LIN YUTANG

# THE BIRTH OF A NEW CHINA

A reprint of Chapter Ten of the revised and enlarged edition of *My Country and My People*

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*A Personal Story of the Sino-Japanese War*

*by*

*LIN YUTANG*

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

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# PUBLISHER'S NOTE

NEARLY 100,000 copies of the earlier editions of *My Country and My People* by Lin Yutang have been sold in the United States. The last previous revision of the book was completed before the outbreak of hostilities in China. Now, four years later, the author has added a new section of 24,000 words showing the transformation of the spirit of the nation from derelict despair to hope, unity and national self-confidence. This new section appears in the revised and enlarged edition published March 9, 1939. To make it available to those who already possess one of the previous editions, we issue it also in this pamphlet form. And we include, on the following page, the author's new preface.

# PREFACE TO 1939 EDITION

THIS book was first written in 1934, when China was in her darkest hours, threatened with invasion and with no leadership in sight. Since then there has been a transformation in the spirit of the Chinese nation, from derelict despair into hope, unity and national self-confidence, as shown in its brave war of resistance. There was great internal progress in social and economic reconstruction, and the modernization of China was going on at such speed as to suggest a race against time, before the oncoming Japanese deluge. Spiritually the Chinese people were first driven into a frenzy by steady Japanese aggressions, and then galvanized into unity, determined to achieve national liberation even at fabulous sacrifice, and confident of final victory.

Such a united nation of four hundred million people, with such high morale and able leadership, can never be conquered by a foreign power. I believe that when China achieved true unity at the time of the Sian revolt, she had passed the worst crisis of her modern history. The story of this development is told in the chapter which I have added to this new edition, entitled "A Personal Story of the Sino-Japanese War." In this story I have recorded step by step China's rebirth as a modern nation; the foundations of Chinese resistance as laid in the years from 1932 to 1937; the impossible state of affairs during those years and my feeling that armed conflict was inevitable and that the regeneration and redemption of China through war were equally inevitable and axiomatic; an outline of the policy of Chiang Kaishek, the master strategist, throughout all these years and his present tactics for prolonged resistance, and finally my forecast of the final victory and the eventual development of China into an independent and progressive democracy.

THE AUTHOR

January 20, 1939
Paris

*Chapter X*

# A PERSONAL STORY OF THE SINO-JAPANESE WAR

## I. The Birth of a Nation

CHINA has a great past. Summing up a survey of the Chinese civilization and the Chinese way of life, one sees certain distinctive achievements and certain characteristic failures of the Chinese people. These achievements and failures of the Chinese way of life are made the more striking by contrast and comparison with the other civilizations. To the ancient Chinese, the Chinese civilization was not *a* civilization, but *the* civilization and the Chinese way of life, not *a* way but *the* way of life, the only one conceivable by the mind of man. The term "Middle Kingdom," as used in ancient texts, meant the civilized part of the world, in contrast with surrounding barbarians. This was not arrogance, but an objective fact; ancient China was surrounded by barbarians and had not known other civilizations comparable to its own. But the searchlight of modern knowledge reveals it as but one way of life among many, puts its beauties into strange relief, and shows up pitilessly its ugly corners. Under the glare of a scientifically progressive, industrially revolutionized, but ideologically confused international world, some modern Chinese hide their faces in shame and others acquire a sense of exaggerated pride. Modern China begins to think, slowly, ponderously and painfully, and sometimes with confusion, but sometimes also with flashes of common sense. The whole process of transformation of modern China is but a prolonged process of slow, ponderous and painful thinking by an entire nation. The Chinese race begins to think what to do with itself and its own way of life.

For China is in the midst of a great historical epoch, comparable to those great epochs in history, like that of the contact of the

Roman world with Christianity, or that of Renaissance Italy or Elizabethan England, when man's mind was vouchsafed a new vision and his imagination was set free and inspired. Tales perhaps more marvellous than those brought back to Europe by Marco Polo about Cathay, or those brought back by Columbus about the Indians, were told of a new world, a new civilization and new races of men, who had telescopes and priests, gunboats and cathedrals, trains and public parks, libraries and museums, cameras and newspapers. Tales, too, of beef-eating, butter-smelling men with hair on their chests and golden-haired, blue-eyed and indecently dressed women. But tales, also, of republics and parliaments and constitutions, of liberty and equality, of government of the people, by the people and for the people. Lastly, tales of devilish weapons of destruction, incomparably superior to any China had known.

China, therefore, for the first time saw a strange, new civilization different from her own, from which she had things to learn. But China was in an isolationist mood, being economically and spiritually self-sufficient. Her bulk, her geographical position and the consciousness of a proud civilization and culture made her slow to learn from the West. The Chinese people saw the white man as scientist-engineer, soldier, and preacher, and only a few saw him as a teacher of new ideas. They admired the white man as scientist and in this sense, "scientist" chiefly meant the maker of attractive gadgets of extreme beauty and ingenuity, like a watch. They looked askance at the warlike soldier, but bothered little about him; it was inconceivable that the white man could ever overthrow their empire, and nothing was done about it. The intellectual Chinese rather sneered at the preacher of a foreign religion, both because they had just as good miracles, faith cures, virgin births, transfigurations, ascensions and hell and heaven in Taoism and Buddhism, and because it was somewhat ridiculous for the white man to come and preach peace and humility and non-resistance to the peaceful, humble and never-resisting Chinese, particularly when the preacher was backed at every step by gunboats.

But the western civilization was, besides other things, also a system of ideas, and the power of ideas was greater than the power of gunboats. While European gunboats attacked the Tangku Fort at Tientsin, and the Allied Troops marched on Peking in 1900, western ideas were tearing down the social and cultural structure of the Empire from within. Perhaps like other epochs of cultural interchange, it was the intellectual class that took the lead, and it was to the credit of China, the old literary nation, that she accepted the western cultural heritage before she accepted the industrial heritage. So important was the importation of cultural ideas that it culminated in the collapse of an empire and a civilization.

The turn of the century, marking the Boxer Uprising and the Allied sack of Peking, was an accurate and convenient historical landmark, from which point on, the infiltration of western knowledge, thought and literature has been a powerful, uninterrupted leavening process. In a decade the Empire collapsed, directly due to western political ideas, and a Republic was established. That the Republic did not succeed as a form of government did not matter; only visionaries could have expected it to succeed at once. What mattered was that here was a new, progressive and warlike, aggressive civilization, with totally different concepts and values, that challenged her own civilization and threatened to engulf it. The leavening process was greatly quickened by the defeat of the Boxers. Yen Fu translated Adam Smith, John Stuart Mill and Huxley; Lin Shu translated Charles Dickens, Sir Walter Scott and Conan Doyle; Liang Ch'ich'ao advocated liberty, equality, general education and parliamentary government; and Sun Yatsen advocated overthrow of the Manchus, republican government, socialism and nationalism. So important was the burden of the new ideas that they included, not only the introduction of all the sciences and philosophy and a scientific method, but the overthrow of the imperial examinations system, the change of the school system, the very contents and method of education, the popularization of knowledge, the changing status of the scholar; the reform of the written language, the

importation of new terms and the change of the literary style; the emancipation of women and the condemnation of foot-binding and concubinage; the undermining of Confucianism, of the family system, the monarchical system and the village system; the break-away from the basic cultural ideas of respect for old age and for authority, of face, fate and favor, of law and privilege and equality, of government service, of nationalism and patriotism, of man's attitude toward society itself. The result was an overwhelming chaos in the minds of the older and younger generation.

Yet by definition, the period of conflict of ideas was also the period of intellectual ferment. Beneath the avalanche of ideas, the nation began to wonder and to think. Looking now over the four decades of cultural interchange, of violent liberalism and arrogant, hollow conservatism, from the spirited communist youth of the present to the warlord advocates of Confucianism of the generation that has today almost died out, one sees an amazing contrast in point of view. One compares the soulless old carcasses governing Puppetia in Peiping—the ex-warlord Ch'i Hsüehyüan, the Anfu politician Wang Kehmin, the long-bearded, literary Ex-Commissioner of Imperial Metropolitan Gendarmerie Chiang Ch'aotsung, and the scholarly collector of old editions Tung K'ang—with the faces of communist youth in Edgar Snow's *Red Star Over China,* or of Hunan girl soldiers marching on foot, carrying rifles and knapsacks, and one gets the impression that the two generations live in two different worlds. Their spiritual profiles are as strikingly different as their physical profiles. Three generations have completed a cycle of change from the stale and mouldy mandarin, with his *après-nous-le-déluge* mentality, to the nationally and internationally conscious, flaming youth of today.

For this is the story of the birth of a nation in four decades. Out of a civilization grew a nation. Yet the word "nation" as used here has a pathetic tone about it. China was a civilization, more than a nation. In the best sense of the word only was China a nation, a political group of homogeneous people permeated by a

homogeneous culture, having a common language, a common history, a common literature and a common belief in certain spiritual values. It was not, however, a fighting nation, organized by railways and radios and propaganda bureaus and equipped and armed for carrying on or resisting international aggression. It was merely a sprawling mass of humanity trying to live out their individual lives, and nobody could question their right to do so. For living in the present decade of upsets of all values, in an internationally chaotic world, when words no longer say what they mean nor respectable statesmen mean what they say, when the most barbaric states can be called "nations," while civilized democracies which desire to live in peace are forced to arm themselves and fight their fellowmen in other countries, or be threatened with national extinction, when the right of a nation to exist is measured by the diameter of its guns and the speed of its bombers, an intelligent man can seriously question the benefit of being ushered into the family of nations, to which China is now being introduced and in which she is now winning a place.

This emergence of China in the family of nations is no heyday visit with a newly discovered relative in the country, no romance of adventure into a blessed Utopia of peace and prosperity, but the return of the Prodigal Son to a family of brother robbers brawling and squalling among themselves and he is greeted by drawn daggers at the entrance. Pass that entrance he must, to gain a seat of honor and equality and eat of the fatted calf that belonged to him. Who can blame him if the Prodigal Son hesitates for a moment and, unarmed, turns blue and regrets he ever thought of returning and wishes he had remained abroad, living with harlots, or had remained in the land stricken with a mighty famine and filled his belly with the husks that the swine did eat? Living with harlots, he thinks, is incomparably saner and more civilized than fighting for the feast of the fatted calf. It takes him days and days to nerve himself to the battle, to discover himself as a fighter. For only by discovering and proving himself as a fighter can he gain the respect

of his robber brothers. What is worse, to maintain that place at the table, the Prodigal Son has to continue to arm himself, and they sit down at the dinner of the fatted calf with one hand holding a fork and the other hand holding a drawn dagger. There is no other way of finishing the dinner and feeding oneself in this household. It is only in this sense that we can speak of the emergence of China in the bitterly quarrelling "family of nations."

The story of China's re-birth as a modern nation is therefore more tragedy than comedy. China did not discover herself until after years of bewildering aggressions, of hesitancy and importunity and begging for mercy, of evasion and futile pleas for intercession, and useless crying over broken pledges, of final disillusionment and the decision to nerve herself to the new atmosphere of the household. Only complete cynicism saved her and taught her dependence upon herself. Thus it was that every step in her advance as a modern nation was due to a bitter lesson in disillusionment, first at the Versailles Conference, then at the League of Nations, and finally through a life-and-death struggle with Japan, in which she is compelled to defend herself or perish.

It can be easily understood that the mass inertia of a big, old country is tremendous, and progress was made only by successive shocks from the outside. It is fair to say that, on the whole, China did not choose to become a modern nation, but was goaded into it. The sack of Peking in 1900 forced the ultra-conservatives out of the way and compelled the realization of the imperious necessity of reform, which finally broke up the Manchu Empire in 1911. The Versailles Conference in 1919, at which China was betrayed by her own allies, directly precipitated the student movement and marked the beginning of Young China to take direct part in national activities, a movement which culminated in the revitalizing of the Kuomintang and the establishment of the Nanking Government. The next betrayal at the League of Nations during the Manchurian incident in 1932 further forced the very healthy realization that China ultimately must rely upon herself and it was

from 1932 onwards that hectic preparations were made for national defense. Thanks to the uninterrupted goading of Japan in the years between 1932 and 1937, thanks to Japan's steady encroachments in Jehol, Hopei, Chahar and Suiyuan, the Chinese people were warned that their national independence was at stake, and continually kept at a point of boiling indignation and furious hatred, in which was finally born the will to resist. It cannot be overemphasized that the foundations for resistance against Japan by the entire nation, and the popularization and deepening of the will to resist, were laid or took place in those years following 1932, years of bitter resentment and harassing disillusionment in which this book was written, years dominated by the thought that China was at last on the road to become a modern unified nation but that Japan would not allow her, years that saw even the pacifist Hu Shih who alone defended the Tangku Pact of 1933 turn into a supporter of the cause of resistance, years that made the Chinese Communists abandon their own program and unite with Nanking on the single condition of pledged resistance to Japan, years that culminated in the Sian kidnapping in the winter of 1936. Finally, it was the armed invasion by Japan that brought the nationhood of China into being and unified China as a modern nation ought to be unified. For the first time in modern history, the whole nation moves as one man, and China hates and fights like a modern nation. Thus a modern China is being born under the baptism of fire.

## II. Will Our Old Culture Save Us?

The question now is: not whether we shall be able to save our old culture, but whether our old culture will be able to save us. Only after we have preserved ourselves against external attack, shall we be able to preserve our old culture.

China has no choice but to become modern. She has had "modernity" forced upon her. If she could have learned from the West

only the arts of peace, greater education for the people, greater enjoyment for men, women and children, better prevention of famines, floods and poverty, more libraries, parks and museums, and better policemen, officials, judges and scholars! If she could only have made use of the rich cultural heritage of the West, and revitalized her literature, re-arranged her musical melodies, and made researches in her medicine and perhaps have contributed to the sciences and arts of the West! It would not be so catastrophic even if China could learn only washing of gold and drilling of oil fields and modern advertising and merchandising and all the raw industrialism and money-hunt of the West! But the gift of the West is given to China in two hands, in one hand the arts of peace and in the other the arts of war, and she has to take both. The Chinese farmers perhaps first see the spread of the Western civilization in the spread of Japanese bombing planes flying over their villages, and first learn what western machines mean by seeing crawling armored caterpillar tanks. Scientific accuracy means the accuracy of gunfire, and the mastery of physics and chemistry is proved by mustard gas, dumdum bullets and searchlights of the Japanese navy on the Yangtse. Perhaps the farmers' children will swear to become modern with a curse while women with raped daughters and bayoneted babies cry in confusion and terror, unable to comprehend the personal happenings that are the results of a far-away world, dominated by sheer commercial greed, that now descends upon them in the frightening combination of Attila hordes armed with machine-guns.

Yet being modern is not simply being armed and warlike and brutal. It is perhaps possible to strike an equation about the advantages and disadvantages accruing to China from this transformation through modern influence and modern circumstances.

