

SOME FACTORS RELATED TO AUTONOMY AND
DEPENDENCE IN TWELVE JAVANESE VILLAGES

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INTERIM REPORTS SERIES

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A Note Concerning the *Interim Reports Series*

One of the distressing aspects of contemporary scholarship is the substantial interval that often intervenes between the completion of field research and the first appearance of writings descriptive of its findings. American scholarship relating to Indonesia has been no exception, and here this delay has been particularly regrettable inasmuch as the extent of research being undertaken is so limited. With respect to much of the research carried out in post-revolutionary Indonesia there has been a lag of two to three or more years between the termination of field work and the first publication describing its results. From this situation stem a number of unfortunate consequences. Scholars and others having a serious interest in the country, Indonesians as well as Americans, are sometimes required to wait so long before seeing the results of such research that when finally available its importance to them has appreciably diminished. Moreover, because they are kept for so long in the dark as to the course and character of this earlier but as yet unreported work, they frequently are obliged to spend time in unnecessarily laying foundations their predecessors have laid but not yet divulged and in undertaking analysis of data similar to that already collected and analyzed or largely analyzed. Thus all too often contemporary students of Indonesia waste much precious time and effort in duplicating or roughly duplicating what has already been done or is in the process of being completed, instead of utilizing such materials, building on them, and possibly refining them. Parenthetically it might be observed that some of those perfectionists who insist that their name appear in print only when attached to a body of material wherein each word has been given its final polish are deprived of what might well have been healthy and useful criticism by those who would have been interested in reading their work at some earlier stage of its processing. Also this reluctance to publish findings sooner sometimes puzzles Indonesians, because frequently for several years they look in vain for some published account of research for which they smoothed the way or in which they actually participated. Consequently some of them tend to doubt the usefulness of American scholars undertaking research in their country.

The object of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project's *Interim Reports Series* is to avoid insofar as possible the situation described above. Wherever feasible those undertaking research in connection with our project will prepare preliminary reports concerning salient aspects of their study well before publication of their relatively finished monographs or articles. Our object, then, is to make available in provisional form what we believe to be some of the more important of our findings soon enough to be of maximum usefulness to others engaging in studies relating to Indonesia or having a serious interest in the topics with which our work is concerned. It is our hope that by doing so we will be of help both to interested Indonesians and to students of Indonesia in the United States and other countries. In thus submitting *Interim Reports* for early publication the members of our group will generally be doing so prior to command of all relevant data or before this data has been completely analyzed. Certainly they will be submitting them without having had an opportunity to cast them in finished written form. It should therefore be emphasized that these preliminary reports are to be considered as explicitly tentative and provisional in character. It is our expectation that most of them will be followed by later publications bearing on the same subject of a less tentative and more solid character. We hope that our *Interim Reports* will elicit candid and open criticism from interested persons reading them. For we believe that thereby we will benefit, and that in many cases such criticisms will point the way to better analysis of the data in hand and/or further research on facets of the subject so far not adequately covered. Thus we cordially invite and welcome such criticism. We would appreciate it if those inclined to offer it would write to the author in question, c/o Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, Southeast Asia Program, Department of Far Eastern Studies, Cornell University, Ithaca, New York.

George McT. Kahin
Director

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PREFACE

The paucity of knowledge concerning the basic characteristics of Indonesian village life has been widely remarked in governmental and educational circles in Indonesia. Unfortunately most qualified Indonesians are so weighed down by governmental or teaching responsibilities as to make it impossible for them to devote sufficient time to the research that is so badly needed. Thus, it is indeed fortunate that Professor Sumitro Djojohadikusumo, Dean of the University of Indonesia's Faculty of Economics, has for some time been encouraging his graduate students to devote a part of their time to field research. It was because of this enlightened policy that individuals were available to carry out research during 1955 and 1956 in 23 Javanese and 14 Sumatran villages.

One of the major interests of the staff of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project being Indonesian village organization, in particular the changes which have occurred during and since the revolution, we have been happy to have had an opportunity to cooperate in this research. In helping support this work, it has been our hope that not only would Indonesians be receiving useful training and their country's yet slender stock of knowledge concerning the way of life of three-quarters of its inhabitants be enriched, but that at the same time a contribution would be made towards advancing the frontiers of anthropology and political science.

While the students undertaking this research were usually able to spend no more than six weeks in any one village, this limitation was, we believe, to a significant extent offset by their being assigned to villages where they commanded a fluency in the local language and because on the whole they were a singularly intelligent and mature group of young men. While the research guide used by the students for the anthropological and political science aspects of their research had a number of limitations, as the work progressed (most villages were visited at least twice) the guide was amended and improved on the basis of the experience gained. Particularly helpful were the improvements suggested by Widjojo Nitisastro, T. Umar Ali, and Ismael--the three men who undertook the major role in supervising the research.

In planning this study and in constructing the research guide I was fortunate enough to have valuable guidance from the experienced hand of Professor Djokosutono, Dean of the Faculty of Law and Political Science at the University of Indonesia, and to him I am particularly indebted. In addition, I should like to express my gratitude to President Soekarno, former Vice-President Hatta, and Dr. Bahder Djohan--President of the University of Indonesia--for the encouragement they gave me.

The preponderant part of the analysis of the data collected in this village research is being undertaken by graduate students at the University of Indonesia. The Cornell Modern Indonesia Project's contribution is minor and peripheral, relating primarily to certain aspects more easily undertaken in Ithaca because of the availability of analytical techniques not yet available in Indonesia. Two Indonesians studying at Cornell have participated in this analysis and will thus be able to carry these techniques back to Indonesia when they return.

This report by Dr. Barbara Dohrenwend represents the first of the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project's efforts to supplement the main body of analysis being undertaken at the University of Indonesia. We expect several other reports to follow, at least one by an Indonesian studying at Cornell. Dr. Dohrenwend holds a Ph.D. in Social Psychology from Columbia University and has had considerable previous experience in sociological analysis, having been co-director of the Cornell Field Methods Training Program from 1953-1955. She is currently Research Associate in the Cornell Modern Indonesia Project.

Ithaca, New York
July 12, 1957

George MCT. Kahin
Director

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am indebted to Mr. Gerald Maryanov for the help he has given generously throughout the preparation of this report. Mr. Maryanov provided information about contemporary Indonesia at many points where the author's knowledge of the area was insufficient. He also read and criticized the manuscript. Without his help, the preparation of this report would have been very much more difficult.

Mr. Selosoemardjan also provided information on a number of points, and Professor George McT. Kahin, Mr. Robert Bone, and Dr. Bruce Dohrenwend read and criticized the manuscript. All helped to eliminate errors of fact and possible misinterpretations of the data. Neither they or Mr. Maryanov are, of course, responsible for inadequacies which may remain in the final product.

Assistance in the tedious and difficult task of coding the interview data was provided by Mr. Harsja W. Bachtiar, Mrs. Margaret Bruno, Mrs. Elana Duberman and Mr. Kismadi.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

	page
PREFACE	i
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS	iii
LIST OF TABLES	ix
INTRODUCTION	1
DATA AND PROCEDURES OF ANALYSIS	5
Political Data	6
Analytic Classification of Political Data	6
Events and Practices	6
Types of Problems and Projects	9
Initiations and Reactions	11
Initiators and Reactors	15
Economic and Demographic Data	17
Summary: Data and Procedures of Analysis	17
DEGREES OF RESPONSIBILITY EXERCISED BY DESAS IN GOVERNING THEIR AFFAIRS	19
Definition of Desa Affairs	19
Three Ways of Handling a Desa Project	19
How the Twelve Desas Handle Their Affairs	26
Summary: Degrees of Desa Responsibility	29
INFLUENCES FROM LARGE CITIES AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY	31
Physical Accessibility of the Desas from Large Cities	31
Magazines and Newspapers	33
Summary: Influences from Large Cities and Desa Responsibility	34

	page
INTERVENTION BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN DESA AFFAIRS AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY	36
Degree of Government Intervention in Desa Affairs	36
Relation of Government Intervention to Desa Responsibility	37
Desa Reactions to Government Initiations	39
Government Intervention, Uncooperative Reactions and Desa Responsibility	42
Summary: Intervention by Government Agencies and Desa Responsibility	42
RELATION OF SIZE AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN THE DESA TO DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY	43
Size of Desa	43
Economic Conditions	44
Size of Desa and Economic Conditions	48
Summary: Relation of Size and Economic Conditions to Desa Responsibility	48
CONFLICT AND LEADERSHIP IN THE DESA IN RELATION TO DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY	50
Conflict within the Desa	50
Form of Desa Leadership	51
Combined Effects of Internal Conflict and Form of Leadership	53
Size of Desa in Relation to Internal Conflict and Form of Leadership	54
Summary: Conflict and Leadership in the Desa in Relation to Desa Responsibility	57
CONCLUSIONS	58
Extent of Desa Responsibility	58
Relations between Desas and Government Agencies	58
Characteristics of the Desa Related to Degree of Desa Responsibility	58

APPENDIXES

A. Informants for Interviews Concerning Decision-making and Political Participation in the Desa	61
B. Questions in Interviewers' Guide Concerning Decision-making and Political Participation in the Desa	63
C. List of Empirical Subcategories Describing Desa Projects Included in the Study	65
D. Reliability of Classification of Interview Data in Analytic Categories	67
E. Newspapers and Magazines Received in the Twelve Desas Classified According to Political Leaning on the Basis of Information in the 1954-1955 Almanak Pers Indonesia (Indonesian Press Almanac), the 1954-1955 Daftar Harian/Madjalah Seluruh Indonesia (List of Newspapers and Magazines throughout Indonesia), and the Judgments of Informed Persons	70

LIST OF TABLES

	page
Locations of Desas in Administrative Units	5
Subjects of Projects Handled Entirely within the Desa by One or More Desas	26
Degree of Self-sufficiency in the Twelve Desas	27
Subjects of Projects for Which Participation is Sought Both Inside and Outside the Desa by One or More Desas	28
Degree of Responsibility for Desa Affairs in the Twelve Desas	29
Subjects of Projects Turned Over or Intended to be Turned Over Entirely to Government Agencies by One or More Desas	29
Physical Accessibility of Desa from a Large City and Degree of Desa Responsibility	32
Number of Newspapers and Magazines Read in a Desa and Degree of Desa Responsibility	33
Political Leanings of Newspapers and Magazines Read in a Desa and Degree of Desa Responsibility	35
Degree of Intervention by Government Agencies in Desa Affairs	37
Degree of Intervention by Government Agencies in Desa Affairs and Degree of Desa Responsibility	38
Relation of Consistency of Action to Noncooperation by Desas According to Different Degrees of Desa Responsibility	40
Size of Desa Population and Degree of Desa Responsibility	44
Desa Self-sufficiency and Degree of Desa Responsibility	45
Relative Desa Wealth and Degree of Desa Responsibility	46
Physical Ecology and Degree of Desa Responsibility	47
Major Sources of Income and Physical Ecology in Relation to Degree of Desa Responsibility	47
Internal Conflict and Degree of Desa Responsibility	51

	page
Predominant Form of Official Leadership and Degree of Desa Responsibility	52
Relation of Form of Official Leadership and Presence or Absence of Internal Conflict to Degree of Desa Responsibility	53
Size of Desa Population and Presence or Absence of Internal Conflict	55
Size of Desa Population and Form. of Official Desa Leadership	55
Relation among Size, Favorability of Conflict and Leadership for Desa Responsibility and Degree of Desa Responsibility	56
Percentages of Agreement between Pairs of Independent Coders	67

INTRODUCTION

The importance of understanding the Javanese desa is agreed upon both among Indonesians and among students of Indonesia. For example, in a recent article on local government in Java, Robert Jay pointed out:

One of the critical planes cutting across this system of hierarchical government units lies between the fifth (ketjaman) and sixth (desa) levels, for it is here that the closest contact occurs between the local population and the central government. Above this plane, the officials are all appointed by the central government. They are mostly town-bred and town-oriented, comparatively well-educated, often not from the local area, and are frequently rotated from region to region. Their loyalties and hopes for advancement are directed toward the higher levels of the central government. Below this plane, the officials are elected (with permanent tenure) by the populations of their administrative units, depend heavily for support upon their neighborhood groups, have not normally acquired superior educations, and identify themselves largely with the values of the rural population. There is no chance for advancement through the sixth to the fifth level. (1)

Above the level of the desa the people have, at best, only indirect control over government officials. At the level of the desa, the people can influence their leaders much more directly. Furthermore, it is almost entirely through the officials of the desa that the people must channel their desires for government action to officials in the central or regional government hierarchy. The desa is, then, both the highest level of locally controlled government, and the level of contact between the local population and government officials.

Interest in the desa is, however, determined at least as much by its place in plans for decentralization as by its present position in the governmental hierarchy. The 1957 law on decentralization states the general principle:

The territory of the Republic of Indonesia is divided into large and small regions, which have the right to govern their own affairs, and which will be formed into, at most, three levels, the ranking of which, from top to bottom is:

(1) "Local government in central Java," The Far Eastern Quarterly, 1956, 15, p. 221.

- a. Region level I, including the municipality of Greater Jakarta
- b. Region level II, including municipalities
- c. Region level III. (2)

In the official clarification of this law the third level is discussed:

/Matters concerning the division into levels/ cannot be separated from the regional understanding of the lowest level of community, which we call the legal community... In Java the name /of the legal community/ is desa. The desa is a legal community which is not subdivided into lower legal communities, and does not form part of another legal community, according to customary law, so that the desa stands by itself. It has its own territory, population, authorities and, perhaps also, property, while the customary law valid in any particular desa is truly homogeneous. (3)

In Java the desa is, then, the third level which is to have the right to govern its own affairs. The lawmakers suggest, however, that existing desas may not be able to carry out this function. In the clarification of the 1948 decentralization law they state:

In actuality, the desa as it now exists is not sufficiently broad to become a desa with the right to govern its own affairs according to this law. Because of that there must be consolidation first, but the work of consolidation is very difficult and time consuming. Therefore, it is still being investigated as to whether or not the results we hope for can be achieved without consolidating first, but rather forming present desas into autonomous regions (with the right to govern their own affairs) according to this law, and after that guiding them towards cooperation so that this guidance would give rise to a feeling of the need to consolidate. (4)

The problem is discussed further in the clarification of the 1957 decentralization law:

In principle, it would be most unwise to have an autonomous unit which is merely constructed, without basing it on

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- (2) Republic of Indonesia, Law No. 1, 1957, Article 2, paragraph 1.
 - (3) Republic of Indonesia, Official clarification, Law No. 1, 1957, mimeographed text, p. 3.
 - (4) Republic of Indonesia, Official clarification, Law No. 22, 1948, Undang-undang Pokok tentang Pemerintahan Daerah, Jakarta: Noordhoff-Kolff N. V., p. 35.

the legal communities which already exist. A second principle is that a region to which we are giving autonomy should, as much as possible, be a community which truly possesses bonds of unity. Because of that it is intended that wherever, according to the conditions of the community, it is not yet possible to have three levels, for the time being only two levels will be formed. (5)

It appears, then, that the desa occupies a problematical position in the Indonesian decentralization program. While the desa is to have the right to govern its own affairs, there are serious questions about the ability of existing desas to assume this responsibility. Nevertheless, it is felt that units which are given autonomy must be "legal communities which already exist," such as the desas. Thus, the desa, as an existing legal community, is the focus of plans for the development of local autonomy at the lowest level, but inadequacies in the desa are seen as perhaps impeding the development of autonomy at the third level in Java.

