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# LACE OF INDIA IN THE EMPIRE

BEING AN ADDRESS DELIVERED BEFORE THE PHILOSOPHICAL INSTITUTE OF EDINBURGH

BY LORD CURZON OF KEDLESTON

ON OCTOBER 19, 1909

"Her throne
In our vast Orient, and one isle, one isle,
That knows not her own greatness."

TENNYSON

LONDON
JOHN MURRAY, ALBEMARLE STREET, W.
1909

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# PREFACE

THE following address was delivered by Lord Curzon of Kedleston at the inaugural meeting of the Philosophical Institution of Edinburgh in the autumn session of 1909. The meeting took place in the Synod Hall at Edinburgh on the evening of October 19, and was presided over by the Earl of Rosebery.

As the whole of the address could not be given in the space of time available to the lecturer, a request has been made that the entire text should be made available for those who may desire to read it.

The title chosen by Lord Curzon—namely, "The Place of India in the Empire"—indicates his desire to treat the subject from a point of view that is apt to be disregarded, and to place the Indian Dominions of the Crown in their proper relation to the remaining factors in the Imperial system.

# THE PLACE OF INDIA IN THE EMPIRE

THE title which I have chosen for this address—viz., "The Place of India in the Empire"—might admit of many forms of treatment. I might depict to you the extent and features of that great continent—for no meaner title than continent can justly describe it—the numbers and diversity of its population, its climate and products, the wealth of its resources, the scope of its industries, its revenue and expenditure, and its constantly expanding trade. Or, by a slight variation of the theme, I might dilate upon the history of the British conquest, the expansion of our dominion, the methods of government by which we rule those 300 millions of people, and the system of defence by land and sea. I propose to say nothing, except indirectly, of any of those topics. They may be found in a score of admirable works, and in every popular textbook on India. The branch of the subject to which I desire to invite your notice is one to which, curiously, little attention has been paid even in the best of those writings, and which is, nevertheless, the most important of all. What part does India play in the structure of the British Empire? What does it mean to the Empire, and what does the Empire mean to it? For unless it has been or can be brought into organic relation with the rest of the Empire, deriving

strength from as well as communicating strength to it, and playing a definite part in the problem of Imperial evolution, its connection with the Empire can only be artificial, and will not be enduring.

Hitherto there has been a tendency to treat India as lying somewhat outside the main congeries of States and communities that compose that Empire; to regard it, so to speak, as a magnificent jewelled pendant hanging from the Imperial collar, but capable of being detached therefrom without making any particular difference to its symmetry or strength. The popular idea of India seems to be that of a distant place where a number of Englishmen have done and are doing great and notable deeds, building up the fabric of an ordered State out of barbarism, and making the desert to blossom like a rose. But when Englishmen speak or think of the British Empire they are apt to leave India out of sight, and to think only of the colonies that were founded and are largely peopled by the men and women of our own race. Until quite recently the English Press has devoted less attention to India than to the politics of Servia or Spain. Even now there is scarcely an English newspaper that keeps a permanent representative there, though handsome salaries are paid to correspondents even at the smaller capitals of Europe. In the opening days of the Tariff Reform movement India was altogether forgotten, and no one paused to inquire what part would be played in the scheme by that which is both the largest and, commercially, by far the most important section of the Empire. When the earlier Colonial Conferences met, no place was found for an Indian spokesman. Cecil Rhodes omitted any mention of India in the noble bequest of his millions to the cause of Empire. Even the problem of Imperial defence has often been discussed without relation to that which is in a sense

its pivot—viz., the defence of India. The patriotic inhabitants of our Colonies, taking their cue from England, have seemed to regard India as occupying a lower plane of Imperial importance to themselves, and finally, the stay-at-home Englishman, startled out of his normal equanimity by the unexpected spectacle of open disorder and sedition in India, almost began to wonder whether India might not, after all, be an encumbrance rather than a source of strength.

The explanation of this narrowness of vision is not far to seek. Apart from the obscurity naturally attaching to a country so unlike our own and so remote, to which Englishmen only proceed as officials or merchants for a term of years, rarely if ever making it their permanent home, and where the entire framework of existence is almost the antipodes of British ideas, it must be remembered that the conception of Empire as a vast organism resting upon the theory of voluntary incorporation, and capable of developing a sense of common duty and self-sacrifice, is essentially a modern invention, springing from the tie of common origin and cemented by loyalty to a common inheritance.

In such a conception India would not easily or *prima facie* find a part, and thus it is that in all the talk of Imperial Federation India has been treated too much as a dependency, impressive and potent, it is true, but lacking any distinct volition of her own, and destined to be fitted into the scheme more or less according to the pleasure of her British masters. It is to show you that this is a false and may be a disastrous view, and to bring home to you that India is not only an important part of any Imperial organization in the future, but so important that without her the Empire could not continue to exist, that I have selected this as the main thesis of my remarks.

In the strict use of the term, India is indeed the only part of the British Empire which is an empire. Nothing less like an empire in the traditional sense can well be conceived than the wonderful aggregation of communities, clinging to each other by common consent rather than by any compulsion from a superior ruling power, which acknowledges the sovereignty of our King. Indeed, though we speak of the British Empire, we never call its monarch the British Emperor, preferring to adhere to the older and more appropriate title of King. But in India he is rightly termed the Emperor, or King-Emperor, because there his power is that of the Roman Imperator, exercised it is true through his Ministry responsible to Parliament, but wielded without the restraint of many of the checks with which we are familiar in Western States possessing what is called constitutional government. Thus, if India were to remind us that in the British system she is the sole and veritable Empire, the pretension could not be denied.

But, after all, her claim reposes upon a more secure foundation; for it arises from the indisputable facts of her history, her geographical position, and her material strength. Consider in the first place what a part India has played in the shaping of British policy and the expansion of the British dominion. It has been the determining influence in every considerable movement of British power to the east and south of the Mediterranean. The Eastern question of the Middle Ages was merely the recovery of the Holy Places from infidel hands. But once we had planted ourselves in India, the Eastern question, though it revolved round Constantinople, was in reality directed by considerations of the security of our Indian possessions. But for India, Lord Beaconsfield would not have bought the shares in the Suez Canal; and but for the Suez Canal, we should not now

[R. H. S.]

be in Egypt. The historic rivalry and struggles with Russia for nearly a century sprang from the supposed necessity of keeping her far away from the frontiers of India. Had it not been for India, we should never have seized the Cape or begun that career of South African expansion that has lately entered upon so remarkable and pregnant a phase. But for India, we should not have been able to incarcerate the mighty spirit of Napoleon in the rocky prison of St. Helena; Mauritius would not now be ours; nor should we have acquired a predominant position in Mesopotamia, or have controlled the Persian Gulf. India compelled us to lay hold of Aden, a position of incomparable importance, and to establish a protectorate over the neighbouring parts of Arabia. India started us on that career of territorial conquest which was only arrested by the snowy ramparts of the Himalayas, and which converted us from a small island with trading and maritime interests into the greatest land Power of the world. It was through India that we established those connections with the Straits Settlements (formerly under the rule of the Governor-General of India), and with China and Japan, that were the foundation of our once unchallenged and still powerful position in the Far East. India took us to the foolishly-surrendered possession of Java.