The process of China's acclimatization to the brutal, warring world of today is necessarily a hardening process, boding good neither for her neighbors nor for herself, just as I challenge any claim that the human life led by the men and women of modern

fascist states, like Germany, Italy and Japan, is a whit better as human life than in, let us say, sixteenth-century Italy or eighteenth-century China. So far as the end of human happiness is concerned, the net result of progress is nil; so far as the ideal of human dignity is concerned, the net result is a minus, and in the judging of civilizations let us never lose sight of the true end and ideal of human life. Suppose China becomes a good, fighting nation, well armed and well equipped after the war; nothing is gained thereby if she has to continue to live in a warring world, as compared to an unarmed, unequipped and isolationist world that she was living in in the eighteenth century. The respect gained by military prowess invites fear from without and breeds haughty arrogance of the 1914-German or 1937-Japan type, corroding the soul of the nation from within and necessarily imposing upon the nation terrific sacrifices for an object unknown. So far as the world can discover, neither the German people of 1914, nor the Japanese people of 1937, knew what they were called upon to fight and sacrifice for. Nations have ruined themselves fighting for nothing else than Victory with a capital letter. The mania of war-mad men creates an illusion in seven letters and makes of it an end sufficient unto itself, for which mothers lose their sons and wives lose their husbands, for behind every triumphal march follow the shadows of countless widows and orphans in mourning. The Japanese have proved themselves good fighters, but so have the Russians, the English, the French, the Germans, the Americans, the Italians, the Abyssinians, the Arabs, the Sikhs, the Turks, the Indians, the Negroes, and now the Chinese. It is just a matter of acclimatization to a higher level of the warlike spirit, and pretty soon nations will tire of warlike pretensions and military prowess and the world will grow sick and weary of victory parades and processions of tanks and aeroplanes, and men will not fight merely to demonstrate that one is braver than the other, but merely to prove that one possesses more devilish machines. Even when the Chinese have proved themselves brave fighters, they have proved only what was

proved long ages ago about the Arabs, the Negroes and the Indians, and it is somewhat insane to prove the civilized man is not inferior to an African native. The Chinese people will only build a bigger and better army, and pay more taxes and for the first time submit themselves to compulsory conscription for the love of country. The world has nothing to gain by seeing the last, great pacifist culture die out and be transformed into a thoroughly efficient, modern war-camp.

Since the modernization of China happens to come at this period of European chaos, it is to be expected also that, with the subtle Chinese sense for moral values, China will lose, to a certain extent, its respect for the civilization of the West, as Japan has already done. And this, not only by the failure of the Western Powers to make a stand for justice and respect for treaty obligations, but also by the moral bankruptcy within Europe itself. Western prestige is lowered in Chinese eyes, not only by Western indifference to catastrophic upheavals in the Far East and such concerns and arguments on their part as reckon solely with commercial gains and losses, but also by a shrewd knowledge of how Europe is treating the Europeans. The arrogant, unintelligent and unscientific Aryanism of Nazi Germany so reminiscent of Wilhelm Hohenzollern, the abandonment of Czechoslovakia by France, the stockbrokerly peace with stockbrokerly honor of Chamberlain in England, the triumphant cynicism of Mussolini in Spain and England's complicity in it, and the surrender of the League of Nations to Italy in the case of Abyssinia, give us a devastating picture of the moral bankruptcy of Europe, resembling so much the moral bankruptcy of China in the third century B.C., with the same selling out of small states by the big states to the growing dictator Ch'in Shih Huang, the same "bribing for peace" by the Six States presenting Ch'in with bits of others' territories, the same fear and hesitancy of the small states in turning for protection, the same cynicism toward covenants and treaties, and the same dallying with the dictator-totalitarian nation by the great Ch'i Kingdom for its

selfish benefit—all done by able statesmen speaking large mouthfuls of desire for "peace," "security," "justice" and "honor," until the totalitarian state engulfed them all. The Chinese realize that if Europe is not willing to fight for justice in Spain, much less can justice serve as the principle of international dealings elsewhere. Thus the word "modernity" has a bad ring about it, and China in accepting modernity has to accept it whole. The modern world is united in a cultural as well as economic unit, and the principle of sacred treaties or the principle of force in world affairs becomes a world system from which none may escape.

Yet the modernization of China contains within it also blessings for the Chinese people. It is necessary to understand the social transformation of China from within, in order to appreciate what is happening inside China. Modernization is an inexorable process brought about by the spread of newspapers and radios and a thousand other contacts with the West, and it cannot be stopped no matter what the vicissitudes of fortune on the battlefield. Even the Japanese cannot do anything about this new reborn Chinese nation. The strength of the Chinese resistance today is built upon this new nationalism, brought about by the modernization of her people. The reason why history is not going to repeat itself and China is not going to be conquered and then absorb her conquerors is that, not only Japan is not the Manchus or Mongols of other centuries, but also China is not the ancient, formless mass conquered by the Mongols and the Manchus. The base of the present resistance against Japan is not the Chinese Government nor the Chinese army, but the Chinese people, who are decidedly different in their temperament, points of view, social attitude and general enlightenment from what they were thirty years ago.

The fact is, we were willing to preserve our old culture, but our old culture was not able to preserve us. Only modernization is going to save China. The wonderful paintings of Mi Fei and the mature poetry of Su Tungp'o in the eleventh century did not prevent the invasion of the Kins into North China half a century

afterwards, nor did the art of painting of Emperor Huichung save him from dying in exile as hostage to the barbarian invaders. There is no proof in history that a mature art and mature philosophy necessarily coincided with the political greatness of a nation. If Napoleon admired Goethe, it did not mean Goethe's Germany was not run under the iron heels of Napoleon, and history records that raw, barbarian Vandals overthrew cultured, if decadent, Rome. The invasion of China by the West in the nineteenth century coincided with one of her recurrent cycles of decay, as set out in the first chapter of this book, when the peace and prosperity of the eighteenth century under Emperior Ch'ienlung was no more, overpopulation and poverty produced unrest and the Taiping Rebellion swept over half of China in the eighteen fifties, and officialdom was corrupt to the core. Whereas a century before, the China of the Ch'ienlung regime was superior to England in communications and public works and the general level of people's living, in the latter half of the nineteenth century China presented a spectacle in sorry contrast to Victorian England. She was in a perfect state of moral and economic decay. The Chinese Republic, founded in 1911, took over this heritage, but old values were disappearing and new values had not yet taken their place, and with the collapse of imperial authority, the giant Republic fell by its own weight into a series of virtually autonomous tuchunates, with military satraps ruling as *de facto* emperors in their respective provinces. Western democratic rulers fear the people, and Chinese rulers under the Monarchy feared the Emperor, but these military satraps had neither an emperor nor a strong public opinion to be afraid of. If Japan had chosen to strike in the first decade of the Republic, as she did in the presentation of the Twenty-One Demands in 1915, and had not been restrained by fear of the Western Powers, China could have been conquered already.

Looking now over the transformation of the spirit of modern China in the last four decades, one cannot remain blind to the benefits that come from the general enlightenment of the people



as a whole. By the western yardstick of Progress, one can easily point to the spread of schools and colleges, the steady increase of newspapers and the output of books, the rapid development of motor highways and railways, the emancipation of women and the participation of women in politics, the growing prevalence of a standard national language, the elimination of *likin* taxes, the consolidation of finance, the gradual weeding out of corruption, and most important of all, an entirely new spirit of hope and endeavor and an almost impetuous desire for reconstruction among the public functionaries of the country. No greater contrast exists than in the management of the finances of the country, between the Peking regime which always paid the salaries of its officials, teachers, and diplomats in arrears and whose finance consisted in juggling with loans from month to month, and the Nanking Government which could invest millions in the construction of public buildings, radio stations, wharves, quarantine boats, gymnasiums, stadiums, highroads and railways, and spent a hundred thousand dollars monthly on the Academia Sinica for scientific research alone. Such progress was due to the existence of a stable government for over ten years, but due in the final analysis to the general penetration of western influence and enlightment. A new generation of western-educated financiers and college professors replaced the old mandarinate of the Peking regime. At one time in the Nanking Cabinet, I could count three professors of the Peking National University, a professor of geology and a professor of economics, both educated in Germany, and a chancellor and professor of education, educated in America. A different generation necessarily meant a different point of view, and the change in the spirit of men is to be ascribed to the modernization of the people and in the last analysis to the mere lapse of time since the establishment of the Republic twenty-seven years ago.

One is fully aware of the illusions of progress. The spread of schools and colleges does not necessarily mean China has better educated youth than in the old days. The emancipation of women

does not mean that the modern girl is a superior type to the ancient home-bred Chinese girl. The increase of modern luxuries and distractions does not mean that modern men and women are having a better time. The rise of new dynasties of wealth does not mean that they have the right to condemn the rich mandarins of former days. The prohibition of bigamy in the new constitution does not mean that wealthy Chinese cannot keep mistresses in the western manner. The appearance of factories does not mean that workers are better treated than ancient artisans or that there is going to be less poverty. And modern industrialism promises to raise more social problems than ever existed before. On the whole, China is still undergoing the process of social transformation and is barely beginning to struggle to her feet and follow the new pattern of things, with signs of poverty and rural disintegration and quite a few comic contrasts in the vast interior that remind us we are a long way from being out of the woods. Yet if China wants to become modern, she has to adjust herself to all that modern industrialism and nationalism mean. I have already indicated that the modernization of China is no holiday visit to a fools' paradise.

I have too much confidence in the Chinese racial character and national heritage to fear they will ever be lost. A national heritage is but a set of moral and mental qualities, a living, dynamic thing, showing itself in certain philosophic attitudes toward life and reactions and contributions in new circumstances. The position should be bravely taken that the modern world has a spiritual unity and that modern culture is the common heritage of the world. China cannot possibly remain apart from this common heritage of the world, whether it be technical science, medicine, philosophy, art or music. She stands to profit by enriching herself with this harvest of modern civilization. It is a common mistaken notion that she will thereby sacrifice her national character and her heritage. On the other hand, I think it should stimulate the Chinese national character to newer and greater creative activities. Frankly, I am not worried. The Germans, the French, the English and the Americans

have all participated in the building of this modern scientific culture without the loss of their national character; so why should China lose hers? The different nationalities have all their peculiar contributions to make, say, the Germans in music and science, the French in art and literature, the English in democratic government and the Americans in technological perfection and big-scale business efficiency, but such contributions must be on the basis of a cultural unity. The modern science of medicine is neither German nor French nor American; there is only one science of medicine. If the Chinese character is a living force, it will assert itself by its ability to make contributions to the common fund of knowledge; and if it is not, it is not worth having at all. A national character cannot mean anything except certain spiritual attitudes and mental and moral assets, which, under whatever circumstances, will show themselves. A living national genius should therefore create and produce. It should not be regarded as something dead and already achieved, to be embalmed and preserved. A national heritage is not a museum piece. Chinese history has already proved the extraordinary vitality of this Chinese culture, surviving all political shocks without losing its continuity.

## III. The New Nationalism

The question before China today is, however, not whether such progress and modernization are theoretically desirable, for modernization is an imperious necessity, if China is to adjust herself successfully to the new world environment and survive. The present circumstances compel us to believe that what matters most today is, whether modernization has gone far enough to give inner vitality to China's new nationalism to check and wear out and finally vanquish the ruthless Japanese war machine. It is no time now for China to choose the wise gift from the Goddess between Peace and Progress. The sinister gifts of Goddess Europa to old China are not given in such simplified forms, but the choice is between Peace-and-Slavery

and Progress-and-War. China has chosen the latter, the so-called new Nationalism, and this is the gift of the West.

The new nationalism, which is the gift of the modern world and which we see today in the national resistance against Japan by the entire people, is different from the love of country as we used to know it. It is based, it is true, on the old racial instinct common to all men to defend one's own home and hearth against a foreign aggressor, naturally strong in a people with a long history and a proud national consciousness. But mere love of country or racial sentiment pure and simple was not enough. Historically, it was not proof against the Mongol and the Manchu invasion. Patriotism in ancient isolationist China was a queer thing. China was an empire, a civilization, a world by itself. The love of China was like the "love of civilization" or "love of the world," or love of the planet called Earth in a contemporary American's mind. How many Americans will fight for the love of the world, or even love of the civilization, if it is threatened by Martians? The sentiment is something far too thin and vague and remote.

That old racial pride evidently was not enough. When China wins, as I know she is going to win, it is because of that new nationalistic spirit come into full being. This new nationalism has surprised the world. The uninformed still regard it as an artificial product brought about by the war, with no basis in it, which will disappear when the external pressure is lifted. The more correct view is that this new nationalism was so much in the ascendant before the war that it became the nightmare of Japan, so that she had to strike before the metamorphosis was completed, or her dream of Asiatic Empire would vanish. Somewhere in 1934-1935, this new spirit passed the line, eclipsing and finally blotting out dark despair, and a new spirit of national self-confidence was born. Only after the onset of the war, did the inner strength of this new spirit and new fabric become apparent and surprise the outside world, most of all Japan herself.

If today we see the will to resist in China uncrushed and un-

crushable by a superior army and navy and air force, it is because of this new nationalism, brought about by the invisible force of general enlightenment. If we see today the unity and coherence becoming stronger and stronger with external pressure, if we see, contrary to Japanese and outside expectations, no selling out of generals and politicians during the year and half of warfare, if we see the old personal enemies of Chiang Kaishek, the Kwangsi Generals Li Tsungjen and Pai Tsunghsi, throw in all their resources and personal service to fight side by side with Chiang and under his leadership, if we see the communist generals act out of equally patriotic motives to support Chiang, if we see school and college students fighting in the services, if we see the stubborn resistance of Chinese soldiery fighting on all fronts against heavy odds in air force and artillery and tanks, if we see the morale of the people behind the front which John Gunther says cannot be described by any other word but "magnificent," if we see young college girls leading hundreds of war orphans in a steamer up the Yangtse, giving them shelter but standing themselves on the deck in the rain, if we see Chinese beggars beg for gifts to throw into the public coffer for war contributions, if we see the call for 9,000,000 cotton vests for the soldiers and refugees in winter answered and oversubscribed in a few days by the entire nation, if we see refugee children organize dramatic corps and tour the country to stir up the people's resistance, if we see the Chinese respect the soldier now, we can say that China's nationalism is an accomplished permanent fact, and China is assured of unity and leadership and determination to fight till the final victory, even if it takes years. If we hear unanimous eye-witness reports that amidst the stark privations and hardships and personal losses of home and property and relatives, *not a single grumble is heard among the refugees against the Government* for the policy of resisting the invader, we know that the basis of this resistance is in the people and not in their leaders only.

In such a war of prolonged resistance, I can foresee what will happen. Japan is like a new Buick car with a splendid engine, trying

to cross the Gobi Desert, and the contest is one between the engine and the sand. Will the engine reach its far-distant and forever shifting objective before the sand gets into the engine and paralyzes it? Is the desert going to destroy the car, or the car going to conquer the desert? An added consideration is that the car carries only a limited gasoline supply at the outset of the journey, so that it has to push ahead in order to reach the supposed objective before the gasoline is used up. If the car reaches the objective with the last gallon of gas, Japan wins, but the likelihood—to me, the certainty—is that the Japanese machine will continue to labor along, and make headway so long as it labors along, but eventually the car will be parked for sheer lack of fuel, and American and British trucks will be called to pull it back to where it began its foolhardy journey, with smeared mudguards and a broken shaft and an engine without grease.

A further peculiar element in the desert race is that at different places can be found only U. S. filling stations, upon which alone Japan absolutely depends for replenishing her gasoline supply and reaching a successful outcome. Japan goes on insulting the filling station employees and knocking down the fences of the station, but gets its machine filled with U. S. oil, while the station employees merely complain of the Japanese insolence and the sand thrown in their eyes, but pocket the price for the gasoline, claiming business as the biggest of reasons. When Uncle Sam will cease to sell for profit and refuse like a New England farmer to have any deal with the reckless fence-breaking party, only time can tell.

And so China fights on, and will fight on, battered and bruised but not beaten. The best hope of China is that she has at present an inhumanly cool-minded and inhumanly stubborn leader, who knows what all this is about, and who views it as a twenty-round match, knowing that it is the final knock-out that counts, and has planned accordingly. It is not China's inherent strength, but the knowledge of that strength and the strategy to use it to full advantage, that is important. This understanding of the essential

nature of the war of resistance is not only made common property among the people of China today through newspapers and radios, but dictates the strategy of the General Staff itself.