This dilemma in the decentralization program raises the question: To what extent are existing desas capable of governing their own affairs? Further, under what conditions are they most likely to be capable of carrying this responsibility, and under what conditions least likely? While these are questions of considerable interest, data have not been available to provide any but the most impressionistic answers to them. In the present paper we report the results of a study based on data collected systematically in twelve desas in Java. While these results do not provide definitive answers on desa responsibility, they may help to clarify some problems involved in developing third level regional autonomy in Java. They also provide a number of suggestions for further research on the desa as a part of local government in Java.

One problem with which we had best deal before going further is: What do we mean by desa? Ter Haar provides a description of the general characteristics of the Javanese desa:

The Javanese desa is another type of community, whose base is purely territorial. Its constituency is formed of unrelated individuals and families....

The desa members are grouped into several sub-divisions: (1) the nuclear villagers..., who own agricultural lands and household compounds, and upon whom fall the full burden of citizenship; (2) those persons...who own either a household compound or agricultural lands and who bear some community responsibilities; (3) those persons...who own a house situated in another person's household compound, and persons who provide for their own food, or

(5) Republic of Indonesia, Official clarification, Law No. 1, 1957, mimeographed text, p. 3.

who work for the masters with whom they live. House-members..., i.e., members of the family group, do not form a separate class.

In Bantam, the desa consists of a number of quite small hamlets..., each with its own chiefs..., who function as intermediaries between the people of the hamlets and the desa chief..., who is aided by a pair of messengers.

A similar arrangement exists in the Preanger area, except that the hamlets... which make up the desa are widely scattered. The desa headman..., who is assisted by two policemen..., is superior to headmen of the hamlets.

In central and east Java, the actual desa is one central settlement..., frequently possessing a group of inferior hamlets.... The village chief..., who is aided by a number of assistants, has rather autocratic powers. (6)

This description brings out two important points. First, the structure of the desa is not uniform throughout Java. It may be composed of a number of more or less widely scattered hamlets, or it may consist largely of a single central settlement. Second, the desa is not the smallest community, nor the lowest level of local government. The hamlets which are grouped into desas are communities in their own right, with their own officials, and some extent of local responsibility and local government. In studying the desa, therefore, we are not dealing with the ultimate base of local government. We are dealing with the level of local government which coordinates some of the activities of the lower level, and comes into direct contact with the representatives of the central government.

The first question we shall ask our study of the desa in Java, is: To what extent do existing desas take responsibility for governing their affairs? We will then ask about factors which tend to promote or inhibit the ability of the desa to govern its affairs, beginning with factors in the larger political environment, moving then to external conditions immediately affecting the desa, and finally to conditions within the desa. We shall examine first the relation of the desa to urban centers to determine what effect, if any, influences from these centers have on the ability of the desa to govern its affairs. Our next question will concern the effect of actions by local representatives of higher levels of government on the ability of the desa to govern its affairs. Then we shall inquire into the relation between desa responsibility and certain nonpolitical characteristics of the desa. Finally, we shall consider the relationship between certain political factors within the desa and its ability to govern its affairs.

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- (5) B. ter Haar, Adat Law in Indonesia, Translated from the Dutch, edited with an Introduction by E. Adamson Hoebel and A. Arthur Schiller, New York: 1948, pp. 71-72.

DATA AND PROCEDURES OF ANALYSIS


This study is based on interviews and records collected by students from the University of Indonesia in twelve desas in Java during the period from December 1954 through the Fall of 1956. As shown on the map following, the desas are widely scattered. Three are in West Java, five in Central Java, and four in East Java. Their locations within administrative units are shown in Table 1.

Table 1

LOCATIONS OF DESAS IN ADMINISTRATIVE UNITS

Province	Residency	Regency	District	Sub-district	Desa
West Java	Bogor	Suka- bumi	Suka- bumi	Tjisaat	Tjibatu
	Jakarta	Subang	Subang	Pegaden Baru	Tandjung Baru
				Segala- herang	Tjidjeng- kol
Central Java	Kedu	Kebumen	Pedja- goan	Sruweng	Djabres
				Petana- han	Djogo- mertan
	Peka- longan	Peka- longan	Kadjen	Kesisi	Karijo- mukti
				Kadjen	Sinangoh- prendeng
East Java	Sura- karta	Wono- giri	Wurjan- toro	Eromoko	Tegal- hardjo
	Malang	Luma- djang	Luma- djang	Sonduro	Kandang- tepus
			Klakah	Ranu- joso	Ranu- joso
	Sura- baya	Modjo- kerto	Modjo- sari	Gedek	Batan- kradjan
				Modjo- sari	Kedung Gempol

LOCATIONS OF DESAS
(Names of twelve desas underlined)



The data available to us on these desas, and the procedures of analysis used to make these data comparable from one desa to another are described in the following sections.

Political Data

In each desa, the team of field workers interviewed from three to ten informants, almost all desa leaders, about decision-making and political participation in the desa. The complete list of informants appears in Appendix A. The political data used in the present study consist of descriptions by these informants of how problems and projects in the desa have been handled since the Revolution (since 1949). As might be expected, there are many discrepancies, particularly in details, in these reports. Rather than attempting to make any judgments about the relative accuracy of various informants, we have given equal weight to all reports. Where contradictions exist, therefore, they tend to cancel each other out. This procedure gives the not unreasonable result that matters on which there is greatest agreement among informants contribute more to the total picture than matters on which there is less agreement.

The guide which the field workers used for the interviews on decision-making and political participation in the desa includes a series of questions on things accomplished in the desa since 1949. (7) It further asks specifically for decisions and recommendations made by the desa assembly, by the desa council, and by the neighborhood associations, and about consultations by the desa head with leading desa inhabitants. General questions about the actions of the government at various levels in relation to the desa are also included. Thus, the guide is designed to elicit information about the part played by various levels in handling desa problems and projects, from the central government down to the neighborhood associations and leading desa inhabitants. The relevant questions from the interviewers' guide are listed in Appendix B.

Analytic Classification of Political Data

Events and Practices

In order to make the political material comparable from one desa to another, the desa leaders' descriptions of the handling of problems and projects were classified in a series of standardized categories. The degree of reliability between coders using these categories is described in Appendix D.

-
- (7) The interview guide used in the interviews on decision-making and political participation was designed by George McT. Kahin with the help of faculty and graduate students of the University of Indonesia.

First, all descriptions were divided into those concerning specific events and those concerning general practices. For example, the following statements are classified as concerning a specific event:

The most important project carried out in the desa since 1949 has been the erection of a prayer house in Tjibolang Girang, the work having been carried out by the inhabitants of Tjibolang. The idea came from the inhabitants of Tjibolang. The proposal was put forward by Kowilah. The proposal was discussed by the inhabitants. The discussions were held in the mosque after prayers on Fridays. No differing opinions were expressed during the discussions.

The following statement, on the other hand, is classified as concerning a general practice:

For repairs to the roads /the funds are acquired by the following means--/ those who are made responsible for the maintenance each of a section of road have this obligation carried out by workers employed for the purpose, the payment being furnished by a contribution of one kilogram of rice each harvest for each metre of road.

This differentiation is made because both general experience with interview data and specific instances in these interviews with desa leaders suggest that the former type of statement is more likely to be an accurate report of actual occurrences than the latter. Interviewers often find, when they are able to pursue the subject, that statements in the generalized form do not represent actual practice so much as a compromise between what is actually done and what the informant believes ought to be done. For example, in one interview the following practice is described:

A security guard is mounted each night, different groups of eight men taking over after every two nights...

Shortly, however, the informant adds:

...in actual practice the guard duty is performed by men who are paid about Rp. 50 per year and who are drawn from the anggulan group.

Without this correction, we would assume that, in fact, the security guard was carried out in this desa on a rotating basis rather than by a paid corps.

Unfortunately, the majority of the statements in the interviews describe generalized practices rather than specific events. In three desas we have supplementary interview material collected in 1956 in order to provide more data about specific events. Even in these desas, however, there are gaps which must be filled by reports of practices. In general, we have excluded entirely the most vague of the descriptions of practices, while using all de-

scriptions of specific events. Moreover, we have relied entirely on descriptions of events wherever they are sufficient.

Types of Problems and Projects

Each event or practice is classified in terms of the type of problem or project involved. The type of problem or project is described as:

1. either (a) primarily in the interest of the desa, or (b) primarily in the interest of persons or groups outside the desa
if it is primarily in the interest of the desa--
2. having as its subject, (a) the material well-being of the desa, or (b) administrative matters, or (c) religious matters, or (d) social festivities
3. having as its aim, (a) maintenance of an existing facility or institution, or (b) improvement or establishment of a facility or institution.

The three cases mentioned so far, the prayer house, road repairs and the security guard, would all be classified as primarily in the interest of the desa. Similarly, projects concerning irrigation works, bridges, dwellings, desa industry, health, education, desa elections, desa celebrations, and a variety of other such matters are classified as primarily of interest to the desa. In contrast, collection of government taxes, preparation for the national election, and transmigration, the program to relieve population pressures in Java by encouraging migration to the outer islands, are examples of matters classified as primarily in the interest of persons or groups outside the desa.

The great majority of projects described in the interviews with desa leaders are in the first group, matters primarily of interest to the desa. In the present study we are concerned only with these projects, not with activities which go on in the desa in connection with projects or problems which are not primarily local. We are concerned, that is, with how the affairs of the desa are handled, not with the implementation in the desa of extradesa affairs.

In the division into projects related to desa material well-being, administrative matters, religious matters, and social festivities, most projects fall into the first category. Within this category, projects are divided into subcategories developed directly from the contents of the interviews. The purpose of these subcategories is to provide specific labels which are comparable from one interview or one desa to another, and to indicate the contents of the general category, desa material well-being. Examples of these subcategories are roads, security guard, irrigation works, bridges, dwellings, handicraft industry, health, education, land transfers, marketing arrangement, local banks, and, finally, projects whose purpose is not clear except that they seem to concern desa well-being. The complete list of these subcategories is given in Appendix C.

We should note that all generalized descriptions of practices which fall into this last, nonspecific subcategory have been excluded from the analysis because of their vagueness. Examples of this type of report are:

The /desa/ assemblies discuss questions of importance to the desa, and when necessary take decisions.

The authority held by other desa officials is directly under the control of the desa head.

In this study we have, in other words, discounted the informants' vague generalizations, and relied, instead, on their reports of specific incidents to build up our own generalizations about decision-making and political participation in the desa.

Also excluded from the present study, but for different reasons, are reports about projects of the second type mentioned above, those related to administrative matters. Almost all of the reports in this category concern either the procedure for calling meetings or the procedure for electing or appointing desa officials. This is not to say that these procedures could not be profitably studied. We might, for example, ask the question: What relation exists between the degree of responsibility exercised by a desa in governing its affairs and the procedure for electing or appointing desa officials? In order to ask this question, however, we would have to describe degree of responsibility independently of the procedure for electing or appointing desa officials. We shall not, therefore, consider the procedure for electing or appointing desa officials, or procedures for calling desa meetings as intrinsic parts of desa responsibility, but rather as independent aspects of desa decision-making which might be studied in relation to degree of desa responsibility. When we describe degree of desa responsibility, we shall not include the second category of projects, administrative matters.

The third type of project among those primarily in the interest of the desa is religious, and the fourth type concerns social festivities. Within these general categories are subcategories which serve the same purpose as the subcategories under the first general category, desa material well-being. They are empirical groupings which provide common labels across interviews and across desas, as well as defining the contents of the general categories. Examples of the subcategories of religious projects are: mosques and prayer houses, religious schools, cemeteries. Most of the projects classified as desa social festivities are related to Independence Day celebrations. The complete list of these subcategories is given in Appendix C. It is these types of projects, along with those concerning desa material well-being, which we shall use to describe the degree of responsibility exercised by a desa.

The last set of categories used to describe problems or projects primarily in the interest of the desa is: (a) projects aimed at maintaining an existing facility or institution, (b) projects aimed at improving one or the other. Projects in the first category are

repetitious or cyclical, recurring at more or less regular intervals. Examples of projects in this category are: repair of irrigation channels, redistribution of communal land to landless desa inhabitants, repair or replacement of deteriorated dwellings. In contrast, projects in the second category are not repeated. An irrigation channel is built, a desa bank is founded, an extension is added to the school not over and over again but once. Of course, other irrigation channels may be built, or further extensions added to the school, but these projects do not repeat previous projects in the sense of redoing something which has been undone over time. Projects in the first category, maintenance projects, do repeat previous projects in just this sense. Irrigation channels must be cleaned and repaired every year; houses must be repaired or replaced periodically. This type of project is never finished. (8)

Initiations and reactions

In the next stage of classifying reports on the handling of projects, the descriptions were broken down to show the functions of the individuals or groups involved in each project. Individual or group functions were divided into initiations, and reactions, the latter being classified as positive or negative.

Actions classified as initiations include identifying a problem, suggesting or proclaiming a plan of action, suggesting or directing action, or any other act which calls for response or acknowledgement by others. Positive reactions include acceptance of the existence of the stated problem, acceptance of a plan, carrying out of suggested or directed action, or, in general, following the lead of the initiator. Negative reactions include rejection of the importance or existence of a stated problem, rejection of a plan, either with or without initiation of a counterplan, refusal to carry out suggested or directed action, or, in general, a refusal to follow the lead of the initiator.

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- (8) The differentiation between the categories of maintenance and improvement, while fairly clear conceptually, was not always clear when applied to the interview material because of the range of meaning of the Indonesian word memperbaiki. English equivalents for this word are: to improve; to rectify, to correct; to revise; to repair, to mend. Since these meanings include both maintenance (to repair, to mend) and improvement, our policy was to rely on the judgment of a translator who was not aware of the classification system to be used. If the person who decided on the proper translation of memperbaiki had known that his translation would determine whether a project was classified as maintenance or improvement, his translation might have been determined by preconceptions about these types of projects. Analysis of the data might then have revealed relationships involving maintenance and improvement projects which were, in fact, built in unwittingly by the translator. Since the translation was done, however, by a person with no knowledge of the way the data were to be analyzed, it is unlikely that any errors in the translation of memperbaiki produced consistent relationships in the data.

In addition to positive or negative, it was necessary to provide for a class of indeterminate reactions. This class includes cases in which insufficient information is given about the reaction to determine where, between the first two classes, it properly belongs. Many of the reactions included in the indeterminate category are probably apathetic or passive acceptance of another's initiation. Our impression is that informants frequently fail to give any information about apathetic reactions because these reactions lack clear characteristics to describe. The few reactions of apathetic acceptance which were explicitly described by the informants are included in the category, positive reaction. An early attempt to separate active from passive positive reactions, that is, to distinguish apathetic acceptance from active acceptance of another's initiation, proved unsuccessful largely because of the inadequacy of the data on passive reactions.