Even now, consider what India means, in the narrowest geographical sense. When a Viceroy sets out for India, or returns from thence, the first and the last place where he touches Indian soil is Aden. Aden involved the acquisition of Perim, the Kuria Muria Islands, the Protectorate of Socotra, and also the Somali Protectorate, for many years administered from India, but now transferred to the Foreign Office. The Laccadive and Andaman and Nicobar Islands are part of the Indian dominion. It is a mere accident that

Ceylon, which is physically a part of the Indian peninsula, and is cultivated by Indian coolies, is administered by the Colonial Office. India includes Burma, which in physical features, population, and creed, might be a part of another continent. It is obvious, indeed, that the master of India must, under modern conditions, be the greatest power in the Asiatic Continent, and therefore, it may be added, in the world. The central position of India, its magnificent resources, its teeming multitude of men, its great trading harbours, its reserve of military strength, supplying an army always in a high state of efficiency and capable of being hurled at a moment's notice upon any point either of Asia or Africa—all these are assets of precious value. On the west, India must exercise a predominant influence over the destinies of Persia and Afghanistan; on the north it can veto any rival in Tibet; on the north-east and east it can exert great pressure upon China, and is one of the guardians of the autonomous existence of Siam. On the high sees it commands the routes to Australia and to the China Seas. Before any of these extensions had been achieved, the supreme value of India as the centre and secret of Imperial dominion was apprehended by the eagle-eye of Napoleon. It was the remark of De Tocqueville that the conquest and government of India were really the achievements that had given to England her place in the eyes of the world.

The figures alone—though I wish to fight as shy as possible of statistics—confirm its importance. When more than one-fifth of the whole of mankind are congregated within a given area, and when three out of every four of the King's subjects are there resident, who can deny the preponderant part that must be played by India in the British Empire? But when to these facts are added the geographical and strategical

considerations which I have named, we begin to realize its influence upon the politics of the world. Let me put it in yet another way. Consider what would happen were we to lose India, and were some other Power to take our place, for it is inconceivable that India could stand or would be left alone. We should lose its splendid and unfailing markets, shut against us by hostile tariffs; we should lose what I shall presently show is the principal, indeed almost the only, formidable element in our fighting strength; our influence in Asia would quickly disappear; we should not long retain the posts and coaling-stations which dot the ocean highways with the British flag; Australia would be much more open to attack; our colonies would cut themselves off from a dying trunk; and we should sink into a third-rate Power, an object of shame to ourselves and of derision to the rest of mankind.

Remember, too, that India is no longer a piece, even a king or a queen, on the Asiatic chessboard only. It is a royal piece on the chessboard of international politics. If we were indifferent to it ourselves, or were disposed to think, in the cant of modern indifferentism, that it does not much matter, there are other Powers quite ready to remind us that such is not the case. Had we abandoned or been evicted from India three-quarters or even half a century ago, it might have been left to fight out its own destiny amid a welter of internal bloodshed and horror. But events have moved since then on a wider stage than India itself. When we see Germany pushing down through Asia Minor towards the head of the Persian Gulf, Russia already in possession of Turkestan and the Pamirs, and separated by less than a dozen miles from the Indian border in Wakhan; France, by whose proximity a quarter of a century ago we were impelled

to the annexation of Burma, possessing a contiguous frontier with our own in the east of Burma, it must be sufficiently clear that India has become a European as well as an Asiatic interest, and that, pleasant as are our own relations with those Powers, if India were left derelict, it would not be salved by Asiatic hands alone.

But these facts serve to remind us of yet another consideration—viz., that, mainly in consequence of them, India has become the strategic centre of the defensive position of the British Empire. Sea-power is, doubtless, the first condition of our continued existence as a great nation. But the Empire has now three great land frontiers to maintain: a frontier in Canada, more than 3,000 miles in length, which we cannot fortunately conceive of any circumstances arising that would call upon us to defend, but that would have to be defended in the last resort; a frontier, 12,000 miles long in Africa, where, however, we abut upon the territories or protectorates of Powers whose forces could hardly be transported to such a scene of action; and, thirdly, the Indian frontier, 6,000 miles in length, which is as essential to the defence of the Empire as the defence of the Channel itself, and which we could on no account abandon. This is the governing factor in all Imperial strategy. Sea-power alone cannot solve it, though sea-power is an indispensable adjunct to its solution. But it is obvious that as long as it exists India must be a dominant factor in the Imperial system, and that we cannot, even if we would, escape the obligation which its possession entails.

These being the external facts of India's position, I pass to the steps which have been taken to give practical recognition to them in the polity of India itself. The first and most significant of these was the

assumption in 1858 by the Sovereign of the powers over India which had previously been exercised by the East India Company. This did not mean that up till that date the Company had been the sole arbiters of India. On the contrary, the sovereignty of the Crown had been recognized in numerous statutes throughout the century, and had been directly enforced. But a system of dual administration had been allowed to grow up, with a strange and impracticable division of powers. All this was wisely swept away after the Mutiny, and the Crown stood out as the sole source of authority in India. The proclamation of November 1, 1858, partly composed by the Queen herself, gave assurances of the spirit in which the Crown proposed to execute its powers, which has ever since been regarded as a charter by the educated sections of the Indian community. The next step was Lord Beaconsfield's Royal Titles Act of 1876, which authorized the Queen to assume the title of Empress of India. This measure was furiously denounced in England — a striking instance of the lack of imagination of our people—but was undoubtedly a judicious and statesmanlike act, well calculated to appeal to the sentiments of the Princes and peoples of India. It was followed by Lord Lytton's Proclamation Assemblage at Delhi on January 1, 1877, and in the following year by Lord Beaconsfield's dramatic step of bringing the Indian troops to Malta as an evidence of the part which India was prepared to play in a great Imperial conflict with Russia. Both these acts, and especially the second, were much attacked in England, where the spirit of the East is to many a sealed book; but in India they confirmed the growing belief of the people in their definite place in the Imperial system. Since then there has been no great ceremony of the Crown in England,

such as the two Jubilee celebrations of Queen Victoria in 1887 and 1897, and the Coronation of the present King in 1902, in which Indian Princes, soldiers, and representatives have not been permitted to take part—indeed, they would sorely resent exclusion; and the Delhi Durbar which I was instructed to hold on January 1, 1903, to commemorate the Coronation of the King-Emperor in India, brought together such a gathering of the potentates and peoples of Asia as had never previously been assembled in a single spot. It is easy, in the comfortable and ignorant security of an English or a Scotch arm-chair, to denounce these proceedings as savouring of useless pomp or meretricious splendour. They are not so regarded in the East, where sovereignty is invested with natural reverence, and has always been accustomed on ceremonial occasions to associate itself with public ceremonial and rejoicings. In a small country like Great Britain, the great majority of the people have seen the King, though even here we are not averse from a glittering ceremony when he is crowned. But in India, where there are millions of persons who hardly understand what is the British power or where is its titular head, no step should be omitted which can bring home to their minds the personality of the Sovereign and their own share in doing him honour. Simultaneously with the Durbar at Delhi, celebrations were held in every district and town in India. When the Prince and Princess of Wales toured through India three years later, in 1905-06, the people welcomed with delight their future Sovereign.

