *KOPASSUS* troops were to be withdrawn, the sisters went in great distress to the local assembly, pleading for help to find their mother. 'If those troops are withdrawn, where can we turn for help to find our mother?' they said.



Thanks for abolishing DOM, but...what about my husband? ***Merdeka, 11.08.98***

Nyak Maneh Abdullah, 35, a widow from Rinti Village, Mutiara, Pidie has testified that she was taken into custody by the military as a hostage for her husband. She was struck so hard on the head with a truncheon that her hearing has been seriously impaired. Under extreme pressure, she told her tormentors where her husband was. But in May this year, she was seized again and taken into custody, with her two-year old son. In front of this child, she was raped and her breasts and vagina were given electric shocks to try and force her to reveal the whereabouts of her husband. Nyak Maneh said she knows the identity of the rapist and is eager to expose him to the authorities. [From an article in *Republika,* 9 August entitled: *The Horror of Skulls Hill* which also elaborates on the discovery of many mass graves.]

But Nyak Maneh's troubles were by no means over. As preparations were being made for troops to be withdrawn, a *KOPASSUS* officer visited her at home and asked her, in threatening language, who had told her to report her experiences to the local assembly. 'I did it myself. Many people in the village are reporting. I'm not afraid anymore,' she told him. [*Serambi Indonesia,* 19 August]

4 unidentified men dumped by army

The mysterious appearance of four men in two villages in north Aceh on 12 August has caused great consternation. The men were seen on the back of a security truck shortly before they were pushed off on the road from Medan to Banda Aceh. Wearing only their underpants, they were in dreadful physical shape, with wounds suggesting that they had been tortured. When villagers tried to succour them with food, the men screamed hysterically, 'Stop electrocuting me, stop hitting me on the head. It's painful,' and

held their hands up as if trying to shield their heads from blows

The men were in such a stressful state that they ran off. As they ran, a truck drove past, hitting one of the men and killing him. The other three disappeared. The dead man has a number of recent wounds and several of his front teeth are missing from an apparent blow to the face. Local people think that they are four of the 34 men listed as having disappeared this year and believe the security forces have abandoned them before troops are withdrawn later this month. [*Serambi Indonesia,* 16 August]

NGOs demand accountability from ABRI

NGOs in Aceh have undertaken the daunting task of documenting atrocities from a severely traumatised population. While devoting their energies to this extremely stressful work, they insist that the most recent disappearances can be resolved quickly because the events are so fresh in people's minds. The whereabouts of these men should be investigated and the identity of their abductors revealed before the combat troops are withdrawn as announced by Wiranto on 8 August.

In a joint statement on 13 August, fifteen local and national NGOs responded to General Wiranto's announcement by asserting that his apology was far from adequate. 'The armed forces,' they said, 'must take full responsibility under the law for all the many abuses perpetrated against the people of Aceh and identify those persons directly responsible'. They contemptuously dismissed the General's decision to replace the GPK stigma with GPL, saying that Acehnese would again be stigmatised by circles intent on using such a label for personal gain. They also said that the families of the disappeared must be given financial support.

Aceh, for so long isolated and neglected at home and abroad, is now in the forefront of exposing the indescribable atrocities of the Suharto regime. All the credit for this must go to the local NGOs and the people of Aceh for their courageous determination to document their experiences, however painful this is. Acehnese civil society in post-Suharto Indonesia is now piecing together the horrors through which people lived while state terror reigned supreme in their region. We owe it to them to press for action from the international community. ✸


Calls for independence reverberate in West Papua

Since the downfall of Suharto, the political atmosphere in West Papua has shifted dramatically in favour of independence for the territory. Flag-raising ceremonies in a number of cities in July, to mark the 27th anniversary of the proclamation of West Papuan independence, were brutally crushed by the armed forces with several deaths, scores wounded and scores more arrested. The armed forces commander said such activities will be treated as 'acts of rebellion'.

On 1 July this year, the West Papuan flag, the 'Morning Star', was unfurled in several places in West Papua and in other places, huge demonstrations took place demanding that the West Papuan people have a say in the future of their country. By openly confronting the authorities, people were taking great risks, challenging Indonesia's annexation of the territory and its incorporation as a province called Irian Jaya. Unfurling the West Papuan flag has occurred on many occasions over the past three decades. As a very public and demonstrative act, it has always invited a harsh response from the forces of occupation and scores of West Papuan men and women have served long prison sentences for this.

West Papua was handed over to Indonesia by the Dutch under a UN-endorsed plan in 1963 brokered by a US diplomat. A so-called 'act of free choice' in 1969 was held while the country was in the grip of repression; a council of 1,026 hand-picked tribal leaders, virtually at gunpoint, decided unanimously to remain a part of Indonesia. Although a UN monitor cast doubt in his report on the legitimacy of the act, the UN General Assembly 'took note of' the outcome and from then on, regarded the dispute as having been solved.

Since then, no member state of the UN has raised the issue of West Papua's status. However, in June this year, some members of the US Congress wrote to President Habibie, raising serious questions about the human rights situation in West Papua and touching also on the status of the territory. This letter was translated into Indonesian and circulated widely in the country, raising hopes among West Papuans of renewed interest from the international community in their fate.



West Papuan flag 1961

But the July campaign in favour of independence was prompted first and foremost by pent-up anger at more than thirty years of heavy-handed suppression of protests about numerous human rights abuses, disregard for the land rights of the people to make way for transmigration and logging, and the unbridled exploitation of West Papua's mineral resources, bringing a severely damaged environment and impoverishment to the rightful land-owners.

Jayapura and Sorong: two shot dead

The most striking demonstrations took place in the capital, Jayapura, in Sorong in the west of the country, at the Cendrawasih University on the outskirts of Jayapura and in Biak city on the island of Biak.

In Jayapura on 1 and 2 July, hundreds of people gathered at the regional legislative assembly to express dissatisfaction over the treatment of the people of West Papua for more than thirty years. They denounced the 'act of free choice' and called for a proper referendum. They staged a sit-in overnight with local residents providing food. On the second day, the crowd grew to more than a thousand. When they refused to disperse on the orders of the army, there were clashes, with troops wielding truncheons and rifle-butts. Many people were injured and there were a number of arrests.

The demonstration in Sorong involved thousands of people, many of whom had travelled in from neighbouring villages. They gathered at the district assembly building and called on the Indonesian President to give West Papua its independence immediately. They supported the 1 July 1971 proclamation of West Papuan independence by the OPM - the Free Papua Movement - which has been waging armed struggle since 1965. They also called for the immediate withdrawal of the Indonesian armed forces and the release of all West Papuan political prisoners.

When their efforts to present these demands were rebuffed, some people in the crowd started attacking cars and shops, in response to which the troops opened fire. Two people, one a pregnant woman, were killed.

Student fatally wounded

On 2 July, 2,000 students attended a free-speech forum on the Cendrawasih University campus at which the status of the territory was discussed. Earlier, Cendrawasih students had held a number of protests about human rights violations in the Central Highlands, around the villages of Bela and Alama, where eleven people were shot dead by troops and 126 people died from hunger or disease after being driven from their gardens. [See *TAPOL Bulletin,* No 147, July 1998.]

While the free-speech forum was underway, some students became suspicious of a man whom they recognised as an army intelligence agent. When they started attacking him, troops standing watch outside the campus entered the premises and opened fire. Two people were hit and rushed to hospital. A high-school pupil was hit in the knee and a 22-year old law student named Steven Suripatti was gravely wounded in the head. After more than two weeks in intensive care, Steven died on 27 July; he never regained consciousness. The officer who had been attacked was injured and, according to the army, died later in hospital.

Biak: Flag-raisers gunned down

On 2 July, the *Kejora* (Morning Star) flag was unfurled on a water-tower in Biak harbour. The Papuans were baton-charged the next day and in the ensuing fracas, two soldiers were reportedly killed, according to eye witnesses, though the army has never admitted this. The flag-raisers held their ground and kept the flag aloft. The flag became the centre of attention and stirred great enthusiasm among the people in the town. On 4 July, the local military commanded warned of dire consequences if the flag was not taken down by the next day. The warning was ignored.

Early on 6 July, the people sleeping under the flag-pole were woken by gunfire. They were surrounded by heavily-armed troops coming from land and sea. The shooting continued as people fled in all directions. Many were shot in the legs but some were hit in the chest, head or stomach. Eye witnesses later spoke of a great deal of blood and claim to have seen a number of dead bodies. Scores of people were wounded. Dozens were arrested and held in police cells, including people with gunshot wounds which were not properly treated.



Demonstration of Papuans in Jakarta. The posters say: Whether we eat or not, we want independence, We, Papuan people want freedom, We need the Freedom.

Many of the wounded were taken to Biak general hospital and the navy base hospital, both of which were placed under heavy guard with no one being allowed in for days to check the whereabouts of missing relatives or visit the wounded. According to eye witnesses, many wounded people left town to return home rather than go to a hospital for treatment.

Biak casualties

An investigation by the National Human Rights Commission appears only to have scraped the surface. It found evidence from hospital records that one person, Ruben Orboi, had died of his wounds in hospital but his body was removed in an ambulance belonging to one of the armed forces and not returned to the family. Twenty-three others sustained gunshot wounds.