Only when we have driven the Japanese army from our soil, or compelled them to retire, shall we again take time to think what all this confusion of cultures means and how to preserve our old culture. Meanwhile, it is not our old culture, but machine-guns and hand-grenades that will save the nation. The Chinese nation will not touch their old culture, until the Japanese cease talking about this "common" Asiatic culture and leave it alone where it belongs. It behooves the wise not to speak too often of a national culture, lest the jingoes hear of it and make of it a catchword and a phrase to destroy it. One never hears of a specific English or French culture, but when Hitler speaks of "German *Kultur*" or Itagaki speaks of "Asiatic culture," let the world look out! When a German hears of German *Kultur,* he immediately reaches out for a gun and when a Japanese speaks of "Asiatic culture," women tremble and scream.

## IV. Brewing Storms

I saw all this three years ago, back in 1935. I saw the inevitability of the coming armed conflict, and saw the regeneration and redemption of China through war as equally inevitable and axiomatic. For it must be clearly stated and understood that the foundations of the present strong resistance were firmly laid in the years after Japan had swallowed up Manchuria in 1932, and that this resistance is not an overnight growth after the war, merely brought about by the unimaginable Japanese atrocities. It should be understood that the Japanese undeclared war against China was begun on September 18, 1931, and has been going on without interruption ever since. "Modern" as the Chinese people comparatively are, their determination to fight Japan was not crystallized and fortified and deepened until they were stung into a frenzy and saw that even after the sacrifice of Manchuria, Japanese appetite was not

satisfied but growing, and that the partition of North China was inexorably in the scheme of the Japanese Army. The years of helpless rage between 1932 and the outbreak of the present war were the years in which Japan herself aided the "spiritual mobilization" of the Chinese people and fanned Chinese nationalism and anti-Japanese hatred into a glowing flame.

I saw that the state of things in those years could not go on for ever and that the boiling indignation of the people at the continuous whittling away of Chinese territory, at the daylight smuggling of Japanese goods by the millions of dollars under Japanese consular protection, at the vile, underhanded and despicable advance of the narcotic trade following the Japanese army—I saw that this boiling indignation, suppressed by the Government to avoid incidents and given no outlet, was bound to accumulate force until one day it would burst and engulf any Government that continued to beat retreat before the never-ceasing aggressions of Japan. For five years, from 1932 to 1936 inclusive, this public feeling of national humiliation and national demand for resistance was given no outlet or tangible expression in public. Under the steady, increasing pressure of these crossing and mutually augmenting trends—(1) the ruthless intrigue and pressure of the Japanese warlords toward completing their separation of the five Northern provinces, (2) the consequent growing bitterness and rising demand for resistance on the part of all Chinese people and a great section of the Government, and (3) the suppression of all demonstrations of this sentiment by the Chinese National Government to avoid incidents while it was getting ready—under these steady, increasing pressures, the nation literally "went crazy." The atmosphere of dark intrigue of the Chahar-Hopei Regime, and the lack of clarification on the part of the Government where and when it would make a stand as the limit of concessions, were so demoralizing that I felt strongly that only by yielding to the popular demand for resistance and fighting it out with Japan, could the nation recover its mental equilibrium, and that a war would, like a

storm, relieve the atmospheric depression and enable the people to breathe in a clarified, if stormy, atmosphere. The nation, fully awakened, would be able to give outlet to the stored-up hatred of the aggressor accumulating for years since the rape of Manchuria, and feel free and sane again. Open warfare under such circumstances was psychologically the more healthy thing; for an opposite course of yielding up the Northern provinces inside the Great Wall without a fight, since no let-up could be expected from the Japanese pressure, would, I was quite sure, cause the nation to settle into a state of permanent depression-mania. As events proved, the tide of rising demand for resistance, whether China was ready or not, was so strong that it swept everything before it and nearly engulfed Chiang Kaishek himself at Sian. Chiang Kaishek could not have survived at Sian had he not been able to convince his captors of his sincerity in deciding to resist further foreign aggression, an idea which was firmly and clearly and actively in his mind, but which he had refused publicly to declare to the nation as a whole.

The peculiar angle in this situation was that while Chiang Kaishek was actively planning for the inevitable conflict, he was also playing for time and the nation was left completely in the dark, without knowledge of a promised leadership for a war of national liberation. For at Nanking there sat the supreme chessplayer of the Far East, and one of the greatest political chessplayers of all time. A good chessplayer is a cool player, and this great enigmatic personality, whom I had watched rise to fame and power for ten years, could be inhumanly cool. On top of his coolness, his fine calculations, his stubbornness (unusually un-Chinese), he was also a man who acted, but kept his own counsel and refused to explain his attitude to the nation. The "inhuman coolness" of Chiang was proved, not only in his ordering Chang Hsuehliang to give up the whole of Manchuria without fighting, but also in his refusal to support the Nineteenth Route Army in the Shanghai War of 1932, even after the gauntlet had been thrown down, and, as far as the

people were concerned, China was already fighting Japan. This was not a possible attitude for a common mortal with common passions like myself. As is evident in this case, he was also a man who knew he was right, even if the whole nation condemned him and even if he stood all alone. He thought China was not ready, not only in regard to military training and equipment, but principally in that China was not sufficiently unified. The war of Shanghai was in the spring of 1932, but he had fought Wang Chingwei, Chang Fakwei, Shih Yushan, Tang Shengchih and the Kwangsi Generals, Li Tsungjen and Pai Tsunghsi, in middle and south China only in 1929, had fought Wang Chingwei, Feng Yühsiang and Yen Hsishan in northern China only in 1930, and he was in the midst of his unfinished campaign against the Communists in Kiangsi, which was yet to be intensified in 1933.

The Communists in Kiangsi, by the way, had already declared war against Japan and were technically at war with Japan since 1932. Japan wanted to "fight the communists" in China, which Chiang Kaishek was doing most determinedly and wholeheartedly, but since the Communists wanted to fight both Japan and Chiang Kaishek, and since Chiang Kaishek did not permit Japan to fight the Communists, Japan wanted to fight Chiang Kaishek in order to be able to command Chiang Kaishek to fight the Communists and gave Chiang Kaishek no peace until Chiang Kaishek didn't want to fight the Communists any more and both Chiang Kaishek and the Communist "Red Napoleon" Chu Teh wanted to fight Japan. When the war started, Japan soon discovered her sole object was to "destroy Chiang Kaishek" because Chiang was anti-Japanese, although he was anti-Communist, and before long I know Japan will discover that she is going to "destroy" Chiang Kaishek because Chiang Kaishek is not only anti-Japanese, but also pro-Communist.

But while such high comedy was going on among the Japanese militarists and diplomats, of which we shall see more later, the people of China were breathing in the stench atmosphere of national

despondency and almost national delirium. The first ray of hope came in the summer of 1935, when the Japanese Army announced that it wanted to destroy Chiang Kaishek. To me, then also in the Slough of Despond, this was unbelievably good news. The Japanese militarists in China at this time were so arrogant that a military attache at the Japanese Embassy in Nanking openly said that the head of a friendly Goverment to which he was officially accredited, ought to be overthrown. This was followed by quite a few equally blunt statements by Japanese Army authorities in North China, who liked to see their names in print and gave perfectly frank interviews about Japanese intentions. The statements had two effects, each electrifying. In the first place, Chiang Kaishek is a human being, with human emotions common to every mortal; in particular, he is a born last-ditch fighter. Japan's open declared hostility affected him just as a Persian cat is affected by having its coat stroked backwards. The second and more important effect was that the Japanese denunciation of Chiang Kaishek at once absolved him in the eyes of the Chinese people from all guilt and suspicion of being pro-Japanese. The Chinese people began to flock around him as their national leader as they never had done before. The Chinese and the Japanese had been working at cross-purposes for so long that the Chinese instinctively sensed that what the Japanese said was good for China was bad for China, and what the Japanese said was bad for China was good for China. When, therefore, the Japanese announced they regarded Chiang Kaishek as the enemy of the Chinese people, the Chinese people felt he must be their savior. In simpler terms, if the Japanese thought Chiang was a bad man, that was proof conclusive in Chinese eyes that he was a good man. If he was not good for China, the Japanese would not try to "destroy" him. This pronouncement of several prominent Japanese militarists in the summer of 1935 convinced the Chinese people that Chiang was preparing for resistance in a way that no statement from Chiang himself could have done, and the critics of Chiang began to change their opinion of the man and rally to his support.

A year before this, back in the summer of 1934, up in Kuling where I was writing this book, I had heard rumors of Chiang's preparations for armed resistance, and had received these rumors with a great deal of skepticism. Near Kuling in Lushan, there was at this time a military training summer camp where the commissioned officers from all parts of China were called to receive direct political training by the Generalissimo himself. Throughout the summer, the Generalissimo lectured them for hours on end, standing beneath the hot sun, on the necessity for resistance, the inequality of equipment and the preparations for national defense. The officers all went back to their provincial armies with their hearts won over to Chiang and, I thought, their allegiance to their direct superiors weakened. But outside these talks at the military officers' camp, which were generally kept secret, I had seen no concrete signs of the intention for resistance, and my impression was that the Generalissimo was extremely clever. That he was also patriotic in regard to the question of Japan he took the greatest pains to conceal before me and before the Chinese nation. The declarations of the Japanese that "Chiang must be overthrown" were therefore the first assurance I had that Chiang's professions of preparing for national defense against further aggressions were sincere, and my instinct was correct.

Since Chiang did not care whether or not the nation knew what was in his mind, and since there was a rigid censorship and the outward policy of the Government was still one of kotowing and capitulation before increasing Japanese demands, what actually occurred was that from the summer of 1935 onwards there was a whispering campaign that Chiang was preparing for resistance, to which the people could lend credence or not according to their individual judgments. Chiang's past record of non-resistance in the Manchurian affair, the Shanghai War and the Tangku Truce was against him, but those like myself, who had bits of inside information on details of actual preparations for national defense, thought that all his past sins could be forgiven him, since he was

envisaging the military conflict, not from a patriotic-sentimental angle but from the point of view of military organization, communications, supplies and facilities for caring for the wounded, stated in facts and figures, as a military man would do. It was not the building of the air force which could be interpreted as strengthening his personal domination over China, but quite definite details, like fortifications of the Chapoo sea coast, compulsory military training of first year students in senior middle schools and colleges, the building of the Canton-Hankow Railway by day and by night in anticipation of a Japanese blockade of the East coast, the investigation of hospital facilities, etc. Personally and secretly I had forgiven him.

I was still dissatisfied with the stubborn attitude of this man toward the Communist offer of a United Front (since August, 1935), an attitude from which he was rudely shaken only by the kidnapping at Sian, whither he went to intensify his anti-Communist campaign and whence he came away convinced of the sincerity of the Communists, who could have taken his life then, but who were responsible for championing his release. I also felt that the time was coming when further capitulation on his part to Japan would cause endless revolts (as happened in the Kwangsi Revolt of 1936) and make it extremely difficult for him to hold China together, in spite of his military superiority, but that on the other hand, the general feeling against the Japanese threat was so strong that only by assuming the leadership in national defense could he transform his military unification of China into a real moral unification. I felt that, if he would openly assume this leadership, he would become a national leader crowned by the loyalty of the peoples' hearts and would emerge as one of China's greatest national heroes in history, a condition which has been realized; but if he should at any time falter and give up national resistance, which is an impossible contingency in view of his known stubbornness and insight, the whole nation would flock to the generals who continued to resist, a fact which is still true today. So are we all,

heroes and common men, puppets of circumstances and masters of circumstances at the same time, as the Chinese saying goes.

Meanwhile, to Chinese who still doubted Chiang's patriotic leadership, the China of the years before the war presented a gruesome picture of despair. Shall I tell the story of shameful, vicious Japanese aggression and equally shameful Chinese capitulation and suppression of all anti-Japanese sentiment? Shall I tell the full story of Japanese meanness and insufferable arrogance and Chinese insufferable submission and of conditions under which no self-respecting men and women could exist? Chinese husbands had to look on while Japanese ronins teased women at a Peking bazaar and then guffawed, at a time when Peking was under Chinese control and Japan and China were not at war. Was it not right that the two nations should fight and decide once for all whether China should remain as an equal nation or should become a vassal state of Japan? How was the Chinese Government to suppress the anti-Japanese feeling even with the most rigid censorship and forbidding of demonstrations? In spite of all precautions, student demonstrations flared up, and the Peking police chopped down the students with big knives, the same knives that the students of Yenching had presented to the Twenty-Ninth Division for defense against Japan on the Great Wall; or as in another case, the police turned the fire hose on the student demonstrators in icy weather. In May, 1936, I witnessed a demonstration of thousands of students in Peiping, with students carried back in rickshaws with blood streaming down their faces, but the Chinese government censorship was so strict that on my return to Shanghai a few days afterwards, I found not a line had been printed about the demonstration in the Chinese papers at Shanghai. On the same trip, I saw personally the daylight smuggling of Japanese goods at the Tientsin East Station. Huge piles of Japanese cotton and sugar were standing in the station of a Chinese Railway and four or five Japanese and Koreans were sitting with their legs planted open on a bench, and the Chinese Railway guards looked on in helpless rage because of

extra-territoriality! Japanese smugglers had ejected Chinese passengers from a third-class coach at Tientsin at midnight and tumbled in their goods from windows, and the Chinese Railway had to carry their smuggled goods to Tsinan under pain of being called anti-Japanese and charged with "insincerity for cooperation." The Chinese Railway Ministry had issued an order that goods without identification papers showing clearing of customs duties should not be accepted on the railways for transportation, but the Japanese consular authorities made it plain that any scratch on the skin of a Japanese or Korean smuggler would be followed by claims for indemnity and possibly a military "punitive" expedition. Japanese gunboats had disarmed Chinese customs launches and forbidden them to patrol the waters of Shanhaikuan, which was transformed into a port for unloading Japanese goods by fleets of Japanese steamers and junks. Any engagement by the customs boats with these gangster boats would be considered an insult to the Japanese flag, as in fact happened once. The Chinese Maritime Customs official report of 1935 stated that the volume of smuggling in North China in nine months amounted to over $25,000,000 Chinese currency in direct loss to the customs revenue. And yet not a line of news or comment about the gigantic smuggling was permitted to appear in the Chinese papers a year after this had been going on, until the newspapers in London and New York began to publish them. A Chinese opium dealer in Tinghsien (near Peiping) was arrested but had to be released on a telegram from the Japanese authorities in Peiping. Japanese tourists went round inspecting the libraries of Tsing Hua and other universities of Peiping and Shanghai, and the Chinese college authorities were notified by municipal authorities to hide away or destroy volumes of Chinese modern history that might mention the loss of Manchuria. Two harmless humorous skits on Hirota had to be taken out of a collection of my essays before my publishers in Shanghai dared to publish them. A comment of mine in an English weekly at Shanghai on the increase of Japanese influence and the wisdom of studying

Japanese brought a sharp warning from the Chief of the Intelligence Bureau of the Foreign Ministry, who had just returned from a trip to Japan, and the manager of the weekly had to take a hurried night-train trip immediately to Nanking to arrange matters and promise to behave. No editorial in the Chinese papers at Shanghai that I ever read in those years touched or was permitted to touch on Japan. A contributed article in the *New Life Weekly (Hsin Shenghuo Chouk'an)*, characterizing the "Emperor of Manchukuo" as a "puppet of a puppet," caused the Shanghai Chinese Court, under direct Japanese pressure, to sentence the manager Tu to a fourteen-month imprisonment, and a young reader, reading that a certain Tu died during this period and mistaking it for the patriotic manager, committed suicide. One student demonstration staged by the students of Fuh Tan and other universities of Shanghai, was denied railway facilities for a trip to demonstrate before the Nanking authorities. The students captured the cars and engineer students ran the locomotives, but the Chinese authorities tore up the rails and compelled the students to disperse and return after reaching Soochow. Another demonstration of Shanghai universities was planned but frustrated by Chinese gendarmes entering the boys' and girls' dormitories at Fuh Tan on the night of March 24, 1936, and arresting eight students, and the next day, apart from the English papers which published the incident as a front-page story, the Chinese papers came out with a small note of the incident, and a bland report issued by the Central News Service, giving the statement of the Commander of the Woosung-Shanghai Gendarmerie to the following effect; "Seeing that the minority of Communist students were so unruly, the Commander's Headquarters has ordered the authorities of the said College to hand over the Communist elements and at the same time caution *the good students* against being utilized by Communists *and persuade them to work at their lessons.*" (Italics are mine.) As late as the autumn of 1936, eight prominent Chinese editors and lawyers of middle age, none of them even suspected of being Communists, were

arrested and jailed at Shanghai for openly organizing an Association Against Japanese Aggression, and were not released till the outbreak of the war when Madame Sun Yatsen went to the Court and demanded: "If being against Japanese aggression is a crime, arrest me!"