Alongside of their participation in Imperial rejoicings our Indian fellow-subjects have frequently borne a share in our Imperial wars. I shall allude later on to the exact nature and value of their services. Here it is sufficient to say that Natal would not have been

saved in the Boer War in 1899-1900, and the Legations at Peking would not have been rescued in the Boxer rising in China in 1900, but for the contingents that were despatched to the scene of war from India. Nor are these mercenary forces employed against their will to fight the battles of a distant Government. Not a war can take place in any part of the British Empire in which the Indian Princes do not come forward with voluntary offers of armed assistance—the precedent dates from the spontaneous offer of the Nizam of Hyderabad in 1885; and the fact that the native army was not allowed to stand by the side of the British in repelling the Boer invasion of Natal in 1899 was actually made the subject of attacks upon the Government in India—so keenly was the popular sentiment in favour of Indian participation aroused. I was in India throughout the South African and Chinese wars. Though not far short of 30,000 troops, British and Indian, were at one time away from the country, perfect tranquillity prevailed; and while the inveterate foes of England may have sneered at the early reverses to our arms, there could be no question of the genuineness of the rejoicings when the tide turned and the news of victory was flashed along the wires. It was perhaps not an unfitting return for these demonstrations of loyalty that at the Delhi Durbar the place of honour should have been given to the Indian survivors of the Mutiny, who had upheld the flag of Britain half a century earlier, and that the English survivors should have been similarly honoured at a great banquet given in London in December, 1907.

These incidents, however, may suggest the question whether there is or is not in India a genuine loyalty to our rule, and whether reliance may be placed upon these and similar evidences of friendly feeling. The answer to the question is not easy, for the simple

reason that on no subject, and least of all one of popular sentiment, is it possible to find a formula that will cover the mental attitude of 300 millions of people. The Princes of India are, I believe, enthusiastically attached to the British connection, partly because they have always been accustomed to recognize a sovereign authority (the Moghul was not less foreign to the majority of them than ourselves), and partly because they recognize in the British Crown the sole durable guarantee of their security and rights. The educated classes are divided between recognition of the paramount necessity of the British overlordship to keep the peace and assure the progress of India, and a surrender to the appeals of Indian nationality and patriotism. A small section is incurably disloyal and hostile. The masses of the people, except when they are carried off their feet by waves of superstitious excitement or racial frenzy, are disposed to be loyal to any master who will insure them food and wages. Perhaps the one form of loyalty in which all would join is loyalty to the person of the Sovereign: a result not merely of the Eastern taste for personal rule and belief in the exalted attributes of the Crown, but also of the impression produced upon India by the virtues and sympathy of the late Queen Victoria, the character of the present King, and by the visit of the Prince and Princess of Wales. Vituperation of an alien Government is found side by side (often in the same newspaper) with expressions of devotion to an alien monarch. There is thought to be no contradiction between the two attitudes. As time goes on and the spirit of nationality assumes more active and insurgent forms in India, the feeling for the Crown will become of increasing value as the ultimate link of union between the two races and between all classes of society. But for that very

reason I am not disposed to subject it to any hazard or to favour the idea of a Royal Viceroy in India. The Governor-General must be the head of the Administration in the Parliamentary sense, if the Government of India is to be properly conducted, and is not to relapse into a subordinate department of the India Office in London. In India he is identified with the acts and policy of Government to a degree unknown even in this country, and the advantage of having a member of the Royal Family permanently resident in India (even if this were physically possible) would be more than counterbalanced by his inevitable association at times of popular excitement with the acts of the Executive. There would be no room for a titular Viceroy to represent the Crown, and for a Prime Minister or *de facto* Viceroy in addition, to conduct the administration.

While in India, I took one small step to bring home to the people the personality and likeness of the Sovereign. In every residence or building of Government and Durbar Hall and Court House I had pictures of the King hung up in a prominent place. These little things are not thought greatly of at home—but they count for much in the East.

There are other respects in which the Home Government has in recent years shown an increasing recognition of India's position in the Empire, and a higher sense of moral responsibility. I have spoken of India's participation in the wars of Great Britain and her resounding voice in the diplomacy of Asia. But so strongly did the idea of India as a dependency subject to the disposition of her Imperial master prevail, that arrangements were regarded as perfectly legitimate which would be condemned by the more sensitive conscience of modern times. Allusion has been made to the supposed predominant interest of

India in the Eastern Question even in Europe; and this was held to justify the payment out of Indian revenues of the entire cost of the great ball given to the Sultan of Turkey at the India Office in 1867. Until quite recent times a portion of the charge for the entertainment of Persian Envoys or Special Missions in London was always borne by the Indian Exchequer; it further contributed a sum of £12,000 to the cost of the British Legation in Teheran (reduced in 1891 to £7,000), and (on a parallel line of reasoning) of £12,500 towards that of the British Diplomatic and Consular Establishments in China. Until 1900 India bore the whole of the military charges for Aden. Similarly, there was a time when Indian troops were employed in external wars such as Egypt, Abyssinia, and the Sudan, which were regarded as having an Indian connection, at the expense, either in whole or in part, of the Indian Exchequer.

A growing sense of the unfairness of these arrangements was responsible for the appointment of the Welby Royal Commission in 1895. The report of this body in 1900, and the action that was taken upon it by Lord Salisbury's Government, led to a much more equitable division, both of spheres of responsibility and of cost. Relief was given to the Government of India in most of the respects already named, as well as in others, to the extent of £257,000 per annum: a geographical basis was adopted for the determination of cases in which Indian revenues might properly be charged with the payment of troops employed outside of India; and, in the event of a conflict of opinion arising, provision was made for its reference to a Joint Committee representing both Governments. In the case of disputes about general administrative charges the arbitration of a Lord of Appeal was arranged. It was under this plan that a proposal to charge India with the whole,

instead of a portion, of a sum of £786,000 per annum—the cost of a permanent addition to the pay of the British soldier in India—was referred, upon the joint protest of the India Office and the Government of India, in my time, to the Lord Chief Justice, and decided against us. The Welby Commission further proposed that the Home Government should contribute a sum of £50,000 per annum towards the cost of the India Office in London—the annual charge for which upon the Indian revenues amounts to about £250,000 per annum. The Government of India warmly supported the proposal that £50,000 should be made an annual charge upon the Consolidated Fund for this purpose, but were unable to carry the point. Corresponding relief was, however, given to Indian revenues under other heads, so that the financial effect was the same as if the recommendation had been adopted in the form in which it was originally made. Although in the view of the Government of India the relief to India might have gone further (Lord Northbrook in the House of Lords even proposed that a refund of arrears should be made to India for a period of years), it is undeniable that the action thus taken removed a substantial grievance, and that injustice is now much less likely to occur.