According to local human rights groups, nine people were still missing at the end of July. Among them was a 62-year old man who left home shortly after the shooting to look for his son who had been involved in the flag-raising. The son later returned home safe and sound. Munir, the

director of *KONTRAS,* the Commission for Missing Persons and Victims of Violence, which has set up a branch in Jayapura, said later that the number had fallen to five, though the names he published included some persons not on the earlier list of nine. He accused the military of responsibility for the disappearances. The five are a male nurse, a taxi driver, a student and two white collar workers, one of whom is a woman. [*AFP,* 17 August 1998]

Three weeks after the bloody attack, twenty people were still in police custody, apparently awaiting trial. They are likely to be charged for rebellion, under Article 106 of the Criminal Code and face a penalty of life imprisonment or 20 years. They include a high-ranking government employee named Philip Karma who is regarded by the authorities as the ring-leader. He is known to have been badly wounded in both legs but was not taken to hospital for treatment.

Since the incident, Biak has been stricken with fear and anxiety from lack of information about the many wounded and missing. Days after the attack, local fishermen reported seeing corpses floating near the coast, some with gunshot wounds. Some of the bodies were hastily buried by the local military authorities without allowing autopsies to take place.

A local fisherman said he had seen six bodies on two separate days soon after the shooting and believes they bore bullet wounds. According to *The Guardian* correspondent in Indonesia, altogether fifteen bodies were washed ashore, one of which was identified as someone who went missing on 6 July. The military authorities claimed that the bodies were victims of the tidal waves which hit the north coast of Papua New Guinea on 17 July even though some came ashore before then. More bodies were washed ashore after the tidal waves but they would have had to float 600 kilometres to reach Biak. The Bishop of Jayapura, Leo Laba Ladjar, rejected the idea as unfounded while John Rumbiak of the Human Rights Advocacy Team for Irian Jaya insisted that autopsies should have been conducted identification and to determine the cause of death. [*Jakarta Post* and *The Guardian,* 30 July 98]

New Forum wants status reviewed

In a striking break with the past, the three Christian churches in West Papua, along with traditional and community leaders, have decided to raise the fundamental issue of the status of Irian Jaya. Until the fall of Suharto, they had chosen to function strictly within the Republic of Indonesia in their attempts to seek redress for the massive violations under his dictatorial regime. In fact, there were repeated delays in making public the report of abuses in the Central Highlands which was finalised late last year because the church leaders in Jayapura were reluctant to face a major confrontation with the military. As a result, the report was finally made public on 25 May this year by the local church leaders in Timika.

The Bishop of Jayapura and the heads of the two Protestant churches, the GKII and the GKI, were signatories of a statement issued by the newly-formed *Forum for the Reconciliation of Irian Jaya Society (FORERI)* on 24 July which lambasted developments in the territory since 1965, complaining that the 'centralised system of government (had) led to many deaths and the destruction of property... to shooting, torture, intimidation, even murder of people in Irian Jaya... while members of the army had been given medals (for) their achievements in murdering their compatriots'. It added: 'Could it be that the Indonesian government is drawn to Irian Jaya not by its people but by its natural resources?'


The church leaders who gave their imprimatur to this important initiative are the Rev. Herman Saud, chair of the GKI Synode in Irian Jaya, the Rev. Dr Benny Giay on behalf of the GKII, and Dr Leo Laba Ladjar OFM, the Bishop of Jayapura.

Making their assessment of conditions in the wake of events surrounding 1 July this year, *FORERI* said: 'What people in Irian Jaya want in essence is the opportunity to handle their own affairs, in other words, FREEDOM.'

They came close to calling openly for a referendum, saying: 'It is absolutely essential that there should be a test of the opinion of the people regarding the status of the territory of Irian Jaya.'

Its other demands were for the armed forces to exercise restraint and avoid the use of force, an end to the territory's status as a 'military operational region', the release of all those held following the events of 1 - 6 July, and the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for a series of grave human rights abuses since 1977.

The other signatories were three student leaders, Gerson Abrauw, Maria Korano and Marthinus Werimon, two women leaders, Selviana Sanggenafa, and two traditional leaders, Tom Beanal and Theys Eluay.



West Papuan human rights?

Call it West Papua!

Other groups representing West Papuans living or studying in Java have come out onto the streets of the capital, condemning the use of the name Irian Jaya and demanding that its proper name, West Papua, be restored. Their demands echo the demands put forward in Sorong and elsewhere in West Papua.

The changing mood is also reflected in the Indonesian press, some of which have carried articles by West Papuans giving an analysis of conditions in the territory that would never have seen the light of day under Suharto. ✸

Stubborn *Orde Baru* remnants

The Habibie government has been in office now for more than three months, enough time to judge whether it truly reflects a break with the Suharto era. How genuine is the commitment of the Habibie government to genuine reform?

Many activists are disappointed with the pace of democratisation. Several crucial issues remain untouched while some burning issues have gone forward at a snail's pace.

Most scenarios of the Suharto overthrow envisaged the aging dictator being held responsible for his 32-year bloody, despotic rule. Impeachment would follow, after which he would be forced to account before a court of law for his many crimes against humanity. The reality was different. Suharto was forced to step down by mass demonstrations but the handover was more in the nature of a 'palace revolution', with the two main players, Habibie and General Wiranto, securing crucial levers on power.



Power consolidation

These two have a complex relationship with each other. In many ways they are rivals while at the same time they rely heavily on each other. Habibie emerged as the successor because this was the most convenient option for Wiranto and the bulk of ABRI, the armed forces. Habibie's mass base was very limited and much easier to control than people like Amien Rais or Megawati who enjoy mass support.

While Habibie is not in a position to take decisions about the ABRI leadership, he has helped to enhance the position of Wiranto, who is concurrently ABRI commander and defence minister, on several occasions in the last few months. In his first days as president and concurrently ABRI supreme commander (*Panglima Tertinggi, Pangti*), Habibie signed documents sacking several important generals like Lt.-General Prabowo and Major-General Muchdi.

Having a civilian as supreme commander is a new experience for Indonesia. The ex-dictator, a five-star general, not only used this position to promote, reshuffle and demote officers but also to initiate military operations. Habibie's role as *Pangti* is bound to be different, given that the relationship between the president and ABRI will be quite complex, sometimes depending on each other, sometimes competing and possibly ending up in conflict with each other.

The President v. ABRI

Suharto effectively grabbed power in October 1965 but it took almost two years before he was officially sworn in as president. This hiatus was used by ABRI to smash and paralyse civilian political life. In August 1966, the military held a crucial seminar that laid the political foundations of the *Orde Baru*. Some analysts correctly argue that by 1967 ABRI was the only organised political force in the country while Suharto, the most senior officer, held all the positions of power: as president, as ABRI commander-in-chief, as minister of defence and as commander of *Kopkamtib*, the notorious security agency.

Several years earlier, General Nasution had designed a military doctrine called *Dwifungsi* or 'dual-function', to justify the army's role in civilian affairs. This was at a time when the army's role in politics was relatively obscure. Political affairs were firmly in the hands of civilians and the military were basically confined to barracks.

In 1967 with Suharto as president, everything changed and *Dwifungsi* emerged as the only dominant political doctrine in Indonesia. Military presence in the administration was not only overwhelming in numbers but ABRI in effect became the only political force in the country. Suharto stood at the apex of the junta and very soon started to depoliticise ABRI as well. No one knew better than he how potentially dangerous ABRI was for his own position. Several contenders for power were swept aside and relegated to obscurity. The Suharto dictatorship emerged and the *Orde Baru* regime became increasingly synonymous with the Suharto regime.

By the mid eighties, ABRI had been reorganised and politically domesticated. Suharto was the boss and the ABRI top merely functioned as a security body to serve the political needs of Suharto. It can be argued that ABRI lost its political independence, functioned like a German sheep

dog to protect the political and economic interests of the Suharto family and cronies. Top generals were hand-picked by Suharto and consisted mostly of former adjutants or presidential guards, including General Wiranto.

Negotiating a new relationship

General Wiranto played a key role in deciding who would replace Suharto. On 21 May, when Suharto announced his resignation, General Wiranto announced that ABRI backed the constitutional promotion of Habibie as president. In 1965 ABRI functioned both as king and king-maker; in 1998, it was reduced to being just the king-maker.



Evening Herald, 22-05-1998

There are many explanations as to why ABRI did not grab power on 21 May. The economic meltdown is clearly part of the answer. The ABRI top realised that if they ran the country, it would complicate matters. The international community would not accept a military regime while ABRI itself lacked the expertise to run the economy. Globally, military regimes are now a rarity which top officers, many trained in the US and the UK, know only too well.

Others argue correctly that ABRI have lost their political skills. Political emasculation turned them into little more than glorified firemen, whose job it was to preserve law and order. On the morning of 21 May Habibie was catapulted to power and Wiranto became the architect of the constitutional coup - the ultimate king-maker [see also *TAPOL* Bulletin No. 147, July 1998]. A fortnight later an ABRI delegation visited the new president to confirm their support.

On 17 July, General Wiranto delivered a key speech to ABRI senior officers reformulating the social-political functions (another terminology for *Dwifungsi*) of ABRI. Obviously some kind of deal with the Habibie group had been struck.

Reformulating the *Dwifungsi*

Despite the fact that *Dwifungsi* remained the dominant political doctrine in the Suharto era, ABRI's political influence was drastically eroded. ABRI became a tool in the hands of Suharto to maintain his power. In the last ten years Suharto said that ABRI should act in accordance with the Javanese saying, *tut wuri handayani,* or 'guiding from behind', as king-maker rather than king.

Wiranto's speech of 17 July reflects this change while openly demanded a share in power, a pro-active form of *tut wuri handayani.* ABRI's third man in command, Lt. General Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, is regarded as the main ideologue of ABRI. As chief of staff for social and political affairs he is responsible for redefining the *Dwifungsi.* According to the 17 July speech, it has been streamlined to four points: 'ABRI need not necessarily always be in front', 'ABRI will change from dominating things to exerting an influence', 'ABRI will seek to influence things indirectly rather than directly', and 'ABRI will agree to share responsibility in political affairs with its non-military partners'.