When Hirota and his successors accused Chiang Kaishek and the Kuomintang of "stirring up anti-Japanese sentiment," the full pathos of the remark could be appreciated only by those who lived through those years before the war. Nanking prohibitions against demonstrations, issued February 20, 1936, to kill instantly the nation-wide students' anti-Japanese meetings that flared up in January, included the following four articles:

(1) In the event of any attempt at disturbing order, instigating riots, disrupting communications or any act or acts which endanger the safety of the Republic, the troops or police responsible for peace preservation *shall use force or other effective means* to suppress them.

(2) Any one found to be doing propaganda work aiming at such criminal acts as mentioned in the last article, *in the form of writing, or pictures or lectures or with any other methods shall be arrested on the spot,* and if he resist, shall be brought under control *by force or other means.*

(3) *Meetings and parades* which aim to violate peace and order and to instigate the people *shall be dissolved by the troops or police* responsible, and *the ringleaders* and any one who resists dissolution *shall be arrested.*

(5) *Any one who hides or gives shelter* to violators of these measures or helps them to escape *shall be arrested.*

It was under such "emergency laws" against "crimes endangering the safety of the state" that the Fuh Tan students were legally arrested in the following month. In my *History of the Press and Public Opinion in China* (University of Chicago Press), I was compelled to write in 1936 in the chapter on "Censorship":

The exercise of censorship implies that the government thinks it is able to carry on the national responsibilities with-

out "interference" from the press or the people, and when such a government is actually marching from victory to victory either in military or diplomatic battles, the people do not mind keeping their mouths shut; but on the other hand, when the press is muzzled at a time when the government is daily losing bits of territory that belong to the entire nation and the people are not allowed to speak out, the only natural consequence, if censorship is prolonged over a long period, is that the people are overcome by a feeling of general cynicism and despondency. The invariable plea of the rulers is that the people should maintain "calm" *(chentsing)* in moments of national crisis, which is true enough in the oriental tradition, but when this beautiful "calm" is kept up too long, in which the people feel they cannot do a thing or say a thing to help their country, it is no longer distinguishable from cynical indifference.

Again:

> I can never sufficiently stress the fact that it is a lie to say that the Chinese people of today are the Chinese people of thirty years ago, and that they are really "indifferent" to their national welfare, simply because one sees no visible sign of people's activities either in the press, or in public demonstrations against daily encroachments of their territory.

The fact was, any less "strong" government than Chiang Kaishek's could not have suppressed the people's anti-Japanese activities and feelings to this extent and survived or remained in power, and it was a miracle that, with the army of insolent Japanese soldiers, sailors, narcotic dealers penetrating into Chinese villages in the interior as far as Szechuen, only half a dozen Japanese were killed in the entire country, except Manchuria, in all those years. By pure statistics it could be proved that Japanese lives were safer and better protected in China inside the Great Wall than in Manchuria by something like 33,000 per cent, in the year 1936, even assuming that the two territories compared were equal in size!

If any body of men had the honor of "stirring up" anti-Japanese feeling, it certainly was not the Chiang Kaishek Government.

Hirota knew better than that. The statement of the plain truth was painful, yet was also useful. The Chief of the Intelligence Bureau thought I was doing China a disservice by stating the facts in the *History of the Press and Public Opinion in China* and the little bureaucrat went so far as to threaten preventing my landing in China on my return. He should be glad now that I have marshalled together here unimpeachable, documented evidence to answer Hirota that the Kuomintang must be absolved from all blame in stirring up anti-Japanese feeling, for which the Japanese were and are solely responsible, and that the national will to resist grew firmly in the people and was not artificially fanned up by the government leaders.

## V. Pressure, Counter-Pressure and Explosions

Meanwhile, in the Far Eastern continent, three historic forces were gathering momentum and rushing China and Japan toward a head-on collision: first, the increasing, inexorable Japanese expansion inside the Great Wall, with the partition of the five northern Chinese provinces as the declared, definite, immediate objective; second, the laying of the foundations of a modern state by Chiang and the Kuomintang Government and the feverish preparations of China for national defense; and third, the explosions of popular feeling all over the country in national revolts against further yielding and procrastination in the Government's policy of playing for time. It is barely possible to summarize the events in the background under the three categories.

Under the heading of Japanese expansion may be mentioned the following: The conquest of Manchuria in 1931-32, the seizure of Jehol in 1933; the conclusion of the Tangku Pact giving Japan a demilitarized zone in the same year; the Eji Amau declaration of Asia for the Asiatics in 1933; the silent penetration into Chahar in 1934-5; the setting up of the East Hopei regime in the demilitarized zone designated by the Japanese in 1935 and its expansion toward Peiping; the immediate use of this bogus regime as base for huge-

scale smuggling and spread of the narcotic trade with its center in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin; the full-fledged smuggling reaching tens of millions of dollars in open defiance of Chinese customs in Chinese territory in 1935-6; the open declaration in 1935-6 by various Japanese generals in North China that Chiang Kaishek must be overthrown and that a "surgical operation" must be "performed on North China"; the enunciation in 1935 of Hirota's "Three Principles" (China-Japan-Manchukuo cooperation, China's abandonment of cooperation with the Western Powers, and abandonment of anti-Japanese policy); the virtual Japanese domination of the semi-autonomous Hopei-Chahar Council under Sung Chehyuan, set up by Chiang Kaishek as a temporary buffer-instrument; the attempt at the conquest of Suiyuan in 1936, a few months before the Sian incident; finally the openly and repeatedly announced Japanese intrigue led by Doihara, to make the "five northern provinces" (Chahar, Suiyuan, Hopei, Shantung and Shansi) a second Manchukuo as their immediate, unchangeable objective; and then the Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937. Although Japanese lies are too simple and childish to deceive the world now, attention should be called to the fact that no Japanese sophist, logician or diplomat can wriggle out of the position that the creation of a "Japan-China-Manchukuo bloc" means, clearly and exactly, that Japan wants to make China a second "Manchukuo."

Under the heading of the consolidation of the Chinese nation into a new-born state, the rapid economic reconstruction and feverish preparations for national defense, may be mentioned the following: the adoption of the silver policy, the formation of national banks, the consolidation of Chinese finance, the concentration of silver in the hands of the Government and shipping it abroad as China's foreign reserve; the rapid development of a vast network of motor highways all over the country, connecting Nanking with the northwest and the southwest (1,185 kilometers in 1921, 30,000 km. in 1927 and 96,345 km. in 1936); the building of four new railways and four extensions, the most important being the com-

pletion of the Canton-Hankow railway by night labor, the workmen working under torchlight, and its opening for through traffic in 1936, the extension of the Lunghai Railway to Sian in the northwest and opening of through express service from Shanghai to Sian, and the opening of a line connecting Hangchow with Nanchang in Kiangsi over mountainous territory within a year and a half; the fortifications of Chapoo, Haichow and Nanking; the rapid development of a new air force; the compulsory military training in camps for three months of middle school and college students, started in 1936; the building of dykes and river conservancy work ($6,890,000 Chinese currency in 1933, $13,059,000 in 1934, and $35,351,000 in 1935); the building of stadiums, gymnasiums, libraries, museums and a $7,000,000 wharf at Kiangwan, completed just before the outbreak of the war; the building of the double-deck steel bridge across the Ch'ientang River at Hangchow, also completed just before the outbreak of the war and since destroyed; the national rural rehabilitation projects, particularly in Kiangsi; the rapid development of rural cooperatives; the compulsory registration of the population under the *paochia* system. . . . China at last, it seemed, had got on to the road of progress, and a new spirit of self-confidence was born. It is important to note that it is the same national spirit which made such internal progress possible that is now determined to fight Japan to a final victory.

While a modern, progressive, unified China was and is certainly wanted by a large section of liberal Japanese opinion, this same modern, progressive, unified China, in the very nature of things, was an obstacle and a threat to the Japanese war-makers' dream of a huge Asiatic Empire. For this reason, Japanese pressure was quickened and the Japanese army was all the time getting more and more impatient with Japanese diplomats and the diplomatic approach and lashed it from behind. In the end the feverish program in China in the years 1934-7 actually assumed the aspect of a race with time to avoid being engulfed by Japan before she was ready for resistance. Actually the war started two years too late

scale smuggling and spread of the narcotic trade with its center in the Japanese Concession at Tientsin; the full-fledged smuggling reaching tens of millions of dollars in open defiance of Chinese customs in Chinese territory in 1935-6; the open declaration in 1935-6 by various Japanese generals in North China that Chiang Kaishek must be overthrown and that a "surgical operation" must be "performed on North China"; the enunciation in 1935 of Hirota's "Three Principles" (China-Japan-Manchukuo cooperation, China's abandonment of cooperation with the Western Powers, and abandonment of anti-Japanese policy); the virtual Japanese domination of the semi-autonomous Hopei-Chahar Council under Sung Chehyuan, set up by Chiang Kaishek as a temporary buffer-instrument; the attempt at the conquest of Suiyuan in 1936, a few months before the Sian incident; finally the openly and repeatedly announced Japanese intrigue led by Doihara, to make the "five northern provinces" (Chahar, Suiyuan, Hopei, Shantung and Shansi) a second Manchukuo as their immediate, unchangeable objective; and then the Marco Polo Bridge incident in 1937. Although Japanese lies are too simple and childish to deceive the world now, attention should be called to the fact that no Japanese sophist, logician or diplomat can wriggle out of the position that the creation of a "Japan-China-Manchukuo bloc" means, clearly and exactly, that Japan wants to make China a second "Manchukuo."

Under the heading of the consolidation of the Chinese nation into a new-born state, the rapid economic reconstruction and feverish preparations for national defense, may be mentioned the following: the adoption of the silver policy, the formation of national banks, the consolidation of Chinese finance, the concentration of silver in the hands of the Government and shipping it abroad as China's foreign reserve; the rapid development of a vast network of motor highways all over the country, connecting Nanking with the northwest and the southwest (1,185 kilometers in 1921, 30,000 km. in 1927 and 96,345 km. in 1936); the building of four new railways and four extensions, the most important being the com-

pletion of the Canton-Hankow railway by night labor, the workmen working under torchlight, and its opening for through traffic in 1936, the extension of the Lunghai Railway to Sian in the northwest and opening of through express service from Shanghai to Sian, and the opening of a line connecting Hangchow with Nanchang in Kiangsi over mountainous territory within a year and a half; the fortifications of Chapoo, Haichow and Nanking; the rapid development of a new air force; the compulsory military training in camps for three months of middle school and college students, started in 1936; the building of dykes and river conservancy work ($6,890,000 Chinese currency in 1933, $13,059,000 in 1934, and $35,351,000 in 1935); the building of stadiums, gymnasiums, libraries, museums and a $7,000,000 wharf at Kiangwan, completed just before the outbreak of the war; the building of the double-deck steel bridge across the Ch'ientang River at Hangchow, also completed just before the outbreak of the war and since destroyed; the national rural rehabilitation projects, particularly in Kiangsi; the rapid development of rural cooperatives; the compulsory registration of the population under the *paochia* system. . . . China at last, it seemed, had got on to the road of progress, and a new spirit of self-confidence was born. It is important to note that it is the same national spirit which made such internal progress possible that is now determined to fight Japan to a final victory.

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for Japan and two years too early for China, and that is why it is going to be a stalemate. But it is exactly because Japan will not give China a chance to continue her normal development and internal reconstruction, at a time when China has at last pulled herself together and got on the road of progress, that modern China's hatred against Japan is so deep and bitter. In trying to "destroy Chiang Kaishek's government," Japan is trying to destroy the first strong, unified and modern Chinese government to bring order out of chaos, and in this sense it is a moral wrong and a deeper injustice than breaking treaties. What the Japanese are doing is, in common English parlance, "unfair." It is neither English "fair play," nor Chinese "gentlemanliness," nor Japanese "bushido."

But while Chiang Kaishek was following a realistic policy of planning for war but praying for peace that China might be given a respite and build herself into a sound and united modern state, and while he had to keep cool himself and keep the nation cool by all repressive measures against outbursts of popular feeling, another big force, the national will to resist and dissatisfaction with his North China policy, was growing so strong as to change the will of this stubborn man whom nothing short of a kidnapping could change. Let it be said once for all that the situation in North China was scandalous in the eyes of foreign observers and more than humiliating in the eyes of the Chinese. More disgraceful and scandalous than even the Japanese smuggling and Japanese narcotic trade was the fact that the Japanese Army had demanded the closing down of the Kuomintang office at Peiping, that is, the office of the ruling party that the Chinese Government represented, and the Chinese authorities had complied with this demand and the Kuomintang officers had been sent down south.

Such outbursts were inevitable. The best illustration was a little incident between a railway guard representing the people, and a Vice-Minister of Foreign Affairs, representing the pro-Japanese officials. I am free to relate this incident because the Vice-Minister is dead and even insulting the dead is too cheap for him, and if I

don't, Chinese novelists are bound to do the same. The Vice-Minister, T'ang Yujen, a "small-white-face" young man, was a protégé and henchman of Wang Chingwei, and was made Vice-Minister when Wang Chingwei was Foreign Minister. His first act on being appointed Vice-Minister at Nanking in the morning was to take the night train to Shanghai in the evening and report to the Japanese Consul-General for duty. His first "job" assigned by the Japanese Consul-General was to make use of his authority to make T. V. Soong, who was returning from the United States on the wheat loan trip, go up to Tokyo when he passed through Japan. This T. V. Soong refused to do, and the Vice-Minister was roundly reprimanded by the Japanese Consul-General for failing in his first assignment. Nevertheless T'ang Yujen continued to pay his weekly calls to the Japanese. This got so notorious that even the guards on the Shanghai-Nanking Railway conceived a contempt for the little "big official," and once when T'ang was going to Shanghai, a railway guard asked politely if His Excellency was going to pay his respects to the Japanese again. On his return, T'ang "wept" (as we say in Chinese) and complained to Wang Chingwei about the lack of courtesy of the railway guards, but nothing came of it and the incident, unimportant but significant, was closed.