In addition to the class of indeterminate reactions it was necessary to have a class of indeterminate acts. These are acts about which insufficient information is given to determine whether they should be classified as initiations or reactions.

As suggested by the terms initiation and reaction, this system of classification is designed not simply to describe individual acts in isolation, but to locate, as well, related sequences of acts. Wherever chronological sequences are reported, therefore, the analytic categories are recorded so as to show which reaction applies to which initiation. An example of such a chronological series of acts is given in the following report:

Recently the inhabitants of Kedung Gempol formulated a resolution calling on the government to arrange for repairs to damaged dikes, and as a result the dikes were inspected. However, the Irrigation Department subsequently notified the desa that "because the department has not yet received funds from higher authorities, any repairs regarded by the desa as necessary should be effected by the inhabitants themselves by gotong-rojong /mutual aid/." Because Kedung Gempol is not in a position to effect the necessary repairs the dikes remain in a defective condition.

It should be noted that the parts of a report of this kind are not necessarily contiguous in the interview. In fact, the last sentence in the report just quoted appears several pages before the preceding sentences.

This report is described, in terms of the analytic categories, as:

1. Desa inhabitants initiate. ("Recently the inhabitants of Kedung Gempol formulated a resolution calling on the government to arrange for repairs to damaged dikes...")

2. Irrigation Department reacts positively. ("...and as a result the dikes were inspected.")
3. Irrigation Department reacts negatively. ("However, the Irrigation Department subsequently notified the desa that 'because the department has not yet received funds from higher authorities /they cannot act/,...'")
4. Irrigation Department initiates. ("...any repairs regarded by the desa as necessary should be effected by the inhabitants themselves by gotong-rojong'.")
5. Desa inhabitants react negatively. ("...the dikes remain in a defective condition.")

We see that the Irrigation Department first accepted, then rejected the desa's suggestion. Next the Department initiated its own counter-proposal, which the desa rejected.

A project which followed a somewhat different course and had a different outcome is the following:

The desa roads were broadened and hardened with stones so that trucks and buses could pass and would not get stuck when it rains. It can be said that all these projects /including broadening and hardening of the roads/ were initiated and carried out by the desa head himself in cooperation with other prominent desa leaders. All these ideas were discussed at the desa assembly. The strongest supporters were the desa youth. There were indeed some different opinions during these discussions, for instance around the problem whether the desa main road should be enlarged or not. After being well considered from both the economic as well as the social point of view, this project was finally unanimously approved. Those opposed were the conservatives. They said that the present road is sufficient since only horse-drawn vehicles will pass by.

This report is described in terms of the analytic categories as:

1. Desa head and prominent desa leaders initiate. ("...all these projects were initiated by the desa head himself in cooperation with other prominent desa leaders.")
2. Desa youth reacts positively. ("The strongest supporters were the desa youth.") Conservatives react negatively. ("Those opposed were the conservatives.")
3. Desa assembly reacts positively. ("All these ideas were discussed at the desa assembly. After being well considered...this project was finally unanimously approved.")

4. Desa inhabitants and desa leaders--indeterminate act. ("The desa roads were broadened and hardened...It can be said that all these projects were carried out by the desa head himself in cooperation with other prominent desa leaders.")

While the reactions to the original initiation by the desa head and prominent desa leaders were both positive and negative, the final reaction was positive. Also, unlike the repairs to dikes in Kedung Gempol, the project was carried out.

The last step of this sequence, the description of the fact that the project was actually carried out, illustrates the case in which information is inadequate to permit us to classify the act as either initiation or reaction. We know that the work was actually carried out, but we do not know who was responsible for initiating or directing it, and who for the actual execution.

Another kind of problem in classification is illustrated by the following statement:

The desa head also experimented with new rice planting methods proposed by the Department of Agriculture.

This statement is classified:

1. Department of Agriculture initiates. ("...new rice planting methods proposed by the Department of Agriculture.")
2. Desa head reacts positively. ("The desa head also experimented with new rice planting methods...")
Desa inhabitants--reaction indeterminate.

It is presumed that the Department of Agriculture proposal was not that the desa head alone should adopt these new rice planting methods, but, rather, that they should be adopted by the desa inhabitants in general. The fact that the desa head is experimenting with these methods suggests that the reaction of the desa inhabitants may not have been overwhelmingly in favor of them. Nevertheless, since we do not really have any information on what the desa inhabitants' reactions to the proposal were, we classify their reaction as indeterminate.

Sometimes, however, we classify a statement not only in terms of what is actually said but also in terms of what is implied. In the first example above, a statement was classified on the basis of its implied meaning in the third step of the classification:

3. Irrigation Department reacts negatively. ("However, the Irrigation Department subsequently notified the desa that 'because the department has not yet received funds from higher authorities /they cannot act/..'")

The classification, negative reaction, was based on the implied statement--they cannot act--rather than on what was reported explicitly. Statements are not classified on the basis of implied meaning, however, unless the implication is quite clear and unambiguous. Thus, we did not classify the desa inhabitants' reaction to the Department of Agriculture proposal concerning rice planting methods as negative, but as indeterminate, even though, as we pointed out, one might infer a negative reaction.

We sometimes cannot accept the explicit meaning of a statement as a basis for classification. The second example provides an illustration of a common form of this problem. The statement:

It can be said that all these projects were...carried out by the desa head himself in cooperation with other prominent desa leaders.

while somewhat vague, could be taken to mean that the desa head and other prominent desa leaders performed the physical labor involved in broadening and hardening the road. This interpretation seems so unlikely, however, that the classification of the statement was not based on it.

Initiators and Reactors

In classifying the data on the handling of desa problems and projects, we are interested in finding out which individuals and groups are involved, and how they are involved. Wherever possible, therefore, an actor, either individual or group, is designated in connection with each initiation and reaction. In all three of the examples given in the previous section, we see that these designations occur at every step.

For the present study, initiators and reactors are grouped into only a few categories. One category is labeled desa. Within this category are included individual desa inhabitants, informal groups of desa inhabitants, neighborhood associations, desa assembly, other desa organizations, and desa officials. For some purposes we differentiate between the desa head acting as an individual and the desa officials acting as a group.

The only other major category which we use to describe initiators or reactors is government agencies. In terms of the government hierarchy, this category includes the first level above the desa, the sub-district, the level above that, the district, less often that next level up, the regency, and infrequently the province. It is often not clear, however, whether the particular initiator or reactor is an official of the sub-district, district or regency as such, or an agent of the central government from, say, the Ministry of Agriculture or Ministry of Education, acting through the sub-district, district or regency office. Since both agriculture and education are legally designated as functions of the regency as an autonomous unit, but little is known about the extent to which these functions have actually been handed over to regencies by

the central government, we cannot safely make assumptions about who the initiator or reactor is when the report is ambiguous. Moreover, frequently the term government is used without qualification, but the contexts in which it is used suggest that it is not used only to designate the central government. Rather, it appears often to be a generic term for all officials and agencies connected in any way with any part of the governmental apparatus. In some cases, then, when we use the category, government agencies, we could be more specific, but in many cases we cannot be sure exactly what part of the central or regional government apparatus is referred to. We shall not, therefore, make any distinctions within the general category, government agencies.

Sometimes we could not be sure which actors should properly be designated in connection with a particular act because the necessary information was lacking. The following statement, for example, presents this problem:

During the last two years decisions have been taken by the desa assemblies on allocations of expenditure for repairs to the bridges.

This statement is classified:

1. Indeterminate actor initiates.
2. Desa assembly reacts positively. ("...decisions have been taken by the desa assemblies...")

This statement is not part of a series, but stands by itself. With this statement alone, it is impossible to tell where the initiative for allocation of funds for repairs to the bridges came from. It is not even possible to say whether the initiative came from within the assembly or not. In other words, it is not possible to say whether this decision involves the assembly following the lead of another, or whether it represents self determination of action by the assembly. Unfortunately, it is generally true that whenever we are forced to classify the actor as indeterminate, we find that we learn very little from the statement involved, given our present system of classification of data.

Despite the fact that all the information we would like is not always available in the report on a particular project, we have, through analysis of the interview data by the procedures just described, been able to collect a large amount of information which is comparable from desa to desa. We discover in each desa who takes the responsibility for initiation, and in relation to whom. We also discover who accepts and who rejects initiations from whom. In short, we get a picture of the exercise of responsibility and influence in the handling of projects in each desa.

Economic and Demographic Data

The major objective of the field workers was the collection of economic and demographic data from records, observations and interviews. These data are being analyzed elsewhere, but they have been used in the present study to supplement the political interviews.

For each desa we have the report compiled by the team of field workers on the economic and demographic characteristics of the desa. We have relied on these reports for information about the road leading to the desa, tax assessments, occupations of desa inhabitants, physical ecology, and size of desa.

Summary: Data and Procedures of Analysis

In interviews conducted by students from the University of Indonesia, leaders in twelve desa scattered throughout Java reported on decision-making and political participation in the desa. In order to make comparisons among desas, these data were classified in a series of standardized categories. The degree of reliability between coders using these categories is described in Appendix D.

In terms of these standardized categories, the political material which we shall use to describe degree of desa responsibility in governing its affairs, and to explore conditions related to different degrees of responsibility are:

1. Information in the form of descriptions of particular events and specific practices
2. Information about certain types of desa projects or problems:
 - a. Those which are primarily the concern of the desa
 - b. Those which are concerned with desa well-being, religious matters or social festivities
3. Classification of these projects as either
 - a. aimed at maintaining an existing facility or institution
 - b. aimed at improving or establishing a facility or institution
4. Wherever available, data on each desa project or problem concerning:
 - a. Who makes each initiation
 - b. Who reacts to each initiation, and whether he reacts positively or negatively.

Besides the information on decision-making and political participation in the desa, the field workers collected economic and demographic data in the desas. We shall use certain of these data in exploring conditions related to different degrees of desa responsibility.

DEGREES OF RESPONSIBILITY EXERCISED BY DESAS IN GOVERNING THEIR AFFAIRS

The first question we want to answer in this study is: To what extent do existing desas take responsibility for governing their own affairs? Before doing this, however, we will have to specify what we include in desa affairs, and what we mean by "take responsibility for governing." In the next section we will define desa affairs. Following that, we will describe three possible ways of handling a desa project. These three ways of handling individual projects will then be used as the basis for describing the different degrees of responsibility taken by the twelve desas in governing their affairs.

Definition of Desa Affairs

Desa affairs have, in fact, been specified in the process of classifying types of problems and projects handled in the desa. All projects or problems classified as primarily in the interest of the desa are desa affairs; all projects or problems classified as primarily in the interest of persons or groups outside the desa are not desa affairs. Borderline cases have, in general, been classified as desa affairs rather than not. For example, desa Kedung Gempol is built on reclaimed swamp land next to a river controlled by a dam. The dam prevents the river from flooding Kedung Gempol but the water provided by this dam serves a number of desas besides Kedung Gempol for irrigation. The state of the dam is not, then, strictly an affair of Kedung Gempol alone; it concerns as well the other desas dependent on it for water. Nevertheless, when it was reported that the inhabitants of Kedung Gempol had tried to get this dam repaired, the matter was classified by the coders as a desa affair rather than not.

Another type of borderline case which occurs in more than one desa concerns security. It is sometimes pointed out that efficient security measures are aimed not only at protecting the desa, but that, in combination with such measures in other desas, they help to protect the region as a whole. In general, activities which serve the interests of the desa as well as those of outsiders are classified as desa affairs. Affairs not of the desa, on the other hand, are those whose aim is to serve the inhabitants of the desa not directly, but indirectly as citizens of some larger political unit. Preparations for the national elections and the collection of non-desa taxes are the most frequently mentioned affairs in this category.

Three Ways of Handling a Desa Project

A desa may fail to take responsibility for governing its affairs for either of two reasons: because outsiders take over the governing of desa affairs, whether the desa inhabitants want them to or not, or because the desa inhabitants reject responsibility

for their affairs. In the first case, the lack of desa responsibility is imposed from outside; in the second case the inhabitants of the desa appear to be unwilling or unable to assume responsibility.

It is important to make this distinction because we want to discover conditions which tend to promote or inhibit the ability of a desa to take responsibility for its affairs. We must, therefore, first differentiate the desas on degree to which the inhabitants are willing or able to take responsibility, regardless of intervention in desa affairs by outsiders. We can then ask, among other questions, whether degree of responsibility taken by desa inhabitants is determined in any part by the extent of intervention by outsiders in the affairs of the desa. In order to determine the ability of the desa to take responsibility for its affairs apart from whatever conditions may be imposed from outside we shall be concerned at this point only with actions of persons and groups within the desa.

In order to see how we determine the ability of a desa to take responsibility for its affairs, let us consider three ways in which a project may be handled by the desa. First, all decisions about the project may be made in the desa, and all resources, e.g. labor, equipment, funds, supplied from within the desa, as in the following example:

Project--drainage ditch cover. This project was first discussed 21 December 1954, discussed further during Moslem holy month in 1954. Implementation was started 1 January 1955 and is not completed yet /as of 7 September 1956/. Purpose of the project--It is hoped that with this permanent cover, the temporary cover would not have to be continually replaced. Further, trucks and other traffic would be able to pass. The idea originated with the desa officials. The idea was discussed with the members of the neighborhood associations Abu, Dasim, Suhari and Tuwuh. Discussion took place at the neighborhood association meeting. The opinion of the originators was that it would be better to have a permanent cover than to have one that was always being damaged. Those invited to discuss it agreed. Attending the meeting were inhabitants of the desa, and there were no absences. Further, people from outside the desa could attend if they wanted to...The desa head reassured the inhabitants of the importance of making a permanent cover, because if it wasn't done, the cover would continually be damaged. This would use up expenses and energy. Further, this new cover would increase the prosperity of the desa.... The final decision was to agree with making the cover.... The final decision was taken at the desa assembly.... The plans turned around the form of the cover, whether it should be flat or arched. Sanawi favored flat, and Sidik favored arched. The plans were discussed with the respective groups, that is, the Sanawi group and the Sidik group. The discussion took place at the homes of

Dulhadi and Daram. The position of Sanawi was that a flat cover is better looking and cheaper. The position of Sidik was that an arched cover is stronger, and even though a little more expensive, is worth it for the added strength. Each group agreed with the group leader.... The desa head wanted an arched cover. Finally Sanawi agreed with Sidik's plan as desired by the desa head.... The leader in the implementation was Mod. Makus, a desa policeman. The people supplied the labor power. The Desa Social Institute supplied expenses to the amount of Rp. 1,200,

Although it is mentioned that people from outside the desa might attend the meetings at which this project was discussed, all decisions were apparently made by inhabitants of the desa, and labor and funds were supplied from within the desa.