ABRI's distrust of civilian politicians is almost as old as the Indonesian Republic. Historians and ABRI watchers know that the struggle for independence proceeded along two different lines: a political struggle through diplomacy and a military struggle through guerrilla warfare. The military always insists that it was their struggle that ultimately won Indonesia its independence, a view that is contested by most Indonesianists. To this day, ABRI leaders hold religiously to this 'sacred truth' as part of their ideological baggage, even though most were still babes in arms at the time.

Sharing power

The post-Suharto period is now three months old and power is being shared by Suharto's two golden boys. Earlier this year it would have been unthinkable for Suharto to be constitutionally toppled by two trusted loyalists. Some people still seem to think that Suharto is *tut wuri handayani,* or guiding from behind, or as Suharto described it more recently, *lengser keprabon,* which means that when the king retires, he stays in the background acting as the wise elder statesman.

However, nothing could be further from the truth. Indonesia has definitely entered the post-Suharto era, and there are no grounds for thinking that Suharto or his kin will be able to make a come back.

For ABRI a new era has emerged, not unlike 1965. The ABRI leaders have become active political players and/or power brokers. The main difference is that now, they have to share power with civilians headed by Habibie. After having had their economic and political wings clipped by Suharto, they now want to make a comeback in both sectors. ABRI's political base is still firmly rooted in the regions where many provincial governors, district chiefs and sub-district chiefs are military. Together with the ABRI territorial structure that reaches down to village level, they have a stranglehold on political and economic affairs. People in the region will need to wage a resolute struggle to drive back the military back to the barracks.

When he took over, Habibie's power base was relatively small. Although he became head of ICMI, the Association of Muslim Intellectuals, in 1990, he never played a key political role. In any case, ICMI has never had a mass

base. He remained Suharto's golden boy which is why he was chosen by Suharto to chair ICMI but he was never a politician with popular support. ICMI was very divided, a mish-mash of ambitious bureaucrats, academics and young Muslim thinkers representing a range of views.



ABRI has never been so unpopular.

Today, Habibie is backed by large sections of ICMI and some ICMI stalwarts now hold key positions in the cabinet and the bureaucracy. There have already been tensions between the Habibie clique and ABRI. Power struggles have broken out over top positions. The battle over the Golkar leadership was particularly significant.

The Golkar leadership battle

The leadership battle in Golkar was first and foremost a test as to whether *Orde Baru* forces could make a comeback. It would show whether Habibie could benefit politically and whether ABRI would at last get off the back of the party.

For weeks *Cendana* (Suharto's private residence) had been making move to regain control of Golkar. Retired General Edi Sudradjat was their candidate for the chair against Habibie's candidate, Akbar Tandjung, his new minister/secretary of state.

Golkar is not easy to define. Set up by the military in the 1960s to fight the growing influence of the Communist Party, it later became Suharto's political vehicle. Some analysts described it as the ruling party but increasingly it became the party of the ruler. Suharto was head of the Advisory Board, a position comparable to the general secretary of the politbureaus of communist parties in the former Soviet bloc. High-ranking officials were automatically high-ranking members of Golkar.

Golkar consisted of three components, the ABRI component reflecting the military influence, the bureaucracy component reflecting Golkar as an extension of the bureaucracy and the third component consisting of political big shots who held the top echelon positions.

Lacking a substantial power base of his own, Habibie opted to turn Golkar into his political vehicle. Using the practices so fine-tuned by Suharto, bribes paid in brand-new bank-notes flowed to the delegates to support the new president's candidate who defeated Edi Sudradjat, a former armed forces commander and then defence minister, despite the fact that many branches were led by local ABRI bigwigs. A statement by General Wiranto that ABRI would not interfere in the party's affairs clinched Habibie's victory.

Wiranto's decision to disentangle the armed forces from Golkar could shake the party to its foundations. For more than 25 years, its leadership consisted predominantly of high-ranking officers. It remains to be seen whether ABRI will indeed withdraw. Although Wiranto wants to control political events more directly through ABRI headquarters in Cilangkap, many retired officers are still entrenched in Golkar structures. ABRI's share in the Habibie cabinet is still quite sizeable. No fewer than five key positions are held by the armed forces, the minister-coordinator for political and security affairs, the defence, interior and information portfolios and the attorney-general.

Another shift that could profoundly affect Golkar's chances in the coming elections is that government employees are no longer required to be members of Golkar's civil service union, Korpri, and are free to vote for parties of their choice.

Orde Baru remnants and *reformasi*

While Suharto's *Orde Baru* has entered history, most of its structures and personnel are still in place and are being used by both Habibie and Wiranto. Pro-democracy groups have started using the term *Suhartoism* to refer to the stubborn structures that stand in the way of *reformasi.*

Both Habibie and Wiranto have repeatedly proclaimed their commitment to *reformasi.* but as always with people in power, they shy away from supporting drastic changes. Both are working hard to consolidate and increase their own power bases. In Habibie's case, he is moving in two directions, joining civil society in driving back the political influence of ABRI while trying to build a coalition with sections of ABRI. Habibie may well seek accommodation with retired ABRI officers who enjoyed high office in the closing days of the Suharto period.

Wiranto has already defined the general thrust of his strategy by reformulating the *Dwifungsi.* At the same time he is busy trying to repair the tarnished image of ABRI. The battle between ABRI and the *pro-reformasi* movement will be crucial for the future of democracy in Indonesia. ✸

continuation from page 16

A first in Esperanto

The publication by the Portuguese Esperanto Society consists of a speech entitled, 'Timor, The Hell Just Next Door' in Esperanto, which was delivered at the 82nd World Esperanto Congress in Adelaide in 1997. The speech is also published here in Portuguese and English, along with very useful graphics, maps and figures. The value of this book, slender as it is, is that it takes the issue of East Timor to what must be a largely new audience. ✸

Who gave the orders to Prabowo ?

The case of the disappeared activists has been front-page news for weeks and pressure from the public has forced ABRI to set up a DKP (Officers Honour Council) for purposes of damage limitation. The pressure group KONTRAS, set up to take on the cases of missing persons, is daily attacking ABRI generals, while activists like Pius Lustrilanang who re-emerged after being abducted, insists that the entire ABRI leadership, including ex-President Suharto, are involved.

This is not the first time that ABRI has been forced to set up a special council to investigate high-ranking officers. International pressure following the Santa Cruz massacre in 1991 compelled ABRI to set up a council to remove a few officers. This time, several senior *Kopassus* officers, including Lt. General Prabowo, will be heard by the *DKP*, the Officer's Honour Council.

ABRI's image has never been as bad as it is today. No one doubts that the armed forces were involved in the May looting and raping. ABRI's military operations in Aceh and West Papua [see separate articles] are now being brought to light by civil society in both regions and the ABRI leadership has admitted that responsibility for the disappearances rests with *Kopassus,* the notorious red-beret crack troops.



Pius arriving back home, next to him a poster about Prabowo.

Demolishing the evidence

In the meantime, many disappearances are still unresolved. High profile cases like the student leader Andi Arief who was kidnapped on 28 March have been well publicised . In this case, the victim has been outspoken about what happened to him [see also *TAPOL* Bulletin No.147, July 1998]. Andi Arief is convinced that *Kopassus was* not the only unit to have taken part in his kidnapping; others were involved, including territorial units and the police. His conclusion is that kidnapping is standard procedure in the armed forces. Top ABRI generals have been trying to insist that the wrong-doings were simply the result of officers wrongly interpreting or excessively carrying out orders.

Information about how and where the kidnapped were held is now being published the press. Piecing together the evidence and descriptions given by 'reappeared' activists like Desmond Mahesa, Andi Arief, Waluyo Djati and Pius Lustrilanang, it is clear that their 'prison' was situated in Cijantung, the headquarters of Kopassus but the complex has recently been bulldozed and a small garden with flower beds has appeared in its place.

State violence

Ever since the first victim re-emerged and gave testimony, a great deal of evidence has come to light. It became clear that sections of ABRI were doing the dirty work for Suharto's violent politics. Prabowo himself has already hinted that his unit, *Kopassus,* was involved in the kidnappings. He told the tabloid *Adil*: *"The operations conducted by my men were based on the assumption that there were people who were a threat to the safety of the nation. There were people who were making bombs and planning to bring down the government. What I and my men did was in the interests of the nation and for the safety of the people. I and my people are dedicated to the state".*

Kopassus has always been an elite unit moulded in the tradition of the US green-berets and the British SAS. A *Kopassus* soldier not only excels in combat skills but is also equipped with training in counter-insurgency. Interrogation techniques including torture are part of the training. As is known many *Kopassus* officers have obtained training in the US and UK.

In 1996 when he was commander of *Kopassus,* Prabowo decided to set up a new unit called Group Four to deal with special intelligence tasks which, as it turns out, included kidnapping activists.



Two adversaries Prabowo and Wiranto

At least 14 still missing

According to *Kontras,* the organisation that deals with disappearances and victims of violence, at least 14 persons are still missing. They include pro-democracy activists: **Suyat (23 yrs), Herman Hendrawan (28)** and **Petrus Bimo Anugrah (25)**; people who were involved in the Mega-Bintang campaign: **Dedy Hamdun (44), Noval Alkatiri (31)** and **Ismail (30)**; PDI-Megawati activists: **Yanni Afri (Rian, 27)** and **Sonny (28)** and people who disappeared during the May 1998 riots: **Yudin Muhidin (22), Hendra Hambalie (19), Ucok Munandar Siahaan (21)** and **Triyono (23).** There are another two cases but the relatives are unwilling to allow the names to be made public. There are others who have disappeared, but some may have gone underground because they thought they were being hunted by the military.