This incident prepares the reader to understand the assassinations, including that of T'ang Yujen, which were part of the popular outbursts against the pro-Japanese party in the Government. At the Kuomintang Congress in 1935, as Wang Chingwei was standing in front of the camera for a photograph of the Opening Session of the Congress, a man disguised as a photographer turned a revolver on him from behind the black hood of the camera, and escaped. A month later, T'ang, the Vice-Minister, was shot dead before his own door-steps as he was returning to his house in the French Concession at Shanghai. Later followed the assassination of Yang Yungtai, an able politician of the Peking regime who had wormed his way into the Kuomintang Government.

Then in 1936 came a series of rebellions which steadily pressed the issue of immediate war with Japan and stopping the war on the Communists which Chiang was still bent on continuing. The chief of these rebellions were that of Kwangsi in August and the Sian Revolt in December. However complicated the motives underlying the revolts, they nevertheless expressed the will of the people. One must have been living in China to feel their full portent. The sincerity of the Communists and even of Chang Hsuehliang, Chiang's captor at Sian, in acting out of patriotic, non-personal motives, was long proved and had convinced Chiang himself at the spot when they saved his life and championed his release. Those who doubted the sincerity of the Kwangsi generals, Li and Pai, in their demand for immediate war with Japan at the time of their rebellion, have been forced to change their minds since the outbreak of the war, when Li and Pai both promised and carried out a policy of united, wholehearted support of Chiang in resistance against the invader. Whether the rebelling generals acted from personal or public motives or a mixture of both, and whether immediate war was advisable, is irrelevant; the fact remains that the whole nation had come to realize the danger of further compromise. They saw that there was no end to Japan's ambitions, no swerving of her will to conquer, and that to yield another inch of Chinese territory could not be tolerated by a self-respecting nation. The nation had reached the point of determining to resist Japan at the risk of a major war. War was in the air, and Chiang felt it, knew it.

These rebellions were therefore inevitable and moreover useful in helping to clarify the issue, the issue helplessly presented by the student demonstrators all over the country, but now vigorously presented by the militarists. It was a remarkable testimony to the Chinese Government's popular strength that although it was taking a more moderate and less anti-Japanese position, it came out of every rebellion stronger than before. Chiang Kaishek settled the rebellions with firmness and considerable sagacity. Some of his

immature rawness had worn off, and he showed more temperance. In his dealing with the Kwangsi Rebellion, he rose to the full stature of a statesman. He faced the opposition and won, but it was a victory far above party or personal lines, for while winning, he accepted the view of his adversaries that it was absolutely necessary to stop further encroachments, to meet force with force, although down in his heart, as a military man, he prayed he should not *have to* meet a superior force with an inferior force, and that a major war could still be prevented, as was so clear in his hesitation during the entire month of July, 1937, after the Marco Polo Bridge incident. Moreover, he acted on his conviction; he predicted that the next Japanese aggression would be in Suiyuan, and when the conflict actually did come, Nanking for the first time in history mobilized its forces to oppose the Japanese, or Japanese-inspired, aggression. The Japanese were repelled from Suiyuan and the Chinese people were satisfied. I still believe that he did this merely to humor the Chinese people and believed there was no danger of a major war in it. But outwardly at least did he thus fall into perfect alignment with the will of the people. Only by bowing to the will of the people could he command. Great man that he was, there was no abstract principle in Heaven that he academically obeyed, but he could not be said to have read the signs of the times wrong. His reward for the new policy of resistance was the spontaneous tribute of loyalty that came to him from the nation during his Sian captivity.

If, as I say, these rebellions served the necessary and useful purpose of clarifying and crystallizing and unifying a national attitude toward Japan, then the Sian revolt may be said to have truly paved the way for a united stand and united front, as significant in the history of this war as it was dramatic in its surprising developments. This admitted, it must be said that a man who is now shadowed in obscurity, Marshal Chang Hsuehliang, must be given credit for bringing this about and for his entirely patriotic and non-personal motives and conduct in the entire affair. Was he or

was he not correct in forcing Chiang to subscribe to the united front and stop the useless war on the Communists who had been suing for years for this united front and for a chance to fight the Japanese? The united front was a logical development of the Chinese situation, and without the Sian incident, it could not have been brought about and China would not be ready for a war of resistance. From Chiang's release at Sian dated the rapprochement between the Kuomintang and the Communists, the Communists promising to relinquish their party program and demanding in return only Nanking's pledge to resist Japan and never to sign away an inch of Chinese territory to Japan.

The Sian incident proved to be the signal for the rallying of all Chinese factions and parties behind Chiang Kaishek for a united resistance against Japan. Thus was a circle completed, beginning with the Japanese denunciations of Chiang Kaishek in the summer of 1935 and ending with the complete alignment of the Chinese people behind him as the national leader in December of 1936.

Writing in the Spring of 1937 ("China Prepares to Resist," *Foreign Affairs,* April, 1937, New York) I concluded with the warning of a final explosion and an appeal to reason: ". . . finally, there is China, embittered by years of bullying at the hand of a nation which in her heart she really despises, hardened by a period of disillusionment in international diplomacy, and finally taught the lesson of ultimate reliance upon herself. At the head of the nation, keyed up at last to the tune of modern nationalism, eaten up by bitter hatred of the invaders, and unified by one single powerful emotion, is a determined, wily, modern statesman-soldier. So much of China's national consciousness has been suppressed in past years by the Chinese Government that when eventually it explodes, as it will if Japanese pressure is continued, the world will be startled. The explosion will have more spectacular results than the last Shanghai War. The only alternative is a prompt application of the old philosophy of 'live and let live.'"

I have been at pains to sketch at considerable length the founda-

tions of Chinese resistance and gradual drawing together and alignment of forces in the years preceding the war, in order to show, and enable Western readers to understand, the solid structure and inner fabric of this Chinese resistance which has given the world a surprise. I wanted to show, in the first place, that the strength of Chinese resistance was built up in the years between 1932 and 1937 and not after it, and that China profited a great deal by the "spiritual" mobilization" of our people by the Japanese through these years. Had Japan not demonstrated her stock methods and real intentions in the puppet state of Manchukuo, and had China chosen to fight Japan in 1931, the basis of Chinese resistance would not have been so broad and deep among the people. In the second place, I wanted to show that the war was brought about by large historic forces in conflict, and that the years preceding the war coincided with the best and most hopeful years of China's internal reconstruction, which became a race with the Japanese plans for onslaught on the budding modern, united China. Thirdly, I wished to show that the will to resist came from the people and largely forced the Government's hand and side-tracked its policy of playing for time. Fourthly, I wished to show that the essential condition for national downfall, such as existed at the end of the Sung and Ming Dynasties, is lacking in modern China. I mean the spirit of petty strife and personal dissensions among the Chinese leaders. This must be credited in the first place to Chiang's leadership and ability to convince the other factions of his honest, although realistic and cool-minded, patriotism; and in the second place it must be credited to the magnanimous attitude of sincere patriotism and broad-mindedness of the Kwangsi Generals, Li Tsungjen and Pai Tsunghsi, and of the Communist leaders, Chu Teh and Mao Tsehtung. Need I emphasize the fact that Chu and Mao held at Sian in their hands the life of the man who had warred upon them for the last eight years and had placed vast sums on their heads, and magnanimously released him because they believed that China needed him for a national resistance against Japan? This coopera-

tion of the leaders for a common war of national liberation I regard as the best index of China's spiritual regeneration. Historically the contrast to the petty personal rivalry of Chinese leaders at the end of the Sung and Ming Dynasties is most striking. When I see China thus unified, I regard my country as having already passed the worst period in her modern history.

## VI. The Man Chiang Kaishek and His Strategy

A psychological study of Chiang Kaishek would be most fascinating. I can discuss it here only in relation to his leadership in the present war. He had not only united China by force and masterly strategy over his older rivals, which was no mean task. He was more modern than Wu P'eifu or Yuan Shihk'ai and succeeded in doing what these two men had failed in the military unification of China under the Republic. Virtually alone and single-handed, he had defied the Wuhan Government in 1927 and established his own Government at Nanking and had changed the entire course of Kuomintang history. He had made of that Nanking Government the stable national government of China for eleven years when the war broke out, and had made of that government the basis and center for China's internal reconstruction. He had fought a dozen major and minor civil wars, at times against formidable combinations, and had always come out victorious by sticking to his guns. He had outwitted his political adversaries and outmanoeuvered his military opponents so that they seemed always to be in the wrong. He had bought and sold generals and made temporary use of political groups to gain immediate ends. He had to work with such a medley of politicians as he found them, with the bitterest cross-currents of internal politics, and therefore he had to tolerate evils until the time came when he could do away wih them. He had to fashion a new administration that held together out of the very imperfect human material a transitional generation had provided him with. He had fought with every friend and

patched up with every enemy, and had employed in his own secretariat, his defeated military enemy, General T'ang Shengchih, who later rebelled and again came to serve under him. He had discredited the entire Nineteenth Route Army heroes of the Shanghai War (1932) in the eyes of the Chinese people within a year and a half, and he had bought off the generals of rival warlords (except the Communist officers who could not be bought) and broken up the armies of really formidable rivals by separating their units in service at different parts of the country. He was self-willed, masterly, astute, far-sighted, determined, stubborn, cool, ruthless, calculating, wily, ambitious and truly patriotic. He has mellowed and broadened and truly has the interests of China at his heart. He has a vision of a strong, united and independent China and another vision of himself at the head of such a China, and the two visions merge and become inseparable from one another in his mind.

Personally, he is a disciplinarian, neither smokes nor drinks, not even tea (!); he acts but does not talk, calls a conference, lets every one express his opinion, listens silently, sends them away and makes his own decision. He can stand in the hot summer sun and lecture his officers for hours. He has a rare disregard for personal danger and has many times risked his life at the front whenever necessity required his personal presence.

In regard to his national leadership both before and during the war, I think he has steered the ship of state during an extremely dangerous period in a masterly manner, with fewer fatal blunders than belong in the lot of common men. I have already pointed out his inhuman coolness of mind in giving up Manchuria and in his attitude during the Shanghai War of 1932, and he had braved national censure in doing so. He had consistently played for time and avoided conflict with Japan until such time as China should be united and at last stood a better chance for forcing a stalemate. In the years 1932-35, he utilized the pro-Japanese group in the Government and the Foreign Ministry to kotow to the Japanese, while he kept consistently away from Nanking, refusing to take direct

part in any negotiations, and was either staying at Kuling, fighting the Communists, or was flying from province to province, fighting anything he could find to fight, or at least inspecting waterworks and river embankments. This subterfuge of evasion was kept up for a long, long time, so that during those years Chiang's return to Nanking for a flying visit was counted quite an event. The Japanese got so annoyed that they at last demanded direct negotiations with Chiang himself. It was to his credit that after the attempted assassination of Wang Chingwei, when Chiang took over the helm of the Executive Yuan and Japan opened direct negotiations with Chiang himself, a new note was struck in the history of Sino-Japanese negotiations. In the eighty-three day negotiations, from the middle of September to the beginning of December, 1936, China met Japanese demands with counter-demands. For instance, the Japanese demand for an air service between China and Japan was countered by the Chinese demand that Japanese aeroplanes cease flying over Chinese territory, and to the Japanese offer to cooperate in fighting Communists in China, the Chinese Foreign Minister replied by offering to send Chinese troops to exterminate Communists in Manchuria! For the first time in Sino-Japanese negotiations China was treating herself as an equal of Japan.

One is almost tempted to give Chiang the credit for purposely yielding to Japan for five or six years to bring the Chinese indignation against Japan up to a white-hot pitch. It might seem plausible, for the waiting and submitting during those years increased China's spirit of resistance. Did Chiang want to wait until he could no longer control the national temper and then strike? Personally I do not think so, but the actual waiting turned out to be for China's benefit. Chiang did wait, however, until he was sure of national support from the leaders and knew he would not be struck from behind while fighting Japan. This last factor of internal split was apparently such a near contingency that Japan counted on it the day she launched war on China, although as if by a sleight-of-hand the magician Chiang made it disappear.

I think the real motive for Chiang's temporary dallying with Japan, by means of Wang Chingwei and of the makeshift Chahar-Hopei Council, was that he was building up China's military strength and really occupied in his successive efforts to exterminate the Communists before he would fight Japan. It must be admitted now that Chiang had an anti-Communist complex, born of his days of association with Borodin. He thought he could smash the Communists. He couldn't. Therefore he was determined to smash them all the more, until it became an obsession with him. Bribery had proved futile with the Communist officers. For seven long years he spent his best time and a very heavy part of China's national revenue in fighting them, in five successive campaigns, using more and more men and resources until in the Fifth Campaign, in late 1933, he mobilized nearly a million soldiers. He established a blockade against them, depriving them of salt, food and medical supplies. He "built hundreds of miles of military roads and thousands of small fortifications, which were made connectable by machine-gun or artillery fire, and pressed in very slowly and at enormous expense." As Edgar Snow puts it in his fascinating story of the "Long March" (*Red Star Over China*), he "built a kind of Great Wall round the soviet districts, which gradually moved inward." Still it was the one thing in which he did not succeed. Still the Communists eluded him; they were forced out of their Kiangsi base, but mobilized their entire population, men, women, young and old, partisans and non-partisans, dismantling their factories and carrying their industrial and military equipment with them, and started on the historic trek to the Northwest on October 16, 1934. They broke through the Kuomintang lines on the West, and marched through almost impassable terrain in the mountains of Kueichow and Yunnan and the borders of Szechuen and Thibet, covering 6,000 miles (18,088 *li*) in 368 days, arriving on October 20, 1935, fighting on the average a skirmish a day, crossing 12 provinces, 18 mountain ranges (five perennially snow-capped), and 24 rivers, breaking through the

enveloping armies of ten provincial warlords, and then settling in Shensi and becoming so powerful as to threaten Taiyuan in Shansi the following year, and to compel the acceptance of the united front policy from Chiang Kaishek himself at Sian the year after. It was a superhuman effort, succeeding by sheer spirit and morale, which Edgar Snow says makes "Hannibal's march over the Alps look like a holiday excursion beside it."

The moral of this is that if Chiang is as stubborn in fighting Japan as he was in fighting the Communists, and if the Chinese guerrillas keep up as beautiful a morale, of both of which there is no doubt, and if both parties have been able to put national interests before them now, of which again there is no doubt, Japan would have to take not five or ten years but generations to conquer China, while her financial system cannot stand the strain for three or four years at the utmost. The singular success of the Chinese guerrillas organized by the Communist leaders (the Eighth Route Army) with their ten years of experience has already been proved. Chiang's stubbornness was proved by the fact that, after the fall of Nanking, the soft, "shaky" leaders in the Central Political Council at Hankow were ready to talk peace, and only when Chiang arrived did the morale pick up and the determination to fight to the bitter end was reaffirmed. But I have told the story of Chiang's "anti-communist complex" also because it made him commit the one mistake of policy in all those years and pass by the opporunity of making a definite alliance with Russia in 1935, which would have prevented the war.

So much depends on the quality and strategy of Chiang's leadership in this war of liberation that it is important to review Chiang's personal point of view in coming to the decision of fighting Japan in a major war, and his plan and attitude once the decision was made. I think he has calculated every step correctly, and his able and far-sighted understanding of the nature of the war to be fought has compelled my admiration as worthy of a great national leader

in a great national crisis. His mental sagacity and moral qualities were and are equal to the situation.