Nevertheless, there is always a danger that hard-pressed departments at home may, in cases where Indian interests are regarded as involved, seek to place an undue proportion of the burden upon Indian shoulders. Cases of this have occurred within my own knowledge, both in respect of military charges and of the entertainment in England of Indian guests, and the utmost vigilance is required on the part of those who are charged with the custody of India's interests to see that they suffer no injury. Quite recently an addition of £300,000 a year has been made

to the payment demanded from India for the recruitment of the British part of its army in England. It may be assumed that this charge, which was the result of inquiry by an impartial committee, was justified. But no papers have been laid before Parliament, and no explanation given on the matter. It can readily be understood that, without any conscious desire to inflict injustice, the War Office or the Foreign Office or the Treasury in England may hold different views of the degree of Indian interest or responsibility from those which might prevail in India itself. In such cases it is for the India Office and the Government of India to fight India's battles. It might surprise some of the more embittered critics of British rule in that country if they knew how bold a struggle had often been waged for the defence of the Indian tax-payer by its much-abused rulers.

In yet another respect the recognition of India as a partner in the Empire has made gratifying strides. When the first Imperial (then called Colonial) Conferences assembled in England in 1897 and 1902, no idea was entertained of inviting India to the Council Board. On the occasion of the last Conference in 1907, the Secretary of State for India, Lord Morley, attended the opening session, and deputed a member of his Council (Sir J. Mackay) to represent him at later sittings. I should like to see this principle carried further, and, in the event of a Conference being held at any future date to discuss a revision of the fiscal system of the Empire, I think it would be well if the Indian Government were represented by its Finance Minister, in the same way as Colonial Governments send their Prime Ministers or leading statesmen. There is, of course, a difference between Dominions possessing responsible government and an Administration like that of India. But that difference is not

sufficient to justify the total omission of an Indian representative from the table.

Indian delegates are increasingly invited to take part in such Conferences in other spheres. When I first went to India, I recall a conference of Imperial Universities in England to which no one had thought of summoning the representatives of the powerful and flourishing Indian Universities. But when the Federal Conference on Education met in London in 1907, each of the principal provinces of India had been invited to depute a delegate. India has a part in another and more august tribunal—viz., the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, which is the Supreme Court of Appeal for the British Empire. Perhaps some day we shall have a Final Imperial Court of Appeal, sitting in something better than a dingy board-room, and by its powers, its constitution, and its *mise-en-scène* more fitly symbolizing the ultimate repository of British law.

While in India I sought to interest the statesmen of the British Colonies in India, and to bring home to both parties their common share in Imperial destinies. I gladly despatched a contingent from the Indian Army to take part in the official inauguration of the Australian Commonwealth in 1901; and in 1903 I invited to the Delhi Durbar, and there were present, representatives of the highest official and personal distinction from South Africa and Australia. There also came to the Durbar as official delegate from Japan one of the Generals who a little later won great fame in the Russo-Japanese War. Evidences of friendly feeling between different parts of the Empire, and still more the mutual knowledge resulting from an interchange of visits or courtesies, may be of the greatest value when an emergency comes. On the other hand, the idea that the Civil Service in India should be thrown

open to Colonials in the Colonies (there is, of course, nothing to prevent a Colonial any more than an Indian from proceeding to England and passing the examination there), and that they should be encouraged to join it, is not one that would find favour with the native community in India, partly from a fear that the same class of candidate as is sent from England might not uniformly be secured, partly from a doubt whether the attitude of the Colonial-born British subject towards dark-skinned races is as a rule sympathetic, and most of all because India would not care to open her doors to those who are so inclined to bang their own against her.

From this survey of the practical means by which the place of India in the Empire is now more definitely and ungrudgingly recognized, I pass to a brief examination of the degree to which both parties profit by their connection. I am far from saying that the question ought to be decided upon a balance of gain or loss, or that any mathematical calculation can be expected of factors which often elude strict analysis. But there is so frequently a tendency in India to assume that the advantage is mainly or wholly on the side of England, and perhaps in England to think that India is the chief gainer, that a comparison of the advantages conferred upon both may not be without value in enabling both parties to arrive at an unbiassed judgment.

First let me endeavour to state what India gives to Great Britain and the Empire. From her abounding population she supplies us with labour for the exploitation of Empire lands in all parts of the globe. Few persons at home have any clear idea of the extent or variety of this service. After the abolition of slavery in the West Indies, had it not been for the supply of Indian labour, many of the islands must

have fallen out of cultivation, and would probably long before now have been transferred by cession or secession to another flag. In Trinidad there are now 86,000 East Indians, and in Jamaica 10,000. With the opening of the Panama Canal, these islands will gain enormously in material and strategic value, and their continued possession will be an Imperial asset of the first importance. But for a similar relief, Mauritius, where there are 206,000 East Indians, would probably have fallen to France, and British supremacy in the Indian Ocean would have been in grave peril. We should never have been able to exploit our South American colony of British Guiana without Indian labour; the Indian population there is now 105,000 out of a total of 278,000. We have even been able to spare surplus labour for other Powers, the French in Réunion, and the Dutch in Dutch Guiana. Indian coolies have penetrated to the remote Pacific; and the Fiji Islands contain 17,000. Africa, which from its proximity to India, supplies a natural field for Indian labour, can tell a similar tale. The planters of Natal would not have been able to develop that colony had it not been for an Indian population, which is now 115,000 strong, and exceeds in numbers the European inhabitants of the State. We all recall the Indian traders in the Transvaal, whose ill-treatment by the Boers was one of the contributory causes of the war, and whose grievances since have been a source of so much irritation. The Uganda Railway was constructed by more than 20,000 Indian coolies, and Indian labour was more than once sought of me by the late Cecil Rhodes. Every year an emigrant force of from 15,000 to 20,000 coolies leaves the ports of India for these distant fields. Of course the benefit is reciprocal, both in relief to the congestion of India and in occupation and wages to large numbers of poor

men. But the service is none the less Imperial, and flows from our possession of India.

Men, too, are available from India for another and a more dramatic form of Imperial expansion. I have already alluded to the service rendered by the Indian army in our wars. To South Africa I sent out in the Boer campaign 13,200 British officers and men from the British Army in India, and 9,000 natives, principally followers. To China we despatched from India 1,300 British officers and men, 20,000 native troops, and 17,500 native followers. To both theatres of war we sent out immense stores of ammunition, shells, tents, saddlery, horses, mules, bullocks, and fodder. India produces or manufactures these resources in an ever-increasing scale, and is becoming an invaluable depot for the Empire in time of trouble. We also raised five native regiments for the defence of outlying portions of the Empire. Indian troops, moreover, conducted during my term of office Imperial campaigns in Somaliland and Jubaland; and it is noteworthy that on these occasions, and also in China, I was enabled to utilize for the first time outside the shores of India the Imperial Service troops which are the voluntary contributions of the leading Indian chiefs to the cause of Imperial defence.