The role of Suharto and Feisal Tanjung

Kontras co-ordinator Munir has emerged as one of the most the vocal critics of ABRI. He rejects the *DKP* procedure because this it only deals with the ethical question whether an officer has violated procedures. It has become more than obvious that some high-placed military should be put on trial. Statements made by commander-in-chief Wiranto and the main suspect Lt.General Prabowo make it clear that someone higher in rank gave the order. There are very few higher-ranking officers above the three-star General Prabowo.

Political weeklies are suggesting that either former ABRI commander-in-chief, four-star General Feisal Tanjung or ex dictator, five-star General Suharto gave the command to abduct the activists. Feisal Tanjung now holds a senior cabinet post as co-ordinating minister for politics and security affairs. He is regarded as a colourless figure, whose only attribute was loyalty to Suharto. It is hardly likely that he would have launched the operation without consulting Suharto.

It is much more likely that Suharto was the one who gave the orders. The Suharto family all live together in the same complex and their homes are interconnected. The place is known as Cendana, the name of the street where Suharto's private residence is located. It is suggested that son-in-law Prabowo could have received his orders directly from Suharto, bypassing ABRI headquarters.

Suharto and *Petrus*

In the early eighties over a period of several months hundreds of corpses were found in many cities, often left lying in the streets. In some cases, their bodies bore bullet wounds or were badly mutilated. It became known as the *Petrus* affair from *pembunuhan misterius,* for mysterious killings. All fingers pointed towards ABRI commander-in-chief General Benny Murdani who was conducting a so-called clean-sweep against crime. Only very few human rights lawyers had the courage to protest against the random killings. Nobody was ever punished for this wave of senseless killing. A decade later Suharto casually admitted in his autobiography that he had given the order for the streets to be cleaned of criminals as a form of 'shock therapy'.

The disappearances are clearly political cases. The people who were abducted were clearly threats to Suharto's rule. As early as 1995 it became clear that Suharto was determined to safeguard his seventh term for 1998. It meant that anybody seen as hindrance had to be removed. Victims of abduction like Pius Lustrilanang are convinced that Suharto himself gave the orders.

How far will ABRI go?

It remains to be seen how far ABRI will go in 'clearing out' their own stable. The ABRI leadership are evidently willing to sacrifice top *Kopassus* officers, including Colonel Chairawan, Major General Muchdi and Lt. General Prabowo. But the *DKP* Honour Council is only about military ethics; it is not a court of law. Public outrage in Indonesia has reached a point where people are demanding that the perpetrators must be put on trial.

A recent trial about the killing of four students at Trisakti University resulted in minimal sentences for two police officers charged with 'misinterpreting orders'. This trial which was clearly nothing more than a damage limitation exercise, scape-goating a few members of ABRI, has aroused public anger.

The reputation of the armed forces is at stake and civil society want things to go much further than a few meaningless trials. What is needed is structural change in ABRI. The police force must be separated from ABRI and placed under civilian control, a demand that is already widely supported, even by President Habibie. In the new political laws now being drafted, ABRI are likely to lose some at least of their seats in parliament.

Most critically, the various military intelligence units: *Bakin, BIA, Kopassus* and the 'intel' units attached to the territorial commands must be disbanded. These are the gangs who organised the kidnappings, the rioting and the many killings and atrocities that have plagued the people of Indonesia for the past 32 years.

Above all, civil society now demands that ABRI must return to barracks, ending the nightmare of militarisation in Indonesia. ✸

TAPOL activist stopped from entering Indonesia

For many years, the New Order regime kept a blacklist of people who are prevented from entering or leaving Indonesia. When the list was first compiled is anyone's guess. When TAPOL co-editor Liem Soei Liong tried to enter Indonesia in July this year, he discovered that he was still 'dicekal' on the instructions of General Wiranto, Minister of Defence/Commander-in-Chief).

The word '*cekal*' is a typical New Order creation. It is a combination of *cegah* meaning 'to prevent' and *tangkal* meaning 'to shield from'. Whatever its origins, the word has now developed a life of its own.

Don't imagine that you can seek information about whether you are on the list; things have not changed in the Habibie era. No one is allowed to know why he/she was listed or whether the name has been scrapped. Lack of transparency is part of the game, creating uncertainty and fear, a characteristic of the *Orde Baru.* Many Indonesia scholars, academics, activists and journalists have been on the blacklist at one time or another but some are known to have been removed.

Lack of transparency

Four agencies, the Finance Ministry, the Justice Ministry; the Defence Ministry and the Attorney General's office, are entitled to put 'undesirables' on the *cekal*-list, including Indonesian passport holders who are prevented from leaving the country and foreigners who are prevented from entering. Any of the four agencies can put a name on the list but it needs the agreement of all four for it to be removed.


Any sovereign country, democratic or totalitarian, has a blacklist to prevent drugs dealers, embezzlers or alleged terrorists from leaving or entering the country but keeping people out for political reasons is a rarity these days.

In the Suharto era, no one questioned the fact that somebody was blacklisted as complaints were ignored anyway and no explanations were forthcoming. Blacklisted people had two options, to give up visiting Indonesia or try to enter through smaller entry-points. Indonesian activists needing to travel abroad took the same precaution.

The main-frame computer at Cengkareng airport, Jakarta is connected to the computers at Medan and Den Pasar airports. Smaller entry points also have computers but immigration officials often don't bother to look. Some small harbours have no computer and rely on computer print-outs which are often out-of-date or too cumbersome to read.

Political blacklisting

The Immigration Department has never revealed the number of people blacklisted for political reasons nor what the criteria are The way cases are handled leaves much to chance. Some people are stopped, then let in while others are refused and immediately deported.



Since the late seventies, East Timor seems to be the main reason for blacklisting. Attending an international East Timor conference or being critical of the invasion is more than enough. Embassy officials seem to be the watchdogs, reporting to one of the intelligence agencies, *Bakin* or *BIA.* Usually this is someone in the political section or the military attache. This would explain the lack of consistency as some embassies are more alert than others, and a changeover in staff can also make a difference. One embassy fanatic may put a whole group of people on the list while in other countries, they are not bothered.

Political blacklisting is primarily the responsibility of *BIA,* the intelligence body under the ABRI commander-in-chief who is concurrently the minister of defence.

The case of Liem Soei Liong

When Liem arrived at Jakarta airport on 19 July, an immigration official spotted his name on the *cekal*-list and took him to the immigration office. He had arrived with Pius Lustrilanang, the activist who was kidnapped by the military and held for two months. Hundreds of activists were at the airport to meet them, several of whom were already inside the immigration section.

Liem, who carries a Dutch passport, discovered that he was blacklisted according to document SKEP/634/X/1997 of 16 October 1997 signed by General Wiranto. The immigration officials told him a *cekal* order is valid for one year and can be automatically extended indefinitely.

Soon, the place was buzzing. Pius and the demonstrators outside refused to leave unless Liem was allowed in and they started arguing with immigration. Then Bambang W. Suharto, a member of *Komnas Ham*, the National Commission of Human Rights, appeared. Despite all the pressure, immigration wouldn't budge unless they got the green light from their superiors.

To the very top

At one point, the immigration office was full of people, Hendardi, Ratna Sarumpaet, Jopie Lasut, Yenni Damayanti, Agus Lennon, Desmond Mahesa, Paskah Irianto, Trimedya Panjaitan, Mindo Rajagukguk, Maria Pakpahan and many more.

It was left to Bambang Suharto talk to the authorities. Being Sunday, senior officials were contacted at home or elsewhere. An immigration official phoned Justice Minister Muladi who was on his way to Jakarta. He told Bambang Suharto he had no objections but it was Wiranto who had blacklisted Liem.

Bambang eventually got through to General Wiranto who said there were 'security problems'; he mentioned a talk Liem gave in 1994 in Bandung and alleged that Liem was *indikasi,* in other words a communist suspect. He said that Liem should make an application to enter Indonesia, which would have to come from abroad and would be discussed at an ABRI staff meeting.

So Liem was forced to get on the next plane for Singapore where he made a hand-written application to General Wiranto. No reply has yet been received.

Kidnapped by BIA in 1994

Liem had previously managed to enter Indonesia legally several times through smaller entry-points. In June 1994 he spent a month in Indonesia but towards the end of his visit, *BIA* discovered that he was in the country. They monitored a meeting in Bandung where he gave a talk to a crowd of local activists. Two days later he was kidnapped by seven *BIA* agents and taken to the *BIA* office in Pasar Minggu. One of the *BIA* directors, Brig. General Slamet Singgih was responsible for the operation. After persistent interrogation, he was taken to the Jakarta Police HQ and interrogated until deep in the night. Lastly he was taken to immigration head office and from here he was deported. A three day nightmare.

His blacklisting goes back to 1981, *cekal* number F4-IL.0103-565 dated 31 August 1981. A few months earlier, he had spoken out at an international conference on East against the Indonesian invasion. By that time he was already a holder of a Dutch passport.

Orde Baru and *Orde Reformasi*

Several things have changed in the post-Suharto era but some things have remained the same.

Some leading Indonesian activists whose passports had been confiscated, went to their nearest Indonesian embassy immediately after Suharto's downfall and received new passports. They include Yenni Damayanti, Reza Muharram, Pipiet Rochyat and George Aditjondro. Their 'crimes' were seen as misdeeds against Suharto, who is no longer in power. People like Liem have committed similar 'crimes' but for him nothing has changed.

