

**THE PUTERA REPORTS
PROBLEMS IN INDONESIAN-JAPANESE
WARTIME COOPERATION**

Mohammad Hatta

**Translated with an Introduction
by
William H. Frederick**

TRANSLATION SERIES

**Modern Indonesia Project
Southeast Asia Program
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PREFACE

The present translation was prepared from a typed copy of an original manuscript that has not been available for re-checking. The rather large number of typographical errors in the copy have been corrected with Dr. Hatta's help; in the majority of cases, a simple letter-change clarified matters, while in several instances dropped phrases and even omitted lines had to be filled in or bridged. In the latter circumstances especially, Dr. Hatta's suggestions as to the intent of the original have been carefully followed. It was not thought necessary to point out these textual difficulties to the reader, though several especially prominent ones are treated briefly in footnotes.

The annotations accompanying the translation are intended to help the reader understand the text, not to go beyond or supplement it in any meaningful or systematic way. A number of explanatory notes benefited from the care with which Dr. Hatta commented on the text during a series of interviews granted to the translator in Honolulu, during August 1968. Dr. Hatta was at that time busy completing a period of study as a Scholar-in-Residence at the East-West Center of the University of Hawaii, and his patience, care and time were much appreciated and valued.

In keeping with the general aim of presenting as uncluttered a text as possible, annotations not directly related to Dr. Hatta's experience or special knowledge have been limited in length and subject matter. Biographical information on many figures mentioned in the reports is available elsewhere and has not been included here for that reason. Likewise, no attempt has been made to supply more than basic information on the large number of groups and organizations mentioned. Discussion of the governmental and administrative terminology has been avoided. Unfamiliar terms have been italicized, translated and explained on their first appearance in the text and at that time only. In one case, an entire complex set of terms is handled as a unit in a single footnote.

Matters of spelling are extraordinarily confused for the Japanese period in Indonesia. There are at least two common methods of romanizing the Japanese language, based upon English practices; in the Indonesian environment these became mixed with Dutch and Indonesian spelling principles. Furthermore, Indonesian spelling rules have themselves altered since the achievement of independence. The procedure followed here is as follows: 1) personal names mentioned in the text have been, if Indonesian, left in their original, old-style spelling (thus, Soepeno, not

Supeno); if Japanese, they have been romanized according to the system adopted in the most recent Kenkyūsha dictionary (thus, Miyoshi, not Myoshi); 2) Indonesian place names have been given their modern Indonesian spellings (thus, Surabaya, not Soerabaia); Indonesian names of newspapers, books, and other materials likely to be sought after by the historian, have been left in their original, old-style spelling (thus, *Soeara Asia*, not *Suara Asia*); 3) Japanese titles and organization names have been romanized according to the Kenkyūsha method (thus, Jawa Hōkōkai, not Djawa Hookookai).

The documents treated in this publication were originally located by Dr. George S. Kanahale in the course of research in Indonesia during the years 1964-1965. I am indebted to Dr. Kanahale for suggesting that the Putera reports be translated, a task which he could not undertake himself because of other pressing commitments. I am also grateful to him for much advice and encouragement on the project, introduction to Dr. Hatta and contact with the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, which expressed interest in publishing the materials. Dr. Kanahale has continued to keep a live interest in the project despite an extraordinarily demanding schedule and additional duties as Indonesia's Honorary Consul in Honolulu.

I would also like to express my thanks to Benedict Anderson and Elizabeth Graves, both of Cornell, whose patient editing and nursing-along of the entire manuscript has been done with care, persistence and goodwill.

William H. Frederick
Honolulu, February 1971

INTRODUCTION

Putera (Pusat Tenaga Rakjat--Concentration of the People's Power), March 1943-February 1944, was an important and in some ways typical organization of Japanese-occupied Java. It was the first more or less durable association of what might be called the semi-public, semi-political type,¹ and the best as well as best-known example of Japanese attempts to harness Indonesian political figures from the old *Pergerakan*² to serve their needs. Though sometimes depicted as such, Putera was neither a surrogate political party nor a simple propaganda arm of the military administration. It was, instead, a complex association with uncertain goals, varied interests and involvements, and an uneven record of success and failure, in which Japanese and Indonesians sometimes clashed and sometimes agreed on the goals to be pursued. A scarcity of concrete and detailed information concerning Putera has made its historical role difficult to assess in any but a very general manner.

The following two documents, made public here for the first time, do much to improve our understanding of Putera. They supply both details of the organization's structure, staff and activities, and discussions of general problems facing it throughout its development. The Putera reports also have much to say about the setting in which their primary subject functioned and therefore provide a valuable description of wartime

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1. The Triple A Movement (Gerakan Tiga A), which preceded Putera, was active for only a matter of months and did not affect all parts of Java. "Semi-public" indicates here that the organization was neither an agency of the military administration nor one in which the general public actually held membership or took part. By "semi-political" is meant that the organization, on the one hand, existed in the deliberately a-political atmosphere of a military occupation under which power and authority were unquestionably in the hands of the government, and, on the other hand, still was involved in many of the activities of political parties and leaned heavily on the reputation and prestige of members of a political elite.
 2. Pergerakan (literally, "movement") was loosely used from the late 1920's on to describe the general struggle of all groups to achieve independence for Indonesia. Sometimes the word was used alone, sometimes with modifiers, as in pergerakan nasional, pergerakan kebangsaan, or pergerakan kemerdekaan.

Java. That they were authored principally by the well-known scholar and political leader Mohammad Hatta and reflect both his views and those of his subordinates, makes them of additional interest.³ For these reasons, it is no exaggeration to say that these lengthy reports are some of the most important of the very few surviving documents written by Indonesians during the Japanese occupation of their country.⁴

3. The reports were compiled for the most part from the information and opinions sent to Hatta's office every three months by the head of each section. Presumably, views from local branches were systematically fed back to Djakarta Headquarters. Hatta took responsibility for the final form of the reports and wrote the introductions and conclusions to them. His opinions also appear clearly from time to time in the main body of the text. (Interviews, August 1968.)
4. Extremely little is known about the existence of documents of this sort in Indonesia. A number are preserved in Dutch archives, but they have not been adequately studied, either individually or as a group. The Rijksinstituut voor Oorlogsdocumentatie, Indische Sectie, Amsterdam (whose materials shall hereafter be identified with the abbreviation RvO-IC and the document number) has published some shorter documents written by Indonesians in: I. J. Brugmans, et al. (comps.), Nederlandsch-Indië onder Japanse Bezetting 1942-1945 (Franeker: T. Wever, 1960). Some other items from the collection are: stenographic notes on the January 8, 1945 session of the Sanyō Kaigi (RvO-IC 036627), which have been partially translated into English by Benedict Anderson ("The Problem of Rice," Indonesia, No. 2 (October 1966), pp. 77-123); stenographic notes on three meetings of the Chūō Sangi In, dated December 16 and 27, 1944, and April 6-10, 1945 (RvO-IC 036573-036677); the so-called Soebardjo reports, short treatments of the economic situation on Java at the end of 1943 (RvO-IC 020113-22), the youth movement from pre-Japanese times (RvO-IC 020098-112), the setting up of the KNI (Komité Nasional Indonesia) in Central Java in March and April 1942 (RvO-IC 031605-30), and the like; an anonymous report on Indonesian opinions of Putera (RvO-IC 020169-73); an anonymous report on Indonesian expectations after the Tōjō declaration (RvO-IC 020161-2). In the archives of the Ministerie van Binnenlandse Zaken in The Hague (hereafter identified with the letters MBZ and the appropriate number) are at least two reports of interest: one on the Indramaju Revolt, with excerpts and commentary on pangreh pradja reports, by Prawoto Soemodilogo (MBZ series 97B, box 2, folder 17); and one on the activities of Parindra between March and July 1942 (MBZ Indische Archieven series, group 15, box 9).

However unusual they may be in other ways, the Putera reports are not special in at least one, perhaps surprising, respect. Like the majority of similar papers prepared for Japanese use, they contain unmistakable and often sharp criticism of a number of aspects of Japanese rule. Hatta's courage and straightforwardness as exhibited in these reports were exemplary but not unparalleled, and there were few Pergerakan leaders who were abjectly subservient to the Japanese. It would hardly have served their long-held interests to be so, and their struggles under the Netherlands East Indies government prepared them in important ways for dealing courageously with Japanese rule. For their part, the new colonial administrators often mistrusted those too eager to come to their aid and were not averse to seeking the opinions of people who were frankly critical of one or another aspect of the New Java.

How much effect such criticism--solicited or not--had on the future course of events, however, is a matter of speculation. In the case of the Putera reports, the Gunseikan's⁵ reaction apparently has gone unrecorded, and Hatta remembers nothing in this regard. From internal evidence, it may be surmised that the first report was either ignored or was unsuccessful in having the problems it outlined solved. The second report, completed after Putera's demise and the launching of the Jawa Hōkōkai,⁶ seems to have been of small consequence to the latter's progress.⁷

Having his criticism and advice ignored was not a new experience for Hatta and did not prevent him from continuing to take the kind of leader's role he had chosen at the beginning of the occupation. This stance, which was cooperative in contrast to his earlier position toward the Netherlands East Indies government and which involved holding official and semi-public office, was the result of both pre-war ideas and assurances received from the Japanese.

By 1940, Hatta had concluded that the only proper behavior for Indonesians in the coming Pacific war was to pursue "the

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5. Chief of the Military Administration.
 6. The Jawa Hōkōkai (Java Service Association) was a successor association to Putera, begun on March 1, 1944.
 7. Official Indonesian advisory bodies and offices may have had a much better record than Putera in influencing Japanese decisions. In any case, the matter of how seriously Japanese administrators took Indonesian advice and opinions, especially in non-political or non-national affairs, remains an obscure and little-studied aspect of the occupation period.

hopes and interests of Indonesia herself."⁸ If they wished to survive and pursue those interests, furthermore, Indonesians must not remain passive, but must act in some way.⁹ With these principles in mind, Hatta met with the Deputy Chief of Staff, General Harada Yoshikazu, several weeks after the Japanese landed on Java. He was assured that Japan's goal was to free Indonesia, not to colonize it again.¹⁰ So grew the conviction that the public leader, though under Japanese eyes, stood a better chance of influencing the direction of change than did the exile or the totally estranged citizen. Though his reasoning appears careful and clear, we may only guess what Hatta, who ten years earlier had bitterly denounced those who cooperated in any way with colonial governments,¹¹ felt as he adopted this new posture and embarked on a new course in his career.

Scattered points of emphasis in the Putera reports indicate, however, that whatever other accommodations were made to the fact of Japanese rule, Hatta's thinking on the great issues facing his people and nation-to-be altered very little. One reason for this is that Hatta's pre-war view of the future included, perhaps even depended upon, a Pacific war¹² and saw a continuous progression in history toward an inevitably-free Indonesia.¹³ The outlook was not as naive as a simplified rendition makes it seem. While condemning fascism,¹⁴ Hatta was

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8. Mohammad Hatta, Kumpulan Karangan (Djakarta: Penerbitan dan Balai Buku Indonesia, 1953), I, p. 143.
 9. Ibid., p. 145.
 10. Mohammad Hatta, Verspreide Geschriften (Amsterdam: van der Peet, 1952), p. 15. (The Dutch-language version of Hatta's writings does not duplicate the one published in Indonesian.) Also, Bintang Timur, March 25, 1942, and the interviews cited in George S. Kanahale, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence" (Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1967), p. 41.
 11. Hatta, Verspreide Geschriften, pp. 422 and 440-441.
 12. As early as 1926, Hatta had written that Asia could never hope to be freed from Western imperialism without an East-West, white-vs-colored conflict. Verspreide Geschriften, p. 65.
 13. On the inevitable fall of imperial systems, see Kumpulan Karangan, I, p. 27; on the "law of history" that Indonesia would eventually be free, see ibid., p. 78.
 14. See, for example, Kumpulan Karangan, I, pp. 142 ff., and II, pp. 18-23.

cautious in his appraisal of other elements in the Japanese plan for Asia. For example, he endorsed the concept of Asian solidarity and brotherhood in the abstract but temporarily suspended judgment on the more concrete matter of whether the Japanese could successfully sponsor such an ideal.¹⁵ Further, there were no illusions as to how long the Japanese would stay in Southeast Asia, especially the territory of the Netherlands East Indies, if they possibly could.¹⁶ There was never any indication that the basic goals and interests of the Pergerakan would be transformed by the Japanese presence. The struggle could be aided immeasurably by the crushing of Dutch dominance, but not consummated by it. For Hatta the final victory (*kemenangan akhir*) was always the achievement of a fully independent Indonesia, not simply a decision against the West in the Greater East Asian war.¹⁷

A second reason is that the conditions of the occupation permitted and even encouraged Hatta's thinking to continue to move in the same directions it always had. The ideas of the Pergerakan, especially those concerned with the building of Indonesian economic and social potential, were often similar to those of the occupation authorities. If the ultimate goals of the Japanese and the Indonesians were not always the same, short-term policies and approaches were very similar in a surprisingly large number of cases. For the first time, Hatta and others saw their ideas or ones like them treated seriously by not only administrators but the public media; there is little reason why they should have or would have wanted to stop propagandizing the same programs they had pursued so hazardously and in such limited fashion under the Dutch.

The Putera reports provide some valuable indications of the extent to which Hatta was able to continue expressing ideas and pressing for programs in which he had a long-standing

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15. Verspreide Geschriften, p. 67. There was particular interest at this time among Indonesian intellectuals with some knowledge of economics in the Japanese idea of an Asian co-prosperity sphere.
 16. Kumpulan Karangan, I, p. 142.
 17. The phrase kemenangan akhir was often used in the wartime speeches of Indonesians and Japanese alike. Officially, it referred to a Japanese victory against the Allies. For many Indonesians it clearly must have meant Indonesian victory in the struggle for independence, the sense in which Hatta had used it since 1923. Kumpulan Karangan, I, pp. 19-25. It is a classic example of the use of double entendre in the speeches and writings of occupied Java.

interest. The clearest example of a steady viewpoint is in the field of economics. Even as a student in the Netherlands, Hatta had blamed most of the Indonesian people's economic ills on Western capitalism and individualism, which had brought with them a modern exploitation far more cruel and pervasive than any earlier system.¹⁸ One of his favorite pictures of the economic destruction of Indonesia came from J. H. Boeke's early writings. A quote from this source appearing in a 1933 article by Hatta¹⁹ is precisely the same one included in the present reports (p. 80f). Nor did the solutions Hatta had in mind for aiding the economy change appreciably. He championed government encouragement of small private businesses among Indonesians and recommended the widespread use of cooperative societies. Both the original analysis and the solutions to some of the problems it outlined were quite acceptable to the Japanese, who made a point of boosting Indonesian business activity and establishing cooperatives throughout Java.²⁰

Hatta's ideas on education also coincided with many of those of the Japanese administration. From an early point in his career, he had bitterly criticized the Dutch approach to educating Indonesians for being too utilitarian and, at the same time, elitist.²¹ He himself, however, did not find intellectuals especially useful to the Pergerakan²² and placed great emphasis instead upon educating the masses, especially in character and practical skills, which would enable them to govern and provide for themselves.²³

18. For example, see Kumpulan Karangan, I, pp. 244-252.

19. Ibid., p. 262.

20. The results, however, were not entirely satisfactory from Hatta's point of view. Indonesian entrepreneurs were encouraged but were at the same time strongly advised to be loyal and obedient to government wishes. The agricultural cooperatives established by the Japanese often were, more than anything else, collection points for rice and sometimes labor deliveries to the government. Financial cooperatives that were begun in the later occupation, a highly inflationary period, were financially unsound and often run by unscrupulous people. The cooperative bank movement in the post-war era had to overcome their bad reputation.

21. Verspreide Geschriften, p. 466.

22. Ibid., pp. 267-268.

23. Ibid., p. 275.

The Japanese subscribed to a similar view, and acted upon it to a considerable extent. Even their well-known interest in building *semangat* (spirit, enthusiasm) was not unechoed on the Indonesian side. Hatta, for example, had long felt *semangat bangsa* (nationalist or national spirit) to be one of the most important gifts of education; both his own colleagues and other members of the Pergerakan had spoken of the necessity of fostering *semangat perdjuaan* (the spirit or will to struggle).²⁴ The propositions on education set out in the Putera reports (especially on p. 85) and to the Japanese on other occasions,²⁵ were in large measure ones which Hatta had made or considered for many years.

One important aspect of Hatta's thinking does not appear as clearly in his pre-war works as in the Putera documents. The lengthy and sharp attacks in the latter against the *pangrèh pradja*²⁶ (especially pp. 32-33) are unparalleled in earlier writings and therefore give the appearance of being caused by the new circumstances of the Japanese occupation. In a sense this is true, though the basic enmity to the *pangrèh pradja* had always existed even if explicit expression of it had not.

The pre-war Pergerakan, after all, was aimed primarily against the Dutch colonial presence, which was thought to be the root of all other evils. There was a clear lack of sympathy for the regent system²⁷ and for feudal elitism or "*ningratisme*" in general,²⁸ but the subject was not dwelt upon. Instead, a vague belief in the masses rather than privilege and aristocracy

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24. See, for example, *Daulat Rakjat*, October 30, 1931, p. 10, and June 10, 1933, p. 124. The building of *semangat* was also a point of emphasis among cooperative political groups, especially Dr. Soetomo's Parindra.
25. *Kumpulan Karangan*, IV, pp. 98 ff.
26. *Pangrèh pradja*, literally "rulers of the kingdom," refers to the elite Indonesian civil service through which colonial rule was extended to the Javanese masses in the Dutch and Japanese periods.
27. For example, see *Verspreide Geschriften*, p. 467. Regents were the highest-ranking members of the *pangrèh pradja*, and the regent system was thus connotative of the so-called "indirect rule" by a colonial power through an indigenous elite.
28. For example, *Kumpulan Karangan*, I, pp. 78-80. The term *ningratisme* (lit. *ningratism*) derives from the frequency with which the suffix *-ningrat* is found in the names of the upper elite or nobility, especially in Central Java.

was assumed. Social revolution was discussed, and held to be above political revolution in value,²⁹ but it was virtually always explained in terms of the Western European (or Turkish) experience and not what might happen in Netherlands East Indies society.³⁰ Not only was ningratism not the average Indonesian's chief problem (capitalism was), it would disappear automatically as the movement progressed, with the powers of the pangreh pradja falling into the hands of the people.³¹

After the arrival of the Japanese, however, Hatta was in a position to see things from closer up and with far less detachment. The Dutch were gone and required little further rhetoric. For the first time, Hatta was personally and deeply involved in the kinds of activity--Putera was the best example--that brought him face to face with the pangreh pradja, allowing him to see not only how much they opposed his theories but how effectively they could block the implementation of programs he supported. It is understandable that his attacks on the holders of privileged civil-service positions intensified.

Besides an opportunity to continue currents of thought and activity begun before the war, Putera offered Hatta much else of potential value in reaching the Pergerakan's goals. Of greatest significance was the size, structure, and even distribution throughout Java which--in theory at least--made Putera the kind of organizational source of power that was merely dreamed about under the Dutch. As, potentially at least, an association offering benefits and true participation to all classes on a broad scale, as a training ground for leaders, and as an Indonesian-manned agency involved in many aspects of improving life on Java, Putera appeared to offer Hatta and his co-workers the materials to create the "state within a state" that had so often been discussed in pre-war days as the foundation of a free Indonesia.³² The enthusiasm with which the public seems to have greeted early announcements of the group and its first weeks of operation must have encouraged Hatta and

29. See Daulat Rakjat, August 30, 1934, pp. 177-178.

30. Hatta did most of his writing from Europe, where he seldom even saw an Indonesian-language newspaper. (Daulat Rakjat, August 20, 1932, p. 5.) Isolation as well as temperament led him to theorize in broad terms, and he drew examples from European, Turkish, and occasionally Japanese experiences in modernization.

31. Daulat Rakjat, December 10, 1932, pp. 1-3.

32. On the power of organization and the state within a state, see Verspreide Geschriften, pp. 63-64.

raised whatever hopes he held.³³

It was not long before such expectations were trimmed back, and, within three months, Hatta wrote that Putera's performance was "completely unsatisfactory." The organization's failure, in fact, is the core subject of the reports. They contain a sober, detailed assessment of Putera's difficulties, indicate how complex these were, and depict clearly some of the impasses and frustrations they caused. And although it is possible to be misled in this regard, Putera's troubles appear in Hatta's analysis to have been due in large measure to factors other than Japanese-Indonesian enmity or difference in goals, neither of which were always very strong. A special feature of the reports is that an examination of some of these "other factors" reveals much about wartime Java in general.

Obviously Putera was expected to flourish in difficult times. A few of the crises affecting its success were lack of rice, labor problems, and a shortage and demoralization of Indonesian leadership. None of these were new to Java in 1942-1943; they had existed in one form or another under Dutch rule. War-time conditions altered them, sometimes to an important degree.

In the matter of food supply, production remained insufficient, especially for satisfying the requirements of the military government.³⁴ The Japanese policy of treating each

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33. Besides the assertions contained in the reports themselves, there is actually little clear evidence on the existence of public enthusiasm for Putera, or on its exact nature. The Beppan [a Japanese intelligence group] Report (RvO-IC 005798) is very generalized and is primarily concerned with possible objections to, rather than approval of, Putera. The suggestion that it was a widespread opinion that Putera would gradually replace the Japanese military government of Indonesia (G. Pakpahan, 1261 Hari Dibawah Sinar Matahari Terbit [Djakarta: n.p., 1947], p. 29) seems open to doubt. Hatta's description of popular hopes indicates strongly that these concerned mostly improvement of conditions and righting of rather specific wrongs. There seems to be little of a political nature. As for intellectuals, other evidence (the Beppan Report cited above, and RvO-IC 020169-73) shows that they were cautious, as might be expected under the circumstances. Many, including Hatta himself, may have seen in Putera many possibilities, but few could have been naive enough to confuse these very seriously with the probabilities involved.
34. Not enough is known about rice production on Java during the occupation to be very certain about such judgments, but

residency (*shū*) as a largely self-sufficient unit caused serious disorders in rice distribution. To make matters worse, the conditions just described coupled with the economic uncertainty of the war economy to increase rice hoarding, encourage hidden production, and greatly heighten speculation in rice and other foodstuffs. Production and distribution of agricultural goods was a persistent problem for the Japanese on Java.³⁵ Though various attempts were made to solve it, often utilizing plans or concepts considered by the Dutch, these were unsuccessful. As Hatta points out several times in the Putera reports (especially p. 67), the underlying significance of this failure was very great to Putera, to the people of Java, and to the success of the Japanese as governors.

Labor problems, which according to some men active in the Pergerakan was the worst problem of the late 1930's, were given a complicated twist by the circumstances of the occupation. Hatta's documentation tells us that unemployment declined dramatically on Java by early 1944 (see especially p. 111). The reasons for this, however--and the reports are silent here--were not always of the sort to make Putera's job easier. The Japanese placed heavy pressure on the population to be gainfully employed, and offered few of the pre-war aids, such as public food distribution, to those who were not. Large numbers of semi- and non-skilled workers were taken off Java as *rōmusha* (literally, though not generally in fact, volunteer laborers), and others were used in local forced-labor arrangements which went unrecorded and had little or no system. Young men with some education were drawn into military-type service as *Heihō* (army units serving with Japanese forces) and Peta (Pembela

the actual total production figure may well have been higher in 1945 than in 1941, if Japanese estimates on the extent of hoarding and black marketeering can be accepted (60% of the rice crop in 1945). See RvO-IC 005374 and 051163-76. Rice was not exported from Java to Japan, but on occasion may have been used to boost supplies elsewhere in Southeast Asia. The fact that the Japanese, unlike the Dutch, were a people whose customary staple was rice meant that the burden upon Javanese rice farmers was much greater during the war than in earlier years. The economic dislocations of wartime also confounded efforts to stabilize the rice market. Before the first year of Japanese rule had ended, rice was being imported to Java from Malaya. See Kuroda Hidetoshi, *Gunsei* (Tokyo: Gakufushōin, 1952), pp. 82-83, cited in Mitsuo Nakamura, "General Imamura and the Early Period of Japanese Occupation," *Indonesia*, No. 10 (October 1970), p. 25.

35. The subject is dealt with in detail in Anderson, "The Problem of Rice."

Tanah Air--Indonesian Self-Defense Force) troops, and not always with their complete consent. Idle youths often ended up with a busy work schedule under the sponsorship of the Seinendan (Youth Association).³⁶ All of these programs reduced slack in the labor market, but they seldom improved the popularity of the government or the organizations it sponsored. The same may be said of the related price-wage squeeze³⁷ and the neglect of pensioners (pp. 111-112).

The crisis in Indonesian leadership, a concomitant of the Dutch colonial system (in which social, political and economic initiative had to remain in Western hands and repression of various sorts saw that it did), was altered under the Japanese, but only to a fine degree and in a curious manner. One of Japan's interests in Indonesia was the encouragement of indigenous, as opposed to Western or Chinese, initiative in productive economic and social endeavors. Leadership of a more political nature was also sought out and utilized in a way it never had been in the pre-war era. At the same time, however, the occupation government demanded a high degree of control over all activities, and in so doing often stifled the same kinds of initiative it in other moments wished to boost.

This paradoxical state of affairs lay behind the leadership difficulties referred to from time to time in the Putera reports. First, there was still a shortage of Indonesian public leaders. Though the creation of organizations like Putera offered many positions through which new leadership could make its appearance and grow, caution led the Japanese administration to rely on the relatively limited number of men whose ability and, often but not always, controllability had been proven in pre-war days.

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36. The Seinendan, though often portrayed as a para-military organization, was in reality a far more sober, mundane and civilian affair. Especially outside of major urban centers, Seinendan branches spent most of their time repairing roads, preparing land for cultivation, and the like. Their members were never armed, and received only self-defense training. Rodney de Bruin, "De Seinendan in Indonesië" (unpublished manuscript, 1968).
 37. Strong demands for many types of labor, caused in part by Japanese pre-emption of workers of all sorts, often pushed wages up. At the same time, however, prices rose even faster in the highly inflationary atmosphere, making the economic struggle increasingly difficult for the vast majority of people. The pangreh pradjaja and a few other groups found their wages decreased from what they had been in pre-war days, and they were thus subjected to a squeeze of a slightly different kind.