The second way of handling a project is to seek assistance from outside the desa. The assistance may be financial or material aid, technical advice of a specialized nature, or general advice. A crucial characteristic of this method of handling a project, however, is that even when general advice is sought, planning and decision-making concerning the project is not given over entirely to outsiders. In all cases, some decisions about the project are made entirely within the desa. Often, all decisions are made within the desa, and the only assistance sought from outside is material or financial. For example, in the following case financial assistance is sought, probably for the purchase of building materials:

Proposals made by the desa for desa development: The market should be repaired; its buildings should be erected by the people themselves with Government money.

Another example in which material assistance is sought from outside, but all decisions are made within the desa is:

A project to close the leaks in the dam on the Sadar River, 30 August 1956, so that the water supply which irrigates the wet rice fields to the north of the Sadar River should flow properly. The project was the idea of Pak Gading, desa irrigation official. Gading discussed the project with Gendang, the head of dukuh (a section of a desa) Bangsri, with the head of desa Djotangan, the head of dukuh Belahan, the head of desa Ngimbangan, and with Djowongso of Kedungkudi /who is a desa messenger/; that is, a letter was brought to each of them by the assistant to the desa irrigation official, Rukiman of Gempolmalang, except for Djowongso, to whose house Gading came himself....The plan was to close the leaks in the gate of the dam on 30 August 1956. Labor power requested was ten people from each desa or dukuh, equipment and materials (leaves, fibers, rice straw) to be brought by each of the workers. Earth would be taken from the shore of the river. If the people from each

desa or dukuh (not including Kedungkudi) did not come on 30 August 1956, their desa or dukuh would not get water, and anyone not transmitting this request should resign. This plan was carried out.

Dukuh Bangsri and dukuh Belahan, and, of course, desa Djotangan and desa Ngimbengan are all outside desa Kedung Gempol. In this case, then, the desa called on neighboring desas or parts of neighboring desas for labor and materials needed to carry out a project, but did not include these communities in the planning of the project.

It should be pointed out that this project is exceptional in one respect. In this case assistance is sought in other desas, but usually the assistance is sought from government agencies above the desa, as in the first example, the market building.

The third way that a problem or project may be handled by the desa is to turn it over entirely to government agencies. In this case, no decisions are made in the desa except the original decision that a problem exists. No plans are made within the desa for dealing with the problem, and no action is taken by the desa to cope with it, except to suggest that a government agency should take care of it. For example, in one desa an informant indicates that the people of the desa want the government to provide new houses for them; this informant is also described as saying:

As desa head, /the informant/ is very desirous of improving the situation of the desa, but the economic resources of the desa population do not allow of the carrying out of necessary projects, as, for example, erection of new houses on a cooperative basis....

Apparently it has been decided in this desa that it is up to the government to deal with the problem of replacing dilapidated houses.

In order to determine which of the three methods was used for a particular project, we must know for each initiation in connection with the project by the desa, or persons or groups in the desa, whether the initiation was directed within the desa or outside the desa. We determine that an initiation is directed within the desa when the reactor is within the desa, and that the initiation is directed outside the desa when the reactor is outside the desa. We consider only initiations by persons or groups in the desa because our aim is to describe the extent to which the desa inhabitants are willing or able to take responsibility for their affairs, independently of the extent of intervention by outsiders in desa affairs. Initiations by outsiders will be examined when we take up the subject of outside intervention in the desa.

In terms of the analytic categories, then, we determine that a project is handled by the first method when we find that all initiations concerning the project by persons or groups in the desa were directed at other persons or group in the desa. For

instance, in the example of the drainage ditch cover, quoted on pp. 20-21, the initiators are:

desa officials

desa head

Sanawi

Sidik

Mod. Makus

all apparently inhabitants of the desa. Reactors in connection with this project are:

members of the neighborhood associations Abu, Dasim, Suhari and Tuwuh

all inhabitants of the desa

Sanawi's group

Sidik's group

Sanawi

the people

again, all apparently inhabitants of the desa. In addition, the Desa Social Institute played a part in the project; whether as initiator or reactor is not clear, but whichever it is makes no difference for the classification of the project as being handled by the first method, entirely within the desa.

The second method of handling a desa project is to seek assistance from outside on projects which are being acted on within the desa. We identify this method of handling a project when we find initiations by persons or groups in the desa directed both at persons or groups inside the desa and at persons or groups outside the desa. Thus, in the example concerning repair of the market, we find:

1. Desa initiates. ("Proposals made by the desa for desa development: The market should be repaired;...")
2. Desa inhabitants--reaction indeterminate. ("...its buildings should be erected by the people themselves...")
Government--reaction indeterminate. ("...its buildings should be erected...with Government money.")

The third method of handling a desa project is indicated when we find initiations concerning the project by persons or groups in the desa directed only at persons or groups outside the desa. In

the example concerning dwellings:

1. Desa inhabitants initiate. (The desa inhabitants want new houses.)
2. Government--reaction indeterminate. (The inhabitants want the government to provide new houses.)

Two points should be made about the way in which we have identified cases in which projects are handled by one method or another. First, it is not necessary that there be evidence that the desa has actually carried out the project. What we have looked for is evidence of public acceptance in the desa of the need for carrying out the project in a particular way. For example, in the illustration of the third method of handling desa projects, turning them over entirely to government agencies, there is no evidence that the inhabitants of the desa actually asked the government to build houses for them. The evidence is that they agreed that this would be the way to solve the problem of housing in the desa. We are dealing, then, with desa policy with regard to problems and projects, not necessarily with desa actions in this regard. When the policy is to handle the project entirely within the desa, or to handle it partly within the desa with assistance from outside, there is often no separation between policy and action; that is, publicly agreed upon intentions are usually carried out. When it comes to turning over a project entirely to government agencies, however, it is frequently unclear whether intentions have been carried out.

The second point about the identification of cases in which projects are handled one way or another concerns the nature of evidence of absence of action, or intention of acting on a project within the desa. In order to say that a project is being turned over entirely to government agencies, we must know that it is not, in fact, being taken up within the desa. In the example of the dwellings, there is explicit evidence that no action has been taken within the desa:

As desa head, /the informant/ is very desirous of improving the situation of the desa, but the economic resources of the desa population do not allow of the carrying out of necessary projects, as, for example, erection of new houses on a cooperative basis....

It is not often, however, that informants report lack of action or lack of intention to act. Rather than assuming that lack of such a report indicates that action within the desa on a project has been taken or is intended, we have assumed when no action or intention of action is reported in the desa, that none, in fact, exists. When initiation directed outside the desa is reported in connection with a particular problem, and no initiation directed within the desa is reported on the same problem, we classify the problem as one which the desa is turning over entirely to government agencies.

As a final step before we can determine the extent to which responsibility is exercised by the twelve desas, we must interpret the three methods of handling desa affairs in terms of the ability of the desa to take responsibility for its affairs. When a desa handles a project by the first method, plans and executes it entirely within the desa, the desa both takes responsibility for decision-making and has the financial, technical or other resources required for the project. To the extent that the desa handles projects by the first method, it is both able to take responsibility for its affairs and able to do without outside assistance, to be self-sufficient. When a desa handles a project by the second method, seeking assistance outside of the desa but making decisions about the project within the desa, the desa takes responsibility for decision-making, but lacks the resources required for the project. To the extent that the desa handles projects by the second method, it is able to take responsibility for its affairs, but is not self-sufficient.

The third method of handling desa projects is the most important for revealing differences among the desas. When a desa turns a project over entirely to a government agency, it not only does not provide the resources required for the projects; it also takes no responsibility for the project. To the extent that projects are handled by the third method, the desa is not able to take responsibility for its affairs. Whether the desas also lack the resources for the particular projects which they turn over entirely to government agencies we cannot tell, but we shall consider later the possibility that lack of resources and low responsibility are related.

Description of the degree to which a desa takes responsibility for its affairs in terms of its use of the third method of handling desa projects can be further refined by differentiating between projects concerned with maintenance and those concerned with improvement of the desa. A maintenance project is recurrent, while an improvement project is carried out only once. If, then, a desa turns over an improvement project to a government agency, it is giving up responsibility on only one occasion. If, however, a desa turns over a maintenance project to a government agency, it is much closer to giving that agency a permanent place in the governing of the affairs of the desa. We shall say, then, that the desa which handles maintenance projects by the third method, turning them over entirely to government agencies, exercises less responsibility for governing its affairs than the desa which turns over only improvement projects to government agencies. By the same reasoning, the desa which handles maintenance projects by the second method, seeking assistance from outside the desa, is less self-sufficient than the desa which handles only improvement projects by the second method. Finally, the desa which handles both maintenance and improvement projects by the first method, entirely within the desa, is more able at governing its affairs than the desa which handles only improvement projects by this method.

How the Twelve Desas Handle Their Affairs

In all twelve desas we find that some maintenance projects and some improvement projects are handled entirely by the desa with no participation whatever, either solicited or unsolicited, by government agencies. All of the desas are, then, functioning political units, taking responsibility for the management of certain affairs which concern their inhabitants. The particular affairs reported as handled by the desas alone vary considerably from desa to desa, as indicated in Table 2.

Table 2

SUBJECTS OF PROJECTS HANDLED ENTIRELY
WITHIN THE DESA BY ONE OR MORE DESAS

Maintenance projects		Improvement projects	
Subject of project	Number of desas	Subject of project	Number of desas
Desa roads	8	Cooperatives	7
Irrigation	7	Desa roads	6
Assistance to needy desa inhabitants	5	Irrigation	5
Mosques and prayer houses	5	Education	4
Desa security	4	Desa hall and other buildings	4
Land distribution or sale	4	Mosques and prayer houses	4
Bridges	3	Bridges	3
Dwellings	3	Dwellings	3
Education	2	Non-electric lighting	3
Cooperatives	2	Desa security	3
Marriage, divorce, birth and death	2	Rice bank or other desa bank	3
Agriculture	1	Desa cemetery	3
Desa hall and other buildings	1	Desa monument or decoration	3
Livestock	1	Agriculture	2
Health	1	Health	2
Rice bank or other desa bank	1	Land distribution or sale	2
Market	1	Desa finances	2
Prices	1	Assistance to needy desa inhabitants	1
Religious education	1	Market	1
Desa cemetery	1		
Desa celebrations	1		

Only four types of projects are reported as handled entirely within the desa in as many as half of the twelve desas: maintenance of desa roads, maintenance of irrigation facilities, improvement of desa roads, and improvements concerning cooperatives (usually the founding of a cooperative). The heterogeneity of projects handled entirely within the desa might be found to be somewhat less if inquiries were made in each desa about the same types of projects; that is the heterogeneity may be partly due to the failure of informants to report some projects which have been handled entirely within the desa.

The twelve desas are quite similar with respect to self-sufficiency. Almost all are low on self-sufficiency, as shown in Table 3.

Table 3

DEGREE OF SELF-SUFFICIENCY IN THE TWELVE DESAS

High	Medium	Low
(Government expected to provide aid for no projects)	(Government expected to provide aid for some improvement projects)	(Government expected to provide aid for some maintenance projects)
Tegalhardjo	Batankradjan Kandangtepus	Djabres Djogomertan Karijomukti Kedung Gempol Ranujoso Sinangohprendeng Tandjung Tjibatu Tjidjengkol

All but three of the twelve desas turn to government agencies for aid even in some routine projects whose purpose is maintenance of existing desa facilities. Only one desa reports no instance in which outside assistance was requested on a project being carried out by the desa.

The subjects of projects for which outside assistance was sought are listed in Table 4.

Table 4

SUBJECTS OF PROJECTS FOR WHICH PARTICIPATION IS SOUGHT BOTH INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE DESA BY ONE OR MORE DESAS			
Maintenance projects		Improvement projects	
Subject of project	Number of desas	Subject of project	Number of desas
Desa security	5	Agriculture	4
Health	3	Desa security	2
Irrigation	2	Education	2
Bridges	2	Desa roads	1
Agriculture	2	Irrigation	1
Desa roads	1	Bridges	1
Education	1	Handicraft industry	1
Desa economic condition	1	Desa economic condition	1
Desa celebrations	1	Cooperatives	1

We see, then, that the areas in which the desas lack self-sufficiency, like the areas in which projects are carried out entirely within the desa, vary widely among the twelve desas.

While all twelve desas are alike in that they exercise responsibility in some areas of maintenance and improvement of the desa, and nearly all are low on self-sufficiency, they differ in the extent to which they turn over responsibility for projects to government agencies. As shown in Table 5, five desas report no projects handled in this manner; two desas report only improvement projects, and five desas report maintenance projects turned over entirely to government agencies.

Following our previous discussion of the interpretation of these actions in terms of the ability of the desas to handle their own affairs, it appears that the five desas listed in the first column on the left of Table 5 are better able than the two desas in the second column to take responsibility for their affairs. The two desas in the second column are, in turn, better able to take responsibility for their affairs than the remaining five desas.

The subjects of projects turned over or intended to be turned over entirely to government agencies are shown in Table 6. The list in Table 6 is probably not a complete record of all projects which have been handled in this way, since informants may have forgotten to report some projects which have been turned over to government agencies. The wide range of subjects of this incomplete list suggests, however, that there is no one area in which desas are particularly likely to give up responsibility to government agencies.

Table 5

DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY FOR DESA AFFAIRS IN THE TWELVE DESAS		
High	Medium	Low
(Government expected to take responsibility for no projects)	(Government expected to take responsibility for some improvement projects)	(Government expected to take responsibility for some maintenance projects)
Djabres Djogomertan Kandangtepus Tjibatu Tjidjengkol	Tandjung Tegalhardjo	Batankradjan Karijomukti Kedung Gempol Ranujoso Sinangohprendeng

Table 6

SUBJECTS OF PROJECTS TURNED OVER OR INTENDED TO BE TURNED OVER ENTIRELY TO GOVERNMENT AGENCIES BY ONE OR MORE DESAS			
Maintenance projects		Improvement projects	
Subject of project	Number of desas	Subject of project	Number of desas
Agriculture	2	Land distribution	
Dwellings	1	or sale	2
Fisheries	1	Irrigation	1
Anti-illiteracy campaign	1	Agriculture	1
Prices	1	Livestock	1
Mosques and prayer houses	1	Desa economic condition	1

Summary: Degrees of Desa Responsibility

All twelve desas in the study handle some projects, both maintenance and improvement, entirely within the desa with no outside help, either solicited or unsolicited. All but one of the twelve solicit outside aid on some maintenance or improvement projects which are being carried out in the desa. The desas differ, however, in the degree to which they turn over responsibility to government agencies for making decisions about their projects. Five desas do not report any projects which they turned over or intended to turn over entirely to government agencies. These desas are high on responsibility. Two desas turned over or intended to turn over entirely to government agencies only improvement projects.

These desas are classified as moderately responsible for their affairs. Five desas report that routine maintenance projects are sometimes turned over, or intended to be turned over entirely to government agencies. These desas are classified as low on responsibility.