The actual strength of the army in India is now 74,000 British troops and 150,000 native troops, to which must be added 2,700 British officers attached to the latter, and 1,000 staff officers, or a total of 227,700. There are, further, 35,000 men in the Native Reserve, 33,000 European and Eurasian Volunteers, and nearly 20,000 Imperial Service troops. The total net military expenditure in 1907-08 (including military works) was 19½ millions sterling.

By a wise provision in the Act of 1858, it is laid down that, "except for preventing or repelling actual

invasion of His Majesty's Indian dominions or urgent necessity, the revenues of India shall not, without the consent of both Houses of Parliament, be applicable to defray the expenses of any military operation carried on beyond the external frontiers of such possessions by His Majesty's forces." But this, which was a necessary safeguard against the unauthorized employment of Indian troops beyond the frontiers or shores of India (the Debate of 1878, when Lord Beaconsfield ordered an Indian contingent to Malta, will repay study), does not prevent the employment of these forces with the full knowledge of Parliament and at the expense of the Imperial Treasury; and the knowledge that there is always present in India, in a high state of efficiency and ready for instant mobilization, one of the finest fighting forces in the world, adds materially to the strength of the British position alike in Asia and Africa. The argument that because some portions of the Indian Army have at different times been spared there must be more than enough for the needs of the country, is a singularly feeble one, for it would equally apply to any country a portion of whose forces was engaged on foreign service, and it entirely ignores the fact that the security of India in the absence of any considerable number of her troops, depends not upon the numerical sufficiency of the remainder, but upon the British command of the sea. As a matter of fact, in relation to the population of India, the Indian Army is by far the smallest in the world. I entertain no doubt that as long as the military feeling survives among the old fighting races of India, and the loyalty of the native army resists, as it has hitherto done, the efforts that are made to tamper with it, Indian forces will be able to come to the assistance of the British in any field where native troops can properly be employed. But it would be

neither proper nor wise to make too frequent a use of this advantage; neither can it be expected that the springs of recruitment in India will for ever remain unexhausted. As regards the argument which is sometimes heard from extreme native politicians that the British Army in India is an expensive luxury which might be dispensed with or reduced, such is not the view that is entertained by any responsible person acquainted with the facts, and if the British contingent in India were by some incredible act of folly to be diminished, nothing can be more certain than that the men would have to go back again, not improbably after a heavy price had been paid for their absence.

It was an interesting corollary of the British military position in India that we were able to accommodate several thousand of the Boer prisoners there during the later stages of the war, St. Helena, a former appendage of India, being utilized for the same purpose.

My audience will be waiting to hear something of the more material services rendered by India to Great Britain in the sphere of business and trade. That India is one of the main fields for the employment of British capital, that she supplies to us in abundance the raw material of a great deal of our industry and much of the food on which we live, and that she furnishes the richest market for our manufactures are propositions which are widely known. But in what relation the Indian trade stands to that of the Empire is less realized. One-tenth of the entire trade of the British Empire passes through the seaports of India; and this seaborne trade is more than one-third of the trade of the Empire outside the United Kingdom. It is greater than that of Australia and Canada combined, and within the Empire Indian seaborne trade is second only to that of the United Kingdom. India has become

the largest producer of food and raw material in the Empire and the principal granary of Great Britain, the imports into the United Kingdom of wheat, meal, and flour from India exceeding those of Canada, and being double those of Australia. At the same time India is the largest purchaser of British produce and manufactures, and notably of cotton goods. Moreover, it must be remembered that under the existing system English cotton manufactures imported into India pay a duty only of 3½ per cent., a countervailing Excise duty of equivalent amount being at the same time levied on Indian manufactures. Contrast this with the heavy tariffs which British goods have to pay in the ports of our own colonies of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, and South Africa. During the past three years the proportions of the import trade of India enjoyed by Great Britain have been 45, 48, and 57 millions, or a percentage of about 67 per cent. in each year; her proportion of the exports has averaged 26 per cent. I might inundate you with further figures, but I think I have said enough to show how excellent a customer is India of Great Britain, and what a part she plays in the commerce of the Empire. On the other hand, be it remembered that the whole of the appliances by which this great trade has been built up—the roads, railroads, canals, harbours, docks, telegraphs, posts, etc.—have been created during the period of British rule, and largely by capital supplied from this country. Indeed, the amount of British capital invested in India for its commercial and industrial development (including the employment of its people) is estimated as at least £350,000,000.

For my own part, it is less in its material than in its moral and educative aspects that India appears to me to confer so incomparable a boon upon the British race. No one now taunts the British aristocracy with

treating India as a playground for its sons. There is not much play there for the Government official at any time, and, such as he is, he is drawn from all classes of the British community. Just as the Indian Army is to the young subaltern the finest available school of manhood and arms, so also the Indian Civil Service is a training-ground for British character that is not without its effect both upon the Empire and the race. The former service is demonstrated by the constant drain upon India for irrigation officers and engineers, for postal and telegraph and forest officers, for financiers and administrators all over the world. The men whom she has trained are to be encountered in regions as far apart as Nigeria and China, the Cape and Siam. They are among the administrative pioneers of the Empire. To those officers of the Civil Service who never leave the country no such field of adventure opens. But India develops in them a sense of duty and a spirit of self-sacrifice, as well as faculties of administration and command which are among the greatest glories of our race. Acting and not talking, working and not boasting, they pursue their silent and often unknown careers, bequeathing a tradition to their families which is sometimes perpetuated for generations, and leaving a permanent and wholesome imprint on the national character.

When we recall the names of the great men whom service in India has produced—some of them among the heroes of the British race—we feel that it is a greater benefaction on the part of India to have exalted and disciplined our character than it is to have put money into our purses or extended our Imperial sway.

And now I turn to the other side of the ledger, and inquire what is the return for these benefits that Great Britain has made to India. First, let us see what are

the civil rights of the Indian who is a subject of the Crown. Though he hails from what is called a dependency, he has not only in India, but in the United Kingdom, the full rights of a British subject. If he comes over here, he does not need to be naturalized, he is already a citizen of the Empire; he has only to acquire the necessary qualification in order to vote in the municipal and Parliamentary elections of this country; he can even sit—he has sat—in the House of Commons; he can enter our Universities; he can compete for that branch of the Indian Civil Service which is recruited by special examination in England; he can be made—he has been made—a member of the Council of the Secretary of State. His rights in the Colonies, or, as they are now called, the Overseas Dominions of the Crown, enjoying self-government, are a different matter, upon which I shall touch presently. But here there is no subtraction from his prerogatives. He is as much a British subject and a British citizen as you or I. Even the subjects of Native States in India, though they are not technically British subjects, are, for international purposes, in the same position as British subjects. In foreign countries they are entitled to the same measure of protection as though they were British subjects; and this protection is extended, not only to the inhabitants of Native States inside India, but to the subjects of Border States, such as Nepal, which, though not incorporated in the Indian Empire, are yet in close political relations with our Government, and in a greater or less degree may be said to accept the suzerainty or protectorate of Great Britain. I recall, too, when I was in India, that the Afghans always appealed to us for protection, and received it at Meshed in Eastern Persia, and elsewhere.