The same was true of the many jobs opened in the government bureaucracy (as distinct from the administrative-type jobs of the pangrèh pradja). As a result, a circumscribed number of recognized and prestigious Indonesians filled multiple positions, often to what must have been a burdensome degree.³⁸ It is uncertain how severely such overloading of Indonesian leaders affected Putera and its progress. But few new leaders were brought to prominence, and the search for old ones slowed Putera's establishment. There was also concern that leadership training in the organization was insufficient for middle and low ranking staff members and that Putera might experience difficulties when current directors no longer filled their positions (p. 75).

Second, as Putera's story shows vividly, those Indonesian leaders who were recognized and given positions by the Japanese often became embittered and frustrated when they discovered the limits within which they were required to work. For political and social activists with pre-war experience, it must have been more aggravating to be placed close to broad opportunities and yet restrained from taking full advantage of them, than to have been simply refused nearly all opportunity. Although they did not intend to do so, the Japanese often placed Indonesian leaders of all types in an unstable limbo of heightened potentiality, where, as self-awareness grew, so did dissatisfaction.

For an organization expected to survive in times characterized by the difficulties outlined above and more, Putera was assigned astonishingly vague purposes. This fact is another important key to the failure that Hatta records. While there is little way of knowing what possibilities were discussed during the months of Putera's formation, it seems likely that a difficult compromise was being worked out between government officials and Indonesians who had become engaged in the effort.³⁹ For all the hesitation and the caution exercised, however, there is no indication that a clearly defined agreement was reached. The two official documents regulating Putera offer two quite

38. For example: R. Abikoesno Tjokrosoejoso (Advisor to the Bureau of Public Works, Advisor to Putera, important figure in the Jawa Hōkōkai, Chūō Sangi In, Barisan Pelopor, and Masjumi) and Oto Iskandar Dinata (editor of the Bandung newspaper Tjahaja, important member of Putera, Jawa Hōkōkai and Barisan Pelopor, Advisor to the Department of Security). The same pattern often occurred at the local level among men of prominence, whose commitments were often varied and extensive.

39. The story is best and most completely told in Kanahele, "The Japanese Occupation," pp. 72-77.

different impressions as to the association's aims and the methods of reaching them.⁴⁰ The constitution speaks only of "a native movement whose object shall be to create a powerful new Java as a link in the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere by extending aid and cooperation to Greater Japan for the purposes of seeing the ultimate victory in the Greater East Asia war and harmonizing the operation of military government," and lists a number of obscure functions such as "cultivation of thrift" and "betterment of the temperament of the people." Putera's Special Regulations, on the other hand, set out more specific tasks for each of its sections. Some of these, especially for the Cultural, Health, and Physical Education sections, appeared to give the organization responsibility for large projects on a Java-wide basis. It is significant that in his reports Hatta shows he looked primarily to these Special Regulations for guidance in judging whether or not Putera was doing its job and living up to its promise (pp. 58-60).

Evidence other than official pronouncements suggests a number of different interpretations of Putera's goals, none of which however is, in itself, satisfactory. From one possible viewpoint, for example, it could be said that Putera was designed as a Java-wide cooperative effort between Indonesian activists and the Japanese to pull the entire population behind the war effort. The demands of wartime, the need for self-improvement and the acceptance of greater social and economic responsibility would be the messages stressed. Above all, as Putera's name implied, the unity of the Indonesian peoples of Java was foremost in the minds of the group's promoters. As for projects, these ranged from obvious propagandizing on behalf of the war, thrift and increased production, to administering substantial social welfare programs.

The above view is thoroughly orthodox in the light of Putera's official promotion and is supported by a general examination of its top personnel and structure. The makeup of Putera's Preparatory Committee⁴¹ and Advisory Board⁴² shows an

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40. Both Putera's Constitution and Special Regulations may be found translated in: Harry J. Benda, et al., Japanese Military Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), pp. 136-143.
 41. Members were as follows: (in order of prominence) Soekarno, Hatta, K. H. Dewantara, Mas Mansoer, Sjarifoeddin; (in alphabetical order) Iskandar Dinata, Samsuoddin, Sartono, Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, Soemanang and Soetardjo. Asia Raya, December 11, 1942.
 42. Members were as follows: Soekardjo Wirjopranoto, Abikoeshno Tjokrosoejoso, Dr. H. Abd. K. Amroellah, Prof. H. Djajadi-

effort to tap diverse opinion and backing from Indonesian groups (Chinese and others were not included in Putera), and, perhaps, to continue the move toward unity begun by the pre-war *Perggerakan*. Further, Putera was structurally designed to cover all of Java's residencies, led by a Central Board in Djakarta. The first branches to be founded were purposely chosen to be evenly spaced among the island's population centers. It is worth considering, too, that the concept of Putera as a real and active body for uniting and improving the lot of Indonesians was held by Hatta himself, who could have been under few illusions as to the intent behind the association he had agreed to lead.⁴³

A different perspective suggests itself when Putera's attempts to become established on the residency and regency (*ken*) levels--amply catalogued by Hatta--are taken into account. In it, Putera appears to have been effective primarily in the context of each locality by tailoring the general programs outlined in Djakarta to local requirements. The function of the Djakarta leadership would be to lend prestige to the project and to facilitate the cooperation of local Japanese administrators with Indonesians of reputation and ability. In this way, provincial self-sufficiency would be given a boost; Indonesian talents for development would be more effectively harnessed than they had been before; and the all-important goals of greater production and unity in the war effort would be brought closer.

The most obvious support for this opinion is found in the key position given the Japanese Residents (*shūchōkan*) in con-

ningrat, I. Kasimo, Mr. Wilopo, H. Agoes Salim, K. H. Dewantara, Moh. Yamin, Mr. A. A. Maramis, Oto Koesoema Soebrata, Ratulangie, Sanoesi Pané, Soebagijo, Ir. Soerachman, Soerjopranoto, Soetardjo, Mr. Tadjoeeddin Noor, K. R. M. H. Woerjaningrat, Dr. Wedianingrat, Dr. Samsi Sastrowidagdo, Mr. R. Singgih, Dr. Soekiman, Soerjodiningrat, R. P. Soeroso, Sutan Sanif, Nj. Maria Ulfah Santoso, Roedjito. Asia Raya, May 21, 1943. There may, however, have been several Japanese members. Bernard Dahm, Sukarno and the Struggle for Indonesian Independence (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1969), p. 243.

43. Putera's eventual failure was by no means the first disappointment for Hatta and men like him. In the first weeks of the occupation, the Japanese had outlawed singing of the anthem "Indonesia Raya" and disbanded all political parties. Coming on the heels of such regulations, the efforts to set up Putera can only have been approached with, at most, wariness and tempered enthusiasm on the part of political figures. See RvO-IC 020169-73 and 029680.

trolling Putera's branches,⁴⁴ and the consistent refusal of the government to give Putera control over truly large, all-Java groups.⁴⁵ Of further significance is the relatively high percentage of Parindra (Partai Indonesia Raya--Greater Indonesia Party) men in the list of branch chairmen, indicating that a premium was placed on the cooperative social activity, avoidance of political offensiveness and local influence characteristic of that party.⁴⁶ Finally, it is possible that the expansion of Putera in Malang and Djakarta Shū (pp. 74-75) was not simply accidental but indicative of the fulfillment at an early date of the long-term expectations that the organization would gradually extend its effectiveness beyond the regency level.⁴⁷

According to a third view, Putera can be regarded essentially as a sop to the political and social activists from the Dutch period, who were courted by the Japanese for their popular appeal and prestige and feared by them for the same reasons. At a time when the war was threatening to take a bad turn for

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44. This was not the same thing as giving the Djakarta government control via the shū offices. The residencies retained their individuality throughout the occupation, usually according to the personalities of their individual Japanese leaders, and their economic well-being.
45. See especially Hatta's example of Gelora (Gerakan Latihan Olah-Raga--Sports Training Movement), p. 59. Since Hatta bemoans limitations of this sort, it would be necessary to believe that he was originally misinformed or misled regarding Japanese intentions on the local versus island-wide effectiveness question.
46. Of the men whose affiliations can be positively determined, five or more had been Parindra officers, and more may have been members. This represents 28% of the 18 actual or prospective branch chairmen. Of the original seven branches, three were headed by Parindra officers, and one by an ex-member of Budi Utomo and officer of the Pagujuban Pasundan, a cooperative group with a program much like that of Parindra. The remaining three branches were headed by a PNI-Partindo member, an engineer and an aristocrat of unknown political affiliations.
47. It seems probable that, as originally planned, Putera's efforts were to extend over a considerable period of time. See Hatta's own comment (p. 73) and those in the Beppan Report (RvO-IC 005798). Note that Hatta emphasizes (p. 74) that the guiding hand behind the expansion in Djakarta Shū was that of a Japanese shū official. The same may have been true in Malang Shū.

Japan, spokesmen from the Pergerakan, beginning with Sukarno and Hatta, were diverted from other activities by a cleverly conducted exercise devised by the Djakarta government. For their part, Indonesian leaders either had the program imposed upon them or were fooled into accepting involvement with an essentially worthless organization.

Although the "diversion" theory ignores most of the evidence and reasoning used to support conflicting opinions, there is much to recommend it. The Putera reports in particular are filled with complaints making it difficult to believe that Putera's meaningfulness and general viability were safeguarded by the Japanese administration. Djakarta's tendencies to take workable or popular Java-wide programs out of Putera's control (pp. 61-62) and to allow pangreh pradja obstructionism to continue unchecked may be considered indications of the cautious, distrustful attitude the Japanese took toward Putera and the men in it. The same may be said of the regulations that there be no actual members of Putera,⁴⁸ that branch chairmen and staffs be approved by the shūchōkan and that no money from outside or public sources fall into the hands of the movement (pp. 106-107).

More research and further documentation are required before the various possible interpretations of Putera's goals can be accurately judged and a thoroughly consistent and convincing analysis of the movement made. At present, parts of all the views outlined above appear to have validity, each receiving different degrees of emphasis according to Japanese interpretations of Putera's functions during its period of operation.⁴⁹

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48. See p. 113, and Benda, et al., Japanese Military Administration, p. 137. This is a very significant fact and sets Putera quite apart from pre-war political parties and the future Jawa Hōkōkai. Paradoxically, without members, Putera may have to be considered in some senses a more truly "mass organization" than the Jawa Hōkōkai, which after all required recommendations for membership and small monthly dues. Putera, though run exclusively by Indonesians, was free to be approached by anyone and attempted to affect all groups with its propaganda and other efforts.
49. That there was indeed a changed approach to Putera seems clear from Hatta's remark on p. 65, and the material in RvO-IC 030704. Most interpretations of Putera agree that a change took place, though cause and timing are matters for discussion. In contrast to those of the Japanese, the hopes of Indonesians regarding Putera remained relatively steady, a circumstance leading to increasing disappointment on both sides.

The extent, nature and even timing of such change, however, is very difficult to judge.

Putera was designed primarily for the Indonesian political elite, a group which the Japanese saw separately from other educated and active segments of Java's population.⁵⁰ Towards these persons, most Japanese officials had ambiguous feelings, supporting their anti-Western drive for self-pride and freedom but at the same time not trusting their political maturity or their loyalty under the difficult conditions of wartime. The occupation government's preference was to accept men from the old Pergerakan on their non-political merits, work with and give work to all those who would accept such arrangements,⁵¹ and attempt to bridge or deemphasize political differences. There was a very clear encouragement of pride in "nation/race" (*bangsa/kebangsaan*). At the same time, however, the Japanese also realized, as had the Dutch before them, that nationalism was more easily coped with than nationalists. There was even a suspicion that the two were inseparable and therefore posed a threat to the kind of New Order Japan was hoping to build on Java.

The government's solution to this difficulty was to limit the powers of especially the political elite in areas where they threatened to take on a large measure of autonomy. In other respects, Indonesians were given important roles to play. The policy was only partly conscious, for it is a natural reflex of a colonial regime to clip back the initiative of the colonized. And it was not always consistently or swiftly applied, for it was interpreted in different ways and put into effect by a sometimes loosely-directed administration.

In Putera's case, certain limitations, both explicit and implicit, were made from the start. Hatta seems to have realized this fact.⁵² Additional restraints were imposed as time went on.

50. The view was to a large extent shared by Indonesians, though many political figures achieved prominence first or additionally in other fields. See the divisions used in Orang Indonesia jang Terkemoeke di Djawa (Djakarta: Office of the Gunseikanbu, 1944), a volume of biographies prepared by Hatta and his staff.

51. Almost all of the political elite were given regular positions with the government, or found work in a private capacity, according to their training. Few men had full-time jobs of the type offered by Putera and even those were only partly political in nature.

52. The best example of an indirect limitation is given on pp. 45-46, where Hatta indicates his awareness that some

The most celebrated of these concerned the sports organization Gelora, which undoubtedly was struck down primarily because the Indonesians associated with it considered it to be an autonomous group, with only vague ties to Putera. Even in this flagrant conflict of interests, however, the Japanese were surprisingly slow to act. Gelora operated and gathered steam for several months. It even organized large soccer matches, advertising them prominently in the newspapers, and received occasionally elaborate coverage and praise in the press.⁵³

With regard to the Gelora question and a host of other limitations, it has recently been argued that, after the arrival of Yamamoto Moichiro (the new Chief of the Department of General Affairs) on Java in early March 1943, the administration's figurative guns were turned on Putera and the political elite in it, giving both the group and its members little chance of survival.⁵⁴ Yamamoto's own relation of his activities is the principal source for this theory.⁵⁵ Hatta's reports, while seemingly sympathetic to this approach in many places, offer cause to doubt that it is of great importance.

To begin with, Yamamoto either was unable or did not care to hinder Putera's development between its founding and the official opening of its headquarters on April 16, 1943. Judging from his commentary elsewhere in the reports, Hatta would surely have mentioned such activity had it occurred. Second, despite the implications of later observers,⁵⁶ it is by no means clear that the Djakarta government actively worked to ensure that the shūchōkan and the pangreh pradjā opposed Putera. It was not part of Djakarta's policy or practice to meddle very deeply in

restraints were imposed, presumably from the start, on Putera's involvement in education. There is nothing in the reports that suggests Hatta's misinterpretation or ignorance of limitations. He only stresses that even working within the limits set was very difficult.

53. For example, Asia Raya, May 15, 25 and 31, 1943.

54. Dahm, Sukarno, pp. 245-248.

55. RvO-IC 030704. This document contains material from 1946 interrogations of Yamamoto. His personal diary and memoirs remain private.

56. Especially Harry J. Benda, The Crescent and the Rising Sun (The Hague and Bandung: van Hoeve, 1958), p. 140, a view to which Dahm, Sukarno, p. 247, subscribes.

shū affairs.⁵⁷ Besides, the reports show that at least two shūchōkan (Malang and Jogjakarta) were enthusiastic about Putera, as were some members of the pangreh pradja (p. 63). Third, if the Japanese were entirely convinced that Putera was worthless and/or dangerous, why was the Pasar Malam Djakarta (Djakarta Fair), in which Putera played a prominent role (and occupied an elaborate new building designed in Japanese-Indonesian style by Soekarno and others), allowed to take place?

Finally, if Yamamoto's purpose was, as he said, to curb the political activists and prevent them from using Putera to their advantage (principally by stressing nationalist sentiment and the ultimate goal of independence), why were Putera's propaganda duties increased beyond the original plans (p. 90) rather than limited more carefully? Such propagandizing was not only difficult to control in any complete fashion, but offered political activists great opportunities for public exposure and expression of their own, as opposed to government, ideas through cleverly composed speeches and writings. The only logical explanation is that, far from wishing to destroy or cripple it, the Japanese continued to have high hopes for Putera until very late in 1943. This was especially true in the field of propaganda (for the war effort, public health, higher production and the like), but also applied to other activities such as collecting information on Indonesian business life and acting as a labor clearing-house. At the same time, the potential difficulties in controlling the political activists became increasingly apparent to the Japanese administration, which attempted to solve them without damaging the workability of Putera as a whole. It is at least possible that the policy might have been successful had Putera's effectiveness not been injured far more seriously by other factors.

It seems clear, then, that whatever Yamamoto and others did to inhibit what might be called Putera's "potential natural growth," they cannot be held accountable for its demise. The kind of antipathy they displayed toward Indonesian activists was responsible for only a modest number of the organization's difficulties. As pointed out earlier, difficult times and unclear purpose were also at fault. Of great consequence too were numerous unexpected internal complications, of which the

57. Java was more decentralized in many ways under Japanese rule than previously. Shū autarchy was insisted upon, and Djakarta's policies on social and economic matters were interpreted differently from shū to shū. Unspoken unity of purpose (aided by pressure to win the war), a good sense of organizational structure, and a fondness of and dependence on sloganized propaganda often makes the Japanese administration on Java seem more uniform than was actually the case.

series of problems encountered in producing large quantities of effective propaganda with a small staff and uninspiring issues is the best example (p. 52).

The most important dilemma facing Putera, however, and a major contribution to its failure, was that posed by the pangreh pradja. Hatta levels his harshest attacks against that group, and blames it--along with the Japanese, whose complicity is implied--for placing insurmountable hurdles in Putera's path. The reports, in fact, appear to speak of a Japanese-pangreh pradja *entente* against political and social activists. This is a very serious accusation which, especially since it is not directly made, deserves extended comment here.

When the Japanese arrived on Java, they faced the task of administering a colonial possession without appearing to do so as imperial masters. The job was made especially complex by the already difficult relations between politically and socially progressive Indonesians and the long-entrenched administrators of Dutch rule, the pangreh pradja. Only speculation may be made here as to the pre-war thinking of Japanese on the subject, but it is unlikely that they could have missed the increasing reliance of the Dutch regime on the pangreh pradja in the 1930's, or the tendency of the pangreh pradja themselves to show signs of adapting with unexpected success to the gradually modernizing political atmosphere of the Netherlands East Indies.⁵⁸ On the other hand, the objections of the Pergerakan, which considered the pangreh pradja to be at least partially corrupt or oppressive, thoroughly pro-Dutch, and symbolic of colonial rule, were no secret either.⁵⁹

58. See Harry J. Benda, "The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia," Journal of Asian Studies, 25, No. 4 (August 1966), pp. 589-605. On the dominance of the pangreh pradja in local elections, especially through the Perhimpunan Pegawai Bestuur Bumiputra (Native Civil Servants' Association), in East Java, see for example: MBZ Mailrapport 554 secret, 1939, letter of van der Plas to the Director of Binnenlands Bestuur, June 9, 1938, and Het Provinciaal Blad van Oost Java, 1938, pp. 1-2. The pattern seems to have been repeated in West, and to a lesser extent Central, Java.

59. On Parindra's attitude to the pangreh pradja, see MBZ Mailrapport 1004, 1935, Bijlage IIIC. In late November 1940, discussions in the Volksraad centered on both the unrest among, and the undesirable activities of, the pangreh pradja. Perhaps the most severe criticism came from Soetardjo Kartohadikoesoemo, himself a member of the pangreh pradja. See the reports in Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, November 26 and 27, 1940.

At the beginning of the occupation, the main objectives of the Japanese were to restore calm and to return to normal conditions as quickly as possible. The Dutch emphasis on *rust en orde* (peace and order), which became especially great after the fall of the Netherlands to the Germans in May 1940, was thus continued by the Japanese, and often with Dutch help. Like-minded Indonesians, notably but not exclusively Parindra members, were asked for information and help in matters concerning government employees, administrative practices and the civil service system.⁶⁰ In all this, the Japanese were sometimes surprisingly non-partisan. Their greatest interest was in having the machinery of government continue to work and daily life (especially in its economic aspects) go on as usual. Whoever could help accomplish these things received approval; whoever would not, or appeared to be actively hostile, was observed carefully.

Following the internment of Dutch civil servants in April 1942, both the activist intelligentsia and the pangrèh pradja found themselves scrutinized by the military government. The former received a hard and partly unexpected blow in July 1942, when it was announced that political-oriented associations would continue to be considered illegal.⁶¹ The pangrèh pradja, at the same time they were confirmed in their positions, were subjected to far less preferential handling than they had received

60. See Afscheidswoord van het Dagelijksch Bestuur van de Parindra, MBZ Indische Archieven series, group 15, box 9. Not only Indonesians were asked; Dutch officials of all types were called upon to explain their functions, the operation of administrative systems and so forth. Most supplied this information, having been instructed to keep law and order and to protect the native population from dislocation.

61. The pre-war political parties had been banned in March, and, on the 20th of that month, politically-oriented organizations were "temporarily" disbanded. In fact, the regulation was interpreted very broadly, and pressure was put on most organizations (with the notable exceptions of the Nahdatul Ulama and Muhammadiyah) to close down. In mid-July 1942, the intentions of the government became clear. Political and politically-oriented groups remained out of the question, but other associations (economic, mutual aid and so forth) could register for approval with the Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst (Political Security Police), which continued to exist under Japanese tutelage. The final decision in such cases rested with the shūchōkan. Pewarta Perniagaan, August 3, 1942.

from the Dutch.⁶² It is difficult to say how aware of it they were in the early months of the occupation, but they soon discovered that the Japanese, unlike the Dutch, were quite prepared to dismiss even regents if their conduct were unsatisfactory.⁶³

62. Relations between the Japanese and the upper pangrèh pradja, especially in the early days of the occupation, have yet to be studied in depth. The pangrèh pradja were unquestionably handled more carefully than any other group, due to their special position both administratively and socially. But this "careful handling" had two sides. On the one hand, the aristocratic and often Western-style education and manners of the pangrèh pradja were not honored by the Japanese in the same way they had been by the Dutch. As a result, regents and others felt themselves humiliated, especially when they were called to the provincial capital and ordered to carry out programs the Japanese had in mind. This began early in the occupation (for example, see accounts in Soerabaiasch Handelsblad, April 24 and June 16, 1942). On the other hand, with the removal of the Dutch civil servants, the pangrèh pradja gained in power at their own level and were given greater responsibilities and freedom to carry them out in their own way. A short and generalized, but first-hand, account of both aspects described here is contained in: R. A. A. S. M. Gandasubrata (translated by Leslie H. Palmier), An Account of the Japanese Occupation of Banjumas Residency, Java, March 1942 to August 1945 (Ithaca: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, Data Paper No. 10, 1953). The degree of trust between Japanese and pangrèh pradja, basic to the approach outlined above, varied considerably from regency to regency. Where there was no trust between the Japanese and the pangrèh pradja, the government's relations with the people suffered and chaos could result. (Prawoto Soemodilogo's report on the Indramaju revolt, MBZ series 97B, box 2, folder 17.) Obviously, this was an extreme case, however.
63. In the first year and one half of Japanese rule, the regents of Pamekasan, Probolinggo, Bodjonegoro, and Purwakarta lost their positions. (RvO-IC 032507.) Other members of the pangrèh pradja were replaced, often by individuals who were neither aristocrats nor trained civil servants (for example, M. Atik Soeari in Djakarta Ken, and Dr. Moerdjani in Indramaju Ken). Appointments of this sort angered especially the middle-rank pangrèh pradja. The Dutch did on occasion dismiss regents, but rarely in the decade before the war, and never without a great deal of hesitation. Even criticism in the Volksraad of regents' behavior was severely frowned upon by the Dutch members and the government.

After a year of working for the Japanese, regents were still thought to require training and indoctrination,⁶⁴ and indeed neither they nor the rest of the pangrèh pradja, including village heads (*lurah*), ever appeared to outgrow the need for such instruction during the entire war period.

While most pangrèh pradja retained their positions during the occupation,⁶⁵ few came close to the ideal the government hoped for. The extravagant praise heaped upon R. M. T. A. Soerjo, the resident of Bodjonegoro after November 1943, not only extolled his virtues of high moral purpose, non-elitism and full cooperativeness for the benefit of public welfare, but implied that those qualities were in short supply among the pangrèh pradja.⁶⁶ Setting quite a different sort of example, the government punished pangrèh pradja suspected of anti-Japanese activity severely, making it clear that they were not to consider themselves immune from such harsh measures.⁶⁷ To the majority of the pangrèh pradja lying between these two extremes of behavior, the Japanese applied varying measures of support and pressure to improve. There was also distrust, indicated in the insistence that the pangrèh pradja not mix in political affairs (p. 113) or make frequent public appearances and speeches.⁶⁸

64. For example, in Djakarta, March 1-20, 1943; in Surabaya, November 16-26, 1943.

65. In addition to the Japanese need to keep as much of the civil service as possible intact, it must be remembered that the pangrèh pradja, like Dutch officials, had been told for several years prior to the Japanese invasion that, in case of enemy occupation, they were to remain in their posts as long as they could, keep the peace, uphold the law, and act as buffers between the occupying government and the people. "Rechten en plichten van plaatselijke overheid en bevolking in geval van vijandelijke bezetting," MBZ Mailrapport 1306 secret, 1939.

66. Soeara Asia, November 24, 1943, and February 22, 1944.

67. One of the most celebrated cases concerned a suspected plot against the Japanese, headed by the regent of Panarukan, in early 1944. Over 25 people, most of them Indonesian officials, were executed. There were also less spectacular affairs, for example the execution of the Assistant Wedana of Djember for making Victory signs in May 1944. De Vrije Pers, September 1, 1949.

68. Malang, of course, was an exception in this regard. The pangrèh pradja appeared at functions in the early occupation, probably as legitimizing symbols for official

Whatever "alliance" there was between the Japanese and the pangrèh pradjā--and the workability of their relationship was indeed significant--it was neither tension-free, constantly in force, or rooted in a mutual distaste for intellectuals and progressivists.⁶⁹ The Putera reports tend to be misleading in this regard, since they imply that the Japanese administration permitted the pangrèh pradjā to obstruct what Hatta considered to be positive programs and aids to both the war effort and popular welfare. It is further suggested that the Jawa Hōkōkai was formed to take power from the activists and give it to the favored pangrèh pradjā, thus soothing the latter's objections to Putera. It must be remembered, however, that the allusions Hatta makes on these questions are extremely vague. In fact, the Japanese are not at any point accused of intentional connivance in either blocking Putera or continuing corrupt practices. Judging from the tone of the rest of the reports, Hatta would not have hesitated long before making such a charge had he thought it true. His argument moves, instead, in the direction of criticism for ignorance and lack of effort. None of his analysis or advice concerning the pangrèh pradjā controvert Japanese ideas and aims. Finally, it is possible that the pangrèh pradjā role in the Jawa Hōkōkai was created by the Japanese as much for the purpose of pulling them together and influencing them more heavily, as for curbing the activists.⁷⁰

ceremonies, but were given much less exposure as time went on. They were not encouraged to become spokesmen for either the people or the government. This was somewhat in contrast to the situation in the last years of Dutch rule. There were, after mid-1943, several pangrèh pradjā in local advisory councils (Sangi Kai), but they were nearly without exception required to relinquish their civil service post before accepting an advisor's position. This was also different from the Dutch practice.