There is no evidence that the way in which a project is handled is determined by the subject of the project. There is considerable overlap in subjects of projects handled entirely within the desa, projects on which outside assistance is sought, and projects which are turned over entirely to government agencies. More detailed analysis of the purposes of projects might reveal characteristics common to projects handled by one or another method. Such analysis would require, however, a more complete list of desa projects than we probably have, and more detail about their purposes than is generally available in our data.

We find, then, not unexpectedly, that in all twelve desas some decisions are taken and carried out entirely within the desa. Some of the desas are willing, however, to turn over responsibility for some of their affairs entirely to outsiders, while other desas are not. We shall try to determine what factors, both outside and inside the desas, are related to these differences in responsibility in the governing of desa affairs. We shall consider, first, influences from large cities. Then, we shall consider the possible effects of government intervention in desa affairs on the degree to which the desa takes responsibility for its affairs. Finally, we shall look within the desa to see if there are factors there which relate to degree of desa responsibility.

INFLUENCES FROM LARGE CITIES
AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

Let us consider the possibility that degree of responsibility is related to factors affecting the desa directly from large cities. It may be that degree of responsibility is related to the accessibility of the desa from large cities. Frequent contact with a large city might have many complex effects on the desa, among them perhaps an effect on the policy pursued by the desa with regard to responsibility for its affairs. Or it may be that magazines and newspapers reaching the desa from cities influence the actions of desa leaders. We shall examine these possibilities in order to decide, at least tentatively, whether urban influences have a marked effect on desa responsibility.

Physical Accessibility of the Desas from Large Cities

There is probably room for debate as to which cities should be included in a list of the major urban centers of influence in contemporary Java. We have chosen for this list only the largest cities, of which it can be assumed that none is under the direct influence or domination of any other. The largest city in Java, Jakarta, is omitted from the list because none of the desas in the study is as near to Jakarta as to one of the following six cities: Bandung, Bogor, Jogjakarta, Semarang, Surabaya, Surakarta.

To indicate physical accessibility we shall describe the difficulty of transportation from the nearest large city to the desa. Two factors need to be included in this description: distance of the desa from the city, and type of road which gives access to the desa. The types of roads on which the twelve desas are located are: provincial highway or railroad, giving easiest access; regency road, giving somewhat poorer access; a road which does not allow the passage of motor vehicles, giving poorest access to the desa.

The relation of physical accessibility to degree of desa responsibility is shown in Table 7. The city nearest to each desa is given under the name of the desa.

Let us see first whether degree of desa responsibility depends on which of the large cities is nearest the desa. The two desas near Jogjakarta, Djabres and Djogomertan, are both high on responsibility, and the two desas near Semarang, Karijomukti and Sinangoh-prendeng, are both low on responsibility. We also find, however, that one of the desas near Bandung, Tjidjengkol, is highly responsible while the other, Tandjung, is only moderately responsible. Similarly, one desa near Surabaya, Kandangtepus, is highly responsible while the other three near this city, Ranujoso, Batankradjan and Kedung Gempol are all low on responsibility. It does not appear that degree of desa responsibility depends consistently on which of the large cities of Java is nearest the desa.

Table 7

PHYSICAL ACCESSIBILITY OF DESA FROM A LARGE CITY
AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

(Distance in Kilometers)

Degree of desa responsibility	Prov. highway or railroad		Regency road		No motor road	
	35-100	Over 100	35-100	Over 100	35-100	Over 100
High	Djabres (Jogjakarta)		Djogomertan (Jogjakarta)	Kandangtepus (Surabaya)		
	Tjibatu (Bogor)					
	Tjidjengkol (Bandung)					
Medium	Tandjung (Bandung)		Tegalhardjo (Surakarta)			
Low	Ranjoso (Surabaya)		Batan kradjan (Surabaya)	Karijomukti (Semarang)	Kedung Gempol (Surabaya)	
			Sinangohprendeng (Semarang)			

Nor does the evidence in Table 7 indicate that physical accessibility from a large city determines degree of desa responsibility. Some highly responsible desas are easily accessible, being under 100 kilometers from a large city on a provincial highway, while one highly responsible desa is much less accessible, being over 100 kilometers from the nearest large city on a regency road. At the same time, one desa low on responsibility is quite accessible, being located on a provincial highway, though over 100 kilometers from a large city, while other desas low on responsibility are quite inaccessible, being located on a regency road or on a road which does not carry motor vehicles, and over 100 kilometers from the nearest large city.

Possibly, however, ideas from large cities come to a desa not so much through personal visits of people from the cities as by way of the mass media of communication. With this in mind, we

shall examine the relation between the magazines and newspapers read in a desa and degree of desa responsibility.

Magazines and Newspapers

The informants were asked in the political interview which magazines and newspapers they read. The number of news sources, either magazines or newspapers, named by informants in a given desa ranges from zero to eight. While we do not know how many people read a given magazine or newspaper which comes into the desa, we might expect that the greater the number of newspapers and magazines read in the desa, the greater the likelihood of ideas from urban centers influencing the thinking of people in the desa. The relation between the number of newspapers and magazines read in the desa and degree of desa responsibility is shown in Table 8.

Table 8

NUMBER OF MAGAZINES AND NEWSPAPERS READ IN A DESA AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

Degree of desa respon- sibility	Number of newspapers and magazines received			
	None	One	Two	Three
High	Kandang- tepus	Djogo- mertan		Tjidjeng- kol
Medium	Tandjung		Tegal- hardjo	
Low			Kedung Gempol	
	Five	Six	Seven	Eight
High	Djabres	Tjibatu		
Medium				
Low	Batan- dradjan		Sinangoh- prendeng	Ranujoso
	Karijo- mukti			

The number of newspapers and magazines in highly responsible desas ranges from zero to six, and the number in desas low on responsibility from two to eight. These figures do not indicate that number of newspapers and magazines in the desa is related to degree of desa responsibility.

It may be, of course, that we are wrong in assuming that all printed news sources are equally likely to promote a position with regard to desa responsibility. Unfortunately, we have no way of checking the actual publications to determine whether they concern themselves with desa affairs, and, if so, what they say on the subject. We might, however, expect to find some consistency in publications with a particular political leaning. We have, therefore, classified the news sources according to political leaning on the basis of information in the 1954-1955 Almanak Pers Indonesia (Indonesian Press Almanac) (9), the 1954-1955 Daftar Harian/Madjalah Seluruh Indonesia (List of Newspapers and Magazines throughout Indonesia) (10), and the judgments of informed persons. The publications thus classified are listed in Appendix E. Table 9 shows the leanings of publications read in desas exercising varying degree of responsibility for their affairs. There is no evidence in Table 9 that publications of any political orientation have a consistent effect on the actions of the desa inhabitants in dealing with their affairs. In all cases where publications in a particular group are received in more than one desa, they are received both in desas exercising high responsibility and in desas exercising low responsibility in governing their affairs.

Summary: Influences from Large Cities and Desa Responsibility

We have found no evidence of direct influence from large cities on degree of desa responsibility. Neither physical accessibility from a city, nor magazines and newspapers read in the desa appear to affect degree of desa responsibility. We note also that the desas nearest a particular city are not necessarily consistent on degree of responsibility, a further argument against direct influences from large cities.

It may be that desas located closer to large cities than any of the twelve in the study, the nearest of which is over 35 kilometers distant, are directly affected by urban influences. Or other cities besides those we have considered may influence the desas. It does not appear, however, that the major cities of Java exert direct influences on desas 35 or more kilometers distant with regard to degree of desa responsibility.

(9) Published by the Press and Public Opinion Institute under the auspices of the Ministry of Information.

(10) Published by the Ministry of Information Documentation Section.

Table 9

POLITICAL LEANINGS OF NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES
READ IN A DESA AND DEGREE OF RESPONSIBILITY

Degree of desa responsibility	Political leaning of publications		
	Communist	Masjumi	Non-party
High	Djabres Tjidjengkol	Tjibatu	Djabres Djogomertan Tjibatu Tjidjengkol
Medium	Tegalhardjo		Tegalhardjo
Low	Batankradjan Karijomukti Ranujoso Sinangoh- prendeng	Ranujoso Sinangoh- prendeng	Batankradjan Karijomukti Kedung Gempol Ranujoso Sinangoh- prendeng
	P.N.I.	P.R.I.	Socialist
High	Djabres Tjibatu		Tjidjengkol
Medium			
Low	Ranujoso Sinangoh- prendeng	Batankradjan	Kedung Gempol

It is, however, possible that degree of desa responsibility is determined by influences from outside the desa, even if these influences do not come directly from major cities. In order to explore this possibility, we shall examine in the next section the relation between the actions of government agencies with respect to the desa and degree of desa responsibility.

INTERVENTION BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN DESA AFFAIRS
AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

All of the desas are frequently in contact with local government authorities about matters concerning the desa. Usually there is a meeting about once a week between representatives of the desa and one or more government officials. Since all the desas rely on government agencies either to assist in projects they are carrying out or to take over projects entirely, it seems unlikely that the actions of government officials directly in contact with desa representatives would fail to have some effect on the desa. The question is: What effects do the actions of government officials have on the desa; in particular, do the actions of government officials with respect to the desa affect the extent to which the desa takes responsibility for its affairs?

We have described desa responsibility in terms of the desa's independence of outsiders or dependence on outsiders to make decisions about desa affairs. Almost without exception, the outsiders to whom desas turn when they are not highly responsible are government officials. If we want to find out what impact actions of government agencies have on desa responsibility, then, we might consider those actions which are the obverse of desa responsibility, government intervention in desa affairs. By government intervention we mean the making of decisions about desa projects by government agencies, without the desa having asked for their participation. The question is, then: What is the relation between degree of intervention by government agencies in desa affairs and degree of desa responsibility, or independence of government agencies? Before we can answer this question, however, we must find out how much government agencies intervene in desa affairs.

Degree of Government Intervention in Desa Affairs

To determine the extent to which government agencies intervene in desa affairs, we shall examine those projects in which a government agency initiates action of some kind. Since we are interested in the extent to which government agencies intervene in desa projects of their own accord, we exclude all cases in which initiation by a government agency follows a request for help from the desa. Therefore when we speak of initiation by a government agency in connection with government intervention, we refer only to government initiations to the desa which do not follow desa initiations to the government.

Degrees of intervention by government agencies will be described in the same terms as degrees of desa responsibility. When a government agency initiates an improvement project of its own accord, it is intervening in desa affairs to a lesser extent than when it

initiates a maintenance project of its own accord. In the first case, it is intervening on only one occasion; in the second case, it is intervening in a project which is part of the regular routine of running the desa. We shall say, then, that government agencies intervene in the affairs of a desa to a high degree when they initiate maintenance projects of their own accord, to a moderate degree when they initiate only improvement projects of their own accord, and not at all when there is no report that they initiate action of their own accord in connection with any kind of desa project.

Table 10 shows the degree of intervention by government agencies in the twelve desas in this study.

Table 10

DEGREE OF INTERVENTION BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN DESA AFFAIRS		
None	Medium	High
Djogomertan Kandangtepus Tandjung	Djabres Tjidjengkol	Batankradjan Karijomukti Kedung Gempol Ranujoso Sinangohprendeng Tegalhardjo Tjibatu

In these twelve desas, government agencies are more likely than not to intervene in desa affairs. In only three of the twelve desas is there no government intervention, while in seven out of the twelve there is a high degree of government intervention in desa affairs. Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing whether these twelve desas are representative of desas in Java or not. We cannot be certain whether, as in these twelve desas, government agencies generally are more likely than not to intervene in the affairs of desas in Java.

Relation of Government Intervention to Desa Responsibility

The question we have asked is: What is the relation between degree of intervention by government agencies in desa affairs and degree of desa responsibility? Table 11 shows the desas grouped according to these two factors. A first glance at Table 11 suggests that the greater the intervention in desa affairs by government agencies, the less the responsibility taken by a desa for its affairs. In all five of the desas which are low on responsibility, government agencies intervene to a high degree. At the other end, however, the relationship between desa responsibility and government intervention is not uniform. Among the

Table 11

DEGREE OF INTERVENTION BY GOVERNMENT AGENCIES IN DESA AFFAIRS
AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

Degree of desa responsibility	Degree of government intervention		
	None	Medium	High
High	Djogomertan Kandangtepus	Djabres Tjidjengkol	Tjibatu
Medium	Tandjung		Tegalhardjo
Low			Batankradjan Karijomukti Kedung Gempol Ranujoso Sinangohprendeng

five desas high on responsibility for their affairs, there are only two desas in which government agencies do not intervene.

Before going further, perhaps we can summarize these results in terms of consistency and inconsistency of government and desa actions. We shall say that government and desa actions are consistent when they both imply that responsibility for desa affairs is located in the same place, and inconsistent when they imply that responsibility for desa affairs is located in different places. Thus, when a desa is highly responsible, locating responsibility for desa affairs in the desa, and the government does not intervene, also, therefore, locating responsibility in the desa, the actions of the two are consistent. When government agencies intervene to a high degree in the affairs of a highly responsible desa, the actions of the two are inconsistent. The actions of desas which are low on responsibility for their affairs, on the other hand, are consistent with those of the government when government agencies intervene to a high degree, that is, when both desa and government agencies locate some responsibility for desa affairs with government agencies. The actions of desas which are low on responsibility are inconsistent with those of government agencies when the government agencies do not intervene in desa affairs.

We can say, then, that Table 11 shows the actions of all five of the desas which are low on responsibility to be consistent with the actions of government agencies. Among the highly responsible desas, however, the actions of only two are consistent, while those of three are inconsistent with actions of government agencies. (11)

(11) The two desas which take moderate responsibility for their affairs are difficult to describe in terms of consistency with

These results do not suggest that degree of desa responsibility and degree of government intervention are related in a straightforward way. Since three desas are highly responsible despite some degree of government intervention in their affairs, we cannot say that the greater the intervention in desa affairs by government agencies, the less the responsibility taken by the desa for its affairs. We will, therefore, look at other effects of government intervention in desa affairs to see if they help us to understand the relation between government intervention and desa responsibility.

Desa Reactions to Government Initiations

When a government agency gives a suggestion or order to a desa, the desa may or may not follow it. The desa may, in other words, cooperate with the government agency or it may be uncooperative. If a desa is uncooperative, it would seem to indicate that the inhabitants of the desa have their own ideas about what the government agency should be doing, or not doing, and that these ideas do not accord with the actions of the government agency. If, then, we were to find that uncooperative reactions occurred in desas whose actions were inconsistent with those of government agencies, but not in desas whose actions were consistent, we might infer that the inhabitants of the uncooperative desas were dissatisfied with the degree of government intervention in their affairs.