These are the privileges of the Indian outside India. Inside India we may divide the advantages

which accrue to him, as we have already done on the other side of the balance-sheet, into material and moral. A summary of the material gains would be in reality a synopsis of the results of a century and a half of British rule in the Indian peninsula. Where, before we entered India, there were no made roads and few bridges, we have overspread the country with a network of roads and have spanned the rivers. We have constructed over 30,000 miles of railway, which last year carried 330,000,000 of people. We have protected the coasts with lighthouses, and have created magnificent harbours and docks and wharves. Splendid public buildings adorn the principal cities. Great schemes of water-supply and sanitation are being extended to all the larger towns. The hospitals vie with those of Great Britain, and in point of scientific equipment are in some cases superior. The telegraphic and postal services are cheaper and offer advantages greater than those which we enjoy at home. Thousands of miles of desolate and uninhabited country have been reclaimed by irrigation works to the plough. I recall a vast area of millions of acres in the Punjab which, when first I visited India, was a howling waste, but is now green with waving crops, is studded with flourishing villages and towns, and supports a population that is numbered by millions. We have taken 240,000 square miles of country under the protection of the Forest Department to the great advantage both of the climate and (in respect of grazing and firewood) of the poorer population. The main recurrent afflictions of India are famine and cholera and plague. Against these our forces are always mobilized; and although the fight is an unequal one, we may say of famine in particular that we have built up a system of famine relief that has rendered starvation wellnigh impossible, and enormously reduced the mortality resulting from desti-

tution and disease. We have passed a series of laws that would startle an English Parliament, for the protection of the peasant cultivator from the exactions of landlords or middlemen or usurers. Manufacturing industries have been started that give wages to nearly 1,000,000 people, of whom 400,000 are engaged in cotton and jute mills; half a million in addition are employed upon the railways alone. I have already given some indication of the immense expansion of Indian trade, but it would be the greatest mistake to suppose that this enriches the Englishman or the foreigner only. The Parsi merchant princes of Bombay tread closely upon the heels of their English rivals; and the Indian merchant is known in Shanghai and Osaka, in Zanzibar and Hamburg, as well as in Calcutta and Bombay. The greater part of the internal trade of India remains entirely in native hands. The Marwaris, or great trading caste of Rajputana, are encountered in almost every town and city of India, and every village has its local *bunia*, not uncommonly a well-to-do man, who combines the functions of local shop-keeper, grain-merchant, and money-lender.

If we look to the condition of the people, we find that they live in better houses than they did even a quarter of a century ago, enjoy more comforts, and wear superior clothes; the taxation upon them is less than 1s. 9d. per head of the population, or, if land revenue (which is properly rent) is included, less than 3s. 3d.; a great system of local self-government, which does not very readily take root in Indian soil, has been extended to them; 750 municipalities containing 8,700 natives out of 10,000 members administer the affairs of 17,000,000 people, and dispense an income of over £6,000,000; 1,100 local boards are charged with the management of village education, sanitation, and civil works, and dispose of an income of £4,000,000.

A Press has been given to India, the liberty of which would shock the most advanced European democracies. The civil and criminal law has been codified, and may compare with that of any Western country. The religion and literature and social customs of India find more scrupulous protectors in their British rulers than they would have done under any native *raj*. Above all, we have given to India the priceless boon of peace instead of war, settled life in place of anarchy, security in place of brigandage and rapine. I can find in no history or record the remotest justification for the belief, sedulously propagated by our critics, that before the arrival of the British, India enjoyed a Saturnian age, from which she has since receded. On the contrary, if we take the period when the Moghul dominion—the most powerful rule in the two preceding centuries—was at its zenith, we find from contemporary writers that while there was a thin crust of splendour at the top, below were dense layers of squalor and misery and suffering. Almost the sole surviving legacy of that epoch is the pathetic magnificence of palaces and temples and tombs.

I have previously spoken of the Army as though it ought to be reckoned on the reverse side of the ledger. But clearly it might equally be contended that the conditions which I have described, and for the enjoyment of which the protection of the Army is largely responsible, justify us in regarding it as a boon to India. Nor should it be forgotten that the supply of so large a force as 74,000 British soldiers involves some sacrifice, since it renders recruiting more difficult at home.

About the Navy there can be less dispute. The total charge upon Indian revenue for marine services is only £400,000 per annum. The greater part of this is spent upon the Royal Indian Marine, which consists

of ten troopships, some inland and harbour vessels, a number of steamers and launches, and a submarine mining flotilla. The sum of £100,000 is paid annually to the Imperial Government towards the maintenance of the East India Squadron, and for the general services of His Majesty's ships. When we reflect that the whole of India's seaborne trade is insured from risks by the British fleet, and that if there were no British Navy India would have to protect a coast-line over 4,000 miles in length with her own, there can be little doubt that she is a substantial gainer by the transaction.

I have reserved as the last of the material benefits conferred upon India—because it is a subject of much controversy—the scope for the participation of Indians themselves in the government of their country. Upon no subject is there more widespread misunderstanding. The Englishman proceeding to India may expect to see his own countrymen everywhere, and, above all, in the offices and buildings of government, in the law courts, and on the magisterial bench. As a matter of fact, except in the great cities, he will rarely come across an Englishman at all. I once visited a city of 80,000 people, in which there were only two official Englishmen, both of whom happened to be away. When we assumed the government of India, the native agency was so notoriously inefficient and corrupt that the British were obliged to take control of all branches of the administration. But ever since there has been a progressive reduction of the European and increase of the native element, until Indians now fill by far the greater number of the executive, magisterial, and judicial posts, entire classes of appointments being reserved for them either by definite rule or by unbroken practice. Figures were published when I was in India which showed that out of 28,300 Government servants

drawing more than £60 a year—a high salary in India —21,800 were Indian or Eurasian inhabitants of the country. Below that figure the Indians practically sweep the board, and I have seen the total number of Government employés in India given as 1,500,000 Indians to 10,000 Europeans.