There needs to be a campaign to put an end to political blacklisting. ❁

Prisoner releases: A slow business

On 17 August, the government announced the release of a further 28 political prisoners, bringing the total freed since Habibie took power to around one hundred. For the first time, three of the 1965 prisoners were included. The government itself admits that they have only released half of the prisoners. For reasons best known to themselves, the government has chosen to handle the releases in piecemeal fashion.

As the East Timorese resistance leader, Xanana Gusmao, who is serving a 20-year sentence, said: 'If this government really wants to call itself a regime of reform, then Mr Habibie has to release all political prisoners without conditions.' The only conceivable explanation for handling the releases piecemeal is, as Budiman Sudjatmiko, chair of the PRD, the People's Democracy Party, has said, that 'the prisoners are being used as a bargaining tool with the international community'. [*The Guardian,* 18 August]

Three elderly, ailing men allowed home

The three released prisoners who had been arrested and tried for their alleged involvement in the 1965 events that triggered Suharto's seizure of power are:

Alexander Warouw, 81, who was freed from a prison in Balikpapan. Warouw was serving a life sentence and had been in prison since October 1965. He is known to be a diabetic and suffering from associated ailments.

Pudjo Prasetyo, 70, arrested in November 1997, who was serving a life sentence and was held in Kedung Pane Prison, Semarang. He is suffering from Parkinson's disease and has for years been in such poor physical shape that he requires assistance for all his daily needs. In 1997, TAPOL was able to make contact with him and published an interview. Even after his ordeal of thirty years in prison, he could still speak optimistically about the positive prospects for democratisation Indonesia and liberation for East Timor. The photo we published, taken in 1995, shows him to be extremely frail. [See *TAPOL Bulletin,* No 139, February 1997]

Manan Effendi Tjokrohardjo, 78, arrested in October 1965, who according to our latest information, was being held in Kalisosok Prison, Surabaya. He was serving a life sentence. He is known to have had a stroke and is now paralysed.

To defend himself against any hint of leniency towards communism which he alleges is still 'traumatic' for the Indonesian people, Justice Minister Muladi said that the

grounds for their release were strictly humanitarian. This is why, he said, only three have been released so far. They were not granted amnesties but were given presidential clemency. [*Suara Pembaruan,* 16 August]

This leaves ten 1965 prisoners still in prison. Four are under sentence of death, of whom three, **Asep Suryaman,** (73), **Bungkus** (71) and **Nataneal Marsudi,** (71) are in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta, while the fourth, **Isnanto,** (74) is in Tanjung Gusta Prison, Medan. The other six are all serving life sentences excepting **Buyung Ketek,** (59) regarding whom very little is known except that he was tried in August 1986 and sentenced to fifteen years; he is now in Padang Prison, West Sumatra.



Photo from Cipinang prison. Centre, Xanana Gusmao (bearded), on his right Wilson, recently released.

Acehnese, Papuans, Timorese released...

The bulk of the political prisoners released in the latest wave were East Timorese, West Papuans and Acehnese.

The six Acehnese released included one woman, **Nurhayati Hasani** who was serving a six-year sentence. Three of the other five who we have been able to identify from Amnesty lists are serving 4-year sentences or less. If Amnesty International's list of 55 prisoners [see *Indonesia and East Timor, Prisoner List,* 4 June 1998, issued by Amnesty Indonesia together with Human Rights Watch] is complete, this still leaves 49 Acehnese prisoners in prison.

The three West Papuan prisoners are each serving very harsh sentences of seven years. Harsh as they may be, these are the lightest of all the sentences being served by West Papuans on the Amnesty list. All the West Papuan and Acehenese prisoners had been tried for subversion.

Ten East Timorese were also named in the release decree. However, four were not in fact in gaol but had charges against them removed.

... but no more PRD releases

Following a decision by the State Administration Court in August to lift the ban on the PRD, it was widely expected that all the remaining PRD prisoners would be released, including the chair, Budiman Sudjatmiko. Since they had been convicted and given harsh sentences for setting up an illegal party which has now been legalised, their releases should have been automatic. However, that was not to be.

In the third wave which took place on 24 July, four PRD prisoners were released. They were **Wilson bin Nurtiyas** and **Ken Budha Kusumandaru** who were serving five years and four years respectively, and **Coen Pontoh** and **Mohamad Sholeh** who were serving three years and six months and four years respectively.

On that occasion, fifty prisoners were released of whom thirty-six were involved in a movement known as 'Divisi X' who had allegedly been holding unlawful military exercises. Three were women who in charge of preparing food for the group. The group also included several members of the army who had deserted. The 36 declared that they would refuse to leave prison because their leader was not included. No names are available.

When the releases were announced, sixteen prisoners in Cipinang Prison, Jakarta including Xanana Gusmao and Budiman Sudjatmiko, strongly denounced the discriminatory nature of the releases and demanded that all political prisoners be released without discrimination and unconditionally. They also said they would refuse to leave prison, should they be scheduled for release, until these demands had been met.

When the prison authorities in Cipinang Prison went to collect Wilson and Ken Budha from their cells, they found the doors bolted and chained, with both men refusing to leave. Saws had to be used to cut open the cell doors, after which the men were forcibly removed from the prison.

PRD lawsuit against Suharto and others

Following the unbanning of the PRD which the government decided not to contest, the party leadership announced that they were filing a lawsuit against three top government officials for banning the party which had resulted in their activists serving long prison sentences. The lawsuit will also cover the abduction of three PRD activists who are still missing. The officials named in the lawsuit are: the former president, Suharto, General Feisal Tanjung (now Minister-Coordinator for Political and Security Affairs) who was armed forces commander at the time of the campaign of vilification of the PRD, and General Syarwan Hamid, now Interior Minister, who was social and political affairs chief of staff of the armed forces at the time.

The lawsuit accuses the three of making groundless allegations against their party such as that they were communists and part of the outlawed PKI. ✸

continuation from back page

'home-coming'. This is a model of solidarity which will come as an inspiration to other groups around the world.

George Aditjondro, an Indonesian scholar now teaching in Australia, who has chapters in both books, writes here about the sufferings of the women of East Timor, written for presentation to the UN Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women. His chapter in the IWGIA is a reprint of his well-known article on the environmental damage inflicted during the Indonesian occupation.

The collection also includes the speech by Justice Marcus Einfield opening the exhibition on Genocide in East Timor and the Holocaust which was taken on tour to several countries by Jim Aubrey. ***continued on page 11***

International outcry against gang-rapes

Members of the Team of Volunteers for Humanity which so meticulously documented the rapes of Chinese women during the May riots in Jakarta visited Washington, Geneva and Amsterdam to help increase international awareness. They were accompanied by victims whose testimonies moved their audiences to tears. Many demonstrations have taken place outside Indonesian embassies, most of which were organised by federations of overseas Chinese.

The Jesuit priest Romo Sandyawan who heads the Team, testified before the Human Rights Caucus in Washington, describing the large-scale raping, looting and other barbaric acts as state violence. The systematic and organised way in which the violence was perpetrated followed the pattern of earlier riots in Surabaya, Solo, Palembang and elsewhere. The term state violence is indeed appropriate for the structural terror of the *Orde Baru.*

The *Tim Relawan untuk Kemanusiaan* (Team of Volunteers for Humanity) were the first to reveal the characteristics of the perpetrators who instigated the May riots, muscular men with crew-cuts and often with tattoos, whipping up anti-Chinese sentiments and rushing from shopping malls to housing projects. They doused shops and houses with gasoline, setting off devastating fires. While this was going on, at least 168 women were raped and sexually molested by similar types.



Action in Jakarta. The posters say:' Stop State Violence against women', 'Systematic raping, find the instigators!'

Tim Relawan has drawn up a detailed report which was completed last month and which proved beyond doubt that the organised gang-rapes in May were part of a plot to instigate riots in Jakarta and other parts of the country. The stories in the report are hair-raising and have stirred deep emotions all over the world.

Karlina Leksono, an astronomer, who is a member of the Team, stressed the importance of international solidarity and described the difficulties faced back home. She herself and others have frequently receive death threats by phone while rape victims have been intimidated with grotesque photos of women being sexually molested.

Tim Relawan also said that the May rapes were not an isolated event. Women in Aceh, West Papua and East Timor have also been victims [see article on Aceh] of gang-raping. In East Timor, rape has been an established part of the brutal terrorisation of the people since the Indonesian invasion in December 1975

According to *Tim Relawan t*he only way to prevent structural violence from happening is to strengthen civil society by organising people in their neighbourhoods and creating networks of neighbourhoods.

The brief visit abroad helped create deeper understanding around the world about the nature of organised terror that still exists in Indonesia.

Embassies flooded by protests

The gang-raping of mostly Sino-Indonesian women in May has now become a major issue around the world and protests have occurred across Asia, Europe, Australia and the American continent.

Web sites have greatly helped circulate information. Press clippings, detailed reports, video reports and photo material have circulated widely and action committees have been set up in a number of countries

In Australia public meetings were held in the major cities attended by large crowds. The Australian government wrote to Habibie urging him not to let the situation deteriorate any further and to end discrimination against the ethnic-Chinese.

In the US, there were many demonstrations and public meetings in the main cities. In San Francisco a protest took place in front of the Indonesian consulate and a teach-in, attended by more than 1,200 people, was held. The teach-in was organised by ICANET (Indonesian Chinese Ameri-

can Network). The Indonesian community in the San Francisco Bay area consists of more than 13,000 people, most of them Sino-Indonesians. The meeting was addressed by Willie Brown, mayor of San Francisco.