In terms of the categories used in analyzing the interview data, we identify uncooperative reactions with negative reactions. Negative reactions are defined as rejection of the importance or existence of a stated problem, rejection of a plan, with or without initiation of a counter-plan, refusal to carry out suggested or directed action, or, in general, refusal to follow the lead of the initiator. In contrast, positive reactions are defined as following the leads of others. We also have a category, indeterminate, for those reactions about which insufficient information was given to determine whether they were positive or negative. The need for the indeterminate category arose, in part, from the fact that a reaction could be classified as positive or negative only when it involved public action. The category, negative reactions, does not, then, include every instance in which two parties were not in perfect agreement. Rather, it includes the instances in which

government actions. In one case, government agencies do not intervene at all, and in the other case they intervene to a high degree. Yet we cannot say whether either or both of these actions are consistent or inconsistent with desa actions, since moderately responsible desas do not place responsibility as clearly within the desa as highly responsible desas do or as clearly outside as desas low on responsibility do. Rather than making arbitrary decisions about the classification of the moderately responsible desas in terms of consistency, we shall omit them from the part of the discussion in which consistency is involved.

disagreements became publicly known. In the traditional desa, however, differences are not supposed to be expressed openly. An issue which arouses disagreements should, according to tradition, be dropped rather than pursued to the point where people are forced to express their differences openly. It seems reasonable, then, to interpret the negative reactions reported in the interviews as signs of uncooperativeness and resistance in the desa, rather than simply as unimportant differences of opinion between the inhabitants of the desa and government officials.

The relation between consistency and presence or absence of uncooperative reactions to government agencies in desas of varying degrees of responsibility is shown in Table 12.

Table 12

RELATION OF CONSISTENCY OF ACTION TO NONCOOPERATION BY DESAS
ACCORDING TO DIFFERENT DEGREES OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

Uncooperative reactions by the desa	Degree of desa responsibility*			
	High		Low	
	Consistent	Inconsistent	Consistent	Inconsistent
Absent	Djogomertan Kandangtepus		Karijomukti Ranujoso Sinangoh- prendeng	
Present	Djabres Tjibatu Tjidjengkol		Batankradjan Kedung Gempol	

* The actions of moderately responsible desas were not classified in terms of consistency or inconsistency with government actions. This decision is explained in footnote 11, p. 38.

We see that, among the highly responsible desas, uncooperative reactions occur in desas whose actions are inconsistent with those of government agencies, but not in desas whose actions are consistent with those of government agencies. In other words, in highly responsible desas, when government intervention is absent, noncooperation is absent; when government intervention is present, noncooperation occurs. This relationship suggests that the basis for noncooperation with government agencies when it occurs in highly responsible desas is unwanted intervention in desa affairs by government agencies.

We cannot, of course, explain uncooperative reactions in desas low on responsibility in the same terms. We have no reason to suppose that they object to the mere fact of government intervention in their affairs. Their failure to take responsibility

for certain projects suggests, in fact, that they would welcome such intervention. On the other hand, the fact that noncooperation occurs in desas low on responsibility is not necessarily inconsistent with our interpretation of these reactions in highly responsible desas. There may well be other reasons for uncooperative reactions to a government agency besides unwanted intervention in the affairs of the desa.

To understand the reason for uncooperative reactions in desas which are low on responsibility, let us look at the projects in which the uncooperative reactions occur. We find that these reactions occur almost exclusively in connection with projects for which the desa solicits assistance, rather than in connection with those which it turns over entirely to government agencies, or those in which a government agency intervenes of its own accord. Apparently the desas which are low on responsibility are likely to become uncooperative when government agencies fail to satisfy their more specific requests, rather than when government agencies intervene in their affairs or when, as they sometimes do, they fail to act satisfactorily on a general request that they take over a desa project. Unfortunately, the interview data are not sufficiently precise to enable us to check this inference on specific cases, since it is almost never possible to tell from the informants' reports exactly what actions of the government agencies in relation to a project elicited the uncooperative reaction. On the basis of the available information, however, the most reasonable conclusion seems to be that the desas which are low on responsibility become dissatisfied with government agencies because of their failure to comply with specific requests from the desa, not because of general or vague dissatisfactions with the actions of government agencies.

The question arises as to whether highly responsible desas react uncooperatively in the same circumstances as desas which are low on responsibility. In fact, their uncooperative reactions also occur almost always in connection with projects for which the desa has solicited aid, rather than in connection with projects in which the government agency intervenes of its own accord. Perhaps, then, the explanation for uncooperative reactions in highly responsible desas is the same as the explanation in desas low on responsibility. Perhaps they are due entirely to the failure of government agencies to satisfy specific requests, rather than to a general dissatisfaction with unwanted government intervention in their affairs. Unfortunately, we cannot determine from the present data which of these is the better explanation of uncooperative reactions in highly responsible desas, or whether they both play a part. The relationship between consistency of action and uncooperative reactions shown in Table 12 suggests that noncooperation in highly responsible desas could be interpreted as resistance to unwanted intervention in their affairs. On the other hand, the specific instances in which these reactions occur indicate that they may be due to specific failures on the part of government agencies to satisfy requests made by the desa.

Now that we have seen where uncooperative reactions occur, and suggested why they may occur, what more can we say about the relation between intervention in desa affairs by government agencies and degree of desa responsibility?

Government Intervention, Uncooperative Reactions
and Desa Responsibility

We have already seen that our results do not consistently indicate that desas adapt their actions to those of government agencies. We now find that one possible interpretation of our data is that intervention in desa affairs by government agencies not only does not result in adaptation by the desa, but actually produces uncooperative reactions. Even though we cannot be sure that uncooperative reactions are directly related to government intervention, the fact that open dissatisfaction with the actions of government agencies is expressed in the desas suggests that adaptation to government policy and actions is not an overriding consideration in the determination of desa actions. We suggest, then, that rather than being determined by degree of government intervention, degree of desa responsibility is probably a function of other factors which influence the desa apart from government actions.

Summary: Intervention by Government Agencies
and Desa Responsibility

We would need more than twelve desas to come to any but tentative conclusions about the extent and effect of government intervention in the affairs of desas in Java. Having pointed out our degree of uncertainty, we suggest that government agencies are more likely than not to intervene in desa affairs. Degree of desa responsibility is not, however, necessarily consistent with the degree of government intervention. Furthermore, a number of desas openly express dissatisfaction with the actions of government agencies, and in some of them the dissatisfaction seems to be directly related to inconsistency between degree of desa responsibility and extent of government intervention. The most reasonable conclusion from our results seems to be that the extent of government intervention in desa affairs does not determine the degree to which the desa takes responsibility for its affairs.

Apparently, then, degree of desa responsibility is not determined either by direct influences from large cities or by the policies and actions of local officials who deal with the desa. The lack of relationship between desa responsibility and these external factors suggests that we look within the desa to see if we find there some basis for understanding differences among the desas in degree of responsibility for their affairs.

RELATION OF SIZE AND ECONOMIC CONDITIONS
IN THE DESA TO DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

In the official clarification of the 1948 decentralization law, the suggestion is made:

In actuality, the desa as it now exists is not sufficiently broad to become a desa with the right to govern its own affairs according to this law. Because of that there must be consolidation first... (12)

The implication is clear that the larger the desa, the more likely that it will be able to take a high degree of responsibility for its affairs.

Size of Desa

If consolidation would increase desa responsibility, we should find that presently existing large desas are more responsible than small ones. In Table 13 the twelve desas are ranked according to size of population and classified with respect to degree of responsibility for desa affairs. There is a clear relationship between the size of the desa and its responsibility in the governing of its affairs. With only two exceptions, the larger desas are either medium or high on responsibility, and the smaller desas low. Since the smallest of the twelve desas is high on responsibility, however, large size is apparently not necessary for responsibility. And since the fourth from the largest desa is low on responsibility, neither is it a sufficient condition for responsibility.

If large desas are more responsible than small ones, the question is: What makes them more responsible? Size by itself does not account for their greater responsibility. One suggestion sometimes made by persons familiar with desa affairs is that consolidation tends to make the desa more self-sufficient economically, and desas which are economically self-sufficient can take more responsibility for their affairs than desas which are not. We should find, then, among existing desas, that larger ones are more self-sufficient economically, and that desas which are most self-sufficient economically are also most responsible. Let us take up first the second of these propositions. We shall examine economic conditions in relation to degree of responsibility in the twelve desas.

(12) Republic of Indonesia, Official clarification, Law No. 22, 1948, Undang-undang Pokok tentang Pemerintahan Daerah, Djakarta: Noordhoff-Kolff N. V., p. 35.

Table 13

SIZE OF DESA POPULATION AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

(Population figures in parentheses)

Rank from largest to smallest	Degree of desa responsibility		
	High	Medium	Low
1		Tandjung (10,316)	
2	Tjibatu (5844)		
3	Tjidjengkol (2850)		
4			Ranujoso (2831)
5	Kandangtepus (2618)		
6		Tegalhardjo (2158)	
7	Djogomertan (2121)		
8			Karijomukti (1766)
9			Kedung Gempol (1355)
10			Sinangoh- prendeng (1339)
11			Batankradjan (1244)
12	Djabres (879)		

Economic Conditions

Various degrees of self-sufficiency, in the sense of ability to carry out desa projects without aid from government agencies, have already been described, and we have found that almost all of the twelve desas are low on this characteristic. If responsibility is closely related to self-sufficiency, we should find that not many of these twelve desas are highly responsible, but we already know that, in fact, almost half of them are. Perhaps, though, we can differentiate degree of self-sufficiency more precisely than we have up until now. In order to distinguish among the nine desas which have been described as low on self-sufficiency, we calculated the percentage of projects in each desa for which outside assistance was sought. The relation between desa self-sufficiency and desa responsibility, with these percentages included, is shown in Table 14. It is clear that self-sufficiency is not related to responsibility in these twelve desas. Frequency of requests to outsiders for assistance is almost identical among desas which are high and desas which are low on responsibility. Perhaps, however, this generalized self-sufficiency does not reflect accurately the economic self-sufficiency of the desa, since the projects which we took to indicate low self-sufficiency in a desa involved not only requests for financial or material aid, but also some requests for advice.

The total wealth of the desa may be a better gauge of its economic self-sufficiency than actual requests for aid and advice.

Table 14

DESA SELF-SUFFICIENCY AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

(Figures in parentheses are percentage of projects initiated in the desa for which outside aid is requested.)

Degree of desa responsibility	Degree of desa self-sufficiency		
	High	Medium	Low
High		Kandangtepus (.10)	Djabres (.20) Djogomertan (.25) Tjibatu (.50) Tjidjengkol (.29)
Medium	Tegalhardjo (.00)		Tandjung (.16)
Low		Batankradjan (.10)	Karijomukti (.21) Kedung Gempol (.20) Ranujoso (.50) Sinangoh- prendeng (.30)

We have taken as an indication of the wealth of the desa the total transitional tax assessed in the desa in 1954 or 1955, whichever we have figures for. Unfortunately, we do not have any data on transitional taxes for four of the desas. Nor can we check directly how closely amount of assessed tax is related to the wealth of the desa. One correspondence indicates, however, that these tax figures are related to desa wealth. We know that one of the desas, Tegalhardjo, is unusually poor. We find that the total assessed transitional taxes in this desa are the lowest of any reported, and they are not just slightly lower but a great deal lower than taxes in any other desa for which figures are available to us.

We note that self-sufficiency and wealth, as indicated by assessed transitional taxes, are, as we suspected, not identical. In the eight desas on which we have tax information there is no indication that self-sufficiency increases with the wealth of the desa. If anything, the wealthier desas are less self-sufficient than the poorer ones. (13)

The relation between relative wealth and desa responsibility in the eight desas for which we have tax data is shown in Table 15. The desas have been ranked, with the desa ranked first being the one with the highest assessed tax.

(13) The rank correlation for eight cases, between wealth and self-sufficiency is $-.38$.

Table 15

RELATIVE DESA WEALTH AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

(Desa wealth is indicated by total assessment for transitional taxes in the desa in a recent year, usually 1954 or 1955. These data are not available for four desas.)

Rank from wealthiest to least wealthy	Degree of desa responsibility		
	High	Medium	Low
1			Kedung Gempol
2	Tjibatu		
3			Batankradjan
4			Ranujoso
5	Djabres		
6			Karijomukti
7	Djogomertan		
8		Tegalhardjo	

There is no indication in Table 15 of a relationship between wealth and degree of desa responsibility. Again, however, we may not have found the economic condition which is most closely tied to desa economic self-sufficiency. Perhaps it is not amount of wealth so much as freedom from economic difficulties that gives a desa the economic base for a high degree of responsibility. Since all of the desas are dependent at least in part on agriculture for their support, one indication of possible economic difficulties is poor land, insufficient water, or inadequate flood control. The relation of these factors to degree of desa responsibility is shown in Table 16.

Those desas which are well-endowed and those which are not do not differ with respect to degree of desa responsibility. Similarly, both the group with chronic problems of poor soil or water and the group with periodic problems of floods contain desas high and low on responsibility. It is possible, however, that these difficulties would have quite different implications depending on the extent to which the desa is dependent on agriculture for support. Among the twelve desas, some are dependent on agriculture alone as the major source of income, some have wages from estate labor as well, and some have handicraft industry. The major sources of income, together with favorability of physical ecology for agriculture, are shown in relation to degree of desa responsibility in Table 17. Again, we do not seem to have found conditions which are related to desa responsibility. The desas which should be most clearly affected by ecological conditions, those dependent on agriculture alone, seem to be least affected. Among these desas, ecological conditions make no difference in degree of desa responsibility. Nor do we find that the sources of support alone, regardless of

Table 16

PHYSICAL ECOLOGY AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

Degree of desa responsibility	Adequate soil, water, and flood control	Inadequate flood control	Poor soil or insufficient water
High	Djabres Kandangtepus Tjibatu	Djogomertan	Tjidjengkol
Medium			Tandjung Tegalhardjo
Low	Batankradjan Sinangoh- prendeng	Karijomukti Kedung Gempol	Ranujoso

Table 17

MAJOR SOURCES OF INCOME AND PHYSICAL ECOLOGY
IN RELATION TO DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

Major sources of income in desa						
Degree of desa responsibility	Agriculture		Agriculture and estate labor		Agriculture and handicraft industry	
	Physical ecology with respect to agriculture					
	Adequate*		Adequate*		Adequate*	
	Poor**		Poor**		Poor**	
High	Kandangtepus	Djogomertan		Tjidjengkol	Djabres Tjibatu	
Medium		Tegalhardjo		Tandjung		
Low	Batankradjan	Kedung Gempol	Sinangoh- prendeng		Karijomukti Ranujoso	

* Soil, water supply and flood control are reported as adequate.

** Poor soil, insufficient water, or inadequate flood control is reported.

ecological conditions, have much relation to desa responsibility. In each of the three groups of desas, with different types of major sources of income, there are desas both high and low on responsibility.

Apparently general self-sufficiency, desa wealth, and certain conditions tending to produce economic difficulties are all unrelated to degree of responsibility. This is not to say that there is no relation between economic conditions and desa responsibility. If there is such a relationship, however, the conditions involved are probably more complex and subtle than factors such as overall wealth, or factors tending to produce economic difficulties. Their description would require more detailed economic analysis than can be undertaken in this study.