It is, however, on the higher posts in the Government service, and more especially in executive offices (for on the judicial side Indians habitually rise to the higher rank), that the ambitions of the Nationalist party in India are fixed. Their demands have recently met with a success greatly beyond even their own expectations in the concessions made to them by Lord Morley, which open to Indians some of the highest places in the service. The justification of this confidence rests in their own hands. There is no difference on either side of politics as to the wisdom and necessity of a progressive increase in the employment of Indians in the administration of their country. No one would impose or defend a merely racial bar. The question at issue is rather, not what is the *maximum* number of offices that can safely be given to Indians, but what is the *minimum* number that must of necessity be reserved for Europeans. So long as British rule in India remains, and there is a consensus that it is absolutely indispensable, there must be a strong British *personnel* in the higher ranks of the Administration. There are, further, a number of posts for which special knowledge and acquirements are needed, of which the supply in India is still deficient, or whose native subordinates require the stimulus of European control. Consistently with these principles the desire will be, so far as possible, to extend the area of Indian employment.

Once again, however, I am disposed to attach far more weight to the benefits conferred by England

upon India in the moral and intellectual than in the purely material spheres. Trade and industries, justice and good government, peace and security, wages and employment, are an incalculable blessing to a people who before our arrival suffered from the triple scourge of robbery, indigence, and oppression. But they do not represent the whole or the best of our service to the Indian community. Our highest claim to their gratitude is that we have educated their character and emancipated their intelligence. All that is best in their thought and writings, the rising standards of morality, the gradual reduction of venality and superstition, even the dawn of a national spirit—all of these have been fostered by the education which, with perhaps imperfect discrimination but with whole-hearted sincerity, we have placed at their disposal.

The instruments of Western civilization have lent a powerful though sometimes unconscious aid to this process. Railways and steamboats have not only bridged distances and helped to relieve distress, but they have broken down the barriers that separated races and communities and castes, and have exerted a unifying influence not merely in the interest of the rulers, but upon the ruled. Cables and telegraphs have brought the news of foreign incidents in Russia, in Persia, in Turkey, and in Japan, and they have facilitated common thought and common action in India. English law has supplied a meeting-ground on which East and West could adjust relations that play a large part in the life of the Indian. English writings, taught in all the schools and colleges, have been absorbed with astonishing alacrity by intellects less gifted for research than for assimilation. Beyond any other cause the English language (although it is still spoken and written only by about half a million out of 300 millions, including the European and

Eurasian communities) fills, among the educated population, much the same rôle as did Latin in the Europe of the Middle Ages, and has proved the solvent of venerable prejudices and the astringent of new and patriotic emotions. The paradoxical point has even been attained that it is to the Englishman that India has to look for the preservation of her vernaculars. Any attempt to revive or enforce their study at the expense of English is viewed with intense suspicion by the advanced Indian party as an attempt to rob them of their newly-won patrimony. The proceedings at the annual Congress meetings are conducted in English, and I have even read of a speaker who commenced a speech in Hindustani being howled down.

These symptoms are not all or wholly good. Many foolish things are written and said in India. Many vain aspirations are kindled, much yeasty sentiment is evolved. We have not rendered the task of the rulers more easy by consolidating the ruled and feeding their minds on a Western diet. But, at least, we have raised entire sections of the community from torpor to life, and have lifted India on to a higher moral plane. It is too early to say whether the eagle will one day be transfixed by the dart that is feathered with its own wing.

Let me here at once confess that the picture which I have drawn is not one which the extreme Nationalist in India would accept, any more than the Irish Nationalist would endorse the views of Whig or Tory about Ireland. While allowing that his countrymen have benefited greatly by the influence of Western thought and ideals, the Indian Radical believes, or affects to believe, that his country is the worse for British dominion. He argues that attachment to any foreign masters is *ipso facto* impossible, and that the only loyalty of true Indians is to themselves. He

depicts India as held by the English for purposes of commercial and selfish exploitation; he asks why any or every post should not be open to him in the Administration of his country. He points to the Excise duty on Indian cotton manufactures as having been imposed exclusively in the interests of Lancashire—as indeed it was. He complains that the highest officer in the Native Army can never rise to a rank which will allow him to give orders to the youngest British subaltern. He declares that the Indian Army is kept to fight British battles; he protests that the revenues of the country are exhausted in the discharge of foreign obligations; and, when challenged about the place of India in the Empire, he replies that the Empire is nothing to him, since it cannot insure for the Indian his rights as a British subject in Australia, or British Columbia, or the Transvaal.

Many of these charges ignore the elementary fact that the rule of India is still, and must for as long as we can foresee remain, in British hands; some of them rest on transparent fallacies or absurd paradoxes which my previous remarks have already refuted. But there are at least two among them so persistently repeated that I must devote a word to their examination. I refer to the popular charge of the so-called "Drain," and to the action of certain of our Colonies in refusing admission to, or imposing harsh restrictions upon, the Indian settler.

The "Drain" argument is the familiar contention that England takes away from India annually a sum of money amounting to many millions sterling, which impoverishes the country, and is even called the "Tribute" by extreme partisans. The total of this alleged drain is variously estimated according to the basis of calculation adopted by the critic; but it is commonly stated as the excess of exports over imports,

which is the means by which a debtor country like India discharges its obligations and maintains the balance of trade. Economically this test is quite fallacious. We have only to look to the experience of the South American States—such as Argentina, Chile, and Brazil—where the exports habitually exceed the imports, to realize that such a condition is no proof of economic exhaustion; while in the richest country in the world, America, the value of the exports exceeds the imports by an average of over £100,000,000 per annum.

The fallacy of the reasoning may, however, be even more clearly exposed by examining the nature of the Home Charges, which are responsible for about three-fourths of the so-called drain, and by far the greater part of which are admittedly payments for services rendered or goods received. For instance, the interest on the Public Works Debt is the price paid by India for the capital that has been raised in England for the construction of railways and canals, and advanced at a rate of interest most moderate, and far lower than could have been obtained in India itself. Further, this interest is more than met by the earnings of the works, which return a handsome profit, and it is therefore no loss at all. Again, the interest on debts incurred by former wars is the payment that India makes for the peace and security from invasion that she now enjoys, and for the consolidation of the Empire, in precisely the same way as Great Britain continues to pay interest on the cost of the Napoleonic, the Crimean, or the South African Wars. The next item is the payment of leave allowances to Anglo-Indian officers on furlough, and their pensions (largely, by the way, contributed by themselves) when they have retired. The explanation is simple. As long as India requires a modicum—it is only a modicum—of

British officers to conduct its administration, the attractions held out to them, including an occasional visit to this country, must be such as to induce a high class of man to enter the service; and if they were not granted pensions on retirement, their pay in India would have to be proportionately raised. Indeed, the absurdity of the contention could not be better illustrated than by the assumption that while the salaries paid in India are legitimate and do not constitute a drain, that portion of them which happens to be paid in England is a tribute. Of course the entire pay is on exactly the same footing, and it is wholly immaterial through what bank it is disbursed. Then there is the cost of the India Office, which may, or may not, be run on an economical scale, but as to which it is obvious that there must be such an institution in England. There are also the home charges for the British troops in India, which could only be dispensed with by dispensing with the troops, and the cost of military and other stores — *e.g.*, rails, engines, etc. These must be bought outside of India so long as India, which is happily becoming more self-providing in these respects, is unable to manufacture them itself. The above are the items that compose the home charges, and are mainly responsible for the so-called tribute. And finally—a perennial source of attack—there are the private remittances made to England, either in respect of the savings of officials, or the profits of British traders and merchants engaged in such industries as tea-planting, factories, or mines. To treat these remittances as an economic loss, is to apply a law to India which is accepted in no other country in the world. The profits of the business are the property of the owner to do with as he pleases, and it has never occurred to any human being that the foreign investor who derives profit from American

cattle-ranches or South African gold-mines is thereby robbing the United States or the Transvaal. On the contrary, the capital which the British merchant has supplied to India is a net gain to the country in the resources developed, the consumption created, the labour employed, and the wages paid.