A large protest took place in Boston on 7 August when 1,000 demonstrators marched from Chinatown to the Holocaust Memorial. The rally was organised by the overseas Chinese community and attended by the local chapters of NAACP and the National Organisation for Women.



Huge demonstration at the Indonesian consulate in San Francisco

Smaller protests took place in Los Angeles, New York City and Washington.

In Europe several protest meetings were held, particularly in Germany and Holland. Several local action groups have been set up in Germany, while in Holland a new organisation AKUI (Humanitarian Action for Indonesia) was established; it hosted the *Tim Relawan* visit and organised a public meeting that was attended by more than 300 people. In London several Chinese organisations held a protest in front of the Indonesian embassy.

Asian protests

There were a number of protests in ASEAN capitals. In Kuala Lumpur more than 70 organisations sent representatives to the Indonesian embassy. A similar protest took place in Singapore where women's organisations expressed their anger about the May events.

In Manila 300 people protested outside the ASEAN foreign ministers meeting, holding aloft placards saying: *Indonesia, where are your Human Rights?* and *No to Anti-Chinese Racism*. In the statement, a comparison was made with anti-Jewish pogroms by the Nazis. Another demonstration of over one thousand people, organised by the Philippine-Chinese Association, went to the Indonesian embassy.

On 17 August, Indonesia's Independence day, demonstrations took place in several capitals, including Manila and for the first time also in Bangkok.

In Hong Kong three demonstrations took place within a week, demanding swift and thorough investigations and the prosecution of the perpetrators. Angry crowds threw rotten eggs at the Indonesian consulate-general. A demonstration in early August attracted more than 10,000 people.


Anger in Taiwan was very deep, with MPs and public figures joining the demonstrators. Press and TV reporting was extensive. A delegation of Taiwanese NGOs flew to Jakarta to express their anger. The Taipei government twice sent protests to the Habibie government. On 3 August hundreds of demonstrators hurled eggs at the Indonesian representative office, calling on the Indonesian government to punish the rapists and compensate the victims. An altar was set up and incense sticks were burned to mourn the killings in May. The protest was organised by the New Party and the Association of Returned Overseas Chinese in Indonesia.

Protest from Beijing

Quite unexpectedly, there were also strong words from Beijing. On 3 August the Chinese government called on the Jakarta government to punish rioters who brutalised the ethnic Chinese minority during the disturbances. The *People's Daily,* the Communist Party daily, carried a front-page article demanding just treatment and protection for ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. Several demonstrations took place at the Indonesian embassy in Beijing, with the tacit agreement of the Chinese government, organised by students and women's organisations together with organisations of overseas Chinese.

Two Chinese newspapers had published photo essays on the violence, prompting public outrage against Jakarta but also against the Chinese government for failing to react sooner and more forcibly. At a meeting in a Beijing hotel decorated with feminist slogans and pictures of the victims, prominent women, many dressed in black and with yellow ribbons condemned the rapes. There were emotional responses to a speech by an ethnic Chinese woman from Indonesia who told the audience: 'Young women don't dare to go out because nowhere is safe.' [*International Herald Tribune,* 18 August]

EAST TIMOR: OCCUPATION AND RESISTANCE
EDITED BY TORBEN RETBØLL
IWGIA PUBL., 288 pg, ISBN 87-9841 10-7-1



Order from *TAPOL*
Price £ 12.00 postage included

CGI aid not the answer

International donors pledged $7.9 billion in aid to Indonesia at the annual Consultative Group on Indonesia (CGI) meeting at the end of July, fifty per cent more than last year. But the package will not provide long-term relief to the stricken economy unless the World Bank/IMF relinquish their control over economic policy and President Habibie fulfils his commitment to political and institutional reforms.

This year's CGI was dominated by the economic crisis and its social effects, described by the World Bank as the most dramatic reversal in fortune of any country in recent history.

The donors' top priority - to cover the 1998/99 budget deficit, estimated at 8.5 per cent. of gross domestic product - was met by a $7.9 billion package of quick-disbursing loans and a similar short-term fund of $6 billion agreed by the IMF in mid-July. Britain's contribution to the CGI commitment increased to $46 million from the 1997 figure of $16 million.

During the 1990s, the CGI, chaired by the World Bank, bankrolled the Suharto regime to the tune of more than $5 billion in financial assistance each year. Massive loans were granted with total disregard for the regime's contempt for democracy and human rights and its lack of transparency and accountability.

This year's 49 per cent. increase from the 1997 figure of $5.3 billion signifies the determination of the West to maintain its malign influence over economic policy without confronting the issue of political reform. The decision to provide a further bail-out to the Habibie regime is flawed both economically and politically.


Economic recovery still remote

The markets were unimpressed by the CGI package as the rupiah and local stock prices lost ground following the announcement of the new deal. In the past week, the rupiah has stabilised at a slightly higher rate. There is still no sign of a significant improvement in the economy.

In the past, the CGI's aid commitments were largely concerned with project aid, but this year's total consists almost entirely of programme aid to help balance the state budget. Most of the funding is, therefore, short term and will not create a significant increase in desperately-needed income-generating capacity.

The Indonesian House of Representatives (DPR) had already expressed concern at the unprecedented amount of foreign aid financing, which accounted for 43 per cent. of the state budget approved by the House on 23 July. The United Development Party (PPP) warned that developing the country with huge foreign aid financing was perilous, especially if it was implemented amid rampant corruption, and that debt servicing would impact on welfare provision and the quality of public services.

The neo-liberal economic recovery programme for Indonesia devised by the IMF and the World Bank, based on the deregulation of capital flows, simply duplicates the volatile conditions which contributed to the original economic collapse. The long-term cutbacks in public spending will have a devastating impact on those hardest hit by the crisis. The right of the World Bank/IMF to lead the rescue attempts must now be vigorously challenged.



Indonesia's sovereign indebtedness will be increased substantially by the CGI package and the earlier IMF bail outs. It is already one of the world's most heavily indebted countries. In March 1998, public sector debt amounted to $65.6 billion. A significant proportion of the aid being disbursed this year is simply being used to service loans from earlier years (total repayments due in 1998 were estimated at $6.4 billion). Debt servicing will be an increasing problem in future years and will impact primarily on the poor, especially when subsidies on basic commodities are eventually withdrawn according to IMF/World Bank dictates.

If the CGI donors had been concerned with the plight of ordinary Indonesians as much as their own economic agendas, they would have included an element of debt forgiveness in their package. Funds saved on debt servicing could then have been used to improve the social safety-net. A limited agreement on debt re-scheduling was reached but that is not enough.

The CGI should also have pressed the Indonesian government on its apparent reluctance to pursue the wealth of the Suharto family, which could have covered the

budget deficit several times over. Some estimates have put it as high as $40 billion - just short of the original IMF bail-out of $43 billion.

Political reform stalled

The fundamental reason for the continuing economic crisis is the failure of the Habibie government to implement the political reforms it promised. Progress has been made, but some measures have been tokenistic and many people remain deeply suspicious of Habibie's intentions and his ability to fully implement the necessary changes.

On the eve of the CGI, Habibie made announcements on the release of political prisoners and the withdrawal of troops from East Timor in an attempt to persuade the international donors to back him. Significantly, he succeeded in bringing the Dutch back on board. In 1992, Suharto rejected further aid from the Dutch because of their criticism of Indonesia's human rights record. The Dutch stated that they are now satisfied Indonesia is changing and moving towards democratisation and better human rights.

It is questionable whether their faith is justified since there has been a lack of progress on a number of issues, notably: the release of political prisoners; the withdrawal of troops from East Timor; the pursuit of the Suharto wealth and the overhaul of the corrupt system of governance; the lifting of restrictions on the right to free expression, the right to freedom of association and the right to organise; the pursuit of those responsible for abductions, killings, disappearances, torture and violence against women under Suharto; the reform of the military; the creation of an independent judiciary; and the repeal of repressive legislation aimed at government opponents.

After the CGI package was announced, the International NGO Forum on Indonesian Development (INFID), a coalition of over 100 national and international NGOs, denounced the $7.9 billion worth of pledges as an attempt by donor nations 'to revive government credibility in the eyes of the international community without taking into account the reality of the situation in Indonesia'. '...a loan of this magnitude will in no way help Indonesia to resolve this crisis, since the public continues to express considerable doubt to the legitimacy of the Habibie government, due to its incapability in implementing transparent and good government,' it added.

It is clear that the economy will not recover until far-reaching reforms of Indonesia's constitution, laws and policies are implemented with the object of establishing a political economy based on democracy, human rights and the right of everyone to share in the fruits of development.

The role of the World Bank

Political reform in the sense just described is not a concern of the World Bank and its fellow donors, whose primary goal is to foster conditions favourable to Western business interests. This explains the Bank's refusal to become involved in the political issues of democracy and human rights. It is not, as it claims, an apolitical institution, but its political agenda is very different from that of the majority of people in the developing countries it is supposed to be assisting.

This also explains why the World Bank has shown no remorse for helping to keep Suharto in power for so long and for ignoring the corrupt foundations on which economic growth was built. In its annual report for the CGI, *Indonesia in Crisis: A Macroeconomic Update*, it states, without apology, that: 'Long-standing defects in governance, earlier camouflaged by rapid growth, have

European Parliament resolution on Indonesia and East Timor

In the wake of the downfall of Suharto in May, the European Parliament adopted a resolution in June, sponsored by almost all the political groupings, on the situation in East Timor and Indonesia. The European Parliament has been calling for years for permission to visit East Timor. The demand is again reiterated towards the Habibie government.