69. The case for the Japanese-pangrèh pradjā alliance has probably been overstated in recent works. See especially: Benedict Anderson, "Japan: 'The Light of Asia,'" in Joseph Silverstein (ed.), Southeast Asia in World War II: Four Essays (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1966), p. 18, and L. Sluimers, "'Nieuwe Orde' op Java," Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-, en Volkenkunde, 124, No. 3 (Fall 1968), p. 350. The entire issue is, however, so clouded and little-studied that judgment must be tentative.
70. The pangrèh pradjā had been left out of both the Triple A Movement and Putera. By mid-1943 they were proving less malleable than the Japanese had perhaps hoped. Also, they, rather than the political elite, were considered to be the key to the masses, on whom new pressure to produce was being

The relatively high incidence of criticism of the pangrèh pradja and ningratism in wartime newspapers, especially after mid-1943, leads to the suspicion that the Japanese were never entirely satisfied with their inherited Indonesian civil service. Most often critiques were made in the form of advice, and the message was uniform: the civil service's structure would remain, but its spirit must change and individualism and elitism be abandoned.⁷¹ This conviction was held with considerable strength, though care was usually exercised in expressing it to prevent the pangrèh pradja--who were, after all, vital to the functioning of Java--from being unnecessarily alienated or demoralized.⁷² Sometimes the ambiguities in the Japanese approach to the pangrèh pradja became quite apparent. In Putera, for example, although the organization was originally warned against tampering with pangrèh pradja affairs,⁷³ local branches were permitted to lecture to pangrèh pradja groups on their responsibilities in the New Java, methods for improving production and popular support for the government, and the dangers of following the old "Dutch" ways.⁷⁴

placed. Putera, it should be remembered, was not originally intended to extend below the regency level. It is not strictly true, as Hatta implies, that Putera men were generally left out of Jawa Hōkōkai activities. In many cases shū Hōkōkai groups appear to have been made up mostly of old Putera officers, probably out of sheer necessity, as the number of local influential leaders willing to work with the Japanese in this way was not large. Further, the pangrèh pradja, even in the Jawa Hōkōkai, were never used for propaganda purposes. This activity was always the special preserve of the political elite and social activists.

71. Soeara Asia, September 7, 1943.
72. For a good, if rather unsoftened, example, see Soeara Asia, January 15, 1944. Sometimes, blunt statements crept into even official documents. See, for example: Administrative Order 776, dated April 25, 1944, in Benda, et al., Japanese Military Administration, pp. 97-100. This document gives an excellent idea of official Japanese opinion toward the pangrèh pradja, being an adroit mixture of admonition, flattery, threat and elaborate gesturing toward a bright future. It also makes clear that some senior pangrèh pradja officials were causing difficulties for the Japanese.
73. Kan Pō, No. 17 (April 25, 1943), p. 16.
74. Based on the experiences of Putera in Surabaya Shū, which do not appear to have been extraordinary in any other way. Soeara Asia, October 19, November 16, 21, 27 and 29, 1943.

After January 1944, the Japanese became especially concerned about lagging production, both of food and goods, and there was growing anxiety over deteriorating economic and social conditions in the Javanese countryside. The administration's attention fell upon the lurah, who provided the all-important link between the main body of pangrèh pradja officials and the masses. Under Japanese rule the lurah had been subjected to new pressures and responsibilities, few of them pleasant or popular.⁷⁵ As a group, they resisted these changes as well as efforts to drain elitism out of the civil service and to alter the bureaucratic system so as to increase the control of the residential capitals over village affairs. During 1944, the lurah became the objects of an intensive campaign to break through such resistance and also to increase production and calm the discontent of the rural population. The upper levels of the pangrèh pradja continued to be evaluated and be given training, but were no longer of prime interest in the government's efforts to improve administrative control of Java.

The uncertain relationship between the Japanese and the pangrèh pradja proved to be an unexpected complication, and one whose solution was impossible within Putera's framework. The old-line civil service could not be drummed out of existence, for obvious reasons.⁷⁶ But neither could it be fully approved and supported, for it did not fill the ideal role created for it by the designers of the New Java. As for the political activists and progressives, they were on the one hand very useful and on the other potentially dangerous; they could not be given the responsibility of uniting and energizing the masses.⁷⁷

75. RvO-IC 032508, and Peraturan Dasar Persatuan Pamong Desa Indonesia (Djakarta ? : PPD I, 1959?), pp. 6-7.

76. One reason for this was that the upper pangrèh pradja had begun to learn how to survive in the new order. A principal way in which they did so was to have their sons enter Japanese-run schools, take qualifying examinations for government positions, and enter various youth and military groups. On the incidence of pangrèh pradja in the Japanese-sponsored Peta, see George D. Larson, "PETA: The Origins of the Indonesian Army" (M.A. Thesis, University of Hawaii, 1970).

77. The chief reason behind the Japanese opinion was probably that they, like the Dutch before them, found the idea of change being encouraged from outside the administrative system rather threatening and potentially uncontrollable. It is also possible that, again like the Dutch, they genuinely questioned the sincerity and ability of politically-inclined Indonesian intellectuals in contacting and influencing the agrarian population. The Japanese had all the

It was to a large extent this three-way tug between the Japanese, the pangrèh pradjā, and the men of the pre-war Pergerakan that brought Putera to a standstill. The Jawa Hōkōkai was structured to avoid such troubles by giving the pangrèh pradjā central responsibility below the regency level, and by putting Japanese, rather than Indonesians, in top controlling positions. The activists who had populated Putera ranks were taken into the Jawa Hōkōkai, used as propagandists and advisors, and generally kept in urban areas.

Putera's short active life--much shorter than the official span of March 1943 to February 1944 indicates--cannot adequately be explained as the result of a simple clash between the Japanese and Indonesian activists. Nor can all of Putera's difficulties be ascribed to Japanese scheming. The Japanese administration took a number of steps, as any colonial regime might, to contain Putera's influence, but there were many difficulties that it did not create and that actually worked against its best interests. One of these certainly was the reluctance of the pangrèh pradjā to condone Putera's activities, especially those of a propagandistic nature, which became for the Japanese the chief, though not the only, value of the organization. Other problems rose out of wartime conditions and uncertainty among government officials.

Under such conditions, it was difficult for either the Japanese or the Indonesians to extract from Putera a full complement of benefits. On the whole, both sides were disappointed with it, and for reasons not always entirely different. The value of Putera's limited successes, particularly in propaganda work but also in other efforts, were on the other hand probably shared equally. This suggestion should not cause surprise. Putera was, it should be remembered, a compromise, and one arrived at with some difficulty. That each side would use the other was no secret, nor were the processes of doing so especially mysterious. Both Japanese and Indonesians would have had to have been considerably more naive than they were not to realize these facts, and for present-day investigators to ignore them seems ill-advised.

At any rate, the political details of a struggle between the Japanese and Indonesians seeking independence are difficult to extract with much certainty from Putera's history,⁷⁸ and are

more to be wary of, as they dealt with ex-members of many varied groups; the Dutch had only the relatively mild-mannered Parindrists and a few others to consider.

78. Two conflicting views have recently been composed, using similar materials. Kanahēle, "The Japanese Occupation," p. 80 and pp. 241-242, suggests, though more cautiously

certainly of lesser importance in a discussion of Hatta's reports. For these reveal, rather than a political arena, a more mundane world of economic and social concerns and activities. In these surroundings, nationalism and politics was no issue: all Indonesians involved looked toward the independence of their country, and before very long realized it was being thwarted by the Japanese. Little could be done about this situation, except to use whatever opportunities Putera provided to further nationalist feeling and thinking. For the rest, and this is the effort Hatta tells us about, it was necessary to do everything possible to promote the welfare and safety of the people of Java. For many of its staff Putera provided the first deep and direct involvement, as well as some obvious disappointments, in such affairs. Its importance is thus very great in non-political matters. Hatta's account is significant in the same way, emphasizing as it does the small successes, problems and overall failure of an effort to begin various kinds of change and development on Java. The Putera reports, in short, by focusing on subjects other than high-level politics and nationalism, provide a key to a better-rounded--one might almost say, more realistic--view of the Japanese occupation of Indonesia than has been popular in the past. Hopefully, it is a key that will not go unused.

than previous writers, that Putera represents a major step for Indonesian nationalists toward the goal of greater power and eventual independence. Dahm, Sukarno, pp. 246-247, argues that Putera's story signifies "the end of the time of hope for the nationalists, rather than the beginning of pressure against the Japanese. . . ." Both views have merit, and only an extremely detailed and sophisticated study of Putera and similar organizations, with less emphasis on political matters, will be able to advance beyond them.

REPORT TO THE GUNSEIKANBU ON
THE FIRST THREE MONTHS OF "PUTERA" -
April 16 to July 16, 1943

I. Introduction

Putera¹ was officially inaugurated by his Excellency the Gunseikan² on March 9, 1943³ during a public rally held at Ikada Square, but it did not actually begin to function until its Headquarters opened on April 16, 1943. The time between March 9th and April 16th was spent in arranging a system of directors for the new organization and in looking for a building to serve as its Headquarters. This was found at Djalan Sunda, 18 [Djakarta].⁴

On April 16, 1943, Putera Headquarters was officially opened by the Gunseikan, His Excellency Okazaki. In his speech, he advised Putera's leaders to be mindful of the goals and purposes of the Japanese Army: to build a Greater East Asia and, in particular, a New Java. The Sōmubuchō,⁵ His Excellency Yamamoto, explained how much the people wanted to assist the

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1. Putera (meaning "youth" or "prince") is an acronym for Pusat Tenaga Rakjat (Concentration of the People's Power), the official Indonesian name for the organization. In Japanese, Putera was known as Jawa minshū sōryoku kesshū undō (Movement for the Total Mobilization of the People of Java).
 2. Chief Military Administrator.
 3. The official date of founding was March 9, 1943, but the first announcement of Putera came a day earlier to coincide with celebrations marking the first anniversary of the establishment of Japanese rule on Java. A Putera-type organization had been under discussion since November 1942, but the road to its realization was not smooth. The obstacles are given detailed treatment in George S. Kanahale, "The Japanese Occupation of Indonesia: Prelude to Independence" (Ph.D. Thesis, Cornell University, 1967), pp. 72-77.
 4. The building was that of the R. K. Hogere Burgerschool (Roman Catholic High School).
 5. Chief of the General Affairs Department of the Military Administration.

Japanese Army in the present war, which had as its goal the destruction of English, American, and Dutch power. He also advised Putera on the nature of its responsibilities. His Excellency Hatakeda, the Naimubuchō,⁶ spoke next. He expressed the hope that Putera would work smoothly with all elements in the *pangreh pradjā*,⁷ and that Putera's work would progress quickly to make the final victory possible. All that day, the new Putera building was crowded with ordinary people (*rakjat*), a sign that they looked favorably upon the founding of Putera.

Beginning the next day, April 17, 1943, Putera Headquarters worked at full capacity; in fact, it was understaffed for the work required of it. No one had imagined that so many people, seeking so many kinds of aid and information, would visit Headquarters so soon. The Correspondence Section received a great many letters, and, on opening day, the Public Welfare Section received not less than seventy guests. All were people living in miserable circumstances, and they wanted different sorts of help. The majority were unemployed. People visited the Economic Affairs Section seeking information on economic problems concerning their own businesses. Delegates from a number of places came to the Organization Section to ask about the structure of Putera and to request that branches be set up soon in their *daerah*.⁸

The other sections also worked overtime, listening and replying to visitors' requests for information. Questions sometimes could not be answered satisfactorily because section officials had not yet worked out their plan of operation. The large

6. Chief of the Internal Affairs Department of the Military Administration.

7. Literally, rulers of the kingdom, later altered to pamong pradjā (servants of the kingdom). Both terms signify an elitist indigenous civil service.

8. The administrative divisions of Java, and the titles of the individuals heading them, are as follows:

<u>Indonesian</u>	<u>Japanese</u>	<u>English</u>
daerah, karesidenan (residen)	shū (shūchōkan)	residency (resident)
kabupaten (bupati)	ken (kenchō)	regency (regent)
kawedanan (wedana)	gun (gunchō)	district (district head)
ketjamatan (tjamat)	son, mura (sonchō)	sub-district (sub-district head)
kelurahan, desa (lurah)	ku (kuchō)	village (village head)

number of letters requiring replies made it clear by the end of the first week that our typing staff was far from adequate. This was quite contrary to our original estimate that at first much of the staff would be idle. In short, Putera operated at full capacity from the very beginning. Its work consisted mostly of looking after details, such as passing on information, answering questions, and giving aid. But all of this showed what high hopes the people had for Putera.

What follows below is a brief analysis of the work completed by each of Putera's sections during the past three months. First, however, a word about some of Putera's general characteristics.

After Headquarters was opened, the leadership⁹ agreed that, if Putera were to proceed in an orderly fashion, three things would have to be done first. These were:

- 1) Establish an Advisory Council [Madjelis Pertimbangan] in Djakarta and call its first meeting.
- 2) Establish seven shū branches, distributed evenly across Java--that is, at Djakarta, Bandung, Jogjakarta, Solo, Semarang, Surabaya and Malang.
- 3) Install the chairmen of these branches in Djakarta and meet with them concerning the organization of their respective branch directorates.

Contrary to the first hopes of the Putera leadership, these matters could not be attended to very quickly. Much had to be prepared beforehand by the Gunseikanbu¹⁰ and the individual Shūchōkan. The Shūchōkan in each daerah first had to approve whoever was to become the shū branch chairman. In this process, the Minshū Shidōbu¹¹ acted as intermediary. The arrangement had advantages insofar as the branch chairman would have to maintain close ties with the Shū Office, but on the other hand, there

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9. The term is used here and throughout the reports to mean the Empat Serangkai (literally, "The Quadrumvirate," i.e., the Big Four; in Japanese, shi i-in): Sukarno, Hatta, Ki Hadjar Dewantara, and K. H. Mas Mansur. The group was formed in October or November 1942, and its members later headed Putera's four departments.
 10. Military Administration Headquarters.
 11. The People's Guidance Department, a propaganda and control office of considerable importance but about which relatively little is known.

were some disadvantages. Usually the Shūchōkan, being strangers, did not know the people who were suggested as prospective Putera branch chairmen. They were often forced to ask the advice of the Indonesian officials under them, and these officials, especially the pangreh pradja, were often biased against people from the *Pergerakan*.¹² In fact, in the old days under the Dutch, the people from the *Pergerakan* were regarded as enemies. Many of these activists were well-known, but it was not always the better-known ones who were trusted by the people. Many leaders influential with the masses were unknown to the people on top. These leaders had strongly resisted the Dutch colonial government and, following their principle of non-cooperation, had refused to work with it in any way. Their lives were ones of sacrifice and poverty, spent in and out of jail. Yet they came of age in the struggle; their character and intelligence were tempered by the Movement. Generally, however, they were considered insignificant even though their ability to lead whole movements, or portions of them, was no less than that of the cooperating leaders who sat in the Volksraad.¹³ The non-cooperating leaders were not famous because they had no official ranks and lived like common people. The cooperating leaders were well-known because they had official rank.

Since people usually measured others by their position, the only individuals considered important were leaders with official rank, or socially prominent occupations in law, medicine and the like. Leaders without official rank, though better known and liked by the masses, and also really more capable than the others, were regarded as insignificant. Certainly they had a low standard of living, like that of the masses whom they led. They had no contact at all with the "big shots" since these "big shots" were their enemies and viewed them with contempt. Unlike the "big shots," they did not know the proper table manners, judged according to Western standards. They did not know how to mix in "society," and they did not even have the proper

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12. The term used here, orang-orang pergerakan, refers to those people active in the pre-war pursuit of change, generally in the direction of modernization and independence. The *Pergerakan* (Movement) included all such activists, regardless of their particular social or political ideas, although non-cooperators sometimes used it to refer exclusively to themselves. The term "nationalist" cannot be used here, as it suggests something too narrowly political.
 13. The People's Council announced by the Netherlands East Indies government in 1916 and set into operation two years later. The Volksraad had limited legislative powers and consisted of elected and appointed members representing major ethnic and interest groups in colonial life.

clothing to do so anyway. For these reasons too, they were considered "nobodies," lacking the means to mingle with the "big shots."

Thus numerous popular leaders--who truly sacrificed themselves for the people and knew the sentiments of the masses--have been refused positions commensurate with their previous contributions. Under present conditions, the Putera leadership has felt compelled to choose only well-known people as local leaders. Fortunately, the old pro-cooperation movement possessed a number of widely-recognized leaders whose capabilities were generally agreed upon, for example, Dr. Moerdjani, Soeroso, Soedirman and others. They can now be given prominent positions as branch chairmen. A number of well-known people, however, cannot be appointed branch chairmen because they already hold government positions. Such circumstances restrict the efforts of Putera's leadership to find branch chairmen acceptable to the Shūchōkan.

The problem of appointing local chairmen has slowed down the establishment of the Putera branches. Financially, the delay can be considered beneficial. But in the light of the essential purpose of the organization to create more effective links between the people and government agencies, the delay has been detrimental. Putera can become a bridge between the government and the people. It can gradually erase the psychological tensions between the people and the pangreh pradja. It can check the oppression of the people by state officials with outmoded views. Letters from all over flood Putera Headquarters, asking that branches be set up quickly for these purposes. The people's cry must be heeded. Otherwise, the people will become disillusioned and be alienated from the government. And, no matter what happens, the people will blame all their difficulties on the government, since the officials receive their authority in its name.

Thus two benefits can be realized by spreading Putera to all shū, ken and gun on Java, as originally intended by the organization's constitution. These two benefits are as follows:

1) The people will be brought closer to the government. This involvement of the people is imperative in order to inculcate a determined spirit on the home front. If the people have a real attachment towards the government, they will willingly undergo whatever suffering or sacrifice the government asks of them.

2) Putera can check the oppression of the people by officials who do not yet understand the New Spirit [*Semangat Baru*]. Even though Putera might not actually be able to take any action itself, the very existence of a Putera branch would help discourage local officials from abusing their power.

Nevertheless, we are not suggesting that branches should be set up quickly in a haphazard fashion. In these things too, we must work slowly and in an organized manner. When a branch is set up, it should have good leaders and an organized structure. The directors of these branches must realize at the very outset that they face a difficult task and that they have the heavy responsibility of furthering the unity of all groups of people in order to provide a strong and undivided spirit behind the Japanese Army. The goal of giving the branches a thorough preparation can be reached gradually by the Organization Section. Before planning branches, we must first visit the daerah, investigate their situations and analyze their difficulties. This job will be easier now that there are seven shū branches to provide assistance.

The Putera leadership only hopes that the pangreh pradja will be willing to abandon their old hostility toward the activists who used to oppose the Dutch East Indies Government. We must try to reach an agreement with them about the men to be appointed branch chairmen in their respective daerah. If they take a negative attitude, no Putera branch leader will be able to mobilize the people behind the government and give them the spirit to support the Greater East Asian War fully.

It is easy enough to install a branch director, but what is the use of a director whom the people neither accept nor like, but simply tolerate for fear of Japan? A government which is obeyed because it is feared will not come to a happy end, no matter what sort of government it is. The experience of the Dutch East Indies Government provides a good example in this regard, and is one that all should keep in mind. What is needed is a government which the people obey because they love the ideals by which they are governed. This love cannot be kindled now by the pangreh pradja, nor by those activists influenced by them or given positions according to their wishes. But this love can easily be fostered by leaders whom the people trust, even though they may be of "low caliber."

The Putera leadership hopes very much that the Gunseikanbu can exert its influence to insure that the pangreh pradja, with whom Putera will always work for consensus, will demonstrate their openmindedness and their abandonment of the old attitudes produced by the atmosphere of the Dutch East Indies.

With the government's consent, it was possible to hold the inauguration and first meeting of the Advisory Board on May 26, 1943. On that evening and the one following, meetings were held between the seven shū branch chairmen, who had been invited to Djakarta.

The Advisory Board was asked to discuss the problems which most needed Putera's attention, that is, problems experienced by the pangreh pradjā and Putera in their attempts to work together. To facilitate the exchange of ideas, the Putera leadership beforehand asked Soetardjo [Kartohadikoesoemo] and Hadji Agoes Salim to prepare working papers that could serve as a basis for discussion at the meeting. Soetardjo is a member of the pangreh pradjā, and Salim is a veteran of the Movement.

Summaries of the preliminary statements of the two gentlemen, along with a report on the Advisory Board meeting are in the hands of Minshū Shidōbu. Therefore it is unnecessary for me to discuss them here. It is sufficient to say that both men thought that conflict between the pangreh pradjā and the Movement should cease because both groups stood squarely behind the government.

But in practice the problem is neither as simple as it is in theory, nor as we would like it to be. The Advisory Board may think that conflict is unnecessary and that there is now a basis for cooperation between the pangreh pradjā and the Movement, but the psychological gulf separating them has not yet disappeared. This is demonstrated by the fact that large numbers of pangreh pradjā officials in various parts of the Priangan have clearly indicated they oppose Putera. One of the bupati has said that Putera represents merely a gesture of thanks on the Sukarno and Hatta for being freed from their Dutch imprisonment by the Japanese Army. In the area around Tjimahi, several lurah have said in public meetings that Putera is meaningless and if its propagandists come to the village they should be ignored. They have also said that Soekarno and Hatta are not the leaders of the people.

Lurah never have their own ideas about government and leadership; they follow the lead of their bupati. They would not dare say such things in public if they did not have orders from above.

It is hoped that, beginning with the establishment of the Putera branch in Priangan Shū, which took place officially in Bandung on July 1, 1943, the attitude of the bupati towards Putera will gradually change. The Priangan Shū branch was opened by the Great Leader¹⁴ of Putera in the presence of the Shūchōkan, and the Shūchōkan himself stated his confidence in Putera's work. All the bupati in Priangan Shū were invited to the inaugural ceremony; only the bupati from Garut did not attend.

14. Pemimpin Besar (Great Leader) was Soekarno's official title within Putera.

Everyone knows that Putera was established by the Military Government to help Japan wage the present Greater East Asia War until final victory has been achieved. The Triple A Movement¹⁵ was purposely replaced by Putera in order to put the leadership of the movement into the hands of people whose names carry influence at all levels of the population. In this way it would be easier to interest the people in forming a solid line of support for the government and the Army. Nevertheless, the pangreh pradja are still suspicious of Putera. Why?

We do not believe that the pangreh pradja are ignorant of the fact that the government itself initiated the Putera movement. They are not stupid. They know that there are no longer any obstacles preventing them from working together with the political activists; the pangreh pradja and Putera stand together behind the government. And they also know that, in reality, they can use Putera as an aid in carrying out their responsibilities. Putera leaders, through their influence on the people, can easily persuade them to support the pangreh pradja in their governing tasks. The pangreh pradja know all this, especially since the activist leaders have repeatedly offered them the hand of friendship. Nevertheless they still distrust Putera. What is the real reason for this?

The matter requires deeper analysis. An explanation is easily found when we examine the pangreh pradja's position in the Dutch period. The pangreh pradja were created and strengthened by the Dutch simply as an instrument through which to govern the people. The operating philosophy of the Dutch government was that the people should be left under the immediate rule of their own leaders, but that these chiefs should be converted into tools useful to the colonial regime. Superficially the people's chiefs remained as before, but in actuality they were changed into oppressive petty officials. In short, the Dutch colonial government continued¹⁶ the feudal system here. Everywhere else feudalism was swept away, but in Indonesia, especially in Java, feudalism was strengthened. In the people's eyes, the bupati's position was greatly exalted. The status of

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15. The Triple A Movement (Gerakan Tiga A; in Japanese, San "A" Undō), begun in April 1942, was a hastily prepared and ultimately unsuccessful propaganda effort whose purpose was to promote Japan as the leader, protector and light of Asia.
 16. The original reads menanam (literally, to plant, i.e., to establish); however, on rereading the passage Hatta said the word he intended was meneruskan (to continue). This seems reasonable in the light of the entire paragraph and especially the wording of the following sentence.

the pangreh pradja was constantly enhanced by comparison with that of other government workers. Even though a doctor was better educated than a wedana, for example, and was far more intelligent, in practice he ranked below the wedana. The pangreh pradja had to be elevated in the people's eyes because they were the henchmen of the colonial government in subjugating the people. For decades the pangreh pradja was educated on this basis. In time, a tradition arose among the pangreh pradja that except for themselves no other leaders of the people existed. For that reason they automatically opposed the Movement and suspected its leaders. They regarded the activist leaders as their enemies because they thought of them as rivals for their positions. And this was increasingly true as the Movement developed and as the people came to regard the activists as their true leaders.

Although the bupati have been confirmed in their positions by the Japanese Military Government, and although they have greater power than before, they still resent the fact that others are recognized as popular leaders. For them the existence of such leaders means that they, the bupati, will lose status in the eyes of the people. The feudal spirit requires one leader only, not two. It is not the people's needs which are important to the pangreh pradja, but rather their own positions, their prestige in the eyes of the population. These sentiments are still very much alive in the hearts of most of the pangreh pradja.

That is why they secretly oppose Putera. They realize it would be possible to work with Putera--but Putera will create a new class of leaders, which is exactly what the pangreh pradja do not want. Such is the psychological explanation of the reaction--sometimes open, sometimes hidden--of the pangreh pradja. Until their attitude changes completely--and such a change on the part of the old guard cannot be expected to occur all at once--opposition from the pangreh pradja will continue to exist. Taking this into consideration, it would be best if the Shūchōkan exercised great care in accepting advice from the pangreh pradja concerning the activist leaders to be nominated for the post of Putera branch chairman. As for the Putera leadership, we will not cease searching for a meeting ground between ourselves and the pangreh pradja, nor will we cease trying to win them over. Without pressure from the Japanese authorities, however, they will only have smiles on their faces and burning resentment in their hearts. So much for relations with the pangreh pradja.

On the evening of May 26, 1943, the meeting of the chairmen of the Putera branches in Djakarta, Bandung, Djogja, Solo, Semarang, Surabaya and Malang, again demonstrated to the Putera leaders and directors that the composition of the branch directorates cannot simply be left up to the local chairman alone.