No doubt India would be better off if she had been able to find this capital herself. She possesses it in abundance, for the hoarded wealth in the country is estimated at a minimum of £350,000,000. But so long as she hides it underground, or hangs it in jewellery on the limbs of women, or spends it in festivals and litigation, she has no cause to complain. On the contrary, she ought to be grateful that foreign capital is forthcoming to supply the place of her own ignorance or timidity, and the wealth that leaves the country in payment for the boon is not more lost (in fact a good deal of it comes back in fresh capital) than that which remains in the country, concealed or unproductive.

The "Drain" argument is, however, only seen in its full absurdity when applied to Indian railways. These have been an almost incalculable blessing to India in cheapening the cost of transport, in preventing or relieving famine, and thereby in saving life, in mitigating the congestion of population, in providing for the rapid concentration of troops, and thus enabling a much larger garrison to be dispensed with, and securing the tranquillity of the country, and in adding to the convenience, as well as promoting the unity, of millions. And yet, because the capital to construct these lines had to be imported from England, it is actually argued that the sums paid by India in interest and sinking fund on these advances, which will ultimately wipe out a large portion of them, and leave India in possession of a magnificent property, are

impoverishing the country, and constitute a "tribute" to the foreigner! Perversity could not further go; and the situation may be summed up in the remark that in order to justify the charge political economy has to reverse all its canons, and what is a source of advantage to other countries becomes an injury when applied to India alone.

The second charge relates to the exclusion of natives of India from other parts of the Empire, sometimes by direct prohibition, sometimes by laws imposing tests, educational, linguistic, or otherwise, which the Indian finds it wellnigh impossible to satisfy. These conditions apply in varying degrees in Australia, in Canada, and in the South African States; and they represent a phase of Colonial opinion and an aspect of Imperial politics which are neither fortuitous nor transient, but are likely, as time passes, to stiffen into harder forms. Both the advocate of Indian rights and the champion of Imperial unity protest against these restrictions as a negation of the Imperial conception; and a denial of the rights which ought to be enjoyed everywhere in the Empire by every subject of the King. In theory this argument is unimpeachable: and strong language may well be justified in condemning some of the disabilities to which Indians of education and position have been subjected in the Transvaal and other colonies. The Government of India is, in my view, entitled to make what stipulations it may please in lending its labour to other parts of the Empire, for the loan is, as a rule, a greater benefit to them than it is a relief to India; and I did not hesitate when Viceroy to say that I would contemplate with equanimity the complete cessation of Indian emigration to South Africa unless I could obtain better terms for those who were there. It is part of the duty of the India Office to put every form of pressure that it

legitimately can upon Colonial Governments disposed to exercise their self-governing rights in a selfish or invidious fashion.

But upon the larger principle involved I am compelled to say that the full measure of the Indian contention seems to me to be impracticable, and to be incapable even in theory of being sustained. The common rights of British citizenship cannot be held to override the rights of self-protection conceded to self-governing communities. They rest upon the postulate that the units composing the British Empire are so equal in character and claim that what is granted to one in one place cannot be withheld from another in another. But in practice this is not the case. There is a difference between the standards of living, the economic aptitudes, and the social and moral conceptions of Asiatic races and of communities of European origin which, at any rate in the present stage of national evolution, is fundamental, and which no abstract reasoning can bridge. Just as the Indians are beginning to recognize in a greater degree the spirit of nationality themselves, so that spirit cannot be denied to the proud and expanding off-shoots of the British race; and where there have been granted to the latter the rights of self-government it is hopeless to expect an attitude of pure altruism on their part. Even in India the native States enjoy in particular circumstances the right of excluding not only the subjects of British India, but Europeans; and we may be sure that did India in Indian hands possess self-governing privileges, even within the Empire, she would be the first to claim similar powers for herself.

The Colonial standpoint is not primarily or designedly racial, though, of course, it is represented as such. It is partly economic (the colonists objecting to the competition of cheaper labour) and partly

sentimental, since they are averse from the permanent introduction into the territories which they have won and are endeavouring to develop as white men's lands, of an element which shares neither their habits nor their ideals. I think, therefore, that the Indian grievance in this respect is not a substantial one; and I doubt if much attention would be paid to it in India, where native politicians do not spend much thought on the labouring classes, were it not a convenient peg upon which to hang a larger agitation.

So much for the general charges against British rule in India.

My own view is that, while the bulk of them are quite unreasonable, and rest upon gross misconception, we should do all that we can to remove any ground, if such there be, for their continued existence, and should guard diligently against their multiplication. The advantage of the union to both parties is so great and striking that we cannot afford to let its merits be obscured by carelessness or misunderstanding. British Governments, and even Secretaries of State, should be mindful, as they have the giant's strength, not to use it tyrannously, but to be very scrupulous in any conflict of interest. The contented incorporation of India in the Empire depends upon her feeling that the Empire is impartial as well as strong, and that she herself profits by the bargain.

I trust that my survey of a wide, but still only partially covered, field will have been sufficient to convince my hearers that the place of India in the Empire is one of the most momentous problems of modern statesmanship. They have followed my attempt to balance the two sides of the account; and while I do not ask them to pass a verdict upon it, while I even refrain from formulating a verdict myself, I yet hope that enough has been said to show that India can

no more prosper without the Empire than the Empire can prosper without India. Each is indispensable to the other, and in their recognition of this principle lies their mutual happiness and strength. If I be asked what is my view of the future, and how I would meet its perplexities, I reply that I am not able to lift so much as the fringe of the curtain, but that I have a very clear idea as to the lines upon which the British nation and its rulers should proceed. I would say to them: Show a lively and sympathetic interest in Indian affairs, improve her agriculture, increase the productive capacity of the soil, extend railways and irrigation, encourage Indian manufactures, coax Indian capital, develop Indian industries, foster co-operation and self-help, guide her national aspirations into prudent channels, give her a sense of pride in the Imperial partnership, place her at the "high table" in the banquet-hall of the Empire States, be not unduly disheartened by calumny, or dismayed by violent deeds, teach India the larger idea and maintain it yourselves. Above all, remember that India is still the great touch-stone of British character and achievement, and with a high heart and sober self-reliance go forward, and persevere to the end.

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