The resolution expressed regret that moves towards greater political openness in Indonesia had been limited so far and regretted above all the failure to release the majority of political prisoners. It called for the immediate and unconditional release of Xanana Gusmao, the East Timorese resistance leader, and all political prisoners, East Timorese as well as Indonesian, stressing that under no circumstances should they be treated as criminal.

The new Indonesian government, it said, should pursue reforms in the direction of democracy as rapidly as possible, and to set a date as quickly as possible for free and democratic elections while taking action to improve people's living standards and fighting corruption.

The Indonesian government should also conduct full investigations into all cases of human rights abuses under the previous regime and take judicial action against their perpetrators.

On East Timor, the European Parliament said that, in the context of the changes underway in Indonesia, firm action should be taken to ensure self-determination for the people of East Timor, on the basis of respect for international law and UN resolutions.

It also reiterated the position expressed in its resolution of 21 November 1991 in the wake of the Santa Cruz massacre, calling for a delegation to visit the territory and said that 'the Indonesian government must, once and for all, take steps to enable this delegation's visit to take place'. ✸

now been exposed as fatal flaws.' The Bank's own role in covering up those flaws has long been apparent.

For some time, analysts have criticised the Bank's poverty figures and its tolerance of corruption in its own projects, but a devastating critique of World Bank policies in the *Wall Street Journal* on 14 July suggested that there was a deliberate cover-up of Indonesia's plight. Annual reports on Indonesia 'highlighted its achievements but danced a semantic jig around such problems as nepotism and collusion,' said the article.

Former consultants to the Bank accused it of sanitising reports to remove critical references to the government or its officials. The soft approach was demanded by government officials, who under World Bank practice got to alter reports before publication so that conditions seemed 'feasible for donor countries to lend', said former finance minister, Frank Seda. This led to public and private capital flooding into the country, a major contributing factor to the economic collapse in 1997.

Seda pointed out: 'Until October 1997, when the crisis was under way, the World Bank was telling the world the fundamentals were sound'. Even now, the World Bank's Country Brief on Indonesia, updated in June 1998, stubbornly proclaims Indonesia's 'remarkable economic development success over the past decade' and repeats the controversial mantra about a decline in poverty from 60 per cent. to 11 per cent. - about 28 million people - between 1970 and 1996.

Although the Bank acknowledges that poverty may now double to affect around 50 million people, Indonesia's Central Bureau of Statistics estimates that 95.8 million people, about 48 per cent. of the population, will be living below the poverty line by the end of the year. This represents a regression to the poverty levels of 1976.

In a frank admission of the World Bank's failings and the seriousness of Indonesia's current plight, Dennis de Tray, the Bank's Country Director for Indonesia, said: 'I will admit to have a very strong sense of not understanding fully ... why things are so bad.' Such an admission of failure should mean the end, once and for all, of the World Bank's supervision of the Indonesian economy. ✸

East Timor: Gestures are not enough

There has been growing clamour for the release of resistance leader Xanana Gusmao to enable him to take part in negotiations to resolve the question of East Timor. But Jakarta, eager to show the world that it is more flexible following Suharto's downfall, has proposed autonomy for East Timor and announced the withdrawal of several hundred troops. However, it remains inflexible on integration.

The fate of East Timor is inextricably bound up with the current political and economic crisis in Indonesia. The downfall of Suharto paved the way for a new initiative from his successor, President Habibie, to distance himself from the previous regime. But he also needed to make gestures that would win plaudits from the West at a time of grave economic crisis.

In a meeting with Bishop Belo in June, Habibie made an offer of special status for East Timor and a promise to withdraw some troops from East Timor. The 'special status' idea was further elaborated by Foreign Minister Ali Alatas as an offer of 'wide-ranging' autonomy which would only exclude control over foreign affairs, defence and financial matters. Several years ago, the governor of East Timor, Abilio Soares made a similar proposal, only to be firmly rebuffed by Suharto.

The Alatas offer is coupled with the insistence that Portugal and the international community accept the integration of the territory as part of Indonesia and a promise that the release of Xanana Gusmao would be part of the deal.

UN talks

The autonomy proposal was the centrepiece at the talks between the Indonesian and Portuguese foreign ministers held under UN auspices on 5 and 6 August. The UN communiqué said that the ministers 'had agreed to hold in-depth discussions on Indonesia's proposals for a special status, based on wide-ranging autonomy for East Timor without prejudice to their basic positions of principle.' In other words Portugal still sticks by its demand for self-determination but is willing to consider the autonomy option, presumably as an interim measure. The ministers also agreed that the East Timorese would be more closely involved in the search for a solution. The response from Jose Ramos-Horta, deputy president of the resistance council, the CNRT, was to say that he was no longer willing to represent Xanana Gusmao in talks because the leader himself should be directly involved and his release was essential for further progress.

The two countries also agreed 'to establish interest sections in friendly embassies in each other's capitals and to relax their visa policies towards each other's nationals'. Previously, Portugal had insisted that interest sections could not go ahead until resistance leader Xanana Gusmao was released, but the way was cleared when Xanana said from his prison cell in Jakarta that it should go ahead regardless of whether he was released or not.

Xanana on the difficulties ahead

In an assessment of the present state of the talks, Xanana Gusmao warned that the negotiation process will be difficult, given Jakarta insistence on maintaining its illegal annexation of East Timor. In a message issued on the occa-occasion of the 25th anniversary of the founding of

sion of the 25th anniversary of the founding of *FALINTIL*, the armed wing of the resistance on 21 August, Xanana was scathing about the Indonesian proposal for autonomy and accused East Timorese who 'passionately ' defend it of wanting 'to save themselves and... save what they now own at the cost of our people's sufferings. They also feel that, by supporting autonomy, they will be protected by the murderous Indonesian troops currently occupying East Timor.'

He also accused the supporters of autonomy of continuing to advocate Indonesian arguments without realising that the process of political reforms in Indonesia had rendered the arguments used by the Suharto regime invalid. He urged these people to reflect on the economic crisis in Indonesia and try to understand 'the complex process of reforms and the yearnings of Indonesian society'. Hence, East Timor's strategy must take full advantage of the democratisation process now underway in Indonesia.



The murdered Orlando da Costa killed by the special forces. This atrocity occurred during the EU Troika visit to East Timor in June.

In Dili, five political parties issued a joint statement on 11 August totally rejecting the proposal for autonomy whatever the form as this would legitimise integration. They called for the release of Xanana Gusmao to participate in the dialogue on East Timor's future 'as an essential condition to finding a solution to the question of East Timor.' The five parties were Fretilin, the UDT, Apodeti, Kota (monarchist party) and Trabalhista (labour party). [In November 1975, members of the latter four parties signed the 'Balibo Declaration' asking Indonesia to take East Timor over. The authenticity of this Declaration has since been discredited and several signatories have said they signed under duress.]

Autonomy in the Indonesian context

By offering 'wide-ranging autonomy' to East Timor, the Habibie government is in danger of unleashing a flood of demands from many parts of the country. Since the abandonment of the 1950 United States of Indonesia constitution, Indonesia has been a heavily centralised state, all the more so during the 32 years of Suharto's rule. As *The Jakarta Post* wrote in an editorial on East Timor [8 August]: 'What about the country's other (sic) 26 provinces. Are they not entitled to enjoy a greater degree of autonomy ... and retain a greater part of their wealth for the development of their own provinces?'

In Aceh, often referred to as the model for special status, the heavy hand of military occupation is now coming to light (see separate item), and in West Papua the call for autonomy or independence is growing by the day. During the days leading up to Suharto's downfall, many regions were awash with calls for autonomy, even independence, from Jakarta.

The Indonesian Constitution makes no provision for regional autonomy but among Indonesian democrats, calls for a federal state are growing. The Catholic social activist and philosopher, Y.B. Mangunwijaya, regards this as crucial to prevent Indonesia from disintegrating like Yugoslavia, and has called for the creation of a United States of Indonesia. [*The Jakarta Post,* 4 August]

However, this is not the way forward for East Timor whose right to self-determination is enshrined in many UN resolutions and in the history of its violent and unlawful invasion and annexation.

Western responses

The question of East Timor is constantly being commented on in the world's media and many western governments have publicly called for Xanana's release. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan has now added his voice, as has the Australian government, whose ambassador in Jakarta recently visited Xanana in prison.

A Troika ambassadorial mission to East Timor in late June, led by the British ambassador, called for Xanana's release and spoke of the need for direct contact between the Indonesian government and the resistance leader, who they visited in prison. It stressed the need for a 'firm commitment to some form of direct consultation of the will of the people there on the issue of independence or on the basis of a negotiated settlement'.

However, there appear to be pressures in the international community for 'strident émigré groups' to go easy on Indonesia at a time of crisis. This message comes across strongly in an article by Georgetown professor of Asian studies, James Clad entitled: 'For East Timor's Sake, Don't Push Jakarta Too Hard'. [*International Herald Tribune,* 21 August] He quoted Alatas as claiming that Australia, Japan and the US 'all accept the sincerity of Mr Habibie's (autonomy) offer'. He also alleged that Portugal's EU partners were 'fed up with Portuguese posturing', adding that after visiting East Timor, the EU ambassadors wrote a private report 'sharply critical of Lisbon's recent diplomacy'.

Such views reinforce Xanana's warnings about the difficulties which lie ahead.

Token withdrawal of troops

Another gesture from Jakarta was the army's announcement that 1,000 troops would be withdrawn from East Timor. When the first contingent of 400 left, foreign journalists were ferried in to ensure plenty of media coverage. The army claimed this would end the presence of combat troops and leave security in the hands of territorial troops focusing on construction and agricultural pursuits and even made the preposterous suggestion that the withdrawn troops would be replaced by 800 army medical and 'counselling personnel' and teachers.

The move was greeted with widespread cynicism in East Timor. Troop rotation is a regular event and in any case, Jakarta always lies about the number of troops in the territory.

Bishop Belo has been in the forefront of demands for Indonesian troops to be withdrawn. In June, he called for the withdrawal of all Indonesian troops. Ever since he took over as the apostolic administrator in 1983, he said, the army had claimed there were 200 guerrillas operating in East Timor. The figure never went up or down. 'So why do we have to have all these battalions? It's surely enough to have 200 *hansip* (civil defence corps) to deal with them.' He also said he would be going to Jakarta to urge the armed forces commander, General Wiranto, to divulge the whereabouts of the victims of the Santa Cruz massacre and return the remains to the families. [*Surya,* 4 July]

Release Xanana Gusmao!

There is no question that Xanana Gusmao is in the very centre of all moves to resolve the issue of East Timor. Prisoner that he is, he is frequently interviewed and widely quoted in the Indonesian and international press. Visitors to his prison cell read like a Who's Who of the diplomatic corps and visiting foreign dignitaries. The Troika mission, in almost every paragraph of their conclusions, backed up their proposals by saying that Xanana had endorsed them.

Indonesia is alone in still pigheadedly resisting the clamour. The Habibie government may think that their gestures will save them from making the only significant move that could break the deadlock. For the international solidarity movement and for the people of East Timor, Xanana's release is, more than ever before, the top priority.☆

An encounter with Gus Dur

Little known to Western media, Abdurrahman Wahid heads the Nahdlatul Ulama, an Islamic group with 35 million members, the largest Muslim group in the world. On a recent visit to East Timor for Radio Four's The World Tonight, Hugh O'Shaughnessy met him in Jakarta and found him trenchant in his views about what he acknowledges has been 'genocide'in East Timor. This is his report.

Abdurrahman Wahid sits in his sofa in an airy house on the edge of the Indonesian capital, surrounded by a respectful gathering, as in the next room, a group of girls study the Koran. A slight figure, he is hampered by very bad eyesight, the result of an eye operation which went wrong. But his authority as a man - known as Gus Dur to his followers - who holds a tolerant reading of this religion, a sound but not excessive nationalism and a healthy distrust of some of the effects of globalisation on his country has tremendous influence in the world's most populous Muslim country.

He feels, as many in East Timor feel, that the United Nations has to play a key role in the future of the former Portuguese colony. He thinks however that the opposition of Indonesian military chiefs will make the deployment of UN troops in East Timor a pipe dream for the moment. But he is keen that East Timorese cultural identity should be safeguarded with teaching being through the medium of Portuguese and Tetum, the native lingua franca. 'And the right people to take care of that is the Catholic Church,' he says firmly, adding, 'After hundreds of years of service, they know the East Timorese people very well.'

The non-governmental organisations in Indonesia should, he argues, be given a leading part in fashioning the socio-economic future of East Timor, lest the big Indonesian companies dominate the territory and blot out the initiatives of the Timorese themselves.

The UN should make sure that East Timor enjoys a totally-decentralised status vis-a-vis Indonesia, with local legislatures acquiring an importance that they do not have now.

Timorese oil

We then turned to the start of the commercial exploitation at the rate of 300,000 barrels a day of the oil found in East Timorese off-shore waters. This is being undertaken by Australian multinational Broken Hill, under an agreement concluded in defiance of international law between the Australian and Indonesian authorities.



Gus Dur and Hugh O'Shaughnessy

Abdurrahman Wahid said: 'I am not sure that I can stop this since it was negotiated by the military but the process of the internationalisation of East Timor must be slowed a bit.'

On the question of the referendum on self-determination that the East Timorese are calling for, the Muslim leader argued that it would be impossible to stage at a time when tens of thousands of Indonesian troops were in the territory.

Picking his words very carefully and opting for a term about Indonesian conduct that is seldom, if ever, heard from the lips of an Indonesian leader, he said that East Timorese and Indonesians should work together 'in stopping the genocide'.

Until there was a referendum on East Timor's future, he said, the government must be forced to be 'human to the Timorese'.

Pending such a decision by the East Timorese on their future, he said, three aims had to be followed, the defence of East Timorese culture, the development of the territory in accordance with the needs of the area, and decentralisation. ☸

BOOK REVIEW

Jim Aubrey *(Ed), Free East Timor, Australia's Culpability in East Timor's Genocide,* Vintage, NSW, 1998, 296 pages.

Torben Retboll *(Ed), East Timor: Occupation and Resistance,* IWGIA-Document No 89, Copenhagen, 1998, 285 page.

Miguel Faria de Bastos, *Timor, the Biggest Extermination Camp in the World,* published by the Portuguese Esperanto Society, Lisbon, 65 pages.

What better proof do we need of worldwide solidarity with and concern for the continuing tragedy of East Timor than the appearance within months of each other of three books on East Timor? There was a time when books about East Timor were few and far between but that is no longer the case.

The reader published by IWGIA (International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs) is its third publication on East Timor, each of which has been edited by the Danish academic Torben Retboll. The earlier ones appeared in1980 and 1984.

As before, Retboll has brought together chapters especially written, the reproduction of important writings and a number of documents of importance to activists and journalists. Part One includes a short article by Peter Carey on the history of the colonial power, Indonesia, followed by two chapters giving accounts of visits to East Timor, before and after the invasion. Elaine Briere's chapter provides a warm and moving account of village life just eighteen months before the invasion. Her stunning photographs of the serenity of village life before the ravages of Indonesian might tore the country apart, have been used widely. Here she writes of how she and a colleague were captivated by the Timorese who took them into their embrace with such grace. Twenty years later, Michael Emin Salla found a country 'reeking with spies, informers and intelligence personnel'.

Part Two deals with important events, the Balibo murders of foreign journalists written by Hugh Dowson, the Santa Cruz Massacre by photographer Steven Cox, the APEC Forum written by Retboll, and the Nobel Peace Prize lectures of Bishop Belo and José Ramos-Horta.

Part Three deals with major themes like health, the environment, the Catholic church and East Timorese women. The most stimulating and original is the chapter by Milena Pires and Catherine Scott about East Timorese women which, while highlighting gender-related atrocities by Indonesian soldiers, draws attention to the marginalisation of women in East Timorese society.

The Epilogue is given over to a powerful condemnation by Noam Chomsky of Australian duplicity. Having in the early 1970s taken the lead in pushing for the adoption of the UN Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations among States, Australia trampled on these principles to justify its decision to sign a deal with Indonesia to carve up oil resources belonging to the people of East Timor.

What is lacking is an account of the solidarity movement in Indonesia which certainly warrants a chapter written by one of the many activists now campaigning so vigorously in Indonesia.

For details on how to order this book from TAPOL, turn to page 18.

Australian complicity exposed

Jim Aubrey's excellent collection brings together some of the key documents about and writings by Australian activists exposing their government's betrayal of East Timor.

The chapters include a full account of Ken Fry MP's two visits to East Timor in 1975 and his presentation to the UN General Assembly, along with correspondence from anonymous contacts, probably government officials, exposing the policy of Andrew Peacock, the then foreign minister. Aubrey has also included the last article written by Roger East, the Australian journalist who chose to remain when all other Australians had been advise to leave East Timor just before the invasion. Roger was killed by firing squad on 7 December 1975.

Rob Wesley-Smith, one of Australia's longest-serving East Timor activists, gives a graphic account of radio communications he and others maintained with the resistance in East Timor during the early years of the war, the deliberate sabotaging of these communications by the Australian authorities and the sabotage of a mission organised by Rob to take medicine by sea to the isolated fighters in East Timor.

Robert Domm's path-breaking interview with Xanana Gusmao in September 1990 is reproduced in full, along with articles by John Pilger. 'A Land of Crosses', and by Russell Anderson who was an eye witness of the Santa Cruz massacre in November 1991.

The Irish solidarity movement, ETISC, gave Australian Prime Minister Paul Keating a hard time when he paid a visit to Ireland to 'go back to his roots'. Keating was taken completely by surprise by the many protests that dogged him during what he had hoped would be an enjoyable

continued on page 16

SUBSCRIPTION RATES

Annual Rates (six issues)	UK	Europe & overseas (air only)
Individuals	£16.00	£16.00
Unwaged	£ 8.00	£ 8.00
Institutions	£22.00	£22.00

Girocheques and Eurocheques are welcome.
TAPOL's Giro account No. 33 338 3281

Please NO Australian, Canadian or US personal cheques to UK

Australian subscribers may pay in A$ to:
TAPOL (Australia)
PO Box 121, Clifton Hill, Vic 3068
Rates for Individuals A$40, Unwaged A$20, Institutions A$70

Dutch subscribers may pay in Dfl to:
S.L.Liem
Binnenkadijk 267, 1018 ZG Amsterdam
Postbank 4637291
Rate for Individuals Dfl48, Unwaged Dfl24, Institutions Dfl80
Kindly state the payment is for TAPOL subscription

Canadian and US subscribers may pay in C$ or US$ to:
TAPOL-Canada, c/o ETAN-Canada
PO Box 562, Station P, Toronto M5S 2T1
Rate for Individuals $35, Unwaged $18, Institutions $70

All other subscriptions and all correspondence to:
TAPOL, 111 Northwood Road, Thornton Heath,
Surrey CR7 8HW, England, Tel.: 0181 771 2904,
Fax: 0181 653 0322, email: tapol@gn.apc.org

PLEASE NOTE: DONATIONS ARE ALWAYS WELCOME