On the evening mentioned, the leaders reminded everyone that the branch directorates should, as far as possible, represent all the various political activist groups of pre-war days. Even though we are not now emphasizing political parties, the goals of all parties now being identical, the people who previously belonged to different *golongan*¹⁷ still exist. It would therefore be desirable to have the leadership composed of members of these various factions, which have stated they are now working together in comradeship and unity. But since the branch chairmen come to the central leadership with a list of directors already made up, it is difficult to change or to revise it according to the above-mentioned principles. It is clear that the branch chairmen all too often choose people who were formerly their party associates. This is not a sign of dishonesty, but occurs because the chairmen choose people with whom they have already been acquainted as colleagues, people whose personality and characteristics they already know. Other groups get the impression that they have been passed over or simply forgotten. There are also chairmen who do not dare to work with leaders of pre-war leftist movements such as the old Partindo¹⁸ and PNI,¹⁹ since many members of these movements have their activities carefully watched by the Kempeitai,²⁰ and there are even those who have been jailed and later released.

It is not surprising that many of the leftists, who were advocates of non-cooperation in the pre-war period, have been imprisoned and subsequently freed. The Kempeitai had no way of knowing about their character and activities; it did not really know about the popular movements in the Dutch period. It took the advice of PID²¹ officials who were all people from the old days and hostile to all political activists. Thus there were

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17. Most often used in a social sense of "group" or "class," golongan seems to be applied here to political factions.
 18. The Partindo (an abbreviated form of Partai Indonesia, or Indonesia Party) was a non-cooperating party founded in April 1931.
 19. The Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Education) was founded in 1927 and had as its platform complete economic and political independence, non-cooperation with the Dutch, and unity of all Indonesians in the independence effort.
 20. The Japanese military police.
 21. The Politieke Inlichtingen Dienst (Political Intelligence Service) was an information-gathering security police for the Netherlands East Indies government.

often mistakes whereby left-leaning activists were thrown into jail without having done anything wrong. Among those who were jailed and later freed were many people who had earned the gratitude of the Japanese Army when it entered Java.

Nevertheless, there are still branch chairmen who are frightened to take people who have been let out of jail into their directorates. They say they are afraid of the Kempeitai.

With this in mind, the Putera leadership is of the opinion that the composition of the branch directorates cannot be left completely in the hands of the designated chairmen. Obviously, appointments must be made after consultation with them, but they should no longer be given complete freedom to establish the directorates on their own. The Putera leadership must act as a guide for all its organizational levels towards cooperation among people who previously were in different groups. This principle will be followed from now on when branch directorates are being chosen. The policy will make additional work, to be sure, but it is the only way we can get the results required by the present time and circumstances.

According to their working program, the Empat Serangkai were to have made a tour in May to propagandize and to install the seven shū branches mentioned earlier. These original plans could not be carried out for several reasons, but primarily because the session of the Advisory Council meetings with the seven shū branch chairmen could not be organized before the end of May. After being postponed several times, the tour finally started on June 30, 1943.

The first stop was Bandung. On the morning of July 1, 1943, the Priangan Shū branch was inaugurated, and in the afternoon there was a rally at Tegallaga Field which was attended by tens of thousands of people, young and old, important and insignificant. The theme of the meeting was "Destroy the Americans, British and the Dutch" and it was led by the Naiseibuchō²² himself.

On July 2nd, the group went on towards Djogja, spending the night at Wonosobo. The next morning we arrived in Djogja and that day were received by the Shūchōkan, along with the directors of the Djogja branch. The Djogja Shūchōkan's attitude toward and enthusiasm for Putera were very encouraging. The

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22. Chief of Internal Affairs Department at the shū level. Sometimes used as a variant of Naimubuchō, the same office at the level of the central government.

Putera branch there will get full support from the shū government.

Most unfortunately, we were not able to attend the official opening of the Djogja branch or the public rally which was held on July 5, 1943. At noon on the 4th, we received a telephone call from Djakarta ordering us to return quickly. We left at dusk, and by the morning of Monday the 5th we had reached our destination. We were called back in connection with the arrival of Prime Minister Tōjō.²³

So it happened that the trip never really got going--until very recently. The installation of our branches was left for the respective local chairmen themselves to carry out in the name of the Great Leader. Only in Solo was the installation entrusted to a member of the Advisory Council, Woerjaningrat. The public rallies in the places we could not visit were also held as planned.

II. Section Reports

As has been pointed out, the work of Putera Headquarters is carried out by twelve Sections, organized into four Departments. They may be outlined as follows:

- I. Planning and Development Department
 - 1. Correspondence Section
 - 2. Finance Section
 - 3. Organization Section
 - 4. Economic Affairs Section
- II. Cultural Affairs Department
 - 1. Education Section
 - 2. Cultural Section
 - 3. Women's Section
- III. Propaganda Department
 - 1. Propaganda Section
 - 2. Press and Radio Section
- IV. Public Welfare Department
 - 1. Physical Education Section
 - 2. Health Section
 - 3. Public Welfare Section

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23. Tōjō arrived in Djakarta on July 7, 1943. The visit was requested by the Japanese authorities on Java to convince the Indonesians of Japan's sincerity and concern for them.

Properly speaking, each department should have been headed by its own chief, but for the time being the four positions were divided among the Empat Serangkai. The first department was headed by Drs. Moh. Hatta, the second by Ki Hadjar Dewantara, the third by Ir. Soekarno, and the fourth by Kijai H. M. Mansoer.²⁴

1. Correspondence Section

This section is a communications center for Putera's relations with the public. All correspondence passes through this section. Incoming letters are sorted at this point and directed to the leadership or to the appropriate section. Also, visitors are received here, unless they are taken care of by the Public Welfare Section. Each visitor is asked about his needs or wishes and is then referred to the appropriate section.

Over the last three months, the Correspondence Section has received 3,215 visitors, 836 of whom it handled itself. The others were directed to appropriate sections.

Incoming letters: 1,987; outgoing letters: 1,378.

In order to show the types of things brought to Putera's attention through the mail, it seems best to include below a list of letters received, divided according to the section concerned.

<u>Leadership and Sections</u>	<u>Incoming letters</u>	<u>Outgoing letters</u>
1. Great Leader [Soekarno]	99	--
2. General Director [Hatta]	224	230
3. Correspondence Section	95	348
4. Finance Section	37	34
5. Organization Section	447	49
6. Economic Affairs Section	372	91
7. Education Section	36	38
8. Cultural Section	59	67
9. Propaganda Section	125	63
10. Press Section	105	6
11. Women's Section	43	86
12. Physical Education Section	140	118
13. Health Section	68	148
14. Public Welfare Section	126	93

24. According to Hatta, the Empat Serangkai themselves considered the appointments to be temporary. They did not expect to be tied permanently to Putera, but thought that the Big Four would have its own, separate life as a grouping of leaders.

The items taken care of by the Correspondence Section itself were of a general nature only, such as requests for work, offers of services, requests for merger from other organizations,²⁵ contributions of various kinds, and other things having to do with administration. Items touching on other subjects were forwarded to the appropriate section.

Besides matters related to the position, actions and composition of Putera, which were taken care of by the Great Leader, the General Director, and the Organization Section, it is clear from the above list that the problems most frequently brought to Putera are economic ones, an indication of both the living conditions these days and the great hopes people have for Putera.

2. Finance Section

Information on Putera's finances through July 15, 1943 is as follows:

Income

a) Received from the Gunseikanbu	f. ²⁶	25,180.00
b) Gifts		<u>3,817.48</u>
Total	f.	28,997.48

Expenditures

Expenditures of Headquarters		
a) Headquarters preparations	f.	860.19
b) Wages for Directors and office staff		14,431.25
c) Office expenses		6,311.29
d) Inspection and tour expenses		<u>3,432.47</u>
Expenditures of Branches		
a) Branch preparations (reimbursed by Headquarters)		3,312.15
b) Expenses of individual branches (as of the beginning of July, none were paid by Headquarters)		
Total	f.	<u>28,347.25</u>

25. The original phrase reads "penjerahan perkumpulan kepada Putera" which could also mean "transmittal of collected funds to Putera," though the version given seems more likely.

26. The currency unit was still the guilder (guilder), signified by "f.," an abbreviation of an earlier Dutch monetary unit, the florin.

Regarding gifts received from the outside, the Putera leadership intends to put them into a special fund for the needy. The money will not be used to pay Putera's own expenses.

Even though Putera has never requested aid or donations, there are people who have given gifts to it as a sign of their regard. Among the donors are many low-ranking officials, and their attitude must be interpreted as evidence of good will, as is the case with those who have worked for Putera on a voluntary basis.

3. Organization Section

Most of the visitors received by the Organization Section brought up questions concerning Putera's activities, its branches, and its need for additional personnel. They also passed on the people's grievances against the pangreh pradja.

In order to study conditions and to prepare locations for the establishment of Putera branches, representatives from the Organization Section have made many inspection tours. During these trips they also examine the work of branches which have already been founded. For this task the division is always short-handed and needs lower-ranking aides. Since the second month of operation, two such aides have been taken on so they may be trained and later sent out to the various branches.

4. Economic Affairs Section

Leadership of the Economic Affairs Section originally was given to Soeriaatmadja, who was (and still is) employed at the Economic Office [a Military Government office]. Soewirjo was made his deputy. But subsequently it became clear that it would be difficult to have Soeriaatmadja released from his present position. Accordingly the leadership was turned over to Soewirjo.

The Section's duties can be divided into six categories:

1. General
2. Trade and handicrafts
3. Agriculture and fishing
4. Cooperatives
5. Economic propaganda
6. Handicrafts exhibitions

In the three months since Putera Headquarters opened, the Economic Affairs Section has accomplished the following things:

1) Drew up a working plan for agriculture, fishing, stock-breeding, handicrafts, trade, shipping and cooperatives. The main problems have been how to achieve the necessary unification of Indonesia²⁷ so that the Economic Affairs Section's activities can be rationalized and how to find ways to increase productivity in all fields.

2) Made a set of regulations to serve as a model for all kinds of economic organizations such as cooperatives, corporations and others.

3) Gave oral and written information to people who raised various economic questions.

4) Acted as intermediary for those interested in getting in touch with government agencies.

5) Drew up a register of Indonesian associations active in economic fields, and listed their condition.

6) Compiled information on the financial status of Indonesian [business] associations, a task which had never before been undertaken.

7) Carried out an investigation of rice-selling in Djakarta during April and May 1943, because of complaints from many people.

8) Compiled information on handicrafts, fishing and animal husbandry in Djakarta.

9) Collected documents concerning all aspects of the economy.

10) Collected works on fish culture, farming, animal husbandry and handicrafts, for future printing and distribution.

The Economic Affairs section had the largest portion of the recent exhibition given in the Putera Building at the *pasar malam*,²⁸ held from June 25 to July 15 [1943] in Djakarta. In

27. It is only partially true that the term "Indonesia" was proscribed during the occupation period; used in a vague, abstract, and non-political sense, the word continued to appear in speeches and the press. There was, of course, no "Indonesia" in the present-day sense under Japanese administration. The old Netherlands East Indies was divided into several distinct portions, and there was at the time no intention of uniting them.

28. A generic term for a market-carnival or fair held at night, not to be confused with a specific market.

the brochure that Putera published for the occasion, there were several "how to" articles for the use of people in various kinds of businesses.

As a follow-up to the exhibition the Economic Affairs Section held a contest on the use of the planting methods demonstrated in the agricultural area in the Putera Building during the pasar malam.

5. Education Section

From the beginning it was apparent that people's interest in the Education Section was enormous, and that they attached great hopes to it as well. This division is where people come to ask for information and help in all matters.

A great many school-teachers have come to offer their services to Putera. Unfortunately, however, the high school teachers in Djakarta received orders--if we are not mistaken, from the Seinendan²⁹ leadership--that they were to have no connection with Putera. Is Putera a group of bandits capable of corrupting teachers who come too close? If the Japanese persist in this narrowminded attitude towards an organization which was expressly established by the government to support the Army behind the front lines, it will be difficult for Indonesians to respect them.

Many people have illusions about Putera's capacity to handle all manner of educational questions. The various requests we have received from visitors or in the mail make it clear that people think Putera can help them with any conceivable problem. For example, people have been asking:

1) For advice on several children who cannot continue their studies.

2) For information on aid for the education of students in financial straits whose parents are in the Outer Islands or are no longer receiving their pensions.

3) That Putera try to have the Bandung Technical Faculty reopened.

4) That private schools be permitted to reopen, particularly since there is a lack of government schools and a high percentage of youngsters who cannot get schooling.

29. The Youth Corps, created early in 1943.

5) For information as to whether a private school diploma is recognized by the government.

6) That Putera explain its education policies in the present period and for the future, so they can become generally known.

The Education Section is making plans for eradicating illiteracy; they are trying to devise an anti-illiteracy campaign that can be effectively carried out despite the paper shortage.

Even in the period of Dutch colonial rule the political activists had an enormous interest in eliminating illiteracy. Every party and political group gave this problem top priority in their social programs. For this reason, the Education Section feels very concerned lest Putera not be permitted to carry on this noble work itself. Also, the people who have been hoping for energetic leadership from Putera in this matter have lost their earlier enthusiasm.

6. Cultural Section

The Cultural Section has also been the object of a great deal of popular attention. In artistic circles, people are anxious to know what Putera's aims are in the cultural field. Generally there is a feeling that Indonesian culture now has a fresh opportunity to be revitalized, since it has been freed from the iron grip of Dutch culture. Which road will Putera take? Simply imitating the culture of neighboring nations, or building a new culture on the basis of our own national heritage? This is what people repeatedly ask us at Putera.

Many people ask for information on:

- 1) The origins of the artistic aspects of many kinds of dances.
- 2) Ways of putting on plays.
- 3) Revitalization of the arts of singing and dancing.

Projects carried out by the Cultural Division over the past three months include:

- 1) compiling a list of people prominent in the arts throughout Java.
- 2) Collecting valuable paintings.

3) Writing articles on the meaning of culture as conceived by Putera.

4) Holding group discussions on the possibility of organizing the various arts on Java.

5) Attempting the revitalization of a number of the Indonesian arts.

6) Cooperating with the Keimin Bunka Shidōsho.³⁰

7) Holding an exhibition of paintings, designs, and so forth at Putera Headquarters and at the pasar malam. The exhibit at Putera Headquarters was attended by 8,773 people.

8) Holding performances to entertain convalescent Japanese soldiers.

7. Women's Section

At first the Women's Section was unable to get underway because it was awaiting the arrival from Semarang of Mrs. Soenarjo Mangoenpoespito, the woman who originally had been appointed its chairman. Apparently Mrs. Mangoenpoespito had difficulty leaving Semarang, since her husband had a position there and could not easily change it.

At the present time, with Mrs. Soenarjati Soekemi appointed chairman *pro tem*, things have begun to be put in order. The main aims of the Women's Section are to improve the education of female children and to get mothers as a group to feel a sense of responsibility to society. Women are the first educators of children. The child's future character depends on this early education. If mothers remain ignorant and don't know how to train their children when they are small, people will remain in their present downtrodden state. The Women's Section has also been considering ways in which girls can be used in public welfare projects.

In the past three months the Women's Section has done the following:

1) Entertained soldiers in the military hospitals. The entertainment was of three sorts: a) giving pictures done by

30. The People's Educational and Cultural Guidance Institute, founded in April 1943, and later taken under the Jawa Hōkōkai.

Indonesian, Chinese and Indian children to the wounded; b) presenting flower bouquets; c) holding performances of dancing and children's singing.

2) Held a meeting on April 21, 1943, in observance of Kartini Day.

3) Organized public meetings for women to develop the "Destroy the Americans and the British" spirit. Meetings of this sort were held jointly with the Djakarta Shū branch of Putera in five places: Tangerang, Bekasi, Krawang, Subang and Purwakarta.

4) Organized the production of socks. This work was begun from the time Putera Headquarters was opened. There were thirty-three teachers giving lessons. So far 830 pairs of socks have been finished, and the women were paid f.1.25 a pair for them. Materials were underwritten by Oei, who owns a sock factory. The work will be ended when work done directly for the Army is begun. When this happens, sock production will be organized in other areas.

5) Helped the Putera exhibition at the pasar malam by having an area for women's affairs, which included, for example: a) an exhibit of paintings and sculpture depicting women in various aspects of their work, with the intention of encouraging enthusiasm for work in these times; b) an exhibit of items received in an all-Java and Madura contest for women.

6) Displayed examples of embroidery methods every week in order to improve handicrafts.

The Women's Section oversees the work of the Puteri Institute, which was developed earlier by the Sendenbu³¹ for educating unemployed girls in various occupations. Now its supervision has been turned over to Putera.

8. Propaganda Department

The Propaganda Department has propagandized via radio, newspapers and public rallies. An agreement has been made with the Military Radio that Putera would hold a monthly propaganda program called *Pantjaran Kilat*.

Propaganda in the newspapers is arranged by the Press Section. Its job is to gather news of Putera which is suitable for

31. The Department of Propaganda.

publication to the general populace, and to gather articles containing guidance for the people. Shorter pieces are suitable for use as articles in newspapers and magazines, but the longer ones must be printed as brochures. The advantage of the latter procedure is that materials in booklet form can easily be saved while newspapers are frequently not saved. Now we are printing booklets on "How to Make People's Soap," and about "Rice" and "Ramie."

Public rallies, which the Propaganda Section helped arrange, are as follows:

On April 29, 1943, at the Taman Raden Saleh, an event was sponsored jointly by Putera and the Sendenbu. This meeting was held to commemorate the Emperor's Birthday [*Tenchō Setsu*] and was used to awaken spirit and the will to "Destroy the Americans and the British." Since the rally, the anti-Allied propaganda campaign has been going along quickly and smoothly.

This meeting was led by Shimizu [Hitoshi].³² His Excellency Yamamoto, head of the Propaganda Department, also spoke. For Putera, speeches were given by Ir. Soekarno, representing the people of Indonesia in Java, and by Kjai H. M. Mansoer, representing the Muslim community. Other speakers were:

1. Mr. Oei Tiang Tjoei, representing the Chinese.
2. Mr. Akbani, representing the Indians.
3. Mr. A. S. Alatas, representing the Arabs.

As far as the contents of the speeches at the rally are concerned, it is unnecessary to go into them here since they have already been reported to the Minshū Shidōbu. At the rally, the following resolution was adopted:

On this day, April 29, 1943, we the Indonesian, Chinese, Indian and Arab peoples living on Java proclaim to all the peoples of the world that:

We express our heartfelt thanks to Japan, who has made sacrifices for the welfare of the peoples and countries of Asia.

In the current Greater East Asian War, we are unanimous in our determination to strengthen our energies and will on the homefront.

We are prepared with all our hearts to join the struggle against the Americans and the British, since

32. Shimizu was the chief of the Sendenhan, or Propaganda Division of the Department of Propaganda.

we fully realize that the destruction of their power is an absolute precondition for the development of the New Society within the Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere.

Therefore we stand with all our feelings and energies squarely behind the Japanese Army, aiming for the final victory.

On the evening of June 24, 1943, at Taman Raden Saleh, a rally was held to welcome the statement made by Prime Minister Tōjō in the Special Session of the Diet held in Tokyo on June 15.³³ This rally was led by the chairman of the Djakarta Shū branch of Putera. Those speaking at the rally were:

1. Kijai H. M. Mansoer, representing Islam.
2. M. Soetardjo, representing the pangreh pradja.
3. Dachlan Abdullah, representing the officials and inhabitants of the municipality of Djakarta.
4. Mrs. Siti Noerdjannah, representing Muslim women.
5. Ir. Soekarno, representing the people.

Representing alien residents on Java were the following speakers: Mr. Isamul, representing the Indians; Mr. Oei Tiang Tjoei, representing the Chinese; and Mr. S. A. Alatas, representing the Arabs.

Then there was also a word from a German national, who paid his respects to the Indonesian people and praised the sincerity of the Japanese Government's policy.

This rally passed the following resolution, which was read by the Great Leader of Putera, Ir. Soekarno:

In connection with the speech of Prime Minister Tōjō to the Diet in Tokyo on the 16th of this month, we at this meeting today announce the following resolution:

Prime Minister Tōjō has explained in the Diet that the political principles being followed by the Japanese Empire remain firm and unchanged: They are to free all of East Asia from American and British oppression, and to give a suitable place and position to each country in the area. In addition, he made clear that the necessary steps will be taken to insure that this year we will have an opportunity to participate in determining internal policy.

33. The correct date is June 16, 1943.

This has caused the Indonesian people on Java, fifty million of us, to feel deeply touched and thankful from the bottom of our hearts.

Therefore we all say thank you to the Imperial Government in Tokyo and swear to bend every effort in aiding the Military Government, each according to his position and capabilities, until the final victory is achieved.

Representative of the
Indonesian People of Java,
Great Leader of Putera,
Ir. Soekarno.

The rally at Taman Raden Saleh was then followed by a mass gathering held at Ikada Square on the occasion of Prime Minister Tōjō's visit to Java. This rally took place on the afternoon of July 7, 1943, and was attended by tens of thousands of people.

The excitement reached its peak when Prime Minister Tōjō, after giving his speech, descended from the platform and walked past, paying his respects to the ranks of people who had gathered to hear him talk.³⁴

In addition to these activities, Putera's Propaganda Division has since the beginning of July helped the Sendenbu propagandize all over Java, right down to the village level. The Sendenbu has been showing the film "Hawaii" and others,³⁵ and Putera has been helping with speeches.

It is being increasingly felt that the task of the Propaganda and Press and Radio Sections is a very heavy one. Propagandizing is not easy, especially in war-time. Propaganda must be based upon a knowledge of the true nature of the people at whom it is to be directed. Therefore an investigation of the soul and way of life of the Indonesian people should now be undertaken. In the Propaganda Division we need a group to

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34. Hatta later recalled that this gesture was deeply impressive at the time because of its drama and contrast with the Dutch style of aloofness.
 35. Many films were dubbed or subtitled versions of works originally intended for Japanese audiences. They were, like the movie "Hawaii," about the war and its inspirational aspects, especially those of flying and suicide pilots. There were several films made by Japanese companies on Java, using Javanese actors; these stressed the struggles and sacrifices necessary to further the national good.

research, prepare and arrange propaganda materials so that they will attract the people's interest. In addition, we need propaganda experts who are gifted public speakers and who know how to reach the people's hearts.

To do all this, the staff of Putera's Propaganda Division is far from adequate and needs to be increased. The Putera leadership is in the process of trying to find additional help, but beyond that we need to try to educate future propagandists by recruiting some of the spirited, activist *pemuda*.³⁶ The past experience of the Pergerakan makes it clear that many of our *pemuda* know how to speak well, but lack experience and knowledge. After receiving training or attending a course for six months or so, they could be sent out to propagandize.

In relation to this need, the Putera leadership is now planning a method of training such future propagandists. Hopefully, with the approval of the Gunseikanbu, this educational program can be begun after *Puasa* [the fasting month], that is, sometime next October [1943].

9. Physical Education Section

After Putera was set up, the Indonesian Sports League [ISI--Ikatan Sport Indonesia] headed by Mr. Soetardjo³⁷ subordinated itself to Putera. Beginning with this merger, the directors hoped to unify all sporting associations on Java quickly. The ISI was an association of various sports organizations founded in the Dutch period, but it was not very strongly unified. Even the All Indonesia Soccer Association [PSSI--Persatoean Sepakraga Seloeroeh Indonesia] did not like the ISI very much. Therefore the ISI directors hoped that Putera's influence might help to unify all Indonesian sports associations on Java.

These expectations did not go unfulfilled. On April 27, the Putera leadership empowered Mr. Oto Iskandar Dinata, who was the head of the Physical Education Section, to organize public athletics under a regularized leadership. Seemingly, the desire for unity was quite strong among all athletic groups. It was just that people had been waiting for trustworthy leaders. Those appointed by Oto Iskandar Dinata received the

36. Literally, "young man" or "youth," but since the days of the late occupation carrying the connotation of "young political activist" or "young patriot."

37. Not to be confused with the Soetardjo mentioned on p. 50, above.

confidence of all groups, and unity was achieved in a short time. On May 30, at the Djakarta meeting of athletic representatives from the sixteen shū, there was born the "Athletic Training Movement" [Gerakan Latihan Olah-Raga], abbreviated Gelora. The decision to found Gelora was really just an unofficial one, since the organization could only operate officially after being authorized by the Gunseikanbu. Nevertheless, it was received by the people with extraordinary joy.

The intentions and goals of Gelora are explained in its constitution as being to develop the bodies and souls of the people through athletics, so that the people will have healthy bodies and a noble spirit. A noble spirit and pure thoughts in a healthy body--such is the founding principle in establishing Gelora. Gelora is also intended as a direct contribution to the government from the people. The people are organizing their own training program and are enthusiastic about expressing their will to stand united behind the Army. Therefore Gelora has been planned as an autonomous body under Putera's supervision; it is not a division of Putera, but rather an autonomous body having connections with Putera.

Unfortunately there has been up until now no decision from the Gunseikanbu concerning Gelora. Since its founding, Gelora has gone ahead quietly and with dispatch. It has sponsored several athletic contests which were held with success. In the short time it has been in existence, it has been able to "Gelora-fy" the people's morale, something which is certainly necessary if the Japanese Army is to strengthen the homefront. Whatever decision the Gunseikanbu makes regarding Gelora and its relationship with Putera, one thing should not be forgotten: *Gelora should be allowed to remain an autonomous body of the people themselves*, a body which will make its contribution directly to the government. We advise strongly that the leaders not be changed, for if there are different ones, we are afraid that the public will be disillusioned. The damage will not be inconsiderable. If this initiative is thwarted, the consequence will be that morale would sag for who knows how long.

The Physical Education Section has given top priority to trying to develop Gelora and, at the same time, to arranging things so it will be a body organizationally and financially capable of standing on its own two feet. Now they can be proud to look at Gelora's progress, existing as it does all over Java, except in Banten and Kediri.

Besides that, the Physical Education Section has given out much information on Gelora's organization, on sports equipment and regulations for athletic contests, and so forth. At the Pasar Malam Building, sports equipment made in Indonesia was exhibited. The intention was to encourage Indonesians to make their own sporting goods, which until now have been imported.

Every Tuesday except the second one in each month, speeches on sports are broadcast over Military Radio.

Since July 20, *taisō*³⁸ has been practiced at Putera Headquarters by all employees. On this matter we have received help from Marjoen of the Office of Education [a Military Government office].