After the Lukouch'iao incident on July 7, 1937, Chiang still hesitated and tried to avoid a major war, not because he was cowardly, but because he saw more clearly than any other man in China what this struggle was going to mean. Japan desired to treat this as a "localized war" so that it would be a simpler task for her to eat up the little army of a warlord than to eat up the entire national army of China, and consequently stated that she would regard the sending of Central Government Troops as "a hostile act" against Japan! Chiang sent his troops up to Paotingfu as a bluff to the Chinese people, but strictly forbade them to attack, while Japan during those three weeks was moving up soldiers, tanks and ammunition along the Peiping-Tientsin Railway with complete freedom from molestation, and had entrenched on three sides of Peiping before the so-called "fighting" began. Chiang sensed perhaps that a war was inevitable, but still refrained from allowing the Central troops to be involved. He called a conference of all military leaders at Kuling, and only on the urging for war of the Kwangsi Generals, Li and Pai, and on receiving absolute assurance of unstinted support from these, did he make the final decision. It was then that he issued the historic statement at Kuling on July 16, 1937. He affirmed in general terms the determination to resist, demanded the evacuation of Japanese soldiers and return to the *status quo* before the Lukouch'iao incident. Then he warned the nation of what this war would mean and the terrific sacrifices entailed and that once started, there was no flinching back or giving up midway, or China's national existence and independence would be doomed for ever. I wonder how many of his Chinese readers caught the drift of what he meant by those words. He had chosen war because now he was assured of internal unity, and because the Japanese had pushed him till his back was against the wall, but definitely not because he had illusions of military equality with Japan. The retreat to the southwest, the scorched-earth policy, the

devastation of the land, and years of prolonged resistance were all in his mind.

Chiang miscalculated on two scores. First, on the support of the treaty-signing nations. To this day, Madame Chiang, with her American and Christian education, is still puzzled by the cynical indifference of the western powers towards catastrophic changes on the Pacific and toward their own interests in the Far East, and by their timidity towards Japan, as if Japan could ever think of fighting all nations at this time. Second, he miscalculated on the discipline of the Japanese Army. The two miscalculations make the war in China the terrible, unparalleled thing that it is, but they about neutralize each other in effect, since the savagery of the Japanese soldiers—in sheer theft, burglary, looting and rape—constitutes one of China's greatest assets in this war. Had Chiang miscalculated only once, and only foreign help failed, a disciplined Japanese army of occupation would be the most terrible catastrophe to China's spirit of resistance. The ability of Japanese soldiers to capture cities is only matched by their lack of rudimentary sense in ruling a conquered population.

The War in Shanghai, starting on August 13, 1937, transforming the conflict into a national war, might perhaps be credited to Chiang, but he needed Japanese cooperation, which was promptly given by the Japanese navy. It should be noted that not a single Japanese had been killed to serve as pretext for the North China invasion. The best the Japanese could claim was that a Japanese private had been "missing." The similar case of a Japanese sailor missing in Shanghai in July after the Lukouch'iao incident threw the whole nation into consternation, and might have precipitated a war had not the diligent Chinese police searched and discovered him and found that he was ashamed to go back to the gunboat because of syphilis. To the great disappointment of the Japanese, the syphilitic sailor was returned and no more "missing," but soon a Japanese naval officer went to play golf with a revolver along the road running past the Chinese aerodrome at Hungch'iao ("Hung-

jao") and was shot dead. Two days afterwards, 39 Japanese warships steamed up the Whangpoo at Shanghai to settle the incident peacefully. Chinese airplanes attacked the Japanese warships on August 13th, and the rest is old history.

Equally important with Chiang's declaration of July 16, 1937, was his declaration of November 1, 1938, after the fall of Hankow and Canton. In this declaration one can read already the factors that make for ultimate Chinese victory, not because it contains a jumble of nice-sounding phrases, but because it is the analysis of the war by the mind which is going to direct it to the end, and the analysis is correct. The successful carrying out of this policy must spell Japan's doom.

In this manner the national leader outlined the policy of prolonged resistance after the fall of Hankow in his message to the nation:

> . . . . At the outset, the people should understand the meaning of the possession or loss of Hankow in the perspective of the war in general. The principal base of Chinese resistance during the war does not lie in the coastal regions or along the rivers, but in the vast interior, particularly in the Western provinces. This has been the fundamental policy for a prolonged resistance fixed by the National Government.
>
> The defense of Hankow had for its principal object the protection of works of reconstruction in the West. It was also to retard Japanese advance and wear out the fighting power of the enemy, so that, during this period, the communications could be developed in Western China, armaments could be concentrated and all Chinese industries in Central and Southeast China could be moved to the Northwest and Southwest. In fact, only a rational development of the Southwest and Northwest can form a solid basis for a prolonged resistance and for national reconstruction. Only an adequate development of lines of communication in the Southwest and Northwest could consolidate our material power and provide the necessary resources for a prolonged resistance.
>
> Now that all available resources in men and materials have been transported to the interior and the development of West-

ern China enables it to meet the initial needs as base of resistance, the plans for a national resistance on all fronts can be carried out, rather than the meeting of our enemy at any particular points . . . .

Actually, a great number of bases have been established in strategic regions in the interior of the provinces of Honan, Anhwei, and Kiangsi, and even in the interior of Hopei, Shantung, Manchuria, Chahar, Jehol, Suiyuan, Kiangsu, and Chekiang, and military plans have been fixed according to an established strategy for a prolonged resistance.

From the point of view of strategy, China should not overemphasize the importance of any particular point or center, and neglect the consolidation of her power for a national resistance on all fronts. . . .

Although Hankow should fall into Japanese hands, the enemy controls nothing except a desolated country and a dead city.

The real war has only begun, through the launching of operations on all fronts. The Japanese troops are already sunk in a morass and from now on will be operating on a yet more difficult terrain.

The Chinese retreat from Hankow should not be wrongly regarded as a military retreat, but as a strategic movement for transforming a defensive war into an offensive war and as a turning point changing defeat into victory.

China, then, has in the course of sixteen months of the war, strictly followed the fixed strategy, which was based on the three principles:

(1) a prolonged resistance
(2) national resistance on all fronts
(3) a fight to keep the initiative in battle.

These principles are the essential factors for securing the final victory.

At the beginning of the war, knowing that the supreme sacrifice had to be made, the Chinese Government began to build up the Western provinces as the principal base for a prolonged resistance.

I have already said to you (the declaration at Kuling) that a war of resistance is not an affair of six months or a year, and that once the war is begun, it must be a war to the end, and

there can be no turning back midway to seek a peace of compromise. It is only by undergoing the greatest hardships and sacrifices that the people of China can hope to achieve the final victory.

Temporary reverses shall not weaken our will to continue to resist. The extension of the theatre of military operations was long ago expected. China has a vast territory, an enormous population and rich resources, and the more extended the field of battle, the more divided will Japan's fighting power become. The enemy will be forced to fight in a manner favorable to China's tactics. Consequently, the fighting will no longer be confined to a region, as it was at Shanghai and at Nanking, but the Chinese forces shall take the entire initiative and enjoy all liberty of action. The nation should launch attacks everywhere against the Japanese.

I repeat that the war of Chinese resistance is not like an ordinary war between two nations fighting for the desire of power, but our war is a revolutionary war fought for national liberation. Such a war can never be limited or handicapped by time or space, by money or questions of economics, by communications, poison gas, inferiority of equipment, or by the weight of sacrifices. There shall be no other end except final victory.

As a matter of fact, our war of resistance is not handicapped. Our war materials have been stocked for a long time and are actually more than sufficient for meeting the situation, and there is no danger of our international lines of communication being cut off. The facts have proved that the more barbarous the invasion turns out to be, the stronger becomes our will to resist, and that the heavier our sacrifices, the quicker will be our power of recovery.

Spoken like a leader! And the development of events will prove the full meaning of those words.

It is interesting to note, *à propos* of the above declaration, that in the evacuation of Hankow Chiang again proved his cool-mindedness by his demand for withdrawing the Chinese forces intact in conformity with his general policy outlined above, and proved his determination by the threat of resignation. A month before, the

Eighth Route Army had opposed this policy and demanded the defense of Hankow at all costs and made Chiang agree by the threat of breaking the united front. Such divergence of policy is no more indicative of a split than the divergence of policy among various members of the Japanese Cabinet, and a defense of Hankow, tactically planned to hold up the advance of Japan and inflict the greatest possible losses on the enemy, had much to be said for it. But Chiang's stand in this matter is illustrative of the mind that was thinking of the larger aspects of the war of resistance, characterized by hard-headed realism, both in avoiding a decisive battle which Japan sought, and in retaining the initiative in forcing Japan to fight on a terrain favorable to China.

If one takes a topographical map of China and studies the course of Japanese invasion of China, one finds that it coincides to a nicety with the areas that are below the 100-meter level above the sea. With the single exception of mountainous Shansi, where the Japanese troops have been having the hardest time of their life in the past year and a half, the invaded areas cover the narrow strip along the Yangtse and its delta, the Huai basin in Anhwei and Northern Kiangsu, and the Yellow River basin in Hopei and Shantung. At the time of writing there are still two regions below the 100-meter level unoccupied by the Japanese, the Poyang Lake region south of Kiukiang and the Han River basin in northern central Hupei running southward into the Tungting Lake region approximately down to Changsha in Hunan. It is inevitable that the Japanese invasion will meet with no formidable opposition within this area and as the maximum will extend about 150 miles westwards roughly to Ichang and about 300 miles southwards along the Canton-Hankow Railway roughly to Hengyang, which the Japanese will be able to occupy. The rest are mountains, where Chiang Kaishek would like to fight Japan. At Ichang on the Yangtse and following a line directly north to Hsiangyang, the country abruptly rises to the mountains of Western Hupei, and so does Hunan south of the Tungting Lake and west of the Canton-Hankow Railway.

In other words, if one takes a pencil and draws a map of Japanese occupied areas in China by the end of 1938, it will coincide exactly with the areas below the 100-meter level in the whole country of China, with the exceptions mentioned. The rest is like Shansi, where an entire Japanese division of 20,000 men was known to have been unspectacularly frittered away by guerrilla encounters to 5,000 men in four months without a single battle.

From the beginning of 1939 on, the war will change its essential character, and while Japan will be fighting a wearing-out defensive war in her occupied areas and advancing with extreme difficulty and caution in the rest of China, China will be fighting a zigzag offensive-defensive war on all fronts or without a front. There will be no Chinese concentration of three-quarter million soldiers at any one point, because the nature of the terrain will not require such concentrations, and the tremendous massed fighting power will be distributed all over the country to engage the invaders where they choose and keep them busy. Whereas in the first one-and-a-half years of war, China was a vast territory in which Japan could choose to strike at any point and time she thought best, henceforth the extended occupied areas will present China the same opportunity to strike where and when China chooses, and on the whole, China will retain the initiative. This is going to be the character of the Chinese war of resistance.

## VII. Why Japan Must Fail

The contest of forces we see today is a conflict between two national wills, Japan's will to conquer and China's will to resist. Since the two wills are equally adamant, because the Japanese are determined and well organized and the Chinese are fighting to save their national liberty and very existence, there can be no yielding or weakening from either side. This much is certain: there will be no faltering in Chinese leadership and no lessening of Chinese morale. The result is therefore that it will become a test of endur-

ance—between Japanese finance and Chinese morale. Whichever has the greater staying power wins. The more territory Japan nominally conquers, the greater will be the cost of Japanese occupation and its drain on Japanese man-power and finance. Granted that the very worst happens for China, that Japan occupies the whole of China, the mere occupation of China will kill Japan. For Japan will be trying to replenish its army of occupation of over a million soldiers, playing only the defensive in a hostile continent with an actively hostile population of 400,000,000. Such a simple statement depends of course on a number of assumptions—continued Chinese resistance, unity and high morale, Japan's inability to consolidate her victory and exploit Chinese resources, and the exhaustion of Japan's finance—but these assumptions are supported by hard, objective facts. That is why it is inevitable that Japan will lose in this war.

Japan will repeat the disastrous victory she had in the Russo-Japanese War of 1905, literally bankrupt at the end and more desirous for peace than Russia and consequently forced to accept an empty victory. At the end of that one-year war in 1905, Japan was like a fighting cock that crowed at the moment of triumph and then fell down dead. Japan was so exhausted that she was not able even to compel the payment of indemnity from Russia at the Peace Conference, because otherwise Russia had threatened to continue the fight. This is the inner story of the "unforgettable injustice" which Japanese publicists have been laying at President Theodore Roosevelt's door for forcing Japan to disgorge Manchuria as fruits of her "victory." Another American President may force Japan to disgorge China, but he will not do so and cannot do so until Japan is reduced to the same state of economic exhaustion she found herself in at the conclusion of the Russo-Japanese War, and it is up to the Chinese to create that condition of economic exhaustion in which American and British intervention will become possible.

It is not my object here to go into the details of Japanese finance,

the heightening Chinese morale, the Chinese guerrilla resistance and the actual conditions of Japan's "occupied areas," which are the essential assumptions for the postulate of a final Chinese victory. The weakness of Japanese finance and its scandalously low gold reserve are well-known to the intelligent western public. Totalitarian measures are good only for domestic finance and do not alter the fact that Japan has to continue to pay with gold and diminished exports for the military and commercial raw material which she must obtain from abroad. Nor can totalitarianism save a state's foreign trade from being ruined in a war.

Equally well-known is the fact of Japan's precarious hold on railway zones, beyond which her troops dare not go out, in the so-called "occupied provinces." Japanese troops are not seen in the countryside of the whole of Shantung and Hopei; the country is ruled and organized by Chinese under the National Government; its magistrates and provincial governors are appointed by the National Government whose authority in Shantung and Hopei today is actually firmer than before the outbreak of the war; the Chinese continue to collect taxes, run the post office and banks and market the agricultural output by rural cooperatives; appointees of the puppet government of Peiping are murdered as soon as they arrive at the country; a complete espionage system organized among the peasantry by the Eighth Route Army makes it impossible for traitors to penetrate into their territory; guerrilla activities reach the very walls or outskirts of Peiping, Tsinan, Tientsin and Shanghai; Chinese guerrillas cross and re-cross the Japanese guarded railway lines; repeated wholesale defections occur of "Manchukuo" troops and Chinese Peace Preservation Corps stationed at different cities and armed by the Japanese; railways are constantly derailed and Japanese ammunition intercepted and Japanese outposts murdered piecemeal in small lots; Chinese guerrillas wear captured Japanese uniforms and depend for one-third of their ammunition supplies on the Japanese. In this state of affairs prevailing in Hopei, Shantung and Shansi, the Japanese dare not venture outside the cities except

in groups of two or three hundreds in broad daylight. At Shihchia-chuang, important junction of the Peking-Hankow line and the line leading to Shansi, a city which technically has been under permanent Japanese occupation for a year and a half, the Japanese garrison retires to within one-third of the city for self-protection at night, while the guerrillas swarming in the outskirts come in at night and get their food supplies and fraternize with the people in the other two-thirds of the city, and leave at dawn.

The net result is that, with the single exception of Peiping, the Japanese are occupying only desolated cities, always precariously held by outposts, with a decimated population of only those too old or too poor to run away, affording no possibility of trade or commercial exploitation. Actually, every additional city occupied means only an added liability for defense on the part of Japan, an extension of her thin, perilous communication lines and an added item in the accumulating waste of Japanese man-power, material and finance.

The Japanese must admit now that they are so universally hated and feared, through their own savagery, arrogance, immorality and inability to protect the innocent, that whole Chinese city and village populations have run away from the approach of Japanese soldiers as they never ran away from the worst plague, and no offer can induce them to return. The wholesale migration of certainly over 50,000,000 Chinese village and city residents and the abandonment of their houses and properties before these hordes of modernized savages are probably the best comment on the conduct of Japanese soldiers. The individual profits of Japanese officers and privates in pillage, looting and rape render impossible a national profit of Japan from occupied areas. No commercial exploitation is possible during the progress of the war. Passive boycott and the extreme poverty of the Chinese remaining in the occupied areas and the general insecurity make this impossible.