If desa responsibility is related to the size of the desa, but not to certain economic conditions, we might ask whether the economic conditions are related to desa size. If they are, then we should question the idea that desa consolidation increases responsibility because it improves desa economic self-sufficiency. If, on the other hand, the economic conditions we have examined are not related to desa size, it may well be that consolidation would improve desa self-sufficiency, but through alteration of economic conditions other than those we have described.

Size of Desa and Economic Conditions

There is, in fact, not a clear relationship between size of desa and the economic conditions we have examined. To the extent that a trend is indicated, it shows that the economic conditions are less favorable in larger desas. Self-sufficiency tends to be lower in large desas than in small ones, (14) and total wealth tends to be less in large desas. (15) Since the conditions which might produce economic difficulties are not such that consolidation would affect them directly, it is not surprising that there is no consistent relationship between relative size of desa and either ecological conditions or major source of income.

Summary: Relation of Size and Economic Conditions to Desa Responsibility

The size of the desa is very clearly related to degree of responsibility, large desas being generally more responsible than small ones. This finding supports the idea that desa responsibility might be increased by consolidating small desas into larger ones.

-
- (14) The rank correlation, for twelve cases, between size of desa and self-sufficiency is $-.33$.
- (15) The rank correlation, for eight cases, between size of desa and total wealth is $-.21$.

It also raises the question: What is it about large desas that makes them more responsible than small desas?

The suggestion sometimes made that large desas are more responsible because of greater economic self-sufficiency is not supported by our results. We have, however, only considered a few very general economic conditions: degree of dependence on government agencies for assistance in carrying out desa projects, total wealth, and certain conditions which might produce economic difficulties. None of these is related to degree of desa responsibility, but neither are they related to size of desa. If desa economic self-sufficiency is increased by consolidation, the economic conditions affected are more complex or subtle than those we examined. Or perhaps it is not economic conditions which are affected when desas are consolidated so as to permit greater desa responsibility. In the next section we shall examine some other conditions in the desa in relation to desa responsibility, and then consider again the problem of why large desas seem to be generally more responsible than small ones.

CONFLICT AND LEADERSHIP IN THE DESA
IN RELATION TO DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

When a desa turns over a project to a government agency, it rejects responsibility for making decisions about that project. However, the fact that the desa turns over the project means that someone in the desa has decided that something needs to be done about it. Why, then, is the project presented to a government agency without any action being taken on it by the desa? We know it is not because the desa is incapable of organizing and executing projects, since all desas handle some projects, both for maintenance and improvement, entirely by themselves. Nor can we say that a desa is forced to turn over a project to a government agency because it lacks the economic, technical or other resources to carry it out, since even when a desa does lack these resources it does not have to turn over all responsibility for making decisions about the project to a government agency. If, however, a project were likely to cause conflict, the desa could avoid difficulties either by dropping the project or by passing it on to others to take care of. To the extent that conflict is the reason for turning projects over to government agencies we should find that degree of desa responsibility is related to the state of the desa with respect to internal conflict.

Conflict within the Desa

In order to determine whether conflict in the desa is related to degree of desa responsibility, we shall have to identify the desas in which there is internal conflict. For this purpose, we shall say that if some inhabitants of a desa react negatively to initiations by other inhabitants of the desa, there is conflict within the desa. This interpretation is justified by the fact, pointed out earlier, that negative reactions do not include every difference of opinion which exists in the desa. Only when a difference is expressed publicly is it classified as a negative reaction. But according to tradition in the desa, differences should not be expressed openly. If there is a disagreement concerning a project, the project should be dropped rather than allowing disagreements among inhabitants of the desa to develop to the point where they come into the open. When tradition is overruled so that differences do become public, the disagreement can be presumed, therefore, to be serious enough to be reasonably described as conflict.

When there is conflict in a desa because of inability to resolve differences among the inhabitants, we might expect to find some projects being turned over to government agencies by the desa because of this same inability. Desas in which there is no open conflict, on the other hand, would be less likely to have

differences of opinion which they could handle only by asking outsiders to take over. In other words, it seems reasonable to expect desas with internal conflict to be less responsible than desas without conflict. Table 18 shows the relation between conflict within the desa and degree of desa responsibility.

Table 18

INTERNAL CONFLICT AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY		
Degree of desa responsibility	Conflict in desa	
	Absent	Present
High	Djogomertan Kandangtepus Tjidjengkol	Djabres Tjibatu
Medium	Tandjung Tegalhardjo	
Low	Batankradjan	Karijomukti Kedung Gempol Ranujoso Sinangohprendeng

Three of the five desas high on responsibility do not have internal conflict, while four of the five desas low on responsibility do have conflict. The two desas which exercise moderate responsibility, like the highly responsible desas, have no conflict. There is certainly a clear indication here that internal conflict tends to be associated with a low degree of responsibility in the handling of desa affairs. It also appears, however, that conflict is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for low desa responsibility. A desa may take a low degree of responsibility for its affairs even though conflict is absent, and it is possible for a desa to be highly responsible even though conflict is present. We should look, then, for other factors in the process of handling problems within the desa which might reduce the ability of the desa to make its own decisions and force it to turn over part of this responsibility to government agencies.

Form of Desa Leadership

The officials of the desa are not only individuals with separate functions; they also make up a recognized group, the pamong desa. The major leadership in the desa may be provided by the pamong desa, that is, not by any single official but by the officials together as a group. Among the officials, however, the desa head is preëminent. As an alternative to leadership in desa

affairs by the pamong desa, it is possible for the desa head to assert his individual leadership over the other officials. Leadership in the desa may, then, take either of two forms, collective or individual.

We will not go into the probable historical reasons for the existence of these alternatives in desa leadership, nor will we investigate, in this paper, the contemporary reasons in the desa for the development of one or the other form of leadership. Given the existence of the two forms, our interest here is in determining whether they have different effects on desa responsibility. The question is: Are desas with one form of leadership able to make decisions about their affairs, while desas with the other form have to pass to government agencies some of the responsibility for deciding what to do about problems in the desa?

The predominant form of desa leadership was determined by counting the number of initiations in connection with desa projects attributed to the desa head alone and the number attributed to the pamong desa. A desa in which the greater number of initiations was attributed to the desa head alone was classified as having predominantly individual leadership; a desa in which the greater number was attributed to the pamong desa was classified as having predominantly collective leadership. The relationship between predominant form of desa leadership and degree of desa responsibility is shown in Table 19.

Table 19

PREDOMINANT FORM OF OFFICIAL LEADERSHIP
AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

Degree of desa responsibility	Predominant form of official leadership		
	Collective	Neither*	Individual
High	Djabres Djogomertan Kandangtepus Tjibatu		Tjidjengkol
Medium	Tegalhardjo	Tandjung	
Low	Ranujoso		Batankradjan Karijomukti Kedung Gempol Sinangohprendeng

* In Tandjung there is a tie between the number of initiations attributed to the head of the desa alone and the number attributed to the desa officials as a group.

Apparently desas with predominantly collective leadership are better able to take responsibility for their affairs than desas with predominantly individual leadership. Individual leadership predominates in only one desa which is highly responsible, while collective leadership predominates in only one desa which is low on responsibility. One of the moderately responsible desas is like the highly responsible desas, with predominantly collective leadership, and in the other moderately responsible desa neither form of leadership predominates.

Combined Effects of Internal Conflict and Form of Leadership

Both internal conflict and predominantly individual leadership apparently reduce the ability of the desa to take responsibility for its affairs. On the other hand, absence of internal conflict and collective leadership both seem to favor desa responsibility. The question we might ask is: What happens to desa responsibility when these favorable or unfavorable conditions are combined? The relation of combinations of internal conflict and form of leadership to degree of desa responsibility is shown in Table 20.

Table 20

RELATION OF FORM OF OFFICIAL LEADERSHIP AND PRESENCE OR ABSENCE
OF INTERNAL CONFLICT TO DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

Degree of desa respon- sibility	Collective leadership		Individual leadership	
	Negative reactions absent	Negative reactions present	Negative reactions absent	Negative reactions present
High	Djogomertan Kandangtepus	Djabres Tjibatu	Tjidjengkol	
Medium	(Tandjung*) Tegalhardjo		(Tandjung*)	
Low		Ranujoso	Batankradjan	Karijomukti Kedung Gempol Sinangoh- prendeng

* In Tandjung neither collective nor individual leadership predominates, the two being tied. To reduce the complexity of the table, the special category for official leadership in Tandjung has been dropped, and Tandjung has been entered under both types of leadership to show that in neither case does it disrupt the relationship shown in the table.

We find that desas in which both state of internal conflict and form of leadership favor responsibility are all either highly responsible or moderately responsible. At the other extreme, desas in which both conditions are unfavorable for desa responsibility are, without exception, low on responsibility for their affairs. When one condition is favorable and the other unfavorable, it is possible for the desa to be high or low on responsibility. In other words, when state of internal conflict and form of leadership are combined in a desa so that they are either both favorable or both unfavorable in relation to desa responsibility, they appear to be crucial in determining degree of desa responsibility. When, however, one is favorable and the other unfavorable, other factors appear to determine the degree to which the desa takes responsibility for its affairs.

Our attempts to interpret these results by means of further analysis of the interview data have not been successful. In order to understand why state of internal conflict and form of desa leadership are so important in relation to desa responsibility, it would probably be necessary to penetrate some of the subtleties of decision-making in the desa which are not revealed in the interview materials. Detailed observation in a desa over a considerable period of time would probably be required to secure these data.

Size of Desa in Relation to Internal Conflict and Form of Leadership

We found earlier that a desa's size is closely related to the degree of responsibility it takes for its affairs, large desas tending to be more responsible than small ones. This relationship might prove useful as a means of identifying desas which are likely to be high or low on responsibility for their affairs, but, as we suggested earlier, it does not provide an explanation of desa responsibility. Rather, the fact that size is related to degree of responsibility calls for its own explanation.

Having discovered that state of internal conflict and form of leadership are both closely related to degree of desa responsibility, we might now ask how size of desa is related to each of these factors. It is possible that large desas are more responsible than small ones because they have less internal conflict, because they have collective leadership, or perhaps because of differences in the way these two factors are combined in large and small desas.

Table 21 shows the relation between size of desa and state of internal conflict. Conflict is found somewhat more often in small than in large desas. The fact that conflict is present in the next to largest desa, and absent in the next to smallest suggests, however, that other factors besides size play an important part in determining the presence or absence of internal conflict. It may be that large desas can tolerate more differences of opinion than small desas, that differences are less likely to develop into

Table 21

SIZE OF DESA POPULATION AND PRESENCE
OR ABSENCE OF INTERNAL CONFLICT

Rank from largest to smallest	Negative reactions	
	Absent	Present
1	Tandjung	
2		Tjibatu
3	Tjidjengkol	
4		Ranujoso
5	Kandangtepus	
6	Tegalhardjo	
7	Djogomertan	
8		Karijomukti
9		Kedung Gempol
10		Sinangohprendeng
11	Batankradjan	
12		Djabres

open conflict in large desas. If, however, there were many controversial issues in a large desa and only a few in a small desa, we might find conflict in the large desa but not in the small one.

Table 22 shows the relation between size of desa and form of official leadership.

Table 22

SIZE OF DESA POPULATION AND FORM OF OFFICIAL DESA LEADERSHIP

Rank from largest to smallest	Predominant form of leadership		
	Collective	Neither*	Individual
1		Tandjung	
2	Tjibatu		
3			Tjidjengkol
4	Ranujoso		
5	Kandangtepus		
6	Tegalhardjo		
7	Djogomertan		
8			Karijomukti
9			Kedung Gempol
10			Sinangohprendeng
11			Batankradjan
12	Djabres		

* In Tandjung there is a tie between the number of initiations attributed to the head of the desa alone and the number attributed to the desa officials as a group.

We find that collective leadership is more likely to predominate in large desas, and individual leadership in small ones. Again, there are exceptions at the extremes. The smallest desa has predominantly collective leadership and the third from largest predominantly individual leadership. Apparently, other factors in the desa can counteract the effect of size on form of official leadership.

We have found that both state of internal conflict and form of leadership are more favorable for desa responsibility in large desas than in small desas. Let us see how these factors together relate to size of desa, and how they affect desa responsibility in desas of different size. These relationships are shown in Table 23.

Table 23

RELATION AMONG SIZE, FAVORABILITY OF CONFLICT AND LEADERSHIP
FOR DESA RESPONSIBILITY AND DEGREE OF DESA RESPONSIBILITY

Degree of desa responsibility	Large			Small		
	Both favorable*	One favorable and one unfavorable**	Both unfavorable***	Both favorable*	One favorable and one unfavorable**	Both unfavorable***
High	Djogomertan Kandangtepus	Tjibatu Tjidjengkol			Djabres	
Medium/	Tegalhardjo					
Low		Ranujoso		Batan-kardjan		Karijokedung Gempol Sinangohprendeng

- * Group leadership without internal conflict.
 ** Group leadership with internal conflict, or individual leadership without internal conflict.
 *** Individual leadership with internal conflict.
 / Tandjung is excluded from the table because neither type of leadership predominates in this desa.

Since internal conflict and individual leadership are each less likely to occur in large desas than in small desas, it is not surprising that the two conditions never occur together in a large desa. On the same basis, it is not surprising that no small desa has no internal conflict and collective leadership. In other words, there is no large desa in which both state of internal conflict and form of leadership are unfavorable for desa responsibility, and there is no small desa in which both are favorable. There are, however, both large and small desas in which one condition is favorable and the other unfavorable for desa responsibility. The interesting point about Table 23 is that where both state of conflict and form of leadership are either favorable or unfavorable for desa responsibility, the relation between size and degree of responsibility is consistent, but where one condition is favorable and the other unfavorable, the relation between size and responsibility breaks down. If both conditions are not either favorable or unfavorable, a large desa may be either high or low on responsibility, and so may a small desa. It appears, then, that internal conflict and form of leadership explain the relation between size of desa and degree of desa responsibility.

Summary: Conflict and Leadership in the Desa
in Relation to Desa Responsibility

If the state of internal conflict and the form of official leadership in the desa are either both favorable or both unfavorable for desa responsibility, they apparently are crucial in the determination of degree of desa responsibility. Among the twelve desas, where there is no internal conflict and official leadership is collective, there is no case of low responsibility. At the other extreme, desas in which there is conflict together with individual leadership are all low on responsibility. When, however, one condition favors responsibility and the other does not, the desa may be either high or low on responsibility. Thus, desas in which there is collective leadership with internal conflict, or individual leadership without internal conflict may be either high or low on responsibility.

We found earlier that large desas tend to be more responsible for their affairs than small desas. We now find that we can explain the relationship between size and responsibility by the fact that large desas tend to have collective leadership and no conflict, while small desas tend to have individual leadership with conflict. In other words, conditions in large desas tend to be favorable for responsibility, and conditions in small desas tend to be unfavorable. Where this tendency does not hold, that is, where state of internal conflict and form of leadership are divided, one being favorable and the other unfavorable for responsibility, large desas are not necessarily highly responsible, nor are small desas necessarily low on responsibility.