10. Health Section

The Health Section has worked with various government health agencies from the very beginning. With the agreement of the authorities, several doctors like Dr. R. Mochtar from the Naimubu Eiseikyoku,³⁹ Dr. Soerono from the Djakarta Shū Eiseika,⁴⁰ and Dr. Marzoeki from the Djakarta municipality declared their willingness to become advisors.

In order to work up a plan for public health propaganda among the people, instructions were sent to the seven shū branches that were already officially open to prepare everything necessary for discussion at the first meeting, which is to take place this coming September. We looked for information on the locations of doctors in private practice throughout Java. The aim was to get them involved in public health, and not be limited only to private practice. In this matter of looking for information, the Health Section has also asked the Residency Health Bureaus throughout Java and Madura for assistance.

In the field of health propaganda, the following things were done:

1) An exhibition of Javanese folk medicines was held at Putera Headquarters.

2) An exhibition of cheap but healthy foods for the common people was held at Putera Headquarters.

3) A demonstration of how to make soap was held at Putera Headquarters.

4) Speeches on health were given over Military Radio.

38. Japanese-style calisthenics.

39. The Public Health Bureau of the Internal Affairs Department.

40. The Sanitation or Health Division.

5) A public health exhibit was held in the Putera Building at the pasar malam. It displayed: a) materials used for bandaging (bandage cloth, cotton, medicine, bi-carbonate of soda, etc.); b) foods that might be included in a rational diet suited to the time, and plants that can be used for medicinal purposes; c) health posters; d) how to build simple but healthy houses with sufficient fresh air and sunlight in accordance with the specifications of the Pest Control Agency (Djawatan Pemberantas Penyakit Sampar).

11. Public Welfare Section

The Public Welfare Section has the closest relations with the people of all Putera's sections. It can be likened to a barometer for measuring the conditions among the people and their general circumstances. Various complaints about life's hardships come to this section. In the past three months, not less than 828 such cases were brought to our attention, some of them by mail.

In order to get a picture of the complaints expressed to Putera by the people, it will be useful to state briefly the more important types:

1) Complaints from pensioners who are no longer receiving their pensions.

2) Complaints of unemployed ex-civil servants who were dismissed when the Japanese Army came to Java and abolished their positions. Among these are many who do not own their own homes and who have so far existed by selling their personal belongings and household goods. There are those who have no relatives to fall back on.

3) Complaints about the harsh method of tax collection.

4) Complaints about the severity of levies on petty traders, for example, excise taxes, the head tax, village *urunan*,⁴¹ etc.

5) Complaints from merchants about arrests and impounding of merchandise by the police.

6) Complaints about the territorial limits placed on trading activities and the difficulties caused by this.

41. Literally, "contributions," usually in kind. But Hatta has noted that during the occupation payment of these "dues" was often made in labor, at Japanese insistence.

7) Complaints from people living in the former Particuliere Landerijen.⁴²

8) Complaints from people living on tea, rubber, and other plantations.

9) Several complaints from those who have been evicted from their houses because Japanese wanted to use them.

10) Complaints about various regulations on the harvesting and sale of rice, which are burdensome to the people.

11) Complaints about the difficulty of obtaining yard goods, cloth for shrouds, and so forth.

12) Several requests from people wanting to be sent back to their native areas because they have no money and no one to turn to.

13) Complaints about the relationships between Japanese and Indonesian personnel in various offices.

14) Complaints about the attitude of some Dutchmen in several offices toward Indonesian personnel.⁴³

15) A number of complaints about the way the police arrest, detain and mistreat people who are accused but whose guilt has not been established. Also complaints about the methods employed by the police and the pangreh pradja for interrogating suspects.

16) Complaints about the attitude of the lower-ranking pangreh pradja toward the people, which is now as bad as or worse than it was earlier under the Dutch.

42. These were privately held foreign estates dating from the days of the Dutch East India Company. The estate owners had immense and often oppressive powers over their tenants. The Japanese Military Administration took over these estates but did not alter the essential features of their operation. Most of the Particuliere Landerijen were near Djakarta and on the West Java coastal plain, though they also existed in the areas of Pekalongan, Pasuruan, Surabaya and Semarang.

43. Not all the Dutch were interned in the spring of 1942, and a small number of men with special knowledge or willingness to cooperate remained out of camps until late in the occupation. Most Dutch women and children were not interned until after mid-1943.

17) Complaints that where the people's economic activities are not neglected by the pangreh pradja, they are actually obstructed.

18) Several complaints about insults to Putera.

19) Reports on hoarding.

Efforts to aid the unemployed have taken the following forms: a) collection of information on requests by factories, offices and other enterprises for labor; b) establishment of lines of communication with such offices, factories and enterprises in order to place people who have registered with us.

The effort to help the unemployed has had some results, although they are not completely satisfactory. Out of 841 people who registered, we have been able to place 279, or 30%. Considering the inadequate means at our disposal this percentage can be termed high. The Public Welfare Section can feel justifiably proud. It works hard from morning to night, receiving visitors, helping them in their difficulties as much as possible, and making them feel as if they are getting their problem solved.

As far as the other things brought to the Public Welfare Section's attention are concerned, explanations are made and the necessary course of action is pointed out whenever and insofar as possible. The Public Welfare Section helps to straighten things out as much as it can. If it does not know anything about a certain matter, the proper office or government branch is consulted. There are also matters which are forwarded to the Gunseikanbu with a request that they be given attention. In particular, people's complaints about the behavior and regulations of government employees are handled in this way. In cases concerning actions of the police and pangreh pradja, the authorities concerned are either spoken to directly or contacted by mail. In this way the sufferings of the people receive attention.

There were many problems which could not be solved because they were related to the general situation prevailing at the present time. We tried to raise the morale of people with this sort of complaint by advising that they steel themselves to face the difficulties they mentioned.

Quite often we had to admonish people who brought us far-fetched stories or distorted complaints out of sheer resentment at the general situation.

If we summarize the complaints of those who have come to the Public Welfare Section, there are three matters which do not

appear to be satisfactory but which could really be improved if there were a desire to do so:

1. Relations between the pangreh pradja and the people.
2. Relations between the police and the people.
3. The attitude of Japanese officials toward Indonesian officials in various offices.

We admit that there are some complaints which are fabrications or which exaggerate the problems involved. But whether they are true or not, we have come to the conclusion that relations between the above-mentioned groups must be improved. There are complaints about the present situation, and that very fact alone makes it clear that things are serious.

There can be only one result of the unnecessary head slapping, physical ill-treatment and coercion so frequently employed by lower level pangreh pradja officials: *alienation of the people from the government*. Behavior of this kind cancels out all the benefits of the propagandizing done so far. What is the point of propaganda about cooperation and brotherhood when the people experience exactly the opposite every day?

We always attempt to convince the people that to bear up under all the difficulties of living is a sacrifice necessary to achieve our high ideals. But we must ensure that they bear these burdens willingly and wholeheartedly, which is only possible if their feelings are not upset by the wrong kinds of attitudes [on the part of their leaders]. Furthermore we must never forget that such things can be used by Allied propagandists to alienate the people from the government.

If the government does not attend to these matters, none of the Putera propaganda will have the slightest beneficial effect. In fact, probably quite the opposite would be true.

III. Conclusion

In concluding our overview of Putera's work in the past three months, it must be said that its situation has been entirely unsatisfactory. It is unsatisfactory for the leadership and the directors, and it is unsatisfactory for the people, who have pinned their hopes on a movement that is being directed by the leaders in whom they once had such confidence.

The leadership and the directors feel that their freedom of action has been extremely limited. If the actual situation is compared with what was written about it in the Special

Regulations,⁴⁴ which were to act as a basis for Putera's work, it becomes clear that there is a gap between theory and practice. Yet the Special Regulations were determined by the Gunseikanbu itself.

Let us take just two examples to illustrate the point:

Article 9 of the Special Regulations says that the tasks of the Education Section are: a) to eliminate illiteracy; b) to help the people educate themselves.

Every step taken to initiate this program has been blocked by the Minshū Shidōbu. Naturally the Education Section asks: "What more can we do?" There certainly is plenty of work to be done, for example, thinking through various educational problems, making plans for a number of programs which need to be carried out, studying the different activities and wishes of the people regarding education for the future. But only too often nothing concrete can be achieved. Cynics frequently characterize the Education Section as being a capon. This sort of caricature, which is passed from mouth to mouth among the common people and even discussed in the market, is not pleasant for the director of the Education Section. In the days of the Netherlands East Indies Government, activists strongly pressed for popular education and the eradication of illiteracy. But at the present time, when we might be offered much greater opportunities, all we can do is sit with our hands in our laps.

Article 16 of the Special Regulations says that the Physical Education Section's jobs are: a) to lead and supervise all physical education, so that the people's bodies may be strengthened and their spirit hardened; b) to encourage sports for training the bodies and spirit of village people.

But the attempts to fulfill the intention of this article too have been frustrated. After this Section has succeeded in founding Gelora as an autonomous body enthusiastically supported by people of all classes, government action nipped these efforts in the bud. Gelora was forcibly disbanded. Just as the second portion of this report was completed, it was announced in the newspapers that the government was setting up a Jawa Tai Iku Kai, or All Java Sports League. This movement has absolutely

44. These Regulations, along with Putera's Constitution, may be found in translation in Harry J. Benda, et al., Japanese Administration in Indonesia: Selected Documents (New Haven: Yale University Southeast Asia Studies, 1965), pp. 136-143. The paragraph numbers and some of the contents as mentioned by Hatta do not match those given in the above source.

no connection with Putera and stands quite outside it. Yet its purposes are identical with Gelora's. The most striking difference is that in all daerah the leadership has been turned over to the pangreh pradja. It is not surprising that many activists feel this to be an expression of lack of confidence. An unsolicited contribution to the government, given openly and sincerely by the people, has been transformed into a compulsory contribution. But the course of history shows that enthusiasm which is given freely by the people to the government is more valuable than that which is extracted from them by the authorities.

Given this situation, it is not surprising that the assistant director of the Physical Education Section has raised the question with the Putera leadership whether it would not be better if his section were done away with altogether, since there is no longer anything left for it to do. He said he was ashamed to accept a salary without having anything definite to accomplish. In this regard, we might ask here whether it would not be better to do away with paragraph 16 of the Special Regulations?

There are other sections too in Putera which cannot do their jobs as prescribed by the Special Regulations. For example, the Economic Affairs Section was not even permitted to publish an appeal in the newspaper calling for the registration of Indonesian-owned businesses, a project designed to increase our understanding of their origins and present conditions and to permit consideration of their future reorganization.

In the villages of Priangan Shū, the Putera branch has not been permitted to propagandize on behalf of agriculture and handicrafts because, according to the authorities, this is the job of the pangreh pradja. Only in Malang Shū has Putera been given a broad leadership role in the people's economic affairs.

For the people, Putera's present situation is unsatisfactory, since it was previously widely believed that Putera would give leadership to various popular efforts. On Putera were pinned the hopes for easing the complaints and lightening the burdens of the people. But all these hopes have proved to be in vain, since Putera has not been allowed to exercise any initiative. That is why the people are bewildered. Their enthusiasm for Putera continues to decline as time goes on.

Whoever wishes to do so may go into the *kampung* [neighborhoods, village communities] and marketplaces to hear for himself people's opinions of Putera. Of course, people do not everywhere want to speak frankly, since they are afraid, but an intelligent person can catch the nature of their hidden feelings from remarks that are dropped.

Except for small groups who help Putera here and there, people's feelings about the organization are generally cool. What the masses are saying in the kampung and other places--which is quite often relayed to us--is frequently not very nice. There are some who say, "Our leaders are now living the good life but we are just as poor as ever."

All of these are expressions of discontent. The people hoped for leadership from those who promote Putera but they were not able to give it. Aside from propaganda, the people see no concrete results of their activities.

Within Putera itself the question often arises of what more there is for Putera to do. The youth have been taken over by the Seinendan. Women have been organized into the Fujinkai.⁴⁵ Sports is regulated by the Jawa Tai Iku Kai. For culture there already is the Cultural Center, or Keimin Bunka Shidōsho. Effective leadership in the fields of education and economics is not permitted. For propaganda there already is the Sendenbu. What is the use of Putera?

If it is only a matter of propaganda, the Sendenbu should be enough; for this there was no need to set up Putera. Our teachers are prepared to designate activists who are good public speakers to carry on Sendenbu propaganda work. Thus if the idea is only to make propaganda, Putera is superfluous. A paralyzed body such as Putera is now can only give rise to suspicion in various quarters. The pangreh pradjā dislike it, while the people feel disillusioned with it. The result is not enthusiasm, as it was at the start, but rather dissatisfaction.

Such is the atmosphere surrounding Putera after its first three months of life. The people's first warm reception of it has turned cold. People from many quarters are even saying, "If this is the way it is going to be, we were better off with the Triple A Movement." And indeed, the Triple A had more freedom of movement.

It would be good if the government considered all of this carefully. If things continue in this manner, Putera will become the object of popular resentment rather than enthusiasm.

The primary aims of our effort and propaganda are to forge a strong popular spirit to help Japan to achieve final victory in the Greater East Asian War, and to reach people's hearts so they will voluntarily accept hardship for the duration of the conflict.

45. The Women's Association, founded in August 1943, and later placed under the Jawa Hōkōkai.

With Putera as it is now, we fear that these goals will not be reached.

There is one additional question. What is the Advisory Council's job if Putera is nothing but a propaganda organization? According to Putera's Constitution, the Advisory Council should meet *at least* once every three months in Djakarta.

A meeting of the Advisory Council is long overdue but the Putera leadership has been reluctant to convene it because there is nothing for them to advise on. If it is simply a matter of abstract debate, the Advisory Council will be of little use to Putera's work. The majority of the members of the Advisory Council are people with experience in both political activity and their professions. Putera needs their judgment in practical matters, not theoretical ones. Simply to invite them to Djakarta for a meeting would be useless, and a waste of money besides.

Therefore in the light of Putera's present situation, the position of the Advisory Council is up in the air. This problem should certainly receive the attention of the Gunseikanbu.

Djakarta, August 16, 1943
For the Putera leadership,
The General Director,

(signed) Moh. Hatta

REPORT TO THE GUNSEIKANBU ON
ONE YEAR OF PUTERA -
March 9, 1943 to February 29, 1944

I. General Introduction

As is well known, Putera began to take shape after December 8, 1942, when a preparatory committee under the direction of the Empat Serangkai was established. On March 9, 1943, Putera was officially inaugurated by His Excellency the Gunseikan, Lt.-Gen. Okazaki, at an Ikada Square rally that was attended by tens of thousands of people. But it was only on April 16, 1943, that Headquarters was ready. Its opening has already been discussed in the report on Putera's activities during its first three months, dated August 16, 1943.

That report also explained the various difficulties Putera faced, and it is therefore unnecessary to repeat them here. It should only be said that the pangreh pradja's obstruction of Putera did not change very much afterwards. Malang Shū alone may be termed an exception, since the Shūchōkan there helped Putera with complete sympathy. The result was that cooperation there between Putera and the pangreh pradja progressed very well. It should also be mentioned that there were several bupati who truly understood Putera's position, and repeatedly requested that Putera branches be set up in their daerah too. But there were not many of these. The majority were jealous of Putera.

The pangreh pradja's attitude was made abundantly clear when the news broke that the government was going to set up a new organization, and that Putera would be absorbed into it. The pangreh pradja were very pleased with the Jawa Hōkōkai,¹ since under it, from the kabupaten level on down, they would be in charge. With the birth of the Hōkōkai, the pangreh pradja

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1. The Jawa Hōkōkai (Java Service Association; in Indonesian, Himpunan Kebaktian Rakjat, or People's Service Association) was a large organization, more directly under Japanese control than Putera, and designed to succeed where the earlier movement had failed. It was undoubtedly carefully planned beforehand, but was first mentioned publicly in January 1944. In February, its complete regulations were published in newspapers, and on March 1, 1944, following the dissolution of Putera on the day before, the Jawa Hōkōkai was officially begun.

felt that their desire to become the leaders of the popular movement had been fulfilled.

It would be fine if that were so, as long as the pangreh pradjā both understand their responsibilities in the matter of leadership and avoid seeing the attainment of this position of leadership as equivalent to getting special status and honors. They must view this leadership role as one requiring them to fulfill their responsibility to society, under the flag of the Army. In this regard, it would be best for me to quote a portion of my radio speech, given last March 5:

One of the most important things about the Jawa Hōkōkai is the position of the pangreh pradjā, who are now being given the job of leading the people. Whereas before, the pangreh pradjā knew only how to give orders, now they are responsible for giving leadership.

The gulf between the pangreh pradjā and the people exists because the pangreh pradjā official was used as a mere tool by the Netherlands East Indies Government. He was not permitted to have individual initiative, he simply had to do what he was ordered. Indeed his only interest was giving orders to the people without taking their circumstances into consideration.

This is also the reason for the conflict between the pangreh pradjā, who defended the government, and the political activists, who defended the interests of the people. Now this conflict no longer exists, or *should not* exist. Over the past year, Putera repeatedly urged cooperation on the pangreh pradjā, since the two groups generally served a single public interest under the leadership of the Japanese Military Government. At that time, Putera and the pangreh pradjā were still going their separate ways. But now this is no longer so. The leaders of the people and the pangreh pradjā have been organized into one movement, under the wing of the Jawa Hōkōkai (Himpunan Kebaktian Rakjat), which is under the Gunseikan.

Although it was not stated explicitly, it was planned from the beginning that the branches of the Hōkōkai would be placed under the leadership of the kenchō, gunchō, sonchō and kuchō. And beside them as aides would be the political activists. Under these new circumstances, the pangreh pradjā officials would have a greater responsibility for the direction of the movement and for the people's welfare--which are really the same and inseparable. The people's welfare is *important* for strengthening the home front! Therefore

one of the Hōkōkai's jobs in wartime is attending to the people's well-being, and this was clearly laid down in its original statement of purpose.

I believe that anything, no matter how difficult, can be achieved by means of leadership. Of course there are many things that have to be achieved simply by giving orders. But there is a great difference between governing simply by issuing orders and governing by exercising leadership. Rule by decree is often resented by the people, but rule through leadership can win the people's hearts. If people are willing to make sacrifices, then the heaviest burdens seem light. Isn't it the Hōkōkai's prime goal to build wholehearted commitment to service? That is why the organization's first tasks are to promote education and to have its officials exercise leadership in a real spirit of service.

If what I said in the above can be fulfilled by the pangreh pradja officials who have gained positions of leadership in the Hōkōkai, then the goals of that organization can be achieved. But of the pangreh pradja cannot change their attitudes and spirit, and continue instead to consider themselves as being far above the people, then the Hōkōkai will miss its mark. This is especially so since leadership having direct contact with the people is in the hands of the pangreh pradja. In the present structure of the Hōkōkai, the popular leaders no longer exercise direct leadership but sit instead at Headquarters or in the shū branch offices.

Although according to the original plans contained in its Constitution and Special Regulations Putera was to have done many things, the government decided, after Putera was under way, that anti-Allied propaganda was to be emphasized. With this decision, other efforts were downgraded.

Anti-Allied propagandizing was accomplished through mass meetings and, with Sendenbu help, penetrated into the villages. The Sendenbu contributed the films, Putera the speeches. The shū branches propagandized energetically in their areas, and their work was very effective.

Since September of last year, the villages were propagandized intensively on the subject of increasing agricultural production. In this campaign, Putera ran into many obstacles because of the problems people were having with the rice supply. This situation was exploited as counter-propaganda by Allied agents. They influenced the village people not to increase production, since they said that the surplus would be given to the Japanese anyway. The Putera propagandists who went into

the villages were constantly attacked with the same words: "We're going to sacrifice our lives for our country all right, but it will be by starving to death." In the Priangan, especially in Garut, Putera workers propagandizing greater production frequently heard insinuations such as: "You speak well, sir, and we are willing to give our rice to the government, but what about the present situation: our families eat rice once a week, while the Chinese have it three times a day."

Popular resistance is certainly related to one obvious set of circumstances, namely, that the Chinese have been hoarding a great deal of rice. It is generally known that the Chinese never go hungry anywhere on Java. The trouble with this situation is its psychological effect on the population. There is a general conviction that the Chinese are never short of food; whereas Indonesians living in the villages often eat rice but once a week, indeed in some cases only once a month.

That the Chinese, especially the merchants, have done a great deal of rice hoarding can no longer be denied. It is clear from the condition of the rice that is distributed to the people in the big cities. Very often people get rice that is dried out or worm-eaten. From this it is obvious that the rice was taken from old stores and was not freshly milled. The Chinese merchants recently got a further opportunity to hoard rice when they found out in advance through their organizations that regulations would be issued for compulsory delivery of rice. These regulations were only put into effect several months after the harvest. Thus the Chinese merchants were able to move in quickly immediately after the harvest and buy up rice from the farmers. When the regulations were put into effect, the farmers had already sold all their surplus rice, and were therefore forced to give the government the rice they had reserved for their own consumption. It was this circumstance that caused various rice difficulties in the villages. In addition, though it had not been publicized, the people know that the shū governments and the Kempeitai had in several places succeeded in seizing tens of thousands of quintals [100 kilogram measures] of rice hidden away by Chinese merchants. Indeed about a month ago the news broke that the Djakarta Shū government had seized 125,000 tons of rice near a Chinese mill in Krawang.

Whether or not such things are true is not the problem. It is only necessary to say here that news and facts of this sort lower people's morale and increase their reluctance to act on government appeals for increased agricultural production. Regardless of how intense the propaganda is, if what people see with their own eyes makes them reluctant to cooperate, the propaganda will have no effect.

It is this situation which caused so much difficulty for the Putera leadership over the past few months. It wanted to fulfill its responsibility of helping the government get the people to increase production willingly, but the people listened to them coolly and rejected their appeals. The Putera leadership hoped that their propagandizing for increased production would be effective if the distribution of rice in the villages were regulated to insure that each person would be able to buy his daily rice on the spot in the established amount. If a law of this kind were enacted, the people's reluctance would undoubtedly vanish. Of this, the Putera leadership was convinced until their organization was brought to an end.

Besides the propaganda work against the Allies and in support of increased production, Putera succeeded in doing some positive work after September 1943, namely training people to spin thread and weave with various kinds of fibers. Through this project the people's interest in Putera, which had been growing weaker, was re-strengthened considerably. The people also began to realize that Putera could give them leadership, though not in all matters. Especially now, with people short of clothing (indeed there are many who are almost naked), the do-it-yourself spinning and weaving movement has had a great deal of influence on the people. It has revived their faith in their own ability.

Putera's basic idea in this direction was that clothing can be made by the people themselves with simple tools and minimal cash outlay.

As far as achieving a direct connection between the Putera leadership and the organization's branches is concerned, two methods were tried: 1) having the Empat Serangkai tour the branches; 2) having the branch chairmen invited from time to time to Putera Headquarters in Djakarta for consultation. The Organization Section itself frequently invited the branch directors to Djakarta to discuss various matters concerning the branches, and then visited those branches to take care of any complications.

The first of the Empat Serangkai trips was described earlier in the report entitled "The First Three Months of Putera." The intention behind this trip was to visit all branches that had already been set up, but upon arrival in Djogjakarta those involved were called back to Djakarta in connection with the arrival of Prime Minister Tōjō. In mid-July 1943, it was planned that the Empat Serangkai would continue their trip around to the branches. But on account of various things having to do with the Minshū Shidōbu, it was necessary to postpone this second trip too.

The intention to visit the remaining branches was carried out on August 10, 1943, but not all the Empat Serangkai were able to go. On the 10th, Ir. Soekarno and Ki Hadjar Dewantara set off, accompanied by [a certain] Yamazaki. Kijai H. M. Mansoer followed later.

It was planned that Ir. Soekarno, as Great Leader, would speak in all the places visited. Ki Hadjar Dewantara would speak in Semarang, Djogjakarta and Solo, while K. H. M. Mansoer would speak in Surabaya and Malang.

Conferences for branch chairmen were held at Putera Headquarters three times:

1) On May 25, 1943, when the chairmen of the seven shū branches were simultaneously inaugurated in their posts.

2) On October 13, 1943, when a briefing was given on the position of the Chūō Sangi In.²

3) On February 24, 1944, when the formation of the Jawa Hōkōkai, and the absorption of Putera within it, was discussed.

The result of the final deliberations at this last conference of branch chairmen was that each branch chairman would put forward the names of Putera leaders and staff members who wished to join the leadership of the Hōkōkai to the Shūchōkan who was arranging the establishment of the Hōkōkai in his respective area. In the event that the Shūchōkan could not find all applicants acceptable, it was hoped that the branch chairman and the directors would peaceably discuss who should be proposed.

Considering how things have gone so far, however, the decision taken at the February 24th meeting was useless, since the shū branches of the Hōkōkai were formed without taking any account of the positions and circumstances of the directors and employees of the Putera branches.

Putera's Advisory Council was one group that accomplished nothing whatsoever. According to Article 8 of Putera's Consti-

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2. The Chūō Sangi In (Central Advisory Council) and its regional counterparts, the Shū Sangi Kai (Regional Advisory Councils), were announced and set up between August and October 1943. Their members were to advise the Military Government, but they were carefully controlled and the Central Council itself was in many ways more unsatisfactory to independence-minded Indonesians than the Dutch-instituted Volksraad had been.

tution, this Advisory Council was to meet at least once every three months in Djakarta. But it only met once altogether, namely on May 26, 1943, the date of its inauguration, as was stated in the report entitled "The First Three Months of Putera." Since Putera's efforts were simply aimed at propaganda, there was nothing of substance for the Advisory Council to discuss. The forecast made in the report mentioned above--that the Advisory Council would have nothing to do--proved to be true in actual practice.

II. Section Reports

1. Correspondence Section

As was explained earlier in the three month report, this section was the center of Putera's relations with the outside. Incoming and outgoing mail passed through it, as did a large portion of Putera's visitors, except for those having direct connections with the Public Welfare Section.

Visitors received by the Correspondence Section and sent on to the leadership or to the proper section totaled 4,305 during Putera's year of existence. Letters passing through the section totaled as follows: a) incoming 5,888; b) outgoing 4,986. These figures are stated here to make clear the magnitude of the job undertaken by the Correspondence Section. Not only were these letters registered, but short notes on their contents were taken before they were sent to their destinations. This helped the leadership keep track of the activities being undertaken by Putera's sections.

The Correspondence Section was made up of three organizational components, namely:

- 1) Director, who guided the section's work.
- 2) Administration, which handled incoming and outgoing mail, archives and inventory.
- 3) Documentation, which was set up on January 1, 1944, at a time when there was a reorganization of the leadership to rationalize Headquarters activities. This sub-section was taken over by Mrs. Soekanti Soerjotjondro, assisted by Miss Mariati, both of whom were transferred from the Women's Section. Unfortunately, however, this sub-section was not able to get off the ground before Putera was absorbed into Hōkōkai. The intention behind putting this sub-section under control of the Correspondence Section was to centralize Putera's documentation activities.

2. Finance Section

The amounts received by the Finance Section during Putera's year of operation were:

a) Received from the Gunseikanbu	
i) Deposited in the Bank of Taiwan	f. 250,000.00
ii) Interest on the above	26.89
b) Public contributions	<u>6,045.03</u>
total	f. 256,071.92

Expenditures were:

A. Headquarters expenditures	
1) For setting up Headquarters	
a) Direct expenditures	f. 860.19
b) Kanrikōdan ³ expenses	
billed to Headquarters	<u>2,339.23</u> f. 3,199.42
2) Wages of directors and staff	56,586.70
3) <i>Lebaran</i> [end of fasting period]	
bonus to the above	3,058.50
4) Office expenses: materials and	
repairs	27,610.61
5) Expenses of tours and	
inspections	3,806.49
6) Job-training program	<u>18,924.60</u>
	f. 113,186.32
B. Branch expenditures	
1) Expenses for preparations	
(all branches reimbursed)	f. 10,315.00
2) Expenses of each branch	
a) Djakarta	f. 19,250.50
b) Priangan	15,276.50
c) Djogjakarta	10,704.50
d) Solo	11,690.50
e) Semarang	14,010.50
f) Surabaya	14,822.20
g) Malang	18,730.00
h) Pekalongan	2,500.00
i) Kedu	2,500.00
j) Kediri	2,800.00
k) Djakarta City	225.00
l) Banten	300.00
m) Tjirebon	750.00
n) Madiun	<u>1,000.00</u>
	f. 114,559.70
total	f. <u>227,746.02</u>

3. This office remains unidentified. The name given here means "Control Bureau," but the reference is obscure. There were

A more complete report on financial matters made by the Finance Section is appended. [Appendix missing, ed.]

Because of the volume of Putera's financial activities, an additional employee, Mrs. R. A. Kartimi, moved from the Pegangsaan Timur Office [of the Kikakuka⁴] to Putera.

3. Organization Section

The special concern of the Organization Section was supervising the preparations for the branches by looking for people considered suitable for and capable of holding positions as directors and staff members. Besides that, it exercised some supervision over branches that were already set up by making inspection tours. Altogether there were twenty-two such trips made by various of the Organization Section directors. On these inspection trips the general atmosphere prevailing in the different daerah was also examined and reported on to the Empat Serangkai.

The Organization Section's external relations were carried on as usual in two ways.

One was receiving visitors and handing out information to them. The number of visitors to the Organization Section from April 16, 1943 to the end of that year was 534, including some from the branches. They came for the following reasons:

- a) To discuss the preparations for setting up a branch.
- b) To confer on matters concerning the structure of a branch and its job.

a number of offices and departments in the Japanese administration having kanrikōdan or the related kanrikyoku in their titles.

- 4. The Kikakuka (Planning Section), under the direction of the Sōmubu (Department of General Affairs), was an important policy-designing section of the Military Government. Housed along with it, but not an integral part of it, was Hatta's own office, designated the Kantor Penasehat Umum (Office of the General Advisor). Hatta was invited by General Harada Yoshikazu, the Deputy Chief of Staff, to act as an independent advisor to the government. He had his own staff, and his office received the additional appellation of Gunseikanbu Daiichi Bunshitsu (First Annex to Military Administration Headquarters).

Visitors from outside the Putera organization, who came from all over Java and Madura, did so for a variety of reasons, such as:

- a) To offer their services to Putera.
- b) To suggest people who would be suitable as Putera directors.
- c) To urge that a Putera branch be set up their own area.
- d) To ask for information about the Putera movement.
- e) To ask Putera's help in suggesting various things to the government which might lighten the people's burdens and expedite governmental operations.

It is obvious from the purposes stated by visitors from outside that Putera Headquarters became a place on which people depended and to which people came to ask for help.

The second connection with the outside was the usual one--through correspondence. The number of letters was: a) incoming 2,603; b) outgoing 2,133.

So much for the scope of the operations carried on by the Organization Section, besides receiving visitors and carrying out ordinary organization work.

The inauguration of the Putera branches took place as follows:

1. Djakarta Shū: June 4, 1943. Chairman: Ijos Wiriaatmadja.
2. Priangan Shū: July 1, 1943. Chairman: Dr. Moerdjani.
3. Djogjakarta Shū: July 5, 1943. Chairman: Pangeran Soerjodiningrat.
4. Semarang Shū: July 8, 1943. Chairman: Mr. Soejoedi.
5. Surabaja Shū: July 20, 1943. Chairman: Soedirman.
6. Solo Shū: July 26, 1943. Chairman: Dr. Kartono.
7. Malang Shū: August 18, 1943. Chairman: R. P. Soeroso.

By "date of inauguration" is not meant the day on which the new branches began actual operation. The seven branches started working earlier, after their chairmen were officially installed in Djakarta on May 25, 1943. The inaugurations referred to above served only as official functions for the benefit of the public.

The full organizational scheme of the branches is attached to this report as Appendix II. [Appendix missing, ed.]

With these seven branches, Putera began working and propagandizing all over Java. But it became obvious that the seven branches alone did not have the staff necessary to carry out such a huge task. This was especially true in the case of the Malang branch, which had been active from the beginning and had taken on such heavy responsibilities in a number of areas, that it was forced to set up sub-branches from the ken to the gun level, earlier than the other shū branches.

In December 1943, three more branches were inaugurated:

8. Pekalongan Shū: December 8, 1943. Chairman: Kromolawi.
9. Kediri Shū: December 11, 1943. Chairman: Sidik Djojosoekarto.
10. Kedu Shū: December 28, 1943. Chairman: Soeprodjo Prodjowidagdo, member of the Chūō Sangi In.

There were four additional branches in preparation, whose chairmen had already been approved by the respective Shūchōkan:

1. Madiun Shū. Chairman: Soeradji.
2. Tjirebon Shū. Chairman: Dr. Soedarsono.
3. Bodjonegoro Shū. Chairman: Fathurrachman, member of the Chūō Sangi In.
4. Banten Shū. Chairman: Harsono Tjokroaminoto.

Also in preparation, with their proposed chairmen were:

5. Djakarta City. Proposed chairman: Mr. Wilopo.
6. Bogor Shū. Proposed chairman: Mohammed Sanoesi.
7. Banjumas Shū. Proposed chairman: Njonoprawoto, from Headquarters, Organization Section.
8. Madura. Proposed chairman: Roeslan Wongsokoesoemo, member of the Chūō Sangi In.

In preparation, but still without proposed chairmen were:

1. Pati Shū.
2. Besuki Shū.

According to the plans, the Putera leadership was to have had branches ready in every shū in Java and Madura, if possible by March 9, 1944. But lo and behold, on January 8, 1944, came the Saikō Sikikan's⁵ decree ordering the Gunseikan to develop a new organization by combining all existing bodies and movements into one! According to His Excellency's order, Putera was to be absorbed into this new organization. So all Putera's preparations came to a halt.

5. Commander of the Osamu Group (16th Army, Java).

As was said earlier, the Malang Shū branch had sub-branches down to the ken and gun level. Those at the ken level were:

1. Pasuruan Ken, inaugurated November 15, 1943.
2. Probolinggo Ken, inaugurated November 16, 1943.
3. Lumadjang Ken, inaugurated November 17, 1943.

Sub-branches at the gun level were:

1. Turen Gun.
2. Pogok Gun.
3. Tumpang Gun.
4. Singosari Gun.
5. Pudjon Gun.
6. Bululawang Gun.
7. Kepandjen Gun.

Besides the Malang Shū branch, only the Djakarta Shū branch had sub-branches reaching down to the ken level. And this would not have occurred without the urging of Kawazue, who used be the Naiseibuchō in the shūchōkan's office. These three sub-branches at the ken level were:

1. Tangerang Ken, inaugurated November 22, 1943.
2. Djatinegara Ken, inaugurated November 24, 1943.
3. Krawang Ken, inaugurated November 25, 1943.

To get a better idea of Putera's entire organization, it seems best to list below the numbers of directors, aides and office staff involved:

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Directors</u>	<u>Aides</u>	<u>Office Staff</u>	<u>Total</u>
Headquarters (including directors and office staff involved in preparations for the Djakarta City branch)	35	26	56	117
<u>Shū</u>				
Djakarta (including the Chairman of the Banten Shū branch, who was originally vice-chairman of the Djakarta Shū branch)	10	15	10	35
Priangan	8	13	7	28
Djogjakarta	9	13	6	28
Semarang	10	15	13	38
Surabaja	9	12	10	31
Solo	6	14	12	32
Malang	10	8	9	27
Pekalongan	4	8	7	19
Kediri	7	7	6	20
Kedu	6	8	7	21

<u>Branch</u>	<u>Directors</u>	<u>Aides</u>	<u>Office Staff</u>	<u>Total</u>
<u>Ken</u>				
Djatinegara	5	1	4	10
Krawang	5	1	4	10
Tangerang	5	2	3	10
Pasuruan	5	1	4	10
Probolinggo	5	1	2	8
Lumadjang	5	1	3	9
<u>Gun</u>				
Turen	5	-	-	5
Pogok	5	-	-	5
Tumpang	5	-	-	5
Singosari	5	-	-	5
Kepandjen	4	-	-	4
Pudjon	5	-	-	5
Bululawang	5	-	-	5
In preparation, already approved by the respective shūchōkan:				
Banten	1	-	-	1
Tjirebon	6	1	-	7
Madiun	5	5	-	10
Bodjonegoro	<u>1</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>-</u>	<u>1</u>
Totals	191	152	163	506

It should be said here that at Headquarters the difference between aides and office staff was very small. Among those listed as office staff are many who worked as aides to the directors, while many of those listed as aides were only temporarily in that position so as to get training for later placement as branch directors.

At one time there was a plan to train all office staff without regard to their positions, so that in time they might gain sufficient knowledge and the right spirit to someday fill the position of director. The principle behind this plan, which I myself suggested, was that *the special responsibility* of leadership is to *prepare for change in its ranks* so that work can continue without interruption when the original leaders are no longer there. The intention was to carry out this basic idea in an organized manner starting in 1944, but since Putera was now disbanded it was not done. Hopefully the Hōkōkai will accept the principle and put it into practice.

Under such a principle, every employee, even messenger boys, would work hard since he would have before him the hope of promotion. And all the while their sense of responsibility would become deeper and deeper. The knowledge that they do not

have to be messenger boys forever, or secretaries or typists, will give people the will and energy to discipline and strengthen themselves. The feeling that a person's fate is in his own hands, that he himself, through his own diligence, can do something to improve his situation, always strengthens the desire to work. Only those with no desire at all for improvement would be left behind.

The meetings that were held at Putera Headquarters, or, when necessary, in rented locations, were as follows:

1) On March 14, 1943, a meeting during which the Putera Worker's Corps [Barisan Pekeraja Putera] was formed was held at the Greater Asian Auditorium [Balai Pertemuan Asia Raja], Gambir Barat, 7. This Putera Worker's Corps was a volunteer corps to aid Putera in various matters, e.g., helping to prepare for public rallies, providing supervision and maintaining order at such rallies, and drafting propaganda materials.

2) On April 16, 1943, there was a meeting at which Putera Headquarters was opened. About three hundred people were invited. The speakers and their functions were:

- a. Ir. Soekarno opened the meeting.
- b. His Excellency the Gunseikan gave advice.
- c. His Excellency the Sōmubuchō gave advice.
- d. His Excellency the Naiseibuchō gave advice.
- e. B. D. Abdullah gave his congratulations.
- f. Moh. Hatta concluded.

3) On May 13, 1943, a meeting about the pasar malam project was held at Putera Headquarters and led by the General Director. This meeting was held with several staff members from the Central Economic Office [a branch of the Gunseikanbu] and the Economic Division of the Djakarta Shū Office [a government department, not a Putera branch]. Their purpose was to help Putera's activities at the Pasar Malam.

4) On May 15, 1943, another meeting on the pasar malam project was held, in continuation of the first, this time led by Soewirjo, head of the Economic Affairs Section at Putera Headquarters.

5) On May 23, 1943, a meeting was held to install the chairmen of the seven shū branches of Putera. It was [also] attended by officials from the Minshū Shidōbu.

6) On the morning of May 26, 1943, the Advisory Council [of Putera] was inaugurated, with the Sōmubuchō representing the Gunseikan, and in the evening there was a meeting of this group. It also was attended by officials from the Minshū Shidōbu.

7) On June 1, 1943, there was a meeting at which the Empat Serangkai got together with the students of the Ika Dai Gakkō [Medical College] in connection with its opening. The event was held at Putera Headquarters and led by Soepeno. At the meeting the Empat Serangkai gave the students advice on their responsibilities in carrying on the present Greater East Asia War.

8) On June 5, 1943, there was a gathering of leaders and staff in the Advisory Council Room to commemorate the death of Admiral Yamamoto Isoroku. Ir. Soekarno spoke. Everyone observed a moment of silence.

9) On September 18, 1943, Putera workers were gathered at the back of Headquarters, where the General Director gave a speech explaining the duties that all workers had to themselves and to society. Ir. Soekarno also gave some advice and suggestions and urged all employees at Putera Headquarters to work more energetically and with a greater sense of responsibility.

10) On October 4, 1943, there was an Idul Fitri Day Celebration [a feast day at the end of the fasting month] for the Headquarters community and the shū branches. It was held at Headquarters. The Empat Serangkai spoke and gave some advice on people's individual duties in carrying out the Greater East Asia ideal, based on mutual prosperity.

11) On October 7, 1943, observance of Lebaran was held by the Women's Section by entertaining and giving encouragement to mothers who did volunteer teaching and sock-making for Putera.

12) On October 13, 1943, there was a meeting of the Putera leadership with representatives from the seven shū branches. Also attending were officials from the Minshū Shidōbu, namely Miyoshi, Shimizu, Yamasaki and Mizuno.

13) On December 5, 1943, there was a meeting of the Putera Worker's Corps at 8:30 in the evening to discuss holding a mass rally at Ikada Square on December 8.

14) On December 20, 1943, there was a Women's Section conference, attended by delegates from the Women's Sections of the following shū branches: Djakarta, Priangan, Semarang, Djogjakarta, Solo, Surabaya, Malang, Kediri and Kedu. This meeting was also attended by Mizuno,⁶ a representative from the Jūmin jimukyoku.⁷

6. It is unknown whether this is the same Mizuno as mentioned earlier in connection with the Minshū Shidōbu.

7. A "Bureau of Native Affairs." The old Dutch office of this function, known as the Kantoor voor Inlandsche Zaken, was

15) On December 31, 1943, there was a meeting of the Putera Worker's Corps at Headquarters to discuss how it could help the victims of the Tanah Tinggi fire. It was decided that this should be discussed with city officials to insure coordination of their efforts.

4. Economic Affairs Section

The Economic Affairs Section underwent several changes in its directorship and staff of aides during its year of operation. As was mentioned earlier in the three month report, Soeriaatmadja, who was originally to have taken the position of Chief of the Economic Affairs Section, was unable to do so. Therefore the job of heading the Economic Affairs Section was turned over to Soewirjo.

Originally the working sub-sections of the Economic Affairs Section were as follows:

1. Chief, and also in charge of Cooperatives: Soewirjo.
2. Handicrafts: Moh. Sanoesi.
3. Agriculture and Livestock: Moh. Sajoeti.
4. Trade and Propaganda: Ma'mun al Rasjid.

As mentioned in the three month report, the Economic Affairs Section made plans from the beginning to do certain things it thought suitable, and later carried out whichever of those it was permitted to. Its field of activity ranged widely, especially in propagandizing and in giving training for and collecting samples of handicrafts in order to get an idea of the present level of achievement and find out how progress might be made in an orderly way.

Therefore in May 1943, the directors were given three young aides who had been trained at the Asrama Angkatan Baru Indonesia ["New Generation" Dormitory]--Soetarjo, Ibnoe and Hoesin. Hoesin was afterwards moved at his own request to the Public Welfare Section, since they were short-handed there and could not manage all the people coming to ask for aid. As a replacement, at the beginning of June, another young Asrama student, Salam Siswapi, was placed in the Economic Affairs Section and given control over documentation.

called in Japanese, *Genjūmin jimukyoku*, and the version given here was considered more polite and wary of Indonesian sensitivities. *Genjūmin* means something like "native" while *jūmin* is closer to "indigene."

After receiving several months' training, in October Salam Siswapi was moved to the Semarang Shū branch of Putera, since they were short-handed there. In the same month the Putera leadership was able to get Soemarno out of the Surakarta Handicrafts Center [Pusat Perdagangan Hasil Kerajinan Surakarta] and into Putera Headquarters as the director of the Handicraft Training Sub-section. With his arrival the training work, which had at first been faltering, was carried through quickly and efficiently--so much so that it attracted many people's attention. From all daerah and several neighborhoods around Djakarta, people came to be trained in various kinds of jobs, especially the spinning of thread from cotton and kapok.

People were also taught how to weave with various kinds of fibers, even those from a type of banana, and how to use the simplest sort of tools, such as could be made by any village workman. To meet the need for these tools, carpentry training for building spinning and weaving equipment was instituted at Headquarters. A kind of cooperative was [to have been] started for carpenters who finished this training course. They were [to be] grouped together in a cooperative so they could work and sell together and regulate and divide the work among themselves. Without a cooperative of this sort, their skills can be exploited by the large-scale Chinese craftsmen and they can end up working for the Chinese rather than working individually at filling the needs of the villages. Soon the Chinese are able to have a monopoly on making spinning and weaving equipment for the villages. It is most unfortunate that the goal of establishing this cooperative was not reached because there was a lack of time and awareness on the part of the people involved. The training period was too short.

Besides spinning thread from kapok and weaving with different fibers, attempts were made at fashioning cigarette paper out of aren-palm leaves, manufacturing lathes, and so forth. Experiments in making blackboard chalk and strong thread were carried out.

When the Pegangsaan Timur Office [of the Kikakuka] closed [in September 1943], Soepranoto was moved to Putera Headquarters to be an aide in the Economic Affairs Section and to direct the administration of the sub-section. Soetarjo, who had been responsible for that job until that time, went to help Soemarno with Handicraft Training.

At the end of December 1943 and the beginning of January 1944, there were additional changes among the directors. Ma'mun al Rasjid resigned his position and was temporarily replaced by Tobing, who was actually supposed to be an aide in the future Djakarta municipal branch. As part of an effort to rationalize the work of Headquarters, sock-making was transferred from the

Women's Section to the Economic Affairs Section. Therefore Mrs. Soekemi, who had headed the activity, and her aide Miss Soeratmi moved to the Economic Affairs Section too. With this change, all activities having to do with sock manufacture were centralized in the Economic Affairs Section. Along the same lines, Soepangat, an aide in the Health Section and involved in soap-making, was moved to the position of permanent aide with the Handicraft Training Sub-section.

After January 1944, the organization of directors was as follows:

1. Head: Soewirjo.
2. Handicrafts: Moh. Sanoesi.
3. Handicrafts Training: a. Soemarno (Head)
b. Soetarjo (Aide)
c. Soepangat (Aide)
4. Trade and Show Room: a. Ibnoe (Aide)
b. Tobing (Aide)
5. Agriculture, Fishing and Livestock: Moh. Sajoeti.
6. Sock-making: a. Mrs. Soekemi
b. Miss Soeratmi
7. Administration: Soepranoto

So much for the changes in the leadership of the Economic Affairs Section during its year of existence.

A word or two above was devoted to Handicraft Training, which we considered to be the most important part of Putera's work, aside from propagandizing for increased agricultural production, simple and thrifty living, and so forth. From the outset, the Economic Affairs Section hoped not only to help the government but to *improve the Indonesian people's economy*, which is as run down as it is because of Dutch colonialism. In order to develop an awareness of how difficult it is to re-build the people's economy, we always kept before us an image of the Westerners' destruction of Indonesian society and way of life on Java. We took as our starting point the clear and accurate picture provided by Professor Boeke. In his words:

Liberal principles, which emphasized the individual as the basis of economic enterprise, and the onslaught of capitalism, which to a far greater degree than in Europe destroyed the communal basis of society, dragged the weakest sectors of society into the misery of the social struggle. We all know that mature capitalism came to Indonesia as a robber and subjugated it in only a few decades. Far more cruelly than in Europe, the colonies have been scarred by a policy oriented to the needs of those who already possessed an advanced technology, a high level of education, and a constant

readiness for struggle. The economic policy which opened Indonesia's doors to the hard-hearted capitalist, the communications policy which brought close everything that had been far away and broke down the walls of isolation, the principle of free trade which opened the door to foreign competitors, the open market which sharpened the isolation of domestic trade, the laws on paying taxes which as time went on were figured more and more in cash terms and which were increasingly imposed on the individual, the laws and justice of the West, the educational policy--all these destroyed the order of native society and its members so that the masses, who were in a weak position, were unable to protect themselves. The existing social unity was smashed and was not replaced by anything new, it was destroyed without having anything put up in its stead; poverty was created, but no new energies were aroused. And the consequence was the brutalization of the human spirit.⁸

This picture makes us conscious of what a difficult task it is to develop the economy of the people of Java. We consider the Japanese arrival on Java to be an opportunity for gradually rebuilding the people's economy. And the method for organizing a healthy people's economy to be put into operation gradually consists of:

- 1) Giving information to Indonesians about the economic difficulties they face daily.
- 2) Organizing Indonesian economic and trade associations so that the people will not continue to be victims of the capitalists as they have been for hundreds of years.
- 3) Encouraging increased production so as to aid the military and fulfill the needs of the people as far as clothing and purchasing power are concerned.

People's interest in Putera's Economic Affairs Section was very great ever since it was first set up. After Headquarters was opened on April 16, 1943, the Economic Affairs Section was flooded with visitors from Java and even the Outer Islands asking for information, advice and guidance on cooperatives, trade, agriculture, fishing, industry and retail distribution--in

8. Hatta, in his Kumpulan Karangan (Djakarta: Penerbitan dan Balai Buku Indonesia, 1953-54), Vol. I, p. 262, uses the identical quote, citing J. H. Boeke, "Auto-activiteit naast autonomie," p. 53. It was not possible to identify or locate this source.

short, asking questions on everything related to general economic affairs.

The number of visitors who came from April 16, 1943, to January 16, 1944, was 740.

Those who were unable to come to Putera Headquarters in person asked for information by mail. The correspondence handled by the Economic Affairs Section through January 16, 1944, was as follows: a) incoming letters 536; b) outgoing letters 406.

In order to devise a working plan for the Economic Affairs Section, it was necessary to gather full information on cooperatives, trade, agriculture, and other things. From April to May 1943, this information was sought from government officials as well as private firms. In May, an appeal was placed in the newspapers asking that Indonesian organizations active in the economic field should register their names with Putera Headquarters. This appeal attracted considerable interest. In only a half-month period, 198 cooperatives, cooperative centers, Indonesian commercial firms, limited liability and limited partnership companies and other groups registered. In addition, out of the thirty-two organizations asked to list their financial assets, the majority sent in the information.

One way of promoting local industry is to have an exhibition of handicrafts and hand-manufactured goods. On May 21, 1943, at Putera Headquarters, there was an exhibit of rubber goods made by the Leuwiliang Rubber Cooperative. From the end of June to the beginning of July, Putera co-sponsored an exhibit of goods for handicrafts, fishing, agriculture and animal husbandry held at the Rakutenchi Pasar Malam. These sample goods came from Indonesian industries all over Java. A certificate was presented to those manufacturers who sent goods of high quality. There were forty-three such certificates, among them a special commendation given to the Kantjil Mas Company, whose demonstration of cotton thread making attracted an extraordinary amount of interest.

In order to increase interest in agriculture, a farming contest with cash prizes was co-sponsored by the Economic Affairs Section of Putera Headquarters and the *Asia Raya* and *Pembangoenan* newspapers.

Following the pasar malam exhibit, the items on show were not returned to the owners but kept in a Sample Showroom so we could watch our progress from time to time. Aside from this intention, the Sample Showroom was devised so that businessmen who needed a particular item could get the address of the company manufacturing it from Putera Headquarters, Economic Affairs Section.

In November 1943, the Economic Affairs Section put out a small book on padi, written by Ir. Kaslan and Soetan Sanif. This book explained in simple terms the best method of planting rice and increasing production. The first printing was 3,000 copies, which were sold out in a short time. The second printing--which, since many people asked for the book, was to be 10,000 copies--has not yet come out. A small book on basketry was completed and ready for publishing, but printing was postponed on account of the paper shortage.

In connection with the difficulty people experienced in buying rice and because of the chaos in the rice purchasing program, in December 1943, all information, regulations, reports and complaints on the subject were gathered from all over Java to be presented to the government by Putera's leaders. The Djakarta City Council suggested a method of selling rice to the inhabitants without dishonesty, chaos or harm to either the government or the people.

Besides the work mentioned above, the Economic Affairs Section of Putera has looked into various industries in several parts of Java. It has also succeeded in settling some disputes between several cooperatives.

Now a word about the efforts made by the branches. Since they didn't have the authority to undertake economic activity themselves, the Economic Affairs Sections of Putera branches did the following things:

Gave information to the people about various economic matters and about the government economic regulations; eased the relations between government offices; suggested several things needed by the people to the appropriate government office, especially in the matters of rice and clothing distribution; and proposed several new kinds of industries to the people. Propaganda for greater agricultural production and more saving was pushed intensively. In addition, the branches imitated the activities of Headquarters by compiling a list of Indonesian firms and having Sample Showrooms. Where there was the opportunity to do so, the branches helped set up several industries. For example, the Solo branch successfully helped establish a soap company which in a very short time was producing 5,000 bars a day. It is true that small industries such as this are not very significant economically, but their *psychological* influence is very great indeed. With a small factory run by Indonesians, the price of soap very quickly fell from 12½ cents a bar to 5½ cents. There was also a paint company, a corn-flour and "Asia flour"⁹ mill, a company making paper and cartons--all these things came about at Putera's suggestion.

9. A Japanese-inspired euphemism for cassava flour.

The Pekalongan branch followed the example of Headquarters in developing the spinning and weaving industry.

The most successful branch with respect to stimulating the people's economy was the one in Malang, since it was given the opportunity to do so by its Shūchōkan. To increase the farmers' enthusiasm, Putera helped the government Agricultural Office to develop community rice barns and peasant organizations. On July 29, 1943, at Putera's suggestion, a Peasants' Cooperative Center [Pusat Rukun Tani] was set up in Tumpang Gun. The center's purpose was to act as a coordinating body for all the peasant cooperatives in the area. The establishing of these peasant cooperatives developed rapidly in Malang Shū. But from September 1943, the Shūchōkan prohibited Putera from sponsoring them because the government itself planned to have a similar organization called the "Agricultural Cooperative" or Nōgyō Kumiai. The Peasants' Cooperative was disbanded. By now there is an Agricultural Cooperative in each of the ninety-six son of Malang Shū.

In order to make rice distribution easier, the Malang Shū branch of Putera succeeded in setting up the Indonesian Merchants' Union [Perserikatan Pedagang-Pedagang Indonesia, or PPPI]. Through this group Indonesian merchants were able to unify and cooperate among themselves more easily than before. The organization was also able to teach Indonesian businessmen to place the public welfare ahead of their own individual interests.

Besides the Indonesian Merchants' Union, Putera in Malang Shū also set up an Indonesian Handicrafts Center [Pusat Kerajinan Indonesia, or PKI], which became a center for various kinds of Indonesian handicrafts. The name of the center was good enough, but its abbreviation could have caused misunderstanding among those who were not acquainted with it, since in the past the initials PKI have been best known as those of the Indonesian Communist Party [Partai Komunis Indonesia]. It would have been better if the name had been changed.

The Semarang branch had a plan for 1944 to bring all iron-smiths together into a regular organization so that their efforts could be coordinated and available for the government to use if necessary. Another reason for bringing them together was to keep the spirit of good workmanship alive and to insure that the skills would not disappear due to lack of materials.

Aside from these things, it can be said that all branches suggested the daerah governments do something to improve rice distribution if they wished to calm the people's restlessness. Without such tranquility, it would be very difficult to propagandize about increasing agricultural production and so forth.

5. Education Section

There was no practical task for Putera's Education Section to undertake, since Putera was not itself permitted to submit plans or lead the campaign for eradicating illiteracy. So the affairs of this section were such that they could be handled by a single person, Joesoef Jahja, who served concurrently as secretary to [Putera's] Cultural Affairs Department, that is, as the deputy of Ki Hadjar Dewantara.

The only special job of the Education Section was to receive various people's objections to and desires concerning educational affairs. The majority of complaints were about the lack of elementary and secondary schools and the fact that private secondary schools are no longer permitted by the government. Many requests have been received to permit reopening the private secondary schools (such as those run by Muhammadiyah and Taman Siswa to correspond to government junior high schools) as long as the government does not have enough replacements available.

Above all, the Osamu Decree #22, which prohibits privately-run secondary schools and states that elementary schools may only be run by a Legal Body, caused great distress among those who had been directing private schools. People did not understand what a Legal Body was. Ki Hadjar Dewantara himself came to ask about this at the Office of Education [of the Military Government], but there too people were uncertain as to what a Legal Body was. Taman Siswa and Muhammadiyah had been energetic in developing schools. But the question remained, could Taman Siswa be regarded as a Legal Body? The Office of Education could not give a definite reply. Ki Hadjar Dewantara was simply told that the two groups should continue functioning as usual. But this advice did not settle the question of Legal Body.¹⁰

In connection with Osamu Decree #22, there was a meeting at Putera Headquarters on August 9, 1943, between the Empat Serangkai and delegates from Muhammadiyah and Taman Siswa to hear the latter's complaints.

According to the information received by Ki Hadjar Dewantara, the government's intention is to decrease the present number of schools because these schools merely teach intellectualism, which does not result in the improvement of society. This difficulty has also been experienced in Japan. By way of replacement, vocational secondary schools will be increased. It is in this connection that private individuals are prohibited from opening secondary schools like the public junior high

10. In fact, in most areas the schools were not permitted to continue.

schools, whose curriculum is exclusively intellectual in character.

The result of the talks with the Taman Siswa and Muhammadiyah representatives was an acknowledgment of the truth of the government's position on the present-day secondary schools. It was also stated that the government's opinion was identical with that expressed by Mohammad Hatta earlier at a meeting of the Committee for the Study of Adat and Public Institutions.¹¹ He too has suggested that what Indonesia needed most was vocational secondary schools of two types: 1) vocational secondary schools which could act as a bridge to tertiary levels and institutions; 2) vocational elementary schools whose goal would simply be to give technical knowledge for practical use in life.

As a result of these talks, it was decided not to object to the government program in general. There would be an objection only if the junior high schools were closed down all at once, since if that happened many students would be left high and dry. In the Taman Siswa junior high schools alone there were 2,480 students. Where would they go if Taman Siswa had to close down? The same was true of the students in the Muhammadiyah secondary schools. Therefore the consensus was that Ki Hadjar Dewantara should suggest to the government that the junior high schools not be closed down all at once, but gradually, for example, by not permitting any students in class 1 the first year, none in class 2 the second year, and so on until, by the end of the third year, the junior high schools would have been phased out of existence. It was also hoped that the government would be willing to place private school teachers in the government schools, especially since their service to society has been great, as was their commitment to promoting popular education, proven by their willingness to accept low salaries as teachers in private schools.

If junior high schools were disbanded in a gradual manner such as this, there would be no stranded students, except those who were not promoted to the next class. It was hoped that this system would be accepted by the Office of Education.¹²

11. In Indonesian, Panitia Pemeriksa [or Komisi Menjelidiki] Adat-istiadat dan Tata-negara; in Japanese, Kyūkan seido chosa kai. This committee was established by the Military Government in November 1942, and its purpose was to investigate local institutions of all kinds with an eye to discovering which ones might be used as a basis for the kind of regime the Japanese desired. Ten Indonesians and thirteen Japanese members served the Gunseikan in a direct advisory capacity.

12. The plan was not accepted.

Another problem brought to the attention of Putera's Education Section concerned the fate of the students in the teachers' training school [Hogere Inlandse Kweekschool or HIK] who in the Dutch period were in the senior class but were not appointed as teachers because their grades in Dutch language courses were no higher than five [50%]. In other subjects these students' knowledge was adequate. It is astonishing that the Office of Education still uses the old criteria and will not appoint these students as teachers because their Dutch language is not good enough. Is Dutch still to be the measure of one's ability? To our way of thinking, it certainly should not be, since we no longer live in the Dutch colonial era. But if there are still officials in the Department who think this way, then it would be a good idea if there were admonitions from above. It is true that many people find it difficult to free themselves of tradition, but in a time of change such as the present, all traditions smelling of the Netherlands East Indies must be broken down. We are convinced that in view of the present shortage of teachers the former pupils of the HIK who sat in the senior class and had acceptable knowledge in everything except Dutch language study should be given the opportunity to become teachers.

The Education Section of Putera also devised several easy systems of eradicating illiteracy despite the present paper shortage. In the instructions of July 2, 1943 to all branches, it was suggested that every device possible be used to carry on the anti-illiteracy campaign in spite of the lack of paper.

For example, bamboo could be used for writing on, as could thick leaves. It was also suggested that all Putera people and their aides volunteer their help in eradicating illiteracy. Wherever they were needed, they should offer their help to the pangreh pradjā in charge of the anti-illiteracy drive. It was also pointed out that the eradication of illiteracy was very important to the achievement of victory in the present Greater East Asia War. Government instructions must be carried out quickly, and illiteracy can be a great obstacle to understanding things suggested by the government.

Besides that, the Education Section urged the Economic Affairs Section to encourage and teach people how to make paper so the anti-illiteracy drive could be carried out quickly and efficiently.

Earlier, the Education Section had spoken with the Minshū Shidōbu about the importance of having a location for a Youth Job Training Course [Latihan Pekeraja Pemuda], so that youths who had graduated from school but were unemployed could get job training and vocational instruction in an orderly, disciplined fashion. The Minshū Shidōbu found ideals of this sort appealing. In practice, however, it seems that they have not yet been properly carried out.

6. Cultural Section

Since its beginning, the Cultural Section faced several difficulties on account of the limits placed upon its activities. It could not sponsor training or instruction in cultural affairs, though a great many people had originally hoped that Putera would be able to do this kind of thing. Furthermore, after Putera was planned, a People's Educational and Cultural Guidance Institute [Keimin Bunka Shidōsho] was set up to take care of cultural matters. A second difficulty was how to harmonize the bases of culture with the war atmosphere, so that the Cultural Section could make a contribution to strengthening the martial spirit.

The prerequisites for a war-time culture are as follows:

- 1) To inculcate the spirit of struggle and reconstruction, and give hope for future progress. Art that teaches a sense of beauty and purity must be able to guide the soul.
- 2) Destruction of everything that has hindered the progress of Indonesian culture, and crushed popular creativity for so long. In short, the liberation--as soon as possible--of Indonesian culture from the bonds of the colonial mentality which was nurtured for hundreds of years by the Netherlands East Indies Government.

It is in connection with the above that the Cultural Section adopted the following platform:

The goals of the Cultural Section of Putera are to advance, to nurture, and to expand all things which form the foundation of a national culture, to collect and improve all those materials and principles in Asian culture in general and Indonesian culture in particular which are in accordance with the pure ideals that through the course of history have clearly given all the peoples of Asia, especially the people of Indonesia, a holy and glorious character. In this way, the Indonesian people eventually will achieve a cultural synthesis of their own and will contribute to the growth of an international culture in which each nation will participate "as in a family."

That is the principle which guided Putera's Cultural Section in its work.

The activities of the Cultural Section were few. To refine artistic sensitivities and increase interest in culture, there were several art exhibits in the back gallery of Putera Headquarters, each one featuring the paintings of different individual artists. In the Culture Room itself, several pictures were

painted that drew on the demands of the times for thematic material. The plastic arts, such as sculpture, were energetically pursued by the Cultural Section, though the personnel and equipment have been far from ideal.

There was also a plan to encourage the writing of *sjair*¹³ that exhibited spirit and the ability to lead people to the new way, but because personnel was lacking it remained only a plan.

There were quite a few visitors to the Cultural Section of Putera, though unfortunately the number was not recorded. Generally those who came were art lovers who wanted to discuss various things and to express their ideas on Indonesian culture in general and Central Javanese culture in particular.

7. Women's Section

The Women's Section underwent several changes in its directorship since it was set up. Mrs. Soenarjo Mangoenpoespito, who was appointed chairman of the Women's Section when Putera was first established, did not take up her post until October 15, 1943. Before that time she was represented by Mrs. Soekemi.

Since there was a government-run Women's Association that carried on miscellaneous activities related to women's wartime duties, there was almost nothing left of a practical nature for Putera's Women's Section to do. The only thing remaining was to train people to knit and make socks for the Army. In this project Putera's Women's Section was aided by twenty-four knitting teachers. The practical advantage to be gained from the knitting and sock-making was that the techniques could be spread among the women of each daerah. This could not only give hundreds of women a new source of livelihood but also could increase the general knowledge of a skill which used to be practiced by Indonesian women in every household, but which has recently been neglected because of oppression, poverty and the influence of technology.

In connection with Putera's aim of promoting work that is not only practical but also suitable for women, the knitting and sock-making was transferred from the Women's Section to the Economic Affairs Section after January 1, 1944.

Besides taking the lead in sock-making, the Women's Section had an information branch for ladies (a Consultation Bureau) to deal with the marriage and divorce problems that often create

13. A traditional verse form, using quatrains of one rhyme.

difficulties for Indonesian women. Actually, this should have been part of the Public Welfare Section, but because ladies prefer to tell their troubles and grief in divorce matters to members of their own sex, this branch of the Women's Section was set up; it was run by Mrs. Soekemi, assisted by Mrs. Soerjotjondro.

The work of the Women's Section is clear from the correspondence: a) incoming letters 381; b) outgoing letters 471. In contrast to all other divisions of Putera, the Women's Section sent more letters than it received, since it made more suggestions that it had questions to answer. Twice the Women's Section held rallies at Taman Raden Saleh:

1) On April 21, 1943, a public rally commemorating R. A. Kartini.

2) On December 2, 1943, a public rally with the theme "The Women of Greater East Asia and their relation to the Greater East Asia War." The rally was [also] attended by women from Chinese, Indo-European and Arab groups.

At Headquarters the Women's Section held a conference from December 20 to 22, 1943, which was attended by women representatives from all existing branches. The purpose of the conference was to lay down guidelines for the work to be done by all women's sections in Putera. But as fate would have it this meeting, which was supposed to plan practical work for the future, in actuality turned out to be a farewell event for Putera women. Not long afterwards the decision came that Putera would be dissolved and absorbed in the Jawa Hōkōkai.

8. Propaganda Section

The Propaganda Section can be said to have been the most important part of the Putera movement. Since it had such a large job to do, very often young people who were in training were used as additional staff. Propagandizing was often done with the help of Putera staff-members and other sections.

At first its direction was set up with Sajoeti Atmoprasodjo and Soepeno working as vice-chairmen of the Office of Press and Propaganda [of the Military Government] under Mr. Soemanang.

The original intention was that the Propaganda Section at Headquarters would only be involved in planning, while the actual propagandizing would be done by the branches. But it turned out in practice that Headquarters also carried on intensive propaganda work. Therefore the staff of directors was increased

by three people, namely Ahmad Soemadi, Asmara Hadi and Mrs. Trimurti, while the number of aides was also increased by three, namely, Soemarno, Loekman and Qosim. These junior aides worked on administrative affairs of all kinds.

On January 1, 1944, Mrs. Trimurti was moved to the Women's Section. Most unfortunately, Qosim was ill for a long time and has still not recovered. May God restore the health of this promising young man.

In connection with the lack of propaganda staff all over Java, Putera Headquarters intended to have a continuing course in Propaganda Training, with each session lasting one or two months. The first session was to have been from the end of October to the end of December 1943. Most unfortunately, this first training course was interrupted because Ir. Soekarno and Mohammad Hatta were sent to Japan after the course had begun.¹⁴ The second course was to have begun this past January [1944], but was discontinued because of Putera's proposed absorption into the Hōkōkai.

Propagandizing was often carried out jointly with the Sendenbu. The points which were emphasized in the propaganda were: a) Destroy the Allies; b) Increase agricultural production.

It is unnecessary to analyze the Propaganda Section's work at great length. A chronological account of propagandizing done since the opening of Headquarters, as given below, will be sufficient.

April 24, 1943--Rally at Taman Raden Saleh with the theme of "Destroy the Allies."

June 5 to 10, 1943--Malang Shū Putera's Propaganda Section held rallies in Malang, Lumadjang and Probolinggo at which pangreh pradja people gave speeches.

June 21, 1943--"Destroy the Allies" propaganda rally in Tangerang.

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14. In November 1943, Soekarno and several other Indonesian national figures were invited to go to Tokyo. The ostensible purpose for the trip was to thank the Japanese Government for the August 1, 1943 announcement that Indonesians would be permitted greater participation in their government. A more important motive, however, seems to have been to impress the Indonesian visitors with Japanese industrial strength and advancement.

June 24, 1943--Mass rally at Taman Raden Saleh welcoming Prime Minister Tōjō's statement in the Special Diet Session in Tokyo about Indonesian participation in governing the country.

July 1, 1943--Mass rally in Bandung, at which the Empat Serangkai spoke on "Destroy the Allies" and "Live Simply and Increase Agricultural Production."

July 2, 1943--Public rally in Padang (Bodjonegoro), supplemented with a film from the Sendenbu.

July 5, 1943--Mass rally in Djogjakarta on "Destroy the Allies" and "Increase Agricultural Production." The Empat Serangkai were scheduled to speak but they were called back to Djakarta before they could do so.

July 6, 1943--Mass rally at Tuban with the theme "Destroy the Allies."

July 7, 1943--Mass rally at Ikada Square to greet Prime Minister Tōjō.

July 13, 1943--Public rally in Lamongan held by Putera, with the help of the Sendenbu.

July 20, 1943--Public rally in Kediri held by Putera and the Sendenbu.

July 28 to August 2, 1943--Rallies throughout the Principality of Djogjakarta with the theme "Destroy the Allies."

August 6, 1943--Public rally in Pamekasan held by Putera and the Sendenbu.

August 7, 1943--Public rally in Sumenep held by Putera and the Sendenbu.

August 8, 1943--Public rally in Kalianget held by Putera and the Sendenbu.

August 11, 1943--Public rally in Madiun held by Putera and the Sendenbu.

August 11 to 14, 1943--Public rallies in the Priangan, namely at Garut, Tasikmalaja, Tjiamis and Sumedang.

August 18, 1943--Mass rally in Surabaya on the themes "Destroy the Allies" and "Propagandize for Putera" at which Ir. Soekarno and Kijai Mansoer spoke.

August 26, 1943--Public rally held at Probolinggo with the help of the Sendenbu.

August 26 to 31, 1943--Public rallies in Klaten, Wonogiri, Bojolali and Sragen.

September 3, 1943--Public rally on "Destroy the Allies" in Djember.

September 7, 1943--Public anti-Allies rally at Banjuwangi.

September 11, 1943--Beginning of a week-long anti-Allies propaganda campaign covering all of Besuki Shū.

November 3, 1943--Mass rally at Ikada Square to promote Peta.¹⁵

December 8, 1943--Mass rally at Ikada Square to commemorate the start of the Greater East Asia War.

9. Press and Radio Section

The activities of the Press and Radio Section of Putera Headquarters should not [really] be considered separately from those of the Propaganda Section. As was mentioned in the Special Regulations, Article 14, the job of the Press and Radio Section was:

- 1) To act as guide in matters of the press and broadcasting.
- 2) To bring about closer relations between the Putera movement and each of the various newspapers.

Because it held this position, all news releases from all sections of Putera passed through the Press and Radio Section. Three copies of each release were sent to every newspaper; for newspapers outside Djakarta the releases were sent via the Dōmei News Agency.

The number of press releases released by Putera Headquarters was as follows:

April 1943	13 press releases
May 1943	26
June 1943	31

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15. Peta is an acronym for Barisan Sukarela (or Tentara Sukarela) Pembela Tanah Air (Volunteer Corps [Volunteer Army] of Defenders of the Fatherland). This Japanese-sponsored version of a "national army" was founded officially on October 3, 1943.

July 1943	10 press releases
August 1943	14
September 1943	11
October 1943	26
November 1943	19
December 1943	<u>18</u>
Total	168

Often, too, the Press and Radio Section prepared material for speeches by the Great Leader and for Putera's propagandists. In all matters of external communications, including speeches to be given at rallies or over the radio by Putera leaders, the Press and Radio Section kept in touch with the civilian and military censors. Besides issuing press releases, the Press and Radio Section also had pamphlets printed for distribution to the people through Putera. Titles distributed were:

1) *People's Soap* by Dr. Moetiono, 9,000 copies sold at 6 cents each.

2) *Padi* by Ir. Kaslan and Soetan Sanif, sold at 10 cents each.

3) *Pasar Malam Program* (June 21 to July 15, 1943), containing articles on: a) "Guidelines for Raising Carp in the Paddy Fields" by Odjoh and Charidji; b) "The Mudjair Fish" by Odjoh and Charidji; c) "The Castor Oil Plant" by Ir. Kaslan and Soetan Sanif; d) "Cotton" by Ir. Kaslan and Soetan Sanif; and e) "*Roseella*"¹⁶ by Ir. Kaslan and Soetan Sanif. The program was distributed free.

Books in the process of being translated from English into Indonesian by the Propaganda Section with the help of the Press and Radio Section, were: a) *Japanese Education*; b) *The Tea Cult of Japan*; c) *The Japanese National Character*; d) *Japanese Buddhism*. The original goal was to have these printed when they were finished being translated. Besides those mentioned above, we were going to publish the book entitled *Food for the People* by Dr. Soetarman. Plans on getting paper for printing these books had already been drawn up by Mr. Soemanang, head of the Press and Radio Section, and are now in the hands of the Minshū Shidōbu.

The nature of the books we planned to print points out the fact that in all communications to the people, priority was given to building up the spirit of struggle and service and to urging increased agricultural production.

16. An annual herb, used as a hemp substitute.

The news releases and announcements made by the branches were supervised by the Headquarters Press and Radio Section, which saw to it that it received a copy of every press release made by the branches to the local newspapers.

The Press and Radio Section had its own documentation section. From the time Putera Headquarters was set up, the Press and Radio Section tried to collect the newspapers printed since the Japanese Army began to govern here. In this effort, it received help from *Asia Raya* and *Pembangoenan* newspapers and now has a complete collection of these newspapers. In addition, the Press and Radio Section itself subscribed to the newspapers published throughout Java.

Newspapers and magazines received by the Press and Radio Section were as follows:

A. Published on Java

1. *Asia Raya*--3 copies, of which 1 was at half price.
2. *Kung Yung Pao*¹⁷--2 copies, both at half price.
3. *Tjahaja*--2 copies, both at regular price.
4. *Sinar Matahari*--3 copies, 2 free except for mailing cost, and 1 at regular price.
5. *Sinar Baroe*--3 copies, of which 2 were free, and 1 at regular price.
6. *Soeara Asia*--3 copies, all at regular price.

B. Published on Sumatra

1. *Nippon Palembang Shinboen*--1 copy, free.
2. *Kita Soematera Shinboen*--1 copy, free.

C. Magazines received

1. *Pandji Poestaka*--2 copies, both at regular price.
2. *Djawa Baroe*--2 copies, both at regular price.
3. *Soeara Moeslimin Indonesia*--2 copies at regular price, also several free copies.

One copy of each of the above newspapers and magazines was given to the Propaganda Section, one clipped for documentation, and one stored for the archives.

News items in the papers were clipped and indexed to make it easy to find any news release when necessary. Besides collecting newspapers, the Press and Radio Section also tried to collect all books printed since the Japanese Army landed, and had 101 volumes at last count.

Correspondence of the Press and Radio Section was as follows: a) incoming letters 261; b) outgoing letters 159.

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17. This was the only Chinese-language newspaper permitted to continue publishing during the occupation period.

The Press and Radio Section did not receive visitors, except for reporters from outside the city or from overseas.

10. Physical Education Section

As has been explained in the three-month report, the Physical Education Section was at first able to work energetically and succeeded in founding Gelora, with the aim of making a direct contribution by building the people's enthusiasm for the government. With the advent of Gelora, public enthusiasm was truly aroused. Energy and enthusiasm for physical training was in evidence everywhere, and public morale was high.

But after the government decided that Gelora had to be abolished and replaced by the Jawa Tai Iku Kai under the direction of the Department of Education, the lively enthusiasm turned cold and disappeared.

On August 23, 1943, the Jawa Tai Iku Kai was established. It was responsible for all athletics in Java, including physical education in the schools, offices and industry, and other kinds of sports.

No matter how hard the Jawa Tai Iku Kai has tried, it has not yet been able to revive the earlier enthusiasm. By starting Gelora, Putera was able to stimulate a sense of satisfaction rising directly from the hearts of the people themselves. The Tai Iku Kai could only achieve things by ordering them to be done, orders which the people obeyed because they were afraid. The basis of the Tai Iku Kai's strength is simply discipline. Gelora's strength was in the voluntary response of the people themselves, and its discipline arose from the sporting code itself.

After Gelora was dissolved on August 3, 1943, the work of Putera's Physical Education Section was hamstrung. For the dissolution meant the elimination of a very broad field of activity, and all that remained was propaganda work. Although there was much to be done even in that field, many of Gelora's directors were disillusioned and reluctant to give it much thought. This was a loss to athletics in general.

Propaganda work continued as usual. Every Tuesday, excepting the second of each month (later changed to Wednesday), Army Radio reserved time for the Physical Education Section to discuss athletic matters. This opportunity was used to give viewpoints on the significance and uses of sports, the techniques of various sports, etc. The revival of the ancient Indonesian sports, which we inherited from our ancestors, was also encouraged.

Together with Putera's Health Section, the Physical Education Section helped the Medical Workers' Service Organization [Iji Hōkōkai] promote People's Health Day by making speeches on the meaning and importance of sports and by giving lessons in taisō to the people.

In connection with Osamu Decree #44, which offered Indonesians the opportunity to become members of Peta, an organization which Putera strongly supported, considerable financial contributions were received from the people. The job of handling these monetary gifts was turned over to the Physical Education Section. After the Peta and Heihō Assistance Association [Tata Usaha Pembantu Peradjurit Pembela Tanah Air dan Heihō] was founded, the business of receiving such funds was turned over to it. The amount of money received and forwarded by Headquarters to Peta was f.1,896.02.

Contributions received by the branches were also turned over to the proper authorities, namely the Soldiers' Aid Organization [Badan Pembantu Peradjurit] in each daerah. The Semarang branch forwarded f.3,383.36, and the Malang branch sent f.2,979.07½.

A great many people came to Putera in order to enlist as recruits for Peta, even though they knew that the recruiting list had to be made at the Shūchōkan's office or through the individual kuchō. This proves that the people took great interest in Putera as the promoter of Peta.

To help Peta, Putera branches were encouraged to hold sports contests, the net proceeds from which could be turned over to that organization.

More recently the Physical Education Section did research on various types of native sports still practiced by the people. It turned out that the majority of these old Indonesian sports, which now do not attract much attention, are forms of self-defense. For example, there is the *silat* of the Minangkabau, *pentjak* of various kinds, *okol*, *bendjang*, *udjungan*, *main panah*, *lawung*, *bondobojo*,¹⁸ and others. It would be excellent if all these were revived and people trained in them systematically, since they all are fundamental to arousing enthusiasm and building martial character.

11. Health Section

Putera's Health Section was clearly devised for propaganda purposes only. For practical health matters, there is the

18. All traditional Indonesian martial or semi-martial arts.

Military Government's Office of Public Health, in whose operations Putera could play no part. Therefore Putera's Health Section's work centered around propagandizing for the following:

1. Ways of protecting physical health.
2. Healthy and practical foods.
3. Planning improvements in people's dwellings from the point of view of health.

The Health Section tried to mobilize private doctors to help in this work. Also the aid of several specialists was asked. Happily we can state here that Dr. Kodijat and Dr. R. Mochtar from the Eiseikyoku [Public Health Bureau] and Dr. Soerono, the Djakarta Shū Eiseikachō [Chief of the Sanitation Division], were ready to help and were also willing to sit on the Health Section Advisory Board.

On July 10, 1943, instructions were sent to all shū branches of Putera to send their plans concerning public health to Headquarters for discussion at the first meeting of the Health Section Advisory Board, which was to be held in September. Since the Medical Workers' Service Organization was founded on September 1, 1943, however, the meeting never took place; we assumed that all public health matters would be turned over to this new organization as its special concern. Putera would help as much as it could.

The practical work done by the Health Section was as follows:

1) Set up a permanent exhibition on hygiene, using pictorial instructions giving pointers on cleanliness and hygiene. This exhibit was also at the Rakutenchi Pasar Malam.

2) Propagandized about nutritious but inexpensive food-stuffs. For example, a diet using *ontjom*¹⁹ as its chief ingredient was suggested. Food of this sort is nutritious but inexpensive and can also be prepared in an appetizing manner. There was a demonstration at Putera Headquarters of how to cook it this way.

Most unfortunately the Chinese merchants, whose only desire is for profit, used this opportunity to further their own ends. They bought up all the *ontjom* and sold it to the people at a high price. The price rose from 7 cents to 14 cents or more. Therefore Putera's promotion had unfortunate results.

3) Because soap was as much as 40 cents a bar, people were taught at Putera Headquarters and several other places how to

19. A kind of tempe (soy bean cake).

make soap using ashes instead of caustic soda. Soap-making according to the method of Dr. Moetiono was propagandized and taught, and also printed up in booklet form. As a result, the price of soap fell back to 5 cents a bar, which was a great advantage for the people. But again the Chinese took the opportunity to fill their own pockets. Since they had capital, they went into soap-making, and as a result the price of soap went up again. Now the price is back up to 27½ cents a bar.

There was even a daerah government regulation prohibiting people from making soap without a permit, but again it was the Chinese with capital who got the chance to have soap factories. This is quite clear from the fact that the Soap Manufacturers' Association [Persekutuan Perusahaan-Perusahaan Membuat Sabun] in Djakarta City, which was just recently set up on the encouragement of the city government, has only one Indonesian among its members, the rest being Chinese.

4) In connection with the scarcity of patent medicines, the Health Section of Putera propagandized about using various herbs as substitutes. Herbs have been used by Indonesians as medicine from ancient times, and many are famous for their efficacy. But, influenced by patent medicines, people have forgotten about such pharmaceuticals. Putera's intention was to remind Indonesians to return to their original medicines.

5) The Health Section eagerly helped with the propaganda for People's Health Days held by the government on the 8th, 9th, and 10th of every month. With the agreement of the Eiseikyoku and the Iji Hōkōkai, the Health Section made propaganda posters, and their cost was divided between the three organizations. The cost was as follows:

a. Posters for the first People's Health Day, on the theme of hygiene; 20,000 copies	f. 1,000.00
b. For the second People's Health Day; 15,000 copies	f. <u>750.00</u>
	[total f. 1,750.00]

The Eiseikyoku paid f. 500.00, the Iji Hōkōkai paid f. 500.00, and the greater share, f. 750.00, was paid by Putera. From then on, Putera's Health Section was permitted to spend f.500 a month on health propaganda such as the above.

The correspondence was as follows: a) incoming letters 216; b) outgoing letters 457. Outgoing letters mostly contained instructions to the branches.

There were 360 visitors to the Health Section during the past year, and they can be categorized as follows:

1) Those who came to look at the exhibition of pictures depicting aspects of good health and at the model house showing the best possible health safeguards.

2) Those who came to look at the medicinal herb exhibit.

3) Those who came to ask for information on food, since the rice ration of 200 grams a day was not enough for the masses. People wanted to know what they should supplement their rice with in order to keep healthy.

12. Public Welfare Section

As was explained in the three-month report, the Public Welfare Section could be considered a barometer for gauging the atmosphere prevailing among the general populace. In the Public Welfare Section's three-month report to the General Director on its work, the Section Head, Mr. Samsoedin, wrote as follows:

Article 18 of Putera's Special Regulations includes mention of the jobs to be carried out by the Public Welfare Section as follows:

1. Study the best ways to care for orphans, the destitute, and old people without anyone to look after them.
2. Encourage the spirit of cooperation.
3. Aid the unemployed.
4. Lead, develop and unify all public welfare activities.

The public interpreted my division's work much more broadly than Article 18, above.

The public believed that anything they felt to be unjust, wrong or unsatisfactory could be brought to the attention of the Public Welfare Section: all complaints, whether from peasants, workers or civil servants; all kinds of desires of various groups; and, especially, matters touching on the relationship between the people and the pangreh pradja, between the people and the police, between the Japanese and Indonesians, and so on.

As a matter of fact, when the Public Welfare Section was first founded, we had to feel out the directions in which our work could actually be developed, in relationship to the most urgent current social problems. It has been clearly proven that an especially important condition

for developing the desire to exert energy in forming a new society is the true unity of all levels of society: between Japanese and Indonesians as well as--and this is very important--between the people and the pangreh pradja and the police, and also between the departments of the government itself. The conclusion drawn from all our work and experience is that the relations between these groups are still very far from perfect. This matter was given top priority by the Public Welfare Section, since no matter how good the format of a cooperative activity is on paper, when put into practice it will not be able to pass the acid test, since the work is only cooperative in name and not entered into with any real, sincere commitment. In short, our effort has been to insure that all groups face up to the ideals and the duties of the present time not just on the surface but also deep down inside. Under the present wartime conditions, every effort to build enthusiasm for working toward the new society must be preceded by a sincere effort to achieve spiritual unity.

The portion of the three-month report just quoted is clearly still of value, and it remained a guide for the Public Welfare Section's work until the end.

Since the basis of every social endeavor must be the prior development of unity, and since unity is something which cannot be developed if serious efforts are not first made to create the conditions for that unity, the Public Welfare Section gave top priority to negotiating and, as far as possible, settling all matters, conditions and problems which hamper the development of unity. Thus the section's field of operations was extremely broad and often gave the false impression that Putera was interfering in affairs that were clearly the province of particular government departments, whereas our intention was, in the broadest possible sense, to link them together.

It is understandable that the path we had to travel in order to carry on this work was full of thorns and pitfalls; it was work that attracted abuse from the left and right.

Nevertheless, there are listed below the various problems which the Public Welfare Section tried to handle.

A. Problems concerning the pangreh pradja and the police:

1) Difficulties with the transportation of rice from one kampung to another.

2) Problems about the illegal seizure of official permits needed to bring rice into a kampung.

- 3) Complaints from Keibōdan²⁰ and Seinendan trainees.
- 4) Problems with the *pekan perkawinan*²¹ and so forth.
- 5) Matters concerning Indonesians working on Dutch sawah.²²
- 6) Problems of detention, looting and arrest or beating by the police and pangreh pradja.
- 7) Various complaints from the people about the activities of the pangreh pradja.
- 8) The problem of getting permission from the kuchō of a particular daerah to till the soil and then having the permission revoked and being forbidden to carry on tilling.
- 9) Problems connected with sawah and houses and their yards.
- 10) Matters concerning the moving of the inhabitants of several villages.
- 11) The unsatisfactory method of distributing and selling land.
- 12) The gathering of village dues and contributions by the kuchō and lower-ranking pangreh pradja in various districts.
- 13) The problem of unsatisfactory distribution of ration cards for daily necessities.
- 14) The problem in several daerah of buying and selling rice.
- 15) Requests for information about the Keibōdan, Seinendan, Heihō,²³ and the Peta.

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20. Literally, "volunteer guard"; it was a kind of auxiliary police, concerned mostly with air defense, tracking down of spies, enforcement of rice regulations, and so forth.
 21. Literally, "marriage market." The reference is obscure, but Hatta said he believed it concerned the new regulations placed on marriage registration, requiring more elaborate paper-work and higher fees.
 22. The reference is probably to unauthorized Indonesian squatters on former Dutch lands.
 23. Heihō were auxiliary Indonesian troops for Japanese forces. They usually remained on Java, but a number were sent to fight in New Guinea, the Solomons and elsewhere.

16) Impediments to the distribution of the MIAI [Madjlisul Islamil A'laa Indonesia, or Great Islamic Council of Indonesia] magazine in several daerah.

17) Difficulties and obstacles faced by Putera people in carrying out their work in several daerah.

18) Unsatisfactory choice of members for the Sangi Kai in some daerah and the consequences thereof.

19) A bill for making wooden planks that is still unpaid by the government.

20) About the distressing methods of collecting coolie laborers for other daerah.

21) About several arrests.

22) Requests for irrigation of sawah that are not attended to by the lower-ranking pangreh pradja.

23) Matters concerning the collection and selling of rice.

24) Requests that the produce tax be lowered.

25) Unfair distribution of merchandise by the government in one area to a small shop cooperative which it organized and the consequences thereof.

26) Request for information on how to apply for permission to use unoccupied lands.

27) The problem of requests to continue working the land.

28) Several actions taken by the police against petty traders.

29) The problem of the export of leather to the Outer Islands and its consequences.

30) Accusations of false reporting.

31) Problems of sending "volunteers" to areas outside Java.²⁴

32) Insults to Putera's Great Leader in several daerah.

24. A reference to the rōmusha, forced laborers, of whom there were as many as 2,000,000. Not all of these were unskilled workers, for carpenters, mechanics, cooks and so forth were in demand.

33) Problems of having to pay excise duties in kind rather than money.

34) The problem of swindlers who used documents from a section of Putera Headquarters.

35) Requests for protection from constant harassment by lower-ranking pangreh pradjä and police.

36) About the raising of market taxes.

37) Reports of hoarding.

38) Behavior of the Dutch that still goes on.

39) Actions on the part of the police and Keibōdan in the rice problem.

B. Problems concerning labor:

1) Requests for work, either by letter or through a personal appearance.

2) Matters concerning dismissals.

3) Complaints of foremen about officials.

4) Requests for help in returning to work at jobs held previously.

5) Complaints about not getting a Lebaran bonus.

6) Requests for help in getting back wages paid up quickly.

7) Requests for information on becoming religious teachers.

8) Complaints of low-level workers about their wages, which they need.

9) Requests for guidance on making equipment for Peta.

10) Dismissals in contravention of "contracts."²⁵

11) Disturbances of people at prayer by officials of one of the regional offices.

25. It had become common practice for employees to ask for and receive "contracts" covering their work, giving them a measure of security. The system was apparently resorted to increasingly, especially in urban areas, during the occupation.

12) Expressions of thanks for our help.

13) Problems concerning pensions and pension funds.

C. Problems concerning business:

1) About letters of permission for buying and selling goods.

2) About arrests and the looting of goods.

3) Mediating requests for permission to leave goods in the marketplace overnight.²⁶

4) Requests for information on problems in business and business firms.

5) About arrests related to the price of goods being sold.²⁷

6) Complaints about the directors of the economy and the sale of rice, oil, and other things in several daerah.

7) Requests for guidance on how to get permission to transport goods to Sumatra and other islands.²⁸

8) Problems of getting permission to transport agricultural products from one place to another.

D. Problems concerning debts and credit:

1) Problems regarding pawning and unconditional sales.

2) Problems regarding debts and credit.

3) Problems regarding debts and credit accepted without written contract.

26. One Japanese regulation that was particularly burdensome to small businessmen was that requiring them to remove all goods from their marketplace establishments for the night. The purpose of the law was to curb looting and theft.

27. Especially during the first two years of the occupation, the Japanese carried out a vigorous campaign against inflation, with varying degrees of success. Chinese tradesmen were the most frequent targets of price investigations.

28. There were limitations on movements between the three Japanese administrative units in the archipelago, and travel between them was minimal after the first half year of occupation. Apart from security regulations, the lack of transportation facilities made inter-island travel difficult.

4) *Idjon* [buying rice when it is still unripe and unharvested] and other practices.

E. Other problems:

- 1) Requests for help in becoming Indonesian citizens again.²⁹
- 2) Turning in [old political] identification papers.
- 3) Distribution of clothing material.
- 4) Guidance in setting up associations.
- 5) Requests for help in returning home to Sumatra and other places outside Java.
- 6) Miscellaneous.

Charity work. When Putera Headquarters was first set up, the Public Welfare Section received several citizens' donations for charity work. This money was used to help deserving people, for example, people in dire straits, their husbands having died or been in accidents; people in Djakarta who were unable to get work and wanted to return to their villages; people who wanted to visit their families because of pressing needs but who were prevented from doing so because of lack of funds; and so forth. But in light of the view that Putera should not be engaged in collecting contributions from the public, at first no effort was made to collect any money for charitable purposes.

Because of the earthquake which shook almost all of Java in June 1943 and caused many casualties, with the permission of His Excellency the Gunseikan, Putera appealed to all the inhabitants of Java to contribute to the aid of victims through Putera Headquarters and also branches in Djakarta, Bandung, Semarang, Djogjakarta, Surakarta, Surabaya and Malang.

The amounts of the donations received between August 1, 1943, and September 10, 1943, were as follows:

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29. The reference is primarily to Eurasians who, during the period of Dutch rule, had taken out Dutch citizenship, in most cases to better their social and political status. During the occupation, however, it became advantageous to sever attachments to the old European regime, and many attempted to shed their Dutch citizenship. According to Hatta, relatively few were successful in doing so.

Received directly by Headquarters	f. 3,882.77½
Received by the Djakarta branch	294.63½
Received by the Priangan branch (contributions for Headquarters, forwarded by Priangan)	12.15
Received by the Malang branch	3,086.79
Received by the Surabaya branch	<u>7,586.08</u>
Total	f. 14,862.43

It should be noted here that the Priangan Shū branch of Putera was not permitted to accept donations for the above cause, while the branches in Djogjakarta, Solo and Semarang received amounts totaling as follows:

Djogjakarta (to September 7, 1943)	f. 913.71
Solo (to September 2, 1943)	2,635.22
Semarang (to September 1, 1943)	158.42

The above three branches were obliged to turn over the donations they received to committees in their localities. Thus Putera's attempt to collect as many contributions as possible was severely limited. Limited first because it could only carry out fund raising in daerah where Putera branches were already established (it was not permitted to do anything outside these areas); second, several branches were not permitted to collect contributions for this charitable purpose.

These are the reasons why the number of contributions collected was actually not very large.

The distribution of the above-mentioned money was mostly undertaken by the head of the Public Welfare Section of Putera Headquarters, Mr. Samsoedin himself, in West and Central Java. The rest was sent by mail through the individual shūchōkan. It also should be explained that contributions totaling f. 174.80 for Ponorogo Ken have not yet been sent to the Madiun Shūchōkan because there was no response from him to our letter on the subject.

In order to deliver the donations, the head of the Public Welfare Section took a trip to the areas of Pekalongan, Pematang, Brebes, Tegal, Purwokerto, Tjilatjap, Magelang, Purworedjo, Kutoardjo, Kebumen, Tasikmalaja, and other places. This trip was also used to look into all matters related to public welfare in those areas. In the course of the trip, the section head acquired a great deal of information and material of real importance to future efforts. The conclusions drawn from the thoughts gathered on that trip are presented as the basic points of this report.

Although donations for earthquake victims were no longer received after September 10, 1943, Putera Headquarters continued to receive donations for other charitable purposes to the amount of f. 2,508.87. Out of this sum, we spent f. 554.38 on deserving individuals, leaving a balance of f. 1,954.49.

Following these efforts to aid victims of the earthquake and floods, and other small-scale charity efforts, after December 1943 plans were made for a drive to bring clothing to every person on Java and Madura. This project came about after the head of the Public Welfare Section heard about or personally saw the lack of clothing suffered by people in the villages and mountain areas of several daerah, especially in Central and East Java. Hopefully this will be one program that is put into operation immediately by the Hōkōkai, so that private charity (not the government) can give help to those who are forced to go stark naked, half naked or dressed in rags that are really no longer fit to be worn by human beings. The clothing distribution carried out last March 9 to benefit peasants who were genuinely working hard in their fields certainly has reduced the difficulties mentioned above. However, because this distribution of clothing reached only 10% of the population, many more clothing shortage problems require the Hōkōkai's attention.

Projects in the field of labor. The results of work done in connection with labor really have been very satisfactory. Satisfactory especially when one considers the lack of equipment and personnel with which this work had to be accomplished.

When Putera Headquarters was first opened, there were many visits from unemployed people who were only looking for a job with Putera. The number of visits paid by those seeking work grew as time went on. To help these people, an attempt was made to set up connections between the Public Welfare Section and both government and private offices. The establishment of these connections had excellent results for placing the unemployed.

Included below are a number of firms, offices and so forth maintaining very good relationships with Putera in helping the unemployed find jobs:

1. Office of the R.S.K. Auto Repair Shop
2. Office in charge of the Public Corporation for Plantations, Military Administration
3. Office of Irrigation and Communications
4. Social Division of the Office of Special Municipalities
5. Office of the Naval Engineering Department
6. Djakarta Bureau of Passenger Transportation
7. The Tiga Pindo Trading Company
8. Diesel Automobile Company Ltd.

9. Java Bay Stevedoring Company
10. Maritime Bureau Office
11. Office of the Southern Territories Development Company and other offices at Tandjung Priok
12. Association of Djakarta Municipal Public Transportation Enterprises
13. Statistics Office
14. Printing Office, Java Military Administration
15. Malaria Eradication Branch, Bureau of Hygiene, Department of Internal Affairs, Military Administration
16. Public Corporation for the Control of Private Estates
17. Kantor Korra [?]
18. Navy Office
19. Mediation Office, "Eswe" Trading Company [?]
20. Public Corporation of Plantations
21. Office of S.S. Djakarta and Manggarai [?]
22. Post Offices in Djakarta Municipality, Pasar Baru and Harmoni
23. The Saleh Store
24. Dai Ni [?] Office
25. Bus Department of the General Bureau of Land Transportation
26. Bodjong Gedeh Private Estate
27. Office of the Department of General Affairs
28. The Bata Shoe Factory
29. Tandjung Advertising Company
30. Office of the *Asia Raya* Newspaper
31. Office of the Department of Education
32. Office of Porti [?]

Besides the above, there were many other firms who have given help in placing the unemployed.

The success of these efforts can be read below:

Period of time	Number of people who registered with Headquarters, Public Welfare Sec.	Number of people who were helped to get jobs
April 19-May 1, 1943	218	-
May 1-May 8, 1943	25	-
May 9-May 15, 1943	80	-
May 16-May 22, 1943	68	9
May 23-May 29, 1943	52	17
		Total for April 19- May 29: <u>26</u>
May 30-June 5, 1943	81	65
June 6-June 12, 1943	96	55
June 13-June 19, 1943	55	57
June 20-June 26, 1943	43	72
June 27-July 3, 1943	45	12
		Total for June: <u>261</u>

Period of time	Number of people who registered with Headquarters, Public Welfare Sec.	Number of people who were helped to get jobs
July 4-July 10, 1943	66	25
July 11-July 17, 1943	62	27
July 18-July 24, 1943	77	29
July 25-July 31, 1943	77	46
		Total for July: <u>127</u>
August 1-7, 1943	138	68
August 8-14, 1943	83	67
August 15-21, 1943	100	73
August 22-28, 1943	137	68
		Total for August: <u>276</u>
August 29-September 4, 1943	181	89
September 5-12, 1943	147	47
September 13-18, 1943	103	137
September 19-25, 1943	57	237
September 26-October 2, 1943	15	68
		Total for September: <u>578</u>
October 3-9, 1943	152	104
October 10-16, 1943	133	266
October 17-23, 1943	138	199
October 24-31, 1943	192	94
		Total for October: <u>663</u>
November 1-7, 1943	117	247
November 8-14, 1943	176	157
November 15-21, 1943	129	55
November 22-28, 1943	106	136
		Total for November: <u>595</u>
November 29-December 5, 1943	99	130
December 6-12, 1943	82	71
December 13-19, 1943	49	99
December 20-26, 1943	55	144
December 27-31, 1943	41	147
		Total for December: <u>591</u>
January 3-9, 1944	86	49
January 10-16, 1944	66	104
January 17-23, 1944	31	152
January 24-30, 1944	54	266
		Total for January: <u>571</u>
Added by the writer ³⁰	<u>245</u>	—
Total, April 19, 1943- January 31, 1944	4,001	3,688

30. The original has *tjatatan dari penulis* but the meaning is obscure. Hatta remarked that, since his reports were drawn up from materials compiled by the various Putera section heads, "the writer" was probably the Head of the Economic Affairs Section, but the intent of the notation remained unclear.

The above list proves that the results of this activity were exceedingly satisfactory. Out of 4,001 who signed up, 3,688, or 92%, were given help.

It should perhaps be noted that from our books one can tell who, when, and what sort of job was obtained by each individual being helped. It should also be explained that there were many kinds of jobs involved. Not only were there jobs for houseboys, maids, day laborers, foremen and chauffeurs, but also many skilled-labor jobs for ironsmiths, carpenters and mechanics. There were also office jobs of many kinds in many varieties of offices, whose requirements ranged from an elementary school education to a senior high school certificate.

In this labor work, it was also necessary to guard against situations among laborers which might have had unfortunate results. In such cases, the Public Welfare Section acted as a mediator between laborers and management. For this work, attempts were made to set up connections with the government Labor Bureau. Talks were very frequently held with this office on labor matters.

The atmosphere in the field of labor, as far as we were able to gather from what was brought before us and from what we picked up here and there and in the daerah, is as follows:

In general there is no longer any unemployment. *It is not the people who need jobs, but the jobs that need people.* The exception to this is the *pensioners*, whose pensions have disappeared, but who are too old to go back to work in an atmosphere that requires more than the usual effort and strength. Also, these pensioners generally have large family responsibilities. Contributions from charity groups and friends are not enough, and usually they are forced to sell their household goods and other things little by little. Inevitably their standard of living has declined steadily. The fate of the pensioners requires quick attention and improvement.

As has already been stated, at this time jobs are not being sought, but do the seeking. So at present the size of the working population is greater than ever before. Therefore we have to become more deeply acquainted with the laborer and pay more attention to his position and fate.

In places where there were large concentrations of day laborers, we often heard reports that considerable improvement was required for medical protection against malaria, dysentery, typhus, etc. We urge the government to undertake a comprehensive investigation of this problem. Aside from this health question, the government should also pay attention to the *problem of wages*, especially the wages of day laborers. A day

laborer's wages should cover the costs of his daily needs. Here and there one hears talk that wages are not really in step with the rising cost of living. This also requires the immediate attention and supervision of the government.

Another problem in the field of labor needing investigation is that of the so-called "Employment Service" of the government. As everyone knows, there has been a great deal of uncultivated brushland opened up for the purpose of growing food. This work should certainly get support from all levels. But frequently things happen which do not benefit the people but do exactly the opposite.

For example, in one daerah some land was opened up. If those who were obliged to do this work had been only people from villages nearby, in general this program would not have disrupted the ordinary activities and source of livelihood of these people. But very often people from villages 30 to 50 kilometers away, bringing their own food, were forced to work on the land that was being cleared. It is perhaps unnecessary to explain that such things do not benefit the people, but do exactly the opposite.

III. Conclusion

It seems proper to analyze at the end of this report a problem which surprised those who did not really understand the organizational complexities of Putera.

People often asked, "Why are there so many directors and other office personnel connected with Putera? At Headquarters alone there are 112 people, and in the daerah there is not one branch with less than 30. If this is compared with the situation of the activist associations under the Dutch, it is larger by an extraordinary degree. In those days the general director and his staff numbered perhaps no more than fifteen people, branch directors between five and ten people, and sometimes under five. Isn't the present composition of Putera excessively bulky?"

Comparisons of this sort are very unbalanced, because the activists' efforts earlier were quite different from those of Putera. In addition, the activist groups had members in the tens of thousands. Besides the directors, there were people called "cadres" who had previously been given special training. They were enthusiastic in helping the directors in their work. Also among the members were a great many who helped as propagandists and so forth. All these staff members were helpful to the directors, and should therefore really be counted as aides.

In this connection, in order to lighten the financial strain on the organization, one or two of the directors did not work full time, and only came to the office at night. During the day he did his regular job as a government worker, as an employee of a private firm or as a journalist.

With Putera it was quite different. Putera had no members to help it carry on its organizational activities. Therefore, everyone who worked for Putera had to do so as a leader, aide, or staff worker. The number of aides and staff was unusually large not only because their help was required for everyday work, but also because they had to be trained to be competent in carrying out the responsibilities of a branch director at a later date. When they were thought to be capable of this, they were placed in the various branches.

The government did not permit its civil servants to become members of the Putera directorates. Therefore these directorates had to be chosen from groups of activists who were not government employees. For that reason they had to be given wages out of Putera coffers so they could earn a living.

There were several difficulties as far as setting their wages was concerned. Among them were some who had lived lives of sacrifice and unreserved service to their native land, refusing official rank and living in poverty. If their talents, which had been developed in the practical work of the activist movement, were no less than those of civil servants--even though they did not graduate from colleges--must they still be asked to sacrifice themselves for pittance of f. 15, f. 20, or f.25?

Clearly not, since today their responsibilities to the government are really no different from those of ordinary civil servants. Why should civil servants, who previously made no sacrifices and lived in comfort like the Dutch, get more than those who made sacrifices before and now are helping the Japanese Government? Granted, a diploma deserves respect; but on the other hand, skills and knowledge that are gained in the struggle and through independent study deserve no less respect.

So even though there were, among the activists (who in the old days never received a salary and lived in poverty), some who received between f. 100 and f. 150, on the average the salaries in Putera were still far lower than the base pay established by the government [for its workers]. There were even Putera directors who gave up rank or good positions to contribute their energies to Putera activities for salaries which were far lower than what they received before, sometimes only as much as two-thirds.

So much for explaining why Putera had a large number of salaried aides and staff.

On balance, Putera accomplished a number of things, but there also was much that it could not do satisfactorily. The reasons for this were that its scope was very limited and its personnel quite insufficient. With a staff of only a little more than 500, it was supposed to unite the people behind the government in order to achieve the final victory in the present Greater East Asia War.

The disbanding of Putera after a year of activity has deeply saddened the Putera people themselves, and created a state of bewilderment in some quarters among the people. People are asking themselves, "Where do we go from here?" That is why the Jawa Hōkōkai has generally received a very cool reception.

On the other hand, nobody regrets Putera's dissolution very deeply. There is only a vague sadness that Putera was never able to give the people what they hoped for.

Djakarta, March 25, 1944

Former General Director of Putera,
(signed) Moh. Hatta