Could one learn to harden oneself to Japanese rape of Chinese women, execution of civilians, burning of surrendered soldiers in

closed matsheds or by pouring gasoline over their heads, bayonetting of babies, rounding up of young men, shooting of refugees in water, sinking of fishing junks and wholesale bombing of civilians —could one harden oneself to all these unimaginable atrocities,* unanimously reported by neutral witnesses in all areas, one might take a long view and regard them as the greatest single blessing uniting all classes of the Chinese people and strengthening their spirit of resistance as nothing else could have done. Since God's creation of man, no race or nation has subjected the population of a fellow-nation to greater atrocities with greater consistency, ruthlessness, arrogance, cruelty, indecency and self-demoralization on such a scale as the Japanese have done in China. No conqueror in history proved himself less fit to rule. If a rudimentary sense can tell one that to rule means to offer a minimum of security and decency of life to a conquered people, the Japanese have not got it. For the appeal to patriotism to resist the invaders among classes that cannot be reached by this appeal, the Japanese soldiers have substituted a more elementary appeal to sheer security of life and protection of their women. A small cigarette-shop owner whose interest in life is only to make a living would probably not mind a foreign rule, but even a cigarette-shop owner does not want to see his wife, sister, mother or daughter raped before his eyes. The "boche" of the Far East has made the "boche" of the West appear by comparison like an advanced type of human being, and Japanese *"bushido"* must go down in history as merely "Yellow *bocheido"* (*-do* is the approximate Japanese equivalent for *-ism,* a transformation from the Chinese word for *Tao in "Taoism"*). The significant thing is that *bushido* as the samurai's code of honor has been completely exposed. The notorious fact in Shanghai and other Japanese-occupied areas is that there is rampant corruption, not only among the Japanese soldiers, but also among the Japanese officers, both in the form of petty cruelty and robbery for profit,

* See the documentary record in H. J. Timperley's *What War Means: Japanese Terror in China* (Gollancz, London).

and in organizing narcotic dens, gambling houses and brothels and other rackets, and illegal extortions of money for issuing permits, etc.—a fact which is repeatedly recorded on the spot, for instance, by the American *China Weekly Review,* published in Shanghai.

I realize that the authorities in Tokyo disapprove of these atrocities and see in them the real threat to Japanese rule in China. I realize also that back in Japan there are any number of decent-minded men and devoted women who do not suspect what their sons and husbands are doing in China. The fact remains that you cannot change the character of a race by a military order; the psychology of an upstart race, systematically taught to be anti-foreign and to regard all other races as inferior, and the Chinese race in particular as unregenerate, is not going to be changed overnight. This Japanese haughtiness and arrogance toward the Europeans and the Chinese is the result of a generation of anti-foreign education and propaganda, and Japan is now reaping the results of her own anti-white and anti-Chinese credo, almost mystic at times. Hence Japanese arrogance and cruelty will not and cannot be stopped. To me, who grew up in Amoy and saw from my childhood the behaviour of the Japanese and the Japanese consular protection of opium-dens, gambling houses and brothels by Japanese subjects in that port for the last thirty years, neither Japanese smuggling in the North, nor the wholesale demoralization of the Japanese soldiers, nor their falling below the standard of a truly great nation, gave me any surprise. When a nation makes use of extraterritorial privileges systematically to encourage smuggling by a fleet of steamers, landing junks, transporting trucks and an army of ruffians working in broad daylight, under the direct, explicit protection of its consular authorities, such smuggling can no longer be said to be acts of individuals, and the nation has stooped to something a first-class and truly great power would never do. Japanese atrocities and indecencies today are supported by their atrocities and indecencies of the years before the war and come from the same racial character. Amidst the admirable characteristics of the Japanese people, I must

regretfully also admit their highly objectionable quality of *meanness*, which is the result of my impressions over a period of years and which honest thinking Japanese must also admit.

I am not here to lecture on Japanese racial characteristics, but merely to point out that technically and militarily Japan has risen to the stature of an imperialist power, but morally she is yet totally unqualified. The Japanese level is, for insance, far below the British level. The point is, rather, that the character of Japanese treatment of the Chinese population cannot be changed. The Japanese authorities in Tokyo are forced therefore to the other dilemma: to expect this savagery to go on, but to hope that the sheer weight of savagery will force the Chinese to become demoralized and to give up the fight. Of course, the result will be exactly the opposite.

I do not know whether to attribute it to Japanese lack of subtlety or to Japanese lack of humor when Japan refuses to see that Japan is the godfather of the Chinese anti-Japanese movement, and that every Chinese has the right to hate all that Japan stands for in her policy towards China. Unable or unwilling to admit that the Chinese so bravely defended Shanghai because each individual soldier hated the Japanese, the Japanese have circulated the story that Chinese soldiers did not run away from the front, in spite of attacks by enemy airplanes, tanks and artillery, only because Chiang stationed regiments behind to shoot them if they attempted to fall back. The real explanation, sad though it may be, is that behind the Chinese soldiers stand the ghosts of their violated sisters, mothers and wives and murdered babies urging them to go on. This army of ghosts of violated women and murdered babies will increase as the war goes on and will follow the Chinese soldiers wherever they go. If therefore it is the object of the Japanese military machine to bomb and murder and rape the Chinese into love of Japan, and to kill every anti-Japanese Chinese, they will have to kill every decent, self-respecting Chinese man, woman and child among the 400,000,000. That the Japanese are perfectly sincere and desirous of stamping out this anti-Japanese feeling is beyond question, and

their seriousness about it makes it so tragic. They do not seem to realize that there are certain things that even a warship or bombing plane cannot stamp out. The Japanese bombers cannot bomb out of existence Nature's Law of Action and Reaction.

Upon Japan's army and navy today, therefore, hangs the spirit of fatalism, of a fatalistic nation setting out fatalistically to accomplish a task that cannot be accomplished, and destroying itself in the process of attempting to do it. The Japanese are too determined and too lacking in the sense of humor to give up the insane task of attempting to bomb and murder and rape the Chinese out of this anti-Japanese attitude and they will not do so until they have literally exhausted themselves and committed national *hari-kiri*. The pity of it! "Oh, what men dare do! what men may do! what men daily do! not knowing what they do!"

The prospect is certain, therefore, that from 1939 on, the Sino-Japanese War will enter a new phase, that Chinese resistance will scatter on all fronts instead of being concentrated, and will be less spectacular but more effective in long-term perspective, that Japan will be defending extended areas that China was defending, that Japanese troops on Chinese soil must soon exceed a million, that the mere cost and wearing out of these million soldiers will bring Japan to thorough financial exhaustion in a year, that it will take Japan at least another half year from now to realize the full nature of this prolonged resistance promised by Chiang, and that by late 1939, the facing of bankruptcy will force Japan to seek mediation, which, however, will come as an intervention of the Pacific Powers. By the year 1980, the Japanese will forget all this and speak of the "injustice" of the American President in forcing her to disgorge the fruits of her "victory." What a subject for the Japanese nation to ponder upon even in 1940!

What a price nations have to pay for the ignorance of their leaders! And what a virtue it is sometimes to be merely well-informed! In the early weeks of the Lukouch'iao Incident in July, before the general war started, I saw one day a truly pathetic re-

port in the *New York Times* dispatch from Tokyo. In that brief dispatch, it was stated that some Japanese militarists assured their government leaders that Chiang's talk of resistance was a "bluff" and Chinese national unity was still a sham, unable to sustain a Japanese onslaught, while on the same day another Japanese diplomat shortly returned from China, warned the leaders that China had already become a new nation and that aggravation of the incident would mean a ruinous major war. As I wrote in November, 1937 (*Asia Magazine*) shortly after the war began, "In Chinese phraseology, Japan is 'saddling a tiger,' unable to get down and equally worried how to go on. But she has to go on 'riding the tiger.' Japan was literally trapped into a ruinous war, while expecting an easy victory. She miscalculated when she thought Chiang Kaishek's talk of resistance a 'bluff.' Again she miscalculated the strength of Chinese unity. For a third time, she has miscalculated in presuming that wholesale attacks on Chinese women and children will demoralize, instead of stiffening, Chinese resistance. The next time, therefore, that Japanese statesmen claim they alone know the Chinese, and Westerners don't, it will be simple to point out these facts." In the same article, I warned that "we have to assume an extended war of years, in which both belligerents will come out thoroughly exhausted," and that "we are presented with the prospect of a war of one or two years in which the only certainty is that both nations will be ruined." The Japanese Army has the virtue of pluck and enterprise, but the unforgivable vice of being woefully ignorant about China. Confucius said, "the gentleman hates those who are brave and headstrong but are not restrained by propriety. He hates those who are daring, but thick-headed." It is evident that Confucius, being a gentleman, would heartily hate the Japanese Army today. The anti-Japanese attitude of Confucius is further assured by the amplifying statement by his disciple, Tsekung: "I hate those who like to spy on others and think they are very clever. I hate those who think they are brave when they are merely unruly. And I

hate the wily persons who pretend to be honest gentlemen" (*Analects,* XVII).

Writing elsewhere (*N. Y. Times Magazine,* Jan. 30, 1938), I stated, "The Chinese determination to fight to a finish will force a stalemate, which I believe is the only certain outcome. . . . At the end of the war, China will be devastated and Japan will be so weakened that she will become a second-class power. When Japan is forced to call off the invasion by face-saving mediation through a third power, this (Chinese) nationalism will come back to engage upon the gigantic task of national rehabilitation. The effects of this war will be felt for decades."

## VIII. The Future Road for China

All human life is shadowed by the ghost of its own past and a forecasting shadow upon its own future, and as the poet says, the evil that men do lives after them. The ghosts of this war will stalk the land of the Orient and shadow China and Japan for the next decades.

The aftermath of the War will present heartrending problems both for China and for Japan. What is certain is that Japan will have enough troubles of her own to think about for a long time—troubles arising from her lost international trade, vanished foreign credit, depleted finance, inflated currency, dislocated industry geared to war production, unsold bonds, rising cost of living, and an army of returned Japanese soldiers brutalized and dehumanized by their experience in the war. Japan will be punished enough by the results of her own militarists' mad adventure, and apart from the overthrow of the militarists' power in Japan, China will not be able to enforce payment of indemnities from Japan for the havoc she wreaked upon a peaceful neighboring country. The calling off of the Japanese invasion will already constitute Japan's defeat and Chinese victory, but since the Japanese navy is still intact and unless

China, with foreign assistance, is able to carry war to Japan by a strong air force, China will see the end of the war there.

Intervention of the Pacific Powers when Japan is reaching exhaustion or near-exhaustion is certain. Selfish economic interests dictate that. By mere economic and diplomatic pressure, the democratic powers will be able practically to dictate a peace to a bankrupt Japan, or as an advanced step, merely give the signal to the Russian Bear to let go by tacit support. As this is contrary to the deep instinct of the capitalist powers, this step is highly unlikely, unless the Russian Bear falls upon Japan by itself. Rather, the Pacific Powers will now raise their voices a little louder, and Japanese diplomats will lower their voices a little softer, and now that the American public is at last assured of no war with a weakened Japan and liberated from its ridiculous fear of a Japan seeking war with the United States during her occupation with China and Russia, the American Government, treading still in the mincing steps of merely "parallel action" with the Pacific Powers free from all entanglements, will be able to go ahead and enforce peace in the Orient. Although British-American joint action, backed by force, will be able to demand indemnities for China, American aloofness will not support the use of force for this purpose. Rather, the Pacific Powers will be interested, in the first place, in re-stating the Open Door Policy and the principles of the Washington Treaty, and in the second place in limiting Japan's military and naval strength. What a golden chance for eliminating a Pacific rival! I am not implying any lack of American friendship or sympathy for China, but base my comment on the hard fact that all talk of "international friendship" in all countries is merely a diplomatic mode of speech and sheer rubbish, and that all international diplomacy is based not on sentiment, but on the conflict or community of interests.

From an enlightened diplomatic outlook, however, both China and the other Pacific Powers should, in order to repair a serious and fatal gap in the Japanese political constitution which may at

any moment engulf both the Japanese people and their neighbors in war again, demand firmly, in the interests of peace for the Japanese people and others, the constitutional curtailment of the power of the Japanese army and navy, the elimination of their super-cabinet, super-parliament and super-legal privileges, and the restoration of true democracy for Japan. There is a great chance that, at the conclusion of the disastrous war, such a demand will fall in line with the sentiments already existing in Japanese parliamentarians and will hasten the overthrow of the Japanese Facists. The Japanese people must be protected against their own blood-thirsty, war-mad and glory-drunk militarists, and the hand of democratic forces must be strengthened in Japan.

If I had my way, I would enforce the following "three principles" as the basis of a just and equitable peace:

(1) Japan must abandon the Anti-Comintern Pact and China shall "cooperate" with Japan in the extermination of Japanese Fascists.

(2) The super-cabinet, super-parliament and super-legal privileges of the Japanese army and navy must be abolished and Japan must be helped to grow into a real democracy.

(3) Japan must abandon her anti-Chinese policy and respect the territorial integrity and administrative sovereignty of China.

These are just as nice-sounding as Hirota's three principles, but much less wicked and hypocritical in content and I am not the unwilling polished agent of military masters in my country. If I were not to spoil the beautiful "three principles," I would add a fourth:

(4) The Open Door policy will be maintained in China, but extra-territoriality and all claims to special status in China by any one nation or group of nations must be abolished.

As for the future foreign relations of China when the war is over, I am quite sure there will be quite a new atmosphere of international goodwill, equality and mutual respect, an atmosphere that

China has earned and won by a heroic war of national liberation. Actually China will have fought a war to a successful issue for the first time since her close contact with the West in the nineteenth century—the only war in a century she did not fight disgracefully. But just as Japan will be a disastrously tired and wearied quitter, so China will also be a disastrously tired and wearied victor, eyes blinking, feet staggering and clothes torn to tatters, shouting victory in gasps. To be sure, there is an inner exhilaration of spirit, a joy of salvation for the land and deliverance from its enemy. But upon the ruins of the destroyed Jerusalem, a New City has to be built, and the joy of triumph and national deliverance is slightly tempered by the Necessity to Borrow. The great Democratic Powers can be counted upon to utilize this weapon—the economic weapon, their greatest—for maintaining their interests in China. Filthy lucre will then become the greatest bond of international friendship in the Far East.

The attitude, then, both of the Chinese toward the foreigners and of the foreigners in China toward the Chinese will be very interesting to watch. On the whole, I must say it will be a *healthier* attitude on both sides. On the Chinese side, there will be a newfound national pride, tempered by traditional Chinese sanity and restraint, and as I say, by the Necessity to Borrow. On the foreign side, there will be an attitude of desire to preserve certain old privileges, strongly tempered by genuine goodwill. China being happy with her own success, and the Democratic Powers being grateful to China for so weakening a Pacific rival, both sides will be pervaded by the spirit of generosity, for happy and grateful people can afford to be generous.

For we must face the fact that China, fighting merely a war for national independence and liberation, will have inevitably fought for a much greater issue. She will have changed the balance of power in the Pacific and the Far East and, by forcing both China and Japan into financial ruin, will have created a situation

in which the only parties that stand to profit by the new situation are Great Britain, France, the United States—and Russia.