CONCLUSIONS

Extent of Desa Responsibility

There seems to be considerable variation in the extent to which desas in Java take responsibility for their affairs. Some desas take a responsible part in everything which concerns the desa, while others expect government agencies to take sole responsibility for some of the routine maintenance of the desa.

Relations between Desas and Government Agencies

It seems to be more likely than not in any given desa that some government agencies will intervene in the affairs of the desa without being asked. This unsolicited intervention apparently does not lead highly responsible desas to adapt their actions to those of the government by becoming dependent on government agencies. On the other hand, it is not clear just what effects government actions do have on the desa. The fact that a number of desas react uncooperatively to government actions in connection with desa affairs suggests that the desas do not always agree with the government about what is good for the desa. Whether these disagreements are all concerned with specific issues, or whether they arise in some desas over the general question of how much the government should intervene in the affairs of the desa is a problem we have had to leave unresolved. Both possibilities are suggested by the results of this study.

Our findings indicate, therefore, that to understand relations between the rural population of Java and the central government, one problem we need to know more about is why some desas come into conflict with higher, more centralized levels of government. The particular questions raised by this study are: What are the specific actions by government agencies which tend to make desa inhabitants become uncooperative? Does general disagreement between a desa and government agencies over how much responsibility the desa should take for governing its affairs aggravate relations between the desa inhabitants and government agencies?

Characteristics of the Desa Related to Degree of Desa Responsibility

It has been suggested in connection with government plans for decentralization that small desas could govern their affairs more responsibly if they were amalgamated into larger units. This proposal appears to be sound inasmuch as we find that large desas are more likely to be highly responsible than small desas. Further investigation reveals, however, that the relation of size to degree

of responsibility can be explained by the tendency of size to vary with other factors, which in turn are highly related to degree of desa responsibility. It is probable, therefore, that amalgamation would not produce more responsible desas unless it was carried out in such a way as to make these related conditions favorable for desa responsibility.

The conditions which explain the relationship between size and degree of desa responsibility are state of conflict within the desa and form of official desa leadership. Large desas tend to be without internal conflict and to have predominantly collective official leadership, both conditions favorable for desa responsibility. Small desas, on the other hand, tend to have some internal conflict and predominantly individual official leadership, both conditions unfavorable for desa responsibility.

The results of this study indicate that when state of internal conflict and form of desa leadership both favor desa responsibility, the desa is either highly or moderately responsible for its affairs. At the other extreme, when both conditions are unfavorable for desa responsibility, the desa is low on responsibility. When, however, one condition favors responsibility and the other does not, the desa may be either high or low on responsibility. These findings suggest that further investigation of conditions which inhibit or facilitate desa responsibility should be concerned with two broad questions: What are the processes within the desa whereby state of internal conflict and form of official leadership affect degree of desa responsibility? What conditions determine degree of desa responsibility when state of internal conflict and form of official leadership are such that one is favorable and the other unfavorable for desa responsibility?

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APPENDIX A

INFORMANTS FOR INTERVIEWS CONCERNING DECISION-MAKING
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DESA

<u>Desa</u>	<u>Informant</u>
Batankradjan	Head of section of desa Desa chairman of P.R.I. (Indonesian People's Party) Teacher Chairman of desa <u>sawah</u> (wet rice land) cooperative Desa religious leader Largest land owner in the desa Member of N.U. (Moslem Scholars' Party) Agricultural worker
Djabres	Desa head Desa clerk Deputy head of the desa Desa messenger Teacher Regency Public Works Employee
Djogomertan	Desa clerk Head of section of desa Desa messenger Desa messenger Desa religious leader
Kandangtepus	Desa head Policeman in section of desa Chairman of desa credit cooperative Desa chairman of N.U. (Moslem Scholars' Party) Large land owner Farmer
Karijomukti	Desa clerk Teacher Teacher Desa Communist party leader Clerk in subdistrict office Farm laborer
Kedung Gempol	Desa head Desa clerk Desa chairman of N.U. (Moslem Scholars' Party) Farmer

<u>Desa</u>	<u>Informant</u>
Ranujoso	Desa head Desa clerk Teacher Subdistrict director of Information Service Official of section of desa
Sinangohprendeng	Desa head Desa clerk Desa religious official Desa policeman Desa Communist party chairman Teacher Farmer Agricultural laborer
Tandjung	Desa head Desa clerk Desa school director Agricultural laborer Unidentified desa inhabitant
Tegalhardjo	Desa clerk Desa messenger Desa religious official Teacher Communist party member
Tjibatu	Desa head Desa clerk Head of section of desa Head of section of desa Teacher Secretary of subdistrict branch of P.N.I. (Indonesian Nationalist Party) Dealer Blacksmith Blacksmith and farmer Farmer
Tjidjengkol	Desa head Member of Communist party Teacher

APPENDIX B

QUESTIONS IN INTERVIEWERS' GUIDE CONCERNING DECISION-MAKING
AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN THE DESA

What is being done for the benefit of the desa inhabitants by:

- a. his desa
- b. the subdistrict
- c. the province
- d. the central government.

Development of the desa:

What have been the most important things accomplished in the desa since the Dutch left (1949)?

Whose ideas were these?

Were these ideas discussed?

Who submitted them?

Who discussed them?

How and where?

Who were the strongest supporters?

During the discussion were there people who had different opinions?

Who were they and what were their opinions?

What can you yourself do to improve the situation in the desa?

In what way or ways can the desa inhabitants influence the government?

Desa administration:

How many times a month does the desa administration see the officials of the subdistrict or the officials of the district?

What do they discuss?

What is the procedure of these discussions?

About what matters do they usually have differences of opinion?

How are such differences solved?

Desa assembly:

How many usually attend and who are they?

How often are meetings held?

What specific matters have been discussed during the past two years?

Does the desa assembly make decisions?

If so, what decisions have been made during the past two years?

To what extent have these decisions been carried out by the desa administration?

Has advice or instructions been decided on by the desa assembly to be given to the officials of administrative units or to the central government?

If so, during the past two years what have they been?

Desa council:

How often are meetings held?

What specific matters have been discussed during the past two years?

Does the desa council make decisions?

If so, what decisions have been made during the past two years?

To what extent have these decisions been carried out by the desa administration?

Has advice or instructions been decided on by the desa council to be given to the officials of administrative units or to the central government?

If so, during the past two years what have they been?

Neighborhood association or similar organizations:

Does an organization of this type exist in the desa?

If so, what have been its accomplishments in the past two years?

Does it make recommendations to the desa administration, desa council or desa assembly, and, if so, what have been the results?

How are the recommendations and decisions concerning the actions of its members made?

Which members participate in the decision-making?

Prominent persons in the desa (according to the desa head):

Who are they and what are their positions in the desa?

What matters does the desa head discuss with them and on what occasions?

How are these discussions conducted? (e.g. procedure, individually or with several or all together?)

Do these individuals sometimes take the initiative in bringing up matters before the desa head? If so, what matters?

Does the desa head often disagree with these people?

Who are the ten most prominent persons in the desa, ranking them according to their importance?

What is the principal role of each in the desa--economic, political, other?

APPENDIX C

LIST OF EMPIRICAL SUBCATEGORIES DESCRIBING DESA PROJECTS
INCLUDED IN THE STUDYDesa well-being

Physical equipment and facilities

1. streets and walls
2. irrigation
3. bridges
4. dwellings
5. agriculture
6. fisheries
7. electricity, mainly lighting
8. handicrafts
9. livestock
10. drinking water
11. non-electric lighting
12. desa hall and other public buildings

Desa safety

1. desa security from external attack
2. emergencies, e.g. flood, famine
3. settlement of internal disputes, desa unity

Health, education and welfare

1. health
2. education of children
3. anti-illiteracy campaign
4. special training for officials
5. social welfare, e.g. special help for poor, aid to bereaved families

Property

1. land owned by desa--usually distribution of
2. privately owned land--usually selling or purchasing

Trade, marketing and finance

1. sale and purchase of livestock
2. cooperatives
3. prices in general
4. desa bank
5. market
6. financing for desa inhabitants--source unspecified
7. desa funds in general

Nonspecific--particulars not reported

1. desa planning and budgeting
2. desa maintenance
3. desa improvement
4. desa maintenance or improvement undifferentiated
5. contributions to the desa--purpose unspecified
6. labor for the desa--purpose unspecified
7. administration--records, permits etc.
8. desa regulations in general

Desa religious affairs

Religious affairs in general
 Mosque or prayer house
 Religious education
 Desa cemetery
 Marriage and divorce, birth, death

Social festivities

Celebration--occasion unspecified
 Independence Day celebration
 Decoration of the desa
 Hospitality in the desa

APPENDIX D

RELIABILITY OF CLASSIFICATION OF INTERVIEW DATA
IN ANALYTIC CATEGORIES

In view of the problems of classification, it is important to know something about the degree of reliability achieved by independent coders, that is, persons who independently classified the interview data in the analytic categories. The available tabulations tell us what degree of agreement was achieved between coders on the refined categories used in the process of classification. From these figures we have estimated the degree of agreement on the grosser categories used in the present report. The figures for reliability of classification between pairs of independent coders are shown in the following table.

PERCENTAGES OF AGREEMENT BETWEEN PAIRS OF INDEPENDENT CODERS

Types of categories	Number of interviews checked	Average percent of agreement on most refined categories used in classification	Estimated percent of agreement on grosser categories used in present study
Event-practice	11	.68	
Type of project	10	.65	.85
Initiation - reaction - indeterminate	10	.42	.88
Actors	10	.53	.66

The figures in the third column, average percent of agreement on the refined categories used in classification, are based on a sample of slightly less than one tenth of the data classified. They probably underestimate the amount of agreement between coders, because the job of checking reliability was partly combined with the job of training coders, in order to reduce the amount of time consumed checking reliability. These figures are, therefore, based

in part on agreement between a partly trained and a fully trained coder, and in part on agreement between two fully trained coders. Percent of agreement between a partly trained and a fully trained coder could not be expected to be as high as agreement between two fully trained coders.

The categories of event and practice used in this study are the same as those used during the process of classification. In this instance, the categories in the study are not grosser than those used in classifying the interview data. The agreement between coders in classifying data into these categories was about seventy per cent, a level of reliability which we judged to be satisfactory for the purpose for which these categories were used in this study.

About sixty-five categories were used in the original process of classifying subjects of projects, but for the present study a much grosser classification is used. We differentiate projects in the interest of the desa from projects in the interest of persons or groups outside the desa. Then, within the class of projects in the interest of the desa, we differentiate projects which are concerned with administration of the desa from projects concerned with desa well-being or religious matters or social festivities. It is only necessary to know, then, that a project is both in the interest of the desa and not administrative, or, that it either is not in the interest of desa or is administrative. We have estimated the reliability of classification into these grosser categories from the reliability of classification into the original sixty-five categories used by the coders. Assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that disagreement between any two of the original sixty-five categories was as likely as disagreement between any other two, we estimate that the coders would agree on the grosser classification of subjects of projects used in the present study about eighty-five per cent of the time. This level of agreement is satisfactory, in our judgment, for the purpose for which these categories were used in this study.

Since the classification of projects into those concerned with maintenance and those concerned with improvement was done entirely by one person, there are no reliability figures for these categories. If these are errors in the classification of projects into these categories, however, the errors probably entered at the time of translation of the interviews from Indonesian into English, as explained in footnote 8, page 11, rather than at the time of the classification on the basis of the English text.

Coders agreed, on the average, less than half of the time about decisions concerning the categories initiation, reaction and indeterminate act. There are two likely explanations for their difficulty. The coders may not have been able to distinguish between initiations and reactions. Or they may not have been able to agree when to use the category indeterminate, rather than either initiation or reaction. In other words, the difficulty may have been that they could not agree on the amount of information needed to classify an action as determinate, either initiation or reaction, rather than indeterminate. Or it may have been that they could

agree on the amount of information needed to use the categories initiation and reaction, but when they agreed that they had enough information they could not agree on whether initiation or reaction was the appropriate category. A partial check on the nature of the disagreements between coders indicates that they almost always involved inability to agree on when to classify an act as indeterminate. Over four fifths of the disagreements examined were between indeterminate act and initiation, or between indeterminate act and reaction. Less than one fifth of the disagreements were between initiation and reaction. This difference is important because the two kinds of disagreements have different implications for the study. To the extent that acts were classified as indeterminate when they should have been classified as initiations or reactions, data were lost which could have been used, but to the extent that acts were classified as initiations when they should have been reactions, or vice versa, errors were introduced which could affect the final results of the study. In order to judge the soundness of the material used for the study, therefore, it is more important to know how well the coders were able to judge whether an act was an initiation or a reaction than to know how well they could judge when they had enough information to classify an act as determinate rather than indeterminate. On the assumption that disagreements between initiation and reaction occurred as much as one fifth of the time, we estimate almost ninety per cent agreement on whether an act was an initiation or a reaction. This is a high rate of agreement, indicating, in our judgment, that the two categories were clearly enough differentiated to serve their purpose in the present study.

At least twenty separate designations were used for actors in the original classification, but only four distinctions were made in the present study. For most purposes, the only distinction was between actors within a desa, on the one hand, and government agencies, on the other hand. In addition, we distinguished in one part of the study between the desa head and the collective body of desa officials. Assuming, for the sake of simplicity, that disagreement between any two of the original twenty categories was as likely as disagreement between any other two, we estimate that the coders agreed about two thirds of the time on designations of actors in these four categories. This is a satisfactory level of agreement.

In general, the problems of reliability caution us against drawing firm conclusions from negative results. When we find systematic relationships despite the classification errors indicated by less than perfect reliability, we are probably dealing with fairly powerful effects. When, on the other hand, we do not find a relationship between certain factors, we cannot be sure that such a relationship would not have been discovered if the data had contained fewer errors of classification.

APPENDIX E

NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES RECEIVED IN THE TWELVE DESAS CLASSIFIED
 ACCORDING TO POLITICAL LEANING ON THE BASIS OF INFORMATION
 IN THE 1954-1955 ALMANAK PERS INDONESIA (INDONESIAN PRESS ALMANAC),
 THE 1954-1955 DAFTAR HARIAN/MADJALAH SELURUH INDONESIA
 (LIST OF NEWSPAPERS AND MAGAZINES THROUGHOUT INDONESIA),
 AND THE JUDGMENTS OF INFORMED PERSONS

<u>Political leaning</u>	<u>Newspaper or magazine</u>
Communist	Harian Rakjat Sin Min Sin Po
Masjumi	Abadi Hikmah Mimbar publications not identified by name but said to be pro-Masjumi by informant
Non-party	Harian Umum Kedaulatan Rakjat Penjebar Semangat Pesat Sipatahunan Suara Guru Suara Masyarakat Suara Rakjat Trompet Masyarakat Waktu
P.N.I.	Merdeka Nasional Suluh Indonesia publications not identified by name but said to be pro-P.N.I. by informant
P.R.I.	publications not identified by name but said to be pro-P.R.I. by informant
Socialist	Pikiran Rakjat Sikap