I disagree with Chinese diplomats that China is fighting for the principle of sacred treaties; China is fighting for something more elementary than that, the defense of her home and hearth, of her national right to exist. Neither America, nor Great Britain, nor France, nor any other single power on earth, in this decade is willing to fight for a sacred principle of justice or of sanctity of treaties; so why should the hard-headed heathen Chinese be expected to fight for an idealistic principle that so far as I know does not exist except in Heaven, and nobody has ever seen how Heaven is run? Suppose the foolish Chinese had decided to fight for the sanctity of the Briand-Kellogg Pact or the Washington Treaty at the beginning, and had in a few months seen that the other signatory powers had let us down, would they have gone on fighting and not given up the Quixotic fight long ago?

But while I disagree on the Chinese *motive* for the war, I agree on its actual implications and results. In spite of herself, China will have fought, single-handed, not only for the principle of sacred treaties, but for a number of other things so ardently desirable for all the Pacific Powers. She will, in fact, if not in motive, have fought against the advance of a fanatical Fascism in the Orient. She will have fought to crush an otherwise powerful ally of Germany and Italy in the next European war. She will have fought and defeated the creation of a terrible, colossal Japanese continental empire, with inexhaustible human power and material resources, to threaten both the world's peace and the world's trade. She will actually have fought to protect the American cotton-growers in the South, who a year ago were so anxious to sell to Japan to enable Japan to kill her trade with them for ever. She will have prevented Japan's becoming an economically and militarily self-sufficient power. She will have effectively stopped Japan's march on the Philippines, Indo-China, Siam and the Dutch East Indies. She will, in one word, cynically enough, have fought against the consumma-

tion of the "Asia for the Asiatics" doctrine, and will have saved the world from the true Yellow Peril, advancing steadily in a military and commercial aggression against the entire world. She will also have stopped the insane anti-foreign, anti-white mania of Japan. She will have weakened and exhausted America's greatest rival on the Pacific, and defeated a nation whose behavior during the war I know the entire American nation at heart execrates. She will have incidentally saved the American taxpayers hundreds of millions of dollars in rearmament. That is why I say the democratic powers will be grateful and generous toward China after the conclusion of the war. Decidedly unwilling to fight for the Open Door in China, the democratic powers will be glad to find that the door remains open. Consequently inside this door they will at least be more courteous toward the host.

Will the hosts be courteous? They will have to be. There will be a lot of graceful nonsense in exchange of compliments by Western diplomats on "your glorious country with a glorious future," but the point is, they will have come to lend money and the owner of the glorious country with a glorious future will desperately desire to borrow. The contemptible China trade, not worth fighting for, will be transformed into a "big possibility" with no risks. It is barely conceivable that stray bands of Chinese soldiers and jingoistic, young partisans will indulge in expressions of their new-found pride by a few occasional outrages on foreigners in China, aping the Japanese. But the innate Chinese quality of toleration will come out again, and Chiang Kaishek can be counted upon to check any discourtesy to potential money-lenders. At least, the Chinese will not machine-gun the British Ambassador's car, sink American and British gunboats on the Yangtse, kick American women "in the pants," slap American consular authorities in the face, throw American flags into the Whangpoo, bayonet French priests protecting Chinese women, ask foreign correspondents to remove their cigarettes before sentries on the Shanghai Bund Bridge—all these raw, insolent acts of anti-foreignism and anti-

Europeanism that were expected of the Chinese, but not quite perpetrated by the Chinese Boxers. The anti-foreignism of the Chinese Boxers of 1900 has become a perennial label against the Chinese, accepted by the Western public that do not realize China in the last forty years had had her national arrogance entirely beaten out of her, and that the prize for this national and racial arrogance has passed to the Germans, the Italians and the Japanese —the descendants of Siegfried, Julius Cæsar, (!) and the Sun Goddess.

Moreover, it must be sufficiently understood that human hatred is allotted to every man in a definite, fixed quantity when he is born. That quantity varies with individuals, but given the quantity, he cannot hate more than is psychologically possible for him. Only psychologically abnormal individuals and nations can hate everybody, and the Chinese are fortunately psychologically perfectly sane. What hatred Nature has endowed them with is so spent on the Japanese that they physically have no more hatred left for any other person, white, black or copper-colored. I am quite sure the Chinese, on the whole, think of the Japanese as veritable demons now, and therefore by comparison think of every other national as at least a fellow human-being. The work of white doctors and nurses and missionary ladies at refugee camps tends to emphasize this contrast, and those much calumniated white residents in the Orient have at least won Chinese goodwill during the war for the benefit of American merchants at home who swear at them for not getting out. Oh, could the westerners ever appreciate the Chinese sensibility to kindness, the great, fine Chinese quality of gratitude! The American Red Cross passed by the great opportunity of rendering mercy to Chinese war victims and orphans and winning the goodwill of the Chinese millions for American trade in the future. This sin of omission cannot be exonerated. The sight of white-clad American doctors and nurses tending to the Chinese women and children might have become an unforgettable picture everywhere in Chinese minds, instead of being isolated phenomena. But Japan

decidedly did not want the American Red Cross to mix up in her affairs in the Orient. So at least I reason, but do not explain. The explanation for this unquestioned failure is not my duty. The American Red Cross, I know, is "ready to receive contributions" for Chinese relief, but when the active American spirit becomes passive and is content to do nothing, I know something is wrong.

Actually, however, China will have fought Japan with foreign assistance and concluded a peace through foreign intervention, although she did the fighting single-handed. This will have contributed to assuage a great deal of Chinese bitterness and sense of disillusionment about the West, brought about by the failure of the Western Powers to live up to their treaty obligations during the first year and a half of the war. As this war progresses and the conflict of Japan with western trade interests becomes clearer and more sharply defined with Japan's advance to South China, and as it is made clearer every day that Chinese resistance cannot be broken and therefore Japan cannot win, help for China from France, Great Britain and the United States will become more and more important. As Japan steadily weakens, the attitude of England and the United States will steadily stiffen. Invisible boycotts, tightening of credits for Japan, embargoes on material, economic reprisals and official actions will steadily mount in importance until the time comes for active intervention. Such responses will naturally bring about Sino-foreign goodwill. The general result will be that the special status of westerners and western concessions in China will be abolished in a short time, and the general principles of the Washington Treaty will be vindicated and China, with foreign financial assistance, will come back to renew the work of national rehabilitation and reconstruction from where it was interrupted in July, 1937, by the outbreak of the war.

The internal political system of China will take a middle road fought out between the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party, or between Chiang Kaishek and the Eighth Route Army Generals, Chu Teh and Mao Tsehtung. The broad base of the

Chinese cultural tradition of toleration will force a political compromise between dictatorship and communism and will produce a type of democratic socialism which is peculiarly China's own. In the broad general struggle between Fascism, Communism and democracy, as generally understood in the West, China will incline toward democracy.

The first trend toward a strong dictatorial regime, as different from totalitarianism of the Hitler-Mussolini or the Stalin type, will be represented by Chiang Kaishek. The personal prestige of Chiang will become so great through his courageous and wise leadership in this war that he will command a huge following and the loyalty of the nation. He will also be more than a moral dictator in the sense of Gandhi in India. He has not renounced, and will not renounce, the democratic principles of Sun Yatsen's Sanmin Doctrine. But he will in his Chinese way dominate the entire Chinese government, hold its military, financial and political power in his hands and within the framework of the Chinese democratic constitution achieve a virtual personal control. The urgent problems facing China's economic and military rehabilitation will also favor strong centralization of power. One will hear a lot about "three-year plans" and "five-year plans." Chinese environment and Chinese racial tradition will not permit Chiang Kaishek to declare himself "dictator" of China and he will not do so, but one can be the real leader of a nation without that title, as Masaryk was in Czechoslovakia. Chiang has already shown himself too subtle and too Chinese to assume a dictatorship, and actually he has become more mellowed in his methods than he was during his early years of determined rise to power. Dictatorship after all is only one extreme form of government, and how the Chinese hate extremes! Not a single Chinese government leader is in favor of Fascism or dictatorship; Chiang will be surrounded and working with these leaders and he is already in too powerful a position to incur popular disfavor by a Fascist revolt against his own regime.

On the other hand, there are the growing forces of Communist

youth and the leaders of the Eighth Route Army. As the war progresses and the scope of Chinese guerrilla activities steadily widens, the leftists will steadily gain in power among the masses and will be powerful enough to force their demands on Chiang's attention. Will Chu Teh and Mao Tsehtung also become Chinese and mellowed and subtle, shun extremism and work toward compromise? The answer is that they have already done so. Anybody who knows Chu Teh and Mao Tsehtung will call them anything except fanatics. Their announcement of willingness to cooperate with the Kuomintang, not only during the war, but even during the period of reconstruction after the war, is significant, and the Communist leaders have never gone back on their words. As the matter stands today, the leftists have abandoned their specifically Communist program of expropriation of landlords, and have taken the stand for democracy, intending to work as a legal party within the democratic frame work. Recognizing with far sight that Chiang's leadership is indispensable to China for this generation, they have accepted it, and their position as the opposition logically forces them to stand for the usual democratic rights of the opposition—in other words, for popular representation, rights of free speech and assembly and the right to criticize the Kuomintang, which they have categorically insisted upon. It is the existence of this leftist party that will prevent the Kuomitang from drifting again into a one-party dictatorship, and they will have become entirely too powerful to be ignored. Their guerrilla fighting will have played such an important role, in fact will have won half the war, that the people will not tolerate another anti-Communist campaign by Chiang, and Chiang will be too wise to start one. The net result will be that the leftists will constitute a healthy influence for preserving the democratic pattern and machinery against any tendency toward one-party totalitarian rule.

What is far more important, the leftists will become a power exerted on behalf of the common people, the peasant and labor, and compel the Kuomintang to emphasize rural reconstruction, ac-

tually the crying need of China. They will also, through the war, have given the peasants the experience, training and technique of self-government, and also to a certain extent armed the peasants and taught them military defense and reliance upon themselves. An internal transformation of the village organization will have taken place, and the last word in public government as public service, as contrasted with traditional Chinese officialdom, will have been taught them. The political training of the country people in the guerrilla areas will reach a level unknown before.

All this brings us to the paradox that the Chinese Communists will become the bedrock of Chinese democracy. This democracy that we are going to see evolving in the Chinese Republic will be as different from the American democracy, as the American democracy is different from the democracy of England or France. The Chinese have a way of adjusting and molding their institutions to suit their temperament and ways of thinking. One cannot predict beforehand the exact form popular representation will take, and what the power of different government and representative institutions actually will be. To judge the progress of Chinese democracy by the standard of any one western pattern would be unfair and superficial. The most perfect outward conformity with an established democratic pattern cannot prevent a democracy from degenerating in fact into a plutocracy. That is why even the American Constitution must go back to the Declaration of Independence and its fundamental faith in the equality of mankind.

For we must distinguish between democracy as a method and democracy as an end in itself, between the machinery and the spirit of democracy. In China, the western democratic machinery will be grafted upon the old spirit of democracy that is as old as China itself. For the machinery of democratic government will be new, while the broad base of a liberal, generous, democratic view of mankind and of a government as existing only for the welfare and benefit of the people is as old as Mencius and *Shuking*, the most archaic of the Confucian Five Classics. It is as old as the

theory of the Chinese historians, based upon the *Shuking,* that a dynasty ruled the people in trust, as a "mandate from Heaven," and that as soon as a government misruled, it forfeited that mandate, and the people had the right to revolt.* As the machinery of republican government is new (since ancient Chinese democracy was based on village self-government with complete *laissez-faire* by the Central Government), this will be the most unpleasant aspect of it. Respectable Chinese gentlemen may perhaps even be seen immodestly telling their electors to elect them, and all candidates will forget to say how unworthy for the office they are. I dread to see the day when this happens. For the last twenty-seven years under the Chinese Republic, I have never yet seen it happen. Everything has been done through wire-pulling and bribery *à huis clos,* decently and respectably. Chinese M.P.'s will probably still decline the traditional three times before they are willing to go into office and "sacrifice all personal considerations for the benefit of the country." But apart from the intellectual-scholars who have so far been the great and sole manipulators for office, one sees today already representatives of all classes in the People's Political Council, which had its first session after the beginning of the war, signalling the first step in the return of the government to the people of China by the Kuomintang. I like to see how the representatives of peasant and labor conduct themselves in a national assembly. All those ugly features of lobbying and party politics and scrambling for votes and the great lesson of abiding by the majority and respect for the rights of the minority, the Chinese people will have slowly to learn for themselves.

The important thing, however, is that there is already a marked enlightenment of the people, in the western sense, to constitute a powerful growth of public opinion in China, and that the political training of the entire people during the war and the active par-

* For an elaboration on this thesis and the development of the power of the "people's voice" in Chinese history, see my *History of the Press and Public Opinion in China.*

ticipation of all classes in the services of national defense will further strengthen and deepen that organized public opinion, upon which democracy in the last analysis depends. Modern public opinion will be better organized and better protected by a constitution than the old "voice of the people" and the "channels of speech" for the people to reach the Emperor, which it was the ideal of a good government in ancient China to "keep open." The constitutional protection of the people's civil liberties, if carried out, will work a fundamental change in the people's psychology and public attitude and transform the passive, indifferent Chinese people into a socially and politically active people, as I have carefully pointed out in my analysis of the origin of Chinese "indifference." (pp. 48-51). Frankly, the prospect of 400,000,000 meek Chinese people learning to be "cocky" and "stand on their rights" rather confuses and frightens me.

But, best of all, the old, humanistic Chinese philosophy of reasonableness will prevent the nation from rushing into extremes of action and ideology. Liberalism will not be dead in the West and liberalism will not be dead in China. Of this I am confident. After all, Chinese humanism and the spirit of reasonableness are the greatest assets of the Chinese nation. It is this spirit which makes Chiang Kaishek less of a dictator than the dictators in Europe, and which guarantees that the methods of autocracy and the secret police, when applied to the people of China, will always be doomed to failure. It is this spirit which tempered the old, absolute monarchy and made it impossible for Chinese to regard their emperors as semi-divine or superhuman beings, for we have chopped off the heads of too many kings and emperors in the last twenty-two dynasties to believe that they are descendants of a mythical Sun Goddess. It is this spirit which humanizes our gods and makes us play tricks with them, believing that even the gods must be human and reasonable, and that there is no god that is too much of a god. A fifth-century folk story tells of a farmer arguing the God of Thunder into submission as his thunderbolts were about to strike

him, since He had listened to only one side of the story and was prejudiced by the Snake Spirit, who had eaten the food in the farmer's lunch basket—the lunch basket of an honest, hard-working man—and had been beaten off by the farmer. When the God of Thunder admitted that it was "unreasonable," he went off and struck the Snake Spirit dead in his cave. It is this spirit which makes it impossible for the Chinese nation to persecute a college professor of political science for saying that "the Emperor is an organ of the state and not the state itself," as happened in Tokyo. It is this spirit which uncrowned Chinese kings, destroyed Chinese tyrants and pulled down Chinese heroes. It is this spirit that forced the Chinese to fight in this war when they saw that after giving the Japanese the 2,673,000 square miles of Manchuria, the Japanese were "unreasonable" enough to want still more. It is this spirit that makes the Chinese condemn the German Nazi regime when it persecutes defenseless women and children and forces them to pay for damage due to its own mob violence, and that makes the Chinese doubt that any vestiges of European civilization are still left.

For humanism and the spirit of reasonableness are associated with the sense of humor and the sense of proportion, and rule out fanaticism of all sorts. Upon this basis of the spirit of reasonableness the Chinese civilization and Chinese private and public life were based in the past, and we can be sure that whatever is fanatical will be ruled out and whatever is "reasonable" will be accepted by China